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**DISARMAMENT AND DISORDER: THE UNITED NATIONS AND
DISARMAMENT IN THE ERA OF ARMS CONTROL**

City University of New York

PH.D. 1982

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Disarmament and Disorder
The United Nations and Disarmament in
the Era of Arms Control

by
AVI BEKER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Political Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1982

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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- IV -

To my parents

Abstract

Disarmament and Disorder

The United Nations and Disarmament in
the Era of Arms Control

by

Avi Beker

Adviser: Professor Abraham Bargman

Contrary to what Third World representatives would suggest a few decades later, the United Nations Charter was never designed to promote disarmament objectives. The drafters of the Charter believed in an international order based on a collective security system under which the major powers would enforce peace and security. Experience has shown that disarmament, which in essence is about the organization of power in the international system, cannot be dealt with as a self-contained process regardless of the conditions of world order. This work proceeds from the premise that there is a revealing gap between the system reflected in the Charter, particularly with respect to disarmament, and what the United Nations became under Third World stewardship.

The dramatic changes in the balance of power within the United Nations brought about a shift in the disarmament debate from the East-West to North-South axis. The New

International Economic Order (NIEO), the overriding concern of the Third World, has changed dramatically the political culture and the climate in which security, disarmament and world order issues are examined. Disarmament is no longer treated as a security concept but rather as a vehicle to reallocate resources in order to challenge the hegemony of the great powers and create a more equal world order. This attitude of the Third World tends to undermine the non-proliferation regime and jeopardizes initiatives to put restraints on the international trade of arms. Like in the North-South economic confrontation, the Soviet Union has managed to disassociate itself from the "North" and exploits some disarmament issues for its campaign against the West.

The work concludes that the juxtaposition of North-South and East-West confrontations tends to foster the tendency to introduce grandiloquent and sweeping plans which ignore questions of international security. At the same time this tendency prevents the United Nations from promoting realistic discussions on limited bargains of achievable and workable agreements of arms control.

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GLOSSARY

ACDA - Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
CCD - Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CD - Committee on Disarmament
CPD - Comprehensive Program of Disarmament
CTB - Comprehensive Test Ban
CW - Chemical Weapons Treaty
DC - Disarmament Commission
ENDC - Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference
ERW - Enhanced Radiation Warhead
GCD - General and Complete Disarmament
HEU - Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
INFCE - International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation
MAD - Mutual Assured Destruction
MBFR - Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MEOP - Middle Eastern Oil Producing countries
MLF - Multilateral nuclear Force
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NIEO - New International Economic Order

NNWS - Non Nuclear Weapon States
NPT - Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
NWS - Nuclear Weapon States
OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PTBT - Partial Test Ban Treaty
RIO - Reshaping International Order
SALT - Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institution
SSOD - First Special Session on Disarmament
SSD II - Second Special Session on Disarmament
START - Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
TNF - Theater Nuclear Forces
UNAEC - United Nations Atomic Energy Commission
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference of Trade and Development
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO - United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization
WDC - World Disarmament Conference

Chapter 1: Introduction - What is the Problem of Disarmament?

As soon as the United Nations opened its headquarters in New York City, the Isaiah Wall across the street from the Organization became a popular gathering spot for demonstrators for a variety of international causes. The inscription on the wall is perhaps the most popular biblical quotation concerning disarmament and international security. The message, chiseled into granite, is taken from the Book of Isaiah (2:4) :

...they shall beat their swords into plowshares
and their spears into pruning hooks, nation
shall not lift up sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war any more.

These words of Isaiah, the great visionary of peace, to his fellow children of Israel in Judah in the 8th century B.C. have buoyed entire peoples and inspired many great thinkers through the conflicts of history. However, what is not revealed by the admonition on the wall are the conditions of this vision of peace. The truth is that even in the religious prophecy of Isaiah, disarmament and peace among nations are not dealt with in isolation but within a broader context of a universal

change of order. One should render the phrase preceding the plowshares line, in the same verse:

And He shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many people...

Though Isaiah meant only to speak about "the last days" of judgment, he emphasized two aspects as pre-requisites for total disarmament:

- 1) A moral (in the religious sense) transformation of man and,
- 2) A new order with a supranational, legitimate authority to judge, rebuke, and enforce the law among the nations of the world.

Characteristically, the omissions in the admonition on the wall highlight the deficiencies in the deliberations on disarmament in the United Nations across the street. To talk about General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) or to elaborate a Comprehensive Program of Disarmament (CPD), is to forget what disarmament is really about. Disarmament cannot be dealt with as a self-contained process, regardless of the conditions of world order. In essence, disarmament is about the organization of power in the international community.

Since it proposes to deprive nations of anything to fight with, disarmament, taken literally, appears frequently as the most appealing method to guarantee peace. The novel aspiration to disarmament became a recurring theme of many individuals who were appalled by the record of human history which could easily be described as history of war and conflicts. In modern history, the concept of disarmament has occupied a prominent place in the thinking of persons and a principal goal of public movements concerned with world peace. But one has to admit that peace and disarmament have not figured among the notable achievements of mankind. They have become the most talked of and least practiced of all social endeavors. With the emergence of the modern nation-state as an institution well-organized for waging war, disarmament proposals became part and parcel of international diplomacy. It was a fruitless effort as can be seen in the Encyclopaedia Britannica which, in its last edition, was shaken from its usual composure to conclude that disarmament endeavors in our time have been "spectacularly unsuccessful."

By the end of the 19th century the idea of a special international conference dedicated to disarmament had achieved particular prominence with the convening of the First Hague Conference in 1899.¹ With the first international conference, disarmament was institutionalized as a major arena of international diplomacy. The framers of the League Covenant took pains to make disarmament the cornerstone of their system of collective security and the principal object of the organization. Perceived as the key for the post World War I international order, disarmament got the first priority and was continuously in the forefront of the League's agenda, culminating in the Disarmament Conference of 1932. World War II led to disillusionment with disarmament and, consequently, to a very low-key and weak reference to it in the Charter of the United Nations. However, because of historical circumstances (the coming of the nuclear age) and the self-propelled dynamics of United Nations routine and polemics coupled with the dictates of political interests, disarmament soon became the subject of more continuous deliberations than any other single item on the United Nations agenda.

The League's experience represented an effort to rely heavily upon disarmament in order to establish a reformed system of international order. The United Nations, after three decades of wrestling with the politics of disarmament, seems to have reached a dead-end where disarmament is completely divorced from the realities and conditions of world order. The record of both organizations suggests a tendency, though motivated by different factors, of overreliance on the conception suggested by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov to the League of Nations that "the way to disarm is to disarm."² Following this approach, international organization has demonstrated extraordinary vitality in treating every possible idea on disarmament and in exhausting almost every possible structural and functional option in the field of disarmament machinery. "Swords into plowshares" was treated alone as if this revolutionary process were possible without elaborating on the general settlement of outstanding political differences and guaranteeing the necessary conditions for maintaining international order. The advice of

Salvador De Madariaga, the top official in the League dealing with disarmament, seems to have gone unheeded:

The solution of the problem of disarmament cannot be found within the problem itself, but outside it. In fact, the problem of disarmament is not the problem of disarmament. It really is the problem of the organization of the World Community. 3

It is this inextricable connection between disarmament and world order and its manifestations in the United Nations which is the concern of this dissertation. Proceeding from the East-West confrontation on disarmament which dominated the deliberations at the United Nations during the cold war era, the dissertation will follow the shift toward the North-South axis during the 1970's. Both in the East-West and North-South confrontations on disarmament, the essence of the debate concerns, in effect, the nature and character of international order. However, in each confrontation there were different types of interplays and clashes between the concepts of disarmament and world order.

At the outset, the dissertation deals primarily with the East-West debate and the evolution of the United Nations machinery in the field of disarmament. First,

we examine (in chapter 2) the historical and legal background for United Nations activities regarding disarmament. Contrary to what Third World rhetoric would suggest a few decades later, the United Nations Charter was never designated to promote disarmament objectives. The drafters of the Charter believed in an international order based on a collective security system under which the maintenance of national armaments, particularly in the hands of the major powers, is a prerequisite to permit the discharge of international obligations respecting the enforcement of peace and security. It is evident that the advent of the atomic bomb fundamentally altered the nature of the world in which the United Nations would function, and therefore attempts were made to accommodate the "pre-atomic" character of the Charter to the requirements of the new age. However, these attempts were doomed to fail since they embodied a new concept of world order. The East-West haggling over the "Baruch plan" 1946 was not as much concerned with disarmament as with the idea of revising the world order envisaged in the Charter. The pattern of differences would create an impasse leaving

the United Nations with no role to play in disarmament. Later, when the superpowers started to negotiate arms control measures, they did it outside the United Nations in keeping with the existing framework of world order. In the United Nations, instead, delegates and staff members were engaged in numerous bureaucratic reforms of the disarmament machinery which had no bearing on the real world outside (chapter 3).

The dramatic changes in the balance of power within the United Nations brought about a shift in the disarmament debate from the East-West to North-South axis. Chapter 4 will examine how the politics of the new International Economic Order (NIEO), the overriding concern of the Third World, have affected the disarmament debates. It was again a debate over international order but unlike the debate on the Baruch Plan, the issue of world government was not raised. This time disarmament was perceived as a major vehicle for the Third World in its attempt to get rid of the "law of the great powers" through disarmament of the superpowers and by reallocation of resources and power from them to the

Third World. The Third World challenged the right of the great powers (recognized by the United Nations Charter) to maintain their privileged position as the custodians of international security (chapter 5). They view the Non-Proliferation Treaty of nuclear weapons as discriminatory and pursue initiatives to undermine the non-proliferation regime (chapter 6). Similarly, they reject efforts in the United Nations to discuss the conventional arms race or to restrain the international trade of arms (chapter 7).

With disarmament debates becoming hostage to NIEO politics, the East-West confrontations have re-emerged. With the decline of arms control efforts between the superpowers, the Soviet Union enjoyed important advantages in the United Nations debates on disarmament over the United States and its allies. The NIEO - disarmament linkage helps the Soviets to exploit the forum to further isolate and divide the Western group (chapter 8).

Significant progress in disarmament cannot be achieved without addressing the issues of world order.

The United Nations seems to foster disarmament plans in terms of grandiose ethical statements and sweeping programs instead of proceeding toward limited bargains and workable measures which recognize international realities. Caught between these East-West and North-South axes, the United Nations cannot play an effective role in promoting achievable agreements of arms control.

Notes: Introduction

1. For historical and documentary review of disarmament efforts and proposals see:
a) Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: R.R. Bowher Company, 1973).

b) Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907 (New York: Macmillan, 1942).

2. Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 298.
The complete abolition of armaments, said Litvinov, is "the only real means of guaranteeing security and affording a guarantee against the outbreak of war."
For Litvinov's statement and further analysis see: Robert W. Lambert, Soviet Disarmament Policy 1922-1931 (Washington D.C.: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1964), Research report 64-2, p. 156.

3. Salvador De Madariaga, Disarmament (New York: Kennikat Press Inc., 1967), reprint of the original book from 1929, p. 56.

**Chapter 2: The Pre-Atomic Charter: Security, Disarmament
and the Nuclear Factor**

As one who was at San Francisco in the spring of 1945, I can say with confidence that had the delegates at San Francisco known we were entering the age of atomic warfare, they would have seen to it that the Charter dealt more positively with the problems thus raised.

John Foster Dulles¹

...if the United Nations cannot produce an Atomic Charter that will work, then the United Nations Charter will not work, either.

New York Times, editorial
June 14, 1946.

A principal characteristic of United Nations operations in the field of disarmament lies in the fact that at the time the United Nations Charter was agreed upon, its framers could not have been aware of the most revolutionary change in military power in the post-World War Two era.

While they were ironing out their last differences on the draft Charter at San Francisco in June 1945, the work on the atomic bomb was proceeding in the greatest secrecy. The first atomic bomb was exploded (at a test site) three weeks after the Charter was signed, and on August 6, 1945, six weeks after the termination of the San Francisco Conference, the bomb fell on Hiroshima.

As soon as it came into being, the United Nations was doomed to function under the "Sword of Damocles" of a nuclear catastrophe. Immediately, the new born international body, whose Charter starts from the commitment "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," was confronted with unprecedented military and political challenges. Symbolically, the first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly was to establish an Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) with the urgent task of making specific proposals for the elimination from national armaments of atomic

weapons and of all other major weapons of mass destruction.² However, this resolution remained symbolic indeed, for the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was paralyzed from the beginning by the impasse resulting from irreconcilable differences.

The Commission's members last met on July 29, 1949, and when the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb in September 1949, UNAEC's failure was sealed.³ The commission was finally dissolved on January 11, 1952, by a United Nations General Assembly resolution which created the Disarmament Commission.⁴ Basically, this Chapter will address two major questions:

- 1) Was the United Nations' Charter a document which envisaged and designated an important role for disarmament efforts?
- 2) Could the United Nations' Charter provide a reasonable framework for an international control system and ultimately the elimination of the threat of nuclear catastrophe?

It would be unfair and misleading to attribute the shortcomings in the Charter's provisions on

disarmament solely to its pre-atomic character. The reasons are more fundamental and grew out of the special historical background and intellectual environment under which the United Nations founding fathers developed their concept about a post-war security organization. It is important, therefore, first to examine this historical context and then to proceed to analyze the United Nations' first major treatment of the issue of nuclear disarmament.

The Charter and the Covenant

"International organization," writes Inis Claude, "is fundamentally, even though not exclusively, a reaction to the problem of war."⁵ In the twentieth century, the urge to avoid war was the major impetus for establishing international organizations which were, in most cases, set up following world wars. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations were organizations designed to maintain international peace and security in order "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." However, the nature of these

organizations was, in considerable measure, determined by the intellectual environment of their founders. Some major differences between the United Nations Charter and the Covenant of the League of Nations suggest that the drafters of the two documents approached differently the problem of international security and its links with disarmament. It is clear that the Charter of the United Nations, by no means, echoes the general approach and the specific provisions of the Covenant on issues relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and disarmament measures.

The different approaches taken in drafting the two documents can be illustrated by the striking differences in their treatment of the concept of security. The word "security" appears only once in the Covenant--and only in a very general and vague form-- in the preamble, in reference to the purpose of the league "to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security." Thereafter, the term "security" does not reappear,

and the Covenant confines itself to terms such as "peace," "peace of Nations" or "peace of the world."

In the United Nations Charter, however, the concept of security is dealt with as the center-piece of the organization, and the phrase "international peace and security" appears thirty-two times. In addition, the supreme and most powerful body envisaged in the Charter is the Security Council. This organ is referred to numerous times, and often appears in conjunction with specific duties, which are the maintenance of international peace and security.

The concept of collective security, which is the keystone of the Charter, grew out of the experience with the League's failure to stop the deterioration of security and the effects of the unilateral disarmament of the democratic powers during the thirties, while the Axis states had heavily armed themselves.⁶ It is clear, therefore, that the notion of collective security, particularly as an instrument of peace enforcement, had direct impact on the Charter's approach to the issue of disarmament. The law

enforcement measures in the Charter (Articles 39, 41, 42) go far beyond anything the Covenant of the League had contemplated.

As the first Article of the Charter indicates, collective security is based on the belief that the most effective way to maintain peace and security would be for the international community to mobilize strong collective counter measures "for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace." By definition, to enforce the law against the law breaker requires readily superior military power. That is why the system of peacekeeping and enforcement measures envisaged by Chapter VII of the Charter was predicated upon the continued existence of strong national armies, navies and air forces as an integral part of collective security.

This straightforward inter-relationship between the concept of collective security and disarmament was in the back of the minds of those involved in the preparations for the new international organization. As

early as 1942, it was clear to the men involved in the preparatory work in the United States Department of State that the problem of the enforcement of peace was

the most difficult problem to resolve in planning a new international institution that would be able to use force when necessary to keep the peace. 7

Analysis of official documents indicates that the approach in the United Nations Charter to the idea of peace enforcement was a convergence, on one hand, of President Franklin Roosevelt's ideas on a postwar international order based upon the "four policemen" (the four major allies of World War II) and, on the other, of the more modified approach of the State Department which was thinking more in terms of the previous international organization, the League of Nations.⁸ Official documents and records released by the State Department reveal how the ideas of postwar security were gradually developed during the war and thereafter led to the concept of peace enforcement and the new role of the Security Council in the United Nations.⁹ This had direct effects on the Charter's treatment of disarmament.

President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were committed to establishing a general international organization and were determined, at the same time, to avoid the disillusioning experience of President Wilson with the League of Nations. The wide-spread public support in the United States for the establishment of a new international organization during and after World War II was a departure from the refusal to join the League of Nations a generation earlier, and it encouraged American leaders to play a prominent role in it.¹⁰ Roosevelt himself envisaged an international order based on the concept of "Four Policemen," whereby the four great powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China) would patrol the world for the benefit of all peace-loving nations. This view of post-war security problems was based on the belief that under conditions of modern warfare, the majority of small nations were incapable of defending themselves against powerful aggressors. Consequently, the police power of the world should reside in the hands of the few powerful nations who would assist the weaker Members of the international community. Roosevelt expressed these ideas to Stalin, as early as May 1942, and

reiterated them in their summit meeting in Teheran.¹¹

After the United States joined the war against the Axis, the postwar planning activities in the State Department entered their most intensive and important stage. Within the department, early in 1942, a new Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, with an elaborate system of subcommittees, was established. The Committee considered ideas for a postwar organization which came from a wide range of private organizations. Most of the committees' personnel were co-opted from outside from both the public and private sectors.¹² The role of the new international organization in the fields of security and disarmament was discussed primarily in the Special Subcommittee on International Organization and Subcommittee on Security Problems.

Naturally in 1942, the issues of armaments and disarmament were clouded with uncertainty. The members of the subcommittee on international organization faced a clear dilemma:

On one hand, the relation between armaments and postwar security was clear; on the other hand, general demand to curtail expenditures in this field was likely. The regrettable effects of the drain upon budgets in practically all states caused by armaments

pointed toward great reduction, but the need had also to be met for the maintenance of armaments at a level that would permit the discharge of international obligations respecting the enforcement of peace and security. The successful aggressions of the enemy against weak neighbors and the attack by Japan upon Pearl Harbor were lessons in the danger of weakness that could not be forgotten if peace and security were not to be imperiled. A minimum level for some states and a maximum for others was envisaged in the tentative views developed. 13

Similar questions were discussed in the sub-committee on security. It was understood that enforcement measures for peace necessitated armaments and, therefore, the question was:

"Would not these armaments have to come from nations?"

Thus in the course of these preparations, in accordance with Roosevelt's view, the seeds of the "discriminatory" approach to disarmament were planted: "a minimum level for some states and a maximum for others." Indeed, the problem of discrimination in the field of security and disarmament would be revived later, after three decades, at the United Nations within the framework of the North-South confrontation on disarmament (Part II of this dissertation).

Though it was agreed that there should be a reduction from the wartime level of armaments, the lessons of the League experience taught that "the armaments of peace-loving states in the future would have to be maintained at a level sufficient to enforce the peace."¹⁴ Accordingly, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of the major allies in August 1944, the participants concentrated their efforts on the security provisions of the emerging Charter.¹⁵ The concept of enforcement raised also profound questions concerning sovereignty and equality among the large and small states cooperating for maintenance of peace.¹⁶ It seems that in the process, the drafters of the Charter abandoned the issues of disarmament and sovereignty in order to give priority to the security issues. It became clear that the security system envisaged by the Charter would require all states to maintain domestic order.¹⁷ As a result, it was agreed among experts on international law that the enforcement of peace was the most radical innovation to be written into the Charter, which also offered the most marked contrast to the provisions of the Covenant.¹⁸

In order to understand even better the link between a particular concept of security and disarmament, it will be interesting to review the statement of the Covenant of the League on disarmament. The members of the League of Nations were convinced, as the Covenant says, that the maintenance of peace requires a major effort to reduce "national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." Their conviction was influenced by the belief that the race in armaments between the major powers in Europe had been largely responsible for the First World War. Their approach was a ramification of the deterministic theory supporting disarmament which views arms races as self-propelling processes in which armament breeds counter-armament leading to an inexorable march to the violent climax of war.¹⁹ This was, as one observer puts it, the fallacy of the direct approach to disarmament which regarded armaments in themselves as the main source of insecurity among nations; therefore, disarmament would automatically bring an easing of international tensions.²⁰ As F.P. Walters indicates, when the League was created there were great expectations within the international public opinion that the new

organization "would put an end to the burden and danger of great national armaments." Rightly or wrongly, disarmament was regarded then:

not only as the test of the League's success, but as almost the principal object of its existence. Men had looked forward, year after year, to the day when the signature of the first general Disarmament Treaty should concentrate and consolidate the peaceful organization of the modern world. 21

As a result, disarmament got a high priority in the Covenant of League of Nations. Already in its first Article "arms regulations" was a stipulation under which every new member that joins the League had to:

accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.

Article 8 of the Covenant is, as a matter of fact, a specified framework of guidelines and agreed principles on disarmament:

1. The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.
2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

3. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

5. The members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

Article 9 provides the establishment of a permanent Commission to advise the League's Council "on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 on military, naval and air questions generally." The commitments to carry out a "reduction and limitation of armament" were continuously in the forefront of the aims and activities of the League and the efforts have culminated in the Disarmament Conference convened at Geneva in 1932.

If World War I was followed by a deep disillusionment with the arms race, World War II led to

disillusionment with disarmament. Edward Teller, who fled from Nazi Europe before the war to become a leading nuclear scientist in America, gives an indication of the international climate at that time:

....there can be little doubt that World War II was caused by an uncontrolled race for disarmament. The peace loving nations disarmed, thereby they gave one lawless government a chance to bid for world domination. 22

The same opinion, with extended application to the nuclear age, is expressed by a prominent scholar on the United Nations, Inis Claude:

An arms race in the 1930's might have prevented the greatest war yet recorded. Such peace as the world had known since 1945 - and, for all its imperfections, the record of statesmanship in this period does include the notable achievement of the nonoccurrence of World War III - may conceivably owe more to the same arms race than to any other factor. 23

For the United Nations' founding fathers, all assumptions on the new security organization started from the recognition of the existence of a state of war.²⁴ They were not just disillusioned with disarmament but also aware of the special circumstances at that time. The final negotiations on the Charter at San Francisco in the spring of 1945, took place

while the war was still raging, at a time when the real problem facing the allies was "not one of reducing armaments but of producing them."²⁵ The allies were striving to increase their military might in order to win the war. Under these circumstances, any attempt to discuss and formulate specific disarmament measures "would have been distracting at best."²⁶ It would be inconceivable, moreover, to expect direct criticism such as that contained in the Covenant, in Article 8, on weapons manufacture by private enterprises.

Not surprisingly, the United Nations Charter's statement on disarmament was relatively weak, with only a vague reference to possible measures to be taken. Unlike the Covenant of the League, the Charter does not obligate the members of the United Nations to reduce their armaments. It is a curious fact that Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter setting forth the purposes and principles of the organization, contain not a single reference to disarmament. Only in Article 11 does the provision appear that the:

General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments... 27

The Charter's understated reference to disarmament can be further illustrated by reviewing its provisions on the functions of the General Assembly in other fields (economic, social, health etc.). In these cases the Charter uses firmer and clearer language (Article 13, and Chapters 9 and 10 contain an extensive list of provisions on international economic and social cooperation and composition, functions and powers of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations). In a word, the Charter's low-key approach to disarmament is not accidental, it is an integral part of its philosophy.

The United Nations Charter subscribes to a particular philosophy concerning the link between international security and disarmament. As Ruth Russell points out, implicit in the Charter, one can identify the so-called "French thesis" which linked national disarmament together with the development of a system of international military sanctions. According to this view, which was most strongly promoted by France during the League period, there is an interdependence between the reduction of national

armaments - which would weaken the capacity of national protection, and the development of a system of international military sanctions which will safeguard the countries' vital interests. Though the "French thesis" is not spelled out in the Charter, its bearing can be found on both the overall approach of the Charter to international security and in its missing provisions on disarmament. It has been recognized that a number of principal features from the French plan have been embodied in the Charter and, thus, hailed by many as making it an instrument superior to the Covenant for maintaining international peace and security.²⁸ The fact that the Charter's provisions for security are more definite than those of the Covenant highlights even more the former's vague reference to disarmament. The drafters of the Charter did not subscribe to the deterministic logic that since men fight because they have arms, elimination of weapons will make fighting impossible. Weapons were treated as result and not as the cause of insecurity, and moreover, as a necessary evil to prevent war. The inter-war experiences of the United Nations' founding fathers, as indicated by Nicholas, suggested that armaments

per se did not cause war but rather "armaments in the wrong hand" led to that condition.²⁹

Philosophically speaking, the founding fathers of the United Nations were realists who regarded peace as a political situation which would allow disarmament to take place as a natural byproduct of a conflict resolution but not an effective method to tackle international conflicts. Accordingly, they have listed disarmament as one of a variety of optional measures (the "general principles of international cooperation") which the General Assembly "may consider." Disarmament, thus, was envisaged as an option, not as a prerequisite. It has been argued correctly, that as far as disarmament is concerned, "the Charter was an unfinished document."³⁰

The Atomic Challenge

It is clear that the nuclear age created a new pattern of security problems which could not have been foreseen when the United Nations Charter was

negotiated. The Charter, it was argued, was inadequate since it "furnished no clue as to the appropriate method for dealing with the control of atomic energy..."³¹ Ironically, the United Nations Charter, which was from the beginning an unfinished document for conventional disarmament, was the only accepted framework to tackle the dangers of the emerging nuclear age.

It is against this background that the American plan for international control of nuclear energy, known better as the Baruch Plan, was submitted to the newly created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. A lot has been written on the "lost opportunity" and the epic failure of the Baruch Plan. Though there are different interpretations of the reasons for the failure, one thing should be clear: the Baruch Plan introduced a different philosophy of international order for the specific purpose of nuclear energy. Unlike the United Nations Charter, the Baruch Plan was perceived, and correctly so, as another prescription for world government, "in the sense that it envisaged an international agency with functions and powers cutting deeply into the traditional preserves of national

sovereignty."³² It provided for a sweeping change in the priorities so carefully established in the Charter on the delicate triangular relationship between international security, disarmament and sovereignty. In terms of the "French thesis," it was a major leap forward toward a total submission of national security in the nuclear field to an international authority. Collective security under the terms of the Baruch Plan required that every sovereign state would surrender its prerogative of acquiring the most powerful of all weapons, and to submit to a supranational authority in nuclear matters. But the world of 1946 was not ripe yet to up-date its law and order to the new requirements of the nuclear age.

It has to be noted that what came to be known as the Baruch Plan was a result of an intensive and extensive process of policy-making starting as early as August 1945, a few days after Hiroshima. At the beginning of November 1945, President Truman, British Prime Minister Attlee, and Canadian Prime Minister King met in Washington and agreed on the need for international action under the auspices of the United

Nations to ensure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, to outlaw atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and to provide for inspection safeguards. Another diplomatic effort brought about a Soviet agreement to co-sponsor, with the United States and the United Kingdom, the first United Nations General Assembly resolution on the establishment of a commission on atomic energy.³³

In the meantime, a committee, consisting of high officials, scientists and industrialists, had met under the leadership of Dean Acheson, then Under-Secretary of State, to formulate the substantive American position on the subject. Later, the Committee was enlarged to include a Board of Consultants headed by David Lilienthal. The "Acheson-Lilienthal Report," made public in March 1946, carried out the Three-Power Declaration proposing a supranational International Atomic Development Authority which would hold a monopoly over all phases of nuclear research, and development.

In an effort to make the Acheson-Lillientahl recommendations more palatable to a skeptical Congress,³⁴ Truman and his Secretary of State, Byrnes, chose to entrust Bernard M. Baruch, the banker and former adviser to Presidents, with the task of presenting the American proposal to the UNAEC which was scheduled to meet that summer. Truman and Byrnes hoped that Baruch's prestige and previous record would assure the anxious members of Congress that Truman Administration would not be duped into an international control plan that would only distribute atomic secrets to the Russians.³⁵ Baruch added to the "Acheson-Lillienthal Report" the enforcement measures which were not to be subject to veto in the Security Council.

On June 14, 1946, Baruch outlined the American plan at the first meeting of the new twelve-nation United Nations Commission. The language was dramatic and apocalyptic, directed at his fellow citizens of the world:

...we are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead... Let us not deceive ourselves; we must elect World Peace or World Destruction. 36

The immediate reaction was enthusiastic and overwhelmingly favorable.³⁷ The New York Times ran a huge headline on its front-page proclaiming "The World at Crossroads" applauding the plan in its editorial:

For the first time in history a nation possessing a unique and destructive weapon has offered to make the essential facts about the weapon generally available, and then to put a stop to its use. 38

Yet, the response from the Soviet representative to the UNAEC, Andrei Gromyko was: "so far matters are going smoothly."³⁹ Smoothly, however, for only a few more days. It took only five days for Gromyko to indicate that the formal East-West tug of war of disarmament negotiations had begun.

At the second meeting of the commission, on June 19, 1946, Gromyko, without mentioning the Baruch proposal, introduced what was almost the exact opposite of the American plan.⁴⁰ The Russian counter plan raised the chief issue of all subsequent disarmament negotiations, which comes first; the commitment to disarm or the control measures to ensure the implementation and observance of commitments?

The American plan was proposed to be put into effect stage by stage. First, a control mechanism would be established providing effective safeguards, after which the United States would carry out its obligation for the elimination of its existing bombs and hand over to the Authority its complete scientific knowledge. The Soviet Union called for the prohibition and "destruction" of weapons at the outset, with the machinery to ensure observance set up at a later date. Not only did the USSR demand the reversal of American priorities, but it also rejected the comprehensive list of the envisaged control mechanism. Gromyko proposed an International agency which would have been subordinated to the Security Council, lacking authority to own, operate, and license atomic facilities. The control function was vaguely defined with limited competence to inspect national atomic establishments. For the Soviets, the enforcement of the outlawing of atomic weapons remained on the declaratory level without any concrete measures. It was on the same moral plane as the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 which outlawed war as a serious crime against humanity.⁴¹ In other words, the Soviet plan really proposed that each state assume

the responsibility for its own atomic-energy industry and see to it that there would be no violations: "each state was to operate on its own - and serve as its own policeman."⁴²

For the first period, lasting from January 1946 until December 1948, United Nations deliberations on disarmament were characterized by a relatively detailed and precise discussion, which for a long time thereafter was not repeated.⁴³ The UNAEC was divided into committees and sub-committees which dealt with the general proposals, control questions, and legal and scientific aspects. On the basis of its findings, the Commission recommended in its first report to the Security Council on December 30, 1946, the creation of a strong and comprehensive international system of control and inspection by an international treaty. Despite the evident difference between the American and Russian ideas, the Commission went through "intensive activity" throughout 1947.⁴⁴ In the course of these negotiations, the superpowers elaborated and modified their proposals but the fundamental differences remained intact. Simultaneously, as a result of a Soviet initiative, a United Nations

Commission for Conventional Armaments was established by the Security Council, but its meetings resulted in no measurable progress.

As the cold war mounted in intensity, the exchanges deteriorated, regardless of the technical feasibilities which were discussed at the United Nations. There was really very little left to do and the debate became a "parallel monologue."⁴⁵ The deadlock was officially acknowledged in the Commission reports which pointed out that an impasse had been reached.⁴⁶ On November 4, 1948, a modified version of the Baruch Plan was finally approved by the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority of 40 to 6, with 5 abstentions (Res. 191, III), but the lack of agreement between the superpowers made it a hollow victory. In 1949, the meeting of the Commission immediately degenerated into petty haggling and propaganda harangues.⁴⁷ The commission reported that the

differences are irreconcilable at the Commission level, and that further discussion in the Atomic Energy Commission would tend to harden these differences and would serve no practical or useful purpose. ⁴⁸

The Failure of the Baruch Plan

The failure of the Baruch Plan was critical, since it demonstrated the inability of the parties to adjust the rules of international conduct and the provisions of collective security to the new requirements of the nuclear age. From then, there has been a long stalemate over disarmament discussions at the United Nations and outside. For the purposes of this study, it does not matter whether the Baruch Plan was a bold initiative⁴⁹ or just shrewd diplomatic gamesmanship.⁵⁰ Those who criticize the provisions of the plan as being part of an alleged American "atomic diplomacy"⁵¹ fail to understand that the major weakness of the Baruch Plan was not as much in its style and technicalities as in the philosophy which it represented. "The Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch proposal," writes Claude, "seemed to be in conformity with the requirements of technical reality, but it did not adequately reflect the conditions of political reality."⁵²

Unlike the Soviet proposal, as Ruth Russell points out, the Baruch Plan was both detailed and free of propaganda broadsides.⁵³ It reflected the intellectual

strains in American thinking in the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scientists shared a feeling of guilt and the theme of editorials was that time was running out on mankind. On December 15, 1945, the first issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists was published and its cover carried a clock set at a few minutes to twelve (still the theme of the publication today). Americans doubted whether the international order envisaged by the United Nations Charter was compatible with atomic weapons. One leading commentator wrote:

It is no reflection on the [UN] Charter, to say it has become a feeble and antiquated instrument for dealing with the problems of an Atomic Age... Time today works against peace... once the nature and imminency of the peril are clearly understood by the peoples of the world their differences will not be a bar but an incentive to common government. 54

It should be noted that the leading atomic scientists in the United States regarded an international authority with inspection powers as critical to prevent nuclear holocaust. The original ideas were those of Robert Oppenheimer from the Manhattan Project, and were incorporated in the Acheson-

Lillienthal report.⁵⁵ In developing the plan, Acheson had already pointed out the centrality of inspection at the expense of national sovereignty.⁵⁶ It was assumed by scientists that openness, friendliness and cooperation with the Soviets were essential.⁵⁷ Already on April 25, 1945, the American Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, wrote to President Truman on the control over nuclear weapons:

No system of control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this menace [of Atomic weapons]. Both inside any particular country and between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and would involve such thorough-going rights of inspection and internal controls as we have never heretofore contemplated. 58

In an article which appeared on June 1, 1946, in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Edward Teller made a sweeping proposal for an open society with free communication jointly guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Americans would declassify all atomic secrets and an Atomic Development Authority would be established as a supranational body to inspect the activities in the nuclear field. The inspectors would be nominated and

responsible only to the authority and would have "the right freely to inquire into any activity which may seem to them directed against their own country, or against world peace."⁵⁹

There is no doubt that the Baruch Plan was designed to revise the Charter, or as the New York Times entitled its editorial on the eve of Baruch's speech "Toward an Atomic Charter."⁶⁰ Public figures in the West called for far reaching political conclusions and a complete readjustment of all international relations to prevent atomic war. It was clear that people thought in terms of sweeping changes in international order: "if world government cannot save us, the world as we know it is lost."⁶¹

In the memoranda which were submitted by the United States to the UNAEC in July 1946, the Baruch Plan had been developed and elaborated reflecting also an intellectual soul-searching. In dealing with the functions and powers of the proposed authority and its relations to United Nations organs, the Americans emphasized that the plan aimed "to fill an existing

gap since the question of control and development of atomic energy was neither considered nor dealt with in the framing of the Charter of the United Nations." It was clear that the Baruch Plan was designed to update the Charter:

...if the Charter is to survive, it must be susceptible of adaptation to meet new needs dictated by new conditions... even if the Charter could be construed to provide for a subsidiary organ created by collective action of several of the existing organs and possessing an aggregate of powers delegated by each of them, such subsidiary organ would not have adequate powers under the Charter. Accordingly, the authority, as a new organ, should be established by treaty granting it all necessary powers and defining its relation with the existing organs of the United Nations. 62

As Michael Mandelbaum explained, the Baruch Plan was a liberal proposal, bearing three distinct liberal trademarks: it was sweeping in scope, it was presented to the United Nations, and it included provisions for the dilution of national sovereignty for the sake of a supranational government.⁶³ It was part and parcel of what Mandelbaum terms "liberal diplomacy," born out of optimistic belief in human progress, political reform and the abolition of national armaments. Similarly, it was liberal

"in foreseeing a world government drawn along the lines of the political institutions of the liberal state."⁶⁴

In this respect, the plan marked a major departure from the vision and arrangements of the United Nations Charter. In order to achieve nuclear disarmament, the plan regarded as a prerequisite the need to strengthen an international authority at the expense of national sovereignty. These proposed revisions of the Charter were totally unacceptable to the Russians and were rejected out of hand.

Those who today still accuse the Baruch Plan of being part of the American "nuclear diplomacy" against the Russians, fail to examine closely this intellectual trend in the United States toward demanding changes in the United Nations Charter for the nuclear age. Similarly, they fail to criticize, at least equally, the counter-plan presented by the Soviets.⁶⁵ The Soviet response made it clear that the gap was fundamental and philosophical. The Soviet Union had enjoyed for a couple of months the advantage of prior knowledge of the American approach

as it found its expression in the "Acheson-Lillienthal Report" already in March 1946. The speed with which Gromyko responded to Baruch at the United Nations (within five days at the second meeting of the UNAEC) and the fact that his response contained no specific references to Baruch's statement made it seem likely that the fundamental Soviet approach had been formulated in Moscow well before Baruch introduced his controversial amendments. Apparently, Gromyko had come to the United States with a comprehensive statement of Russia's minimum conditions regarding international atomic energy control. They were thoroughly irreconcilable even with the "Acheson-Lillienthal" plan (before Baruch suggested abolishing the veto).

Similarly, from a military point of view, it is hard to believe that the Baruch Plan was part of a grand strategy based on "nuclear diplomacy." It is a fact that at the time, no American strategy was devised for employing the nuclear options as a bargaining instrument. Officials in Washington had no intention of actually using the bomb to compel Moscow's cooperation.⁶⁶ Moreover, the fact of the matter is that despite the plan's failure, in the

period between 1945 and 1949 the Americans did not go anywhere in their atomic program. They did not expand their production of uranium or of fissionable materials to any appreciable extent, nor did they proceed on any reactor program. In 1949, for instance, the Canadians were far ahead in the use of heavy water for certain types of nuclear reactors. As one American nuclear scientist said: "We just seemed to be sitting by and doing nothing."⁶⁸

The Baruch modifications of the "Acheson-Lilienthal Report" should also be viewed against the background of the growing distrust of Russia by Americans in 1946. The American policy was, hence, not only based on what the Russians might accept, but also was based in terms of what Congress would not condemn,⁶⁹ under the special circumstances at that period. Historically, the United States and its allies were engaged at that time in unilateral conventional disarmament, and the Baruch Plan implied giving up the only weapon which made it superior without similar provisions for the reduction of conventional forces.

Some historians assert in retrospect that the American monopoly at that time, paradoxical as it sounds, debilitated rather than helped American foreign policy. As Adam Ulam explains, a huge democracy like the United States is prone in peacetime "to indolence and procrastination in international affairs." The bomb, he concluded, encouraged a Maginot Line psychology.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, many have believed that the supremacy of the United States in atomic weapons served as a main defense of Western Europe, and therefore should not be given up without adequate guarantees. Winston Churchill said on March 1949:

It is certain that Europe would have been communized like Czechoslovakia and London (would have been) under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the atomic weapon in the hands of the United States. ⁷¹

Though the veto issue has created the greatest attention at that time, it is widely agreed that Baruch's insistence on abolishing it did not in itself wreck prospects for international control. According to Bechhoefer, who was a member of the American delegation to the UNAEC, the veto was an unnecessary element which permitted the Soviet Union to reject

the whole plan for the wrong reason. The issue has camouflaged the essence of the Soviet rejection:

It was desirable that failure to agree should rest firmly on Soviet unwillingness to permit sufficient penetration of its iron curtain to ensure observance of its commitments. 72

Baruch himself regarded the veto issue as secondary in the Russian rejection. He told Lilienthal that the real reason for Soviet opposition was not the veto "but rather the whole idea of permitting their country to be subjected to the inspection from outside."⁷³ Even Lieberman, who doubted the sincerity of the Baruch Plan, admits that the Russians would have rejected it regardless of the veto element.⁷⁴ It is clear that for the Soviet Union, the first and foremost barrier in every plan of new international authority was the limits that it put on their national sovereignty and their control over internal affairs in the communist system. While there is no doubt that the presence of foreign inspectors was a minimum condition of any reasonable plan for international control of atomic energy, it is also clear that the idea ran against the grain of the entire Soviet political system.

As William Frye explains, in the days of Stalin, the Soviet Union was "a closed shop, utterly barred to foreigners. Comprehensive international inspection, puncturing the Iron Curtain, was anathema to Stalin."⁷⁵ At about the time the United Nations discussed the Baruch Plan, Soviet authorities were refusing to allow a handful of Russian women married to Britons and Americans during the war to leave the Soviet Union "if what those few women could tell about life in Russia was considered to be a danger justifying this extraordinary inhumanity and pettiness, what of inspection of bomb installations and research facilities?"⁷⁶

Richard Barnet, who professed a critical view of American security policies in the postwar era, admitted that for the Soviet Union, virtually every form of on-site inspection would be unacceptable. "Secrecy," says Barnet, "has been regarded historically as a diplomatic asset in Russia's dealing with other nations."⁷⁷ Foreign inspection, he continues, puts a challenge to the exclusive claim of the ruling Communist Party to power. In addition, the Soviets

do not need much inspection in the West since they get a large amount of information from Western open societies anyway.⁷⁸

The Soviets made no secret of their complete rejection of any form of control authority and international inspection. In his speech to the Security Council in March 1947, which lasted an hour and a half, Gromyko gave a suprisingly explicit expression of Soviet fears of political and ideological contamination. For Gromyko the idea of the control authority was "incompatible with state sovereignty" and he described it as "thoroughly vicious and unacceptable." He indicated forcefully:

Unlimited control would mean an unlimited interference in the economic life of the countries on whose territories the control would be carried out and interference in their internal affairs. The Soviet Union and probably not only the Soviet Union cannot allow the fate of its national economy [to be turned] over to this organ. 79

Gromyko's arguments with regard to sovereignty and interference in internal affairs underscores that it would be misleading to attribute the Soviet-

American struggle at the United Nations as only over priorities: control vs. disarmament. At the root of the dispute was a struggle concerning the very nature of the new international order in the emerging nuclear age.

It is against this background that the Soviets also rejected Baruch's proposal to abolish the veto power. The issue of the veto was simply a ramification of the contending approaches to the broader issues of national sovereignty and international control. The American memorandum pointed out that the controls would be ineffectual if the enforcement could be prevented by the veto. It would render the entire principle of "veto" ridiculous:

it is intended to be an instrument for the protection of nations, not a shield behind which deception and criminal acts can be performed with impunity. 80

Similarly the New York Times explained:

In final analysis no plan will work or be acceptable to the United States unless it provides the guarantees essential to safeguard the world against an ambush. That calls for an agency of international control with authority beyond any veto power. 81

The Russians rejected any idea of change in world order. For them, both concepts of national sovereignty and the veto granted to the major powers were integral parts of the international order agreed upon when the United Nations Charter was drafted. Mr. Gromyko, in his reaction to the American memorandum (No. 3) emphasized that:

...when the Charter of the United Nations was prepared by the conference at San Francisco, the question of sovereignty was one of the most important questions considered.

This principle of sovereignty, he said, is one of the corner stones on which the United Nations structure is built. If this were touched, the whole existence and future of the United Nations would be threatened.

Similarly, Gromyko said, it was unacceptable to deny the rights of the Security Council under the Charter, as the American memorandum suggested. The position of the Soviet Government was that "the power, authority, and prestige of the Security Council should not be undermined in connection with the problem of atomic energy."⁸²

Once more, in March 1947, in the speech which put an end to all optimism for an international control on nuclear energy, Gromyko indicated why the veto was so central. The Soviet position was that nothing had changed in the world which would have justified abolition of the veto,

What other principle can be proposed to us by those who are sick of the principle of unanimity of the great Powers, for the solution of all the important questions involved in the maintenance of peace, including the question of sanctions? What substitute can they propose for the veto? Don't they want to draw us back to the ruins of the League of Nations? 83

Of course, from the Soviet point of view, at stake was also the challenge of an unacceptable balance of power. It was not merely the fear of foreign inspectors spying on its society but rather its giving up the race for atomic power. It could not forego the opportunity to obtain a position of power, equal to that of the United States, with a nuclear capacity of its own. As early as April 1946, immediately after the "Acheson-Lillienthal Report" was made public, the State Department was informed

by its envoy in Moscow, that the Soviets had no interest in a workable international control system. The American Ambassador, Walter B. Smith, explained that Russia was counting on producing its own bombs, relying in the meantime on domestic political constraints within the United States to keep the Truman Administration from employing "atomic blackmail." The only control system which Moscow would accept, according to Smith, would be one which furnished Soviet scientists with full technical data on development of the bomb, with no restrictions as to the use of such information.⁸⁴

The Right of Self-Defense

Besides the elementary issues of collective security, national sovereignty, veto, and the realities of power politics, there was another issue which, though almost unnoticed in the literature, highlights the pre-atomic nature of the United Nations Charter: the right of self-defense. Self-defense is an inherent right in customary international law, arising from the existence of a threat to the state defending itself,

the lack of any alternative course of action in the prevailing circumstances, and the use of proportionate action to counter the threat. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter confirms the existence of this customary right as "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" in the event of "an armed attack."

The primary responsibility for dealing with acts of aggression resides in the Security Council, and Member States of the United Nations are obligated to report their responses to attack to the Security Council but are not required to wait for effective United Nations action before taking measures in self-defense. In effect, Article 51 stipulates that in so far as a violation of international law takes the form of an armed attack against a State, the law enforcement system is decentralized. The injured nation, or other nations in "collective self-defense," are allowed to enforce international law against the law breaker. One problem with the concept is that a major power, by ignoring the obligation to report

individual or collective self-defense measures to the Security Council, or by the use of veto in the Security Council, may nullify the role of the United Nations and proceed to handle the situation independently. The problem becomes more complicated when one attempts to apply the provisions of Article 51 to a possible military use of nuclear energy.

Several leading jurists have indicated that developments in the nature, technology and effectiveness of modern weaponry require a consequential, interpretative adjustment to the notion of a threatened or actual armed attack. These developments in warfare technology, added new dimension to the anticipatory right for self defense, under which the factual circumstances inherent in preparations for atomic warfare is a factor seen by jurists as an "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51. Professor Derek Bowett of Cambridge University, in his authoritative work Self-Defense in International Law states:

No State can be expected to await an initial attack which, in the present state of armaments, may well destroy the State's capacity for further resistance and so jeopardize its very existence. 85

The memorandum submitted by the United States to the UNAEC in 1947 reflected the fear that the right of self-defense may take entirely different form in the nuclear sphere. Referring to the proposed treaty on the International Atomic Development Authority, the United States called for a redefinition of "armed attack" in Article 51 to fit the requirements of atomic weapons:

... "armed attack" is now something entirely different from what it was prior to the discovery of atomic weapons. It would therefore seem to be both important and appropriate under present conditions that the treaty define 'armed attack' in a manner appropriate to atomic weapons and include in the definition not simply the actual dropping of an atomic bomb, but also certain steps in themselves preliminary to such action. 86

In retrospect it seems interesting how the Americans had envisaged in 1946, the peculiar logic and the delicate nature of nuclear deterrence. Yet, the Russian reply to the American observations was unequivocal. Gromyko contended that, in general, the American paper had raised "many important political questions, not just legal ones." The Russian focus remained political, and regardless of the new

strategic-military dimension, the proposal which would "change entirely the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter," was totally unacceptable to the Soviets. The Soviets did not regard the discovery of atomic weapons as a change which requires some adjustments in the legal field, particularly in respect to the right of self-defense. For the Soviets the Charter and existing organs of the United Nations were adequate and empowered to deal with control of atomic energy:

Since the United Nations Charter contained general provisions, there was no reference to particular arms of aggressors. Nevertheless the Charter conferred upon the Security Council full power to control atomic energy, as it was a problem relating to peace and security. 87

Sir Humphrey Waldock, who was the President of the International Court of Justice, has further observed on the need to broaden the meaning of self-defense in light of the technological progress in both conventional and nuclear weapon-systems:

To cut down the customary right of self-defence beyond even the Caroline doctrine does not make sense in times when the speed and power of weapons of attack has enormously increased. Indeed, in the Atomic Energy Commission [Document A.E.C/18/Rev.1, p. 24]

it has been suggested that - assuming atomic weapons to be controlled by Convention-preparations for atomic warfare in breach of the Convention would in view of the appalling power of the weapon, have to be treated as an 'armed attack' within Article 51. But even without atomic weapons modern developments in warfare lend force to the interpretation of that Article which has just been put forward. 88

The legal implications of modern conventional and nuclear weapons could not be resolved by international jurists. Similarly, there is nothing in the records of the United Nations in the almost four decades which have elapsed since the Baruch Plan which indicates some renewed interest on the subject. Among scholars who discussed the issue some pointed out that a serious dilemma still exists. Moreover, as Morton Kaplan and Nicholas Katzenbach indicated, Article 51 of the Charter is inadequate for contemporary problems in the field of armed attack and the right of self defense. In their The Political Foundations of International Law, Kaplan and Katzenbach said the following:

The only serious defect of Article 51 is the limitation to 'an armed attack', a limitation that may be both naive and futile in an atomic age, or, for small states, in an age of jet planes and fast tanks.

Must a state wait until it is too late before it may defend itself? Must it permit another the advantages of military build-up, surprise attack, and total offense, against which there may be no defense? It would be unreasonable to expect any state to permit this-particularly when given the possibility that a surprise nuclear blow might bring about total destruction or at least total subjugation, unless the attack were forestalled.

Even though Article 51 permits collective self-defence and even though Article 52 has been interpreted to permit supranational defensive blocs such as NATO, the Charter restriction of self-defence to cases of armed attack undoubtedly is not fully adequate to defense problems of the present age. 89

The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 served as a reminder of the fragility of existing legal definitions and interpretations on issues relating to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The crisis started after the intelligence services of the United States provided hard evidence that the Soviet Union was secretly building offensive missile bases in Cuba. The crisis, which was the climax of rising tensions between the superpowers in 1961-1962, was the first "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation between the two great nuclear powers. It was a seminal event, for which history offers no parallel. According to President John F. Kennedy the odds on disaster - a nuclear war - were estimated "between one out of three and even."⁹⁰

The thirteen days of the crisis have symbolized the character of the mutual deterrence on which international stability and security is largely based. The inadequacy of the provisions of Article 51 were obvious: while Soviet actions in Cuba could not be dealt with by traditional yardsticks of "armed attack" and the right of "self-defense," for American planners it was a classic dilemma of deterrence strategy. No declaration of war was made and no shot was fired during the crisis. But for the leaders of the United States the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba was a violation of the status quo which would have given the Soviets an important military advantage and significantly upset the mutual strategic balance between the superpowers.

The United States responded with a naval quarantine of Soviet shipments to Cuba. The blockade against missiles, which were not yet operational, in foreign territory, has also dramatized another legal aspect which is central to the complex relationship between world order and disarmament: the issue of national sovereignty. As pointed out by Myres McDougal, the

notion of self-defense should be broadened to include issues which are related to the nature of intentions and the structure of the state posing the threat:

The explicit and consistent public utterances of its official spokesmen, the totalitarian character of its internal structures of authority and monolithic character of its demanded system of world public order raised grave questions about the genuineness of the ... dedication by the state concerned to the basic principle of minimum order, that violence and coercion are not to be used as instruments of expansion across state lines. 91

In addition, McDougal continues, a state has to take into consideration the fact that under existing world order it would be impossible to await for appropriate international action:

Given the continuing ineffectiveness of the general community organization to act quickly and certainly for the protection of states, no other principle could be either acceptable to states or conducive to minimum order. 92

* * *

On the second anniversary of the nuclear bomb, the editors of the New York Times said that the ultimate protection against it can only be the abolition of war itself. The Times suggested again that the final

success of these efforts could be realized only in an ultimate world government. The debate over the Baruch Plan and the later deadlock over nuclear disarmament within the United Nations demonstrated that an entirely different constitutional foundation is required for dealing with international security in the nuclear age. The United Nations Charter was drafted on the basis of several specific assumptions of international order and within a specific intellectual environment concerning the approach toward disarmament and security. In one blinding flash, science and technology seemed to have outdated international realities and political institutions. The challenge which members of the United Nations faced was whether to update the constitutional arrangements of world order in the light of the new circumstances or to continue clinging to previous understandings not anchored in the bedrock of international security.

Chapter Two: Footnotes

1. John Foster Dulles, "United Nations Charter Review," Speech before the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the UN Charter, January 18, 1954, (Washington D.C.: Department of State) Series 5, number 3.

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3. Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.25.

4. General Assembly Resolution 502(VI). The Soviets voted against it. See UN & Disarmament 1945-1970, p. 41.

5. Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 215.

6. Ruth B. Russell, The United Nations and United States Security Policy (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 51.

7. Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter - The Role of the United States: 1940-1945 (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958), p. 227.

8. Russell, History of the UN Charter, Chapter X, in particular p. 228.

9. Postwar Foreign Policy Preparations (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1949).

10. A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations: Principles and Issues (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), p. 42.

11. Russell, History of the UN Charter, p. 43, pp. 96-97 and p. 154.

12. Bennett, International Organizations, pp. 40-42.

13. Postwar Foreign Policy Preparations, pp. 113-114.
 14. Ibid, p. 210.
 15. Bennett, International Organizations, p. 45.
 16. Ibid, p. 129.
 17. Russell, History of the UN Charter, p. 239.
 18. Russell, History of the UN Charter, p. 228.
see also: Leland M. Goodrich, "From League of Nations to the United Nations," in Richard Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds), The Strategy of World Order Vol. III: The United Nations (N.Y.: World Law Fund, 1969), p. 31.
and D.W. Bowett, "The Security Council,"
 19. See:
 - a) James T. Shtwell and Marina Slavin, Lessons on Security and Disarmament - from the History of the League of Nations (New York: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1949), p. 10.
 - b) Ruth B. Henning (ed.), The League of Nations (New York: Barnes & Nobles, 1973), p. 63.
 - c) C'aude, Swords, and his criticism on this view, pp. 288-292.
 20. Bennett, International Organizations, p. 218.
 21. F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), Vol. II. p. 500.
Disarmament, explains Walters, was "continuously in the forefront of the aims and activities of the League." The world in general and the members of the League were convinced that the armaments race which preceded World War I "had been the greatest single element in making disaster inevitable." Ibid, Vol.I. p. 217.
- In particular, the British public opinion was impatient in its expectations for immediate disarmament leading to recovery and prosperity in England. The British plan for disarmament submitted to the League by Lord Esher

was an extreme example to the "direct method of arms reduction which starts from the conviction that disarmament in itself promotes security." Ibid, pp. 220-221.

22. Edward Teller, "The Feasibility of Arms Control and the Principle of Openess," in Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security (New York: George Bragiller, 1961), p. 122.

23. Claude, Swords, p. 292.

24. Russell, The UN and U.S., p. 49.

25. Russell, History of the UN Charter, p. 685.

26. Russell, The UN and U.S., p. 49.

27. Article 26 makes a vague reference for plan "for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armament" to be submitted by the Security Council to the United Nations members. Article 47 provides for a "Military Staff Committee" which will advise the Security Council on its "military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament." The Military Staff Committee has never become effective.

See also:

Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1950), p. 10.

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29. H.G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 27.

30. Claude, Swords, p. 80.

31. James T. Shotwell, "The United Nations Atomic Commission," International Conciliation, September 1946, No. 423. p. 314.

32. Claude, Swords, p. 303.

33. On December 27, 1945, the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union met in Moscow and agreed upon sponsoring the resolution. For review and background:

a) Francis O. Wilcox, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Recent American Foreign Policy - Basic Documents 1941-1951 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1953), pp. 51-53.

b) Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. (General Editor), Richard C. Hottel (Editor on the United Nations), The Dynamic of World Power - A Documentary History of the United States Foreign Policy 1945-1973, Vol.V: The United Nations (N.Y.: Chelsea House, 1973). Additional sources are listed below in the following notes.

34. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 332.

35. Joseph I. Lieberman, The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons 1945-1949 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 410.

36. Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, First Year, No. 1, 1st meeting, p. 7 (June 14, 1946).

37. See: a) Shotwell, "The United Nations," p. 321: says there was almost no debate on the details of the Baruch Plan. The proposal to get rid of the veto power in the Security Council "won ardent support among the advocates of world government."

b) Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 173.

