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**OLD VALUES AND CHANGING FRONTIERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
A STUDY OF ATTITUDES OF MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
TOWARDS IMMIGRATION**

by

GALLYA LAHAV

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

1995

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
GALLYA LAHAV

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
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



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**Old Values and Changing Frontiers in the European Union:
A Study of Attitudes of Members of the European Parliament towards Immigration**

by

Gallya Lahav

Advisor: Professor Asher Arian

Abstract:

The European Union (EU) is in the process of forming a single regional market and a transnational organization; hence, the immigration issue has become integral for the consolidation of a "Europe without frontiers." The challenge for the EU is to overcome ideological and national divisions and to formulate a common immigration policy that represents the interests of all of its member countries.

This research analyzes elite attitudes towards immigration in the European Union in the 1990s. Two traditional sources of attitude cleavages are assessed: 1) left-right ideological placement and political party affiliations; vs. 2) nation-state, historical and cultural variables. Can party or ideological variables explain how elites perceive the immigration issue? How important are historical and cultural factors which are nation-specific in shaping policy preferences or thinking? The project focuses on the case of immigration to examine the viability of European nation-state convergence in a transnational community. Survey questionnaires were distributed to all 518 Members of the European Parliament. The 168 respondents represented the 12 countries and 10 party groups of the European Union. In depth interviews were conducted with 54 MEPs.

The empirical data provide evidence that ideological constraints exist in structuring elite attitudes towards immigration. Country-specific factors such as immigrant numbers, public

opinion, and levels of socio-economic development are relevant to elite assessments of the immigration issue. National variables not only condition left-right polarizations, but become crystallized in the new European landscape. The European factor, which involves institution-building and the promotion of a common European identity, in turn revises these traditional polarizations. Party, national, and transnational values shape elite attitudes towards immigration, and contribute to the distinct, yet compatible, interests in the European Union.

Preface

This inquiry stems from my earlier training at the London School of Economics. Amongst the dynamic intellectual commons at Holborn, LSE provided me with the opportunity to have observer and subject status, at one time. From the vantage of a foreign student in London, and later Paris, where I conducted my thesis work, I was a resident of the world's largest "multi-cultural" centers. I had been privy to the fact that Europe had become a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multi-cultural society, perhaps unwittingly, perhaps unacceptingly. But one thing was clear, it lacked a corresponding set of attitudes that resembled the American-pioneered "melting-pot" spirit. What was the common European myth?

At the risk of appearing confused with causal direction or worse, being grandiose, I would say that the salience of immigration grew with my increasing interest in the issue. My Master's thesis analyzed the evolution of immigration from an economic to a social issue, and ultimately its politicization in the French landscape. In 1986, when I completed the work, Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of France's anti-immigrant extreme-right party, took a seat along with 33 other Ministers in the *Assemblée Nationale*. In the United Kingdom where I lived, Margaret Thatcher was soon to head her third mandate, the neo-conservative who in 1979 stole the thunder from her right-flank with her "swamped foreigners" speech. Over the years, I have observed similar trends mirrored throughout Europe. One thing became clear, immigration posed a serious dilemma to liberal democracies; it confounded policy-makers who were forced to deal with increasing agitation of their publics, and the

reality that many foreigners had become permanent residents.

The immigration issue that has evolved over recent years has been further compounded by the increasing insecurity of the changing world. In Europe, immigration has reintroduced cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity at a time when Europeans are witnessing a challenge to the whole idea of their nation-state. The construction of Europe, although an attempt to manage issues like immigration collectively, in process brings to the fore the existing diversities of cultures and political traditions in Europe, particularly in dealing with concepts that are so close to the core of identity: questions of "them," or foreigners.

In search of the discourse that captured the range and depth of ideas on immigration, the European Parliament offered me the opportunity to observe at close quarters the workings of a major European institution representing traditional nation-state and party interests. Here, Members from the 12 (now 15) member countries sit together with their fellow partisans, in order to generate transnational alliances based on ideological affinities. The European Parliament is truly a unique experiment in twentieth-century institution-building. It presents a microcosm of interests of European leaders, as they discuss the prevailing issues of the day.

The research itself was conducted in three parts, and the field work spanned three different European cities, London, Strasbourg and Brussels. Naturally, it owes a debt to a very great number of people, who assisted me in some form along the way--- unfortunately too many, to be named here. Most of them know, and some will never realize how much.

The initial design and implementation of the survey questionnaire owes a great debt to the unconditional generosity of several people in particular. Dr. Arthur Goldberg was instrumental in the creation and revisions of both, the research design and the instrument

itself. He facilitated my journey from theory to reality testing. He taught me the "a-z" of surveys, elites, and expectations. He also taught me that scholarship is a spirit. We shared mutual delight in cultivating and watching the fruits of these scientific instruments ripen. M. Fabien Jurdant faxed out a French translation, only after he thoroughly criticized the English version---an extremely beneficial preparatory exercise. Mlle. Carole Rêmond dedicated extra hours in the office, just to help with the translator's translation. They all made the questionnaire better. In his capacity as Director of the Center for European Studies, Dr. Henry Wasser, along with the rest of the staff, provided me with both moral and organizational support to launch the enormous mailings to the 518 Members of the European Parliament. One person made the implementation ultimately feasible. The massive paper work and professional details could not have been possible without the long long hours, dedication, stamina, and "patience" of Mr. Laurance Bressler. I thank him for being there then, throughout my years of personal, intellectual and professional growth, and inadvertently now. His role transcends the toughest times, and the project directly, and he remains in the spirit of my endeavors.

In Europe, there were many people who physically, psychologically, and inspirationally helped get this project off the ground. In London, Dr. Alan Sked actively facilitated my welcome back at the London School of Economics, an invaluable base of European resources. The staff at the British Office of the European Parliament were extremely helpful, and provided me with the bulk of the weight of my suitcases. Ms. Jennifer Decker helped shelter me, along with the growing amount of accumulated data. We both grew as well. The Jurdant family, extending from London (M. Fabien Jurdant, Mme. Samantha de Benden and Sasha) to Strasbourg (Mme. Irène Jurdant, Dr. Boudoin Jurdant, Mme. Célia Davis and Mr. Samuel Davis) helped make me feel at home, both physically

and spiritually. They were really the first to get all the accounts, and to respond. M. Gilles Guibert fastidiously listened to hours worth of sometimes badly spoken French, and worked to make sense out of them. His translations constitute the majority of the interview data for this research. He and Ms. Karen Linwood were there for the fast and slow times of the work. M. Bruno Zanna was all there, for all of the stops.

And of course, there is the multitude of people at the European Parliament itself, whose voices can be heard throughout the manuscript, but for obvious reasons must remain anonymous. Members of the European Parliament shuttle from Brussels, to Strasbourg, to their home countries; from Committee meetings to Party Group meetings, to National Party Group Committees, to the Hemicycle for voting or question-time, to press events and conferences. The participation of MEPs and the active involvement of their assistants was truly encouraging to this foreign researcher. Some Members were preeminently helpful, sharing with me technical, cultural, and institutional insights. Additionally, Mr. Antonio Cruz of Migration News Sheet, and Dr. Massimo Pastore were wonderful sources of information exchange.

Attempting to set interviews with Members of the European Parliament provided an invaluable and concrete lesson in political culture at work. MEPs have many overlapping interests; however, they order those interests somewhat differently. Furthermore, certain parties were more open and readily accessible than others. Party traditions and ideological principles clearly affected style. In all my months at the European Parliament, both in Strasbourg and in Brussels, these interviews gave life and meaning to the concept of political culture.

In a similar vein, during my initial wave of survey response, I encountered an uneven return from the Southern MEPs. I soon discovered (thanks to the very useful hints

of one particular, British MEP) that language may be a barrier. The original survey questionnaires were distributed in English and French. I very quickly addressed that problem with the assistance of the Italian Language Department at the University of London, at LSE. With other respondents, it was not the language, but the time. It became clear to me that some MEPs were busier than others. The Parliament was a forum representing European elites on a macro-level; a melange of economists, bankers, civil servants, industrialists, intellectuals, lawyers, judges, scientists, and professional politicians. The background of each MEP was reflective of the diverse traditions of national elites in European polities. Understanding how these political culture indicators affected the variant modes of behavior provided insight to the core issues that questions like immigration raise during these changing times. Who is "us" and who is "them"? Furthermore, is there a trans-European political culture?

These questions further developed in my analysis, with the assistance of many colleagues and friends. It is difficult to mention some of the most instrumental people of the analysis phase without thinking of the greater contribution that they made to me in a general fashion. Dr. Bernard E. Brown was more than a reader. His contribution was far greater than the "call of duty". Through word and deed, he provided a remarkable model of the scholar-teacher to which I can only aspire. Dr. Hugo Kaufmann provided moral support since we met at the European Union Studies Center, and warmly gave of himself despite his own demanding schedule.

It is difficult to express appropriate gratitude to several people who exceeded all labels and functions of assistance. Ms. Jill Gross lived with the project. Her multiple talents included conceptual and editorial support. These contributions were only exceeded

by her friendship. Dr. Karen Chandross rode in tandem with me for many many years. In the times that the world slept, I knew that we were there together. It seems only natural that we now exit graduate school and enter the future together.

There were also several particular people whose contributions to my growth may never be appropriately thanked. Dr. Stanley Renshon shaped my initial graduate school agenda. He taught me about the importance of bringing psychology to political analysis. Clearly, aspects of this project on elite attitudes were shaped by his early influence. Dr. Carol Gorden has also helped me pay attention to the dynamics of attitudes. Her friendship and advice along the way were truly heartwarming. Her smile through the phone wires as I interrupted her household was only one part of making me feel like a member of the family. Harold and Gloria Bressler were also part of my enlarged family. Like healthy families, they provided me with love, support, and a sense of pride to help me grow, with the courage to assume such an endeavor.

There are two very special people who have made this manuscript possible, but for whom written words of gratitude will also never be enough. Dr. Martin Schain was a presence in my intellectual development before the time I met him. His work inspired me to endeavor my Doctorate, and his advice helped cultivate this undertaking. My maturation as a scholar is in large part a tribute to him and his work. He is, in his personal and professional being, a model of my aspiration in the field. His unwavering endorsement encourages me greatly.

Most of all, I would like to thank Dr. Asher Arian, my advisor, my mentor, my friend, and my human voice of wisdom, whose contributions to this work include all stages of the project's development and more. He has not only set a standard of scholarship, but inspired in me a confidence, learned through humility. His role does not only pertain to this

manuscript, and my most fundamental growth as scholar, thinker, and person, but also to my realization that, in the words of Henry Adams, "A teacher's work lasts an eternity---one never knows where his influence stops." Professor Arian's largest contribution to this work most probably goes to future students.

The members of my committee, Dr. Asher Arian, Dr. Bernard E. Brown, Dr. Martin Schain, Dr. Arthur Goldberg, and Dr. Hugo Kaufmann, as a group contributed to a significant reworking and rethinking of the manuscript---in some cases, as a result of one question they asked. Individually and collectively, they made this a stronger body of work. I absolve them all from any responsibility for what remain of my original errors.

Finally, I owe my deepest gratitude to my family. From them, I have learned the true meaning of resiliency and strength of spirit. My parents, Eva and Mike Meyerowitz provided me with the chance to realize my fullest potential, to set goals, and to have visions. *Their unending encouragement and confidence have enabled me to face the rigours of life.* It equipped me well during the research. I would also like to express special thanks to my sisters, Alona Liebling and Marna Agmon, their husbands, David Liebling, and Eyal Agmon, and the younger generation of the family, Jonathan, Courtney, Dustin, Storm, Netta and Hadar. Their existence gave me the strength to work long hours, to push on, and to put it all in perspective. Rosalie and Paul Rosenband, Debra, Jeff, and Joshua Franklin have expanded my world of encouragement, support, and sense of family. My grandparents, Mina and Mordechai Mintz, started me on my way to political discourse, and gave me a deep appreciation for history, both personal and intellectual.

Dr. Michael Rosenband, who as my partner in a world of thoughts, dreams, goals and "attitudes", stands on par with this project---a testament to the role of faith in my life.

Lastly, I would like to offer this work as a tribute to my extended family in humble recognition of the fact that without them I am nothing.

And especially, I would like to dedicate this doctoral dissertation to the memory of my father, Dr. Eitan Lahav, who unfortunately, was right this time.

New York
6 April 1995

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Chapter One: Introduction

I. The Nature of the Immigration Problem: The Analytical Framework

Since World War II, immigration has been a domestic concern for all West European countries. Based on historical and cultural traditions, each country used foreigners to fulfill different types of national imperatives. Immigration policy was largely formulated behind closed doors and with little public attention. By the mid-1980s however, immigration emerged as one of the most salient issues on West European political agendas.

Europeans have begun to confront the fact that most of the estimated 15 million foreigners among them are now permanent residents. The presence of culturally, religiously, and racially diverse groups in European society has transformed the immigration issue from a bureaucratic to a public and political phenomenon. Its salience is highlighted by electoral campaigns and party contestation, the emergence and consolidation of extreme-right parties, and increasing public support for xenophobic political forces.

The immigration issue has gained salience in the international arena as well. The traditional notion of state sovereignty has been challenged as the prime tasks of defining citizenship and deciding who shall enter a country has been made more elusive.¹ International population movements, however, increasingly take place outside the ambit of state control and immigration regulation is inherently becoming a cross-border or transnational issue.² Global population movements and immigration have gradually become identified as issue or problem

¹Zig Layton-Henry, ed., The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 1990).

²Mark Miller, The Unavoidable Issue: U.S. Immigration Policy in the 1980s, in Demetrios Papademetriou and Mark Miller, eds. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Inc., 1983).

areas for national welfare caused by actors beyond the jurisdiction of the state. By 1991, the flurry of diplomatic meetings and conferences devoted to international migration attested to the fact that, in the language of international relations, the issue had gone from "low" to "high politics."³ The character of immigration and the European movement towards integration are both creating a need for transnational regulation and standardized policymaking.

As the European Union (EU) attempts to integrate, it has been searching to define a common immigration policy for all twelve member countries.⁴ To the extent that the realization of a single-market Europe, anchored in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, rests on the success of freedom of movement, a harmonized immigration policy serves as a major test of frontier-free Europe. In this sense, immigration may well be the most significant issue confronting the EU.

The nature of the immigration debate becomes more complicated at the European Union level, as it reflects and magnifies the problems that each nation has internally confronted in regard to the issue. With the completion of the single market, citizens of one of the 12 member countries are no longer "foreigners" in the other eleven. As the EU erases its internal borders, immigration policy and implementation requires membership agreement and trust, as well as some common outlook among nations who have traditionally confronted distinct groups differently.

The immigration problem at the EU level is about the harmonization of national policies. Formulating a common policy involves deciding which outsiders require visas to enter the Union, and ensuring that illegal immigrants, drug traffickers and terrorists do not profit from the border-free region. It also raises traditional concerns about social welfare policies, integration strategies,

³International Migration Review, "Special Issue on The New Europe and International Migration," vol. 26 (Summer 1992), p. 235.

⁴Although the analysis here refers to the European Union while it consisted of twelve members, the same standards will be imposed on Sweden, Finland and Austria, after becoming full members in 1 January 1995, and any additional new member-states.

and race relations. These concerns are shaped by country-specific and partisan-ideological debates.

A critical polemic in a Europe which has widened its decision-making fora is what happens to traditional affinities such as party groups, ideology, and national interests? If issues are about the alleged differences between contending parties or candidates,⁵ then the case of immigration may present an interesting research dilemma. How will issue cleavages be organized in a supranational Europe whose members represent diverse cultural experiences, different ideological convictions and party affiliations?

II. Theoretical Framework

Consensual policy-making on political, economic, social and security matters has been a major objective for post-war Europe. Its achievement is a test of European integration. A ten-year study of attitudinal elite history (The European Elite Panel Survey) conducted between 1955-1965, at the conception of the EEC (the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957), found early signs of elite convergence on several major issues of that time; protection, prosperity and prestige.⁶ The study found a developing consensus in Europe that national interests are better served by transnational agreement and action. The study also made a controversial claim that in Europe, ideology, as a way of organizing attitudes and opinions had been supplanted by "pragmatism."

⁵See David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969); Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Errson, Politics and Society in Western Europe (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1987).

⁶Daniel Lerner and Morten Gorden, Euroatlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1969).

That is, instead of relying upon an ideologically codified set of propositions, European elites had removed "the ideological blinders they have worn since the French Revolution" and begun to think pragmatically in choosing policy alternatives.⁷

Lerner and Gorden noted that a convergence in Europe or a "transnational collective," which they saw replacing the nation as the central force to meet new challenges, did not result in uniform priorities throughout national panels. While elites are called upon to make choices that involve collective rather than national approaches to problem-solving, this is not the case for all issues. Neither national differences nor ideological positions have disappeared, as may be demonstrated by the immigration issue.

Whereas programmatic distinctions among parties generally serve to organize political debate and ultimate policy resolution on most issues, on immigration, the process has not been so clear. First, the issue has blurred the domestic and international arenas as it has challenged the traditional notion of state sovereignty.⁸ Second, European national political debates indicate that the issue may divide political parties internally. Finally, unlike most political issues which become salient through a struggle of dualistic tendencies, the immigration issue is marked by uneven political contestation. In no West European country can politicians or political parties gain votes by favoring new immigration or immigrant voting rights.⁹ The immigration debate has extended beyond the issue of numbers, where there is consensus, to include a composite of other

⁷Ibid., p. 243.

⁸Demetrious Papademetriou and Mark Miller, The Unavoidable Issue: U.S. Immigration Policy in the 1980s (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Inc., 1983); Zig Layton-Henry, The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe (London: Sage Publications, Ltd, 1990); Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration," (Draft of a paper in preparation for publication, December 1990).

⁹Antony Messina, "Political Impediments to the Resumption of Labour Migration to Western Europe," West European Politics, vol. 13 (January 1990).

issues related to the integration of permanent residents.

Public opinion polls have provided some insights regarding the nature of divisions in the immigration debate. A 1989 report published by the Commission of the European Community on "Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance" identified polarizations amongst the twelve European Community countries based on a sample of 11,795 individuals. In European publics, the degree of importance attached to the problem of immigration varies little with age, sex, or educational level, but becomes distinguishable, if only in a limited way, on the political/ideological level. That is, according to the survey report's findings, the more one considers oneself to be on the right of the political spectrum, the more importance one attaches to the problem (and *vice versa*). At the same time, a division on the importance of the issue has emerged on country lines, with traditional European "emigration countries" on one side (i.e., Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) and "immigration countries" (i.e., France, Germany, United Kingdom, Belgium) on another.¹⁰

While the rich body of survey research on mass attitudes helps define acceptable bounds of politics, influential elites refine or redefine the boundaries of policy options. Elite opinions and attitudes are not only more coherently structured and consistent than public opinion,¹¹ but are also most apt to run ahead of mass opinion, particularly on topics that are new to national agendas.¹² Elite attitudes may shape public opinion on newer issues as changes in mass opinion

¹⁰Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer 30: Public Opinion in the European Communities: Special Issue on Racism and Xenophobia (Brussels: Directorate-General Information, Communication and Culture, November 1989), p. 4.

¹¹Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems," in Ideology and Discontent, David Apter (ed.) (New York: The Free Press, 1964); M. Kent Jennings, "Ideological Thinking among Mass Publics and Political Elite," in Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 56:419-441 (1992).

¹²Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976).

often follow changes in public policy rather than the reverse.¹³ At minimum, elite opinion complements mass opinion. According to some analysts, elite opinions inform us about how well the representation process functions in Western democracies. While under representative government, the citizens control and the elite rules, the commitment to popular rule is what sets democracies apart from other political systems. In the broadest sense of the term, the representativeness of elite attitudes is measured by their similarity to the overall attitudes of the public also, called "collective correspondence."¹⁴ This view does not take into account that elites, as leaders, often aim to transform mass opinion.¹⁵ Finally, although they typically differ in the scope of their concerns and the specialty of their knowledge, political elites are often influential in shaping public policy and agenda setting.¹⁶ A basic assumption is that political attitudes, values, and beliefs of politicians affect the ways in which decision-makers respond to social change.¹⁷

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴See Russell Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France (New Jersey: Chatham, 1988); Luciano Bardi, "Representation in the European Parliament and the Building of the European Political System," (Paper presented for the XVth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, July 21-25, 1991); Robert Weisberg, "Collective versus Dyadic Representation in Congress," American Political Science Review 72 (1978) 535-47.

¹⁵James MacGregor Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1979).

¹⁶Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam and Bert Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981).

¹⁷Joel Aberbach, James Chesney, and Bert Rockman. "Exploring Elite Political Attitudes: Some Methodological Lessons," Political Methodology, 2 (Winter 1975): 1-28.

A. ELITE DIFFERENCES

Members of the political elite manifestly differ in the way they analyze policy. Putnam concluded from his study of parliamentarians in Britain and Italy, that some political elites are more likely to place an issue in historical context while others refer to future utopias.¹⁸ Some refer to ideological doctrines; others to pragmatism. Divergences of elite opinion may be explained by short-term political interest represented by parties or by more long-term cultural variables which socialize individuals. Each approach and attitudinal style has a different emphasis and therefore varies in implications, depth and duration.

i. Nation-State Differences: Cultural and Historical Variables

The twelve European countries that constitute the EU have numerous features in common on immigration, but policymakers in each country have tried to shape immigration policy on the basis of their own national experiences and imperatives. Each country displays a specific set of attitudes towards the immigration issue---albeit the number of meanings to which the immigration issue is attached varies quite broadly. This is reflected in the literature which examines the immigration issue in country relevant contexts. Thus, in Britain and France, the immigration issue may be linked to race, and the foci of immigration studies tend toward research on the party system and the extreme right.¹⁹ In the Scandinavian countries, the issue is more tied to issues

¹⁸Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

¹⁹See Martin Schain, "Immigration and Changes in the French Party System," European Journal of Political Research, 16: 597-621 (1988); Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Les Immigres et la politique (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1988); Patrick Weil, La France et ses Etrangers (Paris: Calman-Levy, 1991); Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau (eds.), Le Front

of the welfare state.²⁰ Increasingly, the politics of immigration involves conflicts between different visions and models of integration, which challenge long-accepted models of national identity and the nature of national integration.²¹ Both micro- and macro-level comparative analyses reveal significant-nation-state differences on immigration politics that emanate from cultural and historical traditions.²²

National a Decouvert (Paris: Presses de la Fondation des Sciences Politiques, 1989); Monica Charlot, "L'Emergence du Front National," (Paper presented at the International Political Science Congress, Paris, July 1985); Antony Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain (Cambridge: Clarendon Press, 1989); Zig Layton-Henry (ed.), The Political Rights of Migrant Workers in Western Europe (London: Sage, 1990); Layton-Henry, The Politics of Race in Britain (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984); Gary Freeman, Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979); Christopher Husbands, "The Dynamics of Racial Exclusion and Expulsion: Racist Politics in Western Europe," European Journal of Political Research 16, 6 (1988); Michael Walker, The National Front (Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1977).

²⁰See Tomas Hammar (ed.), European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

²¹Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin Schain, "The Politics of Immigration: Introduction," Special Issue on The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe, (ed.), M. Baldwin-Edwards and M. Schain, West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (1994), p. 8; See also Dominique Schnapper, "The Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National Identity," West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2: 127-139 (1994); Patrick Weil and John Crowley, "Integration in Theory and Practice: A Comparison of France and Britain," West European Politics, vol 17, no. 2: 110-126 (1994).

²²See Marilyn Hoskin and Roy Fitzgerald, "German Immigration Policy and Politics," in Michael Le May (ed.), The Gatekeepers: Comparative Immigration Policy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989); Douglas Ashford, Policy and Politics in France: Living with Uncertainty (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982); Martin Schain, "Policy-making and Immigration in France," New Community, vol. 20, no. 1 (October 1993); Hammar (1985); Layton-Henry (1990); Freeman (1993); William Brubaker, (ed.), Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America (Maryland: The German Marshall Fund of the U.S, University Press of America., Inc, 1989); Klaus von-Beyme, ed. "Special Issue: Right-Wing Extremism in Western Europe," West European Politics, vol. 11, no. 2 (April 1988).

ii. Challenges to Nation-state Component: Party and Ideological Variables

It is not at all clear how much of the great diversity among countries is accounted for by cultural and historical factors. According to Mattei Dogan, the differences on some issues within nations appear greater than the differences among nations.²³ Richard Rose also challenges cultural determinants in explaining the diversity among nations.²⁴ He emphasizes the commonalities among the situations of the various pluralist democracies by studying public programs. According to Rose, similarities are greater within a given program across national boundaries than they are across different programs within a single country. According to this perspective, immigration strategies should be relatively uniform in the highly developed, advanced industrialized pluralist democracies which share similar immigration problems. Others identify commonalities of politicians along ideological lines. Dogan, for example, challenges the cultural variable in explaining elite perceptions. According to him, "There are more similarities in the beliefs of a French and a German social democrat than between a French socialist and a French conservative or between a German social democrat and a German christian democrat."²⁵ Party and ideological variables may be helpful in locating the immigration issue.

Indeed, traditional party and ideological differences have created discernible cleavages among policymakers regarding where they stand on issues. According to Aberbach, ideology may be defined as a coherent system of beliefs and values that guide policy choices.²⁶ Ideology is of interest to students of politics primarily because it orders and helps project the choices of

²³Mattei Dogan, (ed.) Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988).

²⁴Richard Rose, "Comparative Policy Analysis," in Comparing Pluralist Democracies, M. Dogan, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 219-242.

²⁵Dogan (1988), pp. 2-3.

²⁶Aberbach et al.

policymakers on a myriad of specific issues. Political elites typically operate with more elaborate, coherent, and well-articulated ideologies than most of their fellow citizens and this is often visible in party affiliations. Most national politicians in the West are considerably more sensitive to ideological differences between the parties than are ordinary voters.²⁷ In the late 1960s, Butler and Stokes noted that more than one British voter in three saw "not much" difference between the Labour and Conservative parties, as compared with fewer than one member of Parliament in ten.²⁸

As Max Weber noted in his famous lecture on "Politics as a Vocation", "the politician in a democratic order is supposed to take a stand, to be passionate, and this passion is typically channeled through political parties."²⁹ Elite beliefs are usually structured by partisan ideological commitments, and often along the familiar Left-Right continuum.³⁰ In diverse cases and countries, it has been shown that partisan affiliation is the best predictor of a leader's position on a wide range of issues.³¹ According to Putnam, "a leader's party affiliation provides a remarkably economical index of his political outlook."³² In Europe, political parties are

²⁷Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1976), p. 117.

²⁸David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), 466.

²⁹Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (ed.) Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77-128.

³⁰Putnam (1976).

³¹See Asher Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Generation (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc. 1985); Allan Kornberg, and Robert Frasure, "Policy Differences in British Parliamentary Parties," American Political Science Review, vol. 65 (September 1971), 694-703; Jeff Fishel, "On the Transformation of Ideology in European Political Systems," Comparative Political Studies, vol. 4 (January 1972), 406-437; Robert Putnam (1973).

³²Putnam (1976), p. 89.

traditionally believed to be the custodians of opinion among their adherents.³³ Even in the case of less disciplined American parties, studies of the attitudes and values of state politicians, congressmen, etc. have consistently found comprehensive differences between Republicans and Democrats.³⁴ Elite attitudes on most issues are based on party affiliations.

Partisanship is not the only component of left-right or ideological positioning; issue attitudes are another.³⁵ Elite values of ideological content are most often determined by both issue positions and partisanship,³⁶ although the precise causal relationship between the three is unclear.

³³Lerner and Gorden, p. 253.

³⁴Herbert McClosky, Paul Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers," American Political Science Review, vol. 54 (June 1960), 406-427; George Serra, Neil Pinney, Albert Cover, and Jim Twombly, "The Changing Shape of Congressional Parties: Ideological Policy Cohesion and Polarization in the U.S. Congress, 1953-1990," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., September 2-5, 1993).

³⁵Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Systems," in Western European Party Systems, ed. Hans Daalder and Peter Mair (London: Sage, 1983).

³⁶John Huber, "Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring Ideology," European Journal of Political Research, (1989), 599-621; Ronald Inglehart and Hans Klingemann, "Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimension among Western Mass Publics," in Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie (eds.), Party Identification and Beyond (London: Wiley, 1976), pp. 269-270; Philip Converse and Roy Pierce, Political Participation in France (Cambridge: Belknap, 1986).

iii. The Challenge to Party and Ideological Differences: the Immigration Issue

Beliefs about immigration and racial minorities often cut across normal lines of political battle.³⁷ First, as has been illustrated in the French case, the left-right continuum has begun to show signs of convergence and party dealignment.³⁸ In the process of defusing immigration and race politics, the British party system has also witnessed party convergence on the issue.³⁹ Second, as shown by the German experience, major parties seem to be internally split on this policy issue.⁴⁰ Finally, immigration has been identified as an increasing dilemma for liberals. According to Julian Simon, there is only a marginal, if any, difference between liberals and others in terms of support for restricting the flow of immigration---and even those who describe themselves as "liberal" may be somewhat divided on the issue.⁴¹ The conundrum for this group is to avoid appearing racist while seeking immigration restrictions in attempting to alleviate problems of social integration.

Most political issues become salient through a struggle of dualistic tendencies. They are expected to generate differences among contending parties or candidates.⁴² In regard to immigration, these differences may be based less on "position" or conflicting views, and more on

³⁷Freeman, (1979) 101.

³⁸Martin Schain, "The National Front in France and the Construction of Political Legitimacy," West European Politics, vol. 10, no. 2 (1988).

³⁹Freeman (1979); Antony Messina, "Race and Party Competition in Britain: Policy Formation in the Post-Consensus Period," Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 38, no. 4 (1984).

⁴⁰Marilyn Hoskin and Roy Fitzgerald (1989); and Marilyn Hoskin, "Integration and Nonintegration of Foreign Workers: Four Theories," Political Psychology (1984) 661-685.

⁴¹Julian Simon, The Economic Consequences of Immigration (Oxford, England and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989).

⁴²Jan-Erik Lane, and Svante Ersson, Politics and Society and Western Europe (London: Sage Publications, 1987).

"valence," essentially one opinion on an issue.⁴³ In this framework, the immigration issue may qualify as a "valence" issue, much like the peace issue which all seek as an end value. Alternatively, differences between elite preferences on this issue may be based on different perceptions of facts. Or, they may be rooted in different value preferences and priorities. In either case, the immigration issue cuts across political groups, and poses a dilemma in how to identify issue-cleavages.

III. Hypotheses

In this study, two competing explanations for elite orientations are put forward and assessed. One explanation focuses on the nation-state, as a factor which shapes certain elite orientations and policy preferences. Nation-based or cultural theory assumes that each nation's past sets for its current leaders and decision-makers a series of problems which are shaped by values, cognitive assumptions, and patterns of beliefs that continue to provide its leaders with a repertoire of familiar responses to political problems.⁴⁴

Another explanation emphasizes political party correlates and taps into ideological and partisan determinants of attitudes toward immigration. This is based on the theory that party affiliation is the best predictor of a leader's position on a wide range of issues. One might expect to find that the immigration issue is split between conservatives who tend to stress economic concerns, and liberals who are more associated with the social and humanitarian dimensions of

⁴³David Butler and Donald Stokes. Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974).

⁴⁴Putnam (1976).

immigration.

Different implications flow from each theory. The persistence of nation-specific attitudes (i.e., perceptions of history and cultural needs) in immigration policy thinking may indicate that policy options are not easily open to transnational regulation. Cultural variables are not easily influenced, altered, or negotiable.⁴⁵ Political culture cannot be legislated or exported.⁴⁶ While political culture variables may change, they tend to remain stable for a considerable period of time and to be long-enduring.⁴⁷ The prevalence of national variables in explaining elite perceptions may indicate that the left-right ideological spectrum (operationalized through partisan affiliations), may be of limited value in identifying issue polarizations, particularly with regard to the immigration issue. The alternative hypothesis assumes that, if the left-right construct is significant in accounting for elite differences, the immigration issue may have transcended nation-state lines in the European Union. This finding would support the theory that there are more differences within nation-states than between them.

The study also leaves room for the finding that both hypotheses are unsubstantiated, and that neither party nor nation-state cleavages account for systematic and comprehensible distinctions on the issue. In fact, the study reveals some random distribution of elite orientations on immigration across parties and across nations. Policy preferences on some aspects of the immigration issue transcend major divisions of opinion which on other issues, such as education, welfare, and housing, account for attitudinal coalitions. Such findings may be explained by the

⁴⁵Tomas Hammar (ed.), European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

⁴⁶Harold Clarke and Moshe Czudnowski, Political Elites in Anglo-American Democracies: Changes in Stable Regimes (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1987), p. 12.

⁴⁷Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990).

levels of modernization of advanced industrial societies.⁴⁸ Thus, regulation of immigration may be based less on ideological references and more on pragmatic assessments of incompatibility between high-technology economies and unskilled immigrant workers. These cases either suggest that the time-honored political divisions of national identification and Left and Right as cognitive or evaluative aids have become irrelevant or that other polarizing factors must be considered.

IV. Research Framework

Both national and political party (left-right) affiliations are used to test which hypothesis comes closer to describing attitudinal coalitions or cleavages on the immigration issue. The research questions are analyzed cross-nationally and intra-nationally within the European context. The European Parliament, the legislative organ of the European Union, provides a most appropriate forum for this study.

The European Parliament (EP) has been gaining more responsibility and power since its inception as mainly an advisory body. It is this organ, more than any other in the European Union that strives to transcend nation-state lines and promote integration. Here, members represent both nation-state and political parties, but by sitting according to party groups, the aim is at fostering some type of consensual thinking based on transnational ideological positions.

The EP also offers a unique testing forum because it removes some of the structural and situational constraints that often counterbalance the impact of elite beliefs in other institutional settings. The absence of strict party discipline facilitates an examination of the left-right or

⁴⁸See Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York, 1973); Samuel Huntington, "Post-Industrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" Comparative Politics, vol. 6 (1973/4); Jurgen Habermas, Towards a Rational Society (Boston: 1970); Russell Dalton, Scott Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck, Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984).

ideological sources of MEP attitudes. While in many European parliaments, the pressure of party discipline overwhelms the effects of individual preferences on legislative voting,⁴⁹ in the European Parliament independence is guaranteed. Rule 2-2 of Rules of Procedure states that "they [MEPs] shall vote on an individual and personal basis; shall not be bound by any instructions, and shall not receive a binding mandate."⁵⁰ According to Fitzmaurice, one may expect more independence in the European Parliament than in national parliaments because failure to toe the party line does not have the same consequences as at the national level (i.e., the survival or defeat of the government).⁵¹ Indeed, due to the special nature of institutional structures and other arrangements adopted by the Union (i.e., direct elections and the absence of real constituencies), party discipline and pressure to conform are greatly minimized. Group cohesion in terms of attitudes thus promises to be linked to ideological orientation more than to political interests. This facilitates access to attitudes of parliamentarians.

MEPs represent national politics as well as partisan and/or European supranational interests. Several factors reflect and promote national tendencies. First, several MEPs are well-established national politicians. A number of them have dual mandates (i.e., Giscard, Le Pen, Andreotti). Although dual mandates are not permitted in six member-states, 34 of the third Parliamentary Session were still members of their national parliaments as well.⁵² Second, MEPs are elected by direct elections every five years in each of the 12 member-states. They often campaign on national issues. Studies have shown that the majority of electorates in EP elections

⁴⁹See Putnam, (1976), p. 103.

⁵⁰Quoted in Francis Jacobs, Richard Corbett, with Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament (Essex, England: Longman Group UK, Ltd., 1990), p. 47.

⁵¹John Fitzmaurice, The Party Groups in the European Parliament (Westmead, England: Saxon House, D.C. Heath Ltd., 1975), p. 163.

⁵²Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackleton, p. 44.

consider the European forum less than the national political situation.⁵³ For many, the European elections represent an opportunity to express discontent. These elections provide a "midterm test" of national governments' popularity.⁵⁴ In cases where national elections have coincided with EP elections, voting patterns have been similar, suggesting that voters themselves do not make a distinction among them. In sum, the EP seems to be a replica of national struggles as they involve the same European publics.

The EP institution provides a good experimental laboratory for analysis. Besides the party discipline constraint, the EP controls for other factors that may account for comparative differences of varying views, namely education and postrecruitment socialization.⁵⁵ This testing "lab" also allows us to tap cultural explanations for inter-nation differences that often get blurred by structural explanations. Elkins and Simeon suggest that, "Societies can vary either in the proportions of people found in each category, or in the views held by people within similar categories or both."⁵⁶ They suggest that when a structural control eliminates the differences, then that control variable identifies a collectivity whose cultural attributes may be important. The uniformity of roles of these elites in the Parliament disentangles these levels and overcomes such methodological difficulties.

⁵³Nonna Mayer, "Attitudes Towards the Region, Europe, and Politics in 1992 France," (Paper delivered at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The Washington D.C., September 2-5, 1993), p. 7.

⁵⁴Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver and Peter Mair, Representative Government in Western Europe (New York, U.S.A: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1992), pp. 279-280.

⁵⁵Lewis Edinger and Donald Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," American Political Science Review, vol. 61 (June 1967), 428-445.

⁵⁶David Elkins and Richard Simeon, "A Cause in Search of its Effect or What does Political Culture Explain," Comparative Politics, 11 (January 1979), 406-437.

V. Parameters and Significance of the Study

This study provides a multi-dimensional contribution to political science. The first relates to the empirical research. The study provides a data base of attitudes of the only supranational body of elites in Western democracy. Unlike other deputies, Members of the European Parliament represent national, party, and transnational interests, and are directly elected. There has been some early work examining transnational party cohesion and cooperation in the European Parliament, but much of it was limited because it focused on roll-call votes, which are often not used on important issues facing the legislature.⁵⁷ The empirical work here not only adds to our understanding of elite attitudinal differences, but it links variables of elite thinking to a specific issue.

The second contribution deals with the field of immigration in particular and draws on two different strands of political research: a comparative framework and an attitudinal study. The research builds on country-based comparative analyses, but applies a macro-level approach. Clearly, a cross-national comparative approach would not have been possible without an understanding of the types of national studies mentioned above. A comparative study of European elites who represent different countries and diverse political parties provides a broader based assessment of general theories of elite thinking on the immigration issue. The European Parliament constitutes one diverse sample of "European elites." Other "European elites" include the European Commission, the executive branch of the EU, the Council of Ministers which is composed of representatives of member states, members of the Court of Justice and diverse Eurocrats who are the high officials of these communities. The MEPs represent both partisan and national interests and therefore provide us with a basis for comparison of both variables.

⁵⁷See Gerda Zellentin, "Form and Function of the Opposition in the European Communities," Government and Opposition, vol. 2, no. 3 (1967); J. Fitzmaurice (1975).

The attitudinal component of immigration responds to the growing gap in the immigration literature, a tendency to look at immigration as a policy output rather than a policy input. Despite public opinion studies generated by Eurobarometer Reports and studies on extreme-right movements, we know very little about attitudes towards immigration. This study generates and adds to a valuable body of elite and mass survey research tapping attitudes and perceptions. The study attempts to understand the immigration issue by examining variables such as partisan affiliations, ideological position, and national identification that account for elite differences in perception of it. It probes patterns. With the survey of a sample of European parliamentary elites (MEPs), one can make statements about the distribution of attitudes and opinions across party and nation-state lines. With the personal interview, one can inquire into the motivations and expectations that guide behavior.⁵⁸

The comparative and attitudinal framework applied here is designed to elucidate the means by which decision-makers define and approach problems in general and immigration in particular. It should be noted however, that this study is not a study **about** the European Parliament and its role and powers. It is not intended to explore in depth the concept of European integration. It is hoped that in the process of exploring the immigration issue as one challenge to a panel of political elites, the study provides a standpoint from which to evaluate the more general problem-solving capabilities of the European political system. Nor is this a **policy** study in the strict sense. Had it been intended as such, more time and effort would be dedicated to observation of policy output. The focus of this study is on policy input, or on deeper political thinking. Elite behaviors are relevant insofar as they are products of cleavages, attitudes, orientations, values, and exigencies. Probing underlying attitudes provides insight into the range of behaviors available to the elite.

⁵⁸Dalton (1988), p. 21.

While the relationship between attitudes and behavior is inherently problematic, the two are not randomly associated.⁵⁹ According to Greenstein, behavior is a function of both environmental situations and attitudinal or psychological predispositions, what is essentially a push-pull relationship.⁶⁰ Aberbach et al. perceive elite attitudes as important parameters in the behavioral equation: setting limits of the debate; directing inquiry and thought; influencing the interpretation of events; guiding the definition of problems and the response to them.⁶¹ According to Putnam, attitudes of parliamentarians are synonymous with behaviors. Thus, "Most of their [parliamentarians] behavior is not physical behavior at all, but verbal behavior; parliaments are, after all 'talking shop'; when we listen to politicians talk about politics and policy, we are in fact watching them behave."⁶² Putnam poses that there is considerable overlap between parliamentarians' verbal behavior in the interview situation and elsewhere.

Finally, on a broader level, the theoretical contribution flows from the more general thesis. The study enhances our ability to understand the value of the traditional left-right construct in explaining differences of elite attitudes. It also informs us about the role of national variables, particularly at a time when Europe is trying to remove national walls.

The manuscript is divided into three sections. Part I describes in depth the nature of the research and the analytical problem. Chapter Two discusses the nature of this project's elite sample, Members of the European Parliament, while Chapter Three describes the nature of the immigration issue. Part II includes Chapters Four, Five, Six, Seven and Eight, each of which

⁵⁹Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, p. 31.

⁶⁰Fred Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 28-29.

⁶¹Aberbach, Cheney and Rockman, p. 2.

⁶²Putnam (1973), pp. 26-27.

empirically examine factors that affect elite attitudes towards the immigration issue. Chapter Four provides an overview of MEP attitudes towards immigration. Chapter Five focuses on the nation-state, and Chapter Six explores political party and ideological patterns. Chapter Seven compares in depth the roles of left-right and partisan orientations across four countries. Chapter Eight explores other variables that are pertinent to contemporary immigration thinking, namely the "European" factor. It suggests that the dynamics of European polarizations in the 1990s are likely to be influenced by European integration efforts themselves. These sections are followed in the last chapter by a discussion of the implications relating to how attitude cleavages on immigration and in more general context, may be organized in Europe of the 1990s.

Chapter Two: A Study of European Parliament Elites: Research Design and Methodology

For the political scientist, the unification of Europe has a peculiar attraction . . . an instance of voluntary 'integration' taking place before his eyes, as it were under laboratory conditions.

--E. Haas¹

I. The Evolution of the European Union²

The present structure of the European Union is a culmination of political initiatives by West European governments dating from the early post-war years. It was inspired by a common determination to transcend national rivalries that had contributed to the outbreak of World Wars I and II. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's plan to integrate West Germany into Western Europe was to pool European coal and steel industries. This resulted in the 1951 Treaty of Paris which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The six countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, France and Germany) that formed the ECSC incorporated the key constitutional element that is the basis of the EU: they ceded some of their sovereignty to a supranational body.

The success of the ECSC in contributing to regional economic growth led to a significantly more comprehensive European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), created by the Treaties of Rome in 1957.³ In 1965, the three

¹Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. xi.

²The European Union (EU) technically refers to the European Community (EC) after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty or the "Treaty on European Union" (TEU), starting 1 January 1994. The EC and EU are used interchangeably in the text, unless the time frame is specified.

³The United States' Marshall Plan, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and the European Payments Union were also major contributors to regional economic growth.

treaties and their institutions were merged, leading to the more commonly known, "European Communities" (EC).

With Community membership size doubled to twelve member states by the mid-1980s (with the addition of Denmark, the UK, Ireland in 1973; Greece in 1983; Spain and Portugal in 1986), the scope for policy convergence also expanded. The Community greatly accelerated the pace of its unification. The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 outlined a more comprehensive strategy for transforming the EC from a customs union into a fully integrated regional market by the end of 1992. The SEA amended the Community's founding treaties to facilitate concrete progress towards European unity through institutional revisions, strengthened common action in the economic and social fields, and in the sphere of foreign policy.⁴ The SEA endorsed the goal of free movement of goods, services, people, and capital, set by the Rome Treaty (i.e., the abolition of frontier controls), aiming to complete the internal market, and giving a more prominent legislative role to the European Parliament.⁵

The Maastricht Treaty (or the "Treaty on European Union") adopted in 1994 incorporated the three previous treaties and the SEA and created the European Union (EU). This Union widened policy competence in the fields of political, legal-judiciary, economic, and monetary union, sought greater unity in foreign policy and security, and introduced the concept of a European citizenship. The Treaty on European Union also strengthened the role of the European Parliament in Community decisions.

⁴EC Delegation to the United States, "A Guide to the European Community," (1991).

⁵The SEA established a new "cooperation procedure" that compels the Council to consider parliamentary opinions on proposed legislation in a second reading. The agreement also granted Parliament the right of joint decision-making with respect to the accession of new members and agreements of association and cooperation with nonmember countries. See Donald Hancock and B. Guy Peters, "The European Community," in Politics in Western Europe, Hancock et al., eds. (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993), p. 467.

By the 1990s, the European Union has come to enjoy features of supranationality, which effectively establish a tier of government above that of the member states. Its purpose is to work towards "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe," and with law-making powers designed with that objective in mind.⁶ The introduction of European citizenship is an important difference between the Community and the Union, particularly since citizenship relates both to the democratic legitimacy of the Union, and to the evolution of policies on a "People's Europe."⁷

The tasks of achieving the aims of all the Treaties have largely rested in the same institutions: the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. The Council and Commission may be referred to as a dual executive. The Council is composed of delegates of the governments of the 12 member states, and thus represents the sovereign powers rather than the more collective spirit of European integration. The Commission is the "guardian of the Treaties" and acts independently of the governments and of the Council. The Commission consists of 17 Members who are appointed by agreement among the member governments for a four-year term. It also includes the thousands of permanent staff or civil servants (the "Eurocrats"). The Court of Justice, composed of 13 judges appointed for 6 year terms, ensures that implementation of the Treaties is in accordance with the rule of law, and the Court of Auditors (12 members) examines revenue and expenditures.

The European Parliament functions as the legislative branch of the European Union

⁶Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Treaty on European Union (Brussels and Luxembourg: ECSE-EEC-EAEC, 1992), p. 7; See also Francis Jacobs, Richard Corbett, and Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament, 2nd ed. (Essex, UK: The Longman Group, 1992), p. 2.

⁷Clive Church and David Phinnemore, European Union and European Community: A Handbook and Commentary on the Post-Maastricht Treaties (Hertfordshire, England: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), p. 39.

system and is composed of 518 Members from the 12 countries and 9 party groups (excluding the Independents). Although MEPs were originally appointed by national governments, the advent of direct elections in 1979 recast the European Parliament as the only directly-accountable body of the EU. The Treaty on European Union (TEU), like previous Community treaties, addresses the EP as the first institution. This can be taken to imply a certain primacy in line with the essential democratic role of parliaments in Western societies, and with the Parliament's claim to represent the people of Europe.⁸ While the number of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have increased by 49 seats since the Maastricht Treaty, tenure of office has remained five years.⁹

The EP has steadily gained powers since its creation. Originally, the Assembly as it was called, was delegated the power only to debate the activity of the High Authority (later the Commission) and to adopt a motion of censure by two-thirds majority which would force the executive to resign.¹⁰ The Assembly did not have anything like the status which the Parliament was to gain in later years.

The goal of the EP has been to take legislative prerogatives more congruent to other conventional parliaments. The Treaty on European Union upgraded the role of the Parliament to some extent. A new Article 138(b) lists five different ways in which the Parliament could share in the EU's legislative process. These include assent, conciliation, cooperation,

⁸Church and Phinnemore, p. 253.

⁹The total seats in the EP was brought up to 567. Paragraph 26 of Part A of the Edinburgh Declaration gave 1 new MEP to Belgium, Greece, and Portugal; 4 to Spain, and 6 each to the U.K., France, Italy and the Netherlands. This was in order to preserve political harmony by balancing the 18 new seats given to Germany to reflect the incorporation of the former German Democratic Republic. See Church and Phinnemore, p. 255.

¹⁰Francis Jacobs, Richard Corbett, and Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament, 2nd ed. (Essex, England: Longman Group, 1992), p. 7.

consultation, and by inviting the Commission to act. Amendments introduced by the TEU mean that the Commission has to reply and is open to a collective dismissal under Article 144.¹¹

Although the Parliament has witnessed a steady growth of powers, this must be put in context of external constraints. The EP can not define its own powers, have a government to support, and it can only play a minor consultative part in revising the Treaties under Article N.¹² The TEU failed to strengthen the executive which is essential for effective decision-making.¹³ According to B.E. Brown, "What passes for an executive in the community, that is, the Council of Ministers, the summit meetings of heads of governments, and the European Political Cooperation, are diplomatic conclaves."¹⁴ The European Union and the EP must still overcome what is often referred to as the "democratic deficit," meaning that the executive institutions and process of decision-making are not subject to proper parliamentary accountability and scrutiny that characterize Western states. The idea assumes that the EP is the natural representative of the peoples of Europe, to whom the institutions should ultimately be responsible.¹⁵ Despite receiving new teeth since its early days, the EP still needs to overcome the weaknesses of the EU system as a whole. In this regard, the evolution of the European Parliament may reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the European Union itself.¹⁶

¹¹See discussion of Treaty on European Union in Church and Phinnemore, pp. 253-262.

¹²Ibid., p. 256.

¹³See discussion in Bernard E. Brown, "Old France in a New World," American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 18, no., 5 (October 1994), p. 10.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Church and Phinnemore, p. 255.

¹⁶See Michael Palmer, "The Development of the European Parliament's Institutional Role Within the European Community, 1974-1983," Journal of European Integration (1983): 183-202.

II. The European Parliament and Transnationalism

The objective of the European Union since its inception has been to create a supranational community based on the common interests of its individual member-states. The role of the European Parliament in this task was established to transcend the nation-state by grouping representatives in broad political groups which cut across nationality. One of the EP's distinguishing characteristics in comparison with other international assemblies is that its central component has been based not on national delegations but on European-wide ideologies.¹⁷ This was the underpinning of the 1953 Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community which was the first international assembly whose members sat according to political affiliation. Since its historical evolution, the Parliament has been organized into political groups.

A. The Role of Political Parties

The European Parliament resembles the role of other national legislatures in the performance of key functions. These include: a) linking people to government; b) recruiting political elite; and c) establishing the viability of a political community by managing political conflict.¹⁸ The role of political party groups is central to these functions and reinforces the EP's role as a legislative body. The TEU captured this essential point as it introduced a new Article (138a) which underscores the role which political parties can and should play within the Union,

¹⁷Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham, Transnational Party Co-operation and European Integration: The Process Towards Direct Elections (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 42.

¹⁸See Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel Patterson, Comparing Legislatures, in Luciano Bardi, "Representation in the European Parliament and the Building of the European Political System" (Buenos Aires, IPSA Conference Paper, July 1991), p. 1.

and by implication in the European Parliament.¹⁹

Whatever the structure of the polity, parties have served as essential agencies of mobilization, and as such have helped to integrate local communities into the nation or the broader federation.²⁰ Political parties tend to act as the driving motors as they perform the organizational functions of interest aggregation, articulation and implementation. In efforts to build the new European supranational state, the EP organized by party groups does the same. Political groups or loose parties are instrumental to the European Parliament's legislative functions. Party groups dominate the organization and procedures of the EP. The ultimate aim of the groups individually, and of the Parliament as a whole, is to influence Community legislation.²¹

While political groups may not be truly transnational political parties, they roughly parallel national political parties in West European legislatures. Party groups form the dominant political and organizational unit of the EP and as such, they enjoy first priority in the allocation of posts and finances. Political groups play the decisive role in changing the Parliament's leaders, the President, Vice-Presidents, the committee chairmen and vice-chairmen and the interparliamentary delegation. They set the parliamentary agenda, choose the rapporteurs and decide on the allocation of speaking time.²² The power of these groups is reinforced by their financial advantages. The EP's budget allocates a considerable sum to the political groups (i.e.,

¹⁹Church and Phinnemore, p. 255.

²⁰Hans Daalder, "The 'Reach' of the Party System," in The West European Party System, ed. Peter Mair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 91-92.

²¹Geoffrey Pridham and Pippa Pridham, "Transnational Parties in the European Community I," in Political Parties in the European Community, ed. Stanley Henig (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1979), pp. 247-248.

²²Francis Jacobs and Richard Corbett with Michael Shackleton, The European Parliament (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p.55.

15% of the total budget in 1990).²³ The political groups also form an important channel of communication between similar parties in different countries and also between European and national politics. For example, political groups receive visitors from national parliaments, and send delegations to national parties.²⁴ On a less formal basis, contacts are maintained through individual MEPs as members of their own political parties.²⁵ In these ways, they fulfill Parliament's role as a forum and channel of communication.

As in national parliaments, the activities of the political groups have a significant impact on the decisions taken by Parliament. The groups convene on two main occasions a month, once during the "Group Week," when there are no committee or plenary activities, and then, during the Strasbourg plenary sessions. The former are normally held in Brussels and are devoted to preparations of the next week's plenary agenda. They are also used for discussion of the group's own activities such as conferences, publications and for receiving visiting delegations or leaders of national parties. Both regular meetings are held to decide group policies and attitudes on issues coming before the Parliament.²⁶

As in any parliament there are significant constraints on the freedom of action of individual members, imposed by party group structure. The agenda of plenary sessions, the distribution of speaking time and of rapporteurships are decided primarily by leaders of the political groups. Backbench members of the groups and non-attached MEPs do not have direct

²³*Ibid.*, p.75.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 78.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 237.

²⁶The European Parliament, "One Parliament for Twelve: The European Parliament," 13th edition, (September 1991), p. 12.

input.²⁷ Groups issue "whips" or voting instructions to their members, both in terms of how to vote on each amendment and text as well as indicating which votes are important. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, independence is also guaranteed and thus, whipping is far less tight than in some national parliaments, although there have been fines imposed on members.²⁸ The most effective sanctions lie in withdrawal of future patronage. This may include not assigning rapporteurships or not renominating a member in the next European elections.

B. Towards Transnationalism

The importance of consolidating a strong legislature was underscored by the conversion of the Common Assembly to the European Parliament. The change of name marked a shift away from a deliberative to a parliamentary and legislative body.²⁹ The role of party groups, particularly since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, also helps to distinguish the European Parliament as a developing parliamentary body rather than a weak assembly. As early as the 1960s, Henig suggested that the status and power of an assembly is related to, and may be measured by the existence of strong party groups.³⁰ He noted that unlike the more peripheral deliberative bodies as the Nordic Council, and NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, party groups have formed in the more independent "quasi-parliamentary institutions in their own rights, rather

²⁷Jacobs and Corbett, p. 46.

²⁸*Ibid.*, p.81.

²⁹Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European Community: A Social-Psychological Study in Four Member States (Cambridge, London, New York,, Melbourne and Paris: Cambridge University Press and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1986), p. 36.

³⁰Stanley Henig (ed.), European Political Parties: A Handbook (New York and Washington: Political and Economic Planning (PEP), Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 474.

than in those formed to link together national parliaments."³¹ In these cases, the trend for parties has been towards transnational cooperation.

"Transnational party co-operation" in the EU refers to the institutionalized coordination and promotion of common policy positions and other forms of European activity by political parties of the same ideological tendency from different member countries.³² The general development of the EC in the 1970s has promoted and conditioned the politicization of transnational party cooperation.³³ This process has been reinforced by European integration, and its future development continues to depend on the EU as a form of "political system." According to Henig,

If the object of the integration process is the creation of a new community, then diverse interests must be aggregated and a degree of consensus established. This is a function that in West European society must heavily rely on political parties. The closer Europe moves toward unity, the greater the need for parties to establish close and institutionalized links with their equivalents in other countries. As decisions taken at the center of the nascent Community begin to impinge on the lives of all citizens in the different member countries, the role of the parties will become more crucial.³⁴

According to Pridham and Pridham, transnational party cooperation must be seen in the context of European party development.³⁵ Although there are national political cultures which shape parties, Henig concluded from his study of European party systems that, "the West European political party has gradually evolved something approaching a common structure."³⁶

³¹Ibid.

³²Pridham and Pridham (1981), p. 1.

³³Ibid., p. 9.

³⁴Henig (1969), p. 19.

³⁵Pridham and Pridham, pp. 3-4.

³⁶Henig, p. 521.

The politicization of transnational party politics parallel party politics in general. In the development of a larger political community, political parties are the main carriers of transnational values and ideologies.

The strength of the European Parliament relies on the evolution of transnational party cooperation. Party group cohesion has come to be recognized as a factor of political weight in the need to assert group influence in a stronger Parliament.³⁷ It reflects the transference of national party political norms to the European level.³⁸

Party policy cohesion is influenced by legislative partisan conflict.³⁹ Serra et al. confirm that higher levels of partisan conflict increase policy cohesion within parties.⁴⁰ Partisan conflict taps the "degree of ideological conflict between the parties as electoral coalitions."⁴¹ According to Sani and Sartori, polarizations can be assessed either by the distances perceived by political elites, of how close, or conversely, how alien they feel the other parties to be. They can also be measured by ideological stands of the parties. They assert that the polarizations that matter generally are of the left-right variety because of spatial imagery.⁴²

³⁷Pridham and Pridham, p. 59.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 53-54.

³⁹George Serra, Neil Pinney, Albert Cover, and Jim Twombly, "Changing Shape of Congressional Parties: Ideological Policy Cohesion and Polarization in the U.S. Congress, 1953-1990, (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., September 2-5), p. 10.

⁴⁰See David Brady, Joseph Cooper, and Patricia Hurley, "The Decline of Party in U.S. House of Representatives, 1887-1968," Legislative Studies Quarterly 4 (1979), pp. 381-307, in Serra et al., p.17.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies," in Western European Party Systems, ed. H. Daalder and P. Mair (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 1983), pp. 307-340.

Before the late 1970s, party cohesion was largely absent, and the EP was characterized by unanimity between party groups. Pridham and Pridham described the 1950s and 1960s as a period where the overall tendency among transnational groups was towards compromise rather than conflict. This was based on a common desire not to undermine the principal role of the Parliament, then acting as a "form of pro-integrationist pressure group in institutional clothing."⁴³ According to Henig, lack of party cohesion is a mark of a weak assembly. He explained that, institutions with limited formal powers are far more anxious to make unanimous declarations without any divisions of a national or party political nature.⁴⁴

Since the late 1970s, there has been an overall increase in the number of political divisions within the Parliament. Relations between the groups after the first direct elections of 1979 have become more conflictual as the Parliament has moved away from its traditional position of consensus.⁴⁵ The development of distinguishable ideological identities between groups has led to relatively greater confrontation among them.⁴⁶ The Parliament has become a livelier forum of ideologically motivated exchanges between left and right. This has not only promoted the internal cohesion of the main groups, but in turn stimulated close relations between groups on the right of the political spectrum in reaction to the Socialists, after they became the largest group in 1975.

The development of relatively more partisan responses to policies is a result of several factors. First, in its advanced stage of the European Union, there has been considerable consolidation of a European political system since the original Treaty of Rome. Second, the

⁴³Pridham and Pridham, 32.

⁴⁴Henig, (1969) p. 474.

⁴⁵Ibid, p. 45.

⁴⁶Pridham and Pridham, p. 92.

relative increase of EP powers has promoted its self-confidence and involvement in internal dissension. As the European Parliament continues to be more secure of its institutional relevance, polarization and party cohesion is expected to rise. Third, direct elections to the EP, introduced in June 1979, have forced party groups to appeal to voters on a cross-national united front. Finally, the development of relatively more partisan responses to policies has been a consequence of the increasing scope of issues introduced into the Parliament.⁴⁷ The widening scope of policy discussion in the EU incorporated new issues, not just the issue of integration, on which most MEPs agreed.

Although the European Union is in its advanced state, the absence of a strong and autonomous executive hinders the full development of the European Parliament as an independent institution. This has implications for levels of party cohesion, as discussed in the following section.

C. Challenges to Transnational Party Groups: Nation-States and Issues

In addition to the more general structural shortcomings of the EU, party cohesion still needs to overcome several obstacles. First, as the last discussion noted, is the absence of discipline as an incentive to party cohesion. Second, is EP membership diversity. Sjoblom's hypothesis, that the greater heterogeneity among party members, the lower the party cohesion, may be applied to the EP.⁴⁸ Third, are the types of issues that face the Parliament. Issues may

⁴⁷See Pridham and Pridham, pp. 48, 60, 93.

⁴⁸See Gunnar Sjoblom, *Party Strategies in a Multiparty System* (Lund: Studenlitteratur, 1968); and Sjoblom, "Political Change and Political Accountability: A Propositional Inventory of Causes and Effects," in Western European Party System: Continuity and Change, ed., H. Daalder and P. Mair, p. 390.

influence party cohesiveness or underline their levels of incompatible interests. Henig warns of the "highly charged political issues" when national blocks tend to replace transnational party lines.⁴⁹ Indeed, when groups fail to vote cohesively, it is usually because one or more national delegations have decided to opt out of a group position.⁵⁰

The nature of issues underlies the more uneven development of transnational party cooperation in the EP. Some policy areas are the subject of ideologically-based conflicts; others are more closely and directly associated with the conflicts of national interests; while much of the subject matter remain politically-non-controversial.⁵¹ Some issues have been of such political significance that they have become a source of deep division between the groups. The Klepsch Report on U.S.-European arms procurement in February 1979 is one of many examples of such division. The Report took the view that Western Europe was not getting enough defense for its money. The divisions lay between the Christian Democrats, Conservatives, Liberals and PCI, on the one hand, who saw EC involvement as a natural development of industrial policy against the Socialists, RDE and French Communists, on the other, who were unwilling to envisage any EC involvement in sectors impinging on defense policy.⁵² On important issues, political groups try to negotiate compromises among their national delegations before taking a decision.⁵³

If some issues tend to be more nationally oriented, there are others which have also come to be more partisan-based. Individual groups have been associated with holding certain

⁴⁹Henig (1969), p. 475.

