

A

Juan Luis Vives: The Poetics of Invention

by

George Frank Kraus

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Hispanic and Luso-Brazilian
Literatures in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, The City University of New York

2005

UMI Number: 3169938

Copyright 2005 by
Kraus, George Frank

All rights reserved.

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI[®]

UMI Microform 3169938

Copyright 2005 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

© 2005

George Frank Kraus

All rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Hispanic and Luso-Brazilian Literatures in satisfaction of the dissertation requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

December 17, 2004
Date

Ottavio DiCamillo Ottavio D. Camillo
Chair of Examining Committee

December 17, 2004
Date

Lía Schwartz Lia Schw.
Executive Officer

Ottavio DiCamillo Ottavio D. Camillo

Isaías Lerner Isaías Lerner

Lía Schwartz Lia Schw.

Abstract

Juan Luis Vives: The Poetics of Invention

by

George Frank Kraus

Adviser: Professor Ottavio DiCamillo

The *Poetics of Invention* takes into account the relation of Vives' early work, *Fabula de Homine*, a highly metaphorical statement of Man's transcendental being, and two of his subsequent major works, *De anima* and *De probabilitatis*. These two major works build upon and extend Vives' metaphorical explanation of man's structure and his place in the world as set forth in the *Fabula*. The allegory established in the *Fabula* is the basis of Vives' subsequent anthropological, philosophical, psychological, theological and political discourse. In the *Fabula*, which is the focus of the Theater of Invention that comprises Part One of the dissertation, man, with Mercury as his guide, reveals his powers of invention to the appreciative gods who have assembled to celebrate Juno's birthday. The *Fabula* itself is Vives' description of a play written by Jupiter as a gift to Juno on her birthday. It is written so that man, the most powerful archmime and ethologue, by following Jupiter's script from which he cannot diverge, demonstrates the protean powers of invention that he has been granted by his father. This theater, although carefully scripted by Jupiter, allows man to express his freedom within the laws of nature by either taking on the shapes or by providing the gods with explanations of the creatures

of other kingdoms during his transcendent path to the eternal banquet of the gods, the place of his beatitude. Part Two is a reading and explanation of the second book of *De anima*; it serves also as an examination of Vives' concept of man's nature and provides a description of the faculties of man that underlie his performance in the Theater of Invention. Part Three provides a close look at the Art of Invention, including the components and historical roots of its poetics, through an analysis of Vives' *De probabilitatis*. This examination of the structure and operation of organizing man's experience by way of reasoning "probabiliter" sheds light on the form of reasoning that is the basis of Vives' concept of dialectic, and is presaged by the activity of man as archmime and ethologue in the *Fabula*.

Table Of Contents

Part One: The Theater Of Invention

1. *Fabula de Homine* 1; Cover letter from Vives to Antonio de Berges (2.);
In Georgia Vergili (12); The *Fabula* and Virgil (13); Reading the *Fabula*
(15); Theater of Man (17); The Necessary Man (22); *Veritas fucata* (25);
Sources of the *Fabula* (30); The *Fabula* and the *Oratio* (39); The Dignity of
Man (43); Time in the *Fabula* (47); Free Will and Liberty (52); Man in the
World (56); Vision of Man (60); Invention (64); Man of the *Fabula* (68);
Man and Jupiter (76); The *Fabula* as an Ontotheological essay (83).

Part Two: A Humanist Inventory of Man

1. The Kingdom of Man (130); The Realm of Sentience (134); The Rational Soul
(137); The Human Will (140); The Structure of Man's Mind (145); Simple or
Primary Intelligence (146); Composite Intelligence (147); Reason (148);
Judgment (154); The Ingenium (156); Of Language (173); The Method of
Learning (175); The Concept of Notion (179); Contemplation (181); Memory
(183); The Whole Mind/Soul-"de mente in universum" (188); Of Sleep and
Dream (192); Interpretation of Dreams (197); Habit (199); Senescence (201).

2. On the Immortality of the Human Soul (203); The Passions of the Soul (219);
The Human Being (221).

Part Three: The Art of Invention

1. Reasoning “Probabiliter” (224); Concept of Mind (236); Authority (246);
Topics (247); The Instrument of Definition (249); Cause and Effect (254);
Comparison and Similarity (258); Antecedents (265); The Figure of
Authority (270); Topoi (271); Probability as Instrument (275); Propositions
and Topics (279).
2. Analysis of the Truth of a Proposition (281); On Propositions (290);
Examination of True and False (297); The Possible (298); Universal to
Particular (299); Truth, Sentence, Person, Time (299); The Tenses, Past,
Present, Future (302).
3. Analysis of Truth in Argumentation (293); Classes of Arguments (296)
4. The Syllogism (315); Eighteen Forms from the Aristotelian Syllogistic
Canon (321); Other Formulations of Syllogisms (331); Multiple Syllogisms
(335); Syllogisms from Comparatives and Superlatives (336); The Negation
of the Part (338); Enthymeme and Language (338); Sophistic Syllogisms
(341)

5. Explanation of Essence (342); Verisimilitude (343); Genus and Species (345); Difference (347); Division and Definition (347); Rudolf Agricola and Definition (347); Distribution of Things in Places (349); The Little Book of Speusippi (351).

6. Vives' Dialectic (357)

Appendix: English translation of *Fabula de homine*.....352

Bibliography..... 360

Part One

The Theater of Invention

Fabula de homine

The *Fabula de homine* is best considered as a unique work that occupies a significant place within the humanist critique of the place of man in the universe. In this fable, Vives describes man as a principle actor of a drama that is set in Jupiter's theater of the world on the occasion of Juno's birthday. The selection of Jupiter's theater enables Vives to produce a fable that draws its material from a broad range of classical sources. The result is a paradigmatic humanist work informed by material recovered from Greek and Roman literatures, a reworking of rhetorical and dialectical tropes that blend into the rich fabric of the *Fabula*. The fable is a departure from the traditional dialogues used by Vives' predecessors in arguing their cases for either man's felicity or misery. In contrast to the fable, however, the dialogue form works toward a logic of simple conclusions, casting away the resonant echoes of other voices that Vives is able to weave into his narrative. As Vives clearly states in the first sentence of his work, "Since man himself is a fable and a play, it is both pleasant and propitious to begin my essay on man with some fables and plays."¹

According to the variety of arguments presented over the course of several hundred years, man's place was identified as occupying a point in the cosmos between God's grace and despair, in other words, between what can be perceived as either man's dignity or his misery. For the purpose of this discussion, the period in

question extends from Petrarch's writing of the *Ascent Of Mont Ventoux* (1336) to Vives' *Fabula* (1518). During this period, as Charles Trinkaus has observed, these writers were not able to conceive of man without describing his relationship to "the nature of the divine and its influence and actions in this world" (I,3). This is the reason for finding a profound overlap of anthropology and theology within this period. The humanist discussion of man was inseparable from his relation to God, since there was no clear distinction between his aspiration toward finding an ultimate unity of being, or salvation, and his worldly condition.

The *Fabula* offers the reader a positive view of man's position, his evolution within the world and his transcendental desire to enter into the condition of beatitude. In terms of its emphasis on man's dignity, and his reception and use of God's grace, it is similar in tone to Pico's *Oratio*.² It can be assumed that Vives benefited from the reading of both Ficino and Pico together with echoes of other classical texts as can be easily identified within the structure of this most unique work. Vives' tract is unique because there are no other essays on man's dignity in the format of a fable or a play, and any comparison to another work must be focused on the content of ideas, rather than the form of expression. The *Fabula* is at once a simple fable and an extremely subtle narrative description of a theatrical presentation. If a model must be posited for such an unusual work, it is most likely that Vives took advantage of the vibrant theater of humanist scholars at university centers. Theater was perhaps at the center of entertainment, and Vives may very well, as a young student and scholar, have come upon the idea of theater as a vehicle to express his view of the nature of man's dignity. Fortunately, as it appears in the *Basle opera* of 1555 and the *Mayans* edition

(1782-90) of the *Fabula* and another short work, *Praelectio in Georgica Vergilii*, this tract is accompanied by a brief introduction in the form of a cover letter written by Vives to his friend and student, Antonio de Berges.³

The cover letter From Vives to Antonio de Berges

In the cover letter (1518) written to Antonio de Berges, a young Belgian nobleman, Vives included the two short works mentioned above, the *Fabula de homine* and the *Praelectio in Georgica Vergilii*. These two works, as he states, should be considered a source of literary pleasure to the young nobleman, if he cares to take sufficient time to read them. Both works are presented in such a way as to demonstrate the Platonic love between Vives, the writer and de Berges, the student. How profoundly this love is shared is a matter of historical conjecture, since there is no record of subsequent correspondence between the two. Vives must have considered de Berges a perceptive reader, a conclusion that is justified by reading the letter. However, without a response from de Berges, it is difficult to assess how this person, obviously considered a knowledgeable reader, received the work.. Part of the problem with the *Fabula*'s reception is that we know very little about how it was received at the time. It is thus difficult to read the work as his contemporary readers would have, to what chords of harmony or dissonance it struck, and what echoes of its implicit and explicit classical references they found. As we will subsequently discuss, the *Fabula* takes into account a world or cosmos built upon a hierarchy of being that extends from Jupiter, God, or unity, toward multiple lower levels of being that are viewed as parts of the whole in a descending order. Man has the innate ability

to ascend along the same order, discovering or uncovering , from simple relations to more complex, the organization of this world.

Man's ascent, as seen in the *Fabula*, is made possible by his mind, and is fueled by his love of beauty and his desire to pursue the pleasure he finds in the goodness of Jupiter's design. Implicit in the *Fabula*'s hierarchy of being is a scale of beauty and goodness that increases as man ascends along the path of being, while inventing at the same time more complex and beautiful forms. The forms, represented in the drama by the masks he invents, are not cast away; rather, upon mastering each one, he stores them in his memory. His guide, Mercury, retains the masks in his arms. In *De anima* (chapter 2, book III), Vives informs the reader that "the good love seeks is not limited to the present. It extends also to the past" (Mayans 429). One can love historical figures whose virtues are admired. Love also moves toward the future in search of those values the soul finds agreeable. To explain the relation between beauty and love, Vives refers to the position taken by Plato and his disciples. Beauty is admired and considered a great good because all things that are beautiful are the embodiment of the Author's infinite love. Divine beauty is the cause of love. The beauty of the body is due to its elegance and harmony of proportions, an expression of beauty of spirit: "Inward perfection creates outward perfection; the former is called goodness, the latter beauty" (Mayans 431). Goodness is the seed of beauty, Vives concludes, and beauty is the blossom of goodness, as in the Greek expression, *kalokagathia* (καλοκαγαθία.), the idea of the unity of spiritual and physical beauty. Furthermore, Vives states that the soul is attracted to beauty as though it were a likeness. It is within this beauty that the soul discovers, admires and loves the

corporeal extension of the spiritual gift received from its Author. In addition, the soul embraces what it finds as similar and rejects as strange and alien any image of ugliness and malice. This idea of “kalokagathia” can be understood more clearly by a consideration of the relation between a work of art and its image in the mind of the artist. The great artist is the Author of everything, moved by his own goodness to create the immense universe (Mayans, 433). In its ultimate forms, the supreme power of love, Vives states, works to transform the many into one, and to convert plurality into universality. To this end he refers to St. John, who conceives of God not only as a lover, but as love itself, a statement also used by Dionysius in his treatise, *De divinis nominibus* (Mayans, 433).

Much of Vives’ concept of love is recovered from platonic and neo-platonic sources. Carlos Noreña, in his study, *Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions*, also finds connections between Vives’ treatise, *De anima*, and Neoplatonic literature on love that was influenced by Marsilio Ficino’s commentaries on Plato, his tract on love, *De amore*, and his *Theologia Platonica*. Noreña observes that Ficino’s work was directed to the harmonization of human and religious aspects of love that formed the basis for subsequent syntheses of Platonic and Christian views (179).

By way of his discoveries, Vives’ man of the *Fabula* follows the Author’s great design. His ascent in this hierarchy can be said to operate on the basis of the concept of love recovered from Platonic and Neoplatonic sources. Man’s love can be understood as the desire of the soul to ascend or return to its source in the unity of being. Leonardo Bruni’s Latin translations of the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* and

Ficino's commentaries on them were available to Vives, although Noreña considers that he was not sufficiently versed in Greek to benefit from older texts.⁴

Although Noreña points out that Vives did not hold Ficino as a reliable source, referring to the Florentine at one point as a "Philosophaster," this is perhaps due to differences in their readings of the original texts (Noreña, 179). It is certain there were other works available, including Pico's commentary and the *Oratio*, admired by Vives, and, starting in 1501, and running into 11 editions, Leon Hebreo's *Dialoghi d'amore*, and finally, Pietro Bembo's *Gli Asolani*, 1502. However, Vives had other sources available to him, including the original texts and also the works of such writers as Macrobius.

Vives' above remark doubting Ficino's ability as philosopher notwithstanding, his reading of the latter's *De amore* would help our understanding of the framework of the *Fabula*. For Ficino, the origin of beauty is found in God Himself, since God is the totality of goodness. Following Plotinus' theory of hypostases, beauty for Vives can be seen as a reflection or as "ray of God infused into four circles" which, according to Ficino, are "moved in some way around God" (Kristeller, 266; *De amore*, 1324). In *De amore*, Ficino states that the good is the highest existence of God, and beauty is an act or ray of God that penetrates all things in different degrees; it is strongest at the level of the angelic mind and gradually weaker as it descends to the World Soul and other Souls, then to Nature and lastly, to the Matter of bodies. This beauty derived from God's goodness adorns the mind with the order of ideas, fills the soul with a series of concepts, strengthens Nature with seeds, and extols Matter with forms (Kristeller, 266; *De amore*, 1326). And again in the *De amore*,

Ficino concludes that contemplation of the four circles of Mind, Soul, Nature and Matter, finds within them the splendor of God, a most important key to understanding both the *Fabula* and Vives' letter to de Berges.

Although Vives does not use the same formulation as Ficino in reference to the concept of beauty and goodness, the above interpenetrating circles emanating from God are implicit in the *Fabula*. Vives writes that the Author of everything is moved by His Own Goodness to create several kinds of beauty. The first of his Creative beams falls on the mind and bestows upon it a contemplative intelligence, which is the supreme form of beauty. The second beam permeates the soul and provides it with the power of understanding. The third beam is directed toward the forms of lower levels that comprise the world and establishes the hierarchy of seeds to propagate the species. The least intense ray works its way into the material mass of the world and fleshes out the variety of forms. These four rays, Vives concludes, are the qualities and orders of all beauty, a reflection of the immense divine light. The use of "seed" should be noted here in the explanations of both Vives and Ficino concerning the conceptualization of the relationship between beauty and goodness, and the various gradations of these two qualities within the organization of the cosmos. In a subsequent section it will be seen that Vives' use of "seed" in his essay on the dialectic of the probable, *De probabilitatis*, has its source in the Stoic epistemological concept of "katalepsis," the manner in which mind "grasps" its understanding of experience. Vives, however, varies this basis Stoic structure, especially in the location of beauty, accepting both the Platonic idea of beauty as an abstract universal that exists in the mind of God, and the Aristotelian definition of

beauty as a concept taken from particular senses experience and generated by the mind. From these two basic positions, Renaissance writers were either proponents of beauty as a form discovered in matter, imposed by the mind on particular objects of experience, or as an abstract quality that formed a field where physical objects participated in varying degrees. If the work of Vives reflects a basic tension created by what seems to be a conflation of Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of beauty, it is perhaps because these were never clearly resolved by either philosopher.

For Vives, Ficino, and Pico it is the consort of human love, desire and appetite that fuels the search for the goodness and beauty the Supreme Author has established as the primary qualities of His cosmos. In a statement that could easily have been taken from Ficino or Pico, Vives writes in *De anima* (Chapter four) that human love seeks union with the beloved, a union that transforms man into God and into a partner of eternal bliss (Mayans, 443/444). This union is indeed an authentic, permanent and joyful union; it is the greatest reward of love.

The final step in the transcendence of man in the *Fabula* is exactly this condition of beatitude. Having completed his ascent, and donning his final mask, man is honored by the gods, worthy to be at their table, sharing the world of mind with them, and participating in the eternal delight of the feast (*Fabula*, 8). At the end of *De anima* (Chapter four), Vives stated concept of love would not have been lost on de Berges: "Love created us, perfected us and makes us happy. The mysteries of love are extremely profound, recondite and incomprehensible" (Mayans, 453). It is through love that the Supreme maker creates being and initiates a dialectical process of returning to its source, to eternal felicity. It is also a basic triadic process that has its

roots in Aristotle's *De caelo* and in the Platonic/Pythagorean triad. As Aristotle states, the Pythagoreans maintain that the world and all that it contains can be explained by the number three, a number that has been incorporated into the worship of gods (*De caelo*, I,268A). Writing on Ficino's interpretation of this Platonic triad in the *Symposium*, Edgar Wind concludes that beings flow from the perennial fountain that gives birth to them, and then they flow back in search of their origin and, lastly, they are perfected upon returning to their origin. It is Jupiter, within the framework of Orphic mysteries which provide the basis of Platonic analogies, who is seen as the beginning, the middle, and the end of the universe (Wind, 42). He is the beginning because he creates; the middle because he draws his creations back to himself, and the end or final phase because he perfects them upon their return. This is similar to the Neoplatonic triad of procession, conversion, and return (Wind, 44). Ficino, Wind observes, introduced the triad of "Pulchritudo-Amor-Voluptas" to describe the progression of love, beginning with the recognition of worldly beauty, the motion through love of finding spiritual beauty, and the rapture or Voluptas of perfecting this beauty and goodness within the realm of the Author. The man of the *Fabula* perfects himself in a similar manner. His return to the unity of the Author's eternal banquet, drinking nectar with the gods, is the ultimate felicity or Voluptas. Although man is able to perfect himself, he does not have within the capacity to reach beyond the "seed" of his original structure. All life under Zeus or Jupiter has its boundaries, as indicated at the beginning of the performance, when the actors of the *Fabula* receive their Author's directions, from which they will not diverge "a finger's breadth." As Bruno Snell observes, even the life of the gods has its boundaries under a "fixed

order or universal law” (35). It is Zeus who finally reconciles their struggles and restores the harmony of their being over nectar and ambrosia, obviously reflected in the final scene of the *Fabula* when man is allowed to be seated at the felicitous eternal banquet.⁵

The above system is inoperable without the key element of “soul.” Vives’ concept of the soul merits a special section. In order to understand the way Jupiter’s theatre operates in the *Fabula*, it is necessary to point out that man the archmime is best understood when his progressive invention of masks follows the system of the Platonic model that includes the soul’s ascent and descent from a previous condition. Also, similar to Aristotle’s approach in *De anima*, Vives’ focus is directed to a description of the soul’s operation and the identification of its faculties. In the first book of *De anima*, he clearly states that it is of no great interest to us to learn what the soul is, or its essence; rather, it is more important to understand its operations (Mayans, 332). For Vives, the soul appears as a unique entity, best described by its faculties. In terms of the theatre, the spectators witness its protean capacity of invention, as it pursues what is good and eschews what is evil. Since man is the “archmime” and “ethologus,” the soul is more ethical than metaphysical, and its love is the desire that drives its ascendance toward its creator. It is a singular entity among other souls, a condition of “ensoulment” that both Vives and Pomponazzi held to, in opposition to the Averroistic position of the soul’s ultimate unity.⁶

In the introductory letter to De Berges, Vives states that he has nothing better at hand to send him as a token of his love than the two works he has written. It is a reciprocal love that can only be measured by the love De Berges has for him. He uses

the example of Plato's affection for Xenocrates, based on mutual respect. Vives refers to the *Fabula* as a short work about the theater of the world in which each thing plays its role, with man as the protagonist. It is an old argument, and even though he may find in it comic turns and gracious statements, at heart it is indeed very serious. It demonstrates an alternative to the villainy that surrounds the things we commonly hold as our goals. To seek these common goals, a person must devote much time and effort that lead to little more than a condition of permanent anxiety, moral blindness and madness. Vives announces that his objective is to raise the level of thinking and transcend the world of the blind and insane, while constructing a level of discourse that will facilitate the analysis of human virtue. All that human life contains, he writes to De Berges, with the exception of the attainment of virtue, is a mere game for children, so ridiculous and ephemeral that it is near the point of being dissipated in smoke. The enclosed *Fabula* is just the beginning, and he adds that, if he has the time, he will write a special book in a more extensive manner to develop the same theme. This promise, unfortunately, was never kept, and we have the *Fabula* as a seed and initial sketch of an unfulfilled promise.

The other work, Vives announces, is an analysis of Virgil's *Georgic*, entitled *Praelectio in Georgica Virgilii*. Vives sees this work as an important aspect of a philosopher's life, offering the possibility of rest from the severe discipline of his usual work by allowing him to investigate the calm world of the muses. Vives confesses that he does this frequently since he dares to follow his Coryphaeus or leader, Aristotle, who also took the time to write the *Poetics*. In fact, for his disciple, Alexander, he provided interpretations of Homer, who Vives considers the Greek

Virgil, as Vives in this work will provide an interpretation of the Roman Homer, Virgil's *Georgics* for his friend, De Berges. Vives concludes the letter to De Berges with the request that his student follow the illustrious path to virtue and avoid the general corruption at court.

This following section will examine Vives' two works sent to De Berges with the above letter of 1518. His analysis of the several passages of Virgil's *Georgics* are of special interest. His methodology of interpretation may shed light on his concept of allegory and metaphor, and also help us to understand more clearly the two important lines from the *Aeneid* that he inserts into the *Fabula*. We will thus have an examination of Vives reading Virgil, and follow his explanation of the text to his pupil, De Berges. The pupil, however, is in the pretext of another mask that is that of an author writing a text directed to a certain reader who also has a profound knowledge of the Latin and Greek texts.

In Georgia Vergilii (1518)

Vives opens the *praelectio* by saying that, as an expositor, he will focus on three points: the author, the work and his material. He will concentrate this analysis entirely on Virgil, whom the Latins knew antonomastically as the "Poet," holding him in esteem as the Greeks held Homer. It should be pointed out that Vives considers Virgil as the sublime master and model of the Latin language for he finds, much like Valla before him, that the Poet is a master of Latin, a title that also includes Cicero and Quintilian. This is one of Vives' well established views, as reflected in his subsequent arguments against the pseudo-dialecticians and the academic logicians

who lack the clarity of concept expressed in the common language of exemplary authors.

For example, in the *In Georgia Vergilii*, Vives cites an example to show De Berges how the *Aeneid* of Virgil has been used by great men to express their experiences, using select lines apothegmatically or aphoristically, either dialectically or rhetorically, depending on circumstances, as Cesar Augustus who, having seen a multitude of mourners in a meeting, said: “Romanos rerum dominos gentemque togatam.” Obviously, De Berges would understand that the speaker is Caesar Augustus, who is attempting to rally the multitudes that face the same fears as Cytherea, Jupiter’s daughter, the original reference in the Virgilian text. The verse itself is found in a speech by Jupiter to Venus, in order to calm her fears by his knowledge of the future. (*Aeneid*, I.282) His prophetic or proleptic speech takes into account the harshness of Juno who, in her fear, stirs up the sea, earth and sky. Later, with better counsel, she cherishes with Jupiter the “Romans, lords of the world, and the nation of the gown.” Augustus and others, according to Vives’ analysis, have used this line from Virgil to calm the fears of their listeners and build support for their ventures. There is at work here a kind of synecdoche, and, obviously, those readers who are able to place the single phrase of Augustus within the context of its original matrix are able to construct a more complete model than a naïve reader would be able to understand. What Vives leads his reader to conclude is that language is historical; its past informs the present is the message, which is usually delivered in a type of code by an author who must carefully select both word and audience. The following quote, taken from *De ratione dicendi* (1532), provides an indication of Vives’

thinking on language: "...there is nothing outside of the jurisdiction of language, from God, sovereign and eternal, to the most vile creatures, from stones to metals that encase the spirits of tormented souls...even the divine properties that we praise are enclosed in the pathways of the human genius (*ingenio*)... we use words that contain mysteries, however elevated, and metaphors inspired by what is most excellent among us, and similes from all created things, and following the example of Christ, there is not one creature that does not reflect some semblance of the Creator" (Riber, 762).

The *Fabula* and Virgil

No critic up to now has considered the significance of this direct quote from Virgil's *Aeneid* included in the *Fabula*: "Nec videsse semel satis est, juvat usque morari" (*Aeneid*, VI . 487). In the Mayan's text this line is set apart from the narrative by the use of a double space. The Basle Princeps separates Virgilian lines from the text by the use of a double space, each set up in a separate line in the closely set print, clearly indicating its importance in the presentation and organization of Vives' text, since spacing of this nature is generally used in other works to identify chapters. The first citation from Virgil concerns the shades along Aeneas' path who are attracted to him and, as Virgil writes: "To have seen him once is not enough, they delight to linger on, to pace beside him and to learn the causes of his coming." Aeneas walks among the shades of the underworld, a figure of wonderment to those who inhabit these far fields. He has just seen Phoenician Dido, whose wound by her own sword is still fresh, among the others betrayed and consumed by stern Love,

condemned to a cruel wasting, even in death, hidden among the bowers of a myrtle grove. These are the fields of mourning, surrounded by the river Styx “with his nine fold circles.” Aeneas asks rhetorically if he were the cause of her death, and claims that unwillingly he left her shores. He tries to soothe “the wrath of the fiery, fierce eyed queen,” but she turns away from him and flees back to the shady grove where her lord of former days responds to her, giving her “love for love.” Aeneas turns toward the farthest fields, in tears, and there finds friends fallen in war. The shades stand around him in throngs. They, the fallen warriors, are those who see him, and seeing him once is not enough. “They delight to linger on.” The sentence is incomplete, and the next line (488) of Virgil finishes the idea, a couplet an erudite reader, De Berges, would most likely quickly complete: “et conferre gradum et veniendi discere causas.” They want to walk with him and learn the causes of his coming. Of course, the gods who watch the archmime learn much about his power of invention as he ascends toward his Creator, his final cause. The resonance of Virgil’s lines, set in the underworld, would not have been lost on De Berges. The gods who marvel at Man’s power are themselves doomed to wander in the far fields.

The second citation (*Aeneid*, IX.106) is taken from Jupiter’s affirmation of raising the ships that have prevailed in the seas and brought Aeneas and his men to shore, to the statues of sea gods. In Virgil’s terms, Jupiter, who sways the starry world, replies affirmatively and strikes terror among those who listen: he will save Aeneas’ ships, and by the waters of the Styx, the banks of which seethe with pitch over the black abyss. He “nodded assent, and with the nod made all Olympus tremble”: (“Annuit {adnuit--text oxford} et nutu totum tremefecit Olympum”). Both

man and gods must tremble. However, this is not fear generated by an accident of the temporal world that man has constructed before the audience. With Hermes as his guide, man has achieved a universal identity and is also able to hear what the gods hear. In this case it is the recognition of Jupiter's divinity. Ficino also quotes Virgil in chapter XVIII of his *De vita coelitus comparanda*:

"Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus

Mens agitat molem et magno se corpore miscet" (*Aeneid*, VI, 726-7).

Here Virgil writes that the spirit within sustains and mind, pervading its members, sways the whole mass and mingles with its mighty frame. Thence is born the world spirit or soul (*anima mundi*) of man and beast, the life or winged things, and the strange shapes ocean bears beneath his glassy floor. Fiery is the vigor and divine is the source. The soul and body are integral parts of living matter and are reflections of a divine source. This unity is the miracle witnessed by the gods in the theater of man; the *Fabula* is a work that does not betray its classical sources.

Reading the *Fabula*

Readers of the *Fabula* agree that it derives much of its composition through Vives' readings of Cicero, especially *De legibus* and *De natura deorum*, and Pico's *Oratio*. Few scholars have considered that the work of Cicero and Pico may very well mask Vives' other sources that include his readings of earlier works within the tradition of western philosophy, religion, and literature. Among those texts are the Greek and Latin works of Plato, the pre-Socratics, Greek dramatists and poets, Plotinus, Macrobius, Boethius, the *Corpus Hermeticum* and perhaps some of the

mystical texts and references within the Spanish tradition of the Kabbalah. A contemporary student should not be surprised by Vives' range of reading since he was in Paris at a time of significant intellectual activity, and his reaction against the Pseudo-Dialecticians of Montague college serves as an example of his unhappiness with the exiguous materials available to him within the narrow curriculum of the prescribed courses. His friendship with the great French scholar, Guillaume Budé, should serve as an indication that Vives was capable of taking into consideration all that was available to him as a student in Paris, a situation that would not exclude the work of LeFèvre D'Etaples, specifically his commentary on the work of Ficino and the *Corpus Hermeticum*.

The *Fabula* at first glance appears as a description of a theatrical text that combines a mythological setting and characters with action that tends toward an allegorical explanation of man's creation and existence. The author enters the action and provides an explanation of the attributes or characteristics of man, who is the spectacle's protagonist. The text, although appearing simple, is much more complex than what immediately meets the eye, as the author places before the reader much more than can be actually seen by the gods or by the narrator's audience. The text is visually constructed, and the play unfolds, driven by man's invention of his masks, establishing a tension between what appears and what does not appear, a ludic enactment of the theme (topos) of appearance and reality, a conceptual category of thinking that provides a substratum that even the lesser gods cannot fathom with any degree of certainty. There are some gods who suffer punishment for not being able to discern the difference between Jupiter himself and his clever archmime, as the

reader is informed by the author, who is endowed with sufficient authority and knowledge to keep track of the protagonist's powerful mimesis. This project reaches toward but never attains the complete capture and transference of Jupiter's power through the metaphors and metamorphoses that the mime and protagonist ingeniously invents. Man the protagonist ascends toward his father. He must sense the eyes of Jupiter watching him, since he soon learns that he is the favored character of the drama. He is in a similar position as the protagonist in Vives' *Dream of Scipio*, in which the protagonist, Scipio, tells us that "... I contemplated the great man who engendered me, who had loved me with a unique love, who had educated me with such purity and virtue; I contemplated that here, the most elevated spirit who dwelled in the time of the republic, who was my father, guide, commander, teacher, who always held me in his mind's eye..." (Mayans, 648).

Theater of Man

Man performs before the assembly of gods, demonstrating his subtle command of the art of invention. With Juno at his side, Jupiter views the spectacle and, as the author emphasizes, derives great pleasure from this "human archmime." Vives uses the Latin "Archimimus," derived from the Greek, ("ἀρχίμιμος") for chief in a troupe of actors. The Greek "Arkhe" also implies an origin or beginning. There is a sense here in which man as "archmime" or "arkhemime" marks the beginning not only of the play or fable, but also of an ontological power that is recognized by the protagonist and witnessed by the spectators, or audience. It is a mysterious power that cannot be immediately explained and categorized: it can only be "mimed." In the

script written by Jupiter, as the narrator points out, the actors must follow without diverging “even by the “breadth of one finger” (*Fabula*,1). Some critics hold this statement to be an indication of a severe limitation imposed by Jupiter on man’s ability to invent a series of more complex masks of the plant and animal kingdoms. It should be understood, however, that the magnitude of the space and time involved with even such a restriction of this nature cannot be taken to mean that Vives’ reduces the protagonist of the *Fable* to a being with fewer options and resources than Pico’s man of the *Oratio*, which is the most common comparison. What the gods witness is the protean ability of man, fueled by his desire, to ascend a hierarchy of being in order to achieve felicity. This is not a simple process of mimicry. The theater is not a simple dance of masks. The action of man in the theater is the invention or production of increasingly complicated organisms, replications of organic structures that are exact copies of the ideas or forms that exist in a Platonic universe. In this sense the soul is a kind of “arche,” since it is connate with the forms that comprise the universe, and thus has been granted by Jupiter an affinity for truth.⁷ The power of man, then, is seen by the gods through his “techne,” since he is able to deconstruct and reconstruct Jupiter’s theatre in accordance to his own will. Man is able to decipher the causes of things and is therefore able to arrange and conserve his life and virtue. His felicity is derived from his power of intelligence that enables him to understand the designs of nature, as Vives discusses in his subsequent philosophical tracts (Mayans, 192).

Man’s action in this theatre is also a reflection of his growth as he ascends to higher levels through the invention of more complex creatures. In this sense, man is

an evolving project, witnessed by the gods along the horizon of his protean development, a complex subject that continuously changes, from its early or precipitate stages to more complex levels as it incorporates into its being the objects from the totality of kingdoms within Jupiter's cosmic theatre. The tension between man's temporal inventions, driven by his desire to unite with his creator, and his objective, both of which the spectator and reader learn while following the course of his ascent, is the underlying point of attraction that holds the attention and awe of the gods. This difference between the time it takes man to discover and display the totality of his masks, and the length of Juno's birthday, establishes a tension that frames the unfolding drama of man and holds the attention of the gods. In this temporal theatre set within the timelessness or eternity of Juno's birthday party, man is not only the Archmime, but he is also the Ethologue, a combination of attributes that suggest his work is more substantial than the creation of a series of costumes that are carried in the arms of Mercury or Hermes, his companion. Man here could very well be engaged in the act and art of inventing languages, a creation described by the *Fabula's* narrator, establishing with "a few letters the immense variety of sounds in the range of man's voice," that "set forth in writing" (*Fabula*, 7). The drama of the ascending man with Mercury at his side, holding the collection of masks in his arms, can be understood as the unification of word and thing in the form of a logos that binds "res" and "verbum" in a unity that holds the gods in awe. Jupiter has created a theatre of language in which man invents the necessary words to explain the images or masks brought to light through his invention. The figure of Mercury, the subject of a subsequent section, a Roman version of Hermes or Toth, has roots in the Ancient

Theologies as a transporter of language to Egypt, and according to one image, is seen as a statue with letters or transcriptions on his arms. This Mercury appears in early writings within the *Hermeticum* and in such Kabbalistic texts as the mystical *Merkabah*. It does appear that Vives has more in mind than the construction of an allegory that would yield a Christian interpretation, since his use of Mercury, a figure that is mentioned four times in the fable, even if any interpretation of his continuous appearance would be limited to Cicero's *De natura deorum* as its only source, enriches the drama and guides the reader into the realm of ancient theology.

What should be noted in this theatre is the emergence of a logos that man uses to communicate with the spectators. Each mask that man creates is an assertion of his being, his act of engagement, his presence in the theatre. Man is the maker of a narrative of being through the creation of structures, of binding and separating, synthesis and analysis. It is his acute understanding and articulation of things that fascinates the gods. Each invented mask also marks a division within the genus/species demarcation of the continuum that man ascends in the theatre of this cosmos. Man, therefore, can be seen as the mind or the understanding that brings to light the various forms of being through the act of disclosure. It is the process of man's inventing the ontological definition of his being before the gods, driven as he is by the desire of his soul to unite with the ultimate designer of the cosmos. Vives, the narrator, has drawn the curtains open to an ontological theatre.

There is here a visible theatrical identification that serves as the basis for the constitution of a "subject." The protagonist captures the belief of the lesser gods by demonstrating his attributes, a form of predication. Predication fails as a grammatical

and dialogical power only when man's ascent leads him finally to Jupiter's inaccessible dwelling, a place surrounded by the caliginous clouds that man's intelligence cannot completely penetrate (*Fabula*, 3). Before this point, all ontological possibilities emerge from the protagonist's action, a spontaneous subjectivity from which his historical existence is created. The essence or soul of this existence is a cause of wonderment to the lesser gods who have immediate access to the protagonist, who walks among them. There is no distance between the lesser gods and the action of man; there are no boundaries in this theatre; it is an amphitheater and contains simultaneously all time and all place, past, present and future. It is the matrix of what would be the juncture of the horizon of expectation and space of experience (Koselleck, 267-88). The function of theatre is to make seen (*theatrizein*), to show, to reveal or, as mentioned above, to disclose and bring to light, without hindering its progress by an accumulation of demonstrative proofs. It is the objective of the theatre to establish the conditions that ensure complete comprehension of the dramatic action. The spectacle itself must be seen or experienced directly. Jupiter's theatre accomplishes this objective, establishing the necessary immediacy of theatrical praxis and filtering out any accidents that would erode belief in the archmime's performance. Some of the gods, having succumbed to man's virtue, mistake his final invention, Jupiter's mask, as belonging to the God Himself. Transported by man's virtuosity, they fail to understand his mimetic undertaking. The result, according to the *Fabula's* narrator, is punishment brought by Jupiter himself upon those gods who are unable to separate the man from the god, the subject from the object, who lose track of the logic of predication and are carried

away by what they conclude is the complete isomorphic unity of Jupiter and man. The gods who received Jupiter's punishment could no longer distinguish between Jupiter and man's use of metaphor to negotiate his horizon of expectation and invent the space of his experience. Mimesis, to be mimesis, is never complete; it is always a ratio that moves toward unity, without ever arriving. Fortunately, the reader has the author, "auctor," who provides an explanation of the action. The reader, then, retains an advantage over the lesser gods who find themselves caught up in the overpowering mimesis and lose distinction between appearance and reality. The reader remains aware of the author's augury, and what truth there is in the fable will eventually be made known at the conclusion of the performance.

The Necessary Man

Unlike Pico's miracle of man, Vives' vision, tempered by the theatrical setting, is not built to transcend the aporia of freedom and necessity without creating a pragmatic of action. The *Fabula*'s opening statement: "Since man himself is a fable and a play," leads the spectators to follow man's action, which then generates the fable and the resulting mysteries and enigmas that provide the basis of allegorical interpretation. While the man of Pico's *Oratio* is at once a philosopher, Vives' theatre tests man's ability to perform as Jupiter's creation. This is not to indicate that the man of the *Fabula* has no inclination toward philosophy; rather he must first provide the gods with a demonstration of his mastery of the temporal. In this trial, Jupiter watches with pleasure as his creation negotiates masterfully the field of temporality with Mercury at his side. Vives' man remains undaunted by the world of experience, and

shows the spectators that he is a master of the logic of cause and effect. In this sense, an aspect of this man that some readers have not seen, man exercises a freedom to explore the elasticity within the concepts of necessity and traditional logic of cause and effect, since he shows his ability to use them as tools for the creation of his masks. Man's inventions within the temporal field recreate the hierarchy of the great chain of being, as identified by Macrobius in his commentary on *Scipio's dream*, a resource available to Vives as he wrote his own commentary on *Scipio's dream*, (*Somnium et vigilia in somnium Scipionis*, 1539).

In sections 13, 14 and 15 of Book One, Macrobius discusses the classification of being, using Plato's *Timaeus* and several directed references to the *Aeneid* as his guide. The soul degenerates as it descends to the lower regions and the earth. Due to the frailty of this mortal realm, the pure divinity of the Mind cannot be sustained. However, human bodies are able to sustain with difficulty a small part of this mind. Man of course is endowed with reason, the power of mind, and since he has a body, he also relies on the faculties of sense-perception and growth. Man possesses reasoning power that helps him control the other faculties and thus enjoys an ascendancy over the other animal and plant kingdoms. Macrobius observes that this classification was also used by Virgil, who assigned soul to the world, which he also called mind. Moreover, Virgil also combined what he understood as the world soul, with its operation of sustaining the sky, lands and sea by its inward breath, with the mind, concluding that it is mind that moves the universe, while being animated by the soul. Macrobius then concludes:

“Since Mind emanates from the Supreme God and Soul from Mind, and Mind, indeed, forms and suffuses all below with life, and since this is the one splendor lighting up everything and visible in all, like a countenance reflected in many mirrors arranged in a row, and since all follow on in continuous succession, degenerating step by step in their downward course, the close observer will find that from the Supreme God even to the bottommost dregs of the universe there is one tie, binding at every link and never broken. This is the golden chain of Homer, which, he tells us, God ordered to hang down from the sky to the earth” (Stahl, 145).

It is Plotinus, followed by Macrobius in the above sections, who asks the rhetorical question in his *Ennead* III: is it “then the Reason-Principle that has measured things out with the set purpose of inequality?” His answer is that it cannot be attributable to this Universal Reason, since it is inevitable (and necessary) by the nature of things (MacKenna, 159). The reason that the man of the *Fable* is able to cleverly negotiate or leap from species to genus, using the logic of cause and effect to his advantage while ascending the hierarchy of things, from the terrestrial vegetable kingdom to the sphere of the gods, is that he is free, according to the degree of purity of mind and soul, to establish his history and temporal ontology along the horizon of his desire to ascend toward the ultimate unity with the supreme designer. Although beautiful, good, multiform, resilient, subtle, creative, inventive, just, and social, Vives does not envision man, although his protean powers produce the admiration of all who watch him, with ultimate power to shape himself and his world. There is still a dependency, a certain restraint. Man must evolve in a world in which space and time

have been created by Jupiter, who arranges the theater and establishes the basis for man's experience of existence. Whatever essence man finds within himself, whatever adroit costumes he weaves over the course of his time in the world, is accomplished within the chain of being that is part of the Architect's mind and unfolds within a logic of necessary connections that form the chain of being into a hierarchy of *genera* that man uncovers in his ascent. This marvelous progress of man is made philosophically possible by the pre-Cartesian union of mind and body. They function jointly to produce a realm of human beings, without a separation that would necessitate the construction of a bridge to establish a harmony between two distinct substances. Here Vives is clearly following Aristotle's *De anima* by presenting the man of the *Fabula* as a being whose soul cannot clearly be separated from the body (413a). Man is at once "living matter," and his essential and peculiar form is continuously in the process of motion and growth in accordance to a design that becomes increasingly evident as it unfolds to a finality on which all prior development depends.⁸

Veritas fucata

That Vives would select the fable as a form to develop his essay on man, as suggested above, seems to be a departure from the position he took in his first essay, entitled *Veritas fucata*, and written in 1520, a satirical tract that basically follows the position of Plato in the *Republic* and arrives at a similar conclusion. Here, Vives is concerned about the destruction of verisimilitude through the work of those poets who would counterfeit experience. In *Sapientia inquisitio*, written about the same time, Vives produced a dialogue that Noreña finds inspired by the Socrates of the

Apology, in which poets are described as liars and fools (1089, 59). Vives, however, must have been unsatisfied with these attacks on poets. In *Veritas fucata*, he clarifies his position and resolves the conflict that had developed in his thinking regarding the relationship between fiction and truth, forcing him to rethink more clearly *Poesis* as a function of the poet who, like Virgil, had been excluded by Vives from the category of liars and fools. In 1522, two years after the publication of *Veritas fucata*, Vives wrote another or second *Veritas fucata*. In this second work, Vives establishes a common ground between fiction and truth and provides, in a monologue by Vergara, the culmination of a dialogue that contains the original elements of the first satire, including what truth must sacrifice to falsehood to ensure the production of poetic fiction desired by the public. According to Riber, this second *Veritas fucata* was not included in the *Opera*, printed in Basle. Mayans, however, was able to include this piece in his arrangement of the *Opera*, upon receiving it as a gift from Don Manuel Roda, Minister of Justice under King Carlos III, who gave him a copy, perhaps the only extant exemplar copy still available, printed in Louvain, 1522, by Teodorico Martí (I, 883).

A close look at several of the word choices in Riber's Spanish translation may very well provide the reader with a clue to the several levels or strata of Vives' thought, and open a path for an hermeneutic reading, providing several more dimensions to the work than Riber seems willing to accept. In the long monologue by Vergara, there is a point where the figure of Truth and the assembled philosophers and poets prepare to describe the dimensions of truth, understood as verisimilitude. Truth herself, after listening to the noise of the philosophers who are unable to let

each other speak, requests that they permit a Christian to speak on the matter. This Christian, upon consulting an ancient Jew about one or another “instrumento” or testament, delivers a speech that praises and describes the function of Truth. Vergara then provides Vives with a brief summary of the points of praise presented by the Christian. Just before the Christian begins, however, he consults the ancient Jew (*priscis judaeis* in Vives’ Latin). Nevertheless, Riber translates this word using the Spanish “primitive,” clouding perhaps a reference to the *prisca teologia*, or ancient theology, which the Christian may very well use as a source. Vergara then informs Vives that Truth, with her dazzling white hands (*candidus* in Vives’ Latin), participates in the making of the architecture of the world, her brilliant fingernails and the firmness of her works produced by her prodigious fingers. Riber uses immaculate, “inmaculadas,” which carries the meaning more toward “pure” or “without blemish”. Both “Priscis” and “candidus” carry the meaning of an ancient theological ground that Vives seems to be using to construct his theater of the *Fabula*; both “ancient” and “brilliant” would be completely in line with what man witnesses during this play while looking toward the position of Jupiter.

This, after all, is a humanistic exercise, not without good humor and clever satire, in which Vives himself is a character. He listens to the monologues of Vergara and his replies are subject to subject, but not without a struggle does he finally yield to Vergara’s argument. Vergara continues with his description of the Old Christian’s report. Truth is the word of God. It is also not only the word but the beginning of the words of God. From head to toe truth is absolutely well proportioned. Vergara also reports the Old Christian’s mention of Moses, demonstrating the above aspects of

truth to the Pharaoh's magistrates or counselors. Truth here undergoes a change from abstract noun, logos, to a material body, a "metaphorization" and metamorphosis (incarnation), acquiring hands and body, and arranging things in the architecture of the world, a resonance of the Platonic body of the *Phaedrus* (D278). If truth works with her beautiful hands to shape the architecture of the world that can be reliably described by words, her enemy, falsehood, dangerously cross dresses, at times a man, at times a woman, as Vives describes her: "...a Hermaphrodite, with an elegant outfit, a splendid courtesan, a gold cape to her feet." Falsehood's face, however, is "ugly, varnished by mixtures of cosmetics, her lips brilliant, eyes blackened by antinomy. Her shoulders are bare, and her legs are so frail and thin she would be easier to catch running away than one who is lame" (Riber, I, 884).

Vives writes in his *De instrumento probabilitatis* that the human mind possesses the faculty to know what is true, having a certain close relation ("*amicitia*") with primordial truths, much like seeds from which are born or emerge all subsequent truths that are then identified through the workings of what Vives refers to as anticipations and formations, categories that facilitate the direct apprehension of exterior and interior objects by the mind. This is the Stoic epistemological position of the mind grasping experience, which Zeno and subsequent Stoic philosophers, including Chrysippus, referred to as *Katalepsis*. Man's mind, Vives says, has the inherent capacity to build relational categories, "anticipations" that facilitate the construction of universal concepts from the particulars of experience, or "formations." The Stoic foundations of this epistemology will be discussed in a subsequent section. Vives finds that the roots of this Stoic epistemology can also be

seen in the Platonic theory of the journey of souls along a horizon of discovery. This process functions by way of discovery, or uncovering, of knowledge latent in the soul, or experience. Vives uses an Aristotelian analogy based on the potential that is inherent in the eye to see colors. In a similar way, the sympathies between “*res*” and “*verbum*” are discovered in discourse; it is only within language that man constructs his true experience. Truth may be the expression of unity or hierarchies of unities; experience, however, indicates that languages are many. Thus, translations into a single master language are probably impossible, since, as Vives points out, to use “*homo*” in Latin is not the same as to use “*anthropos*” in Greek. They are not synonymous, since among both communities they do not have the same significance. This is the key of Vives’ analysis of language. Language is an historical record, it works both diachronically and synchronically. Words have significance and meaning, as Aristotle says (*Kata Sintehen*), by agglutination, convention, usage and consent of the speakers (Mayans, 143). What better figure to accompany man on his ascent than Hermes, who carries Man’s costumes, the languages that he has spoken, in his arms. Hermes is the figure who is capable of crossing frontiers and borders. Indeed, the Egyptian Hermes has been credited for his invention of letters.⁹

Returning to the letter to De Berges, Vives announces that the enclosed *Fabula* is a dissertation that departs somewhat from the general rules of literary production, a topic that he would later set forth in the first parts of *De conscribendis epistolis*, published in 1534. Instead of following these rules, he will pursue at his leisure certain allusions to fables and plays, since man himself, the protagonist of this work, is also a fable and a play. Vives himself provides a key to the *Fabula's* framework in

section 78 and 79 of *De conscribendis*: “Ad doctos et otiosos scribentes licebit illusiones...”(Mayans,104). The writer may include allusions to myths, history and proverbs; he will use them to elaborate or embellish a work, to emphasize important references. In the same section, Vives also mentions the use of riddles and substitution of Greek and Latin words, as Cicero often did in his letters to Atticus, thus veiling the subject of his communication. Cicero, Vives adds, mixed Greek words with Latin, taking advantage of references to citations from Homer, limiting accessibility to only those who could follow the special significance of his highly coded language. For Vives this type of coding is acceptable, as long as it is understood by the addressee (Vives’ Latin, “cui scribimus” {to whom we write}) (Mayans, 105). In section 79 of *De conscribendis*, Vives states that “ since in the entourage of every leader there are multilingual individuals, a very recondite system of signs has been invented. They call them codes, from which no one will ever exact the sense unless he told the secret to the alphabet and significance of the words that they have agreed upon...” (Mayans, 105).

In the first sentence of the *Fabula*, Vives informs the reader that, since it is a pleasure indeed to establish a good opening to the following work, he will offer some fables and plays, since man himself is a fable and a play. The frame of this dissertation or text, then, will be established by using fables and plays. Man himself, another fable and play, will be represented within this textual framework. He will be assisted by Mercury (Hermes) who, introduced early by the author, seems to assume the role of stage manager, guide, and messenger. The first scene established by the author is Juno’s birthday. All the gods will be present, and one imagines all those

Juno would invite. This guest list would include the complete western mythology, should Vives, quite capable of writing and updating a western mythology, decide to describe all those present at the theater and their histories.

Fabula and its Sources

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* contains a small section on a special form of oratorical argument. Aristotle divides these special forms into two main kinds, Example and Enthymeme. In those cases where argument by enthymeme, including the use of maxims, is not possible, argument by example can be employed, since it has the nature of induction, which Aristotle labels the foundation of reasoning. The example is further divided into two varieties, one based on the development of actual past facts, and the other is based on the invention of facts by a speaker. This second variety he further divides into the illustrative parallel and the fable (and provides examples of the fables of Aesop, or those from Libya). After citing examples of the use of fables by Stesichorus and Aesop, Aristotle continues: "Fables are suitable for addresses to popular assemblies; and they have one advantage in that they are comparatively easy to invent, whereas it is hard to find parallels among actual past events; you will in fact frame them just as you frame illustrative parallels: all you require is the power of thinking out your analogy, a power developed by intellectual training..." (1394 a).

In chapter V of *De ratione dicendi* (1532), Vives informs the reader that fables (Latin, "*apologus*", from the Greek, "apo" and "logos") are fictions invented in order to provide a value or model for the practical life, and in order to attain virtue by

persuasion, to dissuade from vice, to stimulate or avoid an action. Without this end, the fable would be superfluous. The forms of fable include one man speaking, *Logicon*, a man and several mute beings such as an eagle or an olive tree, an *Eticon*, or a man and another mute being, a serpent, or *Micton*. The narrative developed in these three types of fable has no relation to the truth; nevertheless, there is always a certain level of verisimilitude. It is easier to invent fables in accordance with their use than to attempt to conserve them for use at an opportune time (Riber, 789-90).

In his *Geneology of the Pagan Gods* (1360), Boccaccio dedicates book XIII to the defense of poetry against those critics who have no place for it as an instrument of truth in the ideal republic. In chapter VI, Boccaccio defends his thesis that poetry is a useful activity. Although poetry can make outrageous departures from the truth, "...because of this failure by some creators of fiction, all of poetry should not be condemned. Especially that in which we read so many persuasive arguments, counsels and teachings of poets in support of virtue, emanating from those whose preoccupation was to write heavenly meditations with great honesty and sublime genius..." In Chapter IX of the same book Boccaccio provides the reader with a defense of the fable, his thesis being that "the fable is more useful than prejudicial". Boccaccio divides the fable into four classes: the first lacks complete truth in its outer presentation, for example, when animals talk among themselves. This form of presentation was utilized by Aesop, and from time to time even Aristotle used it to make a point. The second species is a mixture of truth and fiction when, for example, Bacchus turns the daughter of Minos into a fish. The third class appears more like history than fable, when Virgil describes the heroics of Aeneas or Homer Ulysses.

The fourth kind has absolutely no truth whatsoever in its structure; it is an invention without foundation in the world. The conclusion that Boccaccio draws from this classification is that what the poet identifies as fable or fiction, the theologian classifies as allegory. Christ, himself, it is further argued, used fable, parable and example as representations or vehicles through which the truth can be known. For Vives, following the medieval tradition, truth can be determined by judicious use of the three levels of interpretation, i.e., *sensus allegoricus*, *sensus anagogicus*, and *sensus miticos*.

Pico opens his *Oratio* with his reading in the records of the Arabians, where Abdala, the Saracen, replied to a question concerning what, on the stage of the world, would he consider a wonder. "There is nothing more wonderful than man," he replies. And he adds, using the words attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, "A great miracle, Asclepius, is man." Vives uses same quote but does not attribute it to Pico or Asclepius. He reports that Hermes said it, but not to whom. Hermes has been invisible to critics. The two most recent scholars, Colish and Fernández-Santamaría, who have read the *Fabula* have not found traces of Hermes Trismegistus. This may be due to their efforts to avoid looking into the mythological dimensions of the *Fabula* or their desire to interpret it within strict Christian-humanistic terms. A Christian explanation masks or closes more than it explains; the *Fabula*, and man who is a fable, have deeper roots than the accident of Christianity and the ensuing builders of its institutions and theologies. Man, then, must always be a mystery, since he is never a conclusion, a complete project, and is always evolving, changing, and thus a creature of great risk. Before the biblical fall, knowledge was complete;

afterwards, many languages emerged, invented by different minds and societies, and Man has been trying to piece his experience back together. Hermes, of many languages, who transits all time and exists in all space, the world of the dead and the living, is Man's guide. Pico's miracle of Man does not rely on Hermes; although the latter is cited by Pico, Man has no guide or intercessor.

Cicero describes the many mythological dimensions of Hermes in *De natura deorum*: One Mercury has the sky for a father and day for a mother, and is represented in a state of sexual excitement, a passion inspired by the sight of Proserpine. There is also a subterranean Mercury who is identified with Trophonus; a third is the son of Jove and Maia; the fourth has the Nile as father; the fifth is said to have killed Argus and fled into Egypt where he gave the Egyptians their laws and letters. His Egyptian name is Theuth (Toth), which is also the first month of the Egyptian calendar (341). There is also an association with Aesculapius, the first son of Apollo. Cicero continues to track the various combinations and permutations of second and third generation Mercuries in the same passage.

This stream of mythical thought also informs Virgil's work and is examined by Cicero. This Corpus is then recovered by both Pico and Ficino and others, and is not without its students and instructors in Paris, where D'Etaples (1480-1520) writes and edits a book on *Prisca theologia*, based on Ficino's translation of the *Hermeticum*. Also, Budé translated the *Corpus Hermeticum* from Greek to Latin. When read as an example of a Mythological mode of thinking, the *Fabula* represents an aesthetic synthesis of symbol, metaphor and allegory of pre-Christian theology (ancient theology).

Man's theater of the *Fabula*, a transcendence of temporality as he progresses to more complicated masks and structures, can be considered the work of a religious mind. Here man is seen binding the elements of his life together, developing an ethology, working with mind and memory to explore the great sea of knowledge which he must traverse to attain his objective. This religious effort, this binding together, is a dialectical undertaking that calls for man's mental skill, a platonic memory to invent the creatures and landscapes of his history, lay these before the gods by his cleverness, rise among them. In this work, the reader can clearly see the operation of religion, its base in love and faith, working through the desire to rise to a spiritual unity with his maker, Jupiter. He may be master of appearance before the gods, as he rises to their balconies and orchestras, even transcending them by way of his creations, but he is also a substance that shares an identity with Jupiter, which he must realize in the cosmos of temporality to achieve the blessedness and eternal time of the banquet. Joining the banquet, he has emerged as a player in Juno's birthday party and has thus completed his transcendence of the temporal order and now occupies a space in the eternal, timeless world of Jupiter. For Vives, this is the work and the meaning of religion.

For Vives, Jupiter is the first name of god. Hermes, although appearing at all times in the *Fable* as stage manager, man's guide and messenger of Jupiter, has remained invisible to most of the critics, including Marcia L. Colish. Hermes of the *Fabula* has his own Greek identity, concealed by the name of Mercurius Braubeta, which, the reader must assume, distinguishes him as a personage. The name "Braubeta" does not appear in Cicero's *De natura deorum* as one of the five personages of Hermes.

Vives' Mercury does not serve as a guide to a fallen creature, searching for redemption. Man's quest through the cosmos assumes the form of a search for identity or unification with a Creator. Time in the *Fabula* seems to be part of a circular structure, since it is central to Man's journey to construct or reconstruct himself from the information or "seed" that has been given to him by the Master of time. It is not possible to determine with precision if Hermes or Mercury guides the figure of man to his origin or his end. The *Fabula* does not reflect a Christian teleology; the man as mime or ethologue has not a fallen from his Creator's grace. Mercury assists man to merge the past with the present as he moves forward to his origin, toward the mysterious light of Jupiter, his creator, after his invention of language, which is the true mirror of light.

With Hermes at his side, man passes before the lesser gods as a figure of wonderment, a fable and a game, and past, present and future seem unified. Although Marcia Colish compares man's ascent in the *Fabula* to Jacob's Ladder, it is closer to Platonic evolution of forms or the Aristotelian entelechy. Vives' produced a number of Christian apologetics during his career. The imagery and setting of the *Fabula*, however, is a reflection of classical texts available to Vives. Hermes is Man's guide and companion. The figure of Christ does not appear as an intercessor between man and the deity. This will appear in subsequent writing by Vives, as the Hermes or Mercury of the *Fabula* evolves toward a Christian logos, and the ancient trickster Hermes, the thrice wise master, slips under the image of Christ, where he has quietly remained during the last two centuries.

Vives' man of the *Fabula* presupposes a mind or consciousness that operates on experience, frames experience in language, constructs positions, and proceeds topologically toward unity, perhaps remembered deeply through the mythological foundation of his being in the world. His one great instrument, language, informed by the necessity of thinking and speaking, builds the semantic field of the world, an architecture always subject to modification, permutation, combination and recombination as his experience changes in a world. It is a common sense approach to meaning; its process is dialectical, its orientation is existential, and its truth lies in the establishment of a praxis that will tolerate semantic and existential evolution. Language is not invisible; language constructs the world and it also informs perception. When it functions properly, language, like Hermes, guides Man through the labyrinths of experience.

Discussing the origins of language in his *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Sir William Hamilton of the Scottish school of philosophy, finds in the work of Vives a clear formulation to support his determination of what he considers the "Primum Cognitum."¹⁰ He translates the following from Vives: "The order of learning is from the senses to the imagination, and from this to the intellect, such is the order of life and of nature. We thus proceed from the simple to the complex, from the singular to the universal. This is to be observed in children who first of all express the several parts of different things, and then conjoin them... Thereafter the mind collects universals from particulars, and then again reverts to the particulars from the universal" (Hamilton, 493).

In the penultimate paragraph of the *Fabula*, following the quote from Virgil, “Nec videsse semel satis est, juvat usque morari,” Vives discusses the relationship of mind “mens” and memory, “memoria.” It is a long passage, an elaborate sentence constructed by means of a series of coordinate and relative clauses, taxing the skills of reader and translator. Unfortunately, the translation by Nancy Lenkeith in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, although found by Marcia Colish to be a work that would provide a fresh approach to Vives scholarship, fails to unite the nouns, *mens* and *memoria*, and instead joins “religion and memory”, completely misleading the English reader concerning the close relationship between mind and memory. The Spanish translation of Riber keeps “mind” and “memory” together, and provides the reader with a closer, though not completely satisfactory statement, of this unity of the two faculties of rationality responsible for the construction of a divine and immense science through which the future enters the faculty of perception. Lenkeith’s, (“From religion and memory, foreknowledge is almost obtained, with the prophecy of the future, evidently a spark of that divine and immense science which perceives all future events as if they were present.”), falls short, leaving the English reader seeking to understand how religion and memory provide the means to perceive future actions. These future actions are grasped by language through the process of “*dianoia*” {dia + noia}, the capacity of discursive thinking. This future is an invention of discursive thinking. Here Vives comes very close to an explanation of “Prudence”, a three part entity that comprises “*memoria*”, “*intelligentia*” and “*providentia*” .

As Marcia Colish points out in her essay on Vives, one of his last works, *De veritate fidei Christianiae*, completed just before his death in 1540, is a text that can

be classified as work of Christian apology (20). She observes that in this work that can be classified as rhetorical Thomism, there is one “striking” difference: where a Thomist would focus his argument first on the nature of God, Vives changes the usual terms of analysis and shifts his focus to man. This can also readily be seen in the *Fabula*, where Man performs before the gods, inventing the various masks that mark the sequence of his appearance, yet Jupiter is the underlying power of Man’s most perfect virtue of representation or imitation. Man may be the consummate artist, but Jupiter is the pure power itself, and his nod, closing the last segment of the *Fabula* will make “all Olympus tremble.” This does not necessarily mean that man and the gods are without power. On the contrary, they share this celestial power, since they are endowed with dimensions sufficient to invent their actions from the raw material Jupiter has given them.

Since Jupiter is clearly the earth shaker as well as the master builder of the amphitheater, inventing not only the theater, but all the materials that have been placed in it, man, skilled and nimble as Odysseus, with Hermes at his side, seems much more interested in an ontology that includes epistemology and ethics. Man is identified by the narrator in one of his masks as an “*Ethologus*”, while engaged in presenting a series of satires on the morality of the gods. Through his long and complex series of mimes he represents thousands of animals and plants. Man’s mind must be a palimpsest of other’s dreams, minds, consciousness, actions. It seems he is the infinite dialectic of being, able to transcend each mask held in Hermes’ arms, and build a more complex organism, an infinite division and an infinite number of future possibilities. In this sense, man is a double; his being includes infinite regress and

infinite progress. In terms of the number he is one and not one; he is a continuous motion beyond himself, as though also continuously discovering his memory. If he causes wonderment among the gods who watch the spectacle, it is because he invents a series of sequences or masks that are beyond the bounds of immediate analysis and, thus, tend to generate an allegory or facilitate decipherment on a allegorical level.

The *Fabula* and the *Oratio*

Looking at the *Fabula* as a prism of humanistic thinking, then the various colors or currents of thought can be clearly seen within the light of its unfolding narrative action. One of Vives' many talents was his adroitness or skill of combining and organizing his experience, especially his reading of texts, discovering (*inventio*) the unities within them. Vives' writing reveals a remarkable erudition, due to his having had access to an extensive range of texts, among them Latin and Greek and, over the years, had assiduous conversations with the most prominent humanists and scholars of his period. Before his early death in 1540, his writings indicate a thorough grasp of the major texts available in the period of his brief life. Even more remarkable is that a close examination of the *Fabula*, written at the age of 26, reveals prodigious intellectual reach that did not have time to mature over a long life of contemplation. It should also be noted here that his intellect was of such caliber that it did not merely absorb his reading, but imposed a continuous, unstinting criticism that did not even spare Aristotle, who was one of his most profound influences. An example of his intellectual assertiveness was his comment concerning his Paris experience with the brilliant group of Spanish professors who, according to his view, were spending too

much of their time on the defense of a "fortress of ignorance." Unquestionably, his friendships with Budé, More and Erasmus, were developed among intellectual equals, and were not limited by the framework of student-master relationship. His predilection for humanistic themes and learning emerged very early in his career as he intuitively found little in common with the scholastic organization of study, because he considered its language deficient in providing a way to describe man's existence and his relation to god. Although Vives obviously benefited from the work of the Florentine Platonists, Pico in particular, the *Fabula* is not simply a footnote of the *Oratio*, regardless of the similarities of the two works. Although one could argue that Vives took the *Oratio* and, through his unique talents, created a view of man that was based on a synthesis of Pico's work, there is much more in the work of Vives that indicates that his writing of the *Fabula* was not conditioned by his reading of *Oratio* and that, indeed, he was also familiar with the original sources.

Like Vives, Pico's Bhaktinian dialogic imagination, a product of his early reading of classical sources and commentaries, provided a great range of learning which he had begun to employ in his writing, especially important as a basis for his writing of the *Oratio*. Without his range of learning, his residence in Florence, or his friendship with Ficino and his early exposure to the Platonic and Neoplatonic writing of the Florentine Academy, Pico would not have been able to produce a work that depended, as both Kristeller and Garin have observed, on a synthesis of different ideas and traditions. In addition to these Latin and Greek materials, he was able benefit from his explorations into Arabic and Jewish philosophy, made possible by his study of Arabic and Hebrew. As noted by Kristeller, the *Oratio* was probably

written in 1468, in preparation for delivery of his “nine hundred theses,” an event that was never publicly held, due to the intervention of papal authorities (Kristeller, 217). As a work, the *Oratio* is in line with the medieval and humanist tradition of providing an introduction, highly rhetorical in nature, to a series of courses or, in the case of both Vives and Pico, to a larger work that would follow. In the case of Pico, the “nine hundred theses” were made available to the commission appointed by Pope Innocent VIII. Vives, also, was never able to complete or publish the large work promised in his letter to Antonio De Berges, for which the *Fabula* was the introduction. His subsequent work, however, especially *De anima* and *De tradentis*, can be taken as sections or parts of what would have been a comprehensive essay on Man. Although both Vives and Pico dealt with similar ideas, Vives, unlike the latter, did not become involved in conflicts with religious authorities. In terms of religious authority, perhaps Vives was much more circumspect, due to the Inquisition’s case against his father and mother, a drawn out process that resulted in the immolation of his father and the disinterment and immolation of his mother’s bones. Later in his career, Vives, still the *ethologue*, did in fact have his problems with Cardinal Wolsey, but this was probably due to his negative position concerning Henry VIII’s divorce from Catherine of Aragon.

Pico opens his *Oratio on the Dignity of Man* by citing Abd Allah’s reply to the question as to what creature on this stage of the world would be most worthy of wonder: “There is nothing to be seen more wonderful than man.” These words of praise are followed by a quote from Hermes Trismegistus, taken from the *Asclepius*, 1.6: “...a human being is a great wonder, a living thing to be worshipped and

honored: for he changes his nature into a god's, as if he were a god" (Copenhaver, 69). Vives in his *De anima* also refers to the same statement in eulogizing man: "When God created man it was an extraordinary event, another of his miracles, something so contrary and distinct from the established system of nature that someone, looking at this, would call it a miracle of nature. I do not dissent from this view; not without reason did Mercurius Trismegistus (if he did exist) rightly say that man is a great miracle" (Mayans, 408). In this short sentence, Vives not only uses the same source as Pico, but also deftly sets man as subject, opposed to nature as object. Man is not a part of nature in the same way that other entities around him seem locked into patterns and cycles that may evolve in response to environmental pressures. Rather, he is endowed with the facility or faculty to transcend immediate circumstance. Also, as developed in the *Fabula* and *Oratio*, man is a protean subject, able to invent the properties of other creatures and things in accordance with the structure of his own "free" will. For both Pico and Vives, Man has the power of inventing each form, thus exercising a choice according to the value he selects, while elevating himself among the orders of angels. This is an exercise of Man's dignity. The *Fabula* and *Oratio* are built upon the history of the idea of the dignity of man. Man is an inventor of the arts and crafts, and has the unique ability to communicate by language and reason, transcending lower levels of being. His proximity to God, of course, is assumed in the Old Testament. As Kristeller observes, the early Christian emphasis on the salvation of mankind, made possible by the incarnation of Christ, attributed to Man a special place in the world, and some of the Church Fathers

“developed this notion and fused it with the conceptions inherited from pagan antiquity” (Kristeller, 219).

