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Leadership and Participation in New York City Limited Equity Housing

by

Eric K. Glunt

*A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York*

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Chapter 1

Introduction and Overview

This study investigates resident attitudes and experiences concerning participation and leadership in limited-equity housing co-operatives located in New York City. How do leaders and shareholders in a co-op differ from each other in their views on participation? Is participation in the co-op environment more of an obligatory task for residents than a desirable goal? What factors predict a sense of control and satisfaction in limited-equity housing co-operatives? These are the kinds of questions investigated in the present study.

The purpose of the present study is, on one level, aimed at organizational issues that affect the future of limited-equity housing co-operatives in New York City. The questions that have shaped this study largely result from practical need. Resident participation in self-help can lead to people getting many of the supports they need for day-to-day living. A better understanding of participation and leadership may help reduce some internal conflicts in buildings and allow people to benefit from self-help supports.

On the other hand, it is economically and politically unfeasible for the NYC housing bureaucracy to solely maintain the level and diversity of services needed to keep these buildings adequately habitable. The impracticality of providing adequate services has lead some in city and state government to question why government should continue to be involved with these buildings at all. This narrow perspective argues that residents should organize themselves to solve their own social and physical plant problems. If co-ops can't stand alone, then maybe they would be better off in the hands of a private landlord.

The results of this study may have implications for national and international social housing policy. For example, over the past ten years there have been a variety of attempts to turn public housing units into tenant owned co-operatives (Rohe and Stegman, 1992, 1995) and with tenant management in public housing (Peterman, 1989, 1994). Although these public housing experiments have had mixed results, the problems cited with them parallel many of the experiences faced by limited-equity housing co-operatives in New York City. What we learn through looking at the buildings in the present study can inform housing efforts at a national level.

At an international level, there are many countries with well-developed co-operative and self-help housing models aimed at creating basic shelter. For example, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (1989; Harris, 1997) regularly reports on strategies and case studies for developing co-operative housing projects in places such as Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, India and the Philippines. What is often missing from this body of research is analysis about the long-term survivability of co-operative housing efforts. What does it take to sustain successful co-operative leadership and management with resident involvement? The present research may offer insights into organizational issues that affect survival housing co-ops internationally as well as in the United States.

The economic imperative of participatory self-help organizations such as co-operatives sharpens as funding for important social and human services dwindles in society at large. The results of the present study will hopefully lead to a better understanding of the process of participation and leadership in co-operative residential settings. It is also hoped that the results from this study can contribute to the discussions about the economic and practical

viability of limited equity housing co-operatives. When leaders and shareholders develop and control their housing through participation and self-help, they develop themselves as well as the social fabric of their community.

Issues and Assumptions

The Place of Co-operatives in Low Income Housing

In discussing the current politics of public housing in the United States, Dreier (1997) ponders the opportunities and limits of devolution (ongoing societal arguments for reducing the size and role of the federal government in all aspects of life). He observes that the outcomes of devolution in public social housing have been toward privatization as well as the growth of Community Development Corporations (CDCs—“third sector” nonprofit housing developers). As a result, Dreier warns that simply eliminating all federal operating subsidies (devolution) and forcing public housing complexes to compete in the private rental market (with or without CDCs) is simply a “recipe for disaster.” Dreier argues that we need to be “cooperatizing not just privatizing” our nation’s stock of three million federally subsidized social housing units. We need to see conversion of public housing reserves as opportunities to organize self-help efforts for community empowerment. Furthermore, we need to organize and educate tenants as well as build leadership to take ownership of these properties in order to insure their long-term success.

Helm, Horvitz, and Ben-Egypt (1993) discuss one of the first large scale public housing projects to undergo co-operative housing conversion in the United States (the Upper Lawrence Cooperative Housing Corporation in Denver). They argue that low-income American families will ultimately find housing co-operatives a better alternative to rental

housing. They argue that co-operative home ownership offers low-income families a chance to purchase a share of stock in a housing corporation and to enjoy the economic benefits this entails. One of these benefits is that co-ops can often offer cheaper services and monthly carrying-charges compared to similar rental units and enable members to qualify for certain income tax deductions.

The kinds of social and economic benefits suggested by Drier as well as Helm, Horvitz and Ben-Egypt have been at the core of the advocacy for New York City's Tenant Interim Lease (TIL) program. TIL has been one of the largest alternative public housing efforts in the United States for over 15 years (White and Saegert, 1997). In an effort to examine social and economic benefits of alternatively managed public housing in New York City, Leavitt and Saegert (1988, 1990) compared tenants living in three different programs: 1) TIL, 2) buildings managed by community groups and 3) buildings managed by private landlords. Leavitt and Saegert found tenants in tenant-developed and controlled co-ops were most satisfied, rated building physical conditions highly, felt safest and were most able to defend their buildings from intruders. They also had better social relationships in the building, higher levels of co-operation and participation, and more positive expectations for the future. Tenants in community group buildings ranked second on these measures while private landlord owned building tenants ranked last.

Svensson (1995) rhetorically argues that if co-operatives are such a great solution for low-income social housing—why are there so few housing co-operatives in most countries? By contrast, he notes that about one-sixth of all dwellings (30 percent of the multi-family housing market) are cooperatively owned in Sweden! Svensson argues that the

success of co-operative housing in Sweden is not simply a result of some Scandinavian five-year plan. Instead, as government policies and social institutions fostered the growth of co-operative housing, co-operative organizations themselves rose to the challenge and helped shape the development environment. To Svensson, the 'cooperative' relationship between government, social institutions and co-operative organizations has been climbing a ladder of success over 50 years but has left behind no identifiable critical threshold between success and failure. In other words, the legacy of co-operative housing in Sweden is best characterized by an ongoing partnership between government and co-operatives instead of as an adversarial history marked by critical legislation, public demonstration, or by human suffering exposed by the media. What we should learn from Sweden is the importance of trying to get all the players in co-operative housing to cooperate!

Nonprofit co-operatives are also a major source of low and moderate income social housing in Denmark (Richman, 1995). Richman states that co-operatives constitute over 20% of all residential units in Denmark. Danish co-operative housing evolved over 100 years and with the help of worker initiatives, government policies as well as Danish cultural values. In addition, Richman argues that the unique strength of the Danish co-operative housing movement is its institutionalized participatory structure to oversee nonprofit housing management.

Social Capital and Housing

Both Svensson (1995) and Richman (1995) argue that co-operative housing successes in Sweden and Denmark have been shaped by government, financial, and community participants drawing on their personal and social connections to each other. These are in

addition to the availability of financial and human capital. Both authors suggest these social relationships have historically and culturally been characterized by a degree of trust, exchange of information, and developing a cultural norm of reciprocity to achieve their goals. The emphasis on social process in Scandinavia is a good example of how ‘social capital’ can be integral to successful macro level low-income housing solutions.

Jane Jacobs (1961) first used the term social capital in discussing how urban renewal planning policies worked to destroy informal neighborhood networks of people in cities. Jacobs argued that neighborhood networks were what holds city neighborhoods together and that they are the irreplaceable social capital of a city. Coleman (1988) further developed the concept of social capital as being equal to financial capital and human capital. Putnam (1993, 1995) helped to popularize the notion of social capital by linking its demise to declining levels of civic engagement and voluntary group participation in the United States. More recently, Hornburg and Lang (1997) have led a discussion about applying social capital to American housing and urban development policy.

Although most of the writing about social capital has been at a macro societal level, it is also applicable at the micro level of an individual limited equity housing co-operative. Debertin and Goetz (1997) point out that “community” is a key component linking all definitions of “social capital.” Hornburg and Lang (1997) define social capital as “the stocks of social trust, norms, and networks that people can draw upon in order to solve common problems.” Hornburg and Lang emphasize two main dimensions of social capital—“social glue” and “social bridges.” Social glue refers to the degree to which people take part in group life. In a co-operative this is primarily reflected in how

residents participate in the organization. Social glue also concerns the amount of trust and comfort people have while participating in group life. The degree co-operators perceive agreement, conflict, and crisis in their building are all likely indicators of the 'trust and comfort' underlying social capital.

Social bridges in a limited equity housing co-operative refers to the links a co-op has to the outside world of city government and services as well as networking with neighborhood organizations and other co-operative buildings. In New York City, Clark, Saegert, Glunt and Roane (1990) found residents of the limited equity co-ops they studied concerned about the apparent isolation of their building from the rest of the world. Many of these residents felt that they had a lot of expertise to potentially offer other buildings (or they felt they could learn from others). Co-op residents identified local problems that might be collectively tackled. They also discussed the possibilities of working with other co-ops to do bulk purchasing of common supplies and use of services. Minott, Rechavi, and Clark (1996) discuss several pilot efforts where co-op residents actually went on to organize neighborhood networks of co-ops (discussed below). These are all examples of social bridges.

Viewing limited equity housing co-operatives through a lens of social capital is potentially useful in the debate about the future of American social housing policy. Whereas most discussions lament the decline of social capital in American inner-city neighborhoods (i.e. Hornburg & Lang, 1997), housing co-operative research suggests that the cooperative process itself cultivates social capital formation by shaping norms of trust and reciprocity between people living in the housing co-operative setting (DeSouza Briggs, Mueller &

Sullivan, 1996; Saegert & Winkel, 1996). Rather than housing policies that have destroyed social capital in neighborhoods, limited equity co-operative housing programs appear to foster the development of social capital. Perhaps we should be “cooperatizing not just privatizing” the majority of social housing policy in the United States.

Participation

An important assumption in most co-op research is that participation in the co-op environment is a desirable goal. This participation assumption is not just of scholarly and theoretical interest. The outcomes of participation are documented to have broad social and psychological benefits such as increased satisfaction with the proximal living environment (Leavitt & Saegert, 1990), a sense of control (Leavitt & Saegert, 1990; Rae, 1997), personal empowerment and/or influence (Saegert & Winkel, 1996), and pride of ownership (Leavitt & Saegert, 1990; Rohe & Stewart, 1996). In addition, participation in a co-operative is a key component to social capital formation (DeSouza Briggs, Mueller & Sullivan, 1996; Leavitt & Saegert, 1990; Saegert & Winkel, 1996). In New York City, both leaders and non-leaders of HDFC co-operatives readily acknowledge a prerequisite of resident participation to operate their buildings as well as a general need for additional involvement in co-op activities. However, Clark et al. (1990) found that leaders and non-leader shareholders often have diverse opinions about why participation is not greater in their buildings as well as varying ideas about what constitutes good participation.

Attempts to define participation in psychology appear to have little or no conceptual unity in the literature. Wandersman (1979) argues that the academic research understanding of participation is 'gross and unsystematic' with little empirical attention being paid to the role of individual differences. In an extensive literature review of participation

and decision-making, Locke and Schweiger (1979) observe a 'surprising lack of consensus' as to the exact meaning of the concept. Hollander and Offermann (1990a) continue to suggest that there is little agreement on a definition of participation in the psychological literature.

Participation has been described in the organizational psychology literature as group involvement; a managerial style; a mandated decision making mechanism; an information feedback process; a feeling of obligation to work for the best interests of the group; power sharing; as well as the equalization of influence (Locke and Schweiger, 1979). From a community psychology perspective, Heller, Price, Reinharz, Riger, and Wandersman (1984) define participation as a process in which individuals take part in decision making of the institutions, programs and environments that affect them. Zimmerman and Rappaport (1988) argue that this definition is too narrow because it leaves out the possibility that people find multiple avenues in which to engage in their community.

The English language usage of the concept participation has two meanings which are relevant to the present discussion. Participation is, in one instance, an act of taking part and an act of being involved (as with civic affairs). Participation is also a state of having a part or share in something; having a self-interest; and having a sense of control. Participation has to be understood both in terms of involvement, a dimension which describes the level of activity of a resident, and control, a dimension which describes the effectiveness of that activity (Marcuse, 1970).

This involvement and control dichotomy is paralleled in the worker participation literature. Warr and Wall (1975) argue that participation is usually defined in concepts like

‘involvement’ and ‘influence.’ In his ground-breaking study on participation in the workplace, Vroom (1960) considered psychological participation as the ‘amount of influence that an individual feels he has in decision-making.’ Chell (1985) defines psychological participation as the amount of influence that an individual feels she/he has in decision-making and that it concerns the essential interactive, constructive and problem-solving orientation of those involved. Wall and Lischeron (1977) point out that participation is not a unitary concept and suggest three central elements: 1) influence, 2) interaction, and 3) information-sharing.

Perhaps the most widely known process definition of participation has been advanced by Arnstein (1969). Arnstein combines involvement and control in her definition of (citizen) participation as a categorical term for power. She offers a model with steps of participation as important components for the overall form of participation (*see Figure 1.1*). It is redistribution of power that enables disenfranchised people to be included in a vision of the future. To Arnstein, real participation is empowerment. She is also concerned with differentiating between a potentially empty ritual of involvement and having

<i>Citizen Control</i>	8	<i>Degrees of Citizen Power</i>
<i>Delegated Power</i>	7	
<i>Partnership</i>	6	
<i>Placation</i>	5	<i>Degrees of Tokenism</i>
<i>Consultation</i>	4	
<i>Informing</i>	3	
<i>Therapy</i>	2	<i>Non-participation</i>
<i>Manipulation</i>	1	

Figure 1.1—Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation (1969).

the real power needed to affect the outcome of a process. In this regard she argues that much of what is labeled participation in the world is only a kind of tokenism or not participation at all.

From another perspective, Hollander and Offermann (1990a) describe the extension of participative decision making into the work place as a continuum. They suggest that a sequence of employee influence (or participation in decision making) can be put forth ranging from no influence (autocratic decisions) through various levels of opinion-giving (consultative decisions) to truly joint decision making (power sharing).

Schweiger and Leana (1986) argue that contextual variables are important in moderating the use of participation in work place decision making. They suggest that no one degree of participation, from autocratic to fully participative, can be employed effectively in all situations. The emphasis, here, is on the importance of context in the definition and utilization of participation.

Focusing on the context, Van Ryzin (1996) looked at participation in a senior citizen mutual housing project in Michigan. Van Ryzin argues that participation in the co-operative housing situation he studied could be conceptually looked at in terms of formal, basic and work involvement. Formal involvement refers to taking on roles such as being an officer, chairperson or committee member and otherwise being officially involved. Basic involvement refers to the more fundamental tasks of voting for officers and attending general meetings. Work involvement concerns doing tasks such as helping with maintenance, cleaning, etc. This conceptualization of involvement and participation is

useful in a variety of housing co-op settings because it begins to address real activities as people live and perform them.

Leadership and Participation

There is an explicit assumption made with limited-equity housing co-ops that each building has and needs leaders. Legally, an HDFC co-op must have an elected board of directors. House and Baetz (1990) describe these as formal leaders because they have assigned formal or legal authority to direct others. On the other hand, Saegert (1989) found patterns of informal and formal leadership among women and “unlikely” leaders in Harlem co-ops. House and Baetz describe this second group as being emergent leaders because they have no formally allocated authority.

Leadership Traits

What distinguishes a leader in an organization? In a literature review, Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991) observed a few consistent traits and factors that contribute to leader success in business settings. A key point made by Kirkpatrick and Locke is that leadership traits are not in and of themselves universal. Traits have to be viewed in context according to individual motivations as well as the setting and business conditions in which they were taking place. To apply this research in the present study we need to ask what traits and factors differentiate leaders in the context of a limited equity housing co-operative?

Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991) describe both leadership motivation and flexibility as being key considerations in business settings. They describe two distinct forms of leadership motivation. They define it as the desire to influence others, especially toward the attainment of shared goals. Leadership motivation can cause leaders to seek power

and status as an end to itself (a personalized power motivation). On the other hand, leaders can seek power as a way to achieve cooperative shared goals (a socialized power motivation).

Another key issue suggested by Kirkpatrick and Locke concerns leadership flexibility. Flexibility is the ability of a leader to determine the kind of action needed in a given situation or setting. Research suggests that the most effective leaders do not display rigidly consistent behavior. Instead, they adapt their leadership style to the particulars of the situation and to the needs of followers.

Leaders and Followers

Most discussions about participation and empowerment in co-ops seem to focus on the roles and actions of leaders as opposed to followers (non-leader shareholders or non-leader tenants). Hollander and Offermann (1990b) argue that even though the study of leadership in psychology has always presumed the existence of followers, their roles were viewed as essentially passive. But, what relevance has a leader without followers?

Hollander (1993) further argues that the role of follower can be seen as having potential for both assessing and taking on leadership functions. Followers (or shareholders) in an HDFC are the pool of future leaders needed for renewal and long-term survival of the co-operative. The role that followers play in the legitimation of a leader's authority and privileges is critical. Hollander relates the legitimation process to leader-follower exchanges, perceptions of charismatic influence, and aspects of group decision making.

Some co-op leaders can be classified as charismatic (Leavitt & Saegert, 1990; Lawson, 1983). Charismatic co-op leaders have a special relationship with their resident followers

by which they can inspire a co-op to triumph over building crises. Bass (1985) describes charismatic leaders as usually having high amounts of self-confidence, able to present a clearly articulated vision, and recognized as change agents. Unfortunately, although many leaders consistently use their charisma to benefit the co-op, others do not (Saegert, Clark, Glunt, & Roane, 1989). The best form of charismatic leader is often described in the literature as a transformational leader (Hater & Bass, 1988). Transformational leaders focus their efforts on changing and revitalizing their organizations rather than selfish personal gain.

Leadership Style

Clark et al. (1990) found that conflict and crisis in HDFC and TIL co-operatives is often linked to leader roles and leadership styles. Complaints about autocratic co-op leaders are often linked to building conflict. On the other hand, co-op crisis is sometimes linked to overly permissive leadership styles. Muczyk and Reimann (1987) argue autocratic and permissive leadership styles are not endpoints along a single continuum.

Are residents told exactly how to do co-op tasks?	Are residents permitted to participate in making decisions?	
	Yes (Democratic)	No (Autocratic)
Yes (Directive)	Directive Democrat (Makes decisions with participation but closely supervises.)	Directive Autocrat (Makes decisions unilaterally and closely supervises.)
No (Permissive)	Permissive Democrat (Makes decisions with participation and gives residents latitude in how to complete tasks.)	Permissive Autocrat (Makes decisions unilaterally but gives residents latitude in how to complete tasks.)

*Figure 1.2— Autocratic and Permissive Co-op Leadership Styles
(adapted from Muczyk & Reimann, 1987)*

Instead they argue that we should consider a two factor solution in which leadership is measured on both an autocratic-democratic dimension as well as a permissive-directive

dimension (see Figure 1.2). Extracting from Muczyk and Reimann, co-op leadership and participation only work with their directive-democrat and permissive-democrat leadership styles.




Figure 1.3— The Managerial Grid
 (adapted from Blake & Mouton, 1969)

Another large body of classic research stemming from researchers at the University of Michigan (Likert, 1961, 1967) and Ohio State University (Stogdill, 1974) also advocate a two dimensional view of leadership styles. The first dimension is referred to as initiating structure—a concern for getting the job done. The second dimension is labeled consideration—a concern for people and social relations. Although much of this research was conducted in the 1950's, it continues to be actively discussed in the literature and used in leadership training. For example, Blake and Mouton (1969, 1985; Blake, Mouton & McCauley, 1989) built on this body of research to shape their managerial grid (see Figure 1.3). Team management is the 'ideal' leadership style according to Blake and Mouton.

Hirschhorn (1988) argues that roles set up boundaries for individuals and can affect the style of leadership. Problems exist when leadership roles get distorted. This distortion often has a variety of non-rational psychological origins. Again, Hollander and Offerman (1990a) suggest that taking on a leadership style that emphasizes sharing power and participation of followers as well as the use of delegation may promote leadership

development in others. In addition, leaders contemplating participation need to pay close attention to involving others when they lack information and the need to consider whether subordinates share the organization's goals (i.e. definitions of participation and co-op values) .

From another perspective, Kerr and Jermier (1978) posit that leaders are often unnecessary in situations in which other factors can have just as much influence. Leaders may be superfluous if subordinates have a strong commitment to an organization and an above average understanding of a situation. Leaders may also be irrelevant when tasks are highly structured and routine. Kerr and Jermier define these kinds of conditions as substitutes for leadership.

Along the same line of thinking, Vanderslice (1988) is critical of legalistic leader-follower distinctions in co-operatives. She suggests that labeling, status and communication in groups, power, expertise, responsibility, and resistance support the position that leader-follower distinctions in organizations are likely to undermine the very goals they are established to achieve in co-operative organizations. Rather than being inspired by leaders to do their best, it is likely that followers will either limit themselves to status-appropriate behaviors or resist their low power roles. As a result, Vanderslice urges consideration of leaderless groups in cooperative organizations.

Leadership Training

Given the importance of leader and follower roles and possibilities of leaderless co-ops, it is ironic that training programs for HDFC and TIL co-operatives only target formal building leaders and often intentionally exclude non-leaders. From the City's point of

view, focusing exclusively on leaders is cost effective. From the technical assistance point of view, leadership training is the preferred training model. Leaders are to be trained who are then to disseminate their knowledge to their buildings. In practice, however, Clark et al. (1990) found ample evidence that these knowledge transfer assumptions are not how things really function in most HDFC and TIL co-ops.

Lifecycles of Limited Equity Housing Co-operatives

Leadership and participation are not static processes in HDFC and TIL co-operatives. Saegert, Clark, Glunt, and Roane (1989) as well as Saegert and Glunt (1990) apply Wicker's (1987) ideas about lifecycles in behavior settings to limited equity housing co-operatives. In these discussions, an HDFC or TIL building is considered an individual behavior setting. Wicker argues that behavior settings go through at least three and possibly four phases: pre-convergence, convergence, continued existence and demise. Lifecycles in limited equity housing co-operatives suggest that different styles of leadership and models of participation can be found at different times in the life of an HDFC/TIL co-operative.

In the pre-convergence and convergence phases of a limited equity housing co-operative, the primary focus is on acquiring resources and defining and achieving goals. Wicker (1987) suggests that the personalities, skills, resources and connections of leaders are often critical in the pre-convergence phase. TIL buildings best represent a pre-convergence phase in a limited equity housing co-operative. Leavitt and Saegert (1990) found that internal social relationships in TIL buildings are likely to be characterized by strong leadership, overt efforts to persuade and negotiate, alternating periods of conflict and consensus and strong group efforts in the face of crisis. As a result, charismatic and

confrontational leadership styles are common in the pre-convergence stage. It is also a time when internal threats (i.e. factional conflicts, poor leadership, insufficient knowledge) and external threats (i.e. inadequate resources, a catastrophic fire) can lead to the collapse or non-convergence of the co-operative.

The legal change in status of a TIL building into an HDFC marks the apex of the convergence stage. At this point, leader personality types most able to perform in confrontational pre-convergence situations may conflict with the need to build internal co-operation in the convergence stage and to develop future leaders for continued existence. In a case study example of a troubled co-operative in Brooklyn, Glunt et al. (1995) found that the inability to successfully negotiate stage transition led to feelings of frustration, hopelessness that things will ever work out and even thoughts of moving out.

Wicker (1987) suggests that successful transition between stages is marked by the development of social mechanisms for meeting needs and providing satisfaction. As a result, an outcome of successful stage transition in HDFC co-operatives may be higher levels of apartment satisfaction and/or building satisfaction. As an HDFC matures, there should be a tendency for increased division of labor, more hierarchy, and the development of administrative coordinating mechanisms.

Successful transition into the third stage of continued existence and ongoing maintenance adds the potential for longer range planning and renewed attention to ways that tenants and leaders relate to each other. In this stage, co-operatives should be able to critique and adjust organization and participation processes, as well as emphasize the importance of developing new leaders. In addition, an HDFC focused on continued

existence should be able to look beyond the boundaries of the co-operative to form relationships with other co-operatives and to tackle problems in the surrounding neighborhood environment.

While it is hoped that HDFC's have indefinite life expectancies, some do decline and disappear after a period of time. Wicker (1987) draws on studies of organizational behavior to identify key indicators of decline. In some sense, all organizations fall apart and need to be rebuilt. This is a part of ongoing maintenance and continued existence. However, some HDFC co-ops are unable to overcome critical problems with physical building conditions and/or internal organizational dynamics. These buildings ultimately fail and can be returned to city ownership.

Outcomes of Leadership and Participation

What is an outcome of living in a limited equity housing co-operative? Certainly participation and leadership are integral to the development and ongoing maintenance of limited equity housing co-operatives, but they are not really outcomes of co-op living. In the present study aspects of environmental satisfaction (such as apartment and building quality ratings) and perceptions of control and personal influence are seen as likely results of living in a limited-equity housing co-operative.

Environmental Satisfaction

Tognoli (1987) suggests that most research on housing satisfaction has in some way focused on how individuals successfully adapt and adjust to their housing. In general, housing satisfaction in environmental psychology has been used as an outcome of physical and social factors (i.e., Galster & Hesser, 1981), as a predictor of other factors such as

residential mobility (i.e., Speare, 1974), as a product of “reasoned action” (Lindberg, Garling, Montgomery & Waara, 1987), and as a dynamic process that both influences and is influenced by a resident (Amerigo & Argones, 1997). There has been very little consideration of participation and leadership as predictors of residential satisfaction in any of these research approaches.

Some important predictors of residential satisfaction include physical and social environment factors. Physical environment predictors include such things as density (Holahan & Wilcox, 1978; Aragonés and Corraliza, 1992), design features (Cooper, 1972; Mackintosh, 1982), physical condition of building (Aragonés & Corraliza, 1992); and neighborhood context (Weidemann, Anderson, Butterfield & O’Donell, 1982). Social environment predictors include safety (Rent & Rent, 1978; Loo, 1986), ownership (Rent & Rent, 1978), residential tenure (Rent & Rent, 1978), crowding (Bonnes, Bonaiuto, & Ercolani, 1991), as well as neighbors and neighboring (Weidemann et al. 1982; Aragonés and Corraliza, 1992).

Canter (1983) describes two cognitive processes related to residential satisfaction: purpose and comparison to other housing options. He argues that evaluation of whether a living environment is satisfactory is necessarily purposive. Although the evaluative process Canter is interested in primarily concerns physical attributes of the environment, it can also apply to intentional cooperation, participation, leadership and other social capital factors found in limited equity housing co-operatives. The role of purpose stands out when considering a resident’s relationship to her/his residence. Thus a commitment to

stay living in a co-op or move from it may be related to levels of participation and leadership.

Tognoli (1987) suggests that individual comparison of housing alternatives is an important issue in residential satisfaction. Michelson (1977) suggests that if a new housing choice is equal or better than existing conditions, a resident will exhibit a preference based on the comparison between the two options. Paulus, Nagar, and Camacho (1991) found psychological factors such as the degree of housing choice, comparison of present housing with past housing and social comparisons with friend's housing as important components in housing satisfaction. As a comparative process, Saegert (1993) found that a majority of tenants of city owned buildings in the Bronx expressed a preference for co-operative tenant ownership over community group ownership, city ownership or ownership by a private landlord. Perhaps, in the best of all possible worlds, these residents of city-owned buildings would prefer living in some suburban fantasy, but compared to the realistic available housing options, co-ops and tenant ownership were favored over other choices. In addition, Saegert found that those living in co-ops gave more ratings of "excellent" to their apartment, building and neighborhood than did residents living in any other kind of city-owned (or formerly city-owned) building.

Tognoli (1987) points out that management-tenant concerns are another frequent topic in housing satisfaction research. Ahlbrandt and Brophy (1976) discuss management ratings as being an important predictors of residential satisfaction in multi-family dwellings. Bratt, Keyes, Schwartz, & Vidal (1994) argue that management practices in non-profit sector housing are the best predictors of residential satisfaction. It is interesting to

note that Bratt et al. conclude resident participation plays little or no role in non-profit sector housing satisfaction—despite the fact that they really didn't empirically measure it! In fact most studies of housing developed by community development corporations theoretically regard housing quality as an independent outcome from participation and social capital formation (DeSouza Briggs, Mueller & Sullivan, 1996; Vidal, 1992). These assessments run counter to the ethnographic research of Leavitt and Saegert (1990) looking at tenant owned co-operatives in Harlem. There is an obvious need in the literature for quantitative comparative assessment of both participation and management factors in predicting housing quality ratings.

Sense of Control and Influence

It was suggested earlier in this chapter that participation has two meanings. It is both an act of being involved as well as reflecting a motivational outcome representing an individual or a group having a part or share in something—a sense of control. Influence was also judged to be an important consideration in the earlier discussion. As outcomes of participation, a sense of control and a sense of influence both help to evaluate the psychological effectiveness of the co-op process.

Although the earlier discussion about influence and control was framed as an individual construct, it is also important to consider the collective sense of control and influence. Rae (1997) describes the motivations of residents in a group of 15 privately transferred housing co-operatives in New York City. She suggests that the major motivation for co-op conversion was to try to gain control over living conditions more than a desire for ownership per se. Leavitt and Saegert (1990) also describe the desire for resident control

of buildings as being a major motivation for residents to develop their buildings as co-operative. As such, both of these examples represent a collective sense of control.

Organizational Culture in Co-ops

What may start as personal styles, attitudes, values, or adaptations to external forces in early phases of the development of an HDFC co-operative can come to define the "organizational culture" as co-ops mature and develop systems for ongoing maintenance. Organizational culture (Schein, 1985) refers to shared expectations, characteristic affective styles and responses to certain events, as well as repeated 'scripts' for allocating resources, making sense of new information or handling conflicts. The organizational culture in a good HDFC may be marked by increased environmental satisfaction and higher levels of organizational participation. Irrationalities in this culture may prevent the identification of real conflicts of interest and other problems, as well as the generation of solutions. Ritualized explanations of events may prevent new tenants from acting on valid insights or from finding necessary personal satisfactions in the co-operative. Shareholder evaluation of building management and the board of directors may come to reflect adherence to established scripts and routines rather than consideration of actual task performance or success in meeting co-op goals.

Co-op Values and Principles

Any study of co-operative participation needs to consider the attitudes and values of co-operators as a part of the organizational culture of a building. Rodman and Cooper (1995) report on a Canadian experience in developing co-operative housing that relied on the principles of broad access and social mixing. According to Rodman and Cooper, the

success of these buildings was not so much the attempts at social engineering behavior, but rather in the shared pre-existing attitudes and values held by those who fit best in the co-ops. These shared attitudes included an emphasis on the ability of people to gain control of their building, a desire to improve their housing, and a desire to improve individual and collective quality of life.

Much of the literature about co-operatives and community development begins with a discussion about shared interests and experiences as well as futuristic visions and values concerning people working together and participating for a common good. The larger idea that problems can be solved through voluntary participation in local community institutions and organizations is endemic to an idealized American cultural image. Bellah et al. (1985) suggest that most Americans prefer voluntary community organizations to politics.

Morone (1990) argues that Americans have historically dreaded public power and yearned for communal democracy. As a result, a major concern in our society has been to try to empower people through either direct or representative participation, and, at the same time to try to limit the control of bureaucracy. Morone argues that the tension between "dreading power" and "yearning for democracy" has led to cycles of laissez-faire and civic republicanism in American history. Naisbitt's (1982) idea of "megatrends" seems to support such a cyclical model. According to Naisbitt, American society seems to be in transition from notions of centralization to decentralization; from notions of institutional help to self-help; from representative democracy to participatory democracy; and from hierarchies to networking.

In many ways, the theoretical ethos of co-operatives (at least those in the United States) can be linked with an over arching American cultural framework. The laissez-faire vision of America has periodically focused the public discourse on the pursuit of self-interest (narcissistic participation) and on the protection of private rights from public meddling. However, the pursuit of self-interest and protection of rights has usually been limited to economic self-interest and the protection of property. The 1980's saw a resurgence of the laissez-faire vision.... from Reaganomics to "a thousand points of light." On the other hand, the civic republicanism vision has expressed the American ideal as not so much being the pursuit of private matters, but rather the active participation in civic affairs and working together for the shared public good. In this idealistic vision there is a mystic image of a virtuous, united people, bound together by a shared public good and actively participating in civic affairs (Banning, 1978).

It seems plausible that both the laissez-faire and civic republicanism concepts might underlie the social construction of participation in limited equity housing co-operatives in New York City. Glunt and Clark (1992) argue, however, that contrary to visions of an utopian collective lifestyle, the development of limited-equity housing co-operatives has evolved as an in-place response to economic crises that threatened the livability of residential buildings in many neighborhoods. The commonality of interests, values and visions as well as experiences of race, gender and income among residents are more a feature of the geographic segregation of New York neighborhoods and not of the co-oping process itself.

This is further suggested by Leavitt and Saegert (1990) who argue that the origins of participatory values in Harlem co-ops probably have their roots in African culture and in the African-American experience of community since slavery (as opposed to any idealism originating from the Enlightenment or Romantic philosophy). For example, African-Americans in Harlem have an obvious shared history of racial discrimination. The cultural and social significance of Harlem for black people increases their determination to salvage their homes. At the same time, some tenants perceive that their dealings with City agencies are affected by racial prejudice. Harlem residents share histories of racial discrimination in housing which also affected their sense of housing options.

The observations made by both Leavitt and Saegert (1990) and Glunt and Clark (1992a) suggest the need to pay attention to the influence of minority culture as well as specific issues of place in evaluating the norms of participation. In a similar way, the need to pay attention to cultural and environmental specificity in defining participation is often conceptually argued in the international community development and rural co-operative literature but largely ignored in practice. For example, Levi and Litwin (1986) argue that there is little empirical research linking co-operative values and practice. Gow and Vansant (1983) review the poor record of local participation in rural development programs and conclude that ideological and nationally based policies often limit participant control and result in inadequate involvement.

Idealistic Cooperation versus Cooperative Survival

What is the underlying motivation for forming a given co-operative? This is a related but separate question to that of co-operative values. To what extent do co-operators

come together for idealistic reasons? To what extent do they simply see a co-operative as a means to survival? And, to what extent is co-operation both a function of idealism and survival?

Levi (1994) distinguishes between the pseudo-cooperative, the self-centered co-operative and the change-oriented co-operative. He argues that the “first two types constitute deviant cases whose frequent recurrence may distort the image of the normative cooperative pattern and undermine proclaimed objectives of idealistic participatory development.” For Levi, the heart of the true co-operative depends on adherence to six international principles derived from the Rochdale System. Holyoake (1893) describes the Rochdale co-operative principles as being: 1) open and voluntary membership; 2) democratic control; 3) limited rate of return on investment; 4) return of surplus to members; 5) cooperation among co-operatives, and 6) ongoing education of members.

For Levi, a good example of co-operative housing might be the Dos Piños Housing Co-operative in Davis, California. Dos Piños was formed about 15 years ago. Membership is open and voluntary to the extent that units are available, governance is by direct democracy, there is a limited rate of return when units are sold with profits returning to the overall co-operative. Cooperation and decision making at Dos Piños is greatly facilitated by the like-mindedness of most residents on environmental, political, social and local civic issues. The Dos Piños co-operative readily cooperates with other co-operatives in the Davis area including the Davis Food Co-op and the Muir Commons Co-housing effort. Dos Piños is also active in the California Mutual Housing Association which is a meeting ground for many housing co-operatives across the state.

On the other hand, Levi would probably label most of the middle and upper-class co-operative housing in New York City created or converted over the past 30 years as being either pseudo-cooperatives or self-centered cooperatives. Sahling and Stein (1980) argue that although private cooperative apartment buildings have been in New York City since 1909, it was not until the mid-1960's that the market for these units expanded. Sahling and Stein also note that there are two types of cooperative apartments in New York City—private and publicly assisted. The growth of private co-operative apartment conversions seems to be concentrated in relatively wealthy middle class neighborhoods. According to Sahling and Stein, a major reason for the co-op boom in New York City has been individuals seeking the private tax advantages that co-operative ownership provides.

From another perspective, almost all of the middle and upper-class coops in New York City have been converted from private rental apartment buildings because other sectors of the city's housing market were contracting. In the 1980's many landlords attempted to cash in on a real estate boom by converting their buildings into co-operatives. In the process, tenants were usually offered a chance to buy their apartment as a part of a no-eviction co-op plan. For many people, buying their apartment represented a way of preserving their home and a means of surviving the volatile New York City housing market—albeit middle-class survival.

The more common notion of a survival co-operative refers to a group of economically disadvantaged people coming together to try and empower themselves through a collective enterprise (Levi & Litwin, 1986). For example, Leavitt and Saegert (1990) observe that many of the first buildings in TIL entered the program because building tenants saw

themselves as being just one step away from homelessness. Cooperation was motivated by a desire to survive and a desire to improve living conditions. Rather than arriving at the co-op process from shared idealistic values, TIL buildings usually began because of shared survival goals... maintaining a place to live and maintaining homes.

This is not to say that a survival co-operative can not relate to or value idealistic cooperative principles. Whereas an idealistic co-operative usually begins with principled decision making, the survival cooperative by necessity looks at survival issues first and then considers the idealistic consequences. For example, Glunt and Clark (1992b) found TIL and HDFC leaders interested in learning more about cooperative principles and the Rochdale system despite their primary focus on trying to overcome substantial physical deterioration in buildings.

Limited Equity Housing Co-ops in New York City

All of the limited equity co-ops included in this study developed through one of two New York City alternative housing management programs. In the Tenant Interim Lease Program (TIL), ownership changed from the city to a tenants' association. In the Community Management Program (CMP) ownership first shifted to a nonprofit community based organization that was supposed to teach residents how to co-op their building. After “graduating” from alternative management programs, these limited equity co-ops become legally known as Housing Development Fund Corporations (HDFCs).

The co-ops included in this study are in one of three New York City neighborhoods: East Tremont (The Bronx), Highbridge (The Bronx), and Clinton/Hell's Kitchen (Manhattan). The buildings in these neighborhoods were selected for study because of their

current or potential involvement with the Neighborhood Network Project (NNP, described below). A further impetus for looking at Bronx buildings came from the Task Force on City Owned Property 1992 borough-wide survey of Bronx tenants (TFCOP92, described below).

Several key studies of limited-equity, low income housing co-ops in New York chronicle the history of these buildings from the late sixties through the early nineties. Results from these various studies consider individual, group, community, organizational and societal factors that have both helped and hindered the development of limited equity co-ops. Kolodny (1973) described the experiences of tenants who took control of their buildings early in the landlord abandonment process. Kolodny generally found higher levels of satisfaction among actual co-op residents compared to potential co-op residents living in other types of housing. Lawson (1983) looked at a variety of internal and external forces that inhibit the development of co-ops. Lawson found less successful buildings had weaker organizations, higher tenant turnover and problems with leadership succession. He also found that a key factor in identifying successful buildings was the degree that they had utilized technical assistance resources.

Leavitt and Saegert (1984, 1990) looked at aspects of three different alternative management programs, TIL, CMP and POMP (a private ownership program—non-co-op) and conducted qualitative interviews with tenants. Leavitt and Saegert found the biggest contrast between TIL and POMP buildings. In TIL buildings, people were easy to talk to, more employed, had higher incomes, and strong social networks in the buildings. POMP

buildings had more unemployed and retired residents. Social networks in POMP buildings were also often fragmented.

Most of the co-ops in these early studies originally developed through the TIL and CMP programs or an urban homesteading program existing prior to TIL and CMP. These housing programs evolved as one answer to extensive owner abandonment in the 1970's and 1980's. This abandonment was brought about by skyrocketing fuel and repair costs that squeezed some landlords out of being able to operate their buildings as well as some unscrupulous landlords trying to extract maximum profits from expendable real estate holdings. The declining economics of operating rental buildings in low income neighborhoods was also exacerbated by over a million people moving out of New York City between 1968 and 1980. In 1977, the city passed a "fast foreclosure" law to try to collect property tax arrears. As a result, thousands of building owners left their properties in City hands rather than pay the taxes.

The City proved to be no better at managing buildings than the landlords who had abandoned them. In many buildings, tenants took over day-to-day operations. They collected rent, paid bills and began needed repairs using their own money and skills. Tenants negotiated with the City for repairs, access to building materials and management assistance.

Tenants began to prove that they could manage their own buildings. They pressed the City to transfer ownership to building tenant organizations. Community groups also pressured the City to develop new programs through which the groups could buy buildings in their neighborhoods. The result was alternative management programs such

as TIL (aimed at tenants) and CMP (aimed at community groups). To manage these alternative programs, HPD (New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development) created the Division of Alternative Management Programs (DAMP). DAMP assumed the overall responsibility to revitalize the city-owned housing stock including the development of HDFC co-ops either directly or through interim ownership by community based organizations.

Parallel to housing programs such as TIL and CMP was the growth of community based technical assistance networks intending to support limited equity co-ops. Most of these technical assistance efforts focused on issues such as building management, co-op legal obligations and mechanical operations. HDFCs received very little training around issues of long term planning or organizational concerns such as group dynamics, conflict resolution, leadership development and community organizing.

Leavitt and Saegert (1990) found that contact with local activists, politicians, and community based technical assistance groups was critical to HDFC co-op success. Community based organizations provided management training to TIL and HDFC buildings either on a city wide basis (such as the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board [UHAB]) or on a neighborhood basis (such as Los Sures or the St. Nicholas Development Corporation, both in Brooklyn). Organizations such as the Pratt Institute Center for Community and Environmental Development (under contract with the City) helped buildings deal with architectural and engineering problems. In addition, there were a large number of for-profit private companies offering day-to-day management services to HDFCs.

HDFCs as of 1994

Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 show that there were 692 limited equity housing co-ops (14,317 units) in 1994. This number has dramatically increased to approximately 1000 buildings by 1997. As a result, I have chosen to use 1994 data in the present study because it best reflects the HDFC and TIL landscape when the data were collected.

In 1994 the TIL program included 212 buildings (or 4,085 units) that were moving along a path towards tenant ownership. At the same time, the City still owned vast amounts of vacant and occupied rental property (44,688 units in 3535 buildings). These buildings have been the most significant resource for the future of affordable housing in New York City.

