

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

A

MAKING AND MARKETING NATIONAL IDENTITIES: CULTURE, POLITICS
AND CORPORATE SPONSORSHIP IN PUERTO RICO

by

ARLENE M. DAVILA

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the City University of
New York.

1996

UMI Number: 9630454

**Copyright 1996 by
Davila, Arlene**

All rights reserved.

**UMI Microform 9630454
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.**

**This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

c 1996

ARLENE M. DAVILA

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

MARCH 6, 1996
Date

MARCH 6, 1996
Date

Debra Jones
Chair of Examining Committee

Amily Henderson
Executive Officer

Jane Nash
June Nash

Juan Flores
Juan Flores

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Acknowledgements

As with all long-lasting projects, this work has received the help of many friends, colleagues and mentors who deserve all my acknowledgments and appreciation. I will begin by thanking my advisor, Professor Delmos Jones, who encouraged me from early on to go ahead with this project and provided challenge and support for my ideas. I am also grateful to Professor June Nash for her continuous feedback and support throughout my tenure at the Graduate Center and throughout the development of this dissertation. My thanks also to Professors Juan Flores and Antonio Lauria from the Center of Puerto Rican Studies for their help and insights and to Professor Brackette Williams who served as the outside reader. From the Graduate Center, I am also grateful to Professors Leith Mullings and Stuart Ewen who at different times read, or commented on sections of this work.

I am particularly grateful to my peers at the Graduate School, especially my friends at the dissertation group, Christiana Bastos, Ara Wilson, Jonathan Hearn, Kate McCaffrey and particularly Maureen O'Dougherty and Yvonne Lassalle with whom I have discussed this project almost since its inception and who provided valuable insights throughout its development. Thanks too to Murphy Halliburton who provided continuing editorial assistance and unlimited support. I am also obliged to Jennifer Halladay and Teresa Vega for their editorial help. I also want to acknowledge Marvette Pérez and Agustín Lao, two colleagues working on similar issues in Puerto Rican studies, who were supportive of this work throughout its development.

I thank all the people in Puerto Rico who made my stay such a fruitful and enjoyable experience at the personal, social and intellectual levels. My greatest gratitude go to the Vega family, especially William, Mallín, Toña, Ana, and to Juan and Iris Soto as well as the many grassroots cultural workers I met throughout my research who face "cuesta arriba" conditions in preparing their activities. At the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture I am most grateful to Mariano Rodríguez, Carlos Padilla and Juan Troncoso who showed faith in my ability to understand the complexities of everyday cultural issues and taught me so much in the process. I am also grateful to the staff of the National Archives, Fomento, and Puerto Rico's Tourism Office. At the University of Puerto Rico I am particularly thankful to Professors Angel Quintero Rivera and Jorge Duany.

Funding for this research was provided by the Wenner Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, the National Science Foundation, and the CUNY/UPR Academic Exchange Program.

INDEX

Acknowledgements.....	iv
Map of Political Parties.....	vi
Introduction.....	1
-The Politics of Culture and the Production of Nationalisms.....	8
-Challenges to Homogeneity.....	19
-A Note on Concepts and Terms.....	26
-Methodological Description.....	29
-Chapter Breakdown.....	35
Chapter I: Securing the Nation Through Politics.....	44
-The Nationalist Party, A Curbed Nationalism.....	44
-The Accommodative Option.....	50
-The Early Cultural Policies and the Consolidation of Cultural Nationalism.....	57
-Defenders and Saboteurs of Culture: The Political Base for the Creation of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture.....	65
-The "Culture Wars".....	72
-The Rise of the Annexationist Party.....	80
-The 'Other' Cultural Groups in Puerto Rico's Cultural Politics.....	85
Chapter II: The Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP) and the Building Blocks of Nationality.....	100
-The Initial Program.....	101
-The Turn to Folklore.....	106
-The Building Blocks and the Blending Myth.....	113
-The Building Blocks at Play: The Case of Folk Music in the Reproduction of Cultural Hierarchies.....	120
-The ICP and its Cultural Centers.....	129
-"Cultural Development" in the Reproduction of Inequality.....	138
-The Case of Caone.....	147
Chapter III: From the Center to the "Centros": Cultural Politics From Below.....	153
-The "True Caoenos" and the Unaccounted Bits	

of History.....	157
-Microwars for Political Representation.....	166
-The Rescue.....	176
-Toward the True Keepers of Puerto Rican Culture.....	182
 Chapter IV: "Just One More Festival": New Actors in Caone's Cultural Politics.....	 194
-Vicissitudes of "Breadfruit Lasagnas".....	198
-The Flat Bottom Boat: Whose Boat?.....	213
-"Haciendo Patria": From Space and Representation.....	226
 Chapter V: Culture, Politics and Corporate Sponsorship.....	 245
-The Context.....	246
-Advertising the Nation.....	255
-Marketing the Nation.....	267
-Popular and Commercial Culture.....	271
-Negotiating Culture and Dollars: The Making of a "Cultural Festival".....	 279
 Chapter V: Contending The Nation, Contending Identities.....	 292
-The National Indigenous Festival: In Search of the "Purest" Indigenous Queen.....	 295
-The Bacardi Folk Art Fair.....	312
-Discussion.....	328
 Conclusion.....	 334
-Disclosing the Colonial Veil.....	334
-The Search for Culture.....	337
-"Much More Puerto Ricanness".....	342
 Appendixes.....	 348
 Bibliography.....	 357

Map of Puerto Rican Political Parties Mentioned in Text
(in order of foundation with abbreviation used in text)

Based on Bayrón-Toro's (1989) Elecciones y Partidos Políticos de Puerto Rico. Mayagüez: Ediciones Isla.

Parties Active During Initial Stages of U.S. Occupation

Republican Party	Partido Republicano, founded in 1889, represented interests of sugar growers with links to U.S. Advocated U.S. Statehood
Union Party	Partido Unión Puertorriqueña, Puerto Rican Union Party, founded in 1904, represented the interests of coffee growers and landowners. It initially favored independence for the island, but later changed to a U.S. assimilation political formula. Dominated local politics until 1928.
Nationalist Party	Partido Nacionalista, founded in 1922 by members of the Union Party when the latter abandoned the quest for political independence.
Liberal Party	Partido Liberal, founded in 1932, was a reorganization of the Union Party. Initially favored independence and later settled for increased local autonomy.

Parties Active in the Contemporary Political Scene

PPD	Partido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Party) founded in 1938 from a rift in the Liberal Party. Formed as an intraclass movement, advocates the continuation of the status quo or Commonwealth Status).
PIP	Partido Independentista

Puertorriqueño (Pro Independence Party) founded in 1946 from a rift in the PPD, when the latter abandoned independence as its political platform.

PNP

Partido Nuevo Progresista (New Progressive Party) founded in 1967 from a split in the Republican Party. Formed as an intraclass party that advocates U.S. Statehood.

PSP

Partido Socialista, (Socialist Party). The first Socialist Party was founded in 1915 as a workers' party. In seeking worker rights and labor reforms the party turned to coalitions with the Republican Party to secure labor rights through U.S. labor unions. In 1971 the Socialist Party is reorganized, from Independentista factions with a Marxist Leninist Platform.

Introduction

The world is often regarded as a transnational system, but local cultural identities continue to be salient mediums for political mobilization and a variety of other interests. This is evident in Puerto Rico where a new cultural festival is celebrated every year, where Budweiser and Pepsi associate their products with Puerto Rican culture and traditions, and where the political proponents of U.S. statehood, independence and the maintenance of commonwealth status all claim to promote the island's cultural distinctiveness. These developments demonstrate how culture has become the primary medium for advancing a range of interests in Puerto Rico, from political parties who assert their programs through cultural policies to transnational corporations who have realized that "culture sells."

This study examines the dynamics of cultural politics--the social and political struggles waged through culture (Yudice, Franco and Flores 1992:xiii)--in contemporary Puerto Rican society. My concern is with the debates over the use, definition and representation of Puerto Rican culture¹, emerging from the growth in the number and diversity of agents asserting and legitimizing their

interests through appeals to culture. Because culture constitutes the primary medium for defining Puerto Rico's national identity (Flores Caraballo 1991, Rodriguez 1993), I also set out to explore how debates over culture affect definitions of national identity. These processes are relevant for understanding the nature of cultural nationalism and the forces fueling its growth and impacting views of national identity in contemporary society.

The dynamics of contemporary cultural politics are manifested in diverse sectors of society, ranging from the media to government policies on tourism and education. The present work will focus on the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP) and its affiliated cultural centers, and on Puerto Rico's grassroots cultural groups, whose recent growth has attracted the attention of local politicians, corporate sponsors and intellectuals (Gonzalez 1990, Quintero 1989). These entities provide ideal venues for this study because their activities play an important role in elaborating views about Puerto Rican culture, and because their relations with government, political and corporate interests allow us to examine the array of actors involved in contemporary cultural politics.

The current expressions of cultural identity in Puerto Rico, a Free Associated State of the United States that

continues to debate its political status, represents an important development considering that overt demonstrations of Puerto Rican identity were once regarded as subversive acts (Civil Rights Commission 1991). Previously confined to university settings and Pro-Independence Party events, manifestations of Puerto Rican cultural identity have become mainstream as musicians today sing nationalistic songs on prime-time television, while nationalist symbols, such as the Puerto Rican flag, decorate public advertising and private dwellings alike. These developments, however, have not been accompanied by a change in the island's status as a Commonwealth (Free Associated State) of the United States. In fact, while the average Puerto Rican now feels more pride in his or her identity, most people favor the continuation of some type of political and economic affiliation with the United States. Thus, many disregard the heightened relevance of culture in Puerto Rico as "neonationalism" for its lack of anti-colonial stance and its complicity with U.S. interests on the island (El Nuevo Dia December 8, 1993; Pabón 1995). This assessment, however, does not fully account for the social and political impact of the current emphasis on culture. An analysis of this development requires us to consider this trend as part of a greater development in the nature and scope of cultural nationalism

on the island, involving a shift in the terrain of political action to the realm of culture and cultural politics.

As a government entity, the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP) provides a venue for government cultural policy and the official discourse about what can rightfully represent Puerto Rican culture. While local debates over culture in Puerto Rico can be traced to the ideas of educated elites in the 18th and 19th Centuries, the establishment of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP) in 1955, represents an important landmark in the development of contemporary cultural politics. It was in the 1950s, after the 1898 U.S. occupation, that Puerto Rico underwent a transitory period toward local autonomy under U.S. jurisdiction. With the establishment of the Commonwealth status in 1952, the colonial government developed an "official nationalism" (Anderson 1983) that emanated from and operated in the service of the state. This involved emphasizing Puerto Rico's cultural distinctiveness through a cultural nationalism that helped veil the island's politically dependent status. At this time, images of national identity became centered around the "harmonious" integration of the Taino (Indian), Spanish and African components in society, under the rubric of Hispanic tradition, and the customs and folklore of the rapidly

disappearing agrarian society (Babin 1973). The government cultural policy and the local ICP-affiliated cultural centers were also established upon the implementation of Commonwealth status to promote the Institute's mission at the local level.

Other key figures in this study of contemporary cultural politics in Puerto Rico are the island's community cultural groups.² Although varied in their goals and activities -- which range from sports to environmental concerns to seeking spaces for social enjoyment and interaction -- these grassroots organizations share a common interest in legitimizing their claims through appeals to culture. Currently these groups celebrate over two hundred annual cultural events throughout the island which publicly display and elaborate views of Puerto Rican culture. In contrast to the government-sponsored cultural groups, these entities are not engaged in processes aimed at limiting or generalizing a particular view of national identity. Instead, they are involved in contesting and representing Puerto Rican culture indirectly as they voice diverse interests through cultural claims. In this process, most groups draw on the official cultural policy regarding Puerto Rico's traditional agrarian past and folklore as representative of what is distinctively Puerto Rican. Yet

the extent of this borrowing varies among groups. Rather than "authentic" folklore or other ethnic markers used by the government's cultural policy, increasingly it is popular and mass culture that dominate grassroots representations of Puerto Rican culture. The result is tensions and contestations, which are essential for analyzing the ways in which popular practices can challenge dominant views of the nation and broaden the range of interests that can be advanced in cultural terms.

Finally, this study will analyze corporate advertisers, especially those who represent companies dealing with consumer goods such as liquor, soft-drinks, foods, and tobacco, which are active influences in Puerto Rico's cultural politics through their support of folk art fairs, festivals, and contests. Their patronage of cultural activities and their use of Puerto Rican folklore, history and popular culture as a background in their advertisements renders corporate advertisers as one of the divergent political, economic, and social interests staking claim to Puerto Rican culture in contemporary society.

By paying attention to local groups' and private corporations' involvement in cultural politics in Puerto Rico, my aim is to expand the discussion of culture, politics and nationalism on the island to include these

agents as participants in constituting views and definitions of Puerto Rican national identity along with government initiatives. In addressing these issues, this research will engage two theoretical issues of contemporary analysis: the creation of national identities and their intersection with state-sponsored nationalist programs and popular agendas; and the nature of contemporary processes of identity formation. Specifically, the current popularization of culture in Puerto Rico mirrors the widespread escalation of nationalist and cultural movements evidenced worldwide (Young 1995). Culture is now a global tool for the introduction of commodities to culturally specific markets (O'Barr 1989) and a medium for a variety of political and nationalist movements not limited to issues of sovereignty and independence.³ Thus an examination of cultural politics in Puerto Rico is foremost an exploration into the relationships of local and global processes and the ensuing opportunities and constraints for constructing cultural and national identities in contemporary society.

The Politics of Culture and the Production of Nationalisms

As ethnic and cultural identities acquire greater importance in present day political movements, the study of nationalism and the cultural construction of national identities have come to the forefront of contemporary social analysis (Foster 1991, Fox 1990, Williams 1989). While numerous debates have been advanced as a result of the interest in this topic, my aim here will be to address some of the issues that can illuminate the opportunities and constraints involved in contemporary cultural politics in Puerto Rico. I will start with a discussion of cultural nationalism, which provides the context for the current reliance on issues of culture by political parties, community groups, and transnational corporations. This will be followed by a discussion of the potential of these agents and their popular representations of Puerto Rican culture to shape dominant definitions of national culture.

While all nationalisms share similar attributes, such as their forging of a cultural identity either from an ethnic past (Connor 1972, Smith 1986) or from recent inventions (Anderson 1983), nationalisms have been found to take many forms according to their historical specificity and the forces and agents that deploy them. This diversity has rendered the definition and study of nationalism a

difficult task. Consider the different typologies advanced according to the historical stages in its manifestations (Heyes 1968), its motivation and its political goals--as in the oppressive, liberation, minority, or majority nationalism analyzed by Symmons Symonolewicz (1965) and Worsely (1984) among others.

While not arguing for strict categorizations, I find it useful to distinguish among nationalisms rather than conflate all forms of nationalisms, or treat them along with other social categories of identity such as ethnicity as "peoplehood constructs" (Fox 1990, Wallerstein 1991). Such conceptualizations have been advanced to highlight the similarities among nationalisms, such as their dual cultural and political content (Hutchinson and Smith 1994:3-4), although they can also hide their historical specificity and social particularities. Thus, in discussing cultural nationalism as the background to Puerto Rico's cultural politics, I will start by examining two of the most common uses of the term which inform this case study.

First, cultural nationalism is defined by its identification with the cultural rather than the territorial or juridical aspects of nations. The distinction lies in the "loci of political identity," whether the relevant political unit is regarded to be the cultural unit or the nation state

as recognized by the international community (See Barnett 1974:240, quoted in Williams 1991). As Hutchinson (1987) explains, the distinction between nations and states can be traced to Herder's eighteen century ideas of the "folk soul" in which nations are deemed to have a distinct essence rooted in history and tradition. This conception was later subverted by classical views of a nation as a political entity bounded by a state.⁴ Yet the distinction between nations and states is important in order to study nationalisms that identify with other than a nation state, such as those that are subverted by, or are the product of the unification of a greater state. Cultural nationalisms, however, do not stem from primordial entities. They are ideological constructs deriving from particular historical contexts, which aim to mobilize politicized forms of identity seeking a variety of political goals for the national community including power and cultural autonomy (Barnett 1974, Hutchinson 1993).

Second, cultural nationalism is also known as the process of reinvigoration, authentication and standardization of a nation's culture. This process has been documented as an integral part of the development of all nationalist movements which provides the identification with a continuous or mythical past and leads to the integration

of a plurality of identities into a common national culture (Gellner 1983, Philip 1980). Philip's (1980) study of European nationalist movements, for instance, highlights the cultural standardization involved in nationalist movements - starting from the development of an interest in the past and folklore by a literate elite and leading to the spread of this interest among political leaders and its communication to a greater population as a basis for political change. His analysis does not require that all nationalisms will undergo each of these stages in a similar manner.

My use of cultural nationalism for the case of Puerto Rico is informed by these two uses. By identifying the island's cultural distinctiveness as the important criterion for defining the nation and the political unit, cultural nationalism was tied to state-directed policies aimed at standardizing and legitimizing Puerto Rican culture. In this way, culture became Puerto Rico's "domain of sovereignty" (Chatterjee 1993), a realm wherein the local government could establish a degree of autonomy even when under colonial control. This situation has led to struggles over the control of Puerto Rican culture and the venues for its representation that have historically characterized discussions about culture on the island.

While emphasizing the cultural rather than the juridical aspects of nations, cultural nationalism, like all nationalisms, is always about inclusion and exclusion, designating who is and who is not part of the community. Nationalisms rely on nationalist ideologies, for the "production of conceptions of peoplehood" (Fox 1990:3), that provide ideas of common identity through which people define themselves as part of a given community and operate to produce, define and contest ideas of national identity. In this way, nationalist ideologies provide the terrain upon which actors define or contest the ideas and meanings of the national community. Thus, Dominguez (1990) shows that even while the history of Zionism as the dominant version of Israel's history was under scrutiny, with Sephardic elements of Israeli society attaining voice and political power, the debate never challenged Zionism as the central discursive construct. Instead, all contestations responded to and departed from Zionism, strengthening its central place in Israel's national imagery. Consider also Handler's (1988) analyses of the principal metaphors presupposed by the nationalist ideology such as its requirement for "boundedness, continuity and homogeneity" and its impact on discussions of culture in Quebec; or Verdery's use of nationalist ideologies as "discursive struggles in which the

concept of 'the nation' or 'the Romanian people' has formed a central preoccupation" (Verdery 1991:9). Thus, this research will examine the extent to which dominant ideas about what can rightfully represent Puerto Rican society are affected by or reproduced in the work of local cultural groups on the island.

Nationalist ideologies have also been found to reproduce western based ideological premises which may limit their efficacy as a medium for politics (Gilroy 1987, Williams 1993). As noted by Breuilly (1982), the association of the enlightenment concept of nations as authentic and unique entities with the demand for an independent state has led to assumptions of purity and homogeneity in nationalist ideologies. These have since been rendered "arbitrary judgements" that have to be justified as natural through claims about authenticity and distinctive essences embodied in a language, a unique history or a people (1982:108-109). Thus, Williams (1993:146) suggests that attention be given to how these precepts -- which equate homogeneity, "peopleness," purity and stability -- have affected the development of particular nationalist ideologies and how people construct their cultural identities. For instance, we see recurrent tropes among nationalist ideologies, such as images from nature, kinship

and myths of shared heritage, used to naturalize the national community and to link it with a continuous past (Alonso 1994).

This is evident in Puerto Rico where the official criteria about what can rightfully represent Puerto Rican culture reproduced tropes found to be common in nationalist ideologies in which authenticity is defined through strict dichotomies such as a pure, folkloric and utopian past in opposition to the impure and immoral influences of modernity. Thus, images of Puerto Rico's national identity were centered on a folklorized peasant tradition, and on a concept of Hispanic heritage as the harmonious integration of the Spanish, indigenous, and African racial components, while deemphasizing the African element of Puerto Rican heritage. Especially shunned are Puerto Rico's popular culture and the transnational community of Puerto Ricans, which are perceived as "Americanizing" influences that threaten the purity and legitimacy upon which official views of Puerto Rican identity are predicated.

In turn, the process of creating images of homogeneity out of dissimilar elements is always one of contention and negotiation through which a dominant standard of the nation is constituted and through which elements are included or barred from the national community. Far from being

primordial, cultural identities are intrinsically related to state-building and nationalist projects and the unequal categorization of individuals as "nationals" or "ethnics" according to the dominant criteria for defining the national community (See Alonso 1994, Williams 1989). The strength of state strategies and nationalist elites lies in their attempts at "moral regulation" in their "normalizing, rendering natural, taken for granted, in a word 'obvious'" (Corrigan and Sayer 1985:4) what are in fact arbitrary and historically based forms of social order. In this area, attention to the processes of hegemony has been important in going beyond conceptualizations of nationalism as the ultimate essentialized identity and in assessing the different processes involved in its development. Nationalisms are not "static" entities but rather hegemonies in the making, in which those engaged in a nationalizing project try to foster a homogeneous view of the national identity out of disparate elements. As shown by Williams (1991), these processes often rely on transformist hegemonic processes by which the cultural products of different groups are appropriated, assimilated and neutralized to create an image of national homogeneity while forms of heterogeneity are being recreated.⁵

These processes were evident in Puerto Rico when the

Pro-Commonwealth leadership first accrued political and economic power in the 1950s through the Commonwealth Status, which it legitimized by promoting the nation as a cultural community. Separatist nationalism was contained by repression and cooptation, and different elements of Puerto Rican culture and society were unequally incorporated into a culturalist definition of the nation embodied in folklorized images of an utopian agrarian past. However, it is important to note that due to its colonial history, Puerto Rico's political and economic terrain of maneuver has been limited to forming coalitions that advance U.S. and local interests on the island.⁶ We thus need to make a distinction between hegemony as an ongoing process by which struggles are vested around the incorporation, intersection and articulation of different interests in order to ally groups and advance particular goals; and hegemony as a condition, resulting from a process through which a class or group is able to provide intellectual and moral leadership to the rest of society on the basis of that consensus (Mallon 1995, Roseberry 1994). In Puerto Rico, neither the Pro-Commonwealth Party nor any other political faction has been able to attain local hegemony on the island, although Puerto Rican elites have engaged in processes of containment and incorporation to establish a degree of power over the

colonial state. This was succinctly shown by Pantojas' (1990) work on U.S. export-led development strategies, which he considers to be an important locus of contention for the formation of coalitions between the U.S. and local government and for the struggle over hegemony on the island.

Thus we will see that the promotion of cultural nationalism by the Pro-Commonwealth Party in the 1950's was directly related to the party's political dominance attained by the intersection of U.S. and local interests through the Commonwealth status. In turn, the government's attempts at defining and asserting Puerto Rican identity, were never independent from U.S. prerogatives. As we will see, U.S. colonialism shaped both the content of Puerto Rico's nationalist ideology and the scope and manner in which nationalism could be channeled on the island. Thus, Puerto Rico's nationalist ideology drew from the ideas developed by its Hispanophile elites, who in an anti-colonial response to U.S. imperialism, ended up embracing Spanish culture, the heritage of their previous colonizer.

Current research also reminds us that once constituted, tropes of national identity are vulnerable constructs contingent on power relations and the maintenance or transformation of a given social order (Rowe and Schelling 1992). State-developed myths of national identity,

for instance, need be constantly renewed, defended, updated, and articulated in all areas of society ranging from historical and literary accounts of common peoplehood (Sommer 1990) to cultural policies and official versions of history (Friedman 1992, Kaplan 1994). We will see evidence of the difficulties involved in maintaining views of national identity in this case study. In particular, due to the politically indeterminate context of Puerto Rican society, early attempts by the Pro-Commonwealth government to define views of national identity became the primary medium for the Commonwealth's own legitimization vis-a-vis other political choices for the island (statehood or independence). Thus the Commonwealth Party's insistence on identifying itself as the only political group that could successfully promote and defend Puerto Rican culture limited its definitions of Puerto Rican culture and its willingness to incorporate the interests of a wider range of groups on the island into government cultural programs. As Bourdieu (1993) shows, claims to knowledge and authenticity are part and parcel of struggles over the monopoly of power where those in dominant positions "operate essentially defensive strategies, designed to perpetuate the status quo by maintaining themselves and the principles on which their dominance is based" (1993:83).⁷ In this context we will see

government cultural workers incorporating elements of popular culture and everyday life into official definitions of Puerto Rican culture while, for the most part, sanctioning these definitions through the standards of authenticity, through cultural policies and legislation. These practices are evidence of the tensions between "monopolization and hegemony, between exclusivity and legitimation" that characterize all efforts at cultural classification (diMaggio 1991:393).

Challenges to Homogeneity: The Case of Puerto Rico

Given the tendency of nationalist constructs to recycle notions of purity and homogeneity, we should ask whether counterclaims and oppositions to dominant views of national identity are compromised by or could ever overcome these exclusionary premises. Similarly, given the tendency of nationalist ideologies to further homogeneity against the reality of heterogeneity, we should ask whether there are limits to what can be incorporated and appropriated from everyday life into definitions of national identity in order to update them without challenging their pretenses to purity. This last question is particularly relevant in the current context, where global political-economic processes circumscribe the potential of nationalism to legitimize

territorial spaces; a constant flow of peoples, images and ideas challenge strict conceptualizations of identity; and ongoing processes of commodification threaten cultural markers of identity (Basch et al. 1994, Friedman 1994, Nash 1995). Moreover, as in Puerto Rico, where the state's institutions involved in the processes of shaping and nourishing a view of national identity are increasingly challenged by corporate sponsors and grassroots groups, how do the practices and claims of these latter agents depart from or reproduce the dominant frameworks--are these incorporated or neutralized or do they help expand the criteria on which cultural legitimacy is based?

Contemporary research now calls for analysis of global political economic processes not solely in terms of their homogenizing tendencies but also in terms of how they may promote, hinder or otherwise shape cultural identities and affect national identification (Foster 1991, Hall 1991). This duality involved in all global processes has led many to theorize the widespread escalation of nationalisms at the same time that the world is commonly regarded as a global and transnational system (Friedman 1994, Gupta & Ferguson 1992). This research documents new modes of national identification that elude traditional definitions of space, territoriality and the objectification of the nation through

material bases of authenticity while still expressing and demarcating the existence of a cultural community (Malkki 1992, Rosaldo 1989). In these cases, constructs such as "hybrid culture" and "blurred" or "transnational" identities have been advanced to describe the new processes of identity formation that emerge as a result of the ongoing dislocation of national/state/territorial boundaries (Appadurai 1990, Basch et al. 1994, Garcia Canclini 1992). Similarly, contemporary research has emphasized the potential of local strategies of cultural self-definition through the consumption of global forms, commodities and products (Miller 1995).

In turn, the new spaces and forms of cultural and national identification are often perceived as opportunities that may potentially supersede the exclusions of nationalist forms of identification. Thus according to Garcia Canclini (1992), new forms of cultural identification and more flexible cultural affirmations directly challenge notions of cultural identity tied to patrimony and attachment to territory and are more resistant to appropriation. In a similar manner, the mass media and alternative forms of communication are now regarded as sites for the growth of cultural identities that may supersede nationalist forms of identification as mediums for anti-colonial and progressive

politics (Garnham 1993, Shohat & Stam 1994). The case at hand, where we will analyze alternative sites and expressions of Puerto Ricaness based on popular culture and everyday life by grassroots groups, will speak to these issues by exploring whether and how they can displace or be compromised by lingering precepts for defining national identities. As discussed above these often involve exclusions based on notions of racial, cultural, linguistic or other types of homogeneity. In addressing these issues, I analyze popular practices of representing Puerto Rican culture in reference to the government cultural policy which set the dominant standards defining Puerto Rico's national identity. It is through this analysis that contestations about issues of legitimacy and potential departures from dominant views of national identity are revealed.

Contestations about issues of legitimacy and authenticity in Puerto Rican culture will be evident in the relationships between government cultural officials and commercial interests in Puerto Rico. As we shall see, companies such as Bacardi, R.J. Reynolds and Anheuser Busch, and others dealing with such consumer goods as liquor, soft-drinks, foods, and tobacco, are also drawing upon Puerto Rican culture in their advertising campaigns and becoming involved in the island's folk art fairs and popular

festivals. This involvement has led to new distinctions regarding the criteria for establishing legitimacy in Puerto Rican culture, since "commercialism" is treated as a "threat" to the purity of the nation and an element against which "authenticity," can be defined. This view reproduces old themes of pollution and adulteration prevalent among nationalist ideologies (Lloyd 1994). Ironically, however, the involvement of corporate sponsors is shunned as "commercial" by some of those entities which are already associated with corporate sponsors. Thus, the distinction between "cultural" and "commercial" serves more to authenticate the official view of Puerto Rican culture than to reject the involvement of corporate sponsorship itself, a process that, once again, reveals the relationship between the government's cultural projects and the interests of capital on the island.

Contestations about issues of legitimacy and potential departures from dominant views of national identity will also be revealed in the work of local cultural groups currently involved in representing Puerto Rican culture. Although diverse in their goals and activities, these groups are alike in being perceived as threats to the image of homogeneity which the government cultural policy strives to project. In this context, the government sanctioned

definitions of Puerto Rican culture provide a means to delegitimize the positions of the growing number of players that now claim to be "Puertorriqueñistas." Thus, this work will analyze these groups in relation to the government cultural policy and its standards about culture on the island. Following de Certeau (1984), local variations on official views of national identity and popular forms of resistance and manipulation of the government's cultural policies, like those displayed by some of Puerto Rico's local cultural groups, will be analyzed as oppositional elements to the extent that they present a heterogeneity of practices which contrasts with the homogeneity promulgated by the government cultural policy. In this realm, new ways of representing Puerto Rican culture are being produced and reproduced through the "reception" and "consumption" (de Certeau 1984) of official cultural policy by different cultural groups, which engage in subsidiary productions through the adoption of imposed orders, spaces and regulations.

Lastly, the struggles documented in the following pages are important for understanding the nature of contemporary processes of identity formation. Puerto Rico, where research has pointed to new ways in which identity is constructed such as nonofficial forms of cultural expression: including

joking, beauty pageants (Torres n.d.,) crime and illegalities, and where cultural and language policies are regarded as important sites for challenging or defining views of national identity (Flores 1994, Pérez n.d., Santiago-Valles 1994), provides a good entry point for these discussions. While contemporary analyses have already placed the national question in a "postnational" context, in which cultural expressions are rendered an appropriate locus of analysis (Flores 1994), there is as yet no ethnographic description of the processes through which contestations over culture take place and the way in which dominant views of Puerto Rican culture are challenged or constructed. In Puerto Rico, these issues have not been fully incorporated into contemporary studies due to the literary focus that has characterized much of this research⁸ (which is not surprising considering the historical importance of literature in forging and nourishing politically constrained nationalism like that of Puerto Rico [Bhabha 1990, Said 1993, Sommer 1990]). In this work my aim will be to fill in this ethnographic void by focusing on the discussions emerging about Puerto Rican culture with the increase in numbers and types of players involved in Puerto Rican cultural politics. This emphasis will examine popular manipulations of official constructions of national identity

and how they intersect with various goals and projects.

A Note on Concepts and Terms

Due to the politically divided context of Puerto Rican society, and years of repression and persecution against separatists and "independentistas," the terms "nation" and "nationality" are contentious. Many apply these categories to the U.S. or to Puerto Rico according to their particular political goals for the island--U.S. statehood, commonwealth, or independence--with the latter two groups being more likely to use these terms for Puerto Rico.

My informants at the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, however, did use the term "national," and freely referred to "national" genres, and "elements of nationality" when describing their programs. Their use of these terms is directly related to their concern with shaping and disseminating images and constructs of national identity. Thus, I will employ the labels "national" and the "nation," mostly in relation to the images and ideas that have gained widespread acceptance as representations of Puerto Rican identity, and in my discussions of the intellectuals and "cultural workers" [trabajadores de la cultura] at the governmental level, who used these terms frequently and were most concerned with shaping and disseminating national

constructs.

In this dissertation, national identity will not be defined according to its most common definition: i.e. to denote identification with a nation state as a juridically defined unit (Hylland Eriksen 1993). Puerto Ricans are American citizens under U.S. jurisdiction, and national identity is not conceived around the identification with a nation-state but in terms of identification with Puerto Rico as a culturally distinct community. This is directly tied to the local emphasis on culture rather than on objective political boundaries as the defining element of national identity, and to the channeling of cultural nationalism into cultural programs and policies that will be discussed throughout this work. Specifically, while references to the "national" are not widespread beyond intellectual circles, the terms "culture," and "identity," are often used as statements of national self-identification on the island.

In Puerto Rico, the terms "culture" and "Puerto Rican culture" are used in a manner similar to the way culture was understood in Quebec, according to Handler, where "the issue of national identity was being played out all around...through the continual 'objectification' of what is imagined to be Quebecois culture" (Handler 1988:11). Through "objectification," culture became the object of scrutiny,

discussion, consumption and debate, an arena to channel nationalist identification. Similarly, in Puerto Rico discussions of culture, and claims to be "pro cultura" [pro-culture], "culturalista" [culturalist], "Puertorriqueñista" [Pro Puerto Ricanness and things Puerto Rican] are all used as statements of national identity, or self identification with Puerto Rico as a culturally distinct unit. Thus, culture will not be defined according to the holistic anthropological understanding of the concept, encompassing shared and transmittable ways of life--from values to productive processes--but rather, as the distinct and identifiable traits and products perceived to provide the content of national identity (Handler 1988:13-16, Friedman 1994:88). It is culture, as an element of self-identification which provides the subject and object of appropriation and contention in contemporary Puerto Rican society. Hence my attention to the different traits and ideas advanced or perceived to be representations of Puerto Rican culture irrespective of whether they have been recognized as such at the government level.

Methodological Description

My research on Puerto Rico's cultural politics began in 1992 when I conducted preliminary fieldwork on the island. At that time, I visited some twenty cultural groups and conducted interviews with personnel of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP) and representatives from other government and corporate sponsors, which led me to design my research project and return to conduct my research in July 1993.

Two areas of interest guided my research design. I was initially interested in the character and constitution of Puerto Rico's cultural policy as represented by its official organ for culture, the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture. At another level, I was also concerned with the operations of the various groups, their relationship to the government's cultural policy and their elaboration of ideas of Puerto Ricanness. These two areas of interest demanded that I pay attention both to the national and local level aspects involved in the development of Puerto Rico's cultural policy.

In order to tap into these two areas, I initiated my research by examining the requirements of the cultural policy regulating the work of the centers, government funding requirements and definitions of "culturally relevant

projects." I conducted interviews with representatives of governmental organs for culture such as the Culture Division of the Tourism Office and the Folk Arts Division of Fomento, and the heads of the Cultural Commissions at the Senate and the Legislature. However, it was on the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, the governmental organ for the promotion and dissemination of Puerto Rican Culture, that I focused most of my attention. Interviews with other governmental agencies confirmed that this is indeed the institution that determines the standard about authenticity that is followed by other agencies and the one that is most involved in its dissemination through its supervision of the ICP-affiliated cultural centers. I interviewed representatives working at different levels in the Institute, paying particular attention to those most directly related to the local cultural groups, such as the cultural advisors and the regional supervisors. I also identified artists affiliated with the Institute as important informants about the standards against which authenticity is determined at the ICP. Archival research at the University of Puerto Rico, The Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, the National Archives and the Luis Muñoz Marín Foundation, The Library of the Puerto Rican Senate, and the Center for Advanced Studies in San Juan also provided background information about the

historical development of Puerto Rico's cultural policy. This information, coupled with interviews with informants who had been involved in various struggles and conflicts over the constitution of the ICP and its programming allowed me to determine some of the major issues and interests represented in Puerto Rico's cultural politics.

In order to analyze the role of corporate interests, whom I had identified as important funders of the cultural groups during my preliminary study, I focused on three of the major corporate sponsors on the island. These were Bacardi, R.J. Reynolds and Anheuser Busch, the companies with the greatest visibility in the island's cultural festivals which have been drawing upon Puerto Rican culture in their advertising campaigns for many years. During the course of my research, I held interviews with their respective corporate representatives, and with their publicity and public relations agents. Interviews with representatives of other advertising agencies and members of the publicity industry enabled me to compare the advertising strategies of the three companies with those of the industry at large.

With a background of the major entities involved in the composition of Puerto Rico's cultural policy at the national level, I initiated my study of the issues involved

in the organization of cultural activities and the micropolitical dynamics among funders and organizers. I had originally planned to study four local groups in different regions of the island in order to assess the differences in their work and their expression of ideas of Puerto Rican nationality. However, on realizing the importance of regional, historical and political factors affecting these groups, I decided to focus on one regional area in order to analyze these variables in greater depth. I selected the southeastern town of Caone⁹ as research site because it is one of the first cities in which the government founded a cultural center and because it is the site of one of the five ICP regional offices for the Promotion of Culture -- which is in charge of advising, funding and supervising the work of other cultural centers in the area. This site was also selected because, in addition to the ICP-affiliated cultural center, there are over five cultural groups working in the area which display great variation in both their structure and their activities.

This new regional emphasis added another dimension to my research: issues of place, identity and politics in the work and development of these cultural groups. "The community" surfaced as an important category because these groups identified their work closely with the history and

characteristics of their respective communities.

The concept of "community" has been challenged in the anthropological literature for its association with uniformity, parochiality, homogeneity and consensus. As the split between the world of direct interpersonal relations and the world of indirect relationships in large scale social systems becomes a prevalent aspect of contemporary life, there is a move towards reconceptualizing the nature of communities beyond space and locality (Calhoun 1991). Yet space and place continue to serve as important loci of struggle, domination and resistance (Keith and Pile 1993), and "the community," as spatially recognized, provides an important referent for the construction of memories and identities. In this light, my emphasis is not on overt and fixed regional characteristics but rather on the relationships of power within and across communities that may inform the work and development of the different cultural groups in Caone. This focus does not presuppose that these groups are direct extensions of their respective communities; community groups have been shown often to be more directly related to state structures than to their local communities (Jones 1987). Instead, I focus on the extent to which groups may elaborate alternative visions of Puerto Rican culture, and the extent to which they are self-

contained or have links with their community (Jones 1987).

Having selected the research site, I conducted interviews with present and past leaders and members of the centers that were selected as specific research locations, and made observations of their activities and planning meetings. This provided data about the members (e.g. socioeconomic and political background, race, and gender), their level of involvement in these groups and their views on Puerto Rican national culture. This stage also yielded data about the relationship between local organizers and governmental and corporate funders, whose requirements and conditions are discussed in such meetings. Moreover, the public reception of the groups' activities at the local level was assessed through observation of the level of participation in these activities as well as through interviews with the attending public.

Lastly, a survey of twenty cultural centers (ten ICP-affiliated centers and ten independent centers) was conducted to increase the pool of information about the history, operations and goals of these groups throughout the island. The cultural centers included in the survey along with others centers included in the study and the major activities I observed are listed in Appendix A. The survey was composed of an open-ended interview based upon the

questionnaire guide found in Appendix B. It was conducted throughout the duration of the research, often during visits to planning meetings and different cultural activities organized by the groups.

Chapter Breakdown

The first chapter, "Securing the Nation Through Politics," describes the rise of cultural nationalism as a political tool for the consolidation of the commonwealth government along with the ongoing neutralization of independence as a political option for the island. This chapter discusses the early cultural policies initiated by the local commonwealth government as a locus for this historical development. These cultural policies include DIVEDCO, a grass-roots education program, and "Operation Serenity" through which the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP) and the ICP-affiliated local cultural centers were founded.

The consolidation of cultural nationalism as a political strategy of the Pro-Commonwealth Party and the subsequent decline of this association are traced through a discussion of the debates surrounding changes in cultural policy since the mid-1950's. These debates will evidence the conflict over who is or is not entitled to speak about

Puerto Rican culture, which was already in place by the early legislative debate over the establishment of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture in 1956. Accordingly, the discussion is framed in terms of the major conflicting political options for the island: Statehood and Commonwealth. In this model, the Pro-Commonwealth Party (PPD) is associated with a more folkloric view of Puerto Rican culture and presented as the true defender of Puerto Rican nationality, and the Pro-Statehood Party (PNP), associated with a "universalist" view of culture, is perceived to be the major threat to the Puerto Rican cultural integrity.

As we shall see, these views result from the PPD's appropriation of the national discourse and imagery of the times, which led to the neutralization of independence as a political option and the exclusion of Pro-Statehooders from the nationalist discourse. What is important to note here is how the strict identification of the dominant political parties with particular views of culture veils the way in which the Pro-Statehood (PNP) and Pro-Commonwealth (PPD) parties have, at various times, deployed different views of Puerto Rican culture to further their political interests. As will be seen, the PPD originally held a more "universalizing" view of culture, and the PNP has appealed

to different types of "creole" statehood since the late 1960s.

The peak of these cultural struggles came in the 1980s when culture became the most important rallying ground for the Pro-Commonwealth Party (PPD), which was threatened by the rise of the Pro Statehood Party, and thus strengthened its cultural nationalistic policies in an attempt to differentiate itself from a political opponent which was increasingly similar in terms of actual economic and political policies. The chapter ends with a description of the contemporary situation in which multiple actors have become involved in reformulating Puerto Rico's views of Puerto Rican culture in public life.

The second chapter, "The ICP and the Building Blocks of Nationality," turns to a discussion of the transformative hegemonic processes through which the "foundational" elements of Puerto Rican culture were established and officially disseminated through the government's cultural institutions. These include the folklorization of popular culture into the building blocks from which the myth of national identity has been forged -- the racial trilogy (Taino, African, Spanish), the myth of homogeneity, the idealization of the peasant past and the "unifying" Hispanic heritage. These elements have remained the basis for

defining "pure" Puerto Rican culture according to the official cultural policy since the 1950s. The chapter describes how these ideas are represented in and disseminated by the Intitute's programming through its choice of musical genres and types of performance and folk art that they consider to be representative of Puerto Rican culture.

The institutional framework of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP) described in this chapter provides the context for elaborating the interaction between the central office and the ICP-affiliated local cultural centers founded in the late 1950s to disseminate the ICP's work at the local level. This chapter draws on interviews with officials and representatives of the ICP at the central and local level to describe the relationships between the ICP's cultural promoters and local leaders and the way in which paternalism and partisan politics and gender, class and race inequalities are reproduced through this relationship.

The third and fourth chapters present case studies of the micropolitical dynamics at play in different cultural groups. These chapters incorporate information from different groups, (both ICP-affiliated and unaffiliated centers) interviewed throughout the island, although the discussion centers mainly on three groups in the

southeastern town of Caone.

Chapter three, "From the Center to the Centros: Cultural Politics From Below" describes the ICP-affiliated center of Caone. This center will serve as a venue into the repercussions of national cultural policy at the local level and the struggles that characterize ICP affiliated centers. Chapter four, "Just One More Festival," introduces two of the new cultural groups in Caone and analyzes them as new actors in Caone's cultural politics. The chapter discusses the way in which these groups differ in the composition of their membership, their use of government cultural policy, their approach to culture and their connection with government and corporate sponsors. As will be seen, these groups provide the setting in which neglected parts of Caone's history become manifest as different communities emphasize different aspects of the town's historical development and internal tensions in these communities are played out. I then analyze the extent to which the new groups serve as vehicles for the articulation of new identities or provide alternatives to "official" views of Puerto Ricanness.

Chapter five, "Culture, Politics and Corporate Sponsorship," focuses on the role of corporate interests in shaping and capitalizing on Puerto Rico's cultural

nationalism through their elaboration of ideas of Puerto Ricanness in their advertising campaigns and through their funding of most of the cultural festivals celebrated on the island. The discussion concentrates on the advertising and promotional strategies of R. J. Reynolds for Winston cigarettes and Anheuser Busch for Budweiser beer. An analysis of these campaigns will serve as the basis for a discussion of commercial interests as added players contesting Puerto Rican nationality. As we will see, commercial interests often turn to the more popular activities, thereby promoting views that often counter the government standards. As such, commercial sponsors are currently considered among the most "polluting" influences to Puerto Rican culture.

The sixth chapter, "Contesting the Nation: Contesting Identities," pays particular attention to the ongoing tension between culturalist and commercial views of national identity resulting from the cultural policy's aim to counter the "degeneration" of commercialization and its threat to authenticity. Through the case studies of two cultural events, I argue that the dichotomization of culture (into the cultural and the commercial) is one more cloak for the subversion of alternative views of nationality. By analyzing how "commercial" expressions are continually

subordinated and placed in a low category vis-a-vis the official culture, I argue that this tension is most useful in legitimizing the standards of the institutionalized views of Puerto Rican culture. The chapter will end by highlighting the compromises that people design to cope with these tensions in practice.

Lastly, the conclusion explores the prospects for the creation of alternative views of nationality in the commercial, colonial and national context of contemporary Puerto Rican society. The discussion will revolve around the hegemonic constraints that associate the national culture and nationalism in Puerto Rico with a "proper" discourse in which a pure national culture is presented as disrupted by external forces, while the racist and exclusionary premises on which the nation is grounded remain largely unquestioned. The conclusion will also consider what the case of Puerto Rico reveals about the prospects for constructing national identities within the so-called globalization of the world. I will argue that as culture continues to evolve as a dominant medium for advancing divergent political or economic interests, other forms of defining identity are likely to present challenges to traditional formulations of national identity. For as local intellectuals attempt to control, ridicule, and cope with the new agents elaborating

views of Puerto Rican identity, the content and nature of official definitions of nationality are likely to be affected by these new developments which slowly poke into the totalizing view of national identity, even if not yet into the colonial or subordinate position that envelopes them.

Endnotes

1. See "Note on Concepts" and the discussion of culture in the production of nationalisms below for further explanation of how "culture" will be treated in this dissertation.

2. While these groups are widely varied, I will use the terms "independent groups" or "community groups" to refer to different grassroots groups who are not affiliated with the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture or any other government cultural entity and who organize cultural festivals that are free and open to the public island-wide.

3. See for example the nationalistic social movements described in Johnson's (1994:264) discussion of social concerns such as peace and ecological issues "nested" within nationalistic agendas.

4. The distinction has been made by other authors but with different terminology. Smith, for instance, distinguishes between territorial and ethnic nations with territorial nations taking their base from the state as a "territorial entity with a jurisdiction that, although sovereign, is also strictly bounded...", whereas ethnic nationalisms took the "ethnic demography as the basis of the unit in question, and activat[ed] its more educated and aware sectors" (1986:136-137). Hutchinson (1992), on the other hand, makes the same distinction but refers instead to "political" and "cultural" nationalism.

5. I am drawing here on Williams' (1991) re-elaboration of Gramsci's term "transformist hegemony" and its application to her study of nationalism in Guyana. See also Mouffe (1979), and Alonso (1994) for discussions of this term.

6. Chatterjee (1993) has documented similar circumstances in India. Accordingly, where an emergent dominant class "lacks the social conditions for establishing complete hegemony over the new nation, it resorts to a 'passive revolution,' or the processes by which alliances are formed, in order to create conditions for its local power through the creation of a state that controls the capitalist forms of production (Chatterjee 1993:30). More than the uniqueness of the processes described by Chatterjee, I want to emphasize his insistence on the limits a colonial situation imposes on the development of nationalist thought. In the case of Puerto Rico, the continued repression and the continued colonial relationship with the U.S. constitutes these limits.

7. For a discussion on the creation of boundaries between high and popular culture as means of class legitimation see Levine (1984) and diMaggio (1991) among others.

8. Given that my emphasis is on the contemporary cultural politics, a review of the literature dealing with Puerto Rico's national identity is beyond the scope of this work. Yet, I want to acknowledge the importance of the historical and fictional literature in shaping or contesting definitions of Puerto Rican culture. For instance, discussions of Puerto Rico's national identity pervade most literary and scholarly work on the island. Puerto Rican culture has been interpreted as a form of resistance to Americanization (Seda-Bonilla 1972) and as part of the struggle over power, political representation and economic resources (Blaut 1987, Gonzalez 1987, Ramirez 1977).

9. Caone is a pseudonym for the community that served as a research site. The use of the pseudonym was requested by some of my informants. Throughout this dissertation, pseudonyms will also be used for informants, places, and names of other organizations that requested anonymity.

Chapter I

Securing the Nation Through Politics

The Pro-Independence Party won only 4.4% of the overall vote in the 1993 plebiscite on political status, although it had been the second most popular political option on the island in 1952.¹ This decrease in electoral support for independence does not reflect a decline of nationalist identification in Puerto Rican society, but rather a shift in its historical manifestation. It is this historical shift in the predominant form of nationalism in Puerto Rico that is the focus of this chapter.

The Nationalist Party: A Curbed Nationalism

Due to Puerto Rico's long colonial history, nationalism as traditionally defined, as the political principle that "groups defined as 'nations' have the right to, and therefore ought to, form territorial states..." (Hobsbawm 1992:4), has had an erratic history on the island. As early as the 19th century, the economic backwardness of the island; the immigration policies instituted by the Spanish government to hispanicize and strengthened its hold on the island; and Spanish political repression halted the development of a separatist nationalism² (Ferraio 1990).

Under these conditions economic concerns took priority over sovereignty as Puerto Rico's landowning elites sought more economic and political autonomy under Spanish rule along with rights over commercial treaties and control of trade and tariffs. Thus, contrary to many of its Caribbean and Latin American neighbors, Puerto Rico was limited in its quest for political independence, seeking instead an "Autonomist" relationship with Spain. American colonization in 1898 put a halt to Puerto Rico's aspirations for autonomy, but the early twentieth century saw an upsurge of a nationalism that resembled its 19th century predecessor in its accommodative outcomes.

In a literary movement known as the "1930s Generation," Puerto Rican elites became involved in a project of identity-definition, which held to a 19th century creole identity and relied on the island's Hispanic legacy in response to U.S. colonialism. As such, it involved a conception of the "motherland" Spain as the endower of civilization in contrast to the "Nordic barbarism of the invader" (Ferraó 1990:53). Spanish civilization, the "brotherhood" of Latin American countries, the 19th century metaphor of "La Gran Familia," the Christian legacy, and the assertion of a distinct spirit and personality common to all Puerto Ricans provided different degrees of moral and discursive support for the Puerto Rican elite under U.S. occupation.

Puerto Rico's nationalism also fed from the equation of the local with the moral or spiritual and the foreign with the modern and material, a common dichotomy found in other colonial contexts where it has served to create a "domain of sovereignty" through the regulation of the spiritual domain (Chatterjee 1993). In Puerto Rico, this dichotomy was influenced by Jose Rodo's (1900) novel, Ariel, which makes Shakespeare's noble and spiritual character Ariel the symbol of Latin culture and criticizes American imperialism embodied by the callous Caliban. Just as it had done throughout Latin America, this novel led to a Hispanic turn among the local intellectuals.

Although independence was discussed and desired by many on the political scene, it was not until the foundation of the Nationalist Party in 1923, that it became the priority of a political party on the island.³ At first, the Nationalist Party adopted an accommodative stance towards the United States, harboring the idea of military cooperation with the U.S. even after Puerto Rico's independence (Tirado 1993). In the mid 1920s and early 1930s, under the leadership of Albizu-Campos, the party adopted a non negotiable anti-imperial and anti-colonial stance.

Albizu-Campos' strategies for obtaining the island's independence concentrated on exposing the illegality of U.S. colonization of the island, calling attention to the Puerto

Rican situation in international forums, exposing the shortcomings of the colonial system on the island, and engaging in armed struggle. The introduction of Puerto Rican national symbols such as the flag and the national anthem was also an important aspect of the political strategy under Albizu Campos. Ideologically, the Nationalist Party drew on a conception of nationhood derived from the literary writings of the times, which emphasized the Hispanophile content of Puerto Rican culture. Puerto Rico's Hispanic heritage became the most significant element to define Puerto Rican identity in contrast to the American invader (Carrion 1993).

