INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A TRUE NATIONAL GUARD: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND ITS INFLUENCE ON DEFENSE LEGISLATION, 1915-1933

by

Les' Andrii Melnyk

A dissertation submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in History
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

The City University of New York

2004

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 3115274

Copyright 2004 by
Melnyk, Les' Andrii

All rights reserved.

UMI®

UMI Microform 3115274
Copyright 2004 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

© 2004

LES' ANDRII MELNYK

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in History in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

10/24/03
Date

David Syrett, Chair of the Examining Committee

10/24/03
Date

Joshua Freeman, Executive Officer

Kathleen Williams

Donald Scott

Martin J. Burke

Examining Committee

The City University of New York

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT

A TRUE NATIONAL GUARD: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND ITS INFLUENCE ON DEFENSE LEGISLATION, 1915-1933

by

Les' Andrii Melnyk

Advisor: Professor David Syrett

Throughout their shared history, the relationship between the National Guard and the Regular Army has varied from hostility and mistrust to friendly, if cautious, cooperation. The period from 1915 to 1933 exhibits the full spectrum of this relationship, and spans the enactment of three major – and many minor – laws that transformed the Guard into a modern federal reserve force while maintaining its traditional role as the soldiery of the states.

With the passage of the National Defense Act (NDA) of 1916 Guardsmen demonstrated their ability to defeat legislative proposals which threatened their newfound federal reserve status. This success, however, required acceptance of even stronger federal controls in order to acquire significant increases in funding.

Service on the Mexican border in 1916 and in France in 1917-1918, however, left many Guardsmen dissatisfied with the treatment they received at the hands of Regulars. While demonstrating that there was no single "Guard" point of view regarding the proper solution of these issues, this dissertation shows that individual Guardsmen as well as the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) had significant influence on defense legislation after the war. Unlike the NDA of 1916, the NDA of 1920 represented

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a gain for the Guard without any attendant sacrifice of autonomy.

The period 1921-1933 is revealed as a time when NGAUS and the Militia Bureau fine-tuned the 1920 legislation, when the Guard grew professionally, and when Guard/Regular relations became cooperative. The most significant interwar legislation was the National Guard Status Act of 1933, which formalized the unique dual status of the Guard as both militia and federal reserve force.

In examining the debates that took place from 1915 to 1933, certain key points arise repeatedly: federal versus state control; Guard organization; appropriations; benefits; flexibility of regulations; autonomy of the Militia Bureau; and Guard input into policies. Cooperation between NGAUS and the Militia Bureau was not – as other scholars have asserted – entirely defensive in an effort to maintain federal funding for the Guard. Rather, their attempts to enact legislation and policies beneficial to the Guard made significant progress during a period of increasing fiscal austerity.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Acknowledgments

This dissertation took an inordinate amount of time to finish. As I am perversely fond of telling people, I did everything I was advised not to do when I first entered graduate school: I taught too many classes as an adjunct; got distracted from my studies by falling in love with another grad student; got married, got a full-time job; bought a house; and had kids. In retrospect, I don't regret a single one of those "mistakes" – each of them has been an incredible opportunity that has enriched my life, and I am glad I made them all. But by all rights I should have become one of the 50 percent of graduate students who gets to the dissertation stage and never finishes. That I avoided this particular fate was entirely due to the love, support, and considerable patience of my family, co-workers, and advisors.

At the CUNY Graduate Center, I am indebted to my committee chair, Prof. David Syrett, as well as Prof. David Nasaw and Vice President for Student Affairs Matthew Schoengood, all of whom ensured that I received the proper extensions so that I could complete the thesis. Prof. Kathleen Williams labored with my early drafts and convoluted prose, yet remained a constant source of encouragement. Kathy believed I could do it even when I wasn't sure myself, and I will always be grateful to her for that. In the very small fraternity of National Guard historians, I had the good fortune to have both Prof. Emeritus Jerry Cooper and Col. (Ret.) Michael Doubler, Ph.D., read my manuscript. Their many thoughtful comments made this a much better work.

In the fall of 1998, while still in the early stages of writing this thesis, I jumped at the opportunity to serve on active duty as the Army National Guard Historian at the National Guard Bureau. While there was no requirement for me to hold a Ph.D. while in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

this position, the leadership in the Office of Public Affairs where I am assigned gave me their complete support as I pursued my personal goal. I was granted a degree of flexibility in my work hours and duty location without which I never could have finished. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Ms. Renee Hylton, the Chief of Historical Services, for taking up many of the tasks that would have fallen to me if I had been in the office on a more regular basis. I hope this contribution to the history of the National Guard helps make up for it.

Without a doubt, the most important thing I got out of graduate school was my wife, Stephanie Scott-Melnyk. Stephanie had the good sense to deposit her own dissertation the week before she gave birth to our first child. Since then, she has assumed more than her fair share of the parenting so that I might have the time to research and write. Her support has been phenomenal. I don't know how I could ever be happier in life than I am with her and the beautiful children we share, our son Zennon and our daughter Mattie.

Finally, this work is dedicated to my parents. Their profound belief in the merits of higher education, and their faith in me and my abilities, have motivated me my entire life. I promised them I would finish, and I finally did. My greatest regret in having taken so long is that my father did not live to see the day. Tato, I love you and miss you.

In deepest admiration for my fellow Guardsmen and women, so many of whom are now on active duty worldwide; to quote from one National Guard stalwart of the interwar period, Adjutant General James Drain of Washington, "they are citizens most of the time, soldiers some of the time, patriots all of the time."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND – THE MILITIA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 1916 1

THE MILITIA, WASHINGTON, AND THE CONSTITUTION 4

THE MILITIA ACT OF 1792 9

THE RISE OF THE VOLUNTEER MILITIA 12

THE BIRTH OF NGAUS 26

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 32

ELIHU ROOT, CHARLES DICK, AND THE DICK ACT 36

DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUARD UNDER THE DICK ACT 43

INCREASING OVERSIGHT, INCREASING TENSIONS 48

CHAPTER 2: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1916 AND WORLD WAR I 59

THE STIMSON PLAN 59

THE CONTINENTAL ARMY PLAN 62

THE GUARD VS. THE SECRETARY OF WAR 67

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1916 76

SERVICE ON THE BORDER 84

MOBILIZATION FOR THE GREAT WAR 89

THE ROOTS OF POST-WAR RESENTMENT: REORGANIZATIONS AND REDESIGNATIONS 94

SPECIAL CASES: THE 42ND AND 93RD DIVISIONS 101

TRAINING AND SERVICE IN THE AEF 106

THE HOME FRONT: MILITIA BUREAU AND STATE GUARDS 111

THE GUARD'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR 113

THE ROOTS OF POST-WAR RESENTMENT: PERSONNEL POLICIES 115

THE ROOTS OF POST-WAR RESENTMENT: DEMOBILIZATION 125

THE ROOTS OF POST-WAR RESENTMENT: BARRIERS TO REORGANIZING THE GUARD 128

THE ROOTS OF POST-WAR RESENTMENT: RELATIONS WITH THE MILITIA BUREAU 131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 3: THE DEBATE OVER NATIONAL DEFENSE – 1919 139

THE BAKER-MARCH BILL 140

JOHN MCAULEY PALMER 146

NGAUS REGROUPS 149

CONGRESS AND THE GUARD 157

TWO VERSIONS OF UMT: THE BAKER-MARCH AND CHAMBERLAIN-KAHN BILLS 161

TESTIMONY BEGINS: THE WAR DEPARTMENT MAKES ITS CASE 164

GENERAL O'RYAN TESTIFIES 170

NGAUS ATTACKS 176

PALMER AND PERSHING TESTIFY 180

THE GUARD TESTIFIES 191

THE NGAUS BILL 194

CHAPTER 4: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1920 212

DIVISION OF OPINION 213

THE AMERICAN LEGION ENDORSEMENT 217

THE WADSWORTH BILL 224

THE HOUSE REJECTS UMT 230

KAHN AND WADSWORTH BILLS COMPARED 234

THE SENATE REJECTS UMT 236

HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE: DEFEAT OF THE WADSWORTH BILL 240

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1920 246

UMT, THE POISON PILL 254

THE GUARD'S RELATIONS WITH THE MILITIA BUREAU 258

SUMMARY AND AFTERMATH: THE GUARD'S INFLUENCE 263

SUMMARY AND AFTERMATH: REACTIONS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1920 267

SUMMARY AND AFTERMATH: VICTORY WITHOUT SACRIFICE 270

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 5: 1920-1933 – POST-WAR ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, DEVELOPMENT OF THE MILITIA BUREAU, AND EARLY AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 271

REBUILDING THE GUARD AFTER THE WAR 273

SELECTING THE CHIEF 286

THE REGULAR ARMY AND THE CIVILIAN COMPONENTS 294

EARLY AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT 300

THE ALLIANCE OF THE GUARD LOBBIES AND THE MILITIA BUREAU 309

THE STRUGGLE FOR AN AUTONOMOUS MILITIA BUREAU 315

ORGANIZATION OF THE GUARD IN THE 1920S: ADJUSTING GOALS DOWNWARD 329

SUMMARY 341

CHAPTER 6: LEGISLATIVE REFORM; RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMPONENTS; GROWING PROFESSIONALISM; AND SERVICE ON THE GENERAL STAFF 344

LEGISLATIVE REFORM, 1923-1924 346

LEGISLATIVE REFORM, 1925-1929 363

THE STRUGGLE FOR ADEQUATE FUNDING, 1930-1933 371

THE GUARD AND APPROPRIATIONS 377

RELATIONS WITH THE REGULAR ARMY 382

REGULAR ARMY INSTRUCTORS AND THE GUARD 384

RELATIONS WITH THE ORGANIZED RESERVES 394

GROWTH OF PROFESSIONALISM 399

PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 404

MOTORIZATION 407

NATIONAL GUARD SERVICE ON THE GENERAL STAFF 409

SUMMARY 420

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 7: THE NATIONAL GUARD STATUS ACT 423

EARLY MEANS TO FEDERAL SERVICE: DUAL COMMISSIONING 424

THE MCPHERREN COMMITTEE 429

STUDIES AND REVISIONS 436

RECKORD WRITES THE GUARD STATUS BILL 443

THE STATUS BILL GOES TO CONGRESS 446

THE STATUS BILL BECOMES LAW 454

AFTERMATH 458

SUMMARY 462

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 468

APPENDIX 1 – NATIONAL GUARD, 1920-1933 483

APPENDIX 2 – NATIONAL GUARDSMEN ON THE GENERAL STAFF, 1921-1941 484

BIBLIOGRAPHY 485

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 1: Background – The Militia from Colonial Times to 1916

> *For over 110 years Congress neglected the militia and failed to exercise its right and duty to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel invasion. The agitation to accomplish some such action bore fruit in the act of January 21, 1903, which was the first step toward making the organized state forces a true National Guard. (Senator and Maj. Gen., Ohio National Guard, Charles Dick, January 1910)*[1]

The militia has been a part of American society since the first permanent British settlement was established in the early seventeenth century. While Spanish settlers in Florida may lay claim to having the first colonial defense forces in North America, the militia tradition in this country derives from England, transported to America's shores from a nation where the common citizenry were obligated to arm themselves, muster, drill, and defend their island from its foes. In the colonies, the necessity for self-preservation was more apparent and immediate. Until the mid-eighteenth century, the crown's soldiers were rarely on hand to protect the often far-flung settlements from the hostile, savage Indians or the almost as hostile (though perhaps not as savage) French. From the founding of Jamestown, Virginia in 1607 an organized and disciplined militia composed of all able-bodied adult males was a necessity for survival in the English colonies. While Jamestown established the first English militia in America, it was in the more populous Massachusetts Bay Colony that the various local militia companies were first organized into regiments by order of the colony's General Court on

[1] Charles Dick, "When General Dick took a look at the Dick Act," *National Guard*, Jan-Feb 1980, 39. Reprint of article originally published in *National Guard* magazine, Jan. 1910.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

December 13, 1636 - a date now commemorated as the birthday of the National Guard, America's oldest military institution.

The relationship between the militia, or as it eventually became known, the National Guard, and the Regular (or standing) Army has been a source of controversy in this country since the American Revolution. A person's interpretation of the role played by the militia in that conflict often said as much about his politics as it did about his military experience. Prior to the Revolution, Britain had expected her colonies to maintain civil order and defend themselves against the Indians, and as a result they developed militias capable of dealing with the threat. British Regulars were augmented by militia units during the frequent colonial wars with the French, Dutch, and Spanish, but returned to England after hostilities ceased. This changed following the Seven Years War (French and Indian War), when Parliament decided to permanently station Regulars in the American colonies, with the colonists bearing much of the cost. This action, coupled with increased enforcement of taxes and tariffs on colonial trade, signaled a change in the previous *laissez faire* attitude of the crown towards the colonies and generated a ground-swell of hostility toward the mother country. The red-coated Regulars, who enforced the much-hated taxation policies and were quartered in the homes of colonists, were seen as the hard hand of a distant and tyrannical monarchy squelching the liberties of a free people. This view would continue to color American political sensibilities long after the Revolution had ended.

Such opinions ran particularly deep in mercantile, non-Anglican, New England where the Boston Massacre and the Boston Tea Party raised tensions to the point of rebellion. Colonial leaders began hoarding stores of arms and powder, and in 1774 the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Massachusetts militia revived a long-standing custom of selecting volunteers out of the great mass of the enrolled militia to form "Minute" companies, "quick-reaction forces" to use the modern parlance, that could quickly respond to a crisis anywhere in the colony. However, contrary to legend, it was not one of these companies of minutemen that fired the "shot heard round the world" on April 19, 1775, but a local militia company under Capt. John Parker, which had mustered early in the morning on Lexington green in response to the alarm that a British column was heading for Concord to seize a cache of arms and gunpowder.[2] It was the same New England militia that bloodied British noses at Bunker Hill and, under the leadership of a former colonel of Virginia militia, George Washington, forced the British to abandon Boston. But this was also the ill-disciplined force that, with few exceptions, broke and ran at the Battle of Long Island with near-fatal consequences for the future of the infant American republic.

The volunteer soldiers and officers who manned the regiments of the Continental Army – the infant nation's standing army – came from the militia. Since the Continental Army was rarely large enough to take on the British army without augmentation, Washington and other American commanders were obliged to call upon the local militia whenever battle was imminent. These calls, which reduced Washington to the status of beggar on many occasions, rarely produced the number or quality of soldiers that he

---

[2] John R. Galvin, *The Minute Men: The First Fight: Myths & Realities of the American Revolution* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 120-122. In point of fact, the "shot heard round the world" (the phrase is from Emerson's "Concord Hymn") refers to the battle of Concord, not Lexington. In the public mind, however, the phrase has taken on the meaning of the first shots of the rebellion, which were fired at Lexington. At Concord, while both minuteman and militia regiments were present, Maj. John Buttrick's Middlesex county minuteman regiment fired the shots which dispersed the British at the Old North Bridge (see pp. 145-151).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

hoped for, but the militia's potential to appear on the battlefield in large numbers was a factor the British were forced to respect. It certainly influenced their decision early in the war to abandon much of the countryside to the rebels and take up residence in the relative comfort and security of the coastal cities.

The results of this choice were predictable. Left to the tender mercies of organized Patriot militia, most colonists of a loyalist persuasion either changed their views or fled to the protection of British garrisons. On the shifting battleground which ultimately decided the victor of the war – the "hearts and minds" of the colonists – the tide of public opinion moved inexorably toward independence from Britain so long as Patriot militia controlled the countryside. In a few cases, especially in the South, Tories formed loyalist militia organizations of their own, but these tended to be a minority which offered little material assistance to the British. In contrast, Patriot militia played a major role in virtually every battle fought during the war, including such notable victories as Bennington, Saratoga, King's Mountain, and Cowpens.

The Militia, Washington, and the Constitution

Given his extensive experience with the militia, it is natural that later politicians and historians would look to Washington as an important source of opinion on the utility of the militia as a military instrument. It is clear that the father of the country had had many an unpleasant experience. Following the Battle of Long Island, he despairingly wrote: "To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff .... if I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole I should subscribe to the latter." As Washington would express

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

many times during and after the war, the key shortcoming of the militia was its lack of training and organization. Later that same year he wrote: "They come in and you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores and leave you at last at a critical moment."[3]

By the time the war had ended, however, Washington's views on the militia had matured somewhat. In fact, he had become an advocate of it - but only if it was well-organized and trained. After all, Washington, in addition to his many other talents, was a political realist who understood that the majority of the American people deeply mistrusted standing armies, despised their cost, and romanticized the role that the militia - the most democratic of military institutions - had played in the winning of the Revolution.

When asked by the Confederation Congress in 1783 to contribute his thoughts on future military policy, Washington responded with his famous *Sentiments on a Peace Establishment.*[4] In it, he outlined a military establishment consisting of three parts - a small Regular force of 2,613 officers and men to "awe the Indians" and guard West Point and other important posts, and a "respectable and well established Militia" that would be nationalized in order to allow the central government to oversee its training, equipping and discipline. Within this militia force Washington called for a "Continental Militia"

---

[3] Washington letters of September and December, 1776, quoted in John McCauley Palmer, *America in Arms: The Experience of the United States with Military Organization* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1941), 14-15.

[4] The relatively benign comments concerning the militia contained in *Sentiments on a Peace Establishment* languished unread in the National Archives until uncovered by John McCauley Palmer in the 1920s. Washington's more famous condemnations of the militia were more readily available to nineteenth century readers due to their inclusion in a popular collection of Washington's writings, and helped fuel Emory Upton's attacks upon the militia in his works. See Stephen Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1964), 125-6; Palmer, *America in Arms*, 75n.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that would be, like the minutemen in Massachusetts, the first to mobilize in a crisis. These would be the younger men, and they would receive a high degree of training, to include annual summer encampments. The older men would act as a local reserve. As historians have pointed out, Washington's advocacy of a strong militia did not necessarily indicate that he found such a system an *ideal* military establishment, but rather one that would prove to be politically acceptable.[5] For Washington, the problem was not that militia could never be an effective military force – indeed, the militia system could not only be effective militarily, but was also an inherently sound method for ensuring citizen participation in and support for the young republic. He knew this when he wrote to the governors of the various states in 1783 that "[t]he militia of this country must be considered as the palladium of our security and the first effectual resort in case of hostility."[6] The key point, as Washington stressed, was that the new nation required a uniform militia, one that would be maintained to a uniform standard so it could be relied upon to operate as a coherent, trained military force when called upon in a crisis.

This is a significant belief that arises not only in the writings of Washington, but of the other founding fathers as well.[7] However, the framers of the Constitution did not

---

[5] Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 90-91.

[6] Quoted in John McAuley Palmer, *Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen* (New York: Doubleday, 1930), 26.

