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**The academics and the powers: Colonialism, national
development and the Irish university**

Sheehan, Elizabeth Anne, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1990

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THE ACADEMICS AND THE POWERS:
COLONIALISM, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
AND THE IRISH UNIVERSITY

by

ELIZABETH ANNE SHEEHAN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of
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1990

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

THE ACADEMICS AND THE POWERS:
COLONIALISM, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
AND THE IRISH UNIVERSITY

by

Elizabeth Anne Sheehan

Adviser: Professor Jane Schneider

This dissertation examines the role of universities and academic intellectuals in the construction of Irish national identity over time. The study is based on a comparison of Ireland's two largest and most influential colleges: Trinity College Dublin, founded in 1592 as a Protestant institution, and University College Dublin, part of the National University of Ireland founded in 1908 to educate the Catholic majority. Historical and ethnographic sources are used to explore the changing relationship of these two institutions and their faculty members to Irish intellectual and political life between the colonial period and the present. The long-term conflict between scholarly knowledge and native cultural tradition, a legacy of Ireland's colonial history, is examined as well.

Focusing on the more recent period, the dissertation discusses the increasing influence of state planning initiatives on Irish higher education since the 1960s, as the country has undergone modernization and greater incorporation into the European Community. As both Trinity College and University College commit themselves equally to

this new development agenda, historical distinctions between the two institutions have diminished. However, new divisions have emerged in Irish academic and intellectual life as the state technocrat has gained public authority over the creative and the socially critical intellectual. In this context, the recent participation of academics in the public sphere of political and cultural debate may be viewed as an attempt to restore the traditional authority of the humanist intellectual and to generate critical reanalysis of Irish history and culture in a climate of disorienting social change.

Finally, the dissertation considers the impact of external intellectual and economic forces upon Irish academia, examining Ireland's position within the contemporary "academic world system" of scholarly networks, research funding, conferences and publishing. It suggests that Ireland's historical experience of political economic dependency and cultural marginality is recreated to some extent within this system, and that efforts by the country's intellectuals to redefine Ireland in this international context may be constrained by a prevailing scholarly and popular interest in the "traditional" Ireland of peasants, poets and patriots.

PREFACE

In July 1987, the American Conference for Irish Studies celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary by holding its annual meeting at University College Dublin, the largest branch of the National University of Ireland. One of the keynote speakers at the conference was an American political scientist from the College of William and Mary, whose topic was "Perspectives on the Irish Constitution."

His theme was appropriate, but perhaps too timely. 1987 marked the fiftieth anniversary of Bunreacht na hEireann, modern Ireland's third constitution and a central text in the construction of the nation-state. A product chiefly of the political and social philosophy of Prime Minister Eamon de Valera, Bunreacht has served as both a legislative and an ideological charter for the independent, and predominantly Catholic, Republic of Ireland. Since the late 1960s, with Ireland's modernization as well as renewed sectarian struggle in the North, this constitution has come under attack from those who wish to promote cultural pluralism and a more liberal social climate in the Republic.

The day before the American professor's address, de Valera's private papers relating to the drafting of the 1937 Constitution had been opened to limited public inspection for a period of six months, in commemoration of

this fiftieth anniversary. These materials offered a new opportunity for political analysts and historians to discern the most critical issues in the document's development, as well as the deepest intentions of its authors. For some, greater knowledge of the idiosyncracies involved in the Constitution's construction might provide further justification for its dismantling. The Irish media had already indicated that de Valera's papers would throw a revealing new light on the thinking behind Bunreacht, particularly in regard to the significant role of the Catholic Church in framing certain sections.

The American professor noted the awkward timeliness of these developments, but proceeded to read his paper anyway. After his talk, the head of University College Dublin's Department of Modern History raised his hand to note that he had just returned from the Franciscan research institute where de Valera's files were lodged. The Irish professor had been able to peruse these for only a few hours, but that was long enough for him to counter some of the American speaker's points and in the process bring the academic axis of interpretation squarely back onto Irish turf.

As an American anthropologist attending the conference, I found this event significant for several reasons, apart from the specific historiographical questions it raised. The ACIS meeting took place less than

two weeks before I was to leave Ireland after an eleven-month period of fieldwork on Irish academics and intellectuals. The conference offered an appropriate form of closure for my research, bringing together Irish Studies scholars from throughout Ireland and Great Britain and their American colleagues. In addition, the setting was apt, as my fieldwork had been conducted at University College Dublin as well as Dublin's other leading educational institution, Trinity College. Finally, the you-are-there enactment of historical revisionism right before my eyes offered a dramatic illustration of some of the issues I had come to be most concerned with in my research: the attempt by Irish intellectuals to reinterpret Irish history in a way that might legitimize new agendas for the future, the relationship of Irish culture to intellectual and political life in Ireland as a whole, and the position of Irish academics and their universities within the contemporary "world-system" of international academia.

Specifically, my research concerned the relationship of Irish universities and their academics to national issues of political, economic and cultural transformation in Ireland today. Fieldwork was carried out primarily with faculty members of the Republic's two largest and historically most influential colleges, University College Dublin and Trinity College, both located in the capital

city and associated over time with the nation's intellectual, professional and political elite. As such, many of their faculty members move within intersecting spheres of influence based not only on their position as educators, but on their access to government, state agencies, and the media.

In a larger sense, however, university academics have been somewhat anomalous figures in independent Ireland. In part, this is due to a prevailing preference in Irish society for creative intellectual work that celebrates Ireland's native traditions, and that disdains the formal knowledge associated with colonial institutions. The strong influence of the Catholic Church on Irish intellectual life since the mid-nineteenth century, as well as the delayed development of indigenous educational centers, also continues to affect the public standing of secular academics in Ireland today. Since the 1960s, Irish universities have come to be seen largely as instruments of economic development, with technology and the applied sciences emphasized to the neglect, some educators feel, of the liberal arts. My research was concerned with the combined force of these factors, both historical and contemporary, in influencing the public role and perception of the humanist intellectual in modern Ireland.

An ethnographic focus on university academics offered a way for me to locate intellectuals, an otherwise

amorphous social group, in a discrete occupational setting, with explicit structures, roles, and ideological concerns. Research in Dublin's two oldest colleges also allowed me to consider the importance of history in the creation of contemporary intellectual and social values. Trinity College, chartered by Queen Elizabeth I in 1592 as a Protestant university, has until recently been associated with the political and cultural interests of the Anglo-Irish minority. University College Dublin, the largest branch of Ireland's National University founded in 1908, developed amidst the independence struggles of the new Irish state, and has been primarily Catholic and often nationalist in its public identity. Part of my research concerned whether or not these historical distinctions still had bearing on the public activities of each college's academics, as well as on the popular evaluation of their contribution to Irish life. Beyond this, the university setting also provided an arena of national significance where many of the issues so influential in contemporary Irish society were being played out: the growing importance of technocracy as the perceived path to socioeconomic fulfillment, the integration of Irish intellectual institutions into transnational intellectual spheres, and, not least, the disheartening impact of Ireland's recent economic difficulties on the country's educational system and the opportunities within it for its

students and younger academics.

On the level of day-to-day fieldwork, my research was shaped greatly by its location in Dublin, modern Ireland's cultural and political center. During the year I spent in the Republic, the capital city was preparing to celebrate its millennium in 1988, through a historical calculation more convenient than accurate. Dublin's antiquity and rich history permeate the city, in the physical evidence of successive "invasions" from the medieval period on, as well as in the architectural legacy of its eighteenth century heyday, when it was the second city of the British Isles. Dublin's streets are a virtual walking tour of the political and intellectual landmarks of Ireland's last two centuries. As an Irish friend of mine commented with some irritation, the city is like a book. Perhaps he meant that the past intrudes too aggressively into the very different realities of Dublin's present. It is true that the city's natives regard with amusement the cultural tourists who walk around Dublin with skeleton keys to James Joyce's Ulysses clutched in their hands. Literature has made Dublin public intellectual property, but has also frozen it in time for those who know it only through its great writers. The city has changed greatly since Joyce left it in 1904, and most of these changes have occurred in the last twenty-five years.

Still, Dublin remains remarkably parochial. Its

center is small enough to be traversed in half an hour, and its political and cultural life still narrow enough to be dominated by overlapping networks of fine friends and intimate enemies. The public sphere seems almost tangible, in the close proximity of government institutions, the media, and well-known personalities. These combined characteristics of cosmopolitanism and parochialism make Dublin an ideal site for ethnographic research, but until recently, little anthropological attention has been devoted to it, or to urban Ireland in general. To non-Irish, the country is defined largely by its agrarian features and its declining Gaelic tradition, both of which have preoccupied outsiders' social analyses of the Republic. The tension between town and country still remains in Ireland, where rural interests have dominated much of political life and urbanism sometimes has been viewed as antagonistic to traditional Irish values. However, sociological distinctions between "rural" and "urban" are no longer adequate to describe the alignment of interests in contemporary Ireland, where class divisions are increasingly evident, and where European integration has created new bases for political, economic, and cultural cohesion. In this milieu, academic intellectuals are not an undifferentiated urban force, but representatives of varied social and political attitudes.

On a personal level, this research developed out of

two related interests. The first is a great regard for Irish culture and history, and an almost equally great discomfort with the way these have often been presented for non-Irish consumption. The second is an enduring interest in the unique position of intellectuals in modern society and a desire to understand the manner in which their ideas have impact on the world at large. In Ireland, intellectuals have played a key role as defenders of native culture and as leading figures in the national independence movement. In the wider cultural sphere, Irish writers hold a significant place in English-language literature, while the country as a whole is renown for its poetry and wit. Why, then, do social scientists, and the Irish themselves, so frequently describe Ireland as anti-intellectual? This apparent anomaly requires explanation beyond that of theories positing Ireland's colonial history and its religious traditions as constraints on the liberal imagination. In contemporary Ireland, as elsewhere, discomfort with intellectuals reflects uncertainty regarding their contribution to settings where practical knowledge seems paramount. This is augmented by the fragmentation of intellectual discourse into separate and apparently incompatible domains in modern society, which leaves some intellectuals more socially "useful" than others.

A final personal factor influenced this research, and

that is my half-Irish ancestry. As an American of partial Irish descent, I have been subject to a certain amount of the mythologizing of Ireland that the Irish tourist industry promulgates. This mythologizing ranges from the sublime to the ridiculous; from my awareness of deep personal tranquility in the Irish countryside, to my contempt for the cultural entrepreneurs who have tried to sell me fraudulent versions of my own past. In trying not to engage in the shamrocks-and-leprechauns discourse on Irish culture, I may have distanced myself at times from my own emotional attraction to Ireland. I did not wish to write yet another sentimental account of a year spent in the "ould sod."

This distance was encouraged as well by my recognition that being Irish and being Irish-American are two very distinct things, a fact sometimes overlooked by Irish-Americans. Over the course of five visits to Ireland between 1973 and the time of my fieldwork, I never presumed to call myself Irish to any Irish person, recognizing the great difference between those who left and those who stayed. However, I am not comfortable with this complete separation of my identity from that of those born and reared in the country. Two of my ancestors emigrated from Ireland under classic circumstances of poverty and discrimination. Family graves in Cork and Kildare attest to an inalienable quotient of Irishness in me, which no

amount of sarcasm about "roots" can disallow. This particular version of the anthropologist's liminality -- a series of levels of self and otherness regarding Ireland -- is inevitably reflected in this work and cannot help but shape its concerns and conclusions as well.

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In Ireland, my major thanks go to the faculty members, students and staff of the two colleges where I conducted this study. At University College Dublin, the Reverend Professor Conor Ward, head of the Department of Social Science, granted me visiting scholar status and in many ways facilitated my research at UCD. At Trinity College, the University of Dublin, Professor John A. Jackson of the Sociology Department extended similar courtesies to me and helped me gain entree to Trinity's academic community. Perhaps someday I will be able to reciprocate their collegiality in an appropriate manner.

I would also particularly like to thank Dr. Cyril White of UCD's Social Science Department for acting as my mentor and friend. I am grateful for all the time he spent with me, as well as for his intellectual liveliness, which stimulated my own sometimes flagging thought processes. Joseph Ruane of the Department of Social Theory and Institutions at University College, Cork also deserves special mention for his personal interest in my work, and for his critical insights into much of what I was attempting to understand. Many other faculty members and non-academic individuals in Ireland gave their time and attention to me, tolerating the lurking presence of an American stranger most hospitably. I benefited enormously from these interactions, and hope that what I have written rings true to them.

On the domestic front, my greatest appreciation goes to the Thorn family -- Myles, Imelda, Sarah and Adam. The Thorns provided me not only with a flat to live in, but with a home as well. Their continual concern for my well-being, their generosity in allowing me to participate in their family life, and their great assistance in helping me to deal with the practical problems of maintaining a residence in a foreign country are gifts almost impossible to repay. I also owe a great deal to Dun Laoghaire, the town on Dublin Bay where I lived throughout my fieldwork. Many people there made me feel a part of its community. In

addition to this, Dun Laoghaire's natural beauty and its rich literary and historical associations provided the perfect respite for me from the discouragements and loneliness of fieldwork.

At The City University of New York Graduate Center, my greatest intellectual debt is to Professor Jane Schneider, my advisor and dissertation supervisor in the Doctoral Program in Anthropology. She has guided me through the many challenges of graduate education with the utmost conscientiousness, and her contribution to this thesis is enormous. I count as no less important her personal concern for my academic survival, represented in mercies great and small. Beyond this, I admire her enormous commitment to scholarship, and would like to think that this study reflects her standards in some way.

As a teacher, Professor May Ebihara provided me with much of my basic training in anthropology and was a constant source of intellectual stimulation as I undertook this work. Her own research on the social history of American anthropology and her insights into academic culture have stimulated my thinking to a great extent. Beyond this, her friendship and support have been invaluable. Professor Vincent Crapanzano's broad intellectual vision was an inspiration to one attempting to study a society as rich as Ireland's. Professor Crapanzano encouraged me to write not only what I knew, but what I

felt. I am extremely grateful for both these individuals' involvement in this research over time, and for their personal interest in me. Professor Gary Wray McDonogh, my external reader, provided many thoughtful comments on the final draft and generously extended his time and concern to me under the usual, but no less demanding, pressure of deadlines.

Many other members of CUNY's Anthropology Program have helped me a great deal over the course of my studies. Professor Edward Hansen has been an ally since my early days as a graduate student, and I hope to retain his friendship in the future. As a member of my Second Examination committee, Professor Gerald Sider also contributed to my thinking on some of the issues relevant to this research. Professor Sydel Silverman, Executive Officer at the time I entered the Anthropology Program, offered me encouragement and practical support at many points throughout my graduate career.

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impossible without her wisdom and savvy. I propose that when The City University of New York's budget problems have been resolved, an Institute for Anthropological Research be named in her honor. For now, I will simply say to her:

Tieni Duro!

My graduate student experience has been shared most closely with two members of my cohort, Gerald Creed and Margo Matwychuk. We have survived many crises together, well beyond the normal traumas of doctoral studies. Neither of them has ever let me down, and sometimes I have asked a great deal of them. Gerald offered several brilliant suggestions to me at moments of dissertation-writing crisis, and allowed me to borrow his computer, printer, desk and brain at many other crucial times. To add to her ten-year record of extraordinary friendship, Margo took on the gruesome task of reformatting this dissertation, printing it, and serving as in-house psychiatrist. She is really the person who "finished" this dissertation. Both Gerald and Margo will be my friends forever.

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My decision to obtain a PhD in anthropology was made long before I had even completed a Bachelor's Degree. I owe this foolhardy commitment to Drs. Vincent Corrigan, Ed O'Higgins, and Geraldine McNelly, whose anthropological interest in Ireland greatly influenced my own choice of a career. Mary Woods, first a teacher of mine at The City College of New York and now a close friend, also validated my often inchoate intellectual concerns from the time I first became interested in anthropology.

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him.

My immediate family put up with years of my liminal status, as well as the domestic, emotional, and financial fluctuations this liminality engendered. From my mother, a writer, I inherited a pleasure in words; from my father, an interest in history and an awareness of the extraordinary "connectedness" of people, places, and things in the world. My sister Mary Agnes and my brother-in-law James contributed a great deal in the way of practical and concerned support at my only-too-frequent times of emergency. I would also like to thank two other family members, Maeve and Morgan Montalvo, for their fresh faces and insights into the world at large. The Ohio branch of my family provided encouragement, bowling tournaments, and valuable periods of relief from my unhealthy relationship with a personal computer over the course of several years.

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For Elizabeth Mary Odell Sheehan

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PART I. INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The real question does not concern the transition from the traditional to the modern, but rather the model of modernity itself which Ireland assumes, and, more concretely, the identification of the forces and struggles through which each [actor] strives to direct and control the process of modernization.

Michel Peillon
Contemporary Irish Society, 1982

A. Introduction.

This dissertation examines national identity as a contested public domain in the Republic of Ireland today.¹ It does this through a study of Ireland's two historically most significant colleges and their faculty members who, as educators, politicians, and social critics, are leading participants in contemporary debates over Ireland's past, present, and future. These debates originate in Ireland's historic problems of sectarianism and economic dependence; however, they are propelled now by processes of socioeconomic development since the 1960s, and by Ireland's growing involvement with the European Community in the 1980s.

Public debates about Irish national identity are framed often within a series of presumed oppositions: those between Catholic and Protestant, between tradition and modernity, and between rural and urban. This study suggests that these oppositions can be subsumed within a

larger framework, here termed a discourse between "community" and "cosmopolitanism." This discourse, which contestants present as cultural in nature, maintains ascendancy in Ireland over the potentially competing, and in some ways parallel, political discourse of right and left. Many factors can account for the historical ascendancy of this cultural discourse: Ireland's colonial past, its rural traditions, and its Catholic social values. It is more difficult to account for the continuing dominance of the cultural over the political in an independent country now undergoing "modernization" and increasing class differentiation.

This study attempts to do so by suggesting that the cultural concerns of community and cosmopolitanism remain dominant in debates about national identity to a great extent because of the way such transformations have unfolded. This cultural discourse is not simply the legacy of colonialism, as it might have been in earlier decades, but also a response to shifts in the country's national and international political economy since the early 1960s. In fact, both politics and culture are overshadowed by a wider, and ultimately more powerful, discourse of technocracy, the set piece of national development since the 1970s. This technocratic discourse is now taken for granted. No longer subject to significant debate, it has had the effect of eliminating the political dimension,

namely class, from public discussion of Ireland's economic problems. Technocracy is viewed also as a means of achieving cosmopolitanism without impinging upon the traditional values of community. In this milieu, culture is reaffirmed as the paradigm within which national identity can still be constituted, reformulated, and potentially "restored" to an earlier condition.

In many respects, the two institutions examined in this study, Trinity College and University College Dublin, embody Ireland's new technocracy. However, their present similarity in this regard stands in marked contrast to their very distinct origins. Throughout much of its history, Trinity College represented Ireland's Protestant intellectual tradition, while University College Dublin, part of the National University of Ireland, represented the country's Catholic intellectual one. The dissertation considers the changing role of these two institutions in Irish national life over time, and the degree to which their distinct histories continue to influence their public identity today. Beyond this, the dissertation examines the participation of the two colleges' faculty members in the public sphere of political and cultural debate. It looks at how common commitment to technocratic development has eliminated differences between Trinity and UCD faculty in some respects, but also created new intellectual divisions within both colleges based on the growing ascendancy of the

technocrat over the humanist as a public expert. Technocratic thinking, combined with economic recession throughout the past decade and the rise of a new social conservatism, also threatens to marginalize the political discourse on social issues that gained some influence in Ireland in the 1970s. In the late 1980s, the study suggests, mainstream academic intellectuals have returned to a "cultural" discourse that restores the humanist's traditional authority in the Irish public sphere, and that redirects political analysis back to Ireland's historical experience of colonialism, native cultural repression, and Protestant-Catholic division.

B. Setting and Data Collection for the Study.

Many of the data presented in the following chapters were collected during fieldwork in Dublin, the Republic of Ireland, conducted between August 1986 and July 1987. The two institutions that are examined, Trinity College and University College Dublin (UCD), are both located in the capital city; however, the former sits in the center of a major intersection in downtown Dublin, and the latter in a more residential area several miles from the city's core. On most school days, I spent time in participant observation at one or both of the campuses, which are well-connected by public transportation. Spending time in this manner at the colleges helped provide me with a sense of their daily life, and allowed me to attend meetings,

lectures, and social events where issues of concern to the dissertation were publicly discussed. My home throughout the fieldwork period was a town on Dublin Bay called Dun Laoghaire, about four miles away from UCD and seven miles away from Trinity.

Structured and open-ended interviews were conducted with approximately forty academics and administrators from each college throughout the period of fieldwork. When appropriate, follow-up interviews were conducted with faculty members to trace their responses to public issues as they developed, and to confirm information received from other sources. While the majority of my research population were members of humanities and social science disciplines (Literature, Philosophy, History, Sociology, Economics and Political Science), I also interviewed engineers, scientists and law faculty. In addition, many informal conversations with academics and students took place, as well as with intellectuals (journalists, artists, etc.) not employed within the university sector.

My status at both colleges was clearly liminal. I was granted affiliation with the Sociology Departments of both institutions, but remained anomalous, being neither faculty nor student. In most cases, people imposed upon me the identity they felt most appropriate to my age and credentials. Thus, in some situations I was treated as a colleague, in others as a superannuated undergraduate. In

an appendix to this dissertation, I discuss some of the implications of being an academic conducting ethnographic fieldwork in a university setting. In the long run, I believe that my uncertain status allowed me to gain insight into several levels of academic culture, and helped me to remain unaffiliated with either a "student" or "professor" interpretation of these institutions.

Outside the campuses, I attended public meetings, including academic conferences, political rallies, and literary events, at which members of my research population were participants. The center of Dublin is small, and most of these public events took place within a geographic core containing many of Ireland's major cultural and administrative institutions. Because of this contiguity, immersion in the activities of this central area also constituted a form of participant observation of political and cultural life at the national level.

Historical research for the dissertation was begun in New York City in the early 1980s, and continued throughout a two-month visit to Ireland in 1983, as well as during the period of fieldwork in 1986-87. In Dublin, research on Irish political and educational history was conducted at the libraries of both colleges, as well as at the National Library of Ireland. The literature of state agencies concerned with education and economic development also was consulted. The relevant publications and public statements

of the academics under study were monitored as much as possible, while the literature of various interest groups involved in contemporary public debates were surveyed as well. College catalogs, journals, memoirs and histories provided information on university development and the changing role of these institutions in the national context. Throughout the dissertation, these more-or-less "official stories" have been evaluated against the subjective understandings offered by my research population in conversations and interviews, and against my own interpretations.

C. Background to the Study.

1. Intellectuals, Education, and Irish Culture.

The association between scholarship and cultural identity is deeply rooted in Irish history. During the early Christian period of the sixth through eighth centuries, Ireland's monastic centers were responsible for recording native oral tradition as well as the dynastic history of the country's great chiefdoms. In addition, these monks produced a body of nature poetry celebrating the beauty and spirituality of rural Ireland. In secular foundations, lawyers and bards instructed Irish youth in the ancient systems of law and genealogy-keeping, while passing along the epic tales of Cu Chulainn and Fionn MacCumhail. As Kathleen Hughes (1967) describes, secular and sacred knowledge were not antithetical in Ireland

during this period, but complementary to each other, resulting in a fusion of the Latin and Celtic traditions.

Irish learning survived the Norse invasions of the ninth and tenth centuries, and was enriched throughout the Anglo-Norman period that followed, during which time a distinct Gaelic culture emerged as a melding of Latin, Irish, and Continental elements. In the fourteenth century, England gained some control over the Norman lords in Ireland and instituted the first set of acts designed to destroy native culture. The Statutes of Kilkenny, as these were known, forbade English colonists from speaking Irish, following Irish customs, and recognizing Irish law. An "English Pale" was established in the eastern section of the country, surrounding and including Dublin, England's administrative center in the colony.

Between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, native scholars, often poets and students of the priesthood, were able to provide a modicum of classical learning to Irish children in secret "hedge schools," located in the less-administered countryside. Irish colleges on the Continent were established to provide higher education to native Irish, most of whom were forbidden to attend university in Dublin and England. These colleges became great centers of Catholic pedagogy, and maintained Ireland's political and cultural links with Catholic Europe. Education as a political issue was

clearly linked to Catholicism by the early nineteenth century, when the Irish Hierarchy began to press the English government for native educational facilities. Ironically, the national school system that was eventually created ceded almost full control over primary education to parish priests, who maintained their tight grip on this area up until the 1960s (Coolahan 1981).

Academics and intellectuals played prominent roles in the nationalist movement which gained momentum in the late nineteenth century. Their participation in the events leading up to the Easter Rising in 1916 helped infuse the struggle for independence with the aura of a cultural and spiritual reawakening, while burdening it with a heavy load of romantic idealism. Seven of the ten leaders of the Easter Rising were schoolteachers, and one of them, a mathematics instructor named Eamon de Valera, lived long enough (he died in 1975) to be the dominant figure of twentieth century Ireland and the chief architect of its modern national identity. De Valera, along with most other Catholic politicians and many intellectuals, saw "de-Anglicizing" the hearts and minds of the Irish people as crucial to the realization of true independence. Education was, of course, central to this process.

Yet this drive for education and self-realization did not produce an Ireland fired by love of knowledge for its own sake. In the late colonial period, those concerned

with native heritage had been forced into a holding pattern to maintain elements of Irish culture as they could. The repetition of traditional knowledge and cultural forms was a process contrary to the development of new expressions of national identity. Higher education, although viewed as an instrument of economic development, remained associated with the urban bourgeoisie and with the declining Anglo-Irish ruling classes. Thus, serious constraints were placed on the potential for independent Ireland's university-trained Catholics to assume intellectual leadership of the country. These constraints were increased with the consolidation of a rural-based political culture, wary of cosmopolitan forces, in Ireland by the late 1930s.

In this milieu, critical and experimental thought -- essential to an intellectually vital society -- often was classified as corrupt, alien, and anti-national. The "paralysis" of Irish Catholicism that James Joyce depicted in turn-of-the-century Ireland did not abate in the decades of independence that followed, and was exacerbated by state policies of economic self-sufficiency and political isolationism. Educated Catholics, graduates for the most part of the National University founded in 1908, came to be oriented more towards meeting the new state's administrative and professional needs than towards stimulating intellectual innovation. Those writers and

academics who did question Ireland's narrow cultural milieu in the period between the 1930s and 1960s often found their work vilified, if not censored, by politicians and the Church.

With socioeconomic development in Ireland since the early 1960s, higher education has become more accessible, and the universities closely integrated into state development programs. However, this transformation has not greatly altered the ambiguous status of many Irish academic intellectuals in the wider national context. Held in highest esteem are those creative artists who deal in Irish culture in their poetry and music, and who maintain the appealing, if also somewhat colonial, image of the imaginative Celt. On the other end of the spectrum, and almost equally honored now, are specialists in applied fields who provide guidance to national administrators and politicians. Their efforts are directed not only to economic development, but to making Irish society receptive to the new demands of technology and European integration. It is the academics who fall between these two culturally-defined extremes -- the poet and the technocrat -- who experience a crisis of identity most acutely now, being peripheral to both the creative and the technocratic discourses that dominate the public sphere in Ireland today.

2. Socioeconomic Development in Modern Ireland.

The past thirty years have witnessed a dramatic transformation in the economic and social character of the Republic of Ireland. However, the pace of this transformation, and its long-term implications, have not followed a smooth path. Rapid development in the 1960s and early 1970s was succeeded by economic recession and growing reliance upon the European Community in the 1980s. While further development is greatly desired, there is also wider awareness now of the negative by-products engendered by sudden "modernization" under dependent circumstances. For many Irish, these include a perceived breakdown in traditional values and a loss of control over foreign and often unwelcome cultural influences. The Irish national project now appears to center on the dilemma of maintaining economic growth and external political alliances, a cosmopolitan agenda, without abandoning the country's unique cultural and social characteristics, representative of its communal identity.

Acknowledging the failure of past economic development policies, the Irish government introduced its First Program for Economic Expansion in 1958, which stimulated growth by attracting export-oriented industry through generous tax incentives. This was followed five years later by the Second Program, which built upon the success of the first by increasing state aid to the agricultural sector and by

creating programs for labor retraining and the modernizing of native industries (Murphy 1975). Although Ireland increased its dependence on foreign economic resources through these programs and other initiatives that followed, the country as a whole entered a period of social transition and reinvigoration in the 1960s, evidenced in a decline in emigration and greater receptivity to external cultural forces. Economists and technocrats emerged as "gurus," in the commonly used term, high-profile specialists increasingly necessary to state planning needs and newly-created development agencies.

At the same time, a major shift began to take place in the size, age, and location of the Irish population. Declining emigration led to higher and earlier rates of marriage. This ultimately led to a population increase for the first time since before the Famine of the 1840s. Between 1966 and 1979, the Republic's population grew from 2.8 million to a peak figure of 3.3 million (Chubb 1982). Internal migration to the eastern core of the country shifted Ireland's demographic weight from rural to urban, as young people were attracted to the employment and social opportunities of the greater Dublin area. By the late 1980s, half of Ireland's population was under twenty-eight, and half of it lived in the eastern part of the country.

Socioeconomic development for Ireland did not just mean more of everything; in many cases it meant the first

of everything. The increasing availability of new products and access to more varied media, particularly television (introduced in Ireland in the early 1960s), transformed a society well aware of what it had lacked. The first impact of this transformation was economic and technological. That which was social or cultural often seemed directly linked to the changed environment new prosperity wrought. Even the Catholic Church seemed to sanction this development process. The Second Vatican Council, evoked by a modernizing and media-friendly pope, encouraged a new cosmopolitanism facing outward from the provincial ethos of the Irish Church. This in turn lessened some of the influence religious leaders had had in national affairs, and encouraged Irish Protestants and liberal Catholics to believe that Ireland's conservative social policies were on the verge of reform.

The Republic's movement towards political and economic maturity seemed to be capped by the country's entry into the European Community in 1973. More than 80% of the Irish electorate approved of this entry, and their confidence was rewarded by a rapid growth in the nation's economy in the first five years of membership (Wilson 1985). However, during the same period, the effects of the world-wide recession of the early 1970s began to be felt severely in Ireland. Internal development was stalled as interest rates on Ireland's heavy burden of foreign debt increased,

and the country was forced to continue borrowing just to meet the interest payments on these loans. Efforts by successive governments to maintain public faith in the "economic miracle" which had begun in the 1960s had largely disappeared by the mid-1980s, as youthful emigration resumed and annual unemployment rates hovered near 20%. In the present context, the European Community is not just another variable in national development, but Ireland's main hope for economic recovery and continued growth.

Partly in response to economic insecurity, new social problems which had emerged with urbanization and modernization, such as drug use, teenage pregnancy and inner city crime, became symbolic to many of the threat to "traditional" Irish values. By the early 1980s, religious and political conservatives had regained strength against the liberalizing social forces which had emerged in Ireland in the more optimistic 1960s and 1970s. In 1983, a constitutional referendum to ensure the illegality of abortion in the Republic was endorsed by more than 65% of Irish voters. In 1986, a referendum on making divorce legal was defeated by a similar margin. Social reformers found their efforts blocked both by this conservative revival and by the public's greater preoccupation with improving economic conditions.

Running parallel to this recent history of development

and decline has been another major factor in Irish national life. This is the resurgence of sectarian hostilities in Northern Ireland since 1968, which has destroyed much of the social and economic fabric of that region while posing new problems regarding the Republic's relationship to the Irish Protestant community. Beyond the actual incidents of paramilitary activity that have taken place on the southern side of the Border, the Northern situation has stimulated debate in the Republic regarding the means of rapprochement between its majority population (approximately 95% Catholic) and its Protestant minority. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 lay the foundation for Northern power-sharing between the Republic and the British government; however, this initial effort towards eliminating partition revealed an inauthenticity in the nationalist rhetoric concerning a reunited Ireland. Many southern Catholics are reluctant to take on the political and economic burdens of the North, while Northern Protestants (and some Northern Catholics) view with dismay the recent movement away from liberal social reform in the Republic. Here, another central issue regarding the meaning of "community" in modern Ireland is evident, in the challenge offered by the possible inclusion within its greater political and cultural sphere of a population equally Irish, but antagonistic to the prevailing values of the independent Irish state.

3. Party Politics in Modern Ireland.

The two major parties that have dominated Irish politics in one form or another since the early 1930s have retained a remarkably consistent share of support throughout the past six decades, in part due to their ability to incorporate and interpret developing issues within their established political frameworks. Much of the focus of political debate in Ireland remains fixed on the "oppositions" between these two parties, Fianna Fail, and Fine Gael. While to outsiders they appear very similar in their center-right philosophies, within Ireland they are defined by more subtle distinctions that characterize the former as nationalist, rural, and Catholic, and the latter as more cosmopolitan, urban, and professional. It is not surprising, therefore, that the more nationalist party, Fianna Fail, traditionally has dominated Irish politics, ceding significant ground to Fine Gael only periodically, and in recent years only when the latter was able to form a coalition with Ireland's third, and much weaker, party, Labour.

Both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael support economic development, European integration, and some movement towards resolving the Northern problem. Their success in achieving office and carrying out these agendas, however, lies not in their credibility as outward-facing and "modern" political apparatuses, but in their continued

ability to manipulate the internally-meaningful symbols of Irish independence and national autonomy. This pattern is maintained, perhaps enforced, in the face of evidence that Irish political structures, indeed Irish society as a whole, are now in the position mainly of responding to forces from outside the country.

The roots of the still-meaningful distinction between Fianna Fail and Fine Gael lie in the schism between moderate and more militant nationalists at the time of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921. Cumman na nGhaedheal, the middle class party that accepted national partition and dominion status at that time as a first step towards complete independence from Great Britain, was labeled "accommodationist" by the more republican Sinn Fein party, which under the leadership of Eamon de Valera rejected any form of British authority in Ireland. Cumman na nGhaedheal politicians controlled Ireland's "Free State" government throughout the first decade of independence. During this period, urban academics and professionals played a vital part in national political life. However, in 1932, de Valera's party, renamed Fianna Fail, won the largest number of parliamentary seats and formed a government. Antipathy to the middle class moderates who had supported the Treaty, as well as recognition of the political support to be found in the rural Catholic population, led de Valera to marginalize urban politicians and intellectuals from party

politics. In this effort he was supported by the Catholic Church, also suspicious of the cosmopolitan leanings of the educated middle classes.

In 1933, Cumman na nGaedheal was reorganized under the name Fine Gael, and managed to rebuild its strength, becoming Ireland's second largest party.² However, Fine Gael has never completely overcome its early associations with British colonial administration, while its continuing appeal to urban professionals and business interests has denied it a stronger base among Ireland's rural electorate. In the 1960s, efforts by younger Fine Gael politicians, most notably UCD professor Garret FitzGerald, to reorient the party towards a social reform agenda were modestly successful, resulting in two long-term Fine Gael-Labour coalition governments between 1973 and 1987. However, with the failure of these administrations to resolve Ireland's economic problems, as well as the resurgence of social conservatism, progressive politics within the Irish party system has lost its earlier momentum. Since FitzGerald's retirement as party leader in 1987, Fine Gael has retreated from the social justice platform it developed under his influence.

As often noted, Irish politics is unusual in Western Europe for its absence of a well-developed left. Although the Irish Labour Party, founded in 1912, is the country's oldest, Labour has never gained strong support among Irish

voters, despite the historical realities of poverty and unemployment. Aligning itself with the overriding agenda of achieving national independence in the years after the Easter Rising of 1916, Labour did not seize the opportunities for a class-based politics offered by Ireland's fragmented socioeconomic climate at that time. As a result, some analysts (Gallagher 1982, Murphy 1975) believe, it was permanently excluded from playing a major role in the political life of the new state which came into existence in 1922. Other forces worked against Labour's developing a broader electoral appeal in the decades that followed: the alliance between the majority of Irish voters and the Catholic Church, which discouraged popular support for socialist goals, and the claims to cross-class representation made by the two major parties. Of equal significance was Labour's failure to embrace a genuinely socialist platform, reflected in its leaders' conservative Catholic values. Instead, Labour allowed itself to be a pawn of the dominant pro- and anti-Treaty factions in Irish politics, thereby justifying popular allusions to the country's having a "two-and-a-half-party system."

In the mid-1960s, Labour began to emerge from this compromised position, making a deliberate effort to attract liberal and urban-based voters in larger numbers. Many intellectuals joined the party, and some of them ran successfully for national office as Labour candidates in

the 1969 and 1972 general elections. However, as will be discussed, "left-wing" intellectual politicians -- most of them Protestants or secular Catholics -- were not well-received by the majority of Irish voters, and their political agendas were diluted by coalition with the non-socialist Fine Gael. Along with other progressive and left-leaning forces in Ireland, Labour has been eclipsed in the 1980s by an entrepreneurial trend in party politics, represented not only in Fine Gael and Fianna Fail, but also in a new "Thatcherite" party, the Progressive Democrats. This entrepreneurialism is largely middle class and technocratic in nature, and has little commitment to social reform. Consequently, it does not attract the participation of many intellectuals. All told, the Irish party system seems to have reached a stalemate, evidenced by the narrow margins, and back-room bargaining, by which recent governments have been formed and maintained. The election of two left-wing Irish candidates to the European Parliament in 1989 suggests that the country's potential for progressive political involvement now lies not within Ireland, but within the broader, and ultimately more powerful, context of the European Community.

D. Outline of the Study.

Part I of the dissertation, Chapters One and Two, places this research in historical and theoretical context. The preceding section has provided an overview of Irish

history in relation to education, national development, and modern party politics. These themes are taken up in more detail in the following chapters as they intersect with the history of the two colleges and recent developments in the public sphere of technocratic planning and political and cultural debate. Chapter Two discusses the theoretical literature I have found useful in framing this study and its concerns, as well as the modifications that Ireland's history as an "internal colony" requires of social science analyses based in a strict dichotomy between developed industrial societies and underdeveloped colonial/post-colonial ones. The chapter concludes with a clarification of the terms of reference used in the study and what I see as the study's significance.

Part II of the dissertation, Chapters Three and Four, deals with the historical development of the two colleges and their long-term significance in Irish political and cultural life. Chapter Three discusses Trinity College as a colonial institution, for more than three centuries the symbol of British and Anglo-Irish political hegemony in Ireland, but also a vital participant in the shaping of the country's intellectual traditions. Chapter Four examines UCD's origins in the nineteenth century struggle of Irish Catholics for higher education, part of a broader nationalist agenda of political and cultural self-determination. It also examines the degree to which UCD,

as part of the National University, has retained its Catholic orientation despite its statutory non-denominationalism. These two chapters dwell on the "placeness" of the colleges as well -- their physical location, structure and appearance -- as immutable manifestations of their distinct cultural traditions and political identity in Irish society over time.

Part III, Chapters Five and Six, discusses the contemporary role both colleges play as loci for national development, as well as the structural and intellectual features that maintain significant distinctions between the colleges today. Chapter Five examines the transformations in Irish third-level education that have accompanied socioeconomic development since the 1960s, as well as the recent impact of economic recession and unemployment in the 1980s on the colleges' students and younger faculty. Chapter Six looks at the increasing importance of outside funding, primarily from private industry and the European Community, in the Irish university sector. It also considers the theoretical framework in which Ireland's new social problems, largely the result of modernization, are understood and addressed within social science research.

Moving beyond the university locale, Part IV of the study examines some of the ways the two colleges' faculty members participate in Ireland's public sphere, both as

political figures and as cultural analysts. It compares their differing forms of involvement in these realms as representative of a wider struggle between community and cosmopolitan forces in Ireland today. Chapter Seven discusses the public perception of academics as politicians and the nature of their involvement in Irish political life over the past two decades. Chapter Eight examines the role of the humanist intellectual in recent debates over Irish history and culture. These debates are discussed as a response to modernization and the recent violence of the North.

In Part V, Chapter Nine, the academic study of Irish culture is placed in a wider context. This chapter takes up the impact of external intellectual and economic forces upon Irish academia, examining Ireland's position within the contemporary "academic world-system." This system may be characterized as a set of relationships between academic/intellectual cores and peripheries in which funding, knowledge, and cultural property circulate, usually to the advantage of the wealthier and more powerful cores. Throughout much of its colonial history, Ireland was "explained" by outsiders, often representatives of different strata in the colonial regime. Since independence in the 1920s, Irish scholars and intellectuals have struggled to regain control over the images of Ireland presented to non-Irish, and to deepen their understanding

of its native intellectual traditions, both Catholic and Protestant. In Irish academia, this struggle is reflected, among other ways, in the marketing of Ireland for the "cultural tourist" industry, and in the growing international field of Irish Studies. However, the relationship between native and foreign understandings of Irish culture is complex, and Ireland's intellectuals have been complicit at times in reproducing stereotyped and non-challenging images of their society and history. These processes also have bearing on contemporary intellectual debates concerning Irish national identity, and bring this study out to its widest level -- the international context in which Ireland is understood, and in which it attempts to understand itself.

NOTES

1. For the most part, the term "Ireland" used in this dissertation refers to the twenty-six counties of the independent Republic of Ireland (Eire). The expression "the south" also is used to refer to the Republic. "Northern Ireland" and "the North" refer to the six counties which make up the Province of Northern Ireland, part of the United Kingdom. When speaking of the period prior to national partition in 1922, the term "Ireland" is used to describe all thirty-two counties.
2. Fine Gael has another uncomfortable legacy influencing its contemporary characterization. For a brief period in the early 1930s, it incorporated a semi-fascist element, known popularly as "the Blueshirts." Although the Blueshirts were soon discredited and expunged from the party, this historical association is still used as a basis for criticism by Fine Gael's detractors.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY

A. Introduction.

Those who study Ireland from a comparative social science perspective must attempt to bridge two standard models of national development. On the one hand, Ireland is rightly seen as a participant in the historical process by which the core states of Western Europe emerged with the development of capitalism. As such, Ireland shares with these core states a philosophical tradition based on Western notions of progress and rationality, expressed through political and intellectual values. On the other hand, Ireland is also viewed correctly as a post-colonial new state, underdeveloped as a result of economic exploitation by the European core. In this context, Ireland shares with many "Third World" former colonies a history of cultural repression and resistance, and a present-day effort to maintain its cultural identity in a manner conducive to continued economic growth and political autonomy.

Each of these models of national development is derived to a great extent from Western political theory, and each has its corollary in a body of scholarly work outlining the typical sociological/political characteristics of the core, or, as the case may be, the colonized periphery. The fact that Ireland sits

comfortably in neither category has resulted in a tendency amongst some scholars to view the country as overly unique. Alternatively, Ireland has been made to fit the established models through reductive analyses that leave unexplained the contradictions of the Irish situation.

These contradictions can be understood more clearly if we view Ireland as not only a former colony, but as a former "internal colony" as well. An internal colony is a region within a developed industrial state that is subject to economic exploitation and political subordination by the state's core. As Hechter (1975) has described in case of the Celtic Fringe, spatially uneven "modernization" throughout the centralizing British state beginning in the sixteenth century created geographic areas of relative development and underdevelopment. This at-first random process became ideologically and structurally institutionalized as the British core realized its capacity to maintain exploitative control over the less-developed periphery. A "cultural division of labor" emerged throughout the British Isles whereby the dependency of the Gaelic internal colonies of Wales, Scotland and Ireland came to be justified by Britain on the basis of these regions' distinct ethnic characteristics. This dependency was maintained over time through the British core's denial of equal political representation and economic self-determinism to the populations of its internal colonies.

Hechter suggests that rather than eliminating ethnic distinctions between the core and the internal colony, state development and industrialization in this situation leads instead to such distinctions being maintained and developed. In the core, the ethnic characteristics of the internal colony serve as a rationale for the latter's continued political economic exploitation. The people of such regions are often cast by state administrators as "uncivilized" and incapable of self-government. In the internal colony, native ethnicity forms the basis of regional claims to political and cultural autonomy. The region's ethnic culture is viewed there as well as incompatible with that of the core, and prevented from self-realization by the core's control.

In the internal colony, class differentiation brought about by participation in the process of industrialization may be less significant in political organization than these perceived "innate" cultural distinctions. Native culture provides a basis for binding all members of the subjugated internal colony into a common alliance. Even with independence, as in the case of Ireland, the goal of cross-class cultural unity may remain a more powerful political force than class affiliation as the new state struggles to define itself in distinction to its former colonizer. Internal colonies appear to resolve the problem of their cultural identity with independence, but the close

proximity over time of the two cultures -- that of the core and that of the internal colony -- creates further dilemmas based on the need to sort out these intertwined traditions in a satisfactory manner.

These intertwined traditions can be seen as especially problematic in the realm of formal intellectual culture, given that colonial educational institutions often serve as training grounds for native scholars. In Ireland, a further complexity is added to this situation by the long-term presence there of the Protestant Anglo-Irish, an ethnic community that is both "native" and British, and whose intellectual and social traditions combine elements of both cultures. In the period following Irish independence in 1922, efforts were made by some Irish Catholic educationalists and administrators to dismiss the work of Anglo-Irish intellectuals as anti-national and unrepresentative of Ireland's native traditions. This extreme stance has been modified in recent decades as many Irish intellectuals, both Catholic and Protestant, have come to focus their interpretive efforts instead on the problem of integrating these two traditions, each rich in its own way. The alienation of Anglo-Irish intellectual culture from Ireland's historical record is now seen as doing greater damage to the country as a whole than to the reputations of individual Anglo-Irish writers. More urgently, revived hostilities between Protestants and

Catholics in Northern Ireland since the late 1960s have made it clear that neither independence nor partition has resolved the profound dilemmas posed by social and political divisions based on ethnic identity.

In the discussion that follows, I will examine the usefulness of the internal colony model of national development in relation to Ireland and the concerns of this study. Two themes organize this discussion. The first deals with the role of technocracy as a dominant public discourse, linked to the emergence of industrial capitalism in the core states of Western Europe. I will examine technocracy as it relates to the analyses of ideology and intellectuals offered by Western social theorists, considering the adequacy of these analyses when applied to colonial and internal colonial situations. The second theme of the discussion deals with the role of universities and of academic intellectuals in national life. Universities and academics will be examined as holders of hypothetically "universal" ideas about formal knowledge and intellectual autonomy, but also as instruments of elite social reproduction and national development. These combined functions are present in colonial educational institutions as well, but are affected significantly by the complex relationship between class and culture in such settings. Finally, I will outline the significance of the study as a contribution to the understanding of academics,

intellectuals and universities as both bearers of cultural traditions and as influential social forces in the construction of new state ideologies.

B. Technocracy, the Public Sphere, and the Intellectual.

The rise of scientific rationality in Western society is closely linked to the philosophical innovations of the Enlightenment and the structural transformations of capitalism. As such, rationality, and the technocracy to which it gave rise, must be understood as ideologies originating in the European core. Subsequently, rationality and technocracy became part of the ideological framework through which "modernization" was imposed upon the underdeveloped world by the colonizing core states.

The idea that nature was subject to human understanding, and hence control, was critical in freeing Western Europe from the constraints of religious beliefs. Scientific rationality also challenged the feudal social order by undermining the allied power of the Church and the aristocracy, founded in received wisdom and divine authority. Linked to productive processes, rationality offered the practical means of releasing humankind from back-breaking labor and providing an improved standard of living for all. As such, it presented itself as a source of human emancipation.

However, controlling nature also meant establishing new forms of control over mankind, part of the natural

world. Human labor became another factor to be structured and systematized as industry demanded greater output and reduced costs. In this context, science revealed its potential for domination, legitimized by the commercial and intellectual bourgeoisie in the name of progress and prosperity. As Aronowitz (1988) writes:

Science became the cutting edge of natural domination, albeit rationalized in terms of the quest for human freedom. As human control over nature was extended, the domination of humans became easier since 'human nature,' now the internalized beast, required harnessing (:152).

From being a challenge to received and untested wisdom, science developed into a new, all-encompassing paradigm in industrial society. In this process, technology lost its general meaning of being any practice or craft, and instead became the specialized skills by which scientific reason was applied. As Aronowitz (ibid.) describes, the modern power of science and technology lies in their conflation of knowledge and truth. Science and technology contend that what can be demonstrated through established and reproducible methods is irrefutable, ideology-free, and beyond criticism. The "truth" of other forms of knowledge is viewed as questionable, or, at best, ascientific. Those who deal exclusively in scientific and technical reason marginalize those who do not possess the expert knowledge or credentials to challenge it; at the same time, this type of reason is rarely subjected to internal critique by those who have mastered it. As a

result, science and technology are able to conceal for the most part their unacknowledged aspect of domination.

As state and economy became more closely linked in Western societies throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, technocratic logic became the guiding force behind the administration of the bureaucratic state as a whole. Such bureaucratization was based on the need to standardize and rationalize the complex structures of state authority, and was "scientific" in its attempt to eliminate personal and irrational components from the execution of this authority (Bendix 1968). At the national level, a group of technocrats emerged whose function was not solely to promote their own particular forms of expert knowledge, but to facilitate the acceptance of technocratic rationality as the preferred and normative instrument of socioeconomic transformation. Gramsci (1971) describes these "technical-political personnel" as replacing the traditional political leadership of the industrial state, their job being "to adjudicate between the solutions put forward by the experts, and hence to choose the correct one from the 'synthetic' viewpoint of political technique" (:28).

Technocrats of this sort are drawn from several sectors, including the university, the civil service, and political parties. This diversity supports the claim that technocracy has no single class-based or professional

interest, and thus circumvents the need to examine the technocratic agenda. Technocracy, as Habermas (1970) describes,

removes the total social framework of interest in which strategies are chosen, technologies are applied, and systems established, from the scope of reflection and rational reconstruction (:82).

The specialization of technocratic knowledge and its limited vulnerability to public criticism have implications for the quality of communication within contemporary intellectual communities. Gouldner (1979) sees technocrats (or the technical intelligentsia, in his term) and humanist intellectuals as together constituting a "new class," capable of communication on the basis of a shared "culture of critical discourse." Somewhat idealistically, Gouldner sees this shared discourse as demanding self-critique and accountability on the part of the technocrat as well as the humanist. As he writes:

People must give reasons; they cannot rely upon their position in society or in their science to justify technical decisions And even when operating within a single paradigm, an accumulation of anomalous findings requires them to revise or abandon the paradigm, which they are able to do only by reverting once again to the culture of critical discourse (:30).

But Gouldner notes as well that in technocratic and industrial societies, humanist intellectuals tend to lose their "privileged market position" (:4) as education becomes more accessible and knowledge becomes highly differentiated. As developments in science and technology outpace those in other fields, humanist intellectuals, as

well as the general public, become even more disadvantaged as commentators on these forms of understanding and their practical application. The acceptance of technocratic rationality as the norm imposes new restraints on the capacity of intellectual and scientific specialists to address each other's fields of interests, and, more significantly, to develop an overall perspective on the social implications of technocratic logic. This specialization results in a fading comprehension, as Abercrombie (1980) writes, of "the essential totality of human experience, its organic unity, which is essential to a full and humanized life" (:83).

It is true that all disciplines and intellectual specialties employ their own "fellowships of discourse," to use Foucault's (1972) term. As he describes, humanist intellectuals retain their traditional influence by enforcing their own exclusionary discourses in the university and in other public arenas of intellectual life. The power of the humanist's discourse lies in its basis in traditional forms of knowledge, and in its recreation of old themes in new forms. (Foucault [ibid.] gives the example of The Odyssey resurfacing in Joyce's Ulysses.) But even here there is an important distinction to be made between those who interpret this traditional knowledge and those who create new versions of it. The latter is "art," construed as a creative and self-representing form of

intellectual expression. Art alone remains outside the domination of technocratic and scientific reason. Rather than marginalizing art and artists, this exclusion lends them a unique power, comparable to that once held by religion. This is especially true in settings where intuitive, culturally-particular knowledge, and not academic, culturally-anonymous knowledge, is seen as representing the core ideas of the society as a whole.¹

Communication is a central theme in Habermas's discussion of the emergence and decline of the public sphere in modern Europe. Tracing the history of this entity from its origins in the socioeconomic transformations of the late seventeenth century, Habermas (1989) sees communicative social action within the public sphere as the means by which a new commercial and professional bourgeoisie sought to reveal and impose reason on the state. This reason was based on natural law, whose authority was evident beyond the claims of traditional privilege and absolutist regimes, "unnatural" forces of domination. Enlightenment thought offered a philosophical framework for the emergent public sphere, but it was not until the disintegration of the feudal order was complete, and in its place had risen a state charged with administering authority through differentiated public institutions, that the public sphere could be realized as an arena in which an autonomous "civil society" presented

its demands to state authority.