Similar to the first part of Pico’s *Oratio*, Vives’ Man of the *Fabula* does not enter the theater as an actor with a single mask constructed with fixed properties; rather, he has been granted a power through which he is able to understand and share the properties of all other things and beings. In his *Fabula*, Vives presents man as a creature who chooses ascent toward the higher orders of the gods, mindful of the light that surrounds the place of Jupiter, choosing increasingly the forms that bring him closer to that light. He attains a level of invention that astounds the gods, completely deceiving some of them as well as other actors on the stage. His ultimate invention is the visage of Jupiter Himself. Pico also considers that Man is worthy of his privileged position on the world stage, and as such is chosen to provide a narrative introduction in support of his 900 theses. The *Oratio* is a narrative essay; the *Fabula* is a drama. With the exception of some of the earlier dialogues, which could be presented by players and voices, since these elements of humor and drama also have theatrical value, the *Fabula* is the only piece of theater in the Vives corpus.

On the Dignity of Man

The basic ideas that emerge from both the *Oratio* and the *Fabula* are the two major themes of humanism, the dignity of man and the unity of truth. Perhaps Gianozzo Manetti (1451-1453) in his work *On the Excellency and Dignity of Man*, written in response to Innocent III’s observations in the *On the Misery of Man*, was the first writer to recover the themes and ideas concerning Man’s location in the

macrocosm of the universe, taken from classical and Christian sources. Such common themes presented as man as the microcosm, and the inventor of fields of knowledge; he has been granted by his gods the five exterior or corporal senses, as well as speech and reason. In accordance with this line of thinking, man is the son of his god, and has the innate ability to mirror his father's characteristics. These qualities of man's universal being, his central position in the world and his liberty provided the topics argued by humanists whose positions were as varied as their classical and Christian sources. A clue to Vives' position is found in the introduction to the *Fabula*, when he informs De Berges that it is "an old story." In this "old story" rooted in the "*prisca theologia*" of humanist discourse, Vives presents to De Berges an allegory that takes into account the classical figures that Charles Trinkhaus identifies as early representatives of the "theologia poetica" that gradually evolved during the renaissance to its culmination in a more Christianized "theologia Platonica" (683-760).

In his *Oratio*, Pico reflects on these same topics. However, his argument turns on the account of man's liberty that many scholars view as unlimited by any theological system. Pico's position was built on an analysis of Man's unencumbered subjectivity. Unlike other beings within the universe, man as subject transcends his existence. He is able (has the virtue) to unify the divisions that former philosophical thought had established as canonical. Such dualities as mind/matter, subject/object, man/nature, and the tensions they generated, were resolved within man's consciousness ontologically, according to the view that man no longer occupies a fixed place in the world, however entrenched this perspective become in earlier

thinking. Rather, man is ontologically mobile and metaphysically transcendental. What happens in both the *Fabula* and the *Oratio* is the transcendence of a rigid notion of the hierarchical structure of the cosmos. Man is no longer a stable element within a hierarchical architecture, dependent upon the relations among its dimensions or parts to produce his felicity. In this sense he is no longer the center of a fixed cosmos that operates with an inexorable logic and from which he derives his virtue. He has been detached from this rigid system and endowed with a “free” will, and is able to move within the cosmos in accordance with his own development. With this freedom, or relative freedom, man, unlike the members of the plant or animal kingdoms, has the power to move within this cosmos and to modify his behavior in order to attain, if he so aspires, the felicity of the unity of truth.

The second part of Pico’s *Oratio* is designed as a review of the history of philosophical thought concerning the nature of truth. Pico’s analysis of earlier thinking leads him to a synthetic position in which he accepts certain historical elements that diachronically produce harmonies of thinking, casting aside any dissonant elements from these thinkers and schools of thought. As Kristeller remarks in his introduction to Pico’s *Oratio*: “Pico’s ‘syncretism’ differs from ancient ‘eclecticism’ and modern ‘perspectivism’ on one characteristic point which seems to reflect his Scholastic background: He does not believe with the ancient eclectics that major philosophers all agree in their doctrines and merely differ in their words. Nor does he believe with modern “perspectivists” that every system of thought taken as a whole represents a particular aspect of universal truth” (220). In sum, Pico’s analysis of the evolution of “truth” rejects just as much as it includes while running through

the prior texts within the libraries available to him. The “unity” which he identifies through this process of reading prior texts of philosophers and schools of thought also informs his nine hundred theses. Pico’s other work, including his attacks on astrology, frees man from the hegemony of astrological systems that determined his place within the hierarchical system that Vives’ man ascends in the structure of the *Fabula*. The man of the *Fabula* is able to choose the roles and masks he employs during his ascent to the places of the gods. This can be understood also as an implicit threat to the gods, since Man has the power to replace them. For example, the deep irony in Vives’ choice of a Virgilian line in order to describe the wonderment that man produces in the gods should be considered in relation to his new place in the cosmos. Vives uses a direct quote: “Nor having seen him once are they content; they wish to linger on” (*Aeneid* vi.487). This line from Virgil is also set up in the Basle edition as a separate paragraph to score its importance. The setting involved in this Bakhtinian “dialogic” context is a place in the underworld which Aeneas visits, and in which he is approached by the shades of the dead. The echoes of this subtext color the scene of man, accompanied by Hermes in the *Fabula*, and surrounded by the gods who have been reduced to wonderment. These gods perhaps will soon be lost to the cosmos, since they are no longer necessary to explain its operation. They will remain in the shadows of the underworld. Unfortunately, the Lenkeith English translation of the *Fabula* identifies the passage from Virgil as a quotation, but does not set it apart to emphasize its importance, as it appears in both the Basel Princeps and the Mayans edition.

Kristeller dates the writing of Pico's *Oratio* to the year 1486, six years before Vives' birth and a scant 32 years before the publication of the *Fabula*. If Pico's *Oratio* brings together the dominant humanistic themes, especially the concepts of the unity of truth and the dignity of man, two components of man's evolving subjectivity, these are further synthesized and reflected in the *Fabula* as spectacle, one more introduction to the curriculum designed by humanists and referred to as "*studia humanitatis*".

Time in the *Fabula*

The man of the *Fabula* emerges from the theater of temporality, inventing the changes in his appearances that mark time for the gods, and moves toward the eternal time of Juno's birthday party. Here a quote from the *Oratio* assists in the discussion of the meaning and significance of time in the theater of the *Fabula*: "Man is an intermediary between creatures, the intimate of the gods, the king of the lower beings, by the acuteness of his senses, by the discernment of his reason, and by the light of his intelligence the interpreter of nature, the interval between the fixed eternity and fleeting time, and (as the Persians say) the bond, nay, rather, the marriage song of the world..." (*Oratio*, I) ¹¹

At Juno's request, Jupiter sets the theatre in motion. The actors, including man, are creatures of temporality. Man, however, distinguishes himself by rising above the movements and changes of the senses and, with Hermes as guide (assigned by Jupiter, the reader must assume) creates a temporality through which he chooses to advance toward a place of felicity, in this case, Juno's birthday party. Attaining this

status by his adroit use of masks and mime, and with the implicit will to return to his Father, he is able to transcend temporality and enjoy the eternal feast. This world or cosmos in which man finds himself as the archmime, principle actor, and *Ethologue*, has been set in motion by Jupiter, who has also written the scripts for all the actors in the play. This world in motion exists in time and, since Jupiter is playwright and director, He establishes the polarity between time and eternity. In section I of the *Timaeus*, Timaeus takes it upon himself to explain time and its measurement. Timaeus states that when the “father and creator saw the creature which he had made moving and living, the created image of the eternal gods, he rejoiced, and in his joy determined to make the copy still more like the original; and as this was eternal, he sought to make the universe eternal, so far as it might be” (Jowet, 38). It was impossible, however, to bestow an ideal and everlasting nature upon this creature in motion. Thus, the creature’s image was eternal and universal, but it moved according to number. While eternity rests in unity, its image is what is referred to as time. Time therefore belongs to the phenomenal cosmos, and is a moving image (εἰκόυ) of eternity which, as Sambursky concludes in *The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism*, “is immobile and belongs to the Sphere of the Paradigm (i.e., to the intelligible world)” (121). Sambursky also observes that the above passage from *Timaeus* serves as a basis for the commentaries of all the various Platonic schools concerning the significance of time and its relation to the concept of eternity. The *Timaeus* itself is a basic source of Vives’ consideration of the concept of time. This would also include Aristotle’s description of time as the motion of material bodies, relating time to the movement of the Soul, as seen in the *Fabula*.¹²

In the *Fabula*, it is man's soul that inclines itself toward the ultimate unification with its maker and desires the felicity of the banquet. It should be remembered here that Man's progress in the theater, the temporality derived from his motion or movement in sequence, is bound by another sense of time, Juno's birthday. There is thus another kind of time that governs the structure of this fable and theater, and a source for this can readily be found in Plotinus' treatise *On Eternity and Time*.¹³

Plotinus makes a clear distinction between eternity and time in the universe; the first has its being in the everlasting Kind, the latter in the realm of Process. Thus, the latter is contained within the former. Eternity becomes a separate thing, something that surrounds nature, implicit within it, or always present to temporality, yet not identical. Plotinus identifies eternity with repose, to distinguish it from time identified with movement. This, however, brings out the basic tensions of the "time-eternity" dialectic, since Vives' Man of the *Fabula* negotiates the course of temporality with Mercury at his side, holding the multitude of masks used to ascend a world or system composed of species and genera toward the banquet or place of eternal bliss. In his treatise on "Time and Eternity," Plotinus stakes out an argument that defines the condition of time and eternity. The concept that allows man to conceive of both times is the soul, which "overarches" cosmic movement. "Simply," Plotinus concludes, the Soul's movement has as its prior condition not time but eternity, which knows neither its progression nor its extension. The descent towards Time begins with this Soul-Movement; it made time and harbors Time as a concomitant to its Act" (MacKenna, 232). For Plotinus, time is in every soul, and all souls are in one soul. Time can never be broken apart, it must then be an inexorable succession of events and

manifestations; its being lodges in the eternal realm as an integral constituent of all potential existences.

For the Man of the *Fabula*, the actual components of temporality are best expressed by the movement or change of the various masks created over the horizon of temporality, and viewed by the gods in each presentation as an ascending species of each *genera*. This process can best be understood as an expression of Ficino's concept of "Primum in aliquo genere." Ficino's concept of this system, although perhaps not a direct influence upon Vives' thinking, provides insight into the organization of the Man's transcendence within the theatre of the *Fabula* and also serves to elucidate Vives' use of the dialectic in Part Two of this investigation. Implicitly recognized in Vives' concept of dialectic is Ficino's assertion in reference to Mercurius Trismegistus, expressed in an early work, *De voluptate*, and discussed by Kristeller in his *The Philosophy of Marcilio Ficino*. The personage of Mercury asserts that "in all genera of things there is one greatest and highest and that by participating in it other things are placed in the same genus; as, for instance, all warm things become warm through the nature of fire, to which the greatest warmth is intrinsic, and all good things must be called good because they follow and imitate the highest and first good" (Kristeller, 146). In Ficino's *Theologia Platonica*, he argues that the first in every genus is the cause of the whole genus. It is the cause of other members and it contains within itself the succession of members. The example provided by Ficino is the sun, which is conceived as the first or primary among all light-bearing things, since it does not lack, when compared to all other species of the genera, any degree of light. Since this first form contains all the other forms of less

perfect light, it therefore is not imperfect, and it is considered first or primary. (Kristeller, 147) Vives' Man engages in a transcendent dialectic that operates by means of the play of relationships between genus/species and particular/universal. These structures of thinking are seen in Man's actions as he selects the masks from the ready arms of Mercury. They also are indicative of the way Vives organizes his thinking in the subsequent major texts that will be analyzed later.

An understanding of the concept of "genus" is essential not only to fully appreciate the actions of the Man of the *Fabula*, but to also gain insight into the way in which the humanist dialectic operates. Genus is commonly viewed as a collection of particular elements or parts that share a characteristic. It is this particular characteristic or quality that is used to assign these members to a genus. In Aristotle's *Categories*, genus is conceived as a substance that does not have a contrary, nor does it have in itself degrees of more or less (4.b). However, according to Kristeller, Ficino conceives of a genus as containing an internal structure that admits of a hierarchy in a relation among the parts in which the first or last member can be identified (147). In other words the concept of genus as a plurality of members, a simple accumulation of parts, forming an external unity that would enable one to calculate the extension of being, is not what the *Fabula*'s Man has in mind. Similar to a Platonic concept, as expressed by Ficino, when the genus of any given entity is identified, it then occupies its place in the order of being. Man's progress in the *Fabula* is derived from his action of defining the of genus and species of things, and ordering them in accordance with their characteristics or qualities, assigning them a place in the world.

Man follows an implicit Platonic structure of being as he invents/discovers, or remembers the world while establishing its ontological order.

From the above description, it can be seen that Jupiter's Archmime, propelled by his action of division and combination, crosses the lines of argument concerning the world as envisioned by both Nominalists and Platonic realists. The Nominalist approach can be traced back to Aristotle, who argued that the universal has its existence only in the particular object; it is not a separate entity or category of the mind. The Platonic doctrine opposes this view by arguing that the universal itself exists apart from particulars, and resides in mind as a form of the world. Vives himself later takes a position closer to Nominalism, particularly in his *De Probabilitatis*. In the *Fabula*, however, man passes through the *genera* of real objects in the world, thus subject to a nominalistic experience, but his mind is sufficiently realist to trace a hierarchy of wonderful forms and "masks." The gods who watch are increasingly enthralled by his ability to discover structures that contain and explain prior structures. Man is involved here in a substance/attribute dialectic, an ascending order towards the more perfect forms or ideas that are made manifest by his power of invention. Yet the "Idea" for Plato does not inhere in the particular things that participate in it, since it does not reside in temporal sequences. The *Fabula's* man reflects not only ideas, but also images from the field of experience or sphere of sensible things, and is thus involved in the selection of the most perfect characteristic or quality within each species of possible things. The archmime, through his action of predication among the world of things, discovers the primary essence within each genus, or in Ficinian terms, the "Primum in aliquo genere." Kristeller observes that

the lower species on which the hierarchy of being rests, as posited by Ficino, are defined by substantial forms. The higher *genera*, however, i.e., “light-bearing” and “mobility,” receive their definitions in terms of accidental forms or qualities. In this sense the distinction or difference between quality and substance lose significance within the structure of the “primum” (Kristeller, 151). This shift is witnessed in the *Fabula* as man ascends from the simpler sensible forms to the more complex “Ideas” within the sphere of intelligent beings and higher gods.

Freewill and Liberty

As Marcia Colish point out, both the *Fabula* and the *Oratio* introduce man as a creature or being that has the freedom and ability to change himself and the behavior of others around him (7). However, whether Pico’s man is created with more liberty than Vives’ man-as-Jupiter’s-mime can only be determined by comparing the several comments of the *Fabula*’s author with Pico’s statements in section Three of the *Oratio*, understood by Colish as the basis for her conclusion that “for Pico man’s freedom is hence unlimited. God posits no criterion in the light of which the exercise of man’s creative volition is to be judged” (8). The quotation from Pico that Colish uses as the basis for her conclusion consists of words spoken by God the Father, the Supreme Architect, to man, the creature of indeterminate nature. God, in assigning him a place in the middle of the world, addressed him thus: “Neither a fixed abode nor form is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that according to thy longing and according to they judgment thou mayest possess what abode, what form, and what functions thou thyself shalt desire”

(*Oratio*, 224-225). Man is told by his Father that he is not constrained by any limits, due to his having a free will which will enable him to establish the limits of his own nature. The supreme Architect continues:

“ We have set thee at the world’s center that thou mayest from thence more easily observe whatever is in the world. We have made thee neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of choice and with honor, as though the maker and molder of thyself, thou mayest fashion thyself in whatever shape you prefer. Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul’s judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine” (*Oratio* 225).

However, this generosity from the Supreme Architect should not be taken for granted. Colish should not conclude from this statement that man’s freedom is thus unlimited. This would be a contradiction that Pico himself wished to avoid, and does avoid in section three, as can be understood by closely following the Architect’s speech to man. There is a powerful dimension that is the source of man’s freedom; the Great Architect himself has stressed that with “freedom of choice and with honor” man has the ability to fashion his being. Man is thus an ethical project. This ethical dimension within man, evolving from the “seeds” that the Father has given him, once freed, establishes his project. This is the concept of freedom and liberty inherent in man’s action. It formed the basis of analysis by Renaissance humanists from Petrarch to Erasmus and is reflected by Vives, who also places Man in a

theatre which is set in the middle of the universe, a place originally designed by Plato in the *Timaeus* and the *Republic*.

Although some scholars have taken Vives' theater as a place devised by Jupiter to limit man's potentialty, using as a basis for their conclusion Jupiter's script, handed to all the actors, "to ensure that not one actor of the troop would diverge from the plan of the festival, not even by a breadth of a single finger." (*Fabula*, 2). Jupiter has given, from his all-powerful will, the order and sequence of the plays. It is similar to the work of a great architect. Teleologically, it is also the same as providing the seeds (Pico) of man's possibilities. In both cases, man has the power to chose masks and appearances, the power to find and locate the proportions and harmonies essential to discover or invent his eudemonic location. In section 4 of the *Oratio*, Pico praises the "supreme generosity of God the Father" and finds in it the "most marvelous felicity of man"; he goes on to explain:

"On man when he came into life the Father conferred the seeds of all kinds and the germs of every way of life. Whatever seeds each man cultivates will grow to maturity and bear in him their own fruit. If they be vegetative, he will be a plant. If sensitive, he will become brutish. If rational, he will grow into a heavenly being. If intellectual, he will be an angel and the son of God . And, if happy in the lot of no created thing, he withdraws into the center of his own unity, his spirit, made one with God, in the solitary darkness of God, who is set above all things, shall surpass them all. Who would not admire this our chameleon? Or who could more greatly admire aught else whatever? It is man who Asclepius of Athens, arguing from his mutability of character and from

his self-transforming nature, on just grounds says was symbolized by Proteus in the mysteries. Hence those metamorphoses renowned among the Hebrews and the Pythagoreans" (*Oratio*, 225-26).

As humanistic documents, both the *Fabula* and the *Oratio* are resistant to a reading without a thorough examination of the semantic range of the very abstract notion of freedom. Colish writes in her analysis of Pico: "man's freedom is hence unlimited. God posits no criterion in whose light the exercise of man's creative volition is to be judged." She continues her analysis with a reference to Vives' archmime who, compared with Pico's "fully autonomous creature...seems feeble indeed"(8). The key to deciphering what Pico means by the "unlimited" freedom or liberty man enjoys lies in the several statements built into the *Oratio* that need further elucidation. It is the Supreme Architect of the *Oratio* who bestows upon man the gift of freedom, and thus lies at the root of "those metamorphoses renowned among the Hebrews and Pythagoreans." Pico's use of the Father as Supreme Architect indicates that there are ontological patterns in the world that can be discovered.

Through the gift of mensuration man is differentiated from other forms of being. Since this gift does not seem to have a parallel or similar structure that can be readily identified in other beings, it is best described by Trismegistus as the miracle of man. Although the *Oratio* and the *Fabula* are obviously different forms of diegesis, both humanists construct man's freedom by drawing from the same sources, although using images and descriptions that can be seen as variations of a central theme. Fundamentally there is no difference between Pico's Supreme Architect and Vives' Supreme writer. Man's freedom, presupposed by humanistic and classical sources, is

his innate faculty of inventing or discovering his place in the world. That no other power needs to inform him or tell him about his place is perhaps the simplest differentiation between the scholastic and the humanistic views. Man has, without doubt, the power to discover his place. With this granted power by the supreme architect or writer, man must invent himself, as he is the only being who is not given to himself completely at birth. Man is not granted, by either of these authors, the freedom to be irrational. On the contrary, the gift of reason is at once his freedom and his affirmation of himself as a subject.¹⁴ Although both Pico and Vives provide readers with significant insight into the sources from which this new freedom is derived, it is the latter, in his *De probabilitatis*, who provides an analysis of the components of the forms of reason within temporal frameworks that are instrumental for the understanding of the predication of particular properties without dependence on the work of an immutable deity through which the subject's experience is predetermined.

Man in the World

Both views place man in the center of the world, surrounded by material events that can be perceived through his senses. This situation perhaps can best be described within the terms of a classic Stoic position. The universe is a representation of a supreme design. The ultimate reality is conceived as a divine mind that continues to express itself as an evolving world that contains all being. This view of the world is focused essentially on the existence of a material universe, conceived within the Democritean canon and its variations that describe the world in terms of events

formed by the movement of atomic particles, with the employment of such metaphors or synecdochies as earth, air, fire and water, or the hot/cold, moist/dry as verbal descriptions of underlying configurations. The metaphysical position of the true Stoic, without Platonic or neo-Platonic mediations by subsequent writers, is one that holds matter as the only primal substance, since only matter has the linkages necessary to act upon itself in accordance with a hierarchy of forms. The most subtle form of matter is mind, described as fire, breath or aether. The supreme and primal spirit creates the world from within its own being. As integral part of it, man experiences it with or through his senses and synthesizes it in his mind. This creation, in which the spirit persists as heat or soul or tension, generates all motion and is the cause of life. This creative process is cyclical; ultimately, each cycle culminates in a fiery moment when the original creation exhausts all of its possibilities and collapses, triggering the next cycle of its being. Existence is thus eternal and follows in these cycles the recurring patterns or laws of *logos*. In this view the world is at once perfect and good. Evil is explained as an incomplete view of parts or aspects, without benefit of seeing the whole. Although this system seems deterministic, the Stoics were able to discuss man's freewill or liberty in terms of his faculty of mind, which he employs to discover or invent the laws of his being in the world, thus determining his harmony within it, a eudemonic position.

For the Stoic, since man's freedom is contained in his actions, ethics is the most important dimension of philosophical discussion. Man's life would be pointless without pursuing his appropriate eudemonia. The pursuit of his harmony, this eudemonic being in the world in accordance with his nature, is his virtue. Reason or

“ratio” has been granted to man so that he is able to discover (“*inventio*”) the principle of logos, in which both subject and object, nature and soul, participate. To this way of being, Seneca will add the Latin term, “*cura*,” with the meaning that includes not only “anxious exertion,” but “carefulness” and “devotedness.” Implicit in both Pico and Vives is this element of care, which further distinguishes man from other beings. As read by Heidegger in his analysis of care, Seneca writes in his Epistle 124: “the good of the one, namely God, is fulfilled by his Nature; but that of the other, man, is fulfilled by care (“*cura*”). Similar to the concept of man’s dignity expressed by both Pico and Vives some 400 years earlier, Heidegger writes: “Man’s ‘perfectio’ - his transformation into that which he can be in Being-free for his ownmost possibilities (projection) - is accomplished by ‘care’. But with equal primordially ‘care’ determines what is basically specific in this entity, according to which it has been surrendered to the world of its concern (thrownness). In the ‘double meaning’ of ‘care’, what we have in view is a single basic state in its essentially twofold structure of thrown projection” (243). For Heidegger, this condition of “anxiousness” and “devotedness” completes the primordial and ontological meaning of care (*cura*).

The Stoic position, however, is one of several dimensions that can be identified in Pico’s and Vives’ concept of man. The Stoic materiality is tempered by Platonic and Neo-platonic doctrine. Obviously, this is more pronounced in Pico’s *Oratio*, in which his enthusiastic tone at times masks the kind of freedom that provides the basis for man’s dignity. It is a moral freedom that makes it possible for man to act virtuously and invent his position within the world in accordance with the natural capacities

granted to him by his maker and supreme architect. In Vives' *Fabula*, however, several actors who are unable to recognize this freedom for what it truly encompasses are severely punished. These actors are unable to see the reality that is at work behind the world of appearance. Without insight, light, architecture and mathematics, they are unable to measure man's true position in the world. They are carried away by the ephemeral; victims of time's flux, mistaking the mechanics of change for the principles, unable to distinguish the particular event from its universal idea, these actors are condemned to live in the world of masks, of shadows, locked into the pain and misery of meaningless change. Vives' man, then, is perhaps best described as a synthesis of Aristotle and Plato; Vives himself writes critiques of Aristotle's work with echoes of Platonic thought that shape his analysis. Perhaps the best description of this basic humanistic and synthetic process that informs Vives' thinking is Raphael's painting of the academy, with both Aristotle and Plato standing at the main portal, the former a dark passionate young man whose intense horizontal gesture indicates the primacy of direct experience, and the latter, an older man with flowing white beard, whose vertical gesture indicates the source of this experience in the hierarchical structure of the real, the rational basis of the world of man. Vives as humanist keeps both philosophers in mind, drawing from both sources directly and indirectly to guide his own unique thinking, without blindly accepting the ideas of either philosopher, however prominent and influential they may have been.¹⁵

For both Pico and Vives, man's freedom and dignity are located in the mind, allowing man to transcend experience and, with this power that separates him from the certain or determined structures of plant and animal, to invent himself and his

societies. He is also able to represent himself to others, directly and indirectly. This process of invention is also the way of discovering those measures and harmonies through which he will ascend to a point of dominating his world, discovering the laws of its behavior and matching his being with the supreme being of its architect. To this eudemonic place man's freedom strives. Man the composer thus discovers these harmonies and perfects the score that becomes his history. He has the power granted to him by the supreme architect. A key to this harmonic being is found in the *Fabula*, where the author describes the masks of man which Hermes bears in his arms. The gods contemplate them and admire Jupiter's wisdom and skill, and they agree that they are both beautiful and useful, "fashioned for all actions...His high forehead the vault of a divine mind and atrium in which five ornate senses were usefully arranged and placed...there was such coordination among these parts that it would have been impossible to add, change or subtract anything without completely losing the beauty and utility of this harmonic being" (7). We have here the perfect set of proportions. The author continues, "there doesn't exist an ingenuity that could invent a mask more harmonic for man, unless it desire that which is not possible." This image of man is derived from ideas of proportion and symmetry, from theories of proportion looked upon with the reverence, as Erwin Panofsky has written, that was no longer considered a "technical expedient but as the realization of a metaphysical postulate" (88).

Vision of Man

When the gods attending Juno's birthday party have the opportunity at last to examine man's unique mask closely, after he has been called from the stage to their divine dwellings, they openly admire Jupiter's wisdom and skill, and find "man's body no less beautiful than useful" (*Fabula 7*) A close examination of Man's body or mask reveals that it is a "proper fit at every point, divided into arms and legs that lengthen into fingers and toes that are completely flexible, so beautiful, so apt for all uses." (*Fabula 7*) It is, in other words, an entirely congruent whole, so beautiful that it would be impossible to add, subtract or change any part without losing this harmonic being. The gods are enchanted by this harmonious creature, not only because of its internal properties, but also by the way it uses them to work in the world. Man has assembled before the gods a unity, created by the proportions necessary to produce his hegemony over the other actors or creatures of his world. Man is not an ideal figure. Unlike the Egyptian representation of ideal figures that seem to slide along flat surfaces, stripped of the anatomical details of bodies made to function in the world, the man emerging from the painting and sculpture of the Renaissance combines both intrinsic and extrinsic properties that enable him to function within the dimensions of his being. These images of the Renaissance man serve to commemorate the living human being. As Panofsky observes: "For the Greeks, the work of art exists in a sphere of aesthetic ideality; for the Egyptian, in a sphere of magical reality. For the former, the goal of the art is imitation (*mimesis*); for the latter, reconstruction (Panofsky 62).

This theory of proportions, Greek in its origins, and with roots in the Egyptian methods of representing figures of animals, men and gods, is a system of devising

mathematical relationships of the anatomical elements of living forms to facilitate the work of representation. As Panofsky indicates: "The mathematical relations could be expressed by the division of the wholes as well as by the multiplication of a unit; the effort to determine them could be guided by a desire for beauty as well as by an interest in the 'norm', or, finally, by the need of establishing a convention" (56). This articulate and harmonious man of the *Fabula* was also described by both Galen in his *Placita Hippocratis et Platonis*, and Chrysippus, the Stoic philosopher admired by Vives, who held that the image of man "holds a beauty that does not consist in the elements but in the harmonious proportion of the parts, the proportion of one finger to the other, of all the fingers to the rest of the hand, of the rest of the hand to the wrist, of these to the forearm, of the forearm to the whole arm, in fine, of all parts to all others, as it is written in the canon of Polyclitus" (Panofsky 64).

Vives' vision of man in the *Fabula*, as the uniquely harmonic and proportional figure would not have come as a surprise to De Berges or to other humanist readers. The new harmonic image of man found a place in the work of Albrecht Dürer who, through the work of the Venetian Jacopo Barbari, was made aware of the importance of proportion in representing the human figure in his work. In his effort during the early 1500's, without prior knowledge of the canon of Vitruvius, proceeding by what Panofsky terms "an essentially Gothic geometrical method," he gradually extended his effort to the "proportions and pose of the 'perfect male'" (249). Later masculine figures by Dürer are composed, probably by taking into account the Vitruvian canon which, as Panofsky observes, was brought to his attention by a humanist friend (250). His work on the "Apollo Group", including his *Apollo Belvedere* and his *Augsburg*

Mercury perhaps became the prototype of his “ideal male”. Dürer continued his work toward the ideal figure of man, taking his models from both classical and medieval sources, arriving at his series on Apollo (ca. 1498), who appears, in Panofsky’s words, “proudly erect, nobly proportioned, beautifully poised, dignified by the scepter, a true Pantokrator” (257). Both the Apollo Belvedere as solar divinity and the later *Helios Pantokrator* and the *Sol Iustitiae* may have been suggested to Dürer by the sun-god forms minted into classical coins of the Roman Imperial period. During this period astral mysticism, with its accent on the importance of a sun-god or Helios, incorporated into Mithraism of the Imperial period, was so powerful that the Christian model man, Christ, was associated with the sun from the beginning, and this union gradually produced an important change from the *Sol invictus* of Imperial Rome to the *Sol invictus* of the early Christian period, a sun of righteousness. This kind of climatic change can be easily discerned in the action of Vives’ man whose soul reflects both classical and Christian dimensions.

That Dürer turned to classical sources to discover his models of man parallels the work of other Renaissance artists and Humanists. This would not have been a cause for Vives to see him any less creative for not involving himself in direct observation of nature. This was also done in the work of Breughel and Bosch, whose searches for the particular and grotesque often lead to other kinds of allegories. Panofsky quotes Goethe against the romantic realists who misunderstood the quest for classical symmetries: “Classical art is part of nature and, indeed, when it moves us, of natural nature; are we expected not to study this noble nature but only the common?” and adds that Goethe thus argued that classical art does not deny nature, rather discovers

its essence (Panofsky 266). Vives draws from the particulars of existence, and with each discovery or invention the more perfect man is given a shape. From Aristotle to Galen, Lucian and Cicero, classical aesthetics seek the latent harmonies and the corresponding mean. The humanist disciplines would later add an historical dimension to this aesthetic, seeking to link individual sequences in a greater, wider scope, the particular or individual type evolving dialectically over a period of time or observation. This process is an exemplification of the power of synthetic or topical thinking, locating *topoi* within the manifold of man's changing experience, the process of finding man's meaning in nature.

Invention

The supreme Architect or Master writer provides the ultimate design of nature, enclosing all being in this process, except man who is able and described with sufficient power to write his own history, and to construct a society from the principles he deems likely to provide a basis for the civil world. Man does make history and, within history, what Vives would describe as tradition. Giambattista Vico and José Ortega y Gasset would later extend this humanist position, based on earlier analyses that can easily be traced to Cicero, and this unification of "*res*" and "*publica*". To this end, Vico writes "...that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind" (331) He questions why philosophers should expend so much energy in their analysis of the world of nature, neglecting the study of nations and the civil world. What is referred to as nature appears to the observer

only through its existential meaning. Nature thus exists only when it is “humanized.” Man’s primary condition is not generated by the use of “ratio”; rather, it is a product of discovery or invention (*inventio*), a process of lending or transferring meanings through metaphor. Through this process man is granted insight into a world where he builds meaning by finding shared characteristics among things. Things can also be made to appear (*phanesthai*) “in a way that is human” (Grassi 7). Similar to Vives’ understanding of fantasy, years later Vico would write, as quoted by Grassi: “Fantasy collects from the senses and connects and enlarges to exaggeration the sensory effects of natural appearances and makes luminous images from them, in order to suddenly blind the mind with lightning bolts and thereby to conjure human passions in the ringing and thunder of this astonishment” (7). To the astonishment of the gods, Vives’ man does exactly this during his performance in the *Fabula*, finding or discovering metaphor after metaphor in the language of his ascendance toward the mysterious light of Jupiter. What is at work under the mask of man is that part of his soul that contains the faculty of metaphor, the *ingenium*, or, as Cicero would describe it, the place from which human capacities (*virtutes*) arise, the “*semina virtutem*.” From this place in the soul man finds the metaphorical power to transcend sensory experience and construct his society. Since man is not rooted deeply in nature like other forms of being (plants and animals), due to his special situation among these other kingdoms he must invent his identity, and through his powers, discover the miracle of his soul. He must work toward his own perfection and surmount the perilous circumstances of his own world. This is where Vives and Pico no longer share the same vision of man’s dignity. The Vivesian world created by man’s

freedom is darker, more dangerous, and at all times less certain, as discussed in his work, *De concordia et discordia* (1526).

In the *Fabula*, Ernesto Grassi finds a “radical reversal of the medieval interpretation of metaphysics and a renunciation of the primacy of all speculation about nature, a disowning of every form of a priori or formal thinking” (11). The traditional subject matter of “contemplatio” concerns the first principles, considered eternal and unchanging. Through these first principles, man derives the meanings he assigns to his experience and constructs his reality. In the *Fabula*, however, change itself is the object of “contemplatio,” and from this theater of changes and transformations, the divine or eternal is recognized. Grassi continues with his analysis of “contemplation,” using Pico’s *De Hominis Dignitate* and Giannozzo Manetti’s work of the same name, finding a basic difference between the *Fabula* and the other two works. He reminds the reader that the *Fabula*, as well as a theater spectacle is, as it is designed by Vives, a fable, a form within the humanist tradition that stakes its claim to reveal the truth that can only be deciphered in its matrix of disguise, not presented directly without analogy and metaphor (12). Grassi counsels his reader to remember that such a reading of the *Fabula* should recognize that it is more than a game of fantasy and a literary jest. We are dealing with “seeing” a theatre performance (in Greek “theoria”; in Latin “contemplatio”) that is put on by gods, not men. It takes place during the celebration of Juno’s birthday, and it also represents the pinnacle of man’s existence, the point of absolute joy, freedom, and perfection. This fable, in which Vives presents the form of Man’s self-realization by means of this fantastic representation of truth, takes the form of a spectacle. As man progresses

through the narrative or discourse (theatre-spectacle), he creates masks or costumes; yet, as he progresses, Hermes his companion and champion beside him with the masks man has worn in his ascension, he lays himself bare and, by this, he shows the immortal gods that his nature is akin to theirs. The author, however, crafts the theater in a way to incorporate the gods through the action of “peristrophe,” as they pass from their being as mere viewers in their balconies to the admission of man among them. After Man had so correctly portrayed the gods and Jupiter, they petitioned him to have the mime take off his mask and be seated among them. At this point, the author provides a description of man’s beautiful proportions. If the Fable as a genre taken over by humanists is a vehicle to present the truth in disguise, Vives plays with disguise through his principal actor, the “multi-form Proteus, son of the Ocean,” whose truth or verity is arrived at by the art of disguise or, better, since he is a fable and a play himself, he creates and “discovers” or uncovers himself (construction and immediate deconstruction) with the same action. There remains always, within each moment of his, the act of looking back, his present moment, and his regard to the future, a tri-partite activity that the putting on and taking off of each mask implies. Man himself is thus thrice-wise.

In his first line, the author announces that Man himself is a fable and a play. Individual man within the historical dialectic of Man in the sequence of men expresses his temporality as an actor and “fabulizer.” The *Fabula* within the structure of a spectacle is a place where man within a structure of temporality “fabulizes” his being (being there) through the ingenious invention of metaphors. The fable invented at each moment is at once fabulous, a fantasy and allegory, an act of *gnosis* that

provides man with his reality, as the *Fabula*'s author writes in his description: "All that we know is made manifest by the work of these two, mind and memory, flowing together as it were, a merger that brings to light, ignited by that divine spark of inference, the vision of what lies ahead in that vast sea of knowledge in which all the future exists" (*Fabula*, 7).

This divine spark of inference, located in the action of the *ingenium*, the faculty of metaphor, constructs from the temporal world a place of its being, at once fable, allegory, and reality, but always a mystery. Things are always signs, (as Lacan will say "sign of my speech"), and truth resides in signs. What underlies this placement of signs in a narrative flow that sets in motion man's fable is the invention of allegory, and could also be termed the discourse of the other (from 'allos', other; 'agoreuein', to speak). This allegory becomes both theme and structuring principle of discourse. Metaphor by metaphor, driven by man's will or desire, his discourse evolves historically before the immortal gods, who see each change as a metonymy; watching in awe, astounded by the power of this creature, whose mime is so acute that he achieves a flawless mirror as he offers the audience or spectators a degree of similitude that reaches a point beyond the portrayal of icons, they see, much to their dismay, yet recognized by the greater ones, that this mime has the ability to create or invent the gods. This narrative, however, invented by the mime as he "temporalizes" his fable, although representing temporality, carries with it dimensions of mythic past and future. This progress of man, a synthesis of his evolution, also contains his history, a song or psalm of the earth, all presented in the mythic time of Juno's birthday (eternal time or eternity of Juno's birthday). The man of the fable creates or

discovers his longevity within this timeless eternity of Juno's birthday. Here there is perhaps more than one allegory, one narrative, and one theatre. This mime's discourse at each instant carries a multiplicity of past and present references, and its significance can be constructed in accordance with at least three narrative modes and levels of interpretation ("*sensus allegoricus, sensus anagogicus* and *sensus miticos*") that depart from the primary sense of the *Fabula* as theatre spectacle or drama.

Man of *Fabula*

The Man of the *Fabula* is a historical mega-creature that is an accumulation of signs made up of his costumes and languages; because he has the freedom of the great writer Jupiter within, he is able (while keeping his Father's script at hand) to negotiate the middle ground of language, the path that temporalizes his experience, in a continuous dialectical process, without falling into a schizophrenic exaltation or ecstasy of absolute freedom on one side or, on the other side, the totally socialized, reiterative talking that is a negation of communication. The mime's narrative achieves temporal succession without dependence on contingent accident or through a framework built by a logic of causal relationships. The foundation of the Mime's action is a progression of masks that accumulates possible being, and achieves its form in the world of knowledge (the world of reality), providing a context for the spectators and readers who observe the multidimensional and poly-semantic spectacle. It is a poetic (*poiēsis*) of the dynamic interaction of mimesis and "*muthos*." The archmime, however, as a mime, is not simply a mirror, but is also an inventor of plays and fables. The mime interweaves masks to produce a history and organizes its

metaphors (tropes) to create harmonies that enchant and delight the gods. This organization of actions or events can be understood by the Aristotelian term "*muthos*" (organization of events). It is not a system itself, but a composition of events that are organized into a system by the mime's inventive power or *ingenio*. The gods do not see the outline of time or system, only the mysterious work of Man in the process of discovering and casting off masks and, ironically, at the same time laying himself open, a complete exposition. This mimesis is also a kind of spiritual entelechy as the mime, through his temporality, wrested from cosmic time, exhibits or represents to the spectators his potential, the complete range of his power. This is how the mime represents time: he articulates each moment, giving time a meaning, and turning it into temporality by giving it a meaning through the representation of another mask. Time then takes on a more ghostly dimension. From this shift from the ground of time (perhaps a limit the mime cannot go beyond) to the action of discovering its masks, the spectators witness the transformation of power into knowledge, via the *ingenium*, wherein lies the spark through which the vast sea of knowledge becomes the future. The discourse of the mime is always, then, the discourse of the other, an allegory. Or, as per Augustine, the spacing of time cannot be named; it is the ground of naming, a language into which the mime is born. Yet if the mime's discourse, his narrative, is always of the other during his performance, his own being must then be timeless, or somewhere underneath the masks he casts off during this performance. His final mask, beautiful and useful, much admired by all the gods, is still a mask, not his true being, which can at this point be described as the sum total of all the masks he has

historically used in the sequence of events that he has invented over the course of the spectacle. His invention before the eyes of the gods has become his narrative.

This spectacle is described by the author, who seems to be watching from a balcony outside the frame of action. If this is a canvas, then, the earth would be at mid point, the various balconies of the gods above in ascending order, and the abode of Jupiter in the sky above, the source of light that surrounds the shadows of the spectacle. The mime's action and the polychromatic signs and metaphors of each gesture create a tension that works to retard the mime's action. The reader of the spectacle must pause, much like the gods, to examine each costume or mask the mime uses and then discards, while Hermes, the wardrobe keeper, keeps pace with the protean mime, son of the ocean... a mariner, a wanderer, Odysseus, Aeneas, Ulysses. This spiritual or cosmic journey of man, however, is not without its irony. This ascending man, endowed with mind, memory and will to penetrate the darkness surrounding Jupiter, gazes toward the light in which he is able to decipher the great god's visage sufficiently to construct a mime with sufficient "similitudo" to completely confuse and deceive some of the gods and actors, all of whom are subsequently punished for their failure to differentiate reality from appearance. This is the same man who must also surmount discordant circumstances that would divert his ascent to beatitude.

A close examination of Man the Mime, however, uncovers a deeper desire within the will (*voluntas*) and the desire (*cupiditas*) that significantly shapes the dimensions of man's temporality. This desire moves man toward the discovery of beauty and love of spirit, his ultimate salvation where he will enjoy the eternal feast of the gods, under

the eye (grace) of Jupiter, a deeper experience of time. To arrive at this place man must create masks and cast them away, creating a doubling of time, two dimensions of temporality, one secular, concerned with the wonder of the masks themselves, as man passes through the frontiers led by Hermes, and the other sacred, directed toward a felicitous union with Jupiter. Within the terms of an allegory, then, the reader of the spectacles also observes man's symbolic function. At each instant of man's action, a process that creates an allegorical reading of his ascension to the eternal banquet, there exists a symbolizing function that produces a doubling movement, a subject that at each moment produces a predicate; an other, or costume so artful that it bears close examination by the gods, who seem to follow each work of art, each mask, overwhelmed by the mime's technique. There is a point in the ascension where the gods examine what appears to be Man's final mask, that of himself. Stepping out of this mask, the reader must presume that Man stands before them invisible, visible only to Jupiter, achieving union in the light, a creature of light, whose shape is eternal, part of Jupiter's light. Man will later don this mask that serves him so well, return to the balconies of the gods and partake in the eternal feast, having completed himself with his final mask, a passage through metaphors, witnessed within the spectacle as a series of metonymies, and within the diegesis of the author who describes the spectacle. This description is in a sense synecdochic, since the writer must describe complicated actions that amaze the gods within economies of narrative.

Marcia Colish focuses her analysis of man's freedom as inscribed by Vives in the *Fabula* within a moral or behavioral context and thus concludes that within Jupiter's

universe, the limits of human freedom are strictly controlled by the supreme playwright.¹⁶ The actual passage in question is the following: “The great Jupiter, having written the play beforehand, upon seeing that all the gods were present, gave a signal to begin. To ensure that not one actor of the troop would diverge from the plan of the festival, not even by a breadth of a single finger, he gave the group the order and sequence of the plays from which, once set in motion, none could depart” (*Fabula*1). To accept this analysis without further investigation, however, would deprive the reader of the broader range of reference and meaning of the significance of “the breadth of a single finger,” since this statement has more to do with epistemology than behavioral action within a “freedom vis-a vis necessity” dialectic. One of the sources of the Vivesian Jupiter-Playwright is found in Cicero’s *Academica*, book II, in which Lucullus, in defense of Stoic epistemology, argues a case for the existence of a basic principle, rule or standard within the mind that enables him to judge presentations and determine when they are true and when they are false from that standard one, or the subject, is unable to diverge a finger’s breadth without causing universal confusion (*Academica* 58). Lucullus continues his argument against the skeptical position and adds that that he is certain that “things that exist can be ‘grasped’” (*Academica* 59). This “grasping” is what Vives refers to in his *De instrumento probabilitatis* as Catalepsis, the Stoic doctrine of direct apprehension of things by the mind. As Vives states in the first sentence of *De instrumento probabilitatis*, “Mens humana is the faculty through which the truth is known.” It is grasped by the mind, as Cicero’s ideas of “*energia*” and “*phantasia*”. The “grasp itself, according to Cicero in the *Academica* (I,40) depends upon an

impact from the outside, a *phantasia* in the Greek, or presentation which, the interlocutor adds, must be kept in the discourse since he must use it several times during the remainder of his presentation. It is this grasping of the presentation that forms the basis for knowing, or the act of mental assent, a voluntary act (*Academica* I. 40).

It should not come as a surprise, then, that Vives refers or mentions parts of the *Academica* in his *Instrumento*, since the reader follows the modifications made to the basic Stoic position of Zeno and his school. Vives' Stoicism is modified by his reading of Cicero, or is "Ciceronized" to take into account a non-dogmatic dialectical approach to knowledge that is based on the multiplicity of experience and reference. This approach, following the structure of the Academy's skeptical position, portrayed by Cicero as one of the interlocutors of the *Academica*, opens discussion to all points of view; it is designed to keep the mind open while suspending judgment, allowing each side in any argument ample time to make its presentation. It is a continual forum, and when it works well it opens a space for the fusion of wisdom and eloquence. The *Fabula's* mime, with his creation or invention of multiple masks and metaphors that astound the gods, provides an excellent example of the spirit of Ciceronian academic skepticism. This skepticism does not, however, reduce the scope of philosophical conversation or dialogue, nor does it shackle thinking about exterior reference to a positivistic paradigm on one side and a leap of faith on the other. Marcus, for example, in *De legibus*, is still able to present an explanation that seeks the root of Justice in Nature, "under whose guidance" (20) the entire discussion will be conducted. Atticus is in agreement with this ground of discourse. Marcus then

asks his interlocutors to consider the might of the immortal gods, who “by their nature, reason, power, mind, will, or any other term which will make my meaning clearer, that all Nature is governed”(21). If this proposition is not accepted, the argument would not advance beyond this point. Atticus, the Epicurean, accepts this proposition in good humor for the sake of advancing the argument, and adds that, since Marcus insists, it is fortunate indeed that the singing of birds in the air and the babbling of streams relieve him of the fear that he will be overheard by members of his school.

God troubles himself about nothing, Marcus jokes, echoing Epicurus, who opened his book with the statement, “God troubles himself about nothing, neither His own concerns nor those of others”(22). Marcus promises to keep the argument short, and informs Atticus that his initial admission has led to the grounding of man as an animal endowed “with foresight and quick intelligence, complex, keen possessing memory, full of reason and prudence, he has been given a certain distinguished status by the supreme God who created him, since he is the only one among so many different kinds and varieties of living beings who has a share in reason and thought”(23). It is reason that unites man and God; it is reason, when perfected, that is called wisdom. Law is the result of right reason. Man has reason and law in common with the gods. Since law is derived from right reason, and Justice is a result of men and gods who share both, they must be regarded as members of the same commonwealth. Both men and gods obey the same authorities and powers within the same celestial system, share the divine mind and a God whose power is transcendent. There exists a universe that is one commonwealth in which both gods and men are

members. Cicero continues with an analogy through which the reader learns that just as there is pattern of blood relationships with a state, there is also in the universe on a larger scale a system of blood relationships between the gods and men. The nature of man is examined by way of a discussion of how the continual changes and revolutions of the heavens generate the appropriate combination of elements and time to sow the seed of the human race. After this seed was scattered over the earth, it created a mortal man, fragile and perishable, but also granted the gift of a soul, given by God. Thus there is no other creature who has any knowledge of God and, although Men differ, some highly civilized and others savage, all seem to believe in a god, even though there are arguments about the nature of this god. Virtue thus exists in both god and man. This virtue is nature perfected and developed to its most transcendent point, and at that point is found the similarity between man and god (25). Since man's participation in nature is so intimate, it seems as though there has fallen to man a wealth of things that have been easily adapted for his benefit and use, a series of gifts that are so frequent and that seem to be discovered through accident or chance. Innumerable arts have been brought about by the teaching of Nature. It is by the skillful imitation of nature that man's reason has acquired life's necessities. Nature has also given man a certain nimbleness of thought, and has also provided him with senses that serve as his attendants and messengers; She has also opened herself to facilitate penetration of the obscure and difficult meanings of a number of things that serve as the foundation of knowledge. Also She has granted man a bodily form that is convenient and suited to the human mind. And, while other creatures bend downward to pick up their food, she has granted man the possibility to

look up toward heaven, standing erect and gazing at his first home, heaven (27).

Cicero's concept of man is further developed in *De natura deorum*.¹⁷

Man and Jupiter

There is a moment in the *Fabula* when the journey of man's transcendental mime is arrested during an encounter with the intense but distant light of Jupiter's abode. This encounter occurs after the gods have already appealed to Juno to grant man admission to their balconies. Before she grants their request, man again appears in a mask, rising above the gods and reproducing the appearance of his Father, Jupiter, complete with "admirable and unique" gestures. It is important here to note that, with this mask, he rises above the lesser gods and penetrates the region of darkness that surrounds the inaccessible light that marks the dwelling place of Jupiter. The darkness that surrounds this luminous place obviously thwarts man's ascent and virtually turns him back upon himself. Although he is eventually taken into the eternal banquet, this moment provides a significant insight into his perilous condition. Even though the man of the *Fabula* has demonstrated his protean ability to assemble and disassemble an extensive range of particulars along the hierarchy of being, culminating in his ability to reflect the appearance of Jupiter, his penetration of the darkness leaves him powerless before the luminous existence of a superior being. This is a moment of anguish; it appears as though man does not have the ability to bridge this distance, and thus complete his transcendental journey along the hierarchy of being. This is best described, then, as the instance of the body's inability to ascend to greater being and felicity. It is at this point that man's body has completed its

journey; without masks, the soul stands before the gods as they examine the masks Hermes has carried in his arms, and special consideration is given to his ultimate mask: that of man himself, with its beautiful construction by Jupiter, and the harmonies reflected in its composition. The ascent along the hierarchy of being has been achieved by degrees of accomplishment, from the simplest organisms, or representations, including the mental and physical properties of each creature, and from the lower levels to the higher levels of more perfect harmonies and proportions. Finally, it is the soul of man, placing his ultimate mask before the admiring gods, that has penetrated the darkness, and now views the divine luminosity of Jupiter's dwelling place.

It is Ficino, in his *Theologia Platonica*, who expresses this idea of man directing his being toward a specific end. In the 14th book, he provides the reader with a description of human desire, which he says is a natural movement, destined to seek that end by a disposition of nature. It is through this natural disposition that man's being finds what is agreeable to it, and loves it, and through this love is able to attain its objective. Human desire is directed toward God, the same God who implanted this desire in man's soul. Vives would term this type of desire a seed implanted, a primal cause, in man's soul, causing man's desire for unity. Similar to an Aristotelian entelechy, the soul is conceived by Ficino to desire unity prior to the work of reason, and subsequent to any available knowledge. The natural desire is obviously related directly to the object to which it is attracted. In other words, the essence of desire can best be described in terms of the object it moves toward. In this sense the work of desire is not arbitrary. As Kristeller observes, the historical roots of this concept are

part of the ancient tradition. "Desire" or "appetite" can be traced to Plato, who used it to characterize what was conceived as human willing, a basic concept of Greek ethics. It should be kept in mind that the man of the *Fabula*, if he has any one constant attribute, is referred to by the narrator as an "ethologus." It is Aristotle who classifies what he terms natural and conventional desires. Epicurus later extends this definition to three types of appetite, the natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, and neither natural nor necessary (Kristeller 173).

To the ontology of "desire," Plotinus adds the concept that each entity is motivated by its appetite to seek its cause and, in the universal sense, all things move toward their highest cause, the Plotinian "one." Each entity then, as the spectator sees in Jupiter's theatre, moves toward its origin; the end and the beginning of the *Fabula* are in this sense identical: Jupiter provides the script, and the actors move toward the source, completing their cycle. Man the *ethologue* and archmime, understands the motivation of other beings within the hierarchy of being and is able to represent their masks or complete cycles, as well as his own. His own motivation, as the spectator witnesses, is to return to the eternal banquet. This is man's nature, according to the script of the theater. This is also then his "substance," since this desire or appetite sets him on a course to explain his experience and thus transcend the multitude of masks that define the cosmos, as he approaches the ultimate synthesis of his being. At the beginning of Plato's *Philibus*, a tract available to Vives and other humanists in the Greek or through the translation and commentary by Ficino, in which the Florentine Platonist asks rhetorically: "who will deny that the end of each nature and action is that toward which its impulse is always directed by its own nature?" The force of this

nature produces the intent (“*intentio*”) to direct desire in accordance with the subject’s natural instinct. The end of this action is identified by the object of desire. Ficino concludes that man’s ultimate goal lies in the knowledge or possession of God, which is the objective of his natural appetite (Kristeller 177). The root of the argument is the view that God or Jupiter did not create the world in vain. Man, therefore, is not an actor in the theatre of vanity. Both Ficino and the man of the *Fabula*, of course, side step the observation that vanity, since it also exists ontologically, may be conceived within the framework of an argument by degree, along its hierarchical articulation, ending in its most complete form or union with the prime mover, the ultimate vanity. The man proposed by Vives, however, does not express any skepticism about his representation, or question the organization of the cosmos. As Ficino argues, he is directed by his natural appetite toward the abode of his father, and he does not question the theatre, nor the occasion of its creation. Each species, as Ficino concludes, if directed by a universal nature, is not “wholly in vain.” All minds inhering in this universe “must be able to see the divine substance.” An inclination that is deemed natural must not be in vain, since it would be “most foreign to the order of the universe” (Kristeller 183).

Ficino’s position Kristeller further clarifies by offering an additional aspect of the argument concerning the prime object of the natural appetite. Ficino argues that God would show Himself as an inexperienced marksman if he did not add the feathers to the arrows by which they have a chance to hit the mark. Without His care, then, His attempt to attract his man of the theatre toward Him would fail by not reaching its true end. This appetite toward God is natural, Ficino concludes, and it is

derived from God, the cause of nature and species. The appetite is not provided to man in vain, and its function is to find its resting place, its ultimate objective. This ultimate objective, the end of desire, is a place of joy. Ficino adds that “whatever adheres naturally to an end is not separated from it except by violent force” (Kristeller 183).

The narrative organization of the *Fabula* follows closely Ficino’s use of Aristotle’s basic description of movement. Movement is identified as a series of transitions of things from one state to another. Each thing, thus, has an inner tendency or appetite to move toward its end. The desiring subject or substance expresses itself by movement to achieve its preservation or attain its perfection. Ficino interprets this motion as a process directed toward God, the cause of all good. All movement then is directed toward the subject’s future good, which is its completion and final rest. Since God is the cause of all good, natural movement, emanating from God, returns to its source, and completes a great cycle of the world which can be understood as God’s return to Himself through the things he has created (Kristeller 185).

Perhaps struggling to clarify how the process of natural appetite and movement shapes the dimensions of man’s reality, Ficino explains in his letter to Bernardo Bembo that these two organizing principles also serve to identify both the essence and the species, a structure implicitly assumed by Vives in his approach to the *Fabula* and his subsequent philosophical writing. The following passage from the letter is also cited by Kristeller in his examination of Ficino’s ontology: “Such a condition is common not only to men but also to all created things, that they can rest nowhere but

in their proper origin and that they try for the sake of rest to place their goal in that place from which they had their beginning” (Kristeller 185). Ficino then provides examples of movement and appetite from the animal kingdom, such as the mole’s search for hiding places in the abdomen of the earth while other species of animals move on earth, etc., and then concludes with man’s natural instinct and appetites, responding to his soul, to desire heaven, and “beyond it,” the king of heaven and their creator. Ficino opens his *De mente* with the following argument: “Each natural movement of any species proceeds in a certain manner. For different species are moved in a different way, and each species always maintains the same course in its movement” (Kristeller 185), then continues with a description that would assist any reader of the *Fabula* observe the actions of the Archmime and other actors. For example, the movement of plants has its origins in the need for nourishment, which generates the force to secure sufficient nourishment for the plant itself and to allow its generation of a similar plant. This same force is seen in humans and animals. Man shares this force with other kingdoms; however, his mind also moves with a force that differentiates him from other levels of being, as Ficino would argue and the *Fabula* demonstrates. The addition of mind to man’s standing or being in the world creates an ontology of different spheres and degrees of reality. While he shares the appetite for nutrition, generation and sensation with the other creatures in accordance to their levels of being or spheres of reality, man is also able to penetrate the higher spheres or dimensions to which only he, with mind and soul, has access. This multiple structure of man’s internal and external being, his ability to ascend and descend along the hierarchy of being, increasing the scope of his reality toward the infinite, is a

reworking of Aristotle's *De coelo*. Kristeller observes that it is to this concept of the movement of spheres of reality that Ficino adds an historically Christian concept, providing an eschatological theory. This present state of the world is not an eternal order that exists without beginning and end. It is, rather, a transitory process that fits perfectly within the lines of his argument. This current sphere of being is limited at both extremes by the moment of creation and cessation, which is bound theologically to the concept of the last judgment (Kristeller 189).

While the movement of the human body is directed toward its end as a vehicle for the mind, the latter, governed by the soul, seeks its end in the idea of the true good, which is God. As Ficino writes in the thirteenth book of *Theologia*, "the whole attempt of our soul is to become God" (Kristeller 190). In *De mente*, discussing how the natural appetite of the human intellect and will is uniquely directed to the true and the good, in other words, toward God, Ficino concludes: "Therefore, you cannot rest but in the immense true and good or make an end but in the infinite" (Kristeller 190). Since the soul, however, must also oversee the function of the body, it is conceived in Ficino's theology with two natural appetites, one directed toward God, and the other directed "downward" toward the body. As Kristeller observes, this double appetite of the soul is an important aspect of its position as the central member within in a hierarchy of substances (196). Since the soul looks at both the corporeal and incorporeal, the temporal and eternal, it is envisioned by Ficino as the head of Janus, facing in opposite directions. It is this formulation of the soul that provides the basis of Ficino's argument of the body's resurrection that coincides with the end of the world. This also coincides with the day of judgment, when the soul, united with the body,

within the multitude of happy spirits, will enjoy eternal felicity. For Ficino, and in Jupiter's theatre, the Father's eye contains a thousand years in one day, and the things he created with His hand will return by way of appetite and movement to their origin.

If some readers find similarities between Christian doctrine and the *Fabula*, it is only because Christianity also has its roots in ancient theology. Vives' *Fabula* is a statement and exposition of man's basic desire to transcend the particulars and temporality of his existence and achieve a felicitous union with a principal being that can explain the meaning of his existence. As Trinkhaus has observed in the work of Renaissance humanists, Vives' man in the *Fabula* also works through a plurality of experience and masks, seeking to unify his existence, while manifesting his own trinity of faculties, memory, intellect and will. There is no single doctrine that man follows toward his desired felicity. He relies on his own innate ability to discover the nature of things, which allows him transcendence over the field of his experience. Through his own knowledge and will, he does achieve, much to the amazement of the gods, an image and likeness of Jupiter.

The *Fabula* as an Ontotheological Essay

As an ontotheological essay, the *Fabula* provides the reader with an excellent example of Humanistic writing. The *Fabula*'s allegorical structure was assembled through a careful act of recovery of ancient and classical sources or resources, combining them in a text with sufficient complexity to provide a mirror of religious or sacred vocabulary that, depending upon the reader, offers ways within the text itself to organize the reading to comfortably fit the predisposition of one who finds

delight in her encounter with the presentation of the roots of her particular religious or theological position. If the fable allegorizes the soul's search for its human form, then the theatre in which this search takes place is the universe. As an audience of gods assembled in hierarchical orders watches, man achieves himself, following his Creator's divine *logos* (entelechy), or *telos*. It is a journey in which man the actor, described by the author as the "archmime" and "ethologue," a transcendent figure, invents a series of progressively more complex masks, while borrowing from the metaphysical and theological positions of earlier philosophical schools, creating a synthesis of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic ideas.

What quickly surfaces in the *Fabula* is an allegorical play that Jupiter invents and presents to his lesser gods, who have been invited to celebrate Juno's birthday. The actors brought together at the onset, the reader later concludes, must be the forms or souls of creatures who play out their lives before the gods. This includes the human soul or the form of the archmime, created from memory through his miraculous endowment, which includes the finite variety of combinations of the universe he has come to understand. Vives' view of the man/soul/creator *logos* can be understood to include the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, ancient theologians, Cicero, Cusa, Pico, Ficino, Pomponazzi, and others, as though the *Ethologue* of the *Fable* also incorporates an intellectual history into his repertoire. The fable that Vives produces admits complexities of interpretation and, with the inclusion of a polytheistic reference to a multitude of gods and the use of pre-Christian names and figures, he risks at all times non-Christian interpretations. Perhaps the youthful Vives provides, ironically, more of a mirror than he intended by keeping his language open, without

specific reference to any particular doctrine. The use of Mercury as Man's guide through the universe ensures that the *Fabula* cannot be reduced to a Christian allegory.

As the Man in the *Fabula* ascends to view the luminescent dwelling place of this creator, he is provided with the language necessary to speak about this experience. The Gods of the *Fabula* are not content with seeing him once, they wish to remain near him. Man indeed exhibits a rational mind, prudent and wise, and among other inventions it has helped Man bring forth language that has, with a few letters, incorporated the great variety of sounds in the range of his voice and set it into writing (*Fabula* 5). With this invention his many traditions and doctrines have been maintained, including his concern for religion or sacred domains, the knowledge of the cult of Jupiter, the father, and all the rest of his brother gods. Man, this "Ethologus," as Vives describes him earlier, has the unique sensibility or consciousness of divine powers which are best defined as religious propensities. This religious consciousness identifies those areas where Man's mind cannot penetrate. The Latin "*religio*" used by the author here purveys the supernatural feeling of constraint, and provides for the recognition of the force of prohibition or impediment. This is the sense of the Latin text. It also recognizes a positive obligation, or rule. It is formed as an impediment to action, generated by doubt, awe, or conscience. There exist supernatural laws and divine sanctions, which Jupiter applies to those gods who were unable to distinguish man's mime of Jupiter from Jupiter himself.

The *Fabula* is a multi-dimensional work that incorporates a number of "religious" materials available to the young Vives through his studies and conversations with his contemporaries among the converso and Jewish communities of Valencia, as well as

those from his days as a student in Paris. The analysis of this section draws extensively from what P.D. Walker, Festugiere, and others have identified as "Ancient Theology," that is, a body of early writings and commentaries, a tradition and way of interpretation that stretches back in a seemingly unbroken succession of ancient theologians to Dionysius, Plato, Protagoras, Orpheus, Hermes Trismegistus and Moses. This list should also include the Neoplatonists, since their interpretations of Plato also found a place in the commentaries on ancient theology during the 15th and 16th centuries. As Walker observes, this tradition underlies the Old and New Testaments, and became the basis of discussions and arguments among scholars of what has been described as Platonizing Christianity or Christianizing Platonism (20). These ancient theologians are linked thematically to each other and, in succession, they reflect a pattern of either visiting Egypt, learning the Mosaic doctrine, or combining both travel and study of Mosaic texts derived from the Pentateuch. Most orthodox syncretists had little difficulty holding positions that Orpheus and other Greek Theologians were considerably later than Moses (Walker 21). Vives' Hermes or Mercury of the *Fabula*, however, may very well be seen as a contemporary of Moses, as described by St. Augustine in *Civitas Dei* (XVIII), and Ficino, who accepted Augustine's dating of Hermes in an introduction to his *Pimander*. The *Civitas Dei* was republished by Erasmus with an extensive commentary by Vives (1522). Opinions varied during the 16th century; orthodox Christian writers preserved the primary antiquity of Moses, while Giordano Bruno and others produced an older Hermes (Yates a223).

Vives has been labeled a Christian Humanist. Whether he can be classified as an orthodox reader and interpreter of Ancient Theology or a syncretist is a question that we must pursue in this section. Vives's ontology and epistemology is essentially influenced by Stoicism and his reading of Cicero's philosophic works, and also by Plato and Aristotle. He is more of a theologian than religious moralist, since his dialectic is driven by faith rather than belief. As a theologian and reader of ancient theologians, Vives was equipped to produce the *Fabula*. The *Fabula*, of course can be studied as an allegory. It can also be seen as a way to conceal truth. In his *Heptaplus*, Pico writes that the reason Moses appears "rude" is his use of fables to avoid blinding the simple and ignorant with too much light, and so as to convey multiple meanings at once (Walker 86). Also, as indicated by Walker, unveiled talk or writing about religious truth opens the author to situations better avoided, including warnings, sanctions, investigations, reprisals, and various punishments, including corporal. At the time of Vives' *Fabul*, it was accepted that religious mysteries should "wear a disguise" that could only be penetrated by the initiated. Walker concludes that the 15th and 16th century Platonists had little difficulty in finding a justification for their Christianizing interpretations of Plato, ancient theologies and the Old Testament (Walker 87).¹⁸

This idea of poetic veiling of truth was also used to explain the use of descriptions that contained a multitude of gods. Polytheistic writings used many names to personify aspects and powers of one God, in literature referred to as Jove or Zeus. Walker cites Champier's *Apologia Literarum Humaniorum*, a work that contains a defense of multiple names for gods and their derivations. Champier writes: "When I

name Apollo, nobody could be so silly or frivolous as to think that I wish to restore the old statues of the gods. Anyway I am not a sculptor..."(Walker 89). In the case of Vives' use of Jupiter, the name can be traced to its meaning as "helping father" or "life-giving father," probably borrowed from Cicero's *De natura deorum*, with "Juvans pater" (II. 25) and, in the case of Apollo (II,xvIII), Cicero's derivation from the *Cratylus* (405c).