38. New York Times, Editorial, June 15, 1946.

39. Ibid.

40. Official Records of the AEC, First Year, No.2, 2nd meeting, (June 19, 1946).

41. Shotwell, "The United Nations," p. 332.

42. John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962), p. 76.

43. Bernard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961), p. 124, 562.

44. The United Nations and Disarmament: 1945-1970 (New York: United Nation, 1970), p.15.

45. Richard J. Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p.22.

46. Official Records of the AEC, Third Year Special Supplement. (May 1948).

47. Lieberman, The Scorpion, p. 393.

48. Official Records of the AEC, Fourth Year, Special Supplement, (July 29, 1949).

49. William R. Frye, "Characteristics of Recent Arms Control Proposals and Agreements." in Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961), p.71.

50. Spanier & Nogee, The Politics. p. 57.

51. The case has been developed by Gar Alperovits, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster 1965) p.
See also Herken, The Winning Weapon, a modern version of revisionist history.

52. Claude, Swords, p. 306.

53. Russell, The UN and U.S., p. 68.

54. Norman Corwin, Modern Man Is Obsolete. (New York: 1945), pp. 41-42.

55. Lieberman, The Scorpion, p.

56. Richard J. Barnet, "Inspection: Shadow and Substance," in Falk and Mendlovitz, The Strategy, Vol.IV: Disarmament and Economic Development, p. 383.

57. Stanley A. Blumberg & Gwin Owens, Energy & Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward Teller (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976), p. 339.

58. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Octagon, 1947), pp. 35-36.

59. Edward Teller, "A suggested Amendment to the Acheson Report," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 1(12), June 1, 1946, p. 5.

60. New York Times, June 14, 1946,

61. Sir Arthur Salter, "The United Nations and the Atomic Bomb," International Conciliation No. 423, September, 1946, p. 41.

62. Official Records of the AEC, First Year, Special Supplement annex 5, pp. 106-107.

63. Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question, pp. 27-28.

64. Ibid, p. 16.

65. Herken, The Atomic Bomb, is a typical example; dedicates only one paragraph to the Russian plan in a factual review, without any word of criticism (p. 174). On the other hand he is extremely critical of Bernard Baruch: "Thus the Baruch Plan did not differ in substance from an ultimatum the United States might have given Russian to forswear nuclear weapons or be destroyed." (p. 173). Herken develops the theory that American diplomacy and strategy was based on the fallacy that the American nuclear monopoly could be retained for a long time. It was, he says, a false belief in the "winning weapon" - a "deadly illusion" of enduring nuclear monopoly (pp. 338-342). However, when he comes to the Russian side he has to admit, though just in passing - in one sentence, that there is no way to prove that an altogether different policy on the bomb "would have avoided the cold war or could have lessened subsequent Soviet-American enmity." (p. 340).

Herken, as the other revisionists of the 1960's, does not make a strong case that different American policies would have led to a radically different situation.

66. Gaddis, The United States, p. 246.
67. Blumberg & Owens, Energy and Conflict, p. 202.
68. Ibid, p. 20.
69. Gaddis, The United States, p. 332.
70. Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America & Russia Since World War II (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 103-104.
71. John Foster Dulles, War Or Peace, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1950), p. 116.
72. Bechhoufer, Postwar Negotiations, p. 60.
73. David E. Lillienthal, The Journals of David E. Lillienthal: The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York: 1964), p. 74.
74. Lieberman, The Scorpion, p. 111.
75. William R. Frye, "The quest for disarmament since World War II," in Louis Henkin (ed.), Arms Control - Issues for the Public (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 21.
76. Ulam, The Rivals, p. 37.
77. Barnett in Falk & Mendlovitz, The Strategy, Vol. IV p. 390.
78. Ibid, p. 392.
79. Official Records of the Security Council, 2nd Year (22), 5 March, 1947.
80. Official Records of the AEC, First Year Special Supplement, Annex 5, p. 110.

81. New York Times, June 21, 1946.
82. Summary Records of the meeting in Official Records of the AEC, pp. 117-118.
see also the New York Times, July 24, 1946.
83. Official Records of the Security Council, 2nd Year (22), March, 1947.
84. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, p. 335.
85. Derek Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (New York: Praeger Publishers Ind., 1958), pp. 191-192.
86. Official Records of the AEC, First Year, pp. 109-110.
87. Ibid, pp. 108-117.
88. H. Waldock, "The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law," 81 Recueil des Cours, Vol. II, 1952, p. 498.
See also M. McDougal Peliciano, Law and Minimum World Order, (New Have, Yale University Press, 1961), p. 238.
who observe: "The second major difficulty with a narrow reading of Article 51 is that it requires a serious underestimation of the potentialities both of the newer military weapons systems and of the contemporary techniques of non-military coercion."
89. Morton A. Kaplan & Nicholas de B. Katzenbch, The Political Foundations of International Law (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1961), pp. 212-213.
90. Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, (New York: 1965), p. 705.
91. Myres S. McDougal, "The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 57, 1963, p. 601.
92. Ibid, p. 599.

Chapter 3: United Nations Activities and Mechanism in Disarmament

There seems to be at present a tendency in the thinking of the West which I find worrying... If the disarmament control were to be lifted out of the UN... the result would be a weakening of international cooperation all around as the UN would be robbed of a main part of its substantive content without new and really viable substitute being created. 1

Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary-General
of the United Nations, in a letter
to Christian Herter, the US
Secretary of State (in March 1959).

In the disarmament field, UN debates continue to have little impact outside the United Nations... Everyone understands that UN debates have little leverage in the 'real world' of disarmament talks. None, therefore, gets terribly excited about 'irresponsible' resolutions or debates in the General Assembly. 2

Charles William Maynes, shortly
before taking office as the
Assistant Secretary of State
for International Organizations
(1976).

It is true that already from the beginning disarmament has been the source of more continuous effort and debate than any other single item on the United Nations agenda.³ Perhaps there are few, if any, items in the United Nations agenda on which more resolutions were passed than on disarmament.⁴ However, it is misleading to attribute the functions and deliberations of the United Nations on disarmament, as some people at the United Nations try, to the fact that "disarmament, is one of the main objectives of the United Nations under the Charter" or even to regard disarmament as a "prerequisite for the effectiveness of the system of world order outlined in the Charter."⁵ As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the fact of the matter is that deliberately, and in sharp contrast to the Covenant of the League of Nations, little attention was given by the drafters of the Charter to disarmament matters. The United Nations Charter, places no obligation on the General Assembly or the Security Council to achieve disarmament. Accordingly it makes no promise that disarmament is to be regarded as a goal of the organization. Moreover, the founding fathers produced a relatively weak and vague reference to disarmament in the Charter

simply because they believed in an international system of collective security under which the maintenance of national armaments, particularly in the hands of the big powers, is a prerequisite to permit the discharge of international obligations respecting the enforcement of peace and security. War is to be prevented, as the Charter implied, not by disarmament but by regulating and controlling the use of armed force.

Thus, it should be said that the United Nations has intensified its debates in the field of disarmament not because of the Charter's objectives but, quite to the contrary, despite the limits and constraints of the Charter. There is no doubt that one of the most compelling reasons for United Nations activities in the field was the world-wide alarm at the horrific dimensions and possibilities of the nuclear arms race which were introduced after the signing of the Charter.

In this respect, United Nations deliberations on disarmament served different interests of different factions. For the superpowers, and particularly during the cold war period, it provided a major forum for introducing disarmament proposals as part of East-West

psychological maneuvers. For the smaller nations it could provide a consciousness-raising forum to express their fears and concerns over the perils of the nuclear arms race. For their part, members of the United Nations Secretariat, such as former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld were convinced that, if the United Nations wants to be relevant to international politics, disarmament "must remain a central preoccupation of the United Nations."⁶ In a similar vein, Secretary General U Thant regarded disarmament as the most important problem of our time, which together with the other two "Ds" (development and decolonization) are the three main tasks of the organization.⁷

There would be little point in undertaking a detailed survey of United Nations debates in the field of disarmament. There is no need for it, since the broad outlines of much future disarmament and arms control discussions were laid down at the beginning of the United Nations debate. The fundamental differences between the superpowers in their first major confrontation on the problem of international atomic control, indicated the pattern of disagreements and the "parallel

monologue" for future disarmament discussions for the first fifteen years of the United Nations and beyond.⁸ We shall, therefore, examine just some highlights of these debates. In this chapter, disarmament deliberations at the United Nations will be examined in relation to three following questions:

- a) What was the pattern of differences between East and West in disarmament discussions? How did it reflect their different outlook on international order?
- b) What was the role of the United Nations in the arms control agreements which were achieved during the 1960's and the 1970's?
- c) What is the United Nations machinery for disarmament and how does it operate today?

Our review of some of the highlights of the debate reveals that the fundamental gap between East and West was not as much on disarmament as on the conception of world order. With a continuing deadlock over disarmament at the United Nations, the superpowers had decided to move away from the organization and started to negotiate a series of arms control agreements

without altering the existing international order. Being hollowed out of its activities in the field of arms control, the United Nations was left with the unworldly role of playing bureaucratic and procedural games with its machinery for disarmament.

Pattern of Differences

It became apparent that with the lack of a common approach to a system of international order, super-power initiatives on disarmament were doomed to fail. In addition, the cold war enhanced the propagandistic tendencies of United Nations debates, making a serious exchange on disarmament impossible. But even in this propaganda battle one could identify in each side's proposal the philosophical ingredients which constituted their basic approach to international order. It is true, as Inis Claude puts it, that the proposals were formulated with a view to their unacceptability.⁹ But yet they represented a consistent pattern of differences in their approach to the link between disarmament and world order.

From the beginning, following their rejection of the Baruch Plan, the Soviets were consistent in their proposals, as well. In a variety of proposals for

reduction of armaments (1946-1957)¹⁰, always the primary object was defined as the prohibition of atomic weapons, leaving the control issue rather in general and vague terms. While the West called for "effective international control" and went on to specify what was meant by it (describing in detail the various measures of disclosure, inspection, verification on a continuing basis with a special international control organ to carry out those duties), the Soviets have referred instead to "strict international control" without providing too much detail . This was also the case in the much celebrated Russian initiative of May 10, 1955 which Philip Noel Baker regarded as "the moment of hope." Even then the control provisions fell short of Western proposals. The British proponent of disarmament himself admitted that in the Soviet plan "the proposals about inspections and control left some points obscure."¹¹ The control organ in the Soviet plan raised the same problems of decision-making and enforcement which had frustrated all efforts since 1945 since the Soviets rejected the idea of enforcement and sanctions and insisted on maintaining their veto right.

The pattern has repeated itself in the field of conventional weapons. Always in Western proposals on reduction of armaments the "first and indispensable step" was disclosure and verification.¹² For instance a French-Belgian draft resolution (1948) proposed that first the Commission for Conventional Armaments should devote its attention to:

Formulating proposals for the receipt, checking and publication, by an international organ of control within the framework of the Security Council, of full information to be supplied by Member States with regard to their effectives and their conventional armaments. 13

Here, in the course of the debate, it was revealed that Soviet opposition to effective international control was conditio sine qua non. In this case, unlike in the Baruch Plan, the Soviet veto was guaranteed ("within the framework of the Security Council") and the issue under consideration was conventional forces in which the Soviets enjoyed superiority. Nevertheless the Soviets and their allies voted against the proposal, adding to their reservations the argument that the resolution endorsed the theory that security must precede disarmament.¹⁴

Even when the Soviets incorporated the idea of inspection in their plan they have never spelled out the meaning of what they called "permissible inspection." The nature of their political system could not afford on-site inspection (see chapter 2) and, thus, these insertions in their proposals could not but be dismissed by observers, such as Ruth Russell, as probably a propaganda ploy. The gap, she explains, was fundamental:

What seems a reasonable precaution to Americans as well as the sine qua non for any arms control for reduction agreements that the fulfillment of any undertaking should be verified by inspection - has been consistently resisted by Soviet officials as an attack in disguise on the heart of their closed system. 15

The pattern of irreconcilable differences re-emerged also on the highest-level when the heads of state tried to impress world public opinion with dramatic initiatives. President Eisenhower introduced in 1955 the "open skies" proposal-reciprocal aerial inspection of the United States and the Soviet Union and an exchange of the blueprints of American and Soviet military establishments. It was a limited measure of inspection, marking the beginning of the arms control orientation in strategic thinking, in that it was

intended to establish an effective warning system to lessen fears and dangers of surprise attack. The Soviet responded that aerial surveillance should not be permitted until the last stages of a comprehensive disarmament process (disarmament before control). Similarly, when Premier Nikita Khrushchev launched the new Soviet offensive on "General and Complete Disarmament" he told United Nations delegates that only by complete disarmament (and not through control) could the possibility of a state gaining military advantages be eliminated.¹⁶

On September 20, 1961, there was an impression of a narrowing of the gap between the parties, and of an increasing likelihood of agreement. John J. McCloy and V.A. Zorin, who represented the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, in the negotiations, managed to put together a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations. The Agreed Statement presented a sweeping view of what general and complete disarmament would be like, and listed its characteristics quite specifically setting disarmament by stages. At the United Nations, some

regarded it as a "turning point" and as the "most important landmark and guide to disarmament negotiations."¹⁷ But in reality the progress was illusory. Obviously, the Joint Statement itself cannot tell the whole story. In order to understand the differences, one has to scrutinize the documents which preceded the compromise formula. In the less known exchange of letters between the Soviets and the Americans, the parties made it clear that the gap was substantial and not just another quibbling over details of control methods. In fact the Joint Statement has been reached only after the parties had agreed not to agree on the issue of control, and the United States reluctantly withdrew its insistence on specifying the measures of verification. The omitted sentence read:

Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

The United States indicated in its letter, issued on the same day as the Agreed Statement, that it agreed reluctantly to this omission on the grounds that the Soviet Union had not accepted it.¹⁸

Once again, the Soviets indicated that the idea of a broad control system runs against the *raison d'être* of their Communist regime. In his letter to the Secretary General from September 22, 1961, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko reaffirmed the arguments which he had already delivered in the first debate in the mid 1940's. Even in their declaratory policy, the Soviets would agree merely upon a vague concept of control restricted to disarmament measures only. In other words, international control could be exerted only over those weapons which were destroyed and dismantled but not over existing stockpiles and other possible sources of violations. The Soviet representative emphasized:

While it advocated effective control over disarmament, the Soviet Union is emphatically opposed to control over armaments... Any control unrelated to disarmament measures would evolve into an international system of legalized spying... What is important is disarmament, not control. 19

The accompanying exchanges revealed what the joint statement concealed, that the gap between the parties was even more fundamental, touching upon the issue of national sovereignty and world order. The United States, consistent with its previous

proposals, maintained that parallel to the implementations of measures leading to total disarmament it is an essential to create effective peace-keeping machinery. Moreover, the Americans reiterated their philosophical assertions about the inadequacies of current international arrangements:

The United States believes firmly that nations must be prepared to moderate gradually the exercise of unrestricted sovereignty and to abide by the decisions and judgements of tribunals and other bodies, even if such decision at times may not meet with a particular nation's approval. 20

Correctly, the Soviet Union regarded these ideas as amounting to an attempt to change the existing world order. Therefore it went on to oppose the idea of a new peace-keeping force as an "evasion of the Security Council," and to reject the demand "for the abolition of the unanimity rule provided in the Charter,"²¹ namely their veto right.

From the beginning of the negotiations at the Ten-Nation Conference in Geneva, in 1960 there was a deadlock between East and West on this issue of peace enforcement in the course of a disarmament process. The

Eastern bloc contended that Western ideas sought to supplant the United Nations in the field of peace and security and objected to this tampering with the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly as provided in the Charter. The Western powers insisted that the new peace machinery would remain within the framework of the United Nations but it should be strengthened so it could not be frustrated and rendered impotent by the actions of a single Power or group of Powers. Here, on these question of international order, the most telling reply came from both Poland and the USSR which questioned the emphasis placed by the West "on armed coercion in a disarmed world with widespread controls."²²

These fundamental differences were often overlooked by some disarmament specialists, even those who were close observers at the scene. The tendency to read selectively superpowers' declaratory statements on disarmament was highlighted again a few months later in March 1962, when the Soviet Union and the United States submitted their draft treaties for general and complete disarmament. The drafts, submitted to the newly

convened Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, may have created an appearance of basic understanding between the parties since some observers expressed satisfaction that both plans had formal resemblances, with many elements almost identical. Alva Myrdal for instance, emphasized this resemblance:

The two programs were not only very similar as to their general structure, but set great store on a control and verification system to guarantee the security of nations once the complete disarmament was achieved. 23

But the resemblance was deceiving. Myrdal failed to point out that at their roots the two approaches were irreconcilable. Speaking of the American concern for control, Myrdal dismissed it as "overzealous." In fact, as pointed out by other observers, there were fundamental differences in the two plans on several major issues of the disarmament program.²⁴ Typically, the two parties could not even agree upon what looks as mostly as innocent a phrase as the insertion in the preamble by the United States that general and complete disarmament could, realistically, take place only "in a peaceful world." The Soviet Union consistently demanded to drop this phrase since, in

their view, it implied a need to establish some political arrangements before the GCD, which was in sharp contrast to their approach that "the way to disarm is to disarm." As pointed out elsewhere, this Soviet-American skirmish over a phrase in the preamble was nothing but their traditional controversy on what should be first: disarmament or control.²⁵ In this regard the differences were as sharp as ever.

At issue were again the different outlooks on the relationship between disarmament and world order. Hedley Bull, who compared the plans of 1962, emphasized the permanent nature of their differences:

The difference between the conception of the enforcement of disarmament in the two plans is rooted in a fundamental disagreement about the kind of international order it would be the purpose of the plan ultimately to create - a disagreement that was already manifest at the time of the debate over the Baruch Plan in 1946. The Soviet plan is based squarely on the idea of the maximum possible disarmament, without providing for any other changes of a far-reaching sort in the organisation of international relations. The U.S. plan attempts to link the disarmament of states with the concentration of military power in the hands of a central authority; and it regards both as inseparable from changes in the organisation of international relations that involve much more than disarmament itself

and that are unlikely to be capable of compression into a timetable laid down in a treaty. 26

The parties failed to agree on the nature of peace in a disarmed world and what would be required to change in the existing arrangements to guarantee such a peace. Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker explain that the comprehensive disarmament proposals, which are limited to the disarmament process itself (the Soviet proposals), presuppose the continuation of the order of the present world. They assume the retention of the paramount position of the nation-state international system as well as the central role of the great powers within it. In this regard the Soviet proposal in 1962, is addressed almost entirely to the disarmament process itself while its peacekeeping measures scarcely go beyond a reaffirmation of the United Nations Charter. The Soviets are committed to the existing international order with its conflicts of interest, and with the traditional freedom of action retained by the superpowers, including their right of veto in the Security Council. Philosophically, the Soviet approach implies that states in a disarmed world will continue to rely upon the traditional

instruments of diplomacy (including military force) and possibly may "always break the disarmament covenant and rearm."²⁷ All this of course, they add, is based on a very large assumption that the Soviets offer in their draft a reliable system of verification.

The American approach, on the other hand, assumes that in a world without a very large and all-powerful centralized force the risks of disarmament would be inordinately great. In essence, their peacekeeping provisions envisaged disarmament "within a transformed - and, ultimately, a radical transformed-system of international security."²⁸ It presumes the establishment of a workable and effective system of collective security in which a central authority with the monopoly over legitimate force (similar to government in domestic societies) has replaced the existing institutions of self-help. Self-help, as defined by Robert Tucker, is "the right" of the state to determine when its legitimate interests are threatened, or violated, and to employ such coercive measures as it may deem necessary to vindicate those interests."²⁹

It is interesting that despite these deficiencies, the McCloy-Zorin principles and the notion of GCD provided a source for abundant rhetoric in disarmament discussions in many years to come. People would continue to ignore the fundamental problems of world order even after realizing that it was impossible to translate the principles of the apparent "Joint Statement" of the superpowers into mutually acceptable programs of disarmament. The lessons seemed to be forgotten in 1978 when, at the SSOD, under the initiative of the Third World the same approach of "Joint Statement" was adopted in the form of a multilateral document adopted by all member-States of the United Nations. Indeed, the Final Document of the SSOD can be regarded as an elaboration, to a large extent, of the Joint Statement of 1961.

A closer look at the proposals submitted to the SSOD reveals that notwithstanding the Final Document, the basic divergences between the superpowers remained. The Soviets submitted a proposal calling for a complete ban on nuclear weapons ("ban the bomb"), cessation of production and development of all kind of weapons. Typically, nothing in the Soviet paper was said about

methods and implementation of inspection. Gromyko, even went out of his way to deplore the term "control" as meaningless.³⁰ Conversely, the West continued to stress control on weapons as a major condition. Vice President Mondale in his statement to the SSOD offered no new substantive proposals for disarmament but announced another measure of control. The United States, he said, is prepared to offer countries aerial and underground monitoring devices that would detect the presence of nearby weapons systems. These "eyes and ears of peace," he said, could "help create the confidence" necessary to make mutual arms reductions agreements between countries workable.³¹ Other Western countries submitted proposals involving verification measures and on strengthening the United Nations peacekeeping machinery.³²

The United Nations Role in Disarmament

The record of disarmament debates at the United Nations demonstrates that its forums could not promote a businesslike approach for negotiations. In the first fifteen years from 1946 to 1960 the political climate

of the 'cold war' dominated disarmament deliberations at the United Nations.³³ The public forum character of the United Nations with its democratic concept of open diplomacy made it suitable to promote a public relations campaign. The General Assembly became a forum for proposals which were part of the East-West propaganda warfare, rather than serious overtures to negotiations.³⁴ Spanier and Noguee describe these "politics of disarmament" as cynical gamesmanship:

The essence of this game of disarmament is for each side to pose as the representative of virtue and to picture its opponent as the offspring of the devil. And this is accomplished by including in every disarmament plan a set of proposals calculated to possess wide popular appeal. But every such set of proposals and counter-proposals has also included at least one feature - a "joker" - that has been unacceptable to the other side, thereby compelling it to reject the opponent's plan. 35

It was during this period that nuclear specialists concluded that United Nations debates on disarmament, being entangled in cold war politics, were divorced from real strategic concerns and cannot contribute to agreements in the field. Political analysts concluded that the United Nations has proven to be an ineffective instrument for "either the forging or the implementation

of disarmament policies."³⁶ Inis Claude's views were formulated in the 1950's and have remained apt since then:

International organization has become a great promoter of sheer diplomatic loquacy and has provided an exceptional opportunity for the exercise of propagandistic skill: disarmament debates provide as good example as one might seek of speeches for the record only, and proposals formulated with a view to their unacceptability. 37

It seems that the great powers had reached similar conclusions. While realizing that prevention of nuclear war requires cooperation amidst competitive efforts, they understood that the open forum of the United Nations cannot provide the necessary setting for this kind of business-like approach. As a result, from 1957 major negotiations on disarmament moved outside the United Nations to ad hoc bodies established by agreement of the major powers. These bodies have had "only a tenuous connection with to United Nations."³⁸

The trend toward negotiating disarmament outside the United Nations angered members of the United Nations secretariat. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld

was dismayed by what he regarded as "great power elitism" and "irresponsible" attempts to create new machinery for disarmament. Protesting the Western proposal to establish a new separate international disarmament organization, Hammarskjöld wrote to the American Secretary of State that it "would hollow out of the United Nations one of its main fields of activity."³⁹ However, this protest did not impress the great powers. Even later, when the superpowers enlarged their East-West Ten Nation Disarmament Committee to include 8 nations of the Third World in the new Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) they did not mean to strengthen the United Nations role. The major aim was to create a forum "where the Soviet Union and the United States could meet outside the highly charged political atmosphere of the United Nations."⁴⁰

It is clear that whenever the parties concerned were genuinely interested in pursuing a particular arms control agreement they would move their negotiations away from the United Nations. Even the staunchest supporters of the United Nations had to recognize the fact that the organization has never been a primary

organ for negotiation of specific arms control agreements. With its parliamentary character, it cannot treat disarmament in a businesslike approach, freed of other political considerations. With 157 (in 1981) member states it is also too huge a forum for complex technical issues of arms control.

Nevertheless, some arms control agreements are sometimes misleadingly attributed to the United Nations. Particularly in two cases: the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the Non Proliferation Treaty (1968), some analysts are inclined to regard the United Nations role as influential and effective.⁴¹ The fallacy stems from the failure to understand that while the United Nations was indeed debating for several years some similar initiatives (in fact United Nations resolutions usually encompass almost everything in disarmament), actually the agreements were reached outside United Nations fora. Moreover, it is misleading to assume that because the superpowers were exposed to unpleasant criticism at the United Nations they moved to iron-out their differences and reached arms control agreements. Today it becomes apparent that denunciation

of the superpowers at the United Nation on the lack of progress in their negotiations is to no avail.

Basically, these two treaties, as most other arms control agreements, should be viewed against the backdrop of the superpowers' shift to arms control dialogue in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Only after this "shock treatment" of the thirteen fearful days teetering on the brink of world holocaust were both leaders in United States and the Soviet Union compelled to look into the nuclear abyss to see how narrow is the escape route. It was a bloodless "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation that changed dramatically the entire complexion of the cold war and ushered in a period of series of arms control negotiations and agreements. As a result of the crisis, the common interests of the two powers have become more explicit and closely defined, the aim being to prevent an uncontrolled nuclear race.

As a realistic approach which acknowledges the limits and constraints of the international system, arms control is designed to develop a political

framework which will maintain international stability and security by the skillful management of weaponry. The agreements were to reduce the risk of nuclear war through accidents and to provide regulators and safety valves for the emerging mutual deterrence. In this process leading toward arms control agreements, three stages can be identified. First came the establishment of some "confidence-building" agreements (Hot-Line), in order to avoid miscalculated risks. Secondly, they moved to secure their monopoly by creating a "non-proliferation regime" (NPT) to prevent smaller powers from acquiring nuclear weapons capability. Finally, they began to stabilize a state of deterrence between themselves, at least for the present, on the mutual understanding that each side will retain a second strike capability. During this period of SALT I and SALT II, the superpowers demonstrated how mutual deterrence is their pre-eminent concern.

Unlike the previous exchanges on disarmament at the United Nations, arms control negotiations were not intended to alter international order. To the contrary, arms control relies primarily on the

existing balance of power and aims to make the military competition between the superpowers safer in order to mitigate the dangers of the nuclear age (for further elaboration see Appendix A: On Terminology). The PTBT and the NPT were, thus, an integral part of the emerging new pattern of relationship between the superpowers. The issue of international control was no longer dealt with in the framework of revisions in the United Nations Charter or the establishment of new international organs. In addition, technological progress has reduced in some limited respects the control problem by making some verification possible without formal inspection. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 became possible only when the United States began to launch surveillance satellites which enabled it to detect and verify violations of the ban in the three environments covered.⁴² Soon it became apparent that both the PTBT and the NPT reflected the particular interests of the superpowers and failed to take account of the wishes and the interests of the United Nations majority. Let us examine the role of the United Nations in the achievement of these treaties.

United Nations deliberations on a test ban are in effect the most prolonged of all arms control efforts, going back to the early 1950's. In 1954, as a result of an American thermonuclear testing in the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific, voices were raised at the United Nations to deal with nuclear testing as an urgent measure separate from the general issue of disarmament. Already in 1955, the United Nations decided to set up a scientific committee on the effects of atomic radiation. In 1959, for instance, four resolutions were passed by overwhelming majorities at the General Assembly, urging a moratorium on nuclear tests. The Soviets, having initiated the moratorium which went into effect in 1958 and was maintained for three years, shocked the world with its decision (August 30, 1961) to resume testing, crowning the new series with a fifty-megaton blast in the atmosphere. The United States followed suit and also resumed nuclear testing.

In these years the United Nations played a role which can be viewed as similar and equal to other movements which expressed grave concern over radioactive fallout, notably the scientists and the

intellectuals of the Pugwash movement. Moreover, even the multilateral bodies which dealt with the technical problems of the test ban, did not constitute United Nations machinery: Conference of Experts on Detection of Nuclear Tests (Geneva, 1958), Conference on the Discontinuation of Nuclear Weapons Tests (Geneva 1958-1962) Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament (established in 1960, Geneva) and enlarged later (1962) to Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, and particularly the Tripartite Moscow Test Ban Negotiations (Moscow 1963). All these bodies were established as a result of US-USSR agreements, in which the two countries, in effect, invited the others to participate. Technically they were not United Nations bodies, though some of them were endorsed by the General Assembly and submitted reports to the United Nations.

But even these bodies, in hundreds of meetings, did not finalize the Partial Test Ban Treaty. The agreement was reached only, and at the time, when the superpowers saw it as their common interest: "suddenly, in the summer of 1963, the superpowers switched the

test-ban negotiations from multilateral talks in Geneva to trilateral talks in Moscow. There, within weeks, a partial ban was produced.⁴³ From the super-powers' point of view the treaty reflected a compromise between the traditional three strands: the Americans could be satisfied, since above-ground tests could be controlled; the treaty did not ban underground tests which necessitated verification of a kind unacceptable to the Russians; it also reflected the emergence of the new superpowers' common interest: weapons research could be satisfactorily carried on by them with underground tests, an option which was unfeasible for less technologically - advanced countries. In addition, the treaty served their new common propaganda function against the emerging anti-superpowers front of the non-aligned nations. Arthur Lall, representing the Third World's view, wrote in a somewhat frustrated tone about the ineffectiveness of multilateral machinery for disarmament negotiations: "The United Nations, the Test Ban Conferences, the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, all discussed test ban for some nine years, but when a partial agreement was reached it was in fact, reached bilaterally."⁴⁴

Soon, it also became apparent, that the treaty, which was hailed at the time as the first significant breakthrough in efforts to limit the nuclear arms race, was never intended as a measure to curtail weapons development. Its critics, disillusioned by superpowers negotiations in the field, call it rather a public-health measure,⁴⁵ since it has reduced radioactivity in the atmosphere. Or in another version, "...a clear air bill, a victory for the environmentalists rather than the arms controllers."⁴⁶ As Ruth Russell explains, the PTBT "formalized rather than changed in any significant way the existing situation between the parties." The treaty did not disturb the military balance between the superpowers and by restricting its application "to the three environments where international verification was not necessary the thorny issue of inspection was avoided."⁴⁷

The role played by the United Nations machinery in the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was different only in the procedural sense. Here the United Nations forum was more instrumental, since the NPT necessitated the active participation of the majority of the non-nuclear weapons countries.

Also, an important role was envisaged for the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in supervising the implementation of the treaty. Nevertheless, the NPT was discussed at the United Nations for years, but it became possible only when the United States and the Soviet Union wanted it:

The tremendous power they [the superpowers] wielded and their worldwide interests and commitments could be challenged and endangered if additional and smaller powers acquired nuclear weapon capability. International diplomacy and the exercise of political influence would become much less manageable. 48

Since with the NPT the superpowers were mostly engaged in "selling" activities, and their potential "buyers" were the non-nuclear nations, the United Nations became a major vehicle to promote their ideas. Naturally it involved more multilateral negotiations in larger fora in order to obtain almost universal commitment to maintain, in effect, the existing distribution of world power. The United Nations machinery was therefore a major instrument in the hands of the big two, and the last stage of the struggle for the United Nations endorsement of the draft treaty (1968) was marked by a United States-Soviet Union partnership all the way.⁴⁹

In a few years the NPT would be viewed by the majority of its parties as a discriminatory measure designated to promote only the interests of nuclear weapon states at the expense of the rest of the world (see chapter 6).

Other arms control agreements which the superpowers submitted to the Geneva Committee, such as the Sea-Bed Treaty and the Biological Convention, are considered less significant. They followed the same procedure as the NPT; first submitted separately but in identical drafts by the superpowers and later introduced as their joint draft treaty text.⁵⁰ As Michael Sullivan explains both treaties may be considered quite insignificant as disarmament measures. Since the real threat from underwater missiles comes from highly mobile submarines and not from stationary emplacements, the superpowers regarded the ocean bed as infeasible for their nuclear deterrence policies. Similarly the Biological Convention prohibited only those bacteriological agents and toxins which were so noxious and dangerous that their value was doubted.⁵¹ So far attempts to extend the scope of previous limited agreements by the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and the Chemical Weapons Treaty (CW), have

failed, in part because of the inspection issue.

The record of the 1960's and the 1970's demonstrates that whenever the parties concerned were really interested in arriving at an agreement on arms limitation, or discussing some specific issues of arms control, they immediately moved away from the United Nations. This was also the case in two regional agreements: the Denuclearization of Latin America (Tlatelolco, Mexico 1967), and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki Agreement - 1975). In the 1970's the super-powers held a series of bilateral negotiations on variety of disarmament issues - the SALT talks, chemical and radiological weapons, comprehensive test ban (with the United Kingdom), Indian Ocean arms limitation, international arms trade. Since 1973, countries of the military pacts of NATO and Warsaw have been holding periodic talks on force reductions in Central Europe (MBFR). Especially in SALT, the Americans and the Soviets established an elaborate, formalized permanent machinery outside the United Nations and the CCD framework. For its first four years the forum was rotated between Vienna and Helsinki "almost as if to emphasize its

independence from the United Nations-related organs at Geneva and New York."⁵²

Be that as it may, the striking fact is that at the United Nations and its other related fora disarmament deliberations had little impact on the "real world" of the superpowers. In sharp contrast to their deadlock at the United Nations over the implications of disarmament measures on world order the superpowers were able, outside the organization, to develop their framework of achievable arms control agreements which conformed to existing international order and balance of power. Stripped of any role in the arms control process, the United Nations could deal only with its own store: creating and re-creating various organs of disarmament.

The United Nations Machinery in Disarmament

A United Nations publication concluded correctly: "...from the very beginning, it was not the lack of machinery that stood in the way of disarmament agreements."⁵³ Indeed, in light of the United Nations record in the field of machinery for disarmament, it can be

argued that almost every possible structural and functional option was explored and exhausted. Numerous bodies with a variety of functions and different procedures have been established, enlarged, merged, reformed, dismantled or revived. Composed of from two nations to the full United Nations membership, these bodies have held thousands of meetings and their proceedings are recorded in an immense United Nations documentation. The extent to which organizational proliferation and bureaucratic growth influenced the substance of disarmament exchanges, remains an open question. It seems, and this will be elaborated later, that sometimes organizational reforms were initiated simply as cosmetic maneuvers to compensate for the lack of real progress. Later, with the growing assertiveness of Third World nations, reforms in the United Nations machinery for disarmament were carried out with the deliberate aim to challenge and undermine the delicate framework of arms control agreements negotiated and achieved between the superpowers (chapter 5).

Gradually the so-called "negotiating forum" in Geneva has grown from its nucleus in the Ten-Nation

Disarmament Committee of 1960, through the ENDC (18 nations) and CCD (26 nations in 1969 and 31 in 1975), to the new Committee on Disarmament (CD) with 40 members (1979). The Special Session of Disarmament (SSOD) leadership of the Third World countries succeeded, in what Dag Hammarskjöld failed, to strengthen the link between the CD and the United Nations and to abolish its superpower co-chairmanship. This paved the way for the participation of the two remaining nuclear weapon states: France and China. In addition, the SSOD revived the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) - a plenary body to which every United Nations member belongs.

The movement to shake up and reform the disarmament negotiating forum dates back to the early 1970's.⁵⁴ The CCD at Geneva has come increasingly under criticism, primarily for not producing results - new and significant treaties. United Nations members were irritated by "bilateralism rampant" - the tendency of the superpowers to negotiate alone, and their "condominium" in the CCD under which they determined the agenda, pace of discussions, working methods, etc. This situation was

sharply at variance with the rising power of the Third World bloc within the United Nations system and the demand for greater equality of all states.⁵⁵ Third World delegates pointed out that the CCD was often being dismissed as an irrelevant talking-shop, and called for a reform which would democratize the forum taking into account the many changes that had taken place in the world since 1961.⁵⁶ As a result one of the major goals of the 1978 SSOD was to re-evaluate and reform the existing United Nations machinery for disarmament. While the Final Document has recognized that lack of political will was a significant obstacle on the way toward disarmament, it also expressed the belief that improvements in the machinery are important:

Although the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the political will of States, and especially of those possessing nuclear weapons, a significant role can also be played by the effective functioning of an appropriate international machinery designed to deal with the problems of disarmament in its various aspects. 57

The struggle over United Nations machinery for disarmament during the SSOD revealed the gap between the majority of the General Assembly and the united

front of the superpowers. As the annotated version of the draft final document demonstrates, both superpowers rejected the non-aligned idea of putting the CCD "under the auspices of" the United Nations. The Soviets emphasized the voluntary nature of the links between the CCD and the United Nations, while the non-aligned insisted upon variety of proposals to strengthen the link.⁵⁸ Soviet bloc countries expressed more preference than the West, including the Americans, on continuing the co-chairmanship structure at the CCD. They explained that co-chairmanship never prevented equality in reaching decisions but, on the contrary, the close collaboration of the two co-Chairmen had saved the Committee from lengthy discussions.⁵⁹ However, at the SSOD, the superpowers, unwilling to budge on substance, agreed to let the Third World have a face-saving achievement in the form of bureaucratic reforms. As a result, superpowers' co-chairmanship in the Geneva Committee was eliminated, and its membership was expanded and its links with the United Nations were strengthened (see chapter 5).

Nevertheless, even those who were interested in strengthening the role of the United Nations in the

process of disarmament had to recognize its limits. The non-aligned, which obviously prefer the huge fora where they enjoy a majority, agreed - particularly those of them in the CCD - on the need for some permanent multilateral negotiating machinery smaller than the annual General Assembly deliberations.⁶⁰ In their working papers and statements to the SSOD, they explicitly recognized that there must be a separate body, smaller in size and representation in order to conduct negotiations. Therefore, it was for the first time at the SSOD that an official distinction between two different types of disarmament machinery was drawn and incorporated into United Nations practice and terminology. From then on, United Nations machinery was organized around two pillars: deliberative and negotiating bodies.⁶¹

A deliberative body is usually large in number and strives to develop general guidelines and principles. At the United Nations, deliberations usually involves all member-states and deals primarily with general policy, (the G.A. and Committees, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the NPT review conferences etc.).

A negotiating body is usually limited in size, and in it the professionals and the experts deal with the specifics and technicalities of agreements and treaties (SALT, MBFR- Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe, the Trilateral meetings on CTB - Complete Test Ban-United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom).

These distinctions were incorporated in the resolutions of the United Nations SSOD and were translated into practice in the follow-up machinery. In the words of the SSOD Final Document:

For maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field of disarmament - deliberative and negotiating. All member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership... The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament... The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of General Assembly... The Assembly is deeply aware of the continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus... the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. 62

It remained questionable, however, whether any United Nations organ, which by definition is subordinate to

a representative body of the General Assembly, can serve as an effective negotiating body. The record of the CD since 1979 is not encouraging in this regard.

Table 1: The Vicissitudes of the International Disarmament Machinery

<u>UN Machinery</u>	<u>Linked, but not UN</u>
1946 -Atomic Energy Commission (11 members)	
1947 -Commission for Conventional weapon (11 members)	
1952 -The two aboved merged into the Disarmament Commission (12 members)	
1954 -Subcommittee of the DC in London (Canada, France, U.S., USSR, U.K.,)	
1957 -Disarmament Commission enlarged with another 14 members	
1958 - DC enlarged to include all UN members	
Since 1958 the DC has held only two session in 1960 and in 1965, until it was revived by the SSOD.	1958 - -Discontinuance of Nuclear weapons tests (US, U.K., USSR) -Experts on Prevention of Surprise Attack (Geneva: west 4, East 4) -Experts on Detection of Nuclear Tests (Geneva: west 4, East 4)
1979 -UN Disarmament Commission revived; includes all member states	1959 - Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament (Geneva: west 4, East 4) * 1962 - Zlirteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (Geneva: west 5, East 5, Non-aligned 3) * 1970 - Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) * (Geneva: West 7, East 7, Non-Aligned 12) 1975 - CCD enlarged to 31 members* (Geneva: West 8, East 3, Non-aligned 15)
1979 -Committee on Disarmament (Geneva) under rotated chairmanship, with stronger ties to the UN (40 members)	

*Under superpowers' co-chairmanship.

Table 2: Membership of successive Geneva disarmament committees

	Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee 1960	Eighteen- Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) 1962-69	Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) 1969-74	(CCD) 1975-78	Committee on Disarmam- ent (CD) 1979-?
Soviet Union	**	**	**	**	.
United States	**	**	**	**	.
Britain	.	.	.	.	.
Bulgaria	.	.	.	.	.
Canada	.	.	.	.	.
Czechoslovakia	.	.	.	.	.
France	.	(.)	(.)	(.)	.
Italy	.	.	.	.	.
Poland	.	.	.	.	.
Romania	.	.	.	.	.
+Brazil		.	.	.	.
+Burma		.	.	.	.
+Egypt (formerly as UAR)		.	.	.	.
+Ethiopia		.	.	.	.
India		.	.	.	.
+Mexico		.	.	.	.
+Nigeria		.	.	.	.
+Sweden		.	.	.	.
+Argentina		.	.	.	.
Hungary		.	.	.	.
Japan		.	.	.	.
Monrovia		.	.	.	.
+Morocco		.	.	.	.
Netherlands		.	.	.	.
+Pakistan		.	.	.	.
+Yugoslavia		.	.	.	.
Federal Republic of Germany		.	.	.	.
German Democratic Republic		.	.	.	.
+Iran		.	.	.	.
+Peru		.	.	.	.
+Zaire		.	.	.	.
+Algeria		.	.	.	.
Australia		.	.	.	.
Belgium		.	.	.	.
China		.	.	.	.
+Cuba		.	.	.	.
+Indonesia		.	.	.	.
+Kenya		.	.	.	.
+Sri-Lanka		.	.	.	.
+Venezuela		.	.	.	.

**Superpowers' Chairmanship; + The Group of 21 non-aligned countries;
(.) France did not occupy its reserved seat.

The CD since 1979

The opening of the new negotiating forum - the Committee on Disarmament - in Geneva on 24 January, 1979, attracted a lot of media attention. The Algerian Foreign Minister became the first chairman of the CD under the new monthly alphabetical rotation system. The French Foreign Minister was there also (together with four other Foreign Ministers) to mark the return of his country to the negotiating forum. But, as some observers indicated, the impressive gathering with so much fanfare did not affect the substance of the discussions.⁶³ The French maiden address to the CD was a ringing reminder to the delegates how France's priorities do not coincide with those of the CD's other members. There was no mention, in the French speech, of a nuclear test ban which has been the major priority (and still is) of the majority in the Geneva organ.⁶⁴ Ironically both new-comers to the CD, France and China (which joined the CD in February 1980) are the traditional dissenters among the five nuclear-weapon states. They did not join the major arms control treaties: PTB, NPT, Sea-Bed Treaty and the Biological weapons

Convention). How could so many hope that the entrance of France and China to the CD would strengthen United Nations disarmament efforts?⁶⁵ It was, once more, a failure to understand that as long as there are no common grounds on the issues related with the framework of world order, a real breakthrough in disarmament would be impossible. Both China and France, particularly in their arms control and disarmament policies, have always been the 'enfants terribles' among the Big Five and did not accept the basically bi polar 'arms control regime' which the superpowers began to elaborate since the early 1960's (see chapter 5). It should have been clear to specialists in the field that it would be an illusion to expect that this fundamental gap can be narrowed by petty reforms in the disarmament mechanism. Actually, the net result of these reforms would be to enhance the gap between the deliberations at United Nations forums and the real world of arms control outside.

The Chinese maiden speech a year later (Feb. 5, 1980) was even worse from the point of view of disarmament supporters. Delivered by the Chinese

Vice-Foreign Minister, the speech was dominated by accusations and recriminations, expostulations and reply (he was interrupted twice by the Soviet Ambassador) which are unusual even at the United Nations regular disarmament deliberative bodies. The Chinese charged Moscow with engineering wars by proxy and staging coup d'etat and sending its own troops abroad while masking its true motives with "fraudulent rhetoric." China did not identify the Soviet Union by name but made it clear which country it meant by a reference to the Soviet "armed intervention in Afghanistan."⁶⁶ One may just conclude that the entrance of France and China did not mark any change in their attitudes and approaches toward the fundamental problems of disarmament but rather reflected a tactical decision to make use of the negotiating forum for national purposes.

Soon, it was realized that the reform in the CD created some new problems in the actual conduct of negotiations. The increase in participants meant simply a substantial increase in the workload - mainly for

the purposes of deliberations, with more countries issuing statements during the general debates in the plenary and more discussants on agenda items. In addition to the differences between North and South on disarmament (see the next chapters of the dissertation) and the new aspects of friction introduced by China and France, the CD has witnessed a deterioration in the cooperation between the superpowers. In 1981, the Soviet Union introduced the subject of the "neutron bomb" to the CD discussions with the knowledge that it would be defeated immediately because of the required approval by consensus in the Committee. The Soviet initiative, seconded by all other communist countries in the CD, demonstrated the decline of the organ into another United Nations deliberative body.⁶⁷ It may be argued that had the co-chairmanship of the superpowers remained at the CD, it would have been impossible for the Soviets to get the required American approval for injecting an "East-West" issue to the negotiating forum. As Richard Haas of the International Institute for Strategic Studies pointed out, already in 1979, the reforms in the CD may have had the unexpected result of further complicating the activities of the body, thereby accelerating the trend against using it for serious negotiations.⁶⁸

Gradually, therefore, the Committee on Disarmament, designated as a negotiating forum, was getting closer and closer to being another United Nations deliberative forum. Practically, there have been no negotiations at the CD since its establishment. The protocols of the meetings reveal that the participants are delivering almost identical speeches to what they say in the other deliberative fora: the First Committee of the General Assembly and the UNDC. Similarly, as revealed by the agenda of the CD, by working papers submitted to it, and the indexes of statements by country and subjects, the CD represents not just some overlap with United Nations deliberations but rather virtually repetitions of the same positions, proposals and even mutual recriminations. One can find hardly any difference between the discussions and elaborations on the "comprehensive programme of disarmament" in the United Nations Disarmament Commission (one of the deliberative fora) and the CD (supposedly a negotiating forum).⁶⁹ The Soviet Ambassador to the CD, himself active in introducing the new divisive issues, admitted that the organ for negotiations has failed during its first three years to work out a single, even most modest, agreement in limiting the arms race.⁷⁰

Moreover, even in its organizational structure the CD is becoming more a forum for deliberations than a multilateral negotiating forum. The CD major achievement in its first year of operation, as heralded by the Mexican Representative Alfonsu Gracia Robles, often referred to as the "dean of Geneva" or the "godfather of disarmament,"⁷¹ was the adoption of rules of procedures.⁷² Further hindsight on the issue reveals that from the point of view of negotiations this achievement might be a Pyrrhic victory. As indicated by the representative of the Netherlands, Richard Fein, rules of procedures belong to the United Nations deliberative bodies but were deliberately avoided in diplomatic conferences which met to negotiate treaties. By introducing rules of procedure and other procedural devices "the fundamental difference between a deliberative body and a negotiating conference" was blurred.⁷³

In 1980, the "Group of 21" in the CD (the Third World countries) proposed the establishment of ad-hoc working groups on five agenda topics as "the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee."⁷⁴ This was, in effect, an admission of the difficulties to carry on negotiations in the enlarged CD. Similarly, it was

emphasized by Garcia Robles that the new CD procedures still allow the nuclear powers, when they consider it necessary, "to carry out bilateral agreements they considered to be important."⁷⁵ This was an attempt to salvage the newly reformed organ before it became completely irrelevant, as have other United Nations organs, to the arms control process outside the United Nations. Hence, the Third World had to recognize that still the superpowers may consider, on a bilateral level, some of their arms control issues,

The reformed United Nations machinery for disarmament did not bring any breakthrough, in disarmament. The annual reports of the "deliberative forum" (DC) and the "negotiating forum" (CD) reveal that the members are able to agree only on reporting their differences.⁷⁶ Thus, the extensive deliberations and negotiations in these organs, instead of harmonizing views and approaches to disarmament have sharpened and emphasized disagreement. As shown, the SSOD created terminological confusion in its attempt to formalize and institutionalize the distinction between negotiating and deliberative forum. Ironically, at the CD there are complaints about the deliberative tendencies and the inability to negotiate in the

enlarged forum. On the other hand, when the United Nations Disarmament Commission wants to create at least the appearance of progress and to issue something close to a consensus report, it has to dedicate most of its work to an informal meeting, thus, becoming a negotiating body.⁷⁷

In 1981 it became apparent that the CD could not function any more as a negotiating forum. It was not just a temporary failure due to some transitional developments in international relations, but in essence a collapse of the whole notion that structural and procedural reforms can help to reconcile diametrically opposite outlooks and philosophies on issues such as international stability and world order (see next chapters).

It became obvious that the real debate in the United Nations on disarmament items is not on how to limit or control the arms race but rather on whether to change international order by means of disarmament. In 1981, for the first time in the history of the disarmament negotiating forum in Geneva, the CD report to the United Nations General Assembly included

several paragraphs which raised criticism of the super-powers doctrines of nuclear deterrence. The Geneva organ, which according to the SSOD resolutions should "conduct its work by consensus," became in its third year of operation a kind of panel of experts, or an international seminar on nuclear strategy and international peace and stability. Besides its formal deliberations on these issues which are, after all, part and parcel of an existing world order, the CD has dedicated special informal meetings on the "complex character" of issues "involving security concerns and strategic doctrines."⁷⁸

In these informal meetings, as reported by the CD to the General Assembly:

the group of 21 put forward the view that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the nuclear arms race and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. The group rejected the existing superpower deterrence as politically and morally unjustifiable." ⁷⁹

Though the report also states the views of the socialist States and member of the Western alliance, it still

remains an unprecedented document for a negotiating forum which relies upon consensus among its members. It seems also inconceivable that countries with divergent interests such as Sweden and Iran, or regional rivals such as Brazil and Argentina or India and Pakistan or the United States and Cuba would be able to iron out their differences and offer a workable proposal on disarmament.

Mechanism and World Order

The early debates, during the cold war period, between East and West were marked by the failure to revise the international order in order to accommodate it to the requirements of the nuclear age. The Baruch Plan, whether it was naive or shrewd, was consistent with the American official view at that time that the prospects of a nuclear arms race were too dangerous to be dealt with, in the words of President Truman, "in the framework of old ideas" of national sovereignty.⁸⁰ The failure of the Baruch plan has established the pattern of differences between East and West which

characterized the long impasse in United Nations activities in the field of disarmament.

With the failure of the United Nations to provide the conducive atmosphere for arms control negotiations, the superpowers began to discuss their matters outside the international organization. The public forum of the United Nations with its inherent tendencies toward propaganda warfare made it impossible for the superpowers to negotiate some limited measures of arms control without altering world order. As shown in this chapter, all agreements on arms control during the 1960's and the 1970's were reached outside the United Nations and always after bilateral negotiations between the superpowers. The various treaties were submitted, then, to the United Nations organs as faits accomplis. The only choice left for the disarmament community at the United Nations (diplomats and staff members) was to indulge in a Parkinson-type of bureaucratic expansionism.

The reforms and innovations in the United Nations machinery for disarmament have reached new records

in the SSOD of 1978. According to a report by the Secretary General of the United Nations, prepared by a group of experts the number of disarmament bodies in the United Nations has almost tripled in a period of three years since the SSOD. During the three year period of 1974-1976, there was a total of 15 disarmament bodies that met for 46 sessions; in the three-year period 1979-1981, about 40 committees, commissions, conferences, expert groups held approximately 140 sessions.⁸¹ The CD itself, as a "negotiating" body, has more than doubled its activities in its first two years (1979-1980) in terms of meetings and the production of working papers and other documents.⁸² The SSOD brought about an unprecedented expansion of United Nations involvement in research and studies in the field of disarmament. In three years (1979-1981) the United Nations Centre on Disarmament produced 16 different studies on disarmament.⁸³ Some of the studies had a clear political bias on controversial issues, threatening to politicize the role of the organization (see chapter 5).

The result is an endless vicious cycle of bureaucratic activities which are aimed apparently to compensate for the lack of real influence of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. First the majority of the Third World calls for the strengthening and consolidating the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. Then it adopts resolutions which establish new organs and orders new reports and studies. Finally, the Secretary General, with the help of governmental experts, reports that the "growing disarmament agenda," and the "increasing complexity of the issues" and the "more active participation" of member States in the new and expanded bodies "create increasing demands on the United Nations in the field of disarmament."⁸⁴ So no wonder that the next step would be a further expansion, with more financial implications, of the United Nations machinery for disarmament.

It seems that the United Nations is creating a bureaucratic monster which would not necessarily serve as the institutional framework for the joint exploration of approaches to disarmament. This process

gives rise to an illusion that the problem of disarmament can be dealt with through organizational innovations instead of tackling the political roots of the issues involved. The tendency, as in many complex organizations, "to keep doing what you are doing" may lead to complacency among disarmament observers and overreliance on the structural apparatus of the disarmament machinery. In the SSOD, for instance, the issue of machinery of disarmament has overwhelmed many other aspects of the debate - matters related directly with the substance of disarmament. The proliferation of organs, sessions, studies and reports since the SSOD underscored the trend toward an indiscriminate approach of organizational and bureaucratic experiments instead of dealing with the real political matters. Experience has shown that organs dedicated to disarmament can be easily transformed into an arena for the conduct of international political warfare, or can serve as an instrument for the advancement of the political objectives of a particular state or group of states (see chapter 5 and 8). Machinery as such cannot generate its own supply of leadership, inspiration and

the required political will; the danger is that it may become a substitute for these qualities.

Chapter 3 Footnotes

1. Brian Urquhart, Hammarskiöld (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 325.
2. Charles William Maynes, "A UN Policy for the Next Administration," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, Winter 1975-76, July 1976, p. 805.
3. Urquhart, Hammarskiöld, p. 315.
4. Leland M. Goodrich, Edward Hambro, Anne Simmons, United Nations Charter: Commentary and Documents (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 120.
5. Urquhart, Hammarskiöld, p. 315.
6. Ibid, p. 332.
7. William Epstein, Disarmament - Twenty-five Years of Effort (Ontario: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1971), p. 4.
8. See: a) Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), Introduction.
b) Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 301.
c) William R. Frye, "The Quest for disarmament," p. 21.
d) Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question, p. 33.
e) For an extensive account of East-West propaganda warfare of disarmament proposals see: Spanier & Noguee, The Politics of Disarmament.
9. Claude, Swords, p. 296.
10. See for instance the following Soviet drafts in General Assembly Official Records:
a) A/C.1/87, 29 November, 1946.
b) A/723, 17 November, 1948.
c) DC/4/Rev.1, 19 March, 1952.
d) DC/SC.1/Rev.2, 10 May, 1955.
e) A/C.1/793, 20 September, 1957.

11. Phillip Noel Baker, The Arms Race (New York: Oceana Publication, 1960), p. 20.

12. See for instance in GAOR:

- a) A/C.1/89, 2 December, 1946 (United States).
- b) A/1943, 7 November 1951 (France, the United Kingdom, the United States).
- c) DC/87, 3 July, 1956 (Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States).

13. Adopted as: General Assembly Resolution 192 (III) 19 November, 1948.

14. The UN & Disarmament 1945-1970, p. 31.

15. Ruth Russell, The UN & U.S. Security Policy, p. 91, also in Louis Henkin, Disarmament, The Hammarkjold Forums of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (New York: Oceana Publication, 1964), p. 19.

16. GAOR, Fourteenth Session Plenary Meetings, 799th meeting, 8 September, 1959.

17. Epstein, Disarmament, pp. 14-15.

18. The United States insisted also that verification should start from the beginning and regarded the Soviet position too ambiguous which "would make any disarmament plan a sham." GAOR, Sixteen-Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, Document A/4880.

19. Ibid, Document A/4887.

20. Ibid, Document A/4880.

21. Ibid, Document A/4887.

22. The UN & Disarmament 1945-1970, p. 83.

23. Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), p. 298.

24. William Epstein, The Last Chance - Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 16.

25. Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman (eds.), A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: R.R. Bowker Company, 1973), p. 482.

26. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, p.XX
See also James E. Dougherty, "Soviet Arms Control Negotiations," in Eleanor Lansing Dulles, and Robert Dickson Crane (eds.), Detente-Cold War Strategies In Transition (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 179-200.

27. Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, Force, Order, and Justice (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 334-335, fn. 14.