The public sphere claimed the membership of all those who lived within the state. However, it was the merchant and professional classes, most influential as private citizens, who dominated discourse within it. Nonetheless, competence in public speaking and commentary, and not class per se, ultimately qualified one for participation in this realm. These spokesmen of the public, Habermas writes, "knew of no authority beside that of the better argument" (ibid:41).

Habermas defines the public sphere as "a realm of social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed" (1985:49), and as "the sphere of private people come together as a public" (1989:27). The public sphere is realized in face-to-face dialogue, in public congregation, and in institutions, such as the press. Habermas examines the importance of journalism, salons, and cultural societies in disseminating information and critical opinion about state transactions throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This information made possible an awareness of political diversity and opposition within the public body, but also lay the foundation for monitoring and coopting such diversity -- for example, in the creation of newspapers controlled by political parties and in the development of public opinion polls. Within the intellectual sector of the public sphere, the original

agenda of examining all aspects of social, economic, and political life through a common set of philosophical principles eventually gave way to the development of specialized journals, areas of commentary, and theoretical perspectives. The literary intellectual became closely associated with art and with the delineation of standards of public taste.

Habermas dates the deterioration of the bourgeois public sphere from the last third of the nineteenth century, when the relatively privatized interests of laissez-faire capitalism were replaced by the more organized state capitalism of trusts and cartels. The liberal ideals of the early commercial bourgeoisie, articulated through the medium of the public sphere, lost their claim to universal representation in the context of more and more exploitative economic regimes. Increasingly, the working classes were seen as a threat to the social order, the events of the French Revolution having been echoed in proletarian uprisings throughout the nineteenth century. Mass media assumed the role of controlling, limiting, and molding information in the interests of the state and its dominant political economic sectors, rather than being a force oppositional to institutionalized authority. Technical reason, originally an extension of humanist thought into the practical sphere, became the logic justifying the a priori decisions of state agencies,

no longer answerable to the public.

Habermas (1986) sees the utopian vision of bourgeois ideology as shored up throughout much of the twentieth century by the modern welfare state, in the form of extended legal rights and the provision of economic subsidies which sustain workers as consumers. However, he argues that since the mid-1970s a "new obscurity" regarding the value of the welfare state and its utopian potential for the future has emerged amongst European intellectuals. The welfare state has increased the quantity of goods and services available, but has not improved the actual quality of life. Instead, it has produced, as Dube (1988) describes it, a "philosophy of empty plenty" (:505). The destructive and inhuman forces of technology and bureaucracy pose the threat of further social deterioration, if not human extinction altogether. In Habermas's view, "progressives" now seek to preserve the balance between market and individual needs through welfare state entitlements; "conservatives" have withdrawn from this agenda altogether and encourage corporations and private institutions to take the lead both in stimulating the economy and discharging humane tasks. The state itself has become depoliticized, in the sense that it no longer assumes full responsibility for administering the social and economic order over which it presides.

Using Habermas's model, it is possible to speculate on

what happens to the public sphere when no positive social agenda for the future exists. Within a state-promoted ideological framework of lowered expectations, the public sphere may become simply an arena in which dominant interest groups continue to vie for diminishing services, benefits and influence. McCarthy (1989) describes this transition away from a universalizing agenda:

The public sphere of social-welfare-state democracies is rather a field of competition among competing interests, in which organizations representing diverse communities negotiate and compromise among themselves and with government officials, while excluding the public from their proceedings (:xii).

Touraine (1988) also sees the "center stage" of the public sphere in contemporary Europe as bereft of meaningful ideological combat, a void "filled only superficially by the mass media, putting over either the political razzmatazz or the cult of personality" (:451). With no faith in the possibility of real social transformation, short-term goals, and their short-term improvements, may become the via media of public debate in such settings. Under these circumstances, the technocrat is at an advantage; only he seems to have any practical and integrated notion of what might be done, and how to do it.

As Habermas (ibid.) notes, the cultural policy of the technocratically-administered state also tends to depict critical intellectuals as "non-productive," overly concerned with philosophical issues -- e.g., the quality of life -- which have no relevance to practical matters. At

the same time, as he writes,

conventional morality, patriotism, bourgeois religion and folk culture, is to be carefully nurtured, in order to compensate for personal burdens on one's private life and to offer some cushion against the pressures of a competitive society and its accelerated modernization (:11).

Thus while the critical intellectual who enters into social and political debate is disdained, the "cultural" intellectual, the link to an idealized and unified social order, is honored. Culture in its various traditional manifestations becomes not only a palliative for modern anomie, but an arena in which a moral system independent of political and economic forces potentially can be restored.

Habermas is writing for the most part of successful Western European core states. In such settings, national identity has only recently resurfaced as a public issue in the context of declining political economic influence and the threat to cultural "integrity" posed by ethnic minorities, both native and immigrant. We need only consider the emergence of the heritage industry in Thatcher's Britain to find an example of a previously undermined traditional culture being used now to compensate for the loss of empire and economic self-confidence. "Little Englandism" is a perfect metaphor for lowered national expectations.

Nonetheless, Habermas (ibid.) sees some hope for the revitalization of the Western utopian agenda in the "dissident" social movements of the late twentieth century

-- environmentalism, feminism, and ethnic revivalism, for example. These movements retain elements of Enlightenment social philosophy, but reject the consequences of Western rationality brought to its current global impasse. In Habermas's view, such social movements show a potential for reinstituting a communicative public sphere below the level of established parties, which have been co-opted by political systems, and across national boundaries. In a recent essay, Thompson (1990) goes so far as to suggest that the current transformations of Eastern Europe can be linked to the East-West alliance established by the European Nuclear Disarmament movement. In Ireland as well, civil rights and environmental groups have sought to enter into cross-national coalitions, primarily within the European Community. As yet, however, these groups remain minority interests within Irish politics itself.

The cynical use, as Habermas describes it, to which traditional culture is now put in the declining core states is considerably different from that found in ex-colonial societies such as Ireland. In these settings, there is often a historical disjuncture between the nation and the state. The nation may be seen as autochthonous and having legitimacy prior to the state, which is imposed from outside by alien forces.² This reflects a disjuncture as well between the culture of the colonizer and that of the colonized people, with profound implications for the

public sphere and the participation of intellectuals within it during the period of colonial rule. The public sphere is controlled by alien interests; those natives who enter into it through education and professionalization risk losing their standing as representatives of the people. A separate intellectual tradition, closely associated with the indigenous culture that is devalued and repressed, is maintained by the "nation" apart from this elite public sphere.

While regional cultural revival movements exhibit some parallels with those of colonial and ex-colonial societies, the relationship between local and national cultures in the former setting is often more complex. Colonial economies are almost by definition underdeveloped. Regional economies are not necessarily so, and class differentiation in such areas may influence popular adherence to traditional culture in various ways. Hansen (1977), for instance, describes how the nineteenth century Catalan bourgeoisie used regional culture to assert their demands for political and economic autonomy against the Spanish state. However, a long history of class conflict, based in the region's early industrialization, often worked against proletarian acceptance of the local bourgeoisie's authority. Franco's repression of regional culture spurred its decline in the twentieth century, and in the case of Catalonia lead to the emergence of an individualistic "bar

culture" replacing the collectivism of cultural associations.

In ex-colonial settings, both of the standard and "internal" kind, the clearer distinction that exists between native and imposed culture grants a special authority to those intellectuals -- poets, artists, and musicians -- who can claim unbroken alliance with the perceived tradition of the native community. In such settings, the revalorization of religion and folklore that Habermas describes as a consequence of exhausted utopian energies alternatively may represent a sense that the national agenda has yet to be realized in the independent state. Here, as in contemporary Ireland, technocracy remains a legitimate, perhaps the only, means of fulfilling the practical aspects of this agenda, morally guided by cultural values. Perceived as a socially neutral force, technocratic logic allows modernization (otherwise a path to cosmopolitanism) to proceed without undermining the traditions of community. Traditional culture retains its utopian dimension based in its potential to restore the social order apart from the mundane political sphere, so long under the control of foreign interests.

In considering the problem of the public sphere and utopian vision in the context of societies with a colonial division such as Ireland, I have found that the literature on European intellectuals also requires modification.

Mannheim (1960) sees utopianism as characteristic of subordinate social groups locked in a struggle with dominant ideological interests. In former colonies, however, the newly dominant classes may continue to rely on their historically subordinate status to legitimate their present authority. Such is the case in Ireland, where an entrenched bourgeoisie casts itself as the rightful heir of the once externally-controlled apparatuses of state and economy. Still, this bourgeoisie's utopian agenda, to the extent that it exists, is influenced by Ireland's historical engagement with Western Europe as well. As a result, faith in the bourgeois vision of technocratically-driven progress and prosperity -- a legacy of Ireland's internal colonial history -- is combined with a pragmatic use of "traditional" culture to distinguish the new power holders from the former colonizer. It is, in part, Ireland's close affinity with British political and social values that preserves culture as so powerful a discourse in independent Ireland.

The issues of colonialism and internal colonialism also complicate the long-standing debate concerning the intellectual's position in class society and his degree of autonomy from class interests. In his early discussion of intellectuals in Ideology and Utopia (ibid.), Mannheim describes them as relatively free of such interests, acting primarily as the passive transmitters or representatives of

the interests of various social groups, including those of their respective classes. In his later work, however, Mannheim came to view intellectuals' lack of social unity more problematically as a condition leading to their manipulation by different political forces (Abercrombie 1980). Overall, Mannheim sees intellectuals acting in their intellectual capacities (apart from their inherent class affiliations) as essentially detached from specific classes, but serving as the vehicle of class interest in different ways at different times. Such a formulation relies upon the recognition of clearly differentiated class strata in a given society. As suggested earlier, historical factors within the colonial and internal colonial setting often obscure the political force of such differentiation.

While sharing with Mannheim the notion of detached mobility as a defining characteristic of the intellectual, Gramsci (1971) outlines a more systematic, class-based model of this social type. Rather than seeing intellectuals as a distinct group only partially attached to specific classes, Gramsci describes all classes as producing their own forms of intellectual understanding, representative of their separate class interests or world-views. In all classes, however, certain individuals emerge to perform the public function of representing these interests, and hence become intellectuals in the popular

sense. Gramsci distinguishes between the "organic" intellectual, explicitly attached to a specific class and working towards the realization of its interests, and the "traditional" intellectual, apparently less class-affiliated in his professional role as scholar or clergyman, but also historically associated with elite groups that may be in decline. For Gramsci, it is "idealist philosophy" (:8) that allows the traditional intellectual (once organic to specific classes) to be viewed as independent of dominant social groups.

Gramsci sees social revolution as a product of conscious planning and will, not as an inevitability under the deteriorating structures of capitalism. Working class intellectuals may be key agents in this revolutionary process, but only if they retain their ideological affiliation with their class of origin. However, many traditional intellectuals are recruited from the working class, and hence cease to represent their organic interests. In this transition, they take on the special authority and mystique of the traditional intellectual, which also limits their revolutionary potential. Gramsci (ibid.) argues for the institution of another type of intellectual identity and involvement. As he writes:

The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, 'permanent persuader' and not just a simple orator ... (:10).

Within the colonial or ex-colonial context, Gramsci's distinction between the organic and the traditional intellectual requires some modification as well. In industrialized Western Europe, from which Gramsci derives much of his analysis, class struggle has long been understood to be a vehicle of positive social transformation. Organic intellectuals of the working class have a clear agenda in such settings. Traditional intellectuals may or may not throw in their lot with this group, depending on the opportunities they see for self-enhancement within this struggle. In many colonial situations, however, the alternate distinction between native and colonial intellectuals, located not only in their different class positions but in their allegiance to different cultural traditions, confuses the issue of who is organic and who is traditional, as well as its significance.

In the colonial setting, culture rather than class may form the historical basis for social solidarity. As a result, the class position of the intellectual in this political milieu is often less meaningful than his degree of affiliation with native culture. Priests, for example, are traditional intellectuals in Gramsci's typology, but as indigenous scholars and in some cases anti-colonial forces, they may also be viewed as organic intellectuals, allied with popular interests if not quite "of the people"

themselves. In nineteenth century colonial Ireland, priests were popularly perceived as representing less the elite authority of the Roman Church than an indigenous religious tradition, repressed like other features of native culture by the colonial government. In Ireland today, traditional culture, however variously construed and represented by different social actors, offers a common bond that makes all who act in its defense "organic" in another sense of the word.

The secular intelligentsia Gouldner (1976) sees as replacing traditional intellectuals in the modern world may have less claim to public representativeness in the ex-colonial setting, even if the former are drawn from the native population. The "culture of critical discourse" as Gouldner describes it operates on the assumption that home, church and community are no longer significant social factors. However, the historically-forged understanding of the popular struggle in colonial societies as culture-against-culture, rather than class-against-class, may sustain these traditional sources of authority.³ The emphasis on a shared culture defuses issues of class differentiation within the native population, and obscures the class-based inequities within the newly-independent state.

The creative intellectual whose references are drawn from this native cultural repertoire, rather than from the

dismal anonymity of post-industrial decline, is also protected against "secularization." In former internal colonies such as Ireland, creative intellectuals serve as well to maintain the sometimes fine distinction between the traditions of the colonizer and those of the indigenous community. The uncomfortable fusion of these traditions is clearly evident in the realm of formal academic culture -- the culture of the university. In the following section, I will discuss some of the ways the university and its personnel are ambiguously situated in this historical relationship between core and colony, as well as between the practical demands of the independent state and the ideal of institutional autonomy.

C. Universities, Academics, and the State.

Shils (1981) has described the Roman Catholic Church as the only institution in Western civilization that is older than the university. The scholarly traditions forged in the ancient universities of Europe became, and to some extent remain, the ideals of younger universities throughout the world, including those of former colonies. Such colonial universities were in fact often established by foreign regimes or emigres from core states, replicating academic traditions across centuries and continents. In the seventeenth century, for example, Harvard University was founded by graduates of Cambridge University, founded in the thirteenth century. Cambridge itself was founded by

scholars from Oxford, established in the twelfth century.

Institutional bloodlines such as these reflect the very real continuity of academic traditions, but they also obscure the hegemony that accompanied the expansion of Western intellectual thought into colonial regions. Emphasis on the "universal" traditions of the university also obscures the explicitly political economic role these institutions have played in core states, and later in colonies, in the process of industrialization and modernization. To a remarkable extent, Western universities have been able to maintain their image as "sacred" and unworldly institutions, perhaps because those who work in them and write about them are so deeply attracted to this aspect of their identity. More critical analyses of the university have been confined until recently to the study of educational structures and their intellectual personnel in the developing world.

In the 1850s, John Henry Newman (the first rector of one of the colleges discussed in this study) provided an idealized description of the university's "sacred" character:

An assemblage of learned men, zealous for their own sciences, and rivals of each other, are brought, by familiar intercourse and for the sake of intellectual peace, to adjust together the claims and relations of their respective subjects of investigation. They learn to respect, to consult, to aid each other. Thus is created a pure and clear atmosphere of thought, which the student also breathes, though in his own case he only pursues a few sciences out of the multitude (1893:101).

A half century later, in an essay on the American university, Veblen (1965) described the academic intellectual in a similarly reverential manner:

The university man is, properly, a student, not a schoolmaster. Such is the unmistakable drift of sentiment and professed endeavor, in so far as it is guided by the cultural aspirations of civilized mankind rather than by the emulative strategy of individuals seeking their own preferment (:32).

However, this image of the Western university as a quasi-religious institution, where, in Newman's words, the "great outlines of knowledge" (ibid.) were transmitted from generation to generation, was already outdated by the mid-nineteenth century. By that time, the preferred model of higher education had become that of the new German universities, which stressed practical, applied knowledge over the gentlemanly study of philosophy and the classics. The elite community of disinterested scholars, relatively independent of outside influence, gave way throughout Western Europe and North America to a more pliant institution serving the professional middle classes and the needs of the technocratic state.

Nonetheless, the contemporary university retains a quality of separation from the "profane" world of commerce and politics, based in this tradition of intellectual independence. It creates new knowledge, but also conserves old knowledge -- parallel processes of discovery and rediscovery as Shils (ibid.) has termed them. The idea of

the university is both unique to each individual institution and representative of a collective notion of what university education is about. Old universities continue to present themselves publicly in the full regalia of their distinctive histories and ceremonies. Younger universities, with less institutional patrimony to draw upon, may employ the symbols of the nation as a whole, with an appropriate emphasis on new values and national goals. Both types of university, however, continue to rely upon a shared and transcendent notion of public institutional identity, which legitimates their claims to political and intellectual autonomy. As Shils (ibid.) describes:

The "idea" of the university, the idea of what universities are "by their nature," the conception of what they should be, is the central theme of the academic ethos. The "idea" of the university is the normative ethos of the academic profession (:182).

While this idea or set of ideas about the university does indeed have a universal dimension, other systems of thought operate beneath this broad level to characterize the university and its practices within individual countries. Bourdieu (1967) terms these systems "scholarly cultures" -- the privileging of certain forms of pedagogy and reasoning in universities as a reflection of the values of the national elite. In France, as Bourdieu describes, the educational system has served to enforce a cultural rift between the working classes and the middle and upper classes, based on the latter two groups' access to the

university. This rift has consequences for the capacity of working people to engage in the discourse of public intellectual and political life, in that they are denied the vocabulary and frames of reference through which this discourse is carried out. In this setting, Bourdieu writes, "culture, whose function it was if not to unify at least to make communication possible, takes on a differentiating function" (:351). Within class-stratified societies the university may indeed be a repository of national intellectual tradition, but it is also selective in the way it disperses that tradition.

A Marxian analysis of the political role of education in class society is offered by Althusser (1971). He describes educational systems as one of the "ideological state apparatuses" through which the state exerts hegemonic control over its population. The apparent diversity of interests represented in the various "ISAs" (the Church, legal and political systems, and so forth) is belied by the fact that in Althusser's view they all promote the ideology of the ruling class. Using Althusser's model, the university may be seen as particularly capable of extending its influence well beyond the scope of education in light of its close affiliations with other ISAs -- notably, the "cultural" and the "communications" apparatuses.

Bourdieu's emphasis on the university in the essay cited above leads to his analysis of this institution as a

locus of elite social reproduction. Althusser, more concerned with the permeation of ruling class ideology throughout the entire social system, does not distinguish the university from other structures within the educational ISA. Both of their analyses are derived from the study of highly stratified core states. (Bourdieu does suggest that the comparative study of scholarly cultures would be an appropriate task for the ethnographer.) In colonial settings, however, higher education takes on an additional political dimension, being associated not only with the scholarly culture of local elites, but with that of ethnically distinct colonial rulers. The university is closed to most natives, and those who gain access to it are often schooled in the elite culture of another nation.

In the internal colony, this relationship is even more complex: it becomes difficult to distinguish between the traditions of two native intellectual communities that share, in many cases, a common language and set of formal scholarly references. One way of resolving this problem is to accentuate the differences between the linked traditions, and, as in the case of Ireland, to attempt to revive a native language that is seen as not only symbolic of cultural uniqueness, but as inherently expressive of a different world view. For some Gaelic language revivalists, to speak Irish is not only to reclaim one's history, but to reclaim an intellectual "grammar" absent

from English.

National educational agendas typically undergo reform as colonial societies achieve independence and direct their attention to the priority of internal development. The modernizing society requires new sources of technical, managerial, and political leadership, often drawn from the ranks of the ascendant native middle classes. Lomnitz (1983) describes this transition as it has affected the Mexican university since the 1950s:

As they acquire new roles in economic and political management, professionals have modified their professional practice by introducing new techniques, especially planning. These changes are reflected in the university in the form of new courses, new degree programs, new majors, and graduate degrees with new academic requirements. The national universities of Latin America have been largely responsible for the education of these new leaders and are the first to reflect these new changes. Originally elite institutions, national universities have become mass universities, as the old intellectual elites have been replaced by the new growing middle classes (:24).

Lomnitz's study of the Mexican intelligentsia focuses on their socialization into the established structures of state administration in the ex-colonial setting. Her study also presents technocracy in modern Mexico as a given, a form of reasoning and social understanding that also supplants the traditional authority of the old intellectual elite, based often in humanist scholarship. Earlier studies of intellectuals in post-revolutionary and post-colonial new states, conducted during the 1950s and 1960s, were concerned more with their role as agents of

modernization and political stability in "traditional" settings. Apter (1965) describes intellectuals as "bearing a culture of modernity" (:77), but also vulnerable to anti-intellectual, ultimately repressive forces in new state regimes. "When this happens," Apter writes, "an important part of the yeast of modernization is lacking, and the civic culture to that extent diminished" (:78).

Modernization here is understood as a movement towards not only economic development, but the political morality of Western liberal democracies.

The emphasis on the modernizing impulse of the native intelligentsia in new states is perhaps exaggerated in this literature (it also appears to be anachronistic given the recent resurgence of religious fundamentalism in some parts of the developing world). Touraine (1988) describes a current trend amongst intellectuals in many underdeveloped countries to reject "modernism" due to its association with the erosion of cultural specificity, part of the monolithic modernizing agenda of the core. This "anti-modernism" does not necessarily include a rejection of the university, which may be seen as an institution of national revitalization. The class interests of new elites in ex-colonial settings are sustained by the university, both through its granting of professional degrees and its conferring of an intellectual authority equal to that of Western institutions. Academics in developing societies

also benefit from affiliation with universities outside their own countries. It hardly bears mentioning that most intellectuals of ex-colonial states are graduates of either native or Western universities, and are socialized into the "idea of the university" Shils has described in its dual nature. As he writes:

Universities must, in order to be universities, teach and investigate what is of universal validity; they must also teach and investigate what is of parochial value, either because it is practical or because it cultivates the parochial (or national) cultural tradition (1972:343).

In the ex-colonial setting, however, there is a tension between these two aspects of the university's identity, the universal and parochial, greater than that that might exist in societies with long-established native academic traditions. The parochial resides in the university's responsibility to native culture, perceived as common to all members of the society. As such, it helps cast a communal glow over the actions and values of the new state elite. The parochial also includes the scholarly culture Bourdieu has described, which comes more and more to be associated with the new elite. The universal resides largely in the Western-derived vision of the university as an autonomous intellectual institution, an essential aspect of its identity even in settings where higher education is widely understood to be an agent of national development.

The changing relationships between developed and underdeveloped societies in the post-World War II period,

as well as the growing influence of applied disciplines within universities everywhere, have strained this universal notion of an undifferentiated and fraternal academic community. At the international level, leading scholars have become another marketable item for which wealthier nations, through their academic institutions, may bid. Research funding is derived not only from the state and the local private sector, but from multinational corporations and foundations as well. At the national level, competition amongst local institutions for funding and government favor increases, rather than minimizes, assertions of academic superiority as well as willingness to conform to state- and industry-driven agendas.

Moreover, the divisions that exist in the public sphere of information exchange and influence are replicated within the university under these circumstances, especially in settings where education is closely tied to the pressing needs of national development. Within individual institutions, those disciplines that generate intellectual products, both ideological and practical, that meet national goals as they are defined at the moment assume power over critical and interpretive disciplines. In developing societies that have adopted the Western model of modernization, "old knowledge" preserved by the university remains useful to the extent that it demonstrates continuity with the past and signals the membership of

native intellectuals in the international academic community. The universal dimension of higher education is still defined by Western norms, but now comes to mean the university's leading role in "acultural" scientific and technological development.

The intensified alliance between higher education and the state in societies undergoing economic development raises, once again, the issue of intellectuals' political affiliations. Intellectuals here will be considered not in Gramscian terms (i.e., "all men are intellectuals"), but in terms of their professional and public characteristics. Coser (1965), paraphrasing Weber, defines intellectuals as those who "live for rather than off ideas" (:viii). This phenomenological description is broad and has little political content. Nonetheless, it acknowledges an important aspect of intellectual culture -- the self-understanding of intellectuals, and the criteria they use to distinguish themselves from others, including other intellectuals.

If we choose to consider intellectuals also in terms of their relationship to power, additional questions must be raised. Do intellectuals constitute an elite? Bottomore (1964) describes them as such, but points out that their actual social influence is difficult to determine. Their diffuse professional statuses and class backgrounds also allow them to merge with the lower strata

of the middle and working classes. Even more significantly, intellectuals' influence and prestige vary from country to country, thus precluding a universal answer to the question of their eligibility as elites.

McDonogh (1986) defines "elite" as referring to "a generalized power-holding group within a society," with power described as "the ability to execute and impose choices on others" (:5). Again, social differentiation within the intellectual community is relevant here, as is the degree to which individual intellectuals are capable of achieving power through political careers and other venues for professional enhancement. Bottomore (ibid.) notes that the technical knowledge now associated with the educated classes has allowed intellectuals greater access to the structures of government, but has served also to disqualify them as a "ruling elite" due to their lack of any coherent organization and ideology. It does not seem, therefore, that intellectuals as a group can be defined as elites in a general sense, but must be examined in terms of their varying degrees of influence in different spheres, affected by class and other social features as well.

The term "intellectual" itself requires examination in light of the on-going process by which intellectual knowledge is fragmented. Gouldner (1979) clearly distinguishes between intellectuals and the intelligentsia, with the former associated with humanist sources of

knowledge, and the latter with technical and administrative skills. To both he ascribes the potential for revolutionary action in the interest of the working classes, a potential capable of being realized in their common "culture of critical discourse." Camp (1985) also holds to the distinction between intellectuals and the intelligentsia, but sees the capacity for discerning and transmitting general intellectual trends as more characteristic of the intellectual than the intelligentsia. As he writes:

... it is not necessarily discovering the new idea, concept or process that describes the intellectual, but being able to recognize it when you see it and convey it to others (:34).

Other analysts of the technocratic intelligentsia (e.g., Aronowitz 1987, Habermas 1970) see this social group as devoted to serving dominant class interests, and as such lacking the critical component inherent to the true intellectual. In general, the contemporary leftist perspective tends to equate "criticism" with progressive political attitudes. People with intellectual credentials whose criticism and political activities are directed towards "reactionary" models of social transformation are excluded, therefore, from being intellectuals in this model, or at best conform to Gramsci's definition of the "traditional intellectual." However, "progressive" and "reactionary" are both relative concepts, understood in the context of core societies with long histories of class

struggle. In some settings, such as Ireland today, they are of limited use in understanding the intellectual's political values and public activities.

In this study, intellectuals are understood to be those who "live for ideas" in their professional capacity and who also see their ideas as the basis for some form of social criticism and potential social transformation. In this definition, "progressives" and "reactionaries," as well as humanists and technocrats, are all capable of being viewed as intellectuals.

In relation to the university faculty who are the subject of this study, another question is pertinent: are "intellectual" and "academic" interchangeable terms? The literature concerning intellectuals routinely cites academics as one segment of the intellectual community. In the broadest sense this categorization is correct, if we define an intellectual as anyone professionally affiliated with advanced education. But using the definition stated above, it is clear that not all academics are intellectuals. All academics deal in ideas as educators and researchers, but only some see their ideas, and their professional roles, as having significance beyond the university or the narrow educational needs of the state. It is the willingness to enter into the discussion of socially-meaningful topics outside of one's strict disciplinary or educational domain that defines the

academic as an intellectual in the public sense.

However, this study considers academics as well as the sub-group within them of intellectuals as its focus of interest. Both are influential actors, to varying degrees, in the Irish public sphere. This public sphere shares some of the features Habermas has described for Western Europe's core states, most evidently the dominance of technocratic logic in its administrative sector. Nonetheless, it also retains a vitality, a utopianism if you will, based on the state's relative youth and its long tradition of public debate on issues of national concern. State policies of cultural isolationism in the first decades of independence did not eliminate critical commentary in Ireland, but instead valorized many of those who engaged in it, and maintained an active sense of public responsibility within Ireland's intellectual community. At the same time, reliance upon culture as the key to national self-realization, bolstered by controlled economic development, precluded until recently anything more than a minority role in public discussion for those advocating sociopolitical reform outside the boundaries of party politics. These issues have gained more prominence in Ireland's public sphere since the 1970s, but have been overshadowed throughout the 1980s by the state's renewed commitment to modernization based on technocratic planning. In Ireland today, technocracy and culture remain dominant, and in some

ways complementary, national discourses. Academics help enforce this technocracy/culture bias in their activities as educators, but also in their public roles as planning experts and social commentators.

Much of the theoretical literature on Western intellectuals, discussed above, adopts a broad historical or generalizing view of this social group. Studies of "Third World" intellectuals produced by Western social scientists have been grounded in more specific settings, but also employ criteria derived from the political philosophies of core states. Both types of analysis have tended to overlook the complex role the intellectual culture of core states has played, and continues to play, in forming those of colonies and former colonies. This study addresses this problematic relationship by examining a society that exhibits features of both the core and the colony, where public intellectual discourse remains linked to issues arising from the historical experience of economic dependency and cultural repression. Ireland also provides a unique example of a Western European society still working out what it means to be "modern" and culturally autonomous within the framework of the core states' development models and political values.

The dissertation suggests as well that the study of intellectuals and academics as social actors is enriched by a research context that locates such individuals in their

everyday professional and institutional settings, including the university. The university's bourgeois characteristics reduce academic intellectuals at times to compliance with the hegemony of the state and its dominant interest groups. During periods of social transition, however, intellectuals may emerge from the university to play a more explicit political role. It is by no means certain that this role involves the commitment to major social transformation on the order of revolution. As we have seen recently in Eastern Europe, intellectuals on the "outside," those who have experienced censorship, unemployment, and perhaps imprisonment, or alternatively those who renounce the bourgeois academic structures that have sheltered them, may be more capable of performing this function. This does not mean, however, that the average, non-revolutionary academic or intellectual involved in public life should be dismissed as of no interest. Rather, it is academics' existing and taken-for-granted incorporation into this central arena of ideological reproduction, not their potential as social actors, that makes them worthy of study.⁴ In reference to this issue, Abercrombie (1980) writes:

Analysis of intellectuals as producers of specialist knowledge, or as class-spokesmen is undoubtedly valuable. However, again, one should be wary of narrowing the focus too much, for, as far as the transmission of belief is concerned, institutions (or apparatuses) are of far more significance, especially in capitalist societies, and intellectuals are usually located in, and constrained by, these institutions (:131).

Emphasis on what influence intellectuals and academics might have under certain circumstances directs attention away from the influence they already do have, and the ways in which they use it. It also precludes an examination of the institutions outside the university -- state agencies and the media, for instance -- in which they exercise this influence. Rather than studying academics and intellectuals in isolation from these influential institutions (an isolation that privileges their self-understanding) this study considers the actual social relations and ideological concerns that shape their meaningful actions within the wider public sphere. As such, the study explores the varied roles academics and intellectuals play in national settings, acknowledging both their "sacred" identity as members of the university community and their "profane" identity as agents of political economic transformation.

NOTES

1. Countries such as England, France and Germany are recognized as having produced much of the formal, academically-transmitted knowledge of modern Western society. While this knowledge has become in some sense "culturally-anonymous," it retains its association with the historical processes, intellectual traditions, and national institutions of its countries of origin. A good example of academic culture being incorporated into a national tradition is offered by England's great universities, which have become symbols of "Englishness" as a whole.
2. Not all post-colonial societies or new states have the characteristic of historically being "nations." Many new states are formed out of ethnically distinct or regionally differentiated entities. In such cases, the state has the task of either promoting one type of ethnic identity above others or developing a political culture inclusive of such ethnic diversity. Ireland, of course, offers the example of an extremely homogeneous society capable of viewing itself as a nation prior to the creation of a state.
3. It would be interesting to examine whether Gouldner's "culture of critical discourse" has been sustained within intellectual communities in countries undergoing fundamentalist reform, such as Iran, where Western culture as a whole -- from which secular intellectual discourse largely is derived -- is seen as a contaminating influence to be expunged.
4. Some American anthropologists with whom I have discussed my research have told me that academics are powerless, uninteresting, and therefore hardly worthy of study. This seems to me to be a denial of academics' critical role in social reproduction, and a way of preserving powerlessness as the sine qua non of the American intellectual. Academics, including anthropologists, also maintain a remarkable lack of interest in the academic sub-culture in which they are so deeply invested.

PART II. THE COLLEGES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

CHAPTER THREE

THE CIVILITY OF A UNIVERSITY:
TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN

There it is, then, before our eyes, the procession of the sons of educated men, ascending those pulpits, mounting those steps, passing in and out of those doors, preaching, teaching, administering justice, practicing medicine, making money.

Virginia Woolf
Three Guineas, 1938

A. Introduction.

The frustration of the intelligent female excluded from England's great universities, which Virginia Woolf captures in the passage above, is not dissimilar from that of many Irish people in the past in regard to Trinity College, the University of Dublin. As a Protestant institution, and Ireland's only university for more than two-and-a-half centuries, Trinity once represented a way of life, and a means of upward mobility, from which Irish Catholics were largely excluded. Since the lifting of the ban against Catholic attendance at Trinity in the early 1970s (a proscription applied by that time by the Church itself, not the college), Trinity has been increasingly integrated into the state's third-level educational system and has greatly lessened its sectarian and exclusive image. Nonetheless, Trinity's historical importance as a dominant colonial institution for several centuries continues to influence its public identity in Ireland today.

Trinity College was founded through an act of charter granted by Queen Elizabeth I in 1592. It was established to provide an educational and cultural base for the Protestant English and Anglo-Irish population of Dublin, to train Protestant clerics for proselytizing amongst the Catholic Irish outside the English Pale, and to stimulate the local economy. A modern history of the university states that Trinity's founders hoped that it would be a "powerful auxiliary to military force" in Ireland, breaking down "the two great barriers to the spread of English influence: Catholicism and the Gaelic cultural tradition" (McDowell and Webb 1982:2). Colonial administrators also hoped that the "civility" of a university would stem the corruption of English settlers by Irish customs, and encourage their sons to stay in the country. Modelled on Cambridge University, the source of many of its early fellows, Trinity was the first of a number of colonial colleges, such as Harvard and Yale, to be established by the British overseas. Unlike England's great medieval universities, however, Trinity was from its inception a Protestant university, a product of the Reformation. Its foundation in Dublin, seat of the English Pale, ensured its position as a major symbol of colonial administration and ideology for the next three hundred years.

Several types of sources are used in this chapter to recount the history of Trinity College.¹ They include a

number of official histories of the institution, commissioned by the college at various times over the past century, as well as memoirs and biographies of its students and faculty. College publications such as newspapers, catalogs, and promotional literature have also been consulted. General historical sources on Dublin and Ireland have been used to set the account in a wider context. Finally, interviews with faculty members, as well as my own observations, provide some of the interpretation of issues discussed in the chapter.

B. Dublin.

Dublin's emergence as the capital of Ireland was based on its geographic location and its long history of settlement. The ring of land around Dublin Bay, where the River Liffey meets the Irish Sea on the island's eastern coast, had been a site of human habitation for more than a thousand years prior to the Tudor period. The ancient settlement of Baile Atha Cliath, "the town of the hurdle-ford," was located at the convergence of the country's major roads, and the Liffey itself provided entree to Ireland's fertile central plains. With the Norse invasions of the eighth and ninth centuries, the town became a garrison and trading center, called Dyfflin, or Dubh Linn, the "pool of black water".² This became its common English name, but Baile Atha Cliath remains the city's official Irish Gaelic name.

The Norse presence made urban centers of the other Irish seaports of Wexford, Waterford, Cork and Limerick as well, but Dublin's situation facing Britain and Europe and its access to the interior gave it strategic importance for control over Ireland and the sea routes of the North Atlantic. Viking and Irish political interests eventually fused in the city and the colonized area surrounding it, so that much of Dublin remained Norse even after the battle of Clontarf put an end to Viking expansion in 1014. In the twelfth century an army of Anglo-Normans led by Strongbow landed in support of an Irish king, Dermot MacMurrough, in his claim against the Norse. They were successful in taking Dublin, and were followed shortly afterward by King Henry II and his army, determined to keep the Anglo-Norman barons under control. This event, which took place in 1172, is sometimes said to mark the beginning of the English colonial presence in Ireland, but already ethnic politics were well confused, involving old Irish, Norse, Anglo-Normans, and soon English and Anglo-Irish.

The city and the Pale surrounding it became a colonial enclave from which the rural Irish and their culture were largely excluded by law. Beyond the Pale, Gaelic society survived and absorbed most Anglo-Norman elites, resulting in a powerful lordship which by the sixteenth century threatened not only English control of Ireland but the national security of the home country as well. Complete

English conquest of Ireland took over a century but was violent and thorough, employing conciliation or slaughter as necessary. Irish lords were bought off and English settlers planted, but the Reformation did not succeed and resulted mainly in the close identification of the new religion with English interests. Colonial administration was expanded and bureaucratized, while the Irish parliament in Dublin became a dependent institution controlled largely by the English government.

The Norse had established their settlement on a prominence on the south side of the Liffey, and this site remained the core of the walled city of Dublin for many centuries. In the early thirteenth century, its Viking stronghold was replaced by an Anglo-Norman fort, Dublin Castle, which came to symbolize English authority in Ireland. By the end of the sixteenth century, Dublin's precincts extended well beyond its old walls and across to the north side of the river. Although the capital of the country, Dublin was in many ways already very different from the rest of Ireland: English-speaking, officially Protestant, and distinct in its institutions and customs from the still-Gaelic population beyond the Pale.

C. The Founding of the University.

Monastic schools flourished in early Christian Ireland, and in the medieval period Irish monks helped found colleges on the Continent, but Ireland itself had no

university until the fourteenth century, when one was established as part of St. Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin. Under the direction of the Cathedral Dean, philosophy and theology were taught by Franciscan and Dominican monks, but the school fell into neglect sometime in the fifteenth century. This was due to financial constraints as well as to its location within the Pale, which made it difficult to serve scholars in the larger Irish population. The school existed in name only up until the early sixteenth century, when it was suppressed by Henry VIII. At least two further attempts were made by Irish monastics to establish universities in Ireland, but even though the Pope granted a charter for one of these, no provision was ever made for its foundation (McGrath 1979).

Some Irish scholars attended university at Oxford and Cambridge, but in 1422 the English parliament passed laws limiting their entry (Cosgrove 1967). A century later, Jesuits were sent to Ireland by the Pope to educate Irish youth and thereby defend Catholicism. Once plans for a Protestant university in Dublin became definite, Jesuits founded Irish Colleges in Spain and encouraged Irish attendance at the colleges of Louvain and Douay as well, aiming to train a Counter-reformation army of native priests. Thus, by the time Trinity came into being in the 1590s, higher education for the Irish was already closely connected with the struggle for cultural authority, with

Rome invoked as an ally against the English crown.

To some degree, the founding of Trinity College reflected the failure of Henry VIII's plan to Protestantize Ireland through widespread primary education in English. Attempts to establish such a system were hindered by the country's political instability and by England's limited expenditure on this undertaking, as well as by the continuing provision of Catholic education by clerics from the dissolved monasteries. Educational facilities provided by the English state were rejected by some Irish elites due to their inherent anti-Catholicism, leaving the colonial administration in a position to blame the Irish for their own lack of education. However, it would appear that some native primary and secondary schools outside the Pale survived despite Tudor policy at this time (Hammerstein 1969).

A Protestant university was first proposed for Dublin in the 1540s, and when the idea was broached again in Elizabeth I's time, it was suggested that the old university of St. Patrick's be revived for this purpose. Instead, a charter was given for the founding of a new institution. Dublin Corporation provided a site: the grounds and derelict buildings of the old Augustinian Priory of All Hallows, founded by the victorious Dermot MacMurrough in the twelfth century and dissolved by Elizabeth's father in the sixteenth. The old monastic

community would be replaced by a new community of Protestant divines. A road was cut through the commons which lay in front of the priory grounds, connecting the university with the city center and the Castle. In 1593 building began, and the following year the first students were admitted.

D. Trinity College's Institutional Structure.

Trinity's charter called for the creation of a mater universitas, a college which would be the mother of a university. However, the original "College of the Holy and Undivided Trinity near Dublin" was the only one ever established. Thus, two separate bureaucratic entities were combined in one institution: a college and a university, with the former made up of scholars, fellows and a provost, and the latter, called the University of Dublin, being the degree-granting authority. Some dispute exists as to whether Elizabeth I and her successors ever intended to create the additional colleges that might have allowed the University of Dublin to rival Oxford and Cambridge in intellectual splendor. Money was a concern, and it did not seem likely that enough could be raised to build a second college. The university structure was necessary to ensure prestige and independence, but one college was sufficient to meet actual educational needs.

The original charter therefore invested the college with all the powers required by a university. The two

entities exist to this day, with separate administrative bodies, but in practice overlapping sets of personnel are involved in both. As one college officer has put it, "It's the same people over and over again, with different hats on." This conflation has allowed for some manipulation of bureaucratic structures and statuses, with "college" or "university" procedures being used depending on their effectiveness at the moment. To describe Trinity as just a college disregards its institutional and symbolic weight as a university; emphasizing its university status overlooks the tightly-knit collegial atmosphere which is one of Trinity's great virtues. It efficiently combines both identities in one system which can be constituted as needed.

The institutional structure of the college/university is complicated as a result of a series of reforms which overlay the original archaic arrangements. Trinity is said to be "held" by its provost, fellows, and scholars, who once made up The Body Corporate of the college. Today, the principle governing body for both the college and the university is The Board, which oversees most financial matters as well. The Board consists of the provost, the seven senior fellows, four elected junior fellows and the two elected non-fellow professors, along with the bursar, senior lecturer, and registrar, who may be junior or senior fellows. The University Council handles most academic

matters, and is made up of the provost, senior lecturer and the registrar, ex officio, as well as sixteen other faculty members elected to represent various disciplinary interests.

The chancellor of the University of Dublin is primarily a figurehead, and in the past was often a member of the nobility. The University's current chancellor is a leading Irish industrialist. He presides over the University Senate and acts as a final court of appeal, along with the "visitors" to the college, in matters of statutory reform and institutional dispute. The University Senate consists of about three hundred members, doctors and masters of the University of Dublin, who vote on the conferring of degrees and some other academic matters, but otherwise it has largely formal and ceremonial functions (Jackson 1983). In recent years, full-time administrators have also been added to Trinity's bureaucracy, and these in turn have their own administrative staffs who carry out the daily business of the college.

In keeping with the tradition established at England's great medieval universities, Trinity's fellows and scholars were originally bound to celibacy by university statute. Many of its students proceeded to Holy Orders in the college's Divinity School. Trinity's religious mission was thus emphasized in its early years when student numbers were low, and the college in some respects resembled the

monastic community it had replaced. The celibacy statute was abolished in 1840 as the college population became more diverse and as an increasing number of fellows wished to marry. In retrospect, this reform would appear to represent Trinity's first concession to the eventual intrusion of women onto its grounds as students and faculty. Female students were first admitted to the college in 1904, and the first female faculty member appointed in 1909. Initially, a curfew was set forbidding women to be present on campus after six o'clock; over time this curfew was extended and finally done away with in the early 1950s. However, female students were not eligible for the university's foundation scholarships until 1968, and in the same year female faculty were belatedly admitted to fellowship (McDowell and Webb *ibid.*).

At its foundation the college had three fellows and three scholars, but these numbers quickly grew. Fellowship was split eventually into two strata, senior and junior, and the number of senior fellows was fixed at seven. These seven are the longest-standing members of the fellowship body. A senior fellow must die or retire for the next eligible fellow to be appointed, but technically such appointment is not automatic. Some junior fellows retire before they are eligible, improving the chances for an even more junior colleague to reach the senior group. The number of junior fellows is not fixed, and in the 1980s

has been about 120. Fellows must retire from teaching at age seventy, but may continue to live in college and conduct research there for the rest of their lives. All unmarried or widowed fellows are entitled to room and board at the college, and back when celibacy was required of fellows and Trinity's population was much smaller, these privileges ensured the communal character of the school. In recent years, only about five percent of the academic staff, mostly older and retired, have lived in college (Jackson *ibid.*). A few of these individuals have spent the greater part of their professional lives within its walls.

In Trinity's early years, the small corporate body of fellows and provost had virtually complete control over college affairs. The fellows themselves chose the provost from within their own ranks. In the seventeenth century, statutory reform gave the choice of provost to the English Crown, but senior fellows retained a great deal of institutional power up to the beginning of the twentieth century, at which time junior fellows succeeded in lessening their control. Appointment to the select fellowship body was determined originally by an extremely difficult exam, but since the 1930s fellowship has been conferred usually on the basis of superior scholarship. Fellows are now appointed, or "co-opted," from within the existing faculty body, which includes professors (usually heads of departments) and lecturers (non-fellow full-time

faculty). In addition, tutors are appointed from within the faculty body to work individually with students over the course of their studies.³

Fellowship was first opened to Catholics in 1878 following the passage of Fawcett's Act, which removed almost all religious requirements at Trinity.⁴ This reform was spurred by the British Liberal Party's desire to loosen the Anglican Church's hold over the British universities, as well as by the British government's need to ameliorate Irish Catholics' demands for greater access to higher education. Despite the intentions of Fawcett's Act, however, only three Catholics had been appointed to fellowship by 1911, as a result probably of normal fluctuations in fellowship openings, the limited number of eligible Catholics on the faculty throughout this period, and the quality of their examination performance. It wasn't until 1958 that a Catholic became a senior fellow, a delay of eighty years before the spirit of reform had taken effect at the highest level.

The fellowship system, in conjunction with Trinity's history as a male institution, has also worked against the recognition of women scholars. Resistance to granting women fellowship prior to 1968 was based on a strict reading of the University's ancient charter, as well on the belief that domestic responsibilities precluded a woman's total commitment to scholarship. Also up until the 1960s,

women faculty were compelled to retire at marriage. The selection pool for the first female fellows was limited therefore to those women faculty who had abstained from marriage and had achieved senior standing. Given a probable bias against hiring female faculty to begin with and the possible delay or denial of fellowship to some eligible women, it can be assumed that female faculty often retired or left the university before being able to achieve this honor. In 1987, there were no women amongst Trinity's senior fellows.

Although the expanded number of fellows has diffused the original corporate nature of this group, the fellowship system still allows for a continuity which is extremely valuable to the maintenance of college tradition and institutional procedure. From the most senior to the most junior fellow, a span of thirty or more teaching years at Trinity can exist, while the same junior fellow eventually may be, in another thirty years, senior fellow. This continuity is sometimes familial as well. The senior fellow at the time of my fieldwork was the son of a former senior fellow, who began teaching at the college in the early 1900s.

Major college offices once were held only by senior fellows, but reforms made over the past century have lessened their institutional power. Under present conventions, most college offices are held by junior

fellows for renewable one-year terms. This system provides administrative experience to a greater number of faculty members, counterposing the hierarchical nature of senior fellowship. Deanships, which were created in the 1950s, also balance the traditional hierarchy, as these elected academic offices can be held by any member of the faculty who has reached lecturer status. Within a given faculty, for example arts, a non-fellow lecturer may be dean with some authority over junior and senior fellows.

Trinity has retained many of its original British university traditions, while adding on more efficient modern procedures as needed. The college's institutional glamour is owed in no small part to these archaicisms, as well as to its beautiful Georgian campus. Both are integral to Trinity's history and a mark of distinction in an age of mass education. The academic year is divided into the three medieval terms of Michaelmas, Hilary and Trinity. The college Chapel, with its miniature graveyard behind, replicates Trinity's hierarchy in its seating plan: left or right, front or back, high or low, depending on one's status in college. Faculty can dine together in Hall or peruse the daily papers in the plush splendor of the Common Room. The tutorial system recalls an age when education was more personal as well as elite, while the fellowship system defends academic control against the advance of the professional university administrator.

College ceremonies, such as commencements and dinners, are carried out with full ritual: four hundred years of history reified in words, plate, gown and mace.

But while the preservation of these traditions is consistent with the past, to some degree they contradict the reality of the present, particularly as the college population has grown to more than seven thousand in the 1980s. Communal rituals are enacted in an institution whose students and faculty live and dine and worship mostly off-campus, and whose administration competes for funding and patronage outside the sphere of the university and even the state. Pressure to integrate college terms and accreditation practices with those of European and American universities may also eventually alter more of Trinity's academic traditions. The public effect of such changes will probably be minimized, leaving traditional appearances intact, due to the uniqueness such traditions lend the institution and their appeal to both faculty and students. Trinity now strives to maintain a visible degree of difference from the colleges of Ireland's National University, but also to neutralize the historical significance of that difference.

Trinity's relationship with the British universities has fluctuated over time. The founding of a university in Ireland kept many Anglo-Irish scholars at home, but Oxford and Cambridge remained alternatives. Cambridge's early

philosophical and structural influence on Trinity, reflected in the college's name and some of its customs, ceased to have much significance by the mid-seventeenth century after the institution of major statutory reform. The academic historian Hugh Kearney (1970) has suggested that while clinging to the notion of continuity with Oxbridge tradition, Trinity resembled more the newer urban colleges of Glasgow and Edinburgh -- academically prestigious institutions that lacked, however, the cachet of the medieval schools.

During the second half of the eighteenth century, Trinity's intellectual stature and Dublin's cultural vibrancy ensured the attendance of brilliant men and the less brilliant but well-funded sons of the gentry. Following the Act of Union of Great Britain and Ireland in 1800, and the relocation of much of the Anglo-Irish aristocracy to London, Trinity's student body became more middle class and its academic standards, college historians state, more uneven. By the mid-nineteenth century, some non-residential students did not even attend classes, but sat for exams periodically as necessary. These students were usually English, and their pursuit of a degree was rather leisurely, based more on the social requirements of a gentleman than on academic fervor. Trinity's granting of such "steamboat degrees" augmented its reputation at this time as a haven for mediocre British students who failed to

make the grade at Oxford or Cambridge. Trinity's old nickname, "the silent sister," originally a reference to its faculty's poor publishing record, took on an even more derisive quality. J.P. Mahaffy, Classics scholar and provost of Trinity at the turn of the twentieth century, once remarked that "among all Irish institutions, probably the only one ever accused of silence is the University of Dublin" (quoted in Hinkson n.d.:179). His comment demonstrates a tendency amongst some Anglo-Irish to define an aspect of their culture as Irish when questionable and as English when admirable.

Trinity's affiliation with Oxford and Cambridge was maintained in the past through a system of ad eundem degrees, which allowed its master's recipients to hold honorary degrees from the two British universities. Cambridge and Oxford students were entitled to the same from the University of Dublin, but the arrangement, which implied the academic equivalency of all three universities, usually worked to the Irish institution's advantage. In the 1970s, Cambridge and Oxford withdrew this privilege from Dublin graduates, although the latter university still extends its master's degree to Oxbridge students.

Trinity's other traditional associations with British academic culture have loosened overall in recent decades, notwithstanding the relatively high number of British faculty who remain on its staff. This process was

inevitable once Ireland became independent, but has accelerated in the past twenty years with Trinity's greater incorporation into state education structures and its increase in Irish Catholic students. Although the university remains an autonomous institution, it is now, like Ireland's National University, dependent upon the Irish state for more than 80% of its support.

With these developments, Trinity has made great effort to redefine its public identity and role in the Republic. College literature and representatives refer to Trinity's distinct traditions while emphasizing its present commitment to common educational goals. By characterizing itself now as part of Ireland's rich cultural legacy, the college revises its relationship to Irish colonial history. By vigorously affiliating itself with the sciences and technology, Trinity becomes a vital part of Ireland's future.

E. College Architecture and Possessions.

For centuries, Trinity's prominent location and splendid architecture have made it an ambiguous symbol of Irish history, representing both the elegance of Protestant Ascendancy culture and the hegemony of its colonial administration. Originally situated in the undeveloped periphery of the city, the college eventually came to be located in its heart as Dublin expanded eastward, surrounding Trinity's cast-iron palings and making it into

a kind of island or fort. An enclave of style and learning, its exclusivity and self-containment also made it irrelevant to many Irish people. Yet despite its perception by some nationalists as an alien institution, Trinity has reflected the contradictions of the English-Irish relationship and at times played a notable role in the development of modern Ireland and national independence.

The college is one of the most striking sights in Dublin, with its West Front facing the rounded colonnade of the Bank of Ireland, once the Irish House of Parliament. Both are flood-lit at night in the wide plaza of College Green, which connects several main thoroughfares on the southern side of the city. However, Trinity provides few publicly accessible paths across its campus. As a result, it is necessary for most Dubliners to walk around a good deal of Trinity's walls in order to get to the streets which branch off it from either side. The intrusion of the college's bowed front fence into a major traffic intersection also contributes to making College Green one of the most dangerous pedestrian crossings in Dublin. Trinity cannot be ignored, but must be negotiated several times each day by those who live or work near it. In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, James Joyce described the college as "a dull stone set in the ring of the city's ignorance," but this sour judgement referred

more to its culturally repressive aspects than its physical ones. Trinity is beautiful. Coachloads of tourists are led through its campus all year long to admire its buildings and treasures, and many of them must leave Dublin with the impression that Trinity is the city's only college.

