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THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

City University of New York

Ph.D. 1984

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THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
OF INTERNAL CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

by

Joseph R. Harbert

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the City
University of New York

1984

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JOSEPH R. HARBERT

1984

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
OF INTERNAL CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

by

Joseph R. Harbert

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Traditional scholarship on conflicts within states focuses on structural features of the social system. More recent work analyzes human motivation in the social mobilization process. Neither aspect of the literature, however, deals adequately with the role which exogenous (international) factors may play in internal conflict.

The present study is based on the notion that analysis of the international politics of internal conflict is an essential adjunct to traditional modes of study. In this view, one cannot understand the phenomenon of internal conflict in the twentieth century without considering the international environment in which it occurs. Drawing on literature in international politics and foreign policy analysis, as well as the

extant literature on conflict, political violence and social change, this study develops an approach to studying internal conflict which considers both endogeneous (internal) and exogeneous (international) factors.

This approach posits two areas for exploration: 1) the impact of the general international system on: a) actors in internal conflict, and b) the social, economic, political and ideological environment in which they function; and 2) the effect which specific policies and acts of external actors (discrete external factors) have on internal actors and their milieu. The framework presented builds from analysis of internal factors to analysis of external factors.

The approach is applied in one major case study -- the 1959 Cuban conflict -- and then in two other Latin American cases -- Bolivia (1952) and the Dominican Republic (1965).

The study's major findings with regard to Cuba are that: 1) international systemic factors, particularly the system's bipolarity, influenced the shift to an alliance with the Soviet Union; 2) discrete external factors, particularly economic penetration and political interference by the U.S., altered the internal balance of power between insurgents and incumbents; and 3) the insurgents were highly conscious of international factors

and attempted to manipulate external actors to achieve internal goals.

The comparative viewpoints offered by the two other cases validate the utility of approaching internal conflict from a perspective which incorporates analysis of both internal and external factors.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vii
CHAPTER	
I. PREVAILING VIEWS ON INTERNAL CONFLICT:.....	
A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE.....	
Introduction.....	1
Revolution/Internal Conflict:	
The Prevailing Views.....	
Conflict Violence and Change.....	3
Definitional Issues: Revolution,	
Internal War, Or?.....	8
Explaining Internal Conflict.....	17
Statement of Problem.....	34
Summary.....	52
Footnotes.....	57
II. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF	
INTERNAL CONFLICT.....	
Introduction.....	68
International Factors and Internal	
Conflict in the Twentieth Century.....	70
The Role of Systemic International	
Factors.....	
Introduction.....	77
International Systems and	
State Behavior.....	79
International Systems and Internal	
Conflicts: Structural Factors.....	80
The Influence of International Norms..	86
Summary.....	92
Discrete External Influences on	
Internal Conflict.....	
Introduction.....	97
The Historical Record on	
Discrete External Influences.....	102

International Organization	
Involvement.....	108
Factors Influencing Outside	
Involvement in Internal Conflict..	113
Conclusions.....	128
Domestic and International Factors in	
Internal Conflict: A Framework	
For Analysis.....	
Introduction.....	134
The Domestic Variables.....	138
The International Variables.....	143
Research Strategy.....	148
Methodology.....	154
Footnotes.....	162
III. DOMESTIC FACTORS IN THE 1959	
INTERNAL CONFLICT IN CUBA.....	
Introduction.....	182
A Chronology of Internal Conflict.....	186
The Domestic Factors.....	197
Summary.....	225
Footnotes.....	233
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF	
THE CONFLICT IN CUBA.....	
Systemic International Factors.....	243
Discrete International Factors:	
U.S.-Cuban Relations.....	
Historical Background.....	251
U.S.-Cuban Relations,	
1956-1958.....	257
U.S.-Cuban Relations,	
1959-1960.....	265
Discrete International Factors:	
Soviet-Cuban Relations.....	292
Cuban Communism --	
The Early Years.....	293
The Soviet Connection.....	297

The Soviet Union and the P.S.P., 1956-1959.....	300
Soviet Policy, 1958.....	304
Domestic and Foreign Relations, 1959-1960.....	307
The International Connection.....	311
Footnotes.....	317
V. CONCLUSIONS.....	330
National and International Linkages:	
Conclusions on the Cuban Case.....	331
Discrete External Factors.....	332
Systemic International Factors.....	344
Summary.....	352
The Cuban Conflict and the Literature.....	
The Literature on Cuba.....	355
The Literature on Internal Conflict.....	362
Refining the Framework.....	367
Comparisons to Other Cases.....	372
Domestic Factors.....	375
Levels of Intersocietal Involvement.....	380
International Systemic Influences.....	384
Discrete External Factors.....	386
Summary.....	399
Footnotes.....	404
APPENDICES	
I. TYPES OF INTERSOCIETAL INVOLVEMENT:	
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	409
II. A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE 1959 CUBAN INTERNAL CONFLICT.....	447
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	453

CHAPTER ONE

PREVAILING VIEWS ON INTERNAL CONFLICT: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE

I. INTRODUCTION

The theme of this dissertation is that the international politics of internal conflict should be analyzed as an essential adjunct to traditional modes of study of such conflicts. In my view, one cannot understand internal conflict in the twentieth century without considering the international environment in which it occurs. Although many scholars have taken note of the importance which external actors have had in particular conflicts, there have been relatively few empirical works which have explored the international politics of a given case using a theoretical model.

The major contribution which I hope this dissertation will make, therefore, is the development of an approach to studying internal conflict which integrates external and internal factors, while respecting the view that internal politics are the starting point for analysis. It is hoped that this study will help to fill a gap in the literature on internal conflict by demonstrating the utility of a focus which is somewhat broader than traditional approaches. In particular, I would hope that it might stimulate interest in the potential impor-

tance of international factors in explaining internal conflict.

Chapter One presents a survey of the existing literature on internal conflict and attempts to refine concepts associated with it. It also presents a critique of the literature, based on the notion that it does not deal adequately with the potential impact of external/international factors on internal struggles. The second chapter synthesizes the theoretical literature on international politics as it relates to internal conflict, focusing on: 1) the relationship between internal conflicts and the international system, and 2) the ways in which external actors may influence an internal struggle. The last section of Chapter Two presents a framework which develops from this analysis of international and domestic factors. Because this dissertation is intended to make a contribution to theoretical development as well as to case study literature, I will devote two chapters to the review of literature and presentation of an analytical framework. In part, this extended development reflects the difficulty involved in developing a framework which attempts to connect two complex aspects of social reality -- international politics and internal conflict.

The second section of the dissertation is empirical. Chapters Three and Four present a case study of the Cuban revolution of 1959. Chapter Three details the domestic variables in the Cuban case; Chapter Four

examines the international aspects of that case and draws conclusions about the impact and the usefulness of the framework. In the final section of the dissertation, comparisons to other cases of civil strife in Latin America are made and general conclusions on the refinement of the approach are presented.

II. REVOLUTION/INTERNAL CONFLICT: THE PREVAILING VIEWS

A. Conflict, Violence and Change

Political violence is a widespread aspect of twentieth century life.¹ It appears in a number of guises, ranging in severity from single terrorist acts to revolutions to full-scale world wars involving groups of states. Because of its consequences and its ubiquitousness, political violence has been studied by many analysts who have attempted to explain its causes and develop preventive strategies. Indeed, conflict analysis is a field which had drawn researchers from a variety of other fields, including anthropology, history, sociology, geography, economics and political science.

One type of political violence -- revolution -- has generated special interest. This phenomenon has been examined ever more seriously in recent years by scholars interested in conflict analysis. Although one might agree with Anatol Rapoport that "conflict is a theme that has occupied the thinking of man more than any other, save

only God and love,"² no general theory of conflict exists which satisfies a majority of analysts working in the field. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff note, "There is not even any generally accepted taxonomy for distinguishing, classifying and arranging coherently the various types of conflict."³

There are sharp disagreements in the literature on the etiology of conflict and the processes which characterize it. Some of this disagreement stems from differences in interests between psychologists wishing to explain intra-personal aspects of conflict behavior and political scientists wishing to determine why wars break out between large social units, either within a state or between states.

The present study seeks to combine three related but distinct subfields of social inquiry -- conflict, violence and change -- because most writing about revolution and internal war springs from an interest in one or more of these areas. Scholars interested in conflict, for example, have tended to emphasize the prevalence of conflict within and between societies. In their view, revolution is a particular kind of conflict and should be studied along with other forms.

Those more interested, on the other hand, in the violence which accompanies revolutionary activity tend to place revolutionary violence on a continuum with other forms of social violence. They do so in order to under-

stand why men resort to extreme measures, i.e., they search for the causes and cures of violent action and attempt to discover links between the different forms of political violence.

A third and smaller group of writers, in contrast, looks at revolution as a goal-oriented activity directed toward change of a social system. Theorists of social change, writers of the radical left, and many sociologists focus on the process of change itself.⁴ Whether this change is studied objectively or advocated as a solution to societal ills, the assumption is that societies change because of the behavior of groups within them.

The diagram appearing below as Figure One is an attempt to specify the locus of my concerns in this study and to focus the reader's attention on much of the related literature which will be addressed in this chapter.

In my view, "revolution" is a form of social conflict involving violence which is directed toward changing an aspect of the social order. The three elements specified -- conflict, violence and change -- will lead us to refine the questions to be addressed and to locate some helpful bodies of literature. My emphasis on these three basic elements is a reaction to what I view as a tendency of many writers to avoid clear definition of the phenomenon. One cannot simply assume that all studies of "revolution" are studies of the same thing, since many authors


do not reveal the underlying questions to which they seek answers.⁵

This study will examine the area in which the three circles of Illustration One intersect. Not all conflict is political (e.g., fist fights), nor is all conflict violent (e.g., elections), nor does conflict necessarily result in social change. Moreover, not all political violence is revolutionary, although most such violence is directed toward social change,⁶ and occurs within the framework of an overriding political conflict. One should also note that not all violence is "political," i.e., directed toward the making of decisions which are mandatory for a social group. Similarly, not all social change is achieved through violence, nor, for that matter, through conscious political activity, e.g., change may occur through the invention of new technologies, by climatic changes, etc..

What I propose to study is violent, political conflict which is directed towards social change, i.e., it is conscious, goal-oriented behavior of individuals or groups which reflects a desire for change.

The aim of this opening chapter is to synthesize the writings on conflict, political violence and social change as they relate to internal conflict and to show how most studies have neglected the international variable in the revolutionary equation. The study begins by clarifying some important concepts frequently used in the

ILLUSTRATION ONE



literature in a somewhat confusing fashion. I then outline the prevailing schools of thought on the causes and process of internal war. I conclude with a critique of the traditional approaches to the study of revolution. My purpose in undertaking this extensive review is to demonstrate that despite the range and quality of writing about "revolution," certain elements essential to an understanding of twentieth century internal strife have been neglected. In particular, my argument is that the international politics of internal war is an important, yet under-researched, aspect of social reality.

Because I am attempting to demonstrate the ways in which internal and international processes intersect, the format of this dissertation may vary somewhat from the traditional model in which all relevant literature is reviewed in an opening chapter. Domestic and international politics are both complex social processes. Our understanding of both processes is imperfect and our knowledge of the ways in which they are linked is still in an incipient stage of development. Therefore, I will review the relevant bodies of literature in two separate chapters while developing a framework for analysis which is summarized in a final section of the second chapter.

B. Definitional Issues: Revolution, Internal War, Or?

For a start it will be well to specify as clearly as possible the units of analysis for the study.⁷ Along

the way I shall also define a number of related terms in order to clarify for the reader my own usage of terms which have been used by others in so many ways that misinterpretations are the rule rather than the exception. The key concepts to be examined are: revolution, internal conflict/war and rebellion.⁸

For years social analysts have searched for a definition of "revolution." Those more serious about the enterprise have attempted either to refine sophisticated, restrictive and limited definitions, or have striven for one with universal applicability. In the main, this has led to some confusion for those interested in studying change, conflict and violence. The definitional quest has also added little to our understanding of a complex range of related phenomena.

Footnoted below are over twenty popular definitions of "revolution" drawn from the social science literature.⁹ Virtually all of them speak of sudden or substantial change of either the social or political order, some degree of violence and conflict between groups. There are, of course, incompatibilities between the definitions and this tends to hinder cumulativeness in the field. It also appears that many of the definitions are either too restrictive or too broad. For example, on the one hand, it is argued by Arendt, Brinton, Pettie and others that there have been only a handful of revolutions -- the "great" ones such as the French, Russian, etc..⁹

Alternatively, it has been argued that anyone with a gun in his hand may be a "revolutionary."

Popular usage of the term "revolution" has led to further debasement, e.g., current references to the "revolutions" in data processing, life styles, etc. Even prior to these examples, one can cite terms such as "the industrial revolution," a phrase coined in the late nineteenth century. Also, since Robespierre, Marx and Lenin the term "revolution" has come to be positively valued by many. Hence, many tinhorn dictators may have chosen to proclaim their own "revolutions."

Thus, we are faced with a situation in which the phenomenon being examined has come to mean different things to different observers, and in which the popular connotations of the word only add to the confusion. Although I will not debate the merits of the various definitions cited or search for additional ones, some clarification appears to be in order. My argument is that what has been called "revolution" by most writers is a phenomenon which may be appropriately subsumed under the category of intra-societal conflict/internal conflict/internal war. As popularized by Harry Eckstein, "internal war" is defined as "any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, rulers or policies."¹⁰

The strategy of including many types of domestic or civil strife under one umbrella has a number of advan-

tages. First, it groups together types of conflict which generally occur within a society rather than between societies. All involve attempts to change by force at least the leadership of a society. Inherent in the "internal war" definition are the three basic elements cited previously -- conflict, violence and change.

An added advantage to the internal conflict approach is that the use of a generic term helps to draw our attention to the similarities among various types of intra-societal conflicts. The breadth of the definition, thus, may facilitate exploration of the linkages between the phenomena themselves and between the various bodies of literature which exist.

A third advantage to this usage is that it encourages us to examine the connections between intra-societal and inter-societal violence. Also, there may be something to be learned by comparative analysis of the sources, causes and effects of violent activity directed toward change, regardless of the boundaries within which this activity occurs.

Although these advantages are substantial, arguments made by opponents to the internal war usage ought to be noted. Linda B. Miller, for example, contends that the internal war definition tends to "blur the distinctions between various types of contemporary internal violence."¹¹ There may be, moreover, some exaggeration in calling all violent intra-state conflicts "wars" -- a

term with its own inter-societal connotations. Miller suggests a refinement of the terminology, substituting the term "conflict" for "war." James N. Rosenau prefers the term "civil strife" instead.¹² Lawrence Stone argues that the concept of internal war is

too broad in its comprehension of all types of violence from civil wars to strikes, too narrow in its restrictions to normally non-violent societies, too limited in its concern for one of many means, and too little concerned with the complex roots of social unrest.¹³

Although I reject Stone's views, there is, admittedly, some danger of obfuscation inherent in a strict acceptance of the internal war usage. Yet, with the revisions suggested by Miller it appears to provide many advantages over previous approaches which have studied in isolation such discrete phenomena such as revolution, riot, etc.. Since my aim here is not to add to the debate on what constitutes revolution, I have adopted the "internal conflict" terminology. I ask the reader to keep in mind that I refer to serious conflicts involving violence within a state directed at changing an aspect of the social order.

"Revolution," then, is one type of internal conflict, in which the change objects are the underlying organizational principles of a society, i.e., its values. This definition resembles what Brinton, Pettie, Edwards and Arendt have called the "great" revolutions of history, e.g., the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the French Revolution. One may also consider these as examples of

"structural (internal) wars" as James N. Rosenau does,¹⁴ because they are examples of the most intense types of internal conflict. What is at stake in these conflicts is not merely the replacement of one set of rulers by another, or even changes in the rules of the political game, although both will occur in a revolution. What is distinctive is that revolutionaries seek to change the social organization in a society, by changing the underlying assumptions upon which the social, economic and political systems rest.¹⁵

Below is a summary of facets of internal conflict which may help to highlight some of the differences between types of internal conflict. It is based on the three variables I have specified as being critical -- change, violence and conflict.

In my view, the distinctions between types of internal conflict are based on three major factors:

- 1) the scope of the conflict;
- 2) the level of political violence;
- 3) the target of change being sought and degree of change achieved.

Continuum A - CONFLICT (see page 15, Illustration Two) represents: 1) the scope of conflict, which may be analyzed with respect to the number of participants and their relative importance as indicated by the types of physical and ideological resources they possess; 2) the

extent of the geographical area in which they operate; and
3) the duration of the conflict.

Continuum B - VIOLENCE - represents: 1) the level of violent activity as illustrated by the number of people killed or wounded, the types of weaponry used, the degree to which the activity is organized; and 2) the intensity of the violence (which is a function of the level and the duration of the violence). A summary measure is suggested on the table itself, with types of behavior ranging from assassination to full-scale civil war.

Continuum C - CHANGE - reflects both: 1) the targets of change; and 2) the degrees of change sought and achieved. With respect to targets, they may include:

- a) the policies of an incumbent regime;
- b) the people occupying roles of authority;
- c) the codes governing economic, social, and political behavior, such as laws, constitutions, unwritten rules of the game;
- d) the structural features of society and the values underlying that structure (e.g., a socialist as opposed to a capitalist mode of organization).¹⁶

By specifying where cases register on the three continua, one identifies the conflict in terms of identifiable indicators. In some cases these are measurable, although it is clear that quantifiability and levels of analysis problems limit the precision of the continua. This approach may allow the student to focus more clearly on the elements of a case rather than on the many labels

Illustration Two

Facets of Internal Conflict*

A. CONFLICT (Measures of the scope of conflict)

1. number of people involved
2. significance of people (groups) involved
3. geographical area of operation
4. duration of conflict


B. VIOLENCE (Measures of the level of violent activity)

1. number of people killed, wounded
2. type of weaponry used
3. duration of violent activity
4. degree of formal organization of combatants

C. CHANGE (Targets and degrees of change)

1. Targets
 - policies of regime
 - occupants of governmental roles
 - laws, rules of the game
 - societal values, structural conditions
2. Degrees of change
 - sought with regard to each target
 - achieved with regard to each target

* One may represent items in A, B, and C-1 as linear continua or as a three dimensional representation:



which have been attached to various kinds of conflict.

The indicators may, when considered jointly, also help us to develop a more meaningful typology of conflict.¹⁷ For example, "revolution" would be found in this framework near the right end of each of the three continua. "Rebellion," "revolt," and "insurrection" would fall somewhat further to the left on Continuum A (CONFLICT) and Continuum B (VIOLENCE), and much further to the left on Continuum C (CHANGE). A coup d'etat represents lower scale violence (Continuum B), and would fall left of center on both of the other continua. Guerrilla warfare would score high on the violence continuum (B), towards the middle on the change continuum C (although guerrilla war can be an adjunct of revolution as in China), and to the right of center on continuum A (CONFLICT). An insurrection or rebellion might score as highly on the violence continuum as a revolution, but would tend to score lower on the conflict continuum because the scope of strife would tend to be more localized, fewer groups would be involved, and the geographical area would likely be smaller.

In general, as one moves from left to right on each continuum, more extreme behavior may subsume within it the less severe forms. Thus, a "revolution" may involve any or all of the violent techniques listed. It may, moreover, result in changes in the policies of the existing regime, the people occupying governmental roles, the

laws, or to changes in the basic values of the social system.

One may also find that as the process of internal struggle continues a conflict may turn into a more serious type, or that different types may be occurring simultaneously as different groups in a society pursue their goals. This diversity often leads to some confusion among even sophisticated observers as to the nature of the conflict being witnessed.

One other category of internal conflict not yet mentioned is the "war of national liberation." What differentiates these conflicts from others is that the targets of insurgent activity are external actors. Authority, in these situations, is located in a party external to the state; outside involvement, therefore, must be taken as a given. The goal of such insurgencies is to replace foreign "controllers" with domestic ones. In such cases, both the causal factors and the process are likely to be strongly influenced by this external involvement. Technically, one might even view such conflicts as hybrids of inter-societal conflicts, rather than as a pure type of internal struggle.¹⁸

C. Explaining Internal Conflict

For most internal struggles, one finds a variety of explanations. Yet, there is often sharp disagreement as to the "real" reasons why things happened as they did. In

part, such disagreement is understandable because causal explanation remains a serious problem in the social sciences in general. Quite often, one is able, with some digging and a good eye for detail, to piece together a descriptive analysis of a given conflict. One may even be able to note the antecedent conditions which appear to be connected to the way in which social reality finally unfolded. But definitive explanations often seem to be beyond our grasp.

However, it is this type of question which analysts find most fascinating. Eckstein argues that "with regard to etiology, to causes, we are absolutely inundated with print."¹⁹ Despite this surfeit, one still finds it quite difficult with regard to any conflict to specify precisely what factors caused what actions to occur. Even when one succeeds in ascertaining correlations, the relationship between sets of factors may not be causal. The problem is compounded when authors try to generalize from one case to many by using cross-national data for comparison.²⁰ Even in the best of the cross-national surveys of internal conflict, e.g., those of Ted Robert Gurr, the Feierabends, and Rudolph Rummel,²¹ causal inferences remain elusive.

Thomas H. Greene argues that one must separate the indicators of revolutionary potential from the actual incidence of civil strife in order to build theory.²² In his view, the main problem of broad-range theory is

that it assumes a causal relation between events or processes extended through time. But given the difficulty inherent in demonstrating causal relationships even when events are directly connected in time and space, one would expect it to be especially difficult to show that a given internal struggle was the ultimate result, for example, of the introduction of a market economy in a given country. Although such broad generalization is often useful, it is not generally conclusive. Moreover, if, as some argue, the behavioral process of internal conflict is "essentially non-repetitive,"²³ there can be no single or "grand" theory which will explain all cases.

Of course, I do not advocate that we forsake study of the causes of social behavior. Regarding causes of internal conflict one is far from being helpless, although one does face a shortage of good theory with which to interpret the over-abundance of data which exists.²⁴

This study recognizes that internal conflict is a complex social phenomenon. One cannot, in practical terms, survey all possible perspectives from which to view such an event or process. And although I do not agree with Hagopian's assertion that "A revolution is explained ... when we have enumerated adequate sets of antecedent conditions with their respective empirical generalizations,"²⁵ the search for the antecedent conditions necessary for the event to have occurred is an important

one. Because various groups in a struggle are motivated by distinct goals, it becomes difficult to find a single, decisive cause for all internal conflict. Also, it is critical to recognize that because internal conflict is a process, there may be different causal factors operating at various stages within the process and, therefore, one ought to search for the antecedent factors affecting each stage. Because of this complexity, one is likely to find most satisfying those explanations which accommodate multiple factors.²⁶

Cl. Antecedents and Precipitants/Structural and Behavioral Explanations

Given these cautionary notes, there are a number of plausible ways to approach explanation of internal conflict which deserve our attention. For the most part, the field may be divided into two basic schools of thought, each of which offers its own paradigm. I have labeled these the structural and behavioral explanations.

With regard to structural features, one may begin by focusing on either the time period or the social domain from which the conflict emanates. By focusing on time, one seeks to discover long-term, middle range and immediate causes. Some authors have refined this approach by grouping the long and middle-term factors into a category called "preconditions," and the short-term factors into a category called "precipitants" or "accelerators".²⁷

In this framework, internal conflict occurs because of a combination of underlying social, economic, political and other factors (preconditions) which come to a head in a specific event or crisis leading to the overthrow of an existing regime.

Immediate causes (precipitants, accelerators) promote the final push toward seizure of power because they affect an elite's monopoly of force and legitimacy, thus leading insurgents to believe more strongly in their chances for success.²⁸ Examples are particular acts of repression, strikes, governmental financial crises, etc.

An alternate but still structural framework for organizing one's thinking about antecedent conditions thought to have causal efficacy is based upon analysis of various sub-systems of the social system. One might examine whether the pressures leading to the insurgent challenge were primarily economic, social, political or cultural.

Among economic factors²⁹ one might look for:

- .changing levels of economic growth
- .rapid modernization
- .economic stagnation
- .underdevelopment
- .depression or recession
- .maldistribution of wealth
- .external economic penetration (dependency)

Analysis based on economic factors assumes that economic conditions have a profound effect on the daily lives of

all groups in a society. Problems in this sub-system may, therefore, lead to dissatisfaction with a regime or its policies.

Among social factors one might examine are:

- .the degree of social stratification
- .the ease of social mobility
- .the extent of class differences and rivalries
- .the relative strength of social groups in the political sub-system
- .the relative stability of existing social institutions and their capacity to withstand changes in other sub-systems.

Analysis of political factors³⁰ might include:

- .the degree of access to participation in decision making by various groups
- .the manner in which groups relate to each other
- .governmental responsiveness to societal needs
- .the structure of government
- .the degree to which government is centralized
- .the degree of cohesion and the competence of the ruling elite³¹
- .the degree of political legitimacy
- .the degree of involvement of outside powers, (e.g., in colonial situations or wars).

Among cultural factors one might examine:

- .attitudes toward political participation
- .national political culture
- .traditions and historical experience relating to conflict, violence and change in the society
- .ethnic differences
- .the degree of alienation of the intellectual classes³²
- .the current climate of opinion in a society.³³

Chalmers Johnson, for example, posits a social system model of internal struggle, arguing that "Revolutions must be studied in the context of the social systems in which they occur."³⁴ Johnson focuses on the response

of the system to changes in the social sub-systems. He contends that social problems can never in themselves be the sufficient causes of revolution. However, social problems do create demands that the system be adjusted. When elites in power do not respond to these demands, they lose legitimacy, thereby "disequilibrating" the system. Accelerators, such as defeat in war, loss of morale among the military, etc., may help to bring on the violent stage of an internal conflict.

Some additional notes of caution are in order regarding the structural factors cited. First, these lists are not all-inclusive. Clearly, there are many other factors one may consider as possible antecedent conditions in a given case of internal conflict. Second, one should understand that among the factors listed above there are many levels of explanation. For example, when one considers "modernization" as a cause of revolution, one is generalizing at a rather high level about a complex process which may be related to the eruption of turmoil in particular cases. Similarly, a high degree of social stratification is also a broadly based factor. Such factors differ qualitatively from a factor such as "erosion of governmental legitimacy." They may also differ from other causes listed in terms of the relative scope of human activity over which they have impact. One should, therefore, attempt to specify quite carefully the units of analysis in any particular case study.

More importantly, many of the factors mentioned are highly abstract and deal primarily with structural features of the social system or its subsystems. Explanations such as these do not generally focus on the relationship between these structural factors and the behavior of participants in the process.

However, there is a danger that the search for causality may become a rather pointless and endless guessing game unless one ties it to the concrete behavior of participants in internal conflict. In addressing this problem some scholars have begun recently to search more systematically for linkages between societal conditions, human motivation and revolutionary behavior. This new emphasis on the actors in internal conflict and the reasons for their behavior has great potential for clarifying the relationship between various stimuli and the resulting actions, because it addresses the key question of human choice and decision.³⁵

Using this behavioral approach, one still searches for "structural" factors which seem to have had importance historically. But one views them as a set of potentially relevant conditions in the society which may, under some circumstances, lead groups to use violence to achieve change of the social order.

The essence of revolutionary activity is that human beings use violence to change the politics of the state. Thus, if one is interested in discovering why internal

conflicts develop, one should examine the "state of mind" of significant groups and the impact that changing domestic and international conditions have on the calculations such groups make regarding alternate courses of social action. Although we are not yet at the point where this has been done systematically, there is a sizable body of literature which analyzes domestic factors involved in the motivation to rebel. Beginning with Sorokin's and Edwards' classic formulations on repression,³⁶ continuing with Pettee's notion of "societal cramp,"³⁷ and on into the work of the Feierabends and Gurr³⁸ on the relation between aggression, frustration and violence, there is a general and widely accepted hypothesis: that when man's basic needs are frustrated, feelings of aggression result which may lead to political violence.

Among the most well-known of the theories which attempt to answer the question "why do men rebel" is Marxism. Simply stated, Marx can be said to have propounded a misery theory of revolution: men rebel when their economic conditions become intolerable. Marx saw revolution as an outgrowth of economic and social forces, e.g., class differences, stemming from the contradictions inherent in capitalist structures.³⁹

Like Karl Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville was deeply concerned with the role which economic factors might play in revolution. However, he reached a substantially different conclusion -- that revolution occurs when economic

improvement has begun rather than in the midst of worsening conditions. According to him, "Evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intolerable once the idea of escape from them is suggested."⁴⁰

Further refinements of the economic argument have been made recently by James C. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr. Davies combines the views of both Marx and de Tocqueville but modifies the sequence of events.⁴¹ In his widely-noted theory of the "J-curve," Davies argues that revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. Davies argues convincingly that revolutions rarely occur in societies in which there is overwhelming poverty, simply because the people are far too busy trying to stay alive. This critique of the "misery breeds violence" notion has come to be widely accepted in the social science literature.

By placing de Tocqueville before Marx, but not abandoning either, Davies' theory accounts for many instances of civil strife. The main strengths of his position are that: 1) it seems correct in its assumption that revolution is improbable when there is continued unimpeded opportunity to satisfy expectations within the current social order; and 2) it seems equally unlikely that revolutions will occur when there has been no hope or

no period in which expectations have risen.⁴²

Other theorists have offered different views of the importance of such factors in internal conflict. Hago-pian, for example, concludes that economic growth has had ambivalent effects as a cause of internal conflict, and that economic decline may, indeed, have similar effects.⁴³ Moreover, it is conceivable that the economic factors which have preoccupied theorists historically may not always be the most significant ones. For example, in anti-colonial conflicts nationalism may be a stronger force than economic deprivation, although they may be related. Similarly, other ideological or cultural factors may be more salient than the economic conditions in a given case, e.g., the role of religion in Iran in 1979.

In my view, internal conflicts seem to emerge most often from some mix of factors rather than from a single one. Thus, although I acknowledge the obvious importance of economics in the revolutionary equation, I believe that one ought to avoid unicausal explanations. Economic variables, along with other political, cultural, social, ideological conditions, ought to be considered as structural elements in which there may be deficiencies. These deficiencies, in turn, may motivate groups to seek change.

Ted Gurr's work builds theory in this area by looking to the actors in internal struggle rather than only at the social structure.⁴⁴ He develops a causal

model of the psychological and societal determinants of collective violence, arguing that: 1) political violence encompasses all attacks against the regime, its actors and/or its policies; and 2) the differences between forms of political violence are mainly ones of degree. Gurr poses three major questions, which he then develops a theory to answer:

- 1) what are the psychological and social sources of violence? (why do men rebel?)
- 2) what determines whether this rebellion becomes focused on the political system as opposed to other possible targets?
- 3) what societal conditions affect the form and magnitude of the violence which accompanies rebellion?

According to Gurr, men rebel when they see themselves in a state of "relative deprivation," i.e., when what they have and can attain falls short of what they believe they have a right to expect. "Discontent leads men to political violence when their attitudes and beliefs focus on political objects, and when institutional frameworks are weak enough to give the discontented a sense of potency."⁴⁵

Gurr concludes that men rebel for political reasons and that they direct their behavior at intrinsically political targets -- the incumbent political leadership, their policies, foreign governments, competing political groups, etc., rather than at economic or social targets. Gurr contends that violence is not inevitable, but that it is a human response to specific social conditions. Unlike

Johnson and the structuralists, however, Gurr develops propositions which attempt to specify the relationship between sources of deprivation within a society and the social action which results. For example, he argues that if mass deprivation is high and elite deprivation low, it results in turmoil such as riots and demonstrations. If, on the other hand, elites are also alienated it leads to revolution. If deprivation prevails only among the elite, conspiracy is more likely to occur than is full-scale internal war.⁴⁶ While recognizing the potency of such intervening societal variables as the coercive potential of the regime and the past level of civil strife, Gurr concludes that strife varies directly in magnitude with the intensity of relative deprivation.⁴⁷

As this brief discussion of causes of internal conflict indicates, there is a division of the field into two major schools -- those who seek to explain conflict on the basis of structural/institutional/systemic factors; and those who search for behavioral/psychological explanations.⁴⁸ Gurr and those mining the latter area have alerted us to the utility of approaches which examine the motivations of the participants in the revolutionary process. But, as the structuralists remind us, one should also examine the social context in which the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions of the participants are formed and in which their effects are felt. In my view, both types of analysis are essential to understanding internal

conflicts, although neither approach ought to be pursued in isolation. Moreover, it is my argument that one must find ways to incorporate international factors in any explanation of internal conflict.

C2. Stages of Internal Conflict

Before moving on to my critique of the internal conflict literature, one other body of literature needs to be consulted. Whereas the last section emphasized the structural and behavioral explanations of internal conflict, it did so only from the perspective of determining what causes conflicts to erupt. However, there is also a need to look more closely at how conflicts develop, i.e., the process of internal conflict.

The traditional view of the phases of internal conflict draws upon the French Revolution as a model. As described by Edwards and Brinton⁴⁹ it involves three stages:

- 1) the rule of the moderates -- an interregnum period in which moderates are in power, ruling between the conservatives and radicals;
- 2) the radical period -- in which the left takes power, employing more severe means in the service of more extreme ends;
- 3) the Thermidor -- in which revolutionary energies ebb and normalcy returns.

Unfortunately, although this scheme might suffice to explain parts of the French Revolution, it would be unwise to generalize from this to other cases, even if one were

to restrict oneself to other examples of the so-called "great" revolutions.

A more recent attempt to deal with process aspects of internal conflict is Rex D. Hopper's model.⁵⁰ In his view there are four stages:

- 1) the preliminary stage of mass excitement, characterized by general restlessness, increased governmental inefficiency, developing class antagonisms, and the break-up of society into an alienated mass;
- 2) the popular stage of crowd excitement, in which unrest is popularized, and which leads to the transfer of allegiance of the intellectual classes, the making of a new social myth, the emergence of organizations of the disenchanted, and the presentation of revolutionary demands;
- 3) the formal stage in which specific issues are formulated, policies formed and leadership developed;
- 4) the institutional stage, in which new policies become law and institutions are set up to implement them.

Hopper traces the course of domestic strife from mass alienation to the emergence of a crowd which then becomes a "public," and finally evolves into a society which restructures the values upon which social action is based.

Two very recent attempts to generalize about the phases of the revolutionary process are those of Schwartz and Smelser. Schwartz⁵¹ proposes to explain political revolution in terms of a "multi-stage process model." He posits ten steps, ranging from political alienation to Thermidor, based on categories borrowed from existing literature. He assumes that internal conflicts start

with a general restlessness in the minds of men, which leads to a change in cognitive patterns and a withdrawal from traditional politics. Next, groups form on the basis of perceived needs, and these groups then appeal to the alienated in society. Stage Four involves coalition building, culminating in the formation of new parties. Stage Five sees this new party structure engage in non-violent revolutionary politics. It is only at the sixth stage that one sees the outbreak of violence, and what Schwartz calls "the transition to internal war". Stages Seven through Ten parallel the Edwards/Brinton model outlined above.

Smelser's work, on the other hand, does not assume a series of stages for conflicts, but focuses on the behavior of the insurgent movement in the period preceeding the takeover of power.⁵² Smelser argues that all collective movements are attempts to modify either norms or values, and that they arise because of "structural strain" in the system. Norm-oriented movements are more limited in scope; they are organized to change a law or agency of government to protect, restore or modify existing norms (social, economic, etc.). In contrast, value-oriented movements aim at the "basic reconstitution of self and society," including a redefinition of societal norms.

Smelser contends that a norm-oriented movement may be subsumed eventually within a value-oriented movement

(VOM) or lead to a VOM as structural strain is magnified in the system. Like Gurr and Davies, Smelser is concerned about belief systems of key sectors of the populace, and examines the conditions under which value-oriented beliefs develop. He concludes that whether a VOM becomes a passive cult or an active insurgency depends largely on the conditions of "conduciveness," and on the way in which the parent society reacts to the movement. In particular, Smelser is concerned with the government's response to the movement.

Each of the process approaches cited helps to draw our attention to the sequential aspects of insurgency and sensitize us to see internal conflicts as developmental processes rather than as events. Yet, they all share certain limitations. First, it is quite difficult to construct a process model which applies with equal validity to different types of internal conflict; a great revolution or full scale civil war is likely to differ from an anti-colonial conflict, for example. It is also likely that a model which is appropriate in one time period of history may become less applicable as time passes and the world changes. Third, one should recognize that cross-cultural differences may lead to differences in the process of internal conflict.⁵³ Finally, as is the case with the structuralist and behavioral writers on causality, those most concerned with "process" tend to ignore the potential role which international factors may play.

III. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

As my survey of the literature on causes and process reveals, there are essentially three types of questions studied in the general literature on internal conflict:⁵⁴

1) Why do people use political violence?

Literature on this question tends to be behaviorally oriented, stressing the attitudes and actions of insurgents; focusing on discovering reasons why people resort to violence, under what conditions, and with what success. Examples are: Gurr, Feierabend, Eckstein.

2) Why do societies change as they do?

Literature on this tends to be structural/functional in orientation; focusing on the equilibrium of social systems, the reasons why they become disequilibrated, and the manner in which it occurs. Examples are Moore, Johnson, Eckstein, Huntington, and the historical school which sees revolution as the outcome of broad social forces and long-term historical trends, e.g., Edwards and Brinton.

3) How and why should men rebel?

This category includes polemics for social change, the normative aspects of Marxist writings, the prescriptive writings of guerrilla warriors such as Mao and their counter-revolutionary counterparts, and tracts written by other radicals (e.g., Guevara, Debray, Fanon).

This chapter has focused on works in the first two categories. One of the main challenges of this field, however, is to construct and conduct research which bridges the gap between the structuralist interpretations and behavioral explanations of conflict. Certainly, one may easily agree with the behaviorists' view that revolutionary behavior is motivated behavior.⁵⁵

But it is also clear that economic, social, political and cultural circumstances may alter motivations and condition the effects of the behavior which flows from them. Unfortunately, most authors writing on internal conflict have not attempted to synthesize the major approaches. On the one hand, recent literature focuses on the rebels' state of mind and plays down the role which environmental factors may play. On the other hand, much of the earlier work on revolution over-emphasized the structural aspects, as if systemic conduciveness leads inevitably to internal conflict without human choice.⁵⁶

Although there have been several recent works which have helped to develop theories of internal conflict, there are important areas requiring further research, including:

- 1) A need to delineate clearly the questions which one is seeking to answer. If one asks, "Why do men rebel?" one may find different answers than if the question is, "Why do societies change?" or "Why do people use violence?" Similarly, "how" and "when" questions will generate different types of answers. Researchers should also attempt to specify units of analysis: e.g., are they looking for causes, stages, outcomes or other things entirely?
- 2) The passage of time in studying internal conflict. Internal upheavals are often compared across cen-

turies as if the world had not changed since Thucydides. Even in the modern period, moreover, one should question the appropriateness and utility of comparing internal strife in the seventeenth century and the twentieth.⁵⁷ Even within this century, one ought to acknowledge the likelihood that the world has changed since the Russian Revolution. In my view, there is little to be gained by comparing very complex social phenomena across historical epochs and between vastly different social systems, except to discover how different they are over time and place.⁵⁸ Moreover, as I shall attempt to demonstrate in Chapter Two, there are features of twentieth century international relations which should lead us to emphasize the analysis of international factors in internal conflicts.

- 3) A need to devote equal attention to the actions of the insurgents and incumbents in internal struggle.⁵⁹ The behavior of the incumbents can be a key element in the causal chain; indeed, it may directly foster the growth of an insurgent movement. As an insurgency develops, the response of incumbents is an important variable, since it has been shown that elite intransigence and/or repression may affect the outcome of a conflict.⁶⁰
- 4) A need to focus on outcomes as well as causes. It

is surely as important to know what happens as a result of internal struggle⁶¹ as it is to describe the process which occurs or to specify what causes its occurrence. Harry Eckstein, for example, laments that, "Almost nothing careful and systematic has been written about the long-run social effects of internal wars."⁶² Thus, scholars should be attempting to develop more reliable generalizations about why insurgencies succeed or fail, in both the seizure of power and in the implementation of change. More attention should also be paid to the ways in which power is consolidated and new values infused into the social structure.⁶³

- 5) The different environments in which social change, conflict and collective violence occur. There is a need to explore patterns of insurgent behavior according to the structure of the societies in which they occur and the international environment in which those societies must function.⁶⁴
- 6) Finally, and most significantly from the perspective of this dissertation, the literature does not deal adequately with the role that exogenous factors play in internal conflicts. Most writers have simply assumed that the process of change is directed and motivated internally, with respect to cause, process, and outcome. Few authors have even considered

the impact of either the international system or specific outside actors on the course of internal conflict.

In my view, neither the "structuralist" writers (who stress social structure, economic conditions, etc.) nor the "behavioralists" (who stress human motivation) incorporate external factors to any meaningful degree within their frameworks. For example, among structuralist authors, Chalmers Johnson does note that exogenous sources of change may play a role in internal conflict. He sees two aspects of externally initiated change:⁶⁵

- 1) exogenous value-changing sources which may cause changes in the structure of values or the pattern of the division of labor. He cites as examples the rise or external reference groups, the effect of global communication, war, etc.; and
- 2) exogenous environment-changing sources of influence, e.g., foreign conquest, colonialism, etc. According to Johnson, such factors may, by their effect on societal values or the society's pattern of adaptation to its environment, tend to stabilize or dis-equilibrate a social system.

Johnson, however, stops short at this point in his analysis, evidently satisfied to have specified the locus of change.⁶⁶ But there are other points of external impact which one can find using even Johnson's own framework. For example, it is possible that foreign events may function as accelerators, causing a loss of authority for the incumbent regime. Or foreign initiatives may influence the course of action chosen by insurgents or incumbents, or even affect the outcome of the competition for

power. Unfortunately, although Johnson does acknowledge that there is an external environment, he does not carry his analysis of exogenous forces far enough.

Among theorists of the behavioralist school, the search for explanation centers on why people use violence to achieve change.⁶⁷ According to the Feierabends, this emphasis on factors predisposing humans to violence does not require one to ignore the structural factors that Johnson, Huntington and others see as important, including international relations. Gurr, for example, admits that exogenous actors may play an important supporting role for both sides in an internal conflict.⁶⁸ He also notes that intervention can be an important factor. Gurr, however, excludes foreign intervention, interference, or even influence as variables in his model, simply because they reflect decisions made outside the state undergoing conflict. Moreover, Gurr does not consider the many points of impact which external actors may have (and have had) on either the level of violence or the scope of conflict. Thus, even in the area in which this school of writers is most concerned -- behavior by insurgents leading to violence -- they do not deal seriously with what I consider to be international factors.

Of course, internal war theorists have not been the only ones concerned with internal conflict as a phenomenon. International relations scholars have demonstrated some interest in both internal war, its regulation and

the possibilities of international influences. However, for the most part, this concern for international factors appears to be more of an assumption among international relations writers rather than a matter for serious empirical investigation.

Leiden and Schmitt, for example, argue that,

There is no doubt that the external environment can influence the life of a revolution or a coup.... The proper study of revolution must include this environment as an integral part of the revolution itself. Theories of revolution are ... incomplete that do not give attention to the many facets of this external environment.⁶⁹

Leiden and Schmitt cite inspiration by external propaganda and external events, covert and overt support, and postwar recognition and support as the key factors. Yet, in their case studies in the same volume the attention paid to these factors is minimal.

Similarly, John Burton asserts that,

It is rare to have conflict within a state which does not affect systems that cross state boundaries. It is probably misleading even to regard internal conflict and interstate conflict as separate conditions, or for any ... case of internal conflict or international conflict to be treated as though it did not involve both.⁷⁰

Unfortunately, there is a tendency among even such sophisticated scholars to assume that internal conflicts are inevitably immersed in international relations, but no concomitant effort on their part to explore how, or to examine the relationship between international and internal factors. Indeed, if anything, international relations specialists tend to over-emphasize the role of external

factors. And when they do analyze internal factors, e.g., as Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss do,⁷¹ they do not do so in a way which enhances our understanding of the connections between external and internal forces or of their relative potency.

One of the few authors who does attempt such analysis is Mostafa Rejai.⁷² He claims that the strategies of insurgents are defined by five variables: 1) leadership, 2) ideology, 3) organization, 4) use of violence and 5) manipulation of the international situation. With regard to item five, Rejai claims that leaders must gauge the potential impact of world opinion and outside support and must be able to use the international environment to their benefit. According to Rejai, the actors' success in manipulating the international environment will lead either to support for insurgents or incumbents, e.g., as in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Bangladesh, or to a drive for reconciliation. Rejai concludes in his analysis of three major cases (Bolivia, Vietnam and France in 1968) that, "All three political revolutions were directly affected by international forces."⁷³

Although Rejai's work is a pioneering effort which builds on a solid understanding of both internal conflict and international relations, it does suffer from some serious limitations. First, because it is concerned with exploring insurgent strategy, it tends to de-emphasize incumbent strategy. Yet, it is clear that incumbents,

too, have links to the external environment, often more extensive ones than insurgents. Second, Rejai does not examine the relationship or interaction between incumbent and insurgent groups. Third, Rejai focuses more on the internationalization process from the internal decision makers' viewpoint rather than on the potential impact of external forces. Fourth, Rejai treats the international environment in a rather undifferentiated fashion, not separating out systemic factors from those more related to the foreign policies of specific external parties.

An interesting recent attempt to bridge the gap between national and international theories is Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions.⁷⁴ Skocpol argues that revolution should be studied from a structural perspective, "with special attention devoted to international contexts and to developments at home and abroad that affect the breakdown of the state organizations of old regimes and the buildup of new, revolutionary state organizations."⁷⁵ She rejects the approaches of Gurr and Johnson in favor of a Marxist emphasis on social structural change and class conflict. She argues that revolutions occur not because people rebel, but because of structural reasons, e.g., politico-military crises of state and class domination. Skocpol agrees with the view that "Revolutions are not made; they come."

The most interesting aspects of Skocpol's work are her recognition that existing theories have focused pri-

marily upon intra-national conflicts and her argument that, "Social revolutions cannot be explained without systematic reference to international structures and world historical developments."⁷⁶ In her view, such explanations must include consideration of transnational relations resulting from "the internationally uneven spread of capitalist economic development and nation-state formation on a world scale."⁷⁷

Modernization for Skocpol, however, is not internally directed, but grows from international activity. The spread of capitalism across the globe has affected economic structures and class relations worldwide. According to Skocpol, unequal and/or competitive transnational relations "have helped to shape the state and class structures, thus influencing the existing 'domestic' context from which revolution emerges (or not)."⁷⁸ Furthermore, transnational relations have affected events during revolutionary upheaval. Skocpol cites defeat in war or the threat of invasion as contributing to outbreaks of revolutionary crisis by their undermining of existing political authorities. In addition, the international military balance of power has often provided the opportunity for completion of some social revolutions by dividing the efforts or diverting the attention of external enemies who might have interfered.

Finally, Skocpol contends, international politics and world economic constraints have conditioned the out-

comes of social revolutions. However, she rejects the notion that the effects of transnational relations are on "the people," arguing instead that the key actors through which transnational influences are infused into domestic politics are the state's rulers. "The intersection of the old (governmental) regime and, later, of the emergent revolutionary regime with international arenas ... should be a most promising place to look in order to comprehend how epochal modernizing dynamics in part cause and shape revolutionary transformations."⁷⁹

Skocpol focuses on the state as an organization controlling territory and people, examining old regime contradictions in light of state relationships to military competitors abroad and to dominant classes and existing socio-economic structures at home. To explain "the breakdown and build-up of state organizations in revolution, we must look not only at the activities of social groups. We must also focus upon the points of intersection between international conditions and pressures ... and class structured economies and politically organized interests."⁸⁰

Skocpol's three case studies are France, Russia and China. Among the international factors she examines is involvement in war as a contributing factor in the decline of the old regime. Skocpol argues that each nation was intensively involved in international competition during and after the revolution, and each became a more important

power as a result of the social transformations each underwent. Skocpol concludes that, "wars and imperial intrusions were the midwives of the revolutionary crises and the emerging revolutionary regimes consolidated state power not only amidst domestic conflicts, but also in militarily threatening international circumstances."⁸¹

She suggests, finally, that analysts of other internal conflicts should consider:

- 1) the legacy of colonialism as it affects each socio-political structure;
- 2) the indirect repercussions of economic and political power shifts within global political and economic systems;
- 3) direct economic and military aid from abroad.

Unfortunately, Skocpol's choice of cases does not allow her to explore in any depth the variables one might find operative in other modern cases. Hence, although the analysis is by far the most serious attempt in the conflict literature to come to grips with the interplay of domestic and international factors, the Skocpol volume is disappointing to one who searches for a systematic treatment of the international politics of internal conflict. In the second chapter I shall attempt to build upon what I view as the better elements of Skocpol's ground-breaking study.

One other study is helpful and should be mentioned. James N. Rosenau's paper, "International Aspects of Internal War: A Working Paper,"⁸³ is a theoretically

oriented think-piece which examines types of actors and activities related to external involvement in internal conflict. Rosenau posits four types of actors:

- 1) the international system itself;
- 2) national subsystems;
- 3) the war-torn society treated as a system; and
- 4) its warring factions treated as a subsystem.

If the four actors are seen as initiators and recipients of action and/or perception which crosses the society's boundary, then there are sixteen linkages, according to Rosenau:

- 1) factionally induced national changes, leading to changes in perception within other societies;
- 2) war-stimulated national changes, leading to changes in perceptions in other societies;
- 3) factionally induced systemic changes, leading to changes in structure, function or stability;
- 4) war-stimulated systemic changes, i.e., those leading to change in the international system itself;
- 5) effects of procurement efforts on factions themselves;
- 6) effects of international perceptions of the conflict on the factions;
- 7) effects of procurement efforts on the internal war per se, i.e., how the foreign policies pursued by the factions affect the course and nature of the hostilities;
- 8) effects of external intervention on the nation;
- 9) effects of international organization involvement on the nation;
- 10) effects of factional outputs on the international system and external actors;

- 11) effects on international organizations and international law of their own inputs into the internal war;
- 12) effects of external actors on factions;
- 13) effects of systemic actions on factions;
- 14) effects of external actors on conflict;
- 15) effects of international organizations and international relations on the conflict;
- 16) effects of war outputs on the conflict.

Half of the sixteen "effects" posited by Rosenau, however, are on the external environment. The "international" effects on the internal environment are felt mainly by three targets (the conflict, the nation, and the factions) and are produced by two external actors (the international system defined as international organizations, and the nations external to the war-torn society) and one internal actor (the factions themselves, as their external outputs feed back on the internal struggle).

The Rosenau framework is helpful in that it specifies some of the potential linkage points between international relations and internal conflict. It is also valuable because it treats both external and internal factors potentially as independent variables. Despite its considerable merits, however, the approach is not complete. For example, it fails to deal systematically with the internal factors shaping internal conflict. Furthermore, the scheme suffers from some lack of clarity about the variables themselves, e.g., what Rosenau calls "sys-

temic" variables are really discrete acts of external actors rather than effects based on the structure of the international system. With reference to the volume in which his paper appears, Rosenau himself concludes that, "A gap which this symposium fails to fill is the impact of international variables on the conduct of internal wars."⁸⁴

One other branch of recent international relations literature -- that on "linkage politics" -- has dealt with internal conflict, although it too has done so in a way that has not been especially useful for the concerns of this dissertation. This literature has, in some measure, addressed the question of the relationship between international politics and internal conflict. However, it has done so primarily by examining the relationship between the domestic and foreign conflict behavior of states. Studies by Wilkenfeld, Rummel and Tanter have, for example, focused on cross-national studies of the incidence of conflict. Wilkenfeld and Zinnes have explored the extent to which external events can predict domestic conflict behavior.⁸⁵ Although interesting, these questions are not directly related to my concerns here.

One additional body of literature worthy of mention is "dependency theory." This school of thought has developed essentially out of Latin American scholarship on the relationship between the U.S., as a paramount capitalist

power in the Western Hemisphere, and the various national economies of the Latin American states. In its most refined illustration, represented by the work of Cardoso and Faletto, it represents a point of view about the connections between internal and external factors in development.⁸⁶ Cardoso and Faletto assert that to explain the historical process from the theoretical perspective of dependency, one "must make explicit how international conflicts between states are linked with internal political struggles, as well as with the basic ways whereby, both domestically and internationally, the social organization of economic production takes place."⁸⁷

Cardoso and Faletto, along with other dependency theorists, contend that the linkages of external capitalist actors, particularly MNC'S, with internal social and political groups, structure both the internal process of development and the foreign policy of the client state. According to Aabyar, "the central premise of dependency theory is that Latin American political and economic underdevelopment is directly related to the international system and the hemisphere's "assigned" position within it."⁸⁸

Unlike theorists of imperialism, Cardoso and Faletto argue that "the relationship between external and internal forces ... forms ... a complex whole whose structural links are not based on mere external forms of

exploitation and coercion, but are rooted in coincidence of interests between local dominant classes and international ones."⁸⁹ Thus the system of domination reappears as an internal force through the priorities of local groups. The goal of applied dependency theory is to "explain how internal and external processes of political domination relate one to the other."⁹⁰ The method is to study the relationships among domestic social groups which, the dependency theorists argue, "depend upon linkages between the economic systems and international political blocs."⁹¹

From the standpoint of the present study, dependency theory is useful insofar as it helps to suggest specific areas of potential external/internal linkage which should be examined in studying development and social change in underdeveloped areas. In this sense, it is in basic agreement with the approach presented by Skocpol and is consistent with the concerns of the linkage politics school of thought.

Despite its usefulness in guiding the researcher to nodes of linkage, particularly in the Latin American region, dependency theory suffers from some serious limitations from the present study's viewpoint. First, it is directed primarily at analysis of the development process and deals only peripherally with the phenomenon of structural internal conflict as I have defined it in this chap-

ter. Although broadly concerned with the process of social change in developing areas, dependency theory offers only a one dimensional explanation of the relationship between the domestic and international political/economic process, based upon analysis of the links between the production system and the international market. In my view, its core assumption is that the connections of dependency are primarily economic ones. Second, the view which the theory presents seems to flow from some negative assumptions about the effects of U.S. domination in the Western Hemisphere. Although these assumptions may ring true to many of us, the theory which develops from them may not be complete, i.e., dependency theory may not explain everything, even in the limited Latin American context in which it is most often applied.

Most importantly, dependency theory does not help to explain fully the impact of external factors on internal conflict, at least partly because it appears not to take into account the non-linkage reasons why external actors become involved in internal conflicts (e.g., strategic political considerations) nor the effect of other than regional forces (e.g., international systemic factors). Even when dependency theorists do try to explore the effects of dependency in internal conflict, such as in Aybar's work on intervention and dependency in Guatemala in 1954, there is an assumption that the only important

linkage is that between the government of the metropole (the U.S.), its MNC's and the government and ruling class of the client state. Such accounts do not take into consideration other variables in the decision making process of the external actor.

Hence, it is my conclusion that, although the emphasis of dependency theorists on internal/external linkages is a good one, the "theory" which results does not help to explain internal conflict.

IV. SUMMARY

The study of internal conflict has come a respectable distance since Crane Brinton's pioneering comparative analysis of four of history's major revolutions -- the English, American, French and Russian.⁹² The works of Davies, Gurr, Calvert, Johnson, Skocpol, Rejai and others cited in this chapter have moved us several important steps down the road toward middle level theories of internal struggle. As a result, we have become much more aware of the range of internal factors which may be relevant, and more concerned with their comparative and systematic study. The appearance of a number of general volumes which summarize findings in this field may be seen as one indication of the degree to which the study of internal conflict has come of age.⁹³

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Despite this progress, however, the "international politics" of internal conflict is an area which has been neglected. Scholars have generally treated internal conflict as a self-contained event, fought over principles and practices of political power and authority within a territorially defined state. The prevailing view assumes that the causes, processes and outcomes of such struggles are inherently internal. With the exception of Skocpol, Rejai and Rosenau, one rarely finds serious concern among students of internal conflict about the potential impact which external forces may have on internal conflicts. Actors and events outside the society being examined are generally assumed to be of marginal importance in the process by which insurgents challenge incumbents for political power.

There are several reasonable explanations for this pattern. Internal factors (economic, social, political and cultural) are the more obvious ones. The traditional view of revolution posits internal upheavals as "internal" by definition. It is easy to concede that one who attempts to explain a conflict without reference to these internal factors would be likely to fail. In addition, it has proven difficult enough to analyze even these internal factors in a serious way without complicating matters by searching for other possible sources of influence on internal strife. As a result, the international environ-

ment has, more or less consciously, been held as a constant in most analyses of revolution/internal war, rather than being viewed as a variable.⁹⁴ Thus, the focus on internal factors may have stemmed from an analytical strategy which attempted to simplify reality in order to help us understand it.⁹⁵

The prevailing view may also be a reflection of the tendency in political science itself to compartmentalize knowledge into subfields (comparative politics and international politics) which structure political data differently. As a result of these factors in combination, the linkages between domestic and international politics have only recently become a subject of serious study.⁹⁶ There has been, to date, very little attention paid to the way these factors relate to the three key facets of internal struggle -- conflict, violence and change.

Whatever reasons one finds most convincing to explain the limited amount of scholarly writing on the international politics of internal struggle, it is clear to the student of internal conflict that the gap indeed exists. However, it should be equally clear, even to those most interested in the dynamics of domestic politics, that societies do not exist in an international vacuum. States and the subnational groups within them, participate in relationships which cross territorial boundaries, and they thereby become involved in international

relations. Participation in the international system opens domestic processes, and the actors in them, to influences by processes and actors outside the state. Even on this elementary level, the potential importance of international phenomena for internal political processes is apparent. Yet, the literature on internal conflict does not reflect this view. The international politics literature which has bearing on this topic has dealt primarily with the effects of internal conflict on the international system, and only secondarily with the reverse relationship. Even the more sophisticated analyses of external influences on internal conflict (such as the case study literature on Vietnam, Algeria, Nigeria, wars of liberation, etc.)⁹⁷ have been rather unsystematic in their comparisons of endogenous and exogenous factors, and not concerned with the wider implications of individual cases for the development of the field of conflict analysis.

In my view, no scheme has been developed to date whereby one might compare the relative explanatory potency of internal and external variables in internal conflicts and examine the relationships between them. The limited amount of writing which does deal with this relationship in some fashion has been limited in that it:

- 1) has tended to treat the dynamics of internationalization and the regulation of internal conflict as the issues to be examined;

- 2) has focused more on intervention, rather than on assessment of other more subtle forms of involvement or influence;
- 3) has paid only limited attention to the difficult subject of international systemic influences on internal conflict.

It will be my task in the next chapter to develop a framework which builds toward an integration of the domestic and international aspects of internal conflict, based on analysis of the international politics and foreign policy analysis literature and on an inductive approach toward model building. It is my thesis that the study of exogenous factors offers the student of internal conflict a useful supplement to prevailing approaches.

FOOTNOTES

¹Eugene Kamenka argues that "The twentieth century ... seems the century of revolution and instability par excellence," "The Concept of a Political Revolution," in Revolution: Nomos VII, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton, 1967), p. 123. Pitirim Sorokin, writing earlier in this century, claims that the twentieth century is the "bloodiest and most turbulent period in history," from The Sociology of Revolution as quoted in Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 56.

²Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates, as quoted in Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 1.

³James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1971), p. 139.

⁴See, for example, Wilbert Moore, Social Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); and Ronald Ye Lin Cheng, ed., The Sociology of Revolution (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1973), p. 21.

