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**The social bases of public opinion on military issues: The
example of Star Wars**

Klein, Joshua Richard, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1989

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A

THE SOCIAL BASES OF PUBLIC OPINION ON MILITARY ISSUES:
THE EXAMPLE OF STAR WARS

by

Joshua R. Klein

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York.

1989

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9/12/89
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William Furkum
Chairman of Examining Committee

9/20/89
date

Robert Alfani
Executive Officer

Michael Brown
Professor Michael Brown
Richard Styskal
Professor Richard Styskal

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

ABSTRACT

This thesis proposed and tested a method for selecting predictors of opinion on military policy using commercial poll data. The proposed public opinion model was based on a class-ideology-opinion paradigm and drawn from the mass-elite and class perspectives in the field. The model was applied to a poll dataset to investigate the socioeconomic bases of opinion on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and other military policies. An evaluation of this model was made both in methodological and substantive terms.

Two sets of logistic regression analyses were performed using both a selective and a non-selective procedure. Based on a public opinion formation model, the selective procedure used ideological identification as a filtering step; those variables which were not related to ideological identification were eliminated from the subsequent analysis of military policy questions. In the full set (non-selective) variable run, no such selection procedure was used. The public opinion model revealed that gender and ideological identification, and to a lesser extent, urbanity, were the significant predictors of opinions on military policies. When a regression analysis was performed using all the variables to predict opinion on

military policies, the procedure revealed that gender and race were the significant predictors of the final dependent variable, a choice between pursuing the development of SDI to the exclusion of negotiations, or pursuing negotiations to the exclusion of the SDI weapons program.

The thesis explored two major findings of the logistic regression analyses. First, both income and education, which were important predictors of opinion about war in previous studies, were not predictors for opinion on the arms race and the SDI weapons system during a comparatively peaceful period. Second, race and gender, two characteristics that have been found to predict opinions about war, were also significant predictors of opinion about military policy during peacetime. Specifically, women and blacks were more questioning of SDI's effectiveness, and more likely to support a diplomatic policy in dealing with the Soviet Union, while whites and men were more likely to favor the building of weapons system to the exclusion of negotiation with the Soviet Union. It was suggested that if race and gender are treated as socioeconomic strata, or as segments of social class, then sociological theories on power, inequality, and the state can be applied to the findings, with promising questions for future research.

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This thesis focuses on exploring the social bases of public support for a militarist program, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), popularly called Star Wars, as compared with public support for a strategy emphasizing negotiations. The study uses a CBS/New York Times poll taken immediately prior to Reagan and Gorbachev's Geneva Conference in November 1985. The thesis concentrates on developing a set of variables that will predict who supports militarism and who supports arms negotiations.

Research based on commercial polls indicates that on the issue of war, class differences underlie support for militarist and diplomatic strategies. On the issue of deterrence and foreign policy strategies during peacetime, however, there is little research linking class-related variables to public opinion. This study will be the first systematic analysis of class-related variables to public opinion on military and SDI policy during peacetime.

The major thrust of the thesis is to develop an efficient set of variables that will predict the characteristics of those supporting militarism and of those

who support diplomacy. The thesis will present and test hypotheses relating socioeconomic variables to public opinion on military policy, and will use the public opinion formation model as a technique to eliminate the socioeconomic variables with less statistical power.

1. SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE ON MILITARISM

There is a large body of research on the origins of militarist opinions, primarily in the fields of psychology and social psychology, rather than in sociology. Indeed, sociologists are now arguing that war and military strategy, (e.g., deterrence) constitute critical areas for research and theory (Goertzel 1985; Finterschbush, 1988). Below is a brief review of the trends in the social bases of support for militarism.

A. Definitions of Militarism and Diplomacy

Militarism has been defined in numerous ways (Berghahn, 1981; Eckhardt, 1980). In this thesis, the focus is on the social bases of support for, or disagreement with, militarist foreign policy. Militarism as a matter of opinions is defined in this thesis as the approval of the use of force as a method for solving international problems, and a diplomatic orientation is defined as the approval of the use of peaceful and conciliatory measures. From this perspective, the terms will rely on Mueller's (1973:145) definition of hawks and

doves. At the extreme, militarism includes the advocacy of increased troop commitments, more extensive bombing missions, outright invasions, and the use of nuclear weapons, regardless of the availability of diplomatic solutions. Militarism supports the policy of deterrence: the way to deal with the Soviet "threat" is to have an overwhelming arsenal of weapons that will intimidate the other country sufficiently, so it does not take military action. Diplomacy in the extreme approves of cease-fires, negotiated settlements, and withdrawal from conflicts. Diplomacy is against the policy of deterrence: The way to deal with the Soviet "threat" is to concentrate on negotiations and arms control treaties.

B. Literature on Social Class, Authoritarianism, and Militarism

There has been a long-standing discussion in the social sciences on whether the middle class or the working class has the strongest authoritarian propensities; that is, most receptive to "extremist" measures, intolerant of minorities groups and minority viewpoints, and supportive of militarist and forceful measures to solve problems at home and abroad.

At the turn of the century, Hamilton (1968:439; 1975:183-184) notes, most intellectuals and the population thought that the tough and aggressive orientations in

foreign affairs were characteristic of elites and segments of the lower middle class who identified with a powerful nation or saw profit to be gained through imperialism. Manual workers were viewed for the most part as as pacifists, largely because the socialist parties were officially committed to this position.

Prior to World War II, as Szymanski (1983:346-348) summarizes, discussions of the social bases of authoritarianism focused on the middle class. The life experiences of middle class people generated hostility, which in turn produced aggression, which was then channeled into authoritarian politics such as anti-Semitism, fascism, and nazism. This hostility was manifested in the child-rearing practices of the highly authoritarian middle class, and produced authoritarian (or emotionally blocked, and hence potentially aggressive) personalities in children. There were numerous studies of the Nazi and Fascist movement that attempted to account for both their middle class base and extreme authoritarian form. In general, this approach views the life of shopkeepers, small farmers, and professionals (especially during periods of depression and unemployment) as one of extreme tension from being on the losing side in the struggle to survive. Unlike the working class, the middle class response to such crisis was intensified individualism. Such intense

competition promoted considerable anxiety and aggression, predisposing them to be intolerant and to look for extremist solutions at home and abroad.

In the early 1950s, American social scientists began to study authoritarianism, arguing that it was the working class, not the middle class, whose life experience predisposed them to authoritarianism. Szymanski (1983:348) notes that this sociological shift occurred at that time that the "enemy of America" shifted from fascism, with its middle class base, to the Soviet Union, or Marxism, with its working class base. Lipset's paradigm (Lipset, 1959; 1981) of authoritarianism in the working class was the foundation for this shift in emphasis. The main empirical support for Lipset's thesis came from public opinion studies of attitudes toward civil liberties, especially for Communists, where it was found that, compared to proprietors and managers, manual workers were less likely to allow Communists or atheists to speak in their communities. Lipset's work was applied throughout the field of public opinion, including studies of public opinion on foreign policy.

2. PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES ON CLASS, MASS, AND WAR

The most detailed examination of class, public opinion and foreign policy occurs on the topic of war.

Lipset's paradigm states that the working class is authoritarian, and suggests that it generally supports an isolationist policy, but during war supports a strong aggressive policy. A subsequent reaction to Lipset's work was the class model, which states that the working class supports a more flexible policy, while the educated, upper-middle class supports tough, aggressive policies. More recently, the mass-elite model, which states that the mass public is too ignorant of foreign policy to have strong or consistent opinions, can be viewed as a slight revision of Lipset's paradigm.

A. Lipset's Paradigm

The debate over the position of different classes on foreign policy issues began when sociologists applied Lipset's paradigm to empirical data. Lipset's paradigm (1959; 1981:Chapter 4) describes an elite and educated middle class. Members of this class make informed judgements on political issues and are politically active in parties, in contrast to an isolated, ignorant, and biased working class. For this working class, the frustrations of unemployment, poverty, and menial labor, together with limited education and isolated occupational communities, produce intolerance, a propensity to look for "simplistic" solutions, and an attraction to undemocratic and violence-prone organizations and political solutions.

Similarly, the frustrations of working class life led parents to rely on physical punishment and to express little support for their children, and thus produce children with authoritarian tendencies. Correspondingly, the upper middle class is viewed as "liberal" (at least in matters of civil liberties), as favorably disposed toward due process, and as compromise-oriented. Following a tradition from Pareto (if not earlier), Lipset's paradigm implies that only the middle and upper classes should be politically active in a democracy.

Another version of the Lipset paradigm is presented by Galtung (1969). Galtung divides society into essentially two groups, the "center" who are more rewarded (essentially, these people have higher status and are more informed) and those at the "periphery" who are less rewarded in terms of power and status. Because of their relative isolation from the communication processes in society, and their lack of knowledge, the views of those in the periphery on foreign policy are neither thoughtful nor subtle. Galtung concludes that the periphery is not reliably interested in peace and negotiation, and that to have a "stable, peace-oriented public opinion" a society needs to "eliminate the periphery from influence on foreign policy" (Galtung, 1969:571).

Based on limited empirical data, these powerful theories can be seen to have a "restraining or directive character" (Hamilton, 1975:9) on the sociological exploration of the effects of class variables on public opinion formation.

B. The Class Model

During the early 1960s, as the Vietnam War became more controversial, political sociologists explored public opinion on the Vietnam War and the Korean War, in part as a test of Lipset's model of the working class. While Lipset did not address military policy, his analysis led to the premise that persons of lower socio-economic status would support tougher policies in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The widespread media coverage of hard hats picketing and jeering the anti-war college protesters seemed to give support to Lipset's model (Hahn, 1970; Hamilton, 1975; Mueller, 1973). However, data from public opinion polls between 1964 and 1971 presented a significant challenge to this model. More grade-school educated, working class people than college-educated, middle- and upper-class people favored immediate withdrawal; more defined themselves as "doves" than "hawks," fewer supported continued bombing of North Vietnam, and more supported the Hatfield-McGovern amendment calling for an end to American

troop involvement in Vietnam by 1971 (Modigliani, 1972:960).

Through their analysis of these polls, the class model researchers questioned Lipset's model. Their argument reflects the premises of the conflict school, which asserts that conflict and disagreement are normal processes of society, as are consensus and agreement. Social classes, socioeconomic strata, organizations, and groups may disagree over the means, or goals of government policy, and through various processes of compromise, cooptation, collaboration, subjugation, and violence, evolve various levels of agreement and policy implementation. In public opinion research, this group uses class-related variables to predict public opinions.

In an analysis of public referenda in five cities, Hahn (1970) found that disapproval of the Vietnam War was related to the working-class neighborhoods and not to the middle and upper-middle class areas. Hahn also analyzed a 1969 Gallup poll, showing the high income and well-educated respondents as most likely to describe their opinions on the Vietnam War as "hawkish" while a large proportion of persons with grade school education chose "doves." Manual workers expressed stronger support for both the immediate and gradual withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam than persons in business or professional occupations.

Hahn proposes an interpretation based on class and kinship interests to explain these findings. While it may be difficult to judge which groups could derive benefit or harm from a particular foreign policy, in wartime there are people who have an interest in peace: young men and their families. Hahn argues that blue collar neighborhoods support Vietnam withdrawal referenda because the young men from these areas have a greater chance of induction and drawing combat duty. Blue collar families are more likely to be closely knit and economically interdependent, and the death of young men has a lasting and profound impact.

Like Hahn, Hamilton's research was also a response to Lipset's thesis of the working class' greater intolerance, as well as of the implied working class' right-wing opinions on foreign policy. Hamilton's work (1968) tested Lipset's model of the liberal upper class and aggressive working class in terms of military initiatives using data from 1952 and 1964 election polls. Hamilton also found that the younger, better-off white Protestants, in high status occupations, and the attentive public (those who read newspapers and magazines) preferred a "tough" policy in Korea and in Vietnam, in contrast to the working class.

In an extended analysis of the data, Hamilton (1975:183-217) presented an interpretation of his findings. Those who felt able to influence politics were

the most strongly in favor of bombing Korea and of escalation in Vietnam. Those who felt least able to influence events were the most favorable to negotiation or pulling out.

Hamilton proposed that the better-off white Protestants may be expressing a general "self-righteousness" of any elite, a preference to maintain a well ordered world. The poor, blacks, and immigrants may have a propensity for more peaceful options, withdrawal or negotiation, Hamilton states, because they tend to fear war, and seem to be in a state of anxiety about this possibility. Anxiety for the working class and public is not a product of personality, as Lipset argues, but a product of life conditions (Hamilton, 1975:392).

For the working class, survival at work and in everyday life is possible by avoiding costly and unpredictable conflicts, and by working out and maintaining mutually beneficial supportive arrangements (Hamilton, 1975:183-217). Hamilton notes that the preference for negotiations or withdrawal by the black population may reflect a sweeping alienation from the policy and a distrust of such massive uses of power.

C. The Mass Elite Model

Other researchers used the mass-elite model in their interpretation of the Vietnam and Korean War data to update

Lipset's paradigm. Their interpretation is based in part on a Parsonian consensus model, which assumes, in part, that if the mass or working class holds opinions different from the policies of the government or the elite, it is due to their ignorance or lack of information or non-involvement. This model has no social classes or distinct strata, but rather an elite and a "mass."

For example, in his detailed analysis of nine surveys on Korea and Vietnam opinion, Modigliani (1972) concludes that people with lower socioeconomic status can be expected to have more limited horizons, to be more concerned with their immediate environment and less concerned with the rest of the world. They are more likely to have a parochial resistance to all forms of "altruistic" foreign involvement.

In an analysis of a collection of poll data on the Vietnam and Korean Wars, Mueller (1971; 1973) strongly argues that differences in opinion on war do not indicate substantial disagreement between groups over American foreign policy. Rather, Mueller (1973:123) summarizes that the better educated tend to possess:

a comparatively close identification with the nation, its leadership, and its destiny; an awareness of and a sympathy for the problems of dealing with other countries in a unified manner; and, consequently, a susceptibility to leadership appeal on issues of international policy. In addition, they are likely to know what the present policy is and thus can line themselves up in the appropriate column with a certain efficiency.

Mueller argues that the differences between the "hawks" (supporters of aggressive military policies) and the "doves" (supporters of nonintervention and negotiation) are in fact differences between a highly educated elite and a less educated public. The highly educated simply stand by their government and support its policies, whether for escalation or for withdrawal. The poorly educated are viewed as agreeing or disagreeing with certain policies inconsistently. This perceived inconsistency, which can be traced to limitations in the poll/survey questions, is seen as providing a rationale for discounting public preference for diplomacy rather than militarism.

For Mueller, the shifting opinions of the elite represent attentiveness to issues; the stability of opinion in the mass represents sluggishness, not stability and consistency. Mueller summarizes that:

The impression one garners from such phenomena is of a well-educated group reacting in an active and attentive manner to the war and its consequences, and to the arguments of opinion leaders; and of a poorly educated group responding to the survey stimulus viscerally and in a half-aware, semirandom, and consequently, rather unperturbable fashion (1973:127).

The elite-mass model continued to strongly influence public opinion research on foreign policy into the 1980s. The model relies upon education, and somewhat less, on income and occupation as the major explanatory variables.

While other factors, such as race, gender, and region, are reported as significant in some studies, these variables have not become incorporated into the interpretation, and have not been proposed as additional factors of public opinion formation.

3. PUBLIC OPINION ON FOREIGN POLICY DURING PEACETIME

By the 1970s, the mass-elite theorists argued that the elite had lost its consensus on foreign policy initiatives and had become divided into various foreign policy "attitudinal camps" (Hinckley, 1988:299). This change is the major reason for the lack of substantive findings using opinion polls (Hinckley, 1988; Schneider, 1985; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Holmes, 1985; Mueller, 1973). Schneider (1985:322-26) presents the most elaborate description of this event and its impact on public opinion formation and analysis.

Until the 1960s, foreign policy was formulated and supported by the attentive elite (who were better educated and more attentive to foreign events); they supported government initiatives, whether involving foreign aid, military forces, or nuclear deterrence systems. The inattentive public (the 60 to 70 percent of Americans who have no sustained interests or involvement in foreign affairs) were, until the 1960s, passive and generally

willing to grant management of foreign affairs to the elite. The result was a bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy from 1948 to 1968. This consensus, or conservative internationalism, emphasized cold war interventionism: the containment of Soviet power by using a strategy of confrontation and cooperation. As Modigliani summarized, the premise of this consensus was that "the United States should be ready and willing to help out wherever the values of the 'Free World' seemed in jeopardy" (Modigliani, 1972:997).

In the late 1960s, the attentive public split over the Vietnam War and the Nixon-Kissinger detente initiatives (Mandelbaum and Schneider, 1979). Both segments agreed that the United States should play a major role in world affairs, but conservative internationalists were interventionist, pro-military, and staunchly anti-Communist. On the other hand, liberal internationalists felt that the United States should think less in terms of national security and more in terms of global economic interdependence (Schneider, 1983:40).

After the 1960's crises, the mass (or inattentive public) became anti-establishment, with a growing hostility toward political parties and leaders. The public now no longer consistently supports either a liberal or a conservative United States world role, but can be

characterized as noninternationalist: "they are profoundly anti-foreign aid, anti-troop involvement, and anti-anything that suggests of foreign entanglement" (Schneider, 1985:358). Nor can the public be characterized as isolationist, but rather as simply against foreign involvement. They are less educated and have a "limited understanding of the relevance of events that are complex and remote from their daily lives" (Schneider, 1985:358).

4. MILITARY STRENGTH, DEFENSE SPENDING, AND PUBLIC OPINION

Another aspect of militarism is concerned with public opinion on defense spending, has been quite stable through most of the 1950s and 1960s, with about a quarter of the population wanting to spend more on defense, about a fifth wanting to spend less, and the rest expressing no desire for change (Russett and Graham, 1988:10).

According to Schneider, the non-interventionist mass supports a strong military posture and more defense spending as well as supporting conservatives on issues of military strength and toughness. Hamilton (1973:124) argues that such support of military spending does not represent a predatory working class, but rather the working class's acceptance of the responsible leaders' definition of the Cold War problem. The elites promote the fear of communism and war, and promote deterrence as a solution.

The ability of the elite to successfully propagate such policies is based in part on the remoteness of international events and the dependence on leaders for information. The anxiety that the working class feels is probably the fear of the unknown felt by powerless groups everywhere. It's not that ignorance is bliss: "ignorance is a state of continuous fear" (Hamilton 1973:124).

Schneider's argument (1985) is similar: the mass's approval of military strength and toughness is defensive, not aggressive. The public wants to see the United States increase its military power to protect itself from a growing Soviet threat, not to assume a more interventionist role in world affairs.

However, there are limits to the public support of military spending. The cumulative impact of the Vietnam War produced an aversion to the military, and by the early 1970s half of the population wanted to spend less on defense (Russett, 1974; Allison, 1970-71). By the late 1970s, the public began to support the huge increases in military spending, but by 1983 support had turned to disapproval. The reasons included the ongoing economic crises and recessions, and the growing fear that Reagan might actually use nuclear war weapons or involve the United States in a drawn out and expensive military venture

that could eventually lead to nuclear war (McMahan, 1985:20; Halliday, 1986:11).

This shift in public opinion suggests some support for Mann's (1987) concept of "spectator-sport" militarism. Mann argues that the western public has little knowledge of, and virtually no participatory role in, United States military policy. People will not willingly sacrifice much. If there are heavy losses in a war (e.g., Vietnam), if military spending is damaging to the economy, or if wars are seen as pointlessly sacrificing "our boys," support is withdrawn.

Goertzel (1987) analyzed a series of opinion surveys and found that those who supported increased military spending were older, less educated, lived in the south or were Republican, were conservative, or worked for the police or armed forces. Decreased military spending was favored more by the young, and/or well-educated, nonwhite, atheist, Jewish or Catholic religion, the politically liberal, non-southern, and those employed in education or the social services.

Goertzel's research is the only analysis of military spending that includes socioeconomic strata. He found that income was not a factor, but that education, age, region, religion, and ideology and occupation are predictors. His

findings are similar to those summarized by Hamilton (1970) using data from the 1960's.

5. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS, SDI, AND PUBLIC OPINION

A significant challenge to the study of public opinion on militarism is the fact that the past fifteen years have been relatively peaceful. By contrast, during wars and drawn out military interventions, events begin to have a material effect on people's lives, and opinions are formed. However, public opinion on military policies during peacetime may have little salience. People have little personal experience or real knowledge to base opinions on and are highly influenced by events and arguments emphasized in the media, a problem beyond the scope of this study. Opinions can fluctuate sharply as a result (Goertzel, 1987:66).

The SDI program offers such a challenge to researchers. SDI is presented as a military research program to protect the United States by stopping Soviet missiles in flight before they reach American soil (Snyder, 1986:14; Miller and Van Evera, 1986:xi). SDI is presented as providing America with a protective shield against nuclear war and eventually contributing to the end of the threat of nuclear war.

As in the case of other modern military programs, the SDI program involves a high level of technological and political information. The products of these programs, the weapons of the modern strategic arms race, are complex additions to the arsenal. While some research programs die before they go into production, most get added to the military hardware of a nation and eventually become part of the international strategic balance of power. Due to their scale and complexity, such programs have a long lead time before the concept becomes an actual piece of hardware. Thus, the modern military program becomes a political issue before it becomes a physical reality. During this research and development phase, poll data is often collected on the issue, and social movements make efforts to support or to criticize the policy. Thus, a relatively obscure program may become a controversial issue as the implications of its development are discussed.

An emerging interdisciplinary field, centering on issues of war and peace, has begun to summarize and analyze public opinion on the SDI program, as well as in the related fields of arms control and nuclear weapons. Graham and Kramer (1986) have pulled together over 1000 nuclear related questions from various polls and surveys since 1945. Flynn and Rattinger (1985) have compiled survey research on defense issues from seven NATO countries. In

addition, Graham (1986) has compiled a database of all known poll questions on SDI and strategic defense systems since April 1983.

A. Public Opinion Polls on SDI

According to Graham (1986:3), some two-thirds of the public has heard of Star Wars (a popular name for SDI), although no more than one-quarter of the public had followed the Stars War debate very closely. Americans seem to be moderately optimistic about the possibility of building a defense against nuclear weapons. Like a previous program, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system, Star Wars was quite popular at first. Critics succeeded in raising some uncertainty about the program, but not in increasing the opposition. Between the summers of 1984 and 1985, support for Star Wars had dropped from 54 to 43 percent, while the number of undecideds increased from 12 to 22 percent. The opposition remained about the same (Goertzel, 1985:139).

A major finding in the research has been that the wording of specific poll questions contributes to the findings of SDI's popularity. Questions that emphasize defense and protection elicit majorities in favor of SDI. When other considerations are mentioned, such as the fact that the system entails nuclear explosions in outer space, or that the high cost of the program makes it the most

extensive and expensive military proposal in history, public support tends to evaporate (Kramer and Graham, 1985:15).

B. Demographic Correlates of SDI

Little research has been reported on the demographic factors correlated with support of SDI, reflecting in part the lack of emphasis on these factors in the field. One demographic factor associated with public approval for SDI is region. The primary demographic factor for foreign policy opinion has been region, and specifically the south (Galston and Makins, 1988; Martilla and Kiley, 1988). The south is less likely to limit SDI development, less likely to curb SDI to achieve an arms treaty agreement, and less likely to believe that defense spending is excessive. More than any other region, people in the south believe that their community is quite dependent on defense spending (Davis and Sheatsley, 1985:50).

C. Issue Correlates of SDI

When there is little information available on a controversial, abstract, and technological issue such as SDI, people may form their opinions on the basis of their knowledge and information from related issues. Opinions on four issues have been related to the public's support of the SDI program: anti-Sovietism, the arms race and fear of nuclear war, arms control negotiations, and the high

defense budget (Yankelovich and Harman, 1988). Opinions on these issues will be summarized briefly below.

Given that anti-Sovietism has been the basis of American foreign policy since 1917 (with the exception of the World War II period), that anti-Sovietism has become part of the culture in which one is raised, and that few people have had direct experiences with the Soviet Union, it is not surprising that "all Americans have deeply negative feelings toward Russia" (Schneider, 1985:331). Even at the height of detente in the 1970s, a plurality reported mixed feelings (Schneider, 1985:324). One recent source of increased anti-Sovietism during the late 1970s was the public's perception that there had been a change in the balance of power, and that the Soviet Union was superior. Not until 1985 did a plurality view the two nations as equal. Some analysts have proposed that the increase in anti-Sovietism during that period was a product of the government's campaign to promote support for military programs (Sanders, 1982; Wolfe, 1984).

Nuclear war is another issue related to public opinion on SDI. Americans have a high awareness of the existence of nuclear weapons, and believe that nuclear weapons can never be abolished (Graham and Kramer, 1986). However, Americans also believe that a nuclear war can not be won, that both sides would be annihilated, and would

prefer not to survive an all-out nuclear war. Only 15 percent thought that once nuclear weapons were used, the conflict could be limited to less than a total war.

In the years after World War II, few Americans (only 11 percent) thought the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was wrong, while currently 62 percent of Americans think that the United States would not be justified in using a nuclear weapon first (Finsterbusch, 1988:35-36). Americans thought President Reagan believed that the United States could win a nuclear war. The fear that Reagan would initiate a nuclear war was a potent stimulus to the mass freeze campaign as well as to resistance to still more military spending by mid-1983.

The public's fear of nuclear war has been linked to support for arms negotiations and desire for peace. In reviewing polls on public support for the nuclear freeze referendums and initiatives, Schneider (1985:351) concludes that the public supported the freeze because they view the alternative, a continuing arms race, as extremely dangerous. The public considers a freeze to be a first step, not the last step, in reducing the risk of war. Americans support the freeze while also accepting many arguments made against the freeze. For example, such arguments include such points as these: the Soviets cannot be trusted to live up to the agreement; a freeze would be a

gamble because it would be difficult to verify; a freeze would allow the Soviet Union to gain in nuclear capability and to pursue aggressive policies. Finally, public opinion on the freeze seems to be virtually unrelated to how the United States should deal with the Soviet Union. Those who want to get tougher, and those who want to be more conciliatory almost equally support the freeze. The stockpile of nuclear weapons is no longer perceived as a direct indicator of strength, but as an indicator of risk (Schneider, 1985:350).

Yankelovich and Harman (1988) argue that when SDI policy is presented in polls abstractly, most Americans support it as a defensive measure because SDI is seen as enhancing United States military strength, and does not depend on the cooperation of the Soviet Union. A majority of the public think that SDI could be made to work, although the high cost of SDI is a concern.

Yet public support for SDI is not assured because a majority believe it will escalate the arms race. The public does not support SDI as a militarist alternative to negotiations with the Soviet Union. By a three-to-one majority Americans think that reaching arms reduction agreements is a more important goal than developing space weapons (Yankelovich and Harmon, 1988).

Yankelovich and Harman (1988) conclude by analyzing support for SDI according to its technical and political components. Most support for SDI is as an alternative to the horrors of mutually assured destruction. President Reagan's initial statement that the program would be defensive rather than offensive had captured the people's imagination and desire for peace. But, Yankelovich and Harman conclude, the public rejects SDI as a political program to expand the arms race and by-pass negotiations.

D. SDI as a Salient Issue

Analysts tend to avoid newly introduced foreign policy issues because there may be few correlates to explain public support or disapproval. In the case of the SDI program, it has been argued that slight differences in question wording or changes in the information presented in the media can lead to different opinions. However, current research also shows that when the public is given information on the nature of the new and elusive program, they have strong opinions. SDI policy is also salient in the context of other already proven issues: nuclear war, the military budget, and arms negotiations. Placed in the context of these other, more salient concerns, the issue of SDI has saliency.

6. SUMMARY

Research in the field of public opinion on foreign policy shows that when opinions on war are examined, socioeconomic variables are important predictors. When opinion on peace-time issues are examined, however, ideological variables are predictors. In general, most analysts argue that ideology is a poor predictor of opinion. Overall, there has been little reported research on socioeconomic variables for peacetime issues and almost none reported for the SDI program. Converse (1964) and Mueller (1973) argue that education and income are good predictors of opinion while Hamilton (1973) concludes that these two variables are poor predictors. Hamilton argues that a contextual analysis of opinions is necessary to fully explore opinion from national survey polls, reporting that region, urbanity, and occupation are key variables. Finally, the two relatively consistent predictors, gender and race, are always noted but never integrated into the interpretations. As Hamilton (1975:207) notes:

the mass society theorizing needs both specification and supplementation. It is necessary to specify what the "affected" population is rather than focusing on some large and undifferentiated mass.

This thesis addresses two basic gaps in the sociological analysis of public opinion research: the retreat of sociologists from poll data, and the lack of

socioeconomic correlates of opinion on military policy during peacetime. This study will examine the relationships between socioeconomic variables, ideology, and opinion on military policy through a public opinion formation model. The variables used in this model will include those most frequently found in commercial poll data, and should therefore facilitate the use of such data by sociologists. In addition, the analysis will show how sociological hypotheses can be tested on poll data using logistic regressions, and how the results pose important theoretical issues for sociologists.

7. THE NOVEMBER 1985 POLL

This thesis explores the formation of public opinion on the SDI program using data obtained from CBS/New York Times poll. The poll was taken during the week of November 7 to 12, 1985, just before the summit meeting between President Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev. In the few months before the poll, the media reported on the limited effectiveness of SDI as a leakproof nuclear umbrella, as well as indicating that the Soviet Union would make SDI a negotiable item in the summit meeting. The November 1985 poll includes several questions on SDI, on related military and foreign affairs, and many of the standard socioeconomic and demographic variables.

SDI opinion is measured by several questions in the dataset, which test different aspects of the SDI program, including whether or not it will work, and what proportion of the population it is meant to protect. The poll includes questions on toughness, military superiority, and the Soviet Union's intention to honor a pact. These questions are grouped as opinions on military policies.

The final question focuses on an issue distinguishing militarism versus diplomacy: Should the government proceed with SDI to the exclusion of negotiations, or proceed with arms negotiations to the exclusion of SDI. In past polls, this question (and variations of it) had found that a majority thought nuclear arms reduction was more important than developing SDI (Richman, 1987:5; Graham, 1986). This question places SDI in a salient context, and will be used as the major dependent variable in this study.

8. METHODOLOGICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

This thesis is primarily focused on developing an efficient set of socioeconomic predictors (or model) for opinion on military policy.

The major theoretical proposition of this thesis is that socioeconomic position is the basis for opinions in support of a militarist policy (the United States should emphasize building new weapon systems, such as SDI) or in

supporting a diplomatic policy (the United States should negotiate with the Soviet Union). The relationship between the socioeconomic variables and militarism is not necessarily direct, however; a series of intervening variables, which include ideology and specific opinions about the United States-Soviet Union policies, must also be taken into account.