When the remains of the monastery of All Hallows were cleared away in the 1590s, a timbered quadrangle was built on the west end of the site, with the main college gate facing into Dame Street and Dublin Castle beyond. None of these original buildings remain. Around the turn of the eighteenth century another square was added behind the original one, with red-brick buildings forming its sides. Of these, only the eastern row still stands, and is called Rubrics. The buildings that now characterize Trinity architecturally were begun in 1712 and completed in the 1790s. These include the Long Library (so named for its 209-foot-long main gallery), the Printing House, the Dining Hall, the Examination Hall, and the Chapel. In the middle of the eighteenth century the western side of the college was rebuilt in the Georgian style, and this imposing stand of Wicklow granite is the public face of Trinity today.

In the early nineteenth century, two more squares were completed and a number of science buildings added to the back of the campus, near the playing grounds. In 1852 a Campanile was built in the center of the two front squares,

which were no longer divided by a row of buildings. This brick tower houses the college bell from the sixteenth century chapel, as well as a smaller bell which is thought to date from the original Augustinian priory. As disciplines developed and the college's needs changed, smaller new buildings were built, old buildings were redesigned, and many of the private townhouses bordering the college grounds were taken over for academic use. A new library was built in 1967 to relieve the pressure on the old one, whose open and colonnaded ground floor had been closed-in in 1898 to accommodate more books. In 1978 a new arts and social science block was erected on the south side of the campus, housing most of Trinity's humanities departments. In total, the campus now covers twenty-eight acres of invaluable city real estate within a few minutes' walk of Ireland's National Museum, the National Library and Leinster House, the present seat of the Irish government.

Trinity's buildings and grounds are physical manifestations of Ireland's colonial past, and as such they resist historical revisionism. Over time, Trinity's campus has been the target of attack and the rallying point of defense for the two parties to the colonial relationship, and is referred to repeatedly in college histories as well as colloquial reference. One history written in 1902 states:

There is nothing in the architecture of Trinity College suggestive of the country to which it belongs. It was unfortunate for the civilization of the Celt that the arts in which he was a master did not include architecture, the most enduring of them all (Dixon 1902:200).

Yet despite the appearance of indomitability, Trinity suffered repeatedly from financial crises which threatened to bring it to its knees. For its annalists, the fortunes of the college plate and pictures often seem to stand for the fate of the institution as a whole. To a great extent, Trinity is its buildings, grounds and possessions, which represent the tenacity of the small but privileged social class it once served. Despite its private status, most of Trinity's buildings were paid for by the colonial government, with contributions also from the Anglo-Irish nobility. The college's economic reach extended beyond the campus as well to estates in rural Ireland from which it extracted rent; at the same time, it consumed and preserved a valuable portion of Ireland's native heritage in its libraries and archives. The most notable example of this is the Book of Kells, a ninth century illuminated manuscript considered to be Ireland's greatest national treasure. It came into Trinity's hands for safekeeping in the seventeenth century, during a period of political upheaval, and is now the central feature of the Long Library, along with an ancient harp said to be that of the eleventh century Irish king Brian Boru.

Trinity's library is unique in the Republic for

another reason. Under successive British Copyright acts, it is entitled to receive a copy of every book, pamphlet, map and periodical published within the British Isles. Although this right was challenged by some British publishers following Irish independence in 1922, Trinity prevailed and now receives more than 50,000 additions every year to its library (Fox 1982). The college therefore has the most diverse and well-endowed research collection in the country, including that of the National Library, which is entitled only to books published in Ireland. Trinity's collection is accessible to all scholars, but the college's unique privilege is remarked upon by some who question its appropriateness in the Republic today.

Trinity's walls and its possessions have often antagonized the non-Protestant community outside. If the Provost's House was described frequently as one of the most beautiful residences in Dublin, what benefit was this to the average Irishman? In the Provost's garden, an ancient stream still marks the site of a holy well associated with St. Patrick at which pilgrims once assembled each year on March 17th. The existence of this well is all but forgotten, except to Dublin's historians, but symbolizes the privatization of culture and heritage in which Trinity once engaged. Since the 1970s, several fires on the campus appear to have been the work of arsonists. The most serious of these destroyed much of the interior of the

Georgian Dining Hall, which is in the painstaking process of being restored through insurance, state and private funding.

When the new arts and social science building was designed in the 1970s, a conscious effort was made to increase the college's accessibility to Dublin foot traffic by adding a gate that opened onto Nassau Street on Trinity's south side. Before that, most college personnel and virtually all visitors had to walk through either the main or the back gate, neither of which provided a short cut to the other side of the campus. The presence of guards and the possibility of having to ask one's way out discouraged casual wandering on the part of non-academic Dubliners. One current Trinity staff member, a working class Catholic raised in Dublin, commented to me that her father prided himself on never having set foot on Trinity's campus. Although the new Nassau Street gate does provide easier entry to the college, it still leads into an unmistakably private world. This enclave in the heart of a modern city is one of Dublin's great treasures, however, and it may be more appropriate to view the situation from the perspective of the academic community inside, whose college walks lead outward to the streets and diversions of a lively city. The building boom of the 1960s and notorious official disregard for architectural preservation have destroyed much of Georgian Dublin, but to a great

extent its remaining squares, fanlights and columns constitute the tourist's city, and Trinity College this city's centerpiece.

F. Trinity's Religious Affiliations.

The religious and educational philosophy of Trinity College in its first thirty years was largely Ramist, an intellectual form of Puritanism that stressed practical knowledge over metaphysical interpretation. In the last quarter of the sixteenth century, Ramism dominated Cambridge and much of the teaching at the newer "town colleges" of Edinburgh and Glasgow, which catered to the needs of the urban commercial classes rather than to those of the gentry who had previously filled the universities. In the late sixteenth century, Ireland's native elite were still mostly Catholic gentlemen, the natural enemies of Puritan reformers. Hugh Kearney writes that "Trinity College was to be the instrument of Ramism, righteousness and urbanization in Ireland" (1970:70). Two of its first three Provosts were Cambridge Ramists who aspired to creating a new university modelled on the old one. Dublin provided a philosophical tabula rasa upon which Puritan tenets could be inscribed.

In the 1630s, William Laud was appointed chancellor and set about devising a new charter and code of statutes for Trinity. A high churchman, monarchist and Oxford graduate, Laud expunged much of the influence of Cambridge

Ramism and strengthened the Crown's control over the university. For the next two centuries, Trinity's administration was firmly Anglican, the Established Church of Ireland, except for a period during the Commonwealth when Puritans regained control, and an even briefer time under Jacobite authority. Trinity was spared during Cromwell's reign of terror in Ireland in 1649-50 because of its Puritan sympathies, and the college was used as a prison and stables during his stay in Dublin. In 1689, James II's soldiers seized the college and for the first time in its history the Catholic Mass was said in Trinity's chapel. Also for the first and only time, to the present day, a Catholic was named head of the college, although his tenure lasted less than a year (Clarke 1977).⁵

The Jacobite occupation was brief but violent. Many fellows of the college fled to England; some who stayed were executed. Much brutal vandalism of college buildings and property took place. Such violence may be the normal pattern of military occupation, but it exacerbated Trinity's alienation from Irish Catholics, whose cause the English Catholic James II was willing to exploit. The assault on Trinity's physical structure was an assault on its institutional authority. Catholic grievance at Trinity's architecture, its treasures, its status, and its income from Irish rents encouraged the development at times of a siege mentality within the college walls.

Some Catholics and Dissenters had always attended Trinity, despite the college's various religious qualifications. Prior to the Jacobite rebellion of 1689, non-Anglican students were admitted with the expectation that they would conform to the Established Church by the time of graduation. After 1691, all entering students were obliged to take an oath of allegiance to the Church of Ireland and to repudiate the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation (McDowell and Webb *ibid.*). Thus, no practicing Catholic could graduate from the university. Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, the period of the Protestant Ascendancy's greatest strength, Trinity became entrenched as a symbol of elite privilege from which intellectually-capable Catholics were barred. At the same time, as will be discussed in the following section, the rise of a new nationalism in Ireland encouraged greater support for Catholic civil rights amongst some Anglo-Irish politicians. In 1794, Trinity abolished the transubstantiation oath, ceased the enforcement of compulsory Chapel attendance, and opened itself to Catholics. Nonetheless, the provost, fellows and scholars -- the corporate body of the college -- remained Anglican by statute.

In 1829 Irish Catholics won full emancipation, allowing them to hold political office and to enter the higher strata of government and the civil service. In the

ensuing decades, issues of Catholic civil rights, land reform, and national independence dominated Irish political life. In 1869, the British government disestablished the Church of Ireland, thereby depriving Trinity of its income from church revenues. This "spoliation" had less impact than feared, however, as Trinity received a compensatory payment from the government of £122,000 (Hinkson n.d.). More damaging was the fact that Church and State would no longer act in concert to defend Anglo-Irish interests in Ireland. Disestablishment marked "the beginning of the end of the Protestant Ascendancy in the spiritual and moral leadership of the country," the historian F.S.L. Lyons (1982:10) has written. Trinity's administration, as much as any other Protestant interest group, feared the potential for Catholic political power, abhorred its dependence upon papal dictates, and distrusted the English government's motives in Irish affairs.

Following Disestablishment, Trinity became even more deeply connected with the Anglican bureaucracy, as many of its fellows devoted themselves to the restructuring process forced upon the Church of Ireland at that time. Increasing Catholic agitation for university education, a cause to which Gladstone's Liberal government was sympathetic, also raised the specter of Trinity's incorporation into a larger Irish university system, or, alternatively, the loss of its statutory Anglicanism. The latter course was preferred as

the lesser of two evils. Consequently, Fawcett's Act of 1873, referred to earlier, forbade the administration of any religious test or oath for students and faculty. Fellows need not be ordained, except those of the Divinity School, and could adhere to any faith. But, as noted, it took more than eighty years for a Catholic to reach this elite status.

Ironically, Catholic demands for a religiously-based university, combined with Pius IX's aversion to mixed (i.e., combined Catholic-Protestant) education, seriously undermined the intention of Fawcett's Act. In 1875, the Pope forbade absolution to Catholic parents who sent their children to non-Catholic schools without adequately ensuring their moral safety. This injunction formed the basis for what became known in Ireland simply as "the Ban," the Irish hierarchy's proscription against Catholic attendance at Trinity, which was formally lifted only in 1970. The number of Catholics at the college actually declined slightly in the twenty years following the passage of Fawcett's Act (McDowell and Webb *ibid.*). In 1927, Catholic attendance was estimated at between 10% and 25% (Bowen 1983). But by that time, the National University of Ireland, attended mostly by Catholics, had been in operation for more than a decade.

The Ban became a major symbol of Catholic-Protestant relations in mid-twentieth century Ireland. From being a

general policy of discouraging Catholic attendance in the years immediately following Pius IX's injunction, the proviso became a rigid rule of the Irish hierarchy. In 1944 Archbishop McQuaid of Dublin issued the following statement as part of his yearly diocesan regulations:

No Catholic may enter the Protestant University of Trinity College without the previous permission of the Ordinary of the Diocese. Any Catholic who disobeys this law is guilty of mortal sin and while he persists in disobedience is unworthy to receive the Sacraments. In this Diocese, it is reserved to the Archbishop to grant permission to attend Trinity College. Permission is given only for grave and valid reasons and with the addition of definite measures, by which it is sought adequately to safeguard the Faith and practice of a Catholic student (quoted in Whyte 1980:306).

A decade later, the apparent loophole which implied that non-Dubliners could circumvent that diocese's approval was removed by the clarification that the Dublin Archbishop had authority over all Irish Catholics' requests for permission to enter Trinity. While some Catholics sought and obtained this, for many the mere existence of this antagonistic attitude on the part of the Hierarchy was discouraging enough, and it is likely that some interested students never got beyond their parish priest in making such inquiries.

Catholic "rejection" of Trinity, coming at a time when the college had finally opened itself completely, seemed to confirm some Protestants' perception that the Catholic Church would not be satisfied until Trinity was destroyed and a Catholic university built on its ashes. It also

served to remind Trinity of its minority status in a country overwhelmingly Catholic. Archbishop McQuaid's policy, articulated twenty years after Irish independence and thirty years after the creation of a separate university satisfactory to most Catholics, was an attempt to freeze Trinity out of national relevance as well as a safeguard against religious contamination.

Up until the 1960s, the Hierarchy's policy of maintaining a strict barrier between Trinity and Ireland's Catholic population was successful. But as that decade of economic transformation proceeded, growing popular demand for university education, combined with the country's liberalizing social attitudes, undermined the Church's authority to limit access to Trinity. During this same period, the Irish government also initiated its policy of free secondary education, eventually increasing the number of college-bound Catholic students. Many determined Catholics still sought permission from local prelates to attend Trinity, but this was more easily granted. One Catholic graduate who entered the college in the early 1960s recalled for me her father's joke that he had had to drink a series of glasses of sherry with the local Archbishop in order to send his four children to Trinity.

Throughout the 1960s, McQuaid resisted the reform which many others in the Hierarchy now supported, declaring that Catholics would be willing to wait another four

hundred years, if necessary, until "we achieve the full development of University formation that is our imprescriptible right as citizens and Catholics" (quoted in Feeney 1974:61). Just prior to McQuaid's retirement in 1972, however, the Ban was lifted with little controversy. A Catholic chaplain was appointed to the college and the Catholic Mass celebrated once again within its precincts.

Thus, up until a generation ago, Trinity retained its Protestant atmosphere in part through the reluctance of Catholic students, guided by their religious mentors, to make use of the college. Catholic faculty were few, and consequently, few could be elected to fellowship. Even fewer could become senior fellows, and therefore part of the college's highest decision-making body. The self-perpetuating nature of this dilemma allowed Trinity to shift responsibility for the problem on to Catholics, but it was, to a great degree, a chicken-and-egg situation. A concerted desire by Catholics to diffuse Trinity's Protestantism would have been required for the situation to have changed. For the relatively small percentage of these who sought university education, this was hardly worth the effort, the more so because Trinity suffered a declining reputation during this period -- a result, in part, of a lack of public funding during the early years of Irish independence. The alternate option of attending the National University also lessened Catholic motivation to

enter Trinity. It is not unfair to suggest that many of Trinity's old guard were relieved or comforted by the Ban. The college was open to all, but most who entered would be likely to conform to the traditions familiar to its faculty and administrators.

More troublesome at times than the Catholic question was that of Ulster Presbyterians, whose numbers at Trinity gradually increased throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Middle class Presbyterians, many of Scottish origin, were a dynamic force in the industrial development of northeastern Ireland, and as such resented the traditional landowning and ruling classes of Anglicans in the south. Queen's University Belfast was a Presbyterian stronghold, but those Northerners who attended Trinity or taught at the Dublin college often objected to the Church of Ireland's influence over an institution originally established upon strict Puritan principles (Lyons 1982). As faculty and students, Presbyterians maintained the dissenting voice which Trinity had been founded upon and which countered its elite Anglican tone. Thus apart from its difficult relations with the Catholic majority outside its walls, Trinity sometimes had to negotiate with an aggressive Protestant minority within.

After World War II, the number of students at Trinity from Northern Ireland increased. For a time, the college provided the opportunity for young people from both sides

of the Irish border to meet, and for Northern Protestants to live amongst Catholics in the south. With the resurgence of sectarian hostilities in the North in the late 1960s, such students stopped coming to Trinity.⁶ The loss of this opportunity for cultural contact was a small blow to cross-border reconciliation, as otherwise few opportunities exist for Northern Protestants to gain familiarity with life in the Republic. In the mid-1980s, with heightened competition for places in third-level education in independent Ireland, southern Catholics began applying in much larger numbers to Northern colleges (Queen's University, the New University of Ulster, and other smaller institutions). Catholics from both sides of the border now make up the majority of third-level students in Northern Ireland.

G. Trinity and Anglo-Irish Culture.

Trinity's historical eminence was the result of its status as Ireland's only university for almost three hundred years, as well as of its association with the Protestant Anglo-Irish ruling classes, whose political goals were closely intertwined with their cultural hegemony. In sixteenth and seventeenth century Ireland, Anglo-Irish intellectuals and administrators could be one and the same, while overlapping kinship connections drew landlord, statesman and academic into common networks over time. Trinity's first Provost, William Travers, was the

grandnephew of Edmund Spenser, the Elizabethan poet and civil servant whose essay, "A View of the Present State of Ireland," recommended a scorched-earth policy for Tudor conquest. One of the college's early graduates and vice-chancellors was Archbishop Ussher, descendant of a powerful Anglo-Irish family and author of the notion that the world was created in 4004 B.C. Throughout Trinity's first century, most of the college's notable men were clerical scholars like Ussher, who battled to keep the college afloat in the face of tumultuous political and religious shifts. The college's strong emphasis in its early years on Protestant religious instruction and Biblical studies was balanced, however, by its rigorous sequences of training in logic, philosophy, the natural sciences, and Classics.

Seventeenth century Ireland had endured a series of political and military upheavals, extending from the Puritan Revolution through the Restoration and the Jacobite Rebellion. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, peace and a fragile prosperity encouraged a social and intellectual florescence in Anglo-Irish culture enforced by economic control. It was this development that gave rise to the notion of a Protestant "Ascendancy" -- an empowering label for the Anglo-Irish elites who dominated political, economic and cultural life in colonial Ireland. The literary critic W.H. McCormack (1985) has identified

the term "Ascendancy" as first used in reference to the Protestant urban bourgeoisie; however, in popular usage it soon came to mean the whole world of Anglo-Irish privilege from which Catholics were excluded. The historian J.C. Beckett writes of these people that "their distinguishing mark was not their racial origin but their protestantism" (1966:96). The Ascendancy included Anglo-Irish of varied descent, including settlers from the Tudor and Stuart periods, as well as "Old English" from previous colonizing phases. Some distinguished Irish families were also Anglicized through religious conversion, and incorporated into the colonial power structure.

The dual connotation of insularity must be considered in thinking about Trinity, the Anglo-Irish, and Ireland as a whole. A series of borders -- the college fence, Dublin's walls, the English Pale -- demarcated a world within from a world without. The rural Catholic world without was of concern to the extent that the security of the urban Protestant world within depended upon the effective administration of the natives by civil servants and the gentry, many of them educated at Trinity. Yet, although Protestant Anglo-Irish of varying class and regional backgrounds were bound by a common language and religion, they were not the same as English Protestants. They themselves were alienated from the English world they were thought to be defending. The culture of the

Ascendancy was a product of both English and Irish traditions, but incomplete on its own. F.S.L. Lyons writes of the Anglo-Irish:

If they were arrogant it was because it had been their fate to govern a people which, for much of its history, had shown little capacity to govern itself. If they were ambivalent, it was because, although they were 'of Ireland,' and thought of themselves as Irish, they were doomed never to penetrate the Catholic and Gaelic recesses of Irishness, and could not afford to sever their ties with Englishness, in which a part of their nature found its deepest fulfillment (1982:22).

Trinity College, situated in the heart of the growing capital, was the most evident symbol of Ascendancy culture. The college campus and the Irish House of Parliament across from it set the tone of Georgian Dublin on the south side of the city, where elegant residential squares also developed on the streets radiating out from the city center. Along Kildare Street, branching out from Trinity's College Park, one passed the Kildare Street Club, the Royal Irish Academy and the Duke of Leinster's House, which became the home of the Royal Dublin Society and later the seat of the new Irish Parliament following independence. On the Duke's lawns, a complex was built that eventually housed the National Museum, the National Library, the National Gallery and the Museum of Natural History. This nucleus of social, political and economic authority, extending from Dublin Castle down to Trinity College and the House of Parliament, along Grafton Street and across to the complex of buildings at Leinster House and the

fashionable squares beyond, dictated Irish cultural standards into the beginning of the twentieth century. Within this core, expensive shops, clubs and hotels provided respite for the Protestant upper classes from the wearying work of administering the country, supervising estates, and generally protecting their interests.

By the late eighteenth century, these interests included a desire for greater political independence from England. Given its history, it would appear anomalous that Trinity graduates played a central role in the founding of modern Irish nationalism. However, this role is explicable within the context of the rise of nationalist movements throughout Europe at this time and the Ascendancy's assertion of its right to self-determination. Protestant nationalists were inspired by the American and French Revolutions, both of which presented parallels to the Irish situation. In the 1780s, parliamentary reformers such as Edmund Burke and Henry Grattan, both Trinity graduates, argued for substantial legislative change to increase Irish political independence from England and remove some of the penal restrictions against Catholics. In the 1790s, a more militant coalition of Catholics and Protestants came into being in a group known as the United Irishmen. Led by Trinity graduate Theobald Wolfe Tone, the United Irishmen marshalled support from France in an aborted invasion upon British forces in Ireland in 1796. In 1798, widespread

rebellion broke out as the United Irishmen rose across the eastern and southern counties, awaiting the arrival of French troops and supplies. Wolfe Tone was captured, but committed suicide before he could be executed. The Act of Union followed in 1800, dissolving the Irish parliament and binding Ireland closer to British rule, but a few years later another Trinity alumnus, Robert Emmet, led the remnants of the United Irishmen in another rising. This one also failed, and Emmet was executed. The Anglo-Irishmen Wolfe Tone and Emmet are secure in the pantheon of Irish heroes, although their ideal of united Catholic and Protestant resistance to British imperialism played little part in the independence struggles that followed throughout the nineteenth century. However, this association between the college and Ireland's early, non-sectarian nationalist movement is significant to Trinity's modern claim to be representative of a liberal political tradition.

Despite Dublin's social florescence prior to the Act of Union, Ireland's colonial status placed limits on the professional opportunities available to its educated men. In the eighteenth century many of Trinity's most famous alumni, including Edmund Burke, Oliver Goldsmith and George Berkeley, pursued much of their respective careers outside the country. Jonathan Swift, another graduate, thought of himself as English, but spent the last thirty years of his life in Dublin as Dean of St. Patrick's Cathedral. Much of

his writing during this period concerns contemporary Irish politics, despite his avowed displeasure with having to live in Ireland. Like many other Anglo-Irish, Swift looked upon his native country as a backwater, a kind of professional sentence.

Beyond its unique status as Ireland's only university, Trinity also played a dominant role in the development of the country's scientific and scholarly societies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Early "modernizing" organizations such as the Philosophical Society, founded to promote philosophy and science, and the Royal Dublin Society, founded to develop industry and agriculture, formed the core of Ireland's public intellectual culture during this period. These societies' membership and institutional support were drawn to a great extent from Trinity College, enforcing an association between Protestant Anglo-Irish culture and scientific research. So close was this relationship that it may have limited independent Ireland's commitment to the sciences up until the 1960s. The colonial origin of Ireland's scientific tradition is one of many issues now debated in the on-going reevaluation of Ascendancy culture and its contribution to Irish intellectual history.

Throughout much of its existence, Trinity did little to foster Catholic intellectual consciousness, except inadvertently by providing a focus for cultural resistance.

Instead, the college provided a base for the native Protestant intelligentsia, whose achievements were considerable. To dismiss their work as alien and unrepresentative of Irish culture is incorrect, but attempts to collapse the Protestant intellectual tradition into the broader Catholic one are disingenuous, given that Trinity strove for centuries to distinguish itself from the rabble outside its walls. The "two traditions" model of Irish culture has some legitimacy for the present, but cannot be applied to the past without adequate recognition of Anglo-Irish dominance over formal cultural standards for centuries in Ireland.

Trinity's relationship to the Irish language over time provides a particularly sensitive illustration of this dominance. In the first decades after its founding, some theology courses at the college were conducted in Irish, both to facilitate the proselytization of Catholics and to accommodate Irish-speaking Protestant students. This policy ceased by the mid-seventeenth century, with only occasional Bible readings then given in the language. At the end of the eighteenth century, when other Western European scholars were experiencing a romantic fascination with Gaelic culture, Trinity resisted this movement and circumvented an attempt by a private donor to establish a Chair of Irish Literature (McDowell and Webb *ibid.*). It professed a disinterest in "dead languages" and devoted

itself instead to the development of the new philosophies and natural sciences. A generation later, however, when the evangelical movement gained momentum in the 1830s and 1840s, a Chair of Irish was created in the Divinity School, again to aid proselytization.

Despite the great interest in Irish literature and folklore expressed by some mid-nineteenth Trinity scholars, most notably James Clarence Mangan and Thomas Davis, the college itself remained at a distance from the popular movement towards reviving Irish. Trinity dons publicly professed contempt both for the language and for the Irish nationalists who advocated its study. Such scholars seemed capable to a remarkable degree of separating the living language and culture from the ancient manuscripts that were deemed by them an appropriate focus of study. Several of Trinity's prominent academics showed no hesitation in declaring contemporary Irish and its literature vulgar and debased, even in the poetic interpretations of Gaelic Revivalists. Trinity's Classics professor, J.P. Mahaffy, testified before an Irish education committee in 1899 that the attempt to revive Irish was "a retrograde step, a return to the dark ages" (quoted in Kain 1962:45).

However, there is some irony in the fact that the co-founder of the Gaelic League in 1893, Douglas Hyde, was a Protestant and a Trinity graduate. The Gaelic League was one of the main inspirations of the Catholic nationalist

movement in the late nineteenth century, being committed to a cultural program of "de-Anglicizing" Ireland through greater use of the Irish language and a revival of interest in native culture. Hyde was an unsuccessful candidate for the Chair of Irish at Trinity in 1894, but became the first Chair of Modern Irish at University College Dublin fifteen years later when the National University was founded. In 1937, he was elected the first president of the Republic of Ireland, in recognition of his services to the Irish language and to the Irish cultural revival.

H. Trinity and Independent Ireland.

The second half of the nineteenth century was a period of growing institutional insecurity for Trinity, as Disestablishment and Home Rule loomed, and Catholic agitation on the "university question" increased. This anxiety and the defensiveness it produced are reflected in college publications of the period. A desire to propitiate Irish Home Rule politicians who soon might have control over Trinity is evident as well. In 1865, a college history describes Trinity as "this Ark of the Covenant, which has kept the two countries united" (Taylor 1865:536), while warning that "Romish" control of the university would lead to the burning of most of the library's books (ibid.:536). At Trinity's Tercentenary celebrations of 1892, ceremonial attempts were made to draw town and gown into a closer allegiance, but the possibility of forced

capitulation to Catholic clerical interests rankled. The Dean of St. Patrick's cathedral, seat of Anglicanism in Dublin, spoke out against those who might envision the college as either secular or Catholic:

... if there is in the land any institution in which all alike may feel national pride, that institution is the University of Dublin ... to weaken its efficiency by crippling its resources would be to inflict upon Ireland a grievous hurt without any compensating advantage, while to alter its constitution and deliver it up bound into the hands of some who claim a right to the enjoyment of its prestige would be to mock them by offering them that which could not be transferred to them, and which, even if it could, they are not in a position to maintain (quoted in the Records of the Tercentenary Festival, 1892:84).

The inevitability of some form of Irish Home Rule within a short time increased Trinity's anxiety concerning its status in a more autonomous state. During the 1912 negotiations on the Home Rule Bill, a member of the British parliament for Trinity proposed that the college be exempt from the jurisdiction of the new Irish government and remain, in effect, part of the United Kingdom (Stanford and McDowell 1971).⁷ Wisely, Trinity's officers rejected this plan for such an extreme extension of the college's physical and administrative sovereignty, and instead agreed to acquiesce to the gradual process which would lead, it was assumed at the time, to Irish independence.

However, the Home Rule movement was stalled by the intervention of World War I, and Irish militants moved with violence to create their own form of independence. With the Easter Rising of 1916, during which Irish nationalist

forces and British troops fought for control of Dublin, the ideological siege upon Trinity took concrete form. The college's location made it strategic for securing the administrative center of the city, and the British Army, aided by the Officers' Training Corps of Trinity students, held it against the rebel forces for several days until the Rising was over. Guns were fired from the Front Square and the roof of the college, defending the main streets around it for the British Army and holding the walled campus against invasion. Regret over such events was reflected shortly afterwards in an editorial in Trinity's college magazine:

To be called upon to defend our University against the attack of Irishmen, to be forced in self-defense to shoot down our countrymen -- these are things which even the knowledge of duty well fulfilled cannot render anything but sad and distasteful (quoted in Webb 1945:90).

The events of the Rising and the British government's harsh reprisals against its leaders fueled latent nationalist feelings across Ireland. After World War I, negotiations began between the British government and Ireland's nationalist Sinn Fein party, which had won the majority of Irish seats in the British parliament but had refused to take them, denying the legitimacy of British rule. With the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, Ireland was officially partitioned into two administrative units, Northern Ireland and the Free State of Ireland, both British dominions. Trinity's public response to this event

was gracious, given its extremely vulnerable position in the new state. The Board of the college called for its members to "take an active and sympathetic part" in the building of a new Ireland (Lyons 1978:98).

Trinity's fortunes declined in the period following partition. The college was viewed as an anti-national institution, an adjunct of British authority, by most middle class Catholics. It preserved many of its British ceremonial customs, including toasting His Majesty's health at college dinners and playing "God Save the King" at sporting events (de Vere White 1965). The new Irish government viewed Trinity with suspicion, and it received little public support from the state until the late 1940s, when Prime Minister de Valera's government began to provide some aid. Even with this concession, Trinity remained culturally isolated and financially insecure throughout these decades.

Many Irishmen, Protestant and Catholic, fought in the Second World War, despite great hostility between the Irish and English governments due to Ireland's neutral status and its refusal to allow England use of its ports. An incident occurred on V-E Day which may be viewed as a symbolic coda for Trinity's relationship with the British Empire. On May 7, 1945, celebrating Trinity students, most of them English and Northern Irish, climbed up the West Front of the college and placed a Union Jack on top of its main gate. A

group of Catholic students from University College, on the other side of St. Stephen's Green, marched on Trinity in outrage, and a few of them clambered up and tore the flag down. One of these students was Charles Haughey, at the time an undergraduate in UCD's commerce department, and presently prime minister of the Irish Republic.

The somewhat torpid environment of the college in the post-World War II period has been captured in J.P. Donleavy's novel, The Ginger Man, whose protagonist, an Irish American attending Trinity on the G.I. Bill, is more intent on chasing women, cadging drinks, and dodging landlords than on his lackadaisical studies. Terence de Vere White's campus novel, Lucifer Falling, set in Trinity in the early 1960s, describes an institution still overwhelmingly British and Protestant in its orientation, with the Irish Catholic world outside apparently irrelevant and somewhat bizarre to the faculty, students and administrators within.

Trinity's very rapid incorporation into mainstream Irish society from the mid-1960s on, as socioeconomic development brought about a restructuring of third-level education and as the Ban against Catholic attendance was lifted, is all the more remarkable when one looks at college publications of the period immediately preceding this transformation. Trinity's student newspaper, in a 1960 editorial commending the conferring of an honorary

degree on Eamon de Valera, still adopts a chillingly patronizing tone towards the majority Catholic population:

The College has once again demonstrated its loyalty to our country by honoring the President with the degree of Sc.D. What a pity that many Irishmen still associate Trinity with the years of foreign domination! Unfortunately, this attitude is encouraged by many of us who are British. Maybe some of you are intellectually superior, but we are all God's creatures (or perhaps you feel sufficiently superior to dispute the existence of God) and He has endowed each of us differently (Trinity News May 19, 1960, p.2).

In 1967, as the Irish government sought ways to develop university facilities in the Republic, a very controversial proposal was made by the Minister for Education that Trinity College and University College Dublin be merged into a single institution, under one university authority, with rationalized faculties, students and departments. Under this plan, the National University founded in 1908 would be dissolved. The University Colleges of Cork and Galway would be reconstituted as two separate universities, with a unified TCD-UCD as a third. Not surprisingly, many at Trinity saw this proposal as an attempted takeover, an initiative which would damage Trinity's unique qualities while working to the advantage of the younger and less prestigious UCD. National University administrators were even more hostile to the proposed merger, which threatened the integrity of their own college as well. In the end, the government abandoned the idea of a merger between Trinity and UCD, and delayed the dismantlement of the National. As will be discussed in

Part III of the dissertation, the Irish government's recent educational initiatives have been directed towards raising the status of the newer technical colleges to that of universities, in the process potentially lessening the prestige of both Trinity and the National University.

The public furor concerning the merger of Trinity and UCD reflected the continued antipathy of the two colleges to each other and the enduring significance of their distinct intellectual and political traditions in modern Ireland. In the following chapter, I will discuss UCD's origins in the nineteenth century struggle by Irish Catholics for higher education, and the ways in which the college maintains its distinction from Trinity today.

NOTES

1. The major published sources for the history of Trinity College used in this chapter are Trinity College Dublin 1592 - 1952. An Academic History by R.B. McDowell and D.A. Webb (1982), A History of Trinity College, Dublin 1591 - 1892 by Constantia Maxwell (1946), An Epoch in Irish History by John Pentland Mahaffy (1903), A History of Trinity College, Dublin 1892 - 1945 by Kenneth C. Bailey (1947), Trinity College, Dublin by W. Macneille Dixon (1902), and History of the University of Dublin by W.B.S. Taylor (1845).
2. Dubh linn was originally the name of a monastic settlement located to the east of Atha Cliath.
3. Throughout this dissertation I use the academic terminology of Irish higher education, which is drawn largely from the British university system. Thus, "professor" is generally used to refer to the head of a department, not any full-time faculty member.
4. Fawcett's Act was named for Henry Fawcett, a Cambridge professor of political economy. As a Liberal member of the British parliament, Fawcett first introduced a motion to abolish all religious tests at Trinity in 1867. Six years later, with then-Prime Minister Gladstone's support, Fawcett's Act was passed in amended form.
5. Father Moore, a Catholic priest, ran the college during this brief period. In their official history of Trinity, McDowell and Webb refer to him only as the "head" of the college, while another account refers to him as an actual provost (Desmond Clarke's Dublin, 1977). McDowell and Webb do not include Moore as one of Trinity's provosts in their appendix listing these.
6. I was told by a UCD faculty member that when sectarian violence first erupted again in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, some of Trinity's British faculty temporarily left the Republic and returned to England.
7. When I mentioned this incident to the current senior fellow of Trinity, he said that he doubted it had ever occurred. It is described, however, in the biography of the provost at that time, J.P. Mahaffy (Mahaffy. A Biography of an Anglo-Irishman by W.B. Stanford and R.B. McDowell, 1971).

CHAPTER FOUR

A UNIVERSITY OF ONE'S OWN:
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN

The National University is a new university, with no historic past, no great traditions, no time-hallowed prestige. Trinity College, which will be the rival of our own college, has a history of three hundred years, has produced many learned men, and prides itself on a great academic past ere many years are past, the prestige of the older University will be completely shaded by ours. The glamour of having led the new awakening will give the [National] University a halo all its own and secure for it a deep-rooted affection in the hearts of the Irish race.

Editorial
UCD's National Student, 1910

A. Introduction

University College Dublin is the largest college of the National University of Ireland (NUI), a federated system consisting of the University Colleges of Cork, Galway and Dublin, as well as several other "recognized" colleges.¹ NUI's founding through the Irish Universities Act of 1908 marked the end of a half-century struggle led by the Irish Hierarchy to establish a university serving the country's Catholic population in an environment free of Protestant cultural control. Nonetheless, as with other educational initiatives in modern Irish history, the National University was a compromise that failed to meet the contradictory goals of those involved in its creation. Statutorily non-denominational, NUI became, and to some extent remains, a Catholic university, the nationalist

alternative to the "Protestant" University of Dublin.

Although founded more than a decade prior to Irish independence in 1922, NUI was seen by its first officers, faculty and students as the training ground for a new Catholic professional class, academically accredited and capable of assuming leadership in a free Ireland. NUI's constituency, particularly that of its most influential college, University College Dublin (UCD), consciously saw it as an "engine of national culture," committed to rebuilding "the almost obliterated spirit and traditions" of the Irish Catholic people.² This agenda was not fulfilled as hoped. The college and its faculty have had fluctuating influence in the Irish state, due to changing political circumstances as well as to the uncertain status which higher education and intellectual endeavor in general have had in modern Ireland.

In the account that follows, UCD's history will be discussed in relation to nineteenth century educational developments in Ireland and the role of higher education in the independent state. Unlike Trinity, UCD has no official history covering the entire period of its existence.³ Therefore, books dealing with particular episodes in the college's history, faculty and student memoirs and biographies, and college publications such as catalogs and newspapers have been used to construct this account. As in the previous chapter, interviews with members of the

college community, as well as my own observations, provide some of the interpretation of this history.

B. The Irish University Question.

Catholic university education was one of the major political issues in Ireland throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, involving the relation between British colonial rule and Anglo-Irish cultural hegemony, as well as the Catholic Church's authority to determine education for the majority population. Education emerged as a key issue around which the Catholic Hierarchy articulated its resistance to colonial administration, in the process establishing its primacy over this realm in independent Ireland for many decades to follow.

From the time of Catholic emancipation in 1829, which allowed Irish Catholics to hold public office and removed other discriminatory laws against them, the movement for civil rights and national independence maintained popular support in Ireland. Aiming at a mass movement, rather than a small middle class constituency, Daniel O'Connell's Catholic Association forged an alliance with the Irish clergy, who were well-placed throughout the country to serve as grass-roots political leaders. As Larkin (1978) has described, the "Devotional Revolution" which followed the famine years of the late 1840s drew the Church and the Irish peasantry closer together, increasing the former's authority to defend and represent the interests of the

rural masses. Liberal pragmatism on the part of some British politicians in dealing with the "Irish Question" also provided a wedge for Catholic activists to assert their demands, despite British unease with the prospect of a clerically-controlled political front in Ireland.

From the moment when the British government first broached the question of improving Irish education, in the 1820s, the Hierarchy in Ireland stated its unswerving commitment to a single standard: Catholic education for Catholic students. An early petition by Catholic prelates to the House of Commons regarding primary education declared that "in the Roman Catholic Church the religious and literary instruction of Youth are universally combined ... no System of Education which separates them can be acceptable" (House of Commons Report 1825). In 1831, the question of Catholic primary education was resolved, albeit unsatisfactorily, with the creation of a national school system, funded by the British government, that allowed local authorities the major share of control over their schools. Catholic objection to previously existing free schools, mostly run by voluntary Protestant agencies, focused on their proselytizing nature despite their officially non-sectarian policies. The new national system was committed to multi-denominational teaching, with religious instruction provided separately for Presbyterian, Anglican and Catholic children within the same school.

However, all three denominations resisted this policy to the point where, within a few decades, most national schools had assumed the religious character of their dominant local constituencies.

Throughout this period, Hierarchical objection to mixed Catholic-Protestant education grew, enforced by Papal proscriptions against the dangers of liberal secularism. By the 1850s, a less conciliatory segment of the Catholic Hierarchy had assumed a dominant voice in public debates on Irish education. From this platform, prominent churchmen began a campaign for the establishment of a separate, state-funded Catholic university, equal in status, endowment and self-determined religious orientation to Trinity. Any other solution would place Catholic higher education in a position of "tangible and humiliating inferiority," as a leading advocate for the Catholic university argued (Walsh 1897:45). The British government confronted these Catholic religious leaders rather than a secular political force in its negotiation of the university issue, reinforcing the perception -- held by British administrators as well as many Irish Catholics -- that Irish nationhood and Catholic doctrine were fused. It should be noted, however, that the older British universities had always been closely associated with organized religion; only in the mid-nineteenth century did church and state interests clearly diverge on the matter of

higher education in Great Britain. Catholic clergy in Ireland were in much the same position as dissenting Protestant sects, challenging the combined power of the state and its Established Church in educational affairs (Coolahan 1985).

Beginning in the 1840s, the British government sought to establish a university satisfactory to both Catholic and Protestant authorities in Ireland. However, the Hierarchy's vision of such an institution came into direct conflict with the educational philosophies that had begun to take hold in early nineteenth century Britain. Influenced by the model of the newer German universities, which stressed applied knowledge, professional training and research, in addition to the teaching of the humanities, English educationalists favored the creation of "red brick" universities geared towards the needs of urban industrial society. London's University College, established in 1836 as a fees-paying, non-denominational and non-residential institution, was an acceptable model for a new university in Ireland, not one fashioned on Trinity's Oxbridge-style grandeur, with its communal character and gentlemanly academic requirements. By contrast, the Hierarchy wanted an explicitly Catholic university that would be a physical and intellectual match to Trinity.

Trinity was not an innocent bystander in these disputes. Aside from its religious tests, which until the

late 1870s barred Catholics from professorships and fellowships, Trinity was hostile to schemes for the alternate provision of Catholic education and most definitely opposed to incorporation into a larger national system. Although the University of Dublin's charter allowed for additional colleges to be built, its administrators and graduates would not accept Trinity's merger into a new institution which would diminish its unique position. In successive attempts to resolve the university question over the latter part of the nineteenth century, Trinity's opposition to any state plan altering its independent character formed as much of an obstacle as the Catholic Hierarchy's demands. In the end, the National University that was created not only left Trinity intact, but insulated in a new way from mainstream Irish society.

The first university initiative to take effect was that of the Queen's Colleges, which were founded in Belfast, Cork and Galway in 1845 as state-funded, non-denominational institutions. These three colleges still exist, with the latter two now part of the National University. The British government retained the right to appoint professors, and in 1850 Queen's University was established as the colleges' degree-granting authority. Given the general hostility in England to Irish political claims and the clerical forces involved in the Catholic university campaign, the Queen's system was probably the

only viable solution at the time. However, the Hierarchy viewed non-sectarianism as both threatening to Catholic morals and a continuation of Protestant authority, particularly after an attempt to increase the Irish bishops' influence over faculty appointments failed. In 1850, a national Catholic synod formally denounced the Queen's Colleges, forbade Catholic clergy to teach in them, and discouraged Catholic attendance. With Pius IX's support, the synod established a committee to set up a purely Catholic university (ibid.).

For these and other reasons, Queen's College Cork and Galway were severely hindered in their capacity to serve the middle class Catholic constituency for whom they were created. The Belfast college, whose location gave it a largely Presbyterian atmosphere, prospered and eventually became an independent institution, Queen's University Belfast. The great famine that began in 1845 further impeded institutional development in Cork and Galway, while loud opposition to the "godless" Queen's colleges by secular Irish leaders allied with the Hierarchy, such as Daniel O'Connell, discouraged even those Catholics who might have overcome clerical disapproval (Lyons 1985).

Recognizing the failure of this first solution, the British government dissolved the Queen's University in 1882 and established the Royal University, an examining body that could confer degrees on students from an assortment

of Irish institutions, as well as on students who had prepared for exams on their own. In this plan, the Queen's Colleges and their state endowments remained intact. The Royal's senate was made up equally of Protestant and Catholic members, and the provision of a limited number of scholarships for students from all colleges eased some of the difficulty Catholics had in attending university. In creating this "paper university," however, the British government largely gave up the attempt to bring Catholic and Protestant educational interests together, and each college soon assumed the sectarian character natural to its location and constituency. Lack of real support by the British government for Catholic institutions and the proportional imbalance, in demographic terms, of the Royal's senate membership, ensured the Church's continuing dissatisfaction with the government's second university scheme.

The most persistent spokesman for the Catholic cause in these disputes was Archbishop William Walsh of Dublin, who devoted more than a quarter of a century to seeing a new university created. Walsh's objection to the Royal was based largely on its failure to redress the economic and educational disadvantages Catholics faced in seeking a university degree. He was even willing to forgo theological instruction in a proposed new college for Catholics, if that college would be granted facilities

similar to Trinity's (O'Flynn 1982). Often conflicting with other Irish Church leaders, and engaging the support of British politicians sympathetic to the university campaign, Walsh was closely involved in the negotiations leading to the founding of the National and became its first chancellor.

Two commissions were set up to study the university problem, in 1901 and 1906. Debate and serious division over their recommendations led finally to the passage of the Irish Universities Act in 1908, by which a federated university made up of the Queen's Colleges of Cork and Galway, as well as the independent Catholic University in Dublin, described below, came into existence. Trinity College (the University of Dublin) remained untouched by this arrangement. The Royal University was dissolved and the Cork and Galway colleges renamed "University Colleges" of the new National University of Ireland. There appears to have been some attempt by the government to name the institution the King's University, but this was prevented through the heated objection of the Catholic Hierarchy (Coolahan *ibid.*). Archbishop Walsh's election as the first chancellor confirmed Protestant fears of clerical dominance at the National, but his appointment was not challenged, even by anti-clerical forces within Ireland. Interestingly, the decision to separate Queen's College Belfast from the new third-level system by reconstituting

it as an independent university anticipated Irish national partition by thirteen years. Queen's University Belfast thereby became the first state institution of the future province of Northern Ireland (McCartney 1983).

C. The Catholic University College.

The institution that in 1908 became University College Dublin was founded in 1853 as the Catholic University College. In existence throughout the period of greatest agitation on the Irish university question, the Catholic University College became a symbol of native intellectual accomplishment, as well as a nationalist locus for middle class Catholics in late nineteenth century Ireland. UCD's origins in this explicitly religious institution have influenced the present non-denominational college's identity and educational priorities to this day.

Acting on Pius IX's urging, the 1850 synod of Irish bishops moved to establish on its own a Dublin-based university expressly devoted to Catholic values. The Oxford scholar John Henry Newman, a well-known convert to Roman Catholicism, was asked by the Irish Hierarchy to become the first rector of this new institution. Newman's reputation as a scholar of early Church history was impeccable. As an Oxford fellow and formerly a leading Anglican cleric, he had experienced the highest levels of academic and religious bureaucracy. Coming under the influence in the 1830s of the Oxford Movement, which sought

to restore Catholic doctrine and practice to the Anglican Church, Newman eventually had converted to Catholicism, taking orders in the Roman Church and becoming its advocate. His public relations value as a distinguished English convert and a recognized scholar appeared at first to make him an ideal choice to head the new Catholic University in Ireland, and in 1853 he took up this position in Dublin.

However, Newman did not anticipate the severe obstacles which the country's social climate imposed on his task, and he soon found himself at odds with the Irish Hierarchy on central issues concerning the Catholic University's character. Newman's educational principles, while intellectually profound, clashed with the more pragmatic, and perhaps less sophisticated, thinking of the Hierarchy, which was itself divided on the question of the university's purpose. Newman envisioned a great international center for Catholic learning; the Hierarchy was more inclined toward an expressly Irish institution meeting Irish needs. Newman did not propose to use the university as a proselytizing force against Protestantism, unless indirectly through improving "the condition, the status, of the Catholic body ... by giving them juster views, by enlarging and refining their minds, in one word, by education" (quoted in Ker 1976:xi). In a series of public lectures delivered in Dublin in the early 1850s, he

described his vision of an ideal university, devoted principally to the molding of an elite corps of gentlemen-scholars. Professional training, though provided for, was not the foremost goal. Instead, "liberal education," emphasizing the humanities and social sciences, would lay the philosophical groundwork for success in any chosen life endeavor. Newman's collected essays, Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education (orig. pub. 1852), remain a classic theoretical work on the subject.

The Catholic University College opened for its first academic session in 1854, with five faculties: theology, law, medicine, and philosophy and letters, the last of which included science and engineering. The college was housed in buildings on the southern side of St. Stephen's Green, within ten minutes' walk of Trinity, and a university church was built next to these in which Newman preached. The Catholic School of Medicine, in existence since 1837, was incorporated into the college, augmenting the latter's professional standing. In its first year, the Catholic University College had seventeen faculty members and twenty students (excluding the medical school). By the end of the decade there were more than 150 students. The college suffered from its inability to award degrees, but by affiliating itself with several secondary schools and providing scholarships for their students, it encouraged greater access to university-level training for young

Catholics. It also offered evening classes leading to a university qualification, an unusual feature at that time. Although some Irish Church leaders disapproved of hiring English faculty, four of Newman's choices were British, including Thomas Arnold, Matthew Arnold's brother and the college's first Professor of English Literature.

Despite conflict over the new institution's goals and the practical deterrents to its expansion, Newman's thinking had great influence on Catholic University College and became a significant part of the later UCD's intellectual heritage. But Hierarchical suspicion of Newman, his commitments in England (where he retained a clerical post) and his inexperience in dealing with Irish political matters worked against his plans. In 1858 he resigned in frustration. He had not expected to remain forever, but to stay until the college's basic foundation was secure. Although this goal was not completely realized in so short a time, Newman had done much to establish an academically creditable institution.

In the decade following Newman's departure, the fortunes of the Catholic college declined due to uncertain leadership and funding. It was maintained by the Irish Hierarchy with a minimum of expenditure, and might have been closed down were it not for the proof it offered the British government that Irish Catholics desired higher education. However, Catholic University College was not

well accepted by much of Ireland's middle class. Those capable of attending college often preferred the degree-granting Trinity or a British university, despite the prevailing anti-Catholic bias of these institutions. Those for whom Newman's college might have offered a new opportunity for higher education doubted the value of a long and advanced course of studies in a rural society with few professional openings for Catholics. Even after the Royal University began to provide some funding and made it possible for the college's graduates to receive degrees, student numbers and public support remained low. University education and Dublin itself were still associated with elite culture. Catholic boys with academic gifts were often thought to be better off developing these in universities abroad or in the Irish seminary at Maynooth, where their training would have greater spiritual and practical benefits. By the early 1880s, the Catholic college had only about two dozen students (Gwynn 1954).

In 1883 the college, renamed University College, Dublin, was turned over to the administration of the Irish Jesuits. Some of the Irish Hierarchy were opposed to this decision, in part because they still hoped the British government would create an entirely new Trinity-style Catholic university. But in addition, it is likely that the Irish bishops feared Jesuit worldliness and clerical autonomy. Most Irish Jesuits were trained abroad, and were

thus influenced by a more cosmopolitan form of Catholicism than were members of other Irish orders. As educators, the Irish Jesuits also held progressive views, and were less likely to be malleable to local Hierarchical demands. It was only with the insistent urging of William Walsh, the chief Hierarchical advocate of Catholic university education, that the Jesuits were granted control of the college (ibid.).

Under the direction of its first Jesuit president, William Delany, University College quickly revived, gaining more than a hundred new students in the first year of his administration. Delany soon staffed the college with several other Jesuits, who brought with them not only Jesuit endowments but continental educations and outlooks. While theological instruction was provided, much greater emphasis was placed on the secular subjects necessary for students to pass the Royal's degree examinations. Nonetheless, as a Jesuit institution, the college retained a strong Catholic, and in some respects elitist, orientation. Richard Ellmann has noted the subtle nature of its religious atmosphere, writing that "the effect of having at least half the faculty in surplices was profounder than it might have seemed to those outside" (1959:59).

In the 1890s, the college began to reflect more closely the country's wider political currents. UCD still

had few physical amenities, and its students spilled out into Dublin's streets, parks and cafes in the absence of a private campus like Trinity's. This relative deprivation made the city and its controversies even more their own. Already a clear sense of destiny was apparent in many of these young people, supporters of Home Rule, the Gaelic League and other nationalist causes. This period of the college's history has been described in the works of James Joyce, a student at the end of the 1890s.⁴ In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Joyce provides us with fictionalized accounts of some of his schoolmates, notably Thomas Kettle, later UCD professor of political economy and a member of parliament, and Francis Skeffington, a well-known pacifist and feminist. Both of these enlightened Irishmen died young, and in the same year, 1916. A Home Rule nationalist, Kettle was killed in France as a member of the British Army during World War I. Skeffington was shot by a British soldier in Dublin during the Easter Rising while attempting to quell a riot.⁵ Another friend of Joyce's at UCD, George Clancy, founded the college's Gaelic League chapter. Joyce himself was strongly attracted to some of the romantic imagery of the Gaelic Revival, and employed Irish mythological figures in his work. However, he spurned any form of nationalism that valued politics over art, and that encouraged the censorship of "non-Irish" or critical creative expression.

In 1899, he expressed these feelings publicly by refusing to endorse a public condemnation by UCD students of Yeats's play The Countess Cathleen, which depicted Irish peasants in an unflattering light. The college's students at this time were, on the whole, moderate Home Rule nationalists and middle class Catholics. For them, the Gaelic Revival was a source of cultural regeneration, not social criticism.

With the passing of the Irish Universities Act in 1908 and the incorporation of the Jesuit college into a national system, the Catholic University formed in the 1850s became largely an administrative entity, made up of a few disparate institutions under the authority of the Irish bishops. Graduates of University College became members of the new National University, and many faculty were automatically transferred to its "new" colleges (Coolahan *ibid.*). The Catholic University still exists as a formal entity, and in symbolic ways connects the present UCD to its Catholic past. Until very recently, UCD's academic buildings on St. Stephen's Green were the property of the Catholic University and only leased to the National's UCD. Three professorships of Catholic Theology, endowed by the Irish Hierarchy, remain in the National's faculty listings, although NUI itself cannot fund any theological chairs. The roots of UCD's Catholic origins have pushed up and through its modern secular foundation, leaving a great deal

of the college's original religious character intact.