⁵⁰Jacob and Corbett, p. 79.

⁵¹Pridham and Pridham, p. 94.

⁵²Ibid, p. 61.

⁵³Jacob and Corbett, p. 79.

chairmanships of the Parliament's standing committees. For example, the Socialist Group has held a considerable number of budget and economic committee chairmanships, while the PPE Group has held that of the political affairs committee, and the Liberal Group has for years retained the agricultural committee. According to Pridham and Pridham, this has illustrated the fact that "partisan representation is much more effective than the representation of nationality."⁵⁴

Differences in national cultures also play an influential role. There are variations in emphasis of issues, approach to Parliament's role, and on importance attached to attendance at meetings. According to Jacobs and Corbett, for example, Members from North European countries tend to be more involved with details of technical legislation than their counterparts in Southern Europe.⁵⁵ Many MEPs from smaller Community countries especially, feel committed to defend their country's culture and language. At formal meetings, some Danish Members, for example insisted on Danish interpretation, although they were fluent in English or another Community language.⁵⁶

Clearly, there are issue group cohesions which may cut across the party spectrum. Others tend to be specific to party groups. This study attempts to place the immigration issue in these contexts.

⁵⁴Pridham and Pridham, p. 44.

⁵⁵Jacob and Corbett, p. 53.

⁵⁶Jacob and Corbett, p. 32.

III. The Party Groups in the European Parliament: Ideological and Party Group Cohesion

A. Background

One of the key functions of parties is that of formation of a governing group which is organic and has common goals.⁵⁷ Although the European Parliament does not explicitly create a government, a function typical of other legislatures, it consists of cohesive groups of individuals who know each other, are able to communicate and have some end in common. The section above noted that these transnational party groups fulfill the two broad categories of tasks which party groups in general assume. The first is that of organization, which includes nominating candidates for the various offices of the Parliament, and deciding upon its procedure. The second is what Henig terms ideological; the articulation and promotion of certain commonly held viewpoints in the discussions and voting of the Parliament.⁵⁸ Transnational groups can be grouped according to the way they form links across national frontiers.

Parliament is divided into nine political groups (excluding the Independents) which represent nearly 80 different national political parties.⁵⁹ These loose party groups represent the traditional European political families. Some, such as the Liberals (Liberals, Democrats and Reformists LDR), Christian Democrats (The Group of the European People's Party (PPE)), and Socialists are parties that go back as far as June 1953. More recently, electoral reforms and social changes in Western Europe have led to the advent of new political groups to broaden representation of new interests. These include the European Right, Communist groups, and other

⁵⁷Alessandro Pizzorno, "Parties in Pluralism," in The West European Party System, ed. P. Mair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 69.

⁵⁸Henig (1969), p. 476.

⁵⁹The European Parliament, "One Parliament for Twelve: The European Parliament," 13th edition, (September 1991), p. 12.

more national-based movements. Most of the transnational parties have federations or world-wide organizations which enhance political affinity among groups. They have been responsible for integrating party activities and promoting European attitudes within member parties.

As in national parties, the unity and cohesion of party groups are stressed as an important political priority by all groups. For larger party groups, it serves to support their transnational claims. For smaller ones, cohesion gives political cement to their organizational efforts.⁶⁰ All groups attempt to produce a broad set of policy statements on as many fields as possible, including those which cause divisions within them on national and ideological grounds. Often however, majorities are based on convergent rather than homogenous motives and ideologies.⁶¹

Whether or not political groups are indeed transnational parties, this study tends to treat these loose groupings much like national parties; as representative structures of left and right positions. As in individual European party systems, to be on the center and right means to support those who stand against the communist or socialist parties. This is regardless of the fact that in some countries parties of the right have a distinctly religious basis while in others they are secular, or reflect rural or farming interests or a particular cultural or linguistic subculture. To be on the left has traditionally meant supporting a communist or socialist party claiming to represent the interests of the organized working class.

⁶⁰Pridham and Pridham, p.93.

⁶¹Ibid, p. 12.

B. The Party Groups (1989-1994)

There are three major indicators of supranationality in the EP.⁶² The first criterion rests on how far group policies and views transcend national boundaries and interests to promote European interests. Second, how far is a group able to present a meaningful common viewpoint. Third, how transnational is the composition of the group.

The following is a sketch of each party group with an emphasis on the basis of cohesion. Since there is no strong political discipline (as described above), this section deals with the party and ideological cohesion of each party group.

i. The Socialist Group

The Socialist Group was founded in June 1953, and is the largest (180 members) and most representative (with members from every EU country) group within the Parliament. It is also one of the most cohesive political groups in the EP as it represents the socialist and social democratic political current of Europe.⁶³ Members share common working experience in the Socialist International. The purpose of the International since the 1950s has been to strengthen relations between affiliated parties and coordinate political attitudes and external relations with other progressive democratic parties.⁶⁴ Group cohesiveness is also a result of a general practice of systematic internal discipline at the national level.⁶⁵

Since the 1979 European election campaign, the Socialists have declared their objectives,

⁶²See Pridham and Pridham, in Henig, pp. 248-249.

⁶³See Robert Ladrech, "Social Democratic Parties and EC Integration: Transnational Party Responses to Europe 1992," European Journal of Political Research, Vol 24, No. 2 (August 1993), pp. 195-210).

⁶⁴Henig (1969), pp. 544-534.

⁶⁵Pridham and Pridham, pp. 54-55.

"to contribute to the democratization of the EC and to shaping of a policy in favor of workers and consumers."⁶⁶ The common approach towards the goal of social democracy for this party group is greater "dirigisme" (i.e., planning and control) at the European level. This includes political, economic, and social goals which cannot be attained through national action alone.⁶⁷

ii. Party of the European People's Party (PPE)

The European People's Party (PPE) was founded in June 1953, and is the second largest group in the EP. The party is represented in all of the countries of the EU. It is a member of the federation of Christian Democratic parties. However, the party group sees itself as an embryonic European political party with its own federalist programme.⁶⁸ While the Group is linked to the European Union of Christian Democrats, there are national members (including the French Centre des Democratres Sociaux and Union pour la Democratie Francaise, the British and Danish Conservatives, and the Spanish Catalanian and Popular parties) who have joined the party. The PPE Group is less cohesive and less ideologically homogenous than the Socialist Group. It ranges from Social Christian members from the Low Countries with strong trade union links and who are left-of-center on certain social questions to highly conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) members from Bavaria.

This party is driven by the Christian Democracy philosophy of the individual. It emphasizes a hierarchical system of responsibility extending from the individual, to the family

⁶⁶L. Fellermaier, The Work of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, report to the 10th Congress of the Confederation of the Socialist Parties of the European Community (Brussels: January 1979), p. 3 in Pridhams, p. 62.

⁶⁷John Fitzmaurice, The Party Groups in the European Parliament (Westmead, England: Saxon House, D.C. Heath Ltd., 1975), p. 105.

⁶⁸Jacobs and Corbett, p. 61.

unit, to the local community, to professional organizations and associations, through the state to the European and world communities, each accepting a share of responsibility. The PPE has been held together by its support for integration, and by emphasizing those things which are common to all Christian Democrats.⁶⁹

In 1992, the British Conservative party joined with the Christian Democrats to become members of the PPE Group. After long efforts of each to keep separate identities,⁷⁰ an overriding majority rallied on an anti-left campaign, in an effort to counterbalance a growing Socialist influence.

iii. The Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Group (LDR)

This is the third original group, founded in June 1953. With 49 members, the LDR is the largest of the smaller groups. The group has members from all EU member-states except Greece and the UK. With the exception of the Dutch, left-liberal-D-66, all parties within the Group also belong to the Federation of Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Parties of the European Community (ELDR).⁷¹ The Liberal International is marked by a basic split between parties of Southern Europe which are right-wing in economic matters but possess an historic left-wing character in their anti-clericism, and those of Northern Europe which can be considered as progressive non-Socialists. This split has meant that the International has never acquired any

⁶⁹Fitzmaurice, p.85.

⁷⁰Motivations to keep separate identities varied for the British Conservative Party and the Christian Democrat members. The former was hesitant to affiliate itself with religious namesakes, particularly parties with a predominantly Catholic background, while the latter was reluctant to affiliate itself with a "Conservative" party which has strong right-wing connotations in most European countries.

⁷¹Jacobs and Corbett, p. 64.

ideological homogeneity, although the dominant stream has tended to be the Southern.⁷² The parties which label themselves "liberal" stem from many different traditions, and have been associated with a variety of movements and philosophies. The heterogeneity of these liberal forces in the Union has also been compounded by the fact that not all parties concerned call themselves "liberal". The term "democratic" was incorporated in the title of the party group as an attempt to give some common meeting point.⁷³

According to Fitzmaurice, "the position of the group must be defined largely by negative criteria: that is by reference to the other groups. In some sense, a Liberal is one who is not a Christian Democrat or a Socialist."⁷⁴ As a left-right polarization has emerged more clearly in the European Parliament, the Liberals increasingly play a "middling role," choosing coalition partners according to issue.⁷⁵ As the third largest group, the LDR has become aware of the question of majority formation centered around the two major groups, neither of which, alone, has been in a position of overall numerical dominance. While the LDR has tended to coalesce either on the center-right or center-left in most EU countries, their common position in the EP is influenced by this consideration, and thus has been characterized by flexibility.

The LDR are the heirs to the individualistic and economic "laissez-faire" doctrines of the last century. They reject state intervention and dirigisme in economic affairs, believing in the value of market forces, individualism and free enterprise. While seated in the middle between the Socialists and PPE in the EP, MEPs tend to consider this group ideologically to the right.

⁷²Henig (1969), pp. 533-534.

⁷³Pridham and Pridham in S. Henig (ed.), Political Parties in the European Community (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1990), p. 289.

⁷⁴Fitzmaurice, p. 110.

⁷⁵Pridham and Pridham, p. 50.

They consider themselves more "purist" since the Christian Democrats have adopted some of the tenets of Christian Socialism and believe in the necessity of greater degree of collective responsibility.⁷⁶ According to Fitzmaurice, the Liberals tend to apply their belief in individualism in their parliamentary action and as such are less cohesive. Their tenets of individual freedom and the principle of diversity account for their inherent limitations to group cohesion. It holds fewer group meetings than the other party groups, and leaves more room for the initiative of the individual member.⁷⁷

iv. The Group of the European Democratic Alliance (RDE)

The common thread of this group, which is traced back to January 1965, is based on right and nationalist ideology. The group is composed of two country memberships: French Gaullists and the Irish Nationalist parties. The French Gaullists and Irish Fianna Fail originally claimed that the two parties were supported by similar electorates being primarily Catholic and, united in their belief that the nation-state is the basic unit of international affairs.⁷⁸ Moreover, the policies of this group in the EP has been to promote Charles de Gaulle's vision of France and Europe. It emphasizes a pragmatic approach and believes that supranationalism is unrealistic and that cooperation should be between nations, the only real players in international relations. Although this group is typically national-oriented, the paradox of this Group's position is that it demands increased integration in the economic field and on Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The predominant defense of French interests also creates a paradox in that on specific issues it may advocate a more European position than other groups and appear as dirigiste as the Socialist

⁷⁶Fitzmaurice, p. 111.

⁷⁷Fitzmaurice, p. 167.

⁷⁸Pridham and Pridham, p. 57.

group. However, it does so for France and not for the integration of Europe.⁷⁹

v. The Group of the United European Left (GUE) and the Left Unity Group (CG)

Both of these groups comprise the communist parties of the European Parliament. After many efforts to maintain one front, the formation of majorities did not go beyond patterns of national alliance strategies. The Communist group formally split after the 1989 European elections. The major split was between the more moderate Eurocommunists, largely represented by the Italians, and the more orthodox faction dominated by the French. The breach also manifested itself in the attitudes toward European integration as the former group tended to focus on the beneficial role of the European Union, while the latter acted as an internal opposition. The Italian Communists, with the breakdown of the Iron Curtain and their increasing embrace of pro-integrationist stances, joined the Socialist Group in the European Parliament in the mid-session of the 1989-1994 Parliament (after this survey research had been completed).

By nature of its political tradition, each communist party tends to be cohesive. The members are tied to the party line, established by the central organs of the party outside Parliament.⁸⁰

vi. Technical Group of the European Right (DR)

The European Right was only able to form a European Parliament Group in 1984, after the success of Le Pen's Front National in France. After overcoming deep internal crises regarding national differences, the Group reconstituted itself in 1989 as the Technical Group of the European Right. The word "technical" underlined the failure to agree on a political

⁷⁹See Fitzmaurice, pp. 121-126.

⁸⁰Ibid, p. 169.

programme.⁸¹

In 1989, the Group had 17 MEPs representing France, Belgium and Germany. Other members from Italy for example, joined the Rainbow or Independent groups in the EP because of failure to overcome deep differences. Collaboration among the far right groups in the EP has been considered to legitimate their status as an international movement.⁸² While there were differences over the issue of regionalism,⁸³ the Group held common views on immigration in Europe, nationalism and republicanism.

vii. The Greens

The Greens were the most recent group to join the EP. Before 1989 they belonged to the wider Rainbow Group.⁸⁴ This Group contains both ecologist parties which do not consider themselves to be of the left or the right; and those radical socialist parties which position themselves on the left.

viii. The Rainbow Group

As its name implies, there is little ideological cohesion to this Group, which is composed of representatives from more than 10 parties. The Group is mainly together to meet the criterion of membership numbers required to constitute a political group eligible for parliamentary funding.

⁸¹Geoffrey Harris, The Dark Side of Europe: The Extreme Right Today (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), p. 99.

⁸²Christianne Hardy, "European Integration as a Source for Domestic Political Disintegration: Extremist Parties and Europe," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., 2-5 September), p. 13.

⁸³The Belgian Vlaams Blok is fiercely regionalist, while the French Front National is strongly centralist regarding nation.

⁸⁴Jacobs and Corbett, p. 47.

The Rainbow Group that was established in 1984 had three main sub-groups; the anti-market Danes, the Green/Left Alternative parties, and the regionalist/nationalist parties. As the Green and alternative parties formed their own group, the Rainbow Group became a federation of regionalist and nationalist parties. This Group which includes such parties as the Italian Lega Lombarda is largely interested in a Europe of the regions or more autonomy for their own regions.

C. Party Groups and Aims of the Study

The profile of EP political groups provides a brief sketch of the basis of party cohesion and inter-party dynamics. Regardless of the level of cohesion, each transnational party group may be compared to mass parties in national systems. Traditional criteria are applicable to the analysis and evaluation of the "party system" in the EP. As in national parties, variations of ideological positions may be found internally. Parties themselves may be located ideologically, and party members may also fluctuate greatly according to left-right degrees. Some issues divide parties while others polarize party systems.

The aims of this project are to identify political cleavages in the immigration debate, and in the European Parliament's party system. Recognizing the nature of ideological allegiances in the EP (given the absence of political incentives toward party discipline), and the fact that some parties tend to be more cohesive than others, we may evaluate the extent of cleavage formation on one issue. The application of one salient policy area such as immigration as it delineates differences of approaches is useful in revealing cohesiveness and polarization.

Early studies on European convergence identified emerging party group cohesions which would be consolidated with the increased significance of the European Parliament. Gerda

Zellentin developed a "cohesion index" for the early party groups and concluded that on the average the groups were more cohesive than their national subparts.⁸⁵ Fitzmaurice, however, pointed out that the data were methodologically flawed (roll-calls are not a good measure since they are not used on important political issues) and outdated.⁸⁶ He stressed the necessity for new data to measure party and ideological cohesion and polarizations. The data of this project extends beyond the limitations of roll-call votes and delves into the attitudes of individual MEPs across parties, ideological self-positionings and nation-states.

IV. Research Design and Data Collection

A. The Sample Group

All 518 Members of the European Parliament were sent a closed-ended written questionnaire. A follow-up procedure was undertaken to increase the rate of responses. This study's sample includes 168 Members from all 9 political groups (plus the Independents) and 12 EU member-states.

The sample size of 168 is substantial. The EP's second reading amendment power requires 260 votes. Considering high rates of absenteeism, in actuality this figure constitutes a two-thirds majority of Members present.⁸⁷ The sample group is also representative of both countries and parties (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).

⁸⁵Gerda Zellentin, "Form and Function of the Opposition in the European Communities," Government and Opposition, vol.2, no. 3, April-July 1967.

⁸⁶Fitzmaurice, p. 169.

⁸⁷George Tsebelis, "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter," Working Paper 1.7 (Center for German and European Studies, University of California at Berkeley, August 1992), p. 9.

Figure 2.1 Representation by Country





Figure 2.2 Representation by Party



Key

Country: F=France; G=Germany; I=Italy; UK=England, Scotland, Wales, N. Ireland; S=Spain; NL=Netherlands; B=Belgium; GR=Greece; P=Portugal; DK=Denmark; IRL=Ireland; L=Luxembourg.

Party Group: Socialist; EPP=European People's Party; LDR=Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Group; Verts=Greens; EUL=Group of the United European Left (aka GUE); RDE=Group of the European Democratic Alliance; DR=Group of the Technical Right;

CG=Left Unity Group; ARC=Rainbow Group; NI=Nonaligned or Independents.

The sample group is also representative of EP gender. There are 103 or approximately 20% women MEPs in this third (1989-1994) parliamentary assembly. Our sample replicates that of the general population: it consists of 128 (77%) males and 35 (21%) women. The proportion of women MEPs are higher than in most national parliaments within member-states.⁸⁸

According to our sample, MEPs tend to identify themselves more ideologically left, which is what one would expect, given the party distribution both in the EP and in our sample. Approximately 51% of the sample belong to parties of the left, including the Socialist, Communist and Green groups. On the scale of 1 - 9, (where 5 is the mid-position) 58% of MEPs rank between 1-4 on self-ideological position; only 24% fall between 6-9. One explanation for this left preponderance in the EP may lie in the more negative European image of the term "right" and the reluctance of MEPs to embrace that label. The acknowledgement that the term "conservative" had a strong right-wing connotation in most European countries motivated the British Conservatives to change its group name to the European Democratic Group in July 1979 for the first direct elections.⁸⁹ A second explanation for left predisposition of the MEP sample is that the European Parliamentary elections have tended to produce more favorable results for the parties of the left. Third, the prominence of left identification may not be related to an attachment to working class parties, but a reflection of a more general orientation towards social issues. Lerner and Gorden claimed that the prevalent leftist sentiments they found in Europe was more a result of a preferred predisposition toward social problems and not the choice of one political party over another.⁹⁰ They noted a distinction between "left-oriented" and "left-

⁸⁸Jacob and Corbett, p. 44.

⁸⁹Pridham and Pridham, p. 48.

⁹⁰Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Press, 1969), p. 365.

affiliated" groups.⁹¹ The European Parliament in particular is a forum for social issues as its role has been to represent the "peoples of Europe" *vis-à-vis* the other institutions which are more involved with bureaucracies, national politics, and markets. The Treaties that established the European Parliament of the Communities, declared that its members are representatives not of member states, but of the "peoples of the member states."⁹² Finally, a prevalent leftist orientation may reflect an identity with change. According to Jacobs and Corbett, "It is not possible to understand the workings of the Parliament without realizing that it is an institution concerned to alter the institutional status quo."⁹³ MEPs are inherently interested in system change, whether it means modifying the nature of relationships that exist between the EP and other Community institutions, or between other national institutions.

B. Methodology

In addition to the questionnaire, in depth interviews with 54 MEPs were conducted in order to probe the issue further. These oral interviews were conducted by the author in English, French, or Italian, and were taped and coded. They varied in time between 40 minutes to four hours.

To make the interviews more conversational, and to facilitate analysis of modes of expression and style, each respondent was asked for permission to tape-record the interview. Only one German PPE respondent refused this request. The benefits of taping are quite considerable. The absence of note-taking fostered an atmosphere of conversation rather than

⁹¹*Ibid*, p. 365.

⁹²See Henig (1970), p. 477.

⁹³Jacobs and Corbett, p. 6.

cross-examination. Putnam proposes that the conversational style that is promoted by a tape-recorder leads the respondent into an "engaged discussion which lowers the probability that he/she will precensor the response."⁹⁴

Measuring elite values through the use of both close-ended questions represented by the written questionnaire and more open-ended and less structured questions of the interview offers several advantages.⁹⁵ While the open-ended, quasi-conversational technique maximizes the interviewer's ability to clarify or probe deeply into the responses of the subject,⁹⁶ the absence of closure limits one's capacity to impose powerful analytic or structuring techniques on the data.⁹⁷ Open-ended questions are problematic for codification, more time-consuming, and are often overlooked in systematic analyses because of problems of replicability. But they are useful for generating new hypotheses. The emphasis in this study is on the written questionnaire with an eye towards complementing the data with more depth through the selected interviews.

In order to overcome rhetorical biases, attitudes were probed in two ways: directly by asking MEPs about their thoughts; and indirectly by inference. The questionnaire for example, not only invited each MEP to evaluate the distinctions between political party groups but examined the significance of these differences indirectly by weighing the respondents' party and

⁹⁴Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 18-19.

⁹⁵See Donald Searing, "Measuring Politicians' Values: Administration and Assessment of a Ranking Technique in the British House of Commons," American Political Science Review, 72 (March 1978), 65-79; Milton Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968); Bogdan Denitch, "Elite Interviewing and Social Structure: An Example from Yugoslavia," Public Opinion Quarterly, 36 (Summer 1972).

⁹⁶Lewis Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

⁹⁷Joel Aberbach, James Chesney and Bert Rockman, "Exploring Elite Political Attitudes: Some Methodological Lessons," Political Methodology, 2 (Winter 1975), 1-28.

country affiliation. According to Putnam, "frankness" depends on at least two factors. From the point of view of the respondent, questions have to have a sense of remoteness from the politician's daily world, and a level of professional quality that tends to assure anonymity.⁹⁸ Indeed, a problem of all questionnaire research is that of the socially desirable responses.⁹⁹ Issues of migrant groups and minorities, in particular, tend to be embedded in political sensitivities. In these cases, projection analysis is useful. MEPs may more readily report the views of their colleagues than their own. One French poll in the mid-1980s confirmed that it is easier to label "others" than oneself; while most Frenchmen denied being racist themselves, 71% of French polled considered Frenchmen to be racist.¹⁰⁰

Attitudes towards immigrants vary according to how questions are, and who is asked. Elites tend to assess group preferences through abstraction; the masses by the most immediate images. Converse draws an analogy on questions pertaining to race. Accordingly, while the question to the public would be, "Are you sympathetic to Negroes," the correlate for elites, would be, "If Congress were to vote to give federal aid to public schools, do you think this should be given to schools which are segregated?"¹⁰¹ Clearly, ascertaining elite attitudes is intricate and must take into consideration that structure of questions greatly impact the validity of response. By avoiding the problems that are associated with "treating elites as bricklayers,"

⁹⁸Putnam (1973), p. 21.

⁹⁹Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European Community: A Social-Psychological Study in Four Member States (Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne and Paris: Cambridge University Press and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1986), p. 50.

¹⁰⁰Paris Match, November 1984, quoted in Diana Geddes, The Times, 2 December 1984.

¹⁰¹Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. D. Apter (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 234-35.

one may elicit the more refined attitudes of political elites.¹⁰²

While the data of this study are based on both questionnaires and interviews, this latter part adds only to the qualitative dimension of the research. The qualitative dimension of identifying cleavages in this arena is supported by other sources of data. First, actual policy decisions in Parliament are used. Second, Eurobarometer 1979 on EP Candidates is used; it is a rich data set which was gathered prior to the first direct election of the EP. Third, Eurobarometer 1983, which gathered opinion data on MEPs one year before the second European election is also used. These surveys were designed to elicit a set of political and policy beliefs, and are applied to this study. Finally, public opinion data are useful in delineating the cultural environment that operates as a constraint on each of the political elite representatives. Eurobarometer 30 conducted in 1988 on immigration attitudes has made such mass data available, and these too are also used. Both, the quantitative and qualitative analyses of this research allows us to make some propositions about issue cleavages and elite orientations on the transnational level.

C. Time Framework

The study provides a "snapshot of time" which needs to be delineated. The spring of 1992, when the data was collected, marked the post-mid-point of the third Parliamentary Assembly (1989-1994). This period marked the transition between "Project 1992" and "Maastricht and Beyond," and is thus, a very significant "snapshot of time."

Many changes have occurred since which highlight the relevance of MEP attitudes and this study in particular. The ratification of Maastricht in 1994 not only strengthens the role of

¹⁰²Bernard E. Brown, "Elite Attitudes and Political Legitimacy in France, The Journal of Politics, vol. 31 (1969), p. 421.

the European Parliament, but it particularly broadens its competence in matters of citizenship. The European Parliament retains the power of veto over important areas, such as over the President and Commissioners.¹⁰³ This places the Parliament more nearly within the realm of a true legislature.

The merger of the Italian Communists with the Socialist Group also occurred after the data were collected. However, this development was anticipated by the findings, as the GUE group consistently displayed converging attitudes. In an ideological scale from 1-9, where 1 represents the extreme left and 9, the extreme right, the average self-placement of the GUE group was 3.11. The average mean of the Socialist Group was 3.05. The Green party group placed itself further left (mean=2.50) than both groups.

V. Members of the European Parliament: A European Elite

While there are diverse groups of European elites, ranging from national elites of individual EU member-states, to European elites who represent a Community-wide order, to civil service officials or Eurocrats, the European Parliament is the single body that is elected directly by the European people. Regardless of the strength of the EP, the fact remains that "parliaments are, after all 'talking shop',"¹⁰⁴ and like traditional parliamentarians, MEPs' discussions and attitudes reflect the parameters of elite debate.

While the influence of Members of the European Parliament has been debatable, the most pertinent factor to the analysis here, is their status as directly-elected deputies. Unlike any other EU institution, the EP derives its authority from the people. In many senses, MEPs meet the

¹⁰³See Articles 137, 138a, 158, 189-90, Treaty on European Union.

¹⁰⁴Putnam (1973), pp. 26-27.

criteria of elites prescribed by the classical elite theorists: they have power; are relatively homogeneous and unified internally; and self-perpetuating.¹⁰⁵ In short, they would measure up adequately to Pareto's definition of an elite; "a class of people who have the highest indices in their branch of activity."¹⁰⁶ Only 19% of MEPs defined their private occupation as MEPs; the rest were traditional wielders of power and influence: businessmen, lawyers, judges, scientists, doctors, engineers, teachers and professors (see Table 2.1).¹⁰⁷

Table 2.1: The Study's Sample of MEPs, by Reported Private Occupation

Private Occupation	Frequency	Percent
MEP	32	25%
Teacher; Schoolmaster; Professor	28	22%
Businessman; Economist	15	12%
Lawyer; Judge	14	11%
Diplomat; Administrator	9	7%
Journalist; Writer	8	6%
Scientist; Doctor; Engineer	7	6%
Syndicalist	3	2%
Other	12	9%

N=167; Missing cases=39

¹⁰⁵See Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 5.

¹⁰⁶Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology (New York: Dover Publications, 1963), p. 142.

¹⁰⁷Note however, that there is a large (39) missing response rate. This may be due to an assumption that the private occupation of the respondent is MEP.

The 518 Members who constitute the Parliament experience similar recruitment and electoral channels.¹⁰⁸ Members roughly resemble each other and other traditional elite groups in social status, education, and socialization (see Table 2.2). The mean education level of the MEP sample group is a Master's Degree or MBA.

Table 2.2: The Study's Sample of MEPs, by Highest Level of Education

Highest Education Level Attained	Frequency	Percent
High School	5	3%
Vocational School	2	1%
University and <i>Ecole Superiere</i>	84	56%
Master's Degree and MBA	27	18%
Law School	3	2%
Ph.D. and M.D.	28	19%

N = 167; Missing Cases = 18

MEPs also converge on Mannheim's criteria of age and generational experience. Accordingly, belonging to the same class, and same generation or age group provides a common location in the social and historical process. It thereby yields a specific range of potential experience, predisposing a certain mode of thought and experience of historically relevant action.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸Note however that efforts are still being made to secure a uniform electoral system.

¹⁰⁹Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in Paul Kecskemeti (ed.), Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1952), p. 291. See also Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, pp. 200-101; Putnam (1973), pp. 142-149.

Table 2.3: The Study's Sample of MEPs, by Age

Age	Frequency	Percent
Under 35 years	8	5%
35 to 49 years	63	38%
50 to 64 years	79	47%
65 years and above	15	9%

N=167; Missing Cases=2

Table 2.3 shows that a plurality of respondents are aged 50 years and above. However, a large portion are in the 35-49 age range.

While MEPs are political newcomers (the EP's first elections were in 1979), many of them have had considerable experience in their own national parliaments, or in their own party. In 1990, approximately 150 MEPs were former national parliamentarians, 7 were former heads of state or government, 73 held ministerial office, 24 held national party leadership, and 60 MEPs were involved in regional or local government.¹¹⁰ These estimated figures present an image of MEPs as European partisan politicians who have circulated in similar political circles and are fairly representative of European national politics as well.

MEPs do not only share experiences through their national activities, but they also partake in a unique political culture generated by membership to the European Parliament. This political culture is a product of a common interest to secure the powers of the EP institution as a key player in EU policy.

¹¹⁰Jacobs, Corbett and Shackleton (1992), pp. 47-48.

Chapter Three: The Immigration Issue

I. Introduction

With 25 percent of the world's migrants or 15 million "foreigners" residing in Europe today, the immigration issue poses a critical challenge to established European democracies.¹ Although certain countries experience larger foreign concentrations than others (see Table 3.2), it can be argued that in every West European country, immigration has emerged as a salient issue. This has been marked by electoral campaigns and party contestation, the emergence and consolidation of extreme-right parties, and increasing public support for xenophobic political forces.² The presence of culturally, religiously, and racially diverse groups in European society has transformed the immigration issue from a predominantly bureaucratic phenomenon (characteristic of the post-War period which tied immigration policy to reconstruction needs) to a public and political one.

While every country defines the issue differently, immigration has traditionally been a two-fold dilemma. First, there is a problem of immigration in terms of intake. Questions here focus on immigration: Yes?, No? How many? Basis of entry?: Professional qualifications?; Geographic quotas?; Number quotas? What kinds of immigrants? The second stream of questions addresses the nature of incorporation, or what should be done with immigrants inside? Policy demands focus on the kinds of rights to be extended to immigrants, methods of integration

¹The Churches Committee for Migrants in Europe, "Fourth Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Migration Affairs, 17-18 September 1991" (Luxembourg: Council of Europe, 1991).

²See Gallya Lahav, "Immigration, Hypernationalism and European Security," in The Future of European Security: The Search for Peace in an Era of Revolutionary Change, ed. J. Philip Rogers (New York and London: St. Martin's Press and Macmillan Press, 1992).

(i.e., assimilation, multiculturalism), and strategies for regulation.

The integration process of the European Union (EU) has added a third dimension to the immigration agenda. Questions related to immigration regulation and implementation (e.g., repatriation, financial aid incentives to countries of origin) have been compounded. A separate debate has emerged from the controversy between national and supranational forces of control. Policy issues within the EU focus on conditions for a common immigration policy. Most significantly, the focus is on who should be responsible for overseeing the traditional problem-areas, and how. To the extent that the realization of a single-market Europe rests on the success of freedom of movement, a harmonized immigration policy serves as a major test of frontier-free Europe.

Tendencies toward harmonization may be identified through: a) the scope and content of immigration; b) the standardization of policies; and c) European integration (Section II below). These trends compel attention to the nature of attitudes in a seemingly inevitable movement towards convergence. They must also be analyzed against the disparities that still exist (Section III). Are attitudes converging in the European immigration debate?

II. The Evolution of Immigration in Europe: Towards Harmonization

Europe's inheritance of a diverse immigrant population has evolved over four phases since WWII. The immediate post-War period constitutes the first phase in which many West European countries looked towards immigrants as demographic and economic springboards for reconstruction and growth after the devastation of the war. A need for reconstruction and modernization led many European countries to either actively recruit foreign workers or to adopt some type of laissez-faire immigration policy. Heavy migrant movements in this phase were

guided by economic interests and largely escaped the control of political authorities.

The second phase emerged during early 1970s, when economic and social crises created a new realization that it would be impossible to continue large-scale immigration.³ Most European countries were hit by economic recession and were facing growing unemployment and a large foreign population. A demand for the type of labor provided by migrants was declining as expansion of employment ceased and many manufacturing jobs were eliminated. Moreover, these phenomena were overshadowed by new production technologies. This phase of immigration was marked by government involvement in measures to halt labor migration and to encourage repatriation.

Immigration reached its third phase (in many countries by the 1980s) as most European countries faced economic stagnation and the realization that migrant workers had become permanent residents. The immigration issue had evolved from primarily an economic and demographic issue into the realm of social and political as well. Integration and incorporation posed critical questions on the social front too. The political dimension of the immigration issue emerged as a growing specter of right-wing anti-immigration movement sent many mainstream parties scurrying to address the issue. The politicization of the immigration issue was particularly discernible by developments in party politics. Before the 1970s, heavy immigration countries had witnessed a convergence of mainstream parties. In order to defuse immigration and race politics, discussions largely remained behind closed-doors, and the issue was bureaucratically contained. In the 1980s, immigration entered into electoral campaigns and social movements.

Not all European countries had achieved the same levels of economic development in the post-War period, nor did they experience these phases of immigration uniformly. The traditional

³See Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, Immigration Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Mark Miller, Foreign Workers in Western Europe: An Emerging Political Force (New York: Praeger, 1981).

north-south divide tended to reinforce differences in immigration developments. The northern European countries which tended to be "immigration" countries, were profoundly affected by immigration. In contrast, the southern countries of Europe were more generally referred to as "emigration" countries. The distinguishing mark of the fourth phase of immigration lies in the changing nature of these divisions. The lines between "immigration" and "emigration" have blurred in the 1990s.⁴

The fourth phase of immigration may be characterized as a "balancing out" period. This not only involves the traditional divisions which have separated the industrialized northern European countries from the developing southern ones. It also refers to the uniform salience of immigration. By the 1990s, traditional "emigration" countries such as Italy, Greece, and Spain, countries which have never experienced large-scale immigration, now joined their EU partners in adding immigration to the political agenda.

A. The Scope and Content of Immigration

The four phases of immigration have coincided with a shift in both the geographical origin of these flows and the socio-economic characteristics of migrants. In the first post-war period, large flows of migrants came from Southern Europe which had already supplied a substantial part of foreign labor force in France, Switzerland, and Belgium between the Wars. Countries with ex-colonial relationships extended their area of recruitment in this first phase to

⁴See John Salt, "External International Migration," The Changing Population of Europe, ed. Daniel Noin and Robert Woods (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), pp. 192-196; L. Koch, "Impact of the Reversal of the Migration Situation on the Social Structure of Certain Countries: The Case of Italy," International Migration, 27: 191-201 (1989).

Mediterranean countries such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia or other developing nations such as Pakistan and India. Southern countries such as Turkey and Yugoslavia also served as cheap sources for foreign labor. While earlier migrant flows had largely stabilized because of improved situations at home and economic problems in Europe, the fourth phase of immigration introduced a new element. As the Soviet Union began to collapse in 1989, Europe began to see a rush of new migrants; from east to west. In 1989, a total of 1.2 million people left the Warsaw Pact states.⁵ These new migratory flows from Eastern Europe were mainly in the direction of OECD countries.⁶ In addition to this, European integration officially terminated the status of EU migrants in their immigration censuses. As of 1993 an EC national could choose to live in any of the 12 EC countries.

With the shift in immigrant-sending countries, there has been a change in the character of migrants: from immigration of workers initially; followed later by their families. For many years, most receiving countries considered that they were dealing with labor immigration of a temporary nature (the German term, *Gastarbeiter* or guestworker captures this thinking). It was generally assumed that, after a certain period of work in the host country, immigrants would naturally return to their countries of origin. As a larger number of immigrants were able to obtain residence permits, many migrant workers were joined by their families. The nature of immigration was no longer solely defined by the market or the economic situation, but rather by social and political factors.

In the last decade, family reunification has been the dominant mode of immigration in

⁵Jonas Widgren, "International Migration and Regional Stability," in International Affairs 66, 4 (1990), p. 757.

⁶These refer to the industrialized countries, and include all of the 12 EU member-states, and Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States, and Yugoslavia. See Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI, 1990) (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1991), p. 8.

Europe. According to OECD reports, by 1987, economically inactive immigrants outnumbered economically active ones in inflows.⁷ Measuring the impact of family reunion by changing percentages of economically active persons amongst new immigrants, a linear immigration process is discernible: an immigrant arrives, followed by members of the immigrant family; and finally, the wives and children of immigrant workers enter the labor market. OECD findings confirm this pattern throughout Europe. As Georges Tapinos points out, the only differences among these countries lie in scale and length of time between the various stages in the process.⁸

With widespread restrictions on new immigration, the most uniform immigration pressures in Europe today surface in the number of asylum applicants and illegal migrants (see Table 3.1). Although by definition, clandestine or illegal immigration is a category that lacks accurate figures, it is estimated to be ten percent of the foreign population as a whole.⁹

⁷Office of Economic Co-operation and Development, The Future of Migration (Paris: OECD, 1987), 38-63.

⁸Georges Tapinos, "European Migration Patterns: Economic Linkages and Policy Experiences," Studi Emigrazione, (1982) pp. 339-57.

⁹OECD (1987), p. 55.

Table 3.1: Refugee and Asylum Applications in Selected EU Countries (thousands)

Country	1985	1987	1989	1990	1991
Belgium	5.3	6.0	8.1	13.0	15.2
Denmark	8.7	2.7	4.6	5.3	4.6
France	28.8	27.6	61.4	54.7	50.0
W. Germany	73.8	57.4	121.3	193.1	256.1
E. Germany ^a	NA	NA	377.0	397.0	200.0
Greece	1.4	6.3	6.5	4.1	NA
Italy	5.4	11.0	2.2	4.7	27.0
Netherlands	5.6	13.5	13.9	21.2	21.6
Portugal	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	--
Spain	2.3	3.7	4.0	8.6	8.0
UK	5.4	5.2	16.5	30.0	57.7

^a Refers to *Aussiedler* or ethnic Germans; Financial Times figures (4 March 1992)

Sources: OECD 1992 and Financial Times (4 March 1992); See Baldwin-Edwards (1991)

The increases in asylum-seekers and illegal immigration underscore the interdependent nature of two underlying issue-areas: demographics and economics.¹⁰ They also suggest that the "push-pull" factors of immigration are in full motion, as the gap between the developing and the industrialized countries has widened. Several "push" factors have produced refugee problems. These include conflict, hunger, and natural disasters in the developing world; and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the splintering of multinational states as Yugoslavia, instability and environmental degradation in Eastern Europe. Economic disparities have become more obvious. In developing countries the average per capita GDP for 1990 was approximately \$917

¹⁰See Martin Baldwin-Edwards, "1992 Immigration and migrants in the Europe of the 1990s," *European Access* 3 (June 1992).

compared to \$14,350 in the developed market-economy countries.¹¹ In addition, the demography of North Africa is set to create tremendous migratory pressure across the Mediterranean. Approximately 95 percent of global population growth during the next thirty years is projected to be in developing countries.¹²

The "pull" factors also reflect widespread economic and demographic dilemmas. As Africa grows younger, Europe is ageing. Of the European Union members, only Ireland has a fertility rate that corresponds with the natural replacement level of 2.1 children. Not only has there been a decline in births throughout Europe, but the "graying of the population" has accelerated as life expectancy has surged. A report issued by the European Commission revealed that the average birthrate for 1989 was 1.3 children and that there were 41,000 fewer births in the Union than in 1988.¹³ According to the report, there were 100 million people in the countries of the EU in 1989, over 50 years of age, and their number has grown steadily. By the year 2020, nonworking dependents are expected to account for two-thirds to three-quarters of the people in twelve countries of the EU.¹⁴

The strengthening of the "push-pull" relationship coincides with the consolidation of the industrialized West in the form of further integration of the European Union. Not only does this make Europe more attractive, but it makes illegal migration more likely. According to Baldwin-Edwards, European integration is seen by the Third World as a process of increasing exclusion,

¹¹The Least Developed Countries, Annex, Table 3 (New York, 1990), as reported in Jonas Widgren, "International Migration and Regional Stability," International Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 4 (October, 1990).

¹²Nafis Sadik, The State of the World Population, 1990 (New York: 1990), as reported in Widgren, p. 758.

¹³The New York Times, 22 July 1990, p. 1.

¹⁴Ibid.

particularly between EU and non-EU nationals, and thus, illegal residence in Europe may be a more attractive option than "poverty on its periphery."¹⁵

B. Policy Responses

The evolution of immigration phases, that is the content and structure of immigrant flows coincides with two other dynamics that point towards increasing harmonization: common changes in the nature of immigration-related problems; and approaches to issue resolution. New problems emerged following the economic crises of the mid-1970s. The second phase of immigration evidenced the initial appearance of integration and unemployment concerns. For the first time in post-War Europe, the difficulties associated with returns and number of illegal immigrants emerged in discourse.¹⁶ Immigration was no longer an issue of strict numbers. The realization that foreigners were now permanent residents raised social and economic questions.

Responses to immigration in terms of policy output have also undergone development, each with a corresponding set of repercussions. Immigration policy inherently presumes controlling immigration, but this has fluctuated throughout all four phases of migration. The first post-War phase reflected a *laissez-faire* immigration policy which involved some organized recruitment and no social planning. The second phase was a two-pronged effort; first, to halt immigration, and second, to devise plans to encourage those already there to return home. The outgrowth of stricter immigration policies was a dramatic increase of a new form of population flow: clandestine immigration (see Table 3.1). Government reactions in restricting and halting

¹⁵Baldwin-Edwards (1992), p. 15.

¹⁶Denis Maillat, "Long-Term Aspects of International Migration Flows: The Experience of European Receiving Countries," in The Future of Migration (Paris: OECD, 1987), p. 38.

immigration precipitated a large influx of different types of foreigners, namely that of asylum-seekers and illegal immigrants. These processes condition the character of immigration problems in the fourth phase.

Reaction to illegal immigration has come with further policy responses. Governments have responded in diverse manners. The typical solution to the problem of illegal immigration has been ex-post-facto legislation in the form of "regularisation" programs.¹⁷ These programs offer legal amnesty to illegals satisfying certain conditions, such as entry before a specified date, good health, regular employment, valid passports, etc. Some solutions have also included penalties for employers and immigrants. Germany, the only labor-importing country never to have offered regularization, has relied almost exclusively on large-scale prosecution of employers.¹⁸ Deportation has also been a growing policy option seen in later phases of immigration. Spain, for example, set its most recent immigration policy in 1989 by deporting 4,739 illegal immigrants,¹⁹ instituting penal sanctions against employers, and proposing amnesty for about 70,000 illegal Moroccans.²⁰

Efforts to stem the flow of refugees have led in some cases to changes in national legislation. In 1993, the French Constitutional Council ruled that legislation which would prevent asylum-seekers from entering the country (e.g., a core presumption of the Dublin and Schengen

¹⁷Richard Plender, "Recent Trends in National Immigration Control," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 35 (1986): 530-566; French Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity, "The Employment Market and Immigration in an Irregular Situation: Lessons from the Recent Legalization in France," International Migration Review, vol. 18 (Fall 1984).

¹⁸Martin Baldin-Edwards, "Immigration after 1992," in Policy and Politics, vol. 19, no. 3 (1991), p. 201.

¹⁹M. Carr, "Spain: Racism at the Frontier," Race and Class, vol. 32, no. 3 (1991) in Baldwin-Edwards (1991), p. 201.

²⁰Migration News Sheet (January 1991).

accords) was a violation of both the Geneva accords on refugees and the French Constitution's "Rights of Man." As a result of this decision, the French government decided to amend the Constitution.²¹ That the same year, the German government amended Article 16 of the Basic Law to curb the almost unlimited right of asylum this offered. A much more restrictive asylum regime was introduced.²²

The fourth phase of immigration, more dominated by socio-economic considerations also precipitated corresponding policy responses in this realm. In the 1990s, immigration policy became subordinate to those of immigrant policy. With a virtual curb on immigration intake, the immigration debate has become largely dominated by questions of social integration and immigrant rights, as well as more long-term considerations of the "push-pull" dynamic.

C. European Integration

If immigration dynamics were not coinciding, there would still be a fundamental convergence that stems from the growing degree of interdependence and integration across Europe. Moreover, the immigration issue of post-War Europe has unraveled in a world of increasing interdependence. The growing interdependence of the global economy creates pressures for common policies, and hence for coordinated discussions and procedures which were previously exclusively domestic concerns. The progress of the EU particularly reflects the growing erosion of traditional distinctions between foreign and domestic politics. The Single European Act of 1987 committed the EC member-states to build an area without internal frontiers. The elimination of barriers to the movement of goods, capital and services within the

²¹See Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, p. 10.

²²Butt Philip, p. 184.

European Community now formally imposed the need to respond unanimously to immigration issues. The Maastricht Treaty brought immigration more explicitly under EU competence and introduced the concept of a Euro-citizen.

The various changes in immigration phases described above, have been matched by developments at the European level. The first phase of Union activity on immigration was rather limited in scope. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, immigration policy in the European Community, as in national debate was mostly driven by economic imperatives (e.g., for employment only). With apparent contradictions, in conjunction with a mood for more rapid European integration, a new phase of collective activity on immigration emerged during the 1980s. This second phase however coincided with an opposing drive towards intergovernmental decision-making. Immigration entered a third phase in the 1990s, marked by more serious attempts to bring immigration under EU jurisdiction, making Union decision-making bodies more central to the debate. These phases, as those noted above, also coincided with varying emphases and rationales of policy-making: from demographic and economic spheres to the social and political ones.

The provisions for freedom of movement of labor, fundamental to "Europe without frontiers" was first addressed in the EEC Treaty, the foundation document of the European Community, outlining policy goals.²³ Citizens of member-states were granted the right to enter the territory of another, for the purpose of accepting or seeking employment, self-employment, or to provide or receive a service.²⁴ The Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 reiterated the

²³Preamble, Article 3(C), Title III and Articles 48-66 of the Treaty of Rome (1957).

²⁴Title III, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community. Also EC Regulation No. 1612/68 states that a worker of one member state has the right to seek employment in another member state. The only restriction is that the individual must find employment within a three-month period.

provision of free movement of goods, persons, services and capital according to the treaty (EEC), for the achievement of the internal market by 1 January 1993.²⁵

In the spirit of a European "house", the movement of peoples originated as an economic conception. Movement was prescribed as an economic right. Citizens of the European Community became the beneficiaries of guarantees and rights as economic agents (e.g., as a salaried worker, as self-employed, or as the receiver or provider of services) as they acquired the right to move freely for reason of employment. The SEA confirmed the four freedoms anchored in the 1957 Rome Treaty, and these economic objectives: the free circulation of people came after that of goods. This underlined the primacy of the economic objectives and free movement of peoples as instrumental.²⁶

Clearly, the provisions regarding free movement of goods, services, people, and capital within the European treaties, was limited in envisaging socio-political applications (e.g., civic rights, housing) that would derive from its economic objectives. Moreover, the word "people" was not intended to involve all residents, but only those to whom the Treaty applied.²⁷ More specifically, legislation was only applicable to EC nationals and their families, and excluded the 12-15 million residents who were non-EC nationals.²⁸ By 1989, the European Commission estimated that approximately 2 million EC nationals were taking advantage of free movement of persons provision of the Treaty and established themselves in a different member state from that of their nationality. With their families, this migrant community made up a total of

²⁵Articles 8(a) and 8(b), The Single European Act.

²⁶Giuseppe Callovi, "Immigration and the European Community," in Contemporary European Affairs, vol. 3 (1990) no. 3 (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1991), p. 29.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Paul Gordon, Fortress Europe: The Meaning of 1992 (London, England: The Runnymede Trust, 1989), p. 11

approximately 5 million people.²⁹ The anomalous situation of a large migrant community who fell out of EC legal competence led to the creation of what many observers called "two migrant communities."³⁰

The drive towards abolishing border controls by 1993 however complicated the existence of two migrant communities, since it made it *de facto* possible for "third-country" nationals to travel freely. The major obstacle for common European immigration policy turned to the future status of what is technically referred to as "third-country nationals," or those immigrant groups with privileged status and the right of residence in one EU country. The Single European Act only applied to EU citizens: third-country nationals legally residing in one of the member-states were not entitled to move freely to another member state. They were not even entitled to travel freely within the Community.³¹ The SEA left the means of movement ambiguous. In effect, individual member-states were given the residual right to take whatever measures they considered necessary to control third-country immigration. The General Declaration appended to the SEA reserved the right to national governments to take appropriate measures to control external immigration. It also required unanimous voting for measures concerning the free movement of persons. The upshot of this was that, in order to differentiate members from non-members, controversial border controls would need to stay intact. Britain, for example, advocated the retention of strong border controls at ports of entry, while Italy, with its long sea and land frontiers, favored after-entry control which requires national identity cards and greater police

²⁹Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, Unequal Migrants, "The European Community's Unequal Treatment of Migrants and Refugees," Policy Papers in Ethnic Relations, no. 13 (London: JCWI, 1989), p. 4.

³⁰Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, p. 5.

³¹Jan Niessen, "European Community Legislation and International Cooperation on Migration," International Migration Review, vol. XXVI, no. 2, p. 677.

powers. Frontiers have thus been altered not dismantled.

The competence of EC institutions over third-country (non-EC) nationals remained very limited and most member-states believed that they were completely free regarding immigration law *vis-à-vis* non-EC nationals.³² States sought to maintain as much sovereignty as possible in matters relating to third-country nationals. As member states refused to delegate to EC institutions sovereignty over these issues, most of the work concerning cooperation and harmonization took place at the intergovernmental level.

Throughout the 1980s, immigration exposed anomalies surrounding the European idea. First, the immigration issue embodied the resistance or counter-pull towards full European integration. It touched on the sensitive area of national identity. The reluctance of national governments to cede sovereignty reflected this. As Dominique Schnapper argues, the debate on immigration is embedded in the crisis of the nation-state itself.³³

Second, in spite of the idea of creating a single European economy by establishing a common market as defined by the Treaty of Rome, many of the original barriers to the internal market survived for 30 years. Many fundamental issues related to movement were left untackled. The EC that was borne out of Jean Monnet's functional theory, envisaged economic integration as a means towards ultimate political union. The immigration issue exposed the short-sightedness of the European project's founding fathers in not providing for a number of matters that were bound to arise as the Community gradually dismantled its internal border controls. As long as individual member-states were left to deal with their non-EU immigrant populations separately, the inequalities that the EC had aimed at eliminating were bound to be perpetuated.

³²Callovi, p. 21.

³³Dominique Schnapper, "The Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National Identity," West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2: 127-139 (April 1994).

Finally, the most obvious paradox came in the form of extra-EC activities. In the movement to form a transnational political system, significant problems were delegated to unelected intergovernmental committees which were not bound by Community rules. The immigration issue highlighted the tendency to reenact earlier behind-closed-door types of policymaking that was prevalent throughout national regimes. In a more general sense, the nation-state was slowly being replaced by another "state apparatus, made up of ad hoc and secretive bodies and separate intergovernmental arrangements, which reflect the repressive side of European political development and is largely unaccountable and undemocratic in its workings."³⁴

In addition to these anomalies, this second European phase witnessed limited drives in two different directions of European decision-making on the immigration front; one manifested on the EC level, the other on the intergovernmental one. A 1985 Council communication, entitled "Guidelines for a Community Policy on Migration" marked the first time the term "Community" was found alongside "migration policy."³⁵ Although, the General Declaration appended to the SEA required unanimous voting for measures concerning the free movement of persons, it gave the Commission legal competence (as arbitrator between two nation-states) to take procedural decisions relating to immigration from non-member states. Nevertheless, the majority of immigration measures flourished outside of Community structures.³⁶ A flurry of

³⁴T. Bunyan, "Towards an Authoritarian European State," *Race and Class*, 32 (3), 179-188 (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1991); See also Massimo Pastore, "Fortress Europe," *Strange W-A-Y-S Newsletter*, no. 12 (Edge Hill College of Higher Education: Centre for Studies in Crime and Social Justice, Autumn, 1991).

³⁵Callovi, p. 356.

³⁶Ann Dummett and Jan Niessen, "Immigration and Citizenship in the European Union," CCME Briefing Paper no. 14. (Brussels: Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe, November 1993), p. 5.

intergovernmental meetings and ad hoc groups emerged explicitly for immigration matters, during this period. There were at least 6 such groups, but the most comprehensive and dynamic were the Schengen Group, TREVI, and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration.³⁷

While these intergovernmental groups were in essence national efforts to control immigration through coordinated measures, they represented a two-speed character of Europe. The 1985 Schengen Agreement was originally signed only by five of the EC countries, France, Germany and the Benelux countries; the group was believed to serve as a model, or as the European Commission itself termed as, a "laboratory of what the Twelve would have to implement by 1992."³⁸ The Agreement aimed at making faster progress in the dismantling of internal frontiers, particularly among the signatory member-states, and discussed gradual harmonization of immigration and security issues in general. Nevertheless, the group was reluctant to let in other members, fearful of allowing entry to those countries which were historically weak on border control. Similarly, not all members found acceptable the repercussions that membership incurs: open borders and the inheritance of other members' immigration-related problems (e.g., problems of social integration). The negotiations demonstrated how sensitive these issues were likely to be for EC member states to resolve jointly. The backbone of the Schengen agreement, its computer system (SIS) has also been in contention. It was intended to hold data relating to aliens, asylum-seekers, criminals, firearms, vehicles and persons under surveillance by a state security agency. This kind of data transmission is still controversial on ideological grounds because of data protection safeguards and individual rights.

In the late-1980s, the mood began to change, and the cost of these anomalies began to

³⁷The others include the Pompidou Group, the Mutual Assistance Group, and the Coordinators' Group. See Michael Spencer, 1992 and All That: Civil Liberties in the Balance (London, England: The Civil Liberties Trust, 1990), p. 22.

³⁸Pastore, p. 6.

be felt. By 1993, "free movement of goods, services and capital," prescribed by the SEA was possible, but not freedom of persons. That year, the European Parliament filed a complaint against the European Commission for failing to ensure the free movement of persons within the Community.³⁹ According to Callovi, during this period, it became obvious that national decisions regarding immigration from third countries had a bearing on the Community, and that a joint response to a problem of common interest appeared to be feasible, including the Community's legal capacity to explore ways for a Community policy on migration.⁴⁰ He suggests that these developments coincided with an overall new spirit inspiring the construction of the European Union.⁴¹

In the framework of this spirit, some European action was taken in regard to bringing immigration under collective control. The Schengen Group, now including more members concluded a Supplementary Agreement of June 1990 aimed at removal by 1992 of controls between common frontiers and the correlative strengthening of borders between Schengen members and non-members. Although many essential points were undecided, and the Group was forced to revise its timetable for final implementation several times, the Schengen system made some noteworthy inroads in the 1990s.⁴² It gained credibility by the expansion of its membership to include Italy, Spain and Portugal, with Greece becoming a full member in November 1992. As a consequence of EC and Schengen commitments to strengthen external frontiers, all the southern European member-states have increased coastguard patrols, police

³⁹Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁰Callovi, p. 357.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²The date for implementation is now set for 1 February 1994.

checks on third country nationals and deportations.⁴³ The growth of more similar European-wide immigration policies represent the mood (and difficulties) in the 1990s regarding greater harmonization.

The 1990s marked another phase in the evolution of the immigration phenomenon (as previously discussed) and in European transnational responses. Starting 1990, there were repeated calls for "burden-sharing" among the 12 EC states in handling the large numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers arriving on the territory of a concentrated few (e.g., Germany) of the member-states (see Table 3.1).⁴⁴ In addition to the formal negotiations of the Schengen states, the intergovernmental conference on political union, and the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, the EC institutions were themselves beginning to articulate their interest in immigration issues more strongly. The European Parliament became more adamant in demanding that matters relating to "third-country" migrants be brought explicitly within EU competence.⁴⁵

The Council of Ministers and the European Council invited the Commission in Brussels to draw a report which could ultimately recommend areas of immigration policy for Community initiatives.⁴⁶ The Commission communications on immigration and on the right of asylum issued in 1991 were seen as part of the preparation for discussions at the Maastricht intergovernmental conference.⁴⁷

⁴³Alan Butt Philip, "European Union Immigration Policy: Phantom, Fantasy or Fact?," in West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 179-180.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 181.

⁴⁵Recommendations 47, 56, European Parliament (1990).

⁴⁶Ibid. pp. 181-182.

⁴⁷"Communication of the Commission on the Possibility of Developing a Common Immigration Policy," (Brussels: Commission, EC DOC. 8811/91); "Communication of the Commission on the Right of Asylum," (Brussels: Commission, EC Doc.8810/91).

The outcome of the intergovernmental conference on political union was to make visa policy part of the competence of the EU institutions and to include co-operation at the intergovernmental level on asylum, refugee and immigration issues in the so-called third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty.⁴⁸ The Maastricht Treaty, has taken steps to bring these issues under EU legislation by introducing the admission of asylum-seekers and other third-country nationals.⁴⁹ On migration policy, five main Titles have been set out: 1)harmonization of admission policies; 2)common approach to the question of illegal immigration; 3)policy on the migration of labor; 4)situation of third-country nationals; and 5)migration policy in the broad meaning of the term.⁵⁰ The Treaty also set guidelines for asylum policy and social policy, which included integration for resident migrants and their families. In addition, the Treaty's preamble speaks of a resolution to mark a new stage in the process of European integration, and to establish a common citizenship. Title I Common Provisions, Article B includes in the European aims: "the introduction of a citizenship of the Union."⁵¹

As a result of the Maastricht Treaty, several measures have been undertaken at the European level towards the construction of European-wide immigration policies. For example, the Council, in accordance with the new provisions of the Treaty, annexed a list of 129 third countries whose nationals require visas.⁵² This list had been in existence since December 1987, when it was mentioned for the first time publicly, after a ministerial meeting of the Ad Hoc

⁴⁸Article 100(c), Treaty on European Union. See, A. Butt Philip, p. 181.

⁴⁹See Dummett and Niessen, p. 8-26.

⁵⁰Article 100(c); Title VI, Article K; Article 2; Article V, The Treaty on European Union; See also Callovi, pp. 370-371.

⁵¹Title I, Article B, Treaty on European Union.

⁵²Migration News Sheet (February 1994), p. 1.

Immigration Group in Copenhagen.⁵³ On 21 April 1994, the European Parliament adopted a report based on the Commission's proposal for a Council regulation on visas. It stated that third-country nationals who do not require a visa for entry to a member-state should not be on the so-called negative list of the Regulation.⁵⁴

A movement towards harmonization in this fourth immigration phase, as symbolized by the Maastricht Treaty, also highlighted the difficulties in doing so. Although the Maastricht Treaty gave immigration issues more attention, it did not provide a coherent strategy to overcome the anomalies which plagued the past phases. The battle, for example, between national and supranational control was perpetuated in many ways by yielding to both EU competence and national authority. EU Treaty-based institutions could lead on visa policy, but it was left to individual states, acting separately to make policy and administrative changes.⁵⁵ Moreover, Maastricht gave credibility to the Schengen "model," as it officially included the range and nature of intergovernmental agendas for immigration issues. Decisions were taken to incorporate many general issues, to be decided at later dates. In December 1993, the Commission presented a proposal based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union designating a new inquiry regarding these matters for January 1996.⁵⁶ A meeting in May 1994 also epitomized the degree of ambivalence that exists regarding actual content: the 12 member-states were divided over the idea of creating a Union fund to support East European countries so as to slow down the departure of their nationals.⁵⁷ However, one trend of this period is clear; the immigration

⁵³Migration News Sheet (November 1993), p. 1.

⁵⁴COM(94)0684-C3-0012/94; Migration News Sheet (Brussels: May 1994), p. 1.

⁵⁵Butt Philip, p. 184,

⁵⁶Migration News Sheet, (February 1994), p. 1.

⁵⁷Migration News Sheet (June, 1994), p. 10.

debate is taking on a character of the system which manages it. As the immigration issue passes through the European political system, it runs up against a large bureaucracy (Commission and Council) which is frantically trying to navigate, and European Parliamentarians who are vying to take more control over the decision-making process, as representatives of the "ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."

Some observers argue that the Maastricht Treaty only outlined diluted goals which could find minimum accord.⁵⁸ Attitudes of Members of the European Parliament corroborate this tendency. The overall findings in this research indicate that MEPs only widely agree on the most broad principles; they disagree on most of the specifics. 82 percent of MEPs think that the immigration issue is important or very important; 84 percent feel that immigration problems are greater today than in the past. Even on broad principles of policy preference, a strong consensus may be found: 90 percent of MEPs favor a common immigration policy for EU members; 73 percent claim that immigration should be regulated by EU institutions. MEPs differ on the substance of policy and in their more individual assessments. They disagree on their preferences of immigration levels and immigrant groups; the structure and content of a common immigration policy; and so on. These attitudes underscore the controversies that remain, and which are subjects on the agenda for the 1996 intergovernmental conference.

As immigration has evolved, each phase has reinforced different emphases in policy-making. The stages of the European process bring with them parallel changes in community consolidation and thinking. Thus, while the first stage essentially emphasized economic and labor concerns of a Common Market, the later stages focus on integration of people in a European Union. The different emphases reflect deeper attitudes towards community, as the more recent strategy is a sign of reopening social contracts embodied in the welfare-state regimes of the post-

⁵⁸See Dummet and Niessen, p. 25.

War period.⁵⁹ As President of the Commission, Jacques Delors stated in 1991: "How finally, can we visualize freedom of movement and freedom of establishment for individuals within the Community, unless we gradually define the elements of a common immigration policy and adopt a comparable, positive attitude to the integration of immigrants already living amongst us?"⁶⁰

The three European phases expose different approaches to social integration or insertion of foreigners who desire to settle in Europe. While the first phase inherently marked the absence of these concerns, the second phase noted its emergence within a specific framework. During this period (1970s) integration went hand-in-hand with the decisions to halt immigration. Many governments justified curbs in light of the need to foster integration.