This section briefly describes a methodological approach emphasizing a model of opinion formation. The theoretical premises underlying this approach will also be summarized. Chapter Four will present the hypotheses to be tested in this study.

9. A METHOD TO DETERMINE THE KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

This thesis uses a public opinion formation model to delineate the variables most powerfully associated with a public opinion on military policies. The model is based on one fundamental premise in sociological analysis: one's position in the class structure shapes one's general ideology, which in turn shapes specific opinions.

In the literature reviewed, sociologists tend to focus on specific aspects of this model: either the relationship of class to opinion (the class approach) or the relationship of ideology to opinion (the mass-elite approach). There are numerous disagreements about the

conceptualization of variables based on such a model. For example, sociologists differ on the proper constitution of the stratification system in America (Parkin, 1978). Ideology is another area of debate: its meaning ranges from Marx's original definition as distorted thought to a general world view or a group-based belief system that gives an order to thoughts and values (Mannheim, 1971; Converse, 1964). Despite these difficulties, the model remains the framework of sociological theory and public opinion research.

The model incorporates elements from both the class and the mass-elite approaches to public opinion. Emphasis is on the socioeconomic variables as predictors. As the major intervening variable, however, ideology also plays an important role in the model. Ideological identification is the major cutting point for deciding which socioeconomic variables will be regressed on opinions about military affairs. Thus it is assumed that the socioeconomic variables which are related to ideological identification are also related to opinions on military policies. Finally, those socioeconomic variables which are related to military opinion will be regressed on the final dependent variable, the selection of pursuing the SDI weapons system or of pursuing arms negotiations as a military strategy. This final set of predictors will be evaluated and compared

to a more contextual analysis, a regression consisting of all the socioeconomic factors.

The model also uses ideological identification, a standard variable in political opinion research, but not one used often in the literature on foreign policy (Goertzel, 1987 is an exception). In addition to being used as the major intervening variable, ideological identification will be carried through the rest of the analysis, acting as a control and as a dependent variable. Controlling for ideology will provide a stringent test for the socioeconomic variables' ability to predict military opinion. In addition, the ability of ideological identification (liberal, moderate, conservative) to predict military opinions will be tested.

This analysis concentrates on the usefulness of socioeconomic predictors of military opinions for several reasons.

The first reason for using socioeconomic predictors is that they are indicators of social class. The literature shows that such predictors as education, income, region, gender, race, ideological identification, and to a lesser degree, age and religion, are related to opinions on a variety of military topics. A systematic study of these variables is warranted.

A second reason for the focus on predictors is their practical usefulness; they are included in every poll. While a particular poll may not include one or two variables, there is sufficient consistency across polls to provide a base for building a systematic body of findings. Such a consistency in ideological indices does not exist. However, ideological identification is the one variable that is used quite consistently in the polls, and will be part of this thesis. The ultimate justification for the use of socioeconomic predictors is found in the huge databases of poll data that are beginning to be used by sociologists (Goertzel, 1985), databases that will enable analysts to replicate and elaborate their findings in a fairly rigorous way.

The literature indicates a need to examine each socioeconomic variable systematically in relation to opinion, rather than to build indices of socioeconomic status. This is a difficult task, because most socioeconomic variables operate in complex, interactive ways, and examining one variable at a time is strenuous and somewhat artificial. Yet this task is timely because socioeconomic variables have been dropped from the foreign policy literature for a number of years and have never systematically been used in their analysis of SDI. A re-examination will be useful to sociologists, whose

emphasis is on the social bases of opinions and political ideas.

Examining one variable at a time, with the remaining variables controlled, will provide a limited set of predictors for a particular policy. The limited set of predictors can be developed from the use of a statistical procedure that will allow a sociologist to predict the strength of certain relationships while holding the effects of other socioeconomic variables constant.

A sociological approach combined with a statistical method will enable researchers to systematically tackle poll data. Since poll items are typically non-continuous, non-interval, and include a mix of dichotomous and multi-leveled variables, the abundance of poll data requires tools and methods for analysis of that data.

Many sociologists resort to cross-tabulations as the safest method. However, there are methods available that allow the sociologist to take numerous independent variables into account simultaneously. This thesis will show how logistic regression, a relatively new technique for categorical data, may be used to establish predictors of public opinion. I propose to use a planned set of logistic regressions, step by step, through three sets (and levels) of variables that have been indicators of public opinion.

Using the approach outlined briefly above, the analysis will begin with all the relevant variables. A summary of the literature on each variable in the set will be summarized, with hypotheses of the most powerful predictors that are expected. The analysis will proceed from the most general set of predictors (the socioeconomic items), through the general political ideology factor (ideological identification), to the most precise items (opinions on military affairs). In the final chapter, the resultant set of predictors will be analyzed, and will be presented to the field, along with an evaluation of the method, for subsequent studies.

CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY

1. SELECTING THE DATASET

Polls and survey data have gained popularity in recent years, largely because they focus on political issues and because they are voluminous, timely, and ubiquitous. Over the past fifty years, the opinion polling enterprise has undergone major changes, growing from a handful of polling firms to a large number of polling agencies, ranging from government and academic institutions, to commercial organizations, to politicians, and to the media (Turner and Martin, 1984:341-352; Worcester, 1987).

A. Selecting the Survey Instrument

As polling agencies and polls have proliferated, so have databases. Thus, researchers using secondary analyses, as in this thesis, can choose the most appropriate dataset for their purposes. For example, Thomas Graham presents a compilation of all questions on strategic defense from 1940s to 1986 using every identifiable national opinion poll (Graham, 1986). Starting in 1983, such questions included the Strategic

Defense Initiative (SDI), although most polls had only one or two SDI questions. The most common question was a simple approval/disapproval "reactive" question about President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative.

After reviewing those surveys which used a rich combination of SDI questions, I obtained the actual survey instruments, in order to analyze the non-SDI questions. I sought to find a single poll with the optimum set of socioeconomic and issue-related variables that were theoretically relevant to the study.

The best combination of demographic, issue-related, and SDI variables was found in a national poll taken during the first week of November 1985 by CBS/New York Times. CBS and The New York Times corporation has been conducting national, international, and other types of polls jointly and separately, since 1975 (Gollin, 1987:308; Turner and Martin, 1984:348). The set of socioeconomic and demographic items in the November 1985 poll was standard, with the exception of the occupation question (which is fairly typical of non-academic surveys) and marital status.

B. A Note on Newspaper/Television Polls

When studying current topics, the polls most likely to be considered are those taken by the major news media. There are at least 147 national or state polls sponsored by local newspapers or broadcast outlets around the country (Turner and Martin, 1984:349). In addition, there are

three well-known national news-pollsters: the American Broadcasting Company/Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and CBS/New York Times.

Because polls were useful in supplementing news coverage, the press joined television during the 1970s to institute polling as an integral feature of their news operations. A number of factors contributed to this development: telephone interviewing replaced face-to-face interviewing, random digit dialing and WATS line service facilitated national or regional surveys; computerized data analysis and CATI (Computerized Assisted Telephone Interview) systems sped up the entire polling process, shrinking the turnaround time from weeks (or months) in the 1930s to hours in the 1980s. Newspapers could also use the telephone banks in their classified advertising or circulation offices to keep polling costs down. Joint polling operations involving print and broadcast media became common. Thus the press has developed into a leading actor in the polling enterprise, as well continuing its established role as a shaper and mirror of public opinion (Gollin, 1987:s87).

C. Benefits of Newspaper/Television Polls

Newspaper and television polls should be carefully examined by sociologists as a prime source of useful data. The three major papers, for example, often include a number

of questions on major policy issues in their polls. In addition, the polls usually include a number of the standard socioeconomic variables. Indeed, major media surveys are referenced in public opinion reviews and texts. As with many types of polls, there are limitations which will be discussed below.

2. SAMPLING PROCEDURE

A. Description of Sample

UNIVERSE: Adults in the United States, age 18 and over.

SAMPLING METHOD: Stratified random probability

DATES: November 6-10, 1985

CASES: 1,659

The stratified random sample is drawn using the following method to select telephone numbers. The primary sampling units (PSU's) are blocks of 100 telephone numbers, identical through the eighth digit (Area Code-Exchange-XX__). The PSU's are stratified by geographic region, area code, and size of the geographic location in which the telephone company central office is located.

The first stage of selection is systematic, based on a complete list of all United States area codes and exchanges. Within each PSU, the last two digits are randomly assigned, and that number is called for a screening interview. If it is a working residential

number, the PSU is retained in the sample. Three numbers within each PSU are called. For each survey, the actual telephone numbers are selected in small groups (replicates) that permit varying sample sizes, while still retaining geographic distribution. The initial screening of a PSU makes use of the telephone company's practice of assigning working telephone numbers in blocks of 100's or 1000's before starting a new block. The design is self-weighting, as the likelihood of a given eight-digit group or "block" being selected as a PSU is exactly proportional to the number of working numbers in the block.

Within each household, the probability of selection of a respondent depends on the size of the household. There is an unbiased selection of households of fewer than five adults. This respondent selection controls for gender and the relative age composition of the household.

B. A Note on Telephone Surveys

The use of telephone surveys has raised some important issues; for example, telephone surveys may not reach all individuals with equal probability (Erikson et al, 1988:28-30). The 1986 census reports that 92 percent of all households have phone service. However, the U.S. Public Interest Research Group reported that in 1986, 27 percent of those with incomes under \$15,000 did not have telephone service.

It is estimated that the refusal rate for telephone surveys is 30 percent. Refusals are important if those who decline the interview are systematically different on the questions of interest from those who consent to the interview.

C. Weighting

Poll data can be less than representative of the national adult population for a number of reasons. Weighting is often performed to correct for the occurrence of over- and under-sampled populations. An example might be weighting the sample to compensate for an unrepresentatively small number of Republicans. The poll dataset includes an option to use the weighting scheme or not. In this study, weighting was not applied since only a subsample of the survey was selected, removing the basis of the sample's representativeness.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE POLL AND SUBSAMPLE

A. Comparison of Full Poll Sample to National Statistics

Comparison of the full poll sample (CBS/New York Times, 1985) to 1985 national statistics (U.S. Census, 1985) is shown in Table 1 (see Appendix A). Overall, the demographic characteristics are quite similar. The distribution was almost identical on the following variables: union, religious preference, and region. For

the variables of race and age group, only slight discrepancies exist. A slightly larger discrepancy exists for income in that two categories are almost identical, while the census, in comparison to the poll, includes a somewhat higher percentage of respondents whose family income was over \$50,000 in 1984, and a slightly lower percentage of those in the \$25,000-34,999 range. There was a small discrepancy between the gender distinction, with the poll including a slightly higher ratio of women to men than the census. The distribution on the urbanity variable could not be compared because of the entirely different manner in which the poll and the census categorize the populations by area of residence.

The largest differences were between the distributions of education level. However, the poll questions were worded differently than the census categories are reported and may account for some of the difference. The semantic differences are evident in the following comparisons. Among poll respondents, 13.7 percent said they did not graduate from high school. Within the census, 26.1 percent are reported to have completed one to three years of high school. "Not a high school grad" is less specific than "1 through 3 years high school." On the same question ("What was the last grade in school you completed"), 35.5 percent of poll respondents answered "high school graduate." The census data for years

of school repeated shows 38.2 percent completing four years of high school. The percent of poll respondents who answered this question with "some college" (trade or business) was 25.0. The census data shows 16.3 percent completing one to three years of college. Again, these might strain comparison because of their differences in classification. A census respondent with one semester of college would have to be categorized as having completed four years of high school. The same poll respondent would fall into the category of "some college." The percent of poll respondents who answered this question "college grad and beyond" was 25.4 percent. The census data shows 19.4 percent in the category "four years college or more." It can be assumed that poll respondents who had four years of college or more but did not graduate would fall into the poll category of "some college." It would be difficult to determine into which category a census respondent who had between three and four years of college would fall.

One other factor that makes comparison imprecise for education is that the poll used respondents 18 years of age and older while the census data only reported the education of those 25 years old and older. While the poll encompasses some respondents who could not have had much college or beyond because of their youth, the census

reported on a considerably older population. Assuming that the overall education level in the United States increases with time, this older group would be likely to appear less educated, based on observation of the data.

B. Comparison of the Full Sample to the 16-item Sample

To prevent bias in the analyses of the results, missing data ("no answer" or "don't know") were dealt with by using listwise deletion. This method eliminated from the sample any respondent who had missing data on any of the 16 survey items used in the analyses. The sample size reduced from 1659 to 858. Although mean substitution can be used to compensate for the loss of missing data, it only artificially enhances sample representativeness, since it weights the sample towards the overall mean. Therefore, mean substitution was not used in this analysis. However, as shown above, the analyzed sample is much like the full sample. Table 2 presents the comparison of the full sample to the subsample (see Appendix A).

1. Demographic Variables

The distributions for each variable by percentage were quite similar for the full and the 16-item scale for the following variables: union, education, race, religion, income, urbanity, and region. The distributions within age

groups were similar except that the subsample, in comparison to the full sample, has a somewhat higher percentage of 18 to 29 year olds and a lower percentage of respondents over the age of 64. In other words, in the full sample the younger group gave fewer "no answer" or "don't know" references in comparison to the other three age groups, and those in the older group gave more of these responses in comparison to those in the three younger groups. A somewhat higher percentage of female respondents than male had missing data, changing the proportion of females to males in the subsample.

2. Political Ideology

On the political ideology variable, the percentage distributions for the full sample and subsample were quite similar.

3. Military Variables

After the listwise deletion, the proportion of respondents in the sample answering "yes" increased considerably more than did the proportion of those answering "no" within most of the military opinion variables. For the question asking whether SDI will work, the proportion of respondents in the subsample answering "yes" increased considerably more than did the proportion of those answering "no."

4. Star Wars

For the question as to whether the United States should work towards Star Wars or towards negotiations, the percentage distribution changed approximately proportionally after the listwise deletion.

4. METHODS OF ANALYSIS FOR CATEGORICAL DATA

Logistic regression, a relatively new technique for categorical data analysis, is a type of log-linear technique. Although Goodman had introduced log-linear techniques during the 1960s, sociologists were then preoccupied with Duncan's new path analysis model. Consequently, log-linear models have only recently been considered by survey analysts.

Alwin and Campbell (1987:s146-s147) argue that the log-linear approach provides a unified and rigorous approach to model building for categorical data. Log-linear models focus on tables, the basic building blocks of survey analysis, providing precise tests of simple and complex hypotheses.

Log linear techniques include several different modes of analysis, one of which, logistic regression, is a common categoric technique in the field.

A. Multiple Logistic Regression

Logistic regression is a multivariate technique designed to mimic, in analysis of binary outcomes, the kind of information obtained from linear regression with interval level outcomes. As with multiple linear regression, it allows the researcher to estimate the simultaneous effects of a number of predictors on the probability of one of the states of an outcome, in this case a binary outcome.

It should be noted that logistic regression results are not probabilities but "log odds" (Blalock, 1979:312; Aldrich and Nelson, 1984:32). For the purpose of simplifying the reporting of results, the terminology of probability will be used (for example, "likelihood").

B. Requirements for the Dependent Variables in Logistic Regression

One statistical issue that arose in investigating this dataset was that the variables did not all have the same number of responses. This problem is common in data analysis, and it has implications for any secondary analysis project. Using logistic regression to do the analyses provided an appropriate technique for analyzing dichotomous dependent variables. However, some of the dependent variables were trichotomous; for example, the question on whether the United States is stronger than, about equal to, or not as strong as the Soviet Union is

trichotomous. One way to solve the problem of trichotomous variables is to recode the variable into a dichotomous variable. Another possibility, using the example of the military strength question, would be to simply eliminate a category by making the "about equal" response into missing data. A third possibility is to create two variables using the intermediate response category twice, as follows:

Dummy #1: 0 = About Equal
1 = US Superior

Dummy #2: 0 = About Equal
1 = US Not As Strong

The problem with this solution is that the researcher would be comparing two different groups in terms of sample size (the N changes for each dependent variable). The dummied technique used in this thesis keeps all the respondents in the analysis (the N of the dependent variable remains the same).

The problem with all of these measures is that they entail a loss of information, or redundant use of information. The appropriate solution hinges on the exact research problem that must be solved. Assume that the statistic of interest was the change in likelihood that someone would answer that the United States is superior. The dependent variable can be dummied into two dependent variables for the analysis:

Dummy #1: 0 = Other (About Equal + Not As Strong)
1 = US Stronger

The second dummy is:

Dummy #2: 0 = Other (About Equal + US Superior)
1 = US not as strong

Dummying the dependent variable is a method that allows the researcher to compare the change in log odds that someone will respond, for example, that the United States is superior, with the change in log odds that someone will respond that the United States is not as strong as the Soviet Union. When the dependent variable is dummied into two new variables, it is possible to run the regression for each of them without losing or altering the information contained in the original variable (Grizzle, Starmer, and Koch, 1969:502). It is now possible to analyze the first and third responses, in this case, the response that the United States is superior or that the Soviet Union is superior.

One final note: the researcher's substantive concern must guide the use of measures such as this one. This procedure was particularly appropriate because the substantive concern in this thesis is the responses at the extremes and not the intermediate responses. For example, in the case of the question on who is militarily superior, the extreme responses of United States is "superior" and the United States is "not as strong" are of interest for current purposes, and not the intermediate responses of the

United States and the Soviet Union are "about equal." (See Appendix B for a more technical discussion of this topic.)

C. Dummy and Reference Group

The questionnaire items used in this study included some variables that were clearly categorical (such as religion, which does not measure incremental differences in a specific quality). Other variables can be conceptualized as continuous (or ratio scale) variables (such as income, measured in dollars). In the interest of precision and statistical rigor, all variables were treated as categorical data. A dummy variable technique was used when the variable had more than two responses (Blalock, 1979). This technique makes each category (or response to a question) a dummy variable with a score of 1 or 0. The omitted or suppressed (Blalock, 1979) category is referred to as the reference group for each item in this study. For example, urbanity has five categories. "Large central city" is used as the reference group. A respondent living in a rural area gets a score of 1 for rural, 0 for central city, 0 for suburbs, and 0 for other community, as if there were four (dummy) variables plus the reference group, for the five response categories.

D. Elimination Criteria

In building a model, as with any statistical procedure, criteria must be established beforehand to

insure that the development of the model is not only a matter of empirical exploration, but is guided by consistent adherence to certain principles of investigation.

For the purposes of this research, both statistical decision rules and theoretical concerns were taken into account to guide the analysis. The model was built to test the ordering of the relationships among the variables.

The statistical rule adhered to in the regression analysis was to use a significance test (the coefficient/standard error) with an absolute value of 2.0 or more. Predictors with less than this value were then subject to a theoretical decision, whether or not to select certain variables which did not pass the statistical test for use in further analysis. For example, because of the conceptual importance and the role in the literature of socioeconomic and other variables, they were used in subsequent analyses in order to investigate the effects of changing the multivariate setting for the predictors. More details will be presented on this at relevant points in the thesis. (See Appendix C for a more technical discussion of the justification for narrowing the number of predictors in each step of the procedure.)

In line with holding to scientific principle, each individual regression analysis was performed using a

one-step procedure with all possible independent variables simultaneously, rather than stepwise regression, to arrive at the set of statistically good predictors. This procedure, as well as the predetermination of statistical test values, avoids the kind of "mindless empiricism" that can occur in sociology (Berk, 1988:164).

E. Significance Tests Used in Analysis

Since many variables were treated as categorical and dummied, a joint test was used in each case to measure the effect of the logical variable as a whole. To test the null hypothesis that the variable had no effect on the dependent variable, an F test was used (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984:55-61).

To test the the null hypothesis that the coefficient for each individual term was 0, a t test was used (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984:54). The t test was calculated by dividing the coefficient by the standard error, and a two-tailed test of significance (N=858) was applied (Blalock, 1979:603).

F. The Role of Significance Level in the Use of Dummy Variables

An important methodological issue is the decision, made before analysis is performed, as to what level of significance to use. The standard in sociology is to use a significance level of .05 for a two-tailed test. This is appropriate when it is possible for the relationship

between the two variables to be in either a positive or a negative direction. Despite the hypotheses for the relationship, the possibility that the statistical relationship could be in the opposite direction requires the use of a two-tailed test.

Another issue concerns the dummy terms (individual responses) in an independent variable. If the joint test indicates that the variable as a whole is significantly related to the outcome (dependent variable), then the researcher has the option to investigate the relationships of individual terms within that variable. However, since the different responses to a particular questionnaire item are related to one another, the investigation of the construct (or concept being measured) involves the danger of redundancy in looking at the relationships of each term individually. The researcher must eliminate the possibility of artificially increasing the chances of finding significance. This problem arises because using each individual response for a single logical variable increases the probability of having a statistically significant result. To avoid this, the Bonferonni principle (Harris, 1975:98) can be applied. The principle is that the test of significance for a relationship must be made more stringent to prevent a de facto relaxing of statistical measurement.

To do this, the researcher divides the significance level for each logical variable (e.g., family income being investigated at the .05 level) by the number of separate response categories within that variable minus one. For example, the variable of income has five income levels. Assume that income is significant at the .05 level. The level of .05 is divided by four to create a significance criteria of .0125 for each income level. The appropriate t statistic to use as a reference for statistical significance is interpolated from the standard table (Blalock, 1979). Similarly, the principle is applied to the .01 level of significance by dividing .01 by the number of response categories within the variable minus one, in this case four again. The result is .0025 and the significant t statistic for comparison is interpolated from the same table.

CHAPTER THREE
REVIEW OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a brief review of the literature on the socioeconomic variables used in this thesis, emphasizing the studies that have related these variables both to ideology and to public opinion on military policies. This discussion will follow a general public opinion formation model: The economic base (using income and education), the subcultures within that base (union, religion, race, region, and urbanity), and finally a new variable in group formation and public opinion, gender. In Chapter Four hypotheses will be proposed, linking each of these variables to ideological identification and to opinions on military policy.

2. INCOME

Income is a standard indicator used by sociologists to measure the economic dimension of class, or socioeconomic position. Because economic distinctions produce social differences that are readily visible and keenly experienced (Jackman and Jackman 1983:8), they form

a basis of both group formation and opinion formation. In their review of the field of stratification, Granovetter and Tilly (1988:186) argue that income and wealth are adequate measures of class in most capitalist countries. In the United States, median household per capita income differs enormously by race, national origin, and gender of household head. The differences in wealth are more important than education, age distribution, and labor force participation.

Other sociologists have argued that income alone is not a sufficient indicator for those major economic distinctions that would be associated with differences in behavior and opinion. They have proposed classifications based on manual vs. non-manual labor (Gagliani, 1981), on authority (Dahrendorf, 1959), on occupational prestige (Duncan, 1966), and so forth.

Frequently, income and education are used together to indicate the economic dimension of group and attitude formation. Yet each dimension can also have an independent effect on ideological identification and support for particular policies. Thus they will be examined separately in this thesis.

Income is one of the most important material resources enabling people to meet their basic needs and strive toward goals. Income is distributed unevenly, and the same principle of inequality holds for the concepts of

status and power (Jackman and Jackman, 1983:6). Higher levels of income and wealth are more likely than other strata to be associated with conservative political ideology and conservative ideological identification.

The literature on nuclear weapons and arms control rarely reports any socioeconomic variables, including income. In their report of 1984 polls, the Public Agenda Foundation indicated those results where a particular income group had a particularly strong relationship. Low income (less than \$20,000) was associated with a positive response to such issues as these: civilian defense is desirable against nuclear war, the Soviets will never keep arms control treaties, the Soviets respond only to military strength, nuclear war is inevitable. (Many of these questions also had high percentages of agreement from college students.) People in the highest income bracket have been reported to be against military spending, while also favoring a stronger military stand in Korea and Vietnam (Szymanski, 1983:353) and a strong military stand in general (Hinckley, 1988).

The evidence indicates that the lowest income bracket is associated with opinions that imply a need for a strong United States military. However, there is also a clear tendency for those with higher income to support military expansion and activity. It is expected that both extremes

of income levels would be associated with support for a strong military.

3. EDUCATION

Education, like income, has been an important variable in sociology because of its association with class. Some sociologists view education as the major mechanism by which people can move from one class or socioeconomic level to another. By contrast, others view education as the mechanism by which class position is passed from generation to generation (Szymanski, 1983:289). Most research has shown that when social mobility does occur, it occurs over only a slight social distance. Thus education is assumed to be a variable that is closely associated with but independent from income. Education is often used as another, rough indicator of class, and thus may be associated with behavior and opinions. Jackman and Jackman (1983:37) report that while occupation and money may be interpreted as objective status criteria, education is an objective criterion that has significant expressive and cultural components. Beliefs, life-style, and family are correlated more with education than with occupation or income. Variables associated with education are often assumed to represent socialization into the values of a socioeconomic strata.

As expertise has come to play an increasing role in contemporary, technologically-oriented societies, education is used as an indicator of information, as the basis for informed opinions. This trend is particularly common in the foreign policy literature, where education is assumed to have a broadening effect on opinion. In this field the main distinction is between the college educated and the rest of the population. Education indicates being informed on the issues (or at least on the government's position on various topics), having consistent positions, and in general, being more knowledgeable and sophisticated. It is expected that higher education is associated with identification as a liberal, and that high school education is associated with moderate or liberal identification.

While a higher education level is associated with more liberal opinions on domestic issues, such liberalism does not seem to carry over to military policies. The impact of college education appears to vary by topic.

For example, in the intervention literature, people with high education (and high income) show slightly more support for American military adventures than other groups. During the Vietnam War, the college-educated were the most supportive of the war.

In the military weapons literature, education began to have a discernible effect on support for arms control treaties by the mid-1970s. In their analysis of public opinion trends on the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) in the 1960s and 1970s, Graham and Kramer (1986) report that the general public initially supported deployment of the ABM despite an extensive campaign against its deployment, including unprecedented Congressional testimony by Nobel Prize winning scientists and strong local opposition in three of the ten proposed ABM sites.

However, one significant change in public opinion was that people with at least a college education changed their opinion during the period of Congressional testimony (over the summer of 1969), and eventually opposed deployment. By 1972 the "attentive" public, people with college or post-college education, supported the treaty opposing ABM 10 percent to 20 percent more than the general public.

More recently, in reviewing the polls on the Freeze campaign, Schneider (1985:35) concluded that public opinion on the freeze was more a function of education than of ideology. Liberals, moderates, and conservatives all agreed that the United States should get tougher with the Soviet Union, that the United States had enough nuclear weapons for its national security, and all groups supported a nuclear freeze.

However, the college-educated, who are most likely to favor a tough policy, and are most likely, by a good margin, to feel that the United States had enough nuclear weapons, also showed the strongest support for a freeze (69 percent), more than people under thirty years old (54 percent) and somewhat more than liberals (65 percent).

While college education has been associated with liberal views and progressive movements, researchers note that during the 1980s students have become less liberal (Erikson et al, 1988:154-155). Students currently continue to support interventionist policies, while desiring nuclear disarmament and a lower military budget.

Other educational levels are only touched by researchers in passing. From the military intervention literature, it is clear that people with high school education frequently support non-interventionist policies, disapprove of military adventurism, and are less supportive of "getting tough on communism" overseas (Hamilton, 1975:195). Szymanski notes that while there may be a tendency for workers with high school degrees to be more pro-military in times of peace, this trend may be reversed once casualties (which are disproportionately experienced by this group) start occurring (Szymanski, 1983:354).

Another body of analysis has found that non-college graduates are less able to understand complex facts and

issues, are more isolationist and extremist, and are more likely to support policies promoting military strength and toughness (Schneider, 1986).

In general, the lower educated have fewer experiences and less alternative educational resources to reconsider such beliefs as anti-Sovietism. The higher educated have more alternative sources of knowledge, but they tend to follow and support changes in government policy. For these rather different reasons, it can be expected that high and low educated respondents will support tough military policies.

4. UNION AFFILIATION

Although union membership is often included in polls, it is rarely included in public opinion studies on either domestic or foreign policy. This may be due in part to the small union representation in the workforce, and in part to the fact that since most of the large unions are quite impersonal and bureaucratized, they are expected to have limited impact on the politicization of their rank and file (Jackman and Jackman, 1983:112).

The few studies which do examine unionization and opinion focus on unions and union-related issues. Overall, the findings do not form a cohesive body of results. A review of poll data on unions concludes that the division

between officers and members on opinion is greater than the division between union and non-union members (Heldman and Knight, 1980). A study of unions found that union officers are more liberal and interested in working-class welfare than are union members (Blume, 1970). Compared to non-union members, however, union members are consistently more class-conscious, liberal, and dissatisfied with the economic situation (Form, 1985:19), although Jackman and Jackman (1983:113-116) report that for white union workers in a national survey, union membership is not associated with class consciousness.

Form (1985) presents the most extensive description of current union membership and political behavior, arguing that there are two segments of the union organization. One segment is comprised of the craft unions and the industrial core unions, which tend to include a majority of white males and tend to be conservative. The other segment of unions includes the service unions, with large numbers of minorities (blacks, Hispanics, and women) who tend to be more progressive or liberal.

It can be argued, however, that unionization has a unique impact on opinion, overriding the effects of differences in union composition. At minimum, membership in a union gives people the experience of joining an organization which will improve their chances of making

their grievances heard, and will improve their standard of living. In this study, for example, a plurality of union members (39 percent) have household incomes of \$25,000-\$35,000, in contrast to non-union respondents, a plurality of whom (30 percent) earn \$12,500-\$25,000. In addition, union members and families in general receive more material benefits than non-union workers, including medical care, pensions, higher pay, more holidays and paid sick leave. These benefits are substantial enough for workers and union households to make considerable sacrifices during strikes and lockouts. The sense of having more support in relation to management, combined with receiving some experience of the potential strength of numbers, is expected to improve the chances of union respondents taking a more liberal view on job-related issues, and probably on ideological identification as well. In his analysis of a national survey, Szymanski (1983:346) reports that the working class is more likely to refuse the labels of liberal and conservative, and to select moderate compared to other classes; however, more people in the working class select liberal as their identification.

No studies have been found examining the opinions of people who are not members of unions but who have a union member in their household. Does the union have an effect on household members? The experience of a slightly higher standard of living, empowerment at the workplace, and sacrifices during strikes are likely to influence the whole household, and would lead to the expectation that union households (with the respondent or another person as the union member) would differ from non-union households in economic and political opinions.

There may also be some distinctive aspects of the union household (in which the respondent is not a union member). In this study, for example, 71 percent of the non-union respondents from union households are women, and are probably the wives and the daughters (18 to 29 year olds) of union members. These respondents are also more likely to have some college (38 percent) than are the union member respondents (27 percent) and the non-union households (24 percent). Thus their higher education and gender may correlate with a stronger liberal identification compared to the union and the non-union respondents.