The Nationalist Party gave priority to national liberation over all other issues, including class struggle and economic re-structuring (Dietz 1986). This stance, along with its mostly petty bourgeois political base, limited the scope of its popular support. However, after the Nationalist Party's involvement in the sugar strikes of 1934, the Party evolved into a clear threat to U.S. corporate interests in Puerto Rico (Pantójas 1990:33). The threat of a nationalist revolution in response to the island's poverty was amplified by the proliferation of violence and social outlawry during the Great Depression (Santiago Valles 1994).

As a result, repression of the Nationalists Party peaked during the 1930s. This repression involved both the

American colonial government, which appointed two former military officers as governor and police chief in 1934, and Puerto Ricans who were increasingly incorporated into the colonial government. As noted by Santiago Valles (1994), from the 1920s onwards state mechanisms for social control were extended and "privileged Puerto Ricans" were increasingly involved in the colonial project. Employment in federal positions, in Puerto Rico's legislative body (as early as 1917), and in the commissions for social services established by the colonial government was a common strategy for self-promotion by the Puerto Rican elite at the time. This trend peaked in the decades that followed and the access of privileged Puerto Ricans to governmental structures was a key element that later led to the rise of the Pro Commonwealth Party in the 1940s. Albizu Campos recognized the political implications of this trend when he made it party policy to reject public employment and favors from the colonial government, deeming them acts of complicity with the colonizers (Tirado 1993).

Repression of the Nationalist Party led the party to withdraw from the electoral process as a means of obtaining independence for the island. In 1948 Law 53, commonly known as "ley de la mordaza" (the law of the muzzle) was passed. This law made it a grave crime to attempt in any way-- be it by force, violence or even through the publication, distribution or dissemination of ideas -- to destroy or

challenge the island's government.⁴ The ambiguity of the law permitted the government to incarcerate not only members of the Nationalist Party but anyone with dissenting ideas purely on the basis of their ideological position and without any involvement in revolutionary activities per se (Civil Rights Commission 1989). By providing a legal basis for the arrest and imprisonment of the nationalists, law 53 proved most useful in containing the nationalist revolt which occurred in different towns on the island in the 1950s.

The decline of the Nationalist Party after the 1950s has been the subject of much research, and it is not my purpose to address this topic further.⁵ However, it is important to point out that government repression and the elitist and Hispanophile roots of the Nationalist Party prevented it from forging a strong alliance with Puerto Rico's working classes. Nor did the Party receive unmitigated support from a population subject to colonial constraints and severe economic and social hardships. A number of different political programs have promoted independence for the island, but the position never received greater support from the electorate than during the 1952 election, and Puerto Rico is no closer today than it was then to obtaining political independence. Instead, the political sphere continues to consolidate around the Pro-Commonwealth and Pro-Statehood Parties who advocate the

continuation of some kind of affiliation with the U.S.

The Accommodative Option

At the moment when the Nationalist Party was subject to the most severe repression in 1938, the Popular Party (PPD) emerged. The PPD was the result of a rift in the landowners' Liberal Party, and it became the most effective elaborator of the cultural nationalism that was prevalent among the Puerto Rican elite of the time. The leader was Muñoz Marín, son of a former leader of the landowner-dominated Liberal Party and himself a former advocate of independence for Puerto Rico. With the PPD, Muñoz turned away from the status issue as an immediate concern and emphasized the island's economic development, which he saw as essential if independence was to be a viable option for the island⁶ (Dietz 1986). This emphasis on economic development and away from the status issue coupled with the party's cultural nationalist rhetoric, helped the PPD to form class alliances and successfully constitute itself as a populist party despite its mostly landowning and seigniorial leanings. Its supporters ranged from worker groups and nationalists, who were attracted to the party's claim to be working for the eventual independence of the island; to the state-based technobureaucracy of intellectuals, bureaucrats and professionals, many of whom were already involved in the American colonial government (Quintero-Rivera 1985, Pantójas

1990).

These disparate groups were attracted by a populist discourse that presented the Party as the protector of the people, defined broadly as all Puerto Ricans who, to differing degrees, were exploited by the U.S. sugar corporations. "Pan, Tierra, y Libertad" (Bread, Land and Liberty), was the populist motto used to construct a message of social justice that was also filled with metaphors relating to sugar production, which reflected the daily life of the laboring classes (Alvarez-Curbelo 1993). Muñoz also incorporated appeals to justice as "popular-democratic interpellations" to present the Popular Party as a "synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology" (Laclau 1979:173). Specifically, metaphors of Puerto Rico as the "all embracing family," and "all of us exploited by the corporations," were posited as an "alternative" to the interests of the U.S. sugar corporations. The image of Puerto Rico as an "all embracing family," which draws on the intraclass relations of the hacienda economy and provided a paternalist conception of the fatherland, had been a recurrent theme in Puerto Rican politics since the 19th century (Quintero-Rivera 1985). All along, however, it was the "exploitative capitalists" that the PPD attacked rather than capitalism itself -- a strategy that provided room for the PPD's local power within the dominant capitalist system through its control of the local

colonial state. Thus in the 1940s Muñoz stated:

The real unity of the people stems from its working classes, the agricultural class and the middle class, against those who have made millions from the suffering of the people... (Muñoz, quoted in Quintero Rivera 1985:92).

Meanwhile, the PPD's program in the 1940s aimed to "provide land and bread for the unemployed and use the government's economic power to create industry;" and "to distribute with more equity what Puerto Rico produces and augment that production for the benefit of all the people (PPD program, quoted in Quintero Rivera 1985:92-93; see also Rodríguez 1993).

With these populist appeals, the PPD laid the ground for the absorption and neutralization of opposing interests through what Gramsci has referred to as a "transformist hegemony" involving the "gradual but continuous absorption... of the active elements produced by allied groups" (Mouffe 1979:182). These groups included the hacendados, landless peasants and unemployed workers who were all, in different ways, affected by the sugar corporations. All these groups contributed to the PPD's landslide victory in 1944, in which it won 34 of the 35 electoral districts and 73 of the 77 municipalities (Quintero Rivera 1985: 83). However, it was the incorporation of Pro-Independence advocates and nationalist rhetoric into the PPD's program and the colonial state apparatus that most contributed to the neutralization of

separatist elements. This trend, today popularly known as "melonismo," formed the basis for the PPD's "intellectual and moral leadership," almost since the party's inception.⁷

The development policies of the U.S. towards Puerto Rico were particularly important in consolidating the PPD's local power within the constraints of American colonialism during this time (Santiago Valles 1994, Pantójas 1990). These policies included land reform, and laws on minimum wages and labor conditions, most of which were patterned along the lines of U.S. strategic interests in the island and within the limits of the New Deal Program of President Roosevelt. Although many of them were extensions of U.S. congressional measures relating to the island, these policies allowed to PPD to institute social and economic policies that allowed the party to create a mass of support through a patronage system while reinforcing the popular impression that the party could deliver on its promises of social justice. In addition, these policies spurred the expansion of the colonial state and the re-legitimization of colonialism while providing an infrastructure for semi-autonomous administration that strengthened the colonial government on the island and the PPD bureaucracy. The resulting development policies can be interpreted as "the ideological representation of the political project of a class coalition that represents the interests of metropolitan and local dominant sectors" (Pantójas 1990:25).

Muñoz's focus on economic development soon turned the PPD into a party of accommodation rather than colonial resistance, leaving behind its earlier aspirations for independence. By 1946, the Pro-independence faction of the PPD was accused of undermining the local government's plan for economic development prior to the resolution of the status issue. That same year, the Pro Independence Party (PIP), which remains the most popular party advocating independence on the island, was formed. However, the emphasis on economic development and the enduring repression of the nationalists continued to strengthen the U.S. hold on Puerto Rico and curb independence as an economic and politically viable option for the island. As Luis Muñoz Marín recalled in one of his speeches at Harvard University:

The dichotomy could hardly be more unrealistic. The Puerto Rican economy could not withstand, without a tragic collapse, the economic and fiscal conditions of independence nor the fiscal conditions and the compulsion of uniform federal legislation involved in federated statehood (Muñoz-Marín 1959, Godkin Lectures).

The historical "solution" to this dilemma was the constitution of the Commonwealth in 1952, which turned Puerto Rico into a "Free Associated State" of the United States, a status that was evocative of the Autonomist Charter with Spain in its accommodative outcome. The Commonwealth status gave Puerto Rico political autonomy at the local level while maintaining it in a colonial relationship with the United States. Although hailed as a

local invention, the Commonwealth was both directed and ratified by Congress within the constraints of the Federal Relations Act, which stipulated the applicability of all federal laws to the island. The Commonwealth represented an accommodation on the part of the new elites, descendants of landowners and the new professionals, who required both local governmental autonomy and American capital to constitute themselves as a hegemonic class within the constraints of colonialism (Quintero-Rivera 1985).

With the establishment of the Commonwealth, Puerto Rico's colonial situation was institutionalized and cultural nationalism and political accommodation were promoted rather than the pursuit of independence. By this time, and as documented by Rodríguez-Castro (1993) there was a marked decrease in the use of nationalist rhetoric by the PPD Party, who initially used it as an important tool for forging alliances with labor, and even with the most fervent advocates of independence. Rodríguez-Castro notes that Muñoz slowly changes his appellation for Puerto Rico from "nation" to "culture" in his later speeches, as the two hegemonic principles of the Puerto Rican elites of the times, nationalism and developmentalism, converge in the PPD program (Rodríguez-Castro 1993). By the late 1950s the focus was on cultural identity within the colonial status rather than on independence; and the issue of Puerto Rico's nationality was already presented as one of cultural

identity. The "patria" was now about:

...the colors of the landscape, the changes of seasons, the smell of the earth wet with fresh rain....but more than anything, 'patria' is the people, their way-of-life, spirit, folkways, songs, the way of getting along with each other (Luis Muñoz Marín, Godkin Lectures at Harvard University 1959:7).

Yet, the PPD's appropriation of nationalist symbols such as the flag and the national anthem as the official symbols of the Puerto Rican Commonwealth in 1952 attested to the importance that nationalist symbols and cultural nationalist rhetoric would have in establishing legitimacy within the new colonial arrangement.

To the outside, the newly founded Commonwealth was presented by Muñoz as a "breakthrough from nationalism" (Muñoz Marín 1959) that could serve as an international example. Cultural nationalism was a non-threatening nationalism which relied on love of country and cultural identity not on "petty" attitudes that lead to communism, nuclear war, and revolutions and other "Big Troubles" of the 1950s. He also stated:

Some of us confused love of the homeland with a narrow and petty concept of the national state. We felt that love of Puerto Rico had as a necessary corollary the desire for separate independence. We had not yet comprehended that no law, divine or human, demands that countries must be suspicious, vain and hostile, and that they must live separate from other countries whose peoples are a part of the broad equality which the Lord created on earth (Luis Muñoz Marín, Godkin Lectures at Harvard University 1959:7).

The promotion of cultural nationalism by the Popular

Party (PPD), along with its adoption of developmental and political policies, contributed to the ongoing neutralization of separatist nationalism on the island and the consolidation of both metropolitan and local interests into the Commonwealth itself. An examination of the cultural policies of the time will show culture was not only de-militarized but also articulated with the PPD's modernizing ideology of development into a rhetoric for effecting social change, development, progress and the Commonwealth. The mission given to the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture in the 1950s to "promote cultural development," and the popular perception that "the PPD is the only party that cares for and safeguards Puerto Rican culture" exemplify the consolidation of the PPD program with ideas of cultural nationalism and development at this historical juncture.

The Early Cultural Policies and the Consolidation of Cultural Nationalism

During the 1950s the PPD consolidated its power and laid out the economic and political underpinnings of contemporary Puerto Rican society. The Commonwealth, Operation Bootstrap (Puerto Rico's export-led industrialization model), and the cultural policies at work today all have their origins in this period of social, economic and political change. Much has been said about

Operation Bootstrap, which transformed Puerto Rico's agrarian economy into an industrial one, triggered mass unemployment and migration to U.S., and converted Puerto Rico into an international "showcase of development" (Safa 1974, Bonilla 1985). Less emphasis is given to "Operation Serenity," "Operation Bootstrap's" cultural and social counterpart, through which the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP), and later ICP-affiliated local cultural centers were founded.

Operation Serenity was meant to fulfill the spiritual needs of a people whose political status was considered settled by the Commonwealth and whose economic needs were addressed by Operation Bootstrap. The concept was first espoused by Muñoz Marín in the mid 1950s, although allusions to the overall program were already evident in DIVEDCO (The Division of Community Education)--a grassroots education program established in 1949, centering around mobile educational and literacy workshops presented mostly in rural communities. Operation Serenity aimed to provide a sense of spiritual balance to a society perceived as threatened by the rapid social change caused by the new economic policies. Consider Muñoz Marín's statement about Operation Bootstrap:

...as we shape the course of the future generation in terms of a fuller and richer society, conducted with freedom and order, with more education than conspicuous consumption, with more imagination than acquisitiveness, we feel the deep spiritual urge to link our experience and hope to the wider search for hemispheric unity (Governor's speech on April 7, 1956).

The idea was to prepare the peasantry for modernity while protecting them from its devastating effects of which materialism, consumerism, and culture loss were seen as the most threatening.⁸

Operation Serenity marked an important moment in the historical development of Puerto Rico's cultural nationalism, where awareness of cultural distinctiveness begins to lead to the romanticization and purification of culture in reference to an idealized past. This stage constitutes an important stage in the consolidation of the character and subsequent development of nationalism in the service of a modernizing project (Chatterjee 1993). Chatterjee's study of nationalist thought in India identified this stage as the moment of "maneuver," or the "historical consolidation of the 'national' by decrying the 'modern'," (1993:51) where an anti capitalist discourse romanticizes a pre-capitalist moral utopia that serves as foreground to the expansion of capitalist production and the institutionalization of the state. Similarly, in Puerto Rico, the new cultural policies were advanced in a context of rapid change along with the eradication of the rural economy and the advent of industrialization. These processes led to migratory flows to urban areas and the United States as Puerto Ricans become a source of cheap labor.⁹ In this context, the government cultural policies became important bearers of the ideological underpinnings of

the PPD populist government: modernity and progress accompanied by the strengthening of cultural pride among the citizenry.

Various cultural programs were instituted in governmental departments at this time,¹⁰ but it was in DIVEDCO and the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture that the culturalist program was most directly forged. As the ICP would do later, DIVEDCO worked through regional supervisors allocated to governmental districts in order to reach all municipalities. In addition, as the ICP would also do, DIVEDCO helped foster a patronage network through the recruitment of group organizers, as well as its bulk of artists and creative personnel from the Popular Party (PPD) and the Independence party (PIP). This recruitment further contributed to the presentation of the PPD Party and its program as the legitimate guardians and leaders of the nation, irrespective of the colonial implications of the Party's political program.

Most topics presented by DIVEDCO, (through visual materials such as films, posters and information brochures) promoted self-reliance, education, the promotion of a healthy, modest lifestyle and the cultural development of the people. For example, in the booklet entitled, La Trampa (c.1950s) the audience is warned against the evil of consumerism, which tricks people through offers, freebies, bargains and lay-a-away plans. People are encouraged to

develop modest consumer habits, plan their budgets and not be confused by a seemingly unlimited supply of goods which may make them confuse the essential and the superfluous.

The booklets generally contained "how-to" advice on coping with changes in family structure, diet and other areas of social life brought about by industrialization. The self-management of health, nutrition and family planning are promoted in DIVEDCO's outlook as requirements for happiness in modern life. For instance, families were advised to plan and limit the number of their children, who were no longer needed for work on the farm, but instead needed to be supported (El Derecho de la Felicidad n.d. c1950s). New imported foodstuffs were introduced as DIVEDCO recommended that meat, fish, eggs, vegetables and fruit be added to the traditional diet (Alimentos 1952). Traditional beliefs, described as superstition were also attacked and dismissed as "the product of ignorance and fear," while science was championed as the "product of research and truth" (La Ciencia Contra n.d. c1950s).

The duty of the Puerto Rican, to work and contribute to the expansion of Puerto Rican civilization, is an overriding theme in many of the booklets, as is the strength and continuation of Puerto Rican culture and its legacy. For instance, the Taino, Puerto Rico's extinct pre-Columbian population, is presented as "the good heritage which neither the television, the airplane, [nor] the sport shirt, has

been able to erase" (Isla y Pueblo n.d.).

DIVEDCO, however, did more than ease people's transition to modernity. It also helped to curb and restrain social unrest through messages of compliance and self-control that were filled with contradictions. In a discussion of DIVEDCO's films, Lauria (1991) notes that DIVEDCO films represent the essence of Puerto Ricanness as a rural utopia despite the fact that the government's own economic policies were undermining the traditional lifestyle on which that utopian vision was based. Moreover, he notes DIVEDCO's restraining role in its emphasis on modest consumer lifestyles, rather than material aspirations from which poverty excluded most Puerto Ricans.

A good example of DIVEDCO's restrictive messages is provided by the booklet on emigration; where potential Puerto Rican migrants to the U.S. are counseled to comply with the U.S. assimilationist ethnic policies of the time. They are exhorted to "harmoniously integrate" into the receiving culture and "to contribute to the betterment and the enlargement of the American nation." In contrast, those who stay in Puerto Rico were instructed to affirm and expand their way of being Puerto Rican (Marqués 1966).

DIVEDCO's approach to Puerto Rican culture also contributed to the promotion of cultural nationalism by the local Pro-Commonwealth government. This was achieved through its nonconflictual view of culture and livelihood and its

development of a spiritually based definition of culture within a context in which the prerogative of the colonial political powers was taken for granted. Puerto Rico was presented as "culturally unique," often using images that would later be developed by the ICP:

We are a great family living in this island which god knew to situate between Europe and America and which is our patria. What unites us is a past of almost five centuries. Three different races and cultures gave life and meaning to the Puerto Rican man, the Indian or Taino, the Spaniard and the black or African race (El Guardarrayas 1966).

The spiritually based definition of culture which characterized discussions at this time was also reflected in DIVEDCO's written materials:

We understand that culture refers more to values of the soul, to spiritual values. Culture, as we understand it here, refers more to feelings and attitudes of the people, to what men (sic) are, more than to what they have (Emigración 1966).

Leaving behind DIVEDCO's dual role of educating and preparing the people for modernity while constituting them as Puerto Rican nationals, in the mid 1950s the PPD took to a more overt stance in defining Puerto Rican culture. The creation of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture in 1956, which will be highlighted in the next section, was a focal point of PPD cultural policy.

In the ICP, the spirit based definition of culture was further developed. For Ricardo Alegría, the anthropologist director of the institution for 18 years, culture served as a synonym for nationality and the spiritual values that he

believes characterize Puerto Rican culture (Alegría 1973). Among the spiritual values that characterize Puerto Rican culture he lists:

Our profound humanitarianism, our commitment to equality which is manifested in our mestizaje and exemplary social livelihood, our love for democracy, liberty, peace and civility, our devotion to culture... (Alegría 1973:11).

Puerto Rico's colonial status are ignored in these spiritual definitions which emphasize the sovereignty of the nation irrespective of the island's subordinate political situation.

As will be seen, and, following Althusser (1971), the ICP would function as an important "Ideological State Apparatus" of the new commonwealth administration. These are material representations of ideologies in state institutions that enjoy relative autonomy from the state, yet are key in securing its reproduction. Accordingly, the ICP would help the PPD legitimize the permanence of Puerto Rican nationality within the recently acquired semi-independent, yet mostly contingent position of commonwealth status while also contributing to its existence by channeling any separatist goals into art and cultural programs rather than into political action. Within the ICP, Puerto Rican values became operationalized in a program that centered around specific and distinguishable building blocks of nationality. Yet, as will be evident in the next chapter, the modernizing premises of these early cultural

policies remained in the ICP's emphasis on education, and on promoting local "desarrollo cultural," (cultural development), which entailed embracing Puerto Rican culture as defined by the institution. However, the creation of an institution for the sole purpose of promoting Puerto Rican culture was not without resistance.

Defenders and Saboteurs of Culture: The Political Base for the Creation of the ICP

While the PPD had begun to define Puerto Rican identity in its cultural policy as exemplified by DIVEDCO, the intellectual milieu prior to the establishment of the ICP revolved around a Europeanianized "occidental" culture and the Hispanophile current prevalent among Puerto Rican intellectuals. In addition, Puerto Rico had just been subject to the Americanization policy implemented through the mass education system. Taught in English until 1948, this program aimed to promote American values and the veneration of American symbols (Negrón-Montilla 1971). In this context, the proposal for the establishment of an institute with the sole purpose of advancing Puerto Rican culture met with some resistance. Opponents ranged from those who questioned whether there was a "culture" in Puerto Rico that merited such an enterprise to those who perceived political intentions behind the proposal, to those who interpreted the project as one that would "limit" the scope of Puerto Rican culture.

The debate was long and arduous. Nevertheless, in 1955 Puerto Rico's legislature passed law #89 which created the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture to "conserve, promote, enrich and divulge the cultural values of the *pueblo* of Puerto Rico and achieve their widest and most profound knowledge and appreciation" (Law No. 89, June 21, 1955, in Harvey 1988:34). In Spanish the word "pueblo" designates both a distinct community or nation. The purpose of the law was to create an institution that promoted Puerto Rican national culture, although the law was presented with the less charged word of "pueblo" rather than "national culture" which was the intention behind its proposal as explained in the institution's eighteen year report entitled: "The Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, eighteen years of contributing to strengthening our national conscience." In it the Institute's mission was listed as the "study, conservation, divulgation and enrichment of our national culture" (Alegria 1973:7).

During the legislative debate, the three ideologically opposing political parties (Pro-Independence, Pro-Statehood and Commonwealth) voiced concerns that still frame and permeate contemporary debates about the character and constitution of Puerto Rico's cultural policy. A main point of contention was whether the Institute would lead to a "dirigismo cultural" (cultural authoritarianism) by the Commonwealth Party over the rest of society. Both the

political minority parties (Pro Statehood and Pro Independence) feared that the Institute would serve as a tool to transmit the Pro Commonwealth ideology through the dissemination of the thought and history of people and events which were compatible with Party ideals.

These concerns were not ill-founded. The Pro-Commonwealth Party controlled the whole state bureaucracy, from the Education Department to the government's radio station (WIPR), through which the writing and thought of its leader, Luis Muñoz Marín, were disseminated. Opponents feared that the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture would end up writing the "history of the greatness and the achievements of the immense Popular Party" (Figuerola, Legislative Debate, 1955). Attempting to limit the risk of "dirigismo cultural," the Pro Independence Party proposed to limit the powers of the ICP so that it would not be responsible for stipulating an official interpretation of Puerto Rican history:

If enriching or promoting or disseminating involved some men having the responsibility for selecting, evaluating and choosing from the range of Puerto Rican values, for preferring one interpretation over another and for placing all the weight of official backing on one interpretation, in my judgement that would be to direct towards specific cultural values. People who do not accept that interpretation would be losing their cultural liberty" (Ramírez de Irizarry, Legislative Debate, 1955).

The Pro-Commonwealth representatives challenged their opponents on both technical and ideological grounds. They argued that the proposed Institute could not promote or

disseminate something which had not first been selected or judged to be significant. Ideologically, they presented themselves as "defenders of the nation;" dismissing any criticism of their policy as contrary to the "true essence of the project, against the exaltation of Puerto Rican values" (Font-Saldaña, Legislative Debate, 1955). The PPD Party representatives also appealed to the stated aims of "Operation Serenity" to safeguard Puerto Rican culture from the consumerism and excessive materialism which were perceived to be the result of the economic policies of industrialization:

This project aims to create an organism that can identify and give personality and find the soul of the Puerto Rican of today... Should Puerto Ricans today try to find their true personality or should they continue living day by day not worrying beyond material things...? (Polanco Abreu, Legislative Debate, 1955).

The Pro-Statehood representatives also voiced concerns about the Institute's local and national outlook, as this party itself promoted a universalist view of culture that did not conflict with their ideal of U.S. statehood for Puerto Rico. The promoter of statehood, Luis Ferré, later governor of Puerto Rico (1968-1972), argued that,

Culture is not static, but rather, culture progresses, and Puerto Rican culture today is a culture that came with roots in Spain and has already grown roots in the Anglosaxon culture, and is therefore, a new culture that is daily growing in strength and which aspires for progress and liberty. Any plan to defend the culture through static models, through a regression to things of the past, is a great danger... As our party

wishes that Puerto Rico continues to adapt to the new life norms of Occidental democracy and wishes Puerto Rico to progress in its culture and not be directed through a governmental directorship that could destroy liberty, we have to oppose this project.

The PNP party was not alone in appealing to occidentalist views of culture. Appeals to intrinsic artistic values and intellectual freedom, and references from Western literature and culture, ranging from Aristotle, to John Stuart Mill, and definitions of culture based on the Spanish Royal Academy Dictionary were rampant in the debate.

Despite criticisms from both the Pro Statehood and the Pro Independence minorities, the law was passed and the Institute was founded as the government's organ for the study, development and dissemination of Puerto Rican culture; a mission which also entailed and was predicated on the development of an official view of Puerto Rican culture.

As Puerto Rico's heritage became institutionalized in the ICP, it was also appropriated by the PPD Party, which had not only won the debate but also the exclusive right to manipulate the symbolic material out of which definitions of Puerto Rican culture would be forged. The two opponents to the creation of the Institute, the Pro-Statehood Party and the Pro-Independence, were unequally incorporated into PPD-dominated cultural politics. Pro-statehooders were targeted as the main rivals to the PPD's efforts and excluded from participating in the formation of the ICP, whereas members

of the Pro-Independence Party were incorporated as important contributors to the formation and operation of the ICP. Thus, the Independentistas supplied many of the ICP's administrators, including its first two directors as well as the artistic core of the institution. This involvement was received with great optimism by those involved in this period, who referred to it with great romanticism. However, as the popular epithet for the ICP, the "finquitas de los pips" (the PIP's farm) attests, this involvement not only entailed the development of the ICP as the PIP's symbolic "private property"¹¹ but also the strategic encloement of Independentistas within the ICP, which hid the overt and covert political surveillance to which they were continually subjected, even within the ICP itself. This persecution by the local commonwealth government, widely suspected by many, did not fully come to the public's forefront until the 1990s, when it was disclosed that police dossiers had been compiled on many Independentistas, including well-known cultural leaders within and outside the ICP structure. This containment of the Pro-Independence sector, both under Pro-Statehood and Pro-Commonwealth administrations, reveals the ICP's role as another accommodative institution within the colonial government.

The 1955 debate marked a turning point in the consolidation of the PPD's local power and the constitution of a "field of opinion," or "the locus of confrontation of

competing discourses," (Bourdieu 1977:168) in which the PPD emerged as the defender of Puerto Rican culture. Thus, years after the legislative debate over the creation of the ICP, discussions about Puerto Rican culture were recycling the same ideas: Pro-Statehooders are blamed as "saboteurs" of Puerto Rican national culture, who want a universalist, occidentalist view of culture to be disseminated through the state's cultural institutions; while the PPD are hailed as the true defenders of Puerto Rican culture. These charges ignore the fact that along with its cultural policies, the PPD administration contributed to the promotion of the same "occidentalist" high art forms that have since become popularly associated with the PNP Party. In fact, four years after the ICP was assigned a mere \$35,000 for its general budget, in 1959 the PPD administration assigned almost six times that amount to the Casals Festival, Inc., a classical music festival which was awarded a total of \$230,000. Yet generalized ideas of the PPD as the defender of Puerto Rican culture, the ICP as the guardian of Puerto Rican nationality and the PNP as their major threat will continue to permeate debates on culture and frame interpretations of all cultural policy island-wide. Thus, it is as a threat to the ICP that the cultural policies of the Pro-Statehood Party in the 1980s and more recently in 1994 were interpreted by the cultural intelligentsia.

The debate itself, however, reflected the contestatory

nature that would characterize discussions about Puerto Rican culture and its relationships to partisan politics thereafter. During the 1980s a "cultural war" erupted to which informants within the ICP structure trace the "politicization of Puerto Rican culture," a term used by my informants to designate the politico-partisan maneuvering of culture around party lines. It should be remembered, however, that culture was never truly free from politico-partisan manipulations in Puerto Rico.

The "Culture Wars"

After its establishment in 1956, the ICP remained identified with the Pro-Commonwealth Party, and with the "Independentistas." The political composition of the Institute's staff remained almost unaltered by changes in government administration (from the PPD to the PNP in 1968), giving the institution an image of permanence and neutrality in comparison to most government institutions. In 1979, however, the situation changed when the broadest cultural legislation since the creation of the ICP was conceived, directly threatening the ICP's position as the government's sole organ for culture. More significantly, the change was instituted by a Pro-Statehood administration (1976-1980), legislating for the first time on culture and openly declaring in its campaign that it would bring Puerto Rico to statehood by the next electoral term. The PNP's cultural

legislation was interpreted by the ICP staff and many intellectuals as a vehicle for the dissemination of annexationist ideas through the propagation of a "universal" culture, rather than Puerto Rico's autochthonous culture. The threat posed by the PNP's cultural policies was augmented by the appointment of a Pro Statehood activist and nuclear chemist, not connected with the local arts and the intellectual community on the island, as Director of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture. The new director, Leticia del Rosario initiated a vociferous fight against "communists, socialists and 'populares' which dominated the ICP" (El Mundo 6/21/83).

The PNP measures called for the establishment of an umbrella cultural organization, the "Administración para el Fomento de las Artes y la Cultura" (AFAC), whose mission was to consolidate all artistic and cultural activity under one government body. The newly founded Fine Arts Center, the Symphonic Orchestra and the theatrical arts were drawn under the jurisdiction of the AFAC, giving it an air of "high culture" in contrast to the ICP which had concentrated on the more folkloric expressions of Puerto Rican culture. The AFAC was seen by ICP staff as a threat to Puerto Rico's national culture, as it represented a challenge to the dominance of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture. The proposal was criticized as an example of "dirigismo cultural." This time, however, the charge was levelled

against the PNPs and it was heard.

Pro-Statehood (PNP) proponents defended their project, arguing that the measures were intended not to hinder but to "enhance culture" through an agency with greater governmental powers. According to them, their proposal also was meant to "expand" the vision of Puerto Rican culture beyond the "restricted folkloric" stance promulgated by the ICP throughout the years of its existence. They, the Statehooders, now claimed to have the same right to be "puertorriqueñistas" as any other. An example of this rhetoric is provided by a statement by Carlos Romero Barcelo, then governor of Puerto Rico:

What we want is for culture to expand, that Puerto Rican culture should extend its horizons. The culture that maintains itself closed, that does not give way to new currents, wherever they come from, and then choose amongst those that adjust better to our way of being and to our personality, that culture dies and becomes petrified. (Carlos Romero, Claridad 13-19/80).

Making democratic claims for culture, the statehooders decried the view that "only PIPs and PPD's are puertorriqueñistas" and that they are the only ones entitled to speak about culture. The statehooders presented the PPD's and PIP's as "elitists and intellectuals," disengaged from the true needs of the people, and for whom statehood would mean security, not the abolition of their Puerto Rican identity. These assertions were a re-elaboration of a populist PNP campaign motto of the time, "La estadidad es para los pobres," (Statehood is for the Poor) that

presented statehood as the best solution for the Puerto Rican poor (Ramos 1987).

The PNP discourse also drew from images generalized by the nationalist ideology concerning love and loyalty to the nation as proof of one's patriotism, although they sought to validate their own claim to express such feelings. The first Pro-Statehood director of the ICP states:

There is a belief that in order to be a true intellectual or a patriot one has to be an 'independetista', but things are changing... The other Puerto Ricans who are not separatists [PIP] or autonomists [PPD] are finally awakening. Everyone has the right to love the motherland [patria] in the form they want, and the right to culture and to develop as intellectuals and to express their Puerto Ricanness in the widest way possible without the narrow limits imposed by the "acaparadores" of the Pro-Independence elite (Leticia del Rosario, Claridad 18-24/80).

Despite their democratic claims, two problems lingered behind the Pro-Statehooders demands: their ideological commitment to statehood, which required them to explain the possibility of conserving Puerto Rican culture despite U.S. statehood, and the fact that their claims were contradicted by their own politically motivated vision of what Puerto Rican culture should be. As the founder of the PNP, Luis Ferré stated, the objective of the PNP was to promote "una cultura sin apellidos" (a culture without a last-name) (El Nuevo Día 2/7/80). That is, a "universal" culture, that is not national and has no proprietor, and that is not an obstacle to the future incorporation of

Puerto Rico as an American state. In the colonial context of Puerto Rico, this idea has always had dangerous implications given that culture remains the most important basis for defining Puerto Rico's national identity.

The PNP policies also ignored the fact that the ICP was seen by most Puerto Rican intellectuals as the guardian of Puerto Rican culture and the vehicle for defending the national culture against the threat of Americanization. Any threat to the Institute would be taken as a threat to Puerto Rican nationality. In fact, even the work of other government cultural agencies founded during Pro-Statehood administration (68-72, 76-80) such as the Division of Folklife of Puerto Rico's Development Corporation (Fomento), are regarded within the ICP as an appropriation of its own legitimate mission. Fomento is perceived to voice a more "commercial" view of Puerto Rican culture, because it encourages the development of folk arts as medium for subsistence, even though, like other government departments it follows standards of authenticity prescribed by the ICP.

Moreover, the PNP's criticism of the Hispanophile tendencies of the ICP as elitist was undermined by its appeal to a "universal" culture which had equally elitist associations. This was evident during the highly publicized public hearings about the proposed cultural policy in the 1980s, when the dichotomy between universal/traditional views of culture deepened and came to be seen as two

irreconcilable and politically opposed poles. Colonial and classist metaphors permeated the discussion. The PNP's cultural project (AFAC) was presented by its proponents as an institution that would limit itself to "universal" culture, leaving the "autochthonous" to the ICP. The autochthonous was loosely defined by a lawyer proponent of the measure as a "jíbara ñangota en el campo bebiendo café en una dita" (a female peasant kneeling in the countryside drinking coffee from a coconut cup), whereas universal culture was compared to "un señor sentado en un flamante restaurante, tomando café con toda la expresión de lo que es buen gusto" (a man sitting in a famous restaurant, drinking coffee with all the expression of good "taste" (Claridad) 2/8-14/80. In this comparison, female/male, rural/urban, wooden/metal utensils, and kneeling/sitting images were juxtaposed to convey the inferior standing of autochthonous culture in relation to the universal.

Despite numerous protests from artists and organized groups, the PNP policies were approved by a PNP dominated Senate on April 20, 1980. By then, it was evident that a culture war had commenced. A group of long standing workers at the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, along with artists and university students who had organized as the "Committee for the Defense of Puerto Rican Culture," became more militant in their mission to "defend" Puerto Rico's national culture. They feared that the prophecies voiced by many

intellectuals, including the founder and director of the ICP for 18 years, that "Puerto Rico was on its way to losing its national culture for a universal culture," would be fulfilled (El Mundo 6/6/80). Throughout the island, ICP-affiliated cultural centers became the site of battles between PNP and PPD members as many PNP members entered these cultural centers, (traditional strongholds of the PPD,) backed by the PNP municipal governments.¹²

After three years of cultural strife, the first PNP director of the ICP was forced to resign in June 17, 1983. Her resignation, front-page news in the four national newspapers, was presented as an example of the PNP's inability to legislate on culture and became a campaign issue in the 1984 elections. Then, with culture a major concern, the PPD returned to power, with the overt intention of spurring the island's cultural identity. "Much More Puerto Ricanness" (El Nuevo Día 7/22/85) was the motto of the new cultural policies instituted by the PPD in 1985. Through these laws, the AFAC was abolished and more powers were given to the ICP whose director was promoted to the post of government secretary. In addition, the ICP was further decentralized with the establishment of four regional offices in charge of supervising the work of ICP-affiliated cultural centers throughout the island.

Through the "Plan to Revitalize the Cultural Centers," legislative financial assignments were conferred on ICP-

affiliated cultural centers to buy materials and renovate their physical facilities. A series of travelling programs and conferences were organized at the national level to be carried out at the local centers; and Spanish was instituted as Puerto Rico's sole official language rather than sharing the position with English.¹³ The irony of all of this was that the move towards more "Puertorriqueñidad" was accompanied by a renewed Hispanophile emphasis, through which the "occidental" tendencies of Puerto Rican intellectuals surfaced once more. Thus, the peak of the new "Pro Puerto Rican policies" involved the creation of the Commission for the Celebration of Puerto Rico's quincentennial, through which the Pro-Commonwealth administration accentuated Puerto Rico's ties with the "motherland" through activities, exchanges and highly publicized governmental visits to Spain. This included a highly publicized regatta to commemorate Columbus' voyage and "discovery" of the island, and the opening of the "Puerto Rico Pavilion in Seville," which were accompanied by free nation-wide public celebrations with strong cultural nationalist overtones.

The Rise of the Annexationist Party

The events of the 1980s made culture a primary topic of political contention. However, ongoing transformations in Puerto Rican society since the 1950s, prompted by the policies of industrialization, had been creating contradictions that were making it increasingly difficult for the PPD party to maintain its local dominance. These changes were directly responsible for the rise of the PNP in the late 1960s.

As a result of the industrialization strategy, unemployment, underemployment and poverty had increased, especially in urban areas. By 1970, 65.2 percent of the population was living below the poverty line. Unemployment, which was 11.2 percent in 1970 peaked at 22 percent in 1977, and the lowest income groups in Puerto Rico received no benefit from the economic policies instituted in the 1950s (USDC 1979). The control of the local government over the economy diminished throughout the 1970s, as Puerto Rico's economy changed from a labor intensive model to a capital intensive one, which relied mostly on tax exemptions from federal policies, and less on local government prerogatives (Baver 1993). An important aspect of this change was the enactment in 1976 of Section 936 of the IRC code. This marked the rise of Puerto Rico's High-Finance Strategy, which relied mostly on federal tax policies. Federal transfers, especially in the form of food stamps, which

bypassed the commonwealth government, lessened the island's autonomy and strengthened the appeal of statehood as the only political option that could assure the continuation of these transfers. From 1960 to 1976 transfer payments increased 1,974% (from \$78.1 million to \$1,619.5) (Pantójas 1990:123).

The rise in poverty and unemployment on the island allowed the PNP to present itself as an alternative for the poor and to develop a popular base for the Pro-Statehood option. Previously associated with the local bourgeoisie, since the late 1960's the pro statehood party has been developing an intraclass movement in which the discourses of equality and social justice have become important bases for political mobilization. "La estadidad es para los pobres" (statehood is for the poor) and "estadidad jíbara" (creole statehood) were important slogans through which the PNP aimed to change the bourgeois image of the former statehood party (the Republican Party) to present statehood as an option for the poor (See Ramos 1987 and Meléndez 1993).

With the concept of "estadidad jíbara" (creole statehood), the PNP was leaving behind the presentation of Puerto Rican culture as part of a "universal culture," to propose to work to maintain enough autonomy to protect its linguistic and cultural identity. Indeed, the PNP held power from 1968-1972, from 1976-80, and most recently in 1992, on the basis of similar claims that it would promote social

renewal and equality and maintain Puerto Rican culture (see discussion below). Conversely, the Pro Independence party, characterized by a strong petty bourgeois component of professionals and intellectuals, saw its support base shrink following its peak in the 1970s because it was unable to present itself in this populist manner (Carrión 1980).

Besides the support of the marginal economic sectors, the PNP began to accrue support from what has been called Puerto Rico's new petty bourgeoisie, associated with government sector employment and non productive forms of labor that had been created by the government to counter growing unemployment (Pantójas 1990, Baver 1993). In Pantójas' words, "the PPD had dug its own grave," because the forces that backed the Pro-Statehood Party were the direct product of the Capital Importation/Export Strategy backed by the Pro-Commonwealth Party (Pantójas 1990:131).

The statehood option also benefited from the strengthening of the Left during the 1970s which provoked a conservative backlash in Puerto Rican politics and weakened the base of support for the PPD. These changes were evident in the 1976s election turnout where the PNP won almost 50,000 votes over the PPD.¹⁴ The PPD party remained undefeated in some municipalities, including the city of Caone, and it returned to power from 1984-1992. But the 1976 elections showed that the PNP Party would continue to be a serious threat to the political dominance of the PPD.

Politically, the PNP and the PPD differ only slightly, as evidenced in the popular saying "Estadidad a corto o a largo plazo" (statehood in the short term or statehood in installments) which is used to describe the political options of the PNP and PPD respectively by conflating their political goals into one basic end: assimilation into the U.S. The economic policies of the two dominant parties are also very similar. Both advocate the continuation of some kind of political relationship with the United States and the PNP's economic policies have been congruent with those of the PPD in their responsiveness to the interests of transnational capital. The only difference between the PPD and the PNP's economic policies that give the PPD an edge are the threat of losing the tax incentives of Section 936, and the fear of the imposition of federal taxes. In turn, these are the prerogatives of the commonwealth status that have been most subject to congressional attack and the continuation of which is most uncertain.

On issues of culture, however, the PPD has remained the undisputable victor over the PNP. The latter has not been able to provide a viable answer to the question of whether it would be possible to conserve a distinct cultural identity under statehood.¹⁵ Their vision of a creole statehood in which Puerto Rico would maintain enough autonomy to protect its linguistic and cultural identity, have been limited by the reality that it is U.S. Congress,

rather than the PNP leadership which would ultimately decide on their feasibility. This issue was cause of public debate on the island during the recent plebiscite (1993); with most of my informants agreeing that it would be the U.S. Congress who would have ultimate say on this issue. In fact, the PPD campaign, as it will be discussed later, combated PNP claims on being able to protect Puerto Rican language and culture by quoting U.S. senators advocating English as the only official language in the United States.

In this context, the cultural wars in the 1980s could be interpreted as a defensive response to the encroachment of the PPD's political dominance at a time when culture remained the indisputable basis for contesting the rise of the PNP. Indeed, the PPD's cultural policies of "much más Puertorriqueñidad" (Much More Puerto Ricanness) were one of the few elements that distinguished the PPD (1984-1992) administration from the previous PNP (1976-1984) administration given that once in power, the PPD had no option but to follow the PNP's economic policies of High-Finance Strategy and the CBI/twin plant proposals that it had previously criticized publicly.¹⁶

The "Other" Cultural Groups in Puerto Rico's Cultural Politics

With the Pro-Commonwealth "nationalistic" cultural policies, (1984-1992) the issue of Puerto Rico's national identity became entrenched as the framework for debating politics. This meant that any effective opposition would also have to be framed in terms of national culture, not in appeals to universal values or reversals of the cultural nationalistic policies. It was therefore through culture that alternative views of national identity began to be voiced in the 1980s, especially by new actors in Puerto Rican cultural politics such as the many independent cultural groups that sprang up at this time.

The growth of new cultural groups and activities on the island has been subject to a variety of interpretations. Politically, they have been interpreted as a sign of the autonomous growth of cultural nationalism in Puerto Rico spurred by the PNP's offensive in the 1980s. This is the view of the PPD speaker of the house, Miguel Hernandez Agosto, one of the authors of the 1980s cultural policies of "Much More Puertorricanness," for whom they are proof of the intensity of Puerto Rico's commitment to its national culture.¹⁷ Others have seen them as a "cultural show" or a sign of the neonationalism conjured up by the Pro-Commonwealth Party to strengthen its popular support base. Meanwhile, Puerto Rico's tourism office helps to sponsor the

most "cultural" of these festivals, which are publicized in Que Pasa, the monthly tourist guide to Puerto Rico. Local politicians also vie to sponsor these events in an attempt to present themselves and their political party as defenders of Puerto Rican culture. For their part, Puerto Rican scholars have romantically interpreted this phenomena as a "culture-oriented social movement" or the product of a larger resistance to colonialism (Quintero-Rivera 1991, L.M.González 1990).

While I agree with Quintero Rivera's interpretation of these festivals as a culture-oriented social movement, my research shows that the growth of cultural activities is not only about resistance to U.S. colonialism. For one, the crisis of economic developmentalism and populism, also associated with the growth of social movements in Latin America (Alvarez and Escobar 1992), was an important factor in the growth of these groups in Puerto Rico. This crisis was reflected not only in the strengthening of the PNP and a complementary rise in activism by the left, but also, as will be evident in a later chapter, in a search for alternatives at the community level.

In addition, the PPD's cultural policies of "Mucha Más Puertorriqueñidad" directly contributed to this cultural revival as financial assignments and grants for cultural activities at the local level during the PPD administration led to the proliferation of cultural groups and activities.

From the 1980s to the 1990s, the money allocated to these activities grew at a considerable rate, and faster than at any other time in Puerto Rican history, rising from \$517,000 in 1980 to a high of \$3,783.900 in 1989. This is a considerable amount when one considers that prior to the 1980s funding for grassroots cultural groups had generally remained constant, and had actually decreased before the 1980s (Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, General Legislative Budgets 1978-1990). This figure does not include the "pork barrel" contributions of local legislators to their constituencies which were also channeled to these celebrations. These activities became an ideal way for politicians to present themselves as culturally aware citizens and "verdaderos Puertorriqueños" (true Puerto Ricans) an identity that was becoming increasingly important in contemporary cultural politics. A PNP legislator, who described these festivals as a good venue for "disassociating culture from politics" (that is, from "PPD control") stated:

For us PNPs it has always been difficult to be publicly associated with Puerto Rican culture, but you can see that we are as dedicated to cultural issues as anyone else. I always try to find a little something [money] for the festivals in my constituency. I even helped create some of these activities in my hometown.

Although the amount of these contributions, (most of them ranging from \$1-2,000) is impossible to track down, the four area representatives I interviewed during my research

informed me that sports and cultural activities were the two main receivers of pork barrel funds.

Another important factor contributing to the growth of cultural groups and activities was the formation of an informal artistic/cultural sector, which included everything from food vendors to folk artists, and from unemployed university graduate to the long-term unemployed and underemployed who began to depend upon cultural activities for their livelihood. Folk artists, in particular, became important organizers of many of these activities as a means of increasing the available market for cultural products.

The rise of the informal sector in Puerto Rico is a well known, but under-documented aspect of Puerto Rican economy. The few works that have touched on the subject have recognized its diversity, its extension to the middle classes (Ortíz 1992, Pantójas 1990), and its economic impact which in 1984 was estimated to be over 2.5 billion dollars (Marchand 1987 quoted in Ortíz 1992). Although more will be said about this issue in later chapters; I want to stress that the festival circuit is a vital aspect of Puerto Rico's informal economy and that, depending on people's placement in it (be it as vendors, contractors, sub-contractors) people can earn more from unregulated activities than from employment in the formal sectors of Puerto Rican economy.¹⁸ In the formal sector of Puerto Rican economy salaries for entry level positions requiring (12-14 years of schooling)

range from \$3.80 to 5.19 an hour, whereas kiosks vendors attending a profitable activity could earn around \$500-1,000¹⁹. In the over twenty activities I visited during the course of my research, it was common to see college educated vendors who claimed to be unable to either earn enough or find jobs in the formal sector. Consider what I was told by José, an informant with an MA degree in criminal justice who worked as a civil servant prior to joining the Festival Circuit:

I left the government because it does not pay. It is not that one gets rich in this business, but you can earn well. What I used to earn in a month now I make in a night. You can lose a lot because this is a risky business but you can do well too.

Thus, the informal economy "is not an euphemism for poverty" but in Puerto Rico is a vital solution to rising unemployment that "develop[s] under the auspices of government tolerance" (Castells and Portes 1989:27). This is because cultural festivals are required to obtain municipal permits from the government, but all my informants working in public cultural events assured me that these permits are secured with great ease and, once obtained, there is little or no evaluation of the event. Divided among three agencies, (Hacienda, ARPE and Negociado de Bebidas Alcohólicas), the evaluation of public events is thwarted by bureaucracy and lack of intra-agency coordination. As a result, cultural festivals have become a preferred vehicle for the informal sector. First, it is

generally easier and cheaper to obtain permits to participate in these activities because they are directly granted by their respective organizers, rather than by the municipal administration. In addition, these festivals are easier to "crash" without a permit because their reputation as cultural activities renders them "safer" and shields them from the policing that characterizes municipally organized activities.

The growth of the new cultural groups was also spurred by the many corporations who began to use promotions and grassroots activities as important marketing tools. These entities provided an additional source of funding for these groups, as will be further discussed in chapter five.

While the new groups and activities are often romanticized as an example of the island's nationalistic fervor, these groups have also been the subject of great controversy among many cultural promoters and leaders of ICP-affiliated cultural centers throughout the island. This is primarily because, as we shall see in later chapters, many of the activities that are presented and publicized as "cultural festivals" often appear to challenge the government's views about Puerto Rican culture. In addition, while most of the new groups are registered with the State Department in order to gain access to government grants and assignments from local politicians, they are free from direct ICP control over the content of their programming.

The potential threat that these groups present to the government's cultural policy was evident during my research when the then director of the ICP questioned the legitimacy of ICP-affiliated cultural centers as the sole representatives of the ICP for the first time ever. Instead, she argued that all local cultural groups should have the same relationship with the ICP as its affiliated cultural centers. The assertions of the new director were controversial on several levels. First, as the first Pro-Independence director of the ICP to be appointed by a Pro-Statehood governor, (she was a renowned member of the Socialist Party and an important leader of the Spanish Only Campaign on the island), she was a controversial figure because she challenged the strict dichotomies of Puerto Rican politics in which Independentistas are commonly perceived to be the only ideological allies of the PPD. She was immediately targeted by the opposition as a traitor for "complying" with the Pro-Statehooders because her appointment had undermined the PPD and Independentistas major contention that "Pro-Statehooders do not care about Puerto Rican culture." In addition, her policies were controversial because they were perceived as a threat to the survival and strengthening of the ICP at the local level. Rather than working with the ICP-affiliated cultural centers, the new director favored establishing Community Councils composed of any cultural group or person

representing a cultural organization in a given community. Because, in her plan, local mayors and municipal cultural workers would be part of these councils, they were soon criticized as an easy prey to local partisan politics.

However, in challenging the new policies the ICP-affiliated cultural centers voiced fears beyond politico-partisan concerns. Organized as the "Unitary Committee for the Defense of Puerto Rican Culture," a name similar to the one under which ICP staffers protested the PNP's cultural policies in the 1980s, ICP-affiliated centers defended their position as the only legitimate representatives of the ICP by adopting the old argument in which the ICP is held to be the only legitimate defender of Puerto Rican culture.

The argument of the ICP-affiliated centers and the ICP staff, most of whom sided with the centers in asking the governor to dismiss the director, concerned the experience and seniority of the affiliated centers and the inability of the independent centers to portray Puerto Rican national culture accurately. According to a spokesperson of the Committee,

How is it possible that we, who direct ourselves according to the ICP guidelines, and who have a clear image of Puerto Rican culture, should not have financial assistance from the ICP?. It is not a matter of thinking small. We want many cultural groups to exist, but they all originate from the example of the affiliated cultural centers.

The top-down nature of the ICP-affiliated centers was emphasized in their claim to entitlements as the sole

representatives of the ICP. A resolution signed by many ICP-affiliated centers requesting the resignation of the director of the ICP states:

The creation of these cultural centers was not due to the exclusive will of a group of people. The centers are part of the ICP program to embrace the entire national territory in its work of conserving and enriching our culture...

Fearing that their "rivals'" lack the knowledge, experience and will to defend Puerto Rican culture, the ICP-affiliated cultural centers also voiced criticisms about the involvement of independent centers with popular culture, music and forms of entertainment that are seen as commercial rather than cultural and thus considered damaging to the nation.

In the end, the director, forced to resign, was substituted with a new director who had previously worked with ICP-affiliated centers and was committed to strengthening the centers' ties to the ICP. However, it is important to note that while there were local protests and condemnations of the director, there was no unified protest against the new policies comparable to that of the 1980s. This is partly because this time criticisms were being levied at the cultural centers, which are lesser known appendices of the institution, rather than directly at the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture itself as they were in 1980. In addition, the director's political identity, as a known Independentista, helped curb criticisms of her reforms

by Independentista sectors.