The third phase witnessed attempts to deal with integration as an independent policy concern. By the 1990s, it was clear that much more needed to be done if serious sociopolitical problems were to be avoided.⁶¹ According to CCME reports, immigration policy at the Union level is considered to include policies on integration of immigrants who already reside on Union territory. This includes providing rights for resident migrants and their families as well as promoting social policies and educational plans to assist them.⁶² The European Parliament's more active involvement in this area was celebrated by the creation of a new Committee. The Committee of Civil Liberties and Public Affairs was created in 1992 to deal explicitly with immigration matters. The choice of name reflected the evolution of emphasis. For example,

⁵⁹Martin Heisler, "Migration, International Relations and the New Europe: Theoretical Perspectives from Institutional Political Sociology," International Migration Review, vol. 26 (Summer 1992), p. 610.

⁶⁰Jacques Delors, "Europe: Embarking on a new Course," Contemporary European Affairs, vol. 1, no. 12 (1989), p. 26.

⁶¹Center for Migration Studies and Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, International Migration Review, vol. 26, no. 98 (Summer 1992), p. 234.

⁶²CCME Briefing Paper no. 14 (November 1993), p. 9.

Human Rights and Internal Affairs were two topics covered by this Committee but "internal affairs" tended to link immigration to security matters, and "human rights" to natural law. "Civil liberties" came closest in placing immigration within the socio-political domain.

Interviews with MEPs revealed that there is still a very strong tendency to relate integration to immigration policy, even in the face of appearing to disentangle the two. An MEP of the extreme-right took the view:

The problem of people who talk about integration is that there are two premises: that people who come have a right to stay, first; and people who stay, should be integrated. That is absolutely not obvious. If you invite your friends for a dinner, you don't expect them to stay for a week, and if you invite them to stay a week, you don't expect them to stay a year.⁶³

MEPs tend to agree that immigration policy and integration policy while related are independent issues. They nevertheless do not seem able to disentangle the two. Clearly, throughout the evolution of immigration, policy alternatives have varied in accordance with perspective: immigrant as market player/worker or as actor within political institutions and cultural arenas.⁶⁴

In the 1990s, many substantive blueprints have yet to be worked out. First, what are the preferences for immigrant intake; and second, what rights should immigrants enjoy. Finally, the more recent dimension of the immigration agenda includes such questions as, whether there actually should be a common immigration policy; what should be the content; and who should regulate it. Although the 1990s marks a period of heightened recognition of the fairly uniform problems of, and strategies for dealing with immigration issues, the increase in coordinated debates also illuminates the degree of national and ideological disparities that are involved in the debate.

⁶³Interview no. 272 (Strasbourg: 13 May 1992), p. 11.

⁶⁴See Aristide Zolberg, in Minorities: Community and Identity, Report of the Dahlem Workshop on Minorities, ed. C. Fried (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1983), p. 230.

III. National Disparities and Country Profiles

Although citizenship of a member-state confers economic and social rights exercisable in all EU member states, control over the granting of nationality and citizenship remains exclusively in the hands of member-states.⁶⁵ Europe's immigrants constitute four percent of a population of 330 million, but in countries such as France, eleven percent of the population are foreign-born.⁶⁶ Differences in European immigration experiences reflect historical and cultural disparities. While immigration policy involves the same conflict for all EU countries, namely that of dealing with culturally, religiously, and professionally diverse Third World immigrants, each member-state has taken a distinctive approach based on broader historical national exigencies and priorities.

Each nation of the EU has had to deal with refugee policy, clandestine immigration, and legal immigration. Each nation has also recognized that immigration involves culturally distinct groups with diverse professional skills. National policies show clear divergence in regard to these groups. Nation-states differ with respect to rights of residence, employment, family reunification, education, housing, voting, citizenship acquisition, visa requirements and privileged status (see below). Differences may also be found in the composition and number of immigrants, and in the stage of their immigration process.

⁶⁵Butt Philip, p. 169.

⁶⁶The Economist (16 March, 1991), p. 9.

Table 3.2: Percent of Non-EU Foreigners by Country*

Country	Non-EU Foreigners ^a	EU Foreigners ^a	Total Foreigners ^b
Belgium	3.3	5.4	9.1
Denmark	2.1	0.5	3.1
Germany	5.2	2.1	8.2
Greece	1.1	1.1	2.2
France	3.8	2.8	6.4
Italy	0.6	0.2	1.4
Ireland	0.5	1.9	2.4
Luxembourg	1.9	23.9	27.5
Netherlands	3.0	1.1	4.6
Portugal	0.7	0.2	0.9
Spain	0.4	0.5	0.9
UK	1.8	1.3	3.3
Total	2.5	1.5	4.0

*Note: Figures do not equal total due to the differences in reports.

^aEUROSTAT 1990 figures (reporting 1988 figures)

^bOECD 1992 figures (reporting 1990 figures)

Sources: EUROSTAT 1990; OECD 1992

Some sense of the differences may be gained from the numbers in Table 3.2. Numbers in comparative analysis however, must be treated with caution. For example, the French problem (of integration) is greater than appears from the table, if one adds native-born children of Algerians. Figures must be read in the context of low rates of naturalization in countries, such as Germany, and higher ones in France, for example.⁶⁷ Also, although most migration statistics define immigrant as "a person who settles for some time in a given country from outside that country," in practice, there are variations which may pertain to a minimum duration for such

⁶⁷Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, p. 2.

settlement.⁶⁸

Disparities in European immigration policies may be informed by Hammar's comparative schema, in which immigration policy may be distinguished along four criteria:

1. Immigration regulation and aliens control
 - a)"strict" or "liberal" control of the admission and residence of foreign citizens (e.g., entry based on quotas of geographical origin or professional qualifications)
 - b)guarantees of "permanent status"; legal security vs. vulnerability to arbitrary expulsion.
2. Immigration policy
 - a)indirect: immigrants' inclusion in the general allocation of benefits; "equal" vs. "discriminatory" distribution
 - b)direct: special measures on behalf of immigrants; "affirmative action" and the removal of legal discrimination.

The section below provides brief profiles of the different areas and country dynamics which are subject to conformity. The challenge for the EU is about harmonizing national trends that are rooted in idiosyncratic experiences. National provisions for immigrants vary widely. The following policy instruments are yet to be harmonized under a common immigration policy:

⁶⁸Council of Europe, Immigration, Population and Demographic Development in the Member-States of the Council of Europe: Population Studies, No. 12 (1984), p. 8.

1) Privileged aliens

Each nation has a distinctive history and a foreign policy agenda which has influenced its perspectives on entry of certain non-EU citizen groups. Belgium for example accords privileged status to nationals of Monaco, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Scandinavia who have an automatic right of residence. Denmark, as a member of the 1954 Nordic Labour Agreements, grants unrestricted travel and employment to nationals of Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. Germany grants special status to Aussiedler or ethnic Germans, and makes special regulations for Polish, Hungarian, American, Austrian and Swiss nationals.⁶⁹

2) Rights of residence

Residence permits are required for all non-EU nationals wishing to reside in a member state. The durations of the residence permits vary according to country and purpose of stay.

3) Family reunification

Legal provisions exist in all states except Ireland and Luxembourg for family unification.⁷⁰ The range of family members who can be admitted vary under national regulations. National law on family reunification may also vary according to types of residence permits (i.e., work permit, "guestworker," etc.).

4) Rights of employment

The policy of all member states is to give priority to EU nationals and other 'privileged' aliens. Work permits for third-country migrants are given only when the post can not otherwise be filled. These are employer, work, place and time specific according to member state. Third-country nationals have no protection in law from discrimination of any description in Community law. They cannot rely on the European Court of Justice for protection against unfair dismissal from employment on grounds of race or from the refusal of particular employers to employ people from ethnic minorities or to limit their employment to low grades. The right of third-country nationals to associate, to join trade unions, to obtain standards of health and safety in the workplace which pertain to EC nationals and EC migrants is not a concern of any organ of the Community. These provisions depend solely on national legislation (i.e., UK's Race Relations Act, 1976 forbids race discrimination in a number of social fields).⁷¹

5) Free Movement in the EU

Non-EU nationals, whatever their rights of residence are not given the right of free movement unless they are family members of EU nationals. This means that national policies on visa requirements determine whether or not an immigrant will be permitted to visit any other EU country.

⁶⁹Martin Baldwin-Edwards, "Immigration after 1992," Policy and Politics, vol. 19, no. 3 (1991): 199-211.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 204.

⁷¹Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, p.24.

6) Civic Rights

Certain states grant the right to vote and stand in local elections by virtue of a period of residence. Some countries grant national enfranchisement to "privileged" aliens (i.e., Irish and Commonwealth citizens in the UK, Brazilians in Portugal).⁷²

7) Education

There is little theoretical restriction on access to education, although access to study grants varies by means of foreign students' fees and foreign student admission quotas.⁷³

8) Citizenship

Citizenship of an EU country guarantees security of residence, voting rights, political and public employment rights, and freedom of movement within the EC. Two entirely different means of citizenship acquisition exist (and a combination of them) and they vary according to national domestic law: jus sanguinis (by parental nationality) or jus soli (by birthplace). [see Tables 3.3 and 3.4 below]

Table 3.3: Citizenship in EU Countries: *Jus Soli* and *Jus Sanguinis*

<i>Jus Soli</i> (by birthplace)	<i>Jus Sanguinis</i> (by parental nationality)
Belgium	Denmark
France	Germany
Greece	Ireland
Italy	Portugal
Luxembourg	
Netherlands	
Spain	
UK	

⁷²Baldwin-Edwards (1991), p. 205.

⁷³Ibid.

Table 3.4: Naturalization of Foreigners in EU Countries, 1990*

Country	Years of Residence	Numbers	Percent ^d
Belgium	5+5 ^a	1,878 ^b	0.2
Denmark	7	3,028	1.9
France	5	54,366	1.5
Germany	10	46,783 ^c	1.0
Greece	8	NA	NA
Ireland	5	NA	NA
Italy	5	NA	NA
Luxembourg	10	NA	NA
Netherlands	5	12 790	2.0
Portugal	6	--	--
Spain	10	7 049	1.7
UK	5	57 271	2.9

*OECD report of naturalizations of foreign population in 1990 as a percentage of foreigners in preceding year.

^aBelgium requires an intermediate stage before full naturalization after 10 years.

^b1989 figures

^c1988 figures

Sources: OECD (1992); Baldwin-Edwards (1992).

The country and issue profiles underline the complexity of the immigration issue as it confronts European policy-makers who are attempting to harmonize national trends.

How can the European Union harmonize national policies? The search for integration also produces a separate immigration issue: how to work out a compromise between each nation's "privileged status" group, and "undesirable" group, and to formulate some kind of policy on "third-country nationals" who have the right of residence in one EU country. This is necessary to avoid cycles of displacement, and concentration of immigrants and problems in one member country. Germany has already witnessed massive ousting of Turks from employment and their

replacement by East Germans. Many of these Turks are looking for refuge in neighboring France, a country with sizeable North African and Arab communities and proportionate problems. In turn, many of these "privileged status" North African residents of France are moving south to Italy, a traditional emigration country with little experience with this new culturally and religiously distinct group. There are obvious implications for European integration when each member state preserves national law which varies on so many critical issues relating to a substantial (both actual and publicly perceived) portion of its population. The anomalous case of Macaons who have greater access to British territory by virtue of their access to Portugal (as "privileged status" aliens) while citizens of Hong Kong (a British colony under transition by 1997) are struggling to receive conditional visas, illuminates one such dilemma.

Differences in residence or employment requirements encourage concentration of immigrants in certain EU countries. Discrepant citizenship acquisition means that a Turk born in German territory to Turkish parents who may also be born in Germany (which follows jus sanguinis principles) has less employment and movement rights than a Turk born in Belgium (who through jus soli, has Belgian citizenship and therefore is an EC national) or a French citizen migrating to Germany. The problems of one country in relation to immigration are now problems for the others.

IV. Conclusion

In the 1990s, the European landscape, while becoming more homogeneous, is highlighting the many dilemmas of the immigration issue. In the coming years, Europe may have to coexist with hostility towards immigrants and a demographic demand for more workers. It will be walking on a fine line between "Europe without frontiers" and "Fortress Europe."⁷⁴ Like the "joint-decision trap" between European and national institutions,⁷⁵ immigration and citizenship at one time is manifest on the European level (i.e., a European passport) and under EU regulation, and simultaneously susceptible to country currents. Until Europe is thoroughly homogenized, country dynamics may be very relevant. These are the major paradoxes, which feed the conflict between a common immigration policy and countermovements of resistance.

The evolution of immigration, caught between national and ideological disparities and harmonization, is ultimately informed by the nature of attitudes. Decision-makers now operate in an environment of heightened public awareness.⁷⁶ Reactions to loss of national sovereignty, epitomized by both European integration and immigration has resulted in a similar trend throughout Europe: the emergence and consolidation of extreme-right parties and xenophobic movements. A 1991 Report drawn up by the European Parliament's Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia pointed to the growing strength of racism and xenophobia. Country by

⁷⁴See Patrick Ireland, "Facing the True 'Fortress Europe': Immigrant and Politics in the EC," Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 29, no. 5: 451-480.

⁷⁵Fritz Scharpf, "The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration," Public Administration, 66, 3 (Autumn 1988) 239-278; See Patrick Ireland, "Immigration: The EC and Social Policy Coordination," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The Washington Hilton, September 2-5, 1993), p. 3.

⁷⁶Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, p. 10.

country analysis provided evidence of this surge.⁷⁷ European publics seem to be converging in their assessments. Immigrants cause a host of social problems, and immigration control is the solution not only to the push-pull flow, but to integration itself. How the issue is to be controlled and by whom are questions which yield vague answers. Elite attitudes are instructive here, since as prominent immigration scholars have pointed out, popular perception of the crisis of immigration tends to be constructed by elites and political dialogue.⁷⁸ What are the views of European Parliamentarians?

⁷⁷Glyn Ford, Rapporteur, Member of the European Parliament, "Committee of Inquiry on Racism and Xenophobia" (Luxembourg: European Parliament, 1991), pp. 51-95.

⁷⁸Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, p. 7.

Chapter Four

Attitudes of Members of the European Parliament toward Immigration: An Overview

I. Introduction

This chapter identifies differences among Members of the European Parliament's (MEPs) attitudes that will be explained later by country and party group variables. The data were derived from our survey of, and interviews with MEPs. Four dimensions of elite attitudes regarding immigration are examined: a) assessments of the immigration issue; b) preferences of immigrant intake and immigrant groups; c) views on policy and issue resolution; and d) views on the nature of country/party debates. All sections probe areas of consensus and discord in the European Parliament.

The first set of questions taps the evaluative component of attitudes. It surveys the diverse meanings and levels of importance attached to the immigration issue, the identification of the issue over time, and future outlooks. The second set of questions assesses degrees of support or opposition to immigration and to specific immigrant groups. The third battery of questions addresses strategies for immigration policy. Employing Tomas Hammar's working definition of "immigration policy," this latter set is concerned with two interrelated yet distinct parts: i) regulation of flows of immigration and control of aliens; and ii) immigrant policy.¹ The former comprises questions of numbers, while the latter constitutes civil right issues and questions pertaining to immigrants that are residing in host countries. A fourth section briefly delineates cultural and party sources that shape MEP political thinking. These sources will be further examined in Chapters Five and Six.

Questions in this research were based on previous studies, including immigration issues

¹Tomas Hammar (ed.), European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 9-12.

in Europe, the United States, and Australia, attitudes toward both immigration and other salient political issues in Europe, and the Eurobarometer project on attitudes of candidates to the European Parliament.² These studies provided the framework of both the content of the questions and the structure of the questionnaire.

The overall findings in this research indicate that on most levels of immigration, there is a tendency to agree on broad principles, with greater ambivalence on the specifics. This trend was captured by one Belgian MEP:

You know, in politics, very often it's easy to agree on guidelines and broad principles. As long as you stay on the roof of the house, it seems nice, the house looks beautiful. When you come down to the basement, and you have to build your house, and...say three rooms, two rooms, two bedrooms, four bedrooms, cellar and so on, that's when the discussion starts. So, in politics also. All general principles, everybody agrees but once you have to implement them, then you have difficulties.³

As in more general areas of politics described by the MEP above, consensus tends to decrease from the general to the specific.⁴ For the purpose of this study, consensus was defined by the agreement of over eighty percent of the MEP sample. Conversely, dissensus was marked by

²Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer 30: Public Opinion in the European Community: Special Issue on Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance (Brussels: Directorate-General Information, Communication and Culture, November 1989). This report is based on a sample of 11,795 individuals in all twelve member-states of the European Union. Eurobarometer 10 (1977); Julian Simon, The Economic Consequences of Immigration (Oxford, England and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1989); Rita Simon, Public Opinion and the Immigrant (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1985); and Katherine Betts, Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976-1987 (Carlton, Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1988); Eurobarometer 11: Candidates for the European Parliament April-May 1979 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1985).

³Interview no. 219 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 2.

⁴87 percent think that immigration problems are important or very important ; 84 percent feel that immigration problems are greater today than in the past. Even on broad principles of policy preference, a strong consensus may be found: 90 percent of MEPs favor a common immigration policy for EU members; 73 percent claim that immigration should be regulated by EU institutions.

percentage clusters below eighty percent.

MEPs across the board agree that immigration problems have intensified over time. Immigration ranks high on the political agenda for nearly all. There is a large consensus in favor of a common immigration policy for EU members. Although MEPs agree on such broad principles of immigration, many disparities exist on the more basic "cellar" level, the substantive areas of immigration. MEPs differ in their definitions of immigration problems, substance of policy and in their more individual assessments. They disagree on their preferences for immigration levels and immigrant groups; the structure and content of a common immigration policy; and so on.

The distinctions in the immigration debate may be informed by Butler and Stokes' schema of issues. Accordingly, issues may be classified as valence or position, the former related to high levels of agreement, the latter to conflict.⁵ Unlike position issues, those of valence are marked essentially by one body of opinion. The issues of peace and economic deprivation are classic valence issues: all agree that it is good to have the former, bad to have the latter. How to obtain or to avert each is a matter of contention, guided by differing "positions."

MEPs' general assessments of immigration reflect a "valence" issue. Most agree that immigration has assumed unprecedented problem proportions, that there should be a common policy, and that it should be regulated by EU institutions. In contrast, there are important variations in opinion regarding the more substantive matters. On this level, immigration may be a contested issue of "position."

While the largest disagreements lay around the substance of immigration and policy, the focus of politicization is on the broader assessments of immigration, such as a negative mood

⁵David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice, second edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), pp. 303-316.

regarding immigrant presence, where there is large agreement. Most MEPs would concur with the sentiment of this Greek Conservative MEP: "we can not receive immigrants endlessly--- especially people with different cultural, ideological, political values than those of Europeans."⁶ If the immigration issue is marked by uneven political contestation, then, what is the conflict about? What is the nature of debate, or more simply, why is immigration a heated or politicized issue?

Several types of controversies may fuel the immigration debate. First, there is the conflict between the varying "positions" which underlie the broader principles. Second, where "valence" or skewed-opinion issues are the primary focus of politicization, a contest may emerge on political competence. In an Israeli study, Arian and Shamir noted such a dichotomy, where parties stress valence issues and create a contest over images.⁷ In such cases, parties compete over perceptions of competency to achieve desired values such as peace, prosperity, or in this case, negative climate towards immigration. As one MEP underlined, MEPs engage in politics over these public concerns:

I think immigration is a problem because it is perceived to be a problem, and in politics if something is perceived to be true, then for all practical purposes it is true.⁸

As the following chapter will show, public opinion regarding immigration is an important factor in MEP thinking.

"Valence" issues are more prominent than "position" issues in the immigration debate, and this may be explained by another factor. The immigration issue offers limited "positions"

⁶Interview no. 468 (Strasbourg, 15 May 1992), p. 1.

⁷Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, "Two Reversals in Israeli Politics: Why 1992 Was Not 1977," *Electoral Studies* (1993) p. 24.

⁸Interview no. 32 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), p. 4.

for resolution. The nature of immigration has greatly outpaced strategies to control. According to the director of the UN Population Fund, Nafis Sadik, "The mass migrations of our times threaten to overrun our capacity to cope with them."⁹ As Alan Butt Philip argues, European cooperation may emerge on this front not only from the process of European unification, but also because of the recognition of policy limitations at the national level.¹⁰ A third type of conflict thus involves the distinction between the desirable and feasible aspects of political visions.

Questions that deal specifically with evaluative and normative issue attitudes (e.g., "In general, should immigration be ...?") tend to underscore the conflicting nature between the pragmatic domain of immigration and the ideal. MEP assessments of immigrant intakes for example, reflect the "desirable" component of issue attitudes. However, MEPs also perceive immigration levels practically; a result of the natural flow of events. The interview data suggested that in the struggle between what is desirable and what is feasible, these European elites tend to be on the side of pragmatism. As Putnam's study of elites in Britain and Italy highlighted, there are situations in which politicians feel that what is politically feasible must take precedence over what is ideally desirable.¹¹ Given that these are, for the most part, practicing politicians from democratic countries, this is hardly surprising. MEPs show signs of such thinking in their responses to questions of immigrant intake. The interviews underlined an oft-mentioned theme:

What can you do? You have the Mediterranean near the border. With every fishing boat, people from the Maghreb come in---What can you do? Shoot

⁹The Times, 7 July 1993, as quoted in Alan Butt Philip, "European Union Immigration Policy: Phantom, Fantasy or Fact," West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 179.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 168-191.

¹¹Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 54.

them! Bang!¹²

It becomes a very practical problem with the European lawmakers as to what happens when the Single Market is a single legal space and you have freedom of movement of people. Somebody has to decide who gets the visas and who doesn't get the visas. How many visas, what about permanent settlement? The differences between countries won't be a problem. It will be severely practical problems. I mean how on earth do you police the Italian frontiers? The Italian frontier is sea.¹³

If you look at it in terms of how to stop people coming in, the answer is you have no more chance than to stop Mexicans coming over Rio Grande.¹⁴

You can't establish tolerance by law.¹⁵

It is no solution to say make love not war.¹⁶

[It is no solution to say] the door is open and everybody should come. It's nice, but tomorrow nobody could live in Germany.¹⁷

While a large number of MEPs across the spectrum expressed a priority on some type of controlled immigration intake, they were preoccupied with considerations of feasibility of such control. This may explain MEP predisposition to pessimism. These elites may have taken the warnings of Pisani who claims:

We treat the problem of population movements and immigration as if its increase or decrease depended simply upon people's will. We speak as if good or bad policies could, over the short, medium, or long term, alter them. To reason in this way, however, is to miss the point that intervention can only ever be marginal. Population movements are simply the result of natural, social, or economic disequilibria. Failure to recognize this only aggravates the problems

¹²Interview no. 172 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p.15.

¹³Interview no. 134 (London: 22 April 1992), p. 9.

¹⁴Ibid. p.2.

¹⁵Interview no. 172., p. 14.

¹⁶Interview no. 165 (Brussels, 7 May 1992), 11.

¹⁷Ibid.

which gave rise to them in the first place.¹⁸

The practical dimension of immigration implies that immigration continues because it is physically difficult to stop. For these MEPs, pragmatism also includes a recognition of the legal and political repercussions that result from not fulfilling treaty and legal obligations (e.g., Single European Act, the Geneva Convention, Dublin Convention, European Convention of Human Rights).¹⁹

The pragmatic preoccupations of MEPs were also underlined by the rate of missing survey responses (19%) regarding migration from the EU area. As many observers have pointed out, often what is not said in response to questions may be equally instructive as what is said.²⁰ Interviews with MEPs pointed to a possible explanation for this. Many MEPs do not consider movement from other EU countries as "migration" proper. This psychological adjustment relates to legal definitions. According to one Dutch Liberal MEP, this is a working goal of the European Parliament:

These frontiers are psychological as much as physical or legal in nature. And one of the great challenges of the work in the European Parliament is precisely breaking down psychological barriers. One does that not immediately, but by breaking down the physical ones and legal ones in the first place, and addressing psychological ones indirectly, I would say.²¹

¹⁸Edgar Pisani, "The Need for Solidarity," Contemporary European Affairs, vol. 3 (Special issue on European Immigration Policy), no. 3 (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1991), p. 7.

¹⁹Both arguments are forwarded by Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin Schain, in "The Politics of Immigration: Introduction," Special Issue on The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe, ed. M. Baldwin-Edwards and M. Schain, West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 9.

²⁰Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 34; Knut Groholt and John Higley, "National Elite Surveys: Some Experiences from Norway," Acta Sociologica 15 (no. 2, 1972), 176.

²¹Interview no. 44 (Strasbourg, 12 May 1992), p. 1.

Attitudes regarding EU migration may reflect a psychology of *de facto* acceptance of legal boundaries that constitutes the EU institutionalization process.

II. Empirical Data

A. Assessment of the Immigration Issue

Questions in this section were designed to measure the views of MEPs toward immigration. They address MEPs' understanding of the salience and evolution of the immigration issue over time, and their conceptualization of the problem. An overview of their responses is provided in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1: MEP Assessment of Immigration*

	(very)important				not important
1. How important is immigration to country.....	70%				12%
How important is immigration to EU.....	82%				3%
How important is immigration to party group.....	71%				8%
How important is immigration for you.....	69%				11%
	greater today				about the same
2. Compared to the past, immigration is.....	84%				15%
	optimistic				(very) pessimistic
3. I am _____ about problem resolution.....	38%				60%
	more		same		less
4. Compared to other EU countries, my country has _____ immigration problems.....	18%		43%		36%
5. Immigration is a _____ issue.	political 17%	social 30%	economic 20%	cultural 9%	demographic 10%
6. Immigration problems are related to.....	35%	integration	race relations	unemployment	social welfare
		25%		11%	7%
					citizenship
					4%

*Note: Percentages do not equal 100 due to unreported categories of response.

The assumption of both the survey questionnaires and the in-depth interviews is that MEPs consider immigration to be an important issue, and this assumption is borne out by the data (see Table 4.1 above). MEPs however, may vary greatly in how important they perceive the issue to be. How important an MEP regards the issue is related to how he/she defines priorities. Ascertaining the level of exigency attached to immigration is crucial for evaluating other related attitudes. Hypothetically for example, a study on attitudes towards the role of the Church would need to consider that among a sample of Catholics, there is a distinction between practicing members and non-active ones. These differences must be weighed accordingly. Similarly, all MEPs have certain ideas about immigration, but not all start from the same premise; some Members believe the issue is important, while others clearly do not. As the previous chapter discussed, countries vary in their phases of immigration development, and this may affect MEPs'

perception of issue salience. Such attachment sets the tone, depth, intensity and value of other convictions regarding the issue. Expressions of importance may also suggest where, in the minds of MEPs, the issue places on the political agenda. This factor provides what is referred to as the contextual nature of other answers.

This study attempted to measure the importance attached to the immigration issue in two ways: close-ended questions in a survey; and open-ended questions in an interview. The questionnaire identified four value perspectives: the importance of immigration to 1)the country; 2)the European Union; 3)the party group; 4)to you (MEP). On the basis of these four criteria combined, an index was constructed to determine the overall level of importance the immigration issue placed in the minds of the Members.

For a large majority of MEPs, the immigration case is very significant. The combined index of importance resulted in a cumulative score of 64 percent of MEPs who identified immigration as important or very important in all 4 categories. While there is clear agreement on the gravity of the issue, this view is relatively most prevalent when placed in the European Union context. There are slight differences in consensus levels based on breadth of perspective. From greater to lesser degrees of unanimity, the following indicated that immigration was important or very important to:

...the European Union	82%
...[your] party group	71%
...[your] country	70%
...[you] MEP	69%

As the immigration issue involves more players, more MEPs claim that it is important. This sentiment grows as the focus broadens from personal (69%) to country (70%) and party group (71%) to the European Union (82%).

The stronger concentration of importance assigned to the European level means that the role of immigration is perceived more serious as a compounded problem. In fact, a majority of MEPs reported their national situations to be better than that of other EU members. Thirty-six percent of MEPs believe that their country faces fewer immigration problems than other EU countries, compared to 18% who claim more. MEPs who reported that their countries suffer the same amount of problems (43%) may be identifying with their colleagues from other countries when they report that immigration is an important problem for the EU. These perceptions seem to reflect the overall distribution of foreigners across different countries, as those who reported "more" problems came from Germany, France, and Belgium, countries with larger immigration communities; those who perceived "fewer" problems were more likely from the Southern or traditional emigration countries, such as Ireland. Chapter Five further examines how these estimates reflect the patterns of problems in specific countries.

The study attempts to tap MEP attachment to immigration another way. Since the survey questionnaire is predominantly concerned with immigration-related questions, respondents are forced to focus on that issue. To overcome this methodological bias, the oral interviews, conducted weeks after the application of the questionnaire, began by first surveying ideas on random issues.

Nearly all of the elites interviewed in this sample identified immigration among the first four problems facing Europe in the 1990s. Other urgent areas of concern included unemployment, economic convergence in the EU, questions relating to Eastern Europe,²² and to the "institutional future of the EP" as a central problem in Europe.²³ MEPs were more likely

²²See Interview no. 198 (London, 16 April 1992); Interview no. 123 (London, 24 April 1992), 3; Interview no. 15 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), 6.

²³See Interview no. 198 (London, 16 April 1992), 1.

than their publics to attach an importance to the immigration issue. Although in many countries national debates over immigration have been heated and have had impact, the Eurobarometer study of European public opinion found that among a list of issues, "by and large, Europeans do not see immigration as a problem of the first order: in most countries we find it at the bottom of the list or in the last place but one."²⁴ "Unemployment" appears to be the only common prime concern for both the elite and mass samples.²⁵ A fundamental difference between public and MEP perceptions between immigration and unemployment may inform the discrepancies in problem ordering: that is, while unemployment tends to be a latent factor in accounting for public support of extreme-right, anti-immigrant movements, only 11 percent of MEPs linked immigration to unemployment.

The EP consensus on the importance of the immigration issue was reinforced by another finding. Not only did MEPs agree that immigration was important, but 84 percent of MEPs in the survey perceived immigration problems to be greater today than in the past. This was consistent with the trend that R. Simon found in public thinking. Her study of magazines over the past century in the United States indicated that people look back toward prior waves of immigration with more positive feelings than they have toward present waves.²⁶ One may consider the possibility that any given generation looking back is a) not currently threatened by that wave, and b) probably looking at its grandparents.

A plethora of literature on anti-foreigner sentiment prior to World War II confirms this

²⁴Based on the survey question, "In your opinion, which of the problems that seem to face us nowadays is the most important? And which of these is the least important?" Eurobarometer 30 (1989), p. 4.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Rita Simon, Public Opinion and the Immigrant (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1985), in Julian Simon, The Economic Consequences of Immigration (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989), p. 351.

cyclical dynamic.²⁷ A shift in sources of immigration challenges societal order as events change faster than beliefs, values, and symbols. Many MEPs believe that, as Tomas Hammar suggests, "these changes mean that many of the new minority groups are more highly visible, more different in culture and tradition from indigenous European population than the so-called 'traditional' immigrant groups of the past."²⁸ Since "traditional" groups seem to change over time, it is difficult to identify whether there is a tendency to romanticize the past, or because with new types, and numbers of immigrants, problems seem to be particularly intractable. Are old immigration problems superseded today by new ones, have they been resolved, or were they non-existent in the minds of these politicians?

Past experiences may correspond to future expectations. MEPs may be willing to extend their backward assessments into forward-looking policy judgments. More research is needed to determine whether there is a difference in future outlook between forgetful romanticists and realists who see today's problems as unparalleled. The latter group may feel that the problems are insurmountable and therefore have a more pessimistic outlook. Conversely, romanticists inherently tend to be more idealistic. In immigration debates, this may be reinforced by immigration folklore. As Freeman notes, the most common response to any criticism of immigration is that the same old arguments were used when the critic's forefathers arrived; as they were false then, they must be false today.²⁹ Those romanticists who believe that the

²⁷See Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Citoyennete, Nationalite, et Immigration (Paris: Arcantere Editions, 1987); John Ardagh, France Today (London and New York: Penguin, 1988), pp. 440-451; R. Simon (1985); Zig Layton-Henry, The Politics of Immigration (London: Blackwell, 1992).

²⁸Hammar, p.6.

²⁹Gary Freeman, "Why the Immigration Intake is Too Large in Democracies," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., 2-5 September 1993), p. 8.

present problems are greater because yesterday's immigration problems now appear manageable should generate some minimal confidence and optimism about the future. In fact, this study reveals that a majority (60%) of MEPs are pessimistic or very pessimistic about resolution of immigration problems. Moreover, although there were optimists among this group, not one MEP was "very optimistic." Uncertainty about the future (and pessimism) may follow feelings that immigration problems are important, and have worsened over time.

As the preceding chapter addressed, the numbers, sources, and types of immigrants have changed dramatically over the last 20 years in Europe, and the issue of controlled immigration has increasingly dominated the debate. MEPs' future outlooks may be mitigated by concerns of immigration control. As noted above, there is a discrepancy between MEPs' desires for controlled immigration, and their assessments of feasibility of such control. MEPs who are sensitive to this quality of immigration may naturally be inclined to pessimism. Moreover, future expectations may depend on perspective or vantage point, following the truism, that "things look better from afar than they do up close." Generalists tend to harbor future optimism; those who focus on immigration more substantively are more likely to report pessimism. The account of a French MEP reflects this dichotomy:

I am an optimist. Politicians are always optimistic. Everyone who belongs to politics does so because they hope their action will change the mechanical orientation of life, but objectively, if we analyze the curves rigorously, we could be very pessimistic because the demographic pressure, increased by the differences and social distortions does not stop growing, and therefore the problems will become more and more critical, with consequences of racial unbearability which will make the social tensions increase.³⁰

MEPs who focus on the more abstract nature of politics tend to be more optimistic than those who focus on the nature of immigration.

If MEPs broadly agree on the general assessments of immigration, they show far less

³⁰Interview no. 289 (Strasbourg, 10 June 1992), pp. 2-3.

coherence in defining the nature of immigration problems.³¹ They were divided into three large groups according to whether they perceive immigration as primarily a political (18%), social (30%), or economic (20%) issue. There was another split into two other categories of problem type: those who saw immigration as a demographic (10%) or cultural (9%) issue. In addition, 10% of the sample suggested that it was a multi-dimensional issue including several categories combined. The following chapters explore whether there are country and/or party group perspectives regarding differing MEP conceptions of the immigration issue.

Beyond vague categorization of issue types, MEPs as a group express considerable agreement in linking immigration to fundamental types of social or societal problems. Sixty percent of those surveyed claimed that immigration problems were related either to problems of integration (35%) or to problems of race relations (25%).³² Seven percent of MEPs connected immigration to social welfare issues. In contrast to European publics, who according to Eurobarometer reports and the growth of extreme-right anti-immigrant movements, are sensitive to the more symptomatic issues of immigration, such as "unemployment," MEPs tend to link immigration to the system-oriented issues for policymaking. Thus, only 11 percent of MEPs associated immigration to unemployment. These findings reveal that MEP attitudes correspond to the evolutionary phases of immigration; as Chapter Three noted, the fourth phase has witnessed greater focus on issues of integration and incorporation, than immigration itself.

In identifying immigration problems and problem-areas however, terminology tends to differ, reflecting cultural and ideological biases. An important finding regarding definitions for

³¹This was based on survey question: "Do you think of immigration as an issue that is primarily: 1)political; 2)social; 3)economic; 4)foreign policy and security; 5)cultural; 6)demographic; 7)other: (please specify)."

³²This is based on survey question, "When you think of immigration problems, to which other area do you relate them first? 1)social welfare; 2)race relations; 3)unemployment; 4)education; 5)crime; 6)citizenship; 7)drug-trafficking; 8)social integration; 9)other (specify)."

example, emerged in the marked failure of respondents to link immigration to foreign policy and national security (only one MEP associated the two). This was counterintuitive in face of the increasing blur of lines between international and domestic policy, globalization of politics, and the tendency in the literature to place migration in an international relations context.³³ The interviewees however, suggested that terminology may play a big role in conceptualizations. "Security" for example, is a vague term and this may account for the seeming lack of concern with it. Greek MEPs talked about immigration as a security issue in terms of Turkey,³⁴ while French MEPs tended to link immigration to insecurity and crime.³⁵ Language and conceptual schema play very important roles in exacerbating conflicting visions in the immigration debate. Terminology may account for important differences, and will be analyzed in country and party contexts.

³³See Mark Miller and Christopher Mitchell, "Comparing Policy-Making Patterns Towards Migration in Industrial Democracies: Western Europe and the United States," (Paper presented at the Seminar on Migration, the State, and International Relations, New York University, 26 February 1993); James Hollifield, "Migration and International Relations: Cooperation and Control in the European Community," International Migration Review, 26, 2 (Summer 1992), 568-595; Martin Heisler, "Migration International Relations and the New Europe: Theoretical Perspectives from Institutional Political Sociology," International Migration Review, 26, 2 (Summer 1992), 596-622; Jonas Widgren, "International Migration and Regional Stability," International Affairs, vol. 66, 4 (October 1990) 749-766.

³⁴Interview no. 468 (Strasbourg, 15 May 1992), p.2.

³⁵Interview no. 310 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p.6.

B. Assessment of Immigration Intakes and Immigrant Groups

A fundamental component of MEP assessments of immigration are attitudes towards immigrant groups themselves. This subsection thus attempts to go beyond general conceptualizations of immigration, by capturing views on immigrants and immigration intakes. How do these elites perceive immigrants, their backgrounds and their potential roles? Do MEPs have migrant group preferences? Questions were designed to tap these views in two ways: directly, by asking MEPs to assess views of their colleagues; and indirectly, by weighing respondents' country and party group. Projection analysis is particularly useful in probing attitudes related to issues of discrimination and prejudice.

The media and masses typically draw images of immigrants waiting on line, not as persons coming from somewhere.³⁶ Typically, immigrants are conceptualized as one uniform group, with little consideration of immigrant origins and cultural, religious, ethnic and professional distinctions. However, as the EU considers a harmonized immigration policy, these distinctions have become more relevant.

First, there is the division that has stood in the way of a truly unified Europe, more particularly that which distinguishes advanced industrialized Northern Europe from less advanced Southern Europe. Second, there is the group of West Europeans from countries such as Switzerland, Austria and Sweden (the latter two become EU members after January 1995, after the research was completed) who are not members of the EU but who are equally developed economically and industrially. Third, there is the more recent exodus of peoples from the liberated countries of Eastern Europe. Finally, there is the migratory pressure by the influx of mostly unskilled migrants and asylum-seekers from developing (often ex-colonial) nations. Some

³⁶Micha Brumlick, Conference on "Foreigners Out? Xenophobia and Right-Wing Extremism in Germany," Goethe House, February 13, 1993.

members of the second group will become full members of the EU by 1995, and those of the third group, East Europeans are expected to join in the future. When MEPs discuss immigration problems, it is generally the fourth group, migrants from the developing world to whom they refer. As on many substantive dimensions of immigration, MEPs differ with regard to immigrant preferences.

While the last section revealed that MEPs were more likely than their publics to identify immigration among the most pressing problems facing Europe, in terms of immigrant acceptance, attitudes are reversed. Public opinion is "ahead" of elites regarding the sentiment that there are "too many immigrants."³⁷ According to the Eurobarometer findings, one in three Europeans believe that there are "too many" people of another nationality or race in his country.³⁸ According to the MEP sample, the number of immigrants does not necessarily need adjustment: 51 percent of MEPs claim that immigration in general should be kept at the present level.³⁹ Since approximately 82 percent of MEPs reported the immigration issue to be important, these figures also reveal that the attached significance to immigration is not necessarily related to numbers alone.

Although European publics are resistant to immigration, a decline in birthrates throughout Europe is expected to have consequences for labor markets and social security systems. Demographic considerations have prompted some controversial claims that in order to keep the

³⁷See K. Betts (1988); Geoffrey Harris, "European Integration and the Challenge of the Extreme Right" (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, the Washington Hilton, September 2-5, 1993), p. 4; G. Freeman (1993); J. Simon (1989).

³⁸Eurobarometer 30, p. 42.

³⁹Based on survey question: "In your opinion, should immigration in general be increased, kept at present level, or decreased?" 25% of MEPs reported that immigration levels should "increase"; 24% preferred a "decrease". Note: This does not talk to the issue of illegal immigration, which many MEPs feel needs to be addressed in other contexts.

labor force stable and to guarantee social security for a growing older generation, it might be necessary to recruit more foreign labor. MEPs seem to appreciate the need for foreigners while recognizing public disapproval. The demographic quality of the problem was frequently mentioned in the interviews along with the social aspect of the problem. One Conservative British MEP summarized an oft-mentioned theme:

If we want to keep our society in Western Europe at the same level, running the same number of public services and factories, all the things that people do, we won't have enough people in 20 years time. Either we all rush and create more babies---but even then we got a 20 year problem; it takes 20 years to grow an adult---or we have to import people.⁴⁰

An extreme right MEP reiterated a major theme of his party's campaign against immigration, as he espoused the alternative solution to mend the "demographic paradox":

It is true [that a demographic shortage exists in Western Europe] but I am sure that the solution is not immigration because if we give up the transmitting of life, we lose our right to survive as an independent nation. I'm talking about the French, but the same thing for Italy or Germany. It is very clear to me, if we decide that it is too boring to make children and that we have better to borrow the children of the others, or to have our children made by others, we won't stay eternally masters of our own fate. We have to put the demographic problem and decline of birth as the most important problems in our society.⁴¹

Most MEPs recognize the demographic necessity for more manpower in the future.

The differences among elites however, revolve around solutions; extreme right deputies stress family incentives while the others acquiesce to a future of continued immigration with resentful electorates. In all cases, the implications follow the warnings of Jean-Claude Chesnais, a population expert at France's National Institute of Demographic Studies. Accordingly, "In the coming years, Western Europe will have to coexist with hostility toward immigrants and a

⁴⁰Interview no. 123 (London, 24 April 1992), p. 3.

⁴¹Interview no. 272 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992).

demand for immigrants."⁴²

The cross-pressures between future demographic needs and public resentment towards immigrants creates divisions within the EP not only with regard to solutions, but also to the "favorable" aspects of immigration. According to an Australian study, where people do not know very much about demography, questions about immigration may often tap attitudes towards existing migrants rather than attitudes towards immigration as a contributor to population growth.⁴³

Some MEPs focus on demographic needs and others on public attitudes towards migrants. MEPs were asked about the contribution of immigrants to the West European standard of living and to the social fabric respectively.⁴⁴ Sixty-five percent of the MEPs declared that an increased or present level of immigration would have positive impact on the standard of living. A similar result followed when the question was applied to the social fabric (see Table 4.2). Amidst the negative attitudes towards immigration and/or feelings of the growing urgency of immigration problems, MEPs also recognize the necessity of immigration. Given the "demographic paradox," migrant preferences may become more relevant.

⁴²"In Europe, Immigrants are Needed, Not Wanted," The New York Times, 5 August 1990, p. 1.

⁴³Betts, p. 77.

⁴⁴The survey questionnaire asked two questions: "In your opinion, what level of immigration from outside the EC would have the most favorable impact on the standard of living in Western Europe?"; and "In your opinion, what level of immigration from outside the EC would have the most favorable impact on the social fabric of Western Europe?"

Table 4.2: MEP Assessment of Immigrant Intake*

1. In general, immigration should be...	decreased 24%	increased 25%	kept at same level 51%
2. _____ level of immigration would have positive impact for standard of living.	higher than current 17%	lower than current 31%	current 48%
3. _____ level of immigration would have positive impact for social fabric.	higher than current 12%	lower than current 35%	current 53%

*Note: Percentages do not equal 100% due to missing responses.

MEPs hold clearer biases on immigrant groups themselves. Across the board, there is a tendency for preferential treatment to wane for migrants whose origins are more remote geographically, ethnically, racially and religiously. Table 4.3 illustrates the patterns of MEP responses regarding their own preferences of immigrant groups.

Table 4.3: MEP Preferences of Immigration Levels (present, increased, or decreased) and Immigrant Groups*

Immigrant Region	Increased	Present Level	Decreased
EU	40%	36%	5%
W.Europe non-EU	21%	50%	9%
E.Europe	37%	33%	18%
Turkey	12%	45%	25%
Asia	13%	42%	29%
N.Africa	18%	33%	34%
Africa	18%	32%	45%

N=167; Figures do not equal 100% due to missing responses.

*Based on survey question, "Should immigration from each of the following be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?"

This trend was similar but weaker when MEPs were asked to estimate such sentiment of colleagues from their own party group (see Table 4.4):

Table 4.4: MEPs Estimating the Opinions of their Partisan Colleagues regarding Preferences of Immigrant Groups*

Immigrant Region	In favor	Opposed
N.Euro EU	52%	10%
S.Euro EU	47%	14%
W.Euro non-EU	47%	14%
Eastern Europe	43%	22%
Developing Countries	34%	31%

N=167; Figures do not equal 100% due to missing responses.

*Based on the survey question, "With regard to immigration from the following areas, which of the following best characterizes the opinions of MEPs from your party grouping?"

In fact, immigrant group biases are greater when MEPs are asked about their own preferences. They differ with regard to how they define their priorities and how they believe their colleagues do. They reported a stronger preference toward East Europeans than to West Europeans who are non-EU members. Conversely, where MEPs were asked to identify their fellow partisans' positions, the reverse trend emerged. These findings may reflect a reluctance to expose oneself as prejudiced.

Although there are obvious differences based on country perspectives, and between questions that tap self-priorities and projections of other colleagues, MEPs in general prefer the more job competitive, yet culturally more similar, East European immigrants to those from developing countries. A member of the European Parliament's Civil Rights Committee reported that no specific rules were yet created in his committee except for "the obvious":

We have only just started discussing it [rules regarding immigration]. Obviously, it will be much more simple for East Europeans than for North Africans. That is about the only distinction. They [East Europeans] will be more welcome to people than North Africans, or Asians for that matter, because they are Europeans and the Community will one day include all those countries.⁴⁵

⁴⁵Interview no. 198 (London, 16 April 1992), p. 3.

If demographic shortages are eventually resolved by foreigners, clearly there will be boundaries between those that will be inside the EU, and those on the outside. MEPs not only reflect projections of future European developments, but also a sense of affinities. In view of the likely future accession of some East European countries to the EU, MEP attitudes towards East Europeans are not expected to lag behind, as community boundaries change.

In addition to the country variable, problems related to immigration issue (discussed in section A) account for different priorities of migrant groups. Of MEPS who associate immigration to race problems, many feel that immigrants from the developing countries of North Africa and Africa, should be decreased (44% and 41%, respectively).⁴⁶ In contrast, those that favor decreased immigration from Eastern Europe are slightly more preoccupied with unemployment, than those who prefer decreased levels from North Africa. The converse is true for considerations of race relations (see Table 4.5).

Table 4.5: Percentage of MEPs who Prefer Decreased Levels of Immigrants from Eastern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa by Linkage of Problems to Race Relations or Unemployment*

	Race	Unemployment
Decrease Immigration from:		
Eastern Europe	14%	21%
Turkey	20%	12%
North Africa	25%	13%

*Figures exclude those who link immigration to other problem areas and therefore do not equal 100%.

MEPs who are concerned with unemployment are most likely to seek a reduction of migrants

⁴⁶Only 12% of those who linked immigration to racial relations claimed that immigrants from Eastern Europe should be decreased. This is based on those who claimed that when they think of immigration problems, they relate them to race relations first in the survey questionnaire.

from Eastern Europe. One Socialist MEP, for example, described the gravity of East European influxes:

The fear of immigration from Eastern countries, even though it is very low, can virtually be explosive because it is different from immigration in Europe---which is from North Africa. People from Eastern Europe unlike North Africa will compete for normal jobs with the Europeans....There should be less in terms of racial problems because its more or less the same. But there is more competitiveness in the market. So economically it's worse immigration from the East. In terms of integration, or religion, ethnic groups, it's much easier.⁴⁷

In contrast, the more one is concerned with race, the more likely he/she wishes to see a reduction in migrants from the Third World.

MEPs make various migrant group distinctions based on culture, religion, race and professional status. These distinctions may vary with the individual issues that concern MEPs (e.g., unemployment, race). On a more general level, they clarify why MEPs' perceive immigration problems have worsened over time. A Danish Socialist emphasized distinctions of culture and religion:

Sixty years ago, we had a lot of people from Poland who were coming and working in the agriculture, and there was no problem. Also, they had a different religion . . . And it was not a problem. We had a good relationship with all kinds of people from Poland, but now we have people from Turkey [in Denmark], and you have very big trouble.⁴⁸

According to one British MEP, explaining the growing magnitude of the problem:

The political issue in Europe is obvious. It's the collapse of Communism and the imminence of the single market or the honeypot effect which is producing movements of population which is past the critical threshold. And the critical threshold is when they become noticeable. And they become noticeable because very large numbers of people of different religions, skin colors, language and all the rest all suddenly live in your town. And that produces a political effect that you get parties coming up who say, throw them all out. We have got too many

⁴⁷Interview no. 515 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 1.

⁴⁸Interview no. 15 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 15.

already.⁴⁹

Not only have numbers and concentrations changed over time, but so too have the content of migration and sources of immigrants, and these factors contribute to the sentiment that immigration problems have worsened.

Both the interviews and questionnaires confirmed the public opinion data regarding the effect of immigrant numbers. However, the relationship between size of immigrant group and rejection of foreigners is complex. On the one hand, as the Eurobarometer study suggested, there is a pattern of negative attitudes toward immigrants which rises according to the size of immigrant population (particularly the size of the non-EU immigrant group).⁵⁰ This also follows accounts of electoral behavior; extreme-right parties such as the French Front National tend to do best in areas of high immigrant concentration. Chapter Five explores this relationship in depth.

On the other hand, as the Eurobarometer Report reported, relationships between the number of immigrants and attitude only appear on national averages (correlation rate = .82) not in individual answers.⁵¹ The relationship between immigrant numbers and rejection of foreigners does not indicate that people with more exposure to, and familiarity with immigrants are less favorable to them. In fact, at an individual level, the Eurobarometer study found that people who live in neighborhoods or work within contexts where there is a wider range of different people are neither more nor less inclined than the rest of the population to have a hostile

⁴⁹Interview no. 134 (London, 22 May 1992), p. 8.

⁵⁰This is based on the correlation between "% of answers stating 'too many' others" (in terms of nationality, race, religion, culture and social class) and "percent of non-EEC nationals in relation to population of country (N=12); Eurobarometer 30, p. 45.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 64.

attitude to other people.⁵² The report suggested that attitudes may be more symbolic and subjective than concrete and objective.⁵³ Schnapper argues that, "it is less the objective difficulties of integrating migrants--even if they do exist" which explain the passion of the European debates on immigrants than the crisis of the nation-state itself.⁵⁴ Chapter Eight analyzes in depth the role of the nation-state in a changing Europe.

Our MEP sample also revealed that numbers do not consistently explain attitudes towards immigration. This is a group of abstract and global thinkers, who frequently consider immigration outside of their own personal exposure. One Greek MEP who acknowledged that Greece was "relatively free" of foreigners identified with the problems of having too many immigrants:

I do agree that the number of immigrants in Europe is quite high, and with rising unemployment, we cannot afford the luxury of receiving many more.⁵⁵

Such statements from a spokesman of a country relatively inexperienced with large masses of immigrants, like the mass findings, may mean that in the EU, and on matters of immigration, there is a great deal of international learning that is taking place across EU frontiers.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Eurobarometer 30, p. 64.

⁵⁴Dominique Schnapper, "The Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National Identity," West European Politics, Vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 138.

⁵⁵Interview no. 468 (Strasbourg, 15 May 1992), p. 3.

C. Policy Preferences

"Immigration" has become an all-inclusive catch-word. It refers to a type of policy. Immigration also alludes to a movement or an influx of peoples migrating from one place to another. In one breath, its common usage stretches from a socio-cultural and demographic phenomenon to a legal and techno-bureaucratic policy order. References to the "immigration issue" are also complicated by the fact that the debate focuses on a composite of several policy issues, including regulation of flows and integration strategies. This section explores MEP preferences towards immigration and immigrant policy.

Table 4.6: MEP Views on Policy Preferences*

1. There should be a common immigration policy for EU...			
agree strongly	agree	disagree	disagree strongly
56%	34%	7%	2%
2. European integration should be....			
speeded up	continued at present speed	slowed down	
70%	22%	9%	
3. Who should regulate immigration....			
national governments acting independently			21%
national governments with prior EU consultation			6%
EU institutions with national veto			32%
EU institutions entirely			41%
4. How should immigration be regulated...			
keeping border controls between EU countries intact			5%
after-entry border controls			19%
strengthening borders between EU and non-EU countries			56%
5. On what basis should immigration be regulated....			
number quotas	geographic quotas	race and ethnic quotas	
24%	16%	2%	
professional skill quotas			it should not be regulated
18%			16%
6. Largest obstacle for Schengen Group is...			
possible inclusion of certain EU countries			13%
exclusion of certain EU countries			24%
its computer data service			12%
third national status issues			19%
lack of democratic control			6%
other			9%
7. Which consideration should come first for policy-making....			
humanitarian concerns		economic concerns	social integration
30%		10%	31%
demographic concerns		problems of emigrant countries	
6%		14%	
8. What should be first concern of immigration policymakers...			
integration of foreigners in EU			37%
limitation of further entry			7%
assistance for repatriation			5%
economic and educational assistance to sending countries			41%
9. Immigrant rights should be....			
extended		left as is	restricted
77%		19%	4%

*Note: Percentages do not equal 100% due to missing responses.

There is considerable consensus in the EP on vague and idealistic policy goals, such as European integration and common immigration. However, this consensus dissipates on the particulars. MEPs vary with regard to their policy preferences. Thus, for example, while 70 percent of MEPs wish to speed up integration efforts, each party has different motivations for and conceptions of a united Europe (For this and much of following discussion, see Table 4.6, above).⁵⁶ Members of the mainstream right tend to focus on a united Europe based on charity. MEPs from parties of the left talk about a common Europe of solidarity. One French Socialist makes the distinction between his party's philosophy and that of the other major party in the EP:

The general philosophy of the PPE is a philosophy based on charity, which inspires the Christian Movement. It is not the same [as Socialist movement]. [For the Socialists] solidarity makes the other our equal not the assisted...it is not quite the same.⁵⁷

As Harris points out, the extreme-right groups were among the first to espouse a greater Europe, and this was based on the vision of a "new form of white hegemony."⁵⁸ According to one French MEP from the extreme-right DR Group, the EU is desirable if it strictly restricts itself to European products and people:

...They will build a wide area, but generally the area will be open to anybody to immigration from outside, and not only to the persons, and products of Europe, and we oppose this evolution. You must have European preferences among consumers for products, agricultural products from Europe.⁵⁹

Each party group's conception of Europe varies in emphasis, and this affects how immigration

⁵⁶Geoffrey Pridham and Pippa Pridham, Transnational Party Co-operation and European Integration (London, England: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 11.

⁵⁷Interview no. 310 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p. 2.

⁵⁸Geoffrey Harris, "European Integration and the Challenge of the Extreme Right," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, The Washington Hilton, September 2-5, 1993), 8.

⁵⁹Interview no. 272 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 6.

policy is substantively conceived.

This ambivalence is replicated in attitudes towards a common immigration policy. As global and pan-European thinkers, it is not surprising that MEPs overwhelmingly favor a common immigration policy for EU members (90%). 56 percent agree and 34 percent agree strongly on this goal. Nevertheless, when it comes to regulation there are some nuances. 41 percent of MEPs believe that regulation of immigration should be entirely by EU institutions while 59 percent think that national governments should have some role. Of the latter, approximately 30 percent believe that EU institutions with member governments retaining the right to veto would be appropriate; 20 percent preferred national governments through prior consultation with other EU governments; and six percent deferred responsibility to national governments acting independently. These sentiments roughly correspond to those held by European publics. The Eurobarometer survey reported that one European in three would like to see the adoption of Community-wide legislation; a little under a third prefers national decisions after consultation between EU member governments; and one in five is in favor of unilateral decisions taken by individual member-states.⁶⁰

These mixed portraits of attitudes confirm what one Greek PPE Member described:

Both of these groups [Socialist Group and European People's Party] consider it necessary and also imperative for the Community to formulate its common immigration policy. Now, how this common immigration policy could be formulated nobody knows exactly.⁶¹

Interesting discrepancies emerged as MEPs assigned different meanings and approaches to immigration and integration.

Although MEPs unanimously favor a common immigration policy, they diverge on

⁶⁰Eurobarometer, p. 84.

⁶¹Interview no. 468 (Strasbourg, 15 May 1992), p. 1.

principles of implementation. A significant number (56%) of MEPs thought that immigration regulation should be kept by strengthening EU and non-EU borders. However, 19 percent thought that this could be achieved through after-entry border controls and 18 percent thought otherwise.⁶² The data also showed significant attitude differences regarding principles of regulation.

MEPs were vague and divided on other technical matters of immigration policy. They did not uniformly identify the largest obstacles facing the Schengen Group. Two significant findings emerged from this question. A remarkable proportion (over 10%) of respondents felt strongly enough to go beyond the "closed" question and to offer spontaneous elaborations to their criticisms. Equally striking was the amount (16%) of blank answers. This may best be explained by the finding (clarified during the interviews) that many MEPs were not familiar with Schengen at all. The Schengen Group which sits outside EU auspices and public supervision (see Chapter Three), is representative of the secretive and nonpublic administrative culture of immigration decision-making.⁶³ Formal debate in a public forum is relatively new, and this accounts for little familiarity with the substantive issues and developments at both the mass and elite level.

When it comes to policy or issue resolution, MEPs do not have well-formulated ideas, but rather vague notions. This may be a reflection of the historical nature of the politically diffuse immigration issue in a Europe where such interests have been largely defined by bureaucracies and civil servants. Issue resolution in this domain may be replicated at the transnational decision-making level. The trend towards this type of behind-closed-doors

⁶²This is based on survey question, "How do you think immigration should be primarily ensured in the European Community?"

⁶³See Gary Freeman, Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience, 1945-1975 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979).

administrative policymaking is represented by the numerous extra-parliamentary and intergovernmental bodies that are currently involved in EU immigration policy. The Schengen Group and other such non-public bodies discussed in Chapter Three, exert a great deal of influence over the European Commission and individual governments, at the expense of public awareness and publicly-elected officials such as MEPs. That MEPs are largely unaware of the Schengen Group or its challenges is therefore not surprising.

Efforts discussed earlier, to consolidate EP power over the last few years have included more EP activity on this front. Various initiatives in the areas of immigration and racism have been undertaken by the European Parliament. In 1989, EP President Enrique Baron Crespo accepted a proposal by 147 Members for the establishment of a new Committee of Inquiry to assess the situation of minorities, migrants, and citizens in the member-states.⁶⁴ In 1992, the Report made 77 recommendations. The EP also created in 1992, a new standing Committee on Citizen Rights and Public Affairs in order to focus more regularly on such issues.

The nature of immigration decision-making may account for the lack of fully developed ideas regarding strategies. However, the institutional position of the European Parliament may compensate for this by adding a socially-biased interest. The EP in a power struggle between the Commission and the Council has symbolically found its niche as the institutional alter ego. This means that as the only directly-elected body accountable to the peoples of Europe, promoting a "social Europe" which constitutes a "closer union of peoples" is the particular responsibility of the EP institution. MEPs are primarily guided by social concerns in policy-conceptualization. One Dutch Christian Democrat exemplified this institutional bias:

You know, we have a certain tradition as European Parliamentarians in the field of human rights. We are very active on that point and I think that it must be

⁶⁴Harris, p. 169.

reflected in our point of view.⁶⁵

The role of the European Parliament in the institutional building process affects MEP attitudes, often by encouraging some type of common (most commonly, a social) position.

This study confirmed that there is a predilection toward some type of social thinking in the EP. Thirty-one percent of MEPs claimed that social integration concerns should be the first consideration for immigration policy. Nearly thirty percent named humanitarian concerns. More MEPs thought about the problems of emigrant countries (14%) than economic concerns (10%).

Regardless of proposed solutions and rationales, most MEPs consider social aspects of immigration policy. This is the basis of their shared beliefs that future immigration to Europe is not a positive societal phenomenon. There is a general conviction among MEPs that immigration to Europe should be curtailed and that people would be better to stay in their homelands. For many MEPs this is inextricably tied to a belief that social conditions domestically and globally need to be improved. One MEP made the analogy:

This is not a solution to say let the doors open. Like there is no solution if I have a bed and you have a family with 20 persons and you have no bed. To share with you means that you should come with 20 persons and sleep in my bed with me. Nobody is going to sleep. We need to think about giving you the money to buy 20 beds. I want controlled immigration.⁶⁶

MEPs are in consensus on such views. One German Socialist conceded:

It would be better to help to develop conditions in the countries of the Third World so that people would not have the wish to go out of their country. I suppose this is a position we [MEPs] could have some 85% agreement.⁶⁷

Consensus is mentioned in the same context by another Socialist from the French delegation:

We the Socialists consider that immigration needs to be controlled. Here there

⁶⁵Interview no. 12 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), p. 5.

⁶⁶Interview no. 165 (Brussels, 7 May 1992), p. 11-12.

⁶⁷Ibid., 4.

is a consensus of all French political community.⁶⁸

Thus, the social logic which preoccupy MEPs leads to widespread conclusions that immigration is a negative phenomenon.

Social concerns and convictions that immigration has to be curtailed has contributed to the recent debate which involves the construction of policies that would limit the "pull" by creating obstacles to migration. These obstacles include tighter border controls, increased visa requirements, employer sanctions, greater use of deportations, redefining the criteria for asylum, accelerated procedures and coordination of national policies.⁶⁹ MEPs differ with regard to these strategies. However, they show more consensus regarding the goal of reducing the "push" factors: advocating assistance to countries of migrant origin. According to one French Socialist:

The developed countries have to devote a lot of means--not to give away money because experience has shown that it was not sufficient, but to bring a 'savoir faire' -- to teach people on the spot how to work, so that they could produce, create richness and allow their country to develop.⁷⁰

A Greek Socialist elaborated:

...We can not provide them with jobs and security. At the same time, we destroy these countries that the people migrate from. Immigrants are usually the young people, the strong people. They can work for their [country] good, and... If you take this dynamic away from these countries, you throw these countries into poverty for many decades.⁷¹

Although these strategies appear ideal, they stress the inevitability of migratory pressure, and are

⁶⁸Interview no. 310 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p. 10.