Survey information on unions and foreign policy opinion is almost non-existent. A strong argument can be made for expecting that union members will be more pro-military than others in the working class. From World

War II on, the union leadership of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) has actively promoted anti-Sovietism and anti-communism, and has championed the Cold War. This official attitude has carried over to official union views on the arms race (Raskin, 1982:217). Organized labor also tends to support the arms race and military policies for economic reasons. At least 10 percent of the economy is directly tied to military spending. Ending the arms race without a comprehensive reconversion plan would lead to economic catastrophe. Without such a plan, the unions have become locked in to support of the general contours of the arms race.

However, there is a new trend among some unions in the AFL-CIO. Many unions representing the service industry, particularly health care, teaching, welfare and social services, have taken strong stands against increased military spending and in support of the freeze movement. The defense budget affects their work directly in terms of cutbacks in budgets, staffs, and available programs, and indirectly in terms of their clients (unemployment, lowered wages).

Unfortunately the poll does not include data on occupation, so that the differences between unions cannot be measured and tested. Such cross-pressures within and

between unions could be expected to result in union membership having a suppressed effect on opinions on military policies.

The 1985 poll includes a question on family union affiliation, asking if the respondent or if a household member belongs to a union. There are three categories of respondents: union members, respondents with union member in the household, and non-union respondents.

It is expected that compared to respondents who are union members or who have union members in their households, non-union respondents are slightly more likely to support negotiation and other non-military policies.

5. REGION

Region as a variable in public opinion surveys has often been associated with distinct policy outlooks because regions vary so much in their history and culture (Hamilton, 1972: 283-306). For example, the greatest percentage of liberals are found in the east (New England, mid-Atlantic states), with the Pacific states a close second, while the south is typically thought to be more conservative than any other region.

The traditionally conservative south has changed in recent years. For example, Hamilton (1972) reports that on a number of domestic political issues, the south is no more

likely to be conservative than other regions. In contrast to opinion surveys, the image of southern conservatism may derive more from conservative legislative leadership than popular sentiment.

The similarity between aggregate southern opinion distributions and those of other regions hides strong differences between black and white views (Hamilton, 1972). For example, southern white Protestants are more likely to be conservative than southern black Protestants. For this reason, the analysis of the effect of region on ideological identification must control for race.

In one of the most comprehensive analyses of public opinion in the south, Hamilton (1972) reports that on basic political issues such as guaranteed living standards and medicare, there has for some time been class cleavage in the south (in the sense of income-based differences). Further, income differences in opinions have tended to vary in different sized communities. This has been one reason that medium sized towns tend to be centers of conservatism. Such towns are dominated by an upper middle and lower middle class, with an unorganized, white, conservative working class. These factors lead to the conclusion that an analysis of the effects of living in the south on ideological identification and military opinions must control for size of place as well as income level.

In their analysis of a national poll on foreign policy issues, Galston and Makins (1988) show that region is the primary demographic factor on foreign policy issues, particularly in terms of the contrast between the south and the rest of the country. Many polls show that the south tends to be 10 percent more conservative on foreign policy; for example, the south is less likely to limit SDI development, less likely to support the INF treaty, less likely to curb SDI to achieve an arms treaty agreement, and less likely to believe that defense spending is excessive (Martilla and Kiley, 1988). Researchers conclude that the south had a higher rate of support for Reagan's foreign policy. In reviewing the history of polls on nuclear defense systems and arms negotiations, Graham and Kramer (1986) note that the south was the only region that did not agree with the idea of a treaty for defensive systems against nuclear weapons during the SALT I debates.

In his analysis of social class, Form summarizes regions by their traditional distinctive industrial sectors. The midwest and northeast are areas of high unionization in the blue collar core industries of steel, automobile, and mining; however, the northeast lost employment in electrical industries, steel, textiles, automobiles and chemicals during the late 1970s and 1980s. The west is characterized by high unionization and service

industries. Major unions on the west coast have been more independent and questioning of AFL-CIO policies and have experienced intensive anti-nuclear and pro-peace referendum campaigns. The south has long been characterized as having right-to-work laws and few unions.

Sometimes particular industries are associated with regions, which may also be linked to political opinions. Military bases, for example, are more heavily concentrated in the south. In the early 1980s, the south included many states which received large shares of defense spending. In 1982, the region received \$60 billion, approximately one third of national defense expenditures (Facts on File, 1984:264).

This flow of money can be expected to lead, if indirectly, to support for continued military spending in the south. In the early 1980s, fifty-four percent of the southern population thought their community was very or somewhat dependent on defense spending (compared to 40 percent in the northeast, 42 percent in the west, and 39 percent in the midwest). Interestingly, only 3 percent of the southern respondents were working at the time for a company whose main business was with the Armed Forces, and only 12 percent had worked at such a company (Davis and Sheatsley, 1986).

In a study on people's orientations toward international involvement, Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981) found that ideology, region, and education are the best predictors. Internationalists tend to be from the east and hold a moderate ideology, while the accommodationists are from the south, are conservative, and have a high school education or less. Accommodationists (who favor negotiations) are liberals from the midwest or west, and have some college.

It is expected that the South is more likely to support military policies than other regions.

6. RURAL AND URBAN AREAS

Urbanization has been another variable in public opinion surveys; examining the continuum from rural areas, small towns, and suburbia to big cities. Urbanization has been used as a rough indicator of the degree of liberalism, with the large city the most liberal, and the rural area most conservative (Hamilton, 1975:239). The differences are in part due to the populations of these areas: cities have large proportions of people (such as blacks, Jews, and Catholics) who have been associated with liberal ideologies. Protestants and whites (outside of the south) live in the more rural areas, and are more conservative.

Hamilton found that middle-sized cities are more Republican than are other sized cities (Hamilton, 1972:243).

One unresolved difficulty in using this variable with national surveys concerns whether to classify small, suburban communities adjacent to metropolitan areas as small towns or as metropolitan areas. The category of suburbs may include a highly Republican upper-middle class neighborhood or a Democratic working-class suburb. The use of the urbanity variable is thus more exploratory than definitive. There does seem to be consensus, however, that rural areas are more conservative than large central cities.

Large central cities are places where residents are exposed to extremes of different ideas, different groups, and greater inequality between rich and poor. Therefore, bigger cities may promote a more liberal outlook. Since smaller towns tend to be more insulated from new ideas and various diverse populations, and since there is often little organized opposition to the local Republican elite (no Democratic party organization, for example), the residents of small towns are more likely to identify with the status quo and with conservatism than with liberalism.

In the poll dataset, large central cities included areas with over 500,000 residents, central cities included 50,000 to 500,000 residents, suburbs were undefined,

communities included populations between 10,000 and 50,000 residents, and rural areas were undefined.

Mueller (1973) is the only researcher who reported the effect of urbanity on foreign and military policy opinions. His research showed no effect. It can be expected that any effects that are significant would show smaller towns and rural areas to be more likely to support aggressive military policy.

7. RELIGION

In the public opinion literature, religion has been associated primarily with political ideology. Political differences are associated with the ways in which religious denominations are related to class. Protestants, with higher-status jobs and greater family incomes, are more conservative on economic issues than Catholics. While many of the socioeconomic differences between Protestants and Catholics have disappeared recently (Erikson et al, 1988:187), each group may still reflect its distinctive group heritage. For example, Catholics are more liberal on economic issues, perhaps because of their recent experience of immigration and discrimination. Jews, like Catholics, have experienced discrimination and historically are liberal on civil liberties issues.

Typically, studies of religious affiliation and political opinions are restricted to white populations. American blacks, who are also predominantly Protestant, are liberal unlike the white Protestants. Black and white Protestants differ on such military topics as military spending, intervention in Central America, and cooperation with the Soviet Union (Erikson et al, 1988: Table 7.7 on page 189). The Protestants are least in favor of decreasing military spending and least in favor of cooperating with the Soviet Union. A greater percentage of Jews and others support cooperation with the Soviet Union, a decreased defense budget, and less intervention in Central America. In his analysis of support for the military budget, Goertzel (1987:68) found that Jewish and non-religious respondents were strikingly dovish on military spending, and that Catholics and nonwhite respondents were more dovish than Protestants or white respondents.

It is expected that Protestants will be the most supportive of a strong military, and that Catholics and Jews would be the least supportive of militarist policies.

8. RACE

In general, racial rather than class divisions have been treated as central to social and political life in

America (Jackman and Jackman, 1983:11). Racial groups are based on ascriptive physical characteristics that are readily visible. While there is no single criterion for racial group membership (skin color, hair type, facial features), the configuration of characteristics has become so routine that they are used as a single criterion, such as black versus white. Using survey data to analyze race and class consciousness, Jackman and Jackman found that middle class and working class blacks feel as warm and close to poor blacks as they do to their own class. Stronger race bonds exceed the expression of stronger class bonds for blacks, which is in contrast to whites (Jackman and Jackman, 1983:41-48).

Very little opinion research reports findings for black respondents. Most of the public opinion research that does include black respondents focuses on the race-related issues of integration and affirmative action. Opinion research has found that blacks take liberal positions on civil rights and economic issues (favoring domestic programs and a good standard of living). The low income and low skilled jobs held by young black men are reflected in their low job satisfaction (Hamilton and Wright, 1986:229). Nationally, compared to whites, blacks have lower incomes and less education; they are more religious,

more likely to be Democrats or independent, and more likely to have grown up in the south.

In his study of organized labor, Form (1985) found black and Hispanic workers to be the most class-conscious, politically alert members of the working class.

Predominantly in the service occupations (government, education), they are more liberal than white workers.

There is very little reported opinion research on foreign policy or military policy that includes a discussion of the role of race. When race is reported, usually in passing, the blacks are against war (Mueller, 1973; Hamilton, 1973; Verba et al., 1967:325; Hahn, 1970).

The typical poll item offers three choices of racial identification: white, black, other. Other is not specified further. In this poll, a bivariate analysis of the poll data shows that three groups are similar in terms of education, gender, and union membership. It is assumed that the category of other in this poll is composed largely of Asians and Hispanics, given their distinctive patterns of residence in the south and west, in urbanized areas, high income, and religion (Catholic or other).

The blacks in the poll are distinct from the whites and from others in their income (28 percent of blacks earn under \$12,500, compared to 12 percent for whites and 9 percent for others). At the higher end of the scale, 16

percent of black households earn over \$35,000, compared to 34 percent of whites (and 31 percent of others). More blacks live in big cities (67 percent compared to 30 percent of whites and 58 percent of others), on the east and west coasts.

On the information gleaned from the literature, it is expected that blacks would be less likely to support a strong military than whites and others.

9. GENDER

The impact of gender on behavior and opinion has become a more interesting topic to sociologists over the past decade. For a long time, gender was not a critical issue in public opinion and voting studies. Women's opinions were presumed to be the same as their husbands', and studies of policy issues simply excluded women (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986). It has not been clear to opinion analysts or sociologists how to define women's primary groups, and without a primary group for women, it would be difficult to observe differences in opinion.

The traditional primary group for women is the family, and in particular, other women relatives and neighbors. More families are still located closer to the wife's mother, and that familial connection has remained strong. One study found that women consistently show

significantly higher levels of "don't know" response rates than men (holding constant the question wording, etc.), and that this trend is transmitted from mother to daughter (Rapoport, 1985). Females, both adult and preadult, express fewer attitudes than males.

However, while women continue to express fewer opinions than men, those who do express opinions have begun to express different opinions from men. The study of the impact of gender on opinions, the "gender gap," began in earnest over the past ten years. Since the 1970s, as the economic recession forced more women into the labor force, as clerical and temporary jobs proliferated, and as the women's movement encouraged women to become more active members of society, differences between men and women developed on such political issues as environment, confidence in the political system, minority rights, and so forth (Poole and Zeigler, 1985).

Research has found that one area where men and women have consistently differed is in their opinions about the use of force. Women have been more opposed to continuing the draft, to using the atomic bomb, to handguns and the death penalty, and were less supportive of the Korean and Vietnam wars (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986:42-43). Women who are politically active within the Democratic and Republican parties are more supportive than men of the United Nations

and other related international organizations (Poole and Zeigler, 1985:166). Women have also been more opposed to new weapons systems and have supported arms control more than men (Graham and Kramer, 1986).

During the campaign for more military spending in the late 1970s and early 1980s, large majorities of men and women both favored increasing defense spending. By 1982 the differences between men and women were more obvious. For women, defense expenditures became one issue associated with disapproval of Reagan's performance as president. Gilens (1988) found that younger and more educated men were more approving of Reagan, as were higher income men and women. Gilens also found that women were more liberal than men on military/foreign policy issues, and that their position strongly affected their negative feelings toward Reagan. While men were moderately supportive of increased military spending in 1982, women favored decreased spending. Believing that defense expenditures should be cut back resulted in only a small decline in male approval of Reagan, but a drastic 25.8 point deficit in approval among women.

As more women became gainfully employed, sociologists have begun to explore the relationship between work, gender, and class to facilitate explanations of the gender gap. Until recently, a family's class position was derived

from the husband's position in the labor market. In empirical studies, women were classified by their husband's position, whether or not the women worked (Jackman and Jackman, 1983). Recently, women have begun to use their own work status or combined their status with their husband's status as a basis for class identity (Davis and Robinson, 1988; Simpson, Stark, and Jackson, 1988). Furthermore, class consciousness and union membership has been found to be greater for those women who worked in traditional jobs (that is, primarily with other women). As employment becomes the statistical norm for both married and single women, women's salient identity is changing from family status to work and class identification. This change implies that gender may become a more important variable.

There are some growing differences in opinions between housewives and employed women on some issues (Pool and Zeigler, 1985). Housewives were more pacifist than employed women, and liberal housewives were more interested in negotiations with the Soviet Union (Pool and Zeigler, 1985:113). Conservative housewives, however, were more conservative than conservative working women.

The research indicates that there are conflicting trends influencing women. Unemployed married women may be more liberal and/or more conservative than employed women,

for whom the workplace and an increasing class identity seems to have a moderating influence. Because the 1985 poll data does not include employment and marital data, these factors cannot be controlled for. It is expected that women would be less likely to support a strong military.

10. AGE

While age cohorts have been examined in part to explore the stability of political opinions over time, age is not often included in public opinion studies on military and foreign policy issues. The major distinction in this variable is generally between the young and the old, determining which group is more conservative.

Since the Vietnam War era, sociologists and policy makers have given attention to age-group differences in political opinions. Age gaps are examined to see if other factors are operating as well (Erikson et al, 1988:183-186). For example, age cohorts can vary on a subject because of differences in composition. The under-30 age cohort is much better educated than those over 55, so that the age gap might be explained by the difference in educational levels. There is also a life cycle effect, gauging how people's political views are influenced by maturation. Youth can be more idealistic

than than the middle-aged, who are responsible for family, mortgage, and job. Life-cycle effects seem to operate on the strength of partisanship. Younger cohorts tend to have weaker party identification. However, historical events can change this relationship. The post-1965 generation has remained independent, refusing to adopt a party preference with age.

There are also generational differences, which occur when a specific age cohort is uniquely socialized by a set of historical events. This approach assumes that the political events which have a lasting effect are those which occur when a person is in the process of establishing adult independence. The Vietnam war era (1965-1972) or the Great Depression of the 1930's are typical examples of historical events affecting generations. The Vietnam generation, however, has also been affected by life-cycle and generational effects, and even the most active anti-war protesters have lost some of their distinctiveness (Jennings, 1987).

In some reports, notice is made when a particular age category differs from the others. Among those over 61 years old, one study showed that larger percentages thought that the subject of nuclear weapons was too complex and should be left to the President and experts; that the Soviets would respond only to military strength; that the

Soviets used detente to build up their armed forces; that building more weapons would get the Soviets to make concessions for arms control; that civil defense programs could save millions of lives in a nuclear war; and that little could be done about this development (Belsky and Doble, 1984:14, 36, 69). From the same study, people under 30 years think that building missiles will eventually lead to war. The 45 to 60-year old group thought that the United States should always be superior in nuclear weapons, and that America should do everything to build up military strength even if it might lead to a new arms race.

Clearly, these opinions reflect more anti-Soviet, pro-military viewpoint among older groups than among younger ones. As a cohort, those who were over 65 in 1984 were maturing and establishing their personal independence during the 1940s and 1950s. This is historically consistent with a interest in the military protection of the United States and a negative view of the Soviet Union. The youngest age group in the dataset used here were entering the adult world during the early 1980s. The increased conservative and military political rhetoric of this period may have had the effect of promoting more suspicious views of the Soviet Union. The evidence indicates that even if it did, such an effect was not enough to make this cohort more conservative than older

groups. It is expected that younger people would be less supportive of a strong military.

11. SUMMARY

This thesis explores the determinants of SDI opinion. First, the important variables will be analyzed to see how they influence ideological identification. The variables that are found to be important influences on ideology, as well as ideology itself, will be tested for their effects on specific military opinions. Finally, those variables that influence political ideology and specific military opinions will be analyzed as determinants of SDI opinion.

CHAPTER FOUR

HYPOTHESES

1. INTRODUCTION

The literature reviewed in Chapter Three indicates that education, income, region, race, gender, occupation, ideological identification, and to a lesser degree, age and religion, are related to opinions on such military topics as defense spending, intervention, the use of force, weapon systems, negotiations, and relations with the Soviet Union. Opinions on various military topics have also been linked to support for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Prior research lends support to the inclusion of these socioeconomic variables and ideological positions in an investigation of opinions on SDI. The chapter presents the hypotheses to be tested in this study.

2. IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION

Political sociologists are concerned with ideology because basic political ideas are part of the origin of political opinion. In the public opinion literature, ideological identification is defined as identifying oneself as liberal, moderate or conservative (Knight,

1982). The variable is used as an indicator of political philosophy, and has been used in candidate and voting studies.

While there is no firm consensus over the definition of liberal, conservative, and moderate, a few underlying assumptions can be specified for each.

Liberalism is associated with an emphasis on equality and an optimistic view of human nature (Erikson, 1988:75). Liberals tend to support planned change for the improvement of people's conditions. This often translates into support for government spending for social needs.

Conservatism is usually associated with a more pessimistic view of human nature. Society is thought to be based on the control of "intrinsically base impulses" (Erikson, 1988:75). Conservatives emphasize tradition and authority.

A moderate identification is assumed to indicate the lack of a political philosophy (Robinson and Fleishman, 1988). Studies have found that the selection of moderate represents indifference to the ideological stimuli, rather than studied neutrality (Knight, 1982:841).

Ideology has a dual role in the class-ideology-opinion conceptual model being tested in this thesis. Ideology is expected to be dependent upon at least some of the structural or higher order variables in the model, and is also expected to be an important determinant of opinions

on certain military policies. The remainder of this section will treat the first of these roles, the influence of the demographic characteristics on ideology. (See Section 3, Military Opinions, for a discussion of ideology as an independent variable.)

Recent research has challenged the prominent view that the American mass public does not think ideologically, which dates back to the early 1960s and Converse's seminal article, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" (1964). Others have argued that American voters have become more ideological since the 1950s (Kinder and Sears, 1985:666). Challengers to the "lack of ideology" argument point out that most Americans continue to identify themselves as either liberals, moderates, or conservatives, indicating that these terms do have meaning (Kinder and Sears, 1985:668). For example, an overwhelming majority identify the Democratic and Republican parties with the ideological labels of liberal and conservative (Erikson, et al, 1988:76).

Research has also demonstrated that ideological identification is consistent with positions on specific policies. In 1984, for example, on questions as diverse as whether the government should guarantee jobs, or spend less on defense, the liberal position was taken more than twice

as often by self-described liberals than by self-described conservatives (Erikson, et al, 1988:79).

A. The Meaning of Ideology in 1985

The 1980s has been described by many analysts as a more conservative era. Recent research has shown distinct shifts in the ideological identification of the American public. The ratio of conservatives to liberals has shifted toward the conservative side, going from 1.42 in 1972 to 1.6 in 1984 (Robinson and Fleishman, 1988:136). (This is consistent with the ratio in the 1985 CBS/New York Times dataset examined here, which has a conservative/liberal ratio of 1.7.)

This trend to conservatism has been stronger among those with more interest in politics (Robinson and Fleishman, 1988:136). Among the general public, it has been less extensive, with the exception of certain issues. One of these is the issue of American relations with other countries. During the latter half of the 1970s, the American public became increasingly concerned with the military "weakness" of the United States, which was heightened by the combination of the Iran hostage situation and Soviet actions in Asia (Chafetz and Ebaugh, 1983:275). Despite extensive issue-framing and rhetoric from a conservative administration, however, the shift in the distribution of ideological identification has been

less than might be expected from an easily manipulated public (Robinson and Fleishman, 1988:138; Smith, 1985). Thus, even in the context of a conservative administration, the public shift towards conservatism is less than what might be expected.

B. Liberal-Conservatism and Socioeconomic Status

Public opinion research that includes ideological identification rarely reports the relationship between this variable and socioeconomic factors. In certain studies on ideology, measures of liberalism and conservatism are drawn from responses to questions on economic or political issues including income, education and occupation (Knoke, 1979). In general, such research has found that liberalism and conservatism tend to have different relationships with specific social groups depending on the issue area. Throughout the postwar years, social class has been inversely related to support for government social programs; those with higher income tend to be less supportive of such programs. In the area of political opinion, it is generally agreed by scholars that higher class position is associated with liberalism on non-economic issues, such as civil rights.

C. Hypotheses

Specific demographic and socioeconomic variables are viewed as contributing to a person's ideology. This first

set of variables will be specified and tested to determine the most powerful predictors of ideological identification. Ideological identification is expected to be influenced by these socioeconomic factors in the following ways:

1. Union Membership

Theoretically, the experience of empowerment which comes from being in a union would make a union member more liberal than a non-union member. At minimum, membership in a union provides the experience of joining an organization which will improve the chances of making members' grievances heard and also improve their standard of living. When asked for an ideological identification, the working class is more likely to refuse the labels of liberal and conservative, and select moderate (Szymanski, 1983:346). However, in the context of Reagan's anti-union policies (beginning with the PATCO strike) and the massive layoffs in the early 80's, it is hypothesized that the union members and union households are less likely to select conservative identification.

2. Income

It is hypothesized that the effects of income will be strong once the relationship with ideology is controlled for education, race, and age. Income is expected to be positively related to conservatism.

Because higher income is associated with maintaining the status quo, it is expected that the respondents at the high income levels are more likely to identify themselves as conservative and that this relationship will be weaker when age, education and race are controlled. Liberalism, on the other hand, is more likely to be associated with education and race. Thus, while liberalism may also be expected to be associated with a middle range of income, it is hypothesized that there will be little or no relationship between income and liberalism when race and education are controlled.

3. Education

A higher level of educational attainment has historically been expected to promote liberalism because the experience of obtaining education not only exposes one to new ideas, but also empowers one to think of having more options and more interests. These new ideas and a sense of having more options increase the chances of being more tolerant and liberal about other people's viewpoints. However, in the 1980's, with the resurgence of conservatism among the young, and education increasingly oriented toward business and market priorities, this relationship can be expected to be attenuated.

When gender, urbanity, race, and income are controlled, it is hypothesized that higher education will be positively associated with identification as a liberal.

4. Gender

Overall, women have been found to be more liberal than men. Because of women's experience of economic and political disenfranchisement at the workplace and in society, it is hypothesized that women are more likely to be more liberal than men, and to choose the ideological identification of liberal or moderate. Because men are the beneficiaries of such inequalities as earning higher incomes, holding more responsibility and, in general, exercising more power in a variety of settings, it is hypothesized that men will tend to identify themselves as conservative.

Since the inequalities between men and women are reflected in income, education, and even racial differentials, it is expected that much of the relationship between gender and ideological identification is due to status and socioeconomic differences. Thus, when these variables are controlled for, it is hypothesized that the relationship between gender and ideology will be reduced.

5. Urbanity

Liberal identification is more likely in communities of larger population. Smaller towns tend to be more

insulated from new ideas and populations. The effect of this insulation is to promote in small town residents an orientation that supports the status quo. Bigger cities, on the other hand, are places where residents are exposed to extremes of different ideas, different groups, and greater inequality between rich and poor. It is expected that a greater proportion of respondents in large central cities are more likely to identify themselves as liberal. When race, region, religion, income, and education are controlled, it is hypothesized that the relationship between urbanity and ideology will be reduced.

6. Age

It is a common sociological finding that conservatism increases with age, partly because maturity brings with it increased status, and thus more of an interest in retaining the status and material possessions accrued. A counter-acting force is the increased conservatism of the late 1970s and the Reagan era, which is expected to affect younger people, those who matured in this era (Erikson, et al, 1988:139). Since the early Reagan years involved many young people obtaining status and possessions earlier than usual, it is hypothesized that the usual differences in ideology between young and old are reduced to the point that they are not different.

It is also hypothesized that when the effect of age is controlled for urbanity, education, race, and income, there will be no relationship between age and ideology.

7. Region

Because of its long-standing distinct culture and history, it is expected that respondents in the south are more likely to identify themselves as conservative than in other regions, even after controlling for race, income, urbanity, and religion. Although the south has become less different from other regions, it is hypothesized that it will continue to show some of this conservative tradition as an independent effect.

8. Religion

In general, Protestants are expected to be more conservative than other religions. Since blacks, who tend to be liberal, are included among the Protestants, it is also necessary to control for race in the relation between religion and ideology. It is hypothesized that controlling for race, urbanity, education, income, and region, the following relationships will be significant: the Jewish category will be more likely to be liberal, the Protestants will be the most conservative, and Catholics will be slightly less liberal than the Jewish group.

9. Race

In describing the social basis of opinion formation, the socioeconomic experiences of different races are considered so distinct as to warrant special attention (Jackman and Jackman, 1983:4). However, few studies on foreign and military policy include a discussion of the role of race, and there are none on Asians, Cubans, or Latin Americans now living in the United States. The literature on domestic policy does report that blacks take liberal positions on economic issues (favoring domestic programs and a good standard of living).

It is hypothesized that this strong liberalism in one issue area will result in more blacks identifying themselves as liberal, in contrast to whites and others, and that whites are more likely to identify themselves as conservatives.

3. MILITARY OPINIONS

This section introduces the general problem of the socioeconomic basis of military opinions, followed by a section presenting three survey items about the arms race and United States-Soviet relations. Two opinion items about the SDI program itself are then presented. A subsequent section discusses specific hypotheses regarding opinions about each of these different military policies.

Opinion on military policies has been treated as an area distinct from economic and political issues. Most of the studies of foreign opinion have focused on the relationship of various ideological items to each other, rather than to socioeconomic factors. Knoke (1979) analyzed the relationship between socioeconomic variables and selected political issues, and found that higher socioeconomic status corresponded with conservatism on economic and political issues, and with less conservatism on civil liberties and social issues. Income and occupation had the strongest effects on economic political orientation, while education had the strongest effect on socio-political orientation. Knoke concluded that the socioeconomic correlates of foreign policy opinion should also be investigated.

This section uses a selected number of socioeconomic variables to test their effects on opinions for various military policies. Political ideological identification, previously discussed only in its role as a dependent variable, is now included as an independent variable in this set of hypotheses.

A. Theoretical Expectations

Since there are many groups of people in lower social strata or in situations where they gain less from society than others (materially or in terms of status), these

groups may be less likely to ally themselves with government military policies.

People's opinions on matters of United States-Soviet relations and military policy vis-a-vis the Soviets are determined by their social position in the social structure, which implies certain rewards and/or certain powerlessness and losses. People who gain less from the social structure may not have a coherent or systematic set of beliefs about their position in society, but it is expected that their experience of loss or powerlessness (materially or in terms of status) may engender distrust for the United States' use of military power. This is posited to be true for both general military policies (such as whether the United States should "get tough" with the Soviet Union) and the specific issue of SDI.

The first three military opinions discussed below relate to problems of United States-Soviet relations. There are three remaining opinions which have to do with SDI.

B. Questions on Military Policy

The military policy items involve negotiations with the Soviet Union and on the Strategic Defense Initiative. Each question represents a different military topic of

interest here. Although the questions focus on different aspects of military policy, they are all about the use of force or about the choice between force or diplomacy in international relations.

1. General Military Questions

The military strength questions selected for this study are similar to questions used in related studies. However, the questions have not been systematically selected for their relationship to class-related variables.

Military Strength

Right now, would you say the United States is superior in military strength to the Soviet Union, is about equal in strength, or is not as strong as the Soviet Union?

It is assumed in military opinion research that most people, including experts, do not have the knowledge of weapons necessary to evaluate the relative military strength of the Soviet Union and the United States. Responses to this type of question may therefore reflect the dominant media and government positions on the relative strength of the superpowers. If people view the United States as militarily equal to the Soviet Union, it is assumed that they think that more peaceful relations with the Soviet Union can occur. When people view the United States as less strong than the Soviet Union, it is assumed that they will support a military build-up and also

will hold negative feelings about the Soviet Union. Those who think that the United States is superior may be also be ready to support negotiations; they may also simply be nationalistic (e.g., the United States is better than any communist country).

Soviets Honor a Treaty

Do you think it's possible to negotiate a fair arms control agreement that the Soviet Union would live up to?

This question taps the public's general assessment of whether or not a treaty can be negotiated between the two countries. The questions wording seems to include an anti-Soviet bias; e.g., it implies that the Soviet Union would not live up to a treaty that is "fair" to the United States, and/or that a treaty supported by the Soviet Union would not be "fair" to the United States. Respondents who agree that it is possible to negotiate a treaty under such conditions would probably be less anti-Soviet and more hopeful about a negotiation strategy than respondents who disagree with the statement.

Reduce Tensions or Get Tough

What do you think the United States should do now -- should the United States try harder to reduce tensions with the Russians, or should the United States get tougher in its dealings with the Russians?

Variants of this question have existed in the literature since the 1960s. The choice of getting tough or reducing tension with the Soviet Union is a choice of posture. A tough posture implies willingness to use force, whereas choosing to reduce tension implies willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union. Both of these postures have been found in the national public opinion (Schneider, 1985:322).

Getting tough tends to mean being willing to increase tension by taking a strong position and not giving in. Tough implies being principled and unwilling to compromise. On the other hand, an interest in reducing tension assumes a different view of the United States-Soviet relationship. Reducing tension is more closely associated with acceptance of the mutual give and take of compromise, with an interest in putting the potential adversary at ease. This view tends to see both sides as equal and having similar interests in security. This assumption of common interests is a basis for mutual security.

2. SDI Questions

The two SDI questions described here both represent opinions about the SDI weapons program itself. This is a more specific type of opinion than the three discussed above. The first question concerns the intent of SDI to

protect all Americans, and the second question concerns SDI's likelihood of working.

In his famous nationally televised "Star Wars" speech of March 23, 1983, Reagan announced that he was directing the "...scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" (Snyder, 1986:220). Much of the ensuing public debate about SDI has been on topics brought up in this speech announcing the program.

The specific goal mentioned in Reagan's speech was to create "defensive technologies" which would enable the United States to "...intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies," so that a "...free people...(could) live secure..." (Snyder, 1986:219).