D. NUI's Institutional Structure.

Despite its name and perceived nationalist identity, NUI is not a public university. It receives state support but is technically an autonomous institution, run by a senate which appoints the officers and statutory lecturers of its affiliated colleges. The university acts as an administrative and degree-granting authority for these, under the control of a chancellor, vice-chancellor, and other administrative bodies. NUI's statutes allow for the inclusion of additional institutions as "recognized" colleges, distinct from the three original "constituent" colleges of Cork, Galway and Dublin. This provision was widely regarded in 1908 as a loophole for attaching the Catholic seminary at Maynooth to the NUI system. However, only Maynooth's lay college of St. Patrick's was affiliated, in 1910. Its seminary remains under the control of the Catholic Hierarchy. Other institutions which have been added in the years since then include several teaching colleges and the Royal College of Surgeons.

Although resolution of the Irish university question was a relief to all concerned, some Protestant and Catholic authorities remained dissatisfied with the terms of this compromise. The Hierarchy had not succeeded in creating an openly Catholic institution; there was still some element

of second-class citizenship in the statutory bars against theological instruction from which Trinity was free. Another grievance for Catholics was the level of state funding, which for a long period of time allowed little to NUI colleges for institutional development. On their part, many Protestants predicted the co-optation of NUI's colleges by its largely Catholic administrators, which would make the colleges into powerful agents for the Church in contemporary political matters.

NUI's senate was structured to provide representation from all walks of Irish life, including businessmen, priests and farmers. This was a reasonable ideal, but in practice has meant that non-academic interests have entered often into university decision-making. Professorships are approved ultimately at NUI's senate level, and those of key departments may be influenced by factors which have less to do with scholarship or administrative ability than with secular and religious politics. Another structural problem arises from the small number of officers that controls each constituent college, essentially a president, a registrar and a secretary-bursar.⁶ Despite the creation of additional governing body committees and faculty deans over the years, power resides largely in these officers' hands. At UCD, a tendency toward long tenure also has consolidated a pattern of limited power-sharing at the highest level. The college has had six presidents in its eighty years, but

its first president and registrar remained in office from the time of NUI's founding in 1908 until 1940. The first secretary-bursar was in office until 1939. During this period, much of UCD's administrative procedure was set in place. Four of the registrars eventually became presidents, further promoting an atmosphere of in-group politics in the college.

At its foundation as part of the National University in 1908, UCD had eight faculties: arts, philosophy, Celtic studies, science, law, medicine, engineering and architecture, and commerce. Fifty-one faculty members taught five hundred and thirty students (NUI 1911, UCD 1976). In 1926 the faculty of agriculture was created, and philosophy was expanded to include sociology. The latter two disciplines remain linked in a single faculty, in which metaphysics, logic and psychology are also taught. In the 1940s the faculty of veterinary medicine was added, bringing the total number of UCD faculties to ten. Student numbers grew to over three thousand by 1950, and by the late 1980s were more than ten thousand (UCD 1976, 1983, 1987).

E. Architecture.

For the first fifty years of its existence (as both the Catholic University College and the Jesuit-run University College), UCD was associated with the three small buildings on Stephen's Green in which Newman's

faculty had lectured in the 1850s. Around the corner from these, on Earlsfort Terrace, an exhibition hall built originally to house Dublin's Great Exposition of 1865 was used as the administrative center of the Royal University beginning in the 1880s. With the founding of the National University in 1908, the British government turned Earlsfort Terrace over to UCD for lectures and larger assemblies. Between that time and the early 1960s, these buildings on the Green and the Terrace constituted the heart of UCD's campus, with some specialized faculties located elsewhere. Overcrowded and inadequately renovated from the start, they nonetheless housed the first three generations of Irish state-makers educated at the college.

Trinity's buildings and property were a source of resentment for UCD's founders, one of whom described the latter as a "very tight little college in the shadow of Trinity's magnificence" (Hogan 1954:84). An initial building grant of £110,000 was poorly supplemented in the college's first decades, despite the pressing need for expanded facilities (Coolahan *ibid.*). In the 1930s, college authorities began buying up contiguous parcels of land outside Dublin near the suburb of Donnybrook. This was largely the work of UCD's third president, Michael Tierney, who judiciously bought and exchanged property near the chosen site over a period of twenty years between the 1930s and the 1950s. In the 1960s, the college began

building on this land, and gradually moved most of its faculties to this new location. With subsequent property purchases, UCD's suburban campus now amounts to more than three hundred acres.

There is some question as to whether real estate near the old college at Earlsfort Terrace might have been purchased instead, but even if such were obtained it would not have provided the open landscape upon which UCD could carve its own personality for the first time. The college, or at least its dominant administrators, appeared to choose modernity over tradition, turning toward the suburbs and ceding Dublin to Trinity. The estates on which the new campus was built had previously been owned mainly by Anglo-Irish civil servants and gentleman farmers, and the new site was named Belfield after the original purchase. With the move to Belfield, UCD left behind the buildings associated with its first century and made a deliberate attempt to create a new identity and physical presence. While still occupied by a few departments and used for public lectures, Newman's college and the Terrace became part of UCD's past. Suburban Belfield became its future.

Aside from meeting the practical needs of an expanding college, relocation out of the inner city was symbolic of a general transition in Irish society beginning in the early 1960s. Dublin's architecture was noble but decrepit. Socioeconomic development at this time inspired a building

boom in which urban planners and entrepreneurs began ripping the old city down and replacing it with new office blocks and high-rise housing projects for the poor. The middle class increasingly preferred to live in suburbs beyond the city on land stretching out along the coast and climbing back toward the Dublin mountains. Belfield's construction stimulated other developments in the Donnybrook-Stillorgan area, with Ireland's first industrial park and shopping mall soon located nearby. A widened road running alongside of these provided easy commuting between the city and the new suburban estates. Very quickly, central Dublin changed from being a residential area to an almost entirely commercial one, deserted and often dangerous at night. Even Radio-Telefís Éireann, Ireland's national broadcasting authority, followed suit, moving from its headquarters in the General Post Office on O'Connell Street (where Padraic Pearse had first declared the Irish Republic in 1916) to a site nearly opposite UCD. These two institutions of modern Ireland now seem to have established a mutually-supportive hegemony over the rest of the country's intellectual culture.

In recent years, greater concern with urban preservation, as well as "yuppie" gentrification, have revitalized parts of inner Dublin, where remaining Georgian townhouses are once again fashionable addresses. The development of property near Earlsfort Terrace by

commercial real estate interests in the mid-1980s provoked some urban planning specialists to re-evaluate the wisdom of having moved UCD out of the city center in the 1960s. Some of them argue now that it would have been better for UCD to have stayed and expanded near Earlsfort Terrace, thereby completing a unique chain of cultural institutions stretching across the city from Parnell Square on the north side to Stephen's Green on the south. UCD's relocation to the suburbs also made it invisible to most non-Irish visitors, a situation which is not alleviated by the confusion between its name and Trinity's official one of the University of Dublin.

Belfield's new buildings vary in their architectural quality, but all conform to the poured-concrete and glass-box style endemic to the 1960s and 1970s. Despite this, the campus carefully maintains a fusion of the old and the new, of rural and urban Ireland. An exceptional effort has been made to integrate walkways, shrubbery and a man-made lake into the earlier features of the landscape. The original Belfield House and a few other old buildings have been left to stand near the front of the grounds and are used for modern purposes, such as labs and a fieldhouse. The new concrete boxes are laid out behind these on a main road stretching across the college. As you move to the back of the campus, culture gives way to nature as well as to the land's earlier settlement pattern: the paths are

overgrown, bits of crumbling stone wall emerge from the brush, and a few archways and window openings still sit low in the ground. In this demesne also stands a small Doric temple, erected at Trinity in 1836 as an observatory, and given to UCD as a gift by Trinity's administration in 1975, when the latter's new arts and social science block was begun on the site occupied by the observatory. This little piece of the older college has not been used consistently, and at the time of my fieldwork appeared empty and neglected. The visitor is left with the impression that UCD has "captured" a miniature version of Georgian Trinity and left it to decline in fertile isolation.

Not in its anonymous architectural whole but in its parts does Belfield remind the visitor of colonial and pre-colonial Ireland, as well as of a continuous cultural heritage distinct from that of the Anglo-Irish. Unlike at Trinity, signs are written in both Irish and English. At a ground-floor crossroads in the arts building, wooden statues of the cat Pangur Ban and his scholarly owner are situated in a lounge area, with the words of the ninth century Irish poem they refer to on the wall behind them.⁷ In the mid-1980s, a bust of James Joyce, UCD's most famous alumnus, was placed near the administration building, facing inward toward the college. One wit, noting Ireland's official disdain for the author over decades, has

suggested he would have preferred instead to face away from it. This belated recognition of Joyce by his alma mater is itself a form of historical revisionism that allows UCD, and by extension Ireland as a whole, to reincorporate his work and ideas into the text of the national culture.

Trinity's formal, symmetrical layout is exchanged at UCD for winding paths and asymmetrical building placement, as well as some striking examples of bad planning. The arts building, erected in the late 1960s, is a frustrating maze of dead-ends for the stranger without a floorplan. Student folklore contends that this was a deliberate attempt by the administration to foil the enemy within, potentially riotous UCD students who might have taken over the college during Ireland's relatively benign student unrest of the period. Another problem arises from the campus's amorphous design: it has no center, no student union, but instead an architectural entropy which fails to provide the needed gemeinschaft for this community of over ten thousand. Residence halls were originally planned but not built, due to a lack of funding. In the late 1980s, some student housing was erected, but most students still live off campus in rooming house "digs" in various declining Dublin neighborhoods. This relative absence of dormitory life also prevents UCD from becoming truly communal. Few have lived at UCD since the "clearance" of its former estates, while Trinity has offered a home to at

least part of its population for four centuries. In these aspects Trinity's sheltering walls are attractive, as well as an inspiration to jealousy. In the margins of a book describing Trinity's architecture in UCD's library, someone has scribbled a vehement comment: "Fuckers! Look what we ended up with! A battery-farm with a feeding-coop on stilts!"

F. UCD's Catholic Orientation

Under the terms of the Irish Universities Act, no state funds can be applied "for the provision or maintenance of any church, chapel, or other place of religious worship or observance, or for the provision or maintenance of any theological or religious teaching or study" (NUI Calendar 1911). However, private funds can be used to create professorships, as noted earlier in the case of Catholic Theology, and to provide religious facilities. All three of the National's main colleges have Catholic chapels (and none others) on campus, situated on privately-held ground. At UCD, this has resulted in a curious form of gerrymandering. Here the chapel sits in the center of the campus on a circular piece of private land, surrounded by college property, rather than at a college border, as in the case of University College Cork. Although clearly a Catholic foundation, UCD's chapel also holds Protestant services as well during the academic year. The college does not have chaplains, but instead "deans of residence,"

one of them a priest, who provide psychological and practical counselling.

In its first years, the National University included many Protestants on its faculty. Over time, their numbers decreased. Some of these teachers were transfers from the Queen's Colleges of Cork and Galway, as well as University College in Dublin. Some were new appointees. Their presence reflected NUI's need to accommodate the Anglo-Irish and English interests associated with the University's founding. In 1908, Ireland was not yet independent, and for all its talk of being a national foundation, the university was still a British institution, created by royal charter, whose highest authority was the king of England. In the political milieu of the time, middle class Catholic and Protestant interests were not so deeply divided as they later became; in addition, many Catholics favored a gradual path toward independence through Home Rule and the conciliation of British authorities. During the troubled years following 1916, when both the Anglo-Irish War and the Irish Civil War polarized sectarian differences, and again after Eamon de Valera's grass-roots Fianna Fail party came to power in the early 1930s, Irish institutions such as the National became more openly associated with Catholic political interests. In the time preceding this period, however, lingering Protestant privilege may have been viewed as a small price

to pay for securing state support.

Irish Protestants also were more likely to have the academic qualifications desired of college faculty. In a copy of NUI's first calendar (catalog), found in UCD's library, a list of the original faculty at the Dublin, Cork and Galway colleges is given. On the top of this list a hand from many decades back has inscribed the word "Protestants," and then gone on to underline all those it knew, or presumed, to be of this faith. A member of either religion might have felt compelled to make such a public reckoning; in either case, it was a distinction worth noting at the time.

UCD's early officers were committed personally to maintaining a Catholic atmosphere at the college. Its first president, Denis Coffey, arranged for virtually all of the Dublin Diocese's clergy to do their philosophy training at the college and to be its graduates. He "fostered and organized" a Catholic religious environment at UCD through his own devotion to this cause, former UCD president J.J. Hogan writes in his memoirs of the period (1954:96). "Under his direction," Hogan continues, "the College, without infringing either the letter or the spirit of its constitution, became a Catholic university in a way peculiar to itself; and brought at least some of Newman's prophecies to fulfillment" (:97).

Of particular importance in maintaining this

orientation was clerical control of departments where philosophy was taught. It has been conjectured that NUI's founders tacitly agreed in 1908 to leave philosophy in the hands of the Catholic Church as a compensation for the university's officially non-denominational status. UCD's original faculty of fifty-one included eight priests, five of them Jesuits. As time went on and the original clerical faculty in the college retired, careful management was employed to ensure that new priests would take their place. Of these, however, relatively few have been Jesuits, but instead members of other orders perhaps more pliant to local hierarchical control. At UCD, the Dublin Hierarchy maintained strong influence through its representation on the university's senate and its cultivation of close relationships with college administrators. From the 1940s on, Dublin's conservative Archbishop, John Charles McQuaid, insisted that all his seminarians receive bachelor's degrees at UCD, and arranged for graduate training for those priests more academically capable. McQuaid was particularly concerned that clerics be qualified in the developing fields of psychology and empirical sociology, areas where secular philosophy might form a wedge of influence. Given the limited educational opportunities for most Irish during this period, the Hierarchy's educational policy, combined with the fact that all philosophy appointments required the Archbishop's imprimatur, resulted

in the continued selection of priest-professors. Although this arrangement technically violated university statutes, it was successful on an unauthorized and unchallenged basis.

Clerics have maintained their strongest control within the faculty of philosophy and sociology. Since 1911, five of the seven deans of this faculty have been priests. In 1987, six of its fifteen university-appointed faculty members were priests. The faculty of philosophy and sociology is affiliated with six departments: ethics and politics, education, logic and psychology, metaphysics, political economy, and social science (some of these departments are also part of the arts and commerce faculties). Out of a total faculty in these six departments of about seventy, only nine were priests in 1987, but three of these priests were department heads (logic and psychology, metaphysics, and social science). Logic and psychology's thirteen faculty members in the same year included three priests, two of whom were university appointees (a more permanent and higher-paid faculty status than that of non-statutory college appointees). Of metaphysics' seven faculty members, four were priests in 1987 (two of them university appointees). Clerical influence in the department of ethics and politics has diminished in recent years, with its first secular head of department appointed in the 1970s. The three clerics

teaching in this department at the time of my fieldwork -- a priest, a nun, and a member of a third order -- represented both left- and right-wing Catholic thinking. Priests chaired the department of education up until the 1940s, but there has been only one clerical professor since that time.

Metaphysics remains UCD's Catholic philosophical core. In 1988, its chair, who was also dean of the faculty of philosophy and sociology, became Archbishop of Dublin. His appointment by the Vatican was widely considered a conservative choice intended to repress a growing trend towards liberalism in the Irish Church. The previous dean of philosophy and sociology, a layman and former member of the metaphysics department, is now the president of the college. NUI's statutes do not allow for clerical presidents, but even aside from this technicality, there is no history of college officers emerging from the lay faculty of philosophy and sociology. Earlier presidents have come out of the departments of medicine, physics, Greek and English. Clerical members of philosophy and sociology have tended to become part of the Church's Hierarchy as bishops. In the past, Catholic influence throughout UCD was taken for granted and did not require additional institutional support. The selection of a member of the metaphysics faculty to be president in the late 1980s, when clerical influence has waned in other

areas of the college, may indicate an attempt to reassert an unambiguously Catholic ethos at the administrative level.

Philosophy is taught in three departments: metaphysics, ethics and politics, and logic and psychology. The unusual subject pairings in the latter two departments were explained to me by a current UCD faculty member in the following way: "Ethics was tacked on to politics so as to prevent the discussion of Karl Marx, and logic was tacked on to psychology to prevent the discussion of Sigmund Freud." However, the consolidation of philosophy into a single department is resisted by some secular faculty, who believe its present fragmentation allows them greater opportunity to teach the subject from outside of a Catholic framework. For example, philosophy within the ethics and politics department, which has a lay professor, can follow a curriculum different from that of the philosophy taught in the metaphysics department, chaired by a priest. As mentioned earlier, the current professor of the ethics and politics department is the first lay person to hold that position. As a junior faculty member in the 1960s, this man was urged by the then-professor of the ethics and politics department, a priest, not to publish "prematurely" the book he was writing on Church-State relations in modern Ireland. Soon after, the junior faculty member left UCD and took a teaching job at Queens University Belfast.

There he completed his book, which became the major reference on the subject. He was then recruited back to UCD a few years later to be chair of the department he had left. It would appear, then, that ethics and politics has committed itself to a more secular philosophical orientation than has, for example, metaphysics, although it is still under the partial authority of the clerically-dominated faculty of philosophy and sociology.

In the past, the close control by priests and the Dublin Hierarchy of those departments where philosophy was taught allowed a de facto form of academic censorship to go unchallenged. This censorship was based more on the scholarly framework in which philosophical issues were defined than in the banning of specific types of discussion. The general policy of the college is that nothing should be taught that may offend the sensibilities of students. Rather than leaving the classroom floor open for the critical discussion of all ideologies, this guideline has tended to limit controversy altogether and to enforce the status quo of mainstream Irish Catholicism.

As the faculty of philosophy and sociology has expanded since the 1960s, its number of lay academics has increased. The monitoring of these non-clerical academics' teaching and published work is rarely explicit enough to be labeled outright censorship. For instance, one lay sociologist who had recently published a critical study of

the Irish Church told me that his department chair, a priest, had never acknowledged the book, which was widely reviewed. This may or may not influence the lay academic's professional opportunities in the social science department; undoubtedly, however, it has marked him as a renegade.

An explicit instance of possible censorship was described to me by a colleague of the metaphysics lecturer who had supposedly been its target. According to my informant, her colleague had broached the topic of abortion in one of his classes. A student in the class informed her priest of this incident, and the latter in turn reported it to the lecturer's professor, who was also dean of the faculty of philosophy and sociology. When I asked the lecturer directly involved in this supposed series of events if he had ever been subject to censorship, he said he hadn't. When I asked the dean about it (who is now Archbishop of Dublin), he told me that the subject of abortion was to be avoided because none of his lecturers were sufficiently knowledgeable in the topic to be able to present every philosophical side of the issue. On the basis of this reasoning, one of the most controversial ethical questions in contemporary Ireland can be banned from discussion in philosophy classes.

Examples such as these suggest that academic censorship in UCD's philosophy departments today rarely

risers to the level of open debate, but operates in a more subtle manner. The individual faculty member has the choice of censoring himself, censoring the discussion of possible censorship, or risking university disfavor by saying or writing something that may affect his career without the charge against him being made explicit. One metaphysics lecturer suggested to me that these conditions have the larger effect of discouraging published work of a critical nature by philosophy and sociology faculty members. Instead, these faculty members are safer producing abstract scholarly studies that don't challenge the Catholic precepts upon which much of Ireland's academic social theory is still based.

G. UCD and Irish Intellectual Life.

UCD's role as an educational institution has been subject to varying interpretations since its foundation. The aversion to cosmopolitanism which the Irish Hierarchy had expressed since the time of Cardinal Newman was not alleviated by NUI's official constitution as a non-denominational university in 1908. Trinity had co-opted formal educational standards; NUI therefore had to become the older institution's equal but also somehow different. This was to be achieved through a commitment to native traditions, which sometimes seemed to include a wariness of the "life of the mind" outside of Catholic concerns.

As the Irish Catholic intelligentsia came to assume

greater influence in the early years of the twentieth century, Gaelicism and Catholicism were seen increasingly as linked traditions. Intellectual endeavor that disregarded the latter tradition was suspect. A 1913 editorial in NUI's student journal warned that the university was already in danger of "breeding intellectualism" -- i.e., ideas for ideas' sake -- and criticized those writers and poets who presented non-idealized visions of Irish culture. If the university was to be an "engine of national culture," then it must be truly Irish, and therefore Irish Catholic, in its intellectual standards and interests.

The defence of the Irish language was central to this nationalist intellectual program. Throughout the nineteenth century, the number of native Irish speakers had declined from about one-half of the population in 1800 to one-eighth in 1900 (Freeman 1965). Cultural and linguistic revival was seen as the springboard for national independence from the 1880s on, when the Gaelic Athletic Association had been formed to promote native games. The Gaelic League was founded in 1893 to teach Irish and restore it as the country's spoken language. Both organizations had overwhelming influence on young people who sought an alternate vision of Irish identity to the largely negative one imposed by the dominant culture over the preceding centuries. Given that a number of prominent

Trinity professors had publicly expressed their contempt for the native language and its literature, implying that civilization in Ireland was a by-product of British administration, it was appropriate that Ireland's new National University should support the embattled language through its educational requirements. University College Galway, in particular, was and remains institutionally committed to instruction through the medium of Irish.

In 1913, Irish Gaelic was made a compulsory matriculation subject at NUI for Irish-born students from all thirty-two counties (including those of the present Northern Ireland). Prior to this decision, there was considerable debate over the question of using "essential Irish" to determine university entrance. Opponents believed such a policy would discriminate against eligible students who had never had the opportunity to learn the language, and pointed out that existing Irish language facilities in the colleges were already underused (Morrissey 1983). A further problem was the limited number of Irish textbooks available for second- and third-level instruction. At this time, however, reservations regarding the language were often seen as anti-national and pro-British. Irish was made compulsory for entry to NUI colleges, and the teaching of Irish literature, history and archaeology promoted as academic subjects.

Still, Ireland's attitude towards its language was

already deeply ambivalent. Irish was lost as a living tongue well before independence, and the new state's commitment in 1922 to its fostering through compulsory teaching at the primary level did not succeed in reviving it. Some parents in regions where Irish was still spoken objected to forced bilingual education, believing that totally English instruction was necessary for their children's academic and future success. Donald Akenson, a historian of Irish education, contends that rather than devising an effective policy for its revival, Irish leaders merely idealized the "nearly-magical" power of the language to restore national identity (1975:35). Great individual commitment was necessary to save the language, but this was not forthcoming from most of the population following independence. Ideologically, Irish became a symbol of what might have been. On a practical basis, it became a device for securing civil service jobs under the terms of the government's employment regulations.

Nonetheless, NUI's colleges have made an enormous contribution to formal Irish scholarship through their language departments and others devoted to Gaelic and Celtic culture. A chair of Irish history and archaeology was established in Newman's college with its founding, and throughout the next half-century courses in these subjects and in the Irish language were provided by Catholic University faculty. Celtic Studies was one of the

National's original faculties, and chairs of Modern Irish, Early and Medieval Irish, Welsh, Early Irish History, and Celtic Archaeology were statutorily endowed. Douglas Hyde and Eoin MacNeill, co-founders of the Gaelic League, were two of these faculties' first professors, along with other distinguished scholars, and the college immediately established itself as a major center for Irish and Celtic research (Murphy 1954). Today, academic specialists in those disciplines that pertain to Irish culture -- literature, language, history, folklore and archaeology -- are charged most explicitly with the responsibility for cultural preservation in Ireland. Work in these disciplines has formed one of the richest areas of intellectual life in independent Ireland, drawing together academic and non-academic scholars through a common interest in Irish Studies. The historical distribution of Celtic culture throughout Europe has also provided an international basis for this research, encouraging academic affiliations with universities in Scandinavia and on the Continent.

In the early decades of independence, a new pragmatism emerged in Ireland as the country struggled to create its own agenda for economic development. The Irish writer George Russell described this milieu in a letter to the American literary critic Van Wyck Brooks in 1925:

We in Ireland are reacting against the idealism which led us to war and civil war and I fear we are in for an

era of materialism. Our new government is however honest and energetic and from a romantic conception of Ireland is being evolved the idea of a highly efficient modern state. I would like to live for fifteen more years because I think we will react again to the imaginative and the spiritual and we shall probably begin a fight for spiritual freedom (quoted in McManus 1978:115).

However, "spiritual freedom" for Ireland's early political elite meant largely the permeation of Irish Catholic philosophy throughout all levels of national life. Writers such as Russell hoped for a fusion of Gaelic and English cultural elements in the new state, but the post-1922 period was marked instead by their increased separation. The accession to power of Eamon De Valera's Fianna Fail party in the early 1930s enforced this divide through an anti-cosmopolitan social philosophy that enshrined the small farm and conservative Catholic values as the bedrock of the Irish nation. This vision was powerfully articulated in a new constitution, adopted in 1937, which declared Ireland a sovereign, independent and Gaelic state. Under its terms, the constitution granted the Church a "special position" in Irish society as the defender of public morality, which was in effect Catholic morality. The family was protected against any legislation for divorce, and censorship upheld as a means of curbing harmful social influences. In this period, little disagreement existed between secular and clerical leaders, and the Church secured its hold over the educational system at all levels (Lyons 1982). Independent Ireland's first

generation of university-trained Catholics emerged out of this intellectual and social context.

The period between the 1930s and the 1960s has often been described as a dismal era in modern Irish history. The new state struggled to establish sovereignty through protectionist economic policies and the exclusion of foreign cultural influences. The renewed authority of the Church made intellectuals who worked outside the narrow realms of Catholic nationalism suspect. Even the Anglo-Irish writers of the Gaelic Revival, figures such as W.B. Yeats, J.M. Synge, and Lady Gregory, whose work had helped fuel the independence movement, came under attack as representatives of a colonial mentality. These attitudes were enforced through educational policies as well; Kelly (1983) notes that Anglo-Irish literature was not included on the state's second-level Leaving Certificate examination until 1939 (ironically, the same year that Yeats died). This period was marked also by the self-imposed exile of several well-known Irish writers and the embittered frustration of many who stayed. Censorship of films, books and foreign newspapers was rampant, peaking in the early 1950s. Francis McManus notes that during this time

the most consistent and permanent contact between the Irish state and Irish writers was through a state organ, the censorship board, which could ban with a savagery that seemed pathological (1978:119).

Under its original terms, the five-member censorship board was meant to include representatives from both

Trinity and NUI, but academics did not always make themselves available for such questionable government work (Gray 1966). Up until 1956, the board included one Catholic priest, who unofficially represented the Church's position on upholding Irish morals (Whyte 1980). Membership on the board was usually secret and its decision-making process not subject to public scrutiny. It is an old joke in Ireland that the first step towards providing oneself with a decent literary education is to get hold of the list of banned books, available from the Government Publications Office. In recent years, more extreme censorship standards have been relaxed, leaving outright pornography the usual casualty of the board's decisions. However, in 1987 the censorship board banned Alex Comfort's The Joy of Sex, which had been available in Ireland for more than a decade.⁸ This anachronistic gesture gave rise to a wave of derisive outrage in the country by writers' groups and many of the educated public.

Some UCD academics did not acquit themselves well in the censorship crusade of the 1930s and 1940s. A well-known example concerns Eric Cross' ribald book, The Tailor and Ansty, which recounts the lives and wisdom of a peasant couple in County Cork. Banned soon after its publication in 1942, the book was then subject to a lengthy debate in the Irish Senate, during which passages from it were read aloud. Speaking for the government, UCD Professor William

Magennis defended the book's suppression and went so far as to demand that the Senate erase its own record of the debate, on the grounds that prurient readers would satisfy their curiosity by buying copies of the Senate's published proceedings.

Many other writers of this time found their work suppressed, or wrote with an over-awareness of the censors' power. It is often noted that the most famous "banned" book of all, James Joyce's Ulysses, was never actually banned. Published in 1914, it eluded later state legislation and was subject to confiscation only if an outraged parent or priest wanted to make an issue of it. Censorship therefore was unpredictable and often irrational, and publications that managed to survive did so in an environment of financial and legal uncertainty. The most notable of these was a magazine called The Bell, published between 1940 and 1954 under the editorship of Sean O'Faolain and Peadar O'Donnell. The Bell featured the work of established as well as new Irish writers, including Louis MacNeice, Flann O'Brien, and Frank O'Connor, in an attempt to provide a cross-border survey of current intellectual thought. However, the magazine was often subject to public attack from Church leaders and idiosyncratic censorship by printers and librarians (McMahon 1978). When it voluntarily ceased publication in 1954, its final editorial commented:

... the sad fact is that whatever has gone wrong with the country has gone wrong with the writers too, ... the sleepiness, the dishonesty, the mental starvation and weakness of the country as a whole are quite apparent from an editorial chair as from anywhere else ... (The Bell, Vol. XIX, No. 8:6).

A few journals of a similar nature to The Bell were published sporadically throughout the next twenty years, but it wasn't until the mid-1970s, with relaxed censorship standards, growing liberalism, and a revitalization of interest in cultural debate, that a wide readership for magazines of general intellectual interest was recovered. Since that time, journals such as the Crane Bag, and more recently The Irish Review, both edited by NUI faculty, have provided platforms for the interdisciplinary discussion of contemporary Irish culture by university academics and other intellectuals.

In contrast to The Bell, a journal called Studies flourished in Ireland from its inception and remains a leading publication. Founded in 1912 by a number of NUI professors, Studies offered a forum for writing on literature, philosophy and science "in harmony with the religious and national characteristics" of the country (Studies, Vol. I, No. 1, March 1912:3). Its first editor was UCD's Jesuit professor of political economy, T.A. Finlay, and over the years its contributors have included clerical and secular faculty from NUI's colleges, as well as politicians and state administrators. Recurrent topics in its pages are education, cultural identity, and the

country's religious condition. Studies has also provided a platform for new political statements, which are apparently "vetted" by their inclusion in this mainstream Catholic journal. It remains an accurate barometer of changing social and intellectual concerns within Ireland's educated middle classes.

Given this recent history, it is not surprising that the charge of "anti-intellectualism" has frequently been leveled against modern Ireland, not least by its own social analysts (e.g., Chubb 1982). It might be more precise to view this as a distrust of outside influences combined with excessive faith in Catholic doctrine as an intellectual paradigm. Ireland in the 1950s was economically and socially depressed, its patrimony of native culture perceived as threatened by de-population and modern values. The other kind of culture was a commodity bought with museums and symphony orchestras, neither of which had high priority in the national budget. These circumstances combined in mid-twentieth century Ireland to produce a dominant orientation noted for "tastelessness, censorship, and the cold suspicion of the Church," in the words of Trinity political scientist Basil Chubb (ibid.:22). In this climate, social and intellectual innovation were to be curtailed. UCD's administrators often appeared to reflect such characteristics, which were not incompatible with their genuine commitment to improving university education.

It is true that Ireland's quietus in this period was punctured occasionally by controversies involving church-state relations and censorship, but the critical intervention of intellectuals -- some of them Trinity Protestants -- simply increased clerical and popular distrust of that ilk. Critics of Ireland's narrow intellectual standards found it hard to penetrate the consciousness of a society that perceived itself as homogeneous, its shared religious and cultural values dampening any discourse of class consciousness or abstract defense of minority rights.

Ireland's rapid socioeconomic transition from the 1960s on has fragmented this stereotype, so that being "Irish Catholic" no longer precludes being, for example, pro-divorce or anti-clerical. Added to this has been the pressing need to address issues that are fundamental to the renewed sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland, issues that were not resolved with partition and independence, and that now pose a serious threat to the Republic's own stability and integrity. In this context, intellectuals representing greater philosophical range have gained a wider audience in the public discussion of political values, national identity, and socioeconomic questions. However, suspicion of the motives and representativeness of those intellectuals who remain outside the accepted spheres of traditional culture and traditional politics continues

to limit their influence in Irish public life.

H. UCD and the Irish State.

NUI was in an awkward political position in the first years after its founding. It had come into existence with the support of the Irish Parliamentary Party, which sought national independence through Home Rule. By the early 1900s, Home Rule appeared to many British politicians as a reasonable solution to the "Irish problem," given the rise from the 1890s on of a more militant independence movement. Diverse nationalist goals were temporarily fused in the 1916 Easter Rising, when Gaelic Leaguers, Sinn Feiners and socialists came together in a short-lived but transformative political event. Many of UCD's students were members of the Irish Volunteers, the citizens' army formed by UCD professor Eoin MacNeill, and some fought in 1916. MacNeill's prominent role in the Easter Rising led to his imprisonment and death sentence. The sentence was commuted in 1918, but UCD temporarily withdrew his professorship on the basis of his treason. A UCD student who had fought and died in the Rising, Kevin Barry, was also treated coldly by the college, which resisted efforts to create a memorial to him (it was later erected at Earlsfort Terrace). But at the same time as students like Barry were fighting in Dublin, many UCD students and graduates were fighting World War One in France, members of the British Armed forces. UCD and its students were caught

between Irish nationalism and loyalty to the British state. Dependent on the latter for survival, the college was compelled to protect its interests under the current British administration while trying to ensure its future stability under an Irish one.

In the divisions emerging out of the Anglo-Irish Treaty negotiations of 1921, which created an Irish "Free State" with dominion status, and in the Civil War which followed in 1922-23, UCD was closely associated with the pro-Treaty Cumann na nGaedheal party. This party held power in the first Free State governments between 1922 and 1932, and many UCD graduates and faculty who entered political life during this time quickly gained influence at the national level. UCD students saw almost unlimited opportunity ahead of them, and the college debating society was truly a nursery for statesmen. "Our little team," wrote one student of the period, later a UCD professor, "included a future prime minister,... a future chief justice, a future president of the Incorporated Law Society, and a future senator" (quoted in Meenan 1980:34).

However, UCD's political influence waned in the 1930s after Eamon de Valera's republican Fianna Fail party came to power. The Cumann na nGaedheal party was seen by republicans as pro-British and accommodationist, and UCD was tarred with the same brush. The participation of UCD and other NUI faculty members in national life declined

after 1932, as Irish party politics assumed a rural character that tended to exclude urban professionals and intellectuals. De Valera himself was devoted to seeing that university academics would have little impact on national politics. His 1937 Constitution resulted in the transfer of the universities' political representation from the Dail, the lower house of parliament where the daily business of government takes place, to the Senate, a mainly advisory upper house. With this transition, de Valera ensured that potentially hostile Anglo-Irish members for Trinity, as well as potentially hostile Cumann na nGaedheal members for NUI, would be marginal to party politics. UCD remained popularly associated with pro-treaty sentiments (after 1933 represented by the Fine Gael party, an outgrowth of Cumann na nGaedheal) and the socioeconomic interests of the urban middle classes. Ironically, then, UCD did not gain an untarnished "halo all its own" as a symbol of the new Irish Ireland, as its idealistic students had anticipated in 1910. Its early allegiance to the "wrong" political party, combined with popular distrust of the urban educated classes, instead often placed its administrators and faculty members on the periphery of political and cultural life in independent Ireland.

As academics and intellectuals began to move back into national politics in the liberalizing climate of the 1960s, UCD regained some influence in this public arena, largely

through its Fine Gael associations. Fianna Fail's traditional dominance was challenged by the Fine Gael and Labour Parties, both of which attracted academics and other intellectuals to their ranks for a time. Of this recent generation of academic politicians, former Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald, a UCD economics professor, is undoubtedly the most prominent. In the late 1980s, however, UCD's political affiliations appear to be fragmented, with the most significant alliances emerging between the government and state agencies and those academic disciplines most capable of meeting national development goals. Similar alliances have been formed over the past two decades between Trinity and Ireland's policy-making bodies, as the state has sought to integrate the entire third-level sector into its planning agenda. The next part of the dissertation will discuss the impact Ireland's economic transformation since the 1960s has had on both colleges, their faculty members and their students, as well as the influence of state-directed technocratic thinking on the internal academic structures and priorities of Trinity and UCD.

NOTES

1. The "recognized" colleges of the National University of Ireland are St. Patrick's College (Maynooth), St. Patrick's College of Education (Dublin), Our Lady of Mercy College of Education (Dublin), Mary Immaculate College of Education (Limerick), the Royal College of Surgeons (Dublin), and St. Angela's College (Sligo).
2. The first quote is from an editorial in The National Student (NUI's student journal), Vol. I, No. 1, May 1910, p. 6. The second is a quote from Jeremiah J. Hogan, president of UCD between 1964 and 1972, in the foreword of The Scholar Revolutionary. Eoin MacNeill (1867-1945) and the Makings of the New Ireland, F.X. Martin and F.J. Byrne (eds.), Irish University Press, 1973.
3. Some of the historical sources for this chapter include Irish Education: History and Structure, by John Coolahan (1981), Struggle with Fortune, edited by Michael Tierney (1954), Towards a National University. William Delany S.J., by Thomas Morrissey (1983), and A Page of Irish History. The Story of University College, Dublin, edited by the Fathers of the Society of Jesus (1930).
4. After Joyce had become famous, Trinity's provost J.P. Mahaffy remarked that "James Joyce is a living argument in favor of my contention that it was a mistake to establish a separate university for the aborigines of this island -- for the corner-boys who spit into the Liffey" (quoted in James Joyce, by Richard Ellmann, Oxford University press, 1959).
5. Kettle and Skeffington both married into the Sheehy family, which holds an interesting place in modern Irish intellectual history. Kettle married Mary Sheehy, to whom Joyce had been attracted during his prep school days, and whom he describes as the object of his teenaged affection in A Portrait. Skeffington married Mary's sister, Hanna. Their son, Owen Sheehy-Skeffington, became a Trinity faculty member, a senator, and a leading Irish civil libertarian. Another Sheehy sister, Kathleen, married the journalist Francis Cruise O'Brien and became the mother of Conor Cruise O'Brien. Kathleen is also said to be the model for the nationalist Miss Ivors in Joyce's story, "The Dead."
6. The office of secretary-bursar is now split into two separate positions at UCD. The fourth senior officer of the University Colleges is the librarian.
7. This sculpture was located originally in the Dun

Laoghaire Shopping Center outside Dublin and moved to UCD in the early 1980s. The poem it refers to describes a lonely student slaving over his books with the companionship of a playful cat, intent on his own purpose of catching a mouse. It is the oldest known poem in Irish literature.

8. The Joy of Sex was first banned in Ireland in 1974, but the ban lapsed after twelve years. It was thus "re-banned" by the Censorship Board in 1987.

PART III. THE COLLEGES TODAY

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MULTINATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Higher education in Europe stands on the threshold of profound changes in the patterns of institutional leadership These patterns transcend the specific national circumstances of particular systems. They are, if you wish, the product of a new relationship between university and government, industry and society They point to the rapid demise of the "scholarly corporation," acting in a largely autonomous manner, as the decisive influence in shaping the priorities of the university.

Guy Neave
"Strengthening the Arm of the
Prince," 1986

A. Introduction.

This chapter will discuss the changes that have taken place in Irish higher education over the past twenty-five years as a result of socioeconomic development and the greater integration of Irish academic structures into state, corporate and European Community educational initiatives. While Trinity and UCD have been similarly positioned in relation to these changes, the former institution has undergone a more profound transformation during this period than has UCD. Since the lifting of the Ban in 1970, Trinity may be said to have turned and really faced Ireland for the first time, accepting responsibility for the country's future and that of its young people. The majority of its students are now Catholic, and many of these are of working class background.

However, Ireland's economic recession of the 1980s has

also limited these young people's opportunities for employment within their native country. Unemployment and emigration now loom in the minds of many Irish college students, as well as younger faculty members, as motifs shaping their perception of the value of university training and of their future role in Irish society. This development is ironic given the fact that the expansion of third-level education was designed to increase prosperity and professional opportunity at home. With Ireland's growing involvement in the European Community, "home" may be construed now by some graduates and state administrators as the EC member states. While this broadened employment sector provides some advantages to Ireland's technically-trained young people, it does little for those educated outside this area, and much less for those without any third-level education at all. Within the university, the increased reliance upon external sources of funding seems to be perpetuating, rather than stemming, the flow of young Irish people out of the country.

B. Economy and Demography.

Any discussion of the university and of academia in Ireland in the 1980s must begin with the fact that state funding for education was in a crisis throughout this decade. In the late 1980s, this crisis was reflected in a near-freeze in faculty hiring and promotion, delayed or abandoned development of capital projects, cutbacks in

ancillary services such as remedial education and counselling, and the shutdown of smaller schools and colleges throughout the country. Within the third-level sector, it was reflected also in the aggressive search for private funding, usually from industries involved in technology and applied scientific research, and in the increased dependence upon European Community sponsorship of educational programs.

These funding problems are the outcome of Ireland's economic downturn since the mid-1970s, when the government began relying upon foreign borrowing to sustain the economic growth of the preceding decade. With the world-wide recession brought on by the oil crisis of the early 1970s, and the subsequent rise in international interest rates, the Irish government was forced to increase taxation substantially to keep up with the interest payments on debt, without being able to reduce new borrowing requirements. Domestic consumption and disposable income fell, and there was zero growth in gross national product between 1980 and 1987. Industrial output and foreign export have increased in the 1980s, but not enough to offset the outflow of profits to the multinationals responsible for major development in the manufacturing area since the 1960s. Jobs provided by manufacturing have not compensated for the overall loss of jobs in the agricultural and service sectors of the economy (FitzGerald

1988). In the late 1980s, the Irish government's fiscal strategy called for drastic reduction in public expenditure, affecting social welfare and education sectors most severely.

Yet despite this need for stringency, the state is compelled to maintain relatively high expenditure on education over the next ten years, as a result of the baby boom which began in the 1960s and which now leaves fifty percent of the Irish population under age twenty-eight. One-third of the population is under eighteen, and the tail-end of the bulge in school-age children will not occur until around the year 2000. Out of a total population of three and a half million, one million are students. Meanwhile, the demographic structure of the older population, combined with the high incidence of unemployment and emigration, leaves only 800,000 Irish taxpayers to carry the burden of state funding for education and other social services. Technical and applied education, seen as part of the solution to Ireland's economic problems, costs more to provide than traditional "chalk and talk" instruction. In the late 1980s, Ireland spent approximately 6% of its Gross Domestic Product on education, more than Britain, Japan, or the US, but in per capita spending this amount has been spread thinly over a very large student population (Irish Times 6 February 1987). In the absence of national economic recovery,

skilled young people will continue to leave Ireland, and the country will receive few benefits from having funded their education.

Compounding these difficulties is the fact that student enrollment has already begun to decline at the primary education level, as a result of a decline in the birth rate that began in 1980. It will soon begin to decline at the second and third level as well, as the current generation passes through the system. It is predicted that over the next twenty-five years there will be about 300,000 fewer students in Ireland, leaving a surfeit of schools, teachers, and expensive facilities (Irish Times 11 September 1987). Under these circumstances, new expenditure on education is seen as a dubious investment. Nonetheless, pressure on third-level education has been at its greatest in the late 1980s, and competition for entry is intense. Advanced education of some kind is perceived by many Irish now as a virtual necessity for their children's future welfare.

This situation creates great anxiety for all concerned: parents, students, faculty, and educational administrators. Students and their families must make pragmatic decisions about courses of study to pursue, based on the marketability of their skills at home and abroad. Administrators bear the brunt of harsh decision-making that may contradict their own values as providers of

education. In between these two groups, faculty members express frustration, anger, and fear for their jobs. As student-faculty ratios worsen, younger academics in particular find themselves increasingly burdened, and see little hope of promotion and greater influence in institutional policy. Divisions between disciplines are intensified as some faculties expand and others experience attrition.

Other disturbing features accompany these developments in third-level education. The growing influence of industry on education and the latter's repositioning within developmental schemes for the European economy appear to threaten non-applied disciplines and the intellectual independence of the university. Irish economists and bureaucrats now depict higher education as a productive process that must be shaped towards the needs of those who consume its products, which are its research and graduates. The state seeks to expand its control over this process in order to coordinate it with national economic goals, a reasonable compensation for its investment in the means of production. It also aims to attract foreign students and investors into specialized areas within the third-level sector, a variation on Ireland's status since the 1960s as a high-tech components manufacturer in the multinational economy.

While it would be naive to suggest that the

relationship between economic forces and education is new, the importance of this relationship is overwhelming in Ireland today. All third-level institutions, and universities in particular, are aware that their maintenance and expansion will depend increasingly on their ability to attract outside funding. Universities aim to develop their role in the production of "high-cost" new knowledge, while maintaining their function as preservers of "low-cost" received knowledge. This agenda inevitably leads to a ranking of disciplines according to their economic value and expense to the institution, a hierarchicalizing of knowledge which affects the public perception of academics within its diverse disciplines as well.

C. The Structure of Third-Level Education Today.

Since the early 1960s, the structure and character of education in Ireland have changed tremendously. In the first four decades of national independence, the state took little initiative in educational research or innovation, providing funds for capital and current expenditure but leaving administration and curriculum-control in the hands of local, usually clerically-dominated, education authorities (Coolahan 1981). With the implementation of national programs for economic development beginning in the late 1950s, strong emphasis was placed on education as an investment in Ireland's industrial future. Increased state

participation in international agencies such as UNESCO and the Organization for Educational Cooperation and Development reoriented Irish educational policy towards wider concerns and the world market. During this period, the 1966 census revealed the first growth in Ireland's population since the Famine of the 1840s. Changing ideas about the value of education combined with the evident need for expansion resulted in a general restructuring of state policy, as well as a greater awareness by the Irish public of education as a key factor in socioeconomic development. These circumstances combined to weaken the control of religious authorities as the main providers of and ideological force behind education. The Republic's entry into the European Community in 1973 also greatly affected policy and funding for third-level education, given the EC's drive towards rationalized, equivalent higher education within the member states that will promote the development of the European economy and the free movement of labor and services in its Community.

In 1967, Ireland initiated a program of guaranteed second-level education for all students, a policy which inevitably increased demand for entry to third-level institutions. A number of state agencies now coordinate and finance the third-level sector, which has emerged as a binary system divided into university and non-university spheres. The Higher Education Authority administers the

former, which includes the colleges of the National University of Ireland, the University of Dublin (Trinity College), and teacher-training colleges. The National Council for Educational Awards administers most technical and vocational education, which is provided by three types of institutions. These are the colleges of the Dublin Institute of Technology, the Regional Technical Colleges (RTCs), and the National Institutes for Higher Education (NIHEs). RTCs and NIHEs in different parts of Ireland have been created since 1969 primarily as diploma- and certificate-granting institutions, while degrees are conferred mainly by the universities. Recently, the NIHEs have sought to become degree-granting institutions, thereby raising their status to that of the universities. In 1988, the NIHEs at Dublin and Limerick were reconstituted as full-fledged universities by the Irish government, a reflection of the increasing importance of technical and applied education within the third-level sector.

Admission to most third-level facilities is now handled by one agency, the Central Applications Office, which makes decisions based on exam results, student choice of educational institution, and the number of places available each year for different courses at the various colleges and NIHEs. In addition, post-secondary courses in industry and commerce are provided by AnCO, the state's Industrial Training Authority. Once regarded almost as a

form of welfare aid, given their lower entry standards and their provision of living stipends during the training period, AnCO courses are now tied increasingly into the colleges and NIHEs as another way of subsidizing these institutions and developing their technical areas.

Student enrollment in third-level education has grown by more than 165% since 1966, and within this sector non-university education has experienced the greater growth. In 1986, 29% of Irish eighteen-year-olds went on to higher education (Irish Times 8 November 1986) and approximately 80% of these students entered RTCs, NIHEs, or other technical institutes. Of new university entrants at this time, only 15% were enrolled in arts and humanities programs. In 1986, the total number of students in the university sector was 32,000. 7,500 of these were at Trinity College, and over 10,000 at University College Dublin, which has the largest student population of any single third-level institution. The other three colleges of the National University (University College Cork, University College Galway, and St. Patrick's College at Maynooth) shared the remaining students.

The percentage of women students in higher education has risen dramatically in the professions and some of the sciences since the early 1970s. At the time of my fieldwork, the student bodies at both Trinity and UCD were about equally divided between men and women. However, in

the major growth areas of technology women are still seriously underrepresented (Smythe 1985). Women faculty are also in the minority in the Irish university, making up only 16% of the full-time academic staff in the entire university sector in the mid-1980s. This is partly the legacy of a now-abolished Irish civil service policy that maintained a bar against married women up until the mid-1970s. This bar was loosely applied in the university, depending on the individual involved and the faculty requirements of each department. Senior female faculty, such as professors and statutory lecturers, were exempt, but by the mid-1960s all married women were allowed to continue teaching on a part-time basis. For some women this was satisfactory. Others objected to the peremptory pay cut and loss of status involved. The Employment Equality Act of 1974 ended such discriminatory practices, and the colleges now provide maternity leave and other standard benefits to women employees. Prior to this, however, several generations of female faculty found their careers, and their scholarly ambitions, frustrated by the civil service policy. Now that that the policy has been changed, economic cutbacks inhibit women's professional advancement. As the colleges ceased to hire full-time faculty in the 1980s, women were doubly disadvantaged as exploitable part-time employees, less likely than men to win the few full-time places that were available. UCD now

has a governing body sub-committee responsible for monitoring the position of women in the college and making specific recommendations for change. European Community guidelines support equal rights for women and are capable of imposing economic sanctions on EC-funded institutions if these rights are not enforced.

The overall increase in demand for higher education in recent years has placed great strain on existing third-level facilities, and brought into being a "points system" for determining student access to them. Points are based on second-level leaving certificate scores in a range of subjects, and the number of points required for entry to each course of study at each institution changes every year in accordance with the number of applications and the places available. Socioeconomic background cannot directly influence entry, and the system is designed to ensure that students who are admitted to specific courses will be able to pass them. At the same time, there is criticism of the points system's emphasis on narrow academic achievement and the great pressure placed on students taking the leaving certificate exams. One Irish education expert has characterized the Republic's third-level entry system as "a yearly national tournament, with a clearly understood -- though undeclared -- First Division, Second Division, and so on down to the very sizeable groups of 'also rans' and indeed 'non-starters'" (Hogan 1986:271).

More prestigious third-level institutions can preserve their reputations by setting higher points requirements, thereby claiming they get the "best" students, while racking up the highest number of first-choice applications (and rejections). Individual institutions may also apply their own fine tuning to the national entry system, without making such policy public. One example of this would be to give extra weight to science scores for those applying to engineering, without advising exam-taking students of this weighting in advance. The points system also affects the public evaluation of different disciplines by implying that courses which are easier to enter, such as those in the arts and humanities, have lower academic value. Once in university, students may enforce this hierarchy by asserting the academic superiority of their own disciplines, based on their difficulty of entry.

Given this intense competition, it is often the desire for a marketable degree, rather than the totality of a person's aptitudes and interests, that determines his choice of studies. Students are encouraged by parents and academic advisors not to waste their high exam scores on an easier-entry course of study. Similarly, the prestige attached to attending university rather than a technical or vocational institution is great among the Irish middle classes, adding further to the pressure such students feel as they approach college age. It should be noted that the

average age of entry to third-level education in Ireland is seventeen, the youngest in Western Europe.¹ By age fourteen or fifteen, Irish students are already being pressured to make critical decisions about the rest of their lives.

Media coverage of the race for third-level entry at the beginning of the 1986-87 academic year depicted anxious students wildly criss-crossing the country to apply for any last-minute opening available, be it in hotel catering or business studies. For the most part, these were students who had not been offered places in the first round of admissions, and who were scrambling at the last minute for entry before the academic year began. The Irish Times's education editor reported on the number of places remaining at each institution on an almost daily basis, as well as on the frustration and anger of students trying to find their way into third-level programs. In recent years, the impact of the national economic problem has been sharply revealed at this juncture between second- and third-level education, given that for many of Ireland's college-age students, continued education offers a means of delaying unemployment and emigration.

Studies made in the early 1980s demonstrated that the binary system of higher education in Ireland contains serious class and regional imbalances in student enrollment. A national survey (Clancy 1982) found that

more than half of the new third-level student population of 1980 came from professional, managerial and non-manual-labor backgrounds, even though such students constituted only 26% of the eligible population. Within the university sector, this disproportion was greatest, particularly in professional courses such as law and medicine, with the children of professionals, managers (business executives) and farmers significantly over-represented. Class distinctions at technical and teachers' colleges were also marked, but less so than in the university sector. Regional differences in enrollment were even more striking, but may be attributable in part to closer student proximity to either a technical institute or college.