⁶⁹See Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin Schain, "The Politics of Immigration: Introduction," West European Politics, Vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 7.

⁷⁰Interview no. 312 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 6.

⁷¹Interview no. 509 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), p. 6.

consistent with MEPs pragmatic understanding of immigration dynamics in the long-term.⁷²

MEPs tend to consider the long-term dynamic of immigration rather than the "here and now." Views on more specific policy options tend to concentrate on more future and process-orientated resolutions. Forty-one percent of MEPs subscribed to the belief that immigration policymakers should put first priority on economic and educational assistance to countries who are sending immigrants; 37 percent of Members preferred to concentrate on the integration of foreigners and their families who have been in an EU country. In contrast, MEPs were less likely to be motivated by the more imminent and short-term remedies. Only seven percent thought that immigration policy-makers should first consider limiting further entry of foreigners, and five percent mentioned repatriation.

MEPs in rhetoric, are in conformity with international strategies promoted by the OECD and other European initiatives which look to foreign trade and investment to narrow the gap between the developed and developing countries.⁷³ Such strategies include aid and trade programs to boost the incomes of developing countries. This reflects the thinking that President of the Commission Delors underscored, when he called for "political measures corresponding to another essential common interest: that of assisting countries lagging behind." The underlying rationale is that the longer-run interests of the more developed countries would also be served as they gain the opportunity to expand their trade and further strengthen their economies.⁷⁴

Nevertheless, as Baldwin-Edwards and Schain note, the obstacles here lie in its cost, and the need for the industrialized world to address the structural nature of poverty---goals which

⁷²Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, p. 8; See also W.R. Bohning, "Integration and Immigration Pressures in Western Europe," International Labour Review, 130/4 (1991).

⁷³"In Europe, Immigrants are Needed," The New York Times (5 August 1990).

⁷⁴Jacques Delors, "Europe's Ambitions," Foreign Policy, No. 80 (Fall 1990), p. 22.

have little appeal to mainstream party politics.⁷⁵ One Italian Socialist summarizes the problems of such proposals:

The only solution is to help countries from where people come to develop to stop immigration. But the question is, would Europeans make part of their salary available to help these countries develop?⁷⁶

Moreover, the most labor-intensive industries such as textiles, metal manufacturing, engineering, and food processing for example, have been ones that developed countries have continued to protect. The irony is that these industries continue to produce in developed countries mostly because they employ cheap immigrant labor.⁷⁷ Without a direct constituency, MEPs may be partaking in a debate that is more common within international organizations such as the International Labour Organisation and the European Commission than national politicians.

Unlike traditional nationally-elected public officials, MEPs may afford the luxury to think in the more abstract long-term. They do not have a direct constituency and thus, less accountability. Views on topics such as voting and other civic rights are other interesting cases in point.

MEP attitudes towards immigrant rights deviated from that of European public opinion. European publics are more reserved about immigrant rights than our elite sample. The mass sample portrayed split views on what should be done about the rights of immigrants: 30 percent claimed that they should be extended; 39 percent said that they should leave things as they are;

⁷⁵Baldwin-Edwards and Schain.

⁷⁶Interview no. 515, (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 4.

⁷⁷Gallya Lahav, "Immigration, Hypernationalism, and European Security." J. Philip Rogers (ed.), The Future of European Security: The Future of European Security (New York and London: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 80.

and 18% suggested that immigrant rights should be restricted.⁷⁸

There is a substantial consensus among elites regarding the status of immigrant rights. In contrast to public opinion, 74 percent of MEPs wished to see the rights of immigrants extended. Only four percent of MEPs preferred immigrants' rights reduced, and 19 percent thought that the rights of immigrants were fine the way they were. This prevalent attitude is noteworthy, since it is counterintuitive to the fact, mentioned earlier, that no politician in Europe has been able to mobilize votes by being favorable to immigrants. Lack of direct constituency and accountability may account for the failure of MEPs to correspond to the views of their masses.

MEPs are not unaware of public opinion, however. When asked about voting and other civic rights, MEPs were sure to underline the differences between their personal thoughts and those they contend the public wanted to hear. One French Socialist talked about this difference:

You are not asking me how I am going to win votes, you are asking me what I think; its not the same thing---it is true that often there is a real-politik and we, the Socialists say: here is what we like. But there is public opinion. There are two things. First, to know which are our beliefs, and after if we are ready to delay some things due to the fact that it is not the right time.⁷⁹

More specifically:

I believe an immigrant who has come here and works, etc. should have all the rights of the citizen, he must vote. But as you can see, we could not give him the right to vote, we could not go that far because we know the public opinion...⁸⁰

In thinking about immigrant policy, public opinion counts.

Elites seem to be more favorable than the public to immigrant rights, but in qualified

⁷⁸Based on the question, "Still talking of these people [immigrants], do you think that we should...?", *Eurobarometer 30*, p. 75.

⁷⁹Interview no. 310 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), 3.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 15.

terms. As the interviews clarified, MEPs are ambivalent about voting rights for immigrants; this includes those who claim to be favorable. They differentiate between local and national enfranchisements. They do not extend voting rights beyond the local level. One Italian Socialist stated:

Well, we are in favor of voting for immigrants in local election. Personally, I think from a conceptual point of view, it's right to consider them equal the same; local and national. But I think from a political point of view...it is better to introduce the first step and then to make the second step.⁸¹

As one Spanish MEP underscored, Socialists believe that they are the natural party to support immigrant rights: "We would, as Socialists be much more open to the voting rights of immigrants, naturally as Socialists."⁸² Many Socialists however, gave a rather mixed portrait of their sensibilities. According to one Italian Socialist MEP:

That's a really difficult question, voting rights...I think you do not have to be just a foreign worker to have the right to vote. You have to be something else. I don't know what. Absolutely not a brother for blood reasons, but you have to be something more than a foreigner who works on national territory.⁸³

Another Socialist from Belgium said:

I remember that in my own country, Belgium during that movement [the growth of the left], there was no problem to say we have to give the voting right to all the people who are really legally established in our country. And now you see that after some years later they say, 'Oh no, we have not to go too fast'.⁸⁴

Even those MEPs who support voting rights for immigrants, have very narrow priorities.

Chapter Six looks more closely at party differences.

⁸¹Interview no. 351 (Strasbourg, 15 May 1992), 6.

⁸²Interview no. 387 (Strasbourg, 14 May 1992), p. 1.

⁸³Interview no. 395 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p. 5.

⁸⁴Interview no. 230 (Strasbourg, 9 June 1992), p. 2.

D. Nature of country/party debates

This section probes the independent variables of the analysis, or sources that affect MEP thinking on immigration. Attitudes are surveyed in two ways: directly by asking MEPs about their thoughts; and indirectly by inference.

Table 4.7: MEP Views on Country and Party Debates*

1. In your country, public debate over immigration has been...	very divisive 32	somewhat divisive 51 %	not divisive 17%
2. In the EP, party group differences on immigration are...	very clear 37%	somewhat clear 48 %	not clear 13%
3. The immigration debate in your party group has been....	very divisive 7%	somewhat divisive 38 %	not divisive 49%
4. In your country, left-right differences on most issues are...	very different 41%	somewhat different 49 %	not different 6 %
5. For you, left-right differences on most issues are...	very different 44%	somewhat different 39 %	not different 6%
6. In your country, left-right differences on immigration are...	very different 43%	somewhat different 43 %	not different 10%
7. For you, left-right differences on immigration are...	very different 43%	somewhat different 37 %	not different 10%
8. Historical/cultural differences between EU nations on most issues are..	very important 33%	somewhat important 59 %	not important 7%
9. Historical/cultural differences between EU nations on immigration are..	very important 38%	somewhat important 51 %	not important 9%
10. Factors that shape immigration thinking.....		great importance	no importance
a. ideology		47%	33%
b. national and cultural values		56%	24%
c. personal experiences		50%	27%
d. economic concerns		25%	50%
e. intermarriage concerns		11%	66%

*Note: Percentages do not equal 100% due to missing responses.

MEPs provide a mixed account of sources that influence their thinking. The data point to some degree of party group cohesion on the one hand, mitigated by national groupings on the other (For this and much of the following discussion, see Table 4.7, above). The clearest account of party based cohesion emerged in questions tapping inter-party and intra-party group (tantamount to country) differences. These findings indicated that according to MEPs, both party and country are bases of coalescence in the immigration debate. An overwhelming majority (85%) of MEPs said that party group differences in the immigration debate were somewhat or very clear, suggesting that there were cohesive divisions between parties.⁸⁵ These trends in the European Parliament reinforce those found in the U.S. Congress. According to Serra et al., the degree of partisan conflict in the congressional chamber (i.e., party policy polarization) is likely to affect the degree of party policy cohesion.⁸⁶ Brady, Cooper and Hurley have argued that the greater the difference between parties, the greater the level of policy cohesion within parties.⁸⁷

If MEPs perceive clear party group differences in the European Parliament on the immigration issue, they also report party cohesion within their groups. A large plurality of MEPs (49%) claim that the immigration debate in their party group has not been divisive. However, not all party groups in the European Parliament are equally cohesive. This is reflected in the ambivalent responses to survey question, "How divisive has the debate been in your party group over the immigration issue?" Forty-five percent of MEPs said that the immigration debate in

⁸⁵This is based on the survey question, "In your opinion, how clear are party group differences in the European Parliament on the immigration issue?"

⁸⁶George Serra, Neil Pinney, Albert Cover, and Jim Twombly, "The Changing Shape of Congressional Parties: Ideological Policy Cohesion and Polarization in the U.S. Congress, 1953-1990," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., September 2-5, 1993), p. 10.

⁸⁷David Brady, Joseph Cooper, and Patricia Hurley, "The Decline of Party in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1887-1968," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 4 (1979), pp. 528-543.

their party group was somewhat or very divisive. MEPs are more divided on the issue of internal (intra-) party cohesion than party group (inter-) polarizations.

The discrepancies among MEPs' perceptions of internal party group cohesion may be explained in two ways. First, as Chapter Two noted, party group cohesion in the European Parliament varies from party group to party group. The Socialist Group for example, has long been considered to be most cohesive. In contrast, the Liberal Group has been regarded least cohesive.⁸⁸ Chapter Six explores these differences in depth.

Second, MEP references to internal party group divisions may suggest that national alliances within loose party configurations have a role in shaping perceptions. In fact, 89 percent of MEPs see country differences as somewhat or very important. As discussed earlier, attitudes towards immigration appears somewhat related to the size of the foreign non-EU population in a country. According to the Eurobarometer Report, the public debate about their presence tends to get more heated when immigration is perceived as an important issue in a general social context.⁸⁹

Each country's migration experiences, historical obligations to ex-colonies, and priorities for immigration policy may have bearing on MEP attitudes. A Dutch PPE Member described his country's experience and priorities for immigration policy:

We have always had the tradition in Holland to take people from other countries who have been persecuted. For example, when I look at history, we took all the Jews who were persecuted in Spain, we took all the Hungarians who were I think

⁸⁸See Glenda Zellentin, "Forms and Function of the Opposition in the European Communities," Government and Opposition, vol. 2, no. 3 (April-July 1967); John Fitzmaurice, The Party Groups in the European Parliament (Hants, England and Lexington, Massachusetts: Saxon House and Lexington Books, D.C Heath Ltd., 1975); Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham, Transnational Party Co-operation and European Integration (London, England: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1981); Stanley Henig (ed.), Political Parties in the European Community (London, England: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1979).

⁸⁹Eurobarometer 30, p. 69.

in the 17th or 18th century persecuted; always where there were people persecuted for their belief, religion, something like that. We had a rather generous policy of taking people and this is I think a general line of our policy until now. Now, we have to do with making policy in the European framework, and what you of course want is that our policy is continued.⁹⁰

In contrast, a PPE Member from Ireland, a traditional emigration country claimed:

It's [immigration] not an issue in our country. I suppose it's not a strong issue! With high unemployment it is not attractive for people, so therefore they wouldn't be coming to Ireland in search of better standards of living and also the fact, I suppose, we're so far here in Europe. We're not as close to Third World countries.⁹¹

The overall results regarding the lines of division and cohesion among parties hid considerable disparities between the different countries and parties. These differences are further examined in the following chapters.

National ties and party affiliations are not the only source of cues for a "sophisticated" elite. MEPs may orient themselves in terms of a broad ideological family. In most nations, partisanship and ideological orientations exist side by side and tend to have reinforcing effects.⁹² As will be seen in Chapter Six, the data in this study revealed that knowing an MEPs party can be quite informative of where he/she stands ideologically and vice-versa (see Table 6.3). Given that finding, it is expected that this project's elite sample would identify similar differences between left and right ideological positions to those they identified among party groups.

MEPs were asked to comment on their perception of left-right differences. MEPs feel that left-right differences have more relevance for the masses than for themselves. This is the case not only for immigration, but for most issues in general. On most issues, MEPs perceive

⁹⁰Interview no. 12 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), pp. 1-2.

⁹¹Interview no. 39 (Strasbourg, 12 June 1992), p.1.

⁹²Russell Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc, 1988), p. 30.

left and right greater for their country/masses (90%) than for themselves (83%). This figure declines (80%) when MEPs are asked how they personally conceive left-right differences regarding immigration. Similarly, MEPs feel left-right differences are less prominent for the masses when it comes to immigration in particular (86%).

The data present three interesting trends. First, while MEPs distinguish between the masses and the elites regarding the role of the left-right ideological construct, differences are negligible. MEPs do not necessarily concur with Converse's classic argument that elites are considerably ahead of the masses when it comes to ideological sophistication.⁹³ Second, elites do make distinctions (albeit limited) from the general to policy-specific regarding the role of ideology. The ideological variable is less obvious for MEPs *vis-à-vis* immigration, than the more general issues.

Another discrepancy emerged from the data relating to these attitudinal sources. There are substantial differences between what MEPs directly say about the "left-right" construct and what is indirectly observed. MEPs tend to devalue the role of traditional ideological/party sources in structuring political attitudes, particularly those pertaining to immigration. Like many scholars, they tend to see these sources as outdated (see Chapter Six). This German MEP account was expressed by many others from diverse parties and countries:

I would say the extreme left and the far right are fairly on the same line. You know I think that the distinction between the left-right in general is scurrilous.⁹⁴

As the preceding chapters show, although MEPs do not necessarily think that the left-right construct is relevant, it does have a residual impact on ordering MEP preferences.

Ideological orientations however, do affect MEP attitudes towards immigration. Country-

⁹³Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," ed. David Apter *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

⁹⁴Interview no. 63 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p. 2.

specific experiences are also significant factors in shaping thinking. Not only does ideology decline in importance for MEPs from general issues to immigration ones, this ordering is also applicable to country variables. According to the respondents, historical and cultural differences between EU nations are most important in thinking about issues in general (92%). The rate of importance declines slightly when asked about national values in immigration thinking (89%). Cultural variables were ranked by most MEPs as having great importance in shaping their attitudes toward the immigration issue (56%). Personal experience seems to be a motivating factor for 50 percent of MEPs, followed by ideology (47%).

MEPs are guided by many sources including personal experiences, party affiliations, ideological convictions, country and cultural experiences, institutional considerations and visions of Europe. These factors, as emerged during the interviews, were most prevalent in shaping views towards immigration. The explanatory chapters will attempt to examine each variable separately in order to understand them as sources of immigration thinking. However, as one German MEP noted, these variables are often very complicated:

You know the film, *Casablanca*? When they ask Humphrey Bogart, "How do you feel? Do you feel as an American or a Moroccan? He says, I'm a drinker. I mean what shapes my thinking---I tell you: I am not willing to put the simple label on myself."⁹⁵

⁹⁵Interview no. 172 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 13.

III. Conclusion

MEPs at large believe that the immigration issue is very important, that problems are greater today than in the past, and that there should be some type of controlled immigration. They differ on principles of regulation. Members also have different rationales for controlled immigration. Some focus on the "brain-drain" and "greater good" issue for emigrant countries; others emphasize unemployment at home. MEPs differ with regard to preferences for immigrant groups; for institutional authority over immigration regulation; and for types of control system.

MEPs agree on abstract policy goals. An overwhelming majority feel that there should be some type of common immigration policy. Also, in contrast to the public, they agree that immigrant rights should be extended. Nevertheless, they diverge on the more substantive issue-matter. The interviews showed for example, more divergence regarding qualifications of such rights. MEPs may agree on abstract policy goals, but diverge on the more substantive issue-matter.

The data here also underlined the discrepancy in immigration thinking between what is desirable and what is feasible. MEPs are clearly preoccupied with the latter. In the struggle between what is desirable and what is feasible, these European elites tend to be on the side of pragmatism. In fact, a pessimistic outlook prevails in the EP, and this appears to be a product of assessment of feasible immigration control. Pragmatic considerations may mitigate MEP issue attitudes. The findings also reveal that terminology may account for differences in assessments.

According to MEPs, several factors affect their thinking. Priorities which individual MEPs set themselves for work in the European Parliament and where their loyalties lie include:⁹⁶

⁹⁶See Pridham and Pridham, p. 95.

- national interests
- ideological streams
- respective governments
- national party attitudes and policy in the European context
- regional interest
- sectional interest
- institutional interest

The surveys and interviews revealed that MEPs believe that there are important ideological, party, and cultural differences in the European Parliament regarding attitudes towards immigration. They also suggest that these elites consider ideology and country-related experiences to be major factors in shaping their own thinking. The following chapters explore in depth how these variables affect MEP attitudes towards immigration.

Chapter Five: Analysis by Country

I. Introduction

According to Robert Dahl, the history of a country is analogous to the past of an individual. Behavior at any given moment is a product of interplay between the present situation and what has already been learned from responses to earlier situations. Thus, "In an individual, the sum total of these learned orientations is his personality; in a nation or a country, it's culture."¹ Nation-state differences in immigration politics that emanate from cultural and historical traditions necessarily help explain the nature of divergent thinking in the European Parliament. This chapter attempts to explain these variations by looking at general cultural variables, and specific immigration contexts.

Present responses to immigration tend to be related to past experiences with immigration; both are embedded in political culture. Culture, however, has been used as a residual category, one whose contents are unique to the governing of nations and virtually inexplicable except by vague references to the importance of history.² This has been true of many discussions of national political traditions or national political cultures, whether at the mass level or among elites. This study attempts to capture the country-specific characteristics that create cultural circumstances which differentiate elite attitudes towards immigration. It focuses on immigrant figures, public opinion, and national levels of socioeconomic development as major components of country factors that are associated to thinking about immigration.

¹Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 352.

²Putnam, (1973), p. 149.

A. Nation-States

Immigration policy typifies issues caught between national and supranational domains. On the one hand, defining citizenship and deciding who should enter a country are a state's prime tasks, symbolizing national sovereignty and control. On the other hand, the nature of immigration and the changing boundaries generated by European integration have inherently brought immigration policy under transnational regulation.

As the European Union attempts to integrate, the traditional approach to immigration policy making has been challenged and the new focus is on finding a common immigration policy that represents the national interests of all twelve members. The challenge for the EU is about harmonizing national trends that are rooted in idiosyncratic experiences. Chapter Three provided brief profiles of the different country dynamics and trends which are ultimately subject to conformity. It underlined the complexity of the immigration issue as it confronts European policy-makers who are attempting to harmonize national trends.

National policy-making patterns and practices among institutions have been rooted in cultural values and self-images. Beliefs, values and symbols have weighed heavily on immigration policy-makers. As Miller and Mitchell noted, for historical reasons, the Swiss have not viewed policies towards aliens as a litmus test for their democratic values in the same manner as the Germans.³ Similarly, the ideals of the French Revolution have played a role in formulating citizenship rights that has not been replicated in Germany or the United Kingdom. These principles and policy-making styles have determined state action towards immigration as

³Mark Miller and Christopher Mitchell, "Comparing Policy-Making Patterns Towards Migration in Industrial Democracies: Western Europe and the United States," (Paper presented at the Seminar on Migration, the State, and International Relations, New York University, February 26, 1993), 48.

well as other issue-areas.

Historical experiences socialize masses and elites, and condition political responses. According to Lucian Pye, "political culture is shaped on the one hand, by the general historical experiences of the society or system, and on the other hand, by the general historical private and personal experiences of individuals as they become members of, first the society and then the polity."⁴ One German Socialist MEP explained:

Differences have to do, first of all, with the different, let me put it this way, national experience. If you look at the Dutch or the French, both countries having been occupied by the Nazi army, they have a different, for historical reasons, a different view on asylum, than for example, the Germans have. That's number one.⁵

Historical experiences include more diffuse political culture traits and immigration-specific experiences.

Cultural and historical differences lead us to examine the nation-state as a source of issue attitudes. Nation-based or cultural theory assumes that each nation's past sets for its current leaders and decision-makers a series of problems which are shaped by values and patterns of beliefs that continue to provide its leaders with a repertoire of familiar responses to political problems.⁶ According to Putnam, the most persistent predictor of a politicians' basic attitudes has been country. He argued that political styles, cognitive orientations and operative ideals reflect the "tug of national traditions."⁷

⁴Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 121.

⁵Interview no. 172 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 1.

⁶Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1976).

⁷Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 239.

Many factors account for national differences in immigration politics. Among these are political systems which are based on different welfare ideologies, and social and political organizations of the societies represented. These include political parties, party systems, civil services, interest groups, public opinion and political cultures. Such variables mean that decision-making has been subject to different pressures. Countries with a single ballot, first-past-the-post electoral system as Britain for example, facilitate a two-party system, and thus structurally hinder, though not eradicate, the number of disparate voices on immigration.⁸ In countries where immigration populations are large and such institutional barriers as proportional representation are absent, nationalist groups directly force mainstream parties to respond to anti-immigration pressure. Electoral systems, with features such as Germany's 5 percent barrier, can also circumscribe radical expression. The absence of institutionalized opposition often coincides with the rise of movements such as the German skinheads.⁹ Clearly, these institutional dynamics set the parameters and a tone for the immigration debate.

Geographic factors also condition historical experiences. Ireland and Denmark share with Britain insular cultural elements and perspectives that emanate from their island positions. Denmark is a geographic and cultural bridge between continental Europe and Scandinavia. As Fitzmaurice points out, no regional or minority problems exists in Denmark, a country with a

⁸Note that despite this, the British National Front has helped force the immigration issue to the surface, particularly in the mid-1970s. See Christopher Husbands, "The Dynamics of Racial Exclusion and Expulsion: Racist Politics in Western Europe," European Journal of Political Research, 16, 6 (1988).

⁹See Gallya Lahav, "Immigration, Hypernationalism and European Security," in The Future of European Security: The Pursuit of Peace in an Era of Revolutionary Change, ed. J. Philip Rogers (New York and London: St. Martin's Press and Macmillan Press, 1992), p. 76.

homogenous population of 5.1 million.¹⁰ One Dutch MEP linked his country's immigration concerns to geographic considerations:

I must say here also as a justification for other countries, we are not lying on an external border, like Germany. There are internal borders within Europe, and our [Dutch] position is probably a bit easier than Germany, Portugal, and Greece.¹¹

Many MEPs argue that the North-South geographic divide produces substantial cultural trends and attitudes. For example, according to one French MEP, "France is peculiar because of the double influence of North and South."¹² A Greek Socialist talked about the different attitudes of Southerners:

The Greeks are different from the British, but they are not too much different to the Italians or the Spaniards or the Portuguese. We are Southerners. There is a difference between the British and the Greeks. The way they speak. The way they move their heads. The way the Greeks they scream, they don't speak, they are loud. So are the Italians, so are the Spaniards. I mean the British they are afraid to express themselves. I mean they are emotionless. They don't show their emotions. We cry. And we kiss. Men kiss each other. We are not homosexuals. We are very sure of ourselves. The British, I don't know, they will think twice . . . He is afraid that they may think that he is homosexual. Of course there are differences. Different attitudes, different.¹³

Another MEP from Germany described how these North-South dynamics work in the European Parliament:

The difference to other national parliaments is here you find more than 5 or 6 cultures. I don't think that there are 12 cultures, but there are more than 5 or 6. If you divide it, you have 2 groups, the South and the North... And then you find that there is a different structure in these big groups. The French are very different to the Germans to manage a process, to find a compromise, to think

¹⁰Denmark is a homogenous country with the exception of the German minority in Slesvig and the North Atlantic territories of Greenland and the Faeros. See John Fitzmaurice, "Denmark," in Political Parties in the European Community, ed. Stanely Henig, (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1979), p. 28.

¹¹Interview no. 12 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), p. 6.

¹²Interview no. 310 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p. 2.

¹³Interview no. 510 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), pp. 9-10.

about a problem, and to find a solution in the way of consensus. The British are British. They are coming from an island, and they have behaviors of islanders. They are more interested in their own way to manage political processes. They try to transfer a lot of ways of behavior here in this parliament...They try to work in this parliament as they do in national parliament in London. They are more aggressive in speaking. So you find this difference, and the same situation is in the South. Italy is different from Spain. The Spanish are much clearer, the Italians try to find a way by working as a snake, and so you have these different cultures, and they are together in one group.¹⁴

The two descriptions above underline the variance in emphasis among two cultural perspectives. The description of a Northerner regarding an Englishman is substantially different from that of the Greek Southerner above.

Colonial experiences also distinguish nation-states from each other as these ties have created country specific immigrant concentrations with different characteristics and experiences. There are differences between post-colonial immigration regimes such as France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal, and countries with no colonial ties. As Chapter Three described, immigration in the European Union is a highly diverse phenomenon in terms of the populations involved, their conditions of access to the host country and legal status there. These dynamics are related to historical experiences such as colonialism. The Eurobarometer study of public opinion in the 12 European countries confirmed this immigrant diversity as well as the imprint of Europe's colonial past.¹⁵ In countries such as France, this heritage becomes relevant not only because of the presence of large numbers of former colonial peoples, but also because a colonial mentality seems to dull enthusiasm towards newcomers. According to B.E. Brown, the heritage of colonialism weighs heavily in countries such as France, where ever since

¹⁴Interview no. 167 (Strasbourg, 14 May 1992), p. 1.

¹⁵Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer 30: Public Opinion in the European Community; Special Issue on Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance (Brussels: Directorate-Generale Information, Communication and Culture, November 1989), p. 66. The report is based on a sample of 11,795 individuals in all twelve member-states of the European Union.

the occupaion of Algiers in 1830, the French tradition of dealing with Islam has been a reluctance to confer citizenship, a reluctance shared by Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian foreigners themselves.¹⁶

There are important differences between countries with a longstanding tradition of emigration and those with considerable immigrant populations on their territories, whose presence is linked to a colonial past. According to the 1989 Report on "Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance" published by the Commission of the European Communities, there is a clear distinction of attitudes between Southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Italy) and Ireland on the one hand, and the other countries of the Community on the other. The Report did not ascribe these differences to the north-south division, as much as to different traditions in terms of history and migration.¹⁷ The data of this study concur. According to a Portuguese MEP:

There is a great difference between Northern countries and Southern countries. Because the Southern countries are countries of emigration. The immigrants come and go from Southern countries. Portugal is a country of emigration. We have at least 4 million Portuguese who emigrated to Europe, Brazil, Canada, the U.S., South Africa. So we are a country of emigration.¹⁸

MEPs believe that attitudes towards immigration are affected by the immigration/emigration experiences of their countries. An Irish MEP justifies:

Well, you see, we of course are an emigration country. So, immigration does not affect us like it does all the other European member-states. I am all in favor of freedom of movement of people.¹⁹

¹⁶Bernard E. Brown, "Old France in a New World," American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 16, no. 5 (October 1994), p. 13.

¹⁷Ibid., p.5.

¹⁸Interview no. 378 (Brussels: 5 May 1992), p. 2.

¹⁹Interview no. 51 (Strasbourg: 11 June 1992), p. 1.

Another MEP from an emigration country explains:

As a country of emigration, we see immigration as a fact, a historical fact, economic fact, a right, a human right. So as we like to be respected in our rights, we must respect the rights of other people.²⁰

A Spanish MEP makes the same distinctions:

We've got different traditions in our countries. Now, if you look at countries like France or Germany, for instance, who are traditionally immigration countries... It's easy for us, from Spain, we are not an immigration country, we are sending immigrants. This makes a very big difference.²¹

Differences in history of immigration-emigration often coincide with the North-South divide, and these country difference affect MEP attitudes towards immigration.

Finally, these experiences have produced very different national immigration infrastructures, which further influence the cultural context of immigration. Baldwin-Edwards identifies four cultural distinct immigration "policy regimes" across the EU.²² These four types of immigration-policy regimes represent national traditional approaches to immigration.

First, there are the semi-peripheral or Mediterranean regions of Europe such as Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland who share in common histories of emigration and poor immigration infrastructure. In general, they have had less developed economies, little provisions for immigrants, and bureaucratic procedures which have often been inefficient and ineffective. This group, particularly Italy, Portugal and Spain have been undergoing rapid modernization. They have become immigrant-import countries, and the latest members to join the Schengen Group.

²⁰Interview no. 378 (Brussels: 5 May 1992), p. 3.

²¹Interview no. 387 (Strasbourg: 14 May 1992), p. 1.

²²Martin Baldwin-Edwards, "Immigration after 1992," Draft of an Unpublished Paper, (University of Manchester, England, 1991), and Policy and Politics, vol. 19, no. 3 (1991): 199-211.

The second group of countries is based on the Schengen or Continental types of immigration infrastructure. This includes Germany, the Benelux countries, and France, but there are fluctuations within this group from the most liberal in its treatment of established immigrants to the most strict such as Germany and the most inconsistent, France. These countries have in common a general tendency to strict immigration control, permitting for example only economically necessary guestworkers or humanitarian-based refugees or families. These categories are usually well defined and controlled.

Third, is the Scandinavian prototype exemplified by the EU's only Scandinavian member (at the time of this research), Denmark. It has a historical tendency to follow a liberal policy with respect to immigration and refugees policy.

The fourth type is represented by the United Kingdom which is considered aberrant because of her shift from liberal policy (particularly with respect to her colonial inheritance) to very strict control and a new definition of citizenship (1981). Geographically, the U.K. is unique as an island country. It has a tradition of reliance on external border controls (i.e., sea and airports). The UK also has a fairly organized control of immigration, resembling the Schengen countries.

With variation in experiences and contexts, MEP attitudes towards immigration vary by country to a degree. The culture of a nation influences the beliefs of politicians and the pattern of politics. National concerns have emerged over particular interests in certain policy areas. Dutch MEPs for example, have been interested in institutional issues, regional policy and transportation, because of the importance for their economy; the Belgians have been particularly interested in social policy and agriculture.²³ Public opinion is also provincial. National loyalties

²³Geoffrey and Pippa Pridham, "Transnational Parties in the European Community I and II," in Stanley Henig (ed.), *Political Parties in the European Community* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1979), pp. 252-253.

are expected of Members of the European Parliament. Eurobarometer reports have shown a consistently high proportion of the EU population who expect MEPs representing their country to "support the interests of (your) country all the time, whether or not they are good for Europe as a whole."²⁴ Like all publicly-elected officials, MEPs must be mindful of constituencies. The country factor is thus an integral component of issue attitudes.

Political culture diffusely shapes different country responses to immigration. Country-specific experiences with immigration may be more pervasive in national attitudes towards immigration. These attitudes may be shaped on the one hand, by general historical experiences of a society, and on the other hand, by specific historical approaches to immigration. The latter may provide a repertoire of behaviors for present leaders.

B. A Country Index for Immigration Attitudes

The differences among nations are vast. In order to go beyond nation-specific labels and to generate a systematic and comparative analysis, the cultural component must be first operationalized. To account for effects of country differences, country names were represented by theoretical concepts.²⁵ The immigrant component creates a cultural context that is specific to immigrant-context experiences, and has been found to generate country patterns of MEP responses. Two measures become particularly relevant: 1) the percent of non-EU foreigners per

²⁴The results are consistent over polls. The most recent figures being for 1983: the U.K. 54%; Italy 44%; France 40%; West Germany 39%. See Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European Community: A Social-Psychological Study in Four Member States (Cambridge, London, New York, Melbourne, Paris: Cambridge University Press and Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1986), p. 35; Eurobarometer numbers 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 21.

²⁵See A. Przeworski and H. Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: Wiley, 1970), p. 29.

total population; and 2) public opinion regarding their presence.

Public opinion is related to the size of foreign populations. Eurobarometer's Report on "Racism and Xenophobia" confirmed this view widely held by European politicians. Opinions expressed about the size of foreign populations in one's own country are closely linked to the presence of non-EEC nationals in those countries (correlation = 0.82) [See Chapter Four].²⁶ Since 1981 French politicians across the political spectrum have begun to identify this "threshold phenomenon." MEPs frequently referred to numbers as well during the interviews:

If you are in a country where there has always been a lot of excessive population of immigration, then you have another view than the people who have not always received immigrants.²⁷

While the percentage and origins of foreign populations residing in EU member-states vary, for the most part, reference to immigration problems focus on non-EU foreigners. Legal formulas derived from the Single European Act regarding movements of people seem to be *de facto* accepted and this is reinforced by the number of MEPs who refused to even comment on their attitudes toward migrants from other EU member-states.²⁸

²⁶Eurobarometer 30, p. 45.

²⁷Interview no. 276 (Brussels: 4 May 1992), p.1.

²⁸See Chapter Four; and survey questions regarding levels of immigration from which areas MEPs prefer, and what levels, from which areas they believe their colleagues prefer.

Table 5.1: Immigrant Numbers and Public Opinion according to Country*

Country	Foreign/ Total Population	Non-EU Foreigners/ Total population	Percent Saying "Too Many" Resident Foreigners
Belgium	9.1% [2]	3.8% [3]	43.5% [3]
Denmark	3.1% [7]	1.8% [6]	36% [4]
France	6.4% [4]	3.9% [2]	45% [2]
Germany ^a	8.2% [3]	5.3% [1]	47% [1]
Greece	.7% [11]	.6% [9]	18.5% [7]
Italy	1.4% [8]	.7% [8]	34.5% [5]
Ireland	N/A	.6% [9]	6.5% [10]
Luxembourg	27.5% [1]	1.0% [7]	30% [6]
Netherlands	4.6% [5]	2.7% [4]	30% [6]
Portugal	.93% [9]	.5% [10]	14% [9]
Spain	.92% [10]	.3% [11]	17% [8]
UK ^b	3.3% [6]	2.2% [5]	45% [2]

*The table lists the OECD's reported number of foreigners per total population for each EU country, the number of non-EU foreigners for each, and public opinion as measured by the percentage stating that there were "too many" resident foreigners, according to the Eurobarometer's survey.

^aWest Germany


^bGreat Britain

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Trends in International Migration: Continuous Reporting System on Migration, (Paris, Sopemi, 1992), recording 1990 figures; "L'Europe multiraciale," Documents Observateur, no 4 January/February 1989 (used by Inglehart, this data reports figures collected between the years 1985 to 1987. See Eurobarometer 30, p. 109); Eurobarometer 30 (Nov 1989), p. 45.

The country rankings confirm that there is a close relationship between immigrant concentrations and public opinion. The case of Luxembourg (which has a predominant foreign EU national presence) underlines the fact that public opinion is more sensitive to concentrations of non-EU residents. A plot of these variables visibly portrays this dynamic:

Figure 5.1: Relationship between the Percent of Non-EU Nationals in the Country and Public Resistance as Expressed in Public Opinion

% of answers stating
"too many" immigrants




Source: Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in The European Community, Report on Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance (Brussels: Directorate-General Information, Communication and Culture, November 1989), p. 45; See also Documents Observateur: L'Europe Multi-Raciale, no. 4 (January/February 1989).

The countries were relegated to these categories based on the data of Figure 5.1 (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2: Three Country Types of Immigration-Context, based on the Relationship between the Percent of Non-EU Nationals in the Country and Degree of Acceptance of Immigrant Size

% of answers stating
"too many" immigrants



Category A includes Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Greece, countries which rank low on both percentage of non-EU nationals in relation to population of country (.6 or under), and rate of negative public attitudes (below 20% stating "too many" immigrants). Category B represents countries with modest non-EU concentrations and moderate mass orientations, and includes the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Italy. They have between 1-3 percent non-EU foreigners residing in their countries and between 30 and 38 percent of those surveyed reporting "too many" foreigners. Finally, category C refers to the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and Germany. They all have in common a relatively high percent of non-EU residents (between 2-6%) and high negative orientation (between 43 - 50% stating "too many").

Italy (category B) and the UK (category C), are anomalous cases; both have lower immigration concentrations than the others in their respective groups. The empirical data shown in Table 5.4 however, confirm their placement in separate categories. To test these distinctions, one can compare the response spreads of MEPs from Italy and Greece two traditional Southern emigration countries (see Table 5.5). There is a substantial difference between response rates of MEPs in these countries regarding "my country has fewer immigration problems and "decrease immigration" (i.e., 24% of Italians compared to 75% of Greeks claimed their "countries had fewer problems"; 23% and 43% respectively, preferred "decreased" immigration). Similarly, the placement of the UK in category C is also affirmed by comparison with the Netherlands of category B. Table 5.4 shows that the spread of MEP responses are quite substantial (54% of British MEPs compared to 69% of the Dutch reported that their "country had fewer problems).

These aberrations may be partially explained by the problems of comparative figures employed in immigration research, discussed in Chapter 3. The Eurobarometer Report noted that

the figures used extenuate the significance of the correlation for the UK and for Italy.²⁹ In the case of the UK, it did not include the many people who originally came from India or Pakistan who now have British nationality. In Italy, the necessary immigration statistics are not always available.

The anomalous cases of the UK and Italy where negative attitudes outpace immigrant figures may be informed by another country-specific factor, the level of socio-economic development. This factor also creates conditions that affect immigration dynamics specifically. Both the UK and Italy share similar levels of socioeconomic development with other countries in their respective groups (See Table 5.2). While the countries of the European Union have generally reached levels of socioeconomic development that are quite advanced, they differ among themselves in ways that make cultural comparisons fruitful. Socioeconomic factors may reinforce, and sometimes even mitigate, the role of immigrant numbers and public opinion.

Although economic factors alone are not decisive, a society's level of economic development is one of the most important sources of cultural variation.³⁰ Putnam found that these figures which he called, "crude statistical indicators" produced cross-national differences between attitudes of Italian and British politicians.³¹ Gross Domestic Product per capita and unemployment rates are reliable measures of national economic performances.

²⁹Eurobarometer 30, p. 45.

³⁰See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribners, 1958); R. Inglehart (1977, 1990); Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," Daedalus 93 (1964) 271-303; Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basis Books, 1977); Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99 (1984), pp. 193-218.

³¹Putnam (1973), p. 252.

Table 5.2: Socio-Economic Development, by County Ranked by GDP*

Country		GDP per capita
Luxembourg	Highly Developed	22,3
Germany ^a		19,2
France		18,7
Denmark		18,5
United Kingdom ^b		18,4
Italy		17,8
Netherlands		17,6
Belgium		17,4
Spain	Less Developed	13,3
Ireland		11,5
Portugal		9,5
Greece		9,4

*Gross Domestic Product at market prices per head (at current prices and purchasing power parities) 1989 (PPS) EC 12 = 17,229.

^aGermany = West Germany

^bUK = Great Britain

Source: Eurostat, Basic Statistics of the Community: 28th edition Comparison with some European Communities, (Brussels: Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1991).

In Table 5.2 above, countries with GDPs above the EU average of 17,229 are considered to be the more highly socio-economically developed in the EU; Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece all have GDP's which fall considerably below the EU average. As Table 5.3 reveals, there is notable congruity between socioeconomic levels of development and the immigrant-context index. Thus, the four countries that rank lowest on GDP are all in category A in Figure 5.2 with regard to immigrant numbers and public opinion. This is logical given the nature of "push-pull" dynamics: immigrants tend to go destinations of opportunity. Public opinion negatively follows this trend. The more highly developed countries of the EU are also (in rough order) those where

both immigrant numbers are high and so too is negative public opinion.

Table 5.3: Immigrant Numbers and Public Opinion in order of Socio-Economic Development

Country	% Total Foreign Population [relative rank]	% Who Think "Too Many" Immigrants [relative rank]	GDP per capita [relative rank]
Luxembourg	27.5% [1]	30% [6]	22,3 [1]
Germany ^a	8.2% [3]	47% [1]	19,2 [2]
France	6.4% [4]	45% [2]	18,7 [3]
Denmark	3.1% [7]	36% [4]	18,5 [4]
United Kingdom ^b	3.3% [6]	45% [2]	18,4 [5]
Italy	1.4% [8]	35% [5]	17,8 [6]
Netherlands	4.6% [5]	30% [6]	17,6 [7]
Belgium	9.1% [2]	44% [3]	17,4 [8]
Spain	.92% [10]	17% [8]	13,3 [9]
Ireland	N/A	7% [10]	11,5 [10]
Portugal	.93% [9]	14% [9]	9,5 [11]
Greece	.7% [11]	19% [7]	9,4 [12]

*Gross Domestic Product at market prices per head (at current prices and purchasing power parities) 1989 (PPS) EC 12 = 17, 229.

^aGermany = West Germany

^bUK = Great Britain

Source: Eurostat, Basic Statistics of the Community: 28th edition Comparison with some European Communities, (Brussels: Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1991).

Immigrant rates are higher in countries which are more highly socio-economically developed. In addition, public opinion not only relates to immigrant numbers, but also to more general economic indicators. Public opinion tends to be more negative in the more developed EU

countries that also have more immigrants than in the less developed ones. The relationship between economics and immigrant numbers are complex. Clearly, however, immigration-contexts are of prime relevance. They represent a set of national characteristics that link certain countries together in their outlooks towards immigration, and affect the views of decision-makers.

In assessing country patterns of attitudes towards immigration, one must consider immigrant figures, public opinion and national levels of socio-economic development. Not only are these major components of country-specific factors that are associated to immigration thinking, but they are factors that appear to coincide with each other. The following section empirically assesses the relationship between country-specific factors, operationalized by the immigration-context index, and MEP attitudes.

II. The Empirical Data

The application of the study's empirical data to the index of country immigration-context aims to assess the relation between the nation-state variable and elite thinking. Analysis focuses on the four dimensions outlined in Chapter Four: A)assessment of the immigration issue; B)preferences of immigrant intake and immigrant groups; C)views on policy and issue resolution; and D)views on the nature of country/party debates.

A. Assessments of the Immigration Issue

Although there is MEP consensus, attitudes about immigration reveal country disparities. For example, while there is a striking agreement among MEPs that immigration problems are greater today than in the past (85%), an interesting country pattern emerged. The Italian (96%), Spanish (100%), Portuguese (100%), and Greek (100%) MEPs exceeded the European average on the response that immigration problems were greater today. This Southern tendency regarding the magnitude of immigration problems emerged frequently in the interviews as well. Southerners often discussed the problems they gained with a unified Europe: "To become a partner in a partnership you inherit some problems".³² One Greek Socialist explained:

Greece will get more problems because Northern societies are increasingly very hard. I have seen people going to the garbage in New York and Northern Manchester but not in Greece.³³

This MEP described how Greece, with economic development, has changed from an emigration to an immigration country, and thus: "In the summer, British girls waitress because Greeks don't do that."³⁴ MEPs from the Southern states of the EU perceive immigration problems greater than ever before as their countries are confronted with them for the first time in the post-War period.

The relationship between countries and the belief that immigration problems had worsened was replicated when MEPs were asked about their forecasts for the future. MEPs were more ambivalent on their future outlook regarding issue resolution than on the importance of the

³²Interview no. 509 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), p. 12.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 13.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 6.

immigration issue.³⁵ However, both questions generated similar country patterns. With the exception of Portugal, all of the Southern countries who expressed great concern about the growing nature of immigration problems also had a higher proclivity towards pessimism. 82 percent of Italians, 85 percent of Spaniards, and 63 percent of Greeks reported that they were pessimistic. In contrast, Ireland (67%), Benelux (62%), the United Kingdom (46%), and Portugal (57%) were strikingly above the EU average (39%) of optimists. Why do Southern MEPs appear to be more pessimistic than the general sample? Does the country variable offer any systematic explanations?

Pessimism may be related more to general positions of cynicism than to the immigration issue in particular. Studies have shown that pessimism is related to economic and cultural factors.³⁶ Lower levels of income and education have been particularly associated with individual levels of pessimism, and this may explain a Southern predisposition among elites (see Table 5.2). Eurobarometer's study of public opinion regarding immigration suggested that for many people there is a negative view of the presence of immigrants, and that it is an expression of frustration in other areas.³⁷ MEP pessimism may be associated with socio-economic conditions and/or other more general political culture attributes.

If pessimism is related to a general cultural bleakness, it may also be connected to specific national immigration experiences. MEPs may be pessimistic because they feel that their country is more vulnerable to immigration problems than other EU countries. Lerner and

³⁵The data in Chapter Four suggested that 61% of MEPs were pessimistic or very pessimistic that immigration problems would be resolved.

³⁶See Nonna Mayer, "Attitudes towards the Region, Europe, and Politics in 1992 France," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Association, The Washington Hilton, September 2-5, 1993), p. 7.

³⁷Eurobarometer 30, p. 70.

Gorden, argued that, "many Europeans who have accepted the new transnationalism as a way of life continue to judge transnational policies in some measure, in terms of national interest."³⁸ The data here however, do not substantiate a direct link between country positions and a pessimistic mood.

MEPs assess their countries immigration problems with familiarity of actual numbers (see Table 5.4).³⁹ These assessments however, do not influence their future outlook.

Table 5.4: Degree of Country Comparative Immigration Problems Reported by MEPS and Percent of Immigrants

<u>MEP Sample</u>		<u>Percent of non-EU Immigrants/Population</u>
N = 168		
Above EU average (19%) answering		
"my country has more immigration problems"		
Germany	(57%)	5.3%
France	(40%)	3.9%
Belgium	(20%)	3.8%
Above EU average (44%) answering		
"my country has the same # of immigration problems"		
France	(59%)	3.9%
Belgium	(80%)	3.8%
Italy	(68%)	.7%
Above EU average (37%) answering		
"my country has fewer immigration problems"		
Netherlands	(69%)	2.7%
UK	(54%)	2.2%
Denmark	(50%)	1.8%
Luxembourg	(67%)	1.0%
Ireland	(83%)	.6%
Greece	(75%)	.6%
Portugal	(86%)	.5%
Spain	(56%)	.3%

³⁸Daniel Lerner and Morten Gorden, Euroatlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1969), p. 47.

³⁹The questionnaire asked MEPs to compare their country's immigration experiences with other countries in the EU. MEPs were asked, "Does your country have more, fewer, or about the same number of immigration-related problems as the other EC countries?"

MEPs, with the exception of Italians, seem to compare their national situations with figures of non-EU immigrants in mind. Table 5.4 above lists the countries of MEPs that score above the EU average on three categories; those who claim their countries have more immigration problems than other EU countries, those who perceive their countries to have relatively the same number of problems, and those who report fewer number of problems. MEPs from countries with higher percentages of non-EU immigrant populations claim that their countries have more immigration problems. These assessments decrease with a decline of actual percentages of non-EU population in each country. There is a rough correspondence between perceptions and actual numbers. The Italian exception may be partially explained by its recent change in status from a country of emigration, to that of immigration. This is further discussed in Chapter Seven.

While MEP perceptions of their countries immigration problems follow actual numbers, their future outlook does not. The data revealed no relationship between country comparisons and optimism/pessimism ($\lambda = .00$). MEPs from countries with larger non-EU immigrant concentrations were no more or less pessimistic about issue resolution than those who came from countries with smaller immigrant communities. Optimistic MEPs⁴⁰ reported that their countries had fewer problems (more likely to be from Ireland, UK, Benelux, Portugal). However, pessimists from the Southern countries (who said problems had worsened) also claimed that their countries had fewer immigration problems. Ratings of countries' comparative positions cut across pessimists and optimists alike. That is, all optimists claimed that their countries had fewer immigration-related problems than the other EU states, but not all MEPs who claimed to have fewer problems were optimistic.

⁴⁰Those who indicated that they were "optimistic" that current immigration problems would be resolved, based on the questionnaire.

Country comparisons and actual size of immigrant groups did not predict future outlooks. MEPs from Spain and Greece may agree that their countries have far fewer problems and be correct regarding the size of their immigrant group, but they remain amongst the largest group of pessimists (84% and 63% respectively). However, Ireland and Portugal, which fall in the same category of those reporting their countries have fewer problems, are among the EP's optimists (67% and 58% respectively). France (41%) and Germany (57%) were substantially above the EU average (19%) in reporting that their countries experienced more problems than the others. The MEPs of these countries however were roughly split along pessimism/optimism; they were neither more nor less pessimistic than the EU average. Pessimism is not necessarily a characteristic of MEPs who profess that their countries face more immigration problems.

The data suggest that if pessimism is connected to national immigration experiences, it is not based on negative experiences at home, but rather on those abroad. MEP pessimism is more likely a product of global considerations and process-oriented thinking than of comparative country evaluations. Moreover, pessimism/optimism may be a function of rate (or perceived rate) of growth of problems.

Analysis by country suggests that pessimism depends more on a conviction that immigration problems have grown than any other immigration-related attitude (see Table 5.5). MEPs from Southern countries report fewer immigration problems than other EU countries but tend to perceive immigration problems to be greater today than in the past. They are more likely to be pessimistic. These MEPs may think that their countries experience fewer immigration problems but that the situation has nevertheless worsened. The tendencies of some MEPs to be pessimistic may be a natural concomitant of feelings that immigration problems are bound to get worse.

In contrast, MEPs from more immigrant-intense countries claimed their country to have

more problems than the other EU countries. However, they did not necessarily perceive immigration problems greater today than the past. In these countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK, more problems were reported, and census figures concur with the report. Nevertheless, problems were not completely perceived as greater today than in the past, or new. Regime survival amidst persistent immigration may contribute to resignation, which gets translated into optimism. According to one Dutch Christian Democrat:

I am optimistic, on the basis of our own experiences. When we look back at the history of Holland, it was only a blessing that we had those people from outside. In general, we have the view that is good, it paid off that we were a tolerant country.⁴¹

MEPs from countries with older histories of immigration and more substantial immigrant figures (i.e., Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK) appear more confident about problem resolution than their more anxious counterparts from the more peripheral regions of the EU (i.e., Spain, Italy)

Questions that tap assessment of the immigration issue portray several persistent national differences among elites that may be linked. Table 5.5 applies the immigration-context index of countries to MEP attitudes. This index is helpful in delineating patterns in these two dimensions: "country has fewer problems;" and "problems are greater today."

⁴¹Interview no. 12 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), p. 6.

Table 5.5: MEP Assessment of Immigration and Immigrant Intake, by Country and Immigration-Context Index

	<u>Pessimistic</u>	<u>Country has fewer problems</u>	<u>Problems greater today</u>	<u>Decrease immigration</u>
Total EU	61%	37%	85%	24%
Belgium	44%	0%	100%	33%
Denmark	75%	50%	75%	67%
France	61%	0%	61%	37%
Germany	62%	5%	91%	35%
Greece	63%	75%	100%	43%
Ireland	33%	83%	83%	17%
Italy	84%	24%	96%	23%
Luxembourg	67%	67%	100%	0%
Netherlands	29%	69%	79%	23%
Portugal	43%	86%	100%	0%
Spain	84%	56%	100%	11%
UK	54%	54%	68%	10%
	<i>lambda</i> = .11 <i>p</i> < .05	<i>lambda</i> = .18 <i>p</i> < .02	<i>lambda</i> = .04 <i>p</i> < .05	<i>lambda</i> = .06 <i>p</i> > .05
<u>Immigration-Context Index</u>				
A) IR, P, S, G	65%	71%	98%	16%
B) L, DK, N, I	65%	43%	84%	25%
C) B, F, FRG, UK	57%	23%	76%	28%
	<i>gamma</i> = -.13 <i>p</i> > .05	<i>gamma</i> = -.62 <i>p</i> < .01	<i>gamma</i> = .61 <i>p</i> < .05	<i>gamma</i> = .17 <i>p</i> > .05

The table above reveals the discriminating power of national immigration contexts in questions of immigration assessment. MEPs seem to refer to immigrant numbers and public opinion in their thinking on immigration. On all four questions, but less on pessimism/optimism, a pattern emerged from "low" to "high" countries.⁴² Low countries cohesively and consistently ranked higher on pessimism, on claiming their countries have fewer immigration problems than the other EU states, and yet on claiming that these problems are greater today. An inverse but similar pattern emerged regarding a preference for decreased immigration. That is, MEPs from countries with lower immigrant concentrations and negative public moods were more likely to claim that problems are greater today (but still comparatively less than in the other EU countries) than MEPs from countries with more foreigners. However, they were less inclined to prefer a decreased immigration.

Two patterns emerged. On the one hand, those MEPs who claimed that immigration problems have worsened were more likely to be pessimistic. These were the Southern MEPs from the countries in category A. These MEPs were realistic in the assessment of their relative immigration problems, viewed them as greater today, because with growing interdependence, these issues seemed to be contagious and salient to all. These MEPs did not yet seek "decreased" immigration.

On the other hand, those MEPs who claimed that their countries had relatively more immigration problems were not amongst the pessimists. They were not necessarily inclined to see immigration problems greater now than before. This included MEPs from countries with a substantial number of immigrants such as France and the UK. This group, however, tended to prefer a decreased level of immigration.

⁴²Note: Low countries signify those countries with low levels of immigrant population and lower levels of negative public opinion towards immigrants; high countries represent those with higher levels of immigrant concentrations and higher rates of public rejection.

The responses on "country has fewer problems" correlated with actual immigrant figures. It rose from A to C categories, and appeared to be paired with the response spread on "decrease" immigration. It was not related to optimism/pessimism. Optimism/pessimism appeared to be less related to the concrete numbers of immigrants than to the projected and symbolic dynamic of immigration processes.

B. Assessment of Immigrant Intake and Immigrant Groups

Country patterns were discernible in MEP preferences of immigration levels (see Table 5.6). Belgian (33%), German (35%), and French (37%) MEPs claimed that immigration in general should be decreased. Each of these countries exceeded the EU average (24%) preferring a reduction of immigration. Country analysis using an immigrant-context index helps explain some variance. MEPs who were more likely to prefer decreased immigration tended to represent countries with more non-EU foreigners. MEPs from Greece (43%), Denmark (67%), and the United Kingdom (10%) were exceptions in this context. Interestingly, these countries are all islands or geographically insular. These anomalies may also reflect the different phases of immigration cycles, mentioned in Chapter Three.

Table 5.6: Immigrant Numbers, Public Opinion, and MEP Preferences to "Decrease" Immigrant Levels

Country	Foreign/ Total Population	Non-EU Foreigners/ Total Population	% Saying "Too Many" Resident Foreigners ^a	% of MEPs who Prefer Decreased Immig- ration ^b
Germany ^c	8.2%	5.3%	47%	35%
France	6.4%	3.9%	45%	37%
United Kingdom ^d	3.3%	2.2%	45%	10%
Belgium	9.1%	3.8%	44%	33%
Denmark	3.1%	1.8%	36%	67%
Italy	1.4%	.7%	35%	23%
Luxembourg	27.5%	1.0%	30%	0%
Netherlands	4.6%	2.7%	30%	23%
Greece	.7%	.6%	19%	43%
Spain	.9%	.3%	17%	11%
Portugal	.9%	.5%	14%	0%
Ireland	NA	.6%	7%	17%

^a As measured by Eurobarometer's public opinion survey reported percentage of answers stating that there are "too many" resident foreigners.

^b percent of MEPs preferring a decreased level of immigration

^c West Germany

^d Great Britain

Sources: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Trends in International Migration: Continuous Reporting System on Migration (Paris: SOPEMI, 1992). Eurobarometer 30: Public Opinion in the European Communities, Report on Racism and Xenophobia (1989). Documents Observateur, no. 4 (January/February 1989).

The anomalies of cases such as Greece, Denmark and the UK may confirm that the blurring of lines between the traditional immigration and emigration countries is also taking place at the attitudinal level. These cases also underscore another trend noted by Baldwin-Edwards and Schain: the feeling that there are too many immigrants may be strong even in many countries with small immigrant populations; while expressed tolerance may be found in some countries where the proportion of immigrants is relatively high. They suggest that an analysis of sources of mass attitudes may benefit more from an examination of political processes than from an examination of demographic trends.⁴³ The following chapter explores the dynamics of party politics.

The findings also revealed that MEPs have dissenting opinions regarding the levels of immigration they believe would have a positive impact. More MEPs reported that a "lower than current level" (31%) of immigration would have a positive impact on standard of living in Europe than favored a "higher level" (17%). The above country pattern emerged again as Danish (50%), Belgian (40%), German (37%), French (40%), and Greek (63%) MEPs were more likely than the EU average to claim that a "decreased" level of immigration would have a positive impact on standard of living. With the exception of the French, this was also the case when MEPs were asked about what level would have a positive impact on the social fabric. Twelve percent of MEPs claimed that an increased level would have a positive impact on the social fabric while 35 percent claimed a decreased level would be favorable. Danish (50%), Belgian (56%), German (63%), and Greek (63%) MEPs were most likely to envision a "decreased level" of immigration conducive to the social fabric and to standard of living.

If there are national patterns regarding optimal levels of immigration, there are

⁴³Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin Schain, "The Politics of Immigration: An Introduction," West European Politics, Vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 6.

preferences regarding specific immigrant groups. Again, we note that these preferences do not necessarily follow demographic structures. Baldwin-Edwards and Schain point to the classic misconceptions of the French for example, who throughout the 1980s believed that most immigrants were from North Africa, although North Africans never comprised a majority, and until the end of the decade were outnumbered by the Portuguese.⁴⁴ This is similar to the British case, where resident Pakistanis generally receive anti-immigrant attention while the largest single group of foreigners is the Irish. These cases underscore the role of religion and colonial heritages in immigrant preferences, rather than numbers alone.

Religious factors conjure national images and have given credence to some national orientations. These national images may serve to mold immigrant preferences, as one Greek Communist explained;

Our religion is orthodox Christian, an orthodox religion, which is very traditional, very old. It is the oldest part of Christianity. And as Greece was occupied for four or five centuries by the Ottoman Empire which was a Muslim one, the opposition of Christian orthodox to Muslim, in our tradition is very strong.⁴⁵

This MEP recounted that as a result of old antagonisms, and despite the presence of Muslims in Greece, there was a marked absence of mosques. The role of religion is further explored in Chapter Eight.

Table 5.7 presents from least desirable (1) to most desirable (6) rankings of immigrant groups according to national averages.

⁴⁴See Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, p. 7.

⁴⁵Interview no. 461 (Strasbourg: 13 May 1992), p. 3.

Table 5.7: Country Rankings of Least Desirable Immigrant Groups according to MEP Responses

Immigrant Region	B	DK	F	FRG	G	IR	I	L	N	P	S	UK
EU	3	X	6	5	X	X	X	X	X	2	4	X
Eastern Europe	2	2	5	1	3	3	5	X	3	X	5	4
Non-EU West Europe	4	2	6	4	X	3	4	X	4	3	3	5
Turkey	1	2	4	3	1	X	3	1	2	3	4	3
North Africa	1	2	2	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1
Africa	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2
Asia	2	1	3	3	4	1	2	1	2	1	1	4

X represents no ranking provided; bold-faced represents first choice. Columns may have more than one number in bold, as a result of tie percentage.

Key: B=Belgium; DK=Denmark; F=France; FRG=Germany; G=Greece; IR=Ireland; L=Luxembourg; N=Netherlands; P=Portugal; S=Spain; UK=United Kingdom.

MEPs concur in rejecting Third World immigrants, and in accepting EU migrants. With the exception of Greek and British MEPs, each country ranked immigrants from North Africa, Africa and Asia among the top three least desirable groups. The order of these three groups varies slightly according to country. National preferences however do exist. The most prominent examples were the Greek and German MEPs whose least desirable groups were Turkish migrants and East Europeans, respectively. In each case, these groups represent countries with most proximate political impact.

C. Policy Preferences

Both socioeconomic factors and immigrant contexts help distinguish MEP attitudes toward immigration policy. In areas of policy where country patterns were found, the relevant factors, in addition to more general historical experiences and political culture, were immigrant numbers and economics. A German Socialist captured this general theme:

Second, it depends how dense the population is anyway. Third, it depends on the ratio between jobs and population, flats and population, and another element is how wealthy the society is.⁴⁶

A Spanish Socialist emphasizes the public opinion and social consensus components of model III in influencing MEP policy views:

In Spain, we have just legalized 500,000 clandestine immigrants and it did not affect the public opinion. But if tomorrow in France we have to legalize 500,000 clandestines, there will be a revolution.⁴⁷

According to MEPs, economic levels of development vary among European countries, and these distinctions affect policy views in the following way:

Those who are wealthy, to my experience, are not as much prepared as the poorer people to share. They have something to lose.⁴⁸

You have more egoism in a rich society than in poorer countries. If you look at the refugees. Which country in the world takes up the most refugees? You will find the poorer countries. For example, in Africa, and not the wealthy industrialist nations. It's a matter of fact. So, let's define a difference, at least on the outlook on immigration based on poorer South countries, and the wealthier North countries, even in the EC where you see a difference of the North/South divide.⁴⁹

The data in this section suggest that levels of economic development reinforce not only

⁴⁶Tbid.

⁴⁷Interview no. 495 (Strasbourg, 14 May 1992), p. 3.

⁴⁸Interview no. 172 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p.1.

⁴⁹Tbid., p. 1.

geographic differences between North and South, but distinguish countries with more substantial immigration communities from those with less experience.

At least three questions that measure MEP attitudes towards immigration policy and issue resolution, were found to generate responses which could be predicted by knowing the MEP's country of origin. The following questions yielded country patterns:

- "What should be the first concern of immigration policy-makers?"
- "Who should be responsible for regulating immigration policy?"
- "What should be done about the rights of immigrants?"

Table 5.8 below displays the response distributions.

