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THE RULING IDEAS OF A RULING ELITE:

BRITISH COLONIAL OFFICIALS IN UGANDA 1944-1952

by

BEVERLEY GARTRELL

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1979

APPROVAL

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Feb. 15, 1979
date

Chairman of Examining Committee

Feb. 15, 1979
date

Executive Officer

Prof. Joan Mencher

Prof. Jane Schneider

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

FOR KENNETH

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. The problem

This study is an attempt to find out what the British officials of one former British colony thought they had been doing about development, and the relation between their conception of their task and what they did. It investigates the relation between the ideology held by a group of officials, and their policy choices in certain selected areas. Thus it is necessary to look both at ideology and at the structure of the colonial system within which these men had to act.

Why, when problems of underdevelopment at the present time become increasingly glaring, should an anthropologist be concerned with the beliefs of men long out of power, who were part of a colonial empire that has long since collapsed? There are several answers to this question. First is the standard anthropological concern with the range of variation of human societies and culture. There are few studies of colonial enclaves in the ethnographic record. This work resembles earlier efforts at salvage anthropology, in attempting to reconstruct a culture no longer extant, by interviewing its survivors.

But more important, this study is a round-about way of trying to come to grips with broader problems of the role of leaders' ideology as new nations attempt to grapple with seemingly intractable problems of poverty and underdevelopment. It is rarely possible for scholars to gain access to people at the top while they are in power. I have

therefore used colonial Uganda, and its retired officials, as a case-study in an attempt to gain more understanding of the part played by the ideology of the men at the top, in the diagnosis and attempted cure of problems of development and underdevelopment. It is becoming more widely accepted that formal political independence represented an alteration, but not a fundamental transformation, of previous socio-economic systems. Therefore, it may not be irrelevant to understanding of the problems of today, to try to learn from the experience of the past, by studying men once concerned with attempts at inducing rapid social and economic change of a different sort.

Some recent studies, dealt with in more detail below, assume that these ruling colonial officials were consciously and deliberately working to further the exploitation of the colony they served in. This assumption is contradicted by actual studies of such officials,[1] which have found that most of them, most of the time, firmly believed they were doing the best they could for the colony they worked in. Dismissal of these beliefs leads to over-simplification of the problems involved in directed social change, that is, social change organized from the top of a social system down. Such dismissal of the good faith and good intentions of those at the top in a colony such as Uganda thus makes it possible to dodge the difficult problems of grasping the nature of the ruler's perceptions of the system they ruled and their own role in it, and the effect of these on their actions. To understand the actors' conscious models of the system is prerequisite to understanding their actions. How did such men

develop and maintain their beliefs about what they were doing? In what ways were these beliefs related to what they did? These questions seem relevant not only to problems of directed social change, but to more general theoretical problems of the relation between power, ideology and action in complex societies.

The specifically colonial form of this problem may be past, but its wider generic form remains with us. In a recent article on efforts to organize ujamaa co-operative villages in Tanzania, Raikes rejected the argument that bureaucrats' actions were a deliberate attempt to distort policy and serve their own interests.

> ...the rather simplistic view cited above fails to take account of the self-mystification of the bureaucracy by its own ideology. In spite of the veneer of socialism, this has its roots so deep in modernization theory and the various suppositions which accompany operation within a bureaucratic hierarchy, that sane and intelligent men can really believe that the present compulsory villageization operation and the re-imposed colonial regulations, will achieve socialism and/or development (Raikes 1975:51-52).

At the more general level, then, this study concerns an ideology of good intentions held by those who ruled a social unit, and possible relations of that ideology to certain policy choices.

> ...as with all declining ideologies, the beliefs fade gently away as the originating group disappears, leaving only incoherent memories. After due lapse of time, men look back to the past and marvel at the oddities their predecessors believed without understanding at all why they believed them, and thus are unable to see why they themselves believe something different (Harris 1971:42).

By study of the belief-system of a small group of men in the past, we may better understand, how, in one specific situation, powerful men

came to act as they did, with consequences that we can observe today. We may also, perhaps, gain a little more understanding of the processes by which we come to hold our own beliefs.

But yet another reason for studying the beliefs of a ruling group comes from the essentially egalitarian nature of anthropology as the study of mankind. In its early years, this egalitarian emphasis led to the view that the customs and world-view of obscure "primitives" were equally as worthy of study as those of ancient Greece or "civilized" peoples. British colonial officials had a distinctive sub-culture, a distinctive way of life, that has now almost totally vanished. Their beliefs are today widely misunderstood. But their sub-culture is part of the human panorama, and is as worthy of our understanding as a human product, as that of any remote "primitive" tribe. A truly egalitarian and humanist anthropology must encompass the powerful, not only for pragmatic reasons, the better to struggle against them, but also because they too are human.

This study, then, is in essence anthropological: an attempt to grasp with empathy the belief-system of a sub-culture different from that of the investigator, to stand back and to comprehend it as a whole, to see its relation to social action, then to translate whatever understanding was gained into terms of the investigator's own culture. But the choice of a literate, British ruling group now out of power as a subject of study for a Canadian investigator inevitably leads to many departures from classic anthropological methodology. The cultural gaps across which translation must be made differ; the

fundamental gap is one of time — the need to make half-familiar beliefs of the 1940s meaningful to people of the 1970s. Problems of investigation of the "half-familiar" culture are considerable, but cannot be discussed here. Problems of comprehension may be even greater; those who have no difficulty in understanding the importance of, say, taboos of a remote "primitive" people are prone to treat the concept of duty of a British colonial official as either a joke or a public relations gimmick. Perhaps we are too close to the latter, or still involved in rejecting it, for our traditional relativism to operate. But in both cases, to comprehend is not necessarily to justify.

2. 'Ideology', 'class' and 'elite'

The concept of ideology is central to this work. Since few concepts in social science are more fuzzy, the meaning attached to it here must be clarified at once. It is used in a very broad sense that cannot be sharply demarcated from 'world view'. I take ideology to be beliefs and assumptions about nature and society that not only delineate general characteristics, but also relate the nature of things to moral prescriptions about how people ought to act, and that provide at least part of the social identity of its holders. This formulation derives directly from MacIntyre (1971). Ideology thus by definition involves both empirical and non-empirical, normative statements. I extend the concept even further by emphasizing that not

only what is thought, but also the characteristic ways of communicating thought, are an inseparable part of what is meant here by ideology. Form and content cannot easily be separated. The relation between delineation of the nature of things, and moral prescriptions for action, necessarily involves some consideration of the values in terms of which these prescriptions are laid down.

Although ideology, in this sense, involves at least some empirical statements, this conception differs from those usages of the term that, by definition, render the beliefs false. These include Parsons, who says, "The problem of ideology arises where there is a discrepancy between what is believed and what can be established as scientifically correct" (quoted in Geertz 1973:198), or Shils (1968) who uses the term to refer to distorted and extreme political beliefs. On the other hand, there are a range of Marxist conceptions, ranging from simplistic accusations of "false consciousness" through subtle philosophical theories, which also tend to restrict ideology conceptually to that which is false or imaginary. Any definition of 'ideology' that pre-judges the truth-value of the statements contained leads into severe epistemological difficulties, a point touched on again in the final chapter. Whether the ideology involves distortion or "correspondence with reality," in whatever sense is to be assigned to these terms, is a matter for examination, not formal definition. Such examination, or analysis of the ideology as subject matter in terms of the sense of reality provided by the analyst's own ideological framework, is an important step in the study of ideology, but should be kept distinct

from the first step of establishing what in fact the beliefs of a given category of subjects are, or were, and how these beliefs are related to action. The concept, however, does imply that ideology is a social product, held by a plurality of people; furthermore, ideology will be related in some way to the conditions of life of its holders, and their social interests. The nature of this relationship is also a matter for examination, not to be settled by fiat.

Thus Althusser's complex concept of ideology as representing "...the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence," a relationship that is necessarily and always illusory (1971:162-165) is ruled out as a starting point. Nevertheless, Althusser's essay has proved suggestive in other ways. His concept of the Ideological State Apparatuses, his emphasis on the importance of the school as an ideological apparatus, and his view that ideology exists in a material apparatus and its practices, and the importance of ideology in the reproduction of the relations of production, have proved highly suggestive for this work. This eclecticism seems justified, since these concepts do not appear to be logically dependent on his central, idiosyncratic, and somewhat obscure concept of ideology itself.[2]

Ideology, then is a partial, but not by definition a false or imaginary, account of reality. It provides part of the sense of "reality" to its holders. Especially since many of the assumptions basic to the ideology were transmitted at a very early age, persons interior to the ideology are probably not consciously aware of the

assumptions and cannot consciously manipulate them. An ideology thus has both a consciously held and more or less explicit component, rooted in deeper inexplicit assumptions that are part of the "given" to those interior to it. It contributes at least part of the social identity of its holders; it is related, but sometimes in convoluted ways, to the social interests of its holders.

An examination and critique of an ideology can thus only be carried out within the framework of an ideology that includes the belief that it is desirable to examine the basic premises of ideologies. We shall see in Chapter III that such examination of their own ideology is proscribed by the ideology of the social elements from which British colonial officials were drawn.

Two other concepts used must also be elucidated. The term 'class' was deliberately avoided in the title, since it itself needs specification, especially when discussing the English. The class affiliations and class interests of colonial officials need empirical examination, not definitions derived from theoretical preconceptions. Therefore the term 'ruling class' is not appropriate at the beginning of this inquiry. The problem of class will be taken up again at the end of Chapters VII and XI.

'Class' itself is a slippery term. As an actor's concept, it is central to English culture, to refer to subtle distinctions of status expressed in accent, manner and style of life. When reference is to these status distinctions without which English social relations with each other cannot be understood, 'class' will be used. A shared relation to the means of production will be referred to simply as a

class relation.

The term 'elite' is used in the title as a "first approximation" term, to indicate those people at the top of a social unit, and without reference to classical theories such as the circulation of elites. But the term, useful because it is vague, needs further clarification. There is a sense in which, in a colonial society in Africa, any white person was part of a social elite, as is discussed in Chapter VII. But this view can lead to such confusions as the assumption that the elite category, which has highest social status, is the ruling group (e.g. Smith 1969). A much smaller element within the elite cateogry actually held political power; the delineation of that element, at the Protectorate level, is attempted in the latter part of Chapter VII.

A distinction between a positional elite and an allocative elite can be useful here. Many elite studies have used a positional approach, identifying elite members as incumbents of certain defined bureaucratic or legislative positions. A positional elite can thus be relatively easily, although arbitrarily, delineated by drawing a line across an organizational chart, and defining all those above the line as part of the elite, those below, as non-elite. This procedure is widely used in studies of corporations, civil services, and other formal organizations.[3] It is simple, straightforward, and amenable to quantitative analysis of available published information. It has been used here to demarcate the boundaries of the population of Ugandan officials whose characteristics were subjected to computer

analysis, discussed in Chapter II. It can also be a very misleading procedure. It tells us something of the gross social characteristics of the incumbents of certain defined positions, but nothing about how much influence on crucial decisions these incumbents may or may not have.

Pahl and Winkler (1974), who are critical of this approach, have suggested the term 'allocative elite' to refer to those who significantly influenced major allocative decisions taken for a social unit. A comprehensive delineation of the actual allocative elite, in a complex situation, is methodologically very difficult, as the extensive literature on the "community power" question indicates. An adequate delineation of such an allocative elite, retrospectively, with the inadequate data available for colonial Uganda, is probably impossible. But discussions with informants at or near the top of the system made certain points clear.

1. The formal organization of the Executive Council was not the scene of decision-making, but of decision-ratifying. Actual decisions were hammered out in private, by informal consultation, and little was written down until agreement had been reached.

2. The number involved in these private discussions leading to crucial decisions was often very small. Those involved differed according to the nature of the issue under consideration.

3. Given the small numbers involved, personal factors often affected the influence a man was able to exert.

4. On a number of economic issues, those involved in hammering out crucial issues included influential "unofficials," businessmen members of the Legislative Council.

5. For the regimes of Sir John Hall and Sir Andrew Cohen at least, the governor was the dominant figure in the decision-making process at the Protectorate level.

Given these characteristics, it is clear that the positional elite and the allocative elite will not coincide; the latter will be much smaller than the former.

One must also remember the importance of "non-decisions," that is, the power to keep critical issues from coming up before decision-making groups (cf. Bacharach and Baratz 1968). As far as can be determined retrospectively, this elusive but critical power seems to have been available to a strong-minded governor.

3. The choice of a locus, and definition of the unit of study

An interest in the relations between ideology and policy choice, a concern with problems of development and underdevelopment, a conviction that anthropologists should pay more attention to rulers as well as to the ruled, all influenced the choice of problem. Difficulties of access to the powerful while still in power, together with a long-standing interest in the gap between colonial officials' definition of themselves and the accounts of the colonial system given by political economists, suggested that a retrospective study of a colony might provide an appropriate arena for the study of relations between ideology

and choices of development policies. Uganda was chosen as a locus in part because of my background knowledge of it. But the choice has other justifications. Uganda was what colonial scholars have called a colony of administration, as opposed to a colony of settlement such as Kenya, where political processes were more complex. Unlike Tanganyika, it had not been under League of Nations/United Nations trusteeship. Among the array of British African colonies, it was middle-sized, middle-ranged, and had long been considered a model colony, one of Britain's successes. In terms of development theory, Uganda is an especially relevant choice because in the postwar period it did not suffer from a shortage of capital for development.

To what extent could the results of this case study be generalized beyond the confines of Uganda? The Uganda Protectorate was an open dependent economy in which agricultural raw materials were produced by a land-holding small peasantry, and given preliminary processing and exported by immigrant private businessmen under state control. The presence of a strong settler element, as in Kenya, or large mining enclaves, as in Northern Nigeria, would create rather different fields of power. Uganda was a relatively pure example of a colonial state wherein those who administered also controlled political power. Further studies should clarify to what extent the generic characteristics of colonial officials led to similar policies and behavior in all colonies, and to what extent these were modified by the specific circumstances of the colonies served in (cf. Berman 1974:499-500).

Once the colony had been decided on, there remained the problem of delimiting a time period and a population that could be adequately studied within the limits of the resources available. After a preliminary reconnaissance, the years 1944-52 were chosen as a focus, a time period spanning the governorship of Sir John Hall. As will be demonstrated in Chapter IX, the period of his governorship marked a break with what had gone before; the arrival of his successor, Sir Andrew Cohen in 1952, initiated new trends it has not been possible to chronicle here.

In a retrospective study of this kind, there was of course no extant community in which the anthropologist could immerse herself. The population to be studied was defined as the incumbents of certain positions within the colonial hierarchy of Uganda during a specified time period. Those selected were the Administrative Service, the Agriculture Department and the Co-operatives Department. Previous studies of British colonial officials have been limited to the Administrative Service (e.g. Heussler 1963, 1969, 1971; Berman 1974). It was felt that a focus on development necessitated a somewhat broader approach; since limitations of time prevented a fully comprehensive look at all technical departments, those most central to the focal issues is given below. As the study progressed, attention was increasingly concentrated on the higher levels of the administration in Uganda.

Thus the number involved was, as it traditional for an anthropological study, very small — a group of officials, mainly based in

Entebbe, the capital of the Protectorate. But they were situated at the nexus of a complex, multi-levelled system. From Entebee, lines of authority ran down through the provinces to the British officials in the districts, then through "chiefs" to the African population. The direct line of authority ran, formally, up from the governor in Entebbe to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London. But in practice, the situation was not so simple. Certain issues involved leading members of the business community resident in Uganda; on other issues, the regional level became relevant, for Uganda was part of a customs union and shared common services with the other British colonies in East Africa. The officials in Entebbe thus had to be concerned not only with what was happening among the African population, the reactions of their superiors in London, but also take into account the opinion of local business leaders, the regional implications of any policy choices and, as we shall see in Chapter X, to consider as well the effect on the Protectorate of world market conditions. Thus the very nature and locus of the small population chosen for study makes it impossible to treat it as a closed, bounded unit. To try to understand their view of the multi-levelled system within which they were situated we shall have to try to trace out a few of the threads linking them to other levels; given the vast scale of the system, this attempt at tracing out linkages can only be partial and illustrative rather than comprehensive.

4. Previous literature

It would have been utterly impossible to attempt even such partial tracing were it not for the existence of a considerable body of literature on which to draw. Only the major sources are mentioned here. With regard to colonial officials themselves, Heussler (1963) has provided an invaluable study of recruitment and training of the British Colonial Administrative Service. Lee (1967) and Goldsworthy (1971) have described changing attitudes and policies in Britain to postwar colonial development. A political scientist's study of British officials in Kenya (Berman 1974) was not available to me until after fieldwork had been completed. Although it differs from my own in theoretical orientation, longer time depth and focus on bureaucratic processes, Berman's important work has been invaluable.

The scholarly literature on Uganda is immense. Much has been written by anthropologists about the indigenous peoples, but little of this work is directly germane to the present study. Although anthropologists frequently had considerable contact with colonial administrators, the theoretical frameworks of earlier times directed their professional attention away from the men who ruled the people they studied. The more relevant studies have been carried out mainly by political scientists, economists and historians. At the risk of forcing a rich and multi-faceted literature into a too-narrow format, these could be roughly classified in terms of two contrasting approaches: the colony-as-self-contained-unit and the colony-in-context. In the former case, which I shall without invidious intent call the "orthodox"

writers, attention is focussed on the internal history or structure of Uganda. These scholars are often meticulous and thorough in their handling of the questions they pose for themselves, but these questions do not include the effect of international economic linkages, and the development of dependency. Nevertheless without the careful scholarship of Apter, Low, Pratt, Ehrlich, Wrigley and others a study such as this would be impossible.

Two different works deserve brief mention. Mukherjee (1956) and Kabwegyere (1974) both see Uganda as a colony being exploited by a metropolis. Yet both, in their different ways, confine themselves to the assertion that exploitation takes place, without analysing the precise nature of the international linkages. Thus they are, incongruously, almost as bounded by the borders of Uganda as are the writers above, but without the saving grace of meticulous handling of data.

Brett (1973) has written a pioneering work attempting a comprehensive view of the inter-relationships linking Britain and her three East African colonies, up to 1939. Certain problems with this valuable work are discussed in more detail in Chapter X, on the cotton ginning industry, which considers in more detail the available scholarly accounts of this subject.

The most sophisticated work done so far on Uganda within an "exploitation" or Marxist framework, has come from Mamdani (1976). He attempts to make sense out of an immense range of confusing data by fitting them into one consistent analytic scheme, not always success-

fully (cf. Saul 1976; Mafeje 1977). He ranges from pre-colonial to post-independence time. In his coverage of the colonial period, he presents some valuable new data and raises a number of very important questions. But the conclusion of the present work is in large part an attempt to provide an alternative interpretation to his. Specific points of disagreement are noted throughout the later chapters. The underlying difference centers on the divergent model of the colonial system each of us employs.

5. Models of the colonial system: integration or decentralization?

Mamdani does not present an explicit theoretical model of the relations between colony and metropolis, but his opening chapter sets his work firmly within the Marxist variants of dependency theory. His stated aim is to explain internal political events in Uganda in the first ten years of independence, 1962-72 (ibid.:13). To do so, he presents an account of class differentiation in earlier time that involves, as one of its elements, the nature of the relation between colony and metropolis and the nature of the colonial state. His book seems to be based on a bi-polar model, with surplus flowing from Uganda straight to Britain. Yet his own data (especially Chap. III) indicate that surplus flow was, at the least, tri-polar, since much went to India. I suggest in the final chapter (Chart 11.2) that patterns of surplus flow were even more complex. By using his bi-polar model, Mamdani totally neglects the regional level, the extent of regional integration of the East African economies, and the "secondary

satellization" of Uganda by Kenya, discussed in more detail in later chapters.

On the level of political control, Mamdani assumes a very tight integration of colony and metropolis.

> The colonial state was a geographical extension of the metropolitan state; it was directly subordinate to the latter. Empirically, this appeared as the subordination of the colonial governor to the colonial secretary, and of the colonial bureaucracy to the Colonial Office. Simply put, the colonial state represented an absentee ruling class, the metropolitan bourgeoisie.... (ibid.:142).

On the level of formal structures, he is quite correct that the colonial governor was subordinate to the colonial secretary, more precisely the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the British minister responsible for the Colonial Office. Thus on Mamdani's view, the senior colonial officials become mere clerks expediting the flow of surplus to the metropolis, as obedient as any junior clerk must be to the orders of his superior. On the ideological level, he implies that these men were knowingly expediting surplus flow and deliberately serving their bourgeois British masters.

Wolf said in another context, "...we must not confuse the theory of state sovereignty with the facts of political life. Many organizations within the state generate and distribute and control power, in competition with each other and with the sovereign power of the state" (1966:1). Thus while Mamdani is formally correct, his neglect of the actual processes of political control introduces a tone of unreality to his account. He fails to note that tightness of control differed

according to the nature of the issue involved. Within the British Empire, decision-making on a wide range of issues was decentralized to colonial capitals; those in charge in these capitals had scope to act on their own initiative on certain kinds of issues, within the overall control of the Colonial Office. Whereas orthodox writers treat a colony such as Uganda as a near-autonomous closed system, Mamdani over-integrates it with the metropolis.

I suggest that the complexity of historical fact can best be fitted into a model in which a colony is seen as a discrete organizational, political and fiscal unit, but not autonomous. It was clearly within the power domain of the metropolis. But the metropolitan rulers would have found it very costly to control their colonies directly. Instead, considerable power, and wide discretion as to its use, was delegated to the rulers in the colonies. Thus the colonial capital became a center of decision-making and control, subsidiary, but important nonetheless for understanding the trajectory of development or underdevelopment.

There is no dispute that the underlying purpose for acquisition and early development of a colony was to serve imperial or metropolitan needs — in Uganda's case, first strategic, later economic (see Chap. V). But once the administrative machinery of a colony was established, it generated its own needs, the primary one being for sufficient revenue to pay for maintenance and expansion of the machinery itself. It will be argued later that these colonial needs could sometimes come to contradict imperial needs.

The rulers of the colony — those who allocated resources allocable at the colony level — were situated at the intersection of pressures from many levels of the complex system: internal, regional, metropolitan, and world markets. I suggest in Chapter XI a model in which the basic structure is determined by the needs and sovereign power of the metropolis, but at each sub-level, there is some "play," some room for maneuver among a set of alternatives whose limits are determined by the issue and its salience to the needs of the over-arching structure. The extent of the autonomy which officials had on any issue would, therefore, differ according to the nature of the issue and its salience to British metropolitan interests. It cannot be assumed a priori that the formal authority of the Secretary of State for the Colonies was the decisive element on each and every issue at all times. Delegated power can, under some conditions and within limits, be used against the delegators in defence of the interests of those formally subordinate. Concrete analyses of specific historical instances of political process are necessary, to supplement accounts of formal structure. One such instance is discussed in Chapter X.

The nature of the model used is crucial to the importance accorded to officials' ideology. If, as Mamdani would have them, these men were like junior clerks obeying orders from above, if each level of the system was so tightly integrated with the ones above it that the officials were totally constrained, no choice would have been possible. In such a case, a study of officials' ideology might be of some

descriptive interest, but it could not contribute to an understanding of the operations of the system. Ideology would be a mere epiphenomenon, and the operations of the system could be totally accounted for by a political economy level of analysis.

If, however, there was at each level of the system some "play" or room for maneuver among a set of alternatives whose limits were determined by the nature of the system, then in order to comprehend fully the choices made, we would have to understand the mental constructs employed by the decision-makers. In such a case, for a fine-grained understanding, a political economy analysis would need to be complemented by an analysis of ideology.

I suggest in this work that the decentralized nature of the British colonial system allowed such "play," that the formal structures accorded significant discretion to incumbent governors, and that institutionalized structural controls on delegated power were, on many issues, loose. In the final chapter I shall suggest that colonial officials' ideology was not a mere epiphenomenon; in this situation of loose formal constraints, it was a crucial element of control through which institutions within a colony were developed, maintained and reproduced in a form easily articulable to the wider colonial system, a system more complex than a bi-polar model can account for.

For such a purpose, ideology cannot be adequately dealt with by making brief sorties from a political economy level of analysis to quote, out of context, statements made by senior colonial officials. Ideology needs to be treated as a complex of beliefs, a set of shared

cultural categories that participants used to organize their perceptions of the system, and in terms of which they acted. That is, any one manifestation needs to be interpreted in the context of the whole, and the level of ideology itself needs then to be viewed in the context of the political economy. Thus part of the task posed for this work is to account for the gap between the fact that most of the officials, most of the time, firmly believed they were doing their best to develop Uganda and its people in preparation for eventual independence, and the picture of an exploitative system of surplus appropriation provided by recent political economists.

6. Methods of study

Several different kinds of data have been used in this study. The historical and economic framework has been extracted from the scholarly literature and from published governmental documents and reports. Memoirs and biographies of officials, and even novels of colonial life, had been drawn on. But the main material has come from 44 interviews. In addition, manuscripts in the Rhodes House Colonial Records Collection were consulted. A few informants still had manuscript material that they made available to me, some of which is used below. With these minor exceptions the work has had to be written without access to archival material. It is, in this sense, a methodological experiment to see how much can be reconstructed on the basis of oral interviews in addition to published documents.

All of these diverse sources have been interpreted through my own experience of Uganda. I arrived in 1963, one year after independence, and lived in Entebbe for six years, travelling widely throughout the country. When I arrived, the old British colonial patterns of enclave social life had weakened but still survived; I watched them give way before the newer patterns of an international expatriate community and the continuing processes of Africanization. The points at which I have drawn directly on my personal observations of enclave life are noted below.

A. The quantitative analysis of Staff List data

The Protectorate Government published annually a list of personnel in established positions, giving such details as birth date, date of first appointment, education, service in other colonies, etc. A computer analysis of this information for a selected population made it possible to demonstrate variations in career patterns, as well as changes in staffing patterns over time. More details and part of the results of this analysis are presented in Chapter II. In addition, the detailed knowledge of staffing patterns resulting from this work proved invaluable when carrying out the interviews.

Since changes in recruitment and staffing patterns would not be easily observable over the short time span of seven years, and since the original intent was to cover the whole time period up to independence, the Staff List analysis was carried out for the years 1946-61.[4]

B. The sample interviewed

The 44 interviews conducted are broken down into categories in Table 1.1. Those talked with are listed in Appendix 1. Several factors were used in selecting those who would be asked for an interview. In the preliminary reconnaissance stage of the research, I followed up acquaintances made in Uganda whose stories of colonial life had intrigued me, and also talked with others in a position to give me an over-view of the topic. During the main interviewing stage, July 1974 to April 1975, the quantitative analysis of Staff List data and the resulting organizational charts provided a more systematic selection frame. Since the main focus was on economic development policy at senior levels of the Protectorate, the incumbents of each relevant senior position were charted and attempts made to locate them. Some key men were dead; a few were in such poor health they could not be interviewed; others had retired to distant places such as South Africa or Australia. Only two men refused requests for an interview, and only one of these was central. I attempted to see as many of the senior men available as possible, within the limits of the short time available. In addition, I endeavored to interview a scattering of officials who did not achieve high rank, to gain some idea of how development policies looked from the district perspective.

As work progressed, it became clear that certain issues had involved men outside of the population as first defined; the importance of the distinction between the positional and the allocative concepts

TABLE 1.1

Interviews Conducted

British Officials		
Administration	20	
Agriculture	6	
Co-operatives	2	
Other officials	6	
	34	34
Others		
British political figures	2	
"Unofficials" (businessmen)	3	
Governor's widow	1	
Others	4	
	10	10
Total number of interviews		44

of 'elite' emerged from the work itself. The study of the issues covered in Chapter X led me to see two British political figures and three influential businessmen who had been involved. Also, Sir Andrew Cohen's widow granted me lengthy interviews. I had hoped to get the perspective of some of the Indian and African elite of the 1940s and 1950s on the British officials. However, it was possible to carry out only three such interviews.[5]

Thus the sample of officials interviewed was deliberately skewed towards those of high rank, but does include some representation of lower levels. It is fairly diversified on other criteria. It includes some noted for their conservatism, and some regarded by their fellows as liberal thinkers, some men of long service at the same rank, and some of the Bright Young Men, postwar recruits who ran up the escalator of promotions. I knew from my own observations of Entebbe life that those based there tended to cluster in overlapping social networks based on leisure-activity preferences. I deliberately sought to avoid being trapped within one or two networks, a danger since subjects for interview were often recommended, and addresses provided, by their friends. So I sought for diversity among those who might be flippantly categorized as "church people," "club types," "sportsmen," "scholars." Another more crucial typology emerged during the research; it, and the representativeness of the sample in its terms, are discussed in the next chapter.

But for an anthropologist, representativeness is not the only

dimension to be considered. This was not a sociological survey, where the investigator sets out to get answers to standardized questions from a carefully-balanced random sample. As David Schneider has pointed out (1969:8-9), what an anthropologist needs is not respondents, but good informants, and good informants are very often not "typical" of their culture. When I found them, I deliberately spent more time with them.

The shortest interview was somewhat over an hour; the longest stretched over four very full days. Many people living in the country invited me to stay with them, so interchange included both informal talk over meals, and more formal sessions. Several people were seen more than once. Where possible, I talked with wives as well, and found their viewpoint very valuable. The conditions of enclave life made it possible for those women who chose to do so, or whose husbands permitted them, to share deeply in their husbands' work, especially at the district level.

I used a check-list of topics, but no standardized forms. Discussion roamed widely. My questions included open-ended ones on motives and aims. I found it very difficult to get some men to generalize about underlying premises of their work; this difficulty is itself a datum. I had expected suspicion of an inquiring stranger, but suspicion was evident in only two or three cases. Perhaps in others, it was kep well-hidden behind the polished surface of British good manners.

Methodologically, dependence on recollected data through interviews is of course less satisfactory than prolonged participant-observation within an ongoing social system. But such participant-observation on the level of a ruling group would probably be extremely difficult. The uses of power include the ability to defend against external study. Despite the loss of contemporaneity of ongoing processes, a study of those out of power had the compensating advantage that those interviewed were in some cases willing to discuss issues that had once been "top-secret."

In many cases, the interview situation itself provided a contemporary enactment of the traits of character discussed in Chapter III. The conflict between loyalty to their service and the desire to give as honest an account as possible was often obvious. The skill at small talk developed during years of maintaining smooth social relations on small stations with people they had not chosen to live with was noticeable. Most noticeable of all was the great hospitality with which I was received. This was especially the case with those retired and living in the country, who frequently invited me to stay with them. Pensioners in inflation-ridden Britain, they nevertheless insisted on entertaining me in the style they regarded as appropriate. Elderly people in poor health gave generously of their scarce energy. Self-discipline and sense of duty were exemplified by two wives who insisted on entertaining me, in one case repeatedly, despite enervating illnesses. A devotion to duty, even though that duty was, for the

men, long past, still over-rode personal convenience or comfort. The social rituals that had helped them to maintain social identity even in the threateningly foreign conditions of Africa now helped to maintain their sense of self under threateningly changed conditions at home. My debt to them is very great.

Those interviewed reflected also the civil servant's typical dislike of public attention in their desire for anonymity. I have tried to respect the wish of the majority by using no names throughout this work, except for the governors discussed. Part of the cost of such high position is loss of anonymity.

7. Organization of this work

In structure, this study proceeds from a general consideration of the ideology of the social elements from which the officials predominantly came, to a consideration of specific manifestations in the context of the colonial economy of Uganda. The first of its three parts is devoted to the colonial officials themselves, to recruitment, ideological preparation, and doctrines of rule. Much of this material is probably applicable to officials of other colonies, or at least other African colonies, as well as to those of Uganda. Part II deals with the specific conditions of Uganda, and presents the historical background needed to understand the issues discussed in the third part. These issues — development planning, industrialization policies, the technicalities of cotton ginning and marketing — are very unlike

the standard fare of an ethnographic monograph. I have tried to apply an anthropological perspective to these topics, even at the risk of treating naively material better handled by economists and political scientists. By focussing on disputes about development strategy, and especially over division of the benefits of the cotton industry, I hope to clarify the problems posed in Section 5 above, and demonstrate the complexity of the inter-relations between ideology and action in this context.

Thus, although this work uses a great deal of historical data, its aim is not to give a balanced account of the history of the defined time period, but to clarify certain social processes. Only those issues most fruitful for that purpose are considered, within the further serious constraints of availability of data. Even as an account of the economy, the present work is imbalanced; it omits consideration of the coffee industry, and a detailed consideration of several postwar initiatives. An adequate history of the postwar colonial period would give much space to what was done in the fields of education, medical services, rural water supplies, policies on urbanization, and so on, aspects not touches on here. Such an adequate history, internally detailed yet taking account of external dependencies, remains to be written.

NOTES

1. Studies based on direct contact with officials, in addition to the present one, include Berman (1974), and Heussler (1963, 1969, 1971).

2. This is no place for an extended discussion of the complexities of Althusser's concept of ideology and the discussions it has provoked. My confidence in abstracting what seemed useful from Althusser's provocative essay and leaving the rest has been increased by reading Callinicos' critique of Althusser's approach (1976, esp. 96-101).

3. See, inter alia, several of the papers in Stanworth and Giddens, eds., 1974.

4. No Staff List was published for 1944 and 1945, because of wartime pressures.

5. A number of these people are now exiles from Uganda, living in Great Britain and elsewhere. One such interview occurred by chance, when I found that the owner of a hotel in Canada where I was staying had been a small ginnery owner in Uganda before his expulsion.

PART I

THE OFFICIALS AND THEIR MENTAL BAGGAGE

INTRODUCTION

Part I of this work focusses on the officials themselves, and the ideas, attitudes and values they carried out to the colonies with them. It is well-known that recruits for the Colonial Administrative Service were for the most part drawn from a very narrow segment of British society (cf. Heussler 1963). Chapter II looks not only at the Administrative Service, but also at the similarities and differences in recruitment patterns for two technical departments: Agriculture and Co-operatives. To understand the criteria for selection of colonial officials, one must first get some idea of the nature of the jobs for which they were recruited. Therefore, Chapter II opens with a brief consideration of the characteristics of colonial bureaucracies as a mode of administrative organization. This quick trespass into the field of the public administration specialist draws heavily on Berman's earlier study of the colonial administration of Kenya (1974). After consideration of the general recruitment practices used to meet the needs of the Colonial Service, the focus shifts to those officials sent to Uganda. A quantitative analysis of data pertaining to the men who served in the Administration, Agriculture and Co-operative departments provides a basis for consideration of educational qualifications and changing career patterns. Finally, an "actor's model" of differences among types of officials is used to give more insight into the differing levels of rapport achieved, and hence of information elicited, during discussions with the sample of officials interviewed.

The nature of official recruitment patterns enormously simplifies the task of the student of colonial officials' ideology. From the great complexity of British cultural patterns, one can extract those held by that segment of the English 'middle-classes' whose sons had been a success at public school, had gone into the old universities, and then into the administrative services. Such men were a minority among the British employed in the colonial service within any colony. They were far outnumbered by the other professions, and by the many sub-professionals and skilled craftsmen. The men who manned the Public Works Department, printed government documents, audited the accounts and so on, were mostly drawn from that majority of the British people to whom 'tea' means a family meal rather than an afternoon ritual served by a maid. The Irish, Welsh and especially the Scots were well represented among them. Although the English public-school element was a numerical minority among the British in the colonies, just as it was at home, the ethos and the style of life of this minority provided the dominant pattern to which others were expected to conform.

Studies of elites emphasizing class or 'class' origins are sometimes justifiably criticized for a too-glib assumption that social origins are a valid indicator of ideas held. It is quite true that the social backgrounds that produced colonial administrators also produced many other types: rebels, aesthetes, businessmen, even anthropologists. But because of careful selection procedures, the recruits were overwhelmingly those who had successfully internalized the ideology of the institutions through which they had passed.

But we are concerned here with something much broader than ideology in the sense of a fairly explicit system of inter-related ideas or beliefs. The colonial administrative system required men of a distinct type. Protection of British overseas possessions likewise required appropriate manpower to officer the British army and navy. Reproduction of the manpower necessary to run the British Empire involved much more than mere implantation of ideas; it required institutions that would turn out a steady supply of men of certain personality types, with appropriate attitudes and values as well as beliefs. Not only what they thought, but the way they thought, and felt, and communicated, had to be reproduced. The institutions crucial to the reproduction of such manpower were the 'middle-class' or 'county' or 'gentry' family, and the system of preparatory and public schools. It was these that reproduced what the recruiters called "character."

One possible approach to a study of ideology is to consider the ideology as an inter-related system of ideas, in itself and on its own level. Such an approach may be especially appropriate where authoritative texts or comprehensive explicit statement of beliefs exists. But the ideology of British colonial rulers can nowhere be found explicit in full-blown form; furthermore, it was neither static nor unitary. The lack of explicitness and systematization of premises was itself an important characteristic of colonial officials' thought, as indeed it was of many other aspects of British life. But I hope to demonstrate below that often apparently unrelated phrases, fragments and scattered viewpoints are in fact systemically inter-related at a deeper level.

In articulated form, this system of beliefs is a construct of the external analyst, but a construct built up from bits and pieces of evidence drawn from interviews, documents and in some cases, observation. The articulated form of beliefs presented in the next two chapters could probably not have been elicited complete from any one official. But we are dealing here with a shared, public framework of beliefs, attitudes and values, a cultural heritage not less vital because it was seldom systematically articulated.

In this case, style of thought is almost as important as content. Indeed, the distinction between style and content is formalistic and misleading. Culturally patterned ways of thinking, talking, or as was often the case, not talking, about what they were doing were part of the apparatus with which the British ruled, and justified their rule of others to themselves. 'Ideology' in the sense used here can be for purposes of analysis abstracted and systematized, but was in living reality an indissoluble part of the day-to-day action, communication, the whole social life of this body of men and women (cf. Williams 1977: 70).

An analysis of ideological texts alone cannot get at these culturally patterned ways, nor give us an understanding of how the type of manpower required to rule the Empire was reproduced. To get such an understanding we need to look not only at ideas but also at the institutions central to such reproduction. This is in line with Althusser's view (1971:168) of the embeddedness of ideology in its apparatus or institution. The attempt to meet this requirement has

led, in Chapters III and IV, to a sometimes awkward shuttling between the ideational and institutional levels.

Chapter III starts with some of the characteristics shown by officials during interviews, then discusses some of the ways used for inculcating the ideological premises, the intellectual style, and the traits of character desired. Chapter IV turns more explicitly to the observer's construct of the models of society and the doctrines of rule current in the socializing institutions. To get a better understanding of the specifically colonial doctrines of rule, one must first understand the general tradition of conservative thought in Britain, then turn to its manifestations in official thought about colonial rule, especially such central concepts as 'race', 'the African', 'the tribe', and 'the chief'.

CHAPTER II

BUREAUCRATS IN THE BUSH: STRUCTURE, RECRUITMENT, TRAINING AND CAREER PATTERNS

In this chapter we look briefly at the structure of the formal institutions within which the colonial officials worked, and the nature of the formal linkages between colony and metropolis, before looking at the recruitment and training of the men who manned the colonial structure.

1. The metropolitan level

In theory, the British parliament held ultimate authority over British colonies: the Secretary of State for the Colonies was responsible to Parliament for colonial administration. In practice, parliamentary supervision of, or influence on, colonial policies was slight. Only a few outstanding issues drew wide parliamentary attention (cf. Goldsworthy 1971; Lee 1967:56-66; Perham 1965:xxii-xxvi). Most colonial policy was left to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the permanent civil servants of the Colonial Office, and an "informed minority"[1] of those with commercial, humanitarian or scientific interests in the colonies.

The internal organization of the Colonial Office is not of immediate relevance here.[2] We need ask only about the nature and extent of the C.O.'s control over a colony.

The Secretary of State possessed definite constitutional rights

to disallow legislation passed by a colonial legislature, and to remove a governor from office. Colonial Office control over the dismissal of members of the Colonial Service, and over details of fiscal accounting was close and detailed.

Financially, each British colony was a separate unit. The administrators were recruited by the Colonial Office, but were regarded as employees of the colony in which they served, which paid their salaries and their pensions. Annual budgets were prepared and expenditures controlled by the financial officials of each colony, but were audited with great rigor by officials in Britain. Major expenditures such as public works, any addition of new posts to the bureaucracy, or changes in official salaries, had to have the previous sanction of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Jeffries understates the result:

> The official insistance on the primary importance of financial control...frustrated initiative and put a premium on inaction, since action is apt to cost money (1960:39).

The basic premise of British colonial administration, until late in the colonial period, was that each colony had to generate enough revenue to pay for its own administration, and for any developmental measures that its administrators wished to take. The British government made no direct calls on the revenues of its colonies, which were treated as distinct financial units. But until the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, Britain was loath to spend any money on its colonies that did not promise direct and immediate benefit to itself. The result of such a structure was that the primary obligation of each colonial administration was to generate enough rev-

enue to pay for itself, within the straitjacket imposed by Treasury auditors.

But on non-monetary aspects, there seems to have been a lack of bureaucratic machinery whereby the Colonial Office could enforce its middle-range policies uniformly over its various possessions. By long convention the extreme sanctions of disallowance of legislation or removal of a governor from office were very rarely used. The British Empire was a congeries of separate acquisitions, each with its own conditions and traditions. The prevalent assumption at the Colonial Office was that "the man on the spot" should be trusted to do the right thing, since he knew best the specific circumstances and resources of his colony. Thus many Colonial Office policies were issued as general directives, whose implementation was left up to individual governors.

> The Secretary of State was in a position of great authority but not of great power.... The constitution of the dependent Empire made powers of persuasion more important than powers of command (Lee 1967:54).

During the last, fading days of the colonial era, the initiative and power of the colonial secretaries increased greatly; constitutional advances, and dates for political independence, were settled in London. But this was not the case during the period studied here. Sir John Hall told me:

> The governor is in a very strong position if he wants to use his strength, because no government, no current government of England likes to sack him. And my tendency was to do something and then when it was seriously challenged say, "Oh sorry." And nothing else happened, you see. So you could very often get your own way.... What you want is a very soft exterior and a very tough inside. When that is reversed, of course you simply have a creature of the Colonial Office....

> The instinct of a civil servant is to say "no" the first time. So when you put your schemes to the Colonial Office, the whole instinct is to say "no," and then you have got to waste an awful lot of time trying to persuade them.... But they did interfere. Very often they would say, "Well, do so and so." And then I would have to think, if I didn't want that scheme, of a reason why not—just like home civil servants, you can always find a reason to say no.... But one had a good deal of power, a good deal of power, really.

The Colonial Office had a long tradition of humanitarian concern for conditions in the colonies. For example, it was Colonial Office orders that forced the governors of Kenya and Uganda in the early years of the 1920s reluctantly to give up use of compulsory paid labor for public works projects (Powesland 1957). But to focus on this tradition, or merely on the relations between Colonial Office and colony, is to miss much of the substance. Especially in the years immediately after 1945 that we are concerned with here, British economic and defence ministries were probably at least as influential. Operating on an overall policy of rapid expansion of colonial production to help ease Britain's own economic crises, the economic ministries used the Colonial Office as a conduit for their demands for raw materials, and also set up independent organizations for colonial extraction.[3] The Treasury imposed rigid controls on the colonies aimed at conserving dollars and protecting sterling balances.

Interestingly, in the perceptions of those top officials who had been involved in negotiations with the home government, the Colonial Office was not usually seen as a serious barrier to what they wanted to do. As they saw it, the barriers and problems came from the economic ministries and especially the Treasury. There was a feeling that if an

unpalatable directive had originated from within the Colonial Office, it could probably be stalled off, in the various ways available to unwilling bureaucrats (cf. the quotation from Sir John Hall above). But if the Treasury or economic ministries were involved, the feeling was that they were up against a much sterner and less flexible control. The point will recur below, in the context of the bulk-buying issue in Chapter X.

2. The colony level

Uganda was technically a Protectorate, unlike Kenya, which was a Crown Colony, or Tanganyika, held under mandate from the League of Nations/United Nations. These differences in constitutional law had little substantive effect on the form of government, for all three were governed in accord with the standard Crown Colony model. The difference between Uganda as a Protectorate and Kenya as a colony did, however, figure significantly in the thinking of some officials, as noted below. In this work, the generic term colony will be used for all these forms of colonial holdings.

Each of the British colonies in East Africa (including Zanzibar) had its own separate governmental apparatus and its own budget. The colonies were tied together in a common market/customs union, shared a common currency and certain other services, discussed in more detail at the end of Chapter V.

> The Crown Colony system might be described as autocracy tempered by bureaucracy, slightly diluted by democracy—or, more accurately, by oligarchy (Jeffries 1960:18).

Uganda had all the main features of the Crown Colony system: a governor, an Executive Council composed of senior officials who advised the governor; a Legislative Council with an official majority plus unofficial members appointed by the governor from those considered to be sound and worthy sources of advice, and a bureaucracy whose upper and middle echelons consisted of officials recruited predominantly from Great Britain.

Since the Colonial Office had so few effective bureaucratic controls over governors, and was loath to use the extreme sanction of dismissal, it took great care in selecting the men who shared the assumptions and values of the "official classes" at home. Most colonial governors were appointed from the ranks of the Colonial Administrative Service; the desire to keep an unblemished record, and to earn promotion from a minor to a more important colony, may have been another device tending to keep some governors from major deviations from Colonial Office directives.

> The Crown Colony system revolved round the Governor. He combined in his person the functions of Sovereign, Prime Minister, Speaker and permanent head of the civil service (Jeffries ibid.:40).

As representative of the monarch, the governor was surrounded with, even fenced off by, elaborate ceremony; "the mystique of delegated royalty clung to the governor" (Perham 1965:xxxi). But unlike contemporary British monarchs, a colonial governor had considerable scope for determining policy, and was the executive head of his administration. He was the structural link between the colony and the British government,

and was held responsible for the disbursement of public monies. Structurally, the role provided an incumbent with immense potential power in policy areas, especially "native administration," that did not involve major governmental spending (ibid.). At the same time, he could not write off an accounting item of a few shillings nor dismiss an incompetent junior official sent out by the Colonial Office.

In theory, the Legislative or Executive Councils could curb the power of an impetuous governor. In practice, these curbs were unimportant. Probably the most effective limitation to a governor's power was the inertia of the bureaucratic organization itself. The standard gubernatorial term was five years, and the usual custom was to appoint governors to a colony in which they had not recently served. The incumbent officials, who had usually been there much longer, controlled both the channels of information flowing to the new governor, and the means of execution of his policies. A certain strength was needed if an incoming governor was to divert this bureaucratic machine from its accustomed path and drive it in the direction he wanted to go.

The heart of this administrative machine was the Secretariat, headed by a chief secretary, through whom all business was supposed to pass before reaching the governor. The financial secretary prepared budgets and controlled finance. An attorney-general functioned as the governor's chief legal advisor, and drafted legislation. The judiciary was structurally independent of the governor. The heads of the various specialized departments — Medical Services, Agriculture, Public Works, Police and so on — were responsible to the governor through the chief

secretary. In British colonies, as in Great Britain herself, the structure of administration gave the generalist administrators very strong control over the specialist technical experts.[4] The generalist administrators who manned the Secretariat were drawn from the ranks of the Provincial Administration either in Uganda or, as often happened, by transfer in from other colonies.

The Provincial Administration was the backbone of colonial control over the indigenous population. In Uganda it consisted of three or four provincial commissioners, one of whom was styled 'resident'; a district commissioner for each district outside of Buganda,[5] and a number of assistant district commissioners and cadets. The district was the basic unit of local administration. The district commissioner was responsible for, in approximate order of priorities, the maintenance of law and order, collection of taxes, and welfare and development of its people.

Most districts had various technical experts posted to them: district medical officers, district agricultural and/or veterinary officers, a police officer and so on. The subordination of specialists to generalists was repeated at the district level; the technical experts were responsible to the heads of their respective departments for execution of department policy, but were also subject to the over-riding control of the district commissioner, who "co-ordinated" the efforts of the specialist officials, and was ultimately responsible for everything that went on in his district.

In the early days of poor communications between headquarters and

districts, the principle of "trusting the man on the spot" in the districts had been a practical necessity. It tended to linger on even after communications improved: district commissioners had some limited leeway in interpreting directives from headquarters to fit special conditions in their districts. The relative freedom of the district commissioner to emphasize one rather than another aspect of development, together with the frequent transfer of staff from one area to another, often meant a lack of continuity in efforts at the district level.[6]

Much of the work of the district commissioner and his assistants involved supervision of a hierarchy of African county, sub-county and parish officials, misleadingly called 'chiefs'. These salaried pensionable black civil servants who did the actual work of collecting taxes and enforcing regulations, formed the interface between the British administration and the population at large.

3. Self-reliant bureaucrats

The formal structures that evolved for the administration of British colonies, while clearly bureaucratic, diverge in several respects from the orthodox ideal-type bureaucracy. Berman provides a useful review of the characteristics of this bureaucratic type, which students of formal organization call "prefectoral field administration."

> The Prefect, Collector, or District Commissioner in the field is expected to be an impressive, even awesome, and omnipotent embodiment of the power of the central government and this promotes authoritarian values as well as methods in the organization. Prefectoral organizations are staffed by an elite cadre of generalist administrators who are expected to be skilled in the exercise of power, backing up their orders with the use of force if necessary,

> and to literally 'hold the line' for the regime and maintain the status quo (1974:27-28).

The delegation of discretion to field agents is seen as an unavoidable consequence of great distances, poor communications and widely varying local circumstances. Where the aims of administration are diffuse — law and order and good government — the field officer's responsibilities are equally broad. But this delegation of discretion raises acute problems of organizational control.

> Ironically, prefectoral administration which is established to ensure centralized control of the political system, presents within its own organization extreme problems of central control in the face of powerful centrifugal tendencies. Historically the most serious of these control problems was to prevent the field officer from identifying with and becoming an agent of powerful local interests against the center, and a variety of methods were employed to prevent this from happening. In the modern colonial situation ... the issue is not the 'capture' of the field officer by local interests, but the officer's development of his own interpretation of the interests of the local population,... and his defence of those 'interests' against outsiders, including the central authorities of his own organization (ibid.:29).

Berman adds that some of the means used in other prefectoral systems for checking up on the performance of field officials were not applicable with British colonies, in part because of the belief that the word of a gentleman must not be doubted by seeking independent verification.

Thus there was a built-in tension between the need within any bureaucracy to maintain control and accountability of subordinates, and the imperative of delegating discretion to field officers remote from headquarters. This contradiction can be found on two levels: a) between the controlling center in the metropolis and its colonies, and b) within each colony, between the governor and his staff at head-

quarters, and the field officers in the districts. The center at one level becomes part of the periphery at the higher level. We shall see below that similar attempts to deal with structural tension can be found on both levels.

> Given the limitations on the effectiveness of direct means of control and supervision of field officers, the higher authorities in field administration organizations frequently resort to indirect controls through either highly selective recruitment or intensive indoctrination of personnel after they have entered the organization, or both methods in combination. Thus the central authorities will search for men who are already strongly committed to the basic values and general goals of the regime they are expected to maintain (ibid.:31).

A British colony thus needed staff capable of functioning effectively to further the aims of the organization without close supervision, able to use their initiative to act in local situations without precedent, but to act only within limits acceptable to their superiors. A subsidiary requirement was an ability to communicate easily and effectively with a body of colleagues whose membership was constantly shifting. These needs operated at both levels. At the colony level, field staff were needed who could withstand isolation and in the early days, some physical hardship, and also able to exercise great power over unsophisticated people, unsupervised, in a manner not offensive to British ideas of justice and fair play.

A body of men was recruited that, on the whole, met these organizational needs very effectively, as long as the organization was concerned to "'hold the line' ... and maintain the status quo." The organizational structure was much less well adapted to the task imposed on it later, of preparing for the handover of its own power to a new

ruling element.

In a bureaucratic organization of this type, careful recruitment is one of the alternatives where extensive controls over field staff are impracticable. The British did not adopt the second alternative, of intensive indoctrination of personnel after recruitment, as we shall see below. Yet the structures through which recruitment for overseas possessions was carried on were not standardized; some, in the early years, had an almost improvised quality.

Uganda was one of the thirty-eight or so of Britain's overseas possessions for which the Colonial Office was responsible. The Colonial Office acted as a central recruiting agency for staff at the more senior levels: district officer cadets, degree-holding agricultural officers, etc. These men were employees, not of the Colonial Office, but of the colony in which they worked. However, we find one of those administrative ambiguities so common in the British colonial system: these men were simultaneously members of the Colonial Administrative Service, Colonial Agricultural Service and so on. As such, they could be transferred from one colony to another (Bradley 1950:10-11). As we shall see below, the very senior officials had usually served in more than one colony.

By no means all of British overseas possessions were manned by the Colonial Service. India and Burma, which came under the India Office, had a separate administrative corps, the Indian Civil Service; recruitment was based on examinations, similar to the non-prefectoral Home Civil Service. The Sudan was the responsibility of the Foreign

Office, which recruited its staff. Thus under normal conditions a senior official could be transferred to Uganda from, say, Ceylon, but not from India or the Sudan. Southern Rhodesia provided its own staff.

But running through these differing modes of recruitment was a common assumption: that only 'gentlemen' should be entrusted with power over 'natives'.

4. Recruitment and training

The British officials who filled senior positions in Uganda during the 1944-57 period had for the most part entered the Colonial Service in their youth, one as early as 1908. Understanding of the background of these men can best be gained by considering recruitment and training patterns for the pool from which these officials were drawn.

In the early 1900s, recruitment for the Colonial Service was based on interviews and recommendations, especially from powerful people (Heussler 1963, Chap. 1). At that time, the Colonial Service was not well known; conditions of life were often very harsh, and West Africa, in particular, still deserved its reputation as "the white man's grave." Candidates of high caliber often preferred the more prestigious Indian Civil Service. To meet the rapidly expanding staff needs of the new African colonies, the Colonial Office drew on adventurous ex-officers from the Boer War, and attempted to attract candidates from the old universities. Even then, 'gentlemen' were wanted, especially for colonies such as Kenya, with its aristocratic British settlers (Heussler ibid.).

Recruitment was handled, not by civil servants, but by private secretaries to the Secretary of State. The system was one of patronage, manned by patronage appointments. A young man just down from Oxford drifted into this system in 1910, by taking a supposedly temporary post as assistant private secretary (Appointments). Major (later Sir) Ralph Furse, and the values that he embodied in a remarkably pure form, came to dominate recruitment of the Colonial Service for the next forty years.

Furse was the scion of an old landed Devon family, and a product of Eton and Balliol College, Oxford. He believed deeply in the British Empire as a moral undertaking. To him, only the very best type of men should be entrusted with this crusading task (Furse 1962, passim). His concept of the best type was naturally influenced by his own background and 'class' values. He was strongly opposed to "jobbery," and once he was in charge, set himself to eliminate any suspicion of undue influence from important people on behalf of mediocre candidates. He would have regarded "prefectoral field administration" as a barbaric term, but he believed that it took 'character' to withstand the stresses of isolation and the responsibility of great power over unsophisticated natives, without close supervision. He looked for a sense of responsibility and a belief in service to others. Qualities of personality and character were more important than academic brilliance. Therefore he resisted all attempts to recruit through examination or other "objective" procedures; he emphasized recommendations from those who knew the candidate well, especially headmasters and college tutors; intensive review

of a candidate's background, and personal interviews (ibid.:228-232; Heussler 1963). He worked single-mindedly to build up his networks of personal contacts, make the image of the Colonial Service better known in the right places, improve training, and attract the type of men he wanted, even though he himself remained, until 1930, in the same "temporary" position on a small salary, without the security of civil service status (Furse 1962:217). Only after that date was recruitment incorporated as a regular function of the Colonial Office.

For the Administrative Service, Furse went after the sons of families with traditions of public service, the products of "public" schools, and graduates of Oxford or Cambridge. He had a special preference for those who had been successful school prefects. But "good family" and a public school accent alone could not get one into the Colonial Service. Furse wanted only those men with the attitudes and qualities of leadership he thought essential; he had no use for the other types produced by this background: the aesthete, the brilliant scholar with no interest in athletics, or worse, the disenchanted cynics of the 1920s (ibid.:219). Where he thought he found the qualities he wanted in men of a different background, he hired them. Thus not all — only a large majority — of the men in the Administrative Service were of the "good family-public school-old university" pattern.[8] For 1931-39, Oxford and Cambridge provided some eighty percent of entrants to the Administrative Service (Heussler 1963:239). Heussler points out that the biases of the recruiters were so well known that few men from other backgrounds bothered to apply in the 1930s (ibid.:76).

Furse's attitude became enshrined in print, in the confidential Colonial Office Appointments Handbook, written by his long-time colleague and successor.

> A man's natural qualities ... derive partly from inheritance and home environment, and partly from school or academical training. If he comes from stock that has proved its worth, generation by generation, in the professions or in public service, if he has been reared in the faith that duty and chivalry are of more account than ambition and self-seeking, if his education has broadened his mind in that faith and taught him the meaning of responsibility ... then he has ... many of the qualities for which you are looking. The truth of this is incontestable, and accounts for the fact that a preponderance of men of this stamp, trained at the universities, come forward as candidates for the Colonial Administrative Service, and are successful. (Quoted in ibid.:76).

In a situation of considerable cultural differentiation between 'classes', restriction of recruitment to this narrow range met the needs of the system for men who shared a common cultural code, similar formative experiences and basic premises. Unspoken, but present in the minds of many, was the belief that in a country where invidious status distinctions abounded, those from the 'lower ranks', if entrusted with power, would salve their own bruised egos by arrogant behaviour towards unsophisticated 'natives'. Justice and magnamity, it was believed, came more easily to those "born to rule."

Wherever possible, technical staff were recruited from similar backgrounds. The homogeneity of this class sub-culture meant that from Fiji to the Falkland Islands, from Hong Kong to Uganda, administrators, agriculturalists and other professional officers could speak with similar accents from similar assumptions and traditions. This

shared sub-culture helped to mitigate strains inherent in the organizational structure, discussed below and in the next chapter. This shared background also facilitated movement of officials from one colony to another. The content of the belief system generated by the institutions of "good family" and public school will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Neither a 'middle-class' background, nor even a public school education, necessarily implied that the officials came from wealthy families. Many recruits came from families who had scrimped to provide their sons with the education regarded as appropriate to their 'class'. Some were the offspring of army or colonial officers struggling to get by on miniscule pensions (cf. Bradley 1966a:4, 9); others were sons of poor clergymen.[9] Many went to minor public schools, and got to university on scholarships. By the 1920s, even smaller landed families were finding themselves in straitened circumstances. The custom of primogeniture required that younger sons find appropriate careers.[10] For the right kind of young man, colonial service provided careers with adventure and security, in accord with the 'class' tradition of public service, and free from the taint of 'trade'. Salaries were not high; the Colonial Service was no place for a man hoping to make a fortune.

Even in the 1930s, a few administrative recruits came from other universities in Great Britain, transfers from other services, and from the Dominions. Furse tried to broaden recruitment to the white Dominions, in accord with his view of the Empire as an Imperial trust. During his tours abroad he established recruiting contacts with some elite institutions, such as Upper Canada College. However, numbers

recruited from these sources remained small (Furse 1962).

In the early years of the century, the district officer in Africa was expected to be a jack-of-all-trades who could survey a road, supervise bridge construction, and further the production of cash crops. But as development of the colonies' productive potential became increasingly important in the 1920s, the need for specialized professional staff in such departments as agriculture, forestry and veterinary services became greater. Men with appropriate training were extremely scarce. Various commissions of inquiry were appointed. The Read Report on agricultural staffing stated the problem thus:

> The most important thing to be kept clearly in mind in this connection is the paramount necessity of securing the right type of man. Second-rate officers are worse than useless where scientific aid is in question.... The type of man required to make a good agricultural officer is of a very high order. Not merely must he be a highly qualified technical expert, fitted by his scientific training to grapple with and overcome the problems that will arise in the work of his department, or to carry out independent research work that will lead to valuable improvements in the methods of planting and raising tropical crops, but he must also be endowed by his general education and upbringing with the tact and administrative ability necessary for dealing with the native mind. (Quoted in Masefield 1972:38).

An even more important committee report in 1925 called for men "of the stamp to be met with in the Administrative Departments and who have been through a full degree course" (ibid.:39-40). In other words, they should be not only professionally competent, but also 'gentlemen'. To meet this demand, specialist colleges were established in the 1920s for tropical agriculture in Trinidad, and forestry, at Oxford. Promising science graduates were awarded scholarships for post-graduate work at

these institutes (ibid.:40-41; Furse 1962:149), and also in veterinary science (Furse ibid.:159-162). The colonies bore two-thirds of the cost of the agricultural training scheme (Masefield 1972:40-41) and probably the other schemes also. The principle that the colonies must pay for themselves was extended to paying for most of the specialist training of the staff that their colonial economies needed.

The economic depression of the 1930s eased the recruiting position, both by reducing demand from colonies forced to retrench, and increasing the number of high-caliber aspirants unable to find employment elsewhere. Masefield says, " ... there is no doubt that the average quality of the [agricultural] intake during the depression years was higher than at any period either earlier or later," (ibid.:44), a pattern that probably held true for other services as well.

Thus after the mid-1920s, most professional specialists had one or more years of post-graduate education. Yet, in the British system, the specialist was always under the direction of the generalist administrator.[11] At the district level, the district commissioner was responsible for co-ordinating the work of any specialist professionals posted to his district, although these specialists were also responsible to the heads of their technical departments in the colony's capital. The potential for conflict in such a structure is obvious. It could only work if the specialists respected the administrator, which would not be the case if they were vastly better trained than he (Heussler 1963:44).[12] Heussler suggests that this factor contributed to a drive, in the 1920s, towards some formal training for administrative cadets.

Formal training, however, conflicted directly with another strong British belief: that administration was an art that could not be taught, but only learned by experience on the job.

The result was a one-year course, started in 1926, given at Oxford and Cambridge. The curriculum included language study, law, anthropology, a smattering of agriculture and forestry, and the history of British rule of the colonies. The history lectures were clearly intended to give the future administrators a sense of pride in British achievements, but apparently did not set out an explicitly formulated ideology justifying British rule (Heussler ibid.:47-49; 126-129).

> The most that the prewar course did was to provide a bare outline of the historical facts whereby Britain had acquired the colonies. Lecturers and their hearers knew each other well enough to let it go at that (ibid.: 128).

In other words, ideological preparation for colonial service had been mainly completed by the time the cadets reached the training course; the homogeneous background of the cadets obviated the need for instilling an explicit ideology of colonial rule at that stage.

It seems to have been generally agreed that the course was not intellectually demanding. Of those administrators I interviewed, few recalled the course as a significant source of influence on their thinking, although many felt the language training had been of some use.[13] Berman reports that none of the Kenya administrators he interviewed felt it had been important to them (1974:100). As Heussler says, "The C.O. preferred the semi-trained generalist over the uncivilized specialist" (1963:127). Real training in administration must

wait until the cadets reached their posts.[14]

Not the least of the administrator's problems would be dealing with the professional specialists. In an attempt to improve relations between generalists and specialists, certain lectures and seminars were taken jointly by both types of cadets, and lectures were given to Administrative cadets on the work of the specialized departments.

The 1939-45 war seriously disrupted recruitment. Furse arranged with the army that a few administrative cadets be allowed to go to the colonies, on the grounds that maintenance of law and order was essential (1962:268-270). But many other services were starved of new appointees. At war's end, the colonies, including Uganda, demanded greatly increased numbers of professional specialists, at a time when competition for such men was acute. It appears that the social background of the specialized professionals accepted in those post-war years was somewhat broader than at earlier times. The shortage of qualified veterinarians was especially acute. Furse was "by no means happy about the standard we were able to maintain in certain branches of the Service during this hectic phase," although he felt the quality of administrative recruits to Africa had been kept up (ibid.:279). Immediately at war's end, the demand for staff was so acute that some administrative recruits were shipped to the colonies without the usual year's training course, but among those interviewed, none felt they had missed much, or suffered from the lack. This supports the view that the course was not as important a part of the preparation for colonial rule as the cadet's earlier education and background.

In summary, recruitment for the Administrative Service showed a majority coming from 'middle-' and 'upper-middle-class' backgrounds, with some 'gentry' and a scatter of sons of the lower aristocracy. This pattern stemmed from the recruiters' belief that the desired attitudes and relaxed air of command were fostered in such backgrounds. A large majority had attended public schools, although not always the very prestigious ones. There was a strong preference for graduates of Oxford and Cambridge. For the specialist services, recruiters liked to hire men of similar character and social background, but the range of types hired for these services seem to have been broader than for the Administration, especially in the hectic post-war years.

Such was the pool from which Ugandan officials were drawn. Assignment of new cadets from this pool to a specific colony was done by the recruiters in the Colonial Office. Heussler says, "The pairing of individual applicants with the supposed needs of colonies was therefore a function of the image of each colony that lurked in the minds of private secretaries" (1963:23). Unfortunately, no information is available on the recruiters' images of Uganda. It was a middle-sized colony with middle-range salaries, and no conspicuous problems of the sort that plagued Kenya, or special demands, like skill at polo purported to be required for service in Northern Nigeria. In the absence of information to the contrary, I can only assume that those sent to Uganda were not a skewed sample of the population of the Colonial Service.

Recruitment of staff to man the senior positions at the top of

each colonial administration was also done by the Colonial Office, primarily through internal promotion from within the Colonial Service. This level of recruitment will be discussed below, in connection with career patterns.

5. Uganda's officials

A. The population selected for quantitative analysis

A quantitative analysis of the staff of three sections of Uganda's European civil service shows the patterns that would be expected, on the basis of the broad trends described above.

The Protectorate Government published annually a Staff List, giving information on officials' birth date, date of first appointment, honors, universities and degrees held, local language examinations passed, marital status, salary, service in other colonies, and seniority. An analysis of the total European staff was too vast a task for the resources available, so three branches considered most relevant to the problems posed in this work were selected for analysis: the Administration, the Agriculture Department, an example of an "old" technical department, and Co-operatives, an example of a new post-war technical department. Staff List data for these branches for the years 1946 to 1961 were coded and fed into a computer. The analysis was complicated by a radical reorganization of the administration in 1955, consequent on the introduction of a ministerial form of government. Prior to that date, the Administration meant the Secretariat and its officials, and the staff of provincial and district commissioners and district

officers posted to the districts. After 1955, the Administration is taken to mean the permanent secretaries and their deputies who were generalist administrators in several ministries, as well as those administrators in the districts. Tabulations included district officers, assistant and establishment secretaries and above; agricultural officers and above, but not agricultural research workers, and co-operative assistant registrars and above. The few African officials appointed to these posts towards the end of the study period were not included. The result was an N of 215 for Administration, 71 for Agriculture and 26 for Co-operatives.

The years 1945-1946 saw a heavy turnover not reflected in the results below, as tired men who had stayed at their posts past retirement age finally left. Postwar development programs put heavy demands on staff, but difficulties in recruitment meant that the number of men actually on the job was usually less than the number of established posts. This was especially true for the Agriculture Department, where staff numbers reached their lowest point in 1952. At that time, there were eleven vacancies for agricultural officers.

In addition, patterns originating in the period before air travel impeded full use of the staff that was available. It was customary for a man to work for a "tour" of two and a half years, taking leave locally, and then to take home leave of four to five months, traveling by sea each way. As a result, a man was absent from the colony for six months or so. A replacement had to be available to carry on his work, which necessitated both the employment of extra men,[15] and disruptions

in the continuity of administration. A more rational system of shorter annual leaves and air travel encountered strong resistance, but did make some headway late in the colonial period.

B. The basic variables of the quantitative analysis

To explore possible changes over time, the population was divided into five-year cohorts by date of first appointment to the Colonial Service. Another basic variable was 'rank'. Rank was treated dichotomously, as those who had at some point occupied "senior posts" and those who had never held such a post. "Senior posts" were defined as posts carrying Superscale salaries. Such jobs included provincial commissioners, permanent secretaries, and a range of positions such as deputy financial secretary, assistant directors, deputy directors and directors of agriculture, up through and including the governor.

The "senior post" category should not be confused with the concept of 'allocative elite'. Many occupants of senior posts were not directly involved in making policy; rather, they were senior administrators who often sat astride vital lines by which information flowed to those above them who did determine Protectorate policy. "Senior rank" is a concept based on position: all incumbents of the designated positions held senior rank. But 'allocative elite' is a situational concept: I define it as those directly involved in the making of crucial decisions at the Protectorate level. Its membership fluctuated according to the nature of the decision, but was almost always very small. It almost invariably included the governor, often the chief secretary and

financial secretary, sometimes the attorney general, plus whatever specialist department heads or other staff were directly involved in the problem at hand. Sometimes one or two key unofficial members of Legislative Council were part of the allocative elite. Inclusion was not only a matter of position but also involved personal factors. For example, an attorney general who did not have the governor's respect would have had little influence. But the attorney general who took office in 1951, after many years' work in Uganda, was a man of strong personality and a force to be contended with; he would have been part of the allocative elite on many issues where his predecessors would not have been.[16] Thus, the core of the allocative elite would be drawn from the men of senior rank, but sometimes would extend beyond those bounds. The allocative elite, being small, situational and much affected by personal factors, is not amenable to quantitative analysis.

These figures can give some idea of the education and career patterns of the men who manned these branches of the Uganda Protectorate Administration, especially when supplemented by other types of data. I suspected that characteristics of senior post holders might have changed over time. So 'rank' was broken into four categories by time:

Rank 1 - those who held senior posts 1954 and earlier only

Rank 2 - those who held senior posts 1955 and later only

Rank 3 - senior post holders pre- and post-1955

Rank 4 - those who did not hold a senior post in the defined time period.

TABLE 2.1

Patterns of formal qualifications

	Administration		Agriculture Department		Co-op. Department	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1 or more university degrees	156	73	68	96	11	42
Other qualifications only	3	1	1	1	7**	27
No letters after name	56	26	2	3	8	31
	215	100	71	100	26	100

TABLE 2.1a

Patterns of advanced qualifications

	% of 215		% of 71		% of 26	
2 degrees or other qualification*	19	9	44	62	6**	23
3 degrees or other qualifications*	4	2	16	22	4**	15

* includes barrister-at-law

** majority are special qualifications in co-operation

TABLE 2.2

Sources of first university degree by date of recruitment to Colonial Service

	Recruited before 1945					Recruited 1945 and later				
	Administration		Agriculture		Co-op.	Administration		Agriculture		Co-op.
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	No.	%	No.	%	No.
Oxford-Cambridge	55	86	8	28	2	64	69	6	15	4
Other English	4	6	10	34	0	11	12	13	33	3
Scots-Irish-Welsh	3	5	10	34	1	10	11	11	28	0
Dominion	2	3	1	3	0	7	7	4	10	1
Other	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	5	0
Not specified	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	8	0
Totals	64	100	29	99	3	93	100	39	99	8

C. Educational patterns and their implications

Table 2.1 shows the pattern of formal qualifications obtained by those who served in Uganda between 1946 and 1961, based on Staff List data. As expected, the Agriculture Department had the most highly educated staff, with 62 percent having two or more degrees or qualifications. Forty-five percent of the agricultural officers had post-graduate qualifications in tropical agriculture, almost all from the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad. All in all, Uganda's Agriculture Department was impressively well qualified, in formal terms.

The Co-operative Department had the lowest percentage of university degrees. However, for both this department and for the Administration, lack of letters after a man's name does not necessarily correlate with performance. A number of men regarded by their colleagues as able and very successful at their work had no formal qualifications.[17]

Table 2.2 plots the sources of the officials' first university degrees for the pre- and post-war recruitment periods. The 86 percent of degree holders from Oxford-Cambridge in pre-war years is in line with what one would expect, given the figures for recruitment of administrative cadets as a whole, quoted above. The distribution of pre-war agriculture degrees — 94 percent U.K. plus Eire, and 3 percent Dominions, is also very similar to the 93 percent U.K. plus Eire, and 3.5 percent Dominions, that Masefield gives as the national origins of the Colonial Agricultural Service as a whole in 1938 (1972:7). These correspondences provide some slight support for the assumption made

above that the officials sent to Uganda were not a skewed sample of those recruited. No data on sources of post-war recruits is available with which to compare the Ugandan pattern, but the drop to 69 percent Oxford-Cambridge graduates among administrative recruits seems consistent with what we know of post-war recruitment patterns.

Heussler (1963:157) speaks about the problems created by a tendency of the administrators to look down on the specialist staff as almost "second-class" people — an aspect of the generalist-specialist strains mentioned above. The problem of poor relations, especially between agriculture and administration, seems to have been especially acute in the West African colonies (cf. Burns 1949:104-105). Alerted by these writers, during interviews I enquired at length into this point, but found no evidence of condescension towards the Agriculture Department on the part of administrative staff, or of friction between them, in Uganda. Recollected data are apt to suppress friction, but when asked an open-ended question, "What kind of people were in Administration?" and " ... in the Agriculture Department" most administrators interviewed described their own staff in terms such as "oh, almost all public school types" or " ... a good class of men." Administrators usually described the Agriculture Department staff as similar to themselves in status background. This perception of similarity is especially interesting, since the quantitative analysis suggests that the two departments were drawn from somewhat different but overlapping populations. In England, especially in the pre-war years, the source of the first degree can be used as a rough approximation of the social status of a

population. No other universities could compare with Oxford and Cambridge for general prestige. Yet the old universities produced only a minority of the first degrees held by Agriculture Department staff, as shown in Table 2.2.[18] Nevertheless, the perceptions of those interviewed were such that the cultural backgrounds of the two departments were sufficently similar that easy communication and mixing was possible, both on and off the job. This was not the case for some of the other departments.

As for the Co-operatives Department, the numbers are so small that quantitative patterns are not clear. It had fewer degree holders, and sources of degrees were dispersed. This corroborates the opinions expressed in interviews, that the men of the department were heterogeneous in origins and training. Some of them had, in fact, transferred from the Administration.

D. Rank and Career patterns

This study is concerned primarily with the more senior officials. What sort of men ran the country, and how did they differ from those who did not win promotion?

Quantitative analysis proved an inadequate means of answering these questions. For the Administration, senior rank correlated with age and length of time in the Colonial Service, hardly startling in a bureaucracy. Men of senior rank held a disproportionate number of honors — again, to be expected. The figures provided no evidence that promotion was affected either by university education or its lack, or

by which university one attended. Proficiency in local languages was not related to promotion.

A more interesting result was the association, for the Administrative division, of senior rank with service elsewhere — mostly in other colonies or on secondment to the Colonial Office. Since promotion patterns for 1960 and 1961 were highly unusual, as a result of the approach of independence and the departure of many senior staff, the figures were recalculated to cover only up to 1957; at that time, the staff upheavals associated with independence had not yet begun.[19] The revised data are presented in Table 2.3, by rank. It can be seen that the relation between rank and service elsewhere changes over time. To understand the meaning of this change we need to look at typical career patterns and how these changed over time.

Under normal conditions, a cadet went out to his colony by ship, often being exposed to a few stereotypes from his fellow travellers en route (cf. Stonehouse 1960:20-23). Once arrived in the colony, the new cadet was on probation for two or three years. Before he could be confirmed, an administrative cadet had to pass an examination in law and in two native languages. Agricultural cadets were required to pass language examinations also. Once confirmed, the new officer could count on job security until retirement at age 55, when the colonies that had employed him would pay him a pension.

