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The City University of New York, Ph.D., 1974
History, modern

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1974

ELIE HALÉVY: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY

by

MYRNA CHASE ENGELMEYER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in History in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1974

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in History in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August 12, 1974
date

Gertrude Himmelfarb
Chairman of the Examining Committee
Gertrude Himmelfarb

August 12, 1974
date

Richard C. Wade
Acting Executive Officer
Richard C. Wade

Melvin Richter
Donald J. Harvey
Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

Acknowledgments

I have felt indebted to Professor Gertrude Himmelfarb at every stage of this dissertation and I would like to acknowledge her inspiration, her encouragement and her invaluable suggestions and criticism.

I would also like to thank Docteur Henriette Houffland Guy-Lo , Mal vy's niece and literary executor, for sharing his papers and her memories, and for continuing her family's tradition of warm hospitality to visiting scholars.

I want to thank Professor Melvin Richter who shared his respect for Elie Mal vy, his insights into the special nature of French liberalism and several of his connections with scholars and with Mal vy's family. I want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Donald Harvey, W.O. Shanahan and especially Irving Kristol for their encouragement.

I want to thank Monsieur Pierre Petitrennin, the chief librarian of the Ecole Normale Sup rieure, and his able assistant, Madame Marie-Claire Poulez, for opening their archives for my use. Mademoiselles Humbert and Ry made the Xavier L on papers at the Biblioth que Victor Cousin available for me when the library was closed and I am indeed grateful for their courtesy. The New York Public Library and the facilities of the Graduate Center of the City University of New York were helpful throughout the research.

Finally, I want to thank my friends for keeping the faith.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I. THE MAKING OF A HISTORIAN	10
CHAPTER II. <u>THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM</u>	61
CHAPTER III. THE "HALEVY THESIS"	101
CHAPTER IV. STUDIES IN SOCIALISM	139
CHAPTER V. THE ORDEAL OF THE WORLD WAR	189
CHAPTER VI. THE ERA OF TYRANNIES	233
BIBLIOGRAPHY	263

INTRODUCTION

Elie Halévy was one of the most distinguished historians of this century. His classic six-volume History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century and his Growth of Philosophic Radicalism remain standard works more than a half century after their publication. His work includes nine books, at least forty-seven signed articles and lectures and almost a hundred book reviews in English and French. The conception of his work was profound; the speculative nature of his inquiry into British civilization transcends historical narrative and places him in the tradition of great French observers of England's "miracle" of liberty, civic morality, and stable representative government--the tradition of Voltaire, Montesquieu, Guizot, Tocqueville, and Taine. Like his predecessors, he found in England the alternatives to revolution and tyranny; his History of the English People is the history of individual liberty and progress in a modern society. There is an implicit comparison between England and France in his study, a great unwritten history, hidden so to speak between the lines.

There is in Halévy's work an incomplete history as well as an unwritten one. There are two works, both fragmentary and relatively unknown in the English-speaking world until a decade ago, the Era of Tyrannies and the Histoire du socialisme européen. The first is a book of essays, articles and discussions gathered over the course of his career dealing with problems of contemporary history--war, socialism,

militarism, and the concentration of authority in the modern state. The second is the posthumously-collected and published lectures from the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques which were the labor of half of his life. Like his great contemporary Emile Durkheim, Halévy was interested in the relation between individualism and socialism. In this dialogue he posed decisive questions about the role of ideas, values and beliefs in history and he took from England's experience the evidence for his rejection of a determinist and materialist point of view. Melvin Richter's comment that socialism became the polemical target of much of Halévy's life is an apt one. There is a shift in his thought: first, he posed alternatives to liberty and a progressive society drawn from the French experience of revolution, instability, militarism and caesarism; then, he measured his conception of liberty by the experience of contemporary Europe, experiences of socialism and of tyranny.

The grand History, the small volume titled the Era of Tyrannies and the Histoire du socialisme européen reveal the full range of his thought, the underlying unity of his life and work and underscore the reputation that he earned for his history. His work stands on commanding heights for many of the major historiographical problems to this day because his posing of the problems, in large part, remain ours. His insights into European socialism and the nature of modern war and nationalism remain important contributions to our understanding of these complicated problems, but the sense in which his work can be understood as a single body of thought devoted to major concerns of contemporary history, rather than divided into two projects, is not yet fully comprehended.

This study is a biography of a mind, the mind of a historian who was trained as a philosopher but practiced the art and science of writing history. To Halévy, ideas, beliefs, and values were the moving forces of the world. He wrote the history of ideas as well as history in which ideas and ideologies played a creative and dynamic role. It seems fitting to examine Halévy's life and work in terms of the complex of secular and republican liberal principles that infused his historical work, his political and intellectual commitments.

There is a timeless and unchanging quality to Halévy's self-proclaimed liberalism, to his pessimism and his morality, a firm central core of skepticism to all his observations of human behavior. He reached the major decisions of his life in that fertile and enormously active decade before he began in 1901 to publish the Growth of Philosophic Radicalism--to write history rather than philosophy or sociology, to teach at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques rather than enter the university, to found and edit the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale and to organize the Société Française de Philosophie. He was one of the first of those men of letters who wore proudly the abusive name "intellectual" because he ardently defended Captain Dreyfus. He threw himself wholeheartedly into l'Affaire, participating in politics more completely and more actively than he ever would again, though he remained steadfastly republican and morally and politically liberal throughout his life.

There is a constancy and consistency surrounding Halévy's values, friendships and actions. He was a professor in the "republic of professors" though he was not an office-holding, party member professor-bureaucrat that the image of the Third Republic's profes-

soriate calls to mind. He remained at the Sciences Politiques his entire life, **except during** the war, maintaining a critical detachment from the university. Similarly he remained loyal to the Revue, its men and its purpose until he died. Even the friends that he chose in his youth--Xavier Léon, Léon Brunschvicg, Emile Chartier (Alain) and Celestin Bouglé--remained the friends of his old age. They were held together by a sense of the duty of intellectuals to perform their role as critics, as prophets, as rational men, as philosophers, as "clerics." They might differ in their interpretation of the part but they never doubted their responsibility.

What was the relation of Halévy's historical work--his choice of problems and his principle theses--to his political values and contemporary concerns? It is, after all, the historian of England who is a giant. The History of the English Peoples and the Growth of Philosophic Radicalism are works which stand as masterpieces of the art of history. And yet the great historian of England was a Frenchman of the Third Republic; his nationality and political commitments in his native land too often do not receive their due weight in the consideration of his work. He gained more than a superficial objectivity and distance by virtue of his place between two worlds. His love of France and his love of liberty add another dimension to his study of England, socialism and contemporary history. He loved England deeply, becoming a symbol of the entente cordiale, but he was no more a simple Anglophile than he was merely a laissez-faire liberal. He did not believe English culture or intellect to be the equal of French. But in his view the English had discovered the miracle of responsible politics which could represent the masses

and the interests without succumbing to demagoguery or failing to develop an adequate national policy. He believed this lesson could be learned by France and that it had to be, if democracy were not to lead to caesarism, an authoritarianism in the name of the masses.

His political impulses, republican and secular, were not a simple matter either. His personal sense of morality, especially his decision to live according to a standard of perfect sincerity, meant that he was never able to join a political party though he aspired to uniting his thought and his actions; his stands were not altogether predictable, nor easily categorized. His English friend, H.A.L. Fisher, called him "a man of left-wing sympathies"; his niece who knew him well in the 1930s insists that he was a "man of the Left." Another acquaintance, Julien Benda, respected and remembered him for his Olympian impartiality before all the doctrines, all the pleas of parties. On the one hand, a Times Literary Supplement reviewer could find Halévy at fault for seeing "the face of the socialist bogey in every non-conservative dictatorial regime" because of his liberal prejudices.¹ It is no accident that current attempts to reconstruct the history of nineteenth-century England in terms of rigid class divisions and class conflicts face the obstacle of Halévy's masterly work. On the other hand, Halévy's countryman, Hubert Bourgin whose political evolution resembled that of Daniel Halévy, characterized Elie as one of the leading Jewish, socialist secularists whose commitment to democratic parliamentarianism, English radicalism, and German-Jewish Marxism subverted France under the Third Republic.²

It is clear that Halévy's political values do not fit any easy schematization of France divided into two parts: republican and

royalist, anticlerical and catholic, progressive and traditional, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary. Halévy's politics do not even fit very conveniently David Thomson's categories of a socialist and republican Left, and a Right divided into liberals (corresponding to Remond's Orleanists), Bonapartists, and liberal Catholics.³

Neither are Halévy's political values easily subsumed under Albert Thibaudet's groups of Traditionalists, Liberals, Social Christians, Socialists and Jacobins of two varieties--Radicals of Bonapartist tendencies and Radicals of the ilk of Alain's man of the provinces.⁴ Finally, Halévy cannot be dismissed merely as an Anglophile whose politics have a foreign cast to them. Perhaps the wisest course is to pursue Halévy's political values wherever they turn, particularly in moments of crisis, and hope to catch their true nature. Granted that Halévy was a man of such moral and intellectual stature that his thoughts and his history are sui generis, they may yet illuminate some aspects of liberal republicanism. They will certainly shed some light on his history and it is as a major historian whose conceptualizations are significant contributions to our understanding of nineteenth century England, to modern socialism and to some of the most perplexing problems of contemporary history that Halévy deserves careful attention.

Halévy was a man whose life and work appear to be understood and appreciated in pieces. This partial understanding is symbolized by the fact that his reputation among English-speaking peoples rests on his work on English thought and institutions, while his work on socialism, although compiled from scattered articles and from lecture notes, has been used by French students as the basic guide to this

complex subject. Ironically, the History of the English People was out of print in France until recently while the Histoire du socialisme européen was readily available and widely read in an inexpensive edition.

The response to his death in 1937 illustrates this partial appreciation of his work. In England historians regretted that he left unfinished volume four of the History of the English People, the one intended for the Victorian period, the high point of the British liberal century. Many believed that this era would have been the most congenial to him. He had, after all, described it as the great epoch during which the British people cherished the "splendid illusion that they had discovered in a moderate liberty, and not for themselves alone but for every nation that would have the wisdom to follow their example, the secret of moral and of political stability." He had first studied England because he had shared a large part of that splendid illusion.

Yet, Halévy himself chose to break the chronology of his great work to write the history of the years immediately before the first World War, the history of the period 1895 to 1914 in which he thought a variety of forces undermined the English achievement, not the least of which was the loss of confidence by the English people in their ability to secure peace and prosperity by liberal and stable government. He was a man who was eminently capable of abiding by the priorities he set for himself, of putting first things first--he ordered his life and his weeks and months around his work--and yet the post-war period raised questions that demanded answers. He postponed his History to investigate the origins of the war and a variety of social and political problems relating to aspects of socialism,

all somewhat peripheral matters to those who would have had him write his history of Victorian England. Had he decided that the ideal of moderate liberty as a guarantee of political and moral stability was a merely "splendid illusion?"

In France the brilliant teacher of the Sciences Politiques was mourned and many expressed regret that he had not completed his work on European socialism. And yet, had not the nature of that work, which had developed almost dialectically with the History of the English Peoples, drastically altered since the outbreak of the Great War? Called upon to say something about the nature of socialism and its relation to bolshevism and fascism and to war Halévy did so in the "Era of Tyrannies" raising radical new departures. Immediately afterward he expressed his desire to return to his Victorian volume. Was it a return to the solace of values of another era? Was it not the renewal of his youthful pledge to those values and to the science of history to which he thought he could make a contribution?

¹Review of Era of Tyrannies by Elie Halévy, Times Literary Supplement, November 23, 1967, p. 1102.

²Hubert Bourgin, De Jaurès à Léon Blum; L'Ecole normale et la politique (Paris, 1938), p. 147ff.

³David Thomson, Democracy in France since 1870 (5th ed.; Oxford, 1969), Chapter One.

⁴Albert Thibaudet, Les Idées politiques de la France (Paris, 1932).

CHAPTER 1

THE MAKING OF A HISTORIAN

Elie Halévy was born in the year of the defeat of France and of the Paris Commune. He was born at Etretat in Normandy to a Parisian haute bourgeoisie family of Jewish and Protestant descent. His family was both talented and wealthy; its members joined the world of the Academy with that of diplomacy, the arts, and commerce. His family and their circle of friends, like many Orleanists, rallied to support the Third Republic, a republic by default, during its precarious first years, the years of Halévy's youth.

Elie was known to joke that he suffered no pangs of guilt about the origins of his father's wealth--delighted theater audiences had happily and freely given Ludovic Halévy his fortune.¹ He was the librettist for Bizet and the creator of many operettas with Henri Meilhac and Jacques Offenbach. Halévy's mother, Louise Breguet, whose moral influence was strongest on her eldest son, was a serious, cultivated and intelligent woman. Her family of Calvinist watchmakers had returned to France from Switzerland and England in the revolutionary era to win their reputation and fortune for technical and scientific achievements. Founding their wealth on clocks and watches, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Breguets contributed to the development of telegraphy and aeronautics.

Elie's family had been distinguished and well-established for

several generations. Elie's paternal great-grandfather and his namesake, Elie Halphen Lévy, established the family in France some time during the rule of Napoleon I. He founded a paper, l'Israélite français, during the Restoration. Grandfather Léon, the poet, was one of the talented young disciples of Saint-Simon. He was Saint-Simon's secretary after Comte and he edited Le Producteur until religious mysticism split the movement, estranging him from the other followers of the prophet of the "new Christianity." Leon published his recollections of the master in the hope of preserving the rationalist elements of his critique of the nature of modern society. The Halévy family cherished that aspect of the Saint-Simonian tradition and their circle of friends and relatives included the names of several men who had first come together in the movement. Halévy's great-uncle Jacques Fromental, the composer of La Juive, was elected to the Academy of the Beaux Arts for his contribution to the development of the new French opera form. He was the first Jew who was raised to the Beaux Arts. He married into the Rodrigues family of bankers, active Saint-Simonians. Fromental's daughter, Geneviève, whose salon would be the headquarters of the Dreyfusards during the Affair, married his most talented student, Georges Bizet. Bizet's collaboration with Ludovic Halévy on Carmen created the artistic triumph of the third generation of the Halévy family. Elie's uncle, Marcellin Berthelot, was one of France's most internationally-respected scientists in the era of Louis Pasteur. A noted research chemist and physicist, he was the Minister of Education in the 1890s and pushed university reform, particularly the reorganization of scientific studies.

Several Halévys, Breguets, and Berthelots were elected to the

different branches of the Academy, but one of the most notable of the family was Elie's uncle (Ludovic's illegitimate brother), Lucien Anatole Prévost-Paradol.² He became one of the outstanding political thinkers of the Second Empire, defending the liberal tradition of Constant and de Staël along with others among the Orleanist opposition to Bonapartist despotism. His thought is said to have influenced the men who framed the complicated constitution of the Third Republic. In 1870 in Washington, D.C., where he had been sent as ambassador by Napoleon III, Prévost-Paradol committed suicide. Ludovic's Carnets are a moving tribute to his brother, whom he knew only as his dearest friend, and whose Orleanist sympathies and political opinions he shared. They shared their liberal opinions and their respect for England which was their model of liberal, constitutional, parliamentary principles and institutions.³ On questions of religious belief Prévost-Paradol and Ludovic Halévy were genially tolerant, easily accommodating Protestants, secularists, Jews, and liberal Catholics among their close friends and family. Because it was the Halévy custom to raise their children in the religion of their mother there was a variety of religious beliefs in the family itself. Ludovic's sons were reared as Protestants and Prévost-Paradol's daughter was to become a nun; generation after generation the Halévy family showed remarkable flexibility of religious belief.

When Napoleon III seized power, Prévost-Paradol's circle of "normaliens," academicians and intellectuals, became the liberal opposition; their salons became the center of their political campaign against Bonapartism; and the Journal des Débats became their organ for public controversy and the Academy their meeting place. But long

before Napoleon III's regime relaxed into the "liberal empire" allowing representation and public criticism, the government permitted critics among its officials, and several of the opposition actually held administrative, diplomatic and legislative positions in the Empire. Among them were Prévost-Paradol and Ludovic Halévy.⁴

It was not his indifference to public life but his practical experience of political life, especially in the Corps Législatif, that profoundly disillusioned Ludovic Halévy with French politics and with the professional class of French party politicians and administrators. When he resigned his post with the Corps Législatif, Ludovic wrote:

From the seven years that I spent in the company of the representatives of my country I was overcome by the profoundest political indifference. So many ambitious people had acted around my modest person. As for convictions...they were absent, completely absent, as much on the right as on the left, merely men who weren't much and who wanted to become something.⁵

In fact, the man who resigned government service to write musical comedies and novels was not indifferent to political questions, even to French politics, just to narrow concerns of elections and offices. His influence upon his sons was such that they shared his disdain for French politics and politicians, and neither contemplated a career in administration or in politics,⁶ though they shared their father's informed interest in foreign and domestic affairs and his deep concern for social problems. His father's distaste for political life runs through Elie Halévy's more private thoughts, his youthful journals and his letters to his family and close friends. But there is no trace of indifference to public affairs, only a strong sense of the limits of a moral man's involvement in politics.

If politics were beyond the pale of legitimate aspiration for the young Halévy, the world of literature, music, and arts and sciences

was within easy reach. In the Halévy home some of the most gifted personalities of the era met, including Renan, Taine and Degas who became one of the strongest influences on Daniel's life before the Dreyfus Affair irrevocably separated the Halévys from the great artist. Statesmen and politicians, French and foreign, mingled with intellectuals in Halévy's home in the Rue de Douai which Bouglé remembered as a "sort of Kaleidoscope" revealing all the colors, combinations and variety of French intellectual, artistic and political life.

The precocious child of a wealthy, prominent and cosmopolitan family, Elie was free to choose any profession, any style of life which he could reconcile with his conscience. His conscience ~~was~~ not easily reconciled, however. He longed for an active life; he chose as his own philosophy one of action, of duty and yet he ruled out politics as immoral as a matter of course. He cross-examined his aspirations, suspicious of any desire for advancement, or fame, or even for a life of peace and quiet;⁷ he strove for perfect sincerity. His wealth and his self-discipline gave him the freedom to do and think as he chose, independent even of the necessity of earning a living that his father had faced and that his friends had to acknowledge. He chose a life of scholarship and trained and disciplined himself in the study of philosophy. Yet even this choice was not free from pitfalls; the prospect of teaching as a salaried functionary of a government displeased him, as did the thought that he might become one of a coterie subjecting himself to a doctrine or even to a friendship which might jeopardize his perfect independence of thought.

Elie and Daniel Halévy attended the Lycée Condorcet, one of the best right-bank schools of the period which was known for the quality

of its faculty. The school attracted some of the brightest, most creative and wealthiest of young Parisians, including Elie's life-long friends, Léon Brunschvicg and Xavier Léon, both philosophers, and Daniel's classmates Marcel Proust, Robert Dreyfus and Fernand Gregh, the poet, and Jacques Bizet, the Halévys' cousin. In the 1880s at the Lycée Condorcet two masters, Mallarmé and Alphonse Darlu, represented the two dominant interests of Symbolist literature and idealist philosophy.⁸ The moral authority and intellectual power of Darlu impressed both of the Halévy brothers and both studied English with Mallarmé, but at school their ways parted slightly as Elie and his friends followed Darlu while literature and poetry became the passionate bond of Daniel's group.⁹ In Darlu's class Elie, Brunschvicg and Léon first dreamed their dreams of effecting the moral regeneration of France through the teaching and writing of philosophy. They planned a philosophical journal which would be the forum for critical, secular, rationalist and idealist thought. They hoped with this journal to be able to batter down the walls within which the narrow sense of evolutionist and positivist science had confined French philosophy.

Elie Halévy was a brilliant and confident student. He placed first in the concours général de philosophie the year that he left Condorcet for the Ecole Normale Supérieure. His career at the Ecole Normale was as bright as his years at Condorcet had been; he was second in his graduating class of philosophy. He loved the Ecole for its monastic life of intellectual rigor and vibrant exchange with the true friends he found there, Emile Chartier (Alain) and Celestin Bouglé. He studied philosophy, devoting a year to Spinoza and Pascal and another year to the careful study of Plato's dialogues.

He conceived of a study of the Philosophic Radicals as a group and began an essay on Hume. Despite his profound affection for the Ecole and the life that he led there those years do not seem to have been formative ones in any intellectual, moral or political sense--he had been formed at the Lycée Condorcet and earlier in his family. None of his professors became his mentor as Darlu had, despite the fact that among them were Georges Lyon, the author of Idealisme en Angleterre au XVIII^e siècle, Henri Michel, the author of l'Idée d'Etat, and Leon Ollé-Laprune, the Catholic philosopher whose dismissal by Jules Ferry was a cause célèbre at the Rue d'Ulm. There are, in fact, no discernible references to Lyon or to Ollé-Laprune in his remaining letters and only negative comments about Michel.

Nor were the "normalien" years formative in any political sense. As he remarked later in his life, he had become a "normalien" shortly after the fiasco of Boulanger's abortive coup d'état and he left to begin his research in London in the midst of the Panama scandal. He thought that these events accounted for the apolitical attitudes that he shared with his classmates in those years. Halévy commented, by way of explaining his political beliefs, that in the years 1889 to his agregation in 1892, there had not been any socialists at the Ecole.¹⁰ There were, however, those among his acquaintances who would become socialists. During these years, however, idealistic men were more likely to turn away from politics. Léon Blum, for example, spent his time until he left Rue d'Ulm writing poetry and criticism and acting in amateur theatricals. Jaurès had already achieved his agrégation before Elie Halévy reached the Ecole and the great librarian, Lucien Herr, did not yet exert the power for socialism

that he would in the years of the Dreyfus Affair, five years after Elie left school. Daniel Halévy's friends, Albert Mathiez, Charles Péguy, and Albert Thomas, four or five years younger than Elie Halévy, were the class that he would come to regard as the socialist generation of "normaliens."¹¹

But politics is not merely a matter of timing and chance, no matter how modestly Elie Halévy wanted to explain his commitments. Chance, perhaps, seemed a likely explanation to him of the fact that he and his brother had taken such different turns after the Dreyfus Affair. Daniel moved further Left after l'Affaire throwing himself into socialist causes, helping to found L'Humanité and contributing to the study and propagation in Pages Libres and Cahiers de la Quinzaine of a uniquely French socialism that drew upon Bergson, Proudhon, Sorel and Péguy for its inspiration and the Bourses du Travail for its example. After the first World War and prior to the second débâcle his elitist polemics against democracy and the politics of the Third Republic earned him some notoriety as an apologist for fascism. But Elie Halévy was not a socialist. By his own description his political principles were "liberal," "liberal" in an anticlerical, democratic and republican sense.¹² (It is interesting to note that in the French political tradition he felt it necessary to enclose the word "liberal" in quotation marks.) His response to everyday politics, as well as to great causes such as that of Dreyfus, was individualistic, moral and intellectual to the core.

What did it mean to be "liberal" in the political milieu of Halévy's youth? What was the nature of his anticlericalism, his republican and democratic principles? How did a young man who refused

to think of public office and political activity propose to join thought with action in order to realize the moral reform of France? How did an idealistic individualist whose ability to join movements or to express himself in political slogans was very limited indeed hope to exert influence for the principles that he espoused?

The sordid republican politics of the 1890s inspired Halévy and his friends with the hope that the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale would raise the level of public life and ethical thought. Nothing short of a moral reformation was the ambition of Halévy and his friends when they began the Révue de Metaphysique et de Morale in the last decade of the nineteenth century. They added the word "morale" to their title to make their intentions explicit. Their ambition, as they expressed it in 1893, was to join thought and action, to realize the abstract idea of duty as a concrete end in society, and to reunite the several elements of their social and political life through ethical laws.¹³ As idealists the men of the Revue believed there was a vital connection between the moral thought of the elite and of every individual and the institutions and the material ends of society. They thought that the conscientious efforts of even a few men could elevate life and intellect, revitalize a demoralized elite, rejuvenate a dying public life and a stagnant science and culture. They wanted the Revue to improve public life and to contribute to the secularization of French society by providing a rationalist alternative to both positivism and to religiosity.

With so great a stress on the ethical ideal and the role of the intellectual within the elite it is not surprising that Halévy and the others around the Revue de Métaphysique stressed their contribution

to the sincere and free exchange of ideas. Through the journal and through the Société Française de Philosophie they were hosts to the greatest French, European and American scholars of all philosophical opinions. They created a climate for investigation and for controversy to rival the orthodoxies of their youth and ultimately exerted a powerful intellectual influence in France, exactly as they had hoped to do. Whether or not they had worked the moral reform of republican France was another question, however, and one which a pessimist like Halévy would probably have answered in the negative. Perhaps theirs was more rightly a holding action rather than a victorious campaign over the forty years of the Third Republic from the 1890s to the 1930s.

In Halévy's mind the campaign depended upon the quality of the moral authority held by intellectuals, both the worldly, committed ones and the men whose labors were purely speculative pursuits of the ideal of truth. The intellectual elite must struggle against ignorance, superstition and injustice; yet, to Halévy, the actual battle was the single combat of individuals. It was the only combat in which he willingly engaged. There were other intellectuals who thought that national welfare depended upon the solid ground of the public ethic and who wanted to strengthen it by reinforcing the individual conscience, but they thought that the way to do that was public office or control of the university. There were those among Halévy's fellow Dreyfusards, including some of his friends, who thought the way to realize a national reformation was through commanding the curriculum of the schools, the journals, the bureaucracy, and the legislature. Halévy did not share the image of the intellectual as

as professor engagé that characterized his friends Alain or Bouglé and Durkheim. He certainly did not agree with those who thought a moral reformation would be impossible in capitalist and liberal republican France and increasingly these included his brother and the normaliens who became the following of Jaurès, Herr, Péguy and Sorel.

The conflict of ideas, the spread of learning of an ethical nature through journals, societies and schools, the education of an elite and the action of individuals--not the drastic reordering of institutions by group or by class actions--these were Halévy's way to raise the level of public life. He thought that men of intellect and conscience were obligated to stand for the truth in their scholarship, teaching and public life and he did so. But the first duty was to rational inquiry not to propagation. Truth was vital for the health of the republic and the well-being of the principles that he held dear, but skeptic by nature he was aware that a tension existed between the truth and the effect of the truth on the body politic.

It has been suggested that the generation of the 1890s felt themselves to be mere epigoni to some race of intellectual giants that had preceded them.¹⁴ The Halévy group, at any rate, did not seem to share this feeling. On the contrary, the legacy of Comte, Darwin, Marx, Renan and Taine represented very real evils of positivism, scientism and determinism which this handful of young scholars attacked with great zeal. There were only two philosophical journals in France at the time--the flurry of important reviews of philosophy, science and sociology at the turn of the century followed the establishment of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. This fact both encouraged and discouraged Halévy and his friends; discouraged

them because it indicated how low was the place of philosophy in France, but encouraged them because there was so much for them to do and it was so obviously worth doing. Léon and Halévy wanted their Revue to be a focal point of French philosophy and over the years it became the journal that they had intended, the "most profound organ" of contemporary thought in France.¹⁵ Léon suggested the title, playing on the almost pejorative sense in which "métaphysique" was commonly used in order to call attention to the editors' intention to combat religious excess and narrow-minded positivism by examining general theories of thought and action, knowledge and existence.¹⁶

As early as 1891, when Halévy was still at the Ecole normale, he and Léon agreed to the basic format of the magazine and to some division of labor.¹⁷ Léon would be the editor and would be financially responsible. But the mundane aspects of establishing a journal seemed to appeal to some practical, active side of Halévy's nature because he threw himself into the work. He prodded Léon, not always tactfully, about business matters. He collected opinions from his father's friends about advantages and disadvantages of various publishing firms; if necessary, there were family connections which could be used to launch the magazine. He involved Bouglé, Louis Couturat and Emile Chartier, whom he thought was the best mind among his classmates. Dominique Parodi and Halévy's cousin, René Berthelot, also joined the circle. He visited professors and other eminent scholars, explaining the prospective journal, reassuring the secularists that "métaphysique" should not be understood in any religious sense, and winning promises of contributions.¹⁸ He wrote to many philosophers and philosophical societies and journals throughout

Europe, including Russia, and to the United States.

During his year of research in England, 1892-3, Halévy made contacts for the Revue, which became a reality that year. He promised to write articles and book reviews and insisted that all reviews be anonymous like those of the best English magazines. He was a constant source of topics for articles or exchanges. He suggested special features, for example, Questions pratiques, which would deal with social or political problems in their broadest sense, and the Supplement, which would review important journals, books and articles from all major countries, summarize the arguments of young philosophers when they defended their dissertations, comment upon the meetings of philosophical societies, and even describe the courses relating to philosophy offered each year at all French universities. The diligence with which he pursued each of these projects through the years varied greatly, but Halévy's special concern was the Supplement. Through his editing of it he kept abreast of current developments in philosophy long after his own research had shifted to subjects one would consider to be more purely history or political science.

Léon and Halévy proposed the principles by which the Revue would stand from the first issue, January 1893, but even before that Halévy wrote to Leon:

It is necessary to act against the miserable positivism which we are departing from and the irritating religiosity which we risk getting stuck in, to build a philosophy of action and of reflection, to be rationalist with a passion.¹⁹

Halévy was an uncompromising rationalist who was never very much at home with the rebirth of irrationalism and mysticism at the turn of the century. An inveterate opponent of Bergsonian thought, he was

the foe of positivism as well, though his anti-positivism was not the same as that of Bergson, Péguy, Huysmanns, or the neo-Catholics.²⁰ Insofar as they were rationalists and believed in and aspired to a science of man he was much more at one with the positivists and with the sociologists than he was with their enemies. As he once confided to Bouglé, their vision attracted him and the only time that he was touched by the temptation to belief was each fall when he passed the positivist church in the Latin Quarter. It was part of his ideal, after all. "I ask myself sometimes with some anxiety if the only thing that keeps me from being a Comtist isn't a vague aristocratic feeling, worldly, or a little intellectual, à la Daniel Halévy."²¹

Léon was as much a rationalist as Halévy though his manifesto introducing the Revue was tactful. The Revue would be devoted to pure philosophy; not to science, except insofar as science is concerned with the theory of knowledge, or with the proofs of modern thought; not to the history of philosophy, which treats of the ideals of thinkers as historical facts or items of erudition; and not to religion in the sense of dogma of any particular church. Léon, the Jewish secularist, was always careful not to offend religious sentiments, promising the journal would not be irreligious because "philosophy is the science of eternal things."²² The Revue's rationalism, which was polemically expressed in Halévy's letter, would not be scoffing nor would it be insensitive to questions of the ideal or of the spirit, but it would most definitely be secular and anti-clerical for the lifetime of its founders.

The Revue hoped to compel philosophical thought in France to develop publicly, freely and vigorously by examining first principles.

Their teachers, men like Darlu, Jules Lagneau and Emile Boutroux, had begun the resurrection of metaphysical speculation in France and had reawakened youth to Plato and Kant. They took Charles Renouvier and the neo-criticists as their example, saying they admired the neo-criticists because they had "strengthened and fortified the public mind" by their respect for the "dignity of person and the inviolability of the law."²³ That mere handful of men had altered the conscience of a nation in the generation since the Franco-Prussian War just as the men of the Revue hoped to do.

The editors and contributors of the Revue argued that the decay of metaphysics was due to the fact that two schools had controlled French philosophy for more than a generation: Comte and his successors and the disciples of Victor Cousin. The first believed that Comte had closed the era of systems of philosophy and that all that remained for science to do was to ascertain the facts. The eclectics thought that all systems might be synthesized by drawing the best elements from opposing philosophies. As a result, philosophy had become, on the one hand, the history of philosophy, and on the other, the sterile mechanical pursuit of special studies in the name of science. In short, philosophy was weak and under constant attack, caught between positivism which did not reach beyond the elementary facts, and a revival of mysticism which only furthered superstition. For Halévy, "mysticism" meant Bergsonianism and other currents of irrationalism which he felt would drown rational inquiry. He thought the times were with the mystics and unfortunately, only Chartier of the Revue group had the genius to combat them.²⁴

In the first issue of the Revue Halévy and Brunschvicg attacked

the vicious cycle begun by the decay of genuine philosophy. The decay contributed to the decline of the institutions which were responsible for the creation of nation's elite and for the recognition of scholarship, thus perpetuating the mediocrity of the intellectual life of the nation. In an anonymous article on the Collège de France²⁵ they criticized that institution for allowing scientism to dominate it to the point that only the history of philosophy, classic or modern, and only experimental psychology were taught there. It was true that the professor of the broad generalization, like Michelet, no longer taught at the Collège, but in the process of ridding the school of that style of philosophy the ethical concerns of men like Michelet also disappeared. Special interests dominated the Collège, partly as a result of positivist attitudes and partly reflecting a policy of creating professorships to suit a co-opting elite.

This attack on the Collège de France was part of a broad campaign relating to all aspects of education in France in the 1890s--a campaign that involved the Revue circle at many levels over a period of twenty years. In the 1890s the structure and curriculum of secondary and university education were under constant attack in France as they had been since the Franco-Prussian War. Critics claimed that French education was dominated by literary and philosophical studies to the detriment of scientific inquiry and that this dominance caused the relatively slow rate of industrial growth. Marcellin Berthelot, the Minister of Public Education and Halévy's uncle, combatted this narrow sense of science with all the weight of his enormous scientific reputation. Halévy and the other young men of the Revue defended philosophy, especially metaphysics and ethics, as the core of the

French educational system. They denied that philosophy was inadequate training for modern French youth. They thought the weakness of the French system lay in the fact that it reflected a lack of understanding of the true nature of philosophic inquiry. Humanistic learning was an integral part of the republican morality that France needed to fortify. Broadly defined, the educational reform campaign, like the Revue's philosophical mission, was directed against the control of the nation's youth by the positivists or by the religionists. Over a number of years and repeatedly in the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair, Halévy and the Revue would find it necessary to take up again the defense of humanistic and secular learning as the basis of republican morality.

In the same article on the Collège de France Halévy and Brun-schvicg called for the critical examination of German intellectual dominance in France. They accused the Collège of succumbing to German philosophical movements regardless of their merit. It was one thing for Michelet, Quinet, de Staël and Cousin to bring Herder, Fichte, and Schlegel to France, but it was another when Renan's disciples took hold of the institution to teach Bopp, Miller and Strauss.²⁶ The first stirrings of French philosophical rejection of German domination--la crise allemande--had been felt by the previous generation. For the generation of the nineties the Revue expressed a self-conscious desire to throw off German intellectual hegemony, or at the very least to judge German thought on its own merits. There were several of the circle, of course, who were very much influenced by German thought: Charles Andler, Lévy-Bruhl and Léon himself whose major interest lay in Fichte. However, the revival of classic thought,

Brunschvicg and Chartier's interests, and the importance of English thought for Elie Halévy and René Berthelot indicate the independent stance of the journal.

The circle around the Revue resisted the Prussianization of the French educational system. In the spring semester of 1895 Halévy was sent to investigate the German seminar method to evaluate its effectiveness in teaching philosophy. He observed classes on all levels in Leipzig and Berlin as well as the institutes which were established outside the university system for the study of psychology. In an article which developed from his trip he generalized about the total environment of philosophical inquiry and instruction in Germany. He was severely critical, urging the French to resist imitation of the German system.²⁷ His criticism coincided perfectly with the opinions of Berthelot's ministry and followed the general observations made by Charles Seignobos in the previous decade. He was particularly critical of the practical, materialistic atmosphere in German universities.²⁸ He commented that at the very moment that "unauthorized voices [in France], unfortunately too much heard, demand the total suppression of the teaching of philosophy in our schools..."²⁹ the best German minds, albeit a minority, were demanding the reintegration of philosophy into the secondary curriculum for the spiritual enrichment of German youth.

It was true, Halévy wrote, that Germany excelled in all the material requisites for industrialization, just as the critics of French education feared. But innumerable factors contributed to and resulted from this excellence, including the domination of German universities and intellectual life by material concerns and practical

learning.³⁰ In Germany the true concern of youth and professors alike was the social or economic question. What France did not understand was that this concern could hold the interests and activities of German youth indefinitely without any corresponding development of liberal or democratic government. Frenchmen tended to identify social reform with radical movements, with an urge to emancipate mankind, but in the German Empire dramatic social measures, which were revolutionary by French standards, were merely an aspect of the power of the state. Halévy doubted that concern for social problems there could ever go beyond attention to material needs.

There are so many aspects of the mature Halévy's thought in this 1896 article, especially his interpretation of the impulses to social reform in Germany, that one is tempted beyond the central theme. However, that theme is fundamental to Halévy's approach. He believed the moral idea of a people could be seen in their basic institutions and in his opinion German institutions reflected the materialism of the society and the bureaucratic and autocratic nature of the state. Any attempted transplant of German institutions in French soil would only disturb the life of the French republican ideal either by adding to the materialistic, autocratic and bureaucratic strain or failing to take root at all. Frenchmen must hold to their own ethical ideal if they wished to preserve their republican institutions, he thought.

Halévy's commitment to the Revue de Métaphysique from its founding in 1892, when he was preparing for his examinations, to his death in 1937 was a profound one. His friendship with Léon and his special relationship with the Revue was such that he was never really able to

withdraw from performing heavy editorial duties which were often peripheral to his intellectual interests. In the last years of Léon's life Halévy more and more accepted the tasks of full editorship, without the title, always hoping that he would find someone who could take over the responsibilities of the Revue. His letters from all over the world were concerned in part with the time-consuming task of editing, including the meticulous reading of proof, even in the 1930's when the burdens of the fourth volume of the History of the English People and his history of socialism were ever present. Frequently, he was the editor who urged the journal to examine some new philosophical development outside of France or even to go beyond the confines of professional philosophy. But Halévy's personal contribution to pure philosophy, as opposed to practical questions of the social sciences, ended by the time he published The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism between 1901 and 1904. Long after his professional interests had shifted he continued to fulfill the obligations that he had undertaken as a young man to the Revue and to the Société Française de Philosophie, because his idealist principles remained very much the same.

Sometime before 1896 when he published his thesis on Plato's theory of science or knowledge Halévy decided that he did not want to be a professional philosopher. He wrote to Bouglé in 1896:

The true way to be a philosopher would be to live; to do philosophy in a professional sense of the word is a totally inadequate way of being a philosopher. I would give a fortune to have been a lieutenant of the artillery like Descartes or the Prime Minister of the King of Persia like Plato.³¹

To the first sentiment he remained true; the second needs some explanation. He wanted action and public responsibility for the

reality that public experience would give to his thinking, not for the excitement.³² He was not stimulated by contacts with men of political power; he was, if anything, repelled by French political men. He accepted completely the Platonic suspicion of this world as a distraction from one's true objective of gaining wisdom. And the world of political commitment in France seemed so blatantly corrupt to him that it could never distract him as it did some of his friends. He also accepted the Socratic ideal that public life should not be contrary to the "progress of reason, of wisdom, and of speculative thought...."³³ For him living an active life and realizing his thought in his actions would be not active political engagement but rather to teach at the Sciences Politiques, to write and to refuse to duck a serious or difficult issue.

The rigor of his training would affect his writing of history, but more than that Platonic thought made a formidable impact on the moral cast of his mind and his perception of the problems facing liberal republicanism in France. Halévy was committed to the rational morality of the Greek tradition from Socrates to the Stoics, which he believed to be valid and vital enough to be a secular ethic for his contemporaries and for himself. He usually referred to his own beliefs as stoic and it does seem the best description of them.

Halévy and his colleagues at the Revue de Métaphysique wanted to propagate a rational, secular ethic. They espoused such an ethic because they believed it to be the basis of a true morality, but also because they felt that it was essential to the well-being of the republic to break the hold over the minds of Frenchmen of the Catholic Church and of traditionalism and anti-republicanism. Even before the

Dreyfus Affair made the question a pressing one they were committed to a secular and thereby anticlerical ideal. There were several groups of intellectuals, including most of Halévy's friends, which organized to further a modern, secular, republican ethic.³⁴ Halévy was not drawn to such groups even for lack of some activity more congenial to his principles. He accepted the obligation to contribute to the secular morale as much as Bouglé, Durkheim, Léon, Brunschvicg, Andler or Chartier did, but he thought in the age of sectarianism and nationalism that these groups were able to offer little more than messages of hope, fortitude, courage and charity.³⁵ His skepticism led him to see the residues of religiosity and perhaps the inherent futility of even those causes he held dear. Nonetheless, he attended a few sessions of the Société Française de Philosophie devoted to topics such as the development of a secular catechism for use in the schools.

Halévy did not feel compelled to search for a naturalistic and secular ethic in the same way that Durkheim and his disciples did--as a rational substitute for traditional religion. He thought that the teachings of the classics provided a civic ideal. He thought his contribution to the realization of a secular ethic for modern France might be made by writing a history of Platonism or perhaps a life of Socrates. These were works that he was capable of doing and in which he believed without straining to reconcile his thought and his actions. He said that he hoped his life of Socrates might be the book for secularists that Renan's Life of Jesus was for worldly neo-Catholics, but he did not write the history or the biography.³⁶ He shared this ambition to draw some civic meaning

from Plato and from Socrates with all of his friends but especially with Alain who was writing and teaching comparable messages from the classics at the Lycée Henry IV.

Between 1896 and 1905 Halévy decided that history was his science, rather than philosophy or sociology. He made the decision in stages. In 1896 when Bouglé teasingly warned him not to write another history of England, he responded "If I must not write a history of England, I will write a philosophy of history, or a critical examination of fundamental social notions, or quite another thing in that order of ideas."³⁷ Everything still seemed open to him. He was attracted to problems that were philosophical in the Greek sense in which history is the subject of philosophic meditation on the passions and actions of men and groups. Hadn't Hume ultimately turned to history as the foundation of a science of ethics? When he embarked upon the writing of England in 1815, having definitely resisted sociology and having rejected professional philosophy, he explained:

Another history? Yes, it is unfortunately my only way to make science. It would be better to do physics or astronomy but I can't and I seek where I can for explicative relationships.³⁸

This motif of science runs through Halévy's writing for the first decade. He said that he was drawn to a science of politics and he was, for all his skepticism, deeply influenced by the hope of applying the methods and principles of science to man and society. He did not mean by this any grand scheme of establishing general laws such as Durkheim aspired to; he merely meant the application of the tools of reason to political and social problems. He believed that history was a rational scientific pursuit; he thought that something he called political science was feasible, if there was a rigorous and

thorough examination of first assumptions. He was, as he said, primarily concerned with explicative relationships. But he was convinced that without some rational inquiry into the nature of politics and without the acceptance of the obligation to act according to the implications of that rational inquiry, it would be difficult, if not impossible for moral law to shape social and political life.³⁹ This conviction was the frame in which he placed his thesis on Plato, the subject of some book reviews and one of the themes of his work on the philosophic radicals. The theme remained secondary to other consideration in the latter work but may very well have been the original motivation behind the work--the investigation of a group of thinkers who thought they had developed a science of governing men according to a few simple principles.

Halévy shared with others around the Revue de Métaphysique his concern for political science as the instrument with which moral law might shape social and political life. They were strengthened in their will to invigorate critical philosophy by their fear of the practical effects of the permanent separation of philosophy and social science, which they thought would continue unless they combatted the trend toward the isolation of philosophic from other concerns. In their long critique of the Collège de France Halévy and Brunschvicg called for the reordering of priorities in order to break down the barriers between philosophy and social science. They called for the rigorous philosophical examination of the metaphysical implications and the critical tools of social science. They were particularly troubled by positivist or socialist claims to scientific standing and by the Collège's sponsorship, even indirectly, of these

claims. They thought inaction or resignation to slow and fatal evolution characterized positivistic social science. They also thought that without a social science there was no adequate intellectual challenge to socialists who claim to base themselves on scientific theory. Socialists justified precipitous political action on the "scientific nature" of their theory. (One of Halévy's persistent themes in his earliest studies of socialist writings was the question of **the validity of their economic science.**) To Halévy and Brunschvicg the alternatives facing society without some principles of political science--if only, the exercise of sustained criticism of philosophical assumptions of political scientists--was inaction or foolhardy action.⁴⁰

Halévy found in Plato's dialogues a kindred spirit searching for a science of politics so that morality might infuse society and he stressed this theme in 1896 in La Théorie platonicienne des sciences, the work that he presented for his agrégation. Unlike most of his contemporaries and teachers Halévy thought there was a unity in the dialogues⁴¹ which he found in Plato's desire to surpass the contradictions between purely critical philosophy and merely empirical politics, to reconcile the philosophical and political life for the true welfare of the polis. Plato's task was to found the state, to realize social happiness, and to organize society, all impossible undertakings unless an ideal existed by which a moral and rational individual could judge and act to build, to justify and to condemn.⁴² The task was, of course, the same one that he and the men of the Revue saw before them; it was the duty of moral men from time immemorial.