Although there were critics of the Humanist use of Greek poetic mythology, there was a genuine acceptance and admiration of the *Corpus Hermeticum* and *Orphica* and, as P.D. Walker suggests, these ancient theological texts, including Plato, were readily accepted since they could be interpreted in conformance with Christianity. However, other pagan myths, legends, religious images were, in many cases, considered too unreliable and, at best, over-elaborate masks of basic religious truths (Walker 96). There were many complaints that the Greek and Latin authors were far too eloquent and tended not only to veil religious truths, but to dilute these primary truths in facile speech and extravagant metaphors, or in euhemeristic accounts of gods forming specious polytheisms. It was of considerable concern to these scholars that these fictions had opened the way towards a plurality of gods. This ornate poetry, in contrast to the simpler style of the Bible, raised several concerns. Obviously, some critics opined that God should speak with more eloquence; others argued that the simple biblical style was due to the meager language ability of audience addressed. Yet there were others who saw that this Biblical writing went far deeper than the levels necessary to sustain orthodoxy. Here, Walker cites the French Humanist,

Mornay, who argued that “there are abysses, which frighten even the most presumptuous”(98).

Champier also complained of the easy elegance of Greek and Roman writers. In contrast to these overly ornate languages, Hebrew is the original language in which God talked to man and man to the angels. From the initial passages of the *Hermetica* (*Definitiones Asclepii*), he quotes the injunction against the translation of Egyptian hieroglyphs in Greek: “in order that such great mysteries may not reach the Greeks, and that the Greek’s proud eloquence may not weaken and efface the gravity, solidity and operative power of our names”(Walker 100). As Walker observes, there is at the bottom of this argument a theory of language, in which the word is considered a magical symbol that both denotes objects and also exerts powers connected with those objects, since it contains their substance and /or essence. The language contains the substance or essence of things sympathetically linked in a vertical series through the many levels Man travels in the *Fabula*, as he ascends to reach the dwelling place of Jupiter. The language thus forms a map of the material world, operating on both vertical and horizontal levels, forming a complex network of symbols that generates an endlessly complex pattern of meanings. By this endless pattern of meanings, the Man in the *Fabula* is enabled by Mercury to represent the earth, plants and creatures by the adroit use of icons, symbols, and other instruments, including, we must imagine, ancient vocabularies and narratives. Mercury carries man’s costumes in his arms. It is significant to remind ourselves that Mercury or Hermes is best known in the literature for having delivered letters to the Egyptians.

Walker groups the concerns of some French scholars in reference to the power of ancient theology into three groups. The first group entails the possibility of becoming infected by some kind of magic latent in Neoplatonic sources and those of earlier ancient theologians. The second, is using themes of images taken from these works, they might seem to be approving or tolerating idolatry or polytheism; and, lastly, their work might encourage heretical opinions, especially concerning the Trinity and the nature of the soul (105). Vives is not disturbed by these three concerns, since Hermes/Mercury accompanies Man on his long ascent from earth to the heavens. The figure of Mercury is powerful, and Vives does not detract or debilitate this image in or to justify having him accompany man, nor is his existence at man's side explained, since any explanation would weaken the image. Indeed, the value of Mercury's image is strengthened by Vives' use of him as Man's guide and companion through the world of masks.

Whatever "Magic" Vives' man encounters is natural, since he is discovering the universe of Jupiter. In this, Vives' is tacitly reflecting the work of both Pico and Ficino, both of whom believed in the importance of good magic. Ficino cites the passage in the *Asclepius* in which Hermes shows Asclepius how to make gods by forming images from the souls of beneficent demons (Walker 105-6). Perhaps Vives was much more interested in another passage in the *Asclepius*, in which Hermes ponders the future destruction of the Egyptians due to the demon inhabited statues they keep. In this account, Hermes was pressured by a "divine force" to lament the destruction of pagan gods responsible for the overthrow of Egypt (Walker 106). Augustine provides the orthodox interpretation that Hermes is constrained by the

divine force to divulge the true nature of the pagan gods and predict their overthrow by Christianity, and that he succumbs to a diabolic force to praise and worship them. Both Lefèvre and Champier follow Augustine. Ficino, however, in the “argumentum” of his translation of the *Hermetica* argues that these prophesies are Hermes’ greatest glory (Walker,107). From Ficino’s translation of *Hermetica*, edited by Lefèvre, Walker includes the following citation: “Now he foresees the ruin of early religion, now the rise of the new faith; now the coming of Christ; now the future judgment, the resurrection of the world, the glory of the blessed, the torments of the sinners” (107).

Although one defense of the polytheism found in the accounts of ancient theologians was that they were only personifications of the various powers of one God, another justification, used primarily by Besarion, is that Socrates’ death proved a deterrent, since Plato was also concerned about the implications of opening the sacred mysteries to public scrutiny. It is not known if the *Fabula* faced the controversy and scrutiny that would have questioned it in terms of the two principle classes of heresy linked to ancient theology: the first, identified with Arianism, is the Trinitarian identification of the Holy Ghost with an “anima” or “Spiritus mundi”; the other concerns the nature of the soul, its pre-existence, and its movement as described by Platonic and Neoplatonic writers. It is Bessarion again, however, who comes to the defense of classical authors, arguing that Plato cannot be held responsible for those who would misuse him. Although Plato’s work may contain errors, Bessarion argues, and although some of Plato’s views may have elements not approved by the Church, it would be unwise to throw them away, since they offer the reader the possibility of

separating the ideas and evaluating them. Champier, following Bessarion, argues: “I agree with our Lefèvre d’Etaples, who, in his commentary on Hermes Trismegistus, writes: ‘Here Hermes and Asclepius, prophets of the Gentiles (like the Sibyles, Plato and Balaam) seem, according as they receive light or darkness, to have lucid and obscure moments of prophecy, sometimes pure and sometimes impure’”(Walker 114). How close the Vives of the *Fabula* came to any position or value that could be seen as heretical is a matter that would be difficult at this point to ascertain, since, unlike Pico’s work, we do not have any evidence that the *Fabula* was interpreted as coming close to the above heresies, although there could be some question as to the singularity or multiplicity of soul in Man’s ascent to his creator; an “*anima*” or “*espiritu mundi*” that could be seen as the Christian Holy Ghost, simply do not surface as an issue or as a special point of contention.

The *Fabula* as a Mirror of the *Corpus Hermeticum* and the *Asclepius*

Vives’ fable about man can be easily traced through Ficino, Cicero and Augustine to the earlier Greek and Latin texts that formed the *Corpus hermeticum* and the *Asclepius*. It is the purpose of this section to provide a close reading of the *Fabula* against the *Corpus Hermeticum* and *Asclepius*. This analysis will attempt to show how the *Fabula* is closely related to the metaphorical ground of these earlier pre-Christian narratives. Notwithstanding Juvenal’s satires (Copenhaver xx) about monsters that “lunatic Egypt” chose to worship, especially snake devouring Ibis, associated with Thoth or Hermes, Renaissance humanists, including Vives, believed these mythological narratives to be religious, philosophical and theological statements

worthy of analysis. Of course, much of this extravagant Egyptian imagery had already lost its aesthetic and social impact. The figures and names of these animal gods had been abstracted from a religious tradition of hereditary Egyptian priests, who had maintained these gods with combinations of human and animal shapes, aptly described by Copenhaver as “inverted centaurs and satyrs,” bodies of humans and heads of animals (xxii). The Greek and Roman scholars were quick to bring these Egyptian deities into their language and ritual practice, usually by combining them with their own gods of similar characteristics, e.g., Thoth and Hermes, Imhotep and Asclepius, Zeus/Jupiter and Amon.

The eastern Mediterranean theologies presented a complicated puzzle to the Greek pantheon, already a mixture of multiple relationships, as new correspondences were deciphered and brought into the dominant theology. This syncretism tended to blend various gods with similar characteristics into one, thus providing a more coherent basis for prayer and ritual. Other theological problems emerged from encounters with unknown or unnameable gods that led to a negative theologizing. Although the *Corpus Hermeticum* and the *Asclepius* are considered to be Egyptian in origin, other narratives such as the *Chaldaen Oracles* and *Sybylline Oracles* have informed subsequent texts. One example of the uses of the *Sybylline Oracles* is Augustine’s comment in the *City of God*, where he again describes the work of the Sibyl while making a case for monotheism: “The Sibyl or Sibyls, Orpheus, some Hermes or other, and various seers, divines, sages or philosophers of the gentiles are reputed to have told or foretold the truth about the Son of God or God the Father. In fact, this somewhat serves to refute the foolishness of pagans, not to embrace their authority,

since we show ourselves worshipping that god about whom they cannot stay silent”(18.23).

Vives’ sources for the *Fabula* are taken from the more theoretical or philosophical texts of the *Hermetica* and the *Asclepius*. He presents man’s ability to produce religious or theological material without recourse to the more popular texts that rely on occult magic as the instrument available to him in his dramatic display of his evolution from earth to spirit. The study of these texts as well as the study of Hermolatry has taken a number of turns since its reception in the 15th and 16th centuries. Ironically, this Renaissance reception, probably based on Ficino’s major translation into Latin of the more philosophical texts of the *Corpus Hermeticum* and the *Asclepius*, is more consistent with the current reception of an Egyptian Hermes.¹⁹

Following Francis Yates’ line of argument, it is much more important to look at the reception of these Hermetic texts. The conduits of this reception were Cicero, *De natura deorum*, the *Institution* of Lactantius, Augustine and, of course, Marsilio Ficino. As Yates points out, the great inventions of the Renaissance derive their structure from the recovery of earlier classical texts or, in other words, form a continual looking back (Yates 1.1). Subsequent dating of these texts, which changes time or venue of the Hermetic texts, has little to do with the reception of pre-Platonic or Pre-Hebraic texts that were used to build or construct an Egyptian wisdom or Egyptian illusion. With the exception of Augustine, who was disturbed by the Hermetic creation of idols, most of these classical sources found evidence that these early Hermetic writers were indeed true ancestors of the Christian theologians.

It is Cicero, in *De natura deorum*, who provides some explanation of the five Mercuries of antiquity. One configuration of Mercury as found by the Greeks was Hermes' embodiment as Thoth, the Egyptian God, scribe of the gods and divinity of wisdom. According to Cicero's account, it was Hermes as Thoth who gave the Egyptians their laws and letters (III.56). Based on this embodiment of Hermes/Thoth, an extensive literature in Greek was produced by various unknown authors. This body of work was made up of tracts on astrology, occult writings concerning the properties and powers of plants and stones, and a philosophical literature that were all ascribed to the name of Hermes Trismegistus, as discussed by Yates in her *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition* (2).

Both Lactantius and Augustine accepted Hermes Trismegistus as an historical figure and assigned a high degree of importance to his writings. In his *Institution*, Lactantius writes of the Egyptian Hermes: "although he was a man, yet he was of great antiquity, and most fully imbued with every kind of learning, so that the knowledge of many subjects and arts acquired for him the name of Trismegistus. He wrote books and those in great number, relating to the knowledge of divine things, in which he asserts the majesty of the supreme and only God, and makes mention of Him by the same names which we use God and Father."²⁰ Yates observes that Lactantius uses several quotations from tracts of the *Corpus Hermeticum* and *Asclepius*, for he believed Hermes was more ancient than Plato and Pythagoras, as intimated in his *De ira Dei*. It is Lactantius who reads the *Asclepius*, which he considers "the perfect word" or "*sermon perfectus*," as he traces the historical truth of Christianity. He quotes to this effect: "The Lord and creator of all things, whom we

have thought right to call God, since He made the second God visible and sensible... Since, therefore, He made Him first, and alone, and one only, He appeared to Him beautiful, and most full of all good things; and He hallowed Him, and altogether loved Him as His own Son" (Fletcher, 220). Yates observes that the *Asclepius*, which deeply disturbed Augustine because of its description of Egyptian idols, was understood by Lactantius to be a sacred book, since it contains what he considered a prophecy concerning the Son of God. Similarly, Vives' *Fabula* might also be read as a spiritual ascension of man through various ensouled manifestations. In the same way that man attains virtue to become the *ethologue*, Christ ascends through the orders of the earth to take his place near the Father.

Unlike Augustine, Lactantius considers Hermes Trismegistus an important Gentile seer who envisioned the Son of God and the Sacred Word. Hermes was esteemed as the wise writer whose works reflected the basic elements of Christianity. Augustine found the transference of the attributes or spirits of the gods to their idols to be an aspect of magic that was intolerable. In his *Civitate Dei*, Augustine affirms the great antiquity of the Hebrew language and prophets and also confirms the antiquity of Hermes Trismegistus. Although in one part of this book he is critical of associating Hermes with the manufacture of sacred idols, he establishes the time of a Hermes who existed "long before the sages and philosophers of Greece," and then provides a genealogy through which the age of Hermes and the earlier Moses is a scant three generations. In this extended family of Hermes, Augustine locates Atlas, Prometheus, and an elder Mercury, who begat the father of Trismegistus (*De civitate Dei* 18, xxix). This obvious need to date Hermes in relation to Moses among later

Hermetists was due to the similarities with *Genesis*, which were observed by a succession of readers of the Hermetic *Pimander*. As Yates observes, the Renaissance writers and readers considered both the *Corpus Hermeticum* and the *Asclepius* to be texts of the great Alexandrian library that survived, works which Clement described as containing the entire philosophy of the Egyptians (12). The aura surrounding these great texts was so powerful that Cosimo de' Medici, upon securing a Greek Manuscript of the *Corpus Hermeticum* brought to Florence from Macedonia around 1460, gave the order to Ficino to translate it immediately, thus postponing the translation of Platonic manuscripts already assembled (Yates 13). Cosimo's request is perhaps an example of the desire to reach back to the earliest texts, in this case pre-Platonic, since it was thought that authority is discovered in the earliest possible texts, which are closer to the truths or the original thinking of the sources. As Yates comments, this is also a testimony to the reputation of Hermes Trismegistus as a prime or essential source of the early Egyptian wisdom. Ficino titled his first translation *Pimander*, extending this title to the entire work of 14 tracts or dialogues that it contained. The books, dedicated to Cosimo in the form of an "argumentum," begins with an altered version of Augustine's genealogy of Hermes and also includes Cicero's observations of Hermes providing the Egyptians with law and letters, and the several statements from Lactantius mentioned above. After identifying Hermes as the first author of theology, Ficino concludes that there "is one ancient theology (*prisca theologia*) ...taking its origin in Mercurius and culminating in the Divine Plato" (Copenhaver, xli).

As Yates observes, the *Argumentum* ends “on a note of ecstasy which reflects those Gnostic initiations with which the Hermetica are concerned.” According to Ficino, there shines “a light of divine illumination” in this work (16). He advises the readers to rise above the deceptions produced by the senses or sensory experience and return to the Divine Mind, as the moon turns to the sun, and as *Pimander* to the Divine Mind. It is possible, Ficino remarks, to contemplate the order of all things as they exist in God (16). As Yates remarks, Ficino’s *Pimander* enjoyed an immense diffusion; printed for the first time in 1471, it went through sixteen editions during the sixteenth century, apart from its inclusion in other works (17). This is indicative of the high degree of importance assigned to Hermetic writings during this period. It should be noted here that in 1505, Lefèvre d’Etaples published in one volume Ficino’s *Pimander* and the *Asclepius*. Writing the *Fabula* required more than reading and reworking elements of Cicero’s *De natura deorum*, and *De finibus*, Augustine’s *De civitas Dei*, and Lactantius. That Vives drew from Hermetic texts can be clearly inferred from this delightful fable, which could not have been written without a good understanding of Hermes as an historical text. For it is this Hermetic *corpus* that informed such important works as Plato’s *Timaeus*, Virgil, the Stoa, and the reception of Christian texts by Lactantius and Augustine. Perhaps one of the most telling signs of the importance of Hermetism is the representation of Hermes set into the pavement of the Cathedral of Siena, dated 1488, which portrays a bearded old man with a robe, with the inscription below his feet, “Hermes Trimegistus Contemporaneus Moysi.” Festugière continues his description of the Siena Hermes, describing the text in Hermes’ right hand with the following words: “Siscipite, o, litteras et leges,

Aegyptii.” The Egyptian who receives the text bows with deference to the figure of Hermes, while a personage playing the role of a spectator, perhaps in the clothing of a Renaissance humanist, observes them from behind. With his left hand Hermes touches a large tablet, supported at its base by two sphinxes on either side, with the inscription: “Deus omnium creator secundum deum fecit visibilem et hunc fecit primum et solum, quo oblectus est et valde amavit proprium filium qui appellatur sanctum verbum” (28). Festugière explains that these words are borrowed, with some changes that emphasize their Christian character, from the Hermetic text of the *Asclepius*. Thus Hermes, a contemporary of Moses, was projected as a prophetic figure who foresaw the Christian revelation. This figuration of Hermes was unquestioned throughout the middle ages until the 17th century when Casaubon, in 1614, questioned Hermes’ authenticity as a contemporary of Moses on philological grounds. It is the power of this Hermetic figuration, then, that must be taken into consideration, when reading the *Fabula* as a religious fable or theological text.

Pimander and Asclepius

In his “argumentum” or prologue to his translation of the *Pimander*, Ficino combines both divine books of Hermes Trismegistus as complementary texts by the same author. The 14 treatises of the *Pimander* deal with the power and wisdom of God, and the *Asclepius* concerns the divine will. As Yates observes, later philosophical and historical problems concerning these texts should not diminish their use as found in the *Fabula* and in other Renaissance works. They were received as a genuine revelation of ancient wisdom, produced by a writer who lived before Plato

and long before Christ (Yates 21). That Hermes is mentioned four times in the relatively concise *Fabula* should provide some indication of how important this figure was considered by Vives and his readers.

The texts of both *Pimander* and *Asclepius* are accumulations of descriptions, reworkings and emendations by unknown authors at different times. As Yates and Festugière point out, from these composite and often contradictory texts, it is not possible to assemble a coherent system. At best, they are statements of individual subjects or souls that seek revelation, or knowledge of the divine. They do not invoke the name of a personal God or Savior but rather they attempt, through a spiritual approach to the universe, to redeem the anxiety or fear of contingency by the construction of an underlying theological reality. Thus the unity that is sought is always cosmological, employed to construct an explanation of the universal basis or system or framework that unifies what is found as contingent in man's experience. Equally important here, in our consideration of Vives' *Fabula*, is that images and resonance found in it are derived from what Festugière would consider as a texts savant, distinct from others available that dealt with the occult sciences.

The *Asclepius* is known as the perfect word or "*sermon perfectus*," a description originating in Lactantius. This treatise has been considered an optimistic gnosis. The scene is an Egyptian temple; the characters are Hermes Trismegistus, Asclepius, Tat and Hammon. The spiritual fervor builds from the enthusiasm of these interlocutors and soon "*divinus Cupido*" or divine love speaks through Hermes' lips. They are informed that all being descends from the supreme being, the One who is "all." They are admonished to pay careful attention and maintain the receptivity of their divine

intellects in order to understand the structure of the divine will. The bodies of nature are comprised of all the souls of all species. Matter has been structured by God to hold all forms; it is nature that imprints characteristics on these forms by means of the four basic elements, and through this dynamic, creates a hierarchical series of beings. Man is near to the gods; he has been able to unite himself with them because he has received what exists in their nature. His union with the gods is also made possible because he is a divine creature, and is blessed with an intellect. All the other creatures are bound to him by a celestial plan. Man is alone among creatures because he has a double nature; he was created to admire and adore celestial things and to care for and govern terrestrial things (Copenhaver 67).

The ruler of Heaven is Jupiter, who dispenses life to all things and sustains all being from his place in heaven. It is his breath or "*spiritus*" which keeps life in all beings. For this reason, Jupiter is the god of air, and occupies a space between heaven and earth. The sun is the solar circle that distributes light to all being, and is the second god; the world of living things depends and is governed by this light. The order or orders of gods begin with the thirty-six Horoscopes, stars that are fixed in place. These are the *decans* or divisions of the Horoscope. The divine word or mind also speaks of the society that unites gods and men. Just as the Lord and Father is the creator of the gods in heaven, man is the author of gods who reside in temples. Not only does man progress towards God, he also creates gods. This is the section that Augustine uses to draw his argument against Hermes and the fabrication of statues or images of gods.

Hermes delivers the perfect sermon, since he is the interlocutor of Asclepius. He is also, it seems, possessed by the god, or is inspired and transmits the knowledge, much like an oracle, or with characteristics of oracular being. Speaking for divine love, he initiates the conversation with the statement: "Every human soul is immortal, Asclepius, but not all in the same way; some differ in manner and time from others" (Copenhaver 67). He makes the point that all things pass into earth, water and air from heaven. Earth is the receptacle of all, and is also the renewer of all the kinds of things that are implicit in heaven. The forms are infinite, although the whole can be identified as one and all elements of this multiform whole are derived from one. The heavens administer the growth and decline of all bodies affected by the sun and the moon. God is the maker and governor of heaven, of the soul, and of all things that comprise the world. Heaven itself is the structure of god. All those things that come into being on earth have forms. A form holds together the pattern of a class, i.e., as a single human being is a reflection of humanity. For example, a human is mortal; humanity is immortal.

Bodies cannot be shaped or brought into being without the concomitant process of ensoulment. The form of man is multiform and various; it comes down from its association with a higher form. Therefore, one who chooses to join the gods attains divinity. And, likewise one who incorporates himself with demons assumes their condition. Those who remain content with the middle status, neither divine nor demonic, will remain in their own forms, since they have chosen to remain in this status. The human being is thus a great wonder, a living thing to be worshipped and honored. He is able to change his nature and act as if he were a god, learning to

dislike that part of himself that is human nature, since he has chosen the divinity of the gods. Similar to the man of the *Fabula*, he recognizes his relationship to others, and his ability to incorporate them into his own being, into his soul; he draws them close in a bond of affection, as Hermes stated it in his perfect sermon. In recognizing his relation to gods, man looks up to heaven, enjoying his position and status. He cherishes those beneath him and, in turn, he is cherished by those above him. Man cultivates the earth, swiftly mixing the elements; he plumbs the depths of the sea with the keenness of his mind. Everything in the universe is permitted to him. Heaven is not too distant or high, since it is measured by his intellect as though it were nearby. No clouds of mist reduce his power of thought; the earth underneath does not obstruct his work, and no abysmal depth of water blocks his lofty view. Man is everything; he is everywhere (Copenhaver 69-70).

With the faculties of thought, consciousness, memory and foresight, he is able to know all things divine and looks up to them. Since man is God's integral construction, there is a part that makes him divine, enabling him to rise up to heaven, exercising the higher elements that comprise the soul, consciousness, spirit and reason. Yet he has a material part, consisting of earth, air, fire and water, and he remains firmly fixed on the ground. He longs for heaven's favor. He finds there are many kinds of gods (Copenhaver 77) Some of these deities are intelligible, others sensible. This section of *Asclepius* is significant because it gives us the differentiation between the intelligible gods and the sensible gods. In the *Fable*, man appears before an audience of sensible gods and proceeds to enter their ranks. Upon completing his performance he is ushered by Mercury to the area or place of the

higher or intelligible gods, the "*ousiarchai*," or heads of all classes. The sensible gods produce and represent everything throughout sensible nature. There is a distinction between the hyper-cosmic intelligible gods and the cosmic sensible gods. According to Copenhaver the former group of intelligible gods are the "*ousiarchai*," or heads of essence (231). There are five "*ousiarchai*," including Jupiter, Light, Pantomorphos, Heimarmene, and a second God or Jupiter. Under these are Heaven, Sun, the thirty-six deacons, and seven planetary Spheres and Air. Most significant in this system is that all things are linked from top to bottom. "Heimarmene" is further defined by the necessity in all events (Copenhaver 91). These events are linked to each other and form a chain that reflects the divine laws. This necessity is the source of all things, since without necessity they would not act. This necessary sequence of actions is termed order, the structure of temporal things that are brought about. Order is the vehicle of the world; Order, with Heimarmene and Necessity, are products of God's assent. God's law is itself eternity; it is irresistible, immovable and indestructible. This eternity has no beginning and no end; it works in everlasting motion in which are found fixed and unchanging laws. Accident and chance are also woven into the fabric, although difficult to determine since the world's parts rise and fall, forming a circularity the starting point of which is impossible to determine. It is God's grace that provides man with consciousness, through which he can know Him; thus man does not rely on his dim suppositions of reason. Asclepius completes his oracle by saying that we should rejoice because we have been gods for eternity (Copenhaver 92).

Both Erasmus and Budé were somewhat apprehensive concerning the use of Ancient Theology. The former, because of his concern of mixing literatures and, as Walker suggests, his mistrust of the metaphysical side of religion; the latter who considered Christianity to be centered on the mystery of Atonement and Crucifixion, believed that pagan literature held few clues or parallels to serve as an historical or mythical source. While both were close to Vives, it is unfortunate that we do not have their comments regarding the *Fabula* and its place in the Christian tradition (Walker 125-26).

Of the several levels of allegory on which the *Fabula* can be understood, this section will develop the growth of man's religious consciousness, as clearly presented by the author. The key elements of that support the story are found within Jupiter's amphitheatre: his script, from which the actors are unable to diverge by a finger's breadth, man's ascent from the earth, plant and animal kingdoms to the hierarchical orders of the lesser gods, his mime of Jupiter's image that astounds the gods, and his ultimate stance before the light/*lumen* of Jupiter's location. It is at this point that man experiences the gulf, or abyss, that separates him from his creator, which does not allow him to continue his ascent. Man looks into the light and is perhaps thrown back upon himself, as though facing a mirror. It is man's final place; the next move, a leap from religious to theological thinking, is Jupiter's.

Vives introduces his man of the *Fabula* as the archmime of his Father, Jupiter. The designation is from the Greek, *archimimus*, or chief of a group of mimic actors. The reader, however, should also be aware of the Platonic term, "*arché*," part of the doctrine in which the soul is conceived as a type of "*arché*," since it is somehow

connate with the scale of forms and is the driving force of “becoming” or development. All humans have this kernel or center of truth within them. As Richard Rorty sees this, it is the basis of Kierkegaard’s assumption, expressed in his *Philosophical Fragments*, that the subject has a built-in way of attaining or getting to a more powerful other (Rorty 31). The opposite of this, and perhaps we see this in the *Fabula*, is that the subject can only achieve the truth by an act of re-creation by a more powerful being, and that he is made into this new being through Grace.

One of man’s characteristics, as the *Fabula* shows the reader is the mime’s ability to assert himself. To the delight of the gods, he produces or creates the world of earth below them and then, through an extension of this dialectical process, progresses to the realm of the gods, where he fascinates with his art by creating a mirror of memory where they find themselves in his action as mime. While in the realm of the gods, man shows his tolerance of the multiplicity of spirits and gods that have accumulated in this place of sacredness, where man has historically viewed the actions of the gods and related their actions to the events of the lower worlds. Vives’ man, however, does not linger long among these gods. Man ascends to a higher region, propelled by this inner dialectic; in his journey, he transcends the throngs of lesser gods to a place where he must recognize his own nature, his own mortality. Vives writes: “He had transcended the characters of the lower gods and was piercing into that inaccessible light surrounded by darkness where Jupiter dwells...His mask rose above the nature of lesser gods and penetrated the region of darkness that surrounds the inaccessible light that marks the dwelling place of Jupiter, the king of kings and gods” (*Fabula*, 355).

The light at the end of man's journey is "inaccessible." Man has transcended the level of the accessible gods, the multitude of religious and quasi-religious figures. The overwhelming plurality of these gods has not blunted man's penetration toward the place of Jupiter. Man has shown himself, or has been able to reflect or explain these gods who inhabit, one imagines, a hierarchy of power and knowledge. What is important here is that man, although able to navigate among the number of these gods, has not been detained by them. His act of passing among them, reflecting their characteristics yet transcending them, is a significant demonstration of his religious capacity. In short, he has not been absorbed by them. In one sense, they are lesser creatures than man. Man's mind and memory may contain them. In terms of man's religious experience, these gods, who constitute a polytheism, and whose lives are confined to a lower level of imagination or fantasy, the threshold of the spirit, form part of a more primitive religion that man passes through on his way to his meeting with Jupiter.

Man's initial contact with the gods in this Jupiterian amphitheatre can be understood as the primitive phase of his religious consciousness. He asserts himself among the gods, and is escorted by Mercury through a number of heavens, a cosmos of the imagination (*Fabula* 335-37). In this cosmos of gods, man proceeds according to the unfolding logic of his dialectical journey as he accumulates images of the hierarchical order of religious powers, transcending those lesser orders where it takes more gods to perform functions well within the power of fewer gods above them, until he reaches a point when Jupiter is the ultimate explanation.

Man's progress through the realm of the gods also creates a path from religion to theology. Man's theological moment is found before the dwelling place of Jupiter, an impenetrable light, a location where theology must provide an explanation of the abyss between him and this ultimate reality. This Jupiter is immediate and immanent, yet unattainable by man and his arts. Man looks toward the light. At this point he is powerless to create another level of mask to hold before the pure *lumen* itself, which has provided, all along, the mirror image of his ascent. At this point, man is also aware of Jupiter's holiness and the overwhelming necessity of falling down before Him. Here Collingwood would say that this is the "explicit differentia of the religious experience" (119). It is indeed this sense of holiness and its corresponding attitude of worship in the center and nucleus of religious consciousness that man discovers while facing the light of Jupiter's dwelling place. It is thus the essence of the religious experience. In the *Fabula*, this is the ultimate progress of man; after his masterful historical ascent, he stands before the impenetrable light in which Jupiter dwells. It is Jupiter who must move, if the abyss is to be breached. In this theological place, it is man who must recognize his fallen condition, and it is Jupiter who must provide the grace to resolve it; man himself realizes that he is unable to close the distance that separates him from his creator.

In this spectacle before the gods, requested by Juno and produced by Jupiter, the author Vives provides the reader with a ceremony of man's path towards God. Man has been endowed with sufficient religious, ethical and aesthetic power to perform before the gods. With his art, he makes himself a believable creature and integral organism at each point in his rise toward the light of Jupiter's dwelling. Man

accomplishes this through the use of dialectic skills that include the arts of combination and differentiation. The truth that emerges, as man builds credible aesthetic structures or masks, forms a consciousness that links beauty to religion (*religio*). From this link, man accepts the analogy that holiness and beauty are related in the same manner to their objects of religion and art. As Collingwood ably phrases this mode of understanding, religion can be seen as a dialectical development of art, and holiness a dialectical development of beauty (120). Thus, if the object of art is beautiful, the holy becomes the beautiful that is asserted as real. This is the center around which aspects of God and holiness revolve. The holy becomes an object of aesthetic contemplation, including all objects of religion. Since holiness is asserted as real by man in his assent, Jupiter is thus regarded as a reality, not man's invention, not only a work of man's art, but an ultimate entity, a reality that rises above or transcends the simulations of art. The admiration which man enjoys in his contemplation of the works of art is conflated with his awe of Jupiter, or fused with the conviction that he has come face to face with an aspect that is other than himself and cannot be reached by his skill or imagination. Here man faces the intense luminosity of an entity that is infinitely real and which is the ground and source of his own being. Here, at this point and this instant, man finds the sense of holiness that forms the ground of worship and adoration. It is the elevation of beauty to a metaphysical principle that constitutes worship (Collingwood 120). The difference, finally, between religion and art is that man must believe in the reality of the former, and not in the latter. Therefore, within the religious consciousness, there exists in the mind an awareness of the danger of illusion, and to doubt the reality of god or gods is

to erode the legitimacy of religion. At this level, art and religion are joined. Religion is part of man the maker's repertoire.

Underlying Vives' writing in the *Fabula*, although not as prominent as it is discussed in Pico's *Oratio*, one finds the notion of truth's unity. For Vives, truth is a historical concept. It is developed incrementally through a continuous dialectic of mind and experience. Pico, as Kristeller points out, finds that truth consists of a number of true statements. The tradition of philosophy, for example, is formed by philosophers who contribute their ideas, either true or false, to a body of philosophy. Some of their statements are true, others false. However, philosophers participate in truth when their statements are taken by others within the tradition, without refutation by others. Pico's syncretism is both exclusive and inclusive. This acceptance of a unity of truth within the tradition of philosophy, or agreement among philosophers that provides a common language to further a dialectic, is continuously open to analysis and may change in response to pressures of time and place. There are, however, certain truths that form a horizon of unity that serves as the ground of philosophic method. Like Vives, Pico's skepticism was part of a dialectic method, and not a philosophical position.

Seen in the light of religious consciousness, Pico's man of the *Oratio*, contrary to the opinion of several critics, does not seem to enjoy more freedom than Vives' man of the *Fabula*. Both men have been created by the supreme generosity of their creator. Unlike the beasts, these men have the endowment to become themselves in accordance with the "seeds of all kinds and the germs of every way of life" (Kristeller 225). Man has received these seeds directly from his Father, and whatever seeds he

cultivates grow into maturity and bear fruit. If these seeds are of a vegetative material, the result will be a plant. If sensitive, he will remain on the level of animals, and, borrowing from Ficino's *Theologia Platonica*, if rational he will become a heavenly being. Pico extends his description to account for those seeds that do not germinate to extend exterior being, but remain within the center of spirit, one with God, in God's solitary darkness, set above all things. In the same passage, Pico asks: "who would not admire our chameleon?" (Kristeller 225). Like the man in Vives' *Fabula*, Pico's chameleon is able to invent forms of all the kingdoms, including the gods themselves, and even the creator. Although the nature of all other being is fully defined at the onset, man has been placed at the world's center and is neither heaven nor earth; he is neither mortal nor immortal: he has the facility to invent or fashion whatever shape he prefers, and has the power to reproduce himself within the context of lower or higher forms of life in accordance with his soul's judgment.

It should be noted here that Pico's celebration of the Magus is indeed very close to Vives' Archmime. Both figures seem able to bring forth what lies concealed in the recesses of the world. Both have access to the storehouse of God and, similar to the farmer who weds his elms to vines, the *magus* or mime joins earth to heaven, thus tying the lower things to the powers of heaven. Pico also refers to the ancient theologians' practice of covering or concealing truth with fable or other poetic veil. So deep are these truths that it is difficult, also for Pico, to draw out the hidden meanings of the secrets of philosophy from the riddles and obscurity of fables (Kristeller 254; *Oratio* § 37).

As man progresses among the ranks of his fellow creatures and among the hierarchy of the gods, he must act in a manner that each witness to the spectacle accepts as a true representation of man. Each act, then, is a kind of synecdoche as each mask man uses represents what each member of the audience considers a complete or perfect aesthetic action. As the author of the *Fabula* tells the reader, religion (“*religio*”) is a sacred domain that informs both memory and mind in such a way that man is able to foresee much of what comprises the structure of his world and the sequence of events. If man before the gods has exercised his talents, including song, dance, and speech, he has engaged in aesthetic acts with religious implications. The prayer and ritual of the church are derived from basic patterns of speech and movement that have the same origins as painting, poetry and dance. However, as Collingwood observes, worship is no more mere art than holiness is mere beauty (121). It is the result of a dialectical development that carries within it the result of a transmutation of matters that characterized its earlier stages. Worship immediately adds a new dimension to what begins as art in pursuit of the beautiful, since art at this level is no longer free to respond to fancy of fantasy or imagination simply because of beauty or aesthetic value. Worship must focus on Jupiter, and aesthetic acts and games must illustrate the creed or belief of the particular religion. The subject is thus given and, since it is part of man’s subjectivity and operates within the structure of a necessity, he is no longer free to simply enjoy in general works of art. This is the juncture of art and religion. From this point the religious subject must ensure that aesthetic acts are illustrations of his or her particular creed dedicates (Collingwod 121). Since this creates a field of logic in which choice is no longer free, the art that

is then created is a type of standard religious image with social and religious value, an icon in which aesthetic value is secondary. Here Collingwood insists, however, that works such as songs, poems, and paintings should be understood in terms of what they represent as artifacts of a special creed or program, rather than subject them to rigorous criticism.

What man accomplishes in this universal theatre is to unify a particular ritual and its corresponding mythology within the context of a festival or spectacle produced by Jupiter, who responds to a request from Juno in celebration of her birthday. To understand the inner or essential meaning of religion, man must be aware of the distinction between symbol and meaning. The body of religion contains a combination of mythological and imaginative images and narratives, assembled in a way to facilitate their use in acts of worship. This two part assemblage is inseparable, and both sacred art and sacred story reach their most significant state when the sacred story is revealed as a creed and the performance of that creed is a sacred act. These acts and stories form the body of religion, but their soul, as Collingwood phrases his discussion, lies in their meaning, beyond the creed and liturgy. These acts and narratives are symbolic in character, and their ultimate value is found in what they signify, not in their mere iconicity. Religious acts and language, then, are symbolic.

In the *Fabula*, man returns to the place of the gods, where they examined his masks, and he “calmly and eloquently” explains to them how he had represented the universe, including the gods and Jupiter. Later, man is invited by Juno to partake in the feast. This invitation is affirmed by Jupiter, and his assent “made all Olympus

tremble.” This assent, this acceptance of man, his son, closes the abyss between them. With his creator’s grace, he enjoys being among the gods, and he participates in the eternal delight of the feast. The religious experience has come full circle. Man has followed the orders or continuum of Jupiter’s creation in the amphitheater of the universe. He is able and enabled to speak of it eloquently. He delights the gods with his explanation and remains at the eternal banquet. His quest is complete. The religious cycle is complete and in this case it is no longer necessary, since the initial oppositions expressed in the Man/God encounter have been resolved. Man speaks eloquently to the gods of how he constructed the representations of the elements of all the kingdoms. As *ethologus*, he is concerned with the significance and meaning of his existence, and is able to penetrate the darkness around the inaccessible light of Jupiter’s dwelling place. He accomplishes this without special symbols or sacred gestures that inform religious consciousness.

His accomplishment is achieved without the abstractions of the religious consciousness. After his performance the gods, awed by Man’s accomplishments and the various masks and images he designed during the long day, gather around him and ask: “how and in what manner did he invent on the stage the plants, herbs, wild beasts, man, gods and the god king?” (*Fabula*, 7) What was the art? What was the gesture? While Jupiter orders ambrosia and nectar for the table, man calmly and eloquently explains his inventions for the pleasure of the gods. The narrator also tells the reader of the *Fabula* that the “mind and memory flow together in a merger that brings to light, by that divine spark of inference, the vision of what lies ahead in the vast sea of knowledge in which all the future exists” (*Fabula* 7). Man’s Memory is

the treasury of all things, including the divine powers. This is similar to the language Augustine uses in his description of memory in book X, chapter 24 of the *Confessions*. Where most contemporary philosophers would combine “mind” and “memory” into a complex “mind,” Vives follows Augustine by keeping them apart, as aspects or dimensions of the soul, more in line with the Platonic architecture of the soul and its system of learning or remembering. Although Vives uses the verb “invenio/ire” once in his sentence concerning the memory, Augustine, in the very brief chapter 24, uses this same verb on five occasions, playing on the use of past and present tenses repeatedly. The first phrase of this paragraph establishes the highly rhetorical pattern of the of the argument, with the negative of “See now, how great a space I have cursed over in my memory seeking thee, O Lord; and I found (“*inveni*”) thee not outside it.” Assuming that Vives maintains this theological distinction of mind and memory in the *Fabula*, let us read again the ultimate mime of man, his appearance as Jupiter, an act in which he completely takes the gods by surprise. Man reproduces his father in effigy, with admirable and unique gesture. This mask he has just invented or discovered for the delight of the gods rises above the nature of the lesser gods and penetrates the region of darkness that surrounds the inaccessible light that marks the dwelling place of Jupiter (*Fabula* 4) That man draws this effigy from himself should not surprise readers of the *Confessions*, since St. Augustine also comments that while he sought God outside of himself, He was indeed already inside (X.xxiv). “And behold”, Augustine writes, “thou were indeed with me.” Following this logic, God has turned toward man. The man of the *Fabula* adroitly projects Jupiter’s image while the gods watch. This turns on the biblical assertion that

man is made in God's image, although some would take the opposite position and argue that God is conceived by man in his own image. This inaccessible light is the dwelling place of God. Or is it a mirror where man looks into his own face? Man returns to the lesser gods.

"Quid sit Deus"

In chapter VIII of *De veritate fidei Christianae*, Vives asks "who would be God or what characteristics would He present to those who desire to know Him?" Here Vives distinguishes the kind of language he intends to use in this chapter from his earlier work, *De prima philosophia*, and clearly indicates to the reader that his approach is theological, and will not follow the logic developed in the former work. Vives asks the same burning questions raised by St. Augustine: many things we have said about God and we have cultivated the hope of another life after death. Is there a God, and will there remain something of ourselves after death? Vives then promises the reader a different kind of explanation, unlike the one provided in his *Prima philosophia*, written for those prepared in the study of philosophy. He begins with the statement that it is easier to say what God is not than what He is, since He exceeds man's ability to understand. He then uses an example of Simonides who, when asked by the Tyrant of Syracuse to define God, requested several days to think about it. After the passage of several days he asked for additional time. After several extensions of time the Tyrant, still waiting for Simonides's reply, said, "The more time I grant you to provide your answer to my initial question, the less you are able to find." Vives concludes from this example that the human mind is engulfed by an

immense sea from which land cannot be seen and then cites Virgil's statement from the *Aeneid*, book III. 193: "On all sides, sky; on all sides, sea." A reader of the *Aeneid* would be able to add that then a murky rain came upon the men, followed by night and a tempest, great seas rose and the crew was tossed hither and thither to wander on the blind waves. Even Palinurus knew not day from night. And, on the fourth day the landfall finally discovered was the dwelling place of foul Harpies.

This is the condition of ignorance of divinity, which engenders great and pernicious errors in the life of man. Vives states that, in this manner, he will not attempt a definition of what God is by what He has created, that usual way to characterize an author by the book he has written but, rather, he will attempt to understand sufficiently enough to revere and love Him, however poor and obscure the definition may seem. One should not marvel at the paucity of language because He is greater than man's language can attain, and, since His excellence rises far above or transcends our notions of excellence, man should remain content with his own intelligence, which is sufficient enough to love Him. Vives continues, however, with the attributions of God's worldly reflections that provide images and vestiges of his most excellent being; that being is the highest, most excellent, and unique. In Jupiter, Vives, the narrator of the *Fabula*, discovers the supreme metaphor of unity, in dialectical opposition to the secular plurality of essences of beings and things from which man has drawn the materials for his masks.

In Book 1, Chapter 1 of *De Veritate Fidei*, Vives describes the human will. As Noreña notes, "as a manifestation on the human level of that "appetitus naturalis" by which the Creator intelligently provided each species with the inclination proper to its

end” (b 119). Vives expands this concept in the Book 2, Chapter II, of his *De anima et vita*, where he clearly states that all knowledge has been provided in order to desire what is good. This includes sensible knowledge for the good of the senses, and mental knowledge to make what is good intelligible. It is through this desire for the good that the subject is able to raise itself to whatever degree possible. Only through this emergence of growth is it possible to approach the good. The opposite, of course is the descent into evil. The faculty that executes this end at the level of animal is the sensual appetite, and in man it is the will. Vives then defines will as “that faculty of energy of the soul through which man desires the good and avoids evil, guided by reason” (Mayans 382). Nature itself is the guide of animal senses. There exist two actions of the will: the propensity to attain the good, and an aversion to evil. Failure of the will to pursue these actions is described by Vives as apathy.²¹

Although the will is responsible for all its actions, it only works with the light of reason and judgment, the two dimensions of the soul that act as counsel and guides, not imposing themselves on the will, but rather providing guidance and warnings of what direction is better taken. The mind (reason) may be the will’s teacher and mentor, but it is not the author, who created it exempt and free, with complete right to its own action. And although it obeys reason always, it is not obligated to accept each action offered by reason, but selects that which is best in accordance with its own character from all those proposed. This free will can thus opt to choose an act or omit it. But it does not have the power to decide between two contrary actions, since it is unable to select an action unless it is presented to it by the reason (mind). In other words, as Vives argues, the will may not select that which is good, but it cannot or is

unable to abhor or hate it; on the other hand, that which is evil or bad, the will cannot abhor, but neither can it desire or want it, nor join it or love it (Mayans 383).

There are many ways to make manifest the workings of the will. First, prior to any deliberation the will is free, since it is able to take or not take into account the mind's function. In the process of deliberation it is able to delay or suspend all action and order the thinking toward another subject, with the same authority as the prince who guides or controls his council as it deliberates on a given subject, or suspend or suppress these deliberations. Also, after adopting a resolution, the will can contain itself and limit its participation, since it is free and not limited by decisions in the way of beasts who must follow their natural impulses to the end. It is the reason, however, that views the road ahead toward where the subject is going and where it should depart, examining and assaying the elements of the good and/or evil in each thing. The will has sufficient power to initiate a new deliberation, in conformance with the initial investigation or pattern of thought, and proceed until finding a better and more convenient alternative (Mayans 382), since there are so many objects that present themselves in a multiplicity of forms from which the subject makes a selection. Our reasoning faculty demonstrates powerful motives to make a selection and provides reasons for its adoption; if another offers appears, however tenuous its goodness, the will is powerful enough to provide the subject with a tentative inclination towards it, reject the former that seemed initially an excellent form and substance of good. This should not be surprising, since the subject or human being finds itself in a manifold experience where good and evil are mixed, a multiplicity of

circumstances encountered by the soul and body, both interior and exterior, that should not be left out of the account.

In a world of such great variety of objects, none of which offers itself easily to deliberation or analysis, the faculty of reason is unable to separate and provide counsel on what is good and/or bad due to the diversity of place, epochs, persons, qualities and the continuing flow of circumstances that comprise the varieties of each thing the subject encounters or deduces from experience. Frequently, the will, in order to assert its sovereignty or power, may be disdainful of its counselors, similar to Juvenal's satirical example of the recalcitrant prince who refuses to accept anyone's suggestion concerning his government, and systematically rejects responsible advice. Here Vives cites Juvenal, whose prince exclaims: "this is the way I want it; this is my command; the will is worthier than reason" (Mayans, 384).

Vives adds that, in truth, the will is still unable to crave or desire or execute anything unless it is conditioned by reason's finding some good in it, thus asserting its power and liberty. In the example of the prince, however, this power of the will is more important than advice concerning events that have already occurred. Likewise, some youths also resist disdainfully and impertinently advice provided by their fathers or teachers. This affects the internal liberty of the subject; the external liberty, even after approving an action, is able to deviate from its original intention. This does not occur in animals, since their natural faculty always works with the same extension and speed that their energy makes possible. The fact that sometimes they labor more energetically and swiftly than others does not signify that they attenuate or augment their forces through a voluntary act, but rather by exterior stimulants found in the

circumstances of place or time, or internal movements from habit, or psychic forces that excite or sharpen their energies, similar to a fire when oil is thrown on it or when bellows are used. Energy always burns in each moment, similar to that which the animal nature suffers when moved by blind impulse (Mayans 384).

Vives continues his explanation, offering an example of man's action that degenerates and descends to the nature and disposition of an animal, especially when an action is precipitated and executed without any counsel or deliberation. Also, there are special animals naturally predisposed by nature to create fiction or to dissimulate, as the fox or cat that lies in wait for the mouse. These precautions are occasioned by the fear of suffering or losing something. In point of truth, if some danger menaces or threatens the brute or animal that overcomes its threshold, instinctively this event is neutralized by opposition (Mayans 385) not by way of deliberation, but through an obstacle that is presented to the first motion, as when a weapon thrown by an adversary is deflected.

Vives states explicitly that God's great gift to man is free will and thus, through this gift, man is constituted as his son and not a servant and, by this act, God places man's being in his own hands to shape or form himself as he would want with His help and His favor and grace (Mayans 385). As Vives points out, if this were not the case, there would be no difference in terms of the excellence of virtue between man and beast. Likewise, there is the instigation of the superior intelligences of the angels and demons, by God principally, He alone who can obligate us, and from whom we have received not only freedom but also the same existence. The will, when it is pushed by a greater force or power, elevates itself above its nature, a thing so

evident, dealing with God, and effects works that it by itself admires after realizing them. Although it stops to observe, the will understands very clearly that effort has been conducted by a superior power.

There are those who place the power of the Heavens and stars above man's will and affirm that he is impelled and co-opted by their actions. Of this kind of thought are the astrologists. They have such pretence that all that exists in the entire world is reduced to the conscience or consciousness that they cultivate and enclose within the limits of the stars as they understand them, and they assume that they know the most unique operations of plans the world (Mayans 385). In reality, the sky/heaven can only move or drive man by its own physical constitution. Thus, the faculties of heaven are natural; they can be understood by man, and do not diverge from their nature. It can be seen that under any star that exists the will of man, although solicited by this or that force, applies itself to whatever pleases it; even if it can be seen that in the heavens necessity rules, on earth the human will governs. Vives thus clearly separates man as a social being from the nature of the heavens and stars that operate under the terms of order and necessity.

Before the divine prescience and providence, there are those who doubt that our freedom can with these exist in sympathy. It must be said that this divine prescience does not deprive man of freedom any more than the prescience of any other who would be gazing at him when he executes some act. Neither does God's providence deprive man of free will.

The ethological mime appears on the stage and begins by his will and "*ingenio*" to distinguish himself from other players or actors of the other kingdoms. This statement

needs careful examination in relation to the humanistic views of man's ability and range of action in the context of theological positions taken by earlier and contemporary humanists regarding man's will, divine providence, God's foreknowledge, fate, fortune, freedom and necessity. The humanist position was developed over several hundred years of constant dialogue that defined initial polarities of a universe of order or disorder (chaos), man's existential condition of dignity or misery, his theological location between the realm of despair, and grace, his metaphysical situation between mind and matter, and his ethical situation between freedom and necessity. These polarities defined the area of discourse. Within this discourse the language of fate, fortune and providence provided a dialogue which recovered the ancient theological ideas from Hebrew, Egyptian and Greek sources that were woven into the fabric of Christian theology.

¹ See Appendix I for translation of Vives' *Fabula de Homine*. All subsequent references to the *Fabula* can be found on the page indicated.

² The translation by Elizabeth Livermoore Forbes can be found in Paul Oscar Kristeller's *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*. See also Charles Glenn Wallis' translation of *On the Dignity of Man* with an introduction by Paul J. W. Miller.

³ All parenthetical references to Vives' works will follow the specific editions from which the citations are taken. The three sources used are the *Basle Opera* of 1555, the Mayans' edition of the *Opera*, 1782-90) and the Riber Spanish translation of the Mayans' edition, 1940-41.

⁴ Noreña's statement is difficult to reconcile in the light of what appears to be Vives' translation from Greek to Latin of the *Areopagitica* of Isocrates (Mayans 6-61). This work was dedicated to Cardinal Wolsey. In the cover letter to Cardinal Wolsey, dated Oxford, 15 December, 1523, Vives not only praises the Cardinal's erudition but also offers the enclosed Greek and Latin texts as an example of his scholarship. It is doubtful that Vives would have jeopardized his standing as a lecturer at Oxford and his relation with Catherine and Henry VIII by delivering an inferior work to one of the most powerful men in England.

⁵ See Bruno Snell's "The Olympian Gods" in *The Discovery of the Mind*, especially pages 23-42).

⁶ For discussion of Pomponazzi's opposition the Averroistic position of the concept of the "unity of the soul" see John Herman Randall, Jr.'s introduction (280) in Kristeller's *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*.

⁷ For a thorough discussion of the significance of "*archē*" see Richard Rorty's *Essays on Heidegger and Others*, page 31. Rorty states that "another way to think of him (Plato) as convinced that all human beings have the truth within them, that they are already in possession of the key to ultimate secrets--- that they merely need to know themselves in order to attain their goal... To make this assumption is to believe that we have a built-in affinity for the truth... a built-in tendency to get into the right relation to a more powerful Other... In Plato, this assumption was expressed as in the doctrine that the soul is itself a sort of *archē*..." (31).

⁸ See C.A. Van Peursen's *Body, Soul, Spirit: A Survey of the Body-Mind Problem* for a discussion the Aristotelian and Platonic concept of harmonious unity, especially pages 104-120.

⁹ Cicero in *De natura deorum* describes five ancient versions of Mercury. The fifth version of Mercury ascribes his giving the Egyptians their laws and letters. His Egyptian name is Theuth. (III.56) Also, Gershom Scholem describes the Hermes figure of the Merkbala as having alphabets engraved on his arms. (*On the Kabbala and its Symbolism*). This Mercury of the *Fabula* who accompanies man with what can be described as a wardrobe of masks in his arms could very well carry the alphabets and vocabularies man has used to design the creatures or masks he has constructed during his ascent toward his place of felicity.

¹⁰ In his *Lectures*, Hamilton refers to Vives' *De anima, lib.ii*, and *De discendi ratione*. He refers the reader to the Basle edition of Vives' *Opera*. In his analysis of Vives' concept of mind he concludes that Locke, perhaps without knowledge of Vives, developed a similar line of thinking.

¹¹ This passage benefits from Pico's reading of the Asclepius I.6. See Copenhaver, p 223.

¹² See also Sambursky's *Physics of the Stoics* for a thorough discussion of the Stoic concepts of "Pneuma" and force, the sequence of physical events, and relationship of the whole and its parts, reflected within the structure of the *Fabula*.

¹³ See the Mackenna translation of *The Enneads*.

¹⁴ In his *Principles of Psychology*, William James writes: "freedom's first deed should be to affirm itself" (321). James selects the model of man's free will on ethical grounds. In the *Fabula* Vives refers to man as the "ethologus," an important distinction between him and the other creatures he imitates. For Vives, man's ethical conduct is the mark of his free will. A link between Vives' concept of man and viewpoint of William James can be found in the work of Hamilton. Menéndez Pelayo in his *La Filosofía Española* explores the link between Vives and Hamilton of the Scottish school in reference to the concept of probabilistic thinking. Hamilton, as seen earlier, recognizes Vives' work in the dialectics of probability. James remarks in the introduction of his *Varieties of Religious Experience* that the Scottish school was a significant source of his philosophical development.

¹⁵ In *De disciplinis*, Vives continually reminds the reader that all experience should be subject to rigorous examination. This includes the works of Great writers and philosophers. He takes exception to the remark attributed to Theodoric of Chartres (Thierry) that his contemporaries are merely "dwarfs on the shoulders of giants." For Vives, all prior learning and tradition should be rigorously challenged.

¹⁶ In her article, *The Mime of God: Vives on the Nature of Man*, Marcia Colish finds that Vives' man labors under strict limitations that are divinely imposed and regulated. On the other hand, Pico's man

of the *Oratio* is not constrained by divine limitations and is able to act in accordance with his own free will. However, Vives' man appears to benefit more from classical sources than does Pico's, and thus his Protean ability to transform himself does not seem to fit, as Colish concludes, within the narrow path of Jacob's ladder. See pages 7-10 of Colish's article for her comparison of Pico's and Vives' concept of man.

¹⁷ See *De natura deorum*, II, for an elaborate description of man, sections 118-163. The description of man's eyes, in particular, are very close to Vives' description of Man's final mask as man, which the gods admire. Also, Cicero's use of "the actual organ of vision, called the pupil, or little doll (quae pupula vocatur)," may very well be the source of the Spanish "las niñas de mis ojos" (II.142).

¹⁸ See Leone Ebreo, *Dialoghi d'Amore*, Bari, 1929, pp. 99-101 as an example of the reworking of Platonic themes.

¹⁹ As the *Nag Hammadi Codices* would seem to indicate the texts, that form the basis of an ancient theology {prisca theologia}, indeed provided a foundation for subsequent Judeo-Christian texts, as accepted by Renaissance writers. Casaubon held the position that these "ancient" texts were post-Mosaic and possibly post-Christian.

²⁰ For Lactantius, see translation of *Div. inst.*, I.vi, by W. Fletcher.

²¹ Vives opens the section on "Voluntas" (*De anima*, 382) with the statement: "*Cognito omnis, propter bonum expetendum est tribute. sensualis propter sensuale, mentalis propter mentale, ut cognitum bonum expetat....*" All "knowing" (cognition) has been granted (man) in order to desire what is good, on the level of sensible knowledge and mental knowledge. For Vives, in accordance with the composition of each "*ingenio*", man advances toward an understanding of what is good.

Part II

The Humanist Inventory of Man.

The Kingdom of Man

In the *Fabula de homine*, Vives writes: "...paucis quibusdam litteris comprehensio illius immensae varietatis sonorum vocis humanae, ex quibus conscriptae et traditae disciplinae tot, quibus etiam religion continetur, Jovis patris cognitio et cultus, ac reliquorum deorum fratrum..."¹

These few letters, and how they combine to produce words which in turn generate language, are an integral part of Vives' thinking. Language in this sense can be conceived as a primary modeling system: language is the foundation of epistemology. Thinking about experience is not a phenomenon that happens without the constant mediation of language. All events, including interior and exterior actions, that shape nature are meaningless without the mediation of language. The world at once is logological. For Vives, epistemology is a dialectical process.

Vives' construction of a logological praxis is exemplified in the language he uses in *De anima et vita* to examine the soul. This logological praxis is based on the continuous examination of individual things as transmitted by the senses, internally and externally. Therefore, the soul can best be described by its actions, since its essence or substance, if this can ever be known completely, can only be determined by careful examination and description of its particular functions. As Vives writes to

Don Francisco, Duke of Béjar, Count of Belalcázar, in the dedication to his book:

“there does not exist another thing more commendatory nor more tasteful, nor offers greater wonder, nor grant more utility to the most generous initiatives, than knowledge of the soul” (Riber 1147). The soul is the most excellent creation of all things under the heavens. It is also more valuable than heaven itself, and thus , according to Vives, it merits the most careful study of all of its dimensions that we are able to know. In a phrase that excites the Socratic echoes within the inner ear of his contemporary reader, he writes: “a subject who has not explored himself is unable to govern that which is inside himself, nor accomplish good works,” (Mayans 298) a theme upon which Calderón builds his *Theater of the World and Life is a Dream*, perhaps benefiting, as some scholars have intimated, from his analysis of the rational soul. Vives, however, does not simply assume that knowledge of the self or soul is a matter of taking a simple inventory of available doctrines. First the subject must discover the way or art through which the soul’s existence can be identified, whether it has active or passive states, and to identify its degrees of operation within the field of temporal experience. For this reason, Vives recalls that an ancient oracle established, as the first step on the road to wisdom, the principle that each man should know himself, and not simply his material composition, but his nature and the quality of his soul and power of his imagination (*ingenio*). He should also come to terms with his mental faculties and passions, as well as exploring his many twists, turns and accidental constructions. Modern philosophers, Vives continues, have been phlegmatic in their approach to this subject, relying upon the ancients rather than vigorously questioning past formulations. As a result, their writings have been

without value, totally void relevance and without interest. Vives also takes to task all prior thinkers, from Valla to the Greeks, for building absurd structures to explain the function and nature of the soul. Rejecting the notion that the soul can be described in terms of substance, he characterizes this approach as only producing an overflow of empty words. In this sense he includes both the Stoics and Aristotle, finding in their writings more circumspection than description or analysis. Aristotle, Vives writes, presents the soul in a manner far too crafty, “more suo, tectus est, et vafer”(Mayans 299).

Vives asserts that he intends to explicate the function of the soul in accordance with his sensibility, an exercise that will not take for granted the doctrine of “natural light,” which he describes as a dream of people knowledge. The truth of the soul’s operation is to be found both in nature and above nature, since it is a unity that functions on material and spiritual levels, and should not be considered in terms of a duality, an entity that is divided to reflect the two basic dimensions of being, corporal and non-corporal. Vives considers such a dual structure of truth an error, as he extensively analyzed in his *De tradendis* and *De la verdad de la fe cristiana*. Aware of the various constructions of the soul and intellect, he reminds the Duke that, in these two tracts, he carried out a careful examination of the language, including various neologisms, not only those already received and in use in society, but also those still manipulated in the laboratories of the learned. Since no subject is more recondite than the soul, which he considers the most obscure of all things in man’s speculation, it is absolutely necessary to select the correct and proper vocabulary to represent its character to the reader. To this end, Vives offers the reader a work of

three volumes, in which he discusses the soul's function in three basic aspects. He begins with an analysis of the aspects or spirit of the body (*anima brutorum*), followed by the rational spirit (*de ratione*), and the passions (*affectione*). Vives closes this dedication to Duke Francisco by emphasizing the importance of the third division or book on the passions, since it is the foundation of all moral doctrine, private or public. It was a subject much discussed by them during the Duke's visits to Vives in Brussels, and one that fascinated the former more than any other of the divisions. It was particularly appropriate, since the Duke considered it a valuable instrument for a prince in order to govern himself as he should, as well as his family and the republic.

In the letter to the Duke, Vives is addressing a reader who has helped to shape a text that is a result of their previous conversations concerning the composition of the soul and its passions. Similar to the organizational unity of the soul's operation on both levels of body and spirit, the dualistic relation of writer and reader is replaced by a unity formed in the record of a dialogue by the principle two participants. The text is not the result of a disinterested investigation conducted by a single subject. It is a dialogic enterprise that combines references to prior texts and conversations and is at once a philosophical text, a psychological essay, an ontological and anthropological investigation, and an epistemological treatise. Also, as the Duke understands, the text does contain an analysis of sufficient power to provide applications to the practice of self-governance and state-craft. It is not, of course a political handbook or guidebook to help a prince acquire and maintain power, although the practical aspects of knowing what exists in the soul and how it operates would be as helpful, as the

practical political guidebook Machiavelli presented to Lorenzo d'Medici. Thus, the book should not be understood as a work of pure science. While his examination of the emotions describes their operation from an empirical point of view, Vives' presentation of the immortality of the soul takes the form of a model forensic argument that is presented in a manner to elicit a judgment from each reader. As Vives constructs his man as the arch-mime of the *Fabula*, a theatrical spectacle in which the latter demonstrates the interaction and interdependence between the soul and the body, spirit and matter, *De anima et vita* also assumes a unity of mind and body, spirit and matter, differing only in each individual case, that provides the basis of each subject that exists in a temporal order while desiring eternal felicity.

The Senses (The realm of sentience)

At the beginning of Book 1 of *De anima*, Vives establishes realm of all that is within man's power to know from the senses. He writes that only through their operation are we able to know things grasped by the senses. Man's external knowledge is limited to what is perceived through the senses. This implies that man does not see directly into the substance of things. He refers to his *De prima philosophia* as the fundamental work in which he developed the basic divisions of the world based on Stoic classification of inanimate bodies, animate bodies (those that move by their own force and impetus), and others that are endowed with the faculty of reason. In terms of the animate bodies there are four grades, following a classificatory Aristotelian scheme: the first group, made of plants, is limited to alimentary functions; the second, that only have rudimentary senses, such as certain

forms of marine sponges and snails; a third, which operates on a level of basic organization of senses including some aspect of intelligence and memory, such as birds and animals; and a fourth is the life of man, who exists in a space between heaven and earth. This is the place in the universe that was exclusively granted to man. Vives continues this discussion with what would be a key to understanding how he conceives the word “soul” and employs it in his discourse. The same levels of “soul” are applied to the four gradations of animal bodies. The soul (*anima*) of the first group is vegetative, the second sensitive, the third intelligent, and the fourth, or man, is rational. Thus, it would seem that the soul on each level is used to describe the type of organization of each living thing. For Vives the “soul” as a descriptive term is a synthetic concept. It is used in his discourse to characterize the multiple levels of organization that provide shape and movement to a definite entity. Later in *De anima*, after distinguishing the differences in qualities that constitute a hierarchy of souls, from vegetative to rational, Vives argues a case for the rational soul’s immortality.

The basis of Vives’ argument can be found in Book 1, Chapter IV. Here, he writes that the eyes are in the soul in the same way they are in the body. Taking a position from Augustine’s *De trinitate*, Vives writes that the Author of all things diffused his light throughout the universal world, assigning the spiritual light for spiritual objects and the physical for corporal things. In this way, the spirits would understand each other and the corporal eyes would be able to see. Thus, on the level of angel or messenger there exists the spiritual light of god, whereas on the material level the sun radiates the physical light (Mayans 313). His two dimensional analysis of interior or

spiritual, and exterior or material light is built upon the play and relationships of metaphors designed for each dimension. They interlock in a way that enhances the semantic range of both dimensions, so that they throw "light" upon each other. Perhaps benefiting from a more empirical study of light by Robert Grosseteste (1170-1253) in his *De luce*, and Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, Vives continues his description of physical light, using the Greek word, "diaphanous", which he defines as a condition occurring when light passes through a body that offers no resistance. Such an object becomes transparent, like crystal, water or air. Light striking heavier bodies produces the physics of color. Taking into account the color green as an example of the dynamics of light, he argues that there is not a plant or tree that does not shine with its own unique verdure, distinct from all other kinds of greens. According to Vives, who here takes a nominalist or conceptualist position, green itself is an abstraction, a name or term that tends to be considered a universal. For Vives the unit of analysis remains the individual thing. He eschews a metaphysical model of things essentially related to a substance which leads to a highly abstract statement that God is the ultimate form or substance. Although there is a common duration in which creatures and God exist, the former is temporal and the latter eternal. God is an exemplary form, and His essence cannot be deciphered through the analysis of more complex degrees of matter.

The exterior organ of seeing is the eye; the internal organ is composed of two nerves that connect the eyes to the brain. The exterior light unites (*conjungitur*) with the eyes and produces sight, as the spiritual light unites with the mental light to produce understanding. For Vives, it is not possible to see and discern any object

without a certain gradation of light or clarity, depending upon the strength or power of the eye. Obviously there must be sufficient light to see, since a deficiency of light would produce total darkness. In summary, the first visible is the light itself; the second, color; and the third, by virtue of its closeness, is that which is invested with light or color. Vives' discussion of light can only be understood on his terms which posit the place of meeting where *res* and *lux* combine to unite the two major dimensions of light in the place of the individual soul.

The Rational Soul

In the Introduction to Book 2 of *De anima*, Vives begins his description of man with the assertion that the human being was created to partake of eternal bliss. To achieve this end, he was provided with a natural appetite to desire the good, which enables him to attain a union with eternal beatitude. He identifies this appetite as man's free will. The will, however, would be useless without the faculties of intelligence and memory. The will, mind or intelligence ("*mens sive intelligentia*") and memory are the three principal functions or faculties of the rational soul. They glow in the image of the holy Trinity in accordance with the doctrine of the church fathers, formulated by St. Augustine. Here Vives echoes Augustine's doctrine of the vestiges of the trinity. As Edgar Wind states in his *Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance*, this Augustinian doctrine had its roots in shared Christian and pagan mysteries. It was Augustine who clearly formulated this doctrine, however, in his *De trinitate*: "Oportet... ut Creatorem... Trinitatem intelligamus, cuius in creatura, quomodo dignum est, apparet vestigium"(40). Ficino also in his commentary on

Plato's *Symposium*, found that the concept of a trinity of faculties or substances was regarded by Pythagorean philosophers as a measure of all things, since God governs by threes and things themselves yield to analysis by division into three parts or aspects (Wind 41). This view is also shared by Aristotle who writes in his *De Caelo* that the Pythagoreans were of the mind that the world and all that it includes can be divided by the number three. Aristotle also then concludes that this is the basis for making use of the number three in the worship of Gods (I.268A).