[7] For example, see Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers 28 & 29, under the headings "The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered" and "Concerning the Militia" and Jefferson's first inaugural address for a sampling of similar views. A superb collection of sources surveying opinion on the militia in the early republic is James Brown Scott's *Extracts from the Journals and Debates of the Federal Convention, the State Constitutional Conventions, the Congress, the Federalist, together with other papers relating to the Militia of the United States*, published as Senate

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

elaborate on the details of how the militia should be organized. That there would be a militia in the new republic was taken for granted – there was an obvious need for a state-controlled means of defense against coercive federal authority. This fear of standing armies was not a sentiment that became suddenly obsolete with the removal of the redcoats from the colonies. At war's end, the Newburgh conspiracy among Washington's officers, the violent demands for promised wages made by discharged veterans of the Continental Army, and the formation of a hereditary Society of Cincinnati were all recent events that fed suspicions that a standing army was fundamentally anti-republican, and that a strong militia was needed as a counterbalance.[8] For this reason, the circumstances under which the federal authority could summon the militia were narrowly defined. Congress – not the president – could only summon the militia "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions."[9] The framers simply did not imagine circumstances under which the militia might be needed for action beyond the borders of the United States. In part, this was a reflection of the idealism some of the framers had regarding future conflicts the nation would be engaged in, and in part a reflection of the limited, defensive role they intended for the militia. These circumscribed parameters for summoning the militia would force future generations of lawmakers and soldiers to seek alternative legal means to employ the militia outside the boundaries of the United States.

Document No. 695, 64th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1917).

[8] Michael Doubler, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Washington: GPO, 2001), 62-63.

[9] *U.S. Constitution*, Article I, Section 8. Congress delegated the authority to call forth the militia to the President in 1792.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Constitution also divided responsibility for maintenance of the militia between the federal and state governments. "The Congress shall have Power to . . . provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."[10] While it would take further legislation to flesh out the specifics of how this would be done, the framers of the Constitution gave more than adequate power to the federal government to ensure that the militia would be a viable force, adequately armed and trained, so that the problems experienced with ill-disciplined militia during the Revolution could be avoided in the future. Unfortunately for the military preparedness of the nation, Congress would fail to exercise this oversight authority in any significant way for more than a century.

As a final measure, the founding fathers appended the Second Amendment to the Constitution, thereby guaranteeing the people the right to keep and bear arms for a specific purpose – "A *well regulated* militia, being necessary to the security of a free state ...." This subordinate clause has essentially been forgotten in the modern-day debate over gun control; the right to maintain personal arms also implicitly carries with it the duty to submit to military discipline and actively take part in the defense of state and nation. In fact, the purpose of the Second Amendment was to protect the state's right to maintain a militia: "Because the Constitution did not specifically guarantee the existence of the militia, Antifederalists, who feared the national government might kill the state soldiery

[10] Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

by neglect, won approval for the Second Amendment to assure constitutional protection of the militia."[11] The militia clearly was a key institution to the founding fathers, particularly those who feared centralized power, because they believed in the military strength of virtuous citizens defending their home and their liberty against oppressors both foreign and domestic.

The Militia Act of 1792

Among the first issues the new Congress had to deal with was passage of legislation which would flesh out the rather broad guidance given in the Constitution regarding the militia. In 1790, Secretary of War Henry Knox and President Washington advocated legislation that would have established uniform standards for both the training and organization of the various state militias, and divided all eligible adult men between eighteen and forty-five into categories that would be trained to varying levels of efficiency based on their age. All arms, equipment, and uniforms would come from federal sources, and militiamen would be paid while attending compulsory training camps. Despite Washington's strong backing, the Knox Plan, as it came to be known, failed because of its expense and the persistent fear that federal controls might interfere with the liberty of the states. Congress bitterly argued and delayed passage of militia legislation for two years. When they finally did pass legislation, they had gutted Knox's plan to the point where he and other Federalists opposed it. The end result was a work of

[11] Jerry Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865-1920* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1997), 8. Another fear was that the federal authority might call up the militia and then disarm it, thus leaving the states defenseless; the Second Amendment made this illegal.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

compromise that has been subject to great criticism ever since.

What was left of Knox's plan after its passage through Congress was known as the Militia Act of 1792, and it reflected to some degree the Antifederalist fear of centralized control over the militia. The law imposed a near-universal duty on the citizenry, but failed to provide equipment, funding, oversight, or even penalties for a state's failure to comply with the law.[12] In other words, there would be little to guarantee that there would be anything "uniform" about the militia created by this act. The law remained largely unchanged for the next 111 years, and was a major cause for military unpreparedness at the beginning of every conflict America fought in the nineteenth century.

The Militia Act: (1) required that the states appoint Adjutants General and muster their militia once annually to maintain the rolls, (2) specified the weapons, ammunition, and equipment that each militiaman was to provide at his own expense, (3) detailed the hierarchy of militia units from divisions down to individual companies, (4) and mandated that the militia train according to the same discipline prescribed by Baron von Steuben for the Continental Army. Congress delegated to the president the constitutional power to call forth the militia, but only for a period not to exceed three months in any one year.[13]

---

[12] What is commonly called the Militia Act of 1792 actually consisted of two laws passed in May of that year, the Uniform Militia Act and the Calling Forth Act. Modifications in 1795 and 1808 allowed the President to mobilize the militia by calling either intact units or calling for volunteers, and authorized $200,000 in arms annually to the states for those men too poor to provide their own weapons. See Millett and Maslowski, 94-95; Renee Hylton and Robert Wright, Jr., *A Brief History of the Militia and National Guard* (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1993), 8.

[13] Initially, the President could not call forth the militia to execute the laws of the union unless first notified by an associate justice of the Supreme Court or a district judge that the laws could not be enforced by the normal, civil means. Congress removed this restriction on the President in 1795. See Frederick Weiner,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The most important feature of the Militia Act was that it embodied the concept of near-universal service. Every able-bodied white male citizen between ages eighteen and forty-five owed military service to the country, and comprised the enrolled militia (also referred to as the common, regular, compulsory or obligated militia). This law provided the basis for all subsequent military draft laws, from the Civil War to the present day. The act also provided for a second type of militia – the volunteer militia – who would participate in extra training without pay. These volunteers would form the ready reserve, and become the elite units in wartime.

The Militia Act of 1792 has been justifiably criticized for what it did not do; by failing to provide funding, oversight, or penalties for non-compliance, the act was destined to fail in its mission of creating a strong and "well-regulated" militia. While the legislation could no doubt have been more effective, it needs to be understood within the context of its times. As Russell Weigley points out, the law was useful in that it preserved the tradition of a citizen soldiery inherited from England, a tradition which would serve the nation well in its future wars; though the Militia Act contained serious flaws, "[t]o have expected more of the law was probably to expect unrealistically much of the new constitutional government and the scattered, undisciplined, agrarian society it represented."[14]

As the nation's size and power increased over the next century, subsequent Congresses did little to modify the Militia Act to make it more relevant. The militia was

---

"The Militia Clause of the Constitution." *Harvard Law Review* LIV (Dec. 1940): 187-188.

[14] Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 94.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

not alone in being treated this way – the Regular Army was spared little attention during peacetime, and only grudging attention, it seemed, during time of war.

Given the lack of federal standards and inspections, the militia laws passed by the various states to bring them into compliance with the 1792 act varied widely. In general, the state – like the federal government – simply passed along to local authorities the requirement to have musters without providing funding for arms, equipment, or training. A few states, like New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, provided a degree of funding and built strong militias. In most states, however, even the obligation to hold annual musters was eventually ignored, or became the occasion for a town picnic where the men would perform some semblance of drill and engage in a great deal of carousing.[15] During the 1790s, Presidents Washington and Adams both called forth the militia to suppress insurrection; the first federal use of the militia following ratification of the Constitution was during the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, with President Washington in direct command of the force. In part, the militia was used because the Constitution specified no other option in the case of domestic disturbance, a problem which President Jefferson solved in 1807 by introducing legislation permitting the use of the Regular Army to enforce federal law.

The Rise of the Volunteer Militia

The ideological opposition of the Jeffersonians to federal control over the

[15] Detailed description of the devolution of the annual muster can be found in Chapter 5 of Kenneth McCreedy's "Palladium of Liberty: The American Militia System, 1815-1861." (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1991).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

manpower of the states led, under Presidents Jefferson and Madison, to "a mixed policy that increased the Army, authorized volunteer forces raised by the state but serving as federal forces, and relied on the standing militia to augment regulars and volunteers."[16] The War of 1812 demonstrated the weakness of the Militia Act of 1792 in the poor quality of militia that initially turned out to fight the British. This was particularly true at the Battle of Bladensburg, a disastrous affair which marked one of the very few times in the post-Revolutionary War history of the United States that mass levies of the local enrolled militia were called out to repel invasion. The result – a rout that led to the burning of Washington, DC – eroded confidence in the militia, and the War of 1812 essentially "marked the demise of the regular militia in American military affairs."[17]

On the other hand, successes by militia forces at North Point, Thames River, and New Orleans showed that the militia could make a positive contribution to the conduct of the war. The manpower used to fight the war of 1812 came from three sources: presidential summons of the militia (limited to ninety days); an increase in the size of the Regular establishment; and requisitions to the states for volunteer units. The manner in which these latter troops were raised established a precedent that lasted up through the Spanish-American War in 1898: the president would request that the states organize (and often equip) units and appoint officers, after which the Army would take these state units into federal service. The states in turn would be compensated by the federal government, in whole or part, for the cost of raising the troops. Units raised in this manner fell within

[16] Cooper, 10.

[17] Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Congress's constitutionally granted authority to raise armies, and were not legally considered militia. Thus, they were not subject to the time and usage constraints placed upon the militia by the Constitution and the Militia Act of 1792. However, legalities aside, these units maintained many characteristics of militia: they originated in the states and maintained their state affiliations while in federal service; their officers were appointed by the governors; and, despite their federal status, the troops tended to display a "democratic" disdain for the Regulars' insistence on obedience to seemingly mindless orders and imposition of harsh discipline.

In raising volunteer units, the states often called first upon already existing units of the volunteer militia, and augmented this number with individual volunteers. It was essentially a continuation of the method practiced during colonial times. Though legally permissible, only in cases of dire emergency would the states resort to compelling the members of the enrolled militia to serve. The preferred method was to use hired substitutes and offer bounties of land or cash to entice volunteers for campaigns of any length.

Depending on the popularity of the war, some states showed a willful disregard for what they deemed questionable federal authority to raise troops. During the War of 1812 the governors of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts refused the President's call to turn out the militia when summoned. Although Ohio and New York militia did respond to the call, they refused to cross the Canadian border, citing the constitutional limitation that the militia could only be used to repel invasions, not initiate

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

them.[18] During the Mexican War, the New England states dragged their feet in providing the requested number of volunteer regiments for federal service.[19]

Following the War of 1812, continued federal and state neglect led to the slow death of the compulsory militia in most of the states. Despite several attempts at reform, Congress left the legislation of 1792 basically unchanged.[20] The Regular Army was also neglected, serving as little more than a frontier constabulary, reduced to a tiny size and often threatened with extinction by politicians who not only wanted to limit expenses but mistrusted standing armies on principle. Any potential threat, whether internal or external, was too remote to warrant any greater concern from the rapidly expanding nation. Interest in reforming the militia waned accordingly.

But while the compulsory militia was increasingly neglected by the states, the first half of the nineteenth century saw a rapid expansion in the volunteer militia.[21] These units satisfied the martial desires of young men and were a great source of camaraderie, especially among the waves of immigrants that began arriving in the 1840s and 1850s. Largely – though not exclusively – an urban phenomena, the prime attraction of these volunteer companies were their gaudy uniforms and the social functions they hosted.

---

[18] Samuel Newland, *The Militia's Role in National Defense: A Historical Perspective* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1987), 7-8, 28n. In 1827 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *Martin v. Mott* that the President's determination to summon the militia was not subject to refusal by the states.

[19] Newland, 9; Jim Dan Hill, *The Minuteman in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard* (Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1964), 36.

[20] See McCreedy, 152-183, for efforts to reform the militia on a national level between 1815 and 1845.

[21] Most Northern states repealed laws requiring the muster of the enrolled militia in the 1840s and 1850s; most Southern states continued mandatory militia musters and training to aid in the suppression of potential

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Members continued the colonial militia tradition of electing their own company officers, who in most cases were the community leaders who had taken the initiative to organize the unit in the first place, and who often saw the militia as a means to achieving a measure of political or social advancement. Those who joined bore most, if not all, of the costs of equipping themselves. Most units then sought legitimacy (and perhaps a degree of arming and funding) by applying for recognition from their state governments. The continued practice of the martial arts was encouraged by frequent and friendly competitions between companies that measured precision on the parade ground and – more rarely – the firing range.

Welcomed as a tool for maintaining order in the rapidly growing cities, the volunteer militia of several Northern states became a stronghold for nativist sentiment amidst the growing masses of Irish and German Catholic immigrants. Immigrant militia companies were banned outright in two states and discouraged in several others, but immigrants often countered this discrimination by forming paramilitary "hunting" or "sports" clubs, many of which volunteered en masse for the Union in 1861. Another defining characteristic of many volunteer militia companies was their ephemeral nature. Given their voluntary and essentially social character, simple factors like the withdrawal of a key individual or a feud between factions within a company could lead to the dissolution of a unit.[22]

---

slave revolts.

[22] Hylton and Wright, 11; John Whiteclay Chambers, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York: Free Press, 1987), 38; Cooper, 15-18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

During the Mexican War, 1846-1848, the three month restriction on federal use of the militia, as well as the constitutional prohibition against using the militia for purposes other than "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions" led President Polk to rely on newly raised volunteer regiments and a somewhat expanded Regular Army to prosecute the war. The overwhelming response to this call (70 percent of the forces that fought in the war were volunteers) was fueled by the popularity of the war in the South and West. Volunteer militia companies again composed a large portion of the troops supplied to the federal government by the states. Many such companies volunteered for the war to a man and were promised that they would be allowed to continue to serve together. However, since the members were all technically enlisted as volunteers and not as militia, the Army could evade the restrictions imposed upon the use of militia by the Constitution and the Militia Act of 1792.

The Regular Army in the period following the Mexican War continued to be a small organization, relegated to garrisoning a few key forts, mostly on the expanding frontier. The officer corps, with its low pay, boring assignments, and promotion system based entirely upon seniority, was an unpopular career choice for ambitious young men.[23] Congress provided a bare minimum in funding. In contrast to the Regular Army, the volunteer militia was strong, though few states spent much money on their citizen soldiers. This changed in the latter half of the 1850s in both the North and the South as

[23] This explains why the West Point educated "Regular" officers who earned their spurs during the Mexican War and rose to fame during the Civil War spent much of the intervening decade as civilians – generals like Grant, Sherman, McClellan, Burnside, Halleck, Fremont, Rosecrans, Reynolds, Slocum and Hooker on the Union side, and Confederates T.J. Jackson, D.H. Hill, and Early. See Hill, 47n.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

sectional conflict heated up, especially following Lincoln's election in November 1860. State governors and legislatures began appropriating funds and raising, arming, and recruiting militia units in preparation for war.[24] In fact, just prior to the Civil War, the New York and the Pennsylvania militia were each individually larger then the entire Regular U.S. Army.[25]

In April 1861, following the shelling of Fort Sumter, President Lincoln used his constitutional authority to summon the militia "to suppress insurrection," calling upon the states to furnish 75,000 militia for the statutory maximum length of ninety days.[26] The following month, Lincoln called for a smaller number of volunteers to take up three-year enlistments. No one expected the war would last that long. Most of the men sent by the various states to fulfill the ninety-day call were drawn from already existing companies of volunteer militia. After gathering in Washington, there was barely any time to brush up on the basic elements of drill, much less maneuver as larger formations, before the approaching ninety-day deadline made it necessary to seek battle or lose the militia without a fight. Confident in victory, and aware that the Southern forces – assembled in a similar manner – were equally unprepared, the Union Army marched off to war.

Bull Run was the result, and with it came the realization that the Southern

---

[24] See McCreedy, Chapter 13, for a more detailed examination of how volunteer militia units sprung up in both the North and South in the late 1850s. In many ways, the revitalization of this stagnant institution just before the Civil War parallels the revitalization of the militia just prior to the Revolutionary War.

[25] Hill, 36, 50. Figures are NY: 17,756 officers and men; PA: "nearly 19,000"; Regular Army 16,435.

[26] Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee refused to send the militia forces Lincoln requested, once again demonstrating the power of the governors to challenge federal authority even in times of national emergency. Newland, 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

secession would be neither bloodless nor short-lived. Upon returning to their states after the battle, many ninety-day militia regiments formed or provided cadres for three-year volunteer regiments that were being organized in anticipation of the long war ahead. As military experience of any kind was at a premium in the early days of the war, it was not unusual for capable privates of pre-war volunteer militia companies to become sergeants, lieutenants, and captains in the new three-year regiments, while their pre-war company officers often became colonels and generals. Some ante-bellum units, like New York City's 7th Regiment, a famed "silk stocking" outfit that required a degree of social standing even to enlist as a private, did not return to the war after their initial ninety day's service (viewing active service as mere privates to be beneath the dignity of the regiment's members). Instead, it provided from its members the officer cadre for many other New York regiments that would see service for the remainder of the war.

The Civil War also introduced a new element into the military manpower equation – the draft. As previously stated, the legal authority for the draft was based on the concept of universal service in the enrolled militia as embodied in the Militia Act of 1792. As the nature of modern war had vastly increased the size of the competing armies, the pool of volunteer militia that was the basis for both armies in 1861 quickly ran dry. Both the Confederate and Union legislatures passed conscription laws, in April 1862 and March 1863 respectively, marking the first time in American history that such laws were enacted. Unlike the raising of state volunteer units for the war, the draft was imposed by federal authorities, based (in the North) on a quota assigned to each state. It generated a storm of criticism in both the North and South, in large part because exemptions and substitutions were permitted, making the draft less equitable then it should have been – a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"rich man's war and a poor man's fight."[27] While the draft only directly provided 6 percent of Union forces (21 percent in the Confederacy) during the Civil War, it had the immeasurable effect of motivating many of those who could not afford a deferment to enlist voluntarily and thereby garner a substantial bounty, rather then be forced into service with no hope of additional compensation.[28]

The armies that fought on both sides in the Civil War had a cadre of volunteer militiamen, with large infusions of volunteers and draftees and a small leavening of professional soldiers. Use of the enrolled militia was rare during the Civil War, particularly on the Union side, but it did occur. Perhaps the most notable instance was the call-up of the Pennsylvania, New York and Rhode Island militia during the Gettysburg campaign. However, state militia often saw service in many "rear area" duties, such as garrisoning forts on the coast and the Canadian border, guarding prisoners of war, tracking down deserters, and quelling draft riots.[29]

While both the North and South maintained Regular forces during the war, the vast bulk of the troops raised were in volunteer regiments organized by the individual states, which maintained their state designations and affiliations throughout the conflict. The legacy of this lives on in today's National Guard; despite more stringent rules for tracing lineage than exist in the Regular Army, the National Guard boasts far more units that can trace their history back to the Civil War than the active component. Famous

---

[27] Hylton & Wright, 13.