Table 1.1
1994 Occupied Buildings by Borough^a

		HDFC94 1994 Co-op Status					Total
		Central Mangmnt	Other DAMP	Other Sold	TIL Co-op	HDFC Co-op	
The Bronx	Buildings	550	111	283	35	169	1148
	% in Boro	47.9%	9.7%	24.7	3.0	14.7%	100.0%
	% of Bldgs	15.6%	41.9%	51.4	16.5%	24.4%	21.8%
Brooklyn	Buildings	1523	63	162	60	204	2012
	% in Boro	75.7%	3.1%	8.1	3.0	10.1%	100.0%
	% of Bldgs	43.1%	23.8%	29.4	28.3%	29.5%	38.3%
Manhattan	Buildings	1142	91	96	112	318	1759
	% in Boro	64.9%	5.2%	5.5	6.4	18.1%	100.0%
	% of Bldgs	32.3%	34.3%	17.4	52.8%	46.0%	33.5%
Queen	Buildings	208		9	5	1	223
	% in Boro	93.3%		4.0	2.2	.4%	100.0%
	% of Bldgs	5.9%		1.6	2.4	.1%	4.2%
Staten Island	Buildings	112		1			113
	% in Boro	99.1%		.9			100.0%
	% of Bldgs	3.2%		.2			2.2%
Total	Buildings	3535	265	551	212	692	5255
	% in Boro	67.3%	5.0%	10.5	4.0	13.2%	100.0%
	% of Bldgs	100.0%	100.0%	100.0	100.0	100.0%	100.0%

^a This table is constructed using HPD data. [See DAMP (1994) and HPD (1994)].

Table 1.2
1994 Residential Units by Borough

		Total Residential Units	Mean Units per Building	Median Units per Building
The Bronx	Central	8,493	15.44	11
	Other DAMP	2,891	26.05	25
	Other Sold	10,612	37.50	35
	TIL Co-op	989	28.26	24
	HDFC Co-op	4,784	28.31	25
Brooklyn	Central	8,099	5.32	4
	Other DAMP	1,100	17.46	10
	Other Sold	3,013	18.60	16
	TIL Co-op	645	10.75	8
	HDFC Co-op	3,359	16.47	12
Manhattan	Central	17,909	15.68	13
	Other DAMP	1,534	16.86	16
	Other Sold	2,256	23.50	20
	TIL Co-op	2,429	21.69	19
	HDFC Co-op	6,132	19.28	16
Queens	Central	412	1.98	1
	Other Sold	176	19.56	12
	TIL Co-op	22	4.40	3
	HDFC Co-op	42	42.00	na
Staten Island	Central	135	1.21	1
	Other Sold	30	30.00	na
TOTAL Central Management Units		35,048		
TOTAL Other DAMP Units		5,525		
TOTAL TIL Co-op Units		4,085		
Total Units Currently in HPD Programs			44,688	
TOTAL Other Sold Units		16,087		
TOTAL HDFC Co-ops Units		14,317		
Total Units Sold Through HPD Programs			30,374	
TOTAL UNITS		75,062	75,062	

Virtually all the HDFC and TIL co-ops are located in Manhattan, The Bronx or Brooklyn. Manhattan has the largest number of HDFC/TIL residential units. In January 1994 there were 8,561 units in 430 buildings. Central Harlem, West Harlem and Washington Heights tended to have the largest buildings. Clinton/Hell's Kitchen, Manhattan Valley, East Harlem and the Lower Eastside had the smallest buildings. The Bronx had a total of 5,773 HDFC/TIL residential units in 204 buildings in January 1994.



Figure 1.4—East Tremont HDFC and TIL Buildings




Figure 1.5—Highbridge HDFC and TIL Buildings




Figure 1.6—Clinton/Hell's Kitchen HDFC and TIL Buildings

The largest HDFC and TIL buildings in New York City are located in The Bronx. The largest HDFC/TIL buildings were located in the South Bronx (with the exception of Mott Haven buildings). Brooklyn had 4,004 HDFC/TIL residential units in 264 buildings in January 1994. In general, the smallest HDFC and TIL buildings were in older Northern and Eastern Brooklyn neighborhoods. There were also a few scattered large buildings in Southern Brooklyn.

Glunt and Clark (1992a) suggest a major irony about limited-equity housing co-ops in NYC. Although the location and creation of existing HDFC and TIL co-operatives is place-specific and contained in only a few New York City neighborhoods, most have evolved in relative isolation. The vast majority of co-op residents do not know of their co-operative neighbors in nearby buildings. For example, Glunt (1990) found clusters of HDFCs and TIL buildings in the East Tremont section of the Bronx (*See Figure 1.4*). Most of these co-ops were unaware of each other even though they were all located within a couple of blocks. Similar cluster patterns are observable in Highbridge (*Figure 1.5*) and in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen (*Figure 1.6*). By 1996, however, awareness probably increased due to co-op organizing in these neighborhoods (Minott, Rechavi, & Clark, 1996).

Neighborhood Network Project

The Neighborhood Network Project (NNP) started as an experimental community development and action strategy aimed at helping HDFC buildings work on common problems by forming small-scale self-help networks of resident-controlled buildings. NNP attempted to address the idealistic Rochdale principle of cooperation among co-operatives. It also provided opportunities for HDFC buildings to look beyond the boundaries of their

co-operative to form relationships with other HDFCs and to tackle problems in the surrounding neighborhood environment as was suggested by Wicker's (1987) life-cycle model. The idea for NNP grew out of City University of New York Housing Environment's Research Group (HERG) evaluation studies in the late 1980s and a general concern for the future of these buildings. One important role HERG has had in this process has been as a formal evaluator of NNP training and community development efforts for funding sources such as the Edna McConnell Clark and SURDNA Foundations.

Throughout 1991-92, HERG had many opportunities to conduct informal participant observation of NNP meetings in its 'evaluator' role. In 1991-92, organizing efforts for NNP were primarily in the East Tremont and Highbridge neighborhoods of the South Bronx and in Central Harlem. However, there were also requests for organizing assistance and meetings with tenant leaders in several other NYC neighborhoods such as Washington Heights and Clinton/Hell's Kitchen in Manhattan and in South Central Bedford Styuvesant in Brooklyn. These last three neighborhoods were likely sites for NNP expansion.

Neighborhood Network Projects met approximately once a month in each of the Bronx and Harlem sites. NNP meetings were an opportunity to observe and examine issues confronting HDFC buildings such as group leadership styles and the level of tenant and shareholder participation as well as issues facing the neighborhoods surrounding buildings. HERG involvement with leaders and tenants in these neighborhoods helped refine the research questions in the present study.

TFCOP92 Bronx Survey

Yet another catalyst for the present study came in 1992 from the Housing Environments Research Group and the Task Force on City Owned Property planning a survey (hereafter referred to as the TFCOP92 Survey) of residents living in City-owned and formerly City-owned buildings in the Bronx (Cotton, 1993). The purpose of this survey was to find out who was living in the buildings, what living conditions were like, what form of ownership do residents prefer, and generally what experiences residents had had with their housing. This unprecedented survey successfully reached the largest number of people of any study of its kind (over 2700 residents living in currently and previously City-owned buildings). Again, the Housing Environments Research Group had a lead role in developing the design and methodology for this survey as well as conducting the actual research.

Emerging Research Questions

The present study is a direct extension of prior research efforts by Leavitt and Saegert (1990); Clark et al. (1990); Glunt (1990); and Glunt et al. (1995) as well as the early attempts to organize the Neighborhood Network Program. These various academic and community development efforts have raised issues associated with the TIL program, HDFC organization, HDFC management, residential satisfaction, participation, leadership, empowerment of residents, and gender differences in building involvement. Continuing these efforts, a variety of new, refined, and/or renewed research questions were identified in the present study as an effort to expand a base of knowledge of leadership and participation in limited equity co-operative housing efforts. These include:

Defining Co-op Leadership

Research Question 1: *What factors specific to a co-operative distinguish leaders from shareholders? Are there differences in the ways that leaders and shareholders view the physical and social environment, view participation and hold basic co-op values?*

Research Question 2: *What is the potential leadership pool in a limited equity housing co-operative? What proportion of shareholders are good candidates for becoming a building leader?*

Environmental Satisfaction as an Outcome of Participation

Research Question 3: *Do social capital and co-op participation variables help to explain a tenant's perception of the quality of her/his apartment and building above and beyond basic demographic and environmental factors?*

Influence and Control as Outcomes of Participation

Research Question 4: *What factors help predict the perception of personal influence and a sense of control in HDFC and TIL buildings?*

Effects of Tenant Management

Research Question 5: *Does tenant management make a difference in a resident's perception of the quality of her/his apartment and building or in her/his sense of control in the co-op?*

Organizational Culture in Limited Equity Co-ops

Research Question 6: *How important is organizational culture in predicting outcomes such as apartment and building satisfaction?*

Chapter 2

Methodology

Overview

The basic method in the present study involved a two page interview survey of leaders and tenants/shareholders living in HDFC and TIL buildings in three New York City neighborhoods, Highbridge and East Tremont (both in the Bronx) and the Clinton/Hell's Kitchen neighborhood (Manhattan). The survey contained questions about the respondent's knowledge of their building and building processes, concerns and attitudes about the social and physical environment of their building, attitudes and behaviors about participation and leadership as well as questions about the respondent's personal characteristics and history. All of the data were collected during the Summer and Fall of 1992. The specific wording and format of these questions are discussed in detail later in this chapter.

The initial research design focused only on HDFC buildings in Highbridge and East Tremont. The research design took advantage of a unique opportunity to implement a second questionnaire as an adjunct to the larger Bronx TFCOP92 survey project that was in progress. The questionnaire in the present study (hereafter referred to as the NNP92 Survey) was partially based on the TFCOP92 instrument. The primary difference between the two survey instruments was the addition of questions specific to HDFC buildings in NNP92.

Although only data from the NNP92 survey are presented in the present study it is probably important for the reader to understand how TFCOP92 and NNP92 are methodologically linked. HDFCs were targeted in the present study because of the immediate and

pragmatic needs of the Neighborhood Network organizing efforts. Both types of questionnaires (TFCOP92 and NNP92) were administered in some buildings based on the sampling and implementation scheme described below. In other buildings, only the NNP92 instrument was used. Respondents completed either a NNP92 or a TFCOP92 survey. No respondent completed both types of surveys in any building.

Besides the NNP92 Bronx surveying efforts, Jay Harper, a Hunter College colleague, offered to have his sociology students administer the NNP92 Survey as a methods class project. Through Jay's students, the NNP92 Survey was administered to both TIL and HDFC residents living in the Clinton/Hell's Kitchen neighborhood of mid-town Manhattan. Clinton/Hell's Kitchen was chosen because of the interest that some HDFC and TIL residents expressed in starting a Neighborhood Network in that community. Clinton/Hell's Kitchen was also chosen because it responded to Hunter College's concern about student safety interviewing in a field setting.

There was no theoretical reason for excluding TIL buildings in the two Bronx neighborhoods in the present study. Their exclusion was because of practical time and money constraints. In retrospect, inclusion of the TIL buildings would probably have strengthened the Bronx portion of the study. As was discussed earlier, TIL buildings most clearly identify co-ops in a formation or "pre-convergence" life-cycle stage of development. Nevertheless, field experience in the Bronx suggests that the buildings in the present study represent all of the four life-cycle stages suggested by Wicker (1987). It is important to keep in mind that even though there is a mix of buildings in the present study, it is beyond the scope of the present report to attempt to quantitatively analyze data reflecting four

separate life-stages. On the other hand, life-stages can help us understand qualitative data and provide a general theoretical framework for interpretation of results.

Developing the Sample

A list of HDFC and TIL buildings that were or had been in a Division of Alternative Management Program (DAMP) as of January 1992 was created for each neighborhood in the present study using a DAMP Occupied Building Report (DAMP/HPD, 1992). No attempt was made in the present study to survey any of the 26 failed HDFC or TIL buildings that had reverted back to City-ownership¹. The end goal for NNP92 was to get responses from at least 50% of the HDFC buildings in both Bronx neighborhoods and at least 50% of the HDFC and TIL buildings in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen. Based on Table 2.1², this meant that NNP92 needed to collect survey responses from at least 8 HDFCs in Highbridge, 12 HDFCs in East Tremont and 28 HDFC and TIL buildings in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen. This approach resulted in a modified cluster sample of HDFC and TIL buildings in the three neighborhoods.

The development of the Bronx sample was somewhat complicated in that it had to mesh with the larger TFCOP92 survey effort. Surveying efforts in East Tremont and Highbridge HDFC buildings were prioritized in conjunction with the TFCOP92 study. TFCOP92 randomly sampled 25% of each type of DAMP building in every Bronx community board (Cotton, 1993). Again, based on Table 2.1, this resulted in 4 Highbridge HDFCs and 6 East Tremont HDFCs³ being targeted for inclusion in the TFCOP92 survey.

¹ *There were 22 failed buildings in Highbridge, 2 in East Tremont and 2 in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen.*

² *Calculated by multiplying the total number of HDFC and TIL buildings in each neighborhood by 50%.*

³ *Calculated by multiplying the total number of HDFCs in each neighborhood by 25%.*

The present NNP92 study anchored its efforts to this TFCOP92 25% sample. In other words, TFCOP92 surveys were administered in 4 Highbridge and 6 East Tremont HDfCs at the same time and in addition to the NNP92 surveys in the present study. Furthermore, the first buildings to be visited (priority buildings) in both of these neighborhoods were those in the 25% TFCOP92 sample.

Table 2.1
Potential Buildings for Study
(based on DAMP Occupied Building Report, January 1992)

	<i>TIL</i>	<i>HDfC</i>	<i>Potential for Study</i>
<i>Highbridge</i>	[2] ^a	16	16
<i>East Tremont</i>	[9] ^a	23	23
<i>Clinton/Hell's Kitchen</i>	28	27	55
<i>Potential for Study</i>	28	66	94

^a. Bronx TIL buildings were not included in the study.

Field Implementation in East Tremont and Highbridge

Kevin Jackson of New Directions in Community Revitalization was trained by Susan Saegert and Eric Glunt to conduct both the TFCOP92 and NNP92 surveys in the Bronx. Kevin was asked to first contact buildings using the 25% sample list developed for TFCOP92. After working with these buildings, he was to use a second list which included the remaining 75% of neighborhood HDfC buildings.

Both the TFCOP92 and the NNP92 survey instruments were one page (front and back) questionnaires designed to be either self-administered or administered by an interviewer. Meetings among HERG staff and survey interviewers (including Kevin Jackson) were held periodically in the Bronx to discuss questionnaire administration and any prob-

lems that arose for the TFCOP92 and NNP92 surveys. Initial experience with the TFCOP92 survey in other Bronx neighborhoods found that the response rate was much better when the survey was administered as an interview than when self-administered. We hypothesized that this was due, in part, to problems with respondent reading comprehension. As a result, the interview procedure was adopted as the primary data collection method.

Self-administration of the survey was allowed, however, if a respondent expressed a preference to complete a questionnaire in that manner. A scenario for this happening was when Kevin conducted an interview and a second waiting (eligible) respondent said “I’m in a hurry, can’t I just fill it out myself?”. In that situation, Kevin allowed the second respondent to self-administer the survey. Kevin then waited for her/him to complete the instrument. No detailed records were kept to document the actual proportion of interviewer administered surveys versus the number of self-administered surveys. This issue will be further discussed in Chapter 3 results.

To facilitate initial building contact, Kevin used a supplementary list of current building leaders and phone numbers obtained from the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB). He informed building leaders about the purpose of the study and then asked permission to conduct survey interviews in and around their building. He conducted survey interviews by door-to-door canvassing as well as catching residents outside their building as they were entering or exiting it. He screened people completing survey interviews outside buildings to insure that they were indeed residents of the building being surveyed. Because of time constraints, Kevin generally was able to visit buildings only one

time. Additional visits to previously contacted buildings were occasionally possible when later survey efforts happened in nearby buildings. Response rates resulting from these procedures are reported in Chapter 3.

Kevin was asked to alternate asking TFCOP92 and NNP92 surveys in buildings targeted by the TFCOP92 survey. In other words, in these primary target buildings, if the first survey administered was TFCOP92, the second was to be for NNP92. In the remainder of buildings, Kevin collected only NNP92 interview surveys. In all cases, Kevin was paid \$10 for going to a building and then \$5 for each interview survey he collected.

Field Implementation in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen

Thirty-eight Hunter College sociology undergraduate students conducted the NNP92 interview survey in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen under the supervision of Jay Harper. All data collection in this neighborhood was done as an interview using the NNP92 survey instrument. There were no self-administered surveys conducted in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen. All TIL and HDFC buildings were targeted in this neighborhood using a list of buildings that were or had been in a Division of Alternative Management Program (DAMP) as of January 1992 (DAMP/HPD, 1992). Students were divided into teams of two to four people. Each team was given a list of 4-6 geographically clustered buildings to contact along with corresponding building leaders' names and phone numbers (obtained from UHAB).

Following the same procedure used in the Bronx, students were first asked to contact a building leader for each building. When contacted, building leaders were informed of the purpose of the study and then asked for permission to conduct interviews in and around their building. Interviews were conducted by door-to-door canvassing as well as catching

residents outside of their building as they were entering or exiting it. People completing interview surveys outside of buildings were screened to insure that they were indeed residents of the building being sampled. Response rates from these procedures are reported in Chapter 3.

Interviewer Safety

Interviewer safety was a major concern in both Clinton/Hell's Kitchen and in the Bronx. Interviewers were allowed to avoid buildings and situations which seemed "unsafe" or personally threatening. In most cases, "unsafe" meant that there was visible and threatening drug or gang-like activity on a block where a targeted building was located. In these cases, interviewers were encouraged to approach the building on a different day and time or to ask a building leader contact about how to safely approach their buildings. Indeed, the potential bias introduced by safety concerns was somewhat mitigated by building leaders meeting the interviewer(s) in a mutually agreed upon "safe" location and escorting them to targeted buildings. In a few cases, building leaders were even able to provide interviewer(s) auspice for conducting interviews in additional buildings on problematic blocks.

Variable and Questionnaire Design

There were a number of constraints as to the size and length of the questionnaire due to the necessary brevity of the field research interview. Nevertheless a wide range of topics related to leadership and participation in HDFC and TIL buildings were included. Conceptually these topics were divided into 7 categories: basic demographic variables,

leadership variables, “fixed” environmental variables, co-op environmental variables, social capital and participation variables, organizational culture variables and outcome variables.

Basic Demographic Variables

Basic demographic items were collected in both the TFCOP92 and NNP92 surveys including gender; age; race/ethnicity; education; income; sources of income; head of household status; length of residence in the building and voter registration. In addition respondents were asked about any experience with being homeless (*see Figure 2.1*).

Have you ever: Please CHECK all that apply.	
☐	1) Been Homeless?
☐	2) Doubled Up With Another Family?
☐	3) Lived in a Shelter or Transitional Homeless Housing Facility?
☐	4) Lived in Another City-Owned Building?

Figure 2.1—Homelessness Items in Questionnaire

Leadership Variables

Building Leader Identity: Luis Sierra of the Community Service Society suggested allowing respondents to identify as not being a leader and as having an interest in becoming one (*see Figure 2.2*). This corresponded to the formal and emerging leaders categories suggested by House and Baetz (1990). I initially thought that this variable might be used as an indicator of increasing levels of leadership interest.

Are you a building leader?		
3) yes	2) no, but would like to be	1) not a leader

Figure 2.2—Leadership Identity Item in Questionnaire

<u>Leadership Roles and Principles Items</u>
How important do you think it is for a leader/officer in your building to act as the official head of the co-op in outside community meetings and legal proceedings. 1) not important 2) minimal importance 3) important 4) highest importance
If there is a crisis in your building, how important is it for a leader/officer to check with tenants before making decisions. 1) not important 2) minimal importance 3) important 4) highest importance
How important is it for a leader/officer to make an extra effort to involve residents in the decision making processes of the co-op. 1) not important 2) minimal importance 3) important 4) highest importance
How important is it for a leader/officer in your building to check with residents before making decisions about budgeting and other financial matters. 1) not important 2) minimal importance 3) important 4) highest importance
How important is it for a leader/officer in your building to check with residents before making decisions about building maintenance and repairs. 1) not important 2) minimal importance 3) important 4) highest importance
How important is it for a building leader/officer to be responsible for resolving and reducing conflicts in the co-op. 1) not important 2) minimal importance 3) important 4) highest importance
How important is it for a leader/officer to make an extra effort to treat people fairly in building affairs? 1) not important 2) minimal importance 3) important 4) highest importance

Figure 2.3—Leadership Roles and Principles Items in Questionnaire

Leadership Roles and Principles: Respondents in the NNP92 survey were asked to consider a variety of leadership roles and leadership principles related to co-ops. Seven leadership role questions were created for NNP92. These reflected common principles and expectations of leaders that are held by many residents in HDFC and TIL buildings. These seven items were on a four point scale ranging from “not important” to “highest importance” (see Figure 2.3). Although it was hoped that these seven questions might form one or more scales, there was no a priori arrangement of these items.

<u>Leadership Focus Items</u>		
<i>Is it more important for a leader/officer in your building to try to encourage residents to be involved in the co-op or is it more important to "get the job done"?</i>		
1) more important to encourage involvement	2) equally important	3) more important to get the job done
<i>Is it more important for a leader/officer to try to plan for the future needs of the building or is it more important to focus on day-to-day management?</i>		
1) more important to plan for the future	2) equally important	3) more important to focus on management
<i>Is it more important for a leader/officer to try to keep residents informed of decisions being made about the co-op or is it more important to try to involve residents in the decision making process?</i>		
1) more important to keep people informed	2) equally important	3) more important to involve residents in decision making

Figure 2.4—Leadership Focus Items in Questionnaire

What should leaders focus on?: Three leadership style questions were posed which asked respondents to choose between two leadership styles and issues (*see Figure 2.4*). Neither style posed for each question was right or wrong. Indeed, both styles could be appropriate given the life stage of a co-op and/or specific conditions. The first of these style questions focused on the importance of involving residents vs. getting the job done. The second style question concerned planning for the future versus focusing on day-to-day management. The third style issue concerned the importance of keeping people informed versus actually involving residents.

Basic "Fixed" Environmental Variables

"Fixed" Environmental Variables: Although technically not directly asked of respondents, there were a number of basic "fixed" environmental variables attached a priori to each survey based on characteristics of buildings and neighborhood location. These included residential density of buildings, the number of years since a respondent's building first entered an HPD program, the number of years since a respondent's building had been

sold (if applicable), and dummy variables for the neighborhood in which a building was located.

Rent and Residential Tenure: Respondents were asked about the amount of monthly rent and the number of years they had lived in their building.

Co-op Environment Variables

These variables concerned important issues that have traditionally been the focus of much of the co-op housing literature including attitudes about current building management, the perception of building problems, and the perception of social problems. The perception of conflict and crisis in buildings was also included in this category as well as the overall perception of the agreement climate in buildings.

Current System of Building Management: Figure 2.5 asks respondents to identify how their building is currently being managed. This variable had two purposes. First of all, it was to inform us as to the management style of HDFC and TIL buildings in the three neighborhoods. It also potentially was to serve as a test of correct knowledge of how buildings are being managed.

How is your building managed?		
1) self-managed	2) outside management	1) other

Figure 2.5—Building Management Item in Questionnaire

Building Problem Perceptions: The perception of building problems is often cited as a negative predictor of residential satisfaction in the research literature (Leavitt & Saegert, 1989; Glunt et al. 1995; Aragonés & Corraliza, 1992). In the present study, respondents were asked to rate the condition of six different physical aspects of their building including

heat, hot water, electricity, plumbing, windows, cleanliness as well as security (see Figure 2.6). The seven ratings were on a four point ordinal scale ranging from poor to excellent. The first six items in this group of questions were intended to become a single measure of physical building problems by adding together reversed scores of each item. The scores were reversed in order to get higher scores to reflect worsened conditions and hence greater building problems. The rating of building security was intended to be analyzed as a separate measure.

<u>Building Conditions</u>				
Circle the word that best describes each of the following in your building:				
HEAT	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
HOT WATER	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
ELECTRICITY	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
PLUMBING	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
WINDOWS	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
CLEANLINESS	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
SECURITY	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor

Figure 2.6—Building Condition Items in Questionnaire

<u>Management Rating</u>				
Circle the word that best describes building management:				
OVERALL QUALITY	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
REPAIRS QUICKLY	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
QUALITY REPAIRS	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
PROVIDES INFORMATION	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
AVAILABILITY	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor
EMPLOYEES	4) excellent	3) good	2) fair	1) poor

Figure 2.7—Management Rating Items in Questionnaire

Attitudes About Building Management: Six attitudinal ratings of building management were included in a four point scale ranging from poor to excellent (see Figure 2.7). These ratings were in both the general TFCOP92 and NNP92 surveys. As was discussed

in Chapter 1, Bratt et al. (1994) argue that management practices are the best predictors of housing quality.

<u>Social Problems</u>			
<i>How big of a problem are the following in your building?</i>			
<i>USE or SELLING of DRUGS</i>	2) very much	1) somewhat	0) not at all
<i>CRIMES other than drugs</i>	2) very much	1) somewhat	0) not at all
<i>HARASSMENT</i>	2) very much	1) somewhat	0) not at all
<i>GRAFFITI</i>	2) very much	1) somewhat	0) not at all
<i>NOISE</i>	2) very much	1) somewhat	0) not at all

Figure 2.8—Social Problems Items in Questionnaire

Social Problems: Respondents in both surveys were asked how much five different social problems affected life in their building (*see Figure 2.8*). Social problem perceptions have long been discussed as important predictors of environmental satisfaction outcomes (Rent & Rent, 1978; Loo, 1986; Galster & Hesser, 1981). In the present study social problems examined included drug dealing, crimes, harassment, graffiti and noise. Each of the five items were on a three point scale ranging from not at all to very much.

Building Conflict and Crisis: One question about building crisis and two about conflict were included in the NNP92 survey (*see Figure 2.9*). Glunt et al. (1995) and Clark et al. (1990) found conflict and crisis important issues to consider in co-op environments. The crisis question asked about the perceived level of building crisis and was on a five point Likert-type scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” One of the two conflict items was also on a five point Likert-type scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” and focused on the degree that conflict prevented action in buildings. The second conflict question asked about the degree of conflict or agreement

respondents perceived in building decision making. This conflict/agreement dimension was on a four point scale ranging from “a lot of conflict” to “a lot of agreement.”

<u>Conflict and Crisis</u>	
Some people say that their building seems to be constantly in crisis. In regard to your building, do you...	
1) strongly disagree 2) disagree 3) neutral 4) agree 5) strongly agree	
Conflicts in my building prevent us from getting things done.	
1) strongly disagree 2) disagree 3) neutral 4) agree 5) strongly agree	
Would you say that there is usually a lot of conflict OR a lot of agreement in most decisions affecting your building?	
4) a lot of conflict	3) more conflict than agreement
2) more agreement than conflict	1) a lot of agreement

Figure 2.9—Conflict and Crisis Items in Questionnaire

Social Capital and Participation Variables

Involvement Behaviors: A series of questions were used in the NNP92 survey to assess involvement behaviors that individuals may have demonstrated in the operation of their co-op. These behaviors are also closely approximate operational definitions of social capital. Roughly following Van Ryzin’s (1991) three level categorization, involvement in the present study was conceptualized in three dimensions: formal involvement, basic involvement, and informal work helping assistance. Formal involvement refers to ways that a resident can become explicitly involved in the self-management of her/his building. Basic involvement describes fundamental co-op participation in attending shareholders meetings and voting in elections. Informal work and helping assistance depicts helping with ‘building chores’ as well as helping to promote social interaction in a building.

Three questions were used to assess formal co-op leadership experience (*see Figure 2.10*). These included involvement as an officer, a board member and/or working on a committee. Initially, these three questions were intended to form a single scale. Individual questions were on a three point scale ranging from “now have the job” to “never had the job.”

<u>Formal Involvement</u>		
Have you ever been an Officer (President, VP, Treasurer or Secretary) of your co-op?		
3) Now have the job	2) Once had the job	1) Never had the job
Have you ever served as a Board Member?		
3) Now have the job	2) Once had the job	1) Never had the job
Have you ever served as a member of a committee working on some aspect of your co-op?		
3) Now have the job	2) Once had the job	1) Never had the job

Figure 2.10—Formal Involvement Items in Questionnaire

<u>Basic Involvement</u>			
How often do you, yourself, attend regular shareholders or tenant meetings in you building?			
3) Whenever they are held Hardly ever	2) Sometimes when they are held	1)	
Did you vote in the most recent election for the Board and officers of your building?			
1) Yes	0) No		
Do you participate in a tenants group?		1) Yes	0) No
On the average, how often did your building have a regular shareholders or tenant meeting over the last 12 months?			
3) Once a month don't know	2) Several times each year	1) Never	0) I

Figure 2.11—Basic Involvement Items in Questionnaire

Voting in co-op board elections and attending shareholder/tenants meetings constitute basic involvement in HDFC and TIL buildings. A third dichotomous variable assessing general participation in a tenants group was included as a measure of basic involvement.

Since basic involvement may be influenced by the number of opportunities to participate, survey respondents were also asked to report their perception of the frequency of shareholder/tenants meetings in their building. Basic involvement items are presented in Figure 2.11.

<u>Informal Work and Helping Assistance</u>			
Do you help with any maintenance work or cleaning chores that need doing in the building?	2) often	1) sometimes	0) never
Do you ever help organize social functions or parties in the building?	2) often	1) sometimes	0) never
Do you ever do things for other people in your building like grocery shopping, share meals, watch children or otherwise help out?	2) often	1) sometimes	0) never
Do you ever help represent your building in an official meeting or proceeding (such as housing court)?	2) often	1) sometimes	0) never
Do you ever help building leaders with making telephone calls or contacting people?	2) often	1) sometimes	0) never

Figure 2.12—Informal Work and Helping Items in Questionnaire

Informal work and helping assistance can occur as the result of individuals or small groups who tackle jobs on their own as well as social helping behaviors inside a building. Five questions were used to assess informal work and informal helping experience on a three point scale ranging from “never” to “often” (see Figure 2.12). In retrospect, two items in this group of questions relate more to social norms for participation. They are presented in Figure 2.12 because the metric used for these items [“never” to “often”] conforms to the informal work and helping assistance rather than to social norms for participation. The now apparent conceptual error did not emerge until data analysis was underway and is discussed in Chapter 3 data analysis.

Social Norms for Participation: This group of questions (*see Figure 2.13*) was asked in both the NNP92 and TFCOP92 surveys. They were intended to compare aspects of the perceived social climate by rating the participation of other residents in involvement activities.

<u>Participation Norms</u>	
<i>How many tenants do each of the following in the building?</i>	
PARTICIPATE in TENANTS GROUP	4) most 3) many 2)some 1) few 0) none
KEEP BUILDING CLEAN	4) most 3) many 2)some 1) few 0) none
HELP EACH OTHER	4) most 3) many 2)some 1) few 0) none
LOOK OUT for OTHERS CHILDREN	4) most 3) many 2)some 1) few 0) none
PAY RENT	4) most 3) many 2)some 1) few 0) none
ACTIVE in NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS	4) most 3) many 2)some 1) few 0) none

Figure 2.13—Participation Norms Items in Questionnaire

Organizational Culture Variables

Organizational culture was measured in two different ways in the present study. First, responses to all individual level questions were aggregated by building. Second, tenants were asked to identify with basic co-op values and beliefs.

Aggregate Variables: For all of the items of conceptual interest in the present study, respondents had both their individual score response (what they answered individually) and an aggregate building score. The aggregate score was the mean of all responses from residents in a particular building. As such, it was intended to be an aggregate building level measure of organizational culture. The degree that it is legitimate to generalize mean

responses as representing an organizational culture is determined by calculating generalizability coefficients (discussed in Chapter 3).

Basic Co-op Values and Beliefs: Several key co-op values and beliefs were directly examined in the NNP92 survey (see Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.15). These kinds of values and beliefs were hypothesized to be more common in co-ops that practice self-management and where resident participation is high. The first of these values concerns the importance of resident involvement on the co-op board. The second concerns beliefs about the importance of self-management. The third item reflects the degree to which the respondent feels like a part owner of the co-op (as opposed to a renter). The fourth item asks about a respondent's commitment to stay or move from their building. Although all of these variables were originally intended to be used as continuous variables, the "no opinion" response was subsequently judged to be a questionable mid-point on two of the items. As a result, this specific response was not be included in any analysis utilizing continuous variables.

Co-op Values and Beliefs
<i>In co-op housing, the board of directors is made up of residents of the co-op. The board makes general decisions for the co-op. How important is it, in your opinion, that residents are on the board?</i> 5) very important 4) important 3) no opinion 2) not important 1) not at all important
<i>In many co-ops, the residents themselves do many management jobs, such as interview new residents, plan budgets, hire people to make repairs, and so on. Do think this is a good idea, or is it a bad idea?</i> 5) very good idea 4) good idea 3) no opinion 2) bad idea 1) very bad idea
<i>Some people say that when you live in a co-op, you feel like a part owner of your home, rather than just a renter. What do you think? Do you...</i> 1) strongly disagree 2) disagree 3) neutral 4) agree 5) strongly agree

Figure 2.14—Co-op Values and Beliefs Items in Questionnaire

<u>Stay or Move?</u>	
Would you like to stay in your building or definitely move?	
1) definitely move	2) maybe stay 3) definitely stay

Figure 2.15—Desire to Stay Living in Building

Outcomes of Participation and Social Capital

Quality of and Satisfaction With the Physical Environment: As was mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the most common outcome measures in housing research has been housing satisfaction and/or quality ratings (Amerigo & Argones, 1997; Tognoli, 1987). Questions about resident perception of the quality of their physical environment are probably the most common type of assessment used in housing research. Wicker (1987) suggests that satisfaction is a indicator outcome of successful life-cycle stage transitions. In both the TFCOP92 and NNP92 surveys, respondents were asked to rate the quality of their apartment, building and neighborhood. Quality and satisfaction questions were asked on a four point scale ranging from poor to excellent (*see Figure 2.16*).

<u>Environmental Quality and Satisfaction</u>	
Circle the word that best describes what you think of each of the following:	
YOUR APARTMENT	4) excellent 3) good 2) fair 1) poor
YOUR BUILDING	4) excellent 3) good 2) fair 1) poor
YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD	4) excellent 3) good 2) fair 1) poor

Figure 2.16—Environmental Quality Items in Questionnaire

Control and Influence: Perceived control has been used to predict involvement and to define participation (Leavitt & Saegert, 1990; Wandersman, 1981; Wandersman et al., 1987). It is also a measure of empowerment. Three questions were asked in the NNP92 survey about residents perceived control over their building (*see Figure 2.17*). These three

questions were on a five point Likert-type scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” and were intended to be combined into a single measure validated by reliability analysis.

Whereas control was framed in terms of the effect residents have over distinct building problems and concerns, influence tried to address a broader arena of sway and affect in decision making. Participants in the NNP92 survey were asked about influence on a four point scale ranging from “a lot of influence” to “hardly any influence at all” (see Figure 2.18).

<u>Perceived Control</u>
Some people argue that there is very little residents can do to keep rents from going higher. In regard to your building, do you... 1) strongly disagree 2) disagree 3) neutral 4) agree 5) strongly agree
The residents here have little control over all the rules about what we can and can't do in our apartments. 1) strongly disagree 2) disagree 3) neutral 4) agree 5) strongly agree
Whenever we have a problem with security in this building, there's not much the residents here can do about it. 1) strongly disagree 2) disagree 3) neutral 4) agree 5) strongly agree

Figure 2.17—Perceived Control Items in Questionnaire

<u>Influence</u>
Overall, how much influence do you feel the residents of this building have in the decisions that get made about the building? 4) A lot of influence 3) Some influence 2) Very little influence 1) Hardly any influence at all

Figure 2.18—Influence Items in Questionnaire

Chapter Summary

The basic method used in the present study was an interview survey of tenants living in HDFC and TIL buildings in three New York City neighborhoods. Data collection was somewhat complex in that it had to be integrated into a larger study in the Bronx and was also a sociology class project in Manhattan. Although methodology for the larger Bronx TFCOP92 survey is discussed in Chapter 2, only data from the NNP92 survey (also discussed in this chapter) is reported in the present study.

Chapter 3

Descriptive Results and Scales Construction

Description of the Sample

NNP92 Surveys were administered to a total of 500 people in 57 HDFC and TIL buildings. Table 3.1 notes the number of surveys collected by neighborhood and building type. The mean and median number of surveys collected per building is included in this table. The table also includes the distribution of surveyed buildings by neighborhood as well as the universe of potential buildings and the ratio of surveyed buildings to universe that resulted.

Table 3.1

Surveys Collected by Neighborhood

	Potential Buildings	Total NNP92 Buildings	% of Potential Buildings	NNP92 (n=500) [Raw Data Set]	Mean Surveys	Median Surveys
Highbridge	16 HDFCs	5	31%	53 Surveys	10.6	10
East Tremont	23 HDFCs	17	74%	250 Surveys	14.7	11
Clinton/ Hell's Kitchen	27 HDFCs	18	67%	99 Surveys	5.5	5
	28 TILs	17	61%	98 Surveys	5.7	5
Totals	94 Bldgs	57 Bldgs		500 Surveys		

One-half of the NNP92 surveys (n=250) were collected in 17 East Tremont HDFC buildings. The interviewer obtained surveys from 74% of the possible HDFCs in this neighborhood. The average of 14.7 surveys per building is a little misleading in that 66 surveys were collected in one building, the Tremont Park HDFC (*a pseudonym*). I planned a deliberate oversample in this building because it had been the focus of several UHAB and HERG community development interventions. Excluding the Tremont Park

HDFC from the calculations results in an average of 10 surveys being collected in the remaining 16 East Tremont HDFCs.

The Bronx interviewer conducted a total of 53 NNP92 surveys in 5 Highbridge buildings (*mean = 10.6 surveys per building*). This resulted in a sample ratio of only 31% of the potential HDFC buildings being included in the NNP92 survey. The lower number of buildings contacted in this neighborhood reflected both interviewer safety concerns and time constraints exacerbated by bad weather. In addition, the interviewer was refused access to two buildings by building leaders who questioned the purpose of the research. Drug activity around several targeted buildings limited access to several other buildings. Time and weather constraints also prevented the interviewer from making repeated visits to skipped buildings.

Interviewers were able to contact 37 buildings and obtain surveys in a total of 35 buildings (17 TIL and 18 HDFC) in the Clinton/Hell's Kitchen neighborhood. This resulted in sampling 61% of the TIL buildings and 67% of the HDFC buildings in this neighborhood. Leaders in one HDFC and one TIL building refused interviewers access to their building because of a distrust as to the purpose of the research. Interviewers collected a total of 197 surveys in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen (*mean = 5.6 surveys*). The lower mean number of surveys per building reflects a larger number of smaller buildings in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen.

As was mentioned in Chapter 2, some data in the Bronx were collected in the proscribed interview format and some as a self-administered questionnaire. No detailed records were kept to document the actual proportion of interviewer administered surveys

versus the number of self-administered surveys. Again, this is only an issue for data collected in the Bronx. My debriefing of Kevin Jackson lead me to believe that the vast majority of surveys were interviewer administered. Examination of the handwriting on the original forms suggests that 248 (82%) were probably collected as interviews by Kevin Jackson. It appears that 43 (14%) were probably self-administered based on handwriting differences and changes in the color of ink used to mark forms within buildings. The status of the remaining 12 surveys (4%) were not discernible based on cursory handwriting analysis.

Missing Data

Although 500 people completed some portion of the NNP92 Survey (n=500), substantial amounts of missing data made the raw product difficult to use. In fact, only 79 respondents had totally complete data across the entire array of 157 variables! Therefore, I made a series of decisions about eliminating cases and estimating missing data. The result was the creation of the Individual Analysis Data Set (n=441). The following discussion describes the path taken to develop this final data set used as the base for analysis in the present study.

Obviously it is never desirable to have missing data, but, in field studies, missing data are usually inevitable. Table 3.2 shows that questions about education (*36.0% missing*), income (*38.0% missing*), and the amount of rent paid (*54.4% missing*) were the most common missing items. Direct respondent refusal to tell interviewers some combination of these three variables explained about one-fourth of the incomplete data in the present study. Whereas some respondents may have been reluctant to admit their level of formal

education to an interviewer, the refusal to answer income and rent paid may have been more of a matter of survival. Respondent eligibility for a variety of social and education programs is often defined by the answer to “income” and “the amount of rent paid” questions.

Table 3.2
Missing Data
NNP92 Raw Data (n=500)

Page 1 of Survey				
Conceptually Related Variables [Ordered by Place in Survey]	Count of Items	Cases with No Missing Data	Cases with All Missing Data ^a	Percent Cases All Missing
Length of Residence	1	422	78	15.6%
Leadership Status	1	486	14	2.8%
Experienced Homelessness	1	463	37	7.4%
Building Management Belief	1	399	101	20.2%
MIS_M6 Building Management Attitudes	6	468	5 [495]	1.0%
MIS_VAL Co-op Values	3	472	16 [484]	3.2%
Monthly Rent	1	228	272	54.4%
MIS_SAT Environmental Quality	3	491	7 [493]	1.4%
MIS_E7 Physical Building Condition	7	484	8 [492]	3.2%
MIS_CNF3 Conflict and Crisis	3	458	18 [482]	3.6%
MIS_NRM6 Participation Social Norms	6	426	20 [480]	4.0%
Page 2 of Survey				
MIS_P5 Social Problems in Building	5	428	54 [446]	10.8%
MIS_CTR3 Sense of Building Control	3	424	57 [443]	11.4%
MIS_WS Informal Work and Helping	5	417	65 [435]	13.0%
MIS_LDR3 Formal Leadership Roles	3	425	64 [436]	12.8%
MIS_ROL7 Attitudes about Leadership Roles	7	423	64 [438]	12.8%
MIS_BAS4 Basic Participation ^b	4	270	6 [494]	1.2%
Leadership Choices	3	430	60 [440]	12.0%
Head of Household Status	1	380	120	24.0%
Education	1	320	180	36.0%
Income	1	310	190	38.0%
Voter Registration	1	393	107	21.4%

- a. Numbers in parentheses represent the cases where data are not completely missing in groups of conceptually related variables.
- b. One item in this group of variables, “Do you participate in a tenants group?,” was asked at the beginning of the survey.