28. Ibid, p. 336, fn. 17.

29. Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 4.
The feature of self-help, Tucker suggests, may be the distinguishing feature of the legal equality between sovereign and independent states. In practice it highlights the essential inequality of states "since the utility of a right of self-help is of necessity dependent upon the power at the disposal of those exercising this right." Similarly, "the balance of power itself formed the principal political expression of self-help." (p. 6).

30. GAOR, A/S-10/PV.5, 26 May, 1978,

31. GAOR, A/S-10/PV.3, 24 May, 1978,

32. The Federal Republic of Germany submitted proposals concerning "seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban" and "chemical-weapon verification." (A/S-10/AC.1/12-13). The U.S. and other Western countries introduced proposals on "confidence-building measures" and peacekeeping by the UN (A/S-10/AC.1/24, 26).

33. Epstein, The Last Chance, p. 11.

34. a) John G. Stoessinger, The United Nations & the Superpowers (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 162.
b) Ralph Townley, The United Nations: A View from Within (New York: Scribner, 1968), p. 95.
c) Richard Barnett, Who Wants Disarmament, p. 23.

35. Spanier and Nagee, The Politics of Disarmament, p. 52.

36. Alfred Paul Brainard, The United Nations and the Question of Disarmament 1950-1955. A PH.D. dissertation, University of Washington 1960 (Michigan: University Microfilms Inc., 1961), p. 232.

37. Claude wrote it first in 1961 and has maintained it in his revised edition of 1971, Swords, pp. 295-296.

38. Leland M. Goodrich, Edward Hambro, Anne Simmons, United Nations Charter: Commentary and Documents (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 120.

39. Urquhart, Hammarkiold, p. 325.

40. Michael J. Sullivan III, "Conference at the Crossroads: Future Prospect for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament," International Organization, Vol. 29(2), Spring 1975, p. 394.

41. See: a) LeRoy Bennett, International Organization, pp. 230-234.

b) A similar role to the United Nations is implied in a SIPRI publication: Jozef Goldblat, Agreements for Arms Control (London: Taylor & Francis, 1982), p. 39.

42. Russell, The UN and US Security, p. 82, 92.

43. Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament, p. 93.

44. Arthur Lall, "The Superpowers, the UN, and Disarmament: A View from the Third World," in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and George Ginsburg (eds.), Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations (New York: New York University Press, 1971), pp. 57-58.

45. Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament, p. 95.

46. Elizabeth Young, A Farewell to Arms Control (England: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 86.

47. Ruth Russell, UN & US Security, p. 82.

48. Epstein, The Last Chance, pp. 102-103.

49. Stössinger, The UN & the Superpowers, p. 176.

50. Epstein, The Last Chance, pp. 71-72.

51. Michael Sullivan, "Conference at Crossroads," pp. 399-400. Also Frank Barnaby, the director of SIPRI, told the delegates of the UNSSOD:

The arms control Treaties now in force have had little or no effect on the military potential of States. The choice of measures adopted has been haphazard. In several cases the outlawed activities have never even been seriously considered as methods of war. It is now obvious that the method of negotiating small, unrelated steps cannot produce meaningful arms reductions. Insignificant restraints are bound to lag behind the rising levels of armaments and advances in military technology. GAOR, A/S-10/AC.1/PV.8, p. 47, June 13, 1978.

52. Sullivan, *Ibid*, p. 396.

53. UN & Disarmament 1945-1970, p. 3.

54. Sullivan, "Conference at Crossroads,"

55. See for instance:

- a) Nicholas A. Sims, Approaches to Disarmament (London: Quaker Peace & Service, 1979), pp. 12-20.
- b) William Epstein, "UN Special Session on Disarmament How Much Progress?" Survival, November-December 1978, p. 251.
- c) Homer A. Jack, Disarmament Workshop - The UN Special Session and Beyond (New York: World Conference on Religion and Peace, 1979), pp. 89-91.
- d) Philip Towle, "the UN Special Session on Disarmament-Retro spect," World Today, Vol. 35(8), May 1979, p. 212.

56. Nigeria, Documents of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, CCD/PV.769, 1978. For summary of CCD debates on the issue see the Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 1978, GAOR, Thirty-Third Session supplement No. 27 (A/33/27), p. 77-90.

57. GAOR, the SSOD Final Document Tenth Special Session Supplement, No. 4, A/S-10/4, article 10.

58. Annotated document, see appendix 2.

59. Report of the CCD 1978, p. 81. These debates provided another opportunity for Romania to assert its independence on disarmament matters by joining the non-aligned's demands for reform of CCD. Ibid, p. 85.

60. Sullivan, "Conference," p. 395.

61. The concepts have been known quite before, but were formalized at the SSOD:
see: a) Sullivan, Ibid, p. 395, fn. 4.
b) Sims, Approaches, p. 12.

62. SSOD Final Document, articles: 113, 115, 118(a), 120.

63. Disarmament Times, 28 February, 1979.

64. Report of the Committee on Disarmament
App. IV, Vol. I, CD/PV.2, 24 January, 1979.

65. See: a) SIPRI Yearbook 1979, p. 18, p. 520.
b) New York Times, July, 1978.
c) Christian Science Monitor, June 28, 1978.

66. CD/PV.2, February 5, 1980.

67. The Soviets submitted to the CD papers which are nothing but sheer propaganda. There is no attempt on their part, even to pretend that they are in a "negotiating forum." On 17 August, 1981, they circulated in the CD a long statement by TASS, the Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union, which refer to the "cynical disregard" of the American President for "the wishes and interests of the peoples of the world" in deciding to produce the "barbarous device for the mass destruction of human beings." The article was circulated as a document in the CD, CD/216, 17 August, 1981.

68. Richard Hass, reviewing Opportunities for Disarmament in Survival, July-August, 1979, p. 188.

69. see:
and Report of the Committee on Disarmament GAOR
Thirty-Fifth Session Suppl. no. 27 (A/35/27), pp. 56-60
(1980).

The repetition is best illustrated in the UN Disarmament yearbooks of 1979, and 1980, which provide systematic coverage on each disarmament subject at the UN G.A., the DC and the CD.

70. "Soviet Ambassador Issraelyan Criticizes Geneva Forum," Disarmament Times, Vol. IV(4), September-October, 1981.

71. See for instance the statement by Richard Fein from the Netherland, GAOR, A/C.1/34/PV.12, 23, October, 1979.

72. Garcia Robles, GAOR, A/C.1/34/PV.4, 16 October, 1979.

73. GAOR, A/C.1/34/PV.12, 23 October, 1979.

74. Document CD/64, 27 February, 1980.
"Statement of the Group of 21," on the establishment of working groups on items on the annual agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980," also in CD/139/Appendix II/Vol.I and II, 1980.

75. GAOR, A/C.1/34/PV.4, 10 October 1979.

76. Report of the Committee on Disarmament, GAOR, Thirty-Fifth Session, Supplement No. (A/36/27) and Thirty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27) 1981.

77. Most of the meetings of the UNDC in its 1979 and 1980 sessions were closed meetings (unusual for a deliberative forum) and consultations within working groups. See "Comments" in Disarmament Times Vol. II(7), June-July, 1979.

78. Report of the Committee on Disarmament, GAOR, Thirty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/36/27), 1981.

79. Ibid, para. 70.

80. Osgood and Tucker, Force, p. 180, fn. 45.

81. GAOR, Report of the Secretary General, "Study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament," A/36/392, 11 September, 1981, page 10.

82. Frank Barnaby, "United Nations Centre for Disarmament," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January, 1982, p. 6.

83. GAOR, the Secretary General report, p. 10.

84. Ibid, p. 6.

Chapter 4: The Third World and Disarmament -
the New Context

When two elephants get together, whether to
fight or to make love, the grass and shrubs
always get crushed.

(Sri Lankan proverb)¹

...the pursuit of disarmament is at the same
time the pursuit of development by all nations...
It is an integral part of the process of creating
a new international order.

The Foreign Minister of Sri-Lanka
speaking on behalf of the non-
aligned nations. 2

The proliferation and expansion of the United Nations machinery of disarmament and the new North-South type of confrontation in disarmament debates were the culmination of a revolutionary process which took place within the United Nations for two decades. Since it was founded in 1945 the United Nations has been changed dramatically, from 51 which signed the Charter the United Nations has tripled its membership to 157 in 1982. By the 1960's, as a result of the liquidation of the colonial empires, the birth of new nations became virtually a monthly event. By the 1970's, about one hundred new nations from the Third World enjoyed an absolute arithmetic majority in the General Assembly. Within only one generation the United Nations totally changed in character and became an important political vehicle for its newcomers.

While the two superpowers have moved outside the United Nations to consolidate their framework of achievable arms control agreements, the Third World has emerged as the master of proceedings in the General Assembly. Third World countries, most of which came into existence in the last thirty years, introduced a revolutionary element to the post-World War II balance of power within the United Nations framework. These changes had

direct effects on the agenda, confrontations, and the substance of United Nations debates on disarmament. The overall record of the General Assembly makes it clear that the major political controversies have shifted during the 1960's from an East-West to a North-South axis.

From the beginning of this transition the primary problem for the Third World has always been economic: the demand to reallocate resources from the rich to the poor countries in the framework of the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO). Gradually, within the framework of the economic struggle the Third World realized that disarmament is closely linked to their major collective goal - the new economic order. It became apparent that while the economic and social gap between the rich and the poor countries was not being narrowed, but in fact was widening, military expenditures continued to increase in absolute figures. Hence, disarmament became the next logical field to tackle in connection with a new world order. This chapter will examine the different phases in the evolution of the Third World approach

to disarmament and how disarmament became a corollary of their NIEO politics.

In this chapter, as in other chapters, the terms 'non-aligned' and the 'Third World' are used interchangeably as it is the case in many publications.³ 'Third World' is a rather more general term that has less rigor than that of 'non-aligned' which denotes a political movement with members and institutions. Since 'Third World' has become widely accepted and utilized mostly by the developing countries in the United Nations to generate a new sense of common identity and purpose⁴, it is legitimate to refer to it as a bloc of nations sharing some common interest. Moreover, it is within the United Nations system that this bloc was institutionalized as the so-called Group of 77 representing 120 members in 1981 (see table 3). Experience has shown that Third World nations adopt in most cases the general approach and basic principles of disarmament as agreed upon by the non-aligned movement which comprises the bulk of the Group of 77 (90 states out of 120).

The Initial Emphasis on Disarmament

There is no doubt that increased tensions between the superpowers had a large influence on the origins of the non-aligned movement. In fact, the meeting which is referred to as the first non-aligned meeting took place in New-York, in September 1960 in response to another outburst of the cold war between the Americans and the Russians. For this get-together, during the General Assembly's 15th Session, Nehru of India, Nkrumah of Ghana, Sukarno of Indonesia and Nasser of Egypt came to the Yugoslavian mission to the United Nations upon the invitation of Tito.⁵ The predominant concern of these leaders was how to reduce tension between the superpowers and to move forward toward disarmament.

As Robert Mortimer explains, the role of Tito is important in the understanding of the beginning of the non-aligned movement. Unlike his colleagues in Africa and Asia, Tito represented a special case a country from Europe with a fierce desire for independence from both superpowers. For this reason he sought allies in Asia and Africa while calling into question the

geographic rationale of Bandung which excluded Yugoslavia from Third World diplomacy. The intensification of the cold war in 1960-62 gave Tito the opportunity to seize upon the concern about another world war, as he argued that the fundamental interest of the developing states was "to act against the bloc system."⁶ Together with Nehru, who believed more than anybody else that the menace of nuclear war between the superpowers was the overriding problem which all states faced,⁷ the non-aligned movement was established on a strong disarmament platform.

When the founding fathers of the non-aligned movement gathered at Belgrade in 1961 for their first summit conference, disarmament was the most important issue in their discussions. Interestingly enough, as it seems from the 1980's vantage point, during the first decade economic demands were played down. It is striking today to realize that in the non-aligned first summit Conference (1961) 6 of the 27 points were devoted to disarmament while only 3 and a half dealt with economic matters. The heart of the final declaration of Belgrade was the issue of world peace, while economic

matters were discussed vaguely in uncommitted language. Expressing a growing concern over the threat of an atomic confrontation between the superpowers , the leaders also recommended that the United Nations General Assembly convene either a special session of the United Nations on disarmament or a World Disarmament Conference (WDC), under United Nations auspices.⁸

It is precisely this new focus on problems of world peace which marks the departure of the Belgrade Conference from the previous Afro-Asian conferences. The Belgrade conference was unique not only because it was without China (and with the addition of Yugoslavia and Cuba - both outside Afro-Asia) but because of the new theme under which the non-aligned countries had gathered. In the Afro-Asian conference of Bandung (1955) the accent had been placed on geographical solidarity and on problems of the emerging countries of Asia and Africa. Though there was a reference to world peace, disarmament was not on the agenda and was not discussed as a separate item in the Bandung conference. At Belgrade, on the contrary, the focus was on world affairs, war and peace and disarmament issues. The

literature on the subject seem to gloss over the fact that by definition the Bandung conference could not be a meeting for non-alignment,⁹ since two military allies of the United States participated there: Turkey (member of NATO) and Japan. In addition, Iraq and Pakistan which also attended the Bandung summit were, in 1955, members of the Central Treaty Organization together with Iran, Thailand and the Philippines.

At Belgrade the line of Nehru, and to a lesser degree, of Tito and Nasser prevailed against the wish of Sukarno and Nkrumah who wanted decolonization before disarmament.¹⁰ There was a great deal of talk at the conference on the need to serve as the conscience of the world, and to stand between the two world giants and save the universe from mass destruction by preventing a head-on collision between them. The leaders added a special statement to the final declaration on the "Danger of War and an Appeal for Peace" and a special message to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, urging them to resume the stalled superpowers negotiations. High-level emissaries went

to Moscow and Washington to bring the letters to the leaders of government personally.¹¹ The debates and documents of the Belgrade meeting demonstrate that the non-aligned focused their campaign on disarmament regarding themselves as first and foremost acting to prevent global war by trying to mediate between the superpowers. It is quite revealing that a comprehensive study on the non-aligned movement written in 1964 did not regard economic issues as an important concern of the movement. In its index, there is no reference whatsoever to terms such as economy or development (just rare references to foreign aid). Instead, a whole chapter (among seven), is dedicated to disarmament and the United Nations calling it "the topic at the forefront" of the non-aligned and adding:

As with one voice, proponents of non-alignment have echoed the view of Prime Minister Nehru that disarmament is an 'urgent and vital problem' and a prerequisite for the creation of an effective world order. 12

At that time, as one observer put it, the non-aligned conceived their role as a "golden bridge" between East and West on disarmament issues.¹³

It is understandable, therefore, that 17 years after Belgrade when the United Nations convened a special session on disarmament (SSOD), some writers would conclude that it was a logical outcome of consistent policies of the non-aligned for almost two decades.¹⁴ Similarly, many leaders of the movement have emphasized in their speeches to the SSOD that the session was a result of their continuous effort since the first summit of non-aligned leaders in 1961 at Belgrade. In his concluding remarks to the SSOD the representative of Sri Lanka, speaking on behalf of the non-aligned movement, reiterated once more:

I think we would not be wrong in saying that this special session on disarmament was the realization of a non-aligned initiative launched as far back as 1961. 15

It is clear that the dreams of Nehru and his Third World colleagues could not be materialized without the dramatic shift in power in the General Assembly of the United Nations. In the late 1970's, the United Nations was under the full control of the Third World.¹⁶ Sometimes United Nations meetings were just a replica or the rubber stamp for the non-aligned

conferences ; resolutions adopted at non-aligned summits have become actual guidelines of United Nations General Assemblies. At the end of the 1970's it was agreed that:

The new nations have taken over the United Nations imbuing it with values and cutting it to their cloth. It become their major platform, the place where they express their aspirations and frustrations and where they mobilize world opinion. 17

It is also true that for 27 years the idea of an international conference for dealing with disarmament has been periodically raised by various countries, for different purposes. The SSOD came into being after the Third World succeeded in regaining the initiative from the Soviets and moved to reformulate it according to their objectives and interests. In this regard, the convening of the session was itself a victory of the non-aligned over the superpowers which agreed to it reluctantly; it was testimony indeed to the power transformation which had taken place at the United Nations.

However, it would be too simplistic and even misleading to view the SSOD as the natural off-spring of non-aligned endeavors

since 1961. To do so, is to ignore some significant and dramatic developments during this period. One cannot conclude from the fact that the non-aligned pressed for the SSOD in 1978 that they still professed the same objectives as in 1961. It was not only the United Nations which had been changed; the non-aligned approach to disarmament had grown in complexity and sophistication. Gradually, with the emergence of new practical concerns and increasing conflict of interests, disarmament, as a policy goal for the non aligned, began to decline.

Changing Attitudes Toward Disarmament

The demise of disarmament issues within the framework of the non-aligned movement was gradual and had several different causes. It was affected not only by international developments but also by changes within the non-aligned group. The second summit conference of the non-aligned, in Cairo 1964, for example, was held in different circumstances from those of Belgrade. There had been a

rapprochement between the superpowers in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis. With the Sino-Soviet split and the independent policy of France the division of the world into two opposing world blocs had become less pronounced. The death of Nehru before the conference probably also accounts for the fact that there was less talk there on disarmament and world peace. Anti-colonialism returned as the major theme, following the more militant approach of Nkrumah and other Africans:

as long as oppressed classes exist there can be no such thing as peaceful coexistence between opposing ideologies. 18

The military attack of China on India, and the consequent humiliation of the latter, was a supreme test for non-alignment. India discovered painfully that the invocation of the concept of non-alignment and the so-called "spirit of Bandung" among its participants could not in itself provide national security. It was then discovered that non-alignment was no substitute for national defense. The Indians, in spite the pacifist heritage of Gandhi, have realized that the notion of non-alignment had

to be "refined" and "purified", to the extent that
there was no incompatibility between adherence
to non-alignment and a condition of military
preparedness. 19

In a parallel development, Third World countries began to share the feeling that detente between the great powers, as characterized inter alia by the Moscow test-ban treaty of 1963, could have an adverse effect on them, both in the domain of great-power aid and in the role they would be able to play in the international arena. With growing skepticism for the tenets of "peaceful coexistence" expressed at the Cairo Conference, some leaders were convinced that the non-aligned should strive for "equal strength" in their struggle with the "imperialist states."²⁰ The general atmosphere, thus, was not favorable any more for maintaining the Belgrade emphasis on disarmament.

It seems that sometimes the non-aligned approach toward disarmament reflected their perceptions and attitudes on the role and the goals of their movement. The focus on and the devotion to disarmament

matters by the non-aligned at Belgrade was an expression of their desire to provide their "good offices" as a third party to the superpowers in order to bring about world peace. At the Cairo conference of 1964, though disarmament was still an important issue in the final communique, it did not dominate the agenda. It was probably an expression of the continued struggle between the approach of Tito - who emphasized "non-alignment" and wanted a second Belgrade - and Sukarno with others who wanted in effect a second Bandung in order to press the more parochial interests of Afro-Asians.²¹ Some authors even maintained that non-alignment did not live beyond 1961, and its second conference in Cairo was an Afro-Asian and not a non-aligned conference.²² According to Ashuk Kapur, Indian neutralism and non-alignment after 1962 may be described as post-neutralism.²³

The second half of the sixties was a period of decline and disappointment for the non-aligned.²⁴ It seemed as if the detente between the superpowers was hurting the very foundations of non-alignment; they could not pursue the policy of "playing one bloc

against the other and gaining aid from both."²⁵ There was a common feeling of powerlessness, enhanced by internal divisions between radicals and conservatives, Arabs and Africans, and so forth.²⁶ In addition, there was a psychological crisis of confidence in the once new policies hailed as an alternative to traditional power politics, especially as several founding fathers of the movement (Ben Bella, Nkrumah and Sukarno) were ousted by military coups. There was even some speculation, that the non-aligned group may gradually disappear from the international scene.²⁷

It was particularly in the field of disarmament that the new international circumstances diminished the potential role of the non-aligned. At the United Nations, where Third World power was rising, cold-war type confrontations were replaced by new issues and actors. The growing cooperation between the superpowers on issues of international security took place on the basis of their own self-interest as if to demonstrate that there was no need for a third party to mediate and find compromise formulas. Ironically the non-aligned, who had consistently pressed for a superpower

dialogue, began to feel that the way it has been handled by the big two had some adverse effects on their interests.

As the non-aligned had realized earlier, in the course of the negotiations for the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and to a greater extent for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the superpowers largely ignored their views. They discovered too that in the superpower "strategic dialogue," the two elephants shared similar views about the role of the grass and the shrubs in the bipolar hierarchy of the international system. The NPT negotiations, which by nature encompassed all nations on earth, quickly developed into a two-sided dialogue, with the two superpowers on one side and the non-nuclear powers on the other. The superpowers negotiated with such dexterity that it has been described by one of the American negotiators as the "greatest con-game of modern times."²⁸ The feeling of many United Nations delegates at that time was that the superpowers in their Geneva talks "had become so addicted to the club-like atmosphere of their private negotiations that they had forgotten

the political arts of multilateral United Nations diplomacy."²⁹

It was, perhaps, around this period that the non-aligned realized, as the new version of the Sri-Lankan proverb suggests, that it is the common interest of the grass to reject not just the fighting between the elephants but also their love affairs. Robert W. Tucker has pointed out that, however persistent many Third World governments had been in their criticism of the cold war, they have benefited from the attention they had received as a result of that conflict. The cold war provided them with a psychic confirmation of independence and gave them a much needed sense of importance and worth.³⁰ Detente, therefore, which was reflected also in arms control efforts by the superpowers, was seen by the non aligned already at the early 1970's as "no boon for the Third World."³¹

In sum, a comparison of non-aligned attitudes and pronouncements on disarmament in 1961 and the late 1960's reveals how the significance of the issue declined and how the approach to it had grown more

complex over the decade. The component of disarmament within the ideology of non-alignment has clearly declined "from a near pacifist crusade at the beginning of the decade to being only of secondary importance at the end of the decade."³² This dramatic decline can be illustrated in the formulation of the final documents at the non-aligned summits. At the third conference of non-aligned heads of states in Lusaka 1970, the term "peaceful co-existence" and the idea of "general and complete disarmament" had disappeared from the agenda. Instead there was just a reference to "problems of disarmament" which have received relatively little attention. Moreover, the Lusaka conference introduced, for the first time a militaristic theme for non-alignment: "To safeguard international peace and security through the development of social, economic political and military strength of each country."³³ With the new explicit emphasis on military strength this declaration marks the end of what was once the moral and internationalist approach of the non-aligned toward disarmament issues.

The Revival of the Non-Aligned Movement

Against this background, it was all the more surprising that actually the non-aligned states recovered from their setbacks and came to life again in the seventies as an organised force in the international system. There seem to be two basic reasons for this revival. One is of an organizational nature and the other involves the real character of the movement. Organizationally, the democratic nature of the United Nations allowed the Third World to become a major political force. It is only at the United Nations where the developing countries can link up together and create a force in international relations whose weight by far exceeds the sum of their power as individual states. As one delegate from the Third World commented on the significance of the United Nations: "This is where we little fishes can talk like whales."³⁴

In this regard the United Nations, which initially was established as a security instrument of the great powers, was transformed into a forum in which new states began to press their claims for changes in the international system.

But the major reason for their revival was the non-aligned shift from political to economic matters, which provided the movement with new unity and cooperation in international fora. This shift marked also the "beginning of a particularly active phase of the non-aligned movement."³⁵ Basically the Third World argument was that the political decolonization which had been achieved, by no means entailed liberation from their compelling economic ties with the rich countries. On the contrary, they said, the gap between rich and poor countries kept widening. Gradually, from the beginning of the 1970's, the non-aligned became preoccupied with one overriding issue: the call for economic reforms on an international scale, namely the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).³⁶ In the words of the former Prime Minister of Jamaica, Michael Manley: "The NIEO represents increasingly the primary focus of the Non-aligned Movement and the meeting ground that unites all members of the Third World."³⁷

The politics of the NIEO cannot be understood without reference to the oil factor. There is no doubt

that the dramatic success of the oil cartel of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) gave birth to the wide spread belief in the Third World that a major shift in the existing international economic order is possible. The world energy crisis created by the 1973 oil embargo and the subsequent four-fold increase in oil prices brought about the "sudden and unexpected rise of Third World economic and political power."³⁸ As the Brandt report on the North-South maintains, the OPEC success:

...marked a major turning point in North-South relations... For the first time a group of countries outside the circle of industrialized world was able to exert its own powerful economic pressure... This gave the whole North-South dialogue a new impetus." ³⁹

The OPEC success was seen by its supporters in the Third World as the beginning of a new chapter in world history. Third World leaders, such as Michael Manley proclaimed that OPEC along with other economic cartels "have changed the fundamental equations of economic power as decisively as did the Industrial Revolution."⁴⁰ For the purposes of our analysis it does not matter whether the expectations which were

generated by OPEC have solid basis in economic reality. The significance lies in the manner in which the oil cartel has been perceived by the Southern states and the expectations which this perception has engendered into United Nations discussions between the North and the South. Some observers regarded oil power as a source for rearmament in order to facilitate the change in international order. According to this logic, military buildup in itself may be viewed as a measure for disarmament. Authors such as Ali Mazrui believe that "militarization" and even "nuclearization" of oil power may create new ground rules for international disarmament efforts.⁴¹ Here, around this new theme of change in world order, the Third World approach to disarmament was consolidated.

The NIEO declarations, which burst upon the international scene in April 1974 after the United Nations Special Session have had a very broad scope. Hardly an area of global economic concern escaped the recommendations of the Third World for radical reform. The declarations call for a comprehensive

change of the international economic order - in all crucial areas of North-South relations - trade and commodities, financial matters, science and technology, and industrialization.⁴²

It is generally agreed that the new focus on the NIEO saved the movement from the anticipated disintegration after the upheavals of the 1960's.⁴³ At the United Nations, the establishment of the NIEO has become a priority item on the international agenda,⁴⁴ and the North-South confrontation was added to the divisiveness in the world. The issue has dramatically affected the Third World bloc to the extent that it has been viewed as the "evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement into a pressure group for the establishment of the NIEO."⁴⁵ As a result, any analysis of non-aligned behavior in the 1970's must therefore begin with the premise that the NIEO has become the overriding issue of the movement.

The NIEO and Disarmament

To repeat, against this background of changes within the non-aligned movement it would be simplistic and even misleading to regard the SSOD as a natural off-spring of their policies since Belgrade 1961.⁴⁶ First and foremost it must be recognized that disarmament and world peace became issues of secondary importance in the new agenda of the non-aligned.

As William Sweet explains, the SSOD came about at a time "when disarmament has moved to second spot on the Third World agenda, and when the coalition favoring world disarmament shows signs of internal collapse."⁴⁷ For the Third World it was not just a change in focus. The economic dimension has introduced a new way of looking at disarmament in the first place, by completely subordinating it to the NIEO struggle. From the Third World point of view, right on the eve of the SSOD, the question of priorities never arose:

It is generally recognized that the current platform of the Southern world will continue to be the demand for a New International Economic Order. The developed world has grudgingly come to the view that whatever the merits of this demand and the chances

of its realization, the NIEO will provide the main arena for interaction, be it by dialogue or confrontation between the developed and the developing world... It is within this context that the UNSSOD must be viewed... The primary task for Southern strategists is to postulate a credible and attainable field theory organically linking disarmament to the main collective task of the South - the New International Economic Order. 48

The focus on disarmament during the SSOD did not modify Third World minds. Thus an Indian official wrote after the SSOD:

For the Third World countries the most pressing problem is the widening gap between the rich and poor nations of the world, and therefore, further economic dislocation at the international level and human decay at the national level. For most Third World countries hunger and poverty are aggravated by the pressures to divert their resources to armaments. 49

The politics of the NIEO have changed dramatically the substance of the debates in the United Nations. Thus, disarmament has not been approached as a political issue with direct bearing on international security but rather as an instrument for the reallocation of economic resources. In their summit meeting in Colombo 1976, the non-aligned made clear that their major

preoccupation is the NIEO and disarmament is just a means to achieve it:

The conference declared that the arms race is inconsistent with efforts aimed at achieving the New International Economic Order in view of the urgent need to divert the resources utilised for the acceleration of the arms race towards socio-economic development, particularly of the developing countries. 50

In their working paper submitted to the SSOD, the non-aligned reiterated, in six different references, the links between disarmament and development concluding that the spiralling arms race is incompatible with the goal of the NIEO.⁵¹ To be on the safe side the non-aligned immediately made sure that possible failure in disarmament will not affect their pre-dominant economic concerns and proclaimed that despite the link, progress in one area "should not be contingent upon progress in the other."⁵²

With their influence in the General Assembly the Third World succeeded in getting almost a universal consensus to their view on the link between disarmament and the NIEO. In the Final Document of the SSOD,

adopted by consensus, this causal link was elaborated several times and was taken for granted in the opening declaration that disarmament is essential for the achievement of the NIEO. Moreover, the concept of Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD) has become in the Final Document another vehicle in the NIEO struggle. The document proclaimed explicitly that the CPD should encompass all those measures which will ensure disarmament in a world "in which the international economic order is strengthened and consolidated."⁵³

The Link Between Disarmament and Development

In numerous United Nations resolutions and reports a so-called link between disarmament and development was established and, as a result, taken for granted.⁵⁴ In light of the objectives of the NIEO this trend is understandable, but its acceptance by United Nations majorities does not make it scientifically valid. The mere fact, as stated by a United Nations study on the subject, that disarmament and development are the issues that have most preoccupied the attention

of the international community since World War II⁵⁵ does not mean that these two concepts have much in common. The tremendous gap between the resources devoted to armament world-wide and those allocated to development purposes contributes to rising expectations and demands based on a link between the two. In United Nations debates it is fashionable, and indeed dramatic, to argue that the elimination of a single aircraft carrier can release funds to be used to eradicate some diseases and alleviate human suffering in the Third World or to describe how with the cost of two strategic bombers UNESCO could launch a world-wide literacy campaign.

Soon it became apparent that the focus on the disarmament-development link within the framework of the NIEO diluted the attention, in United Nations deliberations, on the security dimensions of disarmament (see chapters 5, 6, 7). Moreover, there is a danger that United Nations deliberations and activities may create an illusion on a political-economic process which is considered by many authorities as unrealistic and unfeasible. Even United Nations officials, such as Mr. Bradford Morse, the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), cautioned member-states on the tendency to over-simplify, in his words, the linkages between disarmament and development. Practically, he said, one cannot guarantee that resources saved by disarmament among developed countries would be converted

into resources to support development.⁵⁶

Moreover, one may add, experience has shown that it would be difficult to assume that the regimes of the developing countries would use this transfer of resources for economic and social purposes and not, for instance, for their own growing military programs (see chapter 7 on arms races in the Third World).

The "establishment" of a link between disarmament and development by the United Nations General Assembly serves as a case-study in the politicization of the Secretary General's reports by the numerically powerful majority of the Third World. First the General Assembly passed in 1977 a resolution (32/98-A) which enunciates this link and calls for a study on the subject. Later, the SSOD Final Document spelled out the terms of references and guidelines of the mandate of the group of experts for the study. The link was taken as a forgone conclusion: "In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development..." In what the document called a "forward-looking and policy-oriented" study on the reallocation of resources, the mandate of the experts had determined and prejudged the outcome with specific

Instructions:

The study should further be made in the context of how disarmament can contribute to the establishment of the new international economic order. 57

These guidelines followed other ~~for~~gone conclusions in the document which simply stated that there is "a close relationship between disarmament and development," and "progress in the former would help greatly the realization of the latter...", and further assertions about reallocation of resources which would bridge the economic gap between developed and developing countries.⁵⁸

For three years (1978-1981) a group of 27 governmental experts appointed by the Secretary General (on the recommendation of member-States) studied the relationship between disarmament and development. Their conclusions were not unexpected in light of the mandate:

This investigation suggests very strongly that the world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigor or move consciously and with deliberate speed toward a more stable and balanced social and economic

development within a more sustainable international economic and political order. It cannot do both. It must be acknowledged that the arms race and development are in a competitive relationship, particularly in terms of resources but also in the vital dimension of attitudes and perceptions. 59

Here, in an official report by the Secretary General, it is openly declared that the NIEO means change in world order in both economic and political terms. It is not just an interpretation of linkages between disarmament and development but rather a quest for a change in world order through disarmament. The chairperson of the group of experts, Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden, reiterated the economic and political aspects of the NIEO, emphasizing the role of "disarmament in a dynamic economic environment."⁶⁰ It should be noted that certain members of the group of experts, those from Western countries, have submitted some reservations on the report including on paragraphs dealing with the establishment of a new international economic order.⁶¹

For the purposes of this analysis it is not important to establish the degree to which there is a link between disarmament

and development. What matters, however,, is the clear attempt to introduce biased interpretations in a policy-oriented report of the United Nations Secretary General. The report amounts to promotion of a partisan ideology of the NIEO with a special emphasis on attitudes and perceptions regarding a new political and economic order. These conclusions should be disturbing particularly in light of the fact that review of the academic literature suggests that the relationship between military expenditures, economic growth and social development in the Third World is not yet well understood. A study by Emile Benoit on "Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries," for example, concludes that military spending can stimulate civil economic activities and that economic growth more than offsets the fact that these resources could have been put to directly productive use.

The Benoit study is admitted to be the most ambitious statistical survey undertaken into the relationship between Third World defense expenditure and economic growth. Benoit found that countries with

high growth rates tended to have high defense burdens, and vice versa. His statistics suggested that defense programs directly contribute various useful inputs into civil economies in developing countries. In some cases an increase in defense expenditures by a developing country may take no resources out of civilian investment at all, but even increase such investment and further contribute to development. As a result, Benoit rejects what he calls as "a strong intuitive and common-sense impression" that defense expenditures are inherently wasteful or that defense programs necessarily have adverse effects over Third World economies.⁶²

The Third World campaign for a link between disarmament and development is understandable in light of the political character of disarmament debates in the United Nations. One may even agree that when arms races reach the "overkill" level, it is proper to reconsider national policies of defense expenditures. It is, however, questionable whether by subjecting the disarmament debate to NIEO politics the Third World enhances the understanding to their plight in the industrialized countries. It is hard to believe that the developed countries would be forthcoming to the transfer of resources to a group

of nations committed to a radical change in world order, especially at a time of recession and unemployment at home. Ironically, from the Third World point of view, disarmament also mean less military consumption of scarce goods such as oil, bauxite, chromium, copper, etc., and so would lead to a lowering of the demand for such goods. Several producers of these raw materials in the Third World might suffer as a result. Another aspect which is also neglected in the debate is the role of military organization and military life in some underdeveloped countries as a social institution.⁶³

It is evident that many experts, even those who are known to be sympathetic to the Third World economic problems are aware of the complexities involved in reallocating resources. Gunnar Myrdal, one of the outstanding scholars on development has pointed out:

All general and speculative theories about the relations between economic progress of underdeveloped countries and peacefulness are utterly void of true knowledge and of relevance for the problem of peace and war between countries, as well as peace or rebellion within the countries. ⁶⁴

It was recognized, long time before North-South confrontations dominated the agenda of the United Nations that

the transfer of resources is not a panacea for international upheavals. Already in 1951 Charles Malik of Lebanon, who served also as the President of the United Nations General

Assembly concluded on the same problem:

The poor, the sick, the dispossessed, must certainly be done justice to. But to suppose that there will be peace when everybody is materially happy and comforted, is absolute nonsense. 65

The link between disarmament and development is questionable also in light of the experience of many developing countries. Except for most Latin American countries, in all other regions in the Third World many states are devoting a larger proportion of their national budget to military expenditures than they are to health and education.⁶⁶ In contrast, the developed Western countries, including the United States, tend to spend more on health and education combined than they do for military purposes. It should be noted that in terms of military expenditures per capita or per soldier, the oil producing countries of the Middle East - all of which are members of the non-aligned movement - are today the top spenders in the world, providing the greatest single boost to international arms sales in the last decade.⁶⁷ Finally, the United

Nations treatment of the disarmament - development link deliberately ignores other views on the morality as well as on the practicality of the linkage concept. An important school of thought in the field rejects the link as well as the whole notion of the NIEO. NIEO, according to its critics, does not offer a more egalitarian world or more justice in international relations. They argue, contrary to what NIEO proponents suggest, that peace and prosperity in the international system is not dependent at all upon the massive transfer of resources from the North to the South.⁶⁸

Notwithstanding all these reservations, the link between disarmament and development is treated at the United Nations as a matter of fact as an integral component of the NIEO. No wonder that the study by the group of experts was welcomed by the overwhelming majority of NIEO supporters at the United Nations. These representatives found in the report what they wanted. As one delegate from Ghana stated with satisfaction: "The report... has established that arms race and development are incompatible." Since we live in a world of interdependence, he continued,

the reallocation of resources to the Third World is "no longer a moral issue but an inescapable international obligation." Therefore the final conclusion in the view of the African delegate is that:

...lasting peace and security can be attained through general and complete disarmament and the equitable redistribution of resources within the framework of the new international economic order. 69

Disarmament, Development and World Order

With the politics of the NIEO in the background, the disarmament confrontation between the South and the North became more and more identified with issues concerning world order. As Charles Maynes has explained, the NIEO is not just about the transfer of resources from industrialized countries to the Third World but rather a political struggle. The North-South confrontation is over the

Third World attempt "to integrate dissatisfied powers into the central management of the international system."⁷⁰ Development, as seen in the south, is not just an economic phenomenon but rather a multitude of problems: economic, political, social, legal and institutional.⁷¹ Third World spokesmen at the United Nations such as the Algerian Ambassador Mohammed Bedjaoui, who was elected in 1982 as a Judge to the International Court of Justice, do not conceal the objectives of the NIEO: to change the international power arrangements which were negotiated at Yalta in 1945 between the two superpowers and the international economic arrangements based on the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. It is a struggle to get rid of the "law of the great powers" through the establishment of a new international legal order.⁷²

Essentially, the NIEO is a struggle over power in its traditional sense. The NIEO, concluded George C. Affott, is "about power, political and economic power, how to get more of it, and how to use it effectively in the pursuit of national goals."⁷³ The character of this power struggle was reflected

also in the institutionalization of the various organs of the Third World in their campaign against the North. The new leaders of the non-aligned movement, for instance, had different views on their role and began to reject the notion that non-alignment "was created to avoid involvement in bloc politics."⁷⁴ No doubt, the new attitude marked a departure from the Nehru-Tito legacy on the "golden bridge" role of the non-aligned in war and peace matters. As a result, some writers argue that "there is as little reason to define the Non-Aligned in relation to the Cold War as there is to say that the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation are the countries that catch fish around Iceland."⁷⁵ In September 1973, alluding to the Algiers summit of the non-aligned, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger spoke testily of the "alignment of the non-aligned" which was assuming in his words "the characteristics of a bloc of its own."⁷⁶

While they re-established their sense of solidarity around the new themes, the non-aligned began also to develop the features of a formal institution. The

previous practice of rather informal summit conferences, have been replaced by more structured and carefully prepared summits which are held on a regular basis every three years. Preparatory committees discuss and formulate the agenda of the summit meetings in advance. Usually, very lengthy documents, encompassing almost every single aspect of international affairs, are issued at the conclusion of these meetings. Since 1970, the summit meetings have a chairperson, i.e. the Head of State or Government of the respective host country who serves also as the co-ordinator and official spokesman of the movement for the following three-year period. Since 1973, the movement has had a Co-ordination Bureau which operates on the Foreign Ministers level and Ambassadors to the United Nations meeting at least once a year and once a month respectively.⁷⁷ By the end of 1977, the non-aligned movement had succeeded in mobilizing most developing countries in setting up a highly-structured organization, and in establishing a close network of lines of communication for intensive interaction among its members.⁷⁸ Gradually the United Nations headquarters

in New York became the "de facto headquarters of the non-aligned movement."⁷⁹

The United Nations system provided a major vehicle for the non-aligned to expand and strengthen their grip over the Third World, particularly under the mantle of the Group of 77. The Group of 77 has managed to become the major actor in the United Nations system, despite the fact that they did not have headquarters, secretariat, staff and bureau of their own.⁸⁰ Through the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which was founded in 1964, the Group of 77 were able to coordinate the divergent interests of their members into a single platform for international action. UNCTAD had for practical purposes fulfilled the functions of a secretariat for the Group of 77, and helped to bring in to the non-aligned movement most Latin American countries.⁸¹ With this process of institutionalization the non-aligned movement or for our purposes the Third World bloc in the United Nations (see table), was trying to exert its influence in international forums.

In 1976 an Indian author warned his readers against viewing non-alignment just in terms of "an effort to mediate superpowers rivalry or as an attempt to prevent global war." "Non-Alignment," he says, is also a "strategy to become involved in global politics rather than to stay away from bloc conflicts." Furthermore, "non-alignment is a strategy to gain influence despite the condition of material weakness, and to get influence through diplomatic means, if feasible, or through military means, if necessary. In other words, non-alignment is a strategy to gain influence on the cheap; it is a low-risk strategy."⁸² As radical leaders of the movement maintained, the bloc has reached a stage in which it has a definite strategy in its struggle against the "North" - the rich countries. According to this interpretation, the non-aligned have progressed "from the formulation of disconnected grievances to the definition of a combat strategy designed to transform international economic relations." At this stage, however, these spokesmen do not confine themselves to the economic arena, but rather speak about a "New International Order," which "embraces

the political social and cultural fields and goes beyond eliciting claims of the developing countries in the economic sphere."⁸³

In adopting this combat strategy, disarmament got a special connotation in Third World parlance. When the Foreign Minister of Sri-Lanka rose to speak on behalf of the non-aligned countries, he told the SSOD delegates:

We hold that disarmament is not only a political question, but also an integral element in the new international order, and its co-relationship with development is an extremely close and critical one. We are firmly convinced that the pursuit of disarmament is at the same time the pursuit of development by all nations. This is an aspect of disarmament that should not be minimized, misinterpreted or misunderstood. It is an integral part of the process of creating a new international order. ⁸⁴

Though the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka opened by saying that disarmament is not a political problem he meant political in a very narrow sense. His following elaborations demonstrates that the co-relationship between disarmament and development relate to the broader process of establishing a new international order. Interestingly enough, the

spokesman of the non-aligned made it clear that his bloc strives for a new international order, not just economic order. This approach was manifested in a meeting of scholars and officials from the Third World in New Delhi, India, before the SSOD where these separate strands were tied together: "Disarmament, Development and a Just World Order." Their working paper called on the Third World countries to "take initiatives for halting the arms race and changing the present structure of inequity and domination in global power relations."⁸⁵

Disarmament, thus, when it is dealt within the framework of development and the NIEO means a restructuring of world power. In the words of another Third World thinker, in an international seminar on disarmament sponsored by Pugwash, the developing countries "should engage in a radical movement to change the international system."⁸⁶ Others, such as Ali Mazrui, were more explicit indicating that the Third World should rearm itself in order to achieve a "new international military order" as one of the pre-requisites of the NIEO.⁸⁷ According to this point

of view disarmament meant simply disarming only the powerful while the Third World should continue its military build up in order to bridge the gap. The positions of Third World countries in the United Nations on issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and the conventional arms race (chapters 6,7) demonstrate that these militant views reflect a prevailing attitude among the developing countries.

In light of this analysis, it becomes imperative to understand the totality of NIEO politics in shaping Third World policies on disarmament at the United Nations. It was said once that the non-aligned regarded the United Nations conference on disarmament as an opportunity for "consciousness raising."⁸⁸ However, as result of their overemphasis on the new international order the attempt to mobilize public opinion on behalf of disarmament has been diluted.

Observers who followed closely the United Nations SSOD in 1978 were perplexed about the real objectives of the non-aligned in the session. It seemed that after twenty seven years of maneuvering on behalf of a special conference dedicated to disarmament the

purposes of the meeting became obscure even to diplomats in the United Nations.⁸⁹ After three days of United Nations deliberations, the confused editors of the Christian Science Monitor concluded: "So far it seems a most strange United Nations 'disarmament' session... All in all, it invites the facetious observation that a disarmament pose may have to be formed to disarm the disarmament session."⁹⁰ The bewilderment was reflected also from the non-aligned point of view. The Washington Post, on the opening day, provided an important clue on the new role of the issue of disarmament for the Third world. Disarmament, the editors observed, used to be a major factor for the non-aligned twenty years ago - which then were unified on little else. However, "meanwhile the non-aligned movement had switched its principal focus to reorganizing the world economy, and many of its members were themselves scrambling for arms. The point is that although by now no one was really red-hot for it, the thing went forward and the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament is the result."⁹¹

An important clue to the real meaning of the SSOD was provided by a correspondent at the United Nations headquarters who arrived at the conclusion that the non-aligned viewed the disarmament conference just as "a bargaining chip in the larger context of the North-South dialogue."⁹² By giving the United Nations a larger voice in disarmament, the Third World hoped to be able to achieve greater influence in world affairs toward achieving their ultimate goal of a new international order.

Table No. 3: Third World Grouping

The following are United Nations' Member States which belong to the Group of 77*

Afghanistan	- N,B	Ivory Coast	- N
Algeria	- N,CD	Jamaica	- N
Angola	- N	Jordan	- N,B
Argentina	- N,CD	Kampuchea Dem.	- N,B
Bahamas		Kenya	- N,CD
Bahrain	- N	Kuwait	- N
Barbados		Laos P.D.R.	- N,B
Bangladesh	- N	Lebanon	- N,B
Benin	- N	Lesotho	- N
Bhutan	- N	Liberia	- N,B
Bolivia	- N	Libya	- N,B
Botswana	- N	Madagascar	- N
Brazil	- Nob,CD	Malawi	
Burma	- B,CD	Malaysia	- N
Burundi	- N	Maldives	- N
Cape Verde	- N	Mali	- N
Central	- N	Malta	- N
African		Mauritania	- N
Republic		Mauritius	- N
Chad	- N	Mexico	- Nob,CD
Chile		Morocco	- N,CD
Colombia	- Nob	Mozambique	- N
Comoros	- N	Nepal	- N,B
Congo	- N	Nicaragua	- N
Costa Rica	- Nob	Niger	- N
Cuba	- N,CD	Nigeria	- N,CD
Cyprus	- N	Oman	- N
Djibouti	- N	Pakistan	- N,B,CD
Dominican		Panama	- N
Republic		Papua New Guinea	
Ecuador	- Nob	Paraguay	
Egypt	- N,B,CD	Peru	- N,CD
El-Salvador		Philippines	- Nob,B
Equatorial	- N	Qatar	- N
Guinea		Romania	- CD
Ethiopia	- N,B,CD	Rwanda	- N
Fiji		Saint Lucia	- N
Gabon	- N	Saint Vincent	
Gambia	- N	and the Grenadines	
Ghana	- N,B	Samoa	
Grenada	- N	Sao Tome &	
Guatemala		Principe	- N
Guinea	- N	Saudi Arabia	- N,B
Guinea-	- N	Senegal	- N
Bissau		Seychelles	- N
Guyana	- N	Sierra Leone	- N
Haiti		Singapore	- N
Honduras		Solomon Islands	
India	- N,B,CD	Somalia	- N
Indonesia	- N,B,CD	Sri Lanka	- N,B,CD
Iran	- N,B,CD	Sudan	- N,B
Iraq	- N,B	Suriname	- N

Swaziland	- N	Upper Volta	- N
Syria	- N,B	Uruguay	
Thailand	- N	Venezuela	- Nob,CD
Togo		Vietnam	- N,B
Trinidad & Tobago	- N	Yemen	- N,B
Tunisia	- N	Yemen Dem.	- N
Uganda	- N	Yugoslavia	- N,CD
Un. Arab Emirates	- N	Zaire	- N,CD
Un. Rep. of Cameroon	- N	Zambia	- N
Un. Rep. of Tanzania	- N	Zimbabwe	- N

* The republic of Korea (South) and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North) are not Member States of the United Nations. However South Korea belongs to the Group of 77 and North Korea to the Non-Aligned Movement. The South West African People Organization belongs to the Non-Aligned and the Palestine Liberation Organization belongs to both the Non-Aligned and the Group of 77. Burma, a participant at the conference in Bandung (1955) and a founding father of the Non-Aligned, withdrew from the movement in 1979. China participated in the Bandung conference but did not join later the non-aligned movement nor the Group of 77.

Legend:

Group of 77 - The list of the members in the Group of 77 is seldom published but it is available at the Hammarskjöld Library at UN Headquarters in New York.

N - The Non-Aligned movement. Its Conference of Foreign Ministers held in February 1981 at New Delhi, India, drew 90 member states of the UN, one state which is an observer state at the UN and two liberation organizations. Seven states attended as observers (Nob). (See UN Document A/36/116, 6 March, 1981).

B - Bandung, Indonesia. (a second conference was never consummated). A total of 25 States attended (in addition to the states listed, China, Turkey, Japan and South Vietnam also participated).

CD - Members in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The listed states are members of the Group of 21 non-aligned and independent states in the CD (Romania is not member of the Group since it joined the CCD under the East-West package). Sweden which is not member of the Group of 77 is a member of the Group of 21.

Chapter 4: Footnotes

1. "Elephant Superpowers Crush Our Grass," Interview with A.C.S. Hameed, the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, Disarmament Times, June 6 1978. It is interesting that there are different attributions and different versions of the proverb on the elephants and the grass. In 1965, one publication attributes the proverb to be of African origin and in a shorter version: "when two elephants fight it is the grass that suffers." (see: Cecil V. Crabb Jr., The Elephants and the Grass - A Study of Non-Alignment (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 9. This version fits the cold war's struggles of the superpowers. However, the more sophisticated version of 1978 by the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister expressed the growing resentment in the Third World not only for the competition between the superpowers but also for their love affairs (e.g. arms control agreements).

2. GAOB, A/S-10/PV. 4, 25 May 1978, p. 7.

3. Leslie Wolf-Phillips and others, "Why 'Third World'?" Third World Foundation Monograph (7) (London: Third World Foundation, 1980).

4. Michael Todaro, Economics for a Developing World (New York: Longman, 1977), pp. xix, 7.

See also:

- a) Irving Louis Horowitz, Three World of Development (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).
- b) J.D.B. Miller, The Politics of the Third World (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
- c) M.S. Rajan, "Non-Alignment: the dichotomy between theory and Practice in Perspective," Indian Quarterly, Jan-March, 1980. Vol. XXXVI(1), pp. 44-45.

5. Peter Willets, The Non-Aligned Movement: the Origins of the Third World Alliance (London: Frances Pinter, 1978), p. 12.

6. Robert A. Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 10-12.

7. Ibid, p. 14.
8. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1961 (Washington D.C., 1962), p. 381.
9. Willets, The Non-Aligned, p. 3.
Willets rejects the prevailing contention that Bandung was a forerunner of the Non-Aligned conferences.
10. David Kimche, The Afro-Asian Movement Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third world (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1973), p. 97.
11. Presidents Sukarno and Keta went to the United States and President Nkrumah and Prime Minister Nehru went to the Soviet Union. Ibid, p. 111, fn. 53.
12. Crabb, The Elephants, p. 101.
13. Ibid, p. 102.
14. See: a) William Epstein, "Why a Special Session on Disarmament," Transnational Perspectives (Geneva) Vol. 4(1-2), 1978.
b) Homer A. Jack, "A UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament to Break the World Disarmament Conference Stalemate," Bulletin of Peace Proposals (Oslo) Vol. 8(1), 1979, pp. 56-59.
c) Michael J. Sullivan III, "The Outlook for the UN Special Session on Disarmament," in William H. Kincaid and Jeffrey D. Porro (eds.) Negotiating Security - An Arms Control Reader, (Washington: the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), pp. 237-245 (appeared before in Arms Control Today, 1978).
15. GAOR, A/S-10/PV.27, 6 July, 1978. p. 75.
16. Mortimer, The Third World, p. 116.
17. Jane Rosen, "How the Third World Runs the UN," New York Times Magazine, December 16, 1979, p. 39.
18. Kimche, The Afro-Asian, p. 115.

19. Crabb, The Elephants, p. 210.
20. Kimche, The Afro-Asian, pp. 1150116.
21. Willetts, The Non-Aligned, p. 14.
22. G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), Chapters XVII-XVIII.
23. Ashok Kapur, International Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 308.
24. Hanspeter Neuhold, "Permanent neutrality and Non-Alignment: Similarities and Differences," Indian Quarterly, XXXV(3), July 1979, pp. 285-308.
25. Kimche, The Afro-Asian, p. 260.
26. Willetts, The Non-Aligned, pp. 31-36.
27. Neuhold, "Permanent Neutrality", p. 290.
28. Epstein, The Last Chance, p. 118.
29. David Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations 1960-1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 127.
30. Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 45.
31. Mortimer, The Third World, p. 40.
32. Willetts, The Non-Aligned, p. 25.
33. Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries: Lusaka declaration on Peace, Independence, Development, Co-operation and Democratization of International Relations, Lusaka, September 8-10, 1970, in Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvant (eds.), The Third World without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries (New York: Oceana Publications, 1978), Vol. II, p. 83.

34. Jane Rosen, "How the Third World?" p. 70.
35. Jankowitsch Sauvart, The Third World, p. xi.
36. For an analytical review of the pertinent literature see: Robert M. Cox, "Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: Reflection on some Recent Literature," International Organization, 33(2), Spring, 1979, pp.
37. Michael Manley, "Third World Under Challenge: The Politics of Affirmation," Third World Quarterly Vol. II(1) January, 1980, p. 31.
38. Ervin Laszlo, Robert Baker Jr., Elliott Eisenberg, Venkata Raman, The Objectives of the New International Economic Order (New York: Pergamon Press, 1978), p. XIX. Robert Mortimer pointed out that in fact it was OPEC which ushered in the politics of a NIEO providing a model and symbol of Third World assertion, The Third World, p. 3. See also: Statement by the representative of Somalia at the UN Seventh Special Session of the G.A., GAOR, A/PV.234, p. 37, and Michael Manley, *Ibid.*
39. Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Willy Brandt, Chairman), North-South: A Programme for Survival (London: Pan Books, 1980), p. 44.
40. New York Times, October 13, 1975.
41. Ali Mazrui, "The Barrel of the Gun and the Barrel of Oil in North-South Equation," World Order Projects (New York: Institute for World Order, 1978), pp. 15-16, 24.
42. See the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GAOR Res. 3281 (XXIX), 12 December, 1974. For approaches in favor of the NIEO see: Khadija Har (ed.), Dialogue for a New Order (New York: Pergamon, 1980).

43. Neuhold, "Permanent Neutrality," p. 291.
John Conyers speaks about three stages of the non-aligned:

- 1) The pursuit of world peace in a cold war. At this stage the prevention of world conflagration through nuclear war was at the very heart of non-alignment.
- 2) The process of de-colonization and the struggle for national liberation.
- 3) The shift toward the preoccupation with the redistribution of world resources.

See John Conyers, "Non-Alignment and the Afro-Asian People," in A.W. Singham (ed.), The Non-aligned Movement in World Politics (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1977), p. 24.

44. Karl P. Sauvant, "The New International Economic Order: Toward Structural Changes or a More Tolerable Status Quo," in Seymour Maxwell Finger and Joseph R. Harbert, U.S. Policy in International Institutions. Defining Reasonable Options in an Unreasonable World (Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), p. 125.

45. Sauvant, Ibid, p. 143, fn. 1.

46. Michael J. Sullivan, "The United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament" (memo). A similar approach can be found in the articles already mentioned in fn. 4, and also:

- a) Louis B. Sohn, "Disarmament at the Crossroads," International Security, Vol. 2(4), Spring 1978, pp. 4-31.
- b) Homer A. Jack, "A Special Session of the UN General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament," Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), June 20, 1976.
- c) Series of articles on the SSOD in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April, 1978.
Others have focused on the American approach to the SSOD, without pointing out the changes which took place in the Third World position:
- d) Abraham Barzman, "Nuclear Arms Control: A New US Strategy at the United Nations," in Finger & Harbert, US Policy, pp. 28-39.
- e) _____, "Nuclear Diplomacy," in David Kay (ed.), The Changing United Nations - Options for the United States (New York: the Academy of Political Science, 1977), pp. 159-169.
- f) Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Harlin Cleveland, "A Strategy for the United States," International Security Vol. 2(4), Spring, 1978, pp. 32-55.

47. William Sweet, "Delhi: A Third world Overture," The Nation, May 27, 1978, p. 629.

48. Tariz Osman Hyder, "Inchoate Aspirations for World Order Change," International Security, Vol. 2(4), Spring 1978, pp. 56-57. Hyder was a Director in the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

49. M.A. Husain, "Third World and Disarmament: Shadow and Substance," Third World Quarterly, Vol. II(1), January, 1980, p. 76.
Husain has served as Ambassador of India in various Capitals.