The culmination of Halévy's volume on the Platonic theory of science was a chapter on practical and political science which

attempted to show that the latter was absolutely essential for the reconciliation of the ideal of justice and the reality of politics. Ultimately the role of the state was an educational one because man left to his common sense would be merely utilitarian about justice in society, willingly accepting repression to destroy vice. But for Plato the greatest aim of the state was the realization of virtue, not merely the repression of vice, which meant ignorance must be suppressed through education. The accomplishment of this realization of virtue, as well as the understanding of any other goals that might exist for the state, presupposed a science of politics.

For Plato, of course, men were not equally able to realize and exercise the science of politics--the philosopher alone was capable of surmising the general principles of government and society, an aristocracy or an elite was able to understand and exercise the rules of governance and the masses were rarely able to perceive general rules or purposes. The fundamental tool was the dialectic and the ability to realize the vital relationship between the critical dialectic and the positive dialectic distinguished the philosophical mind. The critical dialectic examined fundamental propositions (such as body and soul, the state and the individual, theoretical and practical science, common moral education and philosophical education, and the problems of participation) to discover any truth that they might contain, discarding the untruths. The positive dialectic added true propositions together in an attempt to discern scientific laws. In an effort to seek explicative relationships Halévy borrowed this critical dialectic as a necessary condition for the true work of the philosopher--"to found, to justify and to condemn" ⁴³

Charles Gillispie's brief analysis of the method of this work first pointed out the similarity between Halévy's dialectic and the one that Halevy described as Platonic. Gillispie thought this Halevyan method characterized his approach to philosophic radicalism, political economy and socialism and even, to some extent, his descriptive analysis of the political, economic and social structure of early nineteenth century England.⁴⁴ Halévy characteristically resolved contradictions into systematic dichotomies--"an analysis that unfolds a subject through layer after layer of conceptions until it comes to a core of basic attitudes and assumptions...."⁴⁵ Once he discovered the core assumptions, usually two opposing aspects of a subject, he then organized his own exposition and criticism. This negative dialectic was certainly fundamental to his treatment of all questions of ideology. In making what purported to be a summary Halévy indicated inherent contradictions, thereby confronting each doctrine with a variety of alternative interpretations as he apparently summarized them. Even in writing historical narrative, he used this analytical tool, placing himself at the center of events and describing the dialogue between contemporaries on any major problem.

The impact of Platonic thought left its traces on Halévy's method, as well as on the moral cast of his mind, but it was as an historian and a teacher, not as a philosopher, that he would practice his science. Following his trip to Germany and the publication of La Théorie platonicienne des sciences, he chose his career, a decision which he described, in characteristic fashion, as a matter of chance.⁴⁶ He might just as well have been part of the university, he thought, because he had asked Liard, the rector of the Ecole

normale to find a teaching position for him while he prepared his theses. When nothing developed from Liard's many connections at the Ministry of Higher Education, he took Léon's advice and sought out Emile Boutmy, the director of the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques and one of the foremost interpreters of English civilization in France.⁴⁷ Boutmy was a Protestant, an Anglophile, an economic liberal who believed in national character and the close friend of Hippolyte Taine. At the very moment that Halévy sought him out Boutmy was in the midst of reorganizing the teaching of political economy at the Sciences Politiques. He offered the young scholar the position in English political economy and institutions.

Halévy had second thoughts about accepting the offer thinking that it would mean he would have to hurry his study of Benthamism, but he began teaching. He expressed no second thoughts about the Sciences Politiques as an institution or about teaching the children of the haute bourgeoisie whose reasons for resisting the university were various but often included among them some feeling of detachment from the ardent republicanism of its professors. It has been maintained that the Sciences Politiques was a bastion of reaction which trained the government's servants to undermine the Third Republic,⁴⁸ but that claim seems to be part of the general soul-searching for causes of the fall of France. Why did Halévy, who was deeply and profoundly committed to the Republic, choose the Sciences Politiques and remain outside the university which included most of his friends? He saw teaching as an active life in which he could serve usefully, accepting his duty and yet devoting his life to scholarship and to truth. There was no trace of concern that he would endanger the perfect

independence of his thought by teaching in an institution which trained a class of government officials and which was policy-oriented in general. Halévy intended his criticism of France and French politics to contribute to practical, realizable reforms--perhaps that is why he preferred teaching administrators and diplomats. For him an anti-establishment stance on the part of the intellectual would have made little sense in a republic by default, which was under severe attack at home from the Right during his first years of teaching and from both Right and Left later.

There is, however, in his decision a trace of deliberate rejection of the Sorbonne. He was offended by the practice of filling professorships by co-optation and his ironic comments were usually directed toward the impossibility of maintaining one's independence there. He seemed to think it almost as difficult as preserving one's independence in politics. He expressed jokingly a desire to continue the family tradition of distance from the Sorbonne, but perhaps there was some grain of truth in that view. He refused appointment in philosophy there at least twice, once in 1905 when his former professor's position was free⁴⁹ and again in 1911 when he was considered for another chair in philosophy. It was only a grain of truth, however, because he admitted that he might have been seduced by the vacancy in contemporary history, but not in philosophy. He thought it was out of the question, however, until his History of the English Peoples appeared and so he remained at the Sciences Politiques all of his professional life.

There was more than a trace of rejection of the university system at the Sciences Politiques, however. The institution was a

challenge made by Boutmy and Taine to the university shortly after the Franco-Prussian War. They hoped to reshape the French government after the debacle through the thorough training of an elite administration and foreign service. There had been criticism of the system and of the Grand Ecoles even before the defeat but Sedan precipitated more drastic action. The Sciences Politiques took a policy-oriented approach and instruction was much less specialized than in the law faculties of the university, with a heavy emphasis upon such modern subjects as history, international relations, administration, economics and public law. Modern languages, travel, and even sports were stressed. The patrons of the school and its founders were biased toward the social sciences and in the early years of Halévy's tenure Manchester economics dominated the school through the influence of some of the most important patrons, such as Adolphe d'Eichthal. Among the social sciences there was a definite bias toward individualist methodology as well and more than a trace of hostility toward the campaign of Durkheim's followers to dominate the university and the social sciences.⁵⁰

The school's approach was popular. By the 1890's three to four hundred students were enrolled, including at least ten per cent foreign students.⁵¹ The success of the school was so great that between 1907 and 1927 of the 192 men appointed to diplomatic or consular vacancies a total of 153 held diplomas from the Sciences Politiques, many of whom studied with Elie Halévy.⁵² The school's influence upon the public administration of France was comparable to its preponderance in the foreign service.

Halévy's choice of the Sciences Politiques indicates the breadth of his concerns in the 1890s--political science, sociology, and

economics as well as philosophy and history. He was moving away from the purely philosophical concerns that he shared with his friends of the Ecole Normale and the Revue circle though the bonds of friendship did not slacken. He did not choose history at the Sciences Politiques; his commitment to history and his inquiry into the nature of British society and the forces for stability there predates his teaching. He had already begun his study of British history as the testing ground for fundamental principles of liberalism and democracy. If any of the major problems to which he devoted his life developed at the Sciences Politiques, it was his interest in socialism. There is very much of an air of a young man who knew exactly what he wanted to do about Halévy at the Sciences Politiques. In the first years of his teaching he discovered and wrote a small volume on Thomas Hodgskin, the English working class radical,⁵³ and began his essays on the birth of Methodism;⁵⁴ all part of his attempt "to decipher the most indecipherable people, the most moral, the least familial, the most mobile, the most adaptable, the frankest and the most hypocritical."⁵⁵ He had even decided the length of the history of England that he intended to write.⁵⁶

Ultimately, Halévy's position at the Sciences Politiques was not as important in defining his intellectual choices as it was in allowing him to act according to his political commitments. He took the opportunity to teach the two subjects in which he was deeply interested--European socialism and British institutions and ideas; within the limits of those two topics his major problems could be worked out.

The grand test of the Third Republic reinforced Halévy's

individualist and moral politics and his emphasis on the obligation of the elite to elevate republican public opinion. In a sense, however, the Dreyfus Affair can hardly be said to have been a test for Halévy-- it was not a turning point, not a crisis of conscience. His commitment to the cause was deep and sincere and made long before the sides were drawn and the case had become the Affair, a crisis of conscience for a generation, for a nation and for the republican regime. Halévy was a Dreyfusard of the first hour, one of the first young men to be convinced of the innocence of the captain and to act to redress the injustice done to him. The Herculean task of reversing Dreyfus's conviction, the many set-backs over the years of agitation reinforced for Halévy his ethical and individualist manner of perceiving political causes. It helped to set the limits of his political activism and in the process strengthened his fundamental belief that moral ends are best achieved through the morally regenerative forces of education. The Affair cannot be said to have altered any of his basic attitudes about the nature of his involvement in the real world; it only reinforced his ordering of priorities toward teaching, writing and research as his own way of joining thought and action.

There was remarkable public unity in the reaction to the Dreyfus case in its first months. The union behind the government of Moderates and Catholics which had convicted Dreyfus was all the more remarkable in view of the fact that it drew disparate political forces together which only months previously had threatened to dissolve the fragile political mechanism. The Third Republican leadership had just brazened through a flurry of charges, counter-charges and indictments for corruption and influence which accompanied the Panama scandals.

In an enthusiastic moment of unity when the papers called for a full hearing in order to root out any accomplices of the convicted spy, the Halévy brothers first heard gossip to the effect that the captain might be innocent. Their informed sources were regular visitors to their home and that of their aunt, Genevieve Bizet Straus. It was at Trouville, Madame Straus's summer home in August 1897 that Joseph Reinach, the nephew of the notorious Baron de Reinach of the Panama scandals, proved that Esterhazy had written the bordereau and was the guilty man in the espionage case.⁵⁷ But Halévy was not won over by rumor and inside sources. In the middle of November he became firmly convinced of Dreyfus's innocence on the basis of evidence printed in the daily newspapers. He and Daniel immediately began to recruit "normaliens" and professors, as well as famous intellectuals, to sign a protest manifesto, the first in a long series of moves demanding a revision of the case.⁵⁸

From the beginning Elie Halévy's position was fundamentally a liberal one--it was a matter of redressing a wrong done to an individual who had been deprived of his liberty and position by a miscarriage of justice. Halévy did not, as so many republicans did, move beyond the issues involved in the Affair to an ideological definition of himself. He did not first become aware that he was a citizen of the Third Republic in reaction to the Affair; he and his family had accepted the republic from its beginnings. Father and sons, mother and aunts were as one, republican and Dreyfusard. Halévy did not define his role as an intellectual, nor the character of his loyalty to the regime, nor the outline of his political commitment for the remainder of his life in relation to the affair, as his generation

of intellectuals did. But if the Affair did not define Elie Halévy, it did engage him completely in the furious political activism to save Dreyfus and with him republican justice.

Halévy did not define himself as a Jew though others would explain the commitment of many Dreyfusards by the fact that they bore Jewish names and were of Jewish descent. Alain Silvera, the biographer of Daniel Halévy, found his choice "dictated by a certain racial origin hitherto ignored"⁵⁹; but there is no racial consciousness in Elie Halévy's commitment. There is a single comment in his correspondence that only Bouglé, a French Christian, could tell Halévy if his convictions were an "illusion of caste" because he bore a Jewish name and was a Protestant.⁶⁰ Elie Halévy's assimilation was complete and his passionate involvement in the cause testified to his desire that France be vindicated as the home of religious and political liberty.

Liberal and republican principles, rather than identification with the Jewish captain, dictated Elie Halévy's choice; he found Picquart more admirable than Dreyfus in that he voluntarily faced indignities and imprisonment for justice in spite of personal prejudices. All the same, the issue of antisemitism in France engaged Halévy's passions. He urged his friend Léon to organize his co-religionists to fight for Dreyfus and to struggle openly against antisemitism. He shared his father's papers and stock of memories on the place of Jews in the Second Empire and in republican scandals with Bouglé who wanted to write a work on antisemitism.⁶¹ He confided to a depressed Bouglé that the phenomenon of antisemitism in modern times oppressed him unbearably. He feared the antisemitic coalition which joined "powerful religious passions" with "socialist passions"

by fusing the old aristocrats and old bourgeoisie, the traditionalists and the catholics, with sections of the masses through a shared hatred of "financial feudalism" and the nouveaux riches.⁶² Halévy refused to believe that the socialists who at first took a plague-on-both-your-houses stance would remain antisemitic for long, even as a tactic. He predicted pessimistically, however, that "the day that one must choose between socialism and antisemitism" the hatred of Jews in France would be very strong.⁶³ This conjuncture of tribal passions with class hatreds was totally repugnant to him. He indicated this in a propaganda theme that he sketched for Bouglé as "Orient and Occident." He characterized antisemitism as part of that tendency of the East to form regimes of castes with religious and racial communities isolated from one another. It was, of course, the antithesis of the individualist West which measured men by their work and their personal value. The wave of antisemitism in Russian Poland, Austria, Germany, and now Algeria was, for Halévy, the progress of the oriental mind; his hope was that, with their efforts, France would remain the island in Europe of the western mind.⁶⁴

Halévy's liberal commitment in the Dreyfus Affair remains just that--a liberal commitment--with respect to a number of issues other than antisemitism. He shared the conviction of the "intellectual party" that militarism, clericalism and antisemitism were inseparable and he agreed that unless they acted immediately the "twentieth century would be a sad disavowal of the nineteenth."⁶⁵ He did not share the political stance of many Dreyfusards, however. He never adopted the totally antimilitarist position that many espoused in reaction to the role of the military in the Affair; nor did he join

the socialists in antipathy to the establishment that willingly perpetuated, for a time, this crime of state; nor did he take up the leftist idealization of the masses who, it was asserted, would never have allowed this injustice to take place, if they had political power.

Halévy thought the intellectual's antimilitarism was a luxury that France could ill afford so long as her neighbors, England and Germany, were armed to the teeth. His hatred of war was as deep as that of his dear friends Alain and Bouglé, but unlike them he could not believe that he promoted peace by campaigning against his country's army. Peace might be advanced by rational understanding of international politics and by genuine love and respect for the culture and civilization of other nations but not by undermining the military position of France, which he regarded as a defensive state in European politics. He held this position throughout the Affair and long after when, prior to the Great War, he refused to accept any part of Jaurès's or Hervé's opposition to the three-year military service bill. For one thing, he saw the revolutionary implications of Hervéism long before Leninism imitated its antimilitarist tactics. The international political situation, as he saw it from England in 1899, was a sobering experience. It reinforced his political realism.

And what will become of our work of republican defense, what will be your attitude on the day more or less near when England will be in war with one or more continental powers, and when the universal brawl without precedent in the history of the world begins? They will massacre each other in Africa, in Oceania, in China, in America and in Europe. We are not yet familiar with these ideas, having occupied ourselves from birth with the last European war but we will become habituated to everything and in little time--some wars, more or less European, like the Cuban war or the South African war will suffice to achieve our adaptation.⁶⁶

As he said in the beginning of the Dreyfus crusade in a period of

relative optimism: "We are dealing with a crime of 'virtuous' men. The crime will be repaired. . . . I only ask the reparation of this particular injustice and after that silence."⁶⁷ He would not leap from a liberal position defending a soldier convicted by the military to a condemnation of the military as a whole. "One must desire with all one's strength that, for the honor of France and the army, all will be righted."⁶⁸

Halévy did not join the socialists during or in the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair. In this he broke with his brother and with all that generation of "normaliens" who followed Herr and Jaurès from a liberal struggle to the socialist cause. Daniel Halévy began his pilgrim's progress in French ideologies at this time, becoming involved with Georges Sorel and with Péguy in the Cahiers de la Quinzaine where he first published his re-examination of the Dreyfusard commitment.⁶⁹ There were those among Elie's class who, like Bouglé, envied the socialists their faith and their goals, but Elie never contemplated the jump from Dreyfus to Marx or even to Jean Jaurès.

It seems to me that I am no more or less socialist now than eighteen months ago. I work to calm the exalted ones who declare themselves socialist because Dreyfus is innocent. What is the relation between the return of Dreyfus from Devil's Island and the taking by the state of private property? Better that they said anarchist!⁷⁰

In the period following the socialists' move from neutrality to activism in questions of justice among the bourgeois, the Dreyfus Affair made strange bedfellows. Jewish bankers and anarchist miners, Protestant pastors and naturalist writers joined together to demand appeal and Halévy joined with them because he saw clearly that Dreyfus was innocent. "But beyond that point I cease to see clearly. I continue

therefore to examine my ideas every day waiting until they arrange themselves."⁷¹

As he waited, however, his ideas did not change about socialism, nor about democracy. He was a self-proclaimed democrat and a republican, but his language and point of view seemed Orleanist, reflecting a Burkean belief that complex institutions are the genuinely liberal safeguards. But Halévy found the entire aristocratic affectation that passed for a critique of democracy repugnant. "I could become authoritarian: I would be indeed astonished if I were to become anti-democratic. The most tenacious prejudice of my nature is a lively antipathy for the aristocratic religious and provincial sentimentality with which everyone is satisfied."⁷² He was a republican with serious reservations about civic education in France, especially among the masses. He had little of the enthusiasm of those republicans who saw the masses as the repository of republican virtue incapable of committing or perpetuating a crime comparable to the imprisonment of Dreyfus. A democratic republican, he was perfectly aware of the problems of democracy. The danger of universal suffrage was that it might, by election, ratify the crimes of the state. To Bouglé he would admit that corruption might be an inherent vice of a democratic regime but that did not mean that it was any the less necessary to be republican. As he wrote, quoting Renan, "It is still Caliban who defends Prospero against the Cagots."⁷³ "It is necessary to work, cost what it costs, to make the French republic last, though it lasts only by a miracle, as one knows from the last five years."⁷⁴

Faced with the apathy of the public to Dreyfus's plight Halévy saw it as part of the same general degradation of public opinion and

public morality that had prompted the founding of the Revue de Méta-physique et de Morale. The press, the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme, everyone and every available institution had to be activated and had to testify in Dreyfus's behalf. "Those who are the ruling classes, those who must be liberal by profession, the lawyers, professors, keep silent ultimately because they haven't any organ with which to speak. The press belongs to a special class of adventurers whom no one respects but everyone listens to."⁷⁵ New tactics had to be devised to compensate for the level of the press and of the populace. He wrote long letters of Dreyfusard tactics to everyone: Bouglé must organize the League of the Rights of Man in Brittany to combat the Montpellier antisemitic league; they must publish Havet's lecture on freedom of association for the good that it might do for the cause; he urged friends and acquaintances to sign official letters of protest--they gathered 3,000 names for the January 16th protest in L'Aurore timed to coincide with Zola's J'accuse; and he participated in the great student demonstrations.⁷⁶

Halévy said that his commitment to political action ended on the January day that Dreyfus solicited and accepted a pardon (that is, when he allowed others to assume the implication of guilt rather than continue the struggle for his exoneration). Halévy wanted to "ignore politics."

A man disposed to fulfill his civic duties, but resolved to keep intact the greatest part of his time for the accomplishment of tasks properly intellectual, must rigorously limit the practical part of his existence. I ignore the Dreyfus Affair, I ignore politics; . . .⁷⁷

The issues of public opinion had widened in the Affair, however, steadily bringing into question the depth of republican roots in

France, so that when he decided to ignore the Affair he took up missionary activity in the school. He and his brother threw themselves into the universités populaires movement, which was an attempt on the part of the students to reach the lower classes.⁷⁸ He argued that in a republic the school is fundamental, not secondary, and "must therefore be honored as befits an instrument of the truth. . . . I would like to demonstrate to the people the vanity of enthusiasm and the usefulness of institutions."⁷⁹

Political combat ended, Halévy returned to alternative duty propagating the school and the laic ideal, responding in the same fashion as most of the elite of the "republic of the professors." His friends, all convinced secularists and anticlericals, continued their efforts in the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme and in anticlerical organizations as well. They all supported the laic laws and the anticlerical policy of the Radicals, but Halevy's correspondence indicates that he held to the logic of the laic ideal by a more consistent anticlericalism than that of his friends. When the crushing of the orders and the suppression of the schools was at hand under Combes even his close friends--Bouglé, whose support in this period of the Radicals was almost as consistent as Alain's (the 'official philosopher' of the Radical-Socialist party) and Léon, whose activities in behalf of republican anticlericalism were much more numerous than Halévy's--expressed qualms over the morality of discriminatory laws against the orders.

Elie's position was a much more hard-headed one than theirs on this issue. He chided Léon that he wanted to be rid of the influence of the Church but without the use of pressure or power. No less aware than they of the morally ambivalent position of liberal republi-

cans, he believed that in France individual liberty could only be won and preserved by a struggle against the preponderance of special groups and societies, especially the Church.⁸⁰ Its control over the minds of youth was so great that rationalism could not take root there until its hold was broken. The laic laws were obviously not laws of liberty, in the sense that each individual could act as he pleased without restrictions, nor even after the fashion of Rousseau whereby the law replaced caprice although it might result in the despotism of the group over the individual. As he explained to Bouglé, liberalism was another thing entirely; it admitted the necessity of the state but was fully aware that that state could become tyrannical. Therefore, the state must be so constituted as to remain useful, though deprived of the opportunity to become tyrannical. The state might actually be the weapon by which the capacity of men to be free was strengthened. On the question of anticlericalism, which touched so closely on the issue of free minds and a liberal public opinion, Halévy thought that the French state might have to pursue a policy of persecution of the orders so that France might ultimately be liberal.⁸¹ "There is a sense of the words liberty and liberalism in which these words are synonymous with state anticlericalism," he wrote.⁸² His argument here is very much like that of his fellow Dreyfusard, Emile Durkheim, who also saw the state as one of the liberating institutions that free the individual from the bonds of elementary groups such as the family, patriarchy, the commune and the church.

Some men of a left-Dreyfusard persuasion, men like Daniel Halévy and Charles Péguy, were disgusted by the laic laws and with the bourgeois political game, even as played by their Dreyfusard allies.

They argued that the state had turned from the persecution of the Jewish captain to the harassment of priests and nuns and that there was something immoral in the ends and means of the bourgeois state. The abuse of power by the Radical coalition that enacted the laic laws prompted Péguy to his famous epigram, "Tout commence en mystique et tout finit en politique." The bourgeois state, even when it included their ally Jean Jaurès in the inner circles of government, appeared incapable of realizing their ideals and the experience deepened their feeling for socialism. For Elie Halévy, whose expectations of states were much more limited, the politics of anticlericalism won his allegiance more than any other policy carried out by the government from the time of the Affair to the outbreak of the war.

Halévy's liberalism was not merely Radical politics, however. In practice he tended to vote Délégation des Gauches, sometimes Radical, sometimes Moderate, but that tells a small part of the story. In Radical doctrine, at least as it was expounded by Alain for the provincial voter, the role of the state was a negative one--to prevent disorder, to prevent the usurpation of authority and the corrupting influence of power, to prevent the growth of government or of over-mighty interests. The essential problem of political organization was to maintain order without which there could be no liberty; the government's duty was the preservation of both order and liberty without falling into tyranny or anarchy. Liberty was both personal and public, the distinction corresponding to the realm of freedom of the private individual with which the state ought not to interfere and the sphere of public life in which opinion, expression and beliefs were exercised openly and freely.

There was little in these Radical tenets that Halévy did not espouse and yet commentators have tended to regard his liberalism as nearer to the English variety than to the French strain. There is something to be said for this view. At its worst Radicalism expressed a mean, suspicious, negative view of civic responsibility, of political leadership and representation. It was individualist, as was Halévy, but by that Radicals intended to narrow the scope of legitimate demands on the individual that society or the community could make. By that Halévy intended to preserve the individual's privacy and his right to free inquiry and to participate in political life. It was parliamentary but with such a narrowly circumscribed vision of parliamentary life that Halévy, who was always a parliamentary democrat believing as he did that it was the best hope for peace and for elevating the public ethic, often felt alien to French parliamentarianism. It was democratic but in practice most Radical representatives took this to mean that they *were* the delegates of their constituency and obliged to faithfully vote its material interests.

Halévy assigned a positive role to the state and to political leadership--a duty to educate, to affirm an ideal of political and social justice, to express the public will without partisan spirit. Though he was fully aware of the dangers of Caesarism he had a most un-Radical awareness of the importance of leadership and institutions, as well as the condition of the public ethic, to the good governance of the republic. The problem of French democratic republicanism was that there were no institutions which could wield power in any other way than to check it; a watchdog mentality permeated the Chamber, the administration, and local government and party politics. The result

was an executive handcuffed in emergencies and immobile in even the best of times. Halévy understood the value of state power to achieve social goals and the necessity of active leadership whether it was exercised by great men, such as Peel or Lloyd George, or by an elite, as in the case of the English reformed aristocracy. In France because the representatives were primarily delegates who blocked any concentration of authority, individual or institutional, there was an appearance of enormous activity but little movement. This state of affairs might have been acceptable in a society with few differences or divisions but even before the war there were signs of great social strain, particularly among the working classes. Halévy argued for social reforms and a progressive income tax, which in France was then thought to be confiscation of property, and it was one of his bitterest disappointments that policies resembling the new liberalism of Lloyd George and Churchill had made so little headway in his own country. He was not, as some critics would have it, a laissez-faire liberal arguing as he did that artificial obstacles to the development of the individual must be removed in a democratic state. His was a liberal social philosophy which justified state intervention in the economy to alleviate distress, to open opportunities and to secure justice. At the same time he was a hard-headed critic of economic schemes which purported to lessen the burden on the workers, such as imperial tariffs in England, but which could not fulfill their promise.

There is a tension in Halévy's political thought which he refused to resolve by posing oppositions of liberty and authority, individual and society and democracy and leadership. Fundamental to his idealism was a belief that society's purpose was to enable men to be moral;

he found this belief in Plato and he and his friends around the Revue de Métaphysique hoped to contribute the realization of that purpose. The precondition of morality for him was the free individual acting spontaneously according to ethical principles. But the other side of that coin of liberating and reforming man and society was the supposition that the free agent and the society as a whole must impose a stringent self-discipline. Stability in society and self-discipline in the individual were necessary for free society. He found it paradoxical that in general liberalism was founded on hedonist and materialist principles because he thought freedom rested on the recognition of the absolute sacredness and dignity of the individual, the acceptance of his privacy, his autonomy, and his right to self-development and personal independence. These rights were the ones he chose for himself and he chose for others. This paradox ran through his History of the English Peoples. He thought the future was democratic and there was a moral validity to that fact in that it seemed the society best suited to realize the cult of the individual but he found at the origin of democracy an internal contradiction between liberty and equality, between the individual and society. He found the contradiction expressed most clearly in socialism and the theme ran throughout his observations on the subject. These problems and these principles would infuse his entire life of citizenship and scholarship.

¹Alain to Florence Halévy, Correspondance avec Elie et Florence Halévy, ed. by Jeanne Michel-Alexandre, 7th ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), p. 318. [Hereinafter referred to as Correspondance.]

²Pierre Guiral, Prévost-Paradol: 1829-1870. Pensée et action d'un libéral dans le second empire (Paris: PUF, 1955), pp. 17-18. See also Daniel Halévy's introduction to Ludovic Halévy, Carnets: 1862-9, Vol. I (Paris: Calman Lévy, 1935).

³Halévy, Carnets, Vol. I, pp. 168-178.

⁴La Grande Encyclopédie, XIX, 756-757. Halévy was the editor to the Secretariat of the Ministère d'Etat, the head of the bureau for the Ministère de l'Algérie et des Colonies, and finally the secretary to the Corps législatif. He was also secretary to the Duc de Morny, the illegitimate brother of the Emperor and his most important advisor.

⁵Halévy, Carnets, Vol. I, p. 150.

⁶See Daniel Halévy's introduction to his father's Carnets, Vol. I, p. 64.

⁷Alain, Correspondance, pp. 21-23.

⁸There are several signs that there was a revival of interest in philosophy in France at the end of the nineteenth century: for example, the fact that great numbers of the best students elected the Ecole normale over the Ecole polytechnique in the last two decades of the century. The audiences for the public lectures of Renan or Taine and the general popularity of these two thinkers among the generation attending the university in the 1880s and 1890s indicates a revival of interest in philosophical subjects. After the founding of the Revue de Métaphysique (1893) there was a marked increase in the number of journals devoted to philosophical study.

⁹Halévy's loyalty to Darlu extended far beyond the founding of the Revue de Métaphysique. He dedicated his Growth of Philosophic Radicalism to his lycee master. A number of the young men who attended the lycee Condorcet testified to Darlu's personal and intellectual power. (Dominique Parodi, La Philosophie contemporaine en France [Paris: 1919], p. 15.) Robert Dreyfus, Marcel Proust, Daniel Halévy and friends titled their first literary magazine Le Banquet to honor both Mallarmé and Darlu. This journal is notable today for having included the first published work of Proust, Henri Barbusse and Léon Blum. (Alain Silvera, Daniel Halévy: Gentleman Commoner of the Third Republic [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell: 1966], p. 43). Darlu is said to be the source of Proust's philosophy teacher in Jean Santeuil (George Painter, Proust: The Early Years [Boston: Little, Brown, 1959], p. 74). Darlu replaced Degas in the Halévy family at the time of the Dreyfus Affair. (Elie Halévy to Mme. Ludovic Halévy, 22 February, 1898, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.)

¹⁰Elie Halévy, "Era of Tyrannies," Era of Tyrannies, trans. by R.K. Webb (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1965), p. 269.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Revue de Métaphysique et Morale, I (1893), 376. (Hereinafter referred to as Revue de Métaphysique).

¹⁴H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness and Society (New York: Knopf, 1958), pp. 13-14.

¹⁵Dominique Parodi, La philosophie contemporaine en France (Paris: F. Alcan, 1919), p. 15.

¹⁶Halévy to Xavier Léon, August 30, 1891, Correspondance, p. 380.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Halévy to Léon, rapport sur une visite a M. Boutroux, 1892 n.d., Halévy papers, Guy-Loe collection.

¹⁹Halévy to Léon, 19 or 26 August 1893, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁰Halévy to Léon, August 30, 1891, Correspondance, p. 390. Halévy expressed his antipathy to Bergsonianism frequently over a number of years. (Halévy to Bouglé, March 30, 1901, and Halévy to Léon, December 7, 1908, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.)

²¹Halévy to Léon, October 1, 1913, Correspondance, p. 337.

²²Xavier Léon, "Introduction" Revue de Métaphysique, I (1893), 3.

²³Ibid., p. 1. See also Halévy's letter to Léon, August 30, 1891, Correspondance, p. 390, note 4. For a discussion of the influence of the neo-Kantianism of Renouvier refer to John A. Scott, Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870-1914 (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), pp. 52-85. Elisabeth Waelti, La morale Kantienne de Charles Renouvier et son influence sur la constitution de la morale laïque dans la deuxième moitié de XIX^e siècle en France (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Berne, Switzerland, 1947.)

²⁴Halévy to Bouglé, March 30, 1901, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁵[Elie Halévy and Léon Brunschvicg], "La philosophie au College de France," Revue de Métaphysique, I (1893), 369-381.

²⁶Ibid., p. 370. See Charles Digeon, La Crise allemande de la pensée française, 1870-1914 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1959).

²⁷Elie Halévy, "Les 'seminaires' philosophiques et l'état actuel des études de philosophie aux universités de Berlin et de Leipzig," Revue Internationale de l'Enseignement, XXIII (July-December 1906), 504-521. [Hereinafter referred to as "Les 'seminaires'"]

²⁸Halévy, "Les 'seminaires'" p. 521.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., p. 510.

³¹Halévy to Bouglé, December 13, 1906, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³²Halévy to Bouglé, lundi July 16 (1900), Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³³Halévy to Bouglé, February 4, 1903, Correspondance, p. 322.

³⁴Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and World (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1973), pp. 524-535. See also Halévy to Léon, March 15, 1903, Correspondance, p. 322.

³⁵Elie Halévy and Leon Brunschvicg, "Notes Critiques: F. Pillon ed. L'Année philosophique 1903" Revue de Métaphysique, II (1904), 582.

³⁶Halévy to Bouglé, October 5, 1902, November 13, 1905 and September 16, 1900, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³⁷Halévy to Bouglé, January 22, 1906, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³⁸Halévy to Bouglé, September 14, 1905, Correspondance (dated September 12, 1905), pp. 332-333.

³⁹[Halévy and Brunschvicg], "La philosophie au Collège de France," Revue de Métaphysique, I (1903), 376.

⁴⁰

Ibid., p. 377.

⁴¹

John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (2nd. ed., New York: Basic Books, 1966), p. 11. Passmore makes the point that the work of Lutoslawski, The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic (1897) drew attention to the later dialogues and established a chronology. George Rodier's review of Halévy's La Théorie platonicienne des sciences in the Revue de Métaphysique, V (1907), 725-763 indicated that Halévy's theme of unity in the Dialogues was unusual.

⁴²Elie Halévy, La Théorie platonicienne des sciences (Paris: Alcan, 1936), p. 338. [Hereinafter referred to as La Théorie]

⁴³Ibid., p. 378.

⁴⁴Charles Gillispie, "The Work of Elie Halévy: A Critical Appreciation," Journal of Modern History, XXII (1950), 237. [Hereinafter Gillispie, "Elie Halévy"]

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Halévy to Bouglé, March 22 (1901), Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴⁷Emile Boutmy, The English Peoples: A Study of Their Political Psychology, trans. by F. English (NY: Putnam and Sons, 1904).

⁴⁸David Thomson, Democracy in France since 1870 (5th ed.; NY: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 52 citing Pierre Tissier, I Worked with Laval (1942), pp. 7-17.

⁴⁹Halévy to Bouglé, January 15 and March 2, 1905, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁵⁰Halévy to Léon, October 7, 1911, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection. See Halévy's letter to Bouglé, January 18, 1902, Correspondance, p. 328. Terry Clark, Prophets and Patrons (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).

⁵¹Theodore Zeldin, "Higher Education in France 1848-1940," Journal of Contemporary History, II (1967), 78.

⁵²Richard Challener, "The French Foreign Office in the Era of Philippe Berthelet," in Felix Gilbert and Gordon Craig (eds.), The Diplomats, Vol. I, The Twenties (New York: Atheneum, 1965), 62-63.

⁵³Elie Halévy, Thomas Hodgskin (1787-1869), (Paris: Société nouvelle de librairie et d'édition, 1903). This work has been translated by A.J. Taylor and published by Ernest Benn Ltd. in 1956.

⁵⁴Halévy to Bouglé, May 20, 1904, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁵⁵Halévy to Bouglé, April 28, 1898, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁵⁶Halévy to Bouglé, September 14, 1905, Correspondance (dated Sept. 12, 1905), pp. 332-333.

⁵⁷Georges Painter, Marcel Proust: A Biography, Vol. I, p. 226.

⁵⁸Halévy to Bouglé, November 16 and 18, 1897, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁵⁹Alain Silvera, Daniel Halévy: Gentleman Commoner of the Third French Republic (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 91, citing an antisemitic reference in Daniel's diary for December 2, 1899.

⁶⁰Halévy to Bouglé, November 16, 1897. There is only one other reference to semitic identifications in all Elie Halévy's letters which have survived. In World War I he teased his dear friend Xavier Léon, who was Jewish, that Léon would be chosen as the liaison to the Americans because he had such a good Catholic name. Elie, though Protestant and thoroughly secular in belief carried a name that sounded much too Jewish for many French posts.

⁶¹Halévy to Bouglé, February 22, 1899, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁶²Halévy to Bouglé, March 31, 1898, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Halévy to Bouglé, January 1, 1899, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁶⁵Halévy to Bouglé, mardi 1898, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁶⁶Halévy to Bouglé, Sunday October 1899, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁶⁷Halévy to Bouglé, February 1, 1898, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Daniel Halévy, "Apologie pour notre passé," Luttes et problèmes (Paris, Rivière, 1911). See also Charles Péguy, Notre jeunesse (Paris: Gallimard NRF collections idées, n.d.) which was written in 1911 to answer Halévy's Apologie.

⁷⁰Elie Halévy to Bouglé, mardi (February 7, 1899), Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Halévy to Bouglé, October, 1901, reprinted in Correspondance, p. 326.

⁷³Halévy to Bouglé, February 22, 1899, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection

⁷⁴Halévy to Bouglé, Dec. 2, 1897, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁷⁵Halévy to Léon, mercredi (November 24, 1897), Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁷⁶Halévy to Bouglé, lundi January 10, 1898, and Halévy to Bouglé, mardi, 1898, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁷⁷Halévy to Bouglé (February 16, 1900), Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁷⁸Halévy to Bouglé, January 1 (1899) and January 27, 1900, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁷⁹Halévy to Bouglé, January 27, 1900, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁸⁰Halévy to Bouglé, August 15, 1902, August 10, 1902, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁸¹Halévy to Bouglé, November 1902 "lundi 24," Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

CHAPTER 2

THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM

Halévy defined his intellectual problems for the next thirty years during the decade following his agrégation. He expanded his ideas and changed his priorities after the first World War, but generally speaking by 1904, when he published the third volume of The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, which had begun as his dissertation, he had established the basic nature of his work. He was himself following the two courses that he taught at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques--the history of British institutions and thought and the history of European socialism.

That there was an internal logic to his major problems and that he was conscious of that logic, he indicated in a letter to Bouglé in 1896. Drawing three concentric circles on the page, he wrote that he would next undertake "a theory of society, a theory of modern democracy, or a history of England, or something else entirely in that line of thing."¹ Then, mocking his own seriousness, he commented that destiny would let him know in which of the three circles he would enclose himself. It would be an error to believe that he ever confined himself within the perimeter of a single one of these circles. His writing moved steadily away from the philosophy toward history and political science but the grand concerns of his concentric circles provide the unifying principles of his work.

The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism closed a period of intensive study as much as it opened the major concerns of Halévy's life. From about 1895 to 1904 Halévy's letters were thick with his readings and problems in associationalist psychology, Plato and classical thought, the English philosophical tradition, political theory and political economy. His articles on philosophical problems--on sensations, causality and similitude, the association of ideas and the explication of sentiment--each underline his advocacy of an idealist philosophical position and an individualist psychology and methodology. They developed from his Latin thesis and his study of Hume and the English psychologists.² He continued to edit the Supplément of the Revue de Métaphysique but his contributions to pure philosophy, as opposed to practical questions of the social sciences or to the history of ideas, ended by the time that he published Philosophic Radicalism. He kept abreast of currents of philosophical investigation. He was the editor who urged the journal to examine new developments, especially outside of France and beyond the confines of professional philosophy, but even in the Société Française de Philosophie his contributions centered on practical and social questions rather than problems of philosophy after 1904.³

In one way Halévy's choice of the philosophic radicals as the subject of his dissertation reflected his desire to be a philosopher whose learning might be of some immediate use to society or to him as an active agent in society. He expressed his admiration for Hume's quality of worldliness--not for the fact that he was indeed worldly but that his wisdom was thoroughly penetrated by a sound sense of reality and of politics. Halévy wanted those qualities. Though perfectly aware by the time that he wrote The Growth of Philosophic

Radicalism that the Benthamites had lacked a worldly wisdom, that they were abstract rationalists as much as the French philosophes had been,⁴ he still thought them important primarily as practical reformers. Bentham was a reformer, a man of action, not a political theorist. He was a philosophe simpliste, a non-academic thinker,⁵ and though he was looked upon by his disciples as the "founder of a school," in fact he was "not the principal nor the only author of the new doctrines," nor the inventor of the program of the philosophic radicals.⁶ The doctrine was the one which "Stuart Mill assimilated and vulgarized--its inventors are Hartley, Adam Smith, Bentham, Malthus and Ricardo (not counting Hume and James Mill)."⁷ Bentham himself was a great arranger of ideas, an activist who reflected the spirit of the age which justified its propositions in terms of utility.

Historically, the philosophic radicals had sought to found a social science and a legislative program on the principle of utility. They believed that the motive for men's actions was their desire to gain pleasure and avoid pain. So universal was this principle and so simple a matter of calculation that a social science could be built upon utility. It could serve as the standard by which the legislator could frame laws and create institutions which would maximize pleasures in society just as the rational individual maximized his personal pleasures and minimized his pains. The relatively simple moral arithmetic of the pleasures and pains of the sum of individuals in the society corresponded exactly to the most beneficial policy for the society. On this simple principle the philosophic radicals attacked innumerable evils in the legal, political and economic system of England over the fifty years from the revolutionary era to the Reform

Bill of 1832.

Halévy proposed in his dissertation

to write the history of certain ideas, of certain individuals and of a particular milieu. But I wanted to place on the first step the history of ideas; I wanted the individuals to remain on the second step and only to appear as the vehicles of the ideas. James Mill is only a doctrine made man. I would almost say as much of Bentham.⁸

He wrote a history of Benthamite doctrine, not merely the ideas of Bentham himself. He saw his study of the utilitarians as "a problem in the philosophy of history: what is the historical importance of a doctrine?" He was bothered by this question when he thought of Hodgskin, Pecqueur and Marx and again when he speculated about the impact of the Wesleyans. He returned to this question again and again in that first decade following his agrégation.

Halévy's method was the chronological and topical treatment of the thought of the utilitarians, but he organized it around the events of Bentham's life. The men in the work were the vehicles of ideas, especially those ideologues who came under Bentham's influence or who influenced him, such as James Mill, David Ricardo, and Francis Place.⁹ The three volumes of the Growth of Philosophic Radicalism cover the youth of Bentham, the evolution of a doctrine, and the formation of philosophic radicalism. Within each Halévy discussed the currents of political and economic opinion which influenced Benthamism either to contribute to or to challenge its principles. In doing so, he was able to organize much of the intellectual and political life of England around these English doctrinaires, first for the period from Bentham's birth to the French Revolution and then to the Reform Bill of 1832.

Halévy's central theme supplied the organization and the critique of Philosophic Radicalism. He held that there were two strands of utilitarian thought and that they were inherently incompatible. One, under the influence of Helvétius and Bentham's own predisposition to administrative and legal reform, justified the artificial identity of interests between the subject and the state. The legislator or administrator, by structuring government and law and ultimately society itself to reward preferred behavior and to punish undesired conduct, artificially created a harmony between the interests of the individual and the greater good of society. The other strand, which was incorporated by the Benthamites into their thought from classical economics, assumed the natural harmony of interests; that is, the impossibility of conflict in the long run between the desires of the individual and the greater good of society.

Halévy broke utilitarian doctrine into three components, which roughly corresponded to three different periods in Bentham's life--juridical concerns, matters of political economy and of political reform. Within each volume he described the theoretical considerations and the currents of opinion that contributed to the finished dogma of Benthamism. The first book included the theories of penal reform and legislation of Beccaria and Helvétius which shaped Bentham's formulation of a philosophy of law and the economic thought of Adam Smith. As Halévy pointed out, the central problem of the social order which was first raised by Hobbes remained the issue for the utilitarians, but they did not succeed in grasping the problem. Hobbes had posited that the conflict of interests between the individual and the state must be resolved by the sovereign for the sake of peace. But the

Hobbesian solution had not prevailed in the English tradition; rather, the Lockean natural harmony of interests of the individual and society was assumed.

The utilitarians never directly confronted the conflicting assumptions of Locke and Hobbes. They used both theories. Though in general it could be said that Benthamite legal and administrative thought resorted to the artificial identification of interest while utilitarian economic policies tended to natural harmony, there were times when even this rule did not hold. Many apparently divergent political economists expressed their positions in the language of utility and Halévy's unravelling of the strands was a tour de force. His discussion placed utilitarian causes into one or another category throughout the period. He indicated that the irreconcilable conflict was often completely obscured by the particular issue at hand. The New Poor Law, by which the agency of the state incarcerated subjects in an attempt to discourage public dependency, was an example of artificially-created harmony. The Corn Laws, on the other hand, rested on the principle of the natural harmony in that the state was prevented from protecting the special interests of the agriculturalists. Thus, at one time the utilitarians might promote the growth of the power of the state and at another pursue commercial and industrial laissez-faire policies.

Halévy summarized the development of Benthamism by 1789, noting that in every particular Bentham's juridical theory was complete and was ahead of its time. In economics, its premises and teachings drawn from Adam Smith, utilitarianism reflected the spirit of the age. But in politics, at the moment of the Revolution, the utilitarians were

skeptics, authoritarians and were far from the Radical program they were to develop. So universal a philosophy was the doctrine of utility in England, however, that all reformers in the area of the revolution "were forced to speak the language of utility if they wanted to make their opinions accepted or even understood by the public to which they were addressed."¹⁰ Bentham and Burke both assumed the principle of utility to be hostile to the principles of republicanism and democracy, the latter basing his traditional philosophy on it and the former refuting point by point the Declaration of the Rights of Man on utilitarian grounds. In 1789 Bentham, the future leader of the philosophic radicals, was far from a democrat, but the rhetoric of utility came to be identified with the principles of democracy and republicanism in spite of him.