Respondent fatigue was an important factor in missing data. Interviewers in all three neighborhoods reported respondents who failed to complete the questionnaire often complained about the length of the instrument and the amount of time it was taking to finish it. Table 3.2 strongly suggests respondent fatigue as a factor for missing data. For example, on the first page of the questionnaire, the number of cases where all the conceptually related group items (in bold face) had missing responses was under 5%. This increased to over 10% starting with the second page. Inspection of completed surveys found that over half of those with sizable missing data were substantially complete on the front side of the form, but only sporadically filled out on the back.

Missing data may have been affected by who was conducting the survey. Most of the interviewers in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen were students with no relationship to community residents or their living conditions. Although Kevin Jackson was an African American living in the Bronx, he was not familiar with either Highbridge or East Tremont prior to this study. Inadequate surveyor training may have also contributed to the missing data problem as well as the lack of experience in gently probing for sensitive information.

Looking for Patterns in Missing Data

Were there any patterns in missing data? I conducted a series of one-way ANOVA and step-wise multiple regression procedures to try to answer this question. A series of "missing variables" were constructed to facilitate analysis. One series created 12 "missing" variables that counted the number of missing responses in 12 groups of conceptually related continuous variables (shaded items in Table 3.2). In addition, two global measures of missingness were constructed.

“Missing Variables”: I used a computer count procedure to count the number of missing responses in groups of conceptually related key variables. For example, a single “missing” count variable was constructed for all 6 questions about building management attitudes by counting the number of missing responses in each individual variables. The resulting variable “MIS_M6” had a possible score of 0 to 6 missing items. The number of cases with no missing data and the number of cases with all missing data for each of these groups of variables can be found in Table 3.2.

Three global missing variables were constructed by counting the number of missing individual responses. The first of these global missing variables simply counted missing responses across all collected variables. The second counted missing responses for 55 continuous variables of particular interest in the present study. Neither of these first two approaches offered much insight into missing data in this survey. A third “missing” variable (CMISS12) was constructed that looked at missing data in groups of conceptually related continuous variables.

The construction of CMISS12 is described in Table 3.3 and the frequency of this constructed variable in Table 3.4. In CMISS12, if there were responses to at least half of the items in a conceptually related group (such as social problems in the building), then social problems (*in this example MIS_P5*) was not scored as missing. The rationale for not scoring these items as missing was based on my intention to use mean substitution of missing values in scale construction when at least half of the items in a conceptually related group of items were answered.

Table 3.3

Construction of CMISS12				
<i>Global Missing Variable</i>				
<i>Variable Name</i>	<i>12 Groups of Conceptually Related Continuous Variables^a</i>	<i>Cases With No Missing^b</i>	<i>Criteria for Inclusion as Missing</i>	<i>Resulting Cases^c</i>
MIS_M6	6 Building Management Variables	468	GT 3 Missing	495
MIS_VAL	3 Co-op Values Variables	472	GT 1 Missing	480
MIS_SAT	3 Environmental Quality Variables	491	GT 1 Missing	492
MIS_E7	7 Physical Bldg Condition Variables	482	GT 4 Missing	484
MIS_NRM6	6 Participation Social Norms Variables	426	GT 3 Missing	478
MIS_P5	5 Social Problem Variables	428	GT 2 Missing	441
MIS_CNF3	3 Conflict and Crisis Variables	458	GT 1 Missing	481
MIS_CTR3	3 Building Control Variables	424	GT 1 Missing	438
MIS_W5	5 Informal Work and Helping Variables	417	GT 2 Missing	433
MIS_LDR3	3 Formal Leadership Variable	425	GT 1 Missing	437
MIS_ROL7	7 Leadership Roles Variables	423	GT 4 Missing	443
MIS_BAS4	5 Basic Participation Variables	264	GT 2 Missing	419

a. A total of 55 continuous variables are represented in CMISS 12.

b. Mean of 432 cases.

c. Mean of 459 cases.

Table 3.4**CMISS12**

		Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
Number Missing	0	400	80.0	400	80.0
	1	29	5.8	429	85.8
	2	12	2.4	441	88.2
	3	10	2.0	451	90.2
	4	18	3.6	469	93.8
	5	14	2.8	483	96.6
	6	10	2.0	493	98.6
	7	3	.6	496	99.2
	8	4	.8	500	100.0
Total		500	100.0		

Continuing to use social problems as an example, Table 3.2 tells us that 428 respondents answered all of the related social problem items and that 446 answered at least some of them. Of the 18 people who answered only part of this series of questions, 13 an-

swered at least 3 items (60% of the items). In other words, 441 people answered at least half of the questions relating to social problems in their building. The last column in Table 3.3 presents the number of resulting cases with at least half of the items completed in each conceptually related group of variables using the CMISS12 selection criteria.

Looking for Group Differences in Missing Data: I conducted a series of one-way ANOVAs using CMISS12 as the dependent variable. There were no significant differences in this global missing variable based on leadership status, neighborhood, ethnicity, gender, or HDFC/TIL status.

Regression Analysis: A step-wise multiple regression analysis was performed using the global count of missing items [CMISS12] as the dependent variable and the major demographics, behavioral and attitudinal variables as the independent variables. The purpose of this analysis was to look for any patterns that might be associated with missing data. The regression analysis was performed with mean substitution of missing values.

The results of this regression analysis (see Table 3.5) suggest that higher levels of missing data are more characteristic of residents who want to stay in their building but who are less satisfied with it and perceive more conflict than agreement in their building. They tend to not identify being a building leader and misidentify building management as being HPD. They are less likely to live in a tenant managed building or misidentify building management as being a private landlord. People with higher levels of missing data are also more likely to not report their ethnicity. The equation explained a total of 19% of the variance in CMISS12.

Table 3.5

<i>Regression Analysis</i>							
<u>CMISS12</u>							
<i>Count of Missing Values for 12 Groups of Conceptually Related Continuous Variables</i>							
<i>Method:</i>				<i>Stepwise</i>			
LDR	NONLDR	LDRTOBE	PARTEN	PARNEIGH	VOTEREG	TIL	HDFC
WOMEN	AGE	HEADHOU	ED	HOMELESS	RENT2	INC	STAY
LENGTH	RRENT	APTSAT	BEDSAT	NGHSAT	WHITE	BLACK	LATINO
VBRD	VINV	VOWN	CONFLCT	CRISIS	AGRMNT	BM_HPD	BM_TENS
BM_LAND	BM_MANG	DENSITY	BPROB_6	BMANG_6	WORK_3	CNTRL_3	FORML_5
SPROB_5	TNORM_5	RSCAL_7	BX4	BX6	MN4	SECURTY	
<i>Model</i>	<i>MultR</i>	<i>Rsq</i>	<i>F(Eqn)</i>	<i>SigF</i>	<i>Variable</i>	<i>BetaIn</i>	<i>VarSig</i>
1	.1534	.0235	12.009	.001	In: LATINO	-.1534	p<.001
2	.2197	.0483	12.606	.000	In: AGRMNT	-.1573	p<.001
3	.2585	.0668	11.835	.000	In: WHITE	-.1435	p<.001
4	.3463	.1199	16.861	.000	In: BLACK	-.3563	p<.001
5	.3776	.1426	16.433	.000	In: ASIAN	-.1674	p<.001
6	.3935	.1548	15.053	.000	In: BM_HPD	.1116	p<.100
7	.4023	.1619	13.573	.000	In: STAY	.0884	p<.010
8	.4138	.1712	12.681	.000	In: BLD SAT	-.1093	p<.050
9	.4219	.1780	11.791	.000	In: BM_TENS	-.0869	p<.010
10	.4314	.1861	11.180	.000	In: BM_LAND	-.0943	p<.050
11	.4390	.1927	10.592	.000	In: NONLDR	.0835	p<.050
<i>[Adjusted R Square</i>						<i>.17454]</i>	

Analysis Data Sets Construction

There did not appear to be any major surprises in the pattern of missing data in the present study. As a result, I considered it reasonable to delete cases with substantial missing data without biasing the resulting sample in any systematic way. I then constructed three different data sets for use in analysis. The first of these contained individual responses. In the second, responses were aggregated by building. The third combined aggregate building responses with generalizability coefficients (*explained below*) greater than .6 with individual responses.

Individual Analysis Data Set (n=441)

Selection criteria for the final individual analysis data set was based on respondents having no more than 2 missing groups of conceptually related variables as calculated by CMISS12 (see Table 3.4). Fifty-nine cases were deleted from analysis using this criteria which resulted in a final data set with 441 cases. I judged this to be a reasonable number because it was in between the mean number of cases with no missing data (*432 cases, from Table 3.3, Footnote b*) and the mean number of cases with substantially complete data across 12 groups of conceptually related variables (*or 459 cases, from Table 3.3, Footnote c*).

Throughout the study, I generally used mean substitution of missing values in the individual analysis data set when missing data for a variable was 5% or less. By these criteria, 11 of the 12 groups of conceptually related items had less than 5% missing data in the number of cases where all items were answered. Only the basic involvement items were below this criterion.

Aggregate Analysis Data Set (n=50)

Responses in the aggregate data set were calculated by taking the mean of individual survey answers in any given building. I only aggregated buildings where there were at least three responses in the individual analysis data set described above. This procedure resulted in a data set of 50 buildings. The remaining seven buildings had only 1 or 2 individual responses per building and were, therefore eliminated from the aggregate data set. Responses from these seven buildings were also excluded from the contextual analysis data set discussed below.

Contextual Analysis and Organizational Culture Data Set (n=432)

Some of the data analysis in subsequent chapters makes use of contextual analysis (Iversen, 1991). Contextual analysis is broadly described in the research literature as a collection of data analysis techniques that look at the effect of social context on individual-level outcomes (DiPrete & Forristal, 1994). In the present study this translates to trying to look at how the co-operative building context (organizational culture) affects individual outcomes such as apartment satisfaction or building satisfaction.

The aggregate contextual/organizational culture building contextual analysis data set was constructed by combining both the individual and aggregate data sets. This only made sense to do within the 50 buildings included in the aggregate data set. In other words, the contextual data set contains individual and building level responses from buildings where there were at least three responses in the individual analysis data set. As a result, individuals living in the seven buildings with a small number of surveys were not included in the contextual data set because the aggregate social context variables would not be very useful. The small number of surveys may have been because of a low response rate or because the building was small in size (less than 10 units). Six of these excluded buildings were located in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen where buildings were generally smaller in size. The other building eliminated from the contextual data set was in East Tremont.

O'Brien (1990) discusses the importance of estimating the reliability of aggregate-level variables based on individual-level characteristics when constructing a contextual analysis data set. The estimate of reliability is commonly referred to as a generalizability coefficient. As a result, only aggregate variables that have a generalizability coefficient greater

than .6 are included in the contextual analysis data set. This .6 level suggests a degree of consistency in the way building tenants responded to questions (*hence generalizability*).

Basic Demographic Results

Gender

Approximately 51% (253) of the respondents in the present study were women and 42% (208) were men (see Table 3.6). There were 39 cases where no gender was recorded on the survey. After eliminating cases with substantial missing data, the final data set had 52.4% (231) women and 41.5% (183) men. Mean substitution for missing cases was calculated by borough (Bronx = .59 women; Manhattan = .47 women).

Table 3.6

	Gender			
	NNP92_2 (N=441)		Raw Data (N=500)	
Men	183	41.5%	208	41.6%
Women	231	52.4%	253	50.6%
Missing	27	6.1%	39	7.8%

Race/Ethnicity

The creation of the analysis data set had little effect on the distribution of respondents by race/ethnicity (see Table 3.7). There were almost equal numbers of Blacks [161 (36.5%)] and Latinas/os [166 (37.6%)] in the final data set. Approximately 16% (71) of the sample was White. Twelve respondents (2.7%) were identified as Asian in the final data set. All of the White respondents lived in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen. Asian respondents were scattered across all three neighborhoods.

Table 3.7

Race/Ethnicity				
	NNP92 2 (N=441)		Raw Data (N=500)	
Black	161	36.5%	182	36.4%
Latino/a	166	37.6%	176	35.2%
White	71	16.1%	76	15.2%
Asian	12	2.7%	14	2.8%
Missing	31	7.0%	52	10.4%

Table 3.8

Age				
	NNP92 2 (N=441)		Raw Data (N=500)	
Less than 21yrs	7	1.6%	7	1.4%
21 to 30yrs	111	25.2%	125	25.0%
31 to 40yrs	190	43.1%	209	41.8%
41 to 50yrs	73	16.6%	78	15.6%
51 to 60yrs	25	5.7%	30	6.0%
61 to 70yrs	10	2.3%	11	2.2%
71 to 80yrs	6	1.4%	6	1.2%
Missing	10	4.3%	34	6.8%

Age

The mean and median age in this sample was between 31 to 40 years old (see Table 3.8). The mean age was between intervals 2 and 3 (interval =2.8) in the Bronx or just under 30 years old. Manhattan participants were somewhat older with a mean age between 31 to 40 years (interval = 3.53). Mean substitution for missing cases was calculated by borough.

Education

There was a substantial amount of missing data in people reporting their level of formal education in the present study (see Table 3.9). Almost 30% (130) of the final sample refused to answer this question. Bronx participants reported having a little less formal education than study participants in Manhattan. The educational level (interval =4.46) in

Table 3.9

	Education			
	NNP92 2 (N=441)		Raw Data (N=500)	
Less than high school	9	2.1%	9	1.8%
Some high school	35	7.9%	36	7.2%
High school graduate	115	26.1%	121	24.2%
Some college	73	16.6%	75	15.0%
College graduate	62	14.1%	62	12.4%
Post-graduate work	17	3.9%	17	3.4%
Missing	130	29.5%	180	36.0%

the Bronx was midway between being a High School graduate and having some college. Manhattan responses were also in between having a High School diploma and having some college (interval = 4.73). Mean substitution for missing cases was calculated by borough.

Yearly Household Income

Respondents were asked to report their yearly household income from one of seven categories. Over 32% (143) of the sample refused to reveal their yearly household income in the present study (*see Table 3.10*). The mean income of Manhattan respondents in the final sample was substantially higher than income reported in the Bronx. The mean income (of those reporting income) in the Bronx was a little over \$5,000 per year

Table 3.10

	Yearly Household Income			
	NNP92 2 (N=441)		Raw Data (N=500)	
Under \$5,000	33	7.5%	41	8.2%
\$5-10,000	98	22.2%	102	20.4%
\$10-20,000	68	15.4%	68	13.6%
\$20-30,000	62	14.1%	62	12.4%
\$30-40,000	26	5.9%	26	5.2%
\$40-50,000	6	1.4%	6	1.2%
Over \$50,000	5	1.1%	5	1.0%
Missing	143	32.4%	190	38.0%

Table 3.11
Income Source^a

		Bronx	Manhattan	Total
Job	<i>Count</i>	145	122	267
	<i>Valid % of Borough</i>	76.7%	84.7%	80.2%
Pension	<i>Count</i>	4	3	7
	<i>Valid % of Borough</i>	2.1%	2.1%	2.1%
SSI	<i>Count</i>	13	8	21
	<i>Valid % of Borough</i>	6.9%	5.6%	6.3%
Other Public Assistance	<i>Count</i>	26	3	29
	<i>Valid % of Borough</i>	13.8%	2.1%	8.7%
Other Income	<i>Count</i>	1	3	4
	<i>Valid % of Borough</i>	.5%	2.1%	1.2%
Multiple Response	<i>Count</i>		5	5
	<i>Valid % of Borough</i>		3.5%	1.5%
Total	<i>Count</i>	189	144	333
	<i>Valid % of Borough</i>	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

a. The 108 cases missing income source are not in this table (24.5% of sample)

(interval 2.24). The mean income of Manhattan respondents (who reported income) was just under \$20,000 per year (interval 3.79). Mean substitution for missing cases was calculated by borough.

More people were willing to report the source of their income (333 people) than the amount of income (298 people). Over 80% of all respondents reported getting their income from a job--84.7% of Manhattan respondents versus 76.7% of those in the Bronx (see Table 3.11). Respondents in the Bronx reported more public assistance income and had higher levels of missing data. 'Other public assistance' was a category on the survey instrument. No further interpretation is possible based on the data gathered.

Identity with having been homeless.

In the analysis data set (n=441), over 37% (167) people reported having been homeless, doubled up, or having lived in a city shelter at some point in their life. Only 29 people (6.6%) actually answered yes to the direct question about having been homeless. One-hundred and two (22.5%) reported that they had doubled up with someone and 49 (11.1%) said they had lived in a city shelter. There were 28 (6.3%) missing responses to the homeless items. It is likely that these missing responses are from people who have not experienced homelessness directly and therefore skipped these questions. On the other hand, people's definitions of being homeless may differ. For example, Rivlin (1990) found many people in transitional homeless housing saying that they were not homeless, because they felt that they always had a "roof over my head" and were "never on the street."

A dichotomous 'formerly homeless' variable was constructed by putting together those respondents who identified as having been homeless and/or those who reported having lived in a city shelter. Seventeen per-cent (17%, n=75) of all respondents fit this category. It is interesting to note that 16 of these formerly homeless respondents lived at the Tremont Park HDHC in the Bronx. As was discussed earlier, this site was deliberately over-sampled because of prior HERG involvement evaluating a homeless re-housing program in that building.

Voter Registration

Out of the 441 respondents, 53.5% (236) reported being registered to vote. A little over a third of the sample (38.7%) reported having voted within the last four years. An additional 9.2% reported the last time they voted as being more than 5 years ago. This time period would have included the election of David Dinkins as Mayor of New York.

Head of Household

Out of 441 respondents, almost 46% (200 people) reported that they were the head of their household. In addition, 32.4% (143) specifically stated that they were not the head of their household and 14.1% (62) offered no information.

Basic “Fixed” Environmental Items Results*Density*

The mean size of buildings where surveys were collected was 37.9 residential units. However, the median size was just over 20 units. This reflects differences in the general size of buildings in the three neighborhoods. Table 3.12 shows the distribution of surveys to building size for the entire study. Table 3.13 shows this distribution by neighborhood. The distribution of surveys by building density reflects the actual neighborhood conditions. Clinton has a larger proportion of smaller buildings than either of the other two neighborhoods. Highbridge HDFC and TIL buildings all tend to be larger buildings. In addition there is a greater variety of building sizes in East Tremont.

Table 3.12

Density of Residential Units					
	NNP92 2 (N=441)		Raw Data (N=500)		
Less than 10 units	27	5.9%	27	5.4%	
10-19 units	118	25.9%	130	26.0%	
20-39 units	157	34.4%	173	34.6%	
40-69 units	86	18.9%	95	19.0%	
Greater than 70 units	66	14.5%	72	14.4%	
Missing	2	.4%	3	.6%	

Table 3.13***Surveys Distribution by Neighborhood and Building Density***

		Highbridge	E Tremont	Clinton	Total
LT10	<i>Count of Surveys</i>			27	27
DU	<i>% of Neighborhood</i>			15.3%	6.1%
10-19	<i>Count of Surveys</i>		28	89	117
DU	<i>% of Neighborhood</i>		12.8%	50.3%	26.5%
20-39	<i>Count of Surveys</i>	9	82	61	152
DU	<i>% of Neighborhood</i>	20.0%	37.4%	34.5%	34.5%
40-69	<i>Count of Surveys</i>	36	46		82
DU	<i>% of Neighborhood</i>	80.0%	21.0%		18.6%
GT70	<i>Count of Surveys</i>		63		63
DU	<i>% of Neighborhood</i>		28.8%		14.3%
Total	<i>Count of Surveys</i>	45	219	177	441
	<i>% of Neighborhood</i>	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 3.14

Monthly Rent					
	NNP92_2 (N=441)		Raw Data (N=500)		
Up to \$200	12	2.7%	12	2.4%	
\$201-300	58	13.1%	62	12.4%	
\$301-400	57	13.0%	64	12.8%	
\$401-500	43	10.2%	48	9.6%	
\$501-600	27	6.1%	31	6.2%	
Over \$600	10	2.3%	11	2.2%	
Missing	232	52.6%	272	54.4%	

Monthly Rent

Over half of the people in the present study did not report their monthly rent (*see Table 3.14*). Of those who did, the mean rent was just under \$350 per month. People who thought their rent was reasonable paid significantly less rent (mean = \$301-350) than those who thought their rent was somewhat reasonable or unreasonable (mean = \$351-400). Clinton/Hell's Kitchen reported significantly lower rent (mean = \$301-350) than either of the Bronx neighborhoods (mean = \$351-400). This difference probably reflects the earlier finding that Clinton/Hell's Kitchen respondents reported living in their buildings

almost twice as long as respondents in either Bronx neighborhood. Mean substitution of missing values was calculated by borough.

Table 3.15

	Length of Residence			
	NNP92 2 (N=441)		Raw Data (N=500)	
Up to 1yr	25	5.7%	27	5.4%
2-5yrs	166	37.6%	183	36.6%
6-10yrs	105	23.8%	124	24.8%
11-15yrs	49	11.1%	55	11.0%
Over 16 yrs	32	7.3%	33	6.6%
Missing	64	14.5%	78	15.6%

Length of Residence

The mean length of residence in the present study was 7.23 years. However, this differed by neighborhood. In the Clinton/Hell's Kitchen neighborhood the mean length of residence was 10.27 years. This was over twice the length in either Bronx neighborhood. In East Tremont, the mean length of residence was 4.94 years and in Highbridge 4.0 years. Table 3.15 shows frequencies across all three neighborhoods and is collapsed into 5 categories. Mean substitution of missing data was calculated by borough.

Type of Co-op

Eighty-one percent of the responses in the present study were collected in HDFC buildings (see Table 3.16). The rest were from TIL buildings. All of the TIL buildings in the present study were in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen.

Table 3.16

	Type of Co-op			
	NNP92 2 (N=441)		Raw Data (N=500)	
TIL	88	18.8%	98	19.6%
HDFC	368	81.2%	402	80.4%
Missing	0	0%	0	0%

Building Management

A little over 60% of the respondents reported that their building had some form of tenant or self-management (*see Table 3.17*). Outside management was reported by 13.8% of the survey participants. A total of 14 respondents (9 in the analysis data set) incorrectly identified HPD as managing their building. Technically speaking, all 20 of the respondents who described their building manager as a landlord also gave an incorrect answer. Some confusion may exist with these residents about the role of an outside manager or the characteristics of a landlord.

Table 3.17

Building Management Perception				
	NNP92_2 (N=441)		Raw Data (N=500)	
Tenant Management	268	60.8%	297	59.4%
Paid Management	61	13.8%	68	13.6%
Landlord	20	4.5%	20	4.0%
HPD	9	2.0%	14	2.8%
Missing	83	18.8%	101	20.2%

Specific Co-op Conditions Results

Building Problems Scale

BPROB_6 [$\alpha=.84$ ($n=487$).]: This scale is composed of respondent ratings of heat, hot water, electricity, plumbing, windows and cleanliness. A principal components factor analysis of these items suggested a one factor solution. These items were reversed in the scale so that higher scores indicate more problems in physical building conditions. There was a possible score on this scale from 0 to 23. The actual range of scores was from 0 to 16 (mean = 6.78; median = 7). Cronbach's alpha for this scale is .84 ($n=487$). The generalizability coefficient for the building conditions scale was .90 ($n=431$).

Table 3.18
Rating of Building Conditions

	% Excellent	% Good	% Fair	% Poor
RATE: Heat	29.1%	44.1%	25.9%	.9%
RATE: Hot Water	36.7%	41.0%	21.4%	.9%
RATE: Electricity	30.6%	44.5%	23.5%	1.4%
RATE: Plumbing	18.9%	44.5%	32.5%	4.1%
RATE: Windows	19.1%	39.9%	37.4%	3.6%
RATE: Cleanliness	13.2%	35.7%	47.7%	3.4%

Table 3.18 describes the percentage of responses for individual items in the building conditions scale. Higher scores suggest a greater perception of building problems. Over 70% of respondents rated their heat, hot water and electricity as being good or excellent. Overall building cleanliness and the condition of windows received the most fair and poor ratings.

Building Management Ratings Scale

BMANG_6 [($\alpha = .89$) $n = 468$]: This scale is composed of all six attitudes about building management items including general quality, speed of repairs, quality of repairs, providing information, availability, and rating of employees. A principal components factor analysis of these items suggests a one factor solution. Higher scores indicate

Table 3.19
Rating of Building Management

	% Poor	% Fair	% Good	% Excellent
Management quality	1.8%	36.2%	49.7%	12.3%
Management repairs quickly	5.9%	41.9%	38.2%	14.0%
Management does quality repairs	5.5%	42.2%	40.3%	12.0%
Management provides information	5.5%	41.6%	38.4%	14.5%
Management availability	9.4%	43.5%	34.1%	12.9%
Management employees	5.5%	52.9%	29.8%	11.8%

greater satisfaction with building management. The range of scores was from 0 to 18 (mean=9.3; median=9). The generalizability coefficient for the building management

ratings scale was .92. Table 3.19 describes the percentage of responses for individual items in the building management ratings scale. Respondents rated all of these items between fair and good.

Social Problems in Building Scale

SPROB_5 [(α = .80) n = 428]: This scale is composed of all 5 social problems items including drugs, harassment, graffiti, noise, and other crimes. A principal components factor analysis of these items suggested a one factor solution. Higher scores indicate more social problems in the respondents building. The possible range of scores on this scale is 0 to 10 (mean=2.5; median=2). The generalizability coefficient was .85 ($n=431$).

Table 3.20
Social Building Problems

	% Not at all	% Somewhat	% Very much
Problem with drugs	62.9%	29.7%	7.5%
Problem with other crimes	61.9%	30.3%	7.8%
Problem with harassment	63.4%	31.9%	4.7%
Problem with graffiti	57.2%	34.7%	8.1%
Problem with noise	46.6%	36.1%	17.2%

Table 3.20 describes the percentage of responses for individual items in the social building problems scale. Noise was the most frequently reported social problem with 53.3% of respondents reporting noise as a problem. Harassment, drugs, other crimes, were reported by a little more than a third of all respondents. Less than 8% of all respondents reported drugs, other crimes or harassment as major problem.

Security

Table 3.21
Security Rating

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Poor	31	7.0	7.1	7.1
Fair	201	45.6	46.0	53.1
Good	152	34.5	34.8	87.9
Excellent	53	12.0	12.1	100.0
Total	437	99.1	100.0	
System Missing	4	.9		
Total	441	100.0		

Over 50% of respondents rated the security of their building as at best being fair. This varied significantly by neighborhood ($p < .001$). The mean safety rating for Highbridge was 2.04, for East Tremont—2.35; and for Clinton—2.85 (*all between fair and good, but higher scores suggest greater security perceptions*). The generalizability coefficient for security was .86.

Conflict, Crisis and Agreement

These three items were originally conceptualized as a three item scale. Cronbach's alpha for these items together was less than .4. As a result, conflict, crisis and agreement are used as separate items in subsequent analysis. Further analysis on these variables will be reported in Chapter 6.

Table 3.22 suggests that 26.1% of the sample felt that there were conflicts that prevented their building from getting things done. The generalizability coefficient for conflict was .79. Table 3.23 finds 30.0% of the sample feeling that their building was always in crisis. The generalizability coefficient for conflict was .87. From a different perspective, 78.7% of the sample felt that there was really more agreement than conflict in their

building (see Table 3.24). The generalizability coefficient for agreement perceptions was .62.

Table 3.22

Conflict prevents us from getting things done.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly disagree	54	12.2	12.4	12.4
Disagree	157	35.6	36.1	48.5
Neither	109	24.7	25.1	73.6
Agree	101	22.9	23.2	96.8
Strongly agree	14	3.2	3.2	100.0
Total	435	98.6	100.0	
System Missing	6	1.4		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 3.23

Building is constantly in crisis.

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly disagree	53	12.0	12.2	12.2
Disagree	138	31.3	31.7	43.9
Neither	112	25.4	25.7	69.7
Agree	122	27.7	28.0	97.7
Strongly agree	10	2.3	2.3	100.0
Total	435	98.6	100.0	
System Missing	6	1.4		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 3.24

Conflict vs Agreement Perceptions

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Conflict	5	1.1	1.2	1.2
More cnflict t/agrmnt	70	15.9	16.6	17.8
More agrmnt t/cnflict	275	62.4	65.2	82.9
Agreement	72	16.3	17.1	100.0
Total	422	95.7	100.0	
System Missing	19	4.3		
Total	441	100.0		

Social Capital and Participation Results

Factor Analysis of Social Capital Items

Prior to constructing scales the items related to informal, formal and basic involvement as well as tenant norms about participation were subjected to two separate factor analyses using either a principal components or a maximum likelihood extraction. In both analyses a four factor solution emerged as hypothesized with the exception that two of the informal participation items loaded on the formal participation factor (*see Table 3.25*). Varimax and oblique rotations yielded essentially the same results for both

Table 3.25
Factor Loadings for Participation Items^a

	FACTOR1	FACTOR2	FACTOR3	FACTOR4
Formal Involvement (23.2%)				
Have you ever served as a Board Member?	.86529			
Have you ever been an Officer of your co-op?	.82741			
Have you ever served on a committee?	.81092			
Do you ever help represent your building in meetings?	.57590			
Do you ever help leaders with making phone calls?	.54736			
Tenant Participation Social Norms (13.4%)				
Help each other		.77737		
Keep Building Clean		.75230		
Participate in Tenants Group		.66668		
Active in Neighborhood Organizations		.63896		
Pay Rent		.47213		
Look Out for Others Children		.47041		
Basic Involvement (10.8%)				
Do you participate in a neighborhood organization?			.72801	
How often did your building have regular meetings?			.66555	
Do you participate in a tenants group?			.63309	
How often do you attend tenant meetings?			.60177	
Did you vote in the most recent Board election?			.59308	
Informal Work and Helping (7.2%)				
Do you ever help organize social functions?				.79595
Do you help with any maintenance or cleaning?				.62569
Do you ever do things for other tenants?				.52117

a. Loadings are for a principal components analysis with varimax rotation. Loadings less than .45 are omitted. A total of 54.6% of the variance was explained in this analysis.

extraction methods. The inter-factor correlation matrix for the principal components oblique rotation (*see Table 3.26*) suggests that these four factors were sufficiently unique to develop them as separate scales.

The first factor, formal involvement, accounted for 23.2% of the variance and includes the 3 hypothesized formal leadership items. However, two hypothesized informal work and helping items also loaded on this first factor. One of these items concerned helping leaders make phone calls and contact people. The second asked about representing their building at official meetings. Both of these items address aspects of building leadership and, therefore, conceptually added to the formal involvement dimension. The second factor, tenant participation norms, accounts for 13.4% of the variance and emerged as hypothesized. Basic involvement items made up the third factor and accounted for 10.8% of the variance. Finally, the remaining informal work and helping items constituted the fourth factor and accounted for 7.2% of the variance.

Table 3.26
Factor Correlation Matrix

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4
FACTOR 1	1.00000			
FACTOR 2	.16118	1.00000		
FACTOR 3	.13226	.00616	1.00000	
FACTOR 4	.19544	.13728	-.10079	1.00000

Scales were constructed based on factor analysis and hypothesized concepts. The formal, informal, basic and tenant participation norm scales were developed as is suggested by the previously discussed factor analysis. Each of the remaining scales was first subjected to a principal components factor analysis and then checked for reliability.

Formal Co-op Leadership Involvement Scale

FORML_5 [(alpha = .79) *n* = 418]: This scale is composed of 3 items about leadership behavior including having been a co-op officer, board member or served on a committee. The scale also includes 2 items about representing their building in an official meeting and helping leaders contact or telephone people. Higher scores on this scale suggest more formal leadership behaviors. There is a possible score on this scale from 5 to 15. This is also the actual range of scores (mean = 7.3; median = 6). Cronbach's alpha for this scale is .79 (*n*=418). The generalizability coefficient is .72. Table 3.27 describes the percentage of answers for individual items in the formal leadership involvement scale. Although most respondents reported never having served in a formal leadership role, over half reported having helped a building leader in a formal leadership activity.

Table 3.27
Formal Leadership Involvement

	% Never had job	% Once had job	% Now have job
Building Officer	81.4%	11.4%	7.2%
Co-op Board Member	77.1%	13.1%	9.8%
Served on a Committee	73.1%	16.6%	10.3%

	% Never	% Sometimes	% Often
Help leaders contacting people?	43.5%	41.2%	15.3%
Help represent building?	54.5%	28.6%	16.9%

Informal Work and Help Assistance Scale

WORK_3 [(alpha = .54) *n* = 421]: The three items in this scale concern helping with building maintenance, helping organize social functions and helping other people in their building do chores. The relatively low Cronbach's alpha (.54) for this scale suggests that people did not answer these questions consistently. The item about helping to organize social functions is the "glue" that holds these three items together and has a item-

to-total correlation of .46. There was a possible score in this scale of 0 to 6. The mean score was 2.3 and the median 2 (range=0 to 6). The generalizability coefficient is .55, below the .6 criteria for inclusion. This variable is, therefore not included in contextual analysis. Table 3.28 describes the percentage of answers for individual items in the informal work and helping assistance scale. The majority of respondents reported participating in some type of informal work and helping assistance in their buildings.

Table 3.28
Informal Work and Help Assistance

	% Never	% Sometimes	% Often
<i>Help with building maintenance?</i>	35.2%	45.7%	19.1%
<i>Help organize social events?</i>	45.5%	41.0%	13.5%
<i>Help out others in building?</i>	34.0%	50.4%	15.7%

Basic Involvement

BASIC_5 [(α = .72) n = 264]: This scale is composed of Z-Scores of tenant participation, attendance at building meetings, voting in board election items, the number of perceived building meetings, and participation in an outside neighborhood organization. Higher scores indicate more basic involvement behaviors. Z-scores were used in this scale because individual items were measured in different metrics as well as individual items were skewed. The range of scores was from -5.28 to 6.22. The mean score was .74 and the median .58. The generalizability coefficient is .91. As was discussed in Table 3.3, there were only 264 people who answered all five basic participation questions (419 with three or more questions answered). As a result, the need to use mean substitution for missing items probably overestimates individual levels of basic participation to a small degree. Table 3.29 summarize, the frequency of responses for basic involvement items.

Table 3.29
Basic Building Involvement

	% Hardly ever	% Sometimes	% Always
Freq Attnd Shrhdr Mtgs	30.0%	39.5%	30.5%

	% Never	% Several times a year	% About once a month
Perceived Frequency of Shareholder Meetings held in Building	26.2%	36.9%	36.9

	% No	% Yes
Participate in a tenants group?	40.6%	59.4%
Participate in neighborhood group?	74.2%	25.8%
Vote in last board election?	58.0%	42.0%

Social Participation Norms Scale

TNORM_5 [($\alpha = .69$) $n = 422$]: This scale is composed of 5 of the tenant social norms items including other tenants participating in tenants group, helping keep the building clean, helping each other, paying rent and being active in the surrounding neighborhood. The item about looking out for others children was dropped from the scale to increase reliability and to reduce missing data in the scale. Higher scores suggest more perceived norms for other tenants participating in a respondents building. There was a possible score on this scale from 0 to 20. The mean score was 11.5 (median=11). The generalizability coefficient for the scale is .82. The percentage of responses for each item is included in Table 3.30.

Table 3.30
Tenant Participation Norms

	% None	% Few	% Some	% Many	% Most
Tenants Participate in Tenants Group	2.7%	25.6%	30.2%	22.0%	19.5%
Tenants help keep building clean	2.1%	16.3%	35.1%	20.2%	26.4%
Tenants help each other out	1.1%	14.6%	36.3%	24.2%	23.7%
Tenants pay rent	1.7%	10.8%	33.5%	20.5%	33.5%
Tenants Active in Neighborhood	21.0%	33.4%	24.3%	14.4%	6.9%

Sense of Control Scale

CNTRL_3 [($\alpha = .79$) $n = 424$]: This scale is made up of all three control items including control over rising rents, control over rules, and control around security. A principal components factor analysis of these items suggests a one factor solution. Higher scores indicate more of a sense of control. The range of scores was from 0 to 12 (mean=6.2; median=6). The generalizability coefficient for the scale is .92. This scale will be further discussed in Chapter 6.

Basic Organizational Culture Results

The existence of organizational cultures in HDFC/TIL buildings has been consistently supported in this chapter when calculating generalizability coefficients. Most of the variables in the present study are generalizable by building suggesting a pattern of consistency in the way respondents of a particular building answered questions. In other words, rather than a random pattern of responses in a building, it appears that if building satisfaction is high with one person, it is probably high with fellow residents. The pattern of response consistency at a building level is clearly an indicator of organizational culture and justifies the subsequent use of the contextual aggregate building data set in the present study as described earlier in this chapter.

Cooperative Values

Four “basic cooperative values” were tested in the study as direct measures of organizational culture. The first of these stated that in co-op housing, the board of directors is made up of residents of the co-op. The board makes general decisions for the co-op. How important is it, in your opinion that residents are on the board? Although wording of

this question borders on being a tautology, only 65% of respondents answering this question agreed that this was an important or very important part of the co-operative. The substantial missing data (18.1%) for this item resulted from recoding “no opinion” responses to missing. Mean substitution is used to account for the “no opinion” missing data in analysis. In addition, the generalizability coefficient for this item is .94. Table 3.31 presents the frequency of responses for this item.

Table 3.31

How important is it for residents to be on the board?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not at all important	30	6.8	8.3	8.3
Not important	91	20.6	25.2	33.5
Important	129	29.3	35.7	69.3
Very important	111	25.2	30.7	100.0
Total	361	81.9	100.0	
System Missing	80	18.1		
Total	80	18.1		
Total	441	100.0		

The second “co-op value” concerned resident involvement. The question asked: “many co-ops, the residents themselves do many management jobs, such as interview new residents, plan budgets, hire people to make repairs, and so on. Do you think this is a good idea, or is it a bad idea?” Around 77% of respondents answering this question endorsed this concept. Like the earlier question on the importance of residents on the board, there are substantial missing data from recoding “no opinion” responses. Mean substitution by borough is used for analysis. The generalizability coefficient is .82. Table 3.32 presents frequency responses for this item.

Table 3.32**Is resident involvement a good or bad idea?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Very bad idea	32	7.3	9.2	9.2
Bad idea	48	10.9	13.8	23.1
Good idea	171	38.8	49.3	72.3
Very good idea	96	21.8	27.7	100.0
Total	347	78.7	100.0	
System Missing	94	21.3		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 3.33**Do you feel more like owner than a renter?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly disagree	34	7.7	7.9	7.9
Disagree	54	12.2	12.5	20.4
Neutral	104	23.6	24.1	44.5
Agree	157	35.6	36.4	81.0
Strongly agree	82	18.6	19.0	100.0
Total	431	97.7	100.0	
System Missing	10	2.3		
Total	441	100.0		

The third “values question” concerned whether the respondent felt like a part owner of his/her home, rather than just a renter. Over half of respondents (55.4%) agreed with this idea and around 20% disagreed. The generalizability coefficient for this item was .62. Frequency of responses are presented in Table 3.33.

Finally, a little over 36% of respondents expressed a strong commitment to remain in their buildings while 22% expressed a strong desire to move (*see Table 3.34*). This leaves over 40% of respondents in the middle. The generalizability coefficient for this item is .78.

Table 3.34**Would you like to stay in your building or move?**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Desire to move	97	22.0	22.2	22.2
Maybe stay	178	40.4	40.8	63.1
Definitely stay	161	36.5	36.9	100.0
Total	436	98.9	100.0	
System Missing	5	1.1		
Total	5	1.1		
Total	441	100.0		

Summary of Findings

Although somewhat tedious, this chapter lays a foundation for all of the subsequent data analyses in the present study. The real questions examined in this chapter concerned how representative is the NNP92 survey data set? What anomalies are in the data? How were “messy” data problems accounted for and handled?

The biggest data problem in the present study is missing responses. This was a difficult population from which to get information and there are really no comparable data sets looking at these kinds of issues. Extensive measures were reported in this chapter that tried to understand the nature of and patterns in missing data. To the extent that patterns could be discerned, missing data were higher with people who were less connected and less informed about their building... no big surprise.

The sampling protocol in the present study was based on a building in neighborhood approach (a stratified cluster sample). Over 65% of possible buildings were actually surveyed in East Tremont and Clinton/Hell’s Kitchen. Even though the number of buildings in Highbridge was somewhat lower, the buildings were selected randomly. Random selection, however is mitigated by the important exclusion of several buildings the inter-

viewer felt to be too dangerous or tenant leaders refused access. All in all, it seems that the present study was able to achieve a balanced sample of buildings in at least two of the three neighborhoods.

There were no surprises in the basic demographic results. Prior research suggests that it is not unusual to find more women than men living in New York City limited equity housing. Age, income, and education responses also seemed reasonable. Neighborhood differences (e.g. higher incomes in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen) seemed to be predictable and expected.

Scale development proceeded almost as hypothesized. Factor analysis shifted several participation behavior items between scales. As a result, several items were removed from the proposed tenant participation norms scale. With the exception of the informal work and helping measure, all scales had acceptable reliabilities based on Cronbach's alpha. Again, with the exception of the informal work and helping measure, all of the scales had acceptable generalizability coefficients. In addition, the broad pattern of generalizability across measures emphasizes the importance of including organizational culture in subsequent analysis.

Based on these results, three different data sets were developed. Each data set has a specific purpose in the data analyses reported in subsequent chapters. The individual analysis data set is most useful for questions that focus only on individual factors such as differences between leaders and non-leaders. The aggregate analysis data set is most useful for building level questions. Last but not least, the contextual analysis data set combining individual and building/organizational culture factors is primarily intended for

use in regression equations looking at the relationship between organizational culture and individual behaviors. Based on the results in this chapter, it seems reasonable to proceed with data analyses aimed at answering the basic research questions posed in Chapter 1.

Chapter 4

Results:

Leadership Issues

Most discussions about participation and management in co-ops focus on the roles and actions of leaders and seldom consider issues related to non-leader shareholders. But, as asked earlier, what relevance is a co-op leader without shareholder followers? With this in mind, are there differences in the ways that leaders and shareholder followers view the physical and social environment in and around their buildings? Are there differences in the ways that leaders and shareholder followers view participation and hold basic co-op values? To gain insight on these kinds of questions I chose to first look at differences in leadership identity and leadership experience.