The speech presented the goal of the program as one of protection and implied that the goal was to protect the United States population as well as the populations of its allies. This version of SDI became known as the "leakproof umbrella" or "Star Wars I." This version of SDI dominated the media for the first two years after Reagan's announcement of the program (Thompson, 1985:93).

The question as to what SDI was meant to do was a major part of the ensuing debate. Those who had detailed knowledge about the history and technology of space-based weaponry knew that the purpose of such weaponry was not obvious. Both critics and supporters asserted that SDI technology could have a number of different functions, ranging from an offensive system to a limited defense for small areas of the United States such as military bases (Snyder, 1986:185-6).

Because members of the general public were not involved in the detailed debate, they presumably were not usually aware of any issue other than the question of whether the "total defense" (Star Wars I) would work in its mission to stop all Soviet missiles and protect the United States. The matter of Star Wars II (a limited defense) was sensitive ideologically. By late 1984, the defense establishment viewed SDI as a limited defense; however, Reagan was still presenting it to the public as a total defense (Thompson, 1985:100).

Will SDI Protect the Population

Is the administration's proposed Star Wars system intended to protect the entire population, about half the population, or less than ten percent of the population?

This question is concerned with intention, not capability. The agent whose intentions are being judged

are "the administration's." Since this is a question asking respondents to state their view of the goal of SDI, it is in essence a political question; what do respondents think the administration wants to protect with SDI?

The question being analyzed here is the only national survey question which asks for an opinion about the administration's intended purpose for SDI. The only other question on this issue was a related question also used in November of 1985, which asked whether the respondent thought SDI would someday be able to reduce either the number of missiles getting through, or be a leakproof umbrella, or protect only small areas, etc. The responses showed that only 10 percent expected SDI to comprise a leakproof defense, while 32 percent thought SDI would only reduce the number of missiles getting through, and 22 percent thought SDI would "never be effective" (Graham, 1986:3-31).

However, some of the support for SDI appears not to be based on the expectation that it will protect the United States, at least not by 1985. For example, a Committee on the Present Danger survey in May of 1985 found that support declined from 84 percent for a system that would "destroy almost all incoming missiles" down to 61 percent for a system that "defends only U.S...missiles" (Graham, 1986:315). This is still a majority advocating an SDI system that would not protect them directly.

Will SDI Work?

Ronald Reagan has proposed developing a defense system in space that would destroy incoming missiles before they reached the United States, a system some people call "Star Wars." Do you think this system is likely to work, or not?

Reagan's Star Wars speech presents the idea of Star Wars toward the end of a long speech on maintaining the size of the military budget. In the section presenting SDI, Reagan mentions the difficulty and risk of errors several times, describing the program as a formidable task. This speech was among the few truly optimistic statements ever made about the feasibility of SDI. The others were made by Defense Secretary Weinberger and other officials or strategy experts close to the administration.

The disclaimers presented along with the mention of SDI indicated from the start that it was a difficult task with an unpredictable result. The bulk of the SDI debate revolved around questions of efficacy; would it work? More sophisticated writers on the issue of SDI pointed out that the question was, would it work for what purpose? However, criticism of SDI was muffled by a predominant focus on feasibility (Tirman, 1986:12), ignoring or downplaying the question of purpose.

3. Previous Poll Data on the Efficacy of SDI

The CBS/New York Times polling organization is the only organization which asked the general public whether

they thought SDI would work to shoot down incoming missiles. This question was asked twice, with a slight variation in wording. The first time was in January of 1985. The response to this first question was that the public thought SDI "could" work, by a margin of 62 to 23 percent, with 15 percent saying "don't know." This contrasts with a slight drop in the dataset used in this thesis to 58 percent of those who thought SDI was "likely" to work.

The two questions, a year apart, indicate both relative stability in public opinion on the topic, as well as a slight drop in optimism about SDI. If the public legitimacy of the program faded over time (which is consistent with the steadily declining public opinion support for SDI from 1983 to 1988), the drop of four points could be evidence of declining expectation that SDI will work.

C. Hypotheses

1. Union Membership

Union membership is likely to be divided over military policies. The crafts and core-industry unions are more likely to follow the AFL-CIO policies that support the need for a stronger military, that the Russians cannot be trusted to live up to an agreement, that the United States should take a tough position, and that SDI research is a

good idea but that SDI should be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations. The unions representing public employees and service industries are more likely to deviate somewhat from the AFL-CIO support of the SDI program. These two tendencies may diminish the power of the union/non-union variable.

However, because union members experience the possibility of improving their condition through their union, or at least maintaining their jobs and slowing down givebacks, they may be more likely to think that negotiations, rather than prolonged conflict, would be the appropriate strategy in Soviet-American relations. In this analysis, urbanity, region, gender, income, and ideology are controlled. In contrast to union members, it is hypothesized that non-union members are more likely to think that:

- A. The United States is weaker in military strength to the Soviet Union.
- B. The Soviet Union would not live up to a fair arms control agreement.
- C. The United States government should get tough with the Soviet Union.

It is also hypothesized that there will be no differences between the union and non-union respondents in terms of:

D. Whether or not SDI is likely to work in destroying incoming missiles.

E. Whether or not SDI is meant to protect all of the population.

2. Urbanity

While urbanity has rarely been reported in studies of opinion on foreign policy, its strong relationship to political ideological identification demands that the rural-urbanity variable be given some consideration.

Certain characteristics of big cities may be associated with ideology and with military policy. Large cities have residents from diverse backgrounds and nations, with different opinions and a wide range of organizations, formal and informal. Thus, many city residents experience a range of ideas and opinions, and also experience that diversity does not necessarily mean conflict and that conflict does not necessarily mean the end of a known way of life.

Secondly, large cities exist by a complex set of economic inter-relationships with other regions as both markets and suppliers. Large cities are thus less likely to hold certain rural values of independence and self-survival, and may support more cooperative agreements.

Finally, large cities are economically linked to the federal government and its policies because the cities

receive federal subsidies for programs crucial to commerce, transportation, and welfare. When the fiscal relationships are altered, the cities have a material basis for disagreement with such policies. Thus, the city residents may be less supportive of expensive military programs that will further drain the national treasury, and in turn, diminish fiscal support for programs critical to the city's livelihood.

In addition to being more isolated from the impact of foreign policy during peacetime, the small towns, communities, and rural areas do not have organizations enabling residents from the lower and working classes to question the local political status quo (Hamilton, 1972). While the economy is becoming more nationally integrated and centralized, small cities and towns may still hold on to the values of independence and self-survival. Small city and town residents may view SDI and a strong military as a defense requiring the least involvement, and therefore, one that will be most likely to preserve community life as it now stands.

With union, region, gender, income, and ideology controlled for, it is hypothesized that in contrast to residents of large central cities, residents of towns, suburbs, and rural areas will be more likely to think that:

- A. The United States is not as militarily strong as the Soviet Union.
- B. The Soviet Union would not live up to a fair arms control agreement.
- C. The United States government should get tough with the Soviet Union.
- D. SDI is likely to work in destroying incoming missiles.
- E. SDI is meant to protect all of the population.

3. Income

Empirical evidence indicates that the lowest income bracket is associated with opinions that imply a need for a strong United States military. However, there is also a clear tendency for those with higher income to support military expansion and activity. It might be expected that both extremes of income levels would be associated with support for a strong military.

Urbanity, region, gender and ideological identification are held constant in this analysis. It is hypothesized that, in contrast to respondents in the highest and lowest income brackets, respondents in the middle income brackets (\$12,500-\$35,000) are more likely to think:

- A. The United States is stronger than the Soviet Union.

- B. The Soviet Union would live up to a fair arms control agreement.
- C. The United States should reduce tensions rather than get tough with the Soviet Union.
- D. SDI is not likely to work.
- E. SDI will protect less than half of the United States population.

4. Region

The literature on foreign policy and on military policies shows that region is a strong predictor of public opinion (Galston and Makins, 1988). Many polls show that the south is more likely to support defense spending, aggressive military policies, and the SDI program. In this analysis, region is examined, holding constant urbanity, gender, income, union membership, and ideological identification.

It is hypothesized that in contrast to the other regions, the South is more likely to think that:

- A. The United States is not as strong as the Soviet Union.
- B. The Soviet Union would not live up to a fair arms agreement.
- C. The United States should get tough rather than reduce tensions with the Soviet Union.

D. SDI is likely to work in its mission of destroying incoming missiles.

E. SDI will protect the whole United States population.

5. Gender

From the growing literature on gender and peace, gender is expected to have an effect on military opinions (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Poole and Ziesler, 1985; Cherrin, 1987). Being a less privileged and rewarded group, women may tend to question the government's reliance on expensive weapons and be less supportive of United States military policy. This proposition is the basis of the following hypotheses. Compared to men, women are more likely to think that:

A. The United States is militarily superior to the Soviet Union.

B. The Soviet Union could live up to an arms agreement

C. The United States should reduce tensions rather than get tough with the Soviet Union.

D. SDI is not likely to work

E. SDI is meant to protect half or less of the population.

6. Ideological Identification

It is expected that respondents who identify themselves as conservative have a negative view of the Soviet Union and prefer a comparatively aggressive United States policy, and that those who identify themselves as liberals would support a less negative view of the Soviet Union and a more cooperative policy. Urbanity, region, gender, and income are controlled for in this analysis. It is hypothesized that, compared to respondents who identify themselves as liberals or moderates, those respondents who identify themselves as conservatives are more likely to think that:

- A. The United States is not as strong militarily as the Soviet Union.
- B. The Soviet Union would not live up to a fair arms agreement.
- C. SDI will work to destroy incoming missiles.

Conversely, liberals are expected to think that:

- A. The United States should reduce tension rather than get tough in dealing with the Soviet Union.
- B. SDI will protect half or less of the population.

4. SDI AND NEGOTIATE

The final step of testing this public opinion formation model uses the independent variables retained

from the previous stages as regressors in an analysis of a specific SDI question. This question asks the public to select their preferred "track" of the "dual track" nuclear arms policy. In order to clarify the terms of the question, the next section provides a historical background.

A. The Dual Track Policy and Public Opinion

In December of 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted the "dual track" policy to maintain unity among the NATO allies (De Boer, 1985:119). The decision was to station 572 medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and, simultaneously, to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control so as to obviate the need for this deployment. Previously, deployment of weapons systems had not been linked to specific arms negotiations, but this new policy was added in response to the growing peace movement in Europe and the United States (Halliday, 1986:11). The peace movement, however, continued to expand; demonstrations were held in many nations on an unprecedented scale, directed mainly against the deployment of the new Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. This anti-arms buildup sentiment continued to gain widespread support until 1980, when the protests began to turn toward legislative participation. Opinion polls taken in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Great

Britain showed strong pluralities against deployment of nuclear weapons in their countries (De Boer, 1985:120).

While the United States government has not precluded negotiations during its massive weapons buildup since World War II, its record with negotiations has been sporadic and has taken a back seat to the deterrence policy. Indeed, during this period, the United States developed elaborate weapon systems and stockpiled nuclear arms to bolster its leadership in the arms race and to be able to win a nuclear war (Gervasi, 1986:35; Paine, 1984:8). The 1979 NATO agreement placed negotiations at a level with weapons development. However, during the first Reagan administration, defense spending increased enormously. Between 1983 and 1985, \$691 billion were spent in military outlays (Dumas, 1986:25). In addition, SDI was introduced, jeopardizing an arms control status quo (based on SALT II) that had lasted for over a decade (Drell et al, 1986:96).

In the 1980's, much as before, the stated policy of working towards arms control while installing new missiles was mostly a matter of "public diplomacy," as the Reagan administration was to label its arms control public relations efforts (Talbot, 1985:176). Of the two tracks, the arms control track was to "sugar coat" the unpopular program of installing additional nuclear weapons in Western Europe (Johnstone, 1984:5).

Public support for both peace and strength manifests itself in two contradictory views: distrust of the Soviets and fear of nuclear weapons. One of the clearest poll results that show many of Americans desire both strength and peace is a September 1985 survey showing that 54 percent agree that "we should take a strong position with the Russians so they won't go any further but at the same time we should try to re-establish good relations with them" (Adler, 1986:592).

One phenomenon that may have reduced support for the Reagan administration's military policy is the emergence of Gorbachev and new foreign policy initiatives from the Soviet Union. Conciliatory actions, such as the unilateral nuclear test ban announced July 1985, indicated a genuine interest in arms control (King, 1985:656). These actions have opened up possibilities for arms control that were previously thought to be impossible (Smith, 1989:37). These events, the dramatic increase in military spending and Gorbachev's impressive overtures may have begun to have the impact of directing public opinion away from the Reagan administration policies. This would result in less support for weapons and more support for arms control by the time of the November 1985 poll.

B. The SDI or Negotiate Question

The final poll question examined in this thesis clearly offers a choice between a policy based on a new weapons system (SDI) and a policy based on negotiations:

If it came down to only these choices, what should the United States do -- work to develop a Star Wars system and give up negotiations, or work to negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles and give up Star Wars?

Unlike the other poll questions on SDI, this question does not imply that the SDI is a protective umbrella. In this question, the aggressive direction of the SDI program is emphasized: a Star Wars system which, if developed, implies the rejection of arms negotiations as a parallel strategy.

The question presents a specific occasion in which the interest in strength and in peace come into conflict. During 1985, the Soviets repeatedly stated that the SDI would have a negative effect on continued arms control, and in September 1985, offered to agree to the "most radical" arms reduction proposals if the United States would give up SDI (Gliksman, 1986:195). This question presents the American public with the same choice faced by the policy setting elites.

C. Hypotheses

To analyze this question, five variables were chosen based on previous analyses: income, urbanity, region,

gender, and ideological identification. They are listed here with the respective hypotheses. Because the SDI/Negotiate question is trichotomous, the responses were dummied to create two separate tests. Below is the question with the dummied answers:

If it came down to only these choices, what should the United States do -- work to develop a Star Wars system and give up negotiations, or work to negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles and give up Star Wars?

1. Negotiate (Table 13)
0 = Other (both and SDI)
1 = Negotiate
2. Star Wars (Table 12)
0 = Other (both and negotiate)
1 = Star Wars

1. Income

While the literature indicates a trend for those with higher incomes to be more supportive of an aggressive military policy, there is also a trend for the lowest income bracket to be more supportive of a strong military defense in terms of military policies during peacetime.

It is hypothesized that compared to respondents in the lowest and highest income bracket, the respondents from the middle income brackets will be more likely to support an arms control negotiations strategy and prefer to give up the Star Wars programs.

2. Urbanity

The literature on the effect of urbanity on opinion leads to the expectation that small town and city residents will have a viewpoint that is pro-military build-up. This is based on the lack of diversity of groups and opinions coupled with the reduced saliency of national budgetary politics (military vs. social spending priorities). Combined with the reduced ability for working class dissent in electoral politics in these communities for alternative, more conciliatory viewpoints are rarely heard.

It is hypothesized that compared to respondents in large central cities, those in smaller towns will be more likely to support the continuation of the Star Wars program.

3. Region

In the literature on foreign policy and public opinion, the south is characterized as being more supportive of military build-up than other regions in the United States. There is also a trend for the east coast to be more supportive of negotiations and compromise.

It is hypothesized that compared to respondents on the east coast, respondents in the south are more likely to support the development of a Star Wars system and give up negotiations.

4. Gender

While gender has become an important predictor for public opinion on war issues, there are more mixed results for the role of gender on military defense issues. For example, while more women may be opposed to the increased defense budget than men, the gender gap is less on defense (Poole and Ziesler, 1985). If the question clarifies the intent of the SDI program to be an aggressive military policy, then a difference in gender on the question can be expected.

It is hypothesized that in contrast to men, women are more likely to support negotiations to reduce nuclear missiles and to give up Star Wars.

5. Ideological Identification

Conservative identification is linked to a pessimistic view of the Soviet Union and a veneration for tradition. In United States military policy, the tradition has been to use military build-up and preparation to confront the Soviet Union. It is hypothesized that in contrast to liberals, conservatives are more likely to support the development of a Star Wars system and give up negotiations.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the results of the logistic regressions in terms of the hypotheses proposed in the Chapter Four. First, the full set of socioeconomic variables were run against ideological identification to determine the most powerful set of predictors of ideology. Relying on both the theoretical concerns raised in Chapter One and the results of the first run, a second set of predictors were hypothesized and run against the military policy items. Those socioeconomic variables which were not statistically significant predictors of military opinion, and which were not theoretically critical for the final SDI question, were eliminated. A final run of a small number of predictors were then run against the military strategy item. The result of three runs of variable sets are then evaluated in comparison to a full run of all the socioeconomic variables against each set of questions.

To find out if the socioeconomic variables did in fact affect ideological identification, a multiple logistic regression was run using the characteristics as independent

variables, and ideological identification as the dependent variable.

To analyze the data using logistic regression, the three responses (liberal, moderate, and conservative) were recoded into two dichotomous variables, as follows:

Conservative Dependent Variable (Table 3)

0 = Other (Moderate and Liberal)

1 = Conservative

Liberal Dependent Variable (Table 4)

0 = Other (Moderate and Conservative)

1 = Liberal

The independent variables (and controls) were: union, education, race, religion, income, age, urbanity, region, and gender (see Tables 3 and 4* for coding).

2. RESULTS FOR IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION

It was hypothesized that certain positions in the social structure would lead to a particular identification as liberal or conservative. See Chapter Four for the full set of hypotheses and Chapter Three for a description of the socioeconomic variables.

A. Union Membership

It was specifically hypothesized that union members and those with a union member in their household would be

*Tables 3 through 15 for the logistic runs pertaining to the public opinion formation model are in Appendix D.

less likely to be conservative. A logistic regression was run including controls for religious upbringing, urbanity, gender, education, race, income, age, and region (see Table 3). The joint test for union membership and conservative identification is significant ($p < .01$) Non-union respondents (including those with a household member in a union) are more than twice as likely (111 percent) to be conservatives than are union members. The t test for this term, applying the Bonferonni principle, is statistically significant ($p < .025$). This supports the thesis by indicating that those involved with unions are less conservative than non-members. The joint test for union membership and liberal identification (Table 4) are also statistically significant ($p < .05$).

B. Urbanity

It was hypothesized that, due to several counter-balancing factors, size of city would have a weak relationship to ideological identification. A logistic regression was run using the following variables as controls; union membership, religion, gender, education, race, income, age, and region (see Table 3). The joint test for urbanity and conservative identification is significant ($p < .05$). Statistical trends are observed for the following terms: suburbs ($p < .05$), community ($p < .01$), and rural ($p < .05$). A less significant trend

is observed for central city ($p < .10$). Using the Bonferonni principle (see Chapter Two), the term small community is significant ($p < .0025$). The pattern presents an increasing likelihood of being conservative associated with decreasing city size. The likelihood of being conservative (compared to the reference group of large central cities) ranges from being 70 percent greater for central cities to 109 percent greater for rural areas. The exception to the pattern appears to be small communities (10,000 to 50,000). The small community, rather than continuing a roughly linear increase in the likelihood of being conservative, stands out from a fairly linear pattern; residents of smaller communities are even more likely to be conservative than those who live in rural areas (219 percent greater likelihood for smaller communities versus 108 percent greater likelihood for rural).

The relationship between urbanity and liberal identification (Table 4) is also significant ($p < .01$). Compared to the large central city residents, residents of all other areas are significantly more likely (by 60 percent) to identify themselves as other (as conservative or moderate). These relationships are significant at the .01 level, except for the t for central city residents, which is significant at the .05 level. Using the

Bonferonni principle, the significant terms are: suburbs ($p < .0025$), community ($p < .0125$), and rural ($p < .0125$).

C. Education

It was hypothesized that higher education would be positively associated with liberal identification. The logistic regression did not confirm this (see Tables 3 and 4).

D. Gender

It was hypothesized that the effect of gender would be reduced once other factors were taken into account. The relation between gender and ideology was investigated controlling for education, race, income, age, and region. Tables 3 and 4 show that, with all the controls, there is a trend ($p < .10$) for women to be less likely (-29 percent) than men to be conservative, and more likely than men to be liberal (40 percent).

E. Income

It was hypothesized that when age, education, and race are controlled, income would have a strong positive relationship with conservatism. It was also hypothesized that liberalism would be associated with mid-level income, but that when race and education are controlled for, there would be little or no relationship with liberalism. The joint test for income is not significant for identification either as a liberal or as a conservative. The respondents

in the second highest income group (\$35,000-\$50,000) are less likely to be liberal than those making less than \$12,500 (Table 4). Using the Bonferonni principle to estimate significance, the level must be .0125. The hypothesis is not supported; there is a weak trend in the expected direction for income and conservatism, and the hypotheses of no relationship for liberalism are substantiated.

F. Region

It was hypothesized that the south would be more conservative than other regions. This was tested with a logistic regression, controlling for union membership, religion, urbanity, race, and income. The joint test is not significant for predicting either liberal (Table 4) or conservative (Table 3). However, there is a trend for two regions: The south is the least likely to be liberal (-44 percent), followed by the midwest (-36 percent) (Table 4). While the hypothesis is not supported, the trend is in the expected direction. When the Bonferonni principle is applied to the t statistic for the south term, the finding does not reach statistical significance.

G. Religion

It was hypothesized that since there are suppressor effects masking the relationship between religion and ideology, controlling for other social factors would bring

out a strong relationship between religious categories and ideological identification. Specifically, it was expected that Protestants would be most likely to select a conservative identification and that respectively Catholics and then Jews would be increasingly more likely to select a liberal identification.

The results of the logistic regression (Tables 3 and 4) show that the joint test for religion is not significant for either liberal or conservative identification. Table 4 shows the following trend: All religions are more likely to identify themselves as liberal, with Jewish and "none" being much more likely to be liberal than Catholics. No other religious category is significantly related to ideology.

H. Age

It was hypothesized that there would be no net relationship between age and ideological identification. The logistic regression finding for conservative is a nonsignificant joint test (Table 3), and the joint test for age in the analysis of liberalism is not significant. But inspection of individual terms in Table 4 for age shows a trend ($p < .10$) in the direction of those over 64 being less likely than the young adults to be liberal. These results show a slight tendency in support of the hypothesis for those aged 18 to 29, but not for any other age group.

I. Race

It was hypothesized that, controlling for a number of socioeconomic variables, blacks would be more likely to identify themselves as liberals than would whites and others, and that whites would more likely identify themselves as conservatives. The relationship between race and ideology was investigated controlling for religion, urbanity, education, income, age, and region.

The joint test for the logistic regression findings show that none of the terms for the race variable approach statistical significance for either liberal or conservative identification.

J. Summary of Results for Ideology

A number of socioeconomic and demographic variables were used to predict ideological identification. The two predictors that reveal the greatest number of terms with significant results for predicting ideology are union membership and urbanity. Compared to union members, those not in unions are more likely to be conservative. Decreasing city size is associated with an increase in the probability of being conservative. While men are more likely to be conservative and women are more likely to be liberal, the logistic regression reveals that this difference is not statistically significant.

There is no effect of income in general, but there is one marginal finding that the better-off are less likely to be liberal. Education did not predict ideology.

Region is not significant overall, but the analysis shows that the respondents in the midwest and south are less likely to identify themselves as liberal than the other two regions. The only term in the religion variable that approaches statistical significance is Catholics, who are more likely to identify themselves as liberal than Protestants. Age shows a trend toward an effect among the over 64-year-olds, who are less likely to identify themselves as liberal than the young adults.

Certain socioeconomic and demographic characteristics do, in fact, statistically predict ideology. Section 4 examines how the combination of these socioeconomic characteristics and ideology also influence several military opinions.

3. USING IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION AS A CRITERION FOR ELIMINATING VARIABLES

Socioeconomic variables are run against ideological identification for two reasons. The first reason is to test hypotheses regarding the relationship between class-related variables and ideology. The second reason is to establish a basis for eliminating some of the variables in the process of gaining an efficient set of predictors

for the dependent variable, the SDI/Negotiation preference. Both theoretical and statistical criteria are used to decide which variables are to be used to analyze military opinions, and which are to be dropped.

This thesis uses the public opinion formation model as the framework for selecting variables for subsequent analysis. Thus, those socioeconomic variables which are strongly associated with ideological identification will be used for the analysis of military opinions. Those socioeconomic variables which are not significant for ideology, but are significantly related to military opinions in the literature, will be retained as well.

Although neither income nor education are associated with ideological identification, income will be carried over to the next stage of analysis, and education will not. While income is not a significant predictor of ideological self identification, one category (\$35,000-\$50,000) did show a tendency in support of the hypotheses. In addition, income will be retained because it is considered one standard sociological indicator of class, and has been related to opinions on foreign affairs in the literature. It is also an important control for the other socioeconomic variables.

Education, however, will be dropped from the analysis since it showed no relationship to ideological

identification. This finding is a surprise because of the strong emphasis on education as a key correlate to ideology in the literature. However, the logistic regression analysis shows that when race, gender, age, and income area controlled, the distinctive role of education disappears.

Religion will also be dropped from further analysis. The lack of a relationship between religion and ideological identification is a contrast to the literature, where religion is an important predictor. One reason for the lack of relationship could be that blacks were not removed from the Protestant category. However, race is a control in this analysis. As the literature indicates, Catholics are a more liberal group than are Protestants.

Although region is not a significant predictor of ideology, there is a trend for the south and the midwest to be conservative in contrast to the east, as expected. Furthermore, in the literature on military opinions and foreign policy, region has been the primary predictor, with the south being more conservative and more in favor of strong military policies compared to the rest of the country. Therefore, region is being retained for the next stage of analysis.

Age will also be dropped from further analyses. While there is a trend for respondents over 64 years to be more conservative or moderate in comparison to the 18-29

year old group, the variable itself is insignificant. Given the need for efficiency in predictors, and the fact that only one age category (with a small N) shows any explanatory power, age will be removed from the analysis.

Urbanity will be retained in the analysis. This variable is the strongest predictor of ideological identification; this finding is totally unexpected. It was thought that controlling for race, religion, region, income, and education would reduce its impact. However, urbanity will be used for the analysis of military opinion, which may clarify its role.

Union membership will be retained because it has been shown in this analysis to be a strong predictor of liberal and conservative self identification. Union membership has not been used to study military opinions since Hero's analysis of the AFL-CIO during the 1960s (Hero, 1970).

While the relationship between gender and ideological identification is not significant, the analysis shows a trend for men as more likely to identify themselves as conservative. In the literature on peace and on women, there is evidence that gender is related to political as well as military opinions. In foreign policy research, gender has rarely been investigated for its effect on either ideological identification or military opinions.

Gender will therefore be used in the analysis of military opinions.

Race is another variable that will be eliminated from the analysis. The lack of relationship between race and ideological identification is a surprise finding. Since there is little research on race in the literature on foreign policy and military opinions (with the exception of Hero, 1969), and given the lack of relationship to identification, race will be dropped from further analysis.

4. RESULTS FOR MILITARY OPINIONS

Hypothesizing and testing the socioeconomic correlates of ideological identification in the previous section reveal that union and urbanity are the important variables: region, religion, income, and gender play a minor role. Surprisingly, education, race, and income are not associated with ideological identification. In general, liberal respondents are more likely to be women, people living in a large central city, residing on the east or west coasts, and Catholic. Conservative respondents are more likely to be men, people living outside of big cities (especially in communities and rural areas), residing in the south (and less so, in the midwest), Protestant, and not members of unions.

Ideological identification was selected as the first intervening factor because it indicates a broad perspective which people may use to orient their political views. The next step of this model explores variables that affect opinion on military policies. Thus, the emphasis shifts from a broad ideological framework to a more narrow, issue-centered framework: are the socioeconomic variables associated with ideology also associated with public opinion on specific military policies? (See Chapter Four for the full set of hypotheses and Chapter Three for a description of the socioeconomic variables.)

Two of the military variables being explained include some which are trichotomous. To meet the requirements of logistic regression, these variables are dummied to create two separate variables. They are the following:

Right now, would you say the United States is superior in military strength to the Soviet Union, is about equal in military strength, or is not as strong as the Soviet Union?

This is dummied in the following manner:

United States Superior (Table 5)

0 = Other (about equal and United States weaker)

1 = United States superior

United States Not as Strong (Table 6)

0 = Other (about equal and United States superior)

1 = United States not as strong

What do you think the United States should do now -- should the United States try harder to reduce tensions with the Russians, or should the United States get tougher in its dealings with the Russians?

This is dummied in the following manner:

United States Should Reduce Tensions (Table 8)

0 = Other (both and get tougher)

1 = United States should reduce tensions

United States Should Get Tougher (Table 9)

0 = Other (both and reduce tensions)

1 = United States should get tougher with the Soviet Union

A. Union Membership

Union membership is related to military opinions by the proposition that since union members are supported by their organization in believing their condition can improve, therefore they would be more hopeful about achieving a peaceful solution to the United States-Soviet Union conflict. The specific hypotheses were tested by performing logistic regression analyses for each military question, controlling for urbanity, region, gender, income, and ideology.

It was hypothesized that in comparison to union members, non-union respondents are more likely to think that the United States is militarily weaker than the Soviet Union. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the

United States as superior (Table 5) and one predicting the United States as weaker than the Soviet Union (Table 6). In both tests the joint test for union is not significant. However, Table 5 indicates a trend in the opposite direction from the hypothesis. Table 5 shows that non-union members are more likely to think that the United States is superior. By implication, union members are slightly more likely to think that the United States is militarily not as strong or about equal to the Soviet Union.

It was hypothesized that in comparison to union members, non-union respondents are more likely to think that the Soviet Union would live up to a fair arms control treaty. Table 7 shows the results of the analyses predicting this survey question. The joint test and terms for the union variable are not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

It was hypothesized that in comparison to union members, non-union respondents are more likely to think that the United States should get tough with the Soviet Union. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the United States should reduce tensions (Table 8) and one predicting the United States as weaker than the Soviet

Union (Table 9). In both tests the joint test for union is not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

It was hypothesized that there is no difference between union and non-union respondents in their opinion on whether or not the SDI program is likely to work in destroying incoming missiles. Table 10 shows the results of the analyses predicting this survey question. The joint test and terms for the union variable are not significant. The hypothesis is supported.

It was hypothesized that there is no difference between union and non-union respondents in their opinion on whether or not the Star Wars system is intended to protect the entire population or less than half of the population. Table 11 shows the results of the analyses predicting this survey question. The joint test is significant ($p < .05$). The hypothesis is not supported. The logistic regression shows that non-union respondents are more likely to think that Star Wars will protect most of the population. By implication, there is a trend for union members to think that SDI will protect half or less of the population.