If Bentham's ideological development stood still during the upheavals in France, that of the Jacobin sympathizers did not. Halévy noted that Paine's doctrines reflected the assumptions of natural rights and utility. In effect, Paine attempted to apply Smith's ideas to political problems, positing the natural harmony of interests. Others, Halévy noted, particularly Godwin and Hodgskin, applied the natural identity of interests even more faithfully and more consistently than Paine did. They ultimately denied the need for government at all. If the language and principle of utility coupled with the assumption of the natural identity of interests contained within it the implications of radicalism, including even radical anarchism, then the character of Benthamite ideology depended upon other theorems than these two. For Bentham's disciples that character was based upon a mechanism of the egoistic passions whether they were naturally or

artificially reconciled for the well-being of society. In spite of the fact that Godwin expressed his thought in utilitarian language there was a belief in the individual personality including hope for intellectual emancipation, which was the center of all his philosophy. Halévy thought that this hope, by its nature, separated him from the utilitarian tradition. Similarly Godwin expressed his economic views in utilitarian terms, but ultimately he aspired to a society in which individual property ceased to exist and was replaced by the egalitarian sharing of abundance.

Benthamite economic doctrine was dominated by the utilitarianism of scarcity, not that of abundance. For the philosophic radicals Godwin's fear of maldistribution of goods was vastly overshadowed by the Malthusian prospect of insufficient products for human consumption. But the philosophic radicals incorporated Malthusianism without any explicit recognition that there might be a conflict between Smith's optimism and the pessimism of Malthus. The ease with which they joined philosophically incompatible beliefs could only be explained by historical conditions. Halévy's explication of the conditions in which the philosophic radicals came to favor education was a masterly illustration of his reasons for approaching his subject historically rather than through the philosophical description of their views.¹¹ Their commitment to laissez-faire ought to have led them to oppose compulsory education but they were faithful to the spirit of Malthus when they tried to tame the blind impulses of instinct through education.

Halévy organized the last volume of the book around the Benthamites' political activity leading to the Reform Bill of 1832. He

described the creation of a school of propagandists around Bentham, which he believed to be the work of James Mill. Mill converted Bentham to democracy and was the most capable and ardent propagandist of the group's principles.¹³ Bentham's rigid authoritarianism, his Toryism, was softened by a series of rejections that he thought he had received at the hands of corporate privilege running the complex machinery of aristocratic government in such a way as to foil his reforming schemes. If he could not make reform at the top, then perhaps he could win support for it among the people at the bottom.

Benthamite political activity after 1815 was a strenuous propaganda attack on the common opinions held by Englishmen prior to the Reform Bill. Utilitarian economists attacked the policy of protection, campaigning against corporate or "sinister" interests in favor of the general interest. The latter was defined by them as the aggregate of the interests of consumers in order to avoid the problem of conflicts of interest between producers. The Benthamites assumed that as consumers the interests of individuals would not conflict. The government was chief among the sinister corporations because it was in the hands of the aristocratic elements of society which used it for their individual and class interests. The tactic of the utilitarians was, therefore, to reduce or remove the intervention of the state in behalf of any particular group or class. Ricardo and his disciples promulgated a program which would introduce free exchange of products among individual consumers throughout the world without regard to group, class or national boundaries.

The democratic or egalitarian argument supplied the rationale for the call to reduce corporate privilege in utilitarian political

theory after 1815. The Radicals advocated democracy for its greater equality, but more importantly for them for its dispatch in enacting reforms and realizing progress that would commonly be delayed by the complex machinery of aristocratic government.¹⁴ Bentham's moment of truth came through the frustrating experience of a would-be reformer batting his head against the wall of official indifference and, so he believed, corporate resistance. Bentham had only slightly more ideological commitment to democracy than he had to liberal institutions. The method by which he attained his goals was incidental to the goals themselves. Instead of the facile identification of Benthamism with radicalism, which was common in France, Halévy drew a parallel to the ideal benevolent despots of the philosophes. For want of a despot, Bentham accepted universal suffrage.

Utilitarians believed the chief political fallacy they had to combat was the widespread assumption in England that complex and liberal government were one and the same thing. This assumption was an inherently conservative principle which protected corporate privilege. The complexity of political and legal institutions in England was the refuge of special interests and class government, not the bulwark of popular liberties. And so they attacked the restraining devices of the English system whether it held back the state or the masses. Similarly, they attacked the philosophers of complex government, Montesquieu, Blackstone and de Lolme.

Halévy saw this tactic as a reflection of an inherent contradiction in the very origins of liberal ideology. He thought, in fact, that liberalism might spring from many sources, including this Whig "fallacy" that complex government was liberal, which Benthamites

attacked. Liberalism might also flow from Christian habits, historical traditions, and even from some of the necessities of the industrializing economy. But in the eighteenth century liberalism came to be justified by two arguments--utility and the rights of man. Halévy's book delineated the emergence of the argument of utility to preeminence among the English Radicals rather than the doctrine of the rights of man, which had appealed to the French. The utilitarian position, however, no less than the doctrine of the rights of man, was shot through with contradictions. First, there was the grand contradiction, which permeated the doctrine, between natural and artificial identification of interests, between the legacy of Bentham and that of Smith. If individual interests had to be artificially reconciled with the public welfare, might not there be a threat to individual liberty in that reconciliation? Second, the spring of classical economics fed diverging streams of social thought; the socialism of Godwin, Owen, Holcroft, and Hodgskin as well as the Manchesterism of MacCulloch, Cobden and Bright could be found at this source.

With regard to the first contradiction, which was the theme that bound his book together, Halévy was the first scholar to call attention to the fundamental ambivalence toward liberty in the Benthamite tradition, in its origins and in its influence. He alone of historians in England and France insisted that this ambivalent strain ran through the utilitarian philosophy. Neither Leslie Stephen nor A.V. Dicey saw the difficulties that he raised. The former noted with approval the Benthamite contributions to the development of state machinery. The latter used the concepts Benthamism and Individualism interchangeably.¹⁵

Halévy, the French liberal, held liberty to be the highest good.

He personally believed that a complex constitution was the best safeguard of liberty.¹⁶ Even this might prove inadequate if public opinion did not respect the sacred nature of the individual with an almost superstitious awe. England possessed a complex constitution and the elaborate mechanism of an honored legal system. Furthermore, evangelical pietism had imbued English liberalism with a respect for the incomprehensible, the irrational and the spark of divinity in every human being. With these and other moral controls England had resisted the inherent authoritarianism of Benthamism. In defenseless France, however, both Caesarism and anarchy were a constant threat to liberty; Halévy feared Caesarism as much as, if not more than, anarchy. The omnipresence of that threat to liberty in France heightened Halévy's sensitivity to the indifference to personal liberty in the thought of the English philosophes, a trait they shared with their French counterparts.

There is a consistent theme in Philosophic Radicalism of the Benthamites' indifference to liberty. Halévy's comment on Bentham's Panopticon scheme pointed it out: "liberty is not, according to Bentham, an end of human activity; the doctrine of utility is not, in origin and in essence, a philosophy of liberty."¹⁷ Commenting on Bentham's simplifying mania which could advocate a single remedy for penitentiary, factory, mad house, hospital, and even school, he concluded: "He hoped to make the principles of the doctrine of Helvétius which were despotic, philanthropic, and utilitarian, but not in the least liberal, triumph in his own country. . . ."¹⁸ This utter lack of regard for questions of liberty was not merely Bentham's personal quirk. He shared it with others such as Owen or Godwin who were also under Helvétius' influence.

In his discussion of Bentham's Rationale of Judicial Evidence Halévy contrasted the accepted English procedures with Bentham's recommendations. He concluded: "On Bentham's doctrine, the judge is free to put what restrictions he likes, for reasons of nonpertinence or of superfluity, on the production of evidence, without any rules of exclusion, with a view of arriving at a knowledge of the truth. . . ."19 He repeated: "Utilitarianism is not a synonym for liberalism; in the doctrine of utility, liberty is not a good in itself."20 Halévy pointed out that Bentham only once, and then under the influence of James Mill, defended the institution of the jury. Summarizing Bentham's proposals for juridical reform he wrote:

In short, the judge, as conceived by Bentham's doctrine, is a kind of monarch isolated in his tribunal, delivering his sentences without legal forms, and without any really efficacious control to prevent eventual abuses of power, other than the purely moral control exercised on him by public opinion. But such a doctrine bears no relation to the so-called liberal doctrine: it was almost in the same terms as these that the Caesarists of the nineteenth century were to demand the establishment of a government which should be personal, and responsible just insofar as it was personal.21

Halévy suspected the Benthamite zeal for strong government by experts precisely because it was coupled with this insensitivity to threats to liberty. He distrusted this passion in his contemporaries as well and frequently remarked it in his friends, the Webbs. He thought that the Webbs, who saw themselves as intellectual descendants of Bentham, might have prejudiced his sense of socialism because they defined it as a strong centralized government controlling the peoples' welfare and efficiency. There are those, of course, who see Bentham as the father of English socialism in that he ardently advocated using public authority for social reform and social engineering. Here it

is especially interesting to note that Halévy, whose definition of socialism centered on precisely this willingness to use state authority for intervention in economic matters, did not see Bentham as father to socialism. In Halévy's final estimation, the Benthamite "greatest good for the greatest number" remained individualist and democratic in practice and in thought. To his mind it differed substantially from Saint-Simon's which aimed at "the amelioration of the most numerous and poorest class" as a class, not as simple individuals.

Halévy's judgment of the Benthamite passion for centralization and government by experts was that fundamentally the conception was detrimental to liberty. "The State, as conceived by Bentham, is a machine so well constructed that every individual, taken individually, cannot for one instant escape from the control of all the individuals taken collectively."²² "Pure democracy" meant to Bentham a government as free as possible from every constitutional complication and from every judicial fiction.²³ Bentham's willingness to create anew ancient tyranny in more rational forms was not lost on Halévy, any more than it was on Bentham's contemporaries at the Edinburgh Review or on Thomas Hodgskin, but it had been lost on Bentham's heirs.

The other flaw that Halévy found in philosophical radical theory was the fact that one could defend both laissez-faire capitalism and socialism on the basis of the assumption of natural harmony of interests or the labor theory of value. He found an interesting parallel of the contradictions of philosophic radicalism in two different phases of their history, which he thought underlined his theme and his use of the historical method. Godwin had founded his economic and political system on Smith's natural harmony of interests. On that foundation

he had advocated the end of private property and of government because coercion was inherently evil. Halévy pointed out that later, in the era of the Reform Bill, William Thompson and Thomas Hodgskin had turned Ricardo's labor theory of value against his political and economic conclusions. Both argued that the divergent interests of labor and capital followed inevitably from the realities described by the labor theory. Ricardo stressed the conflict of interests between the landlords and other classes of society, but not the struggle of capitalist and laborer. But that struggle was based on a natural divergence of interests of the class of capitalists and the class of wage earners encompassed by Ricardo's theory. Ricardo was accused of preaching economic optimism and quietism in its most complete form because the theory accepted the momentary or dynamic changes of the economic system as merely short-run problems which would be resolved in the long-run of the economy.²⁴

Halévy was attracted to the democratic, individualistic radicalism which viewed all men, rich or poor, as belonging to a single class. Yet, even there, in the origins of liberal thought, in "left Ricardianism" he found an inherently contradictory doctrine with regard to the utilization of state power and the germs of a class analysis. Certainly, as he pointed out years later in the Era of Tyrannies discussion, radicalism changed once it admitted that there were classes in society arising from the natural evolution of the economy and constituted in such a way that in one class all individuals were hereditarily favored by fortune and in the other hereditarily denied favor.²⁵

Such problems occurred to few of Bentham's contemporaries.

In spite of the contradictions in philosophic radicalism, the doctrine was capable of fully satisfying a young and talented intelligence like that of John Stuart Mill around 1825. Halévy himself, however, was acutely aware of Benthamite failure to reconcile theoretical difficulties. The relative harmony between liberal and radical at the time of the Reform Bill could best be explained by the social ethic and the political programs of the period, not by the logic of arguments. Intellectually, the values of a man like Hodgskin diverged noticeably from the philosophic radicals, but in practical program they actually differed very little. Halévy thought the doctrine of natural harmony had so totally captured the imagination of some of Bentham's contemporaries that in practical terms the distance between libertarian socialist or anarchist and laissez-faire Ricardian was very small. Furthermore, Ricardo's explanation of the fact that workers and masters joined together against the landed interests seemed to describe the political reality of the particular moment, a moment which led to Peel's economic reforms of 1846.²⁶

Once he moved from theoretical difficulties to the social and economic realities of the 1830s, Halévy came very close to a class explanation of the popularity of the ideology. In his volume on Thomas Hodgskin, which was written as he worked on Philosophic Radicalism, he had made the point that this precursor of Marx was utterly unwilling to rely on the state or to interfere with the natural harmony of the economy. There were no differences in the program of the Mechanics' Institute and that of the advocates of laissez-faire once they secured the abolition of special privileges. As a result, the aristocracy of labor concentrated on the virtues of natural harmony and progress--

self-reliance, self-improvement and prudence.²⁷

But it was not the acceptance of the ethos of industrial and commercial laissez-faire by the working class that played the decisive role. The working class mattered relatively little. Nor did Halévy believe that the government policy of free trade derived from Ricardian principles alone.²⁸ Rather, these principles fit the spirit of the age, he said, and in fact, he indicated that they fit the needs of a class; that is, "merchants needed the thesis of the identity of interests to be true, in order to secure the most extended market for their products." "Manufacturers needed to believe in the theory of indefinite progres. . . , consequently it mattered little that certain economic laws brought serious restrictions to bear on the harmony of interests, or set a limit to the progress of the human race. . . ." "The industrial revolution, like the political revolution in France thirty years earlier, was demanding its principles."²⁹

* * *

The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism should be seen in the context of the political and intellectual issues that stirred Halévy in the years 1894 to 1904. It is an extremely complex book in which Halévy brought together many strands of his thought. It must be seen as part of an attempt to examine critically the fundamental propositions of much of liberal thought and as a reasoned defense of much of the

liberal, radical tradition against a French intellectual current which hoped to drown that legacy. It is a masterpiece of descriptive analysis of the English utilitarians' theory and practice as it evolved in response to specific political, social and economic problems and theories. Furthermore, Philosophic Radicalism deserves to be examined as one part of a developing Halévy thesis about the nature of English society in the nineteenth century. It was a work of scholarship and one which sought political wisdom in the ways of modern society, especially those relating to change, order, security, and liberty.

Liberal political economy was the object of attack from many directions in France, as well as in England, at the turn of the century. There were political attacks, of course, but there were intellectual erosions in the none-too-solid ground of economic theory as well. There were those, including Alfred Marshall, the theorist of marginal utility, who refused to accept the view of economics as merely the science of the satisfaction of human wants. Another utilitarian assumption, that of equal desires of equal intensity among equal individuals which were amenable to measurement, was a problematic one; the Benthamites had not solved the simple difficulty of measuring the intensity of the wants of any given individual or group of individuals merely by declaring a priori that the wants were equal.

At the same time, Pareto was groping towards a view that even on the basis of an individualistic and capitalistic theory society could and ought to structure its needs on terms other than individualist ones. Durkheim, who began with a concern for the problem of social order--one which Halévy shared--rejected the naive assumptions upon which the utilitarians built their economics and politics, that human happiness

could be achieved, and increased, through greater divisions of labor to satisfy material needs or that human happiness could be isolated into individual units. Both the Division of Labor and Suicide, written and published between 1893 and 1897, challenged any simple view of the effect on the individual and on society of rationalized economic practices.

Halévy was, as we have shown, committed to the rational investigation of politics and society for all his skepticism. He was, also, liberal and individualist and deeply interested in the impact of current psychological particularly sensualist theories on any hope to ground politics and economics on the individual. He was concerned to test the validity of utilitarian psychological assumptions to see which had held after a century of scientific investigation. Finally, Halévy wanted to examine the utilitarians for what they were and how their ideas developed much the same as Lucien Lévy-Bruhl had studied Comte and the Comteans, integral positivism so to speak, revealing the dominant ideas of the movement and hold them up for close examination. Lévy-Bruhl had laid bare the passion for classification of science, the establishment of sociology, the narrow definition of politics and the Comteans' aim to establish intellectual and social harmony and his work had sharpened the debate among sociologists and other social theorists as to the nature and methods of their enterprise. The utilitarians and Anglo-Saxon political economy in general posed an alternative to sociology in Halévy's mind. He intended a comparable study of the philosophic radicals, not merely of their doctrine, but of the actual evolution of their thought in relation to their times, believing that it was possible to make a contribution by critically

examining the intellectual origins of a doctrine.

The philosophic radicals, the utilitarians, had a poor reputation in France. Since the Revolution French social thinkers were thoroughly critical of utilitarian assumptions: first, on the grounds of their ahistorical nature, and then on the basis of their primitive conception of human psychology and of society. The Saint-Simonians, for example, argued with the utilitarians that human societies were not created to fulfill men's desires, individually or collectively, and that societies had their own laws of development, which were neither made by or very often understood by the members of the society. According to Saint-Simon, societies develop in history and the method of the social sciences must therefore be historical in order to determine the function of any given institution within the society at a given stage.³⁰ Furthermore, in the eyes of the Saint-Simonians the utilitarians' indifference to religion and unwillingness to acknowledge the political importance of class were grievous faults.

Comte had criticized the utilitarians for their failure to include a concept of progress in their social theory (a criticism which Halévy disputed), and for their crude egoist psychology. The positivists complained that the Benthamites thought their rationalism was scientific when, in reality, it was deductive and sentimental. The positivists argued that the only true social science must be based on empirical observation of social facts and upon true quantification, not an abstract felicific calculus.³¹ Halévy first investigated the utilitarians because they were rationalists, not because they were lapsed empiricists, in part reacting against this positivist reduction of social science to merely statistical methods.

On one level then Halévy wanted to examine what remained of individualist assumptions in political economy, and on another he sought to right misconceptions of the Benthamite utilitarians which were commonly held in France. He wanted to redress the neglect of the historical importance of the Benthamites: to prove that Bentham was a "reformer" not an "empiricist, that rather than "sensationalists" or "empiricists," as they were categorized, the Benthamites were rationalists and deductive in method.³² He pointed out how much they tended to assume the natural harmony of interests, how much more stoic than hedonist they all were in behavior, and how much their view of human nature posited man avoiding pain rather than seeking pleasure. An advertisement for Pears soap urging the "habit of happiness" led him to observe that this habit was missing in Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, those great descendants of the utilitarians.³³ Self-restraint and abstinence motivated these "hedonists" rather than self-interest and the pursuit of happiness. Serious-minded Frenchmen were misled by the ideas of these utilitarians when their behavior pointed to an ingrained stoicism. Halévy suspected that the true secret of English liberal society lay in that habitual stoicism, in all the varieties of experience which reinforced the very habit that he thought his countrymen lacked.

Halévy defended the utilitarians against their critics, past and present, in the conclusion to his book. Perfectly aware of their colossal naiveté, their aberrations and short-sightedness, their shallow view of man and society, he nevertheless shared their hope of applying to man and society the methods and principles of science. He defended the part that Ricardo had played in the organization of the

science of economics though his political economy had been refuted for a century.³⁴ He retraced the Benthamites' individualist positions, particularly in the theory of the origins of law, the principles of political economy and psychology. He examined their assumptions and areas of confusion and their terrible penchant for simplification, the appearance rather than the reality of an exact science. It was for their efforts and goals, for their will to enact practical reforms, that Halévy justified the Benthamites for their power for good. It was true that Bentham postulated his rationalism more than he justified it, but if he had not been the maniac of logic, calculation and language that he was, "he would not so thoroughly have infected public opinion with these truths . . . that 'all pain is evil' and that the 'happiness of the worst man in the species is as much an integrant part of the whole mass of human happiness as is that of the best man.'" ³⁵ Furthermore, the second postulate of Bentham's system, the individualistic, egalitarian proposition led step by step to an egalitarian perception of society, in spite of Bentham's lack of concern for equality. Halévy believed equality was a worthy end to have contributed to.

Halévy's concluding defense pointed to his dialogue with the Durkheimian sociologists. He warned that the critique of Benthamite inadequacies ought not to create the illusion that individualism was merely a "philosophical eccentricity," that the need for a social science based on the individual was a popular fallacy of a past period and no more. The simplistic methodology of the philosophic radicals ought not to lead others to believe that a social science of collective representations, passions and institutions was an easy alternative.

Collective representations implied moral and ethical assumptions which their advocates dimly recognized, if at all, assumptions to which Halévy was philosophically hostile. He thought that social science, if it purported to be explicative, had to be based on the individual who was the indivisible atom of all collective representations. And if one ceased to explain social facts and merely attached them to their predecessors in time, as many positivists did, then social science ceasing to be explanatory would become merely narrative, neither history nor social science, handicapped by the inherent limitations of its mechanistic assumptions.³⁶

Halévy's history was, in a grand sense, sociological and his relationship with the sociologists was a complex one. His manner of formulating The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism owes much to a French historical convention, which ascribed the Revolution to the ideas of the philosophes, but it owes more to a problem in the history of ideas, as he explained it, one which we might see as a sociological inquiry. The effect of comparable ideas in two nations was quite different, calling for a special explanation in terms of unique conditions prevailing in England. Halévy did not think he needed to take sides in the debate which set the framework of relations between sociologists and historians at the turn of the century. He thought it was possible to formulate general theory as a historian. As he wrote to Bouglé "Thucydides is more of a philosopher than Gumplovicz."³⁷ His ambition was to write contemporary history, to write the history of social institutions, to write synthetic works, and above all to write history addressed to contemporary problems. Halévy shared with Bouglé a profound intellectual involvement with contemporary problems that made

the differences in their approach secondary. His philosophy was undoubtedly closer to his individualist and idealist friends, Léon, Brunschvicg and Alain, but he and Bouglé possessed common values and common concerns with modern social thought and social movements which provided a bridge in their friendship between traditional history and historical sociology. It was the basis of a lifetime of shared projects.³⁸

Halévy responded to Bouglé's steady advice not to write history by frequently rephrasing his historical problems à la sociologique.³⁹ These conceptualizations are very interesting because they indicate his consciousness of the sociological implications of his themes. The themes that motivated his work--stability, the social significance of institutionalized religion, the basis of socialist movements in the working class and party structures, the nature of bureaucracy--fit our definition of sociological concerns. His conceptualizations from his first period of writing and research, from 1895 to the first World War, indicate clearly the close connection between the Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, his Methodist essays and the history of England: the role of ideology in social reform; the part played by a religious impulse in the creation and influence of a social ethic; a theory of progress in modern society in terms of the relationship of economic, political and social factors to stability and to change; a theory of modern democracy and a theory of modern socialism. His concern for the problem of social stability which allowed for change and for the resolution of conflict in pacific and progressive ways was, in a sense, sociological in inspiration. His examination of England in the crucial period of free trade and electoral and social reform suggested to him a

general thesis of progress and liberty without violence and revolution. France was his model in the sense that it provided a basis of comparison with England.

In spite of genuine and deeply-felt areas of disagreement, Halévy was at one with diverse sociologists, philosophers and historians who shared his rationalism. Men like Francois Simiand, Bouglé, Henri Berr, Charles Seignobos, Halévy and Charles Gide and the philosophers of the Revue who were idealists and individualists were united by a common antipathy to the irrationalism of intellectual culture at the turn of the century, by their desire to make social science possible, by personal friendships and common political attitudes, especially their mutual rally around Dreyfus and the Third Republic. Halévy's disagreements with the positivists and the sociologists were quarrels among friends in the milieu of fin de siècle Paris.

The period of intense political activity around the Dreyfus Affair and his involvement with "schools" such as the sociologists or his own around the Revue de Métaphysique actually contributed to Halévy's appreciation of the power for social good of individuals acting in unison.⁴⁰ Perhaps this explains Halévy's sudden and somewhat uncharacteristic rhetoric in the conclusion of Philosophic Radicalism:

There is no doubt that the young Benthamites had their faults and made themselves hated because of these faults. But were not their very faults respectable, if their exclusiveness and their pedantry can be explained by their fidelity to an idea which was the object of their considered allegiance?⁴¹

Further, he admitted the idea to which they were faithful was narrow, did not account for all they assumed it explained, and that they systematically disregarded many aspects of human nature. After this devastating critique, Halévy continued, almost as if to excuse it,

If, in active life, it is the definition of courage to defend to the last extremity, in spite of all its risks, a position which was at first freely accepted, is it not likewise a sort of speculative equivalent of courage to dare to take an idea as the principle of all one's opinions and of all one's acts, and then to accept without flinching all the consequences which this original idea involves?⁴²

The philosophical discussion waged around the Dreyfus Affair allowed the issues of individualism and anarchy versus order, hierarchy and authority to come to the surface once again in French politics. On these issues there was no easy division of Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards, rationalists and irrationalists, and many of the most ardent critics of liberal individualism were in the camp of Captain Dreyfus. In the French context, in either camp, individualism was thought to have the effect of encouraging merely private morality, isolating citizens and undermining the public interest. Laissez-faire policy had a century of native critics who charged it with contributing to anarchy, atomization, egoism, anomie: in short, to social dissolution.

For almost a century the dominant French intellectual tradition discredited the legacy of the philosophes, blaming the failures of the French Revolution on the naivete of the liberal and individualist vision of society. Some of the most esteemed men of letters--Saint-Simon, Comte, Taine, and lesser figures such as Paul Bourget, Ferdinand Brunetière, Jules Lemaitre and Emile Faguet--held to this tradition. But in the 1890s there were faint murmurs rejecting this interpretation and defending the Enlightenment in one aspect or another. When Halévy first decided to investigate the English philosophes, the work of Gustave Lanson, Daniel Mornet and Louis Liard and a few others constituted the beginning of a revisionist view of the origins of modern France. But

in spite of these beginnings those who maintained the essentially negative character of the philosophes' concept of liberty and individualism still dominated the intellectual scene. Halévy's professor at the Ecole normale supérieure, Henri Michel, the author of the popular L'Idée d'Etat, thought the liberal Enlightenment heritage was essentially negative and his work was solidly in the mainstream of critics of doctrines of self-interest and individualism.⁴³

Halévy did not, of course, see individualism or liberty through these French glasses alone. Nevertheless his formulation of one of the problems of the history of England, a formulation that he was making as he worked on Philosophic Radicalism, brought the question of stability and social dissolution to the front. English critics have regarded as undue and certainly peripheral to a discussion of the utilitarians Halévy's emphasis on the degree to which Benthamite thought was a part of a continental movement, particularly a French movement. Stephen's and Dicey's volumes, which were contemporaneous, saw fit to mention French influences very little, if at all. But Halévy's work was written from a different context, written as a test and a defense of individualism, liberty, of the philosophes' contributions to human freedom.

It has been suggested by Bernard Semmel that the powerfully conservative influence of Hippolyte Taine on Halévy's evaluation of English society was decisive.⁴⁴ There were few men among the generation before Halévy's who were not influenced by Taine. His studies of English literature and of the origins of the French Revolution were classics virtually at publication and his lectures were outstanding in a long tradition of great professorial orators. The power and popularity of his view of the Enlightenment was fairly widespread. Halévy's

interest in Taine's thesis was two-fold: one, as a democrat and a liberal republican he wanted to test Taine's interpretation of the destructive impact on society of the teachings of the philosophes; two, Taine's hypothesis relating popular religion to deference and stability in England in contrast to the disorder and social impudence of the French "mob" tended to be a stick with which he beat the French national character. Halévy's research tested both of Taine's interpretations and in both tests his scholarship rigorously measured generalizations that were merely impressionistic in Taine's work. His rejection of Taine's historical theses was almost as complete as his refusal to accept Taine's mode of explanation, which was determinist and emphasized heavily racial or national characteristics.

Halévy's thesis regarding the philosophic radicals challenged Taine's interpretation because these English philosophes had not moved English society to revolution. Furthermore, England had needed reform as much as France did, especially in law and the judiciary and in its anomalous electoral system.⁴⁵ Surely then the principles themselves did not account for the dissolution of society. Halévy was perfectly aware that a simplistic grouping of the philosophes did not do justice to disagreements among them--they had not posed their principles as absolutely or as systematically as Bentham had⁴⁶--but his revision of Taine's thesis did not make this case. He accepted the parallel and then denied their ideas had had the effect that Taine had described.

Halévy treated philosophic radicalism sympathetically. He thought utilitarianism was a philosophy of emancipation, very different in its inspiration and principles, but akin in many of its applications, to the sentimental philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He paralleled the English and French centuries of liberalism:

to the century of the French Revolution corresponded, on the other side of the Channel, the century of the Industrial Revolution: to the juristic and spiritualistic philosophy of the Rights of Man corresponded the Utilitarian philosophy of the identity of interests.⁴⁷

Cousins though the two philosophies of emancipation were, their progeny differed astoundingly. "The philosophy of the Rights of Man eventually led, on the Continent, to the Revolution of 1848; in England at the same time the philosophy of the identity of interests resulted in the triumph of the free trade doctrine of the Manchester School."⁴⁸ Halévy thought that the success of the English political system in avoiding revolution, in maintaining the social order, actually stiffened its resistance to the Benthamite school. The success of peaceful reform contributed to further victories for pacific evolutionary political and social change. The basic problem of modern democracy in Halévy's mind was not merely one of order and here he most certainly hoped to correct the French conservative interpretation of the revolutionary era but of the kind of order and stability that the English maintained, an order that allowed for change and for liberal reform. Halévy's analysis, unlike Taine's critique of the French national character, did not preclude French imitation of the qualities of self-restraint and tolerance, which he thought were fundamental to stability and to progress, precisely because he refused to root England's stability in race, national character, or inimitable institutions. The origins of liberalism were comparable in the two nations. His concern was to find the functional substitutes in England for the coercion and centralization which was necessary to maintain order in other states. He found them in qualities of mind, in a social ethos, in liberal virtues, all moral characteristics which were imitable and adaptable. They were, however, qualities which were not the contribution of the utilitarians to English society; he thought the Benthamites were a moving force, not the stabilizing one.

It is one of the ironies of posthumous reputation that Halévy, who was the first to emphasize the authoritarian, as well as the liberal, strain in the utilitarian heredity, should be accused of having "no premonition of the collectivist threat"⁴⁹ to liberty. J. Bartlett Brebner, for example, thought that he underemphasized the cumulative state intervention in industry that paralleled the move to free trade and that his view of 1832 was one of unmitigated triumph of "British liberalism, political and economic, over domestic authoritarianism of the landed interest and the mercantilistic restrictions cherished by the trading and maritime interests."⁵⁰ Some historians have been so impressed by the fact that Halévy's final judgment of the philosophic radicals was generally favorable that they have concluded he was too generous and unaware of the authoritarian trend in Benthamite thought. This interpretation deserves close attention, in part for its bearing on our thesis that Halévy, by virtue of his political beliefs and hopes, was peculiarly sensitive to questions of liberty and authority. This is an important basis for evaluating his contribution to Bentham scholarship and to the thesis of the "administrative revolution in government. Finally, this question is essential to an understanding of his overall view of the forces of movement or progress and the forces of conservation or stability in nineteenth-century England.

It would seem difficult to argue that Halévy had no premonition of the collectivist implications of philosophic radical doctrines. Nor, as we have shown, was he unaware of the potential for socialism in several of the social thinkers who drew from the same sources as Bentham did. In fact, Halévy's explication of the idea of the

artificial identification of interests as distinct from the passive acceptance of the natural harmony of interests constituted both the rationale and the prediction of the collectivist threat.⁵¹

Though it would be a mistake to argue that Halévy was unaware of the potential for collectivism in Benthamism--something one could quite legitimately argue about Dicey and Stephen whose books were contemporaneous with The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism⁵²--certainly the weight of his evidence tips the scale toward Benthamism as an individualist, democratic and emancipating doctrine. His concluding observation, written in the winter of 1902-3, noted that within the span of twenty years after Bentham's death a new and simplified form of utilitarian philosophy dominated English life; the principles of Manchester had triumphed over the principles of Westminster. Spencerian liberalism found the meddling Conservatism of Shaftesbury and the meddling Radicalism of Chadwick equally repugnant.⁵³ At the same time, Halévy continued, underscoring the ambivalence he had sketched throughout the volumes, Stuart Mill "was bringing forward simultaneously the object of Liberalism as against authoritarian Democracy, and the objection of Socialism as against the philosophy of laissez-faire." Thus, "the contradiction existing between the two principles on which Utilitarianism was based was now apparent to all men."⁵⁴

There is, of course, some truth to Brebner's feeling that Halévy saw 1832 as too unclouded a victory for free trade. In point of fact, Halévy regarded Peel's reforms as the most significant reforms of the era; but his parallel of the Benthamites with the philosophes and England with Old Regime France meant that he did, nevertheless, see 1832 as a major triumph of individualist and laissez-faire policies.

But even there he saw a double-edged sword in Radical activity just as he admitted the problematic nature of the legacy of the Revolution though a committed republican. Halévy's narrative moved immediately from the political reforms of 1832 to the Benthamite revolution in government, continuing "the victory of 1832 was scarcely won when Radicals made a systematic effort not only to make government democratic but strong. . . ." ⁵⁵ It was this Radical endeavor that aroused the opposition of both Conservatives and Liberals who had grown accustomed to a weak state over a period of the previous century. In his discussion of the election commissioners provided by the Reform Bill--an unusual measure which is not very often cited as evidence of what has since been called the "administrative revolution in government"--he stressed Bentham's "long jump" from "enlightened despotism" to democracy, saying that he had skipped all the intermediate, liberal, mixed-government positions along the way. ⁵⁶

It was very much in keeping with Halévy's theme to emphasize that "this new aspect which the policy of reform was assuming represented a genuine, perhaps even the most characteristic, aspect of the doctrine of the orthodox Radicals, of Bentham and his followers." ⁵⁷ After all, "Utilitarian philosophy was not solely, nor even perhaps fundamentally, a liberal system; it was at the same time a doctrine of authority which looked to the deliberate and in a sense the scientific interference of government to produce a harmony of interests. . . ." ⁵⁸ The "Prussian" or "French" principles of administrative centralization and compulsion dominated the Factory Act as well. Bentham's disciples were very far from "professing that systematic dislike of any and every form of State interference which thirty years later would be

characteristic of Richard Cobden and Herbert Spencer."⁵⁹ Halévy reiterated this theme with regard to the New Poor Law in which the parliament granted powers more extensive than English law had ever before known.

It would seem that, far from lacking a premonition of the implications for collectivism in the Benthamite intellectual and political tradition, Halévy was very much aware of it and of the problems of protecting individual liberty on any utilitarian basis. If he can be held to be insufficiently aware of the collectivist and statist trends in nineteenth-century English history, which is doubtful, such a charge rests on his ultimate sense that the fundamental nature of the period was liberal and laissez-faire. He wrote the pieces of the fourth volume of the History of the English People, which is the posthumously-edited work on the Victorian era, between 1935 and 1937 while he was working on Histoire du socialisme européen. The inherent contradictions in the origins of collectivism and socialism and their roots in the very origins of democracy were the central problem of his thought as he wrote. And yet he saw the previous century as fundamentally different from his own era, not as the origin of it. The period was the high point of Manchester, not Westminster, liberalism.

Halévy's understanding of the evidence led him to argue that although utilitarian ideology could serve as the justification for tyranny, or at least for the greater authority of the state over the individual, the actual results of Benthamite efforts in the first half of the century contributed to greater freedom by destroying the vested interests and privileges of the landed classes and opening a new era

of economic and political reform. Utility was philosophically neutral in respect to emancipation or subjugation, the decisive question was the particular forms assumed by utilitarianism in England in this period.

In his narrative history, as in his study of utilitarian ideology, Halévy was quick to call attention to examples of the Benthamite willingness to infringe upon individual liberal and to strengthen the power of the state, but mid-century England remained for him "The Age of Peel and Cobden," not the era of Bentham and Chadwick. These aspects of English life--the individualist and industrialist ethos, Christian humanitarianism, parliamentary institutions, and historical traditions--far outweighed the impetus to collectivism in mid-century England.

As Halévy later explained it, in one of his last comments on an English historical problem, the essence of the English system of administration well into the twentieth century was the "spirit of the great unpaid."⁶⁰ To his mind this spirit of voluntary service, rather than the esprit of a paid bureaucracy, softened the harsh edges between subject and state and between the classes. The triumph of this spirit was the work of others, not of Benthamites. A century later some editors, who were sympathetic to the utilitarians, asked Halévy to address himself to "municipal progress," choosing to commemorate the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. Halévy remarked this fact, commenting that the critical act in the history of English local government was the New Poor Law of 1834 but that was too painful an experience to celebrate and too heavy an onus for the Benthamites to carry. Just as the Whig aristocracy kept their political influence virtually intact for another half century after 1832, so the gentry

maintained their moral authority after they had lost administrative power, when the enforcement of the New Poor Law had been turned over to a professional class of bureaucrats. By a clever manoeuvre they gave at one time the power and the onus of poor relief to the central government, thus discrediting the Benthamites' hope for a strong, centralized state. For Halévy, the essence of the English way was an antipathy to the state, respect for the duties of the "great unpaid," a prevailing spirit of tolerance, compromise and self-reliance that more than countered any impetus to centralization and to collectivization.

¹Elie Halévy to Celestin Bouglé, June 26, 1896, Correspondance, p. 325.

²Halévy, "Quelques remarques sur l'irréversibilité des phénomènes psychologiques" Revue de Métaphysique, IV (1896), 756-777; Halévy, "L'explication du sentiment" Revue de Métaphysique, V (1897), 703-724; Halévy "De l'association des idées" Communication au Premier Congrès international de philosophie, Bibliothèque du Congrès de 1900 (Paris, 1900), 219-235; Halévy, De concatenatione quae inter affectiones mentis propter similitudinem fieri dicitur (Paris: Alcan, 1901).

³See Melvin Richter's listing of the topics to which Halévy contributed. "A Bibliography of Signed Works by Elie Halévy," Supplement History and Theory, VII (1968), 66-70.

⁴Halévy to Bouglé, October 19, 1896, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁵Halévy to Bouglé, June 26, 1896, Correspondance, p. 325.

⁶Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, trans. by Mary Morris (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1955), p. xix. [Hereinafter referred to as Philosophic Radicalism.]

⁷Halévy to Bouglé, October 14, 1897, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁸Halévy, Supplément, Revue de Métaphysique, IX (1901), 11.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Philosophic Radicalism, p. 154.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 238-248.

¹²Gillispie, "Elie Halévy," p. 237.

¹³Halévy was convinced that Bentham had not been a democrat before 1810 and that it was James Mill who converted him. (Philosophic Radicalism, pp. 257-264.) Halévy's stress on the role of James Mill was not Stephen's view. (Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians, Vol. II James Mill (London: Putnam's, 1900), pp. 7-30. In terms of the conversion to democracy and universal suffrage A.V. Dicey remarked that the school was very divided. Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England in the Nineteenth Century (2nd ed., London, 1914), pp. 162-8, citing Halévy, Philosophic Radicalism, pp. 168-9. Mill was the first utilitarian to try to base a theory of representative government on utility (Philosophic Radicalism, p. 257.) [Stephen will hereinafter be referred to as The English Utilitarians and Dicey as Law and Public Opinion.]

¹⁴Philosophic Radicalism, p. 314.

¹⁵ Dicey's ninth lecture in Law and Public Opinion qualified the complete identification of Individualism and Benthamism, recounting the debt which the "Collectivists," by which he meant Lib-Labs of Lloyd George and Winston Churchill vintage, owed to Benthamism. That debt included a legislative dogma, an instrument and a tendency; i.e., the utilitarian dogma, the omnipotent parliament and improved governmental machinery (pp. 303-310). The notes to this text indicate the areas in which Halévy's book had led Dicey to make any qualifications of his original edition; for example, p. 308 note 2 in which he indicated that he thought the Benthamites were divided on state intervention using as opposing examples the Stuart Mill of "On Liberty" and Chadwick.

¹⁶ Halévy to Léon, December 1916, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

¹⁷ Stephen, The English Utilitarians, Vol. I; Jeremy Bentham, pp. 201-206. Halévy, Philosophic Radicalism, p. 84.

¹⁸ Philosophic Radicalism, p. 235.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 390. See pp. 380-394 for general discussion of questions of evidence and liberal safeguards.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 390.

²¹ Ibid., p. 403.

²² Ibid., p. 432.

²³ Ibid., p. 431.

²⁴ This was the basis of Sismondi's criticism of Ricardo. Halévy published a small volume of Sismondi's writings in 1933 with a long introduction which has been translated and included in the Era of Tyrannies. Discussion of this essay and Sismondi's place in Halévy's thinking about socialism is in chapter four below.

²⁵ Halévy, The Era of Tyrannies, Appendix II, pp. 315-316.

²⁶ Philosophic Radicalism, pp. 337, 514.

²⁷ Halévy, Thomas Hodgskin, trans. by A.J. Taylor (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1956). Trygve Tholfsen argues that Halévy's concentration on the Methodists as the source of stability ignored the Enlightenment radical tradition of self-reliance, independence, self-improvement, and prudence as a stabilizing force. Trygve Tholfsen, "The Intellectual Origins of Mid-Victorian Stability," Political Quarterly Review LXXXVI (March 1971), p. 58. Halévy's explanation, by reason of its deliberate contrast to the experience of France with the political results of philosophe ideas, has as a sub-theme the stabilizing and reforming effect of a doctrine that logically ought to have upset England as well as France. It is true that Halévy did not dig deeply into the working-class radicals other than theorists such as Hodgskin, but Philosophic

Radicalism and Thomas Hodgskin both touched on the role, the special nature of the role of working-class theorists in the non-revolutionary activity of the aristocracy of labor. See as well Halévy's review article of several books on the Chartists in Quarterly Review, 468 (1927) 62-75 in which his description of the nature of working-class radical leaders dwells upon just these characteristics as an antidote to the studies which would dwell on their socialist and revolutionary characteristics.

²⁸Philosophic Radicalism, p. 370.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Stephen made much more of this criticism of the Philosophic Radicals' lack of historical foundation than Halévy did, perhaps because Halévy's thesis was that they were rationalists and not empiricists. Therefore Stephen's criticism that their ahistorical science was paradoxical in empiricists was not pertinent.

³¹Philosophic Radicalism, pp. 492-496.

³²Halévy to Bouglé, October 19, 1896, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³³Halévy to Mme. Léon Halévy, February 6, 1893, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³⁴Halévy to Bouglé, "vendredi" (1902-3), Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³⁵Philosophic Radicalism, p. 497-498, 501.

³⁶Ibid., p. 501. See Halévy and Brunschvicg "Notes critiques: l'Année philosophique 1893" Revue de Métaphysique II (1894), 557-578. On the other hand Halévy's critique of Vilfredo Pareto's paper "L'Individuel et le social" given at the fourth general meeting of the Congrès du Genève and printed in Revue de Métaphysique (XII [1904], 1103-1113) said, in part, that he did not address himself to the assumptions regarding the collective.

³⁷Halévy to Bouglé, January 22, 1896, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³⁸Halévy and Bouglé jointly edited the Doctrines de Saint-Simon and contributed to a number of early socialist editions. Bouglé in the 1930s was the head of the Centre de Documentation Sociale, and Halévy and he shared many projects. Their lifetime correspondence is filled with plans, critiques of one another's work and helpful suggestions.

³⁹The most characteristic example of this rephrasing of problems in sociological language was his response to Max Lazard's comment at the "Ere de Tyrannies" meeting in 1936 that Halévy tended to approach

concrete social facts indirectly as they were reflected in doctrines about them. Halévy then expressed his thesis in terms of classes and social groups rather than ideas in socialism, pp. 274-275

⁴⁰Elie Halévy, "Lévy-Bruhl, 'La mythologie primitive'" Revue des sciences politiques, LIX (1936), 155-156.

⁴¹Philosophic Radicalism, p. 481.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 485-486.

⁴³Halévy expected his mentor to find fault with his comparatively sympathetic treatment of utilitarians. (Halévy to Bouglé, March 16 and 22, 1901, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.) Halévy was very critical of the lack of precision of his own use of words ending in ism. Steven Lukes uses this as his point of departure in Individualism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), ix.

⁴⁴Bernard Semmel's introduction to Halévy's Birth of Methodism in England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 13-16.

⁴⁵Halévy, Philosophic Radicalism, xviii.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., xvii-xviii.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹J. Bartlett Brebner, "Elie Halévy," in Some Modern Historians of Britain: Essays in Honor of R.L. Schuyler, edited by H. Ausubel and J.B. Brebner (New York: Dryden Press, 1951), p. 242.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹See Halévy's essay "Les principes de la distribution des richesses," Revue de Métaphysique, XIV (1906), 545-595 as well as the concluding pages of "La Doctrine économique de Saint-Simon," written at the same time and reprinted in the Era of Tyrannies. The conclusion of Philosophic Radicalism (p. 499) predicts the intervention in the economy in much more neutral terms than Halévy might have used after World War I.

⁵²The first edition of Stephen's The English Utilitarians was published in 1900 and A.V. Dicey's lectures on the relation of Law and Public Opinion in 1905, both contemporaneous with Philosophic Radicalism.

⁵³Halévy, Philosophic Radicalism, p. 514.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Halévy, History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. III: Triumph of Reform, p. 101.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 100.

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 99-100.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 100.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 115. For Halévy's interpretation of the new powers granted to the New Poor Law Commissioners, see also p. 124.