Leadership Identity and Experience

Who is a leader in an co-op anyway? Is it the person who identifies as a leader and says so? What about residents who have formal leadership experience but do not see themselves as leaders? As was discussed earlier, Clark et al. (1990) found that conflict in HDFC and TIL cooperatives was often linked to the ways leadership was defined and perceived in buildings. Glunt et al. (1995) present a case study of an HDFC in Brooklyn where a group of in-group leaders and a group out-group leaders formed two competing building factions that hindered the effective functioning of the co-op.

Table 4.1 suggests that 85 respondents (19.3%) identified as leaders in the present study. An additional 62 people (14.1%) stated that they would like to be a leader. Table 4.2 suggests, however, that leadership identity is not always representative of any actual

leadership behaviors. For example, over 28% of the respondents who identified themselves as a leader in their building reported that they had never been a building officer, on the board of the co-op or even served on a committee. These respondents might be examples of active informal leaders or they might be representative of vocal factions who contribute little to the operation of the building except their opinion.

Table 4.1
Leader Identity

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not a leader	284	64.4	65.9	65.9
Like to be a leader	62	14.1	14.4	80.3
Leader	85	19.3	19.7	100.0
Total	431	97.7	100.0	
Missing	10	2.3		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 4.2
Leader identity by formal building leadership behaviors

		Any formal leadership behavior		Total
		No formal experience	Some experience	
Not a leader	Count	247	37	284
	% of Leader Identity	87.0%	13.0%	100.0%
	% of LDRANY3	76.2%	34.6%	65.9%
Would like to be a leader	Count	53	9	62
	% of Leader Identity	85.5%	14.5%	100.0%
	% of LDRANY3	16.4%	8.4%	14.4%
Leader	Count	24	61	85
	% of Leader Identity	28.2%	71.8%	100.0%
	% of LDRANY3	7.4%	57.0%	19.7%
Total	Count	324	107	431
	% of Leader Identity	75.2%	24.8%	100.0%
	% of LDRANY3	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

On the other hand, 13 % of respondents (n=37) who did not identify as a building leader reported having served as an officer, a board member or on a committee. If the respondent had only served on a committee, she or he might be narrowly defining leadership only in terms of being elected to a leadership role. However, in this sample there were 3 current building officers and 14 current board members (clearly leadership roles) who did not identify as being a leader. Table 4.3 illustrates this point.

Table 4.3

Reported leadership experience of non-identified leaders^a.				
	Never had job	Once had job	Now have job	Total
<u>Ever been an officer?</u>	15	27	3	45
	33.3%	60.0%	6.7%	100.0%
<u>Ever served on the board?</u>	5	27	14	46
	10.9%	58.7%	30.4%	100.0%
<u>Ever served on a committee?</u>	9	28	8	45
	20.0%	62.2%	17.8%	100.0%

^aEveryone in Table 4.3 reported having been an officer, board member or served on a committee at least once.

As a result of differences between leadership identity and experience, I constructed a 5 category leadership status variable (see Table 4.4). Categories 1, 2 and 3 describe people with no reported formal leadership experience in their building. The first category selects residents who identified as leaders but have not reported formal leadership experience (n=24). These are not people aspiring to be leaders. Rather, they are people who currently define themselves as being a leader in their building. They apparently use criteria other than conventional formal leadership experience (*unmeasured in the present study*) to ground their leader identity.

The second category selects those who expressed a desire to be a leader but did not report experience at being a leader (n=53). People in this second group appear to be aspiring leaders. The third category represents over half of the people in the study (n=247) and is comprised of those who reported no leadership identity or formal leadership experience.

Table 4.4
Frequency

Leader Identity & Experience

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Leader identified NO experience	24	5.4	5.6	5.6
Like to be leader NO experience	53	12.0	12.3	17.9
NO experience/NO identity	247	56.0	57.3	75.2
Leader experience/Not identified	46	10.4	10.7	85.8
Leader identity and experience	61	13.8	14.2	100.0
Valid Total	431	97.7	100.0	
Unknown Leader Status	10	2.3		
Total	441	100.0		

The fourth and fifth categories in Table 4.4 describe people who report having had some formal leadership experience in their building. The fourth category is made up of those who report having had formal leadership experience in their building (such as being an officer, serving on the board of directors, or being on a committee) but who do not currently identify as being a leader (n=46). This fourth category combined both groups of residents who had some leadership experience but did not currently identify as being a leader. I found this combination necessary because there were only 9 people in the want to be a leader with formal leadership experience group (*see Table 4.2*). Furthermore, I decided that it was acceptable to combine these two groups of non-identified but experi-

enced leaders when preliminary ANOVA analysis found no significant differences between them for any of the outcome variables in this study.

Some of the people in the fourth category probably represent burned out leaders who no longer wish to identify as being a leader. Others in this group are probably the out-group faction observed by Glunt et al. (1995). If category 4 is the out-group, the in-group leaders are clearly the 61 people in the fifth category who both identified as leaders and also reported formal leadership experience. There were also 10 people who could not be classified because of missing data.

Differences Between Leadership Categories

Basic Demographic Differences Between Leadership Categories

Are the categories suggested by leadership experience and identity relevant? In other words, do these categories help us to better understand what is going on in HDFC and TIL coops? To explore this question I decided to do a series of One-Way ANOVA analyses using the newly constructed leadership categories as the independent variable.

Table 4.5

One Way Analysis of Variance

Age by Leadership Category			
	Mean	N	(n=413)
F=8.61 p < .001			
31 to 40 years ($\mu=3.17$)		24	No experience/Leader identified
21 to 30 years ($\mu=2.82$)		51	No experience/Would like to be a leader
21 to 30 years ($\mu=2.97$)		238	No experience/No leadership interest
31 to 40 years ($\mu=3.38$)		42	Leadership experience/No identity
31 to 40 years ($\mu=3.78$)		58	Leader experience and identity

Age: Table 4.5 looks at age differences by leadership categories. As was discussed in the previous chapter, age was coded in 10 year categories (i.e. 21 to 30 years old was

coded '2', and 31 to 40 years old was coded '3'). There were significant age differences ($F=8.61$; $p < .001$) in this sample based on leadership categories. In general, all of the identified and experienced leaders were older than those without experience and identity. However, only identified leaders with experience were significantly older ($p < .01$) than any of the groups with no leadership experience in their building.

Education: Table 4.6 looks at differences in education by leadership categories. Although the two groups of identified leaders had the highest and lowest education in the sample, there were no significant difference based on the five leadership categories.

Table 4.6

One Way Analysis of Variance

Education by Leadership Category				
		Mean	N	(n=308)
n.s.	Some high school	($\mu=3.99$)	10	No experience/Leader identified
	High school graduate	($\mu=4.77$)	39	No experience/Would like to be a leader
	High school graduate	($\mu=4.53$)	178	No experience/No leadership interest
	High school graduate	($\mu=4.64$)	34	Leadership experience/No identity
	High school graduate	($\mu=4.91$)	47	Leader experience and identity

Table 4.7

One Way Analysis of Variance

Income by Leadership Category				
		Mean	N	(n=292)
F=3.06 p < .05	5-10k	($\mu=2.43$)	10	No experience/Leader identified
	5-10k	($\mu=2.94$)	39	No experience/Would like to be a leader
	5-10k	($\mu=2.81$)	178	No experience/No leadership interest
	10-20k	($\mu=3.31$)	34	Leadership experience/No identity
	10-20k	($\mu=3.41$)	47	Leader experience and identity

Income: Table 4.7 looks at income differences by leadership categories. There were significant income differences ($F=3.06$; $p < .05$) in this sample based on leadership categories. It is interesting to note that the two groups of identified leaders (those with reported experience and those with no experience) had the highest and lowest reported incomes.

This was the only significant income difference ($p < .05$). As was discussed earlier, the lower number of people in this analysis reflects the large amount of missing data for income.

Table 4.8*Crosstabulation***Leader Identity & Experience by Past Homelessness**

		Never Homeless	Past Homelessness	Total
No experience LEADER identified	Count	22	2	24
	% Leader	91.7%	8.3%	100.0%
	% Past Homelessness	6.2%	2.7%	5.6%
No experience LIKE TO BE a leader	Count	34	19	53
	% Leader	64.2%	35.8%	100.0%
	% Past Homelessness	9.5%	25.7%	12.3%
No experience & No identity	Count	204	43	247
	% Leader	82.6%	17.4%	100.0%
	% Past Homelessness	57.1%	58.1%	57.3%
Leadership EXPERIENCE but not identified	Count	39	7	46
	% Leader	84.8%	15.2%	100.0%
	% Past Homelessness	10.9%	9.5%	10.7%
Leadership EXPERIENCE & IDENTITY	Count	58	3	61
	% Leader	95.1%	4.9%	100.0%
	% Past Homelessness	16.2%	4.1%	14.2%
Total	Count	357	74	431
	% Leader	82.8%	17.2%	100.0%
	% Past Homelessness	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Former Homelessness: Table 4.8 looks at past homelessness experience by leadership categories. The two groups of identified leaders had the lowest numbers reporting past homelessness experience. On the other hand, over 35% of those who expressed a desire to be a leader in this sample also reported having been homeless at some point in their life. For Table 4.8, Chi Square=20.893, $p < .001$ ($n=431$). The pattern of more homelessness experience among those who would like to be a leader remains even after removing responses from the Tremont Park HDFC from the table. As was discussed in

Chapter 3, the Tremont Park HDFC was the site of a homeless rehousing effort evaluated by HERG (Glunt, 1990). Even without the Tremont Park building, over 26% of those wanting to be leaders in the rest of the sample also reported past homelessness.

Co-op Environment Variable Differences Between Leadership Categories

Building Condition Complaints: Table 4.9 looks at differences in building condition complaints by leadership categories. There were significant differences in the perception of building conditions ($F=10.38$; $p < .001$) based on leadership categories. Identified leaders with experience in the building had significantly ($p < .05$) fewer complaints than did any other group. People who wanted to be leaders but had no experience had significantly more ($p < .05$) building complaints than any other group.

Table 4.9

One Way Analysis of Variance

Building Condition Complaints by Leadership Category				
		Mean	N	(n=427)
$F=10.38$	$p < .001$	6.42	24	No experience/Leader identified
		8.45	53	No experience/Would like to be a leader
		6.95	246	No experience/No leadership interest
		6.24	46	Leadership experience/No identity
		4.45	58	Leader experience and identity

Table 4.10

One Way Analysis of Variance

Perception of Building Management by Leadership Category				
		Mean	N	(n=403)
$F=10.43$	$p < .001$	9.39	23	No experience/Leader identified
		7.42	50	No experience/Would like to be a leader
		9.14	234	No experience/No leadership interest
		10.25	44	Leadership experience/No identity
		11.83	52	Leader experience and identity

Perception of Building Management: Table 4.10 looks at leadership category differences in the perception of building management. Both groups of residents with formal

leadership experience rated their building management higher than any of the other groups. The lowest rating was from people who wanted to be a leader but had no experience. There were significant differences ($F=10.43$; $p < .001$) between different leadership categories in the perception of building management. Identified leaders with experience rated building management significantly higher ($p < .05$) than did any of the other groups. In addition, residents expressing a desire to be a leader but with no experience rated building management the lowest and differed significantly ($p < .05$) from both groups with leadership experience and those with no leadership identity or experience.

Table 4.11

One Way Analysis of Variance

Perception of Social Problems by Leadership Category				
		Mean	N	(n=408)
$F=10.24$	$p < .001$	1.86	22	No experience/Leader identified
		4.09	51	No experience/Would like to be a leader
		2.69	238	No experience/No leadership interest
		1.90	42	Leadership experience/No identity
		1.38	58	Leader experience and identity

Perception of Social Problems in Building: Table 4.11 looks at differences in the perception of social problems by leadership categories. Whereas identified leaders who also had leadership experience saw the fewest social problems, those expressing a desire to be a leader, but had no experience saw the most social problems. There were significant differences in the perception of social problems ($F=10.24$; $p < .001$) based on leadership categories. People who identified as wanting to be a leader saw significantly more ($p < .05$) social problems in their building than any other group. Residents with no leader identity or experience also saw significantly more ($p < .05$) social problems than did both groups of identified leaders.

The greater perception of social problems by those wanting to be leaders may be related to the higher proportion of those with past homelessness experience in that group (see Table 4.8). Across the entire sample, the mean score for social problem perceptions among the formerly homeless was 3.78 compared to a mean score of 2.24 for the rest of the sample, $F(1,439) = 25.92$, $p < .001$. Therefore, it seems likely that there is some kind of interaction between past homelessness experience, wanting to be a leader and the perception of social problems in a building.

This interpretation is supported by Glunt (1990). Glunt found that new co-op residents who had been living in transitional homeless housing just prior to moving into a TIL co-operative had a heightened awareness of social problems. For many of these people, social problems such as drug use or noise were key criteria by which they were scrutinized in the shelter system as to their worthiness and eligibility for re-housing. These formerly homeless residents also reported having received training from shelter staff on how to demand their rights as tenants but nothing on how to cooperate in a co-operative. On the other hand, most transitional housing involves interacting and sharing with neighbors beyond the realm of the average apartment building. Therefore, transitional homeless housing experience may contribute to a greater awareness of the issues and social problems that arise when living in a shared environment.

Conflict: Table 4.12 looks at conflict differences by leadership categories. Although people who wanted to be a leader but had no experience reported the most conflict, there were no significant differences on conflict perceptions based on leadership identity and experience.

Table 4.12*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Conflict by Leadership Category			
	Mean	N	(n=425)
n.s.	2.54	24	No experience/Leader identified
	3.00	52	No experience/Would like to be a leader
	2.65	245	No experience/No leadership interest
	2.72	46	Leadership experience/No identity
	2.57	58	Leader experience and identity

Table 4.13*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Perception of Building Crisis by Leadership Category			
	Mean	N	(n=425)
F=3.85 p < .01	3.20	24	No experience/Leader identified
	2.94	52	No experience/Would like to be a leader
	2.79	244	No experience/No leadership interest
	2.59	46	Leadership experience/No identity
	2.37	59	Leader experience and identity

Perception of Building Crisis: Table 4.13 looks at differences in the perception of building crisis by leadership categories. There were significant differences ($F=3.85$; $p < .01$) in this sample based on leadership categories. Identified leaders with no experience perceived the highest levels of crisis in their buildings. Leaders with experience perceived the lowest levels of crisis and differed significantly ($p < .05$) from any of the groups without actual experience.

More Agreement than Conflict: Table 4.14 looks at differences between leadership categories of resident perception of more agreement than conflict in their building. There were significant differences in the perception of agreement ($F=2.40$; $p < .05$) based on leadership categories. People identified as wanting to be leaders perceived more agreement than conflict in their building ($p < .05$) than did leaders with experience or those with no leadership interest and no experience.

Table 4.14*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Perception of Agreement in Building by Leadership Category				
	Mean	N	(n=412)	
F=2.40 p < .05	2.00	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.24	51	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.01	234	No experience/No leadership interest	
	1.98	46	Leadership experience/No identity	
	1.87	57	Leader experience and identity	

Table 4.15*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Perception of Reasonable Rent by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=415)	
F=11.89 p < .001	1.96	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	1.90	51	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.02	236	No experience/No leadership interest	
	2.41	46	Leadership experience/No identity	
	2.66	58	Leader experience and identity	

Perception of Reasonable Rent: Table 4.15 looks at differences in the perception of how reasonable resident rents are. There were significant differences in the perception of reasonable rent ($F=11.89$; $p < .001$) in this sample based on leadership categories. Both groups with actual leadership experience were significantly higher ($p < .05$) in their perception of their rent as being reasonable than any of the groups with no leadership experience.

The process of deciding what constitutes reasonable rent probably starts with some kind of underlying equity theory (Adams, 1965). Tenants judge equitable rent by making social comparisons between the amount of rent they pay compared to what others in their building (as well as nearby rental or co-op buildings) pay for their rent. However, realistic judgments about reasonable rent depend a lot on people having accurate information.

Formal leadership experience increases a person's knowledge and exposure to a co-op's real financial situation. Therefore, it is not surprising to find reasonable rent perceptions higher among those with formal leadership experience. In addition, lower perceptions of management combined with a lack of information probably greatly contribute to lower perceptions that the rent being paid is reasonable.

An additional ANOVA equation looked at the perception of reasonable rent between leadership groups while controlling for income and the amount of rent paid. This equation suggested that only income was a significant covariate ($F=19.18$, $p<.001$). However, results from this equation should be interpreted with caution in that it only considered responses from 202 residents primarily due to massive missing data for the amount of rent paid.

Social Capital and Participation Differences Between Leadership Categories

Informal Helping Involvement: Table 4.16 presents differences in informal helping involvement by leadership categories ($F=10.46$; $p <.001$). Both groups of identified leaders had the highest levels of informal work and helping assistance. Experienced identified leaders differed significantly ($p<.05$) in their self-reports of informal work and helping assistance from all three groups of residents who did not identify as being a leader. Identified leaders without experience also were significantly higher ($p<.05$) in their reports of informal work and helping assistance than were those who were not leaders and did not have any experience.

Table 4.16*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Informal Helping Involvement by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
		Mean	N	(n=411)
F=10.46	p < .001	2.96	23	No experience/Leader identified
		2.32	50	No experience/Would like to be a leader
		2.03	238	No experience/No leadership interest
		2.36	45	Leadership experience/No identity
		3.36	55	Leader experience and identity

Basic Involvement: Table 4.17 looks at differences in basic involvement by leadership categories (F=11.96; $p < .001$). The negative numbers in basic involvement reflect the calculation of this scale from Z-scores. The highest levels of basic involvement were reported by identified leaders with experience and differed significantly ($p < .05$) from all other groups. Experienced leaders without leadership identity also differed significantly ($p < .05$) from the group without experience and leadership identity.

Table 4.17*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Basic Involvement by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
		Mean	N	(n=261)
F=11.96	p < .001	.41	10	No experience/Leader identified
		-.13	27	No experience/Would like to be a leader
		-.21	132	No experience/No leadership interest
		1.43	38	Leadership experience/No identity
		3.23	54	Leader experience and identity

Tenant Participation Norms: Table 4.18 looks at differences in tenant participation norms by leadership category. There were significant differences (F=4.79; $p < .001$) in tenant participation norms based on leadership categories. Both groups with formal leadership experience had significantly higher ($p < .05$) perceptions of tenant participation

norms than those who wanted to be leaders or those with no leadership interest or experience.

Table 4.18

One Way Analysis of Variance

Perception of Tenant Participation Norms by Leadership Category				
	Mean	N	(n=384)	
F=4.79 p < .001	11.65	20	No experience/Leader identified	
	10.39	46	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	11.26	223	No experience/No leadership interest	
	13.05	41	Leadership experience/No identity	
	12.89	54	Leader experience and identity	

Outcome Measure Differences Between Leadership Categories

Satisfaction with Apartment: Table 4.19 looks at differences in apartment satisfaction by leadership categories (F=5.06; p < .001). Identified leaders with experience had the highest levels of apartment satisfaction and differed significantly (p<.05) from the groups of residents with no formal leadership experience. Residents who wanted to be a leader but had no experience had lower apartment satisfaction and differed significantly (p<.05) from both of the leadership experience groups and from those with no experience or interest in leadership. In addition, leaders with identity and experience differed significantly (p<.05) from all three of the groups with no leadership experience.

Table 4.19

One Way Analysis of Variance

Apartment Satisfaction by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=429)	
F=5.06 p < .001	2.58	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.60	53	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.82	246	No experience/No leadership interest	
	2.93	46	Leadership experience/No identity	
	3.12	60	Leader experience and identity	

Table 4.20*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Building Satisfaction by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=429)	
F=4.13 p < .001	2.42	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.45	53	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.61	246	No experience/No leadership interest	
	2.57	46	Leadership experience/No identity	
	2.95	60	Leader experience and identity	

Table 4.21*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Neighborhood Satisfaction by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=430)	
n.s.	1.96	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.09	53	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.23	246	No experience/No leadership interest	
	2.09	46	Leadership experience/No identity	
	2.38	61	Leader experience and identity	

Satisfaction with Building: Table 4.20 looks at differences in building satisfaction by leadership categories (F=4.13; p < .001). Identified leaders with experience had the highest levels of building satisfaction and differed significantly (p<.05) from all other groups.

Satisfaction with Neighborhood: Table 4.21 looks at differences in neighborhood satisfaction by leadership categories. Although there were no significant differences between groups, identified leaders with experience had the highest levels of neighborhood satisfaction. Identified leaders with no experience had the lowest levels of neighborhood satisfaction.

Table 4.22*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Sense of Control by Leadership Category				
	Mean	N	(n=407)	
F=10.50 p < .001	3.86	21	No experience/Leader identified	
	5.74	50	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	6.06	237	No experience/No leadership interest	
	6.93	43	Leadership experience/No identity	
	7.98	56	Leader experience and identity	

Table 4.23**Leader Identity & Experience by Control**

		Control Categories			Total
		Low Control	Medium Control	High Control	
No experience LEADER identified	Count	12	9		21
	% of Leader	57.1%	42.9%		100.0%
No experience LIKE TO BE a leader	Count	18	18	14	50
	% of Leader	36.0%	36.0%	28.0%	100.0%
No experience & No identity	Count	72	91	74	237
	% of Leader	30.4%	38.4%	31.2%	100.0%
Leadership EXPERIENCE but not identified	Count	9	11	23	43
	% of Leader	20.9%	25.6%	53.5%	100.0%
Leadership EXPERIENCE & IDENTITY	Count	8	12	36	56
	% of Leader	14.3%	21.4%	64.3%	100.0%
Total	Count	119	141	147	407
	% of Leader	29.2%	34.6%	36.1%	100.0%

Sense of Control: Table 4.22 looks at differences in the sense of control by leadership categories. There were significant differences ($F=10.50$; $p < .001$) in this sample based on leadership categories. People who identified as leaders but had no formal leadership experience reported the lowest sense of control and differed significantly ($p < .05$) from every other group. On the other hand identified leaders with experience had the highest sense of control and differed significantly ($p < .05$) from all three groups without formal leadership experience. Using a median split of control (*see Table 4.23*) suggests that over 57% of the identified leaders without any experience had the lowest levels of

control in the sample and none of them fell into the high control category. On the other hand, over 64% of the identified leaders with experience had high levels of a sense of control.

Table 4.24

One Way Analysis of Variance

Influence by Leadership Category				
		Mean	N	(n=408)
F=8.14	p < .001	3.30	20	No experience/Leader identified
		2.73	48	No experience/Would like to be a leader
		2.99	238	No experience/No leadership interest
		3.43	44	Leadership experience/No identity
		3.39	58	Leader experience and identity

Influence: Table 4.24 looks at differences in the perception of influence by leadership categories. There were significant differences ($F=8.14$; $p < .001$) in this sample based on leadership categories. In contrast to control, people who identified as leaders but had no formal leadership experience reported higher levels of influence and differed significantly ($p < .05$) from the two other groups without leadership experience but not from those with actual leadership experience

To try and gain more insight into the relationship between influence and leadership I created a three category influence variable by collapsing the “no influence” and the “little influence” responses (*see Table 4.25*). Again, in contrast to control, identified leaders without experience had higher levels of influence. None of them felt that they had no or little influence!. The contrast between influence and control responses in identified leaders lacking actual experience is emphasized in Table 4.26. Twenty five percent of all of the inexperienced leaders reported having both high influence and low control.

Table 4.25**Leader Identity & Experience by Influence (3 categories)**

		Influence			Total
		Little/No influence	Some influence	A lot of influence	
No experience LEADER identified	Count		14	6	20
	% of Leader		70.0%	30.0%	100.0%
No experience LIKE TO BE a leader	Count	18	19	11	48
	% of Leader	37.5%	39.6%	22.9%	100.0%
No experience & No identity	Count	46	133	59	238
	% of Leader	19.3%	55.9%	24.8%	100.0%
Leadership EXPERIENCE but not identified	Count	3	19	22	44
	% of Leader	6.8%	43.2%	50.0%	100.0%
Leadership EXPERIENCE & IDENTITY	Count	4	24	30	58
	% of Leader	6.9%	41.4%	51.7%	100.0%
Total	Count	71	209	128	408
	% of Leader	17.4%	51.2%	31.4%	100.0%

Table 4.26**Influence by Control in Identified Leaders Without Experience**

		Control Categories		Total
		Low Control	Medium Control	
Medium influence	Count	6	8	14
	% of Total	30.0%	40.0%	70.0%
High influence	Count	5	1	6
	% of Total	25.0%	5.0%	30.0%
Total	Count	11	9	20
	% of Total	55.0%	45.0%	100.0%

Organizational Culture Differences Between Leadership Categories

Value of Residents on the Board: Table 4.27 displays differences between leadership categories in valuing residents being of the board of directors. There were significant differences ($F=8.28$; $p < .001$) in this sample based on leadership categories. Residents with actual leadership experience valued residents being on the board significantly more ($p < .05$) than leaders with no experience and those with no leadership interest or experience.

Identified leaders with experience valued residents being on the board significantly greater than people who wanted to be leaders but had no experience.

Table 4.27

One Way Analysis of Variance

Value Residents on Board by Leadership Category				
		Mean	N	(n=353)
F=8.28 p < .001		2.45	24	No experience/Leader identified
		2.90	30	No experience/Would like to be a leader
		2.75	195	No experience/No leadership interest
		3.11	44	Leadership experience/No identity
		3.42	60	Leader experience and identity

Table 4.28

One Way Analysis of Variance

Value Resident Involvement by Leadership Category				
		Mean	N	(n=339)
F=10.12 p < .001		2.32	22	No experience/Leader identified
		2.95	38	No experience/Would like to be a leader
		2.85	183	No experience/No leadership interest
		3.19	42	Leadership experience/No identity
		3.48	54	Leader experience and identity

Value of Residents Involvement: Table 4.28 looks at how different leadership categories valued getting and keeping residents involved in their building. There were significant differences in this important part of co-op life ($F=10.12$; $p < .001$) between the five leadership categories. It is especially interesting to note that the greatest difference in valuing resident involvement was between the two identified leader categories. Leaders without formal experience valued resident involvement significantly less ($p < .05$) than any other group. Residents with formal leadership experience valued resident involvement significantly more ($p < .05$) than those with no leadership interest or experience. Identified leaders with experience also valued resident involvement significantly more ($p < .05$) than those who wanted to be leaders but had no experience.

Table 4.29*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Feeling Like an Owner by Leadership Category			
	Mean	N	(n=421)
n.s.	3.58	24	No experience/Leader identified
	3.26	50	No experience/Would like to be a leader
	3.42	243	No experience/No leadership interest
	3.46	46	Leadership experience/No identity
	3.72	58	Leader experience and identity

Feeling Like and Owner: Table 4.29 looks at differences in the degree people felt like an owner rather than a renter by leadership categories. Although there were no significant differences between groups, identified leaders with experience reported feeling like an owner more than any other group.

Table 4.30*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Commitment to Stay in Building by Leadership Category			
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>			
	Mean	N	(n=426)
F=5.94 p < .001	2.04	24	No experience/Leader identified
	1.94	53	No experience/Would like to be a leader
	2.08	244	No experience/No leadership interest
	2.31	45	Leadership experience/No identity
	2.52	60	Leader experience and identity

Commitment to Stay in Building: Table 4.30 looks at differences in the commitment to stay living in a building by leadership categories (F=5.94; p < .001). Although both groups of residents with actual leadership experience had the highest commitment to stay living in their building, only those identified as being leaders differed significantly (p < .05) from the three groups of residents with no formal leadership experience.

Other Leadership Issues

What should leaders focus on?

The results from the three leadership style questions suggested that, for the most part, building leaders should have a little of both styles proposed in each question. The first of these leadership focus questions asked “Is it more important for a leader/officer in your building to try to encourage residents to be involved in the co-op or is it more important to ‘get the job done’?” Table 4.31 is a crosstabulation of leadership status with the results to this question. Although identified leaders with no experience endorsed getting the job done over twice as much as getting residents involved, it is difficult to assess the significance because of the small cell size. It is also interesting to note that both leadership identity groups had less than 50% endorsing both involvement and getting the job done as being equally important.

Table 4.31
Involvement vs Get the Job Done

		Involvement vs Get the Job Done			Total
		Encourage involvement	Both equally important	Get the job done	
Leader identified but no experience	Count	3	11	10	24
	% Leader	12.5%	45.8%	41.7%	100.0%
No experience but would like to be	Count	10	28	10	48
	% Leader	20.8%	58.3%	20.8%	100.0%
No experience... No identity	Count	44	134	52	230
	% Leader	19.1%	58.3%	22.6%	100.0%
Experience but not identified	Count	10	28	6	44
	% Leader	22.7%	63.6%	13.6%	100.0%
Both experience and identity	Count	14	30	17	61
	% Leader	23.0%	49.2%	27.9%	100.0%
Total	Count	81	231	95	407
	% Leader	19.9%	56.8%	23.3%	100.0%

Table 4.32
Future vs Day-to-Day Management

		Future vs Day-to-Day Management			Total
		Plan for the future	Both equally important	Focus on day-to-day management	
Leader identified but no experience	Count	4	12	8	24
	% Leader	16.7%	50.0%	33.3%	100.0%
No experience but would like to be	Count	7	27	14	48
	% Leader	14.6%	56.3%	29.2%	100.0%
No experience... No identity	Count	33	134	61	228
	% Leader	14.5%	58.8%	26.8%	100.0%
Experience but not identified	Count	8	30	7	45
	% Leader	17.8%	66.7%	15.6%	100.0%
Both experience and identity	Count	11	40	10	61
	% Leader	18.0%	65.6%	16.4%	100.0%
Total	Count	63	243	100	406
	% Leader	15.5%	59.9%	24.6%	100.0%

The second leadership focus question asked “Is it more important for a leader/officer to try to plan for the future needs of the building or is it more important to focus on the day-to-day management?” Table 4.32 is a crosstabulation of leadership experience with this question about future planning. Most people thought both issues were of equal importance. However, all three groups that did not report leadership experience had fewer endorsements of both future planning and day-to-day management being equal than did the groups reporting leadership experience.

The third leadership question asked if it is “more important for a leader/officer to try to keep residents informed of decisions being made about the co-op or is it more important to try to involve residents in the decision making process?” Table 4.33 is a crosstabulation of leadership experience with responses to this question. Although the general pattern across all leadership categories was to endorse both being informed and being involved, over one-third of the people who wanted to be a leader but had no experience en-

dorsed keeping people informed as being the most important leadership focus. They endorsed keeping people informed over twice as much as they thought keeping people involved was the more important leadership focus.

Table 4.33
Informed vs Involved

		Informed vs Involved			Total
		Keep informed	Both equally important	Involve residents	
Leader identified but no experience	Count	3	14	7	24
	% Leader	12.5%	58.3%	29.2%	100.0%
No experience but would like to be	Count	17	23	7	47
	% Leader	36.2%	48.9%	14.9%	100.0%
No experience... no identity	Count	57	125	46	228
	% Leader	25.0%	54.8%	20.2%	100.0%
Experience but not identified	Count	9	28	8	45
	% Leader	20.0%	62.2%	17.8%	100.0%
Both experience and identity	Count	11	35	14	60
	% Leader	18.3%	58.3%	23.3%	100.0%
Total	Count	97	225	82	404
	% Leader	24.0%	55.7%	20.3%	100.0%

Leadership Roles and Styles

A principal components factor analysis of these items suggested a one factor solution: *RSCAL_7* [($\alpha = .84$) $n = 423$]. This scale is composed of all 7 leadership role items (*discussed in Chapter 2, page 50*). Higher scores indicate a kind of “leaders do something” continuum. Preliminary data analysis using this scale did not provide any particularly insightful results. This was in part due to a ceiling effect on scores of about a third of respondents identified as leaders. These leaders endorsed every leadership role as being of highest importance. ANOVA analysis using leadership categories as the independent variable, however, suggests some interesting differences. These are discussed below. In addition, individual frequencies for the leadership roles items are also provided.

Table 4.34**Leader Representation Outside Building**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not important	12	2.7	2.8	2.8
Minimal importance	61	13.8	14.3	17.1
Important	244	55.3	57.3	74.4
Highest importance	109	24.7	25.6	100.0
Total	426	96.6	100.0	
System Missing	15	3.4		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 4.35*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Leader Representation Outside Building by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=415)	
F=3.94 p < .01	3.25	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.88	51	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.97	235	No experience/No leadership interest	
	3.18	45	Leadership experience/No identity	
	3.28	61	Leader experience and identity	

Leader Representation Outside Building: How important do you think it is for a leader/officer in your building to act as the official head of the co-op in outside community meetings and legal proceedings (*see Table 4.34*)? Eighty percent (80%) of the sample rated this as being important or of highest importance for leaders in their building. Table 4.35 looks at mean differences in the importance of outside representation by leadership categories ($F=3.94$; $p < .01$). Only identified leaders with experience differed significantly ($p < .05$) from the want to be leaders with no experience and no experience or leadership identity groups.

Check with Tenants in a Crisis: If there is a crisis in your building, how important is it for a leader/officer to check with tenants before making decisions? Table 4.36 suggests

that over 75% of the sample endorses this item as being important. Table 4.37 looks at mean differences in the item about checking with tenants in a crisis by leadership categories ($F=5.40$; $p < .001$). Both groups reporting leadership experience differ significantly ($p < .05$) from both the want to be leader group with no experience and the no identity and no experience group.

Table 4.36
Check with Tenants in a Crisis

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not important	20	4.5	4.7	4.7
Minimal importance	70	15.9	16.4	21.1
Important	254	57.6	59.6	80.8
Highest importance	82	18.6	19.2	100.0
Total	426	96.6	100.0	
System Missing	15	3.4		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 4.37

One Way Analysis of Variance

Check with Tenants in a Crisis by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=416)	
F=5.40 p < .001	2.88	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.64	50	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.89	237	No experience/No leadership interest	
	3.20	45	Leadership experience/No identity	
	3.17	60	Leader experience and identity	

Table 4.38**Make Extra Effort to Involve Residents**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not important	14	3.2	3.3	3.3
Minimal importance	64	14.5	15.1	18.4
Important	234	53.1	55.1	73.4
Highest importance	113	25.6	26.6	100.0
Total	425	96.4	100.0	
System Missing	16	3.6		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 4.39*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Make an Extra Effort to Involve Resident by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=415)	
F=4.73 p < .001	3.17	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.86	50	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.96	236	No experience/No leadership interest	
	3.27	45	Leadership experience/No identity	
	3.30	60	Leader experience and identity	

Make an Extra Effort to Involve Residents: How important is it for a leader/officer to make an extra effort to involve residents in the decision making processes of the coop? Table 4.38 again suggests that just under 80% of respondents thought that making an extra effort to involve residents was important. Table 4.39 looks at mean differences in this item by leadership categories (F=4.73; p < .001). The mean scores of both groups reporting leadership experience were significantly higher (p<.05) than either the want to be leaders group or the no leader identity, no experience group.

Table 4.40**Check with Residents Before Financial Decisions**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not important	37	8.4	8.9	8.9
Minimal importance	52	11.8	12.5	21.3
Important	236	53.5	56.6	77.9
Highest importance	92	20.9	22.1	100.0
Total	417	94.6	100.0	
System Missing	24	5.4		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 4.41*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Check with Residents Before Financial Decision by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=407)	
F=6.42 p < .001	2.83	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.71	48	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.82	233	No experience/No leadership interest	
	3.16	43	Leadership experience/No identity	
	3.32	59	Leader experience and identity	

Check with Residents Before Making Financial Decision: How important is it for the leader/officer in your building to check with residents before making decisions about budgeting and other financial matters? Table 4.40 suggests that 74% of the sample found this statement to be important. Table 4.41 looks at differences in this question by leadership categories ($F=6.42$; $p < .001$). Like making an extra effort, the mean scores of both groups reporting leadership experience endorse checking with residents before making financial decision is significantly higher ($p < .05$) than either the want to be leaders group or the no leader identity, no experience group.

Table 4.42**Check with Residents Before Making Repairs**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not important	35	7.9	8.4	8.4
Minimal importance	86	19.5	20.5	28.9
Important	213	48.3	50.8	79.7
Highest importance	85	19.3	20.3	100.0
Total	419	95.0	100.0	
System Missing	22	5.0		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 4.43*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Check with Residents Before Making Repairs by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=409)	
F=5.01 p < .001	3.04	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.52	48	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.75	233	No experience/No leadership interest	
	3.16	44	Leadership experience/No identity	
	3.02	60	Leader experience and identity	

Check with Residents Before Making Repairs: How important is it for the leader/officer in your building to check with residents before making decisions about building maintenance and repairs? Table 4.42 shows that over 70% of respondents thought that it was important or of the highest importance. Table 4.43 looks at differences in this item by leadership categories (F=5.01; p <.001). The same pattern holds when looking at mean differences between leadership categories as with the earlier leadership items. Both groups reporting leadership experience endorse checking with residents before making repairs significantly higher (p<.05) than either the want to be leaders group or the no leader identity, no experience group.

Table 4.44**Be Responsible for Reducing Conflicts**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not important	40	9.1	9.7	9.7
Minimal importance	65	14.7	15.7	25.4
Important	212	48.1	51.2	76.6
Highest importance	97	22.0	23.4	100.0
Total	414	93.9	100.0	
System Missing	27	6.1		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 4.45*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Be Responsible for Reducing Conflicts by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=404)	
F=6.75 p < .001	2.92	24	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.45	47	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	2.84	232	No experience/No leadership interest	
	3.25	44	Leadership experience/No identity	
	3.16	57	Leader experience and identity	

Be Responsible for Reducing Conflicts: How important is it for the leader/officer to be responsible for resolving and reducing conflicts in the coop? Table 4.44 suggests that just under 70% of the sample think that it is important or of highest importance for leaders to be responsible for reducing conflicts. Table 4.45 suggests that the highest endorsements that leaders be responsible for reducing conflicts was from those with leadership experience and the lowest with people who wanted to be a leader and those with no leadership experience or leadership identity. In the same continuing pattern, the difference between the two groups with leadership experience and the two groups with the lowest endorsement was significant ($p < .05$). In addition, the no experience, no identity group was significantly higher ($p < .05$) on this item than the want to be leader group.

Table 4.46**Make Extra Effort to Treat People Fairly**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Not important	32	7.3	7.8	7.8
Minimal importance	49	11.1	12.0	19.8
Important	197	44.7	48.0	67.8
Highest importance	132	29.9	32.2	100.0
Total	410	93.0	100.0	
System Missing	31	7.0		
Total	441	100.0		

Table 4.47*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Make Extra Effort to Treat People Fairly by Leadership Category				
<i>One Way Analysis of Variance</i>				
	Mean	N	(n=400)	
F=4.55 p < .001	3.13	23	No experience/Leader identified	
	2.69	45	No experience/Would like to be a leader	
	3.00	230	No experience/No leadership interest	
	3.31	45	Leadership experience/No identity	
	3.29	57	Leader experience and identity	

Make Extra Effort to Treat People Fairly: How important is it for a leader/officer to make an extra effort to treat people fairly in building affairs? Table 4.46 suggests that 74% of the people in this study saw this item as being important or of the highest importance for leaders in their building. Table 4.47 looks at mean differences in question about making an extra effort to treat people fairly by leadership categories ($F=4.55$; $p < .001$). Both leadership experience categories as well as the no experience/no identity category were significantly higher ($p < .05$) than the want to be leader group. In addition, the identified leader and experience group also differed significantly ($p < .05$) from the no experience/no identity group.

Discriminating Between Leader Identity and Experience

There are clearly important differences in this sample based on leadership identity and leadership experience. For the most part, these differences are conceptually understandable. For some co-op issues (such as placing importance on co-op leaders representing their building to the outside world) identifying as a leader appears to be the most important factor. For other issues (such as higher ratings of building management) having had actual leadership experience appears to be an influential factor.

To further consider these differences in leadership groups, I chose to conduct a series of discriminant function analyses. In these analyses I investigated differences between the leaders who have experience and are identified as leaders with each of three other groups: 1) those with leadership experience but who don't currently consider themselves leaders, 2) identified leaders who report no formal leadership experience, and 3) those who want to be leaders but have no formal leadership experience. In each of these three analyses I calculated a discriminant function for only two groups at a time as described above and in Table 4.48.

Table 4.48

Planned Discriminant Analyses

Differences between leaders who have experience and are identified as leaders

AND

Analysis 1: Leadership experience but don't currently consider themselves leaders

Analysis 2: Identified leaders who report no formal leadership experience,

Analysis 3: Want to be leaders but have no formal leadership experience.

Using a two group approach allowed for discriminant scores to be calculated for each pair of leadership groups and then the rest of the cases classified as to whether their atti-

tudes and behaviors most resembled one of the two leadership categories being examined in that particular equation. I decided to not use a three group approach (*for example, one in which leaders, like-to-be leaders and others would have been classified*) based on the results of the various One-Way ANOVA analysis discussed above. There are many reasons why people may choose to not be a leader in their building and I, therefore, had no reason to expect that people with no leadership experience or identity would be a distinct group that could be uniquely classified. But, as mentioned above, looking at how ‘leadership outsiders’ compare to experienced leaders does help us to understand the potential leadership pool in a limited equity housing co-operative (*Research Question 2*).

Table 4.49

Variables in Discriminant Analysis

Demographic Variables

Age, Women, Education, Income, Race

Co-op Environment Variables

Social Problems, Building Management, Building Complaints, Rent Reasonable, Security, Conflict, Crisis, More Agreement than conflict, Apartment Satisfaction, Building Satisfaction, Neighborhood Satisfaction

Involvement and Participation Variables

Value Residents on Board, Value Resident Involvement, Feel like a Owner, Tenant Participation Norms, Basic Involvement, Control, Informal Work and Helping, Commitment to Stay

Leadership Roles Variables

Outside Leadership, Check w/Residents in Crisis, Extra Effort to Involve, Check w/Residents for Financial, Check w/Residents before Repairs, Be Responsible for Resolving Conflicts, Treat People Fairly

I utilized a stepwise approach for each analysis including all of the major behavioral and attitudinal variables in each equation (*see Table 4.49*). In addition the key demographic variables of sex, age, education, income, and race (*coded dichotomously for Black, White and Latino*). I chose the stepwise procedure because I did not have any

strong hypothesis to guide a hierarchical analysis and the previously discussed analysis of variance suggested a wide variety of differences in each of the group pairs.