Table 5.8: MEP Attitudes Regarding Policy Resolution, by Country, and Immigration-Context Index

	<u>Economic & Educational Assistance</u>	<u>EU institutions</u>	<u>Extension of Rights</u>
Total EU	42%	73%	77%
Belgium	30%	90%	78%
Denmark	0%	75%	75%
France	44%	71%	70%
Germany	55%	57%	63%
Greece	38%	88%	88%
Ireland	50%	100%	67%
Italy	48%	80%	80%
Luxembourg	0%	67%	67%
Netherlands	46%	69%	85%
Portugal	43%	71%	100%
Spain	53%	84%	84%
UK	26%	54%	75%
	<i>lambda=.10</i> <i>p < .05</i>	<i>lambda=.08</i> <i>p > .05</i>	<i>lambda=.02</i> <i>p > .05</i>
<u>Immigration-Context Index</u>			
A) IR, P, S, G	48%	85%	85%
B) L, DK, N, I	40%	78%	80%
C) B, F, FRG, UK	40%	64%	71%
	<i>gamma=-.03</i> <i>p > .05</i>	<i>gamma=-.13</i> <i>p > .05</i>	<i>gamma=.30</i> <i>p > .05</i>

Each of the three questions of immigration policy presented here involves a concession of some kind. The first refers to a yielding of civil rights.⁵⁰ While MEPs on the whole were disposed to extending rights to immigrants (77%), the overall result hid considerable disparities between the different countries. All of the Southern countries (Italy=80%, Spain=84%, Portugal=100%, Greece=88%) were substantially above the EU average (77%) in favor of extending immigrant rights. It is noteworthy that out of the 6 MEPs that preferred restriction of immigrant rights, 3 were German (category C of Immigration-Context Index and Highly Developed category of Table 2).

The second question relates to surrendering sovereignty.⁵¹ The concept of "losing" or "giving up something" as the German Socialist above described was reinforced by the findings of the question, "Who should be responsible for regulating immigration policy, national governments or EU institutions?". Southern and traditionally poorer EU countries such as Italy (80%), Spain (84%), Portugal (71%), Greece (88%) and Ireland (100%) were more inclined to defer some or entire responsibility to EU institutions. British (46%) and German (43%) MEPs expressed a higher than EU average orientation (EU average=27%) towards maintaining some national control.

The third question involves economic concessions.⁵² MEPs were asked, "What should be the first concern of immigration policy-makers?" MEPs from the Catholic and/or economically peripheral countries of the EU were more likely (than EU average of 42%) to

⁵⁰Refers to number of responses saying, "extend immigrant rights".

⁵¹Refers to number of responses preferring "EU control of immigration".

⁵²Refers to number of responses preferring "economic and educational assistance to countries of emigration".

prefer "economic and educational assistance to countries who are sending immigrants."⁵³ This included MEPs from Spain (53%), Ireland (50%), Italy (48%), France (44%), and Portugal (43%).⁵⁴ The motivations behind these concerns are diverse. Some derive from a general benevolence and others as a means to an end: stopping immigration. As one Italian Socialist remarked:

The only solution is to help countries from where people come, to develop, to stop immigration.⁵⁵

The different intentions behind these priorities are more pronounced among parties, and are thus explored in Chapter Six.

MEP responses to the three questions above follow a neat ordering from more to less consensus. Table 5.8 reveals both horizontal and vertical patterns. That is, the proportion of MEP consensus rises from bottom to top and from left to right. All MEP clusters, no matter how high, are more yielding to civil rights than to sovereignty and economic issues. Conversely, MEPs are more amenable to transferring civil rights and sovereignty to others than to pay for economic and educational assistance.

MEP consensus also rises according to immigrant-context and socio-economic development; from bottom to top; from North to South; from wealthier to poorer countries; from category C to category A states. MEPs from higher socio-economic developed countries, larger immigrant concentrations, and greater public rejection are less generous than MEPs from the

⁵³Germany was an exception as 55% of MEPs indicated that economic and educational assistance to countries who are sending immigrants should be the first concern of immigration policymakers.

⁵⁴75% Danish, 52% British, 50% Belgian, 46% Dutch, 67% Luxemburgoise, 40% Italian, 43% Portuguese, and 38% Greek MEPs cited that the first concern of immigration policymakers should be the integration of foreigners. These countries have fewer concentrations of non-EC foreigners ("low countries", model III).

⁵⁵Interview no. 515, (Brussels, 6 May 1992), 4.

peripheral EU countries, which have fewer immigrants and lower rates of public disapproval. MEP attitudes tend to be more conciliatory in proportion to both their countries' lower rates of development and to the (lower numbers of immigrants and negative public opinion. They are also more generous regarding non-material matters such as immigrant rights and national control than with material resources such as economic assistance.

Many MEPs point to the links between economic development and immigration problems. The idea that immigration "problems" are a by-product of industrialization is underlined by a right-wing MEP who points to the country differences among Members of his party group:

We have a party in Italy...whom I have been telling they need to use the programme of the FN about immigration. They say, it is not easy as they are not a country with a long history of immigration and they have a good opinion about immigrants as they themselves are immigrants in many places like South America and North America. I told them that for the moment they do not have problems of immigration because they were not the richest country of the community. But a time will come, and it comes now when they have immigrants, they have one-and-a-half, which causes them a lot of trouble in Naples, in Genova, in Rome, etc. and where the level of social tension is more tough.⁵⁶

Clearly, MEP attitudes are distinguishable along country lines and these derive from differences of immigration experiences, immigrant numbers, and socioeconomic development.

The divisions between countries regarding these questions of immigration policy may be theoretically illuminated by both immigrant-context and socioeconomic cultural indicators. One MEP from Portugal explained:

I think that countries of immigration are egoistic countries...I think that the big problem is the lack of solidarity between North and South, between black and white people, between rich and poor people.⁵⁷

Another MEP from Denmark pointed to the more narrow divisions within the EU and the less

⁵⁶Interview no. 289, (Strasbourg, 10 June 1992), p. 5.

⁵⁷Interview no. 378, (Brussels, 5 May 1992), p. 5.

tolerant nature of the wealthier societies of the North:

...in the Nordic countries, we have the best welfare system in the world, and people say, 'We don't want to have people to come and have a good relation with this system. We must pay for this system and people are coming and have the same rights, so it's not good'.⁵⁸

These distinctions are not merely based on miserliness of wealthier countries but on immigration/emigration experiences, numbers of immigration concentration and domestic public opinion. A German MEP explained this dilemma:

We could never solve the problems of this world---only if we are disposed to share our richness. This is a very difficult task to say to your own voters, that they have to give up.⁵⁹

In contrast, an Irish MEP summarized his country's position by distinguishing it from the other EU countries:

The Irish attitude toward immigration...we would not take a negative attitude to immigration largely and quite simply because we emigrate. Our citizens emigrate a lot and they have been quite well received in, for example, the United States and Britain, and in other European countries. So, appreciating that, it would make us much more socially sympathetic to the problems of immigrants from other countries.⁶⁰

Higher socioeconomic levels have tended to attract higher immigration levels, and more public outcry. These factors thus coincide and generate less liberal attitudes towards immigration policy.

Not all policy questions generated clear country patterns, along the those discussed above. In fact, the more technical policy-oriented questions offered more limited country explanations. Several factors may attribute to weaker patterns in this realm. First, the traditional administrative nature of immigration policy-making has contributed to a lack of political

⁵⁸Interview no. 15, (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 2.

⁵⁹Interview no. 165 (Brussels, 7 May 1992), p. 12.

⁶⁰Interview no. 39, (Strasbourg, 12 June, 1992), p. 1.

familiarity. A second explanation focuses on the nature of this elite group. As Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman pointed out, politicians, unlike bureaucrats are more sensitive to diffuse issues or problems that highlight their philosophical (or partisan) principles.⁶¹ Furthermore, "Since the mechanics of policy engage their attention more rarely [than bureaucrats], they [politicians] are driven more readily toward abstract, even utopian thinking."⁶² These dynamics were confirmed by the MEP data in this section.

Weak patterns however, may be detectable when isolating certain country variables. Country-specific factors such as socio-economic development or immigration-contexts are less clear, but nevertheless exist. MEP approaches to immigration regulation for example, may reflect country cycles of immigration. The question regarding strategies for immigration regulation revealed four categories of preferences: number quotas, geographic quotas, professional quotas and no regulation.⁶³ The only country pattern to emerge involved MEPs who favored professional quotas. The Southern MEPs from Italy (28%), Spain (22%), Portugal (29%) and Greece (29%) were more likely than the rest of the EU (average=19%) to embrace professional quotas. This may suggest that the less economically developed European countries still tend to focus on the traditional sense of immigration. According to one MEP, traditional immigration is distinct from asylum, illegal immigration and other forms:

To be precise we must distinguish between asylum and political refugees and immigration. Because immigration means that the State takes a decision to let foreigners in because it needs people.⁶⁴

⁶¹Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 13.

⁶²Ibid, p. 132.

⁶³Based on survey question, "On what basis, should immigration be regulated?"

⁶⁴Interview no. 172 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 2.

European countries are at distinctive stages of immigration experiences, and this contributes to different attitudes. As Chapter Three discussed, the nature of immigration has changed. Whereas for many years immigration was thought of as manpower, required to fill a temporary need for reconstruction and economic growth, it now means families in permanent residence. The Eurobarometer study illustrated that the extent to which this development is evident or accepted varies from country to country.⁶⁵

Policy orientations may also be related to immigrant numbers. MEPs from Germany (2 MEPs), France (3 MEPs) and Italy (2 MEPs) mentioned keeping border controls intact. The former two countries have substantial concentrations of immigrants. Italy's foreign population is also growing rapidly.

The question regarding how immigration regulation should be ensured in the EU also generated weak country patterns. The response spread here reflected geographic concerns. 56 percent of all MEPs were interested in strengthening EU and non-EU borders. The highest consensus was found in the UK (71%), Benelux (62%), Spain (56%), Portugal (72%), and Greece (75%). All of these countries are geographically vulnerable to non-EU penetration. One British MEP described the British experience regarding border controls:

British politicians are frightened. We have got all these marvelous frontiers of our own, keep everybody out, rabies, and now we have got the tunnel, and rabbits will run along the tunnel and bite the customs officers when they get to the other side. Its dreadful, isn't it...They think we have got a marvelous system of keeping them out, because we are an island. And under the new system you are supposed to let people already in the Community across the frontier without control. The British say, well, how do we know they are supposed to be in the Community, unless you look in their passport you can't tell. To which the Continentals say, well they are in here already so we must presume they have been let in legally. There is no need to look at them. Then, the British say, well, the ship might have come from Japan and so we have got to look at

⁶⁵Eurobarometer 30 (1989), p. 68.

everyone.⁶⁶

External borders with non-EU countries arouse feelings of vulnerability. One Greek MEP compares movement to Europe as that to the United States and equates New York to Greece:

Usually, people stay in the first port. So, thinking of Greece's neighbor with Asia and Africa---don't forget that this is a meeting point of three continents here---I am afraid that there will be yet more Southerners, Africans, and Asians.⁶⁷

Island geography is a source of anxiety. According to one British MEP:

Of course the British population are worried about cases they think are inefficient like the Greeks, which anyway is difficult because it has got lots of islands. It is like Britain, it has a great many external frontiers.⁶⁸

Geographic factors affect MEP attitudes.

While MEP attitudes towards the Schengen Accord are fragmented, they may be geographically-based. The UK (30%), Ireland (50%), Denmark (67%), and Spain (31%) were more likely than the rest of the EU (22%) to be concerned about third national status. Italy (23%) and Greece (38%) were more apprehensive than the EU average (16%) about possible inclusion of certain countries in the EU. These countries all had in common, external borders with non-EU countries, and concern about vulnerability. One would have expected an increased preoccupation with issues of democratic control and computer systems among the economically more advanced EU countries, and those with more developed immigrant infrastructures. This was not the case. These types of considerations were more party based. The next chapter addresses this factor.

⁶⁶Interview no. 198 (London, 16 April 1992), pp. 6-7.

⁶⁷Interview no. 509 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), p. 6.

⁶⁸Interview no. 198, p. 8.

D. Views on the Nature of Country/Party Debates

There are country patterns of attitudes relating to sources of attitudes and political conflict in the immigration debate. Table 5.9 below presents MEP views on sources of attitudes as measured by three questions that address political divisions and sources of thinking. It provides the percentage scores for MEPs, according to country and immigration-contexts.

Table 5.9: Views on the Nature of Country/Party Debates, by Country, and Immigration-Context Index

	<u>National debate very divisive</u>	<u>Left-right very different-immigration</u>	<u>Very important cultural differences</u>
Total EU	32%	45%	39%
Belgium	40%	70%	20%
Denmark	0%	0%	0%
France	70%	52%	26%
Germany	90%	67%	43%
Greece	13%	38%	25%
Ireland	0%	0%	33%
Italy	32%	56%	46%
Luxembourg	0%	67%	33%
Netherlands	0%	25%	39%
Portugal	0%	0%	86%
Spain	11%	35%	58%
UK	13%	44%	32%
	<i>lambda=.12</i> <i>p<.01</i>	<i>lambda=.13</i> <i>p<.05</i>	<i>lambda=.07</i> <i>p<.05</i>
<u>Model III: Immigrant numbers and public opinion</u>			
A) IR, P, S, G	7%	24%	53%
B) L,DK, N, I	18%	43%	39%
C) B, F, FRG, UK	55%	56%	32%
	<i>gamma=-.66</i> <i>p<.01</i>	<i>gamma=-.34</i> <i>p<.05</i>	<i>gamma=.21</i> <i>p<.05</i>

While immigration is a politicized issue for the EU as a whole, the nature of debate varies according to countries. Eurobarometer's mass opinion survey suggested that "hostility towards immigrants does not necessarily grow in proportion to their numbers, but rather that the public debate about their presence tends to get more heated when immigration is perceived more important".⁶⁹ According to this study's MEP sample, national public debates over immigration are related to immigrant concentrations and public perceptions. Assessment of these debates seems to be country-specific (see Table 5.9). One Spanish Socialist when asked about differences between parties on immigration, explained:

The differences are not very important. I think there are no real differences. There are a lot of differences at the level of countries. We cannot compare the situation of Luxembourg which has 14% of foreigners with the situation in Spain where we have only 4% of foreigners.⁷⁰

A strong consensus emerged among German and French MEPS, that national public debates were "very divisive". In contrast, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, countries with low immigrant populations produced a consensus higher than the rest of the EU, reporting that public debates were "not divisive." These are also countries in which public opinion factors (see immigration-context index) are less restrictive on policy-makers. In these countries, public sentiment that there are "too many" immigrants is relatively low (see Table 5.1).⁷¹

Perceptions of conflict were somewhat reinforced by views on left-right ideological differences. German (67%) and French (52%) MEPs again expressed a greater consensus than the EU average (45%) that left-right positions on immigration were "very different" in their

⁶⁹Eurobarometer 30 (1989), p.69.

⁷⁰Interview no. 495 (Strasbourg, 14 May 1992), p. 2.

⁷¹Denmark, UK, and Spain were split cases; MEPs were equally likely to identify debates "not divisive" as they were "somewhat divisive." This is indicative of their ambivalent views regarding where their issue publics stand.

countries.⁷² These opinions however also seem to reflect traditional national left/right polarizations. The question, "How different are left right positions on **most** issues in your country?" produced a similar pattern of responses. German (67%) and French (46%) MEPs portrayed the same levels of consensus regarding left-right differences on general issues as on immigration issues specifically. These countries displayed higher levels of agreement than the EP on whole (43%). Heated national immigration debates are not only related to immigrant numbers (as the Eurobarometer study suggested), and to public opinion factors (see Table 5.1, ranks 1, 2, and 5 respectively on saying that there were "too many" foreigners), but they seem to be linked to traditional polarized politics as well (see Chapter Seven).

MEPs also report cultural and historical differences among the EU countries in managing the immigration debate. In contrast to the more immigrant-concentrated countries who reported left-right ideological differences, those MEPs from the less immigrant-populated South were more sensitive to cultural and historical differences (see Table 5.10). According to immigration-context, consensus decreases on cultural distinctions as it increases on left-right differences.

Culture and ideology however, are not mutually exclusive sources of divisions, as Chapter Seven demonstrates. Table 5.10 shows that MEPs may attribute their attitudes towards immigration to both factors.

⁷²The question asked MEPs, "How different are left-right positions on immigration issues in your country?"

Table 5.10: Percent of MEPs, by Country, Reporting the Significance of Ideology and National/Cultural Values in Thinking about Immigration*

	<u>Ideology</u>	<u>National and Cultural values</u>
EU Average	45%	49%
Belgium	80%	60%
Denmark	50%	33%
France	38%	59%
Germany	53%	53%
Greece	38%	63%
Ireland	33%	50%
Italy	21%	54%
Luxembourg	0%	67%
Netherlands	58%	33%
Portugal	57%	100%
Spain	65%	74%
UK	41%	39%

*Based on percentage of those respondents who reported that these variables had "great importance" in shaping their views regarding immigration issues.

Bold-face refers to those countries which exceeded the EU average on each variable.

Terminology may obfuscate cultural and ideological factors. For example, according to one Greek: "As a Southerner, my influence on common policy would be more liberal".⁷³

Another Southerner applies an ideologically-based term to culture:

Spain is probably more liberal the sense of culture. Liberal in the sense of being more tolerant. Tolerant and progressive.⁷⁴

A British MEP clarifies this concept with different terminology:

⁷³Interview no. 509 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), p. 10.

⁷⁴Interview no. 495 (Strasbourg, 14 May 1992), p. 3.

The Italians have traditionally been exporters of populations and had a very, as they do with most things, a very easy approach to these things [immigration].⁷⁵

Similarly, MEPs confuse nationalism and nationalistic sentiment, a distinction which blurs the ideological from the cultural orientation. According to one French MEP and scholar:

If you want to speak about nationalism things get more complicated. The two countries which are the most nationalist in Europe are Great Britain and us. Why? Because we are the two oldest nations of Europe. Germany is a nation since 1870. Belgium, 1830. Italy in 1850's.⁷⁶

As mentioned in the last chapter, language is an important cultural variable that may reflect and account for different MEP views.

III. Conclusion

This chapter focused on questions which generated MEP dissensus (under 80% agreement), and were open to country explanations. The analysis concentrated on questions that measured four dimensions of issue attitudes: a) assessment of the immigration issue; b) preferences of immigrant intake and immigrant groups; c) policy preferences; and d) views on the nature of country/party debates.

On each level, at least three questions provided evidence of the effect of country affiliations on MEP attitudes. In order to generate a systematic comparison, an immigration-context index was constructed. This was based on the assumption that country differences regarding immigration are most distinguishable according to the numbers of immigrants and the extent of rejection of immigrant presence. As this chapter established, the contrast between countries with a substantial number of non-EU immigrants and those with smaller sizes underlines

⁷⁵Interview no. 134 (London, 22 April 1992), p. 9.

⁷⁶Interview, no. 329, (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 3.

the fact that immigrant presence has considerable psychological impact. The findings are indicative of the potential of public opinion about immigrant concentrations to affect elite assessment of the immigration issue. The number of immigrants found in each country not only reflects immigration specific contexts, but more general country cultural and historical experiences. Immigration-contexts mirror other more general country-specific factors, more particularly, socioeconomic factors.

The major components of country-specific factors that are associated to immigration thinking are immigrant figures, public opinion and national levels of socio-economic development. These factors appear to coincide with each other. Thus, one can argue that there are broad and comprehensive differences in assessment of immigration and views on policy between MEPs from countries which are 1) economically developed, 2) geographically centrally located; 3) with higher immigrant concentration; 4) traditional immigration societies; and those who come from countries which are not. To some degree, this portrait coincides with the North-South discrepancies which have long characterized Europe. To the extent that countries are still at different phases of the immigration cycle, and experience different numbers of immigrants, country effects may be profound.

The country analysis has underscored broad patterns of attitudes among MEPs from different EU member-states. First, MEPs from the more socio-economically developed countries of the EU which have more substantial immigrant populations residing on their territories tend to hold different preferences from other MEPs. This was the case regarding priorities of levels and types of immigrant intakes, and policy preferences. MEPs from Germany and France for example, favored "decreased" levels of immigration, and were less likely to grant more rights to immigrants than MEPs from the less immigrant-populated countries. However, that Danish and Greek MEPs also preferred fewer immigrants, underscored the fact that other factors such

as geography and socio-economic considerations influence thinking.

The dichotomy between more immigrant-populated, and socio-economically more developed countries and those with less, also emerged in MEP reports of their views of country and party debates. For example, the number of MEPs reporting that national debates were "divisive," and that left-right positions were "very different" rose from the EU's less industrialized to the more industrialized countries. This pattern was inverted on the role of culture, where the immigration-context index was also discriminating according to the broader development levels of north and south. MEPs from the Southern countries of the EU (with less immigrant populations) were more likely to report that cultural and historical factors shape thinking on immigration.

Another trend emerged from the country analysis, and this involved the more general assessments of immigration. The data suggested that MEPs were relatively familiar with national immigrant figures and demographic structures. When asked to place their countries in comparative perspective of other EU countries, MEPs from Germany, France, and Belgium were more likely than those from the more peripheral countries to report that their countries had more immigration problems. The latter group of MEPs however, were more likely to perceive that immigration problems had grown, and to be pessimistic. Again, this reinforced the fact that numbers were not the only relevant factors in MEP thinking.

Geographic positions, levels of socio-economic development and stages of immigration development may influence MEP attitudes. Southern MEPs are most pessimistic. Greece's geographic position between Europe and the Middle East may contribute to bleak outlooks. Nevertheless, the more geographically peripheral Danes are also pessimistic. Both national predispositions may be tied to levels of socioeconomic development. In the Greek case, pessimism may reflect more general economic turmoil; with relatively higher socioeconomic

development, Danish pessimism may be based on the fear of compromising that status. In contrast, MEPs from Germany and France with substantial immigrant figures and experiences are mindful but tempered about the future. In another vein, the pessimistic Italian MEPs may reflect a preoccupation with the country's more recent transition from one of emigration to that of immigration. The detailed analysis here, while confirming the importance of real figures in immigration perceptions, reinforces the role of stages of immigration experience and geographic vulnerability in outlooks.

MEPs seem to respond more to global projection and historical consideration than the "here and now" of immigrant size and public opinion regarding numbers. With the changing nature brought about by European interdependence, these elites seem to incorporate other nation's experiences with immigration in their responses. MEP attitudes (particularly those from countries with low immigrant concentrations) regarding the importance of the immigration issue underlined the interdependent nature of immigration problems. They also underscore the contagious quality of subjective and symbolic fears. Pessimistic outlooks are tied to observations of the immigration dynamic.

Finally, while there are national priorities that fall outside of immigrant-context patterns, this chapter provides evidence that there are some elements of attitudinal convergence. For example, Greek MEPs may be most sensitive to Turkish migrants, and Germans to East Europeans, but all MEPs share in common a rejection of Third World immigrants, and acceptance of EU migrants. Furthermore, although MEPs are sensitive to their country's demographics, a great deal of international learning seems to be taking place. Rather than convergence, one can argue that the less developed EU countries have bought into the political view of the more immigrant-experienced partners. This may explain why the Southern countries are more likely to perceive immigration problems as greater today, and to be pessimistic. It is

logical that they are also more likely to defer to EU institutions regarding immigration regulation.

Heightened sensitivities on the immigration front, even on the part of the less experienced countries, may indicate that the lines between MEP attitudes from traditional immigration countries and emigration countries are narrowing. Several explanations may account for the harmonization of attitudes that the study found. According to Inglehart, norms and values have converged among societies in Western Europe, and there is a cognitive solidarity among elites who interact in institutional settings.⁷⁷ Particularly in a rapidly interdependent Europe, experiences of other countries may be as important as more narrow country-specific experiences. Crowley and Weil, in their comparison of France and British integration experiences, implied that convergence may be an outcome of international learning.⁷⁸ According to Butt Philip, European cooperation on immigration matters has emerged not only from the process of European unification, but also through a reluctant recognition of policy limitations at the national level.⁷⁹ Heisler also argued that the range of treatment of populations has narrowed.⁸⁰ MEP attitudes substantiate the dynamic interplay between historical and cultural preconditions and more recent political exigencies of modernization. One French MEP presented history and change in the following manner:

France has always had a principle of 'land of welcome' towards foreigners. It comes from the French Revolution, which brought out fundamental principles,

⁷⁷Inglehart (1990).

⁷⁸Patrick Weil and John Crowley, "Integration in Theory and Practice: A Comparison of France and Britain," West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994): 111-126.

⁷⁹Alan Butt Philip, "European Union Immigration Policy: Phantom, Fantasy or Fact?," West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994): 168-191.

⁸⁰Martin Heisler, "Migration, International Relations and the New Europe: Theoretical Perspectives from Institutional Political Sociology," in International Migration Review, vol. 26, Summer 1992 (New York: Center for Migration Studies and Giovanni Agnelli Foundation), p. 606.

the rights of men, liberties, which has naturally put the country, thanks to its culture and to its philosophers as an example for other people. We are the heirs, still today of these fundamental principles. Since then, life has changed, the world has evolved, the economies have developed themselves, and the capacity of France is certainly not sufficient to welcome all people from all the planet who would like to leave their countries.⁸¹

According to Schnapper, all European nations are experiencing a crisis created by the impact of modernization on national integration and by the need to rethink the relationship between the market, society and the State.⁸²

These perspectives may argue against the force of historical cultural heritage in policy formulation. However, the data in this study suggest that there are country patterns of immigration assessment that still differentiate elite thinking. They also reveal that MEPs disagree on the more substantive strategies, in ways that make national patterns less clear. Country patterns are weaker on the more specific and detail-oriented issues such as the nature of immigration issues, principles of immigration regulation, and sources of political divisions. Questions of this sort tend to underscore the nature of this elite sample which lacks experience in dealing with the traditionally diffused immigration issue. According to Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, an examination of political processes rather than national demographic structures may be more fruitful.⁸³ The following chapter addresses party dynamics. Party analysis may better elucidate differences of principles. According to Putnam, "Most politicians discuss most issues in terms of differing priorities or differing solutions, rather than in terms of differing

⁸¹Interview no. 312 (Strasbourg, 13 May, 1992).

⁸²Dominique Schnapper, "The Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National Identity," West European Politics, Vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 129.

⁸³Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, p. 7.

interests."⁸⁴ The country analysis in this chapter illuminates the bases of these interests. Chapter Six explores differing MEP priorities or solutions that are related to party group ideologies.

⁸⁴Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 114.

Chapter 6: Analysis by Party

I. Introduction

The last chapter discussed the nation-state and cultural/historical variables as one source of issue attitudes. This chapter examines the role of party and ideological variables in shaping elite attitudes, and especially the left-right construct.

A. The significance of party and ideological positions

The emergence of parliaments, adult suffrage and political parties stemmed from the need to link the masses to those who governed.¹ The national and industrial revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries codified symbols of nation-states and class into ideologies. Groups built rival institutions of political action designed to mobilize adherents and direct their behavior.² The main institutional form was the political party, designed to win elections and gain the seats of power. Ideology was institutionalized by parties which routinized imagery of principles and strategy. This "codified imagery" as Lerner and Gorden refer to it, shaped the posture, strategy, program, and policy orientation of each party.³

Political parties and organizations have been based on a wide variety of ideologies, ranging from those that represent dominant political values to those that were created as

¹Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds), Political Parties and Political Development (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 11-12.

²Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Cleavage Structures and Voter Alignments, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1967). See Lipset and Rokkan in The West European Party System, ed. Peter Mair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 105.

³Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Press, 1969), pp. 193-194.

instruments of counter ideologies. The most prevalent form of political competition pits left-wing parties against those of the right and center. The terms left-right have been widely accepted as part of common political currency of Western Europe. They substantively refer to the position regarding private *versus* public ownership. Thus, parties of the left tend to support government ownership of the means of production, a strong governmental role in economic planning, redistribution of wealth, and expansion of governmental social welfare programmes. In contrast, parties of the right support private ownership, weaker governmental roles in economic planning, and are resistance to governmental social welfare programmes.⁴

The original great divisions derived from the 1789 French Revolution have remained relatively intact, and the terms left-right have been defined by the degree to which individual groupings have wanted to move away from the status quo.⁵ The liberal, republican and secular forces of the Left compete against the conservative and religious forces of the Right. Throughout Western Europe, with the single exception of Ireland, the most important party-forming issue has been that of labor against capital. The persistence of historical class alignments is evident. The working class in each nation gives disproportionate support to Leftist parties. The older middle-class is the bastion of support for conservative parties. The intensity of competition varies from degrees of mild reformism in some countries to fundamentally opposed visions of society in others.

The left-right classification is common to issue attitudes, partisanship and ideology; all three share a complex interrelationship which needs to be simplified for voters. Left-right self-

⁴R. Harmel and K. Janda, *Comparing Political Parties*, Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science (Washington D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1976), pp. 33-35.

⁵Jaroslav Krejci, "Introduction: Concept of Right and Left," in *Neo-Fascism in Europe*, eds. Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson and Michalina Vaughan (Essex, England: Longman Group, 1991), pp. 1-18.

placement is intricately linked to partisan identification. Butler and Stokes were among the first to argue that in the case of Great Britain, partisanship is often the central component of individual self-placement on the the left-right scale.⁶ Inglehart and Klingemann analyzed left-right self-placement in 9 European countries and found that the ideological component tends to be greatly overshadowed by partisan components.⁷ In a later paper, Inglehart asserted that in Europe, the terms "left"- "right" have become largely assimilated to established party loyalties.⁸ Indeed, in most nations, partisanship and ideological orientations exist side by side and tend to have reinforcing effects (see Table 6.1).⁹

⁶David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 208-210.

⁷Ronald Inglehart and Hans Klingemann, "Party Identification, Ideological Preference, and the Left-Right Dimension Among Western Publics," in Party Identification and Beyond, eds. Budge, Crewe, and Farlie (New York: Wiley, 1976), pp. 269-270.

⁸See Ronald Inglehart, "Political Action: The Impact of Values, Cognitive Level, and Social Background," in Political Action, eds., S. Barnes and M. Kaase (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), p.353; John Huber, "Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring Ideology," in European Journal of Political Research (1989), pp. 599-621,

⁹Dalton, p. 31.

Table 6.1: Self-Location of Voters on the Left-Right Scale (Average Values)*

<u>Party Types</u>	<u>Self-locations</u>
Ultra-right	8.3
Conservative	7.0
Religious	6.8
Agrarian	6.0
Discontent	5.8
Liberal	5.8
Ethnic	5.7
Socialist	4.3
Left-socialist	2.7
Communist	2.5

*The indicator on the self-location of the voter on the left-right continuum is measured by a scale from 1 to 10, the higher the value the further right the party (Sani & Sartori, 1983; Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Holmberg, 1981; Valen, 1981. Source: Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe (London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1987), p. 132.

The left-right dichotomy not only describes an ideological abstraction, but an assumption that political groupings and issue positions can be ordered on a continuum. Butler and Stokes argued that, "Since most electors have partisan dispositions and since the parties themselves offer a lead on most issues, it would be surprising if the parties did not assume a special status in giving structure to attitudes."¹⁰ Empirical studies have shown that issue attitudes are frequently a key component of left-right orientations.¹¹ Founded on the labor-capital issue, the left-right continuum reflects an ideological divide as well as a clash of class interests, neither of which has disappeared in the mixed economies and welfare states of Western Europe. However, in all cases, there are other issues superimposed across this cleavage. Historic issues concerned with the role of the Church, regimes, or economic interests other than labor and capital have led to

¹⁰David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 314.

¹¹See Huber, p. 600; See Inglehart (1984); Sani and Sartori (1983).

formations of many new issues and groups.

While cross-cultural equivalence is methodologically problematic for comparative analysis, the left-right continuum has proved durable as it captures issues, parties and ideological positions. According to Budge and Farlie, the left-right competition displays enough common features to render the broad impacts of issue types comparable.¹² Sani and Sartori claim that the left-right identification has "attitudinal issue-related content" and that it is a "summary" indicator that recommends itself on grounds of parsimony and comparability.¹³ They argue that across West European countries, left-right differences are associated with positions in the "social-equality/social change dimension."¹⁴ That is, voters of the left are more inclined to emphasize issues of inequality and the need for social change than those on the right.

Much like cultural theory's assumption of durability discussed in Chapter Five, theories of partisanship and ideological orientation assume that people have some sort of party allegiance and ideological orientation. Presumably, these endure over time and strongly influence other opinions.¹⁵ Party identification or partisanship is defined as long-term, affective, psychological

¹²Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, "Party Competition-Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation?: An Alternative View with Data," in West European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, eds. H. Daalder and P. Mair (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, Ltd, 1983), p. 288.

¹³Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation, and Competition in Western Democracies," in The West European Party System, ed. Daalder and Mair (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 1990), p. 310.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Russell Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies (Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers), p. 180; See also, Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications," American Journal of Political Science, vol. 25, no. 4 (November 1981): 617-645.

identification with one's preferred political party.¹⁶ Miller argues that partisanship constitutes the psychological basis of stable party alignments and influences other citizen attitudes and behaviors.¹⁷

Many scholars affirm the stability of partisan loyalties. Campbell argues that citizens develop a psychological bond to a specific political party that may persist through an entire lifetime.¹⁸ Party attachments or party identification is analogous to identification with a social class, religious denomination or other social groups. According to Asher, a person is more likely to develop a partisanship if other economizing devices as class and group loyalties are not available.¹⁹

Socialization studies suggest that children develop basic partisan orientations at a very early age, often during the primary school years.²⁰ There is evidence that people tend to learn party identification in childhood, even before the party label has much issue content for them as youngsters.²¹ Such consistency has been applied to ideological orientations as well. In a study of French families, Percheron and Jennings substituted measures of partisanship with left-right

¹⁶See Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960); Dalton, p. 181.

¹⁷Warren E. Miller, "The cross-national use of party identification as a stimulus to political inquiry," in Party Identification and Beyond, eds. I. Budge and D. Farlie (New York: Wiley, 1976). See also Dalton, p. 180.

¹⁸Campbell et al.; See Dalton, 29.

¹⁹Herbert Asher, Presidential Elections and American Politics: Voters, Candidates, and Campaigns since 1952, Fourth Edition (Chicago, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1988), p. 76.

²⁰Robert Hess and Judith Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), p. 90; Fred Greenstein and Sidney Tarrow, "The Study of French Political Socialization," in World Politics 22:95-137 1969.

²¹Asher, p. 76.

ideological orientations. They found substantial generational agreements.²² According to Medding,

...ideological appeals and responses are maintained over time because they have been related to the particular experience of the groups to which parties look for support, and have changed slowly to accommodate changes in that experience. Thus, so long as the groups survive, the ideology remains relevant.²³

Ideological and party affiliations, although not immutable are long enduring.

B. Elites, Parties, Ideologies, and Issue Positions

The interrelationship between issue positions, parties, and ideologies described above is generally surveyed in the voting literature. Most studies of partisanship and the left-right construct have focused on their relevance for the masses. Parties and ideologies facilitate electoral linkage by simplifying voter's information processing. Political elites communicate with the masses by using different types of political cues.²⁴ These include social groups, partisanship, and left-right ideological symbols.

Voting studies assume that parties and their leaders, as they contend for mass support, maneuver along a line from left to right and that the electorate too is distributed along that

²²Annick Percheron and Kent Jennings, "Political Continuities in French Families," *Comparative Politics*, 13:1981:421-36.

²³Peter Medding, "Patterns of Elite Consensus and Elite Competition: A Model and a Case Study," in *Political Elites in Anglo-American Democracies: Changes in Stable Regimes*, ed. H. Clarke and M. Czudnowski (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1987), p. 34.

²⁴See Dalton, p. 29.

line.²⁵ According to Butler and Stokes, the notion that policies and leaders can be ranked on an ideological scale running from left to right is perhaps the commonest of all political abstractions.²⁶ If voters however are seen to hold rather abstract views devoid of meaningful issue content, elite opinions are considered to be more sophisticated. Philip Converse addressed the need to distinguish between political discourse at the elite level versus the citizen level.²⁷

Elites are likely to have more coherent views of current political affairs than do average citizens.²⁸ They tend to rely more on ideological criteria for evaluating political events. The assertion that a candidate is a conservative gives a lot of information about the candidate's stance on a wide variety of issues. The same would probably not hold for the average citizen. Converse concluded that, "the liberal-conservative continuum is an elegant high-order abstraction, and such abstractions are not typical conceptual tools for the 'man in the street'."²⁹ Jennings' more recent comparative study confirmed, that political party elites have a more stable set of preferences and perspectives, based on ideological thinking than mass publics.³⁰

According to Arian, "ideology is largely an elite affair".³¹ He claimed:

²⁵Butler and Stokes, 324; See also "Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual American Political Science Association).

²⁶*Ibid.*, 323.

²⁷Converse, (1964).

²⁸Herbert McClosky, Paul Hoffmann, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers," American Political Science Review, vol. 54 (June 1960): 406-427.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 215.

³⁰M. Kent Jennings, "Ideological Thinking Among Mass Publics and Political Elites," Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 56 (1992), pp. 419-441.

³¹Asher Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Generation (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc, 1985), p. 244.

Members of an elite not only produce ideology, they are also its largest distributors and consumers. They distribute it to their constituents in their programs and statements; they consume ideological output because, trained in the language of ideological discourse, they tend to communicate with their peers in that idiom and they are the most alert and sensitive to messages which have an ideological cast.³²

The relative sophistication of elites is based on such factors as higher education, greater involvement in party organizations, practice, and experience with the "lore and lingo" of politics.³³ Many studies have concluded that elite beliefs across different countries are structured by partisan ideological commitments, often along the familiar left-right continuum.³⁴ Kornberg claimed, "For a political elite...party affiliation constitutes a kind of 'conceptual net' for capturing, organizing, and evaluating incoming information which may be politically relevant."³⁵ Where politics is overtly ideological and parties cohesive, studies have found that a leader's party affiliation provides a striking economical index of his/her political outlook. Even in the case of the less disciplined American parties, attitudes and values of congressmen, senators, and other politicians are marked by sharp and comprehensive differences between Republicans and Democrats.³⁶ Butler and Stokes maintained that even while left-right distinctions may be unclear, they are universally employed by "political insiders." They noted that, "the sophisticated are of course aware of the ambiguities of the concepts and of the confused and confusing way in

³²Arian, p. 244.

³³Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 89.

³⁴See Putnam (1976), overview p. 88; Arian (1985), Allan Kornberg and Robert Frasure, "Policy Differences in British Parliamentary Parties," American Political Science Review, Vol. 65 (September 1971), 694-703; Fishel (1972); Converse (1964).

³⁵Kornberg (1967), quoted in Putnam (1976), p. 137.

³⁶Ibid., p.89. See Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981); See also McClosky, Hoffmann, and O'Hara (June 1960).

which they are employed, but almost never escape from using them---and from assuming that they are generally intelligible".³⁷

Elites anchor their parties on the left-right dimension. In a German elite study, Fishel compared parliamentarians from the CDU and SPD parties. He found evidence that the left-right dimension is relevant for those highly active in German politics.

Table 6.2: Ideological Dimension in the Ordering of Parties: Left-Center, Right, Candidates for the West German Bundestag, 1965 (in percentages)*

Candidate Anchors Party on the:	SPD	CDU
Left	35	4
Center	34	79
Right	-	6
Neither	2	-
Old-fashioned, meaningless	21	9
N/A	8	2
N=	(84)	(88)

*Based on the question: On most issues today, do you generally think of your party as being on the left, in the center, on the right, or what?

Source: Jeff Fishel, "On the Transformation of Ideology in European Political Systems: Candidates for the West German Bundestag," in *Comparative Political Studies*, (January 1972) 412.

Putnam's study of British and Italian elites also found a high correlation between the left-right variable and party affiliation ($\gamma = 1.00$ in Britain; $\gamma = .96$ in Italy). He concluded that the left-right dimension dominates political controversy, "reflecting the obvious fact that the political systems in both countries are based essentially, if not exclusively on this dimension."³⁸

The empirical section below confirms this relationship among our MEP sample (see Table 6.3).

³⁷Butler and Stokes, p. 329.

³⁸Robert Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 49.

Our study demonstrates that in the 1990s ideological self-positioning reinforces party positions.

Not only are the left-right cleavage dimensions predictable, but for elites, they are long enduring. Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman concluded from their study of Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies, that there was a continued centrality of the left-right ideological spectrum.³⁹ Inglehart also found that despite the emergence of new issues, West European political elites still tend to describe left-right political polarization in terms of the classic issues of state ownership and control of the means of production.⁴⁰ Putnam claimed that the stable underlying structure of elite opinion is relevant to understanding elite behavior: "Knowing where a leader stands on one issue is likely to help us understand and predict his stance even on tangential or as yet undiscussed matters."⁴¹

The studies above suggest that there are distinctions between elites of the left and those of the right. These differences include conception of roles, world views, cognitive orientations, and normative orientations.⁴² Like their constituents, elites of the left tend to emphasize social inequalities and the need for social change, while those on the right tend to stress free market interests and to support the status quo. In order to assess these variations among European politicians in the 1990s, this study focuses on one group of European elites, Members of the European Parliament.

³⁹Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 117.

⁴⁰Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 300.

⁴¹Putnam, 1976, p. 89.

⁴²Ibid.

C. The Relevance of the Left-Right Construct Amidst Change

Since the 1960's, there has been a growing belief that the historic basis of the left-right divide has changed, inherently affecting party systems. According to B.E. Brown, for example, "the moderation of political conflict between the classic Left and Right has led to a realignment of political forces and perhaps the simplification of the party system."⁴³ Parties are no longer quite competitive on the issues that emerged from industrialization and dominated Western party systems for most of the century. Attitudes toward socioeconomic issues and the state which served as the major source of political competition seem to have converged among conservatives and liberals in Western Europe.⁴⁴ Political parties who traditionally distinguished themselves on social and economic issues have been forced to turn to new issues to differentiate themselves.

Changing issues have fueled a debate on the nature of political conflict and the significance of the left-right ideological construct. The abatement of divisions over policy issues that fed the traditional ideological conflicts of French society have led some to argue that ideological conflicts are less significant.⁴⁵ These scholars relate modifications in society to long-term change in the socioeconomic structure.⁴⁶ Such changes are seen to have liberated the citizen from traditional alignments, fidelities, and ties, and creating a shift in value systems.⁴⁷

Daniel Bell in the End of Ideology, argued that the ideological age has ended in the West

⁴³Bernard E. Brown, "Elite Attitudes and Political Legitimacy in France," The Journal of Politics, vol. 3 (1969) p. 429.

⁴⁴Dalton, p. 99.

⁴⁵Karl Deutsch, Lewis Edinger, Roy Macridis and Richard Merrit, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 52.

⁴⁶See Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

⁴⁷See Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977); R. Dalton (1988).

in the sense that there is a rough consensus on political issues such as the welfare-state, a system of mixed economy, and of political pluralism. Accordingly, the old terms of ideological debate, the "left" and "right" dichotomy is inadequate.⁴⁸ David Kemp, an Australian political scientist also suggested that the presence of new issues threaten old political cleavages:

The events or circumstances which arouse intense political emotions today have little to do with class conflicts. Environmentalism, right to life, women's issues, consumerism, energy, conservatism, participation... Education and cultural positions have more effect on political behaviour and political beliefs than wealth and income.⁴⁹

According to Inglehart, and Dalton, the left-right still exists for old socio-economic issues but a new left and new right is emerging whose potential may restructure social group alignments and party coalitions. This school of thought has argued that the simple dichotomy between old left and old right are no longer adequate to describe present patterns of political competition.

Acknowledging the diminished role of the state in affecting ideological positions, many scholars argue that ideological attitudes nevertheless persist. They warn that modernization and change is not synonymous with the end of ideology or party politics. According to Putnam:

Some of the persisting ideologies are clearly changing as their adherents respond to changes in the social, economic and political environment...But change in the specific content of an ideology is not equivalent to a decline in the importance of ideology as a tool of political analysis any more than changing hemlines mean a decline in the importance of fashion.⁵⁰

According to Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman:

Attitudes on such contemporary topics as nuclear power, terrorism, and abortion are not necessarily related to views on classic issues of socioeconomic reform.

⁴⁸Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 406.

⁴⁹See Katherine Betts, Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976-1987 (Carlton, Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1988), p. 49.

⁵⁰Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 72.

But the simple Left-Right ideological dimension has proved remarkably durable, parsimonious, and pervasive. Predictions of its early demise should be entertained only with great caution.⁵¹

Many scholars maintain the persistence of ideology in the midst of change. Recent studies have shown that while voters consider the left-right less important, they continue to self-identify themselves according to that scale. Lane and Errson cautioned, "Allowing for the rise in voter volatility, the extent to which electorates still tend to orientate toward a classical right-left scale is substantial."⁵² Deutsch et al. in their analysis of French elites found a persistence of ideological attitudes illustrated by the continuing significance attached by respondents to the left-right conflict. Almost half of their respondents still considered this conflict important.⁵³ Dalton, in his study of public opinion and political parties in the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany and France argued that even if traditional cleavages of class and religion have become less central to party programmes, the group ties and institutional structure of the parties have perpetuated these images and stayed intact.⁵⁴ This has been found to be true for political elites as well. The evidence in Fishel's study of German parliamentarians documented that although there is ideological ambiguity, the left-right continuum has not disappeared in the psychological orientation of leaders, nor has it been displaced by conflicting parties competing on the basis of differential attachment to the terms "progressive" and "conservative". Fishel argued that while forces reducing party cleavages grow, ideological conflict between and within

⁵¹Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 117.

⁵²Lane and Errson, p. 131.

⁵³Deutsch et. al., p. 47.

⁵⁴Dalton, p. 148.

two parties continues to be rooted in the framework of left and right.⁵⁵

Although there is disagreement about the pertinence of the left-right construct to modern societies, there is a consensus among scholars that new issues disturb old political cleavages. In face of new issues, the problem has been not only in assessing the relevance of the left-right continuum, but also in defining the nature of party conflict.

New issues arise that are difficult before the fact to relate to the left-right yardstick. Some issues may remain unrelated to this dimension and if they become of intense importance, may split existing parties and redefine alignments. More typically, Converse argued, elites ferret out some limited aspect of an issue for which they can argue some liberal-conservative or left-right relevance and begin to drift to one of the alternative positions. Then, because of party competition pressures, their adversaries drift towards the opposing position.⁵⁶

Issues do in fact vary widely in the degree to which they distinguish the parties in the public's mind.⁵⁷ Parties struggle to differentiate themselves on issue stands along a left-right continuum. However, as new issues of the 1990s emerge, many encounter difficulties in finding a place along an organized conceptual framework. The immigration issue is a case in point which presents such difficulties for political parties. As described earlier, the differences between parties' positions are elusive. The issue has torn parties of the Left between their own working-class base and foreign workers, and has also conflicted parties of the Right, who have struggled to differentiate themselves from their far right competitors. In face of blurred political lines, immigration represents a salient issue which obfuscates left-right ideological positions and party

⁵⁵Fishel, p. 430.

⁵⁶Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in D. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York and London: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 256-257.

⁵⁷Butler and Stokes, p. 292.

distinctions. These complexities call into question the significance of the left-right construct as a tool of political analysis.

II. The Empirical Data

The political party groups in this study are represented by coalitions with shared ideological traditions, who also identified themselves as such at the EP. As explained in Chapter Two, there are 9 political party groups (excluding the Independents) in the EP. This study however focuses only on 6 clusters of party groups: 1)Greens; 2)CG/GUE; 3)Socialists; 4)PPE/RDE; 5)LDR; and 6)DR. These groups constitute the most relevant political players in almost all of the 12 national party systems. For ideological and historical reasons, the two communist parties are grouped together even though they do not share the same approaches to communism. Similarly, if not for nationalist reasons, the largely French RDE would be joined with the PPE. They are thus treated here as a party group cluster.

The data presumes that there is not only a theoretical but empirical relationship between elite membership in a party group and self-ideological placement. The survey asked MEPs to place themselves on an ideological scale from 1 - 9 (left to right). As Table 6.3 illustrates, there is a positive correlation between parties and left-right ideological placement.


Table 6.3: Ideological Dimension in the Ordering of Parties: Members of the European Parliament (Mean Self-Placement according to Party Groups in EP)*

European Party	Self-Placement on Ideological Scale	N
EP	4.23	167
DR (Technical Group of the European Right)	7.83	6
RDE (European Democratic Alliance)	5.67	6
PPE (European People's Party)	5.46	46
LDR (Liberal, Democratic and Reformist)	4.59	17
SOC (Socialists)	3.05	56
GUE (United European Left)	3.11	9
CG (Left Unity)	2.00	1
Greens	2.50	8
ARC (Rainbow)	3.33	3
NI (Independent)	7.00	1
Missing		14

N=167; gamma=.79 p < .001; lambda=.32 p < .0000

Mean self-placement of each party is measured by a scale of 1 (left) to 9 (right), and based on the question asking, "On the ideological spectrum, where do you place yourself from left to right?"

Knowing an MEPs party is informative of where he/she stands ideologically. A rough portrait of the European Parliament in self-ideological terms looks like this:



Both parties' and self-placement measurements reinforce the presence of the left-right construct in differentiating elite attitudes. Recognizing the relationship between partisan affiliation and ideological positions, we seek to understand issue attitude differences between party groups. Transnational cooperation specifically provides a location at which one can

compare individual political parties directly in their relationship with each other. Although such cooperation implies unity, behind ideological fraternity, one may detect differences in national institutional procedures, political roles and political cultures, individual party traditions, and identities. On some issues, these may become more important than ideological motivations.

There are four major dimensions relevant to the immigration issue which may distinguish parties in the European Parliament. First, party differences may be based on ideological underpinnings of the left and right. These include unilinear left-right differences and circular ones. That is, parties may diverge from left to right, but they also may converge at the extremes.

Second, in contrast to the traditional view of competition that parties offer different policies to the electorate on the same issue(s), an alternative view of competition proposes selective emphases. This refers to the idea that parties compete mainly by emphasizing the importance of different issue stands.⁵⁸ Parties may stress particular issues because they work in their favor, and in some sense, they "own" them. The key fact for issue ownership is not what policies candidates promise to pursue, but what problems they promise to address.⁵⁹ According to Budge and Farlie for example, the British Conservatives could never appear more committed to social reforms than the Labor Party. The best Conservative strategy is to divert attention from the need for social reforms to the need for law and order, on which Labor could not credibly propose a firmer line than the traditional party of order. Budge and Farlie concluded that, once

⁵⁸Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, "Party Competition--Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation?: An Alternative View with Data," in Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change, ed. H. Daalder and P. Mair (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 1983), p. 260.

⁵⁹For a good discussion of theories of issue ownership, see John Petrocik, "A Theory of Issue Ownership and the 1980 Presidential Election," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, " (1-4 September 1994).

electors decide which issue is salient, the question of which party to support generally follows automatically. Since many issues will never be emphasized by particular parties, certain areas of resulting space will be out of bounds to some parties and effectively owned by others.⁶⁰ The immigration issue is a relevant example, for it does not lure the individualist Liberal Group as it does the more statist, Socialists. For the purpose of this study, we shall refer to this dimension of party differences as "party policy profile". Party profile in context of the immigration debate refers to parties' levels of attachment to immigration matters.

Third, parties differ with regard to what can be called, "party policy style". Despite very great ideological differences, this factor appears to be a common link between the Socialist group and the DR extreme right group. The active Socialist group has often been found on the same side of the immigration-vocal DR group; both in contrast to conservative and centrist parties. The two groups differ in their substantive appeals; the former group is more likely to promote immigrant rights; the latter to curb immigration. Nevertheless, while their proposals appear to be drastically different, the two have tended to be most visible in national immigration campaigns, and thus tend to resemble each other in "policy style". The left (particularly the Socialist group), has tended to take (at least in rhetoric) a strong stance on behalf of immigrants. The DR has been most visible in its struggle to enter political debate with the established parties. It has struggled fiercely to bring the issue's urgency to center stage.

The parties of the mainstream right have been in the precarious position of confronting the issue without legitimizing their far right neighbors. Their "policy style" has tended to be more reactive, struggling to contain the problem. They include the Liberals and the Conservatives who have been squeezed both by their right and left to confront the immigration issue. This phenomenon is not surprising and may be explained by E.E. Schattschneider's

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 271.

classical account of the "scope of conflict": the existence of "a long-standing struggle between the conflicting tendencies toward the privatization and socialization of conflict".⁶¹ Accordingly, "men of affairs make an effort to control the scope of conflict," and "controlling the scope of conflict may take the form of restricting or expanding it."⁶² In this framework, it is not surprising to find a common style among the DR and Socialist groups, both who have been more vocal in the immigration conflict, and compete against the other party groups who have been forced to react. Policy styles vary from party to party, and often cut through traditional left-right positions.

Finally, parties may be distinguished along a fourth dimension. They may not only be peripherally-active on issues, but in governing in general. There are differences between significant vs. non-relevant parties. Sartori refers to significant parties as "relevant" political parties; those that frequently participate in cabinets and are widely recognized as acceptable coalition partners, or which are so large as to have an important impact on the system even though they are not considered acceptable governing partners.⁶³ Henig's comparative study of West European parties suggested that while traditional parties may have ebbed in political strength, they continue for the most part to play significant roles in the government of their countries. The major government figures in Western Europe in the 1970s came from the same political families as did their predecessors in the 1950s and 1960s.⁶⁴ An analysis gauging the

⁶¹E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1975 (first edition, 1960), p. 7.

⁶²Ibid., p. 8.

⁶³Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework of Analysis, vol. I (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 121-124.

⁶⁴Stanley Henig (ed.), Political Parties in the European Community (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1979), p. 303.

overall strength of parties represented in different national parliaments (weighed by population) has shown the balance of political forces in Western European parliaments since 1946 to favor the Socialist and mainstream right.⁶⁵ In the 1980s, the Socialists, Christian Democrats and Conservatives totalled nearly 70 percent of the average European vote.⁶⁶ It did the same in the 1989 European Parliament elections. If party experience influence MEP ideas on immigration, then Socialist MEPs may be described as the more experienced group (this does not say anything about individual Members). Not only does the Socialist group represent one of the oldest political parties in Europe but even throughout the 1980s it remained the single most powerful political family, polling an average of 31 percent of the vote.⁶⁷ It is also the single most popular group in the EP (with 198 elected MEPs).

We will refer to this cleavage dimension as that of 'party experience'. More particularly, this refers to governing experience such as political hegemony. According to Pridham and Pridham, there are important contrasts between programme aims and governmental responsibilities. Parties in government are more circumspect about the positions which their MEPs take at the European Parliament. In contrast, Members whose parties are in national opposition are freer to indulge a purist ideological stance at the European Parliament level.⁶⁸ One French Socialist summarized these distinctions: "You have behaviors from governmental

⁶⁵Gordon Smith, Politics in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis, Fifth edition (Hants, England: Gower Publishing Company, Ltd., 1988), pp. 378-390.

⁶⁶Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair, Representative Government in Western Europe (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1992), p. 84.

⁶⁷Average polling in 1980s: Conservatives 19%; Christian Democrats 17%; the liberals 11%, Communists 7%; agrarian parties, less than 5%; See Gallagher et al., p. 84.

⁶⁸Geoffrey Pridham and Pippa Pridham, Transnational Party Co-operation and European Integration (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 88.

parties and those who don't belong."⁶⁹ Party experiences vary with or without the constraints of governmental office.

Three cleavage dimensions of the party variable become important in the absence of ideological patterns: party policy profile, party policy style and party experience. As Butler and Stokes showed, ideological closeness is not the basis of all patterns. If this model were true, no one who most preferred the party which is farthest to the left should have his next choice party farthest right or vice versa. They noted that among British Labor supporters in 1963, a third preferred Conservatives to Liberals as a second choice, and among Conservatives, more than a quarter preferred Labor to Liberals.⁷⁰ In France, this scenario was also evident as the strengthening of the extreme right came after periods of relative success for center-left parties.⁷¹

The empirical section below examines differences among party groups according to ideological lines, policy profile, style and experience. This chapter, as the previous one, breaks down the data according to the four dimensions of our case in study: a)assessment of the immigration issue; b)preference of immigrant intake and immigrant groups; c)policy preferences; and d)views on the nature of country/party debates. This section focuses on the relationship between these four dimensions and party and ideological positions.

⁶⁹Interview no. 310 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p. 5.

⁷⁰Butler and Stokes, p. 327.

⁷¹Geoffrey Harris, The Dark Side of Europe: The Extreme Right Today (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990) 165.

A. Assessment of the Immigration Issue

The data in Chapter 5 revealed distinct areas of dissensus in MEPs' assessments of the immigration issue. The country analysis in the last chapter presented some national patterns of MEP attitudes. Party and ideological variables further point to more intricate patterns of MEP attitudes.

Table 6.4: Assessments of the Immigration Issue, by Party Group

	Total EP N (%)	Party Group						<i>Gamma/Significance</i>
		Greens	GUE/CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR	
Attitude Response								
Pessimism	100 (61%)	85%	100%	54%	47%	54%	100%	-.18/p > .05
Country has fewer problems	60 (37%)	0%	50%	31%	65%	47%	0%	.02/p > .05
Problems greater today	140 (85%)	54%	100%	75%	100%	97%	86%	-.65/p < .02
Immigration is a social issue	50 (31%)	8%	38%	40%	29%	33%	17%	.16/p > .05

N=167

*includes NI who was elected on DR platform but due to organizational split joined Non-Aligned.

Table 6.5: Left-Right Means of MEPs on Assessments of the Immigration Issue*

Attitude Response	Ideological Self-Placement	
	Left	Right
About Future of Immigration		
Pessimism	1-----x-----9 4.33	
Optimism	1-----x-----9 4.10	
My country has _____ Problems		
More	1-----x-----9 5.07	
Same	1-----x-----9 3.72	
Fewer	1-----x-----9 4.38	
Problems are _____ Today		
Greater	1-----x-----9 4.43	
Same	1-----x-----9 3.10	
Immigration is a _____ Issue		
Social	1-----x-----9 3.97	
Political	1-----x-----9 3.96	
Economic	1-----x-----9 4.06	

*Means of ideological self-placement, based on a scale of 1 - 9, where 1 refers to the extreme-left, and 9 represents the extreme right.

The relationship between party affiliation and general assessments of the immigration issue is complex, and is not clearly informed by a left-right ideological order. Party policy style and party experiences, in terms of governing, size and marginalization are significant factors in discerning party patterns of elite attitudes. The questions in this section produced two patterns of party polarizations. One type of response spread was characterized by a split between mainstream parties and the extreme parties. In Sartori's terms, this division represents that

between the significant vs. the nonrelevant parties. The other division found the Socialists and DR who have been most immigration active on one side, pitted against the other EP party groups which have been more secondary players on the other.

Party policy style differentiates MEPs ideas on country comparison. Both the Socialist Group and the extreme right, DR have a majority of Members who report that their countries have more immigration problems than the other EU countries. The policy style factor seems to bind the groups' attitudes, distinguishing between MEPs who are affiliated with parties which take active vs. reactive stances on the immigration issue. Socialist MEPs are least likely to assert that their countries have fewer problems than the other EU countries. This is probably attributed to their more active involvement (policy style) and exposure. The relatively small, DR group who have least governing experience, but more immigration-related experience (style) rank highest in reporting that their countries have more problems than the other countries. Conversely, the RDE/PPE, LDR, and GUE/CG are most likely to claim that their countries have "fewer" immigration problems. This latter group of parties, who have attempted to defuse immigration issues in national debates, have been more issue reactive than leaders of the immigration debate. They are distinguished from the Socialist and DR groups by their "policy style."

The Socialist and DR Members of the European Parliament tend to perceive their national situations similarly. Accordingly, immigration problems are more acute: their countries have more immigration problems than the other EU countries. They do not share the same perspective on time. Socialists tend to see immigration problems about the same today as in the past.⁷² The

⁷²The Socialist group (75%) fell lower than all the other party groups (with the exception of the Greens) and lower than the EP average of 85% who say that immigration problems are greater today than in the past. All other party groups in the Parliament seem to show a large consensus (over 85%) that immigration problems are greater today than in the past.

far right DR group claims that immigration problems are more threatening today. While Socialists feel that their country have the same or more problems, these problems are not perceived necessarily new nor greater today than the past (albeit different). Conversely, the DR who report that their countries have more immigration problems do claim that these problems are greater today. These findings are consistent with the previous findings found in the country analysis: there is a weak relationship between the perception of present problems compared to the past and problems compared to other EU countries. The party analysis sheds light on the absence of such a relationship. Politicians pragmatically assess their comparative country positions: they incorporate actual immigrant figures and party styles. However, their perception of the immigration issue over time is a product of global considerations and party experiences.

The impact of party experience is evidenced in accounts of pessimism-optimism. The spread on optimism/pessimism revealed what was discovered earlier: the more peripheral Members (either from the EU's South or from marginal parties) who perceived immigration problems rising, were most pessimistic. Historic and global projections were discussed in the country analysis. The party analysis reinforces the role of experience (or lack of experience). It also introduces the relevance of another dimension of the party variable: mainstream vs. extreme positions.

Differences in future outlook are found between extreme parties who are highly pessimistic about the resolution of immigration problems, and the mainstream parties whose members tend to optimism. All (100%) of the European Right (DR) MEPs and all (100%) of Communist MEPS are pessimistic or very pessimistic regarding their outlook on resolution of immigration problems. The mainstream, PPE/RDE (46%), LDR (53%), and the Socialist (47%) MEPs all express higher than EP (39%) averages of optimism.

As mentioned earlier, pessimism may reflect more general predispositions, such as

cultural bleakness, or feelings of party marginality. Putnam's study of elites in Britain and Italy found a relationship between a politician's perspective on conflict and ideological position, but not a strictly linear one. He noted that in both countries, politicians on the far right were more sensitive to conflict than any others except the far left. According to Putnam, part of the explanation may lie in the fact that moderate left governments were in power in each country at the time of the study, and that those on the far right felt threatened by social trends in their countries.⁷³ The MEP data here supports Putnam's conclusions. Those on the ideological extremes may be more conflict-oriented than are moderates, and therefore more pessimistic.