The training of a raw cadet, under normal circumstances, involved posting him to a district under the supervision of an experienced officer, who gave him rather large doses of responsibility rather

TABLE 2.3

Service elsewhere: 1946-57

Administration

Rank	None		1-4 others*		Totals	
	No.	% of row	No.	% of row	No.	%
1	13	50	13	50	26	100
2	12	63	7	37	19	100
3	13	68	6	32	19	100
4	111	85	20	15	131	100
	149		46		195**	

Chi^2 = 72.64 with three df

Significance = > .001

Contingency coefficient = .519

* 'Others' includes other colonies plus secondment to the Colonial Office

** The N is reduced from Table 2.1 and 2.2, because 20 men began service after 1957

Rank 1 = Held senior rank 1954 and earlier

Rank 2 = Held senior rank 1955 and later only

Rank 3 = Held senior rank before and after 1955

Rank 4 = Did not hold senior rank during the defined period

suddenly. It was a method of learning-by-doing, rather than by exhortation or formal instruction.[20]

An important part of this training was the oral transmission to new arrivals of a body of conventional wisdom, and "definitions of the situation" accumulated over generations of officialdom. This included both concepts of administration, transmitted in the course of doing the work, and details of social procedures common to many British colonies, as well as items specific to Uganda, such as "tribal character." Much of this local lore took the form of anecdotes about the past, including the doings of past governors and their wives. Like folklore elsewhere, each story was both enjoyable in itself, and contained a moral. Help was given in practical details, such as hiring appropriate house servants and giving instructions in how to handle them. By such means concepts of 'the African' were speedily transmitted to newcomers still in their most vulnerable and impressionable stage. Ritual was used to stamp into the new cadet the meaning of hierarchy, and his low place in it, through the "dropping of cards" and the "signing of the book" at Government House. At the same time, the newcomer was welcomed with warmth, friendliness and kindness. Induction into off-duty social life was easy for those who shared the prevalent interests and took part in the appropriate sports. Speedy inclusion and group support were offered, in exchange for speedy acceptance of group norms. By such means, the newcomer rapidly absorbed the attitudes and outlook of the older hands.[21]

Berman points out such oral transmission of administrative lore

reinforces resistance to change. "While the field agent may still possess substantial freedom of action, the folklore and conventional wisdom of the organization provides a general framework for his actions that he rarely strays beyond" (1974:32).

The new cadet, soon after posting to a district, was introduced to safari work. The first times on safari seem to have left vivid impressions on most of the men, especially those posted to the remoter districts. In the more developed south, even where roads were good, old-style provincial commissioners refused to permit their cadets to own cars during their first tour, insisting that they must learn about Africa on their feet. Foot safari left more time to chat with passers-by, and for the magic of the African landscape to steal into the newcomer's heart.[22]

Especially before the Second World War, officers were expected to spend much of their time out on tour. This contact with African villagers and life in remote district stations seems to have left a lasting mark on many of those who later moved to higher posts.

The manner of "moving on to higher posts" was affected by structural characteristics of the organization. This form of bureaucracy is prone to several built-in strains, among them a tendency for the self-reliant field officials to chafe with resentment against those at headquarters. The headquarters staff controlled allocations of money that field staff wanted for their favorite schemes, sent out directives that seemed inapplicable or inane from the perspective of a particular district, or demanded written reports that consumed time the men would

rather have spent on safari. They also enforced the extremely close accounting for every penny that was a characteristic of British colonial administration. At the next higher level, resentments also built up between the top officials in a colony and the officials in the metropolis.

The British tradition of "trusting the man on the spot" was a pragmatic adaptation to the realities of field administration under widely varying local conditions and poor communications. But the custom of leaving precise application of general directives to him led to great variation in patterns of development. In the post-war years, when greater emphasis was placed on more rapid development, these organizational strains increased. They were exacerbated by another tendency inherent in this organizational form -- particularism among the field staff -- that will be discussed later. Resentments were further exacerbated by variations in career patterns that led to staffing of a colony's headquarters and districts with somewhat different types of men having somewhat different outlooks -- variations within the shared 'class' sub-culture.

Similar attempts to reduce these inherent strains were carried out at both structural levels. In 1926 the Colonial Office began to second administrative officers from the colonies for tours of service at Colonial Office (cf. Bradley 1966a:57-59). The practice may have affected individual careers, but seems to have had little overall impact. Of the 215 Ugandan administrators in the defined population, only seven had had service in the Colonial Office. Close contact with bureaucrats of the Home Civil Service did not always have the desired

effect, but instead pointed up the differing characteristics required by the two different forms of bureaucratic organization. A colonial official who spent some time at the C.O. told me:

> I was appalled ... to find that the British civil servant, except at the highest level, seemed to be frightened of his own shadow. They are frightened of the parliamentary questions, they are frightened of everything. You can't get straight answers out of them; they are afraid to make decisions, and the whole thing is from my point of view, exactly opposite to our training. Because in the colonial service they gave you tremendous responsibility, right from the start, and encouraged you to use all the initiative you possible could, and to take responsibility. This was diametrically opposite to the metropolitan service.

A similar attempt to increase understanding between field and headquarters within the colony involved seconding young administrative officers to the Secretariat for periods of time. Instead of hearing court cases, sorting out quarrels, or checking up on chiefs' tax returns out in the bush, they sat in small offices and worked their way through heaps of files, learning how to write minutes and dictate letters. Those seconded to the Financial Division learned how to collect data and prepare figures for the budget estimates.[23]

Men were often highly ambivalent about a summons to the Secretariat. Some of them detested the everlasting heaps of files, and longed to get back to district work. But a Secretariat posting opened up the route to high places: only through it could one have a chance really to advance one's career. If a man aspired to the feathered hat and sword of a governor, he must apply himself to writing polished minutes and becoming a good "Secretariat wallah."

There were two main career paths in those years, for a young

administrator: to stay on in district administration, gradually moving up the short promotion ladder, or to leave district work behind and try for a Secretariat career. Of course many district men were not offered the opportunity for a promotion up the Secretariat ladder, but some of those who had such a chance declined, refusing, as one of them put it, "to turn themselves into a karani" (Swahili for clerk). If he stayed on in the provincial administration, a young district officer was "given his own district," i.e. promoted to district commissioner in charge of a district, after some years' experience of working under others. He gradually moved up the seniority ladder, and might, after many years, be promoted to provincial commissioner. There were only four of these posts in Uganda, so by no means all district men could end their careers at this level. The quantitative analysis shows that of the thirteen men who held this post from 1946 to 1957, ten reached it after 20 to 24 years' service, two after 17 years, and one startling exception after only 11 years in district service.

A provincial commissioner was an important person, especially to a raw cadet, and he had considerable influence on the implementation of policy within his own province. But the provincial commissioner's influence on the formation of policy at the Protectorate level appears to have been minimal, except within the realm of "native administration" very narrowly defined. This seems to have been the case especially under the governorship of Sir John Hall, 1944-1952.

Many other British colonies had a senior official within the Secretariat responsible for "native affairs." Uganda did not have such

a position until 1945, when the post of Secretary for African Affairs was created. It was customary to select the incumbent from those at the provincial commissioner level.[25] Thus the spokesman for "native affairs" within the Secretariat was, in the normal course of events, an older 'district man' near the end of his career, unfamiliar with Secretariat ways, with a preference for dealing with people rather than files.

District men had their own esprit de corps, which included contempt for the "Secretariat wallah."[26] One senior man, after a wartime stint in an important post in the Secretariat and a period as Secretary for African Affairs, manoeuvred to get back to his job as a provincial commissioner. Another commented,

> I was no damned good in the Secretariat. It is a cruel thing after twenty-five years in district administration to shove a man into the Secretariat. I didn't enjoy my last two or three years at all.

As one might expect, these men of very different experience and outlook were not always effective spokesmen for the "district" viewpoint when dealing with the Secretariat and governor. It so happened that the first three incumbents of the post, under Sir John Hall, were also very conservative in their approach to African affairs; they were the governor's chief advisors on that subject. A somewhat younger man, one of those who had achieved provincial commissioner rank after only seventeen years, was appointed in 1952. He held the post, under different titles, until the eve of independence, but his influence on policy formation processes at the center is not clear.

TABLE 2.4

Service elsewhere by "promotion paths"

Administration: 1946-57

A. Provincial commissioners "promotion path"

Service elsewhere

Rank	None	1-4 other postings	Totals
1	8	0	8
2	1	1	2
3	4	0	4
	13	1	14

B. Secretariat "promotion path," deleting provincial commissioners

Service elsewhere

	None		1-4 other posts		Totals	
Rank	No.	% of row	No.	% of row	No.	%
1	5	27.8	13	72.2	18	100
2	11	65.0	6	35.0	17	100
3	9	60.0	6	40.0	15	100
4	111	84.7	20	15.3	131	100
	136		45		181	

Chi^2 = 30.72 with 3 df

Significance = > .001

Contingency coefficient = .374

Thus the life of the 'district man' was highly attractive to certain types of men, especially if their wives enjoyed upcountry stations also, but in earlier years it led to a dead end in terms of promotion.[27] The alternative, for the young man who aspired to more power, was to get on to the Secretariat "promotion path" leading to high places. This alternative required ambition, some ability, the ability to impress superiors with one's ability, a fair measure of luck, and a willingness to accept transfer out of the colony.

Even if offered a transfer, many of the 'district man' type were loath to move away from the colony with which they were familiar, about which they felt they could speak with some knowledge and authority, and with whose vernacular languages they had at least some slight familiarity. Some declined promotions rather than leave Uganda. They stuck to the short and narrow promotion path from district to provincial commissioner to secretary for African affairs, described above. Of the fourteen men in this category between 1947 and 1957, only one had served outside, and that was a slight two-year stint in Tanganyika (see Table 2.4A). But if a man were willing to leave, had a flair for Secretariat work, was competent and lucky, he might even end up a governor.[28]

It was believed in the Colonial Office that service in more than one colony broadened a man's perspective, and prevented parochialism of viewpoint. The most senior positions within the colonial hierarchy — chief secretary and financial secretary and similar posts, as well as governorships — were assigned by the Colonial Office, although an

incumbent governor appears to have had some influence over the appointment of his immediate subordinates. The Colonial Office appears to have kept a roster of rising men who had gradually been moving up the hierarchy, transferring from one colony to another and each time taking on a higher ranking job. When one of these very senior positions fell vacant, a man from this roster was often transferred in. A review of the top posts in Uganda in 1946 shows that the highest ranking post in the Secretariat — chief secretary — was held by a man who had transferred in the year before after a career in Ceylon, Sierra Leone, and the Gold Coast and Nigeria. The second post, financial secretary, was held by a man recently transferred in from Kenya. The secretary for African affairs was, as noted above, invariably a local man. The administrative secretary post was occupied by a young man who had served in Northern Rhodesia, the Colonial Office, and on special wartime assignments; he ended as a governor.

The overly aggregated data of Table 2.3 obscure the presence of these two different promotion patterns found in the early post-war years. If senior posts are re-categorized into those falling within the "provincial commissioner" internal promotion path, and the "Secretariat path" that led up and out, the pattern can be clearly seen. Table 2.4B indicates the dominance of men who had transferred in from outside over policy-relevant senior positions in the Secretariat, in Rank 1. Table 2.4B shows that before 1955, 72 percent of those who held these posts had served elsewhere first.[29]

Colonial Office practice thus gave priority to breadth of exper-

ience rather than extensive knowledge of conditions within a colony, when filling the highest-level posts. It seems probable that this practice helped to curb the particularist tendencies inherent in prefectoral field administration — the danger that Berman mentions above, of officers so identifying with their definition of the interests of the local population that they will defend those interests against even their own superiors. Transferring the most senior men from colony to colony probably functioned to maintain a greater devotion to the Colonial Service as such, and to the Empire, rather than to the interests of one colony. This tendency to particularism will recur in discussion of specific events in later chapters.

But British colonial procedures were far from rigid, and exceptions occurred. The element of chance cannot be ignored in the matter of postings and promotions. In 1947 the chief secretary suddenly died, the financial secretary was promoted to chief secretary and the financial post was filled by a young man who had spent most of his service in Uganda, with only one short spell outside. This man spent almost all his working life in Uganda[30] and had a level of commitment to the country that was probably rare, for the reasons discussed above, in men of such high Secretariat rank. But in the absence of comparative material from other colonies, there is no way of knowing whether the career pattern of this important informant was only somewhat uncommon, or a rare anomaly for that time. We are faced here with the difficulty of trying to piece together the operations of a much larger system from the glimpses of staffing processes that can be obtained in one

colony. The pattern seems to have differed somewhat even in Kenya (Berman 1974:353). There is as yet no comprehensive account of how the Colonial Office allocated its most senior positions, or what criteria it used to decide who should be groomed as future governors.

E. "Development" and career patterns

The post-war expansion of governmental activities led to changes in promotion patterns. The first was a modest one: new departments set up after the war were headed by men who transferred out of the Administration, and in one case, Agriculture. The three new departments of Labor, Public Relations and Social Welfare (later called Community Development), and African Housing, and the new parastatal enterprises of the crop marketing boards and the national parks were all headed by such men. The Co-operatives Department, created in 1946, was headed by an agricultural officer "over-ripe for promotion"[31] with a man from Administration as his deputy, and later, successor. Neither had specialist training or experience in co-operatives work. In the British belief system, an experienced generalist administrator could run anything.

But this avenue provided openings for only some eight men during the period under study. The major change in promotion patterns started with some gradual alterations in the Secretariat in 1953-54, and its radical reorganization as a consequence of the introduction of the ministerial form of government in 1955. Prior to 1952, the central bureaucracy had been relatively small. But the ministerial system led

to a felt need for permanent secretaries and a plethora of deputy and undersecretaries for each ministry. For the most part, these posts were filled from within Uganda's European staff, by appointment of Bright Young Men who had joined the Colonial Service since 1940, and who had no outside service. Table 2.4B illustrates this switch to promotion from within Uganda in Ranks 2 and 3. Eleven of the 13 incumbents of Permanent Secretary posts had been appointed to Colonial Service since 1940, and only two of these 13 men had transferred in from other colonies. Thus one immediate consequence of the political developments of 1955 was the creation of many more opportunities for young British staff to gain promotion without transferring out of the colony. The proportion of senior-rank positions occupied by men transferring in fell sharply, from 73 to 35 percent (see Table 2.4B). However, the positions equivalent to chief secretary and financial secretary, now retitled, remained in the hands of men who transferred in. Immediately below that level, the governor hand-picked Bright Young Men to carry out his policies.

The increase in the proportion of senior posts occupied by men who moved up from within the Ugandan administration is directly opposite to the pattern of staffing changes in Kenya as the administration expanded there. In Kenya, an earlier pattern of filling Secretariat positions primarily from within the local service was replaced by a pattern of drawing in a much higher proportion of men from outside (Berman 1974:353). Reasons for this difference are not completely clear, and discussion of possibilities would take much space. The

difference suggests that structurally similar formal organizations can function in somewhat different ways, in response both to idiosyncratic factors within each organization, and different conditions in the external environment of the organization.[32]

So far, the patterns described have dealt with the Administrative division, for it was this division that monopolized provision of staff for the highest positions, including governorships. Heads of technical departments were chosen by the Colonial Office staff, especially the Advisor to the Secretary of State for that speciality, on the basis of knowledge and reports of the men with seniority in that technical service. Seniority was not totally decisive, but it appears that there were fewer examples of young men "running up the escalator" of seniority in a department such as Agriculture than in the Administration. All heads of the Agriculture Department during the study period had served elsewhere. But two of them came to Uganda early in their careers, transferred out, then came back as directors. Senior positions below the director level were usually filled by internal promotion — except where very specialized skills were required. Thus the specialized professional nature of their work, and the differing kind of responsibilities, seem to have led to differing promotion patterns.

But quantitative data on "service elsewhere" or "internal promotion" can be misleading, unless one specifies very precisely what interpretations are to be given to them. This requires other kinds of data, including the actors' own interpretations.

6. Actors' models, rapport and the problem of bias

A helpful insight was provided by an informant, who while looking back on his experience during an interview, divided colonial civil servants into three types:

1. "The careerists"; their main interest was to advance their own careers. To do so they thought it important to establish machinery for smooth government. Such work earned them reward by promotion to other territories.

2. "Others were not interested in the machinery of government, but in Uganda as Uganda, and its people." (This group I have labelled the Uganda-focussed men; he used no label.)

3. "The idle do-nothing drunks; the lotus-eaters." He thought there had not been many of them.[33]

This is a retrospective actors' model, not one in use at the time, but it is consistent with known modes of thought of the colonial period. It is frankly subjective — the viewpoint of a man who was, and saw himself as, strongly Uganda-focussed. Referring to the first two types, he said, "I think we despised each other."

I have found this mode of classification useful, provided that the three be thought of as points on a continuum, rather than discrete and exclusive categories. Ambition did not always rule out some concern for Uganda. We can think of the Uganda-focussed men, passionately involved in their projects, grading into the competent executors of prescribed work, down into the time-servers, ending in the "lotus-eaters" who were drunk by noon.

Going back to the quantitative analysis of Staff List data, a pattern of several transfers to increasingly more important posts or larger colonies can be taken as an indicator of probable "careerism," especially for the period prior to 1955. After that date, the same type could advance their careers within the colony. But long service within the colony could indicate anything from a strong Uganda-focus down to incompetence. Long service in one colony seems to have been a predisposing condition for deep involvement with the colony, but is by no means a reliable indicator of it.

The sample selected for interviews includes a few regarded by their colleagues as archetypal careerists, some markedly Uganda-focussed people, a number of the intermediate range, but no "lotus-eaters." The latter's life-style is not conducive to longevity nor to clarity of thought in later years. But the major source of bias in this research comes not so much from an unrepresentative distribution of interviews, as from differing levels of response from one type of informant as compared with others. An interview to elicit oral history is a process of social interaction, in contemporary time, centered on events in past time. Events contemporaneous with the interview can thus affect both the interaction and the recollection of past events. At the time interviews were carried out, events in Uganda were much in the British news. General Amin was still regarded as a buffoon by the media; he had expelled the Asians, but not yet arrested an Englishman and threatened him with death.[34] News from within the country was not good, but the full extent of repression and killings had not yet hit

the media. Many interviews started with some discussion of the events in Uganda, and of my own six years' residence there. I was sometimes asked for recent information on the fate of pet projects, or elite Africans they had known. Sometimes people seemed to hope I could reassure them that the newspapers were exaggerating the situation. But the information I had to convey was often painful to us all, and we turned with relief to the past, when people dreamed of a bright future for Uganda.

I sensed marked differences in the quality of rapport achieved during interviews. The English of this 'class' are notoriously skilled in wearing masks, but so far as I can tell the greatest rapport was achieved where I had been much questioned about my own experiences in Uganda, and where discussion of contemporary events had developed a sense that Uganda was more than the locus of a research project to me, and more than the site of a job to them. These were the people who had been deeply involved in their work and who cared about Uganda. This sense of shared pain over a country we had both lived in transcended some immense differences in viewpoint.

I could not respond in the same way to those whose commitment had been to the Colonial Service, or some ideal of Empire, or their own careers. With such men, I sometimes felt my interviewing skills quite inadequate to break through their very polished presentation of an "official" viewpoint. Thus my own experience in Uganda was both an essential element in the eliciting of information, and a source of bias in that process.

Berreman (1962), following Goffman, has spoken of fieldwork in terms of the "front regions" where managed impressions are presented to the ethnographer as audience, and the "back regions." I do not think it possible to get access to the "back regions" of past events through retrospective interviews. The data one gets through such interviews are inevitably "managed," not least by the subconscious processes of recollection and forgetting in the individual psyche. Selection of some recollections rather than others is a further stage of management, in response to the ethnographer's presentation of self. To follow Berreman's image, a few interviews felt like staged performances in large theaters by consummate actors who were consciously composing their script for an audience recording it for publication. Rather more felt like very relaxed improvisations in a small and intimate theatre where the audience was involved also. A few even conveyed the impression of admitting the audience to the "back regions;" perhaps these were the most skilled managers of all.

Use of this image in no way implies an attempt to deceive. I felt most officials were striving to be honest, within the limits of their loyalty to their service. Many were blunt in their criticism of Britain, but more inhibited about criticizing their fellows.[35] My overriding impression was of the great diversity of personality among the officials, despite their similarity of background. Reduction of such individual people to "types" is necessary for analysis, but a gross distortion of reality. The second impression was the deep and sincere commitment of many to the development of Uganda, as they conceived it.

Like Heussler (1963:314), I felt this commitment often varied inversely to the number of words used to express it. Whatever the multifarious causes of the present tragedy of Uganda, a lack of devotion among colonial civil servants to their conception of the colony's future is not among them. This devotion is an ethnographic fact that must be accounted for, and not dismissed by simplistic conspiracy theories. To understand the form this devotion took, and the nature of the officials' conception of 'development', one must examine not only the structure of the system, but also the content of the ideologies they had absorbed from their own social backgrounds. The next chapter will attempt to clarify, in summary form, the "mental baggage" they brought with them to the Protectorate.

NOTES

1. The phrase is Perham's (1965:xxiv). She was herself, of course, a leading member of this "informed minority." Lee (1967) describes the same people as the "official classes" involved in colonial affairs.

2. See, inter alia, Jeffries 1955, Parkinson 1947, Robinson 1965: 29-60. Lee (1967) deals with the multifarious advisory groups and committees linked to the Colonial Office. Goldsworthy (1971) examines the colonial policy of the two political parties and Secretaries of State, and also the influence of such groups as the Fabian Colonial Bureau.

3. E.g., the infamous Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika, a project of the Ministry of Food. Defence concerns did not, in this period, affect Uganda as directly as Kenya; cf. Low 1976:2-7.

4. See Ridley 1968 for a discussion of the specialist-generalist problem in British administration.

5. In Uganda, the standard Crown Colony model was modified slightly to fit the special conditions of Buganda, which had been granted some measure of internal self-control in 1900 (see Chapter V). The details of relations between Buganda and the Protectorate authorities have been discussed at length elsewhere, and are not immediately relevant here. See, inter alia, Apter 1967, Low and Pratt 1970, Low 1971a & b.

6. The most telling account of the effects of this discontinuity in staffing is in Liebenow 1971, a detailed study of the effects of colonial administration in one district of Tanganyika.

7. For the specific details of Uganda's structure see Bryant 1963, which gives an account of the organizational changes within the Secretariat, and the change to ministerial administration in 1955. This public administration dissertation also reviews the post-war commissions of investigation into the terms of service of East African overseas officials, and the changes in these terms. For later changes as a result of Africanization, see Evans 1964.

8. Heussler (1963) documents social origins and education of the Administrative Service in laborious detail, from the early years of the Colonial Service through 1945. Unfortunately there is no analysis available of recruitment sources after 1945.

9. For Uganda officials, information on fathers' occupation was obtained for 18 administrators and 6 agricultural officials recruited in pre- and post-war years, but these are by no means a representative sample. For the administrators, fathers included 1 landowner/traveller, 2 doctors, 2 church ministers, 1 solicitor, 3 middle-level civil servants, 4 colonial service (2 senior administrators, 2 sub-professional), 1 mechanical engineer, 1 small-to-medium farmer, 1 musician, 1 schoolmaster, and 1 miner. The last man, a post-war recruit, had gone on scholarship to Oxford. These men were asked to place their families of origin in status terms. The miner's son was proudly 'working class', 4 said 'lower middle class', 3 'middle class', 1 'well-educated middle class', 1 'Establishment', 1 'upper middle class'. Status self-placement was not obtained from 7, including 4 who insisted they had no idea at all on the subject and disliked 'class' terms. I would tentatively class family origins of two of these as 'lower middle', 3 as 'middle-class' and 2 as not easily classifiable (small farmer, colonial governors' sons). The landowner's son would probably be 'county', certainly not 'middle-class'. The majority thus fall into variants of 'middle-class' status, with an exception at each end. The absence of businessmen is noteworthy, but perhaps merely a result of the unrepresentativeness and small size of the sample. In a sample of similar size for Kenya, Berman found 6 sons of businessmen (1974:141).

   Many of the men were markedly uncomfortable with status self-placement questions, several insisting they had never given it a thought. But when wives were present, the women answered easily, and often pushed their husbands into answers they considered appropriate. For 6 of the 18, service as a colonial administrator had increased social status by at least one notch.

   Among the administrators, 4 had gone to major public schools, 6 to less well-known public schools, 5 to grammar schools, and 2 to well-known Scottish schools.

   For 5 agriculturalists, fathers' occupations were: 1 large farmer, 1 medium-scale farmer, 1 schoolmaster, 1 teacher-training college teacher, 1 stock-jobber. Of the 6 agriculturalists interviewed, one went to a major public school, 2 to a less well-known public school, 2 to grammar school, and 1 to a well-known Scottish school. Status self-placements were not obtained for 4 of these men. My own classification would be: 2 'lower middle-class', 3 'middle-class' and 1 'old county family', the latter is a self-placement.

   Wherever possible, I have relied on status self-placement, because in England 'class' identity involves family tradition and not merely father's occupation. One school-master's son might quite correctly identify himself as 'middle-class' and another as 'lower-

middle'. What is at issue here is people's sense of self-identity and the extent to which they felt themselves part of that stratum "born to rule," as one informant put it, and were so accepted by others.

10. Nancy Mitford (1956:41) notes that even in rich aristocratic families, younger sons tended to get very little money from their families; they were given a good education and turned out to fend for themselves, while the family fortune and estates were kept together for transmission through primogeniture.

11. For discussion of the generalist-specialist problem in the Uganda administration, see Bryant 1963:44-52; for the Kenya administration, see Berman 1974:66-71, 355-361. A broader discussion of the problem is found in Ridley, ed., 1968.

12. Attendance at university gave the administrative recruit some education but not job-relevant training. "Administration" was not for many years considered a subject for academic training in Britain. Heussler shows that for a sample of administrative probationers in the inter-war years, the dominant subject of study was classics: 54 read classics and modern history, 19 classics and law, 17 classics, philosophy and economics, 15 straight classics, 9 classics and geography, 8 classics and literature, 7 classics and science, and 5 classics and languages (1963:240; cf. also 109-110).

13. Even this point is a source of disagreement. Cadets destined for Uganda were given instruction in Swahili until about 1949. The problem of which language cadets should learn was near-insoluble, given the lack of a national lingua franca (see Chapter V). Swahili was of little use in Buganda, but Luganda was useless in the north. After 1949, cadets were instructed in Luganda before they left England.

14. Bradley expresses the common British view of administration:

> Administration is an art, the art of dealing with people. It is sometimes a gift, and it is more often caught than taught, like many of the best things in life, such as getting religion or falling in love. It added up to much more than the techniques of bureaucracy, the politics, economics, law and finance of colonial government. As young District Officers we were dealing with all kinds of people, with Chiefs and villagers, with European farmers and Asian merchants, with missionaries and tribesmen, with colleagues, senior and junior, and with teams of experts (1966a:1-2).

15. Furse, a strong opponent of this leave system, estimated that a reserve of up to 33 percent of the establishment (the number of posts provided for in the budget) was required merely to cover leave replacements (1962:289).

16. The attorney general is not included in the population defined here, since it was the senior post in the Legal Department. However, the post-1951 incumbent was one of the 'Other' officials that I interviewed after their part in crucial decisions became apparent (see Table 1.1).

17. The two men lacking formal qualifications in the Agriculture Department were both special cases. One was a highly regarded plantation manager of long experience, who served as an Agricultural Officer for three years in the period of immediate post-war staff shortage; the second was an experienced administrative officer who took over supervision of the mechanization, tractor-hire and group-farming programs in 1960.

18. Of the 29 degree-holding pre-war recruits, 23 or 79 percent took a B.A. or B.Sc. as a first degree, and only 5 or 17 percent took a specifically agricultural first degree. Among 38 post-war recruits, 22 or 58 percent took a B.A. or B.Sc., and 14 or 37 percent took an agricultural first degree.

19. This study does not attempt to deal with these upheavals nor the arrangements for compensation or departing British officials for "loss of career" as a result of Africanization. These topics have been well covered in Evans 1964.

20. The best description of this process is in Bradley 1966a, Chap. 4. It pertains to Northern Rhodesia in the 1920s, but the essence of the process probably applied also to Uganda.

21. This description is based on interviews and participant-observation, for those practices still prevailed on my arrival in Uganda in 1963. The extent to which even aid personnel from other countries could be indoctrinated with the old British colonial definitions and attitudes within a matter of weeks was astonishing, and very difficult for those with other views to counteract.

22. The Dakin diary, Rhodes House Library, describes a tour in Busoga in the early 1930s, in which he travelled in the cars of the chiefs he was checking up on. The Elliot diaries, Rhodes House Library, describe footsafaris around Kigezi District in the 1920s, and are a good source on the organization of district work in that early period. But by far the most evocative account of district touring comes from Northern Rhodesia, Bradley 1966b.

23. Bradley's description of the work of a junior officer seconded to the Secretariat accords well with the accounts given me during interviews (1966a, Chap. 7).

24. Cf. Postlethwaite, who retired from the Uganda service as a provincial commissioner in the late 1930s.

> At this time, I was approached privately and asked whether I would care for a transfer into the Secretariat. Had I accepted, I should presumably have spent the next fifteen years or so in a comfortable, healthy, but extremely uninteresting position, later on drawing a very considerable salary for performing purely clerical duties devoid of any great responsibility, and also devoid, incidentally, of any great possibility of blotting my copybook, as long as I behaved nicely to the right people and applauded any senior's dicta. In the latter end, given reasonable luck, I should have found myself a Chief Secretary or even a Governor, when the experiences of the previous years could hardly have provided helpful as an education for decisive action or a real knowledge of the country and administration. I shuddered at the prospect, and declined the suggestion with thanks (1947:62-63).

25. This level includes the post entitled "resident" of Buganda.

26. Typical comments, these from a man who had served at both levels, were:

> There was a great antipathy from all levels for the Secretariat. Within the district administration, we considered the Secretariat the people who blocked everything and hadn't a clue what was going on in the districts.... But the antipathy was probably against the permanent people in the Secretariat who had never had any local field experience.... I think there is a different mental make-up. People who sit behind a desk and like to consider problems and organize things from that sort of position as against the man who was in a district who felt he must get out to see so and so and he must get out to inspect this, constantly on the move, meeting people, seeing people, with no great amount of time, or should I say, with a large amount of time spent on his feet rather than his bottom.

27. Uganda's administrators have given us few published accounts of district life. Postlethwaite (1947) is useful for the pre-war years, Bere (1966) deals more with his life among the mountains than his administrative work. Harwich (1961), a memoir by a

police official in Uganda, gives a disenchanted view of the administrators he worked with, reflecting the structural strains described above. Material from comparable other colonies can be of some relevance, such as Bradley (1966a & b) on Northern Rhodesia, and Cairns (1959) and Lumley (1976) on Tanganyika. But none of these books can convey the special challenges that district officials faced in Uganda, of dealing with educated, sophisticated African officals in the native kingdom governments.

28. An example of such a career pattern is Twining, who was a district officer in Uganda, got into the Secretariat, and ended as governor of Tanganyika (Bates 1972). Mitchell, governor of Uganda 1935-40, and Dundas, governor 1940-44, started in district administration in East Africa; both moved into Secretariat positions in Tanganyika (Mitchell 1954; Dundas 1955). Mitchell's pattern is unusual in that he became a governor without service beyond East Africa. The memoirs of both these men provide evidence of the lasting effect of their early years in district administration.

29. The five exceptions need to be accounted for. One was a special case, a man who held a specially created post for one year before retirement. A second was an assistant chief secretary for one year before being appointed to head a new department. The third and fourth cases were "judicial advisors," a post outside the Secretariat, requiring extensive local knowledge, and more akin to the Provincial Commissioner than the Secretariat promotion path. The fifth case was a man who insisted during interview that chance was the major determinant of career paths in the colonial service. He described himself as a "district man" at heart, whose only dream had been to become provincial commissioner, Western Province. According to his account, by chance he was returning from leave when an experienced local man was needed to accompany an outside "expert planner" around the colony, so was assigned the task, became involved in development work, and was carried by the escalator up to the post of development commissioner in the Secretariat.

30. After a period as financial secretary, he deliberately and voluntarily stepped off the "promotion path" by taking a position as head of a para-statal board, thus avoiding having to leave Uganda.

31. The phrase comes from an interview with one of his colleagues.

32. One difference of some significance between officials in Kenya and their Ugandan counterparts was the formers' right to own land in the colony. Ugandan officials were prohibited from buying land in Uganda or shares in any enterprise operating there. This difference was mentioned by some informants as contributing to a different outlook in the officials of the adjoining territories.

33. Such individuals could be invalided out, but only when their condition became very extreme. Burns, a governor of wide experience, had some harsh words in his memoirs about the tendency of the Colonial Office to be very lenient, and to bend over backward to protect the interests of the individual official. He alleged that it was very difficult to convince the C.O. of a man's incompetency or constant inebriation (Burns 1949:162-166).

    Esprit de corps among officials was also operative here. Such men may have been few, but one chronic drinker in a strategic position could demoralize a department or make life unpleasant for the more competent individuals on a small station. The very small size of the European communities, and the inter-penetration of work and social life, multiplied the effect of the alcoholic on those around him.

34. This event, and the "humiliating" demands that the British foreign secretary go to Uganda to negotiate with General Amin, occurred just as the final interviews were taking place.

35. Difficulties over pensions in the recent past may have contributed to an increased willingness to criticize the British government. The British government maintained the view that "each colony must pay for itself" even after independence. The newly independent countries remained responsible for payment of pensions to their former colonial officials, although in some cases Britain made loans to help them do so. These countries were unwilling to grant cost-of-living increases to keep pace with inflation in Britain. For many years the British government denied all responsibility for these pensions; as a result, many pensioners found extreme difficulty in making ends meet. The Overseas Service Pensioners Association was organized as a pressure group to lobby for the same cost-of-living increases granted to home civil servants. After some struggle, the British government finally agreed to assume responsibility for these increases. Several of my informants were among the leaders of this pensioners' association. This issue, and also the refusal of the British government to give financial help to the kabaka of Buganda after he was deposed in 1966, were volunteered by many informants as examples of mean-spirited and ungentlemanly behavior on the part of the British government.

CHAPTER III

THE PRODUCTION OF COLONIAL RULERS

With the passing of the British Empire, Hollywood has lost one of its stock images: the handsome imperturbable British official in khaki shorts calmly dispensing justice to simple natives in the jungle. This stereotype has, in certain circles, been replaced by an image of British colonial officials as cynically and knowingly squeezing the greatest possible amounts of surplus from their colonies in the service of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. It is not the first negative stereotype; while the Empire still existed, writers such as Orwell (himself a former colonial police officer) presented images of colonial administrators that emphasized, not exploitativeness, but pomposity and stupidity, e.g. the senior official in his early novel, Burmese Days (Orwell 1934). In another work, Orwell used as his symbol of the "military and imperialistic middle class" of the period before 1939, the image of "...the half-pay colonel with his bull neck and diminutive brain, like a dinosaur" (1970, Vol. 2:93).

The actual living men that I interviewed turned out to be much too diverse to fit any of these stereotypes. The image of the official as knowing exploiter will be taken up at more length in the final chapter. The still widespread view of the official-as-Blimp needs to be dismissed now. The men I talked with were intelligent — some of them highly intelligent.[1] They did not sit about boring their neighbors with stories of "When I was at Gulu...." They told me they tried to live in the

present, without dwelling on memories of past glory. Several had gone on to satisfying careers at home after retirement from the colonial service. Among the wives I met, a number had managed to preserve, despite years of a colonial life-style where intelligence in women was a handicap, lively minds and a shrewd familiarity with their husband's work in Uganda.

But the majority of officials interviewed shared a certain style of thinking and of expression. Even those who seemed to me highly intelligent did not manifest the fascination with ideas for their own sake, and pleasure in turning an idea around to examine it from every angle, that is the hallmark of the intellectual. They were concerned with implications for action. Speaking generally, and leaving aside some individual exceptions, they showed much greater ease in discussing the particular and specific, and a distaste for generalization, or for attempts to draw out underlying abstract principles. Many were masters of the vivid and illustrative anecdote. They had admirable control of language, but most were noticeably less articulate when in the realm of feelings. There was a marked tendency to explain conflict in terms of personality factors, rather than structural strains. Even questions couched in structural terms, relating for example to "the structure of the cotton marketing system" brought answers from those not directly involved in terms of specific abuses such as short-weighting or packing damp cotton (see Chapter X below). This characteristic was present on a much wider scale: the enclosing colonial system of which they had been a part was, in almost all cases, still, many years after they had

left it, assumed as a "given." Retrospection had made some men critical of certain aspects of the system; some expressed doubt about the wisdom of specific policies, or more often, omissions or slowness to act on certain measures. But these men remained, overall, within the customary framework of thought. The colonial system as a whole remained not only unquestioned, but also unexamined. It was as if these men thought very well within the system, but not about the system.[2]

The specific, anti-abstract, above all practical, style of thought shown in the interviews fits the stereotype of the colonial administrator as "practical man," and also with well-known traits of English culture. Some of my informants, like many English writers,[3] were not only aware of but also rather proud of these traits. The contradiction between patriotism and intellectualism, that Orwell complained of for the 1930s, (see note 1) may have eased somewhat in post-war years, but 'clever' remains an ambivalent term in certain circles in England. It can even be an insult, conveying the impression that the person so described is not quite 'sound'.[4] Popular usage here points to a basic dilemma of organizations such as colonial administrations: the two-edged nature of intelligence. The increasing complexities of administration created a need for more intelligent officials; Furse throughout the 1920s and 1930s was trying to increase the intellectual caliber of his recruits (1962, passim). But too much thinking could be positively harmful to organizations such as colonial administrations; intellectuals are notoriously slow to act, and dangerous if they lead others to "waste time" by examining basic premises. While intelligence was

essential, too much 'cleverness' was apt to be seen as a threat to loyalty.

The Colonial Office recruiters were able to solve this dilemma because they had available a supply of men who had been socialized to think well, but to keep their thought confined within certain channels. The nature of the socialization process marked certain areas as "out of bounds" to the intellect. By careful selection, recruiters were able to reduce the chances of hiring young men with a taste for questioning basic premises. In case a few did slip past them, certain mechanisms of life in the white enclaves of the colonies functioned to help keep thought within accepted limits. These mechanisms shall be dealt with later; first we shall consider the elementary premises of the ideology and modes of inculcating them.

1. The inculcation of the basic premises

The basic premises of this ideology are well known, but need to be summarized here in "ideal-type" form. Its essence is the hierarchical nature of society: it was almost a fact of nature that status, wealth and especially power should be unequally distributed. This unequal distribution not only was, but was essential and good. Society was conceived of as organic — a Burkean view that society would function well if all carried out their obligations and served the whole, in whatever station of life to which God had called them. But those placed by God in high positions had correspondingly great obligations of duty and service to others not so fortunate. Ruling, the provision of law and order, was a service to the ruled, best carried out by those born

to rule and trained to do it well and justly.

An essential prerequisite for ruling, or controlling, others was the ability to control oneself. As a man brought up within this culture said to me in another context, "You can't rule a gang of men in the bush if you can't control your own temper." Control of all emotion, stoicism in the face of hardship, courage in the face of danger: the British Empire needed the "stiff upper lip."

The stiffening of young male lips, and the inculcation of hierarchy, began early. Families were usually hierarchical; family relations within this social stratum could involve warmth and affection, but expression of these feelings was usually austere and restrained. Nannies were common in the more prosperous families, but even where nannies were lacking, children were not expected to eat with parents until they had gained enough self-control to ensure that the serene ritual of family dinner would not be disturbed by any unseemly display of emotion. Parental treatment of servants and others left lasting impressions of differences in rank.[5] 'Class' distinctions remained a highly visible part of daily British life. Parents usually took great care to ensure that their children's playmates were of appropriate 'class' background, and budding friendships with those considered unsuitable were broken off.

Lewis and Maude describe the middle-class home as "distinguished by regularity, order, even ritual...," a prescribed routine of living, habits of cleanliness, punctuality, politeness and so on, and "a conviction that outward and visible signs connote inward and invisible

graces" (1949:291). This self-discipline prepared boys for the next stage of inculcation. At age eight or so, boys were wrenched from their homes and sent to preparatory schools. English literature is full of the recollections of the emotional shock, the pain and homesickness, and the attempts to live up to the proscription on tears. What is striking is that most of these men conclude that the experience did them good. Even the most bitter critic, George Orwell, concludes in his over-drawn account of his preparatory school that its harsh methods worked, in the sense of producing conformity to desired behavior patterns and putting an end to undesired behavior.[6] The poor food, hard beds, cold water, and lack of privacy went a long way towards inculcating the desired stoicism and indifference to material conditions. The young prep school boy, deprived of "mothering" at an early age, learned to hide tears or homesickness behind a mask of manliness, until he discovered the advantages of inhibiting feeling itself. He learned to find enjoyment and satisfaction in the group, especially group games.

Boys' literature of this period provided strong reinforcement of the socially desired traits. Stirring tales of adventure from Kipling, Rider Haggard, Fitzpatrick's Jock of the Bushveld, Henty, Buchan and others since forgotten provided essentially similar role models for their young readers: manly, highly moral, unemotional, lacking overt sex interest, self-disciplined, physically brave and hardy, always honorable as they followed duty and adventure for the good of the Empire. The exotic environment of Africa was a favorite locale for these adventure stories which often depicted a youth maturing into man-

hood through testing himself against Africa's harshness, and learning to accept the moral responsibility of his superior status.[7] Even those who later rejected its racist premises were often deeply affected by this empire-building literature.

The English middle-class family's style of child-rearing can, on its own, produce a high degree of self-discipline, emotional restraint, and devotion to duty. But the combination of these traits with self-assurance, a "relaxed air of command" and internalization of a specific sub-cultural code was the task of the public schools.

2. The message of the public schools

> "As to the Public Schools," writes Furse, "they are vital; we could not have run the show without them. In England universities train the mind; the Public Schools train character and teach leadership." (Heussler 1963:82, quoting a letter from Furse to him.)

The English public schools took their present form in the middle years of the 19th century, well before the era of late 19th century imperialist expansion and the consequent demand for colonial administrators.[8] Some of the most famous schools are far older, but the characteristics regarded as typically "public school" are a Victorian development. These schools provided a means whereby the sons of the rising industrial bourgeoisie and professional men were educated together with sons of the landed gentry and aristocracy. There was a fusion, through this educational institution, of the scions of the two classes. It was thus one of the means whereby the boundary between the landed classes and bourgeoisie became permeable rather than rigid, and conflict that

could have resulted in the overthrow of the landed classes was defused (cf. Stanworth and Giddens 1974:99-100; Wilkinson 1964:4, 24). It was also through this institution that men whose origins were thoroughly 'middle-class' and urban came to accept an ideology derived from a landed aristocracy and rural squirarchy.

Public schools are private, non-profit, fee-paying institutions that do not receive governmental aid — but not all private schools are "public." They usually accept boys about the age of thirteen. Most pupils are boarders; the system of boarding began haphazardly in the 19th century, but by 1900 had become a traditional feature regarded as essential to the "character-building" functions of the school (Wakeford 1969:20).

Illustrative of the difficulties of defining precisely a "public school," Wakeford lists the number of such schools in 1963 as 110 (1969: 20), while Sampson puts the number at 133 (1962:179). There is more agreement, however, about the most influential and prestigious schools: Charterhouse, Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Shrewsbury, Westminster and Winchester (Wilkinson 1964:8). St. Paul's is often added to this elite group. In mid-twentieth century, the public schools educated about 5 percent or less of the secondary school age-group (Wakeford 1969:23; Sampson 1962:180). Yet a large majority of the nation's elite — bishops, deans, judges, top civil servants, senior bankers and businessmen, politicians, senior colonial administrators — came from public schools, while almost half had attended the few "major" public schools.[9]

As we saw in the previous chapter, an overwhelming majority of the Administrative Service, and a significant number of agriculturalists were educated at public schools. However, the inadequate data so far available suggest that only a minority of those in the population studied came from the most prestigious, major schools. Nevertheless, all public schools, "major" or "minor," shared certain structural features, and the minor ones often emphasized in even more extreme form the ethos that animated their older and more prestigious models.[10] These structural features included a headmaster responsible to a board of governors, but with considerable autonomy and great authority over a hierarchically organized staff, and a division of the student body into "houses" or other smaller units. Discipline was in the first instance in the hands of senior boys, or prefects, chosen by the masters. The prefects not only policed the younger boys, but in many cases were authorized to administer corporal punishment to violators of the school code.

The curriculum and ethos of the public school drew from its aristocratic heritage an emphasis on the classics, which dominated the curriculum until fairly recent times. Moral life was centered on the chapel; hard work and Spartan living were emphasized. Team games were compulsory, and were strongly believed to be essential in inculcating character. "School Spirit" was inculcated largely through competitive games and associated rituals. Gentlemanly manners were required, and their inculcation rested mainly on an aesthetic and aristocratic ideal of "good form." As Wilkinson says, "the concept of 'character' welded

middle-class morality to gentry-class style" (1964:10), as implied in the phrase "Christian gentleman."

'Gentleman' is one of those fundamental concepts that members of the relevant sub-culture find very difficult to clarify; it involves the convenient assumption that if clarification is needed, the inquirer obviously falls beyond the pale and so could not fully understand the meaning in any case. A somewhat similar line of thought is found regarding the public schools. For example,

> "The secret of the ethos of a good English Public School," Furse observes, "and how the authorities set about implanting the points of that ethos in their boys...is not an easy thing to explain to anyone who has not been to an English Public School....And there are also glaring instances of ex-Public School boys who have failed...to understand them. Most of these...are misfits." (Heussler 1963:83, quoting a letter from Furse to him.)

The sources drawn on most heavily in this chapter were written by men who were themselves public school boys, but later carried out rational inquiries into the institution.[11] It shall be suggested later that the institution is of that type whereby any adoption of an analytical stance by an "insider" does indeed mark him as a "misfit."

The public-school ethos was not specifically tailored to producing colonial administrators, but rather rulers-in-general, primarily for home use. The virtues which this institution attempted to implant in those who passed through involved, among others, a belief in the superiority of public service to private profit, and especially to 'trade', that privileges implied corresponding duties and responsibilities, loyalty — to his god, the nation, and the institutions in which he was involved, honesty, respect for tradition and authority. Along with

these went what Wilkinson, following Schumpeter, has called "magic," a "mystical glamour and lordly attitude" and dignity that inspires respect and sets a leader off from his followers. "The essence of the gentleman ideal was that it identified social status with moral superiority" (Wilkinson 1964:15).

Success at school involved conformity not only to the written rules and regulations, but also mastery of unwritten codes and traditions of astonishing complexity (Wakeford 1969:55-65). Maintenance of custom was important, simply because it was custom. Dress and personal possessions were strictly regulated; one set of rules specified that a required travelling rug was to be "of a sombre hue" (ibid.:54). Ritual was used to instil in the new boy his lowly status in the hierarchy; fagging, or junior boys' obligations to do chores for senior boys, still survived in Wakeford's research shool in the 1960s. Privacy was slight; very few schools, of which Eton was one, provided the adolescent boys with individual rooms. Even in the 1960s, some schools prohibited boys from using the telephone without permission, and incoming mail was sometimes scrutinized before distribution (ibid.:74). Personal possessions were liable for inspection by staff or prefects at any time. Contact with adolescents outside the schools was severely restricted, and strict limitations on geographical mobility were common. The aim was to restrict contact with "inappropriate" people, i.e. those of other 'classes'. Thus the majority of public school boys grew up with no model of easy social relations with people different from themselves; they also had little grasp of how the vast majority of people in their own

country lived. Segregation from them had become second nature. The schools were, of course, one-sex, and social contacts with the other half of the human species (except possibly for masters' wives) were severely restricted.

Baldly described, these features sound more like a prison than an educational institution. Life had a "planned" quality, with strong mechanisms of social control.

> The fact is that a Tonbridgian's life is organized in such a way as to make the school a total existence. He can swim along on a tide of existence in which days and weeks can be lost without a trace. From waking to sleeping, he does not need to diverge from the enclosed routine which takes him from house - to school - to house - to field - to house - to school....This completeness of life is obviously one of the prime characteristics of a public school. (Quoted in ibid.:38).

In his analysis, Wakeford makes some use of Goffman's concept of "total institution," originally developed in studies of mental hospitals. But such comparisons miss the point of the public school as socializing process:

> The pressures that public school society placed on the individual were more akin to the educational techniques of advertising and brainwashing. That is to say, they operated almost subliminally, moulding the individual's very desires. In the case of the public schools, aesthetic appeals to 'good form' and tradition usually made the individual <u>want</u> to identify himself strongly with his group—<u>want</u> to show 'House Spirit' (Wilkinson 1964:5).

As Wilkinson emphasizes, the ethos of the public school depended much less on direct compulsion than on inculcation of self-restraint through custom. The prefect's cane was available as sanction, but the most highly-regarded prefects were those who, by persuasion and example, had to use it seldom. Ideally, manners, self-restraint, a sense of modera-

tion, were the virtues rewarded, while the bully was scorned.

> By devious ways, the education system taught the individual to identify his private desire with a mystical fondness for the community and a deference to hierarchy. In the end, it taught them to enjoy co-operation and loyalty for their own sakes, irrespective of their context....Only the most resilient individualist would willingly adopt an independent style of life when he knew that etiquette classed such behavior as showing bad taste (ibid.:38-39).

Loyalty was the virtue par excellence. Loyalty was expected, first, to the "House" of which the boy was a member, and second to the school. Winning at team games was a way of bringing credit, not just on oneself but to one's House. The most highly regarded endeavors were group endeavors.

> The public schools, in short, fanned group loyalty by making the individual value himself only as part of the group and as part of an historical continuum. If the antiquity of many school institutions...was really quite recent, this only went to prove Burke's point that the requirements of continuity and must allow for change--as long as it is gradual change (ibid.:42).

Lack of privacy, suggests Wilkinson, increased the efficacy of group pressure towards conformity.

> What the public school inculcation of loyalty really amounted to was a sort of 'education by symbol'. The school community symbolized whatever group would claim the public schoolboy's energies in later life. Once his capacity for loyalty had been developed by the school and its psychological devices, the individual was expected to transfer that loyalty to his adult group (ibid.:46).

Wilkinson suggests that the monastic character of the public school life carried the implication that family life and the distractions of women were potential threats to public service (ibid.:16). Ideally, loyalty to one's service overrode personal or family needs,[12] just as loyalty to one's team, or House, earlier overrode personal pain or discomfort.

The public school code also involved deference and respect to those higher in the hierarchy, and moral obligations to those lower. The hierarchical nature of society was unquestioned, reinforced not only by the structure of the institution itself, but also by the sanctification of religion. Many grew up singing a children's hymn quoted by Wilkinson (ibid.:25):

> The rich man in his castle,
> The poor man at his gate,
> God made them, high or lowly,
> And ordered their estate.

All these elements of the ideology were brought together and driven home by ritual, through compulsory Chapel, and through secular rituals of school life, conducted with dignity and pomp, dramatizing hierarchy (cf. Wakeford 1969:123-125). Thus inculcation of ideology relied on symbol, ritual, and implicit norms of behavior whose ultimate justification was an aesthetic appeal to "good form," more than on explicit reasons or dogma. The appeal to group loyalty roused emotion, rather than rational analysis. Certain things were Done; even more were simply Not Done (ibid.:105).

In the sense that the criteria were inexplicit, the behavioral-ethical prescriptions of the public school resembled what Bernstein has called a "restricted code," although other aspects of public school language do not fit this category (1973, esp. Chap. 8 and p. 200). Bernstein's somewhat controversial socio-linguistic theories are far from universally accepted, but are suggestive here. He describes a restricted code as a context-dependent form of speech, that symbolizes a communally based culture. He sees it as derived from families (or

schools?) that emphasize a positional, rather than personal means of control over children. Restricted codes both derive from and have implications for forms of social relationship.

> In terms of what is transmitted verbally, an elaborated code encourages the speaker to focus upon the experience of others, as different from his own. In the case of a restricted code, what is transmitted verbally usually refers to the other person in terms of a common group or status membership....Thus restricted codes could be considered status or positional codes whereas elaborated codes are oriented to persons....In the case of a restricted code, the boundary or gap is between sharers and non-sharers of the code (ibid.:170-171).
>
> The concept of self developed through a restricted code does not, itself, become an area of inquiry as in the case of an elaborated code... (ibid.:174).
>
> Restricted codes are more tied to a local social structure and have a reduced potential for change in principles. Where codes are elaborated, the socialized has more access to the grounds of his own socialization, and so can enter into a reflexive relationship to the social order he has taken over. Where codes are restricted, the socialized has less access to the grounds of his socialization, and thus reflexiveness may be limited in range (ibid.:200).

Is such a lack of reflexiveness related to the infrequency of "thinking about" the system, mentioned above? In apparent contradiction to such a suggestion, many of the critical, reflective intellects and creative writers concerned with 'self' and 'other' that England produced in the first half of this century passed through such public schools.

The pages above dealt with ideology as held by the masters — what the masters hoped to instill in their boys. Wilkinson also tends to write at this level. Wakeford's participant-observation study deals more with "what actually happens." He found that conformity to school demands was "not a mode which is adopted by most of the boys for most of their school life" (1969:134). He found that the boys' modes of

adaptation to school could be summarized under five headings: retreatism, intransigence, rebellion, colonization and conformity (ibid.:Chap. 6). Conformity he defined as internalization of both the school's official goals and the approved means of obtaining them; too much, too early, could lead to charges from a boy's peers of "sucking up" to the masters. Appropriate amounts, later, could lead to prefects' positions and the special privileges that went with them. Wakeford says it was this small core of boys that the masters regarded as their "successes." What better preparation could have been devised for handling the simultaneous demands of peer relations and desire for promotion in a colonial bureaucracy?

Retreatism, intransigence and rebellion as modes of adaptation are self-explanatory. Colonization Wakeford describes as ambivalence about the formal rules and regulations, indifference to school goals, with enough behavioral conformity to "get by." Such boys "work the system" to get what they can out of it.

Given the weight assigned to headmasters' and housemasters' reports in Colonial Office recruiting procedures, it seems likely that those selected for the Administrative Service would have been chosen predominantly from that minority of public school boys who had successfully internalized the official ideology, who had conformed to the school system and earned its rewards, including the high opinion of its masters. No doubt a few "colonizers," who had been especially successful at surface conformity at school, also slipped past Furse's penetrating eye.

The psychic rewards of public school life, for those fitted to it, were obviously very considerable, as evidenced by the life-long devotion of many men to their old school, and the testimonies of many memoirs. Furse himself was a good example:

> Eton gives to those who can receive it a blend of liberty and discipline which is true freedom. In this her genius is unique. So is the spell she casts on any boy who finds her singular atmosphere congenial: particularly so if he reaches a responsible position, for in Eton it is chiefly the senior boys who keep order....I ended as captain of a good house, adequate at work and games, and a member of Pop.[13] If such has been your fortune, you will in your boyhood have reached a position of responsibility, influence and bien etre such as you will never hold again unless you get into the Cabinet or command an army: so those will tell you who have done such things. It is an experience very sustaining to your nerve in after life (1962:292).

Eton is recognized as unique among public schols in providing rather more scope than most for individuality (Sampson 1962:178; Stansky and Abrahams 1974:85-135). Lest it, or Furse, be thought untypical, here are the comments of Postlethwaite, who attended the stricter and less exalted school of Haileybury, and retired as a provincial commissioner in Uganda:

> I may be wrong, but I feel that no great statesman or great commander-in-chief can ever have the same feeling of exaltation as a small boy has when, for a brief period, he becomes the head of his House at an English public school, with the knowledge that a small body of his fellow scholars regard him in the light of a far greater personage than any master can possibly hope to be (1947:15).

In summary, one can sketch an "ideal type" of character towards which those selected for colonial administration probably tended. Those the masters judged successful in their public school careers would have been those who internalized the ethic in its important respects (or

conveyed the impression of having done so), who had developed a taste for authority and some skill at using it with a light hand, a taste for the symbolic rewards provided by the system, including the adulation of those lower in the hierarchy, and the experience of having earned these rewards through conformity with the system and the demands of one's seniors. The system involved hierarchy and respect for tradition; those successfully socialized within it would have developed a sense of comfort in the presence of both; they would have become "instinctively" conservative. For colonial service, the ideal type would, perhaps, have also displayed sufficient prankishness, within acceptable limits, to indicate initiative. They would have learned loyalty to their group, devotion to its interests rather than their own, or to their own <u>through</u> the group. They would have absorbed an unquestioned assumption of the superiority of their group, which included their 'class', and hence of themselves. This identification of self with group made possible the co-existence of an assumption of group superiority, and an individual modesty, even hidden diffidence or shyness, that is often found in this type of Englishman. Individual arrogance was not gentlemanly; the consciousness of superiority was derivative of group membership.

In this ideal type, the assumption of superiority, like the other assumptions involved, was unexamined. The means of inculcation used, and, if my use of Bernstein's theory is correct, the very structure of the language used for handling behavioral-ethical matters, kept the basic assumptions inexplicit, not easily available for examination. Those who internalized the ethic and were public school "successes"

thus tended to be those who felt little need to reflect critically on the guiding principles of their life. Questioning spirits did not usually find the colonial service an attractive career. It appealed more to the type of boy who enjoyed doing rather than pondering about why he was doing what he was doing; an unspecific sense of service provided answer enough. The public school as an ideological institution rewarded just this type of boy, and recommended them to the Colonial Office.

So far, twelve pages have been devoted to the public school and nothing has been said about curriculum, or even training of the intellect. This space allocation corresponds to that in most works on the public schools, and reflects the priorities of Furse, quoted above.

Although there was variation among schools in the emphasis placed on learning, Wilkinson says public school life in general had a non-intellectual bias (1964:80). Achievements in games and other non-academic areas were surrounded with more ritual elaboration than were academic achievements (Wakeford 1969:125). The curriculum was dominated by classics, and science was slighted, until well after the years during which the officials we are concerned with were at school. Thorough training was given in the subjects covered, but the range strikes a modern reader as narrow. Recent history, or knowledge of the contemporary world beyond the school, was not much covered.[14] The curriculum did not compensate for the narrowness of the boys' social contacts; many boys left school, passed through university, and went out to the colonies knowing very little about the quality of life beyond their own 'class',

and lacking in much direct contact with those British institutions that had led Britain to be regarded as a bastion of freedom and democracy: parliament and the electoral process, local government, the separation of judicial from administrative functions, even the operation of the press. For many, the business world remained tainted, as 'trade'. Those who had served in the military forces, as officers of course, certainly had had greater contact with men of other 'classes', but within the confines of an institution even more hierarchical and authoritarian than the public school.

E.M. Forster summarized the public-school product much better, long ago.

> ...they go forth into a world that is not entirely composed of public-school men or even of Anglo-Saxons, but of men who are as various as the sands of the sea; into a world of whose richness and subtlety they have no conception. They go forth into it with well-developed bodies, fairly developed minds, and undeveloped hearts. And it is this undeveloped heart that is largely responsible for the difficulties of Englishmen abroad. An undeveloped heart—not a cold one....
>
> For it is not that the Englishman can't feel—it is that he is afraid to feel. He has been taught at his public school that feeling is bad form. He must not express great joy or sorrow, or even open his mouth too wide when he talks—his pipe might fall out if he did. He must bottle up his emotions, or let them out only on a very special occasion (1967:15).

Rule of others, had, as pre-requisite, firm mastery of self. The undeveloped heart, the inhibition of feeling, was part of the price that was exacted from those trained to rule the British Empire. The price was paid by the individual, subjected to a socialization process intended to produce traits of character much more useful to the Empire than developed subtlety of feeling.

These virtues were not mere cliches, but were real: loyalty — to their country, their service, their fellows; honesty; incorruptibility; courage in the face of danger; often a real concern for the welfare of those they ruled, when they could deal with them as individuals. During interviews, I saw these virtues reflected in various ways, sometimes in conflict. Loyalty to their service and their fellows sometimes obviously conflicted with their sincere desire to give the inquiring social scientist as honest an account as they could of their view of the system.

As for courage, stories are legion. To take two from Uganda, there was the magistrate who, about the time of independence, drove alone and unarmed into a village of armed rebels, rescued two African women who had been kidnapped, and drove out again.[15] Or the stories about the resident of Buganda at the time of the 1945 riots, who is said to have walked about unarmed, telling people to get down off walls; they obeyed. Africans, of course, knew that British orders were ultimately backed up with guns, but the guns were often far away — British rule was maintained with very little armed force actually in the colony. Furthermore, if situations got to the point that force had to be called for, especially if lives were lost, there were inquiries that might well blight the careers of those in charge. A cool nerve and a self-confident assumption that one would not be defied were also weapons of domination — ones that often forestalled the use of force.

Perhaps one of the most outstanding characteristics of British colonial administrators was their financial incorruptibility. In

colonial service, this tradition appears to be fairly modern, as the early history of the East India Company shows. It dates perhaps from Victorian times, and may well be related to the spread of the public school ethic, and concomitant demands within the home government for greater rectitude in the conduct of public affairs. Anthropologically, cross-cultural evidence suggests that gift-giving in return for favors from those in power is much more widespread than bureaucratic universalism. At each level of the administration, these men had power to allocate highly desired resources, or withhold unwelcome punishments, from others to whom gift-giving in return for favors was a normal part of life. In East Africa, the presence of prosperous Indians offered possibilities of important supplements to small incomes. Yet, with few exceptions, British colonial officials could not be swayed by personal material inducements. Assuming their own culturally specific attitude to be natural and universal, they created administrative structures, such as crop marketing boards, that offered possibilities for private profit at public expense that perhaps only British public school products would have been able to resist. The strength of their resistance, in situations where chances of detection were often slight, seems to have derived in large part from the inculcation of 'honesty' as a part of their self-identity as 'English gentlemen'. Even if they had been aware of the realities of relations between government and the private sector in, say, North America, they were protected from relativism by their sense that there were only two sets of standards: English, and lower. "Taking a bribe" was simply Not Done.[16]

But the great virtue of this method of socialization was that it produced men who could act quickly, without too much reflection. The intellectual who delighted in examining a problem from all sides was of little use in a remote village when faced with an incipient riot. But at the same time, socialization produced implicit but very strong boundaries limiting action to that acceptable to his superiors. Burke expressed the advantages of this approach in 1790:

> We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that the stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capitals of nations and of ages....Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, and does not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision, skeptical, puzzled, and unresolved. Prejudice renders a man's virtue his habit; and not a series of unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his duty becomes part of his nature (quoted in White 1950:29).

And in 1922, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated:

> The code which must guide the administrator in the tropics is to be found in no book of regulations. It demands that in every circumstance and under all conditions he shall act in accordance with the traditions of an English gentleman (quoted in Heussler 1963:60).

In such a system, where inculcation of an ethic and an ideology is implicit, largely through ritual and symbol, an emphasis on custom and 'good form', intellectual examination of basic premises can pose a serious threat. As Wilkinson says, the public school system of education "viewed the intellect itself as hostile to loyalty" (1964:82).

It is a characteristic of all ideological thought that rational examination of the fundamental bases of the ideology requires some detachment from it — a "stepping outside" that will be regarded as it-

self disloyal and potentially threatening, regardless of the consequences of the analysis. This will hold even where the ideology is overtly rational, systemic and explicit. In ideological systems that proclaim themselves to be a product of rational intelligence applied to evidence, inhibition of critical examination of ideological premises poses very severe problems, since the value of intellectual activity is part of the ideology itself. British conservative thought has avoided these problems by downplaying the value of intellect — the 'sound' well-rounded man was preferred to the merely 'clever' — exalting the 'gentleman', openly acknowledging the non-rational and "magical" core of the belief system, and fencing it off by rules of custom and etiquette. The view that monarch, duty and associated central symbols ought not to be examined too closely runs at least from Burke in the 18th century, through Bagehot in the 19th;[17] in our century, perhaps it is manifested most clearly in the establishment of anthropology, at that time the safe study of primitives, at the ancient universities long before sociology, the dangerous study of their own society (cf. Anderson 1968). Just as it was ungentlemanly to enquire if the nation got its money's worth from the large amounts spent on maintenance of the monarchy, it was Not Done, in colonial society, for an official to enquire too closely into the meaning of 'Trusteeship'.[18] Officials had a feeling, a strong feeling, that they were there for the good of the natives, and that was enough. By such means, highly intelligent men learned to think within the system, but not about it.

NOTES

1. By concentrating on those who reached high rank, I deliberately biased my sample towards those who had at least the minimal requisite intelligence to gain promotion. There may have been a few Blimp-like beings among those district officials who never gained promotion; one or two had a reputation among their fellows for conspicuously less intelligence than most, but precisely because of this reputation, they did not have much influence on policy.

2. Only three men of those interviewed gave me the impression that they were moving towards thinking about the system, not necessarily critically, but with some detachment, trying to grasp it as a whole. All three described their families of origin as 'lower-middle-class'; one of them volunteered in course of discussion that he was "not one of those 'born to rule'." Two of them went to grammar schools, while the third attended a public school he described as "minor." These facts are suggestive of a self-perceived "marginal" position leading to greater detachment, but the interview sample is so small and non-random that not too much weight should be attached to the result. The three differed greatly among themselves, and idiosyncracies of personality may have been more determinative than 'class' or educational background.

3. Cf. Orwell:

   > "...the lack of philosophical faculty, the absence in nearly all Englishmen of any need for an ordered system of thought or even for the use of logic (1970, Vol. 2:85).
   >
   > The schools' unquestioning approach to education stemmed in part from the English tendency to value experience above abstract speculations, to ask 'will it work?' rather than 'what is the best conceivable scheme?' (Wilkinson 1964:82).
   >
   > The Englishman is made for a time of crisis, and for a time of emergency. He is serene in difficulties but may seem to be indifferent when times are easy. He may not look ahead, he may not heed warning, he may not prepare, but when once he starts he is persistent to the death and he is ruthless in action (from a speech by Stanley Baldwin, 1924, quoted in ibid.:86).

4. For example, the famous attack by the Marquis of Salisbury, who called Ian MacLeod "too clever by half" when the latter, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, was presiding over the final stages of the formal granting of independence to African colonies.

5. Of many possible examples, one from Sir Ralph Furse's memoirs is especially striking:

> My Grandmother was an aristocrat of the old school, and knew it. As a child I would drive about with her in an immense open landau. If a cottage woman failed to curtsey when she passed, the landau was stopped and the woman taught how to behave. To those who did behave my grandmother was their best friend....She taught me what aristocracy really means and let me see something of what the ancien regime must have been like; and my nurse, Ada Whitham, a dear Essex country woman, taught me how the poor lived, and to love and be at ease with country folk (1962:40-41).

6. "Such, such were the joys..." (Orwell 1970, Vol. 4:379-422). Orwell's preparatory school was among the best available at the time. Stansky and Abrahams (1974) suggest that his experiences there were not as unrelievedly dismal as his recollected account suggests.

7. Hammond and Jablow 1977:100-103 provide a very condensed survey of this adventure literature of the early twentieth century.

8. One of these schools, Haileybury, was specifically founded as a training school for the East India Company, in 1833. This was the only school specifically oriented to producing colonial administrators, but it later developed a more general orientation (Cohn 1966).

9. For supporting figures see, inter alia, Sampson (1962:180), drawing on the 1944 Fleming Commission; Stanworth and Giddens (1974, passim).

10. I do not include here the elite schools of Scotland, which both informants and written sources say are significantly different in both structure and ethos from the English public school. The Scottish educational system also offered some scholarships that permitted some, albeit limited, access to good schools for boys of ability from poor homes (Kellas 1968:77-100). On the other hand, since mid-Victorian times the sons of the Scottish landed aristocracy, and the wealthiest professionals, were sent to the top English public schools (ibid.:80).

11. I have drawn especially heavily on Wilkinson (1964) and Wakeford (1969). Wilkinson attended Winchester, one of the prestigious "Seven," then went to Harvard and became a political scientist. His book centers on problems of the political education of elite leadership, and deals mostly with the schools as they were at the turn of the century. Wakeford did a sociological study, using participant-observation methods, of an anonymous boys' public boarding school in 1962-1963, drawing on comparative material from other schools. He was an 'old boy' of the research school,

which from internal evidence was probably very solid and respectable, but not one of the "Seven." Although Wakeford deals with a much later period than Wilkinson, his account shows great continuity in fundamental processes within the schools. Wakeford deals with the structure and specific practices of a school, while Wilkinson is more concerned with the implications of these prevalent practices for the type of men produced. There is also a vast literature on public schools in the form of novels, memoirs and polemic pro and con that cannot be dealt with here.

12. Evidence comes from diverse sources, including statements of informants. Novels often provide strong statements of a prevailing ideal. In a novel of India, quoted in Greenberger (1969:99), the hero's only child dies while he is off defending the Northern Frontier; his wife welcomes him home with the comment, "It was worth it." A closer example is the novel set in Somaliland, written by that leader of opinion on colonial affairs, Dame Margery Perham, in her youth (Perham 1970, first published 1926). The heroine, a product of a family with a tradition of public service, persuades the man she loves that they must separate, to avoid a scandal that would ruin his career as a district administrator and stop him from pushing for the more progressive policies they both believed in. While this stern ideal was certainly not always lived up to in actual practice, an attitude that it is faintly immoral to attend to family needs when work remains to be done is still found in some men of this sub-culture. Thus, complementary to socialization of males to place loyalty to 'the service' first, was socialization of women, and 'class' endogamy, to provide them with wives willing to accept without complaint the priority of public duty over personal or familial needs.

13. 'Pop' was the term used for the senior boys who acted as prefects at Eton. None of the men in the sample interviewed had attended Eton.

14. Stansky and Abrahams give details on the course of study followed by an apparently ordinary, middling student at Eton from 1916-1921. As a scholar among the intellectual elite at College in Eton, Eric Blair received, they say, the best education England then had to offer.

> But how much it left out, how much it took for granted could be legitimately left out. Where, for example, would have been an appropriate place in Blair's schedule of instruction (Divinity, Geography, Ancient History, French, Sakespeare, and Latin Construe) for two works of great social importance which had appeared at the turn of the century, Seebohm Rowntree's Poverty, a study of town life and Charles Booth's The life and labour of the people of London? Both, by the time Blair was at school, had already had a positive effect ...upon the political life of England....But of this Blair

knew little or nothing (Stansky and Abrahams 1974:131-132).

15. The rebels were part of the Rwenzururu secessionist movement against Toro Kingdom, in western Uganda. I am grateful to Dr. Nelson Kasfir for information on this incident.

16. The distinction between a free gift and an attempt to influence is a matter of cultural definition, and was a recurring problem for officials and their wives. It was regarded as acceptable to receive a box of goodies from one's regular grocer at Christmas, but not from other storekeepers. Beyond that level, officials had to get governmental permission before they could accept more valuable gifts.

    Gifts did not always come directly related to requests for favors, but could be sent as "feelers," or to build up "credit" with the recipient. Shortly after he arrived in Uganda in 1963, a new Canadian aid expert was astonished to receive a case of whiskey from a businessman with interests in the sector of the economy supervised by the government department to which he was attached. "Old hands" advised him that such presents to newcomers were a common practice, and should be sent back forthwith, to define oneself as not open to influence.

    Officials were expected to conduct themselves in such a way that there could be no hint of openness to influence from businessmen. For this reason, even running up large debts with storekeepers was strongly disapproved of. I heard of one extreme case where a cadet's inability to stay out of debt led to his dismissal.

17. Cf. Bagehot, "When there is a select committee on the Queen the charm of royalty will be gone. Its mystery is its life. We must not let in daylight upon magic." Quoted in Sampson 1962:31.

18. This "Not Done" quality is well brought out by Orwell:

> ...every Anglo-Indian is haunted by a sense of guilt which he usually conceals as best he can, because there is no freedom of speech, and merely to be overheard making a seditious remark may damage his career. All over India there are Englishmen who secretly loathe the system of which they are part; and just occasionally, when they are quite certain of being in the right company, their hidden bitterness overflows. I remember a night I spent on the train with a man in the Educational Service, a stranger to myself whose name I never discovered. It was too hot to sleep and we spent the night in talking. Half an hour's cautious questioning decided each of us that the other was 'safe'; and then for hours, while the train rolled slowly through the pitch-black night, sitting up in our bunks with

> bottles of beer handy, we damned the British Empire—damned it from the inside, intelligently and intimately. It did us both good. But we had been speaking forbidden things, and in the haggard morning light when the train crawled into Mandalay, we parted as guiltily as any adulterous couple (1962:127).

One younger officials, who went out to Uganda in 1946, used a "sacred" metaphor, rather flippantly, in answer to a question about the socialization of new arrivals. He said Britain's role in Uganda was never explicitly discussed. "We were there by divine right, one knew that! One doesn't question Holy Writ; I mean, it was Holy Writ."

CHAPTER IV

THE DOCTRINES OF RULE

In this chapter we shall look at some of the specific doctrines and concepts that influenced British rule in Uganda. Attention shall be concentrated first on the patterns of beliefs prevalent in the inter-war period, for it was in this period that the officials who held senior, policy-making positions in the post-war period were socialized, recruited and trained. The reaction to post-war conditions and pressures cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the ideological premises which the officials had absorbed as a result of their earlier experiences.

One of the main British colonial doctrines was that they ruled their empire without benefit of doctrine or theory — a manifestation of the widespread conservative dislike of system-mongering and "theorizing." But, as Brett has pointed out (1973:37-38), this belief could be used to accuse their critics of being "doctrinaire" or "out of touch with the facts." It is true that British colonial rule seldom had an explicit central program applied to all colonies — except for the principle that each colony must pay for its own services. But there was, in the metropolis, a series of somewhat vaguely defined rationales as to what Britain was doing in her colonies and what she ought to be doing. At any one time, one view was more or less dominant, but never to the exclusion of competing perspectives, whether inside or outside of government. The development of these beliefs over

time has been well described by others.[1] We shall be concerned here with only the more recent ones that directly affected the officials studied.

1. Imperial doctrines

The early development of Uganda was undertaken when the forthright imperialist doctrines of men such as Joseph Chamberlain were in the ascendent: it was the obligation of Britain as a colonial power to make the raw materials of the tropical world available to meet the needs of the industrial nations — not just Britain herself, but others as well. This view was, on the ideational level, closely tied to free trade beliefs. Thornton (1965) has called it the doctrine of profit. This doctrine prevailed at a time when "punitive expeditions" against rebellious groups, extensive alienation of land and use of forced labor for European enterprises were regarded as normal, acceptable means of developing Britain's newly-acquired "undeveloped estates." The optimism of the late-Victorian-Edwardian age still flourished, and the colonies were seen as expanding the opportunities of British industry to create an unending good life for all Britons.

But there was a much older doctrine dealing with Britain's relations to Africa. A liberal strain of thought, of bourgeois tone, had flowered in the anti-slavery campaigns, and in such organizations as the Aborigine's Protection Society (cf. especially Curtin 1964). This strain was much influenced by Evangelical Christianity and Quakerism. The mainstream of this bourgeois liberal element blended with the other

strains of late 19th-century imperialism[2] and helped to give a strongly moral tone to British thinking about the expansion of the empire as a civilizing mission. This strain of thought tended to prefer indigenous African to European enterprise as a means of developing the colonies and producing the products needed by British industry. Those holding this view tended to become involved with the "humanitarian lobby" that concerned itself with events in the colonies that it regarded as damaging to African interests.