[28] Weigley, 357; Chambers, 45-64.

[29] Doubler, 108.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Civil War units like the Stonewall Brigade, the Iron Brigade, the Washington Artillery, the Fighting Sixty-Ninth, the Twentieth Maine, and the First Minnesota returned to state service after the war and still exist in today's National Guard.[30]

The immediate aftermath of the Civil War was a low point in the history of the volunteer militia. Men who had managed to survive the four years of carnage had no desire to ever hear the beat of a drum or the bark of an officer's orders again – or so they thought. Few volunteer companies were re-formed when veterans returned home, but this gradually changed in the 1870s as memories of the war began to mellow and men began to recall fondly the camaraderie they had shared around the campfire. Also feeding the growth of the volunteer militia was a new generation too young to have fought in the war but raised on the stories of great battles and campaigns.

In the South, the immediate post-Civil War period saw the formation of numerous black militia units that supported Republican state governments, but most of these were disbanded following the end of Reconstruction. Black militia units would survive in a few Southern states, and were also created in the rest of the country. Unlike the Regular Army, which also formed its first black regiments – with white officers – in the post-Civil War period, black militia units were almost always commanded by black officers who had been elected by their men. During the nineteenth century, twenty-two states and the

[30] Respectively, as the 116th Infantry Regiment, Virginia Army National Guard; the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments, Wisconsin Army National Guard; the 141st Field Artillery Regiment, Louisiana Army National Guard; the 69th Infantry Regiment, New York Army National Guard; the 133rd Engineer Battalion, Maine Army National Guard; and the 135th Infantry Regiment, Minnesota Army National Guard. The U.S. Army permits National Guard units which can trace their lineage to militia units in Confederate service to display campaign streamers on their regimental colors reflecting this fact. These streamers differ from the U.S. campaign streamers in that they bear the Confederate name of the battle (e.g., Sharpsburg instead of Antietam), and the colors of the streamer are reversed – with gray on top instead of blue.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

District of Columbia formed black militia units at one time or another. Despite the elimination of a great many of these units following the passage of the Dick Act in 1903, enough black National Guard units survived to contribute three regiments of infantry to the 93rd Division in World War I.

A final stimulus to the growth of the volunteer militia in the 1870s and 1880s was the increased support of industrialists and state governments. This support was encouraged by the fear of violence from industrial workers. An economic downturn in the 1870s fed the discontent of a growing organized labor movement, and several large and bitter strikes turned violent, revealing the inability of local civil authorities to contain them. A turning point of sorts was reached in 1877, a year when the industrial North and Mid-Western states were wracked by violent strikes, primarily in the railroad industry. The bloodletting that followed the use of federal troops against railroad strikers, as well as lingering resentment in the South over the Army's role in Reconstruction, resulted in the passage the following year of an amendment to the Army appropriation bill that would become known as the Posse Comitatus Act. The act prohibited the use of federal troops to repress internal disorder except in such cases as were expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress, removing entirely the discretion that local marshals and judges had previously exercised in using federal forces during civil disturbances.[31] The end result was that state militia forces, which had done poorly in suppressing riots in 1877, would henceforward be called upon first if a strike situation

[31] Robert Coakley, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789-1878* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1989), 343-345.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

grew violent or potentially violent – especially because this was an era where local police forces were small in number and state police forces were non-existent. Where previously states had been lax with regard to maintaining a citizen-soldiery, "[b]etween 1881 and 1892, every state in the Union revised its military code to establish an organized militia."[32] One of the principal steps taken to increase militia efficiency was the widespread institution of mandatory summer camps. Prior to 1877, only Massachusetts had held brief annual summer encampments for its militia; by 1880 six other states had joined Massachusetts, and by 1890 all but eight states in the Union required some kind of summer training.[33]

Strike duty was widely unpopular among National Guard units.[34] While occasionally employed to protect strikers from violence instigated by strike-breaking industrialists, most Guard deployments during strikes were to protect the property of wealthy capitalists and to protect scabs who crossed picket lines to get to work. In some cases, the soldiers' sympathy for the strikers was evident, insofar as they occasionally refused to fire on them when ordered to do so. Strike duty also hurt recruiting, as labor organizers looked upon both Regulars and Guardsmen as the willing tool of big business,

---

[32] Martha Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1965), 16.

[33] Louis Cantor, "The Creation of the Modern National Guard: The Dick Militia Act of 1903" (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke Univ., 1963), 50-51.

[34] The term "National Guards" was first formally adopted by the predecessor to New York's famous 7th Regiment in 1824 in honor of the visiting Marquis de Lafayette, former commander of the Parisian *Guarde Nationale.* The Connecticut legislature was the first to officially adopt the term "National Guard" for all its militia forces in 1861. The term became near-universal following the Civil War, and with the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 it was federally mandated for all the states, though only Virginia by that point had not made the switch on its own. However, it was not until 1933 that the War Department's Militia Bureau changed its name to National Guard Bureau. See Bruce Jacobs, "The National Guard: By

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and discouraged their membership from enlisting. The personal and professional difficulties strike duty created caused many a Guardsman to complain:

> In my experience of twenty years in the National Guard and two years in the Federal Service, I have had the disagreeable sensation of having railroad men on the trains more or less humiliate me. You men have had the same experience as I have had. I have had stones thrown at me while marching down the streets, by labor unions. I am speaking plainly. This should not occur, and one of the things that keeps the National Guard down today is the fact that a great many of the labor organizations, whether they are right or wrong, look upon us as the enemy.[35]

Though Guardsmen despised strike duty, they were not above using the fear of socialist revolution as a tool to prod state legislatures into increasing funding for the militia. At the same time, they sought to escape the burden of strike duty by being at the forefront among those urging the states to organize adequate police forces to take up the task. The distaste for strike duty, and its perceived negative effects on recruiting and retention, prompted more than one Guard officer to focus on the federal combat reserve mission as a more appropriate calling for the National Guard.[36]

While recent scholarship has demonstrated that labor-related incidents accounted for only 28 percent of all Guard interventions to prevent civil disorder between 1868 and 1899, the high profile of these incidents made them seem more frequent than they actually were.[37] The unpopularity of strike duty, along with the increasing time demands

---

Any Other Name?" *National Guard*, Sept. 1980, 48.

[35] Maj. Donald McRae Jr., NY National Guard, in *Proceedings of the National Guard Association of the United States, 1917* (Hereafter cited as *NGAUS Proceedings*, with year), 104.

[36] Cooper, 44, 151-152.

[37] Ibid., 47. It was far more common, especially in the South, for the Guard to be called out to protect

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of an industrial society, may help explain why membership in the volunteer militia shrank as a proportion of the population when compared to the antebellum period.[38] Noted National Guard historian Jerry Cooper finds that the Guard units that arose after the Civil War were fundamentally different than their antebellum predecessors. While still primarily semi-independent social organizations, state funding (which had been virtually non-existent in the antebellum period) and more developed state military bureaucracies brought with them an expectation of increased efficiency. These increased demands were resisted when they seemed to impinge on what Guardsmen perceived to be their traditional rights, such as electing officers. Guardsmen saw themselves as volunteers who were in control of their own destiny, and they "resented efforts to centralize control over them because they justifiably believed their organizations were more the products of their own time, energy and money than of the states'. As long as the onus for organizing and sustaining local units fell chiefly on their shoulders, Guardsmen refused to surrender control to what they perceived to be outside interference."[39]

While not proportionately as large as before, the post-Civil War Guard strength of 84,000 to 153,000 was still three to six times the number of officers and men assigned to the Regular Army.[40] In addition to being more numerous, Guardsmen – especially

---

prisoners from being lynched and to quell race riots.

[38] Weigley, 282.

[39] Cooper, 83.

[40] Ibid., 28, Table 4. Guard numbers based on sample strength figures from 1873 – 1895, all of which are low estimates because of incomplete data. Guard strength figures fluctuated wildly due to states and territories failing to report, or major reorganizations within states. Regular Army strength between 1871 and 1898 fluctuated between 25,000 and 28,000. See Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officers – were more likely to be influential individuals than their counterparts in the Regular Army. While the Regular Army remained dispersed on frontier posts, physically and socially isolated from the American public, members of the National Guard were prominent in cities and towns across the nation.

The Birth of NGAUS

Guardsmen, like the Regulars, took note of military trends and developments abroad during the latter half of the nineteenth century, particularly in Europe, and noted the need for reform at home. It was a group of such civic-minded volunteer officers who first met in Richmond in 1878 to discuss "measures of practical reform." This was followed by a second exploratory meeting the following January in New York City, culminating in a general convention in October 1879 in St. Louis.[41] They named the organization they formed the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), and elected Maj. Gen. George W. Wingate of New York to be their first president.[42]

As political scientist Martha Derthick has pointed out in her study of NGAUS, since that first convention in 1879 "the Guard has pursued two principal goals: to secure

---

of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945 (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955), 141-149.

[41] *NGAUS Proceedings,1931*, 3.

[42]Wingate essentially *was* the National Guard Association during its first decade. He was also one of two Union veterans to found the National Rifle Association in 1871, and strongly advocated the importance of marksmanship in Guard training, helping to generate rifle competitions that gradually replaced the militarily irrelevant drill competitions that had been so popular among militia units, especially before the Civil War. The link between NGAUS and the NRA continued into the twentieth century when prominent NGAUS members like Milton Reckord, Ammon Critchfield, James Drain, and Fred Waterbury served in NRA leadership positions in the 1920s and 1930s. In fact, the association between the Guard and firearms training for the public at large was so great that the government's Office of Civilian Marksmanship was part of the Militia Bureau for many years.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

federal assistance and a role as a front-line reserve to the Regular Army; and to retain legal status as a state military force in peacetime."[43] By virtue of what they represent, NGAUS has always enjoyed certain clear advantages over the typical constituency groups that attempt to influence Congress. To begin with, the Guard is a public, government institution whose existence is rooted in the Constitution, not a private organization seeking congressional assistance. In addition, the mission of the Guard – defense of the states and the nation – is central to the security of the country and clearly deserving of public expenditure. Finally, the nature of the Guard is such that it is widespread (with members and armories in every congressional district) and highly organized, with close connections to state party organizations because of its function as a state military force under the command of the governor in peacetime.[44] Indeed, except for the lack of deep pockets with which to make campaign contributions, there is unlikely to be an institution more perfectly suited to influence a civic-minded senator or congressman.

Since its founding, NGAUS has been the primary voice expressing the interests of the National Guard to Congress, the Regular Army, and the public at large. By virtue of its status as a private organization, NGAUS has always had more freedom to lobby lawmakers against the wishes of the War Department, a freedom not always enjoyed by the full-time military representatives of the National Guard in the Militia Bureau and later the National Guard Bureau. Because of this freedom, NGAUS is viewed as the single most influential Guard organization in representing the collective desires of Guardsmen

---

[43] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 3.

[44] Ibid., 1-2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and shaping defense policy and legislation. In expressing these collective desires, not all voices are equally heard. The membership has always been restricted to commissioned (and, after World War II, warrant) officers, and discussion and decisions (particularly in the pre-World War II era) are dominated by the adjutants general of the various states.[45]

NGAUS did not develop into a powerful lobbying institution overnight. Despite the fact that it was formed in 1879 for the express purpose of seeking a new militia act and increased funding from Congress, during the first twenty years the organization produced few tangible results. Unfortunately, military legislation of any type was a hard sell in the 1880s and 1890s, when the nation was at peace and there was no evident threat that could spur military reform. This is true despite the fact that the War Department and several Presidents were in harmony with NGAUS in actively supporting militia reform before Congress.[46] The best that NGAUS could manage – and this only after nearly a decade of persistently raising awareness in Congress and the public regarding the need for militia reform – was to separate their militia reform proposal from a less controversial bill that doubled the federal allotment for the militia from $200,000 (an amount set in 1808) to $400,000.[47] This measure passed in 1887, though the increase was diluted somewhat

---

[45] Though NGAUS claims to represent the interests of enlisted personnel and has advocated numerous reforms aimed at them, since 1970 an independent (but closely allied) organization, the Enlisted Association of the National Guard of the United States (EANGUS) has taken on the mission of lobbying Congress specifically on issues effecting enlisted personnel.

[46] Cantor, 86-106, contains a lengthy description of the growing warmth between the War Department and the militia, as individuals on both sides sought to increase the utility of the militia as a federal reserve force.

[47] Cantor, 60-63, notes that the NGAUS proposal introduced to Congress in 1879 had many similarities to the Dick Act which would be passed in 1903; in particular, the NGAUS bill called for increased funding of the militia to be contingent upon militia units conforming to federal standards, would have required annual encampments, and advocated more formal military education for militia officers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

by including the cost of other federal outlays besides ordnance in the total.

It would take a severe jolt to get more out of Congress. When Congress finally did pass a new Militia Act in 1903, the driving force behind it was the memory of the spectacular deficiencies of the Spanish-American War. Only with this memory as ammunition, and the energetic work of a reform-minded Secretary of War, Elihu Root, was a newly invigorated association of Guardsmen able to push for and achieve legislation that finally supplanted the Militia Act of 1792.

This earliest incarnation of NGAUS was also no doubt handicapped by its limited representation among the states. Unlike later years, when membership became universal, the greatest number of states represented in any of the six NGAUS conventions between 1879 and 1896 was eighteen.[48] The early failures of NGAUS also stem from a lack of organization – the association had no permanent staff, no offices, and no funds beyond the meager fees collected annually from each participating state delegation. Bearing the costs themselves, members of the association (particularly General Wingate) visited congressmen and attempted to persuade them of the necessity of militia reform for the good of the nation. This approach would continue for decades to come in NGAUS, with the association operating on a minimal budget, without a permanent headquarters or staff, and relying on the largely uncompensated time, energy and efforts of its leadership to carry on the work of expressing the Guard's viewpoint to Congress, the War Department, and the public at large.[49]

---

[48] Cooper, 93-94.

[49] NGAUS did not have a permanent office until October 1944. At the same time, a single secretary – the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Efforts at militia reform were not helped by the fact that there were Guardsmen that opposed any increase in federal control over the Guard. General Wingate, who remained president of NGAUS throughout the 1880s, headed a group within the association that favored greater federal control and integration of the Guard into the federal army, through such voluntary measures as having Regulars inspect Guard encampments and assigning Regular officers to be adjutants and chiefs of staff of Guard regiments, brigades and divisions. Wingate was generally sympathetic towards the Regulars, though critical of the Uptonian theorists among them who sought to impose "the French, Prussian or Austrian system" of large standing armies and federalized reserves upon the United States.[50] This "nationalist" faction of NGAUS viewed the Guard as a stopgap force, augmenting the Regular Army until such time as volunteers and draftees could swell it to a size suitable for conducting a war, after which the Guard would return to its proper state role.[51]

In 1897, Guard leaders from the Midwest and Plains states, upset at the lack of activity on the part of NGAUS, formed a new organization which they dubbed the "Inter-State National Guard Association." The new name emphasized the group's state focus, and the organizers were characterized by more of a "localist" viewpoint than their NGAUS compatriots. The localists tended to see themselves not as a reserve of the

---

first paid permanent staff of the association – was hired. Details of the early organization and operations of NGAUS are laid out in memorandum to Maj. A.G. Crist, Feb. 11, 1947, by Maj. Gen. Ellard Walsh, President, NGAUS. NGAUS Archives, Box 10, NGAUS History folder.

[50] Peter Karsten, "Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes for the American Century," in *Building the Organizational Society*, ed. Jerry Israel (New York: Free Press, 1972), 223.

[51] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

federal army, but as soldiers of the states committed to maintaining complete independence from the Regulars while fighting the nation's wars – even those abroad.[52] The division between localists and nationalists seemed to break along geographic lines, with the nationalists strong in the Northeast (particularly New York, which had the largest National Guard) and the localists dominant in the Midwest and South. Martha Derthick posits that the reason for this is linked to the relative importance of the Guard to the members of the two factions. The leading New York Guardsmen were prominent professionals of considerable means and social standing – "For them the Guard was not a source of livelihood; it was a fashionable way of demonstrating their patriotism." These men stood to lose a great deal if drawn away for extended periods of time on active federal service. The leaders of the localist faction tended to be "adjutants general and other full-time state officers for whom the Guard was the principal source of livelihood, or they were business and professional men of modest accomplishment for whom the Guard was a crucially important source of social prestige."[53] For them, it was critical that the Guard remain independent from the control of the Regular Army, but also continue to remain relevant to national defense, lest the increasing supply of federal dollars devoted to the organized militia dry up.

---

[52] Derthick and Karsten give opposite characterizations of these two groups, with Karsten arguing that the localists had no interest in serving abroad, and Derthick arguing that the nationalists had less desire to serve abroad. As Derthick's research is better documented and more detailed then Karsten's, her interpretation has been adopted in this work. See Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 22-24; Karsten, 223-224.

[53] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 24.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Spanish-American War

In March 1898, a month after the explosion that sank the *Maine* and with the nation on the verge of war, legislation was introduced to triple the size of the Regular Army and link each Regular regiment to a particular geographic region for recruiting purposes. Members of the Inter-State National Guard Association were quick to see this as an attempt to steal from the Guard the very local roots which made them so politically powerful, and were able to halt the proposed legislation. The Army would still triple in size between 1899 and 1902, but – much to the chagrin of the Regulars – the new officers mostly came from outside the West Point-bred military aristocracy that dominated the Army's officer corps.[54] Many of these outsiders were Guardsmen who saw combat service in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection which followed. In addition to defeating the March 1898 legislation, Guardsmen were able to secure language in a subsequent Army bill which guaranteed that Guard units could volunteer for federal service, and would have to be accepted by the Army so long as they were at full strength and their governors agreed to release them. Units that volunteered in this way would maintain their prewar unit integrity and officers.[55] For many Regulars, this further demonstration of the Guard's clout was troubling.

---

[54] Karsten, 224-225; Weigley 318. In 1898, 80 percent of the Regular Army's junior officers were academy graduates; only 22 percent of the new lieutenants from 1899-1902 were. West Pointers referred to this influx of outsiders as the "Crime of '99." While most of these new officers were volunteers during the war, some were graduates of military colleges other than West Point – the most prominent being George C. Marshall, Jr. of the Virginia Military Institute.

[55] Kreidberg and Henry, 154-155.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Spanish-American War was intensely popular in America – there was no shortage of volunteers rushing to the colors when war was declared in April 1898. Since the recently enacted legislation required that organized militia units be accepted into federal service before any volunteers, Guard units filled up rapidly to war strength. In many states pre-existing militia units volunteered for service in mass formations. Approximately 200,000 of the 275,000 soldiers who served in the war were volunteers supplied by the states, while the remainder were Regulars or among the 16,000 men who enlisted in federally organized volunteer units.