Discriminating Between Residents with Formal Leadership Experience

What distinguishes people in HDFC and TIL coops who report formal leadership experience? Are there any variables that help differentiate identified and experienced leaders from those who only self-report leadership experience? To try and answer this question one discriminant function was calculated, with a Chi-Square (3 df) = 34.99, $p < .001$ (see *Table 4.50*).

What is a discriminant function and how do we interpret it? Klecka (1980) defines a canonical discriminant function as being a linear combination of discriminating variables (*as in Table 4.49*) which are organized so that group means on the function (i.e. the mean scores of identified experienced leaders and the mean scores of non-identified experienced leaders) are as different as possible. Klecka suggests a spatial analogy for conceptually understanding the nature of a discriminant function. He first asks us to consider the discriminating variables (31 variables in the present example) as axes that define a p -dimensional space (e.g. a 31 dimensional space). If the two groups of leaders in the present example differ in their behavior, we can conceive of each group being a cluster of points in some portion of our 31 dimensional space. To summarize the spatial position of each group, we can calculate its group “centroid,” an imaginary central point (a typical position) of each group of leaders mean scores on the 31 discriminating variables.

Table 4.50*Discriminant Analysis****Discriminating Leader Identification
between Residents with Formal Leadership Experience*****Summary Table**

[(n=107) (Not Identified w/experience=46)(Identified Leader w/experience=61)]

		<u>Wilks' λ</u>	<u>Sig.</u>	<u>Label</u>
1	BASIC_5	.87671	.0002	Basic Involvement
2	WORK_3	.76268	.0000	Work Involvement Scale-3
3	SECURTY	.71313	.0000	Security Rating

Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients*Function describes identified leaders with formal leadership experience.*

BASIC_5	.63292
SECURTY	.48454
WORK_3	.68641

Canonical Discriminant Functions

		<i>Pct of</i>	<i>Cum</i>	<i>Canonical</i>	<i>After</i>				
<i>Fcn</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Pct</i>	<i>Corr</i>	<i>Fcn</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Sig</i>
1*	.4023	100.00	100.00	.5356	:	0 .713128	34.993	3	.0000

Structure Matrix*Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables
and the canonical discriminant function.*

BASIC_5	.59124
SECURTY	.54418
WORK_3	.52754

Classification Results

		<i>No. of</i>	<i>Predicted Group Membership</i>	
<i>Actual Group</i>		<i>Cases</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
Group 1		46	35	11
<i>Not Identified w/experience</i>			76.1%	23.9%
Group 2		61	17	44
<i>Identified Leader w/experience</i>			27.9%	72.1%
Ungrouped cases		334	287	47
			85.9%	14.1%

Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 73.83%

If we were to draw a line between the two centroids (the typical position of each group of leaders), we could then look for which of our 31 variables best spatially define the line we have drawn. The scores from three variables in the present example (basic involvement, security and informal work/helping) best defined the line that connects the

typical position of each of the two groups of leaders. This line is the canonical discriminant function. Where each centroid (typical position) falls on the discriminant function line demonstrates key differences between each group of leaders.

Klecka (1980) describes how to interpret the meaning of a canonical discriminant function. He suggests that we first look at the standardized canonical discriminant function coefficients which tell us the relative position of our data compared to our group centroids. Second he states that we should look at the structure loading matrix which tells us about the correlation between individual variables and the canonical discriminant function. In addition, Klecka suggests that we can estimate the total variance explained by a discriminant function by squaring the canonical correlation.

Considering Table 4.50, three variables contribute to the discriminant function differentiating the two groups of leaders (as mentioned above, these are basic involvement, informal work and helping assistance and the perception of security). Higher discriminant scores are associated with identified leaders with experience. Interpreting the standardized coefficients suggests basic involvement and informal work and helping assistance are both slightly more important than security perceptions in understanding differences between these two groups of leaders. In other words, informal work and helping assistance was the best discriminating variable (as opposed to predicting variable) followed by basic involvement and then security. Again, it is important to keep in mind that standardized canonical coefficients only suggest the relative importance of a given variable in a discriminant function and not the direction of interpretation (i.e. the meaning of higher or lower scores). In addition, this discriminant function helped to explain 29% of the variance be-

tween identified and experienced leaders and those with experience but who don't currently see themselves as leaders.

The structure loading matrix of correlations (linear relationship) between predictors and the discriminant function (centroid of three variables) suggests that the best predictors for distinguishing between identified and experienced leaders and unidentified experienced leaders in this sample are basic involvement, informal work and helping assistance and security perceptions (*see Table 4.50*). Function loadings less than .40 are not included in the table or interpreted. Putting all of this together, the key factors that seem to differentiate identified from experienced leaders from non-identified experienced leaders are more basic involvement, more informal work and helping assistance and the perception of building security. Identified and experienced leaders score higher on all of these variables.

Classification of these two groups of leaders based on the discriminant function correctly classified 79 (74%) of the cases compared to the 53.5 (50%) that would be correctly classified by chance alone. This classification helps to us consider the potential leadership pool in a limited equity housing co-operative. In the present model, the classification considers only non-identified leaders with identified and experienced leaders (n=107). The model correctly predicted 76.1% of the non-identified leaders with experience and 72.1% of the identified and experienced leaders. Looking at the remainder of cases (n=334) suggests that 85.9% of the other people in the building fit the pattern differentiating people who do not see themselves as leaders but have some experience. Only 14.1% are similar to experienced and identified leaders.

It seems likely that good future leaders are likely to share characteristics with existing identified and experienced leaders. Unfortunately, based on this assumption, it appears that the vast majority of residents hold attitudes, have beliefs, and behave more like the non-identified leaders rather than with identified and experienced leaders. This unsurprising result is confirmed through day-to-day observation and experience working in and around co-operatives. However, what is interesting about this result from the present discriminant analysis is the low magnitude of general shareholder agreement with the desired characteristics of identified and experienced leaders.

Discriminating Between Leaders With and Without Formal Experience

In this sample, there are two groups of people who identify as leaders in HDFC and TIL coops. Which variables help differentiate identified leaders who report and do not report having formal leadership experience? To try and answer this question one discriminant function was calculated, with a Chi-Square (3 df) = 46.35, $p < .001$. Four variables contribute to the discriminant function differentiating the two groups of leaders (*see Table 4.51*). These are basic involvement, control perceptions, perception of conflict, and valuing resident involvement. Higher discriminant scores are associated with identified leaders with experience. Interpreting the standardized coefficients suggests that conflict is slightly less important than the other three variables in understanding differences between these two groups of leaders. In other words, basic involvement was the best discriminating variable in this model followed by valuing resident involvement, control and then conflict.

Table 4.51*Discriminant Analysis****Discriminating Identified Leaders
With and Without Formal Leadership Experience*****Summary Table**

[(n=85) (Identified Leader w/NO experience=24)(Identified Leader w/experience=61)]

		<u>Wilks</u>	<u>l</u>	<u>Sig.</u>	<u>Label</u>
1	BASIC_5	1	.69937	.0000	Basic Involvement
2	VINV	2	.62581	.0000	Value Resident Involvement
3	CNTRL_3	3	.59689	.0000	Sense of Control
4	CONFLCT	4	.56428	.0000	Perception of Conflict

Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients*Function describes identified leaders with formal leadership experience.*

BASIC_5	.47405
CNTRL_3	.43724
CONFLCT	.37810
VINV	.46018

Canonical Discriminant Functions

		<u>Pct of</u>	<u>Cum</u>	<u>Canonical</u>	<u>After</u>	<u>Wilks'</u>			
<u>Fcn</u>	<u>Eigenvalue</u>	<u>Variance</u>	<u>Pct</u>	<u>Corr</u>	<u>Fcn</u>	<u>Lambda</u>	<u>Chi-square</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>Sig</u>
1	.7722	100.00	100.00	.6601	:	0 .564282	46.348	4	.0000

Structure Matrix*Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables
and the canonical discriminant function.*

BASIC_5	.74613
CNTRL_3	.72531
VINV	.70148
VBRD	.69692
RRENT	.47569
INC	.46081

Classification Results

	<u>Actual Group</u>	<u>No. of</u>	<u>Predicted Group Membership</u>	
		<u>Cases</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Group	1	24	20	4
<u>Leaders with no experience</u>			83.3%	16.7%
Group	2	61	10	51
<u>Identified Leader w/experience</u>			16.4%	83.6%
<u>Ungrouped cases</u>		356	224	132
			62.9%	37.1%

Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 83.53%

The structure loading matrix of correlations between predictors and the discriminant function suggests that the best predictors for distinguishing identified and experienced

leaders from identified leaders without experience are more basic involvement, the sense of control and valuing resident involvement. Other predictors include valuing residents on the board, the perception of reasonable rent and higher income (*see Table 4.51*). Identified and experienced leaders score higher on all of these variables. Function loadings less than .40 are not included in the table or interpreted. Therefore, even though conflict perceptions helped define the discriminating function between the two groups of leaders, conflict as an individual variable did not help predict or load on the combined four variable function at a level of .40 or greater. In addition, the overall discriminant function helped to predict 44% of the variance between identified and experienced leaders and identified leaders without formal leadership experience.

Classification of these two groups of leaders based on the discriminant function correctly classified 71 (83%) of the cases compared to the 42.5 (50%) that would be correctly classified by chance alone. This model correctly predicted 83.3% of the identified leaders without experience and 83.6% of the identified and experienced leaders. Looking at the remainder of cases suggests that just under two-thirds (62.9%) of the other people in the building fit the pattern differentiating identified leaders with no experience and only 37.1% are similar to experienced and identified leaders.

Discriminating Between Leaders With Experience and Like to Be Leaders Without Experience

Which variables help differentiate identified and experienced leaders from people who think that they would like to be a leader but have no experience? To try and answer this question one discriminant function was calculated, with a Chi-Square (3 df)= 109.67, $p < .001$. Six variables contribute to the discriminant function differentiating the two groups

(see Table 4.52). These are age, basic involvement, the perception of building problems, having reported a homeless experience, perception of social problems in the building and informal work and helping assistance. Higher discriminant scores are associated with identified leaders with experience. Interpreting the standardized coefficients suggests basic involvement and informal work and helping assistance are both slightly more important than the other four variables in understanding differences between these two groups.

The structure loading matrix of correlations between predictors and the discriminant function suggests that the best predictors for distinguishing identified and experienced leaders from people who would like to be a leader but do not have experience are more basic involvement, greater valuing of residents on the board, fewer perceptions of building problems, fewer perceptions of social problems, higher rating of building management and the perception that rent is reasonable (see Table 4.52). Identified and experienced leaders score higher on all of these variables. Function loadings less than .40 are not included in the table or interpreted.

Classification of these two groups based on the discriminant function correctly classified a total of 102 (89%) cases compared to the 57 cases (50%) that would be correctly classified by chance alone. This model correctly predicted 92.5% of the people who said that they would like to be a leader and 86.9% of the identified and experienced leaders. Looking at the remainder of cases suggests that 70.9% of the other people in the building fit the pattern of like-to-be leaders and 29.1% experienced and identified leaders.

Table 4.52*Discriminant Analysis****Discriminating Identified Leaders with Experience
and People Wanting to Be a Leader with No Experience*****Summary Table**

[(n=114) (Want to be w/No experience=53)(Identified Leader w/experience=61)]

		<i>Wilks</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Label</i>
1	BASIC_5	1	.64181	.0000	Basic Involvement
2	SPROB_5	2	.47490	.0000	Social Problems Scale
3	WORK_3	3	.42635	.0000	Work Involvement Scale
4	BPROB_6	4	.39571	.0000	Building Complaints Scale
5	AGE	5	.38053	.0000	Age
6	HOMELESS	6	.36562	.0000	Been Homeless

Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients*Function describes identified leaders with formal leadership experience.*

AGE	.30067
BASIC_5	.61557
BPROB_6	-.36922
HOMELESS	-.25815
SPROB_5	-.35120
WORK_3	.50571

Canonical Discriminant Functions

<i>Fcn</i>	<i>Eigenvalue</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Pct</i>	<i>Cum Pct</i>	<i>Canonical Corr</i>	<i>After Wilks'</i>	<i>Fcn</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Chi-square</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Sig</i>
1	1.7351	100.00	100.00		.7965	:	0	.365617	109.672	6	.0000

Structure Matrix*Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables
and the canonical discriminant function.*

BASIC_5	.56714
VBRD	.55454
BPROB_6	-.48387
SPROB_5	-.45801
BMANG_6	.43875
RRENT	.42780

Classification Results

<i>Actual Group</i>	<i>No. of Cases</i>	<i>Predicted Group Membership</i>	
		<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
Group 1	53	49	4
<i>Want to be leader w/no experience</i>		92.5%	7.5%
Group 2	61	8	53
<i>Identified Leader w/experience</i>		13.1%	86.9%
Ungrouped cases	327	232	95
		70.9%	29.1%

Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 89.47%

Summary of Findings

Results suggest that both leadership identity and leadership experience need to be considered in limited equity housing co-operatives. There were important differences in this study sample based on identity and experience. Leaders who both identified as leaders and had experience were different from every one else in a limited-equity co-operative. Having actual leadership experience seemed to differentiate more than simply identifying as a leader. The present study found higher levels of basic participation as the only factor that consistently discriminated experienced and identified leaders from everyone else. Other distinguishing factors included higher security perceptions, more informal work and helping assistance, greater valuing of tenant involvement in building affairs, the perception of rent being reasonable, higher ratings of building management as well as fewer perception of physical and social problems in buildings.

Leaders in HDFC buildings often argue that only a third of tenants really get involved in their building. This hypothesis was tested by three different classifications of the proportion of non-leaders who resemble identified and experienced leaders. Results suggest that the potential new leadership pool is probably limited to between 14% and 37% of the tenants in an HDFC co-operative.

Chapter 5

Results:

Environmental Satisfaction

Perhaps the best overall indicator of a successful co-operative is environmental satisfaction or looking at how residents rate the quality of the co-op environment. What factors associated with HDFC and TIL buildings help us to better understand a tenant's perception of the quality of her/his apartment and building? How does participation affect a tenant's quality rating of her/his living environment? To gain insight on these kinds of questions I chose to conduct a series of multiple regression analyses. In these analyses I tried to find indicators of apartment quality and building quality. These indicators, or independent variables, included basic demographic and environmental variables as well as social capital and participation factors associated with HDFC and TIL buildings.

Three Regression Models

This chapter (Chapter 5) utilizes three different models to predict individual apartment satisfaction and building satisfaction using both individual level variables as well as individual and aggregate level variables in the same equation. *Regression Model 1* utilizes a stepwise selection that allows individual level variables to enter the equation in order of their significance to predict a given environmental quality rating. *Regression Model 2* is a four-level hierarchical multiple regression equation using only individual level variables to examine if co-op participation and co-op values help to better explain environmental quality rating above and beyond the entry of all other variables. *Regression Model 3* is a variation on *Regression Model 2*. It differs from the preceding model in that it also

considers contextual aggregate building level variables in addition to individual level variables.

Regression Model 1—Stepwise

Regression Model 1 utilizes a stepwise selection procedure to multiple regression as an initial exploratory procedure that assumes no theoretical hierarchy in the variables of interest. In this model, all of the basic demographic, basic environmental variables, co-op specific variables and social capital variables are allowed into the equation according to statistical criteria¹. Although the stepwise procedure is somewhat controversial because of its reliance on statistical criteria rather than theoretical variable selection (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1989), it is warranted in the present study as a cross-check to the other two regression models.

Regression Model 2—Hierarchical

For each *Regression Model 2* equation, *Level 1* contains only the basic demographic variables of education, age, income, gender, a dummy variable for past homelessness experience and three dummy race/ethnicity variables (Black, White, Latino). These variables are all entered into the equation at the same time to directly predict a given outcome environmental quality variable.

In each *Regression Model 2* equation, *Level 2* adds “fixed” environmental variables including residential density of building, the number of years since a respondent’s building

¹ *Step-wise selection in SPSS/PC combines the entry criteria for forward selection with the removal criteria for backward selection procedures. As a result, the first variable entered into the equation is the one with the largest correlation with the dependent variable and having a probability of F-to-enter (PIN) less than .05. This variable is then examined to see whether it should be removed according to probability of F-to-remove criteria (POUT) of greater than .10. Additional variables are entered or removed from the equation until none of them meet both the entry and removal criteria.*

first entered an HPD program, the number of years since a respondent's building has been sold (if applicable), the amount of monthly rent, the number of years a respondent has lived in a building, and dummy variables for the neighborhood in which a respondent lives². These variables are all entered into the equation at one time to predict environmental quality ratings after first considering basic demographic factors.

Level 3 and *Level 4* focus on variables specific to HDFC and TIL co-operatives. *Level 3* adds rating variables for specific aspects of co-ops. These aspects include ratings of building management, building problems, social problems, the reasonableness of rent, security, as well as the group dynamics issues of conflict, crisis and the general "agreement climate" in a building. Finally, in *Level 4* the remaining items about social capital and participation are entered at one time. These include the three involvement scales, tenant norms, control, influence, desire to stay in a building as well as the three co-op values items.

Regression Model 3—Contextual Hierarchical

Regression Model 3 duplicates and expands *Regression Model 2* from four levels to eight levels. The purpose of this model is to predict individual level outcomes by considering both individual factors and aggregate contextual and organizational culture building factors in the same equation. In one sense, both the preceding Model 1 and Model 2 make a somewhat untenable assumption that environmental satisfaction outcomes such as apartment quality ratings and building quality ratings are solely the function of an individual. Does living in the social context of a co-operative building have any additional

² Only Highbridge and Clinton were entered into the equation because they generally represented the extremes in scores. In addition, because neighborhood was scored as a dummy variable, the inclusion

effect on an individual's perception of her/his apartment and building? This is the theoretical question that the Regression Model 3 equation is trying to address.

The approach used in *Regression Model 3* is informed by discussions about contextual analysis (Iversen, 1991), multi-level models, (DiPrete and Forristal, 1994) and estimating the reliability of aggregate-level variables based on individual-level characteristics (O'Brien, 1990). Like the previous model, *Level 1* of *Regression Model 3* contains only the basic individual level demographic variables of education, age, income, gender, past homelessness and three dummy race/ethnicity variables (Black, White, Latino). *Level 2* adds the building/organizational culture level variables of aggregated age, aggregated income, aggregated education, proportion of women, and the proportion of European White, African American, and Latino/a residents in a building. These variables are all entered into the equation as separate blocks to directly predict a given outcome environmental quality variable.

In each *Regression Model 3* equation, *Level 3* adds "fixed" environmental variables including residential density of building, the number of years since a respondent's building first entered an HPD program, the number of years since a respondent's building has been sold (if applicable), the amount of monthly rent, the number of years a respondent has lived in a building, and dummy variables for the neighborhood a respondent lived in. *Level 4* adds in aggregate rent and aggregate length of residence. There was no need to aggregate other fixed environmental variables such as density, or year of entry into HPD. The variables in each of these two levels are then entered into the equation as separate

of all three dummy variable neighborhoods left no variance for the third neighborhood to be entered.

blocks to predict environmental quality ratings after first considering basic demographic factors.

Level 5 and *Level 6* focus on rating variables for specific aspects of co-ops. These aspects include ratings of building management, building problems, social problems, the reasonableness of rent, security, as well as the group dynamics items about conflict, crisis and the general “agreement climate” in a building. *Level 6* contains the analogous aggregate organizational culture variables from *Level 5* including aggregate ratings of building management, aggregate building problems, aggregate social problems, aggregate perceptions of the reasonableness of rent, aggregate security, as well as the aggregate items about conflict, crisis and agreement in a building.

Finally, in *Level 7* the remaining individual items about social capital and participation are entered at one time including the three involvement scales, tenant norms, control, influence, desire to stay in a building as well as the three co-op values items. *Level 8* contains the same variables aggregated at the building/organizational culture level. However, at the aggregate level the two basic values items concerning resident involvement on the board and the importance in involving residents in the buildings were combined into a single item because they were highly correlated [$r(432) = .91, p < .001$].

Apartment Quality and Satisfaction

Descriptive Results

How did respondents think about their apartments? How did they rate them overall? The “total” column in Table 5.1 shows response frequencies for the entire sample. The vast majority of respondents rated their apartment as being good or excellent with over

half rating it as being good. However, ratings varied by neighborhood. For example, 33 of the 45 respondents in Highbridge rated their apartment as being only fair (73.3%). By contrast 59 of 177 respondents in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen rated their apartment as being excellent (33.3%). Figure 5.1 graphically suggests how apartment quality ratings varied by neighborhood.

Table 5.1
Crosstabulation Table

Apartment Quality by Neighborhood

		Neighborhood			Total
		Highbridge	E Tremont	Clinton	
Poor	Count	1	3	5	9
	% of Neighborhood	2.2%	1.4%	2.8%	2.0%
Fair	Count	33	74	17	124
	% of Neighborhood	73.3%	33.8%	9.6%	28.1%
Good	Count	11	133	94	238
	% of Neighborhood	24.4%	60.7%	53.1%	54.0%
Excellent	Count		9	59	68
	% of Neighborhood		4.1%	33.3%	15.4%
Missing	Count			2	2
	% of Neighborhood			1.1%	.5%
Total	Count	45	219	177	441
	% of Neighborhood	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%




Figure 5.1—Apartment Quality Rating by Neighborhood

The mean rating of apartment quality varied by gender, leadership identity, and HDFC status. Women rated the quality of their apartments significantly higher than men ($p < .01$). Leaders rated their apartments significantly better than people wanting to be leaders ($p < .05$). People living in Clinton TIL buildings rated the quality of their apartments higher than those living in Clinton HDFCs.

There were also significant differences in apartment quality ratings by neighborhood and ethnicity. Table 5.2 examines an interaction effect of neighborhood and ethnicity on apartment quality ratings. This table suggests that there are significant differences ($p < .05$) in apartment satisfaction between neighborhoods, but not between ethnic groups within each of the neighborhoods. Neighborhood environment may be a more powerful influence on apartment quality ratings than ethnicity alone.

Table 5.2*One Way Analysis of Variance*

**Mean Differences in Apartment Quality
by Neighborhood and Ethnicity**

Student-Newman-Keuls ^a

	N	Subset for alpha = .05		
		1	2	3
Highbridge Latinos	16	2.19		
Highbridge Blacks	27	2.26		
E Tremont Blacks	112		2.67	
E Tremont Latinos	84		2.69	
Clinton Blacks	22			3.05
Clinton Latinos	65			3.14
Clinton Whites	70			3.27
<i>Significance within Subset</i>		.633	.890	.288

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 35.806

From within a building environment however, race and ethnicity can be the base of organizational culture group formation. To examine this possibility, I first constructed a three category variable categorizing race and/or ethnicity homogeneity at the building level. The three categories were 1) buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group, 2) buildings with mixed ethnic/race groups, and 3) buildings where there was more than 10% missing ethnic/race data. Buildings were classified as having a dominant group if one ethnic/race group constituted more than 60% of respondents and the building had less than 10% missing race/ethnicity data. Buildings with mixed ethnic/race groups did not have any one group with over 60% of the population and had less than 10% missing race/ethnicity data. Buildings with more than 10% data missing were classified as a separate group because they suggest potential ethnic/race conflicts in a building (in that respondents did not want this identifier attached to their survey). The results of a one-way ANOVA (*see Table 5.3*) using this newly constructed race/ethnicity homogeneity variable suggest that apartment quality ratings were significantly higher ($p < .05$) in buildings where there is a dominant ethnic/race cultural group.

Table 5.3

One-Way ANOVA

Aggregate Apartment Quality Rating by Building Race/Ethnicity Homogeneity $F(2,47) = 3.467$ $\text{Signif } F = .039$

	N	% of Buildings	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group</i>	18	36%	3.127	.54
<i>Building with mixed ethnic/race groups</i>	14	28%	2.771	.47
<i>Buildings with more than 10% missing ethnic/race data</i>	18	36%	2.719	.48
TOTAL Buildings	50	100%	2.881	.52

A large number of factors were moderately correlated with apartment quality (see Table 5.4). Respondents in Clinton were more likely to be satisfied while those in Highbridge were less satisfied. Fewer building and social problems as well as less conflict and crisis were all associated with apartment satisfaction. Better management quality, better security, a stronger sense of control and influence were also correlated with apartment quality. However, of the four participation scales, only basic involvement and tenant participation norms were significantly correlated to apartment quality ratings.

Table 5.4
Correlation Matrix
Individual Apartment Quality Rating
with Independent Variables

APTSAT\$	AGE	WOMEN	WHITE	BLACK	LATINO	INC
	.1682**	.1440*	.2735**	-.1947**	-.0147	.3599**
APTSAT\$	ED	DENSITY	RENT2	RLENGTH	MN4	BX4
	.1439*	-.2707**	-.1161	.1425*	.4083**	-.2938**
APTSAT\$	BX6	YRIN2	YRSOLD2	HDFC	BLDSAT	NGHSAT
	-.2216**	.0586	-.0753	-.1660**	.6511**	.5130**
APTSAT\$	BMANG_6	BPROB_6	SPROB_5	SECURTY	RRENT	CONFLCT
	.5177**	-.5696**	-.1524*	.3653**	.3532**	-.3879**
APTSAT\$	CRISIS	AGRMNT	CNTRL_3	INFLU	BASIC_5	WORK_3
	-.4523**	.2778**	.4519**	.2581**	.3896**	-.0936
APTSAT\$	FORML_5	TNORM_5	VOWN	VINV	VBRD	STAY
	.1189	.1736**	.2362**	.2987**	.3826**	.3326**
Minimum pairwise N of cases: 439 2-tailed Signif: * - .01 ** - .001						

Regression Analysis of Individuals: Apartment Quality

Regression analysis of individual apartment quality rating proceeded as outlined above in the discussion about regression approach. Only the final equation for each model is discussed below.

Regression Model 1—Stepwise Results: Table 5.5 summarizes the *Regression Model 1* Stepwise analysis. Results in this model suggest that the best predictors of

Table 5.5

Regression Model 1

Individual Apartment Quality Rating

Multiple Regression Analysis—Stepwise Entry of All Variables

Method: **Stepwise** **Basic Demographic and Environmental Variables Co-op Ratings, and Co-op Participation and Values**

R Square=.46362 Adjusted R Square=.45109

F (10,428)= 36.99400 Signif F=.0000

Variables in the Final Equation

Variable	B	SE B	B(Beta)	T	Sig T
Bldg Probs	-.061379	.010179	-.307517	-6.030	.0000
Bldg Mang	.038136	.010630	.202315	3.588	.0004
Women	.194165	.052367	.133276	3.708	.0002
Conflict	-.078790	.027416	-.117545	-2.874	.0043
Control	.028274	.010782	.115990	2.622	.0090
Social Probs	.030944	.012864	.104447	2.406	.0166
Highbridge	-.220675	.087075	-.095527	-2.534	.0116
Income	.055752	.024693	.093610	2.258	.0245
Agreemnt	.087753	.041447	.080036	2.117	.0348
Homeless	.141792	.068482	.076164	2.071	.0390

Variables not in the Equation Having Borderline Significance

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
Crisis	-.078887	-.076821	.389627	-1.592	.1121
Ownershph	.060064	.076482	.380864	1.585	.1137

individual apartment quality, relative to this model³, are fewer perceptions of building problems [$\beta = -.307517$, $p < .01$] and higher ratings of management quality [$\beta = .202315$, $p < .001$]. Demographically, apartment quality ratings are higher for women, those with higher incomes and with people who have past homelessness experience. Apartment satisfaction is lower for those living in Highbridge. Of the other co-op level variables, less conflict and a greater sense of a building “agreement climate” contribute to higher ratings of apartment quality in the equation. Among the HDFC/TIL specific variables, a higher

³ The relative importance of a given predictor is suggested through examination of standardized beta weights (β). Standardized beta weights are partial regression coefficients expressed as standardized Z scores. β values are always relative to the other independent variables in any given model and population sample. They do not reflect any universal importance outside of the model and population sample.

sense of control over what goes on in one's building helps to predict apartment satisfaction. Curiously, increased perception of social problems in a building also helps to explain apartment quality ratings even though this factor is negatively correlated to apartment quality when looked at alone. Two additional variables, lower building crisis perceptions and a greater sense of ownership are of borderline significance for inclusion into the equation. The entire equation explains 46% of the variance in individual apartment quality, Adjusted R² = .45, F (10,428) = 36.99, p < .001.

Table 5.6

Regression Model 2

Individual Apartment Quality Rating

Multiple Regression Analysis—Direct Entry of All Variables in 4 Levels

Level 1 Method:	Enter	Basic Demographics Variables
Level 2 Method:	Enter	Basic Environmental Variables
Level 3 Method:	Enter	Co-op Ratings
Level 4 Method:	Enter	Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.47563 Adjusted R Square=.43569

F (31,407)= 11.90868 Signif F=.0000

Variables in the Final Equation

Variable	B	SE B	B(Beta)	T	Sig T
Bldg Probs	-.058259	.011772	-.291886	-4.949	.0000
Bldg Mang	.031076	.011926	.164864	2.606	.0095
Women	.197333	.054872	.135451	3.596	.0004
Social Probs	.032129	.014698	.108447	2.186	.0294
Control	.025117	.012461	.103038	2.016	.0445
Highbridge	-.213894	.094109	-.092592	-2.273	.0236
Conflict	-.060979	.031903	-.090974	-1.911	.0567
Agreemnt	.091328	.042972	.083297	2.125	.0342
Homeless	.146818	.070884	.078864	2.071	.0390

Variables with Borderline Significance

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
Income	.049145	.030983	.082516	1.586	.1135
Crisis	-.049300	.035449	-.074043	-1.391	.1651
Ownership	.033413	.024049	.054956	1.389	.1655

Regression Model 2—Individual Hierarchical Results: Table 5.6 summarizes the *Regression Model 2* analysis. Results for this equation were basically identical to *Model*

1. However, income is only of borderline significance in *Model 2*. Like *Model 1*, the best predictor of apartment satisfaction is lessened perception of building problems [$\beta = -.291886$, $p < .01$]. The entire equation explained 47% of the variance in individual apartment quality, $\text{Adjusted } R^2 = .43$, $F(31, 407) = 11.91$, $p < .001$.

Table 5.7

Regression Model 3

Individual and Contextual Apartment Quality Rating

Multiple Regression Analysis—Direct Entry of All Variables in 8 Levels

Level 1 Method:	Enter	Individual Basic Demographics Variables
Level 2 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Basic Demographics Variables
Level 3 Method:	Enter	Individual Basic Environmental Variables
Level 4 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Basic Environmental Variables
Level 5 Method:	Enter	Individual Co-op Ratings
Level 6 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Co-op Ratings
Level 7 Method:	Enter	Individual Co-op Participation and Values
Level 8 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.52496 Adjusted R Square=.45510

F (55,374)= 7.51463 Signif F=.0000

Variables in the Final Equation

Variable	B	SE B	β (Beta)	T	Sig T
Control@	-.114852	.047784	-.368548	-2.404	.0167
Crisis@	-.251748	.128629	-.270768	-1.957	.0511
Partn Nrms@	-.077295	.032757	-.266774	-2.360	.0188
Bldg Probs	-.046458	.012883	-.236702	-3.606	.0004
Tenure@	-.222880	.109148	-.222088	-2.042	.0419
Bldg Mang	.034408	.012951	.184277	2.657	.0082
Control	.038161	.015004	.157961	2.543	.0114
Women	.173989	.057604	.120596	3.020	.0027
Social Probs	.033667	.017215	.115301	1.956	.0513

Variables with Borderline Significance

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
Agreemnt@	.281219	.157462	.130644	1.786	.0749
Ed@	-.186406	.099953	-.158082	-1.865	.0630
Homeless	.121200	.071522	.065999	1.695	.0910
Age	.048629	.029547	.074355	1.646	.1006
Crisis	-.059915	.039010	-.090896	-1.536	.1254

Regression Model 3—Contextual Hierarchical Results: Table 5.7 summarizes the *Regression Model 3* for apartment satisfaction. Like the two preceding equations, the

individual sense of control helped to predict satisfaction with one's apartment. However, at the same time, less aggregate sense of control emerged as the best predictor of individual apartment satisfaction [$\beta = -.368548$, $p < .05$] in the equation! Several other aggregate organizational cultural variables emerged as being good predictors in this model including lower aggregate crisis perceptions, less of an aggregate sense of tenant participation norms, and less aggregate residential tenure. Like the previous models, apartment quality ratings are predicted by fewer building problems perceptions by individuals, higher ratings of management quality and a greater sense of control. Women are more satisfied with their apartments than are men. Again, increased individual perception of social problems in a building also help to explain apartment quality ratings even though this factor is negatively correlated to apartment quality when looked at alone.

There are a number of variables of borderline significance in this equation that should be noted. Lower levels of the individual sense of building crisis and the aggregate sense of more agreement than conflict in one's building are both borderline predictors of individual level apartment satisfaction. Older residents, those having had some homeless experience and less aggregate building education are also of borderline significance.

Building Quality and Satisfaction

Descriptive Results

How did respondents rate their buildings? The "total" column in Table 5.8 shows response frequencies for the entire sample. Over half of respondents rated their building as being good (44.9%) or excellent (10.9%). However, like apartment ratings, building quality ratings varied by neighborhood. For example, 40 of the 45 respondents in

Highbridge rated their building as being poor or fair (a total 89.9%). By contrast 145 of 177 respondents in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen rated their building as being good or excellent (a total of 81.9%). Figure 5.2 graphically suggests how building quality ratings varied by neighborhood.

Table 5.8
Building Quality Ratings by Neighborhood

		Neighborhood			Total
		Highbridge	E Tremont	Clinton	
Poor	Count	7	11	6	24
	% of Neighborhood	15.6%	5.0%	3.4%	5.4%
Fair	Count	33	112	24	169
	% of Neighborhood	73.3%	51.1%	13.6%	38.3%
Good	Count	5	91	102	198
	% of Neighborhood	11.1%	41.6%	57.6%	44.9%
Excellent	Count		5	43	48
	% of Neighborhood		2.3%	24.3%	10.9%
Missing	Count			2	2
	% of Neighborhood			1.1%	.5%
Total	Count	45	219	177	441
	% of Neighborhood	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%




Figure 5.2—Building Quality Rating by Neighborhood

The mean rating of building quality varied by gender and leadership identity. Women rated the quality of their buildings significantly higher than men. Leaders rated their buildings significantly better than people wanting to be leaders ($p < .05$). There were also

significant differences in building quality ratings by neighborhood and ethnicity ($p < .05$).

Table 5.9 examines an interaction effect of neighborhood and ethnicity on building quality ratings. Like apartment ratings, this table suggests that there are significant differences between neighborhoods in rating building quality, but not between ethnic groups within each neighborhood ($p < .05$). Neighborhood location may be a more powerful influence on the building quality rating than ethnicity alone.

Table 5.9

**Mean Differences in Building Quality by
Neighborhood and Ethnicity**

Student-Newman-Keuls^a

	N	Subset for alpha = .05		
		1	2	3
Highbridge Latinos	16	1.94		
Highbridge Blacks	27	2.00		
E Tremont Latinos	84		2.37	
E Tremont Blacks	112		2.46	
Clinton Blacks	22			2.91
Clinton Latinos	65			3.08
Clinton Whites	70			3.09
Significance within Subset		.686	.538	.488

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 35.806

Table 5.10

One-Way ANOVA

**Aggregate Building Quality Rating
by Building Race/Ethnicity Homogeneity**

$F(2,47) = 4.253$ $\text{Signif } F = .020$

	N	% of Buildings	Mean	Standard Deviation
Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group	18	36%	2.968	.58
Building with mixed ethnic/race groups	14	28%	2.539	.54
Buildings with more than 10% missing ethnic/race data	18	36%	2.490	.47
TOTAL Buildings	50	100%	2.676	.57

There were significant difference in building satisfaction ratings based on the homogeneity of race/ethnicity in buildings. Table 5.10 suggests that building quality ratings were significantly higher ($p < .05$) in buildings where there is an apparent main ethnic/race cultural group as opposed to a mixed building population.

Table 5.11
Correlation Matrix
Individual Building Quality Rating
with Independent Variables

	AGE	WOMEN	WHITE	BLACK	LATINO	INC
BLDSAT\$	.1288*	.1045	.2728**	-.1699**	-.0093	.3606**
	ED	DENSITY	RENT2	RLENGTH	MN4	BX4
BLDSAT\$	.1222	-.3488**	-.1367*	.1753**	.4604**	-.2966**
	BX6	YRIN2	YRSOLD2	HDFC	APTSAT	NGHSAT
BLDSAT\$	-.2709**	-.0343	-.1215	-.2319**	.6511**	.6136**
	BMANG_6	BPROB_6	SPROB_5	SECURTY	RRENT	CONFLCT
BLDSAT\$	.5667**	-.5949**	-.2582**	.3880**	.3785**	-.3844**
	CRISIS	AGRMNT	CNTRL_3	INFLU	BASIC_5	WORK_3
BLDSAT\$	-.4684**	.2701**	.4979**	.2216**	.4421**	-.0631
	FORML_5	TNORM_5	VOWN	VINV	VBRD	STAY
BLDSAT\$	.0958	.2152**	.1502*	.3359**	.4112**	.3614**
Minimum pairwise N of cases: 439 2-tailed Signif: * - .01 ** - .001						

A large number of factors were moderately correlated with building quality ratings (see Table 5.11). Respondents in Clinton were more likely to be satisfied with their building while those in Highbridge were less satisfied. Building quality ratings were correlated with fewer building and social problems and as well as less building conflict and building crisis. Better management quality, better security, a stronger sense of control and influence were also correlated with building quality. Of the four involvement scales, only basic involvement and tenant participation norms were significantly correlated to higher perceptions of building quality. Building quality ratings were also higher with residents

who saw themselves as owners, and thought it was important to actively involve tenants and to have residents on the board of directors.

Regression Analysis: Individual Level Building Quality

Regression analysis of individual building quality rating proceeded as outlined earlier in this chapter. Only the final equation for each model is discussed below.

Table 5.12

Regression Model 1

Individual Building Quality Rating

Multiple Regression Analysis—Stepwise Entry of All Variables

Method: **Stepwise** **Basic Demographic and Environmental Variables Co-op Ratings, and Co-op Participation and Values**

R Square=.48667 Adjusted R Square=.47833

F (7,431)= 58.37349 Signif F=.0000

Variables in the Final Equation

Variable	B	SE B	B(Beta)	T	Sig T
Bldg Probs	-.062147	.010445	-.290300	-5.950	.0000
Bldg Mang	.044197	.009988	.218606	4.425	.0000
Control	.052745	.010716	.201741	4.922	.0000
Highbridge	-.290839	.090741	-.117382	-3.205	.0015
Conflict	-.078011	.028001	-.108509	-2.786	.0056
Women	.148898	.054424	.095290	2.736	.0065
YRs in HPD	-.022109	.008418	-.092145	-2.627	.0089

Variables not in the Equation Having Borderline Significance for Entry

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
Ownership	-.064535	-.084216	.463685	-1.753	.0804
Agreemnt	.062777	.082232	.482892	1.711	.0878
Basic Inv	.066715	.074622	.455637	1.552	.1215
Influence	-.055254	-.069655	.466017	-1.448	.1484
Income	.058489	.069373	.478493	1.442	.1500
Crisis	-.069473	-.069093	.480242	-1.436	.1517

Regression Model 1—Stepwise Results: Table 5.12 summarizes the *Regression Model 1 Stepwise* analysis. Results in this model suggest that the best predictors of building satisfaction, relative to this model, are lower perception of building problems [$\beta = -.290300$, $p < .001$], higher ratings of building management [$\beta = .218606$, $p < .001$], and a

greater individual sense of control over what goes on in a building [$\beta=.201741$, $p<.001$].

Women rate their building higher than men. People with higher levels of building satisfaction and are less likely to live in Highbridge and to live in buildings that faced landlord abandonment more recently. Building satisfaction is also predicted by less building conflict perception.

Of borderline significance in predicting individual building satisfaction were those who feel less like an owner than a renter of their co-op and perceiving more agreement than conflict in their building. Greater basic involvement but less influence perceptions were also of borderline significance as were fewer crisis perceptions and greater individual income. The entire equation explained 49% of the variance in individual building quality, Adjusted $R^2=.48$, $F(7,431)=58.37$, $p<.001$.

Regression Model 2—Hierarchical Results: Table 5.13 summarizes the *Individual Model 2* analysis with building quality as the dependent variable. Results for this equation differed from *Regression Model 1* in that more informal work and helping assistance and less formal involvement were also predictive of individual building satisfaction. Feeling like an owner shifted from being of borderline significance and conflict moved to being only of borderline significance. The entire equation explained 52% of the variance in individual building quality, Adjusted $R^2=.48$, $F(31,407)=14.23$, $p<.001$.

Table 5.13

Individual Model 2

Individual Building Quality Rating

Multiple Regression Analysis—Direct Entry of All Variables in 4 Levels

Level 1 Method: Enter Basic Demographics Variables
Level 2 Method: Enter Basic Environmental Variables
Level 3 Method: Enter Co-op Ratings
Level 4 Method: Enter Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.52015 Adjusted R Square=.48360
F = (31,407)= 14.23158 Signif F =.0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	B(Beta)	T	Sig T
Bldg Probs	-.056432	.012078	-.263601	-4.672	.0000
Bldg Mang	.044166	.012237	.218454	3.609	.0003
Control	.046481	.012786	.177782	3.635	.0003
Highbridge	-.247290	.096559	-.099806	-2.561	.0108
Women	.147041	.056300	.094102	2.612	.0093
Formal Inv	-.028698	.013524	-.093303	-2.122	.0344
Infrml Inv	.042375	.021079	.084301	2.010	.0451
Ownership	-.051486	.024675	-.078953	-2.087	.0376
YRs in HPD	-.018553	.009702	-.077325	-1.912	.0565

Variables with Borderline Significance

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
Influence	-.070154	.038016	-.074718	-1.845	.0657
Conflict	-.059868	.032733	-.083273	-1.829	.0681
Agreement	.072802	.044091	.061907	1.651	.0995
Crisis	-.058604	.036371	-.082062	-1.611	.1079
Basic Inv	.017273	.011931	.079154	1.448	.1485

Regression Model 3—Contextual Hierarchical Results: Table 5.14 summarizes the *Regression Model 3* for building satisfaction. Relative to this model, the best predictor of building satisfaction in this model is a lower aggregate sense of crisis in a building [$\beta = -.440477$, $p < .001$]. Like the previous models, fewer building problem perceptions and higher building management ratings both helped to predict individual building satisfaction. A greater sense of control helped to predict building satisfaction at the same time that lower influence perceptions were of borderline significance. Buildings with higher

aggregate income significantly predict individual building satisfaction, but so do buildings with lower aggregate education.