Proportionately, the University of Dublin and the National University are equally state-endowed, receiving over 80% of their support from this source in the 1980s. However, neither institution is public, and there are still significant limitations on the state's ability to overtly influence their administrations. Nonetheless, increasingly harsh funding directives and the universities' need to propitiate outside agencies do inevitably affect academic policy and development, often by mutual consent within the university sector. The explicit link between educational supply and employment demand is reflected in the changing annual quotas set by the colleges for entry to different courses of study and the fees charged for such entry.

Unlike the American tuition system, Irish college fees are determined by subject area, and therefore vary within a single institution. A more competitive course, such as medicine, cost over IR £1,500 (\$2,250) annually in 1987, while a less competitive one, such as arts, cost about £1000. However, it is expected that fees for different third-level courses will be equalized at a higher rate over the coming years, in response to state cutbacks in funding and the consequent need to increase income from tuition. The cost of attending university is affected also by the varied length of time it takes to complete different degrees, with most arts and humanities courses taking three years and professional and technical courses taking five. Trinity and UCD are not standardized in this regard. At Trinity, for example, it takes four years to complete an undergraduate degree in sociology; at UCD the same course takes three.

Students are eligible for education grants from the state, local authorities, academic institutions, and the European Social Fund. State grants are awarded on the basis of second-level exam results, income, and the number of other dependent children in the family. In 1987, only one out of five university students was eligible for this type of aid. While state grants have been a boon to working class students in general, they have not risen in proportion to inflation and growing college fees. Even

many middle class students find themselves pauperized by college attendance, and their situation cannot be dismissed, as it might be elsewhere, as a temporary stage. Students' fees and living costs for one academic year in the late 1980s came to about IR £4,000 (\$6,000), a substantial outlay for middle class families with an annual income of £20,000, for example, who are not eligible for state grants. Part-time work is extremely exploitative and hard to find, much of it taken by adults who would otherwise be totally unemployed. Not many college students can be assured of a job in Ireland following graduation, so that the deprivation of their college years may seem like the prelude to a lifetime of under-employment or emigration. For some working class families, the loss of a child's potential income during his or her college years is too great a sacrifice, even with the provision of an education grant.

Despite Trinity's former elite associations, this college has experienced a greater influx of students from lower-income families than has UCD in recent years, as guaranteed secondary education and state university grants have facilitated their entry. The reasons given for this distinction by the college's administrators are geographic and economic. Centrally-located Trinity is only a walk or a short bus ride away from working class neighborhoods on the north and south sides of Dublin, while UCD, several

miles out in the leafy suburbs, may be two fares and another world away. UCD is located in Dublin 4, a prosperous district (now part of the city of Dublin) that carries many popular connotations about class, property and lifestyle. Clothing and accents are mocked as "very Dublin 4," and UCD students as a whole do present a very placid and middle class face, despite their anxieties about the future. The traditional "Dub," an inner-city resident, might be more likely to feel at home now in Trinity, even with its residual sprinkling of semi-aristocrats and its black-tie balls.

D. Industry and the Irish University.

At the same time that opportunities for third-level education were expanding in the 1970s, Ireland was coming to grips with the limited employment potential of its new graduates and their disadvantage in a technically-oriented international economy. In 1979, the National Board for Science and Technology was created to coordinate state and educational policy in these areas. Supported by a widened public consciousness of Ireland's technological future, the NBST has had considerable success in redirecting higher education towards applied areas, evidenced, among other things, by the predominance of students in applied disciplines today.

Closer university linkages with industry have been urged by the Irish government and by the NBST, implementing

the creation of new research institutes, laboratories, and training programs underwritten in part by corporate funds. Such funds also support the hiring of new faculty and students' completion of post-graduate degrees. Appropriate faculty members specialize in "interfacing" between the university and industry as well as the EC, which also provides research grants. Much of the funding drive is centered on the chemical, electronics and biotechnology areas, which benefit from the colleges' orientation to graduate-level team research.

The relationship between greater emphasis on applied research and access to outside funding is clear. In 1987, applied research surpassed basic or "pure" research in percentage within Irish higher education for the first time (Irish Times 31 March 1987). Trinity has more than quadrupled its total of research funding from EC and corporate sources since 1981, in 1986 receiving a total of £4.68 million in research contracts (ibid., 21 April 1987). This hard-won money pales in comparison, however, to the funding American and even British universities are able to corral from industry. In 1987, Oxford received GB £20 million (\$33.2 million) for its pharmacology department in a single grant from the American corporation Squibb (New York Times 25 October 1987).

Multinational industry also has relieved some of Ireland's unemployment problem en masse. In recent years,

the Philips Corporation of Holland has hired many of UCD's electronic engineering students, underlining the quality of the country's technical graduates as well as their loss to the Republic's own economic development. The free movement of specialized labor fulfills long-term EC goals, but in the short term appears to benefit Ireland's economy less than that of its neighbors.

In 1982, a national working party of Irish deans published a report called Education, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship which urged the development of a pedagogic style focused on problem-solving and innovative thinking (Coolahan 1985). A popular social theory asserts that Ireland lacks entrepreneurial spirit as a result of its colonial history and the decades of conservative fiscal policy that followed independence. The Irish experience of economic growth has been so uneven and so discouraging that the psychological components of successful development are now perceived as an important part of the educational agenda. To this end, the Social Research Center at Limerick's NIHE (now the University of Limerick) has designed a training program for schools, youth groups and community centers that stresses the relationship between enterprise and the realization of individual potential. While the growing participation of industry in third-level education benefits the colleges financially, the introduction of entrepreneurial philosophy into the

classroom also promotes industry's interests.

These developments affect non-technological areas within higher education as well. The state has told the universities that they are on their own beyond a certain point, and that future expansion will depend upon their capacity to attract private funding. Third-level education has been forced to get on its "Thatcherite bike" in search of new financial opportunities. To some extent, such funding benefits all disciplines by potentially freeing resources in other areas, while giving the colleges a more marketable state-of-the-art profile. But there are severe limits to the humanities' capacity to attract outside funding, and over time, as discussed in the next chapter, these disciplines cannot help but be seen as losers, burdens on the flashier, self-reliant, upwardly mobile technical areas.

E. The European Community and Irish Third-Level Education.

European Community policies are designed to promote the "four fundamental freedoms": the free movement of people, services, goods, and capital within the borders of the Community (Commission of the European Communities, February 1986). The integration of European economies is facilitated by the Common Market and the Common Agricultural Policy. Third-level education provides a locus for the cooperative development of new technologies and industrial bases, a targeted area in the completion of

the Internal Market. These economic goals cannot be met without the lessening of divisive cultural barriers.

"Young people are Europe's future," EC documents state.

"The Community should help them to prepare for this future, which will be increasingly European" (ibid.:x).

Administrators from both Trinity and UCD indicate their commitment to this agenda by referring to their institutions now as "European universities" and by developing internal proposals for their academic "internationalization." New EC educational directives facilitate the mobility of faculty and students across state borders while providing funds for educational development within individual countries.

The European Social Fund (ESF) is the major source of external support for Irish education. The ESF is an EC program that provides grants mainly for courses in technology, engineering, and the applied sciences. In 1986, more than IR £10 million in ESF money was distributed through local education authorities to third-level students in Ireland (Irish Times 3 October 1986). The COMETT program funds Community-wide technological training, while ERASMUS funds student and faculty exchange, thus encouraging the mutual recognition of degrees and professional qualifications within the member states. Such programs are part of the EC's effort to "break through the existing administrative and other blockages which inhibit

mobility" within the Community's third-level sector (CEC May 1988).

The pressure for entry to higher education and changes in EC policy have resulted since the mid-1980s in a surge of Irish applications to institutions outside the Republic. Students from the Republic and other member states are now exempt from tuition fees at third-level institutions in Northern Ireland and Britain. Students who are eligible in the Republic for state education grants may use these as well in Northern Ireland. All EC states must now consider the applications of non-nationals from other member states on the same basis as they consider those of their own students. Given that education is greatly subsidized in countries such as France, West Germany and Holland, this can result in an Irish student attending college virtually for free outside of Ireland, provided his family can afford to support his living expenses and that the student can master his studies in a foreign language.

While some non-Irish colleges are dubious about the prospect of subsidizing the Republic's student population, others have begun to actively recruit Irish students. Britain's college-age population is declining, and some of its universities are happy to have Irish students who will maintain their enrollment and level of public funding. Increased numbers of students from the Republic in Northern Ireland will provide some basis for better understanding

between the two communities, but may also result in a backlash against the exploitation of the North's weak economy by the Republic's population. Queen's University Belfast, once a Presbyterian stronghold, now has a slight majority of Catholic students (mostly Northern), but some of its administrators are anxious that QUB not become identified as a Catholic institution, thereby driving more Protestants away.

While the direct economic impact of programs such as ESF and ERASMUS is evident, the Community's wider policy goals may be more difficult to implement. The creation of an integrated third-level sector across the member states will depend on the willingness of individual nations and institutions to lessen their autonomy in the educational sphere. For now, EC educational goals should be seen as ideals, rather than as inevitabilities. Although Ireland has much to gain from cooperation with the European Community, many Irish are disturbed by their country's over-dependence on its funding, and by the state's consequent need to conform to the EC's ideological agenda. In addition, the strong emphasis on the vocational sector in these initiatives adds to the concern that non-applied areas will be neglected even more in future European-wide educational planning.

F. Unemployment, Emigration and the University.

The visitor to Dublin is struck not only by its

youthful population, but by the pervasiveness of its youth culture. In the United States, members of the post-World War II baby boom generation are moving forward into middle age together, a demographic fact that has extended the period of young adulthood well into the thirties and beyond for many. In Ireland, where the greatest increase in birth rates took place beginning in the late 1960s, no such illusions are possible. For now at least, young is being eighteen, or at the oldest, twenty-five. There is a sharp contrast between young people and others in terms of clothing, taste and worldview, not a gradual slide into middle age which American baby boomers now experience. This trend may develop in Ireland over the next few decades, given the decline in birth rates in the 1980s, but right now, youth is a physical condition as well as a frame of mind. The parents of today's Irish teenagers are in their late thirties and early forties, well beyond psychological redemption as young people. To be unmarried, indecisive about a career, or poor in Ireland after age thirty is not a phase in one's personal development; it is probably the rest of your life.

These circumstances give rise to self-assertiveness as well as reckless futility among many young Irish, including those lucky enough to attend university. The country's popular culture, promoted by successful young people such as rock stars, disk jockeys and journalists, caters to

their sensibilities for the first time in modern Irish history. The recent international acclaim received by the rock group U2, some of whose members are middle class Dubliners, has boosted self-esteem in a society well aware of its inundation by foreign cultural influences. The phenomenon of U2's success in the mid-1980s is not to be underestimated in regard to Ireland. It has asserted a recognizably Irish view of the world, however commercialized, and reflects the experiences of a generation that has grown up in a climate of sectarian violence, economic decline, and uncertainty about the future.

This generation is also Ireland's first to benefit from greater popular access to higher education. Young Irish people are poised for success, but their means of achieving it are limited compared to those of other western industrial societies. Many face unemployment or emigration in the next few years. In the late 1980s, Irish unemployment has fluctuated at around 18%, with those under age twenty-five accounting for more than a third of this group, but this does not include the many thousands who emigrate each year because they cannot find work. Between 1981 and 1985, unemployment quadrupled amongst Irish school-leavers (those who complete secondary school but do not go on to third-level). It is possible that some of these young people will never find permanent employment in

Ireland. Emigration is now at its highest point in twenty years, soaring from a net outflow of 1,000 in 1981-82 to 31,000 in 1985-86 (Irish Times 4 October 1986). In 1987, the Irish government predicted that 250,000 educated young people -- 7% of the Republic's population, and 20% of its workforce -- will have left by 1992. This figure does not include the additional 100,000 who will leave Ireland to enter the "shadow world" of illegal residency in the United States (New York Times 27 April 1987). Dublin County has experienced the largest loss, reflecting its greater population as well, perhaps, as the greater frustration of those who find themselves at the center of Irish society but still unable to build a future. Education, unemployment and emigration are interrelated factors which force upon young Irish people an early awareness of the world system, contradicting any presumed notion of their provincialism. Students know that their future, even within Ireland, will be determined by the international economy as much as by individual ambition and talent, and this knowledge permeates their everyday consciousness. In the current milieu, third-level education itself appears to be a path leading young people out of the country.

In an effort to boost foreign investment and to improve Ireland's public image, the country's Industrial Development Authority launched an international advertising campaign in 1986 featuring the nation's youth as

exploitable resources. Labeling this group the "Young Europeans," the ads were intended to overcome the stereotype of an unskilled labor force suitable only for basic manufacturing. One ad featured twenty smiling UCD students in their graduate gowns, with copy advising the corporate world to "hire them before they hire you." As the London Times pointed out in a rather smug article, only two of these graduates were actually employed in Ireland by the end of 1986. Nine had returned to school for further study, and nine had emigrated in search of work (Sunday Times 2 November 1986).²

Many of the young Irish people who emigrate to the U.S. are illegal, and must adapt to their new lives under exploitative work conditions and the constant fear of extradition. Irish nationals can work in England without visas or special permits, but in that country, with its own serious economic problems and high cost of living, some young immigrants find themselves jobless, homeless and victims of traditional anti-Irish discrimination. Emigration patterns are not well-documented by the Irish government, but appear to reflect class divisions within Ireland and the wider range of choices for those with better training. Young working class people with only secondary education commonly emigrate to London, the cheapest ticket. "Young Europeans" with technical and language skills are more likely to find work on the

Continent. Those pursuing graduate studies are encouraged to attend university in the U.S. or Britain. Family connections in other countries, such as Canada or Australia, also influence the would-be emigrant's destination.

Until recently, Irish politicians and social commentators have tended to depict emigration as an inevitable and rather positive aspect of Irish society, almost a unique opportunity. Emigrants are described as "exports" or adventurers out to seek their fortunes. The Irish Minister for Industry and Commerce announced in a speech in 1987 that "every one of the 'Brain Drain' population should not be seen as a huge loss, but be seen as a 'rough diamond' temporarily away at the polishers" (Irish Times 27 February 1987). However, the departure each year of so many -- perhaps half -- of the country's technical graduates in science and engineering does pose a threat to Ireland's continued development, given that there is no certainty they will ever return (Irish Independent 22 October 1986). In any case, the fact that so many who leave have been the recipients of expensive training causes some alarm and resentment. A leading Irish journalist has described emigration as the inevitable consequence of socializing young people towards the European Community rather than their own country. In his view, they have "looted the Irish education system, armed themselves with a

good degree and high-tailed it to a better economy in Holland, Belgium, Germany or wherever" (Irish Times 27 April 1987). Frequently, little distinction is made between those who can pick and choose their employment outside of Ireland, and those who leave home certain only that they cannot stay.

Emigration is such a cliché of Irish culture, wrapped in sentimental songs and sad tales of depopulated villages, that it is possible to overlook the fact that it is a part of the larger socialization process for Irish children, not a single, wrenching experience. Young Irish people grow up in a country that many of them must leave by the age of twenty. Even more disturbing is the fact that they are expected to leave by their parents, their teachers, and the public representatives of the state. In an interview with me, one Trinity student expressed his contempt for the situation in this way:

I view the whole parliamentary system as a bogus. It's irrelevant to us, to what's happening to myself and young people here and young people in general. They mean nothing to us. It's obviously very clear they don't give a hoot about us. I can see them encouraging us to emigrate That's the pits, that's really the limit for many people like myself ... after all, we're the people who are paying them, they're looking after us, working for us, looking for a better future for us, and then they tell us to get out of our own country.

Even students whose degrees offer them greater chances for employment within Ireland consider emigration a strong possibility. They are aware of their need for a broader experience of the world, but reiterate their frustration

that Ireland, with its rich cultural tradition and natural beauty, cannot provide them with the opportunities found in other Western European societies. Some of them are idealists who see Ireland as threatened by economic decline and a general state of cultural disorientation. This view was reflected in the comments of a UCD student who was reluctant to emigrate:

We don't know whether we're West British, we don't know whether we're American, we don't know whether we've a culture of our own. We don't know whether we've got any position in the world today.

If they must go, they hope to return eventually. For them, the relationship between youthful emigration and Ireland's future is clear. "Many people say, I will come back, but thousands never do," a Trinity student said. "We're kicking out the best. People who want to do something, who are energetic about Ireland, enthusiastic about it, are being forced to get out of the country."

The difficulties of the job search within Ireland for many qualified graduates are demonstrated in the experience of one young man, a 1986 UCD commerce graduate who won the Industrial Development Authority's Student Enterprise Award for his proposals for the electronics industry. This budding entrepreneur was profiled in a national newspaper under the headline "An IDA Winner's Secret of Success," but a month later he addressed a UCD career seminar, advising students to stay in school for as long as possible. He himself had no job and had entered a course in chartered

accountancy. Another student who spoke at the seminar had graduated a year earlier with a degree in economics. She then took a diploma in accounting, was now still unemployed, and planned to emigrate to London where she had relatives.

Many younger university faculty, with greater career insecurity as well as closer contact with students, express concern and frustration over the problem of youthful emigration. This is not so evident with senior faculty and administrators, who tend to quote employment statistics and the rhetoric of the European Community in their discussion of this topic ("Ask them about their own children," one young UCD faculty member suggested sarcastically). Many presently middle-aged Irish faculty left Ireland themselves for a time following graduation in the late 1950s and the 1960s, earning advanced degrees abroad and spending years working in foreign universities or industry. (One UCD political scientist has devised labels for distinguishing the two main orientations of such return migrants: "Been to Britain" [BTB] and "Been to America" [BTA].) Some of these older faculty compare their experience to that of today's emigrant, implying that what was good for them will probably be good for others as well. A young academic would have had good reason to return to Ireland in the late 1960s, when the economy was growing and the country was open to bright young people with professional

qualifications. It may be difficult for such individuals to understand the depth of frustration today's students feel. Instead, some of them choose to believe that the latter's expectations are unrealistic.

For younger faculty, the possibility of their own imminent emigration seems to hover constantly. In the last few years, job security, not only advancement, has become a real concern for all academics. Throughout the late 1980s, Trinity and UCD were compelled by the state to reduce their salary needs. Academic vacancies were not filled, and new posts were approved only when additional funding had been secured. Part-time faculty, who thus far had filled the breach, were reduced. The Higher Education Authority encouraged early retirement for full-time faculty and warned that "minority subjects and courses" might be closed down or seriously curtailed (Sunday Independent 21 June 1987). Faculty work load will continue to increase in the 1990s, compensating not only for staff attrition but for the growing number of third-level students throughout this decade. Apart from entry-level faculty, who have had little chance of finding permanent academic employment, the recent economic situation has affected middle-level faculty most seriously. Senior faculty members may have little empathy with their dilemma. As one UCD professor commented in an interview:

The business of people saying, oh, this is a terrible place to work, and oh, the student-staff ratio is up

... I've heard that for decades, and my answer is fairly simple: you're white, you're mobile, you're literate, and why the hell don't you get out if you feel like that?

The implications of the international "brain drain" have been discussed in the media since the end of World War II, but recently The New York Times referred to the movement of Oxford faculty to American campuses as a "hemorrhage" (24 April 1988). Academic elites are described as up for sale, with only the richest countries, above all the U.S., and its corporations, able to buy. The underlying concern is that poorer countries will lose out in the technology race and that their children will be denied quality education.³ In Ireland also, the emigration of younger scholars is perceived as a looming threat. However, while this trend may become more evident in the coming years, so far it has had little momentum. UCD President's Reports from 1977 to 1986 list only nineteen full-time faculty over that period who left for appointments elsewhere. Of these, seven took positions at other academic or research institutions in the Republic and Northern Ireland. Four went to England, and one to Scotland. Six went to research or teaching posts on the Continent. Two pursued religious work in Africa. One became the president of a pharmaceutical company. Only one left Ireland for a permanent academic post in the U.S.

The younger Irish academic's threat to emigrate is a measure of the frustration he or she feels that cannot be

resolved at home. This is particularly true of UCD's largely Irish-born faculty, who are burdened also with the responsibility for a greater number of students than Trinity's faculty (based on the colleges' differing student-staff ratios). Many of Trinity's academics, being British or Northern Irish, are quasi-immigrants themselves, and the college's history situates it differently in the current discussion of this issue. Emigration has sharper resonance for native Irish academics who are fed up with overwork, lack of professional advancement, and poor research support. Some of them spend time abroad as visiting lecturers and guest speakers on academic circuits. Irish Studies programs at American universities provide much of the opportunity for this travel, which offers a breathing space from Dublin's sometimes claustrophobic social and intellectual milieu.

The economist's model of emigration stresses the supply-and-demand nature of the problem. Cultural analysts speak of the devitalization of Irish society. But rarely is emigration -- of young people, professionals and families -- discussed publicly as a political issue. Economic decline and a reactionary social climate also drive out those who are politically marginal, those who might have challenged existing power structures and norms had they stayed. One young UCD academic, referring to her own set of activist friends in the college, pointed this

out:

What I would hope would happen is that this cohort within UCD might become a center or a forum for the study of equality, and generate, certainly, major dissent within society, about things such as emigration, unemployment, exploitation within the country, north and south, and the exploitation of his country and other countries in the so-called developing [world] I think that if emigration continues that will not happen. Emigration will always be a safety valve for this country against social revolution.

The departure of Ireland's "surplus" population has itself become a tradition which defuses organized political resistance. Unemployment is experienced as the individual's problem, and only he can solve it by emigrating. Alienation from mainstream cultural values is also a private burden, leading to acquiescence or resistance at great personal cost. But with the heightened awareness in Ireland today of the potential that is lost when the gifted and motivated leave, some who stay do so almost as a political act. This attitude was vigorously suggested by another young UCD academic, referring to the defeat of the divorce referendum in June of 1986:

Brian Bourke, the artist, was interviewed on the Gay Byrne show, I think it was, and he was asked [about the referendum] and he said 'there was a time when we would have been so disgusted, we'd be leaving,' he said, 'but we're not fucking getting out of this country now, they have us, we're staying.' I think a lot of us said, that's right, we're all fucking staying.

To a great extent, activist Irish academics feel powerless, their values and goals overridden by conservative thinking, entrenched bureaucracies, and public apathy. My sense was that such frustration was felt more

acutely by UCD's academics than by Trinity's, whose marginal status is of deeper origin and can be associated with a past prestige. But having something explicit to fight against also fuels intellectual creativity for some of those who persist and struggle. This should not be romanticized. Over time, lack of funding and institutional support wear down the most resilient individual. But looking at it from another perspective, the small field in Ireland within which these ideological battles are fought, the evident connections between theory and practice, between social problems and their impact on people's lives, maintains an unusually vital awareness amongst many Irish intellectuals of their responsibility to the public interest and of their potential role in the country's social transformation. This awareness might be diluted in a broader, and better-funded, academic environment. In explaining why he chose to stay in Ireland, one UCD faculty member, a well-known literary critic, noted the intellectual stimulation brought about by adversity, and the possibilities at home for having some impact on the wider scene. Involvement in public debate can itself be, he suggested, a compensation for professional frustration.

G. Continuing Distinctions between Trinity College and UCD.

The public representatives of both Trinity and UCD speak today of the increasing similarity of the two institutions, while giving the acceptable nod toward their

distinct histories. Certainly, this similarity is very evident at the level of students, where Irish Catholics now make up the majority at both institutions. However, the colleges' styles of administration still differ greatly, being based on very different organizational structures and the patterns that have emerged out of these. Residual animosity between the two institutions is reflected now in a certain amount of criticism and mythologizing in regard to each other's faculty and academic standards. Trinity and UCD are competitive, but, understandably, it is UCD that expresses greater public concern about the fluctuating status of this competition. Trinity displays a certain amount of noblesse oblige in regard to UCD, while downplaying its historical role as a Protestant and Anglo-Irish institution. Several Trinity officers I spoke to used the word "tradition" as a gloss, it seemed to me, for these historical associations. Things were either "of the tradition" or "not of the tradition," as they phrased it.

At the administrative level, Trinity's system of circulating college offices allows for greater dispersal of authority than at UCD, although Trinity's corporate body, made up of senior fellows and officers, still exerts a great deal of control. Furthermore, as the only college of the University of Dublin, Trinity's two administrative structures overlap neatly, minimizing interference from outside interest groups. UCD's position is much different.

It is part of a national university, ultimately controlled by the university structure in critical aspects of its administration, and subject furthermore to the influence of non-academics who are members of its senate.

However, UCD has also created a political machine within itself, an administrative system that is highly centralized and in which senior officers' authority cannot be offset much by faculty participation. This machine appears to be dedicated to retaining control over even relatively inconsequential areas, working out the logic of its existence to the last degree. This situation differs from that of Trinity's power structure, which allows for flexibility at the middle and outer rings of its administration. Predictably, UCD faculty members I interviewed expressed much greater dissatisfaction with college administration than did Trinity's, who do not come up against a system so completely locked in.

Nonetheless, Trinity too is dominated by interest groups that employ the subtle strategies of the common room and the gentleman's agreement, leaving vulgar public display to others. "U" and "Non-U" types can still be distinguished at Trinity, and British class consciousness continues to play a role in the upper echelons of authority. One Trinity faculty member suggested to me that the college's current provost, despite being an Ulster Presbyterian, was viewed as part of "the old elite," and as

such would not "rock the boat." A Catholic faculty member had also run for the provostship in the last election, and had been narrowly defeated. If elected, he would have been the first Catholic provost of the college since James II appointed a priest to this post in 1689. In regard to this issue of entrenched Protestant power at Trinity, perhaps now eroding, another commentator has written:

Since 1692, every Provost has been a Trinity man: the College has never gone outside to look for a Provost. Indeed, it is well known that, even yet, anyone who has the ambition of becoming Provost of Trinity must take the triple precaution of being born in Ireland, a Protestant, and educated at Trinity. No Papist need apply (Donoghue 1986:171).

Although the college's public image is still Anglo-Irish and Protestant, its capacity to contain internal dispute minimizes its negative coverage in the media. As part of the National University, UCD is less capable of such containment. Its internal disputes, monitored in the national press, bear out the belief held by some Trinity faculty that UCD is run on demagogic principles, while Trinity is an essentially democratic institution. As one UCD academic put it, much of this distinction appears to be based on the fact that while his college washed its dirty linen in public, Trinity washed its in private.

Apart from bureaucratic structures, faculty members at both Trinity and UCD have reservations about the desirability of the colleges' increasing similarity. One Trinity academic, long active in leftist politics, spoke

disparagingly of Trinity's "creeping paddyism," a reference not to its Catholic students, but to what he perceived as Trinity's increasing concessions to the narrow social ethos of the Irish state. Whereas up to the 1970s Trinity had been "cosmopolitanism," in his words, it now was in danger of becoming "nine-to-five Irish." The college had lost ground as a liberal institution as a result of its increasing incorporation into state educational structures over the past two decades, this faculty member believed. Related to this, UCD's apparent movement toward lessened clerical control is viewed with skepticism by some lay faculty members of that college. UCD's non-denominational status has always posed a central contradiction in its administration and pedagogy. Forbidden to teach theology, the college's inherent Catholicism was absorbed instead into the system as a whole, and thus is difficult to challenge in specific contexts. The response to this by priest-academics is that Ireland is a Catholic nation, and that therefore this perspective may legitimately be represented, if not dominant, within NUI. However, one Catholic priest at UCD indicated to me that he and other members of religious orders within the college faculty had been placed on the defensive in recent years, and were now subtly discriminated against by secular academics and by students.

While UCD's faculty are characterized often as "Irish"

and Trinity's as "British," their class positions objectively are similar. Ethnicity and class interact, however, to influence self-perception and public identity. Trinity's British faculty are thought of sometimes by Irish academics as having failed somehow to win the glittering prizes of Oxford and Cambridge. Why else would they be living in Ireland? The status of Trinity faculty as professional achievers is insecure given this perception. On the other hand, UCD's faculty are extremely secure within their traditionally narrow milieu. Many are first- and second-generation members of the Catholic professional middle classes, the "best" the country has produced in this century. An Irish academic's ability to pursue a career in Ireland is proof of his success; a British academic's career in Ireland might be proof of his failure.

Yet the sense of being untested, of achieving a status preordained by social background, also gnaws at the Irish bourgeoisie. Trinity's Britishisms may be mocked as the last defense of a dying regime (one UCD academic described Trinity's faculty as "nodding over their glasses of port"), but they are also envied as reminders of a cosmopolitanism and confidence many middle class Irish lack. At the same time, it is possible that some of Trinity's English-born faculty still exhibit a lack of sensitivity to the wider Irish Catholic milieu surrounding them. One English Protestant sociologist at Trinity, when asked what impact

living in a Catholic society had had on him, said he hardly knew any Catholics. When I questioned this, noting that most of his students were of this background, he suggested that their interest in academic social theory -- Marx, Foucault, etc. -- undermined their self-identification as Catholics. In retrospect, I believe this sociologist was making the secular assumption that Catholicism refers strictly to a set of religious beliefs. It is probably true that many of his Catholic students no longer adhere to the tenets of their faith; nonetheless, within the Irish meaning of the term, they are still thoroughly Catholic.

At UCD, the issue of hiring faculty members from within or outside of the college's "tradition" remains an open topic of debate. This is not so at Trinity, which prides itself on its more diverse faculty body. In fact, much of Trinity's faculty is still of English, Anglo-Irish, Northern Irish, and Scottish origin, and therefore predominantly Protestant. Within this "diversity," however, one Presbyterian faculty member at Trinity suggested to me, Anglican (Church of Ireland) academics still constitute the college's power elite. For some NUI academics, Trinity's "British" faculty remains a basis for criticizing the college. In the early 1980s, one UCD professor, a priest, suggested publicly that Trinity's high percentage of foreign-born and preponderantly British academics might give the college "a character not so much

international as colonial" (Sunday Independent 4 October 1981).

All Irish academic jobs are advertised nationally and, in some cases, internationally. As with any institution, compliance with such procedures may leave an Irish college free to make a political appointment, or may indeed result in the most capable person getting the job. Consistent with its history as a British university, politically as well as culturally within the orbit of the British state, Trinity remains part of the British academic employment circuit. In the past, British academics seeking jobs who did not make it into one of the prestigious English universities sometimes "settled" for Trinity, with its simulation of Oxbridge glamour. Undoubtedly, given the limited employment opportunities today for British academics, Trinity is now less of a comedown than it might have been in earlier generations. Trinity does hire some UCD graduates as faculty; however, most of these have received graduate degrees at British or American universities, or at Trinity itself.

UCD's hiring policy is still explicitly influenced by the National University's historical commitment to developing the state's native intellectual resources. One UCD faculty member, a Scotsman, recalled for me hearing a very Irish UCD professor (in fact, the son of Eamon de Valera) recite his "alphabet of bad appointments" from

outside Ireland, a litany of foreigners, including my informant, who had taken jobs away from deserving Irish people. Nonetheless, this faculty member could sympathize with the nationalist sentiments behind such an attitude. In other cases, as another UCD faculty member described it, concern over this issue takes the more subtle form of comments such as "Don't you think there are too many Englishmen on the staff?"

During the 1986-87 academic year, one of the most controversial issues within UCD regarded the circumstances surrounding the appointment of a new professor to head the modern history department, an extremely important position in the Irish academic pantheon. A well-regarded English scholar seemed to have secured the job, being unanimously recommended by an independent board of assessors, chaired by UCD's president, as well as by the arts faculty and the college's academic council. The candidate was invited to Dublin to meet the faculty and to discuss the terms of his appointment. But following his visit, an internal applicant for the job, a specialist in modern Irish history at UCD and a figure well-connected with the highest Fine Gael political circles, resumed his candidacy and this time was successful, eventually winning approval from the college governing body. UCD's President Masterson maintained his support for the English candidate, but the latter's appointment was defeated by the National

University's senate, which had final authority.

The public discussion accompanying these developments involved a range of issues, from the Englishman's alleged Marxism to the question of whether the college was endorsing a "no Irish need apply" policy in the National University. According to the retiring head of the department, it was simply a matter of the best man for the job, but the rejected English academic published a letter in the newsletter of the Association of University Teachers, a professional organization with both British and Irish membership, bitterly criticizing UCD's search procedure and citing "political connections and narrow nationalist sentiments" as the criteria for the final decision. The editor of the AUT newsletter endorsed the English academic's warning to other potential candidates for NUI posts that political factors might influence their chances for employment at its colleges (Association of University Teachers 1987).

Other appointments made that year at UCD and other NUI colleges raised similar issues which were covered in the national press. Even within the institution, some are more inside than others, and the selection of such internally-favored candidates has been criticized as a means of perpetuating the National University's tight circles of patronage and influence. Even when these appointees are the most qualified, they may also be enmeshed in internal

factions, bringing old debts and grievances with them to power.

The issue of inside versus outside hiring at the National University is not one that can be reduced to a question of academic ethics or differing notions of merit. It also illuminates the deep and legitimate concerns of some Irish Catholics regarding their culture and its defense against historically invasive forces, as well as the protection of a system which has supported this defense. For many Irish, an "English-controlled" history department at the country's largest college would be an outrage. However, this issue also intersects with the problems of cultural parochialism and machine-style politics, which limit power to an inner circle of players. Hiring-from-within may be construed as a struggle with foreign hegemony, or as the preservation of a bourgeois native one. In either case, the persistence of such strong feelings within some Irish academic circles, when so much of the wider cultural sphere appears to have been turned over to Anglo-American influences, is significant beyond the question of simple nativism. Irish scholars have striven since the turn of the century to take control of research areas, particularly in history and literature, that are closely linked to Irish culture. Given that such disciplines are unlikely to receive much outside funding, their continued strength lies in their close association

with these "communal" sources of national identity and their public representation.

By contrast, applied disciplines are increasingly important in the university sector, and have less need to affiliate themselves with these traditional aspects of Ireland's intellectual heritage. For both Trinity and UCD, as well as the country as a whole, technocracy seems to offer a neutral ground for national development in which history, colonialism, and Ireland's "two traditions" are no longer relevant factors. In their place, however, have emerged new social phenomena -- urbanism, secularism, and increasing class division -- that may be seen as the by-products of modernization, and which contradict the communal image of Irish society. The following chapter will consider how technocratic planning has affected the internal academic structures and social relations of the Irish university, and how technocracy has set the terms of debate through which issues of national development can be discussed. Related to this, it will also consider the capacity of Ireland's mainstream academic social theory to address the problems that have emerged in Ireland since the 1960s as a result of its rapid modernization.

NOTES

1. Irish children also start primary school very young, often at age four. However, parents are allowed to keep their children out of school for another year if they wish, and an increasing number now do this. In recent years, the Irish government has considered the possibility of raising the standard school entry age to five as a means of curbing educational expenditure.

2. The Sunday Times's article on emigration by Ireland's educated young people had an ambiguous headline: "If you're Irish, join the exodus of brains."

3. This thesis is ironic given the recent discussion in the United States of "cultural illiteracy" and the deterioration of academic standards in the university (see, for example, Hirsch 1987 and Bloom 1987), despite the country's ability to attract internationally-recognized scholars.

CHAPTER SIX

TECHNOCRACY AND SOCIAL THEORY

... Virtually all technical study and experiment are undertaken within already existing social relations and cultural forms, for purposes that are already in general foreseen.

Raymond Williams
The Year 2000, 1983

A. Introduction.

In Ireland today, technocracy may be viewed as the guiding force of national development, and third-level education as a major locus for the inculcation of technocratic thinking. Trinity and UCD now compete with technical and vocational institutes for state funding, research contracts and access to commercial and policy-making bodies outside of Ireland. However, some distinction between Trinity and UCD in regard to their ability to develop these resources remains, based in part on their differing historical relationships to science and applied knowledge. Within both institutions, however, a similar critique of technocracy is evident among those faculty members who work outside this area and who see its influence eroding their standing within the university as well as the critical discussion of Irish social problems.

However, the social theory that informs the analysis of these problems is still greatly influenced by a popular conception of Ireland as rural and socially homogeneous. The contradictions between this cherished image of Irish

society and the urbanization and differentiation that socioeconomic development have helped produce are addressed by economic and social analysts, but by the latter often in terms of their moral connotations. In part, this reflects the residual influence on Irish social theory of Catholic social doctrine and a political culture forged in the early years of independence. These related ideologies combine to direct attention to the ideal rather than the real in contemporary Ireland. As one sociologist commented to me, what should be often seems more a focus of general interest than what is.

Far from being challenged by technocracy, this idealism is in some ways supported by it. Technocracy's acultural and putatively apolitical ideological stance facilitates its incorporation into the social framework of any setting. Technocratic philosophy in itself poses no threat to religion, nationalism and vested class interests. Its explicit agenda of progress and prosperity has a utopian element, particularly in a society such as Ireland that has never developed enough to feel the cynicism of decline. Those irredentist forces that question technocracy's ability to resolve all socioeconomic problems are easily dismissed as reactionary and self-interested. The problems that emerge with rapid development can be viewed as the result of incomplete modernization, worsened by a deterioration in the country's moral fiber.

B. Technocracy and the University: Creating New Traditions.

At an early point in my fieldwork, an academic officer of Trinity College took me on a tour of the campus and its historic buildings. With evident affection, he discussed the college's Georgian architecture, its communal character, and its scholarly traditions. We entered the Printing House, built in 1734 in the style of a Greek temple, and formerly the home of the university's press. Today, he explained, it houses one of the most up-to-date microelectronic computing centers in Europe, with a new wing, tucked discreetly behind the old facade, designed to match the spirit of the original structure. As he commented, "The building which once produced books now produces the new means of communication, the computer."

The academic fusion of old and new forms of knowledge personified by Trinity's Printing House has not always been achieved so elegantly. Resistance to technological innovation, and, more important for purposes of discussion here, to the "invasion" of the university by outside interests concerned with promoting such innovation, has been characteristic of those who perceive the university as first and foremost a bastion of the liberal arts. In contemporary Ireland, such attitudes persist and are articulated by many faculty members in the humanities. Applying a "limited good" model, perhaps correctly, to the universities' growing commitment to technology and applied

science, such academics fear the further marginalization of their disciplinary interests within the changing framework of third-level education in Ireland today.

In the past, colonial administration, the continual out-flow of capital, and a lack of indigenous educational facilities inhibited Irish development in the areas of science and technology. The scientific institutions that did exist in Ireland formed part of the Ascendancy power structure, and as such were largely closed to Catholics. The present effort to integrate this Protestant scientific tradition into the national record of intellectual achievement can be viewed as part of a wider revisionist project. As one Irish analyst has written:

Science and technology, and their interactions, are embedded in the culture of the Irish proto-nation, the roots however being primarily in the Protestant component, and the fruits being sequestered and digested by the Empire, particularly in the nineteenth century, the dominant process being emigration of scientists towards the application of science in the imperial interest abroad (Johnston 1983:62).

The "Protestant component" here refers mainly to Trinity College and Ireland's scientific societies, which constituted much of the country's formal intellectual culture in the colonial period. However, scientific studies deteriorated in Ireland at the end of the nineteenth century, perhaps as a result of the decline in the population of educated Protestants and the increasing burden of underwriting competitive research (Herries Davies 1985). By the 1920s, political and economic survival was

paramount in the new state, and much of what modernizing efforts were carried out was directed towards agriculture, Ireland's largest economic sector at that time.

Since the introduction of national planning schemes beginning in the late 1950s, this situation has changed dramatically. As discussed in the previous chapter, third-level institutions are now a major site for Irish technological research and development, aided by business-oriented disciplines that serve as brokers between industry and education. Particularly slated for support is research in the areas of biotechnology, microelectronics, computing and telecommunications. The academic disciplines involved in this on-going project include not only those areas listed above, but agriculture, medicine, chemistry, engineering, and commerce, among others.

UCD already has an Industry Center, built in the mid-1980s, which hosts international business-oriented conferences and trade fairs. The college's 1987 College Development Plan also proposed the creation of additional research laboratories, as well as a Project Development Center where small companies could be "incubated" under the direction of relevant college faculty. In 1987, Trinity announced plans for a new research center, funded with an initial grant of £1.5 million from Tony O'Reilly, the Irish-born (and UCD-educated) president of the Heinz corporation. This center will concentrate on research and

development in the fields of lasers, computers, and new materials.¹ The initial grant for its construction represented the largest single donation Trinity had ever received up to that time.

New professorships also reflect the influx of corporate funds and the colleges' public identification with industry and finance. At UCD, these chairs include the Jefferson Smurfit Professorship of Corporate Planning and the R. and A. Bailey Professorship of International Marketing. At Trinity, they include the Guinness Research Fellow in Worker Participation in Industry. Other public links between industry and higher education exist as well. The current chancellor of the University of Dublin, once typically an aristocrat or high-ranking churchman, is the president of Irish Distilleries Limited.

While UCD and Trinity are equally committed to these state- and industry-driven initiatives, the latter's deeper tradition in the sciences might give it some advantage in this area. Trinity is also better known throughout the international business community, and directs much of its money-raising effort towards the United States, following the example of British universities. By contrast, UCD's development literature suggests a greater reliance upon the European Community as the college's main source of outside support. It is interesting to note that, in at least one instance, Ireland's Industrial Development Authority has

chosen to promote Trinity rather than UCD in its international marketing of Ireland as a technology and research base. A three-page spread in a 1989 edition of The New York Times business supplement featured a photograph of one of Trinity's more archaic-looking buildings, with a caption underneath reading "Trinity College, Dublin. 16th Century university -- 21st century knowledge." Clearly, Trinity's historicity creates a more compelling contrast with the new technologies than does UCD's anonymous modern architecture.

In addition, Trinity's prestigious record of scientific achievement (including, in the twentieth century, a Nobel Prize for physicist E.T.S. Walton) lends credence to the view, expressed by one scientist there, that Trinity has a broader vision of the role of science and technology in the university than has UCD. By contrast, he suggested, UCD's more recent movement into this area is based less on such a coherent and independent vision than on the need to meet the short-term goals of industry and the state. Ironically, it is UCD which throughout much of its history was often referred to disparagingly as "the poly" in relation to Trinity's more distinguished intellectual reputation. This derisory term reflects the lower prestige applied knowledge once had in the university in comparison with "pure" research. With the reversal of this hierarchy today, Trinity retains an

advantage over UCD in that its applied research is rooted in a long-term institutional commitment to science.

"Technological entrepreneurs" responsible for building academic links with multinational industry exist at both colleges. It is evident that such individuals are increasingly important in academic administration and policy-making. Many of them have practical experience of the corporate world in addition to their academic credentials. Trinity's professor of polymer physics worked for Bell Labs as a consultant; he envisions Trinity's science departments emulating this research model in the coming years. This professor went from being dean of science in the mid-1980s to becoming university bursar in the late 1980s (both are elected offices), in which capacity he is responsible for all internal and external financial matters, including industry contracts for university research. He is also active in developing contacts with the scientific community in Europe, Japan, and the United States.

UCD's present dean of commerce also worked for a time for one of Ireland's largest accounting firms, and upon being hired at UCD in the mid-1970s was given the task of developing the college's first computer system. More recently, he has overseen the creation of its microcomputer center. The commerce faculty is well-funded by grants from state-affiliated agencies and private corporations, and is

viewed as a "coming" division within the college. As Ireland's leading business school, UCD's commerce faculty has also begun to develop links with similar institutions abroad, including the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.

The growing influence of those academic disciplines that lend themselves to national development priorities is based in several distinct, but overlapping, arenas: the university itself, state-level educational initiatives, and party politics. Those older disciplines at UCD that have enjoyed strong positions within the university and the state, such as history and political economy, now compete with younger technical and business-oriented disciplines for these sources of internal and external patronage. Up until the mid-1960s, Trinity remained largely outside the orbit of national influence, with the prestige of its disciplines determined by internal factors (e.g., the antiquity of departments, the reputations of their individual scholars) that also characterized the college in an international academic context. With Trinity's greater incorporation into Irish state planning efforts, its disciplines also angle now for influence within the national sphere. One way this influence is achieved is through the participation of Trinity faculty members on government advisory boards and voluntary bodies, an involvement that has grown in recent years.

Given Ireland's small size and narrow professional circles, it is not surprising to find a personalistic approach there to getting things done, such that success in receiving funding or bureaucratic support is seen often as the result of good connections. Political scientist Basil Chubb describes this system as being based on an implicit distinction between "outsiders" and "insiders," with the latter rating higher on a "legitimacy scale" in seeking influence with members of government and bureaucrats (1982:130). I myself sometimes felt that much of Ireland's state business was conducted at a limited number of exclusive dinner parties, featuring perhaps four or five overlapping sets of influential guests, who among themselves settled the affairs of the nation. Interviews with university faculty members suggested to me that my perception in this regard was shared by others. An economist on UCD's arts faculty, himself closely associated with the Fine Gael party, informed me that a colleague on the commerce faculty, associated with Fianna Fail, was very close with "higher-ups" in that party. For the arts academic, this partly explained the recent expansion of the latter's department. However, the commerce faculty member complained that despite such excellent affiliations, he found senior government figures didn't listen to his recommendations, "although they may start to soon," he added.

Economics is taught as both an arts and a commerce subject, in the first faculty as political economy (including the national economics of Ireland), in the second as a business discipline. Both are among UCD's original faculties established in 1908, and since that time they have maintained their separate identities. Commerce is still viewed by some faculty members at UCD as having lower academic status, despite, or perhaps because of, its growing importance in the college and its skill in receiving outside funding. The two departments are also politically distinct. As noted above, political economy is popularly associated with Fine Gael, and was the department in which former Fine Gael Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald taught. Commerce is evidently Fianna Fail, and numbers among its recent faculty a senator who is the cousin of Ireland's current Fianna Fail President, Patrick Hillery. In 1987, another member of the commerce faculty was elected a Fianna Fail member of the Irish parliament. Its most famous graduate is Charles Haughey, presently Fianna Fail prime minister, and undoubtedly a patron of this department in a college popularly associated with Fine Gael. When I asked UCD's dean of commerce if he thought Fine Gael Prime Minister FitzGerald would return to his teaching post at UCD, this professor's vehement reply was "I hope not!"

University administrators at both Trinity and UCD deny that the further expansion of applied fields will have

negative impact on the arts and humanities, indicating that the present level (i.e., percentage, if not actual amount) of university support will continue in most cases. However, it is clear that arts and humanities disciplines will have to take greater responsibility for their financial maintenance in the coming years, as all sectors within the university are compelled to make up budget deficits with outside sources of funding. Trinity's provost, Williams Watts (a geologist), is explicit on this subject:

... I think from the point of view of the continuing existence of minor arts subjects and their continuing help, the university of course supports them as well as it can. But I think that there will be more and more drive in the future to say to people in arts, look, you can't just sit down and say 'continue to fund me.' You've got to try and find some funds for yourself. It's no good saying it's difficult. It's difficult for everybody, so you just start thinking about it. For instance, if you're teaching Italian, well, there's a large hotel industry in Ireland, the cultural institutions are often linked [into that]. Why not just try to relate them? Just say we'd like some support for the university. I mean, merely to say the state should pay for me, I shouldn't make any effort to raise any funds for myself ... I can only say, it's likely to be an unproductive attitude in the future.

A related issue in the discussion of Irish technocratic planning is the fact that the development of new applied areas proceeds also at the expense of older ones. Some technologies are outdated within a few years. Fused with fluctuations in the national and international economy, too great an investment in certain areas can lead to disaster. At the time of my fieldwork in 1986-87, there

was much media and university discussion of the perilous state of civil engineering in Ireland. National economic expansion in the 1960s and 1970s had produced a boom in the building trades, with a consequent emphasis on this field within the university. However, the construction industry was almost bankrupt in Ireland by the late 1980s, as a result of the recession, and civil engineering graduates could not find jobs. A lesson in the negative consequences of short-term planning was thought by many to be found here.

I interviewed Trinity's professor of civil engineering in his office, situated in the college's Museum Building, an ornate Victorian structure whose entrance hall contains an enormous skeleton of the extinct Great Irish Elk. On first exposure, this professor's lair also struck me as Victorian, if not Dickensian. Surrounded by miniature models of nineteenth century engineering feats -- small bridges, dams, and so forth -- the professor conveyed a sense of total dispirit as he discussed the miserable funding prospects for his discipline and its graduates in the coming years. At UCD, another monument of sorts to short-term planning was provided by the college's new engineering building. When I began fieldwork in the summer of 1986, this building was little more than a cleared site, construction having been abandoned due to a lack of funds. In the spring of 1987, construction was resumed with the

aid of money from the European Regional Development Fund, but one UCD faculty member predicted that the equipment that would be placed in it was already outdated.

Despite the fact that over 80% of Irish university students throughout the 1980s have been enrolled in applied disciplines, arts faculty still make up the largest percentage of teaching staff at both Trinity and UCD. Statistics like these support the commonly-heard argument that arts and humanities departments, as well as their students, are being "carried" by the rest of the university. There is a popular belief that students in the arts are academically inferior to those in applied or professional disciplines, an interesting reversal of earlier university stereotypes. They are also understood to be less employable within Ireland. These perceptions were reflected in a student debate I attended at UCD, organized around the proposition "That Arts is a Derelict Faculty." The debate was more than lively -- it was almost a screaming match, with students on opposing sides shouting obscenities at a series of pro and con speakers. The following exchange was typical:

Commerce Student to Arts Student: We don't want to pay for your fun education and then support you on the dole for the next sixty years!

Arts Student: No! We pay for your education so you can go off to work in the Bahamas!

Maintaining the quality of arts education is still essential to the prestige of the Irish university, but it

is evident that applied disciplines, for now at least, have assumed priority in third-level education. The lack of public discussion on the broader implications of this development leaves many faculty members outside applied areas feeling angry and powerless. "There is no longer any debate on these issues," one NUI lecturer commented. "The debate was settled in the late 1970s." An arts faculty member at UCD pointed out that Irish technocrats and economists have little need of engaging in critical discourse about the nature of state planning and its implications for the university. Having the ready ear of the government, they have "feathered their nests," in this faculty member's words, with consultancies from state and semi-state agencies (as well as, secretly, from private industry). "Their attitude is," he suggested, "'Why should we bother? We don't need to do it, and we don't have time to do it.'"

Along with most state administrators, these academic technocrats tend to view national economic success in Western terms. For the most part, this is a consequence of Ireland's anomalous history as Britain's internal colony, an experience that made it almost, but not quite, the same as England and the rest of the developed world. The legacy of this association manifests itself now in a reluctance to consider the development models (and failures) offered by other dependent post-colonial economies. Those social

critics who speak of "Third World Ireland" are generally dismissed as cranks. Raymond Crotty, a rural economist at Trinity, was widely criticized by politicians and state bureaucrats in 1987 when he suggested that Ireland should look to Asia and Latin America in order to understand its own economic dilemmas. His crusade that same year against Ireland's passage of the Single European Act, which would bind the country more closely into union with the EC, also earned him the contempt of many Irish Eurocrats, those urbane professionals who symbolize Ireland's equal partnership in the Western political economy.

In interviews with me, faculty members with experience outside the developed world, along with many of those in the liberal arts, criticized the new technocracy on two familiar grounds: it encourages a narrow intellectual scope, and it denies its own implicit ideological agenda. One Trinity academic, an East Indian born in South Africa, explained that his main reason for seeking a deanship had been to defend the interests of his fellow faculty members in the arts and to stem the flow of university resources to applied areas:

I felt I had to represent the case for the arts against the miserable gadarene rush in support of technology ... this has been taking place for the last ten years, and you know, investments and priorities are being moved in that direction. I have political views about it -- I know what has happened in other countries. My views are that in fact it is still necessary to have a rounded education, that it is necessary to have education which opens access to critical faculties of human beings, which combines both the technological and

the cultural. The university is not simply a place for producing graduates, because even an emphasis on technology is an ideological matter.

This individual's reputation as a political activist helped win him the support of more conservative faculty members in his successful run for university office. Many of the latter were concerned less with the sociopolitical consequences of technocratic development than with their diminishing influence within the college. As the dean described it:

... I suppose the arts people felt that it's better to have a radical person whom we may not pass the time of day with normally, but at least he'll fight a corner. Well, it was interesting. I didn't mind being an advocate for some of the most reactionary people I ever knew. We got on quite well.

In a wider sense, the alliance between left-wing academics and academic conservatives against the forces of technocratic rationality is an uncomfortable one. Its potential for reproducing the elitism and social disengagement of the university's more reactionary elements is described by Raymond Williams:

Observing [the rise of technocracy], many radicals draw back to defensive positions: identifying the new technologies with the corporations which control them, and both with a new and disastrous phase of 'hyper-capitalism.' The forces they are identifying are real, but all that follows from so undeveloped a position is a series of disparaging remarks and defensive campaigns, leading in many cases to tacit alliance with the defenders of old privileged and paternalist institutions, or, worse, with the fading ideas of the old cultural argument: a high culture to be preserved and by education and access extended to a whole people (1983:129).