⁶⁰Halévy, "Before 1835," A Century of Municipal Progress, ed. by H.J. Laski (London, 1935), pp. 34-35.

CHAPTER III

THE "HALÉVY THESIS"

With the completion of Growth of Philosophic Radicalism Halévy turned to a project he had long planned: "a theory of progress in the modern state to be titled, for example, England in the nineteenth century."¹ Historians might think French history more amusing, he wrote, but "the sociologist has to consider the English point of view much the more serious."² The seriousness of the point of view lay in the fact that the English built a progressive, stable society whose liberties were guaranteed by the fact that fundamentally "England is a country of voluntary obedience, of an organization freely initiated and freely accepted."³ Other men had found England's secret of parliamentary democracy in her navy, her national character, or her industry and commerce. But to Halévy in 1906 it seemed that each of these possessions was fast being acquired by men of other nations and races, with more or less success, until "representative government in fact bids fair to become part of the common inheritance of mankind."⁴ How had the English remained so free and yet so stable, so tolerant, so able to compromise, so liberal? Could the blessings of their liberties become the common inheritance of mankind?

Halévy's answer to his questions, and one of the major themes of his history, was the decisive influence of beliefs, emotions and opinions on English institutions, specifically the evolution of re-

ligious ideals into an effective social ethic. To Halévy the uniqueness of English liberalism lay in the fact that it had maintained its tie to Christianity. The "Halévy thesis" traced the evolution of the evangelical movement of the eighteenth century as it inspired the Nonconformists, revitalized the established church and won the loyalty of many of the working and middle classes away from politics or unmitigated material ends to religious enthusiasm, away from revolution, class antagonisms and economic hardships to reform, Christian love and self-improvement. By the middle of the century, "the religious and moral agencies" needed merely to continue their action "to maintain the balance of English society."⁵ After the first World War, when he wrote the two volumes which constitute an Epilogue to the History, he raised the implications for liberalism and parliamentarianism of the decline of individualist morality which he saw taking place with the rise of socialism and racism, and the "possible euthanasia of Christianity itself."⁶ However, he could still say:

Today [1923] as in the past everything in England is instinctive groping, mutual tolerance and compromise, the effects of that moral and religious constitution whose factors we have analyzed elsewhere. That constitution persists in its main lines unchanged and is still the source of those admirable political manners, abused, but all the while secretly envied by those who, on the Continent, whether they belong to the parties of the right or of the left, profess the creed of violence.⁷

Halévy's "Methodist thesis" was only half of the explanation by which he hoped to account for the "miracle of modern England"--the pervasive liberal reforming temper of mind which was capable of reconciling antagonistic ideologies and competing classes. The other half--the evolution of a reformist temper from the conjunction of radical dogmatic Benthamite utilitarianism with classical economics--

had, after all, been the subject of his first investigation into English ways and thought. Rather than accept the obvious theory that Evangelical Christianity and non-Christian Radicalism were opposites, Halévy saw that there were many areas in which there was a regular working alliance between the two forces represented by Wilberforce's social conservatism and Mill's radical antipietism. He saw that there were intellectual as well as practical affinities between these apparent polar opposites. The austere hedonists, the utilitarians, made up in character what they lacked in philosophical theory. Similarly, the evangelical's narrow intellectual vision was broadened in practice by their feeling for humanity. Halévy thought "the partial junction and combination of these two forces theoretically so hostile" to be "the fundamental paradox of English society."⁸

In England in 1815 he elaborated upon the idea that he had first introduced in Philosophic Radicalism: the affinity between "the moral temperament of the Utilitarians and that of all the Puritanical sects which modern England has produced."⁹ There was not an exact coincidence of specific issues upon which both groups agreed, but the area of overlapping interests was very great. Bentham and his disciples were ardent advocates of model prisons, model factories and model schools, practical causes which also appealed to Christian philanthropists who had been "educated in the school of industrialism."¹⁰ If political and legal reform did not inspire the evangelicals to zealous activity, and temperance or moral censorship were matters of relative indifference for the utilitarians, they were as one on anti-slavery. Bentham himself wrote "if to be an anti-slavist is to be a Saint, Saintship for me. I am a Saint."¹¹ Halévy pointed to the asceticism in Bentham's

moral arithmetic and in classical economics as akin to Protestant asceticism, certainly in its effect.¹²

Halévy was acutely aware of the complex relations of thought in nineteenth-century England. For example, the apparent theoretical contradictions between Malthusianism and Evangelicalism were less significant in practice than their common hostility to the doctrines of progress spread by atheistic humanitarians. Utilitarians and Protestants, for all their differences, were profoundly individualistic; the range of beliefs beginning with the Protestant sects and moving toward the Benthamites were "a series of imperceptible transitions" of individualism. To Halévy, on the eve of the first World War, it seemed a demonstrable fact that British individualism was "a moderate individualism, a mixture whose constituents [were] often mingled beyond the possibility of analysis, a compound of Evangelicalism and Utilitarianism."¹³ The logic of the ideas had little to do with their power. An admixture of tenets from different and contradictory origins could nonetheless deeply move men. This insight was one that on other occasions Halévy extended beyond the evangelicals and the utilitarians to the aspirations of socialists and the emotions of nationalists.

The "English miracle" was an awesome affair to Halévy. It was all the more awesome because in France comparable ideologies had remained irreconcilable, and French class consciousness, which was no more pervasive than that of the English, had deepened into class hatreds. For Halévy the French political reality was the direct result of the revolution, which made factions of parties, tyrants of governments and conspirators of opponents. Not that Halévy's realization of the problematic character of the revolution made him a part of the con-

servative tradition. Eric Hobsbawm appraised Halévy's work saying that revolutionary France made his books as great as they are. This is perfectly true in the sense that the problematic nature of ideas, actions and institutions was posed more clearly for him than it might have been for others. Hobsbawm's other judgment that Halévy's liberalism was his weakness and the cause of the failure of his works patently ignores the fact that it was his liberalism that first led Halévy to the work of the Saints.¹⁴ His English friends might belittle the evangelical contribution because they were advocates of more and grander changes, "truer" progress, but as a Frenchman he was impressed by how much liberty the English possessed because they knew how to compromise, agree and obey.

Halévy was not, of course, the first Frenchman to find England the model of liberal institutions. Limiting oneself to the nineteenth century, one can still point to a number of prestigious predecessors: Constant, Tocqueville, Guizot, Halévy's uncle Lucien-Anatole Prévost-Paradol, his father's friend Hippolyte Taine, his colleague Emile Boutmy and the historian whose work he most admired among his contemporaries, Charles Seignobos. Nor was he the first Frenchman to focus upon Protestantism, in one form or another, as a crucial factor in the unique development of the English social ethic. His Protestant thesis was one he shared with Voltaire, Guizot and Tocqueville. This identification of Protestantism with English liberalism, in almost a Whig fashion, explains his concern over the Catholicizing trend in English religion at the turn of this century.¹⁵

A Protestant or Puritan thesis historically served a variety of purposes for French men of letters. The French liberal tradition

held that "liberty is ancient," tracing its supports to privileged orders or to the struggle of the bourgeoisie for individual freedom in the late middle ages and in the Reformation. Since the Restoration, the giants of the liberal tradition showed a marked sympathy for the Reformation and for the French Huguenots who continued the "bourgeois" struggle for liberty that culminated in the eighteenth-century French political revolution. These origins legitimized the French Revolution which they interpreted as parallel to the English Puritan revolution. That was the tradition of Guizot and de Remusat, Constant and de Staél.

For those who were not a part of the liberal historical tradition, for those for whom the Revolution was a break in French history, the Protestant thesis served to make England's history distinct, a thing apart from France's experience. According to Taine and Renan Protestantism had made revolution unnecessary for England. Thus Renan could confide in David Strauss that the Reformation was the most profound revolution of modern times, implying that it far surpassed the French. Explicitly he could join English and German intellectual and scientific accomplishment to the Protestant tradition. Taine, who would not accept English superiority over the French in the realm of pure thought, nevertheless acknowledged the English genius for liberty -- a genius firmly founded upon the moral seriousness of the English national character, which he persisted in calling their racial character. English Protestantism had created a social ethic which tempered modern individualism (defined by him as egoism without restraints). As Taine saw it, unbridled egoism in France encouraged the frivolity of the philosophes which, when joined to the ignorance of the masses, brought

the disaster of social dissolution, the ultimate end of the Revolution.¹⁶

Although a Protestant thesis was quite common in French thought, it was obviously not understood by everyone to mean the same thing; its meaning varied according to one's politics and view of human nature. Halévy's first venture into this theme was his two articles on the "Birth of Methodism in England" in the Revue de Paris. Halévy had explained his motives for these two essays to his two closest friends. "What is Protestantism? How does it differ from Catholicism? That is all the problem that I am trying to resolve a propos of Methodism."¹⁷ He hoped to "define those two forms of Christian religious exaltation, which are called Catholic and Protestant," he wrote to Léon.¹⁸ But if that were his motivation, his essays did not resolve the grand questions of Catholicism and Protestantism. He began with a brief survey of his sense of Protestantism. He explained that "Protestantism is not a weakened Catholicism; it is a different kind of Christianity: one would be tempted to call it an altogether different religion."¹⁹ In one short paragraph he defined Protestantism as the Pauline adherence to the doctrine of "justification by faith" and moved on to affirm his belief that tolerance is furthered by Protestantism because it had an almost "superstitious awe for the human personality."²⁰ When he actually published these essays it was apparent that Halévy's interests lay in the social implications of the religious beliefs of the English and not in the theological problems of Protestantism.

Halévy's true concern was "how England came to be a Puritan nation and remained one in its social code to the twentieth century." To him England's uniqueness lay in the fact that liberty developed there with

close ties to Christianity. This was not the case for the nations of continental Europe, either the Catholic Latin ones or Lutheran Germany, where Protestantism incorporated and furthered the cult of the fatherland and of the emperor.

Halévy's articles were timely. At that moment in the middle of the French Radicals' campaign to cut the ties between the Catholic Church and the secular state the relevant question for him was the social function of religion in modern society. In the aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair, lasting to the first World War for many of the Dreyfusards, the task for liberal republicans was one of building a secular, rationalist social morale in order to secure French republicanism. Could a secular morale, descended from the philosophe temper, be sufficient support for a liberal social ethic? The English liberal social ethic was the offspring of the marriage of evangelical Protestant impulses with utilitarian doctrines and actions, or so Halévy believed. Unfortunately, he was never completely secure in the conviction that republican schooling could create a viable and cohesive social morale for France in spite of his lifetime of contributions to it. There was, of course, no alternative because Catholic France was not evangelical England. Halévy certainly feared, as did many of the Anglophiles in the French liberal tradition, that the French were too clever by half, that rationalism, though philosophically more sympathetic, had not as yet created a social ethic in France with the force of habit of evangelical self-restraint.

The Methodist project was one Halévy had conceived and initiated several years before he published his essays. He began collecting documents while he was in England working on the utilitarians. On

his honeymoon in Portofino he wrote to Bouglé of his New Year's resolution to "study the English religious mind, especially the relation of dogma to the sociological elements of English Protestantism in the nineteenth century."²¹ In 1901, however, he postponed his work on evangelicalism to get his study of the philosophic radicals ready for publication (in part because he heard of Leslie Stephen's forthcoming volumes on the utilitarians). Meanwhile, he asked Daniel, whose interests led him to working-class movements in England, to search for crucial documents in Lancashire.²² In 1904, when his third volume of Philosophical Radicalism was in print, he took up the subject of Evangelicalism again:

Free finally, I have vast projects on England; and immediately, I am going to see if it is impossible to study religious society in England in the nineteenth century sociologically. I've already talked of this to you. . . .²³

The following year Halévy was so deeply involved in this work that he begged his friends to call off their efforts to secure Henri Michel's post for him; he did not want a chair in philosophy because his science was more and more, history. He reported his progress:

I have plunged deeper into Methodism and after a month of disgust (these exalted minds are very weak minds indeed!) I have regained my interest. And finally, I am thoroughly investigating again modern English history, virtually contemporary history.²⁴

It would seem that Halévy had not, as Bernard Semmel asserts, undertaken his study of Methodism before he "had begun the detailed studies that produced England in 1815."²⁵ For a decade before he published England in 1815 he investigated subjects which were essential to it and he had contemplated such a history since at least 1896. He worked on problems relating to Methodism intensively at least two years before he published the 1905-6 essays and he had, in point of

fact, been involved with Methodism, on and off, since 1900. The Methodist study was already underway for over a year when Halévy learned of two "normaliens" (Chevalier and Léger) who had undertaken research on the same subject. Halévy wrote that he might not have pursued this second part of his set of theses concerning the nature of the balance of English society if Herr had not been such a "fanatic." Lucien Herr had forgotten to tell Halévy of these young men, ignoring them because they were both "more or less clerical."²⁶ Herr may have been quite right not to tell him, though perhaps Halévy's judgment was accurate that it had been for the wrong reasons, because Halévy's study scarcely resembled the work of the others.

In the moment that Halévy hesitated, thinking his time might have been wasted, he confided to Bouglé the point of his historical investigations. He admitted that he had let this Methodist study distract him from his next project, the history of England in the nineteenth century. To Bouglé's comment, "Not another history!" he answered that five or six green cartons of notes in his study seemed to indicate that he had always intended a history of England, but the prospect of a preliminary introductory volume, which he thought absolutely necessary, had made him welcome the temporary relief of another task. But trouble or not, he wondered if he did not have to begin to write it just the same. When Bouglé, as a self-conscious defender of the new discipline of sociology, teased Halévy about his propensity to "do history," he responded, as he often did, by etching his English problem in the sociological manner. What he intended, he said, was "a theory of progress in the modern state. . . ."²⁷ England had built a free, progressive, stable society on the self-discipline of

her people, whose social ethic was one of self-improvement and individualism. That social ethic had been reinforced in the eighteenth century at the precise moment that the propagation of radical ideas, joined with the social discontents of a changing economy had led to revolution in France. Halévy had, in the Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, investigated the nature of English radical ideas and the unique destiny that they had in England. Now he proposed to investigate the religious aspect of England's liberal social ethic.

Just as the Philosophic Radicalism study responded to a French tradition which discredited the ideas of the Enlightenment for their part in the origins of the French Revolution, there was a French interpretation that the base of England's liberties was the Protestantism of its religion. In Hippolyte Taine the two theses had been brought together to explain English liberties and French radicalism; as historian of English literature he noted the contribution that the Methodist revival had made to the spiritualism and emotionalism, to the awakening of religious feelings which made England immune to revolution at the end of the eighteenth century; as the historian of the French Revolution he stressed the impact of radical ideologies on the masses of Frenchmen who were moved by their destitution to attack their institutions and leaders in 1789.

The uncharacteristically loosely-organized structure of Halévy's early essays, the "Birth of Methodism," becomes understandable, in part, when one notes that the argument raised each of Taine's points to make a correction or a refinement. The "Birth of Methodism" essays were published in two sections. They were divided into several pieces roughly held together by the general themes of the Puritan

nature of English Protestantism and the causes and the effects of the Methodist movement. From section to section within those themes the principle of connection is difficult to discern, though they were not random thoughts. They are not the fullest statement of Halévy's thesis but a preliminary sketch of it which he elaborated and placed against the economic and political background in England in 1815. A good portion of these essays was addressed to the revision of misconceptions, which were the mainstays of the Protestant-Puritan thesis of the French tradition, especially as it was propagated by Hippolyte Taine. Characteristically, Halévy's criticism was not a polemic against the great historian, who was his father's friend and to whom Halévy was intellectually indebted. Instead, he quoted the opinions of contemporaries of the Wesleys who espoused Taine's views and then questioned them.

First, Halévy, like Taine, stressed that England had not consistently been a Puritan nation; eighteenth-century England had known as strong a rationalistic tendency as had France. Unlike Taine, Halévy did not see Puritanism as a function of the English "race" or even self-discipline as the "dominating faculty" of the English people. The concepts "race" and "dominating faculty," which he rejected totally, were Taine's stock in trade. Though the greatest positivist historian recognized that the English had been the leading free thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he explained them as a people whose fundamental national character was marked by a tendency to "melancholia," to a seriousness of moral purpose. "The race is capable of deep emotions. . . . You can only move the men of this race by moral reflections and religious emotions. The cooled

Puritan spirit still broods underground. . . ."28 Though Halévy agreed that in the eighteenth century the English experienced an awakening of religious sentiment, he could not accept racial or national explanations. How had the experience of Puritan indoctrination been preserved? seemed a more meaningful question to him.

Halévy thought Taine's contrast of clerical eighteenth-century France with irreligious England missed the enduring Protestantism of the English middle and lower classes. Taine's drama heightened the irreligiosity of the English ruling classes and intellectual elite in order to parallel the situation in France. Taine, for all his stress on the "scientific fact," was more a literary stylist than a scientific historian and this emphasis led him to dramatize the conversion of the nation by a few individuals, that is, by the Wesleys and Whitefield. Taine's admiration for Wesley was boundless: "What could such a man have done in France in the eighteenth century? At his death 80,000 disciples; in 1870 a million!"29 But Halévy, who also believed in the power of the individual and of his ideas, found the stress upon the few individuals "much too simple to be entirely satisfactory" as historical explanation.³⁰ He thought that the Wesleys had built on the solid social foundation of the English middle and lower classes who had remained staunchly Protestant, untouched by the irreligiosity of the ruling class. His narrative of the Wesleys' experience argued that they could make very little impact on the English bourgeoisie as long as their message was ritualist and High Church, which is to say not sufficiently Protestant.³¹

Halévy criticized the overdrawn picture of the irreverent English painted against the background of a declining established church and

dissenting chapel. He denied that the evangelical revival was as great a break with the past as Taine and others had estimated. The picture of decline was based on too exclusive a regard for the leadership of the church and the society and too little regard for the middling and lower people. The "seeds of religious renovation had existed for a considerable time within the Anglican Church, and Methodism emerged from one of these seeds."³² But he argued that small groups of pious men within the Anglican establishment would not have effected the regeneration of English Protestantism without the evangelical fervor of the Dissenters who rebelled against the near-Deist teachings of their ministry. He demonstrated the vitality of the Protestant impulse citing the prevalence of anti-Catholic outbursts and Dissenting secessions over doctrinal issues in the eighteenth century.³³ In short, where the roots of irreligiosity were not deep, as they were not in England, Deist and secularist ideologies would make little headway; Englishmen continued to be heated by religious controversy and warmed by religious faith. By implication, of course, the revolution in France was not merely the work of a few irresponsible philosophes either; it had roots in the French people and therefore it had a certain legitimacy in modern democratic terms. These implications of the French Revolution were much more profound than Taine or others of the conservative tradition had been willing to recognize.

It was here that Halévy's Methodist thesis differed fundamentally from that of Taine. At the same time it was here that his thinking showed the greatest influence of Taine's model of revolution, i.e., his speculations on the origins of the French Revolution. Taine credited the Methodist revival with saving England from the horrors of a French

Revolution by appealing to the spiritual longings in the English nation against its irreverent aristocracy, its native Deists, and a deprived and depraved lower class. For Taine, England in the eighteenth century paralleled France, but the dramatic conversion of the nation through Methodism and the reawakening of the moral sensibilities immunized England from the fatal disease that struck France. This vision of the old regime in England and in France deeply influenced both liberal and conservative French historians and was foremost in Halévy's mind.

Taine coupled a fundamentally conservative view of the role of the elite in history with a vision of the entire destiny of nations being moved by the "blind forces of the masses, by the 'mystery of crowds.'"³⁴ It was this pessimistic polarization that Halévy's thesis combatted. To Taine the important question was: "Why did the working class agitation of 1738, after its violent beginnings, take the form of a religious and mystical movement whose ideal was, after all, extremely conservative, rather than terminating in a social revolution?" Halévy's comment was that "this question raises difficulties only insofar as one has illusions concerning the role that the common people play in history."³⁵

Halévy too ascribed a large influence to the evangelical revival in averting a French Revolution in England, but it was not to the suffering masses that he attributed the active stabilizing or revolutionary role in this particular play. He concluded his essays with an argument for the investigation of "a singularly influential class," one which had played a very small part in Taine's production, the bourgeoisie, the "middle class," "composed of those who occupy posts of command, high or low, in the economy without participating in the political leadership

of the nation, without being members of the governing aristocracy."³⁶ It was the bourgeoisie, he asserted, that "provides nations with their moral tone."³⁷ If in 1739 this class had been moved by revolutionary sentiments, "convinced that it must instigate a movement of intimidation and insurrection against the existing social order to obtain satisfaction of its demands," a democratic social revolution could have been brought about. But the English bourgeoisie was not revolutionary, not irreligious, not republican in the 1730s; it was not, in short, the French bourgeoisie of 1788. Though the lower orders were restless, reduced to poverty and "accessible to all forms of collective emotion" "popular discontent took the form the bourgeoisie wanted to give it," a religious and conservative form.³⁸

The revival of English Protestantism in the eighteenth century at that particular moment in history explained for Halévy "why in modern England there are no genuine lay parties of social and political revolution." In these early essays he wanted to express the vitality of faith and good works in the social ethic despite the attack by modern rationalizing forces--the "advance of the commercial spirit and industrial civilization," the scientific spirit and critical rationalism.³⁹ His emphasis was not on the transmutation of a waning faith into economic rationalism, but on the life that remained in a social ethic built on an eclectic doctrine of salvation by faith and the testimony of good works. He did not assume a connection between Protestantism and the commercial and industrial spirit or between Protestantism and a scientific, critical rationalism; he assumed a conflict between these. A renewed faith struggled more effectively against rationalism in England than anywhere on the continent with vitally different political results:

the English lacked the sectarian and dogmatic spirit and they neither created nor adhered to parties of social and political revolution.

By the time Halévy wrote England in 1815 he was more confident of the context in which his "thesis" belonged. His Philosophic Radicalism had been well received, even in England.⁴⁰ He had investigated both working- and middle-class radical movements. His friends Graham Wallas, the Webbs and Frank Podmore were laying the foundations of a new political and social history of the first half of the nineteenth century with their studies of working-class leaders, local government, the poor laws, and utopian socialist movements. England in 1815 was the first of "four or five volumes" which Halévy planned and for which he had been collecting the green cartons in his study for years.⁴¹ His theme was the Christian basis of nineteenth-century social cohesion, the way in which religion counteracted the individualistic, virtually anarchic tendencies in English society during industrialization.

The first volume was his cross in many ways. In 1906 he found the thought of writing the general themes too demanding for him to make a beginning. He began just the same and virtually finished by the end of 1910 only to have his manuscript rejected by Max Leclerc, the publisher. His confidence badly shaken, he wrote to Lucien Herr, the one man whose discretion and editorial judgment he felt he could rely upon. Herr had been the librarian of the Ecole normale as well as the scientific editor of the Revue de Paris when Ludovic Halévy and Ernest Lavisse resurrected it; he had also encouraged Halévy five years earlier to undertake the Methodist project.

Halévy explained that the last chapters which treated of religion,

letters and sciences were meant to explain the other two sections of his tableau, his introduction to the origin and character of English institutions and beliefs, especially the political liberalism of the English. He pointed to the areas in which he knew his book would be useful, by beginning with the subjects that would most interest the socialist librarian. They were not religious topics at all; they were the textile and related industries, the struggles between the owners and wage earners, the prejudices of each class of the nation, the economic conditions and the recruitment of the ruling elite. In these matters he knew that he had something to add to the present state of knowledge, even to the work of Mantoux and the Webbs. He also stressed that his book was unique on the question of the English Protestants and, above all, on the sects before and after the Methodist revival. On these subjects he said, "I know that my book contains many things that aren't found in any other book; I say this not only for French but for English as well."⁴² In a more modest manner Halévy repeated this claim in his preface to the English translation of England in 1815. His friend Wallas's introduction underscored Halévy's original research into utilitarianism and Methodism, drawing the attention of English students to his refusal to regard religion as sufficiently discussed "by partial compilations or chatter about Newman."⁴³

The ideas he had sketched in broad strokes in the Methodist essays developed into an impressive tableau in his History. His vision was enlightened by his values; he thought the evangelical revival explained the temperate character of the liberalism and individualism of nineteenth-century England. In his early essays he had asked:

If religious sentiment, in its essence, is reverence for the

incomprehensible, could this not be seen as the mystic foundation of English liberalism? Liberalism, thus defined, would imply both the conviction that our reason meets with insurmountable barriers in its course, and reverence for, or, if you like, awe of, those things in nature which escape our intelligence. To this outlook, so characteristic of the English in modern times, French rationalism was singularly unsusceptible.⁴⁴

His study of England convinced him that the almost stoic restraint of the English was based on Christian self-discipline and exercised a powerful force for peace and compromise, stability and social cohesion, greatness and goodness (he enjoyed reminding his English contemporaries of those Victorian words) in the face of an anarchic, atomistic economy and a highly-stratified social system.

It was his aim to depict British civilization and society as a whole, and to show how the different orders of social phenomena --political, economic and religious--combined with one another and reacted on one another. It was a synthetic method. This volume, his masterpiece, was a tribute to Taine's conceptualization of history as a description of institutions and ideas through the scientific display of the facts. But, as Lanson pointed out in his review of Halévy's first volume, Taine himself had aspired to rather than achieved his goals, whereas Halévy came nearer to realizing a perfect blend of analysis and factuality without Taine's prejudices.⁴⁵ Halévy's true break from Taine's analysis lay in the important role he assigned to ideas as much as in his opposition to race, geography, "style," or temperament as modes of explanation.

Significantly, Halévy began after the French Revolution. He assessed the forces that preserved England from revolution in the aftermath of the French wars and then weighed the forces for stability in the face of the emerging industrial revolution. Thus, he shifted the prob-

lem of his Methodist essays from Taine's model of revolution in which a great discontented mass moved by the irreverent ideas of their aristocracy toppled their government and destroyed its institutions. In England Taine asserted this had not happened because the English were religious and religion was the antidote to revolution. From some of Halévy's critics it would be difficult to tell that he opposed such a simplistic view of the nature of revolution.⁴⁶

When Halévy first speculated on Methodism and utilitarianism the French Revolution was foremost in his mind. Taine was the determinist against whom he argued. When his focus shifted to encompass industrialization and the revolutionary implications of industrial change, Marxist determinism became his target. The model of a militant class, bourgeois or proletarian, in the midst of economic dislocation superseding the dominant social group, seizing the state or moving to share authority and enact the legislation of its class interests, did not fit the events either. In Halévy's mind there was no English equivalent of the French Revolution of 1789, the three glorious days, or the uprisings of 1848; neither was there an equivalent for the bloody June days.

Against a Marxist model Halévy accepted a construct in which the governing classes made concessions in order to avoid the greater evil of political instability--a Whig interpretation in part. He did not accept, however, any Whig identification of urban or rural interests with party divisions nor a view of party as the vehicle of conservative or liberal policies. This, coupled with his historical method of writing from the perspective of the center of politics, discussing problems as they were perceived by contemporaries and commenting upon the factors which seemed decisive to them led him to reject a simple party analysis and to see

the importance of men like Peel, the talents of the Liverpool-Castlereagh government and the significance of cross-party campaigns. Further, Halévy accepted in part Tocqueville's proposition that the decentralization of government contributed to liberty by making it more difficult for a minority to seize power and wield it in an illiberal manner.

In England in 1815 Halévy began by arguing not with Taine or Marx but with Montesquieu. Point by point he contrasted the constitution of Britain that was the object of Montesquieu's affection with the reality of government in 1815. In fact, Halévy's argument with Montesquieu was a rhetorical device, certainly not a sustained debate. His analytical description of the legal, administrative, political, and military structure of government, national and local, found that English liberties rested not on the separation of powers, but on the inefficiency of English institutions. The king, popular because of and not in spite of his intermittent madness and his worthless family, was not able to exercise the control over the Government that every other European prince exercised.⁴⁷ The administration was chaotic, corrupt, filled with men whose positions were sinecures. The judiciary confused the powers so that the confusion always operated to the detriment of the monarchy, which was a reductio ad absurdum of Montesquieu's vision. The representative system made some response, though an imperfect one, to public opinion and to mobs, still exercising their 'right of rebellion' in the large loopholes of the law. It was a "country governed without police."⁴⁸ "To palliate the evils of such a system men reckoned on the phlegmatic temperament of the people..."⁴⁹ And through this anarchy the one thread of unity, which was enough to hold society together in the revolutionary era, was the ~~control~~ of the

navy, judiciary, legislature, and central and local government by a single class, an unreformed aristocracy. In his theory of revolution Halévy did not need to blacken the evils of unreformed England, merely to indicate the difficulties of control. Stability was a delicate balance and though Halévy pointed out the system was not sufficient to guarantee peace without evangelicalism, he did not have to depredate the very real potential for reform from within the constitutional system or to heighten into Tory terror the government's measures for social peace.

In the course of the century this government which seemed so fragile in 1815 gave proof of greater stability than any other government in Europe. To account for this apparent paradox, Halévy proposed that those elements, which were capable of sowing disorder and anarchy and which were inherent in the political tradition of the country, "lost their unruly character and submitted insensibly to a discipline freely accepted."⁵⁰ For the secret of this progressive regulation of liberty, he said, "we must seek elsewhere, in the economic organization or the religious life of the nation. . . ."⁵¹

In the realm of the economy there was no other country in the world in which the new capitalism had developed so greatly and with so little governmental assistance; but if wealth increased, deep industrial and financial crises accompanied it. The disorganization of the employers matched that of the workmen who were caught in the chaos of the early stage of industrialization.⁵² The repeal of the Elizabethan Statute of Apprentices "was a triumph by no means making for social peace. . . . Never before had the existence of workmen's associations in England been so precarious; never had their character been so revolutionary."⁵³ The system of credit was far from systematic; it was as

disorganized as the other elements of the economy. It would seem, Halévy summarized, that all the economic evidence pointed to the revolution that Sismondi and Marx had predicted. "If the materialistic interpretation of history is to be trusted, if economic facts explain the course taken by the human race in its progress, the England of the nineteenth century was surely, above all other countries, destined to revolution, both political and religious. But it was not to be so."⁵⁴ From his detailed studies he concluded that the secret of the social order did not lie in the economy any more than it rested in the political institutions.

Several critics have asserted that Halévy's neglect of the social, political and economic factors making for unrest in England in the period 1815 to 1850 limits the utility of his work.⁵⁵ But careful examination does not bear out this charge. A full two-thirds of England in 1815 was devoted to political and economic institutions. It would be even less true of the second and third volumes, which are chronologically developed. His "thesis" in the Methodist essays rests on the assumption of severe economic dislocation in England from at least the 1740s and that in the event of such turmoil there had to be some response. In England's case, however, the response was a religious rather than a revolutionary one.⁵⁶

In spite of Halévy's solid grounding of his work in the material circumstances, he stressed the role of ideas and beliefs. Having described the political and economic institutions of England, he proceeded to the analysis of that other level of reality, the "beliefs, emotions and opinions, as well as the institutions and sects in which these beliefs, emotions and opinions take a form suitable for scientific

inquiry."⁵⁷ His description of the religious establishment paralleled the chaos and confusion of the political and social establishment. For the Protestant sects he went beyond their beliefs and organizations to the practical implications of their religious faith, concluding that the religious revival of the eighteenth century was responsible for the extraordinary stability of English society in the nineteenth century. In England in 1815 the year-to-year feuds between the sects and the Establishment, which he discussed in great detail in volumes two and three of the History of the English People, took second place to this general effect by which evangelism reformed morals and manners by drawing Christian communicants inward to their own lives and souls. The moral commandments became the social codes --anarchical but orderly, practical and businesslike, but religious and even pietist.⁵⁸

Halévy emphasized neither the rigidity and intolerance of the Nonconformist conscience nor Methodist opposition to education and hostility to humane science and culture. Although he had no special admiration for the evangelical mentality, which offended his liberal rationalism,⁵⁹ he was capable of noting its contribution. He was impressed by the practical effects of the dominant religious movement for social solidarity through self-reliance, individualism, and political and social virtue. His narrative of the campaigns of the Nonconformists against Catholic Emancipation, of men like Miall, whose paper the Nonconformist epitomized for Halévy the narrow, bigoted, negative policies of nonconformity, shows little sympathy for their position. Yet viewed sociologically, in terms of the movement's contribution to the distinctive character of British liberalism, his estimation was a deep and abiding admiration.

One of the difficulties of current historiography is that much of the attention that is given to the Halévy thesis assumes that it applies

only to Methodism or Wesleyanism. It pertains to all of England's Protestant sects: first to the Wesleyan reform movement within the established church and then to the evangelicalism that permeated the Dissenters and animated the Methodists. Furthermore, much of the present discussion assumes the impact of evangelicalism bore only upon the "proletariat" or the laboring classes.

The boldest summary that Halévy made of his thesis argued that the Nonconformist sects, strengthened by the Methodist revival, "offered an outlet by which the despair of the proletariat in times of hunger and misery could find relief, opposed a peaceful barrier to the spread of revolutionary ideas, and supplied the want of legal control by the despotic sway of public opinion."⁶⁰ The second and third clauses of Halévy's summary were as important to him as the first one. They are virtually ignored by present historians. By the "opposition of a peaceful barrier to the spread of revolutionary ideas" Halévy included a major theme from the essays and from the History. A necessary ingredient in Halévy's recipe for revolution was a middle-class enthusiasm for radical ideas, specifically that portion of the middle class immediately above the laborers in skills and consciousness, which could furnish the leadership for secular, revolutionary movements, as they had in France. The Nonconformists, not just the Methodists, created an alternative enthusiasm for that all-important class. Evangelicalism, transcending religious, institutional and class barriers, created a social ethic which substituted a moral public opinion for legal control.

Halévy's assumption of a middle-class Wesleyan movement means that much current discussion of the Methodist problem misses the point, a fact which has not been noted by some of the social and labor historians who would be his critics. The middle class had the crucial role in his drama, if not that

of his critics. He did not claim that Methodism reached the depth of the lower classes except for a rare rural area; its potential came into play as the worker rose "out of the barbarism in which the working class was plunged."⁶¹ One of the most successful aspects of Puritan Nonconformity, as far as he was concerned, was its ability to become a transitional creed, "a stage in the history of an English family."⁶² Nonconformity transcended class, formed a social conduit by which the unskilled laborer became a skilled workman, an artisan, moved into the ~~petite-bourgeoisie~~ and perhaps even to the bourgeoisie and from there without the "slightest difficulty" into the Church of England. Halévy was confirmed in his thesis by the fact that radical working-class leadership often originated from Nonconformist backgrounds. He was struck by the phenomenon of relatively little bloodshed in workers' demonstrations, even among the Luddites, when only recently civil war had been endemic in the countryside. To him risings that ended with petitions to Parliament meant that the Nonconformists had done their work.⁶³

E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class accepts Halévy's thesis as applicable to his subjects.⁶⁴ Deeply influenced by John and Barbara Hammond, who thought as he does, that Methodism had a degrading effect on the working classes, Thompson argues that political suppression, Methodism, and betrayal by middle-class Radicals undermined the very real revolutionary potential of the working class between 1780 and 1832. Although the Hammonds' vision of the laborers was not as revolutionary as E.P. Thompson's is, they did believe them to have been increasingly isolated victims of economic forces and of cruel political leadership. For the Hammonds the desirable outcome of radical and

class conscious action by the laborers would have been political rights and trade unions to protect their livelihoods. For Thompson, between 1789 and 1832 there was a genuine working-class revolutionary movement led by secret revolutionary groups. A full-scale political repression launched by the government suppressed the attempted revolution. For both the Hammonds and Thompson the effect of the Methodist movement upon working-class consciousness was a repressive one, but Thompson utilizes modern psychological insights and language to argue that Methodism was actually "the psychic process of counter-revolution."⁶⁵ The Hammonds' three-volume social history of the age of Industrial Revolution depicted an immeasurable social psychology of misery.⁶⁶ The Methodist contribution to this bleak picture was a message of withdrawal, of social passivity, of resignation; it was a cross-current amid the forces that were strengthening the class consciousness of the new urban population.⁶⁷ It divided the working classes, taking their energy and their money and reducing the chances for a successful political or economic manoeuvre.

In a later work, The Age of The Chartists, the Hammonds found it hard to sustain their almost totally negative view of the impact of Methodism, however. They, like Thompson, approached the laboring classes with sympathy for their experience, making it difficult to reject in toto their religious culture. "The teaching of Methodism was unfavorable to working class movements; its leaders were hostile and its ideals perhaps increasingly hostile; but by the life and energy and awakening that it brought to this oppressed society it must, in spite of itself, have made many men better citizens, and some even better rebels."⁶⁸ For both the Hammonds and Thompson the attempt to render the life experience of the laborers led them to an eclectic version of Methodism--the

chiliasm of despair, the defences of the poor--and yet it was the saving experience of great numbers.

The striking fact about the treatment of Methodism by Thompson and the Hammonds is their agreement with Halévy that it did indeed effectively contribute to the prevention of revolution in England. This is an even more striking admission if one realizes that they do not focus on the same class in the main and they do not regard this effect positively, as Halévy did. Both the Hammonds and Thompson regard the transports of Methodist enthusiasm as an unhappy fact in the historical record of the laboring classes whose story they hope to preserve. They draw a dark and passionate portrait of repressive measures of the government that worked hand in hand with Methodism as a stabilizing factor in early nineteenth-century England. Halévy's technique in England in 1815 and the succeeding volumes was to prove the government was weak yet stable and to reason that social peace must therefore rest in the effects of nonconformity upon the populace. But the government might have been weak and because of that either repressive or willing to grant concessions rather than test its strength. Halévy's narration revealed that it did both but his general theory overemphasized the role of evangelical religion in stability as if government repression did not enter into consideration. But the Hammonds and Thompson have perhaps joined the factors together too much. In his picture of the manipulation of the working-class psyche Thompson made Methodism more devastating in its effect upon the working class than Halévy ever imagined--modern psychology helping Thompson to stand Halévy's Edwardian virtues on their heads.

In view of the many areas of agreement between the Hammonds,

Thompson and Halévy, in spite of differences in style, orientation and values, it seems that Eric Hobsbawm's thesis directly confronts Halévy's. Hobsbawm, in "Methodism and the Threat of Revolution"⁶⁹ believes the working classes were badly organized, inexperienced and divided, but not Methodist. He agrees with Halévy, and with Thompson, that there was a threat of revolution but he dates it between 1790 and 1840 subtracting ten and adding eight years to Thompson's period. Halévy thought the threat was intermittent: for example, right after the Napoleonic Wars, 1819-22, 1829-32, 1836-41. Both Hobsbawm and Halévy agree that the British ruling class wisely yielding to the pressure of the middle classes never lost control. Hobsbawm would insist that the ruling class yielded to the pressure of the masses led by middle-class reformers. With so much agreement though, Hobsbawm categorically denies any role of Methodism in preventing revolution. He claims that working-class areas were irreligious (basing himself on the census of 1851, a generation later): that those workers who were religious were Nonconformists, not Anglicans or Methodists: that the Methodists were too few in total numbers to exercise any influence: and that Methodism and Radicalism often advanced together⁷⁰ and many rebels were Primitive Methodists.

Because Halévy's model of revolution focused on the important revolutionary middle and upper-lower class some of Hobsbawm's critique misses the point just as Thompson's did. Hobsbawm and Thompson both have a model of revolution which places the burden on the proletariat and its leadership. Halévy's model may have led him astray because it was based on the French Revolution, perhaps even on a classic tradition in political philosophy which ascribed the stabilizing influence to the middling ranks, but Hobsbawm's Leninist one has not corrected much. Halévy

knew of the irreligion of the lower classes and saw the Nonconformist sects as a buffer between the conservatism of the Establishment and the "gross ignorance of religion of the lower classes."⁷¹

Furthermore, Halévy's thesis was not in actuality merely a Methodist thesis. It was Halévy who stressed the rescue of Nonconformity from the free thinking and the decadence of Christian belief of the eighteenth century by the evangelical movement. Hobsbawm regards Nonconformity from 1780 to 1850 as one piece but the best sources on the religious history of the century agree with Halévy that Nonconformity itself underwent a revival.⁷²

The process by which the Nonconformist conscience, mellowed and redeemed by the experience of personal salvation of evangelicalism, transformed the society and made the English truly self-governing was the third critical clause in Halévy's summary of his thesis. It "supplied the want of legal control by the despotic sway of public opinion." This full process, by which the evangelical message of rebirth moved the Church of England as well as the Nonconformists, thus shaping the entire culture of mid-nineteenth century England, was an integral part of Halévy's thesis. The "Methodist thesis" emphasized the transmutation of the sects from radicalism in the seventeenth century to deism and non-belief on the eve of the French Revolution, into respectable religious groups in the nineteenth century. Their renewal of devotion had important results for social stability, not just in the conservative politics of Wesleyan leadership but in the moral behavior of a nation of respectable subjects.

The Halévy thesis, then, was not merely a "Methodist" thesis. It was one which emphasized the religious underpinnings of the English

national morale, of the Victorian ethos which Halévy saw even in his own time. He found this ethos in the instinctive groping, mutual tolerance and compromise which withstood the terrible ideologies of the twentieth century,⁷³ in the vital force in the British labour movement after the first World War as it tried to obtain some institutionalization of wartime cooperation,⁷⁴ and in the spirit of the League of Nations.⁷⁵ This was the quality which almost made an Anglo-ophile of him.

Contemporary critics who focus entirely on the question of revolution miss the significance of the Halévy thesis. The thesis was tied to an evaluation of the nature of the culture of nineteenth century England. Halévy asked not only why England did not experience a revolution; he was concerned with the nature of the Victorian social and moral reformation which is avoided in so much of the controversy about "the Halévy thesis." In the largest sense, Halévy's thesis poses the following questions: How did the values of the various classes of Englishmen change? How were the new ones internalized to make political peace and stability possible and to make industrialization work? What was the process by which religious ideas and moral reform permeated this culture and continued to effect behavior long after Christian belief was undermined? How and when, if ever, did the working class, or any other class, withdraw from this culture? Unfortunately much of the controversy about the "Halévy thesis" has not addressed itself to questions of this order. But contemporary critics quite rightly have sensed that Halévy's "thesis," and certainly his history of nineteenth-century English culture, constitute a radical rejection of economic determinism and of politics as the inevitable

reflection of class conflict. It is not surprising that Halévy's work and his formulation of the problems have remained central in the historiography of the period.

There is no doubt that Halévy's sense of the good society was one in which there was a minimum of external authority over the individual and a maximum of self-discipline. In such a society he thought liberty might be preserved. John Stuart Mill's tyranny of the majority was not Halévy's dominating fear. For a free society to exist, one with a minimum of state controls, the submission of the individual voluntarily, even unconsciously, to social pressure, to conformity, was perhaps a necessary foundation of social stability and political liberty.

¹Halévy to Bouglé, May 10, 1906, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²Ibid.

³Elie Halévy, England in 1815, p. 591.

⁴Ibid., p. xiii.

⁵Elie Halévy, History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. IV: Victorian Years 1841-1895, p. 337. This particular chapter "Religious Beliefs" is the only finished one of the mid-century tableau which he intended to parallel the survey of social forces of England in 1815. Trygve Tholfsen's point that Halévy explicitly excluded the Victorian period from the reach of his argument on the stabilizing effect of intellectual forces ignores this fact and the significant generalizations that Halévy made on precisely this effect. (Trygve Tholfsen, "The Intellectual Origins of Mid-Victorian Stability," Political Quarterly Review, LXXXVI (March 1971), 58.)

⁶Halévy, History of the English People, Vol. V: Epilogue: Imperialism and the Rise of Labour (1895-1905), p. x.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Halévy, England in 1815, p. 96.

⁹Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, pp. 492-495. See also England in 1815, pp. 586-587.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Halévy, England in 1815, p. 586 note.

¹²Ibid. To this Halévy appended a footnote recommending and criticizing for excessive subtlety Max Weber's "Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus," Archiv fur Sozial Politik, Vols. XX and XXI, (1905). In spite of his deep interest in sociology Halévy appears not to have read Weber at the time of his early Methodist essays which date from the same year. Weber's essays were not reviewed in the Revue de Métaphysique (which did summarize foreign journals including sociological ones, but not that one) or l'Année Sociologique or Revue Philosophique before Halévy's publication.

¹³Halévy, England in 1815, p. 587.

¹⁴Eric Hobsbawm, "The British Secret," New Statesman, LXI (April 7, 1961), 548-9. [Hereinafter referred to as "The British Secret."]

¹⁵Halévy, History of the English People, Vol. V: Epilogue: Imperialism and the Rise of Labour (1895-1905), p. x. This same theme is treated in Halévy "L'Angleterre: Grandeur, decadence et persistance du liberalisme en Angleterre," Inventaires, La crise sociale et les nationales (Paris: F. Alcan, 1936), pp. 5-23. See also his treatment

of Cardinal Newman in Vol. IV: The Victorian Years, 352-364, 374-375, which he wrote in his last months.