⁵Although most authors claim to have the same concerns, they often approach different aspects of those concerns. One will be concerned with why individuals rebel, others with the elusive "revolutionary personality," some with the preconditions or causes of civil strife, and still others with the mechanics of the revolutionary process. Since there is not, and probably cannot be, unanimity in the concerns of many authors, it is hardly surprising that the literature is rather uneven.

⁶There is, of course, some debate in the literature on social change on the degree of change required before one can say there has been a "revolution." For example, is an attempt at social change a revolution if it fails to replace the incumbent regime with a new one? Or is it merely a revolt or rebellion until it succeeds?

⁷Bruce Mazlish argues in his introduction to Revolution: A Reader, with Arthur D. Kaladin and David B. Ralston (New York: MacMillan, 1971), p. 4, that "Definition can be a mere casuistic exercise if carried out in the wrong spirit. Seen as a way ... of trying to come to grips with complex phenomena, it becomes a means by which significant questions may be posed." Furthermore, as Lawrence Stone argues, one must begin by deciding what is and what is not revolution, "Theories of Revolution," World Politics 18:2 (January, 1966): 159-176.

⁸In the chapters that follow I shall clarify my usage of other basic concepts relevant to this dissertation, e.g., interference, intervention, influence and penetration.

⁹Peter Amann claims that revolution is a "breakdown of the state's monopoly of power and its replacement by a new group," in "Revolution: A Redefinition," Political Science Quarterly 77:1 (1962): 36-53. Hannah Arendt defines it instead as the quest for political freedom, Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1963). Crane Brinton sees it as a drastic, sudden shift of a group in charge of the running of a territorial entity, Anatomy of a Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1960). Peter Calvert simplifies matters by defining revolution as an event in which force or its threat is used to overthrow a government, Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 1. A more traditional view is offered by Lyford P. Edwards, who sees revolution as "the supplanting of one system of legality by another," The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970), p. 1. Carl J. Friedrich views it as the sudden, violent overthrow of an established political order in "An Introductory Note on Revolution," in his Revolution. Thomas H. Greene is more specific. He asserts that revolution is "an alteration in personnel, structure, supporting myth and function of government by methods unsanctioned by prevailing norms," p. 5. Ted Robert Gurr, on the other hand, sees any organized, planned civil violence as revolution, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," in Cheng, p. 280. Mark N. Hagopian argues that it is "an acute, prolonged crisis in the class, status or power stratifications of a polity which is a purposive elite-directed attempt to change one of them by recourse to violence and intense political activity," The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974), p. 1. Chalmers Johnson focuses on the social structure in his definition, arguing that revolution is "a form of social change undertaken in response to dysfunction within a social system," Revolution and the Social System (Palo Alto, Cal.: Hoover Institute on War and Revolution, 1964), p. 6.

Three other definitions of interest follow: 1) Samuel P. Huntington contends that revolution is "rapid, fundamental and violent change in the dominant values and myths of a society, its political institutions, social structure, leadership, governmental activity and politics," in "Modernization by Revolution," Revolution and Political Change, eds. Claude E. Welch and M.B. Tainter (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972), p. 21; 2) Eugene Kamenka sees it instead as "a sharp sudden change in the social location of political power, radically changing the process of government, the

foundations of sovereignty and the legitimacy of social order," in "The Concept of a Political Revolution," Struggles in the State, eds. George A. Kelly and Clifford A. Brown (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), p. 110; and 3) Nicholas Timasheff's definition of revolution as a violent conflict within the state over who will make political decisions, War and Revolution (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), p. 159.

Other definitions may be found in Rex D. Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," in Why Revolution? Theories and Analysis eds. Clifford T. Paynton and Robert Blackey (London: Schenkman, 1971), p.173; Sigmund Neumann, "The International Civil War," World Politics 1:3 (April 1949): 333-334; George Sawyer Pettee, The Process of Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 139; D.E.H. Russell, Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 25; and Raymond Tainter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," in Welch and Tainter, pp. 154-175.

¹⁰Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal War," in Kelly and Brown, pp. 197-175.

¹¹Linda B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 3.

¹²James N. Rosenau, International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1964).

¹³Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," in Paynton and Blackey, p. 265.

¹⁴Rosenau, Introduction and Chapter Three.

¹⁵In my view, one ought to attempt to measure the degree and type of change which are attempted and which actually occur. Of course, this does not preclude one from talking about "revolution" or "revolutionaries," since one can, in the pre-power stage of an insurgency, judge the goals of the challengers. However, it might make a bit more sense to replace the term "revolutionary" with the term "insurgent," or to use it strictly as an adjective as in "revolutionary insurgent." Unfortunately, this goes against contemporary usage and might only contribute to the confusion which already exists.

¹⁶See Neil J. Smelser's pioneering work on the value-oriented movement and its motivations in Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1971).

¹⁷For alternative typologies see: 1) Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown,

1966), which outlines a sixfold typology based on four criteria -- the targets of revolutionary activity (government, regime and community), the identity of revolutionary groups (mass or elite), revolutionary goals, and the degree of spontaneity in the uprising; and 2) Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, who offer a typology based on four factors -- degree of mass participation, duration, level of violence, and intentions of insurgents, leading to four types of revolution: mass revolution, revolutionary coup, reform coup and palace revolution. See also a classic formulation in Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ed., Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics (New York: McKay, 1973), pp. 59-106; and Huntington's four part scheme: internal war, revolutionary coup, reform coup and palace revolt, pp. 23-24.

¹⁸Sorokin argues, for example, that nationalist and social revolutions have different goals. Smelser's process approach helps to illustrate that many nationalist struggles begin differently than other types of internal conflict because of the external elements involved, p. 48. D.E.H. Russell contends that nationalist revolt is a special case of revolution. Katherine Chorley traces the effects of outside domination on rebel group homogeneity, Armies of the Night (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).

¹⁹Eckstein, in Welch, p. 63.

²⁰Those authors who insist on generalizing across cultural and geographical boundaries without paying sufficient attention to the different conditions which shape how and why people rebel (and with what effects) have not helped the situation.

²¹See especially the Feierabend's, Rummel, Gurr, and Douglas A. Hobbs, Jr. Mass Political Violence: A Cross National Causal Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973).

²²Greene, p. 153.

²³Ibid., p. 154.

²⁴Gurr's work is an exception to this rule. It is highly theoretical and offers a causal explanation for civil violence: men rebel because they experience relative deprivation.

²⁵Hagopian, p.123.

²⁶The diversity of factors which may be operative in a given struggle does not necessarily lead me to agree with the extreme position held by many historians, i.e., that revolutions are unique. Pettee, for one, argues that internal struggles are so idiosyncratic that generalization is either impossible or far too costly in terms of time and energy expended. Such views, however, may discourage exploration of connections between related phenomena and as such they should be discounted substantially.

²⁷Johnson, pp. 92ff.

²⁸Ibid., p. 99.

²⁹See especially: Marx's works; Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (New York: Anchor Books, 1955); Edwards; Mancour Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History 23 (December 1963): 529-552; and Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), for a discussion of the ways in which modernization, the population growth which accompanies it, and the commercialization of agriculture have weakened old social bonds and allegiances. Cf. Johnson's notion of the "disequilibrated social system," in Revolution and the Social System, and also de Tocqueville's notion that revolutions have social as well as economic origins.

³⁰Cf. Sorokin's ideas on repression and Huntington's argument about the importance of a time lag between changes in the social structure and the institutionalization of political development to accommodate such change.

³¹Writers as diverse as Plato, in The Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 546; Edwards, p. 83; Brinton, p. 60; Louis Gottschalk, "Causes of Revolution," American Journal of Sociology (July 1944), p. 7; and Leon Trotsky, The Russian Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 311, have all emphasized alienation of the intellectuals as a key factor leading up to the outbreak of internal hostilities.

³²This commonly cited factor is called "the transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals" by Edwards and "the desertion of the intellectuals" by Brinton.

³³Cf. Harry Eckstein's list which includes: 1) intellectual factors (alienation, conflicting myths); 2) economic factors (poverty, prosperity, short-term decline, etc.); 3) social structure (lack of access to the political process, social mobility, etc.); and 4) politi-

cal factors ("bad" government, divisions among ruling groups, etc.) in Internal Wars, Problems and Approaches (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 16.

³⁴Johnson, Revolutionary Change, p. xii.

³⁵Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff argue that even in a society with high frustration and alienation, and non-symmetrical rates of change in its social subsystems, internal conflict will not become violent "until deliberate decisions to make political violence have occurred," p. 248

³⁶Sorokin, p. 367, and Edwards, pp. 3-4.

³⁷Pettee, p. 33.

³⁸See the Feierabends and Gurr, and Gurr.

³⁹Cf. Lenin's concern with the strategies for seizing power and Mao' Tse-tung's emphasis on the awakening of the masses.

⁴⁰de Tocqueville, pp. 176-177.

⁴¹James C. Davies, "Toward A Theory of Revolution," in Cheng, and also his When Men Revolt and Why (New York: Free Press, 1971).

⁴²Davies, in Cheng, p. 91. Despite the usefulness of Davies' formulation, there are several weaknesses. First, it may be argued that Davies fails to specify whether his theory applies to long-range factors or to short-term economic crises. Without focusing more clearly on the length of cycles of rising expectation and decreasing realization, Davies theory has limited predictive value. In addition, his conception requires the assessment of the "mood" of the people. Yet, "mood" is itself a vague notion which does not necessarily specify the intensity of dissatisfaction nor the resources which disaffected groups may bring to bear in opposition to an incumbent regime. It is often these factors which are most salient.

⁴³A number of authors have looked at a state's level of socio-economic development as a key predictor variable affecting the incidence of political violence. Schwartz, for one, argues that, "it is clear that a theory of revolutionary behavior ought to be related to development," because of the demonstrated frequency of internal conflict in developing areas, in Davies, p. 130. An obvious connection may be made here as well to the colonial status of much of the developing world throughout

this century. Schwartz argues that development itself has changed the needs, values and perceptions which inhibit revolution, as well as having altered the psychological predispositions of key groups in these areas. Similarly, the Feierabends argue that transitional nations are characteristically deprived in economic terms and tend to be unstable, "Systemic Conditions of Political Aggression," in Feierabends and Gurr, p. 154. Cf. Hagopian, p. 177.

⁴⁴Ted Robert Gurr and Charles Ruttenberg, in Cross National Summary of Civil Violence (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1969), pp. 12-20, develop a model which relates ten independent variables to the likelihood and magnitude of civil violence. They distinguish between instigating variables (which determine the intensity of anger) and mediating variables (which determine the likelihood and magnitude of overt violence).

⁴⁵Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 155.

⁴⁶Gurr concludes that there are only two forms of civil violence: turmoil and revolution. They are differentiated primarily by the degree of planning and organization which characterize them. "Revolution" in this usage includes: 1) internal wars, both civil and guerrilla; and 2) conspiracies, including coups, plots and purges. See Gurr, "Psychological Factors," in Cheng, pp. 280-307.

⁴⁷Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," in the Feierabends and Gurr, pp. 184-222. Gurr studied the pervasiveness, duration and intensity of turmoil, conspiracy and internal war in 114 polities from 1961-1965, and compared the measures of deprivation for each (including economic discrimination, political inequalities, dependency on foreign capital, religious cleavages and disparities in educational opportunities). He then developed mediating variables which, he argues, were critical, including: 1) regime legitimacy, 2) regime coercive potential, 3) institutional strength, and 4) history of past strife.

⁴⁸This division reflects a similar split in conflict analysis and social science literature generally between macro (societal) and micro (individual) approaches. For a critical view of the micro/psychological approach see Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior: A Social Psychological Approach (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).

⁴⁹See Edwards and Brinton.

⁵⁰Rex D. Hopper, pp. 160-168.

⁵¹David C. Schwartz, "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior," in Davies, When Men Revolt, pp. 109-132.

⁵²Smelser, p.48.

⁵³Johnson is especially sensitive to this problem. In Revolutionary Change he argues that "Revolution is a response to a particular crisis in a particular social system, and any attempt to compare revolutions that does not at the same time compare social systems is theoretically inconsistent." Cf. the more extreme view of Welch and Tainter that "only history reveals the whys of a given revolution," in Welch and Tainter, p. 143.

⁵⁴Cf. Peter Calvert's view that the literature has four strands: 1) the economic (with its debates on the importance of development vs. underdevelopment, increasing vs. decreasing realization of expectations, etc.); 2) the social (with internal conflict resulting from the failure of society to meet the demands placed on it by various groups, e.g., Johnson, Edwards and Pettee); 3) the behavioral/individual (with individual alienation from society as the root cause of conflict, e.g., the work of Eric Hoffer, Albert Camus, Hadley Cantril, et. al.); and 4) the work of political philosophers who have viewed revolution as a phenomenon concerned with displacement of political power in the state.

⁵⁵David C. Schwartz argues that because revolutions originate in the minds of men, it is there that we must seek explanations for them, "Political Alienation: The Psychology of Revolution's First Stage," in the Feierabends and Gurr, pp. 58-66.

⁵⁶Russell calls this fallacy "naive structuralism," p. 86. Stone, in Paynton and Blackey, claims that Chalmers Johnson and the structuralists do not show successfully the direct relationship between structural conditions and social action, p. 269.

⁵⁷See Halperin in Roderick C. Aya, ed., National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World (New York: Free Press, 1971); Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt argue that "the contextual factors of space and time will provide a general milieu in which a revolution must be examined. Conditions associated with revolution in 19th century Europe may bear little comparative relation with conditions obtaining in mid-twentieth century Africa or Asia," eds., The Politics of Violence (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 52.

⁵⁸In a similar vein Eckstein criticizes the comparative historical approach of Edwards, Pettie, Brinton, Arendt and others for "drawing enormous inferences from few cases," in Welch, p. 63.

⁵⁹A notable exception to the general rule is Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham, 1970).

⁶⁰Brinton and Pareto, writing much earlier, both emphasized the need to study elite behavior.

⁶¹See Welch, p. 13, and Russell, Chapter One.

⁶²Eckstein, in Welch, p. 63.

⁶³Cf. Walter Laquer, Guerrilla (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 389.

⁶⁴Some of this variety is hinted at by Samuel P. Huntington who distinguishes "Western" revolutions, in which a loss of incumbent legitimacy causes the old order to collapse, from "Eastern" revolutions, in which new groups actively cause the old order's demise, in Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University, 1968), Chapter Five. See also the Feierabends and Gurr who distinguish between modern nations (with stratified economies, stable political structures and low rates of social change) and transitional nations (which are economically deprived, have high rates of social change and slow rates of economic growth). Cf. Smelser, who argues that nationalist movements are different than others and that modernization itself has given rise to this nationalism, leading to a particular variety of the "value-oriented movement."

⁶⁵Johnson, Revolutionary Change, p. 106, Figure 5-1.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 65.

⁶⁷Gurr; Feierabends.

⁶⁸Gurr, Why Men Rebel, pp. 355 and 269.

⁶⁹Leiden and Schmitt, p. 72.

⁷⁰John W. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 83.

⁷¹Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars: A Strategy for the 1970's (New York: Knopf, 1964).

⁷²Mostafa Rejai, The Strategy of Political Revolutions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973).

⁷³Rejai, p. 147.

⁷⁴Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

⁷⁵Skocpol, p. 5.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 14.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 19.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 23.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 24.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 32.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 286.

⁸²Ibid., p. 288.

⁸³James N. Rosenau, "International Aspects of Internal War: A Working Paper," in International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. James N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), Appendix.

⁸⁴Rosenau, p. 12.

⁸⁵See Jonathan Wilkenfeld for articles by these authors.

⁸⁶Fernando Enrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1979).

⁸⁷Cardoso and Faletto, p. 178.

⁸⁸Jose M. Aybar de Soto, Dependency and Intervention: The Case of Guatemala in 1954 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), p. 33.

⁸⁹Cardoso and Faletto, p. xvi..

⁹⁰Cardoso and Faletto, p. xviii.

⁹¹Cardoso and Faletto, p. 13.

⁹²Brinton, as cited.

⁹³See especially: Hagopian; Friedrich; John Dunn, Modern Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); and Brian Crozier, The Rebels: A Study of Postwar Insurrections (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).

⁹⁴It is also possible that scholars have viewed exogenous factors as having only peripheral impact, as they may have had historically. Thus, it may be that the tradition of writing on revolution has sprung from an historical setting in which the international politics of internal conflict appeared less salient. Yet, even this argument for maintaining a strictly internal focus requires that its proponents seek to verify it empirically.

⁹⁵James N. Rosenau notes this general problem in "Politics in a Shrinking World," in his volume, Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press, 1969). He contends that students of comparative and international politics make certain assumptions about domestic and international systems in order to pursue answers to their particular questions. Those writing recently on interdependence, linkage politics and transnational relations have attempted to break down these barriers. See also R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

⁹⁶It can be argued that because political science is a relatively young discipline, the techniques at its disposal have not become well developed enough to explore these linkages. However, this view overlooks the fact that most researchers have not even tried.

⁹⁷See John J. Stremlau's recent volume, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), for an excellent historical but non-theoretical treatment.

CHAPTER TWO

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF INTERNAL CONFLICT

I. INTRODUCTION

I begin with a simple proposition -- that what happens in the international environment affects political processes within states. As George Pettee argues, "A revolution is influenced at every point by the fact that it occurs in a community which is a part of a larger community."¹ Thus, a grasp of "the full scope of international affairs is a necessary background for understanding local events,"² and "cogent political analysis requires a readiness to treat the functioning of national systems as increasingly dependent on external trends and events."³

If one treats internal conflict as the phenomenon to be explained,⁴ then the external environment may be seen as a possible source of influence and, therefore, explanation. This potential exists in two logically different factors which may be considered "exogenous" or "international" -- what I call the "systemic" and the "discrete external."

On a general level one may speak of systemic international factors, i.e., those which relate to the

structure and the norms of the international system viewed as a whole. One may hypothesize that such factors may have an impact on the course of events within a state undergoing internal conflict. In particular, one may argue that the way an international system is structured at a given time influences how the various actors in an internal conflict perceive the costs and benefits of the different courses of action open to them. The international system may also limit the effectiveness of actions undertaken by domestic actors.⁵

For the purposes of analysis, one may distinguish the international "systemic" factors from what I call "discrete external" factors by shifting focus. Whereas in studying the systemic sources of influence on internal wars one is concerned with how the general functioning of a given historical international system of actors has an impact on internal struggle, in examining the "discrete external" sources of influence one is concerned with how the behavior of specific actors in the international system affects processes which are predominately internal to one state. Discrete external effects, therefore, involve the specific acts which constitute the foreign policies of outside actors, policies which are intended to influence the internal policies of another state.⁶

Thus, what one examines in studying discrete external factors are the conscious efforts of outsiders (including the activities of subnational actors or groups)

to influence the incumbents or insurgents in an internal conflict.

It is my argument in this dissertation that internal processes of states are often influenced directly and indirectly by what outsiders do with reference to actors or processes inside the state and in relation to third parties who may also have dealings with those inside the state. When examining discrete factors one should look first for examples of specific behavior aimed at changing the balance of forces within a state. Second, one must be alert for instances of indirect influence, in which outside forces act through others, or in which the actions of outsiders have effects which are unintended but real in their consequences.

II. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNAL CONFLICT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Regardless of one's notions of international politics and internal conflict, there is substantial evidence that outside parties often become involved in the internal struggles of other states. There has been, for example, external involvement in: 1) wars of religion in the 16th and 17th centuries; 2) in the French and later the American revolutions; and 3) nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire, and in many other cases before the twentieth century.

In the post World War II period of this century, the United States was involved in the Greek Civil War in

1947-49, in internal conflict in Guatemala in 1954, in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, in intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in the Vietnam conflict, in Chile in the 1970's and elsewhere as well. In these cases the U.S. justified its policies on the argument that outside communist elements were fomenting revolution within these states. Although one might question the role which outside forces had in the development of these conflicts (arguing that the key factors leading to internal strife stem from problems in the domestic environment), in Vietnam, for example, the origins of the conflict were an important point of contention.⁷ Similarly, the U.S.S.R. has been involved in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, etc. Even in cases where there has been no direct troop involvement, supply of economic and military assistance to contending factions has been significant. One important effect of this outside participation has been the legitimation of insurgent factions in internal strife.

Thus, it appears reasonable to argue that internal conflicts have become battlegrounds for major power conflict in the post World War II period. And even historically, there is little doubt that outside states have attempted to influence developments within other states to further their own interests. There have been limits to the effectiveness of such policies⁸ in many

cases, but they have generally had the potential to be destabilizing for the international system.⁹

Thus, I would argue that there is a fairly strong prima facie case to be made for the desirability of studying the relationship between international variables and internal conflict. However, it is my view that there are additional reasons in the contemporary era why one should study this relationship. Significant changes have occurred in international politics in this century: independent territorial entities have proliferated with the demise of the colonial system; international organizations have grown in number and scope of activity; and various sub-national groups, e.g., transnational corporations, have become important actors in the relations between societies. These changes in the units of international politics have resulted in an international system which is more complex.

In addition, resources in the international system are more diffuse, often leading to greater flexibility of action on the part of lesser states vis a vis the larger actors. Moreover, as Scott notes, there has been a net increase in the volume of interaction across territorial borders.¹⁰ We have also witnessed changes in the issues which generate international concern, e.g., from the more purely strategic questions of earlier years to a renewed emphasis on economic relations and resource questions. Actors have grown more preoccupied with the scarcity of

resources (energy, minerals, food) in light of the tremendous growth in world population. Technological change has also affected international politics dramatically in this century, making transportation and communication easier between societies, and altering the weaponry which societies may use against each other.

Although all these changes do not affect the international system in the same way (and despite the ongoing disagreements among policy makers and scholars about the degree of change), when considered together these changes have affected the way actors behave in international politics. In general, these developments have made the international system more complex and more fluid. One consequence of these developments has been an increased concern with involvement, interference and intervention across territorial lines. Societies now influence other societies in ways not restricted to the traditional categories of diplomacy, trade and war. In general, societies are now highly permeable to outside influences by public and private parties, acting directly and indirectly on them. It is far more difficult for states to remain isolated from developments in their external environment than it once was.

For example, because of communication advances, what happens in one place in the world can be known almost immediately elsewhere. As Raymond Aron argues, "The diplomatic universe is like an echo chamber. Noises of

men and things are amplified to infinity."¹¹ Ideas and information also travel more freely and rapidly across national boundaries than they did previously.¹² As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff note, "Mass communications have facilitated the drawing of relevant and costly comparisons."¹³ National boundaries themselves have become more permeable as a result of transportation advances which have spurred the movement of peoples and goods across territorial frontiers. These changes have put societies and peoples in greater physical and intellectual contact with each other, providing increased opportunities for outsiders to become involved in affairs which were once considered internal. Economic penetration and interdependence through trade and resources have increased as well, although not uniformly throughout the world, and always subject to regulation by the states.

As a result of these developments, societies have increasingly developed great interest in other societies. Whereas the functioning of a given political unit, the territorial state, was once sustained by structures and processes within its own boundaries, now the roots of many internal conditions may be traced to events and processes which originate outside the unit. As Rosenau argues in developing the concept of "linkages" between societies, "politics everywhere seem to be related to politics everywhere else."¹⁴ Although the degree to which the interdependence of societies has increased is

an empirical question, it seems widely accepted that we are now in an age of interdependence -- economic, strategic, ecological and other. Regardless of the degree, there appears to be at the very least an increased consciousness of mutual dependence in recent years. Groups within societies appear to have become more psychologically attached to events and processes occurring outside their own territorial systems, e.g., the concern for human rights violations in other nations. Thus, they may perceive events in other states as having impact on their own activities. Transnational links between professional, business, religious, scientific, academic groups, and transnational economic activity may tend to reinforce such perceptions.¹⁵ These inter-societal contacts may make groups in one society potential participants or supporters of political activity in another state, e.g., U.S. Jews' involvement with Israel. Moreover, these contacts may lead to pressure on a home government to alter its international behavior. As Nye and Keohane argue persuasively, on many issues states are now both more sensitive and more vulnerable to what happens in other areas.¹⁶ This interdependence, whether real or perceived, may thus become an inducement for outsiders to become involved in the internal conflicts of others.

Besides communications and transportation advances, developments in weapons technology have also altered the relative permeability of states. As John Herz contends,

many states no longer have even the capability to defend their citizens against military incursions of other states (via overflights, satellites and missile technology combined).¹⁷ Moreover, the destructiveness of nuclear weaponry has altered the way major powers relate to each other. Because of the unwillingness of states to use this weaponry in routine fashion, influence relations between states have become more important.¹⁸ These developments have structured the relations between major actors so that direct confrontation is to be avoided. This has, in some ways, channelled the competition of these powers into participation in lower level conflicts such as the internal struggles of smaller states.¹⁹ Thus, decision makers have seen their "national interests" at stake in the outcomes of political processes in less developed areas, e.g., recent U.S. involvement in Central America.

Because of the changes discussed here, the usual distinctions between national and international politics, and between internal and international conflict, have become less precise, and linkages between internal and external phenomena have become more apparent. To the degree that there have been meaningful alterations in the traditional lines of definition, one is led to agree with Rosenau, Kelly, Miller and others who have argued that "the conceptual tidiness achieved through analysis of the two types of system separately is no longer compelling."²⁰ Hence, it would seem to behoove analysts

of domestic politics to cast a wider net in their search for the determinants of internal political processes and outcomes. This would seem to hold true especially in the case of serious internal conflicts, in which factions within societies become especially vulnerable to, and often dependent upon, outside forces and events.

III. THE ROLE OF SYSTEMIC INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

A. Introduction

Simply stated, a system is composed of units which interact; as such it is an abstraction which one may find useful in conceptualizing what occurs in a given set of processes. In international relations some theorists have found it helpful to view the international political process in systemic terms.²¹ In this perspective one takes a holistic view of the globe, looking at the major actors and the nature of their interaction. By doing so, one may distinguish between international systems in various eras based on their "operating principles" or "rules," i.e., the general principles which appear to govern how units in the system behave.²² Of course, even if one is able to discern some such patterns in the behavior of states it does not imply that "a system" is a static or immutable thing.

Even in a common sense way, however, international politics appears to be qualitatively different in various periods of history. What is still not certain, however,

is precisely how international systems affect the behavior of units within them. Nonetheless, it does seem to make a great deal of difference for the states in a system whether it tends to be hierarchically ordered, bipolar, or multipolar. Change in the structure and operation of a system, such as the introduction of a new technology which vastly strengthens some actors in relation to others, the pursuit of an expansionist policy by a major actor, the proliferation of power centers, will affect the ways in which actors must behave to achieve their goals. It is my assertion that actors will interact with others in qualitatively different ways based on the structural realities of a given international system.

To analyze the behavior of one state, then, it is important to understand the nature of the international system at a given moment. The literature on international politics, however, is not especially helpful on this point. There is, for example, widespread disagreement about whether we are now in a loose bipolar system, a multipolar system or some other variation. Indeed, one may even ask whether these kinds of summary descriptions are helpful in describing complex international processes. To what extent may one even speak accurately or meaningfully about the existence of a single international political system?²³ What characteristics of the system are the most significant for explaining the behavior of actors within them?

Answers to these questions are difficult. Systemic theorists have generally assumed the existence of a single international system, one which might be described in terms of the number of major actors. For the purposes of this study, I assume there are five elements of the international system which should be examined:

- 1) the number of actors
- 2) the distribution of resources
- 3) the number and types of issues processed
- 4) the degree of organization and institutionalization in the system
- 5) the norms of the system.

Before examining the specific relationship between these international systemic variables and the behavior of actors in the specific case of internal conflict, I shall examine briefly the general connection between international systems and state behavior.²⁴

B. International Systems and State Behavior

How do international systems affect states? To answer this question it is helpful to review briefly the literature on international politics and foreign policy, because the impact of international systemic factors on foreign policy behavior is a subject which has received some attention. If a greater understanding of this relationship has been developed in this area, it might yield some clues as to the international impacts on domestic policy, and, therefore, be helpful in analyzing

international impacts on internal conflict.

There has been general agreement among scholars that two sets of factors shape a state's foreign policy: 1) domestic variables -- (including a state's physical capabilities and resources, cultural biases, the nature of political institutions, historical factors, and personal leadership) which influence the process and content of foreign policy decision making and implementation; and 2) external variables. Policy is thus seen as an outcome of a process which, although largely contained within a territory, responds to certain features of, or stimuli from, the international environment.²⁵ Although this relationship is generally assumed, there are few works which detail explicitly the linkage between external variables and the behavior of individual states.²⁶

C. International Systems and Internal Conflicts:

Structural Factors²⁷

Although a number of authors have tried to isolate the factors which differentiate one historical system from another, and a few authors (such as East) have attempted to define the connections between the international system and state behavior, there has been relatively little attention paid to the relationship between such systems and the phenomenon of internal conflict²⁷.

Raymond Aron, for example, examines international systems on the basis of three critical variables: the

degree of polarity, the intensity of ideological discord and the range of diplomatic activity.²⁸ He distinguishes between stable and revolutionary international systems and assumes that the structure of the system affects the behavior of major actors within it. An unstable system will produce greater conflict, both within states and between them. George Kelly and Linda B. Miller ask whether "a typology of internal war can be related to the historical process, and if so whether it can be related to ... historical systems."²⁹ Rosecrance answers this query affirmatively, although indirectly, by describing nine historical systems and attempting to assess their relative stability. Although incomplete, the Rosecrance effort highlights the relationship between periods of relative international stability and the frequency of internal conflict. Waltz and others explore the effects of multipolarity on the frequency of conflict within the international system, although Waltz does not limit his notion of conflict to internal war. Rudolph Rummel studies the relationship between the frequency of internal and international conflict, but does not examine the impact of external conflict on internal war.

Unfortunately, although systemic factors are considered in many individual studies of foreign policy decision making, there is little research which generalizes from case study findings. Even for the contemporary period one does not find either evidence or argument about

the conditions under which systemic factors seem to be most potent in accounting for the behavior of actors in the system.

Thus, even though we have a reasonable expectation that systemic variables are important, the questions of "when," "how much," and "why" remain unanswered. In large measure, this lack of generalization about systemic effects on internal wars stems from the difficulty inherent in studying the impact of a large scale, complex process such as international politics on the internal policy making processes of states, especially since our knowledge about both sets of processes continues to be incomplete.

Maurice East's work is more helpful than most others. Although he does not deal directly with internal conflict he does suggest that two general aspects of any international system are significant -- its complexity and the availability of resources.³¹ The more complex the system is, he argues, the more difficult it is for any state to control the system's effects on the state.

In his view, the number and type of actors in a system have direct impact on a state's ability to monitor the international environment and respond to changes in it. Similarly, the number and type of issues being processed by a system affect a state's ability to conduct its policies. East contends that a third variable, which he calls "the structure of interaction," is also

important, i.e., the structure of conflict relations (multipolarity, bipolarity, etc.) is often a crucial variable to policy makers.

Foreign policy is also affected, in East's view, by the general availability of resources in a system, broadly defined to include material resources such as raw materials and intangible resources such as prestige. A final factor discussed by East is the degree of organization of the system, i.e., the extent to which issues are processed within international institutions. He concludes that international systemic variables affect foreign policy behavior by providing "foreign policy decision makers with information about the complexity of the international environment in which they must operate and about the availability of resources in the system."³² As an example, East cites the movement of the world system from a bipolar to a multipolar configuration. The result, he argues, is that the foreign policies of states have become more independent; as blocs become less cohesive, the external or systemic restraints are reduced.

One additional area in which some helpful work can be found is studies of intervention. Oran Young examines the relationship between intervention and the international system.³³ He contends that there are structural features of the international system which influence the decisions of major powers to intervene in the internal

affairs of other states. Intervention, for Young, is organized, systematic action directed across recognized boundaries, aimed at changing political authority structures. He argues that the frequency of intervention is directly related to the degree of hierarchy in the organization of international authority relations. This affects the ratio between costs and benefits of intervention for outside parties.

Among the structural factors cited by Young as increasing the likelihood of intervention are:

- 1) the existence of large power differentials between states which create opportunities for intervention;
- 2) bipolarity, which creates pressures for competitive intervention;
- 3) the relative instability of many of the newly independent states, which increases opportunities for intervention simply because the energies of internal combatants are directed at each other (moreover, in unstable societies intervention is often invited);
- 4) the growing level of interdependence in the international system, which "increases both the routine and functional significance of interactions among actors;"³⁴
- 5) ideological warfare between major powers, which intensifies their efforts to ensure that other actors support their goals;
- 6) systemwide sanctioning procedures, e.g., international law and organization, which Young calls "an influential but complex factor;"³⁵
- 7) technological improvements, which may make it cheaper and easier to intervene.

Young argues that systemic factors not only provide opportunities for intervention but also incentives. For example, intervention will be more frequent when there

is dissatisfaction with the international political system or when the distribution of power is changing. Similarly, it will increase when there is an increase in ideological fervor.

Rosenau, also considering intervention, argues that "three systemic variables appear likely to have a high potency as sources of the perceptions, calculations and decisions which lead to intervention:"³⁶ 1) the basic structure of the system, 2) the degree of ideological rivalry, and 3) the stability of the nations in the system. A more dispersed structure, he argues, discourages intervention because it is less likely that any single development (such as internal war) can quickly or radically alter the system. In a tightly structured international system, however, a potential shift of alliances might appear more threatening to outsiders. Rosenau argues that the more international life is structured according to competing ideological views, the more is seen at stake in the conflicts of other states who are clients or allies. Thus, when politics is highly ideological, policy makers are more likely to see governmental changes abroad as affecting their own interests, and hence they become more inclined to intervene. Third, Rosenau agrees with Young that major turning points in international politics come when old regimes collapse and are replaced with new ones with different policies, e.g., China, Indonesia, etc. Because outside states

are concerned about such changes, intervention becomes more likely. Rosenau concludes that the degree of relative stability of nations, however, is the single most potent systemic variable; the precariousness of authority structures in many of the newly independent states tends to invite intervention.

As interesting and helpful as East, Young and Rosenau are with regard to international systemic influences, each has a limited view: 1) East speaks only of the system and its effect on states and not at all about internal conflict; 2) Young focuses on intervention in general rather than on intervention in internal conflict; and 3) Rosenau is most interested in why states decide to intervene rather than on the effects of their decisions and actions with regard to internal war.

D. The Influence of International Norms

The preceding discussion has emphasized the structural systemic variable because the most significant attribute of any international system is its distribution of resources. Great disparities in resources among actors define the structure for a given system of international relationships.³⁷ In a unitary or empire system the great preponderance of resources in a single actor creates a system of dominance and dependence. Other more equal distributions of resources will lead to the development of greater interdependence between units.

However, the relations between units in a system

are a function of factors other than physical resources alone. They are affected also by the norms of the system, its laws, expectations, beliefs and attitudes about appropriate behavior. These other systemic features help to determine how the actors play their roles. As Richard Falk argues, "Every system implies that actors accept limits on the means which they use for their ends."³⁸

One may find such factors at work wherever one finds political interaction. In domestic politics the norms are often formalized in the form of law and enforced by centralized authorities. In international politics, the "rules of the game" emerge instead from the interactions among states with varying degrees of resources. As Oran Young notes, the "rules of the game in international politics are frequently ambiguous, loosely applied and poorly enforced. But they are nonetheless, influential determinants of decision making within national elites."³⁹

Despite the absence of a centralized law making/law enforcing agency, there are norms in the international system which affect behavior. Norms affect behavior by influencing the goals, strategies and means used by actors in the system. Norms do so in two ways: 1) by the actual and repeated indications of approval or disapproval of the behavior of actors in particular situations; and 2) by the anticipation of such support/rejection.⁴⁰

There are several important ways in which international norms may have impact on internal wars. First, there is the collective attitude of important world leaders toward internal conflict. In this century we have witnessed the development of the norm of "the self determination of peoples," which assumes an almost inherent right to rebellion. This norm has its roots in the rise of nationalism worldwide. Many tribal/ethnic groups have declared their "right" to self determination and found ready support in the world community. The widespread acceptance of this principle may actually have encouraged civil strife in developing areas, especially where its aim has been to eliminate outside domination.⁴¹ The dramatic and sudden coming to independence of almost one hundred new states since 1945 can be seen as an indication of this international norm's efficacy.

Besides the informal normative effects just cited one should also note the impact of international law on state behavior. Despite the lack of consensus on the efficacy, sources and legitimacy of international law, it may be said that it does perform important functions in relation to peace and war.⁴² The law does, for example, establish some order and regularity in interstate interactions. As Keith Legg argues, "The violation of international law or the breaking of treaties is the exception rather than the rule."⁴³ Norms are obeyed in the in-

ternational system when the actors see benefit in their observance. As Hans Morgenthau argues, advantages and sanctions remain the only effective means of enforcement of international norms.⁴⁴ These sanctions depend most on the behavior of states or blocs with the most power.

Classical international law was only minimally concerned with the application of international rules to internal struggles. The rules which do exist, therefore, are "few, tentative and to a considerable extent contradictory."⁴⁵ There are essentially two schools of thought among legal scholars concerning the international law of internal conflict. One group stresses that outside support for an incumbent regime is proper even if that regime's legitimacy has been called into question by an opposition group within the society. The other school notes that international law has developed a bias against intervention per se. Yet, neither principle has been observed consistently in state practice. Considerations of foreign policy, national interest, etc., have generally prevailed over the restraints imposed by international law.

Richard Falk cites several principles of the traditional approach to internal conflict whose validity has been questioned.⁴⁶ First, if the insurgent challenge is not "major" then the legitimacy of supporting the incumbent regime is virtually unquestioned. To behave otherwise would strike at the core assumption of inter-

national society, i.e., national sovereignty. Second, even in cases in which insurgents are successful in achieving control over a significant area within a state, third states can withhold recognition of a status of "belligerency," which requires neutrality by third states.⁴⁷ Thus, in a system of states the bias of international law has been against insurgencies. However, because the international system has become embroiled in ideological confrontation in this century, the traditional categories used to regulate outside participation in internal war have become less helpful.

One now finds states (or groups within them) lending active and open support to incumbents or insurgents in internal conflicts. As Edwin Brown Firmage concludes, "It is apparent that rules purporting to govern intervention in internal conflict are now relatively impotent."⁴⁸ And, as Friedmann argues, "policy, not law, determines the actions of states with regard to intervention in civil wars."⁴⁹ At the very least, law appears to play a subordinate role.

One of the main reasons for the decreasing utility of traditional norms regarding third party participation in internal war may be that the structure of international politics is changing. As Kathryn Boats argues, "The structural situation is very different in the contemporary international system, but the nineteenth century model of sovereign and independent states interacting auton-

omously with one another has been carried over and applied to it."⁵⁰ In reality the states of the world have moved far from the idealized notion of sovereign equality. Indeed, in a world of great inequality, advanced technology, increasing interaction and interdependence the concept of "sovereignty" is much less synonymous with "autonomy" than it once was. Moreover, many states are far from being internally cohesive; others are multinational; many others lack the resources to cope with demands of economic development and defense without assistance from outside actors. Contemporary societies, despite protestations of independence and sovereignty, are actually quite vulnerable to outside influence and control.⁵¹ This vulnerability makes it even less likely that the traditional norms embodied in international law will be observed, since they have now less basis in reality.

In the current system of influence relations between societies, outside states may have too much at stake in the results of civil strife elsewhere to resist involvement, regardless of international law. And so long as there is no consensus among the major actors in the international system about the goals of the system or the means to be used to attain them, there will inevitably be opposing interpretations of whatever norms do exist. Hence, the legal regulation of external involvement in civil strife is likely to remain limited.⁵²

E. Summary

My general view is that the nature of the international system at a given time has a potentially important effect on how actors within states pursue their domestic political goals, and also on how they relate to actors outside their territorial borders. In this sense, the nature of the larger international system may become an important variable within the decision making environment of actors in states.⁵³ It is my contention that this systemic influence operates in both "objective" and "subjective" ways on the internal actors.⁵⁴

In the "objective" sense, the structure of the international system (as defined by the number of actors, their relative capabilities and their goals) and its norms may have a constraining influence on the actions undertaken by domestic groups.⁵⁵ The objective distribution of resources in a system defines what Spiegel has called the "international pecking order,"⁵⁶ and this stratification of international society conditions how the various actors behave. This structure of power is often the harsh wall up against which ill-conceived national policies crash; conversely, it provides parameters which define successful policies.

The basic point is that the structure of the system sets boundaries which condition the effectiveness of national initiatives. To be more concrete, my argument is that it definitely matters for any given state "A"

what the existing alignment of forces is in the world, what resources other actors affected by A's foreign policies have to bring to bear on A, whether there are two or five major powers to whom one turns for assistance, whether there are systemic norms condoning intervention or not, and so forth.⁵⁷

In the more "subjective" sense, international structure and norms may affect behavior by altering the perceptions of decision makers as to the costs and benefits of various courses of action. In this regard what is most important is how the leadership sees the international system, not necessarily how it is.⁵⁸ I assume that things which are presumed or perceived to be real are real in their effects and, further, that actors' behavior is based on their perceptions of reality.⁵⁹ This subjective element is a critically important part of the foreign policy process since it introduces the principle of human choice into international politics.

If one accepts the notion that systemic variables have an "objective" and a "subjective" impact on the decision making and implementation process in a state, it then becomes important in analyzing the impact of the international system in a particular case to:

- 1) examine carefully the structure and norms of the international system; and
- 2) determine how relevant decision makers in the state being studied saw the system at that time, and how that system affected their actions.

Too often, however, analysts of international relations do not consider these types of effects. Systemic theorists tend to err on the side of determinism in explaining state behavior, arguing that each system has a characteristic pattern of behavior which is relatively unaffected by national differences. Others contend that the foreign policies of states stem from purely domestic factors, such as national culture, leader personality, political institutions, etc.⁶⁰ Most useful, however, are frameworks which incorporate both systemic and subsystemic perspectives and their effects on: 1) the decision makers' perceptions of the situation, and 2) the success of their policies.

If international factors do affect a state's foreign policy, it seems reasonable to assert that domestic policies may be affected as well. In this view, regardless of whether a society is undergoing serious civil strife, international factors may make a difference in how major actors within states will act, both with reference to the internal goals they pursue (distribution of resources, control of authority structures, etc.), and to external goals as well (e.g., obtaining aid or approval for policies). Since the same actors may predominate in both the domestic and foreign policy processes, and because there is often great difficulty in isolating the effects of domestic and foreign policies, it is reasonable to hypothesize that international factors

may affect the actors themselves, and, in turn, both sets of policies. If this general relationship holds true in "normal" times, then one may reasonably assume that the relationship will hold, or even be magnified, when the society is undergoing civil disorder.

Other reasons why systemic factors may influence internal struggles include:

- 1) technological changes which have given outsiders greater capabilities to become involved in other societies, regardless of the levels of strife in those societies;
- 2) what Moore calls "a high and rising level of interaction" between societies,⁶¹ which places actors in constant contact across territorial lines and increases their interest and "stakes" in the outcome of political processes in other societies;
- 3) the great increase in the number of newly independent states, which has created a more complicated international system and which provides greater opportunities for societies to become involved with each other; e.g., the previous system of maintaining order -- the "Pax Britannica" -- had effectively removed Africa and Asia from contention. With independence this was no longer the case; weak, unstable new states provided an arena for outside involvement;
- 4) a high level of ideological diversity which encourages cross-societal support for likeminded groups;
- 5) a greater degree of interdependence in the international system which increases the opportunities (and motivation) for intersocietal involvement; changes in domestic conditions, therefore, may precipitate greater outside interest and action;
- 6) a low level of global organization for the control of civil conflict and the regulation of outside involvement, and also a low level of consensus on the best ways to handle global problems; and
- 7) a high level of social disorganization system-wide amongst the smaller states, which makes involvement a more tempting proposition.⁶²

In this section I have examined one aspect of the international politics of internal conflict -- the effects which international systemic factors have on such struggles. Beginning with a broad distinction between systemic and discrete variables, I have argued that the characteristics of the international system have consequences for state behavior. To explain the mechanism by which such factors affect domestic actors and processes, I focused on the impact which systemic factors have on foreign policy, arguing that the systemic effect has both objectives and subjective components.

Having established a logical connection between the international system and the internal political processes, I have enumerated ways in which international systemic variables might have impact in the special case of internal war. This analysis leads me to conclude that systemic variables affect internal conflicts by altering both the objective environment of policy makers and the perceptual milieu in which they must choose between various courses of action. As I argued in my discussion of the role of international norms and the structure of the international system, the distribution of resources in the system continues to play a stronger role than do norms, although the function of the latter is not negligible.

IV. DISCRETE EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON INTERNAL CONFLICT

A. Introduction

In contrast to systemic factors, which tend to be more abstract, "discrete external" factors are those most obvious to observers of international relations. These influences are the result of the specific actions of external actors which are intended to affect actions, events or processes internal to another state. These forces, thus, have concrete points of reference in the observable behavior of external actors, in contrast to systemic factors which describe attributes of a system of interaction. One may distinguish between the systemic and the discrete external factors, therefore, by: 1) the presence or absence of a specific actor; 2) that actor's intention to influence internal political processes of another state; and 3) the taking of some concrete action in relation to that state.

Before considering the historical record regarding external involvement in internal conflict I offer a very brief summary of a framework I have found useful in conceptualizing types of intersocietal involvement.

It is my view that the study of specific (discrete external) inputs into an internal conflict necessarily involves one in examination of the forms of involvement between groups in different societies. Because intersocietal relations are highly complex and varied, there are a number of forms which this involvement may take.

The key transaction which is at the heart of inter-societal relations is influence. To explore influence relations one needs to focus on actors,⁶³ their goals vis a vis each other, and the means they use to achieve them.

What is important in studying interaction between societies is the examination of:

- 1) attempts by actors to influence each other; and
- 2) the effects these activities have on the intended target.⁶⁴

By looking at actors, goals and means it should prove possible to specify the characteristic mode of involvement between any two actors. The types of involvement may range along a continuum such as the one which appears in Illustration 1 below.

/ non-involvement / influence / interference / intervention / penetration / annexation

Although there are a number of complex issues surrounding the definition of these terms which I consider more fully in Appendix One, I offer here the following generalizations.

- * Non-involvement implies little or no direct diplomatic, economic or other contact with the outside. It is relatively rare in this century.
- * The normal relations between societies are influence relations; these are characterized by use of diplomatic contact, trade, and other non-violent, non-coercive initiatives designed to affect the foreign and domestic policies of groups in other societies.
- * Interference is a type of undertaking by external parties in which there is direct interaction with parties or issues in the target state not generally accepted as part of normal diplomatic or economic relations (e.g., domestic issues); it is more coercive and may involve a direct physical presence by outsiders and greater emphasis on altering power positions of internal actors in the target society.
- * Intervention is military action undertaken by an external actor inside the target state, designed to ensure the success of one set of internal actors in a struggle for control of the government.
- * Penetration refers to long term, regularized and sanctioned participation of external actors in

the decision-making processes of another state.

- * At the extreme right end of the continuum, one finds annexation/colonization in which the external state openly rules in the target state.

The formulations presented above are provided to help clarify the range of intersocietal involvement.⁶⁵ It is my view that classifying the type and level of intersocietal involvement between two societies is an important technique in understanding discrete external effects on a conflict. One element of intersocietal involvement is the degree or level of intersocietal activity. A second element is the degree of control which characterizes these involvements. Although the scale above is useful, one might extend the analysis further to produce two scales -- one to measure intersocietal involvement and a second to measure degrees of control between actors.

For the purposes of this study, however, I have tried to incorporate both elements in one scale -- as reflected by actors' goals. The detailed presentation of these issues which appears in Appendix One is designed to enhance the analysis of exogenous impacts on internal conflicts. It is my contention that the student of internal conflict will find it useful to think of external influences on a particular conflict in terms of types of intersocietal involvement. In thinking of such involvement, it is important to examine the level of activity, the actors involved, their goals, the means they employ,

the targets of their action and the degree of control which is achieved. When these factors have been examined in a given case, the analyst is better prepared to draw conclusions about the impact of discrete external factors.

As I have argued previously, societies in the present international system may not escape the effects of other societies' behavior toward them, changes in external conditions not consciously directed at them, or even the general functioning of the international system. In order to understand internal conflict more completely, we must take into account the many ways in which external influences make themselves felt.

B. The Historical Record on "Discrete" Influences

The foregoing discussion has provided a context for examining the role of outside parties in internal struggles. The following is a brief summary of the historical record regarding the frequency and forms of external involvement, their consequences, and the mechanisms by which internal conflicts become internationalized.

Haley contends that, "for thousands of years ... powers have engaged in internal intervention-interference between disputant factions in another state -- and revolutionaries within countries have associated themselves with outside powers."⁶⁶ And indeed one can find ample evidence throughout history to show that outsiders have been involved in the internal strug-

gles of other societies. Writing a guide for princes, Macchiavelli cautioned that, "When people have taken arms against you, there will never be lacking foreigners to assist them."⁶⁷ Delving back further into history one can cite Thucydides writing of outside involvement in the Greek revolution at Corcyra, "It became a natural thing for anyone who wanted a change of government to call in help from the outside."⁶⁸ Athens and Sparta interfered in other, lesser states; intervention was common in the 16th and 17th centuries.⁶⁹ And one can find many examples in other centuries as well, e.g., British and French involvement in the U.S. Civil War, Czarist Russia's intervention in Bulgaria, etc.

In the twentieth century there is evidence that outside involvement in internal conflict has been widespread.⁷⁰ In the period 1900-1945, for example, there was significant external involvement in civil strife by: the U.S. in Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, China, and Russia; by the Soviet Union in China; by France in China and Russia; and by G many and Italy in Spain. In the post-1945 period, one finds external participation in conflicts in: Greece, China, Korea, Algeria, Indonesia, Yemen, Vietnam, Iraq, the Congo, Gabon, Chad, Lebanon, Kenya, the Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Angola, Guatemala, Laos, Cyprus, Cuba, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Jordan, Malaya, Nigeria, the Philippines, Rhodesia, southern Africa, Afghanistan, Nicaragua,

El Salvador, etc. Indeed, Klaus Knorr estimates that of 77 internal conflicts since 1900, 37 included outside involvement.

Of course, not all "involvement" has been intervention in the sense of direct military action by outside powers. Among the major exceptions, however, have been U.S. and North Vietnamese involvement in the South East Asian conflicts; the U.S. supported invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs; the British use of troops in Jordan in 1958; U.S. involvement in Iran in 1953 and U.S.-C.I.A. involvement in Guatemala and Chile; U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965; Egyptian and Saudi participation in Yemen's civil war; and Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.⁷¹ In many cases where there has been a high degree of involvement which has stopped short of intervention, there has been a tendency for this involvement to stimulate counter-involvement by competing powers, e.g., in Greece, Lebanon, Laos.⁷²

Other forms of external involvement, however, have been common even in cases where intervention has not occurred. Richard Cottam argues, for example, that there has been a quantitative increase in interference between societies in this century.⁷³ Examples of such outside support include material support (such as supplies of money, equipment, and advisors; military training; provision of sanctuary) and non-material support (such as

recognition of provisional governments or governments in exile, public expressions of support, etc.). Examples are found in Villa's reliance on U.S. border populations for support (Mexico); in the Vietminh's use of Chinese military aid, land, and training expertise; in Bangladesh rebels' reliance on sanctuary in India; and in the Mozambique Liberation Front's use of border areas in Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia. Similarly, Greek communists received training and sanctuary from Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union; Cuban expatriates were trained and armed in the U.S. and Guatemala prior to the Bay of Pigs attack; Cuba itself has supported revolutionary forces in Angola, Bolivia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and El Salvador; China and the Soviet Union have given support to the north Vietnamese and Vietcong during the Vietnam War, and more recently, to the contending factions in Cambodia;⁷⁴ and the Soviet Union has supported movements in Angola and Ethiopia.

One form of material support is the sale or gift of war materials to competing forces in internal conflicts. Such transfers generally benefit incumbents rather than insurgents, at least insofar as the record is known. This may be a function, in part, of the constraints imposed by traditional international legal norms which presume legitimacy on the part of incumbent regimes. Thus there have been fewer constraints on arms sales to recognized governments, but sales to insurgents are

often covert because they are not publicly sanctioned.⁷⁵ Evidence on the true extent of outside supply to either set of actors is limited but it is assumed in the literature that the Soviet Union has supplied arms to China, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia, Libya, the Congo, and Angola; that the U.S. has propped up many incumbent regimes in Latin America by extensive military aid, and has also supplied materiel to factions in Nicaragua, Laos, Guatemala, and Iran. Similarly, France, Portugal and South Africa are reported to have sent arms to the Ibos in Nigeria; Iran is said to have aided Iraq's Kurdish insurgents; and so forth.⁷⁶

In addition to cases in which transfers have occurred there is a shadow world of transnational and governmental activity which involves movement of men and resources across the territorial boundaries of another state in order to foment internal disorder.⁷⁷ At this level, one finds direct activities of external groups aimed at subverting the established order within the state, either covertly through the encouragement and support of domestic insurgents or overtly through operations of mercenaries or troops inside the target state, e.g., U.S. efforts to overthrow regimes in Chile and Guatemala, Nicaraguan and German "fifth-column" techniques, etc.

When undertaken by a revolutionary power such a policy of subversion may be referred to as "revolution

for export" -- a specific policy aimed at spreading civil conflict in a target state, e.g., Cuban involvement in Angola. Perhaps the most significant efforts to "export revolution" have been those of the major communist regimes to encourage and aid anti-Western revolts in this century. Beginning with the activities of the first Communist International in 1919 and continuing through the Soviet Union's and China's support of wars of national liberation, these policies have provided strong ideological and material support for groups and parties within other states who have sought change toward Marxist societies.⁷⁸ However, the Soviet Union stepped in to quash unrest in Czechoslovakia and Hungary when these conflicts took directions not to its liking. Such policies have often fostered "competitive interference" by anti-communist forces, especially the U.S., although not in areas within the Soviet Union's generally acknowledged sphere of influence.

It is obvious that the concept of external involvement which I have been explaining is difficult to operationalize. The lines between interference, intervention and "normal" influence relations between societies are often blurred. It may be, therefore, quite difficult in practice to distinguish between "revolution for export" and other subversive activities undertaken by governments against incumbent regimes in other states. Moreover, in a world where ideological competi-

tion persists, there is little to distinguish such a policy in principle from one of "counter-revolution for export." Both consist of support for friendly elements in other societies; both are likely to be covert; one may originate in a state which styles itself as revolutionary and wishes to promote the development of like-minded regimes, while the other stems from the desire of a status quo power to prevent changes in international alignments which might result from the overthrow of existing regimes.

C. International Organization Involvement

In the preceding discussion of external support I assumed that the outside actors were primarily groups or governments. But there are other actors, such as international organizations, which may have considerable impact on these conflicts, both through the support they may give to contending factions and by their attempts to limit and control the conflicts and outside involvement in them.⁷⁹

On the face of it one might consider the role of these organizations as extremely limited. International bodies are generally constrained by their own charters from interfering in the domestic affairs of the members, e.g., Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter prohibits intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of states.⁸⁰ Moreover, internal conflicts are not even mentioned in the Charter.

Despite the formal limitations, however, the U.N. has found ways to justify its action when there have been internal conflicts which have threatened to affect other states, although these incursions into the internal affairs of states in turmoil have been conditioned by the limited nature of the U.N. mandate and by political considerations. Even in the most extreme examples of U.N. involvement, such as the Congo operation, the U.N.'s initiatives have been designed to limit expansion of the conflict by preventing direct involvement of outside powers. Despite the constraints, the record of international organization involvement since 1945 is considerable. Evan Luard argues that, "of the civil wars of the post war period (excluding colonial wars and those concerning minorities) over half have been confronted by the U.N. in some form or other."⁸¹

In early cases the U.N. considered internal conflicts only if there were charges of external involvement, such as in the Greek civil war, and the conflicts in Lebanon, Laos and Yemen. More recently, the U.N. has been willing to examine cases irrespective of evidence or charges of external involvement.

Linda B. Miller claims that the U.N. has had important roles in three types of internal conflicts:⁸²

- 1) colonial wars, e.g., insurgents in Indonesia, Algeria, and Angola actually called for U.N. involvement as a means of publicizing grievances

against incumbents;

- 2) conflicts involving a breakdown of law and order, e.g., the Congo, Cyprus, and the Dominican Republic; here the U.N. tried to prevent external involvement from increasing for fear that the local violence would escalate into a larger, Cold War conflict;
- 3) proxy wars and cases involving aggression and subversion, e.g., superpower involvement in Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Lebanon, Laos, Vietnam, and Egyptian and Saudi Arabian intervention in Yemen.

What has been the impact of U.N. involvement? There is some evidence that it has helped to limit further outside involvement and to prevent spillover to neighboring areas, but it has not been able to resolve the underlying problems which led to the conflicts. in the first place.⁸³ Moreover, with few exceptions, the U.N. has tried to either stop external involvement or to give its blessings to the involvement of one major power, rather than acting in an independent fashion. In the Congo, for example, the U.N. did not end the internal strife, but did end the Katanga secession, help to restore some semblance of law and order and forestall an escalation of superpower involvement. In the Cyprus case, the presence of U.N. forces helped to ease tensions and facilitated discussion among opponents, but did not create a political settlement of the

basic issues.⁸⁴

In many cases of internal conflict there has been little or no U.N. action. Both the Vietnam conflict and the Nigerian Civil War were handled basically outside the U.N., although both posed threats to international peace and there was little doubt that external assistance was playing a major role.⁸⁵ Moreover, the differences between these conflicts and those in which the U.N. did act were minimal. The critical difference in the Vietnamese case was that the principals and their external allies preferred to handle matters outside the U.N.⁸⁶ In the Nigerian case there was strong regional (O.A.U.) opposition to bringing the issue to the Security Council. African states have tended to invite U.N. participation when European powers are involved but not in intra-African disputes.

The functioning of international organizations affects civil strife in other ways as well. First, because the level of global authority for conflict management is low and dependent upon a generally non-existent international consensus, factions in internal struggles and external actors who might be drawn in cannot rely on international bodies to act. The resulting inaction increases both the opportunity and motivational factors for unilateral outside involvement by states. Second, when civil conflicts are considered in international organizations, they immediately become inter-

nationalized. The "limelight effect" which this creates may encourage weaker parties to continue fighting simply because of the new found legitimacy bestowed upon their cause through publicity. Thus, U.N. involvement may enhance the bargaining position of the weaker group in a conflict. An example of the U.N.'s legitimizing effect is support for SWAPO. Third, because of the increased attention the disputant factions receive, outside parties may increase their support levels to the faction they see as most deserving.

Because the role of the U.N. is to contain, insulate, and dampen down conflict its involvement would be expected to strengthen incumbents against insurgents, as in Greece and the Congo. This is especially true of peacekeeping situations in which U.N. forces become involved only with the acquiescence of the "legitimate government."⁸⁷ Even in performing an observer role, the U.N. will reveal the degree of external support for insurgents. And since there remains a presumption of legitimacy for recognized regimes, externally assisted insurgencies are likely to become more open to criticism once the extent of foreign operations is known. However, in the case of anti-colonial conflicts there may be an opposite effect, with U.N. involvement helping to strengthen insurgents as a result of the anti-colonial majority in the U.N.