Vives, however, does not provide a justification for his use of the concept of a trinity of faculties. He states that it is, indeed, difficult enough to investigate the way these three faculties operate, let alone their origin, development and growth. Man does not enjoy a higher intelligence that would transcend these faculties and enable him to understand their essence completely, since these were given to man by the Author or God to enable him to comprehend his worldly experience and action. The senses, however, inferior to these faculties of the rational soul, can be understood more clearly. Notwithstanding the difficulties of explaining the structure and operation of the rational soul, Vives proposes to investigate and clarify, to the maximum extent possible, the quality of the human mind, its functions and operations.

Vives continues in his description of the three faculties by emphasizing how they are distinguished by their respective actions. Their true essence can be derived only in accordance with the action or operation of these faculties. It would be an erroneous undertaking to describe them by assembling their adherent characteristics or exterior accidents. In terms of the senses, for example, the faculty of the eye is to

see not one color or another, nor in one or another manner, but simply to reveal things (*"simpliciter; ac nude"*). The intelligence, however, has a double function: it exists as a general faculty and also as a particular function. The human intelligence can be observed grasping its exterior experience and conserving the result of this action in a place where this knowledge can again be retrieved at any opportune moment. This recovery of stored experience is called reflection (*"consideratio"*) by Vives.

Reflection recovers experience from memory and delivers it to the active intelligence.

On the basis of the work of reflection, the mind or active intelligence is able to compare things against each other, see and judge what is true and what is false, what is good and what is bad. The stage is then set for the will to select the good and reject the bad. In effect, the will does not on its own pursue or avoid positive or negative characteristics without the mind's judgement. Judgement itself is a component of a process within the mind and it must await the work of reason before forming a decision. The process of judgement is therefore dependent upon the work of cognition and perception (*"cognitum atque intellectum"*) and, additionally, on the transfer of experience stored in memory and presented to the mind during the process of reflection. The above sketch takes into account the relationships among three primary faculties that comprise the rational soul: will, memory and mind. In terms of the mind (*"mens"*) Vives includes the categories or attributes of primary intelligence (*"simplex intelligentia"*), reflection (*"consideratio"*), remembrance (*"recordatio"*), comparison (*"collatio"*), reasoning (*"discursus"*), judgement (*"censura seu iudicium"*) and contemplation (*"contemplatio"*). The following three sections contain analyses of the each of the three primary faculties of the rational soul.

The Human Will (*Voluntas*)

The will, Vives writes, is the power (“*vis*”) of the soul through which we desire the good and reject the bad, guided by reason (“*ratione*”). All knowledge has been granted to man in order to desire the good, including the knowledge of the sensible in order to recognize the sensible good, and the knowledge of the mental in order to recognize the intelligible good. Once the desire for the good is recognized by man, such a knowledge of the good is sought in accordance to each subject’s possibilities. Man’s will is of a higher order than that of the animal kingdom, which exhibits a sensual appetite (“*in brutis appetites est sensualis*”), since the latter’s operation is guided only by the natural stimulation of the senses. The human will is more complex, since it is organized to select the good and reject the bad. Also, inherent in the will is the power of remaining in a neutral state, withholding the option of choice or selection.

Although the will is the author of all its acts, since it does not have its own light its operation requires the illuminating work of the mind, through the attributes of reason and judgement that serve as guides and counselors. It is clear, however, that the mental attributes of reason and judgement do not have power and control over the will; they are a source of mediation placed before the will’s executive power. Although the will operates within the range of mediation by the mind’s attributes of reason and judgement, it retains the power to act or not act. The only limitation of the will’s power of choice, as Vives sees it, is that it does not have the ability to decide to pursue one of two contrary actions. This limit to the will’s operation is due to its

inherent propensity to select what is presented to it as an aspect of the good, and to its inclination to reject only that which is presented as some aspect of evil. However, as indicated above, the will can pursue neutrality by not exercising choice, although it will not act in a contrary manner by abandoning its basic quest for the good or its basic rejection of the bad. Vives here makes the distinction between the will's wanting or desiring good and rejecting the bad, while also maintaining its ability to pursue a neutral course. The will itself, however, does not have the power to abandon its three-part function.

There are many ways in which the will manifests its freedom (*"libertas"*) and mastery of its own actions. The most important point is that it is free before and after an act of deliberation. It also has the inherent facility to postpone or suspend completely any act of deliberation. Here Vives makes the point that not only is the will able to suspend an act of deliberation, but it can change its focus and set in motion the thought process toward another different objective. I can do so with the same facility and authority that a prince uses to direct his council in respect to consider any subject, but keeping the power to suspend or suppress further deliberation. Moreover, after adopting a resolution, the will has the power to control itself and discontinue its course of action toward an objective that was identified as good. This clearly differentiates man from the animals that are condemned to follow their impulses, that are by nature immutable. Since they lack the attribute of reason, they are unable to weigh and assay any alternative and to evaluate and determine their subsequent actions.

Man's will, with its focus on the good, also has the capability to order a new process of deliberation and, instead of conforming to the first decision, press the investigation as far as possible until the best and most convenient action is identified. Obviously, this process is not static; it functions in time and is therefore subject to change as additional information enters the deliberative process, either externally through the senses or internally through memory. Vives provides a complete description of the condition in which the will does its work. Since there are so many objects for selection through man's experience in the world, although the deliberative process strongly indicates that one out of the many would be a viable course toward a good, the will may tentatively lean toward a lesser good, and reject another that has been presented as having an excellent form and substance. The human experience contains at each moment an intermixture of things and values that are not only internal but also, externally, a set of multiple relationships that must be taken into account by the body and the soul.

The variety of objects is so extensive that not one of them offers a clear choice to the faculty of reason once they enter the deliberative process. Each object contains a mixture of good and bad elements that vary according to the diverse sites, epochs, persons, qualities and circumstances. In some cases, the will often manifests its sovereignty and rejects the best counsel of reason and judgement. Here, Vives cites Juvenal's satirical remarks concerning the Prince who refused all sane advice from his counselors: "*Sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione libido*" (Mayans 384). However, Vives again reminds us that there is a limit to the will's freedom, for it is conditioned

by its inclination to pursue what the reason presents as some type of good. Only within these limits does the will demonstrate its power and freedom.

In terms of observing the external function of the will, one finds similar characteristics. Once embarked on a certain course of action, the will is able to withhold further activities, such as the complete cessation of the action previously begun, or to refrain from realizing the activity to the extent originally intended, or to extend the action over a longer period of time. Nothing of this nature and complexity occurs within the animal kingdom, since here the natural faculty of will works only within the extension and time that external forces induce. Vives warns us that this same kind of behavior can occur in man if his faculties degenerate to the point where the power of his will acts as though it were in the animal realm, driven by the exterior forces of nature. While an animal driven by instinct quickly reacts to repel an attack, man's constitution is such that he can select an action that temporarily occludes a better choice. This would occur, assuming a degeneration of his faculties or a kind of sudden excitement that would tend to attenuate his deliberative process. Such an action on man's part is the characteristic of ignorance, that is, accepting as a good what one desires immediately, without taking into account the existence of an equivalent alternative. This failure of the will to act within the process of deliberation establishes the mechanics of sin.

Freedom of the will, Vives writes, is a great gift of God, through which man has been constituted as his son, and not as a servant. This provides man with the power to form himself as he desires, with the assistance of God's favor and grace (Mayans 385). Had this divine gift not been given to man, there would not be any recognizable

difference between man and beast, of degrees in terms of virtue. There is at work, in both man and beast, a natural power that inevitably and necessarily manifests itself in the basic actions they have in common. The human will, however, is capable of both rising above natural forces that hold the beasts in place and executing works that seem clearly done by a superior power.

Although Vives recognizes that some thinkers argue that the heavens and stars have influence over the human will, it is only made manifest, if at all, on the level of corporal bodies as they mutually establish relations with each other. Furthermore, since the heavens must move natural causes, they do not produce contrary effects. For Vives there are no secret influences that lie hidden in the heavens, only deciphered by astrologers, unrecognized by the natural process of cause and effect, nor have they power over the will. The heavens work within the structure of necessity, following a strict logic of cause and effect; the will, on the contrary, is free. Thus, Vives concludes, the human will and the logic of the heavens are diverse and contrary to each other.

Vives comments on the rhetorical question concerning the possibility that man's free will is able to alter the future as God has foreseen. To Vives, this is a gratuitous question because it does not take into account the true nature of divine prescience. He clearly finds that divine prescience does not deprive one of his free will. Providence does not deprive man of his liberty any more than the presence of an onlooker would stop another man's action. Prescience is the divine intelligence that knows all previously or better said, knows or holds all the present in its purview. Past and future are elements of temporality and do not exist as such in the infinite mind of God.

Providence is the will that governs all things with its infinite prudence. Because this divine will has deemed that the human will and that of the angels will remain free, one can conclude that what man does freely is a reflection of the divine will, accomplished through the agency of its mandate and goodness. In conclusion, Vives considers that the human will governs all human actions and that in its power lies the responsibility of doing good or evil, choosing virtue or vice, and giving praise or censure that assigns the prize or the penalty.

The Structure of Man's Mind (*Intelligentia*)

In his three part division of the rational soul, Vives clearly announces that his objective is to describe the mind's activity through an examination of its operation, not its substance. Intelligence ("*intelligentia*") is further divided in terms of operation into simple or primary intelligence ("*simplex intelligentia*") and composite intelligence ("*composite intelligentia*"). The human mind itself ("*mens humana*"), as defined in the opening phrase of *De probabilitatis*, is the faculty used for acquiring true knowledge. It has a certain sympathy and genetic relation to those primary truths that Vives describes as the seeds in which these truths are encapsulated. They can only be grasped through the work of katalepsis, a significant aspect of Stoic doctrine on which Vives bases his epistemology and ontology. Simply, 'katalepsis' is the process by which the mind grasps the meaning of one's experience as presented to his or her senses. It is also the foundation of Vives' dialectic of probability. The two attributes of intelligence, simple and composite, are essential elements in the process of the mind's grasp of its experience.

Simple or Primary Intelligence

This level of intelligence provides the mind with the power to apprehend, simply and directly, all things that are presented to it by the external senses or internally by the imagination. Here Vives compares the act of apprehending external objects to the way the eye functions in the body. As for the internal working of apprehension, he relates it to the way the imagination functions in the spirit (“*animo*”). This primary level of intelligence, or the work of apprehension, is similar to Aristotle’s concept of perception; both concern the soul’s power of bringing things before the mind. Similar to the Stoic act of apprehension, Aristotle’s act of perception is the agency that transforms sensation into images in the mind. Using the analogy of the eye’s function to support his explanation of the work of apprehension, Vives’ account parallels Aristotle’s use of light. This gives the name to φαντασία (imagination), derived, as the Stagerite observes, from φάος (light), because it is impossible to see without light (*De anima*, III. 429a). Vives may well have had the benefit of reading Plato’s *Theatetus* concerning the function of perception (151E), since his concept of direct apprehension is also the initial phase of the mental process that leads to inference, judgement and contemplation. His emphasis on the term “primary” or “simple intelligence” is not called simple because it deals with simple things; rather, it is a form of knowledge that operates on the level of inference or reasoning. The primary intelligence is able to grasp the result of more complex operations of the memory and imagination. Since this form of intelligence does not operate on the level of reasoning, it is not concerned with the formation of universal concepts. It is similar to

the structure of what Vives' understands as nature, and is perhaps the way the Vivesian subject encounters nature empirically, through observation of particulars.

Composite Intelligence (*De composite intelligentia*)

Vives begins his short analysis of composite intelligence with the statement that there is not within the soul ("*anima*") an image of a pure substance ("*substantiae purae*") or pure adherent ("*adhaerentibus denudate*"), that is to say, a substance or an adherent that is stripped of its accidents. He continues by saying that the first image entering the mind through the senses is already complicated by the imagination's work, which tends to add other representations and forms of qualities and actions that have been already perceived through the same channels. In other words, pure experience, without mediation by the powers of the soul, does not exist as an ontological element in Vives' empiricism.

While the composite intelligence holds these complex images, the work of reason compares the elements among themselves and works toward a classification based on differences and similarities, and how they function. It is the power of reason that transforms these images into a language through a process known in the schools as 'syncategoremata,' that is, a determination of each co-signification, not cognizable by any of the senses. Furthermore, according to Vives, reason expands its knowledge of these co-significations, which facilitates the work of analyzing subsequent experience. Of interest here is Vives' use of the term, 'syncategoremata.' According to Kretzmann, the work of medieval grammarians dealt with the two basic categories of 'categoremata' and 'syncategoremata'. The former included both substantivals

and adjectivals, as well as the personal and demonstrative pronouns, and verbs. The latter included all the other elements, such as conjunctions, adverbs, and prepositions (212). Vives' use of the latter term in the context of the composite intelligence locates in the mind the faculty of determination of co-significations, because the senses do not provide signs that are semantically complete. In other words, composite intelligence is part of the mind where the meaning of signs is deciphered. The ability to decipher the composition of signs increases with the maturity and intelligence of each subject. Such an act of deciphering cannot be done through the imagination, which has no power to unite or separate signs through the use of a copula, i.e., what is and what is not, what is the same or what is different. The composite intelligence is the ground of reason, and arranges the signs it deciphers for the action of judgement.

Reason (*Ratio*)

All of what the subject understands, reflects upon, compares and collates, serves the attribute of reason. This process can best be described as a system through which one thing is compared against one or more other things. Because of this interactive process, Vives arrives at the concept of reason that is the equivalent of discourse ("*discursus*") and appraisal ("*reputatio*"). It should not seem strange to refer to reason as discourse, since it proceeds step by step, taking into account diverse elements of experience. It is capable of going forward in an iterative way without interruption, and at the same time it can leap without taking into consideration an intermediate step, either because it chooses to ignore a convenient path or because it

sees no need to follow necessary relations closely (Mayans 354). The work of reason is a complex process that includes the role of imagination, as Noreña points out in his book, *Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions* (100). In fact, Vives considers the imagination an integral part of the reasoning process, producing images or ideas originally taken from the senses and continuously reshaping them. The discourse of reason flies quickly around these images, selecting them for use as they appear in the form of individual accidents in the imagination (Mayans 354). These “accidents” of the imagination are available to the reasoning process and can be incorporated into it, but should be carefully used. This, he warns, is why reason must keep its distance and avoid being overly influenced by these singular images, since complete reliance on them deflects the process of discourse, risking the danger of total immersion in the accidents of the imagination.

This process of reasoning or discourse is complicated by the number of steps it takes to arrive at a conclusion by the several attributes available to modify the operation and, of course, by the individual characteristics of each human subject within the realm of experience that produces one language. Vives is careful to maintain his description of reasoning or discourse so as not to result in an exercise that could easily posit simplistic universal conclusions. The subject should be focused on the level of practical experience, where differences among speakers reflect the result of various combinations of elements, instrumental in forming conclusions that are presented to the process of judgement. As Vives notes, the process of reasoning correctly should avoid precipitous lapses into the accidents of imagination, which would lead the subject astray into dimensions similar to inebriation or fury. This can

only be accomplished by keeping the mind in good health (*"magna sanitate mentis"*). To accomplish what would be called, "good reasoning" or "optimal reasoning," the imagination should work freely, since reason benefits from the images and ideas it produces. Also, as the senses serve the imagination, the latter serves the work of understanding and reflection. The process of recollection benefits from the work of understanding and reflection and is thus able to make comparisons. All of these elements are contained within the reasoning process and, according to Vives, they form a hierarchy: "The senses are a mode of looking at the shadows, the imagination operates on the level of image, the intelligence works on the level of the body, and the reason deals with forms and practice" (Mayans 354).

Vives identifies two different types of discourse. The first responds to the will, and it integrates a search for the truth by way of the intelligence or a search for the good by way of the will itself. The second type of discourse is spontaneous, moved by the free force of the mind, exercising its own unceasing initiative, unguided by clear and known principles that govern the first type of discourse. Both discourses, however, are based on what the senses transmit to the primary intelligence. This process is at once epistemological and ontological; it begins on the level of the senses, or particulars and, guided by the intelligence, it works toward the level of the universal. The spiritual is derived from the material effects, the causes of which are deciphered by the intelligence. Knowledge is acquired on the basis of immediate and direct experience. Additionally, most recondite aspects and relations are derived by the work of intelligence. In terms of Vives' onto-theology, this system works in reverse. God is the author and moderator of all that exists, and to him the causes, both

temporal and spatial, are better known than the effects, just as His grasp of the universal is better known in comparison to the particulars of things. By following this chain of experience from the particular to the universal the subject, through nature, approaches the residence of God. Again, Vives distinguishes the subjects who are more apt in practice and accomplished in intelligence, and therefore able, from those slower ones who are unable to transcend the realm of particulars and are condemned to dwell in the world of the senses (Mayans 355). He sees that the mind, much like a weapon, can be sharpened and polished by the instruction and practice of exercises. The purpose of developing the powers of the mind is to separate truth from falsehood. When it functions to find the truth it also works toward what is good. This obviously produces a judgment that compares the good with evil and the truth with what is found false. This is the exercise of prudence, a characteristic that is not shared equally by all human subjects. Vives, upon establishing the function and end of thinking, finds that sin is associated with ignorance. It is the state of ignorance from which the subject must recover and identify the good and the true. Man does have the capacity within himself to achieve the end for which his mind was created. To support this line of argument, Vives cites Plato's *Meno*, in which it is argued that the mind was created with the necessary characteristics to pursue the most elevated arts and sciences. Although the mind or intelligence (Mayans 355-356) does not possess any quality before it is united with the body, it has received in its creation the propensity to direct itself more toward the true than the false. As a result of this inclination, he argues, it must have been provided with forms that can be seen as the seeds of all the disciplines. As in the earth there exist the seeds of all plants that lead to their growth,

many of which are governed by man's need to cultivate them, there exist in the mind of each subject the principle seeds that are the origin of all the arts and the wisdom of all the sciences. In other words, there is not an art or discipline that does not show some sign, however imperfect in man's mind, that later can be perfected through study and exercise, as one sees in the cultivation of plants when cared for by the industrious hand of the farmer. As the above reference to the *Meno* indicates, Vives' approach to epistemology is rooted more in the Stoic concept that includes the doctrine of 'katalepsis', than in the Platonic theory of recollection of knowledge stored in the soul. What is of interest here is Vives' reference to the *Meno*, a dialogue in which Socrates, upon leading Meno's slave in the discovery of geometric forms that are eternally present in the mind, exhibits a skepticism while stating that he would not want to take an oath on the veracity of the entire system of immortality and the doctrine of recollection (86c). Vives could have selected the later dialogues of *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus* as evidence of his rejection of the ancient soul-cycle theory. Perhaps in the *Meno*, Plato as seen by Vives is closer to the Stoic model, a view corroborated by his opening statement in *De probabilitatis*, in which he finds that Plato's doctrine of recollection also has its roots in the Greek concept of 'katalepsis' (Mayans 82). The Greek cyclical system of the eternal soul would, in Vives' mind, lead to theological confusion. The recollection theory, if pursued to its incarnate roots, would weaken his concept of the probabilistic dialectic. What is most important to Vives' epistemology and ontology is that the mind is equipped with the necessary elements to operate in the world and benefit from its experience. In this sense the mind is an extension of its subject. The capacity to transcend the level of sense

experience is found within man's rational capacity. Within this capacity, Vives locates the basis of man's notion of truth and goodness. Nature, Vives says, endowed man with an attraction toward what is good and the desire to find what is true.

Although his ignorance has obscured this attraction, it has not been completely erased. These desires, or this attraction, remain in man's consciousness as an inborn knowledge of the primary principles of moral action, or as some theologians have called them, *syndereses* (Mayans 356). The meaning of his use of "synteresis" is explained through the examples of what Jerome called "*conscientia*", Basil "*judicorum*," and John of Damascus, "*lux mentis*." As Carlos Noreña points out, Vives refers to *synderesis* as the mind's power of light and judgment (103). Such a power works toward the good and the true (Mayans 356). What should be taken into consideration here is the semantic field of the term, 'synderesis', which includes the additional meaning of essence, ground or center of the soul that is in communion with God. It is also the spark of divinity in man's soul. His acceptance of the notion of *synderesis* and the terms used to describe its function, provides a view of how clearly he saw the interdependent function of reason or discourse as an attribute of the soul and its propensity to move toward the good and the truth.

Although many animals show signs of intelligence, Vives argues that there are obviously great differences between the human mind as extension of the subject and the animal mind and its activity. Here, he refers to Plutarch's book on the intelligence of animals. He also mentions that Valla's dialectic also affirmed that animals were provided the faculty of reason. However, for Vives, Valla's work is often the result of his desire to contradict Aristotle and, often, engaging in an absurd exercise. If

discourse is the transition between one thing and another, Vives writes, there is no doubt that animals also have a discourse. However, they do not have the capacity to compare the less known with the most known, nor do they have the ability to design an argument by predication. They operate in the world of the particular and simply do not make general statements. Vives uses this explanation of animal discourse to differentiate it from the operation of human discourse. True discourse, he says, is not a state or condition; it is a progression, and it is combinatory. Within discourse the subject classifies and compares things against each other, and from this operation is able to arrive at conclusions. Man elevates himself by means of this power of discourse, although it takes diverse forms according to each subject. The end of discourse is to find or discover that which is the object of the search. When this end is not attained, it takes a form similar to the hunting dog that follows and then loses its prey, due to the slowness of its search, the movement of the prey, the debility of will, or the difficulties encountered along the trail. His conclusion is that after the discourse or search is complete, it is convenient to keep in memory what the imagination and investigation have produced. This will ensure that the mind remains aware of what has been obtained and that it will not be carried away by any fleeting impulse to search after another objective.

Judgment

Judgment is the mind's continuous process of appraisal; it oversees the operation of reason. To put it another way, it is the point at which the conclusions produced within the operation of discourse are selected for action. Vives describes judgement

as an attribute of the mind, the function of which is similar to a carpenter's balance. This balance is a metaphor that represents a normative process of the mind that is at rest while the reasoning or discursive facility is at work; it appraises what the latter offers the mind as a conclusion. The act of judgement takes three forms: it rejects conclusions, keeps a conclusion in suspense until it is further clarified, or accepts the result of a discursive process. Carlos Noreña finds Vives' brief section on judgement more of a psychological than a logical description. Even though judgment more closely describes the psychological rather than the logical, it is presented to the reader as an exercise of forensic argument (105). In this account, the mind is not isolated as an abstract substance or form, nor does it operate on a level that is purely rational. The passions are clearly present. It is Vives' view that the mind's process of judgement faces a complex network of conclusions developed by reason in its search for probable representations of the subject's experience. It is very difficult for even the most learned and experienced subject to exercise proper judgment, whereas the rude and inexperienced subject demonstrates little power over the immense field of experience filtered through the senses. The reasoning process functions dialectically to assemble probable truths upon which judgement develops forms for subsequent arguments. Since this process is at best tenuous, Vives warns the reader that those subjects with temperaments controlled by the passions may very well remain in the shadows, unable to develop a base of reliable knowledge necessary for the analysis of continuous flow of sense experience.

The truth, Vives states, corresponds to the intelligence, as the good to the will; the lie instead is foreign and inimical to the good, as evil is to the will. If judgment holds

a conclusion as true, the mind adheres to it and accepts it as congruent. This congruent adhesion is a form of consent. If judgement holds a conclusion false, it is rejected in the form of a disagreement. Vives refers to Cicero's *Partitions* and states that assent is a form of faith, based on a firm opinion. A weak opinion is held in suspicion; and a neutral opinion is held in suspense, since it is not inclined toward good or evil, and occupies an intermediate position between agreement and disagreement. Vives finds these decisions conditioned by emotions. Subjects who are simple, sweet and benevolent, are credulous. Those who are incredulous do not have the facility to comprehend the causes of anything, and there are some perverse spirits who are by nature malevolent, exhibiting an absolute incredulity, and rejecting all forms of acceptance and conformity with other spirits. They will only accept what they themselves invent or propose. Suspicion is the habit of a soul that inclines itself toward the worst characteristics of any conclusion. These characteristics belong to the envious, ambitious, greedy, malignant and malevolent; those who in their lives they have suffered many evils and deceptions. They also include those who are older and have participated in fraudulent undertakings, and have dealt with mendacious and cunning people. Acceptance, on the other hand, is produced more clearly by the careful use of scrutiny and questioning. For this reason, it is easier to accept a simply told fable than a line of reasoning that evolves from controversy, proving that rhetoric is more useful than dialectic.

The Ingenium

In his incisive book, *Vives on the Emotions*, Carlos Noreña describes Vives' concept of "*ingenium*" by drawing on the material assembled in *De anima et vita*, published in 1538. At the onset of chapter VI of *De anima*, Vives boldly asserts that the "*ingenium*" is the force or power of our whole mind, "*Universam mentis nostrae vim, de qua summus hactenus loquuti, Ingenium nominari placuit*" (Mayans 364). In Vives's work, *De disciplinis* (1531), the reader is also provided with an outline of the structure of the *ingenium*: ("*Ingenii partes sunt*"): first, there is the keenness or acuity of observation ("*acies ad intuendum*"); second, the capacity for understanding ("*capacitas ad comprehendendum*"); and, thirdly, the power of comparison in order to judge ("*collation ad iudicium*"). The *ingenium* is the power of the whole mind, in other words the action of understanding; it expresses or manifests itself through its own instruments.

In chapter VI of *De Anima*, Vives offers the reader a metaphor as an explanation of how the *ingenium* functions: the mind inhabits the body in the same way that a person is enclosed in a room. The person, he continues, only has one window that allows him to look out and, consequently, all he can see is restricted and conditioned by this crystal aperture. Obviously, if the window is clean and transparent, the mind will see clearly but, if soiled and dusty, what it sees will be vague or distorted. Similarly, our mind, because it resides within our body, can only attain information from the senses, but what the senses provide must be continuously corrected. Since the mind has no other window than what is presented to it through the senses, it must continuously examine this information. This window or crystal aperture can best be understood as the ground or place of perception, and marks the separation

between the realms of mind and matter. There is a continuous tension between these two realms: as the mind builds upon its experience and strives to work on transcendental levels, the materiality of existence causes situations that impede the process of creating universal statements needed to support transcendental thinking. The mind or intelligence must then continue to focus on experience, only available from the senses, to ensure that the universal statements it has created (the statements, one must assume, that form the above window or crystal aperture) retain validity over time.

Since the operation of all mental activities ultimately depends upon the physiology of the body, Vives builds upon Aristotle's theory of the four humors and Galen's endocrinology. As described in the second book of *De tradendis* (1531) and *De anima*, the predominance of one of the humors, emerging from their many possible combinations, is what produces the incredible variety of human "*ingenia*". In describing some of the physiological changes that produce different tempers and behaviors, he includes one taken from Virgil's *Georgics*. According to Virgil, a poet in his flight toward the muse rises above the cooler levels of blood, toward higher and thus warmer levels, where the sweet muses are found. An attentive reader of Vives' works would immediately understand the depths and ramifications of this reference. It is a clear reminder of the transcendence that the mind constantly desires and seeks out, a yearning similar to the poet's longing for the spell of the muse. In this particular case the mind is the poet, ever aware that if blood stays within the lower regions of the body, it will remain cold and therefore without the quality that would lift its being to the levels of transcendence necessary to see or envision

the invisible forces behind nature and the great lights in the far heavens. This is only an example of how Vives presents a multi-layered text, employing images and ideas from his other writings. By recalling and relying on his own reading and those of others, he keeps on building a life-long work, much like the man of his *Fabula de homine*, who takes on the masks of all that he has assimilated in an unending process that is historical and evolutionary.

Further in his presentation of the physiology of the *ingenium*, Vives refers to the opposite condition, when the organs produce warmth, causing the soul's actions to be quick and vigorous. This, he explains, is brought about by the state and disposition of the heart, conditions that influence both the thought processes and the intelligence. When this condition prevails, men are referred to as "*cordati*," (from the Latin *cor*, *cordis* –the heart) endowed with intelligence, sensibility, judiciousness (hence the Spanish form: "cuerdos"); but when the opposite state exists they are called "*excordes*." Since the heart is the place where feeling and emotions are produced, without its exudations the mind would not understand, perceive anger, fear, sadness or shame. The proof of this exchange, Vives argues, is that however much the blood boils in young men, the heart will not cause any excitement in the soul, as in spirited and balanced young men, since the processes of this disturbance do not reach their minds (Riber 1201).

It is only when the hot and the humid qualities are in balance that humors contribute to the formation of an *ingenio* that is perceptive and sane. A word should be said about melancholy, a much discussed Renaissance issue which Vives regards as a condition of the *ingenium* that is generated from its warmer emanations and the

movement of thoughts. Melancholy is produced by the actions and reactions of conflicting thoughts that are, in turn, the result of warmer humors. The only way to reduce its effects is to ensure that other humors bring the *ingenium* into a balance or equilibrium. If left alone, melancholia will take possession of the brain, and its disturbance of the spirit will cause the loss of fluids, further debilitating both mind and body, a process that will lead to the decadence and distemper of the entire body. However, if this balance of humors is restored by subtle and clear fluids, the potentiality of the *ingenium*'s faculties of reason, judgment, prudence and wisdom is increased. Subjects with such an *ingenium* are endowed with great lucidity and farsightedness so as to be able to make significant contributions and discoveries that shape the tradition of their societies.

In support of his analysis of *ingenium*, Vives refers to Socrates' second speech of the *Phaedrus* in which Plato has the philosopher discuss the "manic art." It is the noblest of all arts. Not only is it associated with the Sibyls, for being the art of divining the future, but is also the fundamental element of poetic creation, since it endows the poet with the "*mania*", which is actually the condition of being possessed by the Muses. Vives adds to this Socratic argument that man, in fact, cannot aspire to write poetry on the sole belief that technique alone will make him a good poet. His sane compositions will never attain the perfection of the inspired madman. He points to Plato, reiterating the words of Democritus: "there is not an excellent talent ("*ingenio*") without passion ("*nullum excellens ingenium sine mania*")" (Mayans 366) Caution is recommended here, however, since Vives balances his Platonism with the Stoic focus on sense experience. The poetic "*mania*" is one form of

“*ingenium*”, and it does not replace the world of sense experience in which the mind labors to construct itself. Again, this passage shows a tension in Vives’ thought that can only be resolved in what it produces in practice at any given point. Vives accepts the language of Platonism and its evolution through Neo-Platonism on the condition that it can be used to (con)textualize sense experience.

In *De anima*, Vives also refers to Democritus’ graphic statement that language (“*sermo*”) is a stream of speech: “*Sermonem apte nominavit rivum rationis*” (Mayans 366). The Greeks, he continues, combined in the same word “*logos*” both reason (*ratio*) and language (speech). In *De ratione dicendi* (1532), Vives again cites the “*rivum rationis*” of Democritus, which is found in the mind and which allows men to live as active participants in society. By extending Democritus’ metaphor to language as “*defluxum rationis*,” or a flowing of reason, Vives asserts that the statement by Democritus is true, since there is not any other instrument more apt to carry reciprocal or collective communication. This is why Mercury, to whom poetic fictions confer the palm of eloquence, is considered not only the messenger but the interpreter of the message between gods and men (Mayans I.93). For Vives, eloquence is the appropriate expression of what is conceived in the mind and communicated through words. A speaker, or orator in this case, requires a perfect or complete knowledge of language, which he virtuously combines congruently with reason or thought.

If language is the substance worked upon by the power of the mind, that is to say, “*ingenium*”, it will be necessary to comment briefly on Vives’ description of the structure of learning as explained in chapter VIII of *De anima*. Vives opens the

chapter with the statement that (“*doctrina*”) or teaching is the transmission of what one knows to a subject who does not know. Discipline is the reception (“*acceptio*”) of what is being taught. Because of this endless process of teaching and reception in the transmission of knowledge, erudition is increased through the ages, like the movement of a flame that burns brighter and purer. In the course of this continuous transmission, the “*ingenio*” takes into account all the objects that materialize at each moment, completes them in language and develops forms to interpret subsequent experience. The less active “*ingenios*” are assisted through instruction, seen by Vives as an activity that constructs society by the language or discourse produced within the continual dialectic of active “*ingenios*”. The key to this process is the discipline of teaching, which Vives considers as the construction of erudition.

The discipline is composed of two related processes: the first is the placing of a quality in one’s soul, such as the transmission of a new language; the second is the actualization of that quality within the mind, either as a power or a potential to an act. The example Vives uses to explain this point is the inventive process of the sciences or arts that take natural materials as the seeds of the next level of understanding. Within this historical process each event becomes an object of further study. It is a dialectical process, open at all times to modification by various levels of “*ingenios*”. He turns to the Stoic argument to illustrate how “seeds” are implanted by nature into the mind, similar to the actual seeds of plants placed in the earth. Teaching, in this case, brings out what lies in the seeds, similar to the process of nature that revives the protein (“*germenes*”) of the seeds and induces growth. Faultless teaching, or

pedagogy, like the perfect combination of natural processes, directs the light, as it were, to promote faster growth.

The process of learning starts with the senses, or sense perception that feeds the imagination, and from the imagination ("*phantasia*") passes to the mind ("*mens*"). Thus, what we have is a movement going from the simple to the complex, the particular to the general. This can be observed in children, who learn and express separate parts of each thing, and later are able to put these parts together and combine them into wholes. Here the universal is built into the language by careful analysis of the particular. The universal is a language-based sign deployed as a universal concept. This universal is continually subject to change, modification and/or recombination. After the initial experience of the particular, the mind builds the universal from the singular events presented by the senses. Thus, the first teachers are the senses, in whose mansion the mind is enclosed. Following both Aristotle and Plato, Vives finds that the most important sense is vision, that organ which is manifest in the greatest number of species and is the author of investigation and knowledge. From vision is born admiration and, from that, observation which, when followed by verification, generates the passion of science. Vives here agrees with Aristotle's observation that this is the sense of discipline.

Although Vives' emphasis is directed to a continual examination of sense experience, he accepts mental images or forms, Plato's ideas, as models that facilitate the assembly of things presented by the senses, since they lead to truer and more exact statements. He sees, however, the need to nurture these ideas through teaching and practice, and states that if this happens, the "*ingenios*" that are involved

in this process will attain a greater operational magnitude. In addition to the cultivation of these ideas, he recommends the study or diligent reading of great authors, whose works will also assist in the development of the "*ingenium*." It is not only through contemplation or studiousness, but through the use and exercise of the knowledge, acquired from all activities in which man is engaged, whether music, eloquence, or practical arts and painting. The more tenacious the perseverance in one's undertaking, without the coloring of sorrow or anger of spirit, the better the work and its reception. One must persist and insist, taking every possible way into account, and always ready to change when one does not yield the expected results. It is important to struggle with the work, since anything less would assume the operation of a universal knowledge that does not exist on the level of the senses.

A generation later another Spanish thinker, Huarte de San Juan, published an entire book on the question of the "*ingenio*", as can be seen from the title, *Examen de ingenios*. He begins his definition of "*ingenio*" in the first chapter of his book with a reference to Plato, who sets forth the method of providing a definition of the subject, the nature of which "we want to know and understand" (40). As he states at the very beginning, the subject of his essay is the "*ingenio*", and the intelligence and ability of man (from the Latin, *habilitas/atis*), that is an integral part of his essence. Huarte emphasizes the importance of defining the term, "*ingenium*", quoting again from Plato in a Latin translation of the *Cratylus*: "est instrumentum docendi discernendique re(r)um substantia" (41). "This name *ingenio*, he continues, derives from one of the following three Latin verbs, "*gigno*" (to bring into being, create), "*ingino*" (to cause to grow), "*ingenero*" (in the sense of engender or produce a

family). Here Huarte finds that the term "*ingenium*" is more closely related to last of the three Latin verbs he examines.

Although the focus here is to clarify Vives' thought and not follow the elegant philology of Huarte, let us look, nonetheless, at the conclusion in which he isolates the word "*ingenero*" from which "*ingenio*" is derived. Huarte finds that the two words share a semantic identity, in that both imply giving form to a whole figure that represents what is alive in nature and is the subject of which is learned through this science (43). However, in terms of the semantic field surrounding the term "*ingenium*," Vives seems to be better prepared to accommodate Socrates, who argues that the superior "*ingenio*" is accompanied by madness, ("*Ingenium excellens cum mania*") than Huarte, who finds in Aristotle a more careful analysis of the particulars of "*ingenium*".

In his *Roots of the Italian Humanistic Tradition*, Ernesto Grassi finds a clear expression of Stoic thinking in Cicero that underlies Vives' analysis of "*ingenium*". Nature, conceived by Cicero, has two aspects. The first aspect is best described as that which, hidden in some way from the subject, comes forth and causes astonishment or wonderment ("*mirabile*"). The second aspect of nature is revealed through human activity. Reality is transformed by man through his own capacity, which Cicero terms "*Virtus*." These human capacities or "virtues," Grassi argues, arise from "*ingenium*," which Cicero calls '*semina virtutem*' or, as he writes in the *Tusculan Disputations*: "sunt enim ingeniis nostris semina innata virtutem" (III.1.2). According to Cicero, these "seeds of virtue" are inborn in man's disposition. If they were allowed to ripen without the corrupting influence of bad habits and beliefs, than

man himself would be a reflection of nature's design and his life would be felicitous. However, this is not the case, since man immediately finds himself, upon seeing the first light of day in an iniquitous world, assailed by wrong beliefs, so that, as Cicero intones, it seems as though man drinks down deception with his nurse's milk. His true nature in this view is hidden behind a fabric woven by a society that replaces the true substance of virtue located within him by a culturally crafted idea of glory.

It is the work of the "*ingenium*", the full force of the mind, that allows man to define himself, finding the coherent language that will reveal the substance of virtue that awaits discovery. The activity of this "*ingenium*" consists in the identification of relationships and the invention of similitudes among things. This art of finding similarities is not based upon deduction. It is not arrived at through the use of the "*Ars demonstrandi*," or deduction, since it is an action of "*inventio*" or invention, which is best characterized as the power of discerning speech that brings out the relationships among things, events, and words. It is the way the human subject draws the form of "*res*", the carrier of human meanings, from nature. Through this "*res*" nature appears (Grassi 9). Work or labor is the activity through which the "*res*" (state of affairs) is constructed from what is presented to man by nature, and its meaning is generated through "*usus*" or use.

Man, as both Cicero and Vives conceive him, is no longer anchored within nature, similar to the being of plants and animals, as distinguished in *De natura deorum* and other works. He must perfect the powers that have removed him from nature and have forced him to construct a world of his own (Grassi 10). Man's mind, its power, "*ingenium*," is revealed through work, and its historical determinations are dependent

upon the construction of probabilities that are expressed by verisimilitudes, or acts of "*invention*." Man has been granted the freedom of making his own history. The study of philology, rhetoric, dialectic, and jurisprudence take on a special philosophic importance, since only through these studies are we able to describe the basic structures of the human world. For Grassi, the essence of this freedom can be discovered through an analysis of the theory of "*ingenium*," a process that would result in a philosophical theory of metaphor (11). At this point in his argument Grassi selects a work of Vives, the *Fabula de homine*, in which it is possible to perceive what he terms the "consciousness" of "freedom," as conceived within the Humanistic tradition.

In the *Fabula*, Grassi finds a radical reversal of the medieval formulation of metaphysics and a deviation from the primacy of formal logic as the basis of speculation about nature (11). He notes that the traditional objects of "*contemplatio*" are the first principles from which are derived the eternal and unchanging meanings given to reality. However, in Vives' *Fabula* the object of "*contemplatio*", the mind, does not show itself immediately. The process of the mind is not derived from a universal through which its particular elements are elucidated. It emerges, rather, through a series of "masks" that man-the-actor wears as he progresses through the hierarchical orders of the cosmos. In this work, man is provided a theater by Jupiter, in which he creates the most appropriate actions to define himself as he moves through his threefold nature within the cosmos: vegetable, animal, and spiritual. He is so ingenious with the masks he creates that even the gods find man's metaphors or masks credible. The culmination of this spectacle, the master metaphor, is man's

mask of Jupiter himself. This act, which confuses the gods, delights Jupiter, who is pleased by the mirror that man has created. In this theater man himself is the object of thought. What the gods observe, however, is not a stationary figure or elemental essence. Rather, it is a complex, multi-dimensional creature that expresses its essence through a progression of identities taken from the three basic kingdoms of man's being. Man's mind does not reveal itself as substance; instead, it creates a history of splendid masks or metaphors that holds the gods in wonder. The ascent of man culminates in the creation of Jupiter's mask, an invention that confuses the gods, some of whom are then severely punished for perceiving this final mask as an identity, not a similarity (similitude) between Jupiter and his creation.

Through this evolutionary process, in which he rises from the world of the particulars, man discovers his similarity with the divine. This activity also leads him to the discovery of his original or primordial nature. Within the terms of the *Fabula*, therefore, man responds through this performance to the necessity of finding his origin and pleasing his father, Jupiter. In so doing, man provides a demonstration of the two sources upon which his society is based: word and justice, two essential components on which Vives elaborates at great length in *De disciplines*: "Humanae omnes societates, duabus potissimum rebus vinciuntur ac continentur, iustitia, et sermone" (Mayans 4. 1). Since the society of men best operates with justice and speech ("sermone"), it becomes obvious that distinguished speakers or orators have an important function. The reason the orator's role in society assumes such importance (in the *Fabula* man is fundamentally an orator) is that the word is the "living flow of the soul" ("esse in animi fluvio, sermone"), best discovered and

presented by able speakers. Only through the “*inventio*”, triggered by the necessity to speak well, and informed by the “*ingenium*,” can one discover man’s origin. The “*ingenium*” is the instrument God has given man to respond to his urgent needs and invent himself and his society: “*Ingenii acumen vivax, et sua sponte actuosum: hinc sunt nata inventa hominum omnia, utilia, noxia, proba, improba*” (*De ratione dicendi* 153). Grassi concludes with another statement taken from Vives’ *De ratione dicendi*: “Even the metaphor, that figurative transfer of meaning, stands in the service of satisfying urgent needs (“*Ornatus dicendi et acutius inveniendi, ex necessitate fluxit*”) (14).

Writing on the “*Ingenium and Rhetoric in the Work of Vives*,” Emilio Hidalgo Serna identifies what he sees as a fundamental problem in the study of philosophy in the Humanistic tradition. The significance of the “*ingenium*”, he observes, has been limited by modern critics and historians to its usefulness as an explanation of a literary faculty or a psychological concept. Understood in this manner, it has lost its primary role as the mind’s inventive power through which man creates his world. For this reason, Hidalgo explores the structure of the “*ingenium*” in the light of Vives’ humanistic philosophy. Taking into consideration the way that man acts as a creator in his world, through the power of grasping the relationships that form the basis of his experience of nature, Hidalgo observes that through this activity, man orders his world and is thus the protagonist and author of his own history (228). This ability to “grasp” relationships presented by the senses cannot be accomplished with the structure of the “*ingenium*” and its function. For Vives, the “*ingenium*” is the fundamental concept on which is built his work on psychology, philosophy and

pedagogy. As Hidalgo concludes, the origins of society, of its arts and sciences, its inventions, and of the knowledge of human behavior and of historical processes, have been decoded by Vives through his theory of the inventive creativity of the human “*ingenium*” (229).

As we have seen, all inventions emerge from crisis and necessity. For Vives, man is only possible after the cosmos is destabilized by his birth. Unlike all other living beings, man has lost the privilege of the vegetable and animal substances whose needs are enclosed by nature. Fallen from this state in which there is no differentiation between nature and being, man through his creativity and faculty of invention assembles his own history. This faculty of “*inventio*” or discovery is man’s response to the necessity of constructing unity in a world that initially appears fragmented. The fragmentation is due to man’s distinct consciousness, which differentiates itself from time and space, and from the vegetable and animal kingdoms. In terms of the Christian doctrine, Vives locates the condition of this basic necessity in man’s fall from grace. However, the very consciousness or mind that initially separates him is also the way to reconstruct himself. It is the “*ingenium*” that reconstitutes man’s experience in speech, and offers him a way of discovering the unity of his being.

As mentioned above, this unity of being is realized within human society. The two most important aspects of speech that support the construction of man and human society are the dialectic, designated by Vives as “*ars disserendi*,” and rhetoric, “*ars dicendi*.” Both “*ars disserendi*” and “*ars dicendi*” are made possible by distinguished speakers or orators. Keen speech, Vives contends, consists in a

cognitive and verbal penetration of individual things. As Vives writes in *De tradendis disciplinis*, this power of mind or “*ingnium*” operates the faculty of perception, and directs attention to all things, in order to gather them together and to arrange them coherently (Mayans 243). This activity (the Stoic “*katalepsis*”) of grasping resemblance and correspondence is the essence of invention. Vives examines the Stoic mode of cognition in the opening statements of his *De instrumento probabilitatis*. It is the direct apprehension of the relationships among things that the senses present to the human subject (Mayans 82).

If the “*ingenium*” is the force of the human mind, then its function is an essential part of obtaining knowledge of itself and the cosmos or world. Further, in *De instrumento probabilitatis*, Vives clearly states that the human mind is the faculty through which man knows the truth, since it has a certain sympathy with primordial truths that are similar to seeds from which the remainder of truths develop. This organization of knowledge is made possible epistemologically by the above mode of “*katalepsis*” that operates through “*anticipationes atque formations*,” or what the early Stoics identified as “*prolepsis*” or intuition that provides within the mind a way to organize experience (Mayans 82). This is also the place, Vives adds, where Plato anchored his system of learning, which he defined as a process of discovery and remembering universal ideas. However, Vives continues, this condition is no greater than the eye’s ability to perceive color while being formed in the maternal uterus before the experience of light. In other words it is closer to the Aristotelian concept of potential; it is not yet the act itself.

A century later another Spaniard, Baltazar Gracián, drawing from Vives' earlier work on the "*ingenium*," produced a work titled, *Agudeza y arte de ingenio* which, unfortunately, has been understood as a handbook on forms of poetic wit or conceit, rather than an analysis of the ontological/epistemological function of the "*ingenium*." In his novel *El Criticón* (Part I, "Crisi Tercera"), Gracián closely follows the progression of man in Vives' *Fabula* within the context of a dialogue between the two principal characters, Andrenio and Critilo, who ponder the interlocking tripartite nature of the world in which the vegetative state provides the basis for the sentient animal creatures. From these two basic kingdoms, a third and higher structure emerges, namely man, who not only has the powers of growth and sentience, but also of judgement, reflection and comprehension. It is this man, according to Critilo, again following the man of the *Fabula*, who directs himself to his God with the purpose of knowing, loving and serving Him. Later in the novel (Part II, "Crisi Duodezima"), both Andrenio and Critilo listen to a discussion among delegates of the arts and sciences concerning which discipline should receive the sovereign title of queen, light of understanding and august empress of letters. Theology does not partake in the competition, since it already occupies a privileged space among the other disciplines. Representatives from jurisprudence, medicine, mathematics and government enter the argument to argue for their respective disciplines as the most transcendent. The competition soon takes on the characteristics of a quarrel. Finally, to resolve the matter, the grand chancellor of letters and President of the Academy rises to announce the true compass of learning, the crown of knowledge and science of sciences. He produces a small book from his breast pocket and states that this is a

book of gold, written by the celebrated grammarian Luis Vives. It is a prodigious work titled *De conscribendis* (*The Art of Writing*). To quell the subsequent laughter of the representatives, the chancellor warns the assembly that there is no other discipline in the world that overshadows the knowledge of writing letters. He then quotes a pertinent aphorism in Latin: "Qui vult regnare, scribat," he who desires to govern, must write. Writing well, writing with eloquence, as we have discussed above, requires the faculty of the "*ingenium*". In accordance with Vives and the humanistic tradition, it is true that the continuing dialogue between "*res*" and "*verbum*", content and form, conducted by the full force of the mind or "*ingenium*," enables man to grasp the full range of his experience, invent a probable world, and express its meaning in ordinary language.

Of Language (*De sermone*)

Vives opens his discussion of language (*sermo*) with the following quote from Democritus, who aptly called it the "rational stream." In Greek, Vives continues, the term "*logos*" combined the notions of language and reason. It is his intention to use "*sermo*" or language as the equivalent of "*logos*" or discourse. He considers that his use of the term not only refers to the spoken, but also to the written language. Language itself flows from the whole mind, from simple words of the simple intelligence to the composite phrases produced by the imagination, culminating in the coherent expressions of reason that are used synthetically and analytically.

When words come from the soul they do not possess the order and arrangement that the mind finds in them. Even though some simple things can be expressed with

order and care, there are others that are scattered and in need of arrangement. These words are not properly received within the soul unless the imagination, with its storehouse of semantic dimensions, quickly orders and colors them. Vives distinguishes the levels of speech available to subjects based on individual abilities. Some subjects simply lack optimal vocabularies and thus have weak powers of description; others have an inhibited imagination; and there are others with problems resulting from slow and weak memories. There are some speakers who, although exercising well the faculty of reason and judgement, nevertheless lack eloquence. Here, Vives defines eloquence as the correct expression of what is conceived in the mind by means of the best words available. Its foundation lies in a perfect knowledge of the language and the congruent connection between the faculties of speech and reason.

The differences among speakers are profound. Although he does not draw the conclusions implicit in his description of the range of discourse that would obviously expand in accordance with the variable dimensions of each speaker, Vives' view of language and its efficacy as a link of reliable communication among speaking subjects, forming a community of speakers, would establish the grounds of an epistemology derived from the semantics of the probable. Vives, however, eschews a skeptical approach that would lead to a complete rejection of the reliability of language to communicate the subject's external and internal experience. For Vives, the key to knowledge is the correct use of language, which is as natural in man as reason itself. Its source is deep within the faculties of soul from which discourse flows. Languages are artificial, not established by nature. All of the languages,

however, are constituted by spoken and written words. The words of man are expressions of the whole soul, including the imagination, emotions, intelligence and the will. The optimal force and power of these attributes of the soul produce what Vives identifies as the "*ingenium*," which has been described in another section. Using a phrase that closely parallels his comment on language found in the *Fabula*, Vives is astounded by how the diversity of sounds within the range of the human voice can be formed into a few letters, which in turn can give birth to such an admirable variety and abundance of words, discourses and languages (Mayans 372).

The Method of Learning (*De discendi ratione*)

Chapter eight of *De anima* is the heart of Vives' epistemology. Here he provides the reader with a description of the dialectical process of learning. Instruction ("*doctrina*"), which is the equivalent of "*traditio*", is the transfer, as the word implies, from one who knows to another who does not know. (Mayans 372) Instruction involves the reception of what is being transferred, which is an active and equally significant part of the dialectical process. Stressing this two part process, he warns the reader that optimum instruction depends upon the power of both minds, those of teacher and student, to augment the body of knowledge ("*eruditio*"). Knowledge, for Vives as he writes in *De tradendis*, is not a perfect resource that should be accepted as the basis of truth; rather, it needs to be continuously examined within a dialectical process that brings forth notions that are used to test the historical structures of thinking. Vives dismisses the idea that the process of learning is comprised of a passive student who accepts without a critique the ideas of a teacher.

He criticizes those who conceive of learning as a passive process of the student's digesting what the teacher offers as a situation similar to the comment of Thierry of Cluny, whom he cites in another section as saying that contemporary scholars are midgets standing on the shoulders of giants. Vives finds no truth in this statement; it has been used, he surmises, as a way to transfer the corrupted texts to innocent students. On the contrary, an example of dialectic in the hands of Vives is his continuous criticism of the works of Aristotle and Valla, among others. For Vives the learning process is a place of continuous questioning.

The method of instruction ("*disciplina*") is twofold. The first is the placement within the soul of a quality such as a new language, which occurs through the exercise of human invention ("*in hominum inventis*"). The second is the action of the mind to bring to the level of understanding that which exists only in the condition of potentiality, as happens in the sciences and arts. As he has mentioned before (in *De probabilitatis*), this can be accomplished because the seeds ("*semina sunt naturalituri menti nostrae indita*") of all natural things have been placed in the mind in the same way that they are placed in the soil. To extend the metaphor, drawn from Stoic thought, the subject who teaches seems to do no other action than, like the sun, give life to the seeds that await germination in the mind. Without instruction these seeds would probably germinate, but not as quickly nor as satisfactorily (Mayans 372).

The course of this method of learning extends from the senses to the imagination, and from the imagination to the mind. It is the same as the course of life and Nature, extending from the simple to the composite, from the particular to the general. This can be observed in children, who begin by expressing the separate parts of each thing

and later combine them in statements. They also use one singular name to signify universals: for example, all artisans are given the name of the first one they recognize and all cuts of meat are either ox or cow, depending on what is heard when they are forming their infantile vocabulary. Later, the mind infers the universal from the particulars. Likewise, in the order of things, the first instructors are the senses whose domain is enclosed in the mind ("*mens*"). The principle faculty of the senses is sight, since it makes evident the greatest number of species and is the most powerful agent of investigation and wisdom. With this use of the ocular metaphor, Vives continues the long tradition going back to Aristotle and Plato on the primary importance of vision. From the seeing of things admiration emerges and from it comes observation, followed by the process of verification, all of which are dimensions of the enthusiasm for wisdom.

The second most important sense is hearing, which teaches the subject additional dimensions of things, attaining with increasing velocity higher levels of understanding. Again Vives refers to Aristotle, stating that the sense of hearing shortens the time that it would usually take to cover the same material with only the visual dimension available. Although Aristotle considered the sense of hearing crucial to the learning process, concluding that those animals that lacked it were inferior to those who derived benefit from it, Vives finds an exception to this case. He cites an example from Rudolph Agricola regarding a person deaf from birth, who proved the contrary, since he was able to learn the art of letters. Vives' uses Agricola's example as a way to avoid sweeping generalizations. It is also is another demonstration of his focus on the individual as the basic unit of analysis, at all times questioning the

process that forms the general or universal statement. In extolling the utility of learning, he refers to certain subjects who are able to learn quickly, since they are naturally disposed to instruction and need only a minimum of assistance. Some of these subjects are so disposed to the learning process that they are autodidactic, virtually educating themselves, and becoming their own best instructors. According to Vives, so much depends on the composition of each individual "*ingenium*," and, of course, on the level of instruction available. The "*ingenium*," or force of each soul, varies among all subjects, thus forming a classificatory range from the most able to the least. Among those of higher levels, Vives describes the group defined by Quintilian with the Greek term, "*enfantasiotos*", or those subjects who are most able in the art of discourse. Within this group are found the natural dialecticians, able to grasp the primordial origin of each thing. This group includes Aristotle and Galen. The great "*ingenios*" in any sphere or discipline emerge from nature, although the growth is assisted by meditation and practice. This nature must be nurtured through training. Here Vives turns to Seneca, and offers the following citation: "...many would have been able to arrive at wisdom if they had not believed they were already wise" (Mayans 375).

The process of erudition is slow. Each step must take into account all the dimensions that are built into the field of discourse. Unlike other activities of life, through which subjects advance quickly and are able to exercise their professions, the studies that enable the subject to attain wisdom are arduous and only can be achieved by the most robust minds. Nevertheless, Vives considers that a subject with appropriate instruction, focused clearly on his or her objective, and having access to

the resources acquired through one's studies, has the ability to govern his life and offer others the assistance necessary to clear the way between ignorance and culture.

The Concept of Notion (*De cognitionibus seu notitis*)

Affirming again his basic epistemological position, Vives opens this section of *De anima* with the reminder that the primary act of knowing ("*cognitio*") emerges from the senses. This primary act of the senses is the origin of all other levels of knowledge. From this basic act of knowing, a body of knowledge is accumulated step by step, through a process of accretion. This progressively incremental knowledge is not only associated with "*disciplina*", as Aristotle describes in his "*Resolutoriis*", but also, with practice as Vives emphasizes, throughout the entire course of life (Mayans 378). Of the diverse external objects that fall under the dominion of the senses, some are obvious and others are hidden. Of the obvious, some are considered present, others absent. The senses, Vives describes, grasp the objects that are present; those that are not apparent or present are grasped by the imagination. Subsequently, the mind works to contemplate and reflect upon both the direct and indirect content of the information presented by the senses and the imagination. The process of reason is guided by the mind, and works with a range of images and notions, from the most recondite to concrete. It takes into account the particular and the general, and submits this form of contemplation to the interior light of mind's eye in order to understand and know. Just as the physical eye needs exterior light to see clearly, so does the mind's eye. Built upon Aristotle's metaphor of the union of light and eye, he describes the method of learning as the relation between the physical and mental eye.

There is no other thing more similar to the intelligence, he says, than the physical eye. What erudition or learning is to the mind, light is to the pupil of the eye. The mind speculates with the help of instruction and the eye sees with the help of light (Mayans 377).

Vives divides the range of knowable things into two distinct parts. The first comprises things that are temporal and changeable and the second, perpetual and immutable. The first division depends upon physical light; the second needs an interior or supernatural light ("*lumen supernaturali*"), which is the light of wisdom. Wisdom also comprehends the temporal and variable character of both particular and general objects, even though the latter do not retain their integrity, as indicated by Cicero, who considered these as subject to opinion and thus brought into discourse with varying degrees of verisimilitude. Even concepts accepted as "universal" show some exceptions and variety. Nevertheless, the mind would be lost in a world of infinite particulars, without the possibility of formulating a single statement. The concept of a general statement, understood as a characteristic that particular members share within a genus, enables the subject to establish roles and precepts, which are the basis of the formation of an art or discipline. While making a reference to the Platonic method, Vives states that the process of inquiry should not submerge itself completely in the world of indivisible particulars, since the human "*ingenio*" would be overwhelmed. The mind works best on the level of the forms of things, where similar qualities can be identified among the flow of an infinite number of things. In the multitude of natural things, particulars that are not unified in general statements return to the darkness of man's mind and are not of the realm of experience. Vives

concludes that the formation of knowledge and the clarity among things that the knowing subject must experience to attain the truth is rooted in the mind, not in things. Although there are minds that are prone to obfuscate the clearest concept of things, there are others that are able to bring light into the most obscure or recondite areas of experience by way of their will, demonstrating both a natural and cultivated ability. Consequently, where there is more light, there is more science; and where there is less light, there is more doubt. Error is not caused by science or verisimilitude; rather, it is caused by the residual caliginous obscurity that is usually mixed with light. There are an astonishing number of things that interpose themselves between the mind and the body, through which the subject must infer what is good and what is true. The diverse conditions of the corporal constitution, including health, customs, and the state of the soul, are products of the circumstances of time and place. Various mixtures of these corporal elements create the numerous variations of the human "*ingenio*".

Contemplation (*De contemplatione*)

As rest follows action, contemplation follows the activities of reason and judgement. Vives uses this statement in a general sense, since the comparison is not one of substance; rather, the action of contemplation is an element of a three part system that works within the mind. Reason itself is a type of scrutiny, and judgment is the process of selection. Contemplation is the calm inspection of all that the workings of reason and judgment have accumulated. Contemplation is not ratiocination. All this work has been done by reason and judgment before passing it

on to the contemplative operation of the mind. For example, in the act of enjoyment there is a certain proportion and congruence between the external object and the corresponding faculty of the soul that receives it. Since the mind finds that there is not a more congruent thing than reason and truth, it takes great delight in the contemplation of the truths presented by the intelligence and judgment.

Vives finds that this applies also to the desire to know the causes of things. There is not one person, he says, who would have a spirit so crude that he will not acknowledge the statement of another who intends to demonstrate the cause of some event. This is due to nature's building into man's soul the desire to know the causes of all things. To emphasize the importance of this desire, Vives cites Virgil's statement from the *Georgics*: "Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causa" (II.490). If indeed a person is happy with the ability to know the causes of things, that is because it lessens the hold that destiny has on one's being, and also neutralizes the echoes from the land of death that awaits him at the end. Although the two lines that complete the above sentence are not directly quoted from Vives' text, as we have seen in other citations from Virgil used in the *Fabula*, one must assume that his readers would either recognize the verses: "atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum (491) "subiecit pedibus streptumque Acherontis avari" (492), or look them up in Virgil's works. Contemplation, together with reason and judgment, is what weakens the explanatory power of fate in man's discourse, which allays his concern with the classical realm of death. The mind derives enjoyment in finding the similarities and proportions among things. It is happiest while working toward a classification from

the most complex sphere of relationships to the simplest forms of things, taking into account both levels of the general and the particular.

The greatest pleasure (“*voluptas*”)—a usage that reminds the reader of Valla’s work-- the elevated spirits can aspire to is to savor directly the certain truths of God. These necessary truths reside above the tenebrous sphere of the earth; they are not dependent upon the workings of verisimilitude. As in Valla, “*voluptas*” is the direct apprehension of the causes of all things designed by their Author. This is the pleasure of emancipation from the dark prison of the human soul, in which no difference exists between experience and judgement. This level of pleasure, Vives continues, does not require any necessary external application. Those who need external applications will invariably discover the methods of discourse that lead to the arts. However, they must proceed carefully, he cautions, since these external applications can suffer from changes of circumstance that compound the multiplicity of subjects, and thus accumulate grave errors that may become part of the common language. Here Vives uses the Greek term, “*polidasis*” to describe the result of discourse that takes into account the multiplicity of such subjects as places, times, persons, and analogies drawn from them that fuel the work of circumspection, prudence, or judgement.

Memory

Vives’ title of chapter 2 is *Memoria et recordatione*. Memory, Vives writes, is a faculty of the soul; it preserves in the mind that which is known by mediation of the external or internal senses. This conservation within the mind is similar to a painting

brought to light by a painter. As the subject looks at the physical painting, producing a notion in the mind, the memory engages in an identical act, through what Vives describes as the eyes of the soul (Mayans 345). The notion formed by this operation is not simple, for the image must pass through a system of reflection that simultaneously examines and investigates its construction. Subsequently, the act of remembering (*recordatio*) must pass through a process of recovery (*recolo/recolere*) through which the image or notion must be brought into the mind at the soul's command. Although the recovery ("*recordatio*") of an image is a simple process, shared by both humans and animals, there is a higher function of reminiscence that depends upon a gradual recovery of images or notions through discourse ("fit per gradus quosdam, et discursum") (Mayans 346). This is a second aspect or dimension of recovery that distinguishes the human soul from the animal soul. The philosophers, Vives states, identify this as recollection or a calling to mind (*reminisce/reminiscor*). To further distinguish this form of recollection and the process of refinement of the original set of images or notions, he selects a line of the *Aeneid*, "Dulces moriens reminiscitur Argos" (X. 782). The horseman, Antor, hit by a spear, lies dying and recalls the sweet land of Argos. Vives employs the Greek term, "*anamnesis*" to support this distinction, which he understands as a reduction of a complex series of images to facilitate the process of reminiscence.

There are two functions of the memory, Vives continues, analogous to the operation of one's hand. The first is to grasp and the second is to retain ("apprehendere, et retinere"). In reference to the doctrine of humors, he states that those who are able to apprehend and retain images and notions in the mind with

facility have cerebral processes benefiting from appropriate mixtures of fluids that enhance memory. Since these mixtures vary, there are significant numbers of differences among subjects concerning apprehension, retention and retrieval of images and notions. This operation covers a range of applications, from the absolute efficiency in certain subjects to the much diminished capacity in others due to their respective social or physiological imbalances. The condition of these latter subjects is one of confusion and incoherence, a reason why their minds remain unhappy and perverted. Perhaps the most robust memories are found among young subjects who exhibit the purest mixtures of warmth and fluids. The memory acquires additional vigor through frequent exercise and reflection. Vives here differentiates between the operation of mind, and the memory. The former does not suffer deterioration when it rests; the latter, however, needs continuous exercise, without which it tends to debilitate (Mayans 348).

As noted by Noreña, Vives' description of the four different types of forgetfulness is not conditioned by a reading of Aristotle's work on memory and recollection, since the latter did not include this dimension in his analysis (98). He again bases his examination of forgetfulness on the analogy of a painter's canvas. The image may be completely eradicated, partially interrupted or destroyed, remain hidden from the subject's searches, or fall into darkness and remain covered with a veil (Mayans 348). The corrective actions to these basic types of forgetfulness are as follows: while the first requires a complete relearning of the subject forgotten, the fourth or last one can only be accomplished by recuperating the health of both body and soul; only the second and third necessitate a search, for they depend upon the degrees of

forgetfulness that tend to obscure the image or notion. They can be recovered through a corrective action that takes into account the entire gradation of a line of an argument. This mental action would take into consideration such relationships as cause and effect, the effect and its form, the part to the whole, the place to the person, as well as the antecedents, consequents, contraries and similarities. In short, this is an indefinite concatenation of topics that would also have to take into account the actual leaps of thought that also influence memory (Mayans 349).

For Vives, the memory system is not a simple machine that collects and retrieves images and notions. Although one dimension of memory operates analogously to the system of sense perception, internally and externally, there are other dimensions in which an ordering process facilitates the recall of mathematical expressions and statements placed in order, as in a verse. The above mental facility of reminiscence also brings forth images and notions summoned by the subject's will and/or soul, a process of organization that complicates the epistemology of memory. Vives, however, does warn the reader that memory functions best when external sense observations are carefully made and ordered to facilitate its operation. This is true also for the reception of internal observations from the imagination. Since memory is a faculty of the soul or, to use a more contemporary metaphor, the central executive, its function must be carefully supervised to ensure its optimal use in building a base of knowledge acquired through the dialectic of the probable. Vives' description of the complex organization of memory and the multiple dimensions in which its elements function suggest that it fills a significant role in both the sensory act of perception and the mental act of cognition. It is indeed difficult to establish where the mechanisms of

the senses end and where memory begins in the case of external sensations. Memory does not seem to be passive while the senses are at work; rather, it has a dynamic role in the organization of sense data.

Furthermore, within the organization of memory, there is an arrangement of places ("*loci*"), the locations of which facilitate the search by the mind's eye through which retrieval of information can be accomplished expeditiously. Vives provides an example of how the memory selects from locations within its organization in accordance with the priorities established by the subject. He refers to his memory of a friend, Idiáquez, with whom he had many good conversations, whose house in Brussels was not far from the royal palace. When the image of the friend's house near the royal palace enters the work of his imagination, Vives always remembers also his friend Idiáquez, and the long conversations they enjoyed. However, when his imagination brings forth the opposite, a conversation with his friend Idiáquez, it is frequently unaccompanied by images of the house and the royal palace. Vives concludes that the remembrance of his friend is thus more notable than the surroundings, since he is able to enjoy the former without attaching it to the latter. The same order of emphasis or importance is associated with sound, taste and smell. Vives provides an example of the taste of cherries during the time in Valencia when he was suffering with fever. The cherries left an undesirable taste in his mouth. Since that time the taste of cherries, after all the intervening years, still triggers an image so strong in his imagination that he virtually senses the same fever in his body. Vives warns the reader that images should not be left to accumulate, since the resulting mixture of images will conceal what is subsequently placed in the same locations.