It would appear that the "high culture" to be

preserved by the university is viewed now as the declining domain of those who cannot, or will not, enter the technocratic community. But given the fact that so many who receive technological training leave the country, the question is often publicly raised: Who is Ireland educating these people for?

Most third-level technological education in Ireland does include some required coursework in "liberal studies," designed to place these subjects in a broader intellectual perspective. However, analysis tends to come from inside the technocratic disciplines, for example, as "the history of engineering," rather than as a comparative and philosophical examination of technocracy. At best, in this approach, the liberal arts are viewed as an instrument of technological development. This attitude was reflected in the comments of one Trinity scientist who advocated increased funding for non-applied areas on the basis of their value to applied ones. "The public at large is afraid of science," he noted. "Science needs arts and humanities graduates to explain technology to outsiders."

However, the fragmentation of knowledge engendered by increasing specialization within academic disciplines limits the potential for critical perspectives on technocracy and development as social issues. In Ireland, one academic suggested to me, such specialization has now paralyzed public discourse on these crucial topics, and

diffused responsibility for its consequences:

... if you went back twenty years ago, that kind of statistical vocabulary, the economic-cum-statistical vocabulary, and the wheeling out of the experts and so forth, that wasn't known You wouldn't have had the presentation of news and the public discourse about matters of social policy, etc., discussed in such technocratic terms. When any question comes up for debate now, [the technocrats] are legitimate with their expertise, but their expertise is in a small area. They will have disclaimers -- oh, you'd better ask the geographer about that, you'd better ask the sociologist, I'm just in commerce.

As Habermas (1989) has described, exaggerated faith in technical reason produces its own irrationality, based on an avoidance of the moral and social questions that technocracy raises. However, this irrationality, once entrenched, becomes an encompassing "newthink" against which critics of technocracy appear fragmented, regressive, and uninformed. As suggested earlier, Ireland's dominant technocratic discourse is appealing not only because it offers hope for further development, but because it provides a putatively neutral zone for the reconstruction of national identity. It bypasses difficult issues of class and, for most part, those of history as well. In the late 1950s, Prime Minister Sean Lemass, who initiated Ireland's new development agenda, made the famous comment that commitment to economic expansion would "lift all boats." Parallel to the ensuing material transformation of Irish society has been a more subtle one, the creation of a new discourse regarding the means of achieving fulfillment and national autonomy. This discourse has succeeded

despite the fact that, up to now, it has failed in its goal of providing greater prosperity to all.

C. Irish Sociology and Irish Social Problems.

Within the social sciences in Ireland -- economics, political science, sociology, and anthropology -- the first two disciplines have had greater weight than the second two. Economists have pride of place in this continuum, for reasons discussed earlier, while political scientists are held in high regard for their expertise as contemporary political analysts. The perceived concern of sociology and anthropology with the "soft matter" of modern Irish life -- values, beliefs, and social welfare -- contributes to their lower standing in a country now preoccupied with statistical measurement and short-term problem-solving. As a relatively young native discipline, anthropology has the additional problem of not yet being fully integrated into the social science curricula of third-level education in the Republic.

Although a well-established native discipline, sociology's status within the university may still be affected by internal departmental antagonisms. One UCD academic outside the social sciences spoke of the "old hatred" at that college between the archaeologists and sociologists that led the former to characterize the latter as "jumped-up social workers." Sociology is also still considered, as I was informed by a woman graduate student

in this department at UCD, a "female" and therefore less rigorous discipline within the Irish university. Yet despite the characterization of sociology in Ireland as a soft science, the discipline has been dominated since the 1960s by an empiricism, promoted by the Catholic Church, that is well adapted to state planning agendas. Centered in UCD's sociology department, this empiricism looks inward almost exclusively to Ireland and to Irish social problems. By contrast, Trinity's department is more heterogeneous, less Ireland-focused, more secular, and consequently less integrated into the national planning agenda.

Sociology in Ireland grows out of two intellectual traditions: that of nineteenth century British empiricism, and that of turn-of-the-century Catholic social philosophy. The former tradition once included both colonial administrators seeking to quantify Irish society, and political economists such as Marx and Engels who saw in Ireland a potential site for a workers' revolution. Catholic social philosophy arose in reaction to the movement towards secularization and secularized social theory in late nineteenth century Western Europe, and was an attempt to fuse quasi-socialist ideals to capitalist economies within the framework of Catholic moral principles (Clancy, Drudy, et al. 1986). Both sociological traditions continue to influence the discipline in Ireland today.

The development of Irish academic sociology beginning

in the 1930s was linked also to the corporatist movement extant in Catholic Europe at that time, which aimed to curb state power and promote egalitarianism through the organization of vocational interest groups, e.g., farmers, teachers, etc., working together to meet the best interests of all citizens. Corporatism influenced the thinking behind Ireland's 1937 Constitution as well, and helped sustain a bias against class analysis both in politics and the Catholic social sciences in Ireland.

The first Irish professors of social science (both priests, situated at Maynooth and Dublin's Jesuit Seminary) were appointed in the 1930s (ibid.). The Maynooth professorship was actually a "Chair of Catholic Sociology and Catholic Action," and was funded by the Knights of St. Columbanus, a lay Catholic fraternal organization. In the 1960s, this appointment was moved from the theology faculty into the arts faculty, becoming simply a professorship in sociology. Sociology departments grounded in Catholic social philosophy were established at UCD and University College Cork in the early 1950s. UCD's department was closely linked to Dublin's Catholic Action movement, which concerned itself with the problems of the urban working class, and thus influenced the academic discipline in Dublin towards social work and social welfare issues.

In response to the growing problems of economic stagnation and emigration in Ireland during the 1950s,

Irish Catholic sociology began to turn towards British empiricism in a effort to make its work more relevant to contemporary social needs.² As noted above, this theoretical orientation, involving social research of a largely quantitative nature, remains dominant in Irish sociology, although alternative qualitative and critical approaches have gained popularity among younger researchers. During the prosperous years of the late 1960s and the early 1970s, sociology expanded as an academic force within Irish universities and began to have input into state policy-making as well, although usually of a kind ancillary to the economic concerns guiding such policy. Several of Ireland's leading senior sociologists are graduates of UCD's department, which has close ties with Ireland's Economic and Social Research Institute, the main body concerned with socioeconomic research and analysis.

As of 1986, about half of Ireland's practicing sociologists were employed by the state or by research institutes (O'Dowd 1986). Only one academic appointment in sociology opened up in the Republic between 1980 and 1987, and few of the discipline's recent graduates can expect to find jobs within the country. In the economic climate of the late 1980s, given Ireland's small size and limited funding for innovative research, there are severe restrictions on sociology's academic and independent

policy-influencing potential. The discipline is hampered in its development also by the perception, held by state administrators and the general public, that research on Irish social issues should serve specific practical, that is, economic, ends.

This economic orientation controls the discourse about contemporary social problems in politics and the media as well. The 1987 general election campaign, one Irish sociologist noted, was conducted entirely in "monetarist" terms. Avoiding discussion of qualitative issues such as human values and the underlying bases of social problems, he said, politicians and public analysts approached concerns such as health care, the elderly, and education as exclusively fiscal dilemmas. However, this sociologist saw Irish academics as complicit in this process both through their obeisance to economic models and their failure to provide a comparative perspective on these issues. They too often fell into the pattern of seeing only "Irish solutions to Irish problems."

The characterization of research interests and their capacity to be funded may also be influenced by this problem-solving orientation, as well as by a long-term policy-making emphasis on the rural sector. Much of the Republic's rural-based sociological research has been underwritten by state-affiliated agencies concerned with the modernization and development of these areas. Urban

culture is addressed most often by such agencies and by academic departments through an examination of its problems -- unemployment, illegitimate births, inner city decay -- rather than as a vital and transformative force in Irish society as a whole. It should be understood, however, that the question of defining Ireland largely through its rural culture is a subject of dispute within the country itself. In Ireland, the "great tradition" of cities and cosmopolitanism is seen often as the terrain of literary analysts and political historians, when accepted as indigenous to Ireland at all. The "little tradition" of the peasant at his hearth would appear to be the natural province of folklorists and ethnologists, as well as politicians. For some social analysts, Ireland is its rural culture, with urbanism still viewed as unrepresentative of Irish society. The implication is clear sometimes that Irish rural culture is somehow more authentic, worthy of study, and moral than urban society, which is overly influenced by non-Irish elements and which holds rural Ireland captive through its political and cultural hegemony.

This view is the legacy not only of Ireland's predominantly rural past, but of a political culture promoted by independent Ireland's early state leaders and dominant interest groups. Ruralism was linked to Catholicism, and both of these to the protection of

Ireland's "traditional" moral values. A famous passage from a radio talk given by Prime Minister Eamon de Valera in 1943 captures his idealized view of this rural society:

That Ireland which we dreamed of would be the home of a people who valued material wealth only as a basis of right living, of a people who were satisfied with frugal comfort and devoted their leisure to the things of the spirit; a land whose countryside would be bright with cozy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be joyous with the sounds of industry, the romping of sturdy youth, the contests of athletic youths, the laughter of comely maidens; whose firesides would be the forums of the wisdom of serene old age (quoted in Brown 1985:146).

De Valera's model of independent Ireland as a rural and homogeneous society was endorsed by the Catholic Church and by most Irish politicians in the post-1932 period. The latter's support was rooted to a great extent in small farmer-based party organizations and a rhetoric of nationalism and shared values. Thus a politics without class was maintained through a call to common cultural characteristics, which were seen as overriding actual socioeconomic differentiation. As will be discussed in the following chapter, much of the political rhetoric of Ireland's party politics continues to rely upon such essentialist images, albeit modified within the context of "modernization" and greater European involvement. The impact of this political culture on the social sciences may be discerned now in a continued emphasis on rural Ireland and a tendency to address urban culture as inherently problematic.

This perspective is evident in the remarks of one Maynooth sociologist, a priest, who has suggested that there are now "two Irelands": one rural, religious and traditional, the other urban, secular and materialist, with Dublin as the centralizing force over both (as discussed in The Irish Times 9 November 1986). This view is shared by other social critics and journalists, who seem to reserve values and community for the Irish countryside. The debate over the meaning and influence of urbanism is reflected at several levels in the Irish public sphere. Irish radio and television have been criticized for representing a Dublin-centered view of Irish life in their political coverage and social commentary; at the same time, some Dubliners believe Radio Telefis Eireann plays to the "culchies" (the rural population) in its entertainment programming. The capital city as a whole is caught in the contradiction of being the state's administrative core but also, historically, a "periphery-dominated center," as the Irish political scientist Tom Garvin has described it (1974).

As Dublin's cultural influence has come to match its structural importance in recent years, the city can be viewed by some as imposing its unrepresentative values and interests on the rest of Ireland through its media, its national-level politicians, and its intellectuals. At the same time, it is still expedient for these groups and institutions to appear to publicly favor the country at the

expense of the city, given the continued importance of rural life in the political culture of the state. This is reflected in the extensive subsidizing of Irish farmers, in the speeches of candidates at election time, and in the celebration of a literary heritage which is presented, in the words of one critic, "as a cultural compensation for the squalor of our inner cities and the potholes on the roads" (Kiberd 1984:12).

Related to this is the antagonism between Dublin-based academics and those working in other urban centers, notably Cork, Ireland's "second city," which has a very distinct political and intellectual tradition of its own. Some academics outside the capital are critical of the greater influence of Dublin experts in the social policy domain. UCD's social science department is the most influential one in the Republic, yet not the most interesting in terms of its research and theoretical orientation. One University College Cork social scientist viewed UCD's sociology as representative primarily of the values and outlook of "Dublin 4," the district in which UCD is located that has come to typify Ireland's new bourgeoisie. By contrast, UCC's sociology faculty comes from throughout Ireland, and is therefore less parochial in its concerns, he believed.

The significant differences between Trinity's and UCD's sociology departments inhibit inter-university cooperation in the domain of social research. Aside from

their different theoretical and methodological emphases (i.e., qualitative vs. quantitative research, respectively), this distinction is related to the fact that most of Trinity's sociology faculty is British, and UCD's Irish. Trinity's department is headed by a British professor (long resident in Ireland, as are most of Trinity's British faculty), while UCD's department is headed by an Irish priest. For understandable reasons, more UCD sociologists are involved in Irish-related research with explicit implications for national planning than are Trinity sociologists.

Graduate students in sociology at each college, with whom I spent some time, frequently expressed aversion to the theoretical orientation of the other college. Some Trinity students saw UCD's sociology as narrow and reactionary (for example, they claimed, in discouraging feminist research), while some UCD students seemed to feel Trinity's interests were overly-qualitative and irrelevant to the national agenda. I might add that, in a few cases, my own research was subject to a patronizing degree of criticism by social science faculty members at NUI institutions. Part of this was a natural response to an outsider (particularly one whose research focused on the colleges' themselves), but was articulated also as an unease with my study's interdisciplinary, and apparently non-applied, orientation. One UCD sociologist told me that

an interest in the sociology of knowledge was outside the proper bounds of anthropology; in another conversation, he questioned why anyone would want to carry out research such as mine.

The traditional influence of the Catholic Church on mainstream Irish sociology lingers on, both within UCD and in state agencies. It is difficult to discern the philosophical strength of this influence now, however, unless one subscribes to a conspiracy theory of Church power. Doctoral training of priests in sociology, discussed in Chapter Four, helped insure that the discipline would not escape the Catholic Hierarchy's control. This unbroken association is reflected now in the department's current priest-professor, a man who is eligible also to be dean of the faculty of social science and philosophy, UCD's Catholic core. The former professor of sociology at St. Patrick's College, Maynooth (also an NUI institution) later became president of that college, and is now Bishop of Limerick. Maynooth's sociology department is presently run by a priest. The Republic's only anthropology program developed out of this department.

The Irish Hierarchy's commitment to empirical sociology since the early 1960s may reflect not only the Church's capacity to "co-opt" secular forms of intellectual understanding, but also its increasing need to conform to the secular state's modernizing agenda. In the early

decades of Irish independence, the Catholic Church generally resisted the forces of modernization that threatened its power. The sociologist Michel Peillon (1982) suggests that having lost much of its local and popular influence in the last few decades, the Church is now dependent upon the state to meet many of its essential needs. As a result, it has accepted the state's social agenda, and in doing so acknowledged its own lack of one. "The Irish Catholic Church," Peillon writes, "professes a social doctrine but no longer entertains a coherent social project" (:99). Nonetheless, the confluence of the Church's ideal view of Ireland with that of many state administrators serves to sustain its public influence as a social critic and moral guardian.

Catholic social teaching has not been known for its commitment to class analysis, although concern with class, or rather, concern with the social consequences of ignoring class inequity, underlay much of the social work orientation and corporatism of Catholic sociology in the 1930s and 1940s. Until recently, mainstream social science in Ireland has resisted the concept of class in its examination of Irish society. Ireland's incipient socialist movement at the turn of the century was cut short by James Connolly's execution in 1916 and by the victory of nationalist politics in the new state. Ireland's Labour Party, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven, only began to

gain popular support in the 1960s, although no groundswell is evident there either. The rural orientation of Irish society has also worked against class analysis, with the binding ties of Catholic, "Gaelic," and rural culture seen as stronger than economic differentiation within the majority Catholic population (a thesis challenged by the recent work of revisionist historians). As one political scientist explained this situation to me:

It's not that Irish people don't know a political left from a political right, but they don't use it when voting for political parties or when they are putting themselves on a political mark. What they use is a communal vs. cosmopolitan dimension, or however they describe it, with the communal thing being you're greener, you're more nationalist, you're more anti-partitionist, you go to mass a lot, you do all kinds of traditional things, you get married later in life, drink pints of porter rather than gin-and-tonics, or whatever it might be.

In the 1980s, Irish social scientists have "re-discovered" class as a factor in Irish life, perhaps inevitably under the present economic circumstances. Class analysis also has had some influence on the Irish Church recently in the form of Liberation Theology. Many of Ireland's religious have spent time in Third World countries working with the poor and politically oppressed. Bringing this experience back home, they have influenced the Church at the grass-roots level in their involvement with social welfare organizations and interest groups committed to the urban working class, the homeless, and Ireland's itinerant population. Some commentators feel,

however, that the radicalism of these priests and nuns is limited by their traditional conservatism regarding sexual and social mores. Their ideas also have had little impact on the Irish Hierarchy, which, if anything, has become more conservative in the past decade. A young UCD sociologist warned me against viewing the current lip-service to radical ideas as too significant a trend in contemporary political analysis as a whole, stating:

There is a lot of left-wing thought in Ireland, but the Catholic Church definitely has to be looked at as something that has 'pietized' any kind of egalitarian or socialist thinking that there was in the country, and has translated it into a kind of rhetoric which has made it totally ineffectual.

The prevailing resistance to class qua class analysis within the Irish social sciences, typified by an official terminology of "social grades," may also influence the way social scientists present their research proposals and conclusions. A Trinity sociologist, although not endorsing the anti-class bias, cautioned me against focusing too much attention on class in my own work. "It doesn't sit well with Irish academics," he warned, and thus hinders serious evaluation of what one has to say. Differences between "Protestant" Trinity and "Catholic" NUI in relation to the sociological analysis of class were informally illustrated to me by two lectures I attended during my fieldwork, both given by a distinguished left-wing British sociologist. The first was held at Maynooth, the second a few days later at Trinity. At Maynooth, the topic of the lecture was

"Culture." The speaker had intended to give a similar talk at Trinity, but was told by the sociology department there that another topic would be preferred instead. He chose "Class." This allowed him to open his Trinity presentation with the ambiguous joke, "Maynooth has culture but Trinity has class!"

As some Irish sociologists see it, their discipline has yet to take full control of an essential aspect of their work: the definition of the problems which are most appropriate and timely for research. For sociologists in the Republic, whose work lends itself to social planning and policy-making, the problem resides largely in the handmaiden role the discipline has played up to now for economists, administrators, and, to some extent, the Catholic Church. Patron-client ties between sociology and state-affiliated agencies support research on specific social problems. However, they do not facilitate sociology's equally appropriate function of providing broader analyses of social institutions and power relationships, as some critics have charged. Initiatives in the 1980s to widen popular understanding of the discipline's potential have included a series of college-level readers published by The Sociological Association of Ireland. At the research level, some sociologists have called for increased commitment to interdisciplinary and qualitative approaches in the coming

years (O'Dowd *ibid.*). However, the lack of funding for innovative research creates serious impediments to realizing this goal. With no equivalent of NSF or SSRC,³ and existing policy-oriented research bodies suffering severe cutbacks, sociology is likely to remain dependent in the coming decade upon the planning goals of the state and the individual endurance of its practitioners.

NOTES

1. A recent article in The New York Times (17 December 1989) discusses the ethical implications of American universities' supplying corporations with their research conclusions. A major trend in the U.S. is for such corporations to buy the results of academic research supported originally by Federal grants. Although the state does of course underwrite scientific and technological research in Ireland, the economic relationship between the university and industry there seems to be more direct, with the latter often supplying the seed money for research it wants done.
2. According to the present professor of sociology at UCD, the college's first professor of political economy, Tom Kettle, took an interest in European social theory, which he attempted to integrate into UCD's social science teaching in the early nineteen-hundreds. Unfortunately, Kettle was killed in the First World War. The priest who replaced him as professor did not share this interest.
3. There is a British Social Science Research Council, which funds some Northern Irish research.

PART IV. UNIVERSITY ACADEMICS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

CHAPTER SEVEN
ACADEMICS AND POLITICS

If you want the country to be run effectively, give it to a load of crooks. Give it to a load of businessmen who are known to be good at making shady deals, because even if they take ten percent themselves, there's still ninety percent left for the rest of us.

Public Relations Officer,
Radio Telefis Eireann

A. Introduction

This chapter and the one that follows will discuss the participation of Irish academics in the public sphere of politics and intellectual debate. For the most part, these chapters will focus on academics outside the realm of technocratic policy-making, looking at those who use political platforms or literary venues to promote their ideas. The public image of the humanist intellectual in contemporary Ireland will also be considered in relation to the traditional prestige of the artist and the recent ascendancy of the technocrat.

Academics participate in Irish politics both as "career" and "activist" politicians. In a few cases these roles overlap, in the sense that some academics who achieve elected office continue to act more as spokespeople for particular issues or causes than as traditional party politicians. Their political participation is not entirely dependent upon holding such office, and their public identity remains more closely associated with their

academic backgrounds or issues of involvement than with their political credentials.

University academics make up a very small percentage of those holding electoral office in the two houses of the Irish Parliament, the Senate and the Dail (after the 1987 election, only 3.5% of the two houses). Within the university sector, political activists also constitute a small minority of the total faculty population, and thus cannot be said to represent the collective interests of their professional community. Rather than being a comprehensive study of contemporary Irish politics, therefore, this chapter examines the nature of academics' recent political participation and their degree of integration into the national political milieu. Two factors are particularly significant in this regard: the different forms of political involvement of NUI and Trinity College academics, and the different forms of commitment required of those who enter political life through the Senate as opposed to the Dail.

B. The Academic as Politician.

Nettl (1969) has suggested that there is a basic contradiction between the function of the politician and the function of the intellectual. The politician is essentially concerned with achieving power, that which "causes the restructuring of action without altering preference" (:17), while the intellectual is concerned with

achieving influence, that which "restructures or alters preference" (:18). For Nettl, the contradiction is extended by the tendency for intellectuals to operate within a universal framework that privileges the direct relationship between the individual and the world, while politicians are committed to the enforcement of power through bureaucratic structures that mediate and control this relationship.

Intellectuals who enter the political field may certainly turn the bureaucratic structures of power to their ends of achieving influence, in the process becoming successful politicians. However, intellectuals who maintain a greater commitment to rationality or to moral principle in the realization of their desired political goals will always find formal political structures frustrating. They may move in and out of such structures as political fashions change, but cannot be absorbed totally by them without losing an essential characteristic of their intellectual identity.

Academics offer an interesting variation on Nettl's model in that they are bureaucratized intellectuals. Academics are committed to the university and to other hierarchical educational systems that structure formal knowledge and decide which aspects of it are "best" or "true." This resembles the commitment of bureaucratic politicians to a political hierarchy that promotes

particular values underwriting the system as a whole. This parallel is enforced in societies such as Ireland where universities play a major role in national development.

More than other kinds of intellectuals, academics are willing to give and take orders, to accept the legitimacy of authority. They have been conditioned by their working environment to seek advancement through the narrow channels of academic committee work, partisanship, and brokerage, all of which prepare them for political careers. Finally, many of them are denied -- and deny themselves -- the problematical label of "intellectual," given their primary occupational commitment to reproducing received knowledge and their incorporation into dominant power structures that constrain their role as critics. In this attenuation of their public intellectual identity, academics become even more eligible for political participation.

At the same time, academics in political life tend to preserve their desire to influence, to convince others through reason rather than force. The main way they do this is by interpreting ideas and issues in the public sphere, placing them within frameworks of meaning different from that of the traditional politician or bureaucrat. In Ireland, academics who are career politicians may align themselves with party philosophies rather than with individual issues of conscience, but they continue to use their intellectual skills to explain and promote their

positions to the public. However, the humanist academic's frequent reliance on "moral discourse" places him at a disadvantage in relation to those, including other public intellectuals, who specialize in utilitarian or scientific modes of reasoning.

Academics in Irish party politics today are well aware of the negative connotations built into their public identity as intellectuals. As a result, they tend to play down their intellectual credentials, and to present themselves as middle class professionals not very different from lawyers or accountants. This is, to some extent, what most university academics are. However, these same credentials also distinguish the academic politician from his or her more "profane" political colleagues -- businessmen, farmers and full-time public representatives -- and as such are a source of respect and authority in some contexts. If the academic politician occasionally aligns himself with anti-intellectual forces, he does so from the perspective of one who knows firsthand what these intellectual types are really about. The goal is to preserve one's intellectual authority without being defined by it.

This uncomfortable stance reflects the ambiguous position of the academic intellectual in contemporary Ireland. Irish university academics enjoy relatively high status, based on their formal intellectual achievements and

their professional affiliations with powerful educational institutions. Status related to the latter has increased in the past two decades as the university has come to be seen as the main route to middle class success. Some academics also enjoy prestige as recognized experts in the public sphere of policy-oriented research and government advisory work.

In contrast to such "pundits," however, the academic who enters the public sphere with a critical or reform agenda generally is viewed with suspicion in Ireland. Academics in the field of law are more acceptable in this respect than are those from other liberal arts areas, given the former's expertise in legislation and state bureaucracies. Academics who are not specialists in this public sense are those most likely to be considered "intellectuals," individuals who place themselves outside the constraints of political and practical expediency. The intellectual, as Baumann (1987) writes,

raises the phantom of 'thinkers' as such, persons living for and by ideas untarnished by any preoccupation bound by function or interest; persons who preserve the ability, and the right, to address the rest of their society (other parts of the educated elite included), in the name of Reason and universal moral principles (:22).

For both activist and careerist academic politicians, the question of their commitment to radical social change remains. Intellectuals who survive in Irish party politics are concerned with reform, not revolution, and many career

politicians find even reform irrelevant to their political agenda. In addition, the bourgeois orientation of the academic intellectual helps preclude his or her rejection of the fundamental social order. Conor Cruise O'Brien has written that "the mere fact of being an intellectual is an index of relative social success within an existing society" (1969:4), and academics as a group are among the most successful intellectuals. Along with a certain routine in academic life comes a steady paycheck, respectability, and, to some degree, public authority. These gifts work against incipient radical impulses, as Jacoby (1987) has suggested in the case of America's younger university academics. Those intellectuals who fail to receive these gifts, and who also fail to find alternate reward in artistic recognition or financial support, often become too socially marginal to be considered serious political figures.

However, proposals that in other national contexts might be considered moderate -- legal provisions for divorce and family planning rights, for example -- are still viewed by many in Ireland as threatening and extreme. The recrimination and ostracism that are directed towards those who publicly advocate challenging ideas cannot be taken lightly in such a close-knit society. Activists as well as cultural critics are subject to these forms of social control, and sometimes show great strength of

character in withstanding them. Those who have the option of leaving the country show commitment simply by staying. It is against this framework that the ideas and initiatives of Ireland's politically active intellectuals must be evaluated.

C. The Academic and the Public Sphere.

In a lecture delivered in 1967, the Irish politician Proinsias Mac Aonghusa made the following statement:

Division on personalities rather than on principles and policies has been a distinct mark of our people for a long, long time and, perhaps, is a national characteristic that is unlikely to disappear Irish traditions usually penalize the inquiring mind in all fields. One of the dirtiest words in Irish politics is 'intellectual' (quoted in Chubb 1970:57).

Mac Aonghusa was in a good position to comment, having been ousted that year from Ireland's Labour Party due to his outspoken and liberal views. In the time since then, the public image of the intellectual has improved in Ireland, in large part as a result of increased educational opportunities and the widened role for academic specialists in state planning. However, as the Irish political scientist Basil Chubb has noted, "it cannot yet be said that the traditional distrust of intellectuals in politics has been wholly dissipated" (1982:23). Chubb cites Ireland's authoritarian culture, the conservatism of its Catholic Church and the lack of indigenous educational centers until the past century as the historical basis of this "anti-intellectualism."

Nonetheless, university education has long served as an entree to public life in Ireland, due largely to its role in conferring professional status. In this regard, a university degree is still extremely valuable. Students entering the professions, as well as those planning political careers, can make contacts, establish high profiles and engage in public debate in an environment that not only mirrors the "real world" outside, but forms a direct link to it. As discussed in the previous two chapters, faculty members from both Trinity and UCD are affiliated as consultants with state agencies and private industry, in the latter case often clandestinely, due to university restrictions on outside employment. Others of them are politicians, journalists and well-known writers. Youth branches of the major political parties are to be found at most of the colleges, and their memberships have some direct input into national party policy. With the Irish voting age lowered from twenty-one to eighteen in 1973, and the great increase in the youth population since that time, politicians court student favor even though there is little they can or will do about rising tuition fees, unemployment and other student concerns. Those closely involved in college party branches are sometimes the children of politicians, for whom such organizations offer experience in national party politics.

The college debating societies also provide valuable

practice in becoming "players" in the national scene. Some of these, such as the Literary and Historical Society at UCD and the College Historical Society at Trinity, are among the oldest at their respective institutions and have deep traditions in Irish public life. The lists of auditors (presidents) of these societies over the years provide a virtual Who's Who of Ireland's future writers, politicians and business leaders. The rigorous standards of debate that are maintained within these societies, the sarcasm and heckling that accompany any performance, and their dinner jacket socializing with distinguished speakers offer a survival course for students interested in hazarding a public career. The literary critic Richard Kain has written that "in Dublin, conversation is still considered an art, and society has long been a career open to verbal talents" (1962:8). In contemporary Ireland, this tradition continues. The young raconteurs of the university debating societies -- future professors, prime ministers and high court judges -- are both frivolous and dead serious in their talk. Their public meetings convey their sense of entitlement to leadership as the most articulate and educated of their generation. Some of these young people begin to develop public reputations before they graduate. One of the great virtues of a small society such as Ireland's is the relative ease with which you can achieve notoriety once you have made your way into an

advantaged position. If you are going to be famous in Ireland, this will probably be evident by your twenty-fifth birthday, leaving you then another fifty years or so to fret about the limits of your influence and wealth compared to your peers in Britain and America.

Up until the 1960s, Irish political careers were usually based on close ties to local party organizations and the ability to present oneself as a committed public servant. Relatively few party politicians had university degrees, and those who had often were academics. The impact of increased access to higher education since that time is very evident now within the political sphere. Almost 50% of the members of the Irish parliament in 1987 were university graduates with professional degrees in fields such as law, medicine and accountancy. Yet this increased professionalization has not much affected the Irish politician's attitude towards higher education, particularly within the context of a technocratic state. Former Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald, himself an academic, commented on this attitude:

What worries me is to hear my colleagues in government -- it seems to be more true of Fianna Fail -- taking such a utilitarian approach to education. Others who themselves have had a third-level education seem to have quite a strong bias against third-level education other than that which is useful to train people for jobs. And if that's true of the leadership of the Fine Gael Party, you can take it as true of Fianna Fail, and it's certainly true of bureaucrats, and the students are the same.

In this environment, the words "intellectual" and

"academic" remain loaded terms. In the course of my interviews with university faculty members, I found very few who were willing to identify themselves as the former, and these were most often individuals within those disciplines, such as philosophy and literature, where being an intellectual is considered essential to professional credibility.¹ For those who are currently engaged in politics, or who hope to be, public acceptance of the label intellectual invites unwelcome use of the term "self-described intellectual" by the media, or, even worse, "so-called intellectual" by one's enemies.

The life cycle aspect of public careers also influences the academic's self- and popular identification in this regard. It is all right to be an intellectual if you are unlikely to do any more damage in the public sphere. Such individuals often enter the category of eminences grise. The only academic politician I interviewed who defined himself without reservation as an intellectual was a former Minister for Finance, now a member of Trinity's economics department, who had retired from politics. The same week that I first met with this professor, his face was emblazoned across the cover of an Irish news magazine, along with those of the last four prime ministers, above the headline "Who's To Blame? In 13 Years They Have Vandalized the Country." Under these circumstances, it was probably desirable for him to

emphasize his academic over his political credentials.

Strictly speaking, the word "academic" refers to anyone who teaches in a third-level educational institution, but even here I found some reluctance to identify oneself as such. In interviews, some younger faculty members half-dismissed their university employment as "just a job," although at the same time anxious to establish that their primary commitment was to teaching. Academics who characterized their employment in this way were usually those in lower faculty statuses who were likely to be blocked in their professional advancement by the universities' current economic strictures. Academics of this sort tended to see themselves as in but not of the university. In this sense, the separation of their teaching role from their institutional role was legitimate. For academics with politically progressive or culturally avant-garde reputations, being a member of the academic establishment also may be a little embarrassing. Some who work in universities in Ireland would prefer to be employed elsewhere, but have little opportunity for this. For this reason as well, they choose not to define themselves as academics in the complete occupational sense of the word.

Popular disregard for academic life, which academics themselves sometimes internalize, certainly is not unique to Ireland. In the Western tradition, its origins lie in the once-elite status of priests and scholars. In Ireland,

however, the close association between colonial administration and higher education further justified this disregard. This attitude makes less sense in the present context, given the fact that the majority of the Irish workforce is employed now in the non-manual "information-processing" of bureaucracies and service industries. In this newer context, the focus of criticism has shifted to the perceived lack of entrepreneurial potential in most academic endeavors. Those engaged in technology and the applied sciences offer an important exception to this stereotype, and are highly approved of accordingly. However, academics of this sort rarely enter Irish politics, perhaps because they are already so well-positioned within the university and the state's planning agencies.

Although urban intellectuals were leading figures in the Irish nationalist movement at the turn of the century, due largely to their role in cultural revival, such intellectuals became marginal to national politics after the populist and rural-based Fianna Fail Party came to power in the 1930s. UCD's Fine Gael sympathies meant that it too was often marginalized during this period. Fianna Fail Prime Minister Eamon de Valera, a former schoolteacher, viewed education as a cornerstone of Irish independence, but as a conservative Catholic he was also concerned that the Church would have ultimate authority

over secular intellectual culture. This aversion to intellectuals showed signs of abating in the 1960s, as the country underwent modernization and economic development, but was revived in a new form as the country experienced a brief period of "government by intellectuals" in the 1970s.

In the late 1960s, Ireland's liberalizing social climate encouraged an interest in party politics among younger and more progressive intellectuals, some of whom were academics, and many of whom were drawn to the Labour Party. Optimistically declaring that "The Seventies will be Socialist," these intellectuals symbolized what was for many conservatives an unwelcome trend towards urban and secular values in Irish life. This was exacerbated by the fact that the most prominent members of this group -- David Thornley, Justin Keating, and Conor Cruise O'Brien -- were affiliated with Trinity College as faculty and graduates. Thornley and Keating had risen to public prominence in the mid-1960s as television personalities. This had given them a national visibility equal to that of more experienced politicians, and was an early, and perhaps unsettling, indication of the power of electronic media in a country that had had nation-wide broadcasting only since 1963.

During the 1969 general election, a smear campaign against Labour, led by both of the major parties and representatives of the Catholic Church, exploited every traditional fear of the intellectual as immoral, alien and

dangerous. Distinctions among individual candidates, as well as among different progressive interest groups in Ireland, were blurred in this rhetoric. One Fianna Fail minister described the Labour candidates as "the new left-wing political queers who have taken over the Labour Party from the steps of Trinity College and Telefis Eireann" (quoted in Gallagher 1982:93). The sexual theme was taken up also by Fine Gael's John M. Kelly (himself a UCD professor), who commented that "Labour's ship" had some "queer fellows in the engine room" (ibid.:94) -- a good example of the bourgeois intellectual distancing himself from his more radical colleagues. Voters in rural constituencies reportedly were told that priests would be tortured and crucifixes destroyed if these "pseudo-intellectual Marxists" got into office (ibid.:93). Conor Cruise O'Brien recounts the story of his wife having heard a priest in Limerick deliver a sermon in which socialism was condemned as a bastard ideology of communism, much as Protestantism was a bastard version of Catholicism (Tobin 1984).

Nonetheless, several university-based Labour candidates did win seats in the 1969 election, and in the 1973-77 National Coalition (Fine Gael-Labour) government, Thornley, Keating, and Cruise O'Brien held ministerships. This progressive movement did not sustain its momentum, however, as the country's economic situation deteriorated

throughout the 1970s and as Labour failed to develop effective strategies as the minority partner in the National Coalition. One especially controversial achievement of this government was the strengthening of the Irish Broadcast Act to ban representatives of paramilitary organizations from Radio Telefis Eireann, the national broadcasting authority. As the government minister in charge of communications, Cruise O'Brien was largely responsible for this initiative, and thus placed himself in the invidious position of being both the country's foremost intellectual and its foremost censor.²

By the late 1970s, Ireland's academic politicians were viewed by many as having failed the test of realpolitik. In addition, the irony of Labour's new zealots being middle class professionals was not lost on most observers. "You'd hardly find a working man among them," one Trinity politician, a member of the Fianna Fail party, commented to me. Cruise O'Brien's censorship policy was used by nationalists as proof of the underlying illiberal and pro-British thinking of Irish intellectuals. Social reformers saw the policy as a betrayal of the principle of free speech and an attempt to withhold vital information from the public. In the 1977 general election, the government's three Labour ministers lost their Dail seats, and since that time most of Labour's university-based candidates have concentrated their efforts on the Senate.

Beyond the temporal aspects of academics' periodic involvement in Irish politics, there is a wider problem of identity for many university intellectuals. This is rooted in the prevailing preference in Ireland for creative rather than academic intellectual work. "In Ireland," a literary critic and failed senatorial candidate noted ruefully, "intelligence itself doesn't matter. People think you should be putting it to practical use writing a poem or a song." Academics who are neither poets nor pundits are caught in the divide between culture and technocracy, and appear marginal to both. To some extent, the Irish accept Matthew Arnold's famous characterization of the Celtic genius as wild and imaginative, rather than disciplined and rational. The latter qualities are typical of the academic mind, and academia itself, up until the mid-nineteenth century, was largely the domain of the "British" and Anglo-Irish elements in Irish society. One political analyst suggested to me that Ireland's colonial experience still influences the contemporary evaluation of the academic intellectual:

He would tend to be resented, because any one who can handle ideas and concepts detachedly from the facts, so to speak, sounds like a boss, he sounds like a master, and he's deeply resented. Or he's a person who pulls apart people's ideologies, and therefore is disruptive of communal solidarity. And no good nationalist can really tolerate that.

Irish universities themselves still are seen as urban institutions, and as such antithetical to native,

rural-based cultural tradition. The university is viewed more as a source of professional accreditation than of intellectual enrichment. As one UCD academic commented, "Education in Ireland is seen as the road to a job, a better job. The other dimensions are rarely perceived." Irish academics are respected now for their success in this domain once closed to them, but some doubt as to their wider social contribution remains.

The ambiguous status of the academic intellectual is reflected in the media's coverage of such individuals. During a year of following the Irish newspapers, I noticed that the word "academic" was used selectively, by academics as well as others, to characterize public figures of similar occupational background in relation to specific issues and contexts. Thus, it might be used to lend weight to a non-political intellectual's newspaper commentary, and also be used as an editorial criticism of a university-based politician's opinions on another matter. At the same time, people who achieve academic credentials without actually being academics, such as the recipients of honorary degrees, are often referred to respectfully in the media as "Doctor," notwithstanding their lifelong commitment to other domains of activity, such as private industry. The professional prestige of academia is more respected than is the intellectual labor by which one usually achieves this prestige.

Unlike the creative intellectual, the academic in Ireland is characterized popularly as distant and alienated from his cultural roots. That which is rational -- knowledge for knowledge's sake -- paradoxically appears divorced from day-to-day reality as well as emotional integrity. Gramsci (1971) describes this aspect of the intellectual's personality:

The popular element 'feels' but does not always know or understand; the intellectual element 'knows' but does not always understand and in particular does not feel (:9).

Extending from this, the intellectual in Irish politics is characterized also as one who lacks the personal skills and warmth necessary to political success. Garret FitzGerald, a UCD economics lecturer who epitomized for many Irish the academic intellectual, commented on this perceived lack in an interview:

It's the contrast between learning out of books and learning from life, from remoter, more rational arguments and the human relationship. The strength of Irish life and Irish politics -- but for every strength there's a weakness also -- is the very strong personal element It's a rather negative factor at times. You see it in the persistence of political jobbery in a country which is almost free of other forms of corruption.

The distinction made between native intelligence and intellectual forms of understanding has had particular bearing on the political career of FitzGerald himself, who holds a Ph.D. in economics. The labels of "Doctor" and "Professor" have stuck to him throughout his political career, despite his earlier work as a technocrat for Aer

Lingus and as an economic journalist for Irish newspapers. This characterization undoubtedly is influenced by his public manner. His speaking style resembles that of a university lecturer, emphasizing statistics on some occasions, and on others appealing to moral reason. But beyond this, FitzGerald's fixed identity as an academic results in his words and actions being defined by journalists and by much of the electorate, including his supporters, in contradictory ways that emphasize the ambiguous qualities of the intellectual over the certainties of the politician.

On the one hand, FitzGerald is characterized in the popular media as an "absent-minded professor," due to incidents like the one where he showed up at a state occasion with mismatched shoes ("And what's wrong with being absent-minded, or wearing odd shoes?" he commented to me). On the other hand, he is described by his critics as a "human calculator," overly reliant on facts and figures and with a poor grasp of the real issues at hand. A joke told about him sums up this aspect of his public identity. Presented by an aide with a scheme for improving the economy, FitzGerald says, "Well, we know very well that that will work in practice, but will it work in theory?" He is also called "Garret the Good," a nickname that denotes idealism and a lack of political savvy. One media observer, employed at Radio Telefis Eireann, endorsed this

characterization:

FitzGerald, unfortunately, isn't in it for himself. He's in it because he's an altruist or whatever the right word is. He wants to do good.

FitzGerald's public image as an intellectual stands in sharp contrast to that of his chief political opponent, Charles Haughey, a contemporary at UCD in the mid-1940s. Haughey, leader of Fianna Fail and also prime minister on three occasions since 1979, holds only a Bachelor's degree in commerce, but enhances his intellectual prestige by being a patron of the arts, particularly music and painting -- forms of creativity that are viewed as intuitive and that are more likely to reflect Irish cultural themes than academic scholarship. Haughey's penchant for surrounding himself with creative artists and thus emphasizing his "Irishness" was explained by an observer in this way:

It provides the king with his court -- the piper, the poet, the architect. That's why Haughey does these very symbolic things -- like going to Newgrange [a Bronze Age site] and standing in the entrance to the Newgrange tombs and saying 'My ancestors are buried in here.' He's saying, 'I'm the high-king of Ireland.'

While FitzGerald reiterates the need to overcome sectarianism and speaks of Ireland's diverse cultural traditions, Haughey ignores these issues and cultivates his reputation as a nationalist and a republican. His credentials in the latter regard are well established. In 1970 he was brought to trial for his alleged involvement in shipping arms to Northern Ireland during the height of the sectarian conflict there. Haughey, Minister for Finance at

the time the scandal erupted, was acquitted. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted by political observers that this incident added to his popular appeal by suggesting his underlying support of the Provisional IRA's militarism. Haughey's affluent lifestyle, resembling that of a country squire, also adds to his popularity, as does his reputation for being something of a playboy. In contrast, FitzGerald's domestic circumstances are much like that of any middle-level professional. He is also known for his devotion to his wife and family.

Haughey's public stands on European integration and Anglo-Irish rapprochement vary according to the political climate of the moment. While supporting Ireland's economic involvement with Europe, he avoids being labeled a Eurocrat by articulating concern for Irish culture and national sovereignty as integration proceeds. Prior to his becoming prime minister again in 1987, Haughey expressed serious dissatisfaction with the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement negotiated by FitzGerald in 1985. However, he took no action to modify the Agreement once in office.

The contradictions in Haughey's public image -- his personal charisma and his administrative steeliness, his role as head of government and his associations with sectarian republicanism -- can be incorporated by the Irish voter within the understood spectrum of pragmatic political behavior. He is both "Charlie" and "The Boss," his two

most common nicknames, without this indicating any flaw in his political character. Self-confident in his power, Haughey's public speaking style is both persuasive and imperious. As the Radio Telefis Eireann staff member quoted above also noted:

Haughey is decisive. When you ask him a question, he'll either tell you he's not going to answer it, or he'll give you a very straight answer and it will sound authoritative He won't bullshit around any question, and he won't drag in the question of identity, or whatever, unless the question is about identity. FitzGerald is simply the opposite. He's indecisive. He often seems to be talking off the subject

My interview with FitzGerald took place shortly after he had stepped down as prime minister following the 1987 general election, which brought Fianna Fail's Charles Haughey back to national leadership. I asked FitzGerald what he thought of the prevailing wisdom that academics don't make good politicians. "There is, of course, a certain truth to it," he replied, and continued:

I'm less skilled in personal relations than most Irish people are. And that is partly my academic formation. There is an actual psychological contrast. If you are concerned with ideas and concepts it doesn't necessarily mean that in your own life your personal relations are any less effective than other people's, but it does mean that when you're dealing with public issues you are concentrating on an aspect which is removed to some degree from the human factor, and you appear, certainly, less human than other people who are arguing in emotional rather than rational terms.

Although the electorate made the actual decision to end FitzGerald's tenure as prime minister, it seemed apparent that he himself was ready to withdraw from his

beleaguered position. As one colleague at UCD observed shortly after the election, "Many of us felt it would almost be a service to the poor man to get him out of office." However, FitzGerald was able to retain his Dail seat and move to the backbench of the opposition. Shortly afterward, he resigned from Fine Gael's party leadership.

D. Irish Academics and Electoral Politics.

At the national level, there are two venues for seeking political office in Ireland, the Dail and the Senate, or Seanad. These are the lower and upper houses, respectively, of the Irish Parliament, or Oireachtas. The Oireachtas also includes the President of Ireland (An Uachtarán), a formal head of state with largely symbolic powers. The country's real leadership is in the hands of the Prime Minister, or Taoiseach, who is, as in Great Britain, the head of the largest party in government.³

The day-to-day business of Irish political life is conducted in the Dail, the lower chamber made up of 166 seats. Dail deputies, called TDs (Teachta Dála), are elected through proportional representation by single transferable vote, a highly competitive system in which winning depends upon the accumulation of first, second and third preference votes by candidates within a single party. Election by first preference votes is very difficult, forcing same-party candidates to compete with each other to win the second and third preferences which will put them

over the top to victory.

Personal style and party loyalty are extremely important for success as a TD, given the PR system and the limited political distinctions among candidates within a single party. Those with family members in politics, as well as those with previous experience in county level politics, still make the strongest Dail candidates, reflecting the personalistic nature of the Irish party system. Once in office, TDs must demonstrate that they are skilled brokers able to divert state benefits -- development funds, grants, jobs, scholarships, and so forth -- to their local constituencies, thus ensuring their reelection (Bax 1976). Those who lack brokering skills and charisma, or at least the will to sustain such an intense relationship with their party and their electorate, will not survive.

By contrast, Parliament's upper chamber, the Senate, is something of a gentlemen's club. A prestigious but definitely subordinate body, the Senate provides a less partisan arena for political debate, and can initiate bills that eventually may be voted upon in the Dail. Its sixty seats are divided into three categories. Forty-three senators are elected by an Electoral College made up of the members of the Oireachtas and the county and borough councilors. These senators represent the "vocational" interests of culture and education, agriculture, industry

and commerce, labor, and public administration and social services. Eleven senators are nominated by the prime minister, often to reward public service or support party interests in the Senate. This category of the "Taoiseach's Eleven" also allows the government to honor creative artists on occasion by granting them senatorships. The playwright Brian Friel was one of Prime Minister Haughey's appointments following the general election of 1987.

Unsuccessful Dail candidates who are favored by their parties occasionally seek Senate seats in order to bide their time until the next election. This is possible due to the fact that Senate races are held after general elections, allowing losing Dail candidates to recycle themselves as candidates for the upper house. As one university senator noted of this practice, "It is especially galling to kick someone out the front door, only to find them waving to you from the drawing-room window" (Irish Times 9 March 1987).

The third senatorial group consists of six members who are elected by the graduates of Dublin University (Trinity College) and the National University, with each institution having three seats. The university representatives have a more open agenda than most other senators, given that they are not compelled to serve a particular corporatist group. As a result, they can define their own interests and attract votes on the basis of their commitment to

particular issues. University senators are also less dependent on party organizations for success, and are able to serve more directly as ombudsmen or spokesmen for particular causes. For these reasons, activist-style academics are frequently drawn to the Senate rather than the Dail in their pursuit of elected office. The Senate's lesser political power is offset, for such activists, by the high-profile platform it provides for national political involvement.

1. University Representation in the Senate.

Like much of Ireland's government structure, university representation in parliament was borrowed from Great Britain, where universities have held seats since the early 1600s. As the only university in colonial Ireland up until the mid-nineteenth century, Trinity College has had virtually continuous representation since 1613, when a Royal Charter granted it seats in the old Irish parliament, which were then transferred to the British parliament at Westminster under the Act of Union in 1801 (Rohan 1982). The colleges that eventually made up the National University system did not have representation in the English Parliament until NUI was formed in 1908, and thus Trinity maintained its unique political privilege for more than half a century after these other Irish colleges were founded.

Under the terms of the Free State Constitution of

1922, Ireland's university seats were transferred to the new parliament's Dail, or lower house. In 1933, these seats were eliminated from the lower chamber, but then reinstated by the 1937 Constitution in the upper chamber of the Senate, where each university retains three. With this transition, the state lessened the political power of all university representatives in government, but in particular those of Trinity, whose constituency was made up for the most part of Protestant Loyalists.

In recent years, university representation in the Senate has come under attack as an anachronistic privilege. One source of contention has been the apparent inequity of Trinity, with its one college and small graduate constituency (about 15,000) holding the same number of seats as all the colleges of the National University combined, with their much larger graduate constituencies (about 60,000). Yet without access to these seats, the Protestant minority is likely to have had little chance of political representation in modern Ireland. University senators are also criticized for using the Senate as an expensive "talking shop" for their idiosyncratic concerns.

While there is some basis to these claims of unjustified representation, the Senate also serves as a valuable platform for independent political expression in the Republic, providing an alternative means of entering national life and promoting interests outside the

mainstream. This is particularly true of Trinity's university representatives, who have been less likely to be affiliated with Ireland's two major parties than have NUI's senators (ibid.). Several of Trinity's senators in the 1950s and 1960s, notably Owen Sheehy-Skeffington, Noel Browne, and Alexis FitzGerald (no relation to Garret FitzGerald) were leading advocates of minority rights and civil liberties in Ireland during a time when such advocacy was extremely unpopular.

Prior to the 1970s, Trinity senators' involvement with these issues was viewed by many Irish simply as a defense of Protestant interests in national affairs. But Trinity's more cosmopolitan orientation must be evaluated within the context of its detachment from the dominant Irish Catholic culture. Although its "liberal" ethos served at times as a convenient way of avoiding social responsibility, by publicly presenting itself in this manner the college also provided a platform for individuals with genuine commitment to social reform. As one Trinity activist noted:

The liberal intellectual thing was a fraud, basically. They weren't all that liberal. Not at all, but they pretended to be, and it was possible for people of courage to call their bluff, and exercise that liberality that was very largely a fiction for the majority of people there.

Two of Trinity's recent senators, Mary Robinson and David Norris, have maintained the college's modern tradition of social reform-minded senators. Both have focused their main political efforts on civil rights issues

of family planning, divorce, and homosexual legislation reform. In doing so, they also represent the broader interests of many in Ireland who seek changes in the state's social policies.

Robinson, a Trinity law professor, is a Catholic married to a Protestant, a fact which has contributed to public criticism of her advocacy of minority rights. When she entered the Senate in 1969 at the age of twenty-five, she was Trinity's first female and Catholic senator, as well as its youngest. As a senator, Robinson's first major political act was to sponsor a Private Member's Bill calling for reform of Irish family planning legislation, which at the time forbade virtually all forms of artificial contraception. She became notorious as a result of this bill, and received hundreds of hate letters attacking her morals. For a time, her parents were forced to leave their local church in Mayo, in the west of Ireland. She recalls the difficulty of withstanding this public assault and the claustrophobic environment which engulfed her:

... I remember at times walking down the street and feeling the physical pressure of it, feeling that people were looking at me, and hating me for what they saw. It was really quite tough at that stage, because I was inexperienced and I wasn't hardened, you know.

David Norris, Ireland's leading gay rights advocate and a first-time senator in 1987, also has withstood a great deal of personal attack in the course of his public career. Norris is a Protestant, a member of Trinity's

English faculty and an authority on James Joyce. His major political interests center on homosexual rights and the redevelopment of Dublin's inner city. The first cause is clearly a marginal one in sexually conservative Ireland, although recent concern in the Republic about AIDS has increased public awareness of the homosexual community. Norris' second cause, Dublin preservation, also has limited popular appeal, due to the lingering hostility many Irish feel toward the "English-built" capital and its architectural features.

In the early 1970s, spurred by a growing frustration with the complete avoidance in Ireland of homosexuality as a civil liberties issue, Norris came out publicly as a gay rights activist. Some university colleagues suggested he play down his association with this cause for the sake of his career. His students called him "Doris" behind his back. The Irish media had a field day with his open identification as a homosexual, which he deflected with his customary wit:

There was a kind of neurotic obsession for a while that anything I did, whether it was about the revival of the inner city or anything, I would be referred to in the newspapers as 'self-confessed homosexual David Norris, speaking yesterday about the inner city, said ...'. And I got fed-up with that, so I'd start every speech I made or every statement I uttered, I used to put in, 'self-confessed non-practicing heterosexual Eamon de Valera said last night in the Dail ...', or 'self-confessed practicing heterosexual President Hillery said last night ...', and they gradually got the point that all this 'Doris' thing was completely irrelevant.