Nevertheless, the slow mobilization to "defend" culture in 1994 still reveals a certain loss of legitimacy by the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP) in relation to the numerous groups that have emerged since the 1980s. By 1994 there was a certain hesitancy to defend an institution which was never able to attain full legitimacy among the greater public, even though it is still regarded by many Independentistas as the embodiment of nationality and, as I was told by an independentista informant, the "wall of contention" which acts as a buffer against Puerto Rico's colonial reality.

Perhaps the clearest indicator of this disentangling of nationalist ideology from the traditional players was the PNP's acknowledgement and appeal (during their current administration (1992-1996) to tactics similar to those that the PPD had employed and benefitted from for so long. In contrast to the 1980s, the PNP purposely turned away from the concept of "universal" culture toward "a culture with a lastname;" that is a culture identified with Puerto Rican identity. For instance, although the PNP criticized PPD spending on cultural policies during its last term in office, the new PNP administration has avoided making direct changes in PPD cultural policies. Instead, they have sharply reduced government spending initiated during the Pro-Commonwealth government, favoring instead the "basic"

issues of crime prevention, health, drugs and education as governmental priorities. This contrasts sharply with the 1980s, when philosophical claims to a universal, more expansive culture were made as a means of attacking PPD policies.

In addition, during the 1993 plebiscite on the island's status, the PNP advocated not only the permanence of Puerto Rican culture despite statehood but also reaffirming the permanence of linguistic and cultural identity and even Puerto Rico's Olympic identity. During the plebiscite campaign the PNP pledged to struggle to maintain Puerto Rican language and culture within the multiethnic states, making Puerto Rico's U.S. first truly multiethnic "frontier state"²⁰. PNP's plebiscite campaign in 1993, for instance, focused on comparing the Puerto Rican flag and hymn with that of other states along with statistics on population, employment, income and number of senators and representatives. The campaign was aimed at stressing Puerto Rico's unequal position compared to any other state in the U.S. while reminding the public of the "diversity" that is possible within the union. The ads were accompanied with a caption that read "Under Statehood, we would keep our hymn, flag, language and culture, besides obtaining the economic development that would assure us a better quality of life." ("Compara Dos Mundos" El Nuevo Dia, Tuesday, October 19, 1993).

The triumphant option in the plebiscite was the Commonwealth represented by the PPD, who countered PNP's claims with Congressional statements from the English Only Movement (such as that of Republican Toby Roth), stressing that it is the U.S. Congress, rather than the local Pro-Statehood representatives who would ultimately decide on the fate of Puerto Rican culture if the island became a Federated State. Instead, the Commonwealth was publicized as the only status that would guarantee both Puerto Rican culture and American citizenship or, as stated in the campaign slogan, "Lo Mejor de Dos Mundos" (the best of both worlds). Yet, for the first time, almost indistinguishable claims and assertions for the defense of Puerto Rican culture were made by all three political parties representing different status options for the island. Moreover, the results of the 1993 plebiscite, in which the commonwealth option won over statehood by only 2.2 percent of the vote, showed that the dichotomies about who is and who is not a defender of Puerto Rican culture will be increasingly harder to maintain as other actors become involved in Puerto Rico's cultural politics. Before discussing these dynamics, I will turn to a discussion of the dominant definitions of Puerto Rican culture as elaborated by the government cultural policies.

Endnotes

1. The Pro-Independence Party won 126,228 votes in the general elections, placing it second to the Pro-Commonwealth Party, the landslide winner with 431,409 votes. The Pro-Statehood party won only 85,591 votes and the Socialist Party 21,719 (Bayron-Toro 1989).
2. For instance, the immigration policies of 1815 allowed Catholics from any nation friendly with Spain to settle free of taxes in Puerto Rico and increased conservative forces on the island. Political repression by the Spanish colonial government was also evident in the banning of literary works with nationalistic overtones produced at the times, such as the works of Daniel Rivera and Eugenio de Hostos.
3. The Union Party which dominated local politics from 1904 to 1928, and represented the interests of coffee growers and landowners was the haven of Pro-Independentistas at this time. However, the party failed to make independence its priority and by the late 1920's was advocating a U.S. assimilation political formula instead.
4. See Yvonne Acosta (1987, 1992) for a detailed analysis of the use of this law for political persecution in Puerto Rico.
5. For more details see Carrión, Ruiz, & Rodríguez Fraticelli 1993.
6. Munoz's shift away from the independence option was already evident when he split from the Liberal Party over participation in the Congressional Tydings Independence Bill in 1936, in which Puerto Ricans would have had to vote to have immediate independence without any economic restitution from the U.S. government.
7. See Torrecillas 1994 for a study of "melonismo" in contemporary society. "Melonismo" or the phenomena of "Watermelon intelligentsia" is the tendency of (green bannered) Independence Party to line up with the Pro-Commonwealth Party (red bannered); and to adopt Independentista stances, while being politically aligned with the PPD.
8. See "Notes of the Implementation of the Concept of Serenity by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." Luis Marin Archives, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

9. As Campos and Bonilla (1985) found, during the first fifteen postwar years, Puerto Rican migration to the U.S. averaged over 40,000 people annually as Puerto Rico's agricultural sector lost thousands of jobs to the new industrial jobs created by Operation Bootstrap.

10. The Recreation Department organized the first folkloric dance groups which were a parallel development to Puerto Rico's Olympic sports program. These groups accompanied teams as tourist icons for the island. See Rodriguez Castro (1993) and Aguilo (1987) for a discussion of Puerto Rico's cultural policies in the 1940s and 1950s.

11. I owe this image to Antonio Lauria with whom I discussed the early perceptions of the ICP held by Puerto Rican intellectuals.

12. It is common for local organizations, not only cultural centers, to change compositions whenever there is a change of government. Local mayors support these manipulations because they are ways through which changing administrations establish control and clientelistic relationships within their constituencies. What was unique about this episode is that local centers had traditionally been excluded from these manipulations given that they were publicly perceived as PIP strongholds.

13. This law was reversed by the following Pro-Statehood administration which reinstalled English as the second official language.

14. The results of the 1976 election gave the PNP 703,968 votes, the PPD 660,301 votes the PIP 83,037 and the PSP (Socialist Party) 10,728 votes.

15. See Ramos 1987 and Meléndez 1993 for reviews of the changing social and cultural claims in the Pro-Statehood Party's political program.

16. See Pantójas' 1990 for a discussion of the PPD and PNP's economic policies in the 1980's.

17. Personal communication during interview on June 16, 1994.

18. This is particularly the case when considering illicit and criminal activities as part of the informal economy as Ortíz (1993) does for Puerto Rico.

19. Salary averages obtained from Departamento del Trabajo y Recursos Humanos, Division de Estudios y Estadistas, Julio 1993. Average for kiosk vendors obtained from conversations

with different informants during course of research. Of course, income from kiosk vending varied greatly according to what was being sold in the kiosk. Pina coladas, drinks and beer kiosks made far better than food kiosks which required more work and investment.

20. This was the view of PNP activist and former governor of Puerto Rico, Carlos Romero Barcelo.

Chapter II

The Institute of Puerto Rican Culture and the Building Blocks of Nationality

It is not enough to try to get back
to the people in that past out of which
they have already emerged; rather we must
join them in that fluctuating movement which
they are just giving a shape to, and which,
as soon as it has started, will be the signal
for everything to be called in question
(Fanon 1963: 227).

Since its inception the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture has been in charge of shaping and disseminating an official view of what constitutes "Puerto Rican culture." Yet, as we have seen, the ICP has historically served as a site of struggle, and an arena where social inequalities become manifested. Some of these issues were already evident in chapter one. In this chapter I analyze the attempts by the ICP to define and constitute images of Puerto Rican national identity. As discussed in the introduction, this process relies on objectifying and delimiting the national community, however defined, and often entails the development of essentialist views of nationhood expressed through folklore, idyllic pasts and other romanticized images. Yet always, this "folklorized" view of culture is incapable of capturing the emergent and "fluctuating moments" of everyday life. In addition, it will be seen

that the same institutions geared at combating colonialism through the enhancement of Puerto Rican culture were simultaneously involved in the reproduction of the colonial premises on which the nation was grounded.

The Initial Program

To fulfill its mandated mission of "conserving, promoting, and enriching" Puerto Rican culture the ICP was founded as an official "autonomous" corporation to be led by a board of seventeen directors. Of these directors, however, eight would be named by the governor with the senate's consent, assuring the governor in turn direct linkages to the institution. Representatives of the principal intellectual organizations of the times such as the Ateneo Puertorriqueño, strongholds of independentista and Hispanophile intellectuals since the 19th Century and the Puerto Rican Academy of the Spanish language, were also to be represented. This assured the predominance of writers, historians, musicians and intellectuals such as Arturo Morales Carrion, Enrique Laguerre, Salvador Tio in the Board of Directors.

The institution was given thirty mandates including the study and restoration of the historic and cultural patrimony of Puerto Rico, the organization of expositions, conferences, fairs, festivals, as well as the creation of museums and the establishment of contests and scholarships.

The institution was also made responsible for conducting archeological, folkloric and historical research as well as for coordinating all governmental cultural efforts that were related to the Institution's mission in one way or another (Text of Law quoted in Harvey 1988:36). All of these foundational goals were consistent with the search for a patrimony in the past, a common process in the growth of nationalist projects through which the nation is grounded in a continuous past (Philip 1980) and its existence verified through patrimony, heritage and cultural property (Handler 1988).

In the process of authenticating Puerto Rican culture, it was not too long before the ICP became the repository for the dominant ideas of Puerto Rican culture that had been elaborated by Puerto Rican elites in the 19th and early 20th century. Thus, although the stated goals of the ICP were to embrace all aspects of Puerto Rican culture, the ICP's initial program was characterized by a reliance on high culture, further illustrating the Hispanophile and occidentalist tendencies that were dominant among Puerto Rican intellectuals. Thus, among the first initiatives of the ICP were the renovation of Spanish military structures and churches, further illustrating the ICP's emphasis on Spanish culture; the opening of the National Archives and the Publications Division, which focused on Puerto Rico's history under Spanish colonization; and the publication of

poetry and literature elaborating the foundational myths of Puerto Rican culture. Among others, these texts include the poetry of Jose de Diego, Luis Llorens Torres, Lola Rodriguez de Tio, Julia de Burgos, Virgilio Dávila, Juan Antonio Corretjer, and works of divulgation of Puerto Rican literature such as the work of Maria Teresa Babín.

A list of the activities promoted and disseminated by the ICP to the local cultural centers across towns plazas during its first five years shows the dominance of high art cultural expressions at this time (ICP 1960). These activities included The Ballet of San Juan which included mainly Flamenco and Spanish derived dances; readings of Spanish, Hispanoamerican and Puerto Rican literature and poetry, choirs, piano, chamber music, orchestral concerts, and painting exhibitions. Meanwhile, the promotion of activities dealing with folklore, such as contests to encourage the construction of native instruments and folk art fairs, were initiated in the 1960's but were a peripheral rather than a central part of the programming until the 1970s.

In addition, many of the images used throughout the 19th century and early 20th century by Puerto Rico's literary elite as symbols of freedom and resistance such as the indigenous population, the Taino, and the peasant (jíbaro), became important components of the program,¹ as well as new images such as the "harmonious" integration of

the Indian/Spanish/African components in society and the rapidly disappearing agrarian society with its customs and folklore as its main manifestations (Pedreira 1934, Marqués 1977).

These elements had been associated with Puerto Rican culture since the 19th century, but they had never been standardized or publicly recognized as contributors to Puerto Rico's national identity. Instead, as we will see, this consolidation was achieved by and through the ICP. The racial syncretism of the island's population, for instance, had been associated with the "weakening" and the "disorganization" of the Puerto Rican character in the literature. This is most evident in Pedreira's Insularismo, the most influential essay of national interpretation in the 1930's. The superiority of the white Spanish race was another dominant element in literary work (See Juan Flores' (1979) study of Pedreira's work). In the context of the ICP, however, the racial mixing of the population and other ideas that had been associated with Puerto Rico are rid of their overt racist implications when they become folklorized. In the process they are transformed into "residual" elements; that is, elements which were formed in the past but which are actively incorporated into and contribute to the continuation of the dominant culture (Williams 1977). In the ICP, these elements began to be given legitimacy as "foundational elements of Puerto Rican culture," and they

are incorporated, albeit unequally, in the ICP programming disseminated by the government's cultural institutions.

Especially in its initial stages, the ICP also served as a venue for the legitimation of the PPD's political power through the exaltation of important figures associated with the Party's formation. One of the most important programs organized by the ICP during its first five years was a travelling exhibition on the life and works of Luis Muñoz Rivera, the father of the then governor, Luis Muñoz Marín, and leader of the landowner-dominated Liberal Party which was an important precursor to the PPD party. This exhibit was one of the most widely disseminated programs having travelled to almost every town on the island.²

Other ICP-sponsored activities originated at this time, such as the first "National Folk Arts Fair of Barranquitas" founded in 1961 in Muñoz Rivera's homeplace, still had strong political partisan overtones. This fair continues to be an important annual meeting place for the Pro-Commonwealth Party. Speeches are given and important PPD political figures visit Rivera's hometown. In addition, Luis Muñoz Rivera's house and a mausoleum in his honor were among the first twelve structures to undergo construction and restoration during the first years of the ICP.

Lastly, the Promotions Program, through which ICP-affiliated local cultural centers were founded, was also among the first programs initiated by the Institute. The

local centers were established as the "natural and preferred vehicle of the ICP's work" to achieve the highest local dissemination of its programs (ICP n/d).

All these early initiatives were conceived as means of resistance to colonization. The independentista artists and intellectuals who had been active in the ICP's early stages, described this time to me as one of renewal, regeneration and overt resistance to U.S. imperialism. In this spirit, museums were built, local artists were promoted, and thousands of posters depicting "Puerto Ricaness," mostly rural images, were printed and disseminated in ICP-sponsored activities. The Three Kings replaced "Santa Claus" as decoration in the government's Christmas cards, and, as I was told by one of the ICP founders, "people were taught not to laugh or be fearful of their culture. This is what we fought for."

The Turn to Folklore

Whereas folklore was part of the ICP's program since its inception, it is in the 1970s that it developed a central focus on folklore which persists to the present day. Peasant music, folk dances and folk arts, conceived as ethnic markers of Puerto Rican identity, became the backbone of the ICP programming. This change was accompanied by a decrease in high culture such as ballet and classical music concerts, which remained part of the programming in the

1960s but were almost entirely removed from the ICP program within a decade.

With the folklorization of Puerto Rican culture, the building blocks of Puerto Rican culture become articulated in all aspects of the ICP's program from its official seal to the musical instruments and the folk arts that were deemed authentically Puerto Rican. For instance, the national musical ensemble is composed of the güiro, (a gourd instrument) and the maracas, the percussion and the cuatro which are deemed to represent the Taino, African and Spanish heritages respectively. In the folk arts, the Afro-Caribbean vejigante masks, the Spano-Christian wood saints and the indigenous hammocks are continually presented as representatives of the same trilogy. An analysis of the list of programs and artists promoted by the ICP for local diffusion from the 1970s to the 1990s shows that travelling conferences entitled "The Indian in Puerto Rican poetry," "African footsteps in Puerto Rico's oral storytelling," "Hispanic influences in Puerto Rico's oral tradition" or "Indigenous, African and Hispanic Influences in Puerto Rican Music" have been prevalent items in the ICP's programming. The founding of the national folk art dance troupe, Areyto in 1970, which featured Europeanized 'salon' dances along with peasant and Afro-Caribbean rhythms in its repertoire, was an important visual representation of the consolidation of the building blocks of Puerto Rican culture.

This turn to folklore by Puerto Rican intellectuals is not unique to Puerto Rico, but can be seen as part of a worldwide cultural trend during the 1970s towards rediscovering ethnic pasts and folklore. Such initiatives have been documented throughout Europe, and in many postcolonial contexts such as Brittany, Quebec, Hawaii, and throughout the Caribbean (Badone 1992, Friedman 1994). This trend has been interpreted as a response to a rootlessness brought about by global changes in the flow of capital since the economic crisis of the 1970s which led to the decentralization of hegemonic centers (Friedman 1994).

One important factor that my informants working in the ICP associated with the turn to folklore at this time does attest to a sense of rootlessness among Puerto Rican intellectuals which is related to the dislocation caused by the advance of global capital. For instance, the popularization of commercial culture in the 1970s, which in Puerto Rico was manifested in the popularization of the new commercial rhythms of salsa, merengue and rock presented a powerful threat to Puerto Rican artists and performers at this time. Folk music was relegated in the media airwaves to the Christmas season (giving folk music the popular pseudonym of "Christmas music"), and divisions emerged among supporters of the new rhythms of rock and Afro-Caribbean popular music, such as "a go-go" and "conserva" which had been emerging since the 1960's (Santiago 1994). The threat

was explained by an officer of the ICP, as follows:

Then you had a commercial bombardment of merengue and American music bands, whereas before, foreign artists would come to Puerto Rico, but the radio and the television were still Puerto Rican. Our intention was to place the Puerto Rican artists involved in folklore at the same level as any other.

Indeed, while Puerto Rican radio and T.V. had been influenced by North American rhythms from the outset, most of the radio and T.V. programming was dominated by Puerto Rican Afro-Caribbean rhythms and Latin romantic songs up to the 1960s. Variety shows, an important genre in the earliest T.V. and radio shows, were significant catalysts for the popularization of Puerto Rican popular music throughout the island. Specifically, programs such as "Borinquen Canta," "Rambler Rendezvous," and "Conociendo Puerto Rico," featured Puerto Rican popular performers and were important in popularizing and giving mass recognition to many musical genres that would have been bypassed or ignored by the ICP,³ but were later included in its program as folklore. This was the case with bomba, an Afro Caribbean rhythm and plena, a rhythm associated with the Puerto Rican working class at the turn of the century. These rhythms were popularized through the music of Canario and later Cortijo, performers whose music was popular in the radio airwaves since the 1930s. These groups developed independently from the ICP, which was ambivalent about including these rhythms in its programming because,

according to a contemporary performer of bomba I interviewed, they were perceived as "too black and primitive." He recalled the racism that hampered the inclusion of his music in the ICP program as follows:

How would anyone be interested in this music when these rhythms began to be referred to by the experts as the music of black people, made of jumps and retorsions or as erotic and grotesque black music?⁴ What is worse, these studies were done by people that never dared to go and mix with the musicians. To study peasant music there was no problem, they went and talked to them, but to come here to the urban communities to study the authors of plena was difficult for them.

According to this same performer plena and bomba groups were recruited by the ICP whenever it needed to show something "African." He explained that it was not until the mid-1970s that his group was approached by the ICP.

They (the ICP) called us and told us that we should be affiliated, and since we were already famous, it was very easy to become affiliated with the ICP. No audition or anything. They knew us from T.V.

Besides the emergence of new commercial rhythms, another factor which my informants associated with the local turn to folklore was the strengthening of the Puerto Rican Left in the 1970s. This was manifested in the growth of support for the Pro-Independence Party in the 1976 elections and in the radicalization of the Pro-Independence Party and the Socialist Party which adopted socialist and Marxist Leninist platforms respectively in the early 1970s. This strengthening of the Left was also manifested in the growing

number of labor strikes (there was an average of 86 strikes per year in the 1970s (García & Quintero Rivera 1986) and in the rise of environmental and feminist movements, which also developed cultural initiatives as a way of expressing their demands for social change.

The University of Puerto Rico was an important site of political action. There were numerous student revolts, such as the 1972 protest against compulsory military service and other cultural and political initiatives, organized by the FUPI (the Federation of Pro-Independence University Students). Grassroots artesanal groups, cultural groups and folk music groups influenced by the Cuban-derived rhythms of Nueva Trova and "countersong"⁵ in Latin America became widespread and important mediums of the Puerto Rican Left at this time. Nueva Trova, a musical "hybrid" that combines modern instruments with patriotic and oppositional lyrics drawn from Puerto Rican and Hispano-American literature, was extremely important in popularizing Puerto Rican folklore. Its most important local exponent, "Haciendo Punto en Otro Son," was the first group to gain broad exposure for folk music on radio airwaves dominated by the new commercial rhythms of the 1970s.

Even commercial sponsors, as will be further described in chapter five, turned to culture in the 1970s in their advertising campaigns, taking advantage of the popularization of folklore and nationalist imagery in the

popular culture. As noted by Lauria (1978) folkloric and rural images, as well as dominant values associated with Puerto Rican culture, such as strong kinship bonds, hospitality, and respect for elders and superiors became popular advertising themes at this time, contributing to the dominant culturalist definition of Puerto Rican national identity.

The development of these alternative forms of expression contributed to the ICP's emphasis on folklore in the 1970s, which can be partly seen as a response to changes in Puerto Rican society rather than as an innovative measure. Although folklore had been part of the ICP program since its foundation, it was broadly promoted only after the popularization of folklore in the media and among the Puerto Rican Left. In this sense, the ICP also contributed to the containment of oppositional genres produced by the Left. In ICP hands, many of the rhythms that were originally associated with the opposition or resistance became "peasantized." The process is exemplified by the case of Nueva Trova, which originally was directly oppositional and was even accused of being subversive or "música de comunista." As a contemporary performer of Nueva Trova recalled:

The Nueva Trova is supposed to be music to open one's social and political conscience. Here the concept was transformed. They thought that Nueva Trova was about mixing old and new instruments and singing to the "jibarita," or the "bohio" [shack]. Those groups that became part of the ICP and were

called Nueva Trova were not really Nueva Trova because they did not include a message of opposition. We, however, received a lot of resistance from the ICP.

In its present manifestation, Nueva Trova has become "peasantized" and "folklorized" and, once again, peasant themes, the mountains, land and nature have become the major themes.

The Building Blocks and The Blending Myth in Puerto Rico

The ICP is a major disseminator of the racial building blocks of Puerto Rican culture and the blending myth in Puerto Rico. Yet, as in other colonial and post colonial contexts the idea of "meztlizaje" and racial syncretism have amounted to an "all inclusive ideology of exclusion" that hides the unequal valorization of its racial components under the trope of racial mixture (Stutzman 1981). For the case of Ecuador, Stutzman notes that this myth has served to hide the ideology of 'blanquamiento' and modernization, by equating national unity to racial miscenagation while associating spiritual and moral characteristics to the different components. Thus, in the meztizaje myth the Indian is equated with backwardness and the contribution of the African is erased to its most limited components. A look at how this myth is portrayed by the ICP also exposes it as a fallacy and reveals its role in reproducing ideas of inequality.

In the ICP program, Spanish culture is associated with language and religiosity. The ICP's seal, for instance, portrays the Spaniards' role through the image of a conquistador holding a book to signify literacy, Christianity, and knowledge. The Taino is shown with a piece of pottery and the African with a "machete," conveying a frozen image of the work relations of the colonial period (Buitrago 1982). The Spanish heritage is emphasized as the most distinctive element of Puerto Rican culture, and Spanish craftsmanship in the form of wooden saints and mundillo (Spanish lace) are highly valued as is the most prestigious Spanish derived folk music genre, the peasant Trova.

The extinct Taino is one of the most important figures in the trilogy due to its symbolic malleability. The Taino adds temporal depth to the national myth by representing the nation's roots in the past while supplying a continuity with the present which is essential for establishing the legitimacy of a nationalist ideology (Anderson 1983). As Ronald Stutzman (1981) discusses for Ecuador, it is the indigenous component of the meztizaje myth that provides the authentic link to the territory around which the mestizo nation is established. The Taino is promoted as an important figure by the ICP through its sponsorship of the National Indigenous Festival since 1969, the Indian Museum and various archaeological excavations throughout the

island. In turn, the Taino is the building block that is most popularly evoked by artists who adorn with Taino pictographs the folk crafts, t-shirts and paraphernalia sold at the numerous cultural festivals celebrated throughout the island. As an interim tradition that differs from the dominant Spanish or enslaved African, the Taino constitutes an evocative symbol of a legendary past that is mystified and permeated with nationalist overtones.

The African heritage is acknowledged in the music and dance genres of bomba and plena, and in the carnival masks that are characteristic of Loiza and Ponce, two coastal regions of the island. The folklore of these two regions serves to embody what is Afro-Caribbean for the rest of the island, rather than the Afro-Caribbean aspects of popular culture and everyday life. Bomba and Plena are always included in cultural activities, (although to a lesser extent than peasant music groups) but the African contribution to other aspects of Puerto Rican culture, which includes food, folk and contemporary music, and even the racial make-up of the Puerto Rican, is Tainoized. Traits that are not identifiably Spanish are attributed to the Taino, rather than the African, with the result that everything and everyone can trace a mythical descent to the Taino. One noted example is provided by the "Festival of the Buren" in Loiza, one of the towns that is regarded as a stronghold of Puerto Rico's Afro-Caribbean heritage. This

festival, organized by an independent group, reproduces this dominant framework by attributing the "buren" (iron cooking board) and the recipes similar to those found throughout the Caribbean, made of coconut milk, cassava and yucca to the Taino, thereby diminishing any African contribution.

Similarly, having an Indian racial background is more easily acknowledged than having an African one, which would place one at the bottom of the island's racial hierarchies. In this sense the Taino image serves to conceal the socio-racial tensions of contemporary Puerto Rican society. For, while Spanish, African and Taino elements are all overtly proclaimed as constituent elements of Puerto Rican culture, their contribution is not given equal acknowledgement.

Instead, there is an overt bias in favor of the Spanish tradition as the most salient and significant influence on Puerto Rican culture, followed by the Taino as the second most important component. The African heritage, also known as "the third root" (La tercera raíz) is seen as the last to arrive, and having the least to contribute. This hierarchy of the legacies which constitute Puerto Rican culture was openly acknowledged by one of the ICP's founders and a long-standing director of the institution (1956-1970). Referring to the values, virtues and traditions that make up Puerto Rican culture he stated:

In this constellation of values that constitute Puerto Rican culture, there is a hierarchy determined by their greater or lesser excellence. Those of less rank should not supplant those in

the higher categories, but nor should (the lesser ranking ones) be looked down on or neglected (Alegría 1973:12).

The ICP director does not specify which values are of higher rank, but it is easily enough discerned from the emphasis that the different "building blocks" are given in ICP programming, such as its historic monument program and its museum program, which have traditionally focused on rescuing and restoring Spanish military structures and churches, and Taino ceremonial plazas.

The over-evaluation of Spanish culture is further evident in the interpretation of the origins of Puerto Rico's peasant culture, which is regarded as another foundational element of Puerto Rican culture. The rural peasant (jíbaro) provides a clear example of the fallacy of the racial trilogy. The jíbaro is usually portrayed as a white male, whose main influence comes from his Spanish predecessors, but who has also been influenced by the Indian heritage, (Alonso, Laguerre and Melon 1968). An African contribution to the jíbaro is never acknowledged or emphasized, neither is a female gender identity. Moreover, while both jíbaro and jíbara can be used to denote ignorance, parochialism, and uncouth manners, the female term has more pejorative implications as was evident in the 1980 legislative debate described in the previous chapter. Specifically, more than the male term, jíbara denotes uncouth presence and manners which run against the standards

of female respectability often demanded by nationalist ideologies. Namely, while women are often constructed as the repositories of traditionality, and thus subordinate to the male national brotherhood, they are also required to maintain standards of decorum and respectability as mothers and dutiful citizens of the nation (Mosse 1985, Parker et al.1992).⁶

The jíbaro (white and male) constitutes the most important building block of nationality in Puerto Rico. It is this "whitened" legacy that provides the model for the traditional folk costume, as well as the core repertoire of Puerto Rico's many folk dance groups. It is peasant music, mostly Spanish-derived aguinaldos and seis, rather than Afro-Caribbean rhythms, that are deemed the purest representatives of Puerto Rico's peasant culture. The fact that the Trova is not unique to Puerto Rico but is also found in other Latin American countries also strengthens its appeal because it helps link Puerto Rican culture to a greater Latin American and Spanish tradition to which performers of this genre often point proudly.

The peasant culture, the rural landscape, nature, agriculture, and the soil are recurrent images that are idyllically portrayed by folk singers affiliated with the ICP. Many have peasant-influenced names such as "Song of the Mountain" or "Peasant Heritage", or "Essence of the Mountain".

This use of the peasant as a symbol to denote freedom, liberty and rebellion, in contrast to what is modern, western, urban and foreign, is a recurrent metaphor in nationalist ideologies that attempt to portray continuity with an agrarian past (Ferguson 1992, Williams 1973). In the case of Puerto Rico, the association of the peasant and rural life with the nation has been traced to a legacy of Maroon communities in the Caribbean, where the countryside provided a space for alternative development within the constraints of colonialism (Quintero-Rivera 1988). As will also be seen, the romanticization of the peasant in Puerto Rico also feeds on the association of the interior mountainous areas with "whiteness" in contrast to the "blackness" of the slave-based sugar plantations on the coast and the racial intermingling in urban areas.

In short, the ICP's emphasis on the contributions of each of the three building blocks of Puerto Rican culture has helped provide an ideological justification for the "superior" group's hegemony based on the "greater" contribution it made to the nation in contrast to the "insignificant" contribution made by "inferior" groups (Williams 1991). Analyzing the relationship between race/class and nation in Guyana, Williams (1991) found that the claims of different ethnic groups to rights and civil entitlements were contested in terms of the group's relative contribution to the nation. According to her, the dominant

homogenization thesis also justified economic and political dominance using an ideological rationale to claim a greater contribution to the nation. The dominant explanation of Puerto Rican culture which implies that the contribution of African culture to Puerto Rican society has been less than that of other groups coincides with a persistent racism and the continuous idealization of the Spanish heritage on the island.

Instead of either transplanted population (the subordinate African or the dominant Spanish), the Taino and a romanticized peasantry are offered as symbols of Puerto Ricanness that attempt to mediate the bipolar social relations existing on the island and disseminate ideas of Puerto Rican society as undifferentiated.

The Building Blocks at Play: The Case of Folk Music in the Reproduction of Cultural Hierarchies

I have argued in this chapter that the constituent elements of the ICP program have contributed to the over-estimation of some and the exclusion of other aspects of Puerto Rican culture. In this section I highlight this strategy through the evaluation process of the ICP in which the authenticity of artists, artisans, and lecturers is determined prior to their inclusion in the ICP program.

The evaluation process provides an example of the limits imposed by the ICP on any innovation in cultural

products, ideas and concepts that are regarded as national symbols. Evaluations have been part of the ICP program since its outset. Some of the first musical groups added to the program were even announced in the national newspapers, further illustrating the status that surrounds the affiliation of artists to the ICP, especially in its origins (see for example El Mundo November 10, 1958). However, since the 1970s and with the growing number of folk artists, evaluations became increasingly standardized. Through these evaluations, those deemed worthy of representing Puerto Rican culture are incorporated into the ICP as affiliated artists, provided with prestige and legitimacy as folk performers as well as inclusion in a list from which groups, institutions, and businesses draw "authentic" representatives of Puerto Rican music.

To learn about the evaluation process and how "authenticity" is safeguarded by the ICP I interviewed ten groups who had passed these evaluations and are active in the festival circuit sponsored by the ICP. These included three groups of folk peasant music, two Nueva Trova groups, three bomba and plena groups, one bomba dance group and one "musica del ayer" group (popular music of the 1940-50's). The performers ranged widely in their background, but many were college educated civil servants and professionals who have a full-time or part-time job and want to increase their earnings through a sideline activity. None of the groups was

led by a woman, although there were some woman vocalists and dancers in the groups. They represent the higher echelons of folk art, and, in sharp contrast with other artists, artisans or vendors, that I will highlight later, none relies solely on music for a livelihood.

The screening evaluations were regarded with ambivalence by those I interviewed. Since they had all passed them, they considered the evaluations a good method for distinguishing their own group from others who "do not know about Puerto Rican culture and are not authentic representatives of it." However, most admitted having engaged in some kind of manipulation of the ICP guidelines in order to pass the evaluation, thus admitting to their own lack of authenticity, or to the ICP's for that matter.

According to the ICP, the standards for measuring authenticity in folk music include following the metric structure of the music, and the inclusion of at least the most typical instruments in the group, according to the genre. The themes of the songs, either patriotic, or peasant-like themes about the mountain, nature, or farming, as well as the presentation of the musicians either in folk attire or in clean and attractive standard clothes are also important criteria for the ICP evaluations.

It soon became evident that the "purity" that they represent as "authentic" artists is more illusory than real and that most artists were constantly pushing the limits of

formal definitions to make their productions more appealing to the public. In this way, the musicians I talked to were also engaged in stretching the official definition of culturally relevant music. One example of this is the tendency among musicians to use the canon to question the canon itself. The racial trilogy, for example, was often used by artists to legitimize the inclusion of percussion instruments like the bomba and the conga in typical peasant music groups, which traditionally include only the cuatro guitar and the guiro, instruments which, according to ICP policy, represent only the Indian and the Spanish and leave the African out.

In my shows, I always play two or three pieces with the three typical instruments so that no one tells me that I do not play typical music, but the public watching you wants more, so I add the percussion.

Appealing to the trilogy is always a good tactic, as this performer discovered:

We always wanted to belong to the ICP but we were never able to until we entered a contest of 'Christmas music', and we competed with a song I wrote entitled "The Three Kings are My Three Races" which went: "Melchor was the African, the Taino was Gaspar, The Spanish, Baltasar and the child was 'Borincano' as if Jesus would have been born in Puerto Rico. We won the first national prize... The song was a typical song (folk song), not the Nueva Trova that we now play. That was a trick I used to be able to enter and after that we went back to our old music.

The issue of instrumentation was a difficult one, and the purist view of the ICP clashes constantly with those of many groups who increasingly add all types of modern and foreign

instruments. Yet, to manage these restrictions, groups who have non-Puerto Rican instruments do not include them when they are being evaluated, they add them later to their performances.

They criticized me for having an instrument of Cuban origin, a 'tresista' in the group. Yet this instrument was once popular here and even substituted for the 'cuatro' at a given time. Nobody would have criticized me if I had added an accordion or a 'sinfonia' to the plena, but the 'treses' are manufactured here, and the accordions are imported from Germany.....That is a case of purism that I do not swallow.

The mixing of elements from other genres, or the addition of instruments and other tactics commonly used to attract the youth and the general public, have brought about great changes in what is officially deemed to be Puerto Rican music. In fact, contemporary folk music is increasingly influenced by the very commercial rhythms the ICP so adamantly wants to exclude.⁸ Even Edwin Colón Zayas, a renowned ICP-affiliated folk artist who has travelled as far as Japan to represent Puerto Rican music and is considered by many to be among the purest performers of folk music, added percussion instruments (such as the conga and the bongo) as well as a flute to his group. He had this to say about his music:

There are some people who criticize my use of the flute but I tell them that I am not losing the folkloric element, on the contrary, I am going to show the public that with another instrumentation I can also make typical music, and that I can even "criollizar" [creolize] any international number. They keep hiring me so I know that people are o.k.

with my views.

Besides the added instrumentation, many musicians have also introduced innovations into the lyrics of their songs, with the development of environmental themes and lyrics in contemporary folk music constituting one of the most recent trends. Yet, while musicians continually add innovations, the identification of the music as a folk genre and thus as a marker of identity places limits to these innovations which never go as far as challenging their identification as folk artists or their music as folklore. Thus, some standards represent the quintessential limits on authenticity, and are carefully guarded by the ICP and those who aim for the status of "authentic" performers because they provide the basis on which the authenticity of folk musicians in the ICP sponsored activities depend. The permanence of folk elements despite the state's promotion of folk arts as national icons and objects for tourist consumption has been documented by Garcia Canclini (1993) for Mexico who regards it as the basis of authenticity on which the profitability of the genre is predicated. Similarly, in Puerto Rico the metric system, the inclusion of at least the most representative instruments and most importantly, the presentation of the group as cultural and educational, not purely for entertainment are carefully guarded by the musicians.

Artists described themselves as "luchadores" (fighters

for the nation), or "trabajadores de la cultura" (workers for culture) or as educators; never as just entertainers. In this way they comply with the government cultural policy which prioritizes a didactic purpose for such groups, as well as the overall ICP view of folklore as an intrinsic aspect of cultural resistance. The director of another musical group affiliated to the ICP explained:

All folkloric groups should seek to reaffirm some roots, they are in charge of representing Puerto Rico and educating Puerto Ricans about our cultural heritage. We are in folklore because of our love for Puerto Rico, but there are other groups that only have commercial purposes and are doing this because it is fashionable or because they want to get 'guisos' [literally 'stew' and slang for getting contracts in the festivals].

As the above musician, many ICP-affiliated artists often emphasized the distinction between "education" and "entertainment." They also judged people's attitude toward folklore in such a way that only patriotic considerations for playing folkloric music were rendered as 'authentic' whereas economic motivations would disqualify musicians from claiming authenticity. In this way, education and patriotism were used as synonyms of "authenticity" whereas playing for entertainment or economic purposes were rendered as unpatriotic and illegitimate. These issues will be more evident in later chapters. What I want to emphasize here is how folklore, is always placed in a high cultural category by the ICP standards compared with popular music which is seen as low and unauthentic, mostly because it is

commercialized. As a result, the ICP refuses to host any group or performer of popular music, which is also commonly heard in the mass media on the grounds that its job is to "safeguard" our culture not promote what is already being aired through other media.

Thus, despite some innovations, groups continue to recycle the peasant-centered material that forms the core of the ICP's programming. Moreover, many innovations on rhythms that are deemed to represent Puerto Rican culture are nonetheless subject to the ICP's constraints, which tend to "peasantize" new forms and genres, as is the case of Nueva Trova. Bomba and plena groups, for instance, complain that they are given fewer referrals and invitations for activities than peasant folk groups and that these groups are encroaching on their rhythms, playing a "whitened" version of plena with string and wind rather than percussion instruments.

There is not a lot of respect for bomba y plena. There are some groups that the ICP likes more but you have to ask yourself whether they sound 'black' or 'white'. Do they sound like 'Nueva Trova' or do they sound European?

As a result, although there has been some diversification in the categories of folk art employed by the ICP since its inception, the constituent elements of the overall program have remained unchanged. The ICP's program still draws on the peasant past and the racial trilogy, and innovations to the program are judged irrelevant or

authentic according to how closely they accord with these themes.

These ideological ceilings reinforce the folkloric emphasis of the ICP's cultural policy, and the ICP's insistence on purity and authenticity translates into the exclusion and devaluation of other aspects of Puerto Rican culture. Thus, true innovation remains a difficult feat within the context of these parameters. The conceptualization of Puerto Rican culture through the building blocks of Puerto Rican nationality not only dismisses aspects of popular culture which are seen as polluting and damaging to the purity of folklore, but also serves to encourage the unequal valorization of the "building blocks" themselves, based upon racist and classist assumptions.

Under these conditions innovation in the definition of Puerto Ricanness in contemporary society is taking place in the context of popular life. This is a social space which the government cultural policy is unable to control, transform or incorporate into dominant definitions of nationhood, because to do so directly would undermine its claim to authenticity. This is primarily because, as I will show in later chapters, popular life is perceived as commercial and "chabacano" (cheap and inferior), and, therefore, as polluting the national culture.

The unequal valorization of Puerto Rican culture by the

cultural policy is not only evident in the expressive forms deemed representative of Puerto Rican culture. It is also reproduced in the institutional organization of the ICP and its affiliated centers.

The ICP and Its Cultural Centers

As early as 1957, local cultural centers were founded to replicate the ICP's mission at the local level. For the most part, they were top-down creations established by the central office in San Juan. The director of the ICP was an important catalyst in their creation and seasonally visited many towns throughout the island to explain his vision of the centers' role. The centers were conceived as autonomous entities which would serve as the legitimate representatives of the ICP, and as the "preferred and natural organ" for carrying out its mission at the local level. As only one cultural center was founded and affiliated to the ICP in each municipality, the centers soon became miniature versions of the ICP, serving both as direct channels for financial resources, technical assistance and programming from the ICP, and as channels for assisting other groups in their respective locations.

The cultural centers soon became an important component of the ICP program. The ICP has used them to counter attacks about its political and elitist underpinnings, presenting the local cultural centers as examples of its

involvement with local communities. As described by a former director of the ICP:

The ICP was never an elitist institution, because the "espina dorsal" (backbone) of the institution was composed by its cultural centers.., they were its institutional heart because they were the ones who made the mission of the ICP transcend from the center to the people.

The cultural center's "popular" nature was also documented by the ICP staff through their local community composition, made up of "gente de pueblo," rather than San Juan intellectuals. Yet, as "mini ICPs," the cultural centers have reproduced, from their inception, the general characteristics of the ICP in San Juan, and this has greatly undermined their democratic pretenses. For example, a survey among ten ICP-affiliated centers disclosed that their membership is mostly composed of teachers, civil servants, and local civic/religious/political leaders according to the historical, political and economic characteristics of the area. This membership was partly the result of the urban character of the centers which are always located in the urban heart of their respective communities and by the class, educational, and political background of the "promotores culturales" (cultural developers), the ICP staff in charge of recruiting members and supervising their work. The elitist tendencies of the centers were most evident in the largest cities, where they were dominated by doctors, and other professionals and small businessmen further accentuating the selective reputation of the centers.

Centers which were awarded physical facilities by the ICP or their municipalities were particularly prone to attracting elites because these facilities endowed the center with more visible signs of prestige. A former member of one of the most important cultural centers island-wide who is now a regional promoter, provides a good example of the influential character of the cultural centers, especially in their origins:

Around that time, the Cultural Center and the Department of Education were the same thing. The membership was drawn mostly from the teachers and the director was the school superintendent. Then every teacher had to help out in the cultural centers' annual festival. Even if they did not want to, they had to provide time from their classes for everything related to the festival... working in the festival became a moral obligation.

Politically, the cultural centers served as a refuge for independentistas who were persecuted in the workplace and their communities but found in the cultural centers a venue to air their political views through cultural work. In turn, the bringing together of the middle classes, educated professionals and independentistas in the centers also contributed to the common perception that the cultural centers were dominated by intellectuals. This perception has been strengthened by the preponderance of independentistas among university educated professionals and intellectuals (Castro 1980).

There is also a widespread feeling that one needs to be educated to be part of the leadership of a cultural center.

This has turned membership into a means of attaining status, because those active at the centers are looked up to as "culturally aware citizens." The centers often serve as springboards for political advancement to the extent that, in some towns, the centers are even directed by the local mayor, and many political leaders have been directors of their respective cultural centers. Youth has traditionally been excluded from the cultural centers, both by the traditional programming, which appeals mostly to the older sectors of society, and by a regulation which prevents persons younger than 18 from voting in the ICP elections.

The relationship between the affiliated cultural centers and the ICP office in San Juan has always been hierarchical. Regional cultural promoters (ranging from 5-8 depending on how the region is organized) are named by the ICP office to orient and supervise the work of the centers, and mediate all communications between the two entities. This organizational structure was strengthened in the 1970s when most of the promoters now affiliated with the program were first hired.

During the course of my research I interviewed eleven individuals who were promoters in the past or were currently serving as such within the ICP structure. Of these, nine were male and most were independentista artists, teachers, community workers or political activists. They were selected from within the ICP structure itself, although some came in

as partisan-political appointments or were drawn from the cultural elite of their respective areas in order to tap the region's social and political resources. They all described their recruitment process as informal. A cultural promoter described his recruitment of another promoter as follows:

"He was kicked out of his job after the teachers strike, and I knew him and wanted to help him... so I explained to him what we were about, that we go against the current, about our commitment..." Other promoters, especially those recently hired, are screened in interviews where their knowledge of Puerto Rican folklore, music and so forth is examined by a committee. Overall, the position of cultural promoter is one of considerable prestige, as are many positions in the ICP regardless of the tasks involved. As I was told by a recently recruited promoter:

For me the ICP was the greatest there was in terms of culture. Anything that had the seal of the ICP was like a Mecca for the Muslims or the church for the Christians. That is where the greatest thing is. That is where God is, what I adore, what I do not know, and if I get there, then that means that I am great myself because I arrive at the end. And I saw the ICP as that place, because it is a place of intellectuals, because here they do not award an Academic degree on folklore or culture, but there is the ICP which serves as the equivalent.

This aura of prestige, along with its political image (as stronghold of the PPD and the PIP), and the purist conception of culture are intrinsically bound up with each other and mutually reinforce the ICP-affiliated

institutions' distance from the general public.

Women, who were not appointed as cultural promoters until recent years, have not attained the salience or the continuity of employment of male promoters, some of whom have remained in their posts for over twenty years. Continuity is highly important in the establishment of the promoters' authority in their respective regions and the development of personal relations with local directors who have also traditionally been male members of the local elite or political activists. In 1994, the official list of the eighty-one ICP-affiliated cultural centers includes only twenty-eight centers led by women compared with fifty three centers led by men.

While the gender imbalance among the centers' leadership was commonly acknowledged by the different groups I interviewed, their racial homogeneity was not. However, most of the leaders of these groups are not only from the educated middle sectors of society but also from the whiter segments of their respective communities. Approaching this issue was a complicated task. Despite the importance of race as a variable for the attainment of status, race and racism are not generalized discursive categories on the island. Instead, the ideas of racial syncretism promoted by Puerto Rico's nationalist ideology have historically circumvented discussions about race, and most of the people interviewed within the context of the ICP-groups denied that

there is such a thing as racism on the island. Moreover, race has served as an important element for the construction of the "moral" Puerto Rican in contrast with the "immoral" American in the nationalist ideology, in which only Americans are branded as racists. A well known contemporary advocate of this view is the independentista sports spokesperson, Fufi Santori. During the annual nationalist celebration of the anti-Spanish colonial uprising ("Grito de Lares") in 1993 he was loudly cheered as he contrasted the United States, a sorrowful and immoral country, with the honesty, kindness and beauty of the island: "We have been around for longer, therefore we have more culture.... All Puerto Ricans are good and kind.... it is just that there are some confused ones."

Meanwhile, racial conflict and difference are ignored, believed to hinder political unity, and to perpetuate American colonialism. As one contemporary scholar stated:

Are we going to substitute the integrationist myths for the dividing counter-myths of racial tension? We would then be like the Americans with their ethnic and racial divisions. It would mean adopting a view that ultimately serves assimilation (Carrión 1993:11).

Puerto Rico's racial classification system, (characterized by a racial continuum rather than the "bipolar" racial categories of the U.S.) does indeed differ from the American system. This is not because it lacks racism but because in Puerto Rico racism is buffered by a dominant ideology that

denies its existence in Puerto Rican society.

When the issue of race is brought up, it is either dismissed as the imposition of American racial categories and racial problems on the island, or it is regarded as entirely irrelevant to Puerto Rico's situation. This latter attitude was the most commonly expressed. People in the cultural centers would acknowledge, to differing degrees, the gender gap or the similarity in the political or class background of these groups, without touching race as another element affecting their homogeneity. Yet on the outside, the cultural centers were often described as being composed of "blanquitos" (little whites, a colloquialism for white and rich), which attests to the fusion of race and class in the island. These dynamics will be most evident in a later section in which I discuss the perceptions of these cultural centers held by independent groups in the southeastern town of Caone.

For their part, cultural promoters refused to acknowledge any racial homogeneity among the cultural centers because this would challenge the democratic pretenses of these institutions. In a patronizing tone that denoted his higher status position vis-a-vis these local groups, one cultural promoter voiced this view when he maintained that these groups are made up of "gente de pueblo" (the common people), which was a common response to any questions about issues of race or class in the cultural

centers. This attitude is encouraged by the cultural promoters, as was evident in the advice I heard one give to a cultural center under his supervision while distributing a survey by an American funding agency which included questions about the racial composition of these groups. After looking briefly through the group's membership, the promoter instructed the people to ignore that question because it "did not apply to our case, or to anyone here." This was the only question that was edited out by the promoter.

Another promoter gave evidence of the racial doublespeak on the island. While dismissing race as an important category on the island, he admitted to the uncertainty that surrounds the only person that his family acknowledges as being black.

I hate those questionnaires handed out by the federal government that inquire about race. I always tell my centers to answer like I do, to mark that we are all a 'minority' or Puerto Rican. Look, I am one of the darkest people in this town, the problem is that here no one speaks of race, we are all of the same three races, I now that I have an Indian ancestor and a black one, I should have somewhere too, but I do not know. There is only one photograph of my grandfather but it is a faded black and white picture, and he looks white and he no longer has any hair, so no one can tell.

"Cultural Development" in the Reproduction of Inequality

Different promoters have different styles of interacting with the cultural centers. However, certain commonalities surfaced during my conversations and

interviews with cultural promoters and with members of the ICP staff that work in the central office for the Program of Cultural Centers in San Juan. Among the most salient commonalities were the use of paternalistic and developmental metaphors to refer to the cultural centers and the ICP's supervisory role, and a defensive preoccupation with the purity of culture.

I often heard the centers' membership described using such paternalistic metaphors as "the sons of the instituto," or "children who need to be raised and molded." Their dependency on the ICP for activities, resources and guidance was seen as the behavior of "spoiled little children who are used to getting everything and now cannot do anything for themselves." These children, I was told, needed to be constantly "taught and guided" by the ICP. One promoter reiterated this view as follows:

The cultural centers are "criaturas" (offspring) of the ICP who need to be constantly guided and educated. In the past we stimulated them by giving them half of the activities, so that they would feel as if they were part of the program, but now with shrinking budgets it has become more difficult to encourage them and some of them are still in their infancy.

For their part, the "children" have a variety of different relationships with the promoters. Those that have been able to acquire more financial help from the ICP tend to follow the promoters' advice, or, as I was told by the president of one cultural center, "all you have to do is let

yourself be guided by him. We never say no to any of the activities he wants to bring to this center." Often, however, the "children" are "mischievous" and promoters often complained of their being lazy, stale, and having authoritarian and inactive leaders. These characteristics were often noted by many promoters who felt unable to change the situation because, after all, the cultural centers are voluntary "autonomous" entities, led by unpaid volunteers who cannot be "forced to work." Thus a stalemate results in which trying to make them work was described by one ICP staff as "giving breath to a dead person."

The paternalism and excessive dependence on the ICP fostered by the ICP itself is manifest in the overreliance of local centers on the ICP for most of their activities, funding and technical support. There is a sense of entitlement among the centers, who see themselves as the legitimate representatives of the ICP and as workers for the ICP, rather than as self-generated entities. Consequently, they regard themselves as being entitled to funds and support from the central institution in return for their work and time commitment. Thus, if their work is not being done, it is either because they are not given funding or the contacts to organize the activity. As I was told:

They told me that this year they have no funding for the fair, but this is their [emphasis mine] fair and it is their responsibility to give us the money.

This same local organizer, whose role appeared to be more of a "mediator" also complained that he had not yet been given the names of the folk artists that will be participating in the fair, which were also selected by the San Juan office. However, funds and resources are hard to get from San Juan, and the centers fail to engage in fundraising activities of their own because, as I was often told "we are not allowed or permitted to do fundraising." As a result, a sense of helplessness characterizes the leaders of cultural centers and the promoters who hopelessly try to motivate them to engage in a project that they fail to embrace as fully theirs. This helplessness is augmented by changes in the political administration at the national level which continuously affect the amount of funding for the cultural centers.

Another common concern among the cultural promoters was the purity of Puerto Rican culture. This was defined according to the adherence to or departure from the "building blocks," described in the previous section. Thus, popular music, specially the inclusion of rhythms considered "non-Puerto Rican" by ICP standards, like merengue, or even salsa; and popular entertainments like gambling and competitions were discouraged and not recommended for funding by the promoters.

While most ICP-affiliated cultural centers draw primarily from the ICP's list of affiliated artists and

performers, especially because these latter are half paid by the ICP, the promoters have had a more difficult time trying to cope with independent cultural groups throughout the island. These independent centers often make requests for subsidized ICP affiliated artists, but are often rejected because of the promoter's opposition to mixing ICP groups with "chabacano" music (popular music), and the independent group's opposition to change their programs to fit ICP standards. As I was told by another ICP promoter:

I told these groups that I would help them but that they have to let me be part of their planning meetings. In this way I can monitor them and make sure they do a good job. But they don't want me to do this. They want to do things by themselves and they just see the ICP as a barrel of money, not as a place from which they can get technical help about how to conduct their activity.