¹⁶K.W. Swart., The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth Century France (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 172-8. Steven Lukes has an excellent summary of this tradition in Emile Durkheim (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1973), pp. 195-199.

¹⁷Halévy to Bougle, July 30, 1905, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

¹⁸Halévy to Léon, July 31, 1905, Correspondence, p. 332.

¹⁹Elie Halévy, The Birth of Methodism in England, trans. by Bernard Semmel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 33-34. This was originally two articles "La naissance du Methodisme en Angleterre," published in La Revue de Paris, XIII (Juillet-aout, 1906) 519-39, 841-867. [Hereinafter referred to as The Birth of Methodism.]

²⁰Ibid., p. 33.

²¹Halévy to Bouglé, December 19, 1900, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²²Daniel to Elie Halévy, April 2, 1902, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²³Halévy to Bouglé, May 20, 1904, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁴Halévy to Bouglé, March 8, 1905, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection. The contemporary history which intrigued him was the general subject of England in the 19th century but specifically the preparation of a small book on the rise of imperialism in England, l'Angleterre et son empire (Paris: Pages libres, 1905).

²⁵Bernard Semmel, "Introduction," Halévy, The Birth of Methodism, p. 16.

²⁶Halévy to Bouglé, July 30, 1905, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁷Halévy to Bouglé, May 10, 1906, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁸Hippolyte Taine, History of English Literature, trans. by T.H. Van Laan (Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1874), III, 73-74.

²⁹Ibid., p. 75.

³⁰Halévy, The Birth of Methodism, pp. 35, 38-40.

³¹Ibid., pp. 43-45, 49.

³²Ibid., p. 41.

³³Ibid., p. 46.

³⁴See Halévy's refutation of this view, The Birth of Methodism, p. 75.

³⁵Ibid., p. 74.

³⁶Ibid., p. 75.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., p. 77.

³⁹Ibid., p. 33-34.

⁴⁰W.G. Pogson Smith, "Reviews of books: La Formation du Radicalisme philosophique" English Historical Review, XVII (1902), 385-391. Paul Mantoux "La Formation du Radicalisme philosophique" Revue de synthèse historique (1901), 121-125.

⁴¹Halévy to Bouglé, May 10, 1905, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴²Halévy to Lucien Herr, December 30, 1910, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴³Graham Wallas Introduction to Elie Halévy's History of the English Peoples in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. I: England in 1815, trans. by E.I. Watkin and D.A. Barker, (1st ed., London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1923).

⁴⁴Halévy, The Birth of Methodism, pp. 39-40.

⁴⁵Gustave Lanson review of Halévy, L'Angleterre en 1815, Le Matin, 1913. Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴⁶See Esther de Waal's review of John Kent, Age of Disunity "Revolution in the Church," Victorian Studies X (June 1967), 435-439 or E. Hobsbawm "The British Secret" or "Methodism and the Threat of Revolution," Labouring Men (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 27-39. [Hereinafter referred to as "Methodism and the Threat of Revolution."]

⁴⁷Halévy, England in 1815, p. 9.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 44.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Halévy, England in 1815, p. 200.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., p. 325.

⁵³Ibid., p. 337.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 382.

⁵⁵Gillispie, "Elie Halévy," p. 243. This is also the burden of Hobsbawm's argument in "Methodism and the Threat of Revolution."

⁵⁶Halévy, The Birth of Methodism, pp. 62-72.

⁵⁷Halévy, England in 1815, p. 383.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 387.

⁵⁹Gillispie is one of the few commentators on Halévy who noted his attitude, perhaps overdoing it, p. 244. "Halévy's indulgence, not altogether unmixed with contempt.

⁶⁰Halévy, "Introduction," History of the English Peoples, Vol. II: The Liberal Awakening, p. vi.

⁶¹Halévy, England in 1815, p. 424.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid., p. 331-335.

⁶⁴E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage, 1966).

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 375.

⁶⁶J.L. and Barbara Hammond, The Town Labourer 1760-1832 (London: Longmans, Green, 1920) The Village Labourer 1760-1832 (London: Longmans Green, 1919), The Skilled Labourer 1760-1832 (London: Longmans Green, 1919)

⁶⁷Hammond, The Town Labourer, pp. 277, 285.

⁶⁸J.L. and Barbara Hammond, The Age of the Chartists: A study of Discontent (1832-54) (London: Longmans Green, 1930), p. 287.

⁶⁹Hobsbawm, "Methodism and the Threat of Revolution," p. 28.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Halévy, History of the English Peoples, Vol. IV: The Victorian Years, p. 337.

⁷²Owen Chadwick, The Victorian Church, Vol. I, (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1966), pp. 370-440. K.S. Inglis, Churches and the Working Classes in Victorian England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

1963), pp. 325-336. W.R. Ward, Religion and Society 1790-1850 (London: B.T. Batsford, 1972), pp. 1-105, 135-176.

⁷³Halévy, History of the English Peoples, Vol. V: Epilogue: Imperialism and the Rise of Labour 1895-1905, p. x.

⁷⁴Halévy, "The Policy of Social Peace in England," Era of Tyrannies, pp. 183-208.

⁷⁵Halévy, "The World Crisis, 1914-18" Era of Tyrannies, pp. 246-247.

CHAPTER IV

STUDIES IN SOCIALISM

Elie Halévy devoted half of his scholarly life to the problems of European socialism. In France his reputation rests upon the volume which his students and friends assembled from his lectures and notes on aspects of European socialism given at the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques every two years from 1901 to 1937. This volume, Histoire du socialisme européen,¹ together with a collection of his essays and lectures in l'Ère des Tyrannies² are his most frequently cited and most popular works in his own country. Yet neither is the finished scholarly history that Anglo-Saxon admirers of England in 1815 or the Growth of Philosophic Radicalism associate with his name.

Halévy's study of socialism takes on an importance beyond the ironies of posthumous reputation when one recalls his central problem in England in 1815--why is it that England has been the most free from revolution, violent crises and violent changes? The answer to that question is a multi-volumed case study in which he tested, among other hypotheses, Marx's predictions about capitalism, industrialization and revolution. As Melvin Richter pointed out, English history and European socialism are more than two courses that Halévy taught: "the first was the subject, the second the polemical target of much of his life's work."³ The History of the English Peoples and the pieces that reflect his study of socialism are contrapuntal works. His students

and friends were aware of the relation of one to the other but the unfinished and random nature of the publication of his work on socialism may have obscured the connection for many others.⁴

There is a sense in which Halévy's work is a dialectic of liberty and authority, liberalism and socialism, but this insight is complicated by the fact that his corpus is divided into two movements composed at different times, broken by the first World War. The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, the Methodist essays and England in 1815 developed side by side with his first investigations of socialism, his extensive readings in the socialist fathers in preparation for his course for the Sciences Politiques, and his biography of Hodgskin and early essays on Saint-Simonian economic thought. The message that ran as a subtheme through Philosophic Radicalism and became his contribution to Saint-Simonian studies was that socialism and democratic liberalism developed from similar intellectual roots and that both ideologies contain a contradiction between their desire to emancipate and their will to organize society.

Prior to the World War Halévy made an extensive study of the history of industrialization in England and of the political, economic and social response to that industrialization, which is told in the first three volumes of his History of the English Peoples, not just in England in 1815. His studies of the crucial period in England just did not bear out the Marxist interpretation of history, not even for a society in the very throes of industrialization, the same epoch upon which Marx built his science. His study convinced him that he was correct in denying that politics (or ideas) were merely the relations

between social classes in conflict (or the rationalizations of the class interests of participants). It convinced him that his "political science," though not very dogmatic, was correct in its focus upon politics and even upon ideas in the sense of claiming a certain autonomy for this realm of men's lives without denying the importance of the social infrastructure.⁵

Even before the war Halévy was sure that socialism held the secret of the future. "But I can't decipher the secret and I am past the state of saying if socialism leads us to a universalized Swiss republic or to European caesarism."⁶ Both his History of the English People and his investigation of socialism were parts of his attempt to comprehend the drift of the twentieth century toward democracy or caesarism. The war deepened his sense of urgency, leading him to write the Epilogue to the History of the English Peoples and to formulate his most pessimistic prognostications regarding socialism. But even before the war he had relatively few moments of optimism and was troubled by recurring doubts.

Like so many of Halévy's intellectual interests, his socialist studies reflected the shifting sympathies of the Dreyfusard generation. He had as an adolescent expressed an interest in "socialism, that great, powerful and formidable doctrine that we can not appreciate in France"⁷ and he was, like his father, deeply sympathetic to the social problem, but his serious interest does not seem to have taken hold until the Dreyfus years. Many of his friends were deeply attracted to socialist movements, their contributions to "socialist" studies marked a surge of interest, and their names are a roll call of the most influential French scholars on the subject--Georges Weill, Durk-

heim, Sebastien Charl  ty, Charles Andler, Bougl  , Maxime Leroy, Charles Rist and Charles Gide, Hubert Bourgin, Daniel Hal  vy, Georges Sorel, Doll  ans and Guy-Grand.⁸

When Emile Boutmy created the course in the history of Europe socialism at the Sciences Politiques he was responding to a new current of interest in socialism. When he chose Hal  vy to teach it he gave him the opportunity to combine his talents for political and social theory and history. He also put him in position to influence the opinion of no less than two generations of graduates over the forty years he taught the course. Hal  vy undertook a number of studies of European socialism and socialist doctrines. He published several articles, reviews and a small book on Thomas Hodgskin. He participated in many conferences at the Soci  t   Fran  ais de Philosophie on problems relating to socialism and he served as the main contributor to the "Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie" for definitions of social ideologies and descriptions of social movements.⁹ After the war, he and Bougl   made substantial contributions to the study of social movements in the publication series R  formateurs sociaux, which includes Hal  vy's Sismondi and Bougl  's Proudhon among a number of good editions of social thinkers edited by the finest scholars of the Third Republic. Their edition of La Doctrine de Saint-Simon: Exposition Premi  re Ann  e 1829 remains the definitive edition upon which other works and translations have been based.¹⁰ The culmination and the institutionalization of their collaboration was the founding of the Centre de Documentation Sociale at the Ecole Normale Sup  rieure under Bougl  's direction.

Hal  vy himself dated this flowering of interest in socialism from Durkheim's course on socialism at Bordeaux in November 1895 to 1895, which he said was the moment of the shift of the intellectuals from

democratic radicalism to socialism.¹¹ Others have attributed the intellectual interest in socialism to the marked leftward turn the Dreyfusard agitation took in the months after Zola's conviction, a leftward movement which has been credited to Jaurès's skill in joining the majority Socialists with the Dreyfusards for Radical or republican reforms against the opposition of the "orthodox Marxists" led by Jules Guesde.¹² The first decade of la belle époque was not a time of rigid sectarianism of any sort, and the conversion to socialism of many Dreyfusards did not cut them off from their fellow republicans nearly so much as the leap into faith of a "neo-Catholic" did. French socialist thought and working-class movements were in a state of flux and as late as the 1890s working-class organizations were not dominated by Marxist doctrinaires in France. Guesde and other leaders who aspired to Marxist orthodoxy had very few sources of doctrine available to them in French translations.¹³ In this milieu those men who made the first scholarly investigations of various aspects of socialism--men like Durkheim, Daniel and Elie Halévy, Charléty, Leroy, Rist and Gide--could hope to make some contribution to social peace as well as to learning.

The scholarly studies that developed from the first flowering tended to emphasize the democratic, voluntarist and associationalist aspects of the native-born origins of socialism. These characteristics contrasted with the Marxist, bureaucratic and statist socialism that they thought of as the German tradition. Most of these men found the French socialist tradition more sympathetic because it was humanist, fraternal, and solidariste, calling for cooperation of the classes and social groups of society to make social reform. Elie and Léon opened the columns of the Revue de Métaphysique to further the dialogue

between socialists and non-socialists, published some of the leading minds of France on questions such as: "The Crisis of Liberalism," progressive taxation, "The Ethics of Socialism," the social role of the cooperative movement, distributive justice, revolutionary and reformist syndicalism, strikes and the right to work.

This non-sectarian republicanism and socialism also infused its spirit into the universités populaires. There bourgeois students tried to "go to the people" with the result that students, workers, socialists, and liberals shared politics, economics and socialism in an informal environment.¹⁴ In the first flush of his non-denominational socialism Daniel Halévy began a book in which he hoped "neither to propose a solution not to convince, but only to describe...the elements of material or moral civilization that exist in the working class." He wanted to "help some people to feel that the people aren't barbarians and that they have among them the possibility of a civilization very different from ours, but most acceptable, if not superior. . . ."¹⁵ The same new hope and new faith inspired Léon Blum's Les Congrès ouvriers et socialistes français (1901). In all, left republicanism and socialism met frequently and shared much in the first years after the Affair.

Most of Elie's close friends remained liberals, democrats, republicans, and anticlericals, but not without a little envy of the socialist faith. Isolated scholars, like Bouglé, fighting apparently losing battles with antisemitic leagues in the provinces, admired the confidence and unity of the socialists and genuinely shared republican values with men of Jaurès's political persuasion.¹⁶ For those who did not become socialists, the half-way house of solidarisme furnished them with

political shelter.¹⁷ Between 1896¹⁴⁴ and 1914 solidarisme was the doctrinally fragile program of piece-meal economic and social reform of the Radical (later the Radical-Socialist) Party. One historian has called it the official creed of the French government in the period prior to World War I.¹⁸ Unwilling to accept class warfare as it was practiced by bourgeois and Marxist alike, the Radicals urged the transformation of political democracy into social democracy by the use of the power of the state to encourage trade unions, cooperatives and educational and friendly societies. They advocated maximum hours legislation, the regulation of working conditions and minimum insurance programs for workers, as well as the progressive income tax. Alain was one of the leading spokesmen for the Radical party. He contributed a regular column in the Rouen Radical newspaper for years. Bouglé was deeply involved in the solidariste movement, and ran for the Chamber of Deputies against Halévy's advice.

Halévy did not participate in Radical solidarisme with Alain and Bouglé. He had a difficult time expressing his political attitudes by slogans of solidarity, and solidarisme was too fragile a doctrine to be more than a slogan. But he voted Bloc des Gauches though he was convinced that the candidates were moral and intellectual mediocrities.¹⁹ Jaurès's political style was more attractive than drab Radical politics, he wrote, but "I would like to die under a liberal and republican regime. Why doesn't Jaurès defend the Republic or better, why does he take such a complicated, revolutionary manner of defending it?"²⁰ He joked, "I remain non-socialist, republican, even Tammany. . . "; after all, the moral worth of the independents was too low for anyone to believe in them.²¹ In spite of the fact that he was genuinely sympathet-

tic to social problems, that he supported all of their reforms and that he agreed with them in wanting to separate social amelioration from the class-bound and ideology-ridden politics of the Republic, his antipathy to political life was too great for active participation. His moral principles and his realistic evaluation of the political temper told him that solidarisme was a dream and socialism was the reality.

Your [Bouglé's] program of liberal bismarckism is almost as utopian as his [Jaurès's]. His advantage over you is that there exists in France and in every country in Europe an organized socialist party while solidarisme only exists in the thinking of some French professors. In this sense, if your goal is to create a French solidariste party, you are more utopian than Jaurès.²²

Halévy might have felt at home with the solidaristes in their goals and their intentions. He admitted that he was always suspicious of class wars. "Because of civil war, class against class, the French Revolution was not the reform it wished to be. . . ." ²³ He agreed with the solidaristes that class warfare in France had made politics there a clash of rhetoric, a field day for demagogues, and little else. Questions of social reform, political democracy and elementary civil liberties had been lumped together, condemned and ignored by many of the political elite of the Third Republic. The solidaristes made the same criticisms of the socially callous policies of French political parties. Halévy held class strife partly responsible for the fact that in the preceding century so little had been done in his country to lessen the want of the many.

For all of his liberal skepticism in the period before the outbreak of the first World War Halévy seemed to be more hopeful for the future of democratic social reform and democratic society than he would ever be again. He thought that a new industrial society was emerging from within the confines of the old one and that there was hope of industrial

democracy if this new system loosened old class rigidities. He wrote at least one article for the Revue de Métaphysique in which he drew some hope that new political institutions might develop from recent trends in the economy. Later, he was to date his attempt to re-evaluate the nature of socialism at around 1910 when he began to question if he had not over-emphasized the illiberal aspects under the influence of the Webbs. But, in fact, that re-evaluation began several years before when he hoped that the new liberalism of Lloyd-George might reconcile socialism and liberalism.²⁴ He thought it was ridiculous for non-socialists to claim that the democratization of industrial society was impossible; new forms of industry and of association might develop. "In any case, one must avoid posing the same antithesis between liberty and socialism as was made forty or fifty years ago between liberty and democracy. Liberty universalized is democracy and when democracy universalized extends from the political to the economic domain, there is only one word to designate that--socialism."²⁵

Before the war Halévy, and men of liberal political opinions like him, avoided or tried to avoid any antithesis between liberty and socialism. His sense of socialism included social welfare measures and intervention of the state in the economy to regulate competition between big industry and big labor. At the close of an essay written in 1906 on "Saint-Simonian Economic Doctrine" a hopeful Halévy foresaw "a new industrial world emerging" in which economic competition would be more and more subjected to rules. The state would intervene to guarantee "to everyone the enjoyment of certain basic rights to a minimum of leisure, health, education and assistance." He, like the Saint-Simonians, looked on society "as an association, not for the abolition of competition, but

for its organization."²⁶

The actual politics of French socialists and socialist parties were unpromising, however, and for all his sympathy for attempts to solve the social question and ameliorate working-class discontent he could not respect the actions of socialist leadership. "Socialists" aspired to universal human freedom but proposed programs which could only end in the greater regimentation of life and the bureaucratization of society. Perhaps their ultimate end was emancipation but Halévy had little sympathy for arguments of ultimate ends. In the present, in the world of political means, the political reality of France, at least before the outburst of labor violence and repression around 1910, was such that socialist leaders actually resisted reform and refused to accept the task of rationalizing industrial practices and organization. Yet a democratic reorganization was essential to the real improvement of the lives of French workingmen.

Halévy thought that the merely verbal and utopian character of socialist demands betrayed a preference for leading a mob rather than educating a people or reorganizing an economy. This opinion was forcefully stated in his exchange with a socialist, Victor Basch.²⁷ The latter argued that there must be a total and drastic change of France before true democracy could be achieved. He scorned the social laws of the Radical party for which he had voted in the Chamber, justifying his behavior on the grounds that pensions would produce an immediate improvement in the conditions of the working class and at the same time bankrupt and ruin the democratic regime in France. He added some intellectual musings on the decadence and degeneration of democracy in classic thinkers. The combination of opportunism and polarization

politics with a smattering of classical learning drew Halévy's fire as he took the floor to defend the democratic future, social legislation and the potential for social peace within the democratic future.²⁸

Halévy, whose own apprehensions for liberty and individualism in the democracy gave an almost stoic tone of resignation to his private thoughts, confided his disgust with Basch's vision of politics and his anguish that "we have come to this and that the French are as incapable as a hundred years ago of interesting themselves in the methodical organization and the progressive amelioration of the society that exists and which is a civilized society."²⁹

On the eve of the war Halévy was convinced that in France the socialists did not want a program of amelioration. They chose a program of nationalization because it was the easiest policy for the entire party, though he thought it a sterile one for France. Rather than devise specific pieces of legislation and participate in good faith in the political life of the nation the socialists advocated a single measure and total change. "All the effort that they [the socialists] ask is to elect a representative with a mandate to claim the socialization of the industrial regime and waiting the day when they can do that, they carry on relentless criticism of the abuses of the present regime."³⁰ Halévy concluded that the real objection to socialism was the political incapacity of the working classes in France, which were capable of no more than electing a revolutionary candidate or sacking a factory inspired more by an urge for revenge and a feeling of impotence than by any desire to reform society.³¹ If a new industrial world were to emerge, it would be the result of men who were capable of supporting those economic institutions which were preparing

for the future--the trade unions, co-operatives, and municipal and state-run social enterprises--and the socialist party leadership gave few signs of that capacity.

Once again the alternatives that faced France seemed to Halévy to be posed by England and by Germany. In England Labourites and Liberals had been able to make reforms and yet preserve the essence of parliamentary, democratic politics. In Germany the bureaucratic state system, the strength of which he had perceived in 1895, seemed to dominate even the socialist movement. This perception, the actual expression of the contradiction that he saw in socialism, remained the leitmotif of all his reflections on the subject. He frequently referred to the tendency in socialism to authority and to bureaucracy as the German way or German socialism, but the germ of the idea was there. There was an inherent contradiction between the socialist impulse to emancipate and their desire to control; the problem was how the conflict would be resolved. The war would convince him that socialism would ultimately end in bureaucracy and controls. Even before the war the thought frequently occurred to him that the future might make his concern for English liberalism and French republicanism beside the point.

What is socialism after all? In England what they call the Labour Party is a party of mutualistes and the principal theoreticians of socialism are the Webbs, thanks to whom I am being presented tomorrow evening to Balfour. All this scarcely resembles the social revolution that Griffuelhes dreams about--and Jaurès. For the historian, the French point of view is no doubt more amusing; but for the sociologists, the English point of view is without doubt more serious. But on the other hand at times I ask myself if England, with its 'liberal' method is not as demodée as France with its revolutionary phraseology. Everyone is looking to Germany anyway.³²

Halévy's prophetic and pessimistic moods in which he tried to ascertain the shape of the future--liberal democracy or authoritarianism did not dominate his pre-war thought. He tried to bring together in a scholarly fashion all the manifestations of modern socialism for his course at the Sciences Politiques. He said that he found it easy to approach the history of socialism through the study of ideas and he placed the ideologies within the context of contemporary liberal or conservative thought and events, just as he did his study of English thought and institutions. His scholarly work, such as his biography of Hodgskin or his essays on Saint-Simon or his foray into the economics of the redistribution of wealth, bore all the characteristics of his work, including a thorough knowledge of the sources and the period. He focused on the pre-Marxist origins of socialism and in a sense he restored the historical reputation of Marx's predecessors and contemporaries. As his observations came closer to his own time they became more and more concerned with the realities of trade unionism, of government intervention in the economy, of socialist internationals and of general trends in the socialist movements and in industrialized society in Western Europe. He ranged very wide and his definition of socialism was broad and relatively vague, broad enough and vague enough to include comment on all the above developments under the heading of socialism. After the war, Halévy's apprehension of class warfare and the authoritarian elements of socialism no longer occupied a secondary place in his thought on this subject. Eventually it dominated his thinking about contemporary history.

A glance at the Era of Tyrannies or the Histoire du socialisme européen indicates the somewhat unorthodox nature of his definition of

socialism. By any orthodox definition he included many ideas and men who are not generally considered socialist, and the orthodox--one might almost say the Marxian--definition of socialism, "utopian" or "scientific", dominates historical thinking on these questions. Halévy's definition was fashioned from liberal opinions, which were much more common at the turn of the century when he first began to write on questions of socialism than they were in 1936 when he still maintained them. For Halévy socialism was simply and broadly state activity in the economy and the economic life of its citizens.

Many of Halévy's contemporaries had just as inclusive a definition of socialism as he did: Sombart, for example, defined socialism merely as a critique or attack upon the capitalist system, "the intellectual embodiment of the modern social movement" to emancipate the proletarian class;³³ Ludwig von Mises in his polemical work, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, discussed much of the same diversity of movements under the general heading "Particular forms of socialism and pseudo-socialism."³⁴ But to most contemporary socialists it was surely contradictory, if not wrong-headed, for Halévy to include Bismarck and Napoleon III and Tory social reformers together with socialist theorists and party leaders, utopian or Marxist. In keeping with his broad sense of socialism Halévy included, in the first half of his course on European socialism, a number of economic theoreticians who were anti-capitalists (for example, the German historicists) or who were critical of utilitarian social policy (like the English Tory reformers or the Chartists).³⁵

This Halévyan sense of "socialism" was evident in his very early work from the period 1900 to 1903. He held to his definition of

socialism throughout his life though his course became "less and less a course in the history of ideas and more and more a course in straight history."³⁶ Halévy's working definition of socialism followed the description that he gave in his course outline: "An economic doctrine above all, modern socialism affirms that it is possible to replace the free initiative of individuals by the concerted action of groups in the production and distribution of wealth."³⁷ Halévy and Charles Andler, the noted French Marx scholar and Halévy's friend, contributed a formal definition for the "Vocabulaire technique et critique" of the Société française de philosophie³⁸ which differed in emphasis but did not add nor delete any of the movements or thinkers that Halévy included in his course. For the "Vocabulaire" socialism was "the doctrine according to which one could not count on the free play of individual interests and initiatives in economic matters to assure a satisfactory social order. Therefore, it was judged desirable to substitute for the actual organization, a concerted organization which would lead to results not only more equitable but more favorable to the fullest development of the human personality."³⁹

Of the many doctrines aptly called socialist, Halévy and Andler distinguished among them on the basis of three separate criteria: (1) those which repudiated free trade but which also rejected the use of public power to constrain individuals economically (including free associations, mutuellisme, collectivism, anarchist communism, contemporary cooperatives), and those which would utilize either the democratic or bureaucratic forms of state power (municipal and state socialism); (2) those which believed socialism might be established legally and without violence (evolutionist or reformist), and those

which asserted a new economic order could only be established by force or revolution; (3) utopian socialists who proposed to describe the particular form of the future socialist state, and socialists without programs such as Sorel's syndicalism and anarcho-syndicalism.⁴⁰ In addition to these he distinguished between the democratic and aristocratic impetus to state action. This was a basic and explicit distinction in all his thinking on this subject that there were non-democratic, paternalistic organizing forces making for socialism just as there were democratic ones. By the aristocratic impetus he meant to include the bureaucratic or paternalistic statist, for example, Rodbertus, Carlyle, Adolph Wagner, who contributed to a theory of state paternalism by their criticism of individualism and laissez-faire capitalism.⁴¹

The contrast between Halévy's approach to socialism and that of Andler was vividly expressed in a note that the latter appended to the definition. Andler thought democratic theory, which had its origin in the defense of the individual against collective oppression, was both emancipating and destructive. The true socialists, he said, aspired to more than the defense of the individual or the equitable remuneration of his work (i.e., to more than liberty or equality); the socialist's goal of fraternity was a positive affirmation of liberty, not merely a negative one. Andler's stress on "positive" liberty was common among French socialists at the time; he shared it with Lucien Herr and with Jean Jaurès. This emphasis on fraternity was the vital humanist impulse to Andler's Marxism, an impulse drawn as much from the Saint-Simonian and German idealist currents as it was from the positivist Marxism that was propagated in that era. Halévy's ideal of individual liberty did not require transcending political and economic justice to an affirma-

tion of fraternity--the tone of this discussion sounded to him like the organization of enthusiasm--and he was much more concerned with the inherent contradiction in socialism between liberty and authority than Andler was.

* * *

From the very beginning Halévy made Marx's historic role the center of his thinking about socialism and the heart of his course.⁴² "It was not to its originality but to its historic role that Marxism owes its importance," he wrote, sounding his theme.⁴³ It also recalled the persistent problem in his work at that period, the problem of explaining the appeal of a doctrine which was not original and which was, in many ways, constructed on faulty assumptions. Halévy made major contributions to our understanding of pre-Marxist socialist thought, but he did not underestimate the power of Marxism in modern socialism. The historic role, the prestige of Marxism, was so great that all revolutionary parties traced their origins to Marx's thought, even those who, like the revolutionary syndicalists, were very far from his thought.⁴⁴ Marxism had become so much a synonym for socialism that it had been forgotten that there had been socialists in France and England before Karl Marx had begun to write. Though Halévy had himself spent the greatest part of his scholarly work on socialism

reviving some memory of the pre-Marxians, he did not think that he and other scholars had lessened the identification of socialism with Marxism in public opinion or even in the minds of the intelligentsia.⁴⁵

For Halévy, Das Kapital was not a point of departure but a point of arrival. With it the history of the ideology of socialism was finished. Marx organized socialist ideology into a "system of genius," an incomparable doctrine for propaganda that was drawn from the English and French social critics, from Hodgskin, Proudhon, Sismondi, Pecqueur, Saint-Simon and Owen. After Kapital, Halévy said, "there is nothing more than the political history of socialism."⁴⁶ True to this thesis Halévy shifted, in discussing the period after Marx, from questions of doctrine to the development of labor movements, socialist parties and state economic activity. This emphasis was faithfully recorded in the Histoire du socialisme européen when his friends compiled it.

One of the difficulties of dealing with Halévy's treatment of socialism is that he has left no extended discussion of Marx whose thought he believed dominated socialism. All that has survived of his interpretation of Marx is a discussion with Sorel on historical materialism and the four chapters on Marx in the Histoire, two of which date from the earliest period of his career. His interpretation in the two early lectures can be drawn from his discussion with Sorel, from his small volume on Hodgskin and from his essay on the distribution of wealth.⁴⁷ His approach to the theory of value was acknowledged by the editors to have been totally different from the way in which he taught the same subject in the 1930s and he would no doubt have revised it had he lived to finish the book. It is difficult to date the writing of the other two chapters.⁴⁸

Halévy was convinced that the power of Marxist doctrine lay in its philosophy of history, which was Germanic and Hegelian, and not in its faulty economic analysis. He was skeptical about the Hegelian dialectical apparatus with which Marx surrounded his labor theory of value--after all, Hodgskin had arrived there first without benefit of Hegel's guidance. But this view did not lead Halévy to underplay the influence of the German philosophical milieu on the young Marx or on German socialism.⁴⁹ He stressed the historical and economic thought as much as the philosophical polemics of the Right and Left Hegelians. He wrote to Bouglé on reading Hegel's Philosophy of Right that "all contemporary German civilization is founded in it."⁵⁰ Raymond Aron, who knew Halévy well in the 1930s, judges that he would not have been "very much interested in the philosophical subtleties" of the Hegelian origins of Marx's thought⁵¹ which he suspects Halévy would have thought tended to obscure the essential reality of Marx. In fact, the younger Halévy had been very much interested in just those subtleties, but the Halévy whom Aron knew in the 1930s would have had little patience with philosophical discussion of the early and late Marx. By then Halévy was preoccupied with the realities of state power that he had not conceived in his most pessimistic apprehensions of the authoritarian tendency in socialism.

Halévy believed the philosophic Marx was the economic Marx just as he believed that the economic critique of capitalism and of industrialization was the distinctive feature of socialism. He accepted the view that Marx, though a critic of Ricardo, shared the latter's psychology in that both men ultimately accepted the egotistic motive, or more exactly the economic motive, the desire to appropriate

wealth as the fundamental motive force of humanity. This view of Marx coincided with the Marxism that dominated socialist thought in the period of Halévy's investigations and teaching, the Marxism that is today sometimes designated as the "positivist Marx" or "late Marx." He thought that Marx had introduced an element of change into Ricardo's basically static psychology by stressing that the egotistical motive, in order to satisfy its wants, employs and modifies the instruments of work without ceasing. But the significance of Marx's critique and its distinguishing characteristic lay in the fact that he maintained a materialist conception of history which saw in the evolution "of the forms of production the necessary and sufficient condition of the total evolution of the human race."⁵²

Halévy's attitude toward historical materialism emerges most clearly in his exchange with Georges Sorel at the Société Française de Philosophie in 1902. Sorel was the leading spokesman for a new movement among French and Italian intellectual socialists which was responding to specific conditions in their respective labor movements, to the revisionist critique of Marxism, and to the vitalist philosophy of Henri Bergson. Daniel Halévy could be counted in this movement. These intellectual socialists were in the process of re-examining their ideological heritage. Sorel was much impressed by Benedetto Croce's interpretation of historical materialism because he found the stress on Marx's metaphysical roots intellectually emancipating.⁵³ In the conference Halévy's position was an ironic one in that he, the "liberal," found himself defining the "orthodox" Marxist viewpoint against a number of interpreters of Marx who thought themselves "Marxists."

Sorel proposed a definition of "historical materialism" which emphasized the role of ideas or propaganda in the shaping of the consciousness of the working class.⁵⁴ He argued that Marx and Engels had never given a systematic exposition of historical materialism and that their successors must treat it, not as a dead doctrine reducible to abstract theses, but as a living attitude of mind of the men who were part of the social movement. The paradoxical nature of Marx's antitheses, which were tossed off in the heat of polemical battle, no longer gave the correct expression of his thought. Sorel thought that the essence of Marx's teaching was the propagation of the socialist idea, that the class struggle would not exist without ideas to "ennoble the struggles of the workers!"⁵⁵

Halévy countered him sharply, arguing that Marx had, in fact, presented in Capital a monistic explication of the consciousness of a class in terms of the material and/or economic conditions of life.⁵⁶ Marx and Engels gave definite expositions of historical materialism, according to which the evolution of the forms of production and exchange is the necessary and sufficient condition of the juridical, political, moral, and religious evolution of mankind. Sorel's philosophy of history was not that of Marx, though he might think that it was. His stress on the "solidarity" of theory and practice reversed the relationship between the two that Marx described. Halévy objected that Sorel's emphasis on an equal and reciprocal action between the elements--the spiritual and material, the theoretical and the practical--would have been inconceivable for Marx. Sorel's use of the concepts "theory" and "practice" made them the exact reverse of Marx's meaning. Halévy agreed that Marx and Engels were men of action and

champions of party, but the combing of texts of political and ephemeral writings to justify Sorel's stress on the activism of "revolutionary consciousness" was dangerous and not true to Marx, the philosopher. The realities of socialist politics of Marx's time might explain his bias toward the language of action which "is almost necessarily the language of spiritualism and of arbitrary freedom";⁵⁷ but among scholars surely Marx should be taken at his word in his most systematic and philosophical exposition, i.e. Das Kapital. Halévy thought it was intellectually dishonest for serious men to "revise" this fundamental principle of Marxism as if they were merely interpreting Marx.

If Marx's historical materialism were wrong--and Halévy spent a great part of his life and historical work proving or trying to prove that it was wrong--then the Marxist system was wrong. Other parts of it might be true; it might hold powerful sway over the minds of men. But the whole could not be said to be a science of society, which was exactly the claim made for it by Marxists. Halévy thought that the intellectual refutation of Marxist political economy would not reduce in any major way the impact of Marxist ideology. The incomparable propaganda potential of Marxism rested much more on its philosophy of history than upon its economics, which were peripheral to it from the very beginning.⁵⁸ Its potential as an activist movement rested on its fatalist or determinist philosophy of history which described the evolution of industrial society and predicted its inevitable end.⁵⁹

Given Halévy's interpretation that Marx was a powerful systematizer of the social and economic thought of others and his sense that Marxism was much more a powerful ideology than a contribution to our social thought, one ought not to be surprised that the works that he

published on socialist topics deal with the origins of socialism. Before World War I he published works on Thomas Hodgskin and Saint-Simon, an essay on the redistribution of wealth, and made extensive inquiries into industrialization and unionization in England and France and the response of intellectuals to it. After the war he continued his work in the origins of the doctrine and the history of labor and socialist movements. His estimation of Marx's indebtedness did not vary nor of the domination of socialist movements by Marxist ideology but his judgment of the full implications of the critique of capitalism grew more pessimistic across the years. His view that socialism did not necessarily or logically end in Marxism was superseded by a realization that the economic, political and social realities of modern industrial society, especially arising from the war, might reinforce the ideological power of Marxism. As he posed it the question of socialism was: "Are there in modern society forces that push toward the dehumanization, toward socialization of economic production? If there are not and to the degree that there are not, then socialism is false. If there are and to the degree that there are, then socialism is true."⁶⁰ As long as socialism was "a social fact," a genuine response to the very real conditions of modern industrial society, then Marxist ideology could serve an activist movement.

The pre-Marxist origins of socialism were critical in Halévy's thought, but he drew away from the popular view, which was made even more popular at the time by the socialist-Dreyfusard alliance, that socialism was left-wing republicanism. Several historians of socialist thought trace the Marxian antecedents to the French revolution and in

a number of cases to the socialist legacy of the eighteenth century in Rousseau, Morelly and Mably.⁶¹ One might have expected Halévy would do so in view of the fact that his original interest in English political and economic thought was that it was an opportunity to study the reformist impact in England of revolutionary French ideas. But Halévy began his course with the period of 1815-48 because he regarded modern socialism as an economic doctrine originating, above all, in the industrial revolution and the poverty which accompanied it. Socialism hoped to resolve "the paradox of the modern world--the pauperism which was born in mechanization."⁶² ". . . [M]odern socialism is an historically original phenomenon . . . [differing] profoundly from ancient conceptions which seem to us today to be more or less socialist."⁶³

Halévy, like Durkheim, excluded eighteenth century social doctrines as primarily agrarian in spirit, more "communist" because more closely linked with the "ancients" than with the "moderns." The emphasis of the "communists" on social harmony through a moral change in the individual meant that the economy was a peripheral concern rather than the heart of society. Unlike Durkheim who tended to separate moral responses from socialist activity altogether, Halévy included thinkers whose response to industrialization was primarily moral (for example, Carlyle and Ruskin). His line of division was whether their quarrel was with industrialization or with human nature

Halévy did, however, see a profound influence of the French revolutionary tradition on socialism, although not on socialist doctrines. A number of republican characteristics which were not

inherently or logically socialist had been joined by historical circumstances to the socialist tradition. For example, the egalitarianism of the Jacobins of 1793, which might or might not be socialist, had stimulated socialism. Or the revolutionary spirit arising from the fact that mankind could move quickly and totally from one regime to another animated the socialist impulse as well as the republican. Republican rationalism inspired socialism with the belief that the age of reason was at hand. Finally, revolutionary internationalism found new strength in socialist propaganda.⁶⁴ However, Halévy stressed the point that none of these principles of '89 was irrevocably or inherently a part of the socialist tradition.⁶⁵ There were socialists who were not egalitarian, notably Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier. Christian socialism, which preached a corporativism based on an idealized Middle Ages (in itself a reaction against the Revolution) certainly was not rationalist in its outlook. There was, and perhaps would always be, a current of socialist thought as nationalistic as it was socialist; certainly state socialism was strictly national and deliberately reacted against the radical internationalism of 1789. No one of the elements of the Jacobin tradition was a fundamental tenet of socialism. The single most powerful characteristic of socialism was its negative reaction to industrialization.

Halévy's first work on a socialist thinker was a short study of a contemporary of Bentham and is almost a direct, chronological narrative of Thomas Hodgskin's life and ideas, containing long extracts from works that were unavailable. This, the first work that he published on a socialist topic, developed almost as an aside from his study of the utilitarians. His first enthusiasm for the eccentric working-class Radical, Thomas Hodgskin, whom Halévy believed to have invented the Marxist theory of surplus value. The weight of the argument placed this book squarely in the line of Philosophic Radicalism.

Originally Halévy intended a hundred pages or so of homage to this forgotten worthy, but when the "short notice" was finished it was too long and too diverse for a journal.⁶⁶ The forgotten man, who made the same criticism of Ricardo that Marx would make and the same critique of Bentham that Halévy would make, assumed an importance great enough for the French scholar to write a full-length study. It was a period of immense activity for Halévy: he was in the middle of his third Bentham volume, which he was rushing because Leslie Stephen had just published his English Utilitarians.⁶⁷ He had just married, was preparing his course on socialist thought for the Sciences Politiques, editing the Revue de Métaphysique and participating regularly in the Société Française de Philosophie. At the same time, he wanted to make a study of the nature of the "English religious mind," "a study on the reciprocal relation of beliefs and social forms,"⁶⁸ centering on the Methodists. He had gathered materials for the Methodist study for some time and he regretted postponing it. Yet he put it off to write this book.

Hodgskin was important to Halévy because he was a man whose

socialist thought was libertarian and individualist rather than étatist or collectivist. Hodgskin was, after all, a radical anarchist, as much the precursor of Spencer as of Marx, and he was the vigorous opponent of the authoritarian strain in Benthamism. He was one of the progenitors of English socialism but in his thought there was little family resemblance to the statist programs of such British socialists as Sidney and Beatrice Webb.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Hodgskin intrigued Halévy because his thinking focused on many of the same problems that Bentham's did, on vital questions of reform, the economy, crime and punishment, and yet his answers differed markedly from those of his utilitarian friends. Hodgskin began his work in the search for a philosophical justification of the right to punish and ended by denying the efficacy and the right of punishment and thus the rationale of legislation. He called into question, in short, the basic assumption of the Benthamite calculus and the utilitarian movement.⁷⁰

Hodgskin was the first man to point out the equivocal nature of Benthamite thought which Halévy believed to be fundamental to the understanding of English utilitarianism and social reform. Benthamism was equivocal in that it combined authoritarian and libertarian strands, the benevolent legislator with the "invisible hand" of laissez-faire economics and the optimism of the natural harmony of interests of Smith with the pessimism of Malthus and Ricardo. Beginning with the libertarian aspect of Benthamite thought, which owed much to Godwin and to Adam Smith, Hodgskin developed its logical conclusions on progress and on law, economics and society. Accepting the thesis of a natural harmony of interests, Hodgskin concluded that there was no need for positive law, nor for that matter, for government. He merely

extended the Benthamite explanation of the origin of "sinister" laws, that they defended private interests to all laws.⁷¹ If Benthamites attacked monarchical and aristocratic systems of government in order to propose parliamentary democracy, as in James Mill's Essay on Government, Hodgskin carried the logic of the argument a step further and denied any need for delegates.⁷² Similarly Halévy pointed out that Hodgskin took his political economy from the Ricardian labor theory of value with which Ricardians justified profit and applied it literally and logically to emerge with an egalitarian doctrine.⁷³ The fundamental characteristic of Malthusianism, as of Benthamism, was a belief in the inevitable persistence of poverty because the limitless growth of population could not be matched by the productivity of land. But Hodgskin's optimistic faith in the natural harmony led him to believe that "as men increase and multiply, there is a constant, natural and necessary tendency to an increase in their knowledge and consequently in their productive power."⁷⁴

Hodgskin's rejection of Benthamite general principles rested on the necessary identification of interests by the supreme legislator or legislature. Hodgskin condemned Bentham and Mill for refusing to admit the existence of natural rights and for positing that law and the law-giver give rights their significance. Hodgskin accused them of having lifted

legislation beyond our reach and secure[d] it from censure. Man, having naturally no rights, may be experimented on imprisoned, expatriated or even exterminated, as the legislator pleases.... Filmer's doctrine of the divine right of kings was rational benevolence, compared to the monstrous assertion that 'all right is factitious, and only exists by the will of the law-maker.'⁷⁵

Hodgskin's critique of Benthamism clearly posed the inherent difficulty in reform through the agency of the beneficent legislator or admini-

strator. If individuals had no fundamental rights which would remain inviolate, what would protect the individual and all his differences from the reformers' passion for organization?

Halévy thought that historians erred when they reduced Hodgskin merely to a predecessor of Marx. The founder of the Mechanics Institute was not merely a man who missed his opportunity to become "the theorist of the nascent English socialist movement."⁷⁶ As Halévy saw him Hodgskin was a libertarian socialist whose practical program did not differ much from Ricardian laissez-faire. Hodgskin's anti-capitalism was subordinated to his anarchism.⁷⁷ "He was the first--before Herbert Spencer--to found a free trade philosophy on the criticism of the Benthamite philosophy of law."⁷⁸ Halévy emphasized that Hodgskin always fought against every intervention of government and of law, but especially he opposed such interference in the distribution of wealth. He rejected the "communism" of Owen, Saint-Simon or the Moravians because it merely continued the rights of property in other forms.⁷⁹ But he and Percy Ravenstone had made the critique of the "fetishism" of the economics of Mill and MacCulloch that Marx would borrow. In this respect Hodgskin was Marx's teacher.

That the English "socialist" tradition developed from such unlikely origins as Hodgskin was one of Elie Halévy's pet paradoxes. It was not possible to consider English socialism simply as a branch of Marxism.⁸⁰ Though Marxism dominated socialist movements at the end of the nineteenth century to the point that Halévy would argue for the centrality of Marx, he refused to consider the socialism of any European movement as nothing more than a simple branch of Marxism. But the English labor movement had not succumbed even to the degree

of Marxist domination that characterized European parties. The profound differences between English and continental socialists were symbolized by the importance of Ruskin, whose first impulse toward "socialism" was religious and aesthetic and humanitarian roots of socialism in England were deep and numerous.⁸¹

It has been said that Halévy was anxious to show Marx's indebtedness to Hodgskin, not in order to belittle Marx's scholarly honesty but to show that because Hodgskin's theories were unsound perhaps Marx's were as well.⁸² The question for Halévy was a greater one than the truth or falsity of Marx's teaching, which could be better handled in philosophical, non-historical discussion. Halévy's interest was rather in the peculiar drawing together here, as in Benthamism, of divergent elements of thought, elements which incorporated biases or prejudices in defiance of logic and yet molded them into powerful doctrines. Why did Marx and Marxism define capitalist economic production according to Ricardian labor theory long after other economists had rejected that theory? The answer to Halévy's question lay in the realm of the history of ideas rather than in the ideas themselves. It was the active propoaganda and the simplicity of the teaching of "an intransigent group of Ricardo's principles"⁸³ which fixed the labor theory on the Marxists. Halévy pointed to the fact that historically, the working-class theorists, the democratic opponents of Mill and MacCulloch, had seized the Ricardian theory of value and refuted it, and along with it Ricardo's political economy, by a form of reductio ad absurdum. Marx had adopted their tactic; "Marx was the victim of a universal obsession of the generation that preceeded him."⁸⁴

Halévy's general problem in Thomas Hodgskin was the same as in

the Growth of Philosophic Radicalism--the influence of a doctrine in history. It was a problem in the history of ideas, just as Benthamism was, and all the more problematic because the body of ideas was based on an economic fallacy. The important question with respect to ideology was neither its originality nor its validity. Hodgskin and Pecqueur were original thinkers but the historic role was Marx's. The answer to the problem of the success of an ideology, in this case of socialism, lay in the history of ideas, in the conditions and the social ethic of contemporaries. Halévy indicated this to Bouglé:

I read Pecqueur. Have you read Pecqueur? All that Marx wrote on capitalist concentration was copied from Pecqueur. The success is a mystery. Because, why does the worth of the theory return, and will it always return, to Marx? I have tried imperfectly to resolve a problem of the same genre with Bentham. [*Italics mine.*]

But other than explaining the successes and failures of doctrines, the fascination for Halévy with the ideas of this period was the relationship between liberal and socialist theories and the peculiar joining of contradictory tendencies in socialism and in liberalism.