In my view, the ambivalence in the U.N. approach

to civil conflict reflects divergencies in the attitudes of groups of member states rather than real differences in the nature of the conflicts themselves. But the net effect has been to limit the specific usefulness of U.N. activity and to weaken any deterrent effect of international organizational action. While one may only speculate on the effect this inconsistency has had on the insurgents and incumbents themselves, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that: 1) insurgents or incumbents will appeal for U.N. involvement when there is a substantial "publicity value" (non-material support), or 2) when the primary goal is to prevent the competing faction from increasing its level of outside support. The notable exception to these two rules is the Congo.⁸⁸

D. Factors Influencing Outside Involvement in Internal Conflict

Some authors, such as George Modelski, state categorically that "there is no internal war without outside intervention,"⁸⁹ assuming that the dynamics of internationalization in the modern era are so strong that outside participation is virtually inevitable. Others more moderate in approach, like Burton, suggest that it is "rare to have conflict within a state which does not affect systems that cross state boundaries."⁹⁰ Still others, such as Galtung, see intervention and interference as structural conditions of the international system to such an extent that, even in non-civil strife situa-

tions, states are deeply involved in each others' affairs.⁹¹ Although on one level these assertions are valid -- to the degree that interactions have increased and cross-systemic affects are more readily felt in the modern era -- one should be cautious about accepting their validity without question, especially since loose usage of terms such as "interference" and "intervention" abounds. Hence, the conclusions which many scholars reach with regard to outside involvement in internal war are, in my view, both superficial and somewhat more sweeping than the evidence may warrant. Moreover, if one defines intervention as direct military invasion, one can find many examples of internal conflict in which it does not take place at all.⁹²

The present study does not assume that internationalization in the form of intervention is either a given or an inevitability. Other types of international involvement are far more likely. In any case, I prefer to treat outside involvement as an empirical question to be examined on a case by case basis rather than as an assumption. A more meaningful approach is one which examines the process by which outside parties become involved in internal conflicts. How, for example, does one explain why outsiders become more or less involved? What factors provide incentives for various internal conflicts?

I assume first, that two societies' interactions with each other have consequences for the participants.

This is true, moreover, even in the absence of serious internal struggle in either or both of them. Furthermore, there are international structural and normative factors which provide an objective and perceptual context for these relations. These systemic factors change over time, leading to different effects.

Second, it is necessary to connect the forms and features of direct outside involvement to the special case of internal war. To do so one should examine support as the key factor which helps us understand the mechanisms by which internationalization (involvement of outside actors) occurs. In my view, influence, interference, and/or intervention all require that one of two sequences occurs: 1) an internal faction (insurgent or incumbent) decides to ask for additional outside support; or 2) an external actor (governmental or other) decides on its own initiative to increase its support to a faction in an internal conflict. Two sets of factors influence these types of decisions. One set of factors is motivational and relates to the reasons why decisions are made to increase or decrease support levels (or to request such changes). The second group of factors can best be viewed as opportunity factors,⁹³ which affect the ability and willingness of external parties to alter the supply of resources or of internal actors to seek such alterations.

As defined in Chapter One, internal conflict is a struggle for control of the political decision

making process in a society. The major internal actors are members of the incumbent regime or of the insurgent opposition. One important sequence to examine is how the actions of outsiders influence the interaction between insurgents and incumbents. My general hypothesis is that they do so primarily by altering the flow of resources to the internal parties, i.e., by changing their levels of support. As indicated already, my notion of support is a broad one, including both tangible and intangible elements. The former are the more observable features, including the supply of money, goods and men to either faction. Linked to these direct forms of assistance are other tangible factors such as training, technical assistance and sanctuary. Among the intangibles one might list non-material items which are, nonetheless, often quite important. External actors may provide moral support and encouragement, offer recognition, and generally confer legitimacy through their public statements and actions.

Within this broad conception of internal conflict and outside influences, several assumptions are implicit. First, I assume that in most, if not all, societies, there is a certain degree of conflict among those currently in positions of authority and those who are in opposition. Some of these conflicts escalate into organized violence aimed at change. The present study argues that the international environment, both in its systemic manifesta-

tions and in the influences of outside actors, may affect the level, process and outcomes of these conflicts. As a result of outside forces operating on the internal actors, conflicts may: 1) become more or less violent; 2) be constrained from developing, or be encouraged to develop, into larger scale societal conflict; 3) be restricted from spreading to neighboring states or be encouraged to widen beyond the territory's borders, etc. Thus, international factors may have internal effects. They do so by acting on: 1) internal actors who are engaged in internal conflict, and 2) the domestic environment within which they function.

Outside involvement may be either invited or uninvited. Internationalization may occur through two sets of decision processes -- one internal and one external. To understand the decisions which lead to changes in support levels and their effects on internal actors, one should analyze the motivational and opportunity factors affecting internal and external decision makers.

1) Factors Affecting External Decisions to Change Support Levels

If one were privy to the decisional sequences of external actors in all cases of interference or intervention in internal war, one might be able to generalize that reasons a, b, c....x, or some combination of them, motivated greater or lesser external involvement in the target society. Because this type of decision reconstruc-

tion is beyond the scope of this essay, however, I restrict myself to some reasoned speculation about why external actors choose to become more involved in internal conflicts, and how the current international system affects opportunity costs for such involvement.

One of the clues to increased external involvement is the record of past involvement. That is to say that intersocietal linkages which have developed over time may play an important role in an external actor's decision to become more involved as an internal conflict escalates. According to C.R. Mitchell, "Further involvement ... is really an extension of an already existing commitment."⁹⁴ Although Mitchell is particularly concerned with the transnational linkages coupling the internal belligerents to groups in other societies, his insight may be extended to include linkages between other actors as well.⁹⁵

John Eley, for example, posits linkages between the two national systems, the international system and the system composed of transnational relationships. He concludes that because incumbents belong to all three systems and insurgents belong to at least the national and the transnational, "any action by either of the belligerents may be salient to at least two linked systems simply because of shared memberships."⁹⁶ Actors external to the society, but connected to actors within it, e.g., through economic ties, may, therefore, become concerned about the effect an internal war may have on : 1) the

national political system in which they are already active; 2) their own state's interests within the international political system; and 3) the fortunes of the groups with whom they are linked in the target society.

What are the important components of this decision making process on the part of external actors? Some of the reasons for increased or decreased support for actors in B will be related to A's own internal political dynamics, including domestic political variables such as bureaucratic conflicts, personalities and views of leadership, etc.⁹⁷ As Rosenau says, large scale changes in A's involvement in B "are very much the product of the perceptions, calculations and decisions that occur within decision making organizations and their leadership."⁹⁸ Predispositions of society A's leadership vis a vis increased involvement in B and the way such involvement may affect the domestic political fortunes of internal actors (in A) are factors likely to influence A's decisions to change its level of involvement in B's conflict.

Factors external to A which may encourage greater involvement in B are numerous and include various aspects of A's foreign policy concerns, such as:

- 1) the strategic/military gains to be made or losses prevented, especially in cases in which historical ties, treaties or informal alliances have created public commitments to maintaining the stability of other regimes. In such instances, increased involvement will generally be aimed at bolstering the strength of the incumbents;⁹⁹
- 2) the economic interests of A in B, which the government of A may fail to protect only at its own do-

mestic political risk; and the economic gains A may hope to obtain by supporting the forces of change in society B, e.g., to protect investments already made or to ensure the supply of resources needed by A;

- 3) the political benefits which may accrue to A by supporting the enemies of its enemies, whether they be insurgents or incumbents. This motivation may be linked to the desire of actors in some societies to make other societies more like their own.¹⁰⁰ And it may be "ideological" insofar as it attempts to promote the spread of an idea of social organization, e.g., democracy, socialism, etc.

Other reasons for increased involvement may center on the degree of conflict in the international system and the distribution of resources. Thus, predominant powers may increase their involvement in civil strife for reasons which are more "systemic," e.g., to preserve an existing balance of power in a region, to preserve their reputation for honoring commitments, to prevent violation of international norms, or to prevent a conflict from spilling over into neighboring areas.¹⁰¹ Or outsiders may become more involved to counter the activities of other powers with whom they are in competition for regional or global leadership. Increased involvement may also be seen as a way to gain advantage in this competition by promoting the fortunes of those in other societies whose ideological views are similar to one's own or by denying an area to an ideological opponent. Where the costs of direct confrontation between major powers is high, involvement in the domestic quarrels of others may be used as a technique to change the status quo. Outside involve-

ment may also increase when there are pressing humanitarian reasons, e.g., the U.N. High Commissioner's involvement in Africa.

In summary, there may be a number of factors motivating an external actor's decision to escalate participation as conflicts in other societies become more intense. I assume that external actors do engage in a decision making process in which costs and benefits are weighed with regard to: 1) the likely consequences of increased involvement for state A's position within its own society; and 2) the effects on the conflict in state B; and 3) the results for A's relations with other actors C,D.....X.¹⁰²

Among possible costs which A may incur are: a) the increased participation may fail to help the faction A wants or the goal it wishes to pursue; or b) it may generate counter-involvement by other actors; or c) it may prove too costly domestically to A if involvement increases beyond the original estimates. Furthermore, it may affect A's relations with other actors in the international system, and even A's reputation or status within the international community.

Besides the question of risk perception which may restrict A's involvement, it is possible that the internal decision making process in A may not be as neat as I have assumed. In particular, there may be conflicts within A's domestic system about the wisdom of increased involvement

in others' internal conflicts, e.g. the current struggle in U.S. politics over involvement in Central America. There may not, therefore, be consensus on the benefits to be gained by policies which increase (or decrease) this involvement. Moreover, actors in A, regardless of their predispositions, often function without perfect information about developments elsewhere. Hence, there is always a possibility of misperception and miscalculation.¹⁰³

In addition to factors affecting motivations of outside actors to change levels of support for actors in other conflicts, one ought to consider what Young, Moore and Rosenau have called "opportunity factors."¹⁰⁴ These include factors related to the general structure and norms of the international system, already discussed, and factors related to policies of external actors. Among the policies of external parties seen as "opportunity factors," which may affect involvement are: 1) geographic proximity;¹⁰⁵ 2) the previous level of involvement;¹⁰⁶ and 3) the disparities in resources between the external actor and actors in the target area. I would argue here that close proximity, a high level of prior interaction and significant power differentials between societies provide opportunities for greater involvement once an internal conflict escalates to violence.¹⁰⁷ I would distinguish these factors from the systemic factors cited previously since they are a function of the physical and

social interactions between specific pairs of societies, rather than of interactions among all the units in the international system.

Factors internal to target societies may also provide opportunities for outside involvement, e.g., a lack of political and social cohesion in newly independent states. In many cases their boundaries are highly artificial, having resulted from lines drawn by colonial powers; often they do not even coincide with those of the "nations" (self-defined groups) within them; many areas are poly-ethnic and hardly cohesive;¹⁰⁸ political institutional development often lags; and the resulting governments are weak and unstable. Moreover, economic problems often overwhelm the fragile new governments, especially when growing populations place great pressure on existing resources. The process of modernization itself may contribute to instability in these areas. In combination, these destabilizing forces may make small, newly independent territories easy marks for external powers.¹⁰⁹ During periods of extended civil turmoil and change, the already limited ability of such states to resist external incursions is likely to decline.¹¹⁰

There are also some serious mitigating factors which may decrease the degree of outside involvement in internal conflict, i.e., "opportunity factors" in the negative sense. Primary among these is the strong nationalism that one finds in many internal conflicts, especial-

ly in anti-colonial conflicts. To a considerable extent, this nationalism has been transformed into an international norm of "self-determination" which has tended to reinforce standard international emphases of non-interference in the internal affairs of others. Although such norms may not prevent outside involvement by a stronger society bent on interference or intervention, they are part of the international environment which decision makers must weigh carefully in their calculations of costs and benefits with regard to increased involvement.

This international normative element may be buttressed in many instances by the direct costs which even a small state may impose on a larger state which attempts to interfere or intervene, e.g., the heavy costs which the U.S. incurred at the hands of the strongly nationalistic, albeit externally supplied, North Vietnamese. Another factor which may decrease the opportunities external actors have to interfere is that the more purely local factors seem to be quite powerful in determining outcomes. By participating in local conflicts, "outsiders accept the restraints and limitations of those areas ... and may have to compete with lesser powers on a more equal footing."¹¹¹ In many cases, internal factions themselves will set limits on the forms and degrees of external support in order to maintain credibility within their own society.

2) Factors Affecting Internal Decisions to Request External Support

Whereas in the last section I asked: why do outsiders want to become more involved in other societies' conflicts, and what factors influence those decisions? here I am concerned with the mechanisms by which internal struggles become internationalized because of internal decisions. Why do actors in these conflicts appeal for outside support, and what influences those choices? My assumption is that one significant reason why external actors become involved is because they are asked to. If this is so, it behooves us to explore why the invitations are issued, as well as why they are accepted or rejected. This requires that we look at the actors in internal war, their needs and the pressures that may impel them to seek external assistance.¹¹²

If one views internal war as a competition for authority among domestic groups, stemming from a conflict involving unsatisfied demands by one or more factions,¹¹³ then one may see the logic of internationalization as an insurgent strategy. When opposition demands for change in a society are not met, dissatisfied elements may be tempted to widen the scope of conflict in the search for allies.¹¹⁴ According to Burton, this is "likely to involve the seeking of foreign assistance."¹¹⁵

For the insurgents the search for outside support

is often difficult since opposition groups in many societies generally lack the kind of access to external resources that incumbents possess and to internal resources that the incumbents have by virtue of their control of the state. One way for insurgents to equalize this disparity is by developing relations with outside actors who may support and supply them. For incumbents the search for foreign support is, by comparison, easier. As they perceive their internal opposition growing in strength they may bolster their military resources, seek advanced counterinsurgency training for their forces, try to arrange for outside neutrality or even condemnation of rebel groups by other states, parties, international organizations, etc. All of these types of assistance fall within the category of foreign support.

Factors influencing the process by which support is requested from outside actors include: 1) the actual and perceived needs of insurgents and incumbents for resources to be used in their internal competition for power; 2) their goals vis and vis each other and the society, i.e., the type of conflict in which they are engaged;¹¹⁶ and 3) the leadership which each group brings to bear on securing the necessary resources.

In turn, the success or failure of both groups in obtaining external support is related to certain factors in the external environment, including:

- 1) the structure of the international system, which

will make it either easier or more difficult to find potential allies with the requisite resources to spare, e.g., in a multipolar system the internal actors have a wider choice;

- 2) the norms of the system, which may facilitate or constrain the internal actors' success in their search;
- 3) the degree of ideological discord and instability in the system, which may allow internal actors to play off outside actors versus each other, thereby maximizing the support they may obtain;
- 4) the pre-existing pattern of relationships between actors within the state (and of the state itself) with other actors in the region or the world;
- 5) the stated policies of potential "power suppliers" in relation to assistance to insurgents in internal wars.

Mitchell argues that internal actors will invoke external aid only when they value the gains to be made from defeating the opposition more highly than they value the maintenance of the existing political system. According to him, the "costs of appeal" are likely to be quite high in the early stages of a conflict.¹¹⁷ Only at the stage of outright violence will the perceived costs of alliance with outsiders seem lower and the advantages higher. In a low level conflict, this threshold may never be reached, or internal actors may find the requisite support by allying with groups within the society. Mitchell argues that the existence of a readily available patron to whom an appeal may be directed, gives the linked group in an internal struggle a sense of security which may make it less willing to compromise on domestic issues.

Similarly, Spiegal contends that for "consumers" of

outside support non-involvement is the preferred strategy, followed by cooperation.¹¹⁸ It is clear that there are costs as well as benefits which appealers (consumers) must weigh carefully. First, there is the potential loss of autonomy that may result from the involvement of outsiders in one's own political struggles.¹¹⁹ Second, there is the possibility that the encouragement of external support may cause a loss of internal support for one's cause. In an age of nationalism, resentment of foreigners and their potential to dominate the society after an internal war may cause the appealers to lose legitimacy among the local population. Third, it is possible that chance factors may change the parameters of external involvement once it is undertaken. For example, once foreign actors have become active in the struggle, they may drop out or change their goals, leaving their internal allies in a tenuous position. Finally, the appealers must consider the possible unintended consequences of outside involvement, including the possibility of counter-involvement by other actors.¹²⁰

E. Conclusions

Support can be either open or clandestine, and provided by either governmental or non-governmental actors. It may be directed toward a variety of targets in the recipient society. Its immediate aim is to improve the fortunes of one group in its struggle for control of the levers of authority of the political system. As a have

noted, the long-term aims of outside supporters may reflect a variety of concerns, many of which may overshadow, or be only loosely related to, their goals with regard to the internal conflict itself.

The means which outsiders employ to support factions in these conflicts may include both non-material and material elements. Non-material support is likely to be relatively easier to obtain than material assistance. Although I have no conclusive proof, it does seem likely that potential costs will be lower when the elements offered are intangible; e.g., expressions of support, diplomatic lobbying of other states with an interest in the conflict, private assurances of sympathy and public support by outside governments. This is especially true if such support to an incumbent regime faced by challengers is readily sanctioned by the international community (except in cases where the regime is particularly repressive), and, therefore, costs of continuance are relatively low. On the other hand, an outright declaration of support of a rebel faction by one government is somewhat more difficult, although the norms regarding involvement on behalf of insurgents have been changing in this century.

Although I agree with Leiden and Schmitt that "it is ... difficult to quantify aid and support ... and almost impossible to be specific about inspiration,"¹²¹ it is possible that external support may have "great

psychological and diplomatic value."¹²² Peter Calvert argues that in an internal war foreign governments may "confer the mantle of legitimacy"¹²³ on an insurgent group, thereby encouraging them to fight and opening avenues of support from other parties. Recognition of a provisional or exile government at a crucial stage may tip the balance in favor of that faction. And "prospective support may be even more important than real support in convincing a revolutionary of the overwhelming power of his cause."¹²⁴ Recognition is also quite important in the period immediately following the seizure of power, as the new regime must suddenly deal officially with other governments in order to continue the society's economic and diplomatic relations.¹²⁵

In addition to the non-material support they may offer, outside actors may contribute in quite tangible ways to the efforts of incumbents to hold power and insurgents to win it. For example, external actors may affect directly the resource levels of the factions.¹²⁶ It is not uncommon for insurgents to send representatives to foreign capitals to facilitate fund raising, arms purchases and lobbying for other measures helpful to their cause.¹²⁷ Outside governments may also have a direct affect on internal conflicts by decreasing or prohibiting the export of arms to parties in the conflict. Examples of movements in the 1970's which have been heavily dependent on external support for their survival

are: the Sudanese rebels, the Sandinista and now the "Contra" guerrillas in Nicaragua and the Mozambique Liberation Front.¹²⁸

Military training is also an important element of support.¹²⁹ It has been particularly significant in U.S. relations with forces in Southeast Asia, e.g., in Thailand, in Cuba's work with insurgents in Latin America, Angola and Ethiopia, in the activities of China in Vietnam, and in Ghana and Algeria. One may also cite the role of the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Egypt. Although most such assistance that we know about is likely to be given to incumbents, especially as weaponry becomes more sophisticated, the basic training of revolutionaries may be more widespread than is apparent. Of necessity, training is likely to be covert in the early stages of a conflict and it is often done on the territory of an outside state, usually a neighbor, e.g., U.S. training of Cuban exiles in 1960-1961.¹³⁰ Training may also be combined with provision of sanctuary for insurgent forces.¹³¹

Besides the effects suggested already, there are other possible influences which external support may have. For example, as outside support increases for one faction the conflict may lose its internal character,¹³² as happened with Soviet intervention in Hungary, and with U.S., UN and Soviet involvement in the Congo. Indeed, I am suggesting that as one moves along a continuum from

influence to interference to intervention, the relative importance of internal and international factors will shift toward the international. This shift may even submerge the original causes of the conflict and drastically affect its outcome, e.g., as in Vietnam. Outside involvement may also "escalate into a direct military confrontation between sponsors of contending client groups,"¹³³ thereby prolonging a conflict. Thus, external involvement may make it more difficult to resolve a conflict, both because the internal issues may become enmeshed in the larger conflicts between external governments and because the equalization of resources may prevent either faction from winning a decisive or quick victory.

A second critical area for investigation is suggested by Gurr. According to him, "foreign support is also likely to affect the form of political violence."¹³⁴ To the extent that external support for dissidents increases their capabilities to wage war against the regime, violent internal conflict becomes increasingly likely. Thus, support may become a precipitating factor. A third area of influence, suggested by Greene, is the effect support has on the success or failure of insurgent movements.¹³⁵ In Gurr's study, thirty of fifty-four insurgent movements accepted outside support.¹³⁶ Unfortunately, he provides no data on the impact of such support on the success of these groups.

I have attempted in this section to develop a comprehensive picture of the factors associated with external involvement in internal conflict by examining the historical record and analyzing the motivational and opportunity variables relevant to such involvement. Throughout the section, I have focused on the concept of external support, arguing that it may:

- 1) help to initiate an internal conflict;
- 2) serve to prolong a conflict already underway, by providing material and non-material assistance which strengthens the competing factions;
- 3) shorten a conflict, when outside involvement is massive and decisive, or when it takes the form of international organization involvement;
- 4) promote a reconciliation or mediated settlement through outside pressure or diplomatic assistance;
- 5) change the character of an internal struggle from a national to an international event, thereby altering the outcome considerably;
- 6) influence the direction the society takes in implementing change once the actual violence in the conflict situation has ceased.

As I have considered these effects I have attempted to provide examples of the many internal conflicts in which they have occurred. I have not attempted to generalize about the types of effects most likely in various types of conflict, because as the discussion in Chapter One revealed clearly, the settings of internal struggle are not cut from one cloth. Thus, I shall argue that the nature of an internal conflict is an important variable which will influence both the degree and the

efficacy of external involvement. Hence, there is a need to develop a framework for analysis which incorporates both the internal factors cited in Chapter One and the international factors described thus far in Chapter Two. This is the task to be tackled in the concluding section of this Chapter.

V. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS IN INTERNAL CONFLICT A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

A. Introduction

Thus far in the first two chapters, I have explored the relationship between international politics and internal conflict. Drawing on literature about conflict, violence, and change, the first chapter argued that the existing literature tends to view domestic politics in isolation from the international environment. The earlier sections of Chapter Two have explored contact points between internal struggles and international politics, in regard to both systemic and discrete international factors. This section grapples with the problem presented at the outset -- developing a framework which connects the international and internal politics of internal war in a systematic way. The framework presented below is an attempt to help fill a gap in the internal conflict literature by providing a scheme which incorporates internal and international variables in explaining internal conflict.

How does one connect the two sets of variables in a way which contributes to explanation of internal conflict? Constructing such a framework is admittedly a difficult and complex task. On the one hand, the types of internal variables which are important should be specified and examined regardless of the international environment. Yet, as demonstrated in Chapter One, many variables may shape the process by which incumbents are challenged by groups willing to use violence to achieve change.¹³⁷ One strategy is to analyze the behavior of insurgents and incumbents as it is affected by the economic, social, political and ideological environment in which they function. In my view, analysis which is not grounded in the study of such internal variables will be incomplete, for all such conflicts are rooted in the fabric of life within a society.¹³⁸

Analysis of internal factors is, in fact, a prerequisite for analyzing the relationship between internal and external factors. To study this relationship one should attempt to specify how internal variables are affected by events, conditions and behavior originating or occurring outside the society. In order to do this one needs to have a clear conception of intersocietal relations. However, this is not a simple task either, since intersocietal interactions are quite complex, even in the simple case of influence relationships between two states.

James N. Rosenau has argued that "it is doubtful

whether a single theory or framework can encompass the international aspects of internal war."¹³⁹ Given the potential importance which international factors have, however, some attempt must be made to examine them in conjunction with internal factors. What is required is a model which simplifies two sets of complex social processes -- internal conflict and international politics -- and which shows the connections between them. Moreover, this model should incorporate internal and external variables in such a way that neither is neglected nor over-emphasized. Although the present study focuses on international variables, it does not assume that international aspects of internal conflict are necessarily more important than the internal factors. The relative potency of international factors remains an empirical question to be answered on a case by case basis. Thus the framework which follows is intended to facilitate exploration of an under-researched aspect of internal war -- the international aspect -- while maintaining sensitivity to the domestic factors which are basic to understanding such conflicts.¹⁴⁰

One strategy which may be used to address these problems is to look at the actors who make policy within a state. A focus on policy making groups as actors may lead us to make connections between what occurs outside the territorial system and the behavior of actors within the system. Instead of trying to generalize about the

relations between two large scale social processes -- internal and international politics -- one adopts a focus on concrete actors and their observable behavior. What one searches for are external effects on:

- 1) the resources of internal actors;
- 2) the strategies internal actors use to attain their goals;
- 3) the outcomes of the interactions among them.

The key is to focus on the constraints and opportunities which the environment (both domestic and international) provides for domestic actors, how the environment affects their behavior, and the outcomes of their interaction.

I propose then to view international variables as they affect certain identifiable units and processes internal to the state. It is my contention that such a focus may help us to make more reliable generalizations about the connections between international and internal processes in the special case of internal war.

In this study the dependent variable is internal conflict. What I wish to explore are a number of questions about how, when and how much internal variables are affected by events, conditions and interactions originating outside the society. To simplify matters, and to organize information on the internal aspects of domestic struggles, I treat them as contests for state authority between an incumbent regime and an insurgent opposition.¹⁴¹ Internal conflict is viewed as a social mobili-

zation process in which these actors compete for governmental control by acquiring and/or maintaining the support of internal and external parties. A key factor influencing the outcome of internal struggle is the effectiveness of each group in marshalling the support of other groups. As defined earlier in this chapter, "support" may be material or non-material. Both incumbents and insurgents should be seen as having physical resources, such as men, money, supplies (a factor I call "capabilities") and psychological resources, such as attitudes about success, strategy, confidence (a factor I call "will").

B. The Domestic Variables

To understand the behavior of internal actors in their struggle for state power, one might examine first what I call the "domestic actor variables," i.e., the "capabilities" and "will" of insurgents and incumbents. In my view, the behavior of these groups is a function of these two elements. I focus on domestic actors first because they are the link between the environmental factors emphasized by many analysts (social system, etc.) and the attributes of conflict which most analysts seem eager to explain (violence, change, etc.).

A second set of factors which must be examined are what I call "domestic environmental variables," such as the economic, social, political and ideological factors explored in Chapter One. These constitute the domestic

setting in which the interaction between insurgents and incumbents occurs.

I use the term "domestic conflict variable," on the other hand, to refer to:

- 1) the scope of conflict;
- 2) the level, intensity and duration of violence; and
- 3) the targets and degrees of change.

I view the first two of these elements as dimensions of the interaction between competing groups; the third of these elements refers to the outcomes of the interaction, especially the consequences for the society.


These three sets of domestic factors -- actor, environmental and conflict factors -- are represented below in Diagram 1. In this illustration, the interactions of insurgents and incumbents are viewed as a subsystem of the national society. My assumption is that their interactions are conditioned by the environmental factors cited. In particular, the domestic social, economic, political and ideological environment provides the material and moral support necessary for a group to survive. In this sense, the environment may be seen as an independent variable.

The actor variables to which I refer above, on the other hand, are intervening variables which mediate between the environmental factors and the interaction itself. In turn, the conflict variables are factors which are affected primarily by the behavior of the factions.

For example, if one were to be interested in explaining the scope of conflict and the level, intensity and duration of violence, then one would examine the relationship between actor behavior and attributes (or dimensions) of the interaction. A desire to explain change requires a further step -- that of looking for the effects on the society of the interaction between the factions.¹⁴²

DIAGRAM 1


Domestic Factors in Internal Conflict



A critical point of analysis is, thus, the effect of environmental variables on the interaction between insurgents and incumbents. In this model, domestic conflict variables will be a function of this interaction rather than of environmental factors. A linear representation of the relationship between the three types of domestic variables might look like this:

DIAGRAM 2

Relationships Between Domestic Factors



In this representation, environmental factors influence actor behavior which structures the conflict and affects the degree and type of change.

It should be noted that there are several assumptions inherent in the model presented. First, it is a model which assumes that both the structural and behavioral factors examined in Chapter One are important and that they are linked. It isolates four sets of domestic structural features which are salient. Being a model rather than a theory it tells us what area of social

reality to examine but does not guide us with any clarity through the maze of causality.

Second, the model assumes that the environmental (structural) factors act primarily on the resources of participants in the struggle. Thus, it assumes that it is important to see how the environment affects both the capabilities and the will of opposing parties in a conflict.

Third, the model posits the notion that the goal of interaction between insurgents and incumbents is the achievement (or maintenance) of state power. Rather than focusing on goals per se, the model directs the researcher to examine the ability of groups to carry on the conflict to a final resolution.

Fourth, the model assumes that the interaction of the competing parties will determine: 1) the scope of the conflict; 2) the level, duration and intensity of the violence the parties use; and 3) the degree and type of change achieved.

Fifth, the model assumes that there is no easy shortcut which will explain the relationship between the structural environmental variables and the conflict variables.

Finally, the model assumes that there may be feedback from changes in the actor variables and/or the conflict variable back to the environmental variables.

How far one carries an analysis based on this, or

any other, model depends, of course, on precisely what it is that one wishes to explain. An analyst interested, for example, in the effects of domestic environmental factors on incumbent/insurgent behavior might pursue analysis only to the point at which conflict erupts, rather than to the point of regime change or the point at which long term consequences for the society materialize. Another analyst, in contrast, might try to correlate changes in environmental variables with changes in the scope of conflict, level of violence, or degree of change achieved, but without examining the actor variables. The latter approach, however, would be unsatisfactory for my own purposes because it would omit an important intervening variable -- actor behavior. Analysis of such behavior is crucial to understanding internal conflict, for it is the interaction between competing groups which actually defines the conflict. It is, in my view, quite difficult to move directly from analysis of structural factors (domestic environmental variables) to correlations with conflict variables without considering the behavior of the actors involved.


C. The International Variables

Building on my argument that the domestic environment conditions the behavior of actors in internal conflict, it becomes important to look at other environmental factors which may influence the actors in internal war

and/or the domestic environment in which they function. If one accepts the notion that national systems are not impermeable, but instead, highly porous to outside influences, it then becomes important to examine international factors such as the structural and normative systemic factors and the discrete external factors described earlier in the second chapter.

One may attempt to determine the impact of international factors by examining the relationship between: 1) international systemic factors and domestic environmental, actor and conflict variables; and 2) discrete external factors and domestic environmental, actor and conflict variables. These relationships are summarized in Diagram 3 below.

DIAGRAM 3



In an attempt to be highly comprehensive one might be tempted to examine all nine sets of linkages suggested

in this diagram. Alternatively, one might choose to adopt one of three strategies. Assuming that it is useful to include analysis of both the systemic and the discrete factors, one might focus on the effect on:

- 1) the domestic environment, or
- 2) the actors themselves, or
- 3) the dimensions of conflict.

In this dissertation I have chosen to focus on the relationship between international factors and domestic actor variables as a strategy to simplify analysis.


For the sake of clarity we will begin by examining the impact of discrete international factors. These factors (which are best seen as inputs from external actors to the society in conflict) act directly on internal actors by affecting their capabilities and will via support or non-support. It is my argument that the degree and types of external support may affect directly the goals, means, and strategies of insurgent and incumbent factions, both with regard to their competition with each other, and in their relations with other parties in the external environment. Discrete external initiatives may also determine how effective internal actors are in their competition for power. Moreover, the likelihood of external support will influence the foreign policies of the factions, i.e., what leaders do to maximize external support while minimizing dependence on external suppliers and their direct involvement in the conflict. External

inputs may also act on the domestic environment in which the factions compete, e.g., by partially affecting the economic and political systems. These environmental efforts may have an indirect effect on the actors as well.

Discrete influences are represented by Diagram 4.

DIAGRAM 4


Discrete External Influences on
Internal Conflict



In addition to examining these direct kinds of influences stemming from the actions of external actors one may also examine international systemic factors -- both structural and normative. These potential influences are illustrated in Diagram 5 below.

DIAGRAM 5

Potential Systemic Impacts on Internal Conflict



Regarding systemic factors, one should look for several things. First, one should study the effect of international system structure on the foreign policy initiatives (outputs) of insurgents and incumbents, and on the foreign policy initiatives of external actors in relation to the conflict in Society A (lines a^1 , a^2

and a³). Regarding international systemic structural effects, one would search for impact on internal actors' strategies for obtaining external support. It is my contention that the structure of the international system provides both opportunities for obtaining support and motivation for seeking it from certain parties. International structure also conditions the success of such initiatives. It is also my argument that systemic factors may affect both the "capabilities" and "will" of competing parties, and the ways they pursue and publicize their internal change goals. The structure of the international system may also affect the policies of external states vis a vis involvement in an internal conflict.

Systemic norms, on the other hand, may affect the behavior of internal factions by influencing the parties will to compete. Norms may also affect the capabilities of internal actors, although indirectly, by their effect on policies of external states regarding support for parties in internal conflicts.


D. Research Strategy

My strategy in this dissertation is to focus on the interaction between insurgents and incumbents, and to look for elements of the environment (both domestic and international) which affect that interaction. Thus, I treat the domestic and international environments as independent variables, and the interaction between fac-

tions as a dependent variable. The intervening variable in this case is internal actor behavior or leadership, which mediates between the resources and the interaction. In this regard, it is my assertion that the capabilities and the will of actors are important.


The domestic environment affects the actors by providing resources (physical and psychological) which structure the interaction, i.e., the choices and actions of internal actors vis a vis each other. A graphic representation appears as Diagram 6.

DIAGRAM 6




The discrete international environment (consisting of the foreign policies of external states) affects this relationship by acting both on the domestic environment and on the actors themselves through the mechanism of support.

DIAGRAM 7



The systemic international environment, on the other hand, acts both on the discrete external actors and on the internal factions.

DIAGRAM 8



Thus, the effects of systemic variables may be somewhat more mediated than are the effects of discrete international variables.


Accordingly, with regard to internal actors one focuses on their foreign policies, their resources and their will. With respect to external actors (other states, international organizations, etc.) one focuses on their policies toward the factions in the conflict (i.e., on their motivation and their opportunities to become more or less involved, and also on the degree and type of support which is given).

One element missing from this framework thus far is the relationship between these variables and the "conflict variables" described earlier: 1) the scope of conflict; 2) the level, duration and intensity of violence; and 3) the type and degree of change achieved.¹⁴³ Although in Chapter One I grouped the conflict, violence and change variables together, there are obviously significant

differences between them. As noted earlier in this chapter, the conflict and the violence variables refer to characteristics of the interaction. The degree and type of change achieved, however, are outcomes of the interaction rather than dimensions of it.

A revised Diagram 6 might, therefore, look like this:

DIAGRAM 9



In this illustration, change becomes a feedback loop which pertains primarily to the domestic environment and which describes the alterations in the domestic systems which occur as a result of the interaction between the factions.¹⁴⁴

The framework presented herein is designed to assist the student of internal conflict trace the pathways of "international impact." It is my hope that application of this model will lead one to a more comprehensive

analysis of internal conflict than traditional approaches which focus on the domestic factors alone. First, the focus on the behavior and perception of insurgents and incumbents, and on the environmental forces impinging on them, may help to foster better explanations of insurgent and incumbent strategies for obtaining support. The choices and actions of the competing groups in relation to each other may be affected by the need for external support, by a high degree of involvement by external parties, by the structure and norms of the international system, etc.

Moreover, certain dimensions of the interaction, such as the scope of conflict and the level of violence, may also be influenced by the impact of external support. In addition, the consequences for the society of the interaction between insurgents and incumbents may be influenced by which party wins power and the bargains it may have made with internal and external parties in the process. Thus, there may also be indirect influences by international variables on the degree of change achieved.

Regarding the relationship between our three initial variables (conflict, violence and change) and international factors, one may develop certain hypotheses. For example, as discrete external involvement increases the scope of conflict is likely to widen. Discrete involvement by two or more external actors may turn a national conflict into an international conflict.¹⁴⁵

International organization involvement, in contrast, may tend to limit bilateral or unilateral involvement by other states, but may also strengthen one faction over another; e.g., as in the Congo.¹⁴⁶ Extensive prior involvement by an outside party, e.g., in the case of a colonial relationship, may actually contribute to the development of an insurgent movement by building up dissatisfaction with external control and contributing to the nationalist character of revolt.

Regarding the relationship between discrete external involvement and violence, one may find that external involvement by outsiders will increase the level of violence but that it may shorten its duration. When the preponderance of support goes to one side, international organization involvement will tend to limit the level of violence but may not be effective in ending a conflict.

Regarding the relationship between societal change and international variables, generalization is more difficult. There are too many variables intervening between the influences of the international environment and the domestic consequences of internal strife to make any reliable generalizations without far more case study literature than is presently available.

One additional problem is to choose a meaningful time frame within which to assess the degree and type of change. In this study, the period used to judge

change encompasses the few years immediately preceding a violent change of regime up to a point several years beyond the actual seizure of power. This period allows assessment of the degree of change and enables one to examine the impact which international factors may have in the post-power period during which significant changes are often made.¹⁴⁷ As for generalization about the relationship between international factors and societal change, this study hopes only to add to the case study literature.

E. Methodology

Chapters Three and Four will explore the domestic and international politics of the 1959 Cuban internal conflict. My choice of the case study approach is based on several assumptions. First, as the Feierabends and Gurr argue in a recent volume, "Case studies provide a kind of understanding that is not easily conveyed by general comparative studies. The single case best illustrates how a constellation of variables interacts to lead to a specific outcome."¹⁴⁸ Second, since the purpose of the case study is to test the utility of a particular research strategy in a concrete case, an in-depth analysis should provide a good test. If the approach is useful in one case it may have value in others as well. In addition, the test may provide further refinement of the framework and suggest other

avenues of research as well.

Rather than maximizing comparability to many cases, and thereby risking superficiality, I have chosen to strive for historical detail and accuracy. As a result, this study must be viewed as only a first step in a long process of empirical verification rather than the final stage in that process. To overcome some of the limitations of the single case study approach, however, the concluding section of the dissertation attempts to draw some comparisons to other cases.

In undertaking the Cuban case study, I pose a series of questions about internal and external factors and the relationship between them. The major questions are grouped in five categories below. My strategy has been to build analysis from the inside out, beginning with a focus on the internal actors and moving to analysis of the domestic environment in which they compete for power. The analysis then broadens to include the relationship between discrete international factors and domestic environmental and actor variables. Finally, the study considers the role which systemic factors may play in affecting external and internal actors and the environments in which they function. The questions which follow serve as an approach to studying the historical record on the Cuban conflict. In my view, this set of questions may be fruitfully applied to other cases as well.

I. Domestic Factors (Actor and Environmental)

- A. *Who are the major groups in the society?
 - *What are their views of the conflict?
 - *What are their goals?
 - *What resources do they have?
 - *What issues are most salient to them?

- B. *What are the basic economic, social, political and ideological forces underlying the conflict?
 - *Is there a predominant one? In what time period? Why?
 - *Can the four types of factors be categorized as precipitants, preconditions, or some mixture?
 - *Regarding insurgents' goals, are they directed toward change of leaders or change of basic institutions? Is this a conflict directed at removal of a foreign power?

- C. *What kind of social mobilization process occurs?
 - *How, when and where does conflict erupt?
 - *How widespread and how intense is the violence?
 - *What are the turning points, if any, in the struggle?

*What domestic environmental factors seem most important in explaining why events took the course they did?

II. External Relations of Internal Actors

A. *Historically, what has been the position of the state in the international system?

*Was it formerly a colony?

*How long has it been independent?

*What is its relationship with countries on which it was dependent?

B. *How important is the state in the world and regional economies?

*Are there other ways in which the state is considered vitally important to the world community? to the region? to any of the world powers?

C. *What is the state's view of itself in relation to other states?

*Is the state's foreign policy insular, neutral, expansionist, other?

*Who are its traditional enemies, allies?

*What are its affiliations with international organizations (international and regional)?

*What are its treaty commitments?

- D. *What is the state's approach to foreign policy?
- *Are there strong ideological components?
 - *What evidence is there of differences between incumbents and insurgents on foreign policy on the international system?
 - *What significant transnational links exist between insurgents/incumbents and groups in other states?
 - *What value do leaders place on international norms?
- E. *How receptive are leaders of both factions to overtures of external actors?
- *How reliant are they upon external actors for moral support? for arms? money? bases of operation? training and technical assistance?
 - *What costs can each faction impose on states considering interference/intervention?
 - *How are the actions and policies of external actors perceived by factional leadership?
 - *What effect do these perceptions have on the actions and policies of internal groups?
 - *To what extent is outside assistance courted by factional leadership?
 - *How do leaders manipulate ideology, moderate

their actions (or make these more extreme)
to gain additional outside support?

III. Discrete International Factors

- A. *How important is the state in the perception
of the major powers? of regional powers?
- *What are the extent and nature of external
interests?
- *Are they predominantly economic, military,
ideological or other?
- *What is the level of involvement of the society
with others (non-involvement, normal influence
relations, interference in one or more sectors,
intervention, penetration, etc.)? To what
extent do external parties control key groups
within the society or key elements within
the economic, social or political subsystems?
- *Is there a history of external interference?
intervention? penetration? excessive depen-
dence by any sector of the society on external
actors?
- *What resources can outside actors bring to
bear on the actors in the conflict?
- *What influence do external actors have on the
domestic environment?
- *What are the constraints on the use of these
resources on internal actors? (treaties,

alliances, moral codes, etc.)

- *How are attempts to interfere received by insurgents/incumbents? How do they respond?
- *In the context of the times, how reasonable are the assumptions and perceptions of internal factions concerning the extent and seriousness of such external involvement?

- B. *What evidence is there of deviation from the "normal" pattern of interaction between the state and outside actors?
- *Is there evidence that external parties have been directly involved?
- *Precisely what means/techniques have been used by external actors? on what targets? with what intent? to what effect?
- *Can it be said that externally initiated acts are critical or predominant at any time?
- *To what extent does it appear that insurgents have succeeded or failed on their own merits rather than by external support?

IV. International Systemic Factors

- A. *What is the structure of the international political system? (the number of actors, the distribution of resources)

*Is there a high or low degree of consensus on goals?

*What are the significant aspects of the international economic system?

B. *Does this system encourage or discourage interference or intervention in the conflicts of other states? in what ways? under what conditions?

*How effective are the constraints on interference, intervention, penetration, colonization, annexation?

*Are these constraints more a result of the structure of power in the system or of the norms of the system?

*What is the role played by international organization in this regard?

FOOTNOTES

¹George Pettee, The Process of Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1938), p. 39. Unfortunately, Pettee does not incorporate such a focus within this otherwise important work.

²Steven L. Spiegel, Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), p. 1.

³James H. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 127.

⁴There are two aspects to the relationship between internal conflict and the international political process. First, one may treat internal war as an independent variable, i.e., as a phenomenon which may affect aspects of international politics. In this view, the international political system becomes the "dependent variable," and what one attempts to explain is the impact which internal struggles (or the changing frequency and character of these conflicts in general) have had on the interactions between actors in the international system.

One may also ask: what has been the impact historically of major internal conflicts on the relations between major actors in international politics? How, for example, have internal struggles had an impact on the course of human history? Have they led the international political system in directions it might not otherwise have taken? What has been the effect of these struggles on the structure and stability of the international political system? Common to all these questions is a concern for the manner in (and degree to) which internal conflicts have become internationalized and the effects they have had.

A second way to view the internal conflict/international politics relationship is to treat internal war as the dependent variable. What one searches for here are: 1) the ways in which relations between actors in international politics affect the frequency and character of internal conflicts in general; or 2) the impact that these relations have on specific internal quarrels.

There is nothing inherently more correct about either of these approaches. They are simply the two sides of the relationship treated from different angles

of view. As such they may fairly be judged only on the basis of how useful they are for resolving the various types of questions which the user wishes to answer.

⁵These constraints are not merely perceptual but actual. See Harold and Margaret Sprout for a discussion of this distinction as it pertains to foreign policy making. "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution I (1957): 309-328.

⁶"Interference" and "intervention" are two common referents for such exogenous efforts.

⁷The question here was whether the conflict was generated indigenously by south Vietnamese dissidents or initiated by "invaders" from the North. This raises the larger question, in addition, as to how one would deal with the problem of discovering whether the degree of outside involvement was sufficient to say a given conflict was "externally initiated."

⁸In Latin America, for example, Che Guevara's efforts failed, presumably because the conditions were not ripe for the development of the type of revolutionary movement which worked in Cuba. In addition, by this time, governments in target states had become more adept at counter-insurgency techniques and more able to muster the resources to destroy incipient revolutionary movements thanks to U.S. assistance.

⁹Whether internal conflicts have become international events because of policies involving "revolution for export" and the responses to it in a competitive world political system, or whether the conflicts have developed indigenously and merely presented opportunities for external involvement, has varied from case to case.

¹⁰Andrew M. Scott, "The Logic of International Interaction," International Studies Quarterly 21:3 (September 1977): 429.

¹¹Raymond Aron, Peace and War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), p. 371.

¹²For my purposes, I compare the twentieth to earlier centuries. However, it may be assumed that some of the changes which I discuss are more prominent in the post World War II system than in the international system of even the early twentieth century.

¹³James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations (Phil-

adelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1971), p. 236. They argue further that, "virtually any conflict which occurs within the ken of newsgathering agencies becomes an item in the environment of international relations," p. 252.

¹⁴James N. Rosenau, "Linkage Politics," in Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 44-67. In general, one does not find an abundance of writing which explores the national/international linkages carefully. Rosenau considers the inputs and outputs which a national system may experience or generate; the fundamental assumption of the linkage politics approach (and it must be stressed that it is not a theory) is that the life of a polity is conditioned by far more than purposeful actions that other polities direct at it. Actors and processes which are primarily internal may be affected unintentionally by events abroad, and adjust to these occurrences in their external environment. The external environment is defined broadly by Rosenau to include the contiguous, regional, cold war, racial, resource and organizational environments. Unfortunately, the output of the "linkage politics school" has produced rather meager results, perhaps because it lacks a sound theoretical underpinning. On interdependence see: Orbis (Spring 1972), pp. 155-173; Richard Rosecrance and A. Stein, "Interdependence: Myth and Reality," World Politics (October 1977), pp. 1-3.

¹⁵On transnational relations see John Burton, World Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Karl Kaiser, "Toward a Theory of Multi-National Politics," International Organization (Autumn 1971) pp. 790-818; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," World Politics 25 (April 1973): 332-368.

¹⁶Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

¹⁷John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). See also Herz' arguments regarding the demise of the territorial state in The Nation State and the Crisis of World Politics (New York: McKay, 1976).

¹⁸See especially Stanley Hoffmann's excellent discussion of the changing essence of power in Gulliver's Troubles: Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); and the October, 1977 issue of Foreign Affairs which is devoted to this debate.

¹⁹Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p. 236.

²⁰Rosenau, "Linkage Politics Revisited," in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), p. 248. These authors agree that we can no longer be confident that the traditional dichotomy between foreign and domestic politics is very effective as an analytical strategy. One cannot ignore the international environment -- in the great states because they are intimately involved in critical transactions throughout the world, and in the smaller states because they are weak and dependent.

²¹For a summary of the major systemic works see Charles A. McClelland, "Applications of General Systems Theory in International Relations," in International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 412-420, and Theory and the International System (London: MacMillan, 1966); see also John J. Weltman, Systems Theory in International Relations (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1973). Of course, Morton Kaplan's System and Process in International Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957) remains the seminal work on the structure of the international system and its consequences. He does explore some of the relationships between internal conflict and international systems in "Intervention in Internal War: Some Systemic Sources," in International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. James N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 92-121.

²²An interesting and well respected volume on types of international systems is Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967). In this volume Rosecrance describes nine historical systems (including the balance of power, empire, bipolar) based on different principles or "rules of the game" which appear to have shaped behavior in them. On the subject of the current international system see Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus (Summer 1968), pp. 880-909; Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," World Politics 16 (1964): 390-406; Richard Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and the Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution 10:3 (1966): 314-327; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Balance of Power Delusion," Foreign Policy 7 (Summer 1972):60-68.

²³This notion has been called into question indirectly by the concept of "issue areas" in international politics. Recent studies argue that one may classify systems of interaction on the basis of the types of issues they process. For example, the "international security system" deals with questions of strategic relations among units (arms races and their limitation, nuclear prolifera-

tion, the strategic balance, etc.). The international political economy, in contrast, processes issues of monetary relations, international trade, aid, etc. Similarly, other "issue areas" may define other "systems." There is no guarantee that actors in one issue area will also be actors in another, nor that their power will be consistent across all issues. Some systems may be less than universal; systems may be more or less organized, etc. As Stanley Hoffman has argued, there may be more than one "chessboard" on which the game of international relations is played. The military/strategic considerations which once dominated the international political process may have given way to different sets of actors and different rules of operation. Nye and Keohane even contend that there are different "international regimes" for different issues.

What this new research asserts is the very complexity of international politics which earlier systemic theorists attempted to simplify for the purposes of analysis. Even the more sophisticated typologies of systems developed in the late 1950's and early 1960's, e.g., Morton Kaplan's, are based on simple assumptions about the units in interaction. The basic assumption was that the primary units were states, and that states were basically unitary actors whose governments spoke for their societies. The more recent literature, however, raises questions about the degree to which these assumptions distort rather than reflect reality and, therefore, their utility for analysis. Thus, the burgeoning literature on transnationalism and issue areas may be seen as a reaction to earlier attempts to explain behavior which may have been overly simplistic to begin with and which may now not reflect changes which have occurred. It is an empirical question whether the international system has become as complex as these authors contend and, if so, whether this condition is temporary or lasting. What this new thrust in the literature does is to suggest that it may be more useful and more accurate to assume the existence of more than one "international system" to study and understand international politics. For the purposes of this study, however, and despite a certain sympathy with the newer approach, I have assumed the existence of a single international system, albeit a complex one. This system is described in terms of the five factors indicated in the text.

²⁴Because the existing literature on internal conflict, as summarized in Chapter One, does not reflect a concern with the effects of international factors, I have turned to the literature on international politics

for guidance. In particular, I have examined the theoretical literature on international systems and external influences on foreign policy, as well as the writing on intervention and international organization, in order to develop some useful perspectives on internal processes of states.

²⁵See Wolfram Hanreider, "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review 61 (December 1967): 971-982; J. E. Harf, D. F. Hoovier, and T. E. James, Jr., "Systemic and External Attributes in Foreign Policy Analysis," in Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods, ed. James N. Rosenau (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1978); Wolfram Hanreider, Comparative Foreign Policy (New York: McKay, 1971); Howard H. Lentner, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1973); Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, and Charles F. Hermann, eds., Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1978); Richard L. Merritt, ed., Foreign Policy Analysis (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975); and James N. Rosenau, "Theories and Pre-theories of Foreign Policy."

²⁶Maurice E. East, "The International System Perspective in Foreign Policy," in East, et al, eds., p. 150, argues that "many discussions of international systems variables have been marred by the failure to maintain the distinction between systemic and external variables." Here, external variables are those attributes of a nation which require reference to some external entity in order to give the variable meaning, e.g., for Cuba -- the distance from the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Moreover, East contends that "few, if any, empirical studies that attempt to relate international system variables to foreign policy behavior have been carried out."

²⁷Having asserted that there is some relationship between the nature of the international system and the states within it, one is led to ask: what difference does the international system make for internal conflict? One may approach an answer to this question either in general terms or with regard to specific instances of internal conflict. In the general sense, one may argue that the structure and norms of international systems seem to be related to the frequency and intensity of internal conflict in a particular historical era. One might attempt to demonstrate such correlations by comparing

structural characteristics of various international systems with data on the amount and type of internal conflict which occurs in those systems. Having done this, one might discover correlations between the type of external system and internal conflict, e.g., one might hypothesize that in a bipolar system with strong ideological overtones there would be quicker internationalization of internal conflict than in a balance of power system. As interesting as such research might be, however, these are not my primary concerns in this dissertation.

²⁸Aron, Chapter Four.

²⁹Kelly and Miller, p. 248.

³⁰Rudolph J. Rummel, "Some Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," in Wilkenfeld, pp. 59-107.

³¹East, p. 152.

³²Ibid., p. 155.

³³Oran Young, "Systemic Bases of Intervention," in, Law and Civil War in the Modern World, ed. John Norton Moore (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins, 1974), pp. 111-126.

³⁴Oran Young, "Intervention and the International System," Journal of International Affairs 22:2 (1968): 177-178.

³⁵Young, "Systemic Bases," p. 120.

³⁶James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," in The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 300-302.

³⁷See Spiegal, and also F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1963) and A.F.K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958).

³⁸Richard Falk, "World Revolution and International Order," in Revolution: Nomos VII, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton, 1967), p. 155.

³⁹Young, "Intervention and the International System," p. 186.

⁴⁰The calculations of decision makers about the likely responses of other actors to the decisions they make and implement are undoubtedly important. The anticipated responses of outside elites, thus, may be considered as an element in the thinking of decision makers, and the actual attitudes/beliefs/norms will affect the success of their initiatives by prompting support or non-support of them. Foreign policy decision makers, with rare exceptions, do not generally wish to antagonize a majority of the world's elites by acting in ways which fall outside current norms. Exceptions to this are found primarily when compelling material or security interests of states make leaders willing to absorb the costs of world condemnation in order to further their goals. On the role of anticipated reactions or "silent power" see Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

⁴¹Arnold Fraleigh contends that with regard to Algeria, "The developing international law of decolonization served as a positive incitement to revolution." Cited in Richard Falk, ed., The International Law of Civil War (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins, 1971), p. 210.

⁴²See Falk; Moore; R.J. Vincent, Non-Intervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), and Evan Luard, ed., The International Regulation of Civil War (New York: New York University Press, 1972).

⁴³Keith R. Legg and James F. Morrison, Politics and the International System (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 228.

⁴⁴Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1967).

⁴⁵Edwin Brown Firmage, "Summary and Interpretations," in Falk, p. 405.

⁴⁶See Richard Falk's "Introduction" in Falk, p. 13.

⁴⁷Belligerency requires neutrality by third party states since it is assumed that there is a situation akin to an interstate war. Belligerency, thus, places the insurgents and incumbents on relatively equal footing, and allows third party aid. "Insurgency," on the other hand, as a condition of international law, does not require neutrality, nor does it sanction aid to insurgents. The line between insurgency and belligerency has always been

difficult to draw because there has been no centralized authority to make the final decision when either state of affairs exists.

⁴⁸Firmage, p. 407.

⁴⁹Wolfgang Friedmann as quoted in Firmage, p. 409.

⁵⁰Kathryn Boats, "The Internal War in Yemen," in Falk, p. 335.

⁵¹See John Herz' ruminations on this theme in The Nation State.

⁵²I have chosen not to discuss the role of international organizations in internal conflict in this section, although a case could be made that the U.N. and other international institutions are systemic actors. Instead, what I have tried to do is separate out two elements of the international system which may vary -- its structure and its norms -- and whose variance may affect internal conflicts. In the next section, where I focus more directly on actors and their observable behavior, I consider the role of international organizations as actors in internal conflict.

⁵³Two helpful works about foreign policy decision making are: Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Aspin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York, Free Press, 1962), and Glenn Paige's case study, The Korean Decision (New York: Free Press, 1968). Recent works on bureaucratic politics have supplemented this approach, e.g., Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), and Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974).

⁵⁴I have borrowed this notion from Harold and Margaret Sprout, who argue that the international environment acts in two ways on decision makers: 1) on their perceptions; and 2) as a constraint on the outcomes of their policies.

⁵⁵On the impact of "international political culture" see Mostafa Rejai, The Strategy of Political Revolution (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1973); and Legg and Morrison; on the role of international organization and norms as constraints in foreign policy making see K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967);

on international law and foreign policy see Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968).

⁵⁶Spiegel; Cf. East's view that the actors, issues, structure, resources and organization are what define a system; however, he stops short of positing the kind of objective/subjective dichotomy to which I refer.

⁵⁷Waltz argues that the most important aspect of the international system is its structure; it accounts for those consequences of foreign policy activity which are not intended. "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus (Summer 1964), pp. 881-909. See also Waltz's contribution to the Handbook of Political Science, Volume 8, "Theory of International Relations," eds. Fred W. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975); and George Questor, "The World Political System," in the same volume.

⁵⁸John W. Burton, Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1968), argues that "Decision makers respond to a situation -- a set of circumstances. The underlying forces creating the situation are not apparent and would not be considered relevant by the decision maker at the time of his decision." Moreover, "it is this black box of decision making that holds the secret to an understanding of international politics. Whatever, the stimulus is in objective terms ... the reality in international politics is how it is perceived," p. 185. Harold and Margaret Sprout contend that it is fruitful to distinguish between the relation of environmental factors to policy decisions and their operational results. What matters with regard to policy making is how the policy maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it really is; with respect to operational results of policies decided upon what counts is how things are, not how the policy maker imagines them to be.

⁵⁹This "subjective" systemic variable is what Walter Lippmann might have called the leadership's "picture in the head" about the makeup of the international system. There is, of course, no necessary congruence between these pictures and the objective reality. Inaccurate perceptions of the international environment may, in fact, doom a state's foreign policy to failure.

⁶⁰See Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), and Richard Barnet, Roots of War (New York: Penguin Books, 1971).

⁶¹Moore, p. xii.

⁶²Young, "Intervention and the International System," p. 178.

⁶³Traditionally, international relations has been studied as state to state interaction. More recently, analysts have become more sensitive to interaction between groups within one state and groups within another.

⁶⁴Of course, one society (or group within it) may influence others without intending to.

⁶⁵It should be noted that although this continuum focuses on levels of involvement between societies, it does not deal adequately with the question of "demonstration effects," e.g., the potential, and perhaps unintentional, influence which an event or events (such as a successful insurgency) may have on other states. For example, the 1830 French revolution helped to persuade the British to accept suffrage reform in 1832. It can be argued similarly that Swedish Conservatives gave in to universal suffrage in 1918 when the collapse of Imperial Germany demonstrated the hopelessness of their position. The French Revolution itself is an illustration of the "power of example." Later illustrations may be found in the spread of anti-colonial uprisings throughout Africa in this century.

⁶⁶P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), p. 8.

⁶⁷Niccolo Macchiavelli, as quoted in Ivo K. Duchacek, Nations and Men (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1971), p. 468.

⁶⁸Peter Calvert, Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970) p. 31.

⁶⁹Young, "Intervention and the International System," p. 178.

⁷⁰According to Klaus Knorr, pp. 105-107, most of the conflicts in the world since 1900 have been internal (of 164 conflicts -- 44 international/ 77 internal; others mixtures). In the postwar period, in fact, most wars were internal. Cf. C.R. Mitchell, who argues that "all international conflicts in the post-1945 international system occurred because of governments being sucked into conflicts within the boundaries of other states," and, further, that "the greater proportion of interstate conflict behavior since WWII

has been connected with situations of internal strife." "Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties," International Studies Quarterly 14 (June 1970): 167. Similarly, Evan Luard notes a trend toward civil rather than international conflicts in the postwar period. "In the modern international system ... attacks across frontiers have become an increasingly rare phenomenon." "Civil Conflict in the Modern World," The International Regulation of Civil War, ed. Evan Luard (New York: New York University Press, 1972), p. 7. Cf. Spiegel's figures: 1893-1947 (28 interstate/27 insurgent conflicts): 1948-1967 (24 interstate/40 insurgent).

⁷¹Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1968).

⁷²In a number of cases, of course, there has been no intervention. Cf. Young's view that "intervention among states is quite limited ... in comparison to earlier periods," in "Intervention and the International System," p. 179.

⁷³Richard Cottam, Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 35 and 76. It is my contention that since the Second World War societies have become ever more concerned with policies and trends in other societies. Moreover, the capabilities of outsiders to participate in other states' affairs has grown significantly in this century. Andrew M. Scott argues convincingly that societies have become less able to control the movement of men, money, materials, ideas and information across their borders. The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 15. Cf. F.S. Northedge and M.J. Greene on the question of asymmetrical interdependence, A Hundred Years of International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 337.