50. From the Political declaration (Chapter XVII), adopted at the Fifth Non-Aligned Summit Conference, Colombo, 16-19 August, 1976; in GAOR: Tenth Special Session Supplement No. 1 (A/S-10/1) Vol. III (1978), A/AC.187/30, p. 51.

51. "Non-Aligned Working Documents: A/AC.187/55, p. 5, and add. 1, p. 3. in GAOR: Tenth Special Session, Vol. IV.

52. Ibid, A/AC.187/55/Add.1.

53. GAOR, SSOD Final Document. Tenth Special Session, supplement No. 4, A/S-10/4, paragraph 109.

54. For a list of United Nations documents on the relationship between disarmament and development see: GAOR, "Report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development," (Appendix II), A/S-10/9, 5 April 1978.

55. GAOR, Report of the Secretary General "Study on the relationship between disarmament and development," A/36/356, 5 October 1981, par. 329.

56. GAOR, A/S-10/AC.1/PV.5, 9 June, 1978, p. 7.

57. GAOR, SSOD Final Document, par. 95.

58. Ibid, par. 35.

59. GAOR, "Study on the relationship between disarmament and development," Ibid, par. 391.

60. GAOR, A/C.1/36/PV.5, 20 October 1981, p. 36.

61. GAOR, study, Appendix II, "Reservations expressed by some experts on the study," pp. 187-195.

62. Emile Benoit, Defence and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 16-17, and the whole introduction pp. 1-24.
For comments and criticism on Benoit's study see: Nicole Ball & Milton Leitenberg, "Disarmament and development: Their Interrelationship," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 10(3), 1979, pp. 251-252.

63. SIPRI, World Armament and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1978 (London: Taylor & Francis LTD, 1978), p. 310.

64. Gunnar Myrdal quoted in:
Bert V.A. Roling, Disarmament and Development: The Perspective of Security (memo), (Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Foundation Reshaping the International Order (RIO), 1979), p. 66.

65. United Nations Bulletin, May 1, 1951, p. 459.

66. The best sources for comparing social, economic and military indicators are the annual publications by Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures (Leesburg, Virginia: *MSE publications, 1981). See also table 5 in chapter 7.

67. Avi Beker, "The Oil-Arms Connection: Fueling the Arms Race," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 8(3) Spring, 1982, pp. 419-442.

68. See: P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey, "East-West/ North-South: Peace and Prosperity?" Commentary, September 1980.

_____, "Against the New Economic Order," Commentary, April, 1977.

Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1977) ; P.T. Bauer, Poverty, Poor Countries, and Perverted Economies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

69. GAOR, A/C.1/36/PV.18, 29 October 1981. The representative of Cuba was even more explicit in his comments on the study: "The struggle for peace, detente, the cessation of the arms race and disarmament are inseparable parts of a New International Economic Order." A/C.1/36/PV.4, 27 October, 1981.

70. Charles William Maynes, "A UN Policy for the Next Administration," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54, Winter 1975-1976, pp. 807-808.

71. Mohammed Bedjaoui, Toward a New International Economic Order, A UNESCO publication (New York: Holmes & Meir Publishers, 1979), p. 75.

M. Bedjaoui was the Algerian Ambassador to the United Nations and was elected in 1982 to serve in the international Court of Justice. According to Bedjaoui, already in 1973 the non aligned countries vigorously maintained that the East-West ideological rivalry is superposed by the "harsher and more obvious reality of the major contradiction between the South and the North." Ibid, p. 34.

72. Ibid, pp. 59-60 and p. 97.

73. George C. Abbott, "The NIEO: What Went Wrong," Co-Existence, April, 1978, p. 11.

74. The Prime Minister of Jamaica, Michael Manley, "Third World Under Challenge", p. 29.

75. Willetts, The Non-Aligned, p. 44.

76. Department of State Bulletin 69, No. 1790, October 15, 1973, p. 470.

77. On the institutionalisation process see: Willetts, The Non-Aligned, pp. 36-43. Neuhold, "Permanent Neutrality," pp. 291-292 and Jankowitsch & Sauvart, The Third World, Introduction.

78. Jankowitsch & Sauvart, The Third World, Vol. I, p. 1.

79. Robert Mortimer, The Third World, p. 93.

80. Ibid, pp. 74-75.

81. Ibid, pp. 10-25. Peter Willetts in his comprehensive and quantitative study on non-aligned behavior says that from the beginning the denials by the non-aligned that they were forming a third bloc through sincerely made at that time, were not valid. As a matter of fact, he argues, already in Belgrade in 1961, "They were setting up an informal, non-military alliance." All the more so is the case in the seventies when the non-aligned have developed the features of a formal institution. Since 1972 the members themselves have recognized the change by increasingly referring to the "Non-Aligned Movement." Willetts, The Non-Aligned, p. 224 and p. 44 respectively.

82. Ashok Kapur, India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making (London: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 56.

83. Indriss Jazairi, Adviser to the President of the Republic of Algeria, in Towards a New International Order. Report on the Joint meeting of the Club of Rome and the International Ocean Institute held in Algiers from 25 to 28 October, 1976.

84. GAOR, A/S-10/PV.4, 25 May, 1978, p. 7.

85. "Disarmament, Development and a Just world Order," the International Workshop on Disarmament, New Delhi, March 27-31, 1978; sponsored by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. For the text see: Bulletin of Peace Proposals 3 (1978): 278-282.

86. El Sayed Yassin, "International Stratification as an Impediment to Disarmament," in William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld (eds.), New Directions in Disarmament (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 112.

87. Mazrui, "The Barrel of the Gun," p. 24.

88. Richard Hass, reviewing Opportunities for Disarmament in Survival, July-August, 1979, p. 187.

89. Kathleen Teltsch, "Special UN Disarmament Session Opening," New York Times, May 22, 1978.

90. Christian Science Monitor, May 26, 1978.

91. Washington Post, May 23, 1978.

92. Louis Wiznitzer, "Feeling of Pessimism Grips UN Disarmament Session," Christian Science Monitor, June 7, 1978.

Chapter 5: The Challenge to Bipolarity, Deterrence
and SALT

The myth that some countries are more responsible than others and that so long as nuclear weapons remain in the hands of a few the safety of the world can be assured through a balance of terror has also to be categorically rejected.

The representative of India, 1
October 1980.

The concept of balance of power... is a totally negative and counter-productive concept that also was against all concepts of the United Nations era.

President Kyprianou of Cyprus²

As soon as disarmament became an important element in the NIEO strategy, the Third World began to use the disarmament debates at the United Nations as a major platform for challenging the existing world order. From the North-South vantage point superpower management of international nuclear deterrence was taken as a barrier on the way to their new international order. In their opposition to existing hierarchies in the world and to the discriminatory distribution of power and the growing economic gap, they challenged the right and capability of the superpowers to manage international and regional security. At the United Nations, the Third World was questioning the notion, implied sometimes in the superpowers' actions and statements, that what is good for Soviet-American interests is good for world order. With that in mind, they started to tackle the rationale of superpowers' strategic deterrence. This chapter underscores how disarmament debates at the United Nations were in effect confrontations on the nature and characteristics of different types of world order.

United Nations deliberations on disarmament provide, as in the early days of the organization, an arena for "shadow-boxing" - the parties debate measures of disarmament, but in effect they mean to make statements on how they envisage international order. In the late 1940's and early 1950's the debate was mainly between the superpowers and it centered on issues of national sovereignty, control and inspection by an international authority or even at times, the idea of world government (Chapter 2). Since the 1970's disarmament has been viewed, mainly by the Third World, as an instrument for reforming the international order by means of a re-distribution of world power. It remains questionable, however, whether the NIEO, even theoretically, means a transformation of the principles of power and order in the current nation-state system.

Nuclear Deterrence and SALT

Third World spokesmen are often scathing in their criticism of nuclear deterrence theories and challenge

the wisdom and responsibility of the practitioners - the superpowers. Since the end of World War II, nuclear deterrence between the superpowers has gradually become the mainstay of international peace and security. As SIPRI defines it, deterrence is a strategic policy which hinders or discourages other nations by means of credible threat.³ This regime of deterrence is based on the status quo between the United States and the Soviet Union in the field of military power, primarily nuclear weapons. The heart of this regime, explains Michael Mandelbaum, is the strategic nuclear balance in a bipolar world in which "the superpowers act as distinct centers in the international system around which lesser states cluster." In this regime, "the two giants have common distinctive rights and privileges that they exercise competitively but they also collude with each other to maintain."⁴ Criticism of superpowers deterrence, in this respect, is directed mainly against the uneven, rank-ordered distribution of nuclear might creating hierarchy in international relations.

The developing countries criticize both aspects of nuclear deterrence: its premise of stability and its exclusiveness which justified the monopoly of nuclear weapons in the hands of a few. The critics raise doubts about the stability of nuclear deterrence in light of the stringent requirements to maintain it. Viewed as an attempt to influence the intentions and the actual behavior of an opponent, the concept of deterrence involves three factors: communication (to convey to the adversary your strategy) capability, and credibility (to influence the adversary's expectations).⁵ Each one of these three elements creates difficult problems of definition and application.

It should be noted, however that these problems are not restricted to nuclear deterrence but are part and parcel of every military strategy. Carl Von Clausewitz, the Prussian General who is often viewed as the father of modern strategy, wrote that "in strategy everything is very simple, but not on that account very easy."⁶ This remark highlights the inevitable contrast between the basic simplicity

of the notion of deterrence and the complexities and difficulties involved in implementing it. Clausewitz's ideas, though written early in the 19th century, retained their validity even in the nuclear age. Some of his followers, who were often referred to as the "Neo-Clausewitzians," were the pioneers in studying and researching problems of power-control in the nuclear age.⁷ It was precisely this literature as well as the policies of nuclear deterrence and arms control which led to controversies and debates in academic and public circles, mainly in the United States,⁸ and later would spur Third World criticism in the United Nations.

In addition to stability the concept of nuclear deterrence implies a continuing framework of bipolarity in international relations. As shown in chapter 3, the arms control process between the superpowers was meant to strengthen and stabilize their nuclear deterrence. Some bilateral arrangements were aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war through accidents, and some other multilateral agreements created the

"non-proliferation regime" (see chapter 6) which legitimizes the gap between the great nuclear powers and non-nuclear weapons states. In this process the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) became the central component of the equilibrium in the nuclear deterrence between the superpowers.

SALT, more than anything else, epitomizes the basic strategic rationale of the superpowers "in the preservation of credible deterrence at a lower level of effort for both sides."⁹ It has codified, as Mandelbaum explains, the three principal tenets of the equilibrium between the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁰ The first element is the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) which exposes the civilian population in both countries to nuclear attacks. Second, by leaving each side with enormous strategic arsenals, SALT ratified another important element of the nuclear equilibrium: high force levels. Finally, the third characteristic of the nuclear deterrence between the superpowers is the principle of equality which was

a hallmark of the 1974, Vladivostok protocol. Later, in the course of the campaign launched by the administration of President Carter, there would be an official announcement on the "evolution from an earlier period of American strategic supremacy to an era of stable strategic equivalence."¹¹

This is precisely why the framework of the SALT agreements and negotiations became central to the confrontation between the Third World and the superpowers. SALT has epitomized the approach* which "explicitly emphasizes the unique political status to be derived from nuclear weapons."¹² According to this view, the United States and the Soviet Union are, in effect, using their nuclear weapons capabilities to dominate the existing political hierarchy in the international system. This approach asserts, that the two superpowers maintain their maximum reliance upon nuclear weapons in order to maintain their supreme status of great power.

* This approach is often referred as the "High Posture Doctrine" which is elaborated in the next chapter.

It was agreed among observers that the non-aligned, in initiating the SSOD in 1978, were anxious to dramatize the relationship of the arms race to economic development. Their specific demand, in order to release resources for the NIEO, was that the superpowers should put a ceiling on their nuclear arsenals.¹³ As pointed out by Louis Rene Beres, the objectives of SALT and the SSOD were, therefore, far from congruent. SALT was concerned mainly with the stabilization of mutual nuclear deterrence between the superpowers and therefore excluded general disarmament plans, which were aimed at a radical redistribution of global power. While the non-aligned, the initiators of the session, were looking for disarmament measures far beyond SALT II, the superpowers shared a commitment, albeit tacit, "to the extant distribution of global power - that is, to continuing their present bi-polar dominance of the planet."¹⁴

As reported by the United Nations' Yearbook on Disarmament, SALT was among the issues which received the greatest attention in the course of the SSOD.

The statements made in that regard ranged from expressions of confidence in the rapid and successful conclusion of the ongoing negotiations to those of dissatisfaction and disappointment that the agreement had not yet been reached,¹⁵ reflecting the gap between different political outlooks. Before the convening of the session there were expectations that the SALT II treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union would be signed if not ratified. Indeed, several alternative paragraphs were drafted by the Preparatory Committee of the SSOD in the winter of 1978, depending upon whether or not the SALT II treaty would be completed by the time the Special Session opened (see Appendix B).

It was clear, however, that the United States and the Soviet Union would reject "any outside interference" in their bilateral talks, and would continue to argue that since they have "global responsibilities," they alone would decide "how and when to limit the nuclear arms race."¹⁶ The superpowers managed to fend off all phrases in the draft Final Document on

SALT which they felt constituted outside pressure or intrusion. The final outcome was another ambiguous compromise expressing the need for a SALT agreement without setting any specific conditions and deadlines.

Criticizing Nuclear Deterrence Doctrines

In numerous statements in the United Nations representatives of the Third World reject the notion that nuclear weapons are stabilizing factors which help to moderate international conflicts. In their working paper to the SSOD the non-aligned countries stated that the arms race "is both the cause and result of great Power rivalry" and therefore it "impedes the realization of the objectives of the United Nations Charter." As shown in Chapter 2, this was not, necessarily, the view of the founding fathers of the United Nations on the relationship between arms race, war, and the security system of the Charter.

For the non-aligned the link was clear and simple: the arms race is responsible for "jeopardizing the

peace and security of all states" and by itself is a "stimulating factor for the persistence of international tensions and conflicts in various regions of the world."¹⁷ This was also at variance with the prevailing approach in the aftermath of World War II and in sharp contrast to the premise of the arms control process, in particular the SALT agreements, which envisaged competition between the superpowers as one aspect of their nuclear deterrence (see Appendix A on "arms control"). With their parliamentary power in the General Assembly the developing countries insisted upon including in the Final Document of the SSOD specific criticism of the premises of superpowers nuclear deterrence:

Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. 18

The non-aligned were not satisfied with what they regarded as the limited reference to nuclear disarmament in the Final Document. Their spokesmen, the representative of Sri-Lanka, rejected the "theory

of mutual nuclear deterrence" which provides for the security of the great powers and the rest of the nations of the world.¹⁹ The Prime Minister of India, Morarji Desai, stated that nuclear deterrence failed to end the arms race and rather stimulated competition.²⁰ Weeks before the SSOD, a gathering of Third World disarmament experts took another step by blaming deterrence doctrines as the source of military conflicts in the developing world:

The doctrine of "deterrence" which ostensibly regards nuclear war as unthinkable, has permitted the transformation of the mammoth coercive capacities into instruments of domination over the rest of the world. The result is a war system which integrates nuclear weapons with the so-called conventional weapons and shifts great power confrontation to the battlefields of the Third World. 21

The debate on the validity and stability of nuclear deterrence has intensified since the SSOD of 1978. Later, in 1980, it would take an official form of a United Nations study on nuclear strategy which would raise serious doubts about deterrence theories (see below in this chapter). At the United Nations General Assemblies, in the plenary and in the First Committee, or in the Disarmament Commission and in

the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, similar points are raised time and again. Frequently, Third World nations speak on the futility of nuclear strategies, challenging the notion that nuclear weapons provide security and stability. They flatly reject the "fashionable concepts of nuclear deterrence and first strike strategy" and the idea of "winning" a nuclear war.²² They argue that new strategic doctrines are developed to justify the continuing nuclear build up; these "perverse doctrines" are in themselves a major reason for the continuance of the arms race in both its qualitative and quantitative aspects.²³ In 1981, it was the first time in the history of the disarmament negotiating forum in Geneva that the CD report to the United Nations General Assembly incorporated several paragraphs of forthright criticism of doctrines of nuclear deterrence made on behalf of the Group of 21 non-aligned states in the CD.²⁴

Sometimes, American allies speak on behalf of the concept of nuclear deterrence as a necessary evil in the global confrontation. Japan, for instance, explained that particularly in periods of increased

international tension, such as after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the "stabilized system" of nuclear deterrence is of ever-increasing importance as a factor to contain the further spreading of such tension.²⁵ Even a country like Ireland, not a member of a military alliance and a staunch proponent of disarmament at the United Nations, called for a realistic approach toward the issue of nuclear deterrence, including the notion of the use of nuclear weapons which is central to the logic of some strategic doctrines.²⁶

It is interesting that though nuclear deterrence involves both superpowers, only the United States found it necessary to defend the concept. The Soviets could, perhaps, ignore the criticism since they enjoy a permanent advantage over the West in disarmament debates in the United Nations. As in the case of the North-South economic debate the Soviets manage to remain on the side-lines leaving the industrialized West alone against the Third World majority in the General Assembly and the CD (see chapter 8).

Since the Soviets do not regard the attack on nuclear deterrence as implicating their role as the other superpower, the United States is alone in defending the system of global nuclear deterrence (other Western diplomats restrict their remarks to regional nuclear deterrence).

In the first major speech on arms control and disarmament of the Reagan Administration, the American representative to the CD, speaking in the summer of 1981, devoted most of his speech to many aspects of his country's strategic rivalry with the Soviet Union. However, in light of Third World criticism of the notion of nuclear deterrence, Ambassador

Flowerree felt it necessary to make a special comment, somewhat philosophically, in defense of deterrence. Flowerree rejected the contention that deterrence is an "abhorrent doctrine" and pointed out that many nations and groups of nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, including even neutral countries are practicing deterrence in one form or another. Deterrence, the American representative concluded, is an

integral part of the nation-state system that exists in the world today and the adoption of a high moral tone in preaching about the evils of deterrence "maybe satisfying to the psyche, but it doesn't get us anywhere."²⁷

Rejecting Superpowers' Balance of Power

In various ways Third World countries challenge the assertion quite often implied by the superpowers in the 1960's and 1970's that they are "responsible managers of the affairs of international society as a whole."²⁸ According to this view, existing hierarchies in international relations are desirable and superpower hegemony vis-a-vis the rest of the world is necessary to maintain global stability. As Hedley Bull wrote, the concept of a great power has always had normative as well as positive connotations. A great power is therefore recognized in the front rank of military might but also is regarded, by itself and by other members of the international community, as having special rights and duties.²⁹

In effect, the Third World challenges what can be considered as a bipolar regime of world order. As described by Michael Mandelbaum, this regime is characterized by three principal pillars: anarchy (no supranational authority), nuclear equilibrium (between the two superpowers), and hierarchy of bipolarity.³⁰ It is the interest of both superpowers to maintain their hierarchical relationship and, thus, to adopt coordinate measures which do not threaten their dominant position (on their High-Posture Doctrine, aimed to prevent nuclear proliferation, see the next chapter). For the developing countries, this regime is the major barrier toward achieving their ultimate goal of establishing a New International Order. As Ali Mazrui indicated, a new international military order (including some degree of nuclear proliferation) becomes a precondition for a new international economic order.³¹ This philosophy is reflected in disarmament debates at the United Nations and has a direct bearing on Third World approach to the world's balance of power.

In their attack on the current regime the Third World nations would dismiss everything which represents the international balance of power, its balance of terror, its structure of military blocs and alliances and, above all, the right and responsibility of the superpowers to manage international affairs. A resolution adopted by the non-aligned Foreign Ministers participating in the SSOD said the following:

...peace, security and the relaxation of tensions cannot be based on the policy of the so-called balance of power, on the division into blocs and on the arms race. 32

Third World delegates argue that the 'balance of power' is "inherently unstable" and cannot provide security on a lasting basis; it also causes the diversion of resources from what they regard as more "productive and urgent" objectives.³³ Even moderate members of the non-aligned join the parade of criticism terming the existing balance of terror as a "false kind of peace and tranquility" and warning of the "tragic process of collective self-deception" which brought about the reliance on these arrangements.³⁴ Typical is the reaction of Cyprus, itself a victim of the

collapse of a delicate balance of power which led to foreign invasion and partition of the island, which injects a new interpretation of the concept of balance of power in the United Nations' Charter:

The concept of balance of power... is a totally negative and counter-productive concept that also runs against all concepts of the United Nations era, and to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations... The concept of balance of Power has no place in our present day interdependent world of the United Nations and in a nuclear age. 35

According to Third World spokesmen even the notion of "maintaining the military balance" is wrong. In discussing a Romanian proposal (after it was adopted without a vote in the Committee) on reduction of military budgets, India expressed its reservation on the suggestion that the reduction should be carried out on the basis of the existing military balance, or a balance of power, concepts which India found "untenable." Instead, India asserted, it should be done on the basis of "ensuring equal security for all States." This means, India continued, concentrated efforts to reduce the five or six most heavily armed States, which account for more than eighty per cent of the total global military expenditures.³⁶

The intimate link between the process of disarmament, as envisaged by the Third World, and world order can be illustrated in their attitudes toward the idea of "superpower responsibility." For Third World theoreticians and delegates, the superpowers have no right, and lack the legitimacy for a responsible management of international affairs. In the words of the representative of India in 1978:

It would be unacceptable at least to my Government, to be told that nuclear weapons are safe only in the hands of the five present nuclear States, since we cannot accept the obvious implication that some States are more responsible than others. 37

An interesting exchange took place during the 1978 SSOD between the American Ambassador Andrew Young, who was considered to be a leading supporter of Third World nations, and the representative of Pakistan. The issue was, again, over the credentials of superpowers vis-a-vis Third World governments in responsible behavior. Addressing himself to the perils of nuclear proliferation, Ambassador Young, early in the debate in the SSOD Ad-Hoc Committee, commented on the efforts of the American Administration to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in research reactors

because of the fear that this material and sensitive technologies may come into the hands of "irresponsible Governments or terrorists."³⁸ Referring to Andrew Young as "our eminent friend and colleague," the representative of Pakistan replied in a way which underscored the gap between the nations on the issue of international responsibility:

Leaving aside this question of Governments and terrorists, who is to determine whether a government is responsible or not? At various moments in history, various Governments have committed actions which history has judged as irresponsible or worse. No individual State, however, powerful, can set itself up as judge of the credentials of other sovereign states. 39

The gap between the Third World and the West is also manifested in the prolonged impasse in United Nations deliberations on international terrorism. It is evident that the West and the Third World do not agree on what is really overly aggressive and even outrageous actions (hijacking of planes in commercial flights, assassinations of diplomats or civilians in foreign capitals etc.). Some Third World countries, with the support of the Soviet Union, often regard such actions as quite justified and appropriate for

what they regard as the righting of old wrongs or for achieving certain political objectives. As a result, these countries succeeded to neutralize discussions on the subject by way of defining the problem. This is how the item is inscribed in the agenda of the General Assembly:

Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to affect radical changes. 40

The issue of international terrorism and its treatment by the international community is closely related to one's approach to the problem of world order. When they are not constrained by formalities of international diplomacy, some Third World scholars provide even sharper observations on this inter-relationship. One of the best-known Indian writers on strategy wrote:

I have no faith in the big powers acting rationally unemotionally and without hysteria. I have more faith in the rationality of Arab terrorists than in the Ivy-League educated, Rand-trained, bright analysts in Washington and elsewhere. 41

Similarly is Professor Ali Mazrui, who propagates the provocative idea of a nuclear option for black Africa. Turning to those who are scared of Idi Amin in nuclear armor Mazrui provides reassuring explanation:

If the threat of a "black man" can make a little white girl behave herself, perhaps a similar threat in a nuclear guise would scare other warmongers into sanity at last.

According to Mazrui, thus, nuclear terrorism may be an important tool of redressing world order.

Concurrently, he dismisses the notion of superpowers "responsible behaviour":

...mad rulers are not limited to the Third World. The Northern Hemisphere has produced both Hitler and Stalin in our own lifetime. And remember, Nixon ordered a world wide nuclear alert in 1973 - partly in order to recover some dignity in the midst of the Watergate scandal. A ruler like him - under domestic fire - could all too easily take a potentially catastrophic international gamble. 42

The Charter and Balance of Power

The assault on the concepts of 'balance of power', 'balance of terror' as well as on the superpowers' ability to manage international affairs cannot be dismissed

as just another exercise of Third World rhetoric. This confrontation has immediate effects on the substance of disarmament debates at the United Nations and, more important, its implication on world order amounts to an attempt to reWrite some fundamental provisions in the Charter of the United Nations. From the point of view of the Charter, disarmament matters cannot be dealt with in the framework of the NIEO. The Charter is to a very large extent a multilateral treaty dedicated to maintain the status quo of the postwar international order and balance of power. In providing special responsibilities and privileges to the great powers, the Charter exempts them from some of the restrictions upon sovereignty that ordinary states theoretically accepted in ratifying it. The politics of NIEO and its manifestations in disarmament debates mark a departure from the provisions of the Charter and should, therefore, be evaluated in terms of what the Charter was initially intended to be and not in terms of what the United Nations became under Third World stewardship.

From the beginning, the United Nations system which emerged in 1945 was based on a mixture of "collective security" (see also chapter 2) and "balance of power."⁴³ Despite the affirmation of the "equal rights... of nations large and small" and the pledge to respect the "sovereign equality" of all member-States, the Charter has practically conferred exclusive power and almost unlimited discretion upon the Security Council which reflected the collective hegemony of the great powers in the postwar world. In this respect the Charter simply registered the world power relations and in the words of Robert Tucker:

the chief difference between the traditional balance-of-power system and the system of the charter is that the latter sought to make explicit and to legitimize what the former left rather obscure and never quite dared to legitimize. ⁴⁴

The Charter reflected the notion of the Big-Five unity in which the great powers were intended to exercise their collective hegemony, a hegemony President Roosevelt insistently identified as "trusteeship" or the "Five Policeman." In light of the Charter provisions, Inis Claude concludes that

there is an element of truth in the accusation that the Big Five unity is just a cynical device of an international oligarchy establishing the great powers as global dictators.⁴⁵ According to this interpretation the veto right of the big powers is a "weighting device" which acknowledges the inequality of states by providing a special status to the most powerful and important states in the international organization. Inis Claude agrees therefore with other scholars who view Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter speaking on "sovereign equality" of member states, as clearly "a myth."⁴⁶

In addition to being deliberately weak and vague on disarmament, the United Nations Charter is, thus, a document aimed to preserve a particular structure of balance of power in the international system. The American Secretary of State at the time, Cordell Hull, explained that the notion of the Big Five unity was central to the world order envisaged by the founding fathers of the United Nations and without it there would be a disaster, but he

added "no machinery, as such, can produce this essential harmony and unity."⁴⁷ For this reason, the right of veto in the Security Council which is so much criticized as unjust and unequal, should be viewed not so much as a measure of great power dictatorship over the rest of the world but rather "as a factor injected into the relationship of the great powers among themselves."⁴⁸ This is exactly what balance of power is about: a device to protect superpower interest but at the same time to secure the stability of the system as a whole. It is understandable, therefore, why Claude distinguishes between the collective security system of the Charter and the pure theory of collective security. In the Charter the recognition of the interests of the great powers is essential for its version of collective security.⁴⁹

In essence the NIEO is not as much a call for a new system of international order as it is a demand for a change in the balance of power. As Robert Tucker elaborates in his essay on The Inequality of Nations, the NIEO does not envisage a transformation

of the international system. The system will remain unchanged because the role and importance of the state will remain as central as it was in the past and even will take on ever greater significance. The demand for a more equitable international system, explains Tucker , is in no way found to contradict an insistence upon the state's sovereign independence. To the contrary:

...the state's sovereign independence - the essence of its equality in both the old system and the "new" - is largely identified with the right of self-help to defend the collective's vital and, of course, legitimate interests. 50

In this respect the North-South confrontation on disarmament is completely different from the earlier debates in the United Nations between East and West. As shown in chapter 2 the Baruch Plan of 1946 was a sweeping proposal for the dilution of national sovereignty for the sake of a supranational government. The plan marked a major departure from the vision and arrangements of the United Nations Charter. In order to achieve nuclear disarmament, the Americans called for a revision in world order through the establishment of an international authority at the expense of

national sovereignty. The idea to abolish the veto power was also a measure to allow the supranational organ to impose sanctions on member-states. Moreover, the control measures in the Baruch Plan meant foreign inspection and interference within the territory of independent states, an idea which the Soviets found "incompatible with state sovereignty."

In the North-South confrontation on disarmament in the 1970s the focus was over a completely different dimension of international order. This time the Third World does not propose a form of world government to implement disarmament measures but rather a change in the international balance of power throughout disarmament of the powerful. As Robert Tucker points out, in the call for NIEO western observers may find a contradiction between the emphasis on interdependence which requires a more internationalist system and the growing insistence upon the state's undiminished sovereignty:

Interdependence is not seen as a means for drawing the sharp teeth of sovereignty but as an opportunity for obtaining maximum concessions from those states that possess a disproportionate share of the world's wealth and power.⁵¹

The NIEO, as can be seen in various United Nations and non-aligned declarations, does not aim to develop an interdependent world system which would restrict the freedom of action by the member-States. The NIEO is rather identified with increasing emphasis of the "full" and "permanent" sovereignty of the developing states. From its inception, the NIEO was meant to strengthen the sovereignty of Third World nations. The major document of the NIEO - the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties - adopted in December 1974, makes it clear that the principle of sovereignty will govern "economic as well as political and other relations among States."⁵² In this respect the NIEO is a far cry from the notion of an international authority which would supervise a universal disarmament process. To the contrary, the NIEO is a demand which is made by states on behalf of the state system in order to challenge the global status quo as registered and legitimized by the United Nations' Charter. Disarmament, as envisaged within the framework of the NIEO, is a vehicle to alter the balance of power in the international system with a view to be rid of the "law of the great powers" (see chapter 4).

United Nations Official Documents on Superpowers'
Deterrence

Gradually, with their growing influence and determination, the Third World nations could inject their observations on disarmament and international order into official reports of the United Nations' Secretary General. In a report entitled "Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons" the Secretary General, with the assistance of governmental experts, adopted the critical view of the Third World on the nuclear arms race and the deterrence doctrines.⁵³

The study made at the behest of the 1978 General Assembly, traces the development of nuclear weapons capability from its beginning. Typically, the General Assembly resolution requested the Secretary General, with the assistance of qualified experts, to study the implications for international security of: "The doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons."⁵⁴ It was the first time that the United Nations as such was ordered by an overwhelming majority of its members to take a stand on the central issue of superpowers nuclear deterrence.

It is interesting that twelve years earlier, the United Nations issued a study on nuclear weapons which, unlike its successor did not take issue with the concept of nuclear deterrence. In 1968, the United Nations study on "Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for states of the acquisition and further development of these weapons," was rather cautious and as its cumbersome title suggests it avoided value judgments on the strategic doctrines of the superpowers. The study said rather that the cause of the arms race, including nuclear weapons, is "the sense of insecurity on the part of nations." Typically, it gave priority to an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as a "powerful step in the right direction."⁵⁵ It is another irony of United Nations disarmament politics that a decade later the idea of non-proliferation would not enjoy wide support at the United Nations, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would be taboo in non-aligned meetings (see next chapter).

In 1980, the study had new focuses and different emphases, underscoring the profound changes in the United Nations position on the question of nuclear arms race. First, the Secretary General's report challenged the argument (which in effect was put forward by its predecessor in 1968) that threats to national security stimulate the nuclear arms race. Instead, the experts found that:

The development of nuclear-weapon technology has created an important dimension in the arms race. It is clear that in many cases technology dictates policy instead of serving it and that new weapon systems frequently emerge not because of any military or security requirement but because of sheer momentum of the technological process... Technology by itself is blind to the dangers of the arms race. 56

On the causes of the arms race the group of experts, among them officials of countries which are protected under the nuclear umbrella of the United States,⁵⁷ tended to endorse only one theory which since the time it was proclaimed in the United States became part and parcel of Soviet propaganda. The experts, without providing due evidence, concluded unequivocally:

Moreover, there is also the undeniable role of the so-called military-industrial complex,

which obviously stands to benefit from the continuation and escalation of the arms race. 58

At no other point during the study (177 pages of over 600 paragraphs) is there further elaboration of the concept "military-industrial complex." One chapter of the study was devoted to "The doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons." The report, which was unanimously approved by all twelve experts, is highly critical of the superpowers' nuclear deterrence system. It challenges the premises of deterrence and rejects its doctrines:

The danger of the annihilation of human civilization should not be made the subject of theoretical arguments... 59

Doctrines, in a sense, are fictions built upon various hypothetical scenarios of nuclear war... It is therefore highly questionable whether the doctrines of deterrence would prove to be reliable instruments of control in a crisis. 60

The report, reflecting the prevailing view in the United Nations of 1980, continues to cast doubts on the bipolar system of international order and it questions the superpowers ability and responsibility

to manage international order and flatly rejects the concept of nuclear deterrence:

It is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security. The future of mankind is then made hostage to the perceived security of a few nuclear-weapon states and most notably that of the two superpowers. It is furthermore not acceptable to establish, for the indefinite future, a world system of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. This very system carries within it the seed of nuclear-weapon proliferation. In the long run, therefore, it is a system that contains the origins of its own destruction. 61

The concept of the maintenance of world peace, stability and balance through the process of deterrence is perhaps the most dangerous collective fallacy that exists... 62

So long as reliance continues to be placed upon the concept of the balance of nuclear deterrence as a method for maintaining peace, the prospects for the future will always remain dark, menacing and as uncertain as the fragile assumptions upon which they are based... 63

As expected, both superpowers opposed the United Nations study on nuclear weapons in the first place, questioning its wisdom and value. While the United States expressed reservations on the terms of reference of the study,⁶⁴ the Soviets were even more specific in criticizing the references to the doctrines of deterrence, present nuclear arsenals and trends in

the technological development of nuclear weapons. Such a study, in the view of the Soviets, "would not bring us any closer to the solution of the problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race by a single step."⁶⁵ Two years later, after the submission of the report, the Soviets said that their reservations have been vindicated.⁶⁶ But superpower opposition in the United Nations is to no avail. Third World countries were eager to pass the resolution which provided for a close scrutiny of the superpowers' deterrence doctrines. In 1978, at the 33rd General Assembly the resolution authorizing the study was supported by 117 countries to none with 21 abstentions. The 21 abstentions provided a telling proof of the superpowers' common interest in nuclear deterrence and maintaining the bipolar balance of power in the international system. The following countries from the West abstained: Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States of America. Israel joined these nine members of NATO. From the East: Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukraine, and the Soviet Union.⁶⁷

The superpowers' cooperation is even more illustrated by the defections from each camp. Several NATO countries and other allies of the United States joined the Third World and voted for the study: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey (Australia, Canada and Japan even participated in the experts group). In the East Romania, the "enfant terrible" of the Warsaw Pact, also voted for the study and sent an official from its Foreign Ministry who joined the twelve experts to issue a critical report on the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1980, the United Nations 35th General Assembly endorsed the report of the experts by 126 votes to none with 19 abstentions,⁶⁸ and again, the joint forces of the superpowers were defeated by the United Nations' majority.

It seems that the Secretary General Kurt Waldheim was aware of the discomfort shared by the superpowers over the report. In his foreward to the report issued as "Report of the Secretary General," he went out of his way to add these remarks:

It should be noted that the observations and recommendations contained in the report are

those of the experts. In this connexion, the Secretary General would like to point out that in the complex field of disarmament matters, in many instances he is not in a position to pass judgement on all aspects of the work..... accomplished by experts.* 69

Bipolarism and Co-Chairmanship

As mentioned in chapter 3, both superpowers cooperated against the Third World initiative to "democratize" the machinery for multinational negotiations on disarmament in Geneva. Observers regarded the CCD as the "illegitimate child of the unlawful USA-USSR amours."⁷⁰ The superpowers, however, realizing that they could not withstand the strong pressures of the United Nations majority on the matter agreed reluctantly to the Third World initiative to eliminate their co-chairmanship in the Committee, and to strengthen the links between the United Nations and the Committee which used to be virtually autonomous

* This disclaimer was understandable in light of the Secretary's campaign for re-election for a third term which he started early in 1981 and finally lost to Perez de Cuellar from Peru.

forum.⁷¹ The demise of the co-chairmanship of the CCD in Geneva was hailed by many, and described as the most significant outcome of the special session.⁷² The campaign for the democratization of the negotiating forum on disarmament should be viewed as part and parcel of the Third World attack on the bipolar system of balance of power in the international system. The experience of the Committee on Disarmament (CD) since its inception in 1979 may serve as a telling proof of the gap between United Nations' rhetoric and bureaucratic reforms and the reality of balance of power outside.

The changes in the new organ in Geneva were aimed at securing Third World control over this forum of multinational disarmament negotiations. In addition to elimination of the co-chairmanship, it was decided to enlarge the Committee, to put it under rotating chairmanship, and to open its plenary meetings to the public. The Secretary-General appointed a secretary of the committee to act as his personal representative, and it was agreed that the CD would report annually to the General Assembly of the United Nations. There was a feeling that the arrangements to revamp the Geneva

disarmament conference would at least stand as a concrete result of the SSOD which failed to agree upon substantive issues.

But the superpowers were quick to demonstrate that the reforms in the machinery for multilateral negotiations of disarmament would not affect their own conduct of bilateral negotiations. In the General Assembly of 1979, the first after the establishment of the new CD in Geneva, both superpowers resisted virtually universal pressure to give the CD the authority and power over disarmament negotiations. The resolution submitted to the Assembly reflected Third World frustration in calling the CD "to proceed without any further delay," to negotiate on priority disarmament questions and asked indirectly the superpowers to conclude their negotiations outside the CD and to submit "a full report on the status of their separate negotiations and results achieved so far." The vote on the draft resolution provided a rare show of superpower unity. the United States joined the Warsaw Pact members in abstaining while all the rest of its western allies voted with the

overwhelming majority of 130 to support the resolution (the 11 abstentions where: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukraine, the United States; Romania voted for the resolution).⁷³

In their statements the superpowers underscored their shared interest to preserve the bipolar balance of power and the framework of bilateral negotiations on strategic arms control. The United States explained that the resolution "is often accusatory in its tone and unrealistic in its request." The Soviets, following suit, rejected the "extremely subjective approach" of the resolution. Similarly, the Soviets regarded as unacceptable the language on the link between the work of the CD and the talks going on outside it. A disciplined Bulgaria, added its rejection to the attempt to subordinate the efforts outside the CD to the authority of the CD, saying that it did not reflect the consensus on the constitution and status of the CD achieved during the tenth special session of the General Assembly.⁷⁴

in 1980, the Soviets were even more adamant than the Americans in objecting to a resolution which dealt with the question of membership of the CD. For two years the Committee on Disarmament was unable to consider the modalities of the review of its membership as required in the Final Document of the SSOD in paragraph 120 which provided for the establishment of the CD. The resolution requested the CD to consider the matter and to report on it to the next General Assembly, and recommended that the first review should be completed during the next SSOD (June-July, 1982). Czechoslovakia, speaking on behalf of the Eastern European States, explained that the Socialist group regards the composition of the CD as a matter which should be resolved by the Committee itself, on the basis of consensus. The Soviet bloc, as Czechoslovakia pointed out, regarded the question of membership as a prerogative of the Committee and the General Assembly should not interfere in it, since the CD is "an independent organ with a special status in relation to the General Assembly." All members of the Warsaw Pact (except Romania), together with Mongolia and Laos abstained in the vote on the resolution

which was supported by everybody else. It is quite revealing that in 1981, in the vote on the same subject, Afghanistan and Vietnam joined the Communist bloc bringing the abstentions to 12.⁷⁵

In 1981, many delegates expressed disappointment over the failure of the CD to achieve any meaningful progress in the field of disarmament. Third World delegates concluded that the Committee "has been paralysed by the lack of political will of some of its members" and their excessive use of the consensus rule in the CD to block even procedural progress, such as the establishment of ad hoc working groups.⁷⁶ But as indicated by France, which joined the CD in 1979, even such questions are too important to be dismissed merely as procedural. France, for instance, has a particular concern in the issue of the prohibition of the tests of nuclear weapons as it has not joined the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Therefore, France insisted that even the mandate of a working group on the matter within the CD should be agreed upon by consensus, which is the fundamental rule for all decisions in the CD: "we do not think that recourse

to the rule of the majority for the establishment of subsidiary bodies in the Committee can in any way contribute to progress in negotiations on the substance."⁷⁷

Mrs. Thorson, the Swedish Deputy Minister for Disarmament, blamed mainly the two superpowers who "have not demonstrated readiness or even willingness to exploit the rich potential of the Committee on Disarmament, because of the way in which they interpret their own security needs and interests in the present international situation." Mrs. Thorson was speaking as a representative of the Group of 21 neutral and non-aligned Countries in the CD, whose views and interests in regard to the international system has been discussed in chapter 4 above. She was more candid in her other remarks which admit that the failure of the new, reformed machinery for multilateral negotiations on disarmament can be attributed to the international power structure.⁷⁸ What she did not say, however, was whether the United Nations can remain relevant to the realities of international power while pursuing bureaucratic reforms which ignore them.

Similar cooperation between the superpowers was exhibited in another debate which touched upon the international balance of power and bipolarity. This time it was a French proposal submitted first in a memorandum to the SSOD in May 1978, calling for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency.⁷⁹ The idea was put forward by the French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing when he addressed the SSOD marking his country's return to the international disarmament arena after a 16 - year long absence.⁸⁰ The proposed agency would monitor and verify the implementation of disarmament agreements and would help, according to France, to strengthen international confidence and security.

The French proposal, following the Gaullist tradition of asserting its independence from superpowers' domination in world affairs, posed a major challenge to the big two powers which enjoy virtually a complete monopoly in satellite surveillance. The proposal envisaged, in a gradual process, the ultimate removal of the superpowers' monopoly when the international agency will have its own "observation

satellites required for the performance of its tasks." In other words, the plan provided also for outside interference in superpowers' arms control through international supervision over the implementation of their bilateral agreements. According to Yugoslavia which supported the French proposal, the new agency would be an "instrument of the whole international community" and would provide equal access to the information obtained by the monitoring and thus leading to "the widest possible democratization of decision-making and equal rights of all the members of the international community."⁸¹

Both the Soviet Union and the United States regarded the proposal as an attempt to undermine their bilateral framework of arms control and, perhaps, an infringement on the bipolarity of the international balance of power. The Soviets questioned whether a universal instrument for monitoring should be sought or was possible in view of the individual nature of disarmament agreements. The Soviets explained that the formation of supervising and monitoring organs without practical disarmament measures might simply

create the appearance of doing something or lead to a heightening of mutual suspicions.⁸² The United States concluded that the project "is not feasible, necessary or desirable in the foreseeable future," and the cost of developing such an agency would be enormous. Finally, the Americans raised the political considerations which may affect the agency saying that "control over and access to its information could become highly controversial issues."⁸³

The vote on the draft resolution on the subject was also interesting in the sense that it reflected the differences in the internal cohesion and discipline within the two camps, between an alliance whose members possess considerable latitude in their relations with each other and an alliance system whose members are bound by coercion. Thus, all the western allies voted for it, while in the Communist camp, only Romania could assert its independence on disarmament policies by supporting the French proposal and by even nominating its candidate for the expert group selected to study the subject. In 1979, the results were: 12⁴ to none with 11 absentions: Bulgaria,

Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukraine, the Soviet Union, the United States, Vietnam.⁸⁴ In this instance, the United States joined the Soviet Union and its allies, as if to demonstrate the special character of superpower common interest. Another telling indication of cohesion in the Soviet camp was provided by Cuba which was the only country to join the two superpowers in expressing a negative view on the project. Cuba maintained that the proposed project may constitute interference in the internal affairs of States and therefore, "far from enhancing, it would impede the proper implementation of disarmament agreements."⁸⁵ It was quite symbolic that Cuba which hosted at the same year the 6th non-aligned summit and would serve as its chairman for the next 3 years, decided to align itself with the superpowers against the Third World and used a familiar Soviet argument in objecting to international inspection.

Military Blocs and Foreign Bases

Another important aspect in the debate on the nature of the international balance of power is the issue of military blocs and foreign military bases. Indeed, from the beginning, the notion of military blocs and foreign military bases was alien to the non-aligned movement. This is one major issue, a leading component of the non-aligned credo, on which no compromise is possible in the United Nations. This issue, as explained by Philip Towle, reflects also a philosophical debate on whether military alliances and foreign bases are a stabilizing or destabilizing factor in international relations.⁸⁶ Here, again, the debate amounted to a struggle between different political approaches on the nature of the international order itself.

In their working paper submitted to the SSOD the non-aligned called for: "the dissolution of military blocs, great power alliances and pacts arising there of, the dismantling of foreign military bases and withdrawal of military forces from foreign territories."

Similarly, the non aligned demanded the "prohibition of the creation of new foreign military bases and the stationing of troops and military equipment in foreign territories."⁸⁷ But soon it became clear that on this issue there would be no concessions. The superpowers could swallow some vague criticism over nuclear deterrence etc., but in no way could they give in on essential ingredients of their structure of international power. The Western states immediately opposed these demands and put brackets around the non-aligned language on the matter.⁸⁸

On this issue the official and declaratory policy of the Soviet Union is closer to that of the non-aligned than that of the West, since it was always a Soviet contention that the Warsaw Pact was established only as a reaction to NATO, and that the Soviets are ready, on a reciprocal basis, to dissolve their military alliance.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, at the SSOD the Soviets and their satellites took a low-key stand during the debate, probably because it was viewed as another challenge by the Third World to the bi-polar order. The working paper of

the Warsaw Pact countries mentioned only "the reaching of agreement at least not to expand the opposing military and political groupings and alliances in Europe by admitting new members." No reference was made to military blocs and foreign bases.⁹⁰ It is interesting to note that this debate provided Romania with yet another opportunity to assert its limited independence within the Soviet bloc by joining the non-aligned camp on the call for the dissolution of military blocs, the dismantling of foreign military bases and by adding something even more daring:

The withdrawal behind national frontiers of foreign troops, their armaments and other combat equipment, and the demobilization of the troops withdrawn. 91

It is clear, however, that for the Western alliance, the issue of foreign military bases is of paramount political and security importance and, therefore, no compromise on the principle could be negotiated. For the West, declaratory policies cannot be twisted on such a principle even for propagandistic purposes at the United Nations (see more on this discrepancy between East and West in chapter 8). At the end of

the SSOD, the non-aligned could only express regret for the failure to

incorporate the principle of the incompatibility between the maintenance of military bases and the presence of foreign troops in foreign territories, on the one hand, and international peace and security, on the other... [and] opposition to military blocs, their bases and the presence of foreign troops has been cardinal to the non-aligned movement from its inception. 92

The confrontation between these contending approaches to international order and security would continue because of the irreconcilable positions. The non-aligned would continue to declare that the policy of balance of force, spheres of influence and military alliances are inconsistent with international security. They would call again in Havana 1979, for dismantling foreign military bases and dissolving military blocs.⁹³

In 1980, marking a departure from their low-key position at the SSOD, the Soviets would join the non-aligned camp on the issue of alliances and foreign military bases. As an integral part of their "peace offensive" against the West (see chapter 8), the Soviets began to ignore their own interest as the other superpower.⁹⁴ The Soviets, thus, together with their

allies in the non-aligned movement (Angola, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, Benin and Democratic Yemen)⁹⁵ revived the call for "the dissolution of existing military alliances" by referring to paragraph 125 of the Final Document which listed the various proposals submitted to the SSOD but could not be agreed upon. In the vote, the Soviets and the majority of the Third World supported the resolution while NATO countries and a few other allies of the United States opposed it.⁹⁶

The explanations which followed the vote lent further proof to the unbridgeable gap between the two opposing approaches. It was made clear that the essence of the debate was on the nature and character of world order, as well as on the correct interpretation of the provisions in the Charter of the United Nations on collective security. According to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, the call to dismantle military alliances is not in line with the Charter of the United Nations and it distorts the notion and the role of such alliances. He pointed out that unlike what the sponsors tried to imply, military alliances do not pose a threat to international peace

and security. Quite to the contrary, in Europe they have been successful in perserving peace and stability, and his country, as a member of NATO, has never been involved in any military conflict. At the same time, West Germany is actively involved in arms control efforts such as the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions.

The resolution, West Germany continued to explain, is in contradiction to the United Nations Charter provisions which under Article 51 guarantees the inherent right of States to self-defense, individually and collectively. That right implies the possibility for States, whether or not organized in regional groups, to make arrangements for collective defense. In a clear allusion to the States of the Soviet bloc which co-sponsored the resolution the delegate from West Germany referred to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and co-operation in Europe (Helsinki agreements of 1975) which they signed and in which they recognized the right of the parties to belong to treaties of alliance .97

Sweden, which abstained in the vote, explained that although adherence to military alliance is incompatible with its policy of neutrality, it did not see fit to prescribe for other states what security arrangements they should choose for themselves or together with others.⁹⁷ Even Finland, which presumably for political reasons had to vote for the resolution, expressed reservations on the attempt to restrict the right of States to interpret their security needs and undertake security arrangements they deem appropriate.⁹⁹ But the non-aligned did not give up on this point. India, again, restated the non-aligned principles on the subject:

As a non-aligned country, we are opposed to competing military blocs and alliances. We do not believe that either individual or collective security is advanced through such military groupings. The simple fact is that the formation of military alliances has invariably led to the creation of an atmosphere of tension and confrontation among nations and generated suspicions of each other's intentions. The main casualty of this process has been international security. We are therefore convinced that dissolution of military alliances would lead to more and not less security, for the States concerned as well as for the world as a whole. 100

In conclusion, it is evident that since the debates on disarmament at the United Nations, touch upon the foundations of the existing international order and hierarchy, the confrontation between the Third World and the superpowers can be sharp and diametrical. While the superpowers share sometimes an uncomfortable alliance, the Third World are united in their demands for a major change in the structure and organization of international affairs. As shown in chapter 4, the Third World of the 1970's did not regard itself any more as a "golden bridge" and mediator between the superpowers. In effect, its criticism of SALT and the attack on the notion of a superpower balance of power based on arms control amounts almost to a rejection of the process of detente. This attitude goes back to the early 1970's when detente was interpreted by the non-aligned as, in the words of the Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika, the "superpowers pretension to reign over the world."¹⁰¹

It can be argued, therefore, that the real debate on disarmament at the United Nations is nothing but a political-diplomatic extension of the struggle to change the international order. As shown in this

chapter the contending parties disagree on the system of nuclear deterrence between the superpowers and their attempt to consolidate it in the SALT negotiations. SALT and superpower bipolarity are totally incompatible with the Third World's goal of a radical redistribution of global power and resources. Nuclear deterrence is rejected, as are the notions of great-power responsibility and balance of power. Moreover, the democratization of the Geneva organ for multilateral negotiations on disarmament secured the Third World control over the process which earlier had been conducted under the chairmanship of the superpowers. All these in effect challenge the premises of the United Nations Charter on collective security and balance of power and, consequently, its conception of world order.

The consensus documents which were adopted at the United Nations, such as the Final Document of the SSOD, are sometimes deceiving, pretending that there is some harmony among United Nations members on these fundamental problems.

As the representative of Pakistan said in the closing debate of the SSOD:

Many of the differences have been reconciled in our final documents, but unfortunately only in a textual sense. Behind the differing texts put forward on various questions there are deep underlying differences of philosophy and approach among the various groups and Powers. There are those who, even while they are willing to make efforts to control the arms race and reduce its dangers, view the future essentially in terms of rationalizing the existing strategic balance. 102

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Chapter 6: Nuclear Proliferation: "Haves" and
"Haves Not"

The Nonproliferation Treaty has in many ways
been perceived as the most visibly discrimina-
tory of the post-war arms limitation agreements.

SIPRI - 1979¹

The Nonproliferation Treaty did not simply
reflect the hierarchical character of inter-
national politics informally; it was explicitly,
and officially, an unequal treaty.

Michael Mandelbaum,²
The Nuclear Question

From the narrow vantage point of NIEO politics it is evident that the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) must appear as a major obstacle to any future reform of the international system. The NPT more than any other treaty symbolizes the attempt to institutionalize by law the inequalities of the post-World War II international order. The distribution of nuclear power in the international system as envisaged by the NPT provisions was a frustrating reminder for the Third World that its new overwhelming power at the United Nations means very little in the real world outside. It is understandable, therefore, that the treaty became during the 1970's one of the major issues of confrontation between North and South in the United Nations. This chapter will examine how the struggle for a new international order has influenced the Third World attack on what they call the "discriminatory regime" of the NPT, and to what extent this clash undermines the international consensus on nuclear nonproliferation.

At the beginning of the 1980's the international consensus on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons

became dangerously strained. The Second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty ended on September 7, 1980, in Geneva on a note of disappointment. Despite last minute efforts after a two-day extension of the proceedings, the participants could not reach agreement on a final document outlining measures to strengthen the future operation of the treaty. The conference was held pursuant to article VIII(3) of the treaty which called on the parties to hold review conferences at intervals of five years. The first review conference in May, 1975, adopted a compromise declaration, albeit weak, it at least reaffirmed the conferees' support of the treaty's purpose. The second review conference was not able even to do that.³

A failure to produce an agreed document is probably unprecedented in United Nations conferences of this kind. The NPT second review conference was the fourth conference to review the operation of a multilateral arms control agreements. The others were the first review conference on the NPT (May 1975), the review conference on the Sea-Bed Treaty (June-July, 1977), and the review conference of the parties

to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (March, 1980). All three reached agreement on a Final Document which reviewed the operation of the treaty concerned and set out the parties' support for its provisions.⁴ As one observer pointed out, the lack of agreement in the NPT second review conference reflected

The fundamental differences between the Third World and the developed countries over the interlocking problems of nuclear proliferation and nuclear disarmament. 5

At the same time the failure highlighted the increasing fragility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Re-Endorsing Bipolarity

The NPT, signed in July, 1968, and entered into force in 1970, attempted to freeze the number of nuclear weapons states. The terms of the treaty were directed at preventing the emergence of additional nuclear weapon powers, there being five at that time, according to the treaty - the United States of America and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. The NPT can be regarded as the major multi-

lateral arms control agreement of the nuclear age. It was widely hailed as a remarkable and important achievement that could prove to be a turning point in human history. Characteristically, it was praised mainly by the superpowers. President Johnson addressed the General Assembly and called the treaty: "The most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the Nuclear Age began." Foreign Minister Gromyko said that "the conclusion of the treaty will be one of the most important steps ever undertaken to restrain the nuclear arms race in the name of the lasting peace."⁶

The key provision of the NPT, Articles I and II, divide the international community into two classes of States: the "Nuclear-Weapon States" (NWS) and the "Non-Nuclear-Weapon States" (NNWS). The division was to be guaranteed by an undertaking on the part of the "haves" to keep nuclear armament as well as material relevant to its production out of the "haves-not" hands, and by a corresponding undertaking by the "haves-not" not to acquire this capability. Moreover, Article III stipulates that the "haves-not" - and they

alone - would have to submit to periodic and systematic international safeguards to ensure that they were indeed fulfilling their obligations. In other words, the non-nuclear States make an important pledge which affects their foreign and military policy, while the nuclear States, in essence take on no new obligation . None of the superpowers had any interest in the transfer of nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear country.⁷

This inequality and disproportion of rights and duties under the NPT were the cause of the loudest protests and criticism. Some observers claimed that the treaty sanctioned discrimination in law for the first time⁸ (a claim which ignores some discriminatory provisions in the United Nations Charter). At the United Nations and in the ENDC in Geneva, delegates raised serious reservations and objections to the provisions of the treaty. India, for instance, regarded the treaty as an instrument of imbalance in international relations and demanded to eliminate it "by abolishing the special status of superiority that goes with the power and prestige these States enjoy through the possession of nuclear weapons."⁹ Even a country such as the Federal Republic of Germany, which is protected

by American troops and nuclear forces, felt that the treaty institutionalized inequality to the detriment of non-nuclear powers. It is interesting that at the beginning Western countries such as West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Japan, which technologically were very advanced in nuclear technology, joined the non-aligned and other Third World nations in the effort to defend the interests of the non-nuclear states.¹⁰ However, after lobbying efforts by the United States, these countries ratified the NPT only days before the 1975 Review Conference¹¹ (Japan in 1976) and since then they are among the stalwart guardians of the treaty in United Nations debates.