Each state handled the raising of troops differently; in general, "[t]he majority of state volunteer regiments were organizations led by National Guard officers and NCOs but manned by volunteers direct from civil life."[56] At least one governor, however, refused to permit his National Guard units to volunteer, and raised new units instead. A few Guard units elected not to serve – a point that strengthened the post-war arguments of Regulars that the Guard could not be relied upon as a reserve force.[57] Even the War Department was unable to provide a definitive answer regarding the percentage of 1898 volunteers who had been militiamen in 1897: one report stated that eleven states and the District of Columbia provided no data upon which to draw a conclusion, twenty-eight states were shown as having between 14 and 87 percent volunteers who had prior service in the militia, and nine states were listed as contributing more volunteers who were

[56] Cooper, 104. See Cooper, 97-107, for a more detailed description of how various states raised their troops.

[57] Kreidberg and Henry, 158.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

previously militia than there were militia in 1897! The report concluded: "While the foregoing data are the best obtainable, it is not believed that they are correct...."[58]

The small Regular Army was overwhelmed with the flood of both state and federally raised volunteers, and was unable to properly feed, house or equip them all. Most volunteer Guard units arrived at their ports of embarkation woefully unprepared, with inadequate and outdated arms and equipment, and lacking basic soldiering skills. While only two Guard regiments played a role in the Cuban campaign, eight of the ten infantry regiments committed to the Puerto Rican campaign were from the Guard.[59] The majority of units, however, could not find transport to the theater of war and instead languished in Tampa and other Southern towns and suffered casualties from tropical diseases and poor food. The most famous "Guard" unit to fight in the Caribbean was the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, better known as the "Rough Riders," a regiment of federally raised volunteers which recruited its 2nd Squadron from the New Mexico National Guard. The Rough Riders were commanded in combat by a former New York Guardsman, Lt. Col. Theodore Roosevelt.[60]

Most of the small Regular Army was committed in the Caribbean. As a result, in the Philippines, "three-quarters of the initial 5,000 troops which sailed from San

---

[58] "The Volunteer Army" – 4 page staff study, n.d., contained in RG 168/12a/056. - Volunteer.

[59] Doubler, 131-132. The Guard also contributed artillery, cavalry, and engineer units to the Puerto Rican campaign.

[60] Department of the Army, Lineage and Honors Certificate, 200th Air Defense Artillery, New Mexico Army National Guard. Roosevelt initially was second-in-command of the Rough Riders, but became the commander when the original regimental commander, Col. Leonard Wood, was promoted to brigadier general and brigade command.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Francisco were Guardsmen from the Western states. The next increment of 5,000 was composed largely of National Guard units from the Midwest."[61] While the Spanish quickly surrendered after only token resistance, the guerrilla war which followed was a new experience against a much more committed Filipino enemy. As the months passed and the insurrection continued, calls increased from both the troops and their families to bring the Guardsmen back. Gradually, the Army replaced the 13,000 Guardsmen in the Philippines with Regulars, recruiting three regiments of volunteers from individual Guardsmen who wished to continue serving after their units were released for home.

The Spanish-American War was the driving force that made significant reform of the Army possible. Prior to the war, there was little interest in military legislation of any kind outside of a few reformers within the military. But despite the war's quick, victorious conclusion, so many obvious deficiencies in both the Regular and militia establishments were exposed that lawmakers could not ignore the need for reform. The Army lacked any agency to plan for mobilization, organization or training for war – this decades after the Prussians had demonstrated to the rest of the world the utility of the General Staff system in the 1860s and 1870s. The War Department had fossilized under the bureau system, where individual fiefdoms competed with each other and the Commanding General lacked the authority to impose efficiency, thus making timely, coordinated campaigns impossible. Equipment was antiquated, rations were spoiled, transport insufficient, and cooperation between the Army and Navy haphazard. The lack of adequate medical and sanitary arrangements accounted for thousands of unnecessary

[61] Hylton and Wright, 18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

deaths – far more than from combat.

Elihu Root, Charles Dick, and the Dick Act

The nation's outrage over these and other shortcomings led to Secretary of War Russell Alger's resignation in July 1899. President McKinley chose as his successor Elihu Root, a Wall Street lawyer with no military background, but who more than made up for any lack of experience with a passion and energy typical of Progressive era reformers. Root immersed himself in the breadth and depth of military literature and was particularly taken by the work of Emory Upton, a West Point-educated Regular and brilliant Civil War commander who, during his post-war career became a great advocate of military reform. In particular, Upton found much to admire in the organization of the German General Staff. Root was introduced to Upton through his 1878 book, *The Armies of Asia and Europe*, and he found Upton's ideas so compelling that he sought out more of his work, discovering in 1903 an unpublished treatise. Root had this published in January 1904 under the title *The Military Policy of the United States*, which he then distributed to newspaper and magazine editors around the country. As Root later wrote, Upton "gave me the detail on which I could base my recommendations and overcome my ignorance as a civilian."[62] Upton was highly critical of the militia, which he believed should be restricted to its constitutionally prescribed duties. He advocated instead an expansible army (i.e., one in which all wartime units are organized in peacetime with a cadre of Regulars, and which at the outset of war would absorb and train volunteers to fill

[62] Ambrose, 155-56; Cantor, 143-144.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in the lower ranks), directed by a General Staff, which could be supplemented in time of war by a federal reserve that drilled regularly and held annual encampments.

Following President McKinley's assassination, Root was asked by the new president to remain as Secretary of War. Theodore Roosevelt, who as New York's governor knew Root well and shared his zeal for reform, used his December 1901 annual address to Congress to urge reform of the Militia Act of 1792, which he termed an "obsolete and worthless" law.[63] Urged on by the president – and by memories of the militia's mobilization for the recent war – Congress finally found the political momentum to make a change. Within short order, Root himself testified before the Senate Military Affairs Committee that the Army could no longer function as it had in the past. Echoing his expertise in the business world, he rhetorically asked "What would become of a railroad, or a steel corporation, or any great business concern if it should divide its business in that way?"[64] Clearly, Root believed (and he would not be the last Secretary of War or Defense to say this) that the running of the Army required the application of sound business principles.

Militia reform, while important, was not Root's first priority. At the core of Root's plan was the concept of a General Staff that would plan for war, supervise training, develop Army policies, coordinate the actions of the feuding departments and

---

[63] Cantor, 221.

[64] Elihu Root, Mar. 12, 1902, as reprinted in *The National Defense: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs – Historical Documents Relating to the Reorganization Plans of the War Department and to the Present National Defense Act, 3 March 1927.* House of Representatives, 69th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1927) Part 1, 7. (Hereafter cited as *The National Defense*)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

bureaus, and direct operations when war broke out. As there were many opponents to these changes, ranging from vested interests within the existing Army bureaucracy to anti-militarists in Congress, Root's first step in 1901was to establish a War College in Washington, DC, for the professional education of Army officers. Root chose for the faculty of the college officers who favored reform, and set them up as an embryonic *General Staff* to further the advancement of this cause. By 1903, Root was able to gain passage of the General Staff Act in Congress. The law replaced the Commanding General of the Army with the Chief of Staff, limited his service in the position to four years, and gave him a staff of forty-five officers. Though the size and scope of powers of the new War Department General Staff were more limited than Root had hoped for and hostility within the Army remained, the staff survived until World War I proved its vital importance to congressional and Army critics alike.

Most members of the Regular Army hoped that military reform would create a large standing army on a par with that of other world powers. Root understood that Congress and the American people not only continued to mistrust large Regular forces, but also would not pay for them. Root supported the Inter-State National Guard Association[65] as it successfully sought a further increase in the annual federal

---

[65] The proceedings from the January 1900 convention of the Inter-State National Guard Association make reference to a February 1899 meeting of a "sister organization, known as the National Guard Association" and efforts made to conjoin the two organizations. By the next convention of the INGA in January 1902, the two organizations appear to have merged, no doubt assisted by the common experience of Guardsmen during the Spanish-American War and the urgent need to present a united front to gain reform. The "Inter-State" name continues to appear on the title page of convention proceedings, sometimes intermixed with the older "National Guard Association of the United States" name, until 1909, after which the latter formulation is solely used. See *Proceedings of the Inter-State National Guard Association, Third Annual Convention* (1900), 164-165.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

appropriation to the Guard from $400,000 to $1,000,000 in 1900, and in the same year he created a board of officers within the Army to study reform. One of the officers summoned for this board was a friend of Root's and the Inspector General of the New York National Guard, Col. William Sanger, who was sent to tour Europe and report back on the reserve systems in use there.[66] Root, given his regard for Upton, would have preferred a wholly federal reserve freed from state influence (as it existed in most of Europe), but he was politically astute enough to realize the Guard had enough friends in Congress to kill any proposed reform along those lines, and that it would be easier, in any event, to build upon an already established organization.[67]

Root sought the support of the newly elected president of the Guard association, Representative Charles S. Dick (R-OH). Dick was a Spanish-American War veteran, a major general in the Ohio National Guard, and Chairman of the House Committee on the Militia. Without his support the legislation would not have a hope of passage in Congress. After drawing up tentative legislation in late 1901, Root invited the INGA to study the draft and propose changes. A special committee chaired by General Dick hammered out several compromises with Root, then presented the modified legislation before the annual convention of the INGA in January 1902 and secured the approval of the membership. Having gained this critical backing, Dick presented the bill to

---

[66] William C. Sanger, *Report on the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces of England and the Militia of Switzerland* (Washington: GPO, 1903). Sanger was appointed Assistant Secretary of War in March 1901, serving as a liaison between Root and the Guard and helping Root craft militia reform legislation. See Cantor, 187-189, for background on Sanger.

[67] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 25; Cantor, 172-173.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Congress.

Though almost entirely the product of consensus, the bill contained one controversial element that the INGA convention had approved at Dick's insistence after heated debate – a section that would have authorized a 100,000 man National Volunteer Reserve, to consist entirely of individual veterans (not organized in units), under federal control and acting as a supplement to the Regular Army and the Guard. Root argued that this reserve served the purpose of retaining experienced personnel that would otherwise be lost for future service, and would include former Guardsmen who could no longer afford the time for active participation in the Guard. However, the provision provoked the ire of some Guardsmen, who feared it might supplant the Guard as the primary reserve of the Army. While Dick's efforts easily gained passage of the bill in the House with the National Volunteer Reserve intact, opponents were able to prevent passage of the bill in the Senate until Root agreed to remove the offending section. The resulting legislation, commonly termed the Dick Act, was signed into law on January 21, 1903.[68]

The Dick Act created two classes of reserve – the Organized Militia, referred to as the National Guard (though the term was not mandated until 1916), and the Reserve Militia – the pool of all adult male citizens ages 18-45 obligated for service if called. The National Guard would receive – if the governor of a state acquiesced – federal arms,

---

[68] "An Act To Promote the Efficiency of the Militia, and for Other Purposes" (The Dick Act), *U.S. Statutes at Large* Vol. 32, Chap. 196 (1903). A fuller account of the Inter-State National Guard Association's role in the passage of the Dick Act can be found in Cantor, Chapter VI; see also Bruce Jacobs, "How the Dick Acts Happened," *National Guard*, Sept. 1988, 42-46, for a discussion that focuses on the INGA's 1902 convention and Guard opposition to the National Volunteer Reserve. Cantor, 220-253, argues that opposition to the National Volunteer Reserve in the Senate came largely from partisan Democrats and states' rights advocates who saw it as an unwarranted extension of the Regular Army; he demonstrates that the INGA and the adjutants general of the states strongly supported the National Volunteer Reserve.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

uniforms and training funds to maintain their units in a high state of efficiency. The Reserve Militia would be excluded from any federal funding. The Guard was obligated to serve up to nine months (instead of three) if summoned by federal authority, though call ups were still limited to the express constitutional purposes of executing the laws of the union, suppressing insurrections, and repelling invasions. When summoned into federal service, each Guardsman would be subject to examination by Regular Army doctors to determine if the soldier met the minimum physical requirements to pass muster.

The Dick Act offered to the states the carrot of increased federal funds for their National Guard units if they would agree to submit to annual inspections by the Army. To qualify for federal funding, a unit had to perform drill or target practice twenty-four times a year and attend annual training for at least five consecutive days. The law granted a one-time appropriation of $2,000,000 to update the Guard's ordnance, but more importantly, for the first time, there would be federal pay for the annual summer camp (though not for drills). In addition to all their arms, equipment, and other supplies, Guard units could also receive training support from the Regulars and Guardsmen would be permitted to attend Regular Army service schools. Even better, from the Guard's perspective, these expenses would not be charged against the funds regularly appropriated for the Guard, but would be borne by the Regular Army. The money appropriated for the Guard – which in the past had always been expended on arms and equipment – would now be used to pay the expenses of Guardsmen attending summer encampments and for other expenses. To preserve the sensibilities of the states' rights advocates, the law expressly required that the consent of the governor was needed before units could submit

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to federal inspection, receive federal arms or equipment, or train with or be trained by the Regulars. To further ease the transition, a grace period of five years (later extended to seven) was given before National Guard units had to conform to federal standards of organization, arming, and discipline.[69]

Now that a statutory relationship existed in peacetime between the War Department and the National Guard, the job of administering federal funds and collecting reports and statistics fell to the Army's Adjutant General office, specifically to Lt. Col. James Parker, a Regular who developed a good rapport with the adjutants general of the various states while working out many of the details involved in implementing the 1903 legislation.[70]

Though Guardsmen in the 1880s and 1890s had discussed the need for militia reform in terms very similar to what was achieved in 1903, several factors had finally come together to convince Congress to reform the nation's militia law after 111 years: the uneven mobilization and preparedness of the Guard during the Spanish-American War; the energy and political savvy of Secretary Root; the influence of Congressman Dick; and a clear consensus among Guardsmen that reform of some type was necessary. With this new legislation, the National Guard took the first steps down a course that it would continue to follow for the remainder of the twentieth century: it traded state sovereignty, poverty, and military obsolescence for federal controls, federal dollars, and military relevance.

---

[69] Dick Act, Sections 3, 10, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 23.

[70] Cooper, 111.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Development of the Guard under the Dick Act

Guardsmen were immensely pleased by the passage of the Dick Act – it assured that the Guard would remain relevant to the nation and the Army, and would not wither on the vine for lack of funding. The imposition of federal oversight seemed acceptable – indeed, many Guardsmen who were sympathetic with the Regulars' complaints about the Guard must have welcomed the closer working relationship with the active establishment. But for most, Martha Derthick is probably correct in concluding that "[n]ot many Guardsmen in 1903 were conscious of the potential consequences of these changes .... [a]quisition of federal assistance was an over-riding goal."[71] What Guardsmen didn't realize was the extent to which federal requirements that accompanied federal dollars would change the militia units they had formed. In less than a generation, federal standards for enlistment and commissioning, for the number and types of units in each state, and for the type of training they would undergo, would fundamentally change the Guard. In all fairness, however, it is doubtful that any individual could have divined these consequences in 1903.

In addition to spurring legal and institutional reform, the Spanish-American War also changed the attitudes of the membership of NGAUS. The "localist" faction which so strongly objected to any imposition of federal controls on the Guard no longer dominated – if it did the 1903 legislation would never have gained the association's backing. The aftermath of the Dick Act brought about a change in the types of men who made up the

[71] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 27.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guard. Those who were in the Guard primarily for social reasons began dropping out as federal requirements increased, and leadership of NGAUS passed into the hands of Guardsmen who sought closer ties to the Regular Army and an assured combat role.[72] Charles Dick himself was most representative of this latter type of man. Elected president of NGAUS in 1902, he held the office for seven years. Aside from his legislative efforts to increase federal support for the Guard, Dick encouraged his fellow Guardsmen to learn from the Regulars:

> Next to the advantage of having the legal status of the National Guard established the greatest gain to the National Guard from the federal legislation ... lies probably in the closer relationship it has created with the Regular establishment. ... The relation is more than a friendly one. It is almost parental – at least that of teacher and pupil. The Regular is the natural instructor of the Guardsman.[73]

The passage of the Dick Act generated a great deal of turbulence within the Guard as units that could not maintain the required strength were eliminated from states' rolls, and new ones organized to meet the War Department's criteria. Between 1903 and 1913, 792 units were disbanded and 902 new ones constituted, largely due to the requirements that Guard units now conform to Army standards of organization.[74] Guard strength dropped by over 11,000 men during the tumultuous period between 1903 and 1907, after

---

[72] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 28. Cantor, 69-78, points out that the process of weeding out the unfit had already begun in the 1880s, as many states increased funding to their militias and began requiring a return on their investment. The arrival of federal pay in 1903, however, brought with it a uniform minimum standard for all states to meet and quickened the process of eliminating those who were less committed to military efficiency.

[73] Charles Dick, "When General Dick took a look at the Dick Act," *National Guard* magazine, Jan-Feb 1980, 39.

[74] Hill, 201.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

which strength rebounded and continued to grow, leaving the Guard in 1915 with 129,398 soldiers – almost 13,000 more than it had in 1903. This number was still far short of what the War Department hoped it would achieve with the increased federal outlays that were made to the Guard following passage of the Dick Act.[75]

Legal hurdles remained. The desire of most Guardsmen to be treated as the first-line reserve of the Army, though newly enshrined in the Dick Act, was still at odds with the constitutional limitation preventing the Guard from serving outside the boundaries of the United States.[76] An apparent resolution to this problem was reached in 1908 with the passage of an amendment to the Dick Act that authorized service by the Guard outside the borders of the United States. The 1908 amendment (often referred to as the Second Dick Act) also removed the nine-month time limit on federal call-ups; in the future, the president would have the freedom to call out the Guard for as long as he saw fit. In return for this extension of federal control, the new law directed that the Regular Army first accept for service all Guard units – regardless of arm – that presented themselves in an emergency before any new Volunteer units were recruited. Congress, in the same law, raised the annual militia appropriation to the states to $4,000,000 – double the amount it had authorized just two years earlier, and ten times the amount authorized for the Guard

---

[75] Cooper, 137. Some 70 percent of the strength lost was in the South, where five states disbanded black units rather than share federal dollars with them.

[76] Under the Dick Act, Guard units would have to volunteer for federal service *en masse* in order to fight abroad; Root hoped that the obvious advantages of federal control and funding would break down the resistance of states' rights advocates and allow for the passage of legislation that would make the Guard an effective federal reserve. See Cantor, 204-206.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in 1887.[77] The NGAUS executive council, under the leadership of Charles Dick, had once again played a key role in developing the legislation and gaining the concurrence of the War Department before submitting the proposed law before the membership of the association at its 1907 convention. With unanimous support from the War Department and the Guard, the Second Dick Act had easily become law on May 27, 1908. Dick, now a Senator, was optimistic about the Guard's ability to gain future legislation:

> [The 1908 legislation] came only as the result of united and organized effort on the part of the officers of the National Guard, associated in state organizations and in an interstate or national association. The results already accomplished show beyond question that Congress will probably enact any reasonable legislation which the Guard unites in requesting.[78]

Despite the infusion of federal dollars between 1900 and 1908, the states as an aggregate continued to outspend the federal government in supporting the militia, though this trend was not universal across all regions of the country. In 1903, prior to the increased federal spending brought on by the Dick Act, total federal spending on the Guard was $969,385, compared to $3,048,775 spent by the states. However, in the South, the federal government outspent the states $279,261 to $183,000. By 1913, despite several increases in the federal outlay for militia, the states still paid out more than the federal government – an aggregate of $5,748,192 compared to $4,174,243. But again, regional differences emphasize that the condition of the National Guard varied

---

[77] An Act Further to amend the Act, entitled "An Act to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes, approved January 21, 1903" (Second Dick Act), *U.S. Statutes at Large* Vol. 35, Chap 204 (1908).