⁷⁴Evan Luard agrees that "The active training and support of rebel forces can be regarded as a form of hidden intervention, little less serious in its consequences than active involvement," p. 17.

⁷⁵Luard, p. 18.

⁷⁶Despite the many examples one can cite in recent years, the literature on revolution is relatively quiet on this subject. One exception is Thomas Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974); he argues that non-support is

often a crucial factor as well, e.g., when Yugoslavia denied entry to Greek Communists in 1948, and when the Huk guerrillas in the Philippines and the Communist insurgents in Malaya failed to obtain sanctuary and adequate external support.

⁷⁷For a discussion of subversion see Paul W. Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion: Manipulating Politics of Other Nations (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964). One can distinguish subversion from other forms of intervention or interference in that both the latter may occur in support of the status quo within a target state.

⁷⁸See Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, eds., Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); and Sigmund Neumann, "The International Civil War," in Why Revolution? eds. Clifford T. Paynton and Robert Blackey (London: Schenkman, 1971), pp. 110-118.

⁷⁹In the survey which follows I consider only global international organizations. On the role of regional international organizations see Ellen Frey-Wouters, "The Relevance of Regional Arrangements to Internal Conflict in the Developing World," in Moore, pp. 458-96.

⁸⁰Article 2(7) reaffirms the principle of sovereign equality. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the U.N. to intervene in matters which are essentially in the domestic jurisdiction of any state." This Article has been used by imperial powers to prevent discussion of colonial disputes, by the Nigerian government in order to contain the discussion in the U.N. of that country's civil war, and by South Africa to prevent discussion of apartheid. In addition, Article 39 provides that the "Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace ... and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore international peace and security." However, this Article has not been used with regard to internal conflict. Articles 34 and 36 also give the Security Council the right to investigate disputes which might lead to international friction and to recommend terms of settlement.

⁸¹Luard, p. 24.

⁸²Linda B. Miller, World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

⁸³See the articles on U.N. peacekeeping by Seymour Maxwell Finger and Ruth B. Russell in U.S. Policy in International Institutions, eds. Seymour Maxwell Finger and Joseph R. Harbert (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978).

⁸⁴Luard, p. 219.

⁸⁵In other cases, U.N. "observer groups" have been active. In Yemen, for example, the U.N. was effective only in providing the outside world with information about developments there. In Lebanon, the U.N. observer group played a much less significant role than did U.S. military forces. However, the U.N. presence there helped to prevent a widening of the conflict through counter-intervention by Syria. In both cases, observer groups added an element of objectivity to reports emanating from the conflict area. In Laos in 1959 the U.N.'s representatives helped to give legitimacy to the government. And in the earlier case of Greece, the observer group, the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, performed a similar role. In these instances the U.N. was not a major factor in ending conflict. It was, however, partially effective in deterring further unilateral involvement by outside powers.

⁸⁶According to interviews with U.S. Mission staff, the U.S. did attempt to get the Vietnam issue considered in the U.N. Security Council, but the time was never ripe for it to be considered.

⁸⁷Rosalyn Higgins argues that although the forces purport to be neutral in the domestic conflict, "their very presence is a boost to the government," "International Law and Civil Conflict," in Luard, p. 180.

⁸⁸On the techniques available to international organizations for use in internal war situations see Oscar Schacter, "The U.N. and Internal Conflict," in Moore, pp. 401-445.

⁸⁹George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal Wars," in Rosenau, International Aspects, p. 36.

⁹⁰Burton, p. 83.

⁹¹In J. H. Leurdijk, "Civil War and Intervention in International Law," Netherlands International Law

Review 24:1/2 (1977): 143. See also Luard, p. 158, on this point.

⁹²For example, Iraq (1963-70). In this regard, Mitchell contends that we must view with some skepticism the argument that the international system compels domestic parties to appeal for external aid, p. 172.

⁹³These important concepts are introduced into the literature by Falk, Moore, and Young. I am indebted to them for their thinking on this subject.

⁹⁴Mitchell, p. 187.

⁹⁵For a critique of Mitchell's transnational theory of linkage see John Eley, "Toward a Theory of Intervention," International Studies Quarterly 10:2 (June 1972): 245-66.

⁹⁶Eley, p. 251.

⁹⁷For a supporting view see Mitchell.

⁹⁸Rosenau, "Intervention," p. 298.

⁹⁹Luard argues that, "the internal situation in states of strategic importance becomes still more important," p. 10.

¹⁰⁰See Burton, p. 118; and Richard Falk, "Janus Tormented: The International Law of Internal War," in Rosenau, International Aspects, p. 219. According to Falk, "International politics is now mainly concerned with the struggle to help elites gain control of the apparatus of government in foreign societies."

¹⁰¹Cf. Rosalyn Higgins, p. 169.

¹⁰²Young suggests that there is a domestic/international cost benefit analysis which occurs, "Systemic Bases," p. 111.

¹⁰³Cf. Young, "Intervention and the International System," p. 182.

¹⁰⁴See Young, Moore, and Rosenau, "Intervention." Unfortunately, Moore's grouping of motivational and opportunity factors is muddled by his inclusion in the same category of factors promoting revolution and factors enhancing intervention.

¹⁰⁵See Luard, p. 18.

¹⁰⁶Cf. Mitchell, p. 174.

¹⁰⁷Luard notes that the increase in political activity in other societies leads to a greater concern about outcomes, p. 9.

¹⁰⁸See Duchacek, p. 485.

¹⁰⁹Leurdijk contends that in many cases the legitimacy of internal authorities is founded on external factors related to bilateral dependency relations, p. 48.

¹¹⁰Young, "Intervention and the International System," p. 164.

¹¹¹Spiegel, p. 164.

¹¹²In the last section, I argued that systemic, subsystemic and internal factors affected both the motivations of outside actors and the costs and benefits attached to their opportunities. Here, I shall attempt to show that the same variables are operative but in different measure.

¹¹³See Burton, p. 232.

¹¹⁴A classic work on American politics details this process. See E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), especially Chapter One in which he describes the "contagiousness of conflict."

¹¹⁵Burton, p. 232.

¹¹⁶Mitchell, p. 176.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸Spiegel, p. 163.

¹¹⁹See Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in Farrell, pp. 5-26, and "External Involvement in Internal War," in Harry Eckstein, Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 100.

¹²⁰See George Modelski, "The International Relations of Internal War," in Rosenau, International Aspects, pp. 14-44.

¹²¹Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of Violence (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 71.

¹²²Eric Wolf, "Peasant Rebellion and Revolution," in National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World, eds. Norman Miller and Roderick C. Aya (New York: Free Press, 1971).

¹²³Calvert, p. 54.

¹²⁴Calvert, p. 170.

¹²⁵On this see Leiden and Schmitt, p. 72.

¹²⁶Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 269. He argues that, "The greatest potential increment to dissidents' military capacity is external support." See also Wriggins, p. 218.

¹²⁷See Calvert, who argues that many Latin American revolutionary movements have maintained representation in Washington through the law firm of Hopkins and Hopkins. This firm lobbied Congress and the federal agencies, and handled public relations for these movements, p. 144.

¹²⁸Greene, p. 95.

¹²⁹See Spiegel, p. 131; Luard, p. 16; and Gurr, p. 269.

¹³⁰On the role of covert support see Blackstock, p. 24.

¹³¹Greene, p. 95; Calvert, p. 54.

¹³²See Leiden and Schmitt, p. 72.

¹³³Ted Robert Gurr, "The Relevance of Theories of Internal Violence for the Control of Intervention," in Moore, p. 77. See also Mitchell, p. 167.

¹³⁴Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p. 270.

¹³⁵See also Walter C. Sonderlund, "An Analysis of Guerrilla Insurgency and Coup D'Etat as Techniques of Indirect Aggression," International Studies Quarterly 14:4 (December 1970): 335-60.

¹³⁶Gurr, p. 271; Cf. Greene, p. 99.

¹³⁷Mostafa Rejai argues that, "Conditions of political revolution are multiple and complex. Many economic, psychological, social, political and other changes converge before a revolutionary movement gains momentum," p. 135.

¹³⁸This holds except in the relatively rare case of externally initiated and directed internal wars, known as "proxy wars." Examples are the conflicts in Southeast Asia (Laos, Cambodia, Thailand), Angola, Ethiopia, Korea, the Thirty Years War, etc. On this point see Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars (New York: Knopf, 1969); Spiegel, p. 152; and Karl W. Deutsch.

¹³⁹James N. Rosenau argues that, "If these aspects are to be sought in the behavioral and/or perceptual linkages between a war-torn society and its environment, these linkages involve too many units acting and perceiving in too many ways to allow for the development of a single overall scheme," International Aspects, p. 289.

¹⁴⁰Given the complexity of both internal and international politics, there is a danger that one might produce a framework so complex that it is not useful. A good framework should cut through complexity without making simplifying assumptions which could lead to a superficial analysis. A framework should help to define the field to be studied, tell the researcher what to look for, where to find it, and what to do with it once it is found. Although a framework is not as sophisticated as a "theory" (which will explain casual relationships and have predictive capability), it should help one turn data into information. In this study I have already developed two conceptual frameworks, e.g., one for internal conflict, one for intersocietal relations (see Appendix One). Now I shall attempt to connect the two frameworks while simplifying both.

¹⁴¹This focus is not entirely novel, of course. The work of the behavioralists stresses actors' mental states. Cf. Cheng's view that, "Circumstances highly conducive to revolution may be present in a society along with considerable contradiction and conflict, and still a revolution will not necessarily occur.... It remains to be determined by the outcome of a struggle between various political groups," Ronald Ye-Lin Cheng, ed., The Sociology of Revolutions (Chicago: Henry

Regnery, 1973), p. xviii. See also the excellent volume by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. which focuses on the relationship between the rebels and the authorities: Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham, 1970). In addition, see Peter Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition," in Claude E. Welch, Jr., and M.B. Tainter, eds., Revolution and Political Change (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972). pp. 36-53, in which Amann argues that one understands revolution only by analyzing the interaction between competing power blocs.

¹⁴²This might best be viewed as a feedback loop from the interaction to the domestic environmental factors themselves.

¹⁴³Ultimately, questions concerning these three factors motivate most studies of internal conflict. Thus, it is important to find ways to connect these variables to any framework one constructs.

¹⁴⁴There might also be feedback to the external environment, especially in terms of impact on the foreign policies of other states.

¹⁴⁵In some cases, an internal struggle may be transformed into a "proxy war," defined by Deutsch as an international conflict between two powers fought in a third. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff note, "In such an instance, the indigenous forces lose initiative and control to an outside process. Once the international prestige of major powers becomes engaged, their rivalry will overshadow the social/psychological attributes of indigenous elements," p. 252.

¹⁴⁶In the Congo, for example, incumbents were strengthened over insurgents, whereas in Rhodesia it was the insurgents who were supported.

¹⁴⁷This time frame forces my own framework to go beyond the simple focus on insurgent-incumbent interaction which is useful for analyzing the immediate pre-power period. In this case what one does is to continue to examine the interaction between the new incumbents and those who have been deposed. In many cases of internal conflict, however, the newly incumbent regime may face little or no organized opposition in the immediate post-power period. Hence, some of the strength of the incumbent-insurgent focus is lost. Recognizing, however, that the interaction itself may no longer be the key to understanding the outcomes of

internal conflict, i.e., the degree of change achieved, one's focus in the later post-power period may shift to the activities of the new regime as it consolidates power and attempts to implement its program.

¹⁴⁸Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Anger, Violence and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. xi.

CHAPTER THREE

DOMESTIC FACTORS IN THE 1959 INTERNAL CONFLICT IN CUBA

I. Introduction

Chapters Three and Four undertake a comprehensive study of one of this century's most significant internal struggles -- the Cuban revolution of 1959. My choice of this particular conflict as the major case study for this dissertation is based on my belief that it presents aspects of internal war which are theoretically and empirically important. Despite the immense volume of writing on Cuba, there are still disagreements among thoughtful students of Cuban history about the causes of the struggle, the direction it took in the critical years, 1958-60, and the reasons for the apparent shifts in course.¹

First among the reasons for choosing this case to study is the fact that the Cuban conflict of 1959 is an example of a successful insurgency in a small, client state of a dominant regional power. This success leads one to ask: what factors account for the ability of a small and dependent state to make a revolution which within a few years leads it to break openly with the power which could do it the most damage? Can one assume that the United States was simply "asleep at the wheel," or did U.S. leadership,

in fact, wish to see the Batista regime replaced? If the latter, why did U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorate so quickly after the new regime assumed power? And why did the U.S. wait so long to intervene, as it finally did in its Bay of Pigs attack?

A second reason for my interest in the Cuban case stems from the fact that it is a rare example of an ostensibly non-socialist insurgency which adopted Marxism-Leninism after achieving power.² What factors account for this apparently drastic shift in mid-stream? To what extent was it a matter of choices made by insurgent leaders on the basis of their assessment of domestic needs as opposed to international considerations? Was the decision to move toward a socialist state in Cuba more a reflection of the existing international systemic rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union than a choice made on internal economic or ideological grounds? Did internal or external factors play the predominant role in these choices?

A third reason to study the Cuban case is that it has been touted as an example for Latin American revolution. How useful is it as a model? Is Cuba an exceptional case? What are the implications for other conflicts and for our study of internal war? Finally, although Cuba has been among the most carefully scrutinized of internal wars, other empirical questions remain

unresolved. Was Fidel Castro a "closet communist" before the revolution? Does it matter? Could Cuba have avoided being drawn into the Soviet orbit? Why did the Soviet Union gain influence in Cuba despite the relative weakness of the indigenous communist party? How important were Fidel Castro's personality and belief system in determining the course the revolution was to take in the post-power period? What were the driving forces behind "Fidelismo" -- nationalism, humanism, pragmatism, anti-imperialism, communism or socialism? Given his beliefs, the long tradition of U.S. involvement in Cuba, and the internal revolutionary dynamic which demanded change, could Castro have reached an accommodation with the U.S.?

Unfortunately, the literature on these questions is not conclusive. This dissertation will attempt to address some of them, although it would be far too ambitious to expect that it will resolve all remaining questions. It is my contention that the use of a framework for analysis which explores the relationship between international factors and domestic developments will help to shed additional light on why certain courses of action were taken rather than others. This analysis may, in addition, help to square the account between those who have been concerned only with internal factors and those who have focused solely on the foreign policies of the

U.S., Cuba and the Soviet Union during the insurgency period. Finally, an intensive exploration of internal and external variables in the Cuban case should provide a test of the utility of the approach developed in the first section of this study.

I shall begin my exploration of the Cuban conflict with a brief chronology of events and then move on to an examination of the economic, social, political, ideological domestic factors with which the insurgent and incumbent factions had to deal in their struggle for power. In the sections which follow, I shall attempt to provide both an accurate description of the course of events, and a full discussion of possible explanations as to why they occurred as they did. In doing so I assume that internal struggle is best viewed as a social mobilization process, and not merely as the end product of such a process. This process must be considered as a "very complex series of actions initiated in highly particular circumstances and at particular points in time."³ Finally, there is an assumption that while social, economic, and political forces were operating, human choice, especially in the form of leadership, played a key role.⁴

II. A CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNAL CONFLICT

Below I present a brief descriptive chronology of the Cuban conflict which is divided into three parts: 1) the early years of revolutionary build-up, 1952-1958; 2) the year of transition, 1959; and 3) the years of transformation to socialism, 1960-1961.

A. The Early Years, 1952-1958

After ruling as President of Cuba from 1940-1944, Fulgencio Batista acquired power again with a coup d'etat just eighty days prior to the regularly scheduled election in 1952. Upon attaining power, he adopted a constitutional code which allowed for Presidential decrees suspending the press and assembly up to 45 days. According to Ruiz, "The restored dictator stepped out of the Machado mold."⁵ Although he was the only candidate in the 1954 elections he postponed them, thereby reinforcing the view that the only way to achieve a change of government was through violent revolution.⁶ Although technically Batista "restored" the 1940 constitution, by 1957 he governed Cuba as if it were in a state of siege.⁷ He organized the police force and armed forces with men loyal to him in leadership positions and did whatever was necessary to curtail legitimate opposition.

On July 26, 1953 Fidel Castro led a small group of men in an attack on the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba. Although the operation failed, and Castro was

sentenced to prison, this attack helped to make him known to the people of Cuba. The Moncada affair appears also to have been the starting point for a period of student violence in Cuban politics. In prison Castro produced a pamphlet, called "History Will Absolve Me," which became one of the foundations for the ideology of the 26th of July Movement.

On May 15, 1955 Castro was freed by Batista and left for Mexico where he planned for an invasion. There he met with former Cuban President Carlos Prío Socarras and obtained financial support (\$72,000) for the proposed expedition, in exchange for an agreement to coordinate anti-Batista activities.⁸

In October 1956, Castro met in Mexico with Jose Antonio Echevarria, the head of the Directorio Revolucionario (Student Directorate), an activist, leftist, university group, to plan for a coordinated uprising in Oriente province in conjunction with the planned landing.⁹ In late 1956, Fidel Castro set out in a small boat, the Granma, along with Che Guevara, Raul Castro and approximately 80 others to invade Cuba. The landing was late and Batista forces were waiting on December 2, 1956.¹⁰ Castro and a dozen survivors escaped to the Sierra Maestra mountains in Oriente Province where they regrouped and began to build a base of support among the peasants.¹¹

In March 1957, the Directorio Revolucionario, act-

ing independently of Castro, attempted a palace uprising to overthrow Batista. Although it failed, it was significant in that it demonstrated that Batista was no longer invincible. On May 28, 1957, Castro forces combined with the DR's forces to attack a Batista base in Uvero. Again this plan failed. Echevarria and other insurgent leaders were shot.¹² The palace revolt and the Uvero attack were turning points for the insurgents for they "helped Castro to stand almost alone as the representative against Batista."¹³ Moreover, they led Batista to take the rebel threat more seriously and step up the pace of repression. As a result of the 1957 campaign against the insurgents many other rebel leaders were killed or imprisoned, further strengthening Castro's leadership among the various insurgent elements.

Castro's claim to the mantle of leadership of the emerging insurgent movement was further enhanced by the interviews with American journalists published in 1957 and 1958. Most significant was the interview with Herbert C. Matthews of the New York Times.¹⁴ This, along with articles in Look and Life, made Castro a more credible figure nationally and internationally.¹⁵ Because of the favorable publicity, Castro's group was able to obtain increased political and material support "not only from within Cuba but from Cubans and others in the U.S."¹⁶

During 1957 the July 26th movement, under Frank Pais' leadership, was very active in the urban areas, e.g., in opening up a "second front" and in organizing a general strike for late 1957. Pais also established the Direccion Nacional, and, according to Bonachea, was in the summer of 1957, "the real focus of political leadership in the 26th of July Movement ... Fidel's forces, in Pais' view, were to be just one of a number of guerrilla foci."¹⁷ On September 5, 1957 there was an uprising at the Cazo Loco Naval Base which was a serious blow to the heretofore monolithic armed forces' support for the Batista regime.

In July 1957 the Declaration (Manifesto) of the Sierra Maestra was issued. Along with the Manifesto of the 26 of July Movement (written in November 1956, but published in July, 1957), it was one of the insurgent movement's primary position papers prior to seizing power.¹⁸ It affirmed "the essentially moderate, populist and democratic character of the movement."¹⁹ The Sierra Manifesto also called for an end to external interference in Cuba's domestic politics and promised restoration of the electoral process.

The significance of both the Sierra and 26JM documents was that they signalled the abandonment of progressive reformism and electoral politics in favor of armed insurgency. By this time, it was also becoming

apparent that the insurgency had developed a broad appeal even to the middle class elements dissatisfied with Batista's repressive tactics. This appeal had a strong foundation in Cuban nationalism. Farber claims that the Manifesto "accommodated ... middle and upper class supporters by adopting a social program which would not frighten them into indifference or opposition."²⁰

Pais' death in late 1957 further strengthened Castro's hold, and by early 1958 Fidel had openly rejected equality with other rebel groups, especially the Student Directorate. But cooperation among the groups did continue,²¹ with the Directorate establishing an urban organization in Escambray and a front in Las Villas. On March 12, 1958 the 26th of July Movement, which at this point was still somewhat distinct from the Castro guerrilla "foco" in the Sierras, called for a general strike and pronounced Manuel Urrutia as provisional President.²² Batista called a state of national emergency thereby seizing absolute power and suspending all Constitutional guarantees. The strike failed²³ and Batista continued his repressive tactics.

In July 1958, as a result of meetings among various insurgent groups in Venezuela, the "Caracas Pact" was issued. The 26th of July Movement, the Student Directorate, the Autenticos Party and the Civic Resistance Group joined forces in a Revolutionary Civic Front,

demanding free and honest elections and respect for the rights of workers, and assuring compliance with all of Cuba's treaty obligations.²⁴ The Cuban Communists were notably absent from these meetings. During the summer period, however, support was gained separately from the Communists, who sent delegates to the Sierra Maestra to talk directly with Castro. Although there are apparently no written records of these agreements, it appears that "unity between both groups was indeed accomplished."²⁵

During the late spring and early summer Batista made a "determined offensive to wipe out the Rebel army."²⁶ He tried to institute a blockade around the Sierras with some 5,000 regular troops and 7,000 newly recruited troops from the peasantry.²⁷

Considering the vast military superiority of his forces (45,000 troops versus several thousand at best for the insurgents), Batista should have succeeded.²⁸ On June 29, 1958, however, Castro forces launched a counter-attack. According to some sources the Castro thrust failed and there is evidence he "began to negotiate with Batista's forces in order to regroup his forces."²⁹ By mid-August, however, it appears that the military battle in the provinces had swung in the direction of the insurgents. "The rebel army was making tremendous gains at the expense of a military without the will to fight, totally demoralized after months of defeats."³⁰

"While the summer offensive proceeded, the urban underground was involved in terrorism in the cities."³¹ The summer offensive "marked the turning point of the insurrection and Batista's eventual demise (It) proved he was unable to control the situation, many of the members of the upper class withdrew their support ... and tried to establish contact with the insurrectionists."³²

On November 3, 1958, Batista held a Presidential election in which his candidate Dr. Andres Rivero Auero was elected.³⁴ Not surprisingly, the rebels urged people to boycott and did not accept the results of this election. On November 7, they launched a final offensive that culminated on December 24th with the fall of Santa Clara. Batista tried vainly to pass the reins of government to another hand picked successor, with U.S. Ambassador Earl E.T. Smith's support. But it was too late. On January 1, Batista fled to the Dominican Republic and a new government was formed.

B. The Transitional Year, 1959

With Batista gone, Castro proposed Manuel Urrutia as President. On January 8, 1959 Urrutia occupied the Presidential palace, forming a cabinet led by Jose Miro Cardona as Prime Minister and with other distinguished middle class professional types as ministers, e.g., Roberto Agramonte, Felipe Pazos, and Rupo Lopez-Fresquet.

Castro himself remained outside the government but controlled the army. He arrived in Havana on January 8. At this time, Guevara, Castro and others emphasized that the revolution was not communist, and that its aim was to restore legitimate constitutional government to Cuba. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union recognized the new government in January, 1959.

Two key events early in 1959 hinted at some of the difficulties that were to follow. The first of these were the public trials and executions of some 550 Batista followers for crimes against the Cuban people. Although the executions received strong support in Cuba, and helped to purge the society of people who were perceived to be guilty of major crimes, they were not well received in the U.S. The friction which resulted foreshadowed greater conflict between the two countries.

The second critical event of the early post-power period was the Cuban Cabinet's approval of the "Fundamental Law" which abrogated the 1940 constitution that the rebels had pledged to restore. This law broadened considerably the powers of the executive by vesting legislative power in the Cabinet. Miro Cardona resigned at this point because of the Law, and Castro was appointed on February 16, 1959 as Prime Minister.

Despite the tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, Castro adopted a friendlier posture toward the U.S.,

making an informal trip to the U.S. in April, 1959. In May he called for a \$30 billion "Marshall Plan" for Latin America, while proclaiming an independent foreign policy course for Cuba.

Domestically, May 1959 saw the implementation of the important Agrarian Reform Law, which led to confiscation of large land holdings. This represented an early turning point in the relations between Castro and his domestic opposition. It struck clearly at the upper economic strata which had been linked to Batista and to American business interests. According to Farber, the U.S. "re-entered the fray with great vigor through the press, Congressional committees and diplomatic pressure."³⁴ The net result of the internal and external criticism was a split between the moderate and radical elements in the broad revolutionary front which had assumed power.³⁵ Many of the middle sector moderates who had assumed that the revolution would restore political freedom left, or were forced out of, government. Castro replaced Secretary of State Agramonte with Raul Roa who was much less sympathetic to U.S interests.

In July 1959, President Urrutia spoke out against Communist elements. Castro threatened to resign in disagreement, thereby forcing Urrutia to step down. In his place Castro appointed Oswaldo Dorticos. Thus, by late 1959, moderates within the Castro regime were in

decline. Diaz Lanz, the commander of the revolutionary air force, defected to the U.S., complaining of communist influence (and later dropped leaflets over Cuba), and Major Huber Matos, of the rebel army, resigned his post as Provincial Governor for the same reason. Castro had him arrested, accused of treason and imprisoned with a 20 year sentence.

During the summer of 1959, Castro's regime assisted in providing a base for exiles launching small scale invasions of Panama, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The O.A.S. met in Santiago, Chile in August to discuss the situation, but with no resolution. Domestically, the open conflict between the Cuban Communist Party and 26th of July Movement members serving in government subsided. In November, 1959, the Cuban cabinet was reorganized with anti-communists being replaced by pro-communist sympathizers. By this time, government pronouncements had taken on a distinctly anti-American tone internationally and an anti-moderate emphasis domestically.³⁶ Gonzalez concludes that the domestic transformation which occurred after the middle of 1959 was "an integral part of Fidel's international strategy for obtaining and consolidating Soviet commitment."³⁷

C. The Transformation to Socialism, 1960

1960 was marked by two trends. The first was an outgrowth of the conflict with the U.S. It took the form of a distinct tilt toward the Soviet Union and the

Communist world politically and economically. In February, 1960, a formal Soviet-Cuban economic relationship was established, including loans to Cuba and the Soviet Union's purchase of Cuban sugar. Meanwhile, relations with the U.S. deteriorated with the expropriation of U.S. refineries, United Fruit properties, and U.S. banks in Cuba. This trend continued throughout the year. On October 19, 1960 the U.S. Congress voted to cut off trade with Cuba. On December 16, at the behest of the Eisenhower administration the sugar quota was eliminated entirely. On January 3, 1961, the U.S. broke relations with Cuba.

Of course, the Cuban revolution did not end at this point, although for my purposes this narrative will. Social change continued in Cuba well past any arbitrary cut off date, and the conflict continued to be affected by Cold war politics -- with the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and the Cuban "Missile Crisis" of 1962. Moreover, the effects of the Cuban conflict were felt throughout Latin America in the 1960's insofar as Cuba helped rebels in other Latin American countries in their struggles against American supported military regimes.

The purpose of my presenting this brief description of the Cuban conflict is to set the stage for analysis of the domestic and international factors which help to explain the conflict. Two essential questions which one must address in explaining internal conflict are: 1) why

did the conflict erupt in this society at this time?; and 2) why did it develop in the way it did? These are the questions which the remainder of this chapter and the next chapter are intended to answer.

III. THE DOMESTIC FACTORS

A. Economic Variables

As demonstrated in Chapter One, theorists as divergent as Marx, Edwards, de Tocqueville and Brinton have argued that economic factors often play a critical role in raising the frustration level of groups which may develop into revolutionary movements. In Cuba one of the more significant economic factors was poor distribution of wealth among segments of an economy which had generally improved during the 1950's in terms of gross indices such as GNP. By Latin American, or Third World standards, Cuba even had a relatively high standard of living. Over 50% of its population was urbanized. According to Zeitlin and Scheer, "When Castro took power the economic indices of Cuba were the highest among the non-industrial powers."³⁸ In addition, there had been no major economic disruptions during the 1950's.

Nonetheless, underlying tensions existed. By most accounts urbanites were economically better off than rural residents. Nearly everyone in the countryside was in the lower class; most upper class people lived in the cities,

except for some members of the powerful land-owning class. There was also a tension which arose from the dominance and decadence of a Havana in a predominantly rural nation. Income was not evenly distributed and the city dwellers, especially in Havana, had all the best of it. There was high unemployment for the larger part of the year when workers were not needed for the sugar harvest, and during other periods there was a significant degree of underemployment of both urban and rural labor.³⁹

Cuba had not successfully industrialized in the 1950's and remained dependent, therefore, on the sugar and tobacco crops. This concentration on just a few crops accelerated and strengthened the development of a powerful land-owning (latifundia) class.⁴⁰

Cuban economic history had been dominated by sugar. In the period 1949 to 1958, 60% of the land was devoted to cane, and sugar accounted for 70-85% of Cuba's export earnings and 30% of Cuban GNP.⁴¹ This made the Cuban economy very vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of sugar. Moreover, sugar was not a growth industry; it could not provide the impetus for development. Further, the advantageous position of Cuban sugar in the U.S. market was bought with sizable tariff concessions to U.S. exporters. These favorable terms tended to limit the growth of domestic industry in Cuba.

Yet, the generally acknowledged stagnation and underdevelopment of the Cuban economy were as much a result of political problems as of inherent economic flaws. In large measure, they were the "result of the interpenetration of political decisions made by organized economic groups in and out of Cuba."⁴² According to Dunn, diversification of the economy had been sacrificed to preserve the profitability of a guaranteed market.⁴³ And as former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, Philip W. Bonsal, notes, fluctuations in crop size and the price sugar could command contributed both to actual economic dependence on the U.S. and to a sense of helplessness among Cubans.⁴⁴

To compound the problem, there is evidence that the economic system in general was a "penetrated" one. As defined earlier, this implies that outsiders participated directly in the political decision making process in Cuba. According to the Cuban Economic Research Project, the degree of Cuban dependence on the U.S. was dramatic. In 1958 over 65% of the exports from Cuba (approximately \$527 million) went to the U.S., and 70% of Cuba's imports (est. \$547 million) were from the U.S.⁴⁵ Furthermore, according to many sources, the U.S. government and North American business interests "regularly interfered directly and indirectly in Cuban affairs."⁴⁶ K.S. Karol argues that "the proximity of the U.S. and the absence of any real tariff walls ... served to make Cuba part and parcel

of the U.S. market."⁴⁷

Boris Swerling contends that "the single most important decision to the Cuban economy, the size of the American sugar quota, was determined by legislative authorities with whom Cuba had no official standing"⁴⁸ -- the U.S. Congress. Moreover, the U.S. quota guaranteed no fixed or permanent share of the American market. This does not imply, however, that Cubans did not benefit from this arrangement. In fact, a significant Cuban "comprador" element had developed within the framework of this dependence. But this element owed its success and, therefore, its loyalty to outside interests.

The pattern of U.S. economic involvement was, thus, one of paramountcy and domination. Not only in sugar but in banking and cattle ranching, monopolization and direct management by U.S. interests were common practice. U.S. investments in public utilities were over ten times larger than in any other Latin American country. In agriculture, "seven of the ten largest latifundia were owned by American enterprises, and as of 1955 the sales of American-owned agricultural enterprises amounted to almost half the total sales of U.S. agricultural interests in Latin America."⁴⁹

As a result of U.S. investment in Cuba there developed "foreign enclaves that were really appendages of the American economy."⁵⁰ According to a 1956 U.S. De-

partment of Commerce publication, "The only foreign investments of importance are those of the United States. American participation exceeds 90% of telephone and electric service, 50% of public service railways and 40% in raw sugar."⁵¹ The pattern of economic decision-making maintained and reinforced the dependence of both urban and rural middle classes on the U.S. According to O'Connor, economic penetration eliminated the property owning rural middle class and transformed the urban middle class into a "comprador" element.⁵² This neutralization of the bourgeoisie appears to have contributed to the stagnation and underdevelopment of the Cuban economy.⁵³

There is little doubt that the Batista regime itself was interlocked with U.S. interests. As Zeitlin and Scheer argue, its central responsibilities seemed to be the maintenance of order and the protection of the interests of outsiders and the comprador group within Cuba. As a result American capital enjoyed "a degree of political and economic security and played a strategic economic role in Cuba quite unlike any anywhere else in Latin America."⁵⁴

Thus, despite the relatively high standards of living and the growth of the economy during the 1950's⁵⁵ there was economic dysfunction in the following forms:

- 1) urban-rural disequilibrium;

- 2) maldistribution and concentration of wealth:
- 3) lack of industrialization;
- 4) underutilization of human resources, and
- 5) dependence on external interests.

Moreover, under Batista Cuba's national debt had quadrupled.⁵⁶

Despite these general economic conditions, however, the fight against Batista was not primarily an economic one. Cuba's revolutionary thrust did not emanate from the poorest groups;⁵⁷ it was not at heart a peasant or labor struggle. Cuban social class structure was more complex than this, and so, in turn, was the revolutionary dynamic.

B. Social Variables

Among the social factors which may affect an internal conflict, one may examine such variables as social stratification, class conflict, degree of urbanization, generational differences and social mobility, among other factors. In the Cuban case, two of the more significant social features were; 1) tensions within the social structure and; 2) the differences in orientation between the generations.

There is no general agreement among scholars of Cuban society about the nature of prerevolutionary social structure. Lowry Nelson argues, on the one hand, that

there were two classes in Cuba -- an upper and a lower, with no middle in between.⁵⁸ Huberman and Sweezy contend, on the other hand, that Cuba's internal war was a definite class war with the lower class aligned solidly against the bourgeois middle and upper classes.⁵⁹

Somewhere in between these two points of view lie the positions of two other thoughtful students of Cuban politics -- Boris Goldenberg and Theodore Draper. Goldenberg argues that Cuba had a large middle class and that it was not a peasant country.⁶⁰ He describes a relatively homogeneous society with no language diversity and no oppressed minorities. Draper's views are more complex and have gone through several reformulations. In his earlier view,⁶¹ Cuba was seen as a middle class revolution that Castro had betrayed. His later position was that it had not been a class revolution at all, and certainly not a middle class revolution, but a "declassé revolution" -- one initiated and executed by those who had rejected their middle or upper class bourgeois backgrounds.⁶²

The problem of defining and understanding the middle class raises serious problems.⁶³ As Nelson notes, despite the existence of a "middle sector," there was no strongly held set of middle class values. The bourgeoisie was almost entirely dependent on American interests. Thus, the middle class did not exist as a

class. It was more of a "residual group between the more easily recognized upper and lower classes."⁶⁴ The lower classes were equally fragmented, with a heavy preponderance of the poorest living in rural areas.

Thus, Cuba was a country with an affluent layer at the top, closely linked with American enterprise, and a large working mass at the bottom. In between existed an amorphous collection of middle groups, mostly dependent on foreign markets.

According to Draper, however, "By itself social structure can't explain the specific path of the Cuban revolution."⁶⁵ Given that no such simplistic explanation is sought or is possible, one ought to look nonetheless, at the tensions existing within the social structure at the time. Foremost among these tensions were:

- 1) an urban-rural dichotomy, with the rural population suffering from a good deal of neglect;
- 2) the presence of a small, but extremely wealthy land-owning upper class residing in the cities and tied to business groups within the United States;
- 3) the existence of an urbanized, educated professional middle class group, whose size and homogeneity are difficult to estimate;

- 4) the presence of a large, lower middle and lower class group of unemployed and underemployed peasants and workers.

The basic fault-points in the social order included at least three additional factors. First was the set of differing relationships which each of the above groups had established with outside actors. O'Connor shows that, paradoxically, a segment of each class enjoyed a large stake in the pre-revolutionary system; others stood to gain from its annihilation.⁶⁶ In the 1950's, in particular, the "middle class," to the extent it did exist, was politically divided.

A second social factor was what Gonzalez calls a "generation gap" among the old line leadership -- the generation of the 1930's -- and the 1950's generation.⁶⁷ The latter group matured during a period in which there was weakened legitimacy for the political, social and economic systems. Gonzalez contends that although Batista had stabilized Cuban society, he had left the major problems unsolved and, worse, had become identified with U.S. interests. In contrast, the "1953 generation saw itself as the sole exponent of the nationalist legacy."⁶⁸ The case Gonzalez makes is a sound one, although he attempts to turn his insights into a monocausal explanation of the entire revolution. Gonzalez does however, help to explain one of the driving social

forces behind the insurgent movement.

A third factor affecting the interaction of class or social groups was the relative weakness of all major social and economic groups. Both Farber and O'Connor argue, for example, that the middle class, in particular, was fragmented and demoralized. Thomas shows further how even the upper-middle level groups had a weak social base.⁶⁹ Draper pinpoints a good deal of the alienation which resulted from it, i.e., the creation of a decasse group ready and willing to launch an insurgency. Gonzalez contends that there was no stable, independent ruling class to stem Castro's onslaught, a factor which became even more important from 1959 onward.⁷⁰ According to Draper, the Cuban conflict was not essentially a class conflict in the simple sense.⁷¹ Even in the later stages of 1958 it was less a conflict of upper versus lower classes than one of political "ins" versus political "outs". It is questionable if there were any Cuban counterparts to the Mexican or Chinese peasants or the urban workers in Russia, although one might consider the sugar workers as a laboring class.⁷²

What this review of social tensions illustrates is the degree to which subtle social forces interacted with economic realities to create a breeding ground for opposition, and eventually, insurgency. Further, the lack of a well defined social structure helps to explain one reason

why the 26th of July Movement succeeded -- there may have been few, if any, social groups to stop it.

In 1959, however, after the new regime was in place, class-differences became more significant. In particular, as Castro moved to a more radical position with his agrarian and urban reforms, the middle class elements which had supported the insurgency began to question their support. The new government's policies were geared toward solving fundamental economic and social problems, whereas the middle classes were more concerned with the immediate political issues which had motivated their support of the movement to overthrow Batista, e.g., restoration of the Constitution.⁷³ Eventually, large numbers of the middle class emigrated to the U.S.

C. Political Factors

Although much of what I have considered is "political" in the broadest sense, there is good reason to isolate those variables pertaining to the party system and structure of government -- these I have chosen to call political variables.⁷⁴ Closely related to the splintered social structure was the condition of the political system. In reality, Cuba had never developed strong political institutions of its own.⁷⁵ According to Ruiz, "The laws, the courts and the government rested on a colonial experience that left the Cubans unprepared to rule themselves and on foreign models ill-suited to domestic conditions."⁷⁶

Historically, there were conservative, moderate, and liberal factions. The liberals became associated with Gerardo Machado in the 1920's. Opposed to them were the reform groups, such as Grau San Martin's Autenticos. In the late 1940's, disappointed by the corruption in Grau's regime, leftist reformers broke away to form the Ortodoxos (the Party of the Cuban People). Under Eddie Chibas this was Castro's original party. The Communist Party stood somewhere to the right of the reform groups.

Cuba had a multi-party system dominated during the 1950's by a single party -- that of Fulgencio Batista. Other parties which continued to function included the Autenticos and the Ortodoxos. e.g., in the November 1954 elections Batista was opposed by Grau. The P.S.P. (Partida Socialista Popular), or Communist Party, also co-existed rather uneasily with the others although it had been declared illegal by Batista. As I shall show in the next chapter, the P.S.P. was not a significant factor in the conflict in the period prior to Batista's fall.

Perhaps the dominant characteristic of this multi-party system was its relative weakness as a form of political organization. To a large extent, party politics itself had become discredited after years of non-constitutional government; elections had become a mere formality and did not even serve a social mobilization

function; political problems remained unsolved; the party system lost much of its legitimacy. In Bonsal's view, "faith in the possibility of successful popular government ... received a blow from the Grau experience from which it was never to ... recover."⁷⁷ According to Ruiz, "the middle sector politician failed to offer able class or national leadership. More frequently he coveted public office for personal profit. Ultimately, the politicians formed a distinct class."⁷⁸

Because there were no truly national parties, political violence often replaced "normal" political activity, leading to the formation of gansterish, political "action groups" on university campuses.

Into this vacuum of political party life arose the "26th of July Movement." Named for the date of Castro's fateful but unsuccessful assault on the Moncada barracks in 1952 the movement was essentially an extra-party form of political organization, e.g., it was never formally constituted as a party with a definite leadership or structure. Yet, it was one of the strongest forces for social change operating in Cuba during the late 1950's. In essence, the movement was a loose coalition of anti-regime groups, including students and what Fidel himself called "the declassé"⁷⁹

The 26th of July Movement began functioning in November 1956, when it produced a Manifesto for

Change, which Zeitlin and Scheer describe as "democratic, nationalist and dedicated to social justice."⁸⁰ Drafted largely by Mario Llerena, the document was an affirmation of the moderate, populist character of the Movement. Its significance lay in its emphasis on a broad strategy of appealing to all dissatisfied groups. Although the movement itself developed from the university student political organizations, by the late 1950's members of many other groups had also become disenchanted with life under Batista, such as the Directorio Revolucionario which was formed in 1955 by Echevarria. Its aims were to overthrow Batista, to implement structural change and to throw off foreign interference.⁸¹

Although the 26th of July Movement and other groups followed in the revolutionary tradition of Cuban patriot Jose Marti, they appeared to have no unified or coherent ideology. Hugh Thomas contends that the entire movement was "amateurism woven into an ideal, ... more an alliance than a party."⁸² At the very least, it is easy to agree with Draper's assessment that the Movement was not homogeneous -- it included reformists and revolutionaries, and both pro- and anti-U.S. groups.⁸³

Despite its amorphous quality, the Movement grew and became more active. In mid-1957 the Declaration (Manifesto) of the Sierra Maestra was issued -- demanding the election of a provisional government.

In 1958, the Movement called for a general strike, leading to suspension of constitutional guarantees. Also in 1958, the Caracas Pact was proclaimed by the 26 JM, the Student Directorate (an alliance of anti-regime student groups) and the Autenticos Party.

Mario Llerena's insider's account of the insurgency's development provides fascinating insight into the turmoil within the general insurgent movement. He details the relationship between the Castro elements, the Student Directorate, the Junta de Liberacion (an exile front for former President Prío), and the 26 JM itself. Clearly the insurgent factions were not wholly unified under a single leader, but there were significant differences in approach among the various elements.

In spite of this activity, and the 26 JM's primary role in the build-up of revolutionary pressure, the Movement ended early in 1959 with the seizure of power by Castro. As Karol notes, it simply disappeared -- without ever having developed into a genuine party with a significant social base.⁸⁴ There had never been a party congress; there were no cells and no training. Gonzalez argues that it simply was "too amorphous and too dependent on Fidel to reconstitute itself into a new party after 1959."⁸⁵ Also, as I shall show in the discussion of Communist party influence, it was no match for the better organized P.S.P. The Movement ended more or less as it

had begun -- a nationalist, moralist, anti-imperialist, youth-oriented alliance dominated by the success and charisma of Castro.⁸⁶

Among other political factors influencing the process of the internal conflict, the low level of legitimacy of the party system was crucial. It helps to explain at least partially why the 26 JM was an extra-party form of political organization. Moreover, not only was the party system itself weak, the entire system of political institutions in Cuba seemed to be suffering from a weakened sense of legitimacy.⁸⁷ As a consequence of this institutional weakness, the military was able to play an increasingly stronger role in Cuban politics under Batista, as it had under Machado. The influence of the military became increasingly apparent as the Batista regime took stronger repressive measures from 1957 to late 1958. This repression, when added to the obvious and open corruption of the regime,⁸⁸ led to greater alienation of members of many social groups.⁸⁹ There was no stable ruling class to stem the revolutionary tide which developed among the "1953 generation." The distinct weakness of major social organs such as the church, labor unions, etc., only reinforced the fragmentation of political groups.

Farber argues that the "political weakness of all social classes and the existence of a veritable

vacuum of political organizations (but not of political struggle and awareness) facilitated the consolidation of a leadership which did not have to be responsible to organized class or group demands."⁹⁰ No homogeneous middle class existed. "Politically, Cuba had reached the end of an era; parties and politicians were bankrupt, and ... the structure of society simply crumbled.... Batista fell because he lost the support of the politically aware segments of the population."⁹¹

Military factors also played a role in Cuba, albeit a curious one. Without a strong or well developed social and political system, the army was able to dominate Cuban politics in various periods. Unlike the military in many other Latin American countries, however, the Cuban army had no links with the Catholic Church or the landlords. Indeed, Batista's army was composed of lower class men, loyal to him rather than to the traditional power structure. This plebeian force had obvious emotional links with the Afro-Cuban lower classes which demanded change, but became the defenders of the status quo.⁹² Nonetheless, it lacked close ties with the poor; it was a personalist military force whose strength rested on American arms. According to D.E.H. Russell, "as for the quality of the army ... by all reports, it was remarkably lazy and inefficient. But it was ... used readily by Batista to suppress the opposition."⁹³ Thomas contends that there had been several attempted coups by army offi-

cers, although they were unaffiliated with Castro.⁹⁴ McGaffey and Barnett contend that the army's loyalty began to wane with the increasing reliance on repression.⁹⁵

The Catholic Church, similarly, was not as potent a force in Cuba as it was elsewhere in Latin America. In Ruiz's view, "it was merely another feeble institution."⁹⁶ especially in rural areas. Racial differences account partially for this weakness; since the Spanish priests were white, it seemed that the Afro-Cubans could not relate readily to them.

The unions, although better organized than some other social/political groups, were also weak. Moreover, they had been dominated for many years by the Communists, a group which itself was discredited by the 1950's. The success of the 26 JM in this environment can be partially explained, thus, by the appeal of its non-traditional, coalitional style in an era in which traditional institution had decayed.⁹⁷

D. Ideological Factors

Closely related to any consideration of political factors is the role of ideology. In this regard a researcher should examine a society's culture, political history and intellectual traditions, especially the existence of any revolutionary tradition.

In Cuba, there were a number of strands in the general ideology of the insurgent movement which built on traditional themes. Historically, there was a strong element of nationalism, stemming from the fierce and bloody battles commencing in 1868 with the Ten Years War and running through the times of Jose Marti, the Cuban patriot who had led the fight to free Cuba from Spanish domination in 1895. This nationalism surfaced in the 1933 rebellion. In its strongest representation the theme of national pride, honor and independence took the form in 1958 of the saying "Patria o Muerte" (Fatherland or Death), popularized by the 26 JM. In this respect Castro may be said to have been in the mainstream of Cuban thought.

Dunn contends that, "It is the historical basis of this tradition ... which must identified before it is possible to guess Castro's fidelity to his revolutionary aims."⁹⁸ In this view, Castro and his followers sought to restore national honor. As O'Connor notes, "The anti-foreign stress ... was the one element binding together the diverse groups and classes ... against the dictatorship."⁹⁹ Similarly, Gonzalez emphasizes that Castro's aims and those of the 26 JM were "the fulfillment of libera tionist aspirations that were held but compromised by previous political generations while thwarted by U.S. involvement."¹⁰⁰ Ruiz concludes that, An aggressive, vocal, anti-American nationalism shaped the charac-

ter and direction of the revolution."¹⁰¹

Closely related to the strong element of Cuban nationalism was an element of anti-imperialist sentiment due to historically heavy U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs, e.g., through military intervention, economic domination and political interference. The latter was most forcefully demonstrated by the U.S.'s imposition on Cuba of the Platt Amendment, which provided that the U.S. could intervene in Cuba virtually at will. This provision was forced into the Cuban Constitution. Anti-imperialist sentiments underlay the 1895, 1933 and, to some extent, the 1959 uprisings. The anti-imperialist sentiment is evident in Castro's early writings and in the 1956 and 1957 Declarations cited in this chapter. It was, however, somewhat sublimated until the second phase of the conflict in 1959. At this point Castro became more openly hostile to the U.S. Whether this was done primarily to attract Soviet support or simply as an internal unifying device is a question which I address in Chapter Four.

Philip W. Bonsal, claims that Castro's "only constraint has been his determination to free Cuba from American influence It was his pathological hatred of the American power structure ... that led him eventually into the Communist camp."¹⁰² The fact remains that the revolution did become more openly critical of Cuban ties with the U.S. and the spectre of economic dependency

they reflected. According to Gonzalez, "The island's close ties ... had created a heightened state of dependency which was felt politically, economically, culturally and psychologically."¹⁰³

Related to the early nationalist tradition of revolutionary forces was an emphasis on restoring constitutional government which had been suspended. In this perspective, the 1933 revolution had failed to achieve reform and the 1940 Constitution had been betrayed by Batista.

Socialism, per se, was not an important component of revolutionary ideology up through the actual seizure of power. This, of course, makes Cuba unique in the history of socialist revolutions. Cuba's adoption of socialism came well after the revolutionary forces took control of the government, and even then it was slow in coming. O'Connor argues that "until 1961 ... there was a lack of ideology."¹⁰⁴ According to Draper, "it cannot be said that the revolution was anything well defined beyond the need to overthrow Batista."¹⁰⁵ Even Mario Llerena, who served as the movement's Director of Public Relations in the U.S. in 1957, argues that Fidel lacked a strong ideology and that Che shared with Fidel a distaste for ideological structure.¹⁰⁶

The eventual shift of the Castro government to socialist practice and ideology, of course, has led many to doubt Castro's original intentions. The most

extreme view is that Castro was a "closet communist" all along who hid his preferences in order to gain power. There is some evidence, for example, in his early writings and in his admitted dealings in the period 1956-1959 with communist elements, within and outside Cuba, to indicate that socialist thoughts had indeed crossed through Castro's mind. Yet, as Bonachea and Valdes argue, "it would be a mistake to confuse his radicalism with communism. In fact, the men with whom Fidel identified considered the Cuban Communist Party to be conservative."¹⁰⁷ In a 1967 interview, Castro argued that "All radical revolutionaries ... do not announce programs that might unite all their enemies in a single front."¹⁰⁸ Moreover, to have declared oneself a socialist early on might have been self-destructive because the Partida Socialista Popular was, by most accounts, the least respected party in a very weak party system. This, however, may show nothing more than revolutionary pragmatism. And intentions are quite difficult to discern after the fact.

Llerena argues that the transformation to communism had not taken place in early 1958 at the March 7-10 meetings in the Sierra. "While communist influence certainly existed within the leadership of the 26JM, ... the movement itself was not yet committed to communism."¹⁰⁹

Farber presents a more credible view of the move toward socialism. He claims that it was a conscious

choice made in mid to late 1959.¹¹⁰ The socialist path was chosen because of the need to disengage the Cuban economy from U.S. economic domination, and, therefore, the need to find some external allies. Supporting Farber's views on timing is the later position of Draper that "when Castro entered Havana, it is doubtful he knew what he was going to do."¹¹¹

O'Connor emphasizes the internal factors leading to a socialist Cuba. "Cuban socialism was not an ideological product, nor a betrayal of the Cuban people, nor mainly the effect of U.S. hostility and intervention.... It was an expression of hard economic, social and political reality."¹¹² Socialism, in this view, was both possible and suitable. It was possible in the sense that the Cuban middle class was not a well-organized, independent force in Cuban politics. It was desirable, in O'Connor's opinion, because Cuban capitalism had failed to solve underlying economic and social problems.

Analysis of documentary evidence does reveal a shift in espoused ideology beginning with the Castro regime's takeover of power.¹¹³ In the pre-power stage, the insurgents appealed to the feelings and aspirations of the Cuban people -- national pride, and a longing for the restoration of legitimate, constitutional government. Even in the early "in-power" stage, the emphasis was on what Castro called "revolutionary humanism" -- "liberty with bread without terror."¹¹⁴ Guevara's view that "All

of our radical measures have been a direct response to direct aggression by powerful monopolists.... U.S. pressure on Cuba has made necessary the radicalization of the revolution" seems more like a rationalization than a credible explanation of the transition to socialism.¹¹⁵ However, as the new regime faced practical problems in the economy and in foreign affairs the movement toward socialist ideology became stronger.

Perhaps the intent of the original broad-based ideology is revealed in Castro's remarks about not wanting to unite one's enemies. Whether or not the broadness of early ideology was intentional, however, its effect was to attract both internal and external support rather than to alienate it. To a large extent, the insurgent movement itself was a broad-based coalition of groups which played upon anti-governmental sentiment.

E. Leadership

In addition to the internal variables discussed under the major headings above -- economic, social, political and ideological -- one should also consider the possible impact of "leadership" factors.¹¹⁶ By these I mean the personality and beliefs of leaders in the revolutionary process.¹¹⁷

Most commentators agree that in the Cuban case the influence of Fidel Castro loomed large. In retrospect, it is difficult to imagine the revolution's taking the course it did without Castro's personal involvement. Of course, the other factors described in preceding sections would still have existed without Fidel. Indeed, another individual such as Guevara may have assumed leadership at a crucial juncture.

Che Guevara himself argued that "the foremost, most original, and perhaps the most important single factor to render the Cuban revolution so exceptional was Fidel Castro."¹¹⁸ It is difficult to disagree with this assessment. From the outset Fidel provided spirited leadership; he was the unquestioned leader of the attack on the government barracks at Moncada in 1952. It was Castro who led a small band of rebels across the Caribbean in 1956 to "invade" Cuba; he was the author of the Declaration of the Sierra Maestra in 1957. It was Fidel who devised and implemented the rural guerrilla military strategy which, in the end, proved successful in toppling the Batista regime. In essence, what Castro provided was exceptional leadership, both in the early phases when he had to mobilize a small guerrilla "foco", and later in 1958, when he assumed unquestioned leadership of the 26th of July movement. Castro's popularity was in part a function of his personal charisma. Even after assuming power

he continued to build support on the basis of his personal example and the respect he inspired. In this sense, Gonzalez is correct in assessing the Cuban conflict as a highly personalized one, in which "Fidelismo" almost became an ideology in itself.¹¹⁹

Because the Cuban case is one in which the personal element appears to have been strong, some attention must be paid to two aspects of leadership: the belief system of the leadership group and the personality factors which may have influenced policy. These are often key variables which may help to account for the decisions and actions taken.¹²⁰ The mechanism by which beliefs and personality affect personal or group behavior is, to be sure, both complex and problematic.¹²¹

My assumption is that the two elements function as perceptual filters through which environmental stimuli pass. Personality may have more to do with a leadership or decision making style; beliefs will structure a leader's definition and analysis of a situation, and, therefore, tend to affect his/her response. Leadership is, thus, a function of belief and personality as well as of other things such as skill, judgement, etc. In an internal conflict it serves as a key intervening variable which mediates between the environment (both domestic and international) and the interaction of groups, i.e., the internal conflict itself. Leadership affects how well

existing resources (both physical and psychological) are to be used in the struggle for power.

An analysis of Castro's belief system and personality, based on his writings, speeches, biographical data, etc.,¹²² leads me to conclude that:

1)philosophically -- Castro's thinking had strong elements of both nationalism and humanism. There was a bias against capitalism and its foremost exponent, the U.S. No definitive economic stance appeared in his works until the mid-1960's, well after the period in which we are most interested in this study. The ambivalence on economic matters allowed Castro to moderate both the rhetoric used in the insurgency and the ideology espoused by the regime upon assuming power. Castro saw politics as a moral struggle against illiteracy, poverty, imperialism and human degradation. His adoption of Marxist-Leninist ideology appears to be based on factors other than its intrinsic compatibility with his own belief system.¹²³ Although Castro has revised his historical perspective on the Cuban revolution considerably in the intervening years, making it appear that he was a Marxist all along and that Cuba was a classic case of class struggle, the original emphasis on nationalism was quite important.

2) Personality -- Castro's background indicates that he was a person of high ideals, almost a utopian dreamer; highly optimistic about the future; willing to take great personal and political risks in order to serve his notion of justice; a supreme patriot; but not a person who most observers would categorize as an intellectual or scholar; In addition, he seems to have always been concerned with obtaining power and control over others.

Although the accuracy of this characterization of Castro's beliefs and personality is admittedly open to question, these factors do appear to shed some light on certain aspects of the conflict.¹²⁴ The strong, hard-driving personal characteristics, for example, make it easier to understand Castro's involvement in all aspects of the revolution and his insistence on direct approaches to the people. The revolution's emphases on education, employment, health care, and housing relate directly to Fidel's humanist streak. The strong nationalist element in his beliefs help to explain the Castro regime's great, and almost paranoid, sensitivity to U.S. involvement. Fidel's immense popularity, which was based on his being perceived as a "man of the people," had a strong influence on his ability to

engineer the drastic shifts in Cuban social, economic, and political life which took place in 1959 and 1960. A largely disorganized, though highly politicized, Cuba was apparently quite willing to follow Fidel's strong leadership in this period, a fact which can be attributed partly to their thirst for change and for direction, but more significantly to the influence of Castro himself.

IV. SUMMARY

This chapter has presented an analysis of the major internal or domestic variables which, in combination, helped to create and shape the Cuban conflict of 1959. In keeping with the thinking of internal conflict theorists such as Eckstein and Rejai, I have assumed that there are a number of possible factors influencing the process of internal struggle. Having isolated a range of environmental and actor variables, including economic, social, political, ideological and leadership factors, there is a need to order the variables according to a scheme which assigns weight to each and which accounts for the passage of time.

As shown in Chapter One, one method for dealing with the problem of ordering is to group factors according to their gestation period. In this manner, one speaks of

there being long-term, middle-term and immediate factors, or more simply, preconditions and precipitants. Using this approach, one might show that the long-term factors contributing to the development of an insurgent movement in Cuba were:

- 1) economic dependency on the United States; upper class links with U.S. business interests;
- 2) underdevelopment and lack of diversity in the Cuban economy;
- 3) class differences, especially between a small, wealthy class and the majority of Cubans in the cities and countryside;
- 4) the lack of mobility for the lower and middle classes;
- 5) a strong nationalist tradition;
- 6) the weakness of social and political institutions as agents of change in Cuban society;

Among the more short-range or immediate factors, one might cite:

- 1) corrupt, inefficient, oppressive rule; elite intransigence in light of demands for change;
- 2) loss of governmental legitimacy, leading to alienation of the intellectuals and the masses;

- 3) lingering economic difficulties despite governmental promises of improvement, and despite a relatively high standard of living;
- 4) the unique brand of leadership brought to the struggle by Castro and the dedication which it inspired in dispossessed Cubans.

In the early years, the thrust of the insurgents was to seize the governmental apparatus from the hands of corrupt, repressive leaders who had strayed from Cuban traditions and allowed Cuban independence to be sacrificed to external actors. Restoration of legitimate government was a goal on which virtually all Cubans could unite, since the Batista regime had repeatedly reneged on its promises of reform. As Rolando Bonachea explains it, the insurgency was not a protest arising from backward economic conditions primarily, but from the inability of preceding governments to exploit effectively the nation's resources.¹²⁵ Thus, in immediate terms the issues and grievances were more political than economic. However, as I have argued earlier in this chapter, and as subsequent events in Cuba were to demonstrate, the underlying social and economic pressures present in the Cuban system eventually led to significant attempts to change Cuban society in the second and third stages of the conflict.

Other important aspects of the first stage included:

- 1) an apparent lack of mass participation in the armed struggle;
- 2) the lack of an immediate, distinct economic crisis as a precipitant;
- 3) the intransigence of the incumbent regime as demonstrated by the lack of concessions to the the insurgents;
- 4) the virtual collapse of the Batista army;
- 5) the absence of any great catalytic event, such as a defeat in a foreign war.