The ideological certainties of the Edwardian age did not survive the First World War, nor, in pure form, did the forthright Eurocentric doctrines of Chamberlain's kind of imperialism. The horrors of that war seem to have loosed a wave of idealism, or at least idealist rhetoric; the colonial spoils of war were allocated under the supervision of the League of Nations, in a new system of "mandates."

> To those colonies and territories...which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.[3]

British colonial spokesmen have said that the mandate system introduced nothing that was not already part of British colonial practice. However little practical effect it may have had on British colonial practice, it did introduce a new element on the ideological level: a public pledge of support for various "enlightened" measures, preparation for independence some time in the distant future, a commitment to the primacy of the interests of the native peoples of the mandate, and a

forum to which the ruling power was publicly accountable.

These various ideological strains were brought together in a book whose appearance in 1922 provides a landmark for ideological change: Lord Lugard's The dual mandate in tropical Africa. This book was the required textbook, almost the bible, for the training of colonial cadets during the inter-war period, so deserves some attention here.

Lugard's own career spanned the period of forceful Empire-building, later consolidation and administration, and a retirement in which he became a leader of the "humanitarian lobby." His book, written just after his retirement from colonial service, combines ideological elements appropriate to the earlier stages of his career, and hints at his future activities.

> Who can deny the right of the hungry people of Europe to utilize the wasted bounties of nature, or that the task of developing these resources was, as Mr. Chamberlain expressed it, a "trust for civilisation" and for the benefit of mankind? Europe benefited by the wonderful increase in the amenities of life for the mass of her people which followed the opening up of Africa at the end of the nineteenth century. Africa benefited by the influx of manufactured goods, and the substitution of law and order for the methods of barbarism (Lugard 1922:615).
>
> Let it be admitted at the outset that European brains, capital, and energy have not been, and never will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa from motives of pure philanthropy; that Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilised administration to fulfil this dual mandate (ibid.:617).
>
> We hold these countries because it is the genius of our race to colonise, to trade, and to govern. The task in which England is engaged in the tropics — alike in Africa

> and in the East — has become part of her tradition, and she has ever given of her best in the cause of liberty and civilisation (ibid.:619).

Lugard's double-edged argument was intended to answer both those who saw the colonies as benefiting only a few profiteers, and those who demanded humanitarian rule for the benefit of the subject peoples.

After 1922, "trusteeship" increasingly became the slogan that dominated colonial ideology.[4] Less was heard of what the colonies could do for Britain, and more of what Britain could, should, do for her colonies.[5] "Trusteeship" was to dominate the colonial ideology of the inter-war period — the period during which most of the older officials we are concerned with were trained and inducted into service.

But as Robinson has pointed out (1965), this term in itself provided no reliable guide for the inter-war administration of the now-consolidated colonies. For sheltering beneath the slogan were at least two competing orientations as to what ought to be done in the African colonies. There was the doctrine of uplift, which had its roots in the old tradition of Evangelism and a newer liberalism. This implied activist policies pushing for change. But stronger, in this period, was a resurgence of the British conservative tradition, which paradoxically became, for a time, the "progressive" mode of thought. Both of these were counterposed against the older view, now on the defensive, of straightforward exploitation and development of European enterprise. For example, the Colonial Office now looked askance at proposals for alienation of land to Europeans; orders were issued from London curbing the grosser forms of forced labor (cf. Powesland 1957), and a new con-

cern to protect the peasantry from exploitation by other Africans became apparent (cf. Chapter V).

2. The conservative tradition

To comprehend the paradox of the conservative tradition playing a "progressive" role we need, first, to examine more explicitly the content of this tradition, which was only touched on above in connection with the public schools. We shall try to clarify here this tradition as it was developed in and for Britain; its colonial applications will be discussed in later chapters.

Writers on the conservative tradition usually start by describing it as anti-theoretical. "The liberal and rationalist mind consciously articulates abstract blueprints; the conservative mind unconsciously incarnates concrete traditions" (Viereck 1956:16). "...Conservatism is less a political doctrine than a habit of mind, a mode of feeling, a way of living" (White 1950:1). But certain common postulates of thought can be isolated. First is a distrust of human nature, a belief that mankind is naturally prone to anarchy and evil. Since this is the fundamental nature of man, an ordering and restraining society is essential. Only through such a society can men enjoy true liberty. "Society cannot exist unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere; and the less of it there is within, the more of it there must be without" (Burke, quoted in Viereck 1956:4). That society is best which has grown slowly, organically, is deeply rooted in tradition. There is a deep distrust of too rapid change; forced

growth is apt to be weak and spindly. The conservative mind shows a deep reverence and affection for tradition. Society must, by its nature, be hierarchical, ordered in classes; men may be equal before God, but that is the only true form of equality. "Society longs for leadership, and if a people destroy natural distinctions among men, presently Buonaparte fills the vacuum" (Kirk 1953:8). Any form of egalitarianism is a dangerous chimera. Therefore the best society will be that ruled by the best men, by an aristocracy capable of fulfilling the ideals of noblesse oblige. Burke, in answer to Rousseau argued:

> Society is indeed a contract...as the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.... (Quoted in Viereck 1956:27).

The keystone of this approach was a "Belief that a divine intent rules society as well as conscience, forging an eternal chain of right and duty which links great and obscure, living and dead" (Kirk 1953:7). Some faith in a divine providence that had ordered society in its hierarchical ranks was prerequisite, even if the individual conservative did not take an active part in religious activities. In addition, private property was seen as a bulwark against chaos, and another source of liberty. But property too was a trust that should be used for the greater good.

Another bulwark of liberty was the strength of the groups intermediate between state and individual. In conservative thought, the individual does not relate directly to the state, but is first a member

of various smaller groups. Burke and other conservatives for long argued against direct representation of individuals in parliament, as neglecting the ancient, unified communities.[6] These ancient intermediate groupings were, in England, conceived to be both local communities and the broader functional groupings, "estates," "interests" and "classes" (Beer 1965:17-20). The idea of the state as an aggregate of isolated individuals was utterly foreign to conservative thought, but more akin to the old 19th century liberal mode.

> When that great lover of liberty, that profound champion of individual moral responsibility, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, met Harriet Martineau he is said to have observed: "You seem to look on society as an aggregate of individuals," and the great lady-Liberal replied promptly: "Of course I do." Now, to the Tory, or the Conservative, that blithe assurance is incredible. To him, it is only the church that is concerned with men as individuals....society is not a collection of "universalised individuals," nor the sum of individuals statistically aggregated, but the product of a system of relations between individuals, classes, groups and interests (White 1950:7-8).

Above all, conservatives feared rootlessness, the destruction of the restraining tradition, weakening of intermediate groups, the release of social control; they feared the mob. The vast majority of men, if roused by agitators and led astray by slogans, could destroy in days what had taken years, if not centuries to evolve. Change there must be, but it should be slow, organic, gradual change, like the growth of an organism, not disruptive, in response to external slogans.

> The Sensual and the Dark rebel in vain,
> Slaves by their own compulsion! in mad game
> They burst their manacles and wear the name
> of freedom, graven on a heavier chain!

These lines express, I think, the deeper feelings of some of those I interviewed about the condition of Uganda in the 1970s. They were written by Coleridge, in 1798, about the revolution in France.

Disorder, then, was seen as the death of liberty, not only for those at the top but for those at the bottom of the hierarchy as well. Those endowed with greater privileges and wisdom must, therefore, rule wisely, to guard those at the bottom against their own worst selves.

This tradition was, in Britain, opposed to the optimistic doctrines of progress and industrialism of the Victorian period. Throughout the 19th century, in Coleridge, Carlyle, Newman and others we find an emphasis on the human need for tradition, ritual, slow solid inner growth, as opposed to mere external, material changes or reforms. Ruskin, Matthew Arnold and others all continued the attack on the heartlessness, the reduction of human beings to mere atoms, related only by a cash-nexus, that they associated with 19th century industrialism; they advocated a return to the traditional, rural virtues of an organic society.

All of these strands, and more, were brought together in that key symbol of British culture, the monarchy. Part of the immense power of this multi-vocal symbol has been its ability to draw out a devotion that transcended divisions of class, the old ethnic divisions within Britain, or political viewpoint. It has even retained astonishing potency in its exported forms in the old "white" dominions such as Canada. The British monarchy expressed to Britons the superiority of their own culture, the strength of their society firmly rooted in a

thousand years of tradition. Although its appeal is not limited to them, the monarch is an especially crucial symbol to conservatives. The monarch was/is the natural apex of the good, hierarchical society, the symbol of both human and divine order in the universe (Shils and Young 1953). Informants did not articulate such sentiments verbally, of course. As we saw in the previous chapter, devotion to such key symbols in the "official classes" was to a great extent inculcated subliminally, fenced off from rational examination, and was all the greater for it.

The symbol of the monarchy was a crucial part of the "mental baggage" that officials and their families took with them when they departed for service in the colonies. Possibly taken for granted at home, this symbol had an important part to play under the stressful conditions of isolated enclave life in foreign parts. A group of isolated Britons in a remote colony did not need to talk about such matters to renew their sense of service and to reassure themselves that they were part of a stronger order and structure, no matter how threatening, foreign or chaotic their surroundings might seem to them. Ritual was far more efficient than words. Respect for the flag, the simple toast at a formal dinner to "The Queen," the deference accorded to her representative the governor, renewed self-identity as Britons, and as servants of the Crown. Such rituals expressed the continuity of British tradition, re-affirmed the comforting presence of order and hierarchy, and provided at least a momentary transcendence of sometimes irritating internal divisions. Scots, Welsh and English, even

some Irish, governor and road foreman, administrator and technical expert, Senior Lady and stenographer, could come together in a shared devotion to the monarchy, hence their shared superiority as British vis-a-vis "others."[7]

But as a symbol, the multi-vocal British monarchy had yet another advantage; the continuity of the British monarchy over a thousand years, in contrast to the fate of the French, Russian and German ruling dynasties, was an assurance that Britain possessed the capacity to preserve tradition through a gradual and graceful process of adaptation to new conditions. The British conservative tradition left scope for change and reform, as long as it was gradual, and carefully controlled from the top. It was the Conservative, Disraeli, who pushed through the 1867 Reform Bill enfranchising urban male workers, as well as various acts legalizing trade unions and somewhat improving factory conditions.

As a general rule, conservative tradition did not exclude humanitarian concern for the less fortunate, and desire to ameliorate the lot of those at the lower end of the hierarchy. Such a concern did not imply any weakening of the hierarchy. A remark made to me vis-a-vis South Africa expresses the point well:

> We will work to help the blacks and protect their rights.
> But we are not Communists; we don't hobnob with them.

Thus in Britain, the Lady Bountifuls who did charity work in the British slums would never have dreamt of inviting any of the recipients to their own home.

The conservative tradition had its stronghold in the British Conservative party, but was by no means confined to it. Elements of the tradition can be found in most unlikely places. Even the liberal, rationalist reformers in Britain turn away from a view of society as composed of irreconcilable, opposed divisions. A conflict model of society is totally foreign to the conservative tradition, but even many in the Labour and reformist tradition have been uncomfortable with it.

But at the same time, the cleavage in thought and feeling that divided the 'classes' in Great Britain prior to the Second World War was very deep; it is not always easy for North Americans in the 1970s to grasp the intensity of this cleavage. There could even be a physical repugnance for the 'lower classes' and their smell, as Orwell has so graphically described (Orwell 1962). To the public school boy, even of 'middle-class' background, the cleavage was

self	:	other
all gentlemen		'lower classes'

The 'other' was unknown, a little mysterious except in the form of faithful servants, and in its working-man forms, potentially frightening, even if by definition inferior.

But in the colony, this opposition was transcended. The garage mechanic or P.W.D. foreman, who at home would have been part of 'them', the 'other', was transformed into 'us', part of the white category, opposed to 'them' the natives. The principle of opposition, and exclusion, was no longer 'class', but race. Thus we cannot consider the

manifestations of the conservative outlook on colonial rule without taking into account the complicating factor of British views about race.

3. Race and racial determinism

Curtin (1964) has traced the roots of what he calls "pseudo-scientific racism," which came to dominate European scholarly thought about Africans from the mid-19th century until well on into the 1920s; it can be found in popular thought to this day. As we assess the sociological consequences of doctrines that are no longer scientifically respectable, it is essential to keep in mind that racial determinism was derived from some of the leading scientific, including anthropological, thought of the time. By racial determinism is meant the doctrine that significant elements of a group's culture, mental characteristics and/or capacity for culture were determined by the same genetic mechanisms as their physical, 'racial' characteristics.

At the turn of the century, racial determinism was prevalent in both scholarly and lay circles. But by the 1920s its scientific foundations had begun to crack. The period we are especially interested in, when most of the study population was being socialized, was a time of upheaval within the world of scholarship, and ripples soon spread out from the ivory tower to touch the world of colonial affairs. For this time of ferment we must track down several competing lines of thought — keeping in mind how, and at what levels, these lines of thought could have affected those who were to become officials.

We have seen that racial determinism permeated the boys' adventure

literature of the early 20th century, reached a wide audience through Kipling, and was presupposed by much of the popular writing in support of imperialism. It was probably not specifically taught in the public schools; the classical curriculum, as we saw above, paid little attention to human biology or 'social studies' as we now know them. It is more probable that the young cadet had only a hazy image of Africa and Africans, unless he came of a family with a tradition of overseas service, until he started the training course before overseas service.

We cannot know with any certainty how exactly these various strains of thought combined in the young men when they were first sent out to the colonies. Recall of one's views when young cannot be thoroughly reliable, and few letters or diaries of this stage in the officials' lives are at present available.[8] One alternative is to organize our inquiry around some of those books we know that cadets were obliged to read. One of these, of unparallelled prestige, was Lugard's, The dual mandate... referred to above.

Lugard had fought Arab slavers in Nyasaland, participated in the British take-over of Uganda, and conquered Northern Nigeria. He then became a great administrator who formalized the doctrine of Indirect Rule, and was the first governor-general of Nigeria (1914-1919). His work was thus regarded as the distilled wisdom of a man of vast experience, not the armchair theorizing which many held in contempt.

4. Lugard's view of 'the African'

Lugard's doctrine rests firmly on a theory of racial determinism.

Lugard carries his racial determinism so far as to look for "... some clue as to the capability of the race for intellectual development and social organisation" among the condition of the blacks in the U.S.A. Here he uses as "evidence," a London Times reporter, and the racist American writers Stoddard and Townsend. He notes that "...the negro race can at the least produce individuals of great force of character and high ideals....Dubois — albeit not of pure negro blood — is said to have the gift of leadership" (ibid.:82). Since, in the English dogma of the time, the "gift of leadership" was denied to the majority of working-class Englishmen, that is a significant concession. But on the whole, he found the "evidence" from the condition of American blacks supportive of his view that 'the African' will be happiest when he follows his own bent and does not try to ape the European (ibid.). He did not have much regard for the "Europeanized African" that he had encountered in Nigeria; there, the tiny minority of educated men was already asking for a voice in government.

Lugard's racial determinism was by no means unique to him. As Curtin points out (1971), the premises of scientific racism in that period underly many diverse doctrines. Even the Labour critics of British rule in Africa, such as Woolf and Olivier,[9] shared the prevalent racial determinist assumptions, although the conclusions they drew from them were different. For example, Olivier (1929, quoted in Curtin 1971) put forward an intriguing argument for the value of other cultures, and of the "hybrid" or marginal man, on a racist foundation, as a basis for liberal humanitarian pleas for reform in labor relations.

As the quotations on p. 228 above illustrate, his book reflects an unquestioned sense of the superiority of the English "race," which implies a theory of the inferiority of the subject peoples of Africa. He saw the Africans as divided into two main stocks: the immigrants from Asia through the northeast, or Hamites, and the negro. As for the Hamitic peoples (in which he included the Masai, Somali, Galla and Fulani),

> All have been modified to a greater or less degree by admixture with negro blood....they vary in their mental and physical characteristics according to the amount of negro blood in their veins... (Lugard 1922:67).

The Hamites and Hamitic negroids exhibit "...powers of social organization and intellectual development in advance of the pure negro stock (ibid.:68). As for the so-called "Bantu" race, "Their intelligence is more developed, and many tribes have reached a degree of social organization which, in some cases, has attained to the kingdom stage under a despot with provincial chiefs of the feudal type" (ibid.).

He saw the "Bantus" and most other negroes as physically fine specimens of the human race, capable of great feats of strength and endurance.

> In character and temperament the typical African of this race-type is a happy, thriftless, excitable person, lacking in self-control, discipline, and foresight, naturally courageous, and naturally courteous and polite, full of personal vanity, with little sense of veracity... (ibid.:69).

The list of allegedly racially linked characteristics goes on and on: mind nearer to the animal world than that of the European or Asiatic, lack of desire to rise beyond the state he has reached, failure to evolve an organized religious creed, insensibility to pain and disregard

for life... (ibid.). But more important, the typical African of this "race-type"

> ...lacks powers of organisation, and is conspicuously deficient in the management and control alike of men or of business. He loves the display of power, but fails to realise its responsibility....He is by no means lacking in industry, and will work hard with a less incentive than most races. He has the courage of the fighting animal — an instinct rather than a moral virtue. He is very prone to imitate anything new in dress or custom....He is an apt pupil, and a faithful and devoted friend.
>
> In brief, the virtues and the defects of this race-type are those of attractive children, whose confidence when once it has been won is given ungrudgingly as to an older and wiser superior, without question and without envy (ibid.:70).

Lugard was not, at least at that stage in his life, a scholarly man. He did not quote scientific authorities, although he did make reference to a few popularizers of scientific racism. He was presenting in strong form views widely held during the period of his active career; his chapter is an excellent example of the late-Victorian-Edwardian doctrines that prevailed during the expansionist imperialism of that time. Hammond and Jablow note that the theme of the childlikeness of 'the African' first appeared in the mid-nineteenth century (1977:65). The image derived from two centuries of contact before that time was that of savages or heathens, but not children. The theme of the African as child appeared unselfconsciously in print as late as 1955, in Sir Charles Dundas' memoirs, and with equal unselfconsciousness in the conversations of a few of my older informants during interviews, 1974-1975. This theme was an important element that the British used to justify their rule in the inter-war period.

During the inter-war period, we cannot distinguish the "humanitarians" or "progressives" by presence or absence of racial determinist views. Cadets recruited in the 1920s could hardly have avoided absorbing some racial determinism, for they were surrounded by such assumptions on all sides, from supporters and critics of Empire alike.

But Lugard's chapter on the African people also drew on two other strains of thought, derived from anthropology, that tended to reinforce its readers' sense of their own superiority. First was an evaluative evolutionism that spoke of inferior and superior, backward and advanced peoples. The most primitive tribes were those who recognized no chief, were still in "the patriarchal stage, lacking any but the most rudimentary communal organisation." Those with "well-defined tribal institutions" merged into the more advanced communities, with centralized despotic rule (ibid.:75). The criterion for placement on the evolutionary scale was degree of institutionalization of differentiated political roles.

People lacking chiefs were also characterized by "gross and cruel superstitions," degrading practices and nudity, while despots, where indigenous negroes, were bloodthirsty in the extreme.

The second strain of thought, a specific form of diffusionism, was then drawn on to explain the presence of "the most progressive" or highly centralized, communities. Here his implicit model was the Fulani of Northern Nigeria. Diffusion had brought the monotheistic religion of Islam, a foreign culture and written language. All three strains of thought are blended in the "Hamitic hypothesis":

> [Islam] has been the more potent as a creative and regenerating force, because it brought with it an admixture of Aryan or Hamitic blood, and the races which introduced it settled in the country and became identified with its inhabitants. They possessed greater power of social organisation than the negro aborigines, and may therefore claim to be of a superior race-type (ibid.:76).

This "Hamitic hypothesis," which in essence alleges that a non-negroid, partly-Caucasoid "race" with a greater inherent capacity for government carried the idea of centralized rule to less advanced peoples, was to survive and influence the thinking of colonial officials for many years. Believers in the Hamitic hypothesis were never able to explain why, if the alleged greater capacity for government were racially-determined, the majority of the alleged Hamites or "modified Hamites" were totally acephalous. Despite this inconsistency, and the jumbling together of racial, linguistic and cultural levels, the hypothesis is only now dying out even in the academic literature (cf. McGaffey 1966).

5. Racial determinism vs. the new anthropology

Lugard's chapter on the people of tropical Africa can be regarded as the full flowering, in lay hands, of currents of anthropological thought of previous years. But when his book came out in 1922, the scientific underpinning for this thought pattern was already eroding. If Lugard had cared to look, by the time he was writing his book he could have found in the United States authorities who were directly undermining the racial determinist arguments. In 1911, Boas, in The mind of primitive man, argued against the prevalent view of race as a unitary type, and replaced it with a statistical concept. He used the

results of his own research in physical anthropology to attack the belief in the hereditary superiority of certain racial types over others. His book was also a mile-stone in the anthropological efforts to disentangle the concepts of race and culture and establish their independent variation. He was at the same time attacking the methodological adequacy of evolutionary theory as then practiced. Furthermore, Boas, in accord with his liberal outlook, used his scientific results in attacks on racial bigotry within the U.S.A. by writing popular articles arguing for the right of Negroes to be treated as individuals and not as members of a "race."[10] Many of his students followed his example and regarded it as part of their professional responsibility to disseminate their anthropological results in an attempt to combat prevailing dogmas on race.

In England, the revolt against the older forms of anthropological thinking took on a different form. This revolt came out in the open in 1922, the same year that Lugard's book appeared, with the publication of books by both Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski (1922a), and an article by Malinowski (1922b) attacking the older evolutionary and diffusionist theories. The insurgents rapidly undercut two of the three anthropological legs on which Lugard's views rested: evolutionism and diffusionism. But they did not attack theories of the racial determination of cultural traits. One reason was their conception of the scope and boundaries of their new approach. Radcliffe-Brown especially, heavily influenced by Durkheim, wanted to establish social anthropology as an independent science with its own laws. He had to battle against

the strong "psychologism" prevalent in British anthropology at the time, which assumed that race-type would affect behavior through differential development of the brain. Radcliffe-Brown combatted this approach by brushing it aside: human physical variations were properly part of human biology; since social anthropologists should not be concerned with such questions, they need take no account of physical anthropology.[11] While this delineation of the boundaries of the discipline had much to recommend it, one consequence was a failure to disseminate to non-anthropological audiences in Britain the findings of recent scholarly thinking on the subject of race, as their counterparts in the U.S.A. had long been doing.[12] In fact, anthropologists of great prestige continued to publish racial determinist views in influential form. Seligman's The races of Africa (1930), widely read by colonial cadets,[13] presented the Hamitic hypothesis in strong form. He argued that whatever traces of civilization were to be found in Africa were a result of the invading Caucasoid Hamites, who were inherently more capable than the Negroids. Cadets of the 1930s can hardly be blamed for maintaining racial determinist views; anthropologists of the time provided them with no alternatives to such theories held by the authorities they were given to read. Instead, Malinowski and Lugard co-operated in the International African Institute, founded in 1926.

Despite strong sales pitches from the anthropologists, often expressed through the Institute, British officials long remained ambivalent about the involvement of professional anthropologists in administrative problems (Asad 1973:138-141). The Colonial Office, however,

was more easily persuaded of the value of greater training in anthropology for colonial cadets. In 1926, when the training course for cadets was expanded to one year (see Chapter II above), the organizers drew on some of the new "functional" anthropologists, as well as some of the older school, for lecturers.

Even though the new social anthropology failed to provide a strong alternative to racial determinism, it did offer much that was positive. The essence of the new perspective was simple: societies were functionally inter-related systems; as such they should be studied as they functioned in the present. The functionally inter-related unit was assumed to be the 'tribe', and concern was directed towards what made for maintenance of integration and stability.[14] A corollory of this view was that even apparently bizarre customs could be seen to "make sense" if studied in their context. A message transmitted both explicitly and implicitly was that the culture and social structure of the peoples ruled were worth studying, hence potentially comprehensible. Perhaps most important was a tone of respect for the differing but comprehensible ways of simpler peoples.

The "anthropological attitude" of respect for the traditions of simpler peoples and interest in studying them can be found in scattered officials, often mavericks of some kind, well before the advent of the new social anthropology.[15] But the inclusion of social anthropology in the training course opened the way for diffusion of this attitude among the cadets on a wider scale. This does not of course imply that all cadets necessarily absorbed it; a few lectures from an anthropologist

could not alone offset British xenophobia, and the evaluative racist evolutionism still current in the wider society and also presented to cadets through their texts. But the new anthropology may well have helped to mitigate these attitudes; at the least, it seems to have made some officials rather more alert to the possibility of unexpected consequences of the changes introduced by colonial rule.

The officials and the anthropologists differed in their evaluation of, and emotional attitudes towards, the simpler societies of the subject peoples, but this difference masks deeper underlying similarities in their implicit general models of society. The implications of the new anthropology were themselves very often conservative: in general, the interests of the weaker people were to be protected through understanding and support of their already existing system. The conservative model, as we have seen, was of an organic, hierarchical society held together by a governing authority, and shared norms or belief system. The anthropological model of a functionally-interrelated society did not necessarily imply hierarchy — it could cope with acephalous systems — but at that time it made frequent use of an organic analogy, and emphasized integrating normative patterns. Both the British conservative tradition and the new anthropology involved profound respect for tradition, and a mistrust of too-rapid change. The anthropological attitude was "progressive" insofar as it involved extending respect for tradition to the traditions of the simpler, subject peoples. From the perspective of the 1970s, it is difficult to grasp the full import of this change; it needs to be seen as a reaction

to the "Manners beastly; customs, none" type of view then widespread among whites in Africa, and to the evaluative evolutionism of earlier anthropological theories. From this new view, African societies and cultures were seen as possessing something of value, worth conserving. This step on the part of some — for not all officials made it — was done at a time when the period available for modification of indigenous tribal traditions and the growth of new superstructures was conceived of in centuries rather than decades.

An almost poetic expression of this attitude is found in the introduction to Rattray's 1923 book on Ashanti, read by many cadets:

> I have taken every opportunity, while gathering material for this volume from my Ashanti friends, to impress upon them strongly that our culture, our ideas, arts, customs, dress, should not be embraced by them blindly to the entire exclusion and extinction of what is good, just, and praiseworthy in their ancient national institutions.
>
> I have told them that their ideal should be, not to become pseudo-Europeans, but to aim at progress for their race based upon what is best in their own institutions, religion, their manners and customs.
>
> I have told them that they will become better and finer men and women by remaining true Ashanti and retaining a certain pride in their past, and that their greatest hope lies in the future, if they will follow and build upon lines with which the national sunsum or soul has been familiar since first they were a people....
>
> I have tried to make the people understand that we are here among them to help them by grafting on to their institutions such of our own as will enable them to take their place in the commonwealth of civilized nations, not as denationalized Ashanti, but as an African people who will become the greater force and power in the Empire because they have not bartered the wealth of their past, metaphorically and not infrequently in reality, for a coat, a collar, or a tie (1923:11-12; my emphasis).

Throughout the inter-war period, the process of change is conceived of by both the "enlightened" officials, and anthropologists, in terms of biological metaphor.

> On the other hand we could employ the other method of trying, while we endeavoured to purge the native system of its abuses, to graft our higher civilization upon the soundly rooted native stock, stock that had its foundations in the hearts and minds and thoughts of the people, and therefore on which we could build more easily, moulding it and establishing it into lines consonant with modern ideas and higher standards, and yet all the time enlisting the real force of the spirit of the people.... (Cameron 1925).[16]

> ...administrative policy in Buganda has created the first pre-requisite for a transformation of native life which has yet left it firmly rooted in the indigenous soil (Mair 1934:275).

> It is not because European institutions are unsuitable to Africans as individuals that their wholesale introduction is deprecated, but because neither African nor any other society can assimilate a complete outfit of alien institutions between today and tomorrow (ibid.:287).

One of the more common phrases was "grafting on" the minimum set of European institutions required for the modern world (see also the quotation from Rattray above). The implication throughout was that, as any good gardener knows, sound growth cannot be forced, but must proceed at its own slow, steady pace. And if the graft was going to "take," the join must receive special care and protection through the delicate period of partial fusion. Above all, the protective wraps around the graft must not be removed too soon. British protection was seen as lasting far into the future.

> For the quarter of a century between the end of the first world war and the end of the second, the feature of British colonial policy that stands out in retrospect is the tranquil assumption of the long-term character of colonial rule. It

> was an assumption accepted by many, perhaps most, of the radical critics of that policy who were often more concerned to purify, supervise, or even internationalize, such rule than to advocate its rapid replacement by independence (Robinson 1965:7).

The soundly rooted native stock on to which Europeans were to be grafted was, of course, the 'tribe'.

6. The concepts of 'tribe' and 'chief'

Central to both official and anthropological thinking of the time was the concept of 'tribe'. This was such a basic, and obvious, concept to the British official mind that no definition was given even in the Census returns. Attempts to explore its meaning with officials during interviews were disastrous, and had to be given up. Informants became inarticulate — a tribe was a tribe — and reacted as if wondering whether incompetence or insanity led me to question such a "self-evident" concept.

Anthropologists no longer regard the concept of 'tribe' as simple or self-evident, but even as late as the 1950s, anthropological thought assumed it as a basic category. It seems probable that both officials and anthropologists drew their implicit model of 'tribe' from the long years of subjection to classical studies at preparatory and public schools. The English term itself is derived from the Latin tribus. But as Fried has pointed out (1975:3-9), information on the early Latin and Greek social units referred to as 'tribes' is conflicting. The classical model of 'tribe' is itself vague and confused, characteristics that have clung to the term ever since.

It is extremely difficult to give a precise account of a British official concept that is itself vague. 'Tribe' was a fundamental category of thought which young officials imported to Africa with them, but the English usage itself was affected by centuries of contact with Africa and other parts of the subject Empire. Like Fried, we can turn to English dictionaries for general meanings. The Oxford English Dictionary says 'tribe' is

> 1a. A group of persons...claiming descent from a common ancestor specifically with reference to the twelve tribes of Israel.
>
> 1b. A particular race of recognized ancestry; a family.
>
> 3. A race of people; now applied especially to a primary aggregate of people in a primitive or barbarous condition under a headman or chief.

The third usage seems to be closer to the meaning generally given to it in official usage, but the others are by no means excluded. Imprecision and ambiguity surround the term.

The British seem to have approached the immense range of African social groupings with their own pre-existing concepts of 'tribe'. When the empirical reality did not conform to their expectations, there was a feeling that it ought to. Many years ago I found in the Mbeya District Book in Tanganyika a comment written in 1936 by an administrator, about the people I was then studying: "The Nyiha are a primitive people, and have not yet fully grasped the idea of the unity of the tribe...."

Tribal consciousness, in those days, was a Good Thing. And the Good Tribe was the one with a strong sense of unity, a clearly bounded

tribal territory, a clearly recognizable ruler with authority, and internal stability that gave its members a strong sense of identity and provided supportive warmth and the restraining control of custom. A British official gave a four-page description of his "ideal-type" undisturbed African tribal society (Orde Browne 1933:6-10). It contains the expected features: mutual aid, unquestioning obedience to authorities, whether chiefs or elders, each person had his or her clearly defined position in society, and clearly defined rights and obligations. The importance of the welfare of the tribe was stressed rather than the individual: "each person learnt to think of himself more as a unit in a group than as a separate entity, and he relied with full confidence on the help of that group in case of adversity" (ibid.). The individual was lost without the tribe; "the individual separated from his fellows was liable to great instability of conduct." And so on. Orde Browne sees the security provided by the tribe as leading to improvidence and lack of thought for the future. Furthermore, he sees these characteristics, along with the distinct lack of capacity for government, as racially linked characteristics. The shadow of racial determinism had not yet been extirpated.

We are not concerned, at the moment, with the degree to which this ideal-type corresponded to any African reality, but only with its relation to British thought. We can recognize here several points: an ambivalent nostalgia for Gemeinschaft that is a recurring motif of European thought; the incapacity of tribal people to govern themselves under modern conditions, hence their need for European guidance, and

the belief that, on his own, a tribesman became lost, unstable, rootless.

We saw above that conservative thought in Britain, as applied to Englishmen, emphasized the importance of the groups mediating between the state and the individual, and involved a fear of rootlessness. Man, European Man, being inherently sinful, needed the restraint of an old and accepted social system, envelopment in local groups, and the overall firm guidance of wise and benevolent rulers. This tradition, evolved with reference to European society, was easily adapted for application to Africa. The obvious mediating group — so obvious the choice seems never to have been seriously examined — was 'the tribe', which under the wise guidance of the European rulers manning the colonial state could be purged of its abuses and used as the basis for the evolution of a new and higher civilization. But if this were to be done, tribal institutions needed to be protected from overly sudden disruptions. The fear of rootlessness became an intense fear of 'detribalization'. At this point, the romantic conservative's belief that, for an African, true happiness was to be found through membership in a purged and reformed tribal life, merged with the fear of the detribalized mob. For if the unleashing of Frenchmen led to the Jacobin Reign of Terror, what inconceivable savagery would unleashed, detribalized Africans be capable of? Race consciousness, the feeling that those people were inherently different from oneself, compounded the dread.

At this point, contemplation of unspeakable horrors usually reduces the official mind to silence. Writers such as Mannoni (1956)

have gone on into speculative realms, wherein the black man is seen as symbolizing what his white rulers most fear in themselves — the darkest depths of human nature itself. Quotations supporting such interpretations could easily be amassed, but mostly from novelists (cf. Hammond and Jablow 1977). The prosaic official mind does not usually express itself on such matters; certainly nothing in my interview data supports such an interpretation. It must be set aside as speculation, even though plausible.

But there is ample evidence that many officials, in the inter-war years, believed that Africans would be losing something of immeasurable value if they rejected completely their tribal traditions. The quotation from Rattray, above, expresses well this view. Such men, in England, mourned the destruction of English village life, the replacement of small craftsmen by large chain stores, and the horrors of industrialization. Ambivalent or opposed to the trends apparent in their own society, and as we saw above, ill-equipped by their heavily classical education to understand the economic basis of these changes, they sought in Africa the lost Gemeinschaft. Men of this type believed it possible to purge what they disapproved of from tribal life, and "graft on" the few necessary improvements, without destroying the basic fabric. Thomas and Scott said of Uganda, "It has been the object of the Administration to superimpose an appropriately coloured version of our own civilization on the structure of native society without causing any serious dislocation of its foundations" (1935:274). Buganda was the living model to which most discussion of this period

referred, as evidence this could successfully be done (e.g. Mair 1937).

Officials of this persuasion continued to believe strongly in Lugard's advice that "Festina lente" (make haste slowly) was always the best policy in Africa. This must have been a singularly comforting belief after 1930, when the financial crisis and budget cutbacks reduced the money available for development programs. This was the period when it was believed unwise to spread Western education too fast, when officials tended to be somewhat suspicious of missionary proselytizing activity, and hostile to educated Africans in trousers. In Europe, the conservative mind was haunted by the spectre of the sans-culottes of the French Revolution; in inter-war Africa, the conservative's view of the future was haunted by the spectre of a detribalized mob of black savages led by a few "semi-educated trouble-makers." The bulwark against the chaos and anarchy inherent in all men's nature, and especially close to the surface in black men, was the preservation of tribal institutions.

Central to the British conception of 'tribe', was the belief that each proper 'tribe' had not only its well-defined territory, but its own chief. There was, on this view, a mystical connection between chief and people, such that chiefs were respected, even venerated, and obeyed. The chief, then, could speak for his people, and represent them in a very real sense, for he was their organic, ritually installed head.

The British seem to have had, in the early years, a difficult problem in grasping how a chiefless society could really function; a

leaderless society, to the conservative mind, is almost a contradiction in terms. It must be remembered that not until 1938-40 were anthropological accounts of acephalous systems available to explain how society could be ordered without institutionalized governmental roles. The scholarly accounts of anthropologists could have done little to offset the influence of the evaluative evolutionism that pervaded Lugard's 1922 "bible," illustrated in the quotations above: that African society was best and most advanced that had the most elaborated, differentiated and hierarchical political system. As one might expect given their background, hierarchy even if despotic was comprehensible, while the "ordered anarchy" of an egalitarian acephalous people was not. Feeling themselves a mystical devotion to their own monarch, they could easily understand, and perhaps sometimes project, a mystical link between African tribesmen and their "tribal" rulers.

7. Indirect Rule

This belief in the tribe as an unchanging primordial unit under its ancient tribal leaders fed into the belief in Indirect Rule, the dominating doctrine of rule during the inter-war period.

Indirect Rule as a pragmatic device is centuries old. Many empires have made use of the indigenous authorities as a means of maintaining local control over conquered peoples. The British had earlier put it to good use in the princely states in India. As we shall see in the next chapter, an administrator now almost forgotten had in Uganda in the 1890s, without benefit of doctrine or guidance,

used the indigenous system of Buganda to compensate for lack of British manpower. But the formalization of this device and its emergence as an ideological doctrine stems from Lugard's work in Northern Nigeria and his book of 1922.

A vast amount has already been written about Indirect Rule, so little need be added here.[17] In the inter-war period, Indirect Rule as a doctrine was usually part of a complex of ideas, often involving a preference for a colonial economy based on peasant production rather than large-scale European-managed enterprises. Especially in the hands of Sir Donald Cameron, governor of Tanganyika 1925-1931, the doctrine was wielded as a weapon against white settler interests in Kenya and Tanganyika that favored a rapid proletarianization of Africans to create a more malleable work force.[18] In the sense that it provided an antithesis to the earlier, straightforward exploitation-by-European-enterprises doctrine, this assertion of the value of indigenous tribal institutions and the need to protect them from too rapid change was "progressive." But at the same time, it is abundantly clear that Sir Donald, a man of much wider vision than many of his contemporaries, also saw Indirect Rule as a means of forestalling nationalist agitation and prolonging British rule.[19]

It has now become fashionable to assert that Indirect Rule <u>was devised</u> for divide-and-rule purposes. This seems an overstatement; a more precise evaluation requires that we distinguish carefully not only between consequence and intent, but also between ideology and practice. Use of appropriate native institutions in Africa began independently

in several places because it was cheap and expedient, where money and British staff were short. This pragmatic device later became elevated into a doctrine enveloped in much talk about its greater benefits to Africans, gradual organic change and so on. But as many writers have shown, even as the talk about Indirect Rule increased, the reality of it in practice declined as demands for greater efficiency in administration led to more and more intervention (cf. especially Austen 1968).

That this convenient administrative device could also have the additional benefit of contributing to the prolongation of British rule was seen by a few such as Cameron. But this is not the same as stating that it was devised for that purpose. As Robinson has pointed out in the quotation above, during the inter-war period the majority of officials so tranquilly assumed the persistence of colonial rule for centuries that the need for such measures was not explicitly recognized by many. But the need for assisting tribal societies to survive and adapt gradually, to prevent the complete breakdown of old forms of social control before new ones could be developed to replace them, was argued by many more.

The prevalence of the doctrine of Indirect Rule during this inter-war period resulted from its congruence with basic premises of conservative thought. But the doctrine had something for everyone. As Low and Pratt said, these beliefs "...appealed to the liberal by the paramountcy they gave to African interests. They appealed to the conservative by the organic view of society which they implied, and by their stress on gradual adaptation rather than rapid change" (1970:175).

In addition, those anthropologically inclined could be reassured that the most modern anthropological thought supported the superiority of Indirect Rule type measures, based on respect for indigenous institutions. The aim was not to preserve these unchanged, but to protect them so that change could be gradual and adaptive, not disintegrative.

Low and Pratt have noted the development during this period of what they call a kind of liberal racialism. Holders of this view were skeptical of the appropriateness of European political institutions for Africans. The leading spokesman of this view was Sir Donald Cameron. When asked about the place of elections in native political development, he said, "As far as I am concerned I would leave that to their genius. I would not force it upon them." And also, "Whether the native...will turn to a western system of government with the vote and the ballot I do not know. Again I saw that must be left to his own genius" (quoted in Low and Pratt 1970:168).

It is no wonder that African intellectuals in British colonies failed to develop concepts of Negritude parallel to those developed by intellectuals in French African colonies. Their British rulers had already pre-empted that position on their behalf.

Lord Hailey said of Indirect Rule that it "...passed through three stages, first of a useful administrative device, then that of a political doctrine, and finally that of a religious dogma" (quoted in Low and Pratt ibid.:176). The doctrine reached Ugandan officials as cadets, through Lugard's book and other writings of the period. It also came to Uganda in a direct line of transmission, for Cameron had

been Lugard's lieutenant in Nigeria, and Cameron's two chief lieutenants in Tanganyika, Mitchell and Dundas, both became governors in Uganda. But doctrine-cum-dogma had to be adapted in practice to local conditions, as we shall see in the next chapter.

8. Summary

This and the previous chapter have attempted to summarize, in ideal-type form, some of the beliefs about man and society, the styles of thought, and personality traits characteristic of those selected for the colonial Administrative Service. The description is subject to the usual caveat accompanying ideal-type delineations: it is an abstraction from a much more complex reality showing a wide range of individual variation.

For convenience of exposition later, the beliefs can be categorized according to level of generality. The highest order includes what was labelled above the conservative tradition or the organic conception of society. These beliefs were not derived from the British colonial situation, and had no direct reference to it. Instead, they were a widely diffused part of the 'class' sub-culture from which the majority of administrative officials were drawn; similarly, the styles of thought and personality traits were formed by 'class'-specific socializing institutions that provided many other kinds of rulers, administrators and soldiers as well as colonial officials.

At a second level of generality were the broad beliefs about the purpose of the colonies and the nature of British colonial rule. As

shown above, these beliefs changed over time. For convenience, I shall refer to this level as the "trusteeship" level. But the concept of "trusteeship" involves as an essential component a concept of the nature of those over whom "trusteeship" was held: "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" as the League of Nations mandate tactfully phrased it. This second level of belief, by justifying British rule of her colonies as trusteeship, emphasized the ideological necessity of a concept of 'ward', or 'the ruled'.

As Lebow has pointed out in a discussion of the British in Ireland (1976), colonial rulers have tended to develop remarkably similar stereotypes of the ruled, regardless of time, geographical location or race. The generic similarities in traits attributed to peoples as diverse as nineteenth century Irish, the peoples of India, Burma or Africa can be most easily explained as a consequence of certain processes within the colonial situation, leading to similar perceptions and simplifying stereotyping. But the ideological shift of the 1920s, away from open acknowledgement of the benefits to Britain of her colonies, towards ever greater emphasis on the benefits to the colonies of British rule, led to an increased ideological need for a concept of the ruled as 'wards' in need of such benefits. In contrast to earlier years when serving the Empire provided a respectable ideological justification for forcible expansion of British rule, in the years of consolidation a concept of the ruled as wards in need of paternal guidance now had to carry almost the entire weight of justifying to themselves British presence in her colonies. This need for a concept of the ruled is thus

of the second order of generality, but the specific content of the concept differed according to time and place and so will be considered below.

But as shown above, the concept of trusteeship provided no specific guidelines for policies. Beliefs about what should be done in a group of colonies can be categorized as a third, somewhat more specific level. Here can be placed the doctrine of Indirect Rule for African colonies, along with its associated concepts of 'tribe' and 'chief', and the belief in slow and gradual change to avoid sudden disruption of indigenous institutions. At a later time, concepts of the need for increased local self-government tended to displace the earlier views. Here too can be placed the generic concept of 'the African', that term used in the singular whose most common reference was, I suggest, not any African people but the British concept of the ruled as wards in need of paternal guidance, a concept essential to complement the second-order belief in trusteeship.

In this third order of generality, we are dealing with beliefs generated by a complex process of actual experience in ruling Africa interpreted through the concepts about the nature of man and society provided by the highest-order level of beliefs. As beliefs on this and the next lower level are a product of the processing of actual experience in the colonies through the "mental baggage" imported by the officials, the results varied both as the actual situations differed and changed over time, and as the "mental baggage" differed from individual to individual, and was modified by ideological shifts in the metropole. Therefore differences of viewpoint and disputes over the best ways to

achieve the desired aims were not infrequent among officials.

While certain beliefs about what was best for Africa and 'the African' were fairly widespread among officials with African service, other beliefs were specific to one colony. This fourth level would include stereotypes about 'tribal character', and beliefs consequent on the unique history of a colony. For Uganda, beliefs about the 1900 Agreement defining the place of Buganda in the Protectorate, and attitudes to the kabaka of Buganda, for example, represent an application of higher-order beliefs to a specific historical situation, and hence can be understood only with reference to both the higher-order beliefs and the local history. On the other hand, certain strong beliefs, especially with reference to technical aspects of economic and agricultural policy, had a greater degree of logical independence from the higher-order beliefs about man and society, as shall be illustrated in Part III. Beliefs on this fourth, most specific level cannot be fruitfully discussed further until the specific history and conditions of Uganda have been reviewed in Part II.

Beliefs about Africa and about the specific colony and its peoples were transmitted from one generation of officials to the next, through the processes of socialization of new cadets discussed in Chapter II. The beliefs absorbed by a new cadet were modified in terms of his own outlook and experience within his colony, and the modified versions transmitted to new arrivals when he, in time, became senior and entrusted with the task of socializing cadets. Thus the accumulated "conventional wisdom" about a colony was not a static nor even a thoroughly homo-

geneous body of doctrine, and it certainly was not explicit nor systematized. Thus at any one time, variant forms of ideology could be found in any one colony, and disputes based on these differences could be sharp and heated.

These distinctions are analytically useful, but introduce a formalization and rigidity quite foreign to official thought as actually expressed in interviews, and as found in documents.[20] The inexplicit and unsystematized nature of this thought, as found in any one representative, is one of its dominant characteristics. But although no one official, unless he were one of the untypical minority prone to thoughtfulness, might produce an explicit systematized statement about, say, the organic society belief syndrome, this belief pattern was nevertheless part of their available cultural background. One might use the metaphor of a vast public cultural storehouse,[21] from which an official could pull out items when needed for use. If the items so withdrawn sometimes formed an oddly heterogeneous or even contradictory assortment, no matter; the storehouse also included a high valuation of pragmatism and the results of practical experience over systematic thought and mere logical consistency, or "theory-mongering." To continue the metaphor, the task of the analyst is to systematize the contents of the public storehouse of culture to which the officials had access, but also to clarify the consequences of the fact that any one representative expressed only a partial and incomplete, and usually inexplicit part of the warehouse's holdings. But first we must look at the specific conditions of Uganda, and some of the policies followed there.

NOTES

1. Among the vast literature dealing with imperialist beliefs, those especially relevant to Africa include Curtin 1964 and 1971, Thornton 1959, 1965, Low 1973.

2. Two specific examples of this blending, on the level of action, concern Uganda: the role of the Church Missionary Society in the public agitation against the threatened British withdrawal from Uganda (see Chapter V; Oliver 1965:134-162), and the role of the CMS and the Buxton family (descendants of the anti-slavery campaigner and author, Sir Thomas Buxton) in the founding of the Uganda Company (Ehrlich 1953:6-10).

3. From Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, reprinted in Curtin 1971:64-66.

4. The term 'trusteeship' applied to colonial rule goes back at least as far as the late 18th century. Burke, in parliamentary speeches attacking the East India Company, argued that the Company's privileges in India were a trust for which it must be accountable to parliament (1949:256-257). But it became a common slogan only after about 1919-20.

5. This statement concerns the ideological level. For what was actually happening in terms of Britain's economic relations with her East African colonies during the 1920s and 1930s, see Brett 1973.

6. Such a view affects ideas as to the proper methods of representation in government. "One-man-one-vote" is a doctrine essentially antithetical to conservatism. It should be remembered that "one-person-one-vote" has prevailed in England only since 1945, when the last remnant of special representation in the Commons for specific groups was abolished. This was the assignment of two seats to represent members of the ancient universities. Even in modernized form, the House of Lords remains a monument to the theory of representation of special groups, as bishops and aristocrats rub shoulders with elderly trade-unionists elevated to life peerages.

7. Part of the evidence for the psychological centrality of these rituals to many, but not all, officials comes from the moral outrage expressed by many informants at the changes introduced by non-conservatives — Sir Andrew and Lady Cohen — in Government House rituals. One woman articulated a feeling hinted at by many

when she declared, "They desecrated Government House!" People would not have been so deeply distressed at the Cohens' replacement of formal dinner parties with informal buffet suppers and multi-racial swimming parties if the structured formal Government House dinner had not been an expression of something beyond itself, which I take to be a symbolic statement of the order and hierarchy valued in the wider society. Elite members of other races were often included in these formal dinners during the Hall regime, but their inclusion within the formal and controlled structure seemed non-threatening. The subject can only be touched on here; it is hoped to provide a more detailed analysis in another format.

8. During interviews, men were asked what they thought had been the most significant influences on their early approach to their work. This line of questioning was often not productive, and was not always followed in later interviews. Of those who did articulate early influences, one mentioned a strongly Evangelical home background, several spoke of the "public school code," one was explicit about Greek and Roman doctrines of rule imbibed through a classical education. A few mentioned family traditions of overseas service. Almost no one was conscious of anthropology as an influence.

9. Lugard's book was in part a polemical answer to Woolf 1920. Woolf had been a colonial administrator in Ceylon before he, like Orwell a generation later, resigned and became a writer against Empire. In his 1920 book he refers throughout to Africans as "the non-adult races." He added

> The African was a savage with all the vices of savagery. Like all human beings, the natives of Africa, not satisfied with the perpetual and unavoidable sufferings which Providence inflicts upon their species, contrived to make their own and their neighbours' lives as miserable as possible. Their methods, when compared with those of our own, were crude; they consisted in war, religion, cannibalism, and cruelty. But the savage has not that organized and intelligent persistence in making his neighbour's life unbearable which is so characteristic of Western civilization. His efforts are spasmodic, often ill-contrived and inconsistent .... (ibid.:336).

Olivier, an early Fabian, had served in the Colonial Office and been governor of Jamaica. He was one of the very few with such experience to become identified with the Labour Party, and was a leading advocate of colonial reform.

10. I have drawn heavily on Stocking 1968 for this paragraph and for greater understanding of the earlier anthropological views prevalent before the Boasian and social anthropological revolts.

11. Radcliffe-Brown was especially explicit on this point in a 1931 paper (1958:44) although it is implicit in his earlier papers, reprinted in the same volume.

12. For example, Evans-Pritchard, in a series of radio talks on social anthropology in 1950, referred to 'race' only by saying that questions of racial variation are part of human biology and do not overlap much with social anthropology (1962:3-4).

13. A number of officials interviewed recalled reading this book while cadets. It was re-published in unaltered form in 1957.

14. I refer here to views put forward in the early 1920s by the leaders of the social anthropological revolt, in opposition to the earlier approaches. Once the "antiquarian" type of history had been pushed aside, controversy broke out in the 1930s among the social anthropologists as to the necessity of historical reconstruction in what was then called studies of "culture contact," cf. International African Institute 1938. In this publication, Malinowski moved to a wider view, and clearly saw that "contact studies" could not assume a functionally integrated system, but often involved groups with irreconcilably opposed interests. His views had evolved far in advance of those of his students, and the kind of studies of European activities in Africa that he called for in 1938 were not undertaken for another quarter of a century at least.

15. E.g. in Uganda, Driberg. The most famous example is probably Rattray of the Gold Coast, whose books several of those interviewed recalled reading while cadets. An administrative officer, he had also studied anthropology with Marett and worked with the Seligmans. His first book on the Ashanti came out in 1923, and reflects his deep respect for the people he studied.

16. This quotation is from Sir Donald Cameron's justification of the application of his version of Indirect Rule in Tanganyika, quoted in Buell 1928:452.

17. The classic source remains Lugard 1922, Chaps. X-XII. Collins 1970 is a convenient source of excerpts from the more important later discussions. Austen 1968 and Graham 1976 on Tanganyika, and Chap. 7 of Low and Pratt 1970 are other useful discussions.

18. Cameron, in a memorandum submitted as part of his intense campaign against closer union of the East African territories in 1931, argued,

> We believe that for the present and for many years to come the only way in which we can prevent the natives from "going under" and becoming a servile people (a condition

> desired for them by a large number of white folk in East Africa); the only way of keeping his society together; the only way in which he can be trained in public affairs — however simply in the early years — is by the system of indirect or tribal administration (quoted in Low and Pratt 1970:166).

Cameron was vociferously opposed to closer union for fear that the white settlers of Kenya would extend the inordinate influence they already had over the Kenya administration to the other East African territories. The doctrine of Indirect Rule was never applied in Kenya.

19. "If we strengthen the Chiefs and build them up, securing their positions for them and paying them generously out of their own Native Treasuries so far as the means of their people allow, we shall have the great majority of them on the side of the Government and not on the side of the political agitator (Sir Donald Cameron, in a document in the Secretariat files, quoted in Graham 1976:3).

See other quotes to this effect from governmental files in ibid. Cameron was less outspoken in his published comments.

20. Cf. Williams,

> Ideology, in its normal sense, is a relatively formal and articulated system of meanings, values and beliefs, of a kind that can be abstracted as a 'world-view' or a 'class outlook'. This explains its popularity as a concept in retrospective analysis (in base-superstructure models or in homology), since a system of ideas can be abstracted from that once living social process and represented, usually by the selection of 'leading' or typical 'ideologists' or 'ideological features', as the decisive form in which consciousness was at once expressed and controlled....The relatively mixed, confused, incomplete, or inarticulate consciousness of actual men in that period and society is thus overridden in the name of this decisive and generalized system... (1977:109).

His point is well taken, but it is difficult to see what other approach is available for retrospective analysis.

21. In this metaphor, I follow Geertz (1973:91) in seeing this cultural storehouse as "public."

PART II

THE UGANDA CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

The first two chapters of this section present in condensed form the essential background on Uganda and its history needed to understand the post-war events discussed in Part III. This material, drawn mostly from the rich secondary sources on Uganda's history, puts more emphasis on the emergence of the colonial economy than on politico/administrative developments. Some attempt has been made to consider significant external events impinging on the development of Uganda's colonial economy, but space constraints and in some cases shortage of data restrict coverage of these external relationships. This is especially true with regard to regional inter-relationships.

Chapter VII poses two linked problems: a) how did the officials interviewed conceive of the colonial society of which they were a part? and b) how can social scientists most fruitfully conceptualize the social structure of Uganda as it was about the end of World War II? It is common to emphasize the racial stratification of British colonial societies such as Uganda, leading to "plural society" models (e.g. Smith 1969). Race provided a fundamental criterion of differentiation in colonial Uganda, crucial to the organization of certain spheres of social life. But an over-emphasis on race differentiation may obscure as much as it reveals. To avoid the trap of a premature application of inappropriate models, Chapter VII starts with an empirical examination of the distribution of control over the resources of Uganda among the differing elements of its population. It is concluded that neither

control of strategic resources, standards of living nor the distribution of power are fully isomorphic with racial strata, and that an understanding of political process at the Protectorate level requires a more fine-grained analysis than can be provided by "plural society" models. Such understanding requires some use of class analysis, despite the difficulties and ambiguities involved in applying class concepts to the flux of colonial Africa. In "colonies of administration" such as Uganda, shared class interests could cross-cut racial categories, but these shared interests had to be worked out within a social situation manifestly compartmentalized by race.

CHAPTER V

THE UGANDAN BACKGROUND

The great European powers who scrambled for Africa at the end of the 19th century divided their spoils among themselves with little regard for ecological or ethnic boundaries. Uganda, about the same size as Great Britain, contains immense ecological, ethnic and linguistic diversity. Its geographic position, enclosing the source of the Nile, was a crucial factor in its colonization, while its internal climatic variations affected both pre-colonial history and the pronounced regional disparities in development that emerged during the colonial era.

Most of the country lies on a plateau at about 4,000 feet elevation, sloping gently down to about 1,700 feet in the north. North and east of Lake Victoria, and along the foothills of the mountains, forty to fifty inches of rain well-distributed through the year provide good conditions for plant growth. In other areas, rainfall is scantier, falling to less than 20 inches a year in the arid northeast plains. Although the country straddles the equator, its altitude gives it a generally pleasant climate; the lower areas to the north are somewhat hotter and dryer than around Lake Victoria, where the administrative capital of Entebbe is situated.

The most ecologically favored part of the country is the aptly named Fertile Crescent, lying north and east of Lake Victoria. In pre-

colonial times, a fairly dense population could be supported here by the settled cultivation of bananas as a staple food. Once the banana plantations were established, women provided most of the labor needed to produce food, freeing men for political and military activities. To the north, shifting cultivation of millets and sorghums provided staple foods, supplemented by animal husbandry. Cattle were especially important in the arid northeast plains of Karamoja, but even here crop husbandry was vital to subsistence.

The foothills of Uganda's mountains provided rich soils, good, well-distributed rainfall, and healthy malaria-free climates. At the time of European conquest, these areas were well-populated. This factor, plus their isolation, may have helped to prevent the massive appropriation of malaria-free highland areas suitable for European settlement that occurred in neighboring Kenya.[1]

Populations in pre-colonial times were far from static. The area includes the point of contact between several different waves of migrating peoples. The effect is most clearly seen in the country's linguistic diversity. The number of languages within the Protectorate differs according to the criteria used to differentiate between separate languages and dialects. The 1959 Census of the African population spoke of "more than thirty" languages, while the Language Survey of Uganda found it useful to recognize 63 languages or dialects (Ladefoged, Glick and Criper, 1972:16, 31). Even more significant, these languages fall into three separate linguistic families, as different from each

other as, say, English, Chinese and Arabic (ibid.:17,33).[2] The Language Survey carried out in the late 1960s found that no single language was spoken as a first language by more than 16 percent of the population. Furthermore, Uganda, unlike Tanganyika, did not develop a lingua franca widely understood throughout the colony. The Protectorate Government did make an attempt to promote Swahili in the inter-war period, but encountered fierce opposition from the Ganda and missionaries. The pro-Swahili policy did not last long (Whiteley 1969:69-72). However, a debased Swahili remained the working language of the Uganda police and army units. This linguistic fragmentation meant that frequently transferred district officials could not hope to gain linguistic ease in all areas they served in (cf. Beattie 1971:164); Luganda learned for the south was of no use in the north, and vice-versa.

1. Indigenous political organizations

British rule was imposed on polities that ranged from the simplest acephalous villages, through age-set systems, small-scale chiefdoms, incipient states, to large kingdoms. One of these, Buganda, was among the most highly centralized kingdoms to develop in pre-colonial Africa.

The pre-colonial history of the area was dominated by the struggle between the rival kingdoms of Bunyoro-Kitara and Buganda. From the 17th to the 19th centuries the previous dominance of Bunyoro was increasingly contested by expanding Buganda, which conquered many smaller

principalities and incorporated their populations into its clan system. By the mid-nineteenth century, Bunyoro under a strong king was holding back Ganda incursions and struggling to reassert its old power.

Buganda seems to have had an advantage, in part because of its rich ecological base in the Fertile Crescent, and in part because of internal political developments. The 19th century kings, or kabakas, had increasingly centralized power in their own hands; the territory was tightly administered by overlapping hierarchies of chiefs appointed by the king with little regard to hereditary principles. There was a standing army, well equipped with guns supplied by Arab traders. The king maintained tight control of this foreign trade. Traditional clan leaders and hereditary chiefship roles had lost much of their significance.[3]

There were a number of other pre-colonial polities of the Inter-lacustrine kingdom pattern in the west, but none so powerful as Buganda. After conquest, the British incorporated a number of small, related principalities into the kingdoms of Toro and Ankole. Beyond the area of the Inter-lacustrine kingdoms was an area of "segmentary states," minor chiefdoms and totally acephalous peoples.

The area that was to become Uganda was, just before the European penetration, in a state of flux, not settled stagnation. Migratory movements of people continued. The limits of political influence fluctuated and political units were by no means co-terminous with linguistic or "ethnic" boundaries. Language and ethnic identity themselves

were not immutable; people or ruling groups underwent linguistic changes as a result of contact with others, and as previously separate groups became absorbed into the clan systems of their conquerors.

2. First European penetrations

Arab traders had reached Buganda by the 1840s, but Europeans knew nothing of these inland kingdoms until the explorers Speke and Grant reached Buganda in 1862, while searching for the source of the Nile. The first missionaries came in 1877, from the Church Missionary Society of Great Britain. Two years later, a party of Roman Catholic White Fathers of Algiers, who were predominantly French, arrived. Rival Christian groups joined Islamic proselytizers in competing for converts at the Ganda royal court. With astonishing speed many young men of the court were converted to the new faiths.

The introduction of new religious rivalries into a polity already in flux, and under heavy pressure from external sources, did much to subvert its stability. Religious differences rapidly became the focus of political-national factionalism. The Catholic missionaries tended to support German claims to the area, while the Protestants were pro-British, and the Muslims supported Arab influence. A highly unstable period followed, punctuated by armed struggle between the competing factions, each struggling to take control of the kingdom and gain the permanent allegiance of its king.

Events in Buganda became increasingly complex. Finally, with

British assistance at a crucial point, the Protestant Ganda emerged as dominant. British intervention also tipped the scales of power in the struggle between Buganda and Bunyoro. After overtures for negotiations from Bunyoro had been rejected, British officers led an army, largely composed of Ganda, in attacks on Bunyoro. That kingdom was devastated by prolonged fighting, followed by famine and disease; its king was finally captured and exiled. In return for Ganda assistance, the British officer in charge handed over a sizeable part of Bunyoro to Buganda, thus creating the "Lost Counties" problem that would bedevil Ugandan politics for the next seventy years.[4]

This shortsighted action can be understood only against the background of the numerical weakness of the British forces in the area, and their dependence on their base in Buganda.

> It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Buganda was the frame of reference through which the early administrators viewed all other areas of the British sphere.
>
> This meant that the wider area later included in the Uganda Protectorate was important largely in terms of its relation to Buganda and to the security of the British administration there. Busoga, Ankole, Toro and Bunyoro became problems or assets, dependencies or allies or enemies, according to how they were seen through the eyes of the Ganda (Hemphill 1963:407-408).

The British did not formally declare a Protectorate over Uganda until 1894, seventeen years after the arrival of the first missionaries. In that short period, the new forces had brought about civil wars in Buganda, a religious revolution, and profound changes in the distribution of power within the polity. The new cadre of chiefs now con-

trolled much of the power that had previously been centered in the kingship.

These chiefs won their positions of power by hard struggle, through ability, not hereditary principles. They were devout Christians, who had faced death rather than renounce their faith. They were literate, skilled in political manipulation, receptive to Western ideas of progress. Both Christian factions were now keen supporters of the British alliance. The internal fighting had not been so much anti-British, as competition for control of the kingdom and the lion's share of the fruits of collaboration with the incoming imperial powers. Although the Protestants had emerged pre-eminent, the Catholics had been reconciled by allocation to their faction of some leadership roles and territorial spheres. Moslems lost out.

Perhaps seldom in their colonial history, at least in Africa, did the British have more effective collaborators than these Ganda chiefs. Robinson (1972) has suggested that formal acquisition of a new colony was a last resort, when collaborative arrangements in a "sphere of influence" were inadequate to maintain British economic interests. Why, then, did the British, at a time when there was considerable sentiment in Great Britain against further imperial acquisition, formally take possession of Uganda?

3. Motives for British acquisition of Uganda

The immediate motives for formal acquisition of Uganda, and its

by-product of the acquisition of Kenya, seem to have been strategic needs, rather than calculation of economic gain from these specific acquisitions. Controversy continues on this point, but to date, the position of Robinson and Gallagher seems most persuasive: Uganda was acquired as but one of a complex series of moves to protect the Nile and hence the Suez canal route to India, Britain's economically most valuable possession. Since troop movements might be needed to forestall French forces threatening the Nile, the British cabinet decided to rush construction of a railway from the coast to Uganda, regardless of cost (Robinson and Gallagher 1968, Chap. XI et passim). There were hopes of future trade in the area, but trade prospects were sufficiently uncertain that private British investors had earlier refused to support plans for a railway. Public agitation protesting against withdrawal of British support for the missionaries and African Christians in the area provided an external rationale used by the Foreign Secretary of the time to strengthen his policy of protecting British positions in Egypt (Robinson and Gallagher ibid.:317).

The British commissioner sent to Uganda to report on conditions there wrote:

> ...those reasons of a purely economic character would appear to weigh on the side of evacuation, since no hope need be entertained of Uganda being able, at all events for some years to come, to defray the costs of occupation (Sir Gerald Portal quoted in ibid.:328).

But such evidence disproves the theory of an economic base to imperialist expansion only if the theory is stated in such crude and

simplistic terms as to require that each and every acquisition be a direct consequence of hopes of economic gain. A wider, systemic view is needed. When one appreciates that Uganda (and Kenya) were acquired as a by-product of a pre-emptive strategy to protect revenues from India and other British spheres, rather than from any burning interest in East Africa itself, it becomes easier to understand the lack of vigor with which Britain exploited her new position in East Africa (cf. Flint 1963:389). When strategic needs changed, the British government was left with two new possessions, whose administrative expenses were running far above revenues, a railway that cost the British Treasury some five and a half million pounds, a parliament protesting at the drain of taxpayers' money, and no clear policy as to how to recoup costs. The immediate imperative was to find means to make the territories pay for themselves. The British government was unwilling to commit more money to the area, over and above the funds already spent for a railway whose justification had been strategic, rather than economic. Private investors showed little interest, at first. East Africa would have to be developed "on the cheap," with minimal resources and little policy direction provided by the home government.

4. The formative period of British colonization

Back in Buganda, the British official in charge, with only a few British army officers and a ludicrously small number of assistants, set the pattern for future developments by doing the obvious: "He

laid his hands upon the native polity and made it the instrument of British colonial rule" (Low 1965:66). He tidied the indigenous Ganda system of administration by replacing the overlapping hierarchies of chiefs with one clear hierarchy of appointed chiefs. As British control was slowly extended beyond the borders of Buganda, this Ganda model of administration, and often Ganda "agents" to man it, were imposed on the newly conquered areas. Simultaneously, the missionaries were encouraging Ganda proselytizers to take the new religion to other parts of the country. To many of the peoples elsewhere in Uganda, early British imperialism often wore a Ganda face (Roberts 1962; Twaddle 1969).

But the British position was less secure than it seemed. The railway was only slowly inching up from the coast; supplies and reinforcements still took weeks to reach Buganda from the port at Mombasa. In 1897 the Ganda king, Mwanga, attempted to raise a rebellion against the British, but most of his people followed the two Christian katikiros (premiers) in supporting the British. A more serious threat followed, when Sudanese soldiers, who had formed a vital part of the British military forces, mutinied. Without hesitation, the Ganda Christian leaders sent their forces to aid the British. The Ganda leaders saw themselves as allies rather than as a conquered people, and were not slow to exploit their new position of strength in the negotiations soon to come.

By 1899 all was secure. The rebel kings of Buganda and Bunyoro

had been exiled. Chiefly control of Buganda was now complete, since Mwanga's infant son had been installed as kabaka, with two leading Protestant and one Catholic chief as regents. But the colony was still exporting only a little ivory, and still needed subsidies from the British Treasury. Something had to be done to produce more revenue and regularize relations with Buganda. The British government sent out an expert.

5. The Uganda Agreement of 1900

The "expert," Sir Harry Johnstone, negotiated an agreement with the regents of Buganda that provided the framework for relations between Buganda and the Protectorate Government until 1955, and had far-reaching consequences for the Protectorate. In brief, the Agreement confirmed British authority over Buganda, which would be one province within the Protectorate; it upheld the position of the kabaka, and specified the structure of his government, through which he would rule his people directly; it confirmed the boundaries of Buganda as enlarged through the handing-over of Nyoro territory; it imposed a hut tax (later changed to a poll tax) to be collected by the chiefs of the Buganda government and handed over to the British, and it profoundly altered the system of land tenure (Wild 1955).

Under the traditional tenure system, the kabaka assigned to chiefs and court functionaries rights to rule over the people occupying an area, for so long as they held office. The Agreement provided that about half of the land area of Buganda was to be reserved to the Pro-

tectorate Government as forest reserve and Crown land. From the remainder, very sizeable estates were allocated to the kabaka, generous ones to his family, the regents and county chiefs, and smaller ones to about 1000 minor chiefs. These allotments were measured out in square miles, hence the term mailo was coined in the vernacular, and adopted in English, for these estates. But the Agreement contained a revolutionary change that no British official of the time seems to have noticed: the estates were granted in freehold tenure. Thus the basis was laid for the emergence of a permanent landholding class, owning heritable property independent of the kabaka.

Johnston, among other things, had hoped to obtain for the Crown a clear right to land that could be alienated to Europeans for plantations or other forms of economic development. But the lukiiko had been given the right to make the allocations, and took years to do so. The leading magnates of Buganda naturally chose the best areas for themselves, riding roughshod over the interests of clan leaders and the less powerful as they did so. In the end, more than 6,600 people were allocated land, instead of the 1,000 originally planned on. Twenty years after the Agreement was signed, only 60,000 acres of Crown land had been demarcated, mostly poor and remote (Wrigley 1959:26-27). Those who had earlier opted to support the British were well rewarded.

6. Early colonial economic development

Officials in Uganda tended to forget, or never became aware of,

the early history of Uganda, and how narrowly it avoided the Kenya path of production by European enterprises. The tendency has been for officials to project back to the beginning of the British period, attitudes and policies that only became firmly established as late as 1923.[5]

Governmental encouragement of plantation development had been hesitant at first, but by the second decade of the century official policy assumed that significant progress depended on the import of European capital and managerial skills. Land was made easily available, outside of Buganda. A commission of local officials had proposed that as much as 80 percent of some districts be made available for alienation, but the Colonial Office had refused to accept such a drastic measure. Wrigley sums up; by 1915

> Uganda was to all appearances moving towards a mixed economy, in which Africans would provide labor-power partly as independent peasant cultivators and partly as wage-earners, while non-Africans would contribute capital and managerial skills, in some cases merely to the processing and merchanting of crops, in others to their cultivation (Wrigley 1959:30).

In 1915, the predominantly European-owned estates had made little direct contribution to governmental revenues, but their future was regarded as bright. However, the economic outlook was no longer as bleak as in 1900. In only fifteen years, governmental revenues had increased to the point that the colony was now able to survive without a grant-in-aid from the British Treasury.

7. The introduction of cotton

This very rapid improvement in revenues resulted, not from European plantations, but from peasant-grown cotton. In 1904, some trial consignments of cotton seed were imported almost simultaneously by both the Protectorate Government and the Uganda Company. This firm had been founded in England in 1903, by a group of businessmen with strong ties to the Church Missionary Society; they hoped to combine their philanthropic interests with sound business enterprise. The Company took the lead in organizing production of cotton by distributing seed to chiefs in Buganda (Ehrlich 1953:11-17). The chiefs soon became staunch supporters of the program, for they made sizeable incomes from cotton grown on their land by labor claimed from their peasant tenants. The peasants were, at first, compelled not only by their chiefs, but by the necessity of earning money to pay the new hut tax. But in Buganda especially, the need for direct compulsion was supplemented by the desire for new material goods. The demand for European consumer goods of good quality was already high in Buganda even before the introduction of cotton, and an increasing number of Indian traders was carrying the lure of European goods into ever more remote areas.

Cotton cultivation was soon expanded beyond the limits of Buganda. It spread first to the Eastern province, where, in certain areas, cotton was introduced almost simultaneously with an external administration. As the District Commissioner-historian Lawrance wrote of Teso:

> The British administration...introduced...poll-tax and, by forcibly encouraging the planting of cotton, ensured that there was no excuse for failing to pay it (Lawrance 1957:40).

By such means, the value of cotton exports was raised from a mere $1,000 in 1905-6, to $369,000 in 1914-15. Governmental revenues were buoyant (Ehrlich 1965:406).

The development of cotton growing in Uganda came at an auspicious time in relation to external market conditions. Lancashire cotton mills at this time were highly dependent on American sources of raw material, and vulnerable to sudden sharp price fluctuations and occasional restrictions of supply. The British Cotton Growing Association had been formed in 1902 by Lancashire cotton interests to promote cultivation of cotton in the Empire to provide more controllable supply sources. British officials in Uganda seem to have been experimenting with many different crops in hopes of finding some exportable product to generate the desperately needed revenue (cf. Bell n.d.:140-141 et passim). Cotton met this need and also Lancashire's need. The B.C.G.A. was lavish with help and advice to the infant enterprise.

The very rapid establishment of the new enterprise was due to several factors: the simplicity of cotton growing, which requires little skill and almost no capital except for cleared land, the favorable climatic conditions of Buganda, where cotton will produce some crop in spite of very slapdash cultivation methods, the strong authority of the chiefs, the desire of both chiefs and peasants for money income. The high prices prevalent on the world market encouraged Lancashire's search for alternative sources, and probably encouraged also the rapid investment in cotton ginneries.

External markets for the export crops being developed on European plantations were not nearly so favorable. Official encouragement of plantations even went so far as use of governmental pressure in labor recruitment to assist labor-short planters (cf. Powesland 1957:22-34), but the plantations did not thrive. The planters failed to find crops of sufficient value and high yield to cover the high costs of European-supervised production plus transport to distant markets. A worldwide collapse of commodity markets in 1920-22, combined with new governmental policies that increased labor costs, drove many Uganda planters into ruin. Coffee and rubber now sold for far less than the costs of production, but the price of cotton did not plunge so sharply.

The ruined planters could get no help from government officials in Uganda or in Great Britian. However, Lancashire at this time was still concerned for its cotton supply.

> The Governor reported in July 1920 that on a recent visit to Britain not only the manufacturers but "members of the House of Commons and responsible officials, including the Secretary of State himself" had impressed upon him the "urgent need on Empire grounds for increasing the production of high-class Uganda cotton as rapidly as possible"...Thus, despite the hopes which it had reposed in plantation agriculture and its strong sympathy with the planters, the Government was not allowed by the Colonial Office to respond to their plea for financial assistance, but it did step in to purchase native cotton in 1921 which would otherwise have remained unsold, fearing lest the growers should become altogether disheartened (Wrigley 1959:38).

A few planters struggled on, and a handful later became moderately prosperous when markets improved. But the market collapse had pointed up not only the economic but also the political weakness of the plan-

tation sector. The effect on governmental thinking was profound. The Chief Secretary, who a year earlier had spoken of government's policy "to encourage European settlement and the investment of capital in every possible way" declared near the end of 1921, "As regards crops in Uganda, I consider the best policy is for the natives to grow these and for the Europeans to purchase and market them" (quoted in Wrigley ibid.:40). The few lonely voices within Government that had argued for an economy based on African peasant enterprise and opposed the pro-planter policy were now vindicated. Since 1923 there have been no serious doubts that peasant production would be the main pillar of Uganda's economy.

One major legacy of the pro-planter period of government policy was the Legislative Council, which was proposed by the governor of the time, to provide for political representation of the planters.[6] Ironically, the Legislative Council was opened in 1921, just as the depression was driving out the planters. However, a number of the planters went into crop processing and merchandizing, and Legislative Council became one of the tools which these interests could use to influence government policy (cf. Engholm 1968). Until perhaps the mid-1950s, the Legislative Council remained unknown to and unrepresentative of Uganda's African population. It had not been intended to represent them, but the oligarchic interests within the country.