The results only partially support the hypothesized relationship between union membership and military opinions, that union members would be more likely to hold opinions that would support a strategy of negotiations rather than a weapons program in relation to the Soviet

Union. The finding that union members are more likely to question the SDI umbrella concept supports the hypothesis. However, the trend that the union members are slightly more likely to think that the United States is equal to or weaker than the Soviet Union is a mixed finding. The dummy variable makes it difficult to determine if more union members think the United States is militarily weaker than those who think the United States is equal. If the union members do think the United States is weaker, then they are more likely to support forceful solutions to international problems. The cross-tabulations show, however, that 44.9 percent of union members think that the United States is equal in strength, and that 9.2 percent think that the United States is weaker.

B. Urbanity

The proposition relating urbanity to military opinions was that the larger the respondent's community, the more favorable the respondent would be toward a peaceful solution to the United States-Soviet Union conflict. The specific hypotheses were tested by performing logistic regression analyses for each military question, controlling for union, region, gender, income, and ideology.

It was hypothesized that residents of less populous areas would be more likely than those from more populous

areas to think the United States militarily weaker than the Soviet Union. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the United States is superior (Table 5) and one predicting the United States is weaker than the Soviet Union (Table 6). Table 5 presents the results of the analyses predicting to the response that the United States is superior militarily versus the United States is not as strong or about equal to the Soviet Union. The joint test for urbanity approaches statistical significance ($.05 < p < .10$). The hypothesis is indirectly confirmed.

From inspection of Table 5, the direction of the data is such that, in comparison to residents of large central cities, those who live in small (10,000 to 50,000 population) communities are least likely to think the United States is superior. Those who live in rural areas are also less likely to think the United States is superior than large central city residents, but more so than the small community group. Those who live in the suburbs are also less likely to think the United States superior but more so than rural dwellers and other small community dwellers. Within urbanity the t tests for other community and rural area are statistically significant ($p < .01$ and $p < .05$, respectively), and the t tests for the suburban category show a trend toward significance ($.05 < p < .10$).

Applying the Bonferonni principle, the t test for other community is statistically significant ($p < .0125$). These findings offer strong support for the hypothesis. Table 6 shows the results of the analyses predicting to the response that the United States is not as strong as the Soviet Union militarily. None of the terms within the urbanity variable approaches statistical significance, and the joint test is not significant for the urbanity variable.

It was hypothesized that the smaller the population of the area that the respondent resides in, the more likely the respondent would be to think that the Soviet Union would not live up to a fair arms agreement. Table 7 presents the results of the analyses predicting the responses of this survey question. None of the terms for urbanity approach statistical significance, and the joint test is not significant.

It was hypothesized that the smaller the population of the area that the respondent lives in, the more likely the respondent is to advocate the United States getting tough with the Soviet Union. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this analysis: one predicting support for reducing tension with the Soviets and one predicting support for getting tougher with the Soviets.

Table 8 shows the results of the analyses predicting the response that the United States should reduce tension, get tough, or do both.

The joint test for urbanity is statistically significant ($p < .05$). Inspection of the data reveal the direction of this difference to be such that residents of a community of 10,000 to 50,000 people are more likely than large central city dwellers to want to reduce tensions, but residents of rural areas, smaller central cities, and suburbs are not. The t test for the 10,000 to 50,000 person community approaches statistical significance ($.05 < p < .10$). Fairly analogous results occur when the same question is analyzed using urbanity to predict the response "get tougher" as opposed to reduce tension or both. Table 9 presents the analyses of these results. The joint test for urbanity is significant ($p < .05$). The direction of the differences is parallel to the direction of the differences reported in Table 8. Residents of a community of 10,000 to 50,000 are less likely ($.05 < p .10$) than residents of a large central city to desire a "get tough" policy, while residents of rural areas, smaller central cities, and suburbs are not. These findings offer mixed support for the hypothesis that smaller population areas will be more likely to promote a tougher position. The finding that small communities are more likely to

promote tension reduction is the reverse of the predicted direction.

It was hypothesized that the smaller the population of the area that the respondent lives in, the greater the likelihood that the respondent will think that SDI will work. Table 10 presents the results of the analyses predicting the answers to the question as to whether or not SDI will work. None of the terms of the urbanity variable approaches statistical significance, and the joint test is not significant.

It was hypothesized that the smaller the population of the area in which the respondent resides, the more likely the respondent is to think that SDI is meant to protect all of the population. Table 11 presents the results of the analyses predicting the response that SDI is intended to protect the entire population rather than half or less of the population. None of the terms of the urbanity variable approaches statistical significance, and the joint test for the overall urbanity variable is not significant.

In summary, the data provide qualified support for the general proposition that the larger the population of the respondent's community, the more likely the respondent is to favor a peaceful solution to the United States-Soviet Union conflict. Among the regression analyses of the

military questions, when the joint test for urbanity is statistically significant or approaches significance, the term within the urbanity variable that emerges as most distinct in the comparison to large central city is the community of 10,000 to 50,000 people. Residents of these communities, in comparison to residents of large central cities, are less likely to think the United States is superior to the Soviet Union. These residents are, however, more likely to be favorable towards the United States reducing tensions and less favorable towards the United States getting tougher with the Soviet Union. The hypothesis receives qualified support.

C. Region

The south's long-standing conservatism on defense issues has, in fact, lasted into the 1980's. The specific hypotheses regarding region and military opinions were tested by performing logistic regression analyses for each military question, controlling for union, urbanity, gender, income, and ideology.

It was hypothesized that, in comparison to non-southerners, southern respondents would be more likely to think that the United States is militarily weaker than the Soviet Union. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the United States as superior (Table 5) and one

predicting the United States as weaker than the Soviet Union (Table 6). In both regressions the joint test for region is not significant. Table 5 shows a trend that does not directly confirm the hypothesis. Table 5 shows that the midwest is less likely to think the United States is superior. This trend is unexpected and interesting. Using the Bonferonni approach, the t statistic is not statistically significant.

As shown in Table 6, the hypothesis regarding the south is somewhat supported ($.05 > p > .10$). Southerners are half again as likely (51 percent) to think the United States is weaker than the Soviet Union. However, the relationships expected among the other regions are not confirmed, and the joint test for region is not significant.

It was hypothesized that southerners would not think the Soviets would honor a fair agreement. Table 7 shows the results of this analysis. The joint test is significant ($p < .01$). The hypothesis is supported. The south is almost twice as likely as the east coast to think such an agreement is not possible. By implication, other regions are less likely to think such an arms pact is impossible. Applying the Bonferonni principle, the t test for the south term is statistically significant ($p < .0033$).

It was hypothesized that the south would support getting tough. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the United States should reduce tension (Table 8), and one predicting the United States should get tough (Table 9). Table 8 shows the results of the analysis predicting this survey question. In both cases, the joint tests are not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

It was hypothesized that southerners would be more likely to think SDI will work. Table 10 shows the results of the analysis predicting this survey question. The joint test is not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

It was hypothesized that southerners would think SDI was designed to protect the whole population. Table 11 shows the results of the analyses predicting this survey question. The joint test is not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

In summary, the hypothesis that the south saw the Soviet Union as stronger and unwilling to honor a treaty is confirmed. The expectations about the south regarding whether to get tough or whether SDI would work or protect are not confirmed. Further, the hypothesis that the east and west would be less likely to see the Soviets in a negative light is not confirmed.

D. Gender

Gender is related to military opinions by the general proposition that having less privilege and fewer rewards from society would foster a questioning view of United States military policy among women. The specific hypotheses were tested performing logistic regression analyses for each military question, controlling for urbanity, region, gender, income, and ideological identification.

It was hypothesized that women would be more likely than men to view the United States as superior to the Soviet Union. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the United States as superior (Table 5), and one predicting the United States as weaker (Table 6). The joint test for United States being superior is significant ($p < .05$), but the joint test for United States being weaker than the Soviet Union is not significant.

Table 5 shows the results of the analyses predicting the question about the United States being stronger. The hypothesis is not supported. The finding indicates that women are actually less likely (-34 percent) than men to think that the United States is superior.

It was hypothesized that women would be more likely than men to think it possible to have an agreement the

Soviets would adhere to. Table 7 shows the results of the analysis of the analyses predicting this survey question. The joint test is not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

It was hypothesized that women would be more likely than men to endorse reducing tensions with the Soviet Union. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the United should reduce tension (Table 8), and one predicting the United States should get tougher with the Soviet Union (Table 9). In both cases the joint tests for gender are not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

It was hypothesized that women would be less likely than men to think SDI would work. Table 10 shows the results of the analyses predicting this survey question. The joint test is significant ($p < .01$). The hypothesis is supported. Women are almost half as likely (-47 percent) as men to think SDI will work.

It was hypothesized that women would think SDI would protect only half or less of the population. Table 11 shows the results of the analyses predicting this survey question. The joint test is not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

In summary, the only hypothesis supported by the data is the expectation that women are less likely than men to

think that SDI will work. The data indicates the opposite of the expected relationship between gender and opinion on which nation is superior; women tend to be less likely than men to think the United States is superior. Cross tabulation shows that the only significant percentage difference between men and women is on whether the United States is stronger; 24 percent of men thought so, while only 16 percent of women thought so.

E. Income

In general, people with lower incomes are more likely to favor compromises and negotiations over confrontation with the Soviet Union. However, higher income is often accompanied by greater access to alternative information about the Soviet Union and the arms race. Thus, for certain military questions, the relationships may be reversed. The hypotheses pertaining to the relationship between income and military opinions were expected to be curvilinear. It was expected that the respondents in the lowest income (less than \$12,500) and in the higher income brackets (over \$35,000) would be the most likely to support policies for a stronger military, while the respondents from the middle income brackets (\$12,500 to \$35,000) would be more likely to prefer more diplomatic solutions. The specific hypotheses were tested by performing logistic regression analyses for each military question, controlling

for union membership, urbanity, region, gender, and ideology.

It was hypothesized that, in contrast to the respondents in the lowest and higher income brackets, the respondents in the middle income brackets are more likely to think that the United States is militarily stronger than the Soviet Union. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the United States as superior (Table 5) and one predicting the United States as weaker than the Soviet Union (Table 6). In both tests the joint test for income is not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

It was hypothesized that, in contrast to the respondents in the lowest and higher income brackets, the respondents in the middle income brackets are more likely to think that the Soviet Union would live up to a fair arms control agreement. Table 7 shows the results of the analysis predicting this survey question. The joint test and terms for the income variable are not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

It was hypothesized that, in contrast to the respondents in the lowest and higher income brackets, the respondents in the middle income brackets are more likely to think that the United States should reduce tensions rather than get tough with the Soviet Union. Because the

dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the United States should reduce tensions (Table 8) and one predicting the United States should get tough with the Soviet Union (Table 9). In both tests the joint test for income is not significant. However, Table 8 shows a tendency ($.05 < p < .10$) for the respondents in the over \$50,000 income bracket to be more likely than the under \$12,500 bracket to favor reducing tensions, and Table 9 shows a weaker tendency in the same direction: the over \$50,000 bracket is less likely to favor getting tougher with the Soviet Union. The hypothesis that the highest income brackets would support a get tough posture has some support, while the hypothesis that the lowest income bracket would support a get tough posture is indirectly supported. The hypothesis is partially (and weakly) supported.

It was hypothesized that, in contrast to the respondents in the lowest and higher income brackets, the respondents in the middle income brackets would be more likely to think that the SDI program will not work in destroying incoming missiles. Table 10 shows the results of the analyses predicting this survey question. The joint test for the income variable is not significant. However, respondents with a family income of \$35,000 to \$50,000 are

more likely than respondents whose family income is below \$12,500 to think that SDI will work. In fact, the likelihood of a respondent in the higher of these two income groups to think SDI will work is 76 percent higher than the likelihood of the respondents within the lower of the two income groups to have that opinion. Using the Bonferonni principle, the t statistic is not statistically significant. In addition, there is a trend ($.05 < p < .10$) that respondents in the \$25,000 to \$34,999 income group are more likely to think SDI would work than those in the under \$12,500 group. These results do not support the hypothesis.

It was hypothesized that, in contrast to the respondents in the lowest and higher income brackets, the respondents in the middle income brackets would be more likely to think SDI will protect less than half of the United States population. Table 11 shows the results of the analysis predicting this survey question. The joint test and terms for the income variable are not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

The relationship of income to military opinions is more complex than predicted. Respondents whose family income is above \$50,000, in comparison to those whose was less than \$12,500, are more likely to favor the United States reducing tensions with the Russians. Those in the

\$35,000 to \$50,000 group, compared with the under \$12,500 group, are more likely to think SDI would work in destroying incoming missiles. A relationship in the same direction, but not as strong, is that respondents in the \$25,000 to \$34,999 group are more likely than those in the under \$12,500 group to think that SDI would work. In summary, these results support the general premise that the lower the income of the respondent, the less likely the respondent would be to think that SDI would work.

F. Ideology

It was expected that respondents who identify themselves as conservative would be associated with a negative view of the Soviet Union and a preference for a comparatively aggressive United States policy, and that those who identify themselves as liberals would support a less negative view of the Soviet Union and a more cooperative policy.

Logistic regressions were run for each of five dependent military issue opinions with ideological identification as an independent variable controlling for income, gender, region, urbanity, and union membership.

It was hypothesized that in comparison to respondents who identify themselves as liberals, those who identify themselves as conservatives would be more likely to think that the United States is not as strong militarily as the

Soviet Union. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the United States as superior (Table 5) and one predicting the United States as weaker (Table 6). In both tests the joint test for ideological identification is not significant. The hypothesis is not supported.

It was hypothesized that in comparison to respondents who identify themselves as liberals, those who identify themselves as conservatives are more likely to think that the Soviet Union would not live up to a fair arms control agreement. Table 7 shows the results of the analyses predicting this survey question. The joint test is significant ($p < .01$). Moderates are more than twice as likely (120 percent) as liberals to say such an agreement is not possible. Conservatives are almost three times as likely (196 percent) as liberals to think this way. The Bonferonni principle is applied to the t statistic for each of these terms, and each is significant ($p < .005$ for both moderate and conservative). These findings support the hypothesis that conservatism is associated with thinking the Soviets cannot be trusted to adhere to a fair agreement.

It was hypothesized that in comparison to respondents who identify themselves as liberals, those who identify themselves as conservatives are more likely to think that

the United States should get tough with the Soviet Union. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two results for this hypothesis: one predicting the United States should reduce tensions (Table 8) and one predicting the United States should get tough with the Soviet Union (Table 9). In both tests the joint test for ideology is not significant. However, the hypothesis is supported by the trend that conservatives are one third less likely than liberals to say the United States should reduce tensions with the Soviet Union (see Table 8). When the Bonferonni principle is applied, the t test does not reach statistical significance. Similarly, conservatives are almost two thirds more likely to advocate getting tough than liberals (Table 9). Again, using the Bonferonni approach, the t test is not statistically significant.

It was hypothesized that in comparison to respondents who identify themselves as liberals, those who identify themselves as conservatives are more likely to think that Star Wars will work in destroying incoming missiles. Table 10 shows the results of the analysis predicting this survey question. The joint test and terms for the ideology variable are not significant. In addition, no terms are significant. However, there is support for the direction of the hypothesis. Compared to liberals, conservatives and

moderates are slightly more likely to think that Star Wars will work.

It was hypothesized that in comparison to respondents who identify themselves as liberals, those who identify themselves as conservatives are more likely to think that Star Wars would protect the whole population. Table 11 shows the results of the analysis predicting this survey question. The joint test is not significant. The hypothesis is not supported. However, there is support for the direction of the hypothesis. Compared to liberals, conservatives are slightly more likely to think that Star Wars will protect the entire population.

In summary, the relationship of ideology to views of the Soviet Union is in the expected direction. The exception is the finding that ideology is not significantly related to views of who is militarily stronger. Finally, there does not appear to be a relationship between ideology and views about SDI.

G. Summary of Results for Military Opinions

Several socioeconomic variables and ideological identification were used to predict a series of military opinions. The three predictors with the greatest number of significant results in predicting military opinions are urbanity, region, and ideological identification.

The urbanity variable has the following effects. In comparison to large central city residents, residents who live in communities of 10,000 to 50,000 people are: 1) less likely to think that the United States is militarily superior to the Soviet Union; 2) more likely to be favorable toward the United States reducing tensions with the Soviet Union; and 3) more likely to be less favorable towards the United States getting tougher with the Soviet Union.

The region variable has the following effects. In comparison to easterners: 1) midwesterners are less likely to think the United States is superior militarily to the Soviet Union; 2) southerners are more likely to think the United States is weaker militarily than the Soviet Union; 3) southerners are more likely to think that the Soviet Union will not honor a pact.

The following summarizes some of the trends from the logistic regression. In comparison to union members, 1) non-union respondents are more likely to believe SDI will protect the whole population; 2) non-union respondents tend to believe the United States to be militarily superior to the Soviet Union; 3) respondents with a union member in their household are more likely to believe the United States to be militarily superior to the Soviet Union.

In comparison to those with incomes less than \$12,500, 1) those with incomes over \$50,000 are more likely to favor the United States reducing tensions with the Soviet Union; 2) those with incomes of \$35,000 to \$50,000 are more likely to think SDI would work in destroying missiles; 3) those with incomes of \$25,000 to \$34,999 are more likely to think that SDI will work.

In comparison to men, women are less likely to see the United States as superior, and are also less likely to think that Star Wars would work.

Ideological identification has the following effects. In comparison to liberals, 1) moderates are more likely to say a fair arms control agreement is impossible; 2) conservatives are more likely to say a fair arms control agreement is impossible; 3) conservatives are more likely to advocate that the United States to get tough with the Soviet Union.

5. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF A CHOICE BETWEEN SDI OR NEGOTIATIONS

Hypothesizing and testing the socioeconomic correlates of opinion on military policies indicates that region, urbanity, gender, ideology, and income are important variables. Surprisingly, gender and union are not as powerful in their effects on a range of military opinions as had been expected. Union may be a weak

variable because the union membership is internally divided between the craft and service industries on military policies. This would have the effect of diminishing the differences between the union and non-union subgroups of the sample. Because there is no direct control (e.g., occupation), union will be dropped from the last stage of analysis.

While showing relatively weak results, gender will be maintained because of the strong support in the empirical literature for gender differences on military opinions.

Because income is a major class-related variable, it will be retained for the final analysis of SDI or negotiate. The literature on class correlates of foreign policy opinions indicates that income is associated with both foreign policy attitude dimensions and opinion on specific issues (Hinckley, 1988).

The final question consisted of this item:

If it came down to only these choices, what should the United States do: work to develop a Star Wars system and give up negotiations, or work to negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles and give up Star Wars?

Although few people answered "neither" to the above question, the dependent variable is dummied to retain all information.

A logistic regression analysis was run with the dependent variable being a question of policy preference

based on a hypothetical tradeoff: should the United States work to develop SDI and give up negotiations, or work towards negotiations, and give up SDI? The analysis included the predictors for urbanity, gender, ideological identification, income, and region. Because the dependent variable is dummied, there are two tests for the hypothesis: One shows the results of the analyses predicting the preference of "Star Wars" (Table 12) and one shows the results predicting the negotiation preference (Table 13). See Chapter Four for the full set of hypotheses and Chapter Three for a description of the socioeconomic variables.

A. Income

It was hypothesized that, compared to respondents in the lowest and highest income brackets, the respondents from the middle income brackets would be more likely to support an arms negotiation strategy and prefer to give up SDI. The results of the analyses demonstrate that no income term is significant for predicting either the choice to develop SDI or the choice to pursue negotiation in both Table 12 and Table 13. The joint test for the income variable is also not significant in Table 12 and in Table 13.

B. Urbanity

It was hypothesized that those who live in larger cities will be more likely to support the choice of negotiation. The logistic regressions results show that the joint test for urbanity is not significant for either SDI (Table 12) or negotiate (Table 13).

Certain specific terms do show interesting results. As observed in Table 12, respondents of cities that are between 50,000 and 500,000 population are two thirds more likely (67 percent) than those in cities of over 500,000 population to choose the option of developing SDI. Using the Bonferonni approach, the t test is not statistically significant. Also, there is a trend ($.05 < p < .10$) within another urbanity term in this regression, the category of cities with populations of 10,000 to 50,000. The likelihood that these medium sized cities would advocate SDI is also about two thirds more (65 percent) than for cities over 500,000.

Both of these findings amount to a partial confirmation of the hypothesis. As expected, smaller cities are more likely to endorse SDI. However, it is expected that there would be an increasing likelihood of advocating SDI as city size is reduced. This is not confirmed, since both terms that demonstrate trends are

almost identical, in comparison to the large, central cities, the reference group.

C. Region

It was expected that the south would be more likely than the east to advocate SDI. The hypothesis is not supported by the findings. Neither choice, developing SDI or pursuing negotiations (Tables 12 and 13), shows any region to be significant.

D. Gender

It was hypothesized that when all the above controls are used, women would be more likely than men to support the choice of negotiation. The logistic regression findings are that women are over 75 percent (77 percent) more likely than men to support negotiation (See Table 13). Women are a little more than half as likely as men (-40 percent) to support SDI (Table 12). Both these findings are statistically significant.

E. Ideology

It was hypothesized that conservatives would be more likely to advocate SDI rather than to negotiate. This is supported by the statistically significant finding that conservatives are almost two thirds more likely to support SDI development than moderates (Table 13). The joint test for the choice of negotiation (Table 13) is statistically

significant. Conservatives are considerably less likely than moderates (-37 percent) to favor negotiation.

F. Summary of Results for SDI or Negotiate

Income does not predict the dependent variable, a choice of either pursuing the SDI program or giving up SDI to maintain continued negotiations with the Soviets. No income terms are significant.

Two terms for urbanity show no effects, either in the joint test or the individual terms. Region has no term that shows up as significant. As expected, women are more likely to support negotiation and men are more likely to support SDI.

6. COMPARISON OF MODEL RESULTS TO FULL SET RUN

This section compares the results of the selective model (Figure 1) to the set of logistic regressions run for the entire set of series of variables (Figure 2), which will be called the non-selective run* to distinguish it in the text below. The comparison will provide one basis for evaluating the results of the model. This discussion emphasizes general trends.

*Tables 16 through 24 for the logistic runs pertaining to the full set of socioeconomic variables are in Appendix E.

Figure 1. Summary of Logistic Regressions for the Public Opinion Formation Model

		Ideology		USA		USSR	Reduce Tension	Get Tough	SDI Works	SDI Protects	Preferred Policy	
		Liberal	Conservative	Strong	Weak	Honor Pact					SDI	Negotiate
Sex	RF: Male Female	(Female +)	(Female -)	Female -					Female -		Female -	Female +
Union	RF: Union Household mmb. Not member	Not member -	Not member +	(Household +) (Not member +)								
Income	RF: Under \$12,500 \$12,500 - \$24,999 \$25,000 - \$34,999 \$35,000 - \$50,000 Over \$50,000	(\$35K-\$50K -)					(over \$50K +)		(\$25K - \$35K+) (\$35K - \$50K +)			
Urbanity	RF: Large central city Central city Suburbs Community Rural	Central city - Suburbs - Community - Rural -	Central city + Suburbs + Community + Rural +	(Suburbs -) (Community -) (Rural -)			Community +	Community -			(Central city +) (Community +)	(Central city -) (Community -)
Region	RF: East Midwest South West	(Midwest -) (South -)		(Midwest -)	(South +)	South +						
Race	RF: White Black Other											
Religion	RF: Protestant Catholic Jewish Other None		(Catholic -)									
Education	RF: Not HS grad HS grad Some college College grad plus											
Age	RF: 18-29 30-44 45-64 Over 64	(Over 64 -)										
Ideology	RF: Liberal Moderate Conservative					Moderate + Conservative +	(Conservative-)	(Conservative+)			Conservative +	Conservative -

Key: () = Joint test for the variable is not significant; + = positive relationship; - = negative relationship

Figure 2. Summary of Logistic Regressions for the Full Set of Socioeconomic Variables

		Ideology		USA		USSR	Reduce	Get	SDI	SDI	Preferred Policy	
		Liberal	Conservative	Strong	Weak	Honor Pact	Tension	Tough	Works	Protects	SDI	Negotiate
Sex	RF: Male Female	(Female +)	(Female -)	Female -					Female -		Female -	Female +
Union	RF: Union Household mbr. Not member	Not member -	Not member +	(Household -) (Not member -)								
Income	RF: Under \$12,500 \$12,500 - \$24,999 \$25,000 - \$34,999 \$35,000 - \$50,000 Over \$50,000	(\$35K-\$50K -)							(\$25K - \$35K+) (\$35K - \$50K +)			
Urbanity	RF: Large central city Central city Suburbs Community Rural	Central city - Suburbs - Community - Rural -	Central city + Suburbs + Community + Rural +	(Community -) (Rural -)			(Community +)	(Community -)				
Region	RF: East Midwest South West	(Midwest -) (South -)		(Midwest -)	(South +)	South +						
Race	RF: White Black Other						(Black +)	Black -		(Black -)	Black -	Black +
Religion	RF: Protestant Catholic Jewish Other None		(Catholic -)			(Catholic -)	(Catholic +)	(Catholic -)			(None +)	(None -)
Education	RF: Not HS grad HS grad Some college College grad plus						HS grad + Some college + College grad +	HS grad - Some college - College grad -				
Age	RF: 18-29 30-44 45-64 Over 64	(Over 64 -)		(Over 64 +)		30-44 + 45-64 + Over 64 +	Over 64 +	30-44 +		(Over 64 +)		
Ideology	RF: Liberal Moderate Conservative					Moderate + Conservative +	(Conservative -)	(Conservative +)				

Key: () = Joint test for the variable is not significant; + = positive relationship; - = negative relationship

A. Selected Policy: SDI or Negotiate

From the public opinion formation mode, gender, and ideology are the two predictors of the militarism/diplomacy question. Specifically, in contrast to men, women are positively associated with selecting a negotiating policy and negatively associated with selecting the SDI policy (Table 13). In contrast to moderates, conservatives are positively associated with selecting the SDI policy and negatively associated with selecting the negotiating policy (Tables 12 and 13). A possible trend (not significant) is the relationship between urbanity and preferred policy. Two urbanity levels, the central city and the small community, are weakly associated with selecting the SDI policy, and with rejecting the negotiating policy (Tables 12 and 13).

When the full set of socioeconomic variables is regressed against selected military policy, gender remains a significant predictor. Race becomes a significant mediator. Conservatism disappears, along with urbanity. Respondents with no religion might indicate a trend, but their number is so small (N=42) that they are dropped from further analysis.

B. Ideological Identification

In the model, all the socioeconomic variables are first regressed against ideological identification (Tables

3 and 4). In the model, only union and urbanity have a significant relationship to ideology (Tables 3 and 4). Religion, income, age, gender, and region all approach statistical significance (Tables 3 and 4). The choice of ideological identification as the intervening variable and cutting point seems to have been too severe. Because of their relationship to opinion on foreign affairs in the literature, income, region, and gender are retained in the analysis for the logistic regression against the military policy questions (Figure 1). Ideological identification is added as an independent variable in the full run of variables.

C. Military Policy Questions

Certain variables, which are not significantly related to ideology, are not carried over to the analysis of military policy questions in the model (race, education, religion, and age). A comparison of the results of the full set of variables to the model on the military policy questions, then, provides one form of evaluation of the impact of that selection process. In comparing the two sets to military policy, the predictors have essentially the same direction and strength (gender, income, urbanity, union, region) (Figure 2).

1. Gender

Gender is significantly related to the questions on military strength, the workability of SDI, and is not significantly related to ideological identification. In contrast to men, women are less likely to think that SDI will work (Table 10), are less likely to think that the United States is militarily stronger than the Soviet Union (Table 5), and are more likely to select the option that the United States should work on arms negotiations with the Soviet Union and drop SDI (Table 13).

The fact that the relationships are the same in both runs strengthens the interpretation that gender is an important predictor of the certain military policies.

2. Region

Region is significantly associated with the question on the Soviet Union honoring a pact. Specifically, in contrast to the east, the south is more likely to think that the Soviet Union will not honor a pact (Table 7). The trends in both sets of logistic regressions are the same for region: compared to the east coast, the midwest and the south are less likely to be liberal, the midwest is less likely to think that the United States is militarily stronger than the Soviet Union (Table 5), and the south is more likely to think that the United States is weaker than the Soviet Union (Table 6). The fact that the results for

region are the same in both runs strengthens the interpretation that the south is an important predictor for the one military issue regarding the Soviet Union.

3. Urbanity

Urbanity is significantly related to ideology. Compared to large central cities, respondents in smaller towns, suburbs and the rural areas are more likely to identify themselves as conservatives (Table 3). In both the model and the non-selective runs, there is a trend for the respondents in communities and rural areas to be less likely to think the United States is militarily stronger than the Soviet Union (Tables 5 and 16). Compared to the large central cities, the small communities are also more likely to think that the United States should reduce tensions with the Soviet Union. This relationship is a significant relationship in the model (Table 8), and is reduced to a trend in the full non-selective procedure (Table 19). In the model, there is a trend that in contrast to large central cities, the smaller towns (central cities and communities) are more likely to support a military policy emphasizing SDI over arms negotiations (Table 12). This trend disappears when the full dataset is regressed (Tables 12 and 13).

Urbanity is a difficult variable to interpret given the wide range of towns and urban areas. It may be more of

an umbrella or proxy for other socioeconomic variables. For example, cross tabulations show urbanity is significantly related to race, religion, and region for the sample. When race and religion are removed from the model, urbanity did show a slight but not significant relationship with the policy choice between SDI and negotiate (Tables 12 and 13). Urbanity's relationship with the other military policy questions, however, remains similar in both sets of regressions for military policy issues.

4. Union Membership

Union membership is significantly related to ideological identification. Compared to union members, non-union respondents (with no union members in their households) are more likely to identify themselves as conservative (Table 3). In both the model and the non-selective analysis, in contrast to union members, non-union respondents (whether they had a union member in the household or not) are less likely to think that the United States is militarily superior to the Soviet Union (Tables 5 and 16). There are no significant relationships for union and the other issues.

5. Income

While income is not a significant variable for ideological identification or for any of the military policy questions, the trends are the same in both runs:

compared to the under \$12,500 bracket, people in the \$35,000 to \$50,000 bracket are less likely to identify themselves as liberals, and people in the \$25,000 to \$35,000 and \$35,000 to \$50,000 brackets are more likely to think SDI will work (Tables 4 and 10). One difference between the model and the full set does occur: compared to the under \$12,500 bracket, people in the over \$50,000 income bracket are more likely to think the United States should reduce tensions with the Soviet Union in the model, but not in the full run (Tables 8 and 19).

6. Education

Education is not a significant variable for ideological identification, and had been removed from further analysis in the model. In the full set regression, however, education is positively associated with the question on the "get tough/reduce tension" posture. In contrast to respondents with less than a high school education, respondents with a high school degree or higher think that the United States should reduce tensions with the Soviet Union (Tables 19 and 20).