These factors were played out against the backdrop of a socio-economic system which had some major tensions, including:

- 1) class differences;
- 2) urban-rural conflict in the form of a higher standard of living in the urban areas; generally uneven distribution of wealth; and underemployment in both urban and rural areas;
- 3) lack of organized social forces to act as a brake on either the regime or the rebels;
- 4) lack of an official colonial presence but real economic and political dependency on external interests nonetheless.

The second stage of the conflict comprises the key years from 1959 to 1961. Because the new regime took control of a fully functioning economy, it had a strong advantage, one that facilitated the transition

greatly. Moreover, as the Castro regime began to change policy direction it was not hampered by the need to live up to a specific program articulated prior to takeover. Indeed, there was no such explicit program, and, therefore, there could be no "betrayal" as Draper claims. During 1959 and 1960, the new regime moved slowly and fitfully toward adoption of socialist policies, and it did so without civil war and without further changes in leadership. Clearly, the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law and other measures adopted in this phase were initiated by the Castro ruling group rather than by the masses themselves. Further, it appears that the changes which did occur happened more through the influence and choices of a charismatic leader than by the urgings of a Marxist-Leninist party or movement.

This critical second phase, thus, appears not to have taken place according to any preconceived plan. As shown earlier in this chapter, there were few organized forces within Cuba that could have constrained the regime from taking the direction it did, for institutional decay had taken a very heavy toll. Regis Debray has said of this phase that Cuba was "an empirical revolutionary action which encountered Marxism on the way to its own truth."¹²⁶

The somewhat startling shift in priorities and policies in the period from 1959 to 1961 has stirred

the interest of many analysts of the Cuban conflict. Why was there a radical revolution, and why were there so few signs beforehand? Draper and middle class Cuban writers suggest that Castro promised one kind of revolution and made another. This view, however, assumes far too much power in Castro's hands and does not allow for any intervening factors. Draper and others also de-emphasize the distortions present in the economic structure, assuming, therefore, that they could have been cured without drastic social change.

Even in the late pre-takeover stage of 1958 the insurgents' goals do not appear to have been very well defined. The sudden shift toward socialism may, in fact, have been hastened by practical realities with which the new leaders had to deal. In particular, Cuba's turn to a state socialist economy, and the elimination of middle class, bourgeois influences may have been at least somewhat a function of "economic necessity as seen by a pragmatic revolutionary who became a progressive revolutionary."¹²⁷ Perhaps, as Goldenberg argues, rather than the shift being a planned one, "the overthrow of old realities created new ones which began to dominate them."¹²⁸

In summarizing the domestic factors in the Cuban internal conflict, therefore, one should note the existence of social tensions and economic dysfunction, the

crucial role played by revolutionary leadership, and the lack of leadership provided by the incumbents. What started out as a political rebellion eventually became a full scale socialist revolution as new leaders attempted to solve pressing problems after taking power.

Among the problems which the new regime faced, however, were Cuba's relationships with others in the international system. Even a highly thorough analysis of all conceivable domestic factors leaves certain phenomena less than fully explained. For example, surely one important force pushing the Castro regime in the direction of a break from the U.S. was the long history of U.S. involvement in Cuba. U.S. policies, such as repeated military intervention, had helped to create an anti-imperialist revolutionary potential which Castro tapped in the years prior to overthrowing Batista, and which assumed even greater importance in the critical years 1959-1961 as nationalist impulses became a public issue in Cuba.¹²⁹

What is missing from the present analysis is a more complete exposition of the role played by international factors in the Cuban conflict. I attempt this analysis in the next chapter, which describes the general international system at the time of the conflict and examines the direct roles played by outside powers. Included in the latter analysis is an examination of the relations between the U.S. and Cuba (including contacts

with both incumbents and insurgents) and Soviet-Cuban relations (including the role of the Cuban Communist Party, the P.S.P).

Footnotes

¹Regarding causes, the literature is divided between Marxists, who view the revolution as an inevitable result of internal economic and social contradictions in Cuba, and those who claim that Cuba's relatively high standard of living proves that the fight was not motivated primarily by economic considerations. See Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961); James O'Connor, The Origins of Socialism in Cuba (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), and Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967). For different views see: Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), Boris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965); and Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962). In addition to the disagreement about economic factors, many authors do not agree on the role of Cuban social structure. Cf., for example, Lowry Nelson, Cuba: The Measure of a Revolution (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota, 1973); Samuel Farber, "Revolution and Social Structure in Cuba, 1933-1959" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1969); and Theodore Draper's later view in Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965).

²Although Castro may have been the first revolutionary to adopt Marxism after coming to power, he is not the first dictator to shift ideology after victory.

³John Dunn, Modern Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 232.

⁴On this point see Sidney Hook's argument that historical alternatives do exist, and that people may exert influence at critical junctures in history, The Hero in History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955).

⁵Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, Cuba: The Making of a Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970). p. 110.

⁶See Ramon Bonachea and Marta San Martin, The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974).

⁷Andres Suarez, Cuba, Castro and Communism, 1959-1960 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), p. 22.

⁸Bonachea and San Martin note that Prio gave Castro \$72,000 then and eventually contributed over \$250,000 to Castro's movement, p. 66.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Bonachea and San Martin argue that Castro broke his deal with Prio by failing to coordinate attack dates, p. 77.

¹¹Nelson, p.3.

¹²Bonachea and San Martin, p. 130.

¹³Ramon Bonachea, "The Overthrow of the Batista Regime, 1952-1958," (M.A. thesis, American University, 1970), p. 87.

¹⁴See Herbert Matthews, "Cuba Rebel is Visited in Hideout," New York Times (February 24, 1957), p. 1.

¹⁵See Mario Llerena, The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 108. Fidel used the various interviews to set a democratic tone for the international press, calling for elections, disclaiming any intention to nationalize foreign investment, and explicitly denying that the movement was communist inspired.

¹⁶Nelson, p. 13.

¹⁷Bonachea and San Martin, p. 143.

¹⁸Llerena, p. 126. This document, called "Our Cause," indicated that, "Cuba in its relations with ... the U.S. will assume an attitude of rapprochement," but said that economic penetration must end, pp. 288-289. This document was distributed from Mexico. According to Llerena, Castro did not receive it warmly but instead issued his own manifesto -- the Sierra Maestra Declaration -- shortly thereafter. The latter was a more radical document but it was still broad enough to give the insurgency a middle class flavor.

¹⁹Farber, p. 354.

²⁰Ibid., p. 350.

²¹Llerena, p. 192.

²²In early 1957, Judge Urrutia had opined that members of the group which had rebelled at Santiago should be absolved. He argued that fighting oppression was not a crime. This opinion gave him national stature and a strong following among insurgent leadership.

²³According to Bonachea and San Martin, "Fidel Castro was responsible for the failure of the strike," p. 214.

²⁴Ibid., p. 222.

²⁵Bonachea, p. 165.

²⁶Herbert L. Matthews, Fidel Castro (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 126.

²⁷Bonachea and San Martin, p. 230.

²⁸Ibid., p. 207.

²⁹Ibid., p. 262.

³⁰Ibid., p. 237

³¹Ibid., p. 263.

³²Ibid., p. 286. See also Fulgencio Batista, Cuba Betrayed (New York: Vantage Press, 1972), pp. 104-105.

³³Bonachea and San Martin claim that the elections were scheduled as a result of U.S. pressure, p. 288.

³⁴Farber, p. 414.

³⁵Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, eds., The Politics of Violence (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 197. They argue that, by the spring of 1959, "Castro's support began to wane among ... middle class elements who were becoming fearful of his increasing radicalism."

³⁶Joseph P. Morray contends that the regime needed to protect itself at this point against reinvigorated internal enemies whose ranks were growing, The Second Revolution in Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962), p. 21.

³⁷Gonzalez, p. 121.

³⁸Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Scheer, Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere (New York: Grove Press, 1963), p. 71.

³⁹Sergio Roca argues this view in "Structural Economic Problems," in Jaime Suchlicki, ed., Cuba, Castro and Revolution (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1971). 1956 estimates were: 17% unemployed and 13% "underemployed."

⁴⁰O'Connor, Chapter Two.

⁴¹Roca, p. 68.

⁴²O'Connor, p.21.

⁴³Dunn, p. 221.

⁴⁴Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).

⁴⁵Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study of Cuba (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1965). See also E.W. Kenworthy, "Cuba's Problems Pose Tests for U.S. Policy," New York Times, Section IV (April 12, 1959), p. 7.

⁴⁶O'Connor, p. 21.

⁴⁷K.S. Karol, Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 1970), p. 211.

⁴⁸Boris Swerling, "Sugar and Sympathy," The Nation, 190: 7 (February 13, 1960): 142-143.

⁴⁹Leland L. Johnson, "U.S. Business and the Rise of Castro," World Politics, 17 (April 1965): 441, 451-454.

⁵⁰Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p.23.

⁵¹U.S. Department of Commerce, Investment in Cuba: Basic Information for U.S. Businessmen (Washington, D.C: General Printing Office, 1956).

⁵²O'Connor, Chapter Two.

⁵³Boorstein, pp. 23ff.

⁵⁴Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 26. Bonsal argues that, "Cuba's problems of political and social development were aggravated by ... three external factors ... the impact of wide, eccentric ... fluctuations in the market for sugar ..., the nature of the relations between the governments of Cuba and the U.S. ..., (and) the role of private American interests in Cuba," p. 229.

⁵⁵A factor to which anti-Castro writers repeatedly refer in arguing that revolution was not "really necessary."

⁵⁶Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 50.

⁵⁷See Huberman and Szweezy for an alternate view.

⁵⁸Lowry Nelson, "Changes in the Social Structure," in Cuba, Castro and Revolution, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1972), pp. 43-50.

⁵⁹Huberman and Sweezy, Introduction.

⁶⁰Goldenberg, pp. 130-134.

⁶¹Draper, Castro's Revolution. One might usefully compare Dunn's argument that the physical scale of Cuba and its relative wealth, by Latin American standards fostered a degree of integration which could not be matched by other Latin American countries.

⁶²Draper, Castroism. Here Draper discusses post-1959 developments in which class differences appear to have played a greater role. Cf. O'Connor, p. 617.

⁶³perhaps the great disparity in interpretations of social structure may be explained partly by the relatively muddy nature of the term "class" itself. Is it strictly an economic phenomenon, or are elements of "status" involved? Is "class consciousness" a prerequisite for the existence of a class? Furthermore, some of the confusion may stem from attempts to describe participants and to impute motives and values to their actions, e.g., it is true that Castro, Guevara, Cienfuegos and others were "sons of the middle class." Yet, they did not act in the name of middle class values.

⁶⁴See Nelson, pp. 166-169.

⁶⁵Draper, Castroism, p. 102. If it could, he argues, then the same structures would lead to revolution elsewhere.

⁶⁶James O'Connor in Nelson Valdes and Edwin Lieuwini, The Cuban Revolution (Albuquerque, N.M.: University of New Mexico, 1971), p. 68.

⁶⁷Gonzalez, p. 114.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 40.

⁶⁹Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

⁷⁰Gonzalez, p. 53.

⁷¹Cf. O'Connor's view that the second stage of the revolution reflected class conflict more clearly.

⁷²On the role of labor in organizing the sugar workers during the 1930's see Maurice Zeitlin, Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970). It can be argued that there was a history of working class and communist-based revolution stemming from the 1930's. In this line of reasoning, Cuba was the first example of a "proletarian" revolution in a country with an industrial working class.

⁷³O'Connor, p. 54.

⁷⁴Harry Eckstein lists among the political "hypotheses" on internal war: the estrangement of rulers, bad government, divisions among governing classes, oppressive government and excess tolerance of alienated groups. Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

⁷⁵Jorge Dominguez' excellent work details the development of Cuban political institutions. Cuba and Revolution (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1978).

⁷⁶Ruiz, p. 153.

⁷⁷Bonsal, p. 271.

⁷⁸Ruiz, p. 12.

⁷⁹Farber, p. 13.

⁸⁰Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 2.

⁸¹Bonachea and San Martin, p. 41.

⁸²Thomas, p. 1080.

⁸³Draper, Castro's Revolution, p. 75.

⁸⁴Karol, p. 170ff.

⁸⁵Gonzalez, p. 170.

⁸⁶A separate issue here is whether, in fact, the 26JM was an incipient communist party. Draper, Castro's Revolution, p. 75, and Farber, pp. 2-8, demonstrate convincingly, however, that the movement could not be considered communist in 1959. Maurice Halperin shows that the P.S.P. and 26 JM were engaged in sharp disputes at this time, The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972), p. 29.

⁸⁷O'Connor notes that there was little support for, or belief in the legitimacy of, the electoral process, p. 47. Cf. Dominguez.

⁸⁸O'Connor argues, and most of the general literature agrees, that bribery, brutality, corruption and terror were common under Batista.

⁸⁹Bonachea and San Martin show that police corruption eventually turned businessmen against the regime, p. 34.

⁹⁰Farber, p. 516.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 15.

⁹²This may help to explain why the army apparently collapsed suddenly in 1958 despite their overwhelming numerical superiority.

⁹³D.E.H. Russell, Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p.25.

⁹⁴Thomas, p. 884.

⁹⁵McGaffey and Barnett, p. 163.

⁹⁶Ruiz, p. 59.

⁹⁷Farber, p. 501.

⁹⁸Dunn, p. 206.

⁹⁹O'Connor in Valdes and Lieuwen, p. 78.

¹⁰⁰Gonzalez, p. 27.

¹⁰¹Ruiz, p. 18.

¹⁰² Philip W. Bonsal, "Cuba, Castro and the United States," Foreign Affairs 45: 2 (January 1967):.267.

¹⁰³Gonzalez claims that, "It was spurred by economic dependence and contributed to by heavy American investment and U.S. policies which made Batista look like a puppet," p. 53.

¹⁰⁴O'Connor, p. 310.

¹⁰⁵Irving Louis Horowitz, "Introduction," in Cuban Communism, Fourth Edition, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977), pp. 5-7.

¹⁰⁶Llerena, Chapter Nine.

¹⁰⁷Rolando Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes, Cuba in Revolution (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1972), p. 27.

¹⁰⁸Lee Lockwood, Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 142.

¹⁰⁹As evidence Llerena cites letters to him from Hilda Guevara, Che's wife, p. 212.

¹¹⁰Farber, pp. 2-8.

¹¹¹Draper as quoted in Matthews, p. 147.

¹¹²O'Connor, p. 11.

¹¹³This can be traced in speeches and transcripts of radio broadcasts during 1959.

¹¹⁴See Suarez, p. 48.

¹¹⁵From Che Guevara's 1960 LOOK Magazine interview as quoted in Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 50.

¹¹⁶One should search for evidence about the effects which different types of leadership might have. For example, one might expect that a highly personalized leadership style might increase the probability that the

party structure would remain weak. Alternatively, a less personalized, more collegial, or issue-oriented, style might require a stronger party structure in order to maintain its power. An interesting new volume on the role of leadership is Mostafa Rejai, with Kay Phillips, Leaders of Revolution (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1979). See also James V. Downton, Jr., Rebel Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1973).

¹¹⁷It is my view that there is a relationship between the leadership style one finds in a given revolution and the philosophical beliefs, attitudes and/or personality characteristics of its major leaders. My assumption is that a leader's beliefs affect behavior.

¹¹⁸karol, p. 179.

¹¹⁹Gonzalez, p. 99.

¹²⁰See Alexander and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study (New York: John Day, 1956), and also A. L. George, "Some Uses of Dynamic Psychology in Political Biography: Case Materials on Woodrow Wilson," in A Source Book for the Study of Personality and Politics, eds. Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner (Chicago: Markham, 1970).

¹²¹Among the best works in this area is Fred Greenstein, Personality and Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975).

¹²²My unpublished 1979 manuscript, "The Operational Code Revisited," is an attempt to analyze the belief system and personality factors which might affect a leader's decisions.

¹²³Matthews, Chapter Six, "The Road to Marxism," pp. 165-198.

¹²⁴One item which seems to stand out for some observers is Castro's apparent resentment of U.S. historical interference in Cuba. Former U.S. Ambassador Bonsal argues that, "Castro's pathological hatred of American power and the impotence of Cuba's influential classes were the cause of the Cuban shift to the left, "Cuba, Castro and the United States," Foreign Affairs 45:2 (January 1967): 267. Thomas argues that Castro's desire to challenge the U.S. was very deeply based, p. 1060.

¹²⁵Bonachea, p. 204.

¹²⁶Regis Debray as quoted in G.A. Kelly and

C.W. Brown, Jr., eds., Struggles in the State (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), p. 75.

¹²⁷O'Connor, p. 11.

¹²⁸Goldenberg, p. 297. He also argues that, "The developing trend toward socialism was not based on a clearly conceived plan, but resulted from the interplay of spontaneous decisions of leadership."

¹²⁹Cf. Zeitlin and Scheer. Although they magnify the efficacy of U.S. policy beyond credibility, they are convincing in their argument that the interplay between U.S. and Cuban foreign policies was important.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNAL CONFLICT IN CUBA

I. SYSTEMIC INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

As I have suggested in Chapter Two, one of the ways in which international factors affect internal conflict is that the structure of the international environment sets the parameters for interactions among nations. The international system of the late 1950's was bipolar. Particularly in the critical years for this study, 1956 to 1960, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in an intense Cold War rivalry, which led both states to regard other areas of the world as potential arenas for increasing their own power at the expense of the other. The competition which occurred, however, was generally peaceful due to the exigencies of nuclear politics. Although this did not preclude the use of force by one power in selected cases, e.g., Hungary, it was generally true that, with the exception of Korea, interference or intervention by the two superpowers took place only in areas within their own tacitly acknowledged spheres of influence.

Other facets of the international system relevant to the present case include: 1) the rise of nationalist,

anti-colonial sentiment worldwide, which helped spur the coming to independence of a multitude of new states in the late 1950's; and 2) the "Spirit of Bandung, stemming from the 1955 Conference of the same name, which led many of the newer states to seek a non-aligned position in the Cold War. As a result of these two factors, there was "an international atmosphere of protection and encouragement for colonial liberation movements."¹ Furthermore, these movements caused the U.S. to begin to lose influence outside the Western Hemisphere, especially in what was later to become known as the Third World. Although Cuba was not a "war of liberation" as the term has developed in the post-War II era, the growing anti-colonial consensus was a supportive element in their international milieu and may have encouraged Cuban insurgents to act upon their nationalist impulses.

Global and regional norms appear to have played some role in regulating the interactions between states in the post World War Two international system. In particular, the norm against direct military involvement was an accepted part of international political life in the Western hemisphere. Combined with the traditional sphere of influence policy articulated by the Monroe Doctrine, its Roosevelt Corollary and the 1948 Rio Pact (which, in establishing the Organization of American States, proscribed intervention), the prohibitions

against such involvement were numerous. The existence of regional norms against intervention, of course, did not actually prevent the two giants from intervening or interfering later on, as in the Bay of Pigs or the missile crisis. However, the regional norm did make intervention more costly. And it was reinforced by the worldwide trend toward nationalism on the part of smaller, former colonial territories.

Cuba's traditional position within this international system of superpower dominance, Cold War rivalry and nascent nationalism was a relatively minor one. Its geographical position, ninety (90) miles from the continental U.S., and its well established political links with and economic dependence upon the U.S., had made Cuba the western equivalent of a "satellite" country. It is highly doubtful that the Cuban insurgency would have succeeded if the U.S. had intervened early on with greater force and commitment than it used subsequently in 1961 at the Bay of Pigs. Indeed, one could make a reasonable case that U.S. policy actually allowed Castro to rise to power and, further, to make the changes he did upon achieving power.²

Cuba's relationship with the U.S. had several effects on the conflict itself. On the one hand, the established pattern of U.S.-Cuban relations had an inertial effect. Cuba was dependent, and it was diffi-

cult for American, Cuban or even Soviet policy makers to foresee how this relationship could change quickly. It would seem that no one, perhaps not even Castro himself, and certainly not the Cuban Communist Party, believed that the U.S.-Cuban relationship would or could change dramatically, even with the displacement of the Batista regime. Thus, the weight of past policy and economic necessity had a conservative effect on the situation. Moreover, the long-standing pattern of U.S.-Cuban relations helped to ward off any direct Soviet encouragement of, or participation in, the insurgency against Batista. One may assume that Soviet policy makers evaluated the risks of conflict with the U.S and concluded that they were too great, at least in the period from 1956 to 1959, for them to become heavily involved.

On the other hand, there is evidence that the traditional pattern of U.S.-Cuban interaction had built up tremendous tensions between the two countries which contributed to the explosions of 1958-1960. While dismissing simplistic interpretations of the contradictions inherent in this relationship, especially the view that the break which finally came was "inevitable," one is led to conclude that there were serious flaws in the relationship and that some type of U.S.-Cuban conflict would result, especially in an era more conscious of colonial and neo-colonial policies.

Another factor which may have influenced outside involvement in the Cuban struggle was the attraction Cuba held as a potential outpost for anti-Americanism. From the Soviet Union's perspective, for example, a Cuban rebellion against American domination might benefit the U.S.S.R. in its competition with the U.S. for ideological supremacy worldwide. A socialist outpost just off the U.S. coast would undoubtedly have a negative effect on U.S. prestige, and might encourage insurgent movements elsewhere in Latin America, a new area of interest for the Soviets in the late 1950's. Moreover, there would be the inestimable value for the U.S.S.R. of having a potential military base near the U.S. That the strategic value of such an outpost was considered by the Soviets is evidenced by the later emplacement of missiles in Cuba which led to the 1962 missile crisis.

The international environment had another effect on the course of the Cuban conflict. According to Gonzalez, "it virtually determined the shape of Cuba's ultimate reversion to client state status."³ Without one protector and provider -- the U.S. -- Cuba would inevitably need another. In the international setting of the late 1950's and early 1960's, the only other power in a position to play this role was the Soviet Union. Halperin contends that in the period from 1956 to 1960, the Soviet Union had expanded its capability and its

willingness to underwrite a revolution almost 6,000 miles away.⁴ The Soviet Union's new interest was directly related to the thaw initiated by Krushchev after 1957. The Soviets saw Latin America as a potential market and an area for expanding their influence. For example, they had, in the period 1956 to 1958, begun to purchase increased amounts of Cuban sugar. As the following sections will show, the Cuban need for an external "patron" encouraged the progressive radicalization of Cuban society during and after 1959. When societal change became more drastic, it became easier for the Soviet Union to offer assistance, and more necessary that it do so in terms of its own prestige in the socialist world.

On the latter point, it should be noted that the late 1950's were a period which also saw the beginnings of serious Sino-Soviet dissension within the international communist community. Although the evidence to illustrate any intense rivalry with regard to Cuba is lacking, there is evidence that both the Chinese and the Soviets became interested in the possibilities presented by Cuba, e.g., as demonstrated by the opening of diplomatic and trade relations in 1959.⁵ Although I have no documentation to prove it, it seems that the influence of this China factor in making the Soviet Union carry out its support for Castro once it had chosen to support him

should not be underestimated. Thus, although the basic pattern of international action was bipolar, the emergent polycentrism of the communist movement may have served as a spur to Soviet involvement in Latin American politics

Another international political factor of importance was the change in the regional political climate in Latin America from 1954 onward. In that year, the U.S. had succeeded in overthrowing the Guatemalan regime of Jacobo Arbenz through C.I.A. activity. After this, Latin America had entered a period of prolonged economic, social and political crises and there was a distinct surge to the left in many countries. According to Halperin, these changes favored Castro by "providing him with important leverage in his confrontation with the U.S."⁶

If, as Goldenberg argues, Castro could rely on anti-imperialist sympathy from many groups within Latin America,⁷ the U.S. would have to be more restrained in its actions toward Cuba, especially since its economic ties with Latin America were a dominant factor in U.S. foreign policy toward the Latin nations. Revolution in Latin America was viewed by the U.S. as something it could not afford. "The Americans could not behave as the Soviet Union had done toward Hungary in 1956 ... because for a long time Castro succeeded in presenting himself as a victim of the Americans.... To some extent, Castro's

policy was based on an awareness of these inhibitions... which made Yanqui imperialism into a paper tiger.... The situation in Latin America demanded the same foreign policy."⁸

In general terms, therefore, Cuba was of potentially greater importance in international affairs than its resources or size would indicate. It was a country of economic, strategic and ideological value to the U.S. It was a source of potential ideological influence and military value for the Soviet Union. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had the capabilities to intervene, although costs for the Soviet Union -- because of the long distance -- would undoubtedly have been higher. As later events such as the missile crises were to demonstrate clearly and frighteningly, the primary restraints on competitive superpower interference and intervention in Cuba were the perceptions both sides had of each others' will to use its immense nuclear power.

The bipolar structure of the international system thus provided some freedom of action for Castro because it gave him choices and allowed him to take advantage of the competition for Cuba's alignment in world politics.⁹ These opportunities were not lost on Cuban leadership. Indeed, much of the impact of what I have called external factors will be seen in the detailed historical examination of U.S.-Cuban and Soviet-Cuban relations which follows.

II. DISCRETE INTERNATIONAL FACTORS: U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS

A. Historical Background

The histories of the United States and Cuba have been intertwined for over a century. In addition to the economic penetration described in Chapter Three, there "was an active tradition of interference since 1898 in Cuba's political affairs."¹⁰ U.S. concern with Cuba had traditionally stressed strategic factors. Because the island was in the strategically significant Caribbean, it had always been important to the U.S. that it remain in friendly hands. Spanish control of the island was not viewed as a problem until the late 19th century when Cuban unrest began to develop. A group of Cuban nationalists struggled against Spain in the Ten Years War, beginning in 1868. Unable to win on their own, the insurgents sought aid from the U.S., with some success. The involvement of the U.S. government was instrumental in achieving a compromise in 1878.

Spain, however, did not fulfill the commitment it had made to home rule for Cuba. As a result, fighting broke out again in 1895 under the leadership of Cuban patriot Jose Marti. Although the U.S. attempted to remain neutral, rebel activity in New York and Florida made it virtually impossible. According to Ruiz, "A Cuban government in exile operated in New York, where Marti made his headquarters, while the Cuban Revolu-

tionary Party solicited funds, recruited men, purchased arms and munitions and enlisted ship captains for an invasion of the homeland."¹¹

Finally, popular sympathy for the rebels, the need to protect the Panama canal project, American economic interests in Cuba, and the sinking of the Maine led to U.S. intervention. According to all accounts it was a relatively easy victory for the U.S. For the Cubans, however, it had been a long and costly struggle. Once the fighting ceased an American military government ruled the island. In four centuries of colonial rule the Cubans had not had much say in their own political affairs. As a result they were not ready for self-rule, at least in the eyes of their North American "protectors." The insurgents, who had waited for a chance to govern themselves, saw it quite differently. Cuban independence from Spain was effected by a peace settlement, the treaty of Paris, to which no Cuban was even a party. In 1902 the U.S. turned Cuba back to the Cubans, but under certain conditions.

Foremost among these conditions were the restrictions imposed by the Platt Amendment. The intent of this amendment was to make the Cuban government tractable. First, the terms of this amendment were imposed upon the Cubans at their constitutional convention held in 1901. They were also incorporated into a treaty between the U.S. and Cuba which was signed after the withdrawal of

U.S. forces. The Amendment limited the authority of the Cuban government to negotiate international treaties and to borrow funds from abroad. It also required Cuba to sell or lease lands to the U.S. for naval stations and coaling stations on the island. One clause of the Amendment states that, "Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty."¹² Not surprisingly, this Amendment promoted fear and distrust of the U.S. and helped to generate what one writer has called "a national inferiority complex on the day the Republic was born."¹³ According to Wolf, "This action served effectively to turn Cuban nationalism ... against the United States."¹⁴ In essence, Cubans had lost the right to govern themselves and the U.S. had arrogated to itself the role of mentor. The shame of the Platt Amendment plagued Cuban politics for over thirty years, arising as an issue in the 1933 internal conflict and even later, though more faintly, as a reference in the 1959 struggle.

The U.S. wasted little time in using the Platt Amendment to intervene in Cuba. After the regime of Estrada Palma collapsed and violence broke out, U.S. forces returned in 1906 to occupy the island until 1909. Again in 1912 American troops arrived to quell an upris-

ing. And in 1916 they returned once again in answer to a plea from President Mario Garcia Menocal. Allegations of fraud in the 1920 election brought not intervention but political interference, this time taking the form of a State Department advisor. The new President, Zayas, thus had to contend with U.S. General Crowder, who selected Zayas' cabinet, and imposed reforms in a variety of fields as a condition of the U.S.'s issuing loans which Cuba desperately needed.¹⁵ Thus, the U.S. had established itself as the arbiter of quarrels between Cuban political forces, and by 1925 had over \$1.25 billion invested in Cuba.¹⁶ The net effect of U.S. political and economic involvement, however, was to encourage the development of a strong sense of nationalism. By the late 1920's this nationalist sentiment led to the demands of many groups for a radical alteration in the nation's relations with the U.S.

In 1933, the U.S. sent Sumner Welles to Cuba "to force the dictator Machado out of office with a minimum of turmoil."¹⁷ His efforts, a general strike and a surge of violent activity finally toppled Machado in 1933. The Grau San Martin regime which followed replaced the Cespede's government which, despite Welles support, had ruled only briefly. Non-recognition by the U.S., however, prevented Grau from ruling effectively. Most scholars agree that the result of U.S. policy from 1898 to

1933 was that "antagonism toward the U.S. became a recurrent theme in Cuban politics."¹⁸ In 1934 the Platt Amendment was abrogated and President Roosevelt attempted to help restore the Cuban economy. "To alleviate the desperate conditions,... the U.S. Congress enacted the Jones-Costigan Act, giving Cuba an annual quota ... of 3000,000 tons of sugar more than it had exported during 1933. At the same time, Roosevelt reduced the import duty."¹⁹ As part of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement of 1934 this duty was reduced further, and Cuba reduced its import duties on a large number of American products. In addition, the U.S. established a Second Export-Import Bank to facilitate trade with and extend credit for Cuba.

After this, official U.S. policy toward Cuba was called "non-intervention," and, in fact, there were no more military incursions. In practice, however, the level of investments, the volume of trade and the pervasive influence of American publications were such that "the U.S., by simply failing to associate itself with internal forces tending to change, exerted a powerful conservative influence"²⁰ on Cuba both economically and politically. A later U.S. Ambassador, Earl E.T. Smith, was to remark that the American ambassador "was the second most important man in Cuba, sometimes even more important than the President."²¹

Throughout this century a major concern of U.S. policy has been hemispheric defense. During World War

Two, Cuba's strategic position in relation to Latin American sea routes made it important to incorporate Cuba into the defense scheme for the Americas. In 1951, just before Batista came to power for the second time, the U.S. and Cuba signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement giving Cuba \$1,000,000 per year in military aid. This assistance, and continued U.S. political support, helped to prop up the anti-communist Batista regime during the 1950's.

Closely related to hemispheric defense was the machinery of inter-American cooperation, which was an element in the environment of U.S.-Cuban relations in the post-World War II years. Article Fifteen of the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) states clearly that, "No state or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state."²² Although it is obvious that, broadly interpreted, this provision has not been honored, e.g., U.S. involvement in Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Nicaragua, El Salvador and elsewhere, it did become an issue in the diplomatic maneuvering that inevitably surrounds any such incursions.

A. U.S.-Cuban Relations, 1956-1958

As a result of U.S. interference, intervention and penetration throughout the twentieth century, Cuba had lived for some sixty years in the shadow of its larger neighbor, sacrificing a good deal of its national autonomy. By 1956, Batista was well entrenched in power and received both military and economic support from the U.S. According to Boris Goldenberg, American policy at this time centered around three goals: "to preserve stability in Cuba, which was very much to the advantage of American business interests; to strengthen anti-Communist elements; and to avoid, as far as possible, any direct intervention in Cuban politics."²³ Thus, Batista's anti-communist, pro-American policies had made him quite acceptable to the U.S.

In 1955 the U.S. Department of State refused to renegotiate the sugar agreements with Cuba. In 1956 there were modifications to the American sugar legislation which "once again brought into high relief the helpless position of Cuba in the U.S. sugar market."²⁴ Starting in 1957, however, U.S. support for Batista began to wane, coinciding with an increase in terror and repression by the Batista regime. In July 1957, U.S. Ambassador Gardner retired, claiming that he had been "ignored and circumvented by State."²⁵ Over the years Gardner had been a staunch supporter of the Batista regime. His

replacement, Ambassador Smith, was given a mandate by the Eisenhower administration to try to influence Batista in the direction of moderation. According to Philip W. Bonsal, who was later to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, in the fall of 1957 the U.S. began to slow up on processing of Batista's orders for military equipment.²⁶

In early 1958, the U.S. decided to suspend the shipment of arms to the Batista regime, although the American military mission remained in Cuba and continued to train officers for Batista's army. U.S. Secretary of State Dulles indicated that he did not want arms supplied for hemispheric defense to be used in a civil conflict.²⁷ Internal U.S. political considerations fueled this decision as well. The insurgent movement had been quite active both in the American press and in lobbying members of Congress for just such a cutoff of U.S. military support to Batista. The impact of the arms decision in Cuba was enormous, since it reflected the loss of American political support for the Batista regime.

Bonachea contends that "Washington's contacts with the revolutionaries were no secret."²⁸ In addition, the U.S. had apparently been doing very little to prevent former Cuban President Prio from using Florida as a base from which to smuggle arms and men into Cuba in direct violation of U.S. neutrality laws and stated U.S. policy. This eventually changed in mid-1958 when the volume of

such activity increased to the point that some arrests were made.

Yet U.S. policy was not entirely supportive of the insurgent movement either. Although Batista's repressive policies made some change necessary, it was never quite clear what policy would evolve and which, in any, of the rebellious elements would best protect American interests upon achieving power. It seems that State Department leadership, most particularly Assistant Secretary Rubottom, was convinced that Castro was not a communist.

The Embassy, however, had an entirely different relationship with and view of the insurgents and Castro in particular. During 1958 Smith "worked vigorously and openly for a non-communist alternative to Batista," claiming that the U.S. could not "do business with Castro."²⁹ According to Bonachea, "Smith refused to establish contacts with the revolutionaries and limited his conversations to the small clique of old politicians seemingly looking to save the country from violent revolution."³⁰ Smith's own view was that he had to deal with Batista who was the legitimate representative of a friendly government; he confirmed that he took a dim view of Castro and that he did try to work for an alternative to Castro but was subverted by the policy makers in Washington.

Thus, something of a dual policy U.S. evolved

during 1958. The U.S. government did not support Batista in a decisive way, yet it appeared to be looking for a way to avoid revolution. It pursued this policy by allowing insurgent activity in Florida, but not supporting the insurgents openly for fear of being thought to have intervened in Cuba's internal affairs while the outcome of the civil conflict was highly uncertain. Much of the ambivalence in this policy can be explained by the differences between the Embassy view and the State Department view of trends and events. Moreover, policy is rarely as clear cut as analysts might wish; it is often inconsistent and may be made as much in the field as it is within the central foreign policy apparatus.

Despite the ambivalence, however, it is clear that during the early part of 1958 there was a break in U.S. political support for Batista, which, many observers indicate, helped to build up the morale of the insurgent forces. This loss of support for Batista seemed to trouble Ambassador Smith greatly, for he claims to have seen the opportunity for a peaceful solution to the conflict, based on supervised elections or the establishment of a government of national unity. "On various occasions when opportunities were available for a solution without Batista or Castro, our Department of State refused to lend its support based on the grounds that the U.S. would be accused of intervention."³¹

There is evidence that the U.S. did try to put pressure on Batista to make concessions in 1958. In particular, Smith and others confirm that he attempted at least twice to get Batista to retire in favor of a regime acceptable to the U.S. But the U.S. did not get involved in a plan proposed by a moderate leader Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, in which some external logistical support was required.³² On December 9, 1958, the Department of State sent Ambassador William D. Pawley on an unofficial mission to Cuba in order to convince Batista that he should yield to a junta immediately.³³ According to Thomas, Pawley paid \$100,000 to get a Colonel Barquin out of jail so that he could replace Batista.³⁴ Bonachea and San Martin claim that Pawley was sent to negotiate a caretaker government which the U.S. would recognize and supply with \$10,000,000 in arms.³⁵ Evidently this formula was supported by CIA Director Allen Dulles.³⁶ Batista himself claims that "the U.S. intervened on behalf of the Castros."³⁷

All of this activity occurred late in the year. However, the key event in Cuban U.S. relations during 1958 was the imposition of an arms embargo. As noted, a military assistance pact had been in place since 1951. Article Two of this pact stated that the U.S. would supply the Cuban government with arms for "implementing defense plans ... important to the defense of the Western

hemisphere."³⁸ In reality, this military equipment was being used to fight a civil conflict. The 1957 Sierra Manifesto of the insurgent movement had demanded an end to U.S. shipments of arms to Batista. As Mario Llerena shows, the Cuban exile groups were quite active in seeking to influence U.S. public opinion against these arms shipments. Llerena himself claims to have given Congressman Adam Clayton Powell a list of all arms received by Batista in the period 1952-1958. This list included rifles, grenades, rockets and tanks with guns.³⁹ On March 20, 1958 Powell and Charles O. Porter, Congressman from Oregon, made speeches in Congress criticizing the supply of arms to the Batista regime.⁴⁰

According to Powell and Porter, the revelations of the contracts for arms and military equipment played a significant role in bringing about a change of course in the Eisenhower administration policy toward Batista.... The polished image of a patriotic Cuban leading a democratic revolution against a bloody dictatorship was having its desired effect on American public opinion. And it was American withdrawal of support for Batista that determined his fall and cleared the path to power for Castro.⁴¹

Thus, in March, 1958 the U.S. stopped shipment on a fairly meaningless number of rifles (1900) which had been ordered as far back as 1956. It indicated further that all arms shipments would be suspended while there was a civil conflict going on. According to Ambassador Smith, "It was no longer possible to engender any support in the State Department for Batista."⁴² The U.S. took

additional steps which reinforced the embargo decision. It insisted that the existing equipment be used only for hemispheric defense, it put pressure on other nations not to sell arms to Batista,⁴³ and it stopped sending replacement parts for existing military equipment.

The announcement of the suspension of shipments was "a double blow to Batista who needed both the weapons and the appearance of approval that the aid program provided."⁴⁴ Although there is serious doubt that the U.S. decision affected the Batista regime's ability to obtain the necessary military materiel, the embargo meant that Batista's main external supporter had assumed a position of active neutrality. The timing of the embargo announcement was critical, for it came just before the planned general strike in April. As Bonachea argues, "The psychological impact of this change in U.S. policy can hardly be over-estimated.... The embargo seems to have damaged Batista's regime considerably."⁴⁵ Ambassador Smith said that it "had a moral and psychological effect on the Cuban armed forces that was demoralizing to the nth degree and it built up the morale of the revolutionary forces."⁴⁶

Relations between the insurgents and the U.S. were complicated by the rebels' kidnapping on June 26, 1958 of twelve U.S. employees of the Moa Mining Company in retaliation for what they claimed to be delivery by the U.S. of 300 rockets to Guantanamo.⁴⁷ Raul Castro's

forces eventually kidnapped approximately thirty-five more Americans, demanding that the U.S. cease all arms shipments in return for release of the hostages. Secretary of State Dulles' reaction was that the guerrillas were forcing the U.S. into intervention.⁴⁸ At the time, President Eisenhower indicated that "We are not disposed to do anything reckless."⁴⁹ He denied any improper aid to Batista. Fidel Castro eventually ordered Raul to release the hostages, possibly because of fears that U.S. public opinion might be affected negatively. However, the net effect was to undermine Batista's authority by showing that he could not even protect the nationals of his main ally.⁵⁰

Other forces at work in 1958 which contributed to changes in U.S. policy were:

- 1) the Cuban elections, which were eventually held in November; these were somewhat of a farce, with Batista's candidate winning easily;
- 2) the role of the press in the U.S.; several interviews published in the New York Times and other magazines were sympathetic to Castro. James N. Rosenau suggests that the widespread support for Castro which resulted, "contributed to the neutralization of the U.S. defense posture and the cancellation of military aid."⁵¹
- 3) Ambassador Smith's own attempts to influence the course of Cuban politics;⁵²
- 4) the active representation of insurgent groups in Washington, through the Committee in Exile, which raised money and sought political support. Llerena argues that the

Committee "contributed enormously to the favorable image the Cuban government enjoyed."⁵³

It is likely that the American policy of official support for Batista then neutrality was also a result of:

- 1) the nature of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, and in particular the tensions between the Embassy and the State Department;
- 2) the pressure on the U.S. of other international concerns at this time, e.g., Berlin; and
- 3) uncertainty about Castro's motives and the type of struggle he was waging.

By the summer of 1958 it was becoming apparent that Batista was unable or unwilling to restore constitutional guarantees and to hold the elections he had promised. As a result, U.S. officials felt that they were under pressure to take some action, particularly in light of the espoused democratic aims of the insurgents.

C. U.S.-Cuban Relations, 1959-1960

The period beginning with January 1, 1959, and extending through December, 1960 is both critical and difficult to examine. To reconstruct the flow of events and to explain why events happened as they did are difficult tasks. The complex chain of political action and reaction is not easily reconstructed. Internal and external

forces impinge, often simultaneously, on decision makers; causality is difficult to attribute; motivation and perceptions are often unknowable, even to the decision maker himself, and hence are not easily researchable. Therefore, what I have tried to do is to explore events chronologically⁵⁴ with some sensitivity to the range of forces operative in the respective decision making milieus of U.S. and Cuban decision makers.⁵⁵

It is, perhaps, easier to begin with an examination of Cuban rather than U.S. foreign policy in this period. David Stansfield argues that Cuban policy makers have traditionally been compelled to deal with two fundamental problems: 1) the size and location of Cuba in relation to the U.S., and 2) the dependence of the Cuban economy on one crop and one trading partner. In Stansfield's view, "Arrangements to deal with them have determined the main course of Cuba's foreign policy both before and after the revolt of 1959."⁵⁶ Because of this dependent relationship, the primary aim of Cuban policy had been to achieve the "best deal" on its sugar sales to the U.S. As McGaffey and Barnett conclude, "Cuban foreign policy was a process of organizing foreign influence rather than an independent line."⁵⁷

Stansfield argues further that the key to understanding the changes in Cuban foreign policy after 1959 lies in an examination of Fidel Castro and his movement.

As depicted above, the insurgency was driven, in part, by a desire to restore Cuba's tarnished sovereignty. Quite naturally, this was fed by a sixty year stockpile of anti-American, anti-imperialist sentiment in Cuba. As subsequent events demonstrate, Castro was very serious in his desire to diminish Cuban dependence on the U.S. This strong, nationalist element led both Cuba and the U.S. to take actions in 1959 and 1960 which the other side either misunderstood or understood far too well.

Boris Goldenberg claims that "Fidel's determination to demonstrate Cuba's independence sharply delimited his position toward Washington."⁵⁸ Hence, even from the outset, there was a degree of strain between the new regime and the U.S. Nevertheless, the State Department had accepted Castro's victory and recognized the new regime within a week. Several days later, Fidel Castro publicly committed himself to implementing the 1940 Constitution, denied that plans existed for expropriation foreign property and said very little against the U.S.⁵⁹ On January 11, 1959, the Cuban regime called for the removal of both Ambassador Smith and the American military mission in Cuba. The American response to these requests was quick and simple -- it agreed to both measures and declared a policy of non-involvement in Cuba's internal affairs. On January 13, 1959, Castro, at a rally for Cuban workers, indicated that Cuba would adopt a policy of "equidistance from the U.S. and the

Soviet Union."⁶⁰ On January 4, Castro had declared "I am not a communist.... I am not taking orders from the Americans."⁶¹ Despite official U.S. approval of the new regime, however, the American response to the trials and executions of former Batista people in January was very negative. According to Halperin, Castro was quite sensitive to U.S. press charges of a bloodbath.⁶²

In February, 1959 Castro charged that the U.S. was attempting to run Cuba and asserted that Cuba must be economically free. Also in February, the internal structure of the Cuban government began to change.⁶³ First, the Cabinet abrogated the 1940 Constitution which Castro had pledged to restore. As a result, legislative power was vested in the Cabinet and, in addition, the Prime Minister's power was increased. Further, Castro himself replaced the more moderate Miro Cardona as Prime Minister.

During March 1959, Castro criticized the U.S. Congress for its consistent use of the sugar quota as a threat to influence Cuban policies. However, he reassured the State Department that Cuba would pursue a neutralist foreign policy. However, on March 23, 1959 Castro accused the U.S. of being Cuba's "real enemy."⁶⁴

In April the regime adopted a friendlier posture toward the U.S. On April 3, Mario Llerena and Manuel Urrutia held a press conference in New York where they

reaffirmed the regime's democratic principles and denied "any contact or understanding with the Communists." On April 4, 1959, Llerena was quoted as saying, "We flatly reject any cooperation whatsoever.... The Cuban reds simply want to get on the bandwagon."⁶⁵

The highpoint of the month's activities was Castro's "informal" trip to the United States to speak before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 17. Evidently, the Eisenhower administration was somewhat uncomfortable because a head of state had been invited by a non-governmental group. But it did arrange for a luncheon with Secretary Herter during Castro's stay. In his major address before the editors Castro defended the Cuban trials and executions, claiming that they had prevented a bloodbath. He reassured Americans that Cuba would remain friendly to the West and that it would remain in the Inter-American Defense Pact. He denied there were any plans to expropriate American property. He indicated that Cuba was seeking trade and not aid and asked for a better commercial treaty with the U.S. On the issue of communism, Castro said, "We have received no aid from Russia, nor have we asked for any aid.... We are against dictatorships, personal or class. That's why we don't agree with communism."⁶⁶ On April 22 he said "Our revolution practices the democratic principle for a humanistic democracy," and gave assu-

rances that elections would be held within two years.⁶⁷

While in Washington, Castro also met with Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom and with Vice President Nixon. Although his visit was an informal one, those at the Latin American desk of the State Department claim there were attempts to accommodate Castro. Although much speculation later surfaced as to why Castro was not offered economic aid to encourage him to remain in the Western camp, Secretary Herter indicates that Castro made no request for financial assistance.⁶⁸ According to Rufo Lopez Fresquet, then Cuban Minister of Finance, the economic aid issue was raised by U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Anderson, but the Cubans declined to discuss it.⁶⁹

It is likely that Castro made this trip partly to mollify American public and governmental opinion on the trials, since a sympathetic U.S. would be less likely to support exile activity against him.⁷⁰ But it would be incorrect to argue that Castro was merely trying to buy time by disorienting American opinion. Since Castro incurred political costs in Cuba for this trip, e.g., newspaper articles against him, suspicions of his selling out to the Yanquis, etc., it is likely that Castro's intentions were broader.⁷¹ Halperin contends that the trip demonstrated that Castro had not yet closed the door to some type of accommodation with the U.S., albeit on

terms which would not threaten his drive to achieve greater independence for Cuba. But according to Halperin,

it is altogether improbable that even assuming Washington's ability to recognize the signal it would have been willing or able to respond. There were large prickly thorns on the olive branch -- both economic and political.⁷²

Before returning to Cuba in early May 1959, Castro went to Buenos Aires where he addressed the Economic Conference of the American States. There he proposed a U.S. Marshall Plan for Latin America -- to the tune of \$30 billion over ten years. In this speech, as well as in the interviews which followed, "Nothing was said to foreshadow the attacks on the U.S. that were to come."⁷³ That Castro was evidently serious about a softer U.S. policy line is evidenced by his own attacks, and those of the 26th of July Movement, against the Cuban Communists, especially in his public denunciation of them in May.⁷⁴ According to U.S. Ambassador Bonsal, "Castro seemed anxious to dispel any impression that the Communists were gaining in influence."⁷⁵ These are indications that Castro may have been going through a period of some uncertainty as to the future course Cuba was to take. But it is possible, as Nelson argues, that he was merely trying to beguile his enemies until his internal position was more secure.

The U.S. response to Castro's Marshall Plan proposal itself, however, was negative. This had led some observers to conclude that the U.S. wasted a "last chance" at keeping Castro within a non-communist framework. For example, Halperin argues, "After Buenos Aires the prospects for a modus vivendi between the U.S. and Cuba rapidly diminished."⁷⁶ In defense of the U.S. posture one can argue, convincingly I believe, that the State Department received Castro with some trepidation, despite its lack of fondness for the Batista regime. Hence its responses in 1959 were not out of character, nor were they necessarily wrong given State's perception of U.S. interests in Cuba and Latin America. For example, it is unreasonable to expect that the U.S. would accede to a demand for \$30 billion in aid from a revolutionary leader representing a small island nation whose regime had been in power a mere three months. If the trips to the U.S. and Argentina were a turning point in U.S.-Cuban relations, it appears that Castro is open to criticism for his naivete regarding the American political process and American aims in Latin America.

Internal developments in Cuba during May 1959 also affected the relations between the two countries. The Agrarian Reform Law was adopted, leading to a redistribution of the large landholdings (latifundia). In some cases, this land was owned by American firms, although very little was affected in the early months of

the new Law's implementation. According to Farber, the Law was a turning point in the relations between Castro and his domestic supporters, as well as between Cuba and the U.S.⁷⁷ In a June 16, 1959 letter from the Revolutionary Government to the U.S., Cuba indicated that compensation was to be paid in twenty year bonds with an interest rate of approximately 3-4%. In its view, a deferred repayment was the only one Cuba could afford.⁷⁸ The U.S. found this proposal unacceptable and protested against it vigorously. The Law itself, however, made sense from an internal political viewpoint, since over-concentration of wealth had been a real grievance of the insurgent movement. Besides being seen by Cuban leaders as fair and necessary economically, the Law became a foundation for the Castro regime's efforts to build popular support for the new government among the lower classes. However, it was the first of the revolutionary measures which seriously affected multiple American interests and the interests of the Cuban middle class.⁷⁹

Internal developments in Cuba continued to have an impact on Cuba's policy toward the U.S. in June and July of 1959. As a result of the first shifts toward a more radical program for change, many middle class professionals who had originally aligned themselves with the Castro movement and regime resigned or were dismissed from their positions and left Cuba. Among the more illustrious to do so were: 1) Major Diaz Lanz, former

Commander of the Cuban Air Force, who later testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary's Internal Security Subcommittee that the Cuban government was being infiltrated by the Communists;⁸⁰ and, later in the year, 2) Huber Matos, a major who had commanded rebel forces in Camaguey Province. He resigned on October 19, denouncing communism, and was later jailed for twenty years for counter-revolutionary activities.

Castro also began to replace some key people in his central administration: 1) Raul Roa replaced U.S.-leaning Secretary of State Agramonte in July; 2) after Castro threatened to resign over his anti-communist statements, President Urrutia was replaced in July by Oswaldo Dorticos; and 3) moderates in Health, Agriculture and Social Welfare were also replaced. The U.S. State Department took these changes as warning signals of troubles to come. Other troubling signs of the times were: 1) Che Guevara's three month tour of non-aligned nations in Africa and Asia;⁸¹ 2) Castro's statements that to be anti-communist was to be counter-revolutionary; and 3) suspected Cuban involvement in plans to invade the Dominican Republic, Panama and Nicaragua.⁸²

Despite these internal developments, which evidently raised a great deal of suspicion in Washington, Castro continued to make intermittent overtures toward the U.S. On June 4, 1959, he suggested a new deal on sugar, offering to sell at a lower price to the U.S. if

it would increase the 1961 quota, a request the U.S. denied. In July he offered to abandon the pursuit of revolution in Latin America in return for normalization of relations with the U.S. On July 26, he said, "We want the best understanding and best relations between the peoples of the U.S and Cuba."⁸³ In August, Secretary of State Roa reassured U.S. Assistant Secretary Rubottom of Cuba's desire for harmony with the U.S.⁸⁴

In September 1959, at the United Nations, Roa proclaimed Cuban neutrality in terms clear to both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. "We favor neither capitalism as it has functioned throughout history nor communism as in reality it is practiced today."⁸⁵ While in New York Roa met with U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, Bonsal, and asserted that the revolution was not incompatible with good U.S.-Cuban relations.⁸⁶ The view that during the middle part of 1959 Castro was "still toying with the notion of remaining truly internationally neutral"⁸⁷ is supported by the realization that: 1) the speech must have been irritating to the Russians, and 2) it could not have been made had there been serious anticipation of the Soviet-Cuban relationship that was to evolve. Thus, by September 1959, it appears that Castro had not taken a final turn toward socialism internally nor toward the Soviet Union internationally, but he was moving in those directions while attempting to consolidate power domestically

On September 5, 1959, U.S. Ambassador Bonsal was recalled to Washington to underscore American displeasure at the Agrarian Reform Law's implementation, the Cuban government's intervention of the phone company and the reduction of rates that Cuban Electric could charge.⁸⁸ The day before, Bonsal met with Castro for the first time since he came to Cuba. Castro had complained that Bonsal's work was being "hampered by attitudes in the U.S. Senate Subcommittee."⁸⁹

By October 1959, internal counter-revolutionary activity and the Castro regime's response to it had begun to affect Cuban foreign policy. Diaz Lanz flew over Havana dropping anti-Castro leaflets. On October 26, Castro accused the U.S. of bombings. The regime repeated these charges over the next few months and implied that the U.S. had some responsibility for the activities. And it did insofar as Lanz had taken off from Florida and the U.S. had not adequately policed this area, thus allowing it to become a base for anti-Castro activity. At this point there was no evidence of direct U.S. involvement in these particular incidents. C.I.A. participation and support for them remains a mystery, although it has become clear that a short six months later the C.I.A. became heavily involved in plans to train and supply exile groups in Florida and Guatemala and in separate plans to assassinate Castro, plans which Castro's regime was evidently quite aware of.⁹⁰

On October 27, 1959, Ambassador Bonsal prepared a memorandum for the President enumerating the points in dispute between the U.S. and Cuba. First, the U.S. was attempting, in Bonsal's view, to stop flights from Florida to Cuba by exiles. Second, the U.S. was displeased that Castro was apparently supporting armed revolution in Latin America. Third, the U.S. was convinced that its business interests in Cuba were in grave jeopardy. Fourth, the U.S. was greatly concerned about the degree to which communists had become involved in the Castro regime.⁹¹ On October 28, President Eisenhower claimed that he was puzzled by U.S.-Cuban relations. "The record of close relations between Cuba and the U.S. made it a puzzling matter to figure out just why the Cubans would now be ... so unhappy."⁹² On the preceding day the U.S. had issued a statement regarding its grievances against the Cuban regime. And on October 26, Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom, appearing before the Inter-American Peace Committee of the O.A.S., reiterated the U.S.'s commitment to non-intervention.⁹³

In addition to the anti/anti-communist trend which surfaced in Cuba during the last half of 1959, other external and internal factors were present in the decision-making environment of the time. The P.S.P and the 26th of July Movement evidently reached some accommodation. Moderates Pazos and Ray resigned from the govern-

ment under criticism for their anti-communist views. The Soviet Union and Cuba reached an agreement involving additional purchases of Cuban sugar. Both Raul Castro and Che Guevara continued to remain "aloof from Castro's friendlier approach to the U.S."⁹⁴ And the U.S.

apparently attempted in October to block the sale of British jets to Cuba.⁹⁵ In late December there was yet another reshuffling of the Cuban Cabinet, with anti-communists being replaced by those more favorably disposed to accommodation with them. Ambassador Bonsal calimed that the Cabinet was restructured "in a manner precluding any further possibility of rational dialogue."⁹⁶ Thus, despite the assessment of C.I.A.

Deputy Director-General, C.P. Cabell, in November 1959, that Fidel Castro was not a Communist or pro-Communist at this time,⁹⁷ the strains between the U.S. and Cuba had begun to widen into fissures that made rapprochment even more difficult and unlikely.

Nineteen fifty-nine closed with the trading of serious and heated charges. Castro claimed that the U.S. would attack Cuba in 1960. Nixon and Eisenhower called for the rejection of communism by Cubans. Ambassador Bonsal claims that, "The U.S. government now recognized that quiet diplomacy had proved worthless."⁹⁸ Bonsal's assertion of quiet diplomacy goes beyond the normal meaning of those words, for the U.S. approach in

1959 had not only been quiet but restrained, and even passive. The U.S. had decided to wait it out, hoping that Castro would reverse direction. Perhaps, as Nelson argues, U.S. policy makers were perplexed by the varying and often confusing pronouncements emanating from Cuba regarding both the plans for domestic change and the direction of Cuban foreign policy. "Whether or not Castro was trying deliberately to confuse Washington, he succeeded rather well in doing so."⁹⁹

The general direction of Cuban-U.S. relations caused the U.S. to re-evaluate its position early in 1960. On January 11, 1960, Ambassador Bonsal presented to the Cuban Foreign Ministry a recital of Cuban seizures and occupations of U.S. lands and buildings and the confiscation and removal of American equipment in Cuba. Cuba responded by criticizing the U.S. once again. Ambassador Bonsal was called home. On January 20, Castro in a radio broadcast, attacked U.S. Secretary of State Herter, claiming that "an obvious plot exists against Cuba."¹⁰⁰

In late January, the U.S. issued a White Paper detailing the following points with regard to U.S. policy: 1) the U.S. favors non-intervention in Cuba; 2) it reaffirms Cuba's sovereign control over its internal affairs, including its right to undertake internal reforms; 3) the U.S. reaffirms its intention to defend U.S. property and citizens; 4) it will prevent the use

of Florida as a base for exile activity directed against the government of Cuba. The document also condemned the Cuban government's hostile posture toward the U.S. and expressed serious concern at the deterioration of relations.¹⁰¹ These main points were also enumerated in President Eisenhower's speech of January 25, 1960. Statements by Castro and Dorticos shortly thereafter showed "a remarkable absence of any attack on the U.S."¹⁰² Some commentators, including Bonsal himself, have concluded that the positions articulated by Eisenhower represented a gesture of rapprochement on the part of the U.S. But even he recognized that at this time, "the gap in basic concepts between the two governments was too great."¹⁰³

From January onward, 1960 became a year of active U.S. opposition to the Castro regime and active Cuban pursuit of an opening to the East. Illustrations of the former trend are: 1) Eisenhower's decision in March to explore possibilities for a U.S. supported invasion of Cuba;¹⁰⁴ 2) the U.S. government's advising private American companies to refuse to refine Soviet crude oil at U.S. refineries in Cuba in late June; 3) U.S. elimination of the sugar quota on July 6; 4) the provision of aid to other Latin American countries but not to Cuba; 5) the implementation of a complete embargo on trade with Cuba on October 19, 1960; 6) "concerted removal of key Cuban and American personnel from American companies in

Cuba;"¹⁰⁵ and 7) stepped up U.S. naval patrols of the Caribbean. At the same time, Cuba acted to decrease American imports to Cuba and thereby reduce dependence on the U.S. Bonsal notes that American imports from Cuba shrunk from \$547 million in 1958 to \$435 million in 1959 and down to only \$224 million in 1960.¹⁰⁶

Examples of Cuban overtures to the communist world include: 1) the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Mikoyan in February, 1960 which established a formal economic relationship including loans and a sugar agreement under which the U.S.S.R. agreed to buy one million tons of sugar a year for five years to be paid for partly by Soviet goods; 2) Cuban-Yugoslav and Cuban-Polish trade agreements in March and April, 1960; 3) a March, 1960 sugar deal with the People's Republic of China; 4) the establishment of diplomatic relations on May 7, 1960 with the Soviet Union; and 5) Krushchev's July 9 pledge to use "rocket fire power" if Cuba were attacked.