The split between parties on future outlooks is reinforced by another factor, discussed in Chapter Four: controlling immigration. The overview chapter noted that a large number of MEPs across the spectrum expressed a priority on some type of controlled immigration, and that the belief of such feasibility largely determined future outlook. Clearly, the extreme parties of the right and left lack governing experience, and have had less access to formulate (although they do in shaping) policy. They seem to feel that controlling immigration is hopeless and perhaps more out of reach than the more mainstream parties who deal more regularly with policy control. *As in many policy domains, experience in governing may be a moderating influence.*

The findings confirm that optimism and pessimism do not fall around any noticeable left-right ordering (optimism/pessimism by self-placement = gamma .04). This is important because it contradicts much of the presumptions made regarding left and right visions. According to Lerner and Gorden, properties associated with leftism tend to be idealism, generosity, objectivity and optimism.⁷⁴ Similarly, Putnam's study suggested that left politicians tend to be more

⁷³Putnam, p. 106.

⁷⁴Lerner and Gorden, p. 364.

optimistic than others.⁷⁵ Many MEPs as well, expected politicians of the left to be more idealistic and therefore optimistic, while those of the right would be more prone to pessimism, based on their affiliation to the realist school. The data here did not substantiate these assumptions.

The fact that ideological extremes resemble each other in future outlooks indicates that if there is any ideological polarization on this attitude dimension in the EP, it is not based on the left-right as a unidimensional political scale. This finding corroborates Milton Rokeach's work on the Open and Closed Mind which distinguishes between structure of beliefs and content. The relative openness or closedness of a mind cuts across specific content: that is, it is not uniquely restricted to any one particular ideology, religion, or philosophy. The theme is, "it is not so much what you believe that counts, but how you believe."⁷⁶ Rokeach's assumptions may suggest that ideological orientation is more like a circle where the extremes meet rather than a unilinear arrow.

Ideological content failed to neatly order other areas of immigration assessment. Perceptions of the nature of the immigration issue vary. As indicated in Chapter Four, MEPs were divided in their views of the nature of the immigration issue. 18 percent of MEPs claimed that immigration was a political issue, 30 percent perceived it to be a social issue; 20, 10, and 9 percent thought it belonged to the realm of economic, demographic, and cultural problems, respectively. The party variable did not elucidate any ideological patterns regarding social orientation. While the Socialists (40%) and Communists (33%) were more likely than the rest of the EP (average=30%) to identify immigration as a social issue, the other mainstream right parties such as the RDE, PPE, LDR each scored close to average with 29 percent of Members

⁷⁵Putnam, p. 105.

⁷⁶Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, (New York: Basic Books, 1960), p. 6.

in each. An examination of each party group's prevalent focus reveals no ideological pattern that is detectable along left and right lines:

Table 6.6: Party Issue Identification*

Party group	(N)	Issue Identification	Percent
Greens	(13)	political	31%
GUE/CG	(9)	political	44%
Socialists	(60)	social	40%
LDR	(17)	political	47%
PPE/RDE	(55)	social	33%
		economic	25%
DR	(6)	political	17%
		social	17%
		cultural	17%

N= 165

*Based on predominant response to question, "What kind of issue is immigration?"

An interesting trend emerged among MEPs from party groups who identified immigration as a political issue. With the exception of the DR, these parties in all national political scenes constitute the smaller political families of Europe. The parties which have had less (but not necessarily insignificant) national governing experiences, and which have been more peripheral players in national immigration debates tend to envisage immigration more as a political problem, involving a conflict over values and influence. This includes the Greens (44%), the Liberals (47%), and the Communists (44%). In contrast, the more experienced players such as the mainstream RDE, PPE, and Socialists tend to be more oriented to the social quality of the immigration issue. MEPs from the smaller, less governing experienced parties displayed a consensus above EP average (18%) that immigration was a political issue. It appears that party group size/experience may influence MEP identification of the nature of the immigration issue.

The party variable thus becomes discernible when party experience is gauged rather than an ideological interpretation is used.

B. Preference of Immigrant Intake and Immigrant Groups

In contrast to more general assessments, attitudes toward specific immigrant groups revealed more direct left-right effects than those found in the section above. The left-right ideological construct is visible in questions that deal with the substantive dimension of the immigration issue: questions that deal with migrant groups.

Left-right ideological orientations distinguish MEP ideas regarding appropriate levels of immigration. A unilinear direction of response emerged regarding both increase and decrease preferences (see Table 6.7).⁷⁷ As Table 6.7 illustrates, *MEPs from parties of the left are less likely to advocate decreases in levels of immigration; MEPs of the right tend to be more supportive of such decreases.*

Table 6.7 MEP Preferences of General Immigration Levels, by Party Group*

	GUE/CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR	EP average
Decrease	0% ->	14% ->	29% ->	33% ->	83%	24%
Same	40%	56%	50%	59%	17%	51%
Increase	60% <-	30% <-	21% <-	8% <-	0%	25%

*N=167
gamma = .58 p < .01.

⁷⁷MEPs were asked, "Should immigration in general be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?"

This unilinear ordering was reinforced when MEPs were asked to talk about specific immigrant groups. Table 6.8 below presents the percentages of MEPs that indicated they would like to see the respective immigrant groups "increased":

Table 6.8: MEP "Increase" Preferences of Immigrant Groups, by Party Group

Party	EP average	<u>left</u>	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	<u>right</u>	<i>gamma/significance</i>
		GUE/CG				DR	
Immigrant Origin							
EU	50%	67%	54%	50%	51%	0%	.26/p > .05
E. Europe	43%	70%	54%	39%	30%	0%	.49/p < .01
Non-EU W. Euro	26%	33%	39%	0%	23%	0%	.44/p < .02
Turkey	15%	20%	15%	31%	4%	0%	.47/p < .01
North Africa	50%	50%	22%	31%	8%	0%	.56/p < .01
Africa	40%	40%	20%	31%	8%	0%	.58/p < .001
Asia	30%	30%	16%	23%	6%	0%	.58/p < .001

The presence of the left-right ideological continuum in MEP preferences toward certain immigrant groups is further confirmed by a test of means. The table of means below shows that on a scale from 1 - 9, where 1 represents the extreme left, and 9 represents the extreme right, there is a left preference towards "increasing" and right one towards "decreasing" immigration levels (See Table 6.9). Again, these differences proportionally fluctuate according to origin of immigrant group.

Table 6.9: Left-right Means of MEPs on Preferences of Immigration Levels and Immigrant Groups*

Immigrant Origin	Increased	Decreased
EU	4.25	5.25
East Europe	3.88	4.96
Non-EU W. Euro	3.96	4.93
Turkey	3.44	5.10
North Africa	3.40	5.26
Africa	3.35	5.16
Asia	3.50	5.33
In general	3.47	5.24

N=167;

*Means of ideological self-placement, based on a scale of 1 - 9, where 1 refers to the extreme left, and 9 represents the extreme right.

The tables above point to two interesting dynamics. First, with the exception of the Liberals (who inherently tend to be more individualist), there is a clear pattern of attitudes regarding immigrant preference which is sensitive to the left-right component of parties. From party groups that represent the ideological left to those of the right, MEPs acceptance of immigration levels decrease. These noticeable preference orders exist for all immigrant groups.

A second trend emerged from a vertical scan of the data (see Table 6.8). That is, among all parties (with the exception of the Radical Right group), there is a more positive attitude towards EU and East European migrant groups over all other groups. Interestingly, MEPs are more supportive of East European immigrant populations than they are of West Europeans from non-EU countries. Since the responses regarding non-EU West European migrants were also unfavorable, it is difficult to say if distinctions are based on cultural, race, ethnic or professional considerations. Most likely, it either varies with each specific group, or it is a product of these factors reinforcing each other (i.e., professional distinctions often reinforce cultural ones).

Questions which ask MEPs to identify the attitudes of their fellow colleagues confirm that partisan/left-right ideological orientations shape MEP attitudes towards particular immigrant groups. Table 6.10 below presents a comparative analysis of two questions that measure migrant group preferences. The first question asks MEPs to indicate preferred levels (i.e., increase, present, decrease) of various immigrant groups. The second question asks MEPs to speculate about the opinions of their party colleagues (i.e., in favor or opposed) regarding migrant groups from different origins. In all cases, a favorable response towards migrant groups decreases from left to right. The table below presents the immigrant 'positive-minded' MEPs. These include MEPs who expressed a desire to see the following migrant group levels increase; and those MEPs who claimed that others from their party group would be strongly or somewhat in favor of those migrant groups.

**Table 6.10: Comparative Percentages of Migrant Group Preferences
"Increase" or "In Favor" Responses for MEPs and their Partisan Colleagues***

Immigrant Origin	<u>left</u>	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	<u>right</u>
	GUE/CG				DR
Developing*					
^a You	40%	20%	31%	7%	0%
^b Other MEPs	100%	69%	50%	33%	0%
E. Europe					
^a You	70%	54%	39%	30%	0%
^b Other MEPs	100%	79%	63%	61%	0%
Non-EU W. Euro					
^a You	33%	39%	0%	23%	0%
^b Other MEPs	100%	82%	86%	76%	33%

N=167

*Calculated averages of increase for Africa, North Africa, Asia combined.

^a Based on those who answered "increased" to survey question, "Should immigration from...[each of the following regions] be kept at present level, increased or decreased?"

^b Based on those who answered "strongly in favor" and "somewhat in favor" to survey question, "With regard to immigration from the following areas, which best characterizes the opinions of MEPs from your party grouping, regardless of country?"

The table of comparative percentages points to a consistent diminishing preferential order from Western Europeans to Eastern Europeans to Third World migrants. An interesting comparative difference emerged between what MEPs revealed about their own attitudes and what they projected on to their fellow partisans. In all cases, MEPs think that their fellow MEPs are more inclined to be positive or in favor of immigration, regardless of migrant origin. MEPs are much more absolute and consensual when describing the more abstract and personally removed feelings of other MEPs than when providing their own migrant preferences.

There are also some biases involving migrant groups from Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Northern Europe, and non-EU non-Western Europe. Clearly, the highest and most cohesive (among all party groups) support is given to Southern and Northern Europeans. This is logical as it reflects the *de facto* acceptance of internal EU migration, which is instrumental

to the European integration process. A slight but meaningful pattern of preferences involved the parties of the right, the DR, PPE and RDE. These groups all distinguished Southern and Northern Europeans, preferring the latter to the former, and in some cases the West European non-EU migrants to the South European EU migrants. Both economic development and cultural factors seem to be at the heart of such preferences. This is reinforced by the lower degree of priorities attached to East European migrants.

Table 6.11: MEPs Estimate the Levels of Positive Support of their Fellow Partisans toward Migrant Groups, by Party Group*

Immigrant Origin	<u>left</u>				<u>right</u>	
	GUE/CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR	<i>gamma/significance</i>
Eastern Europe	100%	79%	63%	60%	0%	<i>-.40/p < .02</i>
Southern Europe	100%	80%	86%	80%	0%	<i>-.02/p > .05</i>
Northern Europe	100%	84%	86%	89%	33%	<i>-.26/p > .05</i>
Non-EC W. Europe	100%	82%	86%	76%	33%	<i>-.28/p < .05</i>

N=167;

*Based on "strongly in favor" or "somewhat in favor" responses to question, "With regard to immigration from the following areas, which of the following best characterizes the opinions of MEPs from your party grouping, regardless of country?" Using the following scale: 1)strongly in favor; 2)somewhat in favor; 3)somewhat opposed; 4)strongly opposed.

MEP attitudes towards specific immigrant groups tend to differ from their general assessments of immigration. In the latter types of questions, the party variable is limited to patterns based on particular party profiles and experiences. In contrast, the left-right ideological component of the party variable seems more operative in questions that tap specific assessments of immigrant levels and immigrant group preferences. This may indicate that where dissenting views exist, the left-right is more significant in discerning the substantive dimension of issues. In contrast to party size, experience, immigration profile and distance (i.e., extremes vs.

mainstream), the left-right spectrum is less pertinent to the general, evaluative and defining terms of immigration. This is in contrast to what was found in the last chapter: the country variable was more discriminating on abstract questions and less so on the technical. In both cases, country-specific or party specific experiences influence general evaluations of immigration.

C. Policy Preferences

Questions of immigration policy are inherently beset with conflicts, normally those which are fought over principles (or ideology). Attitudes pertaining to immigration resolution are most noticeably influenced by ideological and party variables. Conceptualization of policy requires a framework of guiding principle. It is thus, in this section that ideology is most pervasive.

Issue resolution, in this section deals with questions pertaining to immigration policy goals and immigration regulation (means, strategies, approaches). Inherently, attitudes related to this area rely on the politician's more fundamental conceptual framework towards problem management. It should be noted however, that the role of a politician is to define what is politically desirable. His/her responsibility is to bring visions and conceptions to the policy process, rather than detailed blueprints.⁷⁸ Thus, the more technical-natured the questions, the less ideologically-informed the responses.

The data in this section revealed ideological differences towards policy, reinforcing the literature, that politicians deduce policy solutions from their conceptual frameworks. According to Aberbach et al., a leader's propensity for deductive conceptualization of public issues is related

⁷⁸Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 92.

to his ideology.⁷⁹ A left-right party continuum informed policy choices. Party trends were also instructive in the non-ordinal response spreads.

Table 6.12: Policy Preferences by Party Group*

	Party Group							gamma/significance
	Total EP N (%)	Greens	GUE/CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR	
Attitude Response								
Common immigration policy ^a	149 (84%)	84%	100%	90%	94%	96%	50%	.06/p > .05
Regulation entirely by EU	66 (41%)	75%	70%	42%	35%	37%	0%	-.31/p < .02
Extend immigrant rights	122 (77%)	100%	90%	97%	60%	62%	0%	.78/p < .001
Economic-Educational Assistance ^b	68 (42%)	54%	40%	49%	47%	30%	29%	-.17/-p < .10

*excludes Rainbow Group and NI who was elected on DR platform.

^aBased on those who agreed strongly and agreed somewhat.

^bBased on those who thought that the first concern for immigration policy-makers should be economic and educational assistance to countries of migrant origin.

⁷⁹Aberbach et al., p. 133.

Table 6.13: Left-Right Means of MEPs on Policy Preferences*

Attitude Response	Ideological Self-Placement	
	Left	Right
Common Immigration Policy		
Agree	1-----x-----9	
	4.40	
Disagree	1-----x-----9	
	4.36	
Immigration Regulation		
National Governments	1-----x-----9	
Independently	6.00	
EU Entirely	1-----x-----9	
	3.77	
Immigrant Rights		
Extend	1-----x-----9	
	3.73	
Restrict	1-----x-----9	
	7.00	
First Concern for Policymakers		
Economic-Educational Assistance	1-----x-----9	
	4.12	
Integration	1-----x-----9	
	4.00	
Limit further Entry	1-----x-----9	
	6.10	

*Means of ideological self-placement, based on a scale of 1 - 9, where 1 refers to the extreme-left, and 9 represents the extreme right.

Nearly all MEPs can agree on one abstract immigration goal: the need for a common immigration policy. It is not surprising, given the European nature of this elite group, that there is large EP consensus (91%) in support of a common immigration policy. It is less surprising that the only exception to such consensus is the extreme right DR group (50%), which consists of nationalist and anti-European ideologues. This abstract goal marks the point of departure from the more substantive party differences based on principles.

Party polarizations become more distinguishable when MEPs are asked to specify visions of authority. National prerogatives are still in contention when it comes to the substance of

common immigration policy (see Tables 6.12 and 6.13).⁸⁰ Ideological/party variables discriminate national vs. EU preferences of immigration control. From parties of the left to those of the right, the number of MEPs indicating that immigration policy should be regulated "entirely by EU institutions" decreased. 75 percent of Green MEPs; 70 percent of GUE/CG MEPs; 42 percent of Socialist MEPs; 35 percent of LDR MEPs; 35 percent of PPE/RDE MEPs; and none of the DR MEPs wish to see immigration regulated entirely by the EU. The extreme right MEPs are most resistant to EU management of immigration policy. The more conservative and liberal right parties advocate some type of national control as well. These figures were reinforced by the left-right means of self-placement: from most national independence (6.00) to most deference to EU authority (3.77), self-placement shifted from right to left.

The ideological variable is equally noticeable in attitudes towards **immigrant** policy. There is a clear party group pattern ranging from left to right on the question of immigrant rights. While 77 percent of MEPs wish to see the rights of immigrants extended, this consensus hides significant party disparities. Of the 6 MEPs who preferred to see the rights of immigrants restricted, 4 were members of the extreme right. The split between those who favored the status quo and those who were more progressive aligned ideologically. The conservative PPE, RDE and Liberals (LDR) showed a greater preference in preserving the status quo. These party groups scored above the EP average (19%) preferring to leave rights the way they were (43% of DR; 37% of PPE/RDE; and 33% of LDR). The Socialists (97%), GUE/CG (90%) and Greens (100%) revealed a greater progressive tendency, favoring the extension of immigrant rights (above EU average of 77%). These differences were also captured by ideological self-placement rankings, as the Table 6.13 of means indicates. The response spread on this question of

⁸⁰The questionnaire asked the sample, "Who should be responsible for regulating immigration policy?" While the plurality of responses emphasized "EU institutions entirely" (40% of MEPs), a larger tendency in the EP towards some type of national control (60%) is clear.

immigrant policy indicates that there is a party component and ideological order regarding the immigrant policy. However, as Chapter Four discussed, the interviews showed that when immigrant rights were concretely delineated, MEPs had specific visions of the quality and terms (i.e., voting rights).

Questions which measured more non-ordinal concepts of issue resolution, generated weaker patterns. Although they appeared less inspired by a strict left-right continuum, party nuances were discernible. On each question of immigration policy, parties proposed distinct modes of resolution. This included ideas on policy goals, regulation principles, modes of regulation, strategies for regulation, and obstacles for the intergovernmental immigration Schengen group.

Hidden but significant party disparities were found when MEPs were asked to suggest, "What should be the first concern of immigration policy-makers?" MEPs were largely split between advocating integration of foreigners (38%) and economic and educational assistance to countries of migrant origin (42%). No significant difference among parties was found regarding these long-term solutions until one examined the less popular, shorter-term proposals (i.e., limit entry or repatriation). Only 11 MEPs mentioned that the first concern of immigration policy-makers should be to "limit further entry of foreigners". However, of these 11 respondents, one was a member of the DR party group and 10 members belonged to the PPE/RDE groups. Six of the nine MEPs who favored repatriation of foreigners also belonged to parties of the right (2 DR, 3 PPE/RDE, and 1 LDR). *These results suggest that MEPs from right parties tend to find short-term restrictive responses more palatable than other MEPs.*

Long-term solutions proposed by MEPs, while more readily open to country interpretations (see Chapter Five), were also ideologically informed. The in-depth interviews were more sensitive to some left-right dichotomy. As country analysis revealed patterns of

priorities, party analysis noted that intentions varied according to ideological convictions. Take the case of two French MEPs. Both Frenchmen from different political parties and ideological orientations expressed interest in economic and educational assistance to countries of origin, but both emphasized different motivations. According to the French MEP from the extreme right DR group:

...I have always tried to have relations with the countries from where immigrants came. For example, with Morocco, the African countries, to try to find together solutions to this problem. Solutions which come from international cooperation, trying to establish a prosperity in their own country. But one day, I was discussing with Mr. Dumas, a presidential candidate, an ecologist...I told him that this North/South problem would be resolved if we would arrive with capital from the West and technicians to work with the working force, materials from these countries. He told me he agreed. Then I told him, we have just invented again colonialism, as colonialism was just that.⁸¹

A French Socialist who also supported assistance to emigration countries provided another rationale:

We need, especially the left-wing government, to improve social conditions of people, to rein trust of people. The immigrants who have been obliged to come here to find a job and eat, can benefit from new professional training so that ultimately they can go to their country and help in economic development. This is an intelligent action...This is positive integration. An integration to better help their country of origin. We are not there yet because we fear opening the door to the extreme right or the right.⁸²

Clearly, responses from politicians of dissimilar political colors may be based on very different political motivations and ideological convictions.

While there is no order of parties from left to right regarding principles for immigration regulation, there are prevalent choices for each party.⁸³ That is, Socialist MEPs are more

⁸¹Interview no. 289 (Strasbourg, 10 June 1992), p. 5.

⁸²Interview no. 312 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 10.

⁸³Based on survey question, "According to what principle, if any, should immigration be regulated?"

predisposed to number quotas than any other single form of regulation (35%) and more than the EP average (25%). Communists far exceed the EP average of 17 percent regarding geographic quotas. Forty percent of Communists embraced geographic quotas. The dominant group to choose professional quotas was the extreme-right DR (43%), a prevalence that exceeded the European average of 19%. Finally, the choice of "no regulation" was predominantly that of the Greens (69%) and the individualist Liberal (38%) group. For both groups, this was a prevalent answer. Both groups exceeded the European average of 17 percent regarding this choice. The data indicate that even among non-ordinal preferences of regulatory principles, there are clear party patterns.

These party dispositions are partly based on ideological conceptualizations, and partly on governing experiences (a component prevalent in the more general assessments of immigration). It is thus, not surprising that the two larger and more governing experienced mainstream parties converged on number quotas, while the smaller and more individualist groups embraced a principle of "no regulation". That the DR Members chose professional quotas is consistent with an ideological preoccupation with unemployment and other economic issues rather than a justification for ethnicity and race quotas.

Other party-based positions were found where principles of immigration policy were at stake. For example, 4 clusters of responses emerged on question: "In general, when thinking about immigration policy, which of the following consideration should come first?". 31 percent of MEPs preferred humanitarian considerations, 10 percent named economic concerns; 32 percent mentioned social integration concerns; and 14 percent favored problems of emigrant countries. A close analysis bears party preferences. Although social integration is the most prevalent concern in the EP, parties of the mainstream right tend to be more preoccupied with this issue than parties of the left. 42 percent of PPE/RDE groups and 59 percent of the LDR claimed that

social integration concerns should motivate immigration policy. These figures exceed the European average of 32 percent and contrast to 27 percent of the Socialists, 30 percent of Communists and eight percent of the Green MEPs.

The Socialists and the Greens tend to focus on more global social issues than the more problem-specific social integration concerns. Forty percent of the Socialists and 31 percent of the Greens considered humanitarian concerns to be of prime order importance. In general, the left-oriented parties were sensitive to global matters such as humanitarianism and problems of emigration countries. An ideological ordering of parties from left to right was found regarding aid to emigration countries. Thirty-one percent of Greens, 30 percent of GUE/CG, 15 percent of Socialists felt that problems of emigration countries should motivate immigration policy-making. This is compared to six percent of the LDR, six percent of the PPE/RDE, and 14 percent of MEPs on the whole. Finally, while economic and demographic considerations were not prevalent concerns for MEPs, four out of seven extreme-right MEPs and three of the ten Communists espoused these objectives. In both cases, the extreme parties were more likely than any other party group to mention these concerns.

Even on the most technical questions, areas where MEPs appeared least informed, a limited party ordering from left to right was detected. MEPs were ambivalent about obstacles they perceived for the European-wide intergovernmental immigration Schengen Group.⁸⁴ The data did not find any response the domain of one party or one country cluster. However, party distinctions were found within two reported obstacles. The most visible pattern was detected along ideological position of left and right, and was limited to answers regarding "the status of third country foreigners" and "lack of democratic control." While the latter concern was

⁸⁴The most frequent mentioned obstacles were "the exclusion of certain EC countries" (29%), and "resolving 'third-national status' issues (22%).

articulated by only seven percent of MEPs in the sample, all of them were Members of the left parties (Socialists, GUE/CG, and the Greens). 80 percent of the MEPs who named "third national status" as the major obstacle for Schengen, were Members of the conservative and liberal parties, the RDE, PPE, and the LDR, but also including the extreme-right DR Members.

MEP views towards policy appear informed by some type of party orientation. A left-right continuum ordered parties' preferences regarding "who should regulate immigration" and on immigrant policy. Where non-ordinal variables were involved, party positions were also distinctive, indicating the existence of ideological differentiation on policy and resolution. This was evident in priorities for immigration policy-makers, principles for regulation and even the more technical obstacles facing the Schengen Group.

D. Views on the Nature of Country/Party Debates

This section addresses the more affective component of MEP attitudes towards immigration. It directly asks MEPs to report their understanding of the (non)conflictual nature of immigration. It probes the factors that affect views towards the immigration issue, exploring in depth the nature of ideological/partisan factors. It concludes that while the left-right continuum fails to neatly order party views of divisions, the party factor is discriminating. As in the more general evaluative component discussed in Section A above the data regarding this dimension of issue attitudes found a pattern of attitudinal convergence between the extreme right and mainstream left.

Table 6.14: Views on the Nature of Country/Party Debates, by Party Group*

	EP Total N (%)	Party Group						gamma/significance
		Greens	GUE/CG	SOC LDR	PPE/RDE	DR		
Attitude Response								
Party differences in EP are clear ^a	141 (86%)	100%	100%	90%	76%	79%	100%	.29/p < .05
Immigration debate in party group- not divisive	82 (53%)	50%	90%	47%	44%	57%	100%	.18/p > .05
National Debate very divisive	52 (32%)	54%	40%	36%	35%	17%	71%	.35/p < .01
Left-right very different on immigration ^b	71 (45%)	39%	50%	59%	35%	35%	43%	.35/p < .02
Cultural differences very important on immigration	63 (39%)	8%	30%	42%	65%	32%	43%	-.13/p > .05

*includes NI who was elected on DR platform but due to organizational split is NA; excludes Rainbow group.

^aBased on those who reported that party differences were somewhat clear or very clear.

^bBased on those who thought that left-right on immigration in country were very different.

Table 6.15: Left-Right Means of MEPs on Nature of Country/Party Debates*

Attitude Response	Ideological Self-Placement	
	Left	Right
Party Group Differences in EP		
Very Clear	1-----x-----9	3.89
Not Clear	1-----x-----9	4.45
Immigration Debate in Party Group		
Very Divisive	1-----x-----9	3.60
Not Divisive	1-----x-----9	4.34
National Public Debate		
Very Divisive	1-----x-----9	4.33
Not Divisive	1-----x-----9	4.80
Left-Right on Immigration		
Very Different	1-----x-----9	3.81
Not Different	1-----x-----9	4.60
Cultural Differences on Immigration		
Very Important	1-----x-----9	4.19
Not Important	1-----x-----9	3.46

*Means of ideological self-placement, based on a scale of 1 - 9, where 1 refers to the extreme-left, and 9 represents the extreme right.

A convergence of the extreme right and mainstream left, regarding questions directly related to conflict, may be explained. First, the policy profiles and styles of both the Socialists and DR extreme right group are similar. Although on opposing sides, both have been most vocal and active in the immigration debate. Both compete against other party groups who have been forced to react. Second, both the extreme right and the mainstream left have an ideology based on general visions of changing or remolding society. If Putnam is correct that , "A politician's

orientation to social cleavages and consensus is a fundamental characteristic of his view of the world," then it follows that the extreme right and left share similar views regarding the nature of conflict.⁸⁵

When it comes to describing conflict and division, MEPs of the left and those of the extreme right arrive at similar conclusions. All parties of the left, like those of the extreme right, have a strong party consensus regarding ideas on group conflict in the European Parliament. That is, 90 percent of the Socialist MEPs, and 100 percent of the Communist, Greens and DR groups each claimed that party differences in the EP were somewhat clear or very clear. The PPE/RDE (21%) and LDR (24%) groups exceeded the European average (14%) in claiming that party group differences were not clear.

This response spread was replicated when MEPs were asked, "How divisive has the public debate been in your country over the immigration issue". Clearly, MEPs from the more mainstream right (and immigration reactive) parties, the RDE/PPE (38%) and the LDR (30%), were more likely to report that their public debates were "not divisive". This is compared to the EU average (17%), 0 percent of the left parties and 0 percent of the DR group.

These findings support previous studies' conclusions that ideology is an important determinant of attitudes towards social and political conflict. Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman found that leftists were more inclined than rightists to stress what divides the parties rather than what unites them.⁸⁶ As Table 6.15 demonstrates, on all questions relating to conflict, those who perceive divisions are consistently located left of the other MEPs on the ideological scale. Research also shows that extreme conservatives are apt to be discontent with social and political

⁸⁵Putnam, (1973), p. 93.

⁸⁶Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, p. 147.

trends, and they too need a theory about how to reverse these trends.⁸⁷ It is logical that both leftists and extreme rightists are most sensitive to social and political conflict, and perceive party differences to be important. It is not surprising that liberal and conservative MEPs are less likely to report conflict in the immigration issue.

There are two tendencies regarding the perception of left-right differences. First, there is a camp composed of all the left-oriented parties together with the extreme right group who deem that left and right positions are different. The second tendency consists of Members of the conservative and center right party groups who find these differences less obvious.

These trends were reinforced when MEPs were asked about issues in particular. Table 6.13 below points to several dynamics. First, in all cases below, the DR, Socialists and GUE fell above the EU average, claiming that left-right positions were very different. The PPE/RDE and LDR fell below the EU average. Second, in all cases, with the exception of the PPE/RDE groups, MEPs tend to perceive differences among ideological groups to be more important for MEPs personally than for their countries in general. Left and extreme right MEPs are more likely than mainstream right partisans to refer to ideology as an important discriminating factor. The extreme right Members are most committed to this view. Finally, according to MEPs, ideological variables are less applicable to immigration than to other issues.

⁸⁷Ibid.

Table 6.16: Percentage of MEPs Claiming that Left-Right Positions are Very Different for Them Personally and for their Countries: On Most Issues and on Immigration Specifically

Left-right positions are very different on...

	<u>General Issues</u>		<u>Immigration</u>	
	For Country	For You	For Country	For You
DR	67%	83%	43%	71%
PPE/RDE	33%	34%	35%	24%
LDR	35%	40%	35%	40%
SOC	52%	57%	59%	61%
GUE	50%	78%	50%	89%
EP Total	43%	50%	45%	48%

N=167

If MEPs discriminate between ideological positions, it may follow that they feel that ideology is a significant factor in shaping their thinking. Table 6.17 below corroborates this pattern. Socialists and extreme-right party groups rank ideological sources in immigration higher than the European Parliament as a whole.

While party group differences may be evident for the left-oriented parties and the extreme right group, it does not follow that there is internal party agreement [See Table 6.14]. Parties of the extreme right and left were the only groups to report party coherence. All DR members and nearly all Communist MEPs claimed that the debate in their party group over the immigration issue has not been divisive. As one French extreme right MEP expressed, cohesion for the extreme right group is ironically based on the group's national differences:

What we have in common with Schodruch [German DR MEP] is that we both French and German, we would like to keep our differences, so that...he doesn't want Germany to become a kind of...France and I don't want France to become German...and so on...⁸⁸

⁸⁸Interview no. 272 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 7.

All other party groups were split on the question of conflict in internal party debate. National delegations in each loose party grouping may play a role in discriminating positions in the debate.

MEPs cite cultural differences to be important (see Table 6.14).

Table 6.17: The Significance of Ideology, National and Cultural Values, and Personal Experience in Shaping MEP Views on Immigration, according to MEPs*

	Ideology	National & Cultural Values	Personal Experience
DR	71%	100%	14%
PPE/RDE	40%	56%	38%
LDR	44%	60%	38%
SOC	53%	52%	62%
GUE/CG	30%	78%	70%
EP	45%	56%	50%
	<i>gamma</i> = -.04 <i>p</i> > .05	<i>gamma</i> = .10 <i>p</i> > .05	<i>gamma</i> = -.27 <i>p</i> < .02

N = 156

*Refers to the percentage of MEPs that claimed those sources were important or very important (response 4 and 5) in shaping their views regarding immigration; those in bold represent figures that exceed European averages.

While the majority of MEPs attach importance to cultural values, the extreme right and the extreme left exceed the other partisans. There is a marked tendency for the ideological extremes to converge in the belief that cultural and national factors are very important in shaping their thinking on immigration. In fact, these Members consider cultural factors more influential than ideology (see Table 6.14).

According to MEPs, immigration attitudes are also affected by personal experience. The left-right continuum clearly distinguishes those Members who heavily rely on personal experience from others. From right to left, personal experience seems to increase in relevance. The left-oriented parties are more likely than the right to relate to this source in thinking about

immigration. This finding is significant as it underscores the role of experience. Experience related to both the country variable (where factors such as immigrant numbers were important) and the party variable (i.e., policy profile and party experience) tend to be more idiosyncratic. However, they often mitigate left-right continuum and country patterns.

III. Conclusion

This chapter addressed several questions. What is the relevance of the left-right construct in ordering party positions towards immigration? What other aspects of the party variable influence MEP attitudes? Transnational cooperation has allowed us to compare party cohesion when competing interests as national affiliations are involved.

Although recent literature has argued the declining relevance of the left-right scheme in face of more contemporary issues, the findings here substantiate the persistence of ideology in distinguishing parties. While immigration has been an elusive new issue in European party systems, an attitudinal survey reveals that elites differ in their views and preferences of immigrants. The left-right construct is useful in organizing these differences. From left to right, MEPs are more likely to advocate decreases in immigration. MEPs of the left are more likely to choose policy solutions that remedy social inequalities. They are more likely than their counterparts on the right to promote more immigrant rights, and educational and economic assistance to countries of immigrant origins.

Considering that the EU lacks an executive, a weaker Parliament, vying to secure influence, is expected to produce uncontroversial resolutions in its efforts to forge a cohesive institutional position. The party analysis in this chapter however, illustrated that this is not entirely the case, since parties may be differentiated by their members' attitudes. Party

polarizations emerge in important areas: immigration policy and immigrant preferences. The peculiar role of the European Parliament in conjunction with European integration efforts however, do affect traditional alliances and patterns of opposition, and this is examined in Chapter Eight.

In this analysis of parties as sources of issue attitudes, four bases of cleavages were discussed, each generating a different pattern of polarization. First, the left-right ideological continuum orders party positions. This includes both (left-right) unilinear and (extremes) circular spatial patterns. Second, variation in policy profiles mean that some parties are more attached to certain issues than others. As Putnam found in his study, respondents have different propensities to perceive conflicting interests in different policy areas. Often, these assessments are based on differences in the way issues can be conceptualized.⁸⁹ Third, approaches to immigration differ accordingly. Active vs. reactive policy styles on immigration generate some similar attitudinal positions between ideologically distant parties; in this case, the extreme-right DR and the Socialists. Finally, national party experiences are relevant to party factors, and they include both immigration related experiences over time and governing experiences, such as political hegemony, and party relevance.

The data in this chapter concluded that parties for the most part take positions which are distinct. The findings point to a dichotomy between the more general questions which are informed by party-specific experiences and policy profiles, and the more substantive policy questions. It is in this latter area that MEP attitudes are most readily divided between left and right. *Empirically, ideology of party is a better predictor than national or cultural values regarding substantive policy.* The left-right construct has an organizing power among parties in the European Parliament regarding preferences of migrant groups, and policy (see Tables 6.7-

⁸⁹Putnam, (1973), p.112-113.

.12), particularly the technical matters such as immigration authority and immigrant rights.

In contrast, at the most general level, attitudes towards immigration are more conditioned by party experiences, profiles and styles. Socialists and extreme-rightists are most sensitive to the amount of immigration problems compared to other EU countries. They deviate from each other in their perceptions of the evolution of immigration problems. While Socialists feel that their countries have the same amount or more immigration problems, they do not perceive them necessarily new or greater than the past. The extreme-right MEPs tend to see problems to have worsened. Such divergences in time perception may be related to differences in party experiences.

The immigration issue that surfaced in the 1980s and 1990s is a by-product of the post-World War II settlement. Its incorporation into national party schemes is quite new (See Chapter Three). A look at European national party dynamics reveal that when this issue emerged in the last decade, left-wing parties were generally in the front-line. Throughout the 1980s (the 1970s in the U.K.), the parties of the Left have struggled with the conflict between their own working-class base and foreign worker competition. The extreme-right parties emerged later to politicize the issue. Longer experience in managing immigration-related problems also means that the Socialists are less threatened, and less pessimistic than MEPs from other parties. It is not surprising that parties diverge in locating the issue in time, and in their future outlooks.

The chapter also suggested that *the left-right construct is a more suitable organizing tool of polarization on substantive immigration questions*. In contrast, at the most general level, the country variable was more discriminating, particularly on questions which asked MEPs to assess the immigration issue. Indeed, *national cultural factors give rise to beliefs and attitudes that are more conceptual and abstract*.

Finally, the data suggests that both national and ideological/party variables may shape

MEP thinking on immigration. Country and ideological variables overlap on the experience factor. Just as immigrant figures and contexts were influential country characteristics, styles, profiles, and experience with immigration help demarcate parties. Experience, whether personal, party-oriented, country-related, or immigrant-specific needs to be considered in any systematic account of policy thinking. The following chapter explores the intricate link between national and party variables.

Chapter Seven Nation-State and Party Variables: Intricate Links

I. Introduction

The questionnaire and interviews surveyed Members' of the European Parliament (MEPs) a) assessments of the immigration issue and immigrant groups; and b) policy preferences. Chapters Five and Six considered the national and party bases of MEP responses respectively. This chapter compares the roles of left-right and partisan orientations across four countries. It explores the ways in which French, German, Italian, and British MEPs contribute to the attitudinal patterns found in the previous chapters. The analysis suggests that while party/ideology shapes the attitudes of MEPs, they are strongly conditioned by national party traditions and country-specific experiences with immigration. Equally striking is the finding that MEPs clearly draw on the immigration experience of other EU countries; a phenomenon which reflects the globalization of the immigration issue in an interdependent community. Globalization in this context however, means that the EU may align itself with the three more dominant European players, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

The selection of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy for in depth analysis offers a parsimonious test of patterns found in the previous analyses. First, these are the four largest countries of the EU, both in population and numerical representation at the European Parliament. Each country sends 81 members to the Parliament.¹ Our sample group reflects this

¹With the reunification of Germany, preparations for the European elections of June 1994 included the addition of 18 MEPs for Germany, and 6 Members each for France, Italy and the United Kingdom (for a collective bloc).

composition. It includes 24 British, 22 German, 23 French and 25 Italian MEPs.² Second, the four countries also capture the major cultural distinctions in Europe discussed earlier: the North-South divide; immigration vs. emigration experiences; and the presence or absence of a colonial tradition.³ Finally, the four cases represent countries with different levels of immigration, from Italy with a relatively low concentration of foreign residents to France and Germany with substantially higher numbers (see Table 7.5). The salience of immigration issues varies in accordance with these distinctions, and this is marked by electoral platforms, the extreme-right anti-immigration parties and negative public opinion.⁴

The country portraits provide a "snapshot" of the differences parties make in each country. They also explore the extent to which parties (from the DR on the extreme right to the GUE on the extreme left) are cohesive across national boundaries. The organization of national party groups into larger political units is integral to the European Parliament.

The success of the European Union in building a supranational community rests on finding common interests shared by individual member-states. The European Parliament is the major institution in which this goal is pursued as representatives are grouped in broad, cross-national political families. The existence of cohesive party group positions would indicate that ideology (a consistent system of beliefs and values) is guiding the choices of these policymakers and that MEPs may be transcending their particular national visions in following the lead of

²The small size of the cells precludes the use of most tests of statistical significance. However, percentages are suggestive of the differences.

³See Chapter 4.

⁴Gallya Lahav, "Immigration, Hypernationalism and European Security," in J. Philip Rogers (ed), The Future of European Security: The Search for Peace in an Era of Revolutionary Change (New York and London: St. Martin's Press and Macmillan Press, 1992).

Germany, France and the UK.⁵

This study indicates that, although limited, some party group distinctions are operative at the European Parliament level. For example, MEP assessments of immigrant groups tended to transcend nation-state lines. Party groups were polarized on their preferences and a consistent left-right continuum of responses emerged. Table 6.7 showed a striking ordering of parties from extreme left (GUE, CG) to extreme right (DR) regarding thinking on levels of immigration.

The data here also corroborates other studies which profess "the cross-national travelling capacity of left-right scales."⁶ However, it cautions against the assumption that elites with the same ideological self-placement will respond similarly to issues across countries. A sense of attitudinal distance is needed to capture the complexity of ideological positions within different systems and countries (see Table 7.1). This requires an understanding of how ideological differences are filtered through the political cultures of particular EC countries. As noted in Chapter Six, country-specific experiences with immigration also mitigate traditional ideological orientations.

⁵See Joel Aberbach, Robert Putnam, and Bert Rockman, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981); Also, Asher Arian, Ideological Change in Israel (Cleveland, Ohio: Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1968); Mattei Dogan (ed.), Comparing Pluralsit Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988); Robert Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1976).

⁶John Huber, "Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring Ideology," European Journal of Political Research 17 (1989) pp.599-621.

Table 7.1: Mean Ideological Self-Placement of Members of the European Parliament by Party Group and Country*

Party	Greens	Communists (GUE)	Socialists (SOC)	Liberals (LDR)	Christian Democrats/ Right (PPE/RDE)	Radical Right (DR)
Country						
UK	NR	NR	2.69	NR	5.73	NR
France	4.00	NR	2.38	5.00	6.17	9.00
Germany	1.67	NR	3.25	4.00	6.00	7.00
Italy	2.00	3.14	3.63	6.00	3.83	NR

*Based on a nine point scale, and the question asking MEPs, "On the ideological spectrum, where do you place yourself from left to right (1=left; 9= right)?"

NR=nonrelevant

To some degree, attitude variance may be more related to left-right placement than to party label.

The interviews indicated that MEPs recognized that left and right are relative and dynamic terms which may fluctuate according to country and issue. As one Danish MEP commented:

Differences between left-right parties are very small.... Maybe only in countries like France and Germany that differs. But not with a country of 5 million, with distance of 300 miles, all the same religion, same culture, same education. There is no need for differences.⁷

As Table 7.1 above demonstrates (e.g., Greens in France position themselves right of Socialist; and Italian Christian Democrats are left of Liberals), party identification and self-identification must be interpreted in country context. A Greek Communist noted,

Left and right exists but it is a question of priority. I mean, in France, it is much more important, so even the left and right will have to take into account

⁷Interview no. 48, (Strasbourg, 13 June 1992) 3-4.

the experiences of France. It is not as important to Greeks.⁸

In immigration matters specifically, national immigrant-contexts may be relevant. One MEP succinctly addressed this correlation:

When left and right crosscut, you need to look at numbers or the masses of migrants. For example, France. The problem is so heavy in France, that all forces are displaced a bit.⁹

Conversations with MEPs illuminated intra-party and contextual ideological differences.

As discussed in Chapter Six, MEPs from the same party groups may differ on their attitudes toward immigration. These differences often reflect deeper party traditions and political cultures. Parties with the same name may adopt slightly different ideologies. Parties with similar ideological placement in their countries may belong to the same party family in the European Parliament and yet be ideologically distant. The British Labour party, for example, is radically more left-wing than the German Social Democratic Party. Partisans nevertheless sit together in a formal united front at the European Parliament. Finally, internal differences within party groups may reflect national party experiences of governing and party roles in immigration debates. They may also be related to party experiences with what E. E. Schattschneider called, the "scope of conflict."¹⁰ Thus, in an effort to expand their power base, parties will be motivated to consider how victory or defeat on the immigration issue will affect their long-term prospects. Controlling the scope of conflict may "take the form of restricting or expanding it."¹¹ These factors suggest that ideological and party patterns of the left and right must be

⁸Interview no. 37, (Brussels, 30 May 1992), 2.

⁹*Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁰E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1975 (first edition, 1960).

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 8.

considered in country-specific contexts.

Country-specific characteristics such as the level of socio-economic development, religious predominance and the degree of ethnic homogeneity also contribute to variations in MEP attitudes. However, Chapter Five has demonstrated that country-specific features, such as the size of the immigrant population and public opinion are important factors in MEP attitudes toward immigration. The contrast between countries with a substantial number of non-EC immigrants and those with fewer foreign residents indicates that immigrant presence has considerable psychological resonance. MEP responses substantiated this.

The preceding discussion has considered the intricate links between country and party experiences. The empirical data on the four countries support this. The following sections focus on MEP assessment of immigration in general, and views on immigration policy.

II. The Empirical Data

A. Assessment of the immigration issue

The questionnaire tapped MEP assessments of the importance of the immigration issue, their preferences on levels of immigration, and their outlook on future problem resolution. The Parliamentarians were further asked to compare the importance of the immigration issue to the past and to other countries in the European Union.

As previously discussed, MEPs were more inclined to agree on abstract questions like immigration salience. They diverged on more specific issues concerning comparative national problems and appropriate levels of immigration. However, country and party disparities emerged amidst both high and lower levels of consensus.

The vast majority of MEPs (84%) perceived immigration problems to be greater today than in the past. This is consistent with the cyclical dynamic reported by R. Simon in her findings on public opinion.¹² As noted earlier, MEPs perception that immigration problems have worsened may be attributed to a variety of reasons, ranging from romantic notions of the past to actual experiences with immigration. An analysis of national patterns revealed that countries in the EU differ with regard to their phase of immigration development, and that MEP attitudes reflect these experiences. Chapter Five revealed that there is a tendency in the Southern countries of the EC to perceive immigration problems as greater today than ever before. Italian (96%), Portuguese (100%), and Greek (100%) MEPs exceeded the European average (85%) on their response that immigration problems were greater than in the past. This heightened perception among MEPs from traditional emigration countries with small immigrant concentrations reflects a globalization of the immigration issue in a transnational community. If Gary Freeman was correct in suggesting that the effects of migration and their recognition tend to lag, the transition from emigration to immigration societies is being felt in the 1990s.¹³

The changing structure of immigration regimes appears to be recognized by German and Italian MEPs. Table 7.2 shows that they almost unanimously agreed that immigration problems are greater today than in the past. This underscores Freeman's finding that "people develop more accurate impressions of the consequences of immigration and immigrants over time, as migration is repeated year after year, or as the migrants settle in their new countries".¹⁴ This study

¹²Rita Simon, Public Opinion and the Immigrant (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1986). See also Julian Simon, The Economic Consequences of Immigration (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989), p. 351.

¹³Gary Freeman, "Why the Immigration Intake is Too Large in Democracies," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, The Washington Hilton, September 2-5, 1993), 5.

¹⁴Ibid.

confirms that Italian elites are adjusting to their new status as an immigration country. Italians across the political spectrum described the unique nature of their immigration history:

The starting point maybe is the particular situation of Italy. Our country was, up to ten years ago, an emigrant country not an immigration country. Unlike Germany, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and America too, north and south, up to the seventies we were an emigrant country. Now we discovered the problems...of rich countries.¹⁵

Italy is a latecomer in terms of immigration.¹⁶

Similarly, Germans are dealing with changing patterns as they have discovered that the "guestworker" programs are not temporary after all. It is no coincidence that German politicians are for the first time in the post-war era formulating an "immigration policy."

MEPs from traditional immigration countries such as the United Kingdom and France are less likely to identify immigration issues as being more problematic today. The immigration issue has been on the national agenda in the UK since the 1960s, and in France since the 1970s. During the early stages, there was a large cross-party consensus in each country in attempt to defuse the issue. However, as the immigration debate inevitably became politicized, parties in both countries vigorously struggled to differentiate themselves and break the mainstream consensus. This pattern is also identifiable in the European Parliament. MEPs from traditional immigration countries are more likely to be divided on immigration, regardless of party affiliation (see Tables 7.2, 7.3, 7.6).

The four nation profiles suggest a complex dynamic between country and party patterns regarding the magnitude ascribed to immigration problems (see table 7.2). Consensus within the Socialist group (75%) on the question of whether immigration problems had worsened was lower than for all other party groups (with the exception of the Greens with 54%), and lower than the

¹⁵Interview 7, (Brussels, 15 May 1992), 1.

¹⁶Interview no. 51, (Brussels, 14 April 1992), 2.

EP average of 85%. Socialists in Britain and France were even less inclined to report this sentiment. The lack of inter-party accord in these countries tends to support the argument that the evolutionary phase of immigration has implications for party consensus. Moreover, Germany (91% of MEPS) and Italy (96%) displayed remarkable cross-party consensus regarding the nature of problems today. This included the Socialist MEPs. The data here show that party patterns must be interpreted within country-specific contexts, which include each nation's phase of the immigration issue, and traditional party consensus in general.

Table 7.2: MEPs Reporting that Immigration Problems are Greater Today than in the Past, by Country and Party*

Country	N	Question N (%)	Greens	GUE /CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR
United Kingdom	25	17 (68%)	--	--	50% (7/14)	--	91% (10/11)	--
Germany	22	20 (91%)	67% (2/3)	--	100% (9/9)	100% (3/3)	100% (3/3)	100% (3/3)
France	23	14 (61%)	33% (2/6)	--	38% (3/8)	100% (1/1)	100% (6/6)	100% (2/2)
Italy	24	23 (96%)	50% (1/2)	100% (7/7)	100% (8/8)	100% (1/1)	100% (5/5)	--
EP average	165	140 (85%)	54%	100%	75%	100%	96%	86%

N may not equal 100% because the ARC Rainbow Group and Independent Group have been excluded from the tabulated data.

*The table should be read as follows. There were 25 Members from the UK in the sample. 17 of the 25 (or 68%) answered in the affirmative. Socialists constituted 14 of all the UK Members in the sample. 7 of the 14 (or 50%) responded in the affirmative. There were 11 Members of the PPE party in the UK. 10 or 91% of them answered positively.

Table 7.3: MEPs Reporting that My Country has more Immigration Problems than the Other EC Countries by Country*

Country	N	Question N (%)	Greens	GU E/ CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/ RDE	DR
United Kingdom	24	1 (4%)	--	--	7% (1/14)	--	0% (0/10)	--
Germany	21	12 (57%)	0% (0/3)	--	44% (4/9)	100% (3/3)	100% (2/2)	100% (3/3)
France	22	9 (41%)	17% (1/6)	--	14% (1/7)	100% (1/1)	83% (5/6)	50% (1/2)
Italy	25	2 (8%)	0% (0/2)	0% (0/7)	13% (1/8)	0% (0/1)	17% (1/6)	--
EP average	161	30 (19%)	8%	6%	37%	11%	32%	4%

*See note in Table 7.2.

MEPs acknowledged that there are national differences in immigration experiences. Nevertheless, they were also able to put their own country's experience in a broader European context. Most importantly, they portrayed an understanding of the interdependent nature of the immigration issue. MEPs were objective about their national situations but could also internalize the lessons of their neighbors. One Greek MEP, who acknowledged that Greece was "relatively free" of foreigners, identified with the problems of countries with "too many immigrants":

I do agree that the number of immigrants in Europe is quite high, and with rising unemployment, we cannot afford the luxury of receiving any more.¹⁷

MEPs demonstrated a capacity to see beyond national concerns and conceptualize issues from a pan-European perspective.

MEPs may feel that immigration problems are worse today, but better in their country

¹⁷Interview no. 31 (Brussels, 2 July 1992) 3.

than anywhere else. Ninety-six percent of Italians reported that immigration problems are greater today than in the past but they were far more reluctant (8%) to claim that their country had more immigration problems than other EC countries. Both Italian MEPs, and their British counterparts, who also perceived their country as having fewer immigration problems than others, manifested considerable agreement between Members of the two major parties (See Table 7.3). In contrast, French and German MEPs were more likely to claim that their countries had greater immigration problems than other EU countries. They were also more inclined than the EP average (19%) to report that their country has more immigration problems. Table 7.5 below illustrates the numerical basis of such assessments. MEPs relate to domestic realities. This relationship between the number of immigrants and attitudes concurs with the Eurobarometer findings on public opinion in Europe (correlation = .82)¹⁸

Table 7.4: Size and perception of size of foreigner population

Country	Total Foreigners/ Population	Total Non-EC Foreigners/ Population	% Saying "Too Many" Foreigners Resident ^a
Germany	8.2%	5.3%	47%
France	6.4%	3.9% ^b	45%
United Kingdom	3.3%	2.2%	45%
Italy	1.4%	.7%	35%

^aAs measured by Eurobarometer's survey reported percentage of answers stating that there are "too many" resident foreigners.

^bFigures do not include native-born Algerians residing in France.

Sources: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Trends in International Migration: Continuous Reporting System on Migration (Paris: Sopemi, 1992). Eurobarometer 30: Public Opinion in the European Community, Report on Racism and Xenophobia (1989). Documents Observateur, no. 4, (January/February 1989).

¹⁸Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer 30: Public Opinion in the European Community: Special Issue on Racism, Xenophobia and Intolerance (Brussels: Directorate-Generale Information, Communication and Culture, November 1989). The report is based on a sample of 11,795 individuals in all twelve member-states of the European Union.

In countries with larger immigrant concentrations, such as France and Germany, party dynamics are instructive. MEPs from parties of the left differed markedly from their competitors on the right who tended to accentuate the severity of comparative immigration problems. Although this dynamic fluctuates from country to country, the tendency towards inter-party disagreement is constant. This phenomenon underscores the Eurobarometer's warning that although attitudes are related to size of foreign populations, hostility towards immigrants does not necessarily grow in proportion to numbers. Rather, political debate about immigrant presence tends to become more heated when immigrant size is, and/or perceived as large.¹⁹ The majority of Socialist MEPs (with the exception of the British) tended to take similar positions regarding their comparative country positions. They were proportionately less inclined than their opponents on the right to perceive their immigration problems as acute. The patterns in this response spread revealed that in countries where immigrant numbers were high, MEPs tended to disagree about the comparative nature of immigration problems to others. This corroborates the previous hypothesis that the politicization of immigration debates relates to the phase of the immigration cycle in particular countries.

The theory that political debate tends to increase with a growth of immigrant presence is empirically confirmed by the elite data (see Table 7.5). The perception that national public debate over immigration was very divisive was prevalent in Germany (90%) and France (70%). In the UK (13%) and Italy (32%) where immigrant figures are lower, MEPs reported less divisions. There are big country differences regarding national public debates. MEPs positions tend to reflect their national perspectives rather than their party families in the EP.

¹⁹Eurobarometer 30, pp. 45 and 64.

Table 7.5: MEPs Reporting that National Public Debate over Immigration is Very Divisive, by Country and Party*

Country	N	Question N (%)	Greens	GUE/CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR
United Kingdom	24	3 (13%)	--	--	15% (2/13)	--	9% (1/11)	--
Germany	20	18 (90%)	100% (3/3)	--	100% (9/9)	100% (3/3)	50% (1/2)	67% (2/3)
France	23	16 (70%)	50% (3/6)	--	75% (6/8)	100% (1/1)	67% (4/6)	100% (2/2)
Italy	25	8 (32%)	0% (0/2)	57% (4/7)	25% (2/8)	100% (1/1)	17% (1/6)	--
EP average	162	32 (52%)	54%	40%	36%	35%	17%	71%

*See Note in Table 7.2

While MEP national comparisons of immigration problems are related to the actual number of immigrants, their future outlooks on problem resolution are not (see Table 7.6 below). There is a weak relationship between country comparisons and feelings of optimism or pessimism. All MEPs who claimed they had more immigration-related problems than other EC countries were very pessimistic (ie. the German PPE Members). However, not all pessimists claimed they had more immigration problems (ie. Italian GUE Members). In Italy, where MEPs concurred on the assessment that their country faced fewer immigration problems, pessimism was striking. While the mainstream partisans were less cohesive, the majority of Italian MEPs in all parties were pessimistic regarding the future outlook on immigration problems.

Table 7.6: MEPs Reporting that they are Pessimistic or Very Pessimistic about Immigration Problem Resolution, by Country and Party*

Country	N	Question N (%)	Greens	GUE/CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR
United Kingdom	24	13 (54%)	--	--	62% (8/13)	--	46% (5/11)	--
Germany	21	13 (62%)	67% (2/3)	--	50% (4/8)	33% (1/3)	67% (2/3)	100% (3/3)
France	23	14 (61%)	83% (5/6)	--	25% (2/8)	0% (0/1)	83% (5/6)	100% (2/2)
Italy	25	21 (84%)	100% (2/2)	100% (7/7)	75% (6/8)	100% (1/1)	67% (4/6)	--
EP average	163	100 (61%)	85%	100%	53%	47%	54%	100%

*See note in Table 7.2.

Whether or not MEPs report that their problems are greater today does not predict what they expect for tomorrow. Similarly, MEPs who claimed their countries had more immigration problems than others were neither more nor less pessimistic than their colleagues who claimed to have less. Past experiences and country-specific ones are not indicative of future expectations. Party groups exhibited few systematic patterns, with the noteworthy exception of the extreme parties, who unanimously expressed deep pessimism. The findings in this chapter replicate the patterns found in the EP at large: optimism and pessimism are not related to ideological orientations of the left and right ($\gamma = .04$).²⁰ This is important because it contradicts common stereotypes of left and right politicians. For example, many MEPs expected that left-wing politicians, whom they considered idealists, would be inclined towards optimism, while the

²⁰This is based on the correlation of 2 variables. The first asks MEPs to rank themselves between 1 - 9 from extreme left to extreme right and the second, to express their optimism or pessimism to the immigration problem resolution.

"realists" on the right would be more pessimistic.

The focus on immigration policy implementation helps explain why both country and left-right positions are limited in predicting optimism or pessimism. As discussed in Chapter 4, future outlook is much more associated with beliefs about immigration control. MEPs on the whole expressed a preference for some type of controlled immigration. Their beliefs concerning the feasibility of such control varied. These perceptions influence their outlook for the future. The next section probes their views on policy resolution.

B. Policy Preferences

This section probes MEP patterns on immigration management. The data point to an interplay of party and country variables on questions that measure policy thinking in the four countries. Variations in the patterns are evident across countries and questions.

Table 7.7: Percent of MEPs who Prefer a Common EC Immigration Policy, by Country and Party^a

Country	N	Question N (%)	Greens	GUE/CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR
United Kingdom	25	21 (88%)	--	--	72% (10/14)	--	100% (11/11)	--
Germany	22	17 (77%)	67% (2/3)	--	100% (9/9)	100% (3/3)	100% (3/3)	0% (0/3)
France	23	21 (91%)	83% (5/6)	--	100% (8/8)	0% (0/1)	100% (6/6)	100% (2/2)
Italy	25	25 (100%)	100% (2/2)	100% (7/7)	100% (8/8)	100% (1/1)	100% (6/6)	--
EP average	165	149 (90%)	86%	100%	90%	94%	96%	57%

^aSee note in Table 7.2.

^aBased on those MEPs who reported that "agree" and "agree strongly" that there should be a common EC immigration policy.

Table 7.8: Percent of MEPs who Think that EC Institutions Should be Entirely Responsible for Immigration Regulation, by Country and Party^{*}

Country	N	Question N (%)	Greens	GUE/CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR
United Kingdom	24	8 (33%)	--	--	46% (6/13)	--	18% (2/11)	--
Germany	21	7 (33%)	50% (1/2)	--	33% (3/9)	33% (1/3)	67% (2/3)	0% (0/3)
France	21	8 (38%)	67% (4/6)	--	67% (4/6)	0% (0/1)	0% (0/6)	0% (0/2)
Italy	25	16 (64%)	100% (2/2)	86% (6/7)	50% (4/8)	0%	67% (4/6)	--
EP average	161	66 (41%)	75%	70%	42%	35%	35%	0%

^{*}See note in Table 7.2.

The data on issue resolution reveal that MEPs shared a general conviction that immigration policy should be harmonized. Ninety percent of MEPs agreed or agreed strongly that there should be a common immigration policy for EC member states (see Table 7.7). This remarkable consensus disappeared when they were asked about the more substantive aspects of a common policy. For example, they were not convinced that EC institutions alone should be responsible for immigration regulation (see Table 7.8). Assigned proprietorship of such a common policy found more distinguishable country-specific preferences. Only 41 percent of MEPs reported that immigration should be entirely regulated by EC institutions, a lower figure than one might expect from this group of European elites. While the British (33%), German (33%) and French (38%) MEPs generated similar levels of support for EC institutional regulation, Italian MEPs (61%) were more likely to defer to EC institutions. No systematic party patterns emerged.

The overall results discussed in the previous chapters hid considerable party disparities in each country. Even in the more consensual case of common immigration policy, some party group anomalies emerged. For example, the Liberal (LDR), Green, and extreme right DR groups all displayed intra-party group differences. In France, DR members expressed complete agreement with each other and with mainstream parties that there should be a common immigration policy. In contrast, German DR Members did not support common EU immigration policy. This reflects the fact that each member has a different conception of the terms on which a common policy is acceptable. One extreme right member from France qualified his thoughts regarding a common policy: "If it means what the left want a common policy to be, then I say no, but if this common immigration policy means a united effort to stop immigration, then a common policy is correct".²¹ This point serves as a key to interpreting the data: amidst

²¹Interview no. 14, (Brussels, 9 May 1992), 9.

consensus, one may often find heterogeneous interests.

French Liberal party members also differed from those in Germany and Italy. In addition to varying concerns regarding a common policy, Liberal group disparities are consistent with the Liberal tendency towards individualism. This qualifies them as the least cohesive group in the European Parliament. The Green group too exhibited some fluctuations across countries. While on the whole this group tended to prefer some type of common immigration policy, consensus was proportionate to national MEP averages.

Some areas of problem resolution do show discernible party patterns along a left-right continuum. It is noteworthy however that even in these cases, party group cohesion varied in each country. For example, a plurality of MEPs in each of the four countries preferred the extension of immigrant rights (ie voting, associational activity, etc). While party groups do not exhibit the same levels of cohesion in each country, they are equally polarized. The dynamic between parties of the left and those of the right remain the same (see Table 7.9). Attitudinal distance is similar as the parties of the left prefer change, while those on the right were more likely to maintain the status quo. The former thus support the extension of immigrant rights while the latter are less likely to do so. Italy is an exception as MEPs across parties tend to resemble each other. This tendency for party convergence in Italy again reinforces the trend in the previous section; each country is at different phases of the immigration issue and this affects the nature of party dynamics.