Eventually, Ireland's gay rights movement underwent a split, with one faction supporting a broad agenda of civil rights reform, and the other "not wanting to rock the boat, but just wanting to be able to dance with other men and women," as Norris describes it. His own commitment is to the wider agenda, and in this spirit he brought a case before the Irish High Court in the early 1980s, claiming that a Victorian law against "buggery," a vestige of British administration, violated his civil rights as an Irish citizen under the terms of the Constitution. One of the points raised by the lawyer for the defense, the Irish state, was whether or not Norris was "really" Irish -- a bizarre attempt to circumvent the basic issue raised by the case. The defense clearly hoped to establish that as a Protestant, a liberal and a homosexual, Norris had little right to challenge the Irish Catholic social values enforced by the state's legislation, whatever his legal citizenship. Norris demonstrated in court that, on his mother's side, he was descended from one of Ireland's oldest families. The Irish High Court ruled against Norris, who then brought the case to the European Court of Human Justice. In a preliminary decision made in 1987, the European Court declared that Irish legislation against homosexuality interfered with the individual's private life, and as such broached the terms of the European Human Rights Convention.

Like Mary Robinson, who as a lawyer represented his case at both the Irish and the European court, Norris views the Republic's integration into the European Community as an opportunity to place pressure on Ireland to conform to the secular social policies of other member states. This attitude is markedly different from that of most mainstream Irish politicians, who view the EC as a limitless source of economic bounty, with little or no cultural content of significance at home. Other Irish cases Senator Robinson has represented at the European Court in recent years concern efforts to reform Ireland's marital and social welfare legislation.

Robinson has attempted on two occasions to move into the lower house of the Dail as a Labour candidate, seeking a more influential role in government. In both cases she failed, largely as a result of her inexperience with machine politics. As she describes her first Dail campaign:

I found that I was pretty green. I mean, my candidature was not the best news ever for the constituency. There was a local established candidate who deeply resented my coming in as a 'yuppie,' I suppose, in those days [1977], and it was quite a lesson to me to find that kind of very experienced candidate, belonging to a political party, the in-fighting, and the rest of it that can go on

While class may not be an explicit issue in Irish political rhetoric, Robinson's second effort to enter the Dail, in 1981, demonstrated its implicit importance in achieving electoral success in certain settings. While her

first race had taken place in a middle class Dublin district, her second one was located in a working class area. Here, the public perception of Robinson as an upper middle class female worked to her disfavor. As she recalls:

My son was born on the 3rd of May, and the election was called on the 20th of May, and I was feeding the child myself as I had done the other two. So everywhere I went to canvass my son came with me. That in itself was an interesting experience, because if I'd stood in this area even [her own district], or in, say, Dublin South, one of the better-off middle class areas now that women were beginning to want to be more involved in politics, I think people would have said 'You're great.' I can tell you in working class Dublin, they said to me 'You should be at home minding the child, you know, you shouldn't be out canvassing what-have-you. Who'll look after the baby?' Because there had been a certain amount of publicity about the fact that I'd had a child, partly promoted by me and the Labour Party to promote my candidature. It didn't pay off. They didn't like it. It wasn't appropriate.

After these unsuccessful ventures into party politics, Robinson decided to concentrate her social reform efforts on the Senate and on her private practice, where she defends many civil rights cases. She notes the limitations on effecting social change in Ireland through traditional political means:

... what happens is you're more concerned about your own running mate, or two people running on the same ticket as you, and so if you say something even slightly radical on one of these issues, you can be perfectly sure that it's your running mates who'll take you apart, and they will make sure that your views on this are not only known but exaggerated in a way that will harm you, and they'll come in with 'So-and-so, I wouldn't vote for her now -- did you hear what she said? She's in favor of divorce on demand.' It's your running mate who will kick off the issues on which you are vulnerable, because there is only going to be one,

or at the most two, Fianna Fail or Fine Gael [candidates elected] ... that's where the real competition is. And that does not promote radical thinking, or radical expressions of thinking.

Even within the Senate, where politicians often take on the aura of statesmen, a university background can work against the individual. "People say, ah sure, that's academic," David Norris commented. "They mean it's irrelevant." He went on to describe the sort of criticism he was subjected to as a newly-elected member of the upper chamber:

The term 'intellectual' has now come to mean somebody who is divorced from reality. And in the Senate I have recently sat through a number of debates in which I was lectured about what was described as 'the university of life,' which I am assumed to know nothing of, but I disabused them of that notion. I am not at all devoid of ideas, but I think that ideas divorced from action are a luxury that doesn't attract me.

Due to his open homosexuality, it is safe to say that Norris could never be elected to the Dail, and probably would never try. His thoughts on public political life reflect those of the intellectual who perceives other means of popular influence:

I think for any intelligent, literate person who can use language as an instrument, there are two choices: you can either intervene directly, through politics, and attempt to change things with a specific program of issues, or you can do what Joyce did, which is to try to change the consciousness of the people of your country. And as I grow into my middle years, I'm beginning to wonder if Joyce wasn't right. To change the awareness of people in a society is a very much more profound change in some circumstances than merely changing items of legislation.

Both Mary Robinson and David Norris remain outsiders,

to differing degrees, from mainstream Irish politics. Their associations with the liberal Protestant community augment this outsider status. While this helps free them to pursue their closest interests, it also diminishes their wider influence on the Irish electorate and preserves Trinity's reputation as an alien institution. The maverick tradition of university representation in the Senate has also spurred proposals in the last few years to abolish the upper house as an unrepresentative political institution. But given the Senate's potential role in promoting progressive social legislation, its abolition would constitute a major loss for those who envision a more open, outward-facing Ireland in the future. As former Trinity senator Noel Browne commented in reference to this effort, "If you look at the country and the way it is, there is a much better case for abolishing the Dail" (Irish Times 25 February 1987).

2. The University and the Dail.

In contrast to the University of Dublin (Trinity College), the National University of Ireland is well integrated into Irish political culture, with its largest college, UCD, being the most influential of its constituents. Even during periods of its relative marginalization, UCD remained a "player" in Irish political life, due not only to its central location, but to the college's traditional associations with Dublin's

professional classes and with the Catholic Hierarchy.

These associations have been more significant in determining UCD's political influence than have been the actual number of its faculty members holding electoral office. More than Trinity academics, UCD faculty serve as behind-the-scenes advisors to the government and to individual politicians, the main way the college maintains political influence. UCD academics also make themselves available to the media as commentators on national issues. The proximity of the college to Radio Telefis Eireann, located across the road from UCD, facilitates this connection. In the period just prior to the 1987 general election, and on election day itself, several UCD academics were kept busy running back and forth between studio and classroom, and offering political analyses and prognostications over the phone to print reporters. The close relationship between UCD and RTE has led one Dublin journalist to speculate that there must be an underground tunnel beneath the Stillorgan Road connecting the two institutions.

The emergence of particular academics as political commentators and other types of public experts has much to do with Ireland's small size, as well as with its tight professional circles. A UCD professor, affiliated with Fine Gael, described how one becomes a pundit of this sort:

... you get to know people without really trying, without pushing or shoving. You get to know people who

are in politics, because you were at college with them, you may have been to school with them. You get to know people who are in the civil service, you get to know people who are heads of government departments, you get to know people who are in RTE who are your former students

You see, in New York or in London or in Paris, you would have the arts world, the academic world, you'd have the business world, you'd have the pop and the political world, but here it just doesn't work like that. There's just an overlap. Everything merges.

Furthermore, he noted:

Once you establish a reputation for having something of interest to say, you never lose it, even if you never say anything interesting ever again.

UCD graduates still dominate among college-educated members of the Dail. Following the general election of 1987, the number of UCD graduates in the Dail was fifty-four out of a total of 166. The number of University Colleges Cork and Galway graduates was thirteen and eight, respectively, while six Trinity graduates were TDs. Nine of the lower house's thirty-two new members were UCD graduates (one UCD academic was also a newly-elected TD). Only one Trinity graduate entered the Dail for the first time in 1987.

UCD faculty members who seek political office are better-positioned for national visibility than are other NUI academics, given that the formers' constituencies are located usually in Dublin. From this vantage point, even relatively inexperienced politicians can compete effectively with long-term rural TDs, who must divide their time between distant constituencies and Dublin power-

brokering. Dublin-based TDs are also more immediately available to the media for political commentary and response to breaking stories.

Although UCD's faculty has become more politically and socially diverse since the 1960s, the college as a whole remains popularly associated with Fine Gael, the party of the professional middle class. However, UCD's close connection with Fine Gael seems to have deteriorated in recent years, in part because, as discussed in the previous chapter, Fianna Fail has gained ground in some of the college's expanding technical faculties. Below the publicly Fine Gael face of UCD, one political scientist noted, there is now "a lot of quiet Fianna Failery around."

National-level politicians who emerge out of UCD tend to do so with the help of strong family and social ties to the country's political and state institutions. Former Fine Gael Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald, who did not seek electoral office until he was almost forty, is the son of a Cumann na nGaedheal minister in the first Free State government, Desmond FitzGerald, who was a poet as well as a politician. Garret FitzGerald is particularly distinct from most mainstream party politicians in Ireland in having had an explicit "moral" agenda for his political involvement, in addition to party loyalty. In a radio interview given in 1981, FitzGerald recalled his original motivations for entering national politics in 1965:

[Ireland] had become a State imbued by the majority of people who lived in [the southern] part of Ireland. I saw this country become partitioned by constitutions and laws which were alien to the people of Ireland as a whole.

I became increasingly concerned to get into politics about that. I entered politics for that purpose and to try to achieve social reforms and to eliminate poverty from this country.

I believe that this part of the country has slipped into a partitionist attitude with institutions which are acceptable to people living down here but could never be the basis to enter discussions with unionists in Northern Ireland.

I can't accept this. I'm from the North. My mother came from a Northern Presbyterian family and from her and my father, a southern Catholic, I have inherited this belief in the republic of Tone and Davis (quoted in Cooney 1983:7).

Wolfe Tone, founder of the United Irishmen in the late eighteenth century, and Thomas Davis, a leader of the nineteenth century Young Ireland movement, both symbolize the ideal of a plural nationalism embracing all Irish people, regardless of creed or origin. While placing the blame for the Republic's divisive politics on Fianna Fail's sectarian ethos, FitzGerald employed a strategy throughout his political career which appealed to "right thinking" and to the better intentions of the electorate. This approach earned him international respect as a peacemaker and a visionary, but left him vulnerable within Ireland to charges of anti-nationalism and political naivete.

The background of another leading Fine Gael politician, John M. Kelly, is similar to that of FitzGerald. Kelly is also an upper middle class Catholic,

the son of a Chief Executive of an Irish state corporation and a UCD professor. A member of the law faculty, Kelly holds degrees from Heidelberg and Oxford, and is the author of the standard text on the Irish Constitution. Since entering the Dail in 1973, he has served in Fine Gael governments as Attorney General and as Minister for Defense and Foreign Affairs. Like FitzGerald, Kelly was drawn to political participation in part as a result of his family's party loyalties. Unlike FitzGerald, however, Kelly's decision seems to have been influenced by a personal aversion to the men who had assumed leadership of the state, as he describes:

I felt that they [Fianna Fail] were creating the wrong kind of atmosphere in the country it was very much a brash, bullying sort of atmosphere that coincided with jobbery I didn't like their style, their arrogance and so forth. It all contrasted very much with the rather simple, modest style which I had admired in the early people who ran the State -- William T. Cosgrave, Liam Cosgrave's father, and Liam Cosgrave's -- the younger -- grandfather. He died at the end of 1965, and I went to his funeral, and I feel that that occasion made me feel that I wanted to do something to help the [Fine Gael] party.

Although an academic, a frequent contributor to Irish newspapers, and a novelist as well, Kelly distances himself from the label "intellectual," which seems to him to imply a lack of practical ability:

What's an intellectual? Somebody who brings, I suppose, an entirely academic mind to every problem on his desk, that sort of thing. [I'm] not that. I earn my living by teaching. I have written a few books. I'm writing another one at the moment, or trying to, and I read as much as I can. If that adds up to being an intellectual, I suppose I am an intellectual, but I

don't think I ever let it get in the way of trying to do an ordinary, commonsense job the times that I've been in office.

Kelly, an experienced TD, is pragmatic about the stereotypes applied to academic politicians in the Dail:

It's really a matter of who approves of your different stands. If you go with the crowd on every issue, you'll never be called an academic. If you get into the business of conducting political life the same way as your life in university, people will be shouting that you're a lousy academic and things like that If people can't find another way of combating you, or answering what you're saying, they simply say you're an academic.

Although Kelly cultivates the image of a political independent, he symbolizes for many Irish the epitome of the traditional Fine Gael politician, a member of Dublin's bourgeois establishment. Unlike Senator Robinson, and even Garret FitzGerald, Kelly sees little basis for class politics in Ireland even today, instead expressing the view, as below, that the Irish electorate are still bound by a sense of shared background and culture:

The average Irish person, however modest his circumstances, is even in a small way a property owner, or feels he may become a property owner. He doesn't like exaggerated language about the injustice of the property-owning class, and this sort of stuff

... the grandparents and great-grandparents of most people in this country are fairly simply country people who huddled in to the church on Sunday, from whose clothes the odor of turf smoke rose in equal volume. There isn't yet the basis for a very serious class distinction here, at least certainly not anything like there is in England.

As a more-or-less permanent backbencher, described during the 1987 election as the Fine Gael "banker," or

certain winner, for his electoral district, Kelly has carved a secure niche for himself in the Dail. A career politician, his success is unhindered by too specific an identification as an intellectual, or by strong commitment to particular causes. For Kelly, the university is primarily a source of professional legitimacy. Moral discourse is left for the occasional newspaper "think piece," but is not the basis of his political career, as it was for his colleague Garret FitzGerald. Kelly's private intellectual interests reflect cosmopolitanism, but his politics are firmly rooted in "community."

The brief period of greater acceptance of intellectuals in Irish political life, beginning in the mid-1960s, may have ended with FitzGerald's passing from the public scene. The apparent failure of social reform efforts over the past decade, combined with the current emphasis on economic recovery, has led to renewed commitment in Ireland to pragmatic problem-solving and an aversion to politically-informed social analysis. In this context, the intellectual politician is again marginalized. As a political scientist from UCD commented:

I sometimes think the intellectual politics episode in the late 1960s was the last kicking of something rather than the first kick of something. The idea of the educated gentleman in politics -- there was something almost Edwardian about that group of people, where in fact the modern day politician is hard-nosed, not really an intellectual, although he may be very well-educated, and usually is pretty well-educated, is energetic, crafty, a handler of systems and people and images, you know, rather than being a publicist or a

missionary.

The period during which intellectuals gained greater acceptance as politicians was also a time when class politics emerged to compete with Ireland's centrist party tradition. Again, this moment was too brief to ensure the permanent incorporation of class into mainstream political discourse. Continued economic decline throughout the 1980s, coming after the heady experience of rapid expansion, has served mainly to increase popular interest in keeping up with the rest of Western Europe at whatever cost. In this present climate, growing class divisions can be viewed as a product of retarded development, while interest in social reform can be construed as a further threat to national autonomy and stability.

"Cosmopolitanism" to many seems to mean integration into Europe as a means of shoring up the economic strength of the country's most powerful secular interest groups, farmers and businessmen. The social by-products of Europeanization are discussed by the media and by the state largely in terms of their positive impact on Irish people's employment prospects.

These developments suggest a new period of closure in Irish national politics, in which a narrowly-conceived agenda of economic recovery has once again marginalized, although not obliterated, discussions of social reform. As will be discussed in the following chapter, socially-

concerned academics have returned to writing for intellectual journals, offering critical analysis to the already converted. "Real" politics is once again left to the experienced, if self-interested, political entrepreneurs.

NOTES

1. The sociologist Melvin Seeman (1971), in a study of how American academics in a Midwestern university defined their public role and identity, also found a reluctance among his informants to identify themselves as intellectuals. Seeman attributes this partly to their awareness of anti-intellectualism in American culture, leading to a fear of being perceived as "snobbish" or different from other people. The timing of Seeman's study, conducted in the 1960s, also may have influenced his findings, given some of his informants' conflation of intellectualism with political liberalism.

2. Conor Cruise O'Brien is a Trinity graduate, and currently one of the Vice-Chancellors of the University of Dublin. However, his original career was in diplomacy, not academia. Much of his public reputation is based on his writings on a wide variety of cultural and political topics.

3. The Dail is always referred to by its Irish name, no equivalent to it existing in the English political vocabulary. By contrast, the Senate is almost always referred to by its original English name, perhaps as a reflection of its lesser significance in Irish politics. A parallel to this exists in the case of the Irish president and prime minister. The former, the head of state, is referred to commonly as "The President" by the media, while the prime minister, the head of government, is usually called by the Irish term "Taoiseach."

CHAPTER EIGHT

HISTORY AND CULTURE IN INTELLECTUAL DEBATE

Irishness is not primarily a question of birth or blood or language: it is the condition of being involved in the Irish situation, and usually of being mauled by it.

Conor Cruise O'Brien
Writers and Politics, 1965

A. Introduction.

While history and culture have long been central topics in Irish intellectual life, informed discussion of these topics has taken a new turn over the past two decades as both the old problems of sectarianism and the new ones of modernization have challenged Ireland's sociopolitical integrity. Resumed violence in Northern Ireland beginning in 1968 compelled a reexamination of Irish national identity and of the historical forces underlying the contemporary conflict. A less explicit issue raised by this intellectual discussion has been the question of how much of the past Ireland is willing to give up in order to go forward. As the literary critic W.J. McCormack (1986) suggests, Ireland still views its unhappiness as part of its unique cultural patrimony; it has yet to be transformed into the cultural anonymity of post-industrial violence and decline.

The need for a public arena in which intellectual debate on history and culture could be carried out led to

the founding in the 1970s of new literary and critical journals. In its early phase, the "cultural debate" carried out in these journals was explicitly linked to the contemporary political problems of both Northern and southern Ireland. As it has developed, however, the cultural debate has shifted its emphasis to a more limited examination of the past, in some ways reviving rather than lessening ancient animosities. During the same period, the increasing specialization of academic analysis of history and culture has also worked against the creation of a common ground for the discussion of these public issues. Historians and cultural analysts often appear to be addressing different audiences, with the former engaged in an outward-facing discourse, and the latter in an inward-facing one. In both cases, however, revived popular interest in culture and history has provided a way for Ireland's humanist intellectuals to regain their authority and expert status in a public sphere now dominated by technocratic understanding.

B. The "Essential" Ireland.

Due to the association in Ireland between colonial administration and native cultural repression, the Irish nationalist movement at the turn of the twentieth century relied heavily upon a rhetoric of cultural regeneration. As in other national liberation struggles, the "sleeping giant" of native culture was seen as an instrument of self-

realization and identity formation in the years preceding independence. One result of this, as Ruane (1985) writes, was that an essentialist view of national identity was enforced in the new state's political culture. This characterization can be seen, Ruane suggests, as a reflection of independent Ireland's post-colonial status in the years following 1922.

Recent discussions of Irish national identity have posed the question of whether or not Ireland is still a post-colonial society, harboring negative attitudes towards its own culture and over-dependent on external influences. This issue is referred to by some as the "decolonization debate," a term implying an unbroken and more gradual process of cultural transformation in modern Ireland than the alternate "post-colonialism." However, Ruane (ibid.) proposes that debates over national identity that have arisen since the 1970s should be viewed more properly as manifestations of a new phenomenon, namely, the cultural disorientation produced by the recent experience of rapid development and its consequent social effects. My discussion of contemporary cultural and historical debate in Ireland adopts this perspective, seeing the present use of "traditional" symbols of opposition within Irish society as a reworking of older struggles, rooted in very different sociopolitical circumstances. Nonetheless, the old and new sets of oppositions, surviving or emerging under changing

conditions, do create the impression of continuity with the past. As the literary critic Denis Donoghue (1986) has written:

If there is a distinctive Irish experience, it is one of division, exacerbated by the fact that division in a country so small seems perverse. But the scale doesn't matter. At various times, the division has taken these forms: Catholic and Protestant, Nationalist and Unionist, Ireland and England, North and South, the country and the one bloated city of Dublin, Gaelic Ireland and Anglo-Ireland, the comfortable and the poor, farmers and P.A.Y.E. workers, pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty, child and parents, the Irish and the English languages, the visible Ireland and the hidden Ireland, landlord and tenant, the Big House and the hovel. To which it is now necessary to add: a defensive Church and an increasingly secular State, Irish law and European law (:16).

Donoghue's lack of historical chronology here (highly taxed "pay-as-you-earn" workers, for example, being oppositional to lower-taxed farmers only since the 1970s, but listed earlier than the colonial-era Big House and the hovel) is deliberate, a comment upon the merging of the past and the present in contemporary cultural discussion. And of course, the scars from the old wounds that are inflamed by each new culturally-threatening development are scars borne more deeply by Irish Catholics than by Protestants. The concept of "Irish Catholic" being so inclusive, however, has until recently justified a lack of attention to the historical divisions -- and scarring -- within the Irish Protestant community, as a writer of this background describes:

It should be remembered that the majority of southern Protestants are middle class or lower middle class,

that they have signally refused to identify with the northern state of affairs, and that their difficulties (with differences of course) have been shared with their Catholic neighbors. For every burnt-out Big House emblematic of Anglo-Irish alienation from the new realities of the Free State, there is a score of Methodist salesmen, Church of Ireland middling farmers and Presbyterian businessmen (McCormack 1986:51).

Such individuals were eliminated to a great extent from the historical record in newly independent Ireland, or else subsumed under the rubric of a declining "Ascendancy." In the 1970s and early 1980s, efforts to secularize Ireland's constitution were motivated in part by the desire to overcome this discrimination and reintegrate the Protestant community back into the framework of Irish society. However, the apparent defeat of the "Constitutional Crusade" in the 1980s, combined with the re-emergence of Catholic social conservatism, have seriously impeded the progress of such reform and perhaps discouraged intellectual participation in the formal political sphere.

Although many academics and intellectuals remain committed to social and political change in the Republic, and demonstrate that commitment through their involvement with various reform-minded interest groups, the wider intellectual climate of the late 1980s suggests a retreat from direct political engagement. Those academics who remain active in politics, one UCD faculty member suggested to me, are viewed now by the public as either "cranks" or "caricatures." Lack of interest in entering this realm,

this academic continued, "is not at all an elitist contempt for politics. It is simply that to enter it in a committed way virtually means abandoning intellectual inquiry, and critical or creative dissent." Alternatively, many intellectuals concerned with rethinking Irish identity in light of the country's recent transformations have devoted their efforts to participation in the more narrow public realm of literary and critical journalism. Yet both historians and cultural analysts retain their political agendas, which, as will be discussed, appear contradictory in their present efforts to resolve the problems of the past that have so much bearing on the problems of the present.

C. History and Historical Revisionism.

In a best-selling book published in 1986 called The Begrudger's Guide to Irish Politics, Breandan OhEithir offers a satire of contemporary Irish historiography. In a ballad called "The Gentle Black and Tan," OhEithir criticizes the revisionist historian who would take his project so far as to recast this hated figure, a member of Britain's civilian police force in Ireland during the Anglo-Irish War, as a victim of historical circumstances. The ballad ends with the following stanza:

So take heed you blinkered Nationalists
 Fair warning take from me.
 If you want to live in safety
 And keep this land at sea.
 Take heed of our three heroes
 Murphy, Edwards and Yer Man,

Who will sing the fame and clear the name
Of the gentle Black and Tan (:6).

"Murphy" is apparently John A. Murphy, currently Professor of Irish History at University College Cork. "Edwards" is Robin Dudley Edwards, the late UCD historian who was one of the founders of modern Irish historiography. "Yer man" is the hypothetical author of the ballad itself, a supporter of the new breed of post-1968 historians who have adopted a radically revisionist approach to Irish history which, it seems to some nationalists, will leave no stone unturned in the attempt to minimize England's negative role in their nation's history. As one young leftist faculty member at UCD, a non-historian, commented, "Next they'll be telling us there was no Famine."

Historical debate in contemporary Ireland is marked by a conflict -- sometimes a strong antagonism -- between revisionists and nationalists. Revisionists view their task as the creation of an objective, scholarly record of Irish history, independent of the "mythologies" and Whiggery of nationalist interpretation. It is difficult to define nationalist history, given that this job is usually left to those who object to it. A product largely of the independence and Gaelic revival movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nationalist history is the story of Ireland's "eight hundred years of English rule and its unending struggle to overthrow this," as one contemporary revisionist negatively described it.

Nationalist history also tends to have a hagiographic or "cult of personality" quality, emphasizing the role of charismatic individuals in Irish historical developments.

Nationalist history starts from an evident political perspective, while revisionist history presents itself as politically neutral, an objective search for the truth. This may indeed be its proponents' goal. However, revisionist history comes to have political meaning through its challenge to nationalist assumptions in all forms in the public sphere. Despite the difficulties inherent in the labels attached to each type of historiography, I will use the terms nationalist and revisionist here for purposes of clarity.

Nationalist interpretation was the standard for primary and secondary school history teaching up through the 1960s, when it began to be replaced by a less polemical historiography. Today, nationalist history is more likely to be the province of non-historians and non-academics, who remain committed to the centrality of British colonial policy in explaining Ireland's past and its present. Therefore, contemporary debate over the meaning of history does not take place primarily within historical circles, but between historians and non-historians. The widespread acceptance now of revisionism as the dominant historiographical discourse represents the victory of the academic historian over the amateur and the ideologue.

History has finally been professionalized, and thus closed to those who do not have the right credentials to discuss it. For this reason, along with revisionism's evidently nonpartisan agenda, Protestant and Catholic academic historians in Ireland are equally committed to a revisionist perspective.

The problems and preoccupations of Irish history were not eliminated with independence in 1922, nor even with the outcome of the Civil War that followed. Independence was incomplete, both because of national partition and because of England's failure to formally recognize Ireland as a sovereign state. Even with complete independence in 1949 and the severing of all governmental ties to England, the six counties of the North were not "repatriated," and thus for some Irish the revolutionary project has never been finished and the historical dilemmas of the past never resolved.

Historical consciousness remains an important part of the Irish person's cultural patrimony, often inseparable from the consideration of emergent sociopolitical issues. The long tenure of Civil War figures in Irish public life, whose legitimacy was based frequently on their personal experience of the nationalist period, encouraged the association of contemporary political issues with the traditions, betrayals, and glories of the past. Popular understanding of history throughout the early decades of

independence remained congruent with the ideals of turn-of-the-century ideologues such as Padraic Pearse, with "Irish Ireland," and the fulfillment of national destiny infused with a quasi-religious fervor. The nationalist historian Alice Stopford Green, writing in 1936, exemplified this approach:

We must look for the real significance of Irish history -- the idea of a society loosely held in a political sense, but bound together in spiritual union (:20).

This "straitjacket of historiographical piety," as the revisionist Roy Foster (1986:2) has called it, has given way in the past two decades to greater popular acceptance of "secular" historiography, a movement actually founded more than fifty years ago. Modern Irish historiography dates from the mid-1930s, when three academic historians (F.S.L. Lyons of Trinity College, Robin Dudley Edwards of UCD, and T.W. Moody of Queen's University Belfast) joined together in a cross-border intellectual alliance to bring an objective perspective and a more rigorous methodology to Irish historical research. Their goal of placing common scholarly interests above the level of sectarianism was admirable and unusual, and is maintained today amongst Ireland's history departments. The journal founded by Lyons, Edwards and Moody in 1938, Irish Historical Studies, remains the flagship for this professional approach.

Concern about the misuse of history in the political debates of the present, combined with lack of access to

British and Irish state documents for the more recent historical period, led the journal's editors to limit its content to research concerning Ireland prior to 1900. One consequence of this editorial policy was that the still-remembered events of the nationalist period and the first decade of independence were left to be interpreted by popular and non-academic analysts (Fanning 1986). It is likely also that de Valera's entrenched position as national leader between the 1930s and 1960s helped preserve an idealized perspective on Irish history during this period as well, enforced by the nationalist orientation of most schoolteachers. Irish academic historians could easily be labelled as pro-British in this environment, particularly given their "collusion" with Northern Protestant historians. As a result, nationalist interpretation remained an influential popular force up through the 1960s.

Since then, the rigor with which many revisionist historians have continued to observe the thirty-year silence on recent events (a period based on the usual length of time Irish state records are sealed) also provides a milieu in which the controversial developments in Northern Ireland since 1968, and their impact on the Republic, are understood by the general public more frequently through the work of non-historians, particularly journalists, than by historians themselves. Efforts since

the 1970s to change Ireland's constitution and bring about other social policy reforms have also stimulated discussion of Irish culture from a historical perspective. Much of this cultural debate, as will be discussed in the following section, has been led by literary critics, poets and philosophers. Professional historians, wary of its potent implications, have entered less freely into this debate.

Revisionists claim that any historically-based analysis of the Northern situation since the late 1960s would be premature. This is probably true; nonetheless, there is an understandable longing among many Irish people to gain some insight into this recent history, a longing professional historians have absolved themselves from addressing. Apart from their consequences to Northern Ireland itself, "the Troubles" -- now entering their third decade -- have produced a "tension between the scholarly practice of history and the immediate political concerns of the society" (Fanning *ibid.*:132) greater than in earlier periods. As Fanning also points out, several generations of students have gone through the university in the course of these two decades. By the late 1980s, history lecturers found that they were teaching young people who had lived their entire lives with these disturbing images of the North and found it hard to imagine any other conditions prevailing there. For today's Irish youth, the Troubles are both "history" and daily news headlines. Avoiding

analysis of these recent developments, revisionists instead devote their efforts to a re-evaluation of the historical conditions that gave rise to them.

At the same time, the professionals are concerned that historical discussion continues to be appropriated by non-historians. Historians who do analyze recent events are charged to do so in a tentative manner. One NUI historian, a member of the Irish Senate, described for me the particular dilemma he faced in trying to distinguish his academic responsibilities from his political convictions:

... this process has gone on whereby academic historians have had to separate themselves, if you like, from the view of history as the handmaiden of nationalism. It presents a certain difficulty in my own case in that outside the classroom I have had to espouse causes frequently very passionately, and indeed I use the facts at my disposal sometimes to make the best propagandized case I can, whereas inside the classroom I have to be as much of an historian, and as academically balanced, as I can. And sometimes it's not easy when you're talking about near-contemporary subjects, for example Irish neutrality, which I have to teach as a topic in the class, but which as a politician I am concerned very much to uphold, as in the recent Single European Act. So there are difficulties, and it's not always easy to make this distinction.

The term "revisionism" is not one that most modern Irish historians accept happily, preferring instead "academic" or "professional" history. "Revisionism" implies the existence of an earlier objective historiography, which revisionists say did not exist. "Revisionism" also is set up in opposition to "nationalism," and as such can be viewed as the product of

a neocolonial mentality. Arguing against this dichotomy, the Irish historian Roy Foster writes:

Need 'nationalism,' defined as a commitment to Irishness, presuppose obsessive Anglophobia and a dedication to the mentality of the conspiracy theory? ... In a country that has come of age, history need no longer be a matter of guarding sacred mysteries. And to say 'revisionist' should just be another way of saying 'historian' (ibid.:5).

Academic historians are disturbed by the fact that much of their effort involves dispelling, as they see it, the myths of Irish history which legitimate questionable political ideologies. Ronan Fanning, after F.S.L. Lyons, describes this nationalist historical tradition in Ireland as "the great enchantment," the use of myths to explain the past and to justify the political values of the present:

Those who seek sedulously to preserve the integrity of such myths -- as well as those who strive to erect counter-myths in their place -- want to legitimize their political purposes by cocooning them in the comforting cloak of a mythical past.... The more intense the contemporary conflict between such competing legitimacies, the greater the temptation (1986:132).

But the temptation simply to destroy myth grows also in this environment, and what is created instead is, of course, indistinguishable from myth to those of a different political persuasion ("More yawns from the historians," as the revisionist Foster writes in anticipation of this observation [ibid.:1]). One Irish sociologist suggested to me that professional historiography in the post-1968 period has moved towards an extreme cynicism and bitterness, with no evident positive agenda. Revisionists are not simply

doing history, therefore, but carrying out an argument with all those who would "mythologize" Ireland, however they see that enormous army of combatants. Foster writes:

"Commentary on the part played by myth in Irish history has become as profuse as research into actual historical problems" (ibid.:2). Revisionists are no more capable of escaping myth, in this sense, than are the most unreconstructed nationalists.

There is also a relentless, provocative quality to this myth-slaying. At Trinity, I listened to a talk by an NUI history lecturer called "Political Myths in Modern Ireland," an attempt to lay out the falsehoods in nationalist historiography. The lecture was attended mostly by students, some of whom became agitated as the talk preceded, particularly when the speaker proclaimed Ireland a willing contributor to British empire-building in the nineteenth century, and that the Irish should count as one of their major achievements of that time "the copious supply of beef and foodstuffs to the British market." I have the full text of the speaker's paper, in which this phrase is embedded in a more subtle passage. Undoubtedly, however, the speaker sought to provoke the young people in the room with this iconoclastic account of Ireland's colonial experience.

Part of the problem here is clearly that in rejecting all "myths," revisionists are attempting to reject a great

deal of what constitutes historically-informed cultural identity for many Irish. These believers do not respond rationally to the insights of modern scholarship, nor do they hold a monolithic and discrete block of political attitudes capable of being overturned en masse. In addition, as revisionists so clearly recognize, myth is not just received wisdom, but a charter for action in the here and now. Any attempt to remove historical myth entirely from a society is not only doomed, but a threat to its vitality in some respects. The UCD philosopher Richard Kearney draws a distinction between the immobilizing and enabling aspects of myth when he writes:

What is required is a radical interrogation of those mythic sedimentations from our past and those mythic aspirations for our future which challenge our present sense of ourselves, which disclose other possibilities of being. And this interrogation ultimately rests upon the ethical necessity to distinguish between myth as an open-ended process which frees us from the strait-jacket of a fixed identity; and myth as a closed product which draws a magic circle around this identity excluding dialogue with all that is other than ourselves (1984:23-24).

Revisionists may also underestimate the degree to which popular audiences, and intellectuals in other fields, are aware of a bourgeois academic investment in recasting Irish history in a dispassionate mold, due not only to the events in Northern Ireland, but to the increased influence of Fine Gael politics in Ireland throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s. The essay by Ronan Fanning referred to above was published in a book called Ireland in the

Contemporary World: Essays in Honour of Garret FitzGerald (1986). Fanning, a personal friend of FitzGerald's, was considered by some to be the "house historian" of this prime minister's Fine Gael administrations. The more liberal wing of the Fine Gael party, led by FitzGerald up until 1987, is associated with the movement to reform Ireland's constitution and to build links with Irish Protestants in Northern Ireland and the south. Essential to achieving these goals is greater popular acceptance of a "pluralist" model of Irish society, which grants the same legitimacy to the Protestant cultural tradition as it does to the Catholic one.

The new historiography implicitly meets these goals by attempting to defuse some of the tension in Anglo-Irish relations, both within the Irish isle, and between England and Ireland. FitzGerald's success in negotiating the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, which created an advisory role for the Republic's government in the North -- indeed, the very notion of broaching this diplomatic landmine -- would not have been possible if the former Prime Minister had been perceived by the British state as embracing a traditionally nationalist view of Irish culture and history.

This is not to say, of course, that academic historians conspire to serve the status quo. However, their focus on the more distant past, relying on primary sources such as state documents and economic data, lends

itself to a historiography more capable of presenting itself as methodologically rigorous and ideologically neutral than would, for example, a political history of the first decade of the Free State. An Irish sociologist has commented that Irish historians are averse to theory and generalization (O'Dowd 1986), which, if true, would also serve to support their claims to objectivity. One revisionist historian told me that he had never felt any pressure to write history a certain way, and denied in fact that he had any philosophy of history at all. Moreover, he commented:

I would think that colleagues who are conscious of that are colleagues who would wish to bring about a fundamental change in society. In other words, they want to overthrow the university system.

To state it yet another way, intellectuals who challenge the new received wisdom are, predictably, the only kind likely to experience any serious academic criticism of their work.

Contemporary Irish historians are engaged now in the re-examination of centuries of Irish history, symbolized by the projected ten-volume New History of Ireland series (Oxford: Clarendon Press), four of whose volumes had been issued by 1989. Ironically, the delay in preparing and publishing these books has threatened to superannuate them as state-of-the-art historiography, resulting in their being caricatured as the "Old History of Ireland" on occasion. The most recent volume of the series, concerning

the eighteenth century, was published in 1986 but commissioned in 1962. A Trinity academic who reviewed the book praises it overall but notes some of the effects "publication lag" has had on its perspective:

The detachment from the past, stemming from a sense of confidence and security in Irish society, that J.C. Beckett thinks the proper attribute of the historian, may not seem the natural legacy bequeathed by the previous decade or so of Irish political life, yet it is effortlessly adopted by many of the writers here (Ross 1986:208).

Furthermore, in regard to the book's essays concerning the social history of the period, he writes:

Of the details of the daily lives of the poor in Ireland we learn very little. At its worst, the approach verges on the ridiculous. R.B. McDowell, for instance, seems to view the toiling peasantry distantly from the vantage point of the country house. He is, of course, aware of rural hardship and even the 'bitter resentment' aroused by 'what seemed to be injustice in the working of the agrarian system' [the reviewer's italics] (p.675), but he remains mildly surprised by it (ibid.:210).

The publication of this volume was well-timed to coincide with a growing interdisciplinary interest in the eighteenth century. 1986 also saw the first issue of a new journal devoted to this period (with an editorial board made up of faculty members from UCD, Trinity, and University College Galway) and the inaugural conference of the Eighteenth Century Ireland Society. The recent focus on this era, out of the whole panorama of Irish history, is clearly relevant to current political issues and debates, offering a way for historians to indirectly address these themes from a safe distance. The eighteenth century in

Ireland, more specifically, 1691 to 1800 (from the Battle of the Boyne to the Act of Union), is significant for the consolidation of Anglo-Irish political and cultural dominance, the implementation of Penal Laws against Catholics, and the emergence of the Protestant nationalist movement. The editorial of the first issue of the journal Eighteenth Century Ireland (1986) states:

Until fairly recently, the prejudices of nineteenth century nationalism on one side and of Froude or of Lecky [British and Anglo-Irish political historians, respectively] on the other have colored almost everything written about the eighteenth century. Now, however, as Professor J.C. Beckett observed recently, these old views are losing their relevance to contemporary politics and, as a result, the view of eighteenth-century Ireland which rested on them is being challenged (:v).

Research on this period, prior to the emergence of mass political organization by Catholics and to the sectarianizing of all aspects of political and cultural life in Ireland, is essential to an understanding of the actual aims, values, and degrees of power of the differentiated Anglo-Irish community. As such, the new scholarship helps reintegrate this group into the mainstream of Irish history in a more objective manner. Revised analysis of the Penal Laws by the historians Maureen Wall and Louis Cullen, for example, suggests that they were imposed only selectively as a means of limiting Catholic political and landed power, but beyond that had little impact on Catholic religious practice (as discussed in Foster, *ibid.*). Nationalists may see in conclusions

such as this an excessive commitment to minimizing the class and cultural conflict of Catholic-Protestant relations in this period.

The liberating aspects of the new historiography -- its rejection of constraining shibboleths, its resifting of the meanings and elements which form the basis for so much of contemporary Irish culture -- are among its main virtues for the non-historian, apart from its scholarly contribution. At the same time, and this is probably only a short-term phenomenon, it lends itself to paralyzing speech. One of the side effects of the historiographical debate is the impact it has on the casual use of words. It is true that the vocabulary of Irish nationalism is so general in meaning as to incorporate a variety of conflicting interpretations. As the literary critic Declan Kiberd (1984) has written:

The word 'Gaelic,' like the word 'history,' becomes so elastic that it means whatever you want it to mean ... radical socialism to [James] Connolly; life-denying conservatism to Joyce; life-enhancing traditionalism to de Valera; clod-hopping primitivism to a man like Patrick Kavanagh. And for some gifted and versatile men like J.M. Synge, it could evoke all of these varied feelings at different times (:18).

Those interested in Irish history have been informed now by the professional historians that terms such as "colonialism" and "Irish nation" are imprecise or inappropriate when applied too broadly. This is certainly correct, but may lead to an avoidance of saying anything for fear of giving away one's political prejudices or

academic shortcomings. Utterance becomes self-conscious when one has learned that certain frequently-used words have been more narrowly redefined, and yet no alternative glosses are provided. Those who continue to use such words may be dismissed as amateurs and propagandists.

An example of this can be found in the debate over the word "Ascendancy," a term commonly used to refer to the Protestant Anglo-Irish ruling classes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Granted, the word is a catch-all which imputes controlling power and wealth, as well as hegemonic tendencies, to virtually all Anglo-Irish of the colonial period. Historians and literary critics, amongst the latter W.J. McCormack (1985), have argued recently for a more precise and time-specific use of the word, while reminding us that its meaning has changed over centuries. This scholarly exactitude is admirable and necessary, and not dismissive of the potent symbolic value of the Ascendancy concept, but while academics are working out the details of its meaning on an almost decade-by-decade basis, the word -- still central to the popular vocabulary of Irish historical understanding -- has been rendered temporarily useless.

The new historiography also professionalizes and lends esteem to Irish academia outside of Ireland. Nationalism is a parochial impulse, useful for politicians, but a possible embarrassment to academics who move in more

cosmopolitan intellectual circles. The dialectic of Irish and English history works itself out in several ways, and plays to a variety of audiences. The American sociologist Andrew Greeley suggests in a review of Roy Foster's recent study, Modern Ireland, 1600-1972, that contemporary Irish scholars, particularly those living in England like Foster, have adopted a "detached style" in their consideration of Anglo-Irish relations, fearing that "if they display emotion or outrage when writing about their nation's history, they will be dismissed as romantic apologists for nationalism and for the I.R.A." (New York Times 4 June 1989). Father Greeley here is interpreting Irish historians' interpretation of English historians' interpretation of Irish historians' historiography. His own apparent preference for a more nationalist approach is shared by many American readers interested in Irish Studies. However, a revisionist perspective has also been adopted by most American academic scholars in this field.

Contradicting Greeley's suggestion, Foster himself notes in an earlier essay called "We Are All Revisionists Now" (1986) that the English intellectual establishment, particularly its left, tends to embrace a nationalist view of Irish history either as a mea culpa for past sins or as the result of delayed recognition of those sins. To be hostile to Irish nationalism in England is politically incorrect, while in Ireland it is an attempt, in part, to

move beyond stereotypes to a more complex understanding of the past. The English tendency may be largely a liberal impulse, a more acceptable response to the problems of Irish history than "reactionary" revisionism. It is interesting to note in this regard that, according to one UCD historian, Trinity's history department concentrates more on Irish history than does UCD's, offering fewer courses in American and European history than the latter. In being the Republic's largest college, UCD must extend its academic training beyond the scope of Irish-centered scholarship as much as possible. UCD's modern history department also has had close affiliations with Cambridge University for several decades, which is a preferred destination for UCD history students pursuing graduate degrees. At the same time, as discussed in Chapter Five, this same department was the setting for a bitter controversy over the proposed appointment of an English historian to its chair in 1987. One of the issues central to this dispute was the appropriateness of an Englishman controlling the Republic's foremost history department. (Parenthetically, Trinity's professor of modern history in the late 1980s was an Irish Catholic, the son of a well-known poet.) Senior academic posts in Ireland are too few, and NUI's institutional nationalism still too great, to allow revisionism to extend this far.

It is likely that debate over the new historiography

will continue in Ireland for quite some time. Political and cultural critics outside the academic mainstream, including both conservative Catholics and left-wing activists, will remain antagonistic to its ideological implications, to its refusal to celebrate cherished national traditions, and to its dispassionate re-analysis of the record of class and cultural conflict. New topics for competing interpretation will emerge as more recent periods of history come up for scholarly analysis, based on the gradual availability of state documents. The 1987 opening of Eamon de Valera's archive concerning the 1937 Constitution offers an example of such a topic, given its insight into the role of the Catholic Hierarchy in the Constitution's drafting. These revelations confirm the sectarian thinking behind the document, and thus resist a conciliatory interpretation. Irish historians will be well-occupied in the years ahead, accounting for the Ireland the Irish themselves have created.

D. The Cultural Debate.

The term "cultural debate" is most closely associated with a discourse carried out within Irish intellectual circles between the mid-1970s and the present. This discourse centers on the need to develop a unified model of Irish culture capable of incorporating both the Anglo-Irish Protestant and Irish Catholic traditions. Ideally, such a model would restore a pluralism that potentially existed in

Irish political culture at the turn of the century, but was lost with partition and the dominance of Catholic nationalism in the new state. As a result, distinctions between the two traditions were reified beyond their historical reality, and many secular and antisectarian Catholics found themselves the inheritors of a national ideology unrepresentative of their own values.

Another consequence of partition, which artificially eliminated the "problem" of Protestant culture within the twenty-six counties of the Free State, was that intellectual discussion in predominantly Catholic independent Ireland was bifurcated into two camps. As a leading participant in the cultural debate has written, "Culture became narrowly identified with literature and society with party politics" (Kearney 1985:88). This "culture" and "society" were clearly both Catholic in character. In its early stages, therefore, the recent cultural debate attempted not only to reopen the discussion of Irish identity, but to redefine that identity within broader, and not exclusively Catholic and literary, parameters.

The cultural debate that emerged in Ireland in the 1970s was at first closely associated with the reformist political goals of that period. In its early years, the debate dealt with a broad platform of historical, social and political issues relevant to contemporary Ireland.

However, as it has developed throughout the 1980s, in the context of lowered expectations of political reform, the cultural debate has become more "intellectual," literary in nature, and centered on the long-term dilemmas of sectarianism and colonialism. While both Catholics and Protestants participate in the debate, its terms have been defined largely by intellectuals of the former background. Some Protestant intellectuals, particularly those from the North, are inclined to view the cultural debate in its present manifestation as a sophisticated restatement of traditional nationalism.

Two related intellectual projects set the terms for this debate. The first was a journal called the Crane Bag, published between 1977 and 1985, and edited by two southern Catholic academics, a lay philosopher from UCD and a Benedictine monk. In offering a venue for eclectic cultural commentary and social criticism, this journal, as its first editorial stated, was committed to the ideal of providing "a no-man's land, a neutral ground where things can detach themselves from all partisans and prejudiced connection and display themselves as they are in themselves" (Crane Bag No. 1, Vol. 1). By appropriating the right to discuss all aspects of Irish society, the journal made an admirable attempt to disregard narrow disciplinary domains. The Crane Bag was not the first publication in the 1970s to revive the interdisciplinary

discussion of Irish culture, but it was the most influential and successful one, being funded by grants from Ireland's Arts Council, as well as The Ireland Fund and Allied Irish Bank.

In 1980, another intellectual project emerged, known as Field Day. More varied in its activities than the Crane Bag, Field Day is both a theatrical and a literary venture. Its directors are all Northerners (one of them Protestant), mostly resident in the south. They include the poet Seamus Heaney and the playwright Brian Friel, as well as the literary critic and poet Seamus Deane, a professor in UCD's English faculty. Focusing more exclusively on the issue of cross-border relations than did the Crane Bag, the Field Day project aims, as its directors have written,

to contribute to the solution of the present crisis by producing analysis of the established opinions, myths and stereotypes which had become both a symptom and a cause of the current situation (Ireland's Field Day 1986:vii).

While the divisions in the North, with their profound implications for the South, were an important impetus to the development of both the Crane Bag and Field Day, it is likely that these projects also constituted a reaction to the increasingly technocratic tone of Irish social analysis in the 1970s and 1980s. Prior to that, Irish literary critics and creative artists had occupied a prominent place in the public discussion of Irish culture, defined primarily through its literary traditions. While the Crane

Bag aimed for a new synthesis which could incorporate both "culture and society," in fact this synthesis already had been achieved in the 1970s by technocrats, who reconstituted these spheres as a tabula rasa for national development and self-realization. Economic factors define this society now. In this sense, the cultural debate, while stimulating public discussion of important social issues, may be seen also as a defensive stand against a more powerful, and technocratically-dominated, national discourse.

The Crane Bag, as its name suggested, was meant to be more of a container for diverse ideas than a coherent ideological statement.¹ To this end, it published an uneven array of essays and interviews, organized into themes on an issue-by-issue basis, representing a wide variety of intellectual and political views. This eclectic tradition continued until 1985, when the journal ceased publication. A single issue from that year, for example, includes articles about poetry, education, television and science. Among the contributors to this issue are three social scientists, a psychiatrist, a chemical engineer, and a senator (also a sociologist), as well as the ubiquitous English lecturers. Eight of the contributors were faculty members from third-level institutions in the Republic; two were members of the faculty of Queens University Belfast.

The Crane Bag was criticized by some observers for its

decision not to publish literature per se; at the same time, others found that too much of its discussion ultimately relied upon literary themes. However, this situation may be blamed partly on the difficulty the journal's editors often had in getting scholars from other fields to contribute. Richard Kearney, one of the Crane Bag's editors, commented upon this in an interview:

The Crane Bag was an open forum. In other words, we couldn't dictate, and we didn't want to, who wrote for us. But it was invariably, certainly in the early issues, the cultural/literary/historical commentators that were giving us ninety percent of the material We did make efforts, particularly towards the end, to bridge that gap between cultural commentary and empirical commentary [by asking for contributions from economists and social scientists], but it was a gesture. I always found, and I am quite prepared to go on the record on this, that they never volunteered.

The challenge presented by producing a well-written and wide-ranging journal on a regular basis, with a small staff and relatively little money, is evident also in a survey of the Crane Bag's issues. This lack of resources, as well as the pressure to accept sometimes disorganized contributions in order to maintain topical diversity, gave rise, in the words of W.J. McCormack, to "a pluralism of approach going beyond generosity to begin to resemble hesitancy" (1986:50). In addition, the Crane Bag's editors' interest in recent French philosophical theory sometimes threatened to overload the reader and produce a sense of immobility. As McCormack (ibid.) writes:

Looking over the complete file [of Crane Bag articles], one is undoubtedly impressed by what it achieved in

introducing new ideas into the Irish debate on politics and culture generally, less impressed by the impact of those ideas themselves (:50).

However, praxis was not completely lost in this intellectual milieu. As a leading Irish philosopher and social critic, Richard Kearney was invited to make a submission to the New Ireland Forum, the consortium of moderate Catholic and Protestant politicians from both parts of Ireland who began meeting in 1983 to address the impasse in North-South relations. (Mary Robinson, discussed in the previous chapter, made a submission to the Forum as well.) Kearney also wrote for Irish newspapers, hosted a television program, and addressed public meetings and conferences. Nonetheless, the Crane Bag's commitment to eclecticism prevented it from being able to, or desirous of, forging a specifically political agenda. As Kearney wrote in 1985:

We do not operate in terms of a pre-established ideology of 'solutions' but seek to cultivate a creative conflict of interpretations. The Crane Bag is non-aligned (in the sense of being unaffiliated to [sic] any particular party, religion, tribe or educational establishment in this country). This does not mean that it is non-committed. It is deeply so. But its commitment is first and foremost to questioning, to the creation of a form of critical debate which speaks from and to the contemporary conditions of Irish culture in which it is situated (:87).

Various factors contributed to the Crane Bag's editors' decision to cease publication in the mid-1980s. Money was certainly one of these. Although to a lesser extent than earlier Irish journals, the Crane Bag was

dependent upon keeping the goodwill of its major funders. An issue on the sensitive topic of Northern Ireland resulted in the loss of one of these grants (McCormack *ibid.*). Another factor may have been the small pool of contributors available in Ireland for such intellectual labor, which resulted eventually in a repetition of familiar names and themes. A wider social phenomenon also may have influenced the decision to shut down. Writing of the journal a few years later, Kearney expressed frustration with the apparent resurgence of an "apolitical commitment to the private graph of artistic sensibility" in late 1980s Ireland, and recalled his original aspirations:

The founding of the Crane Bag was an attempt to counter this drift towards the polarization of intellectual journals into the exclusively literary and the exclusively political

I do not propose to rehearse the various fortunes of this journal, but to put on record this plea: We need more cultural journals in Ireland today, for without a renaissance of the kind of intellectual questioning which flourished in Ireland between 1850 and 1950, our culture will stagnate -- either by uncritical reversion to tribal platitudes or by an equally uncritical immersion in the anonymous tide of modern consumerism (1988:264-65).