The most powerful image will then monopolize the economy of images and further weaken the others placed in the same location, similar to the stomach's preference for one food it considers suitable among the other nutritious varieties.

Similarities also cause problems to both memory and sense perception. Vives faults the mind or intelligence for not producing a clear differentiation. This lack of clear differentiation is defined by Vives as an error of first attention ("*prima attentione*"). The second error, or the second reflection ("*secunda cnsideratione*") occurs when an image or notion is retrieved from memory in partial or undifferentiated form. Both of these errors occur through the negligence or laziness of the mind, or through a state of animated excitement as in drunkenness, choler, anger, or through the conditions of diminished capacities due to love, boredom or insolence. In the early stages of life the memory is seen to work with greater integrity, since the mind is freer of the concerns caused by age and thus able to focus in a way that minimizes error. Vives concludes, however, that its operation, susceptible to external fluctuation of sense experience and the internal play of emotion, becomes generally less reliable with age.

On The Whole Mind/Soul (*De mente in universum*)

In chapter twelve of *De anima*, Vives announces that he intends to provide a description of the whole mind or soul, having already analyzed the function of the rational soul. Since God has granted man free will, including the power to approve or disapprove of actions, or the choice of acting or not acting, man's will is thus the governor of all human action. "Yes," Vives says emphatically, at the conclusion of

his chapter on *De voluntate*, the will presides over all human actions; all the operations of being are under its jurisdiction, tending toward the good or evil, generated by the difference between classic use of virtue or vice, leading to acts of acclamation or vituperation, prizes or penalties. Having examined the meaning of human action, Vives deems it appropriate to explore the essence of such actions. The essence of all human action, generally ignored by many, is the soul, created by God in order to unite Man with his Creator. It is a divine substance that has the capacity to participate in the divine, thus forming a unity through which the knowledge of love is made clear and beatitude is attained. It is this beatitude that makes possible the union of the soul with its creator.

According to the definition of the "*mente in univrsu*," the human mind is a spirit through which the body lives intertwined with its being. From this nexus the love of God can be recognized, leading toward a union with Him in eternal beatitude ("Dicamus ergo humanam mentem spiritum esse per quem corpus, cui est connexus, vivit, aptus cognitioni Dei propter amorem, atque hinc conjunctioni cum eo ad beatitudinem aeternam"). Similar to the theatrical spectacle Vives presents in the *Fabula*, the soul descends to the world of bodies, from the highest point to the lowest, taking on various masks which he discovers through the Creator's love. He is able to know the world completely, from hidden recesses of the dull earth to the most prominent heights of the world and its heavens. The soul makes manifest all that Man knows, the entire cycle of life, and the great chain of being. Vives' description of the soul runs along identical historical lines earlier, established in the *Fabula*: the initial life of man begins as that of the flora, rises to the level of the animal realm and then,

finally, reaches the level of human being, which includes all previous lower forms. There are, however, other levels above the earthly hierarchy, occupied by angels, which can only be attained through a transcendence that leads ultimately to a union with the Creator. Such a progressive system operates through the material senses at the earthly level, leading to the imagination and fantasy (*phantasia*) at the next level; this in turn leads to the faculties of reason and reflection at the next level and, finally, the realm of love at the ultimate level. The complete cycle of the soul, descendent and ascendant, is at all times vulnerable to the play of the passions, which can at any point overwhelm the work of judgment and imagination, and overpower reason. Passion can so confuse the rational faculties of the soul that they have the power to turn man's being upside down to the point that he walks on earth, as it were, with his head while keeping his feet in the air.

There is a single soul in each person, although within its essence there are a number of actions, public and private, that pertain to the arts and sciences. However, as in the passions described above, this number of activities can limit the soul's perspective. For example, while concentrating on one activity or emotion, such as the intensified effort made in analyzing one specific issue, the capacity to judge is held in abeyance until the primary focus loses its strength and thus cedes to judgment. This is why models of thought and behavior are essential to the human being, since they offer examples that have prevailed against time, and have endured the criticism of generations of readers. The classical texts in Latin provide a case in point. These classic texts should have preference over the modern authors, whose newness may be an obstacle to judgment. Another aspect of these ancient texts is that they offer

models for emulation. An example of this can be found in Cesar's reading, which he was able to transfer immediately into action. There is also the work of Porphyry, who was able to write on Plotinus while fully engaged in the affairs of state.

Vives reminds the reader that the soul's essence can only be known through action; its essence upon cessation of action can no longer be determined. Its action can also be detained and thwarted by overpowering experiences, such as those agents of violence that oppose the nature of the spirit. However, when exterior pressures lose their force, the soul returns to its regular tasks. To accomplish this, the soul does not need or rely on any exterior assistance, other than the removal of the obstacle. The soul, it should be noted, remains vulnerable any time that one does not employ it wisely. As for some who would want to narrow its focus to the point of complete cessation, reducing its strength, it would be similar to taking away the material that would allow a flame to provide the fire within. There are others who would use the mind without any discipline, allowing an unorganized rush of thoughts to enter the soul's field of action, which inevitable results in a complete loss of mind ("*plane amentia*") (Mayans 390).

In his discussion of the "whole mind" or soul, Vives follows closely the analysis presented by Aristotle in *De anima*. Vives does not reduce the material world or body to the realm of spirit or soul, nor does he reduce the latter to the former. At the root of Vives' thinking lies the Aristotelian concept of hylomorphism. Man's spiritual being evolves from the intertwining relationships that comprise the psychophysical unity of the living being. Vives' concept is similar to the ocular metaphor from Aristotle's *De anima*: "If the eye were a living creature, its soul would be its vision. This is the

substance in the sense of the form of the eye”(412b). If the vision fails, there is no sense in having a physical eye. Both Aristotle and Vives expand this example of the eye to the structure of all living beings. Living matter, as can be witnessed in the *Fabula*, is continuously in the process of motion and growth. The man of the *Fabula* progresses through a complex series of beings acclaimed at each step by the gods, who watch until he attains the perfection of his essential being. Man’s form is a principle of perfection, a design or entelechy that becomes increasingly evident as it unfolds before the audience of the gods. Both the soul and the body appear reciprocally in such a manner that it would be impossible to separate them as two different substances. Neither can they be identified as two different places where distinct kinds of work are accomplished and later combined by a third faculty. Both Aristotle and Vives conclude that the soul is an individual set of relations, and it is not interchangeable with other souls of bodies. As Aristotle argues in *De anima*, “the actuality of each thing is naturally inherent in its potentiality, that is in its own proper matter. From all this it is clear that the soul is a kind of actuality or notion of that which has the capacity of having a soul” (414a).

Of Sleep and Dream

After human action, Vives continues with the question of the meaning of sleep, which is understood as the rest, repose and vacation of the complete soul, as well as the senses and other organs of the body. Sleep is a pleasing gift of nature. The continuous rigorous action of the senses merits the repose nature grants through the work of sleep. This is produced by a Galenic combination of bodily functions that

generate the appropriate physical conditions, facilitating the act of sleeping while the body sleeps or rests. For Vives, this condition of sleep is opposed to a state of vigilance, which best describes the waking state of the body. He locates the center of sleep in the anterior part of the brain, close in proximity to the humidity needed by the eyes, closed during sleep, "except in some small fearful animals like rabbits and perhaps some men" (Mayans 390). In sleep, all sensory organs lie in tranquil repose, except in the bodily action of a spasm or fainting, when both mind and entire soul suffer oppression (Mayans 391). His description of sleep is best expressed by the metaphor, and he writes: "the body while in sleep, recovers its equilibrium, just as the plant is revived with opportune irrigation. Because of the state of vigilance and work, the life flow of the body is exhausted and only with rest is it restored. Sleep is found in rest, solitude and silence, since the bodily humors are in the conditions of peace. During this state of rest the vegetative faculty of the soul is provided the opportunity to function in accordance with its structure. As an example he recalls Pliny, who described sleep (*somnus*) as the "recovery by the soul of its own rule" (Mayans 391).

In Chapter XIV, Vives extends his analysis of sleep to the human dreamstate. When the body is asleep, all internal faculties of the soul continue operating in accordance with their appropriate functions. This uninterrupted action of the soul can be identified as the state of dreaming, which is an interior act of the soul that only occurs when the body is in the condition of sleep. With this connection he reviews Aristotle's position, in which not all that presents itself to the spirit during sleep or rest pertains to the dreamstate. In addition to the dreams discovered by the

soul during sleep, Aristotle adds the category of "*phantasmata*." To Vives, however, this additional category is merely logomatic, or a question of words, and should not be confused with the nature of things. The dismissal of "*phantasmata*" is perhaps a misunderstanding of Aristotle, as Noreña points out, leading Vives to conclude that the Stagerite found yet another element present in the mind at the time of the dream presentation (Noreña 127). This misinterpretation notwithstanding, Vives reaches the same conclusion as Aristotle regarding the structure of dreams. He concludes that it is much more expeditious to refer to the order of dreaming by the inclusive definition of "dreaming contains all that is presented to the spirit and the mind during the dream state" (Mayans 393). During the state of sleep, the interior senses remain capable of seeing, since the mind and the soul keep on functioning continuously, sifting through the those problems that were presented by the exterior senses during the state of vigilance.

During sleep the imagination (*phantasia*) finds itself emancipated from reason; in this condition, it is able to bring forth from memory a plethora of objects without order or sequence. It is a free play of images that can drift into incoherence, producing absurdities, similar to a sickness that attacks the mind. Clearly, this dreamstate allows the subject to understand that it has within it something very distinct from the vegetative soul and corporal organs; it is something that perceives and knows the absent objects as though they were actually presented by the eye or ear. In an effort to explain the physiology of these visions, Vives finds that they are produced by vapors that rise from the fountain of the heart. The qualities of these visions can modify themselves, depending upon how other organs process the humors

or vapors or chemical balances of the fluids responsible for the generation of mental images or visions. When this occurs during sleep, the senses are unable to determine the actual causes of these movements and, as a result, normal logic is suspended, allowing the imagination a free play. Physical signals from various organs are then transferred or perhaps turned into metaphors, e.g., "if there is something humid in the throat, the subject is presented visions of water. Similarly an overflow of certain fluids like bile would trigger sad dreams. At times the presence of liquids in alternate circulation produce contradictory visions" (Mayans 394).

Frequently, the subject itself dreams about what happened during the same day. This kind of dreaming occurs when the imagination (*phantasia*) is fresh and agile, not distracted by other representations. For Vives, this happens when the imagination quickly takes over the focus held by what is called common sense. Here, the mind is forced to concentrate on one object while radically omitting all the other possible representations in the field of experience or consciousness, a condition that can be seen in people in love and in others who become dominated or fixated by one single passion. The variety of dreams is extensive. He cites some differences that exist between those who have fragmentary or broken dreams, and others whose dreams are continuous and tranquil. Dreams are clear when the blood has no impure elements in circulation. This happens with the body on a clear morning after it has been purified during a night's sleep, a condition also described by the ancient philosophers, giving rise to certain visions that are said to attain a significant proximity to real events. However, although some dreams or visions are more complete and coherent than others, they are not more true or real than a fiction; they can be more beautiful and

more ornamental, but they are still not truthful. Vives thus makes a clear distinction between what can be known in a vision and what can be present in the mind through the perception of senses; a vision simply has no effective linkage to the world of sense experience.

If the corporal vapor is temperate and tenuous, the course of the dream flows more calmly and continuously, and thus the imagination (*phantasia*) placidly slips like a tame river along its course; however, if the chemistry or emotion is ardent, the result is an imagination that runs wild, losing its reins, generating fantasies at high velocities, a mix and confusion of times and places, combining, for example, in Vives' words, Rome with Paris and making contemporaries of people from different periods, the same person turning into a king or a slave. Thus the most absurd and incredible things are combined. Impassioned dreams can be grave nuisances to the subject; at times they are so chaotic as to insult intelligence, reason, and even the imagination. This is why the subject fears sleep, since the risks of nightmare are similar to the fear of sickness, physical pain, or an emotion that threatens to overwhelm the spirit.

Vives also notes that at times the subject experiences a dream within a dream, especially during a state in which the action is enjoyable, and in which the desire is such that one hopes that the dream is not in vain or without foundation. These visions or dreams at times have so much force that it seems as though they occur during a waking state. They are too powerful for children or for those who are weakened by illness; at times they wake up screaming and attempt to flee and hide, terrified that these images are real. There is an initial state of sleep between deep sleep and

awakening or vigilance in which the subject seems to dream what is actually seen or heard, and the senses are aware of changes of light or sounds. This happens in a soporific state that debilitates the common operations of the senses, and the imagination transfers sensual representations to images that are unrelated to their actual causes. In this state, the subject misinterprets signs and suffers a type of cloying confusion that provokes suffering. Here the imagination does not take from memory the stored notions that would correct the sense, but allows these oppressive images to operate freely without control or judgment. On the other hand, there are images from dreams that the imagination transfers to memory so that they are remembered in their entirety upon awakening. There are, of course, gradations of this kind of transference from dream to memory. There are dreams that remain unassimilated by the memory; in this case, a subject claims not to have dreamed, since there is no remembrance of any image upon awakening. Vives comments that the dearth of dreams in these subjects can only be explained by two reasons; their spirits are too hard to retain images, or the fleeting images are too fluid to capture in memory. The dream, then, is similar to a seal that cannot make an imprint on either rock or water.

Interpretation of Dreams

The interpretation of dreams is a recurrent problem that has been the subject of concern to both ancient and present philosophers. All have attempted to decipher the meaning or the predictive power, assuming that it is a source of commentary on the subjects relation to his or her experience. Regarding this problem, Vives raises the

rhetorical questions: “Is there really a mechanism in dreams through which the future can be revealed? What is it that we learn or see when we are submerged in a dream? Are we able to know beforehand what event(s) will take place? Are dreams signs or causes of events or things, past, present or future, similar to the positions of stars that are said to shape destiny?” (Mayans 396). Vives answers these questions by stating that dreams are not causes, nor do they reflect causes; on the contrary, they are purely signs of physical or corporal chemistries (vapors), the effects of physical causes. To dream is similar to all events in nature, a most natural process that has directly or indirectly, determining causes. Nature did not provide the animal nature with the faculty of dream in order to reveal that which is occult or abstruse; one dreams because the animal energy does not stop when the body rests. If, in fact, there are times when dreams are predictive, this is due to chance or accident, and in no way is it a reflection of a natural capacity that is linked to the nature or structure of events. Dreams, however, can reflect those secondary concerns of emotions and reflect hopes and fears of the subject. And, when the soul is consumed by a special project, its dreaming process assumes a variety of forms while the subject is asleep.

In conclusion, Aristotle also states that the subject dreams every day and thus it is not uncommon that from time to time a dream will provide a window to the future or the past, as has happened without the dreamer’s knowledge. Vives, however, adds to the discussion that there are dreams informed by a superior intelligence of the same art and force as those of the imagination (*phantasia*). These are dreams informed by celestial spirits that provide great benefit, public or private, such as the ones that appear in the Sacred Scriptures, that is to say the dreams of the Pharaoh, or in

classical literature, such as in the dream of Agamemnon described by Homer. These powerful sources, both good and evil, are capable of informing the subject's dreams, particularly those of great men. The subject, however, must be careful, since these dreams may be inspired either by celestial or by hostile or evil forces. In this regard, man must employ his faculty of judgment.

Habit

If dreams of significant figures informed by celestial spirits have a special location within the soul, the creation and development of habit assures the soul of a set of characteristics that inform the constitution of what then can be defined as its nature. What the subject knows as actions are generated by the movements of the faculties (*ex facultatibus nascuntur actiones*). These faculties, as presented earlier in *De anima*, are those of the rationale soul, or the will, intelligence, and memory. All that the soul sets in motion is grasped or received by these three faculties as if presented by nature. These faculties are served by the senses through a series of natural acts, such as seeing and hearing, that are understood as natural after they arrive at a stage of complete development. There are other acts, however, for which additional practice is necessary. This continuous practice or exercise generates an automatic response. When repeated instinctively, it becomes what is referred to in Greek as "*exis*" and in Latin "*habitus*." This custom is used to describe both acts and passions. The formation of the habit, then, for Vives, is the ground for the emergence of a "second" nature, which operates as a form of mime, reproducing acts that have a similar structure to those acts that are accomplished without exercise or practice. He

uses the example of an artist, painter or artisan who works through the resistance of the pen or brush to acquire what seems to be a natural skill, seemingly internal, although initially external to his basic nature. In this same way, the soul acquires the habit of seeking more knowledge and thus becomes more disposed to exercises through which it, in turn, acquires additional skills and information. Custom is reinforced by a propensity to continue and extend additional activities that are consonant with those already considered virtuous by the soul. Vives describes this process through his metaphorical use of “habit that generates roots within the soil of the spirit or soul through continuous practice and thereby acquires a force that is similar to that of nature” (Mayans 399). The subject at this point is able to work without difficulty and with joy. What Vives seems to be saying here is that the soul, interrelated with what can be understood as the body, is capable of growth. It cannot be conceived as a set of instructions, similar to a genetic code, which provides the body with a plan for development and growth. As such, the soul in this discussion of habit begins to take on additional dimensions in the form of layers, beginning with the vegetable and extending to the rational state. The archmime man of the *Fabula* is able to represent, through his invention, the manifestation of each level of soul or organization of his being during his ascendance through the plant and animal kingdoms. The rooting of habit forms a kind of temperament from which the subject is able to judge actions and differentiate those that are beneficial from those contrary to its composition. What underlies this analysis is the concept of Virtue, the search for the good, which provides the rational soul with a method that leads toward an enlightened behavior, a concept that Vives attributes to Plato (Mayans 399).

The rooting of habit, Vives writes, is granted to the soul for its own well being, as it perfects those skills and expands knowledge that provides it with the propensity towards what is good. Otherwise, the human condition would be miserable, indeed, if the development of custom did not serve the subject with an alternative to any bitter and disabling experience. Custom, over time, works toward the subject's betterment. But with disuse, he cautions, sickness or violence may diminish and disintegrate the force of habit. Recovery from this state of degeneration would necessitate the restoration of the instrument or faculties, to restructure or rebuild that which was lost during trauma or illness. It can be surmised that it would not be possible to repair habit by simply retrieving lost information generated by its prior workings. Here, Vives seems to follow Aristotle's basic division of instrument and act, e.g., eye and sight. This homologous design, taken from Aristotle's *De anima*, provides the basis of his analysis of the subject and the function of habit. Habit, in this sense, is associated with the "act" of the soul and is, perhaps, its material essence.

Senescence

In his analysis of the aging process, Vives again provides the reader with an insight into the operation of the soul. It is the soul that clearly conducts its material elements or faculties toward a perfection, as far as the original material permits. Hence the soul or *anima* can be understood best as an instrument or "*entelogeus*" that is the actualizer of the material potential of a living creature. He considers that life itself is the conservation of the instruments used by the mind/soul in the body ("*Vita est conservatio eorum instrumentorum, quibus anima utitur in corpore*") (Mayans

401). However, once these instruments achieve their maximum potential by attaining a level of complete usage, they slowly begin to deteriorate, return to an inert state, and perish. Youth, then, is a state of vigor and perfection of the organs, while age is the period of decay and destruction of what has been actualized. Age is death produced by its natural course, without violence. Vives here uses the analogy of annual seasons to embody the process of the life cycle, the infancy is both the morning and spring, the youth noon and summer, old age afternoon and autumn and death, winter and the final night. The basis of Vives' analysis here is the metaphorical system of the polarity of heat/cold, moist/dry. The body, in its best form in the spring and summer of its actualization, is best understood by warmth and abundant fluids. With age, of course, the coldness dryness are the conditions that prevail as descriptive of the aging process. Life itself is the conservation of those instruments the soul uses to actualize the body's potential. Heat is the body's first principle, then nutrition and maintenance through the balance of heat and moisture. Longevity is a matter of the proper balance of warmth and moisture. In terms of the body's utilization of the material it possess at birth, the key is moderation. Here, Vives cites Hippocrates: "food, drink, sleep, sexual pleasure, physical exercise, all should be taken in moderation" (Mayans 402).

Death is the destruction and termination of the instruments that the soul has used from birth throughout the seasons, attaining the best possible ratio between the potential of each body and its actual existence. The example that Vives readily uses is the factory's loss or losses of tools, hammer, forge and pincers, which reduces the worker to a forced stoppage of work. In other words, he defines death as a

progressive phenomenon that gradually replaces life; the soul no longer has the material instruments to make the body work within the terms of its unique organization, and thus is unable to keep its life in operation. Here Vives concludes that, facing this situation, the soul is not separated from the body due to any incompatibility, nor does the soul diminish in proportion to the body's dissolution. Again, he provides the reader with an example, this time of himself and the pen he uses to write, an act in which there is no direct link or proportion between the writer and the pen, the instrument and the artifice. The artifice of course may run dry or break, but the instrument or instrumentality remains. Life, Vives again emphasizes, expanding upon the same theme repeatedly, is a matter of the appropriate combination of heat and moisture. When moisture enters the process of drying it no longer provides nourishment to the heat, and thus life's light goes out like a lamp that has run out of oil. Not all organisms or animals enter death in the same way. Although some animals survive after being cut in half (the worm, for example), the distinguishing factor is that when the animal dies its soul also is lost, including the vigor of its senses. The soul of man, however, survives the cadaver. Thus, the definition of the act of man's death is the act of separation and disunion of the soul and the body. Vives devotes the next section of his *De anima* to the immortality of the soul.

The Immortality of the Human Soul (*De animae humanae immortalitate*)

This last chapter of *De anima* is the longest of book two. It was also included posthumously by his editors in *De Veritate Fidei* with only a few minor changes. In

this chapter, Vives focuses on the immortality of the human soul, which remains after the material body no longer exists. Here, he provides a kind of finale or culmination of the topics presented in the earlier chapters, concerning the soul's dimensions and how they operate in the human subject to produce a "reality" drawn by the action of the mind from internal and external experience. Vives builds his argument by accumulating evidence, much as a lawyer presents his case to judge and jury. Combining the arts of both rhetoric and dialectic, he produces a persuasive argument with proofs that reinforce each other by way of their moral impact upon the target audience. Noreña describes the argument as a series of proofs that "reinforce each other not by virtue of any formal rule of logic, but rather by the psychological impact of convergence. The mind is compelled to yield assent by a process that is closer to that enhancement of evidence characteristic of a forensic orator than to the quasi-mathematical rigor of deductive inference" (A,132-33). It is an argument that works towards the establishment of a truth, which depends upon the acceptance of a moral concept of what is defined as human being at the root of man's existence. His argument echoes both the Socratic discussion of the soul in the *Phaedo* and St. Augustine's *De immortalitate animae*, which are employed as part of the persuasive technique of building upon powerful prior sources, an important practice of Vives' humanistic project.

For the purpose of clarity, this analysis will assume that Vives, in his argument concerning the soul's immortality, focuses only on that part of the human soul or rational soul that has emerged to a position from which it enjoys the "gaze" of its author. This can be seen clearly in the theatre of the *Fabula*, where man demonstrates

the operation of the vegetative and animal souls through the costumes or masks he employs during his ascent toward the balconies of the gods. His mask of man himself, a rational soul, is briefly transcended by his creation of the likeness of Jupiter, which is also an expression of the immortal human soul that receives the invitation to participate in the eternal banquet of the gods. At this point in the *Fabula*, man the ethologue and archmime, basks in the gaze and light of Jupiter, who is indeed pleased with man and nods his ascent which makes all Olympus tremble. Implicitly for Vives, the immortal soul is the topmost part of a continuum, containing multiple levels in a descending order that increase its interaction or interpenetration with the material of existence.

Vives establishes the basis of his argument at the onset of this chapter. The doctors or wise men of antiquity have already inquired as to whether the soul survives the death of the body and remains free and exempt from the blind force of destiny. The problem of the soul's survival becomes more intricate due to the ignorance of some men, and to the perversity and vice of others, who desire to attribute all existence to the rule of the senses and find it convenient to think that soul is either nonexistent or is so far removed from existence that it cannot be taken into account. Vives, however, promises to examine the topic with greater attention, given its importance to life and religion, and its significance in terms of either human happiness or misery. Vives admonishes the reader that the subject should not accept the position that the senses contain all that can be known, and thus remain trapped in the narrow limits of reality. Such a reality would not include the mind and perception of the existence of effects and forms of other natural beings or creatures. There are other realities apart from

those established by the exterior senses that limit experience to what is seen and sensed. The admission of an exterior reality to the exclusion of others would be not only unscientific but contrary to the sane judgment of the human mind.

In a phrase that could have been taken from the *Fabula*, Vives questions rhetorically what man would not be able to distinguish the great distance between him and a brute. Without elaborating on additional proofs of little value, he focuses instead on man's production of diverse "ingenios." He marvels at his travels in the world and his taking advantage of reason and language and, ultimately, his inner light that reflects a certain power and image of divine intelligence. Although man shares with the beast the cycle of birth and death, it is clearly evident that he is endowed with a superior mind. Similar to St. Augustine, Vives links man's genius ("*ingenium*"), reason and understanding with what he defines as the prerogative of immortality. These three dimensions of man: *ingenio*, reason and comprehension, are examples of man's divine origin and would be diminished without the dimension of immortality. They are also signs in themselves that man has divine capacities that transcend the senses or, as he argues, "surpass what is seen with the eyes or touched by the hands" (Mayans 406). Lack of direct testimony should not be accepted as a basis of negation of immortality, as is commonly accepted by arguing that nobody has returned from death to tell the living about the place of immortality, or other hypotheses of an after-life. However, he asks rhetorically, taking the recently discovered lands of the new world into consideration, would the people of these lands exist if they had not been discovered? How many years did these civilizations exist without our knowledge, without our receiving signs? And does it really matter that

no normal communication has been established with those spirits that have left the corporal world? The way between us and the heavens and the infernal regions does not adhere to any natural law. There is no correspondence between the corporal and non-corporal, nor are we able to accommodate ourselves to another dimension while we are locked inside this corruptible body. Furthermore, he emphasizes that his view of immortality has nothing to do with the morally simplistic view of death as actual geographical location, similar to a map with coordinates that are drawn by various doctrinal religious systems. He writes that it is absolutely without merit to conceive of an afterlife that would offer special locations for those who would find enjoyment and those who would not. What is certain, he continues, is that wherever we look, we see signs that teach us that the soul is immortal. They inform us of its nature, the necessity of causes, proportion and similarity, life, harmonies of experience, the dignity of man, the goodness of god and our standing in the world. Knowledge of these attributes of man, however, as well as other things in the world, cannot be known by isolating their true essences. Essence, Vives maintains, lies in the intimate recesses of each thing, enclosed in the material objects and the opacity of life into which our minds cannot penetrate. We are limited then in our knowledge to circumstances and acts. Referring to Aristotle, he adds that all things are known through their workings and actions, which he defines as quality, quantity and the structure of their essence. With this said, Vives then embarks on the study of the soul's actions.

First of all, he defines the elements of "knowing," which includes the mind's actions of grasping, comprehending and conceiving ("*capere, comprehendere,*

concupere”). Knowledge is produced through the mode of forming an image of things that are reflected by the soul, as in a mirror. However, a material mirror cannot reflect what is spiritual and is, therefore, unable to reflect what is not presented directly to the senses. He uses as an example a closely held mirror through which it is not possible to reflect a mountain in its entirety. Only at a certain distance can the mirror reflect the mountain’s entirety. Likewise, our limited external senses cannot perceive extension and quantity that is greater than they are, nor can they perceive what is absent. In the same manner, our internal senses are also unable to perceive what is spiritual, that is, angels and God. It is the mind, then, that is able to grasp, comprehend and conceive; it is the only earthly being or entity that has the facility to reach the levels of the spirit and, because of this, it is able to comprehend immortality. Similar to St. Augustine, it is the mind that is immortal, even though it finds it impossible to conceive what is incomparably greater to it in amplitude (Mayans 407).

It is impossible for the mind to comprehend all the constituent dimensions of eternity, since it does not have sufficient reach or extension to penetrate such an immense duration. Thus, although the mind is able to accumulate knowledge century by century, becoming a vast storehouse of learning, it does not have within its own power the ability to comprehend greater dimensions than the soul of man, since it remains unable to design proportions or analogies on a sufficient scale to understand the significance of eternity. The soul is only able to do this partially, thereby constructing a secondary model of eternity. Nevertheless the human soul, as a fountain of understanding, easily infers that the souls of plants and animals are

created and put into operation by virtue and power of matter. The mind, a special mode created by God in the body, guides the forces of matter until, through repetitions, they become part of a natural process. There is nothing in nature, however, that has the ability to overcome its primary composition and reestablish itself on a level higher than its original essence and power. The internal and external senses cannot transcend their fundamental nature. Through its extension, man's mind is able to penetrate the heavens, stars and angels, and arrive at the same God who created the cosmos, but it is not endowed with sufficient power to comprehend Him. After setting out the problem in these terms, he concludes that this is a clear proof that the souls of plants and animals are engendered by nature and, thus, they are rationally or irrationally unable to surpass nature's design whereas Man's mind, created by God, is able to comprehend these lesser souls because it exists on a level above potentiality. In terms of the human soul, Vives offers the example of an aquifer in which the water never has the power to rise higher than its source. In this analogy the soul, which is of the same substance as God, is similar to the water of the aquifer, knowable because its substance is identical. A question can arise, however, about the ways in which substance may differ in quality. For example, how is it individualized, how is it united, where are the seams that separate the individual from its totality? Does the analogy of the aquifer come too close to the Averroist position of the unity of mind and soul? Vives answers these questions by his disavowal of the Averroist position, finding the unity of mind and soul an empty universal that does not explain the ontological differences among the prodigious numbers of particulars that must be taken into account.

He proceeds by arguing that the soul is unable to rise higher than its source, although it is able to rise above the inferior senses. In other words, the simple sense data or signs do not form an integral part of its structure, remaining within the limits of the exterior level of perception. He turns to the Moses from the book of Genesis (*"in mundi originibus"*) who affirmed that all things were created by God, including Man. According to Moses, Man is considered a unique creation of God, since Nature itself did not have the power to create him: "We make man in God's image and likeness" (*"Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem"*). To reinforce the difference in quality between man and God, he again quotes Moses, who refers to God's breath upon the face of man as the breath of spirit and life (Mayans 408). From these statements, he adduces that Moses was able to signify the origin of God and the immortality of soul.

Vives then turns his argument to build upon the difference between the realm of nature and the superior realm of God. The creation of man's soul is a work that surpasses the power of nature; however elemental, celestial or angelic it may be perceived, it is still created by God, that is to say, in line with a law set down by Him and ordered in such a way as to exclude the work of anything else. With this in mind, it is therefore not through the logic of nature, as it is commonly known, that God creates man or produces a new miracle, that is to say, something contrary and distinct from the prescribed laws of nature. Man, in short, is thus not seen as a miracle of nature. He is, rather, in line with the statement attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, "a great miracle" (*"magnum miraculum esse hominem dixerit"*) (Mayans 408). What is noteworthy here is Vives' use of Hermes Trismegistus, although he acknowledges

his contemporaries' doubts about his historical existence. Nonetheless, in Vives' *Fabula* it is Hermes who accompanies man in his ascent to beatitude. Moreover, in Vives' argument on the immortality of the soul, Hermes is again utilized as a significant authority, implying that the concept of the immortal soul has its origins in ancient theology.

God implanted the soul within the faculties of the body, that is to say, in the same material formed by nature in conformance with His own law. This same immortal soul is given to everyone, even those of vile birth resulting from adultery to incest, however repugnant to the church or religion. Vives emphasizes that "our being, a soul not created by the faculty of nature, but only through the goodness of God, is a truth that has direct impact upon the human genre, because this is a truth that implies a direct relationship between God and Man, excluding nature, and thus does not include nor is modified by any other faculties outside of the relationship with God, the only Author of spirits" (Mayans 409). While it is granted that both nature and custom exert powerful influences over the body, since the former provides materiality from which laws are adduced, while the latter establishes the bonds of fathers and sons and the hegemony of the human family, the soul is granted uniquely by God. It is equipped to maintain its own power to prevail in the play of circumstance, and it is reserved exclusively for man's felicity. Vives emphasizes this condition of the immortal soul with the statement that "He, God, is the only author and progenitor of the soul and only he can extinguish it" (Mayans 409). Since the soul resides in the domain of God, it is not credible that He would then grant such a power of bringing it into existence to nature, which any at point could destroy it, as

it happens naturally in the animal kingdom. Nor would He, upon making the human soul as it is, pass it on to nature, letting it fall within the law and condition by which it is governed.

The immortal soul notwithstanding, the human subject shares nature with the lower kingdoms. As examined by Vives on frequent occasions, and as supported by the work of other writers, the will was granted to all animals in order to desire or avoid something presented within their field of experience. Actually, the human senses operate in the same manner as that of other animals. And in terms of quality, one can conclude with a reliable level of certainty that man's senses, both internal and external, are held in common with the animal species. The will, however, operates in animals on the level of the immediate experience, and is associated with the instinct to act in order to preserve life; this differs from man's additional sense capacity, which is related to the process of knowing things. On the basic animal level, the will to preserve life is related in nature to the desire to procreate. Thus, the faculty of procreation, (desire to procreate), for example, is not man's principle function, such as knowing, but is understood by Vives as part of the vegetative domain that he shares with the other creatures of the world. Nevertheless, man is able to understand this as an interminable process and acts in accordance with the logic of this force. Since this appetite or will to procreate is natural, it is instrumental to his historical survival and, similar to a commitment, it must be satisfied. It is not in any form accidental to his being; otherwise, the act of procreation itself would be futile. In fact, he concludes, it would be cruel and unnatural to refuse a great benefit granted by nature. Moreover, such a desire to procreate is an indication of the existence of the

will to extend man's being to the level of an eternal essence. This inexorable natural desire is the cause of man's anxiety to perpetuate his name throughout centuries, a sense that is so innate in the human breast that even those who believe that all dies with life still aspire to fame. Even after death, man desires that others continue to speak well of him, as was said of Epicurus, the herald of impiety, who wrote in his testament that his birthday was to be celebrated by his followers during a special banquet on the twentieth lunar day.

This authentic desire of immortality, ravaged by the shadows of misunderstanding and the wrenching afflictions of the soul, degenerated to a mere passion for fame. This is similar to a good seed that falls into a wretched earth. In this condition, the passions themselves declare the nature of the human spirit; whereas the senses are driven to find only the differences that separate one being from another they themselves, both the internal and external senses, become estranged from each other. In fact, when the soul in these circumstances begins to think of its death, it is hindered by the inauthentic operation of the internal senses and the imagination, since together they project the image of a long life, and do not register properly the impression left by the death of another being. Disregard of experience can lead to such an alienation of the senses that the subject's impending death eventually loses its importance. In these circumstances the soul, wrapped in this confusion, sinks into a darkness to such a degree that it loses its connection to its Creator, and does not even attempt to save itself. However, those who become so confused, due to the pain and anguish of their lives, are clothed in a pessimism and desperation that consumes them. They accept the death of the soul with equanimity, and remain so horrified at

the thought of physical death that they believe it is the greatest evil that can befall them. On the other hand, there are others who, healthy and tranquil of spirit, when faced with death that confuses their senses, prove able to the task of mending the errors made on the level of sense experience and overcoming the panic these errors have caused.

Additional arguments for the immortal soul can be found in the work of Plato. He recalls Socrates in Plato's *Apology*, saying to his judges: "if the soul does not die, then there awaits me on the other side of death a greater good; and if, on the contrary, the soul dies, nothing evil will be known" ("Mayans 411). Later, he uses the example of Socrates as presented in the *Phaedo*, surrounded by his disciples, all of whom are experts in sciences yet still desirous of knowing more. Socrates, whom Vives considered the most perceptive and wisest of all philosophers, provides a series of strong arguments, convincing them that the soul preserves itself and has a life beyond the body.

He then asks the rhetorical question, "and what may we deduce from all this?", which he follows with another question, "Does it not make manifest that the thought of the soul's death runs against our own nature?", and a third, "does not this physical death affect the spirit, since it exclusively belongs to or is part of the body and all that is implicit in it, the external and internal senses?" (Mayans 412). It has been proven that the soul is poorly accustomed to body, disturbed as it is by passions and confused by the movements of phantasms. It is seen then as uneducated, vicious, guilty and impious, but it is the remembrance of corporal death that gives it its greatest imperfection, which it could counter if it were, among other qualities,

continuously sober and moderate, sane and serene, innocent and pious. It is obvious that the act of good judgment depends upon the condition of the spirit. Judgment changes in degrees of certainty and truthfulness, depending upon the condition of the soul, whether it is perturbed or calm, sick or well, ignorant or learned, too attached to a good physical disposition, or pious and holy. Vives directs his argument toward the pleasures experienced by the subject and how they serve as analogies of the way the soul functions. From experience found delightful by the subject, the basis of inference to adduce the soul's essence is organized. The greater, delicious and more lasting the pleasures, the closer is the subject's analogy to a soul that is envisioned as constituting the essence of delight, including all the gradations of what is considered pleasure. Also, in judging a species or form of life, in order to express or define the condition of its soul, it is not infrequent to take as a model what is the most prominent and harmoniously organized part of it, e.g., adducing its core nature as the part that seems most resistant to change. This seemingly stable part is then understood as the true indicator of the species. Nevertheless, Vives grants that he is aware of those subjects whose temperament is so brutal that they allow themselves to become slaves of all pleasure the senses offer. But, he adds, one should look to those souls that demonstrate the greatest virtue and generosity. He finds that those souls take more delight in the "internal senses," rather than the external, since the former are more focused on the intelligence than on the fantasy, and reflect, in terms of thinking, on those things that provide greater pleasure, in line with the supreme order of things. They are less dependent on the material realm, and are focused on the eternal. It is precisely this focus on the eternal that the soul desires with greatest

enthusiasm. It is prepared to reflect this enthusiasm faithfully, and has the ability to continuously scrutinize and contemplate the eternal without weariness. The internal senses provide the resources for this kind of contemplation, since they are closer to spirit and they are more in conformance with the soul than the body. There is a perfect relationship between the internal senses and the soul; the latter seems to reflect the likeness and proportion of the soul, equivalent to the same way the external senses lend themselves to the material world. In conclusion Vives adds that, if the soul were mortal like the senses, it would not diverge from the range of their passions, and even the most excellent souls, those almost divine, would show an overpowering passion for things that perish. However, he continues, the structure itself of man's body, with his face erect toward the heavens, demonstrates that he shares a celestial origin with the gods, and is continually turned toward that place as though it were a country toward which he travels as a pilgrim. The human body, elevated and erect, also manifests the stature of the spirit. However, the soul partakes in an ascendancy greater than the body, rising through grades or steps from the lowest level, without finding a place of rest or repose, until it arrives at the level of celestial or divine being. There, it attains its culmination and comes to rest as though it were the final point of its career or growth. Through motion, the properties of all creatures are observed and their stature is known. Terrestrial animals always gaze toward terrestrial things, exactly at the place where their welfare is found whereas man, if his true wealth were not located in the celestial eternity, would not maintain his head high and eyes turned toward the heavens. This is because in the middle of all the calamities, ruptures, and harshness that he has to endure, a view of that most

beautiful resting place, remote from all the misery, would make life even more painful. Does man, finally, feel an ache in himself that makes him aware of a distant happiness? He seeks this most desirable place, so alive with the work of imagination and intelligence; it is a place different from the more debilitating and tiring world he faces, aware of succumbing to the process of aging and the discomfort of living. However, there are some men similar to beasts who ignore such signs, either through mental laziness, or due to a certain drunkenness produced by the favors of fortune.

Another link in Vives' argument is the initial point that, since it is observed that men are born into this mortal life, rebirth into immortal life can be deduced. Likewise, just as inside maternal space man is formed and developed for the present life, in the same way while he is present in this life he prepares himself for the next, the spiritual stages of his post-natal life similar to the stages of his pre-natal development. The light, upon birth, is also bound by an obscure night. There is no other way to think about birth and death. When the time approaches, the uterine life decays and, in reality, the fetus dies upon birth of the new living creature. The birth process itself is similar the subject's passage through life to the point from which he is reborn into another order and resides in another space that is more excellent than the difference between the uterine darkness and terrestrial light. It is in the uterus that man is prepared for the transition to corporal existence, and in the corporal world, he prepares himself for the life of the mind. The untutored soul is horrified to pass from this life due to the great change this signifies, a condition that is exactly in line with a child going through the birth process, assuming some kind of awareness or notion of this event. Each human being passes into a new sphere, the cycle embodies the child

that is born and the man who dies, both enter a new life and light. This new spectacle of things produces amazement. From this shock they must recover; the newness of it all inspires surprise and fear, and they would not leave their small enclosure if the force of nature did not push them toward the next life. Without a doubt, the death of man has a great affinity and similarity to the birth of a child due to the imperfection of both child in utero and man in life, since if the former were perfect and complete in all of its aspects within its maternal confines, there would be no need to come into the world; furthermore man, having the senses and faculties of knowing that cannot be developed in utero, enters the new and spacious light, where he is able to feel and know his beatitude.

There is a point at which man shares much in common with beasts. At this level, the beasts exercise all their functions and put into play all the faculties that nature has built into them, but they do not transcend their material design. However man, who has been given a soul, admittedly used very little in this life, enjoys the prospect of another birth into a realm where he will perform spiritual functions. This will be explained, Vives promises, in *De veritate fidei*, an indication that he had already begun work on this book. He continues, however, by saying that if the soul is mortal, all that pertains to this life, including man, was created in vain. This cannot be the case, since existence without a plan would not be worthy of God's sublimity, and it would signify that God had gone to the trouble of creating everything in vain. Vives asks several rhetorical questions: To what end is creation? So that a few moments later the creations disappear without a trace? For what reason would man drink, eat, sleep, take delight in things, without differentiating himself from the rest of the

animals, a being suffering with them, without exercising spirit, choosing not to attain that which is transcendent and desired, as both Aristotle and Theophrastus confess? And if man, to whom the service of all things is available, including the ability to learn how to use them, was brought into life without any objective, then all the other things created for his well being are little more than part of a calamity. God would then maintain His distance from man. In this case, the entire creation would be in vain and unworthy of the majesty and immense wisdom of God, the extent of which is unthinkable by man. If this is the case then the fabric of the world, with all of its interconnections in which man finds his belief and conviction, and from which proceed the three precepts: religion, divine providence, and the immortality of man's soul, would be null and void. These precepts are so interconnected that any attempt to nullify one of these principles would also menace man's faith in the other two.

In the next step of Vives' argument, he incorporates the dimension of values, rewards and punishments. If souls were not immortal, there would be no system of rewards or punishments related to good and bad works. All virtues and vices would be mixed and confused during the course of this life. To this extent, the life of man would become no more than a continuous deception. In this case, the care that God takes of man does not exist. Furthermore, if He does not care for man, why do men profess a cult of Him? The religion of God and piety would then be without substance. In spite of this, one sees all men and diverse nations, even the most barbaric imaginable, profess some sort of religion. Universally, they all seem to value behavior that includes modesty, gratefulness, piety, peacefulness, patience and equity. These universal human virtues should not be taken as having less value than

their opposites. Virtuous behavior could not be explained without positing God as man's witness and judge. Furthermore, these virtues demonstrate that man remains under His care; thus it can be conceived that the reward for piety can be anticipated in the next life. It is there that man receives the reward of virtue, a central element of his finality. The soul is thus conceived in this case by Vives as a vehicle in which virtuous behavior will lead to beatitude. The finality of man resides in the perfection of the soul. What Vives finds in religious activity is man's desire to follow virtuous behavior, a course that will lead his soul to the supreme good, or its beatitude.

If one believes in the authority of the majority of men who are most knowledgeable, this would constitute another proof of the immortal soul, whose existence is made manifest not only by those learned and civilized men but also by barbarians like the Getas, Escitas, Indians, and other cultures have been ignored such as those in the remote lands of the New World. Within these societies, those who have been considered wise have persuaded their eager listeners that their souls migrate from this world to other places in accordance to the proportion of merits or demerits acquired through the works they have accomplished in this world. Vives, however, also recognizes that there have been some civilizations that have established pleasure as the supreme good, and have thus tended to conceive the soul as mortal. They have been noted for their radical extirpations of religion from their societies, for banning the cult of the gods, denying the concepts of goodness and providence and, even, the notion of the sacred. Once the faith is weakened by these perverse doctrines, the concept of the immortality of souls loses its standing, since it is linked to the doctrines of providence and religion. However, the most wise and virtuous

philosophers have never affirmed the mortality of the soul even when being condemned to capital punishment. This includes, among others, such renowned thinkers as Pythagoras and Socrates, both of whom have drawn consolation from the concept of the immortal soul.

One of the arguments Socrates puts forward in the *Phaedo* is that men have an innate desire to know. Since in this ephemeral world it is so difficult to be certain about things, there is no doubt that this desire to know must be satisfied in the realm of ideas. In Vives' analogy, it would be futile to provide animals with eyes if they were not given something to see, condemning them to live always in the dark. Likewise, man would not have been given the desire or passion to know the truth without thereby having the possibility of attaining it. If this is true, then the complaint of Theophrastus loses its value. Man, Theophrastus laments, has been brought into the world in which animals are given a long life and do not express their appreciation; man, then, should be endowed with a longer life, since he would be very appreciative. Man is in want of a longer life in order to achieve wisdom; just as he embarks on a course that seems to be leading toward knowledge, he faces death. Vives answers this by saying that any spurious statement concerning physical longevity is not connected, by any logical relation, to the achievement of divine wisdom and goodness. It is correct to say that it takes a long life to arrive at a point in which one is able to speak about the world with some assurance. Yet, although man is able to learn from experience, he would not arrive at true wisdom, even if his life were to be quadrupled. His mind simply is not created to support the brilliance of wisdom; since birth, it has been oppressed in the tenebrous confines of his body.

Recalling Aristotle's metaphor, he reminds us that the mind itself is not unlike the owl that suffers from the brightness of the sunlight after his nocturnal flights. For this reason, he finds that a philosopher as great as Aristotle should not insist that all wisdom lies in the realm of man's experience, where it can be apprehended and added to his knowledge of nature. Rather than rely on the external senses, man should be aware of another place where this wisdom has been implanted. It is in the human heart or spirit where this wisdom can then be discovered. This is where man finds a nexus to satisfy his desire for wisdom. Vives observes that Aristotle has nothing further to say at this point; he is suddenly obscure, unclear, like all the others who limit analysis to the physical world. To illustrate he quotes from Aristotle: "*Si intelligere potest mens absque phantasia, separari potest ab ea, sin secus, non potest*" (Mayans 415). If the mind has the ability to understand without the work of imagination, it is therefore able to separate itself from its influence. With all of Aristotle's great intelligence, however, he is unable to see that the soul, while it is surrounded by the body, must be understood in terms of its corporal extension, using only those instruments derived from the external senses. On the internal level, the imagination provides a view similar to what can be seen through a mirror. According to Vives' reading of Aristotle, the Stagerite's position is that any knowledge of the immortal soul could only take place within the realm of the imagination, with the implication that it is a secondary source, without the purer condition of mind. Yet Vives adds for the reader another passage of Aristotle, in which he seems to seem to accept the workings of the imagination as a powerful force in the life of man: "*Separari mentem a sensibus a corpore, ut immortale a caduco*" or (at death) the mind

or understanding is separated from the corporal senses; and the immortal from that which dies (Mayans 415).

Vives advances a moral argument concerning those who pursue the good, as discussed by eminent philosophers, who adhere to examples of the good that can be attained within soul and senses. Those who do not pursue the good remain without hope and desire; for their own convenience they construct a mortal soul, a construction that those who accept the concept of good are unable to tolerate and consider catastrophic. Furthermore, he argues, if man believed that all would end with the destruction of the body and that the subject would be left in perpetual darkness, what good man with a generous heart would not find absolute horror in death? And how could he happily support its idea while knowing that it is inevitable? Extending his analysis to existential suffering, he points to the great misery of the subject who would desire and invoke death as a refuge from the great tempest, bringing with it an escape. Even when the suffering spirit desires death to end the pain (*"et concitatus animus mortem inlclamat"*), it quickly regains its poise and consoles itself with the hope that either the pain will cease or that the period of suffering would be easier or more benign (Mayans 416). These penetrating questions may resonate in the reader's memory, creating a tension by way of the question/answer structure of his argument. Vives must later answer these questions with sufficient power to allay the pressures caused by his penetrating interrogatives. Though he acknowledges man's suffering in this world, he points to the vital light of the soul that offers a place of tranquility even for those most damaged by the cruel play of circumstance.

Again the focus turns to the reward system, by presenting the case of the desperation of the good man who does not receive any prize for his good thoughts and actions; on the contrary, he is often cast into poverty, ignominy, sickness, pain and, finally, martyrdom. Why, after his most virtuous life is he not going to receive more of a return than a man without his renown and great accomplishments? Even recognition is accidental; many times it is based on injustice or the fame and glory that is the result of basically evil actions. Virtuous actions and honor are disdained, and what is most worthy of indignation and infamy is accepted as common. Also, the amplitude of the diversity of customs, intelligence and appearance of all nations is seldom taken into account. Nor is fame lasting, since old age is the mother of the forgotten; and, for that matter, even the dead have no advantage, such as Achilles and Socrates, both of whom are now unable to take advantage of their glory. The ignominy of Catilina and Tersites no longer cause them damage. Similarly, men of knowledge disappear into darkness, after having scrutinized with all the intensity and robustness of their intelligence, penetrating the secrets of the skies, stars, elements, and after having gone through studies of plants, animals, men and angels, advancing their studies to the place of the king of creation. Even after adducing successfully the history of the most remote antiquity, assembling knowledge of all that has transpired in the world, the mind at last fails. This must produce bitterness in men, since there is no refuge in the consolation of knowing that one has seen so much beauty and has participated in a spectacle of such magnitude. Yet this delightful mind that has contemplated all these marvelous things must be extinguished. Vives, ever the orator, asks what becomes of this mind, "this museum of all things?" And what would

happen if a man, on the contrary, were unable to perceive what exists in no other part of the world? Would he then be no more or less than an abject animal spirit, his mind so clumsy that he is unable to rise from his ignorance of the world? Who exists, after having thought of all these questions, who would not fear death, even though submerged in the worst evils of this world? (Mayans 417).

What a great consolation it would be to the good and wise man, the contingencies and reversals of life notwithstanding, to know that there is an ultimate repose, not of privation, orphanages and miseries, all of which are dreamed of by ignorant people, but rather of contentment, disposed by a just and omnipotent God. This would be the optimal form of justice for those who made their contribution of good will with all their heart and soul, while living good and saintly lives. Vives maintains that all he has mentioned concerning the opinions and authority of men is directed towards make clear that the nature of truth is to be found among sane men of good will. That is to say, the group that is esteemed for their goodness by others, since their criteria is more correct than evil and insane men. This judgment of the most accomplished men, the majority of the human genus, exhibits justice, probity, religion and the virtues, all are supported and strengthened by the immortality of the soul.

One should not dwell long, however, on the work of certain pseudo-philosophers, as Cicero calls them, whose thinking defies the nature of the soul. They corrupt the evidence supplied by the senses in concluding that in the whiteness of the snow they see blackness, or in finding coldness in the fire against the testimony of their own fingers. And what causes more sadness, sufficient to shed tears, is that much of what is being said about this world by authors who are not competent and worthy of

faith, does not affirm the truth. Meanwhile, anyone can produce a work of mendacity and evil. With reason, Vives concludes, what comes to mind is the saying of the mimographer (the writer of mimes), "the worst is always easily suspected," an aphorism confirmed by Ovid, who wrote: "In terms of vice we are a credulous mass" (Mayans 418).

Vives finds a double nature in man. Although endowed with an immortal soul, evil and darkness can easily be found in him. Many laugh at Epicurus and refute Pliny; yet this is the mark of idiocy, because it is done without sufficient verification, the same way some men deal with the important elements of their lives and of their nature. In addition, there are some men who espouse their opinions about the suppression of the idea of Providence and Religion. To this extent, their minds have fallen into the darkness of vices and evil. There are others who have a belief in an immortal soul that is vital and incontrovertible. This is associated with a similar belief in the existence of gods, without which men would not be able to conserve a peaceful coexistence. Neither would they be able to do good things if they did not fear that on the other side of this life vengeful divinities would be waiting for them. And, Vives asks, "how should this be interpreted?" Is it really an unforgivable lie that, in order for man to do good works, he must learn early the fear of punishment by vengeful gods who await him in an afterlife? He then exclaims that, indeed, the condition of virtue is miserable if men cannot be convinced without resort to a great lie (Mayans 418). Lies should be unnecessary, he surmises, since there are not two things more sought after by the majority of men than truth and virtue; they are similar

to sisters, daughters of the Gods, and they are a necessary part of the human soul and essential to all honorable minds.

Would God, omnipotent, all knowing and all seeing, have created man so that he could not be induced to do good works in order to arrive at the truth, without depending upon a soul built from lies? If the Creator knew of an artifice more powerful than the perfection of his own work, would He use it, even though it lacked foundation and substance? It is inconceivable that He would employ a lie, related to his enemy, the devil, which would contradict the pure truth of His being (Mayans 419). Nevertheless, there are those who by their own "*ingenio*" have learned a lie or, through being taught, affirm God's use of artifice. Likewise, there are others who also affirm this artifice because they are unread and receive advice from others who envision themselves free of the fear that once held them in bonds. And there are others, gifted by a most refined "*ingenio*", who believe they are free of all superstition and thus have no fear of divine punishment, but only the penalties set down by civil laws. In this case, man comes to believe in his perfection by simply cultivating the intelligence, and thus finds himself more disposed to, or inclined to, evil. Yet, Vives asks, how would man behave if a pure fiction would had been revealed to him, and how long would he continue to perpetuate this fiction as the substance of truth and honor? This belief in artifice constitutes the most significant corruption of the human soul; it separates us from perfection, and eventually provides its own refutation, because the more perfect it seems, the less perfect it becomes. Man often mistakes the worst actions for the best, until the idea of truth is completely reversed; masked by what is false, truth must again be discovered. Until this situation is reversed, man's

life is similar to the workings of beasts, and at a great distance from mankind. At this point man should ask himself questions that would lead him back to his true origin. "Who is man?," Vives asks, "To what condition does he aspire?" (Mayans 419). Is it true that man desires to see his soul ascend from the moribund corpse as though it were smoke from a flame?

Although the truth, Vives observes, can be foreseen and fortified with the most extensive support, the world does not lack people who would fear becoming victims of mirages, their eyes clouded by hallucinations, like seeing the ardent fire as white snow. There seems to be no argument that can completely satisfy those who have an obstacle deep inside that does not allow them to give assent, especially if the subject does not pass their tribunal of reason. But is this not a malevolent and impertinent passion? Have not the philosophers adduced so many arguments in order to corroborate the truth that man has already clearly and certainly found as though he had touched it with his own hands and seen it with his eyes? If only a tenth of a part of humanity were in favor of artifice and deceit, is there not one who would not be able to support his impertinence and insolence? Who are now so destitute of all reason, judgment and understanding, who are so repugnant, who scorn and mock truth as though it were an idiocy, while offering in turn such silly remarks as "perhaps it is thus," or "we have our suspicions," or "I don't think it's this" (Mayans 420).

Taking into account all of the causes and reasons that Vives has offered, he concludes that he has arrived at the maxim of the immortality of the soul, a maxim having so much weight and importance in the foundation of all probity (and also religion, which does not necessarily have to be included among the articles of faith),

because it can be proven by science. The arguments he has offered should be sufficient proof of the immortal soul's existence. There are some men who actually appear as though they were philosophers and maintain that, in light of the faith, the soul is immortal, but it is mortal in the light of nature. There could not be, he argues, a greater ignorance and madness. It is as though one would discuss two aspects of the soul at the same time, confusing their categorical differences. It is not by chance, he states, that the light of nature is also the light of human reason. It often seems, however, that there are hostile forces that insist on reducing the importance of man's soul by way of mounting arguments directed at undermining its truth. This truth, however, Vives accepts as necessary. It is man's only protection against the pernicious darkness that surrounds his being. God is the immense and true light.

In the above argument, Vives describes Man as a unique creature endowed with a soul that comprises an interrelationship of mind and the senses. He is not limited to sense experience. He combines the knowledge derived empirically through the senses with a rationality that also conceives other realities, including the spiritual. These two orders of man's being are perhaps rooted in the three "hypostases" of Plotinus. Vives argues that both orders, if man is to function perfectly, are of equal significance. The *Fabula* reflects the Plotinian Mind as central to Man's ability to incorporate all there is of the material world through sense experience, and also to apprehend the spiritual orders of gods and angels. Similar to Ficino, as Kristeller notes in his *Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino*, Vives' two major foci, of what we will understand as his metaphysics, are the concepts of Soul and God, together the subject and object of man's contemplation and action, as imagined in the *Fabula*, transformed by discourse

into substances. Kristeller writes, "in other words, the two aspects of inner or spiritual consciousness, developed and made independent" (350). Vives' project is designed to establish these two foci as the elements that make discourse possible. It is the mind that operates through a process of divergence and convergence, while it examines all arguments pro and contra, arriving at a synthesis that tends to stabilize the semantic field. According to Vives, this work of the mind or "*ingenium*" also facilitates the replacement of dogma with an ontology that gradually acquires the power of explanation through the logos of dialectic.

The Passions of the Soul

Vives considers the 3rd book of *De anima* the most difficult, since it is his attempt to explain the workings of the emotions. This is due to their extraordinary diversity and complexity, which both the Stoics and Aristotle failed to identify in their writings, the former due to their use of sophisms and absurd subtleties, the latter due to the focus on their use in the art of rhetoric. It is Vives' intention to examine the emotions as rigorously, and with as much exactitude, as possible since, without a study of this nature, it would not be possible to find a remedy to the cruel sicknesses and disabilities they would continue to produce if left to their obscure operations.

As Noreña confirms, Vives establishes the basis of his description of the function of emotions as an integral part of the human being, as essential to his structure as his mind, and participating in the function of his soul (B 1). From Vives' point of view, the King of Nature made all things of the world so that all creatures within it would be able to participate in His essence, while discovering their being and beatitude in

accordance with their own capacities. In order to acquire and conserve those gifts, He endowed each creature with the following faculties: first, the will to offer as much of a defense as possible against all corrupting influences; second, for their own welfare, an appetite for the good and an aversion to evil. To help man care for this endowment, He added to his being the faculty of mind and the attribute of judgement (Mayans 421). The array of emotions (“dicunter affectus sive affectiones”) given to man form an integral part of his soul. If properly working, the emotions assist man in working toward the good and avoiding evil. Vives uses here the dual structure of good and evil that conditions man’s moral nature, operating on the level of each subject’s being. The thought and action of each subject, in accordance with what is considered good or evil, is the result of the work of judgement. For Vives, this plurality produced by the thoughts and actions of others that form what the subject knows of the world results in darkness that clouds judgement. This darkness is pervasive, even though the human being is infused by nature with seminal (“*semina*”) truths of universal character. Two of these seminal truths that Vives deems innate in man are: “the conservation of oneself is a good,” and “to live a felicitous life” (“*bonum esse conservationem sui ipsius, et beate vivere*”) (Mayans 422).

The two quoted seminal truths, however, become obscured on the lower levels of the soul’s operation. This occurs when the bodily appetites produce overwhelming sensations such as hunger, thirst, or sickness due to the changes of bile, intense happiness due to the accumulation of pure blood that circulates around the heart, and irritation from wounds. All of these motions trigger the work of judgement. During these processes the soul must wait, since in most cases it does not move without the

resolution provided by judgement concerning the relative goodness or badness of each movement. There are some occasions, however, when the soul's motions are so quick that they seem to pre-empt the act of judgment. Although Vives is aware of the range and rage of emotions, he concludes that it is possible to manage their power and direction with sufficient training and education. Consequently, each subject, according to his or her capability and training, tends to exhibit a structure of emotions and patterns of their functioning that varies from that of others. The subject's history of emotions is the basis for the formation of what Vives sees as an ongoing pattern of actions that the Greeks named "*hexis*" and the Roman's "*habitus*" (Mayans 424). From the pattern formed by the continuous interaction of emotion, judgment and imagination habit is formed, which is also the basis of behavior.

The Human Being

The subject who emerges in *De anima* achieves his or her place in the hierarchy of being in accordance with the economies generated by the dialectic of the body and the soul. As seen in the *Fabula*, man can best be described as a being-in-process. Within this process, man can be seen as a transcendental being, whose action is generated through the interpenetration of body and soul (*anima*). As the narrator of the *Fabula* informs the reader, man is an inventor of languages, laws and societies. Essential to the Vivesian subject is the framework of human relationships, within which the body and soul are manifested. Man is not a self-subsistent creature; alone he has no meaning. As seen in both *De anima* and *Fabula de homine*, man has been granted the ability to project himself in the theater of the world. He is capable of

operating on both biological and mental planes. Although he is indeed capable of rigorous analysis, he is able to synthesize his experience in an effort to complete himself. This synthetic process of man is dependent upon the language he is able to invent from the universe of sound around him.² Essential to Vives' ontology is man's speaking about his experience. It is "*verbum*" that provides the structure of "*res*". Although man has been granted a mind which permits him to grasp his experience, his world is discovered only when he, as a subject, speaks about the world. Although Vives would not reject the Cartesian "*cogito*" as the basis of an ontological argument, he finds that what can be said about the world is perhaps more essential to his standing in the world. For Vives, "*Dico, ergo sum*" can best describe his approach to ontology.

¹ From the Mayans' edition of the *Opera*.

² See the passage in the *Fabula*: "...with no more than a few letters the immense variety of sounds in the range of man's voice was set forth in writing" (373).

Part III

The Art of Invention

While the man of the *Fabula* invents each successive mask, his guide or companion, Hermes, holds these costumes in his arms. It should be recalled that Hermes, in one of his avatars, delivered language or letters to the Egyptians, as pointed out in Cicero's *De natura deorum*, a book available to Vives and instrumental in any analysis of the *Fabula*. If the masks produced by man are descriptions of his being the term fable, with which Vives titles his play or spectacle, must be a metaphor of man's invention of language, through which he classifies his experience. Such a classification is based on a logic of categories which enables man to systematize his grasp of the information that his senses generate. From this he is able to construct the admirable masks that so amaze his Olympian audience. These categories of masks are assembled or invented by his dialectical use of such "*topoi*" as genus (whole), species (parts), and consequents and division. In *De probabilitatis*, Vives examines the language of invention, that is, the appropriate method of developing probabilistic arguments to come to terms with man's experience of the world.

The "protean" man of the *Fabula* emerges through a dialectical "*teleos*," the powerful transcendental thrust of his spiritual exercise provides him with the strength to develop a series of more complicated masks that completely capture the imagination and admiration of the gods of Olympus, best known for their jealous rages and the vengeful traps they set for lesser beings. Man's transcendence is

generated by two opposing forces, the internal or centrifugal energy of his freedom and the external or centripetal attenuation of necessity. The tension created by these two forces can only be resolved by the method or instrument that man has at his disposal, namely the dialectic of invention that constantly examines his experience in terms of the probability of its meaning and the truth of its expression.

Philological implications of Vives' phrase, 'instrument of probability', should be taken into consideration here by way of an analysis of the semantic field of "instrument" and "probability." The term "instrument" is a composite of the Latin, (in) + struo/ere + mens/tis). The verb struo/ere contains within it the semantic field of "to put together," to "set in order", or to "arrange." For Vives this primary concept would then take on the meaning of "a setting in order or arranging by the mind (mens/tis)." Also, the Latin, probabilitas/atis has a semantic range that includes probation/onis, probabiliter, and probabilis/is. Only with a complete understanding of how Vives deploys these words can one expect to comprehend or grasp his position in *De probabilitatis* or, for that matter, his entire work, since this treatise on probability is perhaps the key to his world view and the ground of his construction of experience, the composition of his language, and the formation of his mind.

Probabiliter

De probabilitatis is the result of Vives' exploration of the structure and function of building a plausible, acceptable, and credible body of knowledge. The semantic field formed by probabilitas, probabilis, and probabiliter contains three basic strands of

meaning: 1) statements that are worthy of approval and thus acceptable; 2) arguments of reasons that are credible and capable of proof, and 3) those statements that contain the appearance of truth. Aristotle, in his *Topica* (certainly a book familiar to Vives), defines what he identifies as two branches of reasoning. The first is demonstration, which proceeds from primary and true premises, and the second is dialectic, which takes into account generally accepted opinions or endoxa, and submits them to a rigorous questioning, otherwise known as the process of aporiai (100b). In the *Topica*, Aristotle makes the distinction between what he sees as clearly irrefutable proofs through the use of primary and clearly true premises, and the dialectical process articulated through the use of probable premises. Similarly, in Cicero's *De inventione*, a work frequently cited by Vives, we also find a clear statement of the use of probability, which takes into account the three strains of meaning discussed above: "we may say that all probability that is used in argument is either a sign, or something credible, or a point which judgement has been given, or something which affords an opportunity for comparison" (I.47/48).

The Concept of Mind

Vives opens this work by stating that the human mind (mens) is the faculty through which the truth is known. It has a certain sympathy and relationship with those primordial truths that are like a seed from which all the remaining truths are generated. This epistemological system operates through what Vives calls "anticipations and formations." These two actions of the mind provide the structure of

the Stoic term, catalepsies, or the direct apprehension or grasp of an object by the mind. Vives begins *De probabilitatis* with the statement : “Mens humana, quae est facultas veri cognoscendi, naturalem quandam habet cognitionem, atque amicitiam, cum veris illis primis, et tanquam seminibus, unde reliqua vera nascuntur, quae *anticipationes* atque *informationes* nominantur, a Graecis χαταλήψεις” (82). As we discussed in the section on *Dialectic*, the mind for Vives is not a simple blank slate upon which experience makes its impressions. Rather, the mind is an active instrument with the inherent capability to build relational categories (*anticipaciones*) that facilitate the construction or formation of universal concepts (*formaciones*) from the particulars of experience. This is how the mind grasps the experience presented by the senses. The source of Vives formulation of this epistemological concept is probably the second book of Cicero’s *Academica*, in which the speaker, Lucullus, describes the process of the mind as it grasps sense experience:

“Some sense-presentations the mind seizes on so as to make use of them at once, others it seizes on to store them away, these being the source of memory, while all the rest it unites into systems by their mutual resemblance, and from these are formed the concepts of objects which the Greeks term sometimes ‘*ennoiai*’ and sometimes ‘*prolepsis*’. When reason, logical proof and an innumerable multitude of facts are added, the mind arrives at a clear perception of all these things” (*Academica*, II. 30-31). Since, therefore, the mind of man is supremely well adapted for the knowledge of things and for the consistency of life, it readily embraces information. The knowing subject’s catalepsis which, in Vives’ view, can be expressed by a literal translation as ‘grasp’, is a function of the mind that fulfils a double purpose: first, it

searches for the light of truth, held most dearly by the mind; second, it establishes a field of knowledge that is governed primarily by the criteria of utility.