Switzerland, a country which professes neutrality in foreign policy, was also among the countries which raised reservations about the NPT provisions. Switzerland observed in 1967, that the treaty establishes "a lasting legal discrimination between States, according to whether or not they possess nuclear weapons."¹² Unlike the Western group of States, Switzerland would continue to air its reservations after its ratification

of the treaty (March, 1977). In a document submitted to the United Nations SSOD, Switzerland expressed its disappointment over the lack of the progress expected when the NPT was agreed upon. Still in the 1970's the Swiss continue, the problem of nuclear weapons is basically a problem of inequality in international relations and, therefore, should not provide a model for other treaties on disarmament and arms control.¹³

There should be no doubt about it. As Michael Mandelbaum explains, the NPT was not merely an informal reflection of the hierarchical character of international politics. It was rather, "explicitly and officially, an unequal treaty" which distinguishes between two different classes of signatories which incurred different responsibilities.¹⁴ It was, in effect, an instrument to re-assert the idea that the superpowers are, as termed by Hedley Bull, "responsible managers of international affairs" and therefore they deserve some special rights (see also chapter 5). Naturally, explains Bull:

The idea of the special rights and duties of great powers, embodies a principle of hierarchy that is at loggerheads with the principle of the equal sovereignty of states. 15

It is clear, as pointed out by Mandelbaum, that there is a positive correlation between the strengthening of the principle of hierarchy in international relations and the prospects for curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. Soviet-American cooperation is important "since the two great powers tend to be either the main threat or the main source of reassurance" for the security of the most members of the international system. "Nuclear hierarchy", concludes Mandelbaum, "will remain a glaring feature of international politics for the foreseeable future."¹⁶ In this regard the NPT subscribed to the view which is shared by much of the literature on the spread of nuclear weapons that a world with more nuclear powers would be vastly more dangerous than a world with the existing few.¹⁷

Sometimes, in the heat of United Nations' debate on the NPT, people seem to forget that the discriminatory nature of the treaty parallels that of the Security Council. As shown in chapter 2, President Roosevelt's ideas on the post-war international order were based upon the notion of "four policemen,"

which is basically a situation of inequality in terms of military power. These ideas had a direct bearing on the Charter of the United Nations, its treatment of international security, disarmament and the role envisaged to the Security Council. Under the NPT, nuclear weapons are permitted to the five nuclear weapon states which are the permanent members of the Security Council with veto power, but not to other nations. Similarly, safeguards are imposed upon the nuclear facilities of the non-nuclear weapon states but not upon those of the nuclear weapon states. Therefore, to repeat, the Third World struggle against the NPT must be viewed against the broad background of their combat strategy on changing world order.

In terms of balance of power the NPT was just a reaffirmation of the special rights accorded to permanent members of the Security Council over matters of peace and security by updating it to the nuclear age. One can always argue that the United Nations Charter is simply a reflection in law of existing inequalities between the member states. Actually, with the entry of the NPT into force, the power

distribution recognized by the United Nations Charter - namely, granting the veto power to the five permanent members of the Security Council - was now extended to include the exclusive right to have nuclear weapons. As one delegate from the Netherlands commented, a certain degree of discrimination is an inevitable element in a non-proliferation treaty and "the different status of the two categories ought therefore to be accepted from the start as being the lesser evil under the actual circumstances."¹⁸

Moreover, as some authors point out, a measure which benefits one group of States should not be viewed as being necessarily harmful to another. The Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be judged by yardsticks of commercial agreements which incorporate reciprocal obligations and concessions. It is, instead, an expression of the common interest of international society facing an urgent security problem and solving it in realistic terms.¹⁹ This interest is based on the assumption that life in "a nuclear armed crowd" would be dangerous, and the narrowing of the gap between the big and small powers will not increase stability.²⁰

Bipolarism and the Rationalization of the Campaign
against the NPT

As noted, it was only in theory that the NPT was negotiated under the auspices of the disarmament conference in Geneva. In fact, what happened was that "the United States and the Soviet Union worked out its terms between themselves, and then invited other nations to subscribe."²¹ An analysis of the struggle over the NPT reveals that it became a viable option only when the superpowers decided to coordinate their activities in the field, and only under the terms which they both considered as favorable. From the beginning, any attempt to extend the terms of the treaty beyond the framework of the existing bi-polar international system was doomed to fail. This explains why only the Irish initiative at the United Nations on non-proliferation (1958) could survive, while all other counterproposals and amendments remained in the oblivion of United Nations protocols.²² The basic difference between the Irish approach and all others was that Ireland wanted in effect to foreclose all options for additional countries to join the nuclear club. It was aimed at preventing the acquisition of

independent control of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear power (weapons acquired from other states or manufactured by itself or with the assistance of others).

The Irish proposal could succeed because it had the required appeal to the superpowers who were moving increasingly during the 1960's toward what was perceived as a responsible management of the affairs of international society as a whole (see chapter 5). It was a proposal which represented, as Alva Myrdal explains, a political philosophy endorsing the concept that

nuclear weapons could be a national asset, but that they should be compulsorily abjured in the wider international interest, although only by newcomers. 23

The superpowers favored the Irish proposal since it "allowed discriminatory distinctions to be established between nations possessing nuclear weapons and those without."²⁴ During the debate over the treaty in the ENDC (from 1966 on) it became evident that many other states did not view the proliferation problem in quite the same way as the superpowers did. Pointing out that there was a "spectrum of positions" on the matter, representatives of non-nuclear countries called

for a package arrangement that would place more substantial responsibilities and obligations on the nuclear states.²⁵

But both the United States and the Soviet Union were eager to have non-proliferation negotiated as a separate measure and not as one linked to other measures of arms control and disarmament. Adrian Fisher of the United States suggested that the negotiations over the NPT should not "link the entry into force of one measure with that of another for fear that we might not get either" and that it was a mistake to assume that a "non-proliferation treaty is advantageous to nuclear weapons States." Similarly, the Soviet delegate argued that "it would hardly be conducive to our purpose to tie up a series of measures in a single package. In our opinion this would complicate negotiations which are difficult enough already."²⁶

Generally it can be argued that most nations of the Third World would agree with the assessment that the probability of nuclear war will increase with the

spread of nuclear weapons to more countries. Probably they would accept Bernard Feld's observation that the NPT was at least as desirable for the nonnuclear nations as for the nuclear powers. They would agree that under the circumstances it would be difficult to conceive something beyond the NPT and the fact that it provides significant advantages to one of the parties is not necessarily by definition disadvantageous to others.²⁷ It is not surprising that the campaign against the treaty in Geneva was conducted by a group of countries which regard the 'nuclear option' as a potential element in their national security policies (Brazil, Egypt, India, and from 1969 also Argentina and Pakistan which joined then the CCD). Nevertheless, it is apparent that in their statements in international forums these countries have gradually rationalized their parochial national interests through proclaiming against discrimination in international relations. Later with the domination of NIEO politics, the campaign against the NPT took the form of the united Third World front within the framework of the North-South confrontation.

In this respect the evolution of the Indian position is most illustrative. The approach of India to nuclear proliferation has undergone a similar transformation to its general approach to disarmament, as described in chapter 4. India which in December 1962, after the Chinese attack had first discovered painfully the weakness of non-alignment, experienced another shock in October 1964, when China exploded its first atomic bomb. The military humiliation of 1962, was followed by intensive conventional rearmament by India. The Chinese nuclear test of 1964, further compounded India's security pre-occupation and probably led it to reconsider its previous decision not to develop nuclear weapons under any circumstances.²⁹ Later, India would lead the Third World's emerging resentment of the efforts to conclude a nonproliferation agreement.

The change in the Indian position was quite significant if one considers its attitude before the Chinese explosion. During the test ban negotiations in April 1963, both India and Sweden did not join the other six non-aligned members of the

ENDC in their memorandum on the Test Ban, presumably in order not "to embarrass the superpowers".³⁰ In those days, India, together with Ireland and Sweden, was in the forefront of those non-nuclear countries urging the nondissemination* and nonacquisition of nuclear weapons.³² Only six days before the Chinese nuclear test, the second summit conference of the non-aligned adopted a very favorable declaration containing all components of a non-proliferation treaty: nondissemination, gradual liquidation of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and commitment not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons.³³ It was only in the aftermath of the Chinese explosion that India, for the first time, argued that all non-nuclear countries needed nuclear guarantees by existing nuclear Powers against nuclear attack.³⁴

* The term "non-proliferation" of nuclear weapons came into general usage late in 1965. It was a broader term that included the concepts of "dissemination" (meaning the spread of nuclear weapons by existing nuclear powers) and "acquisition" (meaning the production or otherwise obtaining of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear powers). 31

Thereafter, India led the camp which during the debates on the Non-Proliferation Treaty emphasized the need for security guarantees and a link between superpower disarmament and non proliferation obligations.³⁵ On the issue of security guarantees by the nuclear powers, India introduced the most far-reaching measures to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and demanded an agreement which would be based on equitable measures consisting of a package or integrated approach which includes both elements: non-proliferation arrangements and some other measures affecting directly the nuclear weapons capability of the nuclear powers.³⁷

For its part, India consequently took some major steps to make crystal clear its position on the subject. On March 27, 1967, the Foreign Minister of India told his Parliament that India had a "special problem of security against nuclear attack and nuclear blackmail." Subsequently, at a press conference, he stated that if India was not to go nuclear, it must have a "credible guarantee" for its security.³⁸

Most Western observers viewed the shift in India's position on both conventional and nuclear disarmament as a major setback. Many of them failed to understand that the Indian change was just a forerunner of many other non-aligned countries. People were accustomed to indulge in nostalgia and to long for the days of Gandhi and Nehru:

India is not capable of giving the world a scientific and military blueprint having the same importance and arousing the same keen interest as the blueprint for peace it offered world public opinion in the time of Gandhi and Nehru. 39

Particularly, people did not anticipate the change among the non-aligned and were wrong to expect that India's position on the NPT "is not likely to strengthen the links between her and other non-aligned States."⁴⁰ Experience has shown that just the opposite occurred: the non-aligned movement moved gradually to adopt India's policy on the NPT almost as its official blueprint. And when the Indians exploded their bomb in 1974, many Third World countries were simply encouraged and even inspired. As one observer put it in 1980

Clearly, the political implications of the Indian explosion are of greater importance

than their military significance because in the next fifteen years or more, India will not be in a position to match the nuclear strength of China, not to mention other nuclear powers. Nevertheless, Third World countries have in large part welcomed the Indian test as a technological achievement demonstrating that even a developing country could acquire the know-how to successfully accomplish the sophisticated task of exploding an underground nuclear device which had hitherto been the exclusive preserve of the five great powers. The pent-up disappointments and frustration of a number of NNWS may have found a psychological release in India's breach of the rules of the exclusive nuclear club. 41

In 1974, Third World reactions to the Indian test were corollaries of the broader approach to the North-South conflict. In fact, reactions to the Indian nuclear explosion were divided, more or less, along rich/poor lines, in which Third World societies welcomed it as a blow to the discriminatory regime of the NPT.⁴²

For the superpowers, the NPT was regarded as a major instrument to re-assert the bipolar character of the international system. It is evident that in the case of the United States, even some major national security interest such as relations with military allies were overtaken by the common goal of preventing

nuclear proliferation in order to consolidate the nuclear status quo. The overriding interest in non-proliferation as a major national security issue was best illustrated in what was termed as a "substantial revolution in thought"⁴³ which took place in Washington and led to a change of policy by the United States. After two years of deadlock over the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF), which the Soviet Union viewed as being contrary to the principle of non-dissemination,⁴⁴ the United States decided that the NPT overrides alliance considerations.

In the course of the internal struggle over policy-making on the treaty, an unusual coalition was created between the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Department of Defense against the State Department. Strangely enough, as observers pointed out, ACDA and the Pentagon were pushing for a formula which would achieve NPT agreement while the State Department had little enthusiasm for any non-proliferation treaty which discriminated against West Germany and which would banish forever any kind of nuclear multilateral force in Europe.⁴⁵

There is enough evidence to suggest, as Ashok Kapur does, that the concept of nuclear deterrence which prevailed in the West had a major impact on the development of the NPT regime. Proliferation was regarded by American scientists as a possible threat to an already complex relationship of deterrence between two superpowers.⁴⁶ It is agreed by experts that deterrence and its mechanics were nurtured and developed within the intellectual context of the Cold War as means "of protecting vital security interests and upholding international order while simultaneously preventing war."⁴⁷ However, it was not just a reflection of the "excessive influence of scientists and lawyers" whom Kapur criticises for their mathematical approach to strategic issues. It was rather an understandable preference of the superpowers to maintain their bipolar relationship as the pillar of international order. Naturally there was a wide-spread belief that in a multipolar nuclear world the operation of deterrence would be difficult if not impossible. Most arms control analysts inclined to the view that a world of many nuclear states would contain "a greater statistical probability of technical

accident, unauthorized use, strategic miscalculation from a limited to a general war."⁴⁸ It is clear that the superpowers began to look favorably at ideas for a treaty or nuclear non-proliferation as soon as they "began to appreciate the problems of managing international relations in a world of multiple nuclear weapons powers."⁴⁹

The NPT, as Elizabeth Young explains, offered the American Administration a major opportunity to pursue President Johnson's policy of bridge-building with the Soviet Union. The military considerations were less significant because that the very magnitude of the American and Russian nuclear missile forces put them beyond the reach of competition. Since in this area the superpowers had political as well as military interests in common the new bureaucratic alliance in Washington (ACDA - Pentagon) revealed how "non-proliferation became a recognized arms control measure and an essential element in the prevailing strategic doctrine."⁵⁰

In his study on the evolution of American policy toward a non-proliferation treaty, William Bader underscored the affects of strategic doctrine and

relations with allies. In the 1950's the United States had a "NATO first" policy and an emphasis on flexibility in the use of nuclear weapons which overrode its interest in elaborating international efforts to erect barriers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Gradually, in the 1960's the United States became preoccupied (according to Raymond Aron, even obsessed) with the spread of nuclear weapons. With the NPT becoming "the centerpiece of United States nuclear policy," Bader concludes, the United States was ready to accept restrictions on the use of its nuclear resources and even to abandon a policy of flexible use of its nuclear weapons assets. The treaty was regarded, despite its shortcomings, as an "opportunity to work with the Soviet Union" and an "ideologically comfortable framework for East-West cooperation."⁵¹

On 24 August 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted identical texts of a draft NPT to the ENDC.* With that the way was paved for

* A similar procedure was followed for two other multilateral arms control treaties - the Sea-bed Treaty and the Biological convention - when the superpowers first submitted separate but identical drafts and later introduced a joint draft treaty.

the approval of the Treaty by the United Nations majority, but at the same time the seeds of an intensive and sharp confrontation with the Third World on disarmament issues were planted. Soon it became apparent that the debate was no longer on disarmament goals but on the division of power among states and the nature of international order. Third World countries would get more and more uncomfortable with the emerging framework of understandings providing for East-West cooperation. Later the debate on the NPT in the United Nations would center on issues such as: international balance of power, hierarchy and order and 'nuclear sovereignty' for the Third World.

From Yalta to the NPT

For the superpowers the NPT was a major international security instrument which legitimized and institutionalized their pre-eminence in a bipolar regime. The treaty created two classes of states and by disproportionate allocation of obligations it left the two leading NWS as the major custodians of world

order. As SIPRI points out it is a fact that the NWS, and particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, are the major "custodians" of world order since they currently occupy the dominant positions of power and status in the international security system. With the size and quality of their nuclear weapon inventories the two superpowers possess the pre-eminent military capabilities which enable them to construct and manage the international system in a world in which military might constitutes the quintessential determinant of status in the international security system.⁵²

For the Third World non-proliferation became a focal point in the emerging North-South confrontation on disarmament. The cleavages of North-South which were basically on economics: development, allocation of food, commodities, natural resources and exploration of the sea were extended to the arena of international security between the "Military Haves" and the "Military Haves-Not." In fact, a large part of the international debate on security and disarmament can be described in terms of two contending strategies for nuclear proliferation: the High Posture Doctrine and

the Low Posture Doctrine. Originally these two alternative strategies were outlined by Hedley Bull in 1967, and after twelve years they were incorporated in a SIPRI study which used them as the essence of the confrontation between the NWS and the NNWS.⁵³

In short, the High Posture Doctrine aims at preserving and possibly even widening the gap between, on one hand, the superpowers and, on the other the smaller nuclear powers and non-nuclear states in order to preserve the essential bi-polar structure of world power. In this view, there is an inverse correlation between the vertical and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, the larger the nuclear weapon inventories of the great NWS, the less likely it is that significant numbers of NNWS will acquire nuclear weapons since their strategic value of becoming NWS could remain insignificant relative to the might of the superpowers.⁵⁴

The advocates of the Low Posture assume just the opposite: there is a positive correlation between the vertical and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear

weapons, namely NWS disarmament will curtail proliferation among NNWS and, conversely, by enlarging their nuclear inventories, the NWS will encourage nuclear weapons proliferation.⁵⁵ On the part of Third World countries the adoption of the Low Posture policy had concrete objectives: to reduce the gap separating the NNWS from the NWS by demanding that the nuclear Powers reduce the level of their nuclear armaments, restrict the qualitative development of their weapons and diminish reliance on such weapons in diplomacy. It can be argued, therefore, that at the United Nations, Third World countries are pursuing a diplomacy of the Low Posture strategy by demanding "to stop the build-up of nuclear arsenals, to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to halt further development of nuclear armaments," specifying that "particularly the two leading nuclear-weapons States bear a special responsibility for realization of these tasks."⁵⁶

The superpowers, on the other hand, defend their High Posture policy and reject Third World demands for priority for nuclear disarmament (directed at them) and assertions of their responsibility. Instead both

suggested "parallel progress" in conventional disarmament, which was rejected by the nonaligned.⁵⁷ The NPT was for the superpowers a major component of their High Posture strategy which reaffirmed their continuing bi-polar dominance of the planet. The US and the USSR worked to strengthen and consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation regime," a call which was outright rejected by the Third World.⁵⁸ As Hedley Bull has written, Soviet-American cooperation in the arms control area has always been accompanied "by the attempt to legitimize very high ceilings of strategic arms, by political cooperation directed against third parties, and by enunciation of a principle of parity whose effect is to formalize the claims of these two states to a special position in the hierarchy of military power."⁵⁹

Even before the entry of the treaty into force, experts had noted that one major condition requisite for its success is a "condominium between the United States and the Soviet Union,"⁶⁰ Critics of the concept, pointed out that this "condominium" was put into effect in the process of securing the passage of the NPT in the United Nations. Its passage at the United

Nations, is seen by Morton Kaplan as a "shameful Chapter in recent history," accompanied as he argues by "threats, promises and pressures which were employed against reluctant nations in a way not seen since Stalin's ham-handed rule of the Soviet satellites - except for Moscow's attempt to halt the liberalization process in Czechoslovakia in 1968."⁶¹ Morton Kaplan's assessment may be correct in terms of 'equal sovereignty' of nations, but its premises are divorced from the balance of power realities which, as shown, were recognized and even legitimized by the United Nations Charter.

Theoretically, at least, one can extend the concept of condominium to a possible collaboration between the superpowers against secondary nuclear powers. Indeed, as the former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger testified, the Russians were begging the United States for license to humble China once and for all with a pre-emptive nuclear attack.⁶² A similar account is provided by H.R. Haldeman - President Nixon's Chief of Staff in the White House - in his

"Watergate" book on his days in the Administration.⁶³ This sort of "condominium" operation was in the mind of French President Charles de Gaulle, who once envisioned a situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union actually join forces and collaborate in the establishment of a new pattern of global dominance.⁶⁴ Perhaps, the Third World call for a new international order was meant to be a response to this superpowers' "condominium."

Against this background it should not come as a surprise to hear a Soviet delegate expressing the view that the NPT was the most important treaty since Yalta.⁶⁵ Similarly, when the penultimate draft of the NPT had emerged early in 1967, the West German ex-Chancellor Konrad Adenauer called it "a second Yalta" and referred back to the Morgenthau plan to raze German industry.⁶⁶ It was in Yalta, in the Russian Crimea, in February, 1945, that Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin, the superpowers' leaders, divided the world into "spheres of influence".

It was also there that the Americans and the Soviets hammered out the controversial procedure in the Security Council and membership in the General Assembly, to pave the way for the United Nations San-Francisco conference in April 1945, and the signing of the United Nations Charter. Both, the concept of spheres of influence and the veto power at the United Nations Security Council, discriminatory as they are, aimed to legitimize the bi-polar foundations of international order. The Yalta conference was among the most controversial events of World War II. Critics of the Roosevelt Administration have repeatedly charged that Yalta was a sell-out of American interests. Some historians defended Roosevelt's wartime diplomacy but blamed the Soviet Union for misinterpreting and exploiting the Yalta agreements.⁶⁷ Both critics and defenders, however, agree that Yalta recognized the emerging new hierarchy of superpowers' domination of international affairs.

The NPT should be looked upon as a sort of a nuclear version of Yalta. The treaty defines and updates the missing provisions of the pre-atomic

United Nations Charter on superpowers' relations and redraws the line between them and the NNWS for the future. The superpowers have a clear interest in preventing uncontrolled situations under which an entirely new structure of international relations could ensue. The impetus for their collaboration lies in their shared fear that the dual superpower club will be expanded or conversely dismantled. Unfair? of course, this is the essence of international power politics. It is precisely under this code of conduct that such a treaty, in the words of its critics, propose no balance, and no mutuality of obligations and benefits between the NWS and the NNWS. Balance in international relations is balance of power, which has nothing to do with the concept of equality or mutuality of obligations. Indeed, what the superpowers meant was exactly what Alva Myrdal criticizes as an attempt to place the major responsibility on their shoulders amounting "to a clever design to get NPT to function as a seal on the superpowers' hegemonic world policy."⁶⁸ Basically there should be no illusions about it:

...there is a clash between the nuclear superpowers who stress the benefits of

inequality, and the non-nuclear-weapon states, who seek to minimize the implications of hierarchy by stressing the benefits of equality. 69

In other words, it should be understood that for both contending camps this diplomatic confrontation on disarmament and proliferation has less to do with disarmament measures as such and more to do with their contending approaches to hierarchy and order in the international system. In this regard, disarmament diplomacy at the United Nations is subordinated to national security interest as it is defined collectively by the two opposing camps. The Third world has committed itself under the NIEO platform to eliminate the sources of discrimination and inequality in the international system. The superpowers, on the other hand, share a common interest to maintain a "manageable" international system which can be endangered by the emergence of additional and smaller nuclear powers. A "manageable" system, from the superpowers vantage point, means a High Posture Doctrine to preserve the gap among nations. This is the essence of the cleavage between the Third

world and the superpowers on non-proliferation and disarmament.

Inevitable deficiencies in the Non-Proliferation Regime

It seems that as long as the NPT will be examined in the United Nations with the yardsticks of 'sovereign equality', 'discrimination' or 'equality', it will be difficult to consolidate a consensus within the organization on strengthening the non-proliferation regime. NIEO politics and Third World rhetoric on disarmament would prevent any serious attempt in this direction. The debate over international order, justice and equality blurs the real problems in the field of nuclear proliferation: what is the real economic significance of nuclear energy for developing countries? and what may be the consequences to their national security?

'Atoms for peace' was an American initiative enunciated by President Eisenhower in his speech to the United Nations in December 1953. His speech

revived and inflated hopes for the world-wide benefits to be obtained from civilian nuclear energy. But already then people such as Robert Oppenheimer claimed that the plan has no firm connection with atomic disarmament and that its bearing on the prospect of nuclear war was "allusive and sentimental" rather than "substantive and functional."⁷⁰ A generation later many would question the desirability of the rapid development in atomic energy by the industrialized countries. More and more would warn that the easiest way to acquire nuclear weapons is through nuclear power programs which are designed primarily, apparently, for civilian purposes.⁷¹ But as seen from the Third World, the problem of proliferation was not the issue. There, the major problem with the NPT lay in the fact that it was "the first unequal multilateral treaty in the twentieth century international relations" and therefore dismissed "a bad move and a lost opportunity."⁷² Again, scholars and delegates tend to ignore the fundamental inequalities legitimized by the United Nations Charter.

The fact that the Treaty was soon signed by over one hundred countries can be deceiving; indeed, some regard this achievement as hollow.⁷³ It should be

noted that the bulk of the nations which joined the treaty did not have much of a chance, or intention, to produce nuclear arms. On the other hand countries which contemplated going nuclear, because of their own perceptions of national interest, refused to adhere and kept their nuclear arms options open. It is there, between the adherents and the opponents of the treaty, that there is no ideological consensus, no real community of interest.⁷⁴ In this regard it is evident that the NIEO platform of the Third World has contributed to a large extent to the campaign against the NPT. As can be seen in resolutions of the non-aligned countries and even in the United Nations General Assembly, the Third World has adopted, in effect, the basic position of the anti-NPT lobby of the developing countries (further elaboration on the Third World's position is provided later in this chapter).

The lack of concern in United Nations debates over the serious deficiencies in the international system of safeguards on nuclear activities may create

the wrong impression that there exists an effective international system to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation. In recent years, however, one can note a growing concern among experts over the operation of the current international regime of non-proliferation. Some of the leading nuclear experts in the United States charge that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is incapable of detecting diversions of nuclear materials to make nuclear weapons. Reports which were prepared for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have concluded that the IAEA safeguards system which was designated to prevent diversion of uranium and plutonium from peaceful nuclear programs to atomic weapons has gross deficiencies.⁷⁵

The conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, in accordance with Article II paragraph 1 of the NPT, is the basic obligation of every NNWS party to the treaty. The system of safeguards consists of three main elements: material accountancy, containment and surveillance. The purpose of these technical measures is to enable "timely" detection of diversion of "significant" quantities of nuclear material from peaceful activities to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, as well

as deterrence of diversion by creating the risk of early detection. Experts agree, and the IAEA itself admits, that there are limits to the extent to which the agency is able to detect diversions and to guarantee an effective international response to a non-proliferation violation, even when it is detected.⁷⁶

The problem with the safeguards system is not confined to the lack of sanctions or enforcement measures in case of noncompliance or violation of the treaty. The problem begins with the detection system since the NPT does not provide for the possibility of carrying out special inspections on the basis of accusations or suspicion, and the whole system of safeguards is dependent on the consent of the state involved.⁷⁷ These deficiencies are particularly alarming because of the 'abrogation risk' which is inherent in the NPT system. According to Article X of the NPT each party might at any time, if it chooses to do so, openly declare its withdrawal from the treaty on three months' notice in what it considered as "exercising national sovereignty." In other words, the IAEA system, and particularly its promotional role, allows a state to proceed under the guise of the NPT as far as possible with all its plans

for making nuclear weapons and, when ready, merely notify the IAEA and the United Nations Security Council that it is withdrawing from the treaty.

But apparently, as it is reflected in United Nations debates, the Third World does not seem to be worried by the loopholes and the weaknesses of the NPT and its safeguards. Instead, in its collective position as well as in statements by individual countries, the Third World challenges the whole notion of the treaty in its revolt against the "unequal" regime of non-proliferation. At the United Nations, representatives of the Third World like to emphasize the promotional role of the agency - i.e. promoting nuclear development programs, particularly in the Third World and, at the same time, belittle its role as regulator-i.e., the function of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation including the safeguards system.⁷⁶

It is the logic of NIEO which leads Third World countries to assume that "the wider distribution of nuclear weapons is a requirement of distributional justice."⁷⁰ This logic dictates the preference for the promotional role of the IAEA at the expense of its safeguards system. An American safety expert for the nuclear

Regulatory Commission pointed out that a large part of the deficiencies of the IAEA safeguard stem from the fact that the agency "combines both the functions of a promotional agency and a regulator." From the point of view of nuclear proliferation, he said, the promotional role of the agency is unhealthy and it creates a situation which "does not promote independent and even-handed regulation" and allows "a large potential for cheating and unauthorized diversion."⁸⁰

A report published in October 1981 by the Ad Hoc Group on United States policy towards the United Nations - a group which included three former Secretaries of State: Dean Rusk, Cyrus Vance, and Edmund Muskie - recommended that a Nuclear Security Planning Committee will be attached to the Security Council, working with the IAEA to strengthen its enforcement capability and improve its information base.⁸¹ However, as debates in the United Nations on the NPT demonstrate, this task is impossible as long as the problem of nuclear proliferation is measured by the yardsticks of NIEO distributional justice. In this context it may be expected that more experts will join the assessment that the existing system of safeguards cannot provide "timely warning" to avoid a sudden manufacture of nuclear bombs from

"safeguarded" material.⁸²

The anti-NPT lobby at the United Nations makes it impossible to inquire, even within the framework of the NPT review conference, why authorities such as Fred Ikle blame the IAEA for making it easier for the exporters of nuclear technology to pretend that their practices are safe.⁸³ Moreover, there was no reflection at United Nations General Assemblies or in the Second Special Session on Disarmament(SSD II) of June-July 1982 to the accusation of a nuclear safety analyst that statements by IAEA officials based on their accounting system are "dangerously misleading to the world."⁸⁴ It is not a surprise, therefore, that the growing disillusion with the safeguards system has culminated on November 27, 1981, when, in the first governmental assertion ever, a document from the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the United States warned on the ineffectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The letter by the chairman, Numzio J. Polladino, was approved unanimously by the five members of the independent commission and was sent to the chairmen of several congressional committees. The Commission concluded that the IAEA is unable to detect diversions of nuclear material in some type of facilities and also declared that it could

no longer be confident that the members of the agency
"would be notified of a diversion in timely fashion."⁸⁵

At the end of the 1970's two different reports by SIPRI, which is known for its general support for the United Nations system and the plight of the Third World, have blamed the developing countries for distorting the arms control aspects of non-proliferation (see p. 328 and 330 below). It seems that this problem would be insoluble within the framework of multinational forums as long as there is no real political consensus on the premises of the non-proliferation regime. As SIPRI noted, from the beginning, the whole history of the NPT negotiations can be viewed as a dialogue between two camps (High Posture and Low Posture) which completely differ in their definitions of the arms limitation and security regime which should buttress the NPT.⁸⁶ The North-South confrontation has overtaken the original security context of the non-proliferation and instead the debate focused on systemic issues such as "discrimination" or "sovereign equality" in international affairs. Let us examine some highlights of this dialogue in the aftermath of the entry into force of the NPT.

Revolt Against the Nuclear Haves

Observers described the struggle of Third world countries at the first review conference of the NPT in Geneva (May, 1975) as a revolt against the hegemony of the superpowers.⁸⁷ The conferees met in the aftermath of the 1974 underground test of a "peaceful nuclear device" by India, the first nation to cross the nuclear threshold after negotiation of the NPT. Also, on the heels of the conference came the unwelcome news that West Germany was about to conclude a multi-billion dollar deal to provide all the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle (enrichment, reactors, and plutonium fuel separation facilities, adequate to make nuclear weapons if desired) to Brazil, a conspicuous non-party to the NPT.⁸⁸ Both events demonstrated the two sides of the fragile NPT coin: the Indian explosion demonstrated the failure to get nuclear threshold countries to join the treaty, and the German deal drew attention to the fact that its transaction was completely legal under the treaty. The conference was also a reflection of the new pattern of confrontation in international fora in the 1970's between the "have" and "have-not"

countries. The NPT became just another source of frustration for the "have-not" such as other global problems which they tackled in United Nations conferences: development, environment, population, food, the law of the sea, energy, and raw materials. But as observers pointed out, the hopes that the conference would achieve a redressing of what the NNWS regarded as discrimination and, thus, would make the treaty a more effective barrier against nuclear proliferation were soon dashed, and the Conference instead, provided more evidence about the failure of the NPT. Even the fact that speaker after speaker referred to the meeting as the most historic disarmament conference to be held in thirty years could not conceal the disappointment.⁸⁹

The superpowers, on the other hand did not intend to make any concessions. The three nuclear-weapon powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom (France and China did not sign the NPT) - held a private meeting in London just before the opening of the Conference to secure its smooth running according to their wishes. Their basic policy was

"to avoid the so-called 'political' issues and concentrate on the 'technical' ones" seeking, in effect, only to rubber-stamp the performance of the NPT and to strengthen the international regime which it envisaged.⁹⁰ The superpowers succeeded in using the conference as a deadline before which important European signatory states (e.g. West Germany) would ratify the treaty and become full participants.⁹¹ During the conference itself, the superpowers spoke "in a singularly preharmonized manner," and rejected out of hand all the proposals put forward by any Third-world country.⁹²

In the conference, the Third World sought in effect to amend the NPT, a motion that was procedurally flawed and went beyond the terms of reference of the Review Conference. They introduced (together with Romania) two additional protocols to the NPT linking specifically horizontal and vertical disarmament and specifying new ceilings for superpower nuclear capabilities (fifty percent of the ceilings agreed under the Vladivostok accords of 1974). The Soviets rejected it flatly as "unacceptable interference" in United

States-Soviet relations, and allied countries added that third parties should not dictate superpower bilateral negotiations.⁹³

The conference provided also another illustration of the ill-conceived technique of "consensus" - employed to draft Final Documents in United Nations fora. The review conference adopted a Final Document which was an attempt to conceal, in ambiguous formulations, the fundamental differences between the parties. At the same time, however, the non-aligned insisted on annexing the unacceptable protocols to the "consensus" document, annexes which served as clear testimony of the continuing gap between the two camps over the necessary disarmament measures and the kind of security regime appropriate to the NPT.⁹⁴

As explained elsewhere there is a strong correlation between the broader cleavage between the rich and the poor countries and nuclear proliferation. The evolution of the Third World into a "strong global bargaining power" may create nuclear incentives for those developing countries which are aspiring to

leadership positions within the bloc. In this sense nuclear weapons capability is a "symbol of modernity and technological competence as well as a source of status and prestige."⁹⁵ In this process, the achievement of these economic and symbolic values is by no means an enhancement of security in the Third World. In fact, those developing countries which would probably seek to respond in kind to the increased power of the new nuclear state are likely to experience a decline in their security and independence from superpowers. The net result ironically would "reinforce or accelerate political hierarchical tendencies within the South."⁹⁶ Even from the point of view of NIEO politics, this process could seriously undercut the principal instrument of Third World strategy in the United Nations, that is their solidarity or unity, by the divisions of the South into nuclear haves and have-nots.

Perhaps the most ominous implication of the North-South spill-overs in the debate on non-proliferation lies in the fact that it depreciates the real dangers inherent in nuclear proliferation. By making proliferation just another element in a general

pattern of challenge to an unjust status quo, the security consequences of the nuclear spread in the Third World are overlooked. NIEO makes the issue of nuclear proliferation a zero-sum game between the Third World and the superpowers; every measure to strengthen the regime of non-proliferation is looked upon by the Third World as infringing on their sovereignty, and development programs. It is very likely, as David Gombert points out, that nuclear proliferation in the Third World would have splintering effects far beyond the nuclear security area. Third World solidarity in this regard is quite deceiving:

To believe that any increase in the prestige of particular Southern proliferation would somehow elevate their non-nuclear brethren in the South is to swallow the most indigestible of all self-serving national rationalization for acquiring nuclear weapons. 97

As pointed out in a study by SIPRI, the serious rift between the Third World and the nuclear powers which has developed along North-South lines "presents a real threat to the NPT's survival."⁹⁸ The threat is particularly worrying since it is agreed that the NPT, because of its provisions for the transfer of

nuclear technology for peaceful uses, "cannot deal with the potential for weapon proliferation inherent in the expansion of nuclear energy."⁹⁹ As we will see, United Nations debates on non-proliferation are doing just this: they undermine the non-proliferation provisions of the NPT while they over-emphasize the nuclear transfer provisions under the guise of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

In the SSOD - the Culmination of the Confrontation

Even before the convening of the First United Nations Special Session on disarmament, it became apparent that the debate on the non-proliferation regime would be a major source of controversy. In the working paper submitted by the non-aligned to the Preparatory Committee for the SSOD the NPT was taboo: nothing was said about the Treaty, not a word on the IAEA safeguards, and not even "lip service" to the whole notion of "non-proliferation." All this in a comprehensive document (10 pages) which enumerates a variety of disarmament measures, particularly concerning nuclear

disarmament; they apparently found the idea of non-proliferation totally irrelevant to the disarmament process.¹⁰⁰

It took more than eight months for the non-aligned movement to think the issue over and to introduce an addendum to their working paper which would include, only in passing, a vague reference (as the last item among 8) which calls for "prevention of proliferation of such [nuclear] weapons and systems."¹⁰¹ This is the utmost that a non-aligned consensus could achieve. Still, no word on the NPT. Interestingly enough, the only allusion to international safeguards had a negative implication:

measures of disarmament shall not be construed in such a way as to hamper the exercise of all States to develop or to acquire [nuclear technology] without any discrimination. Nuclear technology or nuclear materials should be subjected to universal, standardized and non-discriminatory safeguards agreed upon by supplier and recipient States. ¹⁰²

In contrast, the West and the East have collaborated in representing a united front of support for non-proliferation and the NPT. The working paper of the Socialist countries listed as one of the major

priorities in disarmament the "consolidation in every possible way of the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" adding in this context, the need to strengthen the NPT and IAEA safeguards. Similar points were made in the Western working paper. Almost identical expressions were used in both papers on the issue of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Both, while recognizing the right of all States to have peaceful nuclear energy programmes, issued warnings on the perils of unsafeguarded nuclear activities.¹⁰³ In their statements to the SSOD both Vice President Mondale of the United States and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Gromyko paid tribute to the NPT as a major achievement in the field of arms limitation agreements.

The SSOD was an important crossroad for international efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and a major test for the viability and prestige of the NPT. Unlike the NPT review conference which is restricted to the parties of the treaty, at the SSOD the leading opponents of the treaty could join the disillusioned

majority of the parties in their struggle against the NWS. The verbatim of the debates at the SSOD reveal that the issue of nuclear non-proliferation was one of the key issues to which most delegations, each from its vantage point, attached great significance. It became clear that, despite superpower pressure supported by their allies, the member states of the United Nations could not reach agreement on language which would endorse the NPT. The degree of Third World opposition was reflected in a statement by Argentina which viewed the NPT as "clearly discriminatory in nature" since "for the first time in history, it legitimizes a division of the world into two categories of countries: those who are to be given a completely free hand in the nuclear field and those who are to be subject to restrictions."¹⁰⁴ After a long diplomatic battle the compromise formula achieved in the Final Document was to omit specific recommendations and references to measures for non-proliferation and to refer to them in the vaguest of terms. What was left was only a general affirmation of the goal of non-proliferation. As SIPRI pointed out, the reference

to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Final Document was weaker than many United Nations resolutions adopted on the subject.¹⁰⁵

The reference to non-proliferation and the NPT in the Final Document is another example of the deficiencies of the 'consensus' practice in the United Nations. The document does not call for universal adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty. In effect the NPT was downgraded to the level of one of "existing instruments on non-proliferation," placing it on equal footing with another regional agreement, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco). This was a last minute compromise since a few countries such as Brazil, India and Pakistan refused to agree to any reference to the 'discriminatory NPT'.¹⁰⁶

As expected, the compromise did not satisfy either side. Several Western countries expressed dissatisfaction at the SSOD with the manner in which nuclear weapons non-proliferation was treated in the document.¹⁰⁷

The representative of the Netherlands expressed regret that the paragraphs on non-proliferation "lack a sense of urgency" and that they "reflect the absence of universally accepted principles in this field."¹⁰⁸ In a complete contrast, for the non-aligned countries even the Final Document's ambiguous phraseology was too much. Speaking on behalf of the non-aligned group Sri Lanka criticized the nuclear-weapon States for coming out "strongest" on the subject of non-proliferation and putting restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without committing themselves to nuclear disarmament.¹⁰⁹

Peaceful Atomic Energy

With NIEO politics in the background, the gap between the two camps is unbridgeable and goes far beyond the differences over the text and interpretation of the NPT. The debate on peaceful nuclear energy created another arena for Third World grievances over 'discrimination' and 'monopoly'. The debate here goes beyond the Treaty: some of the industrialized countries (with the Soviets support)

regard the NPT safeguards provisions as inadequate to provide a fool proof barrier to nuclear proliferation. As shown, many experts in the field agree with this assessment on the inadequacy of the treaty. The Third World, on the other hand, views the already existing safeguards in the NPT and their application as discriminatory and harmful to the process of economic development.

The two camps advance views which reflect their different needs and interests on various aspects of peaceful nuclear energy. In sum, the clash is on two separate but related areas: on the terms of transfer of nuclear technology its controls and safeguards and over the evaluation of prospective dangers and benefits of the "plutonium economy," i.e., the use of plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle. The latter issue involved also a disagreement between the United States and a number of developed countries - suppliers of nuclear know how material.¹¹⁰ A study conducted by SIPRI concludes that neither the NPT nor the safeguards can prevent a country with a reprocessing plant from having access to fissile materials.

Reprocessing involves the separation of plutonium from the other waste products providing an access to fissile material directly usable for making nuclear weapons. There is no technological solution to this dilemma yet: "It has been impossible to find a proliferation-resistant process for plutonium separation."¹¹¹

In the mid-1970's, the major nuclear suppliers began to pay increasing attention to the relationship between export policies and the implications on the proliferation of nuclear-weapon capabilities. There was a growing awareness of the dual nature of nuclear power and the recognition, to use the phrase of Ernest Bergmann - the former Director of the Atomic Energy Commission in Israel, that: "It is very important to understand that by developing atomic energy for peaceful uses, you reach the nuclear option: There are no two atomic energies."¹¹² As soon as a NNWS acquires a nuclear power industry it proceeds along what George Guester has called the "innocent progress toward the bomb curve," where a for some countries a very short time would be required to move from a peaceful nuclear programme toward the production of at least a few crude nuclear weapons.¹¹³

In 1974, a number of suppliers reached an understanding on common safeguard requirements which was further expanded in a nuclear Suppliers Conference in London (thus becoming known as the "London Club"). These countries defined, in what is known as the "Trigger List," the materials and equipment whose transfers to a NNWS triggers the application of IAEA safeguards. In September 1977 the fifteen countries participating in those meetings adopted export policy guidelines and communicated them to the Director General of IAEA. The fifteen members in the "Club" represent the group of countries which maintains the leverage over international transfer of nuclear technology: Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.¹¹⁴ The "London Club" meetings were held secretly and were followed by series of bilateral talks between the United States and other suppliers. The results were announced in early 1978, and the agreement was sent to the IAEA. But the suppliers consensus did fall short of Washington's overall goals

and it failed, because of some divisions among western suppliers, to insist that future transactions include "full-scope" safeguards, as the Americans wanted, and that recipient countries must allow all their nuclear facilities to be inspected by international teams before they can order new equipment.¹¹⁵

Some suppliers (both Soviet bloc and Western Countries) have adopted national export policies going beyond the requirements set out in London guidelines. The most comprehensive and far-reaching legislation on this matter was taken in the United States under the antiproliferation strategy of the Carter Administration. The Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Act was passed in the American Congress in March 1978, just two months before the opening of the SSOD.¹¹⁶

As their statements and working papers to the SSOD indicated, the restrictions over the transfer of nuclear technology received wide criticism among Third World countries. The secret meetings of the "London Club" aroused their fears of "a new suppliers

cartel with the possible threat of price fixing."¹¹⁷

The United States Non Proliferation Act caused even a greater furor. In the Third World it was viewed as another attempt to perpetuate the supremacy of the industrialized countries over the developing ones. At the bilateral level, confidence in the United States as a dependable supplier of nuclear fuel has been shaken by unexpected cut offs. Third world nations were not pacified by the American initiative which led to the creation of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) in October 1977. The INFCE opened a dialogue at the technical level among developed and developing countries, suppliers and recipients of nuclear technologies, equipment and material. From the point of view of the Third World, it seemed that while the NPT orientation was to discuss the conditions for receiving nuclear supplies, the post-NPT orientation was to discuss restraints on supply.¹¹⁸ The measures taken by the suppliers (the Zangger Committee, the London Club, and the Carter policies) were clearly directed toward curbing sensitive flows to Third World nations. In the view of Third World

commentators all this so-called post-NPT multilateral diplomacy on restraints on nuclear transfers has gone beyond NPT terms and therefore overtook and made the original bargain irrelevant.¹¹⁹ Third World countries emphasized the importance of access to peaceful nuclear technology for the scientific, technological and economic advancement of nations, and criticized the suppliers for placing restrictions on such transfers under the guise of preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. According to their view, these imposed restrictions only served to consolidate the predominance of the few industrialized nations in science and technology and, on the other hand, to condemn the majority to a position of dependency.¹²⁰

Algeria and Pakistan flatly rejected the idea that the "dissemination of nuclear technology would automatically hinder attainment of the goal of non-proliferation."¹²¹ Pakistan was not satisfied even with the recognition of the inalienable right of States to acquire and develop nuclear technology

for peaceful purposes incorporated in paragraph 36 of the Final Document. The language, according to Pakistan, was still "capable of being used to justify policies of restraint and restriction, deprivation and discrimination."¹²² The net result of the debate on peaceful atomic energy in the SSOD was the further erosion of NPT provisions. Immediately after the vague reference to the NPT came the qualification:

Non-Proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. ¹²³

It was this futile game between conflicting conceptions which led SIPRI to conclude:

In terms of the NPT, some Third World states now tend to interpret Article IV as a promise of nuclear co-operation unrelated to the non-proliferation context. They were able to influence the discussion on proliferation at the 1978 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament, to the extent that the Final Document focused little interest on the problem of nuclear weapon proliferation. In contrast, at the insistence of non-aligned countries, the document underlines the inalienable rights of all states to develop nuclear power programmes in conformity with their own priorities, interests and needs. Such excessive emphasis on peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the Final Document has distorted the arms control aspect of non-proliferation. ¹²⁴

The SSOD underscored the opposition in the Third World to any restriction on the export of nuclear technology. This opposition draws heavily from the philosophy and terminology of the struggle for NIEO. India, speaking as a leader of the non-aligned nations, blames the NPT for having perpetuated the technological monopoly of the nuclear weapon powers using phrases such as: "a bizarre new world of nuclear aristocracy ruling the non-nuclear serfdom."¹²⁵ Indian scholars are using NIEO parlance in discussing proliferation matters and speak about: "India's adamant refusal to compromise its sovereignty on nuclear safeguards" and make no secret that at issue is "the present structure of power in the world" in which nuclear safeguards are essentially "a mask for the perpetuation of superpowers hegemony."¹²⁶

A leading nuclear physicist has claimed that the attempt to shift the emphasis in the NPT toward the transfer of nuclear technology, represents a new danger to the integrity of the treaty. The priority given by the Third World to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the transfer of technology to developing

countries amounts to a reinterpretation of the treaty and the overriding of its non-proliferation aspects. In this sense the NPT becomes a means towards achieving nuclear capability through the acquisition of nuclear technology. With this interpretation, which seems to prevail in the United Nations, J. Rotblat concludes that:

...the NPT will in effect become a treaty for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and as such may be instrumental in promoting the very spread of nuclear weapon capability that it was intended to inhibit. 127

In the Aftermath of the SSOD

The gap between the great powers together with their allies and the Third World continued to widen after the SSOD. The debates in the CD, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and in the General Assemblies followed the same patterns of growing resentment by the developing countries toward the NPT and non-proliferation policies of the great powers. In the sixth summit conference of the non-aligned in Havana, September 1979, there was no reference what-

soever to the NPT in the 310 paragraphs of the Political Declaration. Again, the only reference to non-proliferation as such, was negative: "concern for non-proliferation should not be used as a pretext to prevent States from exercising the right to acquire and develop peaceful nuclear technology."¹²⁸ After the SSOD the non-aligned established a Co-ordinating Bureau on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which met in Belgrade in December 1978. This coordination, outside the United Nations, was in some way a countermeasure to the nuclear suppliers meetings, but even more important was the attempt to explore the possibilities offered by co-operation and mutual assistance among themselves in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.¹²⁹

The issue re-emerged again in the annual deliberations in the plenary of the United Nations General Assembly on the IAEA report. A number of developing countries such as India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania and Yugoslavia demanded an increase in the resources allocated to IAEA technical assistance activities. India, expressed dissatisfaction at the "increasing

stress being laid upon regulatory rather than promotional aspects of the Agency's functions."¹³⁰

In the General Assembly of 1980 India, while reaffirming its position on what it termed the narrow and illogical approach of the unworkable document of the NPT, complained in strong terms about the arrangements between the suppliers of nuclear technology. The Indian Foreign Minister referred to "discriminatory constraints" and "cartel-type arrangements" against the NNWS "aimed at perpetuating a kind of nuclear feudalism."¹³¹

As pointed out at the outset, the second review conference of the NPT of 1980, failed even to agree on a consensus document of the type achieved in previous United Nations conferences on similar matters. The differences were the same as earlier ones, and the contending approaches clashed again; only the circumstances became more complex. In a press conference the spokesman of the session told reporters that "in four weeks of negotiations the participants had agreed on virtually nothing of significance."¹³²

It was agreed by diplomats and observers that the fact that the conference ended without a strong declaration of support for limiting the spread of nuclear arms "will undermine the treaty's credibility and extend North-South quarrels into the disarmament field."¹³³ (Except that the essence of all disarmament quarrels at the United Nations was already for a long time a North-South confrontation).

Frank Barnaby, the Director of SIPRI, attributes the failure of the conference not only to the "intransigence of the superpowers," but also - though with less firmness - to the inflexibility of the non-aligned on some issues. It was clear, thus, that the confrontation was mainly between the two camps: the superpowers and the Third World. As indicated by Barnaby, there was a "lack of overt hostility between the American and Soviet delegates" in the conference, despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the American failure to ratify SALT II. In this regard superpower collaboration was highlighted by the disarray among the Western powers because of their differences over nuclear

export policies.¹³⁴ It was expected that when non-proliferation is at stake - something similar in nature to their veto power in the Security Council - both superpowers would work together to ward off Third World attacks, in order to pursue their High-Posture approach.

Third World delegates criticized the High-Posture policies of the superpowers and referred to the Nuclear supplier group as "a secret conclave."¹³⁵ At one point in the review conference, the Peruvian Ambassador said that his country might renounce its participation in the NPT out of dissatisfaction at the failure of the superpowers to meet their disarmament commitments. Some speculated that it was a warning of non-aligned restiveness which may lead to a total collapse of the treaty since there was similar unrest among other Latin Americans, African, Arab and Asian signatories to the NPT.¹³⁶ But it seemed that the NWS did not get excited by what they dismissed as "wild talk," an attempt of the Third World to use the threat of defection as a bargaining counter.¹³⁷ At the United Nations, it is agreed among

diplomatic observers that there is a big dose of bluff in Third World periodic threats to pull out of the non-proliferation treaty.¹³⁸ It is a bluff since nuclear proliferation is not in the interest of most developing countries. However, it is apparent that the United Nations environment and the political culture of the NIEO are not conducive to the NPT and to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

In the 35th General Assembly which followed the review conference, disappointment was expressed by almost everybody. In effect, only the superpowers (with some of their close allies) emphasized what they regarded as achievements of the conference. The American Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie speaking on the NPT as a cornerstone of non-proliferation efforts, referred only to what he regarded as the "unanimous agreement" at the conference "on the fundamental soundness of the Treaty and the desirability of universal adherence to it."¹³⁹ All Western countries expressed in one way or another their disappointment. Ireland which recalls with pride its 1959 initiative as the origin of the Treaty,

while expressing profound regret and disappointment, warned that the unsuccessful outcome of the conference would make the task of preventing the nuclear spread more difficult.¹⁴⁰ Third world countries continued to criticize the Treaty, using the failure of the conference as another vindication of their position. Sri Lanka, saying that the Conference ended "in disarray," blamed the superpowers for failing to negotiate nuclear disarmament as they undertook in article VI of the Treaty.¹⁴¹ Nigeria took this opportunity to conclude that non-proliferation in the 1980's cannot be sustained by the same reliance as in the past on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead, Nigeria said that an alternative multilateral instrument will have to be concluded urgently to prevent "both horizontal and vertical proliferation." ¹⁴²

Some observers were too hasty in pronouncing a death sentence on the NPT. They predicted, before the Second Review Conference, that a similar failure of the first Review Conference of 1975, "will confirm the death sentence of the NPT."¹⁴³ The second

Review Conference's results were even worse than the first, and it ended without an agreed document. Yet the NPT did not collapse. It seems that despite their blatant criticism, most Third World countries regard the non-proliferation regime created by the NPT as an important contribution to their national security. For the time being it seems that nuclear proliferation is slow "not because the NPT is necessarily working, but because the military and economic security perceptions of potential proliferators do not dictate a higher rate of proliferation."¹⁴⁴ Moreover it can be said that most Third World countries realize that in case of nuclear proliferation their own countries would be the first possible victims and not the super-powers. In effect they already recognized it by

joining the NPT, which in its preamble gives an indication why it is preferable to limit nuclear weapons to the NWS since "the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war." To repeat, there is therefore a basic contradiction between the national interest of individual Third World countries and the platform of the group as a whole; a platform that might not exist except for the United Nations.

The spread of conventional conflicts and wars in the Third World (see next chapter) indicates that the military security risks of horizontal nuclear proliferation may run high. Richard Rosecrance has pointed out the risks of nuclear war in "minor power subgames" where primitive, vulnerable nuclear weapon capabilities are deployed in various local or regional conflict situations.¹⁴⁵ Similarly, the former American Secretary Defense James Schlesinger indicated what might be the reasoning of many Third World leaders who support the NPT:

If we are to dissuade others from aspiring to nuclear capabilities, what we should stress is that, if weapons spread, they are not likely to be employed against the superpowers. The penalties for proliferation would be paid, not by the United States, or the Soviet Union, but by Third World countries. The likelihood that the first nuclear war, if it comes, will originate in and be confined to the underdeveloped world should play a prominent role in any assessment of proliferation's consequences. The tenor of the existing discussion of proliferation has led some people in the underdeveloped countries to conclude that the major powers would be the chief beneficiaries of curtailing the spread. If nuclear spread is to be effectively opposed, it should be made crystal clear just whose security is placed at risk and whose is not. ¹⁴⁶

However, there is always a possibility of deterioration in regional and international security

which may affect the strategic environment of potential proliferators. The increase of local regional, self-contained conflicts among Third world nations coupled with dizzying conventional arms races there, may have ominous effects on horizontal nuclear proliferation. At the same time, growing international tension and a superpower military build-up may decrease their condominium coordination on nuclear proliferation. It should be noted that in the case of the Indian explosion of 1974, the superpowers were not capable, or at least unwilling, to take joint concrete measures against India. At this particular juncture it is evident that the United Nations is not only unable to provide the necessary ideological consensus which is crucial for the viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, but may also be concealing emerging differences between the superpowers or conflicting ambitions in regional politics.

Eventually, under the banner of the new international order it is hard to expect a serious debate in the United Nations on issues relating to international security. As pointed out in chapter 4, the United Nations has evolved from an organization primarily committed to maintain post-world war II

international order into a world system intently devoted by its overwhelming majority to a radical change of world order and its power distribution. Disarmament issues, as a result, moved to a secondary spot on the Third World agenda becoming, in effect, a bargaining chip in the large context of the North-South dialogue. Within this new context the NPT symbolizes more than anything else the inequalities of the world system established by the great powers - inequalities which are also reflected in the United Nations Charter. The political culture of the NIEO does not allow the so much needed exchange on the perils of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. With the overriding considerations of 'sovereign equality', non-discrimination, and the right to development, etc. it is impossible to elaborate further non-proliferation measures.

The implications of the NIEO for non-proliferation are particularly ominous at a time when there is a growing recognition that the treaty is a fragile document with many loopholes, and that advanced technologies in the nuclear field are challenging

the basic premise of its safeguards system. As SIPRI writes in 1980, new technologies would make it impossible to rely on the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to detect the diversion of nuclear material to weapon production. In the case of plutonium or highly enriched uranium it may require only a few days for diverted nuclear material to be transformed into an explosive and then there is always the 'abrogation risk' - the withdrawal from the treaty - which is inherent in the NPT system. As Lewis Dunn points out, the world is entering a new and more perilous era in the nuclear age in which international cooperation is crucial to prevent the grave risks of a further spread of nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁸

At a time when authorities in the field conclude that "the fragility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is now crystal clear to all,"¹⁴⁹ the United Nations cannot but add to this fragility. Under the leadership of the anti-NPT lobby of the Third World it can be expected that the United Nations machinery for disarmament, with its deliberating and negotiating forums, will continue to serve the interests of those intent on undermining the

status and effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. To some extent attitudes reflected by Third World spokesmen create a psychological climate for promoting the nuclear option in developing countries.