These trends were magnified by further anti-U.S. acts on the part of the Castro regime, e.g., expropriation of 155,000 acres of United Fruit property on April 6, 1960;¹⁰⁷ expropriation on June 29 of the refineries which had refused to process Russian oil; expropriation of approximately \$500 million in U.S. property in August, including thirty six sugar mills, two refineries and the utility companies; the September 2 Declaration of Havana, in which Cuba declared "political war" on the U.S.; the

takeover on September 17, 1960 of all U.S. banks in Cuba without compensation; and, finally, the nationalization of all remaining U.S. property on October 24, 1960.

It appears that "an interactive and self-supporting system of threat and counterthreat, misunderstanding and counter-misunderstanding, and retaliation and counter-retaliation was established between Cuba and the U.S. during 1959 and 1960."¹⁰⁸

There are three important considerations here: 1) when and why did the relationship deteriorate? 2) how reasonable were the actions of each side in the context of the times? What evidence is there that actual and perceived grievances coincided? and 3) what impact did this particular relationship have on the revolutionary process in Cuba? Could it have been different?

From the American point of view there were traditional economic interests to protect, there were strategic considerations such as the future of Guantanamo and there was also the potential impact on the U.S position elsewhere in Latin America. Most importantly, in the context of the Cold War, the U.S. would have suffered great symbolic loss if communism were to have established a foothold at its very doorstep. As Halperin contends, in mid-1959, "The men engaged in Realpolitik must have contemplated the situation with the most serious misgivings."¹⁰⁹ And indeed there were Cuban

actions which might reasonably have precipitated the the U.S. response: the trials and executions which may have offended American sensibilities and have not met its expectations as to what a democratic revolution should have undertaken; the Agrarian Reform Law which threatened American economic interests; the increased contact with the Soviet Union; the evident rapprochement between the P.S.P. and the 26th of July Movement; the campaign against anti-communism in Cuba; the flight of the Cuban middle class to the U.S.; and the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Castro regime. The evidence shows that for those at the the State Department these acts and trends clashed with Castro's efforts to reach some sort of accommodation with the U.S.

There were also some obvious differences between what the Americans expected and what Castro's regime did. In reviewing the events of 1959, for example, one is inclined to accept Goldenberg's judgement that "Castro certainly was more anti-capitalist than he publicly declared."¹¹⁰ Moreover, it appears that the U.S. government "had been caught unprepared for this new contingency in the Western Hemisphere,"¹¹¹ and was, therefore, somewhat tentative and defensive in its repsonse to the revolution. Whether or not Castro had set out deliberately to deceive or to neutralize the U.S., the net result of his change from an apparently moderate stance to a more radical position (Agrarian

Reform, etc.) was to confirm latent suspicions that the Castro movement was communist infiltrated, and that a real threat to American interests was at hand. That the U.S. waited for a whole year before taking any significant direct action against Castro is evidence that some combination of uncertainty and patience shaped U.S. policy.

From the beginning of 1960 onward, however, many Cuban actions reinforced the perception of American decision makers that the U.S.-Cuban relationship was deteriorating. The open recognition of Communist China, the increased economic dependence on the Soviet Union, the open proclamation of support for revolutionary seizures of American property convinced an already wary State Department that the relationship was not salvageable.

The Cuban point of view on the relationship was, of course, significantly different. To begin with, there was a legacy of genuine grievances prior to 1959, e.g., the Platt Amendment, U.S. ownership of Cuban utilities, economic dependency, U.S. assistance to Batista, etc. All of these may have raised doubts among revolutionary leadership about the viability of continuing the U.S.-Cuban relationship as it was and also about the likely American reaction to any significant revolutionary developments.

Objectively, the U.S. was the only power which

could physically threaten Cuba. Hence, it is not unlikely that "Castro perceived the U.S. as a threat"¹¹² -- militarily and economically. In a 1958 letter to the Junta de Liberacion, the exile coalition operating out of Miami, Castro wrote that "If we succeed in barring intervention, the tyranny will be automatically defeated."¹¹³ Judging from the events of 1959 -- including U.S. opposition to the executions, the land reform and nationalization, the rejection of Castro's aid plan for Latin America, and the apparent laxity of U.S. authorities in keeping exiles from using Florida as a staging area -- U.S. policy was not exactly hospitable. Castro himself claimed that he had interpreted American acceptance of Cuban exiles, conflicts with the U.S. on nationalization and the threats against the sugar quota as hostile U.S. acts.¹¹⁴ According to Bonsal, "Castro believed it probable that the Cuban revolution as he envisaged it would sooner rather than later come into irreconcilable conflict with American interests ... and that the U.S. government would respond with a full scale invasion."¹¹⁵

viewed somewhat dipassionately from the perspective of over twenty years' time, neither side's set of grievances in early to mid 1959 appear to have been sufficient to have caused a rupture. By 1960, however, both the U.S. and Cuba appear to have built up enough real grievances to have warranted a drastic change in

policy direction. From the Cuban vantage point, U.S. actions in 1960 all lent plausibility to the view that the U.S. was out to attack and possibly destroy the revolution. The cut-off of sugar imports was by far the most serious and damaging step taken by the U.S. Bonsal himself claims that "it went too far in comparison to what the U.S. suffered, and left Russia with no choice but to give massive support."¹¹⁶

According to Cole Blasier, Castro knew of the help the U.S. was apparently providing to counter-revolutionaries and therefore believed Cuba to be in deadly peril.¹¹⁷ In this light, many of Castro's statements and acts in 1959 and 1960 are more understandable. In Blasier's view, Castro saw Cuba in deadly peril and feared that American intervention was imminent. Bonsal claims, similarly, that "Castro was fully and currently informed of the C.I.A. directed recruiting, financing, arming and training of his Cuban enemies."¹¹⁸ Hence, his fears and some of his more extreme responses were reasonable in the context of the times. And the U.S. pronouncements after March 17, 1960 must be viewed in light of the secret actions the U.S. was preparing to overthrow Castro.

This is not to say that neither side overreacted. Indeed, almost from the beginning the U.S. and Cuba seemed to expect the worst from one another. And, of course, it is ironic that neither side was disappointed. It is perhaps even more ironic that the net effect of

U.S. policy was the opposite of what was apparently intended. The U.S. eventually lost influence over Castro's actions and thereby lost Cuba to the Eastern bloc.¹¹⁹ There was, also, to some degree a "self-fulfilling prophecy" at work. Each nation seemed to be responding more to what it thought the other would do than to what it had done. This was especially true during 1959.

One critical factor which foreign policy analysts have tended to ignore is the effect of internal factors on Cuban foreign policy in this period. Draper, for example, seems to have assumed that Castro was in total control of all internal developments and that his decisions to radicalize the revolution and to break with the U.S. were simply conscious choices that were his alone to make. There were, however, certain elements to the internal revolutionary dynamic which constrained Castro.

Blasier notes that "Castro's need to establish control over the government and society led him to adopt a strategy which placed important limits on his relations with the U.S."¹²⁰ For example, Castro needed to develop more of an urban constituency, since most of his pre-power activity had been rurally based. Moreover, as I have explained previously the political organization of the 26th of July Movement was extremely loose. Clearly, Castro needed a stronger organizational structure. As I shall show in the next section, the Cuban

Communist Party had both urban support and good organization, hence the move toward rapprochement with the P.S.P. in late 1959. Similarly, the public trials and executions, the postponement of elections, the economic changes such as Agrarian Reform, were all quite reasonable, logical and possibly necessary in the context of internal Cuban politics in 1959. Further pressures to move in this direction were provided by Raul Castro and Che Guevara, who had fought with Fidel from the outset and whose more traditional ties with Marxist theory and organization had an influence on Fidel's policies. When viewed against the backdrop of long term anti-American feeling, these internal leadership factors helped to encourage Fidel to move in a more radical direction.¹²¹

There is some controversy concerning the precise time when Cuban policy took on a distinctly anti-American cast. One group of authors claims that Castro was basically anti-American before the revolution and that even his earliest policies were geared toward soliciting Soviet backing. For example, on June 5, 1958 Fidel wrote to Celia Sanchez that it would be necessary to fight against the U.S. after Batista's overthrow.¹²² As I have shown, however, it is more fruitful to look at both Castro's apparent anti-Americanism and his move toward the Soviet camp in broader terms.¹²³ Although the insurgency had been directed toward Batista's removal rather than being an anti-imperialist revolt, there is evidence that

there was fairly substantial sentiment throughout Cuban society against U.S. policies and influence in Cuba. And Castro played upon this sentiment, if for no other reason than to consolidate power in the name of national independence. That the U.S. itself chose to interpret this motive as sinister may have been reasonable given the climate of official U.S. opinion, particularly the concern of U.S. policy makers about the communist menace worldwide. Nonetheless, Cuba's strong if not strident nationalism seems to have had a negative impact on U.S. perceptions of Cuban statements and actions, both foreign and domestic.

Another perspective places a good deal of blame for the U.S.-Cuban split on the U.S. Zeitlin and Scheer, for example, contend that Castro's animosity toward the U.S. was a result of American policy mistakes. In their view, the U.S. should have accepted Castro's and Cuba's strong nationalism and allowed him more room to maneuver. Even Nelson, who argues that "knowledgeable students of the revolution no longer take seriously the theory that action or the lack of it by officials in Washington forced Castro into the arms of the Soviet Union," concludes that, "In retrospect, it seems to have been a mistake for the U.S. to fail to give Castro greater official attention."¹²⁴ Bonsal agrees, adding that, "We did not force them into the arms of the Soviets, but we were

immensely cooperative in removing the obstacles in their chosen path."¹²⁵ It is probably true that only a strong effort by Washington could have overcome the internal dynamic forcing Castro leftward, but because of both domestic and international pressures such a strong effort was highly unlikely.¹²⁶ Even a continuation of the United States' 1959 approach of watchful waiting would not have been likely to have altered Castro's internal policies, although it might have lengthened the period during which negotiations might have taken place on such issues as expropriation.

It is likely that at least some of the anti-American rhetoric of 1959 was motivated more by internal Cuban needs than by a desire to alienate the U.S., although the latter had allowed itself to become an easy target over the years. Indeed, the Cuban nationalist impulse had to go somewhere, and as time progressed it became clear that "powerful U.S. interests (both real and perceived) ... stood in the way of comprehensive economic change."¹²⁷ According to Bonsal, "Castro's scenario at this time did not contemplate the massive help in ... economic aid and weapons he later received from the Soviet Union. His thrust in 1959 was radically and exclusively nationalistic."¹²⁸

As Boorstein notes, "American interests were so ominipresent in Cuba that if a Cuban government were to make any significant reforms it was bound to collide ...

with these interests."¹²⁹ That this was anticipated to some degree by Cuban leadership is indicated by Guevara's statements, not made public at the time, that a real revolution could not be made behind the back of the United States, and that because of the geopolitical situation the revolution would have to engage in a "deadly struggle against imperialism."¹³⁰ It is not clear whether Castro shared this view at this time. Of course, nationalism alone is not sufficient to explain Cuba's shift away from the U.S. As the Indian and Algerian cases suggest, strong nationalism need not lead to total rejection of a formerly dominant power. In the Cuban case, where the insurgency was not essentially anti-colonial, other internal and external factors must be sought to explain the shift.¹³¹

Thus, I conclude that although a break between the U.S. and Cuba was by no means inevitable, some conflict was. In this sense, 1959 was the critical year, for it shaped the way each side was to respond to the increased tensions. The Cuban case offers us an excellent example of the critical role which images and perceptions of decision makers play in the policy process, and an instance when these factors may have affected the course of an internal struggle. Moreover, it demonstrates that "dependency" may be a constraint on the behavior of the paramount power insofar as the economic interests of transnationals in the client state may tie policy makers

to policies which, in the long run, are contrary to its political security interests. The role and importance of images and perceptions appears to be almost as significant with respect to Soviet-Cuban relations which I shall examine in the next section.

III. DISCRETE INTERNATIONAL FACTORS: SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS

Traditionally, the Soviet Union had had little commercial contact with Latin America. In addition, Latin American states were slow in establishing diplomatic contact with the U.S.S.R. After the Second World War, Latin American states became supporters of the U.S. in the Cold War. Prior to the late 1950's, the Soviet Union's limited forays into Latin American politics focused on support for the development of indigenous communist parties. Among the strongest of these were the parties which developed in Chile and Cuba. Because the history of Soviet-Cuban relations is closely intertwined with the development of the Cuban Communist Party, the discussion which follows will emphasize the Party's policies, its ties to the Soviet Union and the policies of the Soviet Union itself.

The philosophical underpinning of Cuban communism is found in a Leninist view of Latin American exploitation by outsiders. Cuban and other Latin American communists have frequently referred to American economic influence in the area as evidence that Latin American states have

sacrificed their independence. As demonstrated in the earlier discussion of the economic bases of the Cuban conflict, this view has considerable validity in the Cuban case. Moreover, U.S. military intervention, especially in the early years of the twentieth century, supports the communist view. Cuban communists also cite interference by the U.S. in Cuba's domestic affairs as further evidence of U.S. subjugation.

Leninist notions of strategy have also influenced Cuban communist thought and action. According to Lenin, the role of communists in these areas was to throw off foreign oppression by struggle against the private and governmental interests of the advanced nations.¹³² Thus, Lenin called for the formation of an anti-imperialist front, through which working classes would direct their efforts internally against imperialist outsiders. As the historical record of the twentieth century reveals, however, these Leninist principles did not promote social revolutions by communist parties in Latin America. Instead, Lenin favored pressure by these parties on existing governments for democratic reforms, self-determination and national unity. Thus, he conceived of two distinct and simultaneous struggles -- one for national liberation and the other for socialism -- neither of which mandated a policy of violent internal conflict.

A. Cuban Communism: The Early Years

The Cuban Communist Party was formed in 1925, after

Gerardo Machado had assumed power. It was organized as an illegal, underground movement of Marxist students from the National University and the orthodox Communist leaders of the National Confederation of Cuban Labor, the Cuban labor movement. The party grew slowly during the late 1920's and early 1930's, as the repressive Machado regime failed to address the needs of urban and rural workers.¹³³ Most analysts agree that the Communists capitalized on labor unrest in this period to build a political base. By organizing strikes, the Communists were instrumental in the movement to oust Machado. Although they were not entirely responsible for labor unrest per se, it is clear that the Communists benefitted politically from it, emerging as the leaders of the labor movement in Cuba by the mid-1930's.

Grau San Martin, reformist leader of the Autentico Party, assumed control of the government briefly after the fall of Machado and pressed for a program which was anti-imperialist and geared toward domestic reform. The Communists, however, despite their ideological proximity to the leftist Grau regime, refused him their support. Without this assistance, and also because of what most observers agreed was administrative incompetence, the Grau government fell. The conservative Mendieta-Batista regime which replaced it adopted a tough anti-communist, anti-labor stance. As a result, although the Communist Party had by 1935 built "a tightly knit political organiza-

tion,"¹³⁴ they were not a major political party.

The Mendieta-Batista regime, however, faced increased opposition from conservative politicians by 1936 and was forced to alter its strategy. Although the Communists and Autenticos had been excluded from the 1936 elections, by 1937 Batista had allowed them to form the Partido Union Revolucionaria. By 1938, the Communist Party itself was legalized, restrictions on labor organization were removed and a Ministry of Labor was established.¹³⁵ In return, of course, the Communists agreed to throw labor's support to Batista and to keep labor troubles, especially strikes, to a minimum.¹³⁶ In 1940, the Communists supported him in his successful bid for the Presidency.

Six Communist delegates were elected to the Constitutional Convention in 1940. In the elections Communist candidates polled over 80,000 votes, winning eight seats in the Chamber of Deputies. By 1944, Communists were occupying Cabinet posts, and under the banner of the Partido Socialista Popular they polled over 120,000 votes.¹³⁷ By 1946, despite Batista's loss of the presidency in 1944, the P.S.P. polled almost 200,000 votes, over ten percent of all votes cast.¹³⁸ In addition, Communist party membership rose from 43,000 in 1940 to over 150,000 in 1946.

Under Batista the Communist Party had offered the worker a political party which attempted to represent the

common laborer. Of the communist parties in Latin America, only the Cuban party was officially sanctioned, the sole group to collaborate actively with regime in power. According to the World Bank's Report on Cuba, the Communists had succeeded in attaining practically complete control of the Cuban labor movement.¹³⁹ Even Grau San Martin, whose relations with the Communists during his brief tenure as President were less than positive, was forced to seek their support upon his assumption of the Presidency again in 1944.

Thus, it may be argued that the period from 1935 to 1948 had seen the flowering of the Cuban Communist Party. By the late 1940's, however, the P.S.P. had entered a new stage. Whereas in the early years the Communists had little to lose, during the Batista period they had acquired a taste for political power. The policies of the Grau regime, however, forced the P.S.P into a more defensive political position. By 1946, for example, the uneasy alliance which Grau had sought with the Communists in 1944 was broken, as the Autenticos built an independent power base and captured both houses of Congress.

By 1947, there was open conflict between the Communists and the Autenticos. Carlos Prio Socarras, the new Minister of Labor under Grau, even used Cuban government troops against them, arresting a major union chief, Pena, and other labor leaders as well. With this offensive

against the Communists, the Grau regime recognized the Autentico-backed C.T.C., an alliance of workers, which challenged the Communists directly for leadership of the labor movement. In the 1948 elections, Prio ran on a platform of destroying the Communists. According to Suarez, "None of the other parties running for office would accept an alliance with the Communists, whose presidential candidate obtained 157,000 votes."¹⁴⁰ By 1950, "Communists controlled only a skeleton labor organization."¹⁴¹ And by 1952, registration in the P.S.P had declined to 55,000.

B. The Soviet Connection

The Cuban Communist Party was formally admitted to the Comintern in 1928, but the Soviet Union did not have diplomatic relations with Cuba until World War II. The Party itself was modeled after the Soviet Communist Party. In the early years of the Communist International, Latin American communists identified the major enemy as American imperialism and sought to deprive the U.S. of its Latin American "colonies" as a way of destroying its imperialist base. In the 1930's, they focused their criticism internally on left-wing competitors in each of the countries where they were active in Latin America, then switched to an emphasis on the formation of popular fronts.

According to Cole Blasier, "The international communist movement provided financial support ... and carefully trained party leaders."¹⁴² Despite the initial

advantages of such support, however, the Soviet relationship had limited the Cuban Communists' ability to maneuver domestically. For example, the Cubans' responsiveness to shifts in Soviet needs "tended to isolate them from other left-wing parties whose cooperation was desirable in achieving their goals,"¹⁴³ such as the Autenticos. The Comintern's demands forestalled effective alliance building with other elements of the Cuban left and moved the Communists to join with Batista. This inevitably created the impression that the Communists were not to be trusted.

By supporting Soviet policy openly, the Cuban Communists focused attention on their own allegiance to foreign elements, thereby reducing the effectiveness of their appeals to the Cuban masses. They did not hesitate, for example, to support Batista so long as he was willing to cooperate with them. Thus, the Communists were quite willing to soft-pedal the class struggle at various times when it suited their needs. The Comintern-dictated policies of encouraging resistance to Germany and Japan during the Popular Front period, urging neutrality during the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and calling for intervention against the Axis powers after the German attack on the U.S.S.R., showed that the Party's policies were highly responsive to external demands and direction.

The Soviet Union's exploitation of the P.S.P became even more apparent after 1945. During the war the Commu-

nists in Cuba had moderated their original anti-imperialist thrust because the Soviet Union's battle against Germany required an alliance with the West. With U.S.-Soviet relations on a collision course by 1946, however, the P.S.P. resumed its anti-American tone. Given Washington's concern for purging the Western hemisphere of communist elements, it is not surprising that Grau San Martin began a campaign to eliminate them within Cuba. Thus, the Cuban Communists were hurt domestically because of their open ties to the Soviets. By 1948, given this connection and the international situation which had developed, the P.S.P. had dissipated a good deal of its credibility as a defender of the working masses against imperialist exploitation.

In 1952 Batista staged a coup just before the elections were held, installing himself as President in place of Prio. Because of the international situation, however, the P.S.P. was not in a position to forge the kind of alliance with Batista it had in the past. At this time, Batista required strong U.S. support and, therefore, had to accept the State Department's insistence that Latin American regimes cleanse themselves of Communist influences. Thus, in October, 1953, he outlawed the P.S.P. from Cuban politics. According to Ruiz, however, Batista did permit some Communists to serve in his government and used them to assert some control over Cuban labor¹⁴⁴

In the 1950's, therefore, the P.S.P. went back to a strategy which gave it low visibility. It maintained this stance throughout the 1950's condemning the terror and sabotage of the new group of insurrectionists led by Castro, while maintaining a quiet arrangement with the Batista regime.¹⁴⁵ At the time of the Moncada attack in 1952, the Communists declared their preference for "the peaceful road."¹⁴⁶ Toward the end of the struggle against Batista, the P.S.P. insisted on the need to create a democratic national front. According to Suarez, they and most others believed that Castro would not succeed against Batista.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, since Castro's university background was with the violence prone "action groups," the P.S.P. had a natural antipathy for his 26th of July Movement.

C. The Soviet Union and the P.S.P., 1956-1959

Although formal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were broken off in 1952 by Batista, trade between Cuba and the Communist bloc increased from a negligible amount in 1952 to \$442.6 million in 1956.¹⁴⁸ Despite this, however, basic Soviet policy in Cuba, as in Latin America generally, was a relatively cautious one in the 1950's. Because of the predominant American interests in the area and nearby American military power to support them, the Soviet Union had hoped in the 1950's only to increase Latin American independence from the U.S.¹⁴⁹

Despite the presumed interest of the Soviet Union in lessening U.S. influence, "There is no evidence of any contact whatsoever between Castro and the Soviet Union ... during 1957."¹⁵⁰ This was more a function of the local P.S.P.'s attitude toward Castro than a lack of Soviet interest in social change in Cuba. It was apparent in 1957 that the P.S.P. had reached some sort of modus vivendi with the Batista regime.¹⁵¹ And because Castro had not surfaced as a committed communist at this point, neither the P.S.P. nor the Soviets seemed to pay much attention to him.

The role of the P.S.P. in the period of insurgent build up is a curious one. By the 1950's, the P.S.P. was a relatively small, underground party, discredited, but still having some legitimacy among the working classes of Cuban society. Clearly, its role in the period prior to the Castro takeover did not predict the influence it would come to have in the 1960's. If anything, the P.S.P. had tried to obstruct rather than promote the revolutionary movement, seeing Castro as a somewhat misguided bourgeois. As noted, the Party had condemned the Castro assault on the Moncada barracks,¹⁵² and even the Granma expedition in 1956.¹⁵³ According to K.S. Karol, in 1957 the P.S.P. was paralyzed by doubts about the wisdom of opposing the Batista regime, and spent the year "sitting on the fence."¹⁵⁴ On February 28, 1957, the National Committee of the P.S.P. wrote to the 26 JM, expressing

disagreement with Fidel Castro's plans and tactics.¹⁵⁵ In 1958 the Party refused to support the national strike called for April 9 by the 26th of July Movement. However, they did issue a manifesto in April indicating that they were "ready to join all Cubans to end tyranny."¹⁵⁶

That the mistrust existed on both the P.S.P.'s and Castro's part is evidenced by the fact that the July 1958 Caracas meeting of eight revolutionary groups had purposefully excluded the P.S.P. Indeed, there is no evidence that prior to July 1958 Castro had viewed either the P.S.P. or its Soviet mentor as capable of assisting in the insurgency. Nonetheless, as the movement gained momentum, Castro entered into secret discussions in May, 1958 with the Cuban communists, inviting Oswaldo Sanchez Canberra and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to the Sierra Maestra for talks.¹⁵⁶ Boughton claims that "his reasons reflect tactical rather than ideological considerations."¹⁵⁷ According to Halperin, the P.S.P.'s motivation was one of obtaining "an insurance policy" in the event Castro did win.¹⁵⁹

The secrecy with which these meetings were conducted is itself worthy of note, because it minimized for Castro the risk of publicly accepting Communist support. As I have argued earlier, for a number of historical reasons, including the P.S.P.'s earlier support for Batista in the 1930's and the widespread assumption that it had reached an accommodation with him again in the

1950's, the Cuban Communist Party had become a discredited force in Cuban politics. This was especially true in the 1950's when it appeared that all Cuban parties had lost legitimacy. According to Bonachea, "They were considered a danger because of their untrustworthiness."¹⁶⁰ From Castro's point of view, an open alliance with the P.S.P. would undoubtedly have aroused the attention, if not the ire, of Washington policy makers at a point when the success of the insurgency was uncertain. Moreover, it would have made it significantly more difficult to obtain the necessary domestic support. Yet, by meeting secretly with Communist leaders in 1958, Castro was able to mute a potential source of opposition internally.

Gonzalez argues that for most of the period in which the insurgent movement was developing, the P.S.P. was "out of touch with Fidelista radicalism, which tended to ignore communist orthodoxy."¹⁶¹ In fact, Castro, Guevara and others in the movement were considerably more radical than the old line communists who had led the P.S.P., e.g., Blas Roca. Nonetheless, by October, 1958, the P.S.P. had been included within a broad front of revolutionary groups, although it did not take part in the actual fighting to any great extent, even late in the year as military, rather than political, activities accelerated. Indeed, the P.S.P. remained quite consistent in its rejection of armed struggle up until the end of the year.

Conrado Bequer claims that, "The Communists never helped the 26th of July Movement until the 26th of December."¹⁶² As a result, the Communists "neither fostered the Cuban revolution nor were among its leading advocates."¹⁶³ They most certainly did not control either Castro or the July 26th Movement. And "at no time either before or after Castro's victory did they try to force him into a more radical posture."¹⁶⁴ However, the P.S.P.'s negative early view on Castro's movement turned out to be "an indispensable prerequisite to its success, since Communist hostility provided Fidel with immunity from an early and very likely decisive American intervention."¹⁶⁵

D. Soviet Policy, 1958

By 1958 Soviet policy had begun to change somewhat from its earlier emphasis on working through local Latin American parties to achieve its goals. According to George Boughton, in 1958 the Soviet press became much more critical of both the Batista regime and American involvement in Cuba.¹⁶⁶ In particular, when the U.S. landed marines at Guantanamo in July, 1958, ostensibly to protect the water supply for the base, the Soviet Union and the insurgent groups accused the U.S. of aiding Batista by freeing troops who otherwise would have performed the guard function. Criticism was also made of

U.S. aid and technical support for the Batista army. Finally, in August 1958, an editorial in Pravda took note of the 26th of July Movement as a national liberation movement. According to Boughton, the Soviet Union had, by this time, begun to think of Cuba "as an area in which it might expand its influence."¹⁶⁷

In the view of Leo Gourevitch, "Initially, Moscow maintained a very cautious stance. In its view, the petit bourgeois leaders who led the revolution were unlikely to break the U.S.'s hold on the island. Also, the Soviet Union doubted strongly the ability of any leftist regime to survive there in the face of U.S. opposition."¹⁶⁸ Gonzalez concurs in this assessment of early Soviet reactions to the turmoil developing in Cuba. He notes that Cuba's geographical remoteness from the U.S.S.R., the obvious military superiority of the U.S. in the Caribbean, the uncertainty as to the durability or likelihood of success of the movement itself, and the pressures on Russian leadership of the coming summit with the U.S. all combined to make the Soviet Union's behavior quite reserved in the period 1956-1958.¹⁶⁹ Similarly, Karol argues that, "the last thing the U.S.S.R. wanted ... was for Cuban communists to take revolutionary steps."¹⁷⁰ Such steps, or any direct Soviet support for the revolutionaries, would have threatened the Soviet initiatives toward detente with the U.S. concerning Berlin.

On the other hand, as Bonsal contends, it may have been "inevitable that a world power engaged in a global confrontation with America would decide to come to Castro's rescue,"¹⁷¹ once he had achieved power and was encountering difficulties with the U.S. Thus, in 1959, despite its hesitancy to anger the U.S. unnecessarily, the Soviet Union was presented with a set of circumstances in which there were opportunities for it to gain a stronger political foothold in the Americas at the expense of the U.S. Subsequent Soviet support of the Castro regime indicates that the desire to expand influence was latent even in early 1959. What was lacking was the proper strategy and circumstances within which to implement it. During 1959, with the progressive radicalization of the revolution by Castro, and the implicit and explicit threats it posed to American commercial interests and established U.S. foreign policy, it became far easier for the Soviet Union to support Castro. "With this conflict, Krushchev saw an opportunity to recoup for his failure to make gains in Berlin and to divert Washington's attention from Europe."¹⁷²

In the early days of 1959, however, Soviet support for Castro was quite limited. Although the U.S.S.R. recognized the Castro regime two days after he entered Havana, "its support for the revolution was limited for over a year to moral encouragement and vague declarations

of solidarity. Unsure of the economic, military and political stability of the regime, the Soviet Union seemed willing to use it merely for short term, Cold War advantages."¹⁷³ Moreover, at the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the appeals of the P.S.P. for greater involvement went largely unheeded.¹⁷⁴

From Castro's standpoint, relations with the Soviet Union were not paramount in the early days of the new regime. According to Boughton, Castro "made no direct move to establish relations during the first quarter of 1959."¹⁷⁵ Instead, from January through April, Castro focused a good deal of attention on U.S.-Cuban relations, presumably in an attempt to either normalize them or at least to neutralize U.S. opposition to the more radical steps his government was about to undertake.

E. Domestic and Foreign Relations, 1959-1960

On January 6, 1959, the P.S.P. issued a statement known as the "January Theses." This statement represented the organization's view of what the revolution should try to accomplish. The program called for a restoration of the 1940 Constitution, something which Castro himself had promised prior to taking power, e.g., in the Declaration of the Sierra Maestra in 1956 and later in the Caracas Pact. The January Theses also called for land reform, the elimination of Batistianos from Cuban political life

and friendly relations with the U.S.¹⁷⁶ Objectively, there was little in the program to which a change oriented regime would object, although it could hardly have been considered to be a radical document. Nonetheless, the period between January and mid-1959 was characterized by open conflict between the new regime and the old line P.S.P. leadership. One of the key points in this dispute was the variance between the P.S.P. and the Castro regime on the direction Cuban foreign policy should take, especially with regard to the U.S.

Although it was clear that Castro spent part of the early days of his administration trying to placate or neutralize the U.S., it was also apparent that the tone and rhetoric of the new regime was, and almost had to be, strongly nationalistic and even anti-American. The P.S.P., however, acting in accordance with Soviet wishes and also with its own long-established conservatism in style, urged a cautious policy toward the U.S. Indeed, the public pronouncements of the Party emphasized the need for a rapprochement with the U.S., at least for tactical reasons.¹⁷⁷ According to Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, the P.S.P. leadership was "convinced that a brusque change in the political and economic structure would precipitate American intervention."¹⁷⁸ This view clashed with that of the more radical elements within the regime, such as Guevara, who emphasized preparation for

possible U.S. intervention some time during 1959. According to Farber, Castro himself had some differences with Guevara and Raul Castro about cooperation with the U.S.¹⁷⁹ The P.S.P., unlike Che and Raul, supported Fidel's trip to the U.S. in April, 1959. They did so despite the fact that the P.S.P. was under almost daily attack by the 26th of July Movement. Halperin claims that they "were in sharp dispute ... reflected in their newspapers."¹⁸⁰ On May 1, 1959, Che and Raul attended labor rallies in support of the P.S.P but the newspaper attacks continued unabated.¹⁸¹ On May 16, in Revolucion, the editorial explicitly stated that the new regime was non-communist and denounced the communists as "divisionists."¹⁸² On May 21, Castro was quoted in Revolucion as saying, "Our revolution is neither capitalist nor communist but humanist."¹⁸³ On May 22 Castro, in a television speech, called the communists "extremists" and "counter-revolutionary."¹⁸⁴ At this point, however, it appears that Castro himself was not quite sure of the degree to which he wished to cooperate domestically with the Communists. During this period, for example, he criticized them publicly and eliminated them from the National Federation of Sugar Workers, the most powerful trade union in Cuba. Thus, as Bonsal contends, "There was no serious evidence of effective Communist influence upon the new Cuban government either from the local

Communist party or from abroad."¹⁸⁵

By July, 1959, although Castro declared again in mid-July that, "This is not a communist revolution,"¹⁸⁶ he did stop criticizing the P.S.P. publicly. Indeed, it appears that from this point onward the fortunes of the communists in Cuba began to rise, although there were no P.S.P. members in important Cabinet posts until 1960.¹⁸⁷ Despite this apparent shift on Castro's part, as late as September, the battles between anti-communists in the 26th of July Movement and P.S.P. members persisted. The conflict was still active in their respective newspapers, Revolucion and Hoy. Bonsal argues that this "seemed to indicate a truly bitter fight, with Castro on the side opposed to the communists."¹⁸⁸

There are a number of interpretations as to why the new regime began to shift its policies in late 1959. In the earlier discussion of U.S.-Cuban relations, I argued that one of the key variables influencing the shift in Cuban policy was the reaction of the U.S. to the conflict during 1959. But there were other forces at work as well, some of them domestic in origin and others international.

On the domestic front, by mid-1959 it was growing increasingly more obvious that, despite its somewhat tarnished reputation, the P.S.P. had been "the only effective, mass party in Cuba."¹⁸⁹ Goldenberg argues that,

during 1959, it was also one of the few organized groups of any kind operating in Cuban politics.¹⁹⁰ As noted previously, the 26th of July Movement itself was a very very loose alliance of revolutionary groups which never developed into a true party. As Hugh Thomas contends, "In a country without political organizations, and without institutions, the attractions for Castro of turning to the Communist Party must have been strong."¹⁹¹ Moreover, it was clear by mid-1959 that Castro needed urban, labor support.¹⁹² Thomas concludes that, "Castro was primarily interested in using the Communists ... as a kind of bureaucracy to control the labor movement and as much of the economy as he captured from private hands."¹⁹³ Finally, as O'Connor argues, the development of a P.S.P.-Castro alliance in domestic politics was the result partly of the response of the more moderate elements in Cuban society to the Agrarian Reform Law, a response which caused Castro to lose faith in the non-revolutionary camp. Thus, by September 1959, it appears that "Castro ... had decided to make an accommodation with the P.S.P."¹⁹⁴

F. The International Connection

It appears that the growing involvement of the Party was due both to the radicalization of the revolution and to some mix of external forces. It should be noted, however, that one of the qualities which may have attrac-

ted Castro to the P.S.P. was its position as a recognized party in good standing in the world communist community. According to Gonzalez, "They could act as an international broker in initially obtaining Soviet support."¹⁹⁵ Moreover, they could infuse the new regime with enough of a socialist character to ensure Soviet backing of Castro's policies.

Thus, it appears that Castro pursued a complex policy in 1959 designed to neutralize, and establish distance from, the U.S. in the earlier part of the year while making the necessary changes domestically to consolidate his power. Somewhere in mid-year, whether planned or not, this policy began to change, partly in response to domestic pressures (the abandonment by the moderates, which narrowed the revolutionary governments's political base, and the wooing by the P.S.P.), and partly in response to external factors (the negative response of the U.S. to the radical reforms and to the nationalist tone of the revolution). As these forces merged in the revolutionary environment, Castro began to search for allies to maintain himself in power and to effect change. Because the relations with the U.S. were going badly, whatever the reason, Castro began to make overtures to the Soviet Union.

Because of the general international situation at the time, and in particular the system's structure,

the Soviet Union did not respond as quickly as Castro might have wanted or needed. During 1959, the U.S.S.R. confined most of its efforts in Cuba to advising the P.S.P. through visits by Russian and East European advisers. There was, at this point in mid-1959, still some hesitancy to believe that Castro would be very useful to the Soviet Union. According to David Burks, "Soviet intelligence must have been aware of the growing conflict between communists and anti-communists within Cuban government and the P.S.P.'s concern over Fidel's predilection for implementing radical programs very rapidly."¹⁹⁶ Bonsal claims that, "The Soviet Union did not then think of the Cuban revolution as Marxist-Leninist, although they applauded Castro's hostility toward imperialism."¹⁹⁷

But Castro's behavior soon led Cuba to a more neutral position in the Western Hemisphere, a position which represented a major break in the solidarity of the Americas in the Cold War. In particular, Castro seems to have pursued "an audacious foreign policy to demonstrate Cuba's independence from the United States and his own socialist credentials."¹⁹⁸ This, of course, was a campaign which continued well into 1961 and after, but it does appear that by late 1959 Castro had adopted a foreign policy strategy which was designed to replace American assistance to Cuba with Soviet support.

In spite of the shift in the revolution's direc-

tion, and Castro's pursuit of an anti-American line in late 1959, the Soviet Union continued to move quite slowly in its support of the regime, unwilling to forge an actual alliance. As Burks argues, "For the Russians, apparently, nothing seemed more suicidal than to place in the hands of an unstable Castro the trigger of a gun pointed at the U.S."¹⁹⁹ Suarez argues that although Castro needed Soviet assistance and would move toward socialism to get it, the Soviets were not yet quite ready to accept Cuba and Castro, with all their attendant problems, into the Soviet orbit. Even in 1960, when Soviet-Cuban relations began to blossom with the visit of Anastas Mikoyan and the execution of a Soviet loan and sugar agreement, there were fears on the Soviet Union's part that Castro's move toward socialism domestically might proceed at too rapid a pace.²⁰⁰ In addition, Castro's declaration of socialism suddenly implied Soviet acceptance of a military responsibility for Cuba's defense, in order to preserve the myth of the inevitability of the final triumph of communism. But the acceptance of such an obligation for a new member of the group, one located very close to the leader of the Western bloc, might render implausible the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. Bonsal claims that,

The Russian presence in Cuba is largely the consequence of the American reaction to Castro's provocation. Russia took no initiative in bringing

about the situation in the summer of 1960 that presented Moscow with the choice of either replacing the U.S. as Cuba's major trading partner or allowing an anti-American, anti-capitalist, revolutionary movement to die because of economic strangulation. Russia came to Castro's rescue only after the U.S. had taken steps designed to overthrow him.²⁰¹

Although Soviet policy was still ambiguous by early 1960, external pressures on the Soviet Union, such as the U-2 incident and the challenge from China for predominance among the communist countries, led to a change in attitude and behavior on the part of the Soviet Union. By May 1960, diplomatic relations had been re-established and arms shipments had begun. Although there was continued tension between Castro forces and the old line communist elements within the P.S.P., e.g., Roca and Escalante, by 1960 the P.S.P. (apparently without a formal agreement of any kind) had agreed to place itself under Castro, whose Marxist-Leninist antecedents were questionable.

On December 1, 1961, Castro declared that he had always been a Marxist-Leninist. Clearly this was done to solidify his position within the socialist bloc, and especially to pressure the Soviet Union for more assistance. In this speech, Castro admitted he had made a number of mistakes in regard to Marxist-Leninist principles, e.g., in his public attacks on the P.S.P. in 1959. Suarez contends that this speech was actually counter-productive and may have bewildered many Cubans. He

concludes that the Castro regime, rather than being based on Marxist-Leninist principles, "was the product of a revolutionary movement in which the P.S.P ... participated only at a late stage and to a rather insignificant extent."²⁰²

Conclusion

This chapter has ranged over a wide scope of material, compressing some sixty years of Cuban history into relatively few pages, and expanding the attention given to the key years, 1958-1960 to a somewhat greater extent. My purpose has been to explore the international aspects of the Cuban conflict through analysis of U.S., Soviet and Cuban foreign policies and their impact on actors in Cuba's domestic struggles. Having presented the data on both the domestic and international variables in the Cuban case in these last two chapters, I shall in the final chapter draw some conclusions about Cuba and the utility of the dual national-international perspective which has been my theme.

Footnotes

¹John Dunn, Modern Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 254. See also Cole Blasier on the rising tide of nationalism, "Studies of Revolution: Origins in Mexico, Bolivia and Cuba," Latin American Research Review 2 (Summer 1967): 28-64.

²The international norm against intervention and the world-wide outcry against colonialism, although conceivably significant, are not the only factors which may have deterred American policy makers from intervention. It was not very clear, for example, during 1958 or early 1959 that there was a need to intervene to further American interests. Nonetheless, Boris Goldenberg argues that international normative factors did help to deter U.S. intervention at this time, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), p. 10.

³Eduardo Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1974), p. 217.

⁴Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1972), p. 43.

⁵There is a clear need to distinguish between pre-1959 and post-1959 interactions. This is not so much true with regard to international systemic variables because they tend to change slowly. It is, however, more relevant with regard to the ways in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union reacted to changes in behavior of internal Cuban forces from the pre-power to the in-power stages of the conflict.

⁶Halperin, p. 40.

⁷Goldenberg, p. 293.

⁸Ibid., p. 195.

⁹Halperin, p. 55.

¹⁰See Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Scheer, Cuba: Tragedy in our Hemisphere (New York: Grove Press, 1963).

¹¹Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, Cuba: The Making of a Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), p. 20.

¹²Ruiz, p. 25.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Eric Wolf, Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 255.

¹⁵Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the United States (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), p. 254.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Federico Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971), p. 160.

¹⁸Richard R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 217. Also see Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 1061. Thomas argues that anti-Americanism had become an integral part of Cuba's political culture.

¹⁹Gil, p. 162.

²⁰Wyatt McGaffey and Clifford R. Barnett, Twentieth Century Cuba (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 375.

²¹Testimony of Earl E.T. Smith, United States Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Laws. Hearings. Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean. 86th Congress, Second Session, and 87th Congress, First Session. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 700.

²²As cited in McGaffey and Barnett, p. 380.

²³Goldenberg, p. 170.

²⁴Bonsal, p. 271.

²⁵Earl E.T. Smith, The Fourth Floor: An Account of

the Castro Communist Revolution (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 114.

²⁶Bonsal, p. 18.

²⁷"Text of State Department News Conference Held by Secretary Dulles," New York Times (March 9, 1958), p. 10; ²⁸see also Boanachea and San Martin, p. 200.

²⁸Ramon Bonachea, "The Overthrow of the Batista Regime, 1952-1958" (M.A. thesis, American University, 1964), p. 114.

²⁹Thomas, p. 964.

³⁰Bonachea, p. 121.

³¹Smith, p. 229.

³²According to Bonachea, Lopez-Fresquet requested U.S. backing for a coup in 1958, p. 124.

³³Smith, p. 229. Cf. the view of Ramon Bonachea and Marta San Martin that, "Batista or a military junta could be maintained only through direct military intervention by the U.S." The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), p. 305. See also Mario Lazo's interesting account of the period, American Policy Failures in Cuba (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1960).

³⁴Thomas, p. 985. This assertion is not confirmed anywhere else in the literature, to my knowledge.

³⁵Bonachea and San Martin, p. 148.

³⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years, Volume Two, Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 521.

³⁷As quoted in Smith, p. 174.

³⁸Bonachea and San Martin, p. 148.

³⁹Mario Llerena, The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 183.

⁴⁰United States Congressional Record, House of Representatives (March 28, 1958), pp. 4407-4408.

⁴¹Llerena, p. 183.

⁴²Smith, p. 88.

⁴³Bonachea, p. 118.

⁴⁴McGaffey and Barnett, p. 378.

⁴⁵Bonachea, p. 118.

⁴⁶Smith, pp. 90-91. Recently, Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick has taken the position that with respect to Cuba, and other countries as well, the U.S. was wrong in trying "to impose liberalization and democratization on a government confronted with violent internal opposition." In so doing, she argues, the U.S. "greased the skids" for Batista, the Shah, Somoza, etc. "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Commentary (November 1979), pp. 34-45. For a contrasting view, viz, that the real question is whether the U.S. acted wisely in giving regimes such as Batista's as much support as it did, see Seymour Maxwell Finger, "The Reagan-Kirkpatrick Policies and the United Nations," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1983/84), pp. 436-457.

⁴⁷Bonachea and San Martin, p. 244.

⁴⁸John Foster Dulles, "U.S. Non-Intervention Policy with Respect to the Cuba Situation," U.S. Current Documents (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 349.

⁴⁹United States Department of State Bulletin (July 21, 1958), pp. 110-111.

⁵⁰According to Bonachea and San Martin, "The dictator also realized that he could no longer extend guarantees to foreign investors.... Moreover, Batista had been obliged to permit representatives of a foreign government to conduct negotiations within the republic's territory with the enemies of his government. The dictator had no choice but to remain silent while the insurrectionists gained in international stature," p. 245.

⁵¹James N. Rosenau, International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 201.

⁵²This "interference" is not easily summarized, but it pervades Smith's own accounts of events, e.g., in the 1958 election Smith supported his own candidate, Carlos Marquez Sterling, and then tried to get Batista to step down. See also, Eisenhower, p. 521. Raul Chibas,

later to defect to the U.S., argued that, "Smith had played a leading role in the naming of General Cantillo as chief of the armed forces," Ruby Hart Phillips, "Many in Havana Glad Smith Quit," New York Times (January 12, 1959), p. 8.

⁵³Llerena, p. 218.

⁵⁴A summary chronology appears as Appendix Two.

⁵⁵This, of course, is more of an historical approach than a political science method.

⁵⁶David Stansfield, "The Foreign Policy of Cuba," in R.P. Barston, ed., The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 210.

⁵⁷McGaffey and Barnett, p. 374.

⁵⁸Goldenberg, p. 72. See also Halperin, p. 12.

⁵⁹Cole Blasier, "The Elimination of U.S. Influence," in Revolutionary Change in Cuba, ed. Carmela Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), p. 43.

⁶⁰See Ruby Hart Phillips, "Castro Says Cuba Wants Good Ties with U.S.," New York Times (January 18, 1959), p. 1.

⁶¹Herbert L. Matthews, "Top Castro Aide Denies Red Tie," New York Times (January 16, 1959), p. 4.

⁶²Halperin, p. 16.

⁶³The description which follows draws heavily on analysis of materials in the New York Times, The Department of State Bulletin and secondary materials in McGaffey and Barnett, Halperin, and Blasier.

⁶⁴Ruby Hart Phillips, "Castro Bars Pledge to Join U.S. in War," New York Times (March 23, 1959), pp. 1, 4.

⁶⁵Llerena, p. 222.

⁶⁶See E.W. Kenworthy, "Castro Declares Regime Free of Red Influence," New York Times (April 18, 1959), pp.

1,10; and D.A. Schmidt, "Castro Rules Out Role as Neutral; Opposes the Reds," New York Times (April 20, 1959), pp. 1, 5.

⁶⁷Nelson Amaro Vicoria, "Mass and Class in the Origins of the Cuban Revolution," in Cuban Communism, Fourth Edition, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977), p. 238.

⁶⁸McGaffey and Barnett, p. 386.

⁶⁹As noted in Goldenberg, p. 181.

⁷⁰At approximately the same time, Castro supplied pieces for LOOK, LIFE and CORONET magazines.

⁷¹That Castro may have opened himself to attack at home is evidenced by the fact that Raul Castro flew to Texas during the trip to warn Fidel against "selling out to the Yanquis." See Lowry Nelson, Cuba: The Measure of a Revolution (Minneapolis, Minn: University of Minnesota, 1973), p. 4. In an alternate view, Lopez-Fresquet argues that, "The prestige and time gained by Castro on his journey to the U.S. ... had enabled him to consolidate his power at home." My Fourteen Months with Castro (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1960), p. 111.

⁷²Halperin, p. 48.

⁷³Nelson notes that there was considerable anxiety among Cuban communists about Castro's apparent pro-Yanqui "deviations," p. 24.

⁷⁴prensa Libre (May 23, 1959).

⁷⁵Bonsal, p. 75.

⁷⁶Halperin, p. 54.

⁷⁷Farber, p. 350.

⁷⁸Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 97.

⁷⁹Bonsal. p. 80.

⁸⁰McGaffey and Barnett, p. 387. See also Diaz Lanz' testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee.

⁸¹Halperin, p. 63.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 90.

⁸⁴Bonsal, p. 8.

⁸⁵Halperin, p. 69.

⁸⁶Bonsal, p. 89.

⁸⁷Thomas, p. 1236.

⁸⁸"U.S. Indicates Displeasure," New York Times (September 5, 1959), p. 4.

⁸⁹Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 101.

⁹⁰Warren Hinckle and William W. Turner, The Fish is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro (New York: Harper and Row, 1981).

⁹¹Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 102.

⁹²William J. Jorden, "Eisenhower Acts to Bar Illegal Flights -- Castro Enmity Puzzles Him," New York Times (October 29, 1959), p. 3.

⁹³Bonsal, p. 108.

⁹⁴Farber, p. 455.

⁹⁵"U.S. Bids British Deny Jets to Cuba," New York Times (October 29, 1959), p. 3.

⁹⁶As quoted in Halperin, p. 74.

⁹⁷Bonsal, p. 115.

⁹⁸Bonsal, p. 114.

⁹⁹Nelson, p. 23.

¹⁰⁰Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 128.

¹⁰¹Bonsal, p. 270. See also William J. Jorden, "U.S. to Continue Patience on Cuba," New York Times (January 26, 1960), p. 1.

¹⁰²E.W. Kenworthy, "U.S. Gaining Hope in Cuban Dispute," New York Times (February 1, 1960), p. 17.

¹⁰³Bonsal, p. 127.

¹⁰⁴See Bonsal, p. 135, Zeitlin and Scheer, pp. 150-155, and Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1952), p. 379.

¹⁰⁵Bonsal, p. 145.

¹⁰⁶Bonsal, p. 123.

¹⁰⁷Castro did promise \$3.8 million in bonds as compensation.

¹⁰⁸Fagen, p. 222.

¹⁰⁹Halperin, p. 73.

¹¹⁰As quoted in Nelson, p. 24.

¹¹¹Samuel Farber, "Revolution and Social Structure in Cuba, 1933-1959," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1969), p. 418.

¹¹²Blasier, p. 55.

¹¹³Llerena, p. 256.

¹¹⁴McGaffey and Barnett, p. 391. Castro made the point in the speech he delivered to the United Nations in 1959.

¹¹⁵Bonsal, p. 67.

¹¹⁶See Bonsal, p. 154. He argues that Castro was shocked at the sugar quota termination. "Cuba had been dumped on Moscow's doorstep by the U.S.," p. 156. Zeitlin and Scheer argue that, because of the oil policy and the slashing of the sugar quota, Cuba was "compelled to take more radical measures ... and to alter sharply Cuba's relationship with the Soviet bloc.... Until the reduction of the sugar quota, most seizures of U.S. property were interventions not expropriations," pp. 182-183.

¹¹⁷Blasier in Mesa-Lago, p. 72.

¹¹⁸Bonsal, p. 164.

¹¹⁹Blasier, p. 76, and Morray, p. 96.

¹²⁰Blasier, p. 49.

¹²¹Blasier carries the argument a step further by contending that U.S. support of Batista made it unacceptable for Castro to have U.S. support.

¹²²Fidel Castro, "Letter to Celia Sanchez," in Revolutionary Struggle, 1947-1952, Volume I, Selected Works of Fidel Castro, eds. Ramon Bonachea and Nelson Valdes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), p. 456.

¹²³The next section shall explore this move in greater detail.

¹²⁴Nelson, p. 24.

¹²⁵Bonsal, p. 272.

¹²⁶See Gonzalez, pp. 67-72.

¹²⁷See Blasier in Mesa-Lago, p. 54, on this point.

¹²⁸Bonsal, p. 67.

¹²⁹Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p. 16.

¹³⁰Bonachea and San Martin, p. 282.

¹³¹I reject the notion that Cuba had no choice but to go communist. As Farber argues convincingly, "similar or worse economic crises took place in Sekou Toure's Guinea and Nasser's Egypt, neither of which became communist in spite of the fact that Russia had to bail them out too," p. 451.

¹³²See Ruiz, Chapter Seven, for a discussion of "the strand of socialism."

¹³³Ruiz, p. 124.

¹³⁴Blasier, p. 23.

¹³⁵Blasier argues that the demands of Soviet policy led Cuban communists to collaborate with Batista. Their linkage with the Soviet Union seriously undermined the Cubans' claims to be "the leaders of the working class, and handicapped their efforts to attract a mass following," p. 2.

¹³⁶According to Blasier, by the late 1930's the Communists had come full circle in their views about Grau San Martin, and had sought an alliance with his Autentico Party. Grau evidently spurned these

his Autentico Party. Grau evidently spurned these advances because of the Communists' connections with Moscow. Thus, throughout the 1930's, the Communists had failed to achieve a Popular Front with other leftist parties.

¹³⁷ During this period the Communist Party changed its name to Partido Socialista Popular in order to broaden its appeal.

¹³⁸ Figures are from Ruiz, p. 128, and Blasier, iii.

¹³⁹ As cited in Ruiz, p. 132.

¹⁴⁰ Andres Suarez, Cuba, Castro and Communism, 1959-1966 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), p. 5.

¹⁴¹ Ruiz, p. 132.

¹⁴² Blasier, p. 144.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ruiz, p. 132.

¹⁴⁵ Bonachea and San Martin argue that the communists had a "well-established record of collaboration with Batista's henchmen," p. 221.

¹⁴⁶ Suarez, p. 26.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ McGaffey and Barnett, p. 398.

¹⁴⁹ David D. Burks argues that the Soviet Union's normal method was to rely on the military in each country to place the local communist party in power. "Soviet Policy for Castro's Cuba," in Explosive Forces in Latin America, eds. John J. Te Paske and Sidney Nettleton Fisher (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p.24.

¹⁵⁰ George J. Boughton, "Soviet-Cuban Relations, 1956-1962," (Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1972), p. 6. It should be noted that this is one of the most comprehensive studies done of Soviet-Cuban relations. The author examined: 1) statements of U.S. and Soviet leaders; 2) Cuban statements on U.S. and Soviet relations; 3) published diplomatic correspondence of the three countries; 4) editorials from the Soviet press; and 5) the Cuban press on Cuba's foreign relations.

¹⁵¹Suarez, Chapter One.

¹⁵²Boughton, p. 4.

¹⁵³Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 26.

¹⁵⁴K.S. Karol, Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution (New York: Hill and Wang, 1970), p. 151.

¹⁵⁵Theodore Draper, "Castro's Relations with the Communists," in Political Power in Latin America, eds. Donald Fagen and Wayne Cornelius (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 353.

¹⁵⁶Llerena, p. 227.

¹⁵⁷Bonachea and San Martin, p. 22.

¹⁵⁸Boughton, p. 118. There is also a dispute about whether the meeting occurred in February or during the summer. Cf. Karol. p. 151.

¹⁵⁹Halperin, p. 28.

¹⁶⁰Bonachea, p. 171.

¹⁶¹Gonzalez, p. 101.

¹⁶²As quoted in Ruby Hart Phillips, "Communists in Cuba Pose a Big Problem," New York Times, Section IV (May 31, 1959), p. 4.

¹⁶³Karol, p. 152.

¹⁶⁴Boughton, p. 185.

¹⁶⁵Halperin, p. 28.

¹⁶⁶Boughton, pp. 11-18.

¹⁶⁷Boughton, p. 29.

¹⁶⁸Leo Goure, "Soviet Cuban Relations," in Jaime Suchlicki, ed., Cuba, Castro and Revolution (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami, 1971), p. 147.

¹⁶⁹Gonzalez, pp. 5-6; see also David Stansfield, p. 4.

¹⁷⁰Karol, p. 155.

- 171 Bonsal, p. 127.
- 172 Goure, p. 147.
- 173 Stansfield, p. 220.
- 174 Ibid., p. 218.
- 175 Boughton, p. 52.
- 176 Karol, p. 155.
- 177 Ibid., p. 154.
- 178 Lopez-Fresquet, p. 164.
- 179 Farber, p. 462.
- 180 Halperin, p. 29.
- 181 Boughton, p. 79.
- 182 Revolucion (May 16, 1959), p. 1.
- 183 Zeitlin and Scheer, p. 107.
- 184 Ibid., p. 121.
- 185 Bonsal, p. 40.
- 186 See Herbert L. Matthews, "Cuba Has One Man Rule and It is Called Non-Red," New York Times (July 16, 1959), p. 1.
- 187 Thomas, p. 1314.
- 188 Bonsal, p. 93.
- 189 Dunn, p. 5.
- 190 Goldenberg, p. 298. See also Suarez, p. 80.
- 191 Thomas, p. 1222.
- 192 Barston, p. 3.
- 193 Thomas, p. 1313.
- 194 Goldenberg, p. 298ff.

- ¹⁹⁵Gonzalez, p. 117.
- ¹⁹⁶Burks, p. 4..
- ¹⁹⁷Bonsal, p. 11.
- ¹⁹⁸Stansfield, p. 218.
- ¹⁹⁹Burks, p. 13.
- ²⁰⁰See Suarez, pp. 112-199.
- ²⁰¹Bonsal, p. 191.
- ²⁰²Suarez, p. 238.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

This concluding chapter has three sections. In the first part I draw some conclusions about the importance of international factors in internal conflict based on the evidence presented in Chapters Three and Four on the Cuban case. These conclusions are summarized in accordance with the major factors outlined in the framework presented in Chapter Two.

The second section is an attempt to relate the findings on Cuba to the various bodies of literature discussed in the first two chapters, including writings on the Cuban conflict and on internal conflict in general. As part of this section, I attempt to show which controversial hypotheses appear to be confirmed or disconfirmed as a result of this study, and where the evidence on Cuba is peculiar or suspect. This treatment includes some reflections on refining the framework as a result of the findings of this dissertation.

In the third section I explore several other cases and develop a research agenda of additional cases which might be examined in order to shed further light on the dynamics of internal/external patterns in internal conflict.

I. NATIONAL-INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES:
CONCLUSIONS ON THE CUBAN CASE

This section examines the importance of international factors in the Cuban internal conflict of 1959. I attempt here to draw some conclusions concerning linkages between international and domestic political processes and to assess how the international perspective helps us to understand the Cuban conflict.

Chapter Two outlines a framework which treats internal conflict as a social mobilization process in which factions within a society compete for control of the political apparatus by acquiring and/or maintaining the support of internal and external parties. It was argued in that chapter that the "capabilities" and "will" of the competing factions are crucial points for analysis. As "domestic actor variables" they are affected by "environmental variables" which may be either internal or external in origin.

In my framework, the internal factors include economic, social, political and ideological variables. External factors include systemic and discrete external inputs into the domestic system: both direct inputs which affect the participants (support, intervention, etc.); and conditions which indirectly affect the behavior of actors with regard to the conflict (e.g., international systemic influences on levels of interference, the perceptions of internal and external

leadership, etc.).

In my discussion of the Cuban case, I have focused on the effects which international factors have had on:

- 1) the domestic (internal) environment;
- 2) the resources which factions bring to bear on the conflict;
- 3) the perceptions of internal factional leadership about viable internal and external strategies;
- 4) the success of the policy choices of internal actors; and
- 5) the decisions of external actors regarding involvement.

As presented in earlier chapters, international factors include what I call "discrete external factors" and "systemic structure and norms."

A. Discrete External Factors

As presented in Chapter Two, the key discrete external factors relate to: 1) the type of intersocietal involvement existing at the time of a conflict; and 2) the level of external support. As described in Chapters Three and Four, the Cuban conflict was not externally initiated, nor was it a proxy war. Nonetheless, external support and involvement played an important role at various times in the conflict.

(1) Level of Intersocietal Involvement

With regard to the "level of intersocietal involvement" referred to in Chapter Two and Appendix One, the Cuban case shows that U.S. policy toward Cuba influenced:

- 1) the type of economic system in Cuba and the level of economic development;
- 2) the distribution of wealth and the resulting social structure;
- 3) the legitimacy of indigenous political institutions, (e.g., by persistent interference into the political process by U.S. Ambassadors); and
- 4) the development and resurgence of nationalist feeling (e.g., the long history of U.S. involvement which served as a stimulus to nationalism).

In short, U.S. involvement in Cuba from 1898 to 1958 was a contributing factor in the development of the insurgent movement.