Often, requests from independent cultural centers, whose goals were not considered as "cultural" were sidetracked by the promoter through referrals to their local ICP affiliated center in their community which lacked the funds to help the group. However, there is also a trend among promoters toward incorporating the most active independent groups, especially those whose activities and programs are more compatible with the ICP's cultural guidelines. For instance, I found cases where the cultural promoter had been forming coalitions with independent groups as a means of restoring the ICP presence in communities where the ICP-affiliated center had been inactive or inaccessible to the ICP. This was the case with a cultural group led by

environmental activists in a central town of the island. When I first met the group in 1992, they emphasized their independence and openly criticized government cultural groups for their lack of involvement in social and community problems. Yet, when I saw them in 1994, this group had been approached by the ICP to manage the area's cultural center along with their cultural group, which they have been doing since then. The ICP has been particularly interested in the environmental cause, an important cause for the Puerto Rican left, reaching out to cultural associations and musical groups, who address this issue in their work. However, while the promoters have tried to incorporate the most "cultural," and socially active groups led by the left, there was a marked reticence among ICP promoters about working with independent cultural groups whose activities were not perceived as "cultural" according to the ICP's guidelines. In turn, this reticence has created a sharp distinction between ICP backed activities channelled through the ICP-affiliated centers, and other popular activities, which are normally categorized as purely commercial. This again has limited the ability of the ICP to reach out to different groups. A music and lighting technician who has worked at popular festivals for over 12 years noted this situation:

It is the ICP's fault that people are not more interested in jíbaro music, because they do not send musical groups to 'fiestas populares' or 'fiestas de pueblos'. I myself like jíbaro music but I never get to see the groups because they

[the ICP] never send this music to these festivals.

Due to the cultural centers' conformity with ICP programming, and their restraint from mixing musical genres, the programming of many of these centers was described to me as repetitious, and informants from among the public attending their activities complained about the lack of innovation. Most of the organizers of the ten local ICP-affiliated cultural centers I interviewed (See list of Survey, Appendix A) complained about this issue yet simply shrugged when I asked them about what could be done to revive the programming. In the past they had tried to do so but had been faced with limited funds and motivation from their members. Jose, who was concerned with diversifying the activities of his cultural center explained:

The problem is that nobody cares. It is very difficult to motivate people and people do not know how to innovate their activities. They think that bringing a musical group from the ICP list is all they have to do have a cultural activity.

Ironically, the perception of the ICP's view of culture as traditional constitutes one of the main obstacles to its popularization and dissemination, an obstacle generated within the ICP-affiliated cultural centers themselves through their inability to imagine novel ways of "selling" the traditional view of Puerto Rico's national identity.

A common cause of conflict between local ICP-affiliated

cultural centers and the ICP office in San Juan stemmed when a local center showed a preference for local artists in their activities, clashing with ICP's policy of highlighting nationally recognized groups evaluated by the ICP and legitimized as "authentic" representatives of culture. This was the case with a group who wanted to organize an art exhibit with local painters, as well as the case in Aibonito, where the organizers invited a local rock group to the Festival of the Mountain:

We used to only draw from ICP-affiliated activities but in the third and fourth year of the festival we included a local rock group. We received so much criticism! Especially the "independentistas" which thought it was an intrusion. The ICP could not do anything because we had a tense relationship with them. We were struggling to have control of our activities.

What the ICP centers complained most about was the legislation regulating their work. Although supposedly "autonomous," ICP-centers are expected to comply with the 15-page Regulations which govern everything from the names given to the centers to the order to be followed in their meetings. These regulations, although approved by a general assembly of cultural centers in 1986 and ratified by the ICP staff, were originally conceived by the ICP staff, in

accordance with the PPD's cultural nationalistic policies of the mid 1980s. The regulations were aimed at reinforcing the ICP's ties with the centers and limit their vulnerability to partisan politics at the local level. For instance, one of the most important regulations prevents new members from joining less than three months prior to elections in order to limit the recruitment of politico-partisan supporters right before the centers' election.

A great part of a promoter's job is the interpretation of these regulations and the assurance of the centers' compliance with them through reports, summaries of activities, financial statements, and the monitoring of their meetings and elections. This has, in turn, strengthened the local centers' dependency on the ICP bureaucracy. Any reticence or resistance in complying with the cultural regulations or with the bureaucratic paperwork, or any lack of motivation or failure to produce the kind of activities expected by the promoters, was described by them as an indication of "subdesarrollo cultural," (cultural underdevelopment) and lack of cultural awareness, which needed to be corrected with discipline and "education." These interpretations closely replicate the development ethic that pervaded the PPD's cultural policies in the 1950s, when cultural development became associated with the cultural policies of the PPD government.

To achieve the "cultural development" of their

respective areas, promoters consider themselves entitled to interfere in most aspects of the work of the cultural centers, ranging from their administrative work to the organization of their membership. There are cases in which the promoter has taken it into his/her own hands to, in their words, "accommodate" and "activate" a membership which he/she deems inactive or ineffective. To do this, the promoter gets involved in making value judgements about which groups should be represented at the center, making contacts and mobilizing groups. Although this practice is quite common, as I learned from conversations with present members of these groups who traced their involvement to recruitment by individual promoters, none of the promoters I spoke with admitted to their actual managing of a center because it goes against the dominant notion that they are independent and autonomous self-generated entities.

Many of these issues relating to operation of national cultural policy and the ICP's unequal valorization of different aspects of Puerto Rican culture surfaced during my study of the Cultural Center of Caone. More will be said about the historical context of Caone in the next chapter. Here I will briefly discuss how this area was perceived by the ICP central office as a conclusion to my discussion of the reproduction of unequal valorization of particular elements of Puerto Rican culture in the ICP.

The Case of Caone

Caone, a city of about 57,000 people located in the eastern part of the island is also commonly known by the bleak name the "grey city". This name, given to the city due to its cloudy weather and the gray smoke from the sugar plantations which once filled the skies of the area, also captures the economic and political stagnation which has prevailed since the 1960s (see next chapter). Similarly, the regional area in which the ICP-affiliated Cultural Center of Caone is located is generally regarded by the ICP staff as a zone of "enormous cultural deterioration." According to a 1993 report by one of the regional promoters, four of the eight existing ICP-affiliated centers in the area are inactive, and two towns have never had an ICP-affiliated cultural center. The lack of ICP-affiliated folk artisans in the area, (only two among hundreds of government registered artisans come from Caone itself), was another element considered an indication of the "cultural deterioration" of the area. Not surprisingly, the appraisal of the area by cultural officials did not account for the many non-affiliated groups that organize cultural activities.

Psychological explanations of people's low motivation to work and produce at the standard expected by the ICP were also common. Cultural promoters working in other areas said of Caone:

There has historically been less cultural activity in the eastern zone because people here have a closed attitude and are always more distrustful compared with people in the central zone, who are warmer and more willing to establish trusting relationships.

or

This region is too Americanized. They also have a different style. Here the attitude is that 'somos poquito' 'we are little' and people are less progressive than in the North. The eastern personality is more provincial. Also, they have an apathetic personality, they do not show much warmth to you ever. That is their style.

The perception that the eastern zone is too Americanized was explained by its proximity to the capital compared with the more "traditional" rural interior, and by the existence of two military bases in the eastern town of Ceiba and on the island of Vieques. However, more than the area's Americanization, I found that its perceived lack of cultural content was also based on the unequal attention that the ICP has bestowed on it based on preconceived assumptions about its contribution to national culture.

In contrast to the central area, which has been sanctioned as the stronghold of Indian heritage, or the western and southern parts of the island which are associated with Puerto Rico's seignorial Spanish legacy, the eastern zone's cultural contribution remains indeterminate. With a history of poverty, slavery and sugar production, the East remains one of the poorest areas of the island. It has none of the architectural monuments found in the West, the

Spanish military structures of the capital, the Taino ceremonial archaeological sites of the central region nor any other remnants of "culture" that would attract the attention and monetary resources of the ICP. Only the northeastern town of Loiza, and the island-town of Vieques have received attention from the ICP. Loiza is regarded as the embodiment of Puerto Rico's African tradition in its most folkloric version. Thus, while African Caribbean cultural elements are predominant throughout the eastern area, especially the coastal rim, it is only in Loiza that they are officially recognized, through the folklorization of the patron-saint festival which has become a "carnavalesque" tourist symbol for Puerto Rico. Meanwhile, the ICP has channeled resources to Vieques, as I was told, to "build culture in the area and counter its ongoing militarization and Americanization." Of course, Vieques is also appealing to the ICP because of its Spanish fortress rated as "the best example of Spanish defense architecture outside of San Juan" (ICP 1993:42).

Moreover, the East is considered to be "too close to San Juan"; too urban to be of any cultural interest to the central office, for which the rural inland areas are the quintessential guardians of national culture. The virtual oblivion into which the East has fallen is worsened by the lack of continuity among cultural promoters in the area, which has been supervised by over six different promoters

since the 1970s. This situation sharply contrasts with other regional areas which have had the same promoters for over ten years at a time. Considering the top-down character of ICP cultural promotion, there is no wonder that the East remains "culturally underdeveloped" according to government-sanctioned standards about culture.

Nevertheless, the East is not untouched by the popularization of culture as basis for contending and advancing different interests. There too, the idiom of culture and Puerto Ricaness is being borrowed, transformed and put to service by local groups and activists as they struggle to advance different interests and gain greater justice and representation through their work. The many independent cultural groups that celebrate activities and work in the area are evidence of that.

As in the rest of the island, the 1980s saw a rapid increase in community groups that celebrate cultural activities as part of their program. All of these groups were founded in the 1980s although some had previous experience of cultural organizing within their communities. At present there are about seven independent community groups that celebrate a major cultural festival as part of their activities in Caone, whereas there are countless others throughout the island.

As I mentioned previously, these newcomers are often seen as a threat to the conservation of Puerto Rican culture

as defined by the government cultural policy. In the next chapters, the micropolitical dynamics within and across different kinds of cultural groups in Caone will be more closely explored.

Endnotes

1. See Manuel Alonso's 1849 El Gibaro which presented the first literary expression of peasant culture. It described in a detailed manner all the customs and characteristics of the peasant criollo, who was an important symbol for Puerto Rican elites during Spanish colonization. The Taino was captured by Daniel Rivera's Agueybana the Brave, written in 1844 and published in 1854 (Pedreira 1985) and Eugenio de Hostos' The Pilgrimage of Bayoan (1854). In these two novels, Taino Indians were the principal characters used by the authors to convey a message of opposition to the Spanish authorities. The first-encountered cacique, Agueybana, is the main character of the former novel, in which the author urges foreigners and people not born on the island to leave Puerto Rico.
2. See Alegría (1960) for a list of the Institute's programming during its first five years.
3. For a discussion of the dissemination of popular rhythms which in Puerto Rico's radio and T.V., ranging from boleros to 'la nueva ola' (the 1970s Spanish rock boom) see among others, Torregrosas (1991), Malavet Vega (1987), and Santiago (1993).
4. The informant refers to the research on folkloric music done by Rosa-Nieves (1967) and Lopez-Cruz (1967).
5. For a discussion of countersong as a medium of social protest and liberation in Latin America see Reyes-Matta (1988).
6. The standards of female respectability in nationalist ideologies have been traced to the "idealization of motherhood by the virile fraternity" of the nation (Parker et al 1992:6), which constructs women as the repositories of traditionality and as subordinate to the male national brotherhood.
7. As explained, peasant musical rhythms are also commonly known as "Christmas music," after the season in which they

are still most commonly heard on commercial radio stations.

8. An example of a group that has incorporated recent innovations is provided by "Jibaro Jazz" which mixes peasant and jazz rhythms in its compositions.

9. "Fiestas de Pueblos" is the name popularly given to grassroots public festivals and festivities which are opened to the overall public, thus to all the "pueblo". Two of these "fiestas" will be discussed in chapter four.

Chapter III

From the Center to the "Centros": Cultural Politics

From Below

It is easy to locate the ICP-affiliated cultural center in Caone. It occupies a prominent place in the town square plaza, right across from the Catholic church in a building that was once the town's prison and later the city hall. This area was once the social and political heart of the town but is now mostly a declining commercial area. Despite this prominent location Caone's center, is not well known within its immediate community. The same is often the case with other ICP-affiliated cultural centers throughout the island. If it were not for the fact that the Eastern Regional Office of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture occupies two offices in the building, there would be little activity on the premises, aside from the public car drivers waiting for passengers in the center's lobby.

Nevertheless, as was evident by the many local struggles over its management and control, the cultural center continues to be an important institution for some sectors of Caone. This chapter will analyze these struggles as an expression of the microdynamics at play in Puerto Rico's cultural politics. The chapter revolves around this

case study, although it also incorporates information about other ICP-affiliated groups. As the "official" representatives of the national cultural policy at the local level, these other groups are also site of similar struggles.

Organized in 1957, Caone's cultural center was one of the first centers founded after the establishment of the ICP in San Juan. Metropolitan areas, PPD political strongholds, and areas with nationally recognized intellectual figures like Caone were preferred for these first centers. They were established through contacts with local intellectuals and political figures.¹ Additionally, Caone was the homeplace of Aguedo Mojica, a local intellectual and university professor who had been active in a previous cultural group in Caone. In the 1950s this group had caught Munoz Marín's attention as an example to follow in shaping his cultural policies of grassroots decentralization. This early group, founded in 1917, was Caone's intellectual and artistic center of Caone and a perfect example of the upsurge of "hispanismo" values among the island's elites right after the American occupation. The club was called Club Ariel, after the Shakespearian character Ariel, who, embodied the noble and spiritual character of Latin culture against the materialism and imperialism of Caliban (the U.S.). Founded by teachers, poets and other local intellectuals, the club was conceived as a center of social

and cultural renewal. Among its objectives the club aimed to provide children with free education and workers with an "environment of relaxation, of cultural creativity and solidarity against injustice." (Mojica 1983:38)

Like other cultural initiatives which took shape during the early stages of American occupation, Club Ariel emerged in a context of social change. U.S. occupation in 1898 and American sugar monopolies directly threatened Caone's sugar based landowning elite, which dominated the town's economy and its politics through the control of administrative posts in the municipal government (Ortiz-Cuadra 1986).² The production of sugar spurred by the building of a port in 1815 had contributed to Caone's economic and demographic growth in the 19th century and had influenced its designation as a bureaucratic and administrative center in 1881. With the American sugar monopolies, sugar production in the area increased from 900 bocoyes (large barrels) in 1899 to 16,657 tons in 1920, but the number of individually owned lands diminished from 2,484 small farms of 4-9 acres in 1899 to only 380 such farms in 1910 (Ortíz Cuadra 1993), diminishing the number of individual landowners and the available land for subsistence farming.³

Yet, by the time the ICP-affiliated cultural center was founded in 1957, civil administration and manufacturing, was replacing sugar as the economic mainstay following the new commonwealth government's economic policies of export-led

industrialization. When both the port and the sugar mills closed in the late 1950s, thousands were left unemployed and the city's dramatic economic situation dominated the pages of the national newspapers (El Mundo 9/1-9/2/58).

Consequently, thousands left for the mainland in the largest emigration in Caone's history.⁴ Today, 30% of the population is employed in services, 23% in manufacturing (with 37 factories in the area), and 20% in civil administration (Human Resources Department, San Juan 1992). Unemployment is 19,76% and about 59% of the population is living below the poverty line, not very different from island-wide figures of 58.90% poverty and 20.43% unemployment (census 1990). However, due to Caone's former strong economic and political position in the area, it is generally believed that Caone has been abandoned and that its progress has been slower than that of nearby towns.

Within this context, the ICP-cultural center, like its predecessor the Club Ariel, was conceived as a site for cultural regeneration. Yet, as we shall see, the center quickly developed into a way for Caone's urban elite to develop a proud history for its city, bound to leave unaccounted some important bits of history.

The "True Caonenos" and the Unaccounted Bits of History

"Verdaderos Caonenos" (True Caonenos) is the epithet used by a member of Caone's cultural center to describe the cultural center's membership. As she stated, these are people who were born and raised -- and currently work and live -- in Caone and who have built a "respectable" reputation at the local level and are, therefore, perceived as having contributed to Caone's growth and development. As we will see, the label serves as a selective screen for Caone's middle classes, the whiter and more educated Caonenos. It is also a label for PPD affiliates, who are more likely to constitute Caone's "buenas familias" (good families). Caone has been a PPD political stronghold from 1945 until the last mayoral election in 1992, and political clientelism and patronage are indispensable for securing jobs and resources. Partisan politics were the most important variable for all ten ICP-affiliated cultural centers included in my research, yet in Caone partisan politics are heightened by the town's role as the metropolitan and political center of the eastern area. This assures Caone an important role in civic government and makes it a significant venue for employment, status and resources.

However, the relatively privileged class background of Caone's cultural center's membership was, as in other ICP-cultural centers, veiled behind a dominant idea that the

centers are composed of "gente de pueblo" (the common people). Here lies the key to understanding the position of the center's membership and leadership -- their politically motivated need to "connect" symbolically to the popular classes, who they simultaneously shun in practice.

In Caone, the idea of humble origins was established, most often, by contrasting the social status of the membership with that of the big "names," landowners and families associated with sugar, remnants of the paternalistic relations that dominated sugar production prior to the development of large scale capitalist production by American sugar companies (Mintz 1989). For instance, members often claimed their "gente de pueblo" status by comparing themselves to the select elite who attend the Casa Roig. This is the residency of one of Caone's seignorial families (still economically successful) that has become the metaphor for wealth and power in Caone, and which was converted into an art gallery in the 1980's.⁵ The exclusiveness of this gallery, only attended by Caone's richest families and visitors from San Juan, provided the members of the cultural center with a reference to present themselves as equal in social and class status to the rest of Caone.

The prevalence of "verdaderos Caonenos" in the cultural center dates back to its initial years when the membership was composed of medical doctors, school teachers,

merchants, intellectuals and government workers, adding to the center's image of social status and setting it apart from the immediate community. As explained by a recent member to the center, a school teacher, recently invited to the center:

I remember that all the people involved in the center were selected people. I do not remember if they were known because of their lastnames, or their political affiliation, but I heard them mentioned a lot. You knew they were respectable people because of their social values and their good families. You know, in all towns there are some important lastnames you hear a lot...

All of the most important members had political connections with the PPD, such as the first president, who like other independentista intellectuals in the 1950s, was incorporated into the PPD political program as a consultant and as representative at large for the eastern area from 1956-68. Today a mostly middle-class membership, drawn from the urban residential areas of Caone and from the "verdaderos Caoenos" continues to constitute the bulk of the centers' leadership to the present day, despite the fact that the cultural centers' regulations stipulate that all city residents may be members of the cultural center if they wish.

Initially, the center's image of elite social status was intensified by its lack of a public location. Meetings were held in private houses, and participation in the activities was mostly solicited by written invitations. However, the center's seclusion continued after the center

obtained a public location in the 1970s. Nor did a short-lived radio show and newsletter publication initiated by the cultural center in the late 1960s help change the common assumption that one needs to be properly invited to its activities. Today, the cultural center's concern with social status was evident in the formality of its meetings, which follow the parliamentary method laid out in the "Rules and Regulations for Cultural Centers" passed in 1986 and disseminated by the ICP. The center's leadership (for the duration of my study) even strengthened the formality of the meetings by instituting formal seating arrangements for the leadership.

Politically, Caone's leadership has traditionally been composed of "independentistas" and Pro-Commonwealth supporters. In this way, it provides a good example of the ideological synthesis of the Pro-Commonwealth and independentista sectors within the context of ICP-affiliated cultural centers.

Until the 1980s when a group of PNPs entered the cultural center, causing a struggle within the organization, the cultural center had a relatively good relationship with Caone's municipal government, which remained a bastion of the Pro-Commonwealth party until 1992. This positive relationship was assured by the PPD's need to document their commitment to culture which has been a pivotal aspect of the Party's policies. As explained by a PIP member of the

cultural center:

The PPD municipality almost always helped the cultural center but only because they had to. One had to know with whom to talk to and how. However, the mayor would always come through because he had to prove that he cared about culture, even when we know that the PPDs do not dare to speak about "patria."

Another member gave evidence of the way in which PIPs working in the cultural center would be "ideologically transformed" into potential PPDs, an example of the "melonismo" tendencies of Puerto Rican intellectuals, and an outcome of the 1950s transformist processes.

I have always been Pro-Independence, but I remember that while I was working at the center I got to be good friends of the PPD mayor and other PPD's, and I was even offered a post in the PPD government, which I refused.

This same person later on learned that covertly, he as well as other "independentista" members had dossiers with the police and the state department -- a sign of the political persecution of "independentistas", which was brought to light in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the cordial relationship between the municipal government and the cultural center and the political homogeneity of its membership contributed to the common perception that culture and politics never mixed at the cultural centers, until the PNP's political offensive in the 1980s.

In terms of its programming, Caone's cultural center has mostly drawn from the activities produced and brought in from the Intitute of Puerto Rican Culture in San Juan.

Similarly, the members often consulted with the ICP regional promoter to prepare their program according to the cultural policy guidelines. The similarity in programming between the local center and the national ICP office is evident in the local re-initiation in the late 1950s and early 1960s of the Festival of Saint Cecilia which was initiated in 1898 but had been discontinued for many years. This decision was congruent with that of other ICP-affiliated cultural centers throughout the island which either reinstituted or initiated regional celebrations soon after their founding. This was part of a national policy instituted by the ICP's director to develop distinctive festivals in each town of the island as a way of reinvigorating culture at the local level. Such were the origins of the most important festivals in contemporary society, such as the National Folk Arts Festival in Barranquitas and the National Indigenous Festival in Jayuya, founded in the early 1960s.

Initially (1957-1960's), the activities of the Caone cultural center consisted primarily of conferences on Puerto Rican history, concerts of quartets and big bands performing boleros and Danzas or "popular yet refined music", as it was described by a member who was active at this time. Yet as with the ICP in San Juan, the 1970s saw a turn towards folklore in the center's programming, along with the institutionalization of what are now the traditional activities of Caone that still form the backbone of their

programming. These include the annual Festival of Santa Cecilia and the Fiestas de Cruz; two Catholic derived celebrations that also demonstrate the religious homogeneity that characterizes the cultural center.

The Festival of Santa Cecilia is one of the few activities organized by the cultural center that has traditionally been oriented to the greater public since it is always celebrated in the town's public plaza. In the past ten years, however, the Festival has consistently failed to draw a broad public and people have openly criticized it for not being a "real" festival, because the festival genre is now associated with the many celebrations organized by independent groups initiated in the area since the 1980's which include popular music, entertainment, fried food stands (kioskos) and folk arts. Instead, as a "tradition" of Caone, the Santa Cecilia festival has remained almost unchanged since its inception and is essentially a quiet quasi-religious celebration of the patron-saint of music during which large bands play in the middle of the plaza during the early evening hours. There are no food kioskos (vending stands) or popular dancing to attract the public as there are in the other festivals, and its religious connections discourage many who are non-religious or non-Catholic.

In addition to these activities, the cultural center activities and publications are the main vehicle for

disseminating the dominant version of Caone's history which revolves around Caone's Hispanic origins, exemplifying the Hispanophile tendencies that characterize Puerto Rican history. The few written accounts of the town's history were compiled by a founding member of the cultural center who is commonly known as the "town's historian," and another member who was formerly in charge of cultural activities for city hall. This history is also elaborated by the publications of the Absent Caenos,⁶ many of whom were members of the cultural center. This history was evident in 1993 during the official activities to commemorate the Bicentennial of the founding of the city. Accordingly, the town's history revolves around a group from the Canary Islands who migrated in 1721 through the Real Cedula of 1718 to settle and colonize the area, and who are seen as responsible for the growth which culminated in the designation of the town as a city in 1793. No other immigrant group is so well remembered as the canary islanders, despite the continuous influx of slaves, "libertos" and later workers from the Anglophone and Francophone Caribbean that arrived at Caone's port and settled the area after the onset of Spanish colonization. The only sources that document the extent of this influx and its effects on Caone's history is Cruz Ortíz-Cuadra's discussion of the English, French and Danish last names that are common in the coastal areas of the city (Ortíz-Cuadra

1991). Caone's slave history is not recorded anywhere or remembered even though, like the rest of the island, the sugar industry in Caone was maintained by slave labor, and there is evidence that slaves entered the port of Caone even after the slave trade was prohibited for Spanish subjects in 1829 (De La Rosa 1986).

The town's official history also draws heavily upon the cacique Caone, a Taino chief who ruled the area before the Spanish colonization, after whom the city is named and who is credited as "the last cacique to give up to the Spaniards." The official regard for the cacique Caone was evident in the celebrations of the city's bicentennial in 1993 when an official hymn was written for the cacique, whose picture decorated the celebration's print and commemorative t-shirt. At this time, a statue and a sanctuary park were also built in his honor. Besides these foundational elements, Caone also prides itself on its musical past which is perceived to be Caone's greatest contribution to Puerto Rican culture. Caone's has produced nationally recognized composers and musicians and the municipal band and its cuatro string orchestra have represented Puerto Rico in international events. Both the band and the string orchestra are almost always present in the cultural center's activities.

The permanence of programming and approach within the cultural center is secured by the limits imposed by the San

Juan office and the ICP-s regional promoter which only sponsors ICP-affiliated artists. Continuity in the programming is also secured by the cultural center's position as the guardian of Puerto Rican nationality, which translates to presenting Puerto Rican culture as defined by the official cultural policy. In turn, this image of the cultural center as the "guardian" of culture prompts much tension when people other than those who are officially perceived as defenders of Puerto Rican culture enter the ICP's domain, as we shall see below.

Microwars for Political Representation

In the 1980's there was a struggle for political representation in Caone's cultural center which mirrored the national cultural wars of the times. As discussed in chapter one, this struggle was indicative of the decline in the PPD's political dominance and a questioning of its control of culture as an important basis upon which that power had been maintained. Similar struggles were reproduced in different towns of the island, where PNP supporters backed by PNP-led municipalities turned their attention to the ICP-cultural centers. Similarly, for the first time in the history of the cultural center of Caone, PNP supporters purposely set out to dominate its leadership and membership through the active recruitment and mobilization of PNP party members for the cultural center.

This event is highly significant for the center's history because it still provides the moral legitimacy for the leadership, again constituted by PPDs and PIPs supporters, to present themselves as the rightful guardians of the cultural center, which they had to rescue from the PNP's, who have since been accused of acting as "vende patrias" (sellers of the nation). The event is also telling of the tensions that emerge when those not entitled to speak about culture and who lack the "cultural capital," (Bourdieu 1993) or the knowledge and disposition to expound on Puerto Rican culture according to the dominant frameworks, enter ICP-affiliated cultural centers.

The new group shared certain similarities with, but also had important differences from the group that had traditionally dominated the cultural center. Like the old leadership, the new group was mostly comprised of the middle sectors of society; but unlike the first leadership, which was more representative of the traditional petty bourgeoisie (merchants, professionals), the new group can be identified as what Pantójas (1990) and Castro (1980) have called Puerto Rico's new petty bourgeoisie. This sector is associated with administration and bureaucratic jobs or non-productive forms of labor. These were the groups that emerged from the capital intensive, export processing strategy instituted in the Commonwealth in the 1950s and the expansion of the public and service sectors. Moreover,

unlike older leadership, who were mostly professionals highly educated in the best local and even foreign universities, the new group was less educated. They were thus perceived to differ from the old more intellectual leadership, who discriminated against these new groups by pointing to their lack of knowledge and intellectual training to lead the cultural center. As stated by a long standing member of the cultural center.

The new people were just a political committee of illiterates who did not even know how to write their own name and who never went to the university. Before, the cultural center was a serious institution and only educated people would dare to speak of culture.

While the new members were less educated than former ones, like the old group, the newcomers were publicly identified with a political party, although this time it was Caone's minority party (PNP) that was most strongly represented.

Besides these similarities, there were new actors behind the changes in the cultural center, mostly women who were newcomers to the organization. They had previously been involved in the cultural center, but only as assistants organizing and preparing food for receptions and activities, never in important positions in the leadership. Yet it was women, also middle class and from the group of "verdaderos Caoenos," who planned what is still known as the first "takeover" of the center in 1978:

We saw that this town was so dominated by the same people that no one can go against it. We thought

that by giving it a different orientation through the cultural center, or through other ways...we could solve this. We, as pro-statehood women, we wanted to do something... because everywhere we went there was always the PPD inviting the same people, and the PNPs inviting their own people.

Despite the pivotal role of women in seeking PNP representation in the cultural center, none of them ran for the presidency. Their husbands' disapproval of their involvement, or their lack of time to take on such responsibility, or the impossibility of attending evening meetings, were among the reasons I was given for their turning down their own candidacies. Nevertheless, many of the women who had told me that they could not join the cultural center were active in other local organizations such as the local church or female centered groups like the "Mothers of Caone." This suggested their preference for other types of organizations rather than the cultural center, who many perceived as a limited domain for women. This was stated by a church leader in her community, who contrasted her work in the church with her previous work in the cultural center:

God has given women a great capacity, and if we go to the home of the sick we get involved in everything and we cook and we read for them, and the sky is the limit... In the cultural center I felt limited in my capacities but not in the church were women are the "voz cantante" (the leaders).

This woman's observation about being "limited" in the cultural center is corroborated by the fact that while many women hold important positions in many cultural centers,

they are less likely to be elected as directors or move up in the ICP structure to become regional promoters.

The political identification of the new leadership with the PNP party subjected the new leadership to great scrutiny from the previous leadership. As it is generally believed that PNPs are politically incompatible and unfit to occupy positions within the ICP, PNP members were subjected to political and intellectual attacks and to charges of ignorance and inexperience. Examples of these views were provided by a current member of the cultural center:

Only the PIP and the PPD care about culture. Everyone knows that the PNP, even if they care for Puerto Rican culture is because of hypocritical motivations because they ultimately want Puerto Rico to become a state. You can never believe that a Pro-Statehooder wants to defend Puerto Rican culture.

For their part, the PNPs involved in the "take over" of the cultural center denied these charges of fraudulent motivations. Such views were exposed by the first PNP president of the cultural center, Mon elected in 1978. He was another male with respect in the community who was recruited by the women to represent them given that none of them ran for the presidency. He is a lab technician and composer of popular songs (boleros) who has a history of civic involvement. Mon looked back at his presidency with nostalgia and is still convinced that there is a need to rescue the center from the "'independentistas' and communists" that presently dominate it. This is a recurrent

perception among PNP and, to a lesser degree, PPD supporters of the older generations who see the ICP-affiliated centers as "independentista" or communist strongholds. Mon is openly pro-American, and at my slightest hesitation in Spanish, would insert an English word or phrase into the conversation. This contrasted with the attitude of other leaders of cultural centers, most of whom spoke English because they had either studied it or learned it while living in or visiting the States, but who always refrained from mixing languages to the point of apologizing for any anglicism used. Despite his pro-American attitude, Mon repeatedly asserted that he was Pro-Puerto Rico: "We [the PNP] came to prove that we are Puertorriqueñistas, that we can work for our culture" echoing PNP claims for participation in Puerto Rico's cultural policy being voiced at the national level during the 1980s.

When comparing the activities of the cultural center under his leadership to those before, Mon gave evidence of continuity in the programming. He claimed not to differ in the kind of programming that should be presented in the cultural center, but rather was critical of the use of culture for political manipulation.

It is not that I have different ideas of what is Puerto Rican Culture, but I do denounce the use of culture for political manipulation. Today we do not know what "true" culture is because the ICP has always politicized culture.

Mon was outspoken in his denunciation of the ICP cultural

policies as political manipulations, rather than "true" representations of Puerto Rican culture. For instance, he criticized the designation of Nueva Trova as Puerto Rican music in the ICP program.

That music is from Cuba and the ICP wanted to introduce it here, but it is not really Puerto Rican music. There is a great difference between the legacy of our peasant Trova and the Nueva Trova which is from Cuba and is played by militants.

Mon's questioning of Nueva Trova's legitimacy concerned the ICP's endorsement of a foreign genre for what he considered political reasons. This criticism exemplifies the strict association of the ICP programming, such as the music included in its program, with the Pro Commonwealth Party and the PIP that have only begun to be shackled in contemporary society. This association has historically prevented PNP's from drawing upon these symbols (and thus from asserting their Puerto Ricanness, according to the dominant ideology), because it involves drawing from the symbols that have been politically appropriated by PPD's at the national level.

Some examples of these dynamics are provided by the second PNP president of the center, who was described to me as the most controversial president ever. First, although he was considered an expert in Puerto Rican music, which had earned him a reputation in his community, he was the first president with no formal higher education. In addition, he was the first president with a working class background,

having spent over two decades in the U.S. after migrating to seek work in one of the New England farms hiring Puerto Rican laborers in the 1950s. This made him a questionable figure in the cultural center where people questioned not only his lack of higher education but his actual knowledge of Puerto Rican culture because he had been absent for so long. What is more, he became involved in a campaign for PNP political candidates in a radio program while functioning as president of the center, which also made him an easy target for PPD and PIP groups who ultimately accused him of politicking and united to force him to resign.

When I met him, he appeared nervous and was defensive about talking about his presidency of the cultural center. He made constant references to "la guerra" (the war) to denote the opposition to his tenure and said he had felt politically persecuted during his administration. During his term, the PPD municipal administration withdrew the secretarial and cleaning staff and the financial aid that it traditionally awarded the center. The ICP "made our lives impossible" he said, by refusing to affiliate the local folk artists referred by him, merely on the basis of "personalism", which he thought was based upon his political affiliation.

Carmelo called himself a "regionalist," because he considers regional culture, rather than the views of culture advocated by the government cultural policy and

institutions, to be the legitimate culture. Like Mon, he questioned the veracity of many governmental ideas about culture, regarding them as arbitrary judgements of what is original to Puerto Rico. For instance, he questioned the ICP's musical trilogy, where the "Danza" a musical genre which originated from Europe and the "Bomba", which is African derived, are presented as autochthonous Puerto Rican rhythms. Both rhythms, he said, were borrowed from other places and are not truly representative of Puerto Rico. He also was critical of the annual homage to one local musician, Juan Peña Reyes, whose descendants are still important musical figures in Caone, when other local musicians are never recognized. "What culture are we promoting when nobody knows anything? When everything is the same and no one knows anything about local history?" More daringly, he questioned the veracity of the cacique Macao, whom the cultural center has been honoring as part of the celebrations for the Bicentennial Celebration of the founding of Caone. Macao's existence is recorded in the Spanish chronicles (de Oviedo 1509). Nevertheless, Carmelo accusations concern the current trend of reviving caciques (Taino chiefs) mentioned in fictional and legendary accounts, which he sees as an example of an ICP-inspired fabrication of history.

Apart from Mon's disapproval of Nueva Trova groups' participation in the activities, and Carmelo's emphasis on

the local musicians, there were no major differences in the centers' programming during their tenure. It is mostly the San Juan office rather than the local groups that determines the programming, which was dominated by the ICP-affiliated musicians and performers. In the case of Caone the continuity in the program is assured by the presence of a regional promoter in the center's premises since the mid 1980s. Moreover, by the time the new group was in office (1980s), the cultural center's activities had been consolidated around the aforementioned "traditional" activities which formed the backbone of the cultural center's work. However it was seen that Pro-Statehooders were more likely to denounce the ICP view of culture as politico-partisan manipulations because their political ideology [PNP] has not been historically tied to these official definitions of Puerto Rican culture. Therefore, the views of Puerto Rican culture and their open identification with the Pro-Statehood Party made them a threat to the ICP-affiliated cultural center and the mostly PPD-PIP membership that characterized it. The "threat" posed by the members of the Pro-Statehood Party in the cultural center was evidenced in the comment of a PIP school teacher active in the cultural center during recent years:

PNPs do not know anything about culture. They want to destroy anything that smells of Puerto Ricanness. If we had cultural centers directed by PNPs they would feature plays in English, or celebrate American holidays of Halloween or St. Valentine, or sell folk arts with Mickey Mouse designs.⁷

"American programming" in the centers was the greatest fear of people involved in ICP-affiliated groups even though I found no examples of "American programming" in Caone or any other of the ICP-affiliated cultural centers I visited. Because the continuity in the programming is secured by the ICP limits on sponsoring anything that departs from the lists of ICP-affiliated artists. Fears of American programming, however, a byproduct of a legacy of colonialism in which the American dominant culture has been the historical "other" against which Puerto Rican culture is defined, were behind the PPD's "rescue" of the cultural center in the late 1980s.

The Rescue

As noted, the cultural centers' programming remained mostly unchanged during the PNP's administration, and the make up of its leadership, with the exception of Carmelo, was no different in age, race or class from the groups that traditionally dominated the cultural center. The most marked differences between the old and new groups were the number of women who were involved with the center's leadership, the schooling of its directors, which attracted criticisms of their lack of intellectual ability to direct the cultural center, and most importantly, the new administration's open ideological identification with the

Pro-Statehood Party. Of all of these elements, however, it was the PNP's political identity that people found most problematic. PNPs are considered unfit to work with culture and their involvement a threat to ICP goals. Thus, it was when the political affiliation of the PNP leadership became most evident after Carmelo involvement in the PNP political campaign and the political radio show that opposition to the leadership peaked and there was a swift mobilization to overthrow it.

The opposition was organized from within the cultural center itself by an independentista high school teacher who was working as secretary in the cultural center at the time. Luisa had friendly personal relationships with two of the independentista-led independent cultural groups that had been established in the 1980s from which she drew support for this endeavor. They included ARECMA, whose work will be discussed shortly, and a group of students and young musicians (now dissolved) which had organized to celebrate a Festival of Bomba and Plena Music.

As the PNP's had done in the 1980s, Luisa and other members recruited as many new members as possible to vote in the general elections before the closing of the membership three months before the elections. This practice, known as a "plancha," (the iron, for "ironing" or arranging the board) became a common way of covertly manipulating the cultural centers after the 1980s, when PNP's first staked

claim on the cultural centers and these became most contested by the island's dominant parties. Often "planchas" were carried out with the knowledge and assistance of regional promoters of the ICP, as was the case in Caone, where the regional promoter stood behind this accommodation with consenting eyes. On election day, the PNP's were greatly outnumbered and a new, mostly PIP and PPD leadership was elected. The militancy of this event is evoked by some present members, who referred to it as their "mission, their duty, to rescue" the center.

The new leadership of the cultural center was much younger than previous leadership and had little or no previous knowledge of the center before the election. Instead, they had been recruited by Luisa because of their political affiliation (PPD or PIP) and their expressed commitment to "changing the center" and reinvigorating it to make it more representative of the greater community. To do this, they had branched out of the urban areas to seek support among the new independent cultural groups, and selected Luisa as the first female president of the cultural center.

Behind these changes, however, lay the same ideas that had dominated the previous leadership and that constitute part of the historical legacy of ICP-affiliated centers throughout the island. These are the beliefs that the ICP-affiliated center should be directed by "educated people,"

that it should be the venue for conserving Puerto Rican culture in its highest forms of folk expression, and the role of the cultural center as a political battleground and source of political prestige in Caone. Thus, two years after the "take-over" of the center, the current leadership (active during my research) is now composed of college-educated high school teachers and civil workers, and the new director, although not a "verdadero" Caoeno, (as she was born outside Caone), is a well respected woman and a university professor at a local branch of the University of Puerto Rico. The membership of the cultural center was once again drawn mainly from school teachers, civil workers, and the urban residential areas of Caone. The new leadership also exhibited the same preoccupations with pure culture that characterized the older leadership, and re-enacted their political role as an important force for PNP resistance, and authorities on culture in Caone.

The new leadership's concern for pure culture was most evident in their revival of a long campaign to evict merchants operating drinking, dancing and gambling business in premises adjacent to the cultural center. These merchants, some of whom had been conducting business in these same premises for over thirty years, were seen by members of the cultural center as an obstacle to enlarging its space and housing more of the regional offices of the ICP which would be a source of prestige for Caone. Both

housing one of the regional offices of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, and having a government-subsidized physical plant in urban Caone are sources of great prestige for the center which make it more of a locus of political power than other ICP-affiliated centers which lack government subsidized physical facilities and a clear identification with the ICP in its premises. Thus the merchants were accused of promoting prostitution, alcohol abuse and gambling and even when they denied this they were perceived as clashing and "disharmonizing" with the "cultural" goals of the center. It was seen as "a matter of culture versus 'the bolita de azar' (gambling);" or culture as defined by the cultural center versus "decadent" life.

The cultural center's intentions stirred controversy in Caone. Some of the merchants are well known in the community and have family, personal and political connections in the area. Each business also supports a network of families. Not even the previous mayors had dared to evict these merchants because they feared public opinion and reprisals. Therefore, after much ado, the trial was suspended, unresolved, although the cultural center is pressuring to reopen the case.

The merchants' defense, however, is exemplary of the current dissemination of culture as bases for contention. Their defense revolved around their roots in the town and the fact that their long presence in the area has made them

a "tradición de pueblo." This, they argue entitles them to remain in the area because they are just as "cultural" as the adjoining cultural center next door. One barber who claims to have been in the locale for over 30 years commented:

This town does not have traditions. We are the traditions, the barber, the merchant, the shoe-shiner, all who gather here. I was going to bring these old scissors to the trial to show them what culture is.

The merchants defense was further legitimized by their hiring of independentista lawyers ready to present their clients' case as one of popular culture versus the "high" culture of the ICP.

The merchant's defense illustrates what is at the core of the contemporary cultural politics in Puerto Rico; the idea that there are ways of locating and identifying culture other than those sponsored by the official organs of Puerto Rican culture. The existence of different ways of identifying Puerto Rican culture interferes with the cultural center's aim to reach out into a community that already perceives itself as Puerto Rican. These were the kind of issues that made Caone's ICP-affiliated cultural center unable to outreach to other communities and branch out from the urban center.

While the members of the cultural center are the first to acknowledge their inability to attract popular support and outreach to wider publics, they were puzzled about this

situation, especially because of their self-perception as "gente de pueblo" and not as elites. Clues into these issues came from Caone's history of class and regional stratification along with politico-partisan and historical issues. These issues became evident in the relationship of the ICP-affiliated cultural center with other groups in Caone which I will now discuss.

Toward the True Keepers of Puerto Rican Culture

As local representatives of the ICP, ICP-affiliated cultural centers are in charge of advising local cultural groups in their endeavors and channeling any communication between these groups and the ICP in San Juan. Yet, for the most part the ICP-affiliated center has remained independent from other groups and communities in Caone, whose activities are perceived to be either too regionalist, commercial and often devoid of cultural content.

With one exception, none of the members of the other community groups I encountered in Caone, two of which will be discussed in the next chapter, had either visited or participated in the ICP-affiliated cultural center or its activities. For many, the center was seen as a "secluded group of people," and there was a generalized impression that one needed to be "properly invited" to its activities. This reinforced people's impression of the center as a "civic, by invitation only" kind of association.

The most important aspect mediating these perceptions of the ICP-affiliated cultural center was its urban identity stemming from its mostly urban membership and its urban location along with the most important civic clubs, associations, and the church of Caone. Although the prestige of civic organizations has dwindled since the 1960s, due to changes in the urban landscape which have re-directed social, economic and political life away from the urban center, the cultural center, like other civic organizations, is still perceived by many as a prestigious organization.⁸ The preponderance of male intellectuals as a source of this prestige was noted by a woman who was once very active in the center:

One had to be from a respectable family to be part of the center. You would see a lot of men, not the typical men but the man of the university, a humanist, or a sociologist someone who is interested in, well you know.. the idea is that one had to be a prepared [educated] person. I think I was only invited back then because I was a teacher. I tried to recruit other teachers but many were intimidated.

The potential of ICP-affiliated centers to become a site and a tool for politico-partisan interests was another aspect that mediated the cultural center's relationships with other groups in Caone. ICP-affiliated centers, much more than independent groups, are seen as highly politicized entities. They are either dominated by PPD and PIP groups or they are extensions of whatever political party is in power at the municipal level. For instance, a PPD leader of

another community group in Caone mistakenly thought that the Cultural Center was dominated by the PNP which had won, for the first time, Caone's mayoral elections. When discussing the relationship of his groups to Caone's cultural center, he said:

No, we never have contact with them, I do not know what kinds of activities they have, it is not that it does not interest me, but I say that I do not like to go where I am not invited. I think it is difficult to go there, especially now [referring to the PNP in the municipal government], because we are PPD, and politics are everywhere. Everything is involved with politics.

Of all the cultural groups in Caone, the ICP-affiliated cultural center had most links with ARECMA, a community group located in the rural areas of Caone which has had a reputation of being an "independentista" stronghold. This relationship is partly explained by the political affiliation of the leadership of both these groups with the Pro-Independence party, which led to the recruitment of some ARECMA members in the "take-over" of the PNP leadership in the 1980s.

The center's image as the keeper of Puerto Rican culture, which limited its program to ICP-affiliated artists and activities, also shaped its relationship with other groups, who were perceived to be more or less "cultural" according to their choice of programming. For instance, ARECMA's choice of programming, which draws more closely on "authentic" Puerto Rican culture as defined by the ICP's cultural policy in its choice of folk artists, music, and

entertainment won ARECMA a higher estimation by the ICP-cultural center in comparison to other independent groups. Comparing a coastal based celebration, known for presenting salsa music and other popular music and entertainment, I was told by a member:

What happens is that you can tell that ARECMA's festival has done some thinking behind the festival. It is just not a salsa band and a stage but there is typical music and Andrés Jiménez (a singer known for his nationalist lyrics). That is why it is more cultural while the others are just a show.

However, compatibility of programming between ICP and independent groups does not always ensure amicable relations between the two. Many independent groups, who include musicians and artisans that would fit ICP's description for authentic artists, had poor relations with the ICP and its regional representatives, which assessed their activities based on the regional, political, religious, or personal identity of their organizers. One notable example of this is provided by the Festival of the Tomato, which is celebrated by a religious groups in a rural community in a central town of the island. Despite being one of the most "traditional" festivals I visited, featuring folkloric and nationalist musicians⁸ and even prohibiting the sale of alcohol (mainly for religious reasons), the local ICP-affiliated cultural center refused to help the festival. The celebration was dismissed as a "religious fundraising activity" rather than a cultural event that should be

entitled to funding from the ICP.

The geospatial location of different communities in relation to the urban center also mediated the relationships of Caone's cultural center with other groups. As I noted in chapter two, different locations on the island are awarded more or less cultural status according to Puerto Rico's "urban-rural" dichotomy. Just as rural communities are presented as the purest bearer of Puerto Rican culture, being both whiter and more evocative of Puerto Rico's peasant past than urban and coastal regions of the island, the activities of ARECMA, a group located in rural Caone were more positively regarded by the cultural center. Their festival was considered to be more "cultural" because it is a "country event," and because "it is easier for them to present certain things with their country background." The reputation of rural parts of Caone as the stronghold of whiter Caoenos has also contributed to the higher estimation of the rural group ARECMA, considering that in Puerto Rico it is commonly believed that blacks are mostly centered on the coastal areas. As I was told:

Today if you see a black person in the center of the island it is strange, and they tell you that he is not from here, or he is from the coast and there is a lot of racism against people from the coast.

Another informant clarified the subordinate position of the coastal areas of Caone as follows:

Even the richest people from the coast were less than the people of the town, because there were

differences between the merchants in the town and the merchants from the coast. The one in the town had a cement house and the one at the beach had a wooden house, even when the coast used to be better off economically, the town has always been ahead of La Playa. People always had to go to Caone for things.

The distance between the ICP-affiliated cultural center and other communities was evident during the celebration of the city's bicentennial, which the ICP-affiliated center was involved in organizing. With the exception of two renown intellectuals from the rural town of Mariana, most committee members were drawn from the urban center. Most people working in other community groups I talked to claimed not to have been fully informed of these activities, which were not widely publicized. The activities were only publicized in the local newspaper, freely distributed in Caone, and broadcast on the local radio station, which are limited media because they are also perceived as being politicized (with a PIP/PPD bias) and as having an "aged" outlook (especially the radio station which plays a lot of "musica del ayer". Most people, especially the younger generation, associate the local media (the local newspaper and radio station), with "cosa de viejos," which they never read or listen to. Thus the center's insistence on relying just on these two media, and on written invitations, rather than other forms of public information (car speakers, street signs or announcements) continually undermines their intention of reaching a diverse public in Caone.

In turn, the center's image as "the keeper of Puerto Rican culture" serves to limit internal criticism about the work of the cultural center and its elitist trajectory. I saw strong critics of the ICP-affiliated cultural center, including a local musician who also works as custodian of the building, become its active defender against the new government policies which, as explained in chapter one, aimed to discontinue the affiliation of the cultural centers as the only legitimate representatives of the ICP. This informant had been critical of the elitism of the new leadership, but for him, the ICP was the "muro de contención" (the contention wall for Puerto Rican nationality) that must be defended irrespective of his subjective opinion about its work. This sanctioning of the ICP as the guardian of Puerto Rican culture has not only dissipated attacks against the cultural center but, as seen, it has also created great tension when those not considered to be proper defenders of Puerto Rican culture enter its domain.

Finally, the cultural center's role preoccupation with the integrity of Puerto Rican culture against its commercialization and deterioration has further isolated the ICP-affiliated cultural centers from other groups organizing cultural activities in the area. For it is through this issue that the members of the cultural center in Caone, and those in other ICP-affiliated cultural centers throughout

the island, most often distinguish themselves from the many newcomers. As previously described, those involved in the ICP structure tend to emphasize their "cultural and educational" stance as the primary basis to claim their authority over cultural issues. Thus members of the cultural center defined their cultural mission by emphasizing their educational mission and distancing themselves from the commercial stance they attribute to the newcomers. Comments voiced by several members of the leadership reveal these tendencies:

We are different in our approach to the activities. We try to bring activities that are more cultural, to keep alive certain things that you will not see in other festivities, but because those are more commercial (emphasis mine) those activities get more crowded....

and,

People compare our Santa Cecilia Festival with other festivals. People do not understand that a festival of Santa Cecilia is different from these other festivals, where the music is different and is very commercial, whereas in Santa Cecilia, the music is very cultural. A lot of people tell me that they do not like the music that we bring, but if it is a cultural festival, you cannot bring music other than cultural music.

or,

What happens is that everyone uses the word "festival" for anything, and this devalues the idea of a festival, and people think that there will be a merengue orchestra playing in the festival. We have remained at one stage, and they (the other groups) have gone beyond to a more commercial stage.

For the leadership, and most of my informants involved in ICP-affiliated cultural centers, the "commercial" was used

to designate a variety of situations, but always, as will be evident in chapter six, a state of being "less cultural" and of inferior quality. For instance, in the comments above, the "commercial" is associated with entertainment, with popular dancing music and with the involvement of commercial sponsors, which are placed in a lower category in relation to "real" folk culture. Most importantly, any activity that is motivated by economic rather than patriotic purposes is berated as commercial.

The preoccupation with appearing too commercial was a constant concern of the cultural center's leadership, and one which often undermined their goal of reaching a wider public. For instance, street signs and loud-speakers, which are popular forms of communication in Caone, and would help the group branch out into different communities, were never employed by the center because they would make it appear too commercial. This concern also guided their choices for the entertainment part of their activities where, according to the president:

there should not be coca cola in the activities, but rather mavi and Puerto Rican refreshments, some sausage, guava and beer... and that we have "musica de aqui".

While they maintain strict guidelines for their own activities, I saw many of the members of these cultural centers attending the different cultural festivals that they criticized so much for being too commercial. They acknowledged the appeal that these activities have among the

public, including themselves, yet they are unable to make changes to popularize their own activities because they are tied by the limits of the cultural policies' guidelines about Puerto Rican music and culture, against which popular music is considered low class and "chabacano". In a sense they are reproducing the negative criticisms that are levied against them as elaborators of "cultura de viejos" (culture of the aged). For instance, when trying to explain to me why their Festival of Santa Cecilia should continue to be celebrated in the early hours of the evening (approximately from 7-9 p.m.) the president said:

Yes, you can have an activity until 1:00 A.M. but that will attract the kind of public that you do not want, the "muchacheria" (pejorative for youth) or the people that do not work outside their homes. Instead, from 7-9 you will have families, adults and even the elderly.