8. The inter-war period: ideology and economy

We saw in the previous chapter that a new mood of "trusteeship"—

of concern for the welfare and development of Africans in the colonies, and talk of the paramountcy of African interests—became increasingly dominant in the years after World War I. It was increasingly argued that peasant production was less disruptive of native life than wage-labor on European enterprises, and talk of Indirect Rule and its advantages increased. These changes in belief were real, but their impact can be exaggerated. Their significance can perhaps be clarified by comparing Uganda and Kenya. In Kenya, European enterprise had smothered African peasant cash crop development at birth. The concerns of "trusteeship" ran contrary to the interests of the settlers who dominanted the economy, had pre-empted a large measure of political control and aspired to much more. The "trusteeship" of the Colonial Office did little more than restrain their more excessive demands, such as for forced labor, and block their aspirations for a self-governing White Dominion; it did little to restructure the economy (Berman 1974; Leys 1975, Chap. 2; Zwanenberg 1975:33-43).

In Uganda, on the other hand, the sequence of early development was different. When the depression of 1920-21 struck, Uganda's dependence on cotton for governmental revenue, possibly reinforced by Lancashire's continuing need (Brett 1973:221), led both London and Entebbe to opt for peasants rather than planters. In Kenya, the white settlers received governmental help to tide them over the bad times; in Uganda, they did not. In Uganda, unlike Kenya, the concerns of "trusteeship" were congruent with measures to improve the productivity

of a peasant-based agriculture. Peasant production and European enterprise no longer competed for labor after 1922. This congruence helps to explain the relative lack of conflict within Uganda politics prior to 1945. In Kenya, the administration was split between catering to the needs of the settlers, fighting against their demands, and governing the Africans, all the while under the scrutiny of a suspicious "humanitarian lobby" in Britain. In Uganda, the administration was able to go ahead, slowly and carefully, as revenues and wishes permitted, with a single-mindedness impossible to their colleagues in Kenya, and a placid certainty that their policies were in the best interests of their African wards, and that they had an unlimited time to complete their task. The watchdogs of liberal righteousness in Britain paid almost no attention to events in Uganda in this inter-war period.[7] Even the West Indian Marxist, George Padmore, no friend of the British Empire, described Uganda in 1936 as "by far the best administered territory on the East Coast, and one of the most prosperous and advanced in the whole of Africa" (Padmore 1936:75).

9. The inter-war period: changes of emphasis

The economic collapse of the European plantation sector and the ensuing dependence on peasant production, together with the ideological shifts taking place, led to a change in direction in policies within Uganda. Pratt has contended that "...the Protectorate Government had no grand design, no master plan of the Uganda it wished to create"

(1965:483). It may well be that officials of the time responded to specific circumstances as these developed without clearly articulating an overall strategy to themselves. But later observers can discern at least two broad inter-related trends. First was a consolidation of British authority that involved a "reclaiming" of the power appropriated in earlier years by the collaborating Ganda chiefs, now a landlord class. Related to this was an increasing concern for the welfare of the African peasants, and a view that the ideal to aim at was a nation of independent, land-holding small farmers.

One of the first manifestations was a shift in land policy, away from support for large-scale alienation to non-Africans, to advocacy of tenure for Africans. But the question of which Africans led to long struggle.

The most serious situation was in Buganda, where the introduction of freehold tenure by the 1900 Agreement, plus the introduction of cotton, led to the emergence of a classic landlord-oppressed peasantry pattern of relations; traditional tribute had been transferred into money rent (busulu), tithes were exacted on cotton crops (envujo), and tribute labor was exacted. In 1927 the British administration forced passage of the Busulu and Envujo Act, which had the effect of giving tenants virtual security of tenure in exchange for payments at levels specified in the Act. These were substantial at the time the Act was passed, but became almost trifling as the value of money fell. This act seriously weakened the economic base of the landlord class in

Buganda. An historical summary prepared by a later official (Wild 1948, reprinted in West 1969:79-86) gives us some indication of official thinking of the time, as recorded in government files. There was concern over the "monstrous" exploitation of the peasantry, but also a concern that landlord demands, particularly for the nvujo tithe on crops, would discourage the cotton production on which the colony's revenues depended. In addition, Wild's summary shows Governor Gowers' wish to abolish nvujo completely and divert the peasant surplus then flowing into landlords' hands to the state through further taxation of peasants. But total abolition proved impracticable; to preserve some harmony with the chiefs/landlords, the government accepted continuance of nvujo at a specified lower rate. Taxes were increased in the same year (Mamdani 1976:125).

The state and the landlords were not the only ones contending for a share of peasant surplus. The restrictions on landlord exactions were heartily supported by the unofficial Europeans of the time.

> Certainly the peasants of Uganda had no heartier champions in this period than the spokesmen of the European commercial community, who lost no opportunity of drawing attention to the exactions of land-owners and chiefs and of pressing for a reform of the economic system (Wrigley 1959:51).

Wrigley reports that one of the merchants, who believed that a more equitable distribution of incomes would increase the sale of British goods, argued that

> ...the peasants, if given the chance, would buy Manchester fabrics, Birmingham hardware, Coventry cycles, whereas the wealthy chiefs spend their money on American cars" (ibid.).

There was an opposition, then, between the interests of the commercial community, who prospered when peasants had money in their pockets to spend on goods, and the state's desire to maximize revenue through taxation.

Outside Buganda, steps were taken aimed at preventing the entrenchment of a chiefly/landlord class and to forestall the exactions of money rents, in Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole.[8]

As regards administration, perhaps the most dramatic episode in the gradual process of assertion of British hegemony over their former chiefly collaborators was the forced resignation of Sir Apolo Kagwa as katikiro of Buganda in 1925. Not even his outstanding service to the British in the times of crisis before British rule was secure prevented his humiliation in a minor dispute with an aggressive British official. Henceforth in administrative matters the Buganda government was in fact if not in theory more subservient to British direction and control.[9] A new generation of men who owed their positions to the favor of the Protectorate government, not to earlier achievements, took over the reins of the Buganda government. Many old chiefs were retired and new ones appointed. Furthermore, chiefly office and landownership, previously identical, began to diverge as chiefs became more and more salaried, transferable bureaucrats.

A gradual transformation of the chief's role also took place outside Buganda. Especially in the Eastern Province, those appointed as chiefs had been able to grow wealthy by using their authority to

extract tribute labor from residents of their areas (Wrigley 1959:48-50; Vincent 1977). The British, by a series of steps, abolished this right and instituted a system of salaried, pensionable civil service county and sub-county chiefs, who often had no connection with the traditional authorities, and were subject to transfer (Pratt 1965:492-496; Fallers 1965, esp. chap. VIII). They also gradually replaced the Ganda agents, who had acted as chiefs in other districts, with men from those districts.

In addition, regulations were imposed limiting the extent of credit that could be granted to Africans, in an attempt to prevent problems of indebtedness and emergence of usurious moneylenders. The example of India may well have influenced official thought on this point, but there is little specific evidence of this.

All these measures were easily perceived by officials as protecting the weak against those who would exploit them. They did indeed give a greater measure of protection to the peasants from abusive chiefs, grasping landlords or usurious moneylenders. But they also increased the efficiency of the state apparatus and reduced competing claims on peasant surplus. For many officials these consequences probably remained latent. British officials of that period were in the happy position wherein what served the needs of their own administration was easily seen as in the best interests of the mass of those they ruled. "Trusteeship" was congruent with the needs of the peasant-based colonial economy.

10. Articulation and retrenchment

This peasant mode of production was becoming increasingly articulated to the world economy. With regard to imports, East Africans, unlike many colonial subjects, were not limited to high-priced goods manufactured in the metropolis. The Congo Basin Treaties, and Tanganyika's status as a mandate, required that all countries have equal access to the markets of the region. In the 1930s, cheap Japanese textiles and other goods began seriously to reduce British manufacturers' share of the East African market (Brett 1973:151-156).

Uganda's export relations also shifted significantly in the inter-war period. After about 1925 the Lancashire mills took a steadily declining share of Uganda's cotton crop. India bought a steadily increasing share; Japan became an important customer, and smaller amounts were sold to a wide variety of countries (Table 5.1).

The need to export the cotton crop led to improvement in communications. More roads were built. Most important, the railway finally reached Kampala in 1931. Officials' salaries, pensions, housing, offices and public buildings continued to have first claim on revenues. But revenue slowly became available for expansion of governmental activities in agriculture, animal health, medicine and education. Pratt shows that in 1919, expenditure on administration, police, prisons and the military consumed 28.9 percent of government revenue, while public works, agriculture, education, veterinary and medical departments took 24.2 percent. By 1938, these percentages had become 16.6 percent and 50.7 percent (1965:486).

Expansion of welfare measures was slow. No one was in a hurry. There was little articulate demand for improved services from the mass of people. They remained poor in material goods, but because of their subsistence base, not destitute. For men at least, leisure was abundant. More effort in the tedious work of cotton cultivation could have increased their incomes somewhat, but as Wrigley puts it,

> To work eight hours a day instead of four in order to be able to buy two shirts a year instead of one was a course of action which, comprehensibly, the average man was not tempted to adopt (1959:59).

The dynamic, modernizing Ganda elite of the 1890s had now become "comfortable country squires and routine administrators" (ibid.).

> ...the European rulers of Uganda...now valued stability and order more highly than progress. Rapid economic change was indeed generally regarded, by administrators and intellectuals alike, as an evil to be averted rather than as a desirable objective (ibid.).

Even this gradual expansion of governmental services received a setback in the early 1930s, when the world depression led to falling cotton prices and consequent reduction of governmental revenues. The governor of the time followed a cautious policy of maintaining large reserves, and so cut back sharply on departmental spending. The greater stability of an economy based on peasant production was shown clearly in the 1930s: Uganda remained able to balance her budget, albeit with drastic cuts, while in Kenya, the European-farmer-based economy had to be propped up by British grants-in-aid (Brett 1973).

Uganda's financial timidity was to a great extent imposed by the Colonial Office. Brett describes the British colonial financial policy

TABLE 5.1

Destination of Uganda Cotton, 1933-1937

Percentage of monetary value of crop

Destination	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
India	67.1	70.5	92.4	51.3	68.6
Japan	11.8	20.3	0.0	34.2	25.0
U.K.	19.4	7.1	3.6	8.4	2.4
Germany	0.6	0.3	0.3	1.9	0.3
Other	1.1	1.8	2.7	4.2	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total value of crop in £	2,682,210	2,927,796	2,822,739	3,326,879	4,269,283
Volume of crop in centals	1,179,315	1,142,586	1,012,968	1,285,392	1,353,566
Average price per cental in £	2.27	2.56	2.79	2.59	3.15

Source: calculated from data in Appendix IV, Report of the Uganda Cotton Commission, 1938 (Uganda 1939).

during the Depression as "shortsightedness" that affected the colonies much more seriously than the metropolis (ibid.:148).

> Once budgets had been balanced all administrations were expected to build up large surplus balances to remove finally the need for British grants of any kind. These balances were subsequently to be invested in low-yielding British stocks and thus rendered totally unproductive.
>
> The commitment to solvency was made to take precedence over every other consideration, including any desire to maintain the level of economic activity and thereby speed up the return to a growth situation (ibid.:144).

By the mid-1930s, Uganda had recovered sufficiently that it could both maintain its surplus balances and undertake some very modest development expenditures, notably on road improvement, development of rural water supplies, and expansion of Makerere College into a post-secondary institution. But this late spurt is unrepresentative of the atmosphere of the inter-war period. It was a time when administrators favored tranquillity rather than the risks of rapid economic development. Concern about disruption of traditional social organization, and the dreaded spectre of "detribalization" overshadowed concern for increases in material prosperity of the Africans. Wrigley's comments on Buganda could be applied to the whole of the Protectorate:

> [The Ganda] settled down to grow cotton — and that, for a long time, is just about all that happened. In so doing they were no doubt serving the international economy in that station of life to which the law of comparative advantages had called them....In the first decade of the century...it was confidently believed that the railway would shortly be extended across Uganda, that the Nile would shortly be dammed for hydro-electric power, that a textile factory would shortly be set up, but it was not until a half century later that any of these projects came to fruition. The forces which had driven the British people to initiate the

> development of Uganda slackened markedly as soon as the need for new markets became less acute. Having pegged out their claim in East Africa, neither the imperial government nor British capital was in any particular hurry to exploit it. Once it had attained to solvency, the local administration relaxed its own pressure for increased production and settled down to the routine administration of a peasant people (Wrigley 1957:77).

The men who held senior positions in the Provincial Administration during the post-war period were formed by this atmosphere of slow-paced paternalism. Several of those in charge of financial policy, and the senior agricultural officials of the post-war period, had spent their early years of colonial service in such an atmosphere of financial timidity, conservatism and penny-pinching imposed from above.

11. Taxation and sources of government revenue

The reforms of the inter-war period protected the peasantry from irregular and often extortionate demands of landlords and chiefs, but nothing could protect them from the regular demands of the state for taxes. Taxation was imposed in both direct and indirect forms.

Income tax on non-Africans was not imposed until 1940, and even then was considerably lower than rates prevalent in the United Kingdom (Ingham 1958:205-8, 214-215; Mukherjee 1956:157). Until at least 1962, even the richest Africans were not liable to income tax, because of the provisions of the 1900 Agreement. This Agreement, plus the vociferous opposition of the racial minorities, made it difficult to work out a more rational and non-regressive direct taxation structure. The bulk of direct tax revenue came from the African peasantry.

All able-bodied African males had to pay a poll tax, at that time set at a flat rate regardless of income. The rate varied from district to district, in an attempt to compensate for the pronounced regional disparities in prosperity (Ingham 1958:209). In addition, Africans had to pay a second tax, usually somewhat lower, to support the Native Authority, or African local government of the district. These funds were used, among other things, to pay salaries of chiefs and Native Authority staff, and in the kingdoms, to support the traditional rulers and their retinues. Also, in certain districts, peasants were obliged to give one month's labor for roadwork, or alternatively, to commute this obligation by paying additional cash.

In 1936-37, an overhaul of the taxation system led to abolition of a number of "nuisance" taxes, such as one on bicycles, and other license fees, that had been levied on Africans (ibid.:209). Nevertheless, it was generally recognized that taxation of Africans remained high. A report by the Treasurer in 1936 said:

> In Uganda the bulk of the taxation is paid by large numbers in rural areas and the amount paid by each individual represents a very large proportion of his money income; in many cases the proportion approaches 100 per cent....In Uganda taxation is the principal incentive to labour and production. (Quoted in Mukherjee 1956:161).

Pratt is a little more optimistic:

> Only after 1933, as prices rose, as new crops were introduced, and as communications improved, did African incomes [outside of Buganda and the adjoining richer cotton-growing areas]... become substantially larger than the total taxes which they had to pay (1965:494).

The direct tax burden on Africans may well have been unusually high in Uganda, as compared with other British colonies. Governer Mitchell thought so, and pushed for the modest reforms mentioned above:

> The public revenue was, by East African standards, abundant and stable; but to me, coming from the comparatively poverty-stricken Tanganyika, it seemed that the direct taxation paid by the peasantry was too high, and I became involved in something of a crusade on the subject, for it was an opinion which commended itself to few, either in the Government or the Native Government (as the administration of Buganda was traditionally called) or in the other local administrations (1954:165).

No wonder, for Mitchell, in that financially bleak period, was talking of reducing what was at that time the source of almost one-third of governmental revenue. The principal sources of revenue in 1938 were:

Source	Percent
African poll tax	31
Customs and excise	32
Export taxes	8
Direct taxes on non-Africans	2
Other revenue	27
	100

(Figures from Elkan 1961:43)

Customs and excise duties had for long been a major source of revenue. Almost all imported goods, from the peasants' cheap calicos or enamelled mugs, to the European businessman's gin, carried fairly steep customs duties. The Treasurer's report of 1936 noted "The articles in the tariff most productive of Uganda revenue are mainly those which concern native clothing" (quoted in Mukherjee 1956:158). The common tariff between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika led to anomalies; bicycles, bought mainly by Africans, were taxed, while tractors, lorries and other

supplies used by European farmers entered free (ibid.:158). This of course reflects the political potency of the white settlers in Kenya.

The other main indirect source was an export tax on cotton and coffee. A levy on cotton lint exports was first imposed in 1919, on a sliding scale, amended at various times. It was, of course, invisible to the mass of peasants on whose crops it was levied, and was easy for district officials to forget about. Over the years, the tax has been much criticized, by sources inside and out of government. The Report of the 1938 Uganda Cotton Commission said:

> We consider that in principle the taxation of an agricultural export is open to objection. We realize, however, that at any rate a part of the public services of the country has been built up from the proceeds of this taxation. In these circumstances it would be difficult to effect its immediate and complete abolition without giving rise to difficulties in relation to the replacement of the revenue that would be abandoned (Uganda 1939:92).

Government never did find it possible to do without this source of revenue. Rather than being abolished, it increased in importance, until in 1952 no less than 52 percent of revenue came from export taxes (Elkan 1961:43). In 1938 the bulk of the export tax proceeds came from cotton. "In no year during the 1930s did cotton exports account for less than 77 percent of the value of total exports, and in most years it was well above 80 percent" (Ehrlich 1965:462).

The acreage planted to coffee was increasing, however. The beginnings of the post-war boom in coffee can be discerned in the 1930s (Wrigley 1959:61; Ehrlich 1965:462-463).

When the effect of direct taxes, customs duties and export crop

levies are taken together, it can be seen that the tax burden on Africans was extremely heavy. This was realized in Uganda at the time (cf. Ingham 1958:206-207). Officials spoke of the need to reduce the burden on Africans, when the financial situation permitted. In fact, as we shall see below, for various reasons the share of crop proceeds appropriated by government increased, rather than declined.

Analysis of the sources of revenue points up the Protectorate's overwhelming dependence on the production of cotton. If bad weather, or a fall in world prices reduced the size or the value of the cotton crop, government revenues fell, directly through lower cotton export tax returns, indirectly through difficulties in collection of poll tax and lower customs duties. Peasants who were paid less for their crops bought less in the shops; trading profits fell, and fewer goods were imported. The senior officials were acutely aware of this relationship.

> While cotton is not the only source of wealth to the people of Uganda, it dominates the situation to such an extent that the prosperity of the country is determined very largely by the size and value of the cotton crop. The Director of Agriculture has submitted evidence showing the close relationship between customs receipts and the value of the cotton crop, and also between the retail value of trade goods such as bicycles and cotton piece goods and the value of the cotton crop. Reviewing the ten year period ending with 1938, he considers that the country becomes prosperous when the value of the cotton crop <u>to the growers</u> reaches £2,200,000 (Uganda 1939:35. My emphasis.).

This report also expresses concern, in several places, for an increase in grower incomes, so that the peasants' standard of living could be maintained (e.g. paragraph 85, paragraph 89).

The direct, annual dependence of Protectorate revenues on cotton

production had a profound effect on official thinking. It made it quite unnecessary for officials to consider, or even be aware of, the needs of the Lancashire cotton industry. During interviews, it was noticeable that officials spoke rarely of wider economic interrelationships; the few comments on the subject expressed resentment at Uganda's vulnerability. At the senior levels, officials were concerned that the crop fetch as high a price as possible in unstable world markets, and that the long-term sales prospects of Uganda cotton be protected. As they saw it, not only fiscal stability, but any prospect for improvement in government services depended on expansion of export crops, primarily cotton. At the district level, officials knew there was a direct connection between their assiduity in poll tax collection and in exhortation of chiefs to push people into growing more cotton, and the possibility that headquarters in Entebbe might at last approve their request for a new bridge, another dispensary, better housing for themselves or their African staff, enlargements to the district hospital, more agricultural extension staff or whatever other immediate improvement they hoped for.

Implicit in official thinking about governmental spending, and the need for revenue, is the assumption that "development" depended on governmental actions, and that government knew better than the ignorant cultivator what was best for him. The essence of the paternalism characteristic of Ugandan officials was their firm belief that they were taxing the Africans for their own good, so that government could provide more and better services to them. Such considerations of motive, however, are irrelevant when analyzing the structural relations involved. These

relations are clearly those of a peasantry under a superordinate power claiming tribute.

In this respect, one must agree with Mamdani (1976:Chap. 4) that the reforms of the inter-war period left the way clear for the state power to claim the larger portion of peasant surplus. Internal class relations were altered. The economic power of the landlord class in Buganda was weakened but not eliminated. For a long time to come the most feasible route to economic preeminence for an African would involve, first, achievement of positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

But the state's claim to peasant surplus was still contested by those immigrant interests who controlled the processing of crops essential before they could be exported. This point will be taken up again in Chapter X.

12. Low-cost development

The conversion of the "white elephant" acquisition of 1894 into a relatively prosperous model colony sending a steady supply of raw materials to world markets was achieved at remarkably low cost to Britain and with very little help from foreign investors. The officials who directed this transformation did it on the proverbial shoestring, using as their main resource the labor of Uganda's people.

European and Indian enterprise were for the most part confined to manning the institutions linking peasant production to world markets.[10] By 1938, infrastructure sufficient to collect, process and export cotton

and coffee had been established. There were 194 cotton ginneries, five coffee curing works and a number of oil crushing mills (Great Britain 1938:28). In addition to the agricultural exports, a little tin and gold were also exported, but these together amounted to less than five percent of the value of all exports (Elkan 1961:34). Networks for the import and dissemination of consumer goods to the remotest areas were operating. "Law and order" were solidly established, and the offices, prisons and staff housing required for its maintenance erected. Some minimal educational facilities were available, almost entirely due to the efforts of missionary organizations. Rough-and-ready medical services had succeeded in cutting the death rate and reversing the population decline that had been worrisome in some areas, notably Buganda and Bunyoro. Governmental revenues were fairly healthy. But industrial production for the home market barely existed. In 1936-37 there were two sugar factories, two cigarette factories, and "several much smaller concerns" (Great Britain 1938:28), but this lack, and the almost total dependence on exports to world markets, was at that time regarded as normal and not unhealthy. The country seemed, relative to other colonies, to have come a long way from 1900.

These developments were achieved with remarkably little import of external capital. To take public investment first, British Treasury aid was essential in the early years, but

> The total of British grants-in-aid, for the whole period from 1893 until their cessation in 1915, amounted to a mere £2½ million. This could have put little strain on an economy whose national income was about £2,000 million in

> 1911, and whose public expenditure, even in 1900, was some £35 million (Ehrlich 1965:400).

The British Treasury also put up the £5½ million required for construction of the initial stages of the Uganda railway, to Kisumu on Lake Victoria. As we saw above, the railway was started for strategic reasons, but in the event proved essential for the establishment of cash crop economies in Kenya and Uganda. The British government finally wrote off this sum in 1933 (Wrigley 1965:211). The extension of the railway to Kampala was financed by Treasury loans granted in 1924 on strict terms. Since the railway extension was regarded in Britain as a means of giving an immediate boost to British heavy industry, and was also favored by the Lancashire cotton interests because it would facilitate cotton export, the loan can hardly be regarded as evidence of a generous concern for the welfare of colonial peoples (Brett 1973:129-132).

The rest of the communications infrastructure was financed out of governmental revenues; at least until the early 1920s, costs of these works were greatly reduced by the use of compulsory Kasanvu labor (Powesland 1957). Wrigley describes these early years:

> ...apart from the great initial investment in railway construction, little capital had been injected into the Uganda economy, and progress had been achieved mainly by the utilization of the crude manpower that was the country's principal existing asset. Such capital as had been invested had been applied largely to payment of this labour during the period of production rather than to increasing the efficiency of the productive process. Roads and buildings were the products of virtually unassisted human toil. So were the crops produced for export, whether on plantations or on African holdings....(1959:44).

By 1936, a modest public debt of £2,236,000 represented some addi-

tional external capital import (Frankel 1938:270). Servicing of this debt took about eight percent of governmental revenue at that time (Elkan 1961:42).

Thus, apart from the first railway construction, acquisition and linking of Uganda to the world economy cost Great Britain relatively trifling sums; after 1915, the cost of the Protectorate to the mother country was nil, so that any benefits from trade or raw material supply were a net gain to the British economy. For Uganda, the principle of colonial self-sufficiency was not effectively breached until after World War II. Provision of financial assistance for colonial developments that would produce long-term rather than immediate benefits to Britain was not made until the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, which, because of war, had no practical effect until the second half of the 1940s.

Turning to the production of the new crops, minimal money capital was needed for the establishment of cotton and coffee. Once underway, governmental revenues paid for most of the agricultural experts hired for improvement work. The Empire Cotton Growing Corporation, after its founding in 1921, provided some assistance for research and improvements in cotton breeding. The value of this assistance, compared with the developmental work paid for from local revenues, is not known.

In the private sphere, establishment of sugar production in the 1920s undoubtedly required capital. But since both the Indian sugar entrepreneurs had been active in Uganda earlier, one in cotton ginning (Ehrlich 1965:433) and the other in trade, it is reasonable to assume

that a fair amount of the capital used was accumulated from profits derived ultimately from cotton and other African productive activities.

The establishment of Indian trade networks depended much more on small entrepreneurs' willingness to work very hard for long hours, consuming little, to generate surpluses for further expansion, than on sizeable capital imports. "Few of them arrived with much capital, but many brought a spirit of enterprise and commercial acumen..." (ibid.: 407). Again, trading profits were related to the size of the cotton crop and the level of internal demand for goods.

Even mining, in this period, was primarily alluvial and small surface workings, requiring relatively little capital investment.

The one great need for capital that was met by private non-African sources, was for the provision of cotton ginneries. Opportunities in this sphere attracted so many investors that by the early 1920s the number of ginneries had run far ahead of the need. This early over-investment created problems that plagued the cotton industry for years, discussed in more detail in Chapter X. It is not easy to estimate how much capital was in fact invested in ginneries. Wrigley says "no vast amount" was needed; "a ginnery could be set up for as little as £5,000" (1957:76). The entrepreneurs who went "up-country" in the early years did take certain risks. But the ginners used these risks as arguments for perpetuation of privilege long after they had recouped their original investment many times over.

More precise figures on private capital investment prior to 1938 are not available. Frankel, in his landmark study of capital investment

in Africa, found it necessary to lump private investment in Uganda with that in Kenya, rendering the figures useless for our purposes. He noted, however, that private investment in Uganda had been relatively small. Frankel was full of praise for Uganda's progress:

> The development of Uganda's public works has to no small extent been paid for out of revenue. In other words, the necessary saving has been undertaken by the population itself....
>
> One of the striking lessons to be learnt from the economic development of the Protectorate is the value of capital creation and accumulation by the population itself through its own efforts (1938:270-275).

He thought the economic progress of Uganda was "remarkable," especially since the European population was less than 2,000, and investment from abroad had been so small. Whether the population itself thought this method of capital creation so desirable is unknown; they were never consulted.

13. Underdevelopment

Uganda in 1938 was thus an open economy, peripheral, exporting agricultural commodities after only the simplest of processing, whose internal prosperity was directly linked to fluctuations of world commodity prices. The colony was totally dependent on developed countries for manufactured goods, even simple cotton textiles. It was also open to a kind of secondary economic satellization from neighboring Kenya.

The area had thus moved from a condition of 'undevelopment' in the early pre-colonial era, when it was isolated from world markets, through a stage of minimal involvement in the late pre-colonial period, into a

condition of 'underdevelopment'. I use 'underdevelopment' here in Brett's sense: "a condition of dependence — one in which the activities of a given society are subjected to the overriding control of an external power over which it can exert little direct influence" (1973:18).[11]

> Colonialism can be accused of 'the development of underdevelopment' if it can be shown that its impact upon local society was such that it created a situation in which the latter could only continue to function by continuing to accept dependence on the dominant external powers (ibid.).

'Underdevelopment' is of course a post hoc observer's concept that would be flatly rejected by the actors. Our task in the later chapters will be to try to understand how the men in decision-making positions perceived the situation, and what they attempted to do about it. Their options were limited in at least two ways: by the structure and relationships that had evolved, and by the effect of their earlier training and experience on their own outlook.

We are dealing here with an economy in which no major concentrations of capital investment existed to offset the economic power of the state. Rather, economic infrastructure had to a great extent been created by governmental activity. Even those spheres in private hands operated under strict rules laid down by government (cf. Chapter X). Government was already by 1938 a major economic actor, and would become increasingly so in the post-war years. Thus the structure of the colonial economy made it possible for the outlook of the officials who manned the top positions in this bureaucratic state to have far greater impact than in a more developed economy, or even in a colonial economy with strong

concentrations of private capital.

14. The regional level: secondary satellization from Kenya

Uganda was affected by upheavals in world markets through her staple crop dependency, but was vulnerable to events in Kenya through shared economic institutions. Repeated attempts to bring about closer union of the British colonies in East Africa had been defeated, because of fear of both Africans and non-Africans in Uganda and Tanganyika that closer union would mean domination by the Kenyan white settlers.[12] But the colonies shared a common currency, tied to sterling through the East African Currency Board, a common customs and excise tariff, posts and tele-communications, and a few other services. Kenya and Uganda shared a railway.

The controversies among European groups in East Africa over the operation of the inter-territorial institutions are often viewed as a consequence of the inordinate influence that European settler-farmers had gained over the administration in Kenya. While this view is not incorrect, the conflict at its deeper levels stemmed from the attempt to combine within one geographical region and one set of regional institutions, two contradictory modes of colonial production. The fundamental contradictions were not always apparent to the participants in the controversies.

The economy of Kenya colony had come to depend heavily on European enterprises, both settler farms and ranches, and plantations, using the indigenes as reserves of cheap wage-labor. Once the colony had started

down this path, governmental revenue was seen as dependent on the health of the often-troubled European agricultural sector, and European-settler political influence was thus perpetuated. The actual extent of the mixed-farm sector's contribution to the economy has been queried recently by Leys (1975:36-40). Others have emphasized the importance of the metropolitan business sector, whose interests often complemented but sometimes conflicted with those of the settlers. Nevertheless, government policies, until late in the colonial period, were framed on the assumption that the mixed-farm sector was the lynchpin of the Kenya economy. Allocation of tax revenues, governmental services, labor policies, etc. consistently served the needs of the white settlers (Brett 1973:Chap. 6). But the Kenya administration not only allocated internal resources to settler needs, it also attempted, and often succeeded, in using the inter-territorial institutions as a means of subsidizing the economically weak settler enterprises. Railway rates penalized exports of Ugandan peasant-grown cotton, and imports of goods consumed by Africans, while benefiting those produced on European farms (Brett 1973:92-95; Engholm 1968:passim). Prolonged vociferous protests from European officials and unofficials in Uganda had little effect, for Kenya effectively dominated railway administration (Engholm ibid.). High customs tariffs on temperate agricultural products meant that elite consumers throughout East Africa subsidized the settlers and their processing organizations. Tariffs were also set low on goods used for large farms, while those sold to peasants bore the brunt of the revenue-producing customs duties (Brett 1973:99-107). Uganda

especially was at Kenya's mercy with regard to customs duties, for she lacked facilities for collecting her own; collection was carried out at Mombasa.

European settler-farmers and their business allies in Kenya branched out into processing well ahead of such activities in the adjoining colonies. Manufacture of food products — bacon, butter, cheese, flour, later biscuits, fruit canning, jams, etc. — was fostered by use of the customs union to provide tariff protection and guaranteed access to the whole East African market. The customs union provided similar advantages when Kenyan-based interests moved into manufacture of cement, soap and other similar manufactured goods. These moves towards industrialization in the 1930s drew opposition from the Colonial Office, but the pressure groups in Kenya and Britain had sufficient political strength to overcome this (Brett 1973:279-280). Thus the economic nationalism of the Kenya settlers and their business allies led to some diversification of Kenya's economy, in part through access to Tanganyika and Uganda as captive markets.[13] By the outbreak of the Second World War, Nairobi was already the leading commercial and manufacturing center for the whole of East Africa. This pre-war headstart in economic diversification, through processes of cumulative advantage was to give Kenya a lead in the post-war competition to attract new industries that the other two colonies could not overcome (Nixson 1973:68-69; Elkan and Nulty 1976).

The pre-war hostility and often bitter controversy between the enclaves of unofficial Europeans in Kampala and Nairobi can perhaps

now be better understood. The prosperity of immigrant business in Uganda depended directly on the prosperity of the peasant growers; any measures, such as high freight rates, reducing that prosperity had a negative effect on them. Uganda wished to use customs tariffs as sources of revenue, and was conscious of the declining returns that set in when tariffs were raised. Kenya, on the other hand, wanted very high tariffs on certain goods to protect her infant industries. To a typical European businessman in Kampala, moderate tariffs and reasonable freight rates would increase his scope for profit from sales of imported goods to peasant growers, and would reduce the prices he had to pay for the goods he himself consumed. Kenyan policies in the 1930s not only forced him to pay higher than world prices for inferior bacon and butter,[14] but also made it easier for Kenya interests to pre-empt opportunities for production of import-substitution goods that he or his colleagues might have wished eventually to expand into. The endemic squabbles between Kenya and Uganda Europeans were at base attempts by the latter to prevent the dominant interests in Kenya from diverting more of the surplus produced by Ugandan peasants, that might instead have been captured by immigrant business in Uganda.

The inherent conflict between the needs of an economy based on European capitalist agriculture, and one based on peasant production, suggest that firms operating in both Kenya and Uganda must sometimes have found themselves supporting contradictory government policies in the two territories. Detailed studies of business-government relations in East Africa are not yet available to clarify this aspect. It is

noteworthy, however, that exporting firms increasingly came to specialize in either European or African-produced crops, but rarely both (Stahl 1951:282). The task of disaggregating such gross explanatory concepts as "settler influence" or "immigrant business interests" in East Africa has only just begun.

While it is beyond doubt that the customs union operated to Kenya's advantage and Uganda's expense, economists still argue over the precise cost.[15] Uganda, and in some years Tanganyika also, subsidized Kenyan expansion in another form: she consistently exported more to world markets than she imported, whereas Kenya consistently did the reverse. Uganda's strong export performance thus earned foreign exchange to help pay for the luxury goods and the capital equipment that the European enclave in Kenya imported (Zwanenberg 1975:244; Great Britain 1954:197). This held true both before and after World War II.

The need for some harmonization of the conflicting interests of each colony led to the emergence of co-ordinating institutions such as the East African Governors' Conference annually, and an annual meeting of financial secretaries to hammer out joint changes in tariffs or taxation policies, and in post-war years the East Africa High Commission. One financial secretary, recalling his post-war annual negotiations, said with a wry smile that the major task had been to prevent Kenya from grabbing the lion's share of whatever development resources were available. He got along best, he said, with those Kenyan counterparts who did not have to be reminded of Kenya's dependency on Uganda's foreign exchange earnings. He recognized the essential similarity of

interest between Tanganyika and Uganda vis-a-vis Kenya, but as for Tanganyika, "Nobody really cared. Not the same effort was being made to develop the country as we were doing in Uganda."

Thus even the common background and shared membership in the Colonial Service of the British officials who manned each colony could not completely overcome the structural oppositions between colonies. The recent final collapse of the common services, despite many attempts to distribute their benefits more equitably, has its roots far back in the colonial period.

NOTES

1. A useful summary of ecological adaptations in Uganda is found in Wrigley 1959.

2. The classification of African languages remains controversial. I follow Ladefoged, Glick and Criper (1972), whose terminology is based mainly on Greenberg. They classify Uganda's languages into three main groups: Bantu, Sudanic and Nilotic; the Nilotic is split into Eastern and Western Nilotic groups, which "differ from each other as much as English and French" (ibid.:17,33). In an earlier terminology, the present Eastern Nilotic was known as Nilo-Hamitic, and the present Western Nilotic was called Nilotic.

3. The literature on 19th century Buganda is extensive, and cannot be referred to at length here. Beattie 1971, Chapter 10, provides a useful comparison with the internal structure of Bunyoro.

4. The need for brevity makes these three paragraphs a mere caricature of extremely complex events that had a lasting impact on Uganda. The literature on this period is very large; Hemphill (1963) and Low (1965) provide convenient summaries.

5. See for example, Sir Charles Dundas, governor from 1940 to 1944:

> The country...has always been regarded as a purely native land. All efforts could therefore be concentrated on native development, and it has been possible to pursue a steady policy without the distraction of alien interests (Dundas 1955:205).

6. The governor's intentions are reflected in his allocation of Legislative Council seats: five officials, two European and one Asian unofficials. The Asians were understandably angered, since they far outnumbered the Europeans, who, in 1931, totalled only 2,001, of whom 385 were in private employment. The Asians boycotted Legislative Council for some years, and were later granted one additional seat. The allocation of seats to racial groups was a tacit matter of custom, rather than explicitly provided for in law (Ingham 1958:172-177). There was no question of African representation on the Council at this time. Even if a governor had wished to appoint an African, the most likely candidates were Ganda; the Buganda Government maintained a position of strong suspicion of the Council and a wish not to have anything to do with it, for fear involvement might imperil the kingdom government's right of direct access to the governor, as provided for in the 1900 Agreement.

7. The "humanitarian lobby" is Brett's term (1973:59-62) for a loose coalition of liberal, antislavery, missionary, occasionally left-wing people interested in colonial affairs. They used sympathetic parliamentarians to ask questions in parliament about what they regarded as abuses in the colonies.

8. Beattie 1971:Chap. 8 discusses the unforeseen consequences of these changes in Bunyoro. A quotation from the report of the officials investigating Bunyoro land tenure gives the flavor of much of the thinking of the time:

> Our recommendations will, indeed, normally preclude any person from deriving an income from the tribute or rent of others. For such a result we make no apologies and have no regrets. If, as the outcome, there is evolved a nation of small farmers, we shall be well content. (Quoted in Beattie ibid.:173).

9. On the very complicated issues involved in the Kaggwa affair, see Apter 1967:149-158; Low and Pratt 1970:207-219; Kaggwa in Low 1971:70-72; and for the viewpoint of the British official, Postlethwaite 1947.

10. The major agricultural exception was the production of sugar by two large Indian plantation firms. Mining activity was mostly in European hands, but was small-scale and relatively insignificant to the overall economy.

11. The terms 'undevelopment' and 'underdevelopment' stem of course from the work of A.G. Frank, but have been given slightly more precision in Brett's formulation.

12. Much has been written on the Closer Union controversy; for convenient summaries, see the relevant chapters in Harlow and Chilver 1965, also Zwanenberg 1975:Chap. 12.

13. In fact, Tanganyika suffered even more than Uganda from the inequitable division of the benefits of the customs union (Brett 1973:103-107; Elkan and Nulty 1976:334-335).

14. During the war and post-war years, this grievance was removed; quality of Kenyan food products improved and prices were lower than world prices. I cannot prove it, but my own observations suggest that the hostility Europeans in other parts of East Africa might have felt to the Kenya settlers on other grounds was moderated by the availability of good bacon, cheese and tinned butter, even in remote stations.

15. Elkan and Nulty 1976 and Nixson 1973 give summaries of the main positions.

CHAPTER VI

UGANDA DURING WORLD WAR II: A COLONY AT THE SERVICE OF THE MOTHERLAND

The outbreak of war in 1939 shattered the torpor of the 1930s. The administration put all the resources of the colony at the service of the war effort. Wide-ranging governmental controls over the economy, imposed at this time, lasted well into the postwar period. During these years, the basis was laid for the postwar economic policies examined in more detail in Part III. Official thinking about the economy, "development," and the political future of the Protectorate took a new turn. Relations with the neighboring British colonies, and the machinery linking Uganda with the world market, were altered. In these years, Uganda's ties at the regional level, and the region's integration with the British economy, became much closer.

1. Internal consequences

Great Britain asked of her colonies that they make the maximum possible effort to produce supplies, and reduce to a minimum their demands on Britain for goods, assistance or manpower. Uganda's task was to produce as much food as possible, both for her own needs and to supply military forces in East Africa and the Near East, and also to export as much cotton and coffee as possible (Engholm 1968:283). Of these somewhat contradictory goals, food production became dominant, and cotton output fell.

In addition, some 77,000 Ugandans were recruited for service in military forces, and the colony became a staging post for troop and supply movements. Uganda also provided accommodation for thousands of refugees, internees and prisoners of war, who more than trebled its European population. Of these, the largest group was some 7,000 Polish refugees, mostly women and children, who had earlier suffered severe hardships in the Soviet Union, and who had to be accommodated, clothed and fed.

In an attempt to prevent these sudden stresses from severely disrupting the economy, the government assumed wide-ranging emergency powers to control prices and the allocation of both supplies and manpower. The administrative demands of these measures were often beyond the capacity of depleted governmental staffs, and controls were to some extent manned by the very businessmen they were intended to control (ibid.:Chaps. IX and X).

Under the manpower control measures, junior British governmental staff were permitted to join the military forces, but those judged essential to maintenance of government had to remain at their posts, regardless of their personal wish to fight. The numbers of officials fell, while responsibilities mushroomed. For example, the Provincial Administration in 1939 actually had 56 men posted in the Districts; by 1942, this number had fallen to 40. At the core of government, in the Secretariat, five men were attempting to fill the posts normally held by nine; the chief clerk had gone off to war, and there were only two clerk-stenographers. The financial secretary and one assistant handled

the Protectorate's finances, without an adding machine.[1]

Despite the pressures for increased crop production, recruitment to the hard-pressed Agriculture Dept. ceased during the war, although the Provincial Administration did get a small trickle of cadets.

At the beginning of the war, many of those remaining at their jobs were deeply involved in the volunteer reserve force that was hastily recruited. Those with military backgrounds from the earlier war spent much time training the racially mixed forces. After the defeat of the Italian forces in Abyssinia had removed the threat of any military action on East African soil, less effort was devoted to this reserve. Several officials, however, credited it with helping to break down the rigid status distinctions that had divided senior from junior British officials in pre-war years, and with broadening their acquaintance with Indians.

A wave of intense patriotism swept through the British in Uganda during the war years. Their efforts to do everything within their power to help the mother country were perhaps tinged with guilt that they were not themselves fighting, nor sharing the hazards of bombing and food shortage afflicting their kin in Britain. They worked hard. One official who spent the war in the Secretariat spoke of the war years passing like a bad dream, during which he worked most evenings, Saturdays and Sundays. In the districts, the extra work, and the movement of troops, created very heavy pressures on staff.[2]

The women were working also. Those with special skills long unused often went to work, or taught others. Wives filled in as secretaries in undermanned offices. Others organized innumerable fetes, charity

dances, auctions and so on, to raise funds for the Red Cross, the War Fund and various others.

The health of the European population suffered somewhat. Quinine was in very short supply, and malaria a common occurrence (Elliot diary, passim and interviews). Overseas leaves were postponed.

The officials interviewed believed the African population also strongly supported the war effort. For the African elite, this belief was probably well founded.

> There was little open hostility to Uganda's participation in the war. The link with Britain was still accepted as both desirable and lasting. No political leader thought to exploit Britain's position to secure political concessions. Chiefs and rulers were quick to affirm their loyalty.... (Pratt 1965:535).

However, among the masses, the war years accelerated the development of hostility and mistrust of the colonial regime (ibid.). Shortage of staff sharply reduced the time European officials spent touring the districts; increasingly, the administration relied on the chiefs to carry out their directives, but with fewer checks than previously on chiefs' use of arbitrary or punitive methods. There was also real economic hardship. Despite attempts at price control, the cost of living increased sharply. The cutting off of supplies from Japan led to a five-fold increase in the price of cheap cotton goods (Ehrlich 1965: 473). Prices paid to producers were kept very low, as an anti-inflation measure, so the peasants' real income fell markedly (ibid.). Controversies, mostly in Buganda, over various specific issues reflected an increasing political consciousness, but these did not deter the governor, Sir Charles Dundas, a strong believer in Indirect Rule, from

going ahead with administrative changes that actually loosened British control over the Buganda government.[3]

The critically short supply of imported consumer goods bolstered the officials' fear of inflation. The difficulties in obtaining imports provoked officials into thinking more creatively about the need to produce their own. This concern for what we now call import substitution took two main forms: short term improvisational efforts, and recognition of the need for more local industry in the postwar years.

The short-term efforts involved such activities as making pottery from local clays, hoes and other implements from scrap iron, and instruction of Africans in spinning and weaving of wool and cotton, and making blankets. Local oils were adapted for use in paints. Experiments were carried out, often together with technical people in Nairobi, in hopes of producing industrial chemicals; even glass was produced experimentally. A spaghetti-making machine was fabricated from scrap metal, to supply the Italian prisoners with their accustomed food. The Agriculture Department, on learning that rye was the preferred staple of the Polish refugees, experimented until it could grow some in a high altitute area, then had to improvise means of grinding it into flour.[4]

Engholm correctly points out that such improvisations were not, by themselves, "capable of hauling up the economy by its boot-straps" (1968: 332). Even simple capital goods for larger-scale production could not be obtained. But he under-rates the significance of the release of enthusiasm and ingenuity among technical staff that had for long been held down by 1930s austerity measures and the claims to superiority of

the Provincial Administration. The technical men responded to the challenge of wartime shortages with creative attempts to make use of available resources, including the practical skills of the internees and prisoners; they were willing to consider small schemes that, if expanded, would not have revolutionized the peasant economy, but could have diversified it. The enthusiasm for cottage-level developments did not survive when peacetime once again opened Uganda to the manufactured goods of the Western developed countries. But the heightened awareness of Uganda's total dependence on external manufacturers did survive and, under Sir John Hall, was articulated into a new direction in economic policy. One can speculate, also, that the self-confidence generated in the technical departments by their war-time improvisatory efforts strengthened their voice when a new and receptive governor arrived.

As for large-scale industry, during the war there was talk of textiles, paper, matches and glass, among others. But industrial development, it was thought, should be handled on an inter-territorial basis.

2. Regional changes

The outbreak of war led to much closer co-operation between the British East African colonies. As a result, East Africa became to a greater extent one economic unit. The sustained demand for East African products led to a more buoyant economy. Greater profits to be shared around among the businessmen made it somewhat easier to lay aside old controversies. However, the attempts to allocate the small trickle of goods still imported into Mombasa exacerbated the fears of

Europeans in Uganda that they were being "done down" by their Kenyan counterparts (Engholm 1968:Chap. X). Attempts to draw up rational plans for the allocation of industry to the three territories, through the creation of an East African Industrial Council and a licensing system, also bogged down in inter-territorial bickering (ibid.:330, 333-338; Nixson 1973). But joint boards, such as the War Supplies Board and the Economic Council, functioned with reasonable adequacy. Shared research activities, and increasing co-operation among the technical specialists of the three governments, led after the war to the establishment of several inter-territorial research organizations. In this sphere, inter-territorial co-operation was perhaps more successful than in the economic institutions.

3. Aid to Britain

Great Britain was able to draw on her colonial empire for vast amounts of money and resources for the struggle against Germany and Japan. Uganda's share, tiny in relation to the total effort, was immense in relation to her own resources. Direct financial aid to Britain, through the War Fund, reached the astonishing total of some £1,084,000 by September, 1944. Kabwegyere's researches in the Entebbe archives show that this War Fund was built up from the aforementioned dances, shows, etc. (tapping mainly the immigrant population), by those who contributed part of their salary to the fund (including many Africans in government employment), but most importantly, contributions by the Central Government and District Native Councils — funds drawn

ultimately from taxation of peasant production (Kabwegyere 1972:242-250). This one million pounds or so sent as direct grants should be seen in relation to a total governmental revenue of some £1,700,000 in 1939. In addition, districts with surplus funds made interest-free loans to Britain. Kabwegyere says that even in 1948, Great Britain owed various groups in Uganda some £650,000 (ibid.:246). The amount of money sent out of the country as contributions to Red Cross and other benevolent funds is not known.

Kabwegyere is understandably perturbed by this use of his country's limited resources to buy fighter planes for Britain: "Why did not subject peoples revolt or side with the Germans?" (ibid.:248). He regards the War Fund as a mechanism for draining off a surplus that could have been invested in development projects within Uganda. His view is somewhat simplistic, and ignores the lack of supplies and administrative manpower that prevented use of available funds for constructive projects at that time. More serious, Kabwegyere, in his emphasis on the War Fund, totally ignores economic changes whose cumulative effects in draining off a surplus were vastly greater. In the view of one senior British official, much involved in financial matters, the War Fund was a much less significant drain on Uganda's economy than the bulk-buying of Uganda's crops. This issue, and the important changes in overseas cotton marketing arrangements as a result of war, are discussed in Chapter X, on the cotton industry.

4. Thinking about the future

The British, at all levels, were well aware that the war marked the end of an era, when their right to rule was unquestioned. Many of the officials interviewed in 1974 and 1975 pointed to the war years as the turning point, the beginning of what they saw as the headlong rush towards independence. The Africans, they said, broadened their experience and lost some of the former deep respect for Europeans. As one man put it, African soldiers who had seen the British running before the Japanese would never be the same again. Others spoke of the damage done within Uganda by the presence of white soldiers of "a lower type," whose undignified behavior helped to shatter the mystique of the European as a superior being.

Such views are not merely the product of retrospection. Documents found by Kabwegyere give fascinating glimpses into official thinking at the time. In 1942, Governor Dundas sent a circular memorandum on post-war attitudes toward social and administrative policy worth quoting at length:

> ...several forces will combine to impose...reforms that will be in harmony with the spirit of the time. In the first place there is what I might call the Atlantic Charter Spirit, the universal resolve that there shall, so to speak, be no underdogs, a humanitarian doctrine that is the direct outcome of desperate resistance to tyranny. There is also a growing sentiment, born in England already before the war, for betterment of all conditions in our colonies, and elimination of poverty, ignorance and subservient status among backward peoples. It is more than probable that post-war governments in England will be of a very liberal, not to say socialistic, possibly ultra-socialist character, and we know from previous experience that colonial policy of such Administrations is always in the direction of abolition of racial inequalities and emancipation in all directions....more than ever we shall

> have to justify our retention of so large a portion of the globe by impeccable and progressive rule over backward races ....And it will be surprising if thousands of Africans who have served in many lands remote from their own, and who have seen much and gained many ideas, will not exert a new influence which will result in demand for new methods and treatment.
>
> ....In short the demand will be more equality, and less restraint, for large scope and few barriers for better conditions of life and the means to make such possible....They must be met in at least a spirit of accommodation and herein lies the fundamental changes to be expected. We can no longer determine according as seems best to us in other words dictatorship cannot be perpetuated and if we look for the inner reason it is because we have been waging, and have called upon the coloured races to wage with us, war against dictatorship. Hitherto we have always been activated by honest belief that what we think good for the African is so. It is an honest well-intentioned motive on the part of the ruler but not always contenting the ruled. To quote the old saw, 'good government is no substitute for self-government.'....Unless we are prescient there is a danger that it will not be the Africans but ourselves who are backward and that our outlook and methods will be based on premises that long since have ceased to be valid. (Quotation taken from Kabwegyere 1972:252-254. Original found by Kabwegyere in File F23/87, Entebbe Archives.)

Not surprisingly, the tired and overworked officials, cut off from external stimulus, failed to translate the rhetoric of the governor's memorandum into concrete proposals for fundamental change. The governor himself, well-meaning but lacking deep insight into the forces swirling around him, is remembered by officials who served under him as an exhausted man looking forward to retirement, unable to provide the dynamic leadership that some of them felt was needed.

It is doubtful if even all the senior officials sympathized with the governor's analysis of the need for fundamental change. Kabwegyere also quotes from a 1943 memorandum on postwar measures from an Information Officer. This man recognized the need for changes, but urged

caution; changes should be introduced "...with the speed that could be exercised in the case of children...the native problem will still be with us; we must still educate, guard and guide" (1972:255). His proposals centered on the need for improved propaganda measures; to deal with the raised aspirations of ex-servicemen, he suggested newspapers in three native languages, cinema vans and broadcasting services, with an emphasis on musicals (ibid.).

A year later, near the end of Dundas' governorship, a senior official visiting Uganda from the Sudan commented

> The general impression that I've formed so far admittedly from very cursory observation in a week — about Uganda — is that it's a nice orderly, green Happy Valley with no political or racial or economic problems commensurate with Kenya, Palestine, Sudan, etc., but that this "smoothness" tho' fortunate, is itself a danger as it leads to "ticking over," and vague purposeless benevolence...What I most missed was a sense of urgency. I had a feeling that the British were quietly ambling along, very just, very humane, very patient — when they ought to have been impatient and in the dickens of a hurry." There seems no sense of urgency here, re economic or political advance,.... (Letter from Sir Douglas Newbold, quoted in Low 1971b:xi).

Clearly, the governor's sentiments had remained in the rarified air of rhetoric.

One problem that did create some sense of urgency was the future of the returning soldiers. Some 55,000 Ugandan Africans were in the army as the war neared its end. A committee established to plan for their reabsorption emphasized that the majority would have no alternative but to return to their pre-war homes and to cultivation. It was expected that only about 4,000 could be absorbed into fulltime paid employment. Planning emphasized re-integration of the ex-soldiers into their com-

munities; special settlement schemes were not favored: "soldiers should be encouraged to participate in communal activities and not to exclude themselves in special institutions." Formation of ex-soldiers' societies was viewed with suspicion: "...in practice undesirable features might appear in their activities and there might be a danger that they would tend to engage in political rather than social activities" (Uganda 1945c: 14). The emphasis on getting ex-soldiers back to the land was so strong that training courses for only village-level craftsmen were planned for; the heavy postwar demand for skilled artisans was not foreseen. Two years after the war, the village-craftsmen training programs were hastily shifted to try to meet some of the heavy demand for more skilled men (Uganda 1947b:7).

Government was, of course, haunted by the fear of "detribalization" and the specter of aggregations of skilled fighting men in the towns. From the government's point of view, the reabsorption program was a success. While the ex-soldiers undoubtedly did contribute to the increasing political awareness in the countryside, they did so only as members of communities. Ex-soldiers, as such, did not act as a significant political factor in postwar Uganda.

The war years had pointed up the need for greater control of information flowing to the African population. There was, as yet, no radio broadcasting service, but an administrative officer was seconded to act as Information Officer, sending out news sheets, etc; the game warden was assigned the task of censoring the vernacular newspapers and gramaphone records of popular songs. It was felt that post-war conditions

would require more concerted efforts in public relations. Plans were made for a Department of Social Welfare and Public Relations to take on this task.

Meanwhile, in Great Britain, thinking about the future of the colonies had undergone a major shift. The principle that each colony must be financially self-sufficient was formally overthrown by the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, in 1940, six weeks after Dunkirk. This Act committed the British government to spending money from the British Exchequer on schemes to improve the welfare of colonial peoples, once the war was over. The new atmosphere of thought behind that Act has been developing for some time (Lee 1967). This new thought did not envisage early decolonization. Rather,

> Colonial policy after 1940 was based on the idea that social reform in its widest sense was necessary for the political education of the indigenous peoples. The transformation of colonial society was to begin with welfare services. Trusteeship implied the will of the executor (ibid.:4).
>
> In simple terms, the new philosophy represented the view that economic development and social advance should precede constitutional reform (ibid.:17-18).

The Colonial Office, as before, laid down few specific details as to the concrete measures to be taken.

> The chief obstacle to defining the meaning of social advance more precisely was the word-spinning habits of the official classes. Good government sometimes represented a mood rather than an identifiable corpus of ideas. Just as 'indirect rule' and 'trusteeship' were words implying the style of government that prevailed before the war, the term 'partnership' became the post-war symbol of advance (ibid.:18).

The new mood did have a few identifiable consequences, if only through the Colonial Office's dictum that each colony was to submit a

development plan as a basis for allocating postwar grants of Colonial Development and Welfare funds. This externally-imposed requirement forced Uganda, like other colonies, to think seriously about postwar development schemes. The results of this planning process are considered in Chapter IX.

NOTES

1. Data from 1939, 1941 and 1942 Staff Lists, and interviews. The level of staffing for 1943 and 1944 is not available; no Staff Lists were published.

2. Information from interviews; see also Elliot diaries, Bere 1966:44.

3. For a summary of these changes, see Pratt 1965:534-541, and for more detail, Low and Pratt 1970, Apter 1967. For the governor's own account, see Dundas 1955.

4. Information from interviews, and Engholm 1968:332.

CHAPTER VII

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II

Uganda, as it entered the postwar era, was a melange of different "races," "tribes," languages and religions. A few rich and many poor, a few powerful and many powerless, lived side by side, separate, yet part of the same social system. In this chapter I shall discuss, first, the conscious models that the British officials held of the society they presided over, and second, assess the validity of these models, and ask how the internal complexities can most fruitfully be conceptualized.

Most of the officials interviewed shared a simply, pyramidal model of the Protectorate: a population divided into three (sometimes four) 'races' - Europeans on top, Indians (and Goans) in the middle, Africans forming the broad bottom stratum.

Within official circles, the European stratum was seen as divided into officialdom - known colloquially as 'governmenti' - 'commercials', and missionaries.[1]

Although this tri-partite model — rather like a pyramidal layer-cake — was found most frequently, a second, apparently contradictory one was discernable during interviews. This could be phrased as: "Uganda was very different from Kenya. We were a non-racial society; there was very little color bar in Uganda. The better people of all races worked harmoniously together."[2]

The first, or layer-cake, model, has a prima facie validity to any-

one with experience of the social arrangements of colonial or newly independent East Africa. The second model appears blatantly false, in view of the prevalence of the color bar in many public institutions until the early 1950s, the marked social deference accorded to Europeans by members of other races, and the provision of differential educational and medical facilities for each of the three races until near the end of the colonial period. But appearances can be deceptive. The conspicuous importance of race as a principle of social organization has helped to obscure the relevance of class, for class divisions in colonial Uganda were not fully isomorphic with racial divisions. In addition to race, actors' consciousness of social identity was often derived from specific ethnic, religious or caste affiliations.

Distribution of power, social prestige, relative standards of living, and control of the means of production, were disjunctive. The race-hierarchy or "layer-cake" model not only predominated as an actors' model, but can be found in a number of social scientists' analyses, e.g. Kabwegyere (1974) and in more refined form, in Smith's plural society theory (Smith 1961, 1969). It will be argued here that a heavy emphasis on racial stratification is apt to block understanding of how colonial Uganda really worked, a point made by Morris (1967) but often ignored.

To get a better grip on these complexities, it is necessary to review first, with as few preconceptions as possible, who made up the population of Uganda, and who controlled its resources?

1. The population of Uganda

The simple question, "Who lived in Uganda?" leads us immediately into the idiosyncracies of official thought, for the census data were organized in terms of the emic categories of the British officials of the time. Two censuses were held, one for "non-natives," one for "Africans." Egyptians, Ethiopians, and Somalis were excluded from the "African" category and defined as "non-natives." Division of "non-natives" into 'races' caused some problems for the census officials.

> ...the term "race" refers to a combination of colour and basic country of origin. The terms European, Indian, Goan, Arab, etc. cannot be strictly defined as they do not rightly refer to any ethnic group. Europeans include all persons of European origin whose colour is white, while Indian refers to persons whose ancestors resided in the sub-continent of India. There is no political significance in the term "Indian" and this definition has no connection with the two states of India and Pakistan. Goans are classified as a separate race, althouth they arrived from the sub-continent of India, because of their importance in the life of the community.... Again the definition is a combination of colour and basic country of origin but this classification has become generally accepted in African territories. Any other classification, although more academically correct would not have been recorded accurately and would be of little value to either the Administration or the general community (Uganda 1948:8).

Table 7.1 shows a total non-African population in 1948 of less than one percent. The European population was predominantly British (80 percent), and overwhelmingly Christian. There were few school-age children and people over sixty, indicating the "transient" nature of the population.

The Indians showed the demographic characteristics of a normal, settled population with a very high birth rate. Although Europeans and Africans tended to think of the Indians as forming a tight commu-

TABLE 7.1

Population of Uganda

Non-African	1948		1959		% Increase 1948-1959
	No.	%	No.	%	
European	3,448	8.4	10,866	12.5	215.1
Indian (& Pakistani)	33,767	82.4	69,103	79.4	104.6
Goan	1,448	3.5	2,830	3.2	95.4
Arab	1,475	3.6			
Colored	643	1.6	4,259	4.9	85.0
Other	184	0.5			
Total non-African	40,965	100.0	87,058	100.0	
African	4,917,555		6,449,558		31.2
Total population	4,958,520		6,536,616		31.8
European population as % of total population		.06		.16	
Non-African population as % of total population		.82		1.33	

Source: Population Censuses, African and Non-African, 1948 and 1959, in E.A. Statistical Dept., 1953 and 1960.

nity, they were divided into two main religions, plus several minor ones; each of the main religions was subdivided into several caste or sect groups. They were also divided by language, and in 1947 the traumatic partition of the Indian sub-continent created a further line of cleavage. The socially effective groupings were based on sect or sub-caste, and relations between these groups were often highly competitive (Morris 1968). In Kenya, discriminatory measures against Indians had led to formation of strong pan-Indian organizations to fight for Indians as such. But in Uganda, there had been few such issues since the 1920s, and pan-Indian organizations were weak (ibid.).

In the official definition of 'race' quoted above, the Goans were accorded the status of a separate race "because of their importance in the life of the community." From the early years of colonial administration in East Africa, Goans had been employed by colonial governments as clerks and other skilled middle-level personnel.[3] Europeans tended to regard Goans as distinct from, and superior to, Indians (during interviews, retired officials made many approving references to their Goan clerks). The Goans were a solidary community, entirely Roman Catholic, with their own separate schools and social clubs. Many spoke English as their home language.

The African population showed the characteristics to be expected for a poor population: a large proportion of children, very few elderly people because of low life expectancy, and a relatively small number of adults of working age. Nearly half of all children died before the age of 15 (Great Britain 1955:469).

The British officials, like the anthropologists of the time, categorized the African population by 'tribe'. Although the officials found it necessary to define 'race', 'tribe' is nowhere defined in the census. Smaller 'tribes' were, on the advice of Administration officials, grouped with the dominant 'tribes' of their geographical area, so that the categories accepted by census officials are sometimes very different from those recognized by the people categorized. In 1948, the Ganda, at 17 percent of the total, were by far the largest category, followed by the Iteso, who were 9.4 percent of the African population.

This population was overwhelmingly rural. Even in 1959, less than 4 percent lived in towns or trading centers.

2. The control of economic resources: agriculture

In attempting to reconstruct a picture of the control of economic resources as it was about 1945 we immediately encounter problems of data. The need for more adequate statistical information was realized in the postwar years; therefore it is often necessary to use data from a somewhat later period and extrapolate backwards in time. Agriculture was by far the most important economy activity in the colony. The earliest figures obtainable on the makeup of the Gross Domestic Product are for 1954, as shown in Table 7.2. Although there may have been some shifts in the relative importance of smaller items between 1945 and 1954, the overwhelming importance of agriculture did not change.

In 1950, non-African estates produced only 2.6 percent of the Net Geographical Product, compared to African cash-crop production of 26.7

TABLE 7.2

Uganda's Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost, 1954

	Amount, in millions of £	% of total GDP	
Agriculture	84.9	66.0	
(of which imputed subsistence income)	(33.6)	(26.1)	
Forestry, fishing and hunting	3.8	2.95	
(of which imputed subsistence income)	(2.4)	(1.9)	
Cotton ginning, coffee curing, sugar	3.8	2.95	
Mining and quarrying	0.9	0.7	
Manufacturing of food products	1.5	1.2	)
Miscellaneous manufacturing	3.8	2.95	) 4.1
Electricity	0.7	0.5	
Construction	3.9	3.0	
Commerce	11.8	9.2	
Transport and communication	3.7	2.9	
Government (administration and miscellaneous)	2.3	1.8	
African local government	1.0	0.8	
Miscellaneous services	5.2	4.0	
Rents	1.4	1.1	
Total GDP	128.7	100.0	
Monetary GDP	92.7		
Subsistence sector	36.0		
Subsistence sector as % of total GDP		28.0	

Source: E.A. Statistical Dept. 1961

percent and subsistence production of 25 percent of NGP (Great Britain 1954:101). Even though non-African estate production expanded after 1938, by 1962 less than one percent of the total land area was held by non-Africans (IBRD 1961:17).

The colony's economy rested on crop production by Africans, predominantly a combination of cash-crop production superimposed on subsistence cultivation. The distribution of control over land is thus of considerable importance. Outside of the kingdoms, cultivators were technically tenants of the Crown, but land was held through customary systems of tenure which, for the most part, gave proprietors considerable security of tenure and did not involve payment of rent.[4] The majority of men were independent proprietors cultivating holdings averaging from four to ten acres, depending on ecological conditions. Information on the extent of emerging rural social differentiation in these districts by 1945 is extremely scanty. It seems probable that a very few men had been able to manipulate traditional tenure systems to build up larger than average holdings; one can speculate that administrative chiefs and other employed officials would have done so.[5] But the custom of equal partiple inheritance would have militated against the emergence of inter-generational transmission of large farms. Rather, heritable advantage came through superior access to education for such men's sons.

The situation regarding social differentiation in Buganda was much more complex, although information on it is much thinner than one would like. We saw in the previous chapter that the 1900 Agreement led to

the emergence of a class holding very large, heritable freehold estates. Although large estates were fairly rapidly reduced by sale and inheritance, some large estates remained. In a sample survey in one area Mukwaya found that 75 percent of the land area was owned by 13 percent of the owners, and the average size of estates held by this 13 percent was 427 acres (1953:30-31).

The Busuulu and Envujjo law of 1927 limited the landlords' ability to extract rent and tribute and gave tenants security of tenure. This law and the tendency to fragmentation of the estates limited but by no means eliminated the social, political and economic significance of the landholding class in Buganda, which was still considerable by 1945. A major weakness of Mamdani's (1976) analysis of postwar political events is his mistaken assumption that the 1927 law wiped out the power of this class (cf. Mafeje 1977).

But as Mafeje has demonstrated (in Richards, Sturrock and Fortt 1973), to understand emerging social differentiation in Buganda, one must distinguish between large land-owners and large farmers. Many of the former were content to collect their rents, "live like chiefs" — and often were chiefs — or else become absentee landlords active in other spheres. Many sold part of their land to pay for their children's education, sending some to overseas universities, and thus using land ownership to give the next generation high position in the civil service or new professional roles opening up (Richards 1963:273; Fallers 1964:202). A few started large-scale profitable agricultural enterprises on their untenanted land, but these seem to have been a minority

(Richards, Sturrock and Fortt 1973).

The importance of "official mailo" must not be forgotten. These were estates allocated by the 1900 settlement to sub-county and county chiefs, the three ministers of Buganda, the kabaka, the queen mother and his official sister. These official mailo estates were held ex-officio by the incumbents as long as they held office, a system that was not abolished until 1966. By 1945, not all large land-holders were chiefs, but almost all senior chiefs, to reach that well-paid and exalted position, had to have the social cachet associated with land-ownership. In addition, they received the economic benefits of the official estates.

Peasants in Buganda saved money, or spent the proceeds of wage employment, to buy small plots of land; even though the economic benefits of mailo ownership would seem small in comparison to the low fixed rents of tenancies, the social prestige of ownership was worth much to them.

Beginning in the 1920s, a new phenomenon can be observed. Wrigley (1964:39-40) speaks of the emergence of an "agrarian middle class" of landowners with property measured not in square miles, but tens of acres, formed by movement down from above, by rising peasant farmers and by those spending the rewards of employment on acquisition of land. Some of these, probably again a minority, began to operate their holdings as farming enterprises oriented to profit. It was men such as these who provided the germs of that development of larger-scale farms so noticeable a feature of the postwar scene in Buganda (cf. Wrigley 1964; Richards, Sturrock, and Fortt 1973).

But the development of commercial farming of this sort also depended on access to labor resources. By the 1920s, a steady flow of immigrant laborers was coming into Buganda from the much poorer areas of Rwanda and Burundi, as well as from West Nile (Richards 1954; Powesland 1957). Some of these went to work on the sugar estates or in other large-scale enterprises, but the majority worked for African farmers, large and small. Any attempt to delineate a "kulak class" among Ganda cultivators on the basis of employment of labor founders on the well-recognized tendency of even those with very small holdings and low incomes to hire labor when they can, to relieve themselves of drudgery and to compensate for the relatively small size of households and absence of the communal work groups so frequent in other parts of Africa. There is an unbroken continuum between the small cultivator who hires a "porter" for temporary help with heavy chores, and the very large farmer with formal labor rolls and year-round employees.

Outside of the kingdoms, labor for both cash-crop and subsistence cultivation was provided primarily by family sources and a variety of communal work groups and exchange arrangements. Thus, outside of Buganda, the majority of African cultivators had become an independent peasantry, rarely paying wages for labor, owning their own land under customary tenure, but having to produce a fund of "rent" in the form of taxes to the state (cf. Wolf 1966:9-10). In many areas, this fund was produced through cultivation of cash crops, but in some such as West Nile and Kigezi, the cash needed for taxes was more often obtained by temporary labor migration to the richer parts of Uganda.

In Buganda, peasants paid both legally limited rent and tribute to landlords, plus the governmental taxes. Despite this double load, the greater ecological advantages of the area made peasants in Buganda more prosperous than their counterparts elsewhere in the country. By 1945, social differentiation in the rural areas of Buganda was already considerable. At the top, we can distinguish a well-established land-holding class whose position had given them preferential access to political power within the kingdom and to new and rewarding occupations. At the bottom, there were transient migrant workers, very poor. Only slightly above them were the immigrants who chose to settle in Buganda, obtain tenancies and work their way into a better life than they could obtain at home. Above these was "the great mass of ordinary peasant cultivators" (Wrigley 1964:53), Ganda and the more firmly established immigrants. Then came a broad, heterogeneous middle stratum, which Wrigley in 1964 described as "remarkably large" (ibid.:54). It was probably smaller in 1945, proportionately, but still heterogeneous. Wrigley puts in this middle stratum the sub-professional employees (primary teachers, medical orderlies, clerks, etc.), skilled and semi-skilled workers, traders and those farming for a profit. All these categories were already on the Kiganda scene in 1945. It was this middle stratum that provided much of the dynamism of postwar society, which found itself most frustrated by the colonial structure, and in which nationalist sentiments took firmest hold.

Mamdani has recently attempted to go beyond Wrigley's simple conceptualization in terms of strata based on income levels, to a class

analysis. His attempt to explain postwar political developments in terms of emerging conflict in the petty bourgeoisie between "kulaks," traders and bureaucrats is brave but unsatisfactory. The living men and women of this period refused to stay still long enough to fit neatly into class categories. Urban skilled workers held small tenancies near town, then saved to buy larger ones and become emergent modern farmers. Chiefs (part of the bureaucracy) usually had land of their own, and on retirement or dismissal could turn their energies to trade. He has posed contradictions between reified categories, but in reality many men fit into all three categories simultaneously or at different stages in one life-cycle. He tends to ignore the hereditary ruling class that was firmly entrenched at the top; at that time Buganda was governed internally by and for the class of land-owners and chiefs,[6] under British over-rule. But the "middle stratum" immediately below was much more open, with 'aristocrats' moving down into it and peasants moving up. Access to land was both a means of moving up, for entrepreneurial farmers, and an aim in itself, because of its prestige, for those in employment. This flux in Buganda has been confusing enough even for those social scientists armed with the empirical studies done after 1950. It is little wonder that the officials of 1945 failed to grasp fully the significance of the rapid social flux beneath them.

Once again, the complexity of Buganda has drawn here disproportionate space and attention. The social changes set off by colonial rule were most advanced in Buganda, and the conflicts of the postwar period emerged most starkly there, as shall be seen below. But it was

still only one part of the colony, and only one part of an economy in 1945 still overwhelmingly dependent on small-scale peasant production.

3. The linking institutions: crop-processing, trade and commerce

In this kind of economy, the institutions by which peasant-grown crops are aggregated, processed and exported are of crucial importance. Those who control them have a lien, almost a throttlehold, on the economy. Both cotton ginning and coffee processing for export are relatively simple processes technically, but if sloppily done they can materially reduce the prices the crops fetch on the world market. In 1945, processing of both these crops was entirely in the hands of non-Africans.

Control of cotton ginneries is discussed in more detail in Chapter X. Although European and Japanese capital as well as Indian had been involved in ginneries before the war, by the end of World War II about 90 percent of the ginneries were owned by Indians (Stahl 1951:278). Some of these were small, one-ginnery concerns often bought with profits from trading. Others were larger firms owning chains of ginneries. Some of these larger firms were owned by Indian capital based in India, who also exported cotton for their cotton-milling interests. Of the European firms still involved, the Uganda Company was most important. The interests of the ginnery owners were represented by the Uganda Cotton Association (see Chapter X).

By 1945, the effective division among ginnery owners was probably not that based on race, but on size: between small, local, sometimes

undercapitalized family firms, and large firms with overseas connections, often important in other spheres of the Uganda economy as well. During one interview it was suggested that the Uganda Cotton Association more effectively represented the latter than the former.

Because of the peculiarities of the government-regulated structure of the ginning industry, even the most inefficient and decrepit ginnery provided its owners with a regular, assured, generous profit (see Chapter X). It is impossible to say just how generous the profits were, but Morris speaks of the ginnery owners as forming the core of the small elite of rich Indians, and of the secure wealth of the cotton ginners (Morris 1968:138, 158, et passim).

Cotton exporting was shared by European and large Indian firms. A striking feature of cotton processing and export is the relative unimportance of British metropolitan firms. Stahl in her pioneering study of the metropolitan organization of British colonial trade, commented that metropolitan control of the Uganda cotton industry was a pale shadow compared to local control, and if any guiding hand was to be found, it must be looked for in India, not Great Britain (Stahl 1951:282). She contrasts this situation with the permeating influence of metropolitan interests in the other colonies she studied: Malaya, Ceylon and the West Indies.

Coffee processing, like cotton ginning, was tightly controlled by governmental regulation, creating a situation where those already participating held a privileged position, protected from the threat of increased competition because new entrants could not obtain the necessary

governmental licenses. The 1950s boom in coffee prices was to make this a very rewarding sector of the economy.

At the end of the war, coffee processing was shared by Indian and European firms. One of the latter, A. Baumann and Co., handled about 40 percent of native-grown Robusta coffee exported from Uganda at that time (Stahl 1951:285) and was involved at various times in Arabica coffee processing and export (Wallace, Belshaw and Brock 1973:172-177).

The import of manufactured goods is the necessary complement of the export of agricultural commodities in an open economy such as Uganda's. Commerce was second to, but far behind agriculture in contribution to Gross Domestic Product (see Table 7.2). Import and export of goods, and the wholesale trade, were shared by Indian and European firms. A number of the latter were branches of large commercial firms operating in several countries and in diverse spheres of business. No one company held a dominating position in this field. The pre-eminence of the Uganda Company, whose general manager was the unofficial leader of the business community, and usually a member of Legislative Council, was derived more from history and tradition rather than a dominating economic position (cf. Ehrlich 1953).

Despite the importance of European commercial houses, the number of Europeans on the spot was very small. The 1958 census shows only 81 European "Proprietors, managers and directors" in commercial, financial and insurance occupations (p.119) and only three "Agents, factors, buyers...."

European firms were usually branch offices of larger companies,

often with headquarters in Europe and branches in two or three of the East African colonies. These operated in the standard manner characteristic of such joint-stock corporations. Indian firms, on the other hand, were often based on family partnerships, and utilized complex ties of kinship and sect membership to provide access to business intelligence, credit and customers (Desai 1965; Benedict 1968). It was common for Indian firms to be linked by kin ties to enterprises in Kenya and sometimes in Tanganyika also. In this situation of "frontier capitalism" the impersonal, bureaucratic form of organization associated with full-fledged capitalist enterprise often proved less successful in providing medium-range linking enterprises than were firms organized on an older familial basis using traditional ties.