7. Race

Race is not a significant variable for ideological identification and was removed from further analysis in the model. In the non-selective procedure, however, race emerges as a significant predictor of the SDI/negotiate

question (Table 24). Compared to whites, blacks are more likely to select to negotiate an arms agreement with the Soviet Union and to give up the SDI program (Table 23). Race is also significantly associated with the "get tough" question. Compared to whites, blacks are more likely to reject a get tough policy with the Soviet Union. There is a trend for blacks, in comparison to whites, to think that SDI will protect less than half of the American population (Table 20).

8. Religion

Religion is not a significant variable for ideological identification, and was removed from further analysis in the model, but a slight trend indicated in the model becomes quite consistent in the non-selective run. In the model, Catholic respondents are less likely to be conservative. Also, in contrast to Protestants, Catholic respondents are less likely to say that the Soviet Union does not honor treaties (Table 18), and more likely to say that the United States should reduce tensions with the Soviet Union (Table 19).

9. Age

Age is not a significant variable for ideological identification, and had not been considered theoretically critical to bring over to the next stage of analysis. There is one trend in the model for age: compared to the

18 to 29 year olds, the over 64 year olds are less likely to identify themselves as liberals (Table 4). In the full set, the trend continues for the over 64 year old group: compared to 18 to 29 year olds, respondents who are 64 years old and older are more likely to think that the United States is militarily stronger than the Soviet Union (Table 16), and that the United States should reduce tensions (Table 19). Age is significantly related to the questions on the Soviet Union honoring a pact and on the "get tough/reduce tension" strategy. In contrast to the youngest age group, all other age groups think that the Soviet Union would honor an arms treaty (Table 18). In contrast with the youngest group, the 30 to 44 year old group thinks that the United States should follow a get tough posture to the Soviet Union (Table 20).

10. Ideological Identification

Ideological identification is significantly related to the military policy preference question. Conservatives are more likely to favor the development of the SDI program and to drop arms negotiations (Table 12). Ideology is also significantly related to the "honor a pact" question. Compared to liberals, conservatives and moderates are both more likely to state that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted to honor an arms control treaty (Table 18). There is also the trend that conservatives are more likely

liberals to favor a get tough policy with the Soviet Union (Table 20). Ideological identification had no impact on the the two questions regarding SDI (Tables 21 and 22).

D. Summary of Comparison of Model Results to Full Set Run

The most striking conclusion to be gained from comparing the non-selective procedure to the model is that the differences are minimal. Certain variables behave exactly the same in both runs. These are gender and region. The same joint tests and the same individual terms are significant in both the model and the non-selective run.

The independent variables that behave differently in the non-selective (full set) run are union membership, income, and urbanity. The main effect that the non-selective procedure has on these three variables is a change of one or more terms. Within each of the three variables, terms that are significant in the model are not significant in the full variable set run. The majority of those terms are urbanity terms. The greatest single effect of the non-selective run is to eliminate significant terms from urbanity as predictors of the final military policy preference question.

From this summary it is concluded that the portion of explanation contributed by urbanity is in fact partly due to race, for which urbanity is a likely proxy, since the

cross-tabulations show the two variables to be highly interrelated.

Another effect of the non-selective run is to eliminate ideological identification as a significant predictor of the policy preference question on SDI or negotiations. Perhaps the emergence of race as a significant predictor of SDI or negotiations is the reason for the disappearance of ideological identification. However, race is not a significant predictor of ideological identification in the logistic regression. Other variables, age and religion, may have also affected the relationship between ideology and military policy preference.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis sought to address a few of the methodological challenges sociologists face in performing secondary analysis of poll data. Such data are valuable because they provide one source of information on people's ideas about current, political events. This chapter will review the implications of using one strategy to tackle poll data, logistic regression, and will then summarize the major findings in terms of the public opinion model and broader sociological concerns.

2. REFLECTIONS ON THE METHOD

Sociologists frequently avoid poll data because the data are non-continuous, non-interval, and include a mix of dichotomous and multi-leveled variables. When sociologists do tackle polls, they tend to use one of two strategies. One strategy is to use cross-tabulations as the safest method. This approach, however, is not considered very sophisticated, and unfortunately, the findings tend to be

discounted. The other strategy is to assume an interval level of measurement for as many variables as possible and to use, for example, ordinary multiple regression. This usually means excluding the more obviously categorical variables from analysis. This approach, however, keeps sociologists from exploring a multitude of issues that are categorical by their very nature.

In this thesis, the emphasis is on those categorical variables: opinions, urbanity, region, race, and so forth. The strategy was to apply one form of analysis, logistic regression, to all the variables. In this section, the strategy will be briefly summarized and commented upon.

Because the data was categorical and from a commercial poll, this study took an extremely conservative statistical approach. First, a relatively unused statistical method for categorical data, logistic regression, was selected. Secondly, all variables were represented by sets of dummied variables to avoid making inappropriate assumptions regarding measurement. Third, the Bonferonni principle was applied to the results to avoid the effects of collinearity. Finally, scales were avoided in order to obtain the most detailed possible results from the variables under analysis. Each of these decisions and some implications will be briefly discussed below.

A. Logistic Regression

The statistical technique used for this study, logistic regression, was chosen because it is an appropriate method for analyzing categorical dependent variables. While ordinary linear regression is a dominant technique for analyzing survey data, the validity of linear regression analysis depends on a number of features of continuous level data which do not exist in qualitative data (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984:10). The use of linear regression with categorical variables can lead to errors in inference. Logistic regression is a more careful and appropriate technique for analyzing categorical dependent variables.

Logistic regression allows the researcher to explore and test categorical data with the same interpretive power that linear regression has for interval data.

However, statistical methods developed for categorical data, such as logistic regression, have rarely been used in sociology. The dominance of Duncan's path model over the past two decades, the unfamiliarity with odds-ratio terminology, and the computer costs of performing logistic analyses have played a part (Alwin and Campbell 1987). The method, however, certainly holds promise, and has been promoted recently as a method for sociologists (Alwin and Campbell, 1987:S147).

In this study, logistic analysis revealed a few unexpected difficulties for sociological analysis. Some difficulties were mainly mechanical. For example, a series of calculations were required to translate the results into numbers that are directly interpretable. The logistic procedure produces a coefficient, as does ordinary linear regression, but one that is not directly interpretable. The mechanics of logistic regression involves the use of exponential expressions to simulate linear regression. The coefficient from the exponential expression must be transformed into a direct measure of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, the change in odds. This was performed by transforming the exponential coefficient by taking its natural log, e . This produces the change in odds for each term of a logical variable. Finally, the change in odds was multiplied by 100 and then 100 was subtracted from this result. This produced the percent change in odds, a more easily interpreted statistic.

B. Dummying the Variables

Using logistic regression on non-dichotomous variables also raised a methodological issue, and the solution required more calculations and a somewhat stilted mode of discussion for the empirical results. To avoid the assumption that a variable involves an interval level of

measurement, all variables in this study were represented by one or more dichotomous variables indicating membership in mutually exclusive categories, called dummy variables. Variables were dummied to minimize biased or inaccurate results stemming from questionable assumptions about the data. For example, one common assumption is that different income intervals, such as \$20,000-\$30,000 and \$30,000-\$40,000, have the same effect on the dependent variable. Income may be a continuous, interval level of measurement. However, when individual incomes are grouped into categories, one can question whether or not the categories are in fact of equal distance and have the same effect on the dependent variable. For this reason, income categories were treated the same as region, for example.

Dummying the variable allows the researcher to measure the effect of being in a higher income category compared to being in the reference group (which, in this study, was the under \$25,000 group). The technique requires one to phrase the results in a somewhat awkward way: e.g., compared to the lowest income category, respondents in the \$25,000 to \$35,000 income bracket thought that the government should support a particular policy. In short, when one or more of the terms of a variable are significant, one can only make statements for each term in comparison to the reference group. The use of

dumming in combination with logistic regression makes reporting of results and interpretation more complex than it would be with traditional methods. Such formulations may be somewhat restrictive for sociologists.

C. Using the Bonferonni Principle

A set of statistical tests was performed for each logical variable. Because logical variables (such as income or region) were broken up into sets of dummy variables, each required an individual test of significance to the dependent variable. Thus two test statistics were calculated to determine which relationships were significant. A t-test was used to find out if an individual dummy variable for a predictor was significantly related to the dependent variable. An F-test was used to determine if the logical predictor variable as a whole was significantly related to the dependent variable.

Separately testing the individual terms of an independent variable raised the issue of collinearity. Collinearity is a potential problem when different independent variables (or terms of a dummied variable) are themselves related, and the significance of one dummy variable (or term) may be related to the significance of another term. Thus the Bonferonni principle was then applied to the statistical significance level for individual tests in order to insure that sets of tests for significance have a small overall error rate.

The addition of still another test of significance, and a very stringent one, reduced the number of significant relationships. In retrospect, the procedure may be too stringent for the needs of sociological interpretation.

D. Scales

In this thesis, scales were not used. The decision was made for a number of reasons. First of all, by holding a multitude of variables constant, logistic regression allows the sociologist to examine the distinct effects of independent variables, a highly unusual opportunity in sociological research using qualitative data. The method provided for the testing of findings from previous studies of opinions on war and nuclear weapons; these studies employed unscaled data, crosstabular analyses, and few controls. The method provided for the testing of more contextual and complex hypotheses. Secondly, indices as measures of concepts are of dubious quality when they are drawn from secondary analyses of data, particularly poll data. Pollsters do not develop items from conceptual frameworks. When indices of ideas or opinions have been developed by sociologists from poll data, they are often difficult to interpret and to generalize. Thirdly, given the methodological decision to use dummy variables and given the awkwardness of using reference groups in

interpretation, it is not certain that scaling would make a clear contribution to this analysis. Indeed, the requirement of a dichotomous dependent variable for logistic regression would severely restrict the usefulness of any scaled dependent variable, e.g., the scale would have to be collapsed into two responses.

Now that the study has been completed, however, future research in the field may benefit from creating an index for independent variables, such as a socioeconomic scale or a larger additive index. One interesting scale is Galtung's center-periphery social position index (1969), which includes social and demographic data (gender, race, occupation, political participation, and so forth).

A major lesson learned from this analysis is that logistic regression is not a panacea for analyzing categorical data. While logistic regression provides the ability to control for numerous independent variables, the method does require a fair number of additional calculations and some slightly awkward phrasing to describe the results. The most severe limitation, however, is the problem of combining different types of dependent variables in one study. Both academic and commercial polls contain categorical data, often representing a majority of the items on a particular survey. This thesis proposed one solution to the problem of using logistic regression on

some survey items when there are also variables that are analyzable with ordinary linear regression. In this thesis, dependent variables with three terms were combined into a dummied dichotomous variable, using one term as the focus of study, and the combined remaining terms as the reference group. This made it possible to use a single regression procedure in the analysis. Yet this strategy made it difficult to analyze the data in certain respects. The price of using logistic analysis was the loss of more discrete information, and of the ability to track the data. (The consequences of this decision are analyzed in the review of the substantive findings.)

The use of a variety of dependent variables, and the use of two models, however, allowed the thesis to provide a rich interpretation of the data despite the restrictions. The ability of logistic regression to control for a multitude of variables and to rate each variable's effect on the dependent variable is a major contribution to sociological analyses of categorical data. In this study, the method provided some interesting results.

3. THE STUDY

The major theoretical proposition of this thesis is that socioeconomic position is the basis for opinions in support of a militarist policy (the United States should

emphasize building new weapons systems, such as SDI) and in support of a diplomatic policy (the United States should negotiate with the Soviet Union). The relationship between socioeconomic variables and militarism is not necessarily direct; however, a series of intervening variables, which include ideology and specific opinions about relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, must also be taken into account.

This thesis explored the formation of public opinion on the SDI program using data obtained from CBS/New York Times poll. The poll was taken during the week of November 7 to 12, 1985, just before the Geneva summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. The November 1985 poll included several questions on SDI, on related military and foreign affairs, and many of the standard socioeconomic and demographic variables.

The thesis used logistic regression, a technique for categorical data to establish predictors of public opinion. A planned set of logistic regressions was proposed, based on three sets of variables that have been indicators of public opinion.

A public opinion formation model, or framework, was described and used to delineate the variables most powerfully associated with public opinion on military policies. The model was based on one fundamental premise

in sociological analysis: one's position in the class structure shapes one's broad ideology, which in turn shapes specific opinions.

Emphasis was on the socioeconomic variables as predictors. As the major intervening variable, however, ideology also played an important role in the model. Ideological identification was the major cutting point for deciding which socioeconomic variables related to ideological identification are also related to opinions on military policies. Finally, those socioeconomic variables which were related to military opinion were used as the independent variables in a regression with the final dependent variables, the selection of pursuing the SDI weapons system or of pursuing arms negotiations as a military strategy. This final set of predictors were then evaluated and compared to a more contextual analysis, a regression consisting of all the socioeconomic factors.

Because they did not significantly predict ideological identification, education, race, religion, and age were dropped from the subsequent analysis of opinion on military issues. Income, which also was not a significant predictor, was retained because one income category did predict and because income is a common indicator of class and has been associated with opinion on foreign policy opinions.

The remaining variables, gender, union membership, income, urbanity and region, were used to predict a series of questions about the United States' relationship with the Soviet Union. These questions asked about whether the United States is stronger or weaker than the Soviet Union, whether is it possible to have a fair arms agreement the Soviets would live up to, whether the United States should get tough with the Soviets, or reduce tensions with them, and whether or not SDI will stop Soviet missiles and is meant to protect all Americans.

Finally, the question as to whether the United States should develop SDI, or drop it and pursue negotiations was regressed on the following independent variables; gender, income, urbanity, region, and ideological identification.

4. THE MAJOR FINDINGS

One of the most interesting findings is that both income and education, which are important predictors in the literature on opinions about war, are not important predictors for the questions about the arms race and the SDI weapons system which were asked during a comparatively peaceful period. Another major finding of this study is that race and gender, two characteristics that have also been found in the literature to predict opinions about war, were the most significant predictors of the many opinions

in this study. The remainder of this chapter will discuss in detail these findings and their implication for sociological research and theory.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC OPINION MODEL: INCOME AND EDUCATION

One important result of the public opinion model is that income and education are not significantly associated with ideological identification, and only education is significantly associated with one of the military policy questions. This is a surprising finding in terms of the significance of these variables in predicting public opinion on war and for ideology. This section briefly explores the possible explanations for these results, and the implications of these results for the mass-elite model, for the public opinion model used in this study, and for a sociological interpretation of this finding.

To explore the relationships between income and ideology, and education and ideology, cross-tabulations for the variables were reviewed. It was found that education and income were not related to ideological identification. It might be expected that a relationship would be revealed if the cross-tabulation data were compiled to match the combination ideology variable that was created to meet the requirement of the logistic regression model for

dichotomous dependent variables: liberal versus everyone else (moderate and conservative) and conservative versus everyone else (moderate and liberal). However, the results were not significant for these cross-tabulations.

Thus it can be concluded that in using a logistic regression model, in which many variables are controlled for, education and income have no relationship to ideological identification. This finding could indicate that class (as indicated by the socioeconomic variables) is not related to ideology, or that this measurement of ideology is unrelated to these variables. Both possibilities are beyond the scope of the thesis. This finding is an important negative finding, however, and will become available to interpretation when compared with negative findings from other researchers who use this particular measure of ideology.

Another major issue is the relationship of income and education to the military policy questions. In the literature, both the class model and the mass-elite model found that income, education and occupation, together or apart, were the predictors for opinions on the Vietnam and Korean wars. The class model researchers used various combinations of the three variables to indicate social class, and the mass-elite researchers used the same variables to divide the elite from the mass. For both sets

of authors, significant differences were found between the two social groups: the more highly educated and higher income groups supported the war, intervention, and escalation, while the lower income and less educated groups supported negotiations, withdrawal, and nonintervention. This thesis expected that the same results would be found for support of military policies and of negotiation policies, even though the original studies were carried out during wartime, and this study was carried out during peacetime.

The finding that education and income were not related to ideological identification, then, was a surprise and posed an unexpected problem for the selection process in the public opinion model being used in this study. Should both income and education be dropped from subsequent analysis because they were not significantly related to ideology, or should they be continued for sound theoretical reasons? If both variables were kept in the regression runs, as well as gender (which was also not significantly related), too few variables might be eliminated for the next step of analysis. Income was maintained in the subsequent logistic regression runs for the military policy issues, and education was dropped. This decision was based on the fact that the two variables are highly correlated with each other in sociological research and in this sample

as well. Because income was more established than education as an indicator of class, income was retained. Finally when the full set of variables were run against the military policy items in a later stage of analysis, it was found that education predicted only one item.

In the remainder of this section the findings for income (for those income brackets that reached significance) and military policy will be summarized, and then the results for education will be summarized.

Higher income had been shown in the literature to be associated with hawkish sentiments during the Vietnam and Korean wars. While this study found that income was not a significant predictor of opinion on military policy, the analysis does show some trends for income, even when gender, region, urbanity, ideological identification, and union membership are controlled for.

It was hypothesized that the lowest and the highest income groups would be similar in their preference for a more militaristic policy. However, respondents in the highest income bracket (Over \$50,000) were more likely to favor reducing tensions than the lowest income group (Figure 1, Chapter Five). This finding indicates a dramatic difference between the highest and lowest income groups. The pattern indicated by comparing each of the income brackets is an increasing probability of support for

reducing tension as income increases, although only the highest income group is significant.

It was also found that the upper-middle income group (\$35,000-\$50,000) is less likely to be liberal, and that two higher income groups (\$25,000-\$35,000 and \$35,000-\$50,000) are more likely to think SDI will work. This trend also appeared in the full variable set run, when all socioeconomic variables were used as controls. There were no other trends for income predicting the military policy questions.

The findings seem to support the mass-elite researchers' proposition that the elite tends to follow government policy closely, and are highly attentive to shifts in that policy. Unlike the poor, the high income respondents are more likely to think that SDI will work in deflecting missiles from landing on American soil. Given the controversy over SDI's capabilities prior to this poll in 1985, this finding indicates that the wealthy support government policy despite disagreement about its feasibility. As Hamilton (1972) notes, the elite may be more susceptible to the government leadership than are the "masses."

The finding that the highest income bracket supports a flexible rather than a tough policy with the Soviet Union is also different than expected from the literature on

public opinion and war. It may well be that the higher income respondents may be more interested in the economic gain that comes from reduced tensions and improved trade relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It may also be that higher income groups are more likely to accept and repeat the perspective that was presented in much of the major media in 1985; that the tough Reagan was becoming a diplomat willing to talk because the Russians had been finally compelled (by Reagan's rearmament policies) to be willing to make concessions.

The more commonly emphasized variable in the literature has been education. Education was eliminated from the opinion formation model when it did not predict ideological identification. It might be argued that education should have been left in the model; however, as can be seen in the full set variable run (Figure 2, Chapter Five), when education is included, it is a predictor only of the reduce tension or get tough variable. The education variable behaves in a manner which conforms to mass-elite expectations; higher education is associated with being more likely to prefer reducing tension than the reference group, high school dropouts. However, it is important that no other dependent variable was related to education level. This raises problems for the mass society

argument. If education is a key variable, why is it not an influence on more of the military policy questions?

Perhaps the get tough posture is not as strongly related to militarist opinions. Education is related the get tough policy, but not to the final variable, selecting SDI over negotiations. Another possible interpretation is that some people choose SDI over negotiations because they think SDI is a strictly defensive system, a harmless protective shield for America. Thus someone selecting to develop SDI may experience their choice as the best of two dubious options, rather than a simple matter of trusting weapons more than negotiation to attain security. This argument would be stronger, however, if education had been related to the Soviet Union honoring a treaty question.

One additional interesting effect that education has in the full set variable run is to remove income as a predictor of the reduce tension variable. There are other variables added to this run that act as additional controls, but the well-established correlation between income and education makes it plausible that the disappearance of the income term was due to the addition of education. This finding gives support to Mueller's assertion that education is a more powerful predictor of public opinion of military policy than is income (Mueller, 1973:123).

In summary, the use of socioeconomic predictors separately (without indexing them) allows consideration of the relevance of different theoretical perspectives in more detail than would be possible if indices of these variables were used in combination. The findings of this study offer mixed interpretations, which do not uniformly confirm any one perspective.

It may be that education and income do not predict opinions on military policies during peacetime or that they do not predict opinion when so many variables are controlled for. It may also be that education and income are not predictors during times of a great shift in public opinion when new events change the way people think about a particular policy. The poll used in this study was taken during such a transition period. On the American side, there were several major changes in the years leading up to 1985, described below, which may have had effects upon public opinion.

During the late 1970's the policy promoted by elites in the United States increasingly emphasized a greater danger of Soviet aggression and a need for military preparations against possible attacks (Halliday, 1986:11). Public support for increasing the military budget went up, but by 1983, this support turned to disapproval. Reasons for this change included a growing fear that Reagan might actually use nuclear weapons (Schneider, 1985:337).

Reagan had entered office in 1980 claiming that the United States had unilaterally disarmed during the 1970s, and that there was now a "window of vulnerability" which left the United States without protection from Soviet threats and attack (Ferguson and Rogers, 1986:125). During the period from 1980 to 1985, the military budget increased 39 percent (Ferguson and Rogers, 1986:124). During this same period, record cuts were made in social insurance, social security, and services programs (Ferguson and Rogers, 1986:129). The media presented Reagan's military policies in a favorable light, and Reagan continued through the early 1980s to benefit from comparisons with Carter, who was presented in the media as not being tough enough to protect the United States (Plotke, 1985:112).

The fear that Reagan might use nuclear weapons was part of the basis of a resurgence of popular protest against United States military policy. During the early 1980s, the anti-war movement took the shape of the nuclear freeze movement. This grass roots movement was sparked in 1980 by a proposal for a treaty halting weapons research and production by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The nuclear freeze proposal was a resolution demanding that the United States seek to negotiate with the Soviet Union a verifiable agreement to stop testing and building all nuclear weapons as a first step in reversing

the arms race (Halliday, 1986:255). The freeze referendum became a major issue in the 1982 congressional elections, and the freeze movement managed to get a bipartisan freeze resolution passed in Congress in May of 1983 (Feldbaum and Lee, 1985:256).

Reagan's Star Wars speech in March 1983 was framed in peace and arms control rhetoric, and many political analysts have argued that his presentation of SDI was carefully couched as a peaceful program because of the popularity of the peace movement (Thompson, 1985:23). Although the peace movement was popular at home, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had reached a low point by the end of 1983. During 1983, the Soviet Union shot down the Korean airliner that was invading its airspace, the United States had troops and warships involved in Lebanon, and by October of 1983, the United States had invaded Grenada (Halliday, 1986:234).

By 1985, however, changes in American policy and in Soviet policy had led to the November 1985 Geneva summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. In the Soviet Union, the leadership changed three times (Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko) between 1982 and 1985. In February of 1985, Gorbachev was elected as first secretary. Gorbachev was a younger, more energetic leader, and one who initiated a number of arms control proposals to

the United States during 1985. The Soviet Union started a unprecedented unilateral freeze on weapons testing, offered to withdraw the intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Eastern Europe, and Gorbachev agreed to a summit with Reagan without preconditions (Halliday, 1986:245).

In the context of all these changes, and rapidly shifting information about the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, it may have been more difficult for American citizens to have a clear idea of what the Reagan administration policies were. The glibness and bellicose statements of top administration officials during the first few years of the 1980's were indicative of an aggressive thrust to United States foreign policy that could not be expected to change so suddenly. But changes were beginning to occur: Reagan, who had labeled the Soviet Union an "evil empire," was about to meet with the top official of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In the context of this period, it may be that sectors of the public were changing their thinking about both Reagan and the Soviet Union. This could have had the effect of reducing the clarity of the relationship between income level or educational level, and the opinions on military policies studied in this thesis.

Hamilton (1972), however, argues that education and income are not strong predictors of public opinion when they are used on the national level. Hamilton proposes income and education should be used regionally (controlling for the south), and that race, religion, and ethnicity may be better predictors of public opinion. In the next section, race and gender, the two highly significant predictors of military policy in this study, will be discussed. First, race will be discussed in terms of the public opinion model.

6. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC OPINION MODEL: RACE

A major drawback in using the public opinion model is that it did not include race, but race was found to be a major predictor of military policy preference question. This section briefly explores the possible explanations of why race disappeared in the initial logistic regression involving ideological identification.

To explore the relationship between race and ideology, cross-tabulations for the two variables were reviewed. Race is significantly related to ideological identification ($\chi^2=.01$). Blacks and others (Asians, Latin Americans) are both evenly divided among the liberal, moderate, and conservative identifications. Whites are most likely to select moderate (48.1 percent) and the least likely to select liberal (18.7 percent).

Without the controls, then, race is related to ideology. Perhaps race disappears in the run because of the way the variable for ideological identification was created. Two dichotomous variables had been created to meet the logistic regression's requirement for dichotomous dependent variables, as well as for the study's emphasis on strong ideological preferences. Thus the variables created for ideology are: liberal versus everyone else (moderates and conservatives), and conservative versus everyone else (moderates and liberals). The cross-tabulation data was then combined to match the variables used in the logistic regression. This cross-tabulation shows that the differences between black, other, and white disappear for conservatives, and everyone else (roughly 33 percent and 67 percent for both groups). The relationship is weak for liberal versus all others (roughly 32 percent and 67 percent for blacks and for others, and 19 percent versus 81 percent for whites). Thus the dichotomous variables created for ideological identification may have contributed to race being not significantly correlated.

Controlling for other variables may have contributed to race not being significant. When cross-tabulations are examined for race, it is found to be significantly associated with region, urbanity, and religion for ideological identification.

In conclusion, the combination of the constructed ideology variable and the controls (especially region, urbanity and religion) had the effect of reducing toward zero the relationship of race to ideological identification in the model logistic regression analysis.

The use of ideological identification in combination with an array of controls may be an extremely severe criterion for variable selection. If the ideological identification criterion is used in future studies, it may be useful to first divide the sample by region (south versus other) as Hamilton (1973) did, to control initially for the uniqueness of the south (where blacks and whites can have quite different opinions). Religion can also be a confounding variable. In most poll analyses of religion and ideology, blacks are first removed from the analyses. A more useful strategy would be to include the blacks by dividing the Protestant item by black Protestants and white Protestants. Another element of the model is that different kinds of criteria were used for each set of regressions. The first criterion was ideological identification, a one-dimensional variable that had the strength of simplicity and clarity, but also had the weakness of a large middle category (moderates). This variable did provide a clear choice of variables to continue or reject for the next stage of analysis.

The second criterion, however, is slightly less clear: i.e., how variables would be selected to be maintained in or dropped from further analyses. It was assumed that the socioeconomic variables with the greatest number of significant correlations to the five military variables would be used. The results of the logistic runs, however, showed that each variable was correlated with only one or two military items. The proposed criterion was not going to apply easily.

In addition, an unexpected pattern of predictors was discovered. The variables associated with the SDI items (gender, union) were different than those associated with the Soviet-American items (urbanity, gender, ideology, income, and region). When the predictors for the military questions in the model are compared to the predictors for the full set variable run of the data, the differences between the two types of military questions is even more apparent: race and gender are the only two predictors of some items in both types of military questions, and an array of variables (education, age, religion, urbanity, region, income) are associated with one or another of the military items on Soviet American relations.

Given the finding that different predictors are associated with different military items, it was decided to run two different sets of predictors for the final military

policy preference question. From the set of SDI predictors (gender, union), gender was a powerful predictor (Tables 14 and 15). From the second set of predictors (Soviet American relations), gender and conservative identification were the powerful predictors (Tables 12 and 13). When all the variables were used in a logistic regression against the military policy question, gender and race constituted the significant predictors (Tables 23 and 24).

Thus the use of the public opinion formation model resulted in gender as the most powerful predictor of military policy preference. Union and ideological identification might be considered as predictors to explore further. Finally, the model as applied in this thesis resulted in the exclusion of race, a variable that is an important correlate of public opinion on military policy. Suggestions have been made regarding how certain variables might be reconstructed to maintain an emphasis on race while using ideological identification as a cutting variable.

7. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: RACE AND GENDER

In this thesis, race and gender were the most significant correlates of support for a weapons buildup or for diplomacy with the Soviet Union during peacetime. It is interesting that race and gender have also been

consistently reported as significant correlates of anti-war opinions since the 1960s by sociologists using both the class model and the mass-elite interpretations. However, both sets of researchers give little interpretative attention to this finding; instead, they theorize about the anti-war positions of the working class or mass, defined by education and income. In this section, the findings of this study will be briefly reviewed in terms of race and gender. The applicability of various interpretations for working class support for diplomacy over militarism during war will be applied to the findings, and some ideas for future research will be suggested.

It was expected that people who think that the Soviet Union is a trustworthy and equal power might also think that the United States should be flexible and emphasize negotiations rather than to continue SDI. On the other hand, those who think that the Soviet Union was an untrustworthy, superior power might also think that the United States should be tough and emphasize building up SDI rather than negotiations.

The military questions centering on SDI might pose an evaluation of the United States military strength: if SDI works in stopping Soviet missiles from entering the United States, and if SDI will protect most of the population, then the United States will definitely be more powerful

militarily than the Soviet Union, and would be in a position to win a nuclear war. How would peoples' opinions on the Soviet American relations policy questions relate to SDI? Would people view the SDI program as destabilizing, or would people more or less answer the questions consistently along the lines of a militaristic or diplomatic orientation?

Using the findings from the public opinion formation model, the upper middle income group thinks that SDI will work (and by implication, the poor think SDI will not work). Women are more likely to think SDI will not work in intercepting missiles and support negotiations over the development of SDI. By implication (as the reference group), men are more likely to think that SDI will intercept Soviet missiles and are more likely to emphasize the development of SDI to the exclusion of arms control negotiations.

From the full set run of variables, blacks are more likely to think that SDI will not intercept Soviet missiles and will protect few Americans, blacks are also against a get tough policy, prefer a more flexible posture, and are more likely to emphasize arms negotiations and to discard SDI. Whites, by implication (as the reference group), are more likely to think that SDI will intercept Soviet missiles, and will protect most Americans, that the United

States should take a tough posture and emphasize the development of SDI to the exclusion of arms control negotiations. Thus the respondents appear to follow a consistent pattern (militaristic or diplomatic) in answering these questions.

Interestingly, the opinion on whether or not the Soviet Union would honor a pact is little affected by gender and race, and military strength only has an effect on gender. This finding is similar to Schneider's analysis of the Freeze campaign, where public opinion on military strength and toughness is not related to support for the Freeze (Schneider 1985:350).