In the terminology used in this dissertation, discrete external involvement (by the U.S.) affected the domestic environment by affecting the economic, social, political and ideological characteristics of the domestic milieu in which the insurgency developed. In this particular case, one sees a strong connection between the type and level of U.S. involvement historically and general conditions in Cuba. This is not to say that direct support of insurgents or incumbents

was unimportant. It does suggest, however, that historical analysis of the level of external involvement may be an essential first step in developing an understanding of a given conflict.

(2) External Support and Internal Strategies

In the years 1956-1958, the insurgent forces took advantage of two aspects of the external environment:

- 1) the opportunities for obtaining external support (both material and non-material) from groups in the U.S. and Mexico; and
- 2) the opportunity to neutralize a key advantage of the Batista regime -- ongoing U.S. support.

With regard to the first element, actual support in the form of money or material was limited, although external actors did provide sustenance to what would become the nucleus of the insurgent movement.

More importantly, however, the data does support the view that the Castro forces were well aware of the potential importance of the international situation, particularly the importance which a change in U.S. policy toward the Batista regime might have. Among the direct expressions of Cuban insurgent activity designed to neutralize U.S. support for Batista, the interviews with Matthews and other U.S. journalists in 1957 and 1958 were conducted cleverly enough to promote some public sympathy for the insurgents in the U.S. On all

occasions in 1958 when Castro spoke loudly enough for the U.S. to hear, the moderate goals he espoused seem to have been designed to convince U.S. policy makers that the overthrow of the Batista regime they proposed would not threaten vital American interests. Moreover, the insurgent movement was active in lobbying U.S. opinion leaders on the movement's behalf.

Thus, the Cuban conflict demonstrates one aspect of the international politics of internal conflict -- the degree to which objective international factors influence the strategies which domestic parties pursue. I conclude that Castro's moderate ideological stance in the pre-power period represented a calculated choice which was intended to attract moderates' support domestically while creating enough positive sentiment for the insurgents' cause within the U.S. foreign policy establishment to lead the U.S. to shift its level of support for Batista.

Although the actual internal struggle in 1958 was confined to Cuban soil, and although there was no intervention by outsiders, one of the crucial turning points of the struggle between the Batista regime and the insurgent forces came in mid-1958 when the U.S. instituted an arms embargo against the Batista government. It must be emphasized that because of the close relationship between this regime and the U.S. in the 1950's, it may be said with assurance that the degree

of U.S. support to the Cuban military was a key determinant of Batista's ability to rule. The U.S. had a naval base in Cuba; a military mission existed which helped train the Batista army; U.S. weapons were supplied to Batista; and U.S. economic aid helped support the Cuban economy.

The role of patron thus extended far beyond the U.S.'s economic reach as described in earlier chapters. In fact, Cuba was a weak, penetrated, dependent country which could not exist as a viable national unit without massive external support. Neutralization of the military aspect of this external support was, thus, a key factor in determining the success of the insurgency. Although the Batista forces outnumbered the guerrillas by almost thirty to one, a persuasive case can be made that the loss of U.S. military support helped to break the will of the incumbent regime and its armed forces because it presaged the loss of external political support as well.

Clearly, the Batista regime had more than enough arms by early 1958 to defeat the rebel forces. Moreover, as Russell notes, in spite of the U.S. arms embargo, Batista had access to British suppliers.¹

Hence, it must be assumed that Thomas is correct in asserting that it was the psychological impact of the embargo which was significant, both with regard to its demoralizing effect on the incumbents and its uplifting

effect on the insurgents.² Batista himself argues that U.S. neutrality operated against his regime and cites the pressure which the U.S. exerted on other potential suppliers not to sell arms to Cuba as a key factor.³ This position is affirmed by Bonachea, who argues that "the psychological impact of the U.S. arms embargo cannot be overestimated."⁴

External support also played a role in the early days of the insurgent movement, insofar as Castro sought and received aid from groups in Mexico and the U.S., e.g., in using Mexico as a staging ground for the 1956 Granma expedition. There is no evidence to indicate, however, that the U.S. or Soviet governments supplied the insurgents during 1957 or 1958. Despite the lack of external material support, however, there was critical political support that Castro found (or fostered) in the U.S. as a result of the interviews granted to various journalists in 1957 and 1958 and of exile activity in the U.S. Dunn argues that "the absence of significant and effective foreign ... counter-insurgency assistance to the government in the last two years of the revolt may well have been an important factor in assisting (and perhaps was even a necessary condition for) Castro's success."⁵

Regarding the question of outright interference which might have affected the domestic environment, there is no evidence of outside military involvement

at any stage of the conflict during the 1950's, except for the U.S.'s limited support of Batista. However, as the case study demonstrates, there had been a long tradition of military intervention, political interference and economic penetration by the U.S. in Cuba. According to my reading of Cuban sources, this pattern of influence relations between the two states created a deep sense of resentment of the U.S. among the Cuban people, and fostered a strong Cuban nationalist impulse which took on a decidedly anti-American tone. In this sense, external involvement may be seen as a factor which directly affected the domestic environment in the Cuban case. Economic and ideological influences were felt, as were the impact of U.S. policies and American business behavior on both the social structure and the distribution of political power in Cuba. The high level of involvement by the U.S. in Cuban life was thus a serious contributing factor to the development of the conflict which erupted in Cuba during the 1950's.

Thus, external factors related to U.S. involvement were important in the pre-power phase of the conflict. However, the importance of external factors was even greater after the Castro regime came to power. Indeed, it was the growing involvement of the Cuban struggle in Cold War politics beginning in 1959, which helps to explain the revolution's course during the later part of that year and afterward.

Regarding the variable of external support, I have argued that in the period during which a new regime takes power, the importance of international factors increases, almost automatically.⁶ Formal recognition by major powers may help to solidify the new regime's power domestically vis a vis the vanquished forces which, generally, do not disappear but form the core of the new opposition. Recognition or non-recognition by key external actors will generally have a significant effect on a new regime's ability to function internationally. Furthermore, international factors may become more significant at such times because the new regime must begin to translate its incipient foreign policy, i.e., the one it created as an opposition group seeking support, into a legitimate foreign policy for the entire nation. As the new government, the former insurgents must begin to conduct relations with a wide variety of external parties and to conduct multi-lateral diplomacy in international organizations. Thus, the period immediately after a change of regimes is one place an observer might look for clues as to the impact which these international responsibilities have on the policies of the new regime.

In the Cuban case, 1959 was a critical year which led to the involvement of Cuba in the Cold War from which it had hitherto been isolated. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union recognized the Castro regime

immediately and the U.S. offered initial support, politically and economically. The historical record reveals no abrupt U.S. action to increase its level of political, economic or military involvement in Cuba in a way which would have threatened the Castro regime. Nonetheless, the new regime's developing theme of opposing anti-communism, and the changes in Cuban economic structure which internal social and political reforms produced, led U.S. leaders to react strongly to many of the internal developments in Cuba during 1959. The Soviet role in this period was limited to public political support for the Castro regime, criticism of the U.S. and quiet support for the work of the P.S.P. (Cuban Communist Party). In contrast, 1960 was characterized by open hostility between the U.S. and Cuba, and more substantial Soviet political and economic support for Castro.

In what I have called this "in-power" phase, the perceptions of the international situation held by both the Castro regime and by opposition elements played an important role in shaping the direction of Cuba's domestic and foreign policies. In particular, the radical changes in Cuban policy in 1959 and after reflect alterations in the internal decision makers' priorities and their perceptions of the external environment.

Even by mid-1959 Cuba was still economically tied to the U.S. What began to change in this period were Cuban perceptions of, and responses to, the situation. Several factors seem to have influenced this altered Cuban position. First, there were the discrete international factors consisting of U.S. responses to the new regime's domestic behavior.⁷ As documented in the early section of Chapter Four, the U.S. responses ranged from ambivalent to negative. The Castro regime's reaction to what it viewed as lukewarm U.S. support for the new regime and its policies was to view the U.S.'s actions as hostile. Whatever doubts Castro and his followers may have had in the pre-power period about the advisability of continuing the status quo in Cuban-U.S. relations were magnified during 1959 by U.S. policy and actions. Farber argues that although U.S. economic and political pressure could have crushed the Cuban revolution at this point, "Cuba had good fortune that during the first two years ... the internal and external opposition were poorly coordinated."⁸

A second factor leading Cuba's new regime away from the U.S. was the incompatibility between the concept of the Castro revolution and existing U.S.-Cuban economic relations. If Castro were to succeed in making the revolution he set out to make -- a nationalist revolt against internal political repression and external economic oppression -- his policies would necessarily clash with

those of the U.S. Because the Cuban upper and upper middle classes were so intertwined with American economic interests during the 1950's, the overthrow of the Batista regime would almost inevitably have challenged those interests. As a consequence, any genuine social revolution in Cuba would necessarily have affected those Americans who had been linked to the Batista regime, thereby stimulating a protectionist stance by the U.S. government. As Kelly notes, U.S. policy shifted at this time because the internal conflict shifted direction from an "authority war" against Batista to a "structural war" against a type of social organization. The U.S. response was to impose sugar quotas and to cut aid.⁹

However, in beginning to make changes in Cuban society which it saw as necessary, the Castro regime did not have the resources to go it alone. Over four centuries of Cuban dependency did not augur well for a revolution which would threaten the very power responsible for the level of economic development Cuba had achieved and the relative prosperity in which the upper sectors of Cuban society had shared. Examination of the documentary record of 1959 indicates that both Castro and Guevara were well aware of the potential consequences of internal reform on U.S.-Cuban relations. To make the revolution real, change would be necessary, but the anticipated response of the U.S. was predicted to be negative.

If one carries this logic to its conclusion, one may infer that Castro foresaw the need to find other sources of external support. As his actions during 1960 show, Castro's response to the dilemma of wanting change but recognizing its potential international ramifications was to pursue a policy from late 1959 onward which would leave the door open to support from the Eastern Cold War bloc internationally, while maximizing P.S.P. support internally. The major events in Cuban foreign policy in mid to late 1959 centered on Castro's attempt to chart a course which would demonstrate his independence from the U.S. This is not to say that Castro had given up hope of merely neutralizing U.S. policy. Indeed, Castro's actions during early 1959 seem to have been designed to prevent U.S. opposition from growing too rapidly while satisfying the domestic need to repudiate American influence. Castro's mildly anti-American rhetoric in mid-1959 and his proclamation of an independent position for Cuba in international affairs helped to neutralize domestic opposition to his regime and assisted Castro in convincing Cubans that the actual degree of dependence which continued to exist was bearable. Moreover, the shifts in domestic politics, e.g., the accommodation with the P.S.P., helped to establish Cuba's socialist credentials.¹⁰ It may be concluded that Castro's balancing act in this period helped to mask continued dependence until a suitable relationship with another external patron

could be established.

In summary, the "discrete external factors" in the Cuban conflict were: 1) the U.S.'s historical level of involvement in Cuban society; and 2) withdrawal of U.S. support in 1958; cautious Soviet support in 1958, but especially in 1959; and the eventual U.S. planning for and support of exile intervention during 1959-1961, plans of which Castro was evidently aware from the outset. The former helped to shape the internal environment in which the Cuban conflict developed. The latter helped to determine the policies and strategies which the Castro regime would pursue upon achieving power.¹¹

B. Systemic International Factors

Whereas the type and level of intersocietal involvement and the need for support are the obvious factors comprising the "international politics of internal conflict," the role played by the structure and norms of the international system should not be ignored. As I argued in Chapter Two, the structure of the international system, or regional subsystem, and that system's norms, provide a milieu for decision and action for both internal and external pollicy makers.

The kinds of systemic influences one should look for with regard to internal war are the effects of structure and norms on:

- 1) the policy choices and actions of insurgents, incumbents and external actors; and

- 2) the success of those policy choices and actions.

With regard to systemic factors in the Cuban case, one looks to the interplay of three facets of the international system:

- 1) the system's tolerance of spheres of influence;
- 2) the relatively weak regionalism that allowed U.S. and Soviet involvement but which limited such involvement through the influence of regional norms; and
- 3) the bipolarity of the international system.

It is my conclusion that these three factors in concert limited the choices of Cuban, American and Soviet policy makers, affected the success of Cuban policies and ensured the immersion of the conflict in the icy waters of the Cold War.

(1) System Structure

Two facets of the regional subsystem of the larger bipolar international system of the late 1950's were important. The first was the predominant role of the U.S. in the Western hemisphere, which the international system sanctioned through tolerance of spheres of influence for the major powers. The second is the presence of a countervailing pan-American norm, albeit a weak one, of non-intervention -- or what I have called "weak regionalism." Both of these factors should be viewed in the larger context of the international system's structure, which at

this time was strongly bipolar, with some developing tendencies toward polycentrism and encouragement for nationalist movements.

It is my conclusion that the bipolarity of the international system effectively limited the type of foreign policy Cuba could pursue. In the pre-Castro years, geographic proximity and historical economic penetration of Cuba by the U.S. had virtually dictated a non-aggressive Cuban foreign policy vis a vis the U.S. This dependency was sustained by the regional dominance of the U.S. in the Western hemisphere and the virtual absence, until the late 1950's, of another world power to whom Cuba could turn for assistance.

Because the international system was changing by the late 1950's, however, it provided Castro with an opportunity to modify Cuban policies domestically and internationally. In its simplest manifestation, the Cold War provided Castro with a choice, albeit one which had heavy costs to balance its advantages. This choice was between the pursuit of a somewhat modified, moderately nationalist policy which might have allowed for an accommodation with U.S. interests on the one hand, and a policy which moved Cuba away from its dependency on the U.S. and toward alignment with either the emerging neutralist bloc or the Soviet Union on the other hand. The so-called neutralist bloc, however, was not a cohesive unit in this period, nor was it strong enough economically

to provide Cuba with the kind of material assistance it needed. Thus, Cuba's choice was to continue its relationship with the U.S. or to seek Soviet assistance. Dunn contends that "the existence of international rivalry for political influence ... gave Cuba a crucial initial dimension of freedom of action which could hardly have been available to a radical leader even a dozen years before."¹²

In 1959 Castro's ambivalence about this choice led him to pursue a foreign policy which was neutralist in conception. It is difficult to determine whether this was a tactic used consciously to "buy time" internationally while solidifying power domestically, or a policy direction based more on philosophical preferences. Indeed, it is altogether possible that it may have been a policy which Castro saw as serving both ends. It is clear, however, that a neutralist policy could not have succeeded in the long run given the international system at the time. Ten years later, perhaps, a middle position between the superpowers might have been more feasible because the intensity of East/West ideological discord had diminished and the world had become more "multipolar" with the rise of alternate centers of power such as China. In 1959, however, the rejection of the U.S. as a patron more or less required the adoption of the Soviet Union as an alternative. Cuba was not, for example, in a position to become a Yugoslavia by charting an independent way, pri-

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marily because of the level and nature of its pre-existing ties to the U.S. and the degree of economic dependence which existed. As Gonzalez argues, "The very structure of the international environment presaged Cuba's ultimate reversion to client state status."¹³ Morray takes the more extreme view that "The ability of the Soviet Union to pick up where the U.S. left off determined the historic turn to the socialist world."¹⁴

The bipolar structure of the world system affected not only Cuban policies and choices but those of the Soviet Union. For example, the intense political and ideological rivalry between the superpowers magnified the importance of Castro's domestic shift toward socialism. The U.S.'s concern about these internal developments led eventually to the Bay of Pigs invasion, and contributed, in an indirect way, to the development of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Had the international system not been structured in a bipolar fashion, the potential loss of Cuba might not have led the U.S. to respond to events in Cuba in the manner in which it actually did. Of course, the long history of U.S. involvement in Cuba and the geographic proximity of Cuba would have been stimulants to U.S. interests in any case. However, the need to forestall Soviet advances in Latin America was relevant to U.S. responses to Cuba's conflict, for it was here that its stake was perhaps greatest.

The bipolarity of the international system also more or less guaranteed Soviet interest in the Cuban conflict, for Cuba presented remarkable opportunities for the Soviet Union to make major inroads into Latin American politics, perhaps at low cost. Compared to the United States' position, the limits on Soviet policy were more obvious. An overt challenge to the U.S. in a country on its doorstep may have been seen by Soviet policy makers as unwise during the early years of the insurgency. Chapter Four documents the extreme caution displayed by the Soviets in establishing a closer relationship with the Castro regime. Indeed, the development of Soviet relations proceeded rather slowly until domestic reforms began to lead the Soviet Union's internal Cuban ally, the P.S.P., into closer cooperation with Castro.

Although the bipolarity of the international system provided Castro with the opportunity to change external patrons, the predominance of the U.S. in its own sphere of influence led the Soviet Union and the Castro regime to proceed with caution in the early years. Nonetheless, it is true that, "Fidel Castro came to power at almost the precise moment when the Soviet Union acquired both the capability and willingness to underwrite the survival of a revolution, far from its own geographic area."¹⁵

(2) Systemic Norms

Whereas weak bipolarity constituted the major structural element of the international system circa 1958 and helped to draw Cuba into the larger conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, there were several other, more normative, elements of the international system at work as well.

The first of these -- tolerance for spheres of influence-- tended to inhibit the Soviet Union in its dealings with Latin America. Second, the inter-American "system," existing as it had under the umbr-ll o ican protectionism, had developed its own norms of: 1) non-intervention in hemispheric affairs by outside powers; and 2) non-interference in the internal affairs of states in the region by others in the region. Of course, the latter "norm" was a value held rather than one capable of being enforced against the primary regional power -- the U.S. Nonetheless, it did tend to inhibit military involvement and make any form of intervention more costly. Third, Castro's rise to power "coincided with a change of climate in Latin America that was distinctly in his favor. In the beginning it provided him with important leverage in his confrontation with the U.S."¹⁶

The norm of non-intervention played a role in the Cuban case insofar as it made extreme forms of external

involvement much more costly for external parties. At stake for the U.S. in any intervention was its relationship with all of Latin America. There is evidence that the costs of non-adherence to this regional norm were an important element in U.S. policy makers' calculations vis a vis the new Castro regime.¹⁷ Additional evidence demonstrating the importance which U.S. policy makers accorded this norm may be seen in the non-involvement of U.S. military forces in providing air cover in the Bay of Pigs operation, and in the American insistence on obtaining O.A.S. and United Nations sanction for the policies it pursued during 1962 and 1963.

C. Summary

How does the international perspective help us to better understand the Cuban conflict?

I have argued that the systemic factors -- bipolarity, spheres of influence and weak regionalism -- limited the choices of Cuban, American and Soviet policy makers and the outcomes of their interactions vis a vis Cuba.¹⁸ In particular, it is my conclusion that system structure helped influence the internal shift to a socialist revolution after Castro achieved power.

With regard to discrete external factors -- primarily levels of support and external involvement -- it can be said that, in the Cuban case, they affected both the resources of the internal factions and their ability and willingness to use them. Examples include the historical

role which the U.S. played in Cuban economic and political life, U.S. support for Batista throughout most of the 1950's, and the arms embargo in 1958. After 1959, the United States' political need for continued involvement was abetted by Cuba's continued need for an external patron. The Soviet Union's interest in Latin America was the third element which eventually led to the internationalization of the conflict. This immersion in the Cold War helped to push Cuban leadership in the direction of a socialist revolution.

The model presented in Chapter Two predicted some relationship between international variables and internal "conflict variables," defined as: 1) scope of conflict, 2) level of violence, and 3) degree of change sought and achieved. What can be said about these relationships in light of the evidence presented in the present case study?

In the Cuban case the scope of conflict and level of violence were, to a large extent, unaffected by external factors during the struggle between the insurgents and the Batista regime. There was possibly some connection between the lack of support for Batista and the ability of the insurgents to enlarge the scope of conflict by attracting an ideologically broad movement. However, at least partially because there was no lengthy struggle involving violence, it is difficult to measure any effects

of external factors on the level of violence.

With respect to the variable I have called "the degree of change," it can be said that:

- 1) the existence of a penetrated economic system and a porous political system led to internal demands for changes in the relationship between Cuba and the U.S. The Cuban conflict was not simply a struggle to replace one regime with another, but a deeper, more structural conflict based on what the insurgents and others saw as the inequities and inadequacies of Batista's policies;
- 2) U.S. and Soviet interest and involvement in the conflict during the early years of the Castro regime facilitated the movement to a socialist state in Cuba. Both the targets of change and the degree of change achieved were a function of many factors including external involvement.

Despite its role, however, international politics was never the sole explanatory variable in the Cuban revolutionary equation. At certain points Castro's acts seemed to stem from his need to respond to domestic pressures, and at other times from the need to respond to international pressures. In the end, Castro's need to establish control over Cuban society and government led him to the strategy of placing limits on Cuba's relations with the U.S.¹⁹

II. THE CUBAN CONFLICT AND THE LITERATURE

As I have outlined my purposes in this dissertation, they were to refine some answers to questions about the Cuban conflict of 1959 and to test a non-traditional framework for analysis in relation to that conflict. Having demonstrated the ways in which international factors became important at various times during the Cuban conflict, it becomes important to relate these findings to the scholarly literature.

A. The Literature on Cuba

With regard to the first of my purposes in undertaking this study -- adding to the literature on the Cuban conflict -- Chapters Three and Four and the first section of the present chapter hopefully stand on their own in answering the question: what does a dual national/international perspective add to our understanding of the Cuban conflict?

As I hope to have demonstrated, discrete external factors (such as prior involvement and external support) and systemic factors (such as the structure and norms of the international system) played a significant role. Indeed, it is my conclusion that without some understanding of the interplay between the domestic factors most commonly studied and the international factors which I have sought to highlight, it is quite difficult to

explain Cuba's shift to a socialist direction in its domestic and foreign policies. Although it would be quite unfair to suggest that all serious writers on Cuba have ignored the role of international factors, few studies have attempted to examine systematically the interplay between them and the domestic factors usually cited.²⁰

In Chapter Two I detailed a number of reasons why I had chosen the Cuban conflict as a case study. Among those reasons was a desire to refine answers to some questions about the conflict which remained in dispute. Foremost among those questions were:

- 1) Why did the Castro insurgency succeed?
- 2) Why did the new regime turn to socialism?
- 3) To what extent was the U.S. "responsible" for this shift?
- 4) To what extent is Cuba an exceptional case?

Although it was my hope that a dual perspective -- one which took into account international as well as national factors -- would help to shed further light on these questions, I took the position in that chapter, and in developing the framework for analysis used in this dissertation, that even the use of a different framework might not provide conclusive answers.

This caution notwithstanding, I present the following summary of conclusions on these questions.

1) Success of the Insurgency

The reasons why the 26th of July Movement succeeded against the Batista regime are basically of "domestic" origin. On the structural side, there were a lack of social institutions to counteract the development of the insurgency and a loss of legitimacy for the incumbent regime which resulted from its own corrupt practices. Although economically Cuba was better off than many other Latin American societies, the benefits of this limited prosperity fell to the few.

On the behavioral side, there was substantial support for a change in regimes and a lack of resistance to such change on the part of the majority in Cuban society. Moreover, there was an element in Cuban political culture which supported a return to what it thought would be "constitutional government" and a restoration of a sense of national dignity.

Most importantly, however, the Cuban insurgency succeeded because of the effective leadership provided by Castro in expressing a multi-class national unity in relatively non-ideological terms. This was in stark contrast to the corrupt and near tyrannical "leadership" which characterized the Batista government.²¹

Into this mix of behavioral and structural elements one must factor U.S. involvement historically and the resulting role of the U.S. as an external federator

and spur to nationalism.²² Although one may not easily quantify it, the Cubans' view of the importance of U.S. involvement can be seen directly from the writings and speeches of the period. As I have shown, the high level of external involvement helped to fuel the nationalist impulse of the 26th of July Movement. Finally, in a very direct way the U.S. "pulled the plug" on Batista by cutting off support.

With reference to the question, "How was the insurgency able to stay in power?" one must again look to both domestic and international factors. On the domestic side, Castro took over a functioning economy and moved quickly to solidify his political base. On the international side, it is unlikely that he could have continued to do so without the existence of an alternate source of external support for the Cuban economy, viz., the Soviet Union.

2) Cuba's Turn to Socialism

The general debate in the literature on this question focuses on whether or not Castro was a "closet communist" before coming to power and whether he came with a preconceived plan to make Cuba into a socialist state.

The present study shows that insofar as the historical record exists there was no such preconceived plan,²³ although a good bit of the social program had been detailed internally within the Movement and to a

certain degree made public. However, as it became more apparent to members of the Castro regime upon taking power, some fairly radical reforms were required if Cuba was to satisfy the needs of the Cuban people. Effecting these reforms meant: 1) repudiating those elements in Cuban society most directly linked to outsiders, and 2) taking the risk of alienating the U.S. government.²⁴ Castro and Guevara had to take possible U.S. resistance into account because of the U.S.'s proximity to and influence in Cuba.

It is my conclusion that one cannot understand the shift by Cuba to being a socialist state in the Soviet orbit without examining the international system and the inputs of external actors in the key period from 1958 to 1960. This conclusion represents a modification of the Draper view that external circumstances influenced Castro's methods and timing but did not determine the regime's nature and direction.²⁵

3) The U.S. Role

One of the things shown by the present study is the importance of examining external decision factors regarding the state in conflict, i.e., to understand the effect of the interaction between Cuba and the U.S. on the internal conflict, one must also study the foreign policy making process in the external state.

Among the more startling things about the Cuban

insurgency is the fact that somehow the U.S., perhaps the premier power in the world, "allowed" the Castro insurgency to turn toward the socialist model. Why did the U.S. not become more involved earlier than the Bay of Pigs invasion in an attempt to prevent it?

There are a number of ways to explain this lack of activity.

- 1) Castro "fooled" the U.S. by promising one kind of revolution and delivering another (or the closely related view that the U.S. did realize what Castro stood for originally, but that he changed after achieving power);
- 2) the U.S., through inattention or confusion, did not realize what Castro stood for;
- 3) the U.S. could not have stopped Castro without unacceptable costs;
- 4) the U.S. "pushed" Castro into the Soviet camp by not reacting favorably to the winds of change in Cuba after Castro took power.

The present study shows, through an examination of the domestic and international reasons why both U.S. and Cuban policy makers acted as they did, that no one of these strands of explanation is wholly valid or sufficient by itself. Indeed, the "answer" is a rather complex amalgam of all the above explanations at various times in the conflict. Castro skillfully manipulated ideology and policy in the pre-power stage, and during the key year of 1959, when he was attempting to consolidate power domestically while maintaining some momentum in changing Cuban society. It appears that there was a conscious attempt on

his part to neutralize potential U.S. involvement, if possible, while still achieving the domestic changes his regime thought to be important.

The U.S. response, in the midst of changing ambassadors, was erratic, and possibly over-reactive, to policies and statements meant more for home consumption than for U.S. ears. To be sure, Castro did change his policies after achieving power. The U.S. reaction, however, did remove impediments in the way of a closer relationship with the Soviet Union.²⁶ Finally, one should not, in a rush to impose an intellectual order on what appears to have been a rather confusing and unclear jumble of human activity, discount the role played by missed communications, misunderstandings and chance.

(4) Cuba as an Exceptional Case

The degree to which the Cuban conflict serves as a model for other conflicts has been a matter of both practical and theoretical concern. On the practical question, there has been a good deal of debate during the 1960's and 1970's as to whether the Cuban conflict could be "exported," particularly to other areas in Latin America. Che Guevara's involvement in other Latin American conflicts, especially in Bolivia, was an attempt to adapt the Cuban "model" of insurgency -- primarily the development of a small, guerrilla "foco" -- to other situations. These attempts are documented by leftist

scholars of internal conflict such as Regis Debray.²⁷ Although, in my view, these efforts to "export" the Cuban model have been rather unsuccessful, it has not been my purpose to examine the applicability of the Cuban "model" to other areas.

Indeed, my view of internal conflict, as it has emerged from an intensive study of the literature on Cuba and internal war in general, is that such struggles are often quite complex in etiology, development and outcome. Internal conflict, like life itself, is a fluid and dynamic process not easily tamed to the symmetry of a particular intellectual construct or model.

With this limitation in mind, however, there is no reason not to examine the applicability of what one learns from a given conflict to the study of others. Hence, the third section of this chapter is devoted to the development of some comparisons to other conflicts.

B. The Literature on Internal Conflict

With regard to the relationship between the present study and the general literature on internal conflict, the Cuban case study produces some interesting findings and raises a number of issues which require further study.

Chapter One depicted the existence of a dichotomy in the field of internal conflict analysis between structural and behavioral approaches. The framework presented in Chapter Two provides for examination of both structural

features of the internal system (and the impact which external variables may have on them) and behavioral factors (the choices and actions of internal and external decision makers).

The Cuban case supports the view that study of both sets of factors is important to an understanding of internal conflict, and demonstrates that there are external elements which ought to be factored into any analysis. The structural features of the Cuban social system as described in Chapter Three indicated substantial economic, social and political dysfunction to which existing political institutions proved unresponsive. Cuba illustrates that external factors may affect many elements of the internal environment of a "target" society. Further, such external variables may serve either as "preconditions" (such as external economic penetration) or "accelerators" (such as the U.S.' arms embargo).

With respect to the behavioral features of a conflict, Cuba shows the potential effect which external forces may have on the actors themselves in the conflict. In particular, it is my conclusion that international factors affect the calculations and strategies of insurgents and incumbents, especially in relation to the marshalling of external support.

The following summarizes what the Cuban case demonstrates in relation to more specific aspects of the general literature on internal conflict.

- 1) J-Curve Hypothesis -- Whereas Davies argues that internal conflicts are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal, in Cuba there was no such sharp reversal. Yet there was a serious internal conflict.
- 2) Relative Deprivation -- Gurr's viewpoint appears to be validated by Cuba. This case shows that discontent may lead to political violence when attitudes and beliefs focus on political objects and when institutions are weak enough to give the discontented a sense of potency. Cuba is a case of both elite and mass deprivation, insofar as one can determine "states of mind" from the available evidence. In Gurr's framework this combination always leads to revolution. The present study extends Gurr's view that the coercive power of the incumbents is a key by demonstrating how the coercive balance may be altered within a society by external support.
- 3) Process approaches:
 - a) Schwartz' multi-stage process model, as described in Chapter One, posits five basic stages of pre-revolutionary social activity and five stages of internal war. The Cuban case illustrates some elements of this model, e.g., coalition building among internal groups, but not all elements, e.g., no new party structure emerged.
 - b) Smelser's model focuses on the goals of collective behavior, which are either norm or value oriented. The Cuban case exhibited the development of a value-oriented movement, stimulated in part by a high level of external involvement.

My review of literature also included several recent treatments of internal war which have considered international factors as well as a number of general works on international relations which are relevant. Following is a summary of the relationship between the Cuban case and these aspects of the literature.

- 1) Rejai's view of the international situation as one of five factors influencing the strategies of insurgents is confirmed by this study. This dissertation, however, extends his findings by showing the influences of the external environment on incumbent strategy.
- 2) Rosenau's work on international aspects of civil strife is modified by my study in two ways. First, it shows that a restrictive definition of the international system (as international organizations only) is not as useful as one which incorporates structural and normative aspects of the entire international system. Second, the present study helps in a preliminary way to fill the gap on understanding the impact of international variables which Rosenau conceded as being a problem.
- 3) Skocpol's recent work emphasizes a Marxist structural view of internal conflict which takes into account the international environment. Although I do not share Skocpol's world view, it can be fairly said that Cuba supports her emphasis on the connections between international conditions and class structured economies. However, Cuba also demonstrates the importance of other features, such as nationalism, which Skocpol's framework de-emphasizes.
- 4) Linkage politics is a recent approach which asserts the interconnectedness of the international environment and events occurring within states. The present study places itself within this field of study and extends the existing research in a modest way by specifying possible linkage points in the special case of internal war.
- 5) The Cuban case validates the importance of examining the linkage points between external and internal factors suggested by dependency theory, e.g., economic penetration, the coincidence of interest between various elements of the Cuban middle and upper classes and external MNC's, etc. Yet, the Cuban example shows that simplistic assertions that "the metropole" will always intervene to protect the interests of its MNC's may not be accurate. Indeed, Cuba demonstrates the potency of international systemic factors as elements in the decision making environment of external actors.

Cuba also tends to validate or disconfirm a number of more discrete hypotheses in the literature.

- 1) Herz argues that where indigenous forces are primarily responsible for a revolutionary victory, they are not likely to accept control or influence on the part of an assisting power.²⁸ The long term view of the Cuban conflict demonstrates a non-acceptance by the Cubans of Soviet control, although the Soviet Union's influence over the years since 1960 has been strong.
- 2) Calvert argues that "if a reservoir of additional power is available for the asking outside the political system, it is in the interest of the weaker party in any internal dispute to engage it on its behalf ... provided that it does not alienate its existing actual or potential support."²⁹ Although one could easily debate whether it was in Cuba's interest to seek Soviet support, the Cuban case does tend to confirm Calvert's view.
- 3) Halperin contends that once a small nation falls into the sphere of influence of a great power it cannot escape the role of pawn when it suits the purposes of the great power.³⁰ Clearly, this view is not supported by the Cuban example in which there was a break from the U.S.
- 4) Mitchell's view that external involvement is more likely in conflicts occurring in dependent societies is validated by the present study to the extent that one considers the level of intersocietal involvement between the U.S. and Cuba to have been relatively high.³¹ However, since the majority of Mitchell's work centers on intervention as an extension of an existing commitment, it is only partially relevant here. But my description of the "level of involvement" is supportive of the view that transnational connections existed.
- 5) Falk's view that geographic proximity encourages greater involvement by outsiders is validated if one takes the long term perspective (1956-1963) but not necessarily if one focuses only on 1958. ³² On a related issue, Rosenau's argument that proximity increases the chances of intervention was true in Cuba only after the military phase of the conflict was concluded.

In summary, it is my hope that this study can be seen as a useful addition to the literature and one which expands the boundaries of explanation on internal conflict to include a greater emphasis on international variables.

C. Refining the Framework

Despite its utility the framework for analysis I have presented has not passed unscathed through its empirical dry run. Following are seven areas in which refinements are required.

1. Regarding international systemic factors, it has proven quite difficult to find concrete evidence to demonstrate the direct impact of such factors on the decision makers in such a conflict. Indeed, decision making studies in international politics generally suffer from an inability to recreate the perceptual milieu of the decision maker. Moreover, an internal conflict is not merely one decision, but a series of decisions and actions in an environment which is changing rapidly.

2. Although it was my argument that the international dimensions of an internal conflict would be at their height in the period before accession to power, in the Cuban case international variables seem to have assumed greater importance well after the seizure of power by insurgents. The actualization of the new regime's incipient foreign policy did not lead to an

immediate or decisive surge in the relative importance of international, as opposed to domestic, factors but international politics played a key role for several years afterward.

This suggests a need for research based upon a dual national/international perspective which considers a wider span of time, i.e., up to several years after a new regime is in power.

3. Although the original model suggested that the international system should be one focal point for analysis, the Cuban case shows that the regional subsystem may also be important. In the present case, the weak regionalism I have described helps to explain why there was not earlier or stronger U.S. military involvement after Castro had achieved power.

4. The Cuban case also reveals that the concept of "support" needs to be interpreted broadly. Although the framework does include consideration of material and non-material support, it does not highlight effectively enough the potentially important role which non-support may play. The U.S.'s decision to stop supporting the Batista regime was a turning point in the Cuban struggle. Despite the fact that the termination of support was militarily insignificant it helped to tip the political balance in favor of the insurgents.

What this suggests is that it is important to examine the changes in levels of external support as well as the general level of support. And, in cases like Cuba, where there is not prolonged, large-scale violence, it becomes even more significant for the researcher to examine the historical record for evidence concerning the impact of external political support, e.g., recognition, public encouragement, etc.

5. The case study also illustrates that prior involvement and geographic proximity may not always be reliable predictors of external involvement. Mitchell's view that past involvement puts pressure on an external party to become more involved because of transnational linkages which increase external actors' stakes in the outcome of conflict is not wholly borne out by the Cuban case.

The highly dependent status of Cuba vis a vis the U.S. would have, in Mitchell's view, predicted U.S. intervention. Yet, during the early years of the insurgency and up to the seizure of power this did not occur.

6. The study also suggests that one must search outside the subject state for explanations as to the level of external involvement, i.e., in the internal political workings of external actors. For example, one can explain the lack of intensive U.S. involvement in the conflict itself by reference to domestic considerations in the U.S., e.g., disagreements between the White House, the

State Department and the C.I.A. about the likely direction of the Castro regime continued throughout the early years of the new regime and helped to immobilize U.S. policy. This confusion among the external state's policy makers was abetted by Castro's neutralist foreign policy statements during early 1959 and his public attacks on Cuban communists. If Mitchell's hypothesis were true, one would have expected greater U.S. involvement much earlier than 1961 and with greater strength than was finally demonstrated. That the Cuban case did not show this is testimony to the efficacy of intervening variables such as: 1) conflicts in the policy process of the external actor, and 2) ambiguity in the foreign policy of the subject state.

7. Finally, the Cuban study illustrates the critical importance of analyzing the relationship between the domestic environment and potential discrete external factors. While such factors may not always have a direct impact on the actors in a conflict, they may influence the general milieu in which the internal actors conduct their struggle, e.g., U.S. influence on the domestic economic and political environment helped to shape the relationship which evolved between the U.S. and the new regime. This confirms that a focus on actor variables such as capabilities and will must be supplemented by an

analysis of the structural features of the domestic system as they are affected by external forces.

In addition to helping to clarify some of the hypotheses in the literature, this study raises a number of interesting questions requiring additional research:

1. Do long conflicts tend to invite greater external involvement, other factors being equal? (e.g., in Cuba perhaps the relatively low level of direct external involvement in the pre-power period was related to the fact that the period of violence was relatively short-lived).

2. Does a shift by insurgents to a more extreme ideological position with regard to targets of change and degrees of change sought tend to stimulate greater direct external involvement on behalf of one or more of the factions?

3. What role is played by the personalities and world views of major factional leaders? (e.g., Castro looms large as a factor in the Cuban example, what role did his view of the world play in shaping the conflict?)

4. Does frequent regime change stimulate or lessen external involvement in a particular state, i.e., for a country continually involved in internal turmoil do external actors lose interest or does the turmoil itself serve as a stimulus to external involvement?

III. COMPARISONS TO OTHER CASES

Although this dissertation rests on a conscious decision to study one case in depth rather than a number of cases in lesser detail, the question arises as to how much one may generalize from a single case to a social universe in which there are many. Despite its level of detail, my case study of the 1959 Cuban internal conflict is merely an exploratory effort. Accordingly, it would be premature to draw definitive conclusions about the importance of international variables in internal conflict based only on one such case. Indeed, as my discussion in the latter part of section two of this chapter indicates, there remain many interesting questions to be explored further. Moreover, if one is to go beyond the idiosyncratic assumption of the case study historical approach, one should attempt comparisons to other instances of internal conflict, particularly those occurring in relatively similar historical periods.

Recognizing the utility of the comparative perspective, I will compare the Cuban case to two other cases in Latin America in the post-World War Two period. Latin American cases were chosen because it seems likely that international factors might affect the states within a region in relatively similar ways. Thus, my choice repre-

sents an attempt to hold systemic and regional factors somewhat constant, thereby minimizing the need to make adjustments for location and time.

Despite its reputation for chronic political instability in the twentieth century, Latin America has produced few internal conflicts whose scope and general degree of change achieved have given them general significance for the study of internal conflict. One would probably find general agreement among Latin American scholars and students of internal conflict that the Mexican revolution of 1910, the Bolivian conflict of 1952, the Guatemalan revolution of 1949-1954 and the Dominican conflict of 1965 could stand with the Cuban conflict as the most significant examples of Latin American internal strife. Of course, one might also add to this list the recent and ongoing struggles in Central America as being potentially significant although their status in the hierarchy is far from clear at present.

I shall refer only briefly to the Mexican case because it is comparatively far removed in time from the other cases. Instead, I shall focus more closely on two cases which occurred in the post-World War II international system -- the Dominican Republic (1962-1965) and Bolivia (1952), and refer in passing to salient points with regard to the Guatemalan conflict of the late 1940's

and early 1950's.

Limiting one's attention to cases relatively close in time helps to minimize the likelihood that major changes in the international systemic variable may have occurred. And although it is tempting to delve into contemporary matters in Nicaragua, El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America, I have rejected any such focus in this study because of the lack of historical distance which we have on events which are still unfolding.

Limiting one's attention to countries which are geographically proximate may assist the observer in holding a substantial number of variables constant, e.g., the Latin American states share many common cultural and political features including their original relations with colonial powers, the relative immunity of Latin countries from European intervention and interference since the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, the development of a system of Latin American regional norms in the twentieth century, and most significantly, the rather lengthy period most Latin states, especially the Caribbean states, have spent more or less within the sphere of influence of the United States.

In the mini-case studies which I present below, I apply the basic elements of the conceptual scheme

presented in this dissertation to the Dominican and Bolivian cases. I do so in order to draw some initial conclusions regarding the scheme's applicability to other cases. I do not pretend that the level of research for the mini-cases approaches what I have attempted to do for the Cuban case. Whereas my study of Cuba has served the purpose of providing a full scale test of the framework, the mini-cases are an attempt to provide some comparative backdrop for the generalizations reached in my study of the major case. The mini-cases will serve to highlight some additional conclusions regarding the interplay of international and domestic factors in internal conflict.

A. Domestic Factors

(1) The Dominican Republic³³

The Dominican internal conflict may be said to have begun several years prior to the assassination of President Rafael Trujillo in 1962 and to have carried through the 1965-1966 period during which the United States intervened. The Dominican Republic had suffered for almost thirty years under what most scholars characterized as the corrupt, brutal military rule of the Trujillo family. Among the salient factors underlying this conflict was the Dominican Republic's economic structure, which was predominantly agricultural (sugar and other crops accounting for roughly 90% of exports),

largely dominated by the Trujillo family and characterized by a majority of people living in severe poverty. Although there had been some economic development under the Trujillo regime, it had not filtered down to the general public to any significant extent.

The social structure reflected both the level of economic underdevelopment and the rigid manner in which wealth was produced and distributed. Essentially, there was what amounted to a rigid social caste system, with a small elite (bureaucratic/military/landowning) held tightly under Trujillo's control and a large, rural mass peasantry. In effect, there was no middle class to speak of, according to most observers.

Taken together, the economic and social underdevelopment created dysfunction which fostered political instability. There were few organized social groups of any political significance. Unlike many other Latin American countries, neither labor nor the church were particularly well organized or politically significant in the Dominican Republic. Because of the strength of the dictatorship, political parties were only in their infancy at the time of Trujillo's death; for many years there had been only one party rule. Thus, the Dominican Republic could clearly be characterized as a severely underdeveloped country politically and one given to

continuous undertones of political violence. Only the military seemed to maintain its strength, functioning largely as an army of internal occupation and accounting for over one-half of the budget of the Dominican government.

Because of the brutality of the Trujillo dictatorship, there arose small cliques which were active in planning for his demise. After his assassination by members of the opposition, the Dominican Republic remained highly fragmented socially and politically. Nonetheless, several activist groups arose, including the Partida Revolucionaria Dominicana (PRD) and the 14th of June movement, a pro-Castro, anti-U.S. group. Elections occurred in 1962, resulting in the emergence of Juan Bosch, head of the reformist PRD, as President. This regime was, however, short-lived, being overthrown within six months by the military, which proceeded to rule with U.S. support until 1965 when the pro-Bosch, pro-Constitutionalists took to the streets against the interim junta.

(2) Bolivia³⁴

The Bolivian internal conflict spans the years from the early 1940's through the early 1960's, with 1952 representing the year in which the revolutionary forces overthrew the old regime and began what has come

to be known as "the social revolution."

Economically, Bolivia was a one industry nation, based on the extraction and shipment abroad of tin. In fact, 95% of Bolivia's foreign exchange was developed by such sales. The remainder of the economy was based on subsistence farming and the operation of a classic latifundia system. Thus, despite Bolivia's great potential mineral wealth, the majority of the population lived at subsistence levels. In the period following the Chaco War with Paraguay (1937-1942) inflation was also a severe economic problem.

The Indian population, representing approximately two-thirds of the Bolivian nation, was physically and socially isolated from the rest of the country. There was a very small upper class and an underdeveloped, almost non-existent, middle sector. According to major sources, non-participation in politics was the norm.

Politically, the 1940's saw the rise of new political groupings, e.g., the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and a radical labor movement, to replace the older political parties. The army had played a significant role in Bolivia prior to the Chaco War. The loss of the war by Bolivia discredited the military and the government and helped to spur the development of the MNR and other political groups. Unlike other Latin American

countries, and like the Dominican Republic, the church did not play an active political role.

Ideologically, the revolutionary movement which developed in the 1940's was nationalist in its orientation but was not overtly anti-imperialist. The MNR program emphasized that Bolivia's economic resources should benefit Bolivians.

One of the key events of the internal conflict was the 1943 coup led by the MNR and RADEPA, a radical fraternal organization. This coup led to the establishment of the Villarroel government which was forced to expel the MNR to obtain U.S. recognition. In 1946 Villarroel was assassinated, and the MNR went into exile as the old line constitutionalists again took power. In 1951 the MNR participated in the election and won, but was prevented from taking power by the Bolivian military. In 1952 the MNR succeeded in taking power after an essentially bloodless overthrow of the existing regime.

The causes of the Bolivian conflict were basically domestic and related to multiple economic, social and political dysfunctions. The MNR itself was a mass-based popular movement with reformist and nationalistic goals. The emergence of labor as a key power center helped to radicalize the regime after 1952 to the extent that massive changes were made in the agricultural and industrial

sectors through radical land reform and nationalization of the tin industry.

B. Levels of Intersocietal Involvement

As this dissertation has shown, Cuba's conflict was affected by the pre-existing level of U.S. involvement, both governmental and non-governmental, in Cuba's economy and its political life. In terms of the continuum of external involvement presented in Chapter Two, one could characterize Cuba as demonstrating economic penetration and political interference in the period preceding the overthrow of the Batista regime. And the Bay of Pigs stands as an example of interference bordering on intervention in the period following Castro's overthrow of the Batista regime.

How does this level and type of external involvement compare with the Dominican and Bolivian cases?

In the Dominican case, economic penetration was not quite as significant as in Cuba. Although the Dominican Republic was as close to the U.S. geographically as Cuba, the Dominican economy was much less directly dominated by American participation. The Dominican economy was predominantly agricultural, with sugar being the main crop. Although the Dominican Republic was dependent on fluctuations in the market for sugar, foreign ownership was not a severe problem.

Indeed, it is said that Trujillo's family itself owned 50-60% of Dominican agricultural land.³⁵

In the Bolivian case there was an extreme dependence by Bolivia on the U.S. and Great Britain as markets for its tin. Although the tin mines were Bolivian-owned, the three major owners evidently channeled the profits outside the country rather than reinvesting in the Bolivian economy. This, of course, helped to reinforce internal Bolivian perceptions as to the source of its economic difficulties. Yet the lack of direct foreign ownership did help to blunt any anti-imperialist thrust on the part of insurgent groups.

With regard to levels of external political involvement the Dominican and Bolivian cases are quite different. Historically, the U.S. had constantly interfered in Dominican political life -- through direct military intervention (1916-1924 occupation by U.S. Marines) and through various political operatives thereafter. From the time of Trujillo's death, the U.S. again became directly involved as an actor in the internal Dominican political process. This is seen clearly in its interference in the establishment of a government in the confusing days following the assassination, in the direct role the U.S. played in promoting, executing and monitoring the 1962 elections, U.S. Ambassador John Bartlow

Martin's constant efforts to influence various factions in Dominican politics and the manipulation of aid and the sugar quota for political ends during the period 1962-1965. In effect, as Barnett argues, "the Dominican Republic has been a political and economic satellite of the U.S."³⁶ In this regard it was more like the Cuban case than the Bolivian.

Bolivia, on the other hand, because of its remote, interior location and its lesser importance in hemispheric or strategic politics, saw far less direct political interference by outsiders in the early phases of the insurgency's development. There were several external intrusions by the U.S. into the Bolivian political process during the 1940's, e.g., when the U.S. demanded that the MNR leadership be expelled from the revolutionary government of Villarroel as the price of U.S. recognition of the new regime. However, this level of involvement was atypical of external involvement in the conflict as a whole. Whereas in the Dominican case the U.S. was an active participant in the day-to-day events, in Bolivia the U.S. restricted its involvement to certain key times and then apparently used traditional diplomatic means rather than meetings with sub-governmental groups. In the post-takeover phase in Bolivia (after 1952), the U.S. was quite supportive of the regime's efforts to institute significant social reform, yet it did not get involved in the way it would

later in the Dominican case or as it did in Cuba.

In summary, it is fair to say that the Cuban and Dominican cases illustrate economic penetration and political interference to a far greater degree than the Bolivian case during the early phases of insurgency. Of the three cases the Dominican shows the greatest U.S. involvement. Perhaps the historically high level of involvement by the U.S. in Cuba and the Dominican Republic facilitated a continuing escalation of involvement when events began to go in a direction which may have threatened U.S. policy. In the Bolivian case it was far easier for the U.S. to maintain some distance.

Part of the key to understanding why the U.S. decided to interfere or intervene in the Cuban and Dominican cases is an understanding of the role which anti-communism played in each instance. In Bolivia, for example, U.S. support of the 1952 MNR regime was seen as a way to prevent Bolivia from falling to the Communists. In Cuba and in the Dominican Republic, U.S. involvement was seen as a way of removing a regime which had turned to the communist world (Cuba) and of preventing the turn of an insurgency to the left (Dominican Republic). It can be argued that in 1952 the relative danger of communism in Bolivia was less salient to the U.S. than was the danger of communism in Guate-

mala. Indeed, the American experience with Castro, when combined with U.S. activities in Vietnam at the time, virtually ensured that the U.S. would take an active role, if not an interventionary one, in the Dominican case. Interestingly, these three cases, taken as a whole and in light of a broad perspective, tend to support the view held by C.M. Mitchell that it is the past level of external involvement which predicts the likelihood of direct involvement in the event of an insurgency. Of course, as this dissertation shows, this concept has to be modified to take into account the influence of regional and international systemic factors as motivators for intervention, i.e., states do intervene for a variety of reasons which may include protection of existing linkages between states but which are also likely to include factors relating to the intervenor's relations with states other than the target or "victim" state.

C. International Systemic Influences

The Cuban study emphasized bipolarity, spheres of influence and weak regionalism as structural and normative influences on that conflict. What are the salient points of comparison in the Dominican and Bolivian cases?

The Bolivian conflict spanned a number of years during which the structure of the international system was in flux. During the World War II years, Bolivia was a supporter of the U.S., although there was some indication that the MNR had within its ranks a pro-fascist faction. In the post-war years, when anti-communism was important to the U.S. because of the development of a bipolar international system, Bolivia was generally anti-communist. The international systemic conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was, however, focused elsewhere during the early 1950's. This is not to say that the possibility of communist advances in Latin America was not perceived by the U.S. as a real danger and as something which would benefit the Soviets, e.g., the U.S.'s involvement in Guatemala in 1954 appears to have been motivated almost purely by the anti-communist impulse of American foreign policy.

By 1965 the international system was still bipolar, albeit somewhat more loosely bipolar than in the 1950's. Thus, the Bolivian and Dominican cases share a relatively similar structure external to the conflict. Within the regional subsystem, the Dominican Republic and Bolivia were also subject to similar influences -- both the influence of U.S. power and the mitigating, although weak, influence of norms of non-intervention. However,

Bolivia's relative geographic isolation seems to have lessened somewhat the impact of structural features.

D. Discrete External Factors

In the Bolivian case external influences were important but there was no foreign intervention.

First, there were the effects of economic dependence. The fact that tin prices were subject to the needs and whims of outside powers, the U.S. and Great Britain, and that there were no refineries in Bolivia, led to vulnerability. Whichever group was in power had to contend with this economic relationship.

Second, U.S. interference during the 1940's did affect the growth of the MNR and, hence, the internal balance of forces. The U.S. had, for example, used recognition as a tool to extract policy changes from the Villarroel government.³⁷ Recognition was also a key factor in the 1952 stage of the conflict.

Third, the U.S. played a critical role in facilitating the changes which took place after the MNR took power in 1952. The U.S. was particularly influential in forcing the revolutionary government to pay the owners for the nationalization of the tin mines. And the U.S.'s continued economic support throughout the 1950's was essential to the success of the regime. As its own foreign minister indicates, the MNR had to convince the

U.S. that it was neither communist nor pro-Soviet.³⁸ Both Presidents Paz and Siles indicated that their governments would not have survived without U.S. assistance.³⁹ As Huntington notes, "The Bolivian Revolution was, in effect, financed by the U.S. ... by the same American Administration which suppressed one regime in Guatemala and prepared to overthrow another in Cuba."⁴⁰

Unlike Cuba, Bolivia's communist party had no strong economic or political ties with the Soviet Union. The Soviets, moreover, were not then in a position to offer significant economic assistance to the insurgents.

The Bolivian case raises the question as to why the U.S. provided early and sustained support to what was a genuine social change attempt here but not in Mexico, Guatemala or Cuba. As I have suggested, Bolivia's geographic and strategic position may offer some explanation. Yet, other elements also came into play. For one thing, the U.S. had few private interests threatened in Bolivia regardless of which way policy developed. In Guatemala it had to contend with the dislocation caused by the expropriation of United Fruit property; in Cuba there were significant economic linkages which were threatened. In addition to these factors, in Bolivia the Eisenhower government became convinced that,

despite attempts by the opposition to discredit the MNR as communist dominated, the MNR could serve as a bulwark against the communists if encouraged to proceed with its plans for radical change.⁴¹ The net effect of this support was the success of the Bolivian efforts to achieve land reform and to reclaim ownership of its own natural wealth.

One uncommon feature of the Bolivian case is noted by Huntington -- the absence of anti-foreign nationalism as a motivating factor for the insurgents. As noted, the foreign presence in Bolivia was relatively insignificant. "In an isolated, land-locked country far removed from the centers of power, the Bolivian Revolution lacked any immediate and obvious target which could serve as a generator of mass participation."⁴²

The Dominican case is much more similar to the Cuban than to the Bolivian with regard to the influence of discrete external factors.

The key factor again dictating the extent of external influences was U.S. concern with communism. Trujillo's anti-communism had made him relatively popular with U.S. policy makers in the 1950's despite his internal policies. As a direct result of the Cuban experience, however, and the turn of its insurgency to a communist regime, the U.S.'s consciousness of communist influence

in the Caribbean increased dramatically. This is particularly so in light of the Castro regime's avowed policy of active assistance to insurgent movements in other Latin American countries. As a result, "No more Cubas" became the watchword of U.S. policy in all of Latin America. This policy was reinforced by simultaneous U.S. participation in the Vietnam conflict. This continuing concern with the threat of communism eventually immersed the Dominican conflict in Cold War politics.

The actual instances of U.S. interference in the Dominican Republic from 1961 on are far too numerous to discuss in detail. Among the more significant examples, however, were: 1) the U.S.'s breaking of relations with Trujillo in 1960 over his alleged involvement in an assassination attempt on President Betancourt of Venezuela; 2) the imposition of sanctions in conjunction with the O.A.S in 1960; 3) possible involvement in plans to assassinate Trujillo; 4) cuts in the sugar quota in 1962; 5) President Kennedy's sending of warships to Santo Domingo to prevent a coup by the military against President Balaguer and to encourage Trujillo's son, Ramfis, to seek exile following the assassination of his father; 6) manipulation of economic aid;⁴³ 7) direct involvement in the 1962 election process,⁴⁴ and most significantly, 8) the direct intervention of over

20,000 U.S. Marines in 1965; and 9) the intercession of the U.S. Ambassador and special representatives in the internal struggles between the pro-Bosch constitutionalists and the old guard in 1965-1966.

Of the three cases considered in this study, the Dominican Republic is the most prominent example of external involvement in terms of its effects on the outcome of the struggle for power among internal factions. Although most similar historically to Cuba in its level of external involvement, the Dominican case demonstrates a much more active presence by the U.S. in the process of supporting various internal actors. Two lines of explanation seem credible in explaining this difference. First, although roughly comparable in a number of ways, Cuba and the Dominican Republic developed quite differently with respect to parties and political participation. Whereas Cuba had had a history during the twentieth century of political activity, with many parties and factions active in the political process, the Dominican political landscape was and had been a barren one. Moreover, there was a revolutionary tradition in Cuba dating back to the overthrow of Machado and an ideological tradition dating back to Marti. Although both Cuba and the Dominican Republic suffered under military dictatorships for many years prior to the outbreak of

insurgent activity, in the Dominican Republic politics was much more controlled; indeed, it was almost a total police state.

In contrast, Cuban politics generated more opportunities for legitimate opposition activity. There had been strong political parties which predated Batista and which remained as powerful ideological centers even during his regime. Thus, in Cuba there was a true insurgent movement which represented a broad based coalition, developed over time. In the Dominican case gangsterism and cliques were the dominant forms of opposition activity. Whereas in Cuba there were alternate political centers to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the "old regime," in the Dominican Republic the death of Trujillo led to wild scrambling amongst opponents who were relatively politically inexperienced. This instability in the Dominican case provided an almost irresistible opportunity for the U.S. to become involved, if only to assist the Dominicans to re-establish some political order in Dominican society.

This is closely related to the second line of explanation to which I referred above, viz., the dominant presence in the region of a paramount power which defined its interests in relation to anti-communism. Coming close on the heels of what was an apparent defeat for U.S. interests in Cuba, the conflict in the

Dominican Republic assumed even greater importance than it would have strictly on its own merits. During 1962, and especially after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the U.S. was determined not to have the Cuban experience repeated in the Dominican Republic. Hence it became directly involved in the internal political process by supporting particular candidates for President, interfering in the selection of members of the junta in 1962 and in the other ways previously mentioned. Taken together, the political instability in the Dominican Republic and the U.S.'s concern with communism led the U.S. to try to make the Dominican Republic a "showcase for democracy" in the Caribbean after the death of Trujillo. Indeed, in the period 1962-1965, the U.S. used the opportunities and challenges presented by the Dominican Republic to try to re-establish its credibility in all of Latin America; this coincided with the development of President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Thus, one of the important reasons for the different levels of involvement in the Cuban and Dominican cases is the very fact that the Cuban conflict had unfolded in the manner in which it did.

The effects of direct external involvement were different in the Cuban, Bolivian and Dominican cases. In terms of the framework outlined in Chapter Two,

U.S. involvement in Cuba was critical in affecting the "capabilities" and "will" of the insurgents and incumbents in the pre-power stage; the U.S.'s reaction to Castro's turn toward socialism helped to accelerate those changes; the configuration of the international system gave Cuba wider options. U.S. involvement in Bolivia, although not critical in affecting the capabilities or will of participants in the immediate pre-power stage, was essential to the success of the change effort itself after 1952. In the Dominican Republic the U.S. was an active participant in the conflict in the early years after Trujillo's demise but most particularly in 1965. The effect of this continuous interference, and ultimately intervention, was to block the return to power of the pro-Bosch forces in 1965 and to blunt the drive for political change in the Dominican Republic.⁴⁵

All cases cited in this study seem to indicate that within a regional sphere of influence the mere presence of a dominant power is a force to be reckoned with by participants in an internal conflict, both in terms of actual involvement and in terms of the potential for involvement which helps to shape the decision making processes of both insurgents and incumbents. The degree of involvement prior to the outbreak of a conflict

does appear to predict the level of concern on the part of the dominant power as to the course the internal conflict takes, although there seem to be no automatic rules which predict interventionary behavior. As the examination of the Cuban and other cases shows, international systemic factors are seen as crucial variables by the dominant power in its determination of how involved to become in support of factions in a conflict.