In the *Academica*, Lucullus continues his description of the process by extending his analysis to the way the mind employs the senses and creates the sciences as a second set of senses. This, he concludes, is how the structure of philosophy is strengthened to the point that it may produce virtue, which is the sole source for ordering man's life. Against the skeptics, it is this process, he asserts, that endows man with the appropriate instrument to build his society, order his world and, more important still, to speak in terms that have credibility. Our reference to Lucullus is to remind the reader that this argument against the skeptics is one of the important textual references of Vives' thought. It also shows that while Cicero did not venture a Latin translation from the Greek of the two important functions of catalepsis, ennoiai (to form a notion or idea) and prolepsis (envisioning future experience), Vives preferred the Latin meaning of 'formations' and 'anticipations', drawing perhaps on his readings of Plutarch's or Galen's commentaries on Stoic methodology. Perception, then, for Vives, which will be discussed later at greater length, is not a simple imprint of experience on the receptor's mind; it is, rather, the result of a more complex organization of the senses, in conjunction with the mind and memory. The function of this harmonious combination, traditionally referred to as mind and body, did not concern such Stoic philosophers as Chrysippus, who viewed both soul and body as corporeal and interpenetrating forces on all levels of being.

In his opening paragraph of *De probabilitatis*, Vives finds a similar concept in Platonic thinking: "hinc Platonis est orta opinio recordari nos, no addiscere, et animus

hominum magnarum multarumque rerum habuisse cognitionem” (82) He concludes that this is the basis of Plato’s opinion that justifies that apprehension is what the soul remembers from earlier experience of prior being. To Vives, however, this Platonic model does not fully explain this faculty of perception. His idea is closer to the Aristotelian model, as we can see from the example he provides about the eye and its potential to perceive colors while still in the uterus: the eye has the potential, not the actual vision, which will come later. Nonetheless, in terms of the way the mind functions, Vives finds in the Stoic concept of catalepsies a more complete description of the interactive dynamics of the apprehension of sense experience. In the Aristotelian model, the mind works on sense information supplied to it at a secondary stage, as though the senses were neutral conduits that supply data directly. The Stoic position, based on the doctrine of pneuma, or the existence of a “universal plenum,” held that sense data itself is a product of the sense organs also acting upon the objects of the senses. In other words, in the “universal plenum” one unit of matter acts upon another unit of matter; the eye, for example, acts upon the object it sees, and creates a double flow of information to the knowing mind.¹ In her analysis of Augustine’s epistemology, Marcia Colish also provides a discussion of how this Stoic doctrine contributed to his exposition on sense experience in *The City of God*, a book for which Vives had published an extensive commentary (Colish 170).

This Stoic epistemology (that Vives accepts) is perhaps best expressed by Varro’s presentation in Cicero’s *Academica*, Book I. The cosmos, Varro argues, is a continuum that can be understood as a whole or unity of all its parts. This world, cosmos, or continuum contains all of man’s experience. There is no other part or

condition of matter and no other body that exist outside of this cosmos. All things in this cosmos are held together by a sentient nature that exhibits perfect reason. This cosmos is eternal, since there is nothing stronger in existence that would cause its destruction. The force of this sentient nature is called the world soul, which men define as God. This is also termed providence (from the Greek, *πρόνοια*), since things in the cosmos come into existence within its province. The force that creates the succession of events that come into being is also termed “Necessity,” since nothing can arise that has not been ordained or “fated” by this unchangeable concatenation of everlasting order. This process also bears the name of “Fortune,” since its operations cannot be clearly foreseen due to their obscurity and man’s ignorance of causes (*Academica*, I. 28-29). This basic Stoic concept of the cosmos, especially its “sentient nature” is underscored by Lucilius’ description in Book II of *De natura deorum*, in which he argues that, since nothing is superior to the world, thus it must have the faculty of reason. A similar argument can be provided to prove that the world is wise, happy, and eternal, since things with these attributes are superior to those that are devoid of them. Nothing is superior to the world. Zeno thus concludes that the world is god (*De natura deorum*, II. 21).

In Book I of *Academica*, Varro continues his discussion of sensation and the way it is presented to the knowing subject or mind through the act of comprehension. Sense information is presented to the mind through a two part process that is composed of external impression or presentation, and internal assent. Here, Varro resorts to the Greek “*Φαντασίαν*,” in the sense of bringing images before the mind or in the forming of presentations. Information is received by the senses and presented to

the knower, or knowing subject. It is a faculty that resides within the mind of man, and is known through an act of mental assent, which is a voluntary act. Not all presentations are trustworthy, however. Only those presentations that have a certain “manifestation” (ἐνάργεια), that are clear and distinct not only in themselves but also as to the objects presented, can be accorded degrees of confidence, Varro emphasizes. In summation, he explains that the result of catalepsies is the production of knowledge concerning the intrinsic nature of the object perceived. The intrinsic nature of an object, then, can be grasped by the mind working in consort with the senses (*Academica*, I. 40-41). This grasp is the comprehensio or comprehension of the object of sense information. It was Zeno, Varro explains, who envisioned the act of “comprehension” as resembling an object gripped in the hand. The actual term, catalepsis, Varro continues, is a metaphor derived from the act of manual prehension, and Zeno was the first philosopher to describe the acquisition of knowledge in this way. If this “grasp” were irremovable by reason, Zeno termed this knowledge; if, on the other hand, it was not completely grasped on the level of sensation, it was termed ignorance.

The Stoic metaphor of “grasp” was also used by Cicero and Quintilian to explain the difference between dialectic and rhetoric. If the act of catalepsis is best characterized by Zeno by the grasp of the hand, then this metaphor is an abbreviation of how the mind is further shaped by the operation of dialectic and rhetoric. Although dialectic and rhetoric have often been defined in opposition to each other, both Cicero and Quintilian, using the metaphor of open hand and clenched fist, indicate that it is a matter of degree. Discourse would then form a continuum where,

optimally, dialectic and rhetoric overlap to produce a perfect argument. In the *Orator*, Cicero associates logic with the dialecticians. He describes the man with perfect eloquence as having not only the faculty of fluent and copious speech, but also a command of the neighboring territory of the science of logic, since both are concerned with discourse. According to Cicero, Zeno provided his students with a strong image of the difference between these two arts, by associating logic with the clenched fist, and eloquence, to the relaxed and extended hand with an open palm. In this same passage, he also refers to the first chapter of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where the Stagerite states that rhetoric is the counterpart of logic. On this premise he then concludes that the Orator should be thoroughly trained in the older logic of Aristotle or the new logic of Chrysippus. The eloquent speaker, Cicero continues, should know the force and classes of words, individually and in a sentence, the different modes of predication and the method of distinguishing truth from falsity. He should also know how to draw the appropriate deduction, and how to manage consequent and contrary forms of an argument. These skills comprise the training of an orator, since they are continually emerging in discourse and, although in themselves they are not attractive forms of expression, the orator should provide a certain grace of style while presenting them (*Orator* 114-116).

A reading of Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* provides us, as no doubt it provided Vives, with images of Zeno's hand. In a discussion of prudence, in which men know when to open or close the hand, Quintilian observes that it is clear that man has been so formed from the beginning as to plead or speak on his own behalf, if not with perfection, at least sufficiently enough to demonstrate that he has certain sparks of

eloquence implanted in him by nature. There are two kinds of speech informed by these sparks of eloquence. The first, or continuous, is rhetoric, and the second is more concise and is called *dialectic*. Here, Quintilian cites Zeno as saying that the relation between these two kinds of speech is quite intimate and thus the latter, *dialectic* can be compared to a closed fist and the former, rhetoric, to an open hand (Book II.XX.7). Quintilian continues in Book II by saying that it is the task of *dialectic* to provide discussion for whatever is brought before it and it is, thus, a concise form of oratory; its materials should also be appropriate for rhetoric or continuous oratory (XXI. 13).

In the act of catalepsis, Vives finds the origin of Plato's opinion concerning the nature of knowledge as a form of memory. The subject remembers information that is locked into the soul, and has remained there, ready to be unlocked through recall or memory. The souls of man, Vives says, following his reading of Plato, have knowledge already written in them before they take shape as individual bodies. He explains this remark on the basis that they have the potential but not yet the actuality, just as eyes have prior sensitivity to color before leaving the mother's uterus.

From this basic truth, other truths begin to emerge, similar stems and plants arising from seeds. All new undertakings generate the enthusiasm and a sense of the marvelous that fuels the investigation. It is necessary to bring in the power of judgment at this point, since some lines of investigation lead either to truth or falsity. A third, or neutral position, will take more investigation, since it is an intermediate situation where the case is not one thing or another. This neutral state is the result of a lack of equilibrium; the judgment is held in suspense, since it is not equipped to favor one side or another without sufficient information.

Assent, finally, is a simple act. According to Vives a thing is, or is not. Assent, however, can also be tempered with some measure of doubt or caution, which is expressed by the following verbal strategies: "I think, I opine, I believe," when the soul does not have enough understanding to be certain. There is also a third kind of certainty, introduced by the circumspect subject: "I suspect that, or, if I am not deceived, or it seems to me." There is also the negative statement: "I don't believe, think, suspect, agree."

Assent is provided firmly with the enunciation: "I know that....I have verified that"; or through a negation, the firm assent of the contrary case: "it is impossible, it is unbelievable, it is pure fable, it is invention." Here Vives also states that irony is equivalent to dissent; its manifestation is through a question, through which we want to examine or scrutinize carefully the essence or what is inherent of a thing or case in question. It is necessary for the subject who scrutinizes the object to look at the outside of its boundaries or directly inside of it. In terms of the questions themselves, some require a simple response, affirmative or negative, without additional proof. An example would be: "Tell me, Damian, whose cattle are these?." Others require reasons, or proofs, or an explanation and these are, appropriately, called questions.

For what is a concrete object one can ask: "what is this?" or "in what manner?" or, "What do you think?", "What, the town?", "What, the senate?". "What, Aristotle or Cicero?" At times, one can use a form of self interrogation: "Do I believe it? Put it off for tomorrow and I will sleep on it..." These are the ways through which the mind operates. As Vives writes: "Our mind on the surface of things or experience acts as a guide of knowledge and judge of the senses, but there are times when it

diverges from the direct road because of its own judgement. At this point knowledge diverges from direct experience produced by the senses. From this it enters the experience of the senses and prepares for the discovery of what is hidden and obscure. The manner of knowing through the senses remains the same, as in the mind's access toward the known from the unknown, or through the uncertain toward the certain, as it constructs the credible knowledge and verisimilar representations' (Mayans 84). The process of acquiring knowledge, then, is built upon prior construction or deeper penetration into the experience of the knower or subject. This process of knowing or learning generates increasing levels of probability and verisimilitude. Although one subject cannot arrive at the totality of light during his or her lifetime or career, the mind does grasp some light or some degree of certainty, otherwise the subject would not experience the doubt or the tenebrous aspects of his experience. The subject goes forward with his project of knowing, reducing somewhat, by degree, the overwhelming doubt and uncertainty which is our birthright. What Vives finds incredible is the quantity and variety of reasons that the human ingenium uses during its investigation, since the search through darkness and obscurity, can't be done in any other way. And although common sense tells us that both eye and ear are dependable transmitters of knowledge, we still have such statements in the language that admit to degrees of unsubstantiated certainty: "I heard with these very ears, or I see it with my eyes." Although even the Evangelist reports in his gospel "that which we have seen," we learn, however, that each day our senses, including eyes and ears, are deceived, regardless of how sharp and alive they may be. The senses are subject to their own particular defects or to the strangeness of

the object that is the subject of perception. Even if we do work with care and consideration, there is no guarantee that a thing can be correctly perceived. Thus, even in the language of ancient Rome there was a formula for the introduction of an explanation of experience: "I think the following; the following is what I think." There is no substitute for reason; even the "academy" does not rely on the evidence produced totally by the senses. There are very few cases in which the senses fail to record faithfully the intricacies of experience. However, an error occasioned by the senses can always be corrected and rectified. Subsequently, through continued examination of the sense information, it can be compared against models established by the subject's mind. In view of these remarks, Vives asks, "so how does the cannon of 'true experience' come into being?" He replies that the force of arguments, not necessarily apodeictic in nature, are built upon aspects of verisimilitude, and thus the ensuing probable truth acquires the same force as an argument from authority. Other forms of arguments need demonstration. These are based upon the confidence in one's own ingenio and the logic of the argument. On the other hand, those arguments that appeal to authority, even if they do not have the assurance of a rational logic, carry considerable weight. However, since not all authorities give the same levels of trust, arguments that proceed without benefit of demonstrative logic must establish their probable credibility. In this case, the subject should proceed along the lines of Quintilian, who said: "if one thing harmonizes with another and does not present a contradiction," then an argument can be extended to its conclusion (Mayans 85).

Authority

Vives begins this section by saying that he will analyze the form of argument by authority. First, Vives asserts that the senses are the children of nature; they are not brought into existence by training or teaching. Man shares these senses with all other animal beings as a gift of Nature. Of course the passions or emotions have much to do with the articulation of sense experience, as he writes in his work, *De anima*. He states that the subject, drawing from clear and certain things (“*res*”) initiates investigations of the obscure and uncertain experience on the basis of the instrument available, depending on whether one is a jurist, mathematician, or medical doctor. Obviously, here each one conducts the investigation into phenomena on the basis of the question that is asked and the traditions of erudition that are represented. The search for essence, inherent structure, causes and effects, are formulated thus by each subject, in a way that distinguishes one approach from another. Vives uses the example here of a painter who, with the same brush will paint a portrait of Caesar on a wood tablet, an ox on canvas, a portrait of Alexander on a wall, and on paper a fish. The great ingenios can do this without much intervention, if any, from others, depending only upon the quickness of mind and its ability to penetrate into the subject at hand. Lesser ingenios must consult. Vives believes that the best way to examine the procedure of each tradition is to observe, note and catalogue its precepts and reduce to art the same reasoning of inquiring and recovering probable arguments, that are of general use in the discipline or tradition. This, he states, is the structure of the art of invention.

Topics

Without recourse to the dialectical topoi to assist the art of invention, the ingenium would face a peregrination each time it is called upon to respond to a question concerning human experience. This activity would generate a search through an extensive labyrinth of impertinent or unrelated particulars, reflecting the immense stasis of nature, blunting the function of the ingenium by exposing it to the tenebrous and dense mass of things. This is why the ingenium should take advantage of a classificatory framework that already exists, consisting of a number of forms of reasoning that were referred to by Aristotle as topoi. These forms of reasoning are found within the realm of human discourse; they were subsequently examined by Cicero in his *Topica* as places in the mind around which coherent arguments can be constructed. Such a place or topos is the instrument through which the thinking subject is able to see a spark of probable reason. For Vives, these forms of reasoning have names similar to the labels that are found on each bottle in a pharmacy in order to identify the specific drug therein contained. By describing the content of each bottle, they help the pharmacist to identify readily the medicine in each bottle. The same is true when searching for a specific and appropriate form of argument. Although Vives mentions both Aristotle and Cicero as sources for the study of topoi, for analysis of forms of argument he relies on Agricola's *De inventione dialectica*, a work highly respected by him.²

Vives, however, cautions the reader of the possibility that, at any moment, doubt about something may arise; it is absolutely necessary, he points out, that what has fallen into doubt be submitted to a close examination, both externally and internally, in order to bring out the meaning that is hidden from the subject's eyes. In this case

one must discover the pertinence of the object and bring it into discourse. For it is through this process that the shadowy and uncertain dimensions of things are made clear and brought into language and the realm of the probable. In doing this, one must be aware of what is called “definition” and “division,” the two basic aspects of coordinating the clarification of uncertain meaning. This focuses the mind on the essence of the thing in question, including its inherent elements inhaerentis. Vives emphasizes that one must examine the actions and re-actions of things, their causes and the place where each element is located in any sequence of actions. This method will also serve to define as well as possible the complete range of each object’s attributes. It is a process through which the human ingenium invents excogitata arguments that expand the field of human discourse, not simply by adding new to old knowledge in a linear process. At any moment of discourse, new knowledge may radically change what has been accepted as part of the traditional way of understanding things. Therefore, as in the immense world of things, human discourse considers knowledge as a hypothesis that is continually subject to modification and change.

The Instrument of Definition

The essence of a thing in terms of its definition contains the following elements: genus, species, differences and properties, all of which constitute a thing (*res*). If that which occupies the place of “genus” shows a certain inferiority, it is an indication of yet another level of organization that can be discovered. The term ‘genus’, then, is also a hypothesis, and may very well be a species of an idea or thing within an

expanding hierarchical modeling system. For Vives, the essence of a thing is discovered through the operation of the instrument of definition, which provides the structure of his concept of being, the ultimate ground of this organization of human experience within a system of discourse. To illustrate the methodology of this instrument, he refers to Cicero's *Tusculan dialogues*, wherein is found the basis of reference for a definition of what he understands to be articulation of "law," drawn from the observation of experience. The example he selects is Cicero's examination of the manner in which "law," considered to have a universal application, is actually constructed from individual experience. As framed by Cicero, "law" can be discovered in the actions of those who have been profoundly influenced by their teachers or preceptors: "Search the actions of Graccus, and you will find the laws of Sempronias; Search those of Sila, and find those of Cornelias" (Mayans 87). In this manner, the laws are found among the actions of individuals. In other words, the investigation proceeds from the individual, where its form is discovered, to the more general or genus. Each construct has its own parts, and each part is no other thing than that which is differentiated from others within the same structure. Some of these are simple, like the physical aspects or parts of an object, while others are composite or combined, as are those that are characteristic of quantity. What threatens the stability of this process of definition is the motion or dissolution of things, since man is unable to find perfect completion in the world; only his spirit, or that part of the spirit that is celestial and immortal tends toward the transcendence of the world of change.

Vives' illustration of the operation of definition and how it evolves to produce the concept of "law," is also an example of a classic argument by sorites, a term used to describe the placement of each step of an argument, similar to the addition of one grain of sand at a time, that will eventually fill out the object of analysis, a method used to ensure the building of coherent concepts from species or examples to the essential elements of the human genus. In terms of its composition, the human genus is distinct from that of the animal, since the structure of a society and its history are an integral part of its nature. To support this point, Vives cites the statement of Terence: "I am a man, and there is not one human thing foreign to me" (Mayans 88). Following this line of thinking, man is thus conceived to be a construct assembled by a continuing definition of his parts or aspects. His law is also invented ("*inventio*") as he evolves, and it is closely related to man's idea of the res publica. Vives draws on Cicero's observation of the structure of law, quoting from the *Orator*, where C. Casio says: "the law is not but correct reason; it derives from the majesty of the gods, imposing what is honest and prohibiting what is not"(Mayans 88). And since Jupiter has granted man a rational soul, He sanctions all that takes place within the Republic according to its laws, if they are the result of the virtuous functioning of man's rational soul. Because the law is articulated by the correct application of reason, it is not important, Vives concludes, to search for the essence of law as though it were an eternal quality. The essence of a thing can be assembled from discourse, and its definition may very well be found in its adjuncts (ex '*adjunctis*' *cognoscitur*) , as seen in the above examples. A thing's essence can be defined, ex adjunctis from the proximate things associated with it, or from recognized things attached to it that form

its context. As a method of definition, it differs from the determination of essence that draws from inherent characteristics (“ab inhaerentibus”) of the object in question.

What is inherent in an object, Vives writes, can be found in common sense observations and pragmatic arguments. He refers to an example in Virgil’s *Georgics* (II.246) where common sense is applied in judging the appropriate composition of soil for different forms of agriculture :

“at sapor indicium faciet manifestus, et ora
tristia temptantum sensu torquebit amaro.”

This taste will clearly indicate the condition of the soil, for a bitterness will twist the face of anyone who makes the test. The fertility of the earth and the vegetable world can be learned from the senses of taste, touch, color, and smell. The two lines from Virgil, a mnemonic device that Vives employs frequently, can be understood as a sign of the entire passage in the *Georgics*, in which Virgil describes several ways to determine the types of soil used, in accordance with the nature of different crops. The tests he elaborates reflect the interrelation of the senses and reason, leading to conclusions that can be put into practice. In this particular case the poet does not derive the experience directly, but from the water that is strained through the clots of rich soil, which is then subject to the taste test. Through these and similar tests the inherent qualities of a thing are determined by the careful exploration made possible by the use of information from the senses. This, obviously, is a system that does not derive its information from what would be called naïve or raw sense data.

What is called common sense already seems to include ratio and memory, involved on the primary level of the senses, ordering, judging, and verifying against a history of similar experience. The examination of man's experience includes, simultaneously, both internal and external dimensions. Vives describes the external inherent qualities as signs of exteriority, that is, "the quickness of the fire is an example of the intensity of the heat and the formation of ice is an indication of the coldness of water." There also exists what Vives labels the adjunct, an example of which is the statement: "It is more probable that a man will be ripped to pieces by a lion than a dog, since that is the character of the beast." This is the action that emanates from the interior of the object under examination and is the force or power that each thing reveals to the observer. It can be compared to the nature of a well from which one assumes that water can be constantly taken (Mayans 91).

The observer cannot be abstracted from his observations. Action and passion, dimensions of Vives's epistemology, form an interdependency and are thus united, since there cannot be action where there is not passion and vice versa. His position differs from Aristotle's, who held that actions and passions were separable, since each had different attributes, although the Stagerite's position subsequently changes when he admits that the five basic senses appear to overlap. For Vives, this overlap is the key to his concept of the complementary working of the senses. They not only complement each other, but they also form the matrix for the interrelation among the actions and passions of men, providing a unity through which being can be explained. Vives concludes that from this complex field of experience the subject must derive what is said, desired, and thought, not only in the preterit or past tense,

but also in the present and future. At any one point in human discourse there is an abundance of signs. This action brings to mind not only what is inherent within the subject's interior thinking, but also the external object represented by the senses. An indication of the way that the internal or interior thinking process, and the action and passion of the mind operate harmonically, is exemplified by Vives' statements concerning the operation of a perfect ingenium. The force of the ingenium, similar to a magnet, attracts the iron filings, which is his metaphor for the external and internal thinking process.

Cause and Effect

Each action excludes others. When one mode of action is specified, other possibilities of explaining a set of relations are masked. In the case of a general condition of passion, for example, one finds an individual who suffers love or hate. So closely joined are the causes of action in the subject that they are described as efficient, or that which attain a finality. He finds that what is called the efficient cause might seem to have a relation ante rem, as if it were final, and post rem, as if it were complete. However, it is more convenient to separate them, since certain causes are simultaneous with their effects. Although differentiating actions and causes is easier done at the end of an action, he indicates that it is far easier to change or avoid the functioning of human causes than that of natural causes. He cites Dionysius' speech to his mother, concerning her planned wedding, "We are able to violate the laws set down by humans, but not the laws of nature" (Mayans 92).

In extending his description of causes, Vives provides an analysis of the uncertainties involved in the comprehension of human causes. He gives as an example the sequence of causes involved in the description of a dispute between two agents. Here, the truth is deduced by the following chain of causes: the conflict was the cause of the murder, from the conflict arose the disputes and, from these, hatred then, from the hatred the embroilment and, finally, the attempt to murder. Not always, however, do actions follow this order, and their causes are found to be uncertain. They differ, of course, from those causes that always produce the same, specific result. In addition there are arbitrary causes, controlled by nature, without human volition and election or choice, such as the heat of the fire. Regarding the identification of causes, the initial turns of passion are customarily blind, and thus they remain impervious to responsibility, just like animals that are considered blameless while doing something in response to a blind instinct. Less to blame are the nescient, since they are less responsible than the educated; they follow the primary excitement of the soul's emotions, rather than choose a course of action by taking laws into account.

Next Vives examines the mutual linkage of cause and effect. The effect can be confirmed from a well identified cause and vice versa, as in the case of fire as cause, producing the effect of heat; and heat can also be considered as the cause of fire. The effects correspond to the cause and can be attributed in the same manner, following the logic of events, especially while looking at a natural effect such as heat produced by fire. Vives expands upon the idea of mutual linkage by providing a number of additional examples taken from other sequences of action that demonstrate

the same pattern of cause and effect. He turns to an example from Virgil in reference to the sorting of seeds: "I have seen that many seeds, chosen with great care and expectation and anxiety, degenerate if each year man with his hand does not choose the largest among them for planting" (Mayans 96).

Care should be taken, however, in any analysis of the sequence of actions, to avoid accepting a fortuitous effect, a result of chance, as a necessary outcome of a certain sequence of actions. Vives refers to the statement that "Scipio was a better captain than Hannibal since the former defeated the latter." He finds that the defeat or victory can be the result of luck, since many times those of inferior rank defeat those who are superior, as Filemon defeated Manandro in a competition of theatrical works. To this end, he quotes Cicero: "In addition to the overall risk, one should consider the uncertain results, since Mars, has defeated many times those who boasted of victories and had taken the spoils of war. He threw down into the earth those who until this point had not been defeated"(Mayans 96). However, not all men's activities are subject to the vagaries of warfare, there are differences between the pursuit of arts and the use of the sword. It is not likely, Vives affirms, that the order created in a work of art, exhibiting the full force of the artist's ingenium, would be a stroke of luck or that, by chance, it would be ordered. Who would believe that a canvas so beautiful would have been painted by chance and not by art ?

Deepening his discussion on cause and effect, he points to a difference between a proximate and a remote cause. He gives various examples of people's conduct over a time horizon in which remote causes can be identified in current patterns of behavior. There are, however, relative degrees of uncertainty in the attribution of

causes and effects. This can be traced back to a situation in which both time and place can be identified. His example of a certain man who first lived in Carthage, where he learned how to be deceitful; later, in Athens, he learned how to speak well; and much later, in Paris, he learned how to dispute heatedly. In each case the remote cause is associated with place, while the time horizon carries what the man actually learned in each situation. The relation between proximate and remote, time and place, is also mentioned by Cicero as being of help in his speech in favor of Scauro. Cicero explains that the temples near the Roman forum give him material in order to speak in Scauro's favor. What is joined or attached to place and time in this case is natural, although the workings of human actions can be related to these structures.

Natural time is primarily a mode or a quantity, as experienced by a subject. Vives explains that the time, in reality, does not differ substantially from its mode, since it is only a manner of speaking. An example of this is the observation by Socrates, who identifies two different aspects of a single man by the statement, "In the morning, the counsel, and at night, the guest" (Mayans 90). Another example offered by Vives is that most political situations, depending on whether the argument is "pro" or "contra," are set in times that are difficult or simple. Some things are given significance by keeping time and place an implicit dimension within discourse: for example, in terms of time, the wife should rejoice in the return of her husband, implying that the war is over; in terms of place, a statement that assumes a relation is appropriate, as in the statement, "because my friend is there." Within the structure of time and place some things are referred to as natural, like the similarities shared by father and son; others are found in the language of what is willed or desired, like

friend or enemy. And there are yet others generated by fortune or chance, such as functionary, private person, servant and governess. There is never a simple time line among things through which it is possible to organize a series of causes. Such differences in place and time, “before, after, in front or rear, on top of, under,” are used to express location or place. In terms of time, care should be taken that events are properly ordered so as to avoid assigning Cicero’s speeches to a place where he could not have been, prior to his birth, nor make mention of St. Augustine as a contemporary of the French kings who came to power after him. However, as Vives argues, it is here difficult to separate exactly the anterior from the posterior in the following series: “At the point of initiating the military offensive, both sides were there in place, but before the combat peace was declared” (Mayans 98). Here the second part does not follow from the first. Also, chance or fortune at play may confuse the sequence of causes. In such statements as “glorious war,” or “ruinous victory,” the addition of an adjective disguises the workings of chance. (Mayans, 99)

Comparison and Similarity

Comparisons among moral actions when used as exempla also tend to mask the general categories of time and place. Such examples can be used as exhortations to act following the precepts of historical or cultural models, as in the statement: “Since he was able to behave in this way, then it is reasonable to expect that one conduct oneself in a similar manner” (Mayans 100). This does not prove, however, that the comparison or example is appropriate, nor that what has been done is fit to be replicated. Being a form of persuasion, like any form of demonstration it would have

to be acceptable (aequitas) behavior, that is, honest, useful, and decorous. The basis of Vives' analysis of comparison and its relation to exempla, maxim, and fable is probably Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Cicero's *De inventione*, and the Cicero of the *Ad herennium*.

Probability that depends on comparison, according to Cicero, depends on a degree of similarity that is found in diverse materials by the rational subject. There are three subdivisions of comparison: the first is 'similitude' (imago), which establishes the likeness of individuals or characters; the second is the 'parallel' (collation) or statement that sets one thing next to another thing on the basis of a resemblance; third is the example (exemplum), which is used to support or weaken a case by an appeal to precedent or experience, citing some person or historical event (*De inventione* I.49). In the *Ad herennium*, comparison ("similitude") is described as a "manner of speech that carries over an element of likeness from one thing to a different thing" (IV.59). It has four distinct modes of operation: first, it provides a contrast by way of an embellishment, or extending the similarities of the comparison; second, in the form of negation it can be used in a proof that can be employed to distinguish the focus of the comparison; third, it clarifies the terms of comparison; fourth, it is employed to keep the two similarities of an abridged comparison intermingled while extending an argument to its conclusion.

In the *Art of Rhetoric*, Aristotle states that example and enthymeme are the two kinds of common proofs. Associating example ("paradigma") with induction, the Stagerite describes two kinds of examples: the first consists of relating things that have occurred and can be referred to historically and the second, in discovering

through the process of invention, such comparisons as used by Socrates to illustrate points of his argument, or the fables employed by Aesop to support an analogy (II. 1393-1394). Aristotle considers that examples (“paradigma”) can be used in the corroboration of enthymemes. The enthymeme itself is a type of syllogism that is formed from credible statements concerning the similarities or dissimilarities of signs. Quintilian, in his *Institutio oratoria*, writes that the Greek ‘enthymeme’ is translated by the Roman commentum or commentatio and he laments that there is no alternative word in Latin that carries the same meaning and he then concludes that it would be wiser to use the Greek name. He understands the ‘enthymeme’ as having three meanings: the first concerns that which is conceived by the mind; the second signification is a proposition from which a reason follows; and a third deals with the conclusion of an argument drawn from a denial of consequents or from a description of incompatible elements, although this latter can be defined as an epicheireme (1.x.4).

Quintilian goes on to say that the Roman writers have preferred to apply the name of comparison (“similitudo”) to that which the Greeks understand as parabola, while translating paradigma as example. He observes that both have the nature of the example, though he prefers to use the term paradigma or exemplum. His view is different than Cicero’s, who separates ‘comparison’ and ‘example’, perhaps reflecting the latter’s division of all arguments into the class of induction and the class of reason (“ratio”) (V.xi.2). From Cicero’s classification, it is possible to assign the various techniques of comparison to induction; the construction of example (“exemplum”) is then the work of reason (“ratio”). Some teachers have managed to

persuade others that the paradigma or example is best suited for speech and the enthymeme is best established in written work. Quintilian's own view finds no difference between speaking well and writing well, and both exempla and reasoning by enthymeme can be properly deployed by both writers and speakers (V.xlv). The virtuous orator, Quintilian observes, should be equipped with a rich assortment of examples, both old and new. Such a collection should include historical sources and also those that are transmitted day by day through the oral tradition. He should not neglect fictitious examples invented by the great poets (which are seen continuously in the work of Vives). Closing his explanation of examples, Quintilian offers a conclusion close to the heart of Vives' model of erudition. These instruments, he states, are weapons that the orator should have at hand. This is the knowledge he should have, "supplemented by a ready store of words, figures, power of imagination, skill in arrangement, retentiveness of memory and grace of delivery" (XII.iv). However, of all these qualities the most important is the virtuous soul that cannot be undone by fear nor terrified by authority. Without this strength of soul, these weapons are useless.

Similarity, Vives observes, is the way to compare such genres as fable and apology, since they serve as examples of either what has happened or should have happened in accordance with great moral systems. In some cases, a similarity is developed between a significant physical object and a powerful moral action. The example he uses is the similarity between one sun that is sufficient to light all creation and the single voice of a great maestro to speak to all of his students. Though it is a comparison of greater with lesser, the signification shares an equivalence that

functions on a semantic level by tying the two meanings together. Vives finds the same type of similarity expressed in the comparison in Lucan's statement concerning Pompei's fall, "under which Rome lies." Lucan's metaphor of the great man's fall also combines the physical basis of the similarity with its moral implication. Comparison also leads to such diverse dimensions as contrariness and contradictoriness, which occasion embarrassments and stumbling blocks or hindrances. An example of a contrary comparison would be : "injustice is an evil, while justice is a good," or "the enemy leaves you with a wound; the friend will cure your wound." In terms of negatives, Livy provides the following example: "he has never done a bad thing; nor will he ever do it." Relative similarities should be carefully considered by both speaker and audience, since they are often the result of figurative language, used without the same level of exactitude as philosophic precision. This is seen in the statement that uses the terms, "master" and "disciple." The word "master" can be applied to both Augustine and Guillermo Budé, although here there is probably a degree of difference so that the former would hold the office of preceptor, while the latter would be considered a student. Both "master" and "disciple" are relative terms that tend to cloud the scope of knowledge presupposed by each noun, and their degree of difference one has to either transfer or receive during the process of instruction. When the unities of time and place are suppressed in the comparison, it further erodes the strength of any assertion of similarity.

Regarding the comparison of adjectives, they appear to be more uncertain, since they usually involve the use of negatives and contraries. Taking an example that leads to an analysis of a father's action against his son, Vives paraphrases Quintilian. To

the observer, both father and son are good to each other. However, in reference to a father of twins, this simple harmony of father and son is dissolved when the father decides to put one of them to death. Nobody would confess to this act, except one who would want others to understand that it was done for the good of the remaining son. Vives interprets this act as the equivalent of stating that to save one of the sons, it is necessary to commit the greatest atrocity imaginable. He then asks, when would it not be an evil to kill a son? His answer is that most men would argue that only brute animals would do such a thing, meaning that good men would never commit this kind of murder. However, to explore yet another dimension of this case, Vives asks another question: "how much more will a man do than an animal?" (Mayans 95). He concludes that the primary element of this case, the murder of the son, the act itself, is taken from nature; the second, a judgment, comprises the terms of comparison by the use of an adjective of good or bad.

Before an object is brought into existence in discourse, that which precedes it must be adduced in order to determine any degree of similarity or affinity. At first glance it seems that all causes of an event or object could be discovered in the same place. But there may be another location involved, since each sequence of events is brought into the mind by a multitude of signs. During any examination of a probable cause, if there is a lack of clarity that makes it impossible to produce an answer by way of a definition based on a similarity or difference, one should select a connection that is the closest to the original place of its observation. Although this should be considered as a hypothetical cause, it can be used as the basis to examine other possible connections between events. The actual cause of an event or object may be

brought to light by way of a search that takes the subject deep within its experience, into the realm of signs. It is difficult to isolate one particular cause, since there exists in the field of experience an abundance of signs. For example, the causes identified in the following statements are superficial and should be questioned further: "He died because he had an altercation; he trembled, because he had been menaced." Man's experience is constituted by the play of internal and external signs. A statement from Quintilian is used by Vives to show how the mind selects signs within a field of discourse: "Who would doubt what a mathematician would assert concerning the future, if it is demonstrated that he did not lie about the past." In this example there are a number of signs framed in various tenses or times, establishing the mathematician's prior experience and his prediction concerning the future. A simpler example for Vives would be the unchallenged statement, "since the sunset is red, the next morning will be clear." From these examples, Vives concludes that if some action or statement can be adduced to create an imitation, it would pertain to an example; but if it is phrased as an argument, it should be examined as such, since its conclusions should transmit the power of its antecedents.

What immediately follows the subject is viewed as the object. It makes no difference if what follows the subject exists simultaneously or is placed in one of a number of tenses. Here Vives emphasizes that it is understood that both the object and the language describing it are established in time and set in tense. In terms of the judgment of a person, fame or renown become examples only when they are put in place and set in time. This location of objects in the dimensions of space and time is an integral part of his epistemology. The subject's comprehension of a thing through

the act of catalepsis presupposes a place, a shaping or framing of sense experience. He considers that “where” to look and “when” are conditions of experience and are of primary importance in the operation of categories of thought or topoi within the realm of discourse.

Antecedents

Although many types of antecedent constructions have been considered initially by Vives, there are other examples he adds that should also receive our consideration. For example, Cicero’s “authority” and “testimony,” taken from the sentences of others, should be given careful consideration, since Cicero’s are secondary sources. And not only what Cicero alleges as having been said, but also the deeds or actions that have been accepted or not accepted by an audience. He examines a selection of modes of expression including such examples as symbols, apothegms and answers that have the power and rationale of authority, such as popular rumor, unexamined fame or prejudice. One should also take into account the sentence that is pronounced by way of analogy or by way of a cause or reference to a source that has been accepted as authentic, embodied in the form of a witness, a tablet, or even a storm. These embodiments belong to a collection of what the rhetoricians call common places; for the purpose of argument they can be immediately used to reflect a significant verisimilitude. Of course, there are gradations of authority, since not all persons have the same level of reliability. As Euripides says: “the same thing said by diverse speakers does not have identical value in each case” (Mayans 100). There are degrees of certainty in similar statements, depending on the authority of each speaker

and his motives. Vives cites as an example a hypothetical group of wise men, of quick and clear mind, who are able to know things naturally; they are of robust culture, diligent and active, accredited through long practice. From these speakers, or virtuous orators, one does not expect deceitful statements, since there is no reason and no motive to provide their audiences with less than certain words about the nature of things and circumstances.

Vives posits certainty in God, the primary authority and the antecedent of all experience. All men would agree that God is the source of all that is known, and can be considered as all-knowing. His will and his senses were made known or declared principally through his only begotten Son, who remains always in His heart. He is the source of the Sacred Scriptures that the patriarchs and saints received before and after His birth. Their statements concerning the antecedence of God can be found in descriptions of their dreams and in their understanding of the signs that with all certainty men believe are sent by God, including the vatic pronouncements by those imbued with prophetic spirit. Before these Christian interpreters of God's authority, the gentiles had their prodigies, portents, auguries, auspices and presages. From these it has been possible to determine who would have little faith in the word of the Evangelical, and who would not be able to accept the necessary Christian precepts. These precepts can only exist within the consciousness of the human race, and only through the dispositions of the spirit (soul) can be comprehended. From this source emerges the goodness ("aequitas") of those inexhaustible offices or works of humanity inborn in each heart. The principles that are considered the most authoritative of the human race are attributed to the pondering of men who have been

considered to have achieved wisdom. The case Vives sets forth presupposes that these wise men are also the leaders of countries, legislators upon whose work are founded the towns and cities. It does not cost one much effort to believe they have sufficient prudence to maintain a distance from the desire to deceive, since they are benevolent to those whose welfare they desire to ensure. Many are the concessions that are made to friends, Vives observes, as long as they are thought of as having a virtuous ingenium. It is difficult to suspect that they would act deceptively. Because of this, unlimited confidence is placed on those whom one calls father and caretaker, or preceptor. In this location of discourse, men situate the doctrines that are left by those who are considered great and wise, such as Cato and Cicero. It is reported that Cicero, thinking of posterity, provided a general admonition to a public that he considered unaccustomed to believing in the existence of evil by saying: "after me, the flood." The problem, according to Vives, is which of these great persons should be trusted as having developed a site or place of wisdom or certainty? The Greeks found nothing in those they termed barbarians; the Romans laughed at Greek examples. Scipio thought that only his ancestors were grave men with great ingenio, virtue and probity. Following this logic, Vives finds that Christians should not be moved by examples of the non-Christians or, for that matter, of any Christians; they should accept only those who are pure and reflect an authentic expression of Christ. The example Vives provides the reader is St. Paul, who writes: "my imitators thirst as I thirst for Christ" (Mayans 100). Man, for Vives, is still very far away from the order of angels. Truth or certainty is difficult to attain in practice. He who does not contradict himself at times is strong proof that he is not certain about his affirmations

and, thus, takes away the strength of his statements. When it is demonstrated that a speaker has affirmed what is false, he is then known as a person who has been deceived and can deceive others, since he has not had the mind to verify his sources, and lacks study and diligence. Vives classifies unreliable speakers as “those who do not cease lying, those who were informed superficially, those distracted by other occupations, and those who are empty and vain”(Mayans 100). Their comportment generates the following comments from their listeners: “intelligent, but not in the field covered in his speech; he judges with integrity, and he is well informed concerning the causes he identifies in his argument.” The places, times and persons either sharpen the dialogue or let it become slack. Not only those in authority are responsible to maintain the clarity of expression, but also others, who have the ability to employ eloquence to ensure that the power of debate does not weaken, which would then lead to a diminished capacity to establish the truth of man’s of experience. A friend’s death that should be vigorously questioned should not be summarized by a reduction of its import as shown in the following statement: “we spoke between cups, in the resting place of one of our friends, and we enjoyed the pleasant light.” Deceit, then, is not only produced by the intention of those who would seek to establish their advantages through its use, but it is also nurtured by those who lack the pursuit of diligence, and also those who would accept the superficial while being delighted by appearance.

Deception cannot be institutionalized without the lie. Vives refers to ‘wise Aristotle’, who said that the “lie is an article of exchange” (Mayans 101). It facilitates exchange when it is accepted by the listener. It leads to the construction, as it were, of

a false economy. A lie that is accepted has an advantage within a verbal exchange that is deeply entwined with the exchange of money. Vives observes that through this process the statements of the poor can be discredited, and those who are able to establish structures based on the useful combination of deceit and money prevail within a society that permits this evolution. He warns his reader to beware of those citizens who extol or praise the rich and powerful, since this can be attributed to money, not to truth. There is another class of citizens that pursues glory and honor and will sacrifice the truth to achieve its desired end, the possession of which is no less a hindrance toward truth than the hunt for wealth. In addition to all the foregoing, there exists also the desire for physical convenience. The subject will lie to liberate himself from actual pain and torment, to avoid suffering even greater pains, or to defend himself from death. The presence of pain in the weak person, and the threat of punishment for those who are robust, is enough of a threat to quiet or stifle the voice of truth. The passions are also a source of mendacity. This is especially true if the speaker directs his discourse to achieve immediate recognition, without taking into account the historical structures of society or the rules of traditional dialectic, while driven by the uncontrolled passion of the moment to secure a temporary objective. This is seen most often in the descriptions a speaker will provide of his friends and enemies, governed by passions that may diminish if not destroy the art of eloquence. This is also frequently observed in the way some speakers, unable to manage their passions, extol the advantages acquired by their friends and provide copious details of the losses suffered by their enemies.

The Figure of Authority

Place and time can change the power of what is said and what is done. For example, a person speaks the truth and acts forthrightly, at one place and at a specific time. However, the same speech and action can be inappropriate in another place and at a different time, since it may very well produce adverse consequences. Both speech and action in this case depend not only on what was said but also on the speaker's stature. Pointing to the relationship often established between two philosophers, Vives questions implicitly the thinking that goes into the creation of a figure of authority. A sentence like: "To say that Cicero, like Aristotle, affirmed that the world is eternal," is actually attributing the authority of this opinion to the latter, not the former. Cicero is here a secondary figure who happens to agree with Aristotle. In Vives' view, the use of an authority to confirm the correctness of an argument or the structure of a true conclusion should not be accepted blindly, for even the work of Aristotle is at times unclear. The tradition of thinking, the institutions it creates and the authorities that defend it, should be subject to continuous questioning. This process can serve to identify the degrees of truth or certainty of statements made by authoritative figures in support of institutions that may very well be established by falsifications that have been assembled within the materials of discourse through the work of deceit and mendacity. In another work, *Against the Pseudodialecticians*, he provides examples of the kind of thinking that falsifies the common experience of men and obfuscates the process of thinking that is the basis of tradition and erudition.

An example of this type of falsification can be seen in the emergence of a public council as an authority that is affirmed by its assigned name of 'senate'. It should not be composed of the young or, for that matter, the wealthy, since the derivation of "senate" is from the Latin, senex. Delving into the history of the "senate" instituted by the Romans, he finds that the Lacedaemons or Spartans were probably responsible for creating its attributes. The senate is a term that can be analyzed etymologically to uncover meanings that perhaps do not apply to the actual body of reference. Cicero considered that all etymologies were notationes, literally a veriloquia that come to light as a form of testimony for those who use the language, including some words that have their etymologies in other languages (Mayans 113). He argues that names are not given without proper consideration. There is not a deliberative council that debates the appropriate name for each object; rather, it is the work of custom that brings into existence that which fortune has favored. Some of these meanings, Vives thinks, are rooted in secure etymologies, like the senate; others emerge from family customs, like the cognomens Roman children receive from their fathers, which is not the case in Athens and Asia.

Topoi

Vives finds that, in the immense and virtually infinite forest of proofs that embraces the complex of nature, topoi are useful not only for eloquence and discourse, but also for the practical applications of organizing a society. Here, Vives states that he has only attempted a description of the generic or genus, leaving aside the overwhelming numbers or species since this would be an endless task. The

problem involved in such an undertaking is to ensure that an examination of topoi on the level of species does not generate formulations of examples that are mere repetitions of each other or variations of an argument. The most important element here is that the names that designate each instrumental topos should facilitate the construction of an argument that provides the subject with access to the dialectic. Single arguments that can be taken from easily accessible places in memory would be extremely conducive and practical for the invention (“invention”) that discloses each thing (“res”) in its appropriate singularity. In Vives’ view, it is difficult to follow the object being created beyond its practical significance. What is most important in this process is the practical work of discovery or invention based on the economy of clarity and utility, and not on the pursuit of origins that are locked away in its primordial beginnings or inception. Without focusing on the development of a classificatory system which includes the categories of topoi, man’s experience is so diverse that he would not be able to select the appropriate objects that facilitate his daily life, nor would he be capable of using effectively his memory, to help him judge his copious experience of the world.

In substance, man is a combination of the animal and rational, and from this juncture or mixture he derives his definition. From this point, all that he deems human is assembled when he thinks about himself. The parts he identifies as constituting his essence, drawn from the material he shares with the animal kingdom, comes into being and passes away for it only exists in a continuously changing and corruptible flow. Man’s spirit is the most generous result of matter (“res”) that exists beneath the heavens. Similar to Aristotle’s position, this spirit exists apart from the external

material. This is conveyed in the *Fabula*, in which man as the archmime, through his human masks, becomes a harmonic entity composed of both internal and external materials. Inherent in this body of man are color, form, figure, profile, proportion of members, conditions of health. From this mind and body, fueled by reason and passion, man produces arts and offices, virtues and vices.

The topoi of man's actions consist of what has been said, done, wanted, or intended, as well as what he has produced, and the pain and anguish suffered. Man's causes are efficient: they consist of God, his parentage and, to a certain extent, the composition of his native ground. His finality, or what God has destined for him, is eternal felicity. However, there are those who through their ignorance and subjugation to their passions become vain and obnoxious; these subjects define their finality as an accumulation of wealth, honor, fame, and sensual delights. Regardless of the source of man's motivation, many of his works are marvelous: the cultivation of fields, creation of cities, laws, literatures, disciplines and arts, some of which are exercised by the body and others by the mind or ingenio, and some with both. His instruments include the use of ingenio, memory, technique, hands, feet and others that are procured outside the body, such as pen, ink, brush, money, knife, and other materials or tools. As seen in the example of the *Fabula*, man himself is a finality of other animate being and all that exists in the sub-lunar world. He exists in time and can be thus described in winter, the month of January, in the coming calendars of February, the reign of Charles V, in time of serenity, health, at liberty, in the republic of Brussels, in the room, in the closet, dressed with splendor or sordidness.

Man presents himself to God, his Prince and owner: he must also act in accordance with the appropriate patterns of behavior in relation to his father, mother, tutor, uncle, magistrate, pupil, king, country, and a number of other personal and societal relationships that shape his experience and embody his subjectivity. Another dimension of man's description should include the various modes of his thinking and his strategies of representation in relation to his wealth, possessions, honors, fame, glory, and popularity. The composition of his subjectivity shifts in accordance with the economics of his place in society: whether he is poor or noble in comparison to others, or considers himself to be prominent or obscure, envied or envious, hating or hated. His character is also shaped by comparisons among other subjects such as father, son, servant or master, and whether he considers himself superior, inferior or equal to others. To say there is nothing contrary to man is itself a contradiction. Opposite man there is a world of things, creatures and processes that constitute, in the matrix of space and time, an overwhelming multitude of genera and species. Man as an object in the world can be adduced through arguments that take into account his ancestors, history, fables, refrains and predictions that are made about him, if any; he is also what someone has said about him, his name, his last name, his earned name or nickname. There is such a great abundance of topics that serve to structure arguments and descriptions of man that it is not absurd that Rudolph Agricola would think that Gorgias, Hippias, Protagoras and others were prepared to speak in any assembly on any subject concerning man. From the examples selected above that are taken from the immense field of possible topics, Vives concludes that these great speakers never lacked material. These materials comprise the topics or places ("loci") where

discussions of man are found, and are the basis for bringing forth man's image in accordance with probable descriptions that result in the constitution of models that are accepted on the basis of verisimilitude.

Since topics provide a basis for the structure of coherent discourse and the creation of man's narrative, one should know how they are found and how they are used. In the first place, Vives says, topics are used in the same way and manner the great authors used them. Once new speakers understand the way arguments are adduced from the topics, they are able to use them to strengthen their positions or weaken opposing alternatives within the course of dialectical thinking. The problem, however, with older topics or places is that, through usage, they lose their clarity and become obscure and are, thus, less effective within common language. The force of topics can be eroded when writers add material to them and, thereby, they lose the original meaning and place within discourse. Care should be taken to ensure the appropriate use of topics to facilitate arguments, and to avoid the confusion that is usually the result of amplification.

Probability as Instrument

Even the greatest authors, if asked, would not be able to explain how they structure their arguments and what elements they use to link the chain of their reasoning, how they accommodate the central argument, and how they move it forward. To follow the argument, it is necessary to understand its cause on both general and particular levels. One should be able to determine if the argument has multiple proofs or only one and, if there are multiple modes of proof, how they

converge or diverge. One must follow each proof to determine if it has some truth to it and whether or not it is of any utility. If the argument is found successful in terms of its articulation, it is considered credible and its conclusions, worthy of application within a method developed to test the field of probable truth. This is the basis for the instrumental usage of probability. It is not at all difficult to judge what part of an argument based on probability is more convenient for one who would use it as a demonstration of the entire truth proposed. Obviously, it is the part of the argument that can be expressed as its key element, which is located at a point that can be used to unify the parts of the whole in order to provide a coherent explanation. Some of these arguments are used to resolve controversies in which only one word unites the various parts and facilitates the understanding. However, both a simple or complex proposition may be obscure if its proof depends upon the force or power the lies within one word. Vives provides several examples of these simple and complex propositions:

“Socrates will not take a wife because he is a philosopher; to Socrates this is an encumbrance” (Mayans 117). To understand this proposition, it is necessary to determine the degree of correspondence between the subject “Socrates” and the predicate “philosopher.” By assigning the attributes of “quarrelsome” and “problematic” to the unspecific noun, “wife,” Vives is able to draw the conclusion of the proposition. In another example he questions whether a man can be a horse. If it is discerned that he is not a horse because of his rationality, this attribute pertains to him and not to the horse. If, however, it is deduced that he is not a horse since the horse itself is not rational, this correspondence pertains to the horse. If one extreme is

related to another, there are two places within the argument that must be taken into consideration, as in this sentence: "All men are rational; not one horse is rational; therefore, no horse is a man." In this formulation, the conclusion or proof is taken from both the property of "rationality" and its absence in the case of the horse.

When there are two or more verbs in an argument, and each one of them has its proportion and place, both should be considered separately. An example of this type of argument is the following: "Plato will not take a wife because he is a philosopher, and a disciple of Socrates, as Thales did not do." In this case, Vives finds that "not taking a wife" is inherent in the noun, "philosopher." The use of the verb with the name "Plato" relates to the cause, since "Plato" is the disciple and also will not take a wife. In the name "Thales," who also did not take a wife, the verb establishes an example. To understand better how Vives understands these arguments, it is worth following another example he uses to demonstrate other forms of argument that have the same basic structure: "Passion will not prevail against the judge, because he is a good man and an Athenian. He will render the same judgment even if the pressure of the passion increases twofold prior to the rule he uses to measure the case" (Mayans 118). Here Vives shows that the first part of the statement contains the inherent characteristics of the case; the second part contains the attributes of the judge, and the third part contains a graphic comparison that negates the implicit presupposition of the bending of a rule or judgment due to an inimical passion. There exist also other places that become more abstruse due to the practice of deepening the penetration into things ("res"), which allows each subject to go further in the process of discovery. To achieve clarity, however, nothing replaces continuous use and

diligence. Practice itself, aside from theory, is a powerful force. Vives refers the reader to the great orators and polemicists whose works are a demonstration of this kind of invention of argument.

All that Vives has discussed above should be understood as the appropriate use of signs. The process of invention itself should not follow the same order each time the subject develops an argument. It is similar to writing, which should not follow the same course as learning letters, even though at the beginning it would be convenient to continue the process of taking arguments directly from places without concern about the dulling effect of repetition. The process of discovery by place is selective, and what Vives stresses here is the selection of just those places that provide clear, powerful arguments; he warns the reader against using in each case the whole range of similar elements and thus losing the force of the argument in a maze of overlapping examples. He says: "not all are convenient all the time, and thus we also do not use all the meanings and connections available in one word" (Mayans 119).

Here, Vives emphasizes that in practice it is not possible to provide rules for the use of meanings within words, and he asserts the same occurs in terms of places, since it is difficult to prescribe rules to conduct their deployment within the flow of immediate discourse. For this reason, due to the complexity of all elements involved in the art of invention, it is important that the speaker remain both diligent and versed in the discovery of material, to correctly practice the art of elocution. This is necessary not only for the practice of art, but also for the use of common sense. Speakers should be aware of what is admissible as to place before an audience and what material will be refused. This kind of discernment is the work of prudence. It is

prudence, then, that tempers the work of ingenio, ensuring that the art of invention or discovery can be established in common language for presentation to other listeners and readers.

Propositions and Topics

A proposition can be developed by looking, or searching among the recesses of places (“loci”) in order to discover the materials from which pertinent statements can be made. These should contain the semantic linkages necessary to compare terms and subsequently things (“res”). By this process, the able speaker can create an argument with which to organize an assemblage of words as the appropriate building blocks of a proposition. To this end, Vives provides an example of the proper uses of loci by building an argument concerning the death of a Roman man (Claudius), who was killed in an ambush. Through a search of the appropriate places by way of the following questions and related statements, the argument begins to take shape: “Was Claudius killed in accordance with the law? To answer this one must examine what is inherent in the character of Claudius. He was seen promoting seditious acts. But is it correct to state that all seditious persons can be killed within the scope of the law? And if this cannot be applied in all cases, on what basis are distinctions made? Such additional questions as in what time and in what place must be considered. Also, who was the killer? Was the killing done by ambush? And if so, by what person? Would it be licit to kill a seditious person in an ambush? Including this particular one? At this time?” (Msayans 120) Vives concludes that there are an almost infinite number of words and places that one can use to establish an argument. There are even places

that contain several dimensions that increase the scope of the inquiry or the construction of the argument. A case in point is Cicero's speech in defense of Milo, whether or not he deserved exile. To the question: "Did Milon merit exile?" The answer is "No, because he was a valorous man". In the case of Claudius, is the killer a valorous man who does not deserve exile? Vives stresses how both of the words, "valorous" and "exile", and their multiple relationships can lead to copious statements that are readily available for use in the construction of arguments (Mayans 120).

There is also another way to use the topoi in support of an argument that is structured so as to draw from a number of particulars to reach a general conclusion. The particulars can also be seen as a species related within a genus that will also stand as the final point in the argument. Going from species to genus, for example, one can make the following statement: "Is it convenient to study man? Yes, because man is an animal provided with reason. Is an animal provided with reason convenient to study?" (Mayans 121). At this point, the places that should be searched are those that share "rationality." The loci should be compared against each other to ensure the use of the most appropriate link for each step of the argument. This system of argument using topoi or places has a wide application in many disciplines, especially in theology, philosophy and medicine. It can be used for the purposes of instruction, and it is particularly effective in historical narrative, since this system encompasses all classes of writing that draw from man's prior experiences. This is used for the establishment of a basis to create what is probable and reasonable.

Analysis of the Truth of a Proposition/Enunciation

The method used for the analytical examination of truth is the same as that which is applied to the propositions that form all the disciplines and arts. This method does not have any special interrelationship with a particular material, since it is an underlying structure or logic, nor is it analogous to any other approach through which one can interpret probability. Here, Vives seems to be dividing propositions into two distinct classes in accordance with the degree of reliable truth that each contains. The primary method is analytical and deals with those formal statements that are combined in syllogisms to provide rational truths; the secondary method deals with synthetic sentences drawn from the subject's experience, using vocabularies drawn from common language to produce arguments that establish truths based on varying degrees of probability. The former (primary) method can be considered 'mental', establishing categories of thinking; the latter (secondary) is more experiential, and establishes the categories of experience. In brief, this is the basic division of the methodologies that constitute the rules of deduction and induction. It can also be said that the analytical sentence is necessary and the synthetic is contingent. Through the analytical method, a thing or argument can be reduced to its constituent parts. These are comprised of simple propositions that, individually, do not imply a complete argument. The structure of the whole or complex argument itself can best be determined in Vives' subsequent analysis of the syllogism. Some of the grammatical parts of sentences are minimal and extremely simple. In effect, they are so small that they lack sufficient force to exert much resistance in the overall grammatical structure of a proposition. They are similar to the letters of the alphabet

and they comprise voices or entire words that are introduced in the proposition and, thereby, contain significance.

To signify, Vives states, is to make signals which provide an indication of something or someone. Thus, for a man to signify something to another man is through the means of letters, gestures, or hand signals. These devices manifest or declare something: the movement of a hand, the direction of the index finger, the movement of the head, the signals on the side of royal highways, the terms placed on the outside of hostels and taverns and all kinds of offices: all are signs through which a citizen is informed or warned. Of course, included in these signs is also the economic information concerning what objects within a society can be bought or sold, and for what price. Among the signifiers of things are both written and spoken words. Vives informs his reader that he will use words and voices interchangeably. Nevertheless, whether in the form of words or voices, the mind finds the significance of things through what its power is able to act upon and comprehend (Mayans 142).

There are two aspects to the act of cognition: the first is knowledge of the sign, and the second is knowledge of the signified. This can be clearly demonstrated by the following example of the word "man," which is drawn from the subject's experience of men. Upon first hearing or reading the term "man," knowledge of the word is imperfect and inchoate; subsequently, a sign becomes accepted as a signification. Vives cautions the reader, however, that the verb "to signify" should not be accepted in its simple or imperfect sense, nor should it be assumed to contain implicitly a universal application; rather, it should always be taken with reference to a specific thing, since the word for "horse" signifies one thing for some and quite a different

entity for others. Also in terms of languages, there are differences in the meaning of the same word in Latin or in Greek, and still more differences can be found in Spanish.

There are words known only by a few, for convenience or tacit consent as, for example, the special language among the blind or the Spanish Germania of the gypsies, that other groups do not understand. A similar system can be found among members of the underworld. There is the coded language used by diplomats for hiding secrets that others attempt to decipher. This same recourse was used by Cicero in his letters to Atticus, making them extremely difficult to read. For this reason it can be said that those words that do not signify anything in one's spoken language may have significance in other languages. With the exception of certain interjections, all the words or voices within a language, as Aristotle's kata sinteken, indicate, by agglutination, convention, or agreement of those who use the language. Furthermore, there are no significations provided directly by nature, with the exception of some interjections. Some of these interjections that pertain to the spoken Greek or Latin evoke basic emotions, as in the exclamations evax or euge. The listener would not be able to understand without the movement of the body or from an inflection in speech.

In line with the above, Vives defines the signifying word ("vox significans"), as a common sign ("communis nota"), through which some speakers express or expound their notions ("notionis") to others. This is the process through which usage itself is the judge, arbiter and owner of the meaning of what is signified. Vives observes that archaic words like bovinari and lesuum, used by bards or vates in their liturgies, had lost all meaning in the time of Cicero. On the other hand, interpretations of speech

formulas that children regularly employ in their games are purely meaningless enunciations. Vives concludes that, for this very reason, the meaning or significance of words is incumbent upon the mind or soul, and not in the things themselves. For example, the nouns "Hector," "chimera," "Punic war," etc, whose realities do not exist in actuality, can only signify something within the realm of the mind ("animo"). They constitute a sign of some thing that is now separated from nature, but they still reside in the mind or soul and, in a certain manner, they live there, where they are apprehended by the understanding. It is thus that certain words signify what resides in the mind/soul ("animo"), while others represent objects that exist in the subject's experience of the world. Those that have some effective meaning within the mind can signify something or someone, as in "man," "goat," "white," "black," "Hector," and "chimera." Finally, all the nouns are those which the mind clearly conceives as the image of some thing, event, or state of affairs. In this manner, images are formed with the characteristics found in them, such as the name Hector understood as a hero, or chimera understood as some animal or something with an animal's characteristics, or an entity made from parts of animals.

Of the two classes of words in any vocabulary, Vives follows the historic distinction that separates primary words, understood as significant ("significativa") in themselves, from words that are "consignificant" ("consignificativa") (Mayans, 144). The former are traditionally called categorematic, that is, predicables; the latter are known as syncategorematic, or compredicables. In brief, following Kretzmann's delineation of these two basic categories of words, the categorematic is any word that can be used alone as either a subject term or a predicate term; whereas the

syncategorematic word group contains all other words available in any language, including conjunctions, adverbs, and prepositions (211-12). For Vives, these two categories of words are primary or original ("primigenus") and secondary or subsequent ("posteriora"). The essence of a thing ("res") or state of affairs does not exist without the employment of words from both of these categories, since they are instrumental in the definition of inherent meanings identified by the mind through language from its experience of the world. Propositions can only be constructed by use of the terms available in these two categories, without which both inherent substances and singular things could not be designated or established within the subject's field of experience.

Primitive languages (similar to juvenile slang) have fewer syncategorematic terms or "prepositions" than the modern languages, which have been made more efficient by use. Moreover, the eloquent man in a specific language has greater facility in speaking with evenness and exactitude. On the other hand, a speaker with a rudimentary vocabulary, even though he may apprehend the names of things with greater facility, is incapable of discerning the secondary characteristics concerning their place in the logic of syntax. Underlying Vives' comments about the difference between primitive languages and modern languages is the incipient notion that while the former generates categorematic words or descriptive markers, the latter offers greater facility of expression, both logical and descriptive, by way of the addition of syncategorematic words or syntactical markers. These syntactical markers are not only key elements in grammar, but also form the basis of analytical propositions. For Vives, the "logical" form evolves from the grammatical form, and is deeply rooted in

Aristotle's distinction of form and content, which is also the basis of one of the classical versions of the "correspondence theory of truth."

In terms of the composition of categorematic words, Vives divides these in two categories: those words that have identical meanings, and those that have multiple meanings. An example of the former is "Socrates," who will always be the equivalent of "Socrates," and the same is true of the word "horse. Others, due to their inexact significations, can be used as synonyms, such as valde /multum (much) and bellum / duellum (combat). There are still other words that, by way of an explication, loose both equivalence and synonymy. There is also the issue of words in different languages that ostensibly represent the same thing or event, such as homo in Latin and antropos in Greek. They cannot be thought of as synonymous, since common usages between or among cultures are such that their equivalence is problematic. The relations among signs, therefore, cannot be completely translated from one language to another. In his analysis, Vives anticipates the later semiotic analysis of "model worlds" constructed by groups of language speakers that draw signs from their specific experience. These worlds contain specific modes of organization that directly shape each field of signs pertinent to a culture, society, or language group, and do not necessarily maintain their same semantic range when translated or inserted into another language. He observes that in Latin some words are borrowed from the Greek, such as flema and pituita, or "*Palas*" and "*Minerva*." Nevertheless, he warns his reader that the act of signification should not be taken so simplistically, since the sign is seldom simple and, in many cases, is comprised of multiple meanings. Words can have exclusive significations, as in "man" and "animal"; other

significations can be classified as diverse, as in the example of “this man among others,” or the “Trojan man” or “Trojan woman.” There are other signs that have nothing in common such as man/ass, or white/black. There are also those signs that are understood as diverse and distinct; among them some are contraries, others are seen as negatives, “privatives,” comparatives and exclamations (Mayans 145). The contraries are those that are put in a unique genre and attain the condition of perfect opposition, as in “white” and “black” within the category of color, or “cold” and “hot” under the genre of the tactile. The negatives are identical signs, and are indicated by the apposition of “not,” as in the case of “good” and “not good”. The “privative” expresses meaning by privation or its lack of an opposite quality, as in the “blind” person. The comparatives are those signs that have no meaning without a relation to another entity, such as “father”/ “son”; “double”/ “half”, since they by themselves have no sense and are without essence; for these, Cicero employed the term “relative,” since their meanings were conferred by use of another term. Vives is quick to point out that the usage of “relative” by Cicero does not include the category of relative pronouns. This category of “relative pronouns” would be part of a meta-language or, as Vives states, words of words, a special vocabulary that enables men to speak about the structure of language and the syntax of words in statements. This meta-vocabulary forms the basis of instruction in the three arts of language: the first is grammar, which comprises the language of the sentence, including all categorematic and syncategorematic words; the second is rhetoric, or the language of tropes and figures; the third is dialectic, or the language of propositions, syllogisms and enthymemes. Vives finds this division of vocabulary, “words of words”, a meta-

vocabulary rooted in the work of Capella and Boethius. The primary words that name things is done through the act of “imposition” (“impositionis”) or “primae rationis”; the secondary class of words, or the meta-language, is the act of second intention (“secundae intentionis”). This basic two part division informs Vives’ notion of external and internal experience, and the relation of each to the act of cognition that operates on both mental level (the production of analytical propositions) and the empirical level (the production of synthetic propositions).

Within the framework of the above notions of “intentions” and “impositions,” Vives examines the semantic qualities of words. Some words, he states, have only one meaning, or may have had multiple meanings that, through time, have been reduced to one. The examples he uses to support this statement are the following: ‘Socrates’ as a word only has one meaning whereas the term ‘people’ signifies a plurality of persons. Similarly, a noun such as ‘man’ or ‘animal’ unites all the characteristics of the species in one word. Some words are formed by conjunction or accumulation, as in “city,” or as a “unit,” the form of which is an imposition, and it can be understood that it subsumes the individual within a congruent whole while maintaining the analogy of the part to the whole. In this manner ‘man’ includes ‘Socrates’ and ‘Plato’; by the same reason man is labeled a rational animal. ‘Animal’ itself includes ox and horse, since they are united in one word. These beings are called univocals, or certain and defined entities. Other voices/words signify pluralities for a variety of reasons, causes and impositions. They are called equivocal or polivocal (plurivocal) and can be ambiguous, as in ‘bull’ (taurus) which combines ‘ox’ and ‘male’ in Latin. Also, there are some who sustain voices that are

ambiguous by chance, since one signification was by accident transferred to another, not by the imposition of the original name, as in “taurus” which in Rome initially signified ox and only later the famous mountain in Asia, perhaps after L. Scipio advanced there with Roman armies. Other words that are not considered equivocal are distinguished by a different mark, either through pronunciation, writing, or genera and number.