Very few Europeans were involved in retail trade, where Indians predominated. Almost 50 percent of the gainfully occupied Indian men, some 4,900, plus a scattering of Arabs and others, worked in this sector (Morris 1968:134). Non-African traders were confined by law to trading centers. Indian shops ranged from a few prosperous modern enterprises in Kampala, many "general stores" with an astonishing variety of stock in larger towns, down to a large number of tiny tin-roofed "dukas" or shops, each carrying a similar small range of cheap goods in remote trading centers. Many of these smaller traders worked very hard for a poor living. Morris estimates that in 1954 the average net income of such traders was not much more than £400 per year (ibid.:133-137).

In addition, very large numbers of African shops appeared, especially after the end of World War II. A government survey of retail

trade in 1952 found 11,634 African and 4,809 Indian traders, but concluded that the smaller number of Indian traders did three times as much business as the African traders. Many of the latter had tiny shops in remote areas, stocking only a little soap, some matches, kerosene and perhaps sugar, often as an adjunct to a farm rather than a profitable, self-supporting enterprise.[7]

Turning to other aspects of commerce, at the end of the colonial period, there were seven commercial banks in Uganda; all were branches of international banks: three British, one British-French, two Indian and one Dutch (IBRD 1962:73). The commercial banks were important not only for the usual range of banking functions, but also for the provision of finance for crop purchase by the marketing boards (ibid.; interviews). Sixteen Europeans were employed in banking (E.A. Statistical Dept. 1953:119).

Commercial interests in Uganda were united through the Uganda Chamber of Commerce, an organization dating back to 1905 (Engholm 1968: 34). The UCC had from its early years included both European and Indian members. It repeatedly refused to affiliate with the Association of East African Chambers of Commerce, in part because of the strong suspicion and resentment of Kenyan business interests, and in part because of the greater anti-Indian feeling in the Kenyan-based Association (ibid.:17, 362-367, et passim). European and Indian businessmen in Uganda lived in separate social worlds after business hours, but Engholm's study demonstrates conclusively their daily working co-operation on common economic interests, through the UCC, the Uganda Cotton Association

and similar interest-group organizations.[8]

The racially-stratified social life of the colony probably affected the conduct of business to the extent that Indian businessmen may have welcomed assumption by their European colleagues of leadership roles because of the greater access the latter had to officials on informal occasions. For example, the European cotton manager of the Uganda Company seems to have played an active role as an industry representative far in excess of his company's small share in the industry.[9] But even this difference may have declined as officials' attitudes to race broadened. When questions of business were involved, the significant divisions were large against small, established against struggling, not European against Indian.

4. Other economic activities

Other enterprises can be briefly summarized: a small amount of tea production was carried on, expanding in postwar years, by large estates under European ownership. Sugar production and manufacture was carried on by two large Indian firms in Eastern Province, the Mehta and Mahdvani interests. Sale of sugar on the East African market made these two families among the richest in Uganda. Mining, at this time, contributed less than one percent of Uganda's GDP.[10] Tin, some gold and wolfram were mined in small operations run by a prospector-owner. These operations, like marginal mining in other countries, were extremely vulnerable to world price fluctuations. Mining such as it was was dominated by Europeans; the cutting of lumber by Indians, and fishing by Africans.

As we saw in the previous chapter, manufacturing and construction were insignificant in 1938. Rapid expansion in postwar years nevertheless led to manufacturing contributing only 4 percent, and construction 3 percent of GDP in 1954. Industries remained small, based on processing or repairs, as indicated below.

TABLE 7.3

Processing coffee, grain and timber	228
Motor repairs, light engineering, joinery	142
Grain and seed mills	131
Other	97
Total	598

Source: Morris 1968:140. Figures exclude ginneries, but include oil seed and coffee factories mentioned above.

Electricity, rail and boat transport were provided by parastatal organizations. Road transport was in private hands, with Indians predominant and some European participation. In postwar years, some Africans, especially war veterans, tried to enter this area, despite shortages of vehicles and restrictive governmental regulations.

In summary, non-agricultural enterprises were almost entirely in the hands of Europeans and Indians, with the exceptions of fishing, small-scale village crafts and local beer-brewing. Africans had early been squeezed out of trade by imposition of high licence fees in 1901 (Ehrlich 1968); early African participation, along with poorer Indians, in the cotton industry as touring middlemen had been ended by govern-

mental controls (see Chapter X). Postwar African attempts to expand into retail trade or road transport encountered stiff competition from well-entrenched and experienced Indians with extensive credit and wholesale networks. The niches into which Africans wishing to break out of agriculture could have expanded had already been pre-empted.

The officials with whom this topic was discussed tended to see lack of African participation in the "linking" institutions as due to lack of experience or familiarity with the cash economy, or lack of ability. They were not aware of the earlier repressive measures blocking African participation and took for granted the framework of governmental regulation that acted as road-blocks to gaining experience in small entrepreneurial activities (Ehrlich 1963).

5. Standards of living, stratification and class

This section will try to put together the material above to create an overall sketch of social differentiation in Uganda as it might have appeared around 1945. This can only be a very rough approximation; income statistics are lacking, and much of the scanty data refers to a somewhat later period.

It is clear enough that the vast mass of the population consisted of African peasant cultivators, mostly poor. But despite low cash incomes, they were not destitute. There was a surplus of land; food could always be grown and some housing provided by one's own efforts. By the end of World War II, the periodic famines that had been a problem earlier were more or less under control. Leisure, for men at least, was abundant.

Permanent wage-labor was seen as a desirable alternative by only a very tiny minority. Up to about the mid-1950s, the "labor problem" in Uganda meant difficulties in recruiting adequate supplies of even unskilled labor to meet the needs of the economy.[11] One estimate puts the number of Africans in wage-employment in 1951 at about 200,00 (Great Britain 1954:96).

The tri-partite racial stratification of many features of life was equally obvious, and is well-known. It was crystallized in the layout of East African towns, visible in the provision of separate hospitals and schools, appropriately graded as to facilities for Europeans, Indians and Africans. It was reflected in wage-rates. The Protectorate government was the largest single employer; until 1954, separate European, Indian and African civil services were maintained. In the rare instances where a member of another race occupied a position normally held by a European, an Indian would be paid four-fifths, and an African three-fifths of the European salary.[12] Wage rates in private industry were also differentiated by race (Sofer 1954).

But despite this visible racial stratification, when we look at incomes and standards of living, some Africans were richer than many Europeans, some Indians were poorer than the "middle stratum" of Africans, and a few Indians were the richest of all. When we look at access to political power, in the next section, the distribution changes yet again.

Even in the absence of good statistics, most observers would name the Indian sugar-estate families as the richest people in the Protec-

torate, followed by a tiny number of the more successful large ginnery owners and importers/exporters. The owners of private capital operating in the linkage areas of the economy were vastly richer than the European officials regulating their activities. Many of the senior Europeans working in these "linking" enterprises were salaried managers or technical staff, but a few also became directors of their companies.

But those looking with envy at members of the small but rich capitalist class among the Indians tend to forget about the broader middle element of skilled artisans, small traders and salaried workers, whose incomes and standard of living was much more modest (cf. Ghai 1965:98). In addition there was a surprisingly large number of very poor Indians, whose poverty was usually hidden away behind small shops, or in urban slum housing (Ghai ibid.; Hollingsworth 1960). Many Europeans lived for long in East Africa without becoming aware of the extent of this submerged Indian poverty. Although the majority of Indians was much better off than the majority of Africans, there was considerable overlapping in the racial distribution of economic rewards, especially in Buganda (cf. Morris 1968:133).

Most of the Europeans in the colony appear to have been salaried. The missionaries lived modestly. Officials' salaries gave them a luxurious standard of living relative to poor peasants, but to stretch a junior official's salary to cover the standard of life regarded as necessary for health and appropriate to European status took skilled management on the part of wives (cf. Bradley, E. 1950). Many Europeans in government employment occupied relatively modest positions and

received correspondingly small salaries as can be seen by studying staff lists. Colonial service was not a highroad to riches.

Information on remuneration and living standards of European 'commercials' is scant. Salaried managers may have been paid at higher standards than officials. There were a small number of "old-timers," planters who had gone into other activities, miners and so on, who seem to have left behind a richer fund of stories about their adventures than sizeable estates. It seems likely that very few Europeans made even a modest fortune in Uganda.

While the majority of Africans lived at a poverty level far below any European, there was an important minority, especially in Buganda, of prosperous Africans. These included senior chiefs, senior officials of Kingdom and Native Governments, large land-holders, successful large farmers, etc. The prosperity of the latter was to become even more conspicuous in the 1950s, during the years of booming coffee prices.[13] But their prosperity derived from two sectors only: land and farming, and bureaucratic employment. Rewarding participation in other spheres of the economy was negligible. But the upper and upper-middle strata of Africans who supplemented salaries with farming income, or were large-scale farmers, were better off than many middle and lower-level European officials. A common complaint of such Europeans was that these prosperous Africans, because of the anomalies of the tax structure, had to pay no income tax. They also, of course, could provide much of their own food.

But the most extreme case of the disparity between income and the distribution of power concerns the traditional rulers and those close to

them. The kabaka of Buganda in 1956 received from Buganda government funds an official salary of £7,500 plus funds for upkeep of his palace, Rolls-Royces, a palace staff of 159 and other kingly appurtenances. In addition, the kabaka derived revenues from some 350 square miles of official mailo estates (Fallers 1964:127). In the same year, the governor of the Protectorate had just been given a sizeable salary increase: to £5,300 plus £2,500 duty allowance. He too had Rolls-Royces provided for him, but no official estates, and a much more modest Government House establishment. At that time, the Resident, whose task it was to "advise" the kabaka and his government, received £2,900 a year, and no Rolls-Royce (Uganda, Staff List 1956).

To understand how the colonial system worked, it is important not to let the poverty of the majority of Africans obscure the fact that a few of them did very well, economically, under that rule.

6. Race stratification and power

M.G. Smith (1969) has used the typical features of racial stratification referred to above to argue that Uganda is a type-case of what he calls a differentially-incorporated plural society, held together through the monopolization of political power by the dominant segment. I have already shown that income levels were not fully congruent with racial strata. This section will examine Smith's argument that the dominant racial segment held power, and try to explore further Benedict's earlier criticism of Smith (1970:37) that power was usually found in the hands of a small number of that segment.

Part of the difficulty with the plural society model stems from its proponents' failure to distinguish the broad category 'European' from that tiny number of senior officials who held power.

Europeans, as a category, held power only in the very limited sense that in such a society, a white-skinned person was accorded high social prestige, and this generalized prestige gave considerable opportunity for bullying unsophisticated Africans in day-to-day encounters. This opportunity underlay the widespread belief in recruiting "gentlemen" for service in the colonies, for the grosser forms of bullying were considered ungentlemanly. The structured bullying of a hierarchical society was, as in Britain, taken for granted.

But a belief in the maintenance of the prestige of Europeans as a category — what could be described as the mystique of European superiority — was an important part of the British doctrine of colonial rule. British people of lower social status were expected to conform to 'middle-class' norms in the colonies. A European in a British colony was expected "not to let the side down" by behaving in ways that might threaten the prestige of his race-category, and the social controls in those small enclave communities could operate harshly, as many a novel of colonial life has shown. During interviews several informants dated the decline of British rule to the years of the Second World War, when troop movements through Uganda led to the presence of "a lower sort of men." In one way or another, the war was blamed for damaging that European mystique,[14] and hence weakening British hegemony.

But this opportunity for bullying, based on the prestige of one's race-category, should not be confused with the power to make crucial Protectorate-wide decisions and to enforce them. A stenographer or a road-foreman working in Uganda no more ruled than if they had stayed at home in Battersea or Glasgow. They remained lower-level civil servants, who participated in the high prestige accorded all Europeans, and who, because of the nature of enclave life, had much greater social access to higher levels of power than would have been possible for them at home. But power was held firmly within these higher levels.

7. The allocative elite

The nature of the control exercised from London over a colony was discussed in Chapter II above. It was suggested that a colonial governor had neither the unfettered discretion ascribed by some, nor was he the "mere petty functionary" carrying out his master's explicit orders of the cruder forms of Marxist analysis. Within the overall guidance of the Colonial Office, the men at the top of a colony had to make decisions on a wide range of internal policy matters, and to allocate significant resources. Even on those matters that had to be referred up to the Colonial Office for ratification, they possessed that potent power of skillful bureaucrats, who control the main channels of information flowing up, and who can structure their presentations to their distant superiors in a manner likely to evoke the response they want. It will be suggested in the conclusions that the extent to which a strong governor could get his way with the Colonial Office varied according to

the salience of the issue to Britain's own imperial needs. But within this overarching framework of imperial needs, there was a wide range of issues on which a skillful governor could outmaneuver Colonial Office "interference" -- one example is given in Chapter X.[15] There was another range of policy that by custom was left to the discretion of those serving in the colony. Thus even within the constrictions of the imperial system, the scope and necessity of decision-making at the Protectorate level was considerable. Who then was involved in making important Protectorate-wide allocations? Retrospectively, and without access to archives, only a crude approximation can be worked out.

Formally, important decisions were made by the governor-in-council, that is, the governor plus his Executive Council, consisting in 1946 of the chief secretary, the attorney general, the financial secretary, the directors of medical servical services and agriculture, and the resident of Buganda.

Changing membership in the Executive Council may tell us a little about changing priorities. The inclusion of the resident, but not the other provincial commissioners, reflects the special position of Buganda in the Protectorate. For many years, the director of education was included, but this post was dropped in 1946. In 1947 the secretary for African affairs was added, and the senior unofficial member of the Legislative Council took a seat on this inner body. By 1953, under Sir Andrew Cohen, the number of unofficials members had reached six, and the Council had expanded to 15.

But even when it remained a small group under Sir John Hall,

informants say Executive Council was essentially a body for ratifying decisions, not making them. Crucial decisions were hammered out among the governor and the relevant officials and others before Council meetings. This tendency undoubtedly increased as the Council grew larger. Formally, a governor was not required to follow his Executive Council's advice, but if he did not, he had to advise the Colonial Office. He was not bound to consult them, if matters were urgent, or imperial authority best served by his not doing so (Ibingira 1973:31). The Executive Council was not a cabinet, and the governor's power derived from above, and not from support within it. But a skillful governor would strive for good working relations with his senior officials.

Thus a positional analysis of Executive Council membership can give us only a rough approximation of those senior positions considered most important within the administrative structure. Getting at the make-up of the allocative elite — those involved in actually hammering out crucial decisions — is much more difficult. Those involved depended very much on the nature of the problem, but the governor was, on any important issue, central. The chief secretary was positionally central, but his influence would not necessarily be effective if his relations with the governor were not good. The financial secretary was automatically involved on any issue involving spending or taxation. A strong attorney-general could exert influence on a wide range of issues. The involvement of 'unofficial' members will be discussed at greater length below.

Ideally, one would like to reconstruct the decision-making process on a wide range of crucial issues, not possible on the basis of present information. Some glimpses of the process on two issues are available. As will be shown at greater length in Chapter X, those heavily involved in policy-making on re-organization of the ginnery industry seem to have been, on the government's side, the governor, the director of agriculture, and to some extent the financial secretary, with some input from the Co-operatives Department. But the participation of leaders of the ginnery industry, through an ad hoc committee, was also extremely important.

Another decision, occurring outside the time limits of this study but of critical importance for Uganda, was the deportation of the kabaka of Buganda in 1953.[16] Informants say this crucial decision was taken by four men: the governor, Sir Andrew Cohen, the chief secretary, the attorney-general and the secretary for African affairs. The Colonial Office had sanctioned the action, but the secrecy surrounding it was so tight that apparently only two other people in Uganda even knew the move was being contemplated: the governor's private secretary and his wife. The Executive Council was informed only after the kabaka was on his way to London, a good illustration of the impotence of that body on truly critical issues. Speculation as to how those four men came to that decision, which has had profound consequences for the political development of Uganda, will probably long continue.

Several points emerge from these and other less clear-cut examples. The most obvious is the very small number of officials involved in the decision-making process; although those lower in the hierarchy had the

same power mentioned above, of structuring the information flow upward, the smaller size and greater ease of checking reduced this power as compared to the governor vis-a-vis the Colonial Office. Given these small numbers, personality factors were important in determining the extent to which an individual could actualize the potential influence of a position. Most important is the dominant position of the governor; a weak governor could perhaps be "managed" by a strong chief secretary, but the position offered immense scope to a strong man. Both Sir John Hall and Sir Andrew Cohen were very strong men, although using very different styles.

The fourth point is the involvement of 'unofficials' in decision-making, through channels that do not always appear on formal organizational charts. The importance of the leading 'unofficials' was brought home to me by the officials themselves, who urged me to expand my interview coverage to include some of them.

8. The role of the 'unofficials' in government

Who then were these unofficials?

The Crown Colony model provided for a Legislative Council to which leading non-officials were appointed, to enable the governor to draw on their advice. An observer taking the "trusteeship" ideology at face value might well have expected that one or more of the outstanding missionaries, educators or medical workers who served in Uganda might have been regarded as sufficiently expert on furtherance of African welfare that his advice would be sought for Legislative Council. In fact,

Engholm's study of Legislative Council (1968:244-246) shows that until 1953, the Europeans and Indians appointed were drawn exclusively from the ranks of business, banking and plantation interests. Table 7.4 gives occupations for 'unofficials', 1945-52. One official whose advice was much sought by governors on possible Legco appointments cannot recall ever being asked about any missionary. Appointments to Legislative Council would seem in themselves to point to the reality of what colonial government was about.

We can see from Table 7.5 that in 1948 government servants and missionaries were the two largest categories of Europeans in the Colony in 1948; many of the 319 teachers, doctors and nurses were also employed by the missions. Census data fail to distinguish truly senior managers/employers from heads of small businesses, but these figures together with some knowledge of the area suggest that the effective number of Europeans considered positionally suitable for Legislative Council appointments was well under 100. The 'oligarchy' that Jeffries speaks of (p. 42 above) was a tiny proportion of the 3,448 whites actually living in the colony.[17]

There were two each European and Indian members in 1945, plus three Africans, newly appointed for the first time. These numbers rose to eight Africans, four Europeans and four Indians by 1950 (Engholm 1968: 378).[18] These were nominated by the governor, and were always outnumbered by the official members of Legco.

Both informants and scholars agree that in this time period, Legislative Council was a rubber stamp for decisions taken elsewhere. The

TABLE 7.4

Unofficial members of Legislative Council

1945-1952

	European	Asian	African
Cotton interests	-	2	-
Manager, Uganda Co.	3	-	-
General businessmen	2	1	-
Insurance business	-	1	-
Manager, A. Baumann Co.	1	-	-
Unknown	2	-	-
Senior officials, kingdoms and Native Administration	-	-	14
District Council member	-	-	1
School masters	-	-	2
	8	4	17

Sources: tabulated from listings of Legislative Council members in Staff Lists; information on occupations of Indians and Europeans from informants; information on occupations of Africans from Engholm's similar table (1968:388).

TABLE 7.5

Distribution of the European Population of Uganda, 1948 by sector and occupational level

Sector	Managers, Employers, Foremen	Skilled craftsmen, Clerical workers, Shop assistants, etc.	Others, level not specified	Total
Agriculture, fishing	79	5	6	90
Mining, quarrying, etc.			56*	56
Industry, construction, food manufacture, etc.	28	54	18	100
Transport & communications	13	1	24	38
Commerce, finance, insurance, (inc. secretaries, book-keepers of other sectors)	100	98	24	222
Hotel keepers, personal service, etc.	21	16		37
Other workers, n.e.s.			22	22
Total	241	174	144	565

Government service (inc. local government)	724		
Clergymen, priests, nuns, religious lay workers	528		
Professional occupations, inc. teachers, doctors, etc., not in government service	319		
Total	1,571		1,571
No occupation stated			105
Not gainfully employed: children	535		
housewives	637		
retired	25		
other	10		
Total	1,207		1,207
		Total	3,448

* Many of these would have been owner-prospectors or managers of small mines.

Source: compiled from data in Uganda Census of Non-African Population, 1948 (E.A. Statistical Dept. 1953).

significance of the appointment of 'unofficials' to Legislative Council was the opportunities thus opened up to become involved in decision-making at stages much earlier than the Legislative Council debates and the passage of legislation. These included the widespread custom of extensive consultation with leading businessmen, especially the 'unofficial' members, on policy matters; appointments of such businessmen to relevant committees (e.g., the committee on re-organization of the cotton ginning industry discussed in Chapter X), and the involvement of 'unofficial' members of Legco in budget procedures through the work of the Standing Finance Committee.

Informal discussions went on a great deal. An official much concerned with the preparation and administration of the 1947 development plan said:

> There was a lot of consultation with business leaders. A lot was done unofficially. We would drop in to see them, keep them in touch first, so they did not throw bricks later. Or, at least, we would find out what sort of bricks they were going to throw.
>
> The unofficial members of Legco...were keen supporters of what we wanted to do. They had to appear to be criticizing government — at least to the Uganda Herald,[19] but they were reasonable people.

His list of those he remembered calling on frequently included no African members, but did include one or two Indians. Many African "unofficial" members lived "up-country," whereas the leading businessmen were centered in Kampala or, at the furthest, Jinja.

As in many elite studies, we know that informal channels of communication linked senior officials not only with the "unofficial" European

members, but also other leading European businessmen. The informal contacts were not perhaps as close and frequent in Uganda as in some other colonies, because of the spatial separation of the administrative capital of Entebbe from the business headquarters of Kampala. But the European enclave was small, club memberships were reciprocal, and social contacts and friendships did develop despite the inconvenience of the Entebbe-Kampala road. What cannot be demonstrated, on the basis of present evidence, is clear-cut effects of such informal social networks on the course of events. It could be argued that one such effect was a definite tendency for government to award licences, management contracts or other scarce economic privileges to the larger, already established business firms; governmental policies clearly favored such firms over smaller, aspiring enterprises, whether European, Indian or African.[20] Government officials would argue that they gave such economic privileges to firms that were "sound," "reliable," run by men of integrity; established firms, as they saw it, were less likely to indulge in "cut-throat competition" or excessive cheating of "the African." Whether the firms judged "sound" and "reliable" were those headed by the men the top officials mixed with socially can be answered only by a much-needed closer study of business-government interactions.[21] In any case, informal social networks were only one form of contact. Another crucial one was institutionalized membership of unofficials on governmental committees.

During the Hall regime, Makerere College and the missionary world seem to have been isolated from the informal social networks linking officials and European businessmen. This changed when Sir Andrew Cohen

arrived. Intellectually inclined himself, Sir Andrew used often to flee from Entebbe to seek out the conversation of the academics on Makerere Hill, and invited them frequently to Government House. His governorship was regarded by the academics as a golden age when, through their friendships with him, they felt they had some input into the top levels of policy making. Once again, the effects of such contacts on government policy remain unclear. Reverse effects may well have occurred; what has been the effect on the historiography of the period of the friendships between the governor and the leading students of his regime? Such easy inter-change between governor and academics was probably highly unusual within the British colonial situation, but was part of the climate within which Low, Apter, Pratt, Richards, Fallers, Southall, Gutkind et al. worked. Both Apter 1967 and Low and Pratt 1970 are dedicated to Sir Andrew.

The Standing Finance Committee, as it operated to about 1951, consisted of all the unofficial members of Legislative Council, plus the director of agriculture and the development commissioner, under the chairmanship of the financial secretary, who was the dominant official on it. A former financial secretary described its work:

> All the work which is normally done in finance and economic affairs, and indeed in administrative matters involving finance, was handled by the Finance Committee, up until the introduction of the Ministerial system. The whole of the budget of the country — every item of every expenditure — was examined detail by detail by the Committee....The head of every department was called in to be grilled on the items in his head of expenditure or revenue head, by every single member of the Finance Committee...The budget was submitted as the draft estimates. After it had been through this grilling, it became the Budget to be submitted to Legislative Council. The grilling sometimes took four weeks, of meeting every day.

The financial secretary had drawn up the draft estimates on the basis of proposals from department heads. To document the extent to which the unofficials were able to bring about changes in allocations of government resources, through this process, would require analyses of estimates submitted to them and those finally approved — material which is not yet available. Until it is, we have the recollections of the man who ran the Committee for several years.

> The Standing Finance Committee was more powerful, of course, than the Legislative Council itself; it was perfectly possible for an unofficial member, when I was chairman of that committee, to come forward with an idea that ended up as a major piece of policy. I think on occasions it happened.... I allowed members great freedom. I welcomed, I was looking for ideas....I let the unofficial members have full rein in suggestions on issues that were not on the agenda. It was up to one of the other members to protest that it was out of order, if they wished....
>
> If the Standing Finance Committee had vetoed some plan, it would probably not be taken further. If unofficial members were bitterly opposed, we would tread water for a bit and try again later on. We would go on trying behind the scenes.

The system put a premium on the persuasive and diplomatic skills of its chairman. The man quoted above did not seem to feel that his budgets had been seriously distorted by unofficial intervention. He had a high opinion of the unofficials he had dealt with.

> I think the 'commercials' served often as a very useful catalyst. There were quite a lot of the men who were appointed to sit on Legislative Council who — looking back on it — were quite disinterested. They weren't motivated by self-interest by any manner of means. Some of them were, obviously, from time to time. But it is surprising how many of them did give of their best... without any real hope of...rewards to themselves or their particular firms, although undoubtedly that was there in the background....Perhaps I should say the governors of

> the day were particularly skillful in picking the right men.

The outside observer might be inclined to suggest that these 'unofficials' were capable of transcending their particularist interests, and skilled at identifying their class interests with those of the wider society.

It is difficult to determine with certainty who the dominant influences were; recollections of participants are a dubious basis but the best available. A striking feature of this financial secretary's account confirmed by other interviews, is the spontaneous recollection of especially influential 'unofficial' members as both European and Indian. Insofar as the 'allocative elite' of Uganda involved unofficials, it involved both European and Indian. These members were seen by officials as providing a useful flow of information, advice, experience into decision-making processes.

Statements from that time suggest that the role of the African members appointed to Legco was conceived differently. These appointments were made as a hurried political expediency, in response to Governor Mitchell's appointment of Africans to Legco in Kenya, announced without even informing his neighboring governor of his intentions. The selection procedures used to give some regional spread led to shorter terms than was usual for immigrant unofficials, which handicapped the Africans in developing skills and confidence in the new political arena (Engholm 1968:379-389). Many came from up-country, so geographical factors cut them off from the informal networks of consultation. But more fundamental, the role of the African members was seen as carrying information

about government policy downward, not conveying input into the decision-making process.[22]

Essentially, most of the 14 African Legco members from 1945 to 1952 were seen by officials as irrelevant to policy formation. Recollections suggest that two, possibly three, earned the respect of senior officials and were listened to seriously in this time period.[23] But the opinions which the senior officials felt they had to take into account remained, as before the war, those of the unofficials who represented the European and Indian businessmen.

It was pointed out above that no one or two firms held a predominant position in the economy, although the members of the Uganda Cotton Association, as a group, did have a potential throttlehold. This plurality probably contributed to the maintenance of a firm hold on power in the hands of top officials. My interviews and actual policies all reflect a desire among officials to conciliate business interests that seems somewhat at odds with the strength of their formal position vis-a-vis those interests. Engholm (1967) may well be right, that unofficial influence declined in the 1945-52 period, as compared with previous years, but if so, that influence was still considerable. A desire to reach a compromise, to avoid confrontation and the necessity to use the official majority in Legislative Council to force through measures, was explained in terms of, "oh, well, life was easier and pleasanter for everyone if we got along with the 'commercials'." Government had sufficient power to ignore these interests when they chose to do so, but they frequently did not so choose.

This situation could be summarized as one in which power over internal affairs within the colony, and the recognized right to make allocative decisions for that colony, was held firmly in official hands; but a privileged right to consult and exert influence had been granted to a coalition of businessmen, both European and Indian. African members, with a very few exceptions, may have been members of the positional elite, and thus entitled to formal respect at state dinners, but they were not able to transform this position into membership of the allocative elite in this time period. Most of these African members were part of what might be called the African Establishment, leaders and senior officials in district and kingdom administrations. Two of the three who may have exerted some influence at this time (1945-52) were leading members of the Ganda land-holding class.

There is a sense, then, in which the officials' second 'conscious model' mentioned at the beginning of this chapter is closer to actual processes of Protectorate-level decision-making than the more usual "layer-cake" model, however applicable that model may have been in other spheres of the colony's life. Separate schools, hospitals and sports club did not prevent leading people of each race from getting together over policy issues that involved the interests of each, within, of course, the overarching power of the colonial state structure.

9. Internal contradictions

The flux and complexities of Uganda in 1945 could be crudely schematized into something like the following: a large mass of peasantry

producing cash crops for export, a small number of immigrants processing those crops and handling the needed imports; immigrants in lower-level craft and service positions; an African Establishment that, under official supervision, maintained law and order and the flow of produce and tax revenue in from the rural areas; missionary-affiliate groups that, together with governmental departments, looked after education and medical services; and a state apparatus, bureaucratic in form, that both ruled and administered. But in addition to these firmly "fixed" groups there were less readily categorizable elements: farmers moving into larger-scale agriculture, aspiring African traders, educated Africans who had not found a rewarding role within the Establishment. The boundaries between these elements and the African Establishment are by no means rigid; a displaced chief might take up trade, or an educated protestor win a position as a chief, and in Buganda, both might be landowners. Establishment membership and nationalist sentiments also coexisted.

The colonial state, in its task of co-ordinating these elements, encountered increasing difficulty in the postwar period as contradictions between the elements sharpened. The ruling bureaucracy was dependent for day-to-day maintenance of its rule on the African Establishment of chiefs and local government officials. It was dependent on the unorganized peasantry for the production of the cash crops which generated the essential revenue flow, and it was dependent on the immigrant business interests for processing and export of those crops.

The trusteeship ideology, together with the need to keep peasants

sufficiently contented that they would continue to grow cotton and coffee, required that officials protect the peasantry from undue exploitation by the African Establishment, while at the same time supporting its authority. There was thus a constant tension, as traditional rulers tried to maintain their scope for exercise of their power, while officials sought to publicly support while privately curbing (cf. Beattie 1971; Ingham 1975; Apter 1967).

African Establishment figures, insofar as they were landowners or producers, had interests totally opposed to the European-Indian business coalition. Aspiring African entrepreneurs were also structurally at odds with this coalition, which monopolized the niches into which they might have expanded into. The peasants, as small producers, shared grounds for opposition to the processing-import-export coalition with the large landowners and larger producers. But in Buganda especially, the latter element overlapped with the category of chiefs and Buganda government leaders, who collected taxes and often attracted the enmity of the peasants. During disturbances, chiefs' houses were often burned.

While the external observer can from hindsight interpret the history of this period as one of increasing contradictions, it was not so perceived by the men at the top at the time. For example, the British officials recognized profound differences between the elements making up the society, but they did not, at least in Uganda, see these elements as inherently contradictory or opposed. This belief in an underlying harmony may have been harder to maintain in a colony with European settlers, but it was very strong in Uganda prior to World War

II, and not much weakened in postwar years. In 1935, Thomas and Scott wrote:

> ...Uganda is faced with no political issue of first magnitude, and there remains no domestic difficulty which should not be capable of ready solution by co-operation between Europeans, Asiatics and Africans. The community of interests between these different sections of the population is generally realized and informs all branches of public endeavour. There are no separate spheres of activity; Uganda is essentially a native state, and in broad outlines the policy of the Government undoubtedly reflects the will of the people. There is, therefore, neither a 'native problem' nor 'social conflict' to distract attention from the complex task of building a civilization which, in its spiritual and material aspects alike, is beyond the present range of native imagination or aspirations (1935:43).

If this community of interest was disrupted by unrest, the disturbance could be explained away as caused by a few unrepresentative 'agitators' or 'malcontents', or, to Sir John Hall, 'Communists'. The officials really believed that the majority of the people were happy under colonial rule, the majority of the time, a perception found not only in official documents but frequently during interviews.[24] Disturbances, even riots, might indicate the need for some minor adjustments, but not fundamental changes. This reluctance to perceive contradiction can be seen as a consequence of the implicit "organic society" model of society underlying official thought, and a major factor helping officials to maintain that tranquillity commented on by external observers (cf. Newbold, quoted on p. 53 above; Apter 1967 passim).

Among the ruled, consciousness of identity and consequent social action at this time period was still heavily based on race, ethnicity, religion and caste. Perhaps these were most effectively transcended — during working hours only — in the precincts of the Uganda Chamber of

Commerce, the Uganda Cotton Association, and related committees. Thus, while analysis in terms of class interests can give us deeper insight into the underlying workings of the society, these class interests were overlain in the consciousness of both rulers and ruled by racial, ethnic and other identities; class interests had to be worked out within a milieu manifestly organized on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion and caste.

Thus the officials' two "conscious models," discussed at the beginning of this chapter, pertain to different aspects of the same social reality. The most common, the tri-partite "layer-cake" model, reflected the manifest importance of race-stratification as the organizing principle of day-to-day social interaction. The second less common model can be interpreted as the appearance in consciousness of the underlying operation of class as shared economic interests cross-cutting race, but an appearance refracted through the implicit "organic society" assumptions about society, entailing beliefs in noblesse oblige, benevolent leadership, absence of contradictions, and so on. Some of the strongest expressions of this model came from men at or near the top, who had been actively involved in economic policy.

10. The ruling bureaucracy: elite or class?

Within this open, dependent economy of the colony, the bureaucracy was a significant economic factor, both through tight regulation and significant control of the allocation of resources (cf. especially Chapter X), and increasingly in postwar years as a direct participant

through para-statal crop marketing boards and productive enterprises. But the Europeans who manned this bureaucracy were not permitted a personal share in the economy other than their official salaries. They had no part in the ownership of the means of production, and were not permitted to own land within the Protectorate, though their colleagues in Kenya had won this right some time previously.[25] Even though they spent all their working years in Uganda, they were essentially transients, socialized elsewhere, recruited elsewhere, and retiring elsewhere. Thus their position in the specific social formation of Uganda can be only partially comprehended by a narrow focus on the Protectorate level.

In the introduction it was stated that 'elite' was used as a first approximation term, to isolate for examination an element that manned the senior levels of the colonial state. Does such an examination make it possible to dispense with the term? First, it is obvious that the power of this elite cannot be based on any crude economistic concept of class in relation to means of production within the Protectorate. They were expressly barred from ownership or personal involvement. Instead, power derived ultimately from the forces of the metropolitan state, exemplified concretely by the dispatch of British soldiers from their bases in Kenya to help put down the riots of 1945 and 1949.

Second, their own class origins in the home country were in the long run irrelevant to their bureaucratic career. We saw in Chapter II that these origins were rarely direct from the dominant British bourgeoisie, and rarely from the higher reaches of the old landed aristocracy. Rather, the majority came from those social elements near the

top that had long specialized in producing good senior servants of the Empire. Social origins were extremely important in determining the nature of socialization; those who had successfully internalized the relevant values were provided, in this status sub-culture, with a marketable asset that gave them a competitive edge in obtaining administrative jobs in colonial service. But once in the Colonial Service, their actions cannot be explained as serving the interests of the classes from which they themselves originated, even though consideration of these origins is essential to understanding the ideological premises that they brought to their work. The Colonial Service, like other organizations of its kind, had its own norms and traditions, and proved quite capable of absorbing without sign of strain a minority of men of somewhat different social origins. The relative autonomy of these norms, vis-à-vis the potent status distinctions of the home society, is pointed up by the manner in which official enclave life was organized in terms of seniority within the bureaucratic structure, not the status distinctions of the metropolis. Thus in the Protectorate a junior administrative cadet who happened to be a baronet, and his wife, were treated as junior, taking precedence well behind the head of the Public Works Department, and his wife.

Interviewing these men in retirement dramatized the dual nature of their status. Originating frequently in families whose status was greater than their wealth, many of them had had little to sell but a labor-power informed by a specific status-culture. Those who rose to high positions within the Colonial Service had once exercised consid-

able power within the colony. But the norms of their service and their 'class' had prevented them from converting that power to personal profit. They retired into the anonymity of the British 'middle class', to try to maintain an appropriate style of life on modest pensions in an inflation-ridden society. They have been accused of having served the British ruling class, but they certainly were not of it.

We saw above that in terms of consciousness, they saw themselves as serving Uganda, the Empire, or some non-contradictory combination of these, insofar as they were not merely time-serving. But to go beyond consciousness to the level of objective structures requires not a focus on the class affiliations of individuals, but a deeper understanding of the relation of the bureaucracy as a social category to the state, not the local colonial state but the overarching metropolitan state. What was the part played by a given colonial state in the overall system of which it was one, discrete but not autonomous, part? A full answer to that question will take many more studies than this one.

Going to higher levels than the Protectorate can help to clarify certain anomalies of social differentiation within that level. Following Wallerstein (1972) the greater deference and access to superior public resources enjoyed by, say, a white mechanic or stenographer over an Indian millionaire can be seen as a consequence of an international status category, of developed over proletarian nations. "As a status-group category, race is a blurred collective representation for an international class category, that of the proletarian nations." On this reading, the "plural" features and "differential incorporation" of

a given colonial or ex-colonial society need then to be interpreted in the context of the international forces giving rise to it, but the specific manifestations of these forces in interaction with local circumstances in a specific historical situation may not correspond in all dimensions to the international stratification.

NOTES

1. Cf. Sofer and Sofer 1955.

2. This formulation was not found full-blown in any one interview, but it expresses a viewpoint scattered in partial form through a number of interviews. Statements of this kind almost invariably involved a comparison with Kenya.

3. In 1953, there were 235 Goans in government service, but only 206 Indians of other groups (Morris 1968:142).

4. See, inter alia, Brock 1969.

5. Vail (1972:124-125) refers briefly to a "progressive-farmer" scheme in the 1930s in Teso District in which a handful of farmers, "many relatives of chiefs or other petty officials" were given special training. The scheme was a failure, in part because of local resistance to attempts to enclose and improve common grazing land. See also Vincent (1977).

6. Fallers, in a study of the Ganda elite carried out in 1956, found that the chiefs, civil servants, ministers, landowners and leading politicians in his sample were much more closely related to those who received mailo allotments in 1900 than were the elite of other categories, such as teachers or clergymen. He found a "relatively cohesive and hereditary 'inner elite'" with numerous genealogical links (1964:202).

7. See Uganda 1955. For comments on African shopkeepers in Buganda, see Fallers 1964:146.

8. Engholm's conclusion that the two immigrant business communities worked closely together on common economic interests is reinforced by the perceptions of officials given me in interviews. The officials who dealt with the "commercials" clearly thought of the businessmen as a coalition, when it came to questions of policy, although there might be differences of emphasis in how to deal with individual businessmen of the two races.

9. With reference to an earlier period, see also the quotation from Governor Gowers on p. 386 of Chapter X.

10. The only mine to make a significant contribution to Uganda's economy — the copper mine at Kilembe — shipped out its first ore in 1957. But development of the mine was a major goal of the

policymakers during the study period. Seventy percent of the mine's capital was owned by Venture of Canada of the Frobisher mining group; Uganda Development Corporation held a ten percent share, and the Colonial Development Corporation put up twenty percent. Although it has provided a valuable diversification of Uganda's exports, the relatively small deposits are of low grade, and the mine in its early years returned meager profits to its owners (cf. IBRD 1962:268-269).

11. Labor questions in colonial Uganda have received much scholarly attention. Powesland 1957, gives a valuable historical account of labor policy up to 1952. Elkan 1960, discusses the work force of an urban factory, while Richards 1954, is a wide-ranging study of the migration from Rwanda-Urundi and outlying districts of Uganda into Buganda, where many migrants work for Ganda farmers. For later changes, see Hutton 1973.

12. A Commission of Inquiry in 1948 justified this rule on the ground that "the African is at the present time markedly inferior to the Asian of the same educational qualifications in such matters as sense of responsibility, judgment, application to duty and output of work" (Great Britain, Col. 233 1948:24). The Commission argued in similar terms that "the European" surpassed "the Asian"; in addition, it said, Europeans needed a higher standard of living than the other races (ibid.:25). Until well after 1952, senior positions in the administration were reserved to Europeans; the official belief was that competent educated Africans wishing for administrative careers should enter African local governments (cf. Katarobo 1975). Other studies dealing with the civil service in Uganda include Bryant 1963; Motani 1972 on the history of the African civil service, and Evans 1964 on the problem of Africanization.

13. Wrigley said of these years," Especially in the rich coffee-growing area around Masaka, Africans with four-figure incomes (£ 1,000 a year or more) may be reckoned in scores if not hundreds" (quoted in Goldthorpe 1965:21).

14. In addition to interviews and reading, these paragraphs draw heavily on my own experience of living in European enclaves in East Africa, for the attitudes discussed survived strongly even after independence.

15. Sir John Hall seems to have been very conscious of the techniques he used for handling the Colonial Office, cf. his statement on p. 41 in Chapter II. Sir John had himself been a home civil servant at an earlier stage in his career, and had served in the Colonial Office. One of those who served under him in Uganda re-

calls that a formal dispatch to the Secretary of State on important matters would be accompanied by a personal note to one of his friends, now senior civil servants in the C.O. This younger man recalls being taken around the Colonial Office by Sir John on one occasion, while the latter made calls. He talked to the younger man about the necessity of maintaining informal contact with C.O. officials. "You need that when you're a governor." Whether such deliberate maintenance of informal personal networks was common with colonial governors, and the possible effect of such networks on C.O.-colony relations can only be known after much more detailed study of other cases. In Sir John's case, the networks extended only to some of the permanent civil servants. He served in Uganda under Labour ministers; it seems reasonable speculation that his fundamental lack of sympathy with their approach extended to the then head of the African Bureau in the C.O., Andrew Cohen.

16. The complex background to this drastic action is discussed by Pratt in Low and Pratt 1970, and by Apter 1967:276-300. For its attempted resolution, see Low 1971a, Chap. 4.

17. Sir Andrew Cohen broke with tradition in his Legislative Council appointments as in many other spheres. His choices ranged so widely that he even appointed a professor from Makerere College and some women to his expanded Legislative Council.

18. Engholm 1968:379-389 discusses the complicated mechanisms for selection of African members. They usually served on Legco for only one year, a term which barely gave them time to become familiar with procedures and problems. Morris (1968:156-159) discusses criteria used for appointments of Indians to Legislative Council and advisory committees, and (pp. 114-122) describes the social maneuverings within the Indian community by which a man became prominent enough to attract the attention of European officials. Criteria used for selection of European business members have yet to be clarified. The frequent choice of general managers of the Uganda Company is striking. One official insisted there was no intent to represent the Uganda Company as such, but their London managers chose such good men for the post that they invariably stood out.

19. The Uganda Herald was a thrice-weekly English-language newspaper, published in Kampala, that usually maintained a strong editorial stance of criticism of government and support of business enterprise.

20. Some examples of such restrictive measures are discussed in Chapter X. Such a policy of favoring established businesses over new and aspiring ones was not specifically aimed at inhibiting African entrepreneurs; in at least one case it affected smaller European operators as well. But nevertheless it created further barriers for aspiring African entrepreneurs.

21. Such a study might clarify the important role played by H.R. Fraser, the manager of A. Baumann and Co., and a long-time unofficial member of Legislative Council who was appointed to Executive Council in 1949.

22. See especially the quotation from Governor Hall to this effect, in Ingham 1975:135-136. Cf. also Bryant 1963:135.

23. Those who seem to have been listened to with some real respect include Michael Kawalya-Kaggwa, the Katikiro of Buganda, son of Sir Apolo Kaggwa and a very large landowner; Serwano Kulubya, one-time treasurer of the Buganda government and also a large landowner, and Bulamu Mukasa, a graduate of Yale University and a former katikiro of Bunyoro.

24. One especially striking documentary expression is found in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the serious 1949 riots. The Dundas "reforms" of 1944, withdrawing British administrative officials from the district headquarters in Buganda, were described as "a major blunder." "...the people lost their friends and guides in whom, after many years of patient and careful nursing, they had come to place full trust." (Uganda 1950:13). The choice of 'nursing' is appropriate to the paternalistic outlook.

25. Several informants felt that the Kenyan officials' ability to buy farms and houses and invest in Kenyan enterprises helped to explain what they felt to be a difference in attitude between themselves and officials in Kenya.

> We weren't like Kenya. We were a Protectorate, not a colony. Our task was to do the best we could to develop Uganda, and then get out and leave the Africans to get on with it.

PART III

IDEOLOGY AND ACTION: THREE EXAMPLES

INTRODUCTION

In this third section we shall look at the ways in which the ideological outlook described in Part I was applied to specific problems in the context of the Ugandan situation described in Part II. The next chapter returns to the doctrines of rule discussed in Chapter IV, and looks briefly at their application in Uganda. Earlier theoretical orientations placed considerable emphasis on administrative arrangements and constitutional developments preparatory to political independence; political scientists and historians have already written much on these issues, and especially on the problem of the relation between Buganda and the Protectorate administration.[1] This chapter adds some information on the officials' perspective, derived from the interview data. Because much of the material has been covered in great detail elsewhere, it can be short.

More recent theoretical orientations, emphasizing underlying economic relations rather than details of administrative changes, have not yet led to a body of work of equal size. These orientations, especially the perspective that can be loosely labelled dependency theory, lead to emphasis on such questions as the mechanisms impeding the transformation of a colonial economy and perpetuating underdevelopment. On this perspective, the achievement of political independence, while not unimportant, marks merely a transition from one form of dependency to another often with minimal impact on the nature of underlying economic relationships.

Transformation of the economy, in the sense of a reduction in dependency on export of one or two relatively unprocessed staple products, an increase in industrialization, in autonomy and in the capacity for self-sustaining economic growth, has been a much sought-after but highly elusive goal of what we now call Third World countries. Uganda in the late colonial period provides a case study of some interest. The colony was not short of capital nor, as I hope to show below, of rulers with great energy and ambitious plans for development. The results, as we know, fell far short of the dreams. To explain why this was so is a task far too ambitious for the present chapters. My aim is much more modest: to clarify what the officials thought they were doing; that is, the emphasis is on their interpretations of the situation, and on their policy choices, rather than on "what actually happened." I make no attempt to give a balanced and comprehensive account of post-war economic developments; in fact, certain major efforts such as construction of the great power dam across the Nile at Jinja, or the western extension of the railway, are barely mentioned. Although there is as yet no fully satisfactory economic history of the period, Lury (1976) and Zwanenberg (1975) provide the broad outlines.

My aim, as an anthropologist, was not a comprehensive history but a clarification of officials' ideologies of development; therefore I chose to focus on a few selected issues that would most effectively highlight their perspective. Since implicit presuppositions become more explicit in the context of a dispute, each of the issues dealt with in Chapters IX and X involves a dispute of some kind. Other

criteria affecting the choice included theoretical relevance and the availability of data. The latter criterion eliminated examples concerning the coffee industry, despite its increasing importance to Uganda's economy. No study of coffee was available to provide a framework for analysis of officials' accounts.

Chapter IX examines the conflicting concepts of development held by two different governors, as expressed in two different development plans (Uganda 1945b and Uganda 1947a). These documents provide rare and rather lengthy expositions of the rationale behind the proposed allocation of governmental resources for post-war development. The manner in which an incoming governor was able to discard the plan prepared under the aegis of his predecessor, and replace it with his own priorities, tells us much about the scope of the gubernatorial role. It is sometimes said that these plans had little if any actual effect on the course of events in Uganda (e.g. Walker 1962:41). Nevertheless, the reasons for the relative lack of impact of the plans tells us much about the nature of the structures in which the British officials worked, and the scope and limitations which these structures imposed on the implementation of their thinking on development. Involved here also is the issue of attempts to industrialize, important within a dependency theory framework.

Another question of considerable interest is the possibility, or lack thereof, within a dependent economy for indigenous entrepreneurs to expand the scope and nature of their activities. This question has been much emphasized in writings on Uganda by Ehrlich (1958 and 1963); Brett

goes even further in identifying African participation in crop processing and marketing as crucial to possibilities for transformation (1973:238). He sees moves into the handling of agricultural crops as a logical beginning point that could lead ultimately into simple manufacturing (ibid.).

In Uganda, such moves did not occur, even though there were within the colony Africans with access to capital. Although I myself am not as sanguine as Brett and Ehrlich about the potential for transformation of such small-scale entrepreneurial activity, it is worth inquiring as to reasons for the conspicuous lack of African participation in crop processing noted in Chapter VII. Such an inquiry leads us straight into the heart of Uganda's cotton industry.

African demands for a larger share in the processing of the cotton crop led to a crisis that simmered for about three years, from 1949 to 1952, although its roots go back much further in time. The issue that brought this simmering crisis to a head — a demand for the nationalization of the cotton ginneries — is perhaps not very significant in the overall economic history of Uganda. Lury in his general account barely mentions it (1976:232) although he provides useful background on other aspects of the cotton industry. Nevertheless, it serves admirably the anthropological purpose of clarifying official attitudes and revealing social process. The cast of actors involved not only the officials themselves, but also the Secretary of State for the Colonies and one of his senior officials, the leaders of the ginnery industry in Uganda both British and Indian, British politicians and populist African leaders. Offstage hovered disgruntled peasant growers who had recently rioted over

the cotton issue, the Lancashire cotton interests, and even the government of India as a buyer of Ugandan cotton. In the course of building up to the question of nationalization, we see something of official attitudes when they perceived a conflict between the interests of Uganda and those of Britain, over the question of the bulk-buying of cotton.

Chapter X is unavoidably rather detailed and technical. These men were not ideologues churning out words, but practical men getting on with their jobs; their day-to-day actions involved attempts to reconcile competing pressures and demands, and conflicts between their professed beliefs and their definition of what was practical within a given situation. Therefore we have to understand something of this technical situation.

In some respects, this detailed analysis of a dispute as a means of clarifying social process and the definitions of the situation held by the actors involved parallels the "extended-case" or "situational analysis" method pioneered by Gluckman, Mitchell, Turner, Van Velsen et al. (cf. Van Velsen 1968). But the scale of the political arena involved is very different. Further, unlike the compelling studies of village-level disputes presented by these anthropologists, the present case has had to be built up retrospectively, without the richness of direct observation of ongoing behavior that characterizes their work, and with only minimal access to documentary evidence. The major source of data for the central dispute over nationalization has been the recollections of key actors. It is thus an experiment in method, and the interpretation given here must remain tentative until access to archival

sources is possible.

An even more striking difference concerns the nature of the data. Instead of the anthropologically familiar accounts of witchcraft accusations and divinations, Chapter X is full of details about cotton buying, pool shares, staple lengths, size of throughput and similar exotica. The issue underlying these technical complexities is simple enough: how should the benefits of the colony's most important industry be distributed among the disputants? Since the colonial state set the rules within which the cotton crop was grown and processed, its decisions on this issue help us to see how the officials' professions of trusteeship worked out in practice.

NOTES

1. A short selection of books would include Apter 1967; Beattie 1971; Burke 1964; Engholm 1968; Fallers 1964, 1965; Gertzel 1976; Ibingira 1973; Ingham 1975; Low 1971a; Low and Pratt 1970.

CHAPTER VIII

TRIBES, CHIEFS AND POLITICS

1. Native administration in Uganda: ideology and reality

The system of native administration in Uganda evolved as a response of early British officials to specific local conditions, not as a consequence of the explicit ideology of Indirect Rule. As we saw in Chapter V, British thought in establishing administrative institutions throughout the Protectorate was influenced most heavily by contact with Buganda, in conjunction with their own concepts of 'tribe', and 'chief'.

Given the conditions of the time, and the state of anthropological scholarship, the unusual character of the pre-colonial Ganda system could not easily have been appreciated. In Buganda, the traditional kings had over time obtained an autocratic power rare among centralized African kingdoms; an administrative hierarchy of chiefs had evolved of almost purely secular character, appointed by the king with almost total disregard of descent, and owing loyalty only to the king. The pre-colonial system has been referred to as quasi-bureaucratic in character (Southwold n.d.).

Buganda was a highly developed variant of a generic type of kingdom that had evolved in the area, that has been called the Interlacustrine state pattern. The specialization of chiefly roles did not develop to the same extent in these other pre-colonial kingdoms. Nevertheless the Ganda chiefly hierarchy was not incompatible with them. Three rather different ways in which the British used this Ganda model

can therefore be discerned. In Buganda itself, a tidied version of the traditional hierarchy became the tool of administration under British control but with a significant measure of internal self-government (Apter 1967; Low 1971a; Low and Pratt 1970). The British amalgamated several smaller principalities in the west to create the modern kingdoms of Ankole and Toro, imposed the chiefly hierarchy of county, sub-county and parish chiefs, but preserved the kingships of Ankole, Toro and Bunyoro to give a facade of tradition over much more direct rule than was the case in Buganda (Ingham 1975; Beattie 1971). In Busoga, no single ruler was created from the former small principalities, but the Ganda chiefly model was not fundamentally incompatible with pre-existing polities in this outlier of the Inter-lacustrine kingdom area (Fallers 1965).

Beyond this area of the traditional state polities of the Inter-lacustrine type were numerous acephalous, egalitarian peoples to whom traditionally the concepts of rulers, chiefs or any form of differentiated political roles were quite foreign. But as the British, with Ganda assistance, conquered the rest of the Protectorate, the Ganda hierarchical chiefly model was imposed on these areas as well, often manned in early years by Ganda agents. Although this hierarchical administration had no basis whatsoever in traditional structures or ethos, it worked tolerably well as a tool of British control, albeit with most difficulty in the remote area of the semi-pastoral Karamojan peoples (Dyson-Hudson 1966).

We saw in Chapter V that one manifestation of changing ideologies

of rule during the 1920s and 1930s was an increasing attempt to bring these chiefs under greater control, to prevent undue exploitation of those they ruled, and to incorporate them more firmly into the bureaucratic structure by making the county and sub-county chiefs pensionable and transferable (Fallers 1965; Richards 1960; Tosh 1973; Vincent 1977). Thus Uganda had by the end of the 1930s a tolerably efficient hierarchical structure of local administration, throughout the Protectorate, manned by black civil servants misleadingly called chiefs.

The apparent uniformity of the county-sub-county-parish chiefly hierarchy throughout the Protectorate masked the distinction between those areas where these modern structures represented a transformation of differentiated political roles within pre-colonial hierarchical polities, and those where such administrative structures were a fundamental innovation imposed on acephalous peoples. The distinction was clear enough to those involved in reforms of chiefly rule in the 1930s. But my interview data suggest there was a tendency for it to become blurred in later periods.

This bureaucratization of the administrative structure of chiefs was going on simultaneously with the spread of the doctrine of Indirect Rule. This strong belief seems to have had two different types of consequence in Uganda. The first, well known, is the moves towards giving the Buganda government even greater responsibility for its internal affairs. Such steps were begun by Sir Philip Mitchell in 1939, and taken further by Sir Charles Dundas in 1943-1944. Dundas' reforms were reversed by Sir John Hall after riots broke out within weeks of Hall's

arrival (Apter 1967; Low and Pratt 1970).

The second, less well-described consequence concerns the non-kingdom areas. The prevalence of this dogma in the inter-war period did not lead to any abandonment of the forthrightly direct administrative structure in those areas where it had no basis in tradition, although it may have contributed to the introduction of councils in districts such as Teso. But Pratt has suggested (Low and Pratt 1970:178) that this belief contributed to the granting to these civil-service chiefs rule-making and judicial functions, and with their councils, power to amend native customary law and consider expenditures of native administration funds, appropriate within an indirect rule system, but less appropriate to a local subordinate civil service. "What in effect happened in the districts outside the four kingdoms was that the Administration acted as if it was supervising traditional authorities and treated its appointed chiefs as if they had a customary and autonomous claim on the loyalty of the people" (ibid.).

Various investigations of chiefly misrule in these areas during the 1930s were followed by exhortations on the part of superior officers that the chiefs were civil-service personnel, not traditional office-holders (Tosh 1973; Vincent private communication). Yet during interviews many informants spoke of the chiefs as if they were much more than civil servants. This took two forms: a widespread assumption that the chiefs were, somehow, representative of those they ruled, and a less common, but not rare, view that county and sub-county and parish chiefs' positions were rooted in traditional institutions and supported

by traditional sanctions. This was alleged even for such areas as Kigezi, Teso and Bugisu, where anthropological studies have demonstrated conclusively that traditionally, chiefly institutions were quite lacking (Edel 1957; Vincent 1977; La Fontaine 1959). Both district and provincial commissioners and agricultural officers expressed such beliefs.

Even in Buganda, where there was a traditional basis, British rule had transformed the chiefly role and led to increasing alienation between chiefs and people. Yet officials seemed to continue in the belief that by consulting with chiefs, they were tapping African opinion. I asked a former resident of Buganda and secretary for African affairs, "How representative of the people were the chiefs in Buganda?"

> Of the people? (slowly and thoughtfully) Yes, that was the thing we always wondered about. They were not representative, of course, of the younger men that had come forward after the war. But that rather changed, and we got a better type of chief.[1] And lots of chiefs had been away in the army, or doing some work of some description. But you must remember that a chief is a very public figure; for example, take a chief like Kago [the title of a specific county chief] — probably when he sat down to eat his own food in the evening, there might be 30 or 40 people eating there with him, and some of them were there to curry favor with the chief, and some were there for their own purposes ....But by means like this he was in touch with his people.
>
> The chiefs were representative....The average chief, if he didn't do that sort of thing, and really be among his people, I don't think he stayed on as chief very long. Someone would say that he is not a good chief, and so on; and it would become known that he wasn't a popular chief, and he might be pushed out. Oh, no. The average chief in Buganda was in touch with his people. I do think the chiefs were representative of the people.

Another official, a former provincial commissioner, expressed his opposition to the post-war attempts to introduce more popular participation in local government through elected councils. This, he said, was

going too fast. The previous councils made up solely of chiefs were sufficiently representative in that they were chiefs. He had had to support the introduction of elective councils because it was government policy imposed by the Colonial Office, but he personally had not agreed with it. This man was one of those who held the more extreme view that chiefs derived their authority from tradition, even in Kigezi and Teso.

Both the men quoted were old, but the less aged also expressed similar views. In case this startling view of the chiefs as representative was a distortion brought about by the faulty memories of old men, I looked for some contemporary, documentary evidence. In a 1954 speech, a senior agricultural official told the Legislative Council, "I suggest too that more could be achieved by working in greater measure through the Chiefs who are, after all, the recognized and accredited leaders of the people..." (my emphasis, from a copy of the speech in my possession). Conversations with this intelligent and clear-headed official showed that he, too, assumed that chiefs were representative of the people because they had some mystical traditional base for their authority. The chiefs were certainly recognized and accredited by the British, but were far from being "accredited" by the people as their leaders. Whenever discontent broke out in rural areas, chiefs' houses were often among the first to be burnt.

What seems to be happening here is that officials who knew rationally that the native administration involved civil servants who happened to be called chiefs, nevertheless had a tendency to slip into the pre-existing British concept of chief as a tribal leader mystically linked

with his people. Thus there was a tendency to see the chiefs as an organic part of African society, and a reliable conduit through which they could keep in touch with local opinion, even though in other contexts they felt a need to protect the people from exploitation or oppression by these chiefs. The information that did flow up through the chiefly hierarchy would similarly have tended to be interpreted through this conceptual screen. Officials really seemed to believe that by consulting these black civil servants, whose jobs and good salaries were dependent on European favor, they had consulted African opinion. I am not here saying that officials always misperceived the representative nature of the information they gained through chiefs, but only that there was a strong tendency to see these men as much more representative than they could, structurally, have been. At various times, the British seem to have been serenely unaware of the extent of the disaffection simmering beneath the calm surface of Ugandan life. This tendency to slip into seeing the civil service chiefs through the screen of their own conceptions of the organic society, the tribe and the traditional African chief was one of the factors that contributed to this serenity.

A generic problem of those at the top of hierarchical administrative structures is the obtaining of full and accurate information about how those at the bottom are being treated by intermediate levels. In folklore, there are legends of kings who disguise themselves as poor men and go about their kingdom to see for themselves, and in business, stories of magnates who anonymously patronize their own businesses, or

send spies disguised as consumers. No such feedback devices, quite independent of the influence of the local chiefs, existed in a British native administration. The belief was that adequate information was obtained through extensive touring by British district officials, but these usually saw villagers in the presence of the chiefs whose activities were being checked up on. The possibility of later reprisal against a villager bold enough to speak out was always present. The tendency to slip into thinking of the chiefs as possessing some kind of mystical connection with their people, such that they could claim allegiance and not merely compliance, probably helped to mask awareness of the need for any such independent feedback.

This tendency to ascribe a greater base in tradition for the chiefs outside the kingdoms than actually existed was a surprising finding. It may be that this tendency to slip into thinking of the chiefs as having a traditional base helped to reduce the cognitive dissonance between the ideology of indirect rule and the reality of Uganda's direct administration. Supporters of the former argued that the latter was bound to lead to the decay and atrophy of the true tribal institutions, the demoralization and the detribalization of 'the African' and chaos. Yet the system in Uganda seemed to work tolerably well. Indirect Rule as a dogma became increasingly irrelevant in the post-war years, yet its influence on the beliefs of officials who had been exposed when young to the writings of Lugard, Cameron et al. may have lingered on in unsuspected ways.

Hierarchical administrations are prone to another generic problem:

information about disturbances at the local levels may be dispatched up the line, but not be acted upon at the top. This may well have happened to some extent in Buganda in the late 1940s, but the problem in Uganda does not seem to have been nearly as acute as in Kenya.[2]

2. 1945: violent protest and aftermath

Sir John Hall was not impressed with the condition of Uganda when he arrived in December, 1944. He told me it was "...a very sleepy place" where many needed decisions had been put off. But soon after his arrival, the torpor was disturbed by riots and strikes in Buganda. These serious disturbances originated in a complex mixture of rivalries between different sections of the Ganda elite, and serious grievances of working people and peasants, whose real standard of living had fallen sharply since the outbreak of war (see Chap. VI). The real nature of the political struggle between a section of the old African Establishment or Ganda ruling class, and an aspiring element centered on rising traders and "new men," was to a great extent masked because it was expressed as a dispute over adherence to traditional custom and over personalities, all exacerbated by Ganda objections to the Protectorate Government acquiring land for a new hospital and university college to serve Africans.[3]

Hastily summoned troop reinforcements soon put an end to the disturbances; the apparent ringleaders were punished, and a commission of inquiry was set up. Dundas' reforms reducing the supervision of British district officers in the field in Buganda were reversed.

African wages were increased, and consideration was given to increases in crop prices. A Special Branch of the police, to provide undercover intelligence service, was set up for the first time. Plans for the new Public Relations and Social Welfare Department (see Chap. IX) were pushed forward.

The report of the one-man commission of inquiry was soothing: Buganda "seems to be the only part of the Protectorate which is badly infected with the political virus" and even there anti-British feeling was not deep-rooted, but "has been worked up and fomented" (Uganda 1945a:31). Crop pricing policy was fair and reasonable, it claimed (ibid.:13). "The vast majority realize that they are wisely governed" (ibid.:32).

Sir John, after taking the few measures listed above, seems to have brushed aside the riots without focussing his analytical powers on the underlying problems. He relied on a policy of firm rule, under a new pro-British katikiro (the son of Sir Apollo Kaggwa), and more touring by administrative officers. Although some steps were taken to introduce slight political reforms, the chiefs were still regarded as the main representatives of the people (Apter 1967; interview quoted on p. 301 above). Neither Sir John nor his senior officials seem to have realized that Ganda complaints over their economic plight were so deep-rooted that a few cinema vans, more visits from a district officer, and some social clubs for the young men had become irrelevant. Pressure was building up for structural changes, but this pressure did not burst out again for another four years (see Chap. X).

This quick dismissal of what, with hindsight, we now know to have been a serious foretaste of more trouble to come is a puzzling phenomenon. The officials in Entebbe seem to have used several devices to explain away the protests. First, their thought framework, based as it was on an organic society model, could not admit the possibility of fundamental contradictions between their own interests and those of the ruled. Protest, therefore, was perceived as fomented by a few self-seeking agitators unrepresentative of the majority of "friendly, malleable and responsive" natives (Hall in Uganda 1947a:vi). The officials' tendency to emphasize personalities or "character" rather than structural conditions was accentuated in this case because the African protest was also to a great extent phrased in terms of personal rivalries.

Thus at worst, officials regarded disturbances such as the 1945 riots as a slight malfunctioning of an otherwise sound system, remediable by better communication: more touring, more officers who could speak the vernacular, a secret service, the new public relations department with its cinema vans, a clearing out of chiefs loyal to the previous katikiro and replacement with new ones. Communication was seen as a cure-all. But in this attempted communication, heavy reliance was still placed on the chiefs as a conduit.

Sir John added a new twist to these general explanatory devices: a tendency to see protest as fomented not just by agitators, but Communist agitators. Thus the 1945 riots appear to have had only minimal effect on his thinking about development.

3. Indirect Rule, particularism, and ethnic competition

Indirect Rule, and the trends of thought feeding into it, had other pervasive effects on Uganda that persisted into the post-war period and have even affected the post-colonial state. It undoubtedly contributed to the failure of the British rulers to resolve the fundamental political problem of the country, a problem of their creation: the relation of Buganda to a unitary Ugandan state. It also contributed to the local particularism, and the emergence of competitive political units defined in ethnic terms, that has seriously weakened attempts to create a strong unitary state (cf. Kasfir 1977; Gukiina 1972 among others). The contribution of ethnically defined rivalries to the present disordered condition of Uganda can easily be over-estimated. There have been many other crucial sources of disunity: regional disparities, religious conflicts dating from the early colonial period, emerging class conflicts, sometimes expressed in racial terms. But some of the most explosive issues have been expressed in ethnic terms. Furthermore, this divisive ethnic competition in the late-colonial and post-independence period is often interpreted as a consequence of British colonial rule. This can take mild form, as in Kasfir (1977:95) who lists colonial administrative techniques, and the British policy of Indirect Rule, as two out of seven factors contributing to the increased ethnic political competition. Or it can be expressed as conspiracy theory; Kabwegyere (1974) for example not only blames most of the ills of politically independent Uganda on the colonial rulers, but sees these problems as a consequence of a conscious, deliberate intent, sustained over time, to maximize disunity in

order to perpetuate British control.

Here we shall attempt to examine more closely the role of the British officials and their doctrines of rule, while keeping in mind that we are dealing with only one of the complex of factors leading to the present situation. A fuller explanation of today's disordered conditions is far outside the scope of the present study.

First, we must dismiss the simple view that sees contemporary ethnic conflicts as an inevitable expression of innate, primordial ties: the "reversion to tribalism" explanation. This explanation is popular among officials themselves, and can be found, for example, in Sir Andrew Cohen's book (1959:55-57). Differences in language and culture among the people of Uganda pre-date colonial rule, and were very real. Kasfir lists as the first of his seven factors contributing to ethnic competition, pre-colonial migrations and military conflicts. But the mere existence of such differences does not explain how they became politicized.

One major factor, I suggest, has been the British concept of 'tribe', which is both more fundamental and broader than the doctrine of Indirect Rule. The British, on first arrival, dealt with the polity of Buganda, which had for several centuries been expanding and incorporating other peoples. As we saw above, the kingdoms of Toro and Ankole, in their present form, were British creations. The British also excised a portion of Bunyoro and handed it over to Buganda, thus creating the "Lost Counties" issue. With the glaring exception of the "Lost Counties," the British where possible attempted to draw district and county boundaries to correspond roughly with cultural and linguistic variations;

ideally, each district was more or less congruent with a 'tribe'. Although this congruence was never total, the larger groups came to be identified with their administrative district, and vice-versa. Thus acephalous peoples with little sense of tribal unity developed some self-consciousness after decades of administration based on the assumption that they were 'tribes' (cf. articles by Cotran, La Fontaine and Twaddle in Gulliver 1969). The British, by early acts in terms of their definition of the situation, altered the situation so that it conformed more closely to what they believed already existed. Then later conditions were perceived by newly arriving officials as reinforcing the validity of the 'tribe' concept.

Buganda was the reference group to which others aspired (cf. Uganda 1953:13-14; Kasfir 1977; Low 1971a, Chap. 7). It seemed to those of the less-privileged districts that the way to gain the advantages possessed by Buganda was to develop a 'tribal' unit and acquire a kabaka. British policy for a long time reinforced this view. Even as late as 1943, Governor Dundas was telling the Soga, in effect, that if they wanted the same privileges as Buganda, they had better get together and produce a tribal constitution (Kabwegyere 1974).

The particularist, parochial, inward-turning attitudes that developed among African local administrations have been commented on by many.[4] There seems little doubt that this parochialism was at least in part a consequence of the tribally-oriented mode of British administration. The district was the basic unit of administration, and the district-cum-tribe became the major unit of political competition. But can we

go beyond this, and interpret the parochialism and disunity as an intended consequence? Did the British knowingly and deliberately attempt to maximize division among the people in the Protectorate, as a conscious tactic to maintain their own rule? I contend that such an interpretation rests on a misinterpretation of the role of ideology in the conduct of affairs. The British officials within the Protectorate were, until the early 1950s, working on a design in which the 'tribe' and the district were the basic building blocks, on which, somehow, a national state was expected to grow. The mixed metaphor is deliberate; it expresses the nature of British thought.

A mid-1930s statement from the handbook of Uganda, "unofficial" but written by two senior officials, expresses well the viewpoint of that period:

> It will have been patent throughout the foregoing sketch [of the peoples of Uganda] that the population of Uganda has no natural unity and only that degree of cohesion which results from their being included within the artificial boundaries of the Protectorate. It should, however, be stated that, through the application to all tribes...of the advanced administrative organization evolved by the Baganda, the beginnings of political unity are making themselves apparent. Nevertheless, there exists no indigenous civilization suited to the needs and according to the traditions of the whole people. It has therefore been sought, insofar as it is consistent with the advancement of the population as an entity, to preserve for each tribe the best elements in its culture (Thomas and Scott 1935:97).

Thus the need for some political unity is recognized, but the tribe remains the basic unit. Even this need seems to have been weakly perceived in the thinking of Dundas, who in his reforms to move Buganda closer to a native state, seems to have given no thought as to how

Buganda would eventually be incorporated into an independent Uganda (cf. Dundas 1955:134-136 et passim).

In the immediate post-war period the previous emphasis on Indirect Rule was replaced by a new emphasis on "democratic local government," as a result of pressure from the new Labour Secretary of State for the Colonies (Apter 1967:336-337; Lee 1967:143-146, 174; Uganda 1953). But the belief remained that Africans must learn the rudiments of self-government at the local level before they could aspire to control the center.

In his reply to the Secretary of State's 1947 dispatch on local government, Governor Hall emphasized the diversity within Uganda.

> ...no common sentiment of unity exists among its units. The administrative boundaries have not in all cases been drawn to conform strictly with tribal divisions and have therefore the less significance in the African mind; and in some of the districts there is a miscellany of tribal units each possessing a strong tribal consciousness and each jealous of the position of the others. Moreover, the development of indigenous political institutions in the Protectorate has been uneven, with the state of Buganda taking the lead. It is therefore a matter of prime importance to devise some unifying process which, over a period of years, will tend to produce a sense of common interest and of common purpose —and later, it is hoped, of common nationality—and at the same time to encourage, and not impede, the growth and development of indigenous political institutions....The Uganda Government hopes to find this unifying process in a progressive development, both in executive responsibility and in their representative character, of the system of councils, with official and elected members, at the levels of province, district, county, parish and village..., each Council acting as an electoral 'college' for the Council above it. (Dispatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 August, 1947, quoted in Apter 1967:237).

Tribal consciousness is now seen as rather inconvenient, the source of troublesome jealousies, and no longer quite such a Good Thing as it was

in the past. But in some other respects, this statement is remarkably similar to the Thomas and Scott statement of twelve years earlier, despite the watershed of the Second World War. Diversity and disunity, and the great need for a unifying process are noted — the need is rather more urgent now, but the tribe remains the basic unit of thought; the sense of common interest and purpose is expected to develop at the same time as the development of indigenous political institutions. The latter, one can infer, referred primarily to the kingdom of Buganda. Although the need for a sense of common purpose is recognized, the actual measures proposed remain local and particularistic, and have nothing to do with the center.[5] The approach was still to build from the bottom up.

Hall, as we shall see in Chap. IX, was much more interested in economic than political development. His long-term concept of an independent Uganda, some fifty or more years in the future, was some kind of federal arrangement;[6] the details are not clear — there was no urgent need to think out the details of an event so far away — but one can safely deduce from his known attitudes that he expected the traditional kingships to be preserved.

This policy of trying to move in both directions at once was in part a result of the fear of arousing opposition and unrest in Buganda; as later events were to show, most Ganda retained a strong loyalty to their kabaka and neo-traditional sentiment was easily aroused. But in addition, both Hall and his senior officials involved in such matters believed strongly that traditional institutions ought to be upheld; kingships were a good thing that ought to be preserved (even if the

then incumbent, in their view, left much to be desired). Also, the Uganda Agreement, once entered into, ought to be honored, despite the problems it entailed. Sir John Hall's career pattern had preserved him from direct exposure to the Indirect Rule dogma, but his own mode of thought was in many respects profoundly conservative (see Chap. IX). One could not have expected him to support measures to reduce the privileges long ago accorded to a 'tribe' believed to be of ancient origin, with its own long-standing traditions, and a hereditary kingship surrounded with impressive ritual.

Thus I see the emphasis on the 'tribe' and the local unit as the logical results of the ideological premises held by these men, and not as the outcome of a calculated and Machiavellian policy. It remains true that the more far-seeing officials, such as Cameron, believed that Indirect Rule would forestall attempts by "agitators" to claim a share of political power at the center.[7] This does not imply, however, that the policy was devised for that purpose. The image of British officials sitting around conspiratorially asking themselves what administrative devices would best create the maximum dissension among their subjects misconstrues the nature of British colonial policy-making. Making use of indigenous institutions was, in the beginning, cheap and expedient. It was consistent with their inexplicit ideological attitudes, based in the conservative tradition. By the 1920s, it was strongly supported by the latest and most progressive anthropological thought of the time. At that time, it seemed pragmatic, congruent with the perceived facts of the situation. It was accompanied by an implicit belief that there was

an indefinite time ahead during which the British could gently guide the growth and evolution of larger units (cf. Cohen 1959:25-26). It had the additional advantage of apparently offering a means of forestalling the claims of those "semi-educated troublemakers in trousers" who had unfortunately escaped from the wholesome discipline of tribal life. Most of all, it served the strong British preference for wrapping an expedient policy in outer garments of high moral purpose. Over time, the British themselves tended to lose sight of the expediency, and see only the moral purpose.

Whenever a group sets very high standards for itself, such as those of noblesse oblige and constant serving of others, the more strongly held the standards, the greater the difficulty of meeting one's own needs within the limits of those standards. Ideology can function as a means of reconciling these demands when it makes it possible to believe that a policy both meets one's own needs, and best serves the interests of others. Most comforting of all is that ideology which screens out the ways in which a policy or action serves one's own needs, so that one's actions can be perceived as animated solely by an altruistic desire to help others. But precisely because so much of a situation is thus screened out, this latter form of ideology is apt to lead its holders into unsoundly based action. As a result we get the paradox that the best intentions can sometimes lead to the most disastrous results. Realpolitik is contrary to the British public school ethos. The British did not sit around, like White House staff members in the Nixon era, plotting the best ways of spreading disunity and thus discomfiting their enemies.