The center's director explained the low turnout for their activities in contrast to the independent festivals as a natural by product of their more mature image.

It is true that what is fashionable is merengue and a beach festival, but only youth go there. Everything has its time, and they will become interested in culture.

Until "they do become interested in culture," however, new grassroots cultural groups stand as a vehicle for promoting competing positions on Puerto Rican culture. We will now turn to a discussion of two of these groups.

Endnotes

1. Later, the University of Puerto Rico served as a breeding ground for new cultural centers. In the initial years, the director of the ICP himself with his officers travelled throughout the island to found local cultural centers at that time.
2. Behind this concentration of land were two sugar mills: Pasto Viejo, owned by the American Eastern Sugar Associates and El Ejemplo, owned by a Caone family of seignorial origins which managed to establish links with American interests.
3. See Scarano (1993) for a discussion of the "sugar age" and its effects on the island's overall economy.
4. Caone's population decreased from 34,853 to 33,381 inhabitants from 1950-1960. This is the only time that the population shows a general decrease since the 1940's. Since then, the population has steadily grown from 29,833 to 55,203 inhabitants in 1990 (See census of 1940-1990).
5. Roig had been named consular agent of the United States in the port of Naguabo in 1888. He was known to use his contacts with the Americans to learn about the position of sugar in the world market. Establishing links with the Americans was a mechanism for upward mobility initiated by some Puerto Rican elites at the time.
6. The organization of 'ausentes' (former residents) is very common in Puerto Rico where there is one or more such groups in each town of the island. These groups vary in the level of organization and the class composition of its membership throughout the island. In Caone, the organization is dominated by urban educated professionals most of whom now live in San Juan. "Ausentes" meet during the town's annual patron-saint festivities, and increasingly also meet during the celebration of different festivals.
7. During my fieldwork the Disney Store had just opened in the largest Shopping Center in San Juan. As a result, the fashionable Mickey Mouse became a common reference through which people expressed their fears of Americanization on the island.
8. Specifically the steady development of residential living settlements or 'urbanizaciones,' with their accompanying shopping centers has lessened the impact of the urban town as the site of all public activity. In 1984, there were twenty nine residential complexes in Caone, twenty five of which opened after 1960 (Abreu 1984).

9. With this term I refer to musicians whose compositions have separatist lyrics, advocating the need for independence for the island such as Andres Jimenez and Roy Brown.

Chapter IV

Just One More Festival: New Actors in Caone's

Cultural Politics

Nothing demonstrates more clearly the dynamics of contemporary cultural politics than the high proliferation of cultural festivals that are celebrated annually in Puerto Rico. As it will be seen, they encapsulate the variety of interests that are currently waged in cultural terms and the ensuing struggles involved in forging definitions of Puerto Rican culture. For whereas most festivals are popularly referred to as "cultural" festivals, not all of them are deemed culturally relevant, but rather are ranked to be more or less "cultural" according to the government's cultural policy and its view of the "national."

Nevertheless, these festivals have attained great popularity, turning the new grassroots cultural groups into important vehicles for the promotion of competing views of Puerto Rican culture and enlarging who can voice concerns in cultural terms. The popularity of these events is such that posters alluding to different cultural festivals are a common decoration in municipal offices, corporate quarters, and restaurants (from McDonalds to the local tavern), and people's living rooms in Puerto Rico where they are a quick way of identifying one's party, restaurant, product or oneself with Puerto Rican culture.

As a performance genre, festivals are events that "occur at calendrically regulated intervals and are public in nature, participatory in ethos, complex in structure, and multiple in voice, scene and purpose" (Stoeltje 1992:261). In her discussion Stoeltje argues that while many events can fit this description, those that purposely present themselves as festivals are often "contemporary modern creations" following a festival format but serving as medium for wider commercial, ideological and political interests. This definition fits contemporary festivals in Puerto Rico, which I will discuss as modern creations imbued with cultural meaning yet serving a variety of interests in present-day society.

Although there are many different kinds of festivals they all consist of more or less similar components. They are all a "Fiesta de Pueblo" (People's Festivity) in the sense that although organized by a limited and identifiable group, they are free and open to all the immediate community as well as all Puerto Ricans. They are fashioned after a theme that identifies or is associated with the community that organized the festivals, and generally last 3-10 days. They all evolve around a musical component which consists of a day and a night program that is presented on a central stage, around which kioskos [kiosks] or food vending posts are placed. Besides the music, festivals also feature different activities oriented to a wide variety of public,

from cooking contests to marathons.

Although contemporary festivals are fashioned after, and are not much different from the patron-saint festivities that have been celebrated on the island since Spanish colonization, the festivals represent a new development in Puerto Rico's cultural politics. For one, they are organized by local grassroots groups rather than by local governmental administrations, and they are distinguished by having a cultural thematic component that is chosen and highlighted by the organizing groups as a means of self-identification. Moreover, as documented by Quintero Rivera (1989) and as will become evident in our discussion, many organizers struggle to distinguish their work from the patron saint festivities.

The distinctions people draw to highlight the uniqueness of their cultural activities is important in understanding some of the constraints and motivations that have led people to organize these activities. As is evident by now, they occur in a politically charged and, as will be discussed later, in a corporate inundated environment, which makes them primary targets for political and corporate agendas. They also represent one of the few spaces of open public interaction and entertainment on the island where everyday public life is presented in the media as crime ridden, a potential menace and even life-threatening. Stressing the cultural content is often a source of

legitimizing activities which seek to voice wider concerns about social space, quality of life, or the economic development of a given community. These concerns have introduced many to the struggle over definitions of culture, as they seek to legitimize their activities to a larger community through materials that draw people beyond regional, class, and political divisions.

In this chapter I will highlight two independent grassroots groups located in Caone to analyze contemporary issues affecting Puerto Rico's cultural politics, and how these groups impact and are simultaneously impacted and, sometimes transformed by these dynamics. I will particularly highlight the role of these groups in providing new spaces for the forging of more encompassing views of Puerto Rican culture and highlighting nationally unrecognized local bits of Puerto Rican history through their work.

The concluding part of the chapter will consider how these groups help to reconstitute communality by claiming public space through their festivals and how these events cut across the dichotomies created by Puerto Rico's colonial context. Important dichotomies that these groups struggle to supersede include politico partisan divisions, the stereotypes that claim that the adherents of one political ideology are more "Puerto Rican" than others, and the distinction between "authentic" expressions of culture and

commercial culture.

Vissicitudes of "Breadfruit Lasagnas"

In 1982, a group of residents of the Mariana community grouped to found ARECMA (Asociacion Recreativa, Educativa, Cultural del Barrio Mariana), one of the first independent community groups in Caone.¹ The purpose of the organization was listed as follow:

ARECMA is a not for profit organization founded to obtain services to assure the well being of the community, develop recreational facilities, solve social problems that affect community life, and contribute to the social, educational and cultural wellbeing of our sector (mission charter in Que es ARECMA, in undated leaflet).

While the educational and cultural aspects were important components of ARECMA's mission, it was the needs of the upper Mariana community, ranging from waterworks, the construction of roads, to lobbying for the installation of telephone lines and recreational facilities in the area that provided the primary motivational force for the group. These needs were neglected by the municipal government due to the community's geographical distance from the urban center, in the rural highlands of Caone which lacked accessible roads until the 1960's, and its history of political opposition to PPD dominated Caone. Once a bastion for the Socialist party, even known as "Mariana, the Republic," Mariana continues to be a bastion of political dissent, although

today the political majority in Mariana is no longer Socialist but Pro-Statehood.²

ARECMA's members are mostly drawn from three or four large families to which a great percentage of the Mariana highland population are related (through kinship or marriage). They are descendants of small peasants who occupied steep and mountainous lands that were of no interest to the sugar landowners, which allowed Mariana to enjoy a degree of economic security not present in the coastal area. For while many Mariaenos, like most Caoenos, grew sugar cane during the 1920s, and some even lost their lands to the centrales (sugar mills), their farming of tobacco, rice, corn, beans, yams, and breadfruit and other crops sustained the community during the harshest economic times. ARECMA's familial composition has allowed ARECMA to bridge political and religious differences among its members, who represent all political and religious denominations, as well as all age groups in the community.

There is no formal criteria for membership other than a commitment to work in the planning and organization of the activities, and the size of the organization varies throughout the year, peaking during the annual festival, when most people are mobilized to work. Most members work in civil service and manufacturing (which provide 37.5% of jobs in the community). Women, who comprise almost three quarters of the population in Mariana are the majority of

the members and the make up of the leadership which includes up to 15 members. Nevertheless, the most important leaders of ARECMA have traditionally been drawn from the most educated members of the community, and are Pro-Independence and Socialist Party members related through kinship lines to those who originally founded the organization. Two of its most important leaders are a woman university professor of Social Work, commonly known as the "only Ph.d." in the area, and an ex-Catholic priest who is a high school teacher.

Such leadership has given the organization a reputation of being composed of independentistas and intellectuals. This reputation has also been strengthened by ARECMA's mobilizations to demand basic resources like sanitation and waterworks for the community, which were targeted as "subversive" and "troublesome" because according to people in Mariana, social compliance and submission were the social rule in the community.

The organization's reputation as an independentista bastion led to its persecution both within and outside the community. For instance, ARECMA's inclusion of overtly nationalistic folk singers in its annual festival was initially regarded as subversive. Even a walk against drugs organized by the group took on political overtones as the drug dealers were identified as PNP's, and ARECMA's mobilization was deemed to be motivated by politico-partisan concerns. ARECMA members complained of having been accused

of storing firearms in the basement of one of its members, and sending money to Nicaragua in the organization's early days. Its meetings were infiltrated by local agents and police informants who kept files on its meetings and activities. All the most important leaders of ARECMA learned in the 1990s that they had police dossiers listing their political activities and their meetings with the organization.

ARECMA was also subject to criticism from the local Catholic and Protestant churches, powerful organizations in a community that is almost equally divided between these two religious denominations. Because some of the first activities of ARECMA took place next to the Catholic church premises, where one of the leaders, William, had functioned as priest, Protestants initially saw the organization as a Catholic group. The inclusion of dance music and the sale of alcohol in ARECMA's festival also turned the most avid protestants away from the group. Meanwhile, the Catholic church condemned the ecumenical nature of their activities, and the activism that William had encouraged among the congregation. Indeed, it was from within the Catholic church itself that ARECMA's leadership had been developing, and that a Pro-Puerto Rican stance was being generated among the community, such as through the introduction of typical instruments and Puerto Rican music into the church. As William explained when commenting on how the dossier kept by

the police on his political activities had omitted his religious activities:

How silly of them! They included all of my most mundane political activities but there is no word here about my work in the church. How could they have been so stupid to have missed it. It is in the church that this community learned to love our things.

ARECMA's experience of persecution and mistrust was common to many groups I interviewed. This situation was more frequent among groups which began their work in the 1970s and early 1980s when social mobilization around culture was becoming commonplace among the Puerto Rican Left and these initiatives were perceived as openly oppositional. Repression was greatest among groups, like ARECMA, which voiced more specific social, economic and political demands. ICP-affiliated cultural centers, although some have also been subject to persecution, (due to the concentration of Pro-Independence advocates in these entities) were generally more tolerated than the newcomers because, for the most part, they have refrained from social and political concerns and their cultural work is sanctioned by the government.

Even today, when ARECMA's present membership is mostly PNP, the organization's reputation as an "independentista" organization of intellectuals still lingers. However, the group has obtained a strong presence in the community where people I talked to described ARECMA's members as "good workers" and people who "care about the community."

ARECMA's activities which ranged from their lobbying for

services in City Hall, walks against drugs to a children's summer camp, have won the organization greater popularity.

The group has also made itself present by participating in other events organized by other organizations in and out of Caone. In 1992, their festival was even dedicated to Caone on behalf of the city's bicentennial an act which members pointed to as a sign of the growth and capacity of their small group and community to give a "gift" to larger Caone and momentarily transform their subordinate position in relation to it. In turn, these transformations have accrued the group with a sense of moral self-righteousness, as evidenced by the statements of a long time member:

We have overcome too many barriers in this community. This is a very closed community and we have overcome too many obstacles. At first people were fearful and no one wanted to protest in City Hall, or work in the community, but we have achieved great intellectual, spiritual and moral development in our community through the work of ARECMA.

An important element contributing to ARECMA's popular recognition was the "Festival de la Pana," (the Breadfruit Festival), which ARECMA initiated in 1984. The festival, which grew out of a cooking workshop in 1984 was originally conceived as a small community celebration. Yet, much to the group's surprise, the festival soon became one of the most important celebrations for the whole of Caone and the rest of the island. At present, the Breadfruit Festival is the single most important activity celebrated by ARECMA, and the one which members consider to have given the group more

standing and respect in Caone, forging a name for the organization and enabling it to reach out into the community. The event is now attended by thousand of visitors from inside and outside Caone, lessening its previous identification as a politico-partisan event. These changes, however, have not come without a price. For ARECMA has had both to face challenges and engage in many compromises.

Like many other festivals initiated at this time, ARECMA's celebration drew from a particular symbol that is important in the community. There is a diversity of themes for these festivals, but most draw on the ICP's official regard for the peasant past in selecting fruits, vegetables, and other agricultural staples. Generally, however, the selection of most groups rejects an idyllic romantic image of the past by honoring the most mundane and ordinary subsistence crops that may or may not be specific to the region, but that are associated with different regional histories in very particular ways.

ARECMA's selection of the breadfruit, for instance, relates to the historical role of this vegetable as the subsistence staple in times of scarcity. Initially introduced to the island as food for slaves and animals, the breadfruit became the main subsistence staple in Mariana, as well as the rest of the island, because it yielded fruit during sugar production's "tiempo muerto" when the area was most dependent on its own products. People came from all

over Caone to pick wild breadfruit in Mariana, from which Marienos coined the pejorative name of "paneros", or "come pana" (breadfruit eaters). By selecting the breadfruit as their symbol, ARECMA intended to transform the pana from a symbol of poverty, backwardness and inferiority to a symbol of community identity and communal pride. During the festival, the breadfruit is featured in the stage decorations, fried foods and gourmet dishes that are made from breadfruit, and even in the trova (poem folk music) that is played in honor of the breadfruit. As stated by the present director:

What we wanted to do was exalt the breadfruit through its "gourmetisacion" [gourmetization], because the breadfruit was important for the survival of this community where people had to eat breadfruit for lunch and dinner. The breadfruit contributed to Mariana's lower status because the breadfruit was believed to be only for pigs. Peeling and boiling a breadfruit were seen as low status.

The festival has indeed contributed to the transformation of the breadfruit into a symbol of pride for the community. As noted by a long time member:

At first the young people complained about the name of the festival and were embarrassed by it, but now everyone is proud and they are the first ones to wear the t-shirts of the festival.

In 1994, even the national newspaper The San Juan Star featured some of the festival recipes and noted the changed image of the breadfruit. This is a good example of the national recognition many independent cultural festivals

have attained in Puerto Rican society. Today, pride in the festivals is evident among ARECMA members throughout the year. Discussions about the festival dominate most conversations and the Pana t-shirts are worn year-round. Moreover, the festival has become one of the primary means through which ARECMA reaches out to different segments of Mariana. In previous years, the festival has been dedicated to the youth and the Marienos "Ausentes" (former residents of Mariana,) many of which live in the United States, mainly in Delaware where many Marienos migrated to seek agricultural work in the 1940s.

The Breadfruit Festival was initially very similar to an ICP-defined cultural representation. Although it had no ties to the ICP, it drew mostly from the ICP's list of affiliated artists to find "authentic" representatives of Puerto Rican culture for its festival. These festivals are more often organized by independentistas and intellectuals (school teachers and college professors) like the leaders of ARECMA's who purposely aim to display overtly nationalistic musicians. Folkloric artists were also selected because they were seen as the most representative of the community's rural history which is the festival's identifying theme. In addition, nationalist artists like Andrés Jiménez, and Roy Brown, who have attained great popularity nationwide, were a common feature of ARECMA's festival from the start, even prior to their current popularization. Festivals like

ARECMA's are thought to be more "cultural" than commercial by ICP standards and are often, although not always, looked favorably upon by the ICP. The latter attempts to identify with and show approval to these type of festivals by awarding small contributions to their music program (usually no more than \$500.00 to pay an ICP-affiliated artist in their program). These types of festivals also provide the basis for the common scholarly interpretation of these festivals as examples of colonial resistance (Quintero-Rivera 1989).

Nevertheless, like most locally organized festivals, ARECMA's program has always mixed and matched ICP-affiliated artists with popular musicians in order to include local musicians and local entertainment in the activity. Included in ARECMA's mostly folkloric program, for instance, was a "Menudo-like" pop group and a Karate demonstration. "Esto también es cultura," (this is culture too) I was told, after inquiring about the inclusion of these groups which departed from their previously stated goal of a more "traditional" program.

The development of the festival as ARECMA's primary activity was not without internal resistance. In keeping with the dominant ideology of regarding culture as for education not for entertainment, some members believed that the popularization of the festival would detract from the organization's cultural objectives. For one, the growth of

the festival made the organization more dependent on the support from the wider Mariana community which in turn required the organization to "popularize" itself by reaching out to PNP sectors of the community to diversify the mostly PIP and Socialist leadership. This involved taking a less strict stance on issues affecting the community in order to safeguard social consensus and soften their reputation as a "subversive" group. One of the members that distanced himself at this time was a local leader of the Socialist Party. He now recalls:

We realized that some of the positions we were taking were perceived to be too radical in this community. Some people thought that we were jaded ["quemados," literally 'burnt']. At that moment we shifted towards reconciling with the community.

In addition, the growth of the festival required that the organization tap into corporate sponsors, as well as local senators and politicians. These are sources of funding from which they had initially refrained but which were now seen as a way of defraying the higher cost for folk artists and salsa groups whose prices had sharply increased due to the popularity of cultural festivals throughout the island.³ It was also believed that despite the festival's great impact inside and outside Caone, its growth was distracting the organization from other activities, given that festivals can cost up to \$30,000⁴ and take most of the organization's time. Disagreements about these issues ended with the resignation of some members who had been key in the

organization and led to some transformation. The family-based structure of the organization, which had been its strength, ended up hurting the organization at this time because the members left accompanied by their families.

The result of these tensions was the transformation of the group and the organization of the festival. PNP members began to outnumber the socialist core of the group, and the group began to yield to some demands of the community. For instance, to meet members' demands, ARECMA has begun to showcase popular music over the last years, which they had initially refrained from doing. They began to add a salsa or merengue band each night in addition to the traditional folkloric programming. At the same time, the nationalistic genres that initially made ARECMA subject of criticism began to attain greater acceptance and have now become an intrinsic part of its annual program.

However, ARECMA's popularity has made it particularly susceptible to greater political and economic constraints. The "gourmetization" of the breadfruit was indeed a costly task. For instance, because ARECMA's work has gained national recognition, it is a likely candidate for ICP's attempts at incorporating the more "cultural" expressions to strengthen itself through the appropriation of alternative cultural productions. In fact, the local ICP-affiliated cultural center listed the Breadfruit Festival as one of its sponsored activities, (for having contributed \$250.00 toward

a musical group) in its application to the annual "Winston Medal for Culture", which caused tensions with ARECMA when the center won the prize of \$5,000 and national recognition. ARECMA had previously applied for this prize, unsuccessfully, but Caone's ICP-affiliated center won on its first application because it is generally easier for these centers to win given that the corporation grants at least two awards to ICP-affiliated cultural groups as a means of involving the ICP in the project. The major cause of offense to ARECMA was that its festival was publicly linked to the Cultural Center, when the latter's contribution to ARECMA's festival had been minimal, thereby threatening their identification with the festival.

ARECMA has also had to defend the autonomy of their festival from the municipal administration which always requests that some kiosks are reserved for city hall in exchange for the technical support it provides for these festivals (trash collection, lighting and permits). ARECMA's opposition has involved public demonstrations at city hall as well as the active monitoring of the exposure politicians get on stage to limit their ability to use the festival for political self promotion. However, it has been increasingly difficult for ARECMA to defend its autonomy from the municipal administration since it began to borrow a municipally owned public space to celebrate the festival after outgrowing the original locale within the Mariana

community. As a result, the group is often pressed into giving up one or more of the kioskos to the municipal administration, which has been known to use it for political fundraising activities.

The festival has also attracted the attention of corporate sponsors, which created problems when the group decided to hire a "go-between" to help with corporate sponsors, a move which ended up limiting the group's association with their festival. The promoter, hired after she had promised to increase the amount they had received from corporate funders, ended up giving more concessions to the corporations than were originally granted by ARECMA. In previous years, ARECMA allowed advertising in the drink kioskos along with flags and promotional banners around the festival's surroundings. The promoter, however, promised corporations far greater exposure such as placing a giant inflated can of the sponsoring product by the stage, without previously consulting the group. ARECMA members were extremely upset about the concessions because they meant that the companies would obtain too much credit for what is really the community's effort. The sense was that "we work hard for this festival, this is a community festival, and no one can take credit for our work."

Despite difficulties in maintaining the festival as a financially self-sustainable community event, discussions about the festival during meetings and informal

conversations always stressed its importance to the community and ended with a stated conviction that the festival should continue. As one person put it: "This is our gift to this community. We are making history with this event." As other groups who have had to make similar compromises in their festival, they presented the changes as a "need" that would not compromise the cultural nature of the festival. Instead, the group emphasized continued control of the activity, and measures were taken to limit the involvement of politicians and advertising in areas that are considered "most cultural." In the next chapter I will elaborate on how ARECMA and other groups negotiated corporate sponsorship to safeguard the cultural content of their activity. Suffice is to say here that trying to defend their festival's autonomy has been a difficult task.

By the time I left Mariana, ARECMA was on the verge of accomplishing its long time goal of establishing its own multi-activity community center. It had put a down payment on some land with money earned from the festival and donations from the local senator, and it had held community meetings to plan the project. In a public meeting held to discuss the fate of the locate, a cultural center was one of the ideas most community residents supported for the use of the newly acquired space. Their dream facility would include, among other things, an all-purpose activity and recreational area, a child care center, and even a pool,

which points to their concern with issues of recreation and an the improvement of the quality of life which was common among similar groups. The festival would no longer be celebrated on municipal terrain, but would be "brought back to the community," which organizers felt would lessen the risk of crime, provide a more family-like setting and enhance the group's control over the activity. Both their plans to establish themselves in this facility and their future objectives point to their continuing search for spaces in which to achieve greater autonomy and independence, even when these goals may become more elusive for the group.

The Flat Bottom Boat, Whose Boat?

Another well-known group in Caone is the Committee of the Lancha Planua Festival founded in 1988 purely for the celebration of a festival. This is a common origin of many of these groups throughout the island, especially those founded in the late 1980's were mostly inspired by already existing festivals. The festival was originally initiated out of city hall where the main organizer, a long time resident of La Playa, a PPD activist and teacher of physical education, was working at the time. As he explained "the idea was to organize something to highlight La Playa because most of the nearby communities had their own regional celebration and nothing was happening in La Playa." The

group was registered with the following mission statement:

The festival is founded to provide La Playa with a recreational, cultural and sport activity and to promote internal tourism to contribute to the socioeconomic development of the eastern area (Programa del Sexto Festival, 1994).

The festival soon became the primary venue for the expression of a regional identity in an area that has been most subject to the sugar industry. Coastal residents were unable to rely on farming since most flat coastal lands were in the hands of the sugar mills. There, a port, the most important in the eastern area, served as the lifeline of the community until its closing in 1958 (Ortiz-Cuadra 1991).⁵ During the most active days of the port (1910-1950's), a public infrastructure--a school, police department, mail station -- and a booming commerce were developed as a direct result of the coastal sugar activities, allowing La Playa a degree of self sufficiency from Caone's municipal government. As a result of this administrative distancing from the town center, people in La Playa fostered a local identity that glorifies the richness brought by the port while de-emphasizing the region's history of active trade unions, and its dependence on the sugar based economy.

Today, the days of the port are presented as the real cause for Caone's growth, rather than the achievements of the urban center, and many define themselves as "playeros," rather than as Caoenos. The most utopian of all even talk about turning La Playa into a separate municipality; a goal

which has been achieved by other coastal communities in Puerto Rico that have developed independently from their respective municipal towns.⁶ It is this regional pride which the Festival's Committee drew upon to organize a festival that provides a setting where the "greatness" of the area could be recreated.

This "recreation" is particularly important today, thirty years after the port's closing, when poverty and unemployment are common in the area. A post office is the only administrative enclave left in the region where 26.3% of the civilian force is unemployed (census) and only 10.1% of the people work inside the locality (PECES 94).

Like ARECMA, the present Lancha Committee mirrors the regional history of the area. For one, the composition of its membership evidences the continued class/race segregation of the residents, the product of the area's sugar history. This segregation is evident even in the layout of the neighborhood which is divided into the seashore area and the "parcelas," (lands previously owned by the sugarcane industry which were bought by the government to subsidize workers in the area). The seashore properties are presently occupied by the descendants of the wealthy merchants who once dominated the town's economy. Some of them still run small stores, but most work outside the community in service occupations. They are lighter skinned than the rest of the community, and many are linked by

kinship or marriage ties. The "parcelas" are mostly inhabited by the descendants of the sugarcane and port workers, many of whom are currently unemployed or make a living through fishing, part/time construction work, or welfare subsidies.

The festival's organizing committee is mainly composed of merchants, mostly restaurant or food store owners, with the addition of representative members from different groups in the community, whose help, connections and consent are indispensable for the celebration. Thus the president of the Fishermen's Organization, the woman with connections at Lands Authority Administration (which helps arrange for the loan of municipally owned space for the festival), the woman who has experience organizing pageants, or the man who is a known community leader all are part of the committee. Membership, mostly by invitation, confers prestige on the members, and once in the group they tend to attend most meetings. These meetings are organized informally in a member's home and are only held seven to eight months prior to the festival's celebration. Only members and friends or visitors who want to be involved in the festival attend the meetings, which deal primarily with its organization.

The festival is presently organized by a committee of La Playa residents, but the association of its leader with the municipal PPD administration of the times has left the group with a Pro-PPD image. Despite this, and like ARECMA,

the group's present constitution is more politically diverse than its image. This diversity of political representation, more common among independent groups than the ICP affiliated centers, is assured by the dependence of these groups upon the resources, skills and contacts of community members, irrespective of their political affiliation. What has remained constant, however is the autocratic leadership of the organization, which still revolves around the founding member of the group.

Although Committee is not open to the broader public, the popularity of the event is assured by the group's symbolic appeal to the flat bottomed fishing boat, the Lancha Planua, which endows the activity with great popularity among the area's fishermen. This boat, commonly made in other coastal areas of Puerto Rico, is believed to be unique by La Playa residents because of its flat bottomed design and method of construction. The Lancha is useless for fishing today because pollution has made it impossible to fish near the coast. Instead, they are used to take short trips around the coast or as ferries to reach larger fishing boats. Moreover, the Lancha has become a sports and a tourist attraction which has led to transformations in its design. Currently, Lanchas are designed to be faster in order to compete in a race during the festival.

The descendants of the originator of the Lancha are known residents of Las parcelas. They trace the origins of

the Lancha not to their family, but rather to the Taino, who as stated by a local Lancha-builder "were the first ones to navigate with a Lancha Planua." This tendency to find a Taino origin for the object or event around which a festival is celebrated is a common way of legitimizing festivals which do not draw directly on Puerto Rico's peasant past, and which are more likely to be targeted as "fads" for the celebration of one more festival.

Most people, however, traced the Lancha to La Playa, as something "original to this country" without seeking any other legitimation for the celebration of a festival in its honor. The festival has been embraced by the community, which constantly compares it to the famous festivities that were common during the days of the port, La Playa's glory days. This local enthusiasm for the festival even overrides divisions and contradictions, such as the fact that local merchants do not buy local fisherman's fish because frozen imported fish is cheaper, although the fishermen are the greatest supporters of the festival. Fishermen provide financial aid, help with construction and maintenance, and the organization of the Lancha Race Regatta after which the festival is named. It is the fishermen who work to construct "Lanchas", which can cost up to \$500.00, and which may or may not be bought by a participant in the regatta. But the regatta is never publicized as much as the fishermen would like. One fisherman acknowledged their subordinate position

in the Festival's organization, accepting that the 'Lancha Planua' was just a good excuse for the celebration of a festival:

They just have the Lancha because of the name. You can see that because they even schedule three main activities at the same time as the Lancha regatta.

The committee's rendition of La Playa's history, briefly written in the festival's program, or the account of the origins of the fishermen's village, read on stage during a homage to the fishermen, also revealed the fishermen's subordinate position. These renditions were gathered by the committee through taped interviews with the oldest residents of the population, which the committee used to begin the first written account of La Playa's history. The history revolves around the most well known families of La Playa, identified by class and family, (further revealing the permanence of class and status hierarchies in the area) as well as the 'innovations' (factories, farms, barbershops, cars, festivities,) or the achievements (best workers in different areas, war heroes, musicians) that individuals brought to La Playa. The tribute, however, ended up emphasizing the merchants' contribution to La Playa, and deemphasizing the contribution of the fishermen and the port workers. Most of all, the text provoked questions and reactions from people about relatives, forbearers, and other people who were not included in the program. Some fishermen, like Juan, who identified himself as a lifelong fisherman,

disowned the version of the village read on stage during the homage to the fishermen.

What was read was Jorge's version. He is a descendant of the merchants and his father used to steal the workers' salary through his canteen. He enriched himself through poverty and through the children. What was read was a lie. We recognized it but no one said anything because we were already on stage.

Despite these contradictory renditions of La Playa's history and the little attention that the Lancha attained as a festival theme, I was surprised that most residents of La Playa I talked to about the festival defended both the festival and its organizers. I found similar views voiced by the participants of other festivals where the theme was not given a lot of attention. Instead, other aspects of the festival, beyond the theme itself, were regarded by the participants as being also part of La Playa community. For instance, the competition over the "Palo Ensebao," a discontinued popular game that was a centerpiece of the previous celebrations of the area and the pageant contest, in which a young woman is selected to represent the region in other activities throughout the island, were elements of the festival that people identified with La Playa.

The pageant contest was not originally included in the program, but was added on the initiative of one of the women in the group. Its organizer, a single mom whose daughter was later selected as queen, took the idea from the patron saint festivities, which annually selects one queen to represent

Caone. Believing that the selection of one queen for all of Caone was not representative of La Playa, the organizer aimed to create a local pageant that would also serve as a venue for getting young girls involved in the festival. The pageant has since become one of the most important and well-attended activities in the festival, and a way for La Playa to gain representation at the national level. It has also become a venue for young women to join the Lancha Committee as pageant winners are given the option of becoming part of the committee, constituting the youngest members of the group. In order to understand the popularity of this pageant contest it is important to note that beauty pageants along with sports competitions are highly charged with nationalistic overtones on the island, serving as forums for the display of Puerto Rican nationality. These events have historically provided a forum for Puerto Rico to momentarily shed its colonial identity through participation in international beauty pageants, and Olympic sport competitions (McCaloon 1984, Torres n.d.). At the local level these pageants are similarly charged with regionalistic overtones. The "Queen of the Lancha's Festival," for instance, is expected to attend most festivals throughout the island to represent the community of La Playa. The success of her tenure is judged according to the number of different queens from other towns she is able to gather and bring to La Playa for her outgoing

ceremony. A teary outgoing queen, an 18 year old and first-year university student was considered a very successful queen because she attended almost 40 festivals throughout the island during her tenure and invited 50 queens from other towns to her outgoing ceremony. She echoed this sentiment in a monologue that is evocative of the language and the emotionally charged wording used by queens all over the island:

My dear "Playeros," it has been an honor to represent La Playa and exalt the name of the community, and represent our Playero traditions that are the pride of La Playa and of all Puerto Rico, I am a Playera at heart and the trophies I have won, everything, is all for La Playa.....My pride was telling everywhere I went about this community and, and when people asked me which town I came from, I always proudly said La Playa. Some had heard about this festival, and others had even visited, but others learned for the first time that Caone had two queens, not only the one of Caone, but also a queen of La Playa.

Local residents also pointed at its role in attracting commerce and visitors to the area, projecting an image of the community to the outside, and providing a safe, carefree setting [ambiente tranquilo] for social interaction. Unlike ARECMA, the Lancha festival incorporated corporate sponsors from the beginning. Members are not ambivalent about this funding and the number of corporate sponsors that become interested in the activity is one measure of the festival's success and popularity. This attitude is related to its role in attracting commerce and tourism to La Playa, which are key aspects of La Playa's economy. Thus the number of

people from other towns that attend the festivals, the volume of cars in the parking lot, the number of absent players coming back to La Playa during the festival and the increase of sales and commerce, were all cited to me as important aspects that make this festival the "best in the area."

The Lancha festival has evolved into the most popular activity in the community, but the Lancha Committee has not been free of criticism. Internally, women members have voiced criticisms about the autocratic and impulsive attitude of the male founder of the group. Interestingly, some of them excused the director's behavior as that of a child and blamed the vice president, another woman, for the president's flaws. They blamed the woman vice president for failing to "handle" and direct him to control his temperament, an attitude tied to the belief that women should not be leaders but rather be of assistance to the leader. One of them quit the organization and another one was thinking of leaving by the time I left Caone.

Within the community, a local environmental group (the Neighborhood Committee) founded in the mid-1980's to challenge a plan by the Waterworks Administration to build a Primary Treatment Plan in the area, publicly criticized the lack of involvement by the Lancha committee in countering this plan, which would have worsened the area's pollution problem. Although some members of the Lancha Committee

belong to the environmental group that organized the protests, the Lancha Committee itself, as well as the majority of the fishermen and merchants in the community remained outside the environmental struggle which, like ARECMA's mobilization for resources, was feared and targeted as revolutionary. Besides these fears, which are common among other groups organizing protests in their communities, it was believed that the Lancha Committee's lack of participation was due to its links with the PPD municipal government which backed the plant and discouraged local mobilization. The environmental group publicly attacked the Lancha Committee, for not joining in their struggle, and for not being truly representative of their community, because they are not elected by it but are appointed by existing members.

The priorities of the Lancha Committee were also criticized for being unrepresentative of the needs of its larger community. One of the members of the Neighborhood Committee noted:

They are planning to build a "glorieta" [small shrine-like niche] in the cemetery, but if they really were in touch with the community they would know that what we really need is a basketball court and recreational areas to give youth things to do that will keep them off drugs.

The Lancha Committee's more superfluous priorities are partly explained by the fact that the group's priorities are mostly decided by the director of the group, without a

general consultation with other sectors of the population. Thus it is the leader along with a merchant-dominated leadership who sets the group's priorities emphasizing aesthetic changes to boost tourism and economic development rather than addressing more basic needs of the community. The environmental group, in turn, has organized around a neighborhood committee, and like ARECMA in Mariana, is planning to establish a cultural center in its community and maybe a Coconut Festival in La Playa community. I was told that the proposed festival was its response to the inability of the Lancha Committee to fully include the community in the festival's organization. The vicinal committee hopes to incorporate more of the community by adding a voting process to make decisions about the scope and content of the festival. The new festival is in its earliest stages; but yet the reasons I was given for its creation accurately characterize the rationale behind this and other local initiatives:

We want something that is organized by us, and that represents us, where we could bring the things we like, and that is something that unites the community, that is organized and directed by the community.

The plan for a new festival in La Playa exemplifies the value ascribed to these celebrations in attaining recognition and representation within their respective communities. It is also telling of the importance placed on a festival's "community orientation" as a means of popular

legitimization. And, while the new celebration will probably not be rid of internal contradictions, it is likely to broaden the discussion of what and who should be representative of "La Playa."

"Haciendo Patria": For Space and Representation

So far I have emphasized how ARECMA and the Lancha's Committee differ in origins, scope and content. ARECMA, was born out of community work, whereas the Lancha's Committee was the creation of a city hall worker, and is mostly composed of the community's merchants. Membership in the former is also more open than in the latter, where it is mostly by invitation. ARECMA is more cautious of commercial and governmental involvement in the festival than in the Lancha's Festival, where commercial involvement itself was a mark of the success of their festival. Lastly, ARECMA draws more on activities that represent more of the institutionalized views of Puerto Rican culture than the Lancha's Festival in which most activities evolve around beach games, sports and music, rather than folk art and nationalist artists. Beyond these differences, however, ARECMA and the Lancha Committee share many similarities with the other community groups I interviewed throughout the island.

Most significantly, these groups are working at the level of civil and political society (Cohen and Arato 1992);

they are opening new venues for public discussion in civil society while exerting political pressure for greater resources and representation for their communities vis a vis greater Caone. The work of these groups is similar to that of other groups involved in social work within their communities in other contexts, where issues of social reproduction, time, space, resources and identity take precedence over class struggle, and where the construction of collective identities becomes the site of struggles over meaning and representation and resources (Castells 1983, Harvey 1989).

In terms of attaining resources, ARECMA members have secured a three year allocation of \$10,000 towards its community center from the regional senator during the length of my research. This grant bypassed the municipal government which had not contributed to its work (mostly due to the group's local reputation as an "independentista" stronghold). In addition, through the successful organization of the festival, which has increasingly grown in complexity since its origin, the group's members have secured a reputation as competent organizers thereby increasing their leverage with the municipality. The Lancha Festival, for its part, is regarded by people in La Playa community as the most important medium for attracting commerce, visitors, and tourism and attaining greater standing in Caone. However, these advantages affect La

Playa residents unequally since it is the merchants, some of whom have beach front properties, who benefit most from attracting tourism through the festival. Other groups have been even more successful in obtaining resources for the community through their work. The most successful group I met received \$250,000 from their local municipality toward opening a facility for their organization which will incorporate environmental, recreational, drug-prevention and cultural goals.⁷

In attracting public attention to community needs, the celebration of a cultural festival was a common priority for most of the groups I came in contact with during my research. In fact, as stated earlier, most of the independent groups I interviewed have organized, like the Lancha Committee, solely around the celebration of a festival. The public character of the festival, which local residents see as a tool for attaining social recognition and drawing attention to itself within and outside their communities is an important factor that contributes to its popularity. The proliferation of these festivals was described to me as the "fiebre de festivales" (the fever of organizing festivals), referring to the popularity that organizing or being involved in the organization of a festival has attained. This is particularly important in itself because it entails the expansion of the number of individuals, groups, and

interests that can be active participants in the representation of Puerto Rican culture in public life.

In this process, these groups both validate and challenge the standards of the government cultural policy for defining authentic Puerto Rican culture. They sometimes draw from official definitions of Puerto Rican culture in selecting the content of their activities thereby contributing to the reproduction of the government standards for defining culture. For instance, many groups seek legitimization of their activities by including at least some folk music in their programming, although this was usually showcased in the morning or early afternoon rather than in prime time hours of the festival which are at night; by requesting ICP assistance, even if this was often declined; or by presenting the artisans participating in their events as ICP-affiliated, even if not always true. At the same time, however, these groups also promote different elements of regional and popular culture becoming important venues for expressing different aspects of Puerto Rican culture beyond the official cultural policy. In this process, different aspects of contemporary life, including food, music and contemporary folk arts e.g., frying cod fish fritters for sale or even just attending the festival, were referred to as "haciendo patria" and representations of Puerto Ricanness. Often just the event itself was considered cultural, to the point that many groups failed to

include standardized symbols of Puerto Rican culture in their celebrations. This was the case with many festivals in which, as in the Lancha Festival, the theme is never fully acknowledged. For example, during the Pineapple Festival in Vega Alta, once an important pineapple growing region, the only allusion to the pineapple was the Piña Colada vending stand and a pineapple cardboard cut out on stage; or in the Festival of the Chipe, the Chipe fish turnovers sold at one of the kioskos. Yet, despite the lack of elements that clearly associated specific festivals with specific themes, most of the festivals I visited were presented as "cultural festivals." Even activities that had only been celebrated for two or three years were presented in this manner -- as a Puerto Rican tradition that should be safeguarded and continued by the community. This characterization was associated with their being "organized by our communities," which made them representatives of Puerto Rican values and traditions. When I asked what those values are, people pointed to the history of the region, the fried food that is sold in the festival, or the familiar setting that characterizes the event. Thus, far from being seen as a contradiction, the absence of overt themes in the cultural festivals did not lessen their appeal or cultural identification within their communities. This has been previously noted by Quintero Rivera (1991), who observed a preponderance of sensorial stimulus in these festivals,

where food, music and enjoyment were always at the center of the activities. Thus, the meaningfulness of a particular spectacle is not circumscribed by specific "proofs" of representativity or to "the degree to which the elements displayed to the public seem to represent key elements in the public's cultural and emotional life" (Beeman 1993), but rather to the experiences generated within the context of the festival.

Moreover, through their showcasing of diverse genres, rhythms and forms of entertainment, these festivals attract diverse sectors of society that are perceived by public opinion as distinct. In order to understand this issue, it is important to note that music has been an important element around which identities are constructed in Puerto Rican society. As discussed by Ana Maria Garcia's (1993) film "Cocolos y Rockeros," the categories of "conserva" and "a go go" or "cocolos" and "rockeros" (to denominate adherents to Afro-Caribbean music and rock in the 1960's and 1980's), have served to identify distinct class and race groupings on the island. While these social groups are not self-contained, "Cocolos" are perceived as darker lower-class Puerto Ricans in contrast to "rockeros," which refers to whiter, middle and upper class Puerto Ricans.⁸ In most of these cultural festivals, these categories are crosscut through the showcasing of popular, oppositional, folkloric or dancing music, which have served as an important basis

for expressing societal differences, yet are now jointly presented in the same setting. (Not surprisingly, this cross-fertilization of rhythms is one of the things that many ICP promoters most disliked, as noted in chapter two.)

Of course, involvement in the actual production of these events was not the only way in which people became active participants or affected the constitution of the program. This issue becomes evident when one analyzes the disjunctures between the group's objectives and the ensuing developments of these events. ARECMA's original intention to organize a more "cultural" and "community-based" event was transformed as the festival attained a regional and national constituency and the event became so popularized. This transformation involved negotiating greater acceptance in its community which spurred internal transformations in the organization, as well as a toning down of its political identification to bridge gaps between other groups in the community. Similarly, La Lancha Committee's original aim to develop an activity that represents La Playa and attract business and tourism evolved into an important catalyst for the work of other groups in the nearby community who have criticized the outlook of the Lancha Committee. These groups have directly responded to a perceived lack of interest and responsiveness by the Lancha Committee to the greater problems affecting the community.

Many groups I interviewed experienced similar

developments, especially because, as shown by the case of ARECMA and the Lancha Committee, these festivals often constitute the forum in which internal differences, conflicts and contradictions of their respective communities are worked out. Thus while organizers recognized the great appeal of these festivals and their ability to draw attention to the group and help "give a name" to their community, they were also aware that these events often take on a life of their own almost independently of the group.

In light of these issues I became convinced that beyond the particular program or content of the activity the importance of these festivals also stems from the events themselves, and from their role as a venue for social interaction and a forum for social encounters that would otherwise be unavailable. In the local context, where as said before everyday public life is deemed dangerous, the work of these groups speaks to a common preoccupation with the lack of public space for expression and encounters in contemporary Puerto Rican society. Indeed, the encroachment of crime in contemporary life is great and demanding. Puerto Rico's crime statistics have continued to increase in the last years reaching levels that are way above average for most cities in the U.S. (which serves as the major reference for local statistics).⁹ A survey conducted in 1994 showed that 64% of the population feared to venture alone one mile outside their homes, and 67% felt that criminality was worse

than ever (El Nuevo Dia May 25, 1994).

Against this context, attendance to these events can also be seen as a daring act of defiance, and the proliferation of these groups as a venue to create and expand public spheres. Thus, these festivals, in turn help reconstitute communality by providing public spaces for exchange and communication around the open societal events and public, outdoor spaces that are so encroached upon. I am using public "spheres" in plural to go beyond Habermas' conception of a bourgeois public sphere, as an idyllic and unattainable inclusive space centered on "rational critical discourse" (Habermas 1992). Instead, I draw from some re-elaborations of Habermas' term that emphasize the variety of public spaces that can serve as "counterpublics" and alternative spaces and models of community (Calhoun 1992, Urla 1995).

For instance, these festivals and cultural groups are enlarging common grounds and spaces by shattering the strict politico-partisan dichotomies that dominate much of everyday interactions in Puerto Rico. This is evident in the emphasis that people give to superseding individual political, and religious identities for the sake of communal goals. This aspect is especially important in contemporary Puerto Rico, where the sharp political dichotomies between the two dominant parties of Pro-Commonwealth and Pro-Statehood, to the exclusion of the separatist option, have helped

perpetuate the colonial situation and further dependency on the U.S. A self-identified political "fanatic" recounted the way his attitudes about politics changed through his involvement in one of these local groups:

Initially these people from an opposing political party entered the group, and I was suspicious until I realized that their involvement did not affect the work of the community, but that they had the same preoccupations as I did. I began to wonder whether it is positive to identify with different political parties. Today, I consider myself an 'apolitical' person [not involved in partisan politics]. I decided that it is not worth it to be identified with partisan politics, but that what is important is that people are identified with the community. Now I hold the vision that whoever is concerned with the community will have my friendship and support.

This common preoccupation to appear "non-partisan" is also revealing of the reconfiguration of politics island-wide since the 1970s described in chapter one. Specifically, since the PNP Party first challenged the PPD power, people have gotten enough evidence that, as I was told, "civic work and politics don't mix." Many cultural groups have been adversely affected by a strict identification with a political party that makes them susceptible to lack of funds and support whenever there is a change of administration between the two dominant parties (Pro-Commonwealth and Pro-Statehood). Most ICP-affiliated centers have been equally affected, and have also sought to shed their identification with given political parties, although for them this goal has been most difficult to

achieve given the historical legacy of these institutions as PPD and PIP dominated. Thus, the concern to forge intra-party community groups signals a growing obsolescence of the older patronage party system and a growing disenchantment with formal politics in favor of civic activism.

The common concern among these groups with opening new venues of public interaction is also evident in the similar plans many groups have to establish and administer a physical space, just like the groups in Mariana and La Playa. In fact, many of these groups originally met around a project to reclaim a physical space within their immediate community, either unused lands, old houses or historical sites, and share similar goals of establishing multi-purpose and activity centers. These proposed centers were often distinguished from the ICP-cultural centers already established in their community by their organizers, who stressed the community and social service orientation that will characterize their independent projects. A cultural group which is planning to open a physical space in its community explained this difference as follows:

The cultural center is for the entire Vega Alta, but our organization is for the community, and it is not restricted to culture. We aim to attend to the elderly and youth, and to increase the space for recreation and leisure.

In order to safeguard their reputation as "community organizations," people often stressed the "familiar," and "community" setting of their activities by contrasting them

to the local municipally organized patron saint activities that are celebrated annually by each town. Even though many of these festivals often shared many similarities in content and programming with the patron saint festivities, and many have even been modeled after them, people avoided identifying their activities with the latter because these have developed a reputation of being too commercialized, crime and drug-ridden. Most importantly, patron saint celebrations are identified as the product of the political party in the different local municipalities.

Even the most boisterous festivals were presented by the organizers as cultural, family-oriented "community based" activities. One explanation for this emphasis on protecting the family image of these festivals is that most criticisms directed at these events have raised the issue of their community value, questioning their safety and pointing to their excesses. This view was voiced by a member of the cultural commission in the Legislature, who expressed his wish to minimize the number of these festivals as follows:

It is not that I am against these festivals, but why do we have to have so many? Why not concentrate them into four and five and do them the right way, and spend the money for these festivals on other things. You make more "patria" [motherland] that way. I do not understand how you make "patria" and culture standing up on a stage and yelling insanities while a mass is going on in the plaza... if that is culture then let God come down and say so!

In order to maintain their reputation, there is a

marked tendency to excuse and play down any acts of violence that take place in these festivals as "accidents" rather than the norm. Dismissing a stabbing that took place during one of these festivals, one of the organizers told me:

Yes, there was a stabbing, but that had nothing to do with the festival, that was about something that was cooking before, and was going to happen at any moment, and the woman did not get hurt, that was not about the festival.

Similar comments were made about this incident by different people who defended the family nature of their celebrations and denied that the festival was a dangerous place by separating violence and petty fights from the context of the activity. This trend also speaks to people's defense of public space, through their attempt to restrict the proliferation of fear in the festivals, even when crime and violence cannot be so easily curbed.

Another important aspect of the public spheres created by the work of the cultural groups is their emergent transnational character. Many groups have borrowed from the patron saint festivities the celebration of "absentee days" in their events (dedicated to the members of their communities who are now living outside it or in the States). It was also common for people living in the States to schedule their visits to the island during a festival.¹⁰ These visits are facilitated by the many travel agencies geared to the Puerto Rican community in the States, many of which keep a register of these festivals to advise people of

festive times to visit the island and avoid the "tiempo muerto" (a metaphor from sugar cane production also used to describe times of little festive activity on the island). t-shirts, posters and programs alluding to the festival are sent to relatives in the States, and so are the fruits and vegetables that are the theme of the event. Through videotaping (made by visiting Puerto Ricans or local residents) sent to friends these festivals are also finding their way to people's living rooms in New York, Delaware or Connecticut as the latest examples of Puerto Rican culture. A young man taping a children's trovadour contest being held in a festival explained: "This is for my parents back home [N.Y], they come from the countryside and would love to see little girls sing old men's songs". Thus what people oftentimes see are new elements being praised as "cultural" as people tap their communities for the symbolic raw material to organize their festivals and present them as community cultural events.

Lastly, whereas it was common among organizers to present their festivals as a cultural event, different factors affected the public's identification of these festivals. Whether they were residents of the organizing community or visitors, or their expectations for the event were among the factors that contributed to people's appreciation of an activity as a "cultural festival." This is an important point because it frames the significance of

these events at the national level. In particular, whereas these celebrations are organized for a variety of purposes, not limited to "culture," many of them have attained a national reputation and are visited by many seeking outward cultural manifestations in the events.

Those expecting more outward cultural manifestations festival as "cultural" were part of what I will call a "travelling audience," composed of a festival constituency that has developed around these events and that regularly visits these festivals throughout the year. This travelling audience is mostly composed of college students, university-educated professionals, and middle class families and middle-aged women accompanied by friends. These visitors tend to concentrate on the day-time activities (folk-art fairs, children's activities, vendors), rather than on the evening activities where local residents are more highly represented. Lastly, this audience was also more likely to express nationalistic reasons for attending different festivals, such as "to back Puerto Rican culture," "to see our things of Puerto Rico," or "to follow our culture." As a tendency, visitors show their "patriotic" motivations by wearing t-shirts allusive to other cultural festivals, or with patriotic logos, such as "Get Up and Fight Puerto Rican" or Taino iconography printed on them.

However, while the display of outward cultural manifestations was a common expectation for these festivals,

often used to determine how authentically "cultural" they really are, these manifestations were not limited to those elements that officially represent the national culture. Instead, people visited these festivals expecting something different and unique to the area; such as a new food fritter or new ways of decorating the kioskos. A couple of times I even witnessed outside visitors chastising local organizers for "letting Puerto Rico down" by not fully showcasing the cultural theme advertised in the program. A young man with his wife, residents of San Juan (festival followers as was evident by their distinctive festival t-shirts,) reprimanded the organizers of the Festival of the Seeds of Breadfruit in Vega Alta as follows:

There is nothing here that is made of Seeds of Breadfruit. What would happen if the press comes to cover this festival, or a TV channel comes to make a story of the event? They too would be disappointed. This is not only my point of view this is the feeling of a pueblo that is disappointed with this.