There are those words that have come to signify other things by gradation, through the work of metaphor, or “traslatio.” This is based on what Vives calls the instrument of “traslatio,” facilitated by a certain conformity and proportion of things; this in Greek is called analogy, which he understands as analogous, or, as we would say, proportional. The term ferrous from ferro implies strength, but also endurance, and is used to describe, among other things, certain virile temperaments (Mayans 147). An example of analogy, and not plurivocality, would be that of the marine dog (“marinus canis”), since it includes in its name the territory from which it originates. Vives makes the distinction between simple voices or words and what he later refers to as voices or composite words. The former are such simple signifiers as dictator, or father of the family, in both Latin and Greek. Composite or complex words include “I with John” (“ego cum joannio”), “a tempest is passion” (“affectus est tempestas”) or the surnames of “Valldaura” or “Maluenda.” They are formed by the congruence with an adjunct or by apposition, or two substantives in apposition, as well as through the use of certain grammatical structures, as in the case of possessives where diverse qualities can form a word. Examples of this can be found in statements that include name and verb or adverb and name, or verb, or participle, or interjection,

which tend to produce an emotional affect, as in “Oh, well done.” Also, there is “Socrates, by himself,” which says nothing, since it is neither a simple nor a complex phrase. Vives concludes his brief ontological examination of the history of vocabularies, taken essentially from the tradition formed by commentaries on Aristotle’s *Categories* and *On interpretation*, by stating that he has expressed the above examples in very general terms in order to enable the simplest readers to understand and to examine them carefully. However, these elementary examples should not be examined with exaggerated care, since the judge and master of usage, after all, is common speech of the people.

The common speech of the people (as expressed by the best authors) is the instrument through which the truths of things (“res”) and words are discovered. For Vives, the concept of truth ranges from the probable to the demonstrable, and depends upon the subject’s skill (“ingenio”) in the construction of the likeness of things by the use of both analytic and synthetic propositions that are continually compared against his or her experience. Propositions are true when they correctly combine and/or separate signs that agree with internal and external things, and they are false when there is no probable or demonstrable agreement among signs or things within the subject’s field of experience.

On Propositions (*De enuntiatione*)

From the field of composite voices, some offer a sense of the imperfect, as though they were suspended in the air, leaving them undefined; for example, “The man in the field,” or “Socrates and John love the man.” These composite examples are opposed

to sentences that are indicative or perfect, in which these the action is complete, and which they can be judged in accordance with what they represent as being either true or false. For this reason, a mode that can be judged as true or false is called indicative, demonstrative or narrative. By the Greeks it was called the definitive. Quintilian defined it as the mode of confession, that is, saying or demonstrating what a thing is, will be, or was. These classes of sentences or statements were understood by Aristotle as a declaration of predication (“ἀποφάνσεις”) or, as Vives write in the Latin, nuntiationes, nunciata, or loquia. The Stoic philosophers used the term axiom (“ἀξιώματα”) and, later, Cicero used the word effata. All utterances of this type belong to the class of propositions, enunciations, declarations, axioms, and predications.

Certain enunciations or propositions are expressed in a mode other than the indicative. However, those sentences that only have one mode of the indicative are called categoricals (“categoricae”) or as predications (“praedicativae”) and are formed by assertions. When there is one assertion or proposition, it is understood as a simple statement; those that have two or more words, either indicative or subjunctive, are united by one connection or juncture and are composite or conjoined. In the categorical statement, there are two terms that Aristotle refers to as acra (signifying extremes), or something said or stated about something by way of a proposition that has both subject and predicate. The predicate is derived from the verb, “to predicate,” a Latin version of the Greek “categorrein.” The subject refers to that which is subordinated to another, or that to which something is added making it take on another quality or thing. In a proposition, the subject is that which supports the

predicate's significance or meaning, and also works through affirmation or negation, as in the example: "the judge is seated or not seated; he is loved or not loved." The skill or art with which the subject presents the material and the fundamental structure of the predicate is dependent upon an instrumental relationship between both. Vives observes that all that remains in a sentence or proposition, after eliminating the subject, is the example: "Socrates philosophizes very early while walking around the Academy." With the exception of 'Socrates,' the rest of the statement is in the predicate. There are certain enunciations ("effata"), however, in which the subject is the same, regardless of how they are arranged in the sentence, for example: "the crime is pernicious." In other sentences there can be variations such as, "Not all men are animals, not all animals are men." A simpler, and more efficient way is to define the subject as that which signifies, or that which adds to or takes away from the denomination of the object. In this sense, the predicate can be seen as that which is applied to provide a clarification to the statement. In other words, it is no less effective or less reasonable to say that a stone is not animal as that man is animal. There are also instances when the same is said about the object itself, as in "Socrates is Socrates"; in other instances the predicate is equal to the subject, as in "Man is a rational animal"; and there are other instances in which the superior is inferred from the inferior, as in "Man is a living being." There are other instances, such as reversal: "Some animal is man," or an inherent quality of the subject: "Socrates is dark" or "the economy is advantageous," or the expression of difference or the different, as in "Socrates is Plato" or "the man is a horse." There are some words, Vives notes, that support the statement directly; other words refer directly to the object.

It does not benefit a dialectician to define rules that would govern exactly all universal, singular or particular statements. This is also true of negation. For Vives, the efficacy of the dialectic depends upon the art or skill in which the particular is employed in any argument. His analysis of language is not dependent upon the doctrine of universal ideas; rather, his focus is based on the particular statement, or an assemblage of particular statements generated within the dialectic produced by speakers who test their vocabularies against each other. It is due to the clash of vocabularies produced within the framework of the dialectic that both powerful meanings and degrees of probable truth emerge. In this sense, the language produced by this process acquires universal power. Usage itself will accumulate models that serve as guides, not rules. The rules that emerge among speakers of a common language are taken from general use and parlance. Vives concludes that attention must be given to general usage, and that the level of analysis should be held on the level of the particular statement, that is to say, on the "grammatical" level. The following are examples of what Vives considers singular: "Socrates disputes" and "this man teaches." On the other hand, what he considers a universal proposition is: "All men teach; no one teaches; no one stops teaching; who does not teach?" In the preceding examples, "no one" refers to all those men and is no less than the statement, "each one teaches." There are certain statements that, having the appearance of universality, refer to themselves as another genus, as in "A murmur at once arose from them in unison." This appearance of "universality" is actually what Vives refers to as a collective, and is no other than an example of a singular case. There is another genus of universality that should be called "conscience." It provides

the speaker with a necessary and reasonable advantage, as in the example: "All passed from you to me," taken from Cicero, and "Show that all is well," from Exodus. Another example of a universal expression of conscience is the statement; "Aristotle wrote all with diligent care." A similar universality of conscience can be found in Virgil's statement, "and the same earth gave everything with courtesy, without anyone having to ask." There also exists a kind of imperfect universality that can be applied abusively when one refers to "the many or the rest." Cicero, for example, says in defense of Sextus, "the happiness of a few was conveyed by the many."

Particular statements usually take a form similar to, "One man disputes or does not dispute." Admitting the porosity of these categories, Vives admits that if someone were to use the statement, "it is certain that man disputes," he not would quibble about its placement as a particular. On the other hand, infinite expressions or statements are those that cannot easily be classified or attributed to any genus, as in "the man disputes, the Athenians fight, the Romans founded this city." These statements have the sense of universals and can be easily classified among them. There are some statements that contain aspects of both universality and particularity and are mixed, since they are considered by some as universal and by others as particular or special, as in "Socrates passes always by the academy." Another speaker takes this statement and questions why it would not apply to other singular instances, and argues, "what you say in the singular sense about Socrates, would you not say of Glaucus or Hippias?"

The composite statement is that which includes a number of simple statements, as in “Fortune helps the powerful become insolent and the poor become afraid and withdrawn.” At times, this type of connection due to the particular properties of a language requires a mode that is distinct from a simple narrative although, in spite of this, it is not continuously a composite statement. Such statements do not serve to do more than maintain the connection, as in the examples: “If the horse had wings, it would fly,” and “you are so erudite that you have an advantage over Aristotle himself, as the unlearned man affirms of your surpassing Aristotle.” Although these are composite statements they can be understood, since they reflect implicit properties of a language that is spoken within a homogenous society. These properties can vary among different languages, as Vives points out. The Greeks express many things through the use of the indicative and the infinitive that Latin speakers enunciate in the subjunctive or imperative. All the types of conjunctions that are studied by the grammarians are called “dinameis” (δυνάμεις). They comprise statements defined as conjunctive (“conjunctivae”), disjunctive (“disjunctivae”), illative (illativae”), adversative (“adversitivae”), approbative (“approbativae”), and causative (“causales”), and form part of the field of study for grammar schools (Mayans 154).

With reference to Cicero in the *Orator*, Vives states that “negation and affirmation are antagonistic, due to the method of measurement (“quantitatis”), as in the difference between universality and particularity or the singularity,” as the following example shows: “All men read, some do not read; Socrates does not read,” and the singulars: “Socrates disputes, does not dispute,” and the mixed among themselves: “Socrates always disputes, never disputes, at times disputes, now does not dispute”

(Mayans 155). When what had been considered or presented as a universality is used as a particularity or singularity it can become a contradiction, even though Cicero identified this case as a “contrary” in his work *De fato*. However, Vives establishes a distinction. When the universality remains between both terms, it is called contrariety or adversity. When in composite statements, affirmation and negation refers to the link through which the opposition is discovered. Conjunctive statements seem to have some universality and, of course, disjunctive statements have some degree of particularity, as in “Justice is virtue and treachery is a crime; no virtue is justice and not one treachery is a crime,” which are contradictory statements. All those statement that are purported to belong to the class of conjunctive statements participate in universality, and those that are aligned on the side of the disjunctive statements participate in particularity. There is not in the Latin language a general rule that governs contradictions in all kinds of statements, since each statement receives its own genuine meaning through the preposition of negation, or through gradations of difference (Mayans 155). It becomes apparent here that the basis from which Vives draws his analysis of the kinds of statements available to discourse is a model of the square of opposition that comprises the four fundamental propositions of modal logic, the universal affirmative and negative, and the particular affirmative and negative, which can be used to generate the figures and moods of the syllogism as well as the formulations of enthymemes. The paradigm of the square of opposition and its composition of four fundamental statements, for Vives, are seen as categories of the mind or thought and serve as the framework of rational discourse. As intimated in the *Fabula*, within the field of rational discourse man is free to build his society and

culture. Reason is the attribute of man's freedom, a script written by Jupiter from which, as the *Fabula* emphasizes, man cannot diverge a finger's breadth. The thrust of Vives' epistemology is the identification of the appropriate methods that will enable the subject, who resides in the world, to separate truth from falsehood. In this view, common language derives its force or power to communicate through the mind's ability to think within the structure of its innate logic, which can be best understood by the categories of thought it generates. This is Vives' primary notion in regard to and his comments on the differences among languages and the difficulties involved of accepting as equivalent the same words or voices, as he points out in one example cited above, of the Greek and Latin term for man.

Examination of the True and False

There is not a fixed or established rule to discern which statement or enunciation is true or false. However, the criteria of each subject is formed by his or her own experience, and by his or her own competence. For example, the perfect subject is the man of prudence, well versed in affairs and of mature mind, with his extensive experience and discrete intelligence, who is not adverse to a continuous examination of common sense. Notwithstanding this fitting example, Vives still intends to deliver an "instrument" or method that will assist each person, in whatever profession, in determining what is true and what is false in each enunciation. He then provides several statements which he finds undeniable: "Truthful is the pronouncement that 'God is all powerful; Adam existed, Christ will judge each man'" (Mayans 155). He follows these statements with an explanation of the 'truth' of Adam's existence,

which takes into account the mental and physical dimensions of Adam's existence, while providing no little insight into the way the Latin res serves as a nexus and unifier of the corporal and non-corporal, or body and mind. "Adam fuit," Vives writes, "...non est quidem Adam, Adam sed verum est fuisse, et haec, Adam fuit, ita significant sicut est...." It is not the physical Adam, but his truth, that is certain. The statement: "Adam existed," signifies and confirms the state or condition of Adam's existence. To determine what is true from what is false requires the analysis of all circumstances, some that emanate from the thing or subject in question and others, from ourselves. In the thing ("res") there exists what is immutable; it contains what is necessary, possible, and contingent. What is necessary is defined by Vives as that which is (logically) indispensable. He provides an example: "It is necessary that the hungry eat; obedience of the laws is imposed," since the hungry and the laws cannot exist in any other manner. The essence of what is necessary does not admit to change, neither from inevitable forces, nor in the case of death.

The Possible

The possible is that which, in terms of the laws, is licit, or, in other words, is practicable. This includes that which what is conceded or permitted, and whatever is not against the nature of the thing ("res") or state of affairs and that can thus be carried out. In terms of words, among other conditions that can be described indefinitely, some things are certain, while others are uncertain, absurd, incredible, wise, ignorant, and subject to doubt. Once proposed, any enunciation must be examined to see if there is something ambiguous about it, or whether it is a word that

has several meanings (polivocal/ plurivocal), as in “the dog is an animal.” There may also be a connection of words, as in “Ajo te Aeacida Romanos vincere posse,” an oracular equivocation that states that the son of Eaco is able to defeat the Romans as the Romans are able to defeat the son of Eaco. Obviously, this is a statement that must be closely examined because it doesn’t seem to follow any established rule. It seems to incorporate elements of the true and false, and may very well belong to one or the other. It is only through prudence and experience that the subject has the possibility of judging the truth or falsity of this statement. The truth or falsity must be investigated in terms of its quantity, for its linkage and for its effects. Vives then offers the following rule: All that is comprehended through a universality is the truth if it remains congruent with that which is spoken and the manner in which it is spoken. Any statement that is incongruent is immediately false; any incongruent statement would also imply that the context itself might be false.

From the Universal to Particular

When a thing (“res”) or state of affairs is transferred from universality to particularity it is said to descend; and, on the other hand, if it is transferred from particularity to universality it is said to ascend. In order to consider singulars as parts of the universal, the time or tense must be considered, and each element that is a conjunctive must be taken conjointly. In both the ascent and descent, it is necessary to establish the conditions for truth so that all of the elements of universality are comprehended, or that they are comprehended in a general clause, as in “likewise, in all the rest,” or any other analogous expression. In the descent, it only takes one thing

to negate the transfer of meaning, since it is not as complex as the ascending order. This can be seen in the process of induction, through which one continuously checks it against universal implications, thinking that it is sufficient for all cases. Vives extends his analysis, stating that in the Socratic manner, he will illustrate this doctrine with several examples: "In order to govern the boat only the most capable are used, just as in directing a school the most learned; the same is true for the training of a horse or for the administration of a Republic" (Mayans 156). This line of induction contains a latent universality along the following lines: for the horse, boat and school, one does not expect to find something contrary or an opposite point of view. It would be absurd to deny that in the case of the Republic the reasoning does not apply, since it is the same in all the prior cases. If something in this form of reasoning does not seem acceptable, then it is due to an error in time, use of tense, or in inductive method, and not to its truth or universal application.

Truth, Sentence, Person and Time

The logic of both inductive and deductive methods must take into account the particular negative and affirmative statements that introduce into sentences the dimensions of time or tense and the perspective of persons. Truth is then viewed as a relation between a sentence, a person and time. Sentences that can be related by the same speakers at the same time comprise one logical pattern; sentences spoken by different persons at different times change the truth conditions of propositions.

Although Vives does not mention his sources for the discussion of the composition of statements that are differentiated by person and time, he is probably taking into

account the analyses available to him by the followers of Peter of Spain or Duns Scotus.³ A singular instance confirms a particular statement that is related to it: it maintains itself against all statements that run against it, and is similar to the employment of the conjunctive statement that attains the nature of universality. Likewise, in a particular statement a disjunctive can be employed, and has an analogous character. However, if in the particular statement two meanings are found and one of them is certain, the other must be uncertain. The certain meaning is not dissimulated within the enunciation, nor does it refer to another instance; it is the basis of a definite statement, as in "Some orator wrote this." The meaning is uncertain when it is hidden within the semantic range of another word and its sense is not limited to one thing; this occurs when its meaning is included within a universal statement, through which it refers to each singular aspect of the universal, but not to the universal itself. The moderns call this a "confused supposition," an expression which Vives attributes to Cicero in the fifth book of his *Finibus bonorum ac malorum*. For example, Vives writes: when one says "it is without question that all animals live in accordance with their natures, it should not be understood that this condition of being essential or its indispensability is one and only for all animals, but that each individual has an appropriate nature and form, since one is the nature of a horse, another of an ox, and yet another of a man. Vives comments that Cicero carefully makes this point clear (Mayans 157).

This happens with such statements as: "Bread is necessary in order to eat, not this or that bread," since its necessity is not assigned to a specific place where it can only be found. Similarly, in the statement: "Only man knows religion," it is not simply this

one man or another man but, being all inclusive, it is the equivalent of saying, "All those who have knowledge of religion are men." This form can also be seen in the enunciation: "All who eat, eat bread," or: "In Rome and in Sparta the senate is a public council," which is similar to the formulation, "In Paris and in Rome pepper is sold." In these problematic statements, Vives concludes, the universal dimensions of each conclusion must be resolved, taking into account their significations of singularity or particularity.

The Tenses: Past, Present and Future

A singular statement is a referential proof of its common particular, not vice-versa. Vives extends his analysis by saying that in a range of ascending particular statements, the inferior is always an element of proof for the next level of particular statement; but this, however, does not occur in the contrary sense: it is the universal superior proposition that proves the singular and inferior, both in the particular and universal sense. For all that affects the nexus in the simple enunciation, there are three tenses: the present, past and future. These are the tenses of nature, and from these basic tenses all the arts ("artes") of discourse are constituted. The imperfect preterit signifies that some action was not finished and that it is incomplete. There are also other tenses of custom or frequency or condition, as in the following example, "this one paints; that one teaches boys of this city; he declares a judgment, the rose is a soft and fragrant flower." Others do not refer to the tense they indicate, but to that which is understood, as in "Cicero was a boy, but I lie," in which it appears that both predicates express the same tense but, in actuality, they happened at different times.

The same kind of tense structure appears in historical narratives, when historians write about the past in present terms, as in “Scipio defeats Hannibal, Pompey is born, Brugae is founded,” statements that call upon the reader to understand the time or tense of the writing, and when the events actually occurred. Also, there are those who apply limitations that provide the same results, “He plays or plucks skillfully the harp”; or “this one grunts or shouts at the cattle at all hours,” where there is a frequency or continuation of action over a long time. A greater extension of meaning can be attained through what is intelligible, thinkable and debatable, among other categories that exist within the spirit of man (“*humanus animus*”), which encloses more than can be accomplished in anyone’s lifetime, since man’s spirit exceeds the ways of human nature, and thus provides a demonstration of its remote origin.

Vives observes that the present tense does not have the same extension for everyone. An example of this is that, for God, all eternity is present. The soul, closer to Divine Nature, has a greater capacity to understand time. In man’s mind, some things pass by like a river while others remain in place; those things that pass away may not lose their original meaning; other things, that remain, may exert less force within the mind, but they remain teleologically incomplete. These kinds of movements exist in different proportions, and they are not final until all of their parts are identified.

Past and future statements do not signify more than the fact that something was present in the past or that something will take place over the course of time. In accordance with the use of the past tense, they denote what is not now and what has not come as yet, as in “We were the Trojans” and “Troy was,” or “the great glory of

the sons of Dardano, and the fields where Troy was founded.” A statement of the future is true if what later takes place can be said in the present tense; if not, it is false. Preterit statements not only require the completion, but also the negation of other possibilities. These past and future statements include the references of passing things, as in “this hour has gone; that year will come.” Of these statements, if one is asked whether they are true, one can only respond affirmatively if the actions in both cases were completed. The future contains what is possible, and can only be realized if nothing emerges to contradict its becoming. The possibility that ‘God exists’ is realized since there is nothing that would exert sufficient force to completely contradict its postulation. Similar statements are possible because they are intelligible by a human mind that is able to conceive them. However, Vives cautions, one must avoid deceiving oneself by any statement that takes into account the flow of historical time, since it can easily lead to confusion and misunderstanding if it contains unnecessary linkages to universal concepts.

The conditional statement demands that what imposes the condition should follow in the same utterance or enunciation, as in the sentence, “If you want to be sincere, you must admit that this wine is generous,” which is the equivalent of saying, “If you want to be sincere, you will confess that this wine is generous,” or something analogous. For the rational statement, it is required that that which follows the subject can be inferred through reason. The causal statement is not simple, nor can it be reduced to a single class, since it takes into account all statements of causes and effects. Within this structure, obviously temporal statements refer to time, while those dealing with location refer to the place in which the action is explained. There

are two classes of relative statements, either drawn together (“adstricta”) or simple (“simplicia”). These statements drawn together refer to antecedents of the subject, as in “That man is mute who knew the letters,” with the implication that it is the same man who is mute who knew the letters. The relative class of statements that pertain to the unconnected antecedent are not constrained by limitations: “The Roman wins, supposedly the one with the most understanding of military science”; here, it is the Roman who wins that is implied. There are specific “objects” and “expressions” that point to the nature of “complex” matters, as in: “The hunger and the lateness exasperate the bile”; “beer and wine make one drunk”; “you have money and hunger, money or hunger.” “Complex” statements can be taken separately, jointly, or one after another: “debauchery and nap-taking prejudice health”; the former and latter endanger one’s health. If a plural in number is referred to, it can be resolved in a singularity, as in “the sea and the meretrix are two great chasms (“voragines”).” If they are taken together in a complex statement, they are not resolved. It is more convenient to take each separately. Once studied, it can be determined whether they are congruent objects, as in the example: “The rational soul and the body is a man” (Mayans 162).

The truth is examined through equipollent pronouncements (“aequipollentia pronuntiatorum”). All universality is equivalent to universals; all particularity, particulars; certainty, to certainties; uncertainty to uncertainties; although these pronouncements can be inverted they preserve the same relations, the same signification and quality. To support these statements, Vives offers examples: “there

is not a group of elements that would be immortal; there is not an immortal group of elements,” or “Some virtue is sempiternal; some (of what is) sempiternal is virtue.”

There are other equivalencies peculiar to languages (Mayans 162-3). In Latin, for example, generally two negations are affirmative: “numquam non” signifies always, and “nonnumquam” signifies some time, but this phenomenon is specifically related to the Latin language. The truth is also explored through opposition, as in the following contraries, “the white and the black.” Contradictory statements can neither be true nor false. To support this statement, Vives produces the following line of reasoning: “if all ‘a’ is ‘b’” what does not follow is “some ‘a’ is not ‘b’”; and “if it follows that some ‘a’ is not ‘b’” then in that case “what does not follow is all ‘a’ is ‘b’, when ‘a’ is not ‘b’.” (Mayans 163). It is necessary that a man exists or does not exist. ‘To be’ in any other manner is impossible to the extent that not even the most capable human spirit understands it; all of its inventiveness notwithstanding, man’s mind is it not able to reconfigure this basic division. For this reason, this law of contradiction is respected in all the arts and disciplines; it is fundamental to the construction of all propositions. This law of contradiction can be seen as a significant part of the foundation of man’s reason. It can also be understood as both the basic rule of necessity and freedom. Man’s mind is eternally determined and set free in time by the hand of Jupiter at the outset of the *Fabula*. In addition, adverse or contrary statements can be false, but never true. Vives concludes, taking again from Aristotle, that no one can be in all places and, at the same time, in none. Nor can one be everywhere and in no place at the same time.

Analysis of the Truth in Argumentation

Vives understands the process of argumentation to be the connection of enunciations, statements or sentences within a framework from which it appears that a conclusion or posterior element follows, generated by the material organized in the proposition or anterior element. In other words, a man first discerns and then exercises reason. The first element is called antecedent, reason, argument, or premise; the second, posterior, is called the consequence, intention, illation ("illatio"), although Cicero calls it the "conclusion" ("conclusio"). This conclusion or illation ("illatio"), that is, putting into place, is also commonly referred to as a "consequence". Vives considers this arrangement of primary and posterior elements to be due not to its position but rather, to its sense. The primary statement, it is understood, contains the other, and that which is inferred from this containment is the posterior. Vives also ventures to say that this connection is such that the anterior also appears to stem or proceed from the posterior statement. This should still be considered a connection and, in this capacity, it should also be thought of as consequence. For Vives, the subject controls the manner of connection through which the argument is engendered and inferred. The general rule for this type of connection is best understood by the following definition: "In order that the truth of an argument necessarily produces the correct intention, the infallible rule for all contradictory statements will be applied, i.e., a contradictory statement retains its force against the antecedent, or in the case of two contradictory statements that are simultaneously both true and false." (Mayans 164).

This above connection can be verified correctly through its significations, or through the structure of the pronouncements. If the resulting verification proves effective, it can only apply to one instance, since it may not occur with such coherence in subsequent arguments. The other connection is generated by the application of the universal. In this case, the connection and the modes of linking statements are similar. This can be seen in the following example: "All 'c' is possessed by 'a'; all 'b' is 'c'; therefore 'b' is possessed by 'a'." In this argument, the following parts are similar: 'b' pertains to 'c'; 'b' is one part of 'c'; therefore 'b' is possessed by 'c'. Although 'a' has 'c', it is not inferred: therefore 'c' is simply assimilated by 'a', since they do not share, as separate entities, a common characteristic. This form can be seen in the following argument as stated by Cicero: "those who suffer an infirmity are not healthy; the spirit of all the beginners is infirm; therefore all the beginners are not healthy". (Mayans 165). Vives comments that this conclusion is good, since the spirit of the beginners is none other than that of the beginners, and to be sick is no other thing than to be not healthy. This formulation is different and will not provide the correct conclusion for those who would ponder the following argument: "those who are sick are not healthy; all the slaves of all the wise men are sick; therefore, all the wise men are not healthy."

Vives will later examine universal arguments and explore the relations among the three parts of each formulation. There are other arguments that consist of two, three or more statements, but do not have any coherence. Turning to statements that embody particulars, Vives finds that there are some that take the form of temporal statements, and there are others that appear perpetual, without a time frame. The

temporal falls within a time, as in the following examples: "I instruct the child, then I instruct your son"; "he brought about the enmity of Cesar Octavius, thus he would die"; "before the installation of the monarchy it was like that, but not afterwards." On the other hand, perpetual statements are united by condition, cause, and other rational structures. In terms of conditional statements, they follow the actuality of things ("res") but, unlike nature, they are not constant, as in the statement: "If you come, we will depart"; or: "if you want to bring money, you can"; also: "you will find me at home"; and, finally: "If the son would have come, he would have greeted his father."

These statements are of the nature that, when the first is inferred, the others follow naturally, each generated from the initial inference. In these statements, in place of the conditional "if" the term "ergo or therefore" can be placed, as in the examples, "If a man runs, runs an animal; a man runs, therefore ("ergo") an animal runs." Vives denominates these statements "combinations" (Mayans 165), of which we have spoken above and, he adds that they are an important resource of poets and orators, as in the following passage of Silium: "For what reason, if it is licit to afflict the country for one person, it must be illicit to conserve it for a single person?" At times, this combination takes the force of reality; at other times, in accordance with our manner of understanding, notwithstanding its disparity, it is found reasonable. When some things are taken into account, others are no longer considered "causes," i.e., things which seem to be simultaneously implicit in effects, as in "sun" and "splendor" or others, in preceding the effect, as in "father" (anterior) and "son." Of those that are categorized as "effects," some can be understood without identifying a

causal relation with an anterior event, as discussed in Vives' *First Philosophy*. There are things ("res") that immediately precede others, as in "prognostications," in which "causes" are also determined within "the order of things established by nature."

Some of these prognostications should not ever exist along with other signs which reveal coherent connections with their effects. Out of these signs originate the conjectures of informed and perspicacious minds, to whom it falls to ascertain that which is going to take place and that which has already taken place. In these cases are included the "examples" and the "comparisons." In all of this analysis, the valuable conclusions are the result of discrete observation of nature and modes of being, as in "The fire burns; smoke ensues; the sky reddens at sundown; tomorrow it will be clear at dawn".

The material in which the mind grasps things ("res") are voices or words. In these, the signs of things exist. Voices exist in relation to each other; they are found in pairs, unpaired, and opposites. From these relations, inference can be accomplished in the following manner: "It is just, therefore it is also equitable," or the opposite: "it is not just; therefore it is not equitable." Another formulation is "no virtue exists; therefore justice does not exist." Vives' analysis focuses on the following pairs: "All virtue, therefore all justice," and "man, therefore animal"; "not some man, therefore not some animal," and "not man, then not some animal." In this case, the formulation is not deduced by the mind, but is located within the things themselves. From this location in things, the statement can gather the force of conclusions that range from strict to less exact pronouncements, as in the following example: "The man is white, ergo man; the dog of Socrates exists, ergo dog; the life of the stone,

ergo life; picture of man, ergo man.” Thus, of the substantive verb, to which something is added, as in “It is miserable, ergo it is.” Vives concludes that the verb “is” contains all elements of the argument, and offers the observation that, aside from what is understood about what already exists in the nature of things, it is in the mind where its potential is signified, ready to be actualized. Statements exist only in the mind, not in the world of sense experience. Another exemplar set of statements that are also mental constructs, are the following: “If there is a father, then there is a son; if there is not a son, then no father.” However, the following statement is different: “I see the father, ergo the son also,” refers to an essence, and not to the activity of seeing or sight. What is said straightforwardly, as in “If I injure this confederate, I will also injure the other,” also maintains the following logic, as in “It is white, it is seeable, it is man; ergo it is not black, nor blind, nor horse.” This class of statements excludes, “If it is not white, it is black” because there are many intermediate colors. A different class of statement is, “It is not blind, ergo it sees”; although it is not exact, since a creature upon birth isn’t blind but yet cannot see, and being blind is specifically related to one state of affairs. But if they contradict each other without offering any conciliation of an intermediate position, as in “healthy” or “sick,” as Aristotle points out, the presupposition, however apt and congruent, is annulled by what contradicts it. Again, Vives uses the example of blindness/health: “This man is not blind, he has sight; therefore, he is not sick, but healthy.” From these statements, the primary clauses are taken from things (“res”), and each subject will be the judge of his own decipherment of the basic model of antecedent and consequent. In this way, a doctor concludes that if “there is an excessive fever, ergo the heart palpitates more than it

should.” A man who has experience at sea will judge in accordance with the following logic: “The birds play on the dry sand, ergo, there will be a storm.” These last examples are actually dialectical, producing synthetic statements that reveal a contingency and, thus, depend upon probable outcomes. The dialectician himself, more focused on synthetic rather than analytical statements, differs at this point with the mathematician, who argues the truth of geometrical formulations, as in “All triangles that have two equal angles opposite straight sides are isosceles.” The formulations available to the construction of synthetic and analytic sentences are distinct; and they have received different names, such as “enthymemata, epicheremata, ascensus, descensus, comparationes, exempla, epagogas, gradationem, soritas, dilemmata, antistrephontes” (Mayans 167).

Classes of Arguments

There is not agreement as to the enthymeme, although a majority agree that it is an imperfect syllogism. Vives explains that it is within the category of arguments, based on the probable, belonging to what rhetoricians classify as argument by contraries, and that they, by its use, were able to refine their arguments. In this manner, the enthymeme covered a number of structures and types of arguments, similar to the name Homer, which in ancient Greek and Latin took on the generic name of poet. The Greek “epicheirema” is the same as the Latin “aggressio”. It is not, as it seems, a genus of argumentation, since it describes the intention of finding a way to attack a theme. The “ascensus” runs from the singular to the universal; the “descensus” runs opposite, with the difference that, in the former, the ascent is toward a more universal

application or level, and works by adding incremental sentences toward the universal; the latter functions to distribute sentences disjunctively as it descends.

The example ("exemplum") takes the form of an argument through which something similar is proved, as in the example: "Scipio preferred to exile himself rather than limit his liberty in the county; the same should be done by any good citizen." And that which is announced through a negation is something thus resembling a similarity: "That I did not do. Would you do it?" Comparison is that which occurs frequently, as in the following example: "Marcelo, in time of war, took the liberty away from the conquered. You are going to do the same in time of peace?" The following examples are comparisons of the major statement, minor statement, or equal formulations of statements: the major statement is: "Do you not suffer 'exiguous outrages' for Christ, for whose love the martyrs spilled their blood and their lives profusely?"; The minor would be: "Many with your range of ability kept their passions under their dominion; and a man like you who is a follower of wisdom cannot dominate his?"; and the equal statement is: "The philosopher Socrates dissimulated the injuries received; this same thing you should do, being also a philosopher." The epagogue or induction includes the "ascensus" and the example. Socrates made great use of it; through this procedure, all of the arts were discovered by way of the singular examples that he drew from experience and in which he found the forms for all works of art. Each singular element was a sign that he united with others through the work of the mind. To develop an argument in support of his point, Socrates accumulated a number of similar things, in such a way that what he discovered in each were brought forth, each step used to further clarify what was

being examined, which was sufficient to keep the argument going forward. Agricola calls this method “ascending enumeration,” or the epogogue, or induction, because some of the premises induce the listener to be persuaded. Thus, the epagogue is the enumeration of similar parts that, through a confrontation, align themselves with what has been proposed.

The gradation is verified when many things are taken in such manner that the first is inferred from the second and the second from the third, successively, as in the example, “That which Diofanto wants, his mother wants; that which the mother wants, Themestocles wants; that which Themestocles wants, the Athenian people want; ergo that which the boy Diofanto wants, the Athenian people want”. In his first book of *De legibus*, Cicero provides another example of this argument: “Those to whom Nature gave reason, likewise gave them right reason, ergo also the law, which is no more than the right reason to command and prohibit; and thus is the law, also called jurisprudence. And thus equally the body of laws were given to all” (Mayans 168).

This rule is deduced by Aristotle in his *Categories*: when one thing is predicated of another, as in the subject, all that which is said in the predication is also said equally of the subject, as in the following example: “man” is predicated of this man and that man; and animal is predicated also of man and, thus, of this man, since this man is at the same time animal. To support this statement, Vives provides the following argument: “If I have my lineage from Cesar, and have it also from Aeneas; and if this is true, also from Anquises, because Cesar, through Aeneas, is the son of

Anquises. Equally all that which follows for the illation of a good conclusion, follows also for the proposition itself" (Mayans 168).

The arguments ("coacervatio") are verified when the speaker, by additions or subtractions, accumulates a preponderance of evidence without being detained in his presentation. This is a form of argument the Greeks call this soron or sorites.

The dilemma, as Vives defines it, is a horned argument in which two propositions are presented in such a way that, choosing one horn or the other, one is impaled, as in the following example: "If you marry a beautiful woman, you will have her with many; if however, she is ugly, you will be angry; if rich, you will have to endure her; if poor, you will have to maintain her." This is the class of argument that Hortensius used with frequency in *De divinatione* against Verres, recorded by Cicero, who also calls the Greek antistrephon 'conversion'. It is no more nor less than a conclusion of a dilemma, as in "if the woman is rich, she will maintain you; if poor she will not take charge of anything for you." Or, "if you marry a beautiful woman, you will enjoy her; if ugly you will not have anything in common."

The Syllogism

Vives considers the syllogism to be a genuine and perfect form of argumentation. Syllogism, he observes, is a Greek term, with the same signification as the Latin "collectio"⁴ (Mayans 169). Vives uses the term here in the sense of inference, argument or syllogism. By introducing the Ciceronian term, rationatio, Vives provides the reader with an indication that his analysis will be focused on the broader

uses of the syllogism as an instrument of the humanist dialectic and tool of eloquence, rather than limiting his discussion to the scholastic logical formulations he presented as examples of barbarous language in his humanist attack on medieval logic, *Adversus pseudodialecticos*. Vives states that he does not intend to use other than traditional language in his presentation of this form of reasoning. Every language is efficient and provides a clear vocabulary in terms of signification that reflects the same appearance and form, maintaining a congruence of parts necessary for an integral foundation of what speakers understand as language. This language, then, offers the appropriate structure for the dialectic. Vives gives a definition of ratiocination: “an argument (“collectio”) of three propositions, or assertions, in which the third statement signifies and establishes analytically what is inferred and follows naturally through the connection of the other two” (Mayans 169).

Vives employs the word “naturally” because no other extrinsic thing is necessary to complete its formulation; the third statement of the syllogism emerges from the prior two without recourse or supplement of additional intelligence, since this form of argument does not need to be perfected by the use of external augmentation. To ensure clarity of definition, Vives offers another statement to define the syllogism as a “comparison of two statements with a third, which arises from the relation between the prior two, and thus will follow or not from the form or linkage proposed (Mayans 169).

Natural reason (“natura ratio”) can be discovered in arguments because all the things that share a common identity with a third statement demonstrate a congruence that completes them and, therefore, are demonstrably congruent with the third. To

further clarify his explanation, Vives uses the example of a triangle, which in itself is a syllogistic formulation: “if an isosceles triangle is equal to two right angles and the scalene is equal to two right angles, the isosceles and the scalene are equal to each other.” (Mayans 169) However, he concludes, this will not follow if a third term does not share the unity, since there is no common identity or congruence within an arrangement of isosceles, scalene, and a circle. Thus, nothing can be inferred from this arrangement with a third negative term. To extend his explanation, Vives then states that it is not necessary for two statements to share the same common identity if both share it with a third. For example: the isosceles and the square are congruent with the scalene; the former in the right angle, and the latter in the acute and, thus, they demonstrate a congruence. Therefore, it can be seen that there is not any mode of congruence among the parts in the whole arrangement, unless the acute angle shares a common identity with part of the isosceles and the right angle with part of the square, although they exhibit distinct differences.

The complete power of the syllogism consists in that universality is inferred from the universal or from the particular; from the negation, negation; from the affirmation, affirmation. The syllogistic formulation must establish a form in which the middle term is integrally connected to the other two terms. The same signification of words should be maintained so that the argument does not result in equivocation or amphiboly. The result of this action is in keeping with what the formulation requires to provide a valid argument, that is, total congruence or partial congruence, since what is not congruent does not lead to an inference. For this reason, in the middle term, by way of total congruence, all relations exist; and, by way of partial

congruence, something will exist. In both total and partial congruence, there are ten formulations or connections that are called combinations. For example, the middle term would be “a” and the premises “b” and “c.” The middle term, as a connection of the two other terms, complies with its function to measure, thus it remains the vehicle of the argument but not part of the conclusion. Any inquiry would then follow the logic of the two premises, since this is what the formulation is designed to produce in its conclusion. Due to this, the middle term does not enter into that which must be obtained or accepted.

The first or primary term is taken with the middle, and is called the major term; that which is the second is called the minor term. In terms of the same propositions, the primary is called simply the major, and the second the minor, and both are understood as premises. Capella, who Vives cites here, calls the first term the assumption, the second term the proposition and the third, illation. Vives, however, argues that Capella’s definitions are out of the order established by Cicero, which was also subsequently followed by Quintilian. He chooses to use the terms as established by Cicero, whose framework defines the major term as the proposition and the minor, assumption, a nomenclature Vives will follow in his subsequent analysis of the basic moods of the four figures of the syllogism, loosely following the Aristotelian canon.

Vives next explains what he understands as comparisons of terms and premises. The formulations of these comparisons are: if some part “A” includes all “B” and some part of “B” includes all “C”; all “C” will be included by “A.” To provide a guide to visualize this statement, he refers to the arrangement of the following three

triangles: "B" is the greater or major; it will include the second "A" and the third will be the minor within "A," labeled "C." Thus, it can be said that if all of "B" includes "A", and all "C" is "B", then "C" is "A". If this rule is applied, it can be the canon or norm of all the arts and of all life. If the last proposition is weakened, it provides the basis of a contradiction, as in "C" is not "A," since not all "C" is "A", , then it would embrace "C," and (an additional relation) "D." Furthermore, if all "C" is "B," likewise all "D" will be "B"; and if all "B" is "A", also "D" will be "A," and therefore is not "A" (Mayans 171). In those statements that conclude directly by a contradiction of the consequence with the minor term, the contradiction in the assumption is inferred.

Although the use of letters facilitates the examination of an argument, focusing on the analytical framework without the semantic dimensions of words, Vives brings his analysis to the level of actual propositions in order that the form of reasoning will remain more distinct and developed, substituting words for letters, as in the formulation: "all virtue is good; all justice is virtue; ergo all justice is good." This is not to say that, without signification, the argument would not maintain its validity; rather, the mind ("ingenium") suffers less confusion with words that add a practical and semantic dimension to what could become a mechanical exercise. Here Vives again shows his commitment to the praxis formed by the common use of language in reasoning or dialectic. He looks toward the language itself to explain the operation of logic, rather than rely on the abstraction of letters. He adds that if the above conclusion is that "all justice is good," then it can be inferred that "some justice is good," because it follows logically from a universal statement, linking the word

“some” contained in the initial proposition “all.” Also, the proposition, “some justice is good” can be reversed without losing its significance, as in “some good is the justice.” In this case only the words are inverted, but the sense remains the same. Due to this, Vives will speak economically of those formulations that are easily understood, and will elaborate more on those formulations that take into account transformations within the canonic figures of other forms or moods of indirect arguments.

Although Vives refers to Cicero and Quintilian during the above general discussion of terms, the eighteen forms of syllogism loosely follow the pattern of Aristotle’s “organon,” of which the *Prior analytics*, *Posterior analytics*, and probably a set of notes or text from a University course in logic form the ground of his analysis. Of the three figures of the syllogism analyzed by Aristotle, only the first two moods of the third, (“darapti” and “felapton”), are considered by him to be valid on the assumption of their existential import for the universal statements that appear as assumptions. To a total of fourteen moods, Vives adds an additional four moods that were understood in the middle ages as subordinate moods that Aristotle had not recognized (Kneale 74). A clarification of Aristotle’s *Organon* had become part of the university course on logic and dialectic, and thus Vives followed a long line of scholars, including Lorenzo Valla who, in his *Elegantiae latinis sermonis*, disputed the efficacy of the third Aristotelian figure, arguing that there was no advantage within the context of its six moods that could not be achieved through the use of the other two figures. Although Vives was usually quick to point out differences between his viewpoint and those of other commentators, his examination of the third figure

does not take Valla's earlier criticism into account. Among other scholars who expressed concern regarding Valla's dismissal of Aristotle's third figure, there was another Spaniard of the following generation, Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas, who taught at the University of Salamanca, and published his work on dialectic and logic, *Organum dialecticum et rhetoricum* in 1579. This work followed Aristotle's *Organon* closely, and included an analysis of the third figure, although warning the reader that Lorenzo Valla had found the six moods within the third figure redundant combinations of the first and second figures (Sánchez de las Brozas 285).

The eighteen forms of syllogism

Vives begins his analysis of eighteen syllogisms with the first four moods of Aristotle's first figure, Barbara, Darii, Celarent and Ferio. The first mood of the first figure is called "Barbara," following the medieval system of mnemonic names. Here Vives, unlike his presentation of the following seventeen examples, does not provide the reader with an example of this basic syllogism in which two universal statements provide the basis for a universal conclusion or illation. The figure of Barbara contains the universal major statement, followed by a universal middle term and the connection to the illation, by linking the subject of the first statement to the predicate of the second, as demonstrated with the following form of this mood, taken from the work of Sánchez de las Brozas, mentioned above:

"Omne animal est substantia,

"Omnis homo est animal,

"Omnis igitur homo est substantia." (285)

This form, Vives reminds the reader, maintains its universal statements; from its universal premises, other universals can be derived. Also, a particular middle term can lead to a particular illation, assuming a congruence of the two initial terms. It is of interest to note here that Vives diverges somewhat from what has become the standard text of Aristotle's *Prior analytics*, and fails to include a discussion of the "perfect syllogism." First figure arguments are proven true by showing that in the conclusion a sufficient condition has been fulfilled. As Aristotle indicates, the three terms of the first figure are closely related to one another so that the illation is wholly contained in the middle term and the middle, in turn, is wholly contained or excluded from the first. It is the middle term that contains one statement and is itself contained in the other. This is the perfect syllogism (25b.35-40). Here the word "perfect" is a translation of the Greek teleos ("τελείος"), with the meaning of making perfect or complete, or accomplish a thing or act or work within time." It should be mentioned here that this use of teleos is a key to the Humanist criticism summarized by Vives in his work *Adversus pseudialecticos*, in which the extension of syllogistic argument without consideration of the first figure elements of perfection is severely criticized.

The second conjunction ("conjunctio") or mood is Darii: the example is, "If all virtue is good, and some justice is virtue, certainly then some justice is good." The opposite formulation would be: "no justice is good, then neither is the justice that is good (by assumption), then some virtue is not good" and, nevertheless, "all virtue is good." From the particularities the particularity is derived, that is to say, that which

in the antecedents were particularities, remain particular when expressed in the consequent. Aristotle also considers this a perfect syllogism.

Third (Celarent): in the Latin text, Vives provides the example of “si nulla virtus est bonum, et omnis justitia est virtus, nulla virtus est bonum” (If no virtue is good and all justice is virtue, no virtue is good). This is not a correct example of the Aristotelian formulation, which follows the logic of “if A is predicated of none of B, and B of all of C, it follows that A will apply to no C” (*Prior analytics*, 26a). In Vives’ example, perhaps due to a printer’s error, the illation should conclude: “no justice is good.”

Fourth (Ferio): “If no virtue is good and some justice is virtue, some justice is not good”. Vives then provides the reader with a deformation, reversing the organization: of the syllogism: “All justice is good, also this justice is good,” then replaces the second statement concerning ‘the second virtue’, with “this virtue is good,” yet, nevertheless, concludes that “no virtue is good” (Mayans 172).

Fifth: In this fifth analysis, Vives presents an analysis of a premise and middle term of a syllogistic arrangement that does not produce a conclusion: “If all virtue is good and some justice is not virtue.” There is no distribution between the subject and predicate of the two operable premises, and nothing is gained. The collation is useless, since it proceeds without distributing the terms effectively within the structure of a syllogism. It would be more effective if the “good” were the major term rather than “virtue,” and the term “justice” were equal to or less than the “good.” Vives then provides the reader with another example: “All man is animal, some sensible substance is not animal, then some sensible substance is not some animal.”

Vives comments, however, that nobody speaks this way; also, he states that even Petrus Mantuanus, among other sophists, agree that this is an unaccustomed manner of speaking. Again, as in Valla's observation concerning Aristotle's third figure, Vives shows his concern regarding the use of grammar within the analytical language of the syllogism.

Sixth: Here Vives provides the reader with an analysis of several formations that would lead to the syllogistic mood, "Fapesmo," which is not included in Aristotle's *Organon* of three basic figures of syllogism, with 14 formulations or moods. Assuming, however, that "Fapesmo" is related to the Aristotelian square of opposition, its vowel structure, "a," "e" and "o" in accordance with the medieval mnemonic, would indicate a universal affirmative major premise ("a"), or, for example, "every mule is white," a universal negative ("e"), or "no mule is white," concluding with a particular negative ("e"), or the illation of "some mules are not white." Vives is correct in his analysis of the universal affirmative and universal negative: "All virtue is good; no justice is virtue." Vives says that this formulation will not work, since neither the term "no justice is virtue," nor "some justice is not virtue" partake of universality. Also, since the predicate "good" in the first statement did not have a universal import, as in the following formulation in which it achieves universality indirectly: "some good is not justice," it is thus correct as it is formulated. Given what contradicts it: "All good is justice; this good, then, is likewise virtue," which follows the first assumption, then the statement "this justice is virtue," seems contrary to the second expression. Vives concludes by saying that this tortured line of analysis produces the syllogism, Fapesmo, which the reader must

already understand from the foregoing analysis as an invalid formulation, or at least one that does not lead to any practical conclusion. This indirect mood is one of five that Theophrastus, presumably the editor of Aristotle's *Organon*, developed as an extension of the first figure, and is a result of an elaboration of an incidental remark found in the *Prior analytics* (Kneale, 100).

Extending his analysis of the above formulations, he presents the following mood: "if all virtue is good, and all virtue is justice, then some justice is good." Here he provides a perfect example of the third figure mood, Darapti. Continuing his analysis by reversing the formulation, he supposes that the first statement of "no justice is good", will be followed by a negative particular, "then neither this justice." This case demonstrates that the term "virtue" would be placed in the minor term. In this structure, the statement becomes "this virtue is not good," and is in opposition to the original formulation of "(if) all virtue is good," thus losing its universality. A stronger universal statement would be "all justice is good." Vives examines the formulation using the term "virtue," which is the particular statement that is lesser than the "good," and the universal term "justice," which is greater than "good." Finally, he then shifts his analysis to another set of statements that exemplifies the pattern of the Darapti: "thus all man is animal, all man is body, and not the contrary." His analysis, however, lacks another statement that would make it more conclusive, if he were to follow the paradigm more closely, as in the model: "every man is animal, every man is a body; then some body is animal."

Seventh (Datisi): Here Vives provides a perfect example of this third figure mood: "All Virtue is good, some virtue is justice; thus, some justice is good." The

contradiction of this mood, he writes, is: "No justice is good, then neither that justice that is good is virtue," and conforms to the second premise with the Datisi formulation ("some virtue is justice). Its conclusion, however, does not yield a clear contradiction, since he finds that it does not contradict the statement, "all virtue is good." Because he seems to exhibit a need to press the syllogistic moods of the third figure to further analysis, perhaps this shows how intellectually uncomfortable he had become and, as Valla before him, had begun to question their value within the terms of the humanist dialectic.

Eighth : Vives provides the following example: "All virtue is good, no virtue is justice; then some good is not justice". This formulation, he states, can be reduced to the indirect mood, Fapesmo, through the conversion of the minor premise or term, and in this case the formulation follows the rule that has already been provided above. For this reason, Vives says that he will not propose another name for the formulation, since it depends entirely on the other. However, if someone insists on having a name for this figure, he assigns the name Fapello. This is another indication that Vives is using a text that includes the formulations of a group of indirect moods that Theophrastus added to the original Aristotelian *Organon*.

Ninth: Again Vives reaches beyond the Aristotelian *Organon* with an analysis of the following formulation: The major universal premise: "All virtue is good," and the minor particular premise "some virtue is not justice," do not produce the conclusion: "some justice is not good." This is because "justice" is part of a particular negative premise, and it is set in the place that the term, "good", should occupy. "All man is animal, some men are not Spaniards; ergo the Spaniard is not an animal." The

conclusion of this formulation is not the result of a proper distribution, and will not provide an accustomed manner of speaking, as in: “some justice is not good” or, indirectly, “Good is not justice.” If someone is not in agreement with this formulation, it can be transformed to its opposite: “All good is justice, it is seen that all virtue is good; thus all virtue is justice,” which contradicts what is assumed in its contrary as we have discussed it above. This opposite formulation receives its authority from that of Barbara and, due to this, it is not a subject of further analysis. The initial formulation, Vives adds, can be called Barboco, if some one wants to provide it with an identification.

Tenth: Vives opens this tenth discussion with the following formulation: “No virtue is good, all virtue is justice.” The conclusion cannot be inferred universally: “No justice is good,” if the term “justice” is superior to the term “good.” This is similar also to the formulation: “no stone is man, all stone is substance: ergo no substance is man”; but, returning to the original example, the conclusion would be “some justice is not good.” He offers a supposition of the opposite: “All justice is good; then likewise all justice is virtue.” Therefore, either of the following conclusions are the result: “Some virtue is good” and “no virtue is good.” With this, Vives concludes his analysis of the third figure mood, Felapton.

Eleventh: Vives develops the formulation: “no virtue is good, some virtue is justice; some justice is not good.” This is the third figure mood, Ferison. He asks the reader to suppose the opposite: “All justice is good; then also this (haec),” in reference to, one must presume, “that which is virtue,” or “no justice is virtue”;

nevertheless, Vives concludes this rather strained example with the illation: “no virtue is good.”

Twelfth: The formulation of Disamis is “(If) some virtue is good, (and) all virtue is justice; ergo some justice is good.” Similar to Aristotle’s procedure of investigating each formulation by way of contrasting other possible instances or arrangements of the extremes (major term and illation) in relation to the middle term, Vives proposes the following variation: “(if) no justice is good, and neither that which is virtue, “ergo some virtue is not good.” From this variation a syllogism does not emerge, since the illation does not follow. Another conclusion to this variation could be “all virtue is good.” Here Vives seems to be following the Aristotelian system of analysis “per impossible.”

Thirteenth: The first formulation is “some virtue is good, no virtue is justice”; from which Vives infers the conclusion: “some justice is not good,” since it does not result in a necessary distribution. What remains clear is that “virtue” has more extension than the term “justice.” Vives finds this statement similar to “some stone is substantial, no stone is animal.” The conclusion is, therefore, indirect: “some good is not justice.” He presupposes another formulation: “all good is justice, and also that good which is virtue,” thus “virtue is justice,” and, also, no virtue is “justice.” This is a formulation with the name of Ferisco. It bears this name because it can be transformed into the first figure mood of Ferio, if the major assumption is converted to the minor premise. Ferisco itself must be a formulation of university logic, since it is not found within the three figures of the Aristotelian Organon, nor in Theophrastus’ additions.

Fourteenth: This is an analysis of the third figure mood, Bocardo. Vives' formulation is: "(if) some virtue is not good, (and) all virtue is justice; ergo some justice is good." Vives finds that the contradictory formulation of this figure has the power of the first figure mood, Barbara: "All justice is good and all virtue is justice; ergo all justice is good." This is also an example of how a third figure mood can be converted to a first figure mood. As Aristotle observes in the *Prior analytics*, all syllogisms can be reduced to the universal syllogisms of the first figure. This is accomplished, as Vives demonstrates by the conversion of Bocardo to Barbara, by the conversion of the negative statement and each of the particular statements by a reduction "ad impossibile" (29b).

Fifteenth: Vives begins his analysis of the second figure mood, Camestres, with a formulation that fails to produce a conclusion: "All good is virtue, all justice is virtue." Nothing is achieved, he observes, on account of the particularity of the middle statement. He then provides a formulation that reflects the traditional pattern of Camestres: "all good is virtue, no justice is virtue; then no justice is good." However, if the second statement is rendered as "some justice is good" then the conclusion is "ergo, some good is justice." Here Vives seems to argue a case for a conclusion that is particular, based on the particularization of the second statement. (conclusion: "ergo, some good is virtue"). This seems an unnecessary analysis, however, of a strong second figure mood that operates with a universal affirmative and two universal negative statements.

Sixteenth: Here Vives formulates the second figure mood, Baroco: "All good is virtue, some justice is not virtue; some justice is not good." To extend the analysis

Vives provides the following formulation: “if all justice is good, ergo also is this justice,” which indicates for Vives that part which does not contain “virtue.” Also, the statement “this justice is good” indicates something that does not contain “virtue.” The conclusion: “thus some good is not virtue,” contradicts the major premise. Although Vives, perhaps, here tries to demonstrate that Baroco is a vigorous second figure mood by positing alternatives that are not viable, the way this is presented would require further explication to clarify the brief analysis, which may very well have happened if this material were used as an outline of an oral presentation.

Seventeenth: In this section Vives provides a formulation of the second figure mood, Cesare: “(If) No good is virtue, (and) all justice is virtue; ergo no justice is good.” Assuming his reader will object to this formulation, he extends his analysis by the following reformulation: “some justice is good and all justice is virtue.” He then assumes that it is this “justice” which is “good”; the formulation would then produce the statements: “this in itself is virtue; ergo, some virtue is good,” a formulation that contradicts the original proposition. Here Vives reverses the order of the original formulation to arrive at the contradiction.

Eighteenth: Vives here formulates the fourth and final mood, Festino, of the second figure: “No good is virtue; some justice is virtue, some justice is not good.” In opposition to the intention of this formulation, Vives offers a major premise, again reversing the order: “All justice is good”; the second statement or minor premise would then be an indication of what position “virtue” has in the formulation: “Some virtue is good,” which is in opposition to the first illation. His analysis “per impossibile” closely follows Aristotle’s (*Prior analytics*, 27a,20-35)

Other Formulations of Syllogisms

There are other formulations of syllogisms that are different than those Vives has analyzed above. He observes, however, that these forms exist apart from those of the *Organon* that he has examined. As an example of these other formulations, Vives provides the following proposition: “All virtue is good and all justice is virtue” and “all justice is virtue and all justice is good.” In these statements, Vives comments, the conclusion from both premises is similar to the others examined above but is indirect, as in the following example: “All sin is action, all action is voluntary; ergo, all sin is voluntary”; or, as it is read in Cicero: “All that which is good is laudable, all that is laudable is honest; ergo that which is good is honest.” Nevertheless, if someone prefers a direct conclusion, he has only to avoid a formulation that runs from particularity to universality, as in the example: “All justice is virtue, all virtue is good; ergo some good is justice.” This is the reason, Vives concludes, for limiting his analysis to seventeen formulations. These formulations can be distributed in three orders. The first order or figure, according to Vives, contains the structure in which the middle term in one premise is the object and in the other it is the subject; it belongs to the second order or figure when both statements carry the middle term as subject, and to the third order or figure when the middle term is the object within each premise. In the first order are the forms or moods: Barbara, Darii, Celarent, Ferio, Fapesmo (not in the *Organon*, but added later as an indirect mood by Theophrastus). In the second: Camestres, Baroco, Cesare, Festino; and, in the third, Darapti, Datisi,

Barboco (not included in *Organon* or Theophrastus' additions. Also, it is redundant: see Baroco), Felapton, Ferison, Disamis, Ferisco (not in the *Organon*, nor added by Theophrastus), Bocardo. Here, Vives says, we have not examined the comparisons that can be inferred, but only those that facilitate direct inference. All the rest of the formulations or combinations are of particularities or negations, or conclude in the universal or the particular, and seem to reflect some unaccustomed manner of speaking. He does not examine what he identifies as the uncommon comparisons such as: "All virtue is, (and) all good, (then) justice is all virtue." These are of no account and can be reduced to the premise, "all virtue is justice," in order to produce the second order or figure. The statement: "All virtue is all good," is similar to the following: "each one of the virtues is anyone of the good," and does not differ from the singular, nor on the other hand can it be true, since if there are at least two virtues and two goods, it does not conform to the common characteristics of any figure.

Also, the forms of the first order or figure are very effective, since they ostensibly facilitate easily combinations of statements for use in a refutation, if an interlocutor does not assent to an initial argument expressed in another figure. Furthermore, they are in various manageable degrees congruent with nature, since it can be seen that people who lack instruction, with only rudimentary skills, easily make use of them frequently. Because of this first figure's superior facility, most of those without proper instruction want to reduce or modify other orders of figures to it so that they can partake in its economies of reasoning. To formulate clear syllogisms, the more complicated or indirect forms should be reduced to the types of statements contained in the first figure, based on the pattern each has in common. For example, as in the

second figure Cesare: "No animal is stone; all rock is stone, ergo no rock is animal."

The equivalent of the first statement, reversed, has the same value, as the following statement indicates: "no stone is animal," and can be converted to the first figure, Celarent, as in: "no stone is animal, all rock is stone, thus no rock is animal." In the second figure Baroco, it converts to the following: "all man is animal, some white body is not animal; then some white body is not man"; thus, this mood can be reformulated in accordance to the following: "all man is animal, all white body is man; then all white bodies are animal," of the first figure, Barbara. The reason for all this is found in "that which is equal" follows the same course, as in the example of the terms "good" and "justice," or that which is justice and that which is good. What is put forward in the minor statement can be easily extracted from the major.

Likewise, the contradiction of what is inferred recurs in the contradiction of what is proposed, which serves as an indication or touchstone of a the good formulation.

Here, Vives echoes Aristotle's statement that propositions can be proved in more than one figure by reduction to a syllogism in another figure (*Prior analytics*, 50b 5-17).

That which we say of subjects and their distributions can be seen in all particular and universal statements, as in the example: "The books of each educated author are written carefully, Budé is one of the doctors; ergo his books are written well and diligently". Also, we have: "No pride or conceit pleases God; some spirits of men are agreeable to God; then some of those spirits are not prideful." Vives offers another example, formulated with the name of Thomas More: "I do not see one judge (who is) just; More is one just judge; ergo I do not see More.

The modifiers of particular and universal statements: “always, never, sometimes yes, some times no,” will make the same family of syllogisms shown above. In the following formulation, Vives he shows that his observation is correct, since his conclusion is equivalent to the above examples: “Claymondo always walks thinking about something concerning letters, yesterday you met with Claymondo; ergo yesterday you met with someone who was meditating on some letters.” It is the same with cases in which universality is understood: “Virtue is good; justice is virtue, ergo (justice) is good.” This kind of formulation is commonly found in the work of Seneca, one example of which is: “nobody confides a secret to a drunk, only to an honorable man he will confide it; thus the honorable man is not a drunkard.” In this mood, Felapton, both the drunkard and the honorable man are taken universally. Any inquiry into the relations of “the possible, the impossible, and the necessary” should be judged by the following rules: “possible” is particular, more particular than any verb tense; “impossible” is a universal negative; “necessary” is the universal that is expressed exclusively. It is very important, Vives observes, to keep in mind what he has offered as to the characteristics of universality and particularity. There are certain words that, if left unresolved, hinder the elaboration of the syllogism; however, once they are set forth they can be easily resolved: “all pleasure is in senses, all senses are in the brutish part of the soul, ergo all pleasure is in brutish part of the soul.” This universal “all” indicates the quantity of what pertains to it. A statement built from an analogy here would be: “No animal, except man, is capable of religion, the elephant is not man even though it is animal, thus it is not capable of religion.” It is explained thusly: “No animal, that is not man, has religion; (ergo) no elephant has religion.”

The implied “only” (man) here carries the universality to the other extreme, by way of the manner that it is presented, following the above formulation: “All those that have religion are men; the elephant does not have,” etc.

There are those formulations that place value in certain words and do not place value in others, for example: “few men there are in the campaign, the army is not formed by a few men; thus it is not on campaign.” The conclusion will be null if it is said “There are white men in the campaign; the Ethiopians are not white; ergo they are not in the campaign,” if, in both, Germans and Ethiopians are included. In some cases, “singularity” is the same as if it were a certain universality and, due to this, syllogisms that respect the rules can be woven together within the formulations of the three orders. Vives provides an example of the first figure: “John reads: John is the son of Gaspar, thus the son of Gaspar reads”; also, the negative example is: “Socrates does not dispute, Socrates is the son of Sofronisco, thus he does not dispute.” The minor term is not valid, however, in the following example: “Socrates is a philosopher, Plato is not Socrates; ergo Plato is not a philosopher,” since it is argued to a conclusion from what is not distributed to what is distributed, and it is not stated in the same way as the following example: “Someone is not a philosopher.” In the second figure of those moods that are affirmative, there is: “Cicero is an orator, Cicero is a philosopher, ergo some orator is a philosopher.” Of the negative formulation: “Some theologian is not Vergara,” it does not follow that “theologian is not theologian”; rather, that “some theologian is not a certain theologian.” It is expressed the same way in the minor negative. In the third figure: “Aristotle is learned, he is also married; then someone married is learned.” And of the negative

statements: "Socrates was not greedy with money, Socrates was a philosopher, some philosopher then is exempt from the greediness of money." And of the negative minor: "Socrates is a man and is not a Trojan"; it does not follow that "some Trojan would not be a man" but, in accordance with what is said, that "some Trojan is not a certain man."

Multiple syllogisms

There are certain multiple syllogisms, as in the following Socratic: "All is common among the friends; the gods and men are good friends, ergo all is common among them." Some of these formulations are called gradations. The reason Vives does not accept this term "gradation" is that the posterior statement does not always follow from the first or primary, and it is better described as a twin syllogism, of the following tenor: "The goods or wealth of any friends are common, the gods and the virtuous men are friends; thus all their goods are common." And another: "All that is of the gods, is of the virtuous men; all that is of the gods, thus, is of the virtuous men". In these cases, Vives accepts this kind of formulation as a valid form of argument (Mayans 178).

Syllogism from Comparatives and Superlatives

The syllogisms that are made in comparatives and superlatives have a special formulation that can be seen in the following structure: "All that which cultivates your spirit is better than that which does not care for it, for there is nothing greater than one's passion for philosophy; since this is the case, ergo cultivate your spirit."

Also, another example of this formulation is: "The happy man cannot lack that which is optimal; there does not exist a greater thing than wisdom and virtue; ergo the happy man does not lack them." In those relative statements that demand exactness, one should combine the antecedent with the relative term; if it is not done this way, the conclusion cannot be accepted. An appropriate example is the combination of the relative term and its antecedent, as in: "All men who are humble will be praised; the wise man is he who humbles himself; therefore, the wise man will be praised." An unacceptable example of this formulation would be: "The wise man is also a man, ergo the wise man who humbles himself will be praised." A statement similar to the latter is not valid, as can be seen in the following example: "if a stupid man is also a man ("vir"), then a strong man who submits to others will be praised"; here the condition has no existential import, and fails to represent anyone with exactitude. In those formulations that refer to the genus, it is sufficient enough to take the antecedent, as in: "All sophists are contentious, also they are quibblers; Luciano is a sophist, ergo he is contentious and also quibbles." Similarly, in "all justice is strength"; the names of "Cato" or "Cicero" can be used here in the formulation "per similitur" since their names are used to represent a species. The "conjunction" ("conjunctio") that nature is universal follows consequently, and thus it is necessarily true, as in the formulation: "God should be obeyed as well as a man with authority; thus the man who exercises authority should be obeyed" (Mayans 179).

The Negation of the Part

The negation of the part is brought to a conclusion by way of a contradiction of all statements of a formulation, as in: "there is no republic in discord, thus in discord there is not a republic." An example of a disjunction would be: "The avaricious magistrates administer with rectitude." Those who deem a part of a disjunction to be true and the other false believe that, if one part is argued well, the other part will be nullified, following the example: "either he is seated or he eats." The conclusion would be that "either he is seated, or he eats." An example can be found in Cicero's defense of Cluencio: "One thing that is certain; nobody will be so unjust to Cluencio who will not concede that there was a bribe in the judgment, and that the person who paid the bribe was either Avito or Opianco." If it is demonstrated that it was not Avito, then Opianico becomes the target; if it is seen that Opianico can be identified, Avito can be excused. Vives, however, concludes that it seems at the level of genus that this conclusion is not correct, since the person could have been bribed by both men (Mayans 179).