[78] Charles Dick, "When General Dick took a look at the Dick Act," *National Guard* magazine, Jan-Feb 1980, 24.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

greatly from state to state and region to region - in the South and the Plains states, federal outlays exceeded those of the states by a combined total of $1,506,571 to $759,015.[79] Increased federal allotments to the Guard partially compensated for disparities in spending from state to state, but were too little to eliminate the imbalances. Some states, particularly Northeastern ones like New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, had long traditions of supporting strong militias. At the other extreme, Arkansas and Nevada provided no funding at all for their militias.[80]

Notwithstanding the increases, expenditures were still inadequate: "With rare exceptions, combined state-federal military budgets remained insufficient to sustain the National Guard as an effective organization."[81] Guardsmen continued to pay for many expenses by petitioning local governments and businesses for funds, by renting out their armories (if they were fortunate enough to have them), by hosting dances, dinners, and theatricals, and all too often, by taking the money out of pocket. Thus the desire for further state and federal aid – particularly pay for drill – was first on the list of National Guard priorities.

This would be difficult to achieve, as the harmony that had characterized the joint efforts of the War Department and the Guard in gaining militia reform in 1903 and 1908 descended into partisan feuding that reflected, to some extent, the struggle within the

---

[79] Cooper, 131, Tables 14 & 15. Despite the fact that aggregate state outlays continued to exceed federal outlays in 1913, only in nineteen states did the Guard receive more from the state than the federal government; twenty-eight states received 50 percent or more of their National Guard funding from the federal government (Nevada disbanded its militia in 1906). Source: Cooper, Appendix 2.

[80] Ibid., 131.

[81] Ibid., 135.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Army between the newly formed General Staff and the old bureaucracy. As the Guard continued to lobby Congress for additional funding from 1910 to 1916 – particularly pay for drill – it found that its biggest opponent was the War Department with its insistence that the Guard accept further federal controls.

Increasing Oversight, Increasing Tensions

The pressure to conform to federal standards grew markedly after 1908 when oversight of the Guard became more centralized under a newly created Division of Militia Affairs (DMA) within the office of the Secretary of War. The first chief of the division was Lt. Col. Erasmus Weaver, a scholarly artilleryman who spent much of his career as a professor of military science at various colleges, and had some limited experience serving with the militia as a lieutenant colonel with the 5th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry in 1898.[82] The tone of DMA reports under Weaver was decidedly paternalistic:

> His "duty," Weaver emphasized, was to define "what the federal standards are." Sadly, the Guard fell short in nearly every category. ... Weaver reminded Guardsmen . . . that federal funds were not spent "for the purpose of providing a summer's entertainment for officers and men" but to offer "an opportunity for instruction in their field military duties," an observation many Guardsmen took as a gratuitous insult.[83]

Gratuitous insults might hurt feelings, but they could not force the states to change the manner in which they conducted their military affairs. But the Guard gained a much bigger critic than Weaver when Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood became Chief of Staff of the

---

[82] Paragraph 6, Special Orders 38, War Department, Feb. 14, 1908. See also Bruce Jacobs, "The Greening of the Guard Bureau," *National Guard,* Oct. 1982, 40.

[83] Cooper, 112-113.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Army in April 1910. Wood was a leading advocate of national preparedness and a champion of the General Staff system. As the former, he was the driving force behind the creation of the first "Plattsburg Camps" in 1913. These camps gave college students (as well as some business professionals and politicians) who shared a passion for military preparedness a taste of Army life in hopes of developing a reserve of officers for future wars. The camps proved extremely popular, particularly after war broke out in Europe in August, 1914. The 1915 summer encampment at Plattsburg Barracks in upstate New York was attended by so many prominent civic leaders (including the Mayor of New York City) that it lent its name to the entire movement and gave birth to the Military Training Camps Association, a powerful lobby that strongly advocated Universal Military Training (UMT) and preparedness.[84] Many Guardsmen, while advocates of preparedness and UMT themselves, mistrusted the Plattsburg camps because they saw them as an attempt by the Army to create a federal reserve separate from the Guard.

It was Wood's 1911 reorganization of the General Staff and the resulting flood of new regulations, far more than the Plattsburg camps, that grated on many Guardsmen. Wood attempted to realize the unfinished work of Elihu Root when he reorganized the General Staff in order to develop military policy and war plans. In the process, he elevated the DMA in importance, placing a brigadier general, Robert K. Evans, as chief of the division. As one of only four divisions within the General Staff, the DMA had

[84] Donald M. Kington, *Forgotten Summers: The Story of the Citizen's Military Training Camps, 1921-1940* (San Francisco: Two Decades Publishing, 1995), 1-5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

considerably more clout than before, especially with regard to mobilization planning.[85]

After eighteen months, Evans was replaced by Brig. Gen. Albert L. Mills as Chief of the DMA.[86] Mills, probably the most influential Regular officer to serve as Chief, had already had a distinguished career both as a fighter and an educator in the military. Commissioned from West Point in 1879 as a cavalry officer, he served on the frontier policing Indians and also as a professor of Military Science and Tactics and commandant of cadets at The Citadel prior to the Spanish-American War. During the war, Mills was awarded the Medal of Honor after gallantly leading his troops up Kettle Hill. Despite being shot in the head and temporarily blinded, he insisted on remaining in command. After recovering from his wounds, Mills served as superintendent of West Point for six years, along with several other assignments before being appointed the Chief, DMA in August 1912.[87]

Mills quickly began addressing circular letters to the adjutants general of the states detailing how they should conduct their training and a host of other matters. Some Guardsmen saw this as overstepping the legal authority of the federal government; while the Constitution stated that Congress could provide for disciplining (training) the militia,

---

[85] The DMA, which for its first two years fell under the office of the Secretary of War, was transferred to Wood's control shortly after he became Chief of Staff by War Department General Order 141, July 25, 1910. Wood's reorganization of the General Staff occurred under General Order 68, May 26, 1911. See also War Department Special Order 61, Mar. 15, 1911, and Cooper, 113.

[86] War Department General Order 28, Aug. 27, 1912. Documents pertaining to the organizational history of the Division of Militia Affairs/Militia Bureau/National Guard Bureau are contained in RG 168/ MLRs 347a and 12a/029.3.

[87] Julius Rothstein, *The Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau* (Washington: National Guard Bureau, Historical Services Division, n.d.), n.p. (Mills entry).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

it left to the states the right to conduct training according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. Even General Mills acknowledged that the powers of the War Department under the Dick Act of 1903 were largely advisory, but he did have one very large stick with which he could cajole compliance from the states – he could threaten to withhold further federal funding from states that did not comply with the law or could not properly account for federal property and funds. From 1912 to 1916, General Mills' energetic administration, coupled with the threat of cutting off funding, began to steadily improve the efficiency of the Guard.

Mills pressured the militia to start conforming to the organization that had been prescribed for the Regular Army:

> Uniformity in organization did not exist [prior to 1913]; the number of companies in a regiment varied from 8 to 12; in some States a brigade consisted of two regiments, in others of three. In most States, a headquarters staff was maintained out of all proportion in numbers and rank with the troops in service and entailing on the Federal government an undue expense for the payment of salaries.[88]

New policies promulgated in 1913 reaffirmed the basic organizational standards that were required of units, and forced the states to shed "superfluous staff officers and coordinate the rank of those retained with the importance of their duties" through the simple expedient of only paying those officers whose ranks and positions were authorized in equivalent sized Regular Army units. While declaring victory in the battle to get the existing militia organizations to conform to a single Army standard, Mills admitted that a "considerable deficiency" remained with regard to getting the states to organize auxiliary

[88] Memorandum from CMB to CofS, July 21, 1916, Subject: Report of conduct of Militia Bureau since 1912. RG 168/12a/029.3 – 1914-1918.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

units – virtually anything other than infantry – that had little utility while in peacetime state service, but were essential in order to form higher tactical organizations in wartime.[89]

Mills also undertook to enforce the provisions of the 1903 and 1908 militia laws through inspections conducted by federal officers. These inspections verified manning rosters, assessed the general physical health of the men and their level of training, and ascertained whether federal property was on hand and was properly stored and cared for. This was a vast improvement over the level of accountability required prior to General Mills' arrival in 1912. Mills' inspectors, in essence, conducted an outside audit of each governor's books to uncover surpluses or shortages of equipment that had not been previously reported. One immediate benefit of this new accountability was to end the practice of some states taking federal funds and then failing to purchase or disburse uniforms and equipment to their units. Future federal outlays became contingent on the states purchasing only certain, specified items that were required for maintaining existing units.[90]

These changes, naturally enough, provoked a good deal of ire among some Guardsmen who were accustomed to the old system. While the newly imposed (or newly enforced) requirements were understandably decried by staff officers who had been declared supernumerary or men who had profited from lax accounting standards, the new regime also increased the paperwork and time commitments required of every Guard

---

[89] Ibid. See also DMA Circular No. 8, Aug. 1, 1913.

[90] Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officer. A storm of protest questioning the constitutionality of the DMA's actions came out of the October 1913 NGAUS convention. The rhetoric grew so heated that General Mills took the unusual step of publishing a official circular letter containing a lengthy rebuttal of the speech given by the NGAUS Executive Council chairman, General Edward Young of Illinois.[91] On the other hand, not all of Mills' reforms were considered onerous; there was considerable support among Guardsmen for Mills' efforts to increase the number and quality of Regular officer and sergeant inspector-instructors detailed to the militia, as well as the development of a standardized syllabus of instruction and manuals for use in militia training.[92]

From 1910 to 1916, NGAUS focused its efforts on getting Congress to authorize federal drill pay for Guardsmen. Justification for this rested chiefly on the increased requirements, both in time and money, placed upon all members of the militia in order to maintain the federal standards required of themselves and their units. At first, Chief of Staff Wood and the General Staff opposed drill pay unless it was accompanied by increased federal controls over the Guard beyond those mandated in 1903. This requirement provoked the opposition of both anti-militarists and states' rights factions in Congress, while fiscal conservatives objected to the cost of paying for drills. Progress toward a compromise was made when, in early 1912, Secretary of War Henry Stimson withdrew his support for a National Guard pay bill after the Judge Advocate General of

---

[91] DMA Circular No. 12, 1913.

[92] Memorandum From CMB to CofS, July 21, 1916, Subject: Report of conduct of Militia Bureau since 1912. RG 168/12a/029.3 1914-1918.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Army and the Attorney General of the United States both ruled that the 1908 militia legislation was unconstitutional insofar as it gave the President the right to deploy the militia outside the borders of the United States.[93]

The ruling came as a shock to the Guard. With it, the militia's value as a federal reserve again came into question. Many Guardsmen believed the General Staff was deliberately trying to find a means to bypass the states in their search for a reserve force.[94] In fact, Stimson and Wood were able to insert authorization into the Army appropriation bill for 1912 for the creation of a general federal reserve, to consist of individual soldiers who had completed a three-year hitch with the Regulars and would then spend four years in a reserve status.[95]

The Attorney General's ruling may well have prompted the formation of a second influential Guard organization – the Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS). Organized by the Adjutant General of Kansas, Brig. Gen. Charles Martin, AGAUS was formed for the purpose of "mutual helpfulness in exchanging ideas in regard to administration and improving the efficiency of the National Guard, uniformity in laws and regulations and cooperation with the National Guard Association in securing

---

[93] "Authority of President to Send Militia into a Foreign Country," Volume 29, Opinions of the Attorney General (1912), 322-329.

[94] Cooper, 114-115, 117.

[95] Richard Crossland and James Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve* (Washington: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 23-24. Since there were no penalties established in the 1912 law for failure to enter the reserve pool the system flopped, with only sixteen individuals signing up in the following two years. Nevertheless, the 1912 act marked the first successful attempt to legislate a *general* federal reserve. The very first federal reserve of any type was the Medical Reserve Corps, created in 1908, and restricted solely to physicians. Unlike the failed 1912 Reserve, the Medical Reserve Corps succeeded in gaining over 1,700 doctors for the use of the Army by June 1916, when it was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

legislation."[96] As the membership of AGAUS was limited to adjutants general (AGs), it was by definition a more exclusive association than NGAUS. However, in point of fact, the same men were prominent in both organizations, and the political agendas of the two organizations were identical; AGAUS even made it a point to hold meetings at the same location as NGAUS every year, usually immediately preceding the NGAUS convention.

The Guard's struggle to obtain drill pay dragged on. Even in 1912, when the War Department and NGAUS could agree on a pay bill that would increase federal control over the Guard, the new Wilson administration's Secretary of War, Lindley Garrison refused to endorse it because he felt it did not impose sufficient federal controls.[97] The year 1913 produced two conferences between the NGAUS Executive Council and Secretary Garrison in which the general features of a proposed Militia Pay bill were agreed upon, but follow-up meetings held to iron out the details revealed bitter divisions that stalled the process and led NGAUS to propose militia legislation that did not have the War Department's endorsement.[98] The fight for drill pay not only strained relations between the Secretary of War and the representatives of NGAUS, it reopened divisions within the leadership of NGAUS as well, with some members of the Executive Council

---

integrated into the newly created Officer Reserve Corps.

[96] Charles Martin, "History of the Adjutants General Association" (1 page typewritten historical synopsis, Jan. 1923). NGAUS library, AGAUS History files. Surviving records of AGAUS meetings are spotty for the period 1912-1938, but they tend to parallel NGAUS in the issues and concerns they reveal.

[97] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 31; Cooper, 117.

[98] Correspondence relating to attempts to pass a Militia Pay Bill in 1913 can be found in RG 168/12a/011.6 – General - #1 Revision of Militia Laws (Pay Bill). See especially memorandum from Chief, DMA to CofS, Sept. 15, 1913, Subject: Proposed Federal Militia Law.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

still hoping for compromise and cooperation with the War Department, and others more militantly opposed to surrendering any more of the Guard's autonomy to the Regulars.[99]

The constitutional restriction on the Guard serving abroad when called as militia, which had reemerged with the Attorney General's opinion in 1912, threatened to relegate the Guard to obsolescence less than a decade after the Dick Act had secured its relevance in the modern era. Since the Army did not believe the Guard would be there the next time a war was fought abroad, it made sense to create an entirely federal reserve under the Army clause of the Constitution, an idea which was extremely popular with most of the Army's military and civilian leaders. This would also eliminate having to deal with "forty-eight separate armies" (that is, one for each state) in peacetime. The Guard knew that its elimination from war plans would eventually also mean its elimination from federal budget plans, leaving it (barring an improbable invasion from abroad) to molder away as little more then a police force in the states. Unlike the period prior to 1898, when some Guardsmen would have been satisfied with this role, by 1914 opinion among Guardsmen was unified that the Guard had to fight to maintain its position as the first-line federal reserve.

The Guard received legislative support in this effort from Congress in April 1914 with the passage of the Volunteer Act. This law stipulated that the President could only call for federal volunteers with the consent of Congress, and that before calling for volunteers he would first have to accept any organized militia unit in which three-quarters

---

[99] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 32; Cooper, 125.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the minimum enlisted strength of the unit volunteered.[100] While the law did ensure that the Guard would have the first chance to serve if a war broke out, it forced the General Staff to base their mobilization plans on a guess of how many Guardsmen would volunteer for a given conflict, reduced the efficiency of Guard units by allowing any member to opt out of service when he was needed the most, and failed to address the means necessary to raise the massive numbers of men that modern war would soon demonstrate were required. It was clear that this legislation was less than ideal, both from the viewpoint of Guardsmen who wanted federal drill pay and a more secure place in federal war plans, and for the War Department which hoped to have greater controls over the Guard in peacetime. However, the legislation did at least create a method, albeit imperfect, for Guardsmen and their units to get around the legal barriers to overseas deployment that had been raised by the Attorney General.[101]

The prospects for achieving harmony with the War Department over a militia pay bill seemed to improve in the fall of 1914 as a leadership change took place within NGAUS. Tired of the last several years of heated rhetoric which had strained relations with the War Department and failed to produce federal pay for drills, a coup took place at the September 1914 NGAUS convention in Boston that removed General Young and his supporters from leadership on the Executive Council. The new Executive Council and its

---

[100] The Volunteer Act, 38 *Stat.* 347 (1914).

[101] While Derthick asserts (pp. 31-32) that NGAUS might have been more effective in securing passage of militia pay legislation if its membership had been united in its goals, she ignores any discussion of the Volunteer Act and the apparent victory it marked for NGAUS over those elements in the War Department General Staff which desired to reduce reliance on the militia for future war plans.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

chairman, the Adjutant General of Florida, J. Clifford Foster, presided over a series of resolutions endorsing the War Department's version of the Militia Pay bill and promised to cooperate whole-heartedly with Secretary Garrison in securing its passage. The Chief of the DMA expressed a cautious hope that President Wilson could be convinced to support the measure. A spirit of optimism was in the air.[102]

It would soon be dashed. Secretary Garrison had decided instead that a clean break from the militia was needed, and initiated a proposal to create a vast, new, entirely federal reserve for the Army. Stunned and feeling betrayed, the members of the National Guard prepared to fight for their survival.

[102] See letter, Brig. Gen. Wilbur Sadler to Chief, DMA, Sept. 16, 1914 and Mills' reply, Sept. 25 in RG 168/12a/080. – National Guard Assoc. Meeting, 1914. Sadler, the AG of New Jersey, was a powerful figure within AGAUS and NGAUS, and the prime instigator of the coup which overthrew General Young.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 2: The National Defense Act of 1916 and World War I

> *In considering a military policy for the United States we can not bring ourselves to accept the belief that it is wise to discredit and to abandon a force which actually exists, which is susceptible of development, and which owes its being to the patriotic impulses of our citizenry, for a mere plan, confessedly experimental, and presented with implied doubt by its friends as to whether or not it will work. (Maj. Gen. J. Clifford Foster, the Adjutant General of Florida and Chairman of the NGAUS Executive Committee, in testimony before the House Committee on Military Affairs, February 1, 1916)*[1]

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 led to a lengthy and passionate debate in America on military preparedness, and made Congress more willing to consider fundamental changes to the defense establishment. In this respect, the legislation ultimately passed on June 3, 1916 is a parallel of the 1903 Dick Act in that the traditional congressional aversion to major overhauls of defense policy was overcome by outside events, not internal pressure from either the War Department or Guard lobbies. Most participants in the debate leading up to the National Defense Act of 1916 agreed that there was a need for a larger, more vigorous reserve force to back up the Army. The debate focused on the size of the Regular Army and the nature of the reserve – would it be federal, or would it be based on the existing National Guard in the states?