In contrast, the local public from the area where the festival takes place tends to be more heterogeneous than the visiting public. This group was more likely to express other reasons for attending the events beyond their "cultural" content. Among the local public, many identified the festival as cultural, or as a community-oriented event, but most people mentioned the opportunity it provides for sharing with the community while enjoying free public entertainment, as well as the commerce and commotion that it

fosters in the area. As the woman who was "scolded" by the San Juan visitor explained to me:

He is the only person that complained about the festival. Other people come seeking the typical food and do not find it but then, they listen to the music and they get into the ambiance and they no longer complain. They leave satisfied.

Local interest in the festival is intensified by the lack of recreational facilities and open areas on the island. A woman resident of a small interior town of the island succinctly addressed this issue when explaining to me how she did not differentiate between the festival organized by the ICP-affiliated cultural center and that celebrated by another group in her town.

I never miss anything that happens in this town. To me all the festivals are good, they have music and everyone is there. A festival is the only thing that ever happens in this town. I go to all and I could not care less if they are cultural or not.

Overall, economic, cultural, and recreational concerns were always conflated, making cultural festivals the most important aspect of the work of most grassroots groups. While many intellectuals regret this conflation, its existence is a well known fact among corporate sponsors, whose involvement will be further discussed in the next chapter.

Endnotes

1. Before ARECMA, there had been other informally organized community organizations in the area, a cultural group called The Taino Circle and an ecumenical movement of religious renewal (c. 1970's). These groups were also organized by some former and present members of ARECMA to solve problems neglected by the municipal government, such as the establishment of recreational facilities and waterworks for the community. However, ARECMA was the first formal organization in the community, having both a constitution and a registration number at the State Department that entitles it to municipal and governmental grants.
2. The evolution of Pro-Statehood elements within the Socialist Party in Mariana was traced by different informants to the 1930's Coalition Party formed between Republicans and Socialists, who then comprised the major opposition to the landowner-dominated Liberal Party in Caone.
3. For instance, the same artists that ARECMA contracted for \$600-800 for the first festivals in the mid and late 1980's were charging over \$2,000 in 1994.
4. This money is raised by the individual groups through the sale of vending stands or products (such as drinks and food) in the festivals, and through donations from politicians and corporate sponsors. Because the activities are free to the public, festivals produce their own costs and rarely generate much more beyond the price of the festival itself. Many festivals end up losing money. A common margin of profit generated by these festivals ranges from \$2,000 to \$5,000.
5. Indeed, most Caoenos and coastal residents of Caone migrated to the U.S. in the 1950's, with the decline of sugar and the closing of the port in Caone. This pattern of migration contrasts with that of rural communities in Caone who fled to the U.S. in the 1940's, along with the decline of sugar and agriculture island-wide.
6. This was the case of the towns of Arroyo and Barcelona which separated from Guayama and Manatí respectively.
7. It is becoming common among politicians to give money to local groups as a means of releasing the responsibility of delivering and maintaining public projects and services onto the groups. As a local senator in Caone told me: "I know I can give money to ARECMA because they have proven themselves

to be people that work. Today they are working within their community, but tomorrow, who knows! They may even begin to help with the community next to them, or the rest of Caone or the whole eastern area, and I say, better for me and for all."

8. See Ana García's documentary film "Cocolos y Rockeros" for a discussion of this issue.

9. In 1993, Puerto Rico rated third among U.S. cities and territories in the numbers of murders and Type I crimes committed (violent crimes, armed robberies, carjackings etc.) with 73.7% murders per 100,000 inhabitants or 946 killings that year (El San Juan Star, Monday, January 3, 1994, p.3).

10. See Manning (1990) for a discussion of the transnational component of public celebrations in the Caribbean linked to the migratory history in the area.

Chapter V

Culture, Politics and Corporate Sponsorship

Pero es el circuito de las escaramuzas,
las estratagemas y argucias de que ha
estado siempre hecho el camino de los
dominados hacia el reconocimiento social.

Martín Barbero (1987:189)

It should be evident by now that the corporate sector has become an important sponsor of cultural activities throughout the island, and that corporate involvement is creating challenges and contradictions in Puerto Rico's cultural politics. In this chapter I will address some of these contradictions by discussing the interaction of culture, politics and corporate sponsorship.

This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, I provide a context to the involvement of commercial sponsors in Puerto Rico's cultural landscape. In the second section I discuss the appeal to Puerto Rican culture and national motifs in commercial advertising. In the third section, I analyze corporate promotions to resume my discussion of the threat that the commercial interest in culture poses to the government cultural policy and the implications of commercial uses of culture for the construction of alternative definitions of Puerto Ricanness.

The Context

As one of biggest consumers of American products per capita, Puerto Rico is inundated daily with publicity and marketing campaigns for a variety of products. A common theme in these campaigns is the association of products with Puerto Rican culture. The corporate sector appeals to nationalist icons and symbols in the advertising of products, and it has become the primary sponsor of many cultural festivals throughout the island.

These campaigns have become part of the daily lives of Puerto Ricans, who on a normal day are exposed to company logos in the news, in bars and cafeterias in remote regions of the island, and in the hats, t-shirts and paraphernalia that are given away at corporate-sponsored activities. Corporate ads have found their way into even the most traditional activities. For instance, in the 1993 National Folk Arts Carnival in Ponce, Winston ads were placed on a peasant-theme float which reproduced the traditional rural canteen, and which always includes Winston cigarette ads as part of its decoration.

Foreign and local companies have shown an interest in using Puerto Rican culture in their advertising since early on the origins of Puerto Rican radio and T.V. Ads for the locally produced Corona beer¹ in the 1970's identified the beer with a Puerto Rican national who outwits his competitors, the latter represented by Spanish, American and

Nuyorican characters. In the 1970s Don Q Rum associated its product with the traditional peasant wedding, Mazola oil linked its product with Puerto Rico's indigenous population, and Eastern Airlines drew from Puerto Rico's migratory experience by showing emotional images of anxious people awaiting friends and relatives at the airport. As these culturally-oriented advertising campaigns yielded substantial profits, the identification of products with Puerto Rico became a requirement for the successful introduction of products into the local market.

Several factors contributed to the cultural turn in marketing since the 1970s. Brand competition and governmental restrictions on advertising by liquor and cigarette industries encouraged more aggressive campaigns and a move towards grassroots promotions.² The growth of the publicity industry in the island since the 1970s also increased competition and grassroots promotions. Transnational public relations conglomerates had been opening offices in Puerto Rico and creating mergers and partnerships with local offices since the 1940s. By the 1960s, the most important transnational advertising agencies in the world such as Leo Burnett Worldwide Inc, Saatchi and Saatchi Advertising, and J. Walter Thompson had established themselves on the island. However, since the mid-1970's there has been steady growth in the industry. For instance, 43 out of the 59 publicity industries included in

an industry profile study (Caribbean Business October 20, 1994) were founded in the mid-1970's. Although these new agencies are much smaller and accrue less than one million in annual billings, they have added vitality to an industry that is now perceived as one of the fastest growing on the island, generating over \$770.8 million dollars annually and creating 11,680 direct and indirect jobs (Caribbean Business November 11, 1994). The government, for its part, has also contributed to this growth by facilitating the internationalization of the island's economy after Section 936 of 1976 and the Industrial Incentive Law 26 of 1978 which extended tax exemption to export-services such as consulting services and public relations agencies (Pantójas 1990). These advantages led to the restructuring of different industries (such as finance and advertising) along transnational lines, and to the opening of many transnational public relations conglomerates on the island.

Another important factor in the turn to culture by publicity strategists was the nationalization of the publicity industry through the recruitment of local artists and intellectuals. Most agencies, irrespective of whether they are owned by local or transnational interests, are dominated by a Puerto Rican staff that brings local knowledge to the publicity process. As a result, the industry has developed a Puerto Rican flavor that makes it impossible to distinguish sharply between Puerto Rican and

foreign transnational companies. As I was told by a member of the Association of Publicity Agencies:

This industry is not about Puerto Rican or transnational agencies. Most of these agencies have been around forever, and no one sees them as foreign anymore. There are no gringo faces anywhere.

An important element in the nationalization of the industry is the incorporation of independentistas into publicity work. While many publicists, irrespective of their political ideologies, incorporate aspects of Puerto Rican culture in their campaigns, there are many independentistas behind ad campaigns that have most directly drawn from Puerto Rican themes, such as those engaged with Bacardi and Budweiser who have found an outlet for their views through advertisement and the development of some of the most "Puertorricanizing" campaigns on the media. Branded as "independentistas," discriminated against and unable to find jobs, many profited from the growth of the publicity industry which extended consulting contracts to many active independentistas who now constitute important figures in the island's advertising industry. Jose Torres, a former independentista leader and member of the Socialist Party who is now an important figure in the publicity industry stated:

We had great writing skills which we had used to mobilize people and a deep appreciation of Puerto Rican culture as well as an awareness of the importance of Puerto Rican culture for the Puerto Rican -- those were our skills when we entered the marketing industry.

Today, some of the most important figures in

advertising were former independentista leader such as the director of Comunicadora Nexus, one of the largest of the locally owned public relations companies, directed by former leaders of the Pro-Independence Group, FUPI (Federation of University Students Pro-Independence). Many of those of identified themselves as "independentistas" claimed to be committed to the dissemination of Puerto Rican culture and values through their present work. Consider what I was also told by Jose Torres:

The power of advertising is great. How do you have more power over it, alienating yourself from it or working with it?. My concern is to exalt Puerto Rican culture. One does not always get to do it in this business but it is great when one has the opportunity to do it. They may say that we are profiting from Puerto Rican culture, and that may even be the company's concern, but not mine. I do not care about the corporations's objectives. I care about mine which is to exalt the view Puerto Ricans have of their culture, whenever I can.

The appeal to Puerto Rican culture at this time, was also part of a global trend in advertising of tapping into the culture-specific characteristics of a given market, be it along gender, race, ethnicity or national lines (Alden et al 1993, Sveberny-Mohammadi 1991). This global advertising trend has been associated with structural changes in the communications industry towards growing internationalization and pressures to be more specific in targeting diverse audiences (Mattelart, Delcourt, Mattelart 1993, O'Barr

1989). In this quest, what Cornel West (1990) has termed "the new cultural politics of difference" becomes a fashionable tool of transnational capital. Although this turn to culture has been seen an example of the decentering of hegemonic centers and the opening up of spaces for the representation of marginal cultures, for the most part, the turn to the local has been interpreted negatively. This trend is often considered one more form of containment which "disguises the political nature of everyday life and appropriates the vulnerable new terrain of insurgent differences in the interests of crass consumerism" (Giroux 1993:6).

Doubtless, the primary motive behind these advertising tactics is sales: the need to address newer audiences and win new consumers. However, and as Garcia-Canclini (1992) reminds us, the turn to culture among private sponsors has not taken the same direction in all countries, just as the outcomes of these strategies or the way in which they are received are not always easily predicted.³ In Puerto Rico, for instance, the appeal to Puerto Ricanness attains even greater relevance due to the colonial situation, in which most issues, including language, sports and commercial products, have been politicized. In this context, advertising's turn to culture has been an important force in popularizing national icons in a context where open appeals to Puerto Rican culture have been historically perceived as

subversive. For example, shortly after the 1993 plebiscite when it was argued that the use of the Puerto Rican flag as a personal decoration should be banned from the voting polls (because the flag is an "independentista" symbol), an entire advertising campaign was developed for Clorox which highlighted the Puerto Rican flag to present the product as the number one cleaning product on the island. In the end, the local electoral commission allowed the use of personal decorations with the Puerto Rican flag at the voting polls, because it is the symbols of "all Puerto Ricans." Yet as a norm, the corporate sector has been less constrained by political considerations in its decision to use national symbols in advertising campaigns than other sectors of Puerto Rican society such as the government's cultural institutions. These latter have been subject to changes of administration and changes in the government's cultural policy since, as shown in chapter two, they are used by the dominant parties to promulgate ideas that are congruent with these parties' political status ideals.

In addition, the case of Puerto Rico provides an important example for understanding the effects of the new culture-specific campaigns. Once the showcase for an export promotion model of industrialization in the 1950's, Puerto Rico continues to serve as a model, this time for advertising products in culturally-specific markets. As stated by a local president of a U.S. company operating in

Puerto Rico:

Puerto Rico is the first step to explore a new market in a stable territory. It is different from standard U.S. markets but not as exotic or different from them as a Latin American country.

A CEO for a franchise restaurant in Puerto Rico stated:

Puerto Rico's Latin American heritage enables American franchisors, for almost any type of product or service, to test new and different ideas here to measure market acceptance before a stateside launching. In other words, Puerto Rico serves as a testing ground for products that will be launched in areas with a sizeable Hispanic population (Caribbean Business March 31, 1994).

Puerto Rico's telecommunications structure, its dollar-based economy, and its highly skilled labor force also add to Puerto Rico's appeal as a "Mecca" for preparatory marketing and public relations work prior to launching campaigns in other Latin American countries. In 1993, after the passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Puerto Rico became the headquarters of NAZCA S& S., a \$315. million advertising agency, which proclaimed itself the first regional Latin American Advertising network because its headquarters are in a Latin American country rather than in Miami or New York. This network aims to replicate the successes of other regional advertising networks such as Euro RSCG and Dentsu, which were successful in the European and Asian markets respectively (Caribbean Business 4/21/94).

Considering that the corporate appeal to local and nationalist symbols, folklore and popular culture is an

ongoing tendency, what is the effect of these marketing tactics on the nationals whose culture is being used to lure them into new commercial products? In other words, as transnational companies increasingly capitalize on the booming cultural nationalism of Puerto Rican society, what views of Puerto Rican culture are these private companies advocating and for what purposes?

Recent analysis of the increasing integration of the world economy, which sees nationalism within the context of globalization not as a contradiction but as a complementary process, helps us grapple with this issue. This research has led to much theorizing about the relationship between local nationalism, identity politics, and global political economic processes (Glick Schiller 1994, Foster 1991, Hall 1991, Nash 1995). A recurrent theme of this literature is the dual nature of global processes, which calls for an analysis of commercial interests not solely in terms of their homogenizing tendencies, but also in terms of how they may also help promote, hinder or otherwise shape cultural nationalism and national identification.

Stuart Hall, for instance, has noted how the new situation is characterized by the decentering of old hierarchies, where capital "has had to renegotiate and incorporate and partly reflect the differences it was trying to overcome" (Hall 1991:32). In this process, the marginal's "difference" is often coopted or folklorized, at

the same time that new spaces are opened for the attainment of representation which can also serve as the first step into politics. In this context, the local remains a contradictory terrain which is both "rooted in popular culture and available for expropriation at one and the same time" (Hall 1991:26). It is against this context that the unexpected outcomes of corporate promotional tactics can be understood.

Advertising the Nation

Within this context, R.J. Reynolds' Winston and Anheuser Busch's Budweiser have developed successful advertising campaigns which provide clear evidence that "culture sells" on the island. In this section I will analyze these companies' early and most recent advertising strategies to discuss corporate strategies for elaborating ideas of Puerto Rican identity.

"Winston y Puerto Rico No Hay Nada Mejor" (Winston and Puerto Rico There is Nothing Better) sung or written before a backdrop of Puerto Rican landscapes, music, and other national icons such as artisans associated with the autochthonous culture, has been the slogan of R. J. Reynolds in Puerto Rico since the 1960's. The company, which has operated in Puerto Rico since 1956, has a manufacturing plant and a distribution center on the island which produce over 8,000 million cigarettes a year. Of these, 65-70% are

exported, and the remainder are sold locally. The brand controls over 60% of the market in Puerto Rico (El Nuevo Dia 9/16/93). As a result of this marketing success, the company plans to expand its operations on the island, even though production is being discontinued in the United States. On the island, R.J. Reynolds benefits from a variety of tax breaks offered for manufacturing and export services activities under the Internal Revenue Code Section 936, which covers income, property, municipal fees, and manufacturing intangibles (Myatt 1993).

Reynolds developed their advertising and distribution strategy while its presence on the island was still small. The association of the product with Puerto Rico was strengthened when, as part of an international reorganization, the company opened a plant in Puerto Rico. At this time, they also established a public relations company in Puerto Rico with a team of Puerto Ricans in charge of local publicity. This was of utmost importance in the development of the Winston campaign because the Puerto Rican publicists brought local knowledge to the decision making processes. Winston's ads, filmed against a Puerto Rican landscape, featured jingles that incorporated local instruments and were sung by known Puerto Rican singers. Moreover, the models were all Puerto Ricans (young, modern, white, upscale and well-dressed beauty queens and famous models) not the American models who are still commonly used

in other campaigns in Puerto Rico.

The ads were produced with the understanding that the Puerto Rican market and consumers are different. A Winston ad representative stated:

Our campaign is different because the Puerto Rican is different. It is a country with many American things but many Puerto Rican things, what is done for the P.R. market is done here and is unique.

The same ad representative contrasted the culturally specific campaign developed for the Puerto Rican market with that for nearby countries:

In the Dominican Republic you cannot do "Dominica y Winston" because it would not work. In the Dominican Republic, as well as in other republics one appeals to the U.S. to that which one does not have, to that is imported,...whereas the vision here (in P.R.) is different.

Implied in the ad representative's statement is that these types of advertisements fill a void for Puerto Ricans; that while Puerto Ricans, like most consumers, crave the newest and most glamorous consumer product, they also crave for their culture to be publicly showcased. In this way, these ads are ironically helping to counter the historical subversion of Puerto Rican identity under colonial status, and the U.S. dominated entertainment industry which limits the spaces for displaying Puerto Rican mannerism and colloquialism in the media. Even the product's packaging was tailored to Puerto Rico. The hawk logo did not replace the crown that previously decorated the Winston box, because the crown motif had wide acceptance in the Puerto Rican

market.

The product's appeal to Puerto Ricanness is evident in the following slogan which was used (with only minor alterations) from 1968 to the 1980s:

Me and my Winstons, and my Puerto Rico, there is nothing better. What great flavor. Winston and Puerto Rico have in common a great flavor, a unique flavor that never changes and that is why Puerto Rico is our pride, Borinquen is our motherland and Winston is our cigarette. Winston offers an exclusive blend specially chosen and elaborated for the best flavor ... surrounded by history in old San Juan there is Winston.

Like many advertising campaigns which aim to attract the widest possible audience, Winston's ad campaign in Puerto Rico is Janus-faced: sometimes conservative and sometimes trendy. Especially at first, the product was associated with the same dominant images of Puerto Rico that are also used by the government's Tourism Office and the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture. It is the easily recognized tourist spots, like Old San Juan, the Ponce Fine Arts Museum, or romantic beach scenes that are most featured in the advertisements. Similarly, in a series showing a young heterosexual couple visiting local artisans, (1984-1987) the artisans shown are the masters, all male and elderly, who create the folk arts which conform to the government's standards of Puerto Rican culture. These campaigns were accompanied by grassroots promotions that were more flexible and popular in scope, and the company became involved in any public event that promised an

audience and brand exclusivity, from sports to rock concerts to cultural festivals.

Winston's reliance on the official view of Puerto Rican identity backfired; after two decades of such advertising the product came to be associated with old age and maturity. Bacardi's early campaign "Manos Puertorriqueñas," (Puerto Rican Hands) which associated the making of Bacardi rum with the craftsmanship of a Puerto Rican artisan met the same fate.

Realizing that they needed to rejuvenate their campaign without losing the identification with Puerto Rico, Reynold's advertisers turned to aspects of contemporary popular culture. But, since Reynolds wants to convey a relatively conservative image for its product, they have incorporated popular culture in a more constrained manner than Budweiser did. Instead of the familiar background landscapes, or folklore identifying the product with Puerto Rico, Winston's recent campaign (1994) features written captions referring to popular cultural icons and associations that are only known by Puerto Ricans. One example is the ad in which "Festival de las Flores" (Festival of the Flowers, one of the most popular festivals in the island) is superimposed over a photograph of four smiling young women wearing pastel dresses; or "Pelea de Gallos" (Cockfight) is superimposed over a photograph of two men armwrestling. Although the focus was new, the

advertisements drew on the same stereotypical images as the early campaign based on common beliefs about what a tourist spot is, who Puerto Rican artisans are, and which gender is like a flower, or like a "cock."

Reynolds' advertising campaign demonstrates that "La Puertorriqueñidad vende" (Puerto Ricanness sells). This was corroborated by market research on the public reception of cigarette ads which showed Winston to be the brand most easily remembered and recalled by the public. The study showed that Winston and Salem ads, both of which feature Puerto Rican settings and icons, were preferred by the public over Camel and Marlboro which use American motifs in their advertisements (Maribel Guevara Monge, 1992). At present, Winston remains one of the top advertising brands in magazines and the print media.⁴ Meanwhile, tobacco's health hazards and the industry's manipulations, so debated in the United States, are largely overlooked on the island while Winston continues to strengthen its reputation as a culturally concerned company.

Like Winston, Budweiser developed one of its most successful campaigns in Puerto Rico, increasing its market share from 2% in 1980 to over 48% in 1990. The company hired a local advertising company, Lopito and Howie, known for the culturalistic approach it developed for the Pro Commonwealth (PPD) gubernatorial campaigns it has handled since 1972; and for their 1993 status plebiscite campaign which strongly

appealed to Puerto Rico's national culture and Olympic sports identity. Lopito and Howie is currently the third largest advertisement agency in Puerto Rico, accruing some \$35.5 million in annual billings, of which \$4 million comes from Anheuser (San Juan Star 5/16/94).

In the early and mid-1980's, Budweiser's advertising campaign revolved around the need to "recognize, identify and embrace Puerto Rican values and lifestyles." ⁵ The ads portrayed situations and settings that were clearly associated with the island or, as an advertising representative stated: "puertorriqueños en sitios puertorriqueños" (Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rican settings). The jingles or text emphasized the main idea that Budweiser was a product that honors, exalts and embraces Puerto Rican ways. Some examples are the ad honoring the Puerto Rican woman which shows a country wedding with the jingle:

You have all the beautiful things that God made
beautiful in a woman. Puerto Rican woman, because
you are the purest expression of genuine quality,
Budweiser honors your beauty....

or the ad comparing the excellence of Puerto Rican thoroughbred horse or "paso fino" to the excellence of the Budweiser clydesdales:

Our "Paso Fino" unique in the world, and the
famous Clydesdales, two different races,
reflecting the same pride, the search for
excellence, nothing is compromised. Budweiser
honors the excellence of Puerto Rico.

Besides the identification of the product with valued

aspects of Puerto Rican culture, Budweiser's campaign also appealed to Puerto Rico's popular culture by presenting "average" Puerto Ricans engaging in popular activities. One example is the ad recreating the popular Feast of St. James Apostle in Loiza, which has historically been used as an example of the Afro-Caribbean legacy on the island. The ad, with a jingle of bomba music includes people chanting and dancing and using colloquial language, while eating the cod fish fritters that are popular in the area.

In another set of ads, Budweiser appeals to the stereotypical heavy beer drinker (male, blue collar and middle aged) in order to show "real people in bar settings and situations" for the first time ever in Puerto Rican advertising.⁶ The ads use colloquial language and are written in story-form to convey male camaraderie embedded in a joking environment. The ads show public situations such as country bars, people joking with one another, friendly customers and rural family gatherings, because the Puerto Rican was considered to be a social drinker not a solitary home consumer.

The campaign worked. Sales soared, reaching 25.6% in 1982, 37.7 % in 1987 and 48.1% in 1990. Anheuser Busch claimed that the Puerto Rican market had the "largest single brand share for Budweiser anywhere in the world".

More recent ads have turned to a younger audience, but they continue to rely on the same marketing strategy of

"showing Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rican settings." However, the new ads use real people drinking in real locations instead of actors or sets. This tactic, known as "reality advertising," is part of the current trend towards presenting reality that is also evident in the popular infomercials that inundate T.V. stations. The ads also feature Puerto Rican youth, shown in social settings dancing to Caribbean music.

It is important to note, however, that the new diversity of representations is still managed and engineered by "merchants of style" according to dominant notions of aesthetics, appearance and politics that govern marketing practices worldwide (Ewen 1988). In Puerto Rico, this is evident in the prevalence of dominant views of gender relations and aesthetics, the showcasing of youth, lighter Puerto Ricans and women as symbols of sexuality. Nevertheless, the appeal to Puerto Rican culture by publicity strategists does mark an emphasis on showcasing Puerto Ricans and things Puerto Rican in media images.

Moreover, within the advertising strategies that appeal to Puerto Rican culture, there is a visible trend away from representing Puerto Rico through the dominant images fostered by the government's cultural policy. These traditional markers of identity such as folklore are replaced with images representing aspects of everyday life in Puerto Rico. This trend is not about moving away from

Puerto Ricanness, but about refurbishing corporate advertising while maintaining the product's association with the island. A representative for Badillo Saatchi Advertising, one of the largest advertising conglomerates worldwide, explained his agency's advertising tactics in Puerto Rico as follows:

We give our campaigns a touch of Puerto Rico, which is not about the "güiro" (gourd instrument of Taino origin) the "maracas," the plantain, or the Spanish garrison, but about a local flavor, with local music, local talent, and Puerto Rican vignettes.

and,

Our last campaign for Schaeffer was a hit, with a Caribbean beat, and beach vignettes with a lot of Puerto Rican elements: guys in the bar, an old woman dancing with a guy, a sign that read "No talk about politics allowed," a cockfight, all of which associated my product with Puerto Rico without including a flag, or a "güiro" or a "maracca" because that was the stereotype of 15-20 years ago.

Tapping into people's everyday experience, and showing situations where "people see themselves" were also common tactics used to associate Puerto Rico with a wide range of products.

During informal interviews about people's perceptions of Budweiser's 1993 "reality campaign," (which filmed "real people in real settings"), the music, the feeling, the overall mood, the sharing with friends, as well as the idea that "we Puerto Ricans like to "parisear," [party] were indeed among the aspects that were most identified with Puerto Rican culture. Other respondents, however, thought

that this shift to reality advertising marked a departure from Puerto Rican images, and claimed that only campaigns that had relied on overt nationalistic icons and images were "Puertorriqueñistas." One informant asked me:

What is Puerto Rican about this campaign?, this is not about conserving or raising consciousness about something. This is about showing people going about their ways of life. This is about the everyday.

Indeed, the emphasis in the advertisement is not on conserving culture, as the government's cultural policy stresses. The appeal is rather to the everyday and even the commonplace. Nevertheless, people felt a (subjective) identification with Puerto Rico in the ad even though they could not point to specific icons or concrete images of Puerto Ricanness.

One strategy employed by the publicists I talked to was the identification of Puerto Rican culture with "values," (which involve associating products with well-known Puerto Ricans, or ways of being or acting). As explained by the director of one of the largest locally-owned advertising agencies on the island:

What we do is not about nostalgia. It is more modern. It is about values that recognize the youth, the country in general. It is about the things we do, not about overt patriotism or "cursilerias" [cliches]. The audiences would not buy into that. That has been done already.

This strategy was evident in the ads prepared by this local agency for the Independence Party. Most of them

featured young people, both male and female, representing different class and racial backgrounds, in everyday settings (the beach, pool bars, someone's kitchen). Yet their most popular ad was that in which a young independentista was shown singing rock to denote that he is not only Pro-Puerto Rico but also a bilingual rock fan. These identities are perceived as irreconcilable in Puerto Rican society where, as noted in previous chapters, political identifications are often associated with attitudes toward Puerto Rican culture. The youth is shown defending himself from his parents (shown wearing blue and red shirts to identify them with the PNP and the PPD party respectively), who accuse him of betraying his ideals. The youth replies "independence is not opposed to any language, but our language has to be Spanish, now and always, officially..." The ad received a lot of attention and was often praised. Although it did not produce a landslide victory for the Party, it was a landmark in its use of the everyday to convey a more modern vision of what independence would mean for the island that accounts for the many independentistas who are also English-speaking Puerto Ricans.

Raymond Williams suggests that subjective experiences are among the first indicators of change: "... all that seems to escape from the fixed and the explicit and the known is grasped and defined as the personal: this, here, now, alive, active, "subjective" (1977:128). We should

therefore ask if contemporary advertising is tapping into emerging ways of experiencing and expressing nationality in contemporary culture. Given that the new independent cultural activities tend to depart from concrete nationalist icons and symbols, and are conceived as cultural more because of the food, the music or the familiar community environment, the success of these advertising campaigns can be attributed to their successful manipulation of popular expressions of Puerto Ricanness. These rely more on aspects of popular culture and the everyday life than on the traditional "building blocks" of Puerto Rican culture defined by the governmental cultural policy. A discussion of the way in which different cultural groups throughout the island tap into the corporate promotional turn to culture may help clarify this issue.

Marketing the Nation

Increasingly, cultural activities organized by independent cultural groups throughout the island are funded by corporate sponsors. At the same time, they are often shunned by the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP) because they do not restrict themselves to the official cultural policy and because of their use of commercial rhythms.

A variety of factors contributed to the corporate interest in funding cultural events in the 1980s. These

included the need to circumvent advertising controls, brand competition and competition over the promotion of existing public events. A recent example of the way in which brand competition affects local sponsorship is what came to be known as the "guerra de las cervezas" or the "beer wars," provoked by the government's termination of the regulation against long-neck bottles in 1992. This permitted the introduction of about seven new brands into the beer market and led to fierce competition (Caribbean Business July 8, 1993). In 1993, Budweiser alone sponsored some 206 grassroots activities, ranging from sports activities to cultural festivals in an attempt to maintain its position as the number one beer in the market (this does not include the happy hours which are the most commonly sponsored promotional activity).

Competition over the sponsorship of existing public events encouraged companies to sponsor small scale cultural festivals. As it became impossible for companies to attain exclusive exposure for their products in a stiff and aggressive market, most liquor and cigarette companies diminished or eliminated their sponsorship of patron-saint festivities, and began to favor the cultural festivals instead. These were considered easier to tap, as they were organized by local groups with little or no experience in negotiating contracts, rather than by city hall administrations which sponsor patron saint festivals and

often have established commitments to specific brands. As a commercial promoter for Bacardi explained:

Before [in the 1970s], there used to be respect between the companies, and if I sponsored the patron saint festivities the competition would stay away. We, the vendors knew and helped each other out. But then, this company bought our main competitors and became really aggressive. It was a matter of 'you get out because here I come', if they had to break your van they would break it. People spent millions in promotions and the market was spoiled. Before, you could sponsor the patron-saint festivities of a town just by offering the mayor a cocktail for the 'ausentes' [former ex-residents of the town] and the mayor would give you exclusive exposure. Now those people come and they offer a show that is worth \$25,000 and they keep all of the patron-saint festivities.

Despite their involvement with the cultural festivals, corporate sponsorship in Puerto Rico remained diverse, ranging from classical music concerts to beach volleyball tournaments to tours by amateur comedians. These promotions have been considered examples of cultural imperialism in Third World countries (Ram Nath 1986:190), because products are associated with the West and with enjoyment and entertainment. This is one of the goals of advertising which, if successful, transforms the meaning attached to the goods, so that "the viewer/reader attributes certain properties he or she knows to exist in the culturally constituted world to the consumer good" (MacCracken 1990:77). In the case of Puerto Rico, however, the Pro-Puerto Rico advertising histories of Budweiser and Winston have earned them a reputation as "culturally sensitive" companies, that are concerned with Puerto Rican culture and

"la gente de pueblo" (the common people). Thus, the promotion of cultural festivals was an extension of the companies' identification with Puerto Rican culture that allowed them to maintain their cultural image while diversifying their advertising strategies. This identification encourages local organizers of cultural activities to seek out the same companies as funders for their activities. This was confirmed to me not only by the many people who identified the same companies as their prospective funders, but also by my observation of the distribution center of one of these companies in San Juan where people from all over the island travelled to seek funds for their activities.

The involvement of private companies with these new cultural festivals has also been facilitated by the regional promotion and distribution offices opened by Budweiser, Winston and other companies in the early 1980s which allowed them to monitor and gain access to the most popular activities in different regional areas.

The new cultural activities provided corporate sponsors with new venues through which they could associate their products --cigarettes, beer and liquor-- with pleasure and entertainment while reaching their target consumer, the "common people." For their part, corporate sponsors provided these new grassroots celebrations with a flexible and indiscriminate sponsor which would equally fund "pure

national culture" (folklore and peasant music) and popular culture, so long as a mass public was involved.

Popular and Commercial Culture

While the appeal to folklore is always a good advertising tactic, it is what is popular and attractive to the greatest public that rules corporate promoters as they seek to obtain maximum exposure, product exclusivity, and the association of their product with pleasure, and entertainment. In this quest, private companies are leaving behind the romanticized images of folklore and turning to popular culture and the realm of everyday life.

With popular culture I mean, the realm of social practice and everyday life,⁷ and the ground on which transformations between imposed orders and ideas and resistances are played out. This view of popular culture does not differentiate or dichotomize "pure" popular culture from mass culture, but rather emphasizes the "mediations" between the two or the "insertion of the popular classes in a mass society" where popular forms of expression can be present within new technologies or commercial expressions (Barbero 1993). In this way, contemporary popular culture in Puerto Rico is increasingly about the reconversion of forms, that may be folkloric, oppositional or commercial⁸ As such, there is potential for the expression of popular interests and alternative ways of representing Puerto Rican

culture within cultural forms that are often seen as overly commercialized. For instance, corporate support for the popular rhythms of salsa, merengue, rap and reggae for cultural activities has defied government disapproval (through the cultural policies of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture) of these genres and, in turn, has generated a discussion about which musical styles can appropriately represent Puerto Rican culture. Since salsa is not "original" to Puerto Rico, but was created in New York by "Nuyoricans," expatriated Puerto Ricans who are subjected to racism and classism by island Puerto Ricans, this popular genre is still not deemed a proper representative of Puerto Rican culture by government officials. Thus no funding is available in the ICP budget for salsa groups to participate in ICP-sponsored cultural activities.

Interestingly, although salsa remains banned in the context of the ICP, it has already made inroads into the official domain. The last Pro-Commonwealth administration presented salsa rather than the traditionally favored peasant music during the "day of Puerto Rico" at the recent International Expo 92 in Seville, when the then governor, Rafael Hernandez Colon, capitalized on the popularity of salsa music among Europeans. Other examples include the Pro-Statehood Party's use of salsa in their campaign jingles, and their inclusion of this rhythms in the official celebrations of the Central American and Caribbean Olympic

games held in Puerto Rico in 1993.

However, salsa and popular rhythms remain excluded from "proper" representations of Puerto Rican culture, according to the official cultural policy, which always highlights Puerto Rico's peasant past. The racist underpinnings of the local discrimination against salsa were evident in the explanations I was given by a long time organizer of cultural activities. He justified not inviting salsa groups to the activity as follows:

Salsa groups can create disarray in a familiar setting, because they attract a lot of "cocolos" (blacks) that have no respect for anything. Bringing salsa can only create disarray and disorder and lack of control.

Salsa, however, is far better received than merengue, another Afro-Caribbean rhythm, which is criticized for being an "inferior rhythm" and an example of "chabacanería" (what is cheap and inferior). This rejection is closely tied to the racism to which Dominicans, who are associated with this rhythm, have been exposed since their immigration to the island. On many occasions I heard people request unsuccessfully that merengue not be played at certain activities because it would "turn the festival into a Dominican rather than a Puerto Rican cultural festival."⁹

Similarly, rap and reggae, which are popular rhythms among Puerto Rican youth and are closely identified with Puerto Rico's migratory experience and Afro-Caribbean roots, are considered foreign and Americanized rhythms.¹⁰

Neither salsa nor reggae nor rap are intrinsically oppositional in their lyrics and content. In fact, the misogynist character of these lyrics has been noted, along with the processes by which people receive and transform their messages to make them suitable to their specific contexts (Aparicio n.d., Lipsitz 1993). What is of interest here is that these genres are associated with a subordinate population and aspects of popular culture that are considered by the ICP inferior to the pure national culture and are consequently excluded from the national realm. Thus the inclusion of these musical genres in festivals that are overtly identified as "cultural" helps to revindicate aspects of the popular within the national and to politicize the genres through their inclusion in cultural activities despite official discrimination. At the local level, these rhythms are revindicated, as stated by the organizers of a local cultural festival in a coastal town of the island:

We think it is a mistake to think that the only typical and Creole is the string music, and the "seis chorreao" (peasant rhythm), because our music comes from Afro-Antillean rhythms and there is a continuity with salsa and merengue. We always include as many Creole elements in our cultural festival as we can, but in terms of music, it is with salsa and merengue that we identify, and we try to bring in the local artists because we are a community and we want our people and Puerto Rico to develop, and we achieve this by giving opportunities to our local artists.

In this way, salsa, which is not inherently oppositional, becomes politicized as a result of a "dialectic of

antagonism" in which popular forms serve as oppositional elements at the moment that they are subject to constraint or governmental intervention (Stallybrass and White 1986).

The most popular T.V. shows are also considered "chabacanos," and these are heavily sponsored by the same corporate interests that invest and promote cultural festivals throughout the island. I will not analyze these T.V. shows in any depth here, but it is important to note that they are an important topic in contemporary discussions about "Puerto Ricanness." It is in opposition to these shows that conservative sectors of Puerto Rican society define the "true character" of Puerto Rican culture. Yet there are factors that mediate this involvement by "nationalizing" T.V. shows and making the corporate involvement almost inconspicuous. Among these is the fact that corporate sponsorship of T.V. shows dates back to the origins of Puerto Rican television. Comedy shows like the "India Tavern", "Libby's Show" the "Coca Cola Show" and, most recently the "Kiosko Budweiser," have somewhat naturalized the company/comedy junction, especially in a bar/canteen setting.

Today, although they are mostly marketing tools for consumer products, these comedy shows constitute one of the last sources of employment for Puerto Rican artists who are excluded from much T.V. programming because it is dominated by syndicated American shows. Moreover, these comedy shows

are locally produced, often employ nationalistic elements in their settings, and always draw from Puerto Rican popular culture, satire and humor. The comedies revolve around everyday situations, to which elements of the Bakhtinian-carnavalesque are added as when hierarchies are overturned, politicians are debased, clientelism is exposed, and sexual double meanings inundate the dialogue.¹¹ See for example "Que Bacilón," recently rated as the most popular show on Puerto Rican television, which proudly presents itself as "Puro de aquí" "Hecho en Puerto Rico" (authentically Puerto Rican); "El Kiosko Budweiser," whose setting is the popular "kiosko" or standing eatery that is the center of activity in most festivals; and the new "El Gran Bejuco" whose main character's uniform is a t-shirt displaying the Puerto Rican flag. The popularity of these shows benefits from and feeds cultural nationalistic ideas, as played out in the ongoing preoccupation with hiring Puerto Rican artists, "artistas de patio," over foreign artists.

Lastly, many of the new cultural festivals celebrated by independent groups are also perceived as "commercial" and "chabacano" because they are corporate-sponsored and they include popular rhythms and forms of entertainment and because they are perceived to be less patriotic and more commercially motivated. One informant, a local legislator, showed his contempt for these festivals, and criticized their tendency to display "vulgar" forms of expression:

We have to be more selective about these festivals which confuse culture and education with other things. We have to be watchful not to fall into things that could disharmonize with the beautiful things that the ICP should project.

This informant did not specify what the "other things" are that these festivals display that are disharmonious with Puerto Rican culture, yet his immediate association of "beauty" and culture with the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture was evident. Independent celebrations were not only categorized and devalued by my informants working in the ICP but also by officers of the Tourism Company, and Government representatives working in the Culture Commission in the Senate, and, of course, by many political activists favoring "pure" cultural activities. Some of the activities I heard people dismiss were the "staple vegetable festivals" which include the Festivals of the Plantain, the Breadfruit, and the Yam, which are often mocked because these products are seen as "mundane" staples that are not as evocative of a romanticized peasant culture as is, for instance, coffee. These products, mostly minor fruits rather than important export crops like was once coffee, are so commonplace that they are not recognized as part of a legacy and are seen as fads or excuses for celebrating yet another festival. Moreover, most festival themes that tend to emphasize aspects of regional and popular culture which are often in direct opposition to the official view of national culture. A worker at a municipal office in charge of providing

technical support (lights, trash collections), to local public celebrations showed his frustration about the irrelevance of these festivals as follows:

Who has heard anything about a Festival of Yuca or Breadfruit or anything else? People are just inventing reasons to celebrate festivals. If it were a Festival of typical music or folk arts or Bomba and Plena music, which are nationally recognized cultural values then we would not have a problem with these festivals.

The problem, according to this informant, is that people are not emphasizing the nationally recognized cultural icons, but are arbitrarily "inventing" things. Views such as those voiced by this informant, ignore the importance of these activities for distinguishing communities, and how, although varied in content, these events are identified as "cultural" by their organizers. What makes them culturally meaningful is not related to their inclusion of folk artists, typical music, typical foods, or anything typical per se, but to the inclusion of themes that are meaningful to their organizers, and the sense of communality that is fostered in the festival. Moreover, identifying festivals as "cultural" is also a common strategy through which organizers attempt to endow them with legitimacy in the public's eye and to address criticisms from local and national sources.

Negotiating Culture and Dollars: The Making of a "Cultural Festival"

The impact of private corporations in the cultural realm has provoked controversy among government officials about the role of commercial interests in sponsoring cultural programming. The dilemma lies in the fact that the same companies that sponsor events such as "fiestas patronales", beach festivals, and the most popular T.V. shows, or the infamous the three b's ("baile, botella y baraja" or drinks, dancing and gambling) -- considered as examples of consumerism, social decay and disintegration by conservative sectors of Puerto Rican society, -- also sponsor events featuring folk art and traditional music. The companies' flexible approach surfaces in their different strategies for advertising and promotions. In the former, companies often re-enforce images and ideas that have been institutionalized as representative of Puerto Rico; whereas in their promotional strategies they often harbor a different conception of what is a "culturally relevant program," that greatly relies on popular culture. This flexibility of promotional and publicity strategies seems inconsistent to the ICP, as well as to many intellectuals who, irrespective of their political ideology, are concerned with rigidly delimiting and securing what should rightfully represent Puerto Rican culture.

Welcoming the financial assistance of some major corporations, the government has praised and recognized the cultural work of companies such as Winston and Bacardi, which hold large-scale annual activities on the island. Recent examples are the letters of praise and recognition to R. J. Reynolds sent by the then governor Hernández Colon and the President of the Senate, Miguel Hernández Agosto, published on January 1992 in "Las Artes" an annual bulletin published by this company to announce its cultural work throughout the year. The present governor, Rosello (1992-), whose focus is on the "reinvention of government" through increased privatization, has also encouraged the role of private corporations in the funding of cultural festivals and cultural work within the communities.

Moreover, private corporations assure the government's positive evaluation of their work by maintaining close personal ties and good relations with government cultural officials. For instance, the jury panel for Winston's annual "Medal for Culture," an annual prize established in 1983 which is the only national award for cultural activity on the island, is always coordinated with the help of the ICP office. Three of the five awards to cultural groups are always granted to government affiliated cultural centers and the awarding committee often includes a government cultural representative. Furthermore, as explained by one of its organizers, the winners always feature a balance between a

variety of fine art organizations, such as Ballet Companies or symphonies, and folk art institutions, thus bridging the gap between the universal and folk art that have been associated with the Pro-Statehood and Pro-Commonwealth party, respectively. Winston's criteria for selecting the most renowned cultural institutions also adhere to the highest standards about authentic folk art and traditions or international art as stipulated by the different political officials. Bacardi's annual National Folk Art Fair only invites artisans affiliated with and recommended by the Institute for Puerto Rican Culture, and the awarding of the 1993 Budweiser Prize to a Master Artisan gathered a group of directors and officers of the government's folk art institutions on the island and included as a main speaker a renowned ex-director of the Institute for Puerto Rican culture. These activities fail to include the salsa and popular musical groups that these same companies sponsor heavily at the local level.

Moreover, as many more unaffiliated cultural centers are growing outside the cultural guidelines of the ICP, there is great controversy among government cultural officials about the commercial tendencies of these new groups and their legitimacy as representatives of Puerto Rican culture. Specifically, the new cultural festivals are providing a new terrain for the recycling of old discourses about legitimacy and authenticity in Puerto Rican culture. These tensions

surfaced during my fieldwork when as mentioned in chapter one, the new ICP director questioned the legitimacy of the ICP-affiliated cultural centers as the only representatives of the ICP at the local level for the first time. This, in turn, mobilized ICP-affiliated groups to defend their position and attack the non affiliated newcomers as threats to culture.

Tensions also surface in the constant distinction that ICP staff make between ICP-sponsored festivals and commercial activities. One ICP official stated:

In our festival everything is all cultural and it is not commercialized. What you see is typical music, not shows to pull masses. The activity is for a small group and is educational. It is about cultural resistance.

Another official clarified this:

You have to make a distinction when you talk about cultural festivals. Ours are cultural, but not the others. Those are sponsored by people who are culturally underdeveloped. They cannot tell a cultural activity from a commercial activity.

Overall, the involvement of commercial sponsors, who are seen as attracting commercial music and forms of entertainment, in festivals identified as cultural was generally considered by ICP staff as a threat to the cultural objectives of the activity. However, unlike the ICP, organizers of independent events did not always see the involvement of corporate sponsors as a threat to the cultural goals of their activities. Neither was drawing on municipal and governmental funding perceived as compromising

the groups' autonomy and independence. Rather, autonomy was based on the ability of the organizing group to obtain the greatest credit for its work and effort, as well as control over the content of the programming. This view was evident in the explanation given by a long-time organizer of an independent cultural festival, who echoed what I was repeatedly told:

All festivals have regional characteristics, the substance of the activity is cultural,..., What happens is that it is impossible for local commerce to sustain the festival.., but the activity itself, what is presented, besides the commercial promotion of products that are not from here, is Puerto Rican, and what people come to see is the folk arts, and the groups that come to play. Even if it is a merengue group, it has to come from here, has to be Puerto Rican.

Whereas the cultural groups have different relations with the corporate funders, a common preoccupation among organizers is that "the corporations are remembered but individuals are anonymous." Corporate sponsorship of local festivals carries prestige among some people, and is often interpreted as a sign that the group has connections or that the members "know what they are doing." At the same time, however, the work, effort and time that the local organizers put into a given festival is publicly diminished in relation to the contribution of these sponsors. Thus, the amount of credit that corporate sponsors obtain for their involvement, rather than their involvement per se is an important issue debated among groups. This was also the case with municipal, and governmental funding, which in itself was not

perceived as compromising of the groups' autonomy and independence, although it did present added constraints to some groups as was the case with ARECMA. This contrasts with the ICP's stance that sees the involvement of the corporate sponsors as a threat to the cultural objectives of its activities, but never regards the involvement of partisan politics in the festivals as an issue.

In order to limit the credit that corporations obtain for their involvement, organizers of cultural activities employ strategies to accommodate the advertising in ways that are in accord with their activity, often manipulating their funding-conditions at the local level. One common strategy is covering the most prominent areas of the event with the activity's distinctive banners before the corporate staff puts up their logos and announcements. These are always posted by the corporate staff themselves, never by the festivals' organizers. Another strategy involves concentrating all advertising around the drinking areas, leaving the typical food and artisanal kiosks and most visible areas of the stage free from advertisements because these areas are deemed to be the most "representative of the cultural aspect of the activity".

Other groups bought products directly from their local stores to avoid making deals with the corporation which would then press for advertising exposure in the event. This is one of the measures taken by ARECMA as explained by

one of the members.

We always discussed this issue of corporate funding because we wanted our festival to be a cultural event because we were a cultural organization. We did not want a commercial festival. So we never allowed just one company to sponsor the whole event. Instead we would make a deal with the local merchant and we bought produce from him. That is how we kept the purity of the event as a cultural event of the community not a marketing tool for corporations.

I found that local groups were quite publicity literate and able to manage the corporation's demands for maximum public exposure, without sacrificing the cultural nature of their festivals. It was common for groups to have established contact with the company either through members, who might sell the product in a local shop and have contact with the distributors in San Juan, or who might work for the company him/herself, or may be willing to visit the San Juan office and present a funding petition. However, the most threatening development for the autonomy of local groups are the new "corporate promoters" that have rapidly emerged in the later years seeking to act as middlemen between the organizing groups and the corporations. Their hiring is becoming highly popular due to the importance that corporate support has attained in a more competitive environment. Promising groups more funding than they had previously obtained from the company, these promoters are being hired at a rapid pace, often with devastating consequences.

Both "La Lancha" Festival and ARECMA had problems with

promoters during my fieldwork. Both groups had decided to hire a corporate promoter for the first time ever to increase corporate funding. In the case of ARECMA the corporate promoters greatly impaired the potential of the organizing group to assert their decision making power against the corporation. They increased the amount of advertising that is placed in the festival's surroundings thus diminishing the group's control over the appearance of the festival, which is one of the most important aspects of the event. In the case of La Lancha, the promoter failed to bring one of the trendy bands that it had originally promised the group as well as other spectacles for which the group had already paid. The Lancha Committee, however, was oblivious to the added advertising placed by the promoter just as many other groups do not mind the companies inundating their festivals and activities with advertisements, because these are also thought to give a more festive and contemporary feel to the activities. This attitude is also tied to the importance that these cultural activities also attain for people in the informal economy, for which printed ads, posters and publicity paraphernalia are an important way of attracting consumers. I even saw people request that the corporate staff add more posters or decorations here or there, and at other times, people added more such decorations themselves to make their kiosks stand out among others.

Meanwhile, ICP-affiliated cultural centers, which depend mostly on the ICP for their funding, are continually trying to reach compromises between the requirements of the governmental cultural policy about educational programming and the funding-conditions of commercial companies. The government's educational bent is constantly obstructed by the corporate funders' display of banners with logo, which according to a local leader "tend to turn the cultural festivals into a "Shaeffer or Budweiser beer activity." Another critical issue is how to reconcile or find a compromise between the government's preference for a no alcohol policy for cultural activities and the corporate sponsors' preferences, especially in the case of beer and soft drink companies, which include a massive display of freebies promoting these product and always require a commitment of massive sales.

Some groups have chosen to remain at the margin and reject government and corporate funding in order to avoid both governmental and corporate regulation, but most groups are forced to rely on non-state funders to support the popular entertainment aspect of their activities. For while the government endorses folk music and trovadours it is salsa and more often merengue music that draws and lures people to the "cultural" programming. Thus folk music and "trovadores" are often featured during the day, but the night belongs to rum drinks, salsa, and merengue. As a

leader of one local cultural center stated, "through salsa you bring people in so that they participate in the cultural activities," openly voicing the official discourse that distinguishes "salsa" from legitimate "cultural" activities.

Considering that rejection of corporate financial support is almost inconceivable for most groups interested in organizing cultural activities, corporate sponsorship of cultural activities will continue and is likely to increase. The corporations continue to benefit from this publicity strategy and even the government is encouraging the private corporations' role as funding for cultural work has once more been cut. In 1993, the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture experienced a cut of over two million dollars, and most legislative assignments to cultural groups for local festivals and cultural activities are being discontinued.

Yet, far from eroding national culture, these companies are another source which local groups tap in the ongoing struggle over defining and representing Puerto Rican culture. In this process, people draw on corporate funding to highlight aspects that are excluded due to their more popular and less "cultural" outlook, and that can become a venue for the validation and recognition of different elements of Puerto Rican culture.

As we have seen, private corporations are after faithful consumers, just as the ICP favors those groups who

follow their precepts on culture; but ironically, it is through the intervention of capital in these cultural activities that new ways of expressing nationality are obtaining a voice and a space. The authenticated view of culture, constrained by its static and folklorized conception of Puerto Rican culture, is not able to resonate and attract popular support from classes that continually challenge the purist conceptions of Puerto Ricanness that nationalist ideologies depend on.

Increasingly more consumer oriented and leaning toward the "chabacano", a great percentage of contemporary Puerto Rican society is less identified with strict definitions of pure culture and more eager to embrace everyday forms of representing Puerto Rican identity that counter traditional modes. In turn, lacking the nationalist preoccupation with "pure" culture, the corporate sector can be polluted by popular classes from which it accrues support in the form of consumers. In this way, advertisers are part of a greater challenge to dominant standards for defining purity and authenticity in Puerto Rican culture.