The findings for the 1985 poll parallel those reported for race and gender on support for wars. Relative to whites, blacks react to wars as doves (Mueller 1973:147). The opposition by blacks to the Vietnam War has often been noted and is often related to the civil rights movement and urban race riots occurring at the same time (Mueller 1973; Verba et al. 1967). However, blacks held the same position on the Korean War and on World War II (Mueller 1973:147). Furthermore, blacks, unlike the rest of the working class, have consistently rejected measures for extreme escalation (Mueller, 1973:147-148). The causes for black opposition beyond the 1960's turmoil must be deeper in the black experience.

Mueller also notes that blacks uniquely reject measures for extreme escalation (which lower classes do accept). For example, when asked in 1953 whether atomic artillery shells ought to be used in the war should peace talks break down, more blacks than whites (and more black women than white women) thought that atomic shells should not be used (Mueller 1973:148). In his analysis of support for the military budget, Goertzel (1987:69) found that whites are more likely to favor an increased military budget, and that blacks are more likely to be against it. He found gender to be a very weak predictor (1987:70).

The findings for the 1985 poll for gender also parallel the literature on public opinion and war, and on the gender gap in domestic policy. Women and men have consistently differed in their opinions about the use of force. Women have been more opposed to continuing the draft, to using the atomic bomb, to handguns and the death penalty, and were less supportive of the Korean and Vietnam wars (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986:42-43). Women have also been more opposed to new weapons systems and have supported arms control more than men (Graham and Kramer, 1986).

The mass elite model researchers argue that, because of their lower education, the "mass" is relatively uninformed about America's international obligations, and consequently has few opinions on such issues as war and

military policy. While research has found that women and blacks give more "don't know" responses (Rapoport, 1985), those blacks and women who do respond are more likely to be against militarist policies (Hero, 1969:231) and more in favor of negotiations (Hero, 1969:231; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986:42-44). In addition, the mass elite model researchers argue that when the mass does have opinions, they are not consistent. The poll data analyzed in this thesis, and summarized above for the military questions, however, does indicate a rather straightforward consistency for both the militaristic responses and the diplomatic responses. In summary, the mass-elite model does not explain why gender and race are significant predictors of opinion on military policy during war as well as during peacetime.

There are variations of the mass-elite theory that use a kind of biological interpretation for women and blacks (but interestingly, not for whites and men). Women's role in childbearing and child-rearing, their socialization in not being assertive in their opinions, their role as caretakers of health for the family, and their relative physical weakness in contrast to men have been variously put forth as reasons for their support of negotiations over more militaristic policies (Cherrin, 1987:21-67). In a somewhat similar vein, Hero (1969) compares black and white responses to poll data on foreign affairs between 1937 and 1967. In an analysis that

emphasizes racial factors, he finds that since the 1960s, blacks have become more supportive of foreign aid and foreign policy that involves non-white nations (particularly in Africa and Asia), and have remained unsupportive of foreign aid to white countries, particularly northern Europe.

While the biologically based interpretations may have elements of truth in them, they don't explain the persistence and strength of the relationship between gender and race on military policy.

The class model researchers have introduced the notion of power to explain the differences between classes on military issues, and this concept might be extended to race and gender as well. Hahn (1970) uses a type of class-self interest to argue that the working class family's greater economic and emotional dependency on their sons leads the working class to anti-war positions. This line of reasoning has also been argued for women. Both groups, working class whites and blacks, experience greater losses during wartime (more inductions, more combat duty, more disabled sons, and more deaths) than the upper classes. Both groups may remember these losses (which become part of the subculture and kinship history). The disabled are a constant reminder. Subsequently, both groups may respond in opinion polls by opposing weapon

systems, threats of interventions, escalations of armed force, and other militaristic policies that might lead to war.

Hahn (1970) and Hamilton (1973) also note that the people who feel able to influence politics were most strongly in favor of bombing Korea and of escalation in Vietnam, while those who feel least able to influence events were the most favorable to negotiations or pulling out. Hahn notes that while blue collar families do not join protest marches and rallies, they do vote against war in referendums. Interestingly, neither author notes that polls may also be a kind of referendum. The working class, blacks, and women state opinions against war and weapons systems in polls (even if they answer fewer questions than whites, men, and the upper classes).

In general, the sense of powerlessness is a product of exploitation and lack of control over one's fate. Women and blacks as aggregate groups have not achieved economic independence as adults, as roughly indicated by their relatively high unemployment, and their greater concentration in low paid, unskilled, dead-end jobs. In a sense, they are shadows of the other group: women are shadows to men, blacks are shadows to whites. They are dependent upon and subordinate to other groups.

As Hamilton argues (1973, 1975), the working class relies on various techniques of interpersonal and

organizational negotiation and cooperation to survive, and tries to avoid long, expensive fights. Hamilton argues that this experience contributes to the working class's favoring negotiations in international affairs. Women and blacks may also use such strategies. The lack of economic parity with white men is glaring both for women and for blacks. If women and blacks do not figure out how to get along as a housewife, house-cleaner, caretaker, office worker or factory worker, they face unemployment as workers with few marketable skills in for a larger, competitive marketplace.

Blacks' and women's subordinate economic role and their powerlessness make them more vulnerable in public protests. They could lose their jobs if they are recognized at a protest by managers, or if they are arrested, or if they are beaten up (and it would be harder to get another job).

In addition, the working class, blacks, and women experience the deterioration of the urban life and of the economy, which has paralleled a massive military buildup in America over the past decade. The collapse of the educational system, the epidemics of drugs, and of AIDS, the 40 percent to 60 percent unemployment rate for black youth, the crisis of the hospital and health care systems, high mortality and illness rates, all contribute to the everyday experience of deterioration and despair.

There is an urgent need for research on how people link these issues to military policy. Do blacks who are against war and militarist policies see militarist policies as a problem of the white upper class? Do they want to avoid involvement in those protests where they will probably be certain to be among the beaten and arrested? Do women avoid joining protests out of fear of their husband's disagreement? Do blacks and women have fears about protest and jeopardizing their jobs? How do women and blacks think about militaristic policies?

The analysis in this thesis also suggests another line of interpretation and research. Neither blacks nor women think SDI will work in providing defense in a nuclear attack by destroying Soviet missiles before they strike America. In addition, blacks do not see SDI as providing protection to most Americans, which may indicate that they think it will protect only the white upper class, or perhaps only the missiles and a few key locations; they do not see SDI protecting themselves. Finally, blacks report that they do not favor a tough policy, perhaps like the law and order and get tough policies they have experienced in the ghetto and in the south. These findings lead to the hypotheses that blacks may think that weapon systems, and the military itself, may be used against some enemy, but

may also be intended to be used against blacks in this country. To quote David A. Collins, a black Councilman from Buffalo, New York:

My suspicion is that much of what the military budget is about is not about a military to defend this country against whatever "enemies" that there may be, and I put that in quotes because I'm not sure that we know who represents an enemy to this country. But anyway, I suspect that part of what that military is about is to have the wherewithal to put down an insurrection in this country as a direct result of Ronald Reagan's policies. When you put people in the position that they cannot survive, and then tell them they've got to make it. No, they have nothing left to do except to rebel and that rebellion is what the military is, I suspect, prepared to come in and do (Harvey, 1982:79-80).

8. DETERRENCE, THE STATE, AND MONOPOLY OF THE MEANS OF VIOLENCE

The findings in this thesis raise some issues about the tolerable level of the concentration of the means of violence by the state. Weber defined the state in terms of an organization that "(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Gerth and Mills, 1946:78). As Weber put it so long ago, "Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one" (Gerth and Mills, 1946:78).

The intimacy of the relationships between the state and violence is nowhere more dramatic than in the building of the American military-industrial complex and national

security state since the end of World War II. This national security state, comprised of the armed forces, elements of the business class, and scientists and strategists, has consistently promoted the idea that nuclear weapons are needed to protect the United States against the Soviet threat (Raskin, 1982:210).

One major ideological premise legitimating this concentration of force is deterrence. Although deterrence is logically a strategy for preventing attack, when it is used as a basis for expansionist foreign policy, and destroying social revolutions around the world, it comprises ideology (Williams, 1982:72). Deterrence is based on the idea that having the means of total retaliation makes a country safer, and provides for national security. As Finsterbusch so clearly explains:

Deterrence is the capability of convincing an enemy that it would or could suffer unacceptable losses if it attacks...

Supposedly deterrence is the most effective when the destruction of the attacker is assured. This requires building excess kill capacity, demonstrating the will to use the weapons, and keeping offensive technology far ahead of defensive technology. These requirements, however, make peaceful relations practically impossible (Finsterbusch, 1988:24).

As an ideology, deterrence has been used to support the massive weapons built up in history (Thompson, 1985:101). During the Reagan administration, the Pentagon planned to construct almost 40,000 new nuclear warheads, to

develop and deploy MX and Midgetman missiles, B-1 bombers, Stealth bombers, Pershing II missiles, Trident II missiles, the neutron bomb, and cruise missiles, as well as the accelerated pursuit of other projects related to waging nuclear war, including anti-submarine warfare and SDI. The projected Pentagon yearly military budgets were to total \$2,233 billion over the next six years after 1984 (McMahan, 1985:26).

This concentration of force is intended to be so overwhelming that it will keep the enemy from attacking. However, as Finsterbusch points out, the state must show it is willing to use such force to be effective. When Reagan and the Pentagon indicated such a willingness (Haig's limited nuclear war, for example) and began to take more of a bellicose and interventionist policy, the peace movement developed an educational campaign explaining how the use of nuclear weapons would assure mutual destruction, and provided a form of political participation (resolutions and referendums) that counteracted Reagan's rhetoric.

The public's fear of nuclear weapons and nuclear war is well documented in public opinion literature over the past decade (Schneider, 1985:344; Public Agenda Foundation, 1984:25). By the mid 1980's, an emerging consensus of public opinion was that a nuclear war could not be won, that it would not be worthwhile to survive a nuclear war,

and (particularly in the early 1980's) that a nuclear war could occur within one's lifetime.

The presence of such lethal weapons, and the need to threaten to use them in order for such a concentration of force to be an effective deterrent, has resulted in a growing sentiment that the weapons could be used. As the public has become more informed of the omnicidal danger of nuclear war, there has emerged a realization that the use of nuclear weapons against another country would lead to the destruction of this country. There also emerged enormous support not only for arms negotiations, but also for arms reduction (Schneider, 1987:67).

The findings in this thesis suggest still another development. As an ideology, deterrence supported the most massive weapons buildup in history; however, when such power is concentrated in the state for use against a foreign enemy, it is only a matter of time before citizens might think that such power could be used against them. By their very existence, the weapons exert control. Perhaps this concentrated force is the source of the ongoing anxiety of the working class that Hamilton (1975) describes as the basis of their anti-militarist and anti-war opinions in the early 1970's. This thesis indicates that at least some segments of the working class, particularly blacks and women, may be becoming more fearful of such a development.

APPENDIX A
DEMOGRAPHIC TABLES

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF UNWEIGHTED FULL SAMPLE
TO 1985 U.S. CENSUS STATISTICS

1985 Poll	N	%	1985 Census	N	%
<u>You or family member in union</u>			<u>Employed wage and salary workers who are union members</u>		
Yes	300	18.1	Yes	16,996	18.0
No	1354	81.6	TOTAL	94,521	
Missing	5	0.3			
TOTAL	1659				
<u>Education</u>			<u>Years of school completed*</u>		
Not HS grad	227	13.7	Thru 1-3 years HS	37,460	26.1
HS grad	589	35.5	4 years HS	54,826	38.2
Some college	415	25.0	1-3 yrs. college	23,394	16.3
College grad +	422	25.4	4 yrs. college +	27,844	19.4
Missing	6	0.4	TOTAL	143,524	100.0
TOTAL	1659				
			*Persons 25 years or older		
<u>Race</u>			<u>Race (estimated)</u>		
White	1451	87.5	White	202,768	84.9
Black/Other	203	12.2	Black/Other	25,971	15.1
Missing	5	0.3	TOTAL	238,739	100.0
TOTAL	1659				
<u>Religion</u>			<u>Religious Preference</u>		
Protestant	1053	63.5	Protestant	66	
Catholic	460	27.7	Catholic	26	
Jewish	48	2.9	Jewish	3	
Other	46	2.8	Other	1	
None	42	2.5	None	3	
Missing	10	0.6			
TOTAL	1659				

TABLE 1 (continued)

1985 Poll	N	%	1985 Census	N	%
<u>Income</u>					
<u>Percent Distribution of Families, by Income Level*</u>					
Under \$25,000*	740	44.6	Under \$25,000	28,343	45.2
\$25,000-34,999	384	23.1	\$25,000-34,999	11,726	18.7
\$35,000-50,000	312	18.8	\$35,000-49,999	11,914	19.0
Over \$50,000	177	10.7	\$50,000 and over	10,660	17.0
Missing	46	2.8	TOTAL	62,706	
TOTAL	1659				

*Combination of Under \$12,500 and \$12,500-\$24,999

*As of March 1985 for 1984 (in constant 1985 dollars)

<u>Age Group*</u>			<u>Age*</u>		
20-29	394	24.2	20-29	42,744	25.4
30-44	559	34.3	30-44	52,030	30.9
45-64	420	25.8	45-64	44,924	26.7
Over 64	257	15.8	Over 64	28,530	17.0
Missing	0	0.0	TOTAL	168,227	100.0
TOTAL	1630				

*18- and 19-year olds not included because census data only has 15-19 year-old classification

*Calculation of percentages do not include those under 20 years old to facilitate comparison to poll results.

Urbanity*

* Categories on the poll and on census are non-comparable

<u>Region</u>			<u>Region*</u>		
East	367	22.1	East	49.9	20.9
Midwest	436	26.3	Midwest	59.2	24.8
South	541	32.6	South	81.9	34.3
West	315	19.0	West	47.8	20.0
Missing	0	0.0	TOTAL	238.7	
TOTAL	1659				

*N is in millions

TABLE 1 (continued)

1985 Poll	N	%	1985 Census	N	%
<u>Gender</u>			<u>Sex (estimated)</u>		
Male	726	43.8	Male	116,161	48.7
Female	933	56.2	Female	122,579	51.3
Missing	0	0.0	TOTAL	238,740	
TOTAL	1659				

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF UNWEIGHTED FULL
SAMPLE TO SUB-SAMPLE

Question	Full Sample (N=1659)		16-Item Sample	
	N	%	N	%
<u>You or household member in union</u>				
- Yes	300	18.1	165	19.2
- No	1354	81.6	693	80.8
- Missing	5	0.3	0	0.0
<u>Education</u>				
- Not H.S. grad	227	13.7	86	10.0
- H.S. grad	589	35.5	321	37.4
- Some college	415	25.0	221	25.8
- College grad plus	422	25.4	230	26.8
- Missing	6	0.4	0	0.0
<u>Race</u>				
- White	1451	87.5	738	86.0
- Black/White	203	12.2	120	14.0
- Missing	5	0.3	0	0.0
<u>Religion</u>				
- Protestant	1053	63.5	529	61.7
- Catholic	460	27.7	261	30.4
- Jewish	48	2.9	21	2.4
- Other	46	2.8	21	2.4
- None	42	2.5	26	3.0
- Missing	10	0.6	0	0.0
<u>Income</u>				
- Under \$12,500	254	15.3	114	13.3
- \$12,500-\$24,999	486	29.3	251	29.3
- \$25,000-\$34,999	384	23.1	215	25.1
- \$35,000-\$50,000	312	18.8	175	20.4
- Over \$50,000	177	10.7	103	12.0
- Missing	46	2.8	0	0.0

TABLE 2 (continued)

Question	Full Sample (N=1659)		16-Item Sample	
	N	%	N	%
<u>Age group</u>				
- 18-29	423	25.5	279	32.5
- 30-44	559	33.7	304	35.4
- 45-64	420	25.3	206	24.0
- Over 64	257	15.5	69	8.0
- Missing	0	0.0	0	0.0
<u>Urbanity</u>				
- Large central city	190	11.5	110	12.8
- Central city	346	20.9	190	22.1
- Suburbs	564	34.0	281	32.8
- Other community	217	13.1	107	12.5
- Rural	342	20.6	170	19.8
- Missing	0	0.0	0	0.0
<u>Region</u>				
- East	367	22.1	182	21.2
- Midwest	436	26.3	219	25.5
- South	541	32.6	283	33.0
- West	315	19.0	174	20.3
- Missing	0	0.0	0	0.0
<u>Gender</u>				
- Male	726	43.8	448	52.2
- Female	933	56.2	410	47.8
- Missing	0	0.0	0	0.0
<u>Right now US or Soviet Union superior in military strength</u>				
- Soviet Union superior	402	24.2	239	27.9
- About equal	795	47.9	445	51.9
- US superior	287	17.3	174	20.3
- Missing	175	10.5	0	0.0
<u>What should US do now - reduce tensions or get tougher?</u>				
- Reduce tensions	837	50.5	468	54.5
- Both	57	3.4	14	1.6
- Get Tougher	652	39.3	376	43.8
- Missing	113	6.8	0	0.0

TABLE 2 (continued)

Question	Full Sample (N=1659)		16-Item Sample	
	N	%	N	%
<u>Possible to have pact Soviet Union honors?</u>				
- Yes	652	39.3	408	*47.6
- No	832	50.2	450	52.4
- Missing	175	10.5	0	0.0
<u>Will SDI work</u>				
- No	469	28.3	273	31.8
- Yes	964	58.1	585	*68.2
- Missing	226	13.6	0	0.0
<u>Part of population SDI is supposed to protect</u>				
- About half or less	684	41.2	510	59.4
- Entire population	499	30.1	348	40.6
- Missing	476	28.7	0	0.0
<u>Ideology</u>				
- Liberal	321	19.3	176	20.5
- Moderate	754	45.4	398	46.4
- Conservative	512	30.9	284	33.1
- Missing	72	4.3	0	0.0
<u>SDI or negotiate</u>				
- Pro SDI	563	33.9	341	39.7
- Pro negotiate	880	53.0	499	58.2
- Neither	44	2.7	18	2.1
- Missing	172	10.4	0	0.0

APPENDIX B
LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH OUTCOMES
HAVING MORE THAN TWO LEVELS

LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH OUTCOMES
HAVING MORE THAN TWO LEVELS

Logistic regression does not produce joint tests for outcomes with more than two levels, as does generalized least squares (standard multiple) regression. The latter method was proposed by Grizzle, Starmer, and Koch (1969) and is commonly referred to by their names as the GSK method. It is widely available in the SAS CATMOD procedure. A comparison of these results to the results available with this alternative method will help characterize the limits of logistic regression.

The outcome of ideology will be used for illustration. Ideology was "parameterized" as two variables: 1) liberal versus other and 2) conservative versus other. Although "moderate" was considered the "reference group" in the analysis, it was not used as a separate group for comparison to either liberals or conservatives because such a comparison would eliminate major segments of the sample in each analysis. This would result in coefficients that describe the odds of being liberal versus moderate only rather than the odds of being liberal per se. Since liberal and conservative are the extremes on the ideology question, a choice was made to tailor the operationalization (parameterization) of this multi-level outcome for ease of interpretation of the odds of being at either extreme on this scale.

Such a three level outcome could be parameterized differently. However, the design of non-redundant statistical tests requires the use of at most two dichotomous variables to represent membership in three mutually exclusive groups. One optimal way to parameterize would be to design the dichotomous outcome variables to be independent, i.e., orthogonal.

An orthogonal parameterization would require dropping one group from one of the analyses. For example, an orthogonal parameterization would be 1) liberal versus other and 2) moderate versus conservative. Information from one of these analysis is independent of the information in the other but direct interpretation of the odds of being conservative is sacrificed.

The parameterization used in this thesis provides direct statements about membership at both extremes on the scale. Furthermore the parameterization used contains all the information contained in an orthogonal parameterization and

would lead to the sample joint test results if used in a GSK analysis (Grizzle, Starmer, and Koch, 1969).

The parameterization used is closely related to one suggested for ordinal, multiple level outcomes in the GSK literature. Koch et al. (1977) described "cumulative marginal probability functions" in both "weighted" and "unweighted" forms.

Coding for membership in the extreme groups on a three level scale is logically the same as using unweighted cumulative marginal probability functions. There is a minor technical difference because the groups at both extremes are coded as one, not zero. This is called a normalization difference. It results in reversed algebraic signs relative to standard cumulative marginal probability function coding for the coefficients of the group coded lowest on the original scale.

This is just a "clerical" difference: the estimates are the same size with the same significance level. Specifically, with cumulative marginal probability function coding the analysis for moderates versus others would be tested as others versus moderates (the first category is coded as one, the second as zero in performing the math). The signs of the coefficients in such an analysis would be the opposite of what was obtained with the coding actually used but the results would otherwise be the same.

Therefore although logistic regression does not provide a joint test for a multi-level outcomes (it does provide a joint test for independent variables) the parameterization used for the dependent variable ideology captures all the information about ideology that could be obtained with GSK methods. Different parameterizations on the independent variable side of the regression equations lead to the same joint test although some parameterizations lead to more direct interpretations with respect to membership in a particular group. Similarly, different parameterizations on the dependent variable side would lead to the same joint test if GSK methods were used.

Ideology was parameterized for direct interpretations about membership in the groups at each extreme on the scale. This way of describing ideology could be used in a GSK context to get a joint test. The use of only two response variables is necessary in either method to avoid redundancy: a choice of only two variables is necessary with either method. Another parameterization that would

provide direct interpretations about moderates would result in a loss of direct interpretations about one of the two other groups.

APPENDIX C
THE LOGIC OF VARIABLE SELECTION
USED IN THE MODEL

THE LOGIC OF VARIABLE SELECTION
USED IN THE MODEL

Although path analysis was not formally used in this analysis, these principles were used in the selection of variables across outcome measures in the logistic regression analysis. Path analysis allows the decomposition of observed associations into components of either direct and indirect causal effects or spurious and unexplained components of association.

Any variable that did not have a direct effect on ideology can not have an indirect effect on another construct through ideology. Similarly, the spurious component of any association of ideology with a subsequent variable will be zero for any variable that does not directly affect ideology. Thus, any variable failing to have a significant effect in the ideology analysis would not be decomposable to affect subsequent variables because spurious effects can not be separated from unexplained effects and also because the magnitude of direct and indirect causal effects can not be compared.

For clarity of exposition, certain variables that did not directly affect ideology were excluded from all analyses. The interpretation of these variables is severely limited whether path analysis is formally used or not. The interpretation of the other variables is made clearer by the exclusion of variables that, in principle, can not be examined in terms of the components of how they affect other variables in the model. We make implicitly the distinctions that path analysis makes explicitly. We have eliminated those variables for which adequate interpretation is not possible.

APPENDIX D
LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS PERTAINING TO
PUBLIC OPINION MODEL

TABLE 3

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES TO IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION (CONSERVATIVE)

#52 Q. How would you describe your views on most political matters?
Generally, to you think of yourself as liberal, moderate, or
conservative?

Responses: 0. All other
1. Conservative

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
UNION					5.48**
RF:Union Member					
Hsehld Member	0.130	0.0521	1.0535	5.35	
Not Member	2.628**	0.7443	2.1050	110.50	
RELIGION					n.s.
RF:Protestant					
Catholic	-1.891	-0.3438	0.7091	-29.09	
Jewish	-1.169	-0.6885	0.5040	-49.60	
Other	-0.829	-0.4346	0.6475	-35.25	
None	-0.599	-0.2713	0.7624	-23.76	
URBANITY					3.15*
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	1.775	0.5325	1.7031	70.31	
Suburbs	2.243*	0.6435	1.9031	90.31	
Community	3.496**	1.1598	3.1893	218.93	
Rural	2.336*	0.7364	2.0884	108.84	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	-1.959	-0.3056	0.7367	-26.33	
EDUCATION					n.s.
RF:Not HS Grad					
HS Grad	0.792	0.2217	1.2482	24.82	
Some College	0.194	0.0590	1.0607	6.07	
College	-0.213	-0.0656	0.9365	-6.35	

TABLE 3 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
RACE					
RF:White					n.s.
Black	0.260	0.0776	1.0807	8.07	
Other	1.391	0.5052	1.6573	65.73	
INCOME					
RF:Under 12,500					n.s.
12,500-24,999	-0.980	-0.2515	0.7777	-22.23	
25,000-34,999	0.177	0.0473	1.0484	4.84	
35,000-50,000	0.604	0.1708	1.1862	18.62	
Over 50,000	-0.042	-0.0139	0.9862	-1.38	
AGE					
RF:18-29					n.s.
30-44	0.027	0.0051	1.0051	0.51	
45-64	0.649	0.1352	1.1448	14.48	
Over 64	-0.654	0.2046	1.2270	22.70	
REGION					
RF:East					n.s.
Midwest	0.782	0.1834	1.2013	20.13	
South	1.347	0.3023	1.3530	35.30	
West	-0.173	-0.0435	0.9575	-4.25	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 4

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES TO IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION (LIBERAL)

#52 Q. How would you describe your views on most political matters?
Generally, to you think of yourself as liberal, moderate, or
conservative?

Responses: 0. All other
1. Liberal

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test <u>F</u> statistic
UNION					3.68*
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	0.630	0.2384	1.2634	26.34	
Not Member	-1.551	-0.4527	0.6359	-36.41	
INCOME					1.79 n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	0.157	0.4467	1.5631	56.31	
25,000-34,999	-0.717	-0.2196	0.8029	-19.71	
35,000-50,000	-1.989*	-0.6858	0.5037	-49.63	
Over 50,000	-0.959	-0.3761	0.6865	-31.35	
AGE					n.s.
RF:18-29					
30-44	-0.373	-0.0805	0.4470	-55.30	
45-64	-0.743	-0.1882	0.8284	-17.16	
Over 64	-1.792	-0.7403	0.4770	-52.30	
URBANITY					3.66**
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-2.304*	-0.6566	0.5186	-48.14	
Suburbs	-3.691**	-1.0319	0.3563	-64.37	
Community	-2.640**	-0.9484	0.3873	-61.27	
Rural	-2.943**	-0.9503	0.3855	-61.34	

TABLE 4 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
REGION					1.86 n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	-1.753	-0.4512	0.6369	-36.31	
South	-2.294*	-0.5849	0.5572	-44.28	
West	-1.301	-0.3531	0.7025	-29.75	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	1.791	0.3336	1.3960	39.60	
EDUCATION					n.s.
RF:Not HS Grad					
HS Grad	-0.196	-0.0616	0.9402	-5.98	
Some College	-0.678	-0.2346	0.7909	-20.91	
College	-0.179	-0.0622	0.9359	-6.41	
RACE					n.s.
RF:White					
Black	0.627	0.2019	1.2237	22.37	
Other	1.070	0.4025	1.4956	49.56	
RELIGION					n.s.
RF:Protestant					
Catholic	0.556	0.1175	1.1247	12.47	
Jewish	1.249	0.6664	1.8338	83.38	
Other	0.819	0.4416	1.5552	55.52	
None	0.414	0.2106	1.2345	23.45	

RF = Reference Group

(1) The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

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TABLE 5

SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
MILITARY STRENGTH (UNITED STATES SUPERIOR)

#21 Q. Right now, would you say the United States is superior in military strength to the Soviet Union, is about equal in strength, or is not as strong as the Soviet Union?

Responses: 0. Other (U.S. not as strong, about equal)
1. U.S. superior

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test <u>F</u> statistic
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	1.785	0.7413	2.0987	109.87	
Not Member	1.897	0.4988	1.6467	64.67	
URBANITY					2.18 n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-0.755	-0.2142	0.8072	-19.28	
Suburbs	-1.671	-0.4507	0.6372	-36.28	
Community	-2.584**	-0.9602	0.3828	-61.72	
Rural	-2.021*	-0.6204	0.5377	-46.23	
REGION					2.08 n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	-2.195*	-0.5778	0.5611	-43.89	
South	-0.929	-0.2239	0.7994	-20.06	
West	0.077	0.0196	1.0198	1.98	
GENDER					4.96*
RF:Male					
Female	-2.270*	-0.4119	0.6624	-33.76	
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	0.738	0.2116	1.2357	23.57	
25,000-34,999	-0.273	-0.0824	0.9209	-7.91	
35,000-50,000	-0.317	-0.0996	0.9052	-9.48	
Over 50,000	-0.140	-0.0494	0.9518	-4.82	

TABLE 5 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					n.s.
RF: Liberal					
Moderate	-0.721	-0.1687	0.8448	-15.52	
Conservative	0.728	0.1803	1.1976	19.76	

RF = Reference Group

(1) The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

* = $p < .05$

** = $p < .01$

TABLE 6

SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
MILITARY STRENGTH (SOVIET UNION SUPERIOR)

21 Q. Right now, would you say the United States is superior in military strength to the Soviet Union, is about equal in strength, or is not as strong as the Soviet Union?

Responses: 0. Other (U.S. stronger, about equal)
1. Not as strong

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
REGION					
RF:East					n.s.
Midwest	1.197	0.2794	1.3223	32.23	
South	1.847	0.4131	1.5116	51.16	
West	0.100	0.0253	1.0256	2.56	
UNION					
RF:Union Member					n.s.
Hsehd Member	0.658	0.2382	1.2690	26.90	
Not Member	0.439	0.1180	1.1252	12.52	
INCOME					
RF:Under 12,500					n.s.
12,500-24,999	-0.207	-0.0527	0.9487	-5.13	
25,000-34,999	0.727	0.1886	1.2076	20.76	
35,000-50,000	-0.059	-0.0161	0.9840	-1.60	
Over 50,000	-0.355	-0.1109	0.8950	-10.50	
URBANITY					
RF:Lg. Cen. City					n.s.
Central City	0.575	0.1585	1.1718	17.18	
Suburbs	0.465	0.1217	1.1294	12.94	
Community	0.048	0.0154	1.0155	1.55	
Rural	-0.106	-0.0306	0.9699	-3.01	
GENDER					
RF:Male					n.s.
Female	0.933	0.1478	1.1593	15.93	

TABLE 6 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					n.s.
RF: Liberal					
Moderate	-0.615	-0.1280	0.8799	-12.01	
Conservative	0.036	0.0789	1.0821	8.21	

RF = Reference Group

(1) The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

* = $p < .05$

** = $p < .01$

TABLE 7

SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
WILL SOVIET UNION HONOR TREATY?

#41 Q. Do you think it's possible to negotiate a fair arms control agreement that the Soviet Union would live up to?