Table 5.14

Regression Model 3

Individual and Contextual Building Quality Rating

Multiple Regression Analysis—Direct Entry of All Variables in 8 Levels

Level 1 Method:	Enter	Individual Basic Demographics Variables
Level 2 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Basic Demographics Variables
Level 3 Method:	Enter	Individual Basic Environmental Variables
Level 4 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Basic Environmental Variables
Level 5 Method:	Enter	Individual Co-op Ratings
Level 6 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Co-op Ratings
Level 7 Method:	Enter	Individual Co-op Participation and Values
Level 8 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.56442	Adjusted R Square=.50036
F (55,374)= 8.81130	Signif F=.0000

Variables in the Final Equation

Variable	B	SE B	ß(Beta)	T	Sig T
<i>Crisis@</i>	-.441105	.132666	-.440477	-3.325	.0010
<i>Bldg Probs</i>	-.055814	.013288	-.264017	-4.200	.0000
<i>Income@</i>	.216572	.104512	.254103	2.072	.0389
<i>Bldg Mang</i>	.044326	.013357	.220404	3.318	.0010
<i>Formal Inv@</i>	.117209	.039925	.211888	2.936	.0035
<i>Ed@</i>	-.244106	.103091	-.192198	-2.368	.0184
<i>Control</i>	.046229	.015475	.177663	2.987	.0030
<i>Women@</i>	.642495	.264551	.147040	2.429	.0156
<i>Formal Inv</i>	-.033279	.015124	-.107974	-2.200	.0284

Variables with Borderline Significance

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
<i>Agreemnt</i>	.090490	.049458	.077624	1.830	.0681
<i>Rent Amnt@</i>	-.081220	.043359	-.132188	-1.873	.0618
<i>Conflict</i>	-.066444	.035914	-.092899	-1.850	.0651
<i>Ownership</i>	-.039901	.026275	-.062007	-1.519	.1297
<i>Agreemnt@</i>	.245742	.162404	.105992	1.513	.1311
<i>Partn Nrms@</i>	-.051003	.033785	-.163434	-1.510	.1320
<i>Women</i>	.081516	.059412	.052457	1.372	.1709
<i>Influence</i>	-.056746	.041464	-.060670	-1.369	.1720

Whereas being a woman helped to predict building satisfaction when considering only individual level variables, it is the aggregate measure of women that is predictive in the contextual model. In other words, buildings with a higher proportion of women appear to

be a better predictor of building satisfaction than gender alone. Another interesting contrast is suggested by comparing the individual and aggregate measures for formal involvement. Whereas less formal involvement by individuals predicted building satisfaction, so did buildings with higher aggregate formal involvement.

Other borderline factors predicting building satisfaction included higher levels of both individual and aggregate agreement perceptions as well as lower conflict perceptions. Buildings where the mean rent is lower had residents who were more satisfied with their buildings. Finally, buildings with lower tenant participation norms and individuals with less of a sense of being an owner of their building also were of borderline significance in predicting building quality ratings.

Neighborhood Quality

How did respondents rate their neighborhoods? The “total” column in Table 5.15 represents the frequency of responses across all respondents. Unlike apartment and

Table 5.15

Individual Neighborhood Quality by Neighborhood

		Neighborhood			
		Highbridge	E Tremont	Clinton	Total
Poor	Count	12	32	29	73
	% of Neighborhood	26.7%	14.6%	16.4%	16.6%
Fair	Count	32	140	61	233
	% of Neighborhood	71.1%	63.9%	34.5%	52.8%
Good	Count	1	47	59	107
	% of Neighborhood	2.2%	21.5%	33.3%	24.3%
Excellent	Count			27	27
	% of Neighborhood			15.3%	6.1%
Missing	Count			1	1
	% of Neighborhood			.6%	.2%
Total	Count	45	219	177	441
	% of Neighborhood	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%




Figure 5.3—Neighborhood Quality Rating by Neighborhood

Table 5.16

Mean Differences in Neighborhood Quality by Neighborhood and Ethnicity

Student-Newman-Keuls^a

	N	Subset for alpha = .05		
		1	2	3
Highbridge Blacks	27	1.74		
Highbridge Latinos	16	1.81		
E Tremont Latinos	84	2.05	2.05	
E Tremont Blacks	112	2.07	2.07	
Clinton Latinos	65		2.40	2.40
Clinton Whites	71		2.51	2.51
Clinton Blacks	22			2.55
Significance within Subset		.251	.050	.695

Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed.

a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 35.843

building quality, neighborhood quality was rated as being fair (52.8%) or poor (16.6%) by the vast majority of respondents (for a total of 69.4%). This is not particularly surprising given the locations of the neighborhoods. Highbridge residents rated their neighborhood the lowest. Clinton residents rated their neighborhood higher than did residents in either of the Bronx neighborhoods. Figure 5.3 graphically suggests how neighborhood quality rating varied by neighborhood.

The mean rating of neighborhood quality varied by gender. Women tended to rate the quality of their neighborhood higher than did men. Unlike apartment and building satisfaction, there were no differences based on leadership status. There were also significant differences in neighborhood quality rating by neighborhood and ethnicity. Table 5.16 examines an interaction effect of neighborhood and ethnicity on neighborhood quality rating. This analysis suggests that Clinton/Hell's Kitchen respondents differed significantly from residents in both Bronx neighborhoods combined in rating of neighborhood satisfaction.

The highest mean rating of neighborhood was with Blacks in the Clinton/Hell's Kitchen neighborhood. The lowest rating was from Highbridge Blacks. Table 5.16 suggests that if we exclude Clinton Blacks, there is an additional significantly different subset formed by Clinton Latinos and Whites with East Tremont respondents ($p < .05$). Furthermore, there are significant differences between groups within this subset ($p < .05$).

Table 5.17
Correlation Matrix
Individual Neighborhood Quality Rating
with Independent Variables

	AGE	WOMEN	WHITE	BLACK	LATINO	INC
NGHSAT\$	.0717	.1191	.1718**	-.1156	-.0359	.2559**
	ED	DENSITY	RENT2	RLENGTH	MN4	BX4
NGHSAT\$	.0932	-.2417**	-.0098	.0728	.2888**	-.1914**
	BX6	YRIN2	YRSOLD2	HDFC	APTSAT	BLDSAT
NGHSAT\$	-.1670**	.0684	-.0386	-.1512*	.5126**	.6131**
	BMANG_6	BPROB_6	SPROB_5	SECURTY	RRENT	CONFLCT
NGHSAT\$	.4026**	-.4509**	-.1376*	.3204**	.2617**	-.3220**
	CRISIS	AGRMNT	CNTRL_3	INFLU	BASIC_5	WORK_3
NGHSAT\$	-.3526**	.2611**	.3392**	.1942**	.3377**	-.0336
	FORML_5	TNORM_5	VOWN	VINV	VBRD	STAY
NGHSAT\$	.0604	.2177**	.1713**	.2465**	.2466**	.2746**
Minimum pairwise N of cases:			440	2-tailed Signif: *		
				- .01 ** - .001		

A large number of factors were moderately correlated with neighborhood quality rating (see Table 5.17). Respondents in Clinton were more likely to be satisfied with their neighborhood while those in Highbridge were less satisfied. Neighborhood quality ratings were correlated with fewer building and social problems as well as less building conflict and building crisis. Better management quality, better security, a stronger sense of control and influence were also correlated with neighborhood quality. Like building satisfaction, only basic involvement and tenant participation norms were significantly correlated to higher perceptions of neighborhood quality. Neighborhood quality ratings were also higher with residents who saw themselves as owners, and thought it was important to actively involve tenants and to have residents on the board of directors.

There is no attempt to predict neighborhood satisfaction with the variables in the present study. Most of the collected variables concern issues inside co-operatives. External factors such as neighborhood crime rates, graffiti, gang activity, drug traffic, proximity to public transportation, proximity to public facilities, etc. would also need to be considered as influences to reasonably try and predict neighborhood satisfaction. It may be possible for a different study to combine the present NNP92 data with additional archival data to conduct such an analysis. This is beyond the scope of the present study.

Summary of Findings

Apartment quality ratings were consistently predicted by women, higher ratings of building management, fewer perceptions of building problems, and higher levels of an individual sense of control. Less conflict, less crisis and a greater perception of general agreement in a building also consistently predicted apartment satisfaction, although which

one of these variables contributed to the model varied. Although greater perceptions of social problems helped to predict individual apartment satisfaction, aggregate perceptions did not. In addition, individual and collective social problems perceptions did not help to predict building satisfaction.

Like apartment satisfaction, individual building quality ratings were consistently predicted by women and/or buildings with a greater proportion of women respondents, higher ratings of building management, fewer perceptions of physical building condition problems, and a lower general sense of problematic group dynamics issues like conflict and building crisis. Results from the present study also suggest that living in a building where others are actively involved and taking on formal leadership roles increases building satisfaction.

Chapter 6

Results:

**Influential Predictors of
Environmental Satisfaction**

This chapter further explores some of the influential variables and related factors that helped to consistently predict environmental satisfaction (apartment and building quality ratings) in the last chapter. These included basic co-op environment variables such as attitudes toward building management and social capital factors such as the sense of control. Group dynamics issues like conflict and crisis helped to predict apartment and building satisfaction. The perception of building problems and gender were also important in helping to predict both environmental satisfaction outcomes.

Some of these predictor variables lend themselves to further analysis as outcome and dependent measures... and some do not. For example, it is hard to see how gender or building problem complaints can be anything but predictors of other outcomes. Attitudes toward building management could be an outcome measure. However, the right variables to fully investigate management attitudes are not available in the present study based on the work of Bratt et al. (1994, 1998). On the other hand, some insight into management is possible by looking at differences based on the perception of management type. Some of these management type differences are discussed in Chapter 7.

Examining control and influence as outcome measures relates directly to the basic research questions shaping the present study. Both of these social capital outcomes will be further examined in this chapter. In addition, both conflict and crisis will be considered

as outcome measures because of their importance in helping to predict environmental satisfaction in the last chapter.

Control and Influence as Outcome Measures

One of the research questions leading to the present study concerns looking at factors related to the perception of personal influence and a sense of control in HDFC and TIL buildings. How do resident perceptions of environmental conditions, social conflict, and social problems help to predict influence and control? Like the previous chapter, these two social capital and participation outcomes are to be examined at both an individual and at a contextual building level of analysis. At the individual level (*Regression Model 1*) each of the 441 survey responses is allowed to influence each of the outcomes directly. *Regression Model 2* is a four-level hierarchical multiple regression equation using only individual level variables to examine if co-op social capital and organizational culture variables help to better explain influence and control perceptions above and beyond the entry of all other variables. *Regression Model 3* uses the contextual analysis data set ($n=431$) in an eight-level hierarchical model. This model considers contextual aggregate organizational culture variables in addition to individual level variables.

Sense of Individual Control

A large number of factors were moderately correlated to a sense of control (*see Table 6.1*). While being White was moderately correlated with the sense of control, being Black was slightly negatively correlated. Income and education were associated with higher levels of a sense of control as were living in a smaller building and paying less rent. Residents living in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen perceived a greater sense of control while living

in either Bronx neighborhood was associated with a lower sense of control. Table 6.2 suggests that 67.1% of Clinton tenants fell in the highest third of control responses while less than 5% of those in Highbridge experienced high control.

Table 6.1
Correlation Matrix
Sense of Control
with Independent Variables

CNTRL\$3	AGE	WOMEN	WHITE	BLACK	LATINO	INC
	.1141	.0456	.4057**	-.1781**	-.0870	.4257**
CNTRL\$3	ED	DENSITY	RENT2	RLENGTH	MN4	BX4
	.3060**	-.2751**	-.2075**	.1159	.5211**	-.1925**
CNTRL\$3	BX6	YRIN2	APTSAT	BLDSAT	NGHSAT	BMANG_6
	-.3896**	.0117	.4607**	.5048**	.3516**	.4666**
CNTRL\$3	BPROB_6	SPROB_5	SECURTY	RRENT	CONFLCT	CRISIS
	-.4643**	-.1087	.2958**	.5087**	-.3967**	-.5413**
CNTRL\$3	AGRMNT	INFLU	BASIC_5	WORK_3	FORML_5	TNORM_5
	.2088**	.2465**	.4485**	-.1582*	.1650**	.1438*
CNTRL\$3	VOWN	VINV	VBRD	STAY		
	.1859**	.4238**	.4683**	.3061**		

Minimum pairwise N of cases: 417 2-tailed Signif: * - .01 ** - .001

Table 6.2
Crosstabulation

Control Categories by Neighborhood

		Control Categories (Median Split)			Total
		Low Control	Medium Control	High Control	
Highbridge	Count	20	23	2	45
	% Nghbrhd	44.4%	51.1%	4.4%	100.0%
E Tremont	Count	90	81	37	208
	% Nghbrhd	43.3%	38.9%	17.8%	100.0%
Clinton/Hell's Kitchen	Count	15	39	110	164
	% Nghbrhd	9.1%	23.8%	67.1%	100.0%
Total	Count	125	143	149	417
	% Nghbrhd	30.0%	34.3%	35.7%	100.0%

Apartment, building, and neighborhood quality ratings were all associated with a higher sense of control (*referring again to Table 6.1*). Respondents with higher levels of

a sense of control also tended to rate their building management as being better and saw fewer physical problems in their building. The sense of control was also associated with higher security perceptions and the feeling that rent was reasonable. All three group dynamics issues were associated with the sense of control including fewer conflict and crisis perceptions.

Basic involvement was moderately correlated with the sense of control. Table 6.3 looks at the association between the basic involvement component of attending meetings and the sense of control. Indeed 66.1% of residents who said they always attended meetings fell into the high control group as opposed to 23.3% of those who hardly ever attended [*Chi-Square*=55.24, *p*<.001]. Table 6.4 considers voting for the co-op board of directors and the sense of control. In this table, 61.7% of residents who said they voted in the last board election fell into the high control group as opposed to 24.9% of those who did not vote [*Chi-Square*=50.35, *p*<.001].

Table 6.3*Crosstabulation***Attend Meetings by Control Categories**

		Control Categories (Median Split)			Total
		Low Control	Medium Control	High Control	
Hardly ever attend co-op meetings	Count	42	47	27	116
	% Attend	36.2%	40.5%	23.3%	100.0%
	% Control	39.3%	38.8%	18.6%	31.1%
Sometimes attend co-op meetings	Count	48	53	44	145
	% Attend	33.1%	36.6%	30.3%	100.0%
	% Control	44.9%	43.8%	30.3%	38.9%
Always attend co-op meetings	Count	17	21	74	112
	% Attend	15.2%	18.8%	66.1%	100.0%
	% Control	15.9%	17.4%	51.0%	30.0%
Total	Count	107	121	145	373
	% Attend	28.7%	32.4%	38.9%	100.0%
	% Control	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.4
Crosstabulation
Co-op Voting by Control Categories

		Control Categories (Median Split)			Total
		Low Control	Medium Control	High Control	
Didn't vote	Count	82	81	54	217
	% Elect	37.8%	37.3%	24.9%	100.0%
	% Control	75.9%	72.3%	37.0%	59.3%
Voted in last board election	Count	26	31	92	149
	% Elect	17.4%	20.8%	61.7%	100.0%
	% Control	24.1%	27.7%	63.0%	40.7%
Total	Count	108	112	146	366
	% Elect	29.5%	30.6%	39.9%	100.0%
	% Control	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Although the relationship of the sense of control to other involvement behavior variables was significant (*see Table 6.1*), there was not a strong linear association with any of them. Control was slightly correlated with formal participation, influence and tenant participation norms. It was also negatively correlated with informal work and helping assistance.

The sense of control was moderately correlated with most of the organizational culture values items including valuing residents on the board, valuing resident involvement in the building and intentions to stay living in the building. Table 6.5 looks at the association between valuing resident involvement and the sense of control. Over 70% of residents who thought resident involvement was a good idea fell into the high control group as opposed to only one person (3.3%) of those who thought involvement was a very bad idea [*Chi-Square*=93.16, *p*<.001]. In addition, over half of the those who thought resident involvement was a bad idea are in the low control group.

Table 6.5
Crosstabulation

Value Resident Involvement by Control Categories

		Control Categories (Median Split)			Total
		Low Control	Medium Control	High Control	
Resident involvement is a very bad idea	Count	19	10	1	30
	% Value	63.3%	33.3%	3.3%	100.0%
	% Control	15.4%	7.1%	.7%	7.4%
Bad idea	Count	26	16	5	47
	% Value	55.3%	34.0%	10.6%	100.0%
	% Control	21.1%	11.4%	3.4%	11.5%
No opinion	Count	19	36	27	82
	% Value	23.2%	43.9%	32.9%	100.0%
	% Control	15.4%	25.7%	18.6%	20.1%
Good idea	Count	45	65	48	158
	% Value	28.5%	41.1%	30.4%	100.0%
	% Control	36.6%	46.4%	33.1%	38.7%
Resident involvement is a very good idea	Count	14	13	64	91
	% Value	15.4%	14.3%	70.3%	100.0%
	% Control	11.4%	9.3%	44.1%	22.3%
Total	Count	123	140	145	408
	% Value	30.1%	34.3%	35.5%	100.0%
	% Control	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.6 considers the relationship between valuing residents on the board of directors and the sense of control. Of the respondents who thought having residents on the board of directors was a very good idea, 69.9% fell into the high control group and none of those who thought it was a very bad idea [*Chi-Square*=118.87, $p<.001$]. Table 6.7 looks at the commitment to stay living in one's building. Over 58.4% of those who definitely planned to stay living in their building were also high in control against 19.6% who definitely wanted to move [*Chi-Square*=53.44, $p<.001$]. Although ownership was only slightly correlated with control, Table 6.8 suggests that 60% of those who strongly felt like an owner of their building also had high control [*Chi-Square*=33.99, $p<.001$].

Table 6.6
Crosstabulation

Value Residents on Board by Control Categories

		Control Categories (Median Split)			Total
		Low Control	Medium Control	High Control	
Not at all important to have residents on the board	Count	16	14		30
	% Value	53.3%	46.7%		100.0%
	% Control	13.0%	10.1%		7.4%
Not important	Count	49	32	5	86
	% Value	57.0%	37.2%	5.8	100.0%
	% Control	39.8%	23.0%	3.5	21.2%
No opinion	Count	12	30	26	68
	% Value	17.6%	44.1%	38.2%	100.0%
	% Control	9.8%	21.6%	18.1%	16.7%
Important	Count	34	44	41	119
	% Value	28.6%	37.0%	34.5%	100.0%
	% Control	27.6%	31.7%	28.5%	29.3%
Very important to have residents on the board	Count	12	19	72	103
	% Value	11.7%	18.4%	69.9%	100.0%
	% Control	9.8%	13.7%	50.0%	25.4%
Total	Count	123	139	144	406
	% Value	30.3%	34.2%	35.5%	100.0%
	% Control	100.0%	100.0%	100.0	100.0%

Table 6.7
Crosstabulation

Commitment to Stay by Control Categories

		Control Categories (Median Split)			Total
		Low Control	Medium Control	High Control	
Definitely want to move	Count	34	40	18	92
	% Stay	37.0%	43.5%	19.6%	100.0%
	% Control	27.4%	28.4%	12.2%	22.3%
Maybe Stay	Count	57	72	43	172
	% Stay	33.1%	41.9%	25.0%	100.0%
	% Control	46.0%	51.1%	29.1%	41.6%
Definitely plan to stay	Count	33	29	87	149
	% Stay	22.1%	19.5%	58.4%	100.0%
	% Control	26.6%	20.6%	58.8%	36.1%
Total	Count	124	141	148	413
	% Stay	30.0%	34.1%	35.8%	100.0%
	% Control	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.8
Crosstabulation

Feeling Like an Owner by Control Categories

		Control Categories (Median Split)			Total
		Low Control	Medium Control	High Control	
Strongly don't feel like an owner	Count	12	13	7	32
	% Owner	37.5%	40.6%	21.9%	100.0%
	% Control	9.8%	9.2%	4.8%	7.8%
Don't feel like an owner	Count	19	15	19	53
	% Owner	35.8%	28.3%	35.8%	100.0%
	% Control	15.4%	10.6%	13.1%	12.9%
Neutral	Count	26	49	26	101
	% Owner	25.7%	48.5%	25.7%	100.0%
	% Control	21.1%	34.5%	17.9%	24.6%
Feel like an owner	Count	50	51	48	149
	% Owner	33.6%	34.2%	32.2%	100.0%
	% Control	40.7%	35.9%	33.1%	36.3%
Strongly feel like an owner	Count	16	14	45	75
	% Owner	21.3%	18.7%	60.0%	100.0%
	% Control	13.0%	9.9%	31.0%	18.3%
Total	Count	123	142	145	410
	% Owner	30.0%	34.6%	35.4%	100.0%
	% Control	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 6.9

One-Way ANOVA

**Sense of Aggregate Control
by Building Race/Ethnicity Homogeneity**

$F(2,47) = 3.69$ $\text{Signif } F = .032$

	N	% of Buildings	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group</i>	18	36%	7.667	2.48
<i>Building with mixed ethnic/race groups</i>	14	28%	5.426	1.62
<i>Buildings with more than 10% missing ethnic/race data</i>	18	36%	5.921	3.02
TOTAL Buildings	50	100%	6.411	.57

Differences in Control by Building Homogeneity: There were significant differences in the aggregate sense of control based on the homogeneity of race/ethnicity in buildings.

Table 6.9 suggests that aggregate control perceptions were significantly higher ($p < .05$) in buildings where there is an apparent main ethnic/race cultural group as opposed to a mixed building population and buildings with more than 10% missing ethnic/race data.

Table 6.10

Regression Model 1

Individual Sense of Control

Multiple Regression Analysis—Stepwise Entry of All Variables

Method: **Stepwise**

R Square=.48845

F (9,399)=42.33122

Basic Demographic and Environmental Variables Co-op Ratings, and Co-op Participation and Values

Adjusted R Square=.47691

Signif F =.0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
Clinton	1.557892	.348175	.259353	4.474	.0000
Crisis	-.527506	.141584	-.189881	-3.726	.0002
Rent Reasonable	.640934	.182967	.168739	3.503	.0005
Social Problms	.185953	.054324	.152923	3.423	.0007
Education	.386730	.106440	.139963	3.633	.0003
Mangmnt Rating	.095106	.045546	.121828	2.088	.0374
Bldg Probs	-.091823	.043427	-.110976	-2.114	.0351
Conflict	-.273771	.128636	-.097356	-2.128	.0339
Rsdntl Tenure	-.260257	.127160	-.087072	-2.047	.0413

Variables not in the Equation Having Borderline Significance for Entry

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
Value Invlv	.078032	.085561	.343315	1.713	.0874

Regression Model 1—Stepwise Results: Table 6.10 summarizes the *Individual Model 1 Stepwise* analysis. The entire equation explained 49% of the variance in control perceptions, Adjusted R^2 =.48, F (9,399)=42.33, $p < .001$. In this model, the best predictor of control perceptions is living in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen [β =.259353, $p < .001$]. Both higher levels of education and less residential tenure were predictive of the individual sense of control. Higher ratings of building management, the feeling that rent was reasonable, fewer physical building problems all predicted control as well as, again

curiously, the increased perception of social problems. Group dynamics issues such as less conflict and less crisis also predicted control. In addition, increased valuing resident involvement was of borderline significance.

Table 6.11

Regression Model 2

Individual Sense of Control

Multiple Regression Analysis—Direct Entry of All Variables in 4 Levels

Level 1 Method: Enter Basic Demographics Variables
Level 2 Method: Enter Basic Environmental Variables
Level 3 Method: Enter Co-op Ratings
Level 4 Method: Enter Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.51395 Adjusted R Square=.47813
F (28,380)=14.35024 Signif F =.0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
Clinton	1.265567	.554497	.210688	2.282	.0230
Crisis	-.510518	.145051	-.183766	-3.520	.0005
Social Problms	.164489	.059572	.135272	2.761	.0060
Rent Reasonble	.509707	.193301	.134191	2.637	.0087
Conflict	-.275319	.133050	-.097906	-2.069	.0392
Education	.266120	.121960	.096313	2.182	.0297
Resdntl Tenure	-.261649	.135287	-.087537	-1.934	.0539

Variables with Borderline Significance

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
White	.882614	.490164	.110461	1.801	.0726
Bldg Problems	-.081514	.048485	-.098517	-1.681	.0935
Density	.233729	.141791	.088717	1.648	.1001
Mangmnt Rating	.079676	.049667	.102063	1.604	.1095

Regression Model 2—Individual Hierarchical Results: Table 6.11 summarizes the *Individual Model 2* analysis. The entire equation explained 51% of the variance in individual sense of control, $\text{Adjusted } R^2 = .48$, $F(28,380) = 14.35$, $p < .001$. Like the previous model, the best predictor of control perceptions is living in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen [$\beta = .210688$, $p < .01$]. Again, the demographics variables of higher education levels and less residential tenure help to predict the individual sense of control. Less

conflict and crisis predict control as do reasonable rent. Again, higher social problem perceptions also predict an individual sense of control. Of borderline significance in this hierarchical equation are being White, higher density, higher management ratings, and fewer building problem perceptions.

Table 6.12

Regression Model 3

Individual and Contextual Sense of Control

Multiple Regression Analysis—Direct Entry of All Variables in 8 Levels

Level 1 Method: Enter Individual Basic Demographics Variables
Level 2 Method: Enter Aggregate Basic Demographics Variables
Level 3 Method: Enter Individual Basic Environmental Variables
Level 4 Method: Enter Aggregate Basic Environmental Variables
Level 5 Method: Enter Individual Co-op Ratings
Level 6 Method: Enter Aggregate Co-op Ratings
Level 7 Method: Enter Individual Co-op Participation and Values
Level 8 Method: Enter Aggregate Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.54455 Adjusted R Square=.52895
F (48,360)= 13.12271 Signif F=.0000

Variables in the Final Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
Clinton	-2.688291	1.201870	-.447538	-2.237	.0259
@Rent Rsnble	2.191347	.652477	.421827	3.359	.0009
@Bldg Problems	.423631	.131935	.389387	3.211	.0014
@Crisis	-1.408857	.399282	-.358807	-3.528	.0005
@Security	1.481697	.495226	.272044	2.992	.0030
@Partcptn Nrms	-.223350	.097522	-.184546	-2.290	.0226
@White	1.871604	.895314	.170295	2.090	.0373
@Agreement	-1.405758	.549265	-.154193	-2.559	.0109
Bldg Problems	-.123085	.048258	-.148759	-2.551	.0112
@Education	-.720949	.327221	-.145507	-2.203	.0282
Social Problms	.174761	.062472	.143719	2.797	.0054
Density	-.367469	.194260	-.139481	-1.892	.0593
Highbridge	.833115	.423705	.089241	1.966	.0500
Education	.245790	.121870	.088955	2.017	.0445
Partcptn Nrms	-.074250	.038167	-.094074	-1.945	.0525

Regression Model 3— Contextual Hierarchical Results: Table 6.12 summarizes the *Regression Model 3* for the sense of control. The overall equation explained 54% of the variance in individual sense of control, Adjusted R²=.53, F (48,360)=13.12, p <.001. The

addition of organizational culture variables has complex effects on this model. For example, in this model, the best predictor of control perceptions reverses direction to become not living in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen [$\beta = -.447538$, $p < .01$]! In addition, living in Highbridge emerges as predicting an individual sense of control! Several aggregate organizational culture variables emerged as being relatively more influential in this model including higher aggregate perceptions of reasonable rent [$\beta = .421827$, $p < .01$], less aggregate perception of building crisis [$\beta = -.358807$, $p < .01$], and higher aggregate perceptions of security [$\beta = .272044$, $p < .01$]. Oddly, aggregate building problems emerges as a relatively important predictor [$\beta = .389387$, $p < .01$] at the same time that lower individual perceptions of building problems also predict the individual sense of control.

The individual sense of control is predicted in the contextual model by smaller building size, buildings that have a higher proportion of Whites living in them, higher education at the individual level, but also lower aggregate building education levels. Lower levels of both individual and aggregate perceptions of tenant participation norms and less general agreement climate help to predict an individual sense of control. Once again higher individual levels of social problem perceptions contributed to a sense of control.

Predicting Leadership Experience and Control: In Chapter 4, strong differences in the sense of control emerged between those people who had actual leadership experience and those with either leadership identity or wanting to be a leader but lacking actual experience. Table 6.13 collapses data found in Table 4.16 and summarizes the differences between leadership by experience groups through crosstabulation. It considers only those co-op residents with some identity or experience with leadership. In this table over 56%

of the experienced leaders reported feeling high control about what goes on in their building. On the other hand, just over 44% of the non-experienced leaders felt low control. The observed differences in control by leadership experience had a Chi-Square (2 df) = 27.675, $p < .001$.

Table 6.13
Crosstabulation

Leadership Experience by Control

		Control Categories			Total
		Low Control	Medium Control	High Control	
No experience but some identity	Count	34	29	14	77
	% Leader	44.2%	37.7%	18.2%	100.0%
Leadership experience	Count	21	26	60	107
	% Leader	19.6%	24.3%	56.1%	100.0%
Total	Count	55	55	74	184
	% Leader	29.9%	29.9%	40.2%	100.0%

Given these differences, I decided to conduct two additional regression equations predicting control—a separate equation for each group of leadership experience. Each of these equations was a step-wise regression similar to Regression Model 1. However, I reduced the number of variables entered into each of these equations because of a concern about degrees of freedom resulting from the lower number of people in each group. The variables used in these separate equations included: age, sex, education, satisfaction with building management, physical building problems, reasonable rent, security, conflict, crisis, social problems, tenant participation norms, valuing resident involvement, valuing residents on the board, basic participation, and informal work and helping assistance.

Table 6.14 summarizes the regression equation predicting the sense of control among those people with actual leadership experience. The overall equation explained 55% of

the variance in the individual sense of control, Adjusted R^2 = .53, $F(3,95) = 38.47$, $p < .001$.

Control was predicted in those with leadership experience by valuing other residents on the board [$\beta = .465912$, $p < .001$], less of a sense of crisis [$\beta = -.305126$, $p < .001$], and the

perception of fewer social problems (at last in the right direction!) [$\beta = -.155024$, $p < .05$].

Of borderline significance were less perception of tenant participation norms, and greater basic involvement, higher education and valuing resident involvement in co-op activities.

Table 6.14

Regression Model 1b

Individual Control Rating

Of Those With Actual Leadership Experience

Multiple Regression Analysis—Stepwise Entry of All Variables

Method:

Stepwise Basic Demographic and Environmental Variables Co-op Ratings, and Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.54849

F (3,95)= 38.46830

Adjusted R Square=.53423

Signif F = .0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig	T
Value Rsdtd Brd	1.576759	.282969	.465912	5.572	.0000	
Crisis	-.842102	.229588	-.305126	-3.668	.0004	
Social Probs	-.285584	.131943	-.155024	-2.164	.0329	

Variables not in the Equation Having Borderline Significance for Entry

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig	T
Partn Nrms	-.133150	-.189977	.672287	-1.876	.0637	
Basic Invlmt	.144447	.155717	.524714	1.528	.1298	
Education	.106018	.151125	.669976	1.482	.1416	
Value Invlmnt.	.136407	.147738	.457022	1.448	.1509	

Table 6.15 summarizes the regression equation predicting the sense of control among those with some leadership identity but no experience. This equation explained 48% of the variance in the individual sense of control, Adjusted R^2 = .44, $F(5,65) = 12.04$, $p < .001$. Control was predicted in those with leadership identity but no experience having more education [$\beta = .428957$, $p < .001$], believing that your rent is reasonable [$\beta = .250194$, $p < .01$],

fewer conflict perceptions [$\beta = -.252217$, $p < .01$], being younger [$\beta = -.247703$, $p < .01$] and less perception of building crisis [$\beta = -.203445$, $p < .10$]. Of borderline significance were more favorable ratings of building management and less informal work and helping assistance.

Table 6.15

Regression Model 1b

**Individual Control Rating Of Those With
Some Leadership Identity But No Experience**

Multiple Regression Analysis—Stepwise Entry of All Variables

Method:

Stepwise

Basic Demographic and Environmental Variables Co-op Ratings, and Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.48090

Adjusted R Square=.44097

F (6,65)= 12.04319

Signif F = .0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
Education	1.276102	.268058	.428957	4.761	.0000
Rent Reasnble	.922502	.333189	.250194	2.769	.0073
Conflict	-.546880	.232544	-.252217	-2.352	.0217
Age	-.790764	.289962	-.247703	-2.727	.0082
Crisis	-.486170	.254294	-.203445	-1.912	.0603

Variables not in the Equation Having Borderline Significance for Entry

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
Infml Invmt	-.149285	-.190893	.691976	-1.556	.1247
Bldg Mang	.150313	.191072	.680178	1.557	.1243

Influence

What factors help to predict the perception of personal influence in HDFC and TIL buildings? Compared to the sense of control, there were relatively few factors highly associated with influence (see Table 6.16). The strongest association was with higher ratings of building management (.41, $p < .001$). Other moderately associated variables included buildings in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen, fewer physical and social building problem

Table 6.16
Correlation Matrix
Influence
with Independent Variables

INFLU\$	AGE	WOMEN	WHITE	BLACK	LATINO	INC
	.0792	-.0071	.2750**	-.1749**	-.0798	.2406**
INFLU\$	ED	DENSITY	RENT2	RLENGTH	MN4	BX4
	.0084	-.2905**	-.1396*	.0778	.3354**	-.0869
INFLU\$	BX6	YRIN2	BMANG_6	BPROB_6	FORML_5	TNORM_5
	-.2769**	.0717	.4138**	-.3649**	.2352**	.2441**
INFLU\$	SPROB_5	SECURTY	RRENT	CONFLCT	CRISIS	AGRMNT
	-.3402**	.2477**	.2976**	-.2029**	-.2728**	.1271*
INFLU\$	BLDSAT	NGHSAT	APTSAT	CNTRL_3	BASIC_5	WORK_3
	.2177**	.1939**	.2549**	.2379**	.3494**	.1108
INFLU\$	VOWN	VINV	VBRD	STAY		
	.1751**	.2452**	.2534**	.2808**		
Minimum pairwise N of cases:			418	2-tailed Signif: *		
				- .01 ** - .001		

Table 6.17
Crosstabulation

Influence (Collapsed) by Control Categories

		Control Categories (Median Split)			
		Low Control	Medium Control	High Control	Total
Little or No influence	Count	16	35	20	71
	% Influence	22.5%	49.3%	28.2%	100.0%
	% Control	13.3%	25.4%	13.6%	17.5%
Some or A lot of influence	Count	104	103	127	334
	% Influence	31.1%	30.8%	38.0%	100.0%
	% Control	86.7%	74.6%	86.4%	82.5%
Total	Count	120	138	147	405
	% Influence	29.6%	34.1%	36.3%	100.0%
	% Control	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

perceptions, and higher levels of basic participation. There were also smaller associations between influence perceptions and being White, not being Black, paying less rent, perceiving that your rent is reasonable, higher income, smaller building unit size, higher

levels of environmental satisfaction, less conflict and crisis, more security perceptions, and a greater sense of individual control.

It is interesting to note that the correlation between control and influence is only .24 ($p < .001$). Table 6.17 compares control categories against influence collapsed dichotomously. In this table, feeling the perception of some or a lot of influence does not appear to differentiate by perceived control categories.

Differences in aggregate influence perceptions based on building race/ethnicity homogeneity were only of borderline significance [$F(2,47) = 2.956$, $p < .06$]. Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group reported the highest levels of influence. Buildings with mixed ethnic/race groups reported the lowest aggregate influence.

Table 6.18

Regression Model 1

Individual Influence Rating

Multiple Regression Analysis—Stepwise Entry of All Variables

Method:

Stepwise

Basic Demographic and Environmental Variables Co-op Ratings, and Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.23544

Adjusted R Square=.22616

F (5,412)=25.37475

Signif F = .0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
Mngmnt Ratings	.048851	.012707	.224473	3.844	.0001
Density	-.106173	.034250	-.146105	-3.100	.0021
Social Problms	-.049775	.017723	-.144912	-2.808	.0052
Infrml Invlmnt	.077196	.023994	.142389	3.217	.0014
Crisis	-.100211	.039315	-.128450	-2.549	.0112

Variables not in the Equation Having Borderline Significance for Entry

Variable	Beta In	Partial	Min Toler	T	Sig T
Yrs in HPD	.077463	.082540	.532514	1.679	.0939
Rent Rsnble	.089348	.084045	.525080	1.710	.0880

Regression Model 1—Stepwise Results: Table 6.18 summarizes the *Individual Model 1 Stepwise* analysis. The entire equation explained 24% of the variance in individual influence, $\text{Adjusted } R^2 = .22$, $F(5, 412) = 25.37$, $p < .001$. The best predictor of influence emerged as higher ratings of building management [$\beta = .224473$, $p < .001$]. Other predictors of influence included living in smaller buildings, higher ratings of building management, more informal work and helping assistance, less building crisis, and fewer social problems. Of borderline significance was living in a building that entered HPD programs earlier (again suggesting an early building in the landlord abandonment dilemma) as well as the perception of rent being reasonable.

Table 6.19

Regression Model 2

Individual Influence Rating

Multiple Regression Analysis—*Direct Entry of All Variables in 4 Levels*

Level 1 Method:	Enter	Basic Demographics Variables
Level 2 Method:	Enter	Basic Environmental Variables
Level 3 Method:	Enter	Co-op Ratings
Level 4 Method:	Enter	Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.28196 Adjusted R Square=.23028

F (28,389)= 5.45547 Signif F = .0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
Latino	-.263157	.131146	-.155200	-2.007	.0455
Density	-.109582	.047862	-.150796	-2.290	.0226
Social Probs	-.049596	.020034	-.144393	-2.476	.0137
Bldg Probs	-.030729	.016167	-.133186	-1.901	.0581

Variables with Borderline Significance

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
Infrml Invlmnt	.053191	.028848	.098111	1.844	.0660
Formal Invlmnt	.030116	.018412	.089609	1.636	.1027

Regression Model 2—Individual Hierarchical Results: Table 6.19 summarizes the *Individual Model 2* analysis. The entire equation explained 28% of the variance in

individual influence, $\text{Adjusted } R^2 = .23$, $F(28,389) = 5.45547$, $p < .001$. Influence was predicted by not being Latino, living in a smaller building, perceiving fewer physical building problems and seeing fewer social problems in one's building. In addition, higher levels of both formal and informal participation were of borderline significance in predicting the individual sense of influence.

Table 6.20

Regression Model 3

Individual and Contextual Influence

Multiple Regression Analysis—Direct Entry of All Variables in 8 Levels

Level 1 Method:	Enter	Individual Basic Demographics Variables
Level 2 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Basic Demographics Variables
Level 3 Method:	Enter	Individual Basic Environmental Variables
Level 4 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Basic Environmental Variables
Level 5 Method:	Enter	Individual Co-op Ratings
Level 6 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Co-op Ratings
Level 7 Method:	Enter	Individual Co-op Participation and Values
Level 8 Method:	Enter	Aggregate Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.33956

Adjusted R Square=.25198

F (48,362)= 3.87744

Signif F=.0000

Variables in the Final Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
@Rent Amnt	-.134990	.057509	-.200810	-2.347	.0194
Social Probs	-.066927	.023660	-.196122	-2.829	.0049
Partptn Nrms	-.030877	.014292	-.140823	-2.161	.0314
Infrml Work	.071943	.029656	.134076	2.426	.0158
Conflict	-.094457	.049568	-.121117	-1.906	.0575
Education	-.088905	.045623	-.115539	-1.949	.0521

Variables with Borderline Significance

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
Density	-.122193	.071469	-.166898	-1.710	.0882
Resdntl Tenure	-.094258	.055136	-.113754	-1.710	.0882

Regression Model 3— Contextual Hierarchical Results: Table 6.20 summarizes the *Regression Model 3* for influence. The entire equation explained 34% of the variance in individual influence, $\text{Adjusted } R^2 = .25$, $F(48,362) = 3.87744$, $p < .001$. The best predictor of individual level influence emerged as lower aggregate rent [$\beta = -.200810$, $p < .01$]. It is

interesting to note that aggregate rent was the only aggregate organizational culture variable that helped to predict influence. Individual influence was predicted by fewer individual social problems perceptions, lower levels of education, greater individual reports of informal work and helping assistance, fewer tenant participation norms, and less conflict. Smaller building size and having moved into a building more recently were of borderline significance in predicting influence.

Conflict, Crisis and Agreement

In the last chapter, group dynamics issues such as conflict, crisis and agreement helped to predict some aspect of environmental satisfaction. As opposed to control and influence, I had more technical rather than theoretical reasons for looking at these variables. As a result I examined conflict, crisis and agreement using only the contextual analysis data set and stepwise regression (*Regression Model 4*). In *Regression Model 4* all of the basic individual and aggregated demographic variables, basic individual and aggregated environmental variables, and most of the individual and aggregated co-op specific variables are allowed into the equation according to statistical criteria. The three environmental satisfaction outcome variables as well as control and influence are excluded from trying to predict conflict, crisis, and agreement in *Regression Model 4*. This is because conflict, crisis and social problems were significant predictors of environmental satisfaction, control and influence in previous analyses.