It is striking that when many in developed countries are having second thoughts about the economic desirability of nuclear power for commercial purposes the United Nations is prevented from serious examination of other alternatives to meet the energy needs of developing countries. Reality, as experts would agree, has "debunked the fantasy that enormous diversions of national resources for nuclear power would make deserts bloom, cities boom, and villages prosper."¹⁵⁰ Instead, North-South debates on nuclear proliferation divert attention from the security and economic aspects of nuclear programs and foster the illusion that nuclear power is central to national prestige and glamor in international forums. With the lack of community interest, the dictates of "consensus" politics at the United Nations tends to produce at best a document which completely distorts the arms control aspect of non-proliferation, ignores international safeguards, while it reiterates

excessive demands for the transfer of nuclear technology. In a sense, therefore, the proclamation of NIEO philosophy in the nuclear field, with its special emphasis on distributive justice and sovereign equality in international affairs, may make the United Nations instrumental in legitimizing nuclear weapons proliferation.

Chapter 6: Footnotes

1. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Postures For Non-Proliferation (London: Taylor & Francis, 1979), p. 8.

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3. See:

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Round-up of Session, United Nations Press Release, NPT/89, 10 September 1980, Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York.

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e) "Non-Proliferation Treaty Reviewed at Geneva but no Consensus Reached," UN Chronicle Vol. XVII(9), November, 1980, pp. 15-17.

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10. Fischer, The Non-Proliferation, pp. 70-78, 217-218.
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12. Documents of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, ENDC/204, p. 3.
13. GAOR, "Views of the Swiss Government on problems to be discussed at the tenth special session of the General Assembly," A/S-10/AC.1/2. Since Switzerland is not a member of the UN its letter was transmitted by a group of member States, which together with Switzerland are the "non-aligned" or the neutral states of Europe; i.e. Austria, Finland, Sweden, Yugoslavia. Switzerland provided an interesting observation on the complex issues of world order, sovereignty and discrimination: These weapons not only have given mankind the means of annihilating itself but also- by virtue of the Non-Proliferation Treaty - have divided States into two categories: on one hand, a minority of States which are granted the right to possess nuclear weapons and which sometimes derive important political and military advantages therefrom and, on the other hand,

all the remaining States, which have renounced that right. In other words, differences in the realm of military power show a tendency to grow rather than diminish.

In ratifying the Non-Proliferation Treaty like nearly 100 other States, Switzerland has shown its willingness unilaterally to limit its sovereignty in order to diminish the dangers caused by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

However, the Federal Council wishes to point out that such discriminatory measures are contrary to the principle of the equality of all States. In that regard, the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons cannot under any circumstances constitute a model for other disarmament measures.

14. Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question, p. 194.

15. Hedley Bull, "The great irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and world order," International Journal, Vol. XXXV(3), Summer, 1980, p. 432.

16. Michael Mandelbaum, "International Stability and Nuclear Order: The First Nuclear Regime," in David C. Gombert, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard L. Garwin, John H. Barton, Nuclear Weapons and World Politics, 1980's Project/Council on Foreign Relations, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977), p. 71.

17. See: Albert Wohlstetter et.al., Swords from Plowshares (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 128.

This research project sponsored by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency became immediately influential for changing government policy ushering in a major departure in U.S. policy against nuclear proliferation (see the foreword by Fred Charles Ikle).

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20. Albert Wohlstetter et.al , Swords, p. 141.
21. Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question, p. 193.
22. The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970 (New York: United Nations, 1970), pp. 258-263.
23. Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament - How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (new York: Bantleon Books, 1976), p. 166.
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c) David Rosenbaum, "Nuclear Terror," International Security Vol. 1(2), Winter, 1977.
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31. Epstein, The Last Chance, p. 65.

32. Ibid, pp. 64-65

33. Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries: Cairo, 1964, in Jankowitsch & Sauvart (eds.), The Third World Without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries (New York: Oceana Publication, 1978), p. 53.

34. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), publication 27, pp. 444-445.

35. Epstein, The Last Chance, pp. 65-66.

36. GACR, DC/PV.75, 4 May, 1965.

37. UN and Disarmament 1945-1970, p. 269.

38. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1967 (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), Publication 46, pp. 176-206.

39. George Fischer, The Non-Proliferation, p. 157.

40. Ibid.

41. M.A. Husain, "Third World and Disarmament: Shadow and Substance," Third World Quarterly, Vol. II(1), January, 1980, p. 76.

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44. See: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament 1964 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), Publication 27, pp. 444-445, also in Epstein, The Last Chance, pp. 64-70, and Barton & Weiler, International Arms Control, pp. 294-299.

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system. Other writers emphasize the threat of nuclear proliferation to states with extremely militant ideologies which are profoundly dissatisfied with the status quo or leaders of unstable regimes with a 'give me victory or give me death' philosophy. In these cases deterrence may be completely useless. See: - Dror, Crazy States.

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Chapter 7: The Conventional Arms Race - Third World's
Double Standard

The Third World's share of global military expenditure has been on the increase... The Third World's contribution to the cause of arms control and disarmament should not be confined to delivering moral sermons to the super-powers and to the other nuclear-weapon States... We must not allow this special session of disarmament to become yet another United Nations exercise in pro-caxanda and collective hypocrisy.

Ambassador T.T. Koh of Singapore,
June 1978. 1

...we cannot really hope to achieve such peace simply by measures limiting transfers of arms to countries of the Third World... Such an initiative not only would be misguided but would do serious damage to the rights of States to ensure and organise their own national defence in a sovereign manner...

The representative of Algeria,
November, 1980. 2

While the Third World insists upon nuclear disarmament as the key to international peace and security, it is conspicuously ambiguous and even reluctant to discuss the issue of conventional disarmament in United Nations forums. It is again NIEO politics which determine the Third World position on conventional disarmament, making it another arena for North-South confrontation. Though there is more than a grain of truth in the Third World argument that sometimes the issue is exploited to divert attention from the nuclear arms race, it is also a fact that the world's conventional weapons situation is evolving at a rate that is dizzying compared with that in the nuclear area. At a time when the race for conventional weapons becomes a major striking characteristic of contemporary world politics the issue becomes a prerequisite in any discussion on international security and disarmament. Since proportionally the largest increase in conventional weaponry has been in the Third World, the attitudes and policies of these countries are crucial for international efforts to curtail the conventional arms race. This chapter will scrutinize the role of the Third World in the conventional arms race and its position on the matter at the United Nations.

The Conventional Arms Race

Indeed, in terms of destructive potential, even a fraction of existing nuclear weapons may cause a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions. In 1980, the nuclear arsenals of the world contained more than 60,000 nuclear weapons - an equivalent of about four tons of explosives for every man, woman and child on the earth.³ Nonetheless, the fact is that since 1945, mankind has been mercifully spared the horrors of nuclear war. Instead, however, the world has witnessed about 150 wars, mostly in the Third World, all with conventional weapons resulting in the killing of 25 million people. Since 80 percent of global military expenditures goes to conventional purposes, any serious proposal with a view to major reductions in armed forces or military budgets (particularly for the purposes of reallocation and conversion of resources) would have to include conventional arms. In short, the conventional arms race cannot be dismissed and ignored just because of the potential horrors of the nuclear build-up.

SIPRI data have indicated the relatively sharper rise-from very much lower absolute levels - of the rate of increase of military expenditures in the Third World. In 1957, the two major alliances - NATO and WTO - accounted for 85 percent of total military expenditure; the Third World share was about 5 percent. In the end of the 1970's the figure of the alliances had fallen below 70% and the Third World share rose to more than 23% (without China which accounts for 9.9%). Over these two decades, military spending in the Third World increased at an average annual rate of nearly 10%, compared with a world increase of about 3%, while military expenditures per capita remained level during the 1970's in the industrialized countries they rose - at a time of great population expansion - in the developing world by one-third.⁴ The increase was not restricted to the Middle East - where the largest accumulation of arms has occurred - but also in Africa where arms sales increased twenty fold and it tripled in Latin America from 1969 to 1978.⁵


The figures of the international trade in arms are even more illustrative than military expenditures in the Third World. In 1979, the value of global arms exports was five times greater than it was in 1960, and 12 times what it was in 1959. In the 1970's - which was declared by the United Nations as the "Decade of Disarmament" - the total value of major arms imports to the Third World was about three and a half times more than in the previous decade and seven times greater than that of the 1950's. The growth is not only in the volume of the arms trade but also in the number of importing countries and in the demand for more sophisticated weapon systems. According to SIPRI: "two-thirds of the global arms trade involves transfer of weapons to the third world, a good part of which suffers from under-development, starvation and disease."⁶ According to American official estimates in 1978, 81 percent of global arms imports were by developing countries.⁷

There are, of course, many reasons for this staggering demand for arms. The most important is the breakup of colonial empires and the multiplication

of new and independent states - the same process which has changed the character of United Nations debates. In many of these countries the creation of national military establishment was a first priority, and its existence under the command of the head of state is generally perceived as an important attribute of sovereignty. The quantity and quality of arms acquired by a state, explains Andrew J. Pierre, became "a symbol of both its strength and its status."⁸ Again, the concept of sovereignty and the drive for status became factors in Third World arms races adding to inherent conditions of instability in many of these regions. Some observers criticized this process of creating a New International Military Order as an undesirable side effect of the yet-to-be established NIEO.⁹ Perhaps, the growing militarization of the Third World can be viewed as a spill-over of the interrelationships between the NIEO, world order and disarmament (see chapter 4).

Table 4: Trends in Military Expenditure


MILITARY EXPENDITURES
constant dollars
indexes, 1960=100



Since 1960, expenditures of developing nations have risen four-fold (estimated in constant prices), while those in developed countries have gone up a more modest 44 per cent.

Source: Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, 1979, p. 7.

Table 5: Relative Resource Distribution in Developed States for Military, Education, Health - 1977
(Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1968-1977, p. 7.)



Disregard of Conventional Disarmament

Against this background it is even more telling that conventional disarmament has been constantly and deliberately neglected by the United Nations. In the Final Document of the SSOD, the reference to conventional weapons and arms transfers was weak and in fact meaningless. It was drafted in a tortuous and cumbersome language amounting to a justification of arms build-up in the name of just causes such as: national security, independence, inherent right of self-defense, the principle of equal right of self-determination of peoples, etc.¹⁰ The non-aligned approach which attaches absolute priority to nuclear disarmament (and even ignores conventional disarmament) has survived the painstaking consensus process of the SSOD. The nuclear dimension overshadows everything else in quantitative and qualitative terms, in the Final Document. Nuclear disarmament gets special priority in the various sections of the Document and there are many more paragraphs, and stronger language, devoted to it. It is clear that the non-aligned do not consider conventional disarmament as a matter of

urgency, particularly when it is directed to their own military power.

After gradually downplaying their official references to conventional disarmament Third World countries adopted a policy which not only ignores the world wide conventional arms race but also foils all attempts to discuss it in multilateral forums on disarmament. In 1961, at the first non-aligned summit conference in Belgrade, there was no distinction whatsoever between nuclear and conventional disarmament. Disarmament was perceived as an imperative need "in the present states of armament," and more specifically it meant:

the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as elimination of institutions and installations for military training, except for purposes of internal security; and total prohibition of the production, possession and utilization of nuclear and thermo-nuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories. 11

Such an order of disarmament measures, even in a random list of measures, would be inconceivable for the non-aligned in the 1970's.

The second conference, in Cairo 1964, marked already the shift toward some sort of priority list under which the emphasis was placed upon nuclear disarmament, a nuclear ban, and non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. There is a relatively vague reference to reductions in the military budgets of the Great Powers, but surprisingly nothing else specific on conventional disarmament (in the 16 paragraphs of the chapter on disarmament).¹² In 1970's at the third non-aligned summit conference in Lusaka, conventional disarmament was already a taboo. Here, the participants were very precise and specific in listing a "general order of priorities" - all of them non-conventional: various specific measures of nuclear disarmament, prohibitions of chemical and biological weapons, and even the so-called "non-armament or confidence-building measures" deal particularly with nuclear weapons and demilitarization of the sea bed.¹³ In Algiers 1973, there was just a brief expression of concern "with the flow of conventional weapons to non-nuclear states," a concern which would disappear three years later.

Since 1973, the non-aligned countries did not find it necessary even to pay lip-service to the regulation of the conventional arms race and international arms transfers. Both in Colombo 1976 and Havana 1979, at the fifth and sixth summit conferences,¹⁴ there was no reference whatsoever to these important aspects of international security. Again, the overwhelming concern was nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. The only place where the term "conventional weapons" is used is in regard to the conference on the "prohibition of certain conventional weapons of an indiscriminate or cruel nature particularly the prohibition of the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons." The prohibition of these particular types of weapons should not be considered as a measure to curtail the conventional arms race; instead it belongs to the so-called principles and practice of humanitarian law. The question of the prohibition of such weapons has been considered by a variety of international bodies over the years, such as the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).¹⁵

Already from the work of the Preparatory Committee of the SSOD it became apparent that conventional disarmament, which was strongly supported by some Western countries, would not get sufficient consideration even in the limited and ambitious fashion of United Nations formulations. The working paper of the non-aligned revealed their attitude to the problem. Conventional disarmament was dealt as an issue of secondary importance (sometimes giving the impression of being "face-saving" formulas). The document focuses almost entirely on nuclear disarmament. There is no mention of actual conventional wars and their consequences, but just of the dangers of the nuclear arms race. The non-aligned made it clear in their order of priorities that conventional arms and reduction of armed forces are the last items in their programme of action on disarmament.¹⁶ Interestingly enough the only concrete proposal on conventional disarmament by the non-aligned is directed toward a region outside the Third World - Central Europe. Only there the non-aligned paper refers to conventional disarmament which "would constitute a significant step for the attainment of the goal" of

the limitation and gradual reduction of conventional weapons on a global basis.¹⁷ One may infer from this that the situation in Europe is to be blamed for the military build-up in the Persian Gulf region, Africa or South-East Asia.

Failure to Discuss Arms Transfers:

Attempts to have the arms trade discussed in the United Nations General Assembly and the CCD met with the negative or even hostile reaction of most non-aligned countries.¹⁸ Some of these proposals favored the revival of the League of Nations concept of an international register of arms. These proposals were initiated or supported by the major suppliers of weapons in the West but were always rejected by the recipient countries and their allies.

In 1965, at the twentieth session of the General Assembly, Malta proposed that the ENDC consider the question of transfers of arms between states, but the Assembly failed to take up this matter.¹⁹ In 1966,

the President of the United States sent a message to the ENDC on regional disarmament²⁰ and again in 1967, as one of President Johnson's five principles for peace in the Middle East, the United States proposed the reporting to the United Nations of all arms shipments to the Middle East. This initiative encountered strong opposition from the Soviet Union, the Arab States and some Western nations. It was not put to a vote. Some similar ideas on United Nations registration and publishing of all exports and imports of conventional arms were introduced again in 1968 by a group of western states but a number of developing countries (particularly Argentina, India, the United Arab Republic, Syria with the support of the Soviet bloc) strongly opposed it and the sponsors decided not to put it to a vote.²¹

Thus, quite a while before "Rich-Poor" issues began to dominate international fora, a North-South confrontation between the Third World (then supported by the Soviet Union) and the arms producers/supplier started to emerge. As a matter of fact, the arguments were borrowed from the debate over the NPT (see chapter 6) and applied to the conventional field with the same

terminology of the NIEO. Third World countries argued that registration of arms transfers is discriminatory in the sense that it would reveal the arms acquisition activities of the recipients but not of the producers. The proponents of arms registration argued that the secrecy surrounding the acquisition of armaments creates uncertainty which increases insecurity among neighboring states which may overreact by an excessive military build up.

For the next seven years the whole issue of the conventional arms race virtually disappeared from the United Nations agenda (except for some marginal and general references in the framework of the perennial prodiloduent resolutions on "general and complete disarmament"). The issue was revived in 1976 at the CCD by the United Kingdom and the United States who urged restraint by exporters and importers in the arms trade. Nixeria, representing Third world opposition, held that the suppliers were primarily responsible for the arms trade and that it "could not accept attempts to shift emphasis in the CCD from nuclear and general and complete disarmament to such questions as the

arms trade."²²

In the same year, a Japanese initiative supported by the West, was submitted to the United Nations thirty-first session proposing to have a United Nations study on the subject with the assistance of qualified governmental experts. This time the initiative was defeated by means of procedural tricks in which a vote was taken for adjournment of the debate in the First Committee.²³ The issue re-emerged in 1977 in the CCD and the General Assembly. This time several Third world countries (Colombia, Nepal, Singapore, Tanzania) joined the camp which took the position that the priority attached to nuclear disarmament should not distract attention from the conventional arms race. Japan and Singapore held that the continuing technological sophistication of conventional weapons tended to blur the difference between conventional and nuclear arms. Nepal and Tanzania pointed out that since the end of World War II no nuclear weapons had been used in war while millions of people had suffered as casualties of conventional warfare. But still the opposition led by India re-emphasized the position

that nuclear and conventional weapons could not be weighed equally. India explained that conventional weapons must take lower priority since they do not threaten mankind's total annihilation and because they were the only weapons available to the developing countries for their defense and to national liberation movements. Japan expressed concern over the danger that the influx of sophisticated weapons in large quantities into troubled areas may escalate military conflicts into a nuclear holocaust.²⁴ Nevertheless, despite this growing awareness of the perils of the conventional arms race in 1977, no draft resolution was submitted on the subject to the United Nations General Assembly. Attempts to re-introduce the issue of the international arms trade to the United Nations agenda, have provoked vociferous protests from the Third World.

A debate over conventional weapons did take place at the SSOD, again mainly because of the comprehensive nature of the Final Document which was designed to cover all aspects of disarmament measures. It seems also that the conventional arms issue was used

by Western countries as a bargaining chip against the Third World attack on nuclear weapons. In a sharp contrast to the non-aligned disregard for conventional disarmament, the Western working paper to the SSOD said the following:

Most of the world's military expenditure is being devoted to the acquisition and maintenance of conventional military power. This absorbs essential material and human resources. All States should make all possible efforts parallel to those in the field of nuclear disarmament to halt this diversion of resources and to achieve concrete measures for their reallocation from military to civilian purposes. To this end it will be necessary to intensify research on how best to achieve this goal.

The increasing build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world involves a potential risk of heightening military tension and endangering international peace and security. The unabated international transfer of conventional arms should be brought under control. 25

The SSOD has witnessed also some modifications in the Soviet position in this regard, which appeared to have moved closer to the Western approach on the need for conventional disarmament, thus extending the non-aligned superpowers confrontation, though to a lesser extent, to the conventional field. The working

paper of the Socialist countries said:

Limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. Military conflicts involving the use of conventional weapons lead to the tragic and often mass destruction of human lives and of the material values created by man. Accordingly, practical steps should be taken to limit and reduce aircraft, artillery, tank forces and other modern types of conventional weapons as well as armed forces equipped with them. Foreign military bases in foreign territories should be dismantled; foreign troops should be withdrawn from such territories. 26

In the course of the General Debate, Soviet bloc countries tried to impress the non-aligned countries by using the same anti-imperialist arguments against restrictions on conventional arms which may "prejudice the rights of countries and peoples waging a struggle for freedom and independence."²⁷ But at the same time the Soviets raised similar arguments to those of the West pointing out the record world-wide expenditures on conventional arms and the fact that, unlike nuclear weapons, since the end of World War II they had killed millions of persons in warfare.²⁸

The apparent coordination on conventional weapons between the superpowers at the United Nations was

closely related to their new bilateral preliminary exchange of views on the international arms trade which started in December 1977 in Washington D.C.,²⁹ The meetings resumed in Helsinki, on the eve of the SSOD, in May and again on July 1978.³⁰ These meetings followed the announcement of a new "policy of arms restraint" by the Carter Administration (May 1977), which focused on the shipment of advanced weapons to the Third world and called for multilateral cooperation among arms suppliers including the USSR. Along with high-level consultations with the French, British and West German governments, the United States and the Soviets established their intergovernmental working group on arms transfers.³¹

However, these preliminary attempts (which would soon become another futile exercise) were not encouraged by the majority of Third World countries. The debates in the SSOD and in the preceding General Assemblies revealed two different philosophical approaches in the field. These approaches differ on the importance and urgency of conventional disarmament as well as on its scope (who should disarm? who should set arms deliveries?) One group, mainly Western States,

proposes that nuclear and conventional disarmament should be considered simultaneously and with equal attention. They maintain that conventional conflicts may escalate to nuclear confrontations and therefore developing countries bore the same responsibilities as the industrialized countries in the field of conventional arms limitation. The other group - mostly non-aligned and developing countries - emphasize that such equal treatment of nuclear and conventional matters would detract from the urgency and priority of nuclear disarmament. These countries also added that efforts in that direction should not serve to deny legitimate arms acquisitions "necessary for the security of nations, peoples or liberation movements fighting against colonialism and apartheid in the exercise of their right to self-determination and independence." 32 In addition, the arms-purchasing countries of the Third World treat the question of arms transfer together with the question of the production and since the superpowers are responsible for most of the weapons production (for their own economic and political benefit) they should be the first to initiate meaningful

reduction of their own conventional armaments. In this debate the Soviet Union and its satellites played a low-key role and while expressing inclination to support the Western argument on the perils of the conventional arms race the Soviets supported, at the same time, the Third World position on the right of States to legitimate defense and of peoples under colonial and racist domination to use the means available to them, including arms, to achieve and secure their freedom and independence.

Discordant Notes in the Third World

It should be noted that among the non-aligned there were some notes of discord on the tendency to belittle the gravity of the conventional arms race, and particularly its manifestations among Third World countries. The statement of the representative of Singapore, Ambassador P.T. Koh, in the general debate of the SSOD was quite revealing and, no doubt, irritated some of the militant members in the non-aligned. Singapore told the Third World to put its own

house in order first and to stop delivering so many "moral sermons" to the superpowers. Ambassador Koh pointed out that the arms race is not confined to the superpowers and their allies but is a universal phenomenon. He described the sharp rise in Third World's military expenditures at the expense of their expenditures for food and development. Koh made it clear that the Third World should concentrate on regional agreements on conventional weapons and admitted:

Unfortunately, conditions of mutual trust and confidence do not exist in many parts of the Third World today. The Third World is riven by conflicts and disputes based upon conflicting territorial claims and racial, tribal, religious, linguistic and ideological differences. 33

Singapore was joined by Papua New Guinea which focused on the situation in the field of international arms trade where the Third World share reached a staggering 75 percent of the total. The military expenditures explained the representative of Papua New Guinea, are at the expense of economic, health and social programmes.³⁴ In a moment of truth, a rare admission could be recorded when the representative of Nigeria, a leading actor in the non-aligned group, said:

It must be said in all candour that the

developing countries themselves were not immune from the increase in military expenditures. That is most unfortunate. 35

Western countries, on the other hand, have persistently demanded discussion of the conventional arms race and disarmament as priority item. The Prime Minister of Canada, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, gave expression to this concern in his statement to the SSOD. Trudeau pointed out that conventional weapons comprised 80 per cent of the world's military expenditures and, particularly among developing countries, it assumes massive proportions of their public spending. Therefore, he rejected in plain words the attempt by the Third World to concentrate almost exclusively on nuclear disarmament:

There can be no first and second priorities, therefore, as between the nuclear and a whole series of conventional arms races. Both are relevant to the maintenance of world security; both are absorbing resources better devoted to other purposes; both are the legitimate business of an Organization whose purpose it is to harmonize the actions of nations. 36

The Western countries have, of course, some more parochial considerations in their persistence to focus on conventional disarmament. The issue is raised by

the West not merely as an opposition to Third World exclusiveness approach to nuclear disarmament but also because of its special connotation within East-West relations. It is well-known that the NATO deterrent in Europe is based upon the tactical nuclear option and the strategic umbrella of the United States in order to compensate for the disparity in conventional weapons between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Unlike most Third world countries, Western allies, by definition of their security system, view nuclear weapons as the only stabilizing element to offset their relative weakness in conventional weapons. Having that in mind, their tendency at the United Nations is, thus, to give special consideration to conventional disarmament in the framework of the debate on nuclear disarmament. Here is typical statement by the United Kingdom:

We are all acutely sensitive to the horrors that the use of nuclear weapons would entail. The United Kingdom has nuclear weapons precisely in order to prevent a nuclear war from occurring. For it must be recognized that in Europe nuclear weapons have for many years been an integral part of the East-West security system. Nuclear disarmament should in our view take place as part of a far-reaching arrangement providing at the same time for the reduction and limitation of major conventional armories. Otherwise there

would come about a large disparity in power between countries with large conventional armed forces and those without such forces. Such a disparity would be unacceptable in terms of national security and undesirable in terms of the destabilization which would result. It is illusory to believe that just because nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive power they can be treated in isolation for arms control purposes. We therefore consider that this Committee should give greater attention to conventional arms control. 37

But most Third World countries remain unwilling even to discuss the issue. For them the idea of conventional disarmament is a ploy of the nuclear-weapon states to brush aside accusations on the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and an attempt "to reverse the legal as well as strategic disarmament priorities."³⁸

India reaffirmed this position reiterating, in 1980, the three familiar principles:

- a) Rejecting the concept of "a conventional arms race in which all or a majority of countries are enraged."
- b) Pointing out that it diverts the focus from the main issue: nuclear disarmament.³⁹

c) Demanding "a modicum of conventional capability" as essential to newly independent nations to safeguard their "hard-won independence from the aggressive interpositions of great-Power ambitions which straddle the globe and from other threats to their security."⁴⁰

Foreign and Colonial Intervention

One of the arguments which is invoked by the Third World to reject discussions on the conventional arms race is that the superpowers or, as in most cases, imperialism and colonialism should be blamed for military conflicts in the Third World. At the SSOD, the Foreign Minister of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika elaborated on a radical interpretation of war in the Third World. Bouteflika accused the former colonial Powers for using the Third World as a "testing ground for new techniques of mass destruction." These Powers, invent "imaginary ideological conflicts" in order to justify their foreign intervention. This, concluded Bouteflika, is similar to the colonial conquest which "was rooted in the so-called civilizing mission of the West."⁴¹

The great powers, mainly the Western, are blamed for everything: for the creation of the conflict and for its exploitation for their arms sales. According to Nizer, the industrialized countries deliberately spread "hot beds of conflict" in Africa in order "to maintain a psychosis of insecurity" which would lead the Africans to buy arms from them. These arms sales "constitute a tremendous drain on our meagre resources which are thus unjustly used to swell the bank accounts of the arms merchants of the industrialized countries."⁴² Third World countries complain that they become pawns in the big powers' rivalry for spheres of influence and, thus, are forced against their will to increase their military expenditures.⁴³

In 1980, there were a few outbursts of intra-Third world conflicts in the United Nations deliberations on disarmament. In addition to exchanges between Iraq and Iran over their military conflict and some statements concerning the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam, there were indirect allusions to Libya's adventurist policies in Africa. It took a painstaking effort for Tunisia, a staunch member of the non-aligned movement and the

seat of the Arab League, to deliver harsh words directed at Libya although without referring to it by name. Tunisia, itself a victim of one of Gaddafi's military adventures⁴⁴, delivered an unusual statement for a non-aligned and Arab state on the sources of conflict and tension in the Third World. Tunisia made it clear that a new phenomenon of polarization is emerging in the Third World which is "neither the prolongation nor the reflection of the East-West confrontation." It is a phenomenon in which:

...some developing countries, through their own choice, consider themselves possessors of a hegemonistic mandate over their neighbours and, in this one-term adventure, squander enormous financial, human and technical resources in order to accumulate enormous quantities of luxury weapons, greatly out of proportion to their populations, and then to engage in a policy of annexation, intervention and intimidation as a prelude to overtly military operations. The appearance of such pockets in the Third World is accompanied by a new surge of rearmament, and soon by a real initiation of armament programmes, which are planned and diversified in relation to the disturbances occurring around them. 45

Libya is of course the model-state for a rearmament process greatly out of proportion to its population, and which manifested hegemonistic policies over its

neighbours engaging in intimidation, annexation and intervention.⁴⁶ In an allusion to Libya's vast amounts of oil reserves, the representative of Tunisia pointed out that for such developing countries rearmament is an easy task since they can "without much difficulty by simply transferring natural resources" continue to acquire weapons. Continuing in this Aesopian language, Tunisia denounced the phenomenon which brings with it foreign influence since the developing nation is unable to absorb the massive flows of armament and needs, therefore, foreign assistance. Finally, Tunisia appealed to experts and negotiators in the field of disarmament not to concentrate exclusively on the nuclear arms race and the threat of the macro-military arsenals, but to give special consideration as well to the neglected phenomenon of regional military build up by developing countries.

Rejecting New Efforts on Arms Trade

Within non-aligned fora it is impossible to find any reflection whatsoever of the problem of international

arms trade, as if it does not exist (although three quarters of it goes to the Third World). The problem is even more significant since many of these Third World countries are purchasing their weapons with scarce resources which as they claim should be used for urgent economic and social needs. Some of these developing nations are unable to ensure an adequate food supply for their growing populations. In 1978, the year of the SSOD, of the ninety-four developing nations that imported arms, more than one-third were among the poorest nations on earth, with average annual per capita income of under \$500.⁴⁷

Against this background it is striking that the Havana Summit of the non-aligned (1979) did not mention the problem at all, nor did the Final Document of their Foreign Ministers' summit in New Delhi (1981). On some occasions, the non-aligned are forced to make a reference to the problem of arms trade. In the Disarmament Commission, for instance, the non-aligned had to pay lip-service to the issue of the arms trade since it was raised by other countries within the framework of the so-called Comprehensive Programme

of Disarmament which encompasses all the aspects of disarmament. The non-aligned working paper tried, of course, to belittle the significance of the issue of world trade in armaments since it "constitutes a fraction of the total production of conventional weapons." Again it was asserted by the non-aligned that the major problem is the arms trade "between members of the two major alliance systems" and therefore it "should be restrained through their bilateral and regional negotiations."⁴³

Usually the Third World countries oppose limitations on the international transfer of conventional weapons because it "may adversely affect the interests of the smaller powers." They say that an arbitrary policy of arms denial to one State would affect regional balance of forces and will bring deterioration of stability and will provoke armed conflicts.⁴⁹ A restraint on the transfer of conventional weapons, a non-aligned spokesman argued, may force small nations to seek their requirements from arms dealers at exorbitant financial cost and, therefore, worsening their economic situation.⁵⁰

Again, the same Third World countries which dared to stand up on the issue of Third-world conflicts continued to speak out on weapons transfers. In addition to Singapore, both Fiji and its neighbour in Oceania, Papua New Guinea, pointed out that some Third World countries are even profiting from the arms trade and are heightening the competition.⁵¹ It was reported, in 1981, that over the last decade the number of developing countries which are capable of building or assembling military equipment, and not just small arms, has more than doubled. Leaders of the Third world, such as Yugoslavia and Brazil (both members of the Group of non-aligned in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament), are selling arms to their fellow developing countries.⁵² Fiji was one Third World country, though not a member of the non-aligned movement, which was ready to expose some of the double standards in the arguments of developing countries:

The last decade has further seen the emergence of third-world arms producers - supplementing the deplorable efforts of the industrialized countries of both East and West in the export of their domestically produced arms and military equipment to the rest of the world. For these developing countries, now secondary producers of arms, the diversion of their scarce resources to armaments is in turn adversely reflected in their social and economic development needs not being fully met. 53

There are few Third World countries which admit that, at least, there is a need for some cooperation on their part - in the field of conventional disarmament. Sierra Leone, for example, advocated cooperation between producers and exporters of conventional weapons and recipient States in order to realize effective measures to regulate the development, production, transfer and acquisition of conventional armament.⁵⁴

However, the Third World as a bloc and particularly the non-aligned continue to represent the radical interpretation of the arms trade. The same Algeria, which of course does not recognize any military conflict between Third World countries and blames everything on great power intervention, flatly rejects international agreements aimed to put restraints on arms transfers. Algeria, in a statement delivered in the end of 1980 at the First Committee of the General Assembly provided the radical interpretation of the issue which explains why the non-aligned could not agree upon any formula which would allow multilateral

discussions on limiting international arms transfers.

The representative of Algeria told the delegates of the First Committee:

...we cannot really hope to achieve such peace simply by measures limiting transfers of arms to countries of the Third World - as if it were a case of exorcizing their warlike frenzy in this way; as if war had suddenly become the prerogative of the poor. Such an initiative not only would be misguided but would do serious damage to the rights of States to ensure and organize their own national defence in a sovereign manner and it would also affect the right of peoples fighting for their self-determination and independence. 55

As in other instances of the North-South confrontation, the Soviets managed to disassociate themselves from the Western countries in the debate over conventional arms transfers. Initiatives on the conventional arms race are supported by Western countries, while the Soviets - sometimes by expressing general reservations to the financial costs of new initiatives - join the non-aligned countries in opposing these proposals.⁵⁶ Similarly for several years the Soviet Union has abstained on a Swedish proposal on the reduction of military budgets which would establish a reporting instrument

which will take into consideration the problem of comparing military expenditures among different States and the problems of verifications. The Soviets regard the question of comparability and verification as pretexts which allowed military budgets to continue to increase.⁵⁷

Soviet attitudes on the conventional arms race are particularly illustrative in light of their growing role in recent years in the international transfer of arms to the Third World. According to SIPRI estimates, during the period 1979-81 the Soviet Union became the world's largest supplier of major weapon systems.⁵⁸ Although there is no doubt that Western arms exports are often guided by political motives, the Soviet approach is more politically oriented than that of other exporters including the United States. A large part of Western exports of arms during the 1970's were characterized by a lack of any political strings - being mainly commercial. Particularly in their arms sales to the oil-rich countries Western allies plunged into wild competition

for a share of the petromarket even at the expense of political and strategic interests.⁵⁹ The Soviets, on the other hand, since their first arms deal negotiated with Egypt in 1955-1956, regarded arms agreements as points of departure for their advances and penetrations in the Third World. In most cases Soviet weapons were offered on better terms - i.e. low prices and favourable credit terms. In Soviet policy, arms transfer play a far greater role than economic aid or trade to the developing world. Unlike the transfer of technology or agricultural assistance, arms transfers have become the only area in which the Soviets have successfully rivalled the West.⁶⁰ The Soviets are managing therefore to enjoy both worlds: they are rarely blamed for their lack of economic aid to the Third World and their role in spreading the arms race to developing countries is overlooked in the United Nations. Particularly in this field where the NIEO and the link between disarmament and development are highlighted, the Soviets succeed to further isolate the industrialized West. As it is shown in the next chapter, United Nations forums offer the Soviets a setting in which they enjoy a major advantage over the Western bloc. The juxtaposition of disarmament and NIEO by the Third World have rather enhanced these Soviet advantages.

United Nations Study on Conventional Disarmament

At the disarmament negotiating forum of the United Nations - the CD in Geneva there is no item on the agenda dedicated to conventional disarmament or to the international trade in arms. While there are more references to the subject in the debates at the United Nations and the CD, no concrete resolution or even negotiations emerged from these organs. However, it became apparent that there is more recognition, even among Third World countries that "conventional weapons and forces posed the most immediate threat to peace and security of most countries and consumed the major portion of world military expenditures." ⁶¹

In 1980, for the first time in the history of the United Nations a resolution specifically on the subject of conventional disarmament was adopted by the 35th General Assembly (Res. 35/156). The vote on the issue revealed that the non-aligned countries could not develop a unified position on this matter and instead were again split on a major issue of

disarmament. The resolution was introduced by the West (Denmark) and may serve as an example of a hollow document which, in order to get some qualified support by part of the Third World countries, had undergone further cosmetic changes reiterating the "disarmament priorities established in the SSOD" (nuclear disarmament first).

In addition, because of the strong opposition from non-aligned countries, the sponsors agreed to send the issue to the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations to work out the general approach to the study, its structure and scope. In other words, even though the resolution dealt just with a study without offering any concrete measures in the field of conventional disarmament, it fell victim to further delaying procedural tactics. Still the results were telling; among the 14 votes against the study (in addition to the Soviets) were the two leading opponents of the NPT in the Third World, India and Brazil, and another 27 non-aligned countries abstained (among them: Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, Iraq and

Yugoslavia). The Soviet bloc countries objected to the study because of their consistent opposition to the financial costs of various United Nations studies. The Soviets said that the essential task was to begin concrete negotiations towards curbing conventional arms instead of undertaking "an absolutely fruitless study."⁶² It is interesting that both India and Brazil, the only Third World countries which voted against the study, have a remarkable role in the growing militarization of the Third World. SIPRI indicates in its 1982 yearbook the sharp rise in military expenditures in India (together with Pakistan) since 1979 . Both Brazil and India are among the leading producers of arms in the Third World and Brazil in particular has a booming arms industry.⁶³

If somebody had hoped that the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations would make some progress on conventional disarmament, the session of 1981 did dash all such hopes. The Commission, designed as a deliberative body of all United Nations members, was unable to agree even on the general

approach to a study on all aspects of the conventional arms race. Last ditch efforts of the chairman which produced a compromise in a working paper on the subject, were rejected. The Commission reported back to the General Assembly:

The intensive discussions and consultations revealed a significant divergence of views on the matters before the Commission on this item and it became clear that it was, not possible at this stage for the Commission to discharge the responsibility assigned to it by the General Assembly in resolution 35/156-A.

Still, the Commission found it worthwhile to point out that the above conclusions were "adopted by consensus."⁶⁴

Third World Glass Houses:

Since there are fundamental differences in the vantage points of the parties, it is hard to find acceptable criteria by which to determine the scope and seriousness of the problems giving rise to demands for conventional disarmament. What is clear however, is that United Nations rhetoric appears to be obfuscating reality. The motives of many developing

countries in these debates are disturbing particularly at a time when commentators speak with increasing frequency about militarization in the Third World.⁶⁵ Outside the United Nations it is a time of major military conflicts between non-aligned countries (Iraq-Iran) and of the emergence of non-aligned expansionism and occupation (Vietnam and Libya). In this context three major problems are worth further elaboration:

- a) How can one determine whether the Third World is caught up in significant arms procurement? This question should be addressed since there is a tendency to belittle Third World military expenditures as a small fraction, compared to the great powers, of world military spending.
- b) Is it true, as non-aligned countries argue, that this military build-up always enhances self-defense and provides national security for Third World Nations?
- c) Who is to be blamed?

The quantitative methods:

Scholars as well as official delegates often use in their publications and statements various measurements and indices of a nation's military burden of expenditures, as important component of their evidence of criticized tendencies of weapons build-up. The problem with some of the arguments concerning the conventional arms race is that they are derived from premises which were established at a time when the race was confined to the industrialized world, and most of the Third World countries were still under colonial domination. With the dramatic decolonization process and the rise in inter-Third World conflict, there seems to be a need to reconsider these premises. It seems that at this stage it is hard to blame the "North," and particularly the West, as the source for all evils in the "South." including their internal military conflicts. What should be, therefore, the right yard-stick to measure the arms build-up in Third World countries?

The problem is, thus, first and foremost about the right research methods and agreed tools of measurement. At the United Nations, the most popular yardstick is the comparison of the nominal value of military expenditures between non-aligned and industrialized countries. Such an approach will always point its finger at five or six most heavily armed states which have the largest and increasingly sophisticated and growing arsenals of conventional weapons. Another very popular yardstick to measure the "militaristic" tendencies of governments is that of comparing its military budget with the amounts it allocates for foreign aid and development projects in the Third World.⁶⁶ This should be viewed against the background of the attempt to establish the so-called link between disarmament and development.

The problem with these links and correlations is that they were not investigated in an impartial manner, free of parochial political consideration. The fact that the United Nations SSOD has accepted "the close relationship between disarmament and

development" in which "progress in the former would help greatly the realization of the latter"⁶⁷ does not make it yet the iron law of international disarmament. This indicator, thus, should be viewed as a moral judgment (which can be challenged also on moral grounds - see chapter 4), but not as a scientific tool of measurement.

There are several major indicators of a nation's military expenditures such as percentage of GNP, expenditures per capita, soldiers per capita, expenditures per soldier, etc.⁶⁸ The most often and most widely used indicator outside the United Nations is the indicator of military expenditure as percentage of GNP. This at least, gives a fair picture of military expenditures in a particular country in relation to the rest of its economic activities. Nevertheless, even this indicator is getting more and more criticism since it obscures changes in nations with sizable GNP's and does not tell about the priorities of national policy-makers.⁶⁹

As a result, some researchers view as the most useful the indicator which measures military expenditures as a percentage of the country's national budget. This indicator, more than any others, focuses primarily on the priorities and choices of a particular nation in its budgetary allocations. Using this measurement, the picture of the rearmament in the Third World is rather bleak and ominous . The data aggregated on military expenditures as a proportion of state budget on 93 developing countries in 1974 reveal the following conclusions⁷⁰ :

- nearly 25% of Third World countries spent over 25% of their budget on military expenditures.
- nearly 30% spent over 20% of their budget on military expenditure.
- 57% spent over 10% of their budget on military expenditure. These findings mean that nearly 30% of Third World countries allocate more money percentage wise, out of their national budget than the United States, for instance.

Does rearmament enhance the security of Third World countries?

As the following pages suggest rearmament of Third World countries in the Middle East, in the Persian Gulf region, South-East Asia, and Africa brought deterioration in the security of the Third World countries involved. These military conflicts demonstrate how developing countries are dependent on supply from exporting countries not only for the main instruments of war but also for spare parts. The growing sophistication of conventional weapons demands a highly developed technological infrastructure for their constant maintenance, and most Third World countries lack it.

Mary Kaldor, writing on "Arms and Dependence," challenges the conventional wisdom that rearmament in the Third World helps to reduce their military inequality and increases their political power. By means of this process, she says, Third World countries are accepting a dependent ideology and limiting their development potential. For most underdeveloped countries, armaments represent a very high proportion of their total capital and in addition they

experience difficulties in absorbing this new technology:

The increased vulnerability of all weapon platforms-ships, tanks, aircraft - calls into question the utility of equipment which is difficult to hide and expensive to replace. In addition, modern equipment entails considerable logistical problems. A squadron of F-4 Phantoms, for example, requires an inventory of 70,000 spare parts to be kept operational under wartime conditions. 71

In the First Committee's debate in the 35th General Assembly (1980), the representative of Israel commented on this phenomenon in the same vein:

It can therefore be said that hand in hand with the growing sophistication of conventional weapons goes their transfer to an ever increasing number of recipient countries which are not always in a position to provide for their adequate deployment or use in case of war without continued aid from supplier countries. The proliferation of sophisticated weapons all over the globe serves, therefore, to create an illusion of military power, which itself endangers world peace. This illusion promotes States parties to a regional conflict to opt for military solutions instead of seeking pacific means of negotiations and settlement. 72

Another study on the "Economics of Third World Military Expenditure" concludes that, on balance, military spending represents a burden on the economy

and that, given the limited resources of Third World countries and the ambiguous nature of the concept of deterrence which justifies most military spending, it does not, on the whole, contribute to national security.⁷³ More and more countries in the Third World with sharply rising external debt continue to invest to import arms. In these countries military budgets are at the expense of their spending for public health, housing or education.⁷⁴ Under such circumstances the link between disarmament of the great powers and development cannot but be regarded with skepticism (see more criticism on the link in chapter 4). In 1981 there were 54 military-dominated governments in the Third World, the bulk of them have records of violating the rights of their own citizens to safety under law and their security forces employ oppressive policies, including torture and summary executions.⁷⁵ With such trends of militarization of regimes and arms races among developing countries there is no guarantee that transfer of resources from the developed world would be wisely used for common good by dictators or authoritarian regimes in the Third World.⁷⁶

A Third World's Arms Race:

Events in a certain group of nations in the Third World over the last decade make even the improved and refined indicators on military expenditures inadequate. The 1980 yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has identified for the first time a new group of nations in its charts and tables on world military expenditures - all of them Third World countries - belonging to the oil cartel OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries).

In their review of the prevailing trends of the 1970's, the editors of the SIPRI yearbook concluded:

OPEC states have spent a considerable part of their vastly increased income on expanding their military sector--with a growth rate of 15 percent. 77

Figures on the growing volume of arms transfers in the 1970's reveal an undeniable fact: the greatest single boost to arms sales in the last decade came with the 1973 Arab oil cut-off, the subsequent crisis and the immediately resulting quadrupling of oil

prices. The billions of dollars which flowed first into the coffers of the oil-producing countries, and then into the pockets of the arms merchants, were spent primarily by these same Middle Eastern Oil Producing (MEOP)* countries, the world's largest exporters of energy resources. The shift was quick and dramatic:

The explosive rise in crude oil prices has brought new and quick "wealth" to some Middle Eastern countries, which has been used for expensive purchases of modern arms and military equipment as well as for investments in respective infrastructure projects. 78

In this particular case of the MEOP countries, the conventional indicators on defense expenditure may mislead. These "nouveaux riche" have sometimes apparently no limits on their expenditures, and were able, simultaneously, to increase dramatically their allocations for both economic development and military

* It is important and analytically appropriate to distinguish the MEOP countries (Saudi-Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Libya, Algeria, Oman, and Qatar) from the rest of OPEC since they alone account for more than 90 per cent of the total military expenditures by all OPEC countries.

expenditures. In this case, there is no question of priorities in a nation's federal budget, and therefore the indicator of military expenditures as percentage of national spending may deceive and even completely conceal the spiralling increase in military spending.

The quantitative dollar figures alone suggest that a large portion of the dizzying escalation of the world's arms race is literally fueled by fuel. MEOP countries have reached record heights, up to ten-fold and even up to thirty-fold increases in defense budgets within four years. A Third World country like Iraq (the prospective host and chairman of the non-aligned movement in its Seventh Summit Conference in Baghdad in 1982) has received in 1979 more arms than any other Third World country. Saudi Arabia, which in addition to arms imports is engaged in major military construction and training programmes, has exceeded in 1980 the defense expenditure of France.⁷⁹


This new "arms-oil connection" put heavy responsibility on the Third World majority in the United

Nations. Worn-out clichés about the imperialist powers which create tensions and conflicts in the Third World fail to convince even the staunchest supporters of the non-aligned. The long war between Iraq and Iran and Libya's military interventions and occupations in Africa became a source of irritation and grave concern for the Third World. It becomes apparent that the new trends in international arms transfers, precisely because of the new role of Third World nations, brought about revolutionary changes in the world weapons market. The role and policies of these nations proved to be more effective and powerful than attempts at restraint in sales by some major producers; they created wild competition among allies which indeed even thwarted nuclear non-proliferation attempts.

During the 1970's there has been a dramatic shift towards government-to-government foreign military purchases for cash and credit and in most cases the terms of the trade, as well as the orders, were dictated by Third World countries. No longer is the political leverage held by the supplier over the

receptients by the controlling framework of military aid programs. In the case of MEOP countries, the "oil-weapon" is used to apply pressure on the suppliers and to impose the new pattern of arms-for-oil deals. This kind of package deal between governments (notably pursued by Iraq), indexed the volume and price of oil exports to reciprocal commitments of arms deliveries.⁸⁰ As oil-rich countries sought arms, supplying governments soon lost all control over arms transfers and plunged into a wild competition to grab their share of the petro-market. The oil-exporting countries have demonstrated their two-fold power in this inflationary race: they can draw on staggering amounts of money, and they can dispense that money however they please. In the West, this race to please the Arabs has been rationalized as an attempt to recycle the petrodollars: "to bring those dollars back home." Arms sales were justified as a necessary evil to meet the economic crisis posed by stagflation (a simultaneous inflation of prices and growing unemployment). It helped to recover the huge deficits in the national balance of payments and it provided

Table 6: Military Expenditures by Third World Oil-producing countries



Source: This table is calculated from data in SIPRI Yearbook 1982,
p. 140 on world military expenditures.

new jobs in the new flourishing arms exports industries. Typically, even a neutral state such as Austria has joined the competition for the arms market in the Middle East, justifying it "partly on the need to keep down unemployment at home and partly to aid its balance of payments."81

Alva Myrdal, former minister of disarmament of Sweden and leading spokesman for the non-aligned in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva drew a direct link between oil revenues and arms:

With the monopolistic rise in oil prices, some under developed countries have suddenly become very rich and these countries have become major importers of highly sophisticated and expensive weapons. Besides the superpowers' continued deliveries to them, almost all the developed Western countries (in the wake of the 1973 Middle East war and the Arab oil boycott) have been racing to please the Arabs and simultaneously reap profits. There has been a resultant strong upsurge in trade according to a new pattern of arms-for-oil deals. When contracted orders are filled, Kuwait, for instance, with only around a million inhabitants, will have one of the world's most modern air defense systems, and all the Gulf sheikdoms are acquiring sophisticated counterinsurgency weaponry. 82

A pattern common to all MEOP countries' arms imports policies is the consistent attempt to diversify their sources of imports. This approach just enhances the already competitive nature of the market and provides the MEOP countries with a range of arms sources while freeing them from exclusive dependence on East or West or any single supplier. In this case, Third World countries are not just rearming themselves in a dizzying pace but also playing a major and active role in the international arms race. Ironically, in this game the supplier countries represent the weaker partner in the game of arms transfers.

Some of the ramifications of the emerging arms-oil connection is reflected in the role of some MEOP countries as re-exporters of weapons (mainly Libya) and financier of other rearmament programmes (mainly Saudi Arabia). This oil-arms mechanism has crossed also the nuclear threshold and heavy-handed oil-smear tactics have been exerted to extract nuclear deals.⁸³ All indications show that MEOP countries will

continue to order arms. They will continue to have the liquid financial assets, coupled with growing fear for security and/or increasing drive for prestige and regional power. The situation in this region ensures that arms supplies will begin an upward ratchet mechanism destroying any possible stability. Since the operational lifetime of weapons tends increasingly to become shorter, the value and volume of their order will increase. The war in the Persian Gulf will be perhaps a major boost for future orders by the combatants to replace their loss in the battle fields.

Military conflicts in South-East Asia, (Vietnam and its neighbors), in the Persian Gulf (the Iraq-Iran war) and the Libyan military adventures in Africa may well be the bellwether of the growing militarization of intra-Third world relations. Under these circumstances it will be more difficult to organize the same Third World front in the United Nations on issues of conventional disarmament. In the case of Third World MEOP countries it became apparent that with their new oil

power they could dictate the terms of trade to the arms suppliers. By virtue of their oil-arms connection MEOP countries were able to manipulate the West in both markets - as sellers in the seller's market of oil, and as buyers in the buyer's market of arms.⁸⁴ At this point it is hard to focus on initiatives of restraint from the suppliers side - as most experts suggest⁸⁵ - without addressing these dramatic changes in the international market of arms. What remains clear, however, is that these Third World arms races raise further doubts about the credentials of the non-aligned movement as a proponent of global disarmament at the United Nations.

Chapter 7: Footnotes

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The New Republic, March 7, 1981.

47. Pierre, The Global, p. 36.

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Fueling the Arms Race," Armed Forces and Society
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and Andrew Pierre, The Global, pp. 78-80.
The industrialized countries of the West are far more
vulnerable than the Soviets to being deprived of
resources. Sometimes their arms sales are motivated
by this fear, as arms sales are seen as a way to buy
the friendship of raw-material exporting countries.
see: Peter M. Dawkins, "Conventional Arms Transfers
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66. See GAOR, Nigeria in the SSOD or India A/C.1/33/PV.38, 15 November, 1978, p. 15.

67. Final Document of the SSOD, par. 35, 94, 95.

68. See:

a) Milton Leitenberg and Nicole Ball, "The Military Expenditures of Less Developed Nations as a proportion of their State Budgets," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 1977 (4), pp. 310-315.

b) R.L. Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures - 1980 (New York: Institute for World Order, 1980).

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72. GAOR, A/C.1/35/PV.20, 29 October, 1980, p. 21.

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76. An interesting illustration of links between armament and development was manifested by India. A few days after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved a loan of \$5.8 billion to India, its Prime Minister Indira Gandhi showed up in Paris and ordered a \$3.3 billion fleet of Mirage 2000 fighter planes. The arms deal explain also, as the Wall Street Journal editors suggest, why France "was plumping so strongly" for the IMF credit package to India. As a result the IMF, supposedly assigned to helping nations with short-term cash-flow problems, is financing, at least indirectly, major arms transactions. Wall Street Journal, 28 November, 1981.

77. SIPRI Yearbook of 1980, p. 15.

78. Ibid, p. 95.

79. For an extensive discussion on the role of oil in the international transfer of arms see: Avi Beker: "The Arms-Oil Connection."

80. Ibid.

81. Washington Post, 2 September, 1980.

82. Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament - How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976), p. 162.

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84. Ibid, p. 439. In this article the writer suggests that the glut in the oil market since 1981, provides the West with a golden opportunity to reassess its arms transfer policies and decouple the oil-arms connection.

85. Pierre, The Global, p. 42, and the final chapter. Similarly the conclusions of other studies such as Anne Hessing Cahn et.al, Controlling Future.

Chapter 8: Disarmament Forums as a Soviet Instrument

...This was a dilemma for Mr. [President] Carter. He couldn't make a credible speech to NATO on increasing U.S. arms in Europe and at the same time make a credible appeal at the United Nations for reducing arms...

James Reston, "The Absent Host," New York Times, May 24, 1978.

The United Nations is like a multi-party system in a legislature. And we're a country without a party. We have many good friends and no allies, no reliable allies at the United Nations.

The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs. Jean Kirkpatrick, "60 Minutes" CBS Network, Jan., 31, 1982.

The uncomfortable alliance between the super-powers on some disarmament issues at the United Nations is very limited in scope and does not affect their broader relationship which continues to be highly competitive. Both have adopted a "benign neglect" approach to Third World criticism as manifested, for instance, in the decisions of both Presidents Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev not to attend the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, despite earlier rumors.¹ However, because of the nature of United Nations conference diplomacy and the inherited vulnerability of the Western democracies in multilateral forums, the Soviet Union enjoys a major advantage over the United States at the United Nations' debates on disarmament.

The fact that there is an inherent asymmetry in United Nations debates between open and closed societies is quite understandable and widely recognized. It is so much taken for granted that virtually no attention is paid to some practical consequences of this disparity. Conference diplomacy provides the Soviets with several advantages over the United States and its allies.

United Nations forums offer the Soviets a setting in which they can demonstrate the monolithic unity of communist states in contrast to the disunity and lack of resolve or common purpose of the West. The closed nature of the Soviet Union also seems to contribute most heavily to the Soviet penchant for sweeping but meaningless disarmament proposals at international conferences (already in 1927, the Soviets were the first to introduce a proposal for "General and Complete Disarmament" to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference sponsored by the League of Nations).

The failure to understand the fundamental advantage of the Soviets over the West stems from the popular fallacy in the West concerning the weakness and malfunctioning of the Soviet system. It has become a ritual in the West to say that the Soviet system offers no ideological attraction and that its weak economic system is not viewed as a model by Third World leaders. This ostrich-like attitude fails to take into consideration the essence of the Soviet-Third World affinity which is often manifested in United Nations

forums. As Henry Kissinger has noted, Marxism has proved attractive to many Third World countries not because of its ideology but because it supplied an answer to the problem of political legitimacy and authority providing a justification and framework for centralizing political power.² Many of the developing countries, plagued by inherent instability and frequent upheavals, have been intrigued with the Soviet system which succeeded in building the Communist Party machinery in order to assert its absolute power and authority. Soviet aid to developing countries was never based on economic - technological - agricultural transfers, but instead on assistance in providing the necessary instruments of power (military might and training, police and intelligence etc.).

Ever since disarmament deliberations at the United Nations have become part and parcel of the NIEO struggle of the Third World, the Soviet-Third World coalition has re-emerged, reminiscent of the anti-colonialism days at the United Nations in the late 1950's and early 1960s. Veteran diplomats at the United Nations pointed out how conference diplomacy enables the

Soviet Union to perpetuate and even institutionalize "the fiction of Western - and especially American - responsibility for the lack of development, poverty and every other ill that besets the Third World."³ Though the Soviets belong, by almost every criterion to the "North", they have managed to disassociate themselves from the industrialized West in the North-South confrontation. This fiction, enhanced also by the guilt feelings in the West, had immediate effects in the disarmament field. As shown, the political climate at the United Nations dictates an overemphasis on the links between disarmament and development on the way of achieving the NIEO.