* * *

Halévy was intrigued by the revolutionary period between 1780 and 1848. In it he found that origins common to socialism and liberalism in response to social and political problems. He found common and conflicting tenets held together more by belief and emotional commit-

ments than by rigorous logic. He thought the contradictions were pregnant with implications for the ideological and historical development of those movements. This was especially the case for the socialism of Saint-Simon, from which he drew his deepest insights--on might say his premonitions--into the nature of socialism and of modern society. Halévy wrote on Saint-Simon on two different occasions: first, in 1907-8, two essays on Saint-Simon's economic doctrine, essays which he had planned since at least 1902, and later, after the war in 1924, in the introduction to an edition of la Doctrine de Saint-Simon.⁸⁶

In the first essays, Halévy confined his subject to Saint-Simonian economic doctrines, which in itself was a decision to rescue the historical Saint-Simonian teachings from the two generations of oblivion or misrepresentation they had suffered. Charles Andler had just verified the Saint-Simonian origins of Marxist doctrine in his introduction to his translation of the Communist Manifesto which enabled Halévy to restrict himself to the origins of Saint-Simonianism. Contrary to Marxist polemics which dismissed Saint-Simon as utopian, Halévy found that his economic thought had evolved from liberal reformism, classical economics, and specific administrative schemes of the Napoleonic and Restoration regimes; they were, in short, very much a reflection of the period in which they developed and not the half-baked notions they were popularly held to be.⁸⁷ Once again Halévy returned to the era of Bentham and Hodgskin, to the "early years of the century when, in the words of Saint-Simon himself, 'the Revolution had made Frenchmen enthusiastic about politics.'"⁸⁸ He traced the gradual evolution of Saint-Simon's thought from basically

liberal precepts to an implicit socialism before his death in 1825. In the second essay Halévy followed the doctrine in the hands of Saint-Simon's followers until they preached a "complete socialism."

Halévy's point in the first essay was that the liberals associated with Censeur européen and the Saint-Simonians of L'Industrie shared a common view of history, politics and economics and that they remained unaware of the one vital area in which they did part intellectual company. That was the area of social reorganization. To the liberal it meant the suppression of privileges and corporations to make it possible for the individual and the economy to be free. To Saint-Simon social reorganization meant replacing the political and military leaders of his society with its true leaders, the men he called industriels.

To Halévy the authoritarian elements that came to dominate Saint-Simon's system followed naturally from his goal of social organization. The industriels, who included writers, intellectuals, philosophers, scientists, as well as entrepreneurs and financiers, would administer government and the economy. Politics would no longer dominate society and the goal would be increased production and the rationalization of society.⁸⁹ Of course, these fundamentally economic goals that Halévy stressed were only an aspect of Saint-Simon's total picture of society and its evolution, but in these essays his focus on socialism narrowed the scope of his consideration of Saint-Simon. Halévy's focus enabled him to omit the mystical, Christian or religious foundation of Saint-Simonian thought. There is some discussion of the influence of the theocratic school on the prophet's authoritarian bent but little beyond. It is clear from Halévy's other treatments--the Saint-Simon

anniversary, the history of European socialism and the edition of La Doctrine de Saint-Simon--that this element of Saint-Simonianism was no more congenial to Halévy than it had been to his grandfather.

Halévy's main point was that Saint-Simon's doctrine was not an explicit socialism; that, perhaps without his knowledge, his system rested on a principle which was opposed to the fundamental principles of classical political economics, which he still considered his own. Others had affirmed a socialist principle without adhering to socialism. Hodgskin, a working-class democrat whose political thinking was anarchist, had devised the labor theory of value that Marx would use, but he was not a socialist, not even a utopian one. But in Saint-Simonian doctrine there were "latent" elements of socialism; for example, his willingness to use the powers of the government to "industrialize the constitution," "to bring about a transfer of property favorable to the growth of production."⁹⁰ Industrial society, as Saint-Simon conceived it, was a hierarchy of functions, in which each member was rewarded according to his rank. His rank was to be determined by his "producing" ability; he was to be chosen by co-optation rather than by election. Saint-Simon was no democrat. He thought popular sovereignty to be merely a "negative" revolutionary idea with which to destroy the evils of the ancien regime.⁹¹

But modern socialism is an essentially democratic doctrine, Halévy reasoned, and one would have to conclude that Saint-Simonianism was as little socialist as it was liberal "unless, at the same time, it [was] opposed on equally essential points to the social doctrines of Adam Smith and J.B. Say."⁹² Saint-Simon regarded economic phenomena from the standpoint of the producer rather than the consumer who,

by a definition borrowed from the physiocrats, was non-productive, consuming the labor of others. He understood competition as competition for the distribution of ranks and rewards, which more faithfully reflected contemporary French society than Adam Smith's ideal of free commercial competition. For Smith the egoism of individuals would bring about the harmony of interests, but for Saint-Simon professional emulation, the force of moral sentiment or social enthusiasm or some form of religious sentiment was essential to the creation of a harmonious and "positive" society.

As Halévy saw it, Saint-Simon's implicit "socialism" played a unique role in the history of modern socialism because it grew almost imperceptibly out of liberal doctrine.⁹³ Saint-Simon's vision of a central organization of industrial labor and a planned distribution of social wealth was fundamentally socialist and it was his original contribution to social thought.

Halévy's interpretation that the germs of socialist doctrine were present in Saint-Simon's thinking broke with the common opinion of his time. Generally, the disciples were held responsible for turning Saint-Simonianism into "socialism," but Halévy thought the Saint-Simonians were responsible for condensing and systematizing the doctrine rather than for contributing its socialist elements. They had refined Saint-Simon's philosophy of history, positing a progressive view in which the human race inevitably evolved from disparity to unity, from the exploitation of one another to the subjugation of nature. In order to facilitate the industrial development of the world that Saint-Simon envisioned, they proposed to restructure the economic and social institutions of man. To make property as socially

productive as possible they sought to alter the laws governing interest and inheritance.⁹⁴

Halévy pointed out that the Saint-Simonian principle of reward as it was understood in the twentieth century--"from each according to his capacity; to each according to his work"--was not an exact rendition of the doctrine of the disciples. Bazard and Enfantin, the leading Saint-Simonians, recognized the right of the individual to consume freely the value created by his own labor but not the right to command another's labor or to be idle. The only right conferred in the formula was the management, use and exploitation of property, the use of tools, the right to work, but not the right to enjoyment of the produce. Their meaning was evident when they said:

Since everyone is rewarded according to his function, what today is called income is no more than a stipend or a pension. An industriel no more owns a firm, workers and equipment than a colonel today owns a barracks, soldiers, and arms; yet everyone works enthusiastically because the man who produces can love glory and can have a sense of honor as well as the man who destroys.⁹⁵

Halévy's contemporaries assumed that an inequality of function necessarily created an inequality of needs. But the latter inequality ran counter to the Saint-Simonian prophecy of a future in which all antagonisms were suppressed through a world association of individuals who fulfilled tasks that were not so much unequal as they were different. If everyone had learned to love the occupation that he had chosen, why was there a need to add "to each according to his work"? Halévy answered that Saint-Simonian thinking was a profound change in the idea of competition, but his disciples did not believe they could eliminate competition altogether. Their hope was that in the future competition would be in "things" and not in persons; competition would

turn man against nature to subdue it for the benefit of all mankind, not man against man for private profit.

In Halévy's critical estimation the exposition in La Doctrine de Saint-Simon was the most faithful representation of the thought of the group and their master as it had crystallized in 1825-29, following Saint-Simon's death and just prior to the emergence of Enfantin as the new Messiah.⁹⁶ He thought this period the most fertile and inventive one for French socialist doctrines. During these years the Saint-Simonians presented a new definition of the state as a government of things and not persons, a new sense of property as something which must be socially useful and must be utilized by those individuals or classes capable of exploiting it for the public good, and a new idea of religion as the expression of the collective idea of a people, an ideal which united men with or without a belief in a deity.

Halévy thought the Saint-Simonian critique of competition was prophetic. Classical economists, he said, were right to make the idea of competition central to political economy, but they were certainly wrong to believe that it was a simple idea. Competition could be beneficial as well as harmful. Above all, "economic competition presupposes rules; it is not the same thing as the struggle for survival that assures the victory of the strong by the brutal extermination of the weak; it precludes violence; it even precludes fraud."⁹⁷ He thought the Saint-Simonians had wisely seen that the "unlimited competition" of European industry of their time was a transitory stage. The Saint-Simonians had foreseen the growing syndicalization or cartelization of industry developing after that transitory period. Finally, they had predicted the steady growth of the public sector of the

economy.

Halévy concluded his evaluation of the Saint-Simonians with a prophecy of his own of a new industrial world with new rules to regulate competition and to ensure cooperation or the organization of competition.⁹⁸ He took some hope from the fact that without governmental intervention institutions were developing which might be the making of a new industrial world. This, he said, had been one of the blind spots of the Saint-Simonians: they had not foreseen the democratization of industrial production along with its concentration; they had not been concerned that the state which performed increasing public services would be democratic; they had foreseen the cartel but not the trade union. In those hopeful days before the war Halévy thought the remedy for the possible degeneration of the system lay in its democratization, which was taking place, not as the result of state control but of state regulation. Democracy pressured the state to regulate for the public good the competition of gigantic industry with giant labor.

After the war Halévy's interpretation of Saint-Simon, as well as his attitude toward socialism, shifted. Whereas before the war he had been hopeful for the democratic potential of socialism, afterwards he realized if any form of socialism had been strengthened by the war it was the socialism of controls and statism. Saint-Simon seemed all the more relevant to post-war problems, but the statist implications dominated the democratic ones and the virtues of the rationalization of industry paled before the tendency to excessive control. He also thought he saw the decline of the liberals to an intermediate position between two conflicting movements both of which would strengthen the

power of the state--"Caesarist étatisme and democratic étatisme"--a corporation with capitalistic and Christian tendencies and a syndicalism with emancipationist elements.⁹⁹

Halévy was not the only one who re-thought Saint-Simon after the war. There was a vogue of Saint-Simon among intellectuals in Germany and France where he was seen as the prophet of technocratic revolution, of a restructured economy which would alter the political and social system. There were many books and articles on "technocracy," "industrialisme," and Saint-Simonian schemes for economic growth and redistribution of wealth through banking and credit.¹⁰⁰ In both countries there was a certain practical interest stimulated by the fact that the organization of industries into federations, such as le Comité des Forges or the Confédération Générale de la Production Française, to control contracts, fix prices and regulate labor relations seemed to fulfill some of Saint-Simon's predictions. In England there were similar industry-wide experiments to reduce home competition.¹⁰¹

Halévy wrote several articles in which he examined British attempts to insure social peace and the changes in economic and political structure that had taken place during the war.¹⁰² What he saw convinced him that the movement for "industrial democracy" or "worker control" was destined to fade away because it did not "correspond to the deep needs of the proletariat in large-scale industry."¹⁰³ Nor did management flirtations with "neo-Saint-Simonianism" contribute to worker control, at least not as then conceived. The aims of the working classes were the improvement of working conditions and their standard of living; they were not interested in running firms, or

improving productivity or cornering a market by protection or any other scheme that management had in mind. These activities minimized the legitimate and separate interests of the workers. Worker-management organizations would only contribute to the workers' uneasiness and discontent and end by depriving them of their spokesmen. Although in Germany, France, and Italy the question of worker control of industry was a part of militant trade unionist demands in the 1920s, and in spite of the fact that the Tenth Party Congress in Russia (1921) had faced the demand by the Workers' Opposition for worker control, Halévy thought that the movement was merely transient, reflecting worker resentment of wartime controls and the lag in real wages. A policy of taxing the rich to protect the workers' standard of living would undoubtedly have satisfied working class voters' demands had not the cost of living continually risen, thus eluding their legitimate pursuit of a share of the prosperity.

Halévy did not incorporate his observations into his only post-war publication related to Saint-Simon. He chose instead to make general observations about the seeds of authoritarianism in the origins of socialism in the edition of *La Doctrine de Saint-Simon* which he published in 1924 at the very moment that he was making his studies of worker-management sociology. Actually, he only published two long essays on pre-Marxist socialist thinkers after the war: one, this introduction; the other, a short biography and study of Sismondi which both placed him in the context of classical political economy, and drew a parallel to the crisis of overproduction/underconsumption that Halévy predicted would be produced by the war's speed up of the industrialization of belligerents. Both essays contain the results of

Halévy's reflection on the connection of socialism with war which would come to fruition in "the World Crisis" and the "Era of Tyrannies."

When Halévy returned to Saint-Simon, he saw in his socialism the germs of twentieth-century politics of the Right and the Left. He stressed the breadth of his political influence which fed two quite different streams of social thought--the social conservatism of Comte and Littre and the revolutionary schema of Marx. Saint-Simonianism had left its traces everywhere. "Hardly a party or an ideology had not borrowed something from the doctrine, or at least from the phraseology, of the Saint-Simonians, the true heralds of an entire century."¹⁰⁴ On the one hand, Saint-Simon's teaching had attracted all those with an instinctive aversion to modern individualist society: Carl Rodbertus, Thomas Carlyle, and the conservative Comtists, the "extreme right wing of Saint-Simonian positivism"¹⁰⁵ including such men as Charles Maurras. Had Guizot been wrong to see socialism in Napoleon III's humanitarian but statist social measures?¹⁰⁶ Was not the "Saint-Simonian on horseback" as legitimate an heir to Saint-Simonianism as the revolutionary republican socialism of 1848? Napoleon III's measures had precious little to do with the republican tradition of the preceding generation--the era of Buonarroti and Louis Blanc--and with the Marxism of the next, but were they any less socialist? Halévy drew a direct filiation of ideas from Louis Blanc to Lassalle to Bismarck.¹⁰⁷ But the genealogy of left-Saint-Simonianism was as much a story of strange bedfellows as the descent on the right. Halévy asked if Saint-Simonianism had not fed Marx and his followers the fatalistic science that "taught them that the transition from one state of society to a higher state

was always accompanied by violence."¹⁰⁸

The failure of Saint-Simonianism lay precisely in the fact that, like Hegelianism, it could spawn such dissimilar children, some of whom would destroy their own heritage. After all, antagonisms, war and crises had not disappeared; Jacobinism had returned, as destructive and as negative as in its first appearance and this time sired by Saint-Simon.¹²⁸ Europe had not reached a final state of organization in which these horrors had disappeared. But the nature of the antagonisms had changed: the conflicts were no longer between individuals in a system of free competition but between rival state systems. Finally Halévy drew the conclusion that modern socialism is a doctrine with a double aspect: a doctrine of emancipation, which aims at abolishing the last traces of slavery remaining in industrialism, and a doctrine of organization, which, to protect the freedom of the weak against the strong, needs a restored and strengthened state power. The contradiction was present at the very source of socialism in the legacy of Saint-Simonianism. The war only made the conflict more apparent.

¹The publication of his course lectures as the Histoire du socialisme européen (Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1948) drew together pieces from several sources: some finished lectures which date from the period of the first course at Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques (1901-3); his students' notes from the period of the 1930s; and his own notes which were usually brief topical outlines. In 1932-3 there was a photocopy of his lectures on the course "L'Evolution du socialisme anglais de 1815 à nos jours" published by the Librairie des Facultés, and the following year a portion of the course "Le Socialisme en Europe au XX^e siècle" was issued. "Les Amis de Elie Halévy," under Celestin Bouglé's direction until his death in 1940 and then led by Raymond Aron, edited the pieces that they drew together from these diverse sources. The friends were Halévy's former pupils, including Robert Marjolin, Michel Debré, Jean-Marcel Jaanneney, Pierre Laroque and Etienne Mantoux, the author of The Carthaginian Peace or the Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes who was killed in the last months of World War II before the edition was finished and before his own manuscript was published.

²L'Ere des Tyrannies (Paris: Gallimard, 1938) has been translated as the Era of Tyrannies by R.K. Webb and published by Anchor in 1965. The work includes: "La doctrine économique de Saint-Simon," La Revue du Mois, IV (1907), 641-676 and VI (1908), 39-75; "La Politique de paix sociale en Angleterre. Les 'Whitley Councils'" Revue d'Economie Politique, XXXIII (1919), 385-431; "Le problème du contrôle ouvrier." Conference au Comité National d'Etudes politiques et sociales. March 7, 1921; "L'Etat présent de la question sociale en Angleterre," Revue politique et Parlementaire, CXII (1923), 5-29; "Sismondi" Collection Réformateurs Sociaux (Paris: Alcan, 1933); "Socialism and the Problem of Democratic Parliamentaryism," International Affairs, XIII (1934), 490-507; The World Crisis of 1914-1918: An Interpretation. The Rhodes Memorial Lectures (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929); "L'Ere des Tyrannies," Bulletin de Société Française de Philosophie, XXXVI (1936), 181-253.

³Melvin Richter, "A Bibliography of Signed Works by Elie Halévy," History and Theory, Supplement, VII (1968), 46. [Hereinafter "Richter: Bibliography."]

⁴See particularly the review of Era of Tyrannies by Elie Halévy, Times Literary Supplement, November 23, 1967, p. 1102 and the review of the same work by Geoffrey Barraclough, "Historian at the End of His Tether," New York Review of Books, III (January 6, 1966), 20-22.

⁵Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought: The Sociologist and the Revolution of 1848, Vol. I, translated by Richard Howard and Helen Weaver (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1968), p. 332. Aron's analysis of Marx follows Halévy's interpretation rather closely and in Aron's summation of the three sociological approaches he groups himself with Halévy and Montesquieu among the "political sociologists" who are liberal, non-dogmatic and stress the autonomy of the political order.

⁶Halévy to Bouglé, October 1, 1913, Correspondance, p. 337.

⁷"Extraits du journal d'Elie Halévy," 1888, Correspondance, p. 22.

⁸Charles Andler, La Civilisation socialiste, Paris: M. Riviere, 1912); Charles Andler, Le Socialisme d'etat en Allemagne (Paris: Alcan, 1897); Celestin Bouglé, Chez les prophetes socialistes (Paris: Alcan, 1918); Celestin Bouglé, Socialismes français. Du "socialisme utopique" à la "democratie industrielle" (Paris: Colin, 1933); Celestin Bouglé, Proudhon (Paris: Alcan, 1933); Celestin Bouglé, La Sociologie de Proudhon (Paris: Colin, 1911); Hubert Bourgin, Les systemes socialistes (Paris: G. Doin, 1923); Hubert Bourgin, Proudhon (Paris, Bellais, 1901); Sebastien Charléty, Essai sur l'histoire du Saint-Simonisme (Paris: Hachette, 1896); Emile Durkheim, Le Socialisme. Sa Definition. Ses Débuts. La Doctrine Saint-Simonienne (Paris: F. Alcan, 1928); Charles Gide, Fourier, Précurseur de la Coopération (Paris: Association pour l'enseignement de la coopération, 1924); Charles Gide and Charles Rist, Histoire des doctrines économiques depuis les physiocrates jusqu'à nos jours, 2 Vols. (Paris: L. Larose and L. Tenin, 1909); Daniel Halévy, Essais sur le mouvement ouvrier en France (Paris, Bellais, 1901); Maxime Leroy, Le socialisme des producteurs: Henri de Saint-Simon (Paris: Riviere, 1924); Georges Sorel, "Essai sur la philosophie de Proudhon," Revue Philosophique XXXIII (1892); Georges Weill, L'Ecole Saint-Simonienne (Paris: Alcan, 1896).

⁹"Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, III, V, VIII, X, XVI, XXIII. See Richter, "Bibliography" for a listing of the topics.

¹⁰La Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition. Première Année, 1829, edited by Celestin Bouglé and Elie Halévy, (Paris: Riviere, 1924). Georg Iggers' translation and introduction to The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition. First Year, 1829 (Boston: Beacon Hill, 1958) includes the footnotes and substantial critical notes from the Halévy and Bouglé edition.

¹¹Elie Halévy review of "Emile Durkheim, Le Socialisme. Sa Définition. Ses Débuts." Revue des Sciences Politiques, LII (1929), 471.

¹²Aaron Noland, The Founding of the French Socialist Party, 1893-1905 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 82-85, 137-164. Harvey Mitchell, Labor and the Origins of Social Democracy in Britain, France and Germany 1890-1914 (Itasca, Illinois: Peacock Publishers, 1971), pp. 60-64.

¹³Halévy's friend, Charles Andler, was one of the first translators and commentators on Marx in France. His translation and his "adventurous commentary" (as Halévy described it) on the Communist Manifesto was the major French source until the Molitor translation of 1934. See Halévy's review of Molitor's translation of Marx's works, Revue des Sciences Politiques, LVIII (1935), 158.

¹⁴Both of the Halévy brothers continued their devotion to these institutions long after the more rigid political positions of the pre-war period had allowed the université populaire to atrophy. See Halévy's comments in "Comment l'Angleterre organise ses universités populaires" Manuel général de l'instruction primaire, 87 (February-March, 1920), 303-305.

¹⁵Daniel to Elie Halévy, January, 1901, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection; Daniel Halévy, Essais sur le mouvement ouvrier en France (Paris, 1902). Elie's judgment of his brother's history--dilettante, admiring faith for its own sake like a neo-Catholic--is recorded in a letter to Bouglé, Oct. 29, 1901. Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

¹⁶Halévy to Bouglé, October, 1898, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

¹⁷J.E.S. Hayward, "Solidarity in Nineteenth Century France," International Review of Social History, IV (1959) 261-284. See also Hayward's article "The Official Social Philosophy of the French Third Republic: Léon Bourgeois and 'Solidarisme,'" International Review of Social History, VI (1961), 19-48.

¹⁸John A. Scott, Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 179.

¹⁹Halévy to Bouglé, May 10, 1906, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Halévy to Bouglé, December 25, 1906, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²²Halévy to Bouglé, September 6, 1906, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²³Halévy to Bouglé, February 7, 1899, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁴Halévy, "Era of Tyrannies," Era of Tyrannies, p. 271.

²⁵Halévy, "Les principes de la distribution des richesses," Revue de Métaphysique, XIV (1906), p. 594. This article was written in September 1905 according to Halévy's correspondence with Bouglé, October 2, 1905, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁶Halévy, "Saint-Simonian Economic Doctrine," Era of Tyrannies, pp. 98-99.

²⁷Victor Basch, "De la démocratie," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, VII (1907), pp. 107-109, 111-112.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Halévy to Bouglé, December 27, 1906, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³⁰Halévy, "Les Principes de la distribution des richesses," Revue de Métaphysique, XIV (1906), 594.

³¹Ibid.

³²Halévy to Bouglé, May 10, 1906, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection. In another letter to Bouglé, February 27, 1904, Halévy said: "The French quarrel over doctrines. Theories of socialism are French but the realities are German." Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³³Werner Sombart, Socialism and the Social Movement, trans. by M. Epstein (6th ed., New York: Dutton, 1909). Sombart also distinguished reactionary or backward-looking social thought--i.e., moral criticism such as Christian socialism or "ethical economists"--from those who accepted the realities of industrialization. Halévy did not do this.

³⁴Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis, trans. by J. Kahane (2nd ed., New York: Macmillan, 1938), pp. 239-280.

³⁵Halévy's lectures appended to the Histoire du socialisme européen include "Friedrich List and National Political Economy"; "Marxism and Syndicalism."

³⁶Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," Era of Tyrannies, p. 274.

³⁷Halévy, Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 18.

³⁸"Vocabulaire technique et critique," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, XVII (January-February, 1917), 52-55.

³⁹Ibid., p. 54.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 55.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 55, note.

⁴²Halévy to Bouglé, October 29, 1901, samedi 9 (November 1901), Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection. November 24, 1901, Correspondance, p. 327.

⁴³Halévy, Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 75.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Halévy, "The World Crisis: An Interpretation," The Era of Tyrannies, p. 214. [Hereinafter referred to as "The World Crisis."]

⁴⁶ Halévy, Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 126.

⁴⁷ Georges Sorel, "Le Materialisme historique," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, II (1902), 91-122. Halévy, Thomas Hodgskin, trans. by A.J. Taylor (London: Ernest Benn, 1956). The two early lectures--"La Conception materialiste de l'histoire" and "Le Capital. La theorie de la valeur" date from 1901-3. The article "Les principes de la distribution des richesses," Revue de Métaphysique XIV, (1906).

⁴⁸ The footnotes cite the Molitor (1934) translation of Marx's work but there is no indication in the interpretation of "La Jeunesse de Marx et la Formation du Marxisme 1836-48" and "La Lutte des Classes et l'Evolution du Capitalisme" that Halévy changed his view of Marx.

⁴⁹ Halévy, Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 76ff. The early lectures include a substantial inquiry into the historiciists, the work of Fredrich List and of the Kathedrasozialists. Privately Halévy dismissed the historicist school as intellectual lightweights when he wrote to Bouglé: "Neither Schmoller, nor Wagner, nor all the professors, nor all the eclectics interest me. I am sticking totally to Karl Marx. (Surely you have read the chapter on the division of labor?) Marxism will be the pivot of my course this winter. The course, if it becomes a regular one could be entitled: 'Critique or critical appreciation of modern socialism.' Do you approve?" November 9, 1901, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.) He nonetheless, included their contributions to economic thought in his lecture. More importantly he acknowledged their importance in the nurture of German etatist tendencies.

⁵⁰ Halévy to Bouglé, November 21, 1907 printed in part in Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 76 note.

⁵¹ Raymond Aron, "Pour le centenaire de Elie Halévy," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, LXV (1971), pp. 27-28.

⁵² Georges Sorel, "La Materialisme historique," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, II (1902), 115.

⁵³ Sorel had already published an important little book L'Avenir Socialiste des Syndicats (1897) under the influence of Ferdinand Pelloutier, the leader of the trade unionist, syndicalist movement in France, whose book Histoire des Bourses du Travail (1902) Sorel and Daniel Halévy had published. Since 1899 Sorel, Daniel Halévy, Edward Berth, and Victor Griffuelhes, were regular contributors to Hubert Lagardelle's paper Le Mouvement Socialiste, which was the tribune of the syndicalist movement. Sombart and Halévy disagree as to who influenced whom in the question of the relation of Sorel and Arturo Labriola and Enrico Leone. Halévy thought Sorel was the disciple of Croce and the Italians and that Sorel's influence on his generation was so considerable that he deserved attention in himself. See his obituary "Georges Sorel 1847-1922" Revue de Métaphysique, Supplément (October-December 1922), 1-2. See Sombart Socialism and the Social Movement, pp. 98-100 for the influence of

Sorel on the Italians. Both Halévy and Sombart agree that Roberto Michel's mentor was Sorel, but Halévy dismissed Michel's work as lacking the brilliant insights one expects from the Sorelians. See Halévy's review of Michel's Die Verelendungstheorie, Revue des Sciences Politiques, XII (1929), 470-471.

⁵⁴Sorel, Le Materialisme historique, pp. 91-122.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 97.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 119.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 118.

⁵⁸Halévy, Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 126. See also his comment to A. Aftalion's "Les fondements du socialisme," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, XXIII (1924), 5.

⁵⁹Halévy, Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 126.

⁶⁰Halévy on Aftalion's "Les fondements du socialisme," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie XIII (1924).

⁶¹Andre Lichtenberger, Le socialisme au XVIII^e siècle (Paris: Alcan, 1895); Celestin Bouglé, Socialismes française (Paris: Colin, 1933); Maxime Leroy, Histoire des Idées sociales en France, Vol. I (3rd ed., Paris: Gallimard, 1950); George Lichtheim, The Origins of Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1969); J.L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Norton, 1970).

⁶²Halévy, Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 18.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 21.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 21-23.

⁶⁶Halévy to Bouglé, November 1902 "lundi 24," Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁶⁷Halévy to Bouglé, February 16, 1900, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁶⁸Halévy to Bouglé, December 19, 1901, Correspondance, p. 327.

⁶⁹Halévy, Thomas Hodgskin, pp. 167-168.

⁷⁰Halévy, Philosophic Radicalism, pp. 223-224, for discussion of the Godwinian argument that ego and egoism would cease with the end of ownership. See also Thomas Hodgskin, pp. 32-36.

⁷¹Halévy, Thomas Hodgskin, p. 80.

⁷²Ibid., p. 55.

⁷³Ibid., p. 110.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 105, quoting Hodgskin's Popular Political Economy, four lectures delivered at London Mechanics Institution in 1927.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 115 quoting Hodgskin, The Natural and Artificial Right of Property, pp. 19-21.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 129.

⁷⁷Halévy, Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 35.

⁷⁸Halévy, Thomas Hodgskin, p. 169.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 118.

⁸⁰Halévy, Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 343.

⁸¹Ibid., the influence of Ruskin on the thought of Proust, Daniel Halévy and a few other French socialists, who arrived at socialism partly through aesthetic rejection of the bourgeoisie was important during la belle époque.

⁸²_____, Times Literary Supplement, March 23, 1956 makes this point.

⁸³Halévy, Thomas Hodgskin, p. 180.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Halévy to Bouglé, January 5, 1902, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection. Gillispie's observation that from Philosophic Radicalism one might gain the impression that Halévy believed that the "chief practical influence of ideas comes after they have hardened into dogmas and . . . that what often converts ideas into dogmas is their applicability to real interests in definite circumstances" is even more apt a comment regarding socialist ideology. (Gillispie, "Elie Halevy," p. 236.)

⁸⁶Halévy, "La Doctrine économique de Saint-Simon," La Revue du Mois, IV (1907), 641-676 and VI (1908), 39-75. Also Halévy and Bouglé, "Introduction" La Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition, Première Année, 1829 (Paris: Rivière, 1924).

⁸⁷Halévy, "Saint-Simonian Economic Doctrine," The Era of Tyrannies, p. 49.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 21.

⁸⁹Ibid., pp. 40-45. Halévy believed the influence of the theocratic school reinforced Saint-Simon's authoritarian tendencies.

This coincided with Comte's secretaryship to Saint-Simon but Halévy argued that these tendencies were present in the last months of Augustin Thierry's collaboration with Saint-Simon and led to the break. (*Ibid.*, p. 35). Here Halévy took sides against the positivists, including Comte, who argued that Saint-Simon's system made this break from liberalism under the influence of Comte, Bonald and de Maistre.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 90 quoting Exposition de la doctrine de Saint-Simon, Vol. I, p. 134.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

¹⁰⁰ Maxime Leroy, Le Socialisme des Producteurs: Henri de Saint-Simon (Paris: Rivière, 1924). La Vie de Comte de Saint-Simon (Paris: 1925). M. Bourbannais, Le Neo-Saint-Simonisme et la vie sociale d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Presses universitaires françaises, 1923). G. Brunet, Le Mysticisme sociale de Saint-Simon (Paris: Presses françaises, 1925). G. Gignoux, Revue d'histoire des doctrines économiques et sociales (Paris: A. Colin, 1923). Gottfried Salomon, Saint-Simon und der Sozialismus. Wege zum Sozialismus. (Berlin, 1919) Vergeot's Le Credit comme stimulant et régulateur de l'industrie: la conception de Saint-Simon was published in 1918.

¹⁰¹ Roy F. Harrod, John Maynard Keynes (New York: Harcourt, 1951), pp. 379-386.

¹⁰² Halévy, "La Politique de paix sociale en Angleterre. Les 'Whitley Councils'" Revue d'Economie Politique, XXXIII (1919), 385-431. "Le Problème du contrôle ouvrier" March 7, 1921, lecture given to the Comité National d'Etudes Politiques et Sociales. "L'Etat present de la question sociale en Angleterre," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, CXII, 5-29. All three discussions are reprinted in the Era of Tyrannies.

¹⁰³ Halévy, "The Problem of Worker Control," Era of Tyrannies, p. 179.

¹⁰⁴Halévy, "Saint-Simonian Economic Doctrine," Era of Tyrannies, p. 101.

¹⁰⁵Halévy used this same lineage from Bismarckian socialist insurance to Saint-Simon by way of Blanc and Lassalle in a review essay of Gaston Isambert's "Les Idées socialistes en France de 1815 a 1848," Revue des Sciences Politiques, XXI (1906), 407-409. Halévy in this review raised this genealogy by way of disagreeing with the general thesis that the French socialist tradition was humanitarian, fraternal, solidariste as opposed to the German determinist, materialist, and statist heritage. In spite of the fact that Halévy's work can be fitted loosely within this thesis and that he did not stress the contradictions inherent in socialism as strongly before the war as after the germ of the idea was there as early as 1906. Halévy pointed to the Blanquist secret revolutionary societies after the Lyons insurrection of 1831 with their fusion of revolutionary and socialist ideals. Although the stress is not so great as later, Halévy's sense of the organizing and terrorist potential of socialism itself, regardless of its nationality, is evident. After the Bolshevik Revolution Halévy immediately drew the parallels between Babeuf, Blanqui, Gustave Hervé, and Leninism. (Halévy, Histoire du socialisme européen, p. 60.)

¹⁰⁶Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies" The Era of Tyrannies, p. 278.

¹⁰⁷Halévy, "Saint-Simonian Economic Doctrine," p. 101.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., pp. 102-103.

CHAPTER V

THE ORDEAL OF THE WORLD WAR

Elie Halévy was almost forty-four when the first World War began. Ever since his trip to England during the Boer War he had dreaded the coming of a general European war. Even during the struggle for Captain Dreyfus the threat of war and the realities of European power politics had subdued his personal hostility to the military. He had never been a pacifist nor had he ever had much faith in the devices liberal men of peace rely upon to resolve the conflicts that lead to war--arbitration, international law, and an international language.¹ He held individuals responsible for wars; all the individuals who make up the mass, not conspirators or a clique of leaders, cause wars.²

But he hated war and all the irrational passions of men that were allowed to surface in war. He feared the impact of any war that would escape from the cage of European alliances. He understood the destruction which would inevitably follow the unleashing in war of the revolutionary potential of militarism, nationalism, class and national hatreds. He immediately grasped the implications of the extension of the power of the state bureaucracy which would inevitably take place during the war. The ordeal of the World War led him to emphasize the statist and illiberal forces at work in the twentieth century. His sense of the dynamic relation between war and revolution,

nationalism and socialism and liberalism, set new priorities for his post-war work. The events of the four years darkened his hopes for the liberal, democratic and parliamentary institutions in which he believed and cast a shadow over his post-war reflections on socialism.

But the year 1914 was not a turning point in Halévy's life; it did not change his conception of contemporary history, only his emphasis. The Great War did not try his values and find them wanting. He did not succumb to the momentary enthusiasm for conflict that trapped many intellectuals. In fact, his basic beliefs provided the perspective, the intellectual distance, that gives a timeless and philosophical quality to the problems that he raised in relation to the war and to the judgments that he made. A profound pessimism permeates his wartime correspondence. His letters move freely back and forth from his characteristically critical and frank comment on day-to-day events to his abiding ethical concern to comprehend the direction of the social movements of contemporary history. In spite of his disgust for the brutalities of the twentieth century, the tempest fascinated him even as it oppressed him.³ His letters, especially those to Léon, became the expression of his innermost thoughts and moral resolution.⁴

Intellectual independence, objectivity of a sort, were not states of mind easily won or maintained in the midst of national and party passions unleashed in war. In a sense, Halévy chose isolation from Parisian intellectual and political life. Relieved that the Sciences Politiques did not require that he teach--"higher education this year seems the most ridiculous of sinecures..."⁵--he reinforced his spiritual distance from Parisian intellectual life by finding war duty,

first in a village, Rochecorbon (Indre et Loire), and then in a hospital in Albertville in Savoie.⁶ As long as the war continued he would not engage in research, nor would he write on the war or on any other subject, nor would he maintain the daily contacts with Bouglé, Léon and Brunschvicg, all of whom remained in Paris. He would not join his cousin, René Berthelot, or his friend Chartier (Alain) who had volunteered for combat duty at the front. Although his wife and her brother's family were near him most of the war, he was separated from his brother Daniel who served in Pas de Calais, in Paris and eventually as a liaison to the Americans.⁷ Several times during the war Halévy resisted the efforts of his friends to secure a political or diplomatic position for him. He said that his "true friends" in England and in France had no influence and he could not play the role of an agent-- he would die of boredom or of disgust at the idea of all the half-lies he would have to tell. "If I must serve a function related to the war, let it not be an intellectual one or a quasi-intellectual one! Let it be concerned only with the realization of material ends! Let's keep our intellect intact for the day that we can give it complete liberty!"⁸

Distance preserved his patriotism from the exasperations of Paris, watching the hateful quarrels between the parties, conflicts he had always feared were endemic to French political life.⁹ His friends wrote to him of the intrigues and the currents of opinion which charged the intellectual and political atmosphere in the capitol. He was intensely critical of the war effort expended in the offices and salons of the Parisian elite. But in Albertville he learned of intrigue behind the scenes only from letters. He read Parisian news-

papers sporadically, relying on foreign papers, particularly the Swiss.¹⁰ His physical isolation worked together with his skepticism in such a way that his constant thoughts were upon the forces that had brought about the war and the world-wide slaughter that the war permitted. Only the physical exhaustion of his medical duties and the presence of his family in Albertville alleviated this somber mood.¹¹ Distance left Halévy alone with his own bleak thoughts on the realities of the war, alone without the relief or distraction that many men found in keeping abreast of the daily news of politics and battles. Relief was not what Halévy sought in the first months of the war; he wanted a duty that had to be done.

One must proceed without illusions, Halévy wrote to Léon, because "we have before us ten to fifteen years or thirty years of war."¹² "The second, the last part of our lives will scarcely resemble the first."¹³ The insane destruction of mankind masquerading as a crusade of rival cultures would make any peace only a truce.

This war or this set of wars will last a long time. If it can't last a long time with the armies constituted on the type of armies that we have now, they will change the types of armies. If the armies fall to half of their effective strength, they will battle with half-armies. If they must ruin themselves, they will ruin themselves. The questions which have been raised this last summer are those which could not be resolved in a dozen months.¹⁴

Men deceived themselves with illusions of greater causes than their selfish ones, and such illusions only served to intensify their passions.

If war is the law of humanity let us accept war. If universal peace is our ideal, let us say 'down with war!' Without reservations! But to believe that universal peace will happen through a crusade is totally an illusion. War can only lead to peace through the exhaustion and horror that it inspires.¹⁵

The sadness of a fatalist was deepened by the anguish of the pessimist

who saw men all around him evade the implications of their thoughts and acts and deceive themselves with the hope that the war might be turned into a movement for peace or into any other thing but what it was.

"One must do what must be done" is the theme of his correspondence from the very beginning of the war. War teaches the philosophy that it is able to teach, the art of living from day to day and of accepting the necessities of each moment, he wrote to Léon.¹⁶ Each must do what he had to do: Chartier had gone to the front; Léon must resurrect the Revue de Métaphysique as soon as he was able; Halévy must make himself fit for the duties of war.¹⁷ He had 50,000 wounded to care for and must make himself an orderly. It was "the work of a domestic but useful and the conversation of the trooper is much more sane in these times than correspondence with intellectuals."¹⁸

For the moment, however, he was repelled by the bitter campaign against German culture in France. Was it a movement of deep feeling in Paris or a superficial and passing over-reaction to the outbreak of the war? he asked Léon.¹⁹ He would not believe that he could not hear Wagner, read Hegel, nor admire Nernst, the chemist, and Klein, the great mathematician. His first reaction to the fact that the last two had signed a manifesto of ninety-three intellectuals in defense of Germany's invasion of Belgium was to remind Léon that there had been no French intellectuals to resist Napoleon's wars either; but second thoughts recalled that Chateaubriand and Madame de Staël had resisted Napoleon. Perhaps Léon was right that the Germans were a people of lackeys. But Halévy was more interested in the great Germans who had not signed the manifesto, men like Simmel, Hugo von Hoffmannsthal, Richard Strauss, Hilbert and others. He thought about writing

something for the French press to call attention to the abstentions but knew it would only force these Germans to take a second stand. That was more than one could ask of another man's courage.

Léon and he owed it to France to refuse to allow the excuse of the war to suppress indefinitely "all French culture," particularly the contribution made to it by their Revue.²⁰ In the midst of chauvinist passions the most pressing problem was not to become the slave of an exclusive nationalism. It was, of course, second nature to Halévy to think of the Revue when he was anxious about the strength of French national character. They had created the Revue in the belief that critical intellect and moral rectitude could fortify French culture and public life. The Revue like his other commitments had been his personal affirmation of the primacy of the public mind in the life of the republic. He did not think, however, that the efforts of idealists like himself had uplifted the public spirit sufficiently above class antagonisms and material concerns for it to meet an arduous test of faith. His deepest fear was that should the state of siege of 1914 be relaxed France would not have the moral endurance to continue the struggle. And France must continue and must survive! He was repelled by chauvinist rejection of German culture but that did not mean that his pride in French intellectual culture faltered in any way. France was the one nation in Europe with "a civilization to rival Germany"--all the others were dominated by German thought or incapable of fostering a genuine culture. But he had always believed the French public spirit to be too weak, too divided by political and social conflict to safeguard the ideals and institutions that he cherished most deeply.

His prognosis for liberal republicanism in France was a bleak one, as one can see in his grim summary of French nineteenth-century history:

Twice the country was governed by honest men--during the restoration and during the l'Ordre Moral. Twice by low and cynical intriguers--under Louis Philippe and during the Third French Republic. Twice the country was fully and unanimously satisfied--after the coup d'état of 18 Brumaire and after the coup of December 2nd. And I am neither a legitimist nor a Bonapartist. Do you understand?²¹

He was convinced that the war had not healed any of the wounds in the French body politic. In the first months of l'union sacrée he had feared that all the infirmities of the French political mind, of the national morale, were only temporarily alleviated. Political life in France was too precarious to survive the "battle without end in time and space,"²² to survive political anarchy. France could not bear that degree of anarchy without killing itself. The English could bear "anarchy better than any other people, despite zeppelins and submarines ...because at the sign of chaos a great adventurer can always rise out of Parliament to express the national will perfectly."²³ But in France "the dictatorial power required by the military situation of the country [could] only be created outside of Parliament and as a consequence against Parliament...."²⁴

In a note to Léon from December 1916 Halévy suggested a convenient fiction which he thought worth considering. Suppose the Senators and the President were killed virtually simultaneously and the emergency made it impossible to follow the elaborate constitutional procedures of the Third Republic. The assumption of executive authority by a Director or by the president of each of the chief agencies of the administration would create, at once, a highly centralized and democratic government, one which would be too popular for the Chamber to

resist. Even England had come to regard certain parliamentary fictions as encumbrances in the middle of the war. In France, where the true obstacles to reform were the Presidency and the Senate, how much more vulnerable were parliamentary institutions!²⁵

The end of parliamentary institutions in France was not imminent in 1916, Halévy thought, but the danger was there if the generation of national wars which threatened European politics materialized.²⁶ The danger to parliament was at least two-fold: the probable spread of cynicism toward representative government which would be the result of sterile parliamentarianism in a crisis, and the increase of centralization and bureaucratization which was inevitably brought on by the war. Halévy was sure that the political leaders of the French parliament could not break their habit of opposition, their ritual of destroying ministries with no other ambition or policy than taking the place of the ministers. The majority of the Chamber was more concerned with rooting out and preventing corruption, protecting the small propertied citizen, and supervising the bureaucrats than with reform or efficiency in pursuing the war. Halévy thought parliament's incessant control of the wartime bureaucracy had the effect of making it torpid and inert when it ought to be active and intelligent.²⁷ When deputies and their friends burningly denounced the bureaus, he remarked, one regretted that the bureaus had no way to attack the parliament for its lack of foresight and weakness.²⁸

Cynicism itself was an evil and one of the most dangerous results of the failure of liberal institutions during the war. One could not, as adversaries usually did, generalize from the abuses of French parliamentarianism to all representative forms of government. When

Halévy proposed the topic "De la Sterilité du régime parlementaire en France" for the Revue, Léon misunderstood him to mean "De la Sterilité du régime parlementaire," to which Halévy replied "It is not at all the same thing and scarcely has anything to do with the war. It was a problem before the war and will pose a question again after the war."²⁹ Neither the British, nor the United States, not even the Italian political system resembled the French.³⁰

It might very well be that the evil is not susceptible to political reform and is part of a kind of general weakness of our civilization against which all reform of the constitution would be powerless. But, before giving oneself up to skepticism, one must try everything....³¹

Trying everything meant strengthening the executive vis à vis the legislative branch of government. But trying everything was a dangerous gamble because the cards, at least French ones, held the possibility of a future of Bonapartism as much as the prospect of a Jacobin Directory. The only constitutions that were truly favorable to liberalism were complicated constitutions;³² that applied to France just as much as to England. The only times that were truly favorable to liberalism were peaceful ones.