Their actions often perpetuated disunity, but they believed themselves to be acting out of respect for tribal traditions.

The image of the British as conspiratorially searching for the best way to maximize disunity misses another point. As Wilkinson (1964) says, the conservative public school ethos leads men not to ask "what is the best way?" but, "will this approach work?" In the event, the British approach did not prevent the emergence of nationalist agitation. The British then cast around for another policy to meet the same need: stability.

Thomas and Scott wrote "...in Uganda indirect rule has become, more than a policy, a habit of thought" (1935:40). The 'tribal' approach proved to be a habit of thought singularly hard to break. As we saw above, it survived throughout the period of Hall's governorship, and even into the regime of Sir Andrew Cohen. In the specific form of British attempts to conciliate Buganda, it lasted throughout the duration of British rule in the colony.

4. A change in direction

In 1953, the Wallis report strongly criticized the previous belief in building from the bottom up:

> Critics who say that a politically inexperienced people should first learn the arts of local politics before they dabble in central politics miss the point that local and central Government can no longer be kept in separate compartments. You do not graduate from one to the other as from a primary to a secondary school. So one arrives at the paradox that if it is unfortunate to be compelled to grant power at the center to a people untrained in local government, it is impossible to train them in local government unless they also participate in central Government.

> For modern local government needs central Government to give it unity and purpose (Uganda 1953:15-16).

Wallis' investigation of local government was one of the many inquiries, and major policy changes, initiated by Sir Andrew Cohen after his arrival in 1952. The full examination of these changes must be left for another place. In the constitutional sphere, there was an emphasis on the need to develop Uganda as a unitary state; a desire to involve Africans more directly and immediately with government at all levels, leading to a rapid expansion of Legislative Council. These changes, together with external events, led to head-on confrontation with the kabaka of Buganda, and to the latter's deportation in 1953 (cf. Low and Pratt 1970, Appendix I; Kabaka of Buganda 1967). There seems to have been little doubt in Cohen's mind about the desirability of rapid African advance towards a full parliamentary system. In the economic sphere, there was a spectacular increase in spending on education and health, and an increasing emphasis on policies to stabilize a strong "middle class" of traders and successful yeoman farmers. But the problem of Buganda remained central. The agreement paving the way for the return of the kabaka ceded to Buganda even greater control over its own affairs and, in making the kabaka a "constitutional monarch," also gave him greater personal control than ever before over appointments in the Buganda Government (cf. Apter 1967:355). Protectorate policy was still facing both ways at once: caught on the dilemma of Britain's need to create a national government that could ensure future stability, and the need to conciliate a Buganda increasingly alarmed at the prospect of losing the privileged position it had held under the British. Cohen

later defended his policy on the grounds that tribal sentiment was very strong; "...strengthening the unity of the country would not be furthered by failing to recognize the attachment of the people to the parts" (1959: 58). Thus the ground was further prepared for the tragedy of the post-independence years.

This radical shift of emphasis, towards a unitary form of government with African participation at the center, began only nine years before independence was granted. The earlier British view was that, somehow, national-level institutions would evolve; Sir Donald Cameron, in the 1920s, refused to predict their form, saying that it should be left to the African genius. But this was the period when the time for the evolutionary process was believed to be measured in centuries. Hall, in the late 1940s, thought in terms of at least fifty more years of British rule (interview, 1974). Cohen knew it would come sooner than that, but he definitely did not anticipate independence only seven years after the end of his governorship (interview with his widow). Around 1955, the chief secretary was telling worried officials that independence would not come for at least twenty-five years (quoted in various interviews). The new emphasis on a unitary form of government with strong central control came very late.

5. Particularism: African and European

I argued above that the British administration of Uganda was not guilty of premeditated, deliberate attempts to "divide-and-rule" by maximizing differences among people. It is more difficult to absolve them

of the charge of being very slow to realize that a number of their customary administrative practices in fact had divisive consequences, and that a positive policy of building up a consciousness of national unity was needed. Serious attempts to correct regional imbalances in development seem to have come very late. The potential problems that could result from ethnic imbalances in the army seem not to have been confronted until about 1955 (interview).

Kabwegyere (1974), to support his charge that the British officials consciously and deliberately conspired to maximize local particularism and disunity, produces such evidence as the sending of telegrams of thanks from the British government for donations to the War Fund, to the district councils that made them rather than to the people of Uganda as a whole. This is flimsy evidence indeed of conspiracy, but perhaps rather stronger evidence of a failure to take advantage of a situation offering opportunities for symbolic manipulation and development of a national rather than a district pride. The officials of the time, I am sure, would reply that they had had rather more pressing tasks on their minds, as these overworked men indeed had (see Chap. VI). But in the post-war years, even in the Cohen administration when independence was seen as coming in the foreseeable future, there was a lack of an imaginative program of national ideological development.

More striking, many of the officials interviewed seemed notably particularistic and local in their own thinking. The exceptions were those men who had served much of their career in the Secretariat. But the "district men" were often openly and unashamedly devoted to whichever

part of the country had captured their heart. One man, in talking of his fellows, ran down a list saying, so and so was "an Eastern Province man," such and such was a Buganda man, and as for X, he was strictly an Acholi man (i.e. one of the many British who had become fascinated with the Acholi people). It was illuminating, but not surprising, when one secretary for African affairs, a man very much of the old school, interpreted each and every issue I discussed with him in terms of Buganda and the need to conform with the Uganda Agreement; he was markedly uninterested in Protectorate-wide questions. It was more surprising when a much younger official, who had for long worked in one district of the Eastern Province, complained in half-jest that he had not enjoyed "those effeminate people in the kingdoms" during an appointment to Western Province. The officials who manned the district administration in the post-war years could probably not have conducted an effective campaign to create a national consciousness, for many lacked it themselves. They remained sharply aware of the differences among peoples; they continued to think in 'tribal' terms and to accept 'tribal' stereotypes. To them, the people they ruled remained members of a tribe first, and Ugandans second, if at all. Thus a group of men who had absorbed a perspective through the implicit methods described in Chap. III, and who had acted on that perspective for many years, could not be expected to drop such thought patterns overnight. One weakness of such implicit methods of ideological preparation is lack of flexibility; the more inexplicit the premises, the less available they are for modification to fit changing circumstances.

Such problems may have been in the mind of one official, regarded by his fellows as thoroughly 'sound' and middle-of-the-road. One of the faults of the post-war period of colonial rule, he thought in hindsight, had been insufficient education of the officials on the spot. He was not quite sure what they should have been educated in, but he felt they had needed clearer and more inspired direction. He had great admiration for Governor Cohen, but was not at all sure that the men on the spot appreciated what was being aimed at. "Things were not completely clear in our minds."

It is not surprising, for less than thirty years had elapsed since Cameron had been espousing the view that the African genius would slowly evolve its own form of representative government, and the period wherein the Westminster model was being transferred wholesale, complete with Speaker's wig, mace and sergeants-at-arms, to the African colonies. Low and Pratt (1970:167) refer to the Cameron type of view as a kind of liberal racialism. If so, then perhaps an African in a British Speaker's wig was a symbol of non-racialism, 1950s-60s style: the belief, by the more well-disposed officials, that Africans were capable of adapting to British institutions (cf. Uganda 1959:33).

But the transfer of the Westminster model also involved a shift from the conservative view of the state, with tribes as the essential intermediate groups, to a one-man-one-vote view of the state with common rolls, and no special protection for minorities. The shift in fundamental assumptions was immense, but not clearly obvious to all of them. Many officials seem to have felt a sense of disquiet, hard to pin down, that

events were going far too fast, and there was no time to think. This was the almost universal refrain among those interviewed about the 1950s: "We had no time to think."

The same official quoted above harked back, probably unknowingly, to the earlier Cameronian approach in a final comment. In hindsight, he said, he had real doubts as to whether the parliamentary model was best for "these black fellows." No one had seemed to ask the question at the time; they had taken it for granted that the Westminster model was the best available. Perhaps someone should have put his thinking cap on, and considered other alternatives. But — there had been no time.

This man has been quoted at some length because he was franker than most about his sense that something was missing, even thought he could not define it precisely. I think he spoke out what others often implied: the sense that events rushed by so fast the district officials lost a clear grasp of what was happening. The assumptions and categories that had served in the past no longer fit, and there was no time to think through the new ones needed, even if they had had the inclination to do so.

British officials were, inexplicitly, being asked to give up the organic model of society, with its belief in the necessity of slow and solid growth of new institutions, and instead spend their time almost <u>manufacturing</u> new institutions of central government. There was no time for the new institutions to be grafted on; they had to be hastily slapped on top of the pre-existing district basis, in hopes that they would survive future storms. One can understand the anger and resentment

they directed against the British government, that had not allowed them the time to complete their task as they felt it should have been done.

In the meantime, the ordinary work of government had to be carried on as well. Law and order had to be preserved, ambitious development programs pushed, levels of exports maintained, and the colony protected against infection from disturbances in surrounding areas.[8]

The crucial decisions about the timing of decolonization were made in Great Britain, over the heads of the men on the spot in the colonies. These men, for the most part, accepted independence with a public show of good grace, but it seems likely that very few, in their hearts, believed Uganda to be ready for self-rule.[9] They were like ship-builders who had been ordered by a distant management to change radically the design of the craft they had been slowly working on, slap on the finishing touches with incredible speed, and hand it over. They worked hard and loyally in the final years, despite heavy strains, and handed over a superficially complete ship of state, with serious misgivings. It has proved a very leaky craft indeed, quite unable to meet Britain's needs for continued stability to enable continuation of the pattern of economic relations (cf. Saul 1976).

NOTES

1. After the 1945 riots, the new British-supported katikiro had swept out of office many of the previous chiefs suspected of sympathy with the previous deposed katikiro. This turnover of chiefly staff aimed at bringing in chiefs with strong loyalty to the Protectorate government and the Buganda administration (Apter 1967:230), and was carried out under the supervision of the official being quoted.

2. In Kenya, report after report about disaffection and oathing ceremonies were sent from the seething Kikuyu districts into Nairobi, where no action was taken until the violent upheavals called Mau-Mau had actually broken out (Berman 1974:386-387). A story told by one informant gives an interesting sidelight on these events, although independent confirmation of the story had not yet been obtained. Sir Philip Mitchell, then governor of Kenya, visited Uganda not many months before the acute disturbances in Kenya came to the surface. On return from his tour around Uganda he told Sir John Hall he could see signs of insurrection everywhere; Sir John was in for trouble in Uganda, he insisted. An alarmed Sir John summoned his top officials (including my informant), the police commander and so on, who made various checks, but no one could find evidence to support Sir Philip's perception. How was it, my informant wondered, that a man widely recognized as a leading expert on native administration could mistakenly perceive signs of trouble in Uganda, yet not see what was going on in front of him in Kenya?

3. For differing interpretations of the background of the riots, see the official report of the commission of inquiry (Uganda 1945a; Low and Pratt 1970; Apter 1967 and Mamdani 1976).

4. Kasfir 1977 summarizes many earlier commentaries. For official documentation, see Uganda 1953 and Uganda 1961.

5. In the event, the provincial councils were not a success, and the district became the main unit of political activity and competition for the new political resources becoming available (cf. Kasfir 1977; Gertzel 1976).

6. Interview with Sir John Hall, 1974.

7. See Cameron's views from archival documents, quoted in Graham 1976. Cf. Dundas:

> In the nineteen-twenties, one was given to understand that Indirect Rule was to be regarded in a measure as a quid pro quo for political rights from which the African was then excluded. Having no part in the central government of the territorial State, he was to be accorded a degree of autonomy in the ordering of his domestic affairs. This point was repeatedly made in those years to cut the ground from under the feet of any potential agitator (1955:135).

8. One official who was much involved in security matters said an immense amount of time was spent on security problems in the 1950s by senior Secretariat officials. The so-called Mau Mau uprising in Kenya spread some alarm in Uganda and led to the arrest and deportation of Kikuyu; disturbances in Rwanda and the Southern Sudan sent floods of refugees into Uganda; some religious cults caused concern in parts of eastern Uganda and western Kenya. Internally there was a strong fear of Communist activity. Even Europeans with Labour Party connections were spied on (Stonehouse 1960:56; Brockway 1955: 81). A British anthropologist and an Indian sociologist were deported, apparently on the basis of alleged radical political affiliations. I was also told an intriguing story, but have not yet been able to find independent verification, about a European lecturer at Makerere College, allegedly a Communist, who had obtained tenure but was bribed to leave by government.

9. Evans 1964 is a useful source on the attitudes of and pressures on the European officials in the very late stages of colonial rule. See also Apter 1967:412-416 et passim.

CHAPTER IX

CONFLICTING CONCEPTS OF DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter we examine in some detail official thinking on post-war development, as reflected in two documents: the 1944 plan (Uganda 1945b) and the 1947 or Worthington Plan (Uganda 1947a).[1]

1. The 1944 Plan of Sir Charles Dundas

In 1941, when wartime pressures were acute, and the outlook for Britain was gloomy, a few British officials formed a committee in Uganda to start planning the post-war development of the colony. The stimulus was the promise of grants from the British Treasury, under the new Colonial Development and Welfare legislation for post-war development schemes conditional on submission of an acceptable long-term development plan (Dundas 1955:232).

Development committees were not totally new in Uganda. A 1920 committee, dominated by European planters, had submitted a report predicated on development through the plantation sector. It was superseded by the economic collapse of that sector. A 1936 committee had prepared modest proposals for improvement in communications, rural water supplies and more important, in education. But the Colonial Office was now demanding something more comprehensive: a ten-year framework for governmental development expenditure.

The pace of planning was slow. The men called upon to visualize the future shape of the colony had no special preparation for this work.

The committee was made up of the chief secretary, a generalist administrator who had served in Uganda for many years, the financial secretary, and the heads of the departments of Medicine, Agriculture and Education. The secretary of the committee, who wrote much of the final document, was an outstanding field administrator who loathed Secretariat work. None of them had special qualifications in economics. But at that time development economics, as a special body of theory, did not yet exist. Few models were available from elsewhere; even if they had been it is doubtful if the overworked officials, isolated by wartime conditions and armored by their own belief in the superiority of common sense and the knowledge of the man on the spot, would have drawn on them.

The result of course bore little resemblance to a comprehensive development plan in the sense now understood by economists (cf. Walker 1962). No attempt was made to set goals or determine strategies for the economy as a whole. It dealt only with governmental capital spending; it was, in fact, an aggregate of individual projects for which departments of government wanted capital grants. But underlying these specific proposals a common viewpoint can be discerned, which Walker has summarized as "...the best way to increase the economic productivity of the country was by concentrating upon educational and health advances" (ibid.:21). The prerequisite to expansion of the economy was an improvement in the welfare and capacities of the Africans. The rhetoric in the chapters on education and medical services reflects a deep conviction that improvements in health and educational standards would lead to greater economic development. The rhetoric itself should not be taken too seriously;

its tone, curiously familiar to academics, is explained when one remembers that the document is essentially a series of grant applications. But the pervasiveness and consistency of the emphasis, its reflection in the actual allocation of resources, its correspondence with the known views of the governor, and the recollections of informants about the atmosphere of the time, provide evidence that this was in fact the prevailing belief about developmental strategy at that time.

The governor, Sir Charles Dundas, gives an account of his work on postwar planning in his memoirs (Dundas 1955:232-238).

> It was not easy to know where to begin. The cardinal conditions for human well-being are: enlightenment, health and prosperity, and each one is dependent on the other. As I pondered the matter I recalled a little incident that seemed to illustrate the vicious circle that must be broken. In a remote locality I met a native who looked starved, was filthy, nearly naked and was afflicted with a hideous sore on his leg. Said I to him: 'You have a very bad leg. Why do you not go to hospital?' Said he in reply: 'Because I have a bad leg,' which was very true. He could get to hospital only on foot, but being unable to walk was not able to get treatment. His case was of a common sort. At some time he had sustained an abrasion, probably he plastered it with a paste made of mud and spittal; the sore became septic and he was incapacitated from work, then could not feed himself properly; with undernourishment he was debilitated and his wound would not heal. So ignorance caused sickness, sickness caused disability and disability caused malnutrition with resulting debility that increased the disability. The root cause was ignorance.
>
> The inference to be drawn from such a case was that the prime need was education. But education by itself will not transform a man's mode of life. If the standard of living remains barbarous schooling will not bear fruit, and if poverty debars a man from improving his condition his level remains debased. Health is not to be had with insanitary living, and without health the productive energy requisite to material well-being is sapped. So one condition reacts upon the other.

> My slogan was advance all along the line, with bias towards education (ibid.:233-234).

The flavor of this excerpt is consistent with the image of the man given by informants who worked under him: benevolent, well-disposed towards Africans from the serene heights of his own aristocratic background. He had had long service in district administration, and was greatly concerned to preserve the best in traditional African cultures. His interest in traditional cultures led him to be sometimes regarded as "something of an amateur anthropologist" (Bradley 1966a:97). During earlier service in Tanganyika, he had assisted Chagga coffee-growers to establish a thriving co-operative marketing organization, against the strong opposition of European coffee planters. However, by the time he reached Uganda he was looking forward to retirement, unwilling to take on the entrenched interests who had restricted African participation in crop processing. He had little interest in economic affairs and no deep understanding of the historical forces swirling around him, but he was acutely aware of African poverty. In his thinking, "the problem" was the condition of the Africans in Uganda, and the root cause was their ignorance. Diagnosis, then, need go no further. Analysis of the overarching structures, the nature of the economic relations in which the Africans were involved became superfluous. In this framework of thought, the Protectorate Government became the dispenser of measures it had chosen to improve the welfare of its charges.

The measures proposed included a major expansion of education, concentrating first on training of more teachers with the aim of eliminating

illiteracy in fifty years, greatly increased spending on medical services, and smaller welfare-oriented programs in rural water supplies, housing and so on. The original outline of development proposals was estimated to cost £13.5 million over ten years. Of this, 31 percent was allocated to education, 27 percent to public health. Expenditure of this magnitude was thought to be beyond the resources of the colony, and a joint meeting of the governmental Development and Welfare Committee with the Standing Finance Committee (the unofficial members of Legislative Council) cut the proposed plan back to a more modest £4.8 million over six years. The final plan allocated 21 percent to education, 28 to public health, and only 8 percent to agriculture, veterinary and forestry combines, plus another 8 percent to communications. Evidence on the source of pressure for reduction of educational spending is not available; it seems likely to have come from the unofficial members, concerned over the heavy recurrent expenses associated with expansion of schools. Nevertheless, the final plan allocated no less than 49 percent of capital spending to education and medicine, plus another 14 percent to African housing and resettlement.

The tone of the document can be illustrated by excerpts from its general sections.

> It will be noticed that in the proposals made there is one recurring theme and one common aim, namely to train and employ Africans in ever increasing numbers so that they may replace Europeans in official posts and also take over an ever increasing share in the industrial and commerical life of the community. Not only is this most desirable if extravagent expenditure on public services to be avoided, but conditions favourable to the progressive development of self-government, local and central, will be wanting unless an efficient African civil service is brought into being and the

general cultural levels of the community raised.

> Concurrent with this objective, which is necessarily limited to a comparatively small number of the more highly educated section of the population, there will be a steady, concerted attack on ignorance, ill-health, malnutrition, poor housing, bad water supplies, primitive methods of agriculture and all those causes and effects which have retarded the progress of Africans.
>
> "Mass enlightenment" can perhaps best express the Protectorate's target, but this cannot be achieved without toil and sweat on the part of the African, without community endeavour, without an appreciation of the need for self-help and without a sense of civic responsibility.
>
> All these qualities will have to be inculcated into him before progress can result, but once his physical and mental conditions allows him to absorb them there is reason to hope that progress will be more rapid (Uganda 1945b:82).
>
> Though the non-African community will benefit from some of the projects and indirectly from all, the over-riding consideration has been the paramount necessity of raising the economic standard of the African, since it would be worse than useless to create in him a desire for a higher standard of living if he had not the means to attain and enjoy such a standard. The gradual elimination of illiteracy will enable thousands of Africans each year to improve their lot by obtaining a better appreciation of their own potentialities and the potentialities of their land. Improved health and the abolition of debilitating disease will give them that additional physical and mental energy and stamina which will permit them to do a full day's work without flagging. Better methods of agriculture and animal husbandry will pay rich dividends in the conservation and development of the soil. Social welfare will tend to arrest the drift to the towns by making rural life less monotonous, will bring greater cohesion to village communities and stimulate their traditional co-operative and collective spirit, enabling methods of production and marketing to be employed which are beyond the capacity of the individual. Good communications are essential for the movement of goods and produce; and without research little scientific progress can be made (ibid.:6).

The published justification for the proposed establishment of a new Dept. of Public Relations and Social Welfare is interesting:

> ...to lift the African from the rut of ignorance, apathy and dullness which at present characterises the lives of so many, the service will direct its attention to the encouragement of youth organisations, recreational, thrift and other clubs, the formation of guilds, the establishment of circulating libraries, the operation of a rural probation system and the projection and general supervision of mass education.
>
> Closely linked with the social welfare service must be the public relations organisation....On it will fall the task of making Government policy in all its aspects understood by, and acceptable to, the public, particularly the African public. It must also be an instrument of mass entertainment and education. It follows, therefore, that the public relations policy of Government must be closely associated with its social welfare policy and the natural agents for the public relations organisation in the Provinces and Districts will be the officers of the social welfare service (ibid.:62).

In general, the development envisaged in this first plan could be characterized as long-term, grass-roots, emphasizing projects that would gradually expand the welfare and capacities of individual Africans, including women, to do more for themselves. The importance of reaching African women is emphasized repeatedly, in sections on agriculture, medicine, education and social welfare. The plan contains a pervasive emphasis on training of Africans for greater responsibility in those spheres within direct governmental control. In Medicine, much of the proposed grant would have gone to the medical school and to training of support staff. In Agriculture, there was talk of replacing European staff by Africans to be trained at Makerere College — perhaps the earliest specific proposal for "Africanization." There were even mentions of sending women to Makerere for agricultural training.[2] Housing developments, forestry plots, local creameries should as soon as possible be administered by local Africans.

But there are startling omissions in this Plan. First, there is no attempt to examine the structure of the economy, its strengths and weaknesses. There is no systematic review of available resources. Rather, the basic structure of the economy and society is taken as given; the role of private enterprise is barely mentioned, much less seriously examined. Industrialization is slighted, mention being made only of the appointment of yet another committee to consider the machinery needed to deal with industrial matters.[3] Encouragement of cottage industries is mentioned briefly. Agriculture and veterinary development are discussed at greater length, but the proposals made are trivial in comparison to the sweeping changes planned in health and education. Possible constraints inhibiting expansion of private enterprise are not examined. There is no consideration of means to further African participation in the economy, nor to open up processing and marketing of crops to Africans. Co-operative development is spoken of favorably, but given little emphasis. Any proposals for widening African participation in processing would of course have been a direct attack on the interests of the unofficial members, and would probably have ensured that the plan could not have been approved by Legislative Council without a fight.

Even more fundamental, the 1945 planners totally ignored two crucial variables: time and population expansion. There is no discussion whatsoever of time scale — of when, in the future, payoffs from investment in improved health and education might be expected. This absence also suggests an implicit assumption that the time period available to the British officials for development was so long that it need not be

explicitly considered. Population is nowhere considered, nor is there a recognition of the implications for population expansion of the proposed improvements in health services. It was asserted that there was no marked shortage of land, but the relation of land to numbers was not touched on. The planners were, of course, operating with quite inadequate data on this and many other aspects; but there seems no awareness of the need for better data on population trends.

The 1945 document also reflects certain other assumptions prevalent at the time. It contains a belief in the "traditional co-operative and collective spirit" (see quote on p.331 above). At the same time, the planners recognized that this traditional ideal no longer gripped many, especially the younger people; the plan reflects fear of the dreaded "detribalization" and of drift to the towns. The drift to the towns is conceived of in terms of the "bright lights theory": motivation is thought to be escape from rural monotony to urban excitement. Possible economic motivations for urban migration are nowhere mentioned.

On the question of financing the expenditures and covering the recurrent costs entailed by the expansion of educational and welfare services, the planners were modestly optimistic.[4] They thought (correctly, as it turned out) that post-war shortages of supplies and manpower could be more constraining than shortage of funds; also, they felt the government could always fall back on the device of increasing taxation.

It is noteworthy that the underlying principle of this plan — that expenditure on welfare measures such as health and education would lead to economic expansion — later gained some credibility in development

economics under the guise of "investment in human capital."[5] Whatever the merits of this approach to development — and they are still being debated by development economists — the 1944 laymen's version probably had little chance of success; it ignored too many critical constraining factors. But this is hindsight. Despite its gaps and welfare emphasis, the businessmen who made up the Standing Finance Committee were persuaded of the correctness of this strategy; the Legislative Council formally adopted it in 1944, and it was accepted as "a satisfactory framework within which individual schemes may be considered" by the Colonial Office (Uganda 1945b:1). But even before it was actually published, Sir Charles Dundas retired, and the Plan and its underlying philosophy were discarded by the new governor. Sir John Hall summoned an outside consultant to do the job over again.

2. The rejection of the 1944 Plan

The 1944 Plan was discarded because the incoming governor did not agree with its underlying approach. He replaced it with a plan putting primary emphasis on economic expansion and restricting welfare expenditures. This is the conclusion of the economist who has carried out a detailed study of post-war planning in Uganda, using documentary sources. Walker concluded that the role of the governor was much more important in determining resource allocation priorities than the political activity of non-Africans or Africans within the colony. "He [-the Governor-] has great - almost absolute - powers; his views on economic matters are paramount and a change of Governor can produce a change in policy"(1962:15).

My interview data show that the officials involved saw the change of direction in development as a direct consequence of the arrival of Sir John Hall and the impact of his personal views. But this data, based on recollections, is evidence only for the participants' perceptions, not for "what actually happened." It is hard for those accustomed to a materialist view of history, or to structural interpretations, to accept without qualms that such a major shift in policy could be caused by a mere change in the incumbent of one role. One must search for alternative explanations, asking first about external sources of influence — a question Walker does not raise.

It could perhaps be argued that a new development plan was brought in as a result of pressure from the metropolitan bourgeoisie to speed up extraction of Uganda's surplus. Mukherjee says as much (1956:80). But there is presently available no evidence to support this argument, as an explanation of the cause of the change in plans. In 1944, the unofficials, who included local representatives of metropolitan business interests, accepted the Dundas plan, apparently with no protest. In 1947, some of the same officials, representing almost the same interests, accepted the new plan, perhaps with somewhat greater enthusiasm. The Dundas plan offered private business little in the way of short-term economic expansion, but there is no evidence that this lack led to protest from metropolitan interests. The Hall approach to development offered much more in the way of governmental expenditure on economic infrastructure, but again, there is at present no evidence that this was a result of metropolitan pressure rather than Sir John's own views on

how to develop the colony. Neither plan threatened the vested interests of private capital in the country.

An argument that the switch in plans was a result of pressure from the metropolitan bourgeoisie may well reflect a distorted perspective on the importance of Uganda to the metropolitan business interests, by 1946. An alternative hypothesis is that these metropolitan interests were simply indifferent to how Uganda's internal resources were allocated, or what developmental philosophy prevailed, as long as a few specific vested interests were not threatened. If we look from Uganda to Britain, are we not looking through the wrong end of the telescope? Why should British business interests, in 1946, be bothered about what was happening in Uganda?

Uganda was a source of cotton and secondarily coffee to Britain, but the importance of this source must not be over-estimated. In 1938, Uganda accounted for only 1.9 percent of the world's cotton acreage, and 5.7 percent of acreage within the Empire (Stahl 1951:273). After major shifts in supply sources during the war years, Uganda was the most important colonial source of cotton for British mills, but even so, in post-war years all colonial sources combined supplied only about 5 percent of British needs (Great Britain, Colonial Office 1954:20).

Furthermore, Uganda's long-staple cotton was not a direct substitute for the medium-staple American Uplands type that the Lancashire mills used for most purposes. Available statistics do not give us the percentage of British industry's consumption of long-staple cotton for specialized purposes that was met by Uganda's cotton. This percentage

may well have been much higher than 5 percent. But if so, the implication is that only specialized sections of the cotton industry, itself a specialized section of British industry as a whole, would be concerned with the long-term security of its raw material supply from Uganda.[6]

These specialized interests need not be concerned, in 1945-1946, about their short-term raw material needs from Uganda. Britain got as much of Uganda's cotton as it wanted, at low prices, through the government-to-government bulk-sale agreements forced on the colony by the British government as a wartime measure (see next chapter). Mamdani (1976) uses as his main explanatory device, the "needs of the metropolitan bourgeoisie." The evidence that is available suggests that the "needs of the metropolitan bourgeoisie" were not equally potent causal factors at all times. It seems more likely that the British metropolitan interests, especially those centered on cotton, exerted significant influence in the early, formative years of Uganda's economy, helping to lock it into its role as a supplier of raw materials to markets it could not affect. But as years passed, I suggest, British business, with the minor exceptions of those having actual interests there, became increasingly indifferent to Uganda.

As for markets, changing conditions for the British economy made talk of a few import-substitution industries in one small colony less threatening to British manufacturers than before the war (Zwanenberg 1975:125-129). In the post-war years, some metropolitan interests turned increasingly to investment in Kenya, treating Uganda as a mere backwater. Such investment was seen as more advantageous in a number of

respects, while also giving access to the Ugandan market through the operations of the East African common market (Nixson 1973).[7] However, this trend was not yet discernable to Sir John Hall and his officials in 1946.

In sum, there is neither evidence for, nor strongly compelling reasons why, British metropolitan business interests should oppose the Dundas plan and urge its replacement by another better suited to their needs. The Colonial Office accepted the Dundas plan, and was concerned about the adequacy of welfare spending in its replacement (Worthington papers, Box 3, File 1, Item 112).

It could perhaps be argued that Sir John Hall was chosen by the Colonial Office for the Uganda posting specifically because of his preference for economic expansion over welfare spending. Prima facie, such an argument appears unlikely to gain support; if the Colonial Office wanted such a change, why did it accept the welfare-oriented Dundas plan in the same time period that Sir John was selected for promotion? The argument also ignores the known pro-welfare orientation prevalent in the Colonial Office (Lee 1967). The problem here is the lack of available evidence on the criteria used by the Colonial Office in selecting governors. As pointed out in Chapter II, certain aspects of staffing of a specific colony cannot be understood apart from knowledge of staffing procedures for the whole system of which the colony was but one part — knowledge which we do not yet have. Therefore pressure from the metropolis cannot explain the change. One is forced back, reluctantly, to Walker's view that the arrival of a new governor with a different personal vision of the developmental process was the significant

causal factor in the change of policy. But it remains an overstatement to say that a governor's powers were "almost absolute": the present example demonstrates only that the gubernatorial role provided a strong-minded incumbent with scope to change direction within the limits of the existing economic relations.

Since the prime causal factor behind the policy shift appears to be the arrival in Uganda of this one man, we shall look first at his background, and then at the central features of his thinking on development.

3. Sir John Hall in person

By World War II, most colonial governors had risen through the ranks of the Colonial Administrative Service; they started their careers as a district officer,[8] getting to know "the African" (or natives in other colonies) on long foot-safaris away from district headquarters, then switching to Secretariat posts and gradually earning promotions and transfers to other colonies. The memoirs of Sir Charles Dundas (1955) give vivid evidence of the lasting effect of this early experience in direct contact with village people of another culture. Sir Philip Mitchell, governor of Uganda 1935-1940, and governor of Kenya during the Hall regime, provides another example (Mitchell 1954).

Sir John Hall came from a similar social background to these and other high officials, but his career pattern was markedly different. He was the son of a man of private means, whose means had evaporated before his sons' education was completed. After attending good public schools, Sir John sent himself to Oxford by scholarships, tutoring and writing

for the cinema. World War I put an end to his Oxford studies; he commanded an army unit, and was decorated for bravery. After demobilization, he served briefly in the finance division of the Egyptian civil service, and was appointed to the Colonial Office. He spent fourteen years as a home civil servant, then was sent to Palestine and Iraq, where he worked as a financial specialist in the Secretariats. During World War II he was appointed governor of Aden, and then became Resident in Zanzibar. Thus all his overseas service was spent at colonial capitals. He had never undergone initiation into the mystique of Indirect Rule by service in up-country postings in black Africa, nor had he absorbed the complex of ideas usually derived from such experience. Instead, he brought to his post a sharp, analytical and orderly mind, more interested in facts, figures and trends than in individuals. Dundas illustrated his thinking about development with a vignette of one sick old man; Hall talked of "the human factor" (see Dundas quote on p. 328 above, and Hall in Uganda 1947:iv, quoted below). Hall was much more interested in economic affairs than in native administration. He did not share Dundas' interest in anthropology, and nowhere in his writings can one find the sentiments about the virtues of "traditional, communal society" and the ambivalence toward change, so common in officials who had served their apprenticeship in Africa in the inter-war years.

Contrary to the stereotype of the classically educated, public-school generalist (cf. Wilkinson 1964), Sir John enjoyed technical subjects, and prided himself on being able to learn enough about each technical area to understand what the specialists under his authority

were doing.[9] During his governorship, the heads of the technical departments, long regarded as secondary to the Provincial Administration, enjoyed unaccustomed prestige.

Financial caution was etched deep into him, by his years spent balancing budgets in other colonies, reinforced perhaps by his own background.

> In last year's budget debate much was said about the need for faith, faith in Uganda's future, faith in the resiliency of Uganda's revenue, faith in funds materializing somewhere, somehow. But faith won't pay bills. I believe in faith provided it is not misplaced: but in the realm of finance faith should be founded on a certain solid fact or at least on close and unemotional estimation. (Statement to the Legislative Council on 18 June, 1945, quoted in Walker 1962:17).

However, his many years as a civil servant had not smothered a capacity for conceiving of large projects — vast when compared with what had been done before — and energy, determination, political skill and even ruthlessness to carry them through. This capacity to innovate coexisted with a profound conservatism. One senses in Sir John that the belief, noted in the previous chapter, in the naturalness of hierarchy, was present to a very marked degree. There was in him a profound commitment to order and structure. His behavior, and what others say of him, imply also that the concept of the monarchy was a central symbol for him, embodying his deep sense of duty and service, and his loyalty to the idea of Empire. But it is characteristic of him that neither his writings, nor my conversation with him, should touch on such emotional realms.

His secretary, a shrewd and intelligent woman, insists that Sir John was at heart a simple and modest man, a statement that would

startle many who served under him.

> ...anything that was done in the way of ceremony was done in his position as representative of the monarch. It was because of that, I think, that they had the bugle call in the morning and evening, the raising of the flag, the lowering of the flag, the firing of the gun, the signing of the book, all this....We were not paying tribute to him as a man; we were paying tribute to the king of England. (Interview with Sir John Hall's secretary.)

Sir John, I think, consciously conceived of the governorship as a role. In his youth, he had once considered becoming a professional actor, but instead went into public service. There was a certain calculatedness in his performance, and a sensitivity to the symbolic dimensions of his behavior as the monarch's representative, that suggest a consciously dramaturgical conception of the governorship. Sir John himself articulated this point.

> The capacity to act helped me enormously in speech-writing...all those sides. I knew exactly how to get a laugh; after-dinner speaking was a technique, a tiresome, troublesome technique. It was a great help to me as a governor....You've got to have that dramatic capacity.

His conception of the governor's role required maintenance of great social distance between himself and his officials. He behaved austerely, permitting himself no expression of personal warmth. A much younger man who had worked closely with him for seven years and had been in effect his protege told me that Sir John never allowed himself to use the younger man's Christian name until two weeks before the governor's departure, when he suddenly relaxed.

This discipline was also enforced on Lady Hall. In the traditional norms of colonial service, neither the governor nor his lady should hint

at personal favoritism. Sir John's conception fell within the traditional parameters of the governor's role, as one would expect of a deeply conservative person. But he went far beyond the customary pattern in the rigor of the discipline he imposed on himself, and the work-load that he deliberately assumed. It is risky to speculate on the motivations animating this performance, but the evidence suggests some possibilities. He was an ambitious man. He conceived of his task as the development of the economy of Uganda, for the sake of Ugandans, to provide a firm financial basis for independence sometime in the future. He apparently saw no conflict between carrying out this task well, fulfilling his duty to the British monarchy and empire, and advancing his own career. But when conflict did develop between him and the British government of the time, he was prepared to sacrifice his personal ambitions rather than accept policies he regarded as detrimental to Uganda (see Chap. X).

Even more speculatively, in a bureaucratic age, a colonial governorship may perhaps have offered a man of ability and drive a rare scope to wield power creatively. Sir John had a strong personal vision of what he wanted Uganda to become. He was not unconcerned with welfare, but his expression of this concern reflects the creative appeal of power. When reminiscing about his work as governor, he told me

> ...your great joy is to find thin babies and create fat babies — all that you can do under your own hand, to make things grow where nothing grew.

4. Sir John Hall's concept of development

Immediately on arrival in Uganda, Sir John began extensive tours to

survey his new domain for himself. Tours were interrupted by the 1945 riots, but as we saw in Chapter VIII, he was able to treat these as only a minor disturbance whose causes did not deserve his full attention. After making some small changes, he again focussed on problems of economic development.

Sixteen months later, in April 1946, he summarized his thinking on development strategies in a memorandum later published as the foreword to the new development plan (Uganda 1947a). This memorandum is a coldly rational inventory of assets and debits; the thinking is systematic even when based on premises later shown to be dubious. The rhetoric and welfarist sentiments overflowing in the Dundas plan are utterly lacking. He defined the problem thus:

> The whole wealth of Uganda, apart from the human factor ...is to be found in the products of its soil and its water, and the primary and secondary industries dependent thereon; and the problem is to find means whereby that wealth can be so conserved, developed and exploited as both to provide adequate subsistence in its broadest sense for the present populationand for the expansion of population which is to be expected in the future, and also to support the social and other public services of which that population will be in need (ibid.:iii).

The key to his thinking was his conviction that Uganda's population was bound to increase rapidly, a conviction he apparently brought in with him. He has said that this concern with population increase stems from his early experiences in densely-populated Egypt (Hall 1952). It was a concern not widely shared by African administrators at that early date. As he saw it, Uganda's expanding population would have to be supported on soil of declining fertifilty, at a time when improvement of living standards would require a great increase in size of holdings. The most

seriously limiting factors, as he saw it, were the inefficiency of the African labor force (see below) and the peasant basis of agriculture.

> There is little or no doubt that Uganda...could be more efficiently and profitably developed by a system of large estates or concessions owned and operated by Europeans. That is axiomatic.[10] But to adopt such a system in Uganda would be directly opposed to the established policy which aims at developing Uganda for the benefit, not of imported Europeans or Asians, but of its African population. By parcelling out Uganda into large European estates based upon optimum economic units, or by conceding fishing rights over Uganda's lakes to European-controlled companies, there is no doubt that greater wealth would be produced, and would be produced more quickly. It is possible also that a larger African population could by this means be maintained (ibid.).

But, he continued, the land and lakes of Uganda were held in trust for the Africans, and should not be alienated. He briefly considered collective farming on the Russian model, but dismissed it as requiring an impracticable amount of compulsion. Therefore no alternative was open, for the present, except continued dependence on a primarily peasant agriculture.

He reviewed other assets and debits, noting the lack of any large, easily exploitable mineral deposits, and of any fuel but wood. He concluded that there would be no "get-rich-quick" for Uganda; development must be slow, progressive and multiform. Sustained efforts to spread new ideas in agriculture, in animal husbandry, and to reclaim land, would be the basis. He saw little hope that peasant farmers could win a greatly increased standard of living unless the size of holding under cultivation — which, he guessed, averaged only about four acres — could be increased. The four-acre limit was determined, not by land availability, but by the labor-capacity of a peasant and his family with

the hand-hoe. He regarded moves towards mechanization as an essential means of breaking through this constraint (Uganda 1947a:iii; Hall 1952: 127-128). Thus he instigated a long, and costly, series of experiments with mechanization of agriculture (Uganda 1954; M. Hall 1968).

He concluded that this need for much larger holdings, plus rapid population expansion, was bound to lead sooner or later to land shortage. Therefore the only other possible means of supporting this population and creating the wealth needed to provide social services for it, was industrialization (Hall 1952:126). Government's task therefore was "to encourage and stimulate by all possible means the establishment of heavy and secondary industries in the country," (ibid.) to forestall the anticipated shorgage of land. Therefore steps must be taken to provide industry with its basic infrastructural needs: cheap power, improved communications, cheap cement. He foresaw industries to produce goods primarily for markets within East Africa (Uganda 1947a:x-xi; Hall 1952:26). He recognized some impediments to industrial expansion: the lack of a skilled labor force, and the long and expensive rail haul to the sea. Significantly, he makes no mention of the competitive advantages of neighboring Kenya.

He recognized the ignorance and poverty of the mass of the population (see next section) but regarded great expansion of medical and educational services as a luxury that would have to wait until the country's wealth had first been increased.

> Unfortunately a country can only have in the long run the social services that it can pay for, and in their natural enthusiasm to spread health and education throughout Uganda

> the committee charged with the preparation of the [1944] development plan allowed themselves to be led into recommendations for expansion of services far beyond the foreseeable financial resources of the Protectorate. Health and education ultimately produce rich dividends but they are delayed, long-range dividends and meanwhile national bankruptcy would have supervened....
>
> That a great expansion of health and education services is eminently desirable is beyond question, and that such an expansion will in due course become financially practicable one can be reasonably confident; but meanwhile the revenue for that expansion does not exist and, failing large additional taxation which is not practicable at present, our only course is to press on with the production of national wealth and meanwhile to restrict the expansion of social services within the limits imposed by the funds that can be made available (Uganda 1947a:xi-xii).

In neutral phrases that masked much internal upheaval, Sir John added that the Medical and Education departments were now framing "revised and more realistic plans of development" (ibid.:xii). It was common for officials who had served under Sir John so speak of these two departments as the "spending" departments whose insatiable demands for revenue the "productive" departments had to labor to meet.

Sir John, however, pushed ahead with his predecessor's plans for a Department of Public Relations and Social Welfare.

> ...apart from its purpose as a two-ways news service between Government and the people, the department will have the very difficult and vital task of keeping in touch with the educated and semi-educated youth of this country and directing their thoughts and aspirations along healthy channels; in effect, taking over where the Education Department stops. I have described this task as vital because on its success or failure must largely depend the social and political future of Uganda. If we succeed, we may hope to have in Uganda a friendly, co-operative and progressive people, bound to Britain by ties of gratitude and common purpose. If we fail, then the progress of Uganda will inevitably be retarded and her future, social, political and economic, will indeed be black (ibid.).

Thus this department was, from its beginnings, conceived as a political weapon to counter a political threat: the threat of the "educated and semi-educated youth."

5. Sir John Hall's view of 'the African'

It was suggested in earlier chapters that officials' definitions of 'the African', his nature and capacities was one of the crucial variables underlying observed differences in outlook. Sir John presented his views in characteristically blunt terms:

> Let us consider first the human factor. Are the people of Uganda likely to constitute a favourable or an unfavourable factor in the production of wealth? Unfortunately the present answer must be: unfavourable. Speaking generally, and judging by European standards, the Africans of Uganda are indolent, ignorant, irresponsible and not infrequently suspicious of foreign intervention. But that is only one side of the picture. Their indolence is in large measure attributable to malnutrition and debilitation from disease....
>
> Moreover, their unsatisfactory performance as a labour force is, I am convinced, largely due to the conditions of their employment. Bad housing, bad feeding, bad pay, unsympathetic and unimaginative handling by alien employers, dull and distasteful work, make so unattractive a sum total as to provide no inducement to honest labour or reasonably high performance. ...Until employers in general provide conditions for their labourers which those labourers appreciate and are anxious to retain, until, to put it crudely, labourers are apprehensive of, instead of indifferent to, being "sacked," there will be little permanent improvement in the quality of African labour....
>
> Another contributory cause of idleness is to be found in the almost complete absence of consumer goods in the shops, which discourages any sustained effort to earn more money....
>
> The ignorance of the Uganda African, and the suspicion which is largely bred of ignorance, represent faults which, as civilian and army educationists have proved, are definitely curable, provided that education is not allowed to bring in its train, as it has done elsewhere in Africa and Asia, the political distempers

> and social malaise which in turn breed even more harmful suspicions and discontents....
>
> Although the population judged by European standards is at present ignorant and idle, it is as a whole friendly, malleable and responsive. Its faults are eradicable; its virtues should, with sympathetic handling, survive (ibid.:iv, vi).

His highly unfavorable characterization of Uganda's Africans has sometimes been quoted out of context as evidence of "racist" attitudes. On the contrary, he explicitly recognizes that he is using an external and ethnocentric standard to judge present productive performance as unsatisfactory; he then attributes the deficiency in performance, not to inherent racially-linked defects, but to environmental conditions. There is not even any hint of explanation in terms of traditional society or culture, or "conservatism" — "explanations" very common in official circles in the 1950s and 1960s. His view differs sharply from the racial determinism of many earlier officials.

So far, the analysis is not unlike that of the Dundas plan, but the proposed strategy for closing the gap between present performance and future potential is very different. This quotation, and the memorandum as a whole, lack the pervasive emphasis on training of Africans for greater responsibility found in the Dundas plan. To Sir John, "development" was something to be done <u>to</u> the African population, not <u>with</u> it. He saw the population as "friendly, malleable and responsive," almost as if a depersonalized mass was waiting for its European rulers to mould it.

His attitude was highly authoritarian: he would tolerate no questioning of either his personal rule (by his subordinate British officials) or of British rule of the Protectorate (by Africans). But it was not

"paternalistic" in the sense that his predecessors' had been. "Paternalism" implies the condescending affection towards one's "children" that permeates the memoirs of men such as Mitchell and Dundas and to a lesser extent Bradley. Sir John was much too self-disciplined to permit a sentiment such as affection to muddy his thinking.

Paradoxically, he may have found it easier to accept Africans in high positions than the more paternalistic type of official who "knew the African" of the inter-war years. Sir John was not bothered by the thought of men of color in positions of authority over Europeans; he pointed out to me that he had served under Egyptian ministers in his youth. He certainly did not push Africanization, but those Africans who held high positions under colonial rule were entertained and treated with an honor carefully adjusted to their rank. The first African to take up a senior appointment in Entebbe was Bulamu Mukasa, a graduate of Yale University and a member of Legislative Council. Sir John, concerned that the man have open to him opportunities for a social life appropriate to his rank, asked two younger officials of liberal bent to persuade the Entebbe Club, the great bastion of white exclusiveness, to change its rules to admit Mukasa. The move failed, and it appears not to have been widely known that Sir John was behind it.[11] Sir John also maintained friendly contacts, after retirement, with a few of the elite Africans he had dealt with in Uganda. Perhaps he can be best described as a conservative who could accept elite men of another color, provided they shared his commitment to order, hierarchy and the status quo.

But another aspect of the prevalent definitions of 'the African'

had direct implications for the choice of economic strategy, and is of some relevance to economic anthropology. This question has usually been phrased in the concepts of Western economics as the 'rationality' or 'irrationality' of Africans' economic behavior. Here we need not be concerned with the vexed question of whether "price responses" were "normal" or not,[12] nor with the even more vexed question of the appropriateness of Western micro-economic concepts in this context,[13] but only with what officials believed to be the case.

Sir John's argument, quoted above, that low work performance was due to low rewards and lack of material incentives could be interpreted as a view of 'the African' as rationally calculating, i.e. that this response was "normal" in terms of the assumptions of Western micro-economic analysis. But this statement refers specifically to Africans in wage-employment, an insignificant portion of the population. For crop producers, Sir John volunteered during interview a very different view, in connection with crop prices.

> It wasn't wise to give them a sensational return on their work. And that was proved later in several respects. Because at one time...[in another colony] the fishing industry was producing nothing like enough fish that we wanted....And so we thought, *obviously we're not paying them enough.* So we doubled the price they were paid for fish and we got almost exactly half the amount of fish we got before. Because of course, the African was quite content with what he was getting before. And when we paid him more he just did less work, and it was as simple as that. So that the normal methods you would apply in a civilized — a more civilized — community to encourage a greater productivity worked exactly in reverse.

One could not hope for a more explicit statement of a belief in what economists call "a perverse response to price" and/or "the backward-sloping supply curve" (Helleiner 1975). Very similar views were

put forward in interviews with others, notably a financial secretary and head of the Crop Marketing Boards, and several senior agricultural officials. This belief seems to have been one of the several factors involved in the controversial crop pricing policies followed from 1945 to about 1953 (see next chapter).

6. Preparation of a new plan: the Worthington plan

Once Sir John Hall felt he had grasped the main fundamentals of the problems of development, he sought an outside expert to prepare a new plan. His choices reflect something of the small, personalized networks of people involved in colonial affairs (cf. Lee 1967), in those days before the present growth of institutes of development planners. His first choice was a man he had worked with in the Near East, Sir Douglas Harris, an engineer with experience in wider aspects of development and finance. Since Harris was busy elsewhere, Sir John chose another acquaintance who had impressed him, a zoologist and fisheries expert, E.B. Worthington, who had accompanied Lord Hailey on his monumental tour of Africa in the 1930s, and had written a survey of colonial science.

Worthington was assigned an assistant, an experienced and popular administrative officer, who guided him around the country and through a series of consultations with relevant parties. Sir John modestly insists that the document is all Worthington's work, but the plan essentially incorporates Sir John's thinking on key points, especially the central importance of population increase, and the need for "production in all its forms to increase at a greater rate than population" (Uganda 1947a:7).

Worthington seems to have had an even lower opinion of 'the African' than Sir John. He defined the short-term position as follows:

> ...focussing attention on the next ten years, the greatest asset of Uganda is not manpower, because many tribes in the country leave much to be desired as workers, but the large expanse of land and water which has not yet been brought into production. Thus the fundamental problem divides itself into two parts, first how to increase the output per head of African, and second how to remove the handicaps which render large areas unused or unuseable, and to ascertain how those areas could be developed in the best interests of the inhabitants when there is more manpower available (Uganda 1947a:8, para. 19).

He lists as the main factors limiting increased production:

i) the lack of fundamental information about the country;

ii) a system of agriculture inherited from the past and incompatible with the full use of natural resources;

iii) "the low capacity of the African for physical and (less important for the time being) mental work, coupled with a lack of desire for economic or social advancement";

iv) power based on the most inefficient of fuels, namely wood (ibid.: 9, para. 21).

Worthington started by estimating the amount of revenue available for government expenditure over the next ten years, and came up with the figure of £16 million. This plan, unlike the Dundas plan, was concerned with total governmental expenditure, and not just capital expenditures. He allocated about 19 percent of the assumed £16 million to "productive services," including agriculture, tsetse fly control, water supplies, geological survey work, etc.; 22.5 percent to social services, mainly education and health (but also including prisons!), and 40 percent to

general services, the largest single amount of 13 percent going to urban development, and 8 percent to transport development (ibid.:11,14).

The plan reflects the view that "productive" and "social" services were two distinct kinds. Worthington echoed Sir John's criticism that in the past, spending on social services in Uganda had outrun others too fast. For the present, the best that could be done would be an increase in social services just slightly greater than the rate of population increase (ibid.:45).

Worthington's own contributions to the Plan include a salutory emphasis on the need for collection of basic data about the country, its population and resources, to remedy the astonishing lack of basic information, some quantified projections of likely population trends, sound words of caution on the dangers of pollution and environmental degradation as a consequence of economic development, and plans for development of Uganda's fishery resources. More controversially, he proposed several giant "pilot schemes" or experimental settlement schemes under European planning and direction, where modern ideas of efficient land use and intensive production could be tried under close supervision. He proposed to spend no less than £1 million on these experimental projects. This ecologist's pipe-dream came under heavy criticism from old hands within Uganda. Preliminary planning work was undertaken, but the schemes in their original form were never realized. The proposals, however, probably helped to turn the thinking of officials towards settlement schemes, and a number of abortive European-directed schemes were later undertaken in Uganda, some in the South Busoga area

which Worthington had favored for his own massive experiment in land use.[14]

The Worthington Plan had little to say about industrial development. In fact, the major steps of Hall's industrialization policy were taken outside the framework of the formal development plan. These included a massive hydro-electric project involving damming of the Nile at Jinja, construction of a cement plant, developing a new copper mine in Western Uganda, extending the railway west to serve it, establishment of a cotton textile factory in Jinja, and creation of an industrial estate aiming to attract further industries to Jinja, to provide further customers for the electricity, in addition to the textile factory and the copper smelter. At the end of Sir John's governorship, the cement factory and hotels started by government were grouped together in a para-statal body, the Uganda Development Corporation which, it was hoped, would attract more private investment through partnership ventures. There was optimistic talk of Jinja as the future Detroit of East Africa. The dam alone was a far vaster project than anything attempted before the war; the overall conception involved governmental economic initiatives on a scale almost unprecendented for a British colony.[15]

7. Time-scale

The Worthington Plan, for the first time, deals explicitly with time forecasts.

> During the next ten years, while maintaining steady improvements to social services, the prime object should be a concentration on productive effort to ensure that production increases rapidly, at a rate much higher than

> population. At the end of that period, assuming this object is achieved, the way would be open for establishing greatly improved social services, including health and education, which in the early stages tend to accelerate the rate of increase of a population, but in advanced stages tend to cause stabilisation. On the basis of the above guesses, there would be ten to 40 years, that is about two African generations, for the factors to operate in such a way as to retard the rate of increase and give a population stabilised at about 10,000,000 who would use all the natural resources (1947a:8, para. 18).

Here is the ecologist speaking, with a tone more characteristic of the 1970s than the 1940s. But the political dimension is missing. Worthington stated during interview with me that he deliberatedly did not consider the political dimension. The assumption implicit in both his and Sir John's thought was that British rule of Uganda would continue for at least another 40 years; the increasing African demands for more education and medical services could, therefore, be ignored for ten years, while government concentrated its efforts on economic expansion. A need for training of African manpower to take over leadership roles in government and industry was not even considered. The "low capacity of the African for mental work" was "less important for the time being" because the brains and the enterprise would be supplied by Europeans. The very fact that such a phrase could be published in an official document, in a colony with an educated elite, several vernacular newspapers eager to feed a literate readership with anti-governmental tidbits, and a nascent-nationalist movement, indicates the extent to which the top officials in Entebbe still assumed that educated African opinion was irrelevant.

Preparation and acceptance of the Plan by Legislative Council

involved the intensive informal consultations with leading unofficials that was the custom in Uganda (see Chap. VII). Worthington and his assistant recall talking to a few chiefs, and the katikiro of Buganda, Kawalya-Kagwa, himself a large-landowner. But beyond this there seems to have been little real discussion with African leaders. Whatever its economic merits, as a public relations document the Plan was a disaster.

8. The dream and the reality: problems of execution

To execute his policies, Sir John built a team of enthusiasts who thought as he did, and worked almost as hard as he did. He discussed frankly the manner in which he had, rather ruthlessly, reshaped the top levels of his administration.

> I had a system, which I found worked, which meant that the first year of a new posting was terrible. I drew to myself all the decisions in all the departments, until I could see how much I could trust the heads of departments and their administrative capabilities. And then, after say two years or one year, I gradually pushed out more and more responsibility to them, and didn't interfere. But to begin with, I took the whole administration to myself, and worked frightfully hard, until I could see whom I could trust. And those that I found I couldn't trust, I got rid of usually.

This he did, he said, through use of his informal contact at the Colonial Office. After two years, all department heads with the exception of the Geological Survey were new, some through normal retirements, some through this process of arranged transfers. In addition, Sir John brought in technical experts to head such programs as hydrology, and Sir Douglas Harris to act as development commissioner. In the Hall regime, the important members of the "team" were not necessarily those on Executive Council; the heads of technical departments had unaccustomed

prestige and influence, while the so-called "spending" departments of Education and Medical Services declined in influence.

Interviews with survivors of Sir John's "team" showed beyond doubt that these had been men animated by a dream: the dream of building a prosperous and productive Uganda, of creating a firm financial basis for welfare improvements sometime in the future. But their recollected enthusiasm was not found among those interviewed who had worked in the districts during that time. Sir John had not only failed to reach out to animate African leaders with his conception of development, he also failed to reach the lower levels of his own administration. From the perspective of those in the districts, "development" under the Hall regime was a matter of big projects — dams, factories and so on — planned and executed in Entebbe, that did not involve them. There were some exceptions — such as the terracing programs in Kigezi district, that temporarily alleviated land pressures in that over-populated mountain district. One gains an impression, in talking with such men, of a new ferment among the African population, which now included the returned war veterans, but not very much happening administratively to match it. A few wanted to push local small-scale development schemes; men such as these felt keenly the need to involve local people in achievable improvements in their own lives, supplementing the large-scale projects. But despite isolated achievements, usually where staff had by some accident been able to remain in a district for a considerable length of time, local projects with strong African participation were not characteristic of this period. The one major effort, the introduction of elected councils pursuant to the Secretary of State's demands

for more democratic local government, aroused little enthusiasm amongst either British officers or the mass of Africans. Some of the officers in the districts were well aware of the nature of African concerns, as this cynical jotting, written by a district commissioner in 1950, shows:

> Development, or what to say in lukikos.[16]
> 1. Cotton. Tell them they can't buy or gin their own cotton for another fifty years or so, and they will be paid for it just as much as the Government thinks is good for them.
> 2. Coffee. Tell them they can't have hulleries of their own because the reorganization of the industry about which there has been talk for the past few years has not yet begun.
> 3. Maize. Tell them they can't have their own maize mills because we don't want to encourage maize production.
> 4. Education and medical services. Tell them they can't have any more education or hospitals and dispensaries even if they build their own because there isn't any money, in spite of the Development and Welfare Acts and the Cotton and Hard Coffee funds.[17]
> 5. Trade. Tell the traders including ex-askaris[18] that because supplies are still short most of them have to be allotted to Asians who were in business before the war.
>
> These are the main things they are interested in. Wear a bullet-proof waistcoat while expounding these aspects of the development plan.

But perspectives such as these seem not to have reached the governor. There were other younger officials in the districts who, like the one quoted above, tended to think of development in terms of release of existing restrictions, and providing a little bit of help, so that Africans could do things for themselves. Such a viewpoint involved the unspoken idea that Africans were probably capable of doing much more for themselves than they were at present doing. They still of course believed in the necessity of guiding British over-rule, but one is conscious in talking with such men of a "generation gap" when comparing their implicit view of 'the African' with that of older district officials.

9. Summary

The evidence in this chapter supports the conclusion Walker reached earlier: that the role of governor provides sufficient scope for a strong-minded governor to throw out the development plan of his predecessor, and replace it with one corresponding to his personal predilections, but only with a proviso added: that the new plan not threaten the nature of relations in the colonial economy. A plan giving highest priority to major expansions of education, medical and other welfare services, slighting economic development and ignoring industry, was replaced with a developmental strategy based on restraining welfare expenditures, concentrating on increasing production and positively encouraging industrialization. The first plan was based on an optimistic faith in an improved revenue position; the second, on extreme financial caution. The first plan contained a pervasive emphasis on education, training and granting opportunities for gaining experience in self-management to Africans, including women; the second lacks this emphasis, and assumes large-scale developments conceived and executed by Europeans.

More speculatively, the writings of Dundas suggest a man keenly aware of the humanity of those he ruled, of their poverty and their aspirations for a better life, and even with some awareness of aspirations for a greater political voice. But he knew he was too old, and ill-equipped by temperament and experience to deal with the demands of maintaining colonial rule in the postwar era.

> Our African children were passing beyond the age of tutelage and in their adolescence had aspirations....The further way would have been unfamiliar to me, who knew only the earlier course (Dundas 1955:241, 243).

Hall did not share this view of Africans as "children." However humane and gentle he may have been in private life, his conception of his task, and of the governor's role, seemed to require that he depersonalize his thinking about those he ruled, converting them into "the human factor," and depersonalize even his relations with his officials. He had great powers of logic and analyis, but from hindsight, his thinking on development shows a marked insensitivity to the aspirations of Ugandans, especially the rising new men outside the formal roles of the African Establishment. This insensitivity led to a consistent under-estimation of "the political factor."

I suggested above that certain shared assumptions and patterns of thought made it possible for Hall and his senior officials — on whom he relied for information on "native administration" — to ignore evidence of frustrated aspirations and emerging social differentiation. Channels of communication leading up from the district-level officials who were somewhat more aware of African aspirations seem to have been clogged. The developmental strategy that he promulgated depended for its success on, among other things, a prolonged period of British rule, even though the duration of that rule had already become problematic.

10. Implications

> Nous rejetons...la possibilité d'une idéologie générale du développement. Les idéologies diverses correspondent a divers interets sociaus et plus basiquement à diverses classes sociales....Les classes intéressées par le développement sont différentes et cherchent différents chemins de développement (Theotonio dos Santos, quoted in Campbell 1976:211-212).[19]

So far we have attempted to clarify the different strands of official thinking of the time, and to relate these differences to differing life experiences of the two dominant individuals, the two governors. We now must shift the level of analysis, and look at the implications of the two developmental strategies for differing class interests. It goes without saying that both plans were consistent with, and pre-supposed perpetuation of the colonial system. But within that system, diverse social interests had differing, and sometimes opposed, concerns. These interests could be crudely listed as:

Within the metropolis

British government

The Colonial Office and related official circles

The Treasury and related departments concerned with supplies procurement

British capital interests searching for new investment possibilities and/or concerned with overseas markets

Regional level

Business interests in Kenya selling in the Ugandan market

Within the colony

The administrative machine itself

Local bourgeoisie controlling crop processing

The import-export interests, other than basic crops

The Africans:

The African Establishment (native government officials, chiefs, Ganda large land-owners, etc.)

The expanding element of traders, prosperous peasants, aspiring entrepreneurs and educated elite outside the ranks of the Establishment (at this time, still concentrated in Buganda)

The mass of the population: small cash-cropping peasants

migrant laborers

The Dundas plan was highly congenial to the welfare-oriented ideology of development prevailing at the Colonial Office at the time (Lee 1967). The Worthington Plan was less so; its cuts in educational spending came in for serious criticism at that office.[20] On the other hand, the Hall-Worthington emphasis on an immediate expansion of production met more closely the hope of the British Treasury and the production/procurement ministries to obtain the maximum amount of colonial products to meet British needs, a point to be examined more closely below. The Protectorate officials went along with the metropolitan government's drive for production, when they regarded it as compatible with the interests of the colony.

As for metropolitan business interests, the distaste for industrialization shown in the Dundas plan, and the low level of investment in basic infrastructural development, offered little encouragement to outside capital. The same factors presented no threat to business interests in Kenya. The Dundas plan passively offered these interests no competition for the regional market or labor supply. It was silent on the role of private enterprise and the nature of economic relationships. Therefore, by implication, it contained no threat to the privileged position of these local processing interests.

Hall's developmental strategy had very different implications for all three levels of business interests. He was after big capital. He consciously set out to serve the needs of international — not merely British — capital by creating infra-structural conditions that would make investment in Uganda appealing to them. He was convinced, and was almost certainly correct, that only the large capital and expertise of what we now call multi-national corporations could cope with the technological problems involved in development of some of the colony's mineral deposits.[21] Although he is not explicitly on record as saying so, one can speculate that he would have described the export of profits by such international corporations as fair and reasonable payment for use of their capital, creation of employment and expansion of national product. To Sir John, serving the needs of foreign capital was not a latent function of his strategy, but a fully conscious, deliberate and meritorious way to serve the needs of the rapidly expanding population of Uganda, as he conceived them.

His policy implied strong direct competition with business interests in Kenya, both for new capital, skilled labor and for access to regional markets. As for the local expatriate interests who controlled crop processing, Hall's 1946 memorandum contained a clear warning that his government would demand changes from them. The struggle over the form that these changes would take is considered at length in the next chapter.

Hall's views on the involvement of capital from the local Indian bourgeoisie in new enterprises is not explicit in available documents,

but there is reason to believe he would have been favorable to such investment. Therefore his approach increased opportunities for the local bourgeoisie who had access to fairly sizeable amounts of capital.

The basic needs of the Protectorate administrative machine can be regarded as a) an increase of revenue, to provide for its maintenance and expansion, increase of official salaries and improved living standards, as well as improved services, b) peace, law and order so that work could proceed smoothly, and c) long-term security for its members. The rationale of Hall's approach was that a major expansion of governmental revenue was essential, and had to come through expansion of productive activity in the colony. Since this aspect was slighted in the Dundas plan, the Hall plan can be said to serve the short-term needs of the administrative machine better than the earlier one. Needs b) and c) are ultimately political questions, and will be left aside for the moment.

Among the African population, there was an increasingly articulate demand for more medical services, and above all, more education. The Dundas plan thus offered more immediate gratification of this perceived need, but proposed little in the way of long-term economic transformation. The educational measures, and the emphasis on training and even some talk of Africanization, opened up new prospects for the tiny educated elite.

An educated African looking for even such limited and illusory gains in the Hall strategy would have found nothing but some insulting phrases and demands for harder work. There was almost nothing to meet

the short-term demands of either the mass of the population, or the rising new men. Major expansion of education and medical services was to be postponed for some ten years. The plan offered nothing to encourage small-scale enterprises among the "new men"; in fact, policies actually followed often militated against such development. But nothing was even done to involve the natural allies of the British rulers — the African Establishment — with the new economic developments. Consultations, directorships, sale of shares and so on, would have been very cheap devices that could well have had a high political payoff if started in the immediate post-war years. Thus the Hall strategy offered nothing to promote the creation of a dynamic entrepreneurial class in Uganda. On a more political level, Hall overlooked opportunities to bind the economic interests of the colonial regime's natural allies among the African elite more closely to its own. Devices to identify African leaders with the economic interests of the post-war colonial system were not started until much later, 1952, after the change of governors — and after nationalist agitation led by the "new men" was well under way.

But this post hoc judgement understates the historical progressiveness of Hall's emphasis on population growth and industrialization, in comparison with what had prevailed before. Hall's policy represented a fundamental change from pre-war policies of both the British and Ugandan governments. These had both consistently and strongly opposed any change in Uganda's status as a producer of relatively unprocessed agricultural raw materials (Brett 1973:Chap. 9). In at least two

instances in the 1930s, proposals for construction of a blanket manufacturing plant, and a cotton spinning and weaving factory in Uganda were rejected by the two governments. In the 1932 case of the cotton plant, the Colonial Office rejected the proposal because of opposition from Lancashire cotton interests, and the Ugandan government opposed it because it would threaten governmental revenue from duties on cotton piece goods imports, diminish the labor supply needed for agricultural production of export crops, and also, by implication, because of ideological objection to the employment of natives in factories (Mamdani 1976:254). The blanket case in 1938 drew similar objections from the Ugandan governor (Brett 1973:274). But in 1946 a governor of Uganda was talking optimistically of Jinja as "another Detroit." Furthermore, the British government had accepted his policy.

We know now that the policy failed; Jinja today bears no resemblance to a prosperous manufacturing center. But the fact that such an ambitious plan for industrialization could even be promulgated raises important questions about the relation of a colony to its metropolis and about the efficacy to be accorded in analysis to the ideological outlook of a few men.

Those who see colonial governors as "mere petty functionaries" carrying out the wishes of the metropolitan bourgeoisie argue that Uganda's post-war drive for economic expansion and especially its industrialization policy are to be explained by the changed needs of a British economy weakened by the Second World War, threatened by sterling crises and the increasing hegemony of the U.S.A. It is beyond doubt

that these changing economic needs, and the policy of expanded colonial production developed by the Labour Government as one means of meeting them, are related to the post-war economic development policies put forward by the individual colonies.[22] It is also clear that in the immediate post-war period, the task of procurement of colonial products needed by British private industry was carried out on their behalf by the British government's economic ministries, a fact obvious even to the senior Ugandan officials who had to negotiate with them (cf. the quotation on p. 403 below). What is at issue is the directness of the causal relation, i.e. the tightness of the integration between colony and metropolis.

Mamdani, for example, attempts to explain Uganda's switch to a policy favoring industrialization as a way to "establish dollar-earning industries in the colonies in order to accumulate dollars in the metropole" (1976:253). In this case, he has let his apparent desire to find an immediate economic explanation run away with him. No Ugandan official ever entertained hopes that industries there could, given the colony's transport handicaps, compete in world markets with those of developed industrial countries. The proposed markets that Hall spoke of were the "teeming millions" around Lake Victoria in East Africa. Mamdani's second argument, that industrialization, through import-substitution, was a dollar-saving policy, is somewhat more plausible — until one looks at the trade figures. In 1951, only four percent of Uganda's imports came from the U.S.A. (Great Britain 1954:103). This figure, however, could well have been higher were it not for the strict

austerity policies and discouragement of imports from the dollar zone that Britain imposed on her colonies to help cope with her own balance-of-payments crises. But the industries foreseen for Uganda, including textiles and cement, did not represent substitutes for American imports. Britain's need for dollars undoubtedly had a distorting effect on Uganda's post-war economy, but it cannot be pressed into service as a direct explanation of this policy shift.

Mamdani, like many of the bourgeois scholars that he scorns, errs by neglecting the regional context, and the extent to which the Ugandan economy was integrated with that of Kenya. Secondly, his wording seems to imply that an ideological shift in the colony must be directly caused by a shift in underlying economic relations.

If British needs, as expressed in the policies of the British Treasury and the economic ministries, and mediated through the Colonial Office, were the direct cause of Uganda's change in development policy, it should follow that the same cause would produce similar effects in other colonies as well, including the other East African colonies. Do we find in these other colonies strong direct governmental initiatives to expand production and alter the nature of the economy, of the kind observed in Uganda in the 1945-1952 period?

The absence of strong governmental initiatives for economic expansion in Tanganyika has been commented on by Ehrlich (1976); the lack in its senior officials of a sense of drive to develop the colony was noted by Ugandan officials who had to deal with their Tanganyikan counterparts (cf. Chap. V, Section 14). The major steps undertaken

involved some modest encouragement to attract more European settlers, and a rather passive acquiescence to the absurd Groundnut Scheme, started on the initiative of a private British firm and later taken over by a British para-statal corporation (Wood 1950; Frankel 1953; Coulson 1977). Ecological constraints are much harsher in Tanganyika than in Uganda; nevertheless Ehrlich describes governmental policy in attempting to overcome these barriers as "unduly and persistently negative" (1976:321) and characterized by "a fundamental lack of driving force" (ibid.:328). The point at issue is not whether greater driving force could have overcome these barriers, only whether the British economic needs triggered strong efforts by Tanganyikan officials for economic expansion. If Ehrlich and Coulson are correct, these efforts must be rated as weak and misdirected.

The picture in Kenya is rather more complex. There was in the 1945-1952 period considerable economic expansion, especially noticeable in increased manufacturing capacity. This latter expansion took place with little governmental effort; McWilliam speaks of the "muted role of government in industrial development" (1976:273). The advantages of Kenya as an industrial site from which firms could export to the whole East African common market were such that little governmental effort was needed (Nixson 1973; Zwanenberg 1975:132-133).[23] Prior to 1953, governmental initiatives were concentrated on attraction of more European settlers and some infrastructural development (ibid.:44-45; Berman 1974: 311-314). Policies toward African agriculture emphasized maintenance of a subsistence orientation and inhibition of profit-oriented produc-

tion. Agricultural extension efforts among Africans were dominated by official efforts to promote soil conservation which, because they were not accompanied by measures to improve productivity and hence returns to the peasant grower, had to rely on compulsion (Zwanenberg 1975:47-49). A similar pre-occupation was found among agricultural officials in Tanganyika at this time (Coulson 1977).

Sir Philip Mitchell, governor of Kenya from 1945 to 1952, was primarily concerned to build a harmonious multi-racial society, a policy that, according to Berman (1974:303-311), stemmed from the assumptions about organic community held by a deeply religious and idealistic man, the product of long administrative service in inter-war Africa.[24] Results, says Berman, were a lack of comprehensive development policy at the center, and by default, a continuation of the existing divisions within the society and economy (ibid.:311).

In Kenya, strong governmental intervention in economic affairs was much more pronounced after 1953. This delay is to be explained by conditions internal to the colony: the neglect of the growing crisis in the Kikuyu areas leading to the outbreak of the so-called Mau Mau uprising; the replacement of Sir Philip Mitchell by Sir Evelyn Baring, a governor of very different stamp; the recognition that suppression of the uprising required fundamental alterations in the Africans' role within the economy.

This quick comparison suggests that if Britain's changed economic needs are to be regarded as a cause, it produced different responses in the three adjoining British colonies. The nature of the response

needs to be understood with regard to the specific conditions within each colony. If we wish to speak in cause-effect terms, the conditions within each colony, including the perceptions, preferences and energy of its top men, need to be recognized as intervening variables. As Lee has emphasized so heavily (1967:passim), general directives from the Colonial Office were interpreted by each governor in terms of his own priorities, and assessments of his colony's needs. The uncertainty of immediate response from these decentralized administrative units may have contributed to the British decision to mount crash programs for food production in the colonies using military methods under direct metropolitan control, such as the Groundnut Scheme and equally abortive schemes in West Africa.

If Uganda's post-war changes in development policy are viewed in their regional context, it becomes difficult to explain the switch to a policy of industrialization by the changed economic needs of Britain. These changed needs did not directly imply or require a policy of industrialization <u>in Uganda</u>. Rather, they led to a flow of foreign capital to East Africa, primarily Nairobi, for creation of import-substitution industries. Sir John Hall's policy should, I contend, be seen as aimed at capturing a portion of that flow for Uganda, as a way of meeting the needs of what he saw to be an expanding population trying to subsist on a shrinking land resource. Britain's changing needs were, on this interpretation, permissive rather than causative of a governor's policy that would not have been tolerated prior to 1939. The policy involved direct competition with Kenya, and seriously underestimated that country's

competitive advantages. Foreign capital for the most part declined Sir John Hall's invitations, preferring the more established industrial enclave in Kenya from where they still had access to the Ugandan market. The structure of separate, competing administratively almost self-contained colonies was contradicted by the economic integration created by the common market.

Thus, on the basis of the information presently available, it seems reasonable to suppose that if a more orthodox, less energetic governor, sharing the typical class-bias against Africans in factories, had taken office in Entebbe in 1944, there might not have been an attempt at industrialization in Uganda at that time. Sir John Hall's policy can be seen as a courageous, but essentially quixotic, attempt to divert the logical flow of capitalist development in East Africa from its natural path. By 1945, the structure of the colonial system left scope for a strong-minded governor like Hall to impose his own personal strategy on development planning, but this same structure made it almost impossible for that strategy to succeed.

NOTES

1. This chapter owes much to Walker's earlier analysis of development planning in Uganda (1959, 1962) and to a conversation with Professor Walker.

2. In the event, no women were sent to Makerere for agricultural degree training until the mid-1960s.

3. Sir Charles Dundas showed the distaste for industrialization common among the British landed aristocracy and gentry:

> I did not view with equanimity the prospect of an industrialised Uganda and had rather hoped that, if industries there must be, they would be sited over the border, even if the landless ones had to go there to work (Dundas 1955: 236).

4. Engholm 1968:350-352 discusses the financial aspect of the plan in more detail.

5. This phrase stems from the seminal paper by Schultz (1961, reprinted in Blaug 1968). The concept was much debated in the 1960s; the principle remains discernable, although the 1945 planners might not recognize it beneath the economists' jargon and the elaboration of techniques for measuring payoffs to different forms of such investment. Some of the key papers are collected in Blaug (ibid.).