Responses: 0. Yes
1. No

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
REGION					5.63**
RF:East					
Midwest	-0.289	-0.0608	0.9410	-5.90	
South	3.170**	0.6450	1.9060	90.60	
West	1.604	0.3527	1.4229	42.29	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					13.22**
RF:Liberal					
Moderate	4.047**	0.7934	2.2042	120.42	
Conservative	5.142**	1.0860	2.9624	196.24	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hsehd Member	-0.159	-0.0528	0.9486	-5.14	
Not Member	-0.981	-0.2354	0.7903	-20.97	
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	-1.053	-0.2488	0.7797	-22.03	
25,000-34,999	-0.408	-0.0993	0.9055	-9.45	
35,000-50,000	-0.920	-0.2321	0.7929	-20.71	
Over 50,000	-0.596	-0.1700	0.8437	-15.63	

TABLE 7 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
URBANITY					n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-0.848	-0.2145	0.8069	-19.31	
Suburbs	0.803	0.1903	1.2096	20.96	
Community	-0.244	-0.0708	0.9316	-6.84	
Rural	1.046	0.2726	1.3134	31.34	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	0.004	0.0007	1.0007	0.07	

RF = Reference Group

(1) The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

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TABLE 8

SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
TENSIONS (REDUCE)

#22 Q. What do you think the United States should do now -- should the United States try harder to reduce tensions with the Russians, or should the United States get tougher in its dealings with the Russians?

Responses: 0. Other (get tough, both)
1. Reduce

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test <u>F</u> statistic
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	-0.203	-0.0466	0.9545	-4.55	
25,000-34,999	-0.256	-0.0607	0.9411	-5.89	
35,000-50,000	0.519	0.1279	1.1364	13.64	
Over 50,000	1.710	0.4875	1.6281	62.81	
URBANITY					2.65*
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-0.330	-0.0816	0.9216	-7.84	
Suburbs	-0.293	-0.0682	0.9341	-6.59	
Community	1.791	0.5241	1.6880	68.80	
Rural	-1.295	-0.3297	0.7191	-28.09	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					2.31 n.s.
RF:Liberal					
Moderate	-1.329	-0.2535	0.7761	-22.39	
Conservative	-2.163*	-0.4438	0.6416	-35.84	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	-0.310	-0.1014	0.9036	-9.64	
Not Member	0.081	0.0190	1.0192	1.92	

TABLE 8 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	-0.798	-0.1657	0.8473	-15.27	
South	-0.512	-0.1027	0.9024	-9.76	
West	-0.964	-0.2101	0.8105	-18.95	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	0.973	0.1402	1.1505	15.05	

RF = Reference Group

(1) The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 9

SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
TENSIONS (GET TOUGH)

#22 Q. What do you think the United States should do now -- should the United States try harder to reduce tensions with the Russians, or should the United States get tougher in its dealings with the Russians?

Responses: 0. Other (reduce tension, both)
1. Get tougher

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					2.54 n.s.
RF:Liberal					
Moderate	1.379	0.2645	1.3028	30.28	
Conservative	2.267*	0.4674	1.5958	59.58	
URBANITY					2.94*
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	0.021	0.0052	1.0052	0.52	
Suburbs	-0.021	-0.0049	0.9951	-0.49	
Community	-1.853	-0.5447	0.5800	-42.00	
Rural	1.424	0.3628	1.4373	43.73	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	0.290	0.0948	1.0994	9.94	
Not Member	-0.067	-0.0157	0.9844	-1.56	
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	0.245	0.0565	1.0581	5.81	
25,000-34,999	0.259	0.0616	1.0635	6.35	
35,000-50,000	-0.318	-0.0785	0.9245	-7.55	
Over 50,000	-1.516	-0.4341	0.6478	-35.22	

TABLE 9 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	0.407	0.0847	1.0884	8.84	
South	0.367	0.0739	1.0767	7.67	
West	0.537	0.1175	1.1247	12.47	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	-0.453	-0.0655	0.9366	-6.34	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 10

SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
WILL STAR WARS WORK?

#42 Q. Ronald Reagan has proposed developing a defense system in space that would destroy incoming missiles before they reached the United States, a system some people call "Star Wars." Do you think this system is likely to work, or not?

Responses: 0. No
1. Yes

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test <u>F</u> statistic
INCOME					1.29 n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	1.486	0.3532	1.4236	42.36	
25,000-34,999	1.869	0.4650	1.5920	59.20	
35,000-50,000	2.169*	0.5665	1.7587	75.87	
Over 50,000	1.290	0.3786	1.4602	46.02	
GENDER					16.80**
RF:Male					
Female	-4.136**	-0.6397	0.5275	-47.25	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	0.270	0.0957	1.1004	10.04	
Not Member	-0.110	-0.0287	0.9717	-2.83	
URBANITY					n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-0.286	-0.0765	0.9264	-7.36	
Suburbs	-0.605	-0.1518	0.8592	-14.08	
Community	-1.055	-0.3184	0.7273	-27.27	
Rural	0.231	0.0644	1.0665	6.65	

TABLE 10 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
REGION					n.s.
RF: East					
Midwest	0.448	0.1013	1.1066	10.66	
South	-0.037	-0.0079	0.9921	-0.79	
West	-1.229	-0.2834	0.7532	-24.68	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					n.s.
RF: Liberal					
Moderate	1.386	0.2737	1.3148	31.48	
Conservative	1.586	0.3413	1.4068	40.68	

RF = Reference Group

(1) The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

* = $p < .05$

** = $p < .01$

TABLE 11

SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
DOES STAR WARS PROTECT?

#45 Q. Is the administration's proposed Star Wars system intended to protect the entire population or about half or less of the population?

Responses: 0. It will protect half or less of the population.
1. It will protect the whole population.

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
UNION					3.17*
RF:Union Member					
Hsehld Member	0.229	0.0441	1.0451	4.51	
Not Member	1.313	0.2702	1.3102	31.02	
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	0.370	3.0863	21.8959	2089.59	
25,000-34,999	0.746	0.1795	1.1966	19.66	
35,000-50,000	-0.581	-0.1465	0.8637	-13.63	
Over 50,000	0.426	0.1199	1.1274	12.74	
URBANITY					n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-0.254	-0.0635	0.9385	-6.15	
Suburbs	-0.337	-0.0793	0.9238	-7.62	
Community	-0.078	-0.0223	0.9779	-2.21	
Rural	-0.668	-0.1728	0.8413	-15.87	
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	-0.713	-0.1491	0.8615	-13.85	
South	-0.361	-0.0723	0.9303	-6.97	
West	-1.349	-0.2983	0.7421	-25.79	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	-0.866	-0.1256	0.8820	-11.80	

TABLE 11 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					n.s.
RF: Liberal					
Moderate	0.229	0.0441	1.0451	4.51	
Conservative	1.313	0.2702	1.3102	31.02	

RF = Reference Group

(1) The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

* = $p < .05$

** = $p < .01$

TABLE 12

SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES
AND IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION TO
STAR WARS VS. NEGOTIATE (STAR WARS)

#44 Q. If it came down to only these choices, what should the United States do -- work to develop a Star Wars system and give up negotiations, or work to negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles and give up Star Wars?

Responses: 0. All other responses
1. Star Wars

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
URBANITY					1.25 n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	1.970*	0.5130	1.6702	67.02	
Suburbs	0.970	0.2400	1.2712	27.12	
Community	1.690	0.4994	1.6477	64.77	
Rural	1.364	0.3663	1.4424	44.24	
GENDER					12.29**
RF:Male					
Female	-3.534**	-0.5116	0.5996	-40.04	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					n.s.
RF:Moderate					
Liberal	0.312	0.6115	1.8432	84.32	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					9.51**
RF:Moderate					
Conservative	3.109**	0.5023	1.6525	65.25	
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	-0.175	-0.0415	0.9593	-4.07	
25,000-34,999	-0.231	-0.0562	0.9454	-5.46	
35,000-50,000	-0.049	-0.0123	0.9878	-1.22	
Over 50,000	-0.173	-0.0495	0.9517	-4.83	

TABLE 12 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	-1.115	-0.2395	0.7870	-21.30	
South	0.397	0.0800	1.0833	8.33	
West	0.033	0.0072	1.0072	0.72	

RF = Reference Group

(1) The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 13

SELECTED SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES
AND IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION TO
STAR WARS VS. NEGOTIATE (NEGOTIATE)

#44 Q. If it came down to only these choices, what should the United States do -- work to develop a Star Wars system and give up negotiations, or work to negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles and give up Star Wars?

Responses: 0. All other responses
1. Negotiate

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
URBANITY					1.33 n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-2.111*	-0.5470	0.5787	-42.13	
Suburbs	-1.187	-0.2920	0.7468	-25.32	
Community	-1.774	-0.5222	0.5932	-40.68	
Rural	-1.514	-0.4043	0.6674	-33.26	
GENDER					15.61**
RF:Male					
Female	3.983**	0.5732	1.7738	77.38	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					n.s.
RF:Moderate					
Liberal	0.093	0.0181	1.0183	1.83	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					8.25**
RF:Moderate					
Conservative	-2.897**	-0.4658	0.6276	-37.24	
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	0.288	0.0678	1.0702	7.02	
25,000-34,999	0.596	0.1442	1.1551	15.51	
35,000-50,000	0.372	0.0938	1.0983	9.83	
Over 50,000	-0.252	-0.0711	0.9314	-6.86	

TABLE 13 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	0.627	0.1337	1.1430	14.30	
South	-0.776	-0.1560	0.8556	-14.44	
West	-0.365	-0.0809	0.9223	-7.77	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$
**= $p < .01$

TABLE 14

GENDER AND UNION TO STAR WARS
VS. NEGOTIATE (STAR WARS)

#44 Q. If it came down to only these choices, what should the United States do -- work to develop a Star Wars system and give up negotiations, or work to negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles and give up Star Wars?

Responses: 0. All other responses
1. Star Wars

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
GENDER					15.16**
RF:Male					
Female	-3.903**	-0.5664	0.5676	-43.24	
UNION					n.s.
Union Member					
Hsehld Member	0.241	0.4028	1.4960	49.60	
Not Member	-0.161	-0.0375	0.9632	-3.68	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

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TABLE 15

GENDER AND UNION TO STAR WARS
VS. NEGOTIATE (NEGOTIATE)

#44 Q. If it came down to only these choices, what should the United States do -- work to develop a Star Wars system and give up negotiations, or work to negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles and give up Star Wars?

Responses: 0. All other responses
1. Negotiate

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
GENDER					17.73**
RF:Male					
Female	4.227**	0.6091	1.8388	83.88	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	-0.623	-0.2011	0.8178	-18.22	
Not Member	1.028	0.2363	1.2666	26.66	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$
**= $p < .01$

APPENDIX E
LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS PERTAINING TO THE
FULL SET OF SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES

TABLE 16

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
MILITARY STRENGTH (UNITED STATES SUPERIOR)

#21 Q. Right now, would you say the United States is superior in military strength to the Soviet Union, is about equal in strength, or is not as strong as the Soviet Union?

Responses: 0. Other (U.S. not as strong, about equal)
1. U.S. superior

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
GENDER					4.63*
RF:Male					
Female	-2.191*	-0.4075	0.6653	-33.47	
UNION					2.38 n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	-1.793	-0.7646	0.4655	-53.45	
Not Member	-2.084*	-0.5747	0.5633	-43.67	
AGE					1.55 n.s.
RF:18-29					
30-44	0.026	0.0058	1.0058	0.58	
45-64	0.961	0.2420	1.2738	27.38	
Over 64	1.975*	0.6613	1.9374	93.74	
URBANITY					1.76 n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-0.906	-0.2693	0.7639	-23.61	
Suburbs	-1.626	-0.4685	0.6259	-37.41	
Community	-2.502*	-0.9837	0.3739	-62.61	
Rural	-1.728	-0.5819	0.5588	-44.12	
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	-1.799	-0.4890	0.6132	-38.68	
South	-0.590	-0.1490	0.8616	-13.84	
West	0.273	0.0726	1.0753	7.53	

TABLE 16 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test <u>F</u> statistic
EDUCATION					n.s.
RF:Not HS Grad					
HS Grad	-0.332	-0.1036	0.9016	-9.84	
Some College	-0.654	-0.2237	0.7996	-20.04	
College	1.127	0.3799	1.4621	46.21	
RACE					n.s.
RF:White					
Black	0.714	0.2366	1.2669	26.69	
Other	0.336	0.1328	1.1420	14.20	
RELIGION					n.s.
RF:Protestant					
Catholic	1.085	0.2267	1.2545	25.45	
Jewish	0.560	0.2999	1.3497	34.97	
Other	0.084	0.0504	1.0517	5.17	
None	1.095	0.5294	1.6979	69.79	
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	0.863	0.2554	1.2910	29.10	
25,000-34,999	-0.139	-0.0441	0.9569	-4.31	
35,000-50,000	-0.336	-0.1142	0.8921	-10.79	
Over 50,000	-0.515	-0.2017	0.8173	-18.27	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					n.s.
RF:Liberal					
Moderate	-0.796	-0.1898	0.8271	-17.29	
Conservative	0.820	0.2068	1.2297	22.97	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 17

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
MILITARY STRENGTH (SOVIET UNION SUPERIOR)

21 Q. Right now, would you say the United States is superior in military strength to the Soviet Union, is about equal in strength, or is not as strong as the Soviet Union?

Responses: 0. Other (U.S. stronger, about equal)
1. Not as strong

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	1.056	0.2535	1.2885	28.85	
South	1.757	0.4086	1.5047	50.47	
West	0.075	0.0194	1.0196	1.96	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	0.833	0.3082	1.3610	36.10	
Not Member	0.890	0.2464	1.2794	27.94	
EDUCATION					n.s.
RF:Not HS Grad					
HS Grad	0.547	0.1563	1.1692	16.92	
Some College	0.759	0.2327	1.2620	26.20	
College	-0.840	-0.2691	0.7641	-23.59	
RACE					n.s.
RF:White					
Black	-0.156	-0.0466	0.9545	-4.55	
Other	0.051	0.0192	1.0194	1.94	
RELIGION					n.s.
RF:Protestant					
Catholic	0.440	0.0806	1.0839	8.39	
Jewish	-0.687	-0.4019	0.6690	-33.10	
Other	-0.666	-0.3922	0.6756	-32.44	
None	-0.398	-0.1939	0.8237	-17.63	

TABLE 17 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	-0.145	-0.0382	0.9625	-3.75	
25,000-34,999	0.746	0.2052	1.2278	22.78	
35,000-50,000	0.064	0.0188	1.0190	1.90	
Over 50,000	0.066	0.0226	1.0229	2.29	
AGE					n.s.
RF:18-29					
30-44	1.066	0.2083	1.2316	23.16	
45-64	0.682	0.1499	1.1617	16.17	
Over 64	1.143	0.3507	1.4201	42.01	
URBANITY					n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	0.663	0.1893	1.2084	20.84	
Suburbs	0.399	0.1098	1.1161	11.61	
Community	0.005	0.0015	1.0015	0.15	
Rural	-0.130	-0.0404	0.9604	-3.96	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	0.718	0.1159	1.1229	12.29	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					n.s.
RF:Liberal					
Moderate	-0.750	-0.1585	0.8534	-14.66	
Conservative	-0.121	-0.0271	0.9733	-2.67	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 18

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
WILL SOVIET UNION HONOR TREATY?

#41 Q. Do you think it's possible to negotiate a fair arms control agreement that the Soviet Union would live up to?

Responses: 0. Yes
1. No

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
REGION					4.86**
RF:East					
Midwest	-0.506	-0.1103	0.8956	-10.44	
South	2.772**	0.5901	1.8042	80.42	
West	1.328	0.3041	1.3554	35.54	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					12.32**
RF:Liberal					
Moderate	3.910**	0.7771	2.1752	117.52	
Conservative	5.004**	1.0724	2.9224	192.24	
AGE					3.33*
RF:18-29					
30-44	2.842**	0.5134	1.6710	67.10	
45-64	2.117*	0.4279	1.5341	53.41	
Over 64	2.150*	0.6332	1.8836	88.36	
RELIGION					n.s.
RF:Protestant					
Catholic	-1.812	-0.3085	0.7346	-26.54	
Jewish	-0.296	-0.1413	0.8682	-13.18	
Other	-1.517	-0.7482	0.4732	-52.68	
None	1.131	0.5065	1.6595	65.95	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	0.288	0.0978	1.1027	10.27	
Not Member	-0.430	-0.1066	0.8989	-10.11	

TABLE 18 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
EDUCATION					n.s.
RF:Not HS Grad					
HS Grad	-0.046	-0.0122	0.9879	-1.21	
Some College	-0.236	-0.0679	0.9344	-6.56	
College	0.000	0.0001	1.0001	0.01	
RACE					n.s.
RF:White					
Black	-0.795	-0.2241	0.7992	-20.08	
Other	0.671	0.2335	1.2630	26.30	
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	-0.840	-0.2071	0.8129	-18.71	
25,000-34,999	-0.453	-0.1173	0.8893	-11.06	
35,000-50,000	-0.745	-0.2040	0.8155	-18.45	
Over 50,000	-0.745	-0.2370	0.7890	-21.10	
URBANITY					n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-1.020	-0.2687	0.7644	-23.56	
Suburbs	0.535	0.1341	1.1435	14.35	
Community	-0.458	-0.1406	0.8688	-13.12	
Rural	0.554	0.1571	1.1701	17.01	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	0.032	0.0048	1.0048	0.48	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 19

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
TENSIONS (REDUCE)

#22 Q. What do you think the United States should do now -- should the United States try harder to reduce tensions with the Russians, or should the United States get tougher in its dealings with the Russians?

Responses: 0. Other (get tough, both)
1. Reduce

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
EDUCATION					6.84**
RF:Not HS Grad					
HS Grad	2.191*	0.5826	1.7907	79.07	
Some College	3.160**	0.9074	2.4780	147.80	
College	4.246**	1.2502	3.4910	249.10	
AGE					3.02*
RF:18-29					
30-44	-1.511	-0.2697	0.7636	-23.64	
45-64	0.770	0.1550	1.1677	16.77	
Over 64	1.776	0.5290	1.6973	69.73	
RACE					2.97 n.s.
RF:White					
Black	2.396*	0.6827	1.9792	97.92	
Other	-0.438	-0.1487	0.8618	-13.82	
RELIGION					1.47 n.s.
RF:Protestant					
Catholic	2.210*	0.3766	1.4574	45.74	
Jewish	1.335	0.6891	1.9919	99.19	
Other	0.066	0.0312	1.0317	3.17	
None	0.421	0.1792	1.1963	19.63	

TABLE 19 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test <u>F</u> statistic
URBANITY					n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-0.135	-0.0352	0.9654	-3.46	
Suburbs	0.076	0.0191	1.0193	1.93	
Community	1.919	0.5982	1.8189	81.89	
Rural	-0.381	-0.1068	0.8987	-10.13	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					2.12 n.s.
RF:Liberal					
Moderate	-1.525	-0.3001	0.7407	-25.93	
Conservative	-2.088*	-0.4403	0.6439	-35.61	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	-0.716	-0.2429	0.7843	-21.57	
Not Member	-0.487	-0.1202	0.8867	-11.33	
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	-0.585	-0.1425	0.8672	-13.28	
25,000-34,999	-0.582	-0.1497	0.8610	-13.90	
35,000-50,000	-0.458	-0.1247	0.8828	-11.72	
Over 50,000	0.463	0.1477	1.1592	15.92	
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	-0.457	-0.0994	0.9054	-9.46	
South	-0.254	-0.0539	0.9475	-5.25	
West	-0.609	-0.1397	0.8696	-13.04	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	0.998	0.1490	1.1607	16.07	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 20

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
TENSIONS (GET TOUGH)

#22 Q. What do you think the United States should do now -- should the United States try harder to reduce tensions with the Russians, or should the United States get tougher in its dealings with the Russians?

Responses: 0. Other (reduce tension, both)
1. Get tougher

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
EDUCATION					6.65**
RF:Not HS Grad					
HS Grad	-2.001*	-0.5275	0.5901	-40.99	
Some College	-3.348**	-0.9575	0.3838	-61.62	
College	-4.005**	-1.1714	0.3099	-69.01	
RACE					3.29*
RF:White					
Black	-2.541*	-0.7338	0.4801	-51.99	
Other	0.385	0.1307	1.1396	13.96	
AGE					2.84*
RF:18-29					
30-44	1.700	0.3041	1.3555	35.55	
45-64	-0.432	-0.0872	0.9165	-8.35	
Over 64	-1.601	-0.4792	0.6193	-38.07	
RELIGION					1.24 n.s.
RF:Protestant					
Catholic	-1.978*	-0.3378	0.7134	-28.66	
Jewish	-1.207	-0.6218	0.5370	-46.30	
Other	0.125	0.0596	1.0614	6.14	
None	-0.616	-0.2642	0.7678	-23.22	

TABLE 20 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
URBANITY					2.01 n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-0.239	-0.0626	0.9393	-6.07	
Suburbs	-0.466	-0.1171	0.8895	-11.05	
Community	-2.037*	-0.6372	0.5288	-47.12	
Rural	0.417	0.1169	1.1240	12.40	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					2.36 n.s.
RF:Liberal					
Moderate	1.574	0.3113	1.3652	36.52	
Conservative	2.204*	0.4668	1.5949	59.49	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	0.709	0.2409	1.2724	27.24	
Not Member	0.466	0.1153	1.1222	12.22	
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	0.639	0.1559	1.1687	16.87	
25,000-34,999	0.545	0.1405	1.1508	15.08	
35,000-50,000	0.583	0.1591	1.1725	17.25	
Over 50,000	-0.376	-0.1205	0.8865	-11.35	
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	0.164	0.0357	1.0363	3.63	
South	0.237	0.0504	1.0517	5.17	
West	0.274	0.0630	1.0650	6.50	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	-0.475	-0.0711	0.9314	-6.86	

RF = Reference Group

(1) The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

* = $p < .05$ ** = $p < .01$

TABLE 21

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
WILL STAR WARS WORK?

#42 Q. Ronald Reagan has proposed developing a defense system in space that would destroy incoming missiles before they reached the United States, a system some people call "Star Wars." Do you think this system is likely to work, or not?

Responses: 0. No
1. Yes

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test <u>F</u> statistic
GENDER					17.03**
RF:Male					
Female	-4.192**	-0.6619	0.5159	-48.41	
INCOME					1.26 n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	1.379	0.3406	1.4058	40.58	
25,000-34,999	1.744	0.4594	1.5832	58.32	
35,000-50,000	2.201*	0.6224	1.8635	86.35	
Over 50,000	1.562	0.5104	1.6660	66.60	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hsehld Member	0.302	0.1096	1.1158	11.58	
Not Member	0.055	0.0149	1.0150	1.50	
EDUCATION					n.s.
RF:Not HS Grad					
HS Grad	-0.250	-0.0698	0.9326	-6.74	
Some College	-0.734	-0.2208	0.8019	-19.81	
College	-1.540	-0.4675	0.6266	-37.34	
RACE					n.s.
RF:White					
Black	-1.053	-0.3044	0.7376	-26.24	
Other	0.886	0.3423	1.4082	40.82	

TABLE 21 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
RELIGION					n.s.
RF:Protestant					
Catholic	0.334	0.0606	1.0625	6.25	
Jewish	-0.929	-0.4493	0.6381	-36.19	
Other	0.387	0.2020	1.2238	22.38	
None	-0.458	-0.1979	0.8205	-17.95	
AGE					n.s.
RF:18-29					
30-44	0.398	0.0761	1.0791	7.91	
45-64	-0.729	-0.1544	0.8569	-14.31	
Over 64	-1.080	-0.3216	0.7250	-27.50	
URBANITY					n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-0.313	-0.0870	0.9167	-8.33	
Suburbs	-0.673	-0.1793	0.8359	-16.41	
Community	-1.014	-0.3241	0.7232	-27.68	
Rural	0.011	0.0033	1.0033	0.33	
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	0.361	0.0841	1.0877	8.77	
South	0.042	0.0094	1.0094	0.94	
West	-1.391	-0.3348	0.7155	-28.45	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					n.s.
RF:Liberal					
Moderate	1.520	0.3049	1.3565	35.65	
Conservative	1.566	0.3412	1.4066	40.66	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 22

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO MILITARY POLICY:
DOES STAR WARS PROTECT?

#45 Q. Is the administration's proposed Star Wars system intended to protect the entire population or about half or less of the population?

Responses: 0. It will protect half or less of the population.
1. It will protect the whole population.

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test <u>F</u> statistic
RACE					
RF:White					2.60 n.s.
Black	-2.294*	-0.6848	0.5042	-49.58	
Other	0.203	0.0693	1.0718	7.18	
AGE					
RF:18-29					n.s.
30-44	0.745	0.1339	1.1433	14.33	
45-64	0.588	0.1181	1.1254	12.54	
Over 64	1.700	0.4859	1.6256	62.56	
UNION					
RF:Union Member					n.s.
Hsehld Member	-1.373	-0.4916	0.6116	-38.84	
Not Member	0.652	0.1621	1.1760	17.60	
EDUCATION					
RF:Not HS Grad					n.s.
HS Grad	1.013	0.2648	1.3032	30.32	
Some College	-0.492	-0.1401	0.8693	-13.07	
College	0.323	0.0926	1.0970	9.70	
RELIGION					
RF:Protestant					n.s.
Catholic	0.587	0.0994	1.1045	10.45	
Jewish	1.340	0.6321	1.8816	88.16	
Other	0.507	0.2413	1.2729	27.29	
None	0.281	0.1177	1.1249	12.49	

TABLE 22 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	0.461	0.1118	1.1183	11.83	
25,000-34,999	0.625	0.1598	1.1733	17.33	
35,000-50,000	-0.600	-0.1641	0.8487	-15.13	
Over 50,000	0.263	0.0821	1.0856	8.56	
URBANITY					n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-0.792	-0.2076	0.8125	-18.75	
Suburbs	-0.920	-0.2310	0.7937	-20.63	
Community	-0.598	-0.1819	0.8337	-16.63	
Rural	-1.333	-0.3761	0.6865	-31.35	
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	-0.326	-0.0706	0.9318	-6.82	
South	0.336	0.0705	1.0730	7.30	
West	-1.157	-0.2661	0.7664	-23.36	
GENDER					n.s.
RF:Male					
Female	-0.932	-0.1386	0.8706	-12.94	
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY					n.s.
RF:Liberal					
Moderate	0.166	0.0326	1.0331	3.31	
Conservative	1.357	0.2841	1.3286	32.86	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 23

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO STAR WARS
VS. NEGOTIATE (STAR WARS)

#44 Q. If it came down to only these choices, what should the United States do -- work to develop a Star Wars system and give up negotiations, or work to negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles and give up Star Wars?

Responses: 0. All other responses
1. Star Wars

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) <u>t</u> -statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test <u>F</u> statistic
RACE					2.81 n.s.
RF:White					
Black	-2.399*	-0.7264	0.4837	-51.63	
Other	0.393	0.1356	1.1452	14.52	
RELIGION					n.s.
RF:Protestant					
Catholic	-0.300	-0.0511	0.9502	-4.98	
Jewish	-1.509	-0.8159	0.4422	-55.78	
Other	0.130	0.0623	1.0643	6.43	
None	1.761	0.7451	2.1066	110.66	
GENDER					15.22**
RF:Male					
Female	-3.961**	-0.5984	0.5497	-45.03	
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hshld Member	1.345	0.4526	1.5724	57.24	
Not Member	-0.347	-0.0853	0.9182	-8.18	
EDUCATION					n.s.
RF:Not HS Grad					
HS Grad	0.169	0.0445	1.0455	4.55	
Some College	-0.927	0.2650	1.3034	30.34	
College	-0.438	-0.1267	0.8810	-11.90	

TABLE 23 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	-0.313	-0.0767	0.9262	-7.38	
25,000-34,999	-0.482	-0.1248	0.8827	-11.73	
35,000-50,000	0.032	0.0088	1.0088	0.88	
Over 50,000	-0.339	-0.1074	0.8982	-10.18	
AGE					n.s.
RF:18-29					
30-44	0.309	0.0561	1.0577	5.77	
45-64	0.515	0.1039	1.1095	10.95	
Over 64	0.359	0.1036	1.1092	10.92	
URBANITY					n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	1.344	0.3604	1.4339	43.39	
Suburbs	0.311	0.0801	1.0834	8.34	
Community	1.116	0.3429	1.4090	40.90	
Rural	0.357	0.1022	1.1076	10.76	
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	-1.027	-0.2268	0.7971	-20.29	
South	1.048	0.2213	1.2477	24.77	
West	-0.076	-0.0174	0.9828	-1.72	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

TABLE 24

SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES AND IDEOLOGICAL
IDENTIFICATION TO STAR WARS
VS. NEGOTIATE (NEGOTIATE)

#44 Q. If it came down to only these choices, what should the United States do -- work to develop a Star Wars system and give up negotiations, or work to negotiate a reduction in nuclear missiles and give up Star Wars?

Responses: 0. All other responses
1. Negotiate

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
UNION					n.s.
RF:Union Member					
Hsehd Member	-0.732	-0.2458	0.7821	-21.79	
Not Member	1.223	0.2995	1.3492	34.92	
RACE					3.59*
RF:White					
Black	2.721**	0.8277	2.2881	128.81	
Other	0.140	0.0476	1.0488	4.88	
RELIGION					n.s.
RF:Protestant					
Catholic	-0.127	-0.0216	0.9786	-2.14	
Jewish	1.584	0.8591	2.3610	136.10	
Other	-0.006	-0.0029	0.9971	-0.29	
None	-1.894	-0.8122	0.4439	-55.61	
GENDER					17.80**
RF:Male					
Female	4.287**	0.6456	1.9077	90.77	
EDUCATION					n.s.
RF:Not HS Grad					
HS Grad	-0.072	-0.0189	0.9813	-1.87	
Some College	0.790	0.2255	1.2529	25.29	
College	0.571	0.1655	1.1800	18.00	

TABLE 24 (continued)

Variable	Coefficient/ Standard Error(1) t-statistic	Coefficient	Change in Odds	Percent Change in Odds	Joint Test F statistic
INCOME					n.s.
RF:Under 12,500					
12,500-24,999	0.502	0.1225	1.1303	13.03	
25,000-34,999	1.059	0.2743	1.3156	31.56	
35,000-50,000	0.420	0.1145	1.1214	12.14	
Over 50,000	0.043	0.0135	1.0136	1.36	
AGE					n.s.
RF:18-29					
30-44	-1.093	-0.1979	0.8205	-17.95	
45-64	-0.863	-0.1742	0.8401	-15.99	
Over 64	-0.459	-0.1325	0.8759	-12.41	
URBANITY					n.s.
RF:Lg. Cen. City					
Central City	-1.563	-0.4198	0.6572	-34.28	
Suburbs	-0.612	-0.1574	0.8544	-14.56	
Community	-1.311	-0.4028	0.6684	-33.16	
Rural	-0.558	-0.1596	0.8525	-14.75	
REGION					n.s.
RF:East					
Midwest	0.437	0.0962	1.1010	10.10	
South	-1.611	-0.3415	0.7107	-28.93	
West	-0.287	-0.0660	0.9361	-7.39	

RF = Reference Group

(1)The F-statistic for all joint tests that were significant is reported. In addition, if any one term within a variable has a $p < .05$, the F-statistic for the joint test for that variable is reported.

*= $p < .05$

**= $p < .01$

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