Table 7.9: Percent of MEPs who Think that Immigrant Rights Should be Extended, by Country and Party*

Country	N	Question N (%)	Greens	GUE/CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR
United Kingdom	24	18 (75%)	--	--	93% (13/14)	--	50% (5/10)	--
Germany	19	12 (63%)	100% (3/3)	--	100% (8/8)	0% (0/3)	0% (0/3)	0% (0/3)
France	23	16 (70%)	100% (6/6)	--	100% (8/8)	100% (1/1)	17% (1/6)	0% (0/2)
Italy	25	20 (80%)	100% (2/2)	86% (6/7)	88% (7/8)	0% (0/1)	83% (5/6)	--
EP average	160	123 (77%)	100%	90%	97%	60%	62%	0%

*See note in Table 7.2.

Party polarizations are clear on immigrant rights, except in Italy.

A discernible country party ordering was found in other attitudes toward issue resolution. The previous data analyses revealed that the predominant preference among MEPs for immigration policymakers was economic and educational assistance to immigrant-sending countries (41%) and integration of foreigners (38%).²² Table 7.10 shows that preference espoused by MEPs varied when countries were controlled. In the United Kingdom, 52 percent of MEPs advocated integration of foreigners first, and only 26 percent promoted economic and educational assistance. In Germany (55%), France (44%), and Italy (48%) the percentages resemble the EP average ordering more closely, advocating economic and educational assistance. 32, 17, and 48 percent of these national MEPS respectively prefer integration of foreigners.²³ Party patterns also stay relatively the same.

²²This is based on the question, "What should be the first concern of immigration policymakers?"

²³Note: this is most pronounced for Germany.

Although MEPs are divided about appropriate guiding principles for immigration policy, party group tendencies were clear. In all countries, parties of the left were more likely to express such preferences towards economic and educational assistance than those on the right. Nevertheless, as found in the response spread shown in Table 7.8, indexes of party cohesion differed (see Table 7.10). For example, only 31% of British Socialists reported that this should be a preeminent consideration of policy-makers compared to 89 percent of their Socialist German counterparts. This was true in the other countries as well. The extreme right groups, the LDR, and the Greens also exhibited the same patterns discussed above (see Table 7.7 and 7.9). Their attitudes were conditioned by country perspectives.

Table 7.10: Percent of MEPs who Think that Economic and Educational Assistance Should be First Concern of Immigration Policy-Makers, by Country and Party^{*a}

Country	N	Question N (%)	Greens	GUE/CG	SOC	LDR	PPE/RDE	DR
United Kingdom	23	6 (26%)	--	--	31% (4/13)	--	20% (2/10)	--
Germany	22	12 (55%)	33% (1/3)	--	89% (8/9)	67% (2/3)	33% (1/3)	0% (0/3)
France	23	10 (44%)	67% (4/6)	--	63% (4/6)	0% (0/1)	0% (0/6)	50% (1/2)
Italy	25	12 (48%)	100% (2/2)	43% (3/7)	63% (5/8)	100% (1/1)	0% (0/6)	--
<u>EP average</u>	163	68 (42%)	54%	40%	49%	47%	30%	29%

*See note in Table 7.2.

^abased on the plurality response in the EP whole sample.

Attitudinal patterns of MEPs from the UK, France, Germany and Italy regarding issue resolution reinforce those on assessment of immigration (section A above): party dynamics are conditioned by national exigencies. This section shows that parties may be identified in a rough left-right continuum. However, the country-specific variables discussed in Chapter Five are pertinent. The consistent consensus among Italian MEPs for example refers to the relevance of national experiences with immigration. Finally, this dimension of elite attitudes underscores the thesis that the interdependent nature of immigration issues affects the way this group of elites think about immigration resolution.

III. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that MEP attitudes toward immigration are based on an intricate relationship between party/ideological and national factors. Two types of response patterns emerged. MEP assessments on immigration varied by country. In contrast, attitudes toward issue resolution and immigrant policy were more homogeneous. While some questions failed to produce discernible party patterns over countries (i.e., Tables 7.6, 7.8), others pointed to systematic party patterns that fluctuated from country to country (i.e., Tables 7.2, 7.3, 7.9). In both cases, these trends reinforce the thesis that party group dynamics are conditioned by national traditions. MEP attitudes toward immigration and immigration policy must be understood against the background of such factors as national experience with immigration, party roles in governing, and traditional party ideological distances.

The analysis here also confirms a phenomenon found in the Eurobarometer public opinion report; political debates increase with size of immigrant population.²⁴ As far as the nature of party debates reflect national experiences, the phase of immigration experience becomes crucial. The traditional emigration countries may be differentiated from the newer immigration regimes in terms of party system convergence or divergence. In the former, party groups tend to be more polarized, while in the latter party distinctions become blurred.

Finally, another significant finding in this four country MEP profile is the emergence of a global attitude towards immigration in Europe. While country patterns were discernible in MEP assessments of national immigration problems, there is evidence that experiences of other countries, particularly those with larger immigrant populations, may be as important as more narrow country-specific experiences. In contrast to what scholars and observers have described to be a lag in appreciating the international framework of immigration policy, MEPs from all

²⁴See Chapter Five, fn 83; Eurobarometer 30.

countries seem to be cognizant of the impact of interdependence when it comes to immigration issues.²⁵ This substantiates the tendency in the contemporary research to place migration in an international relations context.²⁶

MEP awareness of the global aspects of immigration and their unanimous agreement for concerted action (see Table 7.8) indicates that there is some type of thinking that transcends national experiences. This consensus may be a result of party affiliation and ideological convictions, or of being literate. Global considerations may reflect the fact that MEPs read newspapers, watch TV news, and follow elections in other countries. Global among these MEPs may also be a product of the interactive nature of the European Parliament itself. Collective goals are generated by left-right ideological and party affiliations and institutional allegiance and/or knowledge. Or, this may be linked to their identification with Europe.²⁷ National legislators may be perfectly aware of what is happening in neighboring countries without having to travel to Strasbourg and Brussels. Globalization may be a consolidation of compatible interests

²⁵Mark Miller and Demetrious Papademetrious, "Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy," in the Unavoidable Issue: U.S. Immigration Policy in the 1980s, Mark Miller and Demetrious Papademetrious (eds.), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Inc., 1984, p. 156. See also Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration," Draft of a paper in preparation for publication, December 1990, p. 12.

²⁶See Mark Miller and Christopher Mitchell, "Comparing Policy-Making Patterns Towards Migration in Industrial Democracies: Western Europe and the United States," Paper Presented at the Seminar on Migration, the State, and International Relations, (New York University, 26 February 1993); James Hollifield, "Migration and International Relations: Cooperation and Control in the European Community," International Migration Review, 26, 2 (Summer 1992) 568-595; Martin Heisler, "Migration, International Relations and the New Europe: Theoretical Perspectives from Institutional Political Sociology," International Migration Review, 26, 2 (Summer 1992), 596-622; Jonas Widgren, "International Migration and Regional Stability," International Affairs, Vol 66, 4, (October 1990) 749-766.

²⁷This was anticipated by scholars as early as the 1950s and 1960s. See Daniel Lerner and Morten Gorden, Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1969.); Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958).

among the 12 EU member states, in the character of the 3 dominant countries, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

Chapter Eight The European Factor

The previous chapters have underscored the relevance of national and party variables in shaping elite attitudes towards immigration. In the process, the analyses have uncovered some signs of attitudinal convergence. These findings introduce an element that must be considered in a Europe of changing boundaries: the move towards European integration. What is the role of institutional and psychological constraints in an evolving European landscape? This chapter explores how these variables contribute to attitudinal patterns.

I. The European Factor

The continent which has pioneered the nation-state and nationalism has also been the first to formally develop transnationalism. In the 1950s, Haas described the process of political integration as one which would compel actors in distinct national settings to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions would demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. Accordingly, the end result of political integration would be a new political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones.¹

At its current phase of development, the EU can be best viewed as a "set of complex overlapping networks" in which the supranational system seeks to find compromise and to upgrade common interests, "which under favorable conditions lead to the pooling of

¹Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.

sovereignty."² Ideas on how this should be structured vary from highly centralized to polycentric visions of Europe. Levels of support also waver. The more one believes in Europe (pan-Europeanism), the more the question, which Europe, emerges.³ But, this question comes after the fact, because as Keohane and Hoffman argue, Europe has an institutional core which is the EC.⁴ The primary divisions in the European equation lie between the supporters of this new order, the pan-Europeanists and those who embrace the traditional national order. The predominant polarization on European integration is thus broadly, between those who identify with a more diverse entity called Europe, and those whose memory of and outlook on history is more nation-specific. These thinkers are mobilized by the fact that industrialization and colonial expansion unfolded in different parts of Europe and spread in different directions. Attitudes towards Europe may cut across countries and parties, and these affect other attitudes and/or priorities, related to immigration.

In assessing party and national affinities, this study suggests that integration may be an important mitigating factor. The drive towards a common Europe affects traditional attitudes in two ways. First, institution building and consolidation in a new transnational community requires consensus and power shifts to support the process.⁵ This is particularly evident in the European

²Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, "Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change," The Dynamics of European Integration, ed. William Wallace, (London: Pinter Publishers, Ltd., 1990), p. 277.

³Stuart Hall, "Our Mongrel Selves," New Statesman & Society, Special issue on "Borderlands", (7 May 1992), p. 7.

⁴Keohane and Hoffman, p. 278.

⁵See Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," and "Why are Congressional Committees Powerful?" in American Political Science Review 81 (1987), 85-104, 935-45; James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989); G. Allison and M. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," World Politics, 24 (supplement), 40-79; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and

Parliament which requires 260 votes for a second reading. The European Parliament is engaged in a fierce power struggle with the Commission and Council.⁶ External opposition to the authority of the EP has thwarted potential internal opposition. One MEP explains this dynamic:

We can find within the European Parliament, the consensus of options against the Council and the Commission. Our goal in the European Parliament is first of all to formulate an opinion with a significant majority, so the Council and Commission will bring the Parliament in, and that can only be done if we have a big majority....It seems to be possible on major issues to find a compromise between Socialists, Christian Democrats, and Liberals. It means that when there is an external pressure, the differences decline.⁷

The interviews revealed that MEPs are extremely sensitive to these external threats. According to one Dutch MEP:

If we would just have our national views echoed in the European Parliament, we wouldn't have any power. That means we have to combine our national points of view, make compromises, form integrated opinions to have majorities in the European Parliament. If you do not have these significant majorities, you can't influence for example, the European Commission or the Council. So, in our Group...we just talk and talk as long as we can find a general consensus. I think that in about 80% of the cases, we find a general consensus, as we normally have rather significant majorities in the European Parliament to influence the European Council and the Commission. It is just for survival that you have to do this.⁸

Haas has shown that since the early days of the ECSC, there has been an interparty desire to influence both executives, the High Authority and the Council of Ministers to follow the Assembly's resolutions.⁹ In the EP today, when the Socialists (the largest group) want to make

London: Yale University Press, 1968).

⁶See George Tsebelis, "The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter, (Paper presented at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association).

⁷Interview no. 12 (Brussels, 5 May 1992), 4.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Haas, p. 411.

real impact on legislation, they link up not necessarily with the rest of the left, but with the Christian Democrats.¹⁰ Since these two groups control the majority of the seats, they effectively control the European Parliament between them. These trends concur with what has been found in the American case. Serra et al. explain patternless shifts of party policy cohesion and polarization by exploring both the institutional and external environment of Congress.¹¹

In the 1990s, it is apparent that institutional factors play a large role in shaping MEP attitudes towards issues as immigration. This is captured by one Belgian Socialist:

There is a tendency for the European MPs to have a broader view of a lot of issues, but that's institutional.¹²

The Maastricht Treaty, by delegating more power to the European Parliament, is an effort to redress this balance between institutions, and to increase the effectiveness of a "European" system.

The second component of European integration that influences elite attitudes is related to the psychological processes that buttress the emergence and consolidation of new forces in Europe. In Easton's terms, a sense of community is described as a "we-feeling among a group of people--they are a political entity that works together and will likely share a common political fate and destiny."¹³ "Europeanness," the identification with a larger community, is a significant mobilizing force. It is particularly relevant to thinking on the immigration issue, as

¹⁰Michael Gallagher, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair, Representative Government in Western Europe, (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc., 1992), p. 279.

¹¹George Serra, Neil Pinney, Albert Cover, and Jim Twombly, "The Changing Shape of Congressional Parties: Ideological Policy Cohesion and Polarization in the U.S. Congress, 1953-1990," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2-5 September 1993), p. 7.

¹²Interview no. 271 (Brussels, 6 May, 1992).

¹³David Easton, A System's Analysis of Political Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 332.

"Europeanness" is defined in an inclusive manner, inherently excluding foreigners.¹⁴ MEPs frequently attributed the bases of unanimity in the European Parliament to "European" culture. Respondents often mentioned common religion, shared visions, and the legal entity of the Common Market. They also described a physical entity:

My starting point is my vision of the European community...My vision of Europe is one of an area where people can behave when crossing a frontier between countries in the same way they would when crossing an inter-provincial frontier between communities within their nation-state...that they can cross frontiers freely. These frontiers are psychological as much as legal in nature.¹⁵

European integration may affect affinities in several ways. New loyalties may come into existence as end values. Alternatively, they may develop in response to a pressure for conformity exercised by a new center of power. Finally, as Haas suggested, the study of political integration in a framework of consensus may reveal that new loyalties are a haphazard outgrowth of the means to the ends.¹⁶ Many MEPs corroborated this trend:

One of the great challenges of the work in the EP is precisely breaking down psychological barriers. One does that not immediately but by breaking down the physical ones and legal ones in the first place, and addressing psychological ones indirectly, I would say.¹⁷

The project's sample of elites is particularly sensitive to the effects of European integration. Like other national political elites, they make efforts to maintain their power. However, they are a group of elected politicians who represent not only their territorial or party base, but the EP organization which is directly tied to a pan-European identity.

Elites typically are also predisposed to more global thinking, and MEPs are no exception.

¹⁴See Chapter Three.

¹⁵Interview no. 44 (Strasbourg, 12 May 1992), p. 1.

¹⁶See Haas, p. 14.

¹⁷Interview no. 44 (Strasbourg, 12 May 1992), p. 1.

Inglehart noted a major shift of loyalties and expectations from the national to the European levels among public opinions of the member countries. Post-war generations were expected to seek more "post-materialist" or qualitative values over the more materialist ones.¹⁸ Such values would also be manifest by an emphasis on internationalism and European integration.¹⁹ In a study of secondary school students in four European countries, Inglehart concluded that "Europeanness" tends to be associated with a broader internationalism.²⁰

In general, the more educated elites are more inclined to post-material goals. 96 percent of this study's elites went beyond high school or vocational education. 55 percent of the MEP sample were "postmaterialists," 10 percent were "materialists," and 35 were "mixed."²¹ A substantial number of MEPs are of a younger generation of European elites; 43 percent of those surveyed were under 49 years of age. The data found that attitudes towards Europe were informed by Inglehart's materialism/post-materialism index (see Table 8.1).

¹⁸See Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977).

¹⁹See Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990).

²⁰Ronald Inglehart, "The New Europeans: Inward and Outward Looking?" International Organization 24 (1970) 129-139.

²¹These figures were derived from Inglehart's materialism/post-materialism index. Respondents were divided according to preferences for 1)materialist themes: first and/or second choice on maintaining order and fighting rising prices; 2)post-materialism: first and/or second choice on increasing participation and guaranteeing freedom of expression; and 3)mixed: one post-materialist answer and one materialist one.

Table 8.1: Pro-European Integration MEPs by Materialist/Post-Materialist Values*

Value Position on Europe	Materialist	Mixed	Post- Materialist
Speed up EU	9%	35%	57%

N=100; Those who only mentioned one of materialist or post-materialist themes were not included in the table.

*Based on the cross-tabulation of two questions: one asking MEPs whether they "think that the movement towards European unification should be speeded up, slowed down, or continued at present speed," and the other asking MEPs to indicate their priorities which reflect "materialist/post-Materialist" values (based on Inglehart's materialism/post-materialism index, see footnote 21).

MEP attitudes towards Europe are clearly informed by their value orientations. The more material-oriented one is, the less likely that he/she will be favorable to European integration and to attitudes that are associated with Europeanism. Many factors affect attitudes towards Europe, and these in turn contribute to thinking on such issues as immigration.

II. Some Empirical Findings: Patterns of Opposition

The movement towards a common European identity with strong supranational institutions generates reactions which can be found in the European Parliament itself. Although there is a tendency to support a "speed up" of the European Union, some MEPs want it *less and slower* than others. As Pridham and Pridham noted, it is legitimate to participate in the Union process and take a restrictionist line about future development.²² Margaret Thatcher's speech at the College of Europe in Bruges in October 1988 was a ground-breaking effort to present an alternative to the ideal of political union. Expressions of opposition to a greater Europe come in a support for nationalism and/or the drive towards intergovernmentalism. One extreme-right MEP expressed in this way:

²²Geoffrey Pridham and Pippa Pridham, Transnational Party Co-operation and European Integration (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 16.

We are afraid of...the present technological and bureaucratic evolution of the EC, which is directly against the national identities of each country...They will build a wide area, but generally the area will be open to immigrants from outside, and not only to persons, but also to products, and we oppose this evolution.²³

These reactions affect attitudes toward immigration. This was confirmed by the major divisions found in this study's party analysis.

In the party analysis, the most substantial polarization was found between the extreme right party group on the one hand and the remaining parties in the EP on the other. As one Irish MEP suggested:

The thrust of most Parliamentarians here, apart from the extreme-right groups, and single focus groups such as the Greens, is to achieve as much consensus as possible on a policy basis.²⁴

The differences between extreme-right MEPs and "others" relate not only to their views on immigration but to their position on a common Europe as well.

Table 8.2 presents levels of MEP support for European integration. These findings are important in two ways. They show that the Northern, more developed countries of the EU, UK, Denmark, Germany, and France view European integration less favorably than the others. These countries tend to exhibit more restrictionist attitudes towards immigration. With the exception of Denmark, these countries not only constitute the dominant players of the European Union project, but they have more substantial immigrant concentrations. Ninety percent of non-EU foreigners live on the average over thirteen years in three of those countries, France, Germany, and Britain.²⁵ They may set a scheme for immigration by which other countries consent.

²³Interview no. 272 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992).

²⁴Interview no. 39 (Strasbourg, 12 June 1992).

²⁵Actualites Migrations (1990): 16 in Nermin Abadan-Unat, "East-West vs. South-North Migration: Effects Upon the Recruitment Areas of the 1960s," International Migration Review, vol. 26 (Summer 1992), p. 403.

Second, the table notes a more obscure phenomenon in light of the popular view that the construct of Europe is a CD/Centrist project. According to MEPs, the Communists (90%) are most cohesively in favor of "speeding up" Europe.

Table 8.2: Attitudes toward Europe by Country and Party Group*

	Speed up EU	Present speed	Slow down EU	Total N
EP Total	70%	22%	9%	164
Country				
UK	44%	48%	8%	25
Ireland	83%	17%	0%	6
Benelux	73%	15%	12%	26
Germany	52%	24%	24%	21
Denmark	50%	25%	25%	4
France	65%	26%	9%	23
Italy	92%	8%	0%	25
Spain	79%	16%	5%	19
Portugal	86%	14%	0%	7
Greece	86%	13%	0%	8
Party group				
Greens	85%	0%	15%	13
Communists	90%	10%	0%	10
Socialists	68%	27%	5%	60
Liberals	83%	12%	6%	17
Christian Democrats	70%	26%	4%	53
Radical Right	0%	33%	67%	6

*Note: Party group figures do not include the ARC Rainbow Group and the Independents. Figures do not equal 100% due to rounding.

Bold-type indicates percentages that are 15% over or under EP average.

A. Consensus and Internal Opposition

Despite discrepancies among MEPs that emanate from national and party affinities, there is a noticeable trend towards global thinking. This is particularly evident in questions of immigration policy and areas that touch the pragmatic aspects of immigration. High levels of MEP consensus however are not coincidental. Moreover, evidence of convergence obscures certain divisions in the European Parliament. The European variable sheds a different light on consensus, as it identifies countertrends. Table 8.3 and 8.4 below present questions which deal with immigration policy.

Table 8.3: Percent of MEPs who Prefer a Common EU Immigration Policy, by Country, Party Group and Position on European Unification*

Country	EP	UK	IR	BNL	FRG	D	F	I	S	P	G
	90%	84%	100%	96%	77%	100%	91%	100%	84%	86%	100%
Party	EP	GUE CG	SOC	LDR	PPE RDE	DR					
	90%	100%	90%	96%	96%	50%					
Position on Europe	EP	Speed up EC	Pres- ent Speed	Slow dow n EC							
	90%	96%	86%	57%							

N=168

*Based on those who "agree" and "agree strongly" that there should be a common EU immigration policy.

Table 8.4: Percent of MEPs who Think that Immigration Should be Regulated by EU Institutions, by Country, Party Group and Position on European Unification*

Country	EP	UK	IR	BNL	FRG	D	F	I	S	P	G
	73%	54%	100%	77%	57%	75%	71%	80%	84%	71%	87%
Party	EP	GUE CG	SOC	LDR	PPE RDE	DR					
	73%	100%	68%	71%	78%	14%					
Position on Europe	EP	Speed up EU	Pres- ent Speed	Slow down EU							
	73%	84%	47%	33%							

N = 160

*Includes those who preferred EU institutions entirely and EU institutions with prior consultation with member-states.

Bold-type indicates percentages that are over or under 15% of EP average.

The response spreads in all three tables (8.2-8.4) indicate that the far right, DR group radically disagrees with the rest of the EP. DR Members are not only distinct in their attitudes toward immigration and European integration, but also in their preferences of materialist or post-materialist values: no extreme-right MEPs expressed post-materialist goals. This compares to 28 percent of the RDE/PPE; 89 percent of the LDR; 55 percent of the Socialists; 67 percent of the Communist groups; and 100 percent of the Greens who classified as "post-materialists". Whether it is a question of policy, regulation, immigrant intake, European integration or value orientation, the far right party is most distinguishable from the others in the EP.

These narrow distinctions amid wide EP consensus are reinforced by a corollary line of divergence. A notable division may be found between the more pro-European MEPs and the skeptics, as indicated by MEPs reported position on "speed up EU, continue at present speed,

or slow down EU". National and party positions on European integration (see Table 8.2) reinforce the discrepancies found in preferences of immigration policy and regulation (Table 8.3 and 8.4). The United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany fall below the EP in pursuit of an accelerated EU. So too does the extreme right DR group. These countries and party group are also least likely to defer immigration regulation to EU institutions.

These findings are reinforced by public opinion polls in Europe. The Eurobarometer Report noted that opinion on the presence of immigrants in Europe are closely linked to opinions expressed with regard to the building of Europe.²⁶ According to the Report, the more one is inclined to have faith in the building of Europe to ensure the future, the more one tends to see immigrants as a potentially positive factor.²⁷ Public opinion also reveals that commitment to the European Union also plays a major part in whom people would like to see in charge on immigration matters. The more one supports Europe, the more one tends to opt for Union competence in this regard.²⁸ Finally, opinion on where authority should lie varies also according to one's opinion regarding the presence of immigrants, and whether one wishes to see a more or less favorable policy in their regard.

²⁶Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer 30: Public Opinion in the European Communities: Special Issue on Racism and Xenophobia (Brussels: Directorate-General Information, Communication and Culture, November 1989), p. 71.

²⁷Attitudes toward European integration in the Report are based on the choice between: a)If the countries of Europe were to really unite one day, it would be the end of our national, historical, and cultural identities, and our national economic interests would be sacrificed; or b)The only way of defending our national, historical and cultural identities and our national economic interests in the face of the super powers is to really unite Europe. Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., p. 86.

Table 8.5: Public Opinion regarding Where Immigration Authority Should Lie by Whether One Wishes to See a More or Less Favorable Immigrant Policy

Regulation Authority	National governments	Governments after consultation	EU institutions*
Immigrant Rights...			
should be improved	15%	29%	48%
should be maintained	21%	33%	32%
should be restricted	30%	28%	30%
Aggregate	19%	30%	35%

N=11,796; Excludes "no reply".

Source: Eurobarometer 30, (1989), 86

This tendency was not only replicated, but strikingly more pronounced, among our MEP sample.

Table 8.6: MEP Attitudes regarding Where Immigration Authority Should Lie by Preferences on Immigrant Rights

Regulation Authority	National government	Governments after consultation	EU institutions*
Immigrant Rights			
Extend Rights	3%	19%	79%
Leave rights	13%	39%	49%
Restrict rights	50%	0%	5%
EP total	6%	22%	72%

N=156; Includes those who said EU institutions with national governments having veto and EU institutions.

The more one supports Europe and European institutions, the more supportive he/she is of immigrant rights. Thus, while there is substantial consensus among MEPs that immigrant rights should be extended, opposition to this can be discerned by position on Europe. Table 8.7 again reinforces these patterns.

Table 8.7: Percent of MEPs who Say that Immigrant Rights Should be Extended, by Country, Party Group and Position on European Unification

Country	EP	UK	IR	BNL	FRG	D	F	I	S	P	G
	77%	75%	67%	80%	63%	75%	70%	80%	84%	100%	88%
Party	EP	GUE CG	SOC	LDR	PPE RDE	DR					
	77%	90%	97%	60%	62%	0%					
Position on Europe	EP	Speed up EU	Pres- ent Speed	Slow down EU							
	77%	83%	69%	50%							

N = 160

All of the tables above underscore the relationship between those who were more anti-Europe and who held more distinct attitudes toward immigration. The issue of European integration not only distinguishes the far right from its political adversaries, but also that of the unequivocally immigration restrictionist and protectionist MEPs from the others (see Table 8.8).

Table 8.8: Percent of MEPs who Say that Immigration in General Should be Decreased, by Country, Party Group and Position on European Unification

Country	EP	UK	IR	BNL	FRG	D	F	I	S	P	G
	24%	10%	17%	25%	35%	67%	37%	23%	11%	0%	43%
Party	EP	GUE CG	SOC	LDR	PPE RDE	DR					
	24%	0%	14%	29%	33%	83%					
Position on Europe	EP	Speed up EU	Pres- ent Speed	Slow down EU							
	24%	23%	14%	50%							

N = 168

The reaction against the psychological processes of forging a European identity also provides insight regarding polarizations in Europe, and these affect attitudes towards immigration. The abolition of internal boundaries, one of the most evident symbols of national communities may produce a collective sense of identity crisis which is marked by the growth of nationalist and xenophobic movements. As one MEP explained:

First, we have the development of the European Community. People are rather for Europe, but, and this is very interesting, they start to be afraid for the nations. Will the power of the nation change? Are we going to have a dominant Europe?²⁹

As one Spanish Socialist claimed:

It is very easy to talk about Europe. Many times when it comes down to national interests, we are all the same nationalists. Not talking about Hitler or Le Pen and so on. I mean just nationalist feeling that you have to protect our own nation

²⁹Interview no. 329 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 4.

against certain laws which the community will make and so on... and so I think we are all alike on that...it depends when you touch the very core of it.³⁰

Clearly, there are countermovements to the construction of Europe, and this is not limited to extreme-right groups.

Although the twelve European countries have unified despite thousands of years of brutal religious wars, Europe remains a religiously heterogeneous society. The findings in this study concur with Inglehart's work, which demonstrates that while religious differences between Catholics and Protestants have become smaller, aggregate results from longitudinal surveys reflect cultural patterns.³¹ It is very noteworthy that, MEPs from the more predominant Protestant countries of the U.K., Denmark, and Germany are, like the DR group, less enthusiastic about "Europe" (see Table 8.2) One British Conservative explained British views towards "outsiders":

If I took you to my own district constituency, which is, you hardly see a black person...a totally white agricultural area, and if I stood up and made a speech saying 'really I think it is actually better for humanity if we all start mixing up and having our share in here', they would be very unhappy with me indeed. It's the fear of the unknown. It is not just black men they resent. If I actually stood up and said I think we ought to import half a million French men here, they would be equally angry. And Germans. We are British. We don't want the other people. It's the fear of the unknown. That they are slightly different to us, the French eat frog legs.³²

There are many problems with defining European identity in terms of Christianity. It not only neglects the Renaissance, the anticlericals and the Enlightenment, but the schisms in Christianity, between Greek and Latin, between Constantinople and Rome, between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, between Europe south and north, between the paths to industrialization and

³⁰Interview no. 387 (Strasbourg, 14 May 1992), p. 2.

³¹Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 61.

³²Interview no. 123 (London, 24 April 1992), pp. 6-7.

economic status.³³

Those who are more resistant to European integration tend to embrace more national images of religious history. As this German MEP insisted: "The correct name is the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation."³⁴ These MEPs also tend to see religion in Europe less uniform. A Danish MEP pointed to the older religious schisms that others more commonly overlooked:

It's a very big problem with the culture. You have a Catholic system in the South and you have a Protestant system here. We have such different cultures, so you cannot make a rule and say, 'From this day, we are in Europe'. Because a thousand years ago, they started with a culture and you cannot change it with paper.³⁵

A pan-European identity feeds on the myth of a common religious heritage. Those who nurture their own collective memories recoil from European integration. Religious and other cultural differences, such as those derived from the North-South or Christian-Protestant divide, within Europe serve to maintain national preferences for the extreme-right, and reinforce its reluctance to support European integration.

Although the functions of religion have diminished since Max Weber wrote his treatise on the emergence of Calvinist Protestantism and the rise of capitalism, this study suggests that its role in the advanced EU countries should not be underestimated.³⁶ As a Scottish MEP emphasized: "The role of the Church is terribly important---I mean even to non-believers like

³³See Pieterse, p. 7. Religious differences between the Protestant and Catholic countries have coincided with different rates of economic development [M. Weber, 1958] and suicide or social anomie [Emile Durkheim, Suicide (Glencoe: Free Press, 1897)].

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Interview no. 15 (Brussels: 6 May 1992), 2.

³⁶Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribners, 1958).

me."³⁷ The religious factor affects both attitudes towards the construction of Europe, and immigration thinking on a macro-level as well, as it has increasingly served to distinguish cultural differences **outside** of Europe. In its spirit of solidarity with collective goals, religion provides a common framework to nationalists and pan-Europeanists alike, particularly with respect to immigrant preferences. This is the basis of agreement regarding negative attitudes towards immigrants from the Third World.

Although religion has often been the defining factor in many nascent right-wing movements in Europe, it has become salient in communities who search for identity during times of change. Religion may be evoked as a rallying force either for nationalism or for Europeanism. The interviews revealed that arguments for restrictive immigration policy were based upon the idea of protecting the unique nature of European culture. These attitudes centered on the threat of non-European and non-European religious values. All MEPs, whether pro-European or nationalist could rely on these arguments, often blurring the lines between Eurocentrism and nationalism.

Invariably, all parties in the EP incorporate religious symbolism. Although no one has been able to create a European symbol as the DR managed to deftly find in the Celtic cross, other parties also rely on religion to evoke community. The notion of Christian Europe matters to Christian Democrats.³⁸ One PPE Member explained:

The PPE is basically a Christian Democratic group, with a view of Western Europe or the building of the EU very much as Christendom.³⁹

The Socialists have also conjured images of christian solidarity. On these points, nationalism and

³⁷Interview no. 32 (Brussels: 5 May 1992), p. 2.

³⁸Note: This was the major obstacle in uniting the British Conservatives party to the PPE party group before 1992.

³⁹Interview no. 134 (London, 22 April 1992), p. 7.

Eurocentrism meet. MEPs may tie religion to European or national culture in ways that serve to buttress either idea and their attitudes on immigration simultaneously.

Religious differences between Christianity and Islam are often regarded to be mutually exclusive, to undermine original social formulas, and to destabilize structure. This MEP traces these threats to historical memories:

The PPE is strong on maintaining traditional social structures and therefore would be against influences which threaten both social structures. An influx of Islamic people into what is conceived as a Christian Democratic Europe obviously produces tensions. You could go back and refight the wars.⁴⁰

MEPs also refer to incompatibilities between religions:

The big problem is you can take people with the same religion also kind of the same culture, but if you are taking people from a Muslim system, its so different and people hate it. And you have a confrontation between these two systems.⁴¹

Islam is anti-Christ.⁴²

Some perceive religion to be destabilizing:

People are afraid of foreigners in general but I think that with the people from Maghreb, there is maybe an additional problem; the problem of religion, because we consider Islam as Muslim fundamentalism today, and it is sad.⁴³

There are big problems, as you know from the Salmon Rushdie affair, as to whether or not Islamic groups are entitled to reject a Christian country with an established Church...and set up their own system.⁴⁴

Many associate Muslims with Islamic fundamentalism:

⁴⁰Interview no. 134 (London, 22 April 1992), p. 4.

⁴¹Interview no. 15 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 3.

⁴²Interview no. 219 (Brussels, 7 May 1992), p. 2.

⁴³Interview no. 297 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 1.

⁴⁴Interview no. 134 (London, 22 April 1992), p. 5.

There is a fear of Islam. There is a fear of the Islamic fundamentalism.⁴⁵

Restrictive immigrant positions flow from considerations of religious differences between Europe and the Third World, and this fosters attitudinal convergence in the European Parliament.

The prominent division between the European and non-European worlds or Christianity and Islam, go beyond the rubric of religion. In the contrast between Islam and Christianity, secular democracy may be a better concept in eliciting boundary markers. This was the issue raised by the Rushdie affair or by the French row over the asserted rights of Muslim girls to wear the veil in public schools.⁴⁶ European responses to these 'affairs' and to immigration, consider how to integrate a population whose reluctance to integration and secularism is strong.⁴⁷ Unlike their predecessors, Muslims do not fit the "European" idea so easily. According to Pieterse, "the common European interpretation of fundamentalist Islam is a revolt against modernity (that is against Europe), a countermodernism..."⁴⁸ In more modern Christian Europe, the differences between citizens of Western and non-Western civilizations are substantial and need to be reconciled within a multicultural and pluralist framework.

The move towards a common Europe and its countermovements, nationalism or subsidiarity,⁴⁹ ironically tread on similar grounds, and may explain why the dominant attitude

⁴⁵Interview no. 329 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 7.

⁴⁶See Gallya Lahav, "Population Movements: An Emerging Concern of American Foreign Policymakers," American Foreign Policy Newsletter, vol. 14, no. 5 (October 1991), p. 7.

⁴⁷See Bernard E. Brown, "Old France in a New World," American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 16, no. 5 (October 1994), p. 13.

⁴⁸Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Fictions of Europe," Race & Class, vol. 32, no. 3 (London: Institute of Race Relations, 1991), p. 5.

⁴⁹The principle of subsidiarity stipulates that "the Union shall only act to carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more effectively in common than by the Member States acting separately, in particular those whose action requires action by the Union because their dimension of effects extend beyond national frontiers." The broad idea is traced back to medieval political

towards immigration may be restrictionist and protectionist. As beliefs and aspirations of groups undergo change due to the necessity of working in a transnational institutional framework, merges in values and doctrine are expected to occur, uniting groups across former frontiers. Haas suggested that these are likely to produce, in effect an advent of a "new nationalism."⁵⁰ Both pan-Europeanism and nationalism ask similar types of community-defining questions. In their nature, both are conceptually self-protecting. Both attempt to promote a spirit of collectivity with common goals. In their search for defining common symbols, nationalists and pan-Europeanists (or what may be called, "Eurocentrists") often harbor the same images.

Nevertheless, the point of departure for the groups is the level of cultural homogeneity that is envisaged for community or nation-building. Eurocentrics and nationalists inherently grapple with similar questions: "Who am I?"; "Who I am not?" Like all identity questions, they are a prelude to differentiation which, in their turn, entail the drawing of some kind of line between things like and things unlike. In these answers is where the fundamental differences between the extreme-right and other parties lie on integration and immigration. As one extreme-right MEP explains, there are levels of affinity, and national kin comes first:

We think that when vital interests are contradictory, it is the national interests which have the edge over all the others. In other words, we have a preferential philosophy. That is to say that we think that the social life is made out of concentric circles, the family, the city, the profession, etc. and that we have to look after ourselves first. There is a saying in the Front National, 'I love my daughters more than my nieces, my nieces more than my cousins, my cousins more than my neighbors'. And I add happily that does not mean that I detest my neighbors, it means that I love them less than my daughters. Because our

thought and has been used over time by various groups (i.e., Dutch Calvinists, Catholic Church) to defend the rights of vulnerable groups against repression from above by rules on the distribution of power. See Hugh Miall, Shaping the New Europe (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), p. 56; Clive Church and David Phinnemore, European Union and European Community: A Handbook and Commentary on the Post-Maastricht Treaties (Herforshire, England: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp. 68-69; Treaty on European Union, Article 3B

⁵⁰Haas, p. 14.

adversaries say 'You are xenophobic; you do not want anyone but the French'. No it is not true. But we think that there are hierarchies of affinity and tolerance.⁵¹

Those on the extreme-right and nationalists in general are protectionist both with regard to the nation-state and to immigration; they seek cultural homogeneity which is threatened by the construction of Europe. They differ from their pan-Europeanist counterparts whose criteria for exclusion are less narrow, but nevertheless restrictive. A pan-European preference of immigrant groups may typically sound like this:

...For Europeans, absolutely no limitation. That is their right, but for the others, we are simply not an area of immigration. I would make a difference, yes for all those who belong to Europe, all the Europeans. Yes, they should have the right to vote, and not for the non-Europeans.⁵²

The majority of MEPs are pro-Europe, and in favor of **qualified** immigration (they are not pro-immigration), meaning they prefer qualified immigrant rights, and specific types of immigrants, European. Section III further attitudes towards immigration coincide with the European factor.

B. External Opposition

The focus of this study has been attitudes of MEPs. However, one must also recognize that opposition to institution-building in the EU comes not only from parties inside the EP, but also from the Council, the Commission and national institutions which seek to retain domestic sovereignty. As a German Socialist explained opposition:

The enemy is not in the house, the enemy is sitting in Brussels [the Commission], and it is the Council, because they are 12 national governments, every minister is coming out of the room, and discussing with his press, with the German press, French press, with his press about the items and about the aims

⁵¹Interview no. 289 (Strasbourg, 10 June 1992).

⁵²Interview no. 63 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p. 4.

he reached for his people in his country and not for Europe...they are the real nationalists.⁵³

Indeed, the EU represents a threat to many different institutions, and politicians who are associated with them. Many MEPs underscored this sentiment:

I'm being the spokesman now for the average politician in a national parliament. The average politician in a national parliament says, 'I don't like this European business because it takes the cheese off my slice of bread in the morning.'⁵⁴

...National politicians are concerned that if the Community becomes too important, their jobs lose a lot of their fun...so the juicy bit will be dealt within Brussels politically, and they're left with the scraps.⁵⁵

The struggle between institutions is directly linked to the growth of the European Union, or to what many MEPs claim is the future trend:

The European Parliament is the real power house of what drives Europe and brings us to the future. We are the only body of people from Europe thinking about this full time, arguing discussing at Strasbourg and Brussels, going out to dinner and debating all day long. The Member States and Prime Ministers, and Presidents don't have time to think about this. It's where the intellectual drive comes from, for Europe, from us.⁵⁶

The structure of the debate in the European Parliament is clearly affected by institutional conflict and competition.

The Maastricht Treaty, by delegating more power to the European Parliament may also intensify transparty competition that now exists in limited (but significant) patterns of opposition. Although an autonomous political executive has not been created in the European Union, hampering the consolidation of an effective and responsive political system, the trend has been

⁵³Interview no. 167 (Strasbourg, 14 May 1992), p. 1.

⁵⁴Interview no. 44 (Strasbourg, 12 May 1992), p. 3.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 2.

⁵⁶Interview no. 123 (London: 24 April 1992), p. 4.

towards increasing accountability. Maastricht for example, increased Parliament's tasks of scrutiny and control. It introduced the right to petition to the European Parliament or to apply to the Ombudsman, who is appointed by the European Parliament. The EP not only retains its prerogative to dismiss the Commission as a whole, but through Articles 158 and 154 respectively, it now shares in confirming the President and debating the Commission's programme.⁵⁷ The Treaty also introduced the concept of European citizenship and areas in which common policies were a prerequisite: namely visas, asylum, and immigration. A new committee established by the Parliament to deal explicitly with "Civil Liberties, Public Affairs, and Immigrant Rights" reflects the trend towards more heated debate on immigration. Patterns of opposition on immigration are likely to respond to these changes.

A commitment to gain equivalent powers to national parliaments also includes overcoming the tendencies toward intergovernmentalism.⁵⁸ This is also particularly evident in the case of immigration, a topic of discussion for at least eight intergovernmental groups. As Chapter Three suggested, the European Parliament's activity on immigration issues reflects the conflict between supranational institutions and intergovernmental ones.⁵⁹ The Schengen Group is representative

⁵⁷Clive Church and David Phinnemore, European Union and European Community: A Handbook and Commentary on the Post-Maastricht Treaties, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), p. 257.

⁵⁸Three types of approaches have influenced the construction of a unified Europe: intergovernmentalism, functionalism, and political unity. In contrast to the latter two, intergovernmentalism assumes no federation and no supranationality but intergovernmental organs. The conflicting trends between the two have dominated the evolution of European integration.

⁵⁹See Giuseppe Callovi, "Regulation of Immigration in 1993: Pieces of the European Community Jig-Saw Puzzle," International Migration Review, 26, 2 (Summer); Patrick Ireland, "Immigration : The E.C. and Social Policy Coordination," (Paper presented at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2-5).

of the administrative culture of traditional immigration decision-making.⁶⁰ Decisions have been typically made behind closed doors with little or no formal debate in a public forum. However, the Maastricht Treaty has proposed to shift this balance back to EU institutions like the European Parliament, rendering MEPs more influential in the debate on immigration policy.

"Maastricht" has also balanced both national (intergovernmental) tendencies and more supranational responses to immigration. It acknowledged the work of ad hoc groups on immigration, such as "Schengen," and sought to collaborate with those more national interests, to upgrade common interests. The Maastricht Treaty has given credibility to ad hoc groups, but it has also brought them closer to EU institutional scrutiny.

III. Conclusion: The European Factor and Immigration

The drive towards a common Europe may find its correlate on the immigration front as both have been affected by similar impulses to identify boundaries. In major strides forward towards integration, the European Union has taken commensurate steps on the immigration platform. It is no coincidence that the concept of a "people's and social Europe" appeared for the first time in the early 1970s, when immigration was being halted for the first time in post-war Europe. An analog to this came in the Maastricht Treaty of 1994, when the concept of "European citizenship" was officially introduced as the Treaty formally recognized the need for a serious common immigration policy. Citizenship, a new symbol of post-Maastricht Europe or

⁶⁰For a good discussion of political vs. administrative decisions in immigration policy, see Hammar, pp. 279-281.

a supranational EU, presents new rights, responsibilities, opportunities and constraints.⁶¹

European integration is linked to the case of immigration. Both phenomena require a restructuring of boundaries and identities. The creation of a supranational community involves physical and psychological adjustments. The abolition of internal borders between the twelve member-states redraws "community" boundaries. The new community envisages a common area in which "internal" border controls between EU member-states are transferred to "external" ones between them and non-EU members. It requires a definition of who belongs and who doesn't belong. Immigration policy demands the same kind of considerations.

Many scholars have argued that the "construction of the alien" is a process central to European nation-building.⁶² Cassell argues that it is possible to evaluate the development of national identity and identity crises by focusing on policies and attitudes towards non-members.⁶³

According to Kai Erikson,

Communities are boundary maintaining: each has a specific territory in the world as a whole, not only in the sense that it occupies a defined region of geographical space, but also in the sense that it takes over a particular niche in what might be called cultural space and develops its own 'ethos' or 'way' within that compass. Both of these dimensions of group space, the geographical and the cultural, set the community apart as a special place and provide and important

⁶¹Thomas Wilson, "An Anthropology of the European Community," in Thomas Wilson M. Estellie Smith, eds., Cultural Change and the New Europe (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), p. 11.

⁶²See Mark Cassell, "The Intergovernmental Politics of Immigration in the Federal Republic of Germany: A National Crisis," Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, Washington, D.C., 2-5 September 1993), pp. 3-4; Wolfgang Kaschuba, "Volk und Nation: Ethnozentrismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart," in Nationalismus, Nationalitäten, Supra-nationalitäten, ed. H. Winkler and H. Kaebler (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1993), 56-80; John Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

⁶³See Cassell (1993).

point of reference for its members."⁶⁴

Erikson states that "one of the surest ways to confirm an identity, for communities as well as for individuals is to find some way of measuring what one is not".⁶⁵ Indeed, the problem of immigration in the European Union has more to do with defining members outside the EU (i.e., 'third-national' status) than with movement within the EU.

Immigration policy inherently involves identifying "in-groups" and "out-groups". Creating identities is an active process that concerns inclusion and exclusion. To be "us", we need a contrast with those who are "not us". At a time when a transnational state is attempting to eclipse the traditional nation-state, immigration issues tend to coincide with and to be addressed in the framework of questions of European culture and identity. What is "European" and what does not belong to that realm?

MEPs seem to be fairly unanimous in their ideas on common denominators. Most often, they refer to religion in their conceptualization of Europe. The European idea goes back to ancient times if one invokes religious concepts. MEPs make these connections frequently. According to one Socialist MEP for example,

It's the same as what made a European identity at medieval times--always--it's religion.⁶⁶

A Belgian MEP talks about the "old background of Christianity mixed with the French

⁶⁴Kai Erikson, Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 10. See Massimo Pastore, "Boundary Conflicts around and inside the Community", Paper presented to the 20th Annual Conference of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control, Podova 4-6 September, 1992).

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 11.

⁶⁶Interview no. 172 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 8.

Revolution."⁶⁷ The President of the DR group recounts:

...it was Emmanuel Kant's ideas, 'For peace to reign, we have to pay attention to immigration. If we have existed as an historic entity, it is because we have resisted, physically to the barbarian invasions...We would not be a Europe in the sense we know it today. We would be submerged under the...Turks or the Arabs.'⁶⁸

Within the European context, religion tends to provide the semblance of a common culture. This link between religion, migration, and dominant culture can be traced back to ancient history. Numerous forced population exchanges occurred during the Thirty Years War, and in its aftermath, when the principle of conformity to the prince's religion was generalized throughout the German Empire.⁶⁹ In the 1990s, the European factor poses the notion of a greater Europe based on "Christendom."

The fusion between religion and the conceptualization of Europe influences preferences of immigrant groups. One PPE Member made a symbolic analogy between Europe and a secular religious state:

We must do the same thing what the Jews did in Israel, when they declared that any Jew presenting himself at the borders of Israel has a right to come, whatever his motivations. And I personally hold that every European who comes to another country of Europe has the same right as a Jew to Israel. He is the European to Europe. That's where the line is for me. Extra Europeans no; inner Europeans, yes.⁷⁰

Based on Europe as a religious/cultural entity, MEPs may form their intake preferences. An Italian Socialist explains:

⁶⁷Interview no. 271 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 3.

⁶⁸Interview no. 289 (Strasbourg, 10 June 1992), pp. 2-3.

⁶⁹Aristide Zolberg, "Patterns of International Migration Policy: A Diachronic Comparison," Minorities: Community and Identity, ed. C. Fried (Berlin: Dahlem Workshop, Springer-Verlag, 1983), p. 234.

⁷⁰Interview no. 63 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p. 3-4.

You see in Italy, you don't have any repulsion at all from the people in front of the Phillipinos. You know why, because they're Catholic...They do what we do. On Sundays, they go to Church.⁷¹

These similar criteria explain the unanimous disinclination towards immigrants from the developing world that was described in Chapter Five.

The contrasts between the Islamic world and the Christian world are not only relevant to European identity but they lead to all types of exclusionist policies. According to researchers at the European University Institute in Florence, this type of cultural logic explains why, although Turkey is a member of NATO, it is not a member of the EU.⁷² MEPs acknowledge this paradox as they describe the Turkish request to become a EU member:

Leaving aside the cost because they [Turkey] are very backwards....Christendom, the area where Christians roughly were during the Middle Ages....We all went to Church, whether we did or we didn't. But Turkey is a Islamic country--it is entirely different. We have Sundays as our days of rest. Turks have Islamic practices. The real problem is that the differences between Christendom and Islam are quite big.⁷³

Another MEP explains, "It can be dressed up as an economic argument, but one gets the feeling that they just don't think of it as Europe, because it is an Islamic country." In the European Union, religion serves more as a marker of cultural boundaries than a testimony of persuasion and beliefs.

The psychological and institutional constraints of integration are also relevant to immigration. The period of change heightens insecurity and activates a search for common symbols of attachment and for a collective identity. Immigration touches at the nerve of this

⁷¹Interview no. 395 (Strasbourg: 11 May 1992), p. 3.

⁷²See Jennifer Welsh and Iver Neumann, "The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society," *Review of International Studies* (1991) 17, 327-348, quoted in *Research Review*, Summer, no. 5 (Florence: The European University Institute), 1993.

⁷³Interview no. 123 (London: 24 April 1992), p. 5.

dynamic. Immigrants tend to be the most visible difference in society, and thus are often the focus of concerns arising from difficulties in coping with change.⁷⁴ Harris suggests that the rapidity of the process of change in the modern world is reflected by such events as European integration or immigration. Both may inspire many to hope for a "better world", and yet may lead to a great sense of insecurity and bewilderment among those who fear that these changes will be in some way to their cost in economic terms or in terms of their self-esteem as citizens of a particular place or country.⁷⁵ They would be what the school of "modernization crisis," identified as "losers of modernization" (i.e., those suffering or facing unemployment or economic marginalization).⁷⁶ This phenomenon is most commonly used to interpret the growth of extreme-right movements in Europe today.

According to Heisler, reopening the social contracts of the democratic welfare-states established in the post-War settlement, in order to accommodate immigrants requires "cognitive and institutional adjustments" that need time.⁷⁷ The challenge for decision-makers is to control the flux of immigration while at the same time redress the public tendency to scapegoat immigrants as the most visible sources of difference in the dynamics of a changing Europe.

⁷⁴Martin Heisler, "Migration, International Relations, and the New Europe: Theoretical Perspectives from Institutional Political Sociology," *International Migration Review*, vol. 26, Special Issue: The New Europe and International Migration (Summer 1992), p. 610.

⁷⁵Harris, pp. 161-162.

⁷⁶See Michael Minkenberg, "The New Right in France and Germany: A Comparative Analysis of Changing Cleavage Structures and New Configurations in European Politics," (Paper presented at the Ninth International Conference of Europeanists, Council of European Studies, March 1994); Klaus von Beyme, ed. "Special Issue on Right-Wing Extremism in West Europe," *West European Politics* (April 1988); Hans-George Betz, "The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 25, no. 4 (July 1993): 413-427; Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960); also 2d ed., (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981).

⁷⁷Heisler, p. 610.

Heisler recommends that elites address the cognitive, social and political concerns of the dominant cultural majorities and mainstream institutions directly.⁷⁸ As true for national regimes, these challenges threaten the legitimacy of the European institutions, specifically, and the European system as a whole. MEPs, as Chapter Five demonstrated, are sensitive to their publics when it comes to general assessments of immigration.

The insecurities brought about by these types of changes have implications for behavior.

As one Italian MEP hypothesizes:

All people are afraid of the future, and when they are afraid, they want to close themselves. If you are afraid, you close yourself. If you are not afraid, you are open.⁷⁹

The misconception is that some Europeans lack fear altogether. As one Communist MEP ponders, attitudes towards immigration may underscore the inevitable link between changes and anxieties, and this may have widespread effects:

...I have always wondered if everybody were afraid of the immigrant because he is the other, the different, and the different is always a little worrying...always....We are a little narcissistic, but because we are afraid. Because maybe the different knows things that you do not know.⁸⁰

Virtually no one in national party systems nor in the European Parliament argues for unlimited immigration or for granting immigrants absolute voting rights (e.g., for national elections).

Although there are differences between those who advocate national solutions and those who promote a European approach to changing issues, they are only based on degrees of protection or the degree of cultural homogeneity envisioned for community-building.

As the empirical findings in the last section showed, MEPs who supported European

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Interview no. 351 (Strasbourg: 15 May 1992), p. 3.

⁸⁰Interview no. 329 (Strasbourg: 13 May 1992), p. 5.

integration were more likely to prefer a common immigration policy for the EU, and to accept immigration levels and immigrant rights than those who opposed European integration. Pro-European attitudes however, are not tantamount to *pro-immigration*. Endorsing a common immigration policy for the EU does not imply a lenient immigration policy. If one recalls that the European Coal and Steel Community and the customs union were early attempts to regulate areas of conflict between states, and to improve the effectiveness of governments in these sectors by coordinating policies, then the program for a common immigration policy engenders an image of a restrictive character. As one Italian MEP suggested: "Answers to fears is a united Europe with stronger social policy towards integration and immigration policies."⁸¹ A pan-European's vision of common immigration policy is not necessarily a liberal one:

I realize I don't have a choice, no one has a choice because the European landscape, East and West this time, is changing so rapidly that destabilizing elements may come to the fore. Therefore, you need a strong stabilizing element on the continent, and clearly that is the EC. The EC and NATO are indispensable.⁸²

These statements are voices of increased concern, prohibition, and efforts to control immigration, rather than a common immigration policy based on free and open borders. Similarly, consensus in the European Parliament does not necessarily mean an attitudinal convergence in terms of homogenized views, as much as they reflect compatible interests.

Compromise on the immigration front is skewed towards the most developed and restrictive immigration regimes. These compromises are fundamentally tied to European integration. The rights of EC nationals to free movement within the Community was one of the most contentious items in the enlargement negotiations leading to the accession of Greece, Spain, and Portugal to EC Treaties. Full free movement rights were not conferred upon Greek citizens

⁸¹Interview no. 515 (Brussels, 6 May 1992), p. 2.

⁸²Interview no. 44 (Strasbourg, 12 May 1992), p. 3.

until 1988, nor to Spanish and Portuguese citizens until 1992.⁸³ Similarly, negotiations for Schengen membership involved the same compromises. The applications of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece to join the Schengen Group were delayed by the five founder members (also known as the "fast-track countries") who sought guarantees of serious immigration control. By 1992, the four countries became full members. Although the interests between these countries and the "fast-track" ones stemmed from different impetuses, the consequences for immigration was convergence. In 1991, the Spanish government imposed a requirement on visitors from the Maghreb states to obtain a visa entry into Spain; the Italian government instituted an amnesty program to address illegal immigration problems, and greatly strengthened its efforts to police the Italian maritime frontier. The Portuguese government withdrew the previously automatic right of Brazilians to opt for Portuguese nationality.⁸⁴ As a consequence of EC and Schengen commitments to strengthen their external frontiers, all the southern European member-states have increased coastguard patrols, police checks on third country nationals and deportations as part of the payback for financial benefits of being a member of the European Union.

The harmonization of attitudes towards restrictive immigration gives credence to forecasts that the capacity to live with differences is the compelling question of the 21st Century.⁸⁵ According to Huntington, the "fault lines between civilizations will be the battle of the future."⁸⁶ He poses that they are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes.

⁸³Butt Philip (1994), p. 169.

⁸⁴See discussion in Butt Philip, p. 180.

⁸⁵Hall, "Borderlands," p. 8.

⁸⁶Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (1993), p. 25.

**Chapter Nine:
Conclusion
Party, National, and Transnational Bases of Attitudes in the European Union**

I. Introduction

The preceding chapters provided an attitudinal profile of elites that is based on both traditional sources of thinking and new considerations in Europe, particularly the European factor. The conclusion of this study suggests that party, national, and transnational affinities affect attitudes towards immigration. These factors reinforce each other and produce harmonized, not necessarily homogenized outlooks, based on compatible rather than strictly converging interests.

This research noted three significant attitudinal trends among Members of the European Parliament. First, national affinities affect MEPs' general assessments of immigration and immigrant groups. Second, party affiliations order policy preferences. Alternatively, an MEP's position on the issue may determine the party he/she chooses. Assessments of immigration and policy preferences generate disagreement, which may be predicated by knowing one's national and/or party affiliation. This is reasonable given the diversity of this elite group which represents different political cultures, immigration experiences as well as party affinities. Third, these variables also coincide with the European factor, and may help explain why MEPs are showing signs of pragmatism and attitudinal harmonization.

The three trends are neither contradictory nor separable. While national and party considerations matter, the European variable orders these traditional factors differently, and places them in a broader perspective, a trans-European framework. This is evidenced in practice: the control over the granting of nationality and citizenship remains in the hands of the nation-state, but citizenship of a member-state confers economic and social rights exercisable throughout

the EU.¹ The European factor does not replace, but broadens, traditional polarizations. It ensures a collective immigration policy based on the dominant national and ideological players, the traditional immigration countries, and the mainstream parties. Party, national and transnational interests on immigration are thus expected to be ordered in a way to limit immigration (e.g., an ideologically right inclination), particularly from outside the EU, while considering strategies for social integration (a left orientation). These positions also reflect the interests of the more dominant countries of the EU system, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, who also have had longer experiences with higher levels of immigrants residing in their territories.

II. The Findings

MEPs vary in their general assessments of immigration. They report different levels of immigration problems in their countries; some perceive that immigration problems are greater than ever, others report that the problems remain the same. They conceptualize immigration problems differently. This is expected given the fact that MEPs come from one of 12 countries, each with its own set of cultural values and historical circumstances. Moreover, migrants do not move to Europe, they move to a physical land, a city or a village in a European country. It is therefore not surprising that assessments of such movements are also nationally-conditioned.

Indeed, Chapter Five found the nation-state components generating attitudinal patterns were related to immigration-specific experiences, or "immigration-contexts," which include immigrant numbers and public opinion figures. Immigrant-contexts tend to be reinforced by

¹Alan Butt Philip, "European Union Immigration Policy: Phantom, Fantasy or Fact," West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1992), p. 169.

more general socio-economic indicators. These country-specific factors generate patterns that discriminate elite attitudes. Thus, MEPs from the more economically developed countries of the North, which have larger immigrant populations and corresponding negative public sentiment, tend to be more protective and restrictive with regards to immigration than those from the peripheral countries, particularly of the South, but including Ireland. There are differences between traditional immigration and emigration countries, that emanate from uneven development and disparate political cultures within the European Union.

There are other attitudinal variances in the European Parliament which involve principles, or policy. Chapter Six argued that the party/ideological variable is informative regarding substantive immigration questions. The left-right construct orders preferences of immigration levels, and types of immigrants. Partisans of the left are more likely to endeavor to amend social inequalities and to extend immigrant rights, to delegate authority about immigration regulation to EU institutions, and to be open to increased immigration, than their colleagues on the right.

Chapter Seven highlighted the intricate link between national and party factors and their impact on immigration thinking. It discusses party group dynamics and their conditioning by national traditions. Focusing on four countries, this attitudinal portrait confirmed the role of national affiliation in more general immigration assessments, and that of party in more substantive policy preferences. Moreover, it placed the two variables in broader perspective, and suggested that some international learning may be taking place.

There is also a new issue which clearly affects thinking on immigration and mobilizes new alliances in the 1990s: the construction of Europe. The European factor identifies what some scholars believe to be a developing cleavage between those who think in European terms, and those who have a more nationalistic consciousness.² European integration is intricately tied

²Hugh Miall, *Shaping the New Europe* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993), p. 51.

to the immigration issue, and coincides with traditional sources of alliances as it distinguishes those who are more protective from those who are less protective. One Dutch MEP captured this phenomenon more generally:

Let's just take a bird's eye view of the political landscape of Europe when it comes to reaction to the EC. The Maastricht Treaty in the last few months has triggered a nationalist response in most of the member states, not all, but most of them. That backlash has to do with a perception of the national identity, the national culture being threatened by things foreign. It is often not more specific than that. There is this feeling of minority cultures being swamped by something terrible. And this something terrible is linked to Europe, because the feeling is that all of a sudden there is too much Europe happening.³

Issue polarizations on immigration were found between the few unequivocally anti-immigration MEPs and the majority who preferred some type of qualified immigration. Chapter Eight suggested that a prominent driving force in Europe of the 1990s is cultural protectionism, and that patterns of opposition may be informed by degrees of protectionism preferred. It argued that the role of institutional and psychological constraints in an evolving European landscape reinforced a consolidation led by the EU's dominant players and the more immigration-experienced countries, such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Despite variations in sources and types of thinking, there is considerable agreement about the character of immigration. MEPs' interests may not be homogeneous, but their policy visions are compatible. They tend to place immigration high on the agenda. They agree that immigration is a very important issue, particularly for the European Union; that problems have worsened; and that immigration policy should be regulated by the EU. Collective interests may be found in pursuit of several policy goals. These include controlling immigration and limiting immigrant intakes particularly from Third World countries. Moreover, MEPs wish to realize a common immigration policy, although they have different visions of what that policy would look

³Interview no. 44 (Strasbourg: 12 May 1992), p. 2.

like.

MEPs similarly think about threats to civilization, whether it be to the nation-state or to the European enterprise. They talk about "Christendom" and the social welfare-state culture. As representatives of a "people's Europe," MEPs concern themselves with the social dimension of immigration. They wish to protect their territory from foreign infiltration—if only they could decide on who is an "insider" and who, is an "outsider." Social and cultural preservation are common motivations behind MEP preferences for limited voting rights, or even for providing economic and educational assistance to countries of immigrant origin.

The dynamics of European integration and the nature of immigration galvanize similar practical concerns among decision-makers. MEPs are bound by their appreciation of pragmatics.

As one British MEP put it:

You come to a sort of common sense central point that says well, obviously, you are going to have some immigration. You can't seal your borders. It would be ridiculous to re-erect the Iron Curtain across Europe to stop the Poles from coming into the FRG, and instead of East German border guards shooting people, it would be German border guards shooting them.⁴

Public opinion factors in practical considerations as well. As one French Socialist explained:

I believe immigrants who have come here, and work, *et cetera*, should have all the rights of the citizen. He must vote. But as you can see, we could not go that far, because we know public opinion. We know that we would have badly lost the [1993 French] referendum. But the fact that we didn't do it, because of public opinion, does not mean that this issue is unfair.⁵

Pragmatism rather than ideology may be inspiring policy thinking. History and ideas did validate themselves when policies were both "desirable" and "feasible." Where they could not have both, our elites regularly opted for the feasible.

What are the pragmatics of the immigration dynamic? There are several "social facts."