This is precisely where the Soviets could mobilize Third World support for their sweeping and grandiloquent proposals for disarmament. Their proposals offer, at least, an illusion of a realistic framework for channelling huge resources from disarmament to development purposes in the Third World. In this process the Soviets are assisted by their proxies within the non-aligned camp (Cuba - the chairman for 1979-1982,

Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Syria and others) which secure the support of the United Nations majority and at the same time block any pro-Western or anti-communist initiative which may arise in various forums. This leaves the Western group in a minority and in most cases their representatives make apologetic statements in order to explain their reservations to the grandiloquent approach to disarmament. As may be expected, Western arguments about the need for a gradual approach, realistic measures for 'confidence-building' and guarantees for compliance do not impress the non-democratic majority of the organisation. Similarly, the call for 'inspection' and 'verification' is rejected as a worn out cliché and is missing in most resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

In the United Nations the disparity between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO alliance is manifested on both fronts - the military and the diplomatic. As the French scholar Raymond Aron has pointed out, in the Soviet bloc, unlike in the Western alliance, the military policy toward the other camp is determined

in a sovereign way by the Soviet Union. There is no general staff of the Warsaw Pact equivalent to the NATO general staff. The Soviets possess not only the monopoly of the thermonuclear system but also the quasi-monopoly of immediately utilizable conventional weapons by its own troops stationed in Central Europe. Similarly diplomacy, says Aron, is determined by Moscow in almost as sovereign a way as strategy and as a result the representatives of the Eastern bloc states at the United Nations "faithfully follow the line laid down by the Moscow leaders."⁴ In sum, the juxtaposition of NIEO politics and the monolithic unity of the communist bloc provide the Soviet Union with an important advantage in disarmament debates at the United Nations.

Since debates in the United Nations are today closely related to the policy-making process of consolidating a consensus on strategic and military decisions within the Western alliance, the military and the diplomatic front are becoming inter-related. This chapter will examine three different manifestations

of this inter-relationship:

- a) President's Carter decision not to attend the SSOD.
- b) The decision to defer the production of the neutron weapon.
- c) The Soviet campaign at the United Nations against NATO's doctrines of nuclear deterrence.

Carter and the Abstractions of the United Nations:

Perhaps, more than any previous President, Jimmy Carter seemed dedicated to enhancing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. His idealistic statements on disarmament and the United Nations, epitomized in his address to the General Assembly in 1977,⁵ created wide expectations at the United Nations and outside. Several analysts, expressed the hope that with President Carter's commitment to arms reduction, and given his favorable views on the United Nations, the United States would join the non-aligned in a dialogue at the United Nations (particularly in the SSOD), and thereby would provide the type of leadership

capable of exploiting the opportunities for an effective US strategy at the United Nations.⁶ Indeed, Carter himself considered the conference as "an opportunity to dramatize the importance of arms control and to support the United Nations" in its disarmament efforts.⁷

Carter's pledges and statements were encouraging for those who were willing to grant the United Nations a new mandate in international efforts for disarmament. It seemed that the major blow to Carter's first elaborated and far-reaching disarmament proposal which was rejected out of hand by the Soviets on March 1977,⁸ even encouraged the Administration to concentrate on efforts at the United Nations. In his famous foreign policy Notre Dame speech on 22 on May 1977, the American President called for downgrading the East-West struggle and emphasized instead the "global questions" which cannot be dealt with by dictates of the powerful to 150 nations. Carter rejected the policies and legacy of "containment" toward the Soviets, saying that "we are now free of that inordinate fear of Communism." This fear is outdated, said Carter, since the Soviet threat had become less intensive, and instead

he offered "a new foreign policy" capable of responding to the new realities of the "awakening world."⁹

Underlying the new foreign policy of the American President was the idea that the East-West conflict between the superpowers was becoming obsolescent and that a new axis of conflict was being drawn between the North and the South. Carter's "new foreign policy" was a direct response to the growing demands of the United Nations majority. He called for a policy of constructive global involvement by working closely with the Third World to respond to the changes in the structure of world power. Carter and his close advisers, such as Secretary Vance, National Security Adviser Brzezinski and his ambassador to the United Nations were all pushing the theme of a "changing world," a new "pluralistic global order" under the "new historical circumstances."¹⁰ In the United Nations, Carter referred several times to the "global community" and confessed that the power of the United States is "increasingly only relative" and its leadership "increasingly is in need of being shared" since

"no nation has a monopoly of vision, of creativity or of ideas."¹¹ For those familiar with UN-Third World rhetoric, American statements amounted almost to endorsing in principle the Third World quest for a New International Order.

The fact that President Carter did not go to address the SSOD indicates that, despite his convictions, he did not view the time as propitious for a United Nations role in disarmament. Carter realized, at the very last minute, that a United Nations appearance might damage his political standing and, typically as in other instances, he had to temper "his ideals in the face of political realities."¹² Carter's decision not to go to the United Nations disappointed his United Nations' Ambassador Andrew Young¹³ and within the 'arms control circles' it indicated "the failure of the United States to play a leadership role" at the SSOD.¹⁴

More than this, Carter's decision demonstrated that he recognized the potential damaging

effects of his appearance at the United Nations on the cohesion of the Western alliance and the role of American leadership within it. The decision should be viewed against the background of the strained relations between the superpowers in the middle of 1978. Despite Carter's pronouncements on the decline of the East-West conflict, the air was dominated by reports on the continuing military build-up of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, Soviet-Cuban growing involvement in Africa, human rights violations in the Soviet Union (Anatoly Scharansky was expecting his trial on a charge of espionage for the C.I.A., a charge which President Carter denied), Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa, and the controversy over the neutron bomb. President Carter was planning then to argue at the NATO summit in Washington D.C., compellingly for a 3% annual increase in alliance spending. As the NATO meeting coincided with the SSOD in New York, Carter had to concentrate on convincing American allies to strengthen their defense forces instead of on preaching disarmament at the United Nations.¹⁵ Realizing how difficult it would be for him to appear at the United

Nations, President Carter sent his Vice President Walter Mondale to deliver the American statement to the SSOD in which he accused the Kremlin of "a continuing buildup of unprecedented proportions in Europe."¹⁶

It seems that President Carter had realized that the United Nations may have interfered in the decision-making process of the NATO alliance. This fear was not new. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union regards the United Nations as an important instrument for creating divisions between the United States and its Western allies. This chapter will examine two case studies in which the United Nations became an important component in the broader Soviet strategy of enhancing splits and differences between America and its allies. In 1978, as this chapter will show, the convening of the SSOD may have had direct effects on the considerations of the Carter Administration in its decision to defer the production of the neutron bomb. In 1981, the Soviets again coordinated their campaign against NATO on the nuclear doctrines of

the alliance in a clear attempt to exploit debates and resolutions of the United Nations to weaken the Western alliance. In both cases the campaign at the United Nations was part and parcel of Soviet strategy directed at the Western media and public opinion, particularly toward those circles in Europe which exerted political pressure on their government against cooperation with the United States in the nuclear field.

The Neutron Bomb Fiasco From a UN Perspective

In the vast amount of published material on the neutron bomb debate in 1978, little attention was paid to the United Nations' factor. Obviously the issue pertained to the framework of superpower relations, NATO vs. Warsaw Pact, and had ramifications in the debates within NATO and within the American Administration. Nevertheless, this bitter exchange which developed in the first half of 1978 threatened to dominate the East-West

confrontation at the SSOD. Even after Carter's decision to delay production of the nuclear bomb there were indications that the Soviets might decide to make it a major issue at the United Nations conference.¹⁷ Analysis of United Nations documents reveals that the East-West controversy was injected into the deliberations and working documents both in the CCD in Geneva and in the General Assembly discussions in New York, including United Nations resolutions. There is enough evidence to suggest that the SSOD factor played a role in the American decision to delay the production of the weapon.

Interestingly enough, the neutron bomb is not a bomb at all, but a small nuclear warhead designated for NATO missiles and artillery. Called also an enhanced radiation warhead (ERW), the weapon restricts blast and damage to a relatively small area and, therefore, its effect is directed at hostile manpower and not at urban areas. The ERW is viewed as an important weapon to nullify the three to one advantage in tanks held by the Warsaw Pact forces. Many in the

West believed that the neutron weapon is the only hope for stopping a Soviet massed-tank attack in Central Europe.¹⁸ For the same reasons, the Soviets interpreted the deployment of neutron weapons in Europe as a major challenge to the existing balance of forces in Europe. In what has been regarded as one of their greatest propaganda campaigns against the West, the Soviets attached special significance to the United Nations arena as a major instrument of political warfare, particularly in regard to the approaching United Nations session on disarmament.

The campaign in the disarmament forums was parallel to the world-wide Soviet public relations offensive. The issue was raised by the Soviets and their allies in all available forums: the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Preparatory Committee for the SSOD and the Geneva CCD. The issue was raised first in the General Assembly of 1977, later in the CCD in Geneva - at the beginning of 1978 and, at the same time, at the Preparatory Committee for the SSOD

which convened in New York.¹⁹ As the records of all these organs suggest, all representatives of the Communist bloc were mobilized to issue warnings and condemnations of the new "cruel and inhumane weapon." The Soviets made it clear that their major targets in the campaign were the Western European states, and together with their allies demonstrated that there is an "international movement of protest" against the ERW.²⁰ The Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic told the CCD that the weapon would constitute an open threat to the physical existence of his people.²¹ Simultaneously, the Soviets submitted a working paper on the subject to the Preparatory Committee,²⁹ and a six-point draft convention to ban neutron bombs to the 31 nations Geneva CCD.²³ The issue got also a special Marxist-ideological twist: it is a "capitalist, cannibalistic, barbaric weapon," the Soviet said, since it is designed to preserve property but not human lives.

The Soviets continued to fight at the United Nations even after the American decision on April 7,

1978, to defer the neutron development. With the help of their allies in the Third World,²⁴ they insisted upon including a long paragraph in the draft Final Document condemning the neutron weapon.²⁵ Only at the very end of the session, under the pressure of the emerging "general consensus" the Soviets agreed to drop their proposal. But the issue re-emerged again in the end of 1978, at the United Nations regular General Assembly when the two major alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, introduced again two different resolutions which reflected their irreconcilable views on the ERW.²⁶

Carter's Decision

Since there is no doubt that for the Soviets the United Nations and particularly the SSOD was instrumental in their attempt to reverse the American-NATO decision to go ahead with the neutron deployment, there is a need to review the impact of the United Nations conference on the American decision making.

This close scrutiny has special relevance since it seems that President Carter arrived at his final decision against the advice of all his top foreign policy advisers, and even, in what seems to be unusual for Jimmy Carter, against the opinion expressed in the editorials of most American leading newspapers, among them the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post.²⁷ It seems that because of this strong and widespread opposition, Carter had to back off from an earlier decision to cancel the program at all and instead announced a deferral in the production.

The chronology of events, together with a few other indicators, suggests that the UNSSOD interfered in Carter's consideration of the matter. After expressing the need for the ERW as a counter-measure to the Soviets' new SS-20 mobile missiles, President Carter moved to secure the commitment by NATO's European allies to deploy it on their territory.²⁸ All efforts within NATO were directed toward an agreed formula which would have allowed the United States to proceed

with the production of ERW. By mid-March 1978, the NATO Council prepared a draft compromise under which the Americans would decide on neutron-weapon production and announce the intention not to deploy it if the Russians would cut back on their new SS-20 mobile missiles. On March 22, NATO's military commander, General Alexander Haig, gave the neutron warhead a strong endorsement.²⁹

It is hard to zero in on what precisely brought about Carter's sudden change of heart, probably already during the weekend of March 18-19.³⁰ It is clear, however, that Carter reached his decision against the advice of all his top advisers and without consulting the allies. On March 27, the Americans abruptly called off discussions with their European allies designed to mobilize public support for the ERW.³¹ On April 4, the New York Times reported that President Carter "has decided against producing the controversial neutron bomb." According to the report, Carter's top advisers, including Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and

Defense Secretary Harold Brown, felt that such a decision "would cast doubt on American leadership within NATO and would also be seen as giving in to Soviet efforts at preventing deployment." There was no denial of the story by the White House. Allied governments in Europe reacted with alarm and uneasiness.³² There were strong reactions as well in the United States Congress and in the American media. It seems that in face of all this commotion, the President - who initially opted for cancellation of the neutron bomb - quickly shifted ground and announced his intention to defer a production decision.

On April 7, President Carter issued a statement announcing the decision "to defer production of weapons with enhanced radiation effects." The President added that the ultimate decision on the ERW "will be influenced by the degree to which the Soviet Union shows restraint in its conventional and nuclear arms programs and force deployments affecting the security of the United States and Western Europe."

Andrew Young, Carter's Ambassador to the United Nations, according to several reports, played a role in persuading the President against the production of the neutron weapons. He thought that it might damage the United States' position at the United Nations.³³ There are indications that already in February 1978, the idea of the United Nations SSOD interfered in the decision making process on the ERW. At that time, Leslie Gelb, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, together with NATO officials in Brussels were working on the compromise formula on the ERW production, while giving special consideration to the upcoming United Nations special meeting on disarmament.³⁴ But it seems that even this compromise was found by Carter as bearing potential damage at the United Nations. It was reported that President Carter sought NATO support on the ERW because he expected strong Soviet criticism of the neutron bomb in the upcoming United Nations SSOD. The President, said the Washington Post, did not want to stand alone in the United Nations among world leaders in favor of building neutron weapons.³⁵

Presumably what Andrew Young had in his mind was the reaction of his "constituency" at the United Nations where Carter was scheduled to appear a month later. The syndicated columnists Evans and Novak pointed out that Andrew Young was, in effect, the only high official in the Administration who has publicly expressed concern over the ERW. According to their report, Young was telling the President, "This is a terrible, terrible weapon. How can we go to the special UN session on disarmament with this on our hands?"³⁶ The shift in the American position was interpreted by columnists as further eroding Carter's leadership capabilities. His double-talk on the neutron bomb was seen as indication that his conscience could not face the United Nations SSOD while making decisions on the weapon system, showing that he lacked "the inner strength a President must have in this age of overkill weapons."³⁷ In Europe, the decision was seen as a surrender to Soviet pressure and as further weakening the confidence in the United States among NATO allies. The fact the Carter rejected the advice of his top advisers was regarded as ominous

by the editor of the West German weekly Die Zeit:

Is Jimmy Carter hearing voices from on high, as The Gurdian suggested? Or does Carter listen too much to Andrew Young, mistaking his U.N. ambassador's short-term tactical interests for the American long range national interest? where is the real Carter? 38

In sum, it would not be a far-fetched conclusion to argue that President Carter wanted to avoid a show-down on nuclear weapons at the United Nations special session on disarmament. With his "emotional quest" for a nuclear free world, he did not want to be a convenient target as responsible for the failure of the first post-World-War Two universal conference for disarmament. The editors of the Christian Science Monitor indicated that Carter was concerned with his image among world nations when he made his decision on the ERW. For President Carter, the production and deployment of the neutron bomb:

...would be a grave setback for nuclear disarmament to which he is committed. Indeed production would in effect be telling some 100 nations of the world there now is a nuclear weapon that is 'workable'. This would totally undercut the argument that other nations should not acquire atomic arms. 39

Again, it should be emphasized that when the decision on the neutron weapon was made by President Carter he probably still considered very seriously attending the SSOD and delivering there a strong statement on behalf of the United Nations and disarmament. As a matter of fact, even in late May 1978, after it was decided that Vice President Mondale would make the American address to the SSOD, there were still expectations that Carter would make an appearance before the end of the session, on June 28.⁴⁰ Moreover, three weeks after Mondale's statement speculations on a possible appearance of President Carter continued in United Nations' corridors. Perhaps, the President himself did not make up his mind as can be seen in the answer of his spokesman on June 14, 1978: "I don't know whether he is going to come or not" to the SSOD.⁴¹ Nevertheless for those American diplomats who expressed fears that the SSOD might develop into a quarrelsome U.S.-Soviet confrontation on the neutron bomb Carter's decision brought some relief. Getting ready for the Soviet propaganda offensive on the weapon, these diplomats could tell everybody "as far as we are concerned, we've dealt with this question...

and it's up to the Soviets to show some comparable measure of restraint on their side."⁴² This logic of reciprocity might be applicable for political campaigns within a democratic political system; it does not work at the United Nations.

There is no evidence that Carter's decision on the ERW improved the credibility of his disarmament commitments in the eyes of the delegates attending the SSOD. This could not compensate for their disappointment for Carter's failure to appear at the session. There is a lot evidence, however, that the decision on the ERW damaged Carter's and American credibility in Europe as well as in the United States. In the United States editorials appeared entitled

"The Mishandled Bomb" or "Red Propaganda Victory."⁴³ In effect, Carter's decision did not get the endorsement of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in their meeting on April 19, 1978.⁴⁴ According to Newsweek the decision damaged relations within NATO, and U.S.-West Germany relations plunged to their lowest point in the post-war era.⁴⁵ The High Command in NATO regarded it as "one of the greatest psychological

victories over the West ever achieved by the Soviet Government."⁴⁶ The lesson would not be forgotten in Europe where it would be remembered that while allied governments reared themselves to "sell" the ERW to their people, Carter's unexpected shift had pulled the rug out from under them.⁴⁷

For the Soviet Union it was a major lesson for future campaigns in the United Nations. For a while, after Carter's decision, they continued to make statements on the issue but did not introduce a draft resolution dedicated exclusively to the neutron bomb. Instead the ERW was injected in a Soviet-sponsored resolutions (every year from 1978 on) on the "prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction." The debates and votes on the resolutions reflected the NATO-Warsaw Pact division, with the Soviets winning all the votes of the Third World for their cause.⁴⁸

Among American allies in Europe, Carter's decision was considered "a decision against

the bomb." It affected immediately France which announced on June 11, 1978, (during the SSOD) that it is considering the development of the neutron bomb as a measure which "will reinforce deterrence."⁴⁹ In two years, President Valery Giscard d'Estaing announced the development and the successful test of a prototype of a neutron bomb warhead.⁵⁰ These developments did not spur a major reaction by the Soviets, and did not affect their posture on the issue in the United Nations which was still directed against the United States. Perhaps, for tactical reasons the Soviets felt that a campaign against France would dilute their apparent ultimate objective to drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies. Only in 1981, after the Reagan Administration expressed its intention to proceed with the production of ERW did the Soviet launch a new initiative in the United Nations on the neutron weapon.

The thirty-sixth General Assembly (1981) was the first ever to adopt a resolution dedicated specifically to the neutron bomb. The resolution (Res. 36/92-K)

entitled "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon" was passed by a majority of 68 to 14, with 57 abstentions. Although the large number of abstentions demonstrates the reluctance of many Third World nations to single out for condemnation one type of weapon for Soviet's propagandistic purposes, nevertheless the Soviet won a major diplomatic and psychological victory by creating a major split within the NATO alliance. Five member-states of NATO: Denmark, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands and Norway did not join the rest of NATO who together with Australia, New-Zealand, Japan and Israel voted against the resolution. Other Western countries abstaining were: Austria, Sweden, Ireland and Spain. The text of the resolution referred to the "world wide concern on the production and intended deployment of nuclear neutron weapons" and condemned its "inhumane effects" (which weapon is humane?) and for the grave threat it constitutes to an "unprotected civilian population."

European domestic politics, and NATO problems with the European "peace movement" were reflected

in both the explanations of the vote by the Netherlands and Denmark - members of the Western alliance - which referred to their governments' decision not to deploy ERWs on their territory. Somewhat strange and self contradictory, but understandable under the circumstances, was the explanation by the representative of Denmark which called the Soviet draft "an undisguised attempt to split the Western allies on a very important area of defence policy."⁵¹ The fact is that the Danish abstention was in itself a testimony to the disarray within NATO ranks at the United Nations. In this juxtaposition of a vote and a statement the Danish representative vindicated the Soviet use of United Nations organs of disarmament to expose and enhance differences within the Western camp.

Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons

As in the case of the neutron bomb issue, the subject of non-use of nuclear weapons in its various manifestations strikes at the heart of the deterrence relationship between the superpowers. In recent years, debates at the United Nations have sharpened

the differences between the superpowers on the matter, in what has amounted to a Soviet campaign to win not only the hearts of Third World delegates but particularly to encourage disarray and divisions within the Western group. In 1981, the campaign culminated with the introduction of a new Soviet initiative proposing that the United Nations should "authoritatively and resolutely declare the first use of nuclear weapons to be the gravest crime against humanity." It was the first time that the Soviets singled out for prohibition the first-use of nuclear weapons.

Ever since the beginning of nuclear disarmament deliberations the idea of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons was always under consideration at the United Nations, both as part of general disarmament plans and as a collateral measure. Since the first official proposal was made by the Soviet Union at the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946 (the Soviet reaction to the Baruch Plan - see chapter 3) the issue was periodically at the center of East-West maneuverings in the disarmament deliberations at the

United Nations. However these maneuvers took different forms with some interesting twists.

A historical survey of the issue of non-use of nuclear weapons can be summarized with the following highlights:

- The origins can be found in the early days of the East-West struggle, and the Soviet call to "ban the bomb" (1946).

- Later it became a non-aligned declaration which was supported by the Soviets. In 1961, the General Assembly adopted what came to be known as the Ethiopian resolution (Res. 1653 XVI) which declared the use of nuclear weapons as a violation of the United Nations charter and as contrary to the laws of humanity and as a crime against mankind and civilization." The declaration was opposed by the United States and its allies on the grounds that its aim could only be achieved by complete and controlled disarmament and that it sanctioned, by implication, other means of warfare. They further maintained that the right of individual and collective self-defense, includes the right to determine the

degree of force necessary to repel aggression which cannot be abrogated.⁵²

- After more than a decade of dormancy⁵³ the Soviets revived the issue with a new emphasis (1972) by linking the question of the use of nuclear weapons with the provisions on the non-use of force - found in the United Nations Charter.

- The Western counter-proposal in this context was probably the United States initiative to cut-off fissile material production for military purposes (since 1957). But besides temporary unilateral reduction in the production of fissionable material by the two superpowers no agreement could be reached. The pattern of disagreements was repeated when the Soviets opposed the inspection plan in the Western proposal contending that it amounts to control without disarmament. Similarly the Soviets rejected IAEA safeguards for this matter, by stressing the importance of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles.⁵⁴

- After another period of dormancy, the 1961 declaration was revived by the non-aligned (by an initiative of India) and raised first at the SSOD and adopted later at the 1978's regular General Assembly as Res. 33/71-B on the "non use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war." The resolution reiterated the principles of the declaration of 1961 saying that "the use of nuclear weapons will be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity." Here, the Soviet Union and its socialist satellites, in a major departure from their vote on the Ethiopian resolution 17 years earlier, abstained. As is discussed further below, the Soviets explained that the resolution was artificially divorced from the question of security guarantees and the non-use of force.⁵⁵ Since 1978, there has been an annual resolution on the matter submitted by India and other non-aligned countries.

- Since 1978 the Soviets have submitted every year another proposal on "the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present." The resolution is opposed by the

United States and its allies since it infringes upon intra-alliance relations.⁵⁶

What brought the Soviets to abstain in 1978, in contrast to their past records, on the non-aligned proposal on the non-use of nuclear weapons?

There is no doubt that in 1978, the Soviet Union still shared with the Americans a two-fold common interest: to enhance the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to work out another agreement on limiting strategic weapons (SALT II). The super-powers' common interest was underscored particularly in the SSOD in their united front against the Third World on these two issues (see chapter 5). In the field of the non-use of nuclear weapons the United States and its allies had a consistent position which always opposed comprehensive pledges of non-use or no-first-use of Nuclear Weapons. The change was really on the part of the Soviets and it was indicated for the first time in 1975 at the First Review Conference of the NPT.

From the beginning of the NPT negotiations the issue of security guarantees to the NNWS has divided the superpowers from the NNWS. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union ever formally incorporated in their draft treaties for the NPT provisions for any type of security guarantee, except for a general commitment to respect the principle of denuclearized zones. However, when the superpowers recognized the need to give the non-aligned NNWS some incentives to forgo their nuclear weapon option, they began to propose different type of assurances which were "consistent with their long-standing differences concerning constraints on the use of nuclear weapons."⁵⁷ The USA and the West always announced positive security guarantees against threats of nuclear blackmail directed at the NNWS. The Eastern states, consistently supported negative security guarantees, in what became known at the time as the "Kosygin Proposal."

Soviet Premier Kosygin introduced the proposal in a message to the ENDC on February 1966, suggesting a conditional negative security guarantee of no use,

no threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWS which are parties to the NPT and had no nuclear weapons on their territory. The West criticized the Kosygin Proposal as "unenforceable, unverifiable, disruptive of the current state of mutual deterrence."⁵⁸ By 1967, it became apparent that the NWS were unable to arrive at a compromise with the NNWS on security guarantees, and in their draft treaties they omitted these provisions. Instead, the three NWS (the USA, the USSR, the U.K.) submitted a Tripartite Assurances in which they undertook to assist NNWS against nuclear threat (adopted as Security Council Resolution 255).

In 1975, the sincerity of the Soviet intentions on their Kosygin Proposal was put to a test. At the review conference a group of NNWS (led by Romania) proposed a draft protocol to the NPT which would provide for an undertaking by the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use, and to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons against NNWS. The Soviet Union dismissed this proposal, criticizing it as imposing obligations on only a few NWS which are parties to the NPT.⁵⁹

As William Epstein pointed out, the Soviet position was astonishing considering its constant support for these pledges. In fact, it appeared that the Soviets "have abandoned the Kosygin Formula" which called precisely for these undertakings.⁶⁰ For a while, therefore, the Soviet Union preferred to maintain a position compatible with the United States on an issue which is central to mutual nuclear deterrence.

The shift in 1981

For three years (1978-1980) the Soviets did not support the non-aligned resolution on the non-use of nuclear weapons which was adopted by the 33rd, 34th and 35th General Assemblies. Every year the Soviets explained their abstention by saying that the non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war should be addressed first and foremost through a cessation of the nuclear arms race, by international guarantees, and by strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The Soviets reiterated every year

their regret that the draft resolution was "artificially divorced" from the questions of security guarantees and the renunciation by states of the use of force in international relations.⁶¹ In 1981, however, there was a shift in Soviet policy and together with their allies they supported what was basically the same text to which they objected during the previous years. The Western allies, of course, continued to oppose the resolution.⁶²

The shift in the Soviet position should be understood against the background of the new "peace offensive" which the Soviets were directing at that time toward public opinion in Western Europe. This "peace offensive" was building in 1981 to a crescendo with the ultimate goal being "to drive a wedge between the United States and its Western European allies."⁶³ Since summer 1981, a wave of nuclear isolationism has swept across Europe, and anti-nuclear/anti-American demonstrations in various capitals of Western Europe drew huge crowds. The Soviet Union had con-

concentrated its efforts both in Europe and in the United Nations with the aim being to prevent NATO from implementing its December 1979 decision to deploy the medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe.

From the beginning, the NATO decision on the TNF "was highly vulnerable to Soviet exploitation."⁶⁴ Ironically the issue was raised first by the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt as the Soviets were beginning to deploy their new mobile, medium-range SS-20s, with three warheads each, targeted on Europe (in March, 1982, they had some 300 in place). As Stanley Hoffmann points out, Soviet advances and advantages in TNF undermine the credibility of American deterrence, making a Soviet conventional thrust in Europe possible, which leaves NATO with the "unholy dilemma of either fighting a defensive conventional battle or else taking a nuclear initiative that would expose NATO's conventional and nuclear targets."⁶⁵ It is generally agreed among experts that the overall strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled with Soviet ability to strike military targets in Western Europe sharpened

the controversy in the West over reliance on the first use of nuclear weapons and, as result, provoked the wave of "quasi-pacifism" in Europe.⁶⁶

On the diplomatic front, the Soviets decided to strike directly at the issues which are at the very heart of the NATO alliance: the doctrines of 'limited war' and 'partial' use of nuclear weapons and the option of 'first use' of nuclear weapons. These concepts were not new in the American-NATO parlance of nuclear deterrence and were always, with a certain element of deliberate ambiguity, part and parcel of the broader 'flexible response' approach aimed at maintaining nuclear deterrence and stability. As soon as the United States' nuclear monopoly was broken and the Soviet Union acquired a significant nuclear arsenal and the capacity to retaliate against targets in the United States very real doubts were voiced about the credibility of a massive nuclear response. Inevitably, when Soviet nuclear power began to challenge American invulnerability to a retaliatory strike, further questions were raised about the credibility of the United States' nuclear guarantees to Western Europe. Would the United

States retaliate with a massive nuclear force even for a relatively minor Soviet aggression in Europe? The fear in Europe was that unless the concept of massive retaliation could be supplemented by some new policy, the Western alliance could fall victim to Soviet "salami" tactics - a series of hostile acts which, considered individually, were not sufficiently serious to justify massive retaliation. Gradually the European allies have developed ambivalent attitudes on the subject: sometimes they fear that the United States would be unwilling to defend them with nuclear weapons while at other times their fear is that Europe would become a theater for nuclear exchanges, simply because the United States would be willing to take the risk.⁶⁷

This inherent ambivalence was reflected in the NATO decision on TNF in 1979, which took a "two-track" approach: linking the deployment of some 72 Pershing IIs and cruise missiles (which could hit the USSR) starting in 1983, with first negotiating with the Soviets to try to limit their SS-20s. William G. Hyland explains that the weak political underpinnings of the

decision allowed a classic Soviet campaign against it. The Germans, with their own political problems, gave, in effect, a veto to Belgium and the Netherlands - two nations beset with internal political problems. The Soviet diplomatic campaign in Europe paid off in "generating major political pressures in Europe against any new nuclear deployments, feeding pacifist and neutralist sentiment, especially in Germany and the low countries."⁶⁸ It was a reflection of the mood at that time that when President Reagan made some rather "unexceptionable comments on nuclear warfare" referring to the possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe, his statement was immediately "blown up into a major issue in Europe and exploited to the fullest extent by Leonid Brezhnev."⁶⁹

Notwithstanding these popular neutralist trends, the official position among European allies and particularly in West Germany remained committed to NATO and in some instances has even become less ambivalent in 1982. When the basic concepts and doctrines of the alliance are challenged it seems that European capitals are suddenly shaken. Such a reaction became apparent when four former American officials expressed,

in a well-publicized article published in April 1982, their opinion that the United States and NATO should consider adopting a no-first-use policy. The idea was immediately rejected by West German officials (from the ruling Social Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party, as well as from the Christian Democratic opposition).⁷⁰ These German officials, including Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Gensher, said that such a policy is likely to diminish deterrence and would make a conventional war in Europe conceivable and even more likely. Similarly, the German Chancellor rejected the idea of a nuclear freeze by the two superpowers,⁷¹ and spokesmen for both the governing and opposition parties dismissed the proposal by an international commission (with representatives from West, East and the Third World) to create a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Europe.⁷² But the most impressive and comprehensive rebuttal to these ideas came from four distinguished West Germans, representing different parties and of different backgrounds, in an article published in Foreign Affairs in the summer 1982 issue. The four rejected outright the proposal of the four Americans, claiming that renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons will destroy the confidence of Europeans in NATO and will make war more probable.⁷³

The Soviets were interested apparently in the opposite results - to foster the ambivalence and

confusion in the alliance nuclear policies and to encourage public opinion opposition to NATO nuclear doctrines. In this context, the Soviets could turn again to the United Nations and focus their campaign in disarmament forums and initiated an unprecedented wave of anti-American resolutions (see table 7). In 1980 for the first time, the Soviets injected in a United Nations resolution a reference which was directed against the doctrine of limited and selected use of nuclear weapons. This time the Soviets were cautious, inserting the paragraph in the preamble (which is less significant than an operative paragraph of a resolution):

Noting with alarm the increased risk of a nuclear catastrophe associated both with the intensification of the nuclear arms race and with the adoption of the new doctrine of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons giving rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict. ⁷⁴

The resolution was adopted by a majority of 118 to 18 (Western allies) and 7 abstentions, and a similar text was adopted in 1981.

At the end of 1981, the campaign against NATO was raised to a new level

with the Soviet introduction, for the first time, of a new initiative proposing that the United Nations should "authoritatively and resolutely declare the first use of nuclear weapons to be the gravest crime against humanity." On September 22, 1981, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei A. Gromyko in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations, submitted the text of this declaration under the title "Prevention of nuclear catastrophe - declaration of the General Assembly."⁷⁵ The Soviet attack on NATO on both the doctrines of "first use" and 'limited war' was conducted with the full awareness, on the Soviet part, that the two concepts are integral parts of the same deterrence strategy of the Western alliance. The senior Soviet representative to the CD and the First Committee underscored this awareness when he referred to the SIPRI Yearbook of 1981 which noted that currently the military and technological requirements for carrying out a limited nuclear war are practically identical to those which would have to be met in order to deliver a pre-emptive first strike.⁷⁶

The Disarmament-Security Link

The Soviet draft did not conceal its propagandistic intentions and declared bluntly that "states and statesmen that resort first to the use of nuclear weapons will be committing the gravest crime against humanity" and issued a solemn warning that "there will never be any justification or pardon for statesmen" making this decision. This was rightly perceived by several Western countries as a direct Soviet ploy against the NATO doctrine of deterrence. Obviously, a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, a matter on which the Soviets were conspicuously ambiguous till 1981, would weaken the doctrine of "extended deterrence" which provides for an American nuclear umbrella that covers Western Europe. For that doctrine to remain credible, the United States must retain the option of first using nuclear weapons against an attack on Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact's numerically superior conventional forces. Several Western allies rejected this Soviet initiative and told the First Committee that it was a ploy against NATO and a hypocritical proposal which is inconsistent with what official Soviet military

spokesmen say about the option of a first strike.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, in elaborating on the disparity in conventional forces in Europe between East and West was quite frank about the role of nuclear deterrence in NATO doctrine:

Adoption of the nuclear non-first-use obligation would eliminate the deterrent effect of the NATO defence system in that region and the vast conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact would come fully into play... Now, if the Soviet Union could proceed without the uncertainty as to how - that is by what military means - Western European countries would organize an adequate defence if by consequences there would be a mere confrontation of conventional arms, Western Europe would be in a position of helpless military inferiority...77

In addition to their remarks on the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the balance of forces in Europe, Western allies provided also their interpretations of the United Nations Charter's provisions on collective security, sovereignty and self-defense. Western spokesmen commented that the sovereign rights of self-defense, enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter, do not distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear

weapons.⁷⁸ Arguments on the link between sovereignty, disarmament and security which were used by the Soviets against the Baruch Plan (see chapter 2) were now presented by NATO allies, as to underscore the changing times. Again, what was highlighted in the debate was the intimate link between disarmament measures and world order. Said the French representative Ambassador de La Gorce:

The condemnation of first use and the commitment it seeks to impose is tantamount to guaranteeing a possible aggressor - even if he himself possesses nuclear weapons - against defensive recourse to such weapons. Thus, a State which violates the undertaking not to use force stipulated by the Charter would be the beneficiary of the non-first-use commitment to the detriment of the victim of its aggression, whereas the latter would have imposed on it a fundamental limitation on the exercise of its right to self-defence...
...bearing in mind the geographical and strategic facts that are well known, one cannot without serious risk for stability, security and finally peace deprive of its deterrent effect, through a commitment not to be the first to use it, the nuclear component of the overall balance existing in a region of the world.

The French Ambassador provided also the conceptual framework for his country's approach to the links between disarmament, international security and world order. For this purpose he quoted his President

Francois Mitterrand who said:

The armament-negotiation debate must turn around this fundamental notion: only the balance of forces maintains peace. That is why I have alerted world public opinion to Soviet over-armament in Europe. 79

These words of Francois Mitterrand had a familiar ring which goes way back to the League of Nations' days. Again it was the "French thesis" which lies implicit in the Charter tying together national disarmament with a world order which guarantees the balance of forces and international military sanctions to safeguard peace.

The United Nations as a Propaganda Outlet

The diplomatic struggle over the 'no first use' initiative at the United Nations was part and parcel of a world-wide propaganda contest between the United States and the Soviet Union. A large part of the struggle was played to Western European galleries. In this respect United Nations' forums on disarmament are an important stage for the propaganda warfare that tests the NATO alliance and the cohesion of the free world. This is not a trivial function, precisely because of

the Soviet a priori advantage in this confrontation. The Soviets do not have to be worried about voters or demonstrators at home or among their satellites against their disarmament policies. In contrast, the democracies of the West can only undertake policies that are broadly supported by their populations and accepted by consensus in the alliance. When President Reagan introduced his "zero option" proposal, which offered to forego plans to deploy new American missiles in western Europe if the Soviet Union would dismantle the ones it has targeted at the area, he was aware of the disparity between East and West in the field of propaganda. It was the first major foreign policy speech by President Reagan, which as reported was being made public in advance and was delivered in the morning, American time, in order to be broadcast in the evening in Europe. The Reagan team, in calculating the situation realized that the United States "has no bargaining position as long as Moscow believes that western Europe might not accept the prospective deployment of the new American Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles."⁸⁰ It was clear that the Russians will not have real

incentives to trade real missiles for planned NATO missiles until they are convinced that the allies have political support for deploying them. The Kremlin will not balance power with an America whose influence in Europe can still be eroded.

A major clue to the intimate link between military doctrine and political propaganda was provided by the Soviets in late 1981, when they issued in Moscow their 74-page booklet entitled "The Threat to Europe." The booklet, written in the form of questions and answers and issued by the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, was published in several European languages. Unlike the American publication, issued by the Pentagon two months earlier on "Soviet Military Power," the Soviet booklet dealt less with inventory of weapons and concentrated rather upon re-defining for the Western public Soviet strategy and particularly its nuclear doctrine. The document, defined by observers as the most elaborate defense of Soviet military doctrine since the 1960s, represented "a fundamental recasting of basic Soviet strategic doctrine as it has been portrayed to the outside world."

while portraying the United States as the threat to peace in Europe and the world, the Soviet pamphlet produced what is regarded as its "most ambitious effort to distance itself from the doctrines on the "winability" of nuclear war set out in the early 1960s" by Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky and other prominent Soviet military leaders.⁸¹

Thus, the Soviet offensive in the United Nations on banning the 'first use' of nuclear weapons was a major component in a broader Soviet strategy to undermine Western support and consensus on matters which are direct corollaries of military doctrines, such as the deployment of TNP in Europe. In the Soviet booklet, of which more than half was devoted to the controversy surrounding the SS-20s, the Kremlin offered a new version of nuclear doctrine which explicitly disavows all doctrinal formulations of the 1960s. In what can be regarded as twists in logic, the publication explained on the one hand that "Soviet military strategy is neither immutable nor everlasting" but "changes with the changing world" (in the context of

rejecting charges based on Soviet theoretical works of the early 1960's which justified nuclear offensive, action and initiative), while, on the other hand, it says that "Soviet military doctrine is of a purely defensive nature" and quotes the declaration of the Warsaw Treaty states from May 15, 1980 "We never had and never will have any strategic doctrine other than a defensive one." The Soviets dismissed their own military publications of the 1960's as theories "devoted not to doctrine or military policy but to particular aspects of combat, such as tactics in the battle field." Without further elaborating on the distinction between "tactics in the battle field" and "military doctrines," the Soviets found it fit to refer unequivocally to American pronouncements and concepts; such as United States Presidential Directive 59, of July 25, 1980, and the 'flexible response approach' as doctrines and strategies.

Immediately after the adoption by the General Assembly of the Soviet-sponsored Declaration against "first-use" of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Ambassador

Oleg A. Troyanovsky expressed his country's gratitude for the majority support for the Soviet initiative. Ambassador Troynavosky viewed the adoption of the Declaration as "a timely warning to those that support" the build-up of nuclear arsenals and "promote the senseless doctrine of a nuclear first strike, the doctrine of the possibility and the acceptability of a limited nuclear war." Expressing satisfaction over the "mass movement against the threat of nuclear war" in the socialist countries and the broad-based support for it in non-aligned countries, Ambassador Troyanovsky noted that recently the movement has "encompassed Western Europe" and began to develop in the United States.⁸² Other Soviet statements in the United Nations were clearly designed to drive a wedge into the Western alliance blaming the United States for using the European continent for its anti-Soviet ambitions.⁸³ These Soviet motives were stated bluntly in their official pamphlet which blamed the United States for using Western Europe "in the role of a lightning rod" that "would absorb" any "counter-strike by the Soviet Union" in event of an American

attack on the Soviet Union. The looming threat, the Soviets argued, is:

a downright betrayal of West Europeans, for in that case the Americans want to survive at the price of European lives. Europeans would be their nuclear hostages. 84

In January 1982, the Soviets took a further step in their campaign against the NATO doctrine of deterrence and published another document for popular audiences entitled, "Whence the Threat to Peace?" Aimed again at

Western European leaders (published in six languages), the centerpiece of this 78-page booklet is that the Americans are recklessly set on achieving first-strike nuclear capability. The leitmotifs were repetitions of Soviet speeches and proposals in the United Nations illustrating the "defensive" character of the Soviet doctrine. Reiterating an argument presented by Ambassador Issraelyan, the publication contended that the notion of a limited nuclear exchange is "no more than a variant of the first-strike concept." 85

How the Soviets Win

The psychological-diplomatic pressure is understandable since the West in the United Nations is a minority of more or less 20 countries out of 157 member states. The non-aligned total 92 and together with other Third World countries they comprise a bloc of 117 (the so-called Group of 77 of developing countries - see chapter 4). The Soviets with their 10 communist votes are most often with the majority of these 120 Third World nations against the West European and other states who are always vacillating between opposition and abstention to the majority initiatives.

Western subgrouping makes the situation even worse. As the American Ambassador to the United Nations testified, it is hard today for the United States to rely upon its allies since they have developed a habit of voting together on almost all issues as members of a European bloc of the '10'. Their positions, Mrs. Kirkpartrick said, usually represent the easiest possible 'consensus' and are "often different from the United States position."⁸⁶

When it comes to disarmament the situation is even more complicated. Among the European '10,' there is Ireland, which is not a member of NATO, and proud of its neutral and pro-disarmament position. Another member of the '10' and NATO is Greece, which, under the new Socialist Government of Papandreu, has already deserted the alliance's ranks in many votes on East-West questions on disarmament during the United Nations' 36th General Assembly of 1981. Other members of NATO, such as Norway, Denmark and Iceland, belong to the "Nordic" group of the Scandinavians which often functions as a group on disarmament matters (non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon-free-zones etc.) and therefore are exposed to the influence of Sweden and Finland. Sweden is a member of the Group of 21 of the non-aligned countries in the Committee of Disarmament in Geneva. Sometimes it is amazing to see how Sweden, which belongs to the industrialized West and maintains strong armed forces and has an advanced and diversified military industry and is an active exporter of arms, succeeds in maintaining its positive image in the disarmament field. Little need be said about Finland's

ability to counter major Soviet initiatives against NATO and the United States.

In 1981, the Soviet 'peace offensive' was building to a crescendo, reaching a record of 14 initiatives, most of which were directed against NATO defense strategies. The proposals dealt with virtually every security aspect of the American-Soviet rivalry ranging from a resolution criticizing the arms race in outer space (directed against the American space-shuttle program) through resolutions aiming to undermine NATO military preparedness in chemical warfare and the stationing of nuclear weapons, to proposals of sheer propaganda such as "Obligation of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations." All these proposals were introduced by members of the Soviet bloc and after debates and votes in the First Committee were adopted by the majority in the General Assembly (see table 7).

In sum, the Soviets enjoy a comfortable advantage in the propaganda warfare at the United Nations, since

Table 7
Soviet Sponsored Resolution on Disarmament

in the Thirty-Sixth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations

(September-December 1981)

Res. no.	Title	Sponsors	Highlights	Propagandistic objectives	Votes
14/89	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	Soviet bloc + allies.	Calls upon the great powers to declare their refusal "to create new types of weapons of mass destruction" etc.	Directed against NATO (research and development) of new weapon systems, in particular the neutron weapon. With the traditional Soviet catch: nothing on inspection and verification.	For - 114 Against - 0 Abstentions - 27 (West)
16/91	World Disarmament Conference	Poland and others (Peru, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname)	An annual resolution (since 1971) calling for a world disarmament conference.	An old Soviet idea, watered down to a sticky-sucky text to allow adoption by consensus.	adopted without a vote.
16/92-D	International cooperation for disarmament	Soviet bloc + allies (Cuba, Syria, Jordan, Ethiopia etc.)	Calls upon States not to hamper disarmament negotiations and, "in particular, not to hinder possible progress in negotiations on disarmament by the discussion of unrelated issues."	Allusion to the "linkage" concept of arms control which implies a broader perspective of the political relations between the parties to the negotiations.	For - 116 Against - 0 Abstentions - 26 (West)
16/92-E	Nuclear weapons in all aspects	Soviet bloc + allies	Criticism and expression of alarm on the "adoption of the new doctrine of limited or partial use of nuclear weapons giving rise to illusions of the admissibility and acceptability of a nuclear conflict; Calls for negotiations in the CD on nuclear disarmament."	Against United States' official declaration of nuclear strategy, and its "extended deterrence" in Europe.	For - 110 Against - 10 (Western allies) Abstentions - 5 (Greece)
16/92-H	Status of multilateral disarmament agreements	Bulgaria	Updating the status of disarmament agreements.	Book-keeping. Directed also against countries such as China and France which are not parties to some major multilateral arms control treaties.	For - 115 (Japan, Ireland, Greece) Against - 0 Abstentions - 27 (West and few Third World countries: Argentina, Brazil, India)
16/92-J	World-wide action for collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament	Bulgaria, Mongolia.	This action "would be an important manifestation of the will of the world public..."	How can one compare the collecting of signatures in Moscow and Prague with the disarmament movements in the West?	For - 78 Against - 5 (Brazil, Canada, United States) Abstentions - 16 (West, Third World)
	Obligation of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations	German Democratic Republic, Mongolia.	calls for expanding negotiations.	Sheer propaganda.	This draft resolution was dropped by its sponsors.

they need not worry about voters or demonstrators at home or among their satellites. They do not have to persuade their own public of the wisdom and sincerity of their statements and initiatives on disarmament. Nor do the Soviets have to worry about consistency in United Nations positions and military doctrines driving actual defense policies. It is true that a few Third World countries expressed dissatisfaction that the Soviet-sponsored resolution (36/100) was limited to the first use of nuclear weapon and, thus, side-tracked the effort for a "complete elimination and prevention of the use of nuclear weapons." The fear was expressed that the limited nature of the Soviet initiative implies acceptance of a nuclear second strike.⁸⁷

But the Soviets are not worried about discrepancies or inconsistencies in their statements on nuclear deterrence. As the case of the non-use of nuclear weapons demonstrates, the Soviets can easily change and manipulate their position on disarmament matters at the United Nations when it helps politically. For that

purpose they are ready even to recast their announced strategic doctrines and to distance themselves from their actual deterrence relations with the other superpower .

In contrast, the democracies of the West can only undertake policies that are broadly supported by populations, and accepted by consensus in the alliance - which became a difficult task to achieve. It would be inconceivable for the West to make modifications in its declarations on nuclear deterrence for the purpose of United Nations' debates. Western proposals and votes in the United Nations have to be accountable given the permanent scrutiny of their attentive publics. In the East-West confrontation over disarmament at the United Nations, the popular peace movement in Europe, though invisible, became a third party and its passive role has been significant. It prevents the West from professing more unity and assertiveness in the diplomatic-propagandistic struggles on critical issues of security. The Carter experience in this field has demonstrated

that even an Administration which favored the United Nations and attached to it a major significance as an important instrument of foreign policy found itself in a no win situation when it planned to take seriously United Nations disarmament deliberations.

United Nations forums on disarmament are, thus, instrumental for the Soviet Union not only for enhancing and strengthening the split within the Western alliance but also in providing the Third World majority in the organization with an exaggerated view of Western weakness and disarray against Soviet might and cohesion.

Chapter 8: Footnotes

1. New York Times, March 23, 1978.
2. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1979), p. 69.
3. Arie Eilan, "Conference Diplomacy," The Washington Quarterly, Autumn, 1981.
4. Raymond Aron, Peace and War - A Theory of International Relations (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), p. 218.
5. GAOR, A/32/PV.18, 4 October, 1977.
6. On the expectations on the eve of the SSOD see:
 - a) Abraham Barzman, "Nuclear Arms Control: A New US Strategy at the United Nations, in Finger & Herbert (eds.), U.S. Policy in International Institutions, pp. 28-29.
 - b) _____, "Nuclear Diplomacy," in David Kay(ed.), The Changing United Nations - Options for the United States (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1977), pp. 159-169.
 - c) Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Harlan Cleveland, "A Strategy for the United States," International Security Vol 2(4), Spring, 1978, pp. 32-55.
 - d) Series of articles on the SSOD in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April, 1978.
 - e) Ann Hallan Lakhdar, "The UN Special Session: An Evaluation" in William H. Kincade and Jeffrey D. Porro (eds.), Negotiating Security (New York: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), pp. 245-251.

f) Michael J. Sullivan II, "The Outlook for the UN Special Session on Disarmament," in Ibid, pp. 273-245.

7. James Reston, "The Absent Host," New York Times, May 24, 1978.

Reston added: "Mr. Carter personally wanted to go to the UN to argue for the principles of disarmament, which were central to his campaign for the Presidency."

Reston continued and elaborated on Carter's dilemma:

there is a lot of talk here in the delegates' lounge about "the absent host." Why did the President, who has talked so much about disarmament and about the United Nations as the hope of a better political and moral order in the world, decide to stay away from a meeting he urged other world leaders to attend?

...This is one more illustration of Mr. Carter's yearning for peace, compromise, and disarmament; and the political Carter, knowing he cannot achieve his goals without compromise, proclaiming ideals and backing away when opposed. His decision in this case was not to get too far out in front with the abstractions of the United Nations, but to hold back and deal with the realities of the Senate and the Soviets.

8. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance went to Moscow with a proposal providing a 25 per cent reduction in the Vladivostock ceilings and tight restrictions on the development of new missiles. After the Soviet rejection, the parties had to return to the Vladivostock formula as the basis for SALT II which, consequently, imposed only marginal constraints on arms modernization.

9. Washington Post, May 23, 1977.

10. a) Zbigniew Brzezinski, "SALT II and National Security," remarks at the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, New York Hilton Hotel, May 1, 1979, (The White House Press Release).

b) Cyrus R. Vance, "Meeting the Challenges of a Changing World," speech by the Secretary of State before the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, Illionis, May, 1979, State Department No. 116.

c) On Andrew Young see: Carl Gershman, "The World According to Andrew Young", Commentary, August, 1978.

11. GAOR, A/32/PV. 18, 4 October, 1977.

12. Christian Science Monitor, editorial May 26, 1978. Even after Carter sent Vice President Walter Mondale to replace him at the SSOD, still diplomats at the UN were toying with the idea that Carter would make an appearance before the end of the session. see: New York Times, May 22, 24, 1978 and Richard Hudson, "Will Carter Come?", Disarmament Times, 15 June, 1978.

13. New York Times, May 24, 1978.

14. Arn Hallan Lakhadir, "The UN Special Session: An Evaluation," in William H. Kincaide and Jeffrey D. Porro (eds.), Negotiating Security - An Arms Control Reader, (Washington D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), p. 250.

15. See Time Magazine, June 5, 1978.

16. GAOR, A/S-10/PV.2, 24 May, 1978.

17. K. Teltsch, "Special UN Disarmament Session Opening," New York Times, May 22, 1978.

18. For background and differing opinions on the neutron bomb controversy:

a) S.T. Cohen, The Neutron Bomb: Political, Technological and Military Issues (Cambridge, Mass: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1978).

b) "The Enhanced Radiation Warhead": Hans Gunther Brauch, "A West German Perspective," and Arthur S.C. Collins Jr., "A Military Perspective," Arms Control Today, Vol. 6 Vol. 8(6), June 1978, the issue includes bibliography of sources on the neutron bomb.

c) George Kistiakovsky, "The folly of the neutron bomb," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September, 1978.

d) Roger Morris, "Eight days in April: the press flattens Carter with the neutron bomb," Columbia Journalism Review, November/December, 1978.

e) R.G. Shreffler, "The Neutron Bomb for NATO Defense: An Alternative," Orbis, Winter, 1978, pp. 959.

f) Herber Scoville Jr., "The Neutron Bomb," in SIPRI Yearbook, 1982, pp. 63-74.

19. The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook
Vol. 2: 1977, pp. 218-227, Vol. 3: 1978, Chapter X.

20. See for instance Andrie Gromyko address to the SSOD where he referred to the "powerful wave of protests on the European continent and throughout the world against plans to produce these weapons in the United States and subsequently to station them in Western Europe... We say clearly to the peoples of certain countries where sometimes support is voiced for neutron weapons: Beware lest you be deceived; be on your guard; it is reason rather than folly that must triumph;" GAOR, A/S-10/PV.5, 26 May, 1978, p. 36.

21. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, CCD/PV.775, 28 February, 1978, p. 10.

22. GAOR, A/AC.187/98, 2 February, 1978.

23. CCD/559, 10 March, 1978.

24. The Vice President of Cuba, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez told the SSOD that despite President Carter's decision, "the threat of the neutron bomb still hangs over us" and blamed the "concert of cannibalistic expressions" of the neutron bomb's supporters, GAOR, A/S-10/AC.1/18, 8 June, 1978.

25. The Soviet Document, GAOR, A/S-10/AC.1/18, 8 June, 1978.

26. The divergent approaches on the neutron weapons were confirmed by the fact that this was the only item in the G.A. agenda under which the two military pacts introduced two rival texts of draft resolutions. Though the texts were drafted in the cumbersome UN terminology (without any reference to the bomb by name) the differences become more distinct in the statements and in the votes. See: UN Disarmament Yearbook Vol. 3: 1978, pp. 211-217. See also fn. 48.

27. See editorials: New York Times, April 6, 1978; Washington Post, April 6, 1978; Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1978.

28. Newsweek, 17 April, 1978, p. 38 and 40.

29. Alexander Haig came to Washington and in a press conference there on March 22, he gave strong support for the neutron bomb:

The utility of the weapon; its usability; its credibility generally in deterrence terms contributes to the reality that it will not have to be used; it's our military view (that the warhead) raises, not lowers, the nuclear threshold. Washington Post, March 23, 1978.

30. Hans Brauch, "A West German Perspective," Arms Control Today.

31. Washington Post, 28 March, 1978.

32. The West German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, quickly requested a session with Carter, telling reporters "We feel this should be produced." New York Times, April 5, 1978.

33. See for instance: New York Times, April 4, 1978, Newsweek, April 17, 1978.

34. Newsweek, April 17, 1978.

35. Washington Post, March 28, 1978.

36. Washington Post, April 10, 1978.

37. Max Lerner, New York Post, April 12, 1978.

38. Theo Sommer, "A view From Western Europe," Newsweek, April 17, 1978.

39. Christian Science Monitor, April 7, 1978.
In Europe, an expert on arms control, viewed Carter's decision as an opportunity:

to enhance the credibility of President Carter's commitment to arms control and disarmament at a time when world public opinion is focused on the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.
Hans Gunther Brauch, "A West German Perspective," Arms Control Today.

40. See: New York times, May 22, 1978.

41. See Richard Hudson (ed.), "Will Carter Come?" Disarmament Times, June 15, 1978.

My own notes from the SSOD confirms Hudson's report on the rumors and speculations which were aired by many diplomats on the matter. Members of the United States delegation were perplexed and confused being unable to provide information on Carter's final decision. It was understood, as reported by Hudson, that if Carter does come he would have to 'give' something - as for instance declaring unilateral moratorium on production of fissionable materials for weapons, or a moratorium on testing for a specific time period.

It was revealed earlier, on April 3, 1978, that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance asked President Carter to approve a proposal worked by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) calling for an international ban on the production of material used in nuclear weapons. The proposal which was opposed by the Defense Department, was hoped to be unveiled at the SSOD by the American Administration. See: New York Times, April 3, 1978.

42. The quote was from Andrew Young's deputy Ambassador James F. Leonard, New York Post, May 26, 1978. See also Washington Post, May 24, 1978.