Conflict Perceptions

What factors help predict the individual perception that conflicts in an HDFC or TIL building prevent things from getting done? Table 6.21 summarizes the *Regression Model*

Table 6.21

Regression Model 4

Individual and Contextual Conflict

Multiple Regression Analysis—Stepwise Entry of All Variables

Method: Stepwise

Individual Basic Demographics Variables
Aggregate Basic Demographics Variables
Individual Basic Environmental Variables
Aggregate Basic Environmental Variables
Individual Co-op Ratings
Aggregate Co-op Ratings
Individual Co-op Participation and Values
Aggregate Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.27141 Adjusted R Square=.26273

F (5,420)= 31.29046 Signif F=.0000

Variables in the Final Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
@Bldg Mangment	-.147494	.025386	-.404619	-5.810	.0000
Bldg Mangment	-.068205	.019517	-.239783	-3.495	.0005
Social Problms	-.097729	.022075	-.219488	-4.427	.0000
@Resdntl Tenure	.284917	.068099	.187911	4.184	.0000
Informal Invlmnt.	.084322	.029888	.119608	2.821	.0050

Variables with Borderline Significance

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
Rsdnt Tenure-	.102162	.082685	.356303	-1.698	.0902
Bldg Probms	.113009	.091357	.327273	1.878	.0611
@Forml Invlmt.	.091692	.093367	.348033	1.920	.0556

4 *Stepwise* analysis. The entire equation explained 27% of the variance in individual conflict, $\text{Adjusted } R^2 = .26$, $F(5,420) = 31.29046$, $p < .001$. The best predictor of conflict was lower aggregate ratings of the quality of building management [$\beta = -.404619$, $p < .001$] followed by lower individual level rating of building management. Conflict was higher in buildings where a greater proportion of people have lived a long time and of borderline significance with individuals who were newer to the building. Increased individual informal work and helping assistance significantly predicted conflict as well as (of borderline significance) buildings where a greater proportion of residents have formal involvement experience. It is interesting to note that fewer perceptions of social problems

also helped to predict conflict. In addition, greater perceptions of physical building problems was of borderline significance in predicting conflict.

Crisis Perceptions

Although there were no significant differences in conflict based on building race homogeneity, there were differences based on aggregate crisis perceptions [$F(2,47) = 4.7419, p < .01$]. Buildings with one dominant ethnic group had significantly lower crisis scores than did either of the two other categories. Buildings with mixed ethnic/race groups had the highest levels of aggregate crisis perceptions.

What factors help predict an individual sense that one's HDFC or TIL building seems to be constantly in crisis? Table 6.22 summarizes the *Regression Model 4 Stepwise* analysis. The entire equation explained 40% of the variance in individual crisis perceptions, $\text{Adjusted } R^2 = .38, F(8,417) = 34.11517, p < .001$. Like the conflict equation, individual crisis perceptions were best predicted in the equation by lower aggregate ratings of building management [$\beta = -.283612, p < .001$] as well as lower individual building management ratings. More perceived problems in the physical condition of buildings and less of a feeling that rent was reasonable were significant predictors of crisis. Higher levels of informal involvement was a significant predictor, but, of borderline significance was lower levels of basic participation. Crisis perceptions were higher in buildings with relatively less educated tenants. Again, it is interesting to note that higher individual security perceptions and lower perceptions of social problems helped to predict the individual sense of crisis. Other variables of borderline significance included lower individual income, smaller building size, and buildings more recently landlord abandoned.

Table 6.22

Regression Model 4

Individual and Contextual Crisis

Multiple Regression Analysis—Stepwise Entry of All Variables

Method: **Stepwise** *Individual Basic Demographics Variables*
Aggregate Basic Demographics Variables
Individual Basic Environmental Variables
Aggregate Basic Environmental Variables
Individual Co-op Ratings
Aggregate Co-op Ratings
Individual Co-op Participation and Values
Aggregate Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.39558 Adjusted R Square=.38399

F (8,417)= 34.11517 Signif F=.0000

Variables in the Final Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
@Bldg Mangmnt	-.102504	.025518	-.283612	-4.017	.0001
Bldg Probms	.055773	.017620	.187164	3.165	.0017
Reasnble Rent	-.247160	.065532	-.180218	-3.772	.0002
Bldg Mangmnt	-.044913	.019274	-.157624	-2.330	.0203
Security	.176630	.068326	.130337	2.585	.0101
Social Probms	-.050460	.020873	-.112654	-2.418	.0161
Infrml Invlmnt	.070942	.027415	.100294	2.588	.0100
@Education	-.168422	.072155	-.094688	-2.334	.0201

Variables with Borderline Significance

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
Income	.078527	.080844	.265303	1.654	.0988
Density	-.075084	.083524	.275304	-1.710	.0881
Yrs in HPD	.067688	.082644	.288870	1.691	.0915
Basic Invlmt	-.088163	.081989	.263925	-1.678	.0941

Agreement Perceptions

What factors help predict an individual sense that there is more agreement than conflict in building decision making? Table 6.23 summarizes the *Regression Model 4 Stepwise* analysis. The entire equation explained only 14% of the variance in individual agreement climate perceptions, Adjusted R²=.14, F (4,408)= 17.89037, p <.001. The agreement climate was best predicted by higher individual ratings of building management [β=.253445, p<.001]. Buildings with a higher proportion of blacks, fewer individual

building problems complaints and considering rent as being reasonable also helped to predict higher agreement climate scores.

Table 6.23

Regression Model 4

Individual and Contextual Agreement

Multiple Regression Analysis—Stepwise Entry of All Variables

Method: **Stepwise** *Individual Basic Demographics Variables*
Aggregate Basic Demographics Variables
Individual Basic Environmental Variables
Aggregate Basic Environmental Variables
Individual Co-op Ratings
Aggregate Co-op Ratings
Individual Co-op Participation and Values
Aggregate Co-op Participation and Values

R Square=.14922 Adjusted R Square=.14088

F (4,408)= 17.89037 Signif F=.0000

Variables in the Final Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
<i>Bldg Mangmnt</i>	.041951	.010827	.253445	3.875	.0001
<i>@Black Ethnicity</i>	.454709	.152881	.175843	2.974	.0031
<i>Bldg Probs</i>	-.029251	.011268	-.168442	-2.596	.0098
<i>Rent Reasonable</i>	.107630	.045158	.134173	2.383	.0176

Summary of Findings

The individual sense of control was consistently predicted by higher levels of education and a greater feeling that rent was reasonable. Fewer physical building problems helped to predict control as did fewer perceptions of various group dynamics problems such as conflict and crisis. Informal involvement and smaller building size consistently predicted influence perceptions as did lower levels of either crisis or conflict (depending on the equation).

Looking at experienced leaders, variables predicting control included several “idealistic” factors such as valuing resident board involvement, valuing resident

involvement in general, the perception of weak tenant participation norms and higher levels of basic participation. Variables predicting control in the inexperienced leadership group included perceiving rent as being reasonable and higher ratings of building management. Less informal helping and work involvement predicted control in inexperienced leaders. In addition, control was predicted in both groups of leaders by lower levels of group dynamics issues such as crisis for both groups of leaders and higher respondent education.

The perceptions of crisis, conflict and agreement climate were consistently predicted by lower ratings of building management and a greater perception of physical building problems. More informal involvement helped to predict both crisis and conflict. Lower levels of social problems counterintuitively helped to predict both crisis and conflict. In addition, greater security ratings also helped to predict crisis!

Chapter 7**Results:****Additional Building Differences****Differences by Perception of Management Type**

Ratings of building management quality have been a consistent and important predictor of apartment and building satisfaction in the present study. At the time of the present study, buildings were managed by one of two approaches. They were either self-managed by the co-op itself or through a paid outside manager hired by the co-op board of directors. In Chapter 3, Table 3.17 suggested that just under three-fourths of the sample correctly identified the type of management in their HDFC or TIL co-op. This broke down to 60.8% of the sample saying that they live in buildings utilizing tenant management and 13.8% utilizing a paid outside manager. The remaining respondents either refused to

Table 7.1*Crosstabulation***Perceived Management Type by Neighborhood**

		Neighborhood			Total
		Highbridge	E Tremont	Clinton	
Refused or Missing	Count	8	69	6	83
	% Mangmnt	9.6%	83.1%	7.2%	100.0%
	% Neighbrhd	17.8%	31.5%	3.4%	18.8%
HPD/Landlord	Count	8	21		29
	% Mangmnt	27.6%	72.4%		100.0%
	% Neighbrhd	17.8%	9.6%		6.6%
Paid Manager	Count	8	24	29	61
	% Mangmnt	13.1%	39.3%	47.5%	100.0%
	% Neighbrhd	17.8%	11.0%	16.4%	13.8%
Tenant Management	Count	21	105	142	268
	% Mangmnt	7.8%	39.2%	53.0%	100.0%
	% Neighbrhd	46.7%	47.9%	80.2%	60.8%
Total	Count	45	219	177	441
	% Mangmnt	10.2%	49.7%	40.1%	100.0%
	% Neighbrhd	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 7.2
Crosstabulation
Management Perception by Building

Count	Building Management Type				Total
	Refused or Missing	HPD or Landlord	Paid Manager	Tenant Mangmnt	
Highbridge/Shakespeare Ave.		4	3	3	10
Highbridge/Shakespeare Ave.	2	1	2	5	10
Highbridge/Summit Ave.	2	1	2	4	9
Highbridge/Anderson Ave.	2	1		6	9
Highbridge/Anderson Ave.	2	1	1	3	7
E Tremont/Clinton Ave.	3			2	5
E Tremont/Crotona Park N.	3	2		3	8
E Tremont/E. 178th St.	6	1		3	10
E Tremont/E. 178th St.	5	1	1	4	11
E Tremont/E. 182nd St.	1	3	1	4	9
E Tremont/Longfellow Ave.	1			2	3
E Tremont/Southern Blvd.	15	3	3	42	63
E Tremont/Arthur Ave.	6	2	4	6	18
E Tremont/Belmont Ave.	2				2
E Tremont/Belmont Ave.	2			3	5
E Tremont/Belmont Ave.	1	2		5	8
E Tremont/E. 179th St.	8	2		6	16
E Tremont/E. 181st.	1	1	6	5	13
E Tremont/E. 181st St.	5	1	1	2	9
E Tremont/Mapes Ave.	2		4	6	12
E Tremont/Mapes Ave.	3	1	1	9	14
E Tremont/Prospect Ave.	5	2	3	3	13
Clinton/9th Ave.				7	7
Clinton/9th Ave.			2		2
Clinton/W. 57th St.	1			2	3
Clinton/W. 53rd St.				7	7
Clinton/W. 50th St.				5	5
Clinton/W. 50th St.				7	7
Clinton/W. 50th St.	1		1	2	4
Clinton/W. 55th St.				1	1
Clinton/W. 55th St.				5	5
Clinton/W. 49th St.			2	5	7
Clinton/W. 48th St.				3	3
Clinton/9th Ave.				8	8
Clinton/W. 48th St.			7		7
Clinton/W. 48th St.				5	5
Clinton/W. 48th St.				1	1
Clinton/W. 48th St.				5	5
Clinton/W. 48th St.				3	3
Clinton/W. 48th St.			4		4
Clinton/W. 47th St.			1	6	7
Clinton/W. 25th St.				11	11
Clinton/W. 37th St.				10	10
Clinton/W. 43rd St.				6	6
Clinton/W. 54th St.	1			8	9
Clinton/W. 49th St.	2		5	1	8
Clinton/W. 46th St.			3	1	4
Clinton/W. 47th St.			2	1	3
Clinton/W. 48th St.				6	6
Clinton/W. 46th St.			1	1	2
Clinton/W. 47th St.				7	7
Clinton/W. 51st St.				5	5
Clinton/W. 49th St.				1	1
Clinton/W. 47th St.	1			3	4
Clinton/10th Ave.				4	4
Clinton/10th Ave.			1	5	6
Total	83	29	61	268	441

answer this item or incorrectly identified their building management as being HPD or a private landlord. In addition, Table 7.1 suggests that tenant management responses and paid manager responses are distributed fairly evenly across neighborhoods. But, how accurate are these reports?

If Table 3.17 accurately reflected how buildings are managed, responses for tenant management and paid outside management should aggregate cleanly into clusters by building. In other words, the responses from any given building should either be all tenant management or all paid outside manager. That would be the case if residents correctly knew the type of management for their building. However, Table 7.2 demonstrates that this is generally not the case. With the exception of three buildings in Clinton, there is wide disagreement in reporting the use of paid outside management in buildings.

Visual inspection of Table 7.2 further suggests that most of these discrepancies (as well as missing and inaccurate management perceptions) are from Bronx respondents. Therefore, the type of building management reported in the present study appears to more the perception of building management type than an accurate report on the management scheme. Rather than actual management type, the question that can be looked at in the present study concerns whether or not there are differences between respondents who think their building is tenant managed and those who believe they have a paid outside manager. To explore this question, I decided to conduct a series of One Way ANOVA analyses using the building management type as the independent variable.

Basic Demographic Differences By Perceived Management Type

Income: There were significant differences in income based on the type of management reported in the present study ($F=15.13$; $p < .001$). Respondents reporting paid outside management for their building reported the highest incomes ($\mu=3.48$ or \$10-20,000). Tenant management also fell in the \$10-20,000 annual income bracket ($\mu=3.17$). Both of these groups of respondents had significantly higher incomes ($p < .05$) than did those missing a management type response ($\mu=2.26$ or \$5-10,000) or those who reported that HPD or a private landlord managed their building ($\mu=1.91$ or under \$5,000).

Education: There were significant differences in income based on management type ($F=4.57$; $p < .01$). Both the tenant management ($\mu=4.72$ or high school graduate) and the outside paid management groups ($\mu=4.71$ or high school graduate) reported the highest education levels. However, only the tenant management group differed significantly ($p < .05$) from both the refused/missing ($\mu=4.16$ or high school graduate) and HPD/Private landlord groups ($\mu=3.87$ or some high school). The paid outside management group also had significantly higher ($p < .05$) education than did those who did not report the management type of their building.

Age: There were significant differences in age based on management type ($F=3.13$, $p < .05$). Although both groups of tenant management and paid outside management were slightly older, none of the management type groups differed significantly from each other based on age.

Leadership Category Differences By Perceived Management Type

Table 7.3 compares the leadership and experience categories discussed in Chapter 4 with perceived building management type. The distribution of management type answers appear to be fairly even across all the different leadership categories. It is heartening to note that none of the respondents from the identified leader categories incorrectly reported living in buildings managed by HPD or a private landlord.

Table 7.3*Crosstabulation***Management Type Perception by Leadership Category**

		BLDMANG4 How is bldg mangd?				Total
		Refused or Missing	HPD or Landlord	Paid Manager	Tenant Mangmnt	
No exp LEADER	Count	10		2	12	24
	% Leader	41.7%		8.3	50.0%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	12.0%		3.3	4.5%	5.4%
No exp LIKE TO	Count	9	3	12	29	53
	% Leader	17.0%	5.7%	22.6	54.7%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	10.8%	10.3%	19.7	10.8%	12.0%
No exp/No identity	Count	44	22	35	146	247
	% Leader	17.8%	8.9%	14.2	59.1%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	53.0%	75.9%	57.4	54.5%	56.0%
LDR EXP not identified	Count	6	2	6	32	46
	% Leader	13.0%	4.3%	13.0	69.6%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	7.2	6.9%	9.8	11.9%	10.4%
LDR EXP & Identity	Count	12		5	44	61
	% Leader	19.7%		8.2	72.1%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	14.5%		8.2	16.4%	13.8%
Unknown	Count	2	2	1	5	10
	% Leader	20.0%	20.0%	10.0	50.0%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	2.4	6.9%	1.6	1.9%	2.3%
Total	Count	83	29	61	268	441
	% Leader	18.8%	6.6%	13.8	60.8%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	100.0	100.0%	100.0	100.0%	100.0%

Co-op Environment Variable Differences By Perceived Management Type

Building Management Ratings: Table 7.4 looks at differences in the overall ratings of building management based on the perceived management type. It is interesting to note that respondents reporting tenant management rated building management significantly higher than any other category ($p < .05$)! Not surprising, those perceiving their building management to be HPD or a private landlord gave the lowest management ratings.

Table 7.4*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Building Management Ratings by Building Management Type				
	Mean	N	(n=412)	
F=10.16 p < .001	10.17	250	Tenant Management	
	8.62	55	Outside Paid Manager	
	8.05	78	No Answer/Missing	
	7.72	29	HPD or Landlord	

Building Condition Complaints: The same pattern emerged for building condition complaints as for rating of building management (*see Table 7.5*). The magnitude of building condition complaints differed significantly by perceived management type ($F=10.81$; $p < .001$). The tenant management group reported significantly ($p < .05$) fewer complaints than any of the other groups. The highest level of complaints about building conditions came from those who thought their building was managed by HPD or by a private landlord.

Table 7.5*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Building Condition Complaints by Building Management Type				
		Mean	N	(n=436)
F=10.81	p < .001	5.99	266	Tenant Management
		7.44	61	Outside Paid Manager
		7.72	81	No Answer/Missing
		8.79	29	HPD or Landlord

Social Problems: Table 7.6 looks at differences in social problem perceptions by building type. There are significant differences between groups in this equation ($F=7.34$; $p < .001$). Tenant management respondents reported the fewest numbers of social problems. Those reporting a paid outside manager disclosed the highest perceptions of social problems. In addition, the paid outside manager group differed significantly ($p < .05$) from either the tenant management group and the missing/no response group. This later finding suggests a potential (but, untested) interaction between management type and perceived social problems which may have helped social problems predict apartment satisfaction in Chapter 5.

Table 7.6*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Social Problems by Building Management Type				
		Mean	N	(n=417)
F=7.34	p < .001	2.25	267	Tenant Management
		3.78	60	Outside Paid Manager
		2.27	83	No Answer/Missing
		3.17	29	HPD or Landlord

Security: Security ratings differed significantly by building management type ($F=5.24$; $p < .01$). The tenant management group rated building security higher than any

other group and significantly higher ($p < .05$) than those in the paid manager group. Those reporting a paid outside manager rated security the lowest of any group.

Rent Reasonable: The perception of reasonable rent varied significantly by building management type ($F=17.69$; $p < .001$). The tenant management group rated their rent as being reasonable significantly more ($p < .05$) than any other management group. The missing/no response group had the lowest ratings of their rent being reasonable.

Table 7.7

One Way Analysis of Variance

Conflict by Building Management Type				
	Mean	N	(n=435)	
F=7.54 p < .001	2.55	264	Tenant Management	
	2.54	61	Outside Paid Manager	
	3.12	81	No Answer/Missing	
	3.00	29	HPD or Landlord	

Table 7.8

Crosstabulation

Conflict Categories by Management Type

		Perceived Management Type				Total
		Refused or Missing	HPD or Landlord	Paid Manager	Tenant Mangmnt	
Lower Conflict	Count	26	7	33	145	211
	% Conflict	12.3%	3.3%	15.6%	68.7%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	32.1%	24.1%	54.1%	54.9%	48.5%
Medium Conflict	Count	17	14	18	60	109
	% Conflict	15.6%	12.8%	16.5%	55.0%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	21.0%	48.3%	29.5%	22.7%	25.1%
Higher Conflict	Count	38	8	10	59	115
	% Conflict	33.0%	7.0%	8.7%	51.3%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	46.9%	27.6%	16.4%	22.3%	26.4%
Total	Count	81	29	61	264	435
	% Conflict	18.6%	6.7%	14.0%	60.7%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Conflict: Table 7.7 considers conflict by management types. The missing or no response group reported the highest levels of conflict perceptions. This group rated conflict

significantly higher than did either the tenant management group or the paid outside manager group ($p < .05$). The HPD/Private landlord group also rated conflict significantly higher than did the tenant management group ($p < .05$).

These differences are made a little clearer by collapsing conflict categories in Table 7.8. In this table over 54% of the tenant management group and the paid outside manager group disagreed with the idea that there were conflicts in their building that kept things from getting done. On the other hand, almost 47% of the missing/no answer group felt there were conflicts hindering their building.

Table 7.9*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Crisis by Building Management Type				
	Mean	N	(n=435)	
F=19.020 p < .001	2.54	265	Tenant Management	
	2.64	61	Outside Paid Manager	
	3.43	81	No Answer/Missing	
	3.25	28	HPD or Landlord	

Table 7.10*Crosstabulation***Crisis Categories by Management Type**

		Perceived Management Type				Total
		Refused or Missing	HPD or Landlord	Paid Manager	Tenant Mangmnt	
Lower Crisis	Count	13	6	29	143	191
	% Crisis	6.8%	3.1%	15.2%	74.9%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	16.0%	21.4%	47.5%	54.0%	43.9%
Medium Crisis	Count	20	10	20	62	112
	% Crisis	17.9%	8.9%	17.9%	55.4%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	24.7%	35.7%	32.8%	23.4%	25.7%
Higher Crisis	Count	48	12	12	60	132
	% Crisis	36.4%	9.1%	9.1%	45.5%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	59.3%	42.9%	19.7%	22.6%	30.3%
Total	Count	81	28	61	265	435
	% Crisis	18.6%	6.4%	14.0%	60.9%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Crisis: Table 7.9 looks at crisis perceptions by management group type. The overall equation suggested significant differences between groups ($F=19.02$; $p < .001$). The rating of crisis was significantly lower ($p < .05$) with the tenant management and the paid management groups than with either other group. This relationship is made clearer by collapsing crisis categories in Table 7.10. Whereas 54% of the tenant management group disagreed with the idea that their building was constantly in crisis, almost 60% of the refused or missing group agreed!

Table 7.11*Crosstabulation***Agreement by Management Type**

		Perceived Management Type				Total
		Refused or Missing	HPD or Landlord	Paid Manager	Tenant Mangmnt	
Conflict	Count			1	4	5
	% Agreement			20.0%	80.0%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt			1.8%	1.5%	1.2%
More cnflct t/agrmnt	Count	20	5	8	37	70
	% Agreement	28.6%	7.1%	11.4%	52.9%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	25.6%	17.9%	14.0%	14.3%	16.6%
More agrmnt t/cnflct	Count	45	19	33	178	275
	% Agreement	16.4%	6.9%	12.0%	64.7%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	57.7%	67.9%	57.9%	68.7%	65.2%
Agreement	Count	13	4	15	40	72
	% Agreement	18.1%	5.6%	20.8%	55.6%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	16.7%	14.3%	26.3%	15.4%	17.1%
Total	Count	78	28	57	259	422
	% Agreement	18.5%	6.6%	13.5%	61.4%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Agreement: Both the missing/no response and HPD/Private landlord groups reported relatively higher levels of conflict and crisis in the previous discussion. The effects of crisis and conflict by building management type are somewhat mitigated, however, when considering agreement categories. Table 7.11 suggests that although there is conflict and

crisis in buildings, most residents perceive more agreement than conflict in the decision-making affecting their building. It is interesting to note that none of the refused/missing or HPD/Private landlord respondents felt that there was “a lot of conflict.”

Differences in Social Capital Measures By Perceived Management Type

Basic Involvement: Table 7.12 considers the basic involvement scale by management types [$F=12.04$; $p < .001$]. The tenant management group reported significantly higher scores ($p < .05$) over all the other groups. The group perceiving management as being HPD or a private landlord reported the lowest levels of basic participation. These differences are also shown in Table 7.13 where 51.5% of the tenant management group voted in the last board election. On the other hand, 90.5% of the HPD/Landlord group did not vote. Likewise 37.3% of those in the tenant management

Table 7.12

One Way Analysis of Variance

Basic Involvement by Building Management Type				
	Mean	N	(n=261)	
$F=12.04$ $p < .001$	1.57	175	Tenant Management	
	.08	29	Outside Paid Manager	
	-1.08	43	No Answer/Missing	
	-2.09	14	HPD or Landlord	

Table 7.13

Crosstabulation

Voting in Last Board Election by Management Type

		Perceived Management Type				Total
		Refused or Missing	HPD or Landlord	Paid Manager	Tenant Mangmnt	
Didn't Vote	Count	51	19	37	115	222
	% Mangmnt	72.9%	90.5%	67.3%	48.5%	58.0%
Voted in last board election	Count	19	2	18	122	161
	% Mangmnt	27.1%	9.5%	32.7%	51.5%	42.0%
Total	Count	70	21	55	237	383
	% Mangmnt	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 7.14*Crosstabulation***Attend Co-op Meetings by Management Type**

		Perceived Management Type				Total
		Refused or Missing	HPD or Landlord	Paid Manager	Tenant Mangmnt	
Hardly ever attend	Count	24	10	31	52	117
	% Mangmnt	35.3%	41.7%	54.4%	21.6%	30.0%
Sometimes	Count	30	13	12	99	154
	% Mangmnt	44.1%	54.2%	21.1%	41.1%	39.5%
Always attend	Count	14	1	14	90	119
	% Mangmnt	20.6%	4.2%	24.6%	37.3%	30.5%
Total	Count	68	24	57	241	390
	% Mangmnt	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

group report always attending meetings versus only one person in the HPD/Landlord group (see Table 7.14). It is also interesting to note in this table that 54.1% of the paid manager group reported hardly ever attending building meetings... the lowest of any of the four groups.

Table 7.15*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Informal Helping Involvement by Building Management Type				
		Mean	N	(n=420)
F=3.60 p < .01		2.21	256	Tenant Management
		2.15	59	Outside Paid Manager
		2.65	77	No Answer/Missing
		2.96	28	HPD or Landlord

Informal Helping Involvement: Table 7.15 considers some unexpected differences in informal helping involvement by management types. The tenant management group had significantly lower levels of informal helping involvement than the HPD/Landlord group or the refused missing group ($F=3.60$; $p < .01$). The paid management group reported the lowest amount of informal helping involvement.

Formal Involvement: Although the tenant management group reported the highest levels of formal involvement, there were no significant differences between groups based on this category.

Tenant Participation Norms: Table 7.16 considers tenant participation norms by management types. The paid management group had the lowest perception of tenant participation norms in the sample. Both the tenant management group and the refused missing group reported significantly more tenant participation norms than did the paid management group. The higher levels of perceived participation norms by refused-missing group may be yet another indicator of background conflict and building factions.

Table 7.16

One Way Analysis of Variance

Tenant Participation Norms by Building Management Type				
		Mean	N	(n=393)
F=2.93	p < .05	11.84	247	Tenant Management
		10.17	53	Outside Paid Manager
		11.61	67	No Answer/Missing
		11.92	26	HPD or Landlord

Table 7.17

One Way Analysis of Variance

Value Resident Involvement by Building Management Type				
		Mean	N	(n=347)
F=18.13	p < .001	3.16	217	Tenant Management
		3.02	41	Outside Paid Manager
		2.49	69	No Answer/Missing
		2.15	20	HPD or Landlord

Table 7.18

One Way Analysis of Variance

Value Residents on the Board by Building Management Type				
		Mean	N	(n=361)
F=25.57	p < .001	3.16	215	Tenant Management
		3.02	41	Outside Paid Manager
		2.36	78	No Answer/Missing
		2.07	27	HPD or Landlord

Differences in Organizational Culture Measures By Perceived Management Type

Value Resident Involvement: Both the tenant management and paid management groups valued resident involvement significantly more than did two remaining groups (see Table 7.17). The same pattern was evident in looking at how management group perceptions affected valuing residents on the board of directors (see Table 7.18).

Outcome Measure Differences By Perceived Management Type

Apartment and Building Satisfaction: Table 7.19 looks at apartment satisfaction differences by building management categories. Table 7.20 looks at building satisfaction using the same categories. There were no significant differences between tenant management and paid management in either apartment or building satisfaction. However, there were significant differences in apartment quality ratings ($F=12.60$; $p < .001$) and building quality ratings ($F=10.40$; $p < .001$) between those who disclosed the type of management in their building as being tenant or outside managed and those who did not. In general, those who reported their management type as being either tenant or outside managed

Table 7.19

One Way Analysis of Variance

Apartment Satisfaction by Building Management Type				
		<u>Mean</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>(n=438)</u>
$F=12.60$	$p < .001$	2.96	267	Tenant Management
		2.90	60	Outside Paid Manager
		2.54	83	No Answer/Missing
		2.38	29	HPD or Landlord

Table 7.20

One Way Analysis of Variance

Building Satisfaction by Building Management Type				
		<u>Mean</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>(n=438)</u>
$F=10.40$	$p < .001$	2.72	267	Tenant Management
		2.75	60	Outside Paid Manager
		2.31	83	No Answer/Missing
		2.21	29	HPD or Landlord

rated their apartments and buildings significantly higher ($p < .05$) than did those who either did not report this information or reported it as being HPD or a private landlord.

Table 7.21*One Way Analysis of Variance*

Control by Building Management Type				
	Mean	N	(n=416)	
F=29.71 p < .001	7.06	255	Tenant Management	
	6.25	60	Outside Paid Manager	
	4.08	74	No Answer/Missing	
	4.18	28	HPD or Landlord	

Table 7.22*Crosstabulation***Control Categories by Management Type**

		Perceived Management Type				Total
		Refused or Missing	HPD or Landlord	Paid Manager	Tenant Mangmnt	
Low Control	Count	47	17	16	56	136
	% Control	34.6%	12.5%	11.8%	41.2%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	56.6%	58.6%	26.2%	20.9%	30.8%
Medium Control	Count	31	11	21	89	152
	% Control	20.4%	7.2%	13.8%	58.6%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	37.3%	37.9%	34.4%	33.2%	34.5%
High Control	Count	5	1	24	123	153
	% Control	3.3%	.7%	15.7%	80.4%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	6.0%	3.4%	39.3%	45.9%	34.7%
Total	Count	83	29	61	268	441
	% Control	18.8%	6.6%	13.8%	60.8%	100.0%
	% Mangmnt	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Control: Table 7.21 considers differences in individual control based on management type perceptions. Tenant management was significantly higher ($p < .05$) than any of the other management categories in the amount of control respondents perceived they had over what goes on in their building. Respondents reporting paid outside management were also significantly higher ($p < .05$) than either group of those who did not report a type of management or who thought HPD or a private landlord managed their building.

Table 7.22 presents an even clearer picture of control differences by management type. Using a median split of control scores suggests that over 56% of the refused, missing and incorrect HPD/Landlord respondents fall in the lowest third of control responses. On the other hand, over 39-45% those who perceived either tenant or paid outside management were in the highest third of control responses.

Additional Differences in Key Variables
Based on Building Race/Ethnicity Homogeneity

Social Problems: Table 7.23 considers differences in aggregate social problem perceptions based on the homogeneity of race/ethnicity in buildings. Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group perceived significantly fewer social problems in their co-op than did co-ops with more mixed ethnic/race groups or buildings with over 10% missing ethnic/race data. This finding suggests yet another potential variable interaction that may have contributed to social problems consistently predicting outcome measures in the previous two chapters.

Table 7.23

One-Way ANOVA

***Aggregate Social Problems Perceptions
by Building Race/Ethnicity Homogeneity***

$F(2,47) = 3.222$ $\text{Signif } F = .049$

	<i>N</i>	<i>% of Buildings</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
<i>Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group</i>	18	36%	1.451	1.56
<i>Building with mixed ethnic/race groups</i>	14	28%	2.618	1.50
<i>Buildings with more than 10% missing ethnic/race data</i>	18	36%	2.786	1.945
<i>TOTAL Buildings</i>	50	100%	2.259	1.772

Basic Involvement: Basic involvement differed significantly based on the homogeneity of race/ethnicity in buildings. Table 7.24 suggests that the aggregate basic participation is significantly higher in buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group. Based on this classification, the lowest aggregate participation is in buildings with mixed ethnic/race groups.

Table 7.24

One-Way ANOVA

**Aggregate Basic Involvement
by Building Race/Ethnicity Homogeneity**

$F(2,47) = 3.740$ $\text{Signif } F = .0311$

	N	% of Buildings	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group</i>	18	36%	2.149	2.64
<i>Building with mixed ethnic/race groups</i>	14	28%	.3714	2.59
<i>Buildings with more than 10% missing ethnic/race data</i>	18	36%	.6782	2.64
TOTAL Buildings	50	100%	.9137	2.769

Table 7.25

One-Way ANOVA

**Aggregate Commitment to Stay
by Building Race/Ethnicity Homogeneity**

$F(2,47) = 5.484$ $\text{Signif } F = .007$

	N	% of Buildings	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group</i>	18	36%	2.564	.386
<i>Building with mixed ethnic/race groups</i>	14	28%	2.113	.432
<i>Buildings with more than 10% missing ethnic/race data</i>	18	36%	2.071	.605
TOTAL Buildings	50	100%	2.260	1.772

Commitment to Stay: The commitment to stay living in the co-op also differed significantly based on the homogeneity of race/ethnicity in buildings. Buildings with one

dominant ethnic/race group had a significantly greater commitment to stay than did buildings from either other group (see Table 7.25).

Table 7.26

One-Way ANOVA

**Aggregate Valuing Resident Involvement
by Building Race/Ethnicity Homogeneity**

$F(2,47) = 3.942$ Signif $F = .026$

	N	% of Buildings	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group</i>	18	36%	3.26	.447
<i>Building with mixed ethnic/race groups</i>	14	28%	2.751	.532
<i>Buildings with more than 10% missing ethnic/race data</i>	18	36%	3.057	.545
TOTAL Buildings	50	100%	3.044	.538

Table 7.27

One-Way ANOVA

**Aggregate Valuing Residents on the Board
by Building Race/Ethnicity Homogeneity**

$F(2,47) = 5.534$ Signif $F = .007$

	N	% of Buildings	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group</i>	18	36%	3.439	.523
<i>Building with mixed ethnic/race groups</i>	14	28%	2.610	.676
<i>Buildings with more than 10% missing ethnic/race data</i>	18	36%	3.033	.858
TOTAL Buildings	50	100%	3.061	.763

Co-op Values: Table 7.26 considers differences in aggregate valuing resident involvement based on the homogeneity of race/ethnicity in buildings. Table 7.27 considers these differences in terms of aggregate valuing residents on the co-op board. Buildings with one dominant ethnic/race group placed significantly more value on both resident in-

volvement in general as well as having residents on the co-op board than did buildings with mixed ethnic/race groups.

Summary of Findings

A wide variety of differences were observed in the present study among tenants who perceived tenant management over all other types. People who thought they lived in a tenant managed building rated management higher, saw fewer physical problems in their buildings, perceived fewer social problems, and thought their rent was the more reasonable than did respondents from the other perceived management categories. Tenant management respondents had the highest basic involvement levels in their buildings and perceived the greatest amount of control. They also held the highest levels of organizational culture values. In addition, a variety of aggregate organizational culture variables emerged as important predictors of both apartment and building quality.

Chapter 8

Summary and Discussion

Summary of Findings by Research Question

Research Question 1: What factors specific to a co-operative distinguish leaders from shareholders? Are there differences in the ways that leaders and shareholders view the physical and social environment, view participation and hold basic co-op values?

Analysis and results from the present study suggest that both leadership identity and leadership experience need to be looked at in limited equity housing co-operatives.

There are clearly important differences in this sample based on identity and experience. In essence, leaders who both identify as leaders and have experience are different from every one else in a limited-equity co-operative.

In addition, having actual leadership experience seems to make more of a difference than simply identifying as a leader. Results in the present study found higher levels of basic participation as the only factor that consistently discriminated experienced and identified leaders from everyone else. Other distinguishing factors included higher security perceptions, more informal work and helping assistance, greater valuing of tenant involvement in building affairs, the perception of rent being reasonable, higher ratings of building management as well as fewer perceptions of physical and social problems in buildings.

Four Types of Leaders

The present study began by trying to understand differences between leaders and shareholders in limited equity co-operatives. Hollander (1993) argues that the role of the

shareholder (or follower) offers an opportunity to assess leadership in a given setting. More important for the present study, understanding shareholder/followers could provide insight into the pool of future leaders needed for the long-term survival of the co-operative. Unfortunately, Hollander's conceptualization assumes the stability of a workplace organization where there is usually a single leader and a group of workers following that leader. Instead of a neat and simple structure, the analysis and results from the present study suggests that there may be two or more factions of leaders and therefore often several groups of followers.

In trying to understand these apparent factions, key leadership group differences emerged in the present study based on leadership identity and leadership experience. The chief difference between groups centered on whether or not the respondent had had any actual experience as a leader in her/his co-operative. Dividing people on this criteria created two groups—people with formal co-op leadership experience and people with some leader identity but no actual co-op leadership experience. Both of these groups were further subdivided into two additional categories to form a total of four distinct leadership categories based on experience and identity.

Traditional leaders: There were two groups of residents reporting actual leadership experience in the present study. The clearly identified and experienced leaders in the sample were different in many ways from every one else in limited-equity co-operatives. These leaders had the highest sense of control and satisfaction with the environment. Many participation and co-op values (extrinsic socialized motivations) items helped to distinguish these people as leaders. If we could extract a “perfect” form of these leaders,

they might be characterized as having a smidgen of idealism as well as the skills to actively meet the day-to-day needs of the co-op. However, it is important to keep in mind that the present data rely on leader self-reports. Although we can hypothesize traditional leaders from the present data, we can not directly examine leader effectiveness.

Disinclined leaders: Respondents in the other experienced group did not identify as being a leader. These people were distinct from traditional active leaders by being lower in informal helping involvement and lower in basic participation even though they perceived the highest levels of tenant participation norms of any leadership group. They felt less safe in their building. They were significantly lower on key co-op values than traditional active leaders. They perceived more conflict and more crisis than did active identified leaders albeit not at a statistically significant level. In addition, they were higher than traditional active leaders in their perceptions that leaders should check with tenants before making key decisions and felt leaders should make an extra effort to involve residents in the co-op. They also reported the highest level of any leadership group in their perception that leaders should be responsible for reducing conflict and in treating people fairly. Most importantly, these people reported that they had had some type of leadership experience in the past despite the fact they did not identify as leaders.

This combination of factors suggests some degree of co-op burnout (perhaps combined with other outside life stress) as distinguishing characteristics of this group. In addition, these factors may also describe out-group leaders who have been voted out of office and are disinclined to be seen as leaders—at least until the next election. Yet another possibility it that these leaders are disinclined because they greatly value their

personal privacy. To take on a traditional leader identity may well be negatively viewed as becoming a target for complaints and conflict resolution. As a result, a privacy oriented person would be disinclined to take on the identity of a traditional leader.

Emergent want-to-be leaders: There were two groups of respondents with some degree of leadership identity but who did not report every having any formal leadership experience. One of these groups expressed a desire to become a leader, but had not yet taken on any leadership roles. This group of emergent leaders was distinguished by the highest degree of seeing more physical building problems, more social problems, being less satisfied with management and having lower perceptions of reasonable rent. These people were also lower in basic participation and placed less importance on having residents on the board of directors. Their motivation to become a leader was stimulated more by problems that need attention—problems that effect the survival of the co-op, basic quality of life and/or their individual ability to meet basic survival needs.

Back seat leaders: The fourth group of leaders was in many ways the most interesting academically. They readily identified as being leaders, but did not report any history of leadership experience in the co-operative. On many factors these people looked like the traditional leaders. Like traditional active leaders, they saw fewer social problems and less conflict. They also agreed with traditional active leaders that it was important for building leaders to represent their building to the outside world. On the other hand, they had the lowest income and education of any group. They placed the least value on any kind of resident involvement in the co-op. They were high on the perception of physical building problems and the perception of crisis. They had the lowest levels of satisfaction with their

apartment, building, and neighborhood. In general, they were more likely to endorse items that suggested that leaders should do something... despite the fact that they had never taken on any formal leadership experience. This pattern of attitudes and involvement lead to the most interesting observation about the back seat leaders. Although they generally felt that they had a fair amount or a high level of influence about what goes on their building, they also reported feeling the lowest levels of control. The leadership motivation of this group seems to be personalized and intrinsic. As a result, these people seem to be good candidates for leaders of permanent out-group factions (since they are unlikely to ever take an active role).

Generalizability of Leadership Categories

Although data in the present study was gathered in limited equity co-operatives, the leadership types identified may well be applicable to middle and upper class co-operatives as well as a wider array of other organizational types. The key finding here is that both leadership experience and leadership identity should be considered in organizational research settings. Accounting for both of these factors may help explain some of the leader factionalization and conflicts in a variety of organizational settings.

Research Question 2: What is the potential leadership pool in a limited equity housing co-operative? What proportion of shareholders are good candidates for becoming a building leader? Common wisdom in HDFC co-operatives suggests that only a third of tenants ever get involved in their building. This common sense hypothesis was tested in the present study by three different classifications of the proportion of non-leaders who resemble identified and experienced leaders. The process of distinguishing leaders from shareholders began by trying to find sub-groups of residents who were not

active leaders. This search gradually evolved into an effort at understanding potential leadership factions in the co-operative as was discussed above. The remaining group of shareholders was not so easily analyzed. For one thing, there are a wide variety of outside work and volunteerism factors that can shape patterns of individual involvement inside a co-op. Unfortunately there are no measures to consider the world beyond the proximal co-operative in the present study.

Shareholders and the Leadership Pool

To look at the potential leadership pool, a series of discriminant classifications of shareholders against the observed traditional active leader was conducted. Comparing burned out leaders with the traditional active leader found that only 14.1% of the shareholders seemed to look at the co-op environment the way that traditional active leaders do. This classification differentiated people who have actual experience. Therefore, it appears that the best candidates for traditional active co-op leadership come from a very small pool of people. Leadership burn-out is a potential problem when the leadership pool is so small.

Comparing emergent leaders with the traditional active leader found that only 29.1% of shareholders saw the co-op from a perspective that was high in valuing resident participation. This suggests that the vast majority (70%) of shareholders have more of a survival co-op mentality. These people are less interested in co-operative values or participation and more interested in leaky pipes and keeping the rent reasonable.

Comparing back seat leaders to the traditional active leader found that almost 63% of the remaining shareholders were closer to the profile of the identified leader who has never

formally participated. This leaves the backbone of the work of the co-operative to be done by about 37% of the residents. This estimate fits a conventional common sense rule of thumb about co-op participation where building leaders estimate only a third of residents ever get involved. With this in mind, it is clear that Vanderslice's (1988) idea of leaderless groups is not very practical for HDFC and TIL co-operatives.

In general, the present study suggests that the potential new leadership pool is probably limited to between 14% and 37% of the tenants in an HDFC co-operative. The highest estimate (37.1%) was made by comparing actual leadership experience. The lowest estimate (14.1%) came by comparing the identity of experienced leaders. This suggests that in a building of 100 people, there may be 37 people who are willing to become involved with some type of leadership experience, but only 14 people who might readily identify as a future building leader. Indeed, experience has shown that it is difficult to entice residents to become a fully functioning building leader.