Accounting for these new developments pushes us to rethink the processes of constructing national identities in contemporary society and to acknowledge that Pro-Independentistas are as likely to work in the publicity industry and that multinational products are as likely to

appear more or less "Puerto Rican" to the average consumer. Yet far from contradictions, these new processes are intrinsic components of contemporary cultural politics on the island where corporate sponsors continue to sell products through culture and culture through products.

Endnotes

1. I am referring here to a discontinued locally produced beer, which was associated with "Cantalicio" the Puerto Rican national. The campaign was developed by Young and Rubicam associates in Puerto Rico in the 1970s.
2. Advertising trends were affected by regulatory restrictions on advertising by Tabacco in print and media regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (U.S. C. Title 15, Section 1335) given that the island's publicity market, like all mass media on the island, is under U.S. regulatory jurisdiction (Subervi Vélez and Hernández López 1990:169).
3. See Garcia Canclini's (1992) comparison of the privatization of art and culture in Argentina and Mexico.
4. According to the 1994 Public Records Service, Inc. in San Juan, Puerto Rico, a marketing service that collects information on the top advertising categories and brands in different media.
5. See video documentary produced by Lopito and Howie to describe the 'successful' advertising of Budweiser, 1993.
6. Documental produced by Lopito & Howie Advertising Co. San Juan, Puerto Rico
7. The term popular culture has become a contentious term in contemporary studies. It has been widely defined as folklore, as an alternative expression of subordinate classes, and as a 'degenerate' product of mass culture, among many other definitions (Mukerji & Schudson 1991, Storey 1993). In this dissertation I will define popular culture as the realm of social practice and everyday life, and following Hall (1981), as the ground on which transformations between imposed orders and resistances are played out. This focus analyzes popular culture not as something that has an intrinsic nature in and

of itself, but in relation to existing cultural hierarchies, against which it is placed in a subordinate position. See chapter four and the conclusion for further discussion of this term.

8. See the work of Garcia Canclini (1993) on "reconversions" and Barbero (1993) for a discussion of mass-mediated popular culture in Latin America. With these terms they challenge the idea that popular culture can be identified or contained, highlighting instead the hybrid transformations of cultural forms with commercial culture, mass media and new technologies.

9. For a discussion of the government's love/hate relationships to salsa see Juan Flores' "Cortijo's Revenge" CENTRO 3(2) 8-21.

10. See Rivera (1993) and Flores (1991) for a discussion of rap music in Puerto Rico and among Puerto Ricans in the States.

11. The transgressive character of Puerto Rican T.V. comedies has been discussed by Eliseo Colon Zayas (1990) in a Bakhtinian analysis of "Sunshine's Cafe," a discontinued program that was number 1 in local ratings in the early 1990's.

Chapter VI

Contending the Nation, Contending Identities

When considering the likelihood that alternative views of nationality will have an impact on dominant conceptions of Puerto Rican identity, the delegitimization of many new cultural expressions as commercial is clearly an obstacle to their validation. This trend, which is intrinsically related to the involvement of commercial interests in Puerto Rico's cultural politics, has added a new dimension through which hierarchies between forms and genres claiming to represent Puerto Rican culture are maintained, as they are either legitimized as cultural or rejected as commercial.

The division between "cultural" and "commercial" forms is embedded in a larger field of cultural production in which the ICP sets the dominant standards for the production, circulation and consumption of cultural goods that aim to represent Puerto Rican culture, be it a festival or a folk art piece.¹ As we have seen, what is considered "cultural," according to the cultural policy's standards, is associated with a "traditional" past where utopian pre-capitalist and non-capitalist forms have the strongest claim to authenticity.

While precapitalist forms are a common foundational basis of cultural authenticity (Ferguson 1992, Garcia Canclini 1993), we have seen that in Puerto Rico this

association was strengthened by the island's colonial relationships with the United States. In this context, modern culture and consumption are associated with the American dominant "other" which provides the reference against which authentic Puerto Rican culture is forged.² Thus, consumerism and materialism were constructed as the major threats against Puerto Rico's cultural "domain of sovereignty." The cultural policy's standards also state that patriotism should be the motivation for producing cultural forms that aim to represent Puerto Rican culture and that the production of "authentic" cultural forms be devoid of economic and commercial motives. In this way, what is defined as authentically "cultural" becomes what Bourdieu has termed, the "economic world reversed," or the "disavowal" of economic value, motive and interest from the creation and production of cultural goods and practices (Bourdieu 1993). Bourdieu's discussion refers mostly to high culture products rather than folklore or objects and expressions that aim to represent a national identity. However, for these cases too, as evident in Puerto Rico, the "disavowal" of economic interest in the production of cultural goods and activities also helps to sanction and "consecrate" dominant interests under the unquestionable standards of authenticity.³

At the circulation and consumption end, similar standards help to legitimize dominant views of authenticity.

These standards demand that "cultural" activities should promote education and be consumed as educational products rather than as a source of mere entertainment. Accordingly, what is legitimized as cultural according to institutional standards ends up reproducing social hierarchies and excluding popular ways of expressing and consuming "Puerto Rican culture."

In this chapter I will analyze the contemporary distinctions created by the official cultural policy between "authentic" and "commercial" expressions as part of a greater process of struggle over the criteria for defining legitimacy in Puerto Rican culture. In this context, the distinctions between legitimate and heretical, and high and low culture serve as axes to legitimate dominant culture and exclude subordinate culture, just as other classist and racist distinctions serve to delimit and exclude people from a national community however defined. I will argue that these contemporary distinctions between "cultural" and "commercial" forms are providing a new terrain for recycling discourses about legitimacy and inauthenticity in Puerto Rican culture, and that they serve as a veil for the subversion of alternative views of Puerto Rican identity stemming from subordinated groups.

I will address these issues through two case studies: the National Indigenous Festival, a ICP-sponsored activity, and the corporate sponsored Bacardi Folk Arts Fair. These

represent two of the most important activities sponsored by the ICP and a commercial sponsor respectively. I will argue that a commercial component is an inescapable aspect of all cultural expressions on the island rather than a qualitatively different domain; and that the assessment of cultural products as legitimate and authentic or commercial and inauthentic is most important for legitimizing or disqualifying different claims. As such, these categories are arbitrary and can be shown to be situationally deployed and constituted.

The National Indigenous Festival: In Search of the "Purest" Indigenous Queen

The National Indigenous Festival was founded in 1969, four years after the inauguration of the ICP-affiliated cultural center of Jayuya. Since its inception, the festival has been the one activity that most directly celebrates the legacy of Taino culture through a massive display of its dress, music, foods, dance and games. The activity is famous island-wide, and is considered by the government representatives one of the most authentic festivals and the one event that highlights an important "component" of Puerto Rican national identity.

As such, the festival has been a priority of the ICP, which regards it as a model to be followed by other cultural centers. In turn, the cultural center of Jayuya has become the home of one of the regional offices of the ICP and has

produced some of ICP's most influential regional promoters. The National Indigenous Festival also enjoys more government funding than other local ICP celebrations, which has allowed the cultural center to reject or exert greater control over control corporate sponsors and ensure the festival's image as a purely cultural event. The few commercial sponsors involved in the festival are not allowed to advertise and obstruct the decoration of the festival.⁴

Yet, even within this culturally sanctioned domain there is evidence of struggles over the definition of authenticity. These are manifested in the different popular perceptions of the activity (as a tourist attraction, a cultural or a political act) and in the participants' rejection of imposed and unattainable standards of authenticity.

I first became aware of these issues when I heard local residents of Jayuya commenting on the festival during my fieldwork. Their remarks ranged from overt admiration to indifference about the activity. The feelings of people involved in the organization of the festival clashed with those of other people I later met in Jayuya who were generally less enthusiastic about the event. Most people pointed to the event's entertainment value, and said the festival was important because it was one of the few shows that provides a diversion for Jayuyanos.

These different perceptions of the festival, as a

"show" or a leisure activity rather than a culturally relevant event, were among the first signs that for many, the activity was not purely the cultural event envisaged by the cultural center.

I later learned that there had been some skepticism about the legitimacy of the festival ever since its inception. Initially, there had been public opposition to the celebration of the festival. Some saw it as a ridiculous invention given that the Taino had been officially extinct since the 1600's and perceived it as a heresy, as "digging up the dead." As discussed in chapter two, this belief was directly tied to Puerto Rico's national myth which holds that the Taino have been extinct since the Spanish colonization of the island, and that only "traces," and "contributions" remain. This common perception has maimed the authenticity of the festival because in the name of authenticity the best that can be achieved is a performance of cultural forms attributed to the Taino.

The second point of contention was the political identification of the festival with the PPD and the PIP Party. This further undermined the legitimacy of the festival among some people, such as PNP advocates, who saw it as a political strategy rather than a culturally worthwhile activity. Although this political identity is common to ICP-funded events, Jayuya's history as one of the bases of the harshly suppressed nationalist uprising of

1950, and the place where Puerto Rico was declared an "independent republic" has given the festival a nationalistic image that attracts thousands of visitors island-wide.⁵ The area's cultural promoter said that the festival especially attracts, "those who want to express their "nacionalismo solapao" (hidden nationalism), without having to be open independentistas, which they would be afraid of. And indeed, the festival I witnessed was extremely crowded, even though it was competing with two blockbuster public events: the 1993 Central American Olympic games and the government-funded Quincentennial celebration of the island's "discovery", which were mass public events with nationalistic overtones on the island. The politically charged environment surrounding the festival has often turned it into a public competition between the PNP and the PPD municipal administration. At the festival I attended, the tension was evident when a palm tree, the political emblem of the PNP Party, was burned. The incident was interpreted by some as the act of crazy kids and by others as the work of nationalists. It led to rumors and references to the 1950's Revolution, indicating the fear that is still associated with open expressions of nationalism in Jayuya.

The political identification of the festival is also strengthened by the close connection between the cultural center and two government offices: the Education Department

and the ICP in San Juan. These agencies have been involved in the development of the festival since its origin because of its controversial nature and political connotations at the local level. The ICP in San Juan was particularly important in maintaining the festival. Anthropologists and archaeologists employed by the ICP were a motivating force behind the cultural center's decision to highlight the city's Indian heritage.⁶

The festival's reputation as a pure cultural event has turned the National Indigenous Festival into a nationalist and tourist activity, and Jayuya into the "Taino capital" of Puerto Rico. As such, the festival is of great importance for tourism and brings life to the small town of Jayuya, where lack of accessible roads and industry has hampered the town's economic growth. Jayuya's unemployment is 33.96% and its population has remained constant at around 15,000 inhabitants since the 1940's, because youth leave in search of work.⁷ But during the festival people from in and outside Jayuya crowd the town's plaza, local hostels are full, and commerce booms.

The festival's key role as a tourist attraction in the local economy has molded the event to appeal to the outside public rather than to the locals because, as I was told, "people come to Jayuya to see the festival and they expect to see certain things". This emphasis on the outside public was evident in the cultural center's coordination of the

programming and the arrangements of the musical and artistic contracts. These were not discussed at the meetings of the cultural center, but were first decided by the director of the festival and the ICP regional promoter. As a result, the programming is predictable and locals complain that it features the same artists year after year, a fact that the cultural center's staff defend on basis of the performers' authenticity.

Yet one aspect of the festival has continued to attract local residents, providing a good example of the way in which authenticity is contested and reformulated in the activity. This is the celebration of an Indigenous Pageant which, since its inception in 1973, remains the most popular addition to the festival, and the activity that involves the greatest community participation in its organization. The pageant was added on the initiative of the first woman director of the cultural center, a renowned school superintendent who, despite her influence, faced opposition from the other members of the cultural center who saw the pageant as a modern event. As the founder of the pageant remembers:

People associated the pageant with Miss Universe and Miss Puerto Rico, something modern. People in the center thought it was out of place to do this. Yet I explained to them that Taino society was organized around kings and queens and that their daughters must have been princesses of the tribe. Then people realized that they had nobility and that it was probably in these types of societies that pageants initially originate, in societies with queens and princesses, and I finally

convinced them.

The decision was also influenced by the popularity that pageants were attaining among the public, which peaked after Puerto Rico won the Miss Universe Pageant for the first time in 1970.

The initial idea was to select an indigenous queen (a "cacica" in Taino) on the basis of the themes represented in the candidate's dress, very much like carnival contests celebrated in other cities, although in the Indigenous Pageant the dress themes had to be related to Indigenous Culture. The first dresses were created with cloth, sequins, glitter and other synthetic decorations in a confection aimed at representing different themes from the Indigenous flora, fauna and ways of life. By 1976, however, the center turned away from modern materials toward native materials and the authenticity of the dress was judged according to its use of autochthonous materials found in the natural environment, like animal feathers, seeds, shells, earth, roots, shells, and pebbles. Dresses were made of "majagua" (tree shells) with flower or seed trimmings and complemented by tiaras made of seeds, corns, and other natural materials. The use of synthetic materials, like glue, sequins, cloth or plastic was banned and made grounds for disqualification.

The strengthening of the Taino identification in the pageant, through the use of the purest local materials in

the design of the dress occurred as the Taino were becoming an important symbol of cultural identity in Puerto Rican society in the mid 1970s. This shift was evident in the resurgence of archeological and historical studies of the Taino, the popularization of Taino themes in artistic work, and the use of the Taino in commercial advertising.⁸

The popularization of the Taino as a symbol of national identity contributed to the festival's reputation as the guardian of indigenous culture island-wide; a process that required a continuous searching of the past for further bases for authenticity. Indicative of the festival's emphasis on strengthening links to the past was the foundation in 1974 of the Indigenous Band and the Indigenous Dancers in charge of replicating Taino dance, and the communal ball game played during the festival. The added importance of the event nation-wide was explained by a high school teacher, who has been involved in the organization of the pageant for over ten years:

The festival was so pure, so pure that everything had to be natural, if we were going to select an indigenous queen, naturally we had to choose something that was congruent with the festival, with the culture, with the customs, something virgin. It was no longer possible to select an indigenous queen with a sequined dress.

Additionally, the center decided that as an indigenous pageant, physical resemblance to the Taino should be the main characteristic for the selection of the queen. Before that, the participants were mostly white young women, and I

was told that blondes wearing dark wigs and skin paint to represent Taino characteristics were the favorites. After the change in policy, candidates were chosen according to their indigenous characteristics, among which straight hair, a narrow forehead, elongated eyes, "chata" (short) nose, pronounced cheekbones, and copper coloring were identified as the criteria for selecting authentic cacicas. As there are no living Tainos, these features of physical authenticity were based upon historical descriptions and the bust of a local high school boy selected for his indigenous appearance in the 1970s.

In this way, the pageant emerged as another way of showcasing authenticity in the festival, through the selection of an "authentic" Taino queen. However, the criteria for selecting the authentic queen have been contested because the performance aspects of the activity rather than the physical appearance of the queen are most popular. It is the dress and its presentation which has become the most important aspect of the pageant rather than the physical appearance of the cacica stressed by the ICP-affiliated cultural center.

After the adoption of the new policies, the cultural center gave most emphasis to physical characteristics in the selection of the cacica. Potential candidates seeking to represent each competing school in the final pageant were first chosen on the basis of their features and skin color

alone. The dress only became important during the competition itself. But in response to criticism from people involved in making the costumes, the cultural center later gave equal weight to both physical traits and dresses during the selection process. Nonetheless, the center's preference for the physical traits as the true mark of authenticity remained. As one of the organizers explained:

The dress also represents the culture, but we have to make people understand that we are after those physical characteristics, because that is the true root. Sometimes, the schools say that they cannot find candidates, but after a while they always find one. As long as we find the characteristics we will continue to emphasize them as the defining aspect of the festival.

The center's concern about the physical characteristics does not mean that the cultural center espouses the view that there are living descendants of the Taino in modern Puerto Rico, but only that physical traits will be the determining factor in selecting those who look more "authentically" Indian. This was evident in the reaction of one of the organizers of the activity who declined to present on stage a group of Puerto Ricans from New York who claimed a link to the Taino through spiritual descent. This group had developed a religious connection with the Taino which went beyond their having physical features or looking Taino. Rejecting the groups' request to make a public announcement inviting local people to a ceremony they wanted to perform by the Taino burial monument near the cultural center, he

explained:

Our goal is to make people feel Puerto Rican, not to turn people into indigenous people. This festival is scientific and cultural. Only scientifically and officially validated indigenous people get to be announced in the festival.

In the past, indigenous people from South America or the Caribbean have been invited and featured as participants in the festival, but the Puerto Rican spiritual Tainos were banned from participating because their claim to Taino descent was spiritual rather than biological and therefore dismissed as illegitimate. In this way, the cultural center is following the ICP's official policy of emphasizing the traits and contribution of the Taino legacy to contemporary Puerto Rican culture, rather than the mobilization of Taino identity for political purposes. This view also serves to invalidate the attempts of expatriate Puerto Ricans to look to the Taino for the symbolic material to construct their cultural identity as Puerto Ricans.

Thus the festival presents Tainos who look "authentic," without ever believing themselves to be real Tainos as have their "fake" counterparts who could not possibly be authentic given Puerto Rico's official canon about the Taino's extinction. Because the physical appearance required of the candidates is not presented as a genetic link to the Taino, it is not perceived as a threat to dominant racial ideals of whiteness; looking Taino is never equated with being Taino.

In selecting the cacica, members of the cultural center visit the different schools to make sure that the selection of the cacica is done according to the physical standards. The women in charge of the contest pride themselves on having educated the town to recognize Taino traits, and claim that there is little controversy about their selection. I was told:

They themselves know which are good candidates, we no longer have to tell them what to look for. Some of the darker girls are disappointed, but things are explained to them, and usually they have selected some good candidates before I go to advise them on what to look for.

What remains inexplicable is that it is easier for whiter girls to appear Indian and be selected as candidates than it is for darker girls. This is mostly because it is color and hair texture (the two characteristics that are most commonly used to distinguish race on the island,) that are the predominant features for selecting the queen, rather than other characteristics (nose shape, forehead etc.) which are more easily ignored. A candidate with "bad" (curly) hair, was far less likely to be selected even if she had other Taino traits such as high cheekbones, a narrow forehead and elongated eyes. The requirements of straight hair and copper color discriminate most against black Puerto Ricans (identified mostly by their hair and color).

The fact that it is easier for whiter girls to meet the requirements for looking Indian is discernible in the composition of the Indigenous Band group, which also selects

participants according to Indian traits. The band, composed of about 30 adolescent boys and girls (many of whom were former cacicas or candidates in the pageant) is also sponsored by the cultural center. Like the pageant, the band aims to replicate the racial features of the Taino, yet whiter girls, either wearing make-up, or long dark wigs were included in the group, while black and darker girls were absent. There were also male dancers whose features would disqualify them from participating, who wore wigs to the performances. It was easier for darker males to appear as Indians than for women because most males felt too embarrassed to participate in dances which clashed with traditional gender roles. This led to the relaxation of entry requirements for men in the dance troupe.

Jayuya, like other inland towns, is whiter and more racially homogeneous than coastal and urban towns. However, the overt inconsistency of accepting that white and Indian can merge but black and Indian can not merge as easily belies the cultural center's claim that the emphasis on the candidate's physiognomy is innocuous.

The importance of the Indian characteristics, which was never challenged by the organizers of the festival, was continually debated in practice because people placed less value on these criteria as a legitimating factor. First, despite the cultural center's emphasis on the physical traits, it is the dresses that steal the show. These are

still created with natural products, but have nevertheless become more elaborate in their production and in their themes. There are far more arguments about which is the best, most original and creative dress than about who is the most "Indian looking" candidate. Arguments about the dresses have sometimes escalated to the point where jurors have been physically threatened by people unhappy with their voting.

This incident actually led to my involvement in the pageant. I was asked to serve as a juror because it was believed that, as an outsider, I would be impartial in the voting. I can therefore confirm that it is the performance aspects of the contest that draw the most popular attention, rather than physical features, which the cultural center saw as the main determinant of authenticity. I had to review and talk to all the candidates as part of my role as a juror, and it was clear that the candidates and the people who made the dresses were working according to different standards from those of the pageant organizers. For instance, the Indian features were disregarded as an important element for selecting the cacica as they focused on how the dress was made, the different materials used, how they were found, whether they were novel or had been used before and, most importantly, who was involved in the creation of the dress.

The amount of time people dedicated to making the

dresses (which were made by students from the participating schools or by someone hired to do the job,) as well as the way in which the creators had obtained their inspiration for different themes were also important issues that came up spontaneously during my meetings with the contestants.

In contrast, none of the candidates or the people around them (mostly those involved in making the dresses) drew attention to the candidates' physical features. These became a secondary aspect of the contest referred to only in order to legitimize the juror's decision. However, people seemed to be generally aware that the candidates tended to be whiter Indians, as evidenced in the generalized explanation I commonly heard to explain a juror's disregard of a favorite candidate, which was by calling attention to her whiteness. "She was too white, that's why the other candidate won, though her dress was better," I often heard, further suggesting the predominance of whiter Indians in the pageant, and the reason that racial features are popularly invalidated and overlooked as a determining category in the pageant.

The priority that the dress has attained over the physical features in selecting the pageant's winner was a cause of tension for people who preferred a more "purist" festival. "This is not a festival, this is a carnival" said an outraged representative of this view, who was once very active in the organization of the festival.

He claimed that people no longer care about the educational purposes of the festival, or the authentic indigenous features that it aims to highlight, but are only concerned about "giving a show" and performing rather than enhancing Taino culture. These claims reproduced the same dichotomies in which what is educational and authentic is deemed cultural and what is for show or entertainment is perceived to be "tainted," and purely for "wasteful" consumption.

The importance of controlling the carnivalesque aspects of the activity in order to preserve its purity was also evident in the reaction of members of the cultural center to the candidates' costumes that I reviewed. One of my first choices was a bat dress, made of feathers, earthy, crushed stone, carbon and hair, inspired by a Taino legend about a young Taino woman who takes the form of a bat to be able to fly to her lover. However, I was initially discouraged from this choice by one of the organizers of the event because it was too much like "batman" and "ugly". My attention was directed to other contestants who looked more Indian in their dress, (a contestant dressed with more earthly materials such as seeds, and bark, representing the sun) and away from the bat which was based on a mythical story and was too picturesque.

To conclude, although the festival is commonly represented as a pure and educational activity it is not

entirely without entertainment or even commercial content. The entertainment component is assured by the nationalist ideology which limits the Taino identity to a performance of Taino lifestyles. Meanwhile, the festival's commercial component is assured by its role as one of the most important economic activities in Jayuya, which helps strengthen the area's tourist appeal as the "Taino capital of Puerto Rico". Yet, while the cultural, educational, entertainment and economic aspects of the activity are all intertwined, boundaries are still maintained among those aspects of the activity that are more or less cultural. These boundaries are maintained by the cultural center but contested by the public. Thus, during the pageant, physical traits are deemed the determinant of authenticity by the cultural center's staff rather than the dress that is constructed by participants as the most important aspect of the event. The relevance of this distinction in maintaining hierarchical notions of authenticity is obvious when one considers that it helps disqualify the dress, the one aspect of the pageant that challenges the emphasis on physical traits and its racist implications.

The Bacardi Folk Arts Fair

Artisan

Man, Essence of Borinquen [Taino name for Puerto Rico]

Flower of the "ilan", "ilan"

you emerge from the earth

Artisan

Naboria [Taino worker], Patriotic jibaro.

(Pierluissi de Rodriguez 1989)

In Puerto Rico, almost everyone knows that the Bacardi Folk Arts Fair involves two different fairs: the "inside fair," organized by the company inside its facilities, and the "outside fair," which develops outside as a spontaneous creation of the informal economy.

The inside fair was founded in 1976 as part of a broader promotion strategy aimed at identifying Bacardi Rum with Puerto Rico. It was the outcome of research done by the company's public relations company in the mid 1970s which revealed that the product's image of being a "Cuban" product was hampering its sale on the island. This research showed that the product, of Cuban origin, had not been able to shed its image and compete with other Puerto Rican produced rums on the local market, even though the company had been operating in Puerto Rico since 1936 when it moved to the island in search of better tax conditions. This image-problem was particularly worrisome when anti-Cuban sentiments were rising due to the arrival of Cuban immigrants to the island after the 1959 Cuban Revolution.

The fair was part of an overall campaign entitled "Manos Puertorriqueñas" (Puerto Rican Hands) which aimed to

solve Bacardi's image problem and identify the product with Puerto Rico by comparing the process of making Bacardi rum with the craftsmanship of nationally recognized Puerto Rican artisans, painters and other artists. Launched in the mid 1970s, this advertising focus continued until the mid 1980s when the advertising strategy for Bacardi rum shifted to more modern images, abandoning overt folkloric and nationalistic imagery. Once again this move was informed by research which revealed that the product's identification with folklore had associated it with old age and maturity. However, the product continued to be linked to Puerto Rico through the sponsorship of cultural events, folk art museum exhibits, and most importantly through the annual fair, which has since evolved into a national event attracting thousands of visitors to the company's premises.

The identification of the product with Puerto Rican culture helped increase Bacardi's market on the island from 3 percent in the 1970s to 45 percent in the 1990s.⁹ The campaign has nationalized the product to such a degree that the rum is popularly known as a Puerto Rican product on the local market, and the U.S. market, even though Bacardi is not a Puerto Rican based or owned company but a Delaware incorporated multinational company which benefits from tax breaks under IRS 936 code, just like other multinationals on the island. Bacardi in Puerto Rico is just one among 13 other independent producers of Bacardi worldwide. The other

producers do not identify the product with Puerto Rico, but operate independently and contribute to making Bacardi the best-selling rum in the world.¹⁰ Thus Bacardi's identification as a Puerto Rican product is as spurious as R.J. Reynolds identifying Winston cigarettes as a local product solely on the basis that they are manufactured on the island.

The continued identification of the rum as a national product is a pivotal part of Bacardi's operations on the island. Besides changing the product's image, this identification enables the company to profit from the exize tax on rum imported to the U.S. which is returned to the Puerto Rican government. In 1992, according to Fomento (Puerto Rico's Development Corporation), this amounted to a total of 195 million in taxes returned to the Puerto Rican government, of which \$17 million are awarded for promotion purposes. As Bacardi is the number one rum importer, it is a primary beneficiary of this tax benefit, which translates into millions of free promotional dollars for the company.

In seeking the most authentic representation of Puerto Rican folk arts with which to identify their product, the company sought, from early on, the collaboration of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture in the organization of the fair. This collaboration is highly publicized in the fair through signs announcing ICP's co-sponsorship of the activity and by small signs with the logo of the ICP in

front of each artisan's space. These connections with the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture allow the company to publicly legitimize the activity as a cultural event while also relinquishing the most controversial aspect of the organization of the activity -- the actual selection of the artisans who participate in the activity. This has made the ICP the subject of numerous criticisms about the reappearance of the same artisans in the fair to the exclusion of many others who have never been invited. This exclusion is due to the event's emphasis on authenticity and the stipulation that participants be the best representatives of Puerto Rican master artisans, despite the increasing number of Puerto Rican artisans whose work diverges from official definitions of authenticity.

The official definitions of Puerto Rican "master artisans" which are recycled in the governmental cultural institutions promote the image of a male, elderly, rural, white peasant who inherited the craft from his immediate family and is a true lover and defender of Puerto Rican culture. This artisan carves "santos," (wooden images of Christian iconography), or does woodworking, or makes hammocks and does not rely solely on his craft for sustenance. The economic role that crafts have historically played on the island is ignored by this image which emphasizes only the patriotic role of folk artists as the bearers of Puerto Rican cultural traditions. However, contemporary Puerto

Rican artisans differ from the government's image of a master artisan, and most of them are therefore perceived as commercially motivated, rather than as true defenders of Puerto Rican cultural values.

According to a recent study (Vargas 1991), 52.9 percent of contemporary Puerto Rican artisans are women, most are between 31-40 years of age, and 56 percent live in urban areas. The study referred to these artisans as "neo artisans" because 51 percent were found to have been working as artisans for only the last ten years. Most of these neo-artisans learned their craft from friends, at technical schools, or even at the university. Most of them took up their craft as a means of solving unemployment problems, and most of them, irrespective of their cultural motivations for taking up the craft, increasingly respond to economic pressures. As a result, it is what sells best that guides the choice of the items they produce: souvenirs in clay and leather, silkscreen t-shirts which express Puerto Rican "themes," such as the Three Kings, Taino iconography, nationalist phrases or poetry. Jewelry and other easily manufactured goods are much more common than the "traditional" folk arts (wood carving, embroidery, mask making) which require more time and training to produce and which are therefore less profitable for the artisans. Moreover, the primary materials of contemporary folk arts, such as leather and clay, are mostly imported from abroad

because of cheaper prices, rather than from locally produced raw materials, which challenges governmental dictates that authentic crafts be made from indigenous materials.

Attempting to maintain high standards for its event, Bacardi follows the official distinction between "cultural" and "commercial" folk arts, inviting only those folk artists who have been evaluated according to the standards of the ICP. These are based on Law #99 of 1986 which lists general criteria for the evaluation of artisans. Among other things, these stipulate that the product "be made in Puerto Rico, that one should use Puerto Rican material, and that the themes should be related and should reflect Puerto Rican culture, such as its history, its fauna, flora, and the symbols of the traditional life of our people." The law also stipulated that I.D. cards be issued to artisans who passed the evaluation process to identify them as authentic representatives of Puerto Rican culture. This evaluation process, is supposed to be coordinated by four governmental agencies (The University of Puerto Rico, The Folk Arts Division of Puerto Rico's Development Corporation, The Tourism Office and the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture) but is usually referred to as the "ICP-evaluation" because it is the ICP that presides over the evaluation process.¹¹

By assuring that only "quality" folk art is showcased in the activity, the Bacardi Folk fair has obtained a reputation as one of the most "cultural" activities

nationwide, and one that sets standards against which excellence and authenticity is measured by cultural workers, even though it is openly corporate sponsored. The event is highly praised in the media as an "autochthonous homage to the island," "an activity filled with cultural value," and "an autochthonous manifestation of our culture." The activity also has the backing of the government and the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture.

This image is strengthened by the showcasing of "artistas nacionales," that is, popular artists who have a national reputation, either because they are internationally known and have represented Puerto Rico in international settings, or because their music and songs developed nationalistic themes (for example, Danny Rivera, Lucecita Benítez, Andrés Jiménez). Although the program generally excludes popular music, like salsa, it has showcased internationally recognized salsa groups like El Gran Combo, or exponents of what has been called "elegant salsa" due to its romantic lyrics and the more elegant dress code adopted by the performers. Since 1984, Bacardi has also reinforced the cultural image of the event by holding a "Trovadour Contest" involving the most renowned trovadores in their organization.

In contrast to the inside fair, which is organized inside the company's spacious premises, the outside fair is made up of hundreds of artisans and vendors clustered along

the two main road entrances to the company's facilities. The outside fair began when uninvited artisans (both non-certified and ICP-certified artisans) began to reclaim a share of the market after the fair became popularly known as one of the most profitable fairs for the invited artisans who could sell all their products within two days. One of the first artisans to "take over" the fair recalled:

We had just arrived from New York with no way of making a living. I realized that they sold a lot in the Bacardi Fair, I used to make a living knitting covers, so I put up a table at the entrance. I sold everything that day. Back then it was only me and someone else selling pinchos (fried meat).

As artisans became increasingly attracted to the area, informal organizers began to take on the task of organizing and charging fees to different vendors. Among these organizers are people native to the area, as well as the vendors and artisans themselves. Anyone who pays a fee, from a voluntary contribution to over \$300 for food and drink vendors, is assured a space in the activity.

One of the first informal organizers was a former fisherman and native of the area who took on the role of finding people spaces, picking up the trash and building wooden stands for artisans, functions which he claimed he took up to ensure his wife a place to sell her things. He has since remained involved in the fair in charge of organizing the artisans, albeit according to an entirely different logic from the one which governs the inside fair.

The different standards by which authenticity is identified in the outside fair were explained by the same informal organizer:

I do not see the material, or the person, or whether he is black or white or yellow or ugly or pretty, or if he has an ICP card or not, or if they sell 'fantasia' or not, because this is pal' pueblo, "pa'todos" [for all].

This greater inclusiveness is one of the many aspects that has made the outside fair so popular to the public. For one thing, while less than 200 artisans can participate in the inside fair, there are more than 400 artisans and countless food vendors outside. Artisans are greatly attracted by the sale conditions, which many consider better than at the inside fair. Inside, the artisans are concentrated in a particular part of one tent, relatively close to one another, in an area that gets extremely crowded with onlookers. The artisans are away from the stage and other food or drink kioskos (kiosks), serving almost as a 'show' in their own right, with little connection to other events that comprise the activity. This organization contrasts with the outside fair, where artisans are closer to food and drink vendors on a street where traffic flows in both directions and there is plenty of space for social interaction.

Although the outside vendors may enjoy better selling conditions, these advantages are partly offset by the standards of authenticity, which relegate them to the status

of mere "vendors" rather than "true artisans."

To understand the implications of these categories, it is important to note that while folk arts have undergone great transformations, the dominant ideology which holds that artisans should be motivated by cultural not commercial concerns persists. The outside artisans were concerned to challenge this negative identification and assert their legitimacy on the basis of different claims which allowed them to assert their identity as Puerto Rican artisans. In this process, shattering the line between "commercial" and "cultural" folk arts is a major preoccupation.

To do this, it was common for the "vendors" to define their productions as authentic and cultural according to more flexible standards than those propounded by the ICP. Being made by a Puerto Rican, and having Puerto Rican themes, whether peasant, Afrocaribbean or reminiscent of Taino imagery, were ways in which products were defined as Puerto Rican. The more flexible criteria used to define folk arts often represent an accommodation between the cultural content required of folk art and its economic and commercial function as a means of livelihood in the face of increasing unemployment. An informant who had been working on jewelry since she was fifteen years old and who relies on the income from her craft to supplement her part-time job stated:

My work is folklore because it is made here and by myself, a Puerto Rican. I obtained my ICP card

doing something else but I continued adding beads because it is what I like and it sells much better. I am indeed a representative of Puerto Rican culture, but one who represents a contemporary aspect and a historical moment in Puerto Rican culture and history, unemployment and the socioeconomic situation.

Another woman who had passed ICP evaluation by presenting a traditional cloth doll now makes clown-dolls because they sell better. She described her clowns as cultural because they are part of a tradition that can be traced back to the African, Spanish and Indian components that make up the blending myth of identity in Puerto Rico. As she put it:

My clowns are a Puerto Rican folk art because I make them with my hands, and our ancestors, the Spanish, African and Indian mothers also made them with their hands for their daughters. They made a variety of designs, just like the clowns I make today.

Practices like those of the women above reveal how aware my informants were of the importance of presenting their work as "cultural" and authentically Puerto Rican. Their manipulations of ICP policies were also a manifestation of people's questioning of the cultural policies themselves, which were often inconsistent with reality.

For instance, the cultural policy's requirement that indigenous materials be used was publicly dismissed as an impossible condition. This requirement is contradicted by the island's colonial situation which limits local decisions about production and trade, and allows the imposition of

federal regulations on the collection of materials. As a result, the leather used by most Puerto Ricans artisans is imported from Latin America, even though Puerto Rico produces unprocessed leather for export. Artisans cannot freely collect indigenous natural resources from certain government-controlled and private areas, as another informant discovered when she attempted to collect seashells from a tourist beach. Ultimately she decided to forego her quest for indigenous materials and asked her daughter who lived in Florida to buy and send her Florida seashells for her work. The selection of the participating artisans by the ICP, presented in terms of mastery and authenticity, was also questioned by many who saw politico-partisan motivations behind the ICP's selection. While many defended the ICP's objectivity in the selection, others rightly regarded "authenticity" as a cloak for favoritism along politico-partisan lines.

We know that only their friends [referring to ICP] get invited to the inside fair. I have never been invited. Not because my work is not good enough. I have an ICP card that says I am a proper artisan, and I make the best seed rosaries there are. But because I am a PNP activist, and they already have their lists of who they like to invite.

Finally, the rapid changes undergone by folk arts have also challenged the cultural policy on folk arts, and served to delegitimize the distinction between cultural and commercial forms. For instance, the ICP's authentication of

forms once perceived as purely commercial has set an important precedent which highlights the arbitrariness of the distinction between authentic and commercial folk art forms. This is the case with silkscreen t-shirts, which were excluded when they were first popularized in the 1970's but have now become a new category of folk art.¹² These t-shirts have been responsible for the introduction of many innovations to the themes associated with Puerto Rico, and have been a particularly important medium for the introduction of Afro-centric themes.

While most artisans tried to present themselves as "cultural" in order to assert the legitimacy on which the profitability of their work is based, the commercial value of folk arts was no secret among artisans in the "outside" fair. It is generally understood that people are there to make a living and most participants felt artisans should be given a "break" instead of being kicked out of fairs if their work is "unfit," as commonly happens at ICP-organized events. This economic concern overrides government concerns about authenticity, particularly because, as we have seen, almost anything can be presented as "authentic" and its economic value raised by cultural claims.

At first, the Bacardi corporation ignored the outside fair because, as I was told by a Bacardi representative, they "never thought it would become so popular and so strong." However, the outside fair soon became a threat to

the "inside fair." It is incredibly popular with the public, many of whom regard the outside fair as the fair and do not even bother going inside the company's premises to the "real" fair. For the ICP representatives I talked to this is highly problematic because, as one said: "people leave with the impression that Puerto Rican folk arts are just plastic;" whereas for the Bacardi representatives it means that people would confuse the outside fair for the "real" fair and then get the "wrong impression" of the kind of activities the company puts on for the public. Among the attractions that have made the outside fair the public's favorite are the cheaper prices, the greater diversity of folk arts, and the accessibility of food and drinks closer to the kioskos area which provides more opportunities for socializing during the event.

The outside fair is also a threat to the inside fair because it challenges the company's attempt to obtain exclusivity for its products. Only the company's products are sold inside (Bacardi rum drinks, Coca Cola, Medalla Beer and other Bacardi's Food and Spirits Products,) but the outside fair is filled with all the brand competitors, who have been known to give the outside vendors even better deals in order to feature their products on Bacardi's terrain.

Most of all, the outside fair presents a threat to the company because it signals the incursion of the nearby

community, one of the poorest on the island, into the company's premises. This incursion is visually evident in the complex system of color paint marks that have been added by artisans and informal organizers on the roads that lead to the company's main entrance to identify spaces and maintain the continuity of the fair year after year. These are secured by some organizers and residents of Cataño, who often hang out on the company's premises to guard the marks or paint over those that have been destroyed or erased. As a result, the two main entrances to the company are covered with a growing profusion of white, yellow, red and blue paint marks which further establish the outside fair's stake in the event. This visual incursion, combined with fears that the outside fair would get out of control and damage Bacardi's reputation and suppositions about the informal organizers' connections with crime, were major preoccupations voiced by representatives of Bacardi I talked to who showed great frustration at not being able to tame what has already emerge a self-sustained annual event.

The corporation has tried to evict the fair from the company's entrance, using a variety of means, ranging from calling the police, destroying the kioskos, painting over the name marks and putting pressure on the municipal government. Legally, they have resorted to the ban on selling drinks on local and state roads such as those that lead to the company's premises. However, by the time these

measures were taken, the fair was popularly known and strong enough for the informal organizers to appeal to politicians, neighborhood connections and the strength of the whole informal economy which was being sustained by the fair. Indeed, the fact that the outside fair lacked institutional and municipal support had built a base of support for the fair among the people who benefited from it and from the public, who regarded it as a sign of a self-generated cultural overload. As a consultant for Bacardi Corporation who is himself a sympathizer of the fair said,

I have a lot of sympathy for the outside fair. I believe it is an authentic and autonomous expression of the people. How could you prohibit that expression, and a call to culture that goes overboard because it does not fit in the inside fair? I don't know why they do not like it. Maybe it is to protect the artisans who are selling inside.

This consultant had advised Bacardi to "win over their competitor" by making the outside fair part of the overall activity. He suggested placing speakers with music in the outside area, so that the public would be enticed to go inside to hear the music, and helping the vendors with trash collection. Most importantly, he suggested giving outside vendors discounts on Bacardi products to reduce their competitors' sales. The company did reach out to the outside fair, but only after their attempts to suppress it had failed. By then the offer was rejected outright by the informal organizers, who could now get back at the company

not only through their presence but also through their open rejection of the company's discounts on Bacardi products.

At present, the outside fair has acquired a local reputation as a "cultural event" in its own right. This in turn assures its permanence because it deters Bacardi from taking a public position against the fair. To do this would jeopardize the image of being a "culturally concerned" company which Bacardi so hard tries to project. However, among the informal organizers the community value of the activity was never in dispute. A sense of entitlement was evident among those I talked to who asserted their rightful place as long-term residents of Cataño with a legitimate duty to organize a "community" event. This attitude was evident in one of the organizer's comments about the permanence of the fair, when he said: "They do not know what they are up to. Bacardi's new president has only been here for three months, but I have been here for eighteen years, and this has been our fair all this time. The fair stays and will live on."

Discussion

The case studies above describe two very different events. One is an activity whose authenticity is controlled by the ICP; the other is a corporate-sponsored event that ironically enforces even stricter standards of authenticity than other local groups I came in contact with. However,

both cases illustrate the contradictions of contemporary cultural politics on the island. First, it is clear that "authenticity" in the context of the Indigenous Beauty Pageant is just as contested as the boundary between cultural and commercial folk arts is in the Bacardi Folk Arts Fair. In both events, legitimacy was officially defined by adherence to the official cultural policy as defined by the ICP-affiliated local cultural center or the ICP in San Juan. These standards favor forms that evoke a "traditional" past and whose cultural and educational content not be tainted by economic interests or leisure purposes. However, these standards generate their own contradictions because they also require local participation and a public. These local participants increasingly challenge the standards and bring about disagreement about the basis for determining authenticity. Thus it was seen that there was ample subsidiary production stemming from the consumption and adoption of imposed orders, spaces and regulations (de Certeau 1984), such as the manipulations of the artisans presenting their products as culturally motivated so as to raise the legitimacy and value of their productions by cultural claims. As shown, these processes involved validating new practices for defining what constitutes a legitimate celebration or folk art as "cultural," while the actual fulfillment of formal standards for "authenticity" is rendered less important.

The standards upon which authenticity is based were also popularly discredited simply on account of their unattainability in contemporary society; it is impossible to find a "pure" indigenous queen or produce authentic folk arts that conform perfectly to the official romanticized version of folk art.

As a result, despite the official standards, it is the entertainment aspect of the National Indigenous Festival that attracts most attention, and the "outside fair" at the Bacardi Arts Fair that is gaining in popularity. Meanwhile, most folk art fairs are saturated with jewelry, t-shirts, souvenirs and other forms of folk art which the ICP dismisses as commercial and having little cultural value. Even the National Folk Art Fair in Barranquitas, widely known for displaying only traditional forms of Puerto Rican art, included the same genres that were described to me as commercial or economically-motivated by ICP officials.

The distinction between more or less authentic forms is thrown into further doubt by the ironies of contemporary cultural politics. Here we find corporations like Bacardi upholding the ICP's standards of authenticity to assure the fair's reputation as a cultural event and the success of its own marketing strategy. The praise given to the fair by the press proves that the company has successfully veiled the economic motive behind the event and succeeded in presenting the activity as purely cultural. Meanwhile, the increment of

corporate funding in most cultural activities assures that a commercial component is an inescapable aspect of most cultural expressions rather than a qualitatively different domain. Thus the permanence of discursive categories for what is "cultural" or "commercial," or more or less "authentic," made irrelevant in practice, needs to be understood as part of a greater process of struggle over the criteria used to defined legitimacy in Puerto Rican culture. In this process, these distinctions serve to invalidate cultural expressions that involve entertainment or do not conform to dominant standards of "authentic" cultural content, irrespective of whether they provide a basis for legitimating different ideas about culture. Thus, in the end, what is legitimized as cultural according to institutional standards ends up reproducing social hierarchies and excluding popular ways of expressing and consuming "Puerto Rican culture."

Endnotes

1. I follow Bourdieu's (1993) discussion of the legitimacy of cultural goods and practices considered in relation to the position they occupy within the field of cultural production. This field is defined as "the site of the struggles for the monopoly of the power to consecrate..." (78). It encompasses the agents and the conditions involved in the production, circulation and consumption of cultural goods. Because, in his model, the field of cultural production is subordinate to the field of power, it serves to establish definitions of legitimacy by veiling the underlying power relations that sustain it and by reproducing oppositional relations between dominant and

dominated fractions.

2. In fact, among the primary motivations for the creation of the Institute of Puerto Rican culture were the protection of the Puerto Rican soul against the malaises of consumerism that were seen to lead to Americanization and the culture loss. (See Legislative Debate for the Creation of the ICP).

3. Disassociating culture from commercial values has been a historically documented tendency to safeguard taste and distinguish "authentic" culture from mass commercial culture and its threat to exclusionist standards of authenticity since the origins of mass consumer culture as documented, among others, by Williams (1991) and Handler 1992.

4. Besides the ICP and the Municipal Administration, it is mostly the local commerce and the two manufacturing factories in Jayuya (Boots Pharmaceuticals and Baxter Laboratories) that support the festival. Big commercial sponsors, like Winston, have supported the festival in the past, but their advertising is controlled by the cultural center. The festival I witnessed had no visible advertising from either local or external sources.

5. In November 1950, there was a Nationalist uprising in over 15 municipalities of the island, along with the attacks to the Blair House in Washington. Municipal offices and police headquarters were taken by the nationalists who in Jayuya declared Puerto Rico to be an independent Republic.

6. It was the ICP staff who originally informed the cultural center of the cacique who ruled the area prior to Spanish colonization. Through archaeological work the ICP has been pivotal in unearthing Jayuya's archaeological materials to reinforce the city's indigenous history.

7. Jayuya is one of the most economically depressed areas on the island with 75.58% of the population under the poverty line (Census 1990).

8. Recall for instance, Mazola's oil ad recreating Taino society harvesting corn produced in the mid 1970's.

9. Percentage of sales provided by a public relations officer for Bacardi Corporation

10. According to the Financial World Bacardi was chosen the most valuable spirit brand name in the world in 1993, and the 10th most valuable brand, in terms of sales, profitability and potential of growth, following Marlboro, Coca Cola, Kellogg's Cereals (San Juan Star September 22, 1993).

11. Due to controversies aroused by the evaluation process, both between the evaluating governmental agencies and the artisan community, artisans are being evaluated more informally by the ICP or the Folk Arts Division of Fomento, rather than by the whole committee. Evaluation still evolved around the overall guidelines of the law and the "Institutes's card" as the I.D. cards that are issued are commonly known, are required for participation in most ICP-organized events.

12. In Puerto Rico, graphic arts have been historically important as a means of communication. The ICP was particularly important in this development through its sponsorship of graphic art workshops and its production of a commemorative print for each of its activities since the 1950's. Today, most festivals print allusive t-shirts, rather than the print poster which is more costly to produce, although the ICP still subsidizes the poster for the program of its affiliated centers.

Conclusion

This dissertation has shown various agents advancing a variety of interests by appealing to culture, a process that disclosed struggles for the control over definitions of Puerto Rican culture and the venues for its representation. In assessing how these struggles affect contemporary cultural politics and the dominant views and definitions of Puerto Rican national identity, this dissertation first examined the colonial foundations that frame discussions about culture on the island.

Disclosing the Colonial Veil

It was noted that due to the island's ambiguous political status culture has historically constituted a primary medium to define local sovereignty. We saw evidence of this during the discussion of the promotion of cultural nationalism by the Pro-Commonwealth party in the 1950s, which served as a tool in the establishment and the legitimization of the current commonwealth status. Yet, emphasis on the island's cultural distinctiveness by the Commonwealth government also contributed to furthering United States interests by highlighting a culturalist definition of Puerto Rican identity that helped veil the colonial contradictions embedded in the island's commonwealth status. In particular, we saw how cultural

nationalism contributed to the neutralization of independence from the United States as a political option.

The promotion of cultural nationalism was also linked to the creation of cultural policies and institutions which were never fully popularized due to their political significance for those who controlled them. As we saw, control over government cultural policies and institutions was an important medium through which people asserted their views of Puerto Rican culture, attempted to direct the island's political future, and advanced particular agendas at all levels of Puerto Rican society. Hence the strict association of politico-partisan interests with the government cultural policies undermined the ability of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture to disseminate an uncontested view of Puerto Rican national identity. Instead, the assertion of government standardized views of Puerto Rican culture were often perceived as a cloak for political partisan interests rather than as statements of national identity. In this way, rather than generalize a "content" for Puerto Rican culture, what the government cultural policies most readily accomplished was the consolidation of culture as the dominant medium for political discourse.

In addition, due to the island's colonial history, the United States with its commercial culture has historically provided the "other" against which "authentic" Puerto Rican

culture has traditionally been defined. While commercial culture is perceived as an influence on national cultures worldwide, on the island it is perceived as the embodiment of Americanization and the most potent threat to the purity of Puerto Rican culture. Thus, since the 1950's, industrialization and increasing consumerism and materialism have been important factors influencing Puerto Rico's cultural policies. Seen by many Puerto Rican intellectuals as threats to the Puerto Rican spirit, culture and values, they were a driving force behind the foundation of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture as part of a broader governmental cultural program aimed at limiting the effects of the economic policies of export-led industrialization in the 1950s. Today, "commercialism" is still a driving force in Puerto Rican cultural politics and an all-purpose label for aspects of popular culture that are perceived as challenging to the purity of the nation according to dominant standards of authenticity. However, the utility of these conceptualizations is questionable when transnational interests are as likely to use cultural issues to assert and legitimize their claims as local interests are; and when, within the "commercialized" context of contemporary Puerto Rican society, people are continuing to assert Puerto Rican culture, perhaps even more openly than before.

The Search for Culture

While a generalized consensus about what can rightfully represent Puerto Rican culture was never fully secured on the island, it was argued that the attempts at defining images and representations of Puerto Rican culture has led to some standardized ideas about who and what are its most appropriate representatives. This is evident in the existing hierarchies documented throughout this dissertation in which the Pro-Commonwealth Party (PPD) and the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture's promoters and affiliated cultural centers were constructed as the "true" guardians of Puerto Rican culture, while the ability of other groups to be considered "Puertorriqueñistas" was contained. These distinctions were not drawn solely along political lines. They also involved class and race distinctions so that popular representations of Puerto Rican culture are more likely to be subverted in favor of "authenticated" images of Puerto Rican culture. Thus, this study documented a variety of divisions between those who are entitled to defend Puerto Rican culture and those who are not because their political affiliation, and discourse and practices are perceived to be incompatible with it.

This dissertation traced the intensification of cultural struggles on the island to the political transformations that began in the 1970s. These changes weakened the base of support for the Commonwealth Party,

which had until then dominated Puerto Rico's cultural politics. At that time, the coordinates around which discussions about politics and the island's political status would turn were in place, with culture as subject and object of contention. Thus, it was demonstrated that most agents involved in contemporary cultural politics operated within the dominant framework of debate in which appeals to culture serve to legitimize a variety of interests. These ranged widely from fundraising for the establishment of physical facilities as in the case of many independent groups, to supplementing one's own income for Puerto Rican artisans, to seeking greater representation for one's community which was the goal of ARECMA and the Lancha Committee, or even selling beer which was the aim of Budweiser sponsorship. In a similar manner, the "building blocks of nationality" are still the surest materials to ascertain authenticity, and popular ways of representing Puerto Rican culture are still more likely to be rejected as low and "polluted."

Having documented the dominant standards that frame discussions and representations of Puerto Rican culture, this dissertation documented contestations over definitions of Puerto Rican culture and the possibilities for expanding that definition whenever there were attempts to define and represent authentic culture. Thus, during the National Indigenous Festival in Jayuya the disregard for physical features as a criterion for selecting the cacica can be seen

as an unspoken rebuttal of the racist biases embedded in the pageant, just as the development of the outside fair during the Bacardi Folk Arts Fair is a rebuttal of the strict division between "cultural" and "commercial" Puerto Rican artisans.