6. What the British economy needed at that time, and what British policy stressed most, was increased colonial production of medium-staple cotton of the type grown in Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Nigeria, which could be directly substituted for American-grown cotton (Great Britain 1954:22) and so conserve scarce dollar resources. In fact, cotton production in Tanganyika and Nigeria increased dramatically in postwar years, mostly through governmental efforts to bring new areas under cotton cultivation.

7. An article in the Financial Times (London), Nov. 6, 1953, gives a contemporary expression of business opinion. "A Correspondent in British East Africa" wrote that circumstances in Uganda were such that British investors might be expected "to find a ready and profitable outlet for his money and enterprise." But British firms were showing a marked preference for Kenya.

> This is because, risky as Kenya may prove to be, it is at least a Crown Colony and has a strong "settler" element in the Legislature; whereas Uganda is a Protectorate only, is in essence a group of small native states, and is

administered by a Government of somewhat doctrinaire character.

The story did not elaborate on the "doctrinaire character" of the government.

8. Perhaps the best account of the daily life of the district officer in a remote post is Bradley 1966a, about Northern Rhodesia. First published in 1943, it was written before the officials had become self-consciously defensive about their role. Bradley 1966b testified to the lasting effect of this experience on a man who rose to high office.

9. This fascination with technical subjects is amply illustrated in his 1946 memorandum (in Uganda 1947a); at several points details of technical measures, e.g. on tsetse fly eradication or improved fishing boats, obtrude incongruously into his general survey of available resources and impediments to development.

10. These statements were of course written before the widespread economic collapse of many large-scale European schemes in Africa, of which the Groundnut Scheme in Tanganyika was merely the most spectacular.

11. Information on this incident comes from interviews with the two younger officials involved.

12. Helleiner (1975) an economist, summarizes the research available on this point, and argues that attempts to establish peasant smallholder response to price by simple correlations involving one crop are inadquate.

13. This "formalist-substantivist controversy" within economic anthropology (cf. Leclair and Schneider 1968; Schneider 1974) is now fortunately being displaced by more fruitful issues.

14. See Belshaw (n.d.), for a survey of later resettlement policy; see Illingworth 1964 on the South Busoga scheme.

15. Lury (1976:235-240) surveys these projects, summarizes the mostly disappointing results, and provides references to more detailed studies.

16. The Luganda word for council meeting, or meeting of local people with a touring administrative officer.

17. The reference here is to the British Act of 1940 making development funds available to the colonies, and to Uganda's crop funds

built up by paying peasants only a part of the price they would otherwise have received for their cotton and coffee, as discussed in the next chapter.

18. Askari is the Swahili word for soldier. Returned war veterans were often keen to invest their gratuities in trade or transport.

19. We reject...the possibility of a general ideology of development. Diverse ideologies correspond to diverse social interests and more basically to diverse social classes....The classes affected by development are different and look for different paths of development.

20. Interview with Worthington; see also Worthington Papers, Box 3, File 1, Item 112.

21. In the event, even though several large multi-nationals became involved, some of the technological and economic problems connected to certain large deposits remain unsolved.

22. An insightful but overly condensed analysis of the implications of these changed conditions for the economic development of the colonies is found in an unpublished paper by Swainson (1978). Her forthcoming book on economic growth in Kenya should help to elucidate these inter-relationships.

23. See also Note 7 above.

24. See also the chapters on Kenya in the governor's memoirs (Mitchell 1954).

CHAPTER X

CONTROVERSIES OVER COTTON

The colonial economy of Uganda rested on a foundation of cotton. Although coffee exports became increasingly important in post-war years, coffee could be grown in only certain ecologically favored areas of the Protectorate. Elsewhere, cotton retained its position as one of the peasants' main sources of cash income, and one of the Protectorate government's main sources of revenue. Struggles over who should control and profit from this key sector of the economy were the staple of the colony's political life for many years. It is impossible to understand the officials' perceptions of these issues, and the actions they took in the period under study, without looking at the history of the cotton processing industry in Uganda. Accounts of how cotton marketing and processing in Uganda took the rigid structure found at the end of the war have been given elsewhere (Brett 1973; Ehrlich 1958; Engholm 1968; Mamdani 1976). These writers provide a framework into which can be fitted the oral accounts of some of the participants in the post-war struggles.

1. Sources: actors, scholars and bias

First, a note on sources. It is widely recognized that recollected accounts of past events collected by oral interviews from participants must be used with great circumspection as sources of historical evidence. There is danger not only of faulty recall, but of post hoc rationaliza-

tion, ideological distortion, etc. It is hoped that such circumspection has been used here. The original intent was to use oral accounts as a source of evidence only on attitudes. But some of the data given by informants either supplement standard historical accounts, or suggest other interpretations of them. Use of interviews in this chapter as a source of data on "what actually happened" must remain tentative and subject to further verification when the relevant archives become available. But the interviews are themselves "primary sources" with regard to attitudes to these past events, as recollected in retirement by the central actors discussing their life's work. Archival data, when and if available, cannot "disprove" these expressions of 1970s attitudes; they can, however, provide a valuable basis for comparison to show possible changes of attitude over time. It must be remembered also that the written record is itself incomplete; as we saw above, these men were not standard bureaucrats, but men of action who disliked paper work and did as little as possible.

But circumspection is needed in dealing with scholarly accounts at least as much as with oral sources. The main sources used each have a perspective that could be called ideological, which affects the way in which they define their units of study, the questions asked, and the interpretation of the sources they use.

The indispensable work remains Ehrlich's 1958 economic history thesis on cotton marketing in Uganda, on which I, like other later workers on this topic, have relied heavily. But this work, like others of its kind during this period, tends to treat the colony as a self-

contained unit. Furthermore, it was written in the context of disputes prevailing within orthodox economics at that time between those committed to laissez-faire principles for commodity marketing and those willing to support some measures of governmental intervention. All his work is thoroughly permeated with his own strong laissez-faire commitments, perhaps most explicit in Ehrlich 1970. At crucial points, his strong faith in the superiority of unfettered competition in a free market limits his collection of data, as I hope to demonstrate below; of course, this same faith informs his assessment of the official actions that he documents. Despite these problems, we are all in his debt for his work on the primary sources.

Brett, a political scientist, has broken from the narrow focus on the colony as a self-contained unit to look at interactions between the colony and interests in Britain. He regards his 1973 book as "an untutored contribution to the old tradition of political economy and more especially to its Marxist variant" (1973:viii). Of these writers, Brett is the only one to show a sophisticated self-awareness of the influence of his theoretical perspectives on his handling of data (ibid.: viii-x). His original empirical work was carried on within a much narrower and more conservative theoretical framework (Brett 1966). His change of orientation may perhaps explain the absence of data on questions that one might well expect a Marxist to examine. For the internal organization of the Ugandan cotton industry, Brett relies heavily on Ehrlich. The great value of his work lies in the demonstration of relations between the colony and metropolitan economic interests, mediated

through the Colonial Office. Unfortunately, it goes only up to 1939.

Engholm, a political scientist, has provided us with a straightforward empirical study of the influence of immigrant groups on the Ugandan administration. It is somewhat thinner for the 1945-1952 period, archival sources not then being open, but is especially useful for the war years, a period skimpily covered by most sources.

Mamdani formulated his problem, carried out original archival research, and wrote his book solidly within a Marxist framework. It is brave in its wide scope, raises important questions, but is frequently unsatisfactory in handling them. Others writing more or less within the same tradition have heavily criticized the book for crudities of interpretation (e.g. Mafeje 1977; Saul 1976). It also contains a number of distressing factual inaccuracies.[1] Nevertheless, his third chapter, on the formation of Indian capital and the cotton industry, contains a great deal of valuable new data that suggest certain revisions to the standard sources. Some use has been made of these data, without necessarily accepting the interpretations that Mamdani himself places on them. As we have seen, "serving the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie" is a readily available "explanation" all too frequently used to forestall exploration in depth of underlying causes of official actions. As with Ehrlich, ideologically derived presumptions block full examination of questions on which less committed readers would like to know more.

Published primary sources have also been used where available. Of these, the various reports of commissions of inquiry into the cotton

industry are especially important for this chapter. These reports, especially that of 1962 (Uganda 1962) reflect thoughtful examination and criticism by men internal to the capitalist/colonial system, yet somewhat detached from this specific manifestation of it.

Thus any equation of actors' oral accounts with ideology, and social scientists' accounts with knowledge, is overly simplistic. Both types of source require great care; both, I would suggest, are indispensable.

2. Historical background of the cotton ginning industry

The early introduction of peasant-cultivated cotton as a cash crop, and the increasing dependence of governmental revenues on that crop were discussed in Chap. V. This section attempts to give a very condensed overview of the emergence of the economic structures for aggregating and ginning the peasants' cotton crop, as background for the post-war disputes.

The first to invest in cotton ginneries were British firms, led by the Uganda Company. But their dominance was soon challenged by the entry of Indian capital, both large and small. Indian firms, often able to draw on family labor and with much lower management costs, and perhaps, less encumbered with traditional British ideas as to how to conduct business, soon became increasingly important.[2] The high-cost British firms turned increasingly to the Protectorate government and Colonial Office asking for protection to keep them in business.[3] The problem then was seen in part as over-investment in ginneries leading to a situation of "cut-throat competition" for the available small

cotton crops. By 1927, further entry into ginning was banned by government, giving already established ginnery interests some measure of protection. They were further protected by government action against "middlemen" or small traders who bought cotton from peasants for re-sale to ginneries. These small operators included a number of Africans; several writers, especially Ehrlich and Brett, have criticized governmental actions against them for blocking perhaps the only route by which small African entrepreneurs could have gained business experience and amassed a little capital for further expansion.

By the end of the 1920s, a new conflict was appearing: between the better established, larger firms, and the small, under-capitalized ginners. Profits in cotton ginning depend in great part on a large throughput. Hence these small firms, needing short-term profits to survive, competed strongly by buying cotton over wider and wider areas. Increasing use of truck transport facilitated this tendency. This competition benefited growers through higher prices, but threatened other interests in at least two ways. The larger Indian firms, and the high-cost British firms, were striving to establish "buying associations" to offer agreed-upon prices to growers; these associations often collapsed as some firms broke ranks and paid more in order to maximize their own throughput. The Agriculture Dept., on the other hand, was seriously concerned about the spread of disease, and the mixing of seed types and staple lengths, as a result of this movement of cotton around the country.

A new series of regulations was introduced in 1933, dividing the country into fourteen cotton zones, and making it illegal to transport cotton beyond the boundaries of a zone. Growers were now required to sell only to ginneries within their own zone. Government also tacitly supported, and the Agriculture Dept. advised and encouraged, the formation of new and stronger buying associations, or pools.[4] The governor spoke of the zoning ordinance and restrictions on cotton movement as a means to "eliminate unnecessary competition among ginners."[5]

Since this 1933 ordinance provided the framework within which the post-war controversies were fought out, it should be looked at in more detail. Under the pool arrangements, ginning firms divided a zone's available crop amongst themselves, roughly according to their ginning capacity. Each ginnery within the pool was allotted a share, including old ginneries no longer economic to operate. Consequently such old ginneries retained an economic value, for their "pool shares" of cotton could be used to increase the throughput of more modern ginneries owned by the same group or firm. Penalties were imposed for buying and ginning more than the specified quota. Competition between ginners to purchase cotton was not totally eliminated, but was reduced (Ehrlich 1958:245-49; Uganda 1962).

To give some protection to growers, government at the same time instituted a system of minimum prices. Officials were well aware of the depressed world prices for cotton. If grower prices dropped too drastically, peasants would no longer bother to grow the troublesome, high-labor crop on which governmental revenue depended; the administra-

tion could not afford to neglect grower interests entirely (cf. Brett 1973:245).

By the mid-1930s, cotton marketing and ginning had become a fairly rigid, governmentally controlled structure in which those already entrenched held secure positions protected against further competition. To explain this apparent contradition to the officials' professions of a trusteeship policy, Ehrlich and Brett put considerable emphasis on the attitudes of the officials: their naivete, lack of economic expertise and business experience, an official pre-occupation with tidiness, order and predictability in marketing, and especially a concern among agricultural officials for "quality for its own sake" regardless of economic advantage (see especially Ehrlich 1958:241 et passim). Brett speaks of official attitudes as "an obsession with quality control" (1973:246). Statements they quote provide some basis for such views: the director of agriculture of the 1930s did seem to show a naive assumption that reductions in ginnery costs would lead to better prices to growers, despite considerable evidence to the contrary (cf. Ehrlich, op.cit.). But in reading the quotations from officials of the time, one cannot help but conclude that most of these men were well aware that their actions would benefit the larger, established, and especially the high-cost firms. A quotation given by Mamdani is of special interest. Governor Gowers suggested to the Colonial Office in 1930 that the Indian ginnery interests, already near-dominant, did not wish to see British firms disappear altogether.

> The reason that they wish for a continuance of some British interests is, I think, mainly because they regard the presence of these interests as an influence in favour of the recognition by government of a higher scale of costs than would be expected if all the ginners were under Indian or Japanese ownership and management. It is possible that they would also believe, not altogether without reason, that the representations of the body which contains a considerable proportion of British ginners receive more consideration both locally and by the Colonial Office than were those of a body composed entirely of Indians (quoted in Mamdani 1976:102).

As the industry moved more and more towards a cost-plus basis for ginning, setting cost formulae at levels that would keep high-cost European operations from going bankrupt enabled more efficient Indian firms to pocket profits at levels well above those envisioned as "fair and reasonable" by the cost formulae. This was clearly seen by Gowers, as shown by another quote (ibid.:104).

Nevertheless, very few European-controlled firms survived, but their representatives were influential in industry-government contacts far beyond the actual economic strength of their companies. Once the 1930s had passed, the important opposition, as Mamdani and some of my informants make clear, was no longer between European and Indian ginners but between larger firms often with overseas connections, and smaller, family-based operations confined to East Africa or even Uganda. The Uganda Cotton Association, the ginners' group, tended to be dominated by the former.

Following the 1933 measures, ginnery profits went up,[6] peasant protests against the monopsonistic marketing structures continued, and continued to be ignored (Ehrlich 1965:466-467). Another indication of profit levels comes from the high prices paid for any ginneries for sale.

Ehrlich says ginnery values increased "considerably" in the 1930s, and several were sold at two to three times their original cost (1958:268). In a system where new entrants could gain access only by buying out existing ginneries, the "right to gin" represented by the pool shares formed an important part of the price. These very high prices for ginneries provided further disincentives for well-to-do Africans to enter crop processing.

Thus, whatever the officials' intent may have been, writers coming from very different perspectives seem to have made a strong case that the structure created in the 1930s in fact operated to give disproportionate benefits to ginning interests at the cost of the peasant growers. A 1938 official Commission of Inquiry was, however, sufficiently satisfied with the system that it recommended a statutory basis for the ginning pools (Uganda 1938:81-84). Before action could be taken on this recommendation, war broke out. Major re-organization was postponed until after the war.

3. Officials' perspectives: the problem of quality

So far, the structure has been described as perceived by an economic historian with a strong commitment to laissez-faire principles (Ehrlich), a nouveau-Marxist (Brett) whose analysis is astonishingly similar to Ehrlich's, and a more orthodox Marxist (Mamdani). The structure as perceived in hind-sight by those who worked within it is, not surprisingly, rather different. Conversations with those involved in later operations of cotton marketing revealed a range of concerns

that these writers barely touch on. Informants showed themselves to be far more conscious of the colony's dependence on world markets, which Uganda as a tiny producer could not affect, than the academics. Unlike the latter, they did not see cotton as a homogeneous entity, but as differing in variety, staple length, fineness, fibre strength, milling qualities, and so on. Furthermore, each of these variables affected the saleability, and the likely price levels, to be obtained for any particular batch. Cotton is basically divided into several categories by staple length; each category can differ in such quality variables as sheen, strength, etc.[7] Furthermore, the ecological conditions under which cotton was grown affect these quality variables. As a result, cotton of the same variety and staple length, but grown in different environments, could show different milling qualities. If cotton of differing characteristics were mixed in the same lots, overall quality, and hence price obtainable, is reduced; at worst, the cotton would be unsaleable, because of lack of homogeneity within a batch. Officials insisted that the division into zones, by ecological conditions, was an essential measure to protect the reputation for quality, and hence the saleability, of Uganda cotton on the world market. The cotton was marketed under eight trade names that reflected the varietal and ecological differences between zones (Dunn 1949:41); each of the eight types, differing somewhat in characteristics, attracted somewhat different prices.

> Unpleasant as it was, the whole object of this pool-zone sharing was to ensure staple purity. It wasn't just to give profits to Indians, which was the way it was always interpreted by the opponents. It was there for a

> good technical reason. It was the only device man had been able to invent to stop wily buyers running madly all over the country buying cotton and pushing it into one ginnery. It was to stop wildcat buying. And it worked. You see, otherwise, let us take a ginnery that had the capacity—most of them—of two thousand four hundred bales throughput....Now if they didn't suffer a penalty for overginning their quota, there was a temptation to go hither, thither and yon, and the man with the biggest amount of capital to use in buying many lorries, could have brought in cotton from all over the place in order to get his bale output up, and this would absolutely ruin the whole of the seed distribution program, and also lower marketable quality of the cotton they produced, because it would be all mixed staples....Quality is all important...with mixed staples like that we'd have been selling at rock-bottom prices. (Interview, former chairman of the Lint Marketing Board.)

Ecological conditions in Uganda can yield high-quality cottons of medium long staple lengths. These are <u>not</u> the cottons that form the bulk of the raw material used by Britain's Lancashire cotton yard goods industry, but are used for more specialized purposes.[8] Protectorate officials have been from the beginning of the cotton industry acutely conscious that the colony's economy depended on the saleability of the cotton crop. A strategy of specializing in production of predictably high-quality cotton of specialized properties that would be sure to attract buyers even in times of glut was explicitly followed after 1951. Similar market constraints were probably operative in the 1930s. It seems probable that a concern to protect the <u>long-term</u> saleability of Ugandan cotton led, internally, to the rigid governmental zoning ordinances of 1933. Present evidence suggests strongly that those who designed the 1933 zoning ordinances had two main purposes in mind: to control quality through protection of the pure-seed distribution program, prevention of disease spread and avoidance of mixed staple-lengths, and

on the other hand to provide a firm basis for buying pools to facilitate "orderly marketing." "Orderly marketing," one of the favorite phrases of the period, may well have been seen as desirable in itself; later informants saw it as essential for quality-control purposes. Larger, established firms with their own reputation to protect on the world market were seen by officials as more apt to show a similar concern for the long-term saleability of Uganda cotton; hence they would avoid buying cotton anywhere in order to maximize their own throughput and meet their need for short-term profits. Mamdani has shown that this is precisely what the small firms were doing at the time of greatest complaints about "cutthroat competition" threatening the quality of Uganda's cotton, ca. 1929-1932, (1976:102).

Scholars who have ignored the technical and ecological constraints, and treated cotton as a homogeneous entity, have seriously underestimated the nature of the marketing problems that Uganda cotton faced. Mamdani is the only one of the writers considered above who recognizes that cotton comes in different staple lengths that have specialized purposes; he uses this knowledge to good effect in increasing our understanding of changing patterns of exports of Uganda cotton up to about the mid-1920s (see below), but he ignores the point for the rest of his account. The others have failed to look at the nature of external markets, and have tended to dismiss a governmental strategy of trying to establish a relatively stable niche in unstable world markets as an irrational "obsession with quality" (Brett 1973) or "the purist standards of technicians" (Ehrlich 1958:241). This view, which seems to originate

with Ehrlich, apparently is based more on deduction from abstract laissez-faire marketing principles than on solid evidence.

> In any sense except that of an artificially created standard of 'quality' it is difficult to see why buyers should be so inefficient as to operate against market requirements. If a buyer were careless or ignorant, he would presumably be penalized for his mistakes by losses at a later stage of marketing. If 'quality' can be understood to mean those grades of produce effectively demanded in the market, then competition among buyers would probably be the most likely form of market system to ensure that such grades were purchased (1958:241-242; my emphasis).

But those less imbued with faith in the wisdom of the invisible hand of the market would prefer a more detailed examination of actual external market conditions, and especially of possible contradictions between short-term needs and long-term security through reputation for quality. This task will have to wait for some future economic historian. In the meantime, I attach rather more weight to the views of those with long experience in ginning and selling cotton,[9] that consistent quality was critically important on world markets, than to Ehrlich's deductive presumptions. The strategies devised by successive administrations to cope with the ecological, technical and economic complexities of the cotton industry may well deserve criticism; most observers would conclude that, whatever official intent may have been, the structures devised disproportionately benefited ginnery and exporting interests at the cost of peasant growers (cf. Lury 1976:231-233). But to dismiss their strategies as irrational obsessions or "technical standards divorced from market needs" (Ehrlich 1958:336) is not only unfair; much more serious, it neglects one of the major means by which dependency on

the world commodity markets penetrated and distorted the internal development of Uganda's economy.

4. Officials' perspectives: the problems of profit and participation

Information derived by ethnohistorical methods can thus be a useful supplement to accounts based on archival data. On the other hand, a comparison of informants' accounts with data from archival studies can clarify the ways in which the actors' social position and orientation conditioned their perspective on past events. I shall consider here views expressed in interviews during 1974 and 1975, by a very small number of officials who had been actively involved in crop marketing issues in post-war years. Each had arrived in the colony after the events of the 1930s described above. They were busy men, with no time to read archives and little or no contact with academic historians. History to them was transmitted in the stories of the past heard from older officials, and was embodied in the structures within which they had to operate. These they tended to take for granted — that was the way things were.

Thus most took for granted the wisdom of "orderly marketing" and of governmental intervention in the economy — at least in the colonial situation; they were much more critical of such intervention in contemporary welfare-state Britain. Private enterprise was seen as the most desirable way of conducting certain economic activities. But private enterprise should be responsible, reputable, established. And government must be on guard against influence from vested interests in that sphere. The task of government was to consider over-all national

interests, not narrow vested interests. It had become an axiom that only good, predictable quality cotton would find steady sales in unsteady world markets, hence ensure governmental revenues and peasant welfare, and maximize the money needed for Uganda's development. To allow profits to private enterprise was necessary in order to achieve these broader aims.

> Profit wasn't a dirty word, at that time. And I hope it still isn't in most places, although it seems to be growing so here. Unless there is a profit motive, you are not going to get people to do what you want them to do....The profits made out of ginning were grossly exaggerated, as the African co-ops themselves found, once they got their ginneries. (Interview, former chairman of Lint Marketing Board.)

In this and in many other interviews there was an implicit assumption of the morality and correctness of a "fair and reasonable" profit. But the very implicitness of the assumption failed to provide criteria of fairness or reasonableness. In classic capitalist free-trade theory, a "fair and reasonable profit" is often seen as that which is earned by an efficient firm in open free competition with others. Officials tried to reconcile their commitment to private enterprise principles with their sense of trusteeship for the Protectorate as a whole, and the reality of a monopsonistic ginnery structure where governmental regulation protected those already entrenched against competition and recompensed them on a cost-plus basis. One method of reconciliation was selective perception of past events. Two of my sharpest and most conscientious informants both denied that a desire to provide a firm basis for buying associations had had anything to do with the introduction of zoning

legislation in 1933. They saw these changes as determined solely by the technical problems of quality control, needed to prevent "border-jumping" and mixed staples, etc. But we have seen that their predecessors had explicitly stated that the 1933 ordinance had the additional purpose of furthering buying associations or "pools." This second purpose, the basis of the ginnery industry's guaranteed profits, was blocked out, whereas the quality-control function of the zoning system was an ongoing part of their daily work.

The question of what was a "fair and reasonable" profit was also of practical concern throughout this post-war period, for ginneries were paid on a cost-plus basis, through use of an unbelievably complex cost formula negotiated between government and ginnery representatives. As we have seen above, costs were originally computed in the early 1930s on the basis of high-cost European-type operations; it seems highly probable that an official desire to keep some British forms operating in the ginnery industry was a covert purpose in setting this pattern around 1929-1930. My two leading informants would, I feel sure, have been horrified at the thought of using such a device to favor British over Indian firms (unfortunately, I failed to enquire specifically about this point), and were unaware of the purpose of setting costs at such a level at that earlier time. That purpose was no longer relevant, since Indian firms by the post-war period almost totally dominated. Yet the pattern of allowing high costs in the formula continued. Many informants, including some in the ginnery industry, told me that any moderately efficient ginner could easily make at least twice the "fair and reasonable"

profit per bale allowed by the negotiated cost formula. But reliable data on actual costs of efficient ginnery operations were not available to government until almost the end of the colonial period (cf. Uganda 1962).

Ehrlich's main criticism, in his classic 1958 account, was not that some ginners were allowed to make profits higher than would have been possible under an open and competitive system. More fundamental is his argument that the rigidly controlled structure prevented the emergence of African entrepreneurs, and the gradual structural transformation of the economy. Brett goes even further in identifying African participation in crop processing and marketing as crucial to possibilities for transformation.

> Thus the organization of these secondary economic activities was of the greatest possible importance for the future development of the economy—to the extent that these made it possible for members of the indigenous population to move out of purely agricultural activities into trade they would also make it possible for individuals or groups to acquire the attitudes, skills and capital required for a subsequent move into processing and ultimately into simple manufacturing as well (1973:238).

Thus to these writers, and to Mamdani as well, the early governmental measures to eliminate small middlemen were crucial in blocking off one available means whereby aspiring Africans could gain business experience.

Informants, on the other hand, did not see this issue as very important. One man was disbelieving of my contention that Africans had taken part in middleman activities; he thought only poorer Indians had done so. To this man, well-disposed towards African activities, lack of African participation in crop processing was a consequence of lack of

business experience and ability. Governmental measures inhibiting activities in which Africans could gain such experience had been imposed so long ago that they had become part of the familiar pattern, no longer specifically perceived. He supported his view with the (true) case of a small group of Ganda entrepreneurs who, in 1930-1931, attempted to buy and gin cotton, with the co-operation of the Uganda Company. The attempt failed, leaving peasants unpaid for cotton they had sold; a consequent court case produced considerable evidence of ineptness and malfeasance (Ehrlich 1965:467). Once again, an informant's selective perception of past events, both of which happened before his own arrival in the colony, suggests much about social transmission of knowledge of the past within the enclaves of colonial life. He was unaware of the early minor successes of small African businessmen until wiped out by governmental restrictions, but vividly aware of the details of the one, more spectacular, failure. This 1930-1931 case was referred to by many others as well, as evidence of African incapacity even when given opportunities.

So far, we have looked at external analysts' accounts of the cotton ginning structure that evolved in the 1930s, and then at the perceptions of this past held by a few of those involved in post-war decisions, as expressed during interviews in the mid-1970s. These perceptions of and attitudes to past events were operative elements in post-war policy choices. But before dealing with these post-war issues, we must go back once again to the external analysts' accounts, and look briefly at changing patterns of Ugandan cotton export.

5. Ugandan cotton export prior to 1945

The facts of Uganda's cotton exporting patterns have long been clear; the interpretation of these facts remains in dispute. It is clear that Lancashire cotton interests, through the British Cotton Growing Association, gave early strong encouragement to infant cotton growing endeavors in Uganda; Lancashire bought much of the early cotton crop (Ehrlich 1965:399-405). But after the First World War, Lancashire showed declining interest in Ugandan cotton; the bulk of the crop was increasingly sent to India, and some to Japan and elsewhere. Ehrlich says

> This absence of metropolitan greed for exports or import markets leaves slight opportunity for the historian who would interpret Uganda's story in Marxist terms of imperialist exploitation... (1965:396-397).

Mamdani, however, writing within a Marxist framework, used these same facts and some of Ehrlich's own data to support a thesis of imperialist exploitation. He shows how the fine, long-staple cotton grown in Uganda met the changing needs of the Indian and Japanese cotton industries, which around 1914-1918 were switching to production of finer cotton cloth (1976:86). Lancashire mills, after about 1920, showed little interest in buying Ugandan cotton. But, he suggests, British cotton interests wanted to keep Uganda as a reserve source of supply. To this end exports to India, at that time safely within the Empire, were encouraged, and exports to Japan discouraged. He quotes a Colonial Office minute of 1918: "There can be no doubt that, from the point of view of internal as well as imperial policy, the outlet to India must be safeguarded" (ibid.). But Mamdani's own data suggest that his bipolar model

of British metropolis exploiting colony is over-simplified. He shows that large Indian-owned capital based in India was heavily involved in Ugandan cotton ginning, exporting the crop to its own Indian mills (1976 Chap. 3). The India-based Indian investors need to be distinguished from the smaller Uganda-based Indians who invested internally-generated capital, often derived from trading ventures, in one or two ginneries, but who lacked the vertical integration of large firms such as Narandas Rajaram. If British capital was exploiting Uganda, so too, apparently, was India-based, Indian-owned capital. The involvement of the British-owned National Bank of India in supporting at least the early stages of this trade suggests further complexities (ibid.:96). Further clarification of these inter-relationships needs much more information on the structure of the Indian cotton industry, which Mamdani does not provide and which lies far outside the scope of this study. It is apparent that a simple unidirectional model of surplus flow from Uganda to Britain does not fit the facts Mamdani himself presents. However, his argument that British interests wished to keep Ugandan cotton available as a reserve supply is supported by later changes in cotton exports during the war.

6. The war years: marketing changes and the bulk buying issue

The war led to serious dislocations of Uganda's previous external economic linkages, and the measures taken had profound consequences for economic organization within the country.[10] Uganda cotton had previously been sold by privately owned exporting firms through the Bombay and

Liverpool cotton markets. India in the 1930s had taken by far the largest proportion of the crop (see Table 5.1).[11] But in the 1940-41 season, fears of Japanese invasion dislocated the Bombay market and caused a sharp price fall. Ginning firms in Uganda cut back sharply on prices paid to peasants for seed cotton. The government, knowing well the extent of the Protectorate's dependence on cotton, intervened to prevent even more drastic price collapse. Disposal of the crop was problematic. The important Japanese market was of course lost, and shipping difficulties made access to other markets uncertain.

In Britain, meanwhile, the exigencies of war led to centralization of procurement of needed supplies in governmental ministries. The Liverpool Cotton Exchange was shut down. The Uganda administration solved its problems of crop disposal, and met Britain's needs at the same time, by negotiating a bulk-sale agreement with the British Ministry of Supply, which provided greater stability of cotton export, but at low prices. Bulk-sale agreements were also negotiated with the government of India, at considerably more favorable prices. In 1943, Britain took 50 percent of Uganda's cotton crop, at half the price paid by India, whereas before the war she consumed an average of only 8 percent. In 1944 and 1945, the proportion of the crop going to Britain fell to 9 and 26 percent, still at prices substantially less than received from India (Ehrlich 1958:286).

Bulk sales required some machinery for aggregating the crop. The Ugandan government set up a statutory Cotton Exporters Group to handle this function. Already established private exporting firms were used as agents of government for purchasing cotton lint from the ginners and

arranging for export. Members were allocated quotas of the crop, based on their past export performance. Thus entry of new participants into this activity was closed off. The firms were compensated for their work on a fixed commission basis. Yoshida (1966:18) says the 2½ percent rate of commission was "on the high side" when compared with those paid elsewhere; the rate was later reduced to more reasonable levels.

The structure of cotton marketing was now totally controlled by government. The Uganda administration set the prices paid the peasant growers for seed cotton, to ginners for cotton lint, and the level of commissions paid to exporters. The ultimate prices paid for the cotton crop resulted from government-to-government negotiations.

The price paid to growers was linked to the low prices paid by the British Ministry of Supply. Government's profits on the sales to India were put into a special fund, earmarked "for the benefit of the cotton industry." This was the modest beginning of the Crop Funds, controversies over which figured large in later discussions of postwar development.

Uganda's Robusta coffee was also sold to Britain through bulk-purchase agreements at controlled prices. Profits from coffee sales again went into a special Coffee Fund. The marketing of other crops came under stringent controls, but did not lead to formation of similar crop funds.

Government thinking in pegging grower prices for coffee and especially cotton at low levels was influenced by two main factors: the fear that high grower incomes when consumer goods were in critically short supply could lead to inflation, and concern lest payment of world

prices for cotton would lead peasants to allocate their resources to that crop instead of to food production. Whereas in 1930-1938 the growers received an average 60 percent of the proceeds from cotton exports, in the 1941-1942 season they got only 45 percent, and in the three following seasons their share ranged from 28 to 38 percent (Ehrlich 1965:473). In terms of real income, the peasants were far worse off than before the war. The costs of goods they bought had more than doubled. In addition, peasants now bore the full brunt of the tax on cotton exports, since both exporters and ginners worked on fixed profit margins and therefore made no contribution to this source of governmental revenue (Ehrlich 1958:290-291). Peasants of course still paid the regressive poll taxes discussed above, plus heavy customs duties on whatever goods they bought. As Ehrlich says, the "benefits" of the new marketing system fell disproportionately on the three groups involved in the cotton industry. Ginning and export firms thrived, while peasant discontent smouldered with little effective outlet, "...the level of taxation and compulsory saving was such as no politically articulate society would have borne, even in wartime" (ibid.:298).

Government was, however, well satisfied with the new system, for "removing the uncertainties of market and price"; the governor expressed hope that it could be perpetuated in the post-war years (ibid.:285). The payment of low grower prices and consequent amassing of profits in the crop fund was regarded as an essential form of forced saving. By the end of the war the Cotton Fund stood at some £1½ million, roughly the equivalent of the pre-war annual revenue of the Protectorate. The

government promised to consult with all involved as to the uses of this money, after the war.

In postwar years, while a Labour secretary of state for the colonies spoke of new developments for Britain's overseas possessions, Britain's economic ministries continued to insist on bulk purchasing arrangements for Uganda's cotton (and coffee) at prices very much below those prevailing on world markets. Professional economists find it difficult to specify precisely how much Uganda lost as a result of these bulk-buying agreements (Ehrlich 1958:285-287; Lury 1976:231).

Bulk-purchase agreements with Britain and India for purchase of Uganda's cotton lasted until 1952. After 1945, they were extremely unpopular with the businessmen of the cotton industry as well as with officials of the Protectorate government; both itched to take advantage of booming world prices. Public prounouncements from Entebbe loyally endeavored to put a graceful mask on Britain's strong-arm extraction of raw materials from her colonies. It was announced in 1948 that an agreement for sale of almost all the 1948-1949 crop to the United Kingdom Raw Cotton Commission, and to India, at a low price, had been "approved by the Board and the Protectorate Government, at the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government, as part of the Protectorate's contribution to the economic recovery of the sterling area." (From Uganda Herald, Nov. 8, 1948, quoted in Lury 1976:231). In 1951, Governor Hall invoked patriotism in a speech to the Uganda Chamber of Commerce. He had hoped, he said, to get rid of bulk sales, but threat of war increased instability. "We must comfort ourselves with the knowledge that by consenting to bulk

sale agreements — and in practice we cannot do otherwise — we are making a not inconsiderable contribution to strengthening the British Commonwealth against the threat of aggression" (quoted in Uganda Herald, March 10, 1951:4-5).

But in private, Hall's senior economic official, who had been involved in negotiating prices for the bulk purchase agreements, was much more outspoken. "We were exploited!" he declared emphatically. He described the bitter arguments they had had in price negotiations with the "mean-minded" London officialdom. Bulk-buying, he said, had started initially with a "right and proper motive of rescuing the Uganda Co. and others when there was no market" at the time of market collapse in 1941-1942. But it had gone on far too long. They had received instructions from the Colonial Office that bulk-buying was not to be departed from, he said.

> Interviewer: Was it not your duty as a British subject to help Britain in her difficult post-war years?
>
> Official: NO! Our duty was to Uganda! Uganda paid our salaries. The U.K. did not pay us. The U.K. did not even want to pay our pension!

Print cannot convey the angry tone nor the emphatic chair-thumping that accompanied these words. During the war, he said, they had willingly done their best to help Britain. But once the war was over, there was to him no doubt that his duty was to fight for Ugandan against U.K. interests, when these conflicted. He complained that there had been an attitude in Lancashire that it was Lancashire's right to have cotton at a subsidized rate. The British Ministry of Supply, he said, had drawn on the Lancashire cotton industry for temporary advisors. Lancashire had

done a lot to help the establishment of Ugandan cotton in the beginning, but that gave them no right to a permanent subsidized source of supply, he contended. This hostile reference is almost the only mention throughout the interviews with officials of British metropolitan economic interests, what Mamdani would call the "interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie."

Bulk-buying is intriguing because on this issue the conflict of interest was so blatant that it was capable of arousing intense indignation almost twenty-five years later. One can speculate that the replacement of normal private-enterprise marketing arrangements with government-to-government negotiations made transparent the dependency and powerlessness of Uganda's position. Apparently the thought of defying Colonial Office directives and selling on the open market was inconceivable to the officials involved. Unfortunately I failed to ask what sanctions they would have anticipated had such a course been followed. The official quoted above went on to talk about how much they wanted to get back to a free market situation — that is, one in which only Uganda would have a voice in where and how her cotton crop was to be offered for sale. He did not see the "normal" institutions of the world commodity market as exploitive.

7. Post-war ginnery re-organization: the struggle for participation

Bulk-purchase arrangements had one incidental consequence for Ugandan cotton marketing: they provided an undiscriminating market making little demand for quality. It is generally admitted, says Leubuscher

(1956:64), that these arrangements had a detrimental effect on the quality of Ugandan cotton.[12] They could also be looked at as providing a breathing-space wherein a re-organization of the cotton industry could be carried out, in preparation for the more intensely competitive conditions on open world markets. Vested interests prepared to defend their privileges; African resentments built up to explosive levels, and government temporized.

The need for re-organization was recognized in the 1938 report of the Cotton Commission, but little was done because of wartime pressures. About 1944, a plan for the elimination of redundant ginneries was worked out by the head of the Agriculture Department, probably in consultation with the Uganda Cotton Association (the ginners' organization) but nothing came of it. In 1947, visiting experts commented pungently on the deplorable mechanical condition of Uganda's ginneries. Yet another visiting expert recommended changes in the price-fixing formula for cotton lint, and urged the imposition of strict quality standards on the ginning industry.[13] Of crop processing industries in general, Governor Hall said

> That many of them are inefficiently operated at present is obvious to the most inexpert observer, and these must be given every encouragement and stimulus to improve their plant and their technique. The present inefficiency is a drag on the economy of Uganda (Uganda 1947a:xi).

This clear warning that change must come was followed by the Report of the Uganda Cotton Industry Commission, 1948.

This report said the non-competitive, protected structure of the industry led to inefficiency. But it gave more attention to the opera-

tional level, waxing indignant about the prevalent practices of short-weighting, under-paying, etc. The report demonstrated that deliberate cheating of growers, emanating from top levels of ginnery management, was a basic policy in the industry (Uganda 1948:13-22).[14] It made numerous recommendations for small changes — better scales, more supervision, etc. The basic problem, however, was structural. After praising the advantages of free competition, the Commissioners did an about turn, "recognized that there would be a chaotic transition period" (ibid.:27) if free competition were allowed, and so recommended that government pass legislation providing a statutory basis for the already existing cotton buying pools. This concession to the ginners was to be contingent on reorganization of the industry acceptable to government.

Government reaction to this report reflects certain thought patterns that I found to be widespread among officials. During interviews, when asked about the structure of the cotton industry, those officers who had worked in the districts often replied with comments on the problems of cheating in cotton buying, adding that of course, the peasants cheated too, putting stones in their bags, and so on. The Commission's Report had also noted this, but had grasped the essential point: that the "individual and spasmodic" attempts of growers were of a different order from the widespread, systematic practices of those in a strong position vis-a-vis mostly illiterate peasants (Uganda 1948:16). But in Uganda the inherently antagonistic relation between small peasant grower versus produce buyer was exacerbated by racial difference. Officials, in mentioning peasant cheating, seemed to be making an effort to be even-handed, to avoid suspicion of anti-Indian feeling,[15] thus obscuring the

power differential inherent in the relationship regardless of race. Furthermore, the prevalence of malpractices at the operational level seemed to make it easier for field officials to interpret grower protests about the cotton industry as directed against this operational-level cheating. They took the basic structure of the industry for granted. To the field officials, zoning, the pool system, even governmental pricing policies whereby substantial percentages of growers' returns were "creamed off" and went into governmentally controlled crop funds,[16] were simply part of the context within which they worked, not critically examined. Thus to the average field officer, "problems" in the cotton industry meant cheating in cotton buying, Indian versus African.

Government was apparently upset that the authors of the 1948 report should put in writing what was common knowledge, and published the report with a prefatory note. It did not deny that such malpractices occurred, but suggested the Commission gave an unbalanced picture. "It is a deplorable fact that dishonest practices and fraudulent transactions are prevalent throughout Uganda today; and, as the records of convictions for such offences in the Kampala and other Courts show, the offenders are by no means confined to one community or one race only." Nevertheless, government would take whatever practical steps it could to minimize malpractices.

After devoting a lengthy paragraph to this carefully worded attempt to dissociate government from what might be construed as racist allegations, the note said a statement of government policy on statutory pools, and ginnery rationalization, would be "issued as soon as possible."

Operational malpractices and racial sensitivities, both real enough, functioned to obscure fundamental inequities of structure.

But government could no longer ignore the structural problems of the ginnery industry. Hall's policy of economic development (see Chap. IX) required increased returns from cotton to increase Protectorate revenues; Britain was pressing for increased production of cotton to reduce the need for cotton purchases from the U.S.A. with scarce dollars; officials wanted to get back into world markets, and realized that a strong competitive position would require much better lint than was then being produced. Government was also under pressures of a different kind: political pressure from Africans for greater returns from and a greater share in the colony's basic industry. It had become apparent to officialdom that Africans would no longer be content to play a part in the cotton industry merely as passive peasant cultivators. African protests against the system of zoning and pools had been vociferous prior to the war, but had been successfully ignored (Ehrlich 1958:passim). In Buganda, Africans had taken the initiative in attempting to participate through co-operative marketing, but a government bill to provide for co-operatives was withdrawn in 1938 following strong protests from immigrant business interests (Engholm 1968:239-243). In 1946 a Co-operatives Department was set up, to supervise and control African co-operative activity. In that same year, a governmental committee noted the increasing African aspiration for more returns from the cotton industry. It noted two types of interest: those who sought personal gain through entrepreneurial activity, and those with a political or nationalistic

vision. The committee predicted an increase in the numbers of such men and an alliance between the two sections, but at that time agitation was seen as confined to a small number of the "more articulate Africans." Nevertheless, "...the industry should not be forced to make concessions in excess of those warranted by the facts." (From Native Produce Marketing Committee, Memorandum on Cotton, May 1946, quoted in Kabwegyere 1974:133). The facts of the situation, in governmental thinking, now clearly had to include the level and likely growth of African agitation, and the increasing desire of Africans for participation in cotton ginning, not only on the part of prosperous aspiring enterpreneurs, but also a more populist demand for participation through co-operative organization. This populist demand provided the basis for formation in 1947 of the Uganda Farmers' Union by I.K. Musazi. Organized nationalist activity in Uganda now entered the political arena in the form of an economic organization struggling for greater participation in the cotton industry.[17] This, as well as other issues, led to serious rioting in 1949.[18] In contrast to the report on the 1945 riots (Uganda 1945a), the inquiry into these riots made the connection between economic policy and political unrest thoroughly clear to officialdom (Uganda 1950).

Even before the 1949 riots, the Protectorate Government had sent a stern letter to the Uganda Cotton Association.[19] Referring to the previous year's Cotton Industry Commission's proposal that buying pools be made statutory, it declared such a measure could not be accepted unless the industry came up quickly with an acceptable plan for modernization and rationalization. There ensued a prolonged series of meetings

apparently typical of official relations with the business sector: informal, highly secret.[20] Discussions with informants suggest that the same principle noted above in Chap. VIII was operative; government was unwilling to use its majority in the Legislative Council to force through changes without first striving for agreement with the representatives of immigrant capital through informal consultation. "It was in everybody's interest to have smooth and easy relations with the business community," commented one official.

These intensive, secret negotiations continued throughout 1949 and much of 1950. Finally, near the end of that year, "a report containing recommendations for improvements in the industry" was submitted to the Protectorate government and the Colonial Office (Progress in Uganda 1950: 2).

At this stage new actors entered the arena, in the form of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and some of his senior officials, notably the head of the Africa section, Andrew Cohen. Brushing aside the principle of trusting the men on the spot, the Colonial Office rejected the plan worked out between Uganda's officials and ginnery representatives. A bland statement from the Protectorate Government on February 17, 1951, that discussions and correspondence with the Colonial Office were continuing (Uganda Herald, February 22, 1951:1), masked a major struggle between the Protectorate Government and the Colonial Office. The Secretary of State for the Colonies had decided that nothing short of full nationalization of the cotton ginning industry could remedy the situation, and Uganda's officials were outraged.

One can speculate on a number of factors that contributed to insistence on such a drastic measure. The Fabian, Arthur Creech-Jones, had lost his seat in the 1950 election, and been replaced at the Colonial Office by a former coal miner and trade unionist, James Griffiths. Nationalization was then a major component of the Labour Party ideology, a remedy seen as suitable for rectifying old injustices. Furthermore, the Protectorate Government and the business interests no longer monopolized lines of communication into the Colonial Office, as had been the case previously.[21]

The 1949 riots had drawn Colonial Office attention to the situation in Uganda; African leaders such as Musazi were able to use informal channels to keep that attention. Musazi had, while in England, established ties with Fenner Brockway, the Labour Party M.P. who was active in organizations for colonial freedom. Brockway arranged for the dispatch of three young people from Britain to help Musazi with his efforts to organize independent co-operatives.[22] Brockway himself toured Uganda in 1950 as a guest of Musazi's colleagues in the former Uganda African Farmers Union, which had been banned following its part in the 1949 riots. Brockway was impressed neither by the situation in Uganda nor by its officials, and on his return reported fully to his friend and colleague, James Griffiths, both formally and informally (Brockway 1955: especially p. 67; interview with Lord Brockway). Musazi himself was back in Britain in 1950, providing yet another channel of communications. In addition, the Labour Minister of State for the Colonies, John Dugdale, had toured Uganda in 1950, making himself most unpopular with officials there. All in all, Griffiths had available to him a perspective on

Uganda, its officials and on the intensity of its people's resentment against the status quo in the cotton industry, that had probably never before reached the Colonial Office. In his demand for nationalization, Griffiths stood firm against strenuous opposition both from Protectorate officials, and from the Agricultural Advisor within the Colonial Office itself,[23] who had an intimate knowledge of the ginnery situation in Uganda. As Griffiths saw it, nationalization would hand the ginnery industry over to the people, to be operated by a public board. He was supported by the then head of the African section of the Colonial Office. "Andrew Cohen supported my idea. Andrew Cohen was a socialist, you see. The only full-blooded socialist in the Colonial Service!"[24] (Interview, Rt. Hon. James Griffiths).

The idea of nationalization was of course anathema to conservative Sir John Hall, both on principle, and because he felt it an impractical solution to the problem. Although an ambitious man, he felt so strongly that the proposal was harmful to Uganda's best interests that he staked his career on the battle against nationalization. The official closest to him said

> He was bitterly opposed to the idea of nationalization ....He didn't want to see the start of nationalization in Uganda, purely for political motives. I mean, he regarded it as purely a political move on the part of the government of the day at home. I think he was a little frightened as to where it would lead.

This official saw his own opposition as more pragmatic.

> I don't think you can really say that the stand on nationalization was a matter of principle, not so far as I was concerned anyway. It was more pragmatism; it

> just wouldn't work....If I had thought nationalization was the right answer at that particular time I would have supported it, although I don't favour nationalization for nationalization's sake.
>
> Throughout my time I have never worked from preconceived ideas—I hope; at least I never consciously have. I was prepared to accept anything that would achieve what I thought was the right answer. I wasn't concerned with the means so much as the end results.

Nationalization, he thought, could not bring about the desired end of satisfying African political clamour.

> We would merely have had to use exactly the same people to run them. And how would they have run them? For their own advantage. There was no way. It wouldn't have worked, even if we have been completely sold on the idea of nationalization. The object of the exercise, in the eyes of the Labour government at home, was to appease the Africans....What was the point in changing cheating by the Indians for their own private enterprise for cheating by the Indians for their own pockets under the guise of nationalization? There was no point in it.

The pragmatic realism of this statement rests on the unspoken fact that after almost 45 years of operation in Uganda, the ginnery industry had trained almost no African gin fitters (mechanics), cotton buyers, or accountants, much less ginnery managers. Part of the explanation for this dearth of alternative staff, but by no means all, lies in the nature of the Indian family firm organization, and the prevalent practice of employing kin or caste-members.

The officials realized, but James Griffiths did not, that nationalisation under a public board would do nothing to meet the African demand for greater participation in the industry. By March, rumors of the nationalization proposal had reached the newspapers: the Uganda Herald and business interests thundered against it. C.K. Patel, reflecting a

misunderstanding of Labour Party ideology, told the Uganda Cotton Association that the Indian ginners felt there would have been no talk of nationalization if the industry had been in the hands of Europeans. The talk was scaring away capital; ginners were not averse to African participation; they were willing to sell ginneries to them, and admit them to the buying pools. He also announced a new scheme for training Africans for ginnery work (Uganda Herald, March 24, 1951:4). The ginners were frightened.

In government circles, one informant recalls some talk of the need to prepare cotton storage facilities, in the event of a possible strike by the cotton ginners, but it is not clear whether this was seen as a probable event.

Two other newspaper items about this time are of interest. It was announced that Sir John Hall's appointment would expire December 31; he would leave Uganda in mid-September, taking accumulated leave (Uganda Herald, March 10, 1951:1). It was also announced that the Colonial Secretary was coming out in May to look at the ginnery situation for himself, and to discuss the nationalization question yet again. The minister duly came, accompanied by Andrew Cohen. He followed a hectic schedule of meetings and discussions with all concerned, arranged at least in part by the Protectorate officials. These included a meeting with the members of a local co-operative branch in Buganda.

The outcome of this trip was an agreement that Africans be given a greater share of ginnery ownership through sale of a specified number of ginneries to African co-operative unions. In return, Griffiths dropped his demand for nationalization. Accounts of the origin of this

proposal differ. Griffiths says that he was profoundly moved by the meeting with simple African farmers, where their local co-operative leaders put their views to him. As he recalled the occasion in 1975, to them, co-operatives meant they would own it; nationalization, run by a public board, meant the Europeans would own it.[25] The farmers at Namungalwe had made clear to him what the officials could not: that the state, as a colonial state, was as foreign an imposition as the Indian-owned ginneries.

Co-operation was of course another plank of Labour Party ideology; Griffiths writes glowingly of the successful transplanting of the Rochdale principle to the cotton farmers of Uganda (1969:105). During interview, he spoke of the introduction of co-operatives as a great success. Although Griffiths' account says that he instigated the proposals for co-operative ownership, other accounts suggest that the Protectorate officials skillfully made use of the known Labour Party pre-disposition towards co-operatives as a means of combating the demand for nationalization. The Namungalwe meeting was arranged by the Protectorate officials, although there was probably no need whatsoever to prime the farmers on what to say. A senior official in the Co-operatives Department recalls that not long before Griffiths came out to Uganda, he was asked to prepare proposals for co-operative participation in ginning. He recalls drawing up a paper suggesting that 25 percent of ginning capacity could be taken over within ten years, even though the co-operative movement was then still small. After much discussion, and skepticism on the part of Governor Hall, such proposals were agreed to by the top

officials, and, he thought, later put to Griffiths. The Financial Secretary described the proposals for co-operative participation as

> ...our bolt-hole. The force of circumstances in some ways possibly forced us into co-operative ownership of some ginneries to keep the peace with the Labour government of this country...to avoid complete nationalization, that they were trying to force on us....It was a political expediency.

Those who worked with him describe Hall's views on co-operatives as somewhat skeptical; he accepted their necessity without a great deal of enthusiasm, a position well reflected in the policies adopted earlier in his governorship (cf. Engholm 1968). Co-operative ownership and operation of ginneries had already been used as a means of trying to appease African protests. Government funds had been used in 1948 to buy one ginnery for operation by a Buganda co-operative union, and a second was leased early in 1951. Previous government policy had apparently envisaged very slow, gradual expansion of this sort. Now, suddenly, came proposals for ginnery participation by African co-operatives on a scale, and with a level of governmental assistance, unheralded by previous policy choices. It seems that a determined Colonial Secretary had been out-maneuvered by an equally determined governor.

The proposals, when they came out (Uganda Gazette, September 21, 1951), called for a share of ginning capacity to be purchased, with government assistance, by co-operatives who would operate within a fundamentally unchanged structure. The pool system was to be retained; co-operative-owned ginneries would become members of the relevant pools, and required to gin no more than their allocated quota of cotton. The pool system was to be given a firm statutory basis for ten years. In

return, the ginnery owners had agreed to compulsory purchase by government of some 35 redundant ginneries, most of them old and no longer operating. The proposals further provided for compulsory purchase of some ginneries, again at fair market prices, for re-sale to African co-operative societies; the co-operatives would be required to put up one-third of the purchase cost, and were given government loans at fairly reasonable rates of interest to cover the balance. It was expected that the private ginners would find their own capital sources for re-equipment and modernization, given the ten-year period of security under the new policy. Government specified strict standards for equipment and working conditions.

The problem of improving lint quality had also been tackled, independently, by the new Lint Marketing Board, set up as a para-statal corporation in 1949. By law, all ginneries had to sell their lint to the Board, which operated the ginnery inspection service and a price incentive scheme providing fairly generous premiums for superior quality lint.[26] The 1951 proposals did, however, make some provision for schemes to train Africans in ginnery skills.

The re-organization had two main objectives: to increase efficiency and quality in the ginning industry, and to provide "to the extent necessary" for African co-operative societies in ginning. The scheme did indeed meet the governmental objectives as stated; it appeased immediate African demands, but it also met the additional, unstated, objective of blocking the Colonial Secretary's demand for nationalization, and indeed of forestalling any fundamental change in the existing structures.

As the proposals said, "It has been accepted as a principle that any re-organization must proceed from the fact that the present organization exists and that planning cannot commence completely anew." Instead of dismantling the old structure that virtually guaranteed profits to private ginners, the 1951-1952 reforms merely found a small niche for some African co-operatives within the pre-existing structure, then further rigidified that structure by ordinance. The cost, to the state and ultimately to the growers, was great.

8. The consequences of the 1951-1952 ginnery re-organization

One catch in the 1951 proposals, later embodied in legislation, was the provision that the redundant ginneries compulsorily acquired by government were to be "paid for at normal market rates for ginneries of equivalent value, as assessed by an arbitration tribunal regard being had to the pool shares held by the ginneries at the time of acquisition." Ginneries acquired by the State on behalf of co-operative unions "would be paid for at full and fair prices and the basis of price would be the value of the ginnery in the open market as agreed or as assessed by an Arbitration Tribunal" (Uganda Gazette, ibid.).

Government, in the end, was required to spend a great deal for acquisition of these two types of ginneries. The money was drawn from the Price Assistance Funds, those funds built up since the war years by paying the cotton growers considerably less than the world price for their seed cotton. As we saw above, when these funds were started, government stated that they were to be held in trust for the benefit of

the growers. Yet, as Lury asks, "...why should the growers have had to bear the burden of providing nearly one million pounds for these purchases when processors were receiving such excessive profits?" (1976:232).

To those involved, rationalization through elimination of redundant ginneries was seen as in the interests of the cotton industry as a whole, and hence ultimately of the country. But those who actually had to carry out the acquisition were unhappy about the prices paid. The problem of price has two aspects. First, the eliminated ginneries were in themselves old, decrepit, uneconomic to operate; they would, in a normal, open-market system, have been worth very little. But under the pool system, the "pool shares" even of old, silent ginneries had considerable monetary value.[27] Thus a considerable portion of the price paid to eliminate these old ginneries was paid for an economic value that was purely an artifact of the restrictive system itself: the "quota" of seed cotton allocated to the ginnery under the pool system of dividing a zone's cotton crop among the ginneries within the zone. At least one informant was uneasy about paying for rights attached to unused or non-existent ginneries, while a second felt the prices paid, especially for the ginneries bought for co-operative use, were far too high. But they both loyally co-operated in administering the settlement once it was adopted.

As specified in the ordinance, prices were set by an independent evaluator (a man brought in from Nairobi), according to standard business criteria. The financial secretary thought the owners had been grossly overcompensated; "we had to put out far too much money." The amounts

actually spent have not yet been precisely determined. Lury, in his authoritative history, says almost one million pounds (1976:232). But the Report on Accounts for 1954-1955 shows, under Agriculture Department expenditures, a total of £1,277,546 spent for the acquisition of silent or uneconomic ginneries for elimination. For the acquisition of working ginneries on behalf of co-operative societies, by 1957-1958 £659,763 had been laid out, but part of this, some £158,764, had been repaid by co-operative societies. It is not clear how much of the debt owed by co-operative societies to government was finally repaid. But it seems apparent that the net debit to the crop funds for purchase of the two types of ginneries, for elimination and for re-sale to co-operatives, was well over one million pounds.[28] As a consequence, co-operative unions were saddled with immense debts through this external valuation of the ginneries they bought. Nevertheless, they were still able to make profits, because of the generous provisions of the ginnery cost formula.

The 1952 scheme, however, also restricted co-operative growth by the provision that their ginneries could process no more than their allocated quota of raw cotton. The Co-operative Department reports of the later 1950s describe the problems of trying to explain to growers why their own co-operative union could not handle all its members' cotton, but had to hand some over to private ginneries, to fill up private ginners' quotas.[29]

By 1961, co-operative unions were operating 14 ginneries (Uganda 1962:33-34), and it was estimated that they processed about 16 percent

of the country's cotton crop (IBRD:1962:195). However, they handled the buying of somewhere between 22 and 30 percent of the raw cotton crop,[30] the difference presumably being handed over to private ginners under the restrictions of the pool agreements. To that extent, the co-operatives lost profits from ginning.

Overall, the 1952 settlement had the further consequence of locking the country into another ten years of a rigid, protected ginnery system that virtually guaranteed profits to those able to participate in it. In the words of the very moderate 1962 Commission,

> ...we here conclude that the aim of stability has in a sense been achieved but only by casting the industry in a mould which preserves it in a ten year old shape and largely confines its profits to those who operated it ten years ago or their heirs and assigns. By contrast, the stability which is desirable is one which does not prevent the shape of the industry from being adjusted to changing needs (Uganda 1962:36-37).

Participation of co-operatives in ginning did a little, but not much, to disperse the profits of ginning; the 1962 Commission estimates that one adult male cotton grower in eight was a member of a co-operative society. As we have seen, the high costs of ginnery purchase and the restrictions on ginning all their members' cotton kept ginnery profits and hence members' bonuses lower than they might otherwise have been.[31]

The visiting World Bank mission was even more critical.

> Despite the reorganization program, the principal problem is still, in our view, that of an inefficient and uneconomic system—inefficient in the sense that the industry is a heavy charge on producers and uneconomic because the system is preventing a rational use of resources (IBRD 1962:173).

They pointed out that the high costs of ginning could not be shifted to consumers, given present market structures, and hence must be borne by

growers; the effects of high ginning costs could well be a disincentive to growers to expand production (ibid.:174). Despite the claims of continued economic inefficiency, the quality of cotton exported did, however, greatly improve under the careful supervision of the Lint Marketing Board, with its ginnery inspectors and quality incentive schemes.[32] These gains were reflected in higher prices for higher quality lints.[33] No economist has yet attempted an overall assessment as to whether the gain in Uganda's income resulting from such higher prices in fact offset the high, and often unmeasurable, costs, of the controls imposed to ensure production of an even, high-quality lint.

The evaluations quoted above of the efficacy of the 1952 reforms in creating an <u>efficient</u> processing sector were made by men thoroughly internal to the ideology of capitalism. Even these men hint at some doubts about the <u>equity</u> of the changes — cf. also the comment of Lury, quoted above. One does not have to be a flaming radical to conclude that the 1952 reforms reflect much greater consciousness of trusteeship for the interests of ginnery owners than for those of African peasant growers. But even the most thoughtful of those involved contended that their motives had been good.

> Anybody who has been confronted with making recommendations on ginneries in Uganda....(long pause, shrug and sigh). The only thing I can say is the fact that, at the time, the best possible was done...for everybody. For the industry, and for the peasants as well. I can't say we were always correct; I would be the first to admit that. But we are going back to hindsight, and if we had to do it all over again...?

The rationale for saying that "the best possible was done—for everybody" seems to rest on a culturally specific concept of 'property'. If the

definition of "pool shares" as property is accepted, and protection of the principle of property rights is seen as essential to the maintenance of social order, and the maintenance of social order is essential for the welfare of all within the society, then it follows that funds appropriated from peasant production, and pledged to be used for the good of the cotton industry as a whole, could morally be used to buy up "pool shares." But as we saw above, extension of the concept of property in this manner was not fully convincing even to all of those involved. One reason for devoting so much space to this specific issue has been that, by placing a strain on the officials' methods of justifying their own actions, it has thrown these methods into sharper relief.

9. Assessments

Other writers' interpretations of the ginnery settlement of 1951 differ considerably from that presented here. It is difficult to accept Engholm's assessment of this settlement as a defeat of the ginnery interests from which it was impossible to make an effective recovery (1967:78). Even at the end of the ten-year period, private ginners were still processing all but 16 percent of the crop. Their privileged position was now entrenched by statute; the new cooperative participants were required to abide by the "pool" arrangements, even at loss to themselves. The cost-plus formula, as well as the new bonuses for higher quality, still virtually guaranteed profits, and the private owners had been paid extremely generously for the ginneries given up. The truly serious blows against the private ginning interests were delayed until after independence.

On the other hand, it is also difficult to accept Mamdani's interpretation of the entry of co-operatives into cotton ginning as a calculated attempt by the colonial state to "liquidate" one section of the "petty bourgeoisie," the chiefs, in order to open up opportunities for another section, the "kulaks" (1976:195-200). My investigations of the genesis of the settlement suggest that it arose as a desperate last-minute improvisation in order to forestall a move regarded as even more undesirable — nationalization. Mamdani is correct that, in the following years, larger farmers dominated an expanded co-operative movement. But as the officials who negotiated the settlement did not think in terms of class differentiation among the African population at that time, this seems an unintended consequence. They were searching for the minimum possible concession that would reduce the political demands of "Africans" (undifferentiated) for a share in the ginnery industry, while satisfying a militant Colonial Secretary and not causing uproar among the ginners. To interpret the settlement as part of a long-term plan to re-align class relationships ascribes a degree of understanding of processes of social differentiation, and clairvoyance about the consequences of their policy choices, that officials did not possess. We know that under Sir John Hall co-operative development had previously been accorded low priority; official attitudes were ambivalent, but with a strong belief that the potentially dangerous movement, with its connotations of dread socialism, must be carefully controlled by government. The sudden expansion of the role allotted to co-operatives represented by the 1951 ginnery proposals seems better explained by the terms used by the official quoted on p. 416

above: a "bolt-hole...a political expediency" than as a calculated long-term plan to re-align class relationships. An interpretation of the move as an ad hoc measure to get the officials out of a situation that had drifted into crisis seems more consistent with what we know of the way they operated. This settlement did serve the interests of capital, primarily Indian and heavily local. It reflects the common theme observed on other issues, of an unwillingness to act strongly against the allies of the state, but instead to seek compromise rather than risk confrontation. But the settlement also served the interests of the officials themselves, by getting the Colonial Secretary off their backs, easing political pressure from demanding Africans, and perpetuating a familiar structure that gave them strong control over a crucial sector of the economy. Above all it did not threaten the regulatory structure which they regarded as essential to maintain quality of Uganda's cotton, and hence the stability of her revenues. In fact, it opened the way to improvements of quality. But at a deeper level, the settlement achieved these desiderata without threat to the basic principles of economic organization regarded as desirable; the fact that the ginnery owners were mainly Indian seems to have been much less important than that they were owners of private property.

One argument that cannot be seriously maintained in the present case is that the colonial state was bowing to pressure from the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The settlement reached was highly favorable to the ginning interests, but only a small share of these interests remained metropolitan. There seems no prima facie reason why British officials

would choose to serve the interests of capitalists in India. This suggests that an approach in terms of direct "serving the interests of..." or "pressure from" an external bourgeoisie may be too crude. The current emphasis on dependency theory and the importance of metropolitan-satellite relations should not blind us to the fact that many problems internal to a colony were handled on the level of that colony.

It would appear that staffing the colonies with men of conservative outlook made it possible for the relations of production in one small and remote corner of the Empire to undergo a needed but relatively minor modification, without the involvemnt of metropolitan economic interests, and without threat to the basic principles of economic organization underlying the system as a whole. A capacity to handle local economic adjustments on the local level would seem positively functional for the wider imperial economic system, especially at a time when today's sophisticated technology for maintaining communication and centralized control was not yet available. The men in charge were operating in terms of their definition of what Uganda needed, but on principles, learned at home, that led to maintenance of economic structures meshing neatly with the wider system.

10. The fates of men

Back on the level of individuals, the long dispute over Uganda's ginneries had other unintended consequences. It contributed to the end of colonial service for Sir John Hall. After his appointment to Uganda expired, he was not offered another assignment; instead, he went on to

a successful career within private enterprise in the City of London. Of more significance for Uganda, as a direct outcome of the dispute and the Colonial Secretary's visit to Uganda, James Griffiths offered the governorship to Andrew Cohen.[34] "That socialist from Whitehall" as Uganda's astounded senior officials described him, became the next governor of Uganda. But the consequences of that appointment, both for Uganda and for its officials, would take another dissertation to describe.

NOTES

1. To give but two examples: in Chap. 6 he describes the 1945 riots as a revolt against the state crop marketing boards; but these boards were not established until 1949. On p. 155, he says the "requirements of coffee production put it beyond the reach of the middle or poor peasant, making it a kulak crop." This suggests he never ventured beyond the confines of Makerere hill to see the many small peasant plots each with a few Rohusta coffee trees.

2. British firms such as the Uganda Company were organized according to the usual bureaucratic pattern, with boards of directors in London, paid managers, bookkeepers and so on in Uganda. There were also some smaller European "family firms" but these do not seem to have lasted long. The larger Indian firms were somewhat similar to the British firms in structure. But more typical were the firms based on an extended family, and utilizing caste or sect ties as additional sources of labor. These "traditional" forms of organization proved highly effective in competition with the more "rational" and "modern" bureaucratically organized European company, whose white staff demanded housing and other amenities far in excess, and working hours far shorter, than those demanded by members of an Indian family working for family advancement. The "family firm" organization also facilitated involvement in more than one form of economic activity, and switching of family labor from one enterprise to another as required seasonally. Credit networks were elaborate, based on both kin and caste ties often linking Uganda with other East African colonies, and sometimes back to India. Mamdani describes how these forms of organization facilitated expansion of both Indian retail trade and ginnery enterprises in early colonial Uganda (1976:80-84, 91; cf. Benedict 1968). The European bureaucratic form of business organization regained competitive advantage at the time of African independence; it was much easier for such firms to make at least token gestures towards Africanization than it was for a family enterprise set off by both language and culture from an African elite educated in English.

3. Ehrlich 1958, Brett 1973, Chap. 8, Mamdani 1976, Chap. 3, all contain illuminating quotations from documents of the 1920s and 1930s on these contacts.

4. This support is made clear in Dept. of Agriculture annual report, 1933:8, (quoted in Brett 1973:255).

5. Statement in Uganda Herald, May 16, 1934, quoted in Brett (ibid.).

6. We have direct information or profits for this period only for the Uganda Company (Brett 1973:256-257). This firm, operated on orthodox accounting principles, deposited its records in Makerere library. Solid documentation of what the investigating commission called "super-profits" for the period after 1952 is found in Uganda 1962:42-46.

7. For technical details, see Arnold in Jameson 1970:158-164, and Dunn 1949.

8. In 1949, a visiting American cotton expert wrote:

> The significance of Uganda cotton is greater than is implied in the small percentage of the world's total production it now holds. Outside the United States, Uganda is practically the only source of fine-fibered, long-staple upland cotton. In the other areas of the world where upland types are grown the staples are shorter than 1-3/32" or the fibers are harsh. In spinning quality the silky fine-fibered cotton from the Uganda plateaus is said to be just under the shorter Egyptian and directly competitive with 1-3/32", 1-1/8" and 1-5/32" from the Mississippi River Delta in the United States. On occasion, the Uganda cottons are said to possess a staple length of as much as 1-3/16". Before the war these cottons had been sold primarily to Japan for mixture with short staple, to the United Kingdom for mixing with medium staple and to Indias where they were usually spun pure (Dunn 1949:8-9).

9. My informants on this point include two former chairman of the Lint Marketing Board, a former director of the Agriculture Department, and the former cotton manager of the Uganda Company, a businessman with more than thirty years' experience in cotton processing.

   Documentary support for my informants' position can be found in Dunn 1949 passim, and the Report of the 1962 Cotton Commission, made up of men experienced in the industry who had consulted much with exporters. This excerpt refers to the period following the 1952 reorganization:

> ...we have...come to the conclusion that the measures adopted for the improvement of quality have, in fact, yielded a net benefit to the industry and thus to the whole country. First, it is clear that the repute of Uganda lint in the overseas markets has been raised significantly, so that there is an element of premium attaching to all the grades which are produced for "safi" cotton. Spinners, it is true, are keen and discriminating buyers and are not ready to pay a premium for lint which does not have the characteristics

> which they seek. But if Uganda lint in general has these characteristics the defects of a particular consignment will not jeopardise the general premium. If, however, the spinner cannot normally be confident that Uganda lint will be free from these defects he will be cautious in bidding for all Ugandas, and so the possibility of finding these defects will tend to depress the value of lint which is free from them. For however keen and discriminating a buyer the spinner may be, it will pay him to rely to some extent on the general repute of a lint rather than to incur the trouble and expense of examining minutely every portion of a consignment. And once a lint has shown itself in general to have the characteristics which will give him the kind of yarn in which he specializes, he will tend to be faithful to it (Uganda 1962:40).

10. The following account of bulk-buying and other related changes in marketing arrangement is drawn from Ehrlich 1958:279-307; Engholm 1968:290-298; Yoshida 1966 and 1973. For a broader study of bulk-purchase arrangements between Britain and her colonies, see Leubuscher 1956.

11. Mamdani argues that these figures (derived from Ehrlich's primary research) over-inflate the amount of Ugandan cotton actually consumed in India. An unknown amount, he says was, for ease of shipping, re-exported from Bombay to Britain (1976:95-96). It is not clear whether this re-export pattern applied right through the inter-war period, or only in the early years.

12. Bulk-buying arrangements, which provided no premium price for superior quality cotton, were used by the ginners' organization as a justification for the industry's failure to invest capital in plant improvements to produce superior lints. See Uganda Cotton Association 1951:3.

13. The Lockhart Report, unpublished, 1947.

14. My discussions with a ginnery owner corroborated this contention. However, he argued that cheating was prevalent at all levels, not just cotton buyer to peasant. Ginnery owners, he said, had to resign themselves to a certain level of cheating by their employees, taking action only when losses exceeded the costs of prevention. A preference for hiring kin was, he said, in part an attempt to reduce cheating. A similar view, that cotton buyers often defrauded their companies as well as the peasants, is found in the memoirs of a police officer who served in Uganda (Harwich 1961:31-35).

15. This conscious effort to be even-handed and fair to Indian businessmen, often noticed during interviews in 1974 and 1975, may have been increased by General Amin's brutal actions in expelling the Indian minority, only two to three years before the interviews.

16. Pace Mandani's contention that few economists have dealt with this issue, (1976:181) the question of crop funds has been covered at length, so will be touched on only briefly in this work. See Lury 1976:225-232, for a brief summary. For more detail, see Lury 1963; Ehrlich 1958; Walker 1964; Walker and Ehrlich 1959.

17. The same interests, after several organizational metamorphoses, formed Uganda's first nationalist political party, the Uganda National Congress. For accounts of these events, see inter alia, Apter 1967; Shepherd 1955; Stonehouse 1960.

18. For an account of the rioting and issues leading up to it, see Apter 1967, and the official report of the commission of investigation, Uganda 1950. The economic issues, and questions of cotton policy, are given considerable weight in this report.

19. A copy of this letter was made available to me by an informant. The copy should now be deposited in the Rhodes House Library, Oxford.

20. The full story of this period may become clearer when, and if, archival sources become available. Probably, as was the custom, little was written down until agreement had been reached. Unfortunately the director of agriculture of the time, who led negotiations for the government, had died before the time of fieldwork.

21. Both Brett 1973 and Engholm 1968 document the extent to which business interests used various organizations in Britain to present their position to the Colonial Office, especially prior to 1939.

22. Two of these people wrote accounts of their work; see Shepherd 1955 and Stonehouse 1960.

23. This man was a former director of agriculture for Uganda, and involved in the 1944 plan for ginnery re-organization. His strong opposition was mentioned during interviews with one of the leading participants in the argument against nationalization.

24. Cohen of course was in 1951 still a member of the Home Civil Service, in the Colonial Office. He joined the Colonial Service only in 1952, when he became governor of Uganda.

25. The account given in interview, March 5, 1975, was essentially similar, although somewhat fuller and more outspoken, to that recorded in his memoirs (Griffiths 1969:104-105).

During the interview, the 84-year old former miner and cabinet minister showed somewhat less enthusiasm for nationalization than he had in 1951. He drew a parallel between the attitudes of the cotton growers and those of striking British coal miners who objected to the Coal Board, and showed me some articles he had recently written on the need to reduce worker alienation in nationalized industries.

26. The most convenient published review of the operations of the Lint Marketing Board is Uganda 1962.

27. A document listing the 35 ginneries originally proposed for acquisition and elimination was made available to me by an informant. Of these, 15 were working ginneries, 18 were "silent"; half of these had not been operated since 1929; one very small ginnery had never been worked, and one is shown as having been demolished in 1941. Although the ginnery no longer physically existed, it still had to be purchased, apparently, because it possessed pool shares. Of the 35, five were owned by four British firms, and all five had long been silent. Information is not yet available to make it possible to allocate the remainder between India-based and Ugandan-based Indian capital. The concern for the interests of ginners, and lack of concern for growers, is especially striking in this "Top Secret" document which appears to be a summary of the agreement reached by the secret committee that negotiated the proposed settlement whereby government would buy out the redundant ginneries; it carries no date, but was probably prepared somewhere around 1951.

> Hence, if a single owner's rights are compulsorily extinguished, it is considered that he should be fully compensated. Similarly, if one ginnery in group ownership is acquired, the owners should also be fully compensated since the additional share interest which the group owner obtains is only a small portion of the share interest formally held in the pool by the ginnery acquired.
>
> ...since under the proposals generous provision is being made for African participation in the ginning industry, we consider that the cost of the ginneries recommended for purchase as listed in Table 'A' should be borne by the Cotton Price Assistance Fund.

A copy of this document is being deposited in Rhodes House Library, Oxford.

28. At that time, just at the end of the Hall regime, the accumulated crop funds totalled £23 million (Great Britain 1954:98). Such a large sum had not been a deliberate aim of governmental policy.