⁴Interview no. 134 (London, 22 April 1992), p. 4.

⁵Interview no. 310 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p. 15.

First, immigration is difficult to control. As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, immigration continues not only because it is physically difficult to stop, but because it is difficult to halt for legal and political reasons.⁶ Furthermore, European voters want it controlled; the percentage of negative opinion increases with the size of non-EU immigrant populations. More explicitly, immigration of almost one million Algerians and about as many Portuguese in France, of nearly 2 million Turks in Germany, almost that many New Commonwealth immigrants in the UK, not only affects these countries, but also raises a fundamental question about the future character of these societies.⁷ Third, the natural evolution of immigration, which includes the "push/pull" phenomenon and demographic processes, means that Europe is ageing, as Africa grows younger; economic and environmental disparities are widening in the midst of communication revolution; and European countries are experiencing growing structural gaps in their labor markets and heightened immigrant resentment.

Pragmatics also takes into account interdependence. The evolution towards interdependence has been seen to supplant the traditional notion of national interest defined as power (especially military power).⁸ This is particularly applicable to the politics of immigration. The globalization of the world economy conditions the "push-pull" factors of immigration dynamics. The needs of the European economy may make a continuing process of immigration inevitable. More than ever before, immigration patterns are shaped by changing world conditions which determine not only the dispositions of individuals toward movement, but the policies of states

⁶See Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Martin Schain, "The Politics of Immigration: Introduction," West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 9.

⁷Tomas Hammar and Yngve Georg Lithman, "The Integration of Migrants: Experience, Concepts and Policies," The Future of Migration (Paris: OECD), p. 254

⁸For an extensive discussion of the theory of interdependence, see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2d. ed. (Glenview, Illinois, 1989).

towards movement of individuals across their borders. European integration reinforces interdependence in immigration dynamics (see Chapter Three). The progress of the EU reflects the growing erosion of traditional distinctions between foreign and domestic politics. Policy-thinking incorporates the pragmatic considerations of an interdependent world.

The findings indicated that MEPs are sensitive to pragmatic constraints. As Chapter Four illustrated, these elites distinguish between the "feasible" and "desirable" aspects of immigration and these considerations elicit common fears and bleak outlooks. Sensitivities to interdependence also lead to such diverse priorities as educational and economic assistance to countries of immigrant origin, or disinclinations to cede sovereignty on immigration matters to EU institutions.

The nature of attitude cleavages regarding immigration suggest that immigration is a two-fold issue. Immigration is a "valence" issue, meaning there is essentially one body of opinion: all want it controlled; few are optimistic that they are competent to control the problem single-handedly. As one MEP explained: "The [immigration] problem is so heavy...that all forces are displaced a bit".⁹ One Dutch MEP expressed a sentiment echoed by most MEPs:

I think that the bottom line is, ideological lines have been blurred by the immigration issue, and no longer provide a yardstick or even a direction for the parties themselves. Everybody is coping with the problem.¹⁰

But this undermines the fact that there are still substantial differences regarding approaches and solutions to "coping with problems". The findings here revealed that hidden country and party disparities exist, even among consensus. Immigration is also a "position" issue; MEPs take different positions on implementation, and more substantive questions. As Chapter Four indicated, they still fundamentally disagree on the "desirable" aspects of immigration. Moreover,

⁹Interview no. 461 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 4.

¹⁰Interview no. 44 (Strasbourg, 12 May 1992), p. 15.

there are vestiges of traditional polarizations in the immigration debate.

A very interesting finding emerged from the discrepancy between the survey data and what individual MEPs recounted in interviews. This underscores the importance of employing the two types of methodology used, in studying elite attitudes. MEPs may be misleading themselves in reporting that the left-right construct is irrelevant in a changing world. In fact, as a group, they seem to suggest that the left-right/party may serve as an organizing tool for policy preferences.

Many MEPs argued that the left-right terms were anachronistic. Pointing to the old French origins of left-right in Assembly seating, this German PPE remarked, "Now, it has very little to do with reality."¹¹ This sentiment is particularly pertinent to immigration, according to MEPs. A French Socialist explained:

There is a certain confusion between the Left and Right on some things. I don't think that party lines are important on questions like immigration. Of course probably in Le Pen's party, you are bound to find more anti-immigrant people than let's say in the Communist party, but I don't think that it is such a strong difference, as I said before, because those who belong to a leftist party will always tell you that they don't mind living with a lot of immigrants around, but I don't think that is always true really. They feel obliged to say so, because they belong to a certain party, but I think on the whole, the vision between the left and right is a bit overstated.¹²

Although discussions with MEPs revealed that the left-right terms may be exaggerated, the statistics show that they are far from obsolete. Further research is required in order to assess which account comes closest to reality.

¹¹Interview no. 63 (Strasbourg, 11 May 1992), p. 2.

¹²Interview no. 310 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 2.

III. The European Parliament

It is difficult to talk about cleavages in the European Parliament without mentioning the intrinsic peculiarities of the institution itself. If, as Bagehot noted, politics is about the "action and reaction between the Ministry and the Parliament," then the role of opposition is to exercise functions of control.¹³ This dynamic presupposes certain characteristics: an executive power responsible to the parliament and in which alternation can occur through periodic elections; and that coherent parties or blocs of parties exist in the legislature, organized to dispute before the electorate for control over the executive.¹⁴

Until the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament had virtually very little control over a lacking executive. The entire legislature acted more as an opposition than a viable power to bring down governments or appoint new ones. The European Parliament has however come closer to resembling a multiparty system. National scenarios have shown that even in multiparty systems there is a tendency towards formation of opposition. This dynamic is now discernible at the European Parliament.

Despite sometimes narrow lines of opposition, the quality of animosities is intense, particularly that which separate MEPs of the mainstream parties from those of the far right. Although opposition is considered central to democratic functioning of any system, the acceptance of opposition in the EP itself has been very controversial. This has been evidenced at the formal and informal level. At the time the extreme-right was formed in 1984, nearly 200 MEPs took part in a symbolic silent protest. They each carried a white rose, a symbol of German resistance

¹³See John Fitzmaurice, The Party Groups in the European Parliament (Westmead, Hants, England and Lexington, Massachusetts D.C. Heath Ltd, 1975), p.195.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 195.

to Nazism. This action was initiated by the Socialist Group, but was widely supported.¹⁵ Nevertheless, it became obvious that symbolic protests could not be kept up for the five-year term of office of the EP. Attempts to change the rules would weaken the credibility of the Parliament and provide an opportunity for the extreme right to attack the whole idea of parliamentary democracy.

MEPs perceive these antagonisms in personal and political terms:

I know him [fellow Belgian, Karl Dillen from the extreme-right party], we say hello to each other, but I have never had a conversation with him. I am not in favor however of the attitude of some people who say to neglect them, and ignore them. That's no good. That's what they want. Because every time you isolate them [extreme-right], in my opinion, you make heroes of them, and you give them a chance to say, 'Look, they speak about democracy; we represent so many thoughts, and they don't want to talk to us'. I think that's an error. When you keep them in isolation, you make them strong; when you mix them with you, you compromise them.¹⁶

A Communist MEP agreed:

I do not agree sometimes with my own party. I disagree when we say that we should not elect people from the National Front. I made a declaration which amazed people when we had a commission on the German question. We calculated the commission in a way that the NF could not have any representatives and they protested. I stood up and I said, 'I am sorry but I agree with the NF because they have the right to have representatives; it will be in minority, but they have the right. But I think that if a fascist party would be too close to the majority, we should stop them from having the power, but this is another thing.'¹⁷

These types of approaches to opposition are also observable at an informal level, as demonstrated by MEP avoidance in the Parliament corridors. The line between the majority and opposition are quite imbalanced but the minority, extreme-right in the EP has carved for itself a distinctive

¹⁵Geoffrey Harris, The Dark Side of Europe: The Extreme Right Today (Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), p. 138.

¹⁶Interview no. 219 (Brussels, 7 May 1992), p. 3.

¹⁷Interview no. 329 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), pp. 9-10.

position. It is not surprising that with over 15 seats, it holds one of the highest proportion of seats in Strasbourg *vis-à-vis* other Parliaments of EU member-states.

The EP response to the extreme right has been consistent with many national party dynamics: it has brought immigration onto the political agenda. A rejoinder to decisions in the mid-1980s not to take any action to prevent Le Pen and his fellow MEPs from receiving the rights, privileges and financial support available to all MEPs, came in the creation of Committees of Inquiry on immigration, racism, and xenophobia.¹⁸ Since democratic methods were chosen, another approach was needed. The immigration issue was placed in the European arena: bringing experts and politicians and asking them to relay their national experiences has also been a means of developing a serious European response.¹⁹

In general, it has been expected that as the process of integration proceeds, values themselves will undergo change.²⁰ According to Haas, community sentiment would be considered to flourish if groups and parties organized beyond the national level, and if they defined their interests in terms larger than those of the separate nation-state from which they originate.²¹ The findings here identify such propensities, and reveal that this process is indeed in progress.

Particularly if parties are to survive, it is important that they become more flexible and adaptable to a changing post-industrial environment. According to Flanagan and Dalton, this may

¹⁸See the Evrigenis Report, PE 97.547 (Brussels: European Parliament, December 1985); and Glyn Ford (rapporteur) European Parliament, the "Committee of Inquiry on Racism and Xenophobia: Report on the Findings of Inquiry" A3-195/90 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1991).

¹⁹See Harris, p. 145.

²⁰Haas, p. 13.

²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

depend on their ability to abdicate to a continuing shift in decision-making authority to other sites.²² The role and structure of the EP creates incentives for policy coordination and for standardizing party dynamics in fighting national campaigns.

IV. Implications and Speculations

These findings lead us to reconsider the critical questions of this study. How important are historical and cultural factors which are nation-specific in shaping policy preferences or thinking? What is the significance of the traditional left-right ideological construct in explaining elite attitudes towards immigration?

The answers are two-fold. According to the findings, these sources may be both understated and overstated. The study on MEPs provides a revised image for the early demise of ideological constraints that has been described by many scholars (see Chapter 6). It underscores the fact that although immigration seems to have obscured party/ideological differences, party affiliation persists to differentiate elite attitudes towards immigration. MEPs devalue the role of traditional ideological/party sources in structuring political attitudes, but their positions on immigration may be distinguished by party identification. This follows trends found in studies of the masses: voters report that the left-right scale is less important to them, but continue to self-position themselves on that scale (see Chapter Six). As Chapter Six demonstrated, even when left-right failed to generate clear party patterns, party experiences, policy profiles and styles were found to bind attitudes (i.e., pessimism/optimism; assessments of magnitude of problems).

²²Scott Flanagan and Russell Dalton, "Models of Change," in The West European Party System, ed. Peter Mair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 246.

The role of these traditional sources in the immigration debate however, should not be overstated. The discrepancies between the empirical findings and the interviews compel us to examine the bases of these confusions. More specifically, why are party/ideological distinctions elusive?

First, ambiguities are based on the fact that in a growing complex world, other interests must be reconciled. In arguing that party/ideology continue to order preferences, one must not ignore that the position of parties has also become fluid, to incorporate new issues. Parties are adjusting to new conditions, particularly ones that result from globalization and European integration.

In an evolving Europe and growing interdependence, national and transnational interests are also significant, and this complicates the role of parties. The debate over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty revealed what Schnapper described as being "underestimated under the influence of Marxism": the sentimental tie which binds the people to the nation as the locus of historical continuity.²³ As Chapter Eight showed, the European factor galvanized its own patterns of opposition. The prominence of the European Union in the domestic politics of many European countries was a consequence of the debate associated with the process of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. This underscored the impact of pan-Europeanism on national and party dynamics.²⁴ National (and transnational) interests may obfuscate traditional party/ideological alliances.

Second, this phenomenon may be particularly applicable to the immigration issue, as it

²³Dominique Schnapper, "The Debate on Immigration and the Crisis of National Identity," *West European Politics*, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 138.

²⁴Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffman, "Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional Change," *The Dynamics of European Integration*, ed. William Wallace (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), 281.

involves a number of competing interests. As one Greek Communist described:

If you look at the Parliament, which has less powers than any other parliament, you can find 10, 20, 30 points of division. On immigration, the division is eroded. Thus, there is the growth of the extreme right--too much compromise.²⁵

The data revealed that MEPs perceive left-right differences to be less important to immigration issues than to more general issues. Immigration questions, as Hammar suggested, place political parties in unfamiliar waters: "the issue is not the usual one of how to divide the economic pie between the voters, but instead how to divide it between citizens and non-citizens."²⁶ Immigration may resemble issues such as crime and poverty; issues which Putnam posed did not involve competing interests among social groups, but rather, common problems facing the community.²⁷ Moreover, national interests in assessing the immigration problem may cut across party/ideology affiliations. This may explain why MEPs claim that when parties cross-cut, one must consider national situations, more particularly immigrant numbers (see Chapter Seven). As Hammar pointed out, immigration policy has a great deal in common with other political issues affecting a country's international relations. Political parties often agree to act concertedly in the "national interest" or in this case, the "transnational interest".²⁸

Third, beliefs that ideology is no longer a polarizing factor, may be confounded by the fact that the original issues have changed. MEPs repeatedly indicated this:

There is no question of difference between the right and left...because the class struggle has finished....The immigration question is not...in terms of right or

²⁵Interview no. 461 (Strasbourg, 7 May 1992), p. 6.

²⁶Tomas Hammar, ed., European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 280.

²⁷Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 112-113.

²⁸Hammar, p. 281.

left...it's a new question. Absolutely new. It's not a plastic ideological scheme.²⁹

An LDR Member from the Netherlands provided a similar account:

I do not perceive the left-right division to be very relative to this [immigration] debate. Obviously in the way that Right and Left respond, you detect traces of their heritage. But I do not find those traces to be dominant. I don't find them indicative of future behavior. If I have a socialist party in front of me today, I am incapable of judging its position on immigration.³⁰

The study shows that despite the evolution of original conflicts of ideological polarization, there is a kernel of truth in old distinctions.

The emphasis of party functions have changed, and this factors in accounts of its declining relevance. Nevertheless, if the lines between the left and right are often more symbolic than objective, their reported demise may also be more anecdotal and fashionable than substantive. Ideological rhetoric continues to provide powerful cues for communication among this elite group. As one British MEP admitted:

Well, yes, I suppose that these terms [left-right] are out of date. But they are convenient. They provide images still.³¹

The legacy of these images figured in the reluctance of the British Conservatives to join the Liberal Party in the EP, even though many agreed that they were often ideologically closer to them than to the Christian Democrats.³² Regardless of other sources of interest organization (i.e., nation-state, the European factor), the left-right continuum has reinvented its key functions, namely that of preserving common images and heritage; the reference points in discourse.

This persistent function substantiates arguments that although the role of parties is

²⁹Interview no. 339 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 4.

³⁰Interview no. 44 (Strasbourg, 12 May 1992), p. 7.

³¹Interview no. 123 (Unofficial conversation, New York, 25 August 1993).

³²Interview no. 123 (Unofficial conversation, New York, 25 August 1993).

changing, they are not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future.³³ Traditionally, in working out ideas on governing, parties have acted as catalysts for political discussion. This has taken place between parties and inside them, and has played an important role not only in educating the public to the great controversies of the day, but in the evolution of political thought.³⁴ Parties have also facilitated administrative decisions by reducing the area of what is considered politically possible.³⁵ The evolution of parties seem to be following Flanagan and Dalton's prescription for durability: becoming more pragmatic, flexible, and loose structures so that they are more receptive to new interests and more adaptable to local and national changes.³⁶ As one French Socialist illustrated, MEPs encourage party adaptability:

I am not for the disappearance of traditional parties, but for their transformation. After all, these parties have a history which was very useful for the life of each country. But if they remain with yesterday's vision, they will disappear. People want answers in relation to the future.³⁷

In Europe, parties and ideology have remained significant at the level of political discourse and political debate. They continue to shape the dialogue on immigrant intake, and educate the public to the various policy dilemmas and goals.

Finally, the confusion over the role of the left and right, emanates from the apparent abatement of the intensity between traditional conflicts. Evidence of convergence has often been equated with the demise of traditional affiliations. Lerner and Gorden identified "a new

³³Scott Flanagan and Russell Dalton, "Models of Change," in The West European Party System, ed. P. Mair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 245.

³⁴Stanley Henig, European Political Parties: A Handbook (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 6.

³⁵Alessandro Pizzorno, "Parties in Pluralism," in The West European Party System, ed. P. Mair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 70.

³⁶Ibid.; See Flanagan and Dalton, p. 245.

³⁷Interview no. 312 (Strasbourg, 13 May 1992), p. 2.

intellectual pragmatism" that cut across party lines to choose options that "seem more effective and desirable regardless of its ideological label".³⁸ They described a consensus among European elites that national options were not viable and that transnational choices were the only realistic alternatives. Have European attitudes moved in the direction anticipated by scholars as early as the 1950s and 1960s?³⁹

Many students of immigration politics have expounded convergence theories.⁴⁰ Miller and Mitchell's comparative study of policy-making patterns on migration, concluded that despite major differences in immigration contexts, transatlantic convergence was taking place.⁴¹ Butt Philip argues that European integration disseminates information and experience across frontiers, and thus facilitates policy convergence.⁴² Crowley and Weil also imply that international learning may produce converging strategies for integration.⁴³

Theories of interdependence have also been used to argue that immigration is increasingly

³⁸Lerner and Gorden, p. 206.

³⁹See Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958); Daniel Lerner and Morten Gorden, Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1969).

⁴⁰Martin Heisler, "Migration, International Relations and the New Europe: Theoretical Perspectives from Political Sociology," International Migration Review, vol. 26 (Summer 1992): 596-622; Patrick Weil and John Crowley, "Integration in Theory and Practice: A Comparison of France and Britain," West European Politics, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994): 110-126; Butt Philip (1994): 168-191; Hammar (1985): 292-304; Mark Miller and Christopher Mitchell, "Comparing Policy-Making Patterns towards Migration in Industrial Democracies: Western Europe and the United States," (Paper presented at the Seminar on Migration, the State and International Relations, New York University, 26 February 1993).

⁴¹Miller and Mitchell (1993).

⁴²Butt Philip, p. 186.

⁴³Crowley and Weil, p. 124.

vulnerable to global trends.⁴⁴ According to Hollifield for example, legal immigration is tied to economic needs, international agreements, and to a network of rights which have been applied universally by legal authorities.⁴⁵ Interdependence is reinforced not only because of European integration but also because states have become porous, and borders are increasingly permeable.

Evidence of mounting pressures towards convergence is abundant. The state in Western Europe tends to share more and more of its functions with other states.⁴⁶ Defense has been from states to alliances such as NATO. The regulation of trade has been delegated to multilateral institutions such as GATT and the EU.⁴⁷ Law-making has become shared between member-states and the EU. In general, where EU law conflicts with national law, EU law prevails.⁴⁸ The Single Market has also induced most states to coordinate their social and immigration policies and control of their borders.⁴⁹

Given these trends, a significant question remains: Are elite attitudes also converging? Does a rapidly evolving Europe outpace the more traditional values in Europe, and does the issue of immigration serve to draw attention to the erosion of traditional polarizations in Europe?

Increasing pressures toward harmonization may lead to beliefs that old polarizations are irrelevant. This logic lacks historical perspective and denies the processes of alliance formations

⁴⁴S. Weintraub and C. Stolp, "The Implications of Growing Economic Interdependence," in The Future of Migration (Paris: OECD, 1987).

⁴⁵James Hollifield, Immigrants, Markets, and States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).

⁴⁶William Wallace, "The Changing Role of the State in Western Europe," (London: ESRC Seminar, 15 March 1991), in Miall, p. 53.

⁴⁷Miall, p. 53.

⁴⁸Butt Philip, 174.

⁴⁹Note that no established cooperative network for immigration matters serving the EC members existed before the single market program was agreed [Butt Philip, p. 172].

in an evolving political system. In fact, in a developing European system, traditional values seem to serve as a broad organizing device of interests. It is not surprising that, the original framers of the European Community (Treaty of Rome) created a Parliament whose common interests would emanate from party/ideology affiliations. The existence of the European Parliament creates an incentive for policy coordination between parties sharing similar platforms in different countries. Signs that these polarizations exist, give credibility to the EP, and the development of the European system.

This study of elite attitudes urges caution in equating growing policy harmonization with attitudinal convergence. Making inferences from policy to thinking not only overlooks the ideological and national imprints that persist in Europe, but also misses the fact that attitudes lag behind global trends. Early signs of attitudinal convergence do exist, but do not mean that interests have become homogenized. In fact, this study delineates that what is considered convergence is often really compatibility of several interests.

Compatible interests are found among nation-based attitudes, ideological differences, and positions on Europe. The data indicate that the attitudinal differences between partisans of the left and those of the right are more compatible than conflictual. Positions or policy preferences vary with ideological groups by degree. For example, MEPs from the left are more likely to support immigration levels and extended immigrant rights than partisans of the right, but they do not accept immigration unequivocally. As demonstrated, virtually every MEP in the sample expressed a desire to see immigration limited or controlled. There are certain priorities that cut across the left and right. These include wishes for decreased immigration from the Third World, and no immigrant rights for national elections. Thus while there are partisan struggles over policy approaches, MEPs may compromise on degrees of protection.

Compatibility rather than convergence may also characterize national attitudinal patterns.

The differences between the Northern countries of the EU and the Southern are not only in socio-economic levels of development, but in sizes of immigrant populations. These are also marked by differences in attitudes towards European integration and immigration. The dominant players of the EU, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, are also the ones that have the largest concentrations of immigrant populations. The peripheral countries, mostly of the South whose MEPs report relatively fewer immigration problems have, internalized the problems of their partners. Moreover, the research shows that MEPs from the less developed areas of the EU are more likely to make policy concessions regarding immigrant rights, national sovereignty, and assistance. Policy convergence may be based on the reconcilable interests between restrictive immigration interests of the dominant nations, and the interests of the less developed countries, to reap the rewards of full integration.

Compatible interests also materialize on positions on Europe. MEPs may be distinguished by their national vs. European perspectives to policy, and this contest is also heralded by competing institutions (i.e., the Council or intergovernmental groups vs. the EP). In face of growing political interdependence, the prominent divisions may be as Putnam described in his study of summitry:

The fate of a congressman from Youngstown depends on decisions taken in Brussels or Tokyo. The tradeoff for price stability in Hamburg may be unemployment in Harlem. In such predicaments, governments and politicians must choose some mix of two broad strategies: one nationalist, one internationalist. They may try to regain control over their own destiny by re-erecting barriers. Or they may seek instead to co-operate in effort to manage politically.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, as Chapter Eight showed, the common denominators between national and European solutions revolve around the processes of community-protection. The distinctions between pan-Europeanists and nationalists therefore mean that at minimum, external EU frontiers

⁵⁰Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, *Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits*, p. 3.

will be tightened.

While national attitudes still vary within the EU, common interests regarding immigration mean that the traditional immigration countries, the socioeconomically more developed EU countries will set a restrictive tone, and the more peripheral countries with less immigration exposures will accept as a price for being members of an advanced free-trade area. These interests also coincide with the objectives of the dominant mainstream party coalitions.

Compromise characterizes the direction European integration takes in general, and the way immigration policy evolves. The Treaty on European Union itself was a compromise between those who wanted to move towards a federal Europe with a stronger supranational element (the original EC-6, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland) and those who preferred intergovernmental (national) cooperation. The result was a three-pillar structure which extended the areas of economic policy under supranational control while strengthening intergovernmental mechanisms for foreign policy and home policy.⁵¹

These compromises drive immigration policy. Competition between more national and more transnational responses resulted in what has been called the "soft option" taken by the 1989 Report of the European Committee on Racism and Xenophobia.⁵² In essence, the Report examined the issues in isolation, as extreme movements, rather than within the framework of the European body politic. According to some critics, the latter approach was followed in order to avoid looking at racism in context of each country and/or making judgements over each country's immigration policy. An earlier report by the Runnymede Trust sponsored by the European Commission was abandoned, on the grounds that it was "unwilling to enter into conflict with the

⁵¹See Miall, pp. 55-56.

⁵²Liz Fekete, "Report of the European Committee on Racism and Xenophobia: A Critique," in *Race & Class*, vol. 32 (1991), p. 148.

Member States."⁵³ The European vs. national conflict affected the resolve of the 1989 Report as well: the Committee had agreed to a compromise whereby the European Commission was asked to "study seriously" the report's recommendations, rather than "endorse" them.⁵⁴

That policy thinking at the European level incorporates nation-state and ideological assessments of immigration, is clearly reflected in the direction Maastricht has taken. To a large degree, new guidelines were based on the previous work already undertaken by intergovernmental groups such as the Schengen. Moreover, the work of committees and ad hoc groups in conjunction with decentralized institutions reflect the compromise between national and European interests that takes place at the institutional level. A great deal of informal coordination among national bureaucrats and interest groups has occurred. Committees of national experts and bureaucrats frequently prepare Community proposals and decisions.⁵⁵ More and more, Community institutions and national government bodies act in concert rather than autonomously.

The culmination of national, party, and European interests in immigration means that policy at the European level will continue to tie issues of immigration with social integration. The upshot of multidimensional interests in the 1990s may be a common immigration policy that looks like the one this Dutch MEP described:

I think Europe's politicians are trying and groping towards two different but related approaches. One is to reduce the legal scope for immigrants from outside the EC to move into the EC. That is the same--more restrictionist policy. On the other hand, I think they will want to compensate that by giving the legally

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia, Rapporteur: Mr. Glyn Ford (Brussels, European Parliament Sessions Document, 1989); In order for the report to be produced at all, the Committee had to overcome a major controversy between the French Liberals and the Socialists over voting rights in local elections to migrants with 5 year residence, see L. Fekete, p. 147.

⁵⁵See Keohane and Hoffman, p. 281; Dusan Sidjanski, "Communauté Européenne 1992: Gouvernement de Comité?" in Pouvoirs, Issue on Europe 1993, no. 48 (1989), pp. 71-80.

established residents more rights. So that, while you're being more restrictive towards outsiders, you compensate that psychologically in your own mind, but also in the way you relate to the population, by saying, 'hang on', but we cannot just be nasty to all these people. A number of them are living here legally, and it's about time we give them more rights.⁵⁶

A common policy intends on improving the lot of immigrants residing in Europe while at the same time consolidating external boundaries. This is reminiscent of what took place in the 1970s throughout the nation-states of Europe. Integration went hand in hand with decisions to curb immigration: governments justified the curbs in light of the need to foster integration.

If immigration policy in Europe is based on compatible interests, so too are the sources that organize these interests. In fact, the study suggests that amidst convergence, the left-right construct is consolidating into a broader system. MEPs may be misleading themselves in thinking that the left-right construct is extinct at a time when it is crystallizing. In a world of growing interdependence, the immigration issue is a testimony to the more compatible interests that flow from traditionally polarized sources of thinking.

This study argues that national trends not only reinforce left-right polarizations, but these in turn are reinvented in the European landscape. The construction of Europe both reinforces and reconciles national and ideological differences. The European factor provides a rallying force to obtain (not define) national interests collectively. It relies on traditional party and ideological ties as organizing tools in an enlarged forum.

The European factor in many ways perpetuates a dualism in politics. Old passions coincide with new ones. The range of polarizations includes the lines between "Europe without frontiers" and "Fortress Europe"; supranational and national institutions; internationalism and nationalism; materialist and post-materialist values; or to put in "old-fashioned" terms, the left and the right. It builds on older schisms, but in the context of a world of change and insecurity.

⁵⁶Interview no. 44 (Strasbourg, 12 May 1992), p. 6.

Moreover, polarizations in an enlarged Europe continue to distinguish between those who have more to gain and those who have more to lose.

As in all political systems, the dominant forces are expected to prevail. For immigration in Europe, this may mean that policy will follow the thinking of the three dominant, most socio-economically developed EU powers, with the largest immigrant numbers. This dominant attitude also coincides with that of the mainstream parties. This means more restrictive immigration policy, and more serious integration policy, at the European level.

Ideological, national, and transnational bases of attitudes shape immigration thinking; they are not mutually exclusive. The salience of the immigration issue, as reinforced by MEP reports is symptomatic of the vitality of these sources. As this study suggested, although MEPs do not see this picture, ideological patterns continue to motivate thinking.

In addition, Daniel Bell's account of what gives ideology its force, poses that cultural factors may also induce passion:

One must say that the most important latent function of ideology is to tap emotion. Other than religion (and war and nationalism), there have been few forms of channelizing energy.⁵⁷

Interviews with MEPs reveal that cultural sources (both national and European) may serve to generate a consensus. Ironically, this was best captured by a Greek Communist:

It [European civilization] is like being Jewish. I mean a religion, a very strong feeling of ancient origin. Sometimes even me personally, I am very emotional...It's a very strong sentiment, you know. The idea of being one of the most ancient civilizations.⁵⁸

Immigration in an evolving Europe is logically (and particularly) an emotionally-charged issue, and thus inherently validates the presence of ideological and cultural interests. A

⁵⁷Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, 2nd ed. (New York: Collier Books, The Free Press, 1962), p. 400.

⁵⁸Interview no. 461 (Strasbourg: 13 May 1992), p. 7.

committee appointed by the European Council captured these sensibilities in a report proposing to give the Community a new political, cultural and social dimension. It stated:

A reduction in the formalities and controls which take place at frontiers within the Community is one of the tangible manifestations of the Community to which people are very sensitive. From a practical point of view, it is one of the few highly visible and frequently recurring factors which affect everyday life.⁵⁹

The politicization of immigration in Europe of 1990s gives credibility to the latency of ideology and cultural alignments. Particularly in an enlarged Europe, they may grow in importance. If ideology mobilizes passions, so may national or transnational factors, particularly during a time of community-building.

The observations here compel us to say something about the more general nature of conflict in Europe of the 1990s. In his classic account of traditional party politics, E.E. Schattschneider said, "What happens in politics depends on the way in which people are divided into factions, parties, groups, classes, etcetera."⁶⁰ Conflicts divide people and unite them at the same time, and the processes that prompt each reflect the times.

Both population movements and European integration are separate sides of the same coin. Their common denominator is the process of interdependence. The progress of the EU throughout its history reflects gradual erosion of traditional distinctions between foreign and domestic politics. The dynamics of immigration are caught in the same process. It represents a dynamic issue of the 1990s, caught between domestic and international lines, produced by growing interdependence. Issues that fall in that domain, like states that are becoming porous,

⁵⁹The Report was adopted in June 1985 by the Milan European Council. Commission of the European Communities, "Citizens of the Community: A People's Europe" (Brussels: Directorate-General), pp. 5-6.

⁶⁰E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press, 1975), p. 60.

gravitate to international and transnational organizations,⁶¹ such as the European Parliament. In a world of interdependence, states which can no longer control their own economies or defend themselves alone, are obliged to join institutions and organizations in order to carry out policies effectively.⁶²


If the "European project" and the European Parliament evolve, then it is likely, according to the attitudes uncovered in this study, that the left-right will further crystallize. These attitudes would be embedded in a culture of a consolidating Europe, based on compatible interests, primarily led by three powers, with the assent of the other member-states. This means that the seeming contradictions between efforts to limit immigration or the movement of non-EU migrants, and those to secure open borders to trade may be reconciled through the strengthening of external controls. Tightening external EU borders is a policy response which both guarantees the "freedoms" of a European common area, and ensures a sense of security for its European citizens.

⁶¹See Miall, p. 53.

⁶²Miall, p. 52.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: English Letter Accompanying Questionnaire



The Graduate School and University Center
of the City University of New York

Center for European Studies / Box 555
Graduate Center 33 West 42 Street, New York, N.Y. 10036-8099
212 790-4442

March 9, 1992

Dear Member

The Center for European Studies at the City University of New York is concerned to develop in the United States a greater understanding of the European Community, and especially of the European Parliament. I write to seek your assistance in that endeavor.

In studying the European Parliament at this time, our goal is to build a base from which to trace its development over time. To that end, we are conducting a study of the current members' perspectives and policy preferences regarding one of the most challenging issues facing the Community, i.e., immigration.

As the central emergent leadership institution in the European Community, the Parliament seems crucial on this issue. Therefore, the perspectives and policy preferences of the members are essential not only for our understanding of the development of policy, but to our understanding of the development of the Parliament itself.

In pursuit of such understanding, we are asking the cooperation of each member of the European Parliament. Specifically, we ask that you take a few moments of what we know is precious time to share your views on immigration with us by completing the enclosed questionnaire. Your thoughtful and candid answers are essential for our study. They will, of course, be kept completely confidential.


As project director, I will be in Europe during the period 1 April 1992 and 1 June 1992. Should your time permit, I would very much appreciate the opportunity of discussing these issues with you. If you would be willing to have such an interview, please so indicate in the place provided at the end of the questionnaire, and I will be in touch with your office to arrange a specific time.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Gallya Lahav
Project Director

APPENDIX 2: English Questionnaire



The Graduate School and University Center
of the City University of New York
Center for European Studies

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

March 1992

Gallya Lahav, Project Director
Center for European Studies
Box 555
Graduate Center
33 West 42 Street
New York, N.Y. 10036-8099, U.S.A.

Telephone: [01] (212) 593-5742
Bitnet: GAL@CUNYVMS1

All responses will be kept confidential. Data generated by this study will be used for statistical analysis only.

Questionnaire for Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)

This questionnaire focuses primarily on immigration from outside the European Community (EC), although it touches upon intra-EC migration as well. For the following questions, please either circle the number which is closest to your position or rank the categories as requested.

An addressed return envelope is provided for your convenience. All questionnaires or inquiries can be sent to the address listed on the first page. We ask that you kindly give your valuable time to this study, which will not be possible without YOUR cooperation.

Thank you very much for your assistance.

* * * * *

Please begin by entering the names of the following:

Country: _____

Political Party: _____

I. On Immigration

1. On a scale from 1-5, ranging from not important (1) to very important (5), how important do you think the immigration issue is . . .

- | | not important | very important |
|-------------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| a) to your country? | 1—2—3—4—5 | |
| b) to the European Community? | 1—2—3—4—5 | |
| c) to your party grouping? | 1—2—3—4—5 | |
| d) to you? | 1—2—3—4—5 | |

2a. Do you think of immigration as an issue that is primarily: (Please circle one)

1. political 2. social 3. economic 4. foreign policy and security 5. cultural
6. demographic 7. other:(please specify) _____

b. When you think of immigration problems, to which other area do you relate them first? (Please circle one)

1. social welfare 2. race relations 3. unemployment 4. education 5. crime 6. citizenship
7. drug-trafficking 8. integration 9. other: (Please specify) _____

3. Are the problems of immigration in Europe: (Please circle one)

1. greater today than in the past 2. about the same today as in the past 3. lesser today than in the past

4. How optimistic or pessimistic are you that current immigration problems will be resolved?

1. very optimistic 2. optimistic 3. pessimistic 4. very pessimistic

5. Should immigration from each of the following be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?

	increased	present level	decreased
from other EC member countries	1	2	3
from East European countries	1	2	3
from West European <u>non</u> -EC countries	1	2	3
from Turkey	1	2	3
from North Africa	1	2	3
from Africa	1	2	3
from Asia	1	2	3
in general	1	2	3

6a. In your opinion, what level of immigration from outside the EC would have the most favorable impact on the standard of living in Western Europe?

1. higher than current level 2. same as current level 3. lower than current level

b. In your opinion, what level of immigration from outside the EC would have the most favorable impact on the social fabric of Western Europe?

1. higher than current level 2. same as current level 3. lower than current level

II. On Immigration Policy

7. In general, when thinking about immigration policy, which of the following considerations should come first? (Please circle one)

1. humanitarian concerns 2. economic concerns 3. social integration concerns
4. demographic concerns 5. problems of emigrant countries 6. other: (Please specify) _____

8. How strongly do you agree or disagree that there should be a common immigration policy for members of the EC?

1. agree strongly 2. agree 3. disagree 4. disagree strongly

9. Who should be responsible for regulating immigration policy? (Please circle one)

1. national governments acting independently
2. national governments, through prior consultation with other EC governments
3. EC institutions, with member governments retaining the right to veto
4. entirely by EC institutions, through majority vote

10. How do you think immigration regulation should be primarily ensured in the European Community? (Please circle one)

1. by keeping border controls between member-countries intact
2. by having after-entry border controls
3. by strengthening border controls between member-countries and non-member countries
4. other: (Please specify) _____

11. According to what principle, if any, should immigration be regulated?

1. number quotas 2. geographic quotas 3. professional skill quotas 4. race and ethnic quotas
5. it should not be regulated 6. other: (Please specify) _____

12. What should be done about the rights of immigrants?

1. extend their rights 2. leave things as they are 3. restrict their rights

13. What should be the first concern of immigration policy-makers? (Please circle one)

1. integration of foreigners and their families who have been in an EC country
 2. the limitation of further entry of foreigners
 3. assistance to foreigners who desire to return to their homeland
 4. economic and educational assistance to countries who are sending immigrants
 5. other: (Please specify) _____

14. In your opinion, what is the largest obstacle, if any, for the Schengen Group? (Please circle one)

1. the possible inclusion of certain EC countries that are currently non-members
 2. the exclusion of certain EC countries
 3. its computer data service
 4. resolving 'third-national status' issues
 5. other: (Please specify) _____

III. On Left -Right and Party Groups

15. In your opinion, how clear are party group differences in the European Parliament on the immigration issue?

1. very clear 2. somewhat clear 3. not clear

16. How divisive has the debate been in your party group over the immigration issue?

1. very divisive 2. somewhat divisive 3. not divisive

17. (If immigration has been very divisive amongst your party group, you may wish to skip this question)

With regard to immigration from the following areas, which of the following best characterizes the opinions of MEPs from your party grouping, regardless of country? Please use the following scale:

1. strongly in favor
 2. somewhat in favor
 3. somewhat opposed
 4. strongly opposed

Developing Countries	1	2	3	4
East European states	1	2	3	4
South European EC member states	1	2	3	4
North European EC member states	1	2	3	4
West European non-EC member states	1	2	3	4

18a. In your opinion, how different are left and right positions on most issues:

	very different	somewhat different	not different
in your country?	1	2	3
for you?	1	2	3

b. In your opinion, how different are left and right positions on immigration issues specifically:

	very different	somewhat different	not different
in your country?	1	2	3
for you?	1	2	3

IV. Country

19a. In your opinion, how important are historical and cultural differences between EC nations in thinking about most issues?

1. very important 2. somewhat important 3. not important

b. In your opinion, how important are historical and cultural differences between EC nations in thinking about immigration issues?

1. very important 2. somewhat important 3. not important

20. In your opinion, how divisive has the public debate been in your country over the immigration issue?

1. very divisive 2. somewhat divisive 3. not divisive

21. Which of the following statements most accurately represents your view regarding immigration problems?

1. My country faces more immigration problems than other EC countries.
2. My country faces about the same number of immigration problems as other EC countries.
3. My country faces fewer immigration problems than other EC countries.

V. On Integration

22a. Do you think that the movement towards European unification should be speeded up, slowed down, or continued at its present rate?

1. speeded up 2. continued at present rate 3. slowed down

b. What position, in your opinion, does your country's present government take on this subject?

1. It favors speeding up 2. It favors continuing at present rate 3. It favors slowing down

c. What position, in your opinion, does public opinion of your country take on this subject?

1. It favors speeding up 2. It favors continuing at present rate 3. It favors slowing down

VI. MEP

23. There is a lot of talk about the objectives that your country should strive to achieve in the next 10 to 15 years. This list includes objectives that certain people believe should have priority.

a) Which of these objectives do you personally believe is the most important one in the long-term?

b) Which do you believe is the second most important objective? (Please check just one in each column).

	<u>First</u>	<u>Second</u>
Maintain order in the country	_____	_____
Increase participation of citizens in government decisions	_____	_____
Fight rising prices	_____	_____
Guarantee freedom of expression	_____	_____

24. How important, do you think each of the following is in shaping your views in regard to immigration issues?
(on scale of 1-5 where 1 = no importance and 5 = great importance, please indicate by circling each)

	no importance	great importance
a) Ideology	1—2—3—4—5	
b) National and Cultural Values	1—2—3—4—5	
c) Personal Experience	1—2—3—4—5	
d) Concerns about Economic Competition	1—2—3—4—5	
e) Concerns about Intermarriage	1—2—3—4—5	
f) Other: (Please specify) _____	1—2—3—4—5	

25. On the ideological spectrum, where do you place yourself from left to right?

left right

1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9

VI. Background Information

26. Sex of respondent: 1. Male 2. Female
27. Age: 1. Under 35 years 2. 35-49 years 3. 50-64 years 4. 65 years and above
28. Highest level of education attained: _____
29. Private Occupation: _____

If you feel there is something that you would like to discuss that is not addressed in this survey or if you wish to add any further comments, please feel free to do so in the space provided on the following page. All responses and comments will be kept confidential.

Comments:

If you would be willing to have a future interview, please indicate: _____ yes _____ no
(and list your name below)

If you wish to receive a summary of the findings, please list your name and address below.

Thank you very much for your time and cooperation.

APPENDIX 3: French Questionnaire

Questionnaire pour les Députés du Parlement Européen

Ce questionnaire concerne principalement l'immigration en provenance des pays non-membres de la CEE et à destination des pays membres. Mais certaines questions touchent aussi à la question des mouvements migratoires à l'intérieur de la CEE.

Pour les questions suivantes, entourez s'il vous plaît le nombre le plus proche de votre position ou organisez les catégories selon l'indication.

Une enveloppe est fournie pour votre convenance. Tous les questionnaires ou demandes d'information peuvent être adressés au Centre des Etudes Européennes. Votre attention et vos réponses sont nécessaires pour cette étude qui ne pourrait pas être achevée sans votre coopération.

Merci beaucoup pour votre assistance.

* * * * *

Commencez s'il vous plaît par les questions suivantes:

État Membre: _____

Parti: _____

I. Sur l'Immigration

1. Sur une échelle de 1 à 5 – ou (1) signifie "pas important" et (5) signifie "très important" – veuillez indiquer quelle importance vous donnez à la question de l'immigration...

	pas important	très important
a) Pour votre pays?	1—2—3—4—5	
b) Pour la Communauté Européenne?	1—2—3—4—5	
c) Pour votre parti groupe?	1—2—3—4—5	
d) Pour vous?	1—2—3—4—5	

2a. Est-ce que vous pensez que la question de l'immigration est surtout: (Encerclez une des réponses, s'il vous plaît)

1. politique	2. sociale	3. économique	4. de sécurité nationale et de politique étrangère
5. culturelle	6. démographique	7. autres: (spécifiez s'il vous plaît) _____	

b. Quand vous pensez aux problèmes d'immigration, à quel autre genre de questions les associés vous en premier lieu?

1. le système de sécurité sociale	2. les relations interraciales	3. le chômage	4. l'éducation
5. la criminalité	6. la citoyenneté	7. le trafic de drogue	
8. l'intégration	9. autre: (Spécifiez s'il vous plaît) _____		

3. Est-ce que les problèmes d'immigration en Europe sont:

1. plus graves aujourd'hui que dans le passé
2. à peu près pareils que dans le passé
3. moins graves aujourd'hui que dans le passé

4. Etes-vous plutôt optimiste ou pessimiste quant à la résolution des problèmes d'immigration?

1. très optimiste
2. optimiste
3. pessimiste
4. très pessimiste

5. Est-ce que l'immigration en provenance de chacune de régions suivantes devrait rester au même niveau, être augmentée ou diminuée?

en provenance...	1 augmentée	2. même niveau	3. diminuée
des autres pays de la CEE	1	2	3
des pays de l'Europe de l'est	1	2	3
des pays de l'Europe de l'ouest, (non-membres de la CEE) de la Turquie	1	2	3
de l'Afrique du Nord	1	2	3
de l'Afrique	1	2	3
de l'Asie	1	2	3
en général	1	2	3

6. A votre avis, quel niveau d'immigration (en provenance des pays non-membres) aurait le résultat le plus favorable sur le niveau de vie en Europe de l'ouest?

1. un niveau plus élevé
2. le niveau actuel
3. un niveau moins élevé

b. A votre avis, quel niveau d'immigration (en provenance des pays non-membres) aurait le résultat le plus favorable sur la société en Europe de l'ouest?

1. un niveau plus élevé
2. le niveau actuel
3. un niveau moins élevé

II. Sur la Politique d'Immigration

7. En général, concernant la politique d'immigration, laquelle des considérations suivantes devrait venir en premier? (Encerclez une des réponses, s'il vous plaît)

1. considérations humanitaires
2. considérations économiques
3. considérations d'intégration sociale
4. considérations démographiques
5. les problèmes des pays d'emigration
6. autre: (Spécifiez s'il vous plaît) _____

8. Jusqu'à quel point êtes vous d'accord ou pas d'accord que la CEE devrait avoir une politique commune d'immigration?

1. tout à fait d'accord
2. d'accord
3. pas d'accord
4. pas du tout d'accord

9. Qui devrait avoir la responsabilité de la réglementation de la politique d'immigration?

1. Les gouvernements nationaux des pays membres agissant indépendamment
2. Les gouvernements des pays membres après avoir consulté les autres gouvernements de la CEE
3. Les institutions de la CEE, les gouvernements membres ayant le pouvoir de veto
4. Seulement les institutions de la CEE avec vote majoritaire

10. Comment pensez-vous que les flux migratoires devraient être régulés dans la CEE?

1. en gardant les contrôles des frontières entre les pays membres intacts
2. en ayant des contrôles après le passage des frontières
3. en renforçant les contrôles entre les pays membres et les pays non-membres
4. autre: (Spécifiez s'il vous plait) _____

11. Suivant quel principe l'immigration devrait-elle être contrôlée?

1. des quotas numériques
2. des quotas géographiques
3. des quotas professionnels
4. des quotas raciaux et ethniques
5. elle ne devrait pas être contrôlée
6. autres: (Spécifiez s'il vous plait) _____

12. Que devrait-on faire pour les droits des immigrants?

1. améliorer leurs droits
2. les maintenir comme ils sont
3. restreindre leurs droits

13. Quel devrait être la première priorité des responsables de l'immigration?

1. l'intégration des étrangers et de leurs familles qui sont dans un pays de la CEE
2. la limitation de l'entrée future des étrangers
3. l'assistance aux étrangers qui désirent retourner dans leurs pays d'origine
4. l'assistance économique et d'éducation pour les pays d'origine
5. autre: (Spécifiez s'il vous plait) _____

14. A votre avis, quel est le plus grand obstacle pour le "groupe Schengen"?

1. la possible inclusion de certains pays de la CEE qui ne sont pas couramment membres de ce groupe
2. l'exclusion de certains pays de la CEE
3. le système d'information Schengen (SIS)
4. la résolution de la question du statut des étrangers qui sont privilégiés dans chaque pays membre de la CEE
5. autre: (Spécifiez s'il vous plait) _____

III. Concernant la Gauche et la Droite et les Groupes de Partis

15. A votre avis, est-ce que les groupes de partis dans le Parlement Européen ont des vues très différentes sur la question de l'immigration?

1. très différentes
2. différentes
3. pas différentes

16. Quel niveau de division le débat concernant la question de l'immigration a-t-il amené dans votre parti groupe?

1. un niveau très élevé
2. plus ou moins élevé
3. un niveau très bas

17. (Si le débat concernant l'immigration est très élevé dans votre parti groupe, vous pouvez choisir d'omettre cette question.)

En ce qui concerne l'immigration en provenance des régions suivantes, lequel des choix suivants caractérise le mieux les opinions des députés de votre groupe de partis quelque soit leur pays? Utilisez la classification suivante.

1. fortement en faveur
2. plus ou moins en faveur
3. plus ou moins opposé
4. très opposé

Des pays sous développés	1	2	3	4
Des pays de l'Europe de l'est	1	2	3	4
Des pays membres de la CEE du sud	1	2	3	4
Des pays membres de la CEE du nord	1	2	3	4
Des pays de l'Europe de l'ouest, <u>non</u> -membres	1	2	3	4

18a. A votre avis, quel est le degré de différence entre les positions de la droite et de la gauche en général:

	1. très différent	2. plus ou moins différent	3. pas différent
dans votre pays?	1	2	3
pour vous?	1	2	3

b. A votre avis, quel est le degré de différence entre les positions de la droite et de la gauche en ce qui concerne les questions de l'immigration:

	1. très différent	2. plus ou moins différent	3. pas différent
dans votre pays?	1	2	3
pour vous?	1	2	3

IV. Pays

19a. A votre avis, quelle est l'importance des différences historiques et culturelles entre les pays de la CEE en général?

1. très importante
2. plus ou moins importante
3. pas importante

b. A votre avis, quelle est l'importance des différences historiques et culturelles entre les pays de la CEE en ce qui concerne les questions d'immigration?

1. très importante
2. plus ou moins importante
3. pas importante

20. A votre avis, quel degré de division la question de l'immigration a-t-elle créé dans votre pays?

1. un degré de division très élevé
2. un degré de division plus ou moins élevé
3. aucune division

21. Laquelle des phrases suivantes représente le mieux votre opinion à propos des problèmes de l'immigration?

1. Mon pays a plus de problèmes d'immigration que les autres pays de CEE
2. Mon pays a autant de problèmes d'immigration que les autres pays de CEE
3. Mon pays a moins de problèmes d'immigration que les autres pays de CEE

APPENDIX 4: Italian Questionnaire

Questionario per i Deputati del Parlamento Europeo

Questo questionario riguarda principalmente l'immigrazione proveniente dai paesi non membri della CEE verso i paesi membri. Ma alcune domande tratteranno anche dei fenomeni di migrazione all'interno della CEE»

Per le seguenti domande segnate con un cerchietto il numero più vicino alla vostra posizione o classificate le categorie come indicato.

Una busta da lettere é provvista per vostra convenienza. Tutti i questionari e domande di informazione possono essere spediti al Centro di Studi Europei. La vostra attenzione e le vostre risposte sono necessarie per questo studio che non potrebbe essere portato a conclusione senza la vostra cooperazione.

Grazie per l'assistenza.

* * * * *

Cominciate per favore con le seguenti domande:

Paese: _____

Partito Politico: _____

I. Sull'immigrazione

1. Su una scala da (1) a (5) - dove (1) significa "non importante" e (5) significa "molto importante" -- indicate l'importanza che daresti alla questione dell'immigrazione . . .

	non importante	molto importante
a) Per il vostro paese?	1-----2-----3-----4-----5	
b) Per la Comunità Europea?	1-----2-----3-----4-----5	
c) Per il vostro partito?	1-----2-----3-----4-----5	
d) Per voi?	1-----2-----3-----4-----5	

2a. Pensate che la questione dell'immigrazione dell'immigrazione sia soprattutto: (Per favore segnate con un cerchietto una sola risposta)

1. politica	2. sociale	3. economica	4. di sicurezza nazionale e di politica dell'estero
5. culturale	6. demografica	7. altre: (Specificate per favore) _____	

b. Quando voi pensate ai problemi dell'immigrazione, a quale altro genere di questioni li associate subito?

1. sistema dell'assistenza sociale	2. relazioni inter-razziali	3. disoccupazione
4. educazione	5. criminalità	6. cittadinanza
7. traffico di droghe	8. integrazione	9. altro: (Specificate per favore) _____

3. I problemi dell'immigrazione in Europa sono:
1. piu seri oggi che nel passato
 2. simili a quelli del passato
 3. meno seri oggi che nel passato
4. Siete piuttosto ottimisti o pessimisti per quanto riguarda la risoluzione dei problemi dell'immigrazione?
1. molto ottimista
 2. ottimista
 3. pessimista
 4. molto pessimista
5. L'immigrazione proveniente da ciascuno dei seguenti paesi dovrebbe restare allo stesso livello, essere aumentata o essere diminuita?
- | proveniente da... | 1. aumentata | 2. lo stesso livello | 3. diminuita |
|--|--------------|----------------------|--------------|
| gli altri paesi della CEE | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| i paesi dell'Europa dell'est | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| i paesi dell'Europa dell'ovest
(non membri della CEE) | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| la Turchia | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| l'Africa del Nord | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| l'Africa | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| l'Asia | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| in generale | 1 | 2 | 3 |
6. Secondo voi quale livello d'immigrazione (proveniente dai paesi non-membri) avrebbe il risultato migliore sul livello di vita dell'Europa occidentale?
1. un livello più alto
 2. il livello attuale
 3. un livello più basso
- b. Secondo voi, quale livello d'immigrazione (proveniente dai paesi non-membri) avrebbe il risultato migliore sulla società dell'Europa occidentale?
1. un livello più alto
 2. il livello attuale
 3. un livello più basso
- II. Sulla Politica dell'Immigrazione
7. In generale, per quanto riguarda la politica dell'immigrazione, quale delle seguenti considerazioni dovrebbe venire per prima? (Segnate con un cerchietto per favore)
1. considerazioni umanitarie
 2. considerazioni economiche
 3. considerazioni di integrazione sociale
 4. considerazioni demografiche
 5. i problemi dei paesi di emigrazione
 6. altro: (Specificate per favore) _____
8. Siete o non siete d'accordo che la CEE dovrebbe avere una politica comune sull'immigrazione?
1. completamente d'accordo
 2. d'accordo
 3. non d'accordo
 4. per niente d'accordo
9. Chi dovrebbe essere responsabile della regolamentazione della politica dell'immigrazione?
1. I governi nazionali dei paesi membri agendo indipendentemente
 2. I governi dei paesi membri dopo essersi consultati con gli altri governi della CEE
 3. Istituzioni della CEE, i governi membri con diritto di veto
 4. Solo le istituzioni della CEE, con voto di maggioranza

10. Come pensate che le regolazioni sull'immigrazione possano essere mantenute nella Comunità Europea?

1. tenendo intatti i controlli delle frontiere tra i paesi membri
2. avendo dei controlli dopo aver superato le frontiere
3. rafforzando controlli di frontiera tra paesi membri e paesi non-membri
4. altro: (Specificate per favore) _____

11. Secondo quale principio l'immigrazione dovrebbe essere controllata?

1. quote numeriche
2. quote geografiche
3. quote professionali
4. quote razziali ed etniche
5. non dovrebbe essere controllata
6. altro: (Specificate, per favore) _____

12. Che cosa bisognerebbe fare per i diritti degli immigranti?

1. migliorare i loro diritti
2. mantenerli come sono
3. limitare i loro diritti

13. Quale dovrebbe essere la priorità dei responsabili dell'immigrazione?

1. l'integrazione degli stranieri e delle loro famiglie che sono in un paese della CEE
2. la limitazione dell'entrata futura di stranieri
3. assistenza agli stranieri che desiderano ritornare al loro paese di origine
4. assistenza economica e di educazione ai paesi di origine degli immigrati
5. altro: (Specificate per favore) _____

14. Secondo voi, qual'è il più grande ostacolo per il "Gruppo Schengen"?

1. la possibile inclusione di certi paesi della CEE che non sono membri di questo gruppo
2. l'esclusione di certi paesi della CEE
3. il sistema d'informazione Schengen (SIS)
4. risoluzione della questione dello status degli stranieri che hanno privilegi in ciascun paese membro della CEE
5. altro: (Specificate per favore) _____

III. Sulla Destra, la Sinistra e i Partiti Politici

15. Secondo voi, i gruppi dei partiti nel Parlamento Europeo hanno opinioni molto diverse sulla questione dell'immigrazione?

1. molto diverse
2. diverse
3. non diverse

16. Quale livello di divisione si è avuto nel vostro gruppo di partito a riguardo della questione dell'immigrazione?

1. un livello molto alto
2. un livello più o meno alto
3. un livello molto basso

17. (Se il dibattito a riguardo dell'immigrazione è molto alto nel vostro partito gruppo non dovete rispondere a questa domanda.)

Per quanto riguarda l'immigrazione proveniente dai paesi seguenti, quale delle scelte seguenti meglio caratterizza le opinioni dei deputati del vostro gruppo di partito, qualsiasi sia il loro paese?

Utilizzate la seguente classificazione.

1. fortemente in favore
2. più o meno in favore
3. più o meno contro
4. completamente contro

Dai paesi sottosviluppati	1	2	3	4
Dai paesi dell'Europa dell'est	1	2	3	4
Dai paesi membri della CEE del sud	1	2	3	4
Dai paesi membri della CEE del nord	1	2	3	4
Dai paesi non-membri dell'Europa dell'ovest	1	2	3	4

18a. Secondo voi, quanto diverse sono le posizioni tra la destra e la sinistra in generale?

	1. molto diverse	2. piuttosto diverse	3. non diverse
nel vostro paese	1	2	3
per voi	1	2	3

18b. Secondo voi, quanto diverse sono le posizioni tra la destra e la sinistra sulla questione dell'immigrazione?

	1. molto diverse	2. piuttosto diverse	3. non diverse
nel vostro paese	1	2	3
per voi	1	2	3

19a. Secondo voi, qual'è l'importanza delle differenze storiche e culturali tra i paesi della CEE in generale?

1. molto importante
2. più o meno importante
3. non importante

b. Secondo voi, qual'è l'importanza delle differenze storiche e culturali tra i paesi della CEE per quanto riguarda la questione dell'immigrazione?

1. molto importante
2. più o meno importante
3. non importante

20. Secondo voi, quale grado di divisione la questione dell'immigrazione ha creato nel vostro paese?

1. un grado di divisione molto alto
2. un grado di divisione più o meno alto
3. nessuna divisione

21. Quale delle frasi seguenti rappresenta meglio la vostra opinione sul problema dell'immigrazione?

1. Il mio paese ha più problemi d'immigrazione che gli altri paesi della CEE
2. Il mio paese ha tanti problemi d'immigrazione quanto gli altri paesi della CEE
3. Il mio paese ha poco problemi d'immigrazione che gli altri paesi della CEE

25. Su una scala ideologica da sinistra a destra, dove vi piacerebbe?

alla sinistra
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9
alla destra

VII. Informazioni Personali

26. Sesso: 1.maschile 2.femminile
27. Etá: 1.meno di 35 anni 2.35-49 anni 3.50-64 anni 4.più di 65 anni
28. Grado di educazione raggiunto: _____
29. Professione: _____


Se desiderate discutere una questione non inclusa in questa ricerca non esitate ad utilizzare lo spazio che segue. Tutte le risposte e tutti i commenti sono confidenziali.

Commenti:

Se desiderate ricevere un rapporto sui risultati di questa ricerca, indicate il vostro nome ed indirizzo.

Grazie per la cooperazione.

APPENDIX 5: French Follow-up Letter



The Graduate School and University Center
of the City University of New York

Center for European Studies / Box 555
Graduate Center, 33 West 42 Street, New York, N.Y. 10036-8099
(212) 642-2977


le 31 avril 1992

Cher Député:

Il y a quelques semaines je vous ai envoyé un questionnaire vous demandant votre opinion en tant que député du Parlement Européen sur les questions d'immigration dans la Communauté Européenne. Si vous avez déjà répondu au questionnaire, veuillez accepter mes sincères remerciements. Dans le cas contraire, permettez moi d'insister en vous rappelant l'importance que peut avoir chaque réponse pour notre étude.


Bien que nous ayons déjà reçu de très nombreuses réponses, le Centre d'Etudes Européennes n'a pas encore atteint un nombre significatif d'opinions venant de France. Nous espérons grâce à votre réponse, obtenir une meilleure représentation de l'opinion des membres français du Parlement Européen sur l'immigration.

En vous remerciant de votre coopération, veuillez accepter cher Député l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.


Galiya Lahav
Directeur de Projet

CENTER FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

APPENDIX 6: Italian Follow-up Letter



The Graduate School and University Center
of the City University of New York

Center for European Studies / Box 555
Graduate Center 33 West 42 Street, New York, N.Y. 10036-8099
(212) 642-2977

Egregio Deputato:

I Questionari sulla questione dell'immigrazione formulati dal "Center for European Studies" sono stati ben ricevuti dai vari deputati del Parlamento Europeo. Le Opinioni dei vari deputati devono essere rappresentate con precisione e tutti i paesi membri dovrebbero esser presenti.


Vorremo soprattutto che un maggior numero di deputati Italiani rispondessero al questionario. Per questo scopo, includiamo una versione Italiana.

La ringrazio per l'assistenza.

Distinti saluti,

Gallya Lahav

APPENDIX 7: Final Follow-up Letter



The Graduate School and University Center
of the City University of New York

Center for European Studies / Box 555
Graduate Center, 33 West 42 Street, New York, N.Y. 10036-8099
(212) 642-2977

Strasbourg, 6th July 1992

Dear Member:

The Center for European Studies of the City University of New York has sent each member of the European Parliament a questionnaire regarding immigration. Up to date, we are very pleased with our rate of response and are looking forward to producing some very significant results. Thank you for your assistance.

As we are now approaching the final stage of collecting our data, we are asking those of you who have not yet had the opportunity to respond to please help us reach an accurate representation from your party and country. YOUR questionnaire is critical.

As the project director, I shall be collecting the final questionnaires this week in Strasbourg. For your convenience, we ask those of you who have not yet done so to forward the questionnaire to Gallya Lahav; c/o Marilena Efthymiou; IPE-2; 318.

Thank you very much.

Cher(e) député(e):

Le Centre d'Etudes européennes de City University of New York a envoyé à chaque député au Parlement européen un questionnaire sur les questions d'immigration dans la Communauté européenne. Nous avons le plaisir de constater un bon taux de réponses jusqu'à présent. Nous estimons pouvoir arriver à des résultats très significatifs. Nous vous remercions pour votre aide.

Etant donné que nous nous approchons à la phase finale de la collecte de données, nous demandons ceux qui n'ont pas encore eu l'occasion de répondre de nous aider à atteindre une meilleure représentation de votre parti et de votre pays. VOTRE réponse au questionnaire est primordiale.

En tant que directeur de ce projet, je passerai recueillir les derniers questionnaires cette semaine à Strasbourg. Je prie ceux d'entre vous qui ne l'ont pas encore fait, d'adresser le questionnaire à Gallya LAHAV, aux bons soins de Marilena Efthymiou, IPE-2, 318.

En vous remerciant de votre coopération, veuillez accepter, cher(e) député(e), l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Gallya Lahav

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