Research Question 3: *Do social capital and co-op participation variables help to explain a tenant's perception of the quality of her/his apartment and building above and beyond basic demographic and environmental factors?* The attempt to answer this question, in the present study, was through the use of a series of different multiple regression models for each environmental outcome. From one perspective, the answer to this question was somewhat related to the statistical regression approaches used. As was noted earlier, two of the regression models forced hierarchical statistical consideration of variables. In the present study, this meant that the social capital and participation factors were the last to be taken into account in any given equation. Despite this forced

approach, various social capital and co-op participation variables (especially the sense of control) survived and helped to explain additional variance. It can, therefore, be statistically argued that social capital and participation in a co-operative do help to explain apartment and building quality perceptions above and beyond basic demographic and environmental variables.

In addition, there were small differences in the results between the three apartment satisfaction models and between the three building satisfaction models. These differences also occurred because of different statistical assumptions underlying each of the three models. As a result, the most robust factors predicting a particular outcome were those that consistently show up across different regression models.

Apartment Satisfaction

Apartment quality ratings were consistently predicted by women, higher ratings of building management, fewer perceptions of building problems, and higher levels of an individual sense of control. The literature supports these findings. Leavitt and Saegert (1988, 1990) found a strong link between women and apartment satisfaction. Bratt, Keyes, Schwartz, & Vidal (1994, 1998) found management practices and building conditions as key factors in residential satisfaction. Wandersman et al. (1987) found the sense of personal control related to other kinds of environmental satisfaction such as neighborhood satisfaction.

Less conflict, less crisis and a greater perception of general agreement in a building also consistently predicted apartment satisfaction, although which one of these variables contributed to the model varied. In other words, group dynamics factors in buildings,

expressed as the general perception of conflict, building crisis and/or the agreement climate seemed to be important in predicting apartment satisfaction more than any one of these factors. The importance of group dynamics factors in predicting apartment satisfaction was expected based on the work of Glunt et al. (1995), and Glunt (1990).

It was somewhat counterintuitive to find greater individual perceptions of social problems in a building contributing positively to apartment satisfaction. Social problem perceptions had a small (-.15) but significant ($p < .01$) negative correlation to apartment quality when looked at alone. In other words, there was a slight tendency for apartment satisfaction to diminish as a resident develops greater perceptions of social problems in her/his building. The lack of a strong bivariate correlation may suggest that the types of social problems presented respondents were not a big factor in apartment satisfaction. It could also suggest that there was a degree of desensitization to social problems like drugs and graffiti that are endemic in the surrounding neighborhood context.

It is also important to note that, although greater perceptions of social problems helped to predict individual apartment satisfaction, aggregate perceptions did not. In other words, the collective perception of social problems did not help to predict apartment satisfaction either positively or negatively. In addition, individual and collective social problems perceptions did not help to predict building satisfaction. Therefore, it seems possible that apartment satisfaction is higher for those who perceive greater building social problems because these people differ in this perception from others in their building as they withdraw to the satisfaction and sanctum of their own apartment.

The perception of social problems could also be an indicator of some untested interaction between variables. In Chapter 4, for example, an unexpected relationship between leadership identity and homelessness suggested an interaction between past homelessness experience, wanting to be a leader and the perception of social problems in a building. In addition, differences in social problem perceptions may be influenced by the type of building management of the co-operative. Findings in Chapter 7 suggested a potential interaction between having a paid manager and the perception of social problems. Other findings in Chapter 7 suggested that there are significant differences in social problem perceptions based on the degree of building/race homogeneity.

Building Satisfaction

Like apartment satisfaction, individual building quality ratings were consistently predicted by women and/or buildings with a greater proportion of women respondents, higher ratings of building management, fewer perceptions of physical building condition problems, and a lower general sense of problematic group dynamics issues like conflict, and building crisis. It is interesting to note that several co-op positive attitudes and behaviors negatively predicted building satisfaction. For example, depending on the equation, less of a sense of ownership, less influence and fewer formal leadership behaviors all helped to predict individual building satisfaction!

This makes some sense if you keep in mind that higher levels of each of these social capital factors implies greater interaction, commitment, and involvement with a building. More interaction and involvement can increase stress levels and reduce chances to avoid building decision making conflicts. The result is higher conflict levels significantly predict lower levels of individual building satisfaction. On the other hand, results from the present

study also suggest that living in a building where others are actively involved and taking on formal leadership roles increases building satisfaction. Therefore, it might be that for some people, higher levels of building satisfaction are linked to living in a well kept and well managed building where others do most of the work and deal with day-to-day hassles... a very likely possibility!

Last, but not least, it is important to note that women were the most satisfied with both their apartments and their buildings. When it came to predicting building satisfaction, however, buildings with a greater proportion of women rather than individual women proved to be the significant predictor. This finding suggests a linkage to the community household model proposed by Leavitt and Saegert (1988) and to a kind of organizational culture that that model promotes.

Research Question 4: What factors help predict the perception of personal influence and a sense of control in HDFC and TIL buildings? The individual sense of control was consistently predicted by higher levels of education and a greater feeling that rent was reasonable. Fewer physical building problems helped to predict control as did fewer perceptions of various group dynamics problems such as conflict and crisis. Informal involvement and smaller building size consistently predicted influence perceptions as did lower levels of either crisis or conflict (depending on the equation).

The finding that living in Clinton/Hell's Kitchen predicts higher control levels when considering only individual level variables is interesting. Even more interesting is that when aggregate organizational culture variables were added to the equation, the neighborhood effect reversed directions! This probably resulted from control levels being

generally higher in Clinton suggesting less individual variation from the aggregate building level. Therefore an individual's control score from Clinton did not vary greatly from the scores of her/his fellow residents thus reducing its ability to "stand out" in the contextual regression model.

On the other hand, living in Highbridge had a simple negative bivariate correlation with control. This relationship also reversed direction when considering both individual and contextual level variables. Thus, in the contextual model living in the Highbridge neighborhood predicted higher levels of control! This probably resulted from aggregate building control scores in Highbridge generally being the lowest in the overall sample. Therefore, an individual with higher control perceptions in Highbridge stood out from her/his fellow residents increasing the ability of the neighborhood to be a predictor. There may be, however, a dark side to this finding. For example, an autocratic co-op leader would likely be a person high in individual control perceptions living in a building with relatively low aggregate control scores.

Again, higher levels of the 'meddlesome' social problems factor predicted the sense of control even though the bivariate correlation between these two variables was in the opposite direction and not significant. On the other hand, fewer social problems perceptions helped to predict influence perceptions. Perhaps social problems are a kind of environmental press to take action. In this contingency, influence may be less related to actual experience than is control.

There were some interesting differences, however when looking at the sense of control among those with leadership experience and those with some identity as a leader but no

experience. For experienced leaders, variables predicting control included several “idealistic” factors such as valuing resident board involvement, valuing resident involvement in general, the perception of weak tenant participation norms and higher levels of basic participation. Variables predicting control in the inexperienced leadership group included several “survival” factors such as perceiving rent as being reasonable and higher ratings of building management. Less informal helping and work involvement predicted control in inexperienced leaders. In addition, control was predicted in both groups of leaders by lower levels of group dynamics issues such as crisis for both groups of leaders and higher respondent education.

Conflict and Crisis: The perceptions of crisis, conflict and agreement climate were consistently predicted by lower ratings of building management and a greater perception of physical building problems. Lower levels of social problems counterintuitively helped to predict both crisis and conflict. In addition, greater security rating also helped to predict crisis! Again, the effect of social problems and security in predicting group dynamics issues suggest some untested interaction with other variables.

More informal involvement helped to predict both crisis and conflict. More informal involvement suggests conflict and crises were higher with those who interact with a greater number of other tenants. In addition, informal involvement helped to predict influence but not control. Perhaps it is important, at this point, to recall an earlier finding that identified leaders without experience had the second highest levels of informal involvement only behind identified and experienced leaders (*from Table 4.16*). With this in mind, it seems possible that informal involvement predicts conflict and crisis in the

present study as a substitute for out-group factionalization. This idea was further supported in Chapter 7 where those who refused to report their building management type (missing data) had significantly higher informal helping involvement scores than did people reporting tenant management.

Research Question 5: *Does tenant management make a difference in a resident's perception of the quality of her/his apartment and building or in her/his sense of control in the co-op?* The best way to have answered this question would have been to examine differences between residents who actually lived in tenant management buildings and residents who actually lived in buildings with paid outside managers. Results from the present study, however, are not so neatly arranged. With the exception of three buildings in Clinton, it is impossible to discern which buildings (if any) actually use paid outside managers. As a result, it is not possible to directly answer Research Question 5.

On the other hand, results from the present study offer some insight into the perception of tenant management. A wide variety of differences were observed in the present study among tenants who perceived tenant management over all other types. People who thought they lived in a tenant managed building rated management higher, saw fewer physical problems in their buildings, perceived fewer social problems, and thought their rent was the more reasonable than did respondents from the other perceived management categories.

Tenant management respondents had the highest basic involvement levels in their buildings and perceived the greatest amount of control. They also held the highest levels of organizational culture values. Perhaps the real significance of the observed differences

between perceived management types is that the tenant management group, by-and-large, buys into the co-op model and this is reflected in a greater acceptance of co-op values and norms.

Research Question 6: *How important is organizational culture in predicting outcomes such as apartment and building satisfaction?* From one perspective, the idea that there are organizational cultures in buildings was best supported in Chapter 3 through calculating generalizability coefficients prior to contextual analysis. Most variables were generalizable. This suggests that there is a degree of natural interaction and influence among residents in buildings that can result in patterns of shared beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. The pattern of response consistency at a building level is clearly an indicator of organizational culture.

A variety of aggregate organizational culture variables emerged as important predictors of both apartment and building quality. This is, in and of itself, a measure of the importance of organizational culture in predicting outcomes such as environmental satisfaction. However, the contextual equation predicting apartment satisfaction presented somewhat counterintuitive findings. Although higher levels of individual control predicted apartment satisfaction, so did lower levels of aggregate control and aggregate tenant participation norms. Perhaps this, again, suggests that environmental satisfaction is linked to living in a good building where there is a strong leader or a small group of strong leaders who willingly do most of the work of the co-op without involving other shareholders. Leavitt and Saegert (1990) as well as Glunt et al. (1995) observed co-ops that fit this archetype.

From another perspective, the contradictory patterns of aggregate social capital measures could be acting as proxies for the unmeasured concept of privacy. For example, lower levels of aggregate tenant participation norms were of at least borderline significance in predicting both apartment and building satisfaction. It is easy to understand how a building organizational culture that values personal privacy could also be a co-op with lower tenant participation and interaction norms.

Differences were observed in the last two chapters based on the homogeneity of race and ethnicity in co-ops. What is important about these differences is not so much that they are based on race and/or ethnicity, but in that sub-group cultures can form within the larger organizational building culture context. A dominant sub-group can easily develop into an “in-group” with some co-op members left on the outside. This type of social dynamic can lead to conflict, stigma development and artificial perception of social problems in buildings. Thus, findings from the present study suggest that conflict and crisis help to predict lower levels of environmental satisfaction.

Discussion

This study has looked at resident attitudes and experiences relating to leadership and participation in New York City limited-equity housing co-operatives. The purpose of the study was largely intended to address unanswered questions—questions left after many years of research by the Housing Environments Research Group in these kinds of buildings. How can we increase the leadership pool and/or develop new leaders in HDFC and TIL co-operatives? Is co-op participation seen as more of an obligatory task for

residents than a normal part of day-to-day living? Are New York City limited equity housing co-operatives viable in the long run?

It is ultimately through the lens of this last question that present explorations in leadership and participation have to be interpreted. What can the present study tell us about the long-term sustainability of co-operative housing efforts? The political and economic landscape of New York City's limited equity housing co-ops has changed somewhat in the six years since data were gathered for the present study. In a 1998 New York Times article, Kennedy (1998) reported that 352 of the 632 buildings taken over by tenants through the TIL program owed taxes and/or city water and sewer charges ranging from several hundred dollars to several hundred thousand dollars. Kennedy also reported that more than one-third of those former TIL buildings in arrears were in danger of once again being taken by the city for failure to pay taxes. Indeed, what can the present study tell us about the long-term sustainability of co-operative housing efforts?

Co-op Leadership

Against questions of sustainability, any discussion of nuances in co-op leadership seems a little like conducting a leadership seminar on the Titanic. Looking over the 30 year history of limited equity housing co-ops in New York City, however, suggests that co-op leadership has often been key to the success or failure of buildings in times of crisis. Indeed, as was discussed earlier, Lawson (1983) found the failure of early co-ops was often due to a weak organizational structure and problems with leadership succession. On the other hand, Leavitt and Saegert (1990) discussed the important role of elderly leaders and the influence of women on leadership development in the success of limited equity housing co-ops.

A HDFC co-op must have, by law, formal leaders such as an elected board of directors. In addition, as Saegert (1989) and others have observed, there are also informal leaders in these buildings. The present study suggests additional categories of leadership beyond formal and informal leaders that need to be considered when looking at HDFC buildings. Four categories of leadership emerged in the present study including: 1) traditional leaders; 2) disinclined leaders; 3) emergent leaders; and 4) back-seat survival leaders. The formal leadership grouping best applies to idealistic traditional and possibly burned out leaders. The informal leadership grouping is best represented in the emergent and back-seat survival leaders.

The present study found 46 out of 107 people (43%) with past and present co-op leadership experience did not identify as being a formal leader. This finding is similar to Rae (1997) who found that 37% of her respondents currently serving on their co-op's Board of Directors did not think of themselves as leaders. Rae also concluded that even on a Board of Directors, the leadership and decision making responsibilities probably fall on only one or two people. In general, most of the leadership research literature is based on this type of singular leader.

Earlier Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991) argued that leadership traits have to be viewed in context according to individual motivations as well as the setting. Results in the present study suggest that understanding individual leader motivation in HDFC co-ops may hinge on how the individual defines participation. For example, idealistic traditional leaders may have a greater socialized power motivation that helps distinguish them from the other leader groups. Evidence of this socialized power motivation is suggested by these leaders

holding stronger co-op values and reporting greater basic involvement than any of the other leadership groups.

Blake and Mouton (1969) argued that team management is the ‘ideal’ leadership style. This style emphasized both a people orientation and a task orientation. For the most part participants in the present study widely endorsed people oriented leadership roles. When asked to judge whether co-op leaders should focus more on a people orientation or a task orientation, the majority of residents thought that both were of equal importance.

Leadership Training

The equal emphasis on high concern for people as well as a high concern for getting things accomplished fits Blake and Mouton’s (1969) team management description. Leadership training based on the Managerial Grid (*again see Figure 1.3*) is not foreign to HDFC and TIL buildings. For example, Glunt (1990) describes a leadership training program attempted in an HDFC co-operative that was loosely based on the managerial grid. However, Glunt suggests that this training approach was not useful in helping to integrate formerly homeless families into an existing co-op. Concepts such as “country club management” were not meaningful to training participants and thus largely ignored. This, once again, confirms the often heard adage that training materials need to be




*Figure 8.1— A Co-op Managerial Grid
 (adapted from Figure 1.3; Blake & Mouton, 1969)*

modified to fit the organizational setting in which they are being used. When contextualized, almost any leadership training approach that emphasizes team building and team management can be made appropriate for an HDFC co-op (*see Figure 8.1*).

Beyond developing contextually relevant training materials, results from the present study also suggest that training should address key differences between observed leadership groups. Looking across all of the discriminant analysis results in Chapter 4, suggests that basic co-op values and principles are topics that need to be emphasized in any leadership training program. Co-op leadership training should not just be about efficient management and problem solving. This is a key lesson learned by international survival co-operatives. Rather than fuzzy middle class idealism, international survival co-ops organized by economically disadvantaged people coming together to try and empower themselves emphasize co-op values and principles throughout all aspects of co-op leadership, management, and organizational development (Levi & Litwin, 1986).

Leadership training needs to get co-op leaders focused on the three central elements of participation suggested by Wall and Lischeron (1977): 1) interaction, 2) information-sharing and 3) influence. Interaction should be informed by Van Ryzin's (1991) formulation of basic, formal, and work participation. Results from the present study suggest that higher levels of basic and formal participation help differentiate idealistic traditional leaders from the other three groups.

Information sharing is, in part, figuring out how to make the business of the co-op accessible to shareholders. Issues such as reasonable rent perceptions may hinge on information sharing processes within the co-op. Solutions to information sharing

problems are probably not limited to better graphics in an improved newsletter. Rather, a better approach might focus on current leaders mentoring relationships with aspiring leaders.

Focusing on how leaders and shareholders use influence may well give leaders insights into some of the sources of conflict within HDFCs. Far too often influence is negatively understood as attempts to persuade, to instigate, and to bias others toward a particular position. These potentially negative forms of influence are often at the root of building conflict. On the other hand, Covey (1991) describes over thirty methods of influence used in organizational settings that he breaks down into three categories. First, influence is a way to model behavior by example. Second, influence is a way to build community and caring relationships. Third, influence is a way to mentor by instructing others. These are all useful perspectives for future leadership training efforts.

Earlier Hirschhorn (1988) argued that conflict can develop when leadership roles and leadership influence get distorted. Given the degree that conflict and crisis helped to predict environmental satisfaction, both influence and role boundaries seem appropriate topics for leadership training. Again, Hollander and Offerman (1990) suggested that promoting leadership styles that emphasize power sharing and involving followers may promote leadership development in others. In addition, co-op leaders trying to implement participation need to pay close attention to involving others when they lack information and the need to consider whether subordinates share the organization's goals (*i.e. definitions of participation and co-op values*).

Values and Leadership Principles

Levi (1994) argued that the heart of a true co-operative depends on adherence to six international principles derived from the Rochdale System. These principles are: 1) open and voluntary membership; 2) democratic control; 3) limited rate of return on investment; 4) return of surplus to members; 5) cooperation among co-operatives, and 6) ongoing education of members. The operation of a true co-op is based on Rochdale principles. As a result, management and leadership in a true co-operative are also centered around co-op principles.

Are these kinds of principles, as some housing officials have informally suggested, too utopian for poor people living New York City? American history has had a number of utopian experiments such as Brook Farm in Massachusetts (circa 1841) and New Harmony, Indiana (circa 1824). Palisi (1970) argues that these early American utopian experiments ultimately failed because they were too small and too poorly run. In addition, he suggests that the core reason for failure was really that they each went too far beyond the boundary of the social system they rejected. Being utopian, they were transitory in nature and this prevented them from influencing the mainstream of their society. Do limited equity housing co-ops go too far beyond the boundary of the society system that they are attempting to adapt and cope with?

This is hardly the case. Glunt and Clark (1992) argued earlier that the development of limited-equity housing co-operatives has come about in response to economic crises that threatened the livability of residential buildings in many neighborhoods more than utopian dreams. Glunt and Clark further argued that the glue that binds many limited equity housing co-ops together has been shared experiences of race, gender and income and not

the co-oping process itself. Results from the present study, however, suggests that co-oping process itself may also be an important factor in some buildings. Further consideration needs to be given to the ways that existing co-op values and principles may contribute to environmental satisfaction and leadership development.

Outside the co-operative tradition, Covey (1991) attests to principle-centered leadership (*see Figure 8.2*). There are four phenomenological levels to Covey's model starting with the trustworthiness I exude as an individual. At the other end of the model is how I, as a leader, shape organizational structure, systems and strategies. From an leadership development perspective, Covey places the onus of changing organizational culture on leaders. Covey argues that principle-centered leadership shapes organizational culture by focusing people on guiding principles instead of conflict.

Principle-Centered Leadership		
Four Levels	Locus	Key Principles
Personal	<i>Self</i>	Trustworthiness
Interpersonal	<i>People</i>	Trust
Managerial	<i>Leadership Style</i> <i>Leadership Skills</i>	Empowerment
Organizational	<i>Structure</i> <i>Systems</i> <i>Strategy</i>	Alignment

Figure 8.2 — Principle-Centered Leadership
(adapted from Covey, 1991)

Although principle-centered leadership is potentially useful to HDFCs, it needs to be considered cautiously. Clearly Covey is deeply embedded in Humanist, Existential and organizational development epistemologies. In many ways, Covey is the epitome of pop

psychology with best selling books, books on tape and recognition by Time magazine as being one of the twenty-five most influential Americans. His former Covey Leadership Center was located at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah. His writing primarily speaks to an American middle-class, European White business management audience.

Despite these “minor problems,” there is a core idea that seems useful to a limited group of HDFC co-operatives. This core idea is the need to focus people in a co-op on the values and principles of the organization as a way of working through conflict, crisis, and disagreement. Principle centered leadership will work best in buildings where leaders already possess some internal sense of the importance of co-operative values. The idea is also most useful to co-ops where the organizational structure is the root problem and not massive building systems failures. In other words, focusing on values and principles may not work in all HDFC co-op settings.

A lot of the conflict in HDFC and TIL co-ops described by Glunt et al. (1995) and Rae (1997) stems from territorial battles and interpersonal issues rather than disagreements over larger co-op principles. However, focusing on organizational principles and process can be effective in reducing conflict when the issues are related to organizational structure and functioning. Territorial battles are often related to failures in an organizational structure and functioning. Territorial battles may include competition over scarce resources (e.g. who gets their plumbing fixed first) or, inversely, ambiguity over responsibility (e.g. figuring out who was supposed to call the plumber). Again focusing on co-op principles can help solve conflicts that stem from organizational structure. By returning to principles you start resolving conflict from a base of shared meanings and

agreed upon values. On the other hand, conflict based in interpersonal issues may require the help of an outside mediator or other technical assistance.

Beyond conflict resolution, a desired training outcome of technical assistance groups such as UHAB has long been to get residents saying that they “feel more like an owner than a renter” in their building. As a result authors such as Rae (1997) and Clark and Saegert (1995) have looked at the differing meanings of home ownership in a co-operative. If these are the kinds of outcomes we want to learn about, then we are really interested in the personal and collective meanings of living in a co-operative. This is precisely where Covey (1991) says that we should put our efforts. Developing personal and collective meaning is the key paradigm for principle-centered leadership.

Organizational Development

Results from the present study suggest that the potential pool of new leaders is probably limited to between 14% and 37% of the tenants in an HDFC co-operative. In other words if a building has 100 people, there may be 37 people who might help out with formal leadership activities with only 14 future building leader candidates. In Chapter 5, group dynamics issues such as less conflict, less crisis, and a greater perception of general agreement in a building consistently predicted apartment satisfaction and building satisfaction as did the perception of social problems. If we are concerned about increasing the leadership pool and dealing with group dynamics problems at the same time, we may need to change our focus from leadership training to organizational development.

Organizational Citizenship Behavior

How can a co-op increase participation in their building? A relatively recent body of literature that was not considered a priori in the present study focuses on organizational citizenship behavior—OCB. OCB is defined as action by members of an organization that exceed the formal requirements of membership and are, therefore, above and beyond the call of duty (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994). Although organizational citizenship behavior (*or co-operative citizenship behavior*) can take many different forms, Morrison (1994) suggests that most seem to fall into five basic categories: altruism, conscientiousness, civic virtue, sportsmanship, and courtesy (*see Figure 8.3*).

Konovsky and Pugh (1994) argue that trust—the belief among organizational members that they will be treated fairly by the organization and its leaders—is one of the

Co-operative Citizenship Behavior

Types	Examples
Altruism	<i>Informal helping neighbors; Volunteering</i>
Conscientiousness	<i>Completing co-op tasks; Always attending meetings</i>
Civic Virtue	<i>Keeping informed about the co-op; Attending Board meetings even though not on the board;</i>
Sportsmanship	<i>"Grin and bear it"; Making do without complaint; Not finding fault with the co-op</i>
Courtesy	<i>"Turning the other cheek; to avoid problems; Not "blowing up" when provoked</i>

Figure 8.3 — Co-operative Citizenship Behavior
(adapted from Morrison, 1994)

most important factors in promoting organizational citizenship behavior. In workplace settings, Konovsky and Pugh found that trust is positively correlated with the extent an employee believes that her/his supervisor's decisions are based in principles of distributive justice and procedural justice. In other words, trust is related to the perception of fair

distribution of resources as well as equal treatment in organizational processes. The more trust a person has of organizational leaders, the more likely she/he is to engage in prosocial behavior and participation.

The focus on trust is the key difference between promoting organizational citizenship behavior through co-op principles and a “values clarification” approach. Glazer (1992) describes how some social housing providers in the Bronx (such as Banana Kelly) have used individual values clarification in their buildings to reinforce good behavior. Residents are required to sign “tough love” leases that attempt to change residents’ attitudes and behaviors into ‘model residents.’ Based in the logic of behavior modification, residents either change their behaviors or they are forced to leave. As a result, cooperation becomes little more than compliance.

Trust and Cooperation

The efficacy of both trust and cooperation are core assumptions needed to advocate co-ops as a significant form of low-income social housing. Trust has been found to be a powerful predictor of cooperation in a number of recent research studies. For example, Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza (1995) found that the more trust a person has in coworkers, the more likely a person is to cooperate with their coworkers. These authors also found that perceptions of procedural justice strongly influenced outcomes of trust and cooperation.

In a study of business managers, McAllister (1995) observed two distinct kinds of trust that can affect cooperation in different ways: cognition-based trust and affect-based trust. Cognition-based trust concerns our beliefs about others’ reliability and

trustworthiness. Affect-based trust refers to the emotional bond between people that involve genuine care and concern for the welfare of others. McAllister found that affect-based trust was influenced by how much manager/leaders interacted with their peers and had previous helping experiences with them. On the other hand, cognitive based trust did not appear to influence cooperation directly, but, rather it developed through the expression of affect-based trust.

Building a Cooperative Organizational Culture

Applying this body of research on trust and cooperation to HDFCs suggests that simple cognitive training curriculums alone may not hold the key to developing a co-op cooperatively. The antecedent interpersonal trust necessary for group process may need to be grown and nurtured from within individual buildings until it gels into a co-op's organizational culture. As was noted earlier, what may start as personal styles, attitudes, values, or adaptations to external forces can evolve into the "organizational culture" of a co-op. Again, organizational culture (Schein, 1985) refers to shared expectations, characteristic affective styles and responses to certain events (*interpersonal trust*), as well as repeated 'scripts' for allocating resources (*distributive justice*), making sense of new information or handling conflicts (*procedural justice*). Results from the present study support the existence of organizational culture in HDFCs in that most variables were generalizable at an aggregate building level. Evidence of organizational culture in co-ops was also indicated by increased environmental satisfaction and higher levels of organizational participation at the aggregate building level.

The present study agrees with Bratt, Keyes, Schwartz, & Vidal (1994) in that management practices in non-profit sector housing are important predictors of residential satisfaction. However, the results from the present study challenge the idea that management is the only important predictor. Organizational dynamics exist in HDFC co-ops. Irrationalities in these building dynamics may prevent the identification of real conflicts of interest as well as other problems that negatively predicted environmental satisfaction in the present study. These conflicts and crises in the organization may also hinder the invention of solutions as well as the perception and development of management.

Ritualized explanations of co-op events may prevent new tenants from acting on valid insights or from finding necessary personal satisfactions in the co-operative. Shareholder evaluation of building management and the board of directors may come to reflect adherence to established scripts and routines rather than consideration of actual task performance or success in meeting co-op goals.

Indeed results in the present study (*Chapter 7*) found differences based on the homogeneity of race and ethnicity in co-ops. What is important about these differences is not so much that they are based on race and/or ethnicity, but that they remind us of the sub-group cultures that exist within the larger organizational building culture context. Shetzer (1993) argues that these types of prior dispositions based on culture, history, beliefs, and interpersonal interactions can make it extremely difficult to establish cooperative and collaborative systems. People living in a co-op do not give up other

cultural and community identities when they move into an HDFC co-op. Instead they are faced with multiple influences acting on them at a given time.

Looking at workplace settings, Kochan and McKersie (1992) suggest that the early stages of cooperation and collaboration can be easily undermined because of prior learned histories between parties. When problems arise, culture and past experience can amplify suspicion and mistrust. Quirk (1989) suggests the remnants of past conflicts (either real or symbolic) make it difficult to establish cooperation and collaboration in workplace settings because people believe that any concessions they make may be turned against them in the future. The problem is often who will break the cycle of conflict and collaborate first?

Reynaud (1983) argues that organizational development is a process of changing collective identities through the dynamics of collective micro-cultures. To Reynaud, developing community collective culture creates collective capital in an organization that is common to all group members. It is the community building process that helps organizations cope with environmental constraints. Reynaud suggests that the development of a collective organizational identity is key to prolonging the life-span of an organization.

For example, Saegert and Winkel (1998) suggest that although many buildings struggle with internal conflicts and low levels of participation, the unity that they achieve in the process has clear benefits. Often, new tenants are chosen for their potential to accept the collective co-op identity and for the skills they can bring into the building. In

addition, the organizational development process can put a lot of pressure on tenants who are engaged in antisocial or illegal behavior to change their behaviors or move out.

Taking an organizational development approach in HDFC co-operatives is not about reinforcing some utopian idealism. Earlier, Hornburg and Lang (1997) defined social capital as “the stocks of social trust, norms, and networks that people can draw upon in order to solve common problems.” Organizational development is a process gluing the social fabric of a co-op together and of building social bridges. Organizational development faces the reality that there are interpersonal differences, there are conflicts, and there are a variety of other psycho-social concerns that inhibit people and their ability to live together.

Building a cooperative organizational culture in HDFCs is not an utopian conception devoid of the social realities of inner city neighborhoods. It results from a slow and sometimes painful process of human interaction. It can not be done, however, without vision, without principles and without building trust between co-operators. These are core assumptions underlying a successful co-operative. If you can't stand behind these kinds of assumptions, then you are probably not going to advocate the extensive establishment of co-ops. You will see them as having limited efficacy and you are more likely to view centralized management and private landlord ownership as being a more viable social housing solution. Indeed the main problem with getting New York City housing officials to adequately support limited equity co-operatives may stem from a bureaucratic disbelief that people are capable of sustaining cooperative and interpersonal trust, or that it is not cost effective to put in the effort to do so.

Sustainability

Dreier (1997) reasons that, at a national policy level, we should be looking for social housing solutions that take us forward into the next century. We need housing solutions that are sustainable. Most of the concern about sustainability in the current social housing literature is focused on whether the non-profit sector will prove itself able to manage and maintain housing consistently and well over the long run (for example, Bratt et al. 1994). Good management is talked about as the 'holy grail' of sustainability. Results from the present study, however, suggest that there may be group dynamics and organizational factors that should also be taken into consideration.

In general, the concept of sustainability has a growing influence on planning and policy at the local level (Maclaren, 1996; Beatley, 1995). Some local communities have adopted sustainability as a goal in their planning activities. Along the same lines of thinking, New York City's efforts at alternative management of landlord buildings have been directed toward sustaining this source of low income housing within the city. But is the goal simply to sustain bricks and mortar? By what criteria do we use to look at sustainability? Maclaren argues that there is an absence of a clearly articulated methodology for reporting on urban sustainability and that this poses a dilemma for planning in general.

Saegert and Winkel (1998) proscribe that policies sustaining limited equity housing co-op must shift from generalized models to generalized principles. The complexity of sustaining limited equity co-ops gets tougher as we move beyond bricks and mortar models. Generalized principles offer the opportunity to quickly shift direction as circumstances change. Generalized models for alternative management of buildings have proven to be difficult to sustain over time.

Piccolomini (1996) argues that the literature on sustainable development is somewhat banal because it tries to explain sustainability within the current theories and reasoning of social modernization models. Piccolomini observes that new social movements and sustainable development should be viewed as two sides of the same coin. According to Piccolomini, this double aspectism represents a crisis of the current mainstream paradigm of social change. This crisis makes it unclear as to what is to be sustained.

Sustainability is more than bricks and mortar. It also concerns factors about how to help support people to successfully live in cities. Again, Maclaren (1996) points out that there is an interaction between quality of life issues, the ability to find employment as well as natural environment quality that underlie sustainability in addition to physical community development. In creating cities we need fewer throwaway models such as apartment complexes built with 20 year life cycles intended to be tossed away—but that really don't ever get tossed away. In this regard, most buildings that are HDFCs were not built in the throwaway model and are worthy of sustaining.

What is worth sustaining in an old decrepit multi-family apartment building?

Numerous authors have observed that limited equity tenant co-ops are often in some kind of financial or social crisis (Glunt et al., 1995; Leavitt & Saegert, 1990; Rae, 1997). Yet these same authors continue to promote limited equity co-ops. Saegert and Winkel (1998) point out that financial and social crises are common to all types of non-publicly owned low-income housing and not just co-ops. The problem at hand is not how to eliminate crisis in low-income housing but how to best create sustainable low-income housing in spite of inevitable crises.

If we only look to the sometimes appalling physical condition of a building, we might propose just tearing it down and starting over. This was a solution taken to heart at Charlotte Gardens in the Bronx during the early 1980s (Starr, 1984). In the 1970s and early 1980s, Charlotte Gardens was a symbol of urban decay. Both President Carter and President Reagan visited this neighborhood as a part of their election campaigns (Wiseman, 1981). The crumbling 5 and 6 story elevator buildings were torn down and replaced by single story pre-manufactured housing built in Indiana and trucked cross country to the site. The renewed Charlotte Gardens was supposed to be the epitome of American Dream social modernization. Over 100 families were able to become homeowners and move into a suburbia transformed from the rubble of the ghetto.

However, the economic price paid for these housing units suggests that only middle class families need to apply. The low density land use fails to support city infrastructure such as public transportation. The social price paid for these housing units paints a portrait of people living with barred windows and chain link fortresses topped with barbed wire in some cases. Like the suburban model they are based on, people rapidly become isolated from their neighbors in the new and improved Charlotte Gardens. The result is social modernization and the reinforcement of little nuclear families. Charlotte Gardens is, in many ways, Slater's (1970) "pursuit of loneliness."

Compare that inner-city solution to one of an East Tremont housing co-operative located approximately six blocks to the north of Charlotte Gardens. People well below the median income are living in this building. In this co-operative there are people sharing tasks. The building is relatively graffiti free. There are no bars on windows. There is a

sense of community and of an intergenerational community household model similar to that described by Saegert (1989). Saegert suggests that these kinds of community and sharing are crucial in an age of diminished social services. Outside of the building, existing neighborhood infrastructure, public transportation, power, telephone, water systems fit the established carrying capacity of the South Bronx (albeit in various stages of disrepair). Which is more sustainable, reusing buildings that have this infrastructure in place or trying to accommodate a new suburb?

Co-operatives and Social Change

Earlier, Piccolomini (1996) argued that that we should view new social movements and sustainable development as two sides of the same coin. Barton (1996) suggests that the development of a non-profit social housing sector over the past 30 years has not only helped to create affordable housing but has also shaped organizations that can mobilize on behalf of both themselves and their residents. These organizations can be an offsetting force to the political power of the for-profit real estate sector.

Social housing efforts such as limited equity housing co-operatives (and the related Neighborhood Network Project) have been both about sustaining affordable housing and social change (Clark & Saegert, 1995). The combination of these two illustrate the importance of Hornburg and Lang's (1997) two main dimensions of social capital—"social glue" and "social bridges." Again, social glue is a key component found within individual co-operatives and refers to the degree to which people take part in group life. On the other hand, the Neighborhood Network Project theoretically drew its nexus from the social bridges that link a co-op has to the outside world of city government and

services as well as networking with neighborhood organizations and other co-operative buildings.

Saegert and Winkel (1998) perceive that tenant “social bridge” organizing has often been necessary to educate and involve tenants in the TIL co-op program. However, once tenants begin to see that they can directly change their living conditions through cooperative action, they become motivated to press city officials for more building and neighborhood investments. Saegert and Winkel also argue that the usual pattern in a distressed privately owned building is for tenants to look for ways to move out as their income increases or they become more educated. By contrast, co-op tenants often use their education and financial resources to improve living conditions for themselves and others in their co-op. This is one way co-ops accumulate social capital that can be tapped into during times of crisis.

Social capital can often compensate for part of the financial capital needed to improve and maintain co-op buildings (Saegert and Winkel, 1998). However, these authors also point out that financial investment and management quality should not be downplayed. Like the results from the present study, Saegert and Winkel suggest that various social capital factors need to be taken into consideration in addition to money and management. The social capital that co-ops can muster has clear benefits to public policy. Saegert and Winkel (1998) suggest that these benefits come both through tenants’ close attention to the quality of repairs and upkeep of their buildings as well as their advocacy for public investment in neighborhoods.

Neighborhood Networks Revisited

As was noted in Chapter 1, the now defunct Neighborhood Network Project started out as an experimental community development and action strategy aimed at helping HDFC buildings work on common problems by forming small-scale self-help networks of resident-controlled buildings. The purpose of this effort was aimed at helping to sustain HDFC co-ops at multiple levels. As originally conceived, there were three tracks to the Neighborhood Network Project:

Track 1: Self Help Initiatives. These activities were aimed at helping buildings to improve their self-help problem solving capacities as well as identify opportunities to share problem solving resources between buildings and to bolster efforts to develop site-specific network organization.

Track 2: Community Initiatives. Community initiatives were to encourage buildings to work collaboratively on problems and solutions that lie (at least partially) in the broader community outside of the scope of individual buildings.

Track 3: City-Wide Initiatives. These activities were aimed at getting HDFC and TIL coops to work together on larger city-wide projects.

With self-conscious purpose, the Neighborhood Network Project initially recognized the critical link of social change and community organizing with long term survival of HDFC co-ops. The three tracks recognized various needs of co-ops. Level 1 attempted to address factors affecting co-ops from within. Most of the measures used in the present study examined issues related to Level 1 problems. Level 2 expanded the horizon to

neighborhood problems and Level 3 took on the city. In theory, each of the three levels was important and needed to be active.

However, as you read the Neighborhood Network Final Report (Minott, Rechavi, & Clark, 1996) most of the described effort of network organizers was aimed at the “glory” of city-wide organizing rather than the trenches of Track 1 self-help initiatives. To be fair, funding cutbacks and ongoing UHAB staffing problems heavily contributed to the limited focus on city-wide issues. But, out of three tracks, why did Track 3 take the predominant role? One suggestion Minott et al. make is that that key network organizers received Industrial Areas Foundation training (Rooney, 1997; Alinsky, 1946) that emphasized city-wide coalition building and confrontation. As a result, it was incidental that Track 1 and Track 2 were able to take off at all in the project. Results from the present study point to the need of stabilizing individual co-ops as a firm foundation to build on coalitions on. This suggests that future NNP type efforts utilizing limited equity co-ops as a nucleus for social change may be better off emphasizing self-help and community initiatives before starting in on city-wide coalitions.

Criteria for Co-op Sustainability

In looking at the broad topic of urban sustainability, Maclaren (1996) circumscribes a variety of criteria found across the planning literature spectrum. These sustainability criteria include: 1) intergenerational equity, 2) intragenerational equity (including social equity, geographical equity and equity in governance), 3) protection of the natural environment (and/or limiting further environmental degradation as well as living within the carrying capacity of an environment), 4) minimal use of nonrenewable resources, 5)

economic vitality and diversity, 6) community self-reliance, 7) individual well-being, and 8) satisfaction of basic human needs. Against this list of general criteria, limited equity co-ops have a great potential to contribute to the urban sustainability of New York City. But, what criteria does the present study suggest we add to judge sustainability of limited equity co-ops themselves? What policies will help meet the present needs of HDfCs but also help future generations living in these buildings to meet their own needs?

1—Leadership Development: Ongoing leadership development is a key policy consideration for the sustainability of limited equity housing co-ops and enhancing their political viability. We need leadership development that helps teach leaders to work together at the same time as working to bring some unity to different groups of leaders. To some degree, promoting cooperative values might be a key component in training. Indeed this leadership development needs to be more than training individuals to be autocratic landlord managers. We can not forget about developing the organization as well.

2—Internal Organizational Development: Fostering organizational development is a key task for leaders. By nature a co-operative should get its strength from the organization as much as from a leader. Organizational development enhances ties among residents and helps build social capital. Organizations with a good supply of social capital are likely to have less conflict and be better prepared to take on crises. They are also better able to deal with preexisting perceptions of other residents with different ethnic backgrounds, languages and cultures.

3—Neighborhood Community Development: The assumptions underlying the Neighborhood Network Project remain sound. HDFC co-ops should be encouraged to develop ties among building residents and other neighborhood co-ops. These ties help to build a collective social capital that can be used to sustain co-operatives. The Neighborhood Network Project was intended to utilize some of the social capital developed in individual cooperatives to effect neighborhood change. However, as the initial years of NNP suggest, those expecting co-op residents to develop a greater sense of community or ties with their neighborhood will be disappointed if they do not also advance specific organizing and technical assistance efforts aimed at community development.

4—Infrastructure and Support: Achieving neighborhood community development requires investment of funding assistance, technical assistance, staff expertise and time, tax break considerations as well as social capital. HDFC co-ops depend on the local demographic, institutional, economic and political context in which they operate. In short, people who try to explain the existence of “utopian experiments” (such as an HDFC co-op) through individual and individual building commitment should recognize that infrastructure is worth its weight in individual commitment many times over (Blasi, Mehrling & Whyte, 1984).

Saegert and Winkel (1998) agree with the needs for leadership training as well as organizational and neighborhood community development. Indeed, good organization and leadership can enhance the political viability of co-ops. However, Saegert and Winkel also caution that the time investment spent on extensive leadership training, tenant organizing

and neighborhood activism must be weighed against local media and politician desires for quick substantive results. To this end they suggest that the media and politicians, as community leaders, also need to be educated about the social benefits and ideological appeal of co-operative homeownership

We live in an age where policy makers are searching for new approaches to neighborhood revitalization and social service delivery that simultaneously allow for budget cutting and the devolution of responsibilities from federal and state government to the local level. HDFC and TIL co-operatives have been able to provide homes to residents that have improved the conditions of their lives despite these budget cuts and devolution. Evaluation of this type of housing, in the end, can not be made by looking at myopic management practices and/or tax arrears alone. Co-ops offer a potential contribution for urban sustainability and social change beyond their basic role of providing shelter.

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