Governor Hall had, on the basis of events following World War I, expected an economic collapse and drastic fall of world prices; in the event, commodity prices rose sharply. He and his officials further believed, with considerable justification, that payment of the full amount of these rapidly rising proceeds to peasants, when supplies of consumer goods were still small, would lead only to disruptive inflation. The flow of imports to Uganda was constricted, especially by congestion in Mombasa harbour, until at least the end of 1951. In addition to these arguments, much discussed in the literature cited in note 16 above, during interviews Governor Hall and his financial secretary expressed a strong belief that Africans showed a "perverse" response to price, as discussed in Chapter IX. In all, from 1945-1960, the amount kept back from the growers was equal to about half the payments actually made to them (Lury 1976: 226). This was in addition to the usual export tax, also borne by growers. The bulk of the funds were accumulated prior to 1952-1953; after that time, a policy was adopted of paying growers a price, announced at the beginning of the season, based on the best available estimate of the world price. Most of these funds were eventually spent on general developments during Governor Cohen's regime — setting off further controversy within and outside the government.

29. The Report of the 1962 Commission of Inquiry into Cotton-Ginning also considers the various arguments on this problem (Uganda 1962: 37-39).

30. The IBRD mission estimated 22.5 percent, the 1962 Commission of Inquiry, about 30 percent (Uganda 1962, Graph 2).

31. Co-operatives, in the 1951-1961 period, were fairly strictly supervised, and their account books open to public inspection. The 1962 Commission found that on average, co-operatives operated more efficiently and made more profit than that indicated by the accounts made available to them by private ginners.

32. The various control measures and the quality incentive scheme are described in Uganda 1962:24-30. The Commission concluded that the improvement in quality had been a net gain for the country, despite the often unrealized costs such as the extra labor required of peasants in sorting over their cotton.

33. Speech by the new chairman of the Lint Marketing Board, 1.12.1961; copy made available by the speaker. Also, discussions with the previous Board chairman.

34. Interview with Rt. Hon. James Griffiths, March 5, 1975.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS

1. The dangers of the epistemological bog

> Whatever else ideologies may be...they are, most distinctively, maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience. Whether, in any particular case, the map is accurate or the conscience creditable is a separate question to which one can hardly give the same answer for Naziism and Zionism, for the nationalisms of McCarthy and of Churchill, for the defenders of segregation and its opponents (Geertz 1973:220).
>
> The social function of science vis-a-vis ideologies is first to understand them—what they are, how they work, what gives rise to them—and second to criticize them, to force them to come to terms with (but not necessarily to surrender to) reality (ibid.: 232).

Methodologically, this work has attempted to follow Geertz' prescription for a two-step approach to ideology, the first stage based on a non-evaluative concept of ideology that does not, by definition, treat ideology as false. Many anthropologists are content to restrict their analysis of belief systems solely to this first level, that is, exploring in depth the inter-relations of beliefs to each other, as symbolic systems "in their own terms." But even questions as to "how they work" involve reference to other forms of behavior. Such comparisons of beliefs to other forms of behavior are routinely handled by anthropologists on a common-sense level; it is a truism within the discipline that actors' beliefs about their own behavior are frequently not an accurate reflection of what they actually do.

But Geertz' second step goes beyond such common-sense comparisons. The whole tenor of his essay is that anthropologists can, and should, deal with such questions as to whether ideological maps are "accurate," and conscience "creditable." Unfortunately he does not in this seminal work tell us how this should be done, other than by prescribing as a task of science that ideologies be forced to "come to terms with ...reality." While acknowledging the importance of the task, I will argue here that the manner in which Geertz has phrased his argument leads us straight into an epistemological morass populated permanently by philosophers of science who have been unable to find a way out either for themselves or any practicing anthropologist foolish enough to go too deep into the bog. Geertz is well aware of the morass; he suggests that we can circumvent "Mannheim's paradox" — whereby even the thought of the social scientist becomes relativized by the effect of the life-situation of the thinker — by seeing science and ideology as different symbolic strategies for encompassing situations (ibid.: 230). But this suggestion appears to be negated by his talk of science forcing ideologies to come to terms with "reality." That is, in practice his approach falls back on the assumption that scientific knowledge is a form of privileged access to reality and that ideologies are to be forced to "come to terms with reality" through comparison of their empirical assertions with "reality" in the form of the empirical assertions constituting scientific knowledge. Geertz' formulation does not solve the problem of the "scientificity" of scientific know-

ledge, nor provide a clear criterion for distinguishing "science" and "ideology."

Recent years have seen increasing recognition that "social science" can have a strong ideological component, the more effective because of its symbolic garb as dispassionate, objective science (e.g. Asad 1973; Blackburn 1972). But the search for a clear criterion distinguishing 'ideology' and 'social science' leads straight to the depths of the epistemological morass.

There are of course many anthropologists who avoid the problem by taking the position that the "truth" of actors' beliefs is either irrelevant or unknowable, and who content themselves with analyzing beliefs on Geertz' first level only.[1] But such restraint makes it impossible to deal with some questions of considerable interest; the ways in which belief-systems function, and the manner in which they are maintained, can be expected to differ according to the "accuracy" or "inaccuracy" of the beliefs. In a study such as this one, such judgments are unavoidable. But by what criterion can they be made?

Anthropologists often handle such questions in terms of a "correspondence" approach to truth, using the usual scientific criterion of inter-subjective agreement on some specified set of critical observations. The procedure is straightforward, provided that the assertions in question can be operationalized in a manner that observers recognized as qualified can agree among themselves as to what observations would constitute a critical test — not always an easy matter. Such a

positivist approach of "testability" might usefully be applied to certain specific lower-level components of the belief system considered here, but not to the higher-order beliefs. "To what extent did the officials act in accordance with their trusteeship ideology?" would involve obtaining agreement among differing observers on an operationalization of "trusteeship" that would be impossible to obtain. Such a question could meaningfully be posed to a social scientist and student of colonial affairs such as Mair, but the question in that form would probably be rejected as meaningless and unanswerable by a social scientist and student of colonial affairs such as Mamdani. It was argued at the end of Chapter IV that the concept of trusteeship, and many of the specific lower-level beliefs, are logically dependent on the officials' higher-level assumptions about the nature of society. These higher-order assumptions cannot be directly compared with "reality," but only with social scientists' constructs of a similar order. As is well known, social science on this level is characterized by "competing paradigms," to use Bottomore's phrase (1975:191). The problem can be exemplified by using Mair and Mamdani as representative figures. A comparison of Mair's 1949 paper "Self government or good-government" (reprinted in Mair, 1969) with Mamdani (1976) reveals the extent of the paradigmatic gap dividing them. There is also a vast gap in value assumptions, although these remain implicit. Mair, in effect, accepts the morality of colonial rule under some conditions, while reserving the right to criticize specific regimes for lapses in

execution; it could be called a "balance-sheet" approach. Mamdani, on the other hand, would reject the rule of one people by another as inherently wrong. Mamdani is explicitly using a Marxist version of a conflict model of society, in terms of which he could argue, deductively, that the actors' beliefs in, for example, trusteeship must be "false consciousness"; "inaccuracy," in this case, is established not by a positivist approach to "correspondence to reality" through a critical test of a specific belief, but by appeal to the higher-order principles of political economy and resulting evidence as to the presence of exploitation in the colonial system as a whole. On the other hand, Mair deals much more with specific practices, and does not accept "...the crude theory that colonial peoples as a whole have been 'exploited' for the benefit of the metropolitan powers..." (1969:114), even though she acknowledges specific economic disadvantages. Mair's underlying societal paradigm seems to be one of functional integration, or at the least, a rejection of a model based on conflicting class interests. Those who reject "exploitation" and the "conflict" paradigm of society frequently work within a paradigm that is a more sophisticated cousin of the "organic society" model that, it was argued in Chapters III and IV, underlay the officials' beliefs.

In such a situation of competing paradigms, there is little hope of determining the accuracy of an ideology through "correspondence with reality" as established by comparison with the unequivocal results of social science. The alternative approach of a deductive demonstration

of the falsity of a belief-system follows a distinguished precedent: Evans-Pritchard's anthropological classic, Witchcraft, oracles and Magic among the Azande. Evans-Pritchard's appeal to the principles of Western science to support his assertion that Zande witches could not exist has drawn few objections from anthropologists, although it has been criticized by the philosopher Winch (1970). But the principles Evans-Pritchard appealed to enjoy unchallenged prestige among observers, unlike the principles of political economy appealed to by Mamdani and others sharing his approach. A deductive argument thus cannot yield an undisputed result in this case.

At the present time, any naive hope of comparing actors' "ideology" with social scientific "knowledge" founders in a situation where social scientists dismiss each others' work as "ideology." The present situation in colonial studies is especially intriguing, as the old distinction between actors' models and analysts' models becomes somewhat blurred; the ranks of the analysts are being swollen by an infusion of former "actors" of two kinds: some colonial officials, and some colonized, turned scholars.[2] Further consideration of this intriguing situation must be left to the sociologists of knowledge, but its existence has implications for the present study, to be returned to below.

2. A way around the bog?

The distinction between ideology and knowledge, the snares of

Mannheim's paradox, and the whole epistemological morass they represent, need to be circumvented if analysis is to proceed. Since results of an analysis of a belief-system such as that presented here is clearly contingent on the paradigm in terms of which it is analyzed, it is incumbent on the analyst to make that paradigm explicit. I propose to leap over the epistemological bog by frankly adopting a "conflict" model of society, although I remain critical of much of the work done on colonial society within such a paradigm.

The phrase "conflict model of society" is used here as a label rather than a definition, to refer to a perspective that includes as essential concepts 'domination', 'class', 'exploitation', and 'power', in which a complex society is seen as held together, at base, by the power of its dominating elements. Such a model does not preclude recognition of essential elements of cooperation and functional integration as well. I find a model of this kind provides a more adequate framework within which to fit available information about the operations of complex societies, especially colonial societies, than the alternative model of a functionally-integrated society held together by value consensus, or a Gluckmanian perspective that recognizes conflict but sees it as contributing to cohesion at a higher level. A colonial situation was a situation of domination by a colonizing group, who held superior power over the colonized, leading to fundamental contradictions between the interests of the colonized and the colonizers, as well as to the emergence of complex interdependencies

(cf. Balandier 1970:21-56).

It is important not to confuse a colonial situation, or colonialism, with imperialism, which predated, and has survived, the period of formal colonization so recently ended. Berman has well expressed the distinction.

> Imperialism is the relationship between a metropole and a dependency; a series of asymmetrical linkages established and maintained for the perceived economic and political interests of the metropole. As long as the expected benefits of profits, resources, and strategic advantages are obtained, imperialism requires no necessary interest in or direct control over the internal affairs of the dependency. Colonialism, however, is a complex of ties created within a colony between European colonials, both administrators and settlers, and the indigenous population that ensures for the European an exalted political, social and economic status in a racially based system of stratification. While the relationships of imperialism are large scale, distant, and impersonal; the relationships of colonialism tend to be personal, immediate and reaffirmed daily. The imperial interests of the metropole and the local colonial interests are not identical and may in fact be in conflict (1974: 508-509).

This conceptual distinction alerts one to possible ambiguities and conflict in the relation between the metropolitan power and the emergent colonial institutions (cf. Berman ibid.; Emmanuel 1972).

Use of the term 'exploitation' in this section needs further explication, in view of recent vociferous claims that it has no validity or usefulness in social science (Dalton 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977). Unlike Dalton and Mair (1969:114), I find 'exploitation' an essential social science concept, although one frequently in need of more precise definition and handling than is often given. The recent controversy (Dalton op. cit.; Derman and Levin 1977; Dunn 1976; Newcomer 1977;

Roseberry 1976) has not fully resolved the question of a broadly applicable formal definition useful for cross-cultural work. However, Dunn's formulation provides an interim working definition adequate for present purposes, despite certain weaknesses.

> ...people, including peasants, can be said to be potentially or actually exploited if and when: (a) they do not control the means of producing and marketing goods, and are therefore obliged to rent land, sell commodities (including their own labor power), and buy needed supplies at prices set by others, whether these prices are payable in money, in goods, or in labor, and/or (b) they are not self-governing, and hence must pay taxes and other charges to the state without regard to the value of what they receive from it, and/or without having a voice proportionate to their numbers in the levying and final disposition of these charges (1976:640).

Dunn further emphasizes that the presence or absence of exploitation does not depend on an imbalance between payments made by subordinates, and what is returned to them, but on relative power (ibid.:641). Thus on his definition it is possible to assert the presence of exploitation, even though some proportion of the surplus appropriated by the more powerful is used to provide services beneficial to the ruled. Further,

> ...the presence or absence of exploitation is determinable (given adequate ethnographic information) by strict factual tests, and is in principle absolutely independent of the subjective perceptions of the people involved; and that accordingly exploitation is not a product of the reasoning of certain intellectuals, but is built into the fabric of a great many societies... (1976:641).

Just as the progressiveness or regressiveness of a taxation structure is dependent on objective ratios between tax and what is taxed, and not the consciousness of either tax collectors or taxpayers, so exploitation is dependent on similar objective relations. While the estab-

lishment of these objective relations is the task of political economy, it is nevertheless important for a broader understanding of the system to switch the focus of analysis and inquire into the subjective perceptions of those involved, both rulers and ruled.[3] For the interplay between the underlying structure of a social system, as modelled by external, post hoc analysts, and the lived experience of those who took part in it, poses a number of questions of great interest to anthropologists.

These questions are obscured if we start with the question of the "accuracy" in the sense of "correspondence with reality" of the actors' beliefs. The question of "accuracy" needs first to be directed to the adequacy of an ethnographic account of the actors' perceptions and beliefs. If the ethnographic accounts are adequate and accurate, these beliefs need to be accepted as valid on their own level, as forming one element that has to be taken into account for a full understanding of how the social system operated. Thus, if my account is accurate, an adequate model of a British colonial system such as Uganda needs to include as one of its elements the strong official beliefs in trusteeship, building up the colony in preparation for independence, etc., regardless of whether the analyst considers these beliefs to be a true reflection of the underlying system. That there may be discrepancies between what the actors believe and what the external analyst construes the system to be is an anthropological truism. Long ago Levi-Strauss said

> ...when the structure of a certain type of phenomena does not lie at a great depth, it is more likely that some kind of model, standing as a screen to hide it, will exist in the collective consciousness. For conscious models...are by definition very poor ones, since they are not intended to explain the phenomena but to perpetuate them. Therefore, structural analysis is confronted with a strange paradox well known to the linguist, that is: the more obvious structural organization is, the more difficult it becomes to reach it because of the inaccurate conscious models lying across the path which leads to it (1968:281).
>
> ...even if the models are biased or erroneous, the very bias and type of error are a part of the facts under study and probably rank among the most significant ones (ibid.:282).

Thus the anthropologist's task will include attempts to account for such discrepancies, to explain how the "conscious models" were maintained if discrepant, and to explore for possible consequences of the presence of "conscious models" of one kind rather than another. To do so, one does not need to deny the reality of the "conscious models" or the actors' ideology, nor the sincerity of the actors' motives.

Emphasis on such elementary points would not be necessary were it not for a curious feature of current work on colonial societies: the tendency of some writers to assume that colonial officials were engaged in a <u>conscious</u> conspiracy to exploit their colonies. British officials react with irritated non-comprehension to writers who put forward theories about conscious divide-and-rule or conscious exploitation policies. At the same time, some of those who accept a conflict model of society seem to find it difficult to swallow the proposition that the officials were sincere in their claims to be doing their best for

those they ruled. The sense that the two sides are talking a different language is undoubtedly related to fundamental differences on the paradigmatic level, and also to the differing social roots of those involved. We saw in Chapter IV that officials were often acutely aware of differences between elements of a colonial society, but did not interpret these as contradictions, for they operated on "organic society" assumptions.

Conflict theorists, on the other hand, are aware not only of cleavage, but see these as contradictions between structurally opposed elements of a society held together by the superior force of a ruling element. If the conflict theorist is also an activist, he/she then defines the ruling element as the enemy who must be overthrown. It is all too easy, from this stance, to project his own view of the ruler-as-enemy into his perception of the rulers' consciousness, and to assume that the ruler sees the world in the same manner. As a result, the conflict theorist slips over into conspiracy theories, such as Kabwegyere (1974) and to some extent Mamdani (1976).[4] None of those operating with a conspiracy model has actually investigated what the belief system of the colonial rulers was. If the analysts' aim is to demonstrate the presence or extent of exploitation, then such assertions of conspiracy are in principle irrelevant, if 'exploitation' pertains to objective relationships independent of the consciousness of the actors. Such assertions of conscious conspiracy seem therefore to have no useful theoretical purpose, as well as little empirical

support.

But it is possible to hold a conflict model of the colonial system, yet reject the onward move into conspiracy theories of deliberately intended "divide-and-rule" or exploitation and accept instead the statements of the ruling officials as sincere. This becomes possible when we take seriously the relation between ideology as a framework through which we construct reality, and actions affecting that reality. Conflict theorists who try to reason backward from rulers' actions to rulers' consciousness, in terms of the theorists' own construction of reality, cannot help but misinterpret the consciousness of those who operated with a different construction of reality. The only reliable evidence on the consciousness of any set of actors comes from those actors themselves.

3. Objective structures and ideological screens

With these conceptual problems out of the way, we can now turn back to the questions posed in the introductory chapter, to see what kind of answers can be extracted from the empirical material presented in the intervening chapters. The questions can be summarized as follows.

a) How did the colonial officials develop and maintain their beliefs about what they were doing?

b) How were these beliefs related to what they did?

c) How can we most effectively conceptualize British colony-metropolis

relations in this time period?

The way in which the prevalent beliefs of a social 'class' were inculcated into potential recruits for colonial service was discussed in Chapter III. The explanation of maintenance of beliefs becomes problematic where there is internal contradiction, or where an external analyst perceives a contradiction between the beliefs of a set of actors about a situation and what the analyst construes that situation to be. Therefore this question could be loosely rephrased: how did these intelligent, educated men maintain their trusteeship beliefs, while working within a system that, according to highly persuasive evidence provided by contemporary political economists, operated to the economic detriment of the colonized peoples? For those who do not find this evidence persuasive, there is no problem. Thus, just as Evans-Pritchard (1937) showed how the Azande maintained their beliefs despite his assumption of a lack of empirical foundation, I must attempt to demonstrate how the officials avoided disconfirmation of their beliefs as a result of experience. Discussion of this question of maintenance of beliefs cannot be easily separated from that of the relation between beliefs and action. The third question will be taken up in the final section of this chapter.

To start, we should remind ourselves briefly of the objective life-situation of these men, using the categories of an external observer. Although most came from the middle to upper-middle reaches of a stratified society, very few had independent wealth. For the majority, their personal situation was, at base, one of need to con-

tinue to sell their labor power, a labor power informed by special preparation for the specialized services of ruling, furthering the production of crops, and so on. They were part of a system of political domination of alien peoples, in which power was concentrated in the colonial state, which was simultaneously a system of economic appropriation; it had, as a bare minimum, to generate revenue to pay for the support of the apparatus of domination. Part of this apparatus included provision for the ruling officials of a standard of living vastly luxurious in comparison to that of the majority of peasants who paid for it (although modest enough in comparison to their brethren in Britain). In addition to supporting this apparatus of domination and control, and generating almost all the capital for developing the infrastructure needed for linkage to the world economy (see Chap. V), the colonial economy also had to meet various demands from the metropolis, all within the constraints imposed by the wider imperial system of which the colony was one part.

Any of my informants reading the above paragraph would find the vocabulary foreign to their thought, and the approach repugnant. To them, such an approach eliminates the purpose and meanings with which they had imbued their work. For, like most human beings most of the time, they interpreted the bare institutional structure through a pattern of meanings, a screen in part imported to the colony in their "mental baggage," in part acquired by socialization within the colony. Within the colony, the early interactions of colonizers and colonized

had created new patterns and new, localized meanings transmitted to cadets. This colonial sub-culture was not unchanging, but it changed slowly; an incoming cadet with a fresh approach had to get out or adapt. If the latter, as he modified the interpretations given him by his superiors in terms of his own experience of the colony and its people, his somewhat modified view would then be transmitted to the next generation when he, in turn, became senior enough to be placed in charge of new cadets.

The hypothetical officials reading these paragraphs would probably recognize, perhaps ruefully, their basic need for a job, but many of them interpreted their work as a career, a form of service, and not a mere selling of labor power. Many of them described themselves as highly fortunate in having found work giving them so many gratifications over and above a salary; many felt themselves fortunate to have been able to combine earning a living with work they regarded as useful, serving others, reducing suffering. For others, the sheer technical challenge of making more crops or trees grow, or finding water or minerals, of using their skills in challenging circumstances, was an important satisfaction. Berman declares that "...the exercise of control and the domination of the African population were the principal satisfaction administrators derived from their job" (1974:507). I would suggest that this enjoyment of power over less-sophisticated peoples was a real satisfaction, but only one of many. To many men, the possibility of the <u>creative</u> use of power, to do something useful

for others, was as important as the sheer ego gratification of power itself. In addition, the life itself offered many rewards that, for most, outweighed the discomforts: a beautiful country, adventure, ample servants, social deference, leisure, lots of sports, the satisfactions of comradeship within a small group on a good station, offset by the back-biting and feuding of a "bad" station. These satisfactions of comradeship were, of course, conditional on the individual's "playing the game" or "mucking in" and conforming to established patterns and beliefs -- an important means of social control. Gaining promotion, in part through seniority, in part through performance, was another source of gratification, more important to the 'careerist' than others (cf. Chap. II).

Continuation of these non-economic gratifications was thus heavily dependent on maintenance of the pattern of meanings that justified British rule in terms of service. There were of course time-servers merely doing a job, but for many, a quiet sense, no matter how seldom articulated, that what they were doing was of use to others beyond themselves provided a source of strength and motivation of effort. We saw in Chapter IV that this justification of rule and definition of purpose was rarely explicit, and was modified over time. The justification for rule in terms of Empire needs was, on the ideological level, almost completely displaced over time by an emphasis on the need of the colonized peoples for benevolent guidance, and then preparation for independence. The fundamental relationship of ruler and ruled was

defined in terms of paternalism. These gradual ideological shifts meant that at any one time in a colony, men of somewhat different outlook were in office; disputes over policy alternatives, within the framework of the shared premises, were not uncommon.

A schematic table of "ideological variants," based on interview and other data, is given in Chart 11.1. This "ideal-type" continuum centers on definitions of 'the African', the central concept justifying the need for rule.

The two end-points have been logically constructed; no full representative of the extremes was found among those interviewed. Officials therefore shared as basic premises that 'the African' was improvable, and that some supervision by British Protectorate administrators was still needed. But variations in the view of 'the African' implied variations in the speed and extent to which 'he' was capable of absorbing changes and handling greater responsibilities.

In the Romantic Conservative Paternalist, the nostalgia for a lost Gemeinschaft was highly developed. This latter type often had an interest in anthropology. The quotations in Chapter IX, his memoirs and the comments of those who knew him all suggest that Sir Charles Dundas had strong elements of the "Romantic Conservative Paternalist" type. There are many others, both among my sample and in the literature.[5] But those interviewed included a number of men, mostly of a somewhat older generation of officials, who believed in very slow and controlled change, but did not display the ambivalence to educated Afri-

CHART 11.1

An "Ideal-Type" Continuum of Definitions of 'The African'

Position		Label
1.	'The African' is genetically inferior, no scope for improvement; incapable of self-government; needs continuing rule by others better endowed.	Racist reactionary
2a.	'The African' is like a child who needs sure and gentle guidance to grow, plenty of time to absorb new elements. Therefore progress should be slow, power handed over in small amounts.	Conservative Paternalist
2b.	As a member of a 'tribe', 'the African' belongs to an organic community, is happiest as part of that community under the firm guidance of its natural leaders, the chiefs. Therefore disruptions should be kept to a minimum, and the integrity of tribal society protected.	Romantic Conservative Paternalist
3.	'The African' is ignorant and indolent, but capable of improvement given better conditions. Much needs to be changed and we the rulers have the skills to do it. We shall make plans and execute them on behalf of 'the African'.	Middle Paternalist
4.	Educated Africans are capable of handling much more responsibility, right now, than we are giving them. Therefore we should entrust more to local control, under our continued supervision.	Liberal Paternalist
. . . . .		
5.	Africans are just as capable of ruling themselves, right now, as any other population.	The liberal (?)

cans nor the nostalgia for a disappearing or already lost Gemeinschaft characteristic of the Romantic Conservative Paternalists.

The third position is constructed to fit Sir John Hall and certain members of his team. A striking characteristic of Sir John's thought is the lack of this romantic nostalgia for a simpler tribal way of life. There is no more use of 'the African as child' metaphor. The middle paternalist wanted an efficient British administration to push on with plans for changes to benefit 'the African', who was assumed to be adult but, with a few exceptions, incapable of doing much for himself at that time. Hierarchy and order must be maintained; both were seen as essential to carry out the measures needed on behalf of the African population. Position Four would include a number of the younger men interviewed, some of whom responded with enthusiasm to the programs and appeal of Sir Andrew Cohen. These men, like Sir Andrew himself, believed in a more rapid devolution of power to prepare for an approaching political independence, but also in the maintenance of firm British control while this process was going on. They were much more willing to associate with Africans, provided these Africans were sufficiently westernized to fit in easily with their customary British style of life.

All officials shared to at least some extent the belief that British efforts were intended to benefit 'the African' or 'Africans' or the people of the Protectorate. Those towards the upper end, down to Position Three, often combined this belief with some idea of serving

the Empire as well; the two aims were rarely seen as contradictory. Those tending towards the "Liberal Patèrnalist" pole rarely spoke of Empire; such talk to men of that cast would have been faintly embarrassing. Instead there was even greater emphasis on rapid development on behalf of, but preferably with the active involvement of, Ugandans themselves. The newer belief pattern centered on welfare improvements, more rapid political advance, "non-racialism," attempts to break down old barriers, reduce the rigidity of hierarchies, and so on, had quite displaced the importance of Empire and British patriotism as an ideological element. This newer belief pattern became the official ideology of Government House with the arrival of Sir Andrew and Lady Cohen in 1952. In a space of eight years, the dominant ideology stemming from Government House changed from one with strong Romantic Conservative Paternalist elements, through a Middle Paternalist, to a strong Liberal Paternalist outlook. Few of these changes of ideological emphasis were made explicit; the closest to explicit statements of the first two comes in the development plans considered in Chapter IX. It is not surprising that an official like the man quoted in Chapter VIII should declare that "Things were not very clear in our minds." The pragmatic style of handling problems piece-meal in which they had been trained, and the common distaste for consideration of questions about why they were doing what they were doing, ill-prepared them for such a rapidly shifting situation.

But underlying the variations, definition of Africans as in need

of paternal guidance provided continuing justification for the official presence in the colony, the exercise of power, and motivation for efforts to improve them. It is tempting to see in their definition of 'the African' the justification of the inequality so characteristic of a colonial situation, but to do so is to fall into an ethnocentric trap. These British had no need of a degrading definition of the colonized to justify inequality, for inequality was assumed to be inherent in all societies; as argued in Chapter IV, the move to a colonial situation required merely an alteration in the principle of hierarchy and exclusion: from 'class' to race. In this sense, the ideological situation of British colonizers was very different to that of the French. Sartre, in his introduction to Memmi's classic study, says,

> Conservatism brings about the selection of mediocre men. How can an elite of usurpers, aware of their mediocrity, establish their privileges? By one means only, debasing the colonized to exalt themselves, denying the title of humanity to the natives, and defining them as simply absences of qualities—animals, not humans (Memmi, 1967: xxvi).

This may have had some basis in reference to the petit blancs or even the officials of the French colonies. But the British, by selecting men socialized into a calm certainty of the superiority of their own kind, found it quite possible to regard the colonized as human, but a different kind of human — tribal man. Memmi's brilliant account of the colonizer, presented as universal truth, is in fact applicable only to those who had paid at least lip service to the ideals of

liberty, equality, and fraternity. British officials, nurtured at home on principles of inequality and exclusiveness, had fewer ideological barriers to overcome in adapting to a colonial situation.

Thus the colonial regimes were seen as having brought great benefits to 'the African': peace and security where there had been war and slave-raiding; protection against the scourge of famine; reduction of disease.[6] These were almost universally regarded as unmitigated benefits; Western education, and Christianity, were seen more ambivalently, as eroding tribal cultures, in early years. Education was viewed more enthusiastically by 1952.

The effectiveness of this emphasis on increased physical security and reduction of famine and disease, as a justification to officials themselves of their presence and activities, was greatly increased because it had a solid basis in historical fact. British officials' ideology put great emphasis on the despotic powers and low regard for life of the Ganda kings, but more recent pro-African scholarship does not disprove this view altogether. British rule <u>did</u> ease famine in Uganda and <u>did</u> reduce disease and lead to population increase, even though later scholarship suggests that some of the diseases were in fact introduced as a result of population movements consequent on colonial penetration.

We confront here another danger in assuming that ideologies are by definition false. It may be the case that in literate societies, "conscious models" or screens masking underlying reality may be

especially effective if they include components that are soundly based on observable fact. The easy verification of these components may provide the holders with a sense of the whole as soundly based, even though the whole may involve over-emphasis on certain facts and/or suppression of others. All components of an ideological screen need not necessarily be false, but such a screen can be a selective use of facts for justification of the position of its holders.[7]

Thus the belief that British rule had brought and would continue to bring great benefits to the Africans provided the officials with a solid basis for action. Every new school, new dispensary, borehole and water pump, new road, every food shortage eased, every disease epidemic (human or cattle) forestalled, was perceived confirmation of this belief. To bring these benefits, law and order, the pax Britannica, must not be threatened, and revenue had to be found.

4. Surplus and services

Switching to the perspective of political economy, one would like to have a great deal more specific information than is presently available on the flow of surplus generated within the Ugandan peasant economy. From what we now know, it seems probable that the colonial state itself was the major appropriator of surplus, through the mechanisms of taxation and the buildup of crop funds discussed in the chapters above. Another important method of appropriation was what was called above the linking institutions: those institutions in

private hands that collected, aggregated, processed and exported peasant-produced crops, and imported and distributed consumer goods. The crop processing/export activities were, as was shown above at length, carried out under strict state controls that determined the levels of profits to be made. Thus the colonial state was itself a major direct appropriator of peasant surplus and also controlled the structure and set the rules for appropriation by the processing-export interests. But the shares taken by these and retail traders cannot at present be quantified.

Once again, the language and approach would be unrecognizable to the officials, who saw the situation very differently. The perspective of the officials was well expressed by the financial secretary, who when challenged that the taxes borne by Uganda Africans were heavier even than in other parts of East Africa, replied thoughtfully:

> Yes, I think they probably were. I think we were probably more eager to get developments going on the ground, and needed the money to do it with. We couldn't borrow money; we were not allowed to have any more loans....And the net result was, I think, that Uganda was much more developed by the end of 1952 than her neighbours were. From the point of view of the welfare of the African populace, who had more and better schools, hospitals, dispensaries—a much better string of social services than our neighbours did.

This statement is factually accurate; roads, water supplies and welfare services <u>were</u> better in Uganda at that time than in her two neighbors. In Kenya, the political influence of the settlers reduced the proportion of the surplus appropriated from Africans that was returned in the form of services to them, whereas Tanganyika was

simply too poor to support extensive services. But the interpretations of the facts made by critical political economists and by the officials naturally differs. To the first, such improvements were means to increase surplus formation which could then be appropriated; to the officials, surplus appropriation through the taxation mechanism was a means to improve welfare. To some officials, welfare improvements were perceived as contributing in turn to greater productivity, but to the man quoted here, to Sir John Hall and many others, welfare improvements were their own justification — a desirable end in themselves. This conviction that they knew better than the Africans themselves what the Africans needed, and the conviction that they were taxing the Africans only in order to improve their welfare, constitutes the essence of the paternalism so characteristic of Uganda's officials. It is a conviction common to reformers who wield great power over relatively inarticulate populations.

Thus to the officials, taxation and the other mechanisms the state used for appropriation were not seen as exploitative, but as necessary to pay for services to benefit the Africans, including the essential service of ruling and maintaining order for the good of all. But if we use an objective concept of exploitation such as that discussed in Section 2 above, a system may be exploitative if it fits the criteria specified, even though some return is provided in the form of services. It can be seen that a colonial situation such as Uganda fits Dunn's definition very well. The officials and political economists

are on this point as on many others, talking past each other as a result of using different concepts stemming from different paradigms.

5. Private profit and the public good

Official attitudes to private business were rarely articulated systematically during interviews, and must be inferred from scattered statements and from the specific policies discussed in the two preceding chapters. Their perspective seemed to rest firmly on a view of society as functionally integrated, with each sector carrying on needed tasks for the benefit of the whole. There was a general assumption that private enterprise was usually the most efficient means to carry on economic enterprises, but if private enterprise was not forthcoming, there was an undoctrinaire willingness for government to become directly involved in productive enterprises.[8] On their view, in order to get businessmen to do what government wanted done, to provide services needed by the country as a whole, there had to be opportunity for a fair profit. As one man insisted emphatically, "Profit is not a dirty word!" Rather, it was compensation for carrying on essential economic tasks for the benefit of the whole. The problems in determining a "fair" profit and the importance of the belief in the sanctity of private property, were discussed at length in the preceding chapter and need not be reemphasized here.

A striking feature of these officials' discussions of economic affairs was the rarity of reference to metropolitan business interests.

This rarity may be related to the specific structure of private enterprise in Uganda, and the relative unimportance of large metropolitan firms or metropolitan connections. It would be worthwhile to compare their view with that of officials who had served in, say, Northern Rhodesia, dominated by two large mining corporations, or some of the West African colonies. Whatever the cause, the evidence is that the Ugandan officials' focus was strongly and narrowly on Uganda.

It was argued in the previous chapter that it is not necessary to drag in "serving the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie" in any direct sense to explain each and every policy decision favorable to the interests of private capital. While the pressure of metropolitan interests could be important on specific issues, the concerns of the local Ugandan bourgeoisie were made known to officialdom on an almost daily basis. The susceptibility to these local pressures is well illustrated by Engholm's work (1968) and by the example of the ginnery settlement of 1951-52. The previous chapter attempted to show how officials could maintain to themselves that they had done their best for everyone in this difficult situation. The "room for maneuver" available to them was reduced by their strong commitment to the principles of private enterprise and private property, that is, by their ideological beliefs, as well as by pressure from the Colonial Secretary and African populist leaders. Present evidence strongly suggests that their scope for action was also greatly reduced by the objective conditions of the world cotton market in which they soon had to compete

once again. Aware of Uganda's weak position as a small supplier, and opting for continuing a policy of trying to strengthen that position through maximizing quality, they greatly feared any disruption of the internal structure of pools and cotton zones that they saw as essential to maintain the saleability of Uganda's cotton. This awareness of market conditions and fear of disruption of quality does not justify the favoring of ginnery interests shown in the 1951 settlement. But combined with the ideological commitment to private enterprise, the regard for private property, the distaste for radical disruptions of existing structures, and the doubts that Africans could successfully run ginnery enterprises, it helps to make the settlement more comprehensible in terms of their own system of beliefs and values. But even then, as we saw in Chapter X, the settlement created some strain for at least one or two officials.

6. The relation of ideology to action

> We make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very definite assumptions and conditions (F. Engels, letter to Bloch, in Marx and Engels 1970b:487; emphasis added).

The relation of ideology to action in the form of policy choice could be most easily shown where an ideology was explicit, systemic and at variance with objective conditions or external pressures. A causal relationship between ideology held and policy chosen could then be more unequivocally demonstrated. But the ideology of these colonial officials was not of this sort. They defined themselves as practical men

who worked within the limitations of a situation as given, and strove for modest improvements and small gains: slow, incremental change. One of their most prominent characteristics was the tendency to take for granted the structures within which they worked, to fit in with what already existed. We have seen the consequences of this characteristic tendency as expressed in the ginnery reorganization proposals of 1951, discussed in Chapter X, Section 7: "It has been accepted as a principle that any reorganisation must proceed from the fact that the present organisation exists and that planning cannot commence completely anew" (Uganda Gazette, Sept. 21, 1951). As Brett has already pointed out (1973:37-38), this view of themselves as practical men, untheoretical, "non-ideological" is an important part of their ideological outlook.[9] "Service to others" was expressed in getting on with the job in hand, no matter how dull, routine or technical, and not wasting time searching for ultimate meanings, or even talking very much about why they were doing what they were doing.

The term 'ideology' thus tends to abstract and reify what was in reality an indissoluble part of the way in which men perceived and acted in given situations. Because this ideology was diffuse, as much a matter of ways of approaching problems as of explicit formulations, its influence on specific actions, although pervasive, is often difficult to isolate and abstract in pure form. The difficulty is worsened if one employs the over-reified concepts of 'base' and 'superstructure', use of which itself creates the difficulties of the inter-relation

between them. Williams' approach (1977:55-94) is closer to my intent: men who in the processes of day-to-day action in the colony reproduce the institutions within which they work and live; in this process of reproduction through social action, the ideas, values and consciousness that I summarize as ideology are an indissoluble part. As men of somewhat variant outlook (see above, Section 3) enter the arena and battle over policy, as external groups increase pressures, or external events jolt them into new awareness, this ideology is modified, the institutions reproduced in somewhat modified form, and the modifications then transmitted to new arrivals as established form. But some of their specific beliefs did have specific consequences. Some of the politico/administrative questions discussed in Chapter VIII illustrate this connection fairly clearly. Others have pointed out the connection between British ideas of 'tribe' and 'chief' and Indirect Rule (e.g. Low and Pratt 1970). It has now become somewhat fashionable to deemphasize the differences between the British and French "indirect" and "direct" administrations, regarding the differences more as differences in style of handling a system of domination (e.g. Berman 1974:495-508; Kiwanuka 1970), or even differences in self-description. But different styles nevertheless can have real consequences. One can test the point by speculating for a moment on what Uganda's political development might have been, had the country by some accident of history come under French rule rather than British, that is under rulers with less regard for kingships and ancient traditions. Would Buganda not, early in

colonial rule, have been divided and administered just like any other district, its kabaka as irrelevant as any other superseded petty African ruler? It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the post-independence political crises centering on the relation of Buganda to the rest of the country were a consequence, not just of colonial domination as such, but of the specific style of British colonial rule.

Salzman (1978:67) has given us a salutory reminder that the influence of ideology can also be manifested by actions not taken, possibilities not realized. The British definition of their rule as paternal, their belief in the rule of law, and their dislike of the cruder forms of bullying, did provide some constraints to the raw exercise of power, if we place their rule in a comparative context. Further, as Brett has said, they "...were by no means the most rapacious colonial ruling class which the world has seen" (1973:42). They did not use their power to make fortunes for themselves; their traditions of honesty and definitions of themselves prevented most from profiting by the generous "gifts" made available to them by those seeking favors. Their expectations of deference from those judged their social inferiors were often accompanied by a paternal concern for those who served them — provided, of course, that appropriate deference was maintained. On the larger scale, even the processes of extraction were restricted by law. Crop pricing practices built up immense reserves in the Crop Funds; controversies over these funds have been prolonged. But no one has made the obvious point that these reserves were not simply

appropriated by Britain. They were made use of, through being invested in Britain, to support the pressured pound sterling. Nevertheless they remained the property of the Uganda government, and were in the end spent within Uganda, primarily on schools, hospitals and other welfare and development measures during the regime of Sir Andrew Cohen. Whether they were spent wisely or not will long remain a matter of controversy (see Lury 1976 for a summary); but straightforward confiscation was, by that time, no longer an acceptable procedure. A sound historical and comparative approach will require recognition that certain possible forms of exercise of power were ruled out by the officials' ideology defining themselves and the purpose of their rule, as this changed over time.

At a deeper and more general level, it can be argued that ideology functioned as a controlling, calibrating mechanism, without which the system could not have functioned as it did. We saw above that the British government had few middle-range structural controls over its governors; there was no inspectorate, and few sanctions were available short of the extreme sanction of dismissal. It could be said that the metropolitan government insisted that imperial needs be met, but on many issues left governors great scope as to how to meet them. To meet these imperial needs, and generate revenue to support a colonial administration, new economic institutions had to be created, maintained and over time adjusted to meet changing conditions. It was argued at the end of Chapter X that such institutions could be created, and ad-

justments made as needed, with little direction from the metropolis. The officials' attitudes towards business and private property, widely shared as they were by men of their 'class' (cf. Miliband 1973:67-76) provided an important means of ensuring that such economic institutions would be maintained in a form easily articulated to the wider imperial system, without the necessity of frequent direct control from the metropolitan interests, and without the officials consciously striving to serve these interests. These officials, at least by the time period we are concerned with, were aiming to develop an economy that could support a wider range of social services, and could be handed over to Ugandans at independence as a viable going concern. But the "models for" economic relations that they had available to them in their cultural repertoire,[10] and the limitations imposed on them by their ideological convictions, including their definitions of 'the African' restricted them to a fairly narrow range of alternatives — alternatives compatible with the wider system. The ideological controls resulting from careful socialization and selection supplemented the rather loose institutional controls from the center, and made it possible to "trust the man on the spot" not to stray too far from acceptable paths in economic as well as other spheres of activity. These ideological restrictions operated within, and were in some areas, I suggest, even narrower than, the objective constraints of ecology and dependency.

We have argued that the ideologies of rule had, along with other factors, a determining effect on certain types of action, gave a

distinct style to British administration that has had observable consequences, and acted as internal controls that kept official actions within acceptable limits in situations of little supervision and poor communications. It provided categories for rendering comprehensible complex situations foreign to their earlier experience, making possible actions in terms of those categories. It provided justification for the exercise of power over alien peoples, their presence in strange and not always comfortable situations, and a strong sense of self-identity and superiority in the midst of alien cultures. It provided a range of non-economic gratifications, notably a satisfaction of that need to feel of service to others instilled by their early socialization. For some, ideology thus motivated a higher level of effort than could have been obtained by merely economic rewards. Yet these men had to operate within the constraints of external conditions that often left them with little room for maneuver, conditions over which they had no control. As post hoc observers, we can see many occasions when the effective determinants of their actions were other than their own benevolent motives about developing the Africans. They worked within an underlying structure of dependency, subject to imperial demands, part of a system of imperial relations that operated, if the analyses of today's political economists are sound, in ways antithetical to what they thought they were doing.

7. Ideological screens

How, then, did the officials maintain their beliefs, and especially their belief in the benevolence of their rule, if the system did, overall, in fact operate antithetically to the best interests of the Africans? A number of elements and patterns of thought helped to reduce the strains of cognitive dissonance and to maintain the officials' belief in themselves and what they were doing. These must be discussed sequentially, which tends to obscure the ways in which several devices could operate simultaneously, reinforcing each other as needed.

1. The principle of the primacy of knowledge gained through direct personal experience.

1a. As a corollory, an emphasis on what was manifest and could be directly observed or experienced — the well-known British emphasis on empiricism, but in practical day-to-day form.

2. Recruitment of men oriented to action rather than intellectual analysis (cf. Chap. II).

3. Recruitment of men socialized to take for granted, without much analysis, the institutions within which they worked, and to respect established patterns (cf. Chap. III).

4. An absence of any tradition, in their education, of reflexive examination of their own society and hence their role in it. This point is related to the central lack in the British intellectual tradition of a developed critical sociology (cf. Anderson 1968).

4a. The "fencing off" by custom of the central elements of culture,

definitions of purpose, and key symbols. Inquiry into the deeper meanings of "trusteeship" or "service" or the monarchy was Not Done (cf. Chap. III). Those of intellectual bent took up the "safe" avocations of history, amateur anthropology or natural history.[11]

5. Social customs within the enclave that left little time for thought or scholarly inquiry. These ranged from heavy pressures of work through the demands of social activities. For those prone to bouts of thoughtfulness, the antidote of yet another cricket game or another amateur drama production, plus social pressures to take part, was always available.

5a. Strong measures of social control within the colonial enclaves that discouraged expression of markedly dissident viewpoints (cf. Tanner 1963).

6. The inexplicit, inarticulate nature of beliefs. Here, the ordinary connotations of 'ideology' as an articulated system are misleading. Articulation and systematization, as attempted in Chapters III and IV, is an artifact of analysis that distorts the actual processes of thought. In Chapter IV I used the metaphor of a great public "warehouse" of culture, from which officials could draw elements as needed. The fact that at any one time, only some of the elements were in use and in public view, reduced the possibilities of internal contradictions between them becoming blatantly apparent.

7. The definition of themselves as "practical men," not ones prone to "wasting time" pondering on ultimate purposes.

7a. A distaste for comprehensive long-term planning — much less marked in Sir John Hall than in most.

8. Very strong inculcation of loyalty as a primary virtue, that accompanied the similar inculcation of a belief in service to others, duty and obedience to recognized authority (cf. Chap. III).

9. Restriction of the focus of interest to Uganda. This was less true for governors, and for "careerists" (cf. Chap. II) than for the majority who spent most of their working lives in one colony.

All of these traits and orientations of thought cumulated to inhibit deep inquiry into the nature of the wider structures of which they were a part. While most are self-explanatory, the first point needs special emphasis. We saw in Chapter II that the administrative structure was arranged in such a way that the point of articulation with the controlling metropolis was very narrow. One result was that very few men had direct experience of imperial demands on the colony. Even the most blatant demands, such as bulk-buying, were handled by only a few at the top. As shown in Chapter X, this issue left a residue of indignation and accusations of "exploitation," in at least one of these. Another man was still resentful in 1974 because a governor some thirty-five years before had cut out the comments critical of employers from his report on an investigation of labor conditions. But even these men who had experienced, on specific issues, the realities of the extractive system, did not generalize that experience to other issues. A few others were cynical about the influence of the

local businessmen. Thus there were unresolved strains, but for these officials the strains did not reach the point where they threatened to be demoralizing. They could be offset by loyalty and the principle of service to Uganda. Most men, especially those serving in the districts, could go through their careers without such direct experiences of imperial demands or economic realities.

On this point, there is a weakness in the design of the present study. By focussing only on those who continued to function in their posts, I cannot say how many of those who chose to resign, or even those who sought solace in the bottle, did so as a consequence of dissonance between their professed ideals and an awareness of underlying exploitation. My expectation is that the number would be very few, so careful was the selection and so powerful the combination of factors helping to sustain the system of beliefs and definitions of self. But this point needs further investigation.

The serenity of these men, the lack of self-doubt that was itself an instrument of domination, is perhaps now easier to comprehend. We can see that, given their backgrounds and their life-situations, maintenance of their beliefs was critically important to their own interests. Definition of their work as a happy combination of challenging and enjoyable tasks, paying enough money to live and retire on, with a chance to serve others, could have been easily threatened by examination of the wider implications of what they were doing. Those in administration, especially, exercised great power over inarticulate

people, a responsibility potentially crushing to those not buoyed up by a confidence that they knew best and were equipped to rule. It was a good and satisfying life — as long as they kept their ideological screens firmly in place.

From the point of view of the imperial system, once the cynicism of the 1920s had displaced the earlier faith in working for the greater glory of the Empire, motivational patterns emphasizing working for 'the African' or the colony were probably much more effective than talk of Empire in maintaining morale and drawing forth effort from young Britons, in situations of low supervision in remote areas. We saw above that collection of taxes, and production of export crops, was carried out within a perspective that defined these tasks as essential to building up the colony for the good of its inhabitants, not for the Empire.

But from the metropolitan viewpoint, this emphasis on an ideology of service ran at least two serious risks. First, for those raised to set very high standards for themselves, in an ethic in which service and helping others should always take precedence over meeting one's own needs, these latter needs can be met through actions to "help" others provided the self-serving aspects of such actions can be successfully screened out. The phenomenon is familiar enough on the individual level, but appears to have operated often on the social as well. Examples can be quoted of policies devised originally for an expedient purpose obvious to their originators, but wrapped in outer garments

of high moral purpose. Later comers recall only the high moral purpose. Most dangerous perhaps are those situations where the expediency is not obvious even to the originators. The "screening out" of disturbing information, essential to maintain the belief in one's altruism, can result in such biased and incomplete perception of a situation that action based on such perception can lead to disaster.[12]

Secondly, selection of senior staff to man the colonies ran the risk of an excess of the virtues for which those men were selected. The system needed intelligent men, but not too questioning; a touch of idealism, but not to the point of unreality; a belief in working hard for the colony, but not to the point of putting the colony's needs ahead of imperial needs. Berman point out (quoted in Chap. II) that administrative structures of the "prefectoral field administration" type are subject to strong centrifugal tendencies, posing serious problems of central control. The ideology of service inculcated in those sent out exacerbated this tendency for officials manning the units to identify with their perception of the interests of the unit against those of the central authority. Thus the colonial system, as a device for meeting imperial needs, was from the imperial point of view subject to the constant danger that the men who manned it could believe the ideology of service too strongly, by identifying with service to the colony against the center. This, together with the differential rates of change in outlook between metropolis and colony mentioned above, contributed to make the colonial administrative

apparatus less immediately responsive to changing demands from the metropolis than the metropolis might desire (cf. Lee 1967:54-55).

Still from the perspective of the imperial system, maintenance of these ideological screens was essential for the functioning of the system as then set up. British colonies, until late in the colonial period, were run on the cheap. Esprit de corps, the satisfactions of service, all the non-economic gratifications discussed above, helped to keep men working at jobs not highly paid if measured on a British scale. The strong internalization of what was Done and Not Done, and the implicit implantation of limits to action, made it possible to run these administrations with very low levels of supervision, again keeping costs down. Recruitment of men from a narrow sub-culture, who shared assumptions and a communications code, made it possible for men to be shifted from one area to another, and one colony to another, with minimal disruption. As regards economic matters, these shared assumptions included attitudes to property and profit that helped to ensure the maintenance of the appropriate economic relations with minimal direction from the metropolis, again reducing the costs of centralized control. Thus, despite the presence of some time-servers and a few men of the type one informant called "lotus-eaters" (cf. Chap. II) these men continued to provide the services needed to maintain order and expedite the flow of surplus, without either the lure of very high salaries or the goad of strict supervision, in part because they firmly believed they were doing so for the purpose of

building a new society for their colony's inhabitants.

8. Parallels

We have now looked at some of the complex inter-relations between ideology and action, including its crucial function of control, and have examined some of the devices that contributed to maintenance of belief by people working within structures whose deeper operations were often antithetical to what they thought they were doing. The specific historical example of British colonial officials has vanished along with the era of formal colonies. There may be few social roles today that combine in the same way great power over inarticulate alien peoples, low to moderate salaries, decentralization and absence of strict supervision, with an ideology of service providing an important element of motivation and control. But certain features of this combination may be found in contemporary situations; before turning back to the level of colonial political economy it is worth looking briefly for possible parallels. Are there contemporary situations in which ideological screens function in a similar manner?

One possible parallel may be found among some communities of expatriate foreign aid personnel. Foreign aid personnel have much less political power than did British officials, are much more highly paid, and often much more cynical. Nevertheless, in hindsight, I can recognize many similarities between the devices listed above, and those used by myself and others in the expatriate aid community in

Uganda in the 1960s, to still nagging doubts about the deeper significance of our work. Absorption in the immediate technical challenges, a narrow focus on the specific project, and at the widest on Uganda without regard to its external ties of dependency, the screening out of disturbing information, taking satisfaction in the feeling that one was doing something useful for the country, all helped to still the twinges of guilt that liberals raised with egalitarian values felt at the gross inequalities of their privileged life. Aid personnel, on this score, lacked the benefits of the older British doctrine of inequality as inherent in any society; nevertheless, in my experience, liberals and even radicals adapted quickly to their privileged way of life, as I did myself. Very high salaries helped to compensate for the lack of a strong esprit de corps and a sense of a commitment to a career. Less careful recruitment resulted in considerably greater fluctuation in level of skills and adequacy of performance. The greater heterogeneity of the expatriate community reduced the intensity of informal social control, which nevertheless remained strong. It was still Not Done to question seriously the justifications for one's presence in that comfortable life, as I know from experience. It was a good, well-paid and satisfying life — as long as we kept our ideological screens firmly in place.

Nevertheless, the beliefs that sustained us then were relatively weak, in that many of us, once removed from that social setting, look back and wonder how we could have used so narrow a perspective. The

ideology prevalent among the officials in Entebbe in the 1940s, despite internal variants, was much stronger and more coherent than that found there in the 1960s. In the 1940s, it was also sustained by social rituals and a shared cultural code to which even those in the "lower ranks" not socialized at public schools were expected to adapt to. This ideology has been sufficiently powerful that, despite retirement back in Britain, and despite the tragic events in Uganda, all but one or two officials interviewed still seemed thoroughly internal to it, when interviewed in 1974-75. The coherence of their beliefs has sustained them in a manner not possible for the 1960s aid personnel.

An analysis along these lines, with modifications to allow for differing cultural content, might be relevant to the question raised by Raikes (1975) quoted in Chapter I: how can the officials manning the bureaucracy of Tanzania maintain the belief that they are building socialism by reimposing colonial regulations and using force to compel peasants into villages?

If we move even further away from the dimension of power, are there not occupational roles within our own society sharing some of the features isolated above: low supervision and low to moderate salaries, but maintenance of the performance of needed services through maintenance of a belief in service to others, or in doing something useful for society. One thinks immediately of social workers, teachers and possibly even that type of university professor whose motivation involves a belief in being useful.[13] In these jobs, as with colonial

officials, security of tenure is usually high, "time serving" or doing a bare minimum to meet formal requirements is possible, but provision of services at a level above this bare minimum is beneficial to the wider system. Such provision is heavily dependent on maintenance of the individual's belief in the value of what he or she is doing, even when the operations of the deeper system are antithetical to that belief. Maintenance of "ideological screens" may be even more crucial to the continued delivery of an adequate level of certain types of skilled services in the middle and upper echelons of society, than for wage-laborers producing commodities, where "quality control" and strict supervision are more feasible. Further research on the nature and functioning of "ideological screens" among our own kind could be of great interest for anthropology, provided that the researcher could avoid the paralyzing effect of querying the point of doing the research. For, as the Colonial Office recruiters well understood, too much thought about why one is doing tasks of this order is not conducive to getting them done, and done well.

We may now be better able to understand why many colonial officials, looking back on their work, put such heavy emphasis on their motivations. This emphasis was less characteristic of those regarded by their fellows as archetypal careerists than those who had spent many years in Uganda and become deeply involved in their work there. Dismayed by the tragic turn of events in recent years, they seemed to turn back to the one element that, given their epistemological principles, they could

be absolutely certain of, for they had experienced it directly: the goodness of their intentions. This emphasis is not entirely a post hoc phenomenon. Wild's scholarly inquiry into the actions of some of his official predecessors opens with a quotation from Winston Churchill, who expresses with incomparable style the essence of this English perspective:

> It is not given to human beings, happily for them, for otherwise life would be intolerable, to foresee or to predict to any large extent the unfolding course of events. In one phase men seem to have been right, in another they seem to have been wrong. Then again, a few years later, when the perspective of time has lengthened, all stands in a different setting. There is a new proportion. There is another scale of values.
>
> History with its flickering lamp stumbles along the trail of the past, trying to reconstruct its scenes, to revive its echoes, and kindle with pale gleams the passion of former days.
>
> What is the worth of all this? The only guide to a man is his conscience; the only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his actions. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting of our calculations; but with this shield, however the fates may play, we march always in the ranks of honour (quoted in Wild 1955:vi; original source not given).

9. Motivations and structures

But in the long run, history is made not by the motives of men and women, however good, but rather by the consequences of their actions, intended or not. We must turn from the level of motivations back to the new proportion made possible by the passage of time: the perspec-


tive of political economy. The present inquiry, focussed on the level of subjectivity, has pointed up certain gaps in our present knowledge of the objective structures and dynamics of the colonial system. In this final section I shall list briefly a few aspects needing further exploration.

First, a consideration of the specifics of the Ugandan case shows that in this and possibly many other cases a simple metropolis-satellite model is inadequate. The economic relations, and the flow of surplus, were much more complex. Chart 11.2 attempts a schematic diagram of the surplus flows for which we now have evidence. This chart indicates especially the need for greater information on possible connections between the British metropolis and the Indian cotton industry.

Second, a better understanding of the dynamics of the Ugandan economy may require refinement of a number of concepts now current. The above analysis suggests that it is too easy to slip into use of the actors' categories of 'European' and 'Indian' businessmen. However salient the racial categories may have been for understanding many social interactions, they may disguise important economic differentiations: between local small capital owners (such as those with one or two ginneries) and local large capital owners (such as the sugar estates), and between local and foreign-based capital. For example, it may be the case that the differences in the situation of a small under-capitalized ginnery owner and that of the Uganda ginnery

CHART 11.2

The upward flow of economic benefits



* Especially tariffs bearing heavily on peasant-used consumer goods

** Especially freight rates beneficial to Kenya European produce, detrimental to Ugandan produce

branches of large vertically-integrated industrial complexes based in India are far more important than the fact that both were run by Indians.

Similarly, a better understanding of Uganda's role vis-a-vis the British economy requires refinements of the gross concepts of "Lancashire" and "cotton." We need to know who needed what kinds and staple lengths of cotton at what time; why British demand for medium-long staple Ugandan cotton fell off in the early 1920s, why Indian and Japnese demand went up. In particular, what happened to Ugandan cotton after it reached India? How much was reexported, if any, in later years? Was the Indian cotton industry independent, or in the long run subservient to the British economy? Ideally one would end up with a model of the Empire cotton supply/textile industry in which it would be possible to place expansion of cotton crops in Tanganyika and Nigeria, medium-long staple in Uganda, and the special long-staple cotton of the vast irrigated Gezira scheme in the Sudan, in relation to changing demand for different kinds of cotton in the manufacturing countries, especially Britain and India.

Many scholars, following Ehrlich (1958), have accepted the view that Uganda's vast internal apparatus of regulations controlling cotton production was to be explained by an official obsession with "orderly marketing," tidiness and a taste for authoritarian control. But we need seriously to consider the officials' viewpoint that controls were necessary because a high, specialized, consistent quality was

essential to try to win for Uganda, as a tiny producer, a somewhat more secure niche in world markets. It seems probable that some British officials had in fact a more realistic awareness of the impact of world cotton market forces than some scholars.

Third, broader comparative studies of the British colonial system are needed, to correct the tendency of studies (including this one) focussed on one colony to look at the colony-metropolis relationship through a distorted perspective that tends to overemphasize the importance of that colony to metropolitan needs. If we reversed positions and examined the economic ties between Uganda and Britain from the British end, we might well find that Uganda had been salient to a small and specialized segment of the British bourgeoisie at one time, of much less interests for many years, somewhat more important during the war years, and so on. That is, direct imperial demands may well have fluctuated in intensity; during intervening periods, the cultural "templates" held by officials guiding economic relations could be relied on to maintain appropriate economic structures "in reserve" as it were, to be called on when needed.

Fourth, if 'exploitation' pertains to objective relations, and is in principle quantifiable then it can also, in principle, occur in larger and smaller magnitudes. Once again, a comparative approach will in time rectify a certain lack of perspective in some contemporary studies, a lack that may be exacerbated by a moral disapproval of exploitation wherever it is found in whatever amounts. The moral dis-

approval can be harmful only if it interferes with adequate scholarly recognition that the degree of exploitation could vary over time in one society and also from one type of colonial society to another. It is not a justification of British rule to point out that the situation of the independent land-holding peasants of Uganda (especially those in the ecologically-favored areas) was considerably less precarious than that of, say, the nineteenth century peasants of Ireland (cf. Lebow 1976), the shattered remnants of colonial penetration in British Columbia, or even the people of Central Province in adjoining Kenya. The fact that Uganda's peasants bore an extremely heavy load of taxation imposed by the colonial state does not alter the fact that they did not, as many peasants elsewhere did, also have to bear simultaneously the heavy exactions of a landlord class or have recourse to usurious money-lenders. Further, they did get certain services in return. If we fail to recognize such variations, we run the risk of confirming Dalton's accusation that 'exploitative' is used merely as a label for regimes we do not like (1975:339).

Finally, we are left with the vexed question of the objective class position of a colonial bureaucracy of the sort whose higher reaches we have been looking at here. The population delineated in Chapter II was just one small part of a larger bureaucratic organization. In addition, the European civil service included medical doctors, veterinarians, engineers, printers, auditors, police officers, judges, surveyors, geologists, technicians of all sorts, cypher clerks,

secretaries, public works managers, and so on. The majority of these were recruited in Britain, but many came from more humble social origins than the administrators or the agricultural officers analyzed here.

A colonial bureaucracy of this sort provides an especially vivid illustration of Poulantzas' concept of a bureaucracy as a social category.

> ...social categories may, because of their relation to the state apparatuses and ideology, present a unity of their own, despite the fact that they belong to various classes; and what is more, in their political functioning, they can present a relative autonomy vis-a-vis the classes to which their members belong (1974:40 emphasis in original).

The isolation and the homogenizing effect of enclave life provided ideal conditions for the development of an esprit de corps and some sense of unity in a common service that helped to transcend, on official occasions at least, internal differentiations in 'class' subculture. But this unity was forged by the hegemony of the higher administration, not only as wielders of power but also as providers of the social norms and the dominant ideology. Information on the social background of administrative recruits is relevant, not on the naive assumption that these men will invariably serve the class interests of the class from which they came, but because such social origin determined the ideological institutions through which they passed, and hence their ideological preparation.

Brett (1973:37-43) has earlier put forward an analysis in which he

speaks throughout of these men as members of a British ruling class and as forming a colonial ruling class. His use of "ruling class" is somewhat loose. If class is to be determined by relation to the means of production, and if, as Miliband argues, to Marxists "...the 'ruling class' of capitalist society is that class which owns and controls the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society" (1973:23), these men were clearly not of the British ruling class. We saw in Chapter II that only a tiny minority had independent wealth; many came from families rich only in status-culture. The main supply of colonial administrative officers came from social elements that had for generations specialized in providing servants for the Empire, but were not themselves significant owners or controllers of the means of production. They were, however, educated along with the sons of such owners, through the key institution of the English public school. They were linked to the ruling class, not by shared membership, but shared ideology. Although only a minority were themselves of aristocratic background, this ideology transmitted by the public schools had, as Wilkinson (1964:10-12) and Berman (1974:105-6, 505) have pointed out, strong elements derived from the class outlook of the older landed aristocracy. This melding of the aristocratic and bourgeois traditions in the nineteenth century created the unifying sub-sulture of the English gentleman with his ethic of service, that was transmitted not only to the sons of the

aristocracy and bourgeoisie proper, but also to the 'middle-class' elements who scrimped to send their sons to public schools and the old universities.[14] A striking characteristic of men such as these colonial officials is their combination of lack of personal wealth with possession of an ideology or class sub-culture shared by the owners of wealth and to some extent by the older aristocracy as well. The tension between their need of a job for economic survival, and the demands of their ideology of service, helps to explain how the British Empire ran. It is obscured if these men are lumped into a loosely defined "ruling class."

Similarly, to speak of colonial officials as a "colonial ruling class," as Brett does, confuses matters further. As we saw above, the higher reaches of the Administration kept firm control of power, and certainly can be said to have ruled the colony. But, in the case of Uganda and most other colonies of administration, ownership of any part of the means of production in their colony was expressly forbidden to them. Conceptual clarity is enhanced if we adopt Poulantzas' terminology and regard the bureaucracy as a social category; social categories

> ...can at times function as effective social forces; i.e. they have an important political role <u>of their own</u> in a given conjuncture. This role is not reducible to the fact of being 'in tow' behind the social classes to which their members belong or even behind the fundamental social forces, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (1974: 41; emphasis in original).

If this relative autonomy is possible for a bureaucracy within a

metropolitan society, it would appear even more likely for a colonial bureaucracy in an isolated colony. For a bureaucracy, Poulantzas insists, can serve class interests quite different to those from which its members came.

To writers of Mamdani's type, the answer is obvious and straightforward: a colonial bureaucracy served the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. But this answer has both logical and empirical problems. In brief, it is a functionalist assertion, and hence subject to the standard critiques of functionalist explanation. It is empirically vague; in fact, it is sometimes wielded in a manner astonishingly reminiscent of the old Radcliffe-Brownian explanations of "contributing to the maintenance of social solidarity." If it is to be of use, it needs more careful specification. For it to be true, would each and every action of a colonial bureaucracy have to demonstrably serve the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie? Or only half their actions? Or only the most important ones? What would count as disconfirming evidence? Does "serving the interests of" mean taking actions actively benefiting the interests of a metropolitan class, or merely not contrary to their interests — a point of some practical significance.

Such an explanation is also subject to the critique that in any complex system, the consequences of an action or element may be different for different levels or sub-units of the system. In addition to the metropolitan bourgeoisie, there were involved in this complex system a peasantry, a local bourgeoisie, the regional bourgeoisie of

Kenya, elements of the bourgeoisie of India, as well as wider markets, and not least, the interests of the bureaucracy itself. To take a specific example, the early operations of the cotton industry contributed to the needs of the metropolitan bourgeoisie for a safe Empire source of cotton, were beneficial to a local bourgeoisie, and served the needs of the bureaucracy for a source of revenue. The benefits the metropolitan bourgeoisie derived from Uganda in the inter-war years are less readily apparent, but may have been present on a small scale. The bulk-buying of the war and postwar years was a blatant imposition of metropolitan needs over local needs, and was opposed by both the local bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. The ginnery settlement of 1951 seems to have served primarily the local bourgeoisie and to some extent that element of India's bourgeoisie with ginnery interests in Uganda, with the metropolitan interests having been reduced to a minor share. The 1951 expansion of cooperatives even met, to a minor extent, the demands of the rising new African middle element. Above all, the settlement met the needs of the bureaucracy itself (see Chap. X). For, as argued above, creation of a colony led to new social institutions whose own interests might often overlap with, but were not always identical to, those of the metropolis. The primary device for keeping such contradictions within acceptable limits was the shared ideology. As Brett puts it, "The high degree of agreement over fundamentals made it possible for the system to sustain a considerable degree of conflict over detail (1973:40).

A modified version of the "serves the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie" argument might hold that the colonial system as a whole, and overall, benefited the metropolitan bourgeoisie, but that each and every official action in each and every colony did not necessarily do so. Such a version is prima facie more plausible, subject to the logical caveats and need for specification noted above. Such a version would make it possible to account for the partial autonomy sometimes displayed by a colonial bureaucracy, and the complex inter-relationships of the sort illustrated by Chart 11.2. That is, the evidence presented here, and found in other studies of actual relations between colony and metropolis, suggests that within this decentralized system, some "play" or room for maneuver on the part of a colony's senior officials not only existed, but was essential to the operations of the system. This "play" was kept within limits tolerable to metropolitan interests in large part through ideology as a controlling mechanism.

One problem here is the difficulty of clarifying complex functional inter-relationships of a multi-levelled system by starting with an analysis of one constituent sub-unit of that system. A fuller understanding of the part Uganda played within that wider system, and of the consequences for the different interests of the actions of its rulers, requires a broader framework, and considerably more empirical evidence than is yet available.

This conclusion reflects both the dangers and the challenge of

"studying up" within complex societies. The present study began by focussing on a population of a few hundred man — small by anthropological standards, but strategically situated. Tracing out only a very few of their actions has led step by step to recognition of a need for systemic analysis on a scale little short of Wallerstein's world-system. Can anthropologists contribute to analyses on such a dizzying scale?

NOTES

1. My thinking on this point has been clarified by discussions with my colleague, H. Sharp, a spirited defender of this position.

2. Former colonial officials now anthropologists would include Beattie, G.I. Jones, Cochrane and Brokensha among others. A leading historian of the colonial period, Kirk-Greene, was earlier an administrative official in Nigeria; historians Stigger, Barber, Freeman-Grenville all served in East Africa, as did the legal scholar H.M. Morris. A few of the leading "formerly colonized" from Africa would include Uchendu, Onoge, Owusu and by extension, two South Africans, Magubane and Mafeje; three of those whose work is dealt with here fall into the category of formerly colonized: Kabwegyere, Mamdani and Mukherjee.

3. My emphasis on the objective nature of exploitation thus does not deny the great importance of works such as Scott (1976); what he calls his phenomenological approach is an exemplary demonstration of how objectively exploitative conditions are experienced by a peasantry. Unfortunately we have almost no material on this subject for the peasants of Uganda. During the decade in which serious anthropological work began (1950-60) the dominant theoretical frameworks made no use of concepts such as 'exploitation' or even 'peasantry'. If, as Dalton would have it (1976:645) we can demonstrate the presence of exploitation only when we have evidence that the exploited feel outraged, the use of the concept would depend on the accidents of what researchers write down in their notebooks. To take a specific example from Uganda, few anthropologists have provided information about peasant reactions to the "creaming off" of a high proportion of the growers' share of cotton and coffee proceeds into the Crop Funds (see Chap. X), a question apparently of little theoretical interest to anthropology at that time. Desirable as it would be now to have such information on peasant perceptions, its absence should not debar us from classifying the Crop Funds as a highly effective mechanism of exploitation.

4. A typical example of Mamdani's projection of his own categories into rulers' consciousness is found in his summary of the implications of the 1949 riots.

> The point was that the 1949 rural violence, just as that of 1945, could not be dismissed as a "disturbance," for these were <u>political</u> events. And as political events they represented the demands of a class, the

> African petty bourgeoisie (specifically, the Baganda kulaks). This class found that the very nature of the organization of social production and appropriation set limits to its own growth, and that either room had to be made for it in the existing system of appropriation or the whole system was in danger. For this to happen, a fundamental shift in the political relations between the colonial state and the African petty bourgeoisie was necessary. The colonial state understood this very well (1976:183).

But whether the men who manned the higher positions in the colonial state did or did not dismiss these riots as a "disturbance," and did or did not understand their implications, is a matter for empirical investigation. I have argued above that the 1945 riots were so dismissed, the 1949 ones rather less so. But the 1949 riots certainly were not understood in anything like Mamdani's sense, for the officials did not think in class terms; they responded to the political pressure of the 1949 riots and later events, but without an analytical awareness of the accelerating processes of social differentiation, at that time (1949-51). The new men who took over after 1952 showed somewhat more awareness.

5. For example, Rattray, quoted in Chapter IV. See Gartrell 1974 for further discussion.

6. Since such justifications were seldom explicit nor systematized, written expressions are rare. One of great interest is contained in the introductory chapter of an historical study, the product of an official's avocation. In this chapter we see a thoughtful Liberal Paternalist grappling with the history of colonization, acknowledging strategy and trade as factors, but concluding that "the humane desire to remove or alleviate the suffering revealed by explorers was a powerful motive in inducing Europeans to come to East Africa" (Wild 1944:4). The argument at this point substitutes statements about the motivations of individuals for analysis of the new systemic relations created by colonization.

7. See the example discussed in Chapter X, regarding perception of the historical evidence of African entrepreneurial efforts. The negative instances used were soundly based in fact, but knowledge of positive examples that historians now draw attention to was not widely disseminated among officials.

8. Thus government started a hotel in Entebbe, a fish marketing enterprise, a cement plant, a mechanized farm. The development

of the parastatal Uganda Development Corporation to provide for governmental participation in new productive enterprises also illustrates this attitude.

9. See also the quotation on pp. 412-413 above.

10. Cf. Geertz' distinctions between "models of" and "models for" (1973:73).

11. It is notable that not even those classed as professional intellectuals, the British social anthropologists, inquired deeply into the nature of the colonial situation, of which they themselves were intermittently a part.

12. This point can contribute to the frequent accusation that hypocrisy is the national vice of the English. E.M. Forster discussed the point in a short but penetrating essay on the English character.

> The Englishman's deceit is generally unconscious. For I have suggested earlier that the English are sometimes hypocrites, and it is now my duty to develop this rather painful subject. Hypocrisy is the prime charge that is always brought against us....Is the charge true? I think it is; but while making it we must be quite clear as to what we mean by hypocrisy. Do we mean conscious deceit? Well, the English are comparatively guiltless of this; they have little of the Renaissance villain about them. Do we mean unconscious deceit? Muddle-headedness? Of this I believe them to be guilty. When an Englishman has been led into a course of wrong action, he has nearly always begun by muddling himself. A public-school education does not make for mental clearness, and he possess to a very high degree the power of confusing his own mind (1967:22).

What Forster does not deal with is the systemic functioning of this highly developed capacity for deceiving oneself, and especially deceiving oneself about one's help to others.

13. To take a specific example, it may not be far-fetched to see some similarities between the attitude of colonial officials that they knew better than the Africans themselves what the Africans needed, and the attitudes of social policy makers who believe they know best what is good for the aged. This point was suggested by discussions with Krystyna Starker.

14. Some of these latter may have been families originating in higher strata, but downwardly mobile because of the British principle of primogeniture in transmission of both titles and estates.

APPENDIX

LIST OF THOSE INTERVIEWED

Uganda Protectorate Civil Service

G.D. Badger
W.L. Bell, C.M.G., M.B.E.
Sir Arthur E.T. Benson, G.C.M.G.
D.R.N. Brown and Mrs. Brown
C.F. Campbell
Sir George Cartland, Kt., C.M.G.
J.S. Champion, C.M.G., O.B.E., and Mrs. Champion
Dr. K.A. Davies, C.M.G., O.B.E., and Mrs. Davies
C.R.C. Donald, C.M.G., O.B.E.
R.L.E. Dreschfield, C.M.G.
J.R. McD. Elliot, C.M.G., O.B.E., and Mrs. Elliot
G.M. Fletcher, O.B.E. and Mrs. Fletcher
Mrs. Elizabeth Forbes
Geoffrey Greenwood
Sir John Hathorn Hall, G.C.M.G., O.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., and Lady Hall
Miss C.I.M. Hastie, M.B.E.
F.J. Lattin, C.M.G., and Mrs. Lattin
J.C.D. Lawrance, O.B.E.
R. Maltby, M.B.E.
G.B. Masefield
Reginald McKay and Mrs. McKay
Sir Geoffrey Nye, K.C.M.G., O.B.E., and Lady Nye
C. Powell-Cotton, C.M.G., M.B.E., M.C., J.P.
C.A.L. Richards, C.M.G.
D.W. Robertson, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.
J.M. Ross, O.B.E., and Mrs. Ross

C.C. Spencer, C.M.G., and Mrs. Spencer
R.E. Stone, C.M.G., and Mrs. Stone
Sir Colin Thornley, K.C.M.G., C.V.O.
D.C. Todd
A.R. Tucker
T.Y. Watson, C.M.G., M.B.E., and Mrs. Watson
J.V. Wild, C.M.G., O.B.E., and Mrs. Wild
F.R.J. Williams, O.B.E., and Mrs. Williams

Others

Sir Kenneth Bradley, Kt., C.M.G.
Lord Fenner Brockway
Mrs. Michael Hope (formerly Lady Cohen)
Lt. Col. W.H.L. Gordon, C.B.E., M.C.
Rt. Hon. James Griffiths, P.C., C.H., and Mrs. Griffiths
Clifford Lewis, C.B.E., and Mrs. Lewis
Sir Amar Maini, Kt., C.B.E.
Mrs. T. Makumbi
Aziz Mitha
T.N. Watson
Dr. E.B. Worthington, C.B.E.

In addition, the following social scientists kindly shared with me their observations on aspects of colonial life they had encountered while working in Uganda:

Dr. John Beattie
Dr. L.A. Fallers and Margaret Chave Fallers
Dr. A.I. Richards, C.B.E.
Dr. Aidan Southall
Dr. David Walker

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