The potential of these contestations to affect the dynamics of cultural politics were particularly evident in the discussion of the non-governmental groups celebrating cultural activities throughout the island. It was discussed that through their claims on and appropriation of culture, these groups generated new ways of identifying Puerto Rican culture, some of which superseded the distinctions generated by the government cultural institutions. By drawing from popular culture and everyday life, popular groups such as ARECMA and La Lancha Committee were also more likely to bypass the distinctions between popular versus high culture and folk versus commercial forms in their festivals and activities. Similarly, because independent cultural groups were more dependent on their immediate communities for support, they were more likely to engage in more informal recruitment practices and leave aside the distinction as to who is or is not a true defender of Puerto Rican culture that is so prevalent among ICP-affiliated groups.

I also discussed how different cultural groups provided arenas for the validation of their communities and the dissemination of elements ignored by official accounts of

history and nationhood. They also provided a context for the expression of internal tensions in their communities while confronting dominant views about the subordinate position of their communities. Such was the case with the Caone groups with respect to Caone's urban-biased history. In this way they incorporated the idioms of community and marginality, in socio-economic terms or in relation to the dominance of their respective municipal centers, as added bases for the representation of their communities. They were also shown to provide new public spheres of interaction and recreation for their respective communities, who are concerned about crime and the lack of public space.

This flexibility in the recruitment practices, goals and programs of the new cultural groups and the ways in which people represent Puerto Ricanness constitutes them as agents helping curb the power of the government cultural policy in fixing definitions of Puerto Rican identity. If resistance is defined according to its capacity to limit the extent of power to define action (Foucault 1983) these new groups can be seen as agents of resistance to the attempts of the ICP, political parties and other agents trying to affect cultural directives or secure strict definitions of national identity on the island.

In turn, popular representations of Puerto Rican culture and the association of new ideas and objects with Puerto Rican culture were also shown to be pushing the

limits of the government cultural policy. Glimpses of these processes were evident in several areas of this dissertation. It was seen, for instance, that the growth of new actors and festivals has affected the reception of folk music within the ICP toward the increased acceptance of more "hybrid" musical forms in their program. Also, while the cultural policy limited the styles of music that should represent Puerto Rican culture, at the level of practice, contemporary folk music was greatly influenced by the same musical rhythms and instruments that were shunned by the official cultural policy. Similarly, while the government maintains divisions about pure and commercial folk art forms, the same objects described to me as "commercial" (such as mass produced handicrafts or commercial music) have become generally accepted as representations of Puerto Rican culture at the level of everyday life. Most significantly, a measure of the way in which these new groups can threaten and whittle away dominant conceptions of Puerto Ricanness can be seen in the fear and condemnation of these groups by those trying to enforce the government's cultural policies. Among the practices that is most feared by representatives of the cultural policy is the presentation and public acceptance of popular practices, events and products such as festivals or "commercial" folk arts as "cultural."

Nevertheless, the eventual development of these popular practices of representing Puerto Rican identity in relation

to the nationalist ideology remains indeterminate, as are all emergent forms that are rooted in practice. We can, however, begin to assess what the case of Puerto Rico can tell us about the prospects for the construction of cultural and national identities in the contemporary transnational context.

Much More Puertorricaness

As discussed, official views of Puerto Rican culture rely on the presentation of culture as pure, traditional and therefore unchanged at the same time that attempts are made to renew and update these definitions with elements of popular culture. Recall the processes by which the symbols developed by the Nationalist Party in the 1950s, such as the flag, were incorporated as symbols of the Commonwealth, and how the peasant culture was romanticized in Puerto Rico's blending myth. Efforts to incorporate the new grassroots groups and ways of representing Puerto Rican culture were also evident in ICP's attempt to affiliate and work with those independent groups whose activities were closest to reproducing the ICP's view of culture. This was a way to reinvigorate the ICP program with new participants, although not necessarily with the new material delivered by many of these groups. Recall also the efforts of various political representatives to associate themselves with these groups as means of presenting themselves as "Puertorriquenistas".

Nevertheless, on and on, we saw that fears of purity, adulteration and commercialization defined the outer limit of adoption and incorporation of the new groups and popular practices of representing Puerto Rican culture. Thus, while there were attempts by the government institutions at incorporating some of the activities and materials produced by popular groups, official definitions continue to be maintained through the same appeals to legitimate knowledge and claims to authenticity.

Yet, considering that national myths and selective traditions need be renewed and updated to preserve their dominant position through the partial incorporation of diverse elements--such as that stemming from popular culture--and that in Puerto Rico popular culture is becoming more and more "what we make out of the products and practices of mass-produced culture" (Storey 1993:201) and thus increasingly "contaminated" with commercial culture, what prospects are there for the incorporation of these new elements as part of the "content" of Puerto Rican culture. What prospects are there for nationalist ideologies, which rely on ethnic components and traditional pasts to establish legitimacy through culture, when culture becomes "commercialized," globalized, or "adulterated"? Are there limits to the incorporation of forms that are perceived to be "commercial" when the nationalist constructs depend on establishing continuity with a foregone utopian pre-

capitalist past? These are questions at the heart of all contemporary constructions of nationhood in the increasingly global, commercialized or "mass-mediated" context of contemporary society.

Imagining the extent to which nationalist ideologies may reproduce or challenge exclusion and inequality pushes us to visualize the issue of cultural identity in the context of globalization beyond traditional paradigms, where identities are perceived to be tamed and depoliticized or more optimistically reconstituted under new guises. Instead, analysis should start from an acknowledgement and questioning of the exclusionary notions of nationalist projects, which may limit their efficacy as an alternative to the advancement of the interests of contemporary capital, which operates more and more through appealing to culture and difference. Such analysis may better assess the reconfiguration of hegemonies and the opening of breaks and alternative spaces for reshaping cultural identities in the context of globalization.

In this work, we saw how views of Puerto Rican identity are being redefined, although around regional identities, as in the case of the many groups organizing community cultural festivals, or through the "commercialized" domain of many corporate-sponsored cultural festivals. In particular, I highlighted how people create meaning out of "commercial" expressions and draw from forms that may be defined as

"commercialized" in their cultural activities. Thus, the search for a collective identity becomes a search for "secure moorings in a shifting world," as Harvey (1989:302) would describe it, but with commercial culture and mass-mediated cultural expressions serving along with "tradition" as motivational forces. Thus, what is of interest is not only the prospect for the development of new identities against increasing global constraints (given that in Puerto Rico processes of identity formation have been active and ongoing despite these pressures) but also the potential of these new constructs to bring about transformations in the dominant views of national identity.

In turn, at the heart of local preoccupations about the state of the island's national identity in the face of the continued political and economic assimilation to the U.S. are not only anti-colonial preoccupations but also racist concerns that our Spanish would become "rotten" or, as I was told by an ICP official, that we would become a "cultural phenomenon" like the "Nuyoricans." What these fears signal is a general awareness of change, which would need to be accounted for and could thereby challenge the foundational premises of official views of Puerto Rican identity to incorporate the transnational community of Puerto Ricans and the mass-mediated popular culture.

These issues are particularly important given that the battle for culture is, ultimately, intrinsically related to

the battle for the island's political status--either statehood, independence, or even a permanent commonwealth status. That is, the same political ambiguity that perpetuates the need for an "official" view of Puerto Rican identity to define sovereignty makes it possible that the island's political status may be resolved through the development and mobilization of more inclusive definitions of identity. With 2.7 million Puerto Ricans living in the U.S. and 3.5 million on the island, the constant migratory traffic between Puerto Rico and the U.S., and the continued involvement of American commercial culture in every aspect of contemporary Puerto Rican life, the issue of purity and authenticity in Puerto Rican culture will certainly continue to be challenged creating the possibility for the elaboration of alternative conceptualizations of identity.

Thus, what is at stake in the current context is not the sole continuation of cultural identities but whether new forms through which people may assert their identities within a context of social change could translate to more inclusive definitions of identity that affect configurations of power. In assessing these issues, studies of "particular" nationalisms remain important for assessing different views of national identity which may be involved, either in a subverted or in an emergent form, in leading to alternative political possibilities. This is specifically the case in the current global context where culture remains

a popular medium for social movements, identity politics and marketing strategists, and tropes of culture and nationhood are likely to remain relevant for many types of political movements.

In Puerto Rico, where nationalism is currently dismissed by island intellectuals since separatism is not backed by most Puerto Ricans, I have shown that cultural nationalism has played an important role in the colonial project and presently serves as a terrain where divergent interests contest views of Puerto Rican identity. Thus the new frameworks are new contexts for the reworking of older processes: the continued struggle for more inclusive representation in national communities. Meanwhile, the current discussions on the island point to the existence of alternative visions about "Puerto Ricanness" that are not predicated on the old recycled cultural origin myths or even a conclusive solution to the island's political fate.

APPENDIX A

Cultural centers included in the study:

*An Asterisk is placed by those groups of which I visited one or more of their activities during the course of my fieldwork.

ICP-affiliated cultural centers

Centro Cultural de Humacao* - Humacao
Centro Cultural de Jayuya* - Jayuya
Centro Cultural de Barranquitas* - Barranquitas
Centro Cultural de Añasco* - Añasco
Centro Cultural de Hatillo - Hatillo
Centro Cultural de Ponce* - Ponce
Centro Cultural de Vega Baja - Vega Baja
Casa Pueblo, Adjuntas - Adjuntas
Centro Cultural de Aibonito - Aibonito
Centro Cultural de San Germán - San Germán
Centro Cultural de Morovis* - Morovis
Centro Cultural de Naguabo - Naguabo
Centro Cultural de Bayamón - Bayamón
Centro Cultural de Barceloneta - Barceloneta
Centro Cultural de Peñuelas - Peñuelas

Non-Affiliated Groups

Comite Cultural de el Festival del Panapén - Vega Alta
Festival del Tomate* - Jayuya
Festival de la Pina* - Vega Alta

Asociación Recreativa Educacional del Barrio Mariana -
Humacao*

Club Civico Social Pedreño - Las Piedras (Festival del
Lechón)*

Asociacion de Pescadores de Fajardo*

Comite de la Lancha Planua* - Humacao

Festival del Buren, Inc.* - Loiza

Festival del Pescador (Tiburón) - Humacao

Comite Vecinal de Punta Santiago - Humacao

Comite Los Hijos de Candelero Abajo - Humacao

Festival de la Chiringa de Candelero Arriba - Humacao

Festival de Bomba y Plena, Inc. - Humacao

Activities attended during course of research and organizers

In addition to those of the groups included in the study, I
attended these events:

Festi-Carnaval de Oriente, by Humacao's municipal
administration.

Festival del Acabe, by the Centro Cultural de Maricao

Generacion del Relevó, by ICP office in San Juan

Festival de Claridad, by the Claridad Newspaper

Fiestas de San Sebastián - by independent artisans in San
Juan

Fiestas Tradicionales de Loiza Aldea, by Loiza's municipal
administration

Festival el Jíbaro, by Palo Viejo Rum

Feria de Artesanías de Bacardi, by Bacardi Rum

Medalla R.J. Reynolds a la Cultura, R. J. Reynolds Company

Premio al Artesano Mayor de Budweiser, by Anheuser Busch

Festival de la Hamaca, by Centro Cultural of San Sebastian

APPENDIX B

GUIDE FOR SURVEY OF CULTURAL CENTERS

-Información sobre la persona(s) entrevistada: edad, genero, profesion.

Information about the person(s) being interviewed: age, sex, occupation

-Cuánto tiempo ha estado envuelto en el centro o grupo
How long have you been involved in the center or the group

-Nombre del grupo y tipo de organización (centro cultural, grupo independiente, comunitario, etc.)
Name of the group and type of organization (ICP-affiliated, community-based etc.)

-Año de Fundación
Year it was founded

-Motivo de fundación y personas envueltas en la fundación
Reasons for founding the group and people involved in its foundation

-Misión u objetivo del grupo
What are the groups' stated goals?

-¿Está incorporado con el departamento de estado? Año?

Is the group incorporated in the State Department? In what year was it incorporated?

-¿Quiénes forman parte del grupo y cómo se cualifica para ser parte del mismo?

Who is considered a member and how does one qualify for membership?

-¿Cómo se reclutan los miembros?

How are the members recruited?

-Número de miembros y participación de los mismos en la organización de actividades

Number of members. Describe members' participation in meetings or events.

-Describe la directiva (género, profesión, religion, political affiliation, edad)

Describe the leadership in terms of gender, occupation, religion, political affiliation and age.

-¿Qué grupo o grupos están más representados en la membresía (religioso, político, región, profesión?)

Which group or groups are most represented in the membership (for example, religious and political groups, whether there is a dominant profession or family, or an area where most members come from)

-¿En dónde se celebran las actividades y en qué comunidades tienen mas repercusión sus actividades, comunidad rural, urbana, en la escuela, en la iglesia etc.?

Where do your activities take place, and where do you think they have most repercussion?

-Patrocinadores, con la aportación de cada uno en dinero o ayuda técnica

Sponsors, and their contribution in money or technical assistance

Municipio Municipal government

Instituto de Cultura *ICP in San Juan or regional office*

Asignaciones Legislativas/ o de turismo
Tourism or Legislative grants from local politicians

Fuentes Privadas *Private corporations*

Otras Fuentes *Other*

-Describa su relación con cada uno de estos patrocinadores
Describe your relationship with each one of the aforementioned sponsors.

-Describa cómo se hizo el contacto inicial por cada uno de estos patrocinadores
Describe how you established initial contact with each one of these sponsors.

-Describa qué condiciones le imponen cada uno de estos auspiciadores
Describe what conditions, if any, these sponsors place on your organization.

-Si ha percibido fluctuaciones en el respaldo a su organización de parte de estos auspiciadores, describa como explica usted estas fluctuaciones?
Have you perceived fluctuations in the sponsorship of any of these patrons? If you have, can you explain these fluctuations?

-Si sus actividades son evaluadas por los auspiciadores, describa el proceso (Por ejemplo, si sus representantes asisten a las actividades auspiciadas)
Are your activities evaluated by these sponsors? Do representatives of these sponsors visit or oversee your activities. If so, please describe.

-¿Qué aspectos los distinguen a ustedes de otros grupos que celebran actividades culturales en su municipio?
What distinguishes your group from other groups organizing cultural activities in your town or community?

-¿De acuerdo a su experiencia, cómo reacciona el público a su organización?
What public reactions has your organization generated within the community?

-¿Qué imagen quieren proyectar en su comunidad?
What image does your organization try to project onto the community?

-Describa si alguna vez ha tenido que enfrentarse con alguna crítica o reacción negativa del público
Has your organization or its members ever been subject to negative reaction or criticisms by the community? If so, please describe.

-¿Cuáles son las actividades más populares que organiza su grupo? *Which are the most popular activities organized by your group?*

-Si celebran un festival, explique lo siguiente:
If you organize a cultural festival, please note
 Nombre y fecha de fundación del festival
Name and date of foundation
 Razón por la cual se originó el mismo
Reason for celebrating the festival
 Lugar de celebración y número de días:
Place and length of celebration

-¿Cómo se le da promoción al festival (radio, t.v. comunicación directa, otro)
How is the festival promoted?

-Si emplean a un promotor para hacerse cargo del festival, desde cuándo se emplea y por qué?
If you have hired an independent "promoter" to organize the festival, when and why did you hire this person?

-Costo, ganancias y uso de la diferencia
Cost, earnings or losses and use of the profit

-A qué audiencia o audiencias está dirigido el festival
What is your target audience?

-Sobre el programa del festival,
Regarding the Festival Program

Describe si incluye actividades deportivas, concursos y la razón por la inclusión o exclusión de estas actividades

Describe the type of activities included in the program and the reason for their inclusion.

Describe el tipo de música y la razón para la inclusión de ésta

Describe the music included and the reason for its selection.

Describe qué tipo de alimentos y bebidas venden

Describe the food and beverages sold, and reason for your selection.

Describe los temas destacados en el programa,

What themes are highlighted during the program.

Describe las artesanías, la manera de contratar los artesanos y la razón para la inclusión de éstos

If your festival includes a fair, describe the types of folk arts sold, and the way in which the artisans are invited.

Si hay kioscos cómo se eligen sus encargados

Describe the food vending stations, and the way in which they are contracted.

Describe si tienen restricción de comidas, bebidas o marcas en su festival

If you group has restriction on types of food, beverages, or commercial brands, please describe them.

-¿Cómo se diferencia esta actividad de las fiestas patronales, festivales playeros y otros espectáculos en el área?

What distinguishes this activity from 'patron-saint' feasts, beach festivals and other public events held in your town?

-Si ha habido cambios en el festival desde su inicio, describa y explique la razón de los mismos

If there has been any changes or additions in the festival describe and explain the reason for these changes

-¿Qué parte o actividad del festival se considera más representativo de la cultura puertorriqueña?

What part of the activity is considered by your group as being most representative of Puerto Rican culture?

-¿Qué actividades del festival se consideran menos representativos de la cultura?

What activity in the festival is considered the least representative of Puerto Rican culture?

-Explique lo que significa para usted pertenecer al centro cultural (o al grupo)

Explain what it means for you to be part of the cultural center.

-Si lo estima necesario, ¿qué aspectos mejoraría en su organización y programación de su grupo o (si es afiliado al ICP, qué modificaría del Instituto de Cultura?)

If you deem it necessary, what aspects of your organization and programming would you change? If ICP-affiliated, would you modify about the ICP's program?

-Describa su relación con el Instituto de Cultura, y si lo estima necesario los aspectos de esta relación que usted cambiaría

Describe your relationship with the ICP in San Juan, and if you deem it necessary, the aspects you would change in this relationship.

-Describa su relación con fuentes privadas y otros auspiciadores y si lo estima necesario los aspectos de esta relación que usted cambiaría.

Describe your relationships with private funders, and if you deem it necessary the aspects you would change in this relationship.

-Describa su relación con otros grupos que organizan actividades culturales en su comunidad y si lo estima

necesario que aspectos de esta relación usted cambiaría.
Describe your relationships with other groups in your community that also organize cultural activities, and if you deem it necessary, the aspects you would change in those relationships.

Bibliography

- Abreu-Vega, Salvador
1984 Apuntes Para la Historia de Humacao. Dominican Republic.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila
1990 The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power Through Bedouin Women. *American Ethnologist* 17:41-55.
- Acosta, Yvonne
1987 La Mordaza. Rio Piedras: Edil.

1992 Hacia Una Historia de la Persecución Política en Puerto Rico. *Homines* 15(2):142-151.
- Aguiló, Sylvia
1987 Idea y Concepto de la Cultura Puertorriqueña en la Década del 50. San Juan: Centro de Estudios Avanzados.
- Ahmad, Aijaz
1992 Three World Theory: End of a Debate. In *Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*. London: Verso, pp. 287-318.
- Alarcón, Norma
1994 Conjugating Subjects: The Heteroglossia of Essence and Resistance. In *Another Tongue*. Arteaga, ed. Durham: Duke (125-138)
- Alden, Dana & Wayne Hoyer and Chal Lee
1993 Identifying Global and Culture-Specific Dimensions of Humor in Advertising: A Multinational Analysis. *Journal of Marketing*, April (64-75).
- Alegría, Ricardo
1960 El Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, Los Primeros Cinco Años. España.

1973 El Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña 1955-1973: 18 Años Contribuyendo a Fortalecer Nuestra Conciencia Nacional. San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña.
- Alonso, Ana Maria
1994 The Politics of Space, Time and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity. *ARA* 23:379-405.

- Althusser, Louis
1971 *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. New York and London: Monthly Review Press.
- Alvarez-Curbelo & Rodríguez-Castro, eds.
1993 *Del Nacionalismo al Populismo: Cultura y Política en Puerto Rico*. Rio Piedras: Huracán.
- Anderson, Benedict
1983 *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Anzaldúa, Gloria
1987 *Borderlines: La New Mestiza=La Frontera*. San Francisco: Spinsters.
- Aparicio, Frances
n.d. *Popular Reception of Salsa among College Students*. Presentation, Association of Puerto Rican Studies, 1994.
- Appadurai, Arjun
1990 *Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy*. *Public Culture* 2(2):1-24.

1986 *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Arteaga, Alfred,
1994 *An Another Tongue: Nation and Ethnicity in the Linguistic Borderlands*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Babin, Maria Teresa
1973 *La Cultura de Puerto Rico*. San Juan: Instituto de Cultural Puertorriquena.
- Badone, Ellen
1992 *The Construction of National Identity in Brittany and Quebec*. *American Ethnologists* 19 (4):806-817.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail
1984 *Rabelais and His World*. Indiana: Midland.
- Balibar, Etienne and Immanuel Wallerstein
1991 *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London: Verso.
- Barbero, Jesus Martin
1987 *De Los Medios a las Mediaciones*. Barcelona: Gustavo Gil.

1993 *Latin America: Cultures in the Communication Media*. *Journal of Communication* 43(2):18-30.

- Barnett, Marguerite
1974 Creating Political identity. *Ethnicity* 1:237-265.
- Bash L., Blanc-Szanton, & Glick-Schiller
1994 Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation States. Gordon and Breach Publishers.
- Baver, Sherrie
1993 The Political Economy of Colonialism: The State and Industrialization in Puerto Rico. London: Praeger.
- Bayrón-Toro, Fernando
1989 Elecciones y Partidos Políticos de Puerto Rico. Mayagüez: Ediciones Isla.
- Beeman, William O.
1993 The Anthropology of Theater and Spectacle. *ARA* 22:369-93.
- Bhabha, Homi
1990 Nation and Narration. London and New York: Routledge.
- Blaut, James
1987 The National Question: Decolonizing the Theory of Nationalism. N.J.: Zed Books.
- Bonilla, Frank
1989 Migrants, Citizenship and Social Pacts. *Radical America* 23(1):81-89.
- Bonilla, Frank and Ricardo Campos
1985 Evolving Patterns of Puerto Rican Migration. The Americas in the New Division of Labor. S. Sanderson ed., New York: Holmes and Meier, pp. 177-205.
- Bourdieu, Pierre
1993 The Field of Cultural Production. New York: Columbia University Press.

1977 Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Breuilly, John
1982 Nationalism and the State. New York: St. Martin Press.
- Brow, James
1990 Notes on Community, Hegemony, and the Uses of the Past. *Anthropological Quarterly* 63(1):1-6.

Buci-Glucksman, Christine

1982 Hegemony and Consent. *In Approaches to Gramsci*, Shawstack-Sassoon, ed. London: Writers and Readers.

Buitrago-Ortíz, Carlos

1982 Anthropology in the Puerto Rican Colonial Context; Analysis and Projections. *In Indigenous Anthropology in Non-Western Countries*. edited by Hussein Fahim.

Cabral, Almicar

1973 National Liberation and Culture. *In Return to the Source*. N.Y.: African Information Service.

Calhoun, Craig

1993 Civil Society and the Public sphere. *Public Culture* 5:267-280.

1992 Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge: MIT.

1991 Indirect Relationships and Imagined Communities: Large Scale Social Integration and the Transformation of Economic Life. *In Social Theory for a Changing Society* Bourdieu & Coleman, eds. Boulder: Westview.

Carrión, Juan Manuel

1980 The Petty Bourgeoisie and the Struggle for Independence in Puerto Rico. *In The Puerto Ricans: Their History Culture and Society* Cambridge: Schenkman.

1993 Etnia, Raza y la Nacionalidad Puertorriqueña. *In La Nación Puertorriqueña: Ensayos en Torno a Pedro Albizu Campos*. Carrión, García-Ruiz and Rodríguez Fraticelli, eds. Puerto Rico: Editorial de la Universidad.

Castells, Manuel

1983 The City and the Grassroots: a Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements. London: E. Arnold; Berkeley: University of California press.

Castells, Manuel and Alejandro Portes

1989 World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics and Effects of the Informal Economy. *The Informal Economy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press. Pp. 11-40.

Chatterjee, Partha

1986 Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? London: Zed Books.

1993 The Nation and Its Fragments. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Civil Rights Commission

1991 Informe sobre discrimen y persecucion por razones politicas: las practicas gubernamentales de mantener listas, ficheros y expedientes de ciudadanos por razon de su ideologia politica. Revista Del Colegio de Abogados. Vol 52 (January-March).

Clement Bond, G. and Angela Gilliam

1994 Social Construction of the Past: Representation as Power. London: Routledge.

Cohen, Abner

Masquerade Politics: Explorations in the Structure of Urban Cultural Movements. Oxford: Berg.

Cohen, Jean and A. Arato

1992 Civil Society and Political Theory Cambridge: MIT Press.

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,

General Legislative Budgets (1978-1990). San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Connor, Walker

1978 A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a..." Ethnic and Racial Studies 1(4)379-88.

Corrigan, Philip and Derek Sayer

1985 The Great Arch. English State Formation as Cultural Revolution. Basil and Blackwell.

De Certau, Michel

1984 The Practice of Everyday Life. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

De la Rosa, Luis

1986 Los Negros del Brick - Barca Magesty: Prohibición del Tráfico de Esclavos. La Revista de el Centro de Estudios Avanzados. San Juan: P.R.: 3 (45-57).

Departamento del Trabajo, San Juan, Puerto Rico

1993 Division de Estudios y Estadísticas, Sección de Analysis de Areas del Mercado de Empleo. July 1993

Deutsch, Karl W.

1966 Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.

Díaz-Quinones, Arcadio

1993 La Memoria Rota. Rio Piedras: Huracán.

Dietz, James

1986 *Economic History of Puerto Rico: Institutional Change and Capitalist Development* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

DiMaggio, Paul

1991 *Cultural Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth-Century Boston*. In *Rethinking Popular Culture*. Mukerji and Schudson, ed. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pp. 374-398)

DIVEDCO (Division of Popular Education), San Juan, P.R.

c.1950s, *La Trampa*

c.1950s, *El Derecho de la Felicidad*

1952, *Alimentos*

c1950s, *La Ciencia Contra*

1966, *El Guardarrayas*

c1950s, *Isla y Pueblo*

Dominguez, Virginia

1990 *The Politics of Heritage in Contemporary Israel*. In *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures*. Richard Fox, ed. American Ethnological Society Monograph Series (2):130-147.

Englis, Basil

1994 *Global and Multinational Advertising*. Rutgers: New Jersey.

Escobar, A. & Sonia Alvarez, eds.

1992 *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*, Colorado: Westview Press.

Ewen, Stuart

1988 *All Consuming Images: The Politics of Style in Contemporary Culture*. New York Basic Books.

Fanon, Franz

1963 *On National Culture. The Wretched on the Earth*. New York: Grove Press, pp. 206-248.

Featherstone, Michael, ed.

1990 *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London: Sage.

Ferguson, James

1992 *The Country and The City on the Copperbelt*. *Cultural Anthropology* 7(1): 80-92.

Ferrao, Luis Angel

1990 *Pedro Albizu Campos y el Nacionalismo Puertorriqueño*.
Rio Piedras: Editorial Cultural.

Flores, Juan

1979 *Insularismo E Ideología Burguesa*. La Habana: Casa de las Americas.

1992 Cortijo's Revenge. In *On Edge: The Crisis of Contemporary Latin American Culture*, Yudice, Franco and Flores, eds. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

1991 "Latin Empire: Puerto Rap," *CENTRO Bulletin*. Spring

Flores, Juan and George Yudice

1990 *Living Borders/Buscando America: Languages and Latino Self-Formation*. *Social Text* 24:57-84.

Flores, Juan and Milagros López

1994 Dossier Puerto Rico. *Social Text* 38(93-95).

Flores-Caraballo, Eliut

1991 Class Bound Reductionism vs. the Multidetermination of National Cultures: An Essay on Puerto Rican National Consciousness. *Studies in Latin American Popular Cultures*. 10 (25-57).

Foster, Robert

1991 Making Cultures in the Global Ecumene. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 20:235-60.

Foucault, Michel

1983 Subject and Power. In *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*.

Fox, Richard, ed.

1990 *Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures*. American Ethnology Monograph Series, Number 2.

Franco, Jean

1967 *Modern Culture of Latin America Society and the Artist*. New York: Praeger.

Friedman, Jonathan

1992 The Past in the Future: History and Politics of Identity. *American Anthropologist* 94(4):837-859.

1994 *Cultural Identity and Global Processes*. Sage Publications.

Gable, Eric, et al

1992 On the Uses of Relativism: Fact, Conjecture and Black and White Histories at Colonial Williamsburg. *American Ethnologist* 19(4):791-805.

García, et al.

1988 Estudio Comunidad Mariana. Departamento de Ciencias Sociales, Escuela de Trabajo Social (unpublished manuscript).

García-Canclini, Néstor

1977 Las Culturas Populares en el Capitalismo. Habana: Casa de las Americas.

1992 Culturas Híbridas. Argentina: Editorial Suramericana.

1993 Transforming Modernity: Popular Culture in Mexico. Texas: University of Texas Press.

García-Passalacqua, Juan

1994 Hegemón: Otredad y Mismidad de la Otra Cara. Puerto Rico: Editorial Cultural.

García, Gervasio and Quintero Rivera

1986 Desafío y Solidaridad: Breve Historia del Movimiento Obrero Puertorriqueño: Rio Piedras: Huracan.

Garnham, Nicholas

1993 The Mass Media, Cultural Identity, and the Public Sphere in the Modern World. *Public Culture* 5(2):251-266.

Gellner, Ernest

1983 Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gelpí, Juan

1993 Literatura y Paternalismo en Puerto Rico. Rio Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico.

Gilroy, Paul

1987 'There Ain't No Black in The Union Jack': The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Giroux, Henry

1993 Consuming Social Change. *Cultural Critique* 26:5-32.

González, Jose Luis

1987 El Pais de Cuatro Pisos. Rio Piedras: Huracan.

- González, Lydia-Milagros,
1990 Cultura y Grupos Populares en la Historia Viva de Puerto Rico Hoy. CENTRO 2(8):98-113.
- Gramsci, Antonio
1971 Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey N. Smith, eds. New York: International Publishers.
- Guevara Monge, Maribel
1992 Estudio/Publicidad y Cigarrillos. Rio Piedras: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Escuela de Mercadeo. (Unpublished).
- Gupta, Akhil and James Ferguson
1992 Beyond Culture, Space, Identity and the Politics of Difference. Cultural Anthropology 7(1):6-24.
- Gupta, Akhil
1992 The Song of the Non-Aligned World: Transnational Identities and the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism. Cultural Anthropology 7(1):63-79.
- Hall, Stuart
1986 The Relevance of Gramsci for the Study of Race and Ethnicity. Journal of Communication Inquiries 10:5-27.
- 1986 Popular Culture and the State. In Popular Culture and Social Relations, Tony Bennet, ed. Philadelphia: Open University Press.
- 1991 Old and new Identities, Old and New Ethnicities. In Culture, Globalization and the World System A. King, ed. SUNY.
- 1991 The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity. In Culture, Globalization and the World System A. King. ed. SUNY.
- 1981 Notes on Deconstructing the Popular, Reproduced in Journal Cultural Studies, from People's History and Socialist theory, R. Samuel, ed. London: Routledge.
- Handler, Richard
1988 Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec. Madison: Univeristy of Wisconsin Press.
- 1992 High Culture/Hegemony and Historical Causality. American Ethnologist 19 (4):818-824.
- 1986 Authenticity. Anthropology Today. 2(1):2-4.

- Harvey, Edwin
1988 Legislación Cultural. San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña.
- Harvey, David
1989 The Condition of Post Modernity. Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Hernández, Luis
1991 The Origins of the Consumer Culture in Puerto Rico: The pre-Television Years (1898-1954). CENTRO Bulletin, Winter 1991: 38-54.
- Heyes, Carleton
1968 The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism. New York: Russell and Russell.
- Hill, Jonathan
1992 Contested Pasts and the Practice of Anthropology. American Anthropologist 94(4):837-859.
- Hobsbawm, E.J.
1990 Nations and Nationalism Since 1770. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1992 Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today. Anthropology Today 8(1):3-13.
- Hoskins, Janet
1987 The Headhunter as Hero: Local Traditions and Their Reinterpretation in National History. American Ethnology 14(4):605-622.
- Hutchinson, John
1992 Moral Innovators and the Politics of Regeneration: The Distinctive Role of Cultural Nationalists in Nation-Building. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 33(1-2)101-117.
- Institute of Puerto Rican Culture
1993 Patrimonio Historico Edificado de la Region Este. San Juan.

1960 El Instituto de Cultural Puertorriquena. Los Primeros Cinco Anos. San Juan, Puerto Rico.
- Johnson, Hank and Joseph Gusfield.
1994 New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity. Temple University Press.

Jones, Delmos

1993 Anthropology and the Oppressed: Reflection on 'Native' Anthropology. Unpublished manuscript.

1987 The Community and Organizations in the Community. In Anthropology in the United States. L. Mullings, ed. Columbia University Press.

1982 The Political Context of Ethnogenesis: An Example from Australia. In Aboriginal Power in Australian Society. M. Howard, ed. University of Queensland Press.

1992 Declining Social Services and the Threat to Social Reproduction: an Urban Dilemma. with Joan Turner and Joan Montbach. City and Society. 6(2): 99-114.

Kapferer, Bruce

1989 Nationalist Ideology and a Comparative Anthropology. Ethnos 54(3-4):161-199.

1988 Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia. Washington: Smithsonian Institute Press.

Kaplan, Flora

1994 Museums and the Making of Ourselves. The Role of Objects in National Identity. London: Leicester University Press.

Keith & Pile

1993 Place and the Politics of Identity. New York: Routledge.

Kohn, Hans

1967 Nationalism: Its Meaning and History. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co.

Laclau, Ernesto

1979 Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory - Capitalism Fascism - Populism. Norfolk: NLB.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe

1985 Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. London: Verso.

Laguerre and Melón

1968 The Jíbaro of Puerto Rico: Symbol and Figure. Conn: Troutman.

Lamont and M. Fournier

1992 Cultivating Differences. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Lao, Agustin

1995 Islands at the Crossroads: Puerto Rican-ess Travelling Between the Traslocal nation and the Global City. In *Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism*. Negron, F. ed. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Lauria, Antonio

1980 Reflexiones sobre la cuestión cultural y Puerto Rico. In *Crisis y Crítica de las Ciencias Sociales en Puerto Rico*, edited by Rafael Ramírez and Wecslao Serra Deliz. Rio Piedras: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales.

1980 "Respeto," "Relajo and Inter-personal Relations in Puerto Rico. *Anthropological Quarterly* 37(2):53-67.

1991 Images and Contradictions: DIVEDCO's Portrayal of Puerto Rican Life. *CENTRO Vol. III, No. 1*, pp. 92-96.

Lee, Martyn

Consumer Culture Reborn: The Cultural Politics of Consumption. London: Routledge.

Legislative Debate (See Under Puerto Rico's Legislature)

Levine, Lawrence

1984 William Shakespeare and the American People. *American Historical Review*. 89 (1)34-66.

Lipsitz, George

1993 We Know What Time It is: Youth Culture in the 1990. *CENTRO*. 5(1)10-21.

López, Maria Milagros

1994 Post-Work Selves and Entitlement 'Attitudes' in Peripheral Postindustrial Puerto Rico. *Social Text* 38(111-134).

López, Ramón

1993 El Oficio y la Cultura. *Diálogo*, December 8, p.8.

Lopez-Cruz, Francisco

1967 Los Bailes de Bomba. La Musica Folklorica de Puerto Rico. Connecticut: Troutman Press.

Malavet-Vega, Pedro

1987 La Vellonera está Directa. Santo Domingo: Corripio.

Malkki, Liisa

1992 National Geographic: The Rooting of peoples and the Territorialization of national Identity Among Scholars and Refugees. *Cultural Anthropology* 7(1):24-44.

- Mallon, Florencia
1995 Peasant and Nation: The Making of Post-Colonial Mexico and Peru. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- MacAloon, John
1984 La Pitada Olimpica: Puerto Rico, International Sports, and the Constitution of Politics. In Text, Play and Story: The Construction and Reconstruction of Self and Society. E.M. Brunner, ed. Washington, D.C.: American Ethnological Society, pp. 315-355.
- Manning, Frank
1990 Overseas Caribbean Carnivals: The Art and Politics of a Transnational Celebration. Caribbean Popular Culture. John Lent, ed. Ohio: Bowling Green, pp. 20-37.
- Marqués, Rene
1977 El Puertorriqueño Dócil y Otros Ensayos 1953-1971. Barcelona: Editorial Antillana.

1966 La Emigracion. DIVEDCO, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
- Marriot, McKim
1962 Cultural Policy in the New States. Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, Clifford Geertz, ed. New York: The Free Press. pp. 27-56
- Mattelart, Armand
1983 Transnationals and the Third World: The Struggle for Culture. Mass: Bergin and Garvey.
- Mattelart, Xavier Delcourt and Michelle Mattelart
1993 International Image Markets. In Cultural Studies Reader, During, ed. New York: Routledge, pp. 421-437.
- McCracken, Grant
1990 Culture and Consumption. Indiana: Midland.
- McLellan, David
1995 Ideology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Meléndez, Edwin
1993 Movimiento Anexionista en Puerto Rico. Rio Piedras: Universidad de Puerto Rico.
- Mintz, Sidney
1989 The History of a Puerto Rican Plantation. Caribbean Countours. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mojica, Aguedo

1983 *La Entrega Luminosa*. Rio Piedras: Huracan.

Mosse, George

1985 *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Mouffe, Chantal

1979 *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*. London: Routledge.

Muñoz, Marin, Luis

1959 *Breakthrough From Nationalism: A Small Island Looks at a Big Trouble*. New York: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Department of Labor.

1956 Governor Speech, Harvard Clubs, Coral Gables, Florida

"Notes of the Implementation of the Concept of Serenity by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." Luis Marin Archives, San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Mukerji, Chandra and Michael Schudson

1991 *Rethinking Popular Culture*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Nath, Ram

1986 *Smoking, Third World Alert*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nash, June

1995 *The Revindication of Indigenous Identity: Mayan Responses to State Intervention in Mexico and Guatemala*. Latin American Research Review.

1994 *Crafts in the World Market: The Impact of International Exchange on Middle American Artisans*. State University of New York Press.

1988 *Cultural Parameters of Sexism and Racism in the International Division of Labor*. In *Racism, Sexism and World System* J. Smith, et al., eds. New York: Greenwood, pp. 11-35.

Navas-Dávila, Gerardo, ed.

1985 *Cambio y Desarrollo en Puerto Rico La Transformación Ideológica del Partido Popular Democrático*, Navas-Dávila, ed. Rio Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico.

- Negrón, Frances and Grosfogel
1995 Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism. Forthcoming in University of Minnesota Press.
- Negrón de Montilla, Aida
1971 Americanization in Puerto Rico and the Public School System 1900-1930. Rio Piedras.
- Nine-Curt, Carmen Judith
1994 Cross Cultural Communication among Puerto Ricans and Anglos from a Nonverbal perspective," Presented on December 8, 1994 at TEPSA Annual Convention, San Antonio Texas.
- O'Barr, William
1994 Culture and the Ad: Exploring Otherness in the World of Advertising. Boulder: Westview Press.
- 1989 The Airbrushing of Culture: An Insider Looks at Global Advertising. Public Culutre. 2(1)1-19.
- Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant
1994 Racial Formation in the United States New York: Routledge.
- Ortíz-Cuadra, Cruz Miguel
1986 Los Hacendados de Humacao ante la Crisis del Dulce. Revista Oriente. Humacao, P.R: 4(10-66).
- 1991 Punta Santiago: Origen y Desarrollo. El Regional del Este, Humacao: P.R.: 7/25/91 - 8/21/91
- 1993 Lineas de Crédito: Apuntes sobre el financiamiento de la Central Ejemplo y Otras Empresas de Antonio Roig Torrellas, 1896-1933. Boletín Cultural Regional Este. Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, No. 5.
- Ortíz, Laura
1992 Al Filo de La Navaja: Los Márgenes en Puerto Rico. Centro de Investigaciones Sociales. Rio Piedras: Puerto Rico.
- Pabón, Carlos
1995 De Albizu a Madonna: Para Armar y Desarmar la Nacionalidad. Bordes, pp. 22-40.
- Pantójas-García, Emilio
1990 Development Strategies as Ideology: Puerto Rico's Export-Led Industrialization Experience Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Parker, Andrew et al.

1992 *Nationalisms and Sexualities*. New York & London: Routledge.

PECES

1994 *Estudio de Necesidades*. Unpublished study directed by Alejandro Cotte, Ivis Santana y Noe Mojica. Graduate School of Social Work, University of Puerto Rico.

Pedreira, Antonio.

1934 *Insularismo*. Rio Piedras: Puerto Rico.

Penroso, Jan and Joe May

1991 Herder's Concept of Nation and Its Relevance to Contemporary Ethnic Nationalism. *Contemporary Reviews on Studies on Nationalism* 18(1-2):165-178.

Perez, Marvette

n.d. *Ambiguity in the Creation of Puerto Rico's National Identity*. Forthcoming Ph.D Dissertation

Philip, Alan Butt

1980 *European Nationalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. In *The Roots of Nationalism: Studies in Northern Europe*. Rosalind Mitchison, ed. Edinburgh, Scotland: Donald.

Pierluissi de Rodríguez, Aura

1989 *Dos Décadas del Festival Nacional Indígena en Jayuya*. Jayuya, Puerto Rico.

Puerto Rico's Legislature

1956 *Second Legislative Assembly 1953-1956* P. de la C. 1381

Quintero-Rivera, A.G.

1985 *La Base Social de la Transformación Ideológica del Partido Popular en la Década del '40*. In *Cambio y Desarrollo en Puerto Rico*. Navas-Dávila, ed. Rio Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. pp.35-124.

1989 *De La Fiesta Al Festival*. David & Goliath. 18(64):47-54.

1991 *Culture-Oriented Social Movements: Ethnicity and Symbolic Action in Latin America and the Caribbean*. CENTRO Bulletin Spring 1991: 97-104.

1988 *The Rural-Urban Dichotomy in the Formation of Puerto Rico's Cultural Identity*. New West Indian Guide. 61(127-144).

- Ramírez, Rafael
1977 National Culture in Puerto Rico. Latin American Perspectives 10(3).
- Ramos, Aarón
1987 Las Ideas Anexionistas en Puerto Rico Bajo la Dominación Norteamericana. Río Piedras: Huracán.
- Rivera, Raquel
1993 Rap Music in Puerto Rico: Mass Consumption or Social Resistance?. CENTRO Bulletin Spring 1993:53-66.
- Rodríguez-Castro, Maria
1993 Foro de 1940: las pasiones y los intereses se dan la mano. In Del Nacionalismo al Populismo: Cultura y Política en Puerto Rico, Alvarez-Curbelo and Rodríguez Castro, eds., Río Piedras: Huracán.
- Rodríguez-Fraticelli, Carlos
1992 Pedro Albizu Campos: Strategies of Struggle and Strategic Struggles. CENTRO Bulletin 4(1):24-33.
- Rosa-Nieves, Cesareo
1967 La Bomba, La Plena y el Cuento Popular. La Voz Folklorica de Puerto Rico. Connecticut: Troutman Press.
- Rosaldo, Renato
1989 Culture and Truth. Boston: Beacon press.
- Rosebery and O'Brian
1991 Golden Ages, Dark Ages: Imagining the Past in Anthropology and History. Berkeley: University of California.

1994 Hegemony and the language of Contention. In Everyday Forms of State Formation. Joseph and Nungent, eds. Durham: Duke University Press. 355-366.
- Rowe, William & V. Schelling
1992 Memory and Modernity: Popular Culture in Latin America. London: Verso, pp. 1-36.
- Safa, Helen
1974 The Urban Poor of Puerto Rico: A Study of Development and Underdevelopment. New York: Holt, Riverhart & Winston Press.
- Said, Edward
1993 Culture and Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Santiago, Javier

1994 *La Nueva Ola Portorricensis: La Revolución Musical que Vivió Puerto Rico en la Década del 60*. Puerto Rico: Del Patio.

Santiago-Valles, Kelvin

1994 "Subject People" and Colonial Discourses: Economic Transformation and Social Disorder in Puerto Rico, 1898-1947 Albany: SUNY.

Santiago-Valles, Kelvin

1994 The Unruly City and the mental Landscape of Colonized Identities: Internally Contested Nationality in Puerto Rico, 1945-1985. *Social Text* 38(149-163).

Scarano, Francisco

1993 *La Epoca del Canaveral*. Puerto Rico: Cinco Anos de Historia. MacGraw Hill

Schiller, Herbert

1976 *Communication and Cultural Domination*. White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press.

Scholle, David

1990 Resistance: Pinning Down a Wondering Concept in Cultural Studies Discourse. *Journal of Urban and Cultural Studies* 1(1)87-105.

Shohat, Ella and Robert Stam

1994 *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the Media*. London and New York: Routledge.

Smith, Anthony

1986 *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. New York: Blackwell.

Sommar, Doris

1990 *Foundational Fictions: The National Romances of Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stallybrass, P. and Allon White

1986 *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Steward, Julian, et al.

1956 *The People of Puerto Rico*. Urbana: University of Illinois.

- Stoeltje, Beverly
1992 *Festival, Folklore, Cultural Performances, and Popular Entertainments*. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp.261-271.
- Stoler, Ann
1989 *Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in 20th Century Colonial Cultures*. *American Ethnologist* 16(4):634-60.
- Storey, John
1993 *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture*. Georgia: University of Georgia.
- Stuzman, Ronald
1981 *El Mestizaje: An All Inclusive Ideology of Exclusion*. In *Cultural Transformations and Ethnicity in Modern Ecuador*. N.E. Whitten, ed. New York: Harper and Row, pp. 45-93.
- Subervi Vélez, Federico and Nitza Hernández López
1990 *Mass Media in Puerto Rico. Mass Media and the Caribbean*. Surlin and Soderlund ed. New York: Gordon and Breach.
- Sveberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle
1991 *The Global and the Local in International Communications*. In *Mass Media and Society*, Curran and Gurevitch, editors. London: Edward Arnold. pp. 118-138.
- Symmons-Symonolewicz, K.
1965 *Nationalist Movements: An Attempt at Comparative Typology*. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 7:221-30.
- Tapia, Gloria
1973 *Compra Ventas de Esclavos en Humacao, 1826-1873*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Therborn, Goran
1980 *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology*. London: Verso
- Tirado, Almicar
1993 *La Forja de un Lider*. In *La Nación Puertorriqueña: Ensayos en Torno a Pedro Albizu Campos*. Carrión, García-Ruiz and Rodríguez Fraticelli, eds. Puerto Rico: Editorial de la Universidad.
- Torrecilla, Arturo
1994 *Watermelon Intelligentsia: Intellectuals in the Party-*

State. Social Text 38(135-147).

Torregrosa, José Luis

1991 Historia de la Radio en Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico: Esmaco.

Torres, Arlene

1995 Beauty Pageant in Puerto Rico: On Race and National Identity.

United States Department of Commerce

1979 Economic Study of Puerto Rico.

Urla, Jacqueline

1995 Outlaw Language: Creating alternative public spheres in Basque free radio. Pragmatics (June 1995).

Vargas, Miriam

1991 Artesanos y Artesanías en el Puerto Rico de Hoy. San Juan: Centro de Estudios Avanzados.

Vázquez, Blanca

1991 Puerto Ricans in the Media: A Personal Statement. CENTRO Bulletin 3(1):4-15.

Vega, Ana Lydia

1981 Vírgenes y Mártires. Río Piedras: Editorial Antillana.

Verdery, Katherine

1991 National Ideology Under Socialism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Walby, Sylvia

1992 Woman and Nation. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 31(1-2):81-99.

Wallerstein, Immanuel

1991 The Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity. Race, Nation, Class, Ambiguous Identities. Balibar & Wallerstein, eds. London: Verso. pp. 71-86.

West, Cornell

1990 The New Cultural Politics of Difference. October 53:93-110.

Williams, Brackette

1989 A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation Among Ethnic Terrain. Annual Review of Anthropology 18: 401-444.

1993 The Impact of the Precepts of nationalism on the

Concept of Culture: Making Grasshoppers of Naked Apes.
Cultural Critique, Spring.

1991 Stains on My Name, War In My Veins, Guyana and the
Politics of Cultural struggle. Durham: Duke University
Press.

Williams, Raymond

1977 Marxism and Literature New York: Oxford University
Press.

1973 The Country and the City New York: Oxford University
Press.

1983 Keywords. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wirth, Louis

1936 "Types of Nationalism," American Journal of Sociology
41:723-737.

Worsley, Peter

1984 The Three Worlds: Culture and World Development.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Young, Crawford

1993 The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-
State At Bay. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Yúdice, George and J. Franco and J. Flores

1992 On Edge: The Crisis of Contemporary Latin American
Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Newspaper Articles

Bruno, Mini Seijo

1980 "La Guerra Cultural" Claridad 13-19 Junio de 1980.
Colección Rosado, Archivos de Puerto Rico.

Cabán, Luis

1980 "Alegria: Puerto Rico va Camino a perder cultura
nacional por la universal," El Mundo 6/6/80. Colección
rosado, Archivos de Puerto Rico.

Colón-Zayas, Emilio

1990 Sunshine's Café y el Poder del Espectador. El Mundo
Domingo 1 de abril de 1990.

Davila Colon, Luis

1993 El Nacionalismo. El Nuevo Día. 12/8/93.

Jiménez, Félix

1985 "El Arte del Cambio: El Pais ante la Nueva Política

Cultural," El Nuevo Día 7/22/85. Colección Rosado, Archivos de Puerto Rico

Mier, Mariano
1993 Pero Expande Operaciones Acá. El Nuevo Día 9/16/93.

Molina, Marina
1960 "Pueblo Humacao Considera Actual Tragedia la Mayor de su Historia," El Mundo 9/7/60.

Myatt, Clifford
1993 Testimony Before the Puerto Rico Senate Committee on Federal Affairs and Socio Economic Development. Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration.

Ortíz, Maria Mercedes
1980 "La Politización del ICP," Claridad 18-24/80. Colección Rosado, Archivos de Puerto Rico.

Prensa Unida Internacional
1981 "Somos un solo pueblo, una sola cultura," El Reportero 4/10/81. Colección Rosado, Archivos de Puerto Rico.

Pointi, Gino
1994 "San Juan Third in Nation in Number of Murders," San Juan Star. Jan 3/94 p.3

Redacción El Nuevo Día
1994 "El Crimen, Peor que Hace Dos Años," El Nuevo Día, May/25/94.

1980 "Cultura Provincial," El Nuevo Día 2/7/1980.

Redacción Claridad
1980 "A 'malletazos' contra la cultura," Claridad 2/8-14/80. Colección Rosado, Archivos de Puerto Rico.

Rodríguez Cotto, Sandra
1994 Puerto Rico's Advertising Agencies, Industry Profile. Caribbean Business. Thursday, October 20.

1994 Nazca S & S: A New Daw in Advertising. Caribbean Business. 4/21/94.

Rojas Daporta, Malen
1958 Por la Crisis en Humacao. El Mundo 9/1/58
1958 Dos Humacaenos Senalan Como Aliviar la Crisis del Desempleo. El Mundo 9/2/58

1958 Grupo Opina Union Resolveria Problemas. El Mundo 9/3/58.

Ryan, Frances

1994 If Opportunity knocks - Let it in! Franchise Business is a Natural for Puerto Rican Entrepreneurs', Caribbean Business Thursday, March 31, 1994 (Front page).

Schell, Mari Carben

1993 Industry Profile. Food and Beverage Distributors. Caribbean Business. 7/8/93.

Zehr, Douglas

1994 Business Outlook, San Juan Star, 5/16/94.

1994 Puerto Rico's Marketing Indstury. Caribbean Business. Thursday, November 11, 1994.

"Compara Dos Mundos" El Nuevo Dia, Tuesday October 19, 1993, p.24.

"Leticia del Rosario: Yo sere Revindicada por la Historia" El Mundo 6/21/83.

"Instituto de Cultural Puertorriquena Anade Otros Dos Grupos A Su Programa Musical" El Mundo November 10, 1958