In contrast to the Crane Bag, the Field Day project had its origins in an explicitly artistic milieu. Founded in 1980 as a theatre company in Derry, Northern Ireland, Field Day also aimed to redress Belfast's "hegemony" as the perceived center of Northern intellectual life. As its name implies, Field Day's goal was to celebrate Irish culture, and to interpret that culture through Irish

perspectives. It does this for popular audiences through its theatrical productions, which tour rural Ireland as well as the standard urban venues of Dublin, London, and Northern Irish cities. Field Day's more explicitly intellectual project is centered on its pamphlets, which deal with different aspects of Irish cultural and historical experience.

Whereas the Crane Bag was criticized by some Irish commentators for politicizing literature, Field Day's publications sometimes seem to "literaturize" politics. Out of fifteen pamphlets it published between 1983 and 1989, nine were by literary critics. Of the remaining six, one was by a historian, one by a Northern Unionist politician, three by legal experts, and one by a philosopher (Richard Kearney of the Crane Bag). It would appear that, in Field Day, academics and intellectuals from outside the core area of literature have been marginalized once again. However, Field Day director Seamus Deane has characterized the project's central focus on literature as an attempt to reinvigorate a traditional discourse within Irish society:

In a sense, Field Day is trying to exploit this part of our history, trying to reinstitutionalize the idea of literature in such a way that it is an enabling activity, rather than that sideline activity ... (1985:63).

Nonetheless, it is difficult to see what this enabling activity consists of, aside from allowing already well-

published writers to publish even more. Literature has never been a sideline industry in Ireland, even during the worst period of censorship in the independent state. In the present climate, literature -- not political or social analysis -- has again become the strongest card of the Irish humanist. In this regard, the Field Day project reaffirms not only the intellectual authority of the literary artist, but that of the literary critic as well.

To a greater extent than did the Crane Bag, Field Day places the historical experience of colonialism in the center of its intellectual analysis, viewing it as a paradigm for interpreting present-day North-South and Catholic-Protestant relations. As such, Field Day's directors and contributors enter into a long-standing discussion of what it means to be Irish both within and beyond the stereotypes applied to Irish people by England and its representatives. Since its inception (which can be dated most clearly from the Tudor period), this discussion of Irish cultural identity has dealt in oppositions: civilized and savage, rational and irrational, legal and illegal. While Field Day argues against the legitimacy of these colonially-imposed characterizations, it sees them as still in operation, at least on the English/Protestant side. Consequently, they continue to influence and limit Irish people's potential to define themselves. Writing of the stereotypes historically applied by the English to the

native Irish, Seamus Deane concludes:

Political languages fade more slowly than literary languages but when they do, they herald a deep structural alteration in the attitudes which sustain a crisis. Of all the blighting distinctions which govern our responses and limit our imaginations at the moment, none is more potent than this four hundred year-old distinction between barbarians and civilians (1986:42).

A similar theme provided the framework for a book published in 1985 called The Irish Mind, edited by the Crane Bag's Richard Kearney. An ambitious attempt to develop an integrated model of Irish intellectual history incorporating both the Protestant and Catholic traditions, The Irish Mind took as its starting point the tyranny of the "cultural apartheid" imposed on Irish Protestants and Catholics by colonial rule. As a result of this apartheid, Kearney writes in the book's opening essay, the Catholic majority internalized much of the negative stereotyping of their culture as irrational, or at best, purely imaginative. Alternatively, Kearney proposes another interpretation of the Irish intellectual tradition -- inspired by Claude Levi-Strauss, among others -- as rooted in a rejection of Western logocentrism:

In contradistinction to the orthodox dualist logic of either/or, the Irish mind may be seen to favor a more dialectical logic of both/and: an intellectual ability to hold the traditional oppositions of classical reason together in creative confluence (1985:9).

Intellectuals outside the Crane Bag/Field Day coterie have entered into the "decolonization" debate in order to examine the usefulness of this characterization in

describing Ireland today. The Irish sociologist Joseph Ruane suggests in a review of The Irish Mind that the book's preoccupation with refuting British colonial images of Irish culture is regressive, a resurrection of images which no longer have much meaning in contemporary Irish society:

In this context, the emphasis which The Irish Mind places on the negative aspects of the Irish experience (defeat, diminishment and damage) and their continued relevance and meaning today, locates it within that older tradition. It also updates and reinforces that tradition at a time when the culture should be, and is, developing new roles and identities, ones more appropriate to solving the problems and realizing the possibilities of the present. As such, it retards rather than advances, decolonization (1986:90).

Other critics of the intellectuals' cultural debate charge that, as it has developed throughout the 1980s, it has not lived up to its goal of providing a genuinely non-partisan platform for critical discussion. Field Day's directors have stated that their efforts are directed towards "revealing and confirming the existence of a continuous tradition, contributed to by all sects and parties" (1986:viii). However, some critics of Field Day have tended to see an overemphasis on a continuous Catholic nationalist tradition in the project's work, as well as a lack of attention to the complexities of the Northern Protestant experience. Reviewing three Field Day pamphlets by the cultural critics Terry Eagleton, Edward Said, and Frederic Jameson, the Northern critic Edna Longley writes:

[This series] confirms a primary Field Day obsession

with 'Ireland's long colonial concussion' An important effect of this emphasis is that it absorbs contemporary Northern Ireland into Ireland's longer-term colonial history. It minimizes the 'internal conflict' model, now favored by political scientists. Field Day, and these pamphlets are no exception, predominantly addresses the axis of 'England and Ireland' (as does the ill-named [Anglo-Irish] Agreement) rather than the interpenetration of Britain and Ireland within Ulster (1989:9).

The cultural debaters' present emphasis on colonialism as a framework for discussing contemporary Irish culture has several consequences. First, it directs attention to the past, to an era when the divisions within Irish society could be characterized (probably too easily) by religious and ethnic distinctions. It neglects the class divisions within present-day Ireland, as well as the structures of the independent Irish state, more or less self-determining in its cultural and political policies for almost seventy years now. No Field Day publication has addressed civil rights issues outside the scope of sectarian divisions. Its three pamphlets dealing with Irish law focus on emergency powers legislation in Ireland over the past hundred years, laws which indeed infringe upon the civil liberties of all citizens (particularly in their censorship aspects), but which originate in official policies developed in response to sectarian activity.

It follows from this that Irish Protestants cannot escape the onus of being cast still as "colonizers" in the present cultural debate, no matter what their political or class affiliations. One Northern Protestant journalist has

commented upon the continual sense of grievance exhibited by Catholic intellectuals involved in the debate.

Referring to the Northern-born playwright Brien Friel, one of Field Day's directors (and a senator in the Irish Republic), Sam McAughtry writes:

I shall always picture him, standing before the TV cameras four years ago, in front of a house with a double-front, and enough room in it to swing the directors of Field Day -- a house about ten times the size of the one I shared with ten over-privileged Protestants in Cosgrave Street.

'When I was born, I was robbed of my inheritances,' the great playwright told the camera, and I remember thinking that I would have settled for that sort of victimization, any day (Irish Times 13 May 1987).

Also excluded from the cultural debate, although to a lesser extent in the Crane Bag than in Field Day, are female intellectuals. Field Day's directors are all male, and only one pamphlet from its series is by a woman, a historian. Public intellectual life in Ireland is still primarily a male domain.² Women's exclusion from this domain takes shape not only in their marginality within male-dominated intellectual networks, but more subtly in the manner in which male intellectuals characterize what is debatable and how it is to be debated. As one woman faculty member at UCD, a leading Irish feminist, described in an interview:

I have a lot of respect for some of the ways in which the journals over the last few years have opened up a space for intellectual debate, but I often don't like the tone of that debate, and I don't like the sense of closure that I have in relation to it, because I don't actually feel part of it. And while women have over

the years been invited to contribute to that debate, it has been very much in terms which have been defined by the Other. It has been very much in terms of 'Have you got a contribution to make to our debate?'

Furthermore, she suggested, the "obsessive-compulsive" theorizing over Irish identity in the cultural debate, as well as its lack of attention to contemporary social problems outside of those pertaining to sectarianism, do not address the practical concerns of Irish women. The feminist intellectual's commitment, she believed, must remain centered instead on political strategies for social change:

...We've been involved in survival tactics, as well as in developing an identity and an agenda for identity. So I think the concerns of these reviews, or of that particular cultural-intellectual climate, haven't at all meshed with the concerns of women, and that feminists haven't seen any particular value in becoming involved in that debate, because it's so closed, because the effort required to make a space for yourself there is very enormous.

The feminist critique of the cultural debate as a subtly exclusionary discourse may be extended to a broader criticism. Although the term "cultural debate" implies an open arena for intellectual discussion, its terms are set largely by those who initiated the debate and who now maintain it. The cultural debaters are genuine in their desire to incorporate a wide range of views, but it would appear that the issues these outsiders raise must conform to those deemed critical by the debate's leaders. In other words, the cultural debate does not include all those who write about Irish culture, but those who specialize in

writing about it in specific ways. In addition, the language of the cultural debate appears designed to exclude not only those who lack higher education, but those whose intellectual specialties fall outside the areas of literary criticism and modern philosophy. While it would be unreasonable to expect the intellectuals' cultural debate to garner man-on-the-street interest, it is not unreasonable to ask what audience the cultural debate is addressing, and what wider social purpose it is meant to serve.

Another issue raised by these criticisms is the social and economic position of those who participate in the cultural debate. Whatever their vulnerability to Ireland's recent economic setbacks and their sense of powerlessness in wider political and policy-making spheres, the Irish intellectuals who engage in the cultural debate are, for the most part, successful male professionals. Many of them are academics, and of these, many are Catholics employed at the colleges of the National University. The Field Day project is less academic in its original foundation, but no less "intellectual" in its terms of debate. Field Day's primary focus on cultural disenfranchisement and alienation may also be viewed as somewhat disingenuous, given that most of its Northern-born directors are profitably employed in the south. These individuals' personal experience of discrimination, the legacy of their early years in Northern

Ireland, have become the inspiration for plays, poems, and public careers, but they do not address many of the fundamental political issues affecting much of Ireland today: restrictive social legislation, unemployment, and the second-class status of women and other "minorities" in the twenty-six counties of the Republic.

Among some of Ireland's older and perhaps now less prominent intellectuals, part of the criticism directed towards the cultural debate appears to be related to the celebrity its leading participants have achieved in the Irish media and in wider intellectual circles. Within Ireland, the "Crane Baggers" (or "Wind Baggers," as one UCD academic termed them) are featured regularly on television talk shows, radio discussions, and in newspapers. They are favored speakers at Irish Studies conferences abroad, where the literary discussion of Irish culture and history still forms the major focus of interest. The cultural debaters cannot be accused of hiding their intellectual lights under bushels, and within Ireland's highly competitive literary circles, their visibility and media coverage may rankle. Most of the cultural debaters are also highly productive: Kearney, in his mid-30s, has published or edited four books in the last five years. This precocity is likely to engender jealousy as well.

However, some of the criticism aroused by the Crane Bag/Field Day discussion works to these projects'

advantage, placing them just enough outside the mainstream to grant them enlightened and embattled status. The Irish Mind was denounced publicly at a Catholic mass by the Bishop of Limerick (a sociologist), who described it as a "blinkerred" book, "devoted almost entirely to a type of thinking that is anything but typically and traditionally Irish" (Irish Independent 13 May 1985).³ On the secular intellectual front, The Irish Mind was subject to a scathing attack in the Times Literary Supplement, where, writing for a largely British audience, Conor Cruise O'Brien condemned the book and the contemporary cultural debate as "a manifestation of cultural nationalism." The participants in this debate were merely, in his words, "the latest generation of what used to be called the literary side of the movement -- a term formerly employed -- with genial derision, by the military leaders of the movement in question: the IRA" (1 November 1985).

Both attacks enhanced the cultural debaters' avant-garde status: the first by its basis in "reactionary" Catholicism, the second by articulating a connection between the debate and militant political commitment. I do not suggest that the Crane Bag/Field Day participants have any involvement with paramilitary activity, but more mundanely that such insinuations heroicize the bourgeois intellectual. This is particularly true in the Republic, where, sheltered from the worst effects of sectarian

violence, "sneaking regards," in the colloquial term, of the Provisional IRA are not uncommon. It is worth noting in this respect that despite its concentration on Northern topics, Field Day has not been subject to the same sort of censorship and financial insecurity apparently experienced by the earlier Crane Bag. Perhaps this is because Field Day, remaining securely within the bounds of literature and history, has put political criticism back into its proper, and harmlessly intellectual, place.

Returning to a theme raised earlier, it would seem that much of the implicit motivation for the present cultural debate is rooted in the need for a certain type of humanist intellectual to command attention and maintain influence in an Irish public sphere dominated by economists and planning experts. The Irish sociologist Liam O'Dowd (1988) has commented upon the fact that "traditional intellectuals' preoccupation with Irish identity and uniqueness is in danger of becoming an established intellectual specialism in its own right" (:10). As such, these identity specialists retain competitiveness with technocrats, without challenging the latter's logic and spheres of power. Rather than synthesizing culture and society, as it originally hoped to do, the cultural debate as it has developed in the late 1980s to a great extent reaffirms the distinctions between these realms, in the process reserving control over the cultural to the poet and the literary

critic once again.

The two discourses of historical revisionism and cultural debate emerged in Ireland around the same time, and in reaction to the same social and political developments of the 1970s. Both reflect the degree to which history and culture have been appropriated by academic specialists, a development which has not eliminated popular discussion of these themes, but which has challenged the authority of non-academic interpretation. Arising in the context of renewed sectarianism and major shifts in the country's social climate, both discourses began with a similar agenda of deconstructing the historical divisions that have informed so much of modern Irish identity. Yet as they have developed over the past decade, revisionism and cultural debate seem to have diverged in their intellectual intent.

Revisionism offers a conciliatory, politically mature discourse regarding the past that defines the Republic as no longer nationalist and sectarian. As such, it is instrumental to the externally-directed goals of improving North-South relations and those between England and Ireland. The cultural debate's entry into the past, based not on neutral socioeconomic analysis but on an examination of the cultural scars produced by colonialism and sectarianism, has tended to reproduce these ancient divisions in a new, albeit highly intellectualized, form.

The cultural debate, therefore, retains a nationalism no longer acceptable within outward-facing political discourse, but which has provided the inspiration for Irish writers and artists for more than a century. This view of Irish creativity as based on a confluence of cultural repression and cultural expression still provides ideas that are "good to think" for many Irish people, as well as for many outside Ireland who are interested in its literature and history. In the following section, I will discuss the relationship of Irish scholarship in the field of Irish Studies to these wider audiences, as well as the manner in which increasing academic interest in Ireland by foreign scholars now affects internal constructions of Irish cultural and intellectual identity.

NOTES

1. The name Crane Bag derives from Irish mythology. As the journal's editors describe its origins:

In Irish legend the crane bag contained the alphabet of knowledge. The crane bag belonged to Manannan, the god of the sea. It was made from the skin of his wife Aoife who had been transformed by Manannan into a crane because she had tried to steal his secret knowledge and communicate it to the world. It was said that cranes formed the letters of this alphabet as they flew.

2. Ireland has historically been characterized in feminine terms -- Mother Ireland, Kathleen ni Houlihan, etc. These terms refer to archetypical images of Ireland as both a haggard crone and a radiant young girl, with the transformation from one state to the other symbolic of the throwing off of colonial oppression. It might be argued that one result of this characterization is that it allows Ireland's male poets to establish romantic or chivalric relationships with the Ireland they depict in their works. A sadomasochistic element also enters into this imagery -- Ireland is symbolically seen as raped by male England. Ireland's female poets draw on these images more positively to connect themselves with fertility and nature's power, but tend also to romanticize themselves in this process. I feel it is important for me to state the opinion here that no country that insists on idealizing women through its literature as "the muse" is prepared to grant women their basic civil rights.

3. The newspaper account of this prelate's attack was headlined "Bishop Warns He Will Not Be Muzzled."

PART V. CONCLUSION

CHAPTER NINE
INVENTING IRELANDS

You'll understand I draw the line
At being robbed of what is mine,
My patria, my deep design
To be at home
In my own place and dwell within
Its proper name --

Seamus Heaney
An Open Letter, 1983

In a perceptive essay entitled "Inventing Irelands" (1984), the literary critic Declan Kiberd writes of the burden imposed on his country by its literary and political stereotypes. What were once the private idylls of figures such as Yeats and de Valera have become the basis for still-growing cottage industries in Irish identity, culture and "otherness".¹ The cost of sustaining faith in these images within Ireland, to the extent that they constitute a great deal of its attraction for outsiders, may be great. As Kiberd writes, "Irish people no longer live in a country of their own making, but in a kind of tourist's filmset" (:11-12) where the "green card" of nationalism and romanticized ruralism is often played to the neglect of an examination of Irish society as it is today.

As for the attention focused on questions of Irish tradition, Kiberd writes:

This obsession with tradition is a product of the conservative academic mind, endlessly rehearsing themes for an Irish-American audience. In their hearts, our scholars suspect that all this talk of tradition has a

great deal more to do with tourism than with art, with peddling a national image than with understanding ourselves (:12).

While literary studies may still be the most popular "locus of an advanced tourism" of this sort, to use W.J. McCormack's phrase (1985:2), other academic disciplines participate in this phenomenon as well. Irish culture and history are an important part of what Ireland needs to sell. They are also, genuinely, an important part of what Ireland needs to comprehend. These spheres overlap, as do their audiences. The Irish poet or academic concerned with such topics writes not only with his colleagues and compatriots looking over his shoulder, but with a broader community of those with Irish interests -- political and intellectual -- peering as well. This is distinguished from the usual attention given to intellectual products in the European-American cultural sphere by the fact that, for most non-Irish, the main virtue of Irish intellectual work is its Irishness. That is, outside Ireland, Irish contributions to areas apart from Irish Studies may not be viewed as really Irish at all.

Beyond their participation in the field of Irish Studies scholarship, Irish intellectuals, and academics in particular, are also part of a broader structural and cultural system of knowledge and power. This system is based on the increasing integration of educational and cultural institutions and funding sources across Western

countries, and on the circulation of intellectuals throughout cultural centers within this area. These processes have a political component in being dominated by those countries whose wealth and influence are greatest, and which therefore have greater control over the flow of knowledge, interpretation and funding. Irish intellectuals receive benefits from their membership in this system: trips abroad, contact with other intellectuals, stimulus for their work, and enhanced prestige at home for their international credentials. Helms (1988) has written of the authority gained by those political and intellectual specialists who acquire knowledge of the world beyond their own kingdoms. While knowledge of the world brought home increases these specialists' internal influence, in some cases similar influence may be gained by taking knowledge of one's own society abroad. Irish intellectuals gain personally by their external contacts; Irish intellectual culture gains by their dissemination of its products, concerns, and worldviews.

These processes have bearing on the study of what Hannerz (1986) has termed "complex cultures," the amalgams of diverse cultural references and understandings in modern societies that have arisen in the context of global political and economic integration. Intellectuals, particularly those sponsored by institutions such as universities and research centers, are key figures in this

division of labor characterized by a division of knowledge, where, as Hannerz writes,

the connection between culture and locality is attenuated, so that someone may be more linked through his ideas to an individual living thousands of miles away than he is to his neighbor next door (:363).

However, the Irish intellectual's relationship to those living thousands of miles away is not an entirely untroubled one. Much of this relationship is mediated by the academic research area of Irish Studies. Irish Studies creates an international marketplace for Irish writers and scholars and stimulates greater intellectual interest in Ireland today. At the same time, the increasing involvement of foreign -- largely North American -- academics and institutions in this field gives rise to an uncomfortable dialectic between native scholars and foreign researchers, between the images of Ireland that are presented by the Irish themselves, and those imposed upon Ireland from outside.

Irish Studies is an interdisciplinary research field incorporating scholarship on Irish literature, history, politics, folklore, law, archaeology, and contemporary society. Within this broad field, the first two disciplines have had the greatest influence, and until recently have dominated (it might be said defined) Irish Studies as an academic entity. Beyond academia, however, Irish Studies may be perceived by popular audiences as any type of scholarship or creative endeavor that pertains to

Irish culture, past and present. This interpretation widens the marketability of Irish academics and writers whose work may bear little direct relation to the country's history or its language.

However, Irish Studies, as a coherent set of research interests, is not yet a native academic category. While efforts in Ireland to create an integrated course of studies in this area have gained momentum in recent years, to a great extent the label "Irish Studies" still serves as a way of grouping together various Irish-related research interests for outsiders. Disciplinary divisions in Ireland among the fields of folklore, archaeology, history, and anthropology, for example, are maintained strongly at the university level, and often appear to be overcome only in the context of scholarly conferences. This situation is not surprising, given these disciplines' distinct histories, but undoubtedly influences the fact that no Irish university presently offers an interdisciplinary major in the field of Irish Studies. Therefore, in speaking of Irish Studies within Ireland, I am referring here to those areas of scholarship that make up this research field in a popularly understood, but academically still-nascent, sense.

While disciplinary boundaries and an over-emphasis on Irish Studies as an "export/tourist commodity" may have deterred the academic integration of this field within

Ireland, as Pettit (1989) has suggested, other factors may be influential in this regard as well. Pettit proposes that the neglect of Irish Studies within native academia may also reflect an unwillingness to grapple too closely with the implications of fusing the past with the present.

As he writes:

Maybe it is because Irish Studies for 18-21 year old students is potentially too dangerous that it has not been instituted in Ireland. What if students were encouraged to ask questions -- the issue of emigration comes to mind -- that engage with contemporary concerns by using historical examples? They might end up with a list of embarrassing conclusions (ibid.:16).

This critique is, of course, less likely to emerge in those countries that received the Irish diaspora, where the immigrant experience is often presented as a story of hard work rewarded by upward mobility. Understandably, these countries have also had the greatest influence up to now on shaping Irish Studies as an international field, and consequently have had the greatest influence on this research area within Ireland. Irish Studies in Ireland faces in particular towards the United States, where a large population of Irish descent provides a natural basis for this orientation, supported by academic programs and cultural organizations devoted to Irish interests.

Scholarly interest in Irish Studies in the United States appears to be growing. The American Conference for Irish Studies, an interdisciplinary body founded in 1962, reports that the number of U.S. colleges and universities

offering Irish Studies courses or programs increased from 356 to 454 in the period between 1982 and 1987 (ACIS 1987), while individual membership, organized into four regional units, grew from about 300 in the early 1960s to approximately 2,000 in 1988 (McCaffrey 1988:4). Canada also has an Irish Studies association, with ties to the U.S. one. It is worth noting that interest in this field in the U.S. and Canada is expanding out of the traditional realm of Catholic colleges and those located in areas with a large Irish population. Irish Studies has profited as well by the expansion in the 1970s and 1980s of ethnic studies on North American campuses, and has the virtue of being integrated easily into existing English literature departments, whose "canon" already includes Yeats, Joyce and Beckett. The editors of a recent reader on Irish Studies, the first of its kind designed specifically for an interdisciplinary course in the field, suggest that public awareness of the Northern Ireland situation since the late 1960s has also stimulated academic and popular interest in Ireland (Bartlett, Curtin, O'Dwyer et al. 1988).

Irish Studies in other countries with large Irish populations is growing as well. The 1987 Australian Bicentennial stimulated cultural and academic links between Ireland and Australia (notably, the funding of Chairs of Irish history in Australian universities, and of Australian history in Irish ones). The relationship between Australia

and Ireland is a relatively untroubled one, with few implications of cultural imperialism. Irish Studies in England represents a more delicate situation, one where tensions about the colonial past may influence collegial links in another way.

For the general English audience, Northern Ireland remains the most potent symbol of Irish culture and history. A certain amount of savoir-faire about Northern politics and intellectual life is common amongst educated English, but even here stereotypical images of Ulster's violence and sadness prevail. More negatively, the public representation of Irish affairs in Great Britain is influenced by broadcast policies that allow for the censoring of television programs pertaining to Northern Ireland, and by the school system, where, as one study of English textbooks revealed, "Ireland only exists in relation to British concerns, and then only in terms of violence and lawlessness, and hence irrationality" (Irish Times 5 February 1987).

By and large, as Kiberd's comment about Irish-American audiences indicates, U.S. scholars and institutions constitute the most important segment of the international Irish Studies community. Increased American interest in Irish Studies provides greater opportunities for Irish scholars and writers to take part in lecture tours and conferences sponsored by U.S. universities and research

institutions. There is a seasonal migration pattern evident amongst Irish poets, for example, many of whom tour North American cities and campuses in the months of February, March and April. The public appearances of poets who are less well-known outside of Ireland are featured in newspaper announcements under headings such as "Poetry from Ireland," or, if appropriate, "Poetry from the North of Ireland." In other words, these poets are not sold to the American literary audience on the basis of their individual work (with the exception of very famous poets such as Seamus Heaney and Thomas Kinsella), but on the basis of their cultural/regional affiliations. Sometimes the categories used are strained. The appearance of two Northern poets in New York City a few years ago was advertised under the heading of "Northern Poetry." However, the following week, the same two poets were featured in another New York reading that included English poets as well, under the heading "New Poetry from the United Kingdom." "Irish Poetry" can mean southern poets, or it can mean southern and Northern Irish poets; the artificial rubric "United Kingdom Poetry" here includes only Northern and British poets, a political category with little cultural significance.

The "ghetto" of Irish Studies is both a boon and a liability to Irish intellectuals who seek recognition outside of Ireland. As with representatives of other

historically marginalized cultures (those of Africa, Latin America, and some East European countries, for example), Irish writers find a steady market for their work outside their country, but at the price of being defined primarily as "Irish." To some degree, this definition imposes certain ready-made assumptions upon their intellectual products. The need to meet the expectations of foreign markets, especially that of the U.S., is great: it is better to be reviewed in The New York Times as a "new Irish voice" than not to be reviewed at all.

A small number of Irish intellectuals are able to maintain permanent relationships with American institutions by holding part-time professorships that allow them to spend one semester each year in the U.S., "a more centrally-heated exile," as one Irish writer has described it. Presumably, the presence of such figures on campus increases a college's academic stature in the Irish Studies field and encourages greater student specialization in this area. However, Irish academics who seek affiliations with American colleges usually act as individual entrepreneurs. Institutionalized affiliations between Irish and American universities are not yet common, except in the area of summer school programs that allow American students to spend time in Ireland taking survey courses in Irish literature, history and so forth.

The promotional literature for these summer schools

tends to feature photographs of Norman castles, great writers, and cheerful students in country lanes. Apart from the educational opportunities provided by coursework, these programs also sell the experience of traditional culture, and in some cases of the traditional university, to the American student. As one of these brochures notes, "Each program has been designed to duplicate centuries-old academic traditions." Aer Lingus, Ireland's state-sponsored airline, is in this business as well. The flyer for its "in-depth cultural vacations" reads like the perfect package deal for the efficient ethnographer:

There are four themes from which to choose -- Castles and Gardens, Art & Architecture, the Literary Life and Ireland Today. Resident Irish consultants, each an author and expert in his or her field, meet with you and welcome you to their homes and offices as part of the program.²

American academia also supports Irish publishing by expanding the general market for Irish books and structuring new sub-fields of research. Several academic presses in the U.S. (Wake Forest Press and Syracuse University Press, to name two) specialize in Irish topics and have been influential in creating American reputations for younger Irish writers and scholars. The power of the American publishing market produces some resentment within Ireland, however. In an Irish review of The New Oxford Book of Irish Verse, edited by the senior Irish poet Thomas Kinsella, the younger Irish poet Ciaran Carson wrote in 1986:

... The Americans, it suddenly occurs to me, would love this: who, after all, would have to be informed by Kinsella's 'explanatory and biographical notes' that 'Seamus Heaney was born in Derry', that Samuel Beckett won a Nobel prize, or that Synge 'spent some time on the Aran Islands and wrote a book about his experiences there'? Who else would believe that Derek Mahon is 'an English teacher and lecturer in Northern Ireland and Dublin'? As the well-known poker player Amarillo Slim says, this is strictly for the tourists (Irish Review, Vol. I, No. 1:101).

For the tourists this book may well be, but Carson's sarcasm also suggests elitism and indifference to the ideal function of literature, to embody universal human experiences. It is not only Americans who do not know, but may be very interested in learning, the biographical details of modern Irish writers. Much of Ireland's contemporary literary culture, at least as I read about it and discussed it with those involved in this area, bears this quality of ambivalence about its audience and uncertainty regarding its position in wider intellectual spheres. Who is the Irish writer writing for? How successful is the Irish scholar or poet who is well-known in Ireland, but virtually unknown beyond, except to those with a special interest in his or her field? A common language extends the capacity of Irish writers to gain reputations in other English-speaking countries, but having entered this broader marketplace, what prominence do such figures have outside the confines of Irish Studies, a category that can also limit the readership for their works? Success is understood to be relative. There is

Irish fame, English fame, and above all, American fame.

Interest in Irish Studies from outside the country inevitably shapes some of the intellectual concerns that are pursued within it, directly as well as indirectly. The Northern Irish literary critic Edna Longley has written of the "multi-national companies of Yeatsians and Joyceans" who seem to view Irish intellectual culture as a growth sector (Times Literary Supplement, November 1, 1985). One UCD academic, a political activist not in this field, described Irish literary criticism to me as a "parcelling up" of Irish culture for Americans:

... alongside they sell kind of a mystical notion of Ireland, which is a corrupt notion of Ireland. It is a destructive notion of Ireland because it is not the kind of notion which invites people to re-think Ireland, to challenge. It's misleading, it's simplistic, and it's very, very entertaining

Mysticism has helped sell Irish Studies since the romantic movement of the late eighteenth century, when Gaelic literature was rediscovered by European intellectuals. Mysticism was also part of the fascination traditional Ireland held for the "Celtic Twilight" writers of the late nineteenth-hundreds, who saw in Irish folkways and archaeological ruins the remnants of an earlier, pre-Christian civilization. Today, Irish-Americans seem to be the strongest adherents of this romanticism, which is often fused with a simplified view of Ireland's contemporary political problems. One UCD academic characterized this phenomenon in the following way:

Irish-Americans are cut off from their roots. They are living on ideas, but the ideas are from the nineteenth century. They are fanatically anti-British They have a dangerously sentimental view of Irish heroism and British oppression.

The danger here, he went to say, was that this sentimentalism justified American financial support of the Provisional IRA, funnelled through U.S. groups such as NORAID. However, it is unlikely that much support of this kind is found within the American academic community. In my discussions with Irish academics, I found they often tended to view Irish-Americans in such stereotyped ways. Little distinction was made between the Midwestern university professor and the Blarney-Stone-kissing tourist. Few seemed to have any awareness of the Irish-American working class, of the children and grandchildren of Irish immigrants who recalled with bitter clarity life in Ireland in the early decades of this century.

There is a tension between the mythic images of Ireland that are perpetuated within the country (by academic "cultural brokers" as much as by tourist agencies) and those that are imposed on it from outside. If some Irish scholars are impatient with such cliches, others perpetuate them in their presentation of Irish culture to non-Irish. Within Ireland, this encourages a false dichotomy between those who view Irish society in terms of its communal characteristics of identity, values, and traditions, and those who view it within the comparative

and more cosmopolitan framework of economic change and political realignment.

Irish state agencies that promote tourism and foreign investment are caught between the two models. The Irish Tourist Board sells various versions of "traditional Ireland." Here is an example of the "simple, happy folk" version, taken from one of the Board's travel brochures:

In Ireland the laughter starts early in the morning and lasts till late at night. We want you to come and share the fun, the good times and the special laughter. Just bring along your sense of humor. Ireland is always ready to entertain you -- at a medieval banquet; with an ancient game; or with a glorious concert. Or simply with all the spirit and warmth of an Irish pub -- where you can actually feel the very soul and spirit of Ireland.

The state's Industrial Development Authority turns these same folk around to meet a new demand in image-making. A 1986 IDA advertisement directed toward foreign investors, headlined "Missing the Industrial Revolution was the Best Thing that Ever Happened to the Irish," included the following copy:

You won't find many smoke-stacks, crumbling kilns or abandoned cotton-mills in Ireland -- or the negative industrial attitudes that went with them.

Our industrial revolution coincided with the electronic age.

Today, Ireland is the European base for leading companies in hi-tech and international services industries -- thanks to the innovative skills and progressive attitudes of its people.

Many scholars have examined the images of Ireland that derive from its political and literary history. A separate

field of study would be that of the images derived from this type of scholarship itself. One of the most prevalent cliches of this sort is inherited from the colonial period, when British commentators identified and then worried about "the Irish question." The term has been carried over to analyses of contemporary sectarian politics. A small example from my own research reflects its power. In looking for books on contemporary Irish politics at New York University, I typed the subject heading "Irish politics" into its library computer system. In response, the computer told me that my topic matched no subject heading found in the program, and listed instead related topics that might meet my needs. No less than six separate subject headings appeared for the topic "Irish question"! While I did eventually find my desired topic under the more standard formula of "Ireland - Politics," I was left to wonder how such a small country could produce so many distinct, Dewey-designated, categories of questions.

While most Irish scholars support U.S. interest in their research fields, and recognize the personal benefits to them of this interest, there is also resentment of the academic "ugly American" brandishing his money about and expecting some entertainment in return. One Trinity faculty member experienced in organizing international Irish Studies events spoke to me of Americans' reputations for letting the Irish do the work and then showing up on

opening day, ready to take full credit. He also noted an irritating tendency for Americans to co-opt Irish cultural icons, notably James Joyce, as their own, based on the belief that these artists are under-appreciated in their native country:

... having adopted Joyce so early on, [the Americans] feel that he was neglected in his own country, and in some strange way he's become an American cultural product, and that they are entitled to him in some particular way, and that the Irish having, as they see it, either rejected or ignored him, have lost their claim.

The purchase of Irish writers' manuscripts and ephemera by American institutions also causes alarm, although it is acknowledged that there is little money in Ireland for such acquisitions and some lingering disregard for their value. One academic noted the irony of the dispute over the sale of the poet Patrick Kavanaugh's papers to an American university, which a relative of Kavanaugh's had tried to prevent:

What did we do with Patrick Kavanaugh when we had him here, when he was going along Baggot Street? People hated Patrick Kavanaugh, because he was a nasty guy. I mean, I think he was a very good poet, but what do we do with him? We've got this old Irish thing of honoring dead people over living people

Some of these sales to American universities are negotiated surreptitiously, by writers themselves, as a means of circumventing Irish tax laws. (Fees for lecture tours are kept out of the country whenever possible for the same reason.) While international interest in Irish Studies, on the whole, is considered to be a good thing, it

is marked by the same power imbalance that affects much of Ireland's dealings with wealthier countries in other regards. There is a general "leakage" of Irish cultural property, including archaeological artifacts, out of Ireland and into the hands of foreign institutions and private collectors. The Irish Times, in reporting that a hand-written notebook of Yeats' love poems was up for sale at Sotheby's in London, noted that, at a minimum auction price of £12,000, the manuscript was likely to be "well above the price of acquisition by [Ireland's] National Library" (29 June 1987). In the end, the notebook went for £31,000 to an unnamed bidder (Irish Literary Supplement, Vol. VII, No. 1). James Joyce's papers have been separated and sold to various institutions around the world.³ The Irish student who wants to carry out an in-depth study of the great man's correspondence must go to the State University of New York at Buffalo to do so. However, it should be noted that the politics of this particular dispersal are complex, relating to Joyce's affiliations outside of Ireland as well as to his heirs' concern over the misuse of Joyceiana within his native country. In 1987, Joyce's grandson cancelled his bequest of Joyce memorabilia to the James Joyce Tower in Dublin, citing disapproval of the over-commercialization of artifacts already in its collection (Irish Times 18 November 1986).

There is also resentment of the use of Irish research

materials by American scholars, whose affiliations may place them in a better position to profit by these. One Irish language specialist at UCD commented that, in her experience, American researchers often had an inadequate grasp of the Irish language and the wider context in which Irish manuscripts should be placed; nonetheless, their scholarship found publication easily, she thought.

Resentment of the funding available to American academics is also a recurring theme. "Every little paper you see in an American journal thanks two or three funding agencies," one informant noted. "We're lucky if we can get any money at all for our major work." When foreign financial resources are brought to bear on research in Ireland, the resulting frustration for native scholars is understandable.

There is certainly a legitimate basis for these concerns, which are compounded by the desperate shortage of academic jobs and funding within Ireland. It is worth noting, however, that Irish academic achievement can be rewarded in a way that is different from in the U.S. Younger academics often enjoy close contact with senior colleagues, and this mentorship facilitates recognition of the formers' work. Academic publications produced in Ireland tend to be taken seriously by the wider intellectual community, and can lay the basis for a popular reputation, leading to related work in journalism or

advisory positions. The vast size of the American educational system, combined with its relative prosperity, allows access to the university for average scholars, many of whom secure academic funding and employment. However, American academics enter an enormous intellectual marketplace, even within their own research field. Publication is highly competitive, and it is rare for one article or book, particularly by a younger scholar, to make much impact on a discipline. In envying Americans' broader academic opportunities, Irish scholars may underestimate the value of their own close networks and contained intellectual culture in spurring individual recognition and prestige.

Some Irish academics speak well of American interest in Irish research areas (at least to an American interviewer). One UCD faculty member, also a television personality, noted in an interview the positive impact of this interest:

I would genuinely think that, by and large, [American interest in Irish Studies] has been very good. I think it has improved -- if not merely increased -- the quantity of publication. I think by and large it has improved the quality of it. It's idiotic to generalize, but I have found an extraordinary work capacity among many American scholars. They come in here, they're here for three weeks or a month, in to the National Library there from ten in the morning till ten at night, they take a break, and they're working and working and working and they're doing it because this is their only time to do it.

A Trinity academic involved in Irish Studies spoke more guardedly of this phenomenon:

I think we should be genuinely grateful for the American interest. I think we have to make sure that it doesn't take over and distort things, and you see people do feel a bit disturbed at the idea that they're put under the microscope and regarded as specimens and this sort of business.

A UCD academic outside the field of Irish Studies focused his criticism on Irish scholars themselves:

I think there is a lot of Irish literary tourism, and I think it is just as much a product as the cottage in the little plastic container with the snow which you can shake I'm not saying that the Irish literary thing shouldn't be going on, but I think there are these objectionable elements to it, which reflect a number of things. I think it reflects the insecurity, the vulnerability of the academic literary establishment in Ireland, an academic literary establishment which has never done anything for Irish literature in terms of creativity. [They're] kind of the Greek chorus, never quite sure of whether their existence is legitimate, and constantly in search of things which will help them survive.

For the time being, survival means maintaining these strong contacts outside Ireland (a positive goal) and keeping the academic discussion of Irish culture centered on familiar and marketable themes (a less positive one). There may be some danger here of discouraging more challenging and idiosyncratic contributions to the wider field of Irish Studies. W.J. McCormack (1986) has criticized the internal constraints that deny the Irish writer's "particular responsibility to the reflexive relations which necessarily link his/her art to social reality" (:72). Although the number of Irish writers who deal with urban themes (particularly in recent novels) is growing, it is possible that such writers' emphasis on

social realism is disturbing to native cultural brokers concerned with maintaining a more idealized, and internationally appealing, image of Irish society.

Intellectual products that reflect the country's contemporary problems of increasing class division, economic decline, and social alienation contradict the romanticized notion of Ireland that Irish cultural institutions are careful to promote. Even the horrors of Northern sectarianism are glamorous compared to the mundane deterioration of inner-city Dublin. Such modern images suggest to the outsider that Ireland is now much like any other post-industrial society, and as such, perhaps less worthy of study than when it was viewed as remote and "backward." Given that Ireland's national sense of identity is rooted so much in its traditional culture, rather than in its international political economic standing, the perceived loss of this tradition may be threatening indeed.

In the coming years, the "Europeanizing" of Ireland may offer an alternative focus of orientation for many Irish intellectuals, who reject American cultural influence on their society as well as Ireland's own internal constraints. In becoming European again, as Kiberd (*ibid.*) suggests in his essay "Inventing Irelands," these intellectuals may fulfil an agenda laid out by writers such as Synge and Joyce in the early decades of this century,

but diverted by the more provincial aims of nationalists and cultural revivalists. However, the openness to Continental intellectual trends which these scholars and artists envision -- and which they demonstrate in their work -- would appear to have little in common with the concept of "Europeanization" promoted by the European Community. The EC's explicit notion of regional ethnicity as a deterrent to the acceptance of a hypothetical "European" identity is contradictory to many Irish intellectuals' goal of locating Ireland -- in its singularity -- within the varied contexts of modern Europe and modern Western intellectual identity.

The debate over what images of Ireland should be purveyed to the rest of the world is one for the country's own intellectuals and scholars to resolve, however. These invented Irelands have much in common with the "imagined communities" of the nation-state that Anderson (1983) has described. As he writes, "communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined" (:15). As nationalism re-emerges as a central political issue in both the declining core states and what was once the Third World -- as well as, most critically, in the transformations of Eastern Europe today -- examining the legitimacy of these imagined or invented communities is only one part of the anthropological agenda. Of equal concern is the question

of who is doing the imagining, why, and in what influential settings. The study of academics and intellectuals in the national and international context provides a pathway into these processes, as well as a mirror to our own faces.


NOTES

1. I do not exempt my own research from this characterization.

2. The "Ireland Today" tour consists of visits to traditional farmhouses, prehistoric monoliths, Georgian manors, monasteries, galleries, museums, and Trinity College. The more contemporary aspects of Irish life are dealt with in a visit to a fashion show, a cooking school, and the racetrack. A coffee reception on one afternoon of the eight-day tour is devoted to a lecture on the "current political, economic, and social scenes in Ireland." The Irish consultant for the tour is fashion designer Sybil Connolly.


3. The Joyce archive, including papers of family members and associates, is located in the following cities: Dublin, Galway, London, Trieste, Zurich, New York, Ithaca, Buffalo, Camillus (New York State), Boston, Princeton, New Haven, Austin, Evanston, Carbondale, Stanford and Los Angeles.

Figure 1. Map of Dublin, circa 1910



Source: Dublin in the Age of William Butler Yeats and James Joyce (Kain 1962)

Figure 2. Map of Trinity College Campus, 1980s



Source: Trinity College, The University of Dublin

APPENDIX
ACADEMICS AS INFORMANTS

Some of the problems encountered in the ethnographic study of the university arise in the study of other bureaucracies as well. Many doors are closed to the fieldworker in such settings, and those that are open lead to offices devoted to providing positive information about the institution in question. The methodological dilemmas posed by "studying up," that is, gaining access to and establishing communication with influential social groups, also affect one who attempts to conduct research with academics. However, a whole other set of issues will emerge in this type of ethnographic study based on the fact that both the researcher and her informants are members of the same professional group. In this appendix, I will briefly describe some of these issues and how they are likely to influence the fieldwork process.

Clearly, any type of research by foreign anthropologists in societies that have been "explained" too often by outsiders, and where anthropology may not yet be a well-developed native discipline, poses serious ethical and political problems. These problems are compounded, I believe, when such societies' own intellectuals are the ethnographic focus of inquiry. Here the foreign researcher can be cast as -- and may be -- just another in a long series of exploiters. At the same time, it is important

to remember that academics in any setting are relatively privileged individuals. Their desire to take on a watchdog role in relation to their native culture is understandable and in many cases appropriate, but it is also a strategy that allows them to deflect attention away from their own influence as intellectual interpreters of other people -- their poor and disadvantaged countrymen -- with whom they may share only a common nationality. These issues require consideration at a level I will not attempt here, although they formed a counterpoint to much of my research.

For the graduate student undertaking the study of academics in any setting, an on-going problem will be that of establishing a workable fieldsite status. Whereas in many non-academic research settings the dissertation-writing anthropologist is granted professional authority, in the university this may be denied. The researcher is perceived as completing an academic assignment; therefore, he or she is a student, not a colleague. By taking this position, the academic informant can control and limit the nature of the relationship he has with the researcher, and can maintain his status as a higher authority. This may pose some practical problems for the anthropologist in terms of achieving access; more significantly, however, it points out the fact that many anthropologists rely upon a somewhat illusory sense of intellectual superiority to sustain themselves throughout the ego-threatening

experience of fieldwork. This comfort will not be found in the ethnographic study of academics and intellectuals, and in my opinion suggests that all anthropologists need to reevaluate the premises upon which they carry out their fieldwork.

Several criteria can be employed by the academic informant to define his status in relation to the researcher, knowing that the latter recognizes these criteria and will grant their legitimacy. Degrees alone do not determine status in many academic settings, given the fact that outside of the U.S. the doctorate is not a universal qualification. Long tenure in the university, influential intellectual achievement, and affiliation with state agencies and the media make academics a rich ethnographic source, but often limit the nature of the relationship a younger researcher can establish with senior academics. More accomplished researchers may be too absorbed themselves in the elaborate professional codes of academic culture to consider such colleagues subject to study. There is some suggestion of bad taste, if not hubris, in the notion that one academic should study another, a delicacy of feeling not extended usually to the rest of the world.

For the female ethnographer, the preconceptions of high-status male informants regarding younger members of the opposite sex will probably influence the research

relationship. Within the university, my being a woman probably accentuated my junior status. Most academic institutions function (one might say survive) along sexist principles, and my two university fieldsites were no exception. This sexism was expressed often in paternalism, which combined disregard for my intellectual capacities with genuine concern for my well-being as a woman alone in a foreign country. However, as with other criteria which categorized me as a student, rather than a colleague, this junior status sometimes worked to my advantage by allowing my informants to take on the task of educating me to an extent that might have been unlikely were I perceived as more equal in status. I might add that women academics were less likely to assume this paternalistic role, perhaps because many of them were well aware of their own professional disadvantage within the university.

The actual process of interviewing academics presents other special problems and rewards. Academics define themselves largely through their academic work, the part of themselves they present to the public. Like celebrities and politicians, they become so used to this public role that it is difficult for them to offer something beyond it, even if aware that something more is expected. This tendency was enforced, I am sure, by the fact that much of my work was conducted within the colleges, rather than in informal social settings that would have encouraged less

professional behavior. Academics also perceive themselves as experts -- why else would anyone ask their opinion? My offers to supply a copy of the interview were sometimes brushed aside with the comment that the academic gave so many interviews, he had little interest in, or fear of, my use of the material. In this regard, my informants often struck me as naive, unaware of the comparative and sometimes critical context in which it was necessary for me to view their comments. By placing the encounter within a format well known to them, such as a newspaper interview, they misperceived its overall effect and, as a result, lost some of the control over the encounter they assumed they had.

Even after explaining the general outline of my project, and received assurances of informants' willingness to participate, I found that academics often had trouble relinquishing their authoritarian mode. These were people who spent their days telling others the correct ways of seeing things, and it sometimes seemed that my initial interviews were recaps of the professor's last lecture. The questions I posed first produced textbook responses. It was only with pressing beyond these, usually by showing familiarity with the literature being referred to, that I was able to elicit more personal responses. Informants also frequently suggested that I read their books and articles before meeting with them. In some cases, of

course, I already had, if the individual's academic research was of concern to the study. In other cases, it posed the difficult task of clarifying to the informant that his personal opinions about his discipline or college, not his intellectual work, formed the basis of my interest in him.

In relation to this, I found that many of my academic informants tended to question the value of their own personal observations, labelling them "just gossip" or too subjective to be of any scholarly use. While there is some truth in this view, it seemed to indicate an exalted place in their minds for hard and quantifiable facts -- facts which others could bear out and for which, therefore, my informants assumed no personal responsibility. I wondered if the same standards would be applied if I had studied rural laborers or working class teenagers, those whose thought processes are relatively free of the intellectual constraints of higher education. It seems absurd to suggest that qualitative studies can be of value only with such informants, a harkening back to the time (could it ever have existed?) when anthropologists studied the "primitive mind" to discern the fundamental characteristics of the human psyche.

Still, the bias held by highly-educated informants toward formal and theoretically-cohesive knowledge can present real obstacles to establishing deeper levels of

communication. This may be one reason why so many social science studies of intellectuals have focused on their professional or organizational cultures, frameworks that privilege intellectuals' self-understanding and maintain a respectfully empirical distance. By contrast, ethnographic research among academics must begin with the assumption that their intellectual understandings are not entirely scientific and objective, but are also subjective constructions. It follows from this that such research must involve some demystification of the academic enterprise as a whole, a project that is likely to encounter resistance.

Complexities surrounding the issue of intellectual attribution also emerge very vividly when studying academics and intellectuals. Published work and public statements remain private property, not only in terms of academic ethics, but as part of an individual intellectual process that extends beyond the finished article or speech. As intellectuals, many academics create their lives through their work and their work through their lives. Interviews with such informants can provide exhilarating insight for the ethnographer, brought to a sudden halt by the realization that the ideas you are now thinking are not entirely your own, but the product of a mutual intellectual exchange. How do you correctly ascribe ideas that emerge in conversation but which are also the basis of other

peoples' new work, new publications? How do you separate the public person from the private, honor his confidentiality, and still offer an analysis that is meaningful? The latter question concerns all anthropologists, but the stakes are raised when your informants' public identity exists largely through their ideas, rather than their acts. Within this dilemma lies the basis, perhaps, for the kind of reflexive ethnography many anthropologists now wish to develop. However, its standards and practices must be acknowledged at some level before it can really come about.

I confronted an aspect of this when requesting an interview with a professor who had recently been the subject of some controversy regarding his academic appointment. In my initial letter to him, I had taken care to confine my areas of inquiry to those I thought were innocuous, not wishing to discourage an interview that for other reasons might be valuable. However, what I thought were neutral areas (his intellectual development and perspectives on his discipline) were not so for him, given that he intended to write about these himself and to place his own interpretation on them. With the life history method, anthropologists may be said to write the book for their informants. Intellectual informants want to write the book themselves. They are aware of the capital in their ideas and experiences, and may understandably limit

your access to them, not because they are too personal, but because they are too valuable.

Another significant problem facing those who do fieldwork with academics is that of handling the wide array of intellectual paradigms in which such individuals are trained. The well-educated informant is no longer a rarity in fieldwork; however, the anthropologist will have to struggle with an accentuated sense of intellectual inadequacy when dealing with historians, economists and scientists whose personal and professional identities (like that of the ethnographer) are dependent upon a belief in the superiority of their chosen fields as an explanation of the world. If all fieldworkers experience crises of legitimacy, here they will take the particularly gruesome form of recreating childhood memories of missing homework and bad report cards. Ironically, this problem may be most evident when working with those who are themselves engaged in the social sciences and who are likely to adhere to a theoretical and methodological approach different from that of the ethnographer.

On the whole, I sensed that most of my academic informants questioned the basic premise that they themselves were appropriate subjects for social science research. They were quite used to being consulted for their scholarly opinions, and happy to participate in various public debates, but these were self-chosen roles

that preserved their intellectual and interpretive authority. There is also a subtle distinction, hard to pinpoint, between the intellectual's role as commentator and critic and the qualities needed in a good informant. Few intellectuals can be, for the ethnographer's purpose, the hypothetical Everyman, unselfconsciously letting himself be woven into a social pattern of the fieldworker's design. This is due not only to intellectuals' class and professional position, but to the very nature of their special role as social analysts. In a sense, they are ideal "chief informants," sources of understanding about their society as a whole, but resistant to incorporation into the everyday structures and values of that society. Intellectuals have an investment in appearing to remain outside the system, as well as in the mystique that surrounds intellectual endeavor. These factors add to the difficulty of studying intellectuals from a social science perspective, both in terms of identifying their deepest affiliations and in characterizing the extent and sources of their influence.

A final point is worth mentioning here, one particularly relevant to the junior ethnographer conducting research in an academic community. Clearly, such research may pose a threat to the younger anthropologist's career. Few American anthropologists fear writing critical studies of capitalists and politicians; it is another thing

entirely to write critically of your own professional community. In addition, anything you write about academics is reviewed by academics. This may lead to inappropriate self-censorship on the part of the ethnographer, who is well aware that her informants' identities in many cases cannot be disguised. It may be that recognition of this problem has had the effect of discouraging research on academics to begin with, or it may be that those who enter the social sciences soon grow accustomed to the idea that academics should not be part of the researchable world.

If the research is conducted in a foreign setting, a negative response to it from local academics (themselves the subject of study) may result in difficulties in carrying out further research in the area, and might influence other anthropologists' chances of working there. Near the end of my stay in Ireland, I was told by one of my informants in a friendly tone of voice that were I to write anything unpleasant about him or his colleagues, they were quite capable of meeting me as a group at the airport the next time I showed up in the country. I have often thought of this not-so-veiled threat while writing this dissertation, and now wonder to what degree it has affected the finished product.

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