Enthymeme and Language

Another kind of rational formulation that can be used to structure discourse is the Enthymeme. In all enthymemes, there is either a major term of inference (illation) or a minor term. In some formulations of argument by enthymeme, the major term is absent; in others the minor term is lacking. This form of argument, as Vives emphasizes, is presented in common language, and the orators who employ these arguments structure them in accordance with the audiences being addressed. Since

their object is to persuade, the enthymeme does not use complete or perfect syllogisms. Yet the syllogistic argument remains the ground, although its inferential statements may vary in order to keep the listener's attention. This is similar to the epagogue, a form of inductive argument in which the particular instances support the inference. This can be accomplished by simple enumeration. Originally, the formulations of enthymemes could be reduced to the first or third figure, and only on rare occasion to the second figure.⁵ When the opposite statement is the same as the affirmative universal, the argument cannot be reduced to the third order since the middle term would be linked to the conclusion, and thus it could only be reduced to the first figure. If the subject is the same in all its instances, it can be reduced to both first and third figures. If other instances are added as supplements, and if each opposite is congruent with the others, it can be reduced to a mood in the third figure, or if both the subject and its opposite are linked it can be reduced to the first figure. When there is a congruence between subjects, the enthymeme can be reduced to the second syllogistic figure. When both the proposition and assumption cannot be identified, the argument must be closely examined, since it is a case that lacks the means of verification, without the necessary order to make a perfect proof (Mayans 180).

Other types of enthymemes that have nothing in common amongst themselves can be reduced to numerous syllogisms, as in the following example: "The man runs; thus the animal moves." This statement can be formally inferred in the following way: "The man runs, all man is animal, thus the animal runs." For the exploration of the syllogism and any other sequence of statements, there is not a truer touchstone for

Vives than the use of the following rule of contradiction: if a contradictory statement of the intention contradicts all reasoning, or if one part of a statement contradicts the other, the argument does not contain a universal application. From this case he draws the axiom that "the consequent ("consequens") is always equal or superior to the antecedent, that is, if the antecedent is correct in communicating the intention but not the reverse" (Mayans 181-2). Vives warns, however, that if the supposition is formed by an inappropriate consequence, the argument is turned back upon the antecedent. What is expressed is always clear and transparent if the proposition is true and its intention is necessary. The contrary could produce a true antecedent from a false illation. If the antecedent is possible, so is the result it produces; if it is congruent, it is understood as a premise with intention. But it is not the reverse, since the antecedent can be false and the consequent true, as in: "The studies are good; ergo, they are desired by all." If something follows in relation to the inference, it follows also in relation to what precedes it, since that which is the posterior statement is also in the anterior statement, as in: "All man is white, and all rational is man." From this follows: "Something rational is white," but it does not follow that "all rational is white," even when it originates in the anterior statement. If something contradicts the consequent statement, it also contradicts the precedent, but not reciprocally, since the primary antecedent maintains the contradiction as in the following: "Something rational is not white," but not with the consequent intention.

A similar situation can be verified through an examination of the conditions from which it emerges, similar to the process of determining the relations ("res") emerging from an analytical process. If the argument is understood, it should then be accepted:

this is also true for its inference. If this should be denied or placed in doubt, so would the reasoning behind it be subject to doubt. If someone begins to have suspicions over the consequence of a good conclusion, this suspicion can extend to the antecedent, since this establishes the basis for doubt (Mayans 182).

Sophistical Syllogisms

Vives observes that the basis of pseudomonas and Stoic logic in general is challenged in Cicero's dialogue *De academica* and in the shorter *De fato*. In these dialogues, the logical formulations attributed to Chrysippus are subject to the analysis of Varro, who relies on the skeptical position of Carneades, a similar position to that used by Cicero in his examination of the Stoic position presented by Lucullus (*De academia*, II). Attacks on Stoic skepticism and on its logic structure were revisited by Cicero in several of his works. This provided the basis of the skeptical approach by 15th and 16th century humanists and scholars in their effort of re-examining traditional concepts of reasoning, especially those that had been classified by the Scholastics as "insolubilia", "inexplicabilia" and "consequentiae." It should be noted here that Vives also comments that these "pseudmonas" or "inexplicabilia" were based on extremely thorny and problematic propositions, the designs of which created more confusion than subtle clarity in the art of disputation (Mayans 183).

Questions concerning "insolubles" do not lead to rational conclusions since words, by way of their use as instruments, accommodate other things not found in themselves. A word is similar to a knife, a tool that was not invented in order to cut itself: nor was the hammer invented in order to hit itself. Words, then, for Vives, do

not serve themselves; they serve what they represent. One should always understand that words represent the things for which they are employed. When one speaks seriously, as in “this he wrote in the days of October”; the speaker signifies the past or what followed, but not the act itself, expressed in a naked infinitive. Likewise, as Cicero, writing to Atticus, says: “This is that which I said of the friendship.” And Horatio, in reference to the past, wrote: “This is what I was writing for you behind the damp moldy ruins of the temple of Vacuna” (Mayans 183). Each of these statements provides the reader with a time and location, bringing an existential importance and substance to the action of a verb. Vives finds that these seemingly universal statements do not lead to reliable conclusions without the logic of tense applied to the verb within the initial premise. What is important, Vives concludes, is to speak as perfectly as possible (Mayans 184).

Explanation of Essence

Vives considers that the subject of “essence” has been overly elaborated by so many, with each adding his or her own particular artifice to the fermentation of the mix, that it has taken on the shape of a virtually impenetrable jungle. Worse, these historical explanations have been internalized both by those who have disseminated these ideas and by those who have learned them. To describe this process he relies on the metaphor of “fermentation.” This process of fermentation results in the loss of man’s ability to reason, since it enters his being, similar to a disease, and there takes form within him, wherever it is most convenient, gathering its strength. This is the acceptance of the term “essence” within the language that Vives sets out to rectify.

Although he is acutely aware of the semantic confusion accumulated regarding the way this word has traditionally operated in the field of discourse, he boldly insists on explaining it again in order that it regain its clarity and usefulness. His explanation begins with the example of the pharmacists who keep their bottles placed in convenient order, boxes, drawers or other places, in accordance with what each contains. In each of these places there is an inscription with the name of the substance therein contained. This is similar to the way in which nature distributes its elements, each of them bearing its common name: man, horse, diamond, pear, whiteness, blackness, virtue and vice. The same goes on in a city with its families and their names, such as the Scipios, Lentulos, Ciceros or Fabios. To put it another way, this similarity always refers to the essence, and not to the adhesions that are acquired through discourse (Mayans 122).

The essence of each thing is known, Vives stresses in another clear reference to the Stoic “catalepsis”, not through itself, but through that which we acquire or grasp through the senses. In terms of the subject’s actions and passions, they are not mere accessories, since they are products of inherent qualities, where the form and source of all essence exists. A subject’s actions and passions are perpetual, not because they are in continual action, but because the mind is continuously at the point of “catalepsis” or knowing (that point where the senses merge with the mind that acts upon them and interacts with nature). The Stoic notion of “lekta”, discussed earlier, could very well form the basis of what emerges as Vives’ concept of “essence.”⁶

Verisimilitude

Vives introduces this grasping of experience, or catalepsis, as the basis of establishing structures of verisimilitude that reflect the subject's acquisition of knowledge through the senses. This function of the mind's grasp of experience or things ("res") is true even for those entities that are not derived from material causes, such as the inherent qualities of the angels, whose characteristics are defined by their intimate and constant actions, from which their similarities and dissimilarities are categorized. Vives, however, admits that he is unable to find sufficient reason to explain why some aspects of angels coincide with a similarity produced both within man's ingenium and in nature, as do the souls of men and many other inherent qualities. Matter does not cause ("efficit") only the single individual, but is the efficient cause ("sed effectorem") of a multitude of different things. That which grasps ("astringet") the elements of matter is itself the cause of unity. The continuous examination of that which falls within the realm of the senses from the realm of matter produces its being before the (mental) eye as it searches the external forms of experience. It is through this process that the forms of things emerge and reveal themselves to the senses. This is the first step in the process of grasping that which comes to be known. This first step is followed by the act of judgment, which functions exclusively to construct the architecture of the material world, an act through which originates the name of the concept of form and species. It is the above arrangement of form and substance, commonly grasped and judged by all men, which provides the basis of the language of similarities. It is through the exercise of this process that similarities and dissimilarities of species are discovered (Mayans 122).

Genus and Species

This genus or that species not only inheres in the names that inform intelligence, but also in the similarity that is formed by the mutual sharing of qualities that exist in the nature of things. Another way of expressing this condition would be to say that the same things share similarities and participate in certain configurations that express unity. This is found in the faculty of nature, and forms the law of the world; it is that power of the mind that generates and organizes the production of similar beings. The power of this law remains in the things that exist and await expression. This being the case, the subject compares the similarities identified within its experience; other names are imposed upon singularities that are discovered through this process of recognition, extending the order among the objects of experience until they can be placed within a system. There are certain intermediate similarities that would be well defined as “*subalternae vicissitudinariae*” (Mayans 124). These similarities do not cover an extensive range of experience, nor do they facilitate reduction to general terms, since they are found within prior concepts. These types of similarities are called intermediate or interjected (“*interjectae*”); they are a unique configuration of genera and/or species, due to their own energy and action, which appropriates (“*capio*”) a similitude that distinguishes itself from prior objects. The Greeks, Vives maintains, called this discovered similitude an “*atomon*” (“*ἄτομον*”), a recognizable particular that is indivisible. This is defined by Vives as the Latin singular object (“*rerum singula*”), which carries the meaning of “one, unique or individual (“*individuum*”). He recognizes that several terms can be used to designate the same characteristic. Each thing of the world, Vives observes, whether it be substance or

accident, is one and singular in the mind of its author. There is never a similarity between two things that allows the two to be united in one. Only in figurative language can it be said that the two souls are linked in love and make one (Mayans 125).

The above remarks by Vives provide the reader with some insight into his understanding of the epistemological operation of the Stoic faculties of catalepsis and prolepsis. His concern is that the subject must proceed with caution, so that the names of things do not prove deceptive. There are, in effect, certain things that are only singular and do not have an indivisible or atomic name, as the “sun” or the “moon”. Keeping this in mind, one must carefully consider the significance of names. One must be aware of how these names are imposed and in what sense they are used. It should be clear to the subject that a word signifies one thing exclusively, and not any additional thing or quality. “Socrates,” for example, while signifying a single instance, also signifies all that has a similar essence. If it signifies only one quality, it is a species; if it signifies only one among others, it is an individual. For example, Vives considers that the sun is a species; Saturn or Venus individual. The gradations through which the genus descends to the species, that is, that faculty of action or passion, appropriate to each species and through which the species expands within the genus, is the proper attribute of each of the species. What is termed appropriate for each member of a species is precisely that property that is continuous and endures (Mayans 125).

Difference

The difference, as defined by Vives, is that point in which things differ among themselves, similar to the difference between Plato and Socrates, in nobility, in beauty and in age. Difference presupposes three genera of distinct things: “diversa”, “varia”, and “separata” (Mayans 125). The term diversity refers to the essence, the term variety refers to the inherent qualities, and separation to the connection or conjunction of different elements. He clarifies these definitions by offering the following example: the two “white” (“candidae”) faces of this paper, although integral, are diverse; if one of these has a black spot, they are various (“varia”); and if they are torn apart, they are “separata”. Vives’ purpose is to observe carefully the rendering (“rationem spectamus”) of essence. He proposes to examine that power and faculty attributed to each form of nature, through a gift of God, that is not allocated to another thing. Any analysis must continue onward in accordance with the possibilities available to the investigation.

Division and Definition

Vives observes that the logic of division and definition can be readily found in the descent from genus to species. These are two functions that are fundamental and necessary to the operation of all the arts. Division is not any other operation than the separation into parts of that which appeared or seemed united, and definition is the delimitation of any object in the mind. There are parts that are united in one continuous mass and other parts that are joined numerically. When parts are sectioned from a continuous mass, the partition itself is properly verified. When the partitions

are numerous, this action is called distribution, segregation and separation, or other convenient names. The specie resides in the genus and, because of this, the genus appears to contain all individual elements. The species itself only contains parts of the genus. Thus, it is understood that the genus correctly holds all the forms within it, as the body holds all of its parts. For example, each man is an animal, but not any part of man is man; similarly, each part of water is water, but not within the same part. Each man is animal, but not other than he is, since the truth of that form is distributed evenly through all the beings comprehended in that specific uniformity, as in the family and lineage wherein each one is either Scipio or Cornelius. Also, similarity may be confirmed in an image, as in a painting of a specific man. The figure of man portrayed in the painting partakes of "man" only through the use of a common language, since this language is ruled by the senses that inform the minds of ordinary subjects, the arbiters and judges of the common language (Mayans 129).

Rudolf Agricola and Definition

As an example of the process of definition, Vives offers the reader an extended quote from Agricola, taken from the topical dialectical method the latter used to build his definition of "the law." Agricola, Vives observes, uses the following argument:

"Let us take by way of example the law and define it. One finds, in the first place, that the law has a certain power of co-action, it has a mandate ("et jussum") from which it seems to have taken the name. It is in this way that

the law presents itself to us by way of a certain order or decree. Yet with all this, not all decrees will be lawful, since owners give orders to their servants, parents to their children, philosophers to their disciples and we do not call these orders law. One thinks of a way to exclude these orders. One sees that in them there exists a certain power, but, of course, much less than the power of making the law. At this point one adds that this is the will of a power much higher, that is to say, of the people, or of that entity in which the people have delegated their power, that is: the senate, the prince. It will be necessary that the law shows that it is equitable. One must use his eyes diligently to see clearly that it is that which fits inside the complex of the definition and that which is not contained in the name of the defined, and the reverse, if the defined contains something that the definition does not admit. And if one would not discover it clearly, one binds all the elements in this case and concludes that the law is the decree of the sovereign power for the defense of the collectivity, founded on that which is equitable and good" (Mayans 134).

Distribution of Things in Places

In the light of truth it is very necessary that one who must define or divide, in accordance with the way it should be done, have an intimate knowledge of the subject at hand by way of thoroughly studying it in all of its aspects, both internal and external. This includes a complete and total possession of all that pertains to it and all that it concerns. In order to contribute to the clarification of this important point, Vives adds that some elements can be assigned to the same essence of the thing

defined, as can be seen in the following order: "genus, form, differences, singulars, part, all" ("genus, forma, differentiae, singularia, pars, totum"). All of these instances, in direct series, in either ascending or descending order, pertain to the mutual essence, as in "animal, man, rational, Aristotle, body, head." (Mayans 134). Other elements are applied to the object and considered an adherent, or attached to what has been defined as the essence (as those that are comprehended by the senses, and those that are comprehended by the thinking mind), and then seized and glued to the object/thing so closely that, without it, they would not be able to subsist a single moment. Action and passion emerge from the application of these elements; furthermore, from this combination both the efficient and final causes are generated and, also, their intermediate actions and effects. This produces the structure that contains the thing ("rem"): "arms, clothing, place, time," and within this, "the order, the anterior and the posterior," and that which the thing itself contains: that which is in the "place," that which is in "time," that which is in the "body," and that which is in the "clothing." And, to extend this line of analysis, Vives includes four categories of thought that make it possible to refer to an object, comprising the four genera of opposition: that which contends ("pugnantia"), that which deprives ("orbantia"), that which contradicts ("contradicentia"), and that which relates the object to another ("relata"). A fifth category contains the dissipated ("dissita") and separated characteristics; these are two subcategories of diverse things that have not been established in relation to each other by any link of comparison. Vives understands that comparison comprises the above four forms of opposition. There are also those aspects used in comparison, which are added and applied in one manner or another, as

in “blood on the clothing or mud on the face.” (Mayans 134). There are also those attributes that one proposes or sets forth, as in “possessions and those possessing them, possibilities, riches, honor, dignity, nobility, magisterial standing.” To this is added that which stands before the object, that is, the manner in which it is encountered; it is drawn from an antecedent, as in the following examples of “ascendancy, predictions, oracles, dreams.” And, in addition, comparison also concerns itself with the manner in which an entity or thing acquires additional meanings due to what can happen at a later time, as in the categories of “fame, posterity, or if it results in an exemplary model” (Mayans 135). Vives concludes these remarks by affirming that he has also provided an explanation of these four elements as subtly as possible in the books of his *First philosophy*.

The little book of “Speusippus”⁷

Vives introduces this section with a reference to the little book by “Speusippus”, which he considers a source of Platonic definitions and divisions. “Speusippus” follows closely the work of Porphyry, whose work was translated by Boethius and readily available to Vives, including the *Isagoge*, or commentaries on Aristotle’s *Categories*. Aside from commentaries on both Plato and Aristotle, one of Porphyry’s significant works was his treatise on the similarities of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophic thought. The “little book” to which Vives refers concerns definitions and divisions available to all writers of distinction and extensive experience of the world. According to Vives, this small book can be found in the hands of everyone, contains

the definitions of Plato and provides copious examples of all the points discussed above (Mayans 136).

That which comprehends a thing is contained in various genera, a concept that Vives demonstrated in his tract *First Philosophy*. It is from this whole that divisions and definitions are made, the examples of which can be observed in the following: “Some men dress in corduroy; others wear linen; in Holland there are men who wear silk; and there are men who cover themselves by interlaced leaves or feathers. Some wine is conserved in a barrel or tun, other wine in a tank; and there is wine kept in a skin” . This classificatory scheme can also be used in the construction of topics: “In terms of animals, some serve on the earth, others in the water; some are in the air, and some are amphibious.” This approach can also be done to define a number of topics, including herbs: “some of which are from the fields, others from the gardens; the crocodile is a serpent fish that lives in the Nile; Balsam is a liquid intensely aromatic that is only grown in Judea, and Valencia is a city in Spain separated from the sea by one mile; oration is a discourse that is given in a public place for the multitude; and the Triarii are the oldest and bravest soldiers placed in the posterior line of battle.” (Mayans 137). This usage can also be seen with the use of time, as in “flowers blossom, some in the spring, others in a more advanced season, others in summer and some wait until fall. The almond is a tree that first flowers, the pirus is a tree that flowers last.” Vives continues with the example of vegetation: (it) “is the force of the soul or spirit that early is made manifest in man. (“vegetatio est, *vis animae quae prima se in homine proferit*”) and reason is that which comes later (“ratio, quae postrema”). The passion of glory is the last emotion that is laid aside by

eminent men.” The following are those aspects that are inherent in substance: “The intellectual force resides in man, or in the angels, or in the demons. Angina is the pain that is localized in the throat, and gout resides in the articulations of the feet” (Mayans 138).

Definitions are also derived from the relation of the part to whole, as in fingers and toes, which “are common to the hands and feet; the trees, shrubs and herbs have leaves”: “Intercalaris” is the “day that only comes every fourth year”; that which is potentiality in some objects, as in “some grains are in the plant and others in the seed.” This can also be noted in paintings: “some are already delineated, and others are in the mind of the painter.” Definition can exist in some objects as a power or potential: “to rule exists in one person, or many, or a few, or within the nobility or the people.” It is not easy to discover (“invenio”) definitions that are clear in the above genera, since that which contains the power masks the potential of other characteristics that exist in a latent state. These characteristics can be explicated, starting by any aspect of the object, working toward a definition that will explain its entirety. Vives recommends to the reader his *First Philosophy*, where he has adduced examples of each type of definition (Mayans 138).

Changing the arrangement of particulars in any possible object, thus producing a different form of comprehension, can easily be accomplished, as seen in the following example: “In the wineskin is conserved honey or water or oil or wine.” In seeds “there are those that contain in themselves the tree, others the shrub, and still others the herb.” Among kings, “there are those that possess the totality of the kingdom; others a good part, still others have an exiguous portion.” Other acceptable

definitions are: the human mind “is the seat of intelligence, of rationality, of counsel”; a city without justice “is a cave a thieves”; the year “is the space of time that comprehends 12 months”; a foot “is the extreme and lowest part of man”; sunrise “is the beginning of the day”; the good prince “is he who is immersed not in his preoccupations with his own interests, but with those of his people.” (Mayans 137). Those characteristics that are referred to by other characteristics “are inherent in the object” but, when compared among themselves, pertain to a place where division no longer fits, since those that are separated through their superior part are of another kind, as in the statement of colors, “this black, this white,” that includes both genus and form. Concerning definitions of men: “There are those who come here, others are blind; some are fathers, others are sons,” and their characteristics are located among adjuncts. If one intends to divide one from the other, the definition will thereby be advanced. Even for those definitions that have been well explored, it is difficult to determine with facility where or at what point the defining characteristics were assembled to provide the ultimate definition.

To conclude, Vives states that in accordance with the laws of definition, the definition itself should be equivalent to the defined, not lesser or greater; and, of course, it should fully explain the object (“res”). For this reason, a definition is seldom asserted when what is to be defined still remains under consideration. Obviously, it should not contain anything superfluous or redundant, that is to say, that can be cut without losing its entire semantic range. Not all talented minds (“ingenios”) find brief definitions sufficient, but neither is it convenient to lengthen them, nor should they be constructed in order to provide a rapid and expeditious

knowledge of the thing in question. When the explanation is referred to the “ingenio” of the listeners, it should be put forth with great diligence to those who listen, with the purpose that the material in question is defined in a way that accommodates its semantic range within discourse. When a definition is well made in the beginning, the result will provide a way to facilitate the acquisition of reliable knowledge of those things that are brought into existence within discourse (Mayans 139).

Unlike the Cartesian model of the ‘cogito’, which posits a universal subject thinker as the epistemological foundation of what will emerge as the ontology that must take into account a basic mind-body dualism, Vives locates the subject, among others, in a field of culture that exists in the present, conditioned by prior definitions, and necessarily evolves toward a future within a continual dialectical process that provides the framework of human experience. The subject, Descartes ‘ergo sum’, achieves his or her identity among other speakers of ordinary language, and is irrevocably part of a cultural praxis that must be continuously constructed from human experience in accordance with a dialectical methodology that consists of a logic or ‘logos’ of both demonstrative and probable relations of truth. Vives’ subject is not the result of a universal pre-supposition that informs the Cartesian ‘cogito’; rather it exists among others, and it implicitly contains a range of ability and energy, in accordance with the composition of each ‘ingenio’ (power of the mind) within an evolving culture.

While the ‘cogito’ of Descartes seems to offer the subject a firm basis for inquiry, Vives’ subject recognizes that only the realm of ‘God’ is immutable. There resides in God an inaccessible light, while all human experience is surrounded in darkness and

mystery, and the subject remains unable to enter this light nor penetrate completely the mystery of its being (*Prima philosophia* 184). While the rational subject navigates the mysteries of being, it remains fully aware that its 'vision', although significant, is only partial, and its ability to apprehend experience is based on the functions of *homoiosis* and *mimesis*. Essence, for Vives' rational subject, concerns the representation within a language of what is apprehended within the realm of man. It is not a simple description of being, since this would then obscure the difference between being itself and that which can be spoken. Being that can be spoken about or represented through the inventive reconstruction emerges from the impenetrable light of Jupiter's dwelling place. Man's being can only fully be described or represented in each individual case in accordance with the force or power of each mind or 'ingenium'. The process of the discovery of 'truth' will never attain the end result of an accurate or complete representation of man's being as rational subject.

The difference, however, between what can be known and spoken about and the mystery of being and impenetrable light of God's dwelling place does not imply that Vives admits a Cartesian mind-body dualism that must be bridged, circumvented, or transcended. Within the human subject, the mind and body form a unity that is best described as a hierarchy of intelligence and sense experience that are interpenetrable. The senses participate actively in the apprehension of experience. For example, both the eye and the ear are able, within their ranges, to grasp things or states of affairs. They are not messengers of experience that set things before the rational mind, nor able to decipher appearance from reality. The eye itself is capable of extracting one object from others in accordance with similarities and differences and participates

actively in the process of definition. In the *Fabula*, Jupiter's finger has been taken to mean that man the archmime does not have the freedom to diverge from the divine plan or script. While some readers have noted the difference between Vives' man and Pico's man of the *Oration*, concluding that the latter enjoys a greater freedom, the former is endowed with the freedom of reason ("ratio"), which he uses to construct his languages, cultures, and the place of his beatitude.

While the Cartesian subject seems to describe the world, the Vivesian subject, a unity of mind and body, understands the world as a project that must be constructed from its experience. Vives' use of "res", as thing, entity, or state of affairs, can be seen as the result of the subject's construction of what comes to hand through both internal and external senses, grasped by the mind. Although "res" is brought to light in the mind, it should not be considered merely a mental construct. It is a product of the subject's encounter with experience and, as such, must be held to continuous scrutiny within a dialectical process through which both "res" and "verbum" are transformed within the logos of discourse. This transformation is based on the subject's continual work of determining the degrees of distinction within the field where "res" and "verbum" merge to produce a vocabulary. It is this vocabulary that establishes the subject's praxis. It can be said that "res" itself is a product of the dialectic; it is what is brought to light, a "lekta" in the Stoic sense, and within the subject's logos of discourse, it represents what can be said about the world where man dwells.

Dialectic

Although dialectic for Vives is a conceptual instrument that provides a rigorous methodology designed to classify the many gradations of truth that the subject discovers within the matrix formed by language and experience, its operation depends upon an ontology that has been shaped by Stoic, Neo-Platonic, and Aristotelian principles. On the basis of these sources, he elaborates a methodology that is used by the mind or soul to construct a language from the momentous flow of signs coming from the senses. The foundations of his notion of dialectic can be found in the first book of *De transcendendis disciplinis*, in which he deals with man's discourse. This power of mind that allows man to understand the function of things, enables him to express his experience through the language he invents. Underlying this description of the way mind works is the Stoic concept of logos, which is understood as the mental ability to structure reality and systematize knowledge.

Following closely this Stoic epistemological doctrine, Vives states that all man's knowledge is the result of the close inspection of each particular object. Similar to the observation that distinguishes the gradations and differences in a variety of colors, the mind ponders each object, searches the memory, and is able to examine a series of events in order to discover their end. This faculty of the mind is made up of the "hegemonikon", the ruling center of the Stoic soul, and seven other parts, namely the faculty of speech, the generative faculty, and the five senses that radiate outward through the body. (Watson, 29) It is precisely this "hegemonikon" that receives information from the sense organs, coordinates impressions, thinks and decides on what action to take. But, unlike the Stoic "hegemonikon", Vives' concept of the rational soul is a three part structure that consists of the faculties of the will, mind

(intelligence), and memory. Within the faculty of the mind, he includes the attributes of primary intelligence (“simplex intelligentia”), reflection (“consideratio”), remembrance (recordatio”), comparison (“collatio”), reasoning (“discursus”), judgment (“censura seu iudicium”), and contemplation (“contemplatio”), in short all the operative elements of the dialectic (*De anima* 340). It is precisely the mind that organizes and categorizes the universal aspects of each subject and deciphers its normative values in accordance with the way it has historically structured prior experience. The cumulative experiences that generations of men add to this mind are what form the different branches of knowledge, that is to say, the arts. For Vives, whatever is incorporated into the arts is first found by the mind in nature, as pearls are found in shells or gems in sand. Many men, he says, have looked apathetically at material that others, more alert, were able to examine carefully in order to discover the reality of what lay hidden among the senses. Within Vives’ concept of the arts, dialectic is that which brings together sequences of particulars, and throws light on individual experiences that were initially obscure.

For Vives, experience that is not ruled by reason is useless, and will not constitute an art unless it is subject to continuous measurement. Stressing the reciprocal relation between mind and experience, he recalls Plato’s *Gorgias* to illustrate this point: “let experience illuminate art, and let art rule experience.” Similar to the mysterious power, latent in the earth, that produces plants of all genera, the rational soul or mind (“anima”) facilitates the germination of the seeds of arts and learning. The mind, then, is not a blank slate, nor is it a social construct. It is, rather, a faculty endowed by the Creator that man discovers within himself and that is

tied to the nature of things. Because it is linked irrevocably to the dialectical relation between the subject and object, it allows man to transcend his particular experience and construct his being.

According to Vives, the dialectical process enables the student to extract or actualize the meaning that is latent in things. This is similar to the Aristotelian concept of potentiality/actuality and also to Plato's use of the concept of "semina". In fact, Vives' idea of "prolepsis", as the work of the mind or soul that discovers clearly what already exists potentially in his being, includes both of these concepts. To illustrate this point he offers two examples: that of a boy who will agree immediately to a self-evident truth which he has never had in his mind, and that of a lamb that quickly flees a wolf, having never seen one before. It should be noted here that the Latin "semina" used by Vives has the same meaning as the Greek "sperma" of the Stoic Philosophers, whose "Sperma Logoi", or generative principles are responsible for the structure of mind and discourse.

Vives opens his treatise *De probabilitatis* with the statement that the human mind ("mens") "is the faculty through which the truth is known" (Mayans 82). The mind has a certain sympathy and relationship with those primordial truths that are similar to a seed from which all subsequent truths are generated. Such an epistemological system operates through what he identifies as "anticipations and formations." These two actions of the mind are described with the Stoic term, "catalepsis," that is to say, the direct grasp or apprehension of an object by the mind. "Catalepsis" operates on two levels simultaneously. On the primary level it is the operation of "catalepsies" itself, where the mind is moved by the desire to seek truth. On the second level it

establishes a field of knowledge that is governed primarily by the criteria of utility. In short, the mind is an active instrument with the inherent capability to build relational categories (anticipations) that facilitate the construction of universal concepts (formations) from the particulars of experience. The source of Vives' formulation of this epistemological concept is probably the second book of Cicero's *Academica*, in which the speaker, Lucullus, describes the process of the mind's grasp of sense experience: "...the mind (mens) seizes on some sense presentations so as to make use of them at once, others it stores away, these being the source of memory, while all the rest it unites into systems by their mutual resemblance, and from these are formed the concepts of objects". The mind of man, Lucullus concludes, is supremely well adapted for the acquisition of knowledge; it not only employs the senses in its quest, it also brings into being the arts and sciences as a second set of senses. Such a grasp of both internal and external experience, then, strengthens philosophy itself, and leads man to virtue, which is the true source of being that brings order to the whole of life (*Academica*, II, 30-31).

The Stoic metaphor of "grasp", apprehension, conceived by Zeno as an act of manual prehension, was later used by Cicero and Quintilian to explain the difference between dialectic and rhetoric. Although dialectic and rhetoric are often conceived in opposition to each other, both Cicero and Quintilian extended Zeno's metaphor of the open and clenched fist, arguing that this difference is only a matter of degree. Discourse is a continuum where, optimally, dialectic and rhetoric overlap to produce a perfect argument. In the *Orator*, Cicero describes the speaker with perfect eloquence as having not only the faculty of fluent and copious speech, but also a

command of the neighboring territory of the science of logic, since both are concerned with discourse. The perfect orator should be thoroughly trained in the older logic of Aristotle or the new logic of Chrysippus. He should know the powers and classes of words, singly and in a sentence, the different modes of predication and the method of distinguishing truth from falsity. In addition to the knowledge of where and how to draw the appropriate deduction, he should also be able to manage consequent and contrary forms of argument. These dialectical forms of argument, although they are not particularly attractive in themselves, should be delivered with a certain grace of style (*Orator* 114-116). Because Vives' views concerning the art of discourse are fundamentally Ciceronian, he is highly critical of the models of scholastic logic produced by logicians whom he considers "pseudo dialecticians." Against their logic, he devotes a significant part of his *De probabilitatis* where he examines the three figures of syllogism in the Aristotelian *Organon*. These, he considers, when employed within the framework established by the common usage of language, are most valuable in the construction of both demonstrative and probable arguments.

A practical exposition of the way dialectic works can be found in Chapter Eight of *De anima*, which also happens to be the heart of Vives' epistemology. Beginning with a description of the dialectical process of learning, he writes that instruction ("doctrina"), is the equivalent of "traditio", that is to say, a transference, as the word implies, from one who knows to another who does not know (Mayans 372). Such a transference of information that increases the body of knowledge ("eruditio"), depends upon both parts of the dialectical process, namely transmission and

reception, and on the power of mind of both the teacher and the student. As he writes in *De tradendis*, knowledge is not the result of perfect learning and, thus, should not be readily accepted as the basis of truth. It is, rather, an acquisition that must be continuously examined within a dialectical process that will bring forth additional notions that are used to test the historical structures of thinking. He dismisses the idea that the process of learning simply has to do with a passive student who accepts without questioning the ideas of a teacher. Learning, for Vives, is a process of constant questioning, a method which he himself uses when he studies the works of Aristotle and Valla.

As far as the pedagogic method (“disciplina”) is concerned, he explains it as being twofold. First is the placement within the soul of a quality such as a new language, which occurs through the exercise of human invention (“in hominum inventis”). The second is the action of the mind that brings to the level of understanding that which exists only in the condition of potentiality. As already noted, this is possible because the seeds (“semina sunt naturaliter menti nostrae indita”) of all natural things have been placed in the mind in the same way that they are placed in the soil. To extend the metaphor, so dear to Stoic thought, the teacher is like the sun, for he only helps to give life to the seeds awaiting germination in the student’s mind. Without instruction these seeds would probably germinate, but not as quickly nor in a desirable manner (Mayans 372).

In dealing with the art of discoursing “probabiliter” in the *De probabilitatis*, he follows Agricola in understanding this term to mean the invention of arguments that approach the threshold of certainty. Echoing Agricola’s *De inventione dialectica*, he

writes: "Human knowledge moves from those things which are known by the senses to those which are known by the soul and mind, namely from singulars to universals, from material things to spiritual, from effects to causes, from things which are apparent and obvious to those which are hidden." (Mayans 354) But to God, who is the maker of all things, the causes are better known than effects, just as universals are better known than singulars. The same is true among men; he who excels, either in natural talent or experience, is better able to employ dialectical skills in order to construct the topical arguments as set forth by Agricola. It is through these arguments that the prudent man is able to discover his reality. However, on the other hand, a duller person who tries to use the techniques of dialectic will remain closer to the level of sense experience (Mayans 354-55).

In the famous letter, "Against the Pseudo-dialecticians", to his friend, Juan Fortis, who was teaching at the University of Paris, Vives clearly states that the Dialectic, like Rhetoric and Grammar, is a science of language. This prompts him to ask Fortis what the obscure dialectic he teaches has to do with language, whether it is French or Spanish, Gothic or Vandal. His answer to this rhetorical question is that any dialectician should use words and propositions that no one who speaks the language can fail to understand. Language, he adds, is not invented by the Grammarian, the Dialectician or the Rhetorician; it exists historically among the people who speak it. For example: "Homo est albus" is a Latin sentence that can be understood because the Roman people who spoke true Latin judged it a meaningful expression, and not because a Grammarian established specific laws for students who eagerly await further instruction. Nor has rhetoric itself designed its figures by decree.

Both grammar and rhetoric have evolved from the direct observation of speakers who use the language everyday; the grammarian's work, in fact, is to set down, as models, written or spoken usages that have achieved clarity and beauty. The same is true of dialectic. It is not the teaching of dialectic that makes an indicative statement true, while the same statement in another verbal mood is not; nor is a conjunctive or disjunctive statement understood because a dialectician has so judged. The rules of dialectic, like grammar and rhetoric, are also derived from the everyday use of the language. He points to Aristotle's *De sophisticis elenchis*, where no mention is ever made of those absurd refutations one finds in the dialecticians of Paris. Their extravagant phrases and neologisms, as well as their frequent altering of the meaning of old words only serve to delude and deceive their opponents. Although words take their meaning from convention, as the dialecticians quickly point out in their own defense, they should understand that it is the common will that governs their usage. Latin words do not take their meaning from what Parthians or Indians decide, nor do the words of Parthians and Indians take their meaning from what the Romans dictate. If everyone were to profess his own logic, then the words of Vives himself, or Fortis, Lax and Dullaert, would mean a different thing to each one. If, however, meaning is important, and all agree on a Latin logic, then they must follow the meaning that has been established by practice or usage.

As an example of how the dialectic should work within the context of ordinary language, Vives points to the work of Aristotle, who, unlike the pseudo-dialecticians, was able to write his books in the Greek language understood by all people. He praises the Stagerite for having been able to write an entire *Oranon* consisting of

brief precepts taken from familiar words. It was this common language that was used to describe the nature of terms used in the *Categories*, the meaning of propositions in *On interpretation*, the principles of syllogisms in the *Prior analytics*, and the principles of demonstration in the *Posterior analytics*. Common language is also prominent in the *Topics*, which contains ways to construct probable arguments through the process of invention structured by topics; the same is true in the *Sophistical refutations*, in which he makes use of more elaborate forms of argument. Of course, while praising these works as examples of how concepts can be put into common language, he nevertheless observes that some parts of Aristotle's *Organon* remain unsatisfactorily explained, at times unclear, and not sufficiently developed.

What is most important to Vives, however, is that these works of Aristotle lead students directly to the learning of all arts and sciences. Dialectic, then, is only an instrument to be used in the production of discourse, not as a body of work that is learned for its own sake. As Vives sees it, Aristotle does not place obstacles in the pupil's learning progress, unlike those who teach the slow, dreary work of suppositions, amplifications, restrictions and verbal quibbles. And although these verbal games may be justified by some as tools to sharpen the wits of young students, he finds no reason for their use by theologians who erroneously believe them to be a systematic and rigorous approach to matters of concern. His point is that the mind needs real and substantial things for its good health, and will not benefit, not even structured as an exercise, from the practice of a logic or dialectic that breaks the rules of ordinary grammar. Vives concludes that a man who spends too much time on dialectic, at the expense of applying it to other branches of learning, will both lose

the value of the dialectic itself, and not progress as far as he could in the praxis of the arts. Unless a student has a tenacious memory, all the time wasted training in dialectic for the sake of dialectic vanishes as though it were the substance of smoke, blown away by the slightest breeze. This type of education, promoted by the pseudo-dialecticians, will result in the inability to conduct a practical life based on common sense. Similarly, keeping the dialectic involved in arcane gymnastics that have no application to ordinary language will eventually divert it from its true work of invention. The pseudo-dialecticians threaten the integrity of the art of invention, which Vives, following Agricola, considers the soul of dialectic.

Vives' concept of dialectic was already operating in one of his youthful works. In his short *Fabula de homine*, he has man ascending toward beatitude through a dialectical "teleos." This powerful transcendental thrust provides man with the strength to create and put on a series of ever more complicated masks, astonishing and capturing the imagination of the Olympian gods, well known for their jealous rages and for the vengeful traps they set for lesser beings. Such a transcendence is tempered by two opposite forces working together: the centrifugal energy of freedom and the centripetal force of necessity. The continual tension they create can only be resolved by dialectic, a method that constantly examines man's experience in terms of the credibility of its meaning and the probability of its truth.

¹ See David C. Linberg's *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler*.

² For an extensive analysis of Agricola's concept of dialectic see Mack's *Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic*. This book also contains a chapter

concerning Vives' use of Agricola's concept of dialectic. Also see Noreña's article, "Agricola, Vives and the Low Countries", in *Erasmus in Hispania Vives in Belgio*, edited by J. Ijsewijn. The article contains an exploration of how Vives transformed and put into practice Agricola's central ideas on dialectic and rhetoric.

³ See A.N. Prior's *Worlds, Times and Selves* for an account of Peter of Spain's *Sumulae Logicales*, and its influence on the ideas of modality and quantification. For a discussion of Duns Scotus, see Kneale's, *The Development of Logic*, especially section 3 of chapter IV, on Roman and Medieval logic.

⁴ Vives writes: "Sequitur vera, et germana, et perfecta *argumentation*, quae a Graecis *Syllogismus* dicatur, id est, *collection*, a Cicerone *ratiocination*..." See Mayans, 169.

⁵ See Kretzmann's discussion of the structure of enthymeme in accordance with Peter of Spain's position. According to Peter, all enthymemes can be reduced to syllogisms. To achieve this one must supply the missing premise (282).

⁶ For a discussion of the idea of lekta see Kneale's section on "The stoic theory of meaning and truth", pp 138-158. Also, Gerard Watson considers that the stoic lekta are judgments of the subject knower, expressed in words. These words lead the subject to elucidate the linkages among things (27). This assists the subject to identify seminal structures (the σπεματικός λογος) of his experience. For Vives, the stoic idea of lekta can be understood as the foundation of his epistemology.

⁷ Speusippus, one of Plato's pupils, is quoted in the *Theologumena Arithmeticae* in reference to the Pythagorean doctrine of the perfection of the number ten. (Kneale, 392) This would suggest that Vives read Speusippus in the original Greek.

Appendix I

Fabula de homine . (1518) Translation from the text established by Mayans-Síscar, 1782-90.

Since man himself is a fable and a play, it is both pleasant and propitious to begin my essay on man with some fables and plays. As it is known, after a magnificent and elaborate banquet laid out by Juno to celebrate her birthday with all the gods who, warmed by the nectar they had drunk copiously, asked her, without constraint, if she had prepared some plays (for them) to observe, since nothing would then be left out of this most important and happy feast.

In order to gratify the immortal gods, Juno herself earnestly asked her brother and husband, Jupiter, since his being was all powerful, to create an ampitheater and invent, again, characters in the beautiful manner of classical plays, so that the celebration of her fabulous day would lack nothing and maintain such a distinguished level that the esteem of the gods toward her would not wane. Then quickly, exercising his will, omnipotent Jupiter, who sets all in motion, brought to light, as you may perceive, this elegant universe, so great, so ornate, so varied and instantly beautiful. It was indeed the Ampitheater, the highest part of which rose toward the heavens above and the dwelling places where the gods watch over the lower levels, in the middle of which is what they call Earth, a stage where masked actors are brought forth; it is known as a universe that includes animals and all other things.

After the feast was over and the tables were put away, Mercurius Braubeta announced that the masked actors were already on stage. Joyously, the spectators came and took their places in order of their rank. The great Jupiter, having written the plays before-hand, upon seeing that all the gods were present, gave a signal to begin. To ensure that not one actor of the troop would diverge from the plan of the festival, not even by a breadth of a single finger, he gave the group the order and sequence of the plays from which, once set in motion, none could depart.

As soon as they heard the voice and signal of the sovereign Jupiter the actors, assembled behind the scenery, came upon the stage in order and there, with such great skill and composure, much in the style of Roscius, they performed tragedies, comedies, satires, mimes, farces and other similar works. The gods swore they had never seen a spectacle so beautiful, one that had offered them so much pleasure. Juno was delighted by the contentment and delight of the gods and almost jumped up and down with happiness as she asked each one of them about the plays. All were unanimous in saying that they had never seen anything quite as marvelous; and also that this admirable spectacle was worthy of her most fabulous day, which they were celebrating. There was nothing else that could complete the joy and exultation of this most great Juno, wife of omnipotent Jupiter. Excitedly she skipped among the balconies of the gods, repeatedly asking them to consider which of the all actors had satisfied them most. The wisest of the gods answered, saying that not one thing was more admirable than man. The father of the gods affirmed man's appearance by inclining his head further. The gods continued to observe man's gestures and his words; they were completely astonished by his entire compass of action. Jupiter

himself was pleased to see the extent of the admiration and praise given to his creation by all the gods.

All the gods near Jupiter saw the great pleasure he derived from this human archmime and were quick to perceive that he had fashioned this actor without the help of any others. Directing their gaze carefully toward this man they recognized his close resemblance to Jupiter. Even the dullest of the gods would have judged that this man's birth was the work of Jupiter. Man himself, hidden beneath his mask, frequently looked out toward them, almost to the point of abandoning his disguise by revealing himself in his actions as a divine likeness of the great god, Jupiter. He was a participant in Jupiter's immortality, sharing in this fashion the same virtues including wisdom, prudence and memory. It was readily apparent that man had received this endowment directly from the great treasury of virtues, granted by Jupiter himself.

Continuing on his course, similar to the greatest of gods whose virtue embraces everything and is all things, the gods saw that man was Jupiter's complete mime. He also transformed himself into all things. He changed his mask to that of a plant, becoming then a simple insensate thing. Later, after withdrawing briefly, he returned disguised as a sacred satirist, and impersonated the moral traits of the gods. Afterwards, he changed his masks to appear in a thousand different shapes of wild beasts, including the lion, furious and raging, the rapacious and devouring wolf, the savage boar, astute fox, a sow, voluptuous and sordid, a timid rabbit, envious dog and stolid ass. After having represented his range of action through all these animal

forms, he slipped behind a curtain for a moment, out of sight, and returned to appear now as a prudent, just, sociable, humane, benign and courteous man. He frequented cities and societies, made and obeyed laws, cared for all customs and institutions, and finally, of course, was a participant in the praxis of society.

Although the gods were not expecting to see him take more shapes, he surprised them by remaking himself into one of their own kind, transcending the ingenuity of man, all facilitated by his extremely knowledgeable mind. Great Jupiter! How great a spectacle it was for them. First, they were astonished to find themselves embodied to such a degree by way of the representation of this ethologus. Due to this many of the gods were convinced that this polyform Proteus was the son of the Ocean. After an incredible ovation, so overpowering that he could not continue his ingenious inventions, the gods asked Juno that he discard the mask and be admitted to their balconies and, like them, become a spectator rather than an actor. Joyously she was on her way to the seat of her husband when, at that precise moment, man again appeared bearing the mask of Jupiter, the most virtuous of gods, reproducing his father in effigy with admirable and unique gestures. His mask rose above the nature of lesser gods and penetrated the region of darkness that surrounds the inaccessible light, marking the dwelling place of Jupiter, the king of kings and gods.

Seeing this mask the gods, in their surprise and confusion, thought that their god and father had descended to the stage. A little later, however, their composure restored, they raised their eyes toward the throne of Jupiter to see whether he were there or if he had descended to play a part in the mask. When they saw him still on

his throne, they again turned their eyes toward man and then again looked up to Jupiter, aware that they had been deceived by the verisimilitude produced by the actor's imitation. Some of the other actors swore that this was not man but Jupiter himself, and for such an error they suffered severe punishments. All the gods were unanimous in their veneration of this image of the father of all gods and decreed with their vote that divine honors be granted to man. Their entreaty, Juno also joining them in that this same man who aptly played the roles of the gods and Jupiter should take off his mask and be seated among the gods, was favorable received by Jupiter. He then granted to the gods what he had already of his own accord determined to give man.

Thus it was that man was called from the stage to the divine dwellings of the gods. Mercury introduced him and declared him the victor, while bearing in his arms man's discarded masks, which were carefully scrutinized by the gods. They contemplated the masks for a long time, admiring Jupiter's wisdom and skill, and they adored the way he fashioned them for all actions, since they were no less beautiful than useful. His high forehead was the vault of a divine mind and atrium in which the five ornate senses were usefully arranged and placed. The ears set near the temples were not suspended on soft skin nor immobilized on hard bone but, on each side, were attached to disks of sinuous cartilage which enable the reception of sound from both sides. The dust, straw fluff and gnats flitting around in the air could not penetrate to the inside of his head since they remained trapped in each ear's labyrinthine passageways. Indeed, his eyes were also an equal number of two, elevated in a manner where they viewed

all things, and protected against stubble, straw, dust and minute midges by a wall of eyelids with fine lashes. They were the sign of the soul and the supreme part of the human countenance. Finally, they examined the garments of the mask, or the mask itself, a proper fit at every point, divided into arms and legs that lengthened into completely flexible fingers and toes, so beautiful, so apt for all uses. As there is insufficient time to pursue what others have expressed completely, I'll add this conclusion: in its entirety it provided a congruent whole, each part contributing to the whole. There was such coordination among these parts, that it would have been impossible to add, change or subtract anything without completely losing the beauty and utility of this harmonic being. There doesn't exist an ingenuity that could invent a mask more harmonic for man, unless it desire that which is not possible.

This is how the gods saw man, embracing him as though he were a brother, and they judged that it would be undignified for him to return to the stage and exercise the ignoble art of an actor, nor were they able to resist throwing kisses at the mask of their images and that of their father. Man came under the scrutiny of each god, who carefully examined the intricacies of his body, taking more delight in this than in the spectacles of all the plays.

“Nor to be seeing him once are they satisfied, it delights them to be lingering near him.”

Indeed, in man resided a mind capable of providing counsel, so prudent, wise, rational; and so fertile that it was able to invent incredible things. The inventions it brought forth were towns, houses, the management of animals, plants, stone, metal; also he joined the names and descriptions of things, which was primary among the many inventions that have been admired by the wisest of men. With no more than a few letters the immense variety of sounds in the range of man's voice was set forth in writing. With this many traditions and doctrines were maintained, including his concern for sacred domains, and knowledge of the cult of Jupiter, the father, and all the rest of his brother gods. This dimension, not existing in any other animal, shows the relationship he has to the gods. Also, of course, little if any would be the progress of discovering, if a treasury or storehouse of all things, memory, had not been added, which preserves these divine powers. All that we know is made manifest by the work of these two, mind and memory, flowing together as it were, a merger that brings to light, ignited by that divine spark of inference, the vision of what lies ahead in that vast sea of knowledge in which all the future exists.

These, among other aspects, the attentive gods were still contemplating, without tiring, like those who look intently in the mirror at their own beautifully formed image take delight in it and do not sense the weight of time while staying there. Such was how the gods found themselves, and their father, so skillfully expressed. Man pleased them while they kept looking, beholding their surroundings, seeking first one thing and then another. How and in what manner did he invent on stage the plants, the herbs, the wild beasts, man, gods and the god king? By what art? With

what gesture? While man calmly and eloquently explained all this, Jupiter ordered that ambrosia and nectar be taken from the banquet and placed on the table. Many of the gods were pleased to turn from the spectacles to this afternoon refreshment they shared with him. They enjoyed their guest as much as possible. He was their brother and fellow citizen. After resting from the labor of the plays, refreshed by heavenly food, man put on the bordered purple robe. Like all the other gods, crowned, he went forth toward the spectacle, and many of the gods stood up. They were very willing to step aside, and many gave up their seats. Some of them tugged on his cloak, delaying his entrance somewhat so that he might remain with them. Then the great Jupiter nodded toward Mercury, who led him toward the gods of the first order, and they received him in the orchestra. These gods of the highest order were far from demeaning man, who shortly before had been an actor. He was received by them with all honors and invited to the front seats. He sat among their group and from there he watched the plays, which continued without interruption until Apollo himself, at Juno's request, reduced the light, for the majordomos and remaining servants, advised by the cooks, announced that supper was more than ready. Night fell. In addition to the stars, wax torches, bundles of sticks, candles, lamps and oil lamps were brought in, and in the same solemn procession as the afternoon feast they received supper. Man himself was invited by Juno. The father Jupiter,

“assented, and his will made all Olympus tremble.”

And just as he had learned as a spectator, standing with the highest gods, he reclined easily among them again at the banquet. He took the mask that he had shortly before taken off and put it back on himself. The mask itself was honored, since it had accommodated the uses of man. It was considered worthy to be at the table of the gods and at the splendid banquet. In that way, sharing the world of mind with them, he enjoyed participating in the eternal delight of the feast.

Vives Bibliography

Vives, Juan Luis

I. Opera Omnia

Vives, Juan Luis. Joannis Ludovici Vivis Valentini Opera Omnia. 8 vols. Ed. Gregorio Mayans y Sísar. Valencia, 1782-90. Reprint, London: The Gregg Press, 1964.

---Lodovici Vivis Valentini opera. 2 vols. Basel: Episcopio, 1555.

---Obras Completas. 2 vols. Trans. Lorenzo Riber. Madrid: Aguilar, 1947-48.

II Critical Editions

-----In pseudodialecticos. Critical ed. Charles Fantazzi. Leiden: Brill, 1979.

-----Praefatio in Leges Ciceronis et Aedes Legum. Critical ed. Constantius Matheeussen. Leipzig: Teubner, 1984.

-----Early Writings: De Intiis, sectis et laudibus Philosophiae, Veritas fucata, Anima senis, Pompeius fugiens. Introduction, Critical Edition, Translation and Notes. Ed. C. Matheeussen, C. Fantazzi, E. George. Leiden-New York, Kobenhavn, Köln: Brill, 1987.

-----Declamationes Sullanae, Part One (Declamations I and II). Ed. Edward V. George. Louvain: E.J. Brill, 1989.

-----Somnium et Vigilia in Somnium Scipionis. Ed. Edward V. George. Louvain: E.J. Brill, 1989.

-----De conscribendis epistolis. Ed. Charles Fantazzi. Leiden-New York: E.J. Brill, 1989.

III. Translatons

Vives, Juan Luis. Antología. José Corts Grau. Madrid: Fé, 1943.

-----De la concordia y De la pacificación. Trans. Enrique Rivera. Madrid: Ediciones Paulinas, 1977.

-----Diálogos y otros escritos. Trans. Juan F. Alcina. Barcelona: Planeta, 1988.

-----Epistolario. José Jimenez Delgado. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1978.

-----Concordia y discordia. Trans. Laureano Sánchez Gallego. México: Séneca. 1940.

-----Causas del la decadencia de las artes. Trans. Beatriz Maas. Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1948.

-----Centinela del alma (Satellitium animi). Trans. Juan Bautista Gomis. Valencia: Todo, 1944.

-----Pensamientos. Trans. Luis Guarner. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1940.

-----Obras sociales y políticas. Trans. Lorenzo Riber. Madrid: Ibarra, 1960.

-----Soixante lettres de Jean-Louis Vives, trans. Ricardo Asnar Casanove. Paris: Presses Universitaires de la France, 1943.

-----On Education (De tradendis disciplinis, part 2). Trans. Foster Watson. Cambridge: UP, 1913.

-----Introduction to Wisdom: a Renaissance Textbook. Trans. Alice Tobriner. New York: Teachers College, 1968.

-----Assistance To The Poor. Trans. Sister Alice Tobriner. Chicago: UP, 1971.

-----The Passion Of The Soul. Trans. Carlos Noreña. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.

-----Juan Luis Vives Against The Pseudodialecticians. Trans. Rita Guerlac. Boston: D. Reidel, 1979.

Primary sources

- Abellán, José Luis. El erasmismo español. Madrid: Ediciones del Espejo, 1976.
- Agricola, Rudolph. De inventione dialectica. Repr. Nieukoop, 1967.
- Alonso Fueyo, Sabino. Luis Vives y su Examen de Ingenios. Valencia: Agebel, 1948.
- Aristotle. Ed. Barns, J. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Rivised Oxford Translation. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984.
- Ed. G.P. Goold. The Complete Works of Aristotle. 23 vols. London: Harvard UP, 1995.
- Asensio, Eugenio. La España imaginada de Américo Castro. Barcelona: El Albir, 1976.
- Ashworth, E.J. Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period. Boston: Reidel, 1974.
- Bataillon, Marcel. Erasme et l'Espagne. Paris: Droz, 1937.
- Boccaccio, Giovanni. Genealogia de los dioses paganos. Ed. Consuelo Alvarez y Rosa Iglesias. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1983.
- Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy. Trans. Steward, H.F. London: Harvard UP, 1968.
- De topicis differentiis. Trans. Eleonore Stump. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1978.
- In Ciceronis Topica. Trans. Eleonore Stump. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988.
- Bolgar, R.R. "Humanism as a Value System with Reference to Budé and Vives." in Humanism in France at the End of the Middle Ages and in the Early Renaissance. Ed. A.H. T. Levi. Manchester, 1970: 199-215.
- Bonilla y San Martin, Adolfo. Luis Vives y la filosofía Del Renacimiento. Madrid: Rufino Garcia Blanco, 1903.
- Bouwsma, William J. "The Two Faces of Humanism." In Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformations. Ed. H.A. Oberman and Th. A. Brady. Leiden: Brill, 1975.
- Carreras y Artau, Tomás y Joaquín. Historia de la filosofía española: de los siglos XIII al XV. 2 vols. Madrid: Real Academia de Ciencias exactas, físicas y naturales, 1939-43.

Cassirer, Ernest. The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1972.

Castro, Américo. España en su historia: cristianos, moros y judíos. Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1983.

-----De la edad conflictiva: crisis de la cultura española en el siglo XVI. Madrid: Taurus, 1973.

-----La realidad histórica de España. México: Porrúa, 1975.

-----“Un aspecto del pensar hispano-judío.” Hispania. 35 (1952): 161-72.

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. The Works of Cicero. 28 vols. Ed G.P. Goold. London: Harvard UP, 1976,

Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De Republica. De legibus. Trans. Keyes, Clinton Walker. London: Harvard UP, 1961.

----- De natura deorum. Trans. Racham, H. London: Harvard UP, 1972.

Clements, Raymond D. “A Sixteenth Century Psychologist on the Immortality of the Soul: Juan Luis Vives, Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 28 (1966): 78-88.

Colish, Marcia. “The Mime of God: Vives on the Nature of Man.” Journal of the History of Ideas 23 (1962): 3-21.

Collingwood, R.G. Speculum Mentis. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1924.

Copenhaver, Brian P. Hermetica. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992.

Curtius Ernst Robert. European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages. Trans. Willard R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990.

Cusa, Nicholas. De docta ignorantia. Trans. Jasper Hopkins. Minneapolis: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 1981.

-----De li non aliud. Trans. Jasper Hopkins. Minneapolis: The Arthur Banning Press, 1983.

Di Camillo, Ottavio. El Humanismo castellano del siglo XV. Valencia, 1976.

Debus, Allen G. Man and Nature in the Renaissance. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978.

Del Nero, Valerio. Linguaggio e filosofia in Vives. L'Organizzazione Del Sapere Nel "De disciplinis" (1531). Bologna: Quaderni di Schede Umanistiche, 1991.

D'Ors, Eugenio. Estilos del Pensar. Madrid: Imprenta Marisal, 1945.

Dust, Philip S. Three Renaissance Pacifists. New York: Peter Lang, 1988.

Epictetus. The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, The Manual, and Fragments. Trans. Oldfather, W. A.. 2 Vols. London: Harvard UP, 1989.

Erasmus, Desiderius. Opus epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami. Ed. P.S. Allen. Oxford, 1906-1958.

-----Opera omnia. Amsterdam, 1969.

-----The Collected Works of Erasmus. Toronto: Toronto UP, 1974.

Fernández-Santamaría, J.A. The Theater of Man: J.L. Vives on Society. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1998.

Festugière, A.J. Hermétisme et Mystique Païenne. Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1967.

Ficino, Marsilio. Opera. Repr. Turin, 1962.

Funkenstein, Amos. Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986.

Gerson, Jean. De mystica theologia. Ed. A. Combes. Verona, 1958.

Gil Fernández, Luis. Panorama social del humanismo español (1500-1800). Madrid: Alhambra, 1981.

Gilbert, Neal W. Renaissance Concepts of Method. New York: Columbia UP, 1963.

González y González, Enrique. Juan Luis Vives. De la escolástica al humanismo. Valencia: Soler, 1987.

-----Juan Llvís Vives. Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1987

-----"Humanistas contra escolásticos. Repaso de un capítulo de la correspondencia de Vives y Erasmo." Dianoia 29 (1983): 135-61.

Gould, Josiah B. The Philosophy of Chrysippus. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970.

- Grassi, Ernesto. Vives and Humanism. New York: Peter Lang, 1990.
- Rhetoric as Philosophy. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1980.
- Green, Lawrence D. John Rainold's Oxford Lectures on Aristotle's "Rhetoric". Newark: U of Delaware P, 1986.
- Grafton, Anthony. Commerce with the Classics. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1997.
- Greenfield, Concetta Carestia. Humanist and Scholastic Poetics, 1250-1500. Lewisburg: Associated UP, 1981.
- Hidalgo Serna, Emilio. "Ingenium and Rhetoric in the Work of Vives." Philosophy and Rhetoric 16 (1983): 228-41.
- Hopkins, Jasper. A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1980.
- Huarte de San Juan, Juan. El Examen de Ingenios. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, 1953.
- Ijsewijn, J. Ed. Erasmus In Hispania and Vives in Belgio, Colloquia Europalia, I. Lovanii: In Aedibus Peeters, 1986.
- Jardine, Lisa. "Lorenzo Valla and the Intellectual Origins of Humanist Dialectic." Journal of the History of Philosophy 15 (1977): 143-64.
- Kelly, Donald. Renaissance Humanism. Boston: Twayne, 1991.
- Kerenyi, Karl. Hermes, Guide of Souls. Zurich: Spring Publications, 1976.
- Kinsman, R.S. The Darker Vision of the Renaissance. Berkeley: U of California P, 1974.
- Kottman, Karl A., Law and Apocalypse: The Moral Thought of Luis de León. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.
- Kretsmann, Norman. Ed. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000.
- Kristeller. Paul Oskar. Renaissance Concepts of Man. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
- The Renaissance Philosophy of Man. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1960.

-----Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1966.

Mack, P. Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of Rhetoric and Dialectic. Leiden: Brill, 1993.

Macrobius, Ambrosius Theodosius. Commentary on the Dream of Scipio. Trans. William Harris Stahl. New York: Columbia UP, 1952.

Mandelbaum, Maurice. The Anatomy of Historical Knowledge. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1977.

Manetti, Giovanni. Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity. Trans. Christine Richardson. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1993.

Maravall, José Antonio. La oposición política bajo los Austrias. Barcelona: Ediciones Ariel, 1972.

Marin Ibañez, Ricardo. Luis Vives. Valencia: Anubar, 1977.

Margolin, Jean-Claude. "Vives, Lecteur de Platon et d'Aristote." In Classical Influences on European Culture ad 1500-1700. Ed. R.R. Bolgar, 245-58. New York: Cambridge UP, 1976.

Marsh, D. The Quattrocento Dialogue: Classical Tradition and Humanist Innovation. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1980.

Menendez Pelayo, Marcelino. La Filosofía Española. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S.A., 1964.

Merkel, Ingrid and Debus, Allen. Ed. Hermeticism and the Renaissance. Washington: Folger Books, 1988.

Mestre, A. Ed. Ioannis Lodovici Vivis. Opera Omnia. Volumen introductorio. Valencia, 1992.

Monfasani, J. "Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agrícola." Journal of the History of Philosophy 28 (1990): 181-200.

-----"Aristotelians, Platonists, and the Missing Ockhamists: Philosophical Liberty in Pre-Reformation Italy." Renaissance Quaterly 46 (1993): 247-276.

More, Thomas. The Complete Works of Thomas More. Ed. And trans. D. Kinney. New Haven, 1986.

Murphy, James J. Ed. Renaissance Eloquence. Berkeley: U of California P, 1983.

- Noreña, Carlos. Juan Luis Vives. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
- Studies in Spanish Renaissance Thought. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975.
- The Passions of the Soul. Lewiston: Mellen Press, 1990,
- Juan Luis Vives and the Emotions. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1998.
- Ortega y Gasset, José. Obras Completas . 12 vols. Madrid: Alianza, 1983.
- Panofsky, Edwin. Meaning in the Visual Arts. New York: Doubleday, 1955.
- Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni. Opera omnia. Repr. Turin, 1971.
- Plato. The Dialogues of Plato. Trans. B. Jowett. 2vols. New York: Random House, 1937.
- The Works of Plato. Ed. N.H. Fowler. 12 vols. London: Harvard UP, 1995.
- Plotinus. Enneads. Trans. Armstrong, A.H. London: Harvard UP, 1966.
- Enneads. Trans. Mackenna, Stephen. London: Penguin, 1991.
- Popkin, Richard. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. Assen: Van Gorcum & Co., 1960.
- Quintilianus, Marcus Fabius. Institutio Oratoria. Trans. H.E. Butler. 4 vols. London: The Harvard UP, 1993.
- Renaudet, Augustin. Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie (1494-1517). Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1981.
- Rico, Francisco. Nebrija frente a los bárbaros. Salamanca: U Salamanca P, 1978.
- El sueño del humanismo: de Petrarca a Erasmo. Madrid, 1993.
- Robinson, Richard. Plato's Earlier Dialectic. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953.
- Rorty, Richard. Essays on Heidegger and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991.
- Rummel, Erika. The Humanist-Scholastic Debate. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1995.
- Sainz, Rodríguez P. "Luis Vives y el Renacimiento en España". In Homenaje a Luis Vives. Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1977.

Sambursky, S. Physics of the Stoics. London: Routledge, 1959.

----- The Concept of Time in Late Neoplatonism. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1971.

Sánchez, Francisco. Quod nihil scitur. Trans. Douglass Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988.

Sánchez de las Brozas, Francisco. El Arte de Hablar. Trans. Eustaquio Sánchez Salor. Cáceres: Institución Cultural "El Brocense," 1984.

----- Tratado de Dialéctica y Retórica. Trans. Cesar Chaparro Gomez. Cáceres: Institución Cultural "El Brocense," 1984.

Schmitt, Charles B. Cicero Scepticus. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.

----- Aristotle and the Renaissance. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983.

Secret, F. La Kabbala cristiana del Renacimiento. Trans. Liaño y Pollán. Madrid: Taurus, 1979.

Scholem, Gershom. On The Kabbala and its Symbolism. New York: Schocken Books, 1970.

----- Kabbalah. New York: Meridian, 1978.

----- Origins of the Kabbalah. Princeton: Princeton UP., 1987.

Seigel, J.E. Rhetoric and Philosophy in Renaissance Humanism: The Union of Eloquence and Wisdom, Petrarch to Valla. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1968.

Snell, Bruno. The Discovery of the Mind. Trans. T.G. Rosenmeyer. New York: Dover, 1982.

Sinz, William. "The Elaboration of Vives' Treatises on the Arts," Studies in the Renaissance 10 (1974): 68-90.

Struever, Nancy S. Theory as Practice. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992.

Stupperich, R. Melanchton. London, 1966.

Swift, Louis J. "Classical Rhetoric in Vives' Psychology," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 10 (1974): 74-83.

Trinkaus, Ch. In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity In Italian Humanism. 2 vols. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1970.

Valla, Lorenzo. Opera omnia. Repr. Turin, 1962.

Valdés, Juan de. Diálogo de la lengua. Madrid: Catedra, 1984.

Van Peursen, C.A. Body, Soul, Spirit: A Survey of the Body-Mind Problem. Trans. Hubert H. Hoskins. London: Oxford UP, 1966.

Vergilius Maro. Eclogues, Georgics, Aeneid. Trans. Fairclough, Rushton. 2 Vols. Loeb Classical Library: London, 1967.

Walker, D.P. The Ancient Theology. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1972.

----Spiritual and Demonic Magic. From Ficino to Campanella. London: The Warburg Institute, 1958 (Reprint with Introduction by B.P. Copenhaver, University Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 2000).

Vasoli, Cesare. Umanesimo e Rinascimento. Italia: Palumbo Editore, 1976.

----- La dialettica e la retorica dell' Umanesimo: "Invenzione" e "Metodo" nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo. Milano: Feltrinelli Editore, 1986.

Watson, Gerard. The Stoic Theory of Knowledge. Belfast: The Queen's University, 1966.

White, Kevin. Ed. Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery. Washington: The Catholic University of America P, 1997.

Waswo, Richard. Language and Meaning in the Renaissance. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987.

Wind, Edgar. Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968.

Woodward, William Harrison. Studies in Education During the Age of the Renaissance, 1400-1600. New York: Russell & Russe, 1965.

Yates, Frances A. Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1977.

--- The Art of Memory. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987.