The Stimson Plan

The General Staff had seemed to have settled on a definite scheme for the Army's

[1] *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs*, House of Representatives, 64th Congress, 1st Session. Vol. 2, 983.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

structure in 1912 with the publication of *Organization of the Land Forces of the United States* (often referred to as the Stimson plan after Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who commissioned it).[2] The document was a seminal work, and reflected the essence of the General Staff's mission; it promulgated a unified military doctrine that would eliminate a problem the Army had faced at the beginning of every previous war – extemporized mobilization. Its principle author was a captain assigned to the War Department General Staff, John McAuley Palmer. Palmer, one the more influential – if unheralded – policy-makers in the history of the Army, would have a say in the shaping of the U.S. Army for most of the first half of the 20th century, beginning with his authorship of *Organization of the Land Forces of the United States*, and later in helping to formulate the National Defense Act of 1920 (to be discussed in the next two chapters) and the post World War II army.

The *Organization of the Land Forces of the United States* covered all aspects of Army mobilization with the exception of economic mobilization, and divided the Army into three components: (1) a Regular Army of 112,000 men organized into three tactical divisions and three cavalry brigades which would be ready for immediate deployment in the early stages of a war;[3] (2) the National Guard, 348,000 strong, organized in peacetime into twelve tactical divisions which would mobilize at pre-determined locations and

---

[2] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1912*, Appendix A: "Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States."

[3] Previously, the largest peacetime organization in the Regular Army had been the regiment; the National Guard of Pennsylvania and New York had organized their forces into permanent tactical divisions in 1879 and 1908 respectively.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reinforce the Regulars, and (3) an army of volunteers, to be organized when forces larger than those which could be provided by the Regulars and National Guard were required. The personnel and facilities necessary for recruiting and training these volunteers were to be included in the peacetime structure of the Regular Army. The plan "made a historic departure from the expansible army plan which had been advocated not only by Upton but by Calhoun and in embryo by Alexander Hamilton. It proposed a Regular Army not skeletonized but ready to fight immediately."[4] Though the plan stated a preference for a wholly federal organized reserve and made clear that the Guard would have to conform more closely to federal standards (for instance, by shedding excess infantry units and organizing the necessary combat support units to fill out the Guard divisions) it realistically accepted the fact that, for the short term at least, the Guard was the only force in being that could play the role of an organized reserve.[5]

Congress, unfortunately, refused to pass additional legislation in order to institute the changes proposed in the Stimson plan. Therefore, just prior to leaving office in 1913, Secretary Stimson ordered the Army to comply with the new arrangement insofar as it could within existing laws. The General Staff divided the country into four administrative districts – East, Central, West and South – organizing an infantry division in each of the first three districts and a cavalry division in the last (a separate cavalry brigade was also allotted to the Central district). It then divided the states into twelve

---

[4] Weigley, 339.

[5] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1912*, Appendix A: "Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States," 117-118.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

geographic districts, with each one supporting a National Guard division (numbered 5-16, the designations 1-4 being reserved for the four Regular Army divisions). In addition to these twelve infantry divisions, three Guard cavalry divisions were divided up among the districts. In 1914 the DMA disseminated this new organization to the states, but enthusiasm in the Guard for the plan was limited, and compliance was voluntary so long as the Guard remained in state service.[6] New York and Pennsylvania – the two states that had organized divisions on their own prior to 1914 – were each assigned their own district, and these two divisions were brought into compliance with the new tables of organization with little trouble. The other ten districts contained anywhere from two to seven states sharing a division, and governors hesitated to disband existing units and form new ones – especially expensive field artillery and medical units – that had limited utility in their state. Many refused to take any action at all.[7]

The Continental Army Plan

Wilson's defeat of Taft in 1912 and the replacement of Secretary of War Stimson with Lindley Garrison in March 1913 meant that the Stimson plan would not be the end of the debate over the structure of the Army and the function of the Guard. Garrison, who from the beginning of his tenure as Secretary of War had grave doubts about the Guard's suitability as a federal reserve, was dissatisfied with the *Organization of the Land Forces of the United States*, and – taking advantage of the heated preparedness debate in

---

[6] Division of Militia Affairs Circular No. 19, 1914.

[7] John Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington: Center of Military History, 1998), 31-32.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Congress in 1915 – introduced his own "Continental Army" plan. After the General Staff spent the better part of 1915 working on it, Garrison's plan for the organization of the Army and its reserves was laid out in all its detail in September 1915 in a report titled *Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States.*[8]

Garrison's plan envisioned an enlarged Regular Army of about 140,000 supplemented by a federal reserve of 400,000 – the "Continental Army." The reservists would all be volunteers required to serve three years in an active status, during which time they would assemble periodically for intensive training. Reservists would then have to serve an additional three years in an inactive status, during which time they would not train and would be subject to recall only in the event of a war. Under Garrison's plan, the National Guard would stay at its current strength, around 129,000, and receive increased federal support, but would be limited to the three constitutional roles of executing the laws of the Union, suppressing insurrection, and repelling invasion. The provisions in the 1903 and 1908 Militia Acts requiring that the Guard serve as the first line reserve of the Army, as well as the 1914 Volunteer Act giving the Guard first preference to volunteer for a war, would be repealed.

Believing that most Guardsmen enlisted because they wanted an opportunity for federal service, Garrison declared that Guard units would be permitted, if they desired, to transfer intact to the Continental Army.[9] Guardsmen must have suspected that the

---

[8] War Department General Staff, Army War College, *A Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States* (Washington, GPO, 1915). Also see Garrison's description of the policy and arguments in favor of it in *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1915*, 6-34;

[9] *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1915*, 20- 21, 25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

increased federal funding Garrison proposed for the Guard would never materialize if at the same time the federal reserve mission was eliminated. Many accordingly viewed the promised money as "a palpably sordid effort toward a buy-off."[10]

Advocates of preparedness such as former Chief of Staff Leonard Wood and former Secretaries Root and Stimson backed Garrison's plan, as did – naturally enough – the current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Hugh Scott, and the entire General Staff (to include Maj. Gen. Mills, the Chief of the DMA). The Republican party tended to ally itself with the Army's desire for reform, as did interventionists seeking to strengthen the military in preparation for U.S. support of the Entente powers.

Private organizations, such as the National Security League (founded by 150 distinguished public figures) supported Garrison's plan and took on the task of informing the public of the need for preparedness. The Plattsburg camp graduates, headed by Elihu Root's former law partner, Grenville Clark, made up the influential membership of the Military Training Camps Association and also supported Garrison's plan. They hoped that a federal system of Universal Military Training would be established to provide the bulk of the Continental Army. It should be noted that Guardsmen overwhelmingly supported the concept of UMT as well. One survey of colonels, captains and first sergeants in the El Paso District found these Guardsmen favoring the establishment of UMT by 500-10. However, they wanted either the states to conduct the training (with federal funding), or for the Guard to be the recipient of the soldiers after they were

[10] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1915*, 22-29; Hill, 220.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

trained.[11] The problem with the federal reserve that the Military Training Camps Association advocated was that it would siphon off all the young men who might otherwise enlist in the Guard, leaving the state forces to wither on the vine.

Opponents of Garrison's plan came from a variety of backgrounds. A few, like former President Theodore Roosevelt, opposed it because the goal of 500,000 trained men seemed absurdly small when compared to the massive armies struggling at that moment in Europe. Most opponents, however, felt quite the opposite. Among them were isolationists, led by William Jennings Bryan, who had resigned as Wilson's Secretary of State in June 1915 because he thought the administration's foreign policy might drag it into the war in Europe. Bryan and others saw the Continental Army plan as further proof that the Wilson administration, despite its public rhetoric, was preparing to commit America to the war in Europe. There was strong opposition to the "Big Army" plan in the Midwest and South, where people considered the Preparedness movement a tool of East Coast bankers and munitions makers, and Southerners in particular feared that blacks would be enlisted in the Continental Army and trained to use weapons.[12]

Anti-militarists, who were suspicious of plans to expand the Regular Army, had a powerful ally in Representative James Hay (D-VA), the chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, probably the single most powerful man in the House in the area of military matters. The son of a Confederate surgeon, Hay was not a pacifist, but he

---

[11] *NGAUS Proceedings,1917*, 70-71. The proceedings cite the source of the UMT survey as the *Congressional Record*, Mar. 15, 1917, 5927.

[12] George C. Herring, "James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy, 1915-1916." *The Journal of Southern History* XXX (Nov. 1964): 390.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

favored states' rights, wanted to keep the Regular Army small, and was wary of the influence of the General Staff. Hay's advisor and assistant was the former Adjutant General of the Army, Maj. Gen. Fred Ainsworth. Ainsworth had been forced to retire from the Army in 1912, the result of a power struggle between himself and Chief of Staff Leonard Wood.[13] While the feud with Wood had been fueled in part by personal antagonism, Ainsworth's defeat had done much to establish the primacy of the General Staff over the various bureaus. Though Ainsworth had been forced out, he gained the opportunity for revenge against the General Staff through his friend Hay. In 1912 Ainsworth assisted Hay in formulating legislation that reduced the size of the General Staff and forced staff officers who had served more then four of the past six years on detached duty to return to service with their respective regiments.[14] In 1916, Ainsworth and Hay would lead the opposition to the Continental Army plan as well.

President Wilson's own position on preparedness vacillated. By nature he had little interest in military affairs, and did not want to appear interventionist by building up the military in the name of preparedness. However, he feared that the Republican opposition would use his "softness" on preparedness as a weapon against him in the 1916 election. He tried to follow a middle course, such as favoring Universal Military Training (but only on a voluntary basis, thus making it somewhat less than universal)

---

[13] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 34.

[14] Weigley, 332. I.B. Holley, Jr., *General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 212. The so-called "Manchu Law" of August 1912 stripped the General Staff of many experienced officers, including John McAuley Palmer. Their "exile" from Washington was likened to that of the recently ousted Manchu dynasty in China.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with the hope that he would not divide his own party. Nevertheless, not wanting to appear soft on defense amidst the growing crisis in Europe, Wilson reluctantly supported his Secretary of War and his plan.[15]

The Guard vs. the Secretary of War

The new, more moderate leadership of the National Guard Association had spent much of 1915 lobbying for the support of the War Department for a Militia Pay bill, unaware of Secretary Garrison's developing Continental Army plans. In general, relations between the adjutants general and the Division of Militia Affairs were excellent; when a group calling itself the "National Defense League" (not to be confused – though its founders probably wanted it to be – with the National Security League) attempted to gain support for removing control of the Guard from the DMA and placing it in the hands of a "National Board of Adjutants General," it gained few backers. In fact, several of the adjutants general vocally supported Mills and denounced attempts to eliminate the oversight of the DMA.[16]

Secretary Garrison first attempted to win over the Guard to his plan by trying to convert the members of the National Militia Board (a panel of senior Guard officers set

---

[15] Herring, 384.

[16] See correspondence in RG 168/12a/080. – National Defense League, particularly from AGs of Idaho, Missouri, and Wyoming. The Militia Division files only contain responses that various AGs chose to forward to Mills; invariably these are letters that denounce the motives of the League and endorse Mills. While there is no record that the League ever gained much in the way of overt support from any of the AGs in 1915, the plan to govern the Guard through a national board of AGs is remarkably similar to one that would be proposed by NGAUS in 1919.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

up in 1908 to advise the War Department) in late October 1915.[17] He also invited the Executive Committee of NGAUS and president of AGAUS to the meeting, which was held two weeks in advance of that year's NGAUS convention. After making his presentation he walked away believing he had gained their support for the Continental Army proposal – even though the Guardsmen made no promises regarding the stance that would be taken by the membership of NGAUS at the upcoming convention. Garrison promised that if the NGAUS convention supported his plan, he would in turn lend his support to a Militia Pay bill that would grant federal pay for performing drills.

Two weeks later when the convention opened in San Francisco there was a cautious neutrality in the Executive Committee's presentation of Garrison's plan, coupled with a recommendation only that NGAUS develop legislation providing for drill pay and present it to Congress. The delegates now looked to Garrison's envoy to the convention, Assistant Secretary of War Henry Breckinridge, for further clarification:

> The convention immediately convened and I believe there was not a willingly absent delegate. In fact, they were all in their seats. I have rarely seen more interest manifested in a speech than that of the delegates in the speech of the Assistant Secretary of War. I have never seen more absolute disappointment than that of the delegates when the Assistant Secretary concluded his remarks. Every delegate agreed that the speech was an able one, magnificently delivered, but so did every delegate likewise agree that it was the "handwriting on the wall," setting forth the end of the National Guard system.[18]

---

[17] *Report of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau relative to The National Guard of the United States, 1916.* (Washington, GPO, 1916), 45. (Hereafter *CMB* or *CNGB Annual Report* with year)

[18] Memorandum from Capt. H.A. Hanigan to Chief, DMA, Nov. 15, 1915, Subject: National Guard Convention at San Francisco, 3. RG 168/12a/080. – National Guard Assoc. Meeting – 1915. Capt. Hanigan was a Regular officer, an inspector-instructor of the California National Guard who attended the convention and filed a nine page report with his observations.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Breckinridge was greeted with silence after finishing his pitch for the Continental Army. Only through extraordinary efforts did the NGAUS leadership squash any open expression of anger from making it on to the floor of the convention, and thus into the official record, but the hallways outside the meeting hall buzzed with frustration and anger:

> It had been the hope of every delegate that the Secretary of War would recognize the Organized Militia as a part of the first line of defense; that a scheme for the removal of the Constitutional limitations of the use of the Militia would be proposed; that his support of the Pay Bill would be emphasized; and that an assurance would be given that every National Guard officer would be accepted in his rank, if a necessity for the calling forth of the Organized Militia should arise.
>
> This group would say "the War Department has again failed to keep faith with the National Guard." Another group would say, "The Secretary's plan is a veiled insult to the Guard." ... It seemed to be the opinion of the delegates, freely expressed, that the Secretary's plan was not prepared by military experts familiar with the difficulties of maintaining a volunteer army of citizen soldiers.[19]

Discussion on the convention floor studiously avoided the Continental Army plan for the remaining two days of the proceedings. When a retired general officer (who was not a delegate) put forward a resolution supporting Garrison's plan it was immediately referred to the Legislative Committee without debate – where it was tabled. The membership of NGAUS instead approved a resolution calling for a constitutional amendment making the militia available for federal service to the same extent as the Regular Army, but reserving peacetime control of it to the states. They backed up their words by assessing each state a fee based on its total Guard membership with which they

---

[19] Ibid., 4-5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

built a "war chest" to fight the Secretary of War's plan.[20]

The battle was carried out by the Executive Committee of NGAUS, which did its utmost to expose what it later described as a "deliberate conspiracy to destroy the National Guard."[21] They mobilized the support of the adjutants general to get them to lobby their representatives for the defeat the Continental Army plan and passage of a Militia Pay bill that had been introduced in the Senate.[22] Opposition to the Militia Pay bill came from both Secretary Garrison and the General Staff. Garrison told the members of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs that the bill should not be considered: "If we put the Organized Militia firmly in the saddle, as contemplated in this Bill, the opportunity for adopting a sound military policy for the nation will have passed beyond recall."[23] The DMA contested the Guard's claim that federal pay for the Militia would improve its recruiting and the efficiency. In two reports released in January 1916, the

---

[20] Ibid., and Martha Derthick, "Citizen Soldier on Capitol Hill: The Political Life of the National Guard" (Ph.D. dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1961), 106-108. Derthick's interpretation of Garrison's October success with the NGAUS leadership, and her statement that the November 1915 Convention "refrained from attacking the plan" and "ignored it altogether" is at odds with both the convention proceedings and Hanigan's eyewitness account of the events. While the transcript of the 1915 convention indicates that the delegates were courteous in their consideration of the Continental Army plan, the resolutions that they passed (and the one they tabled) clearly indicate the hostility of the majority of delegates to the plan. In particular, this is shown by the extraordinary step of voting extra funds to fight for the NGAUS legislative program. Derthick, by failing to recognize this measure, or the hasty tabling of a resolution supporting the Continental Army plan, misjudges the mood of the convention. See *NGAUS Proceedings, 1915*, 18-29, 53-57, 69-71, 76, 79. For a brief alternative view of the 1915 convention, see Bruce Jacobs, "The NGAUS Conference of 1915: Saving the Guard for Total Force," *National Guard*, Oct. 1985, 46.

[21] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1917*, 75-83. Note: Due to the complete mobilization of the Guard in 1916, no NGAUS convention was held that year. Thus, the discussion of the Continental Army Plan and efforts by the NGAUS leadership to defeat it took place during the March 27-29, 1917 convention.

[22] S. 1158, 64th Congress, 1st Session. See circular letter, Chairman, NGAUS Executive Committee to the AGs of the States, Jan. 10, 1916 in RG 168/12a/011. – Continental Army.

[23] Garrison to Chairman, Senate Military Affairs Committee, Jan. 29, 1916. RG 168/12a/011.6 – Pay Bill.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Division demonstrated that attendance and discharge rates in states that provided drill pay for their Guardsmen were not materially different from those in states that did not. In fact, according to the DMA the average attendance for drill in 1914 was only one-tenth of 1 percent higher in states that provided drill pay than it was in states that did not.[24]

Representatives of NGAUS met with the House and Senate Military Affairs Committees in January and early February 1916 to discuss many of the complaints about the unreliability of the Guard that had been raised in the press and by the General Staff – complaints that included concern over a governor refusing to call out troops in a national emergency, or even disbanding them; governors appointing Guard officers for political reasons; and the constitutional limitations on deploying the Guard outside the borders of the United States. While demonstrating that some of these complaints were groundless and others easily solved with legislation, the chairman of the NGAUS Executive Committee, Maj. Gen. J. Clifford Foster of Florida, struck back by expressing the wounded indignation many Guardsmen felt:

> It is a cause for wonder that in a Government which proclaims its dependence for defense upon the citizenry of the country and makes a direct appeal to the patriotic impulses of the people to sustain it, an institution such as is the National Guard, a force designed to stimulate and to develop those qualities which are the highest attributes of American citizenship, should have to fight, constantly to fight, not only to maintain but to justify its existence.[25]

---

[24] DMA memorandum, "Comparative data concerning State pay for armory assemblies for drill and instruction" and DMA memorandum "Statement of total number of discharges during years 1912-1913-1914, in States allowing pay for attendance at drills" both dated Jan. 14, 1916. RG 168/12a/056. – General – National Guard. Seven states provided drill pay, generally 25 cents per drill, with one state (Maine) making drill pay optional at the discretion of the Governor.