This finding reinforces the view developed in my study of the Cuban conflict that to understand the interplay between internal and external factors one needs to undertake a review of the structure and norms of the international system and any pertinent regional subsystems. This view is further reinforced by contemporary events in Central America in which it appears that an anti-communism reminiscent of the Cold War era has been resurrected as a concern of American policy makers and, therefore, has become a determinant of U.S. involvement in internal conflict.

One further finding, which although tentative is worthy of note, is that the ideological thrust of a movement or regime within a country undergoing internal conflict appears to be an important variable influencing the factions' success in obtaining external support or forestalling its use by the opposition. This seems to

hold true for the three cases discussed herein and for Guatemala as well. In my view, the ideological factor appears to be more important than the type of internal conflict (i.e., in a personnel as opposed to structural war) as a factor influencing external involvement.

What do the Dominican and Bolivian cases reveal as to whether Cuba was an exceptional case?

With regard to both the internal and external variables, the Cuban, Bolivian and Dominican cases (as well as the Guatemalan) share a number of common elements, including some degree of external dependence economically, a nationalist thrust, a lack of fixed ideology on the part of the insurgents, geographic proximity to a paramount regional power and a history of political instability. Yet, in each case the difference in the domestic economic, social and political environments fostered different connections to external parties.

Several elements of the Cuban case in particular seem to have helped to produce the result one finds -- that Cuba is a rare example of an insurgency which became socialist after achieving power. As I have argued in this dissertation, this anomaly is explained only by reference to the interplay between domestic and international factors. In particular, the Cuban insurgency appears to have unfolded as it did because of the leadership which Fidel Castro provided in mediating between

internal and external demands and needs. Moreover, Castro was fortunate to have inherited a well-functioning economy in a relatively bloodless struggle at a time when the Soviet Union was both motivated to provide, and capable of providing, economic and political assistance. Cuba does appear to have been exceptional insofar as it apparently disoriented the U.S. to the extent that intervention was too late and too weak to reverse the insurgency or to restore a more moderate regime.

Unlike much political turmoil in Latin America, Cuba stands as an example of a mass supported insurgency rather than a garden variety Latin American "palace" struggle. In this sense it is most comparable to the Dominican, Bolivian, Mexican and Guatemalan examples. It is also an example of a conflict in which the economic, social and political structures became nationalized and in which the real thrust for radical social change emanated from above. In this sense it bears some resemblance to the Russian, Chinese, Yugoslavian, Albanian and Vietnamese struggles.

In all of the cases considered in this dissertation the subject society in each case has been unable to escape the influence of the U.S. Although the present study has focused on Latin American internal conflict it is

fair to ask how applicable is this framework to other cases outside Latin America?

Chapter Two cites a number of examples of internal conflict in which external support appears to have been provided to factions in an internal conflict. Generally speaking, although I do not find most scholars typologies of internal conflict or revolution very useful,⁴⁶ one might expect that international factors as I have described them would assume relatively greater importance in three types of situations:

- 1) where there is a colonial situation and a war of national liberation takes place;⁴⁷
- 2) where there is a post-colonial situation in which external economic and political involvement may still be significant;
- 3) where, even in non-colonial situations, there is a high level of involvement by a predominant regional power or by neighboring states.

This study, and the history of Latin American political instability in this century, indicate that the influence of the U.S. has been so strong that, even in cases where direct external support has been weak or non-existent, the U.S. and its potential reactions to the conflict have been a matter of concern for both insurgent and incumbent factions. In other areas of

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the world where such regional variables do not exist, the relative influence of international factors may vary considerably. Furthermore, as Regis Debray contends, "unlike the anti-colonialist wars in Asia and Africa, the American national liberation struggles have been preceded by a certain experience of political independence."⁴⁸ Hence, in Latin America the struggle against outside penetration does not take the form of a front against foreign forces of occupation but of a struggle against the dominant internal forces which are generally linked to the U.S. Midlarsky and Tanter suggest further that "violence and revolution may be explained in part by the U.S. economic presence as a linkage to the external environment."⁴⁹ Recent events in Central America appear to bear out at least the first of these two statements.

IV. SUMMARY

I began this study with a review of literature which focused on three aspects of social reality -- conflict, violence and change. In discussing the scholarly work on these subjects I noted that the international political aspects of internal conflict had been an under-researched area of study. Further review of international politics literature itself revealed that, although there were helpful studies on intervention and on the international law of internal

war, this literature did not entirely fill the gap. Accordingly, I attempted in Chapter Two to synthesize an approach which would allow one to examine the interplay between domestic and international elements in internal struggles.

The major case study, Cuba, and the other two mini-cases, Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, demonstrate the validity of this general approach. Although the framework itself has been shown to be lacking in some ways as a result of the case study analysis, the basic concept that one ought to study the international variables in internal conflict has been affirmed by each of the three cases, albeit in slightly different ways. Among other things, Cuba demonstrates the way in which international systemic factors may affect the outcome of an internal conflict. The Dominican study illustrates how, at various points in the course of a conflict, an external actor may assume equivalent status with internal actors. Bolivia shows how important a strong regional power can be, particularly when there is a historical foundation of intersocietal involvement between the regional power and the target state.

Although the contemporary literature is not blind to the potential influences which external factors may have, it is clear that there has been little emphasis on studies which attempt to bridge the gap between domestic and international explanations of conflict.

It is my view, which I believe the present study upholds, that external factors ought to be analyzed as potentially relevant in any serious internal struggle. Cuba, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and the recent events in Central America, as well as a number of other cases in the post-World War II era (Nigeria, Angola, Greece, etc.) support the view that internal conditions, external environment and the actions of outside parties are interconnected. This is particularly true in the present age in which communications have flourished, distances have disappeared and interdependencies have increased.

Accordingly, although one should commence a study of internal conflict by examining structural features of the subject society (economic, social, political, ideological) and motivational factors affecting the behavior of internal actors, one should also examine the degree to which other societies are connected to this internal structure and to the groups which act within it, the structure and norms of the international system itself, and the attempts by external actors to influence developments in the society undergoing conflict. The degree of influence which these linkages may have should be a matter for empirical investigation in a given case rather than being assumed to be unimportant, as traditionally scholars have tended to do, or being assumed to be a given, as international relations specialists have often done without examining the interplay between the domestic

and international aspects.

What is required to move forward in this spirit are other studies which use some sort of dual domestic/international framework for analysis. This dissertation has attempted to develop one such approach in order to help answer the question: how does one determine the impact of international factors generally in internal conflict? Of necessity this attempt at "pre-theoretical development precedes the question: how important are international factors generally in internal conflict?

To determine whether the findings of this dissertation are broadly applicable to the general study of internal war one should examine a large number of cases of civil strife in comparative historical perspective. One may wish to do this in any event to discover whether the internal/international linkages which I have found in these few cases are a new phenomenon, resulting from changes in either the international system or in the nature of internal systems, or whether such linkages have been prevalent throughout the history of internal struggle but have increased in importance recently. Although there is absolutely no way to prove in a dissertation such as this one, within the constraints I have established for myself, that the international dimensions of civil conflict have become more important than they once were, it is my sense of the contemporary world situation that international factors have indeed

assumed greater significance. As other studies are undertaken, the historical development of each particular conflict must be examined in its own right. But it ought to be done with more sensitivity to the international dimensions than has traditionally been exercised. It is only through empirical approaches that treat the boundary lines between domestic and international social reality as being porous and somewhat artificial, and which recognize politics as a seamless web of human activity, that future progress will be made in the study of internal conflict.

Footnotes

¹D.E.H. Russell, Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 25.

²Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 985.

³Fulgencio Batista, Cuba Betrayed (New York: Vantage, 1972), p. 94.

⁴Ramon Bonachea, The Overthrow of the Batista Regime, 1952-1958 (M.A. thesis, American University, 1970), p. 116.

⁵John Dunn, Modern Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 202.

⁶See Donald J. Goodspeed, The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'Etat (New York: Viking Press, 1961), p. 232. He notes that what the rebels need most upon seizing power is time. They must undertake diplomatic and political activity in order to consolidate their gains. "Once the insurgents have seized power they must strive for international recognition and support. Normally they do this by declarations of good will, by the offer of alliances, or sometimes by asking for the protection of interested nations or groups of nations." Goodspeed cites the example of the Bolsheviks making peace with Germany and appealing for support from the proletariat of the world.

⁷See Maurice Zeitlin and Robert Scheer, Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere (New York: Grove Press, 1963), Chapter Two. The authors argue that "U.S. policy acted both to change political attitudes among the Cuban leaders and to increase the probability that men already holding communist ... beliefs would move into positions of influence."

⁸Samuel Farber, Revolution and Social Structure in Cuba, 1933-1959 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 1969), p. 417.

⁹George Kelly and Clifford W. Brown, Jr., eds., Struggles in the State: Sources and Patterns of World Revolution (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), p. 210.

¹⁰As noted previously, one can argue that the shift toward incorporation of communist elements in the regime occurred at least partly for domestic reasons (to consolidate domestic support) rather than solely to generate international support.

¹¹The hypothesis that leaders will try to maximize the advantages presented by the international milieu should not, however, be viewed as an absolute. That is to say that in their approach to the international environment, i.e., in their foreign policies, insurgents and incumbents alike will try to maximize these advantages. But the international political situation is not necessarily their only or primary concern. Other domestic goals may be important. In the Cuban case, the foreign relations of both the Batista regime and the rebel groups had this instrumental character. International politics became a concern of theirs in their internal struggle, but it was only one concern among many.

¹²Dunn, p. 202. Cf. Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, Cuba: The Making of a Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), p. 5. "International competition between Russia and the U.S. ... proved a decisive factor in the rupture of Cuban-U.S. relations" for it gave Castro alternatives denied previous rulers.

¹³Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1974), p. 217.

¹⁴Joseph P. Morray, The Second Revolution in Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1962), p. 83.

¹⁵Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California, 1972), p. 43.

¹⁶Halperin, p. 4.

¹⁷It is not my intention to diminish the importance of U.S. vacillation or confusion in 1958 and 1959, or to de-emphasize other determinants of U.S. policy, but merely to note that norms played some role.

¹⁸As Gonzalez argues, "Even the extraordinary Castro has been limited by the opportunities and limits of the external environment," p. 14.

¹⁹Halperin argues that "A proper perspective on the great anomaly that is the Cuban Revolution requires ... explanation of the domestic and international environment in which Fidel Castro sailed his ship of state," p. 37.

²⁰See Peter Calvert, Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 175, for the opposite argument. Kelly also argues this position, p. 216. "Time must usually elapse before the nature and direction of an internal war become clear; not until then can policy makers abroad identify both their own and their

competitors' stake in the conflict."

²¹Thomas H. Greene concludes that "Batista's inability to marshall greater support was critical," Comparative Revolutionary Movements (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 98.

²²Gonzalez concludes that the U.S. "provided an external enemy for mobilization and an excuse for turning to the Soviets," p. 23.

²³Boris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), p. 293.

²⁴See Ruiz, p. 4, and Andres Suarez, Cuba, Castro and Communism, 1959-1966 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), p. 64.

²⁵Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), p. 170.

²⁶Philip W. Bonsal, "Cuba, Castro and the United States," Foreign Affairs 45:2 (January 1967): 270. Morray concludes that "The history of the maturing Cuban Revolution would have been slower and rougher had the U.S. not accelerated it by trying to reverse it," p. 93.

²⁷Regis Debray, "Castroism: The Long March in Latin America," New Left Review 33 (September/October 1965): 17-58.

²⁸John H. Herz, The Nation State and the Crisis of World Politics (New York: McKay, 1976), p. 86.

²⁹Calvert, p. 80.

³⁰Halperin, p. 71.

³¹C.R. Mitchell, "Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties," International Studies Quarterly 14 (June 1970): 166-194.

³²Richard A. Falk, ed., The International Law of Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1972), pp. 23-24.

³³The major sources consulted on the Dominican case were: Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Juan Bosch, The Unfinished Experiment: Democracy in the Dominican Republic (New York: Praeger Publishers,

1965); Jeremy Slater, Intervention and Negotiation (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); Howard J. Wiarda, The Dominican Republic: Nation in Transition (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969); Jesus de Galindez, The Era of Trujillo (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona Press, 1973); Dan Kurzman, Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965); Eugenio Chang Rodriguez, ed., The Lingering Crisis: A Case Study of the Dominican Republic (New York: Las Americas Publishing Company, 1969); Theodore Draper, "The Dominican Crisis: A Case Study in American Policy," Commentary 40:6 (December 1965): 33-71; F. Parkinson, Latin America, the Cold War and the World Powers, 1945-1973 (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1974); Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., eds., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Aprad von Lazar and Robert R. Kaufamn, eds., Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969); John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken By Events: The Dominican Crisis From the Fall of Trujillo to Civil War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966); and Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1968).

³⁴The major sources consulted on the Bolivian conflict were: James M. Molloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971); Mostafa Rejai, The Strategy of Political Revolution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973); Robert J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958); Alberto Ostria Gutierrez, The Tragedy of Bolivia (New York: Devon Adair, 1958); Victor Andrade, My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, 1944-1962 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976); Herbert S. Klein, Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); James M. Molloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970); and Eldon Wayne Lanning, The Bolivian Revolution of 1952 and the Cuban Revolution of 1959 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1965).

³⁵Wiarda, p. 40.

³⁶Barnet, p. 153.

³⁷Rejai, p. 66.

³⁸Cole Blasier, "The U.S. and the Revolution," in Molloy and Thorn, p. 65; see also Richard S. Thorn in the same volume, "The Economic Transformation," p. 169.

³⁹Blasier, p. 99.

⁴⁰Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 332.

⁴¹See Rejai, pp. 57 and 67; Molloy, p. 5 and Klein, p. 238.

⁴²Huntington, p. 332.

⁴³Martin, p. 48, indicates that in the period from 1946 to 1961 the U.S. supplied only \$5 million in non-military aid. In 1962 and 1963 the U.S. supplied approximately \$70 million and in the period immediately following the fall of Bosch over \$100 million.

⁴⁴According to Barnet "The American presence ... in 1962 completely dominated the politics and economics of the unhappy island," p. 159.

⁴⁵Edwin Brown Firmage argues that "without American intervention, the Constitutionists would likely have been successful in unseating the right wing government," "National Liberation and the Third World," in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, ed. John Norton Moore (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1974), p. 336.

⁴⁶Some of the more interesting, if still unsatisfying, typologies can be found in Moore, Falk, and Evan Luard, ed., The International Regulation of Civil War (New York: New York University Press, 1972).

⁴⁷On the differences between nationalist struggles and other internal conflicts see Pitirim Sorokin, The Sociology of Revolution (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967); Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1971); D.E.H. Russell; and Katherine Chorley, Armies and the Art of Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).

⁴⁸Regis Debray; see also Kelly and Brown, p. 477.

⁴⁹Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "Toward a Theory of Political Instability in Latin America," in Anger Violence and Politics, ed. Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend and Ted Robert Gurr (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 244.

APPENDIX I

TYPES OF INTERSOCIETAL INVOLVEMENT: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In order to clarify how discrete external factors influence internal conflicts, I present below an analysis of types of interactions which occur between societies. It is my view that to study specific external inputs into internal conflict, one should examine degrees and types of involvement between groups in different societies. To set the stage for analysis of the impact which discrete external factors have on internal conflict, I discuss below a number of concepts used in international relations to describe the interactions which occur between societies, e.g., influence, interference, intervention, penetration, interdependence, etc.

One major challenge facing analysts of international politics is the development of theories which explain the behavior of actors in relation to each other. Systemic theorists focus on the international system itself as the prime determinant of state behavior. Other writers have focused more closely on the internal factors accounting for the foreign policy behavior of single entities. In my view, both perspectives provide only partial explanations of key transactions which lie at the heart of intersocietal

relations -- influence relations. In order to explore these relations, I shall focus on interactions between actors in one society and those in another. My conception of international relations thus encompasses the totality of relations between entities in one state and entities in others. The political aspect of those relations involves the attempts of these entities (be they supranational, national, governmental, sub-governmental or even individual) to influence entities in other societies.

There are a number of ways one may conceptualize relations which cross territorial lines. Traditionally, political analysts have stressed government to government relations as the most significant aspect of intersocietal relations. In this view, one might speak of "the U.S." acting and "China" reacting; and one might search for explanations of these actions and responses based on the assumption that "the U.S." and "China" act to maximize the achievement of their goals. This concept has served fairly well in describing historical eras in which the number of actors and interactions have been limited, and the contacts themselves have been primarily inter-governmental, e.g., the 19th Century "Balance of Power" system.

Although still useful as a shorthand technique for conveying information quickly, this approach has several drawbacks in the present era. First, although

it may generally be understood that when one speaks of "the U.S." acting one means that the legitimate representatives of the U.S. government act in the name of society, this usage tends to de-emphasize the role played by the sub-governmental entities in the domestic system of the "actor", e.g., the activities of various, and often competing, groups within the government itself and others in the society at large. Thus, the traditional view tends to treat the state as an entity whose sole legitimate spokesmen are the top level officials within the government. In addition, there is a tendency among theorists of this school to view the output of the state itself, i.e., its foreign policy, as a rational, or at least calculated, response to external stimuli rather than as a result of an internal political process involving a mix of internal actors, goals, etc.

The utility of traditional, rational actor models has been called into question recently by students of foreign policy who have paid greater attention to the process of decision making within government. Factors such as role, personality, bureaucratic politics, national political culture, etc., have been introduced into models of foreign policy and international relations as we have become more aware of their potential impact on the decisions, policies and actions taken in the name of the state. Furthermore, there has developed

both a greater awareness of sub-governmental, cross-territorial interactions ("transnationalism" in the new vernacular) and probably a net increase in these types of interaction between societies.¹ Thus, both the "state as sole actor" assumption and the "state as unitary actor" assumption of earlier theorists have been called into question as a result of perceived changes in the national and international phenomena they purport to describe. The result has been a more complex view of how societies interact, although one that is as yet rather incomplete.

In the following discussion, I attempt to incorporate elements of this more complex view as I examine the types of relations between societies. As a simplifying device, however, I ask the reader to picture a dyad (composed of societies A and B) and to explore the ways in which the units comprising it may interact.

To begin, one may look at the volume of transactions between the members of one society and those in another. These might include such things as communications (letters, broadcasts, verbal exchanges), economic interactions (trade, aid), and military activity (support through training, arms, or money; invasion; war). Scales might then be constructed to measure the volume of transactions for each type of activity. Having done this, one might be in a position to evaluate more effectively the level of intersocietal involvement.

Conceivably, on such a scale two societies might be relatively uninvolved with each other, moderately involved or very involved. These degrees of involvement, moreover, could apply in one area, e.g., travel, cultural exchange, etc., trade and military aid; or for most types of interaction.

Having conceptualized intersocietal involvement in this manner, one might then try to identify the entities internal to the societies who actually interact with each other. One might find that there may be many sources of boundary crossing behavior and that not all of them will be governmental. For example, pressure groups within a society may have ties to groups elsewhere, e.g., Jews and Irish Catholics in the U.S. with Jews in Israel and Catholics in Ireland, respectively. Because these links are potentially important, and because there is no assurance that all groups in a society will "push" in the same direction regarding a state's foreign policy, it becomes important to identify within the society the entities whose activities cross the society's boundary. Clearly, this is an empirical question and not one for which an easy assumption about actors serves us well.

Once one has specified the actors, one may then explore: (1) their goals with regard to actors and processes within other societies; (2) the means they employ (techniques and resources) in order to achieve

those goals; and (3) the targets of their actions in the other society.

In general, one may study the interactions between societies with reference to two sets of concerns: (1) the attempts by actors in A and B to influence each other; and (2) the effects these activities have on the intended target. There are two aspects, moreover, of any international relationship which are significant: (1) the deliberate action, and (2) the consequences (both intended and unintended). The "deliberate" factors include all types of behavior whose conscious aim is to influence actors or processes in another society. Such influence attempts are at the heart of the international political process. In my view, they are the essential element in all intersocietal interactions.

In addition to these "deliberate" aspects, however, one must examine both the consequences of attempts to influence others and the eventual outcomes of the interactions, i.e., the actual effects of A's initiatives on the behavior of B. These consequences may be of two types -- the intended and the unintended. With regard to the former, one searches for evidence that B's behavior coincides with A's preferences. Such evidence may be taken as an indication (though not a foolproof one) that A has been successful in achieving its goals vis-a-vis B's behavior. The unintended consequences,

on the other hand, are those outcomes which are different from what A intended; the result of activity in A not consciously directed at targets in A; or the responses of B based on anticipation of A's behavior, or on misperception of that behavior, or of the intentions of A.²

Thus, we may posit the notion that when A tries to influence B, B responds by being influenced or not influenced. But B may be affected by developments within A that are not aimed directly at B, as in the case of an interdependency or linkage, and hence may act in response to that factor.³ Moreover, B may act without any prior action by A, simply because it calculates that A wishes it to act in that way. Also, there are obvious problems involved in operationalizing the notion of intersocietal influence in a world with many actors. One is never quite sure to which stimulus a nation is responding. Influence, therefore, becomes difficult to trace or to prove. Nonetheless, the distinction between attempts to influence and the results of those attempts appears to be sound when one is exploring the character of intersocietal relations.

To clarify further the concept of influence relations between societies, I offer a continuum of intersocietal involvement (Diagram 1), based on four factors -- actors, ends, means and targets. This continuum will be used to examine the variety of ways

in which societies may influence each other, and to clarify the often confusing terminology regarding intersocietal involvement.

The continuum below depicts variations in degrees of involvement between two societies.⁴ On the left end of the spectrum, one finds little or no interaction between entities within each of the societies. On the other extreme, one finds so high a level of involvement that one society becomes incorporated within the other. In between, one finds a number of degrees and forms of involvement, including points on the continuum I have labelled "influence," "interference," "intervention," and "penetration". In general, one may assume that the "normal" relations between societies fall generally within the category of "influence" relations.

/ non-involvement / influence / interference / intervention / penetration / annexation

A. Non-involvement: this term implies that societies have little or no direct diplomatic, economic or other contact. States which do not recognize each other are one example.⁵ This condition is relatively more likely to occur in ages in which transportation is a problem. In this century, therefore, "non-involvement" is rather uncommon generally, although it may characterize the relations between any two states. Non-involvement may, nonetheless, be an accurate description of relationships of small states with limited resources who cannot interact heavily with more than a few other states, e.g., the ministates.

B. Influence: Moving to the right on the continuum, one finds increased interaction between societies in several areas -- diplomatic contact, trade, aid, communications, travel, etc. Here one might speak of the basic influence relations which characterize inter-societal contacts. "Influence" in my framework involves the use of traditional diplomatic channels and techniques (recognition, negotiation, alliance formation, notes, verbal protests, ambassadorial contacts, press releases, public statements, etc.) and of well recognized economic instruments such as trade and foreign aid. Generally, influence relations involve non-violent, non-coercive initiatives by actors in one society which are aimed at changing or reinforcing actors, policies or political/

economic processes in a "target state".

With regard to "actors" and "influence", one might argue that within a given state several types of entities may become intersocietal actors. These include:

- 1) The administration of the established government, which is likely to control the greatest resources which may be used to affect the behavior of groups in other societies;
- 2) groups within the government, such as the military, the intelligence community (e.g., CIA, KGB), the political elites (legislators especially), the civilian bureaucracy, etc.;
- 3) groups outside government, including parties, unions, corporations, and academic, religious, professional and ideological groups, many of which are likely to have contacts with groups in other societies; and
- 4) individuals outside government whose wealth or prestige makes them potentially important as intersocietal actors.

Influence relations are a function, in part, of the resources, both material and non-material, which actors have available for use in boundary crossing transactions with actors in other societies. Although much of what concerns us as analysts of international politics centers on the behavior of those with the most resources -- governmental leaders -- in many cases sub-

governmental and non-governmental actors have sufficient resources to function as effective actors in inter-societal relations. In a sense then, one may speak of the U.S. Treasury Department, ITT, the Mafia, insurgent groups, parties, etc. as having their own "foreign policies," insofar as they interact with and attempt to influence groups in other societies in their own internal competitions for power with other groups.

With respect to goals, one may argue that influence relations are characterized by limited goals. Generally, one may divide these goals into two categories:

- 1) those which attempt to influence the foreign policy outputs of actors in another society; and
- 2) those aimed at influencing domestic policies in that society.

For example, state A's representatives may wish to alter the policy of state B's representatives vis-a-vis A or towards a third party, C. This is an illustration of a foreign policy influence attempt. Or state A may want to change the balance of forces within the government of society B, e.g., by influencing an election or the strength of a party or element within the government, such as the military over the diplomatic service, etc. These are examples of domestic policy influence attempts.

Although no definitive line may be drawn between foreign and domestic policy, there is some merit in trying to separate them as targets for outside actors.

With regard to foreign policy influence attempts, the goal of actors in A is to affect B's outputs into the international environment in such a way that B's policies are in line with A's preferences.⁶ With respect to domestic policy influence attempts, on the other hand, A's motives center on the: a) existing internal policies of the target society; or b) conditions within the society, (such as actions taken to strengthen or weaken one economic, political, religious or ethnic group in relation to others in the society). In both foreign and domestic influence attempts, the outside actor may act to change or reinforce actors, policies, processes or conditions.

Regarding the goal-related distinctions between influence and other concepts on the spectrum,⁷ I would argue that as one moves from left to right, the scope of A's goals vis-a-vis B will widen. Whereas in a situation of non-involvement, A's goals are very limited, in an influence situation A has more B-related goals.

Moving further to the right, A's goals in relation to B will extend deeper into the domestic realm.⁸ Whereas a "goal" is a condition desired by an outside actor; a "target" refers to an actor, policy, process or condition⁹ in another society at which initiatives are aimed. Thus, to achieve a goal such as increased trade, for example, society A's actors may seek to influence specific actors in society B who are respon-

sible for decisions regarding the lowering of tariff barriers. Most goals have implied targets to which initiatives are directed, and these are generally governmental. Yet, the universe of likely targets within a society may include: the legitimate government, other elites (press, labor, parties, business), and various segments of the public (ethnic groups, religious organizations, etc.) all of whom may have some leverage in the internal political processes of the target society.

Whereas in what I have called "normal influence relations" between societies, actors in each society tend to restrict their initiatives to their counterparts in other societies, as one moves toward "interference" one notes an increase in the range of targets in which the external actor is interested and sees as appropriate. Thus, as one moves further to the right on the continuum, the frequency with which actors in A attempt to influence the sub-governmental and non-governmental entities in B increases. In Rosenau's terms, actors become involved in "tradition breaking" encounters with actors to whom they normally do not relate. For example, agents of A seeking to change B's policy in some area may try first to influence the legitimate rulers, then, if unsuccessful, the opposition within government or forces outside the government who might be amenable to the changes

With regard to the means used by external actors to achieve their goals there are also significant changes as one moves to the right on the scale. The resources and techniques which actors in A use to influence actors in B will change quantitatively and qualitatively. For example, whereas in influence situations, actors in A tend to restrict their use of instruments to the standard repertoire of diplomacy, in interference situations one finds greater physical presence of A's agents in B, including evidence of subversion and espionage to affect actors in B directly. In general, this also represents an escalation of the coercive element among the means applied. As one moves toward intervention, the means used become less political and economic and more directly military. In a fully penetrated system, military, economic and political involvement are at a very high level. In annexation, conquest and/or colonization situations, A's agents not only influence the actors, policies and processes within B, but directly control them through the threat or application of extreme coercive measures.

The continuum I have presented depicts increasing activity across national boundaries, by a variety of actors (governmental, sub-governmental and non-governmental)¹¹ whose goals may include changing (or maintaining) either or both the foreign policy or the domestic policy of another society.

As one moves from left to right on this scale, one finds:

- 1) that with regard to actors no strong generalization may be made, except that there are now many actors within societies who have the potential to affect actors in other societies, that for the most part governments have the highest potential to be influential, and that as one moves toward intervention, penetration and annexation it is increasingly likely that the important external actors will be almost exclusively governmental;
- 2) that the goals of outsiders become less limited to influencing foreign policy and more concerned with altering domestic policies. One may, therefore, speak of a widening scope of outsiders' goals vis-a-vis the target state;
- 3) that there is an expansion in the range of targets which outsiders see as appropriate, and an increase in activity which diverges from past patterns of behavior between the actors in the two societies (e.g., increasing interaction with actors other than one's counterparts, with other than governmental actors, etc.); and
- 4) that there is both an application of greater resources and the use of different types of resources by A or B, especially in the direction

of increased coerciveness.

As is true of most continua, there are no firm dividing lines between categories. Some authors reject such attempts to differentiate normal diplomatic relations, for example, from such phenomena as interference and intervention. Cottam, for one, contends that this effort is "not only futile, but tends to obscure the important point that there is a continuum from slight to intensive interference."¹² Howard Wriggins suggests, on the other hand, that there are important differences; he distinguishes influence relations from intervention by the test of whether one state has its agents in another's territory and whether they act coercively. J.H. Leurdijk proposes a much broader definition for intervention, arguing that it refers to "any act that invades the theoretical sphere of action of states.... Intervention is a structural aspect of international politics."¹³ Despite the wealth of definitional activity, however, it is fair to say that, "the literature has long suffered from the absence of a clear distinction between intervention and the other types of influence attempts."¹⁴ Much the same holds true for interference and the other concepts which I shall discuss below.

C. Interference: Is there a way to distinguish "influence relations" from "interference"? Considering "means"

first, I would argue that "interference" includes:

- 1) the use of propaganda aimed at the general public and specific elites in the target state (e.g., Radio Free Europe, Toyko Rose, etc.);
- 2) the infiltration of groups within the society (by outside agents) for the purpose of leading or supporting subversive action against the incumbent regime (as in U.S. C.I.A. involvement in Chile, Iran and elsewhere); and
- 3) the actions of foreign aid officers acting directly in another country (USAID, UNDP, etc.) with or without invitation.

Interference is distinguished from simple influence relations by the physical presence of the external society's agents in the target society (excluding traditional diplomatic representatives, unless they double as spies).¹⁵ Interference may occur either when an outside state tries to influence developments in the society directly by invitation of the incumbent government or when outside actors undertake such direct activities on their own initiative.

Concerning goals, the move along the continuum from influence to interference implies the external actor's increased emphasis on influencing domestic policies. Thus, "interference" is defined for the purposes of this study as a direct effort by external forces to alter the relative power positions of internal actors

in the target society. Interference may be:

- 1) invited or uninvited (and either of these by incumbents or their opposition);
- 2) overt or covert (aid as opposed to sabotage or terror); and
- 3) formal or informal (undertaken by external governmental or non-governmental actors).

As in the case of influence relations, it is not critical whether the goal of the external party is to change or to maintain a regime's behavior or its composition. Interference may occur in either situation.

In contrast, the traditional view of interference accords greater legitimacy to external initiatives which provide support to incumbents, no matter how directly the outside parties become involved. In this notion, interference occurs only when an outside actor supplies money or material to opposition groups in another society, especially when those groups have explicitly stated aims regarding the use of violence to achieve change in their society. This usage coincides roughly with the common conception of interference as one state's "meddling" in the "internal" affairs of another. This view carries with it an implied norm prohibiting outside actors from attempting to influence such "internal affairs," and hence interference has only negative connotations. In my definition, it is much more value free.

D. Intervention: Thus far, my argument is that influence and interference are distinguished primarily by the physical presence (in the latter case) of external agents who undertake activities directly in the target society with the intention of altering the relative power positions of actors in the domestic contest for power. The external actor attempts to affect the policies in another society by acting directly on the actors who make them.

How, then, does one differentiate between "interference" and "intervention"?¹⁶ Richard Falk classifies intervention as "conduct with an external animus that intends to achieve a fundamental alteration of the state of affairs in the target nation."¹⁷ Manfred Halperin argues that "Intervention is any action, beginning with deliberate remediable interaction among nations, that significantly affects the public internal realm of another state and which stops short of aggressive crossing of international frontiers."¹⁸ In contrast, C.R. Mitchell defines intervention as "any military act undertaken by a state, within or outside state lines, which is calculated to affect one or another factions in civil strife."¹⁹ Max Beloff contends that it is an attempt by one state to affect the internal structure and external behavior of other states through various degrees of coercion.²⁰ And Oran Young argues that intervention is organized, systematic activity directed across recog-

nized boundaries and aimed at affecting the "political authority structures" of another state, but not merely its policies.²¹

This brief survey reveals clearly that "'intervention' suffers from from a lack of definitional clarity The line that differentiates the presence of intervention from its absence remains elusive."²² Recent attempts have focused on the coercive or dictatorial aspects of the phenomenon, i.e., it is argued that intervention occurs when the affairs of one state are altered against its will by external actors. Thus, some theorists have tried to define intervention by the degree of compulsion in the relationship rather than on the basis of the use of force itself.²³ However, this approach leads again to the problem of distinguishing between intervention and influence. Moreover, none of this is very helpful in identifying an act of intervention, since one must try to evaluate and measure such things as "will".

Because of the problems surrounding this concept, a more limited operational definition is required.²⁴ One interesting possibility is offered by Rosenau. In his view, most definitions of intervention share two features: 1) that the behavior itself represents a sharp break with existing patterns of interaction between the particular actors in question; and 2) that such behavior is always directed at changing or preserving the "struc-

ture of political authority" within the target state. With regard to the first point, most theorists agree that interventions are finite acts with temporary time spans. They are, moreover, what Rosenau calls "convention breaking" and therefore readily recognizable. On the second count, intervention occurs, according to Rosenau, only when the convention breaking behavior is directed at either of two targets: A) the recognized decision makers for a society; or B) the processes by which such decisions are made. According to Rosenau, an act must be both convention breaking and directed at the political process in order for it to be intervention.

This formulation excludes behavior by outside actors which aims at changing policies or capabilities rather than authority structures. Yet, it is unclear how one would determine in practice whether an outside actor's behavior is directed at policies, processes, conditions, actors or some mix of them. Furthermore, if one adopts the Rosenau framework, one can only show that intervention has occurred by comparing the act in question with the pattern of interaction which existed previously between the actors.

By building on the notion that intervention is a discrete, time-bound act -- one with a beginning and an end -- one might, according to Rosenau, help to distinguish intervention from influence.²⁵ A second key element of the definition is the military aspect of

intervention. In my view, intervention involves the large scale movement of troops or armed men (or bombs or missiles) across state borders. This serves to distinguish it from interference. Intervention, therefore, is a physical act undertaken by the military agents of one society invading another society, regardless of the reason. As such, it may be overt or covert, and invited or uninvited. Intervention is virtually indistinguishable from "aggression" (itself an imprecise term), except insofar as aggression is, by definition, uninvited by the legal rulers of the target state.²⁶

With reference to the four variables (actors/ends/target/means), intervention is:

- 1) undertaken by any outside actor, though most often by an external government's agents;
- 2) difficult to distinguish solely on the basis of the external actor's goals from other forms of involvement;
- 3) characterized by targets which are numerous, but which center on the relative power positions of key internal actors in their internal struggle for control of the political processes of the society; and
- 4) distinguished by the means employed across state borders -- predominantly military.

E. Penetration: Popularized by Rosenau, Scott, Herz and others, the term "penetration" has been used in various ways. Rosenau defines it as the long-term, regularized and sanctioned participation of one state in the decision making processes of another, a definition close to the one used in this study.²⁷ In his view, penetration goes beyond interference and intervention because the outside agent participates directly in the policy making processes of the other society as an accepted part of those processes. A penetrated society does, however, maintain a national identity while sharing decision making power with outsiders. This distinguishes penetration from relationships in which the outside actor totally dominates the target society, such as conquest and annexation. Modern examples of penetrated systems are the occupied territories after the Second World War and the Soviet satellite states. According to Rosenau, a society may be penetrated with regard to a single issue area (e.g., the economic) or with respect to many issues.

In contrast, Andrew M. Scott treats penetration as a more widespread phenomenon, citing the increase in "informal access" which outsiders now have in others' political systems.²⁸ In his view, the porousness of national boundaries allows members of external groups, (including governmental, quasi-governmental, non-governmental, and international governmental) to reach into

other societies. They do so through economic and military aid, technical assistance, training, counter-insurgency, cultural exchange, intelligence gathering, formation of front groups, sabotage, etc. Scott claims that states have come to rely on these types of techniques and less on traditional diplomatic channels to influence other societies' domestic affairs.

Whereas Scott is concerned with the "revolution in statecraft" and Rosenau deals with the concept on an issue basis, John Herz examines penetration as a boundary piercing phenomenon with systemic ramifications.²⁹ He argues that economic and technological developments have signalled the end of the "hard shell" territorial state. Examples are:

- 1) psychological warfare as used by the Communist powers and German Nazi regime;
- 2) technological penetration through spying and missile technology;
- 3) economic penetration through aid programs; and
- 4) political penetration by assistance given to insurgent forces in other societies (by recognition, military aid, etc.) and/or penetration of the top levels of political leadership through bribery.³⁰

Herz also cites "counter-penetration", in which outsiders attempt to shore up incumbent regimes, e.g., through defense agreements, military aid, training, currency

arrangements, trade relations, etc.³¹

In my view there are good reasons to choose a more limited definition than has been presented thus far. The illustrations presented by Herz and Scott, for example, can be subsumed under "interference" as described previously. One may then reserve the term "penetration" to describe relations among actors in which there is both a high degree of inter-societal involvement and a high degree of external control of an actor on an ongoing basis.

In my view, penetration is likely to involve the establishment of bases in the target state. In addition, means other than military are likely to be employed. Penetration is distinguished from intervention, however, by the relatively longer time span which characterizes it. And whereas intervention is a military venture designed to affect policies of another state, penetration involves external actors directly in the on-going political processes of the target state, including the formulation and implementation of domestic policy. Thus, penetrators are likely to seek to control the political process in another society, either in cooperation with existing authorities or by superseding them.

A final factor in a penetrated relationship is the acceptance of external participation by the dominant elements of the target society, either by choice (as in a patron-client relationship), or by necessity (as when

a high degree of inter-societal dependency exists). This conception differs from Rosenau's in that I assume that there is a high degree of inter-societal control, rather than mere participation, and that the control will extend beyond a single issue area.

In my framework, a penetrated system is one in which the target state is dependent on the penetrator.³² A penetrated society, therefore, would retain its formal sovereignty (and possibly its existing governmental structure), but would sacrifice some decision making autonomy to an external actor.³³

Outside actors would act directly and officially in the decision processes of the target state, and the elites of the society would exercise broad tolerance of such control. Penetration may be distinguished from other more extreme forms of intersocietal involvement such as annexation or colonization on the grounds that the latter imply a denial of the sovereignty of the target area. For example, whereas satellites are independent territorial units with their own governments, colonies and conquered territories have non-indigenous regimes imposed on them.

The most extreme form of intersocietal involvement is outright conquest and/or annexation. In such cases, one society literally swallows up another, and the reins of political control pass completely into outside hands. Formal sovereignty of the dominated area passes directly

to the government of the conquering state. The external actor will then incorporate that area into its own governmental structure (if a neighboring state) or subject the territory to an imposed government. This is generally done by a combination of coercive and non-coercive techniques applied to reconstituting the political authority structure of the conquered area.³⁴

F. Other forms of intersocietal involvement: The question of dependency itself is closely related to the two variables of involvement and control. In the literature, these problems are dealt with under various headings, including "imperialism", "colonialism", "dependencia", etc.. There is often overlap, moreover, with other concepts such as interdependence and linkage, and some confusion regarding distinctions between all the above concepts and the ones I have focused on in this Appendix -- influence, interference and intervention. Thus, some final clarification is in order.

At the heart of this problem is an empirical reality -- what Tucker calls "the inequality of nations."³⁵ As documented by Spiegal, Vital, Singer and others, and as confirmed by our daily existence, all actors in international politics are not equal.³⁶ There are international power hierarchies, based on actors capabilities and their effectiveness in using them. Resource disparities and asymmetries strongly

condition how any two units will interact. Hence, the theoretical treatment of intersocietal relations between my imaginary dyad A-B should be considered in light of unequal capabilities (or power) between them. Because societies are not equally endowed they have varying degrees of independence or "autonomy" (defined as the ability to control internal decision making and implementation regardless of outside influences).³⁷

Most functional definitions of "independence" posit a high degree of freedom of action in relation to external actors. Yet, there is no absolute independence in a global international system which is linked by trade, travel, communication and strategic interdependence. Even superpowers are constrained -- by each other and by an inability to control all factors in their external environment. Of course, the dependence of societies on each other is not entirely new;³⁸ historically, societies have annexed others or controlled areas through colonization. Even in this century, informal control has been exercised by outsiders through mandates, protectorates and spheres of influence.

However, whereas there was formerly more direct political control by external actors, in the current system this has given way to what Spiegel calls a "global influence race"³⁹ among a proliferation of nominally sovereign units which are not self-sufficient economically, militarily, or even politically. As a result

of technological developments, new techniques have altered the ways in which actors affect others in different societies. In addition, societies appear to have become more nationalistic while becoming ever more porous to direct participation by outsiders in internal processes, more vulnerable to outside influences, and often more dependent on outside support.⁴⁰

Closely related to these problems are those of "interdependence". This is a generic term which describes mutual dependence.⁴¹ Despite its current popularity, however, "interdependence" is not a precise concept with clear empirical referents. As Rosenau contends, "the concept is presumed to refer to any phenomenon in one system, the functioning of which cannot occur without some events or processes occurring in one or more other systems."⁴² All intersocietal relations involve mutual dependence to some degree, and it is the degree which is important.

One way to approach the concept is to examine the perceived and actual needs which actors have for support from others. Spiegal argues, for example, that societies with the most resources are generally "suppliers" for those with less, the "consumers".⁴³ Similarly, Klaus Knorr suggests that societies have become more dependent on the importation of foreign military technology, fuel, raw materials, etc., and as a result dependencies have increased.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, the

literature has not progressed much beyond such assertions. Interdependence does not explain why or how actors behave as they do in the international system, except insofar as it may, in greater or lesser degrees systemwide, constrain or provide opportunities for a state to act internationally.

G. Summary: The formulations presented above are provided to help clarify the range of intersocietal relations. It is my contention that classifying the type of intersocietal involvement is an important technique in understanding discrete external effects on a revolution. At the outset, I called it a scale of "degrees of intersocietal involvement" and asked the reader to use it to explore the types of interaction which coincide with various degrees of involvement. As I have shown, however, measuring the level of activity alone does not suffice. One must, in addition, try to specify the degrees of control which characterize different types of relationships. Thus, one might extend the analysis further to produce two scales -- one to measure intersocietal involvement (relating to the volume of activity to types of behavior such as influence, interference, etc.), and a second scale to measure degrees of control and dependence between actors in different societies. One might still employ the four factors I have used -- actors, ends, targets, and means -- to

describe the actual behavior related to levels of activity and degrees of control.

For the purposes of this study, however, I have tried to incorporate both elements in the one scale, i.e., control and dependency within the category of goals of participants. I have done so, moreover, in order to keep the discussion focused and to avoid unnecessary complexity. Despite the limitations of this framework, I believe it is a useful one. By using my scale in conjunction with the concept of dependence, one may begin to study the complex reality of inter-societal relations as they relate to internal conflict. My efforts to arrive at a more complete understanding of interstate activity has been motivated primarily by my desire to enhance the analysis of exogenous impacts on internal conflicts.

In my view, there is no way that societies in the present international system may escape the effects of other societies' behavior towards them, changes in external conditions not consciously directed at them, or even the general functioning of the international system. Thus, in order to understand internal conflicts more completely, we must take into account the many ways in which external influences make themselves felt.

Footnotes

¹See Andrew M. Scott, "The Logic of International Interaction," International Studies Quarterly 21:3 (September 1977): 429-60, and Karl Kaiser, "Toward a Theory of Multinational Politics," International Organization (Autumn 1971), pp. 790-818.

²The attempt to define and measure influence is a problem which has plagued political science. The difficulties are, indeed, formidable, even when one defines the term in a relatively clear fashion. For further discussion of these problems see Klaus Knorr, Power Among Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Robert Cox and Harold Jacobsen, The Anatomy of Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973); and Jeffrey Hart, "Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations," International Organization 30:2 (Spring 1976): 289-309.

³Scott explores these inadvertent consequences and shows that as the number of actors in a system increases, the patterns of influence and mutual dependence become more complicated. As the web of interactions between actors becomes more dense, it also becomes more effective as a transmission medium.

⁴To facilitate analysis, I have held systemic influences and indirect influences (through actions on third parties) constant. I look only at direct influences of A on B.

⁵Ironically, a low level of involvement may not necessarily mean that one society has no influence on the other. For example, the U.S. did not recognize the Chinese Communist regime for many years, but it did try to influence the behavior of that regime, e.g., through its actions in the UN. Thus, even in non-recognition situations actors may influence each other.

⁶Such attempts are often undertaken as insurance, since there is often considerable uncertainty about how others will behave.

⁷Cf. Harold Wriggins' argument that in influence relations the only agents of A in B are diplomatic; "involvement" connotes action in another state when the purposes of A and B are shared; "intervention" connotes activity in another society where purposes diverge and hostile action is taken. "Political Outcomes of Foreign Assistance: Influence, Involvement or Inter-

vention?," Journal of International Affairs (1968), p. 218.

⁸One always faces a methodological problem in analyzing goals of international actors because stated and actual goals may differ considerably. Thus, one cannot observe a goal per se. Rosenau argues that, "goals and attitudes can be inferred from observed behavior only crudely.... To be faced with the task of inferring whether an intervening actor really meant to behave coercively ... is to take on a staggering assignment." in "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 296.

⁹Technically, a target should either be an actor or have an actor as its agent. But an outside actor may be attempting to influence the target actor's behavior in his role, the person occupying that role, and/or the policies which are the outputs of the target state's political process. Or an outside actor may try to affect a condition in the society's economy, the way political authority is structured, etc.

¹⁰In an alternate view, one might focus on policies rather than actors as the ultimate target. This view, however, requires that one try to separate processes and actors as distinct kinds of targets. In my judgement, it seems more reasonable to assume that an outsider's goals relate to changing the target state's policies and decisions, but that the direct target is usually an actor responsible for those policies or decisions. For a different view, see Rosenau, who argues that the "authority structure" of the society is the target. Cf. R.J. Vincent, Non-Intervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), who distinguishes between domestic and foreign policies as targets.

¹¹Among the governmental actors one must include not only states but international organizations.

¹²See Richard Cottam, Competitive Interference and Twentieth Century Diplomacy (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University, 1967), p. 36. His ten point continuum of interference focuses on state behavior and on means. It ranges from what he calls "regular diplomatic channels," to propaganda, public statements aimed at incumbents and opposition, overt efforts to remove bureaucratic personnel from their positions, subversion, espionage to reduce the target state's capabilities

and direct use of force to alter a policy or replace leadership. This is a useful catalogue of instruments, but it treats unsystematically two essential elements which I emphasize in my framework, viz, actors and targets.

¹³J. Henk Leurdijk, "Civil War and Intervention in International Law," Netherlands International Law Review, 24:1/2 (1977): 143.

¹⁴James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Intervention as Adaptive Behavior," in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, ed. John Norton Moore (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins, 1974), p. 130.

¹⁵Andrew M. Scott cites infiltration, sabotage, terror, externally initiated coups, use of front groups, formal support for newspapers, unions, parties, etc. as mechanisms which outsiders use to gather intelligence, harass incumbent regimes, paralyze or dominate domestic politics, influence public opinion, seize power or annex the state. Cf. my own view that the latter two are examples of intervention -- not penetration or interference.

¹⁶The following discussion draws heavily upon James Rosenau's excellent, though by now dated, summary in "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," pp. 280-85.

¹⁷Richard Falk in Essays on Intervention, ed. Roland Stanger (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 47.

¹⁸Manfred Halperin, "The Morality and Politics of Intervention," in International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. James N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 252.

¹⁹C.M. Mitchell, "Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties," International Studies Quarterly 14 (June, 1970): 169. Mitchell distinguishes intervention from involvement on the basis that the latter includes actions of non-state actors.

²⁰Max Beloff, "Reflections on Intervention," Journal of International Affairs (1968), p. 198.

²¹Oran Young, "Intervention and the International System," Journal of International Affairs, 22:2 (1968): 177-188, and "Systemic Bases of Intervention," in Moore, pp. 11-26. With regard to the general concept Cf.

Talleyrand's assertion that non-intervention is a "mystical word that signifies roughly the same thing as intervention." A similar view is espoused by Halperin, p. 251, "Great powers intervene in other states by their sheer existence."

²²Rosenau, "Intervention," p. 283.

²³See Vincent, p. 12, for a discussion of this view. He argues that intervention is an act undertaken by a state, group within a state, group of states, or global international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state, and which is aimed at that state's authority structures.

²⁴Some support for this comes from a recent volume by Urs Schwarz, Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1970). He argues that "most non-military interventions are not interventions at all. The whole field of non-military intervention presents a great variety of puzzling problems. They can be solved by applying strictly the definition of intervention." Schwarz, p. 84, rejects the notion that a propaganda attack is intervention or that economic aid is a form of intervention. For him, intervention is an act involving military force and aimed at modifying political structures in the target society. See also Graham T. Allison, Ernest May, and Adam Yarmolinsky, "Limits to Intervention," Foreign Affairs 48 (January, 1970): 251, for an argument that, "it is essential to draw a sharp line between official combat operations and the rest;" the supply of material or advisors is not intervention. See also Rosenau, "Intervention," p. 292.

²⁵On this point see James N. Rosenau, "Cross Systems Theorizing: Linkage Politics Revisited," in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfeld (New York: McKay, 1973), pp. 318-39. In this selection Rosenau updates his earlier discussion on the literature about intervention; here he defines it as a single sequence of coercive behavior.

²⁶John Burton argues that "intervention that is not aggression is action by and in support of legitimate authority." Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 230.

²⁷James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston,

Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp. 70-71. He defines a penetrated political system as one in which non-members participate directly and authoritatively through actions taken jointly with the society's members in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support in behalf of its goals.

²⁸Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration (New York: Random House, 1962). Cf. Paul Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1964).

²⁹John H. Herz, The Nation State and the Crisis of World Politics (New York: McKay, 1976), pp. 226-257. Cf. Klaus Knorr's argument that external governmental actions in relation to non-governmental actors in other states is penetration; the techniques are propaganda, bribery, conspiracy, and the supply of arms. See also Blackstock.

³⁰Cf. Ivo D. Duchacek, Nations and Men (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), Wolfram Hanreider, "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review 6 (December, 1967): p. 973, and Knorr, who argues that governmental action with regard to non-governmental entities in another state is "penetration."

³¹Cf. Duchacek's view that "penetration" is a challenge to the territorial state. He argues that, although states are, and always have been, penetrable and their "walls" porous, external pressures on state autonomy have grown in this century, e.g., in the form of economic and technological links, transnational communications, contacts, organizations and coalitions. Hanreider, p. 978, argues on the other hand, that a political system is "penetrated" if its decision making process is strongly affected by external events.

³²Cf. Cottam's notion of dependency relations, p. 57.

³³Some examples of this type of dependency relationship are the satellite states' relations with the Soviet Union (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, etc.) and the relationships which the U.S. has had with Nationalist China, South Vietnam, South Korea, etc.

³⁴Cf. Knorr's distinction between "empire" (a

loss of sovereignty), "hegemony" or spheres of influence (coercive domination over a formally independent unit), and "patronal relations" (which involve an agreement between the patron and the client state, which is engaged in voluntarily by the weaker state in return for protection or services). The latter is closest to my own notion of penetration.

³⁵Robert Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

³⁶See Stephen L. Spiegel, Dominance and Diversity (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers (New York: Free Press, 1972), and David Vital, The Survival of Small States (London: Oxford University, 1971).

³⁷Singer, p. 38, contends that, "A state is independent . . . only insofar as it has power to enforce its freedom of decision making regardless of other countries." Cf. Hart's definition of power as control over resources against the notion that it is control over outcomes.

³⁸Singer, p. 108, argues that "current forms of dependency and subordination are not new.... Weaker states have always been subordinate."

³⁹Spiegel, p. 145.

⁴⁰Cf. Burton, pp. 136-38, who argues that, "A characteristic of the contemporary world environment is the weakening of external power dominance." Small states want participation in the decisions affecting them; and great powers are curbed in their attempts to control small states by political and moral restraints.

⁴¹J. David Singer argues that interdependence is a condition of being, a relation. Intervention, on the other hand refers to an event. Linkage is a process by which events and processes in different societies are connected. "The Global System and its Subsystems," in Linkage Politics, ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969).

⁴²Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems," p. 468.

⁴³Spiegel, p. 131.

⁴⁴Knorr, Chapter 8.

Appendix II

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE CUBAN CONFLICT
1957-1961

1957

- February Interview with Herbert Matthews; New York Times article series; Castro claims no ill will toward U.S.
- May Attack on Uvero leads to increased public unrest.
- July Declaration of the Sierra Maestra demands establishment of a provisional government which will not tolerate foreign interference.
- U.S. Ambassador Gardner retires; Earl E.T. Smith appointed.

1958

- January Smith says U.S. will never be able to do business with Castro.
- February Interview with French journalist J. Dubois; Castro disclaims communism, says there will be no nationalization, free elections will be held.
- Castro, in interview with Andrew St. George, says no plans for nationalization exist; stresses need for Cuban industrialization.
- March July 26th Movement calls for general strike.
- April U.S. Secretary of State, Dulles, states arms for Batista regime intended only for international defense purposes.
- General strike, opposed by P.S.P., fails; Batista declares national emergency and suspends the 1940 Constitution.
- U.S. institutes arms embargo of Batista regime.
- June Caracas meeting of eight revolutionary groups (excluding P.S.P.) calls for free elections in Cuba.

June/July Castro enters into secret discussions with P.S.P.; Raul Castro kidnaps American citizens in Cuba.

State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research reports that Fidelistas were not communists.

July U.S. Marines at Guantanamo take over plant to protest base's water supply.

November Elections held; Batista backed candidate wins; accusations of fraud.

December American special envoy, William Pawley, urges Batista to resign.

U.S. refuses to withdraw its military mission as requested by the rebels.

1959

January 26th of July Movement is victorious; Castro proposes Urrutia as Provisional President.

Guevara denies revolution is Communist.

President Urrutia asks for removal of Ambassador Smith.

U.S. recognizes Urrutia government.

Miro Cardona forms moderate Cabinet; assures use of 1940 Constitution and free elections.

Castro says elections will be held within 18 months.

Castro again criticizes presence of U.S. military mission in Cuba.

Castro declares he is not a communist; nor will he take orders from the U.S.

U.S. State Department declares policy of noninvolvement in Cuba's internal affairs.

Philip Bonsal named new U.S. Ambassador.

Dulles states the U.S. will withdraw military mission.

Soviet Union recognizes Revolutionary government.

Public trials held which led to 550 executions of Batista followers.

P.S.P. calls for restoration of 1940 Constitution, agrarian reform, friendly relations with U.S.

February

Castro charges U.S. tries to run Cuba; declares Cuba must be economically free.

Cabinet approves abrogation of 1940 Constitution; legislative power vested in Cabinet.

Castro replaces Cardona; New Law replaces 1940 Constitution and increases power of Prime Minister.

Castro becomes Prime Minister.

March

U.S. Ambassador Bonsal takes office.

Castro states neutrality as Cuba's foreign policy; denies he is anti-American, but opposes Cuban participation in Cold War.

Castro criticizes U.S. for threat to cut sugar quota.

April

Castro adopts friendlier posture toward U.S.; makes informal trip to U.S., then to Montreal; speaks at National Press Club on April 17; meets with Vice President Nixon and State Department leaders (Herter, Rubottom).

U.S. alleges Cuba involved in supporting exile invasion of Panama.

P.S.P. criticizes 26 JM publicly.

May

Meeting of Buenos Aires Inter-American Economic Conference; Castro calls for \$30 billion "Marshall Plan for L.A."

Castro emphasizes Cuban independence and attacks P.S.P. in press; Che sent to U.A.R., relieved of responsibility for military matters.

Castro insists revolution is "not red."

Agrarian Reform Law adopted, leads to some confiscation of land and to U.S. protests.

June Castro replaces U.S.-leaning Secretary of State (Agramonte) with Raul Roa.

Exile invasion of the Dominican Republic with alleged Cuban help.

Major Diaz Lanz, commander of the revolutionary air force, defects.

Castro offers to sell sugar to U.S. at a lower price if U.S. will increase following year's quota.

Che's African tour begins.

July President Urrutia replaced by Osvaldo Dorticos; Castro accused of phony resignation by Urrutia.

Castro offers to abandon Latin American revolution in return for normalization of relations with U.S.

August O.A.S. meets in Santiago to discuss situation in Cuba.

September Raul Roa declares Cuban neutrality at the U.N.

Accommodation reached between P.S.P. and 26 JM.

October Major H. Matos resigns as Governor; Castro criticizes him for citing "communist problems."

Former Major Diaz Lanz drops leaflets on Havana; Castro accuses U.S. of "bombings."

Castro accuses Huber Matos of treason.

November Ambassador Bonsal initiates U.S. attempt at rapprochement.

November/December Reorganization of Cuban Cabinet; anti-communists replaced by pro-communists. Che Guevara appointed to National Bank.

December Matos tried for treason and imprisoned for 20 years

Castro claims Cuba will have to be defended with arms in 1960 from U.S. attack.

Castro calls Nixon "insolent."

President Eisenhower calls for Cuban people to defeat Communist influence.

Soviet News Agency, Tass, admitted to Cuba.

1960

January	U.S. issues statement saying: it favors nonintervention, will prevent use of Florida as base for exile activity; reaffirms Cuban sovereignty in internal affairs; reaffirms U.S. intent to defend U.S. property and citizens; condemns Castro's hostile posture.
February	Mikoyan visits Cuba; formal Soviet-Cuban economic relationship established; \$100 million loan; sugar deal -- 5 million tons.
March	Eisenhower secretly consents to plans for invasion of Cuba. Cuban-Yugoslav Agreement. Sugar shipments to China begin.
April	Polish trade with Cuba opened; first Soviet oil to Cuba. Expropriation of 155,000 United Fruit acres; promise \$3.8 million in bonds.
May	Cuba fires on U.S. submarine. Cuba establishes diplomatic relations with U.S.S.R.
July	Cuba takes over U.S. refineries, after their refusal to process Russian oil. U.S. reduces sugar quota. Krushchev pledges to use "rocket fire power" if Cuba is attacked. Soviet Union agrees to buy more Cuban sugar. U.S. announces \$500-600 million economic aid program to Latin America; specifies that Cuba

cannot participate without changes in its policy.

Peoples Republic of China agrees to buy more sugar.

August Expropriation of additional \$500 million of U.S. property.

U.S. Senate votes to cut aid to those who help Castro.

O.A.S. Conference (Costa Rica) condemns outside intervention in Latin America.

September Declaration of Havana; Cuba declares "political war" on U.S.

U.S. banks in Cuba taken over at a loss of \$250 million.

Castro appears at U.N.

October U.S. implements trade embargo, excluding food.

Nationalization of all remaining U.S. property in Cuba.

November U.S. orders naval patrol of Caribbean to prevent Cuban invasion of Guatemala and Nicaragua.

Che, in Look Magazine, proclaims "rebound theory"; all Cuba's radical measures were response to direct aggression by powerful monopolists.

December U.S. cuts sugar quota to zero.

New Cuban sugar agreements with Soviet Union and China.

1961

January U.S. breaks relations with Cuba.

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