Alain said the historian was sad because he was a fatalist. Halévy was not a fatalist but his pessimism was so deep that all his wartime letters are profoundly sad. His medical duties were rigorous enough to satisfy his desire to be useful and active. Carrying out his war service to the point of exhaustion in a provincial town made it possible for him to avoid the political intrigues and gossip of Paris. He could respond to the demands of duty, obey the commands of national loyalty, and yet hold himself aloof from the propaganda of war.³³ He felt that silence was best. "In times of war, if pacifist eloquence

sounds false, the eloquence of belligerence sounds falser still. A single writer pleases me right now and that is Joffre. The rest is, or ought to be, silence."³⁴ By its nature scholarship was radically international, incapable of being organized for Allied or Central Powers. He cautioned Léon that they should not try to mobilize science in the service of national causes, but rather should imitate the Vatican and defend their religion as well as the Catholics did by continuing to exist above nations.³⁵ He grimly observed that during the war the true intellectual life of Europe had been forced to live in prison camps.³⁶ Their Revue must not take part in the campaign of national hatred that was being carried on in each of the belligerent powers.

The Revue, however, ought not to be silent. It was imperative that an independent voice be heard in France during the war as it had been before the war. For France to maintain the uninterrupted publication of a consistently serene and impartial review would be a challenge to Germany.³⁷ "It is essential that it [the Revue] contain, in as great a number as is possible, articles of pure philosophical speculation...."³⁸ The Revue did not have to take on the look of a patriotic pamphlet. "Bernhardi and Maurice Barrès must not make Europeans forget either Plato or Descartes."³⁹ It was one thing for the Revue to deal with the literature of the war, with parliamentarianism during the war, or with socialism and the future of democratic socialism after the regimen of the war--after all, Halévy had never shied away from relevant topics and these were but a few that he proposed for discussion in the Revue under the rubric of "practical questions." But it was another matter entirely if an issue were devoted

199

solely to questions of the war.⁴⁰

There were many difficulties of publication during the war and not the least of these was the fact that there were few metaphysicians who lived and wrote philosophy in the heat of battle. Halévy's unwillingness to undertake his usual commitment to editing made him sympathetic to Léon's publication problems. But understanding did not mean that he accepted Léon's intellectual and organizational activities outside the Revue. What was the point of reviving the Société Française de Philosophie, if everyone was an idiot?⁴¹ He doubted the utility of Léon's attempts to organize scholars from the Entente nations because there was no spiritual or moral cohesion behind the Entente, only common political interests of the moment. When Léon took up duties as a cultural liaison to the Americans, Halévy was quick to remind him of his obligations to the Revue. At that moment (1917) when French morale had sunk to a very low point--Halévy thought it even lower than the morale in any other belligerent country --there were other more pressing duties. So long as they had in their hands the "instrument with which to struggle against such decadence," they ought to use it.⁴² When Léon took up again the anticlerical campaign which was one of his life-long commitments, Halévy warned him against an excess of anticlericalism if he were truly concerned for the national morale: "The true French danger isn't the clericalism...the true French evil is apathy, indolence, negligence of duty...."⁴³ It was this French apathy that Léon and the Revue must combat with all their efforts if they hoped to strengthen the national fiber.

The Revue must turn every adversity to the advantage of

furthering the life of the mind in France. If there were no works of pure metaphysical speculation, then why not commission something on ideological movements? Why not a series of the philosophy of war literature that was revealed in each of the belligerent states?⁴⁴ Perhaps they should do something on the concept of civilization that each of the belligerents believed itself to be defending. The question of the influence of the war on socialism merited a study. Halévy was sure that the effect would be unfavorable to the democratic or liberal forms of socialism (syndicalism or trade unionist movements) and conducive to state socialism.⁴⁵ He was convinced that "the state of war directly favored state socialism and by reaction revolutionary or anarchist socialism."⁴⁶

The war had driven the thought of pure speculation from everyone's head so Halévy recommended the Revue de Métaphysique stress practical questions. Why not put together a special number on the repercussions of the war on the organization of Europe, particularly on the economic systems? Or one on the political transformations of democracy during the war--on the "insensible evolution" of democratic governments under the pressure of external events?⁴⁷

There were a number of problems which deserved attention that had been put aside during the war; for example, educational reform and the question of feminism.⁴⁸ An issue devoted to the question of the make-up of Europe after the war in terms of nationalities, of the new balance of power which would be established with or without arbitra-

tion and a League of Nations, would be a worthwhile project.⁴⁹ As for the peace conference Halévy had a half-dozen problems he wanted to pose for League of Nations enthusiasts from the point of view of a skeptic. Did the principle of nationalities mean that the League would have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of states to insist that new states be created for the minority nations? Would the just peace that everyone called for mean that each nation would be accorded what it wanted, i.e. independence? Could there be any practical equality between states? Were the rights of small nations to independence as sacred as pacifists said they were? Would the League intervene in terms of obstacles to immigration, or tariffs, or colonies, or would the last problem remain outside the jurisdiction of the League?⁵⁰

The last months of the war Halévy was recalled to the Sciences Politiques to take up teaching again. At Sucy he worked without pause, not stirring even for the air raids. He threw himself into the "most urgent task" which was to "work to draw together again the ties of European civilization...."⁵¹ He was convinced that a new era in world history had opened on the day that the war began and that Jaurès was assassinated. It was madness to believe that the factions and parties could return to the pre-war politics or even that nations could pursue pre-war policies. He was, therefore, a "convinced Wilsonian," musing that it was the wisest position to take and the risks of taking it were absolutely nil. Of course, the American "didn't have angel's wings under his presidential overcoat" but until the "new order" he wrote, he would remain Wilsonian.⁵²

I ask for a quick peace and no annexations. And that's that for politics. But when I say that I am less nationalist than ever, my preoccupations are a great deal less political than intellectual. I ask that a religion of patriotism isn't allowed to establish

itself, more exclusive, more tyrannical, more bloodthirsty than that of any church. I want there to be some scholars, some professors, some 'mandarins' to conserve intact the center of European culture. I ask that the French forget the existence neither of Kant, nor Hegel, nor Goethe; that they look for those Germans (Swiss republicans, southern Germans, etc.) with whom it is possible, without dishonoring themselves, to revive relations. We can't spend the remainder of our lives,--which begins to grow shorter--, in these idiotic questions of races, of languages, and of frontiers.⁵³

His commitment to conserve a center of European culture shaped Halévy's post-war role. He was also committed to conserving liberal, democratic and parliamentary institutions. In the drastically changed and changing world of post-war Europe this liberal historian found there was much that he wanted to conserve of the past.

* * *

The broad general outlines of the topics that Halévy proposed for the Revue were the problems of contemporary Europe which he felt were crucial to the post-war world. His own schedule of research and publication more and more returned to the origins of the war, the political and economic transformation of democracy under the impact of the war, and the effect of the war on socialism and revolution. The historian who returned to the History of the English People quite frankly admitted that he saw the diplomacy and the economic problems of reconstruction in the nineteenth century in a new light and that volumes two and three were affected by the war.⁵⁴

His articles indicate how deeply conscious he was of his obligation to do what he could to sew the fabric of European civilization together

again. On the one hand, Halévy deliberately cast himself in the role of go-between from England to France, a special, self-imposed role of explaining the English policies to the French and the political behavior of their French allies to his English friends. As part of this new drama he intensified his critical efforts to destroy harmful illusions, myths, or ideologies which he felt stood in the way of genuine understanding among the allies and the peoples of Europe. At the same time, he dug deeply into the problems of the origins of the war, in part to be able to clear away the rubble of simple explanations and simplistic definitions of national interest in the popular mind. Halévy believed the simplifying ideological explanations of aims and interests had contributed to war by aggravating the public's "disinterested and fanatical emotions" which had pushed politicians to aggressive policies. He dug so deeply into the origins because he had grasped from the tense years before August 1914 that the war would be truly revolutionary. He hoped that his science was capable of comprehending the true nature of revolutionary forces in the twentieth century.

As Melvin Richter pointed out, Halévy himself became a veritable symbol of the entente cordiale.⁵⁵ In many respects, this is more true after the war than before it. He adjusted his life in order to be this symbol. The scholar, who refused a position in the Secretariat of the League of Nations because it would interfere with his work and who had always left the numerous social obligations of the Revue and the Société Française de Philosophie to Léon, initiated and maintained contacts in England with men of all parties and many occupations.⁵⁶ Each year the austere historian-philosopher whose rigorous work schedule

led him to put aside every honor and refuse social occasions in France spent the several months that he and his wife Florence were in England freely mingling with English friends. They saw his old and dear friends Graham Wallas, the Hammonds, the Webbs, H.A.L. Fisher, Ernest Barker, and G.P. Gooch, as well as many political and intellectual figures. He frequently spoke before English meetings in the inter-war years. He published several pieces in the Revue de Paris and in History which were written for intelligent, educated French and English readers, rather than scholars, and clearly show his intention to be a spokesman, if not a symbol. In addition, he accepted the commission to work with Pierre Renouvin and Sebastien Charl  ty collecting the official French documents on the origins of the war.⁵⁷ Accepting it could only take him away from the History of the English Peoples and he ran the danger of being a part of the war propaganda effort he had avoided for the duration of the hostilities. But he defined his citizen's duties in the most direct and public ways in the post-war world.

An essay-review that he wrote marking the end of the war underlined his commitment to action on a grander scale and in a much more direct way than he had made as a scholar and teacher before the war.⁵⁸ In a review of John Morley's Recollections, Hal  vy's tribute to Morley, the "last of the great Victorians," was also his epitaph for Victorian liberalism. Morley's resignation at the outbreak of the war when, in Hal  vy's judgment, liberty and universal civilization were at stake symbolized the denouement of the Victorian era, an era "so serious and so charitable, so full of faith and capable, all the same, of so much tolerance."⁵⁹ The pessimistic despair of Morley, the austere, free thinker, the moralist of democracy, of pacifism, of liberty, the states-

man in Ireland and in India, the last man of the Benthamite tradition, dissipated the stoic virtues of an era. Halévy too had despaired but he had not thought it possible to wash his hands of responsibility. In the Victorians, two strong currents--the sentimental and the rational--had come together to create a powerful stream of reform. Among the Victorians both currents had included the strengths of stoicism, men who possessed the stoic virtues and who were at the same time great men of action. Several Benthamites had been such men, and it was that capacity for rational reforming action that had first attracted Halévy to the philosophic radicals. He had seen the stoic behavior underlying the hedonist principles of the Benthamite disciples as he had seen the discipline beneath Methodist emotional indulgence. As Halévy faced the post-war world he rejected Morley's despair, reaffirming the philosophical ideal of stoic action.

Halévy's role as intermediary between the publics of the once cordial allies was not a popular one. As he indicated much later in an unpublished exchange with an editor of The Spectator, he felt that one must go against the trend and speak the truth, attempting to allay the fears and distrust between the two peoples--there were too many others who were willing to raise the public's political temper.⁶⁰ To go against the trend and to speak the truth had always been his ideal. To attempt to allay the fears and distrust between the two peoples was a new perspective. In England, he criticized English policies and explained French behavior of which he was sharply critical. In France, he explained English policy calmly and patiently and used his sharp wit to puncture hackneyed ideological clichés and French national prejudices.

Implicit in Halévy's concern to fill this role was his fundamental assumption that the true interests of the Western democracies were bound together just as they were held together by their common principles and institutions. The assumption grew stronger in the inter-war years, though in Halévy's honest estimation the prospects of understanding did not brighten. The democracies could be divided as easily as they were joined by a public opinion enflamed by distrust and misunderstanding, reacting to ideological clichés rather than rational self-interest. The true danger to peace lay in the public's willingness to sacrifice their real interests to great causes, to ideological clichés, simple ideas which, by their nature, were revolutionary ideas imposing themselves to the exclusion of and by the destruction of all other principles. By doing violence to the complexity of things, simple ideas worked against peace.⁶¹

For the first post-war meeting of the French and British philosophical societies at Oxford, Halévy chose to address his colleagues on "The Nationalities Problem."⁶² Actually, he chose to make a complex problem of a principle which was fast becoming the dominant simplification of liberal ideology. The most popular liberal formula for a lasting peace in 1920 was assuredly the "self-determination of peoples." Halévy believed in the principle and had from his youth extended it to the Irish and to colonial peoples subject to the French and English, not just to oppressed Poles or Czechs or Alsatians. But at Oxford he questioned the programs for peace that liberal Europeans naively espoused not recognizing that they included several inherently, or at least potentially, contradictory principles.⁶³ In England, the home of the greatest enthusiasm for the League of Nations and for the slogan

of national self-determination, Halévy, "the Wilsonian," voiced his doubts. Wasn't there a contradiction between self-determination and a League of Nations which implied, to some degree at least, the limitation of sovereignty in order to keep the peace? Was it possible to maintain a durable peace if the concept of national self-determination alone were pursued to the neglect of other principles, particularly those of national frontiers and of European equilibrium? These companion principles were too easily dismissed by the current liberal ideology. Surely the principles of national self-determination could be the cause of war if it alone were allowed to govern the relations between states and peoples.

The nationality problem was not the only issue in which ideology and reality were dangerously far apart. France was faced with a rapidly dwindling stock of good will among her allies.⁶⁴ Public opinion in France was scarcely aware that France had few staunch allies in Britain. The French, who had never understood England or English public opinion very well, now undermined their own diplomatic position because they operated with an image of England that was merely a figment of their own ideological imaginations.

Too many Frenchmen made the mistake of attributing an ideological motive to the diplomacy that resulted in the Anglo-French Entente. They compounded the error by assuming that this ideological motive remained in force. Some made this error because they thought antagonism to Germany was the inevitable conflict of rival capitalist nations; some did so because they assumed the foreign policies of democratic and liberal states were compatible with one another and inherently incompatible with those of the auto-

cracies, forgetting that Germany was no longer an autocratic state. Halévy warned that before and after the war England had several alternatives in world politics, but that France was not so fortunate. Historically, England's most characteristic position was diplomatic isolation which, should England return to that policy, would be unfortunate for France. In England general public opinion was turning against France because it believed the French to be insatiable and vindictive in their relations with Germany. Halévy could not drive home his message forcefully enough; public opinion was the force to be reckoned with in any modern democracy.

He hoped for a little realism in place of national prejudices. The conditions which had caused Britain to join the Entente and later the war no longer existed. Germany no longer threatened to upset the European balance of power by virtue of its naval and colonial power. In addition, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires were both in ruins. In short, in all the areas of most vital concern for the English the threat in Central Europe had disappeared, a fact that few Frenchmen bothered to remember. From a British point of view only France remained overmighty on the continent. The English did not perceive the French post-war grandeur to be the illusion that many Frenchmen feared it to be. "Downing Street visibly looks, if not for allies, then for friends against France, even if they be in fascist Italy...;"⁶⁵ the French deceived only themselves if they believed that ideological differences would keep the English and the Italians or the English and the Germans permanently apart.

Halévy insisted that the French must found their policies on a realistic estimation of England's economic position in the post-war

era. He did not mean by this the ridiculous political charge of the French Left, a crude, vulgarized Marxism, that British capitalism having defeated Germany now would destroy France's economy. Neither did he mean the kind of glib economic analogy to the period following the Napoleonic Wars. The current passion for comparing Versailles with the Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe was misleading,⁶⁶ he insisted. In the nineteenth century England's unemployment problem existed when English industry dominated world markets; now England desperately needed trade with anyone, even with the Bolsheviks. To the degree that the French demand for reparations or collective security threatened the possibility of improved world trade, English policy was necessarily anti-French. The French interest must be made perfectly clear to England, whether it be reparations or collective security or whatever it might be.⁶⁷ This meant, of course, first deciding upon that interest.

It was imperative in the aftermath of the war that Frenchmen understand the true significance of the crisis in Europe. Europe was no longer the center of world affairs, a fact which few French leaders other than Clemenceau were prepared to admit. To achieve a lasting peace France must win the support of America and England because Germany's actual power, not France's apparent hegemony, was the reality with which France must deal. The survival of republicanism in France and French adherence to the League of Nations would win the support of the Anglo-Saxons, if France did not dissipate their good will. How many times in the last half century had it seemed impossible that France could save republicanism? And yet out of the war only France and England of the great Western nations had preserved themselves without the excesses of Leninism and of "Mussolinism." The

League was an institution that was dearer to the hearts of the English than to the French in 1923 when Halévy wrote that the French must join with the British to strengthen it because the day would come when France would have to go to the League for more important problems than reparations.⁶⁸

Halévy approached the problem of European relations before the war with a mind to exploding myths, simple and destructive ideas, about the origins of the war. The questions of the origins of the war were not purely intellectual problems for anyone in post-war Europe; they were questions charged with political implications for the present and for the future. These problems were a test of Halévy's belief that rational critical analysis of contemporary history, rigorously applied, could break the hold of prejudice and ideology on the mind and passions of the public. All his life Halévy fought an economic determinist interpretation of history, affirming the importance of individual action, of personal and group ethics, and of ideas and beliefs. All his life he rejected history by littérateurs because it propagated the belief that history depends on the intimate detail which decided the actions of single individuals or that a few simple ideas sufficed to explain complex problems. Determinism deprived man, citizen or statesman, of his responsibility for failures of policy between states; popular history ignored great forces and problems and with respect to the war lulled public opinion with feelings of false security. Halévy's critical history was his only way to create the necessary intellectual conditions for a realistic estimation of interests and policies. It was his political science.

The paradoxes and contradictions of history had always fascinated

Halévy--he was inclined to find them in history--but there were times when paradoxes existed not in the events but in the minds of those who read back the present into the past.⁶⁹ There is a scrupulous care for the events in the essays and reviews on the origins of the war which he wrote between 1918 and 1929. Written in response to specific problems and interpretations he eschewed the technique, which he used so brilliantly in the past and would use again in "The World Crisis, 1914-18" and in the "Era of Tyrannies," of seizing upon the inherent contradictions to reveal some fundamentally ironic or tragic, but true, aspect of the collective forces in history. He used the narrative chronological method to organize his Epilogue volumes (as well as volumes two and three of the History of the English People) and in the apparent flow of events he allowed his themes to emerge.

In his essays on the causes and events which led to the war, at least nine of which were important statements, he stressed half a dozen main themes, some of which were specifically addressed to correcting English and French popular prejudices about the role of the other in precipitating or influencing the outbreak of the war. In the essays the dominant message was Halévy's belief that public opinion was the greatest cause of shifts in policies and diplomacy. Several subthemes developed from this thesis. For one thing, Halévy rejected any interpretation that regarded the Anglo-French Entente as inevitable or the Franco-German conflict as irreconcilable. Such interpretations would not stand up to the historical facts, he thought. Furthermore, he stressed the failure of personal diplomacy--that of Chamberlain, or Edward VII or Baron von Eckardstein or William II--to smoothe over rough relations between the nations when

public opinion was aroused. In addition, he denied that economic causes were a major consideration in the minds of policy makers immediately before the war. He pointed out that colonial aggravations had been alleviated in the decade before the war and that the mercantile groups in every major state vociferously opposed the war. These positions were not developed in any systematic exposition on the causes of the war, rather they were the upshot of his criticism of the interpretations advanced by others. They were grounded very solidly in his research for the French commission of the documents of the war and for his Epilogue to the History of the English People. They were grounded as well in his experience of England and France before the Great War.

Halévy wrote two long critiques of Baron Eckardstein's "indiscreet" memoirs to drive home his point that in a democracy public opinion dominates the conduct of statesmen and of foreign affairs.⁷⁰ These memoirs revealed that in the 1890s England had an alternative to alliance with France and Russia and that the alternative was much more popular than Frenchmen in the 1920s were willing to believe. In England in 1898 there was an almost symbolic confrontation between Salisbury's policy of isolation and conciliation and Chamberlain's aggressive imperialism. By 1919 men had all but forgotten Chamberlain's attempt to join the "teutonic races" in a triple alliance and Halévy chose to remind his readers that had Chamberlain not been rebuffed by German public opinion England's policy would have been quite different. English opinion-leaders had not opposed the naval and imperial policy that Chamberlain's alliance implied, they had merely responded to the rebuff. The confrontation the atmosphere of aggressive imperialism, and the hostility to France had stuck in Halévy's memory from his stay in England during the Boer War. He had distrusted the politics of empire and his antipathy to

Chamberlain, to imperialism, and to the Boer War had inspired a little book, L'Angleterre et son empire (1905), in which he traced the foreign policies of Gladstone, Disraeli and Salisbury to the advent of a full-blown imperialist policy.⁷¹ His distaste for politics of empire and his vision of the global nature of contemporary history date from that experience which he chose to share with his readers after the war.

In France it was commonly believed that the personal influence of Edward VII brought about the rapprochement between England and France. Halévy reminded the amateur diplomatists that the Prince's imperialism would have predisposed him to a German policy as late as the turn of the century. His predilection for French night life and racing would hardly compensate for the anger he felt at the reoccurring anglophobia of the French press. His friend Dilke was pro-French but his closest friend was Rosebery, the pro-German imperialist. Perhaps Edward VII had tried to influence the Cabinet to a pro-French policy but such a move could only have been successful with the support of ministers and public opinion. The burst of bad humor in 1902 against William II's visit to London was a moral insurrection of the press against the routine of the bureaucracy and against the German policy, an irresistible pressure of the public upon reluctant ministers. If the Cabinet had any desire in the face of this outburst, Halévy thought, it was to loosen Germany from the Triple Alliance. It did, in fact, work to rigidify the Alliance and to increase naval expenditures with the most unfortunate results for world peace.

Halévy wanted to stress the fact that the Anglo-French Entente had not been inevitable in the past, nor was it in the present. He was also passionately angry at diplomatic historians who thought the Great War was the result of perpetual antagonism between the Teuton and the Gaul, a

mere renewal of the Franco-Prussian conflict. Halévy challenged his friend G.P. Gooch's Creighton lectures on Franco-German relations with the remark that an Englishman discussing continental affairs gave the general impression of a man sitting behind the window of a highly-respectable house looking down in sheer contempt upon an unseemly quarrel in the street. Halévy proposed to offer the view of the man in the street, a continental, a Frenchman, and a French democrat.⁷²

Gooch and many other diplomatic historians erred because they did not note the interplay between domestic and foreign policy. Under the Third Republic when Gambetta, Ferry and Hanotaux pursued a colonial policy there had been a Paris-Berlin détente abandoning the revanche. In actual fact, at the turn of the century the powers of Europe appeared united in common antipathy to Britain in Asia and Africa, not divided into two hostile camps, one of which included Britain. Revanchisme did not dominate French politics: every election from 1870-1 to the eve of the Great War was a resounding vote for the party of peace. In France, though not in Germany, constitutionalism and parliamentary government were vital institutions which made public policy.⁷³ Gooch stressed Franco-German conflict emphasizing the influence of Maurras before the war, but Halévy countered that the ultra-pacifism of Gustave Hervé was far more influential than the revanchisme of Maurrasian intellectuals. Diplomatic historians who saw the 1912 election of Poincaré as President as a move away from Caillaux's policy of reconciling colonial conflicts with Germany missed the domestic issues. The "Chamber without a soul" was divided by anti-clericalism and the income tax, not foreign affairs. The election of Poincaré was not a significant symbol; the fact that the French sent a delegation of 200 parliamentarians to the Berne in-

terparliamentary conference for peace and Germany sent a mere forty was of much greater significance.

Halévy's impassioned reaction was motivated by more than his antipathy to a thesis of inevitable conflict, a determinist thesis. As a self-styled go-between from England to France he was acutely sensitive to Gooch's analysis because it played down England's responsibility in European politics. Did Gooch propose that France ought to have tried harder to remain friends with all states? It was a common hindsight view in England. Then he had forgotten that it was Germany which was determined to break the French-Russian Entente. And he had forgotten that in those days Britain only allied with far-away nations like Japan.⁷⁴ Did Gooch propose isolation as an effective foreign policy for France when even England was unwilling to take that path?

Despite years of concern with the issue of the origins of the war Halévy never wrote his frank estimation of the causes. His Epilogue, which at least one critic thought was written to take the British to task for forgetting so quickly their role in precipitating the war, emphasized the importance of the naval race with Germany in shaping English public opinion for military preparedness. The English documents on the origins of the war indicated an England, if not apathetic to Balkan affairs in 1912 and in 1914, then one so preoccupied with Ireland and social unrest that all other interests were excluded.⁷⁵ The breakdown of the Irish conference in 1914 pushed the Austrian ultimatum to the side in the papers and out of the notes of the Cabinet as well.⁷⁶ To all Europe the English four-day bank holiday, coinciding as it did with the weekend of the Austrian and Serbian mobilization, was incomprehensible and irresponsible. But Halévy remained true to

his role of go-between and reminded his countrymen that for all Britain's preoccupation with its own affairs, it had followed immediately when France declared war. With the threat of revolution casting a shadow as long as that of war in those summer days of 1914, if France had had England's alternatives, how many days would it have hesitated?⁷⁷

Most of Halévy's articles on the war were written in response to specific problems, but it would be a mistake to see these concerns as transient interests or as works that merely represent his political commitments. These articles developed from the very center of his investigations into contemporary history. He searched for general implications, the collective forces, in the facts of current history and one must be struck by the shift in time and in efforts of his work after the war to the forces for conflict, revolution, socialism, and totalitarianism rather than to his history of liberty. The general implications for modern society of the forces for revolution and conflict held together his exploration of progress in a democratic society and his second major work, the unrealized history of European socialism, but in the post-war period his attention was drawn more and more to the convulsion of contemporary history.

The relation of social and national revolution to the war, and the implications of war, socialism and revolution for the democratic and parliamentary liberal state, began to take shape in Halévy's thought with the Rhodes Memorial Lectures on "The World Crisis, 1914-1918." The lectures drew together the apparently disparate lectures and articles that he had done on war and on nationalism and socialism. The problem that he raised in the lectures became the central concern of the last fifteen years of his life and led him to see the war as the great

convulsion of the twentieth century that had not yet subsided, a convulsion brought on by the fever of national and class fanaticism.

All the great convulsions in modern history combined the forces for war and the forces for revolution, Halévy said in 1929.⁷⁸ In the main, massive dislocations such as the World War, the French Revolution or the Protestant Reformation were not caused by economic problems; the true sources of such catastrophes lay buried in the deepest human passions. In a few bold strokes, he sketched the outlines of a picture of class conflicts, of socialism, which had rigidified into a movement dominated by a single doctrine and aiming at the revolution of European society. Among the socialists the German Social Democratic Party had emerged as the most powerful party in the most powerful state. But for all its revolutionary rhetoric it was a party which pursued a policy "not so much of revolutionary action as of revolutionary expectation, a policy of waiting."⁷⁹ The paradox that Halévy had seen a young man visiting Germany still seemed crucial to his analysis of the role of socialism in the German Empire. Germany, the most highly industrialized and apparently democratic power, was, in reality, subject to a political regime of feudalism and absolutism in which the party that stood for democracy simultaneously stood for social upheaval, a fact which would have explosive consequences for world history.⁸⁰

Halévy emphasized, however, that in spite of the authority of the German Social Democrats in the pre-war socialist movement, no one thought that Germany was the center of the world revolutionary movement. France and Russia were Europe's revolutionary centers. Revolutionary activity, as opposed to doctrine or organization, was not directed or

dominated by the Second International. In France the rise of an anti-parliamentary syndicalism, calling for direct action against the state and against capitalism, captured the loyalty of both workers and intellectuals. The syndicalist movement had spread to many countries outside of France--Spain and Italy, where orthodox Marxism had always had a difficult time sinking roots, and had even reached England and the United States. In Russia, where a revolution had already occurred in 1905-6, terrorist activities tried "to throw the whole society into a state of constant panic, dislocate the machinery of government, and prepare the advent of universal liberty through universal anarchy."⁸¹ On the eve of the war, Halévy reminded his audience, in every country diplomats and statesmen feared that the beginning of revolution would spark war as it had in the French Revolution or that social upheaval would spread throughout Europe as it had in 1848; but as it happened the outbreak of the war "threw the revolutionary peril into the background."⁸² The forces for war were still more powerful than the forces for revolution in 1914.

Pushing aside the question of the war guilt of individual nations, Halévy challenged the economic or materialist conception of the war's origins with a few well-chosen facts.⁸³ Between 1904-11 French and German capitalists were able to resolve their conflicts, but the Krupp-Schneider agreements broke down in the face of the resistance of the French nationalists "who thought it too international, and of the French socialists, who thought it too capitalistic."⁸⁴ Halévy rephrased Norman Angell's argument that the forms of capitalism in the great states actually made for peace, and he extended it to say that there was much that might be said for the system of "armed peace" between

1870 and 1914.⁸⁵ He went further and argued that the three "unholy allies" of the nineteenth century had correctly understood that "revolution and war are two very closely allied notions." They had formed their system of mutual insurance against both notions.⁸⁶

Halévy argued that despite the alliance systems which split Europe in two, the three autocratic courts of Eastern Europe managed to preserve the general peace in the first and second Balkan Wars because they knew that "peace was the safest course for the preservation of monarchical order in Europe."⁸⁷ Ambition for material or military power took a poor second place to the power of ideology, the revolutionary movements of national liberation, as the force that pushed the great powers to war. The collective forces for war came from the East, let loose by the revolution in Russia following the conflict with Japan, and then rapidly spreading to China, India, Persia, and to the Young Turks. Halévy insisted that the dissolution of Turkey inevitably raised the possibility of the dissolution of Austria. "The Great War was a war for the liberty of the peoples from its inception," he argued and once the revolutionary principle of nationality began to dismember the Austrian Empire "nothing short of a miracle could prevent its developing into a general war."⁸⁸

Halévy's aim in his third lecture was to approach the history of the war in a new way stressing the interaction of class and national conflict. Dividing the war into two parts, broken at 1917 by the Russian Revolution, he interpreted the struggle in the West as a struggle for nationality, whereas the German-Russian conflict of 1914 was merely a rivalry of imperialisms.⁸⁹ He assumed that had Germany been able to maintain its triumph of 1914-16 in the West it would have broken down in the face of national rebellion. Similarly, Austria-

Hungary would have disintegrated following the withdrawal of German troops, victorious or vanquished. The principle of nationality was so powerful that even the Germans could appeal to its force against the British and French in North Africa, against the British in India and Ireland; in Belgium and Russia the German appeal to nationality divided the populace.

This war of rival nationalities was stalemated by 1916 and it took the entrance of the United States and the exit of Russia to drastically alter the balance of power. Although Halévy insisted on the importance of American entrance to world power politics, he concentrated, in this essay, on the impact of the Russian Revolution, which bore out his thesis of the inextricably entwined nature of war and revolution. At the beginning of the war it seemed as though the revolutionary aspirations were submerged in the hopes of national solidarity. But Halévy was one of the first historians to call attention to the fact that even those working-class leaders who participated in the national efforts of their respective countries succeeded in furthering the cause of socialism.⁹⁰ The war economy came to be the model for socialist organization. Socialists hoped that the interventions and the consolidations of the economy achieved by an emergency government would be continued. They could then achieve a "permanent regime of state socialism combined with syndicalism without the horrors of revolution, if not without the horrors of war."⁹¹

But in the "socialist" stream there had always been at least two rival currents joined together: one, an attraction to organization to make the productive and political forces of society more efficient, and the other, a libertarian resistance to organization whether it be

capitalist or statist. During the war, workers who were discontented with conditions in spite of the greater benefits that they received, joined with pacifist elements against both the war and the state leadership in the war. It did not matter that men who were also socialists participated in the organization of victory. At the same time, there were those, symbolized by Lenin at Zimmerwald, who remained true to Hervéist propaganda of the syndicalist period before the war. They aimed for the revolution of the future, a revolution against capitalism and against war carried out by workers and soldiers.⁹²

In the Rhodes Lectures Halévy assigned the Russian Revolution a role which differed significantly from the part that he believed the revolution played in the history of the socialist movement or in the era of tyrannies. In the drama of the war of nationalities "the Russian Revolution had acted as a solvent of imperialism for the benefit, not so much of Communism, or even of socialism, as of nationality."⁹³ Its immediate impact on the war was to demoralize the war effort of both the Allied and the Central Powers, but events in Russia made possible the United States' entrance so that "the war could be fought on the democratic lines of President Wilson's Fourteen Points."⁹⁴ Halévy commented that Wilson's program "to a certain extent, directly or indirectly, consciously or not, was influenced by the new Russian formula of 'a peace without annexation or indemnity.'"⁹⁵ Events in Russia also inspired the revolt in Germany that ultimately led to peace and to a republican and socialist government. In Austria, following the Russian collapse, the national and social revolutions combined to bring about the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire. The battle of Vittorio Veneto, Halévy asserted, was merely the breaking up of the Austrian army into

its component national elements to promote the social revolution in Vienna and Budapest and the national revolution in Prague and Zagreb.⁹⁶

Halévy underlined the inevitability and spontaneity of the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire in the last weeks of the war. In 1929 many English liberals, as well as a number of Central European publicists, rejected the Versailles Treaty, regarding the creation of independent nations from that empire as a serious mistake. Halévy reminded his audience that to end a revolutionary war a revolutionary treaty based on the principle of nationality, recognizing states created according to that principle was written. The realization of the aspirations of nationality at Versailles "represented the triumph of everything that the liberals of the nineteenth century had fought for."⁹⁷

Halévy's lecture on the "World Crisis" was a pivotal work which drew together his investigations into the domestic problems of modern European states and his research into the origins of the first World War. Once again he stressed the power of ideas to move men to act often against any simple economic definition of their interests. It is particularly significant that he conceived of the crisis as world-wide. He was one of the most ardent of the spokesmen who took it upon themselves to remind Europeans in the post-war period that theirs was a new age because power had shifted from Western Europe to include America, Russia, Japan, and Britain's Empire. He stressed the world-wide significance of the crisis but he expressly denied that imperialism, in any vulgar Marxist sense, had been the cause of the war. He denied economic causation but he stressed the enormous revolutionary potential of anti-imperialism and of colonial nationalism in both his Epilogue and in the Rhodes lectures. He saw Russia's loss to Japan in terms of its revolu-

tionary potential for colonial peoples. It was such a powerful force that he ascribed the origins of the war to the uprising which spread from the revolt in the East. He saw the national revolution in Asia as a dual revolution against the West and against native governments.⁹⁸ As a matter of fact this theme so dominated his thinking that he subsumed his discussion of the day-to-day negotiations in July and August of 1914 under the heading "The East and the Principle of Nationality" which led Charles Seignobos, whose writing of contemporary history was more restrained, to give Halevy a geography lesson of the Balkans in his very favorable review of volume six.⁹⁹

His emphasis on anti-colonialism reflected his own political code. In the years before the war Halevy had been particularly sensitive to issues of imperialism and national revolution among colonial peoples, realizing immediately the enormous importance of European expansion on their political and military systems. Yet, as a young professor, the conflicting values of peace and national self-determination had bothered him. As he had written to Bougle from Ireland:

Why aren't they [English and Irish newspapers] interested in the uprising of the Bulgars? the conquest of the Far East by Russia? the absorption of the Touaregs by France? All these events diminish the importance of the acts of the Combes ministry.... They raise again a problem that I can't resolve.... You say to me that, as professors and not soldiers, our function is to preach peace and not to conquer nations. But the problem remains. In preaching peace are we going to realize the peaceful federation of that crowd of misformed beings, great and small, which we call modern nations; or indeed, in discrediting war, to prepare for the absorption of all the weak and tired nations by those capable of dominating all the others? Ireland wants to be a nation.... What moral value does that present for an apostle of universal peace?¹⁰⁰

It is difficult to understand Geoffrey Barraclough's charge that

Halévy was blind to the costs of colonialism for human freedom and happiness¹⁰¹ unless Barraclough did not know the Epilogue. His further point that Halévy's exclusive concern with the crisis of European liberalism blinded him to the fact that the death of laissez-faire liberal individualism might mean the beginnings of freedom for millions of non-Europeans plainly ignores the nature of Halévy's liberalism. His anti-imperialism was not built on a theory that the liberal laissez-faire individualism presupposed colonialism. In point of fact, he believed the opposite--that colonialism or imperialism developed hand-in-hand with the extension of a demagogic democracy and statism. Halévy's thinking was much closer to the radical individualism of a man like Hobson who reasoned that the preservation of liberal democratic government required an anti-colonial foreign policy precisely because imperialism strengthened the authority of the state and of the militarist social groups in the state and was therefore detrimental to democratic liberalism.

Fritz Stern has pointed out that the Rhodes lectures "reflected the happy glow of the Locarno spirit" which would be extinguished within the year.¹⁰² Halévy did, after all, remark that the failure of the revolutionaries to turn the nationality struggle into the class struggle marked the end of the world crisis. The events which signalled the true end of the war were the failure of a communist rising in Italy and the retreat from Warsaw of the Bolsheviks. On the whole, in 1929, he thought the European results of the war had not been as disastrous as he had thought they would be from his place in Albertville. He was able to see that the war had been conducted for the liberation of nationalities, against imperialism, and that to a degree

something had been accomplished. There was still labor unrest to appease and oppressed nations to liberate, but Germany's defeat allowed the "states of the season" a springtime and a respite for England and France.

For the time being it seemed to him that class antagonisms were buried beneath national fanaticisms.¹⁰³ Bolshevism had been successfully contained in Russia as he had thought it would be in 1917. Socialism, which had been a disruptive force before and immediately after the war, had been acclimated in the democracies. The Labour Party had taken up the tasks of the Liberal Party and much of its foreign policy. Once again England's social ethic had restrained a potentially destructive force. In France the socialists had survived their confrontation with the communists and Léon Blum's leadership seemed to promise some continuity with the Jaurèsian tradition of democratic socialism.

The full significance of fascism with its limitless potential for terror that came from fusing the two fanaticisms of class and national hatreds was not yet apparent to Halévy, or for that matter to others, early in 1929. He knew Italy well and was much more aware than his contemporaries of how much cause for alarm, for moral repulsion there was in Mussolini's experiment. But it did not seem to be an ideology for export. He did not despair for democracy until he saw the paralysis of the democracies, including the socialists, in the depression and in Hitler's seizure of power. Then, convinced that war was inevitable, Halévy would look back to 1914 as the beginning of the era of tyrannies when the combined forces for war and for revolution threatened to end parliamentary, liberal democracy.

¹See Halévy's comments during the session of the Société française de philosophie of December 30, 1907. T. Ruysen, "Pacifisme et Patriotisme," Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie, VIII (1908), pp. 54, 59, 61. Halévy's letter to Alain of March 8, 1913 passionately rejected an article by Alain which attacked the draft on pacifist grounds. The letter is printed in the Correspondance, pp. 130-132.

²Elie Halévy, "The World Crisis of 1914-18: An Interpretation," The Era of Tyrannies, p. 247.

³Halévy to Léon, November 21, 1917, Correspondance, p. 366.

⁴Halévy to Léon, December 16, 1916, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection. "If I should have the misfortune to bury you and I want to give the impression of your political wisdom I would only have to publish a collection of your letters that you have sent to me for the last twenty months. I would not be able to say as much for any other of my correspondents."

⁵Halévy to Léon, November 26, 1914, printed in part in Correspondance, p. 342.

⁶Halévy to Léon, September 4, 1914 and February 15, 1915, Correspondance, pp. 339, 345.

⁷Halévy to Léon, May 25, 1915, Correspondance, p. 348.

⁸Halévy to Léon, October 11, 1915, Correspondance, pp. 352-353. See also Halévy to Leon, February 3, 1916, p. 356.

⁹Halévy to Léon, September 23, 1914, printed in part in Correspondance, p. 340.

¹⁰Halévy to Léon, October 14, 1915, Correspondance, p. 353.

¹¹Halévy to Léon, May 10, 1915, Correspondance, p. 347.

¹²Halévy to Léon, November 26, 1914, Correspondance, p. 342.

¹³Halévy to Léon, February 11, 1915 and June 5, 1915, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

¹⁴Halévy to Léon, June 5, 1915, Correspondance, p. 348.

¹⁵Halévy to Léon, February 11, 1915, printed in part, Correspondance, pp. 344-345.

¹⁶Halévy to Léon, September 23, 1914, Correspondance, p. 340.

¹⁷Halévy to Léon, November 26, 1914, Correspondance, p. 342.

¹⁸Halévy to Léon, September 23, 1914, Correspondance, p. 340.

¹⁹Halévy to Léon, October 21, 1914, printed in part, Correspondance p. 341.

²⁰Halévy to Léon, September 23, 1914, Correspondance, p. 340.

²¹Halévy to Léon, December 16, 1916, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²²Halévy to Léon, October 21, 1914, Correspondance, p. 341.

²³Halévy to Léon, September 12, 1916, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Halévy to Léon, December 13, 1916, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁶Halévy to Léon, December 9, 1916, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁷Halévy to Léon, March 28, 1917, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁸Halévy to Léon, April 24, 1917, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

²⁹Halévy to Léon, October 12, 1917, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³⁰Halévy's unpublished and incomplete essay on the French parliamentary system, which was written some time after the condemnation of Malvy. Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³¹Ibid.

³²Halévy to Léon, December 1916, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³³Halévy did write one piece of propaganda during the war which was published anonymously in 1917, L'apart de la France, a pamphlet in the form of a letter from a French soldier to American soldiers. A remarkably restrained pamphlet, it attempted to explain the sources of French pride to the American allies. The work was identified by Halévy's niece and executor, Docteur Henriette Noufflard Guy-Loé. The work is listed in Melvin Richter's "Bibliography."

³⁴Halévy to Léon, December 15, 1914, Correspondance, p. 343.

³⁵Halévy to Léon, October 9, 1916, Correspondance, pp. 360-361.

³⁶Halévy to Léon, April 12, 1916, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³⁷Halévy to Léon, November 14, 1915 and September 21, 1916, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³⁸Halévy to Léon, November 14, 1915, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

³⁹Halévy to Léon, March 1, 1915, Correspondance, pp. 345-346.

⁴⁰Halévy to Léon, October 5, 1916, Correspondance, p. 360.

⁴¹Halévy to Léon, September 12, 1915, Correspondance, p. 352.

⁴²Halévy to Léon, November 22, 1917, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴³Halévy to Léon, August 20, 1916, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴⁴Halévy to Léon, June 22, 1915, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴⁵Halévy to Léon, September 18, 1917, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴⁶Halévy to Léon, January 10, 1917, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴⁷Halévy to Léon, January 10, 1917, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴⁸Halévy to Léon, September 18, 1917, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁴⁹Halévy to Léon, January 10, 1917, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁵⁰Halévy to Léon, September 29, 1917, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁵¹Halévy to Léon, December 30, 1918, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection. See also Halévy to Bouglé, March 23, 1918 and June 8 1918, Correspondance, pp. 367-368.

⁵²Halévy to Léon, December 30, 1918, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection. See also March 24, 1916, Correspondance, pp. 356-357.

⁵³Halévy to Léon, January 14, 1919, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁵⁴Elie Halévy, "Introduction," History of the English People, Vol. II: The Liberal Awakening (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1916), pp. ix-x.

⁶⁷Halévy, "L'Opinion anglaise et la France," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, CXVII (1923), p. 365.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 370.

⁶⁹Elie Halévy, "Les Rapports franco-anglais de 1882 a 1914," Les Cahiers de Radio Paris, VIII (October 15, 1937), 1003.

⁷⁰Halévy, "Les origines de la discorde anglo-allemande," Revue de Paris, XXVIII (February 1, 1921), 563-583. The Daily Telegraph had published before the war a series of articles by a Silesian Junker Baron von Eckardstein in which he revealed, as he repeated in his Souvenirs, that he, as secretary to the ambassador to London under Count Hatzfeldt, had participated in discussions with important English figures. These discussions, had they been successful, would have drawn England from isolation into an alliance aimed at France and Russia. [Daily Telegraph, August 15, 19, 26, 28, September 7, 10, 11, 1912] Halévy's second article was "Les Origines de l'Entente (1902-3), Revue de Paris (1924), XXXI, 293-318.

⁷¹Halévy, Angleterre et son Empire (Paris: Pages Libres, 1905).