[25] *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs*. House of Representatives, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 2, 986.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Both the House and Senate committees invited NGAUS to submit proposed legislation that would embody their ideas for improving the efficiency of the Guard.[26] According to the NGAUS Executive Committee, over forty sections of their proposed bill were incorporated in the official House and Senate versions of the final bill, though "[t]here were omitted from both bills, however, sections which we deemed vital to the establishment of a system in the National Guard which would insure intelligent and sympathetic administration."[27] Among these were a section that would have had National Guard officers running the Division of Militia Affairs on the General Staff. Predictably, "this provision of the bill met with violent opposition from the War Department. It was regarded as presumptuous that National Guard officers should seek to invade the sacred precincts of that Holy of Holies."[28] Indeed, even after the battle was over and new legislation passed in June 1916, the Annual Report of the Militia Bureau revisited the debate with an uncharacteristically lengthy and partisan attack on NGAUS for supporting legislation to place Guardsmen in control of the Militia Bureau:

> Such a result would be deplorable. ... It would be almost inevitable that militia officers serving in such a capacity would become the representatives of local interests and the wielders of local influence for the benefit of local interests in national military affairs in much the same way that this function was exercised by a group of National Guard representatives in bringing local influence to bear on the legislation

---

[26] See "Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Guard Association," Jan. 30 - Feb. 5, 1916 for discussion of testimony and meetings with members of Congress; Identically titled document dated March 14 lists specific proposed changes to both the House (Hay) and Senate (Chamberlain) versions of the legislation. Both documents in NGAUS archives, Box 10.

[27] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1917*, 80.

[28] Ibid., 80-81.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

enacted at the recent session of Congress.[29]

NGAUS' proposal to replace the entire staff of Regulars overseeing Guard affairs was too radical a change from what had preceded to have a chance of success. Indeed, the author of the Militia Bureau report was certainly correct in his contention that "there was not full concurrence on the part of the National Guard in the views of their representatives and in the measures advocated by them."[30] Instead, a severely watered down version of NGAUS' proposal which allowed two Guard officers to serve on the staff of the bureau made the final version of the bill.[31] General Mills was opposed to even this small step; in testimony before the House Committee on Military Affairs, he told the committee "I think a departure from the principle now governing in the Militia Division which would include militia officers in its personnel would be all wrong."[32]

The real work, however, of undermining the Continental Army plan was done by Representative Hay, with the strong support of House Majority leader Claude Kitchin (D-NC). In addition to raising concerns over the size and cost of the proposed increase in

---

[29] *CMB Annual Report, 1916*, 55.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Enacted in the National Defense Act of 1916, Section 81. Section 81 also abolished the National Militia Board, which had rarely been called by the Secretary of War since its inception in 1908. After considerable delay on the part of the Secretary of War, Lt. Col. Frank Rumbold of the Third Missouri Infantry was the first Guard officer assigned to duty at the Militia Bureau in April, 1917. He was relieved shortly thereafter in order to return to Missouri for war service. He organized and commanded the 128th Field Artillery, 35th Division during the war, and returning to Washington DC in 1920 to serve as an additional member of the General Staff. See *CMB Report, 1916,* 45, 54-55 and *CMB Report,1917*, 58. Records concerning the extensive – and highly competitive – search for suitable Guard officers to serve as Assistants to the Chief are contained in RG 168/12a/029.3 – Militia Bureau Assistants.

[32] *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs*, House of Representatives, 64th Congress, 1st Session. Vol. 2, 974.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Regular Army, and expressing indignation over the marginalizing of the National Guard, Hay questioned the Army's ability to raise and sustain a reserve of the size Garrison proposed. After all, the Guard, with all its advantages of local affiliation and rich history, had difficulty maintaining a force less than one-third the size of the proposed Continental Army. When members of the General Staff admitted that the reason for adopting the Continental Army plan had been the constitutional impossibility of gaining adequate federal control over the National Guard, Hay devised an alternative that would strengthen the Guard and impose greater federal control over it at the same time.[33]

Hay proposed greatly increasing the funding for equipping and training the Guard, requiring that Guard units conform to Regular Army Tables of Organization, doubling the number of armory drills and tripling the length of annual summer camp. In return, the federal government would cover the cost of this training, to including the long-sought payment for attending drill. To combat political patronage in the selection of officers, the federal government would gain the right to "federally recognize" Guard officers in their respective grades, rejecting for federal pay or federal service those who did not meet the necessary physical or educational standards. To ensure that the Guard could deploy outside the borders of the United States under federal control, all Guardsmen would be required to take an oath to the federal government that they would respond with their entire units when called. In addition, in order to ensure that there would be no remaining restrictions linked to their status as militia, the law provided that Guardsmen would then be drafted into federal service.

---

[33] Weigley, 345.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Representative Hay presented his plan to President Wilson, who found it more appealing than Garrison's Continental Army scheme. The political calculus was fairly simple: Hay's plan was supported by Majority Leader Kitchin; would avoid a potential split in the Democratic party; and was far more palatable to Guardsmen – a significantly larger political constituency than the General Staff, Secretary of War, and the various preparedness groups. Hay also assured the President that there was no possibility of Garrison's plan ever gaining passage in the House. Wilson hoped to reach a compromise with his Secretary of War, but Garrison, declaring that "there can be no honest or worthy solution which does not result in national forces under the *exclusive* control and authority of the national government," resigned in protest when he realized his plan would never be passed. The President's political vision, in this case, clearly exceeded that of his Secretary of War. After closely examining the Hay bill to ensure it enacted adequate federal controls, Wilson and his new Secretary of War, Newton Baker, endorsed the plan and it sailed through the House by a vote of 402 to 2.[34]

The Senate, however, proved more of a challenge. Senator George Chamberlain (D-OR), chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, was a champion of the General Staff and the Preparedness movement and resented the lobbying campaign conducted by NGAUS throughout 1916 to defeat Garrison's plan. On December 13, 1915 Chamberlain proposed his own military reform bill. This bill called for a much larger increase in the Regular Army and a smaller increase in the Guard than the Hay bill, and created a federal "Volunteer Army" similar to Garrison's Continental Army, but

[34] Weigley, 345-346; Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 36-38; Herring 393-398.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

filled it through the enactment of compulsory UMT.[35] Advocates of preparedness and UMT were delighted. The NGAUS leadership was deeply frustrated with Chamberlain's refusal to make changes to his bill, and petitioned the membership of the association to write or cable their Senators with their objections, but to little avail; the Senate passed Chamberlain's military reform bill.[36] The competing Hay and Chamberlain bills became deadlocked in the joint House/Senate conference committee, with little chance a compromise would be reached during 1916, a Presidential election year.

The National Defense Act of 1916

It was international tension that finally pushed the conferees to reach a compromise in May 1916, but not from the war in Europe. Rather, it was the threat of war between Mexico and the United States. President Wilson's ill-conceived blockade of Tampico and Vera Cruz in 1914 and the subsequent occupation of Vera Cruz had been intended to bring the Mexican Revolution to a speedy, democratic end. Instead, it had only increased Mexican hostility towards the United States. By choosing sides in the struggle, Wilson gave one of the contenders, Francisco (Pancho) Villa, ample excuse to tap into popular anti-American sentiment in Mexico and stage a cross-border raid of Columbus, New Mexico in March 1916 that resulted in the deaths of seventeen Americans.[37] Wilson summoned the National Guard of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico

---

[35] Hill, 229.

[36] NGAUS "Bulletin to the National Guard of the United States," Mar. 31, 1916, 2. NGAUS archives, Box 10.

[37] Weigley, 347; John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York: Macmillan,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(about 5,000 men in all) into federal service to defend the U.S. border, and sent a force of Regulars under Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing across the border to pursue Villa. War with Mexico seemed imminent as Pershing's forces failed to run down the Villistas and instead clashed with the Mexican Army. The Mexican government demanded U.S. withdrawal, and Villa's bandits raided Glen Springs, Texas. It was under these circumstances that House and Senate conferees finally reached a compromise between the Hay and Chamberlain bills and quickly passed the resulting legislation into law.

The National Defense Act of June 3, 1916 (sometimes referred to as "The Hay-Chamberlain bill") was as landmark a piece of legislation as the Dick Act of 1903 had been. Criticized by anti-militarists and preparedness advocates alike, the more moderate mainstream termed it "at least a step in the right direction – as long a step, perhaps, as a Democratic Congress could be expected to take."[38] The key aspects outlined by Congressman Hay survived in the final, compromise version of the bill. The Guard would be the first-line reserve of the federal army. To ensure its uniform efficiency, the federal government would take over all arming, equipping and training expenses associated with the Guard, sharing with the states only administrative and armory costs. In addition, the federal government would pay Guardsmen for fifteen days of summer camp each year, and forty-eight 4-hour drill periods as well. Given the new requirements, the costs would be far higher; federal requests for appropriations for the Guard in 1917

1983), 151; Hill, 230.

[38] *Literary Digest,* LII (Mar. 4, 1916), 547; as quoted in Herring, 402-403, n. 66.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

totaled $57,500,000 – nearly nine times what was appropriated in 1916.[39] For the first time, federal expenditures on the Guard would be greater than the combined expenditures of the states.

Federal drill pay, the cause for such bitter dispute since 1910, was the great victory that NGAUS carried away from this fight. But this largesse exacted a price. Each Guardsman was required to take a dual oath upon enlistment binding him to both his state and to the United States. Guard officers would be held to prescribed federal standards regarding their "physical, moral, and professional fitness" to hold a commission in their grade. Drill and annual training requirements would take up significantly more time. The Guard would be required to organize the number and types of units dictated by the federal government, and maintain them at a prescribed strength, or be deprived of funding. The President was authorized to assign Regular officers and NCOs to Guard units without the consent of a governor, even to positions of command in Guard divisions and brigades, if those units were split between two or more states. The Regular Army would be increased gradually to a peacetime strength of 175,000 over five years, while the Guard would recruit up to a strength of 435,800 in the same period.[40]

---

[39] Cooper, 155. Cooper's figures are based on the Militia Bureau Report for 1916; data from the U.S. Department of Treasury's *Digest of Appropriations for the Support of the Government of the United States* shows actual appropriations (as opposed to requests) for the National Guard significantly lower, at $30,885,4450 for 1917. Nevertheless, this represents an almost sixfold increase in dollars spent from 1916. Source: "Army Funding, 1903-1997," NGB Historical Services files.

[40] An Act for Making Further and More Effectual Provision for the National Defense, and for Other Purposes (National Defense Act of 1916), *U.S. Statutes at Large* Vol. 39, Chap 134, 166 (1916); Sections 2, 3, 38, 62, 64, 70, 73, 75, 92. (Hereafter NDA 1916). Guard strength was apportioned to the states on a basis of 800 men authorized per member of Congress, plus allotments for the territories and the District of Columbia.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Despite NGAUS' best efforts to have it eliminated, the Senate provision creating a federal reserve was preserved, though narrowed, in the final bill. This reserve consisted of three parts – a Regular Army Reserve, consisting of former enlisted members of the Regular Army, an Officers' Reserve Corps (ORC) and an Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC). The ORC would consist of retired Regular officers, graduates of the Plattsburg camps, and graduates of military training instruction in the nation's colleges through a new program called the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). The ERC would include only enlisted specialists from technical fields such as Engineers, Signal, and Medical Services. None of the Reserve Corps would contain units – only individuals.[41]

The Division of Militia Affairs, in a move that heartened Guardsmen, was removed from the General Staff, renamed the Militia Bureau, and made to report directly to the Secretary of War.[42] The bureau would continue to be run by Regulars, though two Guard officers could be selected by the Secretary of War to serve on the staff as Assistants to the Chief of the Bureau. The Militia Bureau was granted broad powers to supervise the National Guard and ensure it maintained federal standards, or cut off funds from those states that failed to do so.[43] Although the law decreed the use of the term "National Guard" for all land forces that were part of the Organized Militia, the War

---

[41] NDA 1916, Sections 30, 37, 55.

[42] Ibid., Section 81. In this regard, the objective of Hay and his advisor, General Ainsworth, to reduce the power of the General Staff coincided with the goals of NGAUS. The Militia Bureau was one of three divisions removed from the General Staff or abolished. In addition, the Chief of Staff was handicapped by a restriction in the act that permitted only half of the General Staff to be stationed in or around Washington DC. See Derthick, "Citizen Soldier on Capitol Hill," 113-114.

[43] War Department General Order 24 of July 6, 1916, is the order that promotes the Division of Militia Affairs from the General Staff to become the Militia Bureau of the War Department, and spells out the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Department continued to use the term "Militia Bureau" because the office also supervised the remaining two classes of the militia – the Naval Militia and the Unorganized Militia, the latter being the great mass of male citizens age 18-45 who were subject to military service should the need arise.

The critical hurdle of overcoming the constitutional limitation on deployment outside the United States was achieved not just by an oath to be sworn to both state and federal authorities, but also by empowering the President to draft individual National Guardsmen into federal service in the event of an emergency. This was the first national conscription act since the Civil War, though it would quickly be followed by another one after the nation entered World War I. Once drafted, Guardsmen ceased to belong to the militia. If the president summoned the Guard as militia through the governors, he was required to take them as intact units. But when drafted under the Army clause of the Constitution, no such restrictions applied. Though Guardsmen expressed concern over how this would effect unit integrity and esprit, the law did not require the Army to keep Guardsmen together in their pre-war units once drafted, and also failed to provide for the return of these men to the Guard upon their release from active duty.[44] Both these omissions in the law would infuriate Guardsmen during and after World War I, and motivate them to correct these legal deficiencies during the inter-war period.

In retrospect, despite the NGAUS Executive Council's claim to the contrary, the Guard's role in influencing the specific nature of the National Defense Act of 1916

---

duties and responsibilities of the Chief, Militia Bureau.

[44] NDA 1916, Section 111.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

appears to have been minor. While Guardsmen no doubt found sympathetic ears in Congress, there is little evidence to suggest that the key figure in defeating Garrison's plan – James Hay – was substantially influenced by the Guard lobby. In fact, when NGAUS submitted a list of proposed changes to the bill to the House Committee on Military Affairs, Hay ignored the two most urgent requests.[45] These were a desire to have Guard representation on the General Staff, and to require the War Department to accept Guard units for service intact. Not surprisingly, both these issues would become the source of major complaint by Guardsmen during and after World War I. As one leading Guardsman recounted in 1919 when appearing before Hay's old committee, "...there were some things in the proposed legislation in which, of course, we did not quite agree with some members of the committee. Mr. Hay was chairman of the committee, and it was his bill, and he was rather hard-headed and hewed strictly to the lines he had in mind, and therefore it was not quite as we thought it should be."[46]

The Guard's influence in defeating the Continental Army plan was significant, but indirect. By virtue of its very existence as a force in being, with close ties to the states and a demonstrated willingness to serve the nation in time of war, the Guard made Garrison and the General Staff's vision of a Continental Army seem both unnecessary and a threat to states' rights. General Foster's words, as quoted at the beginning of this chapter, clearly struck a chord in Congress. Most congressmen were able to oppose

---

[45] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 39-41.

[46] Brig. Gen. Charles Martin, Adjutant General of Kansas and President of AGAUS, Dec. 16, 1919 in *Army Reorganization: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs,* House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, p.1905.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Secretary Garrison's plan not just due to its expense, but also because an influential constituency within their states stood united in opposition to it. The unity of Guard opposition, however, did not translate into universal support for the alternative proposals presented by NGAUS to Congress. This pattern would hold true when the Guard faced a similar situation four years later. At that time Guardsmen would once again unite in opposition to the plan proposed by the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, but divide over what type of organization should be instituted in its stead.

Most Guard officers were enthusiastic supporters of the National Defense Act of 1916 after its passage, demonstrating a significant shift from the resistance to greater federal control that most Guardsmen had in the 1890s.[47] Indeed, though historians have failed to comment on it, there was significant support in NGAUS for even greater federalization of the Guard than was introduced by the law. The NGAUS convention in 1917 passed, as the first of six resolutions:

> ...that the National Guard should be reorganized under Section 8, Article 1, Clause 12 of the Federal Constitution which gives to Congress the power to raise and support armies by amending Sections 57 and 58 of the National Defense Act so as to take the National Guard out of the definition of militia and create of it a veritable Federal force, with such provision governing the location of units, the appointment of officers and representation in the General Staff as the Congress may prescribe.[48]

In passing this resolution, and a further one supporting Universal Military Training, the membership of NGAUS was following the leadership of one of the most influential Guardsmen of the era, the Commanding General of the New York National Guard and the

---

[47] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 41.

[48] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1917*, 118.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6th (New York) Division, Maj. Gen. John O'Ryan. O'Ryan made it clear during his address to the 1917 NGAUS convention that he felt the 1916 Act was defective in several regards, including the lack of federal controls. It appears that for a brief window of time, O'Ryan's views had sufficient weight to carry the day on the subject.[49] This would change. Although O'Ryan's desire to see the Guard organized exclusively under the Army clause of the Constitution retained significant support among Guardsmen after World War I, NGAUS itself would never again waver as it had in 1917 from backing state control of the National Guard in peacetime.

Like the Dick Act, the National Defense Act of 1916 was a two-edged sword. While federal funding had increased dramatically, greatly surpassing that of the states, the Guard would now have to contend with a whole raft of new requirements that accompanied the funding. There were also unintended consequences:

> Contemporary and scholarly critics contend that the law represented a National Guard victory, but the 1916 NDA can be described as a state triumph only in the sense that the Guard avoided being eliminated from military policy. . . . The state soldiery's most fundamental loss in 1916 was its central place in the nation's war armies, although that was not evident when Congress approved the law. . . . Guardsmen had failed to anticipate that the nation's next war might demand an army of millions of men or that the general staff might raise that army through conscription.[50]

Despite the fact that future generations of Guardsmen would now have to share their reserve role with a federal reserve, it seems clear that the Guard gained the majority of

---

[49] Ibid., 27–32. Col. Crist also postulates that it was O'Ryan's influence which led NGAUS to resolve that the Guard be placed completely under federal control. Crist ms., NGAUS library, Box 18, 41.

[50] Cooper, 155-156. Derthick (*The National Guard in Politics*, 42), among others, is of the school that the National Defense Act of 1916 was a triumph for the Guard on a par with the passage of the Dick Act.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

what it had sought in 1916 and could rightfully declare victory. It had finally won the lingering debate over whether it could be deployed abroad, and it had won not only federal drill pay, but substantial additional federal support to ensure its continued military relevance. If Guardsmen had to sacrifice a further degree of their local individuality to conform to a uniform national standard, at least they could console themselves with the thought that by doing so, they had eliminated one more argument that the Regulars used to disparage them in the past.

Guardsmen barely had time to digest the scope of the new legislation when they learned that they were being called up for federal active duty. With the ink barely dry on the new law, President Wilson summoned the Guard in its traditional role as militia for a purpose that would have been familiar to militiamen as far back as the War of 1812 – to repel invasions of the sovereign territory of the United States.