43. New York Times, April 6, 1978; Editorial in the Hearst Newspapers, July 23, 1978.

44. New York Times, April 20, 1978.

45. Newsweek, April, 24, 1978.

46. Hearst papers, July 23, 1978.

47. Christian Science Monitor, September 29, 1978. As reported in the New York Times, January 5, 1979, by Drew Middleton - the military analyst, "Chancellor Schmidt has never accepted the wisdom of Mr. Carter's decision to shelve the neutron bomb."

48. See UN Disarmament Yearbook Vol. 3: 1978, Chapter X and Chapter XVII; Vol.4: 1979, Chapter XIV and Vol. 5: 1980, Chapter XV.
In 1978 two different proposals were submitted to the General Assembly on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. They reflected the two divergent approaches of East and West on the matter: The Soviets called for a general agreement banning the development of all new types of weapons (including the neutron bomb). The Western countries opposed a general agreement and advocated conclusion of separate conventions on specific new types of weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, the West viewed the ERW as a regular nuclear weapon mentioned in the United Nations 1948, definition of mass destruction weapons, and emphasized that it is not a "new" weapon as the Soviets and their allies claim. See in the above yearbooks and in particular the statement by the United Kingdom (AC.1/33/PV.49, 24 November, 1978). The two resolutions were adopted by majority:
a) The Western text 33/66-A was adopted by 117 to none with 24 abstentions (Communist countries and their allies).
b) The Eastern bloc text 33/66-B was adopted by 118 to none with 24 abstentions (U.S. and allies, Austria, Israel, Guatemala, Ireland Sweden).

In subsequent years the Western countries failed to convince the Soviets to elaborate a single text on

the issue to be adopted by consensus (see statement by Ireland A/C.1/34/PV.40, 23 November, 1979, and disarmament Yearbook). But again the West underscored its reluctance to confront the Soviets in this battle of resolutions and it decided to drop its counter-resolution and instead just continued to abstain on the Soviet text.

49. New York Times, June 12, 1978.

50. New York Times, June 27, 1980.

51. GAOR, A/C.1/36/PV.40, 23 November, 1981, pp. 44-45.

52. UN and Disarmament 1945-1970, p. 153.
The resolution was adopted by 55 to 20 with 26 abstentions.

53. The issue was discussed at the UN during the same period, also in the framework of the security guarantees to the non-nuclear weapon states and in the context of nuclear weapon free zones, but there were no new initiatives on the subject till 1972. See the relevant UN & Disarmament volumes and in particular the working paper on the subject prepared by the UN secretariat in the preparations for the SSOD:

A comprehensive study of the origin, Development, and present status of the various alternatives proposed for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. (A/AC.187/71, 19 August, 1977).
See also: William Epstein, "Banning the Use of Nuclear Weapons," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, April, 1979, pp. 7-9.

54. UN and Disarmament 1945-1970, pp. 161-163 and William Epstein, "A Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons," Scientific American Vol. 243(1), July, 1980. Though basically the issue should be regarded as a measure of non-proliferation, the Soviets found it preferable, for their reasons to emphasize the need for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and thus, to avoid the issue of control and inspection.

55. UN Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 3: 1978, p. 180. The draft was adopted by 103 to 18 (Western allies) with 18 abstentions (Soviet bloc countries and others).

56. Ibid, pp. 173-174.

57. SIPRI, Postures for Non Proliferation (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1979), p. 100.

58. Ibid, and William Epstein, The Last Chance, pp. 138-139.

59. SIPRI, Ibid, p. 143.

60. Epstein, The Last Chance, p. 143.

61. See: The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook Vol. 5: 1980, p. 117, and previous Yearbooks.

62. GAOR, A/36/PV.91, 12 December, 1981, pp. 66-67. The resolution was adopted as Res. 36/92-I.

63. "Moscow's Aim: Split NATO," Time Magazine, November 16, 1981.

64. William G. Hyland, "The Soviet Union and the United States," Current History, October, 1981, p. 312.

65. 65. See Helmut Schmidt, "The 1977 Alstair Buchan Memorial Lecture," Survival, Vol. 20(1), January-February, 1978, pp. 2-10, and Stanley Hoffman, "The Western Alliance: Drift or Harmony," International Security, Fall, 1981, Vol. 6(2), p. 111.

The European fear of the SS-20 coincided with the final negotiations of SALT II between the superpowers, since the draft treaty did not address the so-called "gray-area systems" - i.e. nuclear delivery systems that are neither battlefield weapons nor of intercontinental range. According to the Christian Science Monitor's report, European allies were uneasy over the prospect of isolating the European nuclear balance between the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic alliance.

Mainly they were concerned because NATO "has no weapon comparable to the SS-20 in its arsenal." "Soviet Missiles Worry Europe," Christian Science Monitor, November 8, 1978. More on Western European objections to SALT II at that time see in Washington Post, November 8, 1978 and Senator Henry M. Jackson, "SALT and European Security," Wall Street Journal, December 27, 1978.

66. a) Joself Joffe, "European-American Relations: The Energy Crisis," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59(4), Spring, 1981, pp. 835-851.

b) Warner R. Schilling, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity," International Security, Vol. 6(2), Fall, 1980, p. 62.

67. The literature on the subject is vast and can only be sampled:

a) Garnett, "Limited War," in Baylis et.al, Contemporary Strategy, pp. 114-131.

b) K. Knorr and T. Read (eds.), Limited Strategic War (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962).

c) Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, Arms and Stability in Europe (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).

d) Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965).

e) E) Robert L. Pfaltzfraff Jr., The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969).

f) Edwin H. Pedder (ed.), Defense Politics of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980).

g) George Ginsburgs & Alvin Z. Rubenstein (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978).

68. Hyland, "The Soviet Union," pp. 343-344.

69. Editorial of the Wall Street Journal,
October 28, 1981.

70. McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert
S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the
Atlantic Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60(4),
Spring, 1982, pp. 753-768.

For West German reactions see: "Bonn Parties Cool to
Ban on First Use of Atom Arms," New York Times, April 10,
1982 and "Bonn Aide Upholds Atom - Arms Policy," New York
Times, April 16, 1982 and "Why Bonn shudders over the new
nuclear debate," Christian Science Monitor, April 20, 1982.

71. New York Times, April 21, 1982.

72. The group - the Independent Commission on
Disarmament and Security Issues - was made up of govern-
mental officials and politicians from Western, Eastern and
Third World Nations. The chairman was Olof Palme, former
Prime Minister of Sweden, and among the members of the
group were Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State of the
United States, Georgi Arbatov a senior Soviet official and
expert on the United States. The report was published on
June 1982: The Independent Commission on Disarmament and
Security Issues, Common Security - A Blueprint for
Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 146-150.
For the reaction in West Germany see: "Atom-Free Zone
Rejected in Bonn," New York Times, June 3, 1982.

73. Karl Kaiser, George Leber, Alois Mertes,
Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation
of Peace," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60(5) Summer 1982,
pp. 1157-1170.

74. GAOR, Res. 35/152-B, "Nuclear weapons in all
aspects," Res. 36/100.

75. GAOR, A/36/241, 22 September, 1981.

76. Ambassador Victor Issraelyan, GAOR,
A/C.1/36/PV.16, 28 October, 1981, p. 52.
See also World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook
of 1981, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
(London: Taylor & Francis LTD., 1981), pp. 33-35.

77. GAOR, A/C.1/36/PV.32, 17 November, 1981, p. 18.
78. Ibid, p. 21.
79. GAOR, A/C.1/36/PV.21, 2 November, 1981, pp. 407.
80. New York Times, November 30, 1981.
81. "In Move Aimed at Europe, Moscow Recasts Its Strategic Doctrine," The Washington Post, December 1, 1981. See also: The New York Times, November, 21, 1981 and December 6, 1981 and September 27, 1981 (on the Pentagon's Booklet).
82. GAOR, A/36/PV.91, 12 December 1981, pp. 115-116.
83. See for instance just a sample of the vast amounts of statements by the Soviets and its satellites: a Soviet statement, GAOR, A/C.1/36/PV.16, 28 October, 1981, or statements by the other "member-States" of the bloc: Ukrainian SSR: A/C.1/30/PV.37, 20 November, 1981 and Byelorussian SSR: A/C.1/36/PV.23, 3 November, 1981, the representative of Czechoslovakia made the point in criticizing NATO decision: "for changing Western Europe into a launching pad for new United States medium-range nuclear missiles..." A/C.1/36/PV.18, October 29, 1981, p. 18.
84. The Washington Post, December 1, 1981.
85. The Washington Post, January 18, 1982.
86. The Washington Post, January 28, 1982.
87. See for instance statements by Malaysia and Bangladesh: GAOR, A/36/PV.91, 12 December 1981, pp. 115-117, and Kenya which criticized the Soviet initiative: "...why single out for special proclamation first use instead of the only logical and defensible position of non-use, unless this is, of course, for propagandistic purposes?" A/C.1/36/PV.43, 25 November, 1981.

Chapter 9: Conclusion - Disarmament and Order

When the United Nations Charter was signed in June 1945, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," the world had a few more days to learn about the potential scourge of a nuclear war. Soon the United Nations made disarmament a top priority in its first resolution, but, after 37 years of deliberations, it seems that the world is no nearer that much-desired goal of nuclear disarmament than it was at the beginning. In criticizing the role of the United Nations in the field of arms control and in exposing the futility of its deliberations on disarmament, this work did not mean to underestimate the challenges of the nuclear age. If one takes the Doomsday Clock which appears on the cover of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists since 1947 as a reliable indicator, mankind stood in June 1982 at four minutes before midnight. Even those who cast doubts on the accuracy and premises of such a method--particularly after more than 37 years of workable nuclear deterrence - cannot absolve themselves from this awesome responsibility

simply by relying solely on the delicate presumptions of rational calculations and behavior which underlay nuclear deterrence.

The question, thus, which guided our inquiry was rather whether the United Nations - with its polemical debates on disarmament - is capable of promoting achievable disarmament and arms control policies. As in 1946, United Nations deliberations continue to ignore the advice of Salvador De Madariaga, the top official in the League of Nations dealing with disarmament, who said some time before the nuclear age that disarmament can be achieved only in a well organized world-community. Otherwise, warned Madariaga, the profound mistrust among nations guarantees that "all disarmament conferences are bound to degenerate into armament conferences."¹ Indeed, when the United Nations began to confront the endless minefield of controlling nuclear weapons, the idea of supra-national authority for nuclear activities was discussed for the first time. But, as shown at the outset, the world of 1946 was not ripe yet for sweeping changes at the expense of national

sovereignty in the nation-state system on which the United Nations was erected.

In 1982, with the outburst of public interest on nuclear-policy issues in the Western world,² attention has been drawn again to the same "indissoluble connection between sovereignty and war." Jonathan Schell who writes dramatically on this connection in his The Fate of the Earth, succeeded to publish the most compelling thesis on the consequences of a nuclear catastrophe. In his third and final essay entitled "the Choice," Schell blames the concept of sovereignty as the original sin:

It was into the sovereignty system that nuclear bombs were born, as "weapons" for "war"...
The system of sovereignty is now to the earth and mankind what a polluting factory is to its local environment... 3

As Schell explains it, the world has chosen "to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons."⁴ Since the bomb cannot be disinvented, Mr. Schell suggests disinventing the nation-state and thus getting rid of the cause of major war.

But as the debates in the wake of the Baruch Plan in 1946 have demonstrated diplomats at the United Nations found it easier to continue their clinging to the understandings arrived at in the United Nations pre-atomic Charter. In 1982, it is apparent that members of the United Nations are still not ready to engage in a re-examination of the system based on sovereignty in order to promote disarmament.

In the United Nations of the 1980's, more than ever before, the concept of sovereignty has been elevated into a sacred principle of the organization. During the de-colonization process the United Nations has enhanced and multiplied the claims of statehood as the key to identity for peoples. The concept of one nation-one vote has come to be considered a kind of natural right, like the civil rights of the individual. This voting system, which is disproportionately weighted in favor of the weaker members has made the Third World the master of decisions in the General Assembly. With this, the organization placed the NIEO at the top of its agenda--calling for a more egalitarian international system while at the same time insisting

upon the state's undiminished sovereignty. There is an inherent contradiction between the Third World demand for international justice backed by special machinery for its implementation and the reluctance to accept supervision of internal redistribution and realization of human rights. As seen clearly in NIEO resolutions which emphasize the state's sovereign rights, the call for redistribution of power and resources has no bearing on the nation-state system and its security mechanism of self-help. In this international order the state would remain the basic unit which protects its people and its interests with the military at its disposal. The philosophy of the NIEO thus runs counter to the idea of a new centralized security system which would limit states in the exercise of traditional freedom and sovereign rights.

The NIEO has changed dramatically the political culture and the climate in which security, disarmament, and world order issues are examined. Even in studies sponsored by the United Nations, the view is that there is a change in the role and functioning of

the organization established upon the notion of collective security guaranteed by the privileged great powers. As a result of the NIEO revolution, the United Nations has changed its character and emphasis:

An organization primarily committed to political and security issues above all, the United Nations has now evolved into a world system intently devoted to assuring the equitable development of the world's peoples. 5

This change in the United Nations system had immediate implications for the notions of international security and order. Within the framework of the NIEO disarmament is different in character and purpose than in both the League Covenant and the United Nations Charter. Both in the Covenant and the Charter, disarmament, despite differences in role and relative significance, is closely related to the relevant approach to world order and the system of security. Within the NIEO system, however, disarmament is not a security concept but rather a vehicle to reallocate resources in order to get rid of the "law of the great powers" and create a more equal world order. Sovereignty, rather 'sovereign equality'

has replaced security as the guiding principle for the pursuit of disarmament.

With the NIEO becoming a priority item on the international agenda, disarmament has come to be regarded as an important instrument for the redistribution of world resources. Nuclear non-proliferation is not tackled as a security issue but rather as another source of 'discrimination' between the 'haves' and 'haves-not'. The Third World emphasizes its 'sovereign rights' for nuclear know-how and dismisses non-proliferation concerns - as 'unworkable' and 'non-democratic'. The net result is that United Nations debates undermine the status of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and become instrumental in legitimizing nuclear weapons proliferation. In a similar fashion, Third World countries reject initiatives on the conventional arms race and attempts to restrain international arms trade since they infringe on their sovereign rights. This does not mean that individual Third World countries do not have national security concerns. It could well be that some of them might consider arms control efforts on bilateral or

regional level, but they have no choice at the United Nations but to maintain their bloc solidarity on disarmament as part of the NIEO.

Shifting majorities at the United Nations created innovative concepts - such as the NIEO - which were undreamed of by the founding fathers of the United Nations. The United Nations Charter does not only express certain values, principles or objectives which still need to be promoted; it also envisages a certain structure of international order and balance of power. As shown in this dissertation, there was a sense of realism in the Charter's approach to collective security by recognizing the necessity for the big powers' unity. The Third World in its call for NIEO rejects the notion of balance of power and the hierarchical international order legitimized by the Charter. Instead they invoke the weak and vague provisions on disarmament to direct them against the big powers. On the other hand, the major document of the NIEO - the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Res. 3281- XXIX, 12 December, 1974) fails to recognize, perhaps deliberately

so, that the use of sovereign rights can be limited by international law and does not acknowledge that functional sovereignty on specific subjects may have to be transferred to an international organization. In the light of this attitude, it is unlikely that under the NIEO the role of force in international politics would be reformed to a meaningful extent.

It is almost taken for granted in the literature that a comprehensive approach to disarmament would require some revisions in the United Nations Charter. These revisions are always at variance with the conceptual framework of the NIEO. Such for instance is the work of Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn who collaborated in developing the most impressive scheme for disarmament as part and parcel of their plan for world government. In this process sovereign nations would give up their sovereign rights for the sake of an international federal system in which all individuals are citizens of a global state.⁶ Even modest plans for disarmament and order require a discriminatory approach to sovereign rights of States. So is the plan by Leonard Beaton which provides also for the security

of many small nations. Beaton, who rejects the notion of world government as impossible and even undesirable, still provides for international forces. He emphasizes that any attempt to build a permanent structure of world order "must be a great power system" in which supra-national forces - including nuclear forces - are provided and controlled by the five nuclear powers.⁷ In sum, it is evident that both the all-encompassing concept of world government or the limited and restricted system of supra-national great power forces are necessarily alien to the NIEO philosophy and mentality.

The Soviet Union, which has managed to disassociate itself from the North-South confrontation,⁸ is a major beneficiary of the new United Nations disarmament approach. The Soviets were smart enough to develop the link between the NIEO and the control of the superpowers arms race.⁹ The Soviets have introduced the idea that superpowers' political detente and cooperation in arms limitation "constitutes an indispensable condition for the establishment of a new international order."¹⁰ At this particular juncture, the Soviets imply more than they are prepared to explicate that the notion of world government or any limitation on the sovereign approach to security is foreign to their ideology.

As shown, the Soviets enjoy comfortable advantages in the propaganda warfare at the United Nations since they need not worry about voters or demonstrators at home. Unlike the NATO alliance, the Soviets determine strategy and diplomacy for their satellites in a completely sovereign manner. As a result, United Nations forums on disarmament help the Soviets to enhance splits within the Western alliance and to appear as leaders of a cohesive and monolithic bloc in front of the Third World majority. For the West, as experience has shown, there is limited utility if any in relying on the United Nations as means for pursuing disarmament and arms control policies.

It seems that even the terminology of disarmament has been politicized at the United Nations. The Charter emphasis on "the regulation of armaments" is unpopular in the new environment where the majority rejects concepts such as hierarchy, deterrence and balance of power. The Third World tends to overlook the security and order aspects of disarmament and instead focuses on the ultimate goal of establishing the NIEO through, inter alia, disarmament. The Americans, on the other hand, prefer 'arms control' over 'disarmament' as a more realistic concept under existing international circumstances of mistrust and ideological confrontation. The Soviets, again, can

afford to enjoy both worlds: they practice and support superpower 'arms control' while they avoid the term in their declaratory policies and support as well as initiate catch-all resolutions which call for a disarmed world (more on the terminology in appendix I).

This juxtaposition of North-South and East-West confrontations tends to foster the tendency to introduce grandiloquent and sweeping but hollow plans of General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) or Comprehensive Program of Disarmament (CPD). These proposals do not provide an international authority with teeth which will enforce order in a disarmed world. This tendency prevents the United Nations from serious discussion on limited bargains of achievable and workable agreements of arms control. Stripped of its activities in arms control, the United Nations has become engaged in an unprecedented process of creating institutions and organs which deliberate, "negotiate", and study disarmament. But apparently bureaucratic reforms and institutional arrangements cannot compensate for the lack of political conditions for a meaningful debate on disarmament.

In July 1982, when the Second Special Session on Disarmament (SSD II) of the General Assembly fizzled out, many diplomats were reported to regard the failure of the conference as damaging to future activities of the United Nations in disarmament. According to some observers the Final Document of the SSD II was nothing but a "vague blueprint for inaction, papering over the failure of consensus... (and) dramatizing the collapse of an international consensus on the theoretical goals of arms control" which were enumerated by the SSOD.¹¹ SSD II failed even to reach agreement on the priority that should be accorded to various disarmament measures by the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva - the multilateral organ for disarmament negotiations.¹²

In essence, the dismal outcome of SSD II should have been anticipated, and those disappointed were victims of their own misconceptions and unrealistic illusions. Already in 1978 it was clear that the consensus of the SSOD was more of an appearance than reality. As long as the patterns of differences in the United Nations are those outlined in the preceding chapters of this work, it is likely that 'disarmament' will remain a theoretical

topic which permits each group to carry on its political struggle by other means. Given the unworldly concepts of NIEO and CPD which ignore the current world hierarchy and balance of power and in the absence of serious confrontation of questions of security and international order United Nations debates on disarmament are doomed to remain irrelevant to the real world outside.

Chapter 9: Footnotes

1. Salvador De Madariaga, Disarmament (New York: Kennidat Press Inc. 1967 - reprint form 1929), p. 62.

2. 40 books on nuclear issues were reportedly coming out in 1982, The New York Times Book Review, April 11, 1982, p. 6.

3. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), p. 187.

4. Ibid, p. 194.

5. Ervin Laszlo, Robert Baker, Jr., Elliott Eisenberg, Venkata Raman, The Objectives of the New International Economic Order (A UNITAR Study. New York: Pergamon Press, 1978), p. xi.

6. Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace Through World Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

7. Leonard Beaton, The Reform of Power (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), pp. 202-206, 229.

8. Antony J. Dolman, Resources, Regimes, World Order (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 96-97.

9. See the Speech by Alexei Gromyko to the Sixth Special Session GAOR, A/PV.2210.

10. B.S. Fromin, "The New International Economic Order as Viewed in the CMEA Countries," in E. Laszlo and J. Kurtzman(eds.), Eastern Europe and the New International Economic Order (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980). p. 6.

11. "UN Session Ends, Loss of Consensus on Disarmament Confirmed," Washington Post, July 11, 1982.

12. "Major Disappointment," Disarmament Times, 13 July, 1982. For the document adopted at SSD II see: GAOR, Twelfth Special Session Supplement No. 6(A/S-12/6) document A/S-12/32, 10 July, 1982.

Appendix I: On Terminology

In the long course of United Nations activities in disarmament some procedures and terminology have been introduced and insitutionalized. It is evident that United Nations' international civil servants and the delegates involved in the disarmament business are using some terms differently than the American community of arms controllers (or the so called "arms chair strategists.") It seems, therefore, that it will be helpful, to clarify the meaning which some of the terms have acquired, particularly because their use at the United Nations has somewhat drifted away from the common sense use in the literature. Moreover, different notions which are given to the same terms by different delegates, reveal the polemical distortion of terminology at the United Nations. The different attributions to the terms disarmament and arms control are in accordance with the fundamental approaches of East and West to the subject matter. In the meantime the evolvement of a third notion of "disarmament" at the United Nations, underscores the changes in the settings of the deliberations. For the United Nations' new majority, the Third World countries,

disarmament has become an integral part of their struggle against both superpowers, and therefore necessitated original connotation.

Historically, as the language of the League's Covenant suggests, disarmament was the broad process in which gradual measures were welcomed to bring about limits, control and regulations as elements of a broader strategy for disarmament. In more precise terms: "disarmament" has meant the reduction or elimination of armaments or armed forces. "Arms control" or "arms limitation" on the other hand, means limitations of the number or types of armaments or armed forces, of their deployment or disposition or of the use of particular types of armaments. "Arms Control" also encompasses measures designed to reduce the danger of accidental war or to reduce concern about surprise attack.¹ The United Nations charter explicitly recognized the existence of this distinction when it referred to "principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments."

Writers of the arms control school such as Thomas Schelling and and Morton Halperin, tend to broaden the

term "arms control" to include all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies as part of a national security strategy.² Hedley Bull points out that there can be disarmament which is not controlled (unilateral or unconditional) and arms control which does not involve a reduction of armaments.³ Arms control may also cost more and involve or imply a build-up in weapons arsenals if that minimizes the danger of accidents and false alarms and stabilizes strategic deterrence, between the superpowers. As an American expert wrote at the height of arms control's popularity:

There is nothing in the concept of arms control to prevent the increase of certain types of armament, if it appears in the interest of national or world security to do so. 4

In 1981, Secretary of State Alexander Haig has elaborated on the nature of arms control:

...arms control agreements are aimed to enhance security... valuable agreements can be envisioned that do not save money and do not eliminate arms. The vital task is to limit and to reduce arms in a way that renders use of the remaining arms less likely. 5

The new twist here is the recent attempt of the United States to redefine arms control in terms of arms reductions (START - Strategic Arms Reductions Talks replaced SALT in the Reagan Administration), while insisting on the enhancement of national security rather than the ideal of disarmament as the criterion.

Ironically, as experts in arms control have demonstrated, efforts to negotiate limits on arms may involve inter-related processes ("bargaining chips", "displacement effects" etc.) which may initiate or accelerate other weapons programs.⁶ During the public debate in the United States concerning the ratification of the SALT II treaty (1979) it was taken for granted that implementation of the agreement would be coupled with increases in the American defense budget and the development of new weapon systems. In this respect, arms control is part and parcel of superpowers nuclear deterrence; the aim being to maintain and stabilize the international system on the basis of bipolarity. Arms control, according to this interpretation, is a policy of High Posture which aims at preserving, and possibly even widening the gap between, on the one hand, the superpowers and, on the other the smaller nuclear powers and non-nuclear states (see chapter 6).

Another angle of the issue is provided by Hans Morgenthau who presents the opinion of "political realism" on disarmament in its purest form. For Morgenthau, disarmament no less than the arms race, is the reflection of the power relations among the nations concerned.

This is why, explains Morgenthau, arms control attempts have been only moderately successful in the nuclear field in which the major nuclear powers reached that optimum of assured destruction beyond which it is irrational to go.⁷ Arms control, as he explains, is not disarmament at all but merely a "regulation of the arms race" in the sense of a cartel agreement.⁸

The bipolar nature of the concept of arms control explains why Third World spokesmen reject it. The Indian representative suggested once that , in a particular United Nations document, the term 'arms limitation' be used instead of the controversial term 'arms control'. To him arms control has "certain unacceptable connotations since it implies "controls even without working for genuine disarmament." The Ambassador underscored how the terminology is closely related to the notion of world order in stating that arms control "carries overtones of control exercised by one group of countries over another in the name of disarmament" and is therefore "discriminatory".⁹ Similarly, the

Brazilian Ambassador blasted the superpowers for dropping the term 'disarmament' from their political lexicon and replacing it with euphemistic expressions such as 'arms control'.¹⁰

In the same vein it is understandable that Alva Myrdal, a former Minister of Sweden for disarmament and a leader of the 21 Group of non-aligned countries in the committee on disarmament in Geneva, regrets that the term arms control has become popular, creating in her words a "terminological jungle". To make the term "control" synonymous with the limitation or regulation of armaments, says Myrdal, leads to nothing but confusion. For her, arms control is a shrewd cover-up of the superpowers game which involves "scant or nil disarmament." Arms control, suggests Myrdal, should be used only in the context of verification. She draws a distinction between "control" as the general regulation or control of arms race through treaty obligation and "verification" as more specifically concerned with the methods used for ascertaining facts about compliance.¹¹

In the United Nations it is informal practice to refer to disarmament as the broad term which includes all degrees of weapons reductions and limitations. Most countries (except the United States and its Western allies) avoid the use of arms control. During the preparatory discussions for the SSOD the delegation of Mexico submitted a working paper (August 1977) which indicated:

It seems advisable to point out that the term "disarmament" is used here in the same sense in which it has been used in the various forums of the United Nations: that is, as a generic term which encompasses and may designate any type of measures relating to the matter, whether they are measures for the prevention, limitation, reduction or elimination of armaments or for the reduction of military forces. 12

Consequently, disarmament in United Nations discussions and documents includes a variety of measures on different levels, from general and complete nuclear disarmament to confidence - building measures in military-political relationships. The Final Document adopted at the SSOD is an excellent example of the United Nations approach to the problem of terminology. This long document (129 paragraphs) contains a sort of "check list" of virtually all possible measures of disarmament, from

total prohibition of nuclear weapons to collateral-political measures aimed at the relaxation of international tension.

In this regard the Final Document marks a departure and deviation from the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter's approach to disarmament. The expression "regulation of armaments" which appears in the Charter as well as in the Covenant of the League does not appear anywhere in the Document. Similarly there is no reference to "arms control" and instead the document uses "arms limitation". Measures which are basically designed to preserve the stability of nuclear deterrence such as "hot lines" are referred to as "confidence building" measures.¹³ At the behest of the Third World, the whole notion of arms regulation, so central in the days of the League and later adopted by the drafters of the Charter, had completely disappeared from the official document of the SSOD.

Alessandro Corradini, a former Director and Deputy to the Assistant General, of United Nations Center for Disarmament regarded the Final Document of the SSOD

as representing the real philosophy of disarmament. The philosophy of disarmament, said Corradini, is not that of regulation of armaments or what he regards as the same, of arms control. In his view, the Final Document "has contributed most significantly to bringing back the true meaning of disarmament, that is, the reduction and, ultimately the elimination of armaments." Even when the Document refers to "arms limitation, explains Corradini, it implies reduction given the Document's clear goal as set out in its very first paragraph and subsequent ones.¹⁴ This interpretation coupled with the deliberate omission of the concept of "arms regulation" in the Final Document marks a departure from the philosophy of the Charter on the collective security system and its link to disarmament.

In the East-West confrontation on disarmament in the United Nations, terminology is not just a matter of semantics but involves political differences which go back to the beginning of post World-War II deliberations. From the outset, the Soviet Union and its satellites have used the single word "disarmament" to describe all kinds

of initiatives and negotiations even though many of them over the years have not called for disarmament or even a reduction of armaments, such as the non-use of nuclear weapons or non-use of force or even 'hot lines' arrangements to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.¹⁵

The Western powers, on the other hand, with greater caution have preferred to use the terms "limitation, regulation, and control of arms" or since 1958 its shorter variant "arms control". The use of the term arms control coupled with the insistence by the West on inspection and verification measures immediately invites Soviet propaganda. The Soviets charge that the West is not interested in disarmament or a reduction of armaments but is concerned solely with control and the resulting penetration of the Soviet iron curtain, which in turn is vaguely linked to espionage.¹⁶ Even in the late 1970's, when the superpowers were finalizing their second treaty on strategic arms limitations (SALT II), the Soviets made it plain that their rejection of the term control is an elementary factor in their approach to disarmament. In his statement to the SSOD, Foreign Minister Gromyko said the following:

Many of those present must have noticed that representatives of some countries generally

find it difficult even to pronounce the word 'disarmament'; they would rather speak of control. Control over what? Control over armaments; they say it openly, in so many words. But the volume of armaments in the world can be increased to five times the present level even if they are under control. 17

The United States, being aware of the Soviet-Third World coalition against 'arms control', indicated already before the SSOD that it attached special significance to efforts in this field. In a letter to the Secretary General on the SSOD the American Ambassador called upon governments to consider the concepts involved and recommended:

The national reviews that precede the session itself should be based on a recognition that arms control arrangements have the potential of enhancing, not merely preserving, the security of the participants. 18

The American letter did not use the Soviet and Third World's terminology on general and complete disarmament but instead referred to "restrictions" and "limitations" of weapons or "tension-reducing measures" etc.

If one takes into consideration the views expressed by the Charter's framers on arms and the collective security system the Western approach seems to be more in line with the Charter than is the Soviet maxim that "the way to disarm is to disarm" and its manifestations in their grandiloquent proposals for disarmament. The preference for the more restricted terms stems from the belief that under existing international circumstances of mistrust only a gradual and verifiable approach is feasible. Leaders of the West such as the former Vice President Walter Mondale, the West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada and James Callaghan of United Kingdom as well as others, in their addresses to the SSOD, referred to arms control agreements as something distinct from disarmament. Though in informal discussions and sometimes even in speeches Western delegates use the terms "disarmament" and "arms control" interchangeably it is rather for practical reasons, in the recognition that the popular meaning of disarmament at the United Nations generally describes any subject matter in the field. A meticulous examination of the positions of states as reflected in the 1978 SSOD reveals

that East-West divergences over terminology remained the same. The Western working papers placed the distinction already in the subtitle: "immediate measures of arms control and disarmament."¹⁹ The Socialist states (the Soviet bloc) did not use the term "arms control" at all. The Soviet view is that detente and "peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems" have created favorable conditions for successful negotiations on disarmament. Under this category the paper specifies a variety of bilateral and multilateral agreements which have been reached in the field, including SALT. Even measures aimed "at preventing nuclear war and reducing the risk of its accidental outbreak", are referred to as disarmament.²⁰

Characteristically, the United States in all its official statements and publications refers to SALT and other agreements as "arms control". It was an established practice in the monthly Bulletin of the State Department to discuss SALT issues under the title of arms control. In Vice President Mondale's statement it was apparent that United States officials have adopted the logic and

terminology of their fellow citizens from the arms control community, in which arms control embraces all ranges of possible measures. Mondale explained the thrust of United States policy:

The prudent policy of any nation must include both sufficient military preparedness and arms control efforts, if its security is to be assured. In the short run no nation can be asked to reduce its defenses to levels below the threats it faces.

Referring to the record of President Carter's administration he said:

...the United States has been engaged in the broadest set of arms control negotiations in our history. Together with our negotiating partners, the United States has developed an agenda more extensive than any nation has ever attempted. We are taking concrete action in 10 different areas - from nuclear-weapon accords to regional restraint and to limits on conventional and unconventional arms such as anti-satellite and radiological weapons. 21

Since the Third World is in the position to determine the agenda of the General Assembly its approach is more influential than both East and West on the terminology used in United Nations documents. In fact, to the extent that a common Third World position can be identified on the basis of their joint statements and documents, disarmament to the Third world

is a generic term but subject to two qualifications:

- 1) Every single measure should be instrumental to the broader framework of general and complete disarmament.
- 2) Disarmament is a process which is consciously subordinated to the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

The eighty-two non-aligned countries' working paper submitted for the SSOD outlined a comprehensive program for disarmament which includes inter alia, some immediate short-term measures to get the process started. However, only when these partial measures would lead to general and complete disarmament can they qualify as disarmament measures. . In contrast to the superpowers' arms control agreements, this definition is less concerned with stability of nuclear deterrence and even less, of course, with the preservation of superpowers' bipolarity. According to this view, agreements which fail to slow down the arms race or which encourage more spending on weapons programs, do not serve disarmament purposes:

An assessment of disarmament efforts in the past three decades indicates that, despite some

measures in the field of arms limitation, no real progress has been made on the crucial question of disarmament, and in particular, concerning the nuclear arms race.

Instead, the non-aligned demanded the reorientation of the negotiations between the superpowers towards "solutions that would make it possible to achieve decisive progress toward genuine disarmament." In sum:

All efforts and negotiations should be geared in a balanced and integrated way and lead to general and complete disarmament. 22

The second qualification is critical to the understanding of the Third World approach to disarmament. Disarmament for the Third World became a secondary issue on their agenda completely subordinated to their quest for the establishment of the NIEO (see chapter 4). In their working paper to the SSOD the non-aligned said:

the arms race is inconsistent with efforts aimed at achieving the new international economic order in view of the urgent need to divert the resources utilized for the acceleration of the arms race towards socio-economic development, particularly of the developing countries. 23

With their overwhelming power in the General Assembly the Third World inserted several statements which tie together disarmament with the NIEO in the Final Document of the SSOD. The reference to the comprehensive program of disarmament (CPD) in the Final Document reflects both aspects of their approach to disarmament the goal of general and complete disarmament and the NIEO. The CPD, according to the Final Document, should encompass

all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. 24

In sum, the analysis of the terminology used in the United Nations reveals the three different approaches to the concept of disarmament by the East, West and the Third World. The Soviet bloc, with its traditional sweeping and gradiloquent disarmament proposals, emphasizes exclusively disarmament measures without further elaboration on the political arrangements and principles surrounding it. The Western allies make a clear distinction between disarmament and arms

control and emphasize the political context of the disarmament process and the requirements of world order. The Third World speaks about the link between disarmament and world order but in a different sense: disarmament is viewed as an instrument by which to achieve the NIEO. Disarmament thus, does not require prior political settlements and new international security institutions although essentially by disarming the major power the developing countries intend to transform existing world order.

Notes: Appendix I

1. John H. Barton and Lawrence D. Weiler (eds.) International Arms Control. (California: Stanford University Press, 1976) p.3 fn.
2. Thomas C. Schelling, Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control. (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961) p.2 & pp. 141-143.
3. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965) p.VII
4. Donald G. Brennan, in Brennan(ed.), Arms Control and Disarmament: American Views and Studies. (London: Jonathan Lape, 1961) p.31.
5. New York Times, July 15, 1981.
6. G.W. Rathjens, Abram Chayes, J.P. Ruina, Nuclear Arms Control Agreements: Process and Impact. (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1974) pp. 9-25.
7. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973) p.401.
8. _____, "Some Political Aspects of Disarmament" in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), The Dynamics of the Arms Race, (New York: Halsted Press, 1975) p.57.
9. GAOB. A/C.1/35/PV.37, p.22, 20 November, 1980.
10. GAOB, A/C.1/35/PV.17, p.3, 28 October, 1980.
11. Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament - How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976) p.XVI and 293.
12. GAOB, Tenth Special Session (1978) Supplement no.1 (A/S-10/1). Report of the Preparatory Committee For the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. Vol.II, A/AC.187/30/Add.1

13. GAOR, the SSOD Final Document Tenth Special Session 1978, supplement No.4, A/S-10/4/
In another meeting on disarmament sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) there was an obscure reference to control of arms.
The World congress on Disarmament Education convened by UNESCO in Paris in June 1980 simply could not completely disregard the vast amount of literature on arms control. The Congress, incorporated the concept in its definition of disarmament:
"For the purpose of disarmament education, disarmament may be understood as any form of act aimed at limiting, controlling or reducing arms, including unilateral disarmament..."
However in this form the controlling of arms is ambiguous and it can have the connotation suggested by Mrs. Myrdal - as related to verification and inspection.
"Disarmament Education" Report and Final Document World Congress on Disarmament Education (UNESCO, Paris 9-13 June, 1980) p.8. Document number 55-80/Conf.40/37 Rev.
14. Alessandro Corradini, "The Development of Disarmament Education as a Distinct Field of Study: an Introductory Analysis", p. 63.
Disarmament, a periodic review by the United Nations Vol.III(3), November 1980. p.63.
15. GAOR, Tenth Special Session 1978, OP.CIT., Vol.VI, A/AC.187/81.
16. Bernard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961) p.7.
17. GAOR, Tenth Special Session (1978), OP.CIT., Vol.VI, A/AC.187/96.
18. Ibid, Vol.II, A/AC.187/17, 22 April 1977.
19. Ibid, Vol. IV, A/AC.187/80.
20. Ibid, A/AC.187/81
21. GAOR, A/S-10/PV.2, 24 May 1978.
22. GAOR, Tenth Special Session (1978), OP.CIT. Vol.IV. A/AC.187/55/Add.1.
23. Ibid, A/AC.187/55. Later on in the document the non-aligned declare:

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...a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

24. GAOR, the SSOD Final Document, Tenth Special Session(1978) supplement No.4, A/S-10/4. paragraph 109.

Appendix II: On Research Methods

Since the United Nations does not operate in a vacuum, this dissertation incorporates analysis of perspectives of essential matter outside the international organization. Academic literature and primary official sources are utilized for this purpose. As disappointing as are the United Nations activities in disarmament, from an academic vantage point they provide an abundant source for research. United Nations meetings are well-documented and include verbatim transcripts, working papers and draft resolutions. The 1978 United Nations First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) substantially expanded the work of the organization in the field, providing even more data for researchers.

Both the number of disarmament bodies the volumes of documentation have tripled since 1978. Outside the United Nations very few specialists on disarmament and arms control know about these activities which include extensive preparation of numerous studies

on specific aspects of disarmament commissioned by the General Assembly (see chapter 3). Some of these studies have certain political biases which raise questions about the qualification of a politically motivated body to sponsor research projects on issues which have a direct bearing on strategic and national security interests. These studies can be requested by a simple majority of the General Assembly against the will and interest of many member-States. By adopting the dictum that "the way to disarm is to disarm" these studies are often divorced from tendencies in the other spheres of diplomacy and security. It seems that by adopting these practices the United Nations majority tells the major powers: "if you won't disarm, we can at least force you to discuss it." The significance of these studies and their political repercussions are discussed in several chapters of this dissertation.

It was my first-hand experience as a member of the Israeli delegation at five General Assemblies (1977-1981) and two Special Sessions on Disarmament which provided me with a unique vantage point of both a participant and observer. For instance, the basic manual prepared for the first SSOD was a

3,000 page record in seven volumes, covering 18 months of the work of the Preparatory Committee, working papers and special reports and studies. But the major advantage for the researcher lies in the method of work in preparing the Final Document of the session. The Preparatory Committee produced a monumental document on disarmament which was designated as the bargaining text of the session. Through this exercise member-States are forced to express their views on various aspects which encompass the whole field of disarmament.

The draft was interesting in its own right but was far more fascinating in its annotated form (see annex). It was loaded with brackets expressing reservations on paragraphs, clauses, words on the part of some states or group of states. As submitted to the SSOD, the complex manuscript looked like "a forest of brackets" - illustrating the lack of agreement on the major issues of disarmament. The annotated version of this exercise in "bracketsmanship" reveals who is bracketing whom and on what issues. A systematic

analysis of the document can illuminate the political and strategic meanings of respective positions. This document, in its annotated version, was circulated as an informal working paper to the delegates but, for obvious reasons was not issued as an official document of the United Nations (the official document contained the brackets without indicating their affiliation). These documents combined with the academic literature on strategic and political trends, and the review of major newspapers was supplemented with private notes gathered during various sessions and length discussions with delegates and United Nations staff members and experts in the field.

In the following tables portions from the draft final document of the SSOD are reproduced. To the official document (GAOR, Tenth Special Session Supplement No. 1 A/S-10/1, 1978) we added the initials based on the informal annotated version of the draft final document. The initials explain who is bracketing whom, thus revealing the contesting opinions on each issue. The brackets together with the initials speak for themselves.

Legend:

- Initials on text identify authorship;
- Initials on square brackets indicate origin of brackets;
- E - Eastern (the Soviet bloc)
- NA - Non-Aligned
- PAK - Pakistan
- W - Western
- MEX - Mexico
- IND - India
- SU - Soviet Union
- F - France
- US - USA
- S - Sweden
- R - Romania

Table 8: Non-Use of Nuclear weapons
(p. 28 of the draft final document)

(d) Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war

The most efficient guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

^W
/Since the use of nuclear weapons^{NA} would cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and, as such, is a crime contrary to the rules of international law and the laws of humanity, as long as nuclear weapons exist threatening the security of all States,^{PAK} particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States/, the following measures will be taken:

- A convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons should be urgently concluded.
- Nuclear-weapon States should renounce ^{PAK} /in a legally binding form/ the use /or threat of use/ of nuclear weapons /against States which have no nuclear weapons on their territories/ /against States not^{NA} parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers/.
- ^{NA+PAK} /Nuclear-weapon States should undertake/, ^{MEX} /jointly or individually/, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons./

Alternative 1 ^E /Strict implementation of the principle of non-use of force in international relations can be realized through full compliance with the Charter of the United Nations./^W

Table 9: SALT
(p. 26 of the draft final document)

(a) /Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)/

Alternative 1 MEX

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should strive to conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation negotiations (SALT II) ^{PNK} /which should provide for meaningful reduction in their deployment of nuclear weapons and a moratorium on the testing and refinement of new kinds of nuclear delivery systems/. The Governments of both countries should transmit in good time the text of this agreement to the General Assembly and should initiate promptly the third series of such negotiations (SALT III) intended to ^{PNK} conclude another agreement including significant reductions ^{PNK} w/ from 10 up to 50 per cent in their deployments of strategic nuclear weapons/ and important qualitative limitations ^{PNK} w/ such as a five-year moratorium on any qualitative improvement of their strategic nuclear-weapons delivery systems/ as a step towards the complete, total destruction of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the consolidation of a world truly free of such weapons.

Alternative 2 MEX

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should adopt without delay all relevant measures for the effective implementation of the agreement they have concluded as a result of the second series of the strategic arms limitation negotiations (SALT II) the text of which has been transmitted by them to the General Assembly. The Governments of both States should also initiate promptly the third series of such negotiations (SALT III) intended to conclude another agreement including significant reductions ^{PNK} w/ from 10 up to 50 per cent in their deployments of strategic nuclear weapons/ and important qualitative limitations ^{PNK} w/ such as a five-year moratorium on any qualitative improvement of their strategic nuclear-weapons delivery systems/ as a step towards the complete, total destruction of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the consolidation of a world truly free of such weapons.

Alternative 3

W+E

There should be the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement in the second strategic arms limitation negotiation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties leading to agreed ^{PNK} /significant/ reductions and qualitative limitations.

Table 10: Nuclear and Conventional Disarmament
(pp. 25-26 in the draft final document)

C. /Immediate and short-term measures to halt
and reverse the arms race/

1. /Nuclear weapons/

Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. To this end steps should be taken urgently to stop the build-up of nuclear arsenals, to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to halt further development of ^Wand production of new types of ^Wnuclear armaments. The nuclear-weapon States ^{NA}particularly the two leading nuclear-weapon States ^Wbear a special responsibility for realization of these tasks.

Alternative 1 ^{NA} ^{W+E}
/Measures of nuclear disarmament will require parallel progress
in the limitation and reduction of the armed forces of States and of
their conventional weapons. / ^{NA}In ^Wturn/

Alternative 2 ^{NA}
/Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create
an atmosphere which could contribute to progress in conventional
disarmament. / ^{NA}and vice versa. /

Alternative 3 ^{PAK} ^{JND}
/Progress in the limitation and reduction of the armed forces
of States ^{JND}/nuclear-weapon States and their allies/ and of their
conventional weapons could contribute to progress in nuclear
disarmament. /

Table 11: Machinery of Disarmament
(pp. 44-48 in the draft final document)

IV. MACHINERY

1. While disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, has become a necessity for ^{NA}ensuring^W the survival of mankind and for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, ^{W+E}very little^{NA} /insufficient/ progress has been made since the end of the Second World War. In addition to the need to exercise political will, the international machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved to enable implementation of the Programme of Action and help the United Nations to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament...

^{W+E}The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to be the principal multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament /under the auspices^{NA} of and reporting to the United Nations/. Its practice of taking decisions on the basis of consensus should be continued. In order to enhance its effectiveness /and representative character^{NA}/ the following improvements should be undertaken:

(i) The existing link between the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations should be ^{NA}retained^{E+US} /strengthened^{E+US}/. To this end:

(a) ^{E+US}Consideration should be given to ^{NA}Arrangements should be made for ^Apossible limited increase^{NA} in the membership of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament ^{US}through nominations to be made by the President of the General Assembly after appropriate consultations^{NA}. ^{NA}The limited size of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and its representative character should be maintained. / ...

(e) ^{E+US}The Conference of the Committee ^{NA}on Disarmament should submit progress reports to the General Assembly more frequently. ^{NA}In addition to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament's annual report to the General Assembly, occasional progress reports should be prepared for the information of States not members of the Conference. / ...

(iii) ^{NA+W}The present system of co-chairmanship should be ^{NA+W}retained^{SU+US} /replaced^{SU+US} by a system of monthly rotation between all ^{NA}non-nuclear-weapon States^{MEX} members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament^{SU+US} /a bureau of four members, rotating on a monthly or sessional basis, consisting of one chairman and three vice-chairmen chosen in such a manner as to reflect the composition of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament^{SU+US} /a chairman appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament^{MEX} /a chairman elected on a yearly basis by the members of the Conference. /

E+US

- (vi) ^R /The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to negotiate concrete measures of disarmament on the basis of the recommendations of the General Assembly and proposals submitted by the members of the Conference and other members of the United Nations. ^{NA} /The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, once it has undergone the reforms envisaged in this section, should ^{MEX} undertake the ^{MEX} preparation /^Mcontinue discussions and development/ of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. ^W /The said programme should be completed by 1 March 1981 at the latest and should immediately thereupon be submitted, as a draft, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that he may transmit it to Member States and to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament./...
- (viii) ^{NA} /There should be improved ^W opportunities for the public to follow the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament./ ^W /The plenary meetings of the Conference ^{NA} of the Committee on Disarmament should be made public unless otherwise decided.///

Table 12: Challenging the Balance of Power
(pp. 39-40 in the draft final document)

E. Other measures to strengthen international security and to build confidence/

In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. For this purpose, the following measures should be undertaken:

- ^W
/Early conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of force in international relations;/
- ^W
/Prohibition of the establishment of new foreign military bases and stationing of troops in foreign territories;/
- ^W
/Withdrawal of foreign troops and dismantling of foreign military bases;/
- ^W
/The dissolution of military blocs;/
- ^W
/Not to extend the existing military alliances by admitting new members;/

Submission by States of reports to the United Nations on their military budgets ^Eusing the method shortly to be finalized through a pilot study by the Secretary-General for the standardized reporting of such budgets as a step towards verified and balanced reductions in military expenditure./

^{Egypt}
/Arrangements could be made, on a regional or bilateral basis, and in accordance with regionally agreed criteria, providing for prior notification of major military manoeuvres, ^{E+W}refraining from conduct of such manoeuvres above agreed level/ and for exchanges of observers to military manoeuvres and other kinds of exchanges, on a reciprocal basis, of military personnel by invitation./

^E
/An undertaking not to make ^Rshows of strength or concentrate armed forces near the frontiers of other States./ ^Rexcept on the basis of mutual agreement./

The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict.

^E
/Publish detailed information ^Wabout their armed forces, and the total value of their arms production and of their transfers of arms to other countries;/

States should assess the possible ^{S Poland}negative implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Table 13: Non-Proliferation
(pp. 20-23, 33-34 in the draft final document)

2. Among such measures, ^{W+E}the highest priority ^{NA}must be given to ^{NA}nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war ^{NA}are of the ^Whighest priority. To this end it is equally imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race by ^Wstopping the production ^{NA+E}of nuclear weapons and ^Wprogressive reduction of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems until their total elimination has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons ^{W+E}on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, without infringing on the sovereign rights of States, or ^{PAK}hindering international co-operation and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. 11/
11. Measures of disarmament ^Wshall not be construed in such a way as to hamper ^{NA}the exercise of the inalienable right of all States ^{NA}should be ^Wconsistent with the exercise of the inalienable right of all States
- ^{PAK}without discrimination ^Wto develop, transfer, acquire or use ^Wwithout any ^{PAK}discrimination or hindrance, nuclear technology, equipment or materials for peaceful purposes and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests. Such measures must not hinder the strengthening of international co-operation in that field. ^{NA}In order to ensure that the ^Wpeaceful application of nuclear energy does not lead to further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, access to such technology, equipment and material ^{NA}and its ^Wapplication ^{NA}for peaceful purposes should be subject to ^{W+E}universal, ^{NA}standardized and ^{PAK}non-discriminatory ^{NA}international ^{PAK}safeguards ^{PAK}agreed upon by supplier and recipient States. ^{NA}Appropriate national and international ^Wmeasures, including in particular the ^{NA}International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system ^{NA}to cover all relevant nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States ^{PAK}applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis and without jeopardizing the respective fuel cycle policies of various countries or international co-operation, agreements and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which should be fulfilled in good faith in accordance with their terms and provisions. /

NA

Further measures should be undertaken jointly by the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States to develop an international consensus on ^{NA}additional ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons ^{PAK}on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, ^{NA}including agreed measures to strengthen ^{NA}and consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation régime ^{PAK}in conformity with the principles of independence and sovereignty of States, ^{NA}based primarily on adherence of all States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ^W13/ and on the system of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency/.

To this end: ^W19/

Steps should be taken to ensure that all ^{NA}nuclear facilities ^{NA}/source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities ^{NA}/of ^{NA}all States ^{NA}are placed under agreed and appropriate international safeguards ^{NA}arrangements ^{NA}/applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency ^W/on a universal, standardized and ^{NA}non-discriminatory basis./

^W/Steps should be taken by the ^{NA}nuclear-weapon States for a binding commitment to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race leading towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to stop the refinement of nuclear weapons and the production of new systems of such weapons ^Eand to undertake not to ^{NA}use nuclear weapons ^W/which would lead to ^Ethe removal of the threat of use of nuclear weapons. ^W/

^{NA}/All ^Wpeaceful ^{PAK}nuclear facilities ^Ein all States ^{W+NA}/source and special fissionable material ^{NA}which are not presently subject to international inspection and control should be brought under the International Atomic Energy Agency system of safeguards./

Alternative 1 ^{NA}/Universal adherence ^Wto the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be encouraged. All States should be urged to ratify the Treaty or at least to abide by its provisions and objectives./

NA

The International Atomic Energy Agency should be assisted in its attempts to strengthen its safeguards system, in evolving a standardized system of safeguards to be applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

Agreements should be reached on adequate standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials.

NA

Alternative and more proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies should be studied with a view to their development.

NA

The possibility of giving suitable international character to appropriate nuclear fuel cycle operations, and to effective measures for the control of plutonium in civil nuclear programmes should be examined; and

NA

The work currently being undertaken in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluations should be supported.

Alternative
text for
preceding
three
paragraphs

PAK

Contribute to the success of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluations in accordance with the objectives set out in the joint communiqué of its organizing conference.

NA These non-proliferation measures should be designed to enable not hinder the exercise of the inalienable right of all States to apply and develop as embodied in article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons their programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear technology for economic and social development, in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs, and to have access to and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear-explosive devices.

ITALY

Substantive and timely measures should be devised in order to guarantee to all States the exercise of their inalienable right to develop - under appropriate internationally agreed safeguards and through an increased international co-operation - research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to enjoy the benefits thereof.

PAK

An international programme should be considered under the auspices of the United Nations system, for the promotion of transfer and utilization of nuclear technology under appropriate and agreed international safeguards applied on a universal, standardized and non-discriminatory basis, for economic and social development, especially of the developing countries in accordance with taking into account the principles approved in General Assembly resolution 32/50.

Table 14: "Security assurances" by the nuclear -
weapon States

From the beginning of the NPT negotiations many NNWS urged the NWS to extend credible and effective assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Such assurances could take the form of "positive" guarantees, i.e. assistance as among allies in the case of nuclear threat or blackmail as well as "negative" assurances that the nuclear-weapon States will not use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom have stated their inability to go beyond Security Council resolution 255 (1968) in extending "positive" guarantees, although Article 51 of the United Nations Charter could be interpreted as providing for collective defence against aggression with conventional as well as nuclear weapons. During the SSOD, the nuclear powers made pledges on the non-use of nuclear weapons. As it can be seen the declarations were not unconditional and reflected the security interests and strategic doctrines of each power. Here are the non-use pledges as delivered at the SSOD:

United States

"The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear State party to the non-proliferation

Treaty or to any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack."(A/S-10/AC.1/PV.9)

Soviet Union

"The Soviet Union declared that it will never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no nuclear weapons on their territories. We are ready to conclude special agreements to that effect with any such non-nuclear State. We call upon all other nuclear Powers to follow our example and assure similar obligations."
(A/S-10/AC.1/4)

United Kingdom

"I accordingly give the following assurance, on behalf of my Government, to non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices: Britain

undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against such States except in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon State." (A/S-10/PV. 26)

France

"In terms of their security, the decision by the States of a region to preserve a nuclear-free status should entail an obligation for the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from seeking a military advantage from this situation. Nuclear-weapon States should in particular preclude, according to a formula to be defined, any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States that are part of a nuclear-free zone." (A/S-10/PV.3)

China

"We have... on many occasions stated that we will at no time and in no circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons... A measure of urgency is for all nuclear countries to undertake not to resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones." (A/S-10/PV.7)

Similar pledges were presented by the NWS to the Committee on Disarmament in 1980 (see CD/133 and CD/136).

In 1981, together with their world-wide peace offensive against the West, the Soviet introduced in the United Nations, for the first time a draft resolution asking the General Assembly to "authoritatively and resolutely declare the first use of nuclear weapons to be the gravest crime against humanity" (see chapter 8 for analysis and references). At the Second Special Session of the United Nations on June 12, 1982, the Soviet Union made a further step in its declaratory policy and for the first time has unilaterally committed itself to a no first use policy. The message of the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev was delivered to the General Assembly by Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister:

Guided by the desire to do all in its power to deliver the peoples from the threat of nuclear devastation and ultimately to exclude its very possibility from the life of mankind, the Soviet state solemnly declares the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics assumes an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

This obligation shall become effective immediately at the moment it is made public from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly. (A/S-12/PV.12).

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Biographical Note

Avi Beker was born in Tel-Aviv (1951) and served as a lieutenant in the Israeli Army. He is a veteran of the Yom Kippur War (1973) and as a reservist served as liaison officer with U.N. forces in the Sinai bufferzone.

He is a graduate of Tel-Aviv University in Political Science and Jewish History and worked there as a research assistant and instructor in international relations.

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He is a member of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations (1977-1982) and a delegate to five General Assemblies serving in the plenary meetings of the Assembly and, in particular, as an advisor in the First Committee on Political and Security Affairs. He was a delegate to the U.N. Disarmament Commission and to the two Special Sessions of the General Assembly dedicated to Disarmament in May-June 1978 and June-July 1982.

His article "The Arms-Oil Connection - Fueling the Arms Race" was published in Armed Forces and Society Volume 8 (3) Spring 1982.

Avi Beker is married to Zvia and father of two sons: Areli and Elad.