⁷²Halévy, "Franco-German Relations since 1870," History, IX (1924), 18.

⁷³Ibid., p. 19.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 28. Halévy's student, Etienne Mantoux, wrote The Carthaginian Peace to forestall the repetition of the revisionism inspired by Keynes' Economic Consequences of the Peace. Mantoux wrote his book in English and left the manuscript with Halévy's widow shortly before his death in the liberation of France.

⁷⁵Halévy, "Document anglais sur les origines de la guerre," Revue de Paris, CXXIV (1927), p. 788.

⁷⁶Halévy, "L'Angleterre sur le seuil de la guerre (Aout 1913-1914)," Revue de Paris, XXXVIII (September, 1931), p. 32.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 36.

⁷⁸Halévy, "The World Crisis: An Appreciation," The Era of Tyrannies p. 213.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 215.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 216. This argument is fundamentally the liberal view of German history of the Second Empire which stresses the failure of Wilhelmine Germany to reflect in its institutions the rising power of the working class. See Carl Schorske, German Social Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), and Rudolf Caper, Failure of a Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge at the University Press, 1955). For a critique of this thesis see James McRandle, "The German

⁵⁵Melvin Richter, "Elie Halévy," International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.

⁵⁶Angleterre carton, Halévy papers, Ecole Normale Supérieure. There are many letters, memos from labor leaders, employers, administrators from whom Halévy received information or of whom he made inquiries about the workings of the Whitley Councils, the nationalization proposals in the coal industry, inspection schemes, etc. There are as well innumerable clippings and drafts of legislation sent by English friends. In general his contacts with men of all parties and occupation in England.

⁵⁷Sebastien Charléty, "Elie Halévy, 1870-1937," Revue des Sciences Politiques, LII (1937), pp. 422-426.

⁵⁸Elie Halévy, "Viscount Morley 'Les Souvenirs de Lord Morley,'" Revue de Metaphysique XXV (1918), 83-97. Actually Halévy wrote three reviews related to "honest John." "Morley, 'Recollections,'" Revue des Sciences Politiques XXXX (August-December, 1918), 316-317; the long essay in Revue de Metaphysique; and "J.H. Morley 'John Viscount Morley, An Appreciation and Some Reminiscences,'" Revue des Sciences Politiques XXXXVIII (1925), 603-604.

⁵⁹Halévy, "Viscount Morley 'Les Souvenirs de Lord Morley,'" Revue de Metaphysique XXV (1918), p. 96.

⁶⁰Halévy to chief sub editor of The Spectator, January 12, 1930, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.

⁶¹Halévy, "Le problème des nationalities," Revue de Metaphysique XLVI (1939), 147-151. This paper was given at Oxford in September 1920 and reprinted in memoriam. It was originally printed in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. XX (1919-20), 237-242.

⁶²Ibid., p. 148.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 147-148.

⁶⁴Halévy, "l'Opinion anglaise et la France," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, CXVII (December 10, 1923), 354-371.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 359.

⁶⁶Halévy's second and third volumes to the History of the English Peoples were published in France in 1923. He commented that he brought new insights to the problems of England after the Napoleonic Wars because of his experience of the Great War. But he resisted the parallels between statesmen of 1815 and those of 1918 which were very popular after the first World War. His own judgment of Canning was negative and his positive estimation of Peel reflected his war-time re-evaluations, he said. (pp. ix-x).

Revolution," The Track of the Wolf (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965). Most historians of socialism in Germany must tackle the problem of the failure of the German Social Democratic Party to make a revolution. Halévy never thought that it was capable of attempting revolution.

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 221-222.

⁸²Ibid., p. 223.

⁸³Ibid., p. 224.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 225-227.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 227.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 233.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 231. For this thesis Halévy acknowledged his debt to a great historian whom he had always admired Albert Sorel. Halévy's other mentor Seignobos was critical of his stress on the Eastern aspect of the nationality question but even as a young man Halévy had drawn his friends' attention to the East as the source of conflict for the West.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 235.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 240.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 241.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid., p. 245.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 243.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 244.

⁹⁷Ibid.

⁹⁸Halévy, The History of the English Peoples, Vol. VI: Epilogue: The Rule of Democracy (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961), p. 621ff.

⁹⁹Charles Seignobos review of Halévy, Epilogue: Vers la démocratie sociale et vers la guerre 1905-1914 in Revue critique d'histoire et de littérature (1932), p. 565.

¹⁰⁰Halévy to Bouglé, August 20, 1903, Correspondance, p.329.

¹⁰¹Geoffrey Barraclough, "Historian at the End of His Tether," New York Review of Books, III (1966), 20-22.

¹⁰²Fritz Stern, "A Note on 'The World Crisis of 1914-1918,'" The Era of Tyrannies, p. 323.

¹⁰³Halévy, "The World Crisis," p. 245.

CHAPTER VI

THE ERA OF TYRANNIES

In November 1936 in the middle of the Popular Front Elie Halévy led a conference on the era of tyrannies, by which he meant the emergence of totalitarianism in the twentieth century. His observations were out of step with the political march of the moment. He drew attention to communist and fascist regimes, asserting that they had many features in common. They both rejected liberal, parliamentary democracy. Both systems arose from the first World War and from a socialist critique of capitalism. He did not claim they were identical but in the politically charged atmosphere of 1936 that fact was not immediately apparent to many of his audience. To those who had chosen the Left as the best defender of their political ideals against the threat of fascism the comparison was, if not a slap in the face, then at least a sound shaking. To those whose sympathies lay on the Right, and there were a few who participated in the session, Halévy's liberal, democratic principles were anachronistic and his sympathies too much to the Left.

In the beginning of the discussion Halévy returned to his theme that from its very origins socialism suffered from an internal contradiction: on the one hand its supporters thought it the logical outcome, the fulfillment of the democratic promise of liberty, equality and fraternity of the Revolution of 1789, a liberation from the subjection

of labor by capital; on the other hand, socialism, reacting against individualism and liberalism, proposed compulsory organization.¹ He offered three historical examples to illustrate his points. First, he asserted that socialism was organizational and hierarchical in its earliest form, an insight he had drawn from his study of Saint-Simon. Second, he argued that the internal contradiction of socialism in 1848 led inevitably to Bonapartist caesarism, which he thought comparable to Mussolini's fascism. Finally, he stressed that the origins of German social democracy incorporated both Marx and Lassalle, the radical internationalist with anarchist and communist aspirations for humanity and the nationalist creator of Bismarck's "social monarchy." These assertions were familiar territory for an audience that knew Halévy's thought on socialism. His historical examples were, in fact, the same ones that he had drawn upon in his introduction to the 1924 edition of La Doctrine de Saint-Simon.

The second section of Halévy's communication opened with his first formulation of the thesis that the era of tyrannies began in August 1914 when the inherent contradictions of socialism were forced into the open by the major convulsion of World War I. The belligerents extended state control to the means of production, distribution and exchange with the aid of the leaders of workers' organizations. According to Halévy that extension of control was syndicalism and corporativism under state aegis. State control reached beyond the economy to thought control in the forms of censorship and what Halévy called "the organization of enthusiasm."² He warned that the development of similar structure and methods in all the belligerents, whether democratic or autocratic, characterized a new

era. Actually, in his letters Halévy had raised these problems during the war which he thought would strengthen the illiberal form of socialism over the democratic one.

Halévy asserted that post-war socialism derived more from the wartime regime than from Marxist doctrine. Paradoxically, he commented, hatred and disgust for war drove many of the participants into the camp of revolution and socialism and adherence to a revolutionary warlike regime which persisted in time of peace. The Russian Revolution was, at the outset, a national rejection of war but it became organized as "war communism." The Bolsheviks' tactics inspired him with another paradox, which irritated his listeners: "Because of the anarchical collapse, because of the complete disappearance of the state, a group of armed men, moved by a common faith, decreed that they were the state: in this form Bolshevism is, literally, a 'fascism.'" ³

His fourth and last observation stressed that "fascism" was a counter-socialism which directly imitated Russian methods of government. He admitted that he took the "corporatist" experiments of fascism more seriously than did other anti-fascists because he saw them as the expansion of state control allied with and not in opposition to elements of the working class. ⁴ There was, he remarked, an internal contradiction in European society itself in that conservatives called for unlimited strengthening of the state with severe reduction of its economic functions, while socialists demanded the limitless extension of the state's functions with an unlimited weakening of its authority. Between these polar opposites there was a compromise position which he provocatively called "national socialism." ⁵

Halévy's statement of his thesis was very brief, fewer than 750

words. He was, in fact, immediately criticized for his brevity.⁶ Yet a lifetime of historical and philosophical investigations and attitudes were packed into a few general symbols, such as socialism, which took on a multiplicity of meanings, confusing the issues but also illuminating them in a manner not unlike Tocqueville's use of "equality." He was much more explicit regarding other concepts. He chose the term "tyranny" over the current one of "dictatorship" because he intended to call to mind the ancient Greek tradition of arbitrary rule without a foreseeable end. Furthermore, in Aristotle the tyranny frequently developed from the conditions of a degenerate democracy or a war, implications which he accepted.⁷ To him the word "dictatorship" signified a provisional regime, which left the normal rule of liberty intact, in that it was assumed the society would return to that state at some future date. He noted that none of the regimes to which he referred as tyrannies assumed that the governmental form was an emergency measure lasting only for the time of troubles.

It might be remarked that some characteristics of the ancient tyranny were not Halévy's subject, for example motives of personal aggrandizement of the tyrant. Halévy's failure to stress peculiar traits of the regimes that were his subject, such as the monolithic ideological party and the systematic use of terror, may have arisen from his acceptance of the classic conceptualization. This is particularly puzzling in Halévy, who was deeply moved by the brutality of the tyrannies, some of which he had seen first-hand in Italy. Of the terror, perhaps even he did not comprehend the systematic nature of purges and repressions in tyrannies in spite of the fact that he was outspoken and active in the defense of individuals who were victims of

political repression in Italy and the Soviet Union.⁸ The fact that this master of ideology tended to skim over the ideological basis of the monolithic party in the middle of a discussion of the intellectual implications of socialism for this century is significant indeed. His emphasis on the importance of war in the creation of governments of armed bands of men reinforced his sense of tyranny. It suggests that he believed the fine points of theory to be much less important to the Bolsheviks or the fascists than the absence of any real counter power.

Halévy thought he found an explanation of totalitarianism in the socializing tendencies of modern life, which he saw in contemporary ideological movements and in the overwhelming extension of the power of the state in this century. His argument was basically two-fold: one, that the intellectual origins of communism and fascism were rooted in "socialism" and that they, therefore, shared many features; and two, that the experience of this century, including both the war and certain trends of modern industrial society and government, reinforced and contributed to these intellectual affinities. Socialism was essential to Halévy's definition of the modern tyrannies. He limited his discussion to those states which made some appeal, demagogic or not, to socialist principles, that is to Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. He preferred to leave Spain aside because its fate was not yet clear and he said that he would not speak of the Balkan tyrannies, which offered nothing new, except that in 1936 they could claim that they had raised themselves to the level of German civilization by their autocratic and barbarous practices.⁹

There was another socialist tradition, libertarian and rationalist,

democratic and anti-statist--one which Halévy had tried to preserve some memory of--but it took second place to the authoritarian and bureaucratic extension of state power in his observations of 1936. There was an ironic element in the fact that Halévy, whose early publications on socialist origins tended to concentrate on the non-Marxist, non-statist figures like Hodgskin, or critics of capitalism like Sismondi and Saint-Simon, would be the one who insisted on the authoritarian heritage. These early studies had pointed to the liberating impulse in socialism but after the war he was oppressed by the tyrannical aspects of socialism. When others preferred to stress the democratic, anarchist heritage and to reject the statist, irrationalist and especially nationalist traits of twentieth century social movements as aberrations, inauthentically socialist, Halévy claimed a legitimate place for these mutations. There was a surfeit of ironies in this session of the Société Française de Philosophie. Halévy, who had resisted the Marxist domination of socialist thought because of its bureaucratic and authoritarian aspects, found himself in the position of placing Marx, because he was internationalist, humanist, and anarchist, in the democratic tradition in opposition to the authoritarian, nationalist strain represented by Lassalle.

It is difficult to establish the issues Halévy preferred to address himself to in the discussion that followed his hypothesis. By its nature the debate moved in directions that other participants chose, and it was Halévy's nature to pursue relentlessly the logic of his argument. Much of the exchange related to the validity of the communist-fascist parallels and to his definition and interpretation of socialism. Yet in Halévy's responses one finds his life-long concerns, views he had held for a long time and insights which he had come to only relatively

recently. The consistent themes are, of course, the importance of socialism in the twentieth century and its contradictory nature. Another fairly constant message was his sense that war threatened the destruction of political liberty, perhaps the life of independent democratic states as he knew them. The relative optimism of "The World Crisis" was gone--his sense that the war of nationalities had indeed fulfilled the liberal program of national self-determination and held up the promise of liberty to the politically subject peoples of the world. Now he thought August 1914 had opened the era of tyrannies.

Halévy's discussion of socialism confused and provoked many in his audience and continues to this day to spark vehement reactions. In his mind socialism was both an ideology and the behavior of states and mass movements. It might and did include collective ownership of the instruments of production, a planned economy or an economy in which the state manipulated the price mechanism, provided supports, subsidies, social legislation or sponsored the cartelization of industries, and modern collectivist ideology. Without distinguishing between these aspects of state authority, his definition bordered on equating all growth of the authority, his definition bordered on equating all growth of the authority of the state, or étatisme, with socialism. In the debate he discussed a variety of phenomena as modern socialism, frequently shifting the ground of his argument. He spoke of socialism as a philosophy, as a political and economic trend toward concentration and collectivization, as the aggrandizement of state power, and as an historical movement with complex associations between socialist and nationalist developments.

That Halévy intended to probe the implications of socialism in terms of both the ideological developments and the structural characteristics of modern society may have been obscured by some by his

intellectualist manner. It seemed clear, however, from the discussion and from his defense of his ideological approach to the subject that he meant to approach the tendency to "socialism" or to "tyranny" much the same as Durkheim and Tocqueville addressed the tendency in modern society to "organization" or to "democracy." He said:

Ideas stylize and schematize events. Nothing I can think of seems more useful for an understanding of events than such schematization. When we see what success a doctrine like the Marxian doctrine has had, it is because it expresses certain striking features in economic development better than anything else, because it answers certain deep needs of the working masses. How can we deny its utility, insofar as it helps us to understand those striking features and those deep needs?¹⁰

Halévy's sense of socialism was equivocal though fertile. But the most striking thing about his discussion of it that November day in 1936 was the difficulty of sharing the insights that he had. While his sense of socialism and his contrast of it with liberalism undoubtedly heightened his sensitivity to common traits among the totalitarian regimes, it was also the source of considerable misunderstanding. As he himself had noted many times, the Marxist domination of socialism was so pronounced that men had forgotten there had ever been any other kind of socialism, which was borne out when one of his listeners demanded that he distinguish between false socialism and Marxism, the "only true and living socialism."¹¹ His further comments and those of others indicated that there were many who had forgotten that there were Marxists other than Soviet ones. Those who were unwilling to differentiate Marxism and Leninism were antagonistic to Halévy's grouping together of bolshevism and fascism by common characteristics arising from socialism and war.

But Halévy intended to discuss all the aspects of socialism implied in his many variations on the theme. When Brunschvicg's preliminary remarks threatened to direct the discussion toward the philosophical question of historical materialism by recalling the Sorel-Halévy exchange of 1902, Halévy abruptly opened the debate to all aspects of socialism, not just Marxian, and not just theoretical or ideological ones. In fact, throughout the discussion he tended to direct it away from theory to the reality of the moment. He threw the discussion wide open by asking not only about the tyrannies he had described--their potential for decomposition, for survival, for expansion--but about his view of socialism itself.¹²

As we have seen Halévy devoted half of his life to questions of European socialism, problems of ideology and of working class and intellectual movements and parties. His first sense of socialism derived from his study of Saint-Simon who incorporated into his doctrine contradictory impulses to liberate and to organize some authority capable of improving the "lot of the most numerous and the poorest class." This conflict resembled the one between artificial and natural identity of interests that he had found in the origins of utilitarianism. He admitted that the internal contradictions in socialism might have been present in the idea of democracy, but he thought that the radical democratic stress on the equality of individuals, rather than classes, separated political democracy from socialism. Radical democracy was a different movement, perhaps an inherently more liberal one, though there was an ambiguity in the Jacobin legacy as well.¹³

Furthermore, conditions in the nineteenth century had provided

liberties along with the shortcomings of liberalism and the merely political nature of the radical democratic program. The History of the English Peoples in the Nineteenth Century was, after all, a history of liberty, stability and even progress. The comparison with France that was implied throughout the work was a comparison with another liberal democratic state, but one which had developed through more perilous political and social conditions threatened by the extremes of Caesarism and anarchy. Historical conditions in the twentieth century did not seem to promise comparable benefits of either liberty, stability, or democracy. To Halévy's mind conditions seemed to reinforce state authority, ultimately vitiating the emancipating impulses of socialism because war misshaped socialism into tyrannical regimes. He was fearful that even France might succumb to the illiberal form of socialism.¹⁴

From his earliest comments on socialism Halévy connected socialism and the militant nation-state in a profound way. In the 1930s his emphasis was much greater on this connection than on any other aspect of socialism. In the "Era of Tyrannies," for example, one might say by way of criticism that it is difficult to distinguish nineteenth-century authoritarianism or Caesarism from twentieth century totalitarianism. His constant assumption of the strong bond between socialism and the powerful nation-state blurs many distinctions between Bismarck's social monarchy, Napoleon's Caesarism, and bolshevism and fascism. To draw the attention of his audience at Chatham House in 1934 to the "new despotism" of the 1930s, he borrowed Spencer's prophecy of a "new Toryism" of protection, socialism and militarism.¹⁵ To a superficial

observer there is more than a difference in degree between Joseph Chamberlain's reforms and Mussolini's dopolavoro, or perhaps between Cripps and Mussolini or Stalin.

Halévy thought that socialist doctrines were so easily assimilated to militancy and to extreme nationalism that it presented a problem to liberal socialists. Their Gladstonian pacifism, internationalism and economic cosmopolitanism conflicted with their demand for a strong state to protect the well-being of its citizenry. As he said: "In the west, liberal socialists would like to speak the language of Gladstone and the language of Lenin at the same time."¹⁶

He illustrated his point with the Labour Party's ambivalent position in the Parliament. Parliament embodied the nineteenth-century principle, one might say the Whig principle, of preserving liberty against the natural absolutist tendencies of the state by constantly challenging its authority, by criticizing and supervising it, and by virtually refusing obedience to it.¹⁷ Labour politicians found such a delicate balancing act difficult, oriented as they were toward opposition to the state while trying to move toward a stronger government in order to realize their program. Of course, conservatives faced the reverse of this problem, desiring a powerful state which would be economically passive.

In the twentieth century both conservatives and socialists found their positions intolerable, if they thought them through, because a strong state equipped for war meant an unprecedented level of intervention and control of the economy and the citizenry. Halévy asked the socialists, to whom he had addressed this dilemma before, "How could the state be strengthened without running the risk of militant

nationalism?"¹⁸ The alternative of militant nationalism was still offensive to most liberal socialists. Halévy might have directed the reverse of the question to conservatives--how could the militant nation-state be strengthened without controlling the economy?--but his attention was focussed on the dilemma of socialism in the twentieth century. Could militant nationalism, socialist or other, live in peace with rival militant nations? Halévy thought not and he warned that the nature of war in this century was such that it would undermine liberal, socialist and by implication conservative values as well.

At the outbreak of the previous war Halévy was struck by the qualitative change in the nature of state intervention caused by total mobilization. The wartime state in all the belligerent nations organized production and the allocation of raw materials and finished goods and censored public opinion to the point that few dared speak of the hardships of civilian sacrifice for the war effort. These government controls were akin to communism and at the same time devoid of any radical theory or messianic hope of liberation or emancipation of mankind. He wondered if there was anything in a program of state ownership or controls of basic industries which contradicted Caesarism, or fascism or authoritarianism of any sort.¹⁹ He decided that there was not and that liberal socialists must accept that fact for the threat to their liberal principles that it was. It seemed clear to him that conservatives and liberals alike must admit that the state that was prepared for vigorous and militant foreign policy was by his definition "socialist" in a new and fearsome way. As he pointed out, the wartime measures of the Great War (which even conservatives resorted to) would have fulfilled the program of nationalization demanded by the Guesdists

245

at the turn of the century.²⁰

As we have seen, this was not the first time that Halévy had connected war and socialism. In the midst of the first World War he had written that a new era opened on the day that Jaurès was assassinated and the conflagration of war broke out,²¹ a new era in class and national conflict. But he had put aside his wartime, cassandra-like premonitions in the 1920s. During the war he had seen that its impact on a mass, industrialized society would be so great as to change the very nature of European civilization--to democratize it further in the sense of mass democracy, to alter the power relationship between the states and between social groups within the state, to weaken the hold of parliamentary government on the loyalties of citizens, to intensify nationalism, to "organize enthusiasm." As for his estimation of the nature of the war itself, he had stressed the dynamic relationship of the forces for war and the forces for social revolution in the very origins of the war. He had speculated that there were those among the leadership, especially in Germany, who risked war rather than face the impending drastic social changes. He thought that national fanaticism had triumphed over class hatreds in the origins of the war and that when the hostilities ceased national self-determination triumphed having held back social revolution at the gates of Warsaw.²²

By 1936 the revolutionary movements for liberation, whether national or social, were secondary in his thinking. His stress was heavier by far on the statist, organizational and hierarchical aspects of socialism. The war was a concrete reality which had made structural changes in economy, society, and government, changes which strengthened the illiberal states and reinforced illiberal forms of socialism. To

him it was axiomatic that fascism and communism had their origins in war. Both movements seized power in the midst of anarchy or impending disorder and forced the concentration of power in industry, in the state, and in the state over industry, thus continuing wartime policies and tendencies toward hierarchy and control. Fascism and nazism mixed proletarian ideology with military ideology; under the control of these movements the nation entered a permanent state of siege. Halévy's audience agreed that bolshevism rose from the first World War but there were those who resisted tying Nazism and fascism directly to the war. The Depression or economic instability figured very little in Halevy's analysis of the era of tyrannies. He argued that Germany's wartime mobilization had influenced Lenin's vision of war communism and that Mussolini and all other fascist movements imitated Lenin's experiments. He did not discuss the degree to which bolshevism was influenced by the autocratic regime of tsarist Russia or the Leninnist conception of the party though the point was made. He did not discuss the possibility that Lenin's war communism may have owed as much to the bolsheviks's fear of decentralizing power with the risk of losing control as it did in wartime mobilization.

If socialism required state ownership of the instruments of production or a planned economy then only Russia came to socialism from the first World War. But Halévy's equivocal definition of socialism meant that he thought the rationalization of the economy which took place at the end of the war was socialist too, as were experiments at labor representation in management. That rationalization and those experiments, which he felt both the bolsheviks and the fascists continued, led him to see the war as the decisive event in the history of the twentieth-century socialism. In his introduction to the edition

of Sismondi's writings he accounted for depression as a phenomena of underconsumption and overproduction, but explained it as having originated in the accelerated industrialization which was forced by the war. It seems clear that in Halévy's mind war and the structural changes arising from the war determined the nature of the era of tyrannies, just as it determined the shift of socialism toward its bureaucratic, hierarchical organization and illiberal forms.

Were the inherent contradictions Halévy found in socialism rooted in the diverse origins of socialist theory, in the structure of contemporary political and economic life, or in human nature? It is clear that in the short space of the "Era of Tyrannies" that he would have answered yes to all three senses of the contradictions of socialism. In the discussion he concentrated upon the diverse origins of statist socialism, not referring to the libertarian and even liberal origins that had impressed him in the earliest period of his studies--the cross fertilization between the utilitarians and the working class radicals, the liberal origins of Saint-Simon's thought, and the critique of classical economics made by Sismondi. Here he chose to emphasize conservative features of nineteenth century European socialism--authoritarian, monarchical and Christian--the influence of Lassalle on Bismarck,²³ of the Saint-Simonians through the Duc de Morny on Napoleon III, or the ambiguous role of Louis Blanc whose socialism glorified the Terror and Robespierre the Incorruptible over the French Voltairean liberal tradition.²⁴ He reminded his listeners that the young Marx was very definitely swayed by Blanqui, the intellectual heir to Babeuf.²⁵

Halévy's response to two of his correspondants indicated that he

thought that some of the difficulties facing socialism originated in human nature. Both questioned whether there were internal contradictions in socialist thought. Weren't the difficulties actually those which arose from external conditions, from the resistance of the bourgeoisie to socialist measures or from the complexities of economic institutions which required a strong state or the specific problems of attempting socialist measures in a period of restricted economy, of scarcity rather than prosperity, of stagnation rather than growth? They argued that abstract theory could not be expected to be applied perfectly and immediately. Halévy thought that the contradictions in socialism arose from something he called human nature, from the fact that both the proprietor and the worker needed freedom, for one to pursue profits and the other to pursue higher wages and better conditions, and that these freedoms were mutually exclusive if pushed to an extreme. It was the nature of the entrepreneur or manager, whether it be the state or an individual or a corporation in a corporativist system, to insist upon the freedom to innovate, to accelerate production, to change conditions, and in the nature of the worker to desire freedom from the pressures of innovation, accelerated production and changing conditions. He did not consider this difficulty resolved by placing one's faith in a future in which the nature of workers and work supposedly would change.²⁶

There was a sense, of course, in which Halévy's posing of contradictions, his contrast between liberating and regimenting socialism in the twentieth century, unnecessarily limited his conception of alternatives. Bougle accused him of suffering from "an abuse of contradictions" making it impossible for him to see a third way of political and intellectual liberalism coupled with economic controls.²⁷ The

possibility did not elude Halévy, but he was skeptical. He recalled that he had been hopeful of a reconciliation of liberalism and social reform on the eve of the first World War but that hope was stillborn as a result of the war. In fairness, we have seen from his essays in the 1920s that Halévy still hoped for Bouglé's third alternative.²⁸ In a world in which he thought the liberals were no more than an intermediate or center party between "a caesarist étatisme and a democratic étatisme, between a corporatism with capitalistic and Christian tendencies and a syndicalism with emancipationist tendencies"²⁹ there was no doubt that he hoped as much as Bouglé did for the democratic, syndicalist form of étatisme. But his point was that it was étatisme just the same.

Halévy had experienced some hopes in the post-war period that Britain might once again reconcile the class conflict. The Labour Party was the most democratic and pacific of Europe's socialist parties. Yet confronted with economic instability and aggressive rival nations it responded very ineffectively. His observations of socialist behavior in the post-war period led him to wonder what would be the outcome of Labour's failure to satisfy legitimate and realizable desires.³⁰ Who would realize the ambitions of working men? Or if they remained unfulfilled what effect would follow from the mass of men armed only with revolutionary rhetoric against critical economic need?

Perhaps the very structure of economic organization in modern industrialized society, which commanded greater organization and control of production and distribution, rendered the idea of workers controlling their destiny more and more illusory. The conditions of industrialization required an ever-stricter work discipline from the

very men who had turned to socialism for emancipation from the rigors of the factory system. These conditions did not seem to change with the advent of socialists to power. Thus, socialism had whetted the workers' appetites for freedom and/or increased pay and benefits but conditions required greater rigor, less abundant and less secure life in the 1930s, regardless of government.

The Labour Party was surely the most committed of all the parties of socialist colors to democratic and parliamentary government. In the 1920s Halévy had written that the Labour Party included the intellect of the country, and yet in spite of so much vitality, intelligence, organization, and public support, the party did not have a single representative in the capital or daily paper, had not conquered any municipal council or committee, and had abandoned all administration in the country to the benevolent care of bourgeois notables.³¹ The Labour Party felt secure in trade unionist activity and cautious parliamentary politics and had been curiously hidebound in its attempts to face economic hardship. Halévy suspected that it was "afraid of the responsibilities of power."³² Rumor had it that when the Tories took England off the gold standard a Labourite complained, "But you didn't tell us we could do that." By 1934 a bitterly disappointed Halévy raised a general criticism asking the reason for the paralysis and inefficiency of socialist parties in the west.³³ Privately, he confided harsh judgments to Bouglé: "In England as in every other country, [the Labour Party] has left everything, by the force of inertia and imbecility combined with a revolutionary phraseology which moves fools, to some 'national socialism' more or less mussolinien."³⁴ He admitted that Labour's record since the end of the war led him to shudder "at the

thought of the Labour Party ever having a real majority, not for the sake of capitalism, but for the sake of socialism."³⁵

The fascist and communist alternatives were too omnipresent and too threatening to allow for the kind of incompetence and impotence that Halévy thought he saw in the Labour Party. If socialism in the hands of tried and true parliamentarians was in danger, then how much greater was the danger in other states? He did not believe that democratic government would fall from internal pressures, but in the face of the external threat his thoughts were not very sanguine in those first days of the Popular Front. He shared the commitments of the men of Popular Front but he had little faith in the prospects of European federation or collective security establishing conditions which would make the world safe for democracy and not the habitat of tyrannies. Whatever hope others had of the Soviet Union preserving peace, he reminded them that the tyrannies of Berlin and Rome were nearer at hand, narrowly nationalist, and offered no other prospect but war, a war from which he did not think the democracies would emerge as parliamentary and liberal states.³⁶ His cousin Berthelot thought the tyrannies faced greater internal contradictions than the democracies and war would endanger those regimes more than it would democratic ones.³⁷ But Halévy was not reassured. War had forced the Jacobin regime into Caesarism and the first World War had taught "men of revolution and men of action that the modern structure of the state put almost unlimited powers at their command."³⁸ Historical precedent provided too much evidence for pessimism.

The most provocative of Halévy's propositions was his comparison of bolshevism and fascism. The discussion returned again and again

to this thesis. Bouglé found his equation of the two movements shocking. He argued that although their methods might be comparable, the goals of the tyrannies differed, and they worked for the benefit of different classes.³⁹ An ardent defender of soviet Marxism argued against Halévy that the German and Italian regimes were different from the communist dictatorship; the latter would soften, suppress itself, wither away when it was no longer necessary and was at that moment in the process of evolving greater democracy.⁴⁰ The dictatorship of the proletariat existed in order to raise the economic, intellectual and cultural level of mankind which fascism, for all of its extraordinary capacity to impose discipline, had not shown itself capable of lifting. Hitler and Mussolini aggressively threatened Europe with national wars, but the soviets ~~were~~ fundamentally peace-loving.⁴¹

Raymond Aron observed that the common features of the totalitarian regimes might be important to a "liberal who reacts sentimentally against the loss of formal and democratic liberties,"⁴² but he himself dismissed such concerns. To his mind the class struggle and the will of the proletarian classes was the central social fact of our times. The decisive problem for democratic countries arose not from liberalism but from the fact that class antagonisms were as strong as national passions.⁴³ It was obvious, he said, that both communist and fascist regimes directed their economies, but while Italy defended capitalism and moved toward war, the U.S.S.R. directed its economic life toward the common good. Nazism made the fundamental differences even clearer. Another participant struck this same note saying that Halévy's analysis was merely a superficial parallel built on the fact that socialism and fascism were led to use the same means, though they looked toward opposite goals. National

socialism was "a movement directly opposed to socialism, resembling it only because, like socialism, it has been adapted to the modern world."⁴⁴ It was, of course, the nature of that modern world that Halévy was discussing.

Halévy responded somewhat impatiently to the discussion of soviet totalitarianism. He shook off the arguments of several of his listeners who differentiated the regimes on the basis of their ultimate ends and cited the communist promise of the emancipation of man and the withering away of the state. He was not a hostile critic of socialism but discussions which became rationalizations of the dictatorship of the proletariat obviously depressed him.

Alas! There lies the tragedy. I am sure that nothing could be truer than my statement. Every socialist government coming to power is forced to use complicated scholastics to explain how it must act when, professing a doctrine of complete socialism, it takes over in a non-socialist society. Here the Marxist formulas come in.⁴⁵

He too was capable of being moved by the heroic struggle of the Russian people to modernize and he had seen it first hand,⁴⁶ but he believed an intellectual owed a special duty to the truth. The soviets promised a temporary dictatorship but practiced a morality in which the individual sacrificed his desires for the good of the state. Such a moral state of mind was heroic but it bore little "resemblance to a hedonism relegated to the distant future" and he thought that state of mind was warlike.⁴⁷

He could not suspend judgment and submit his intellect to formulas. Was the dictatorship merely the suspension of legality such as Marx might have foreseen, resembling the grant for six months of plenipotentiary powers to Poincaré to save the franc? Was it to last for

several decades or for a century or two? "I cease being interested in the state of anarchy that they tell us will succeed it. What interests me is the present and the near future; beyond that lies what Jules Romain calls the ultra-future."⁴⁸ As for the promise of some future state of the human race, when a perfect socialism would be united with perfect freedom, he asked "What freedom? The freedom to do nothing as in the abbey of Thélème, or the absence of obedience to a master, along with incessant labor like an ant or a bee?"⁴⁹ He claimed such freedom was beyond the limits of his imagination. Such dreams were certainly against the grain of his temperament. "When I see men giving themselves up to these dreams, I cannot help but think of Kant's dove trying to fly in the void, or of Hegel's swimmer without water."⁵⁰

Was it really necessary to convert to one of the twentieth century's secular religions to better the lives of one's fellow men? He had never thought it was and even the experience of the 1930s had not convinced him otherwise. He wrote to young Etienne Mantoux to stop awhile among the Scandinavians or the Dutch and "see what can be done for the well-being and the culture of the popular classes by the development of certain secondary virtues, which are lacking in the French."⁵¹ They had a secret there which one could find without a journey to Moscow, he thought. For oneself, one must ask what would be the effect on one's conduct of converting to communism. Would he be able to produce happy results by his social action? Then he ought to convert. But if conversion would merely enable him to disengage from all responsibility for society by taking an intransigent attitude, to protest without cease and to do nothing while awaiting the final overthrow, then he advised Mantoux that he ought not to become a communist. It was the same re-

sponse that he had made as a young man when his fellow Dreyfusards had converted to socialism or when Victor Basch urged non-negotiable demands and refusal to co-operate as a "socialist" policy.

Several times in the "Era of Tyrannies" discussion Halévy tried to explain his insights autobiographically. With the same unassuming quality of his letter to Mantoux he thought he could teach a lesson of tolerance from the "accidental nature" of our beliefs: "If we have learned it well, we have to ask if it is worthwhile to massacre each other for beliefs whose origins are so flimsy."⁵² He credited, one might almost say reduced, his liberal and republican opinions to a function of his age or environment, saying that in the years that he had attended the Ecole normale supérieure there were no socialists there and the political milieu of the nation was not Dreyfusard but the calm corruption that followed the Boulanger Affair and the Panama Scandals. He was a "liberal," an anticlerical, a democrat, and a republican, all that the word Dreyfusard would come to characterize in French political life, but he was not a socialist.

Charles Gillispie has observed that the historian could well learn humility from Halévy's modest approach to his own political commitments.⁵³ One could well learn that lesson of tolerance and of humility from Halévy, but not from the accidental nature of his allegiance to liberalism rather than to socialism. One could learn that lesson from his life, his work, and from the "Era of Tyrannies" which was something in the nature of an apologia pro vita sua.

There are serious reasons for doubting that Elie Halévy would have followed his brother's path or joined the socialist generation of Péguy, Mathiez, or Albert Thomas had he been born five years later.

A careful study of his political behavior at several crisis periods--the Dreyfus agitation, at the first World War, in the face of the deepening class conflict in France--indicates that he was a Dreyfusard with or without Dreyfus. His commitment was to justice and to toleration, not to factionalism and sectarianism; he rejected opportunism from any political quarter. Julien Benda observed that Halévy thought it was easy to be impartial because the ideologues all justified their politics with such good arguments. But he was a man who could choose between the arguments and could discern differences between the facts and the arguments as well. That was his role in the "Era of Tyrannies."

As we have seen his fight for justice in the l'Affaire for an innocent individual did not become a struggle against the state, as did that of many of his contemporaries. In the first World War he did not succumb to chauvinist passions or to pacifism. He opposed war but acted to affirm as much of the life of reason and of universal humanitarianism as he could. At the end of his life he remained committed to the liberal, rational republicanism of his youth, to the perfect independence of his thought. The events of his life reveal his remarkable capacity for holding to his principles in spite of shifts in the direction of political winds. Rather than argue that the intellectual environment of his university years had made him "liberal" he might as well have argued that his temperament made him unfit for duty as a "doctrinaire."

He offered evidence of his abiding liberalism in his autobiographical comments. He commented that as a young man he had seen in the Webbs, who were older than he and already important figures in the socialist movement in England when he met them, an "essentially anti-

liberal," and "ostentatiously imperialistic" socialism. He thought it might well have been their fault that he was impressed by all that was illiberal in the socialist idea.⁵⁴ "The independence of small nations could well mean something to believers in liberal individualism, but not to them, precisely because they were collectivists;" for them "the future lay with the great administrative nations, where governing was done by the bureaucrats and order maintained by the policeman."⁵⁵ The Webbs and Shaw had not betrayed their principles by their enthusiasm for fascist or bolshevist experiments. One might well add that neither had Halévy betrayed his liberalism. He had identified with the Liberals and Labourites who became pro-Boers out of "generosity and a love of liberty and humanity"⁵⁶ and over the years his affirmation of liberal humanism had not diminished, had in fact been strengthened because the course of events seemed to leave fewer and fewer who were willing to affirm it. It was not chance that led Halévy to liberalism rather than socialism; it was choice.

It is certainly true that Halévy's liberal individualism remained particularly wary of the imperialistic, anti-democratic and illiberal aspects of socialism. He had found a conflict between the internationalism professed by socialists and the exigencies of legislating and organizing within national frontiers.⁵⁷ He had observed the anti-semitism that demagogues had tapped in the "socialist" working classes during the Dreyfus Affair. He thought it was obvious that socialism was a political force within a nation-state and that nationalist and separatist passions were more powerful than internationalist, brotherly sentiments. It was useless to argue that national hatreds were the illegitimate offspring of "false" socialism. Halévy noted that even the democratic idea could take on less liberal, less parliamentary forms

258

when joined with socialism.⁵⁸ The irrationalist and anti-liberal protests of the syndicalist movement were married without much difficulty to nationalist and racist hatreds; he had observed such unions forged by the demagogues in France during the Affair and again the South African labor movement. Long before Henri de Man and Marcel Deat became Hitler's supporters Halévy sensed their motivations and the exact nature of their anti-democratic, corporatist doctrine.⁵⁹

Much of the lecture was formulated in Halévy's most challenging manner. He may very well have intended, as Alain commented, to astonish and scandalize the naive beliefs of his audience, many of whom were socialists by sentiment. Halévy was perfectly aware of the fact that democratic socialists had come more and more in the post-war world to express the hopes for peace and for change that would preserve liberty and critical thought. Anti-fascist, anti-bolshevist, a liberal, who, as Alain said, never refused combat, Halévy raised his shocking hypotheses in a laconic manner. It is impossible to know if he feared that his observations might have the unintended effect of debilitating the resistance to fascism when he hoped to encourage the love of liberty; one can only note that he was dissatisfied by the results of his session.

His remarks were not very well received either on the level of a "political and social testament" or as the merest outline, albeit a lucid and provocative one, of the issues which were the major interest of his last decade of work. Bouglé's comment that this lecture was his testament is certainly apt in the sense that Halévy bore witness

to the values of his entire life that day. And it is also true in the sense that this lecture was his legacy by the chance that he died the following year. He made no further comment on the significant generalizations that he made that day about the nature of socialism, revolution and war, nationalism and totalitarianism in this century. The theses that he advanced were not widely accepted--in point of fact were hardly acceptable--when he made them.

In a sense that November discussion was for the end of Halévy's life what the Dreyfus Affair had been for his youth--his positive moral commitment to human freedom and political liberty, a commitment that he made though he was acutely aware of the conflicts of political ends and means. He appeared to be a hostile critic of socialism. He was certainly hostile to the tyrannical traits and tendencies that he perceived in it. But he shared the values of most of the participants in the discussion who hoped for peace, democracy and justice that democratic socialists defended. He admitted that if he were forced to choose he could live with a communist regime but that he must unalterably oppose fascism. But part of the commitment of his youth was to speak the truth as he saw it and he saw tyrannical tendencies in socialism, especially when coupled with war. One might make distasteful political choices from necessity, but one need not leap into faith, blind oneself to the truth or abdicate one's intellectual duty to speak it.

¹Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," The Era of Tyrannies, p. 265.

²Ibid., p. 266.

³Ibid., p. 267.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Max Lazard's comment, Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie: Seance du 28 novembre 1936, p. 186. [Hereinafter referred to as Bulletin 1936.]

⁷Communication from Marcel Mauss, printed in the Appendice, Bulletin 1936, p. 234.

⁸Halévy actively supported the Italian antifascists, particularly Salvemini and the Rosselli brothers, who though exiles in France were assassinated by Mussolini's agents. He frequently requested aid for refugee Jews or political liberals trying to get to England. His letters from Italy where he often travelled to visit his wife's family and her journal of the trip they took to the USSR are extremely critical of the regimes.

⁹Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," The Era of Tyrannies, p. 306.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 274.

¹¹Maublanc's comment, Bulletin 1936, XXXIV, p. 219.

¹²Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," p. 272.

¹³Ibid., pp. 315-316. See also pp. 279-280.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 307.

¹⁵Halévy, "Socialism and the Problem of Democratic Parliamentarianism," Era of Tyrannies, pp. 260-261.

¹⁶Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," p. 313.

¹⁷Halévy, "Socialism and the Problem of Democratic Parliamentarianism," pp. 260-264. This is also the theme of Halévy's contribution to "L'Angleterre: Grandeur, decadence et persistance du liberalisme en Angleterre," Inventaires, La crise sociale et les ideologies nationales. (Paris: Alcan, 1936).

¹⁸Ibid., p. 262.

¹⁹Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," p. 312.

²⁰Ibid.

- ²¹Halévy to Léon, March 24, 1916, Correspondance, p. 358.
- ²²Halévy, "The World Crisis," Era of Tyrannies, pp. 244-245.
- ²³Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," pp. 265-266, 272-273. See also "Saint-Simonian Economic Doctrine," pp. 100-104.
- ²⁴Ibid., p. 274.
- ²⁵Ibid., p. 280.
- ²⁶Ibid., p. 313-314.
- ²⁷Bouglé's comment, Bulletin 1936, pp. 198-199.
- ²⁸Halévy, "The Policy of Social Peace in England," Era of Tyrannies, pp. 105-157. See also "The Problem of Worker Control," pp. 159-181 and "The State of the Social Question in England," pp. 183-207.
- ²⁹Halévy, "Saint-Simonian Economic Doctrine," Era of Tyrannies, pp. 103-104.
- ³⁰Halévy, "Socialism and the problem of Democratic Parliamentarianism," Era of Tyrannies, pp. 258-260.
- ³¹Halévy, "Après les élections anglaises," Revue de Paris, XVI (March 1919), 215.
- ³²Halévy, "Socialism and the problem of Democratic Parliamentarianism," Era of Tyrannies, p. 255.
- ³³Ibid., p. 250.
- ³⁴Halévy to Bouglé, April 20, 1934, Halévy papers, Guy-Loé collection.
- ³⁵Halévy, "Socialism and the Problem of Democratic Parliamentarianism," Era of Tyrannies, p. 255.
- ³⁶Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," The Era of Tyrannies, p. 277.
- ³⁷Berthelot's comment, Bulletin 1936, p. 219.
- ³⁸Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," Era of Tyrannies, p. 316.
- ³⁹Bouglé's comment, Bulletin 1936, p. 197.
- ⁴⁰Maublanc, Bulletin 1936, pp. 221-222.
- ⁴¹Ibid., p. 223.
- ⁴²Raymond Aron, Bulletin 1936, p. 227.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Roger Lacombe 's comment, "Era of Tyrannies," Era of Tyrannies, Appendix II, p. 297.

⁴⁵Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," Era of Tyrannies, p. 280.

⁴⁶Halévy to Mantoux, September 20, 1934, Correspondance, pp. 372-373. Halévy and his wife traveled in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and were frequent visitors to Italy.

⁴⁷Halévy, "Era of Tyrannies," Era of Tyrannies, pp. 283-284.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 313-314.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 314.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Halévy to Mantoux, September 20, 1934, Correspondance, p. 373.

⁵²Halévy, "Era of Tyrannies," The Era of Tyrannies, p. 270.

⁵³Gillispie, "Elie Halévy," p. 249.

⁵⁴Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," The Era of Tyrannies, p. 271.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Halévy, "Socialism and the Problem of Democratic Parliamentarianism," Era of Tyrannies, p. 261.

⁵⁸Halévy, "The Era of Tyrannies," The Era of Tyrannies, p. 315.

⁵⁹See Ehrmann's comment on this point of Halévy's Histoire du socialisme européen in "Recent writings on the French Labor Movement," Journal of Modern History, XXII (1950), 151-158.

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