Service on the Border

On June 18, fifteen days after President Wilson signed the National Defense Act of 1916, he increased security in the Southwest and tested the Guard's ability to mobilize by calling nearly the entire National Guard for service on the Mexican border. Coming so closely on the heels of this major reorganization of the Army, the call up was naturally accompanied by more than the normal amount of confusion and disorder. Guardsmen were unsure about the changes brought about by the new National Defense Act, or even whether the new law applied to this particular mobilization.

Whether or not the 1916 mobilization was a success for the Guard depended on the observer's point of view. The thirteen years that had passed since the implementation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the Dick Act clearly improved the Guard's ability to respond to a federal call, but not to the extent that most professional soldiers were satisfied with the Guard's performance. Many units mustered into federal service below the minimum authorized peacetime strength (which was generally about half of the prescribed war strength), with inadequate arms, uniforms, and equipment, and ill-trained at the individual and unit level. Historian Jerry Cooper summarized the sense of frustration that professional officers must have felt: "On first impression, the Guard's 1916 performance appears to differ little from the 1898 record. For Army officers, the millions of federal dollars spent on the state forces seemed a monumental waste that put the nation's security at precarious risk."[51]

Mobilization strength was low chiefly for two reasons. First, the states had not paid particular heed to federal standards of enrollment when recruiting Guardsmen; 18.45 percent of the Guardsmen initially called failed their physicals and could not be mustered into service. Secondly, the mobilization was extremely unpopular and a financial hardship for a great many soldiers, who requested – and were generally granted – discharges by their states, or otherwise found ways to avoid being sworn into federal service.[52]

To some extent, these criticisms are justified, but they miss the larger picture. The Guard demonstrated that it could provide a reserve force of semi-trained units in remarkably short time. The National Guard in June 1916 was approximately 132,000

---

[51] Cooper, 156.

[52] War Department, Militia Bureau. *Report on Mobilization of the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States, 1916* (Washington: GPO, 1916), 34-47, 55.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

strong; by July 31, with the help of vigorous recruiting, 110,957 state soldiers had reached the border while another 40,139 were mobilized but remained in state camps.[53] There they joined the 5,000 Guardsmen from Texas, Arizona and New Mexico who had entered active federal service back in March when Pancho Villa had made his first cross-border raid. Guardsmen mobilized in their home towns and in many cases deployed by train straight to the border, without stopping to organize in camps first. New York and Pennsylvania furnished entire divisions – the 6th and 7th – upon being mobilized, the only two organized divisions in the entire Army at that time. By any measure, the 1916 mobilization was a vast improvement over 1898.

The 1916 mobilization helped whip the Guard into shape for the coming ordeal in Europe, in much the same manner as the peacetime mobilization of the Guard in 1940 would prepare it for its role in an even bigger war. Calling the Guard into active federal service more than doubled the size of the Army in 1916, as it would in 1940 as well. While it is impossible to quantify, each of these precursor mobilizations had a huge impact on preparing the small peacetime Army for expansion to a wartime footing.

Most Guardsmen reached the border hoping for a quick fight with Villa's bandits and a quick trip home. Instead, they bivouacked in the dust and heat of the Southwestern desert and chafed as time dragged by. No doubt the feelings expressed by one

---

[53] Ibid., 153-156. Over 10,000 infantry and 8,000 coast artillery troops were not called up for federal service, though they are included among the 132,000 pre-mobilization strength figure. Those units remaining in state camps generally were there because they did not yet meet federal standards for deployment. Usually this was because of lack of equipment (a federal problem) or lack of men (a state problem). In all, the states furnished some 158,000 troops to the federal government in 1916, of which more than 156,000 were sent to the border.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guardsman on duty in West Texas were near-universal – "This is the most forsaken country the Lord ever made. We ought to clean Mexico up, and for punishment make them take back this part of Texas."[54] Despite the fact that they saw no action, the Army was determined to put to good use the time that it had the Guard directly under its control. Having weeded out the physically unfit at mobilization, those who remained benefited physically and professionally from months of hard training and exercise.[55] The experience was especially valuable for both Guard and Regular Army senior officers assigned to command and staff positions in the newly formed divisions and brigades, as well as for officers on the War Department General Staff and on the state staffs who learned to coordinate a major mobilization. As Brig. Gen. William Mann, the Chief of the Militia Bureau – and a frequently harsh critic of the Guard – proclaimed in December 1916:

> The mobilization of the National Guard and its dispatch to the border was a great accomplishment .... Whatever mistakes were made were those of judgment and not of purpose. Undoubtedly the immediate purpose of the call was attained. It may not be too much to say that the knowledge and experience gained from the mobilization are incidental advantages worth the cost.[56]

Many units that had still not received federal arms and equipment in accordance

---

[54] Clarence Clendenen, *Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars* (London: Macmillan, 1969), 292.

[55] Maj. Gen. Charles Clement, commander of Pennsylvania's 7th Division, noted that his men gained an average of twelve pounds while in service on the border due to the relatively good diet and extensive exercise they received. *NGAUS Proceedings, 1917*, 58-59.

[56] *Report on Mobilization of the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States, 1916*, 5. This statement was made in spite of the general tenor of the report, which pulled few punches in describing the inefficiency of Guard units when first called.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with the Dick Act finally began receiving these materials now that they were on active duty, and the Army also insisted that many Guard units convert to other branches of service before they would mobilize them. Some states had resisted reorganizing their units to conform with the requirement to create twelve National Guard divisions specified by the DMA in 1914. Cavalry, artillery, and sundry support-type units were more expensive to maintain than infantry, chiefly because of the cost of procuring, feeding and caring for horses. Units of this sort were also less useful than infantry in dealing with the types of disruptions the states most often encountered – strikes, civil disorder, and natural disasters. Thus, many states were forced to scramble in 1916 when they realized that the federal government, for the first time in its history, would only accept from the states those number and types of units it had specified, rather then simply assigning a quota of men for each state to provide. Nevertheless, the Militia Bureau was heartened by the progress which was made in this regard:

> Considering the shortness of the period that had elapsed since the publication of the plan [in 1914], the progress made toward the completion of the tactical divisions may be considered satisfactory, and with the increased powers in respect to organization granted to the War Department by the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, and the additional appropriations made for the support of auxiliary arms, it should be possible to complete the tactical organization of the National Guard in the near future.[57]

The Mexican border mobilization also hastened the end of the traditional American concept of the volunteer soldier. Since colonial times, despite the legal obligation placed on every adult male to serve in times of military necessity, the states

[57] Memorandum, CMB to CofS, July 21, 1916, Subject: Report of conduct of Militia Bureau since 1912. RG 168/12a/029.3 1914-1918.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

had usually done their utmost to ensure volunteers filled the ranks of regiments provided for national service – even if the motivation for volunteering was often more material than patriotic. During the Mexican War, the early stages of the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War, volunteers had rushed to the colors and filled the ranks of the Army. In between wars, volunteers maintained the soldiery of the states. Compulsory military service, while legally permissible, seemed un-American.

Many Guardsmen in 1916 still viewed themselves as traditional volunteer soldiers, and from that point of view they believed they could choose not to serve if they disagreed with the political goals of the conflict or could not be spared from their civilian obligations.[58] This came in direct conflict with the new legal requirements binding state soldiers to federal service regardless of the circumstances. The unpopularity of the Mexican border mobilization and the attendant flood of resignations, discharges, and failures to report for duty demonstrated that the traditional American reliance on patriotic volunteers or Guardsmen was risky – especially given the quantity of soldiers necessary for modern war. While the Army could squeeze through the crisis on the border in 1916 with insufficient volunteers to bring Guard and Regular units up to wartime strength, the lesson was abundantly clear to both the War Department and many in Congress that if America joined the war in Europe, it would require conscription from the outset.

Mobilization for the Great War

The number of Guardsmen deployed on the border decreased gradually as the

[58] Cooper, 158.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

months went by: as the new year 1917 was ushered in over 83,000 remained on active duty; some three months later that number had been cut in half. At that point, in late March, following the publication of the Zimmerman telegram and the initiation of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany against American shipping, an additional 40,000 Guardsmen were recalled to active duty by President Wilson to guard key facilities against German sabotage. When Congress declared war against Germany on April 6, some 80,446 National Guardsmen were already in federal service, while another 101,174 were "back in civil life, but still sun-tanned by Border service."[59]

Surprisingly, the Army took its time bringing the remainder of the Guard back onto active duty. The General Staff's failure to adequately plan for mobilization, as well as a physical lack of arms, equipment, and mobilization camps, meant that the balance of the Guard remained in state service from April through July 1917. By the end of July, two-thirds of the National Guard had been called into federal service, though most still remained in their home states. Legally, all the service performed by the Guard both on the Mexican border and following the declaration of war in April 1917 had been as militia, but all that was about to change. On August 5th, each individual Guardsman was drafted into federal service in accordance with the dictates of the National Defense Act of 1916.[60]

---

[59] "Strengths Present and Absent of Troops at Stations on the Mexican Border," compiled by AG US, Jan. 3 1917, *Baker Papers*, Box 1; Kreidberg and Henry, 222, 224; Hill, 242. In an odd twist of fate, the 1917 NGAUS Convention was held March 27-29 at the 7th Regiment armory in New York City, at a time when that regiment – which had just returned from nine months of service on the Mexican border – was being mobilized to guard against German sabotage. A week after the convention ended the nation would be at war.

[60] This action was resented by most Guardsmen, because it clouded the distinction that they were initially

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Prior to that, however, while the Guard was mobilizing in state camps, recruiting units up to wartime strength with volunteers, and protecting local infrastructure from saboteurs, the national debate over conscription came to a head. Most Guardsmen viewed themselves as citizens with a strong sense of civic duty, and they believed that the duty to serve in time of national need extended to the rest of the adult male population as well. While voluntary service was always preferable, the needs of the service might be greater than the numbers of volunteers. In this case, Guardsmen favored the draft as a means to stimulate voluntary enrollments. Returning home from the border in early 1917, Guardsmen undoubtedly spoke out clearly and with authority on topics relating to the military, and they were influential in shaping public opinion on the need for a draft if America was to intervene in Europe's war.[61]

The General Staff had already begun preliminary planning for a system of national conscription in December 1916. Those plans went into high gear after diplomatic relations with Germany were severed on February 1, 1917. Within days, President Wilson requested that the Secretary of War develop a conscription bill in short order. Work on this was accomplished primarily by Judge Advocate General of the Army Enoch Crowder, a student of military history as well as the law. The resulting proposal deliberately avoided the many unfair practices of the Civil War drafts of both the North and South. Commutations, bounties and substitutions were all made illegal, and all men

---

volunteers, not unwilling conscripts. However, it was legally necessary in order to formally sever ties with the militia so that the Guard could be employed abroad.

[61] Hill, 248-249; Mahon, 155.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ages 18-45 were required to register – eventually, over 24,000,000 would do so.

President Wilson delivered the bill to Congress on April 7, the day after war was declared. Congressional debate lasted into May, but Crowder's basic legislation underwent little modification before Wilson signed it into law on May 18 as the Selective Service Act. Over 4,600 local draft boards, supervised by the adjutants general of the states at the local level and General Crowder himself at the federal level, oversaw the granting of deferments and exemptions. This injected an aspect of local democracy into this national necessity – and in the process avoided another pitfall of the Civil War draft, the complaint that the process had been overly centralized. Despite predictions of riots and wide-scale abuse based on the nation's experience during the Civil War, Selective Service was implemented with little violence and relatively few delinquencies. Furthermore, it finally ended the antiquated American custom of fighting wars with volunteer armies filled by a system of state quotas. [62]

Deployment to the Mexican border had diminished enthusiasm for service within the Guard, and many units suffered a wave of resignations after returning to state control in early 1917. However, after war with Germany was declared and Selective Service instituted, the appeal of going "over there" with one's friends and neighbors helped bring most Guard units up to strength quickly in the summer of 1917. While some of these new Guardsmen were eager to go off to war, others simply wished to avoid taking their chances with the draft and ending up with a group of strangers.

---

[62] Hill, 250-254; Chambers, 179-186; Doubler, 169.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guard strength, which was 181,620 on April 1, 1917, rose to 379,071 – nearly full authorized war strength – four months later when the Guard was drafted into federal service. This number would drop by almost 19,000 as slightly more then 7 percent were rejected for medical reasons – a number that the Militia Bureau proudly touted as a huge improvement over the Mexican border mobilization of a year earlier. The additional step of formally conscripting each individual Guardsman (a step not required a year earlier when the Guard served on the border in its role as militia) made it absolutely clear that there were no restrictions on what the Army could do with these troops. From this point on, National Guard units ceased to have any legal connection with the states from which they came.[63]

Guard units continued to fill up with volunteers during the summer and fall of 1917, but this tapered off dramatically after voluntary enlistments for men of draft status were terminated on December 15, 1917.[64] Guard units also received Reserve officers (many of them recent graduates of the Plattsburg camps) and draftees to help them reach the 433,000 maximum strength authorized for the Guard in the National Defense Act of 1916. By the end of the war, draftees made up 2.8 million of the 4 million men in

---

[63] *CMB Annual Report, 1918,* 9, 13, 23-24, 132; Kreidberg and Henry, 222-224. Some 55,000 Guard enlisted personnel, most of whom were released to attend Officer Training Camps and were subsequently commissioned in the ORC, are not included in the 379,071 total. See Hill, 308n.

[64] Kreidberg and Henry, 248-253. Prior to December 15, any man who had not been ordered for induction into the National Army could volunteer. After December 15, only men 18-20 and 31-40 could volunteer; men 21-30 were required to remain available for the draft. According to the Statistics Branch of the General Staff, the actual enlisted strength of the Guard on April 1, 1917 was 164,292; voluntary enlistments into the Guard from April 5, 1917 until the end of the war totaled 296,756. Therefore, approximately 36 percent of the enlisted Guardsmen who served during the war had been members of the Guard before the war started. See chart B-9 "Enlisted Men Furnished U.S. Army – World War – By States, etc. (Exclusive of Regular Army)," Nov. 5, 1921 (p. 278) in RG 165/37/Box 1 – binder labeled "World War I."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

uniform, though they represented only somewhat more than half of the men who deployed to France with the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).[65] However, given the core of men who made up the Guard in April 1917 and the intensive recruiting of volunteers in their home states prior to being drafted into federal service in August, the percentage of draftees in Guard units remained far smaller than in the rest of the Army. This meant that Guardsmen who shipped out to France shared with each other strong emotional ties to their state and militia roots, and felt secure in the knowledge that almost all the men they fought beside had *chosen* (for whatever reason) to be part of their unit.[66] The superb combat performance of the National Guard in World War I may in part be explained by the cohesion and esprit d'corps this common experience generated.

The Roots of Post-War Resentment: Reorganizations and Redesignations

Though the original Stimson plan in 1912 had called for twelve divisions to be organized out of the Guard, the War Department in 1917 announced that sixteen Guard divisions were being formed for the war in Europe. In May 1917 the Militia Bureau specified which units would be provided to each division by state. These Guard divisions

---

[65] *CMB Annual Report, 1918*, 12; Chambers, 200.

[66] The numbers of draftees, ORC and Regular officers in each Guard division varied considerably – at the two extremes, the 28th Division contained a total of 468 non-Guard officers and men upon embarkation for France, while the 31st Division had a total of 13,414. On average, 25 percent of the total strength of the Guard divisions embarking for Europe were draftees. These figures do not take into account the 93rd Division or any non-divisional units formed from the Guard. Data supplied by Militia Bureau on chart A-2, "National Guard Divisions in the World War," Apr. 3, 1920 (p. 167) in RG 165/37/Box 1 – binder labeled "World War I." Of course, replacement of combat losses eventually increased the percentage of draftees in Guard units, particularly infantry regiments. During the course of the war 112,000 replacements – either Guardsmen or draftees depending on the depot division they were drawn from – were fed into the twelve Guard divisions that saw combat. See Mahon, 159-160. The case of the 165th Infantry was probably typical – only 1100 of the 3600 men who left for France returned with the regiment to New York. See "Only 1100 Men Left of the Old Sixty-Ninth," *New York Times* (hereafter *NYT*), Feb. 6, 1919, 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were part of the initial War Department plan that called for a total force of thirty-nine divisions – sixteen Guard, sixteen National Army, and seven Regular.[67] In August, the National Guard – which had initially mobilized at state camps and home armories – began moving to divisional training camps, a process that for some units lasted until early October due to lack of equipment, unfinished training camps, and the requirement that some troops remain behind to guard critical facilities.[68] The divisional training camps were invariably located in the southern tier of states or in California. This was due to Secretary of War Baker's decision to save time and money and construct only tent camps for the Guard, so the locations were chosen for their milder winters. Because the sixteen National Army divisions took months longer to organize than did the Guard divisions (the first draftees were not even inducted until September 1917), the War Department had time to construct permanent facilities for National Army units in the region of the country where the troops were raised. No plans were made to concentrate the new Regular Army divisions in stateside training camps prior to shipment to Europe.[69]

Despite months of service on the Mexican border, the Army had not completed organization of any Guard division beyond those two that had already been organized by Pennsylvania and New York.[70] With the mobilization for war in Europe, the effort to

---

[67] Wilson, 58, 65-66. An additional four divisions (two from the Guard) would be organized between August 1917 and January 1918, for a total of forty-three. In July 1918 President Wilson approved a plan to expand the Army to ninety-eight divisions by the end of 1919, but few of these units were organized and none saw combat before the war ended.

[68] *CMB Annual Report, 1917*, 9-10 and *CMB Annual Report, 1918*, 9.

[69] Wilson, 57-58.

[70] *CMB Annual Report, 1917*, 10; Bruce Jacobs, "Two Tours Under Pershing," *National Guard*, Dec. 1986,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

organize complete divisions that were ready for training was upset by a radical change in the composition and structure of these fundamental units. The Army decided to switch from the 'triangular" style division of 1916 (with three brigades containing three infantry regiments each) to a "square" division that contained fewer, but larger, subordinate elements (two brigades of two regiments each). This change was the result of a General Staff study that determined American regiments and divisions should be roughly twice the size of their European counterparts, in order to give them more staying power in the trenches. The end result was a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for an infantry division in August 1917 which called for 27,120 officers and men, and which grew by 1,000 additional men before the end of the war.[71] In addition to the sixteen divisions of this size initially allotted to the Guard, two more divisions (discussed below) were ultimately organized from Guard elements, for a total of eighteen. The remainder of the Guard was organized into sufficient non-divisional troops (including fourteen regiments of pioneer infantry, who served mostly as laborers) that a further two combat divisions could have been created had the Army desired.[72]

The Guard divisions were not only structured differently, they were also numbered differently from the divisions that Guardsmen had so recently served in while on the border. In fact, the Army, in a move that angered and dismayed the vast majority

---

44-45; Wilson, 36. The New York and Pennsylvania division were completely organized; the Ohio division lacked only its cavalry regiment.

[71] Wilson, 54, 56, 67. The General Staff's decision to reorganize Guard divisions along a new TOE would be repeated, with similar resulting confusion and delays, following the outbreak of World War II.

[72] War Department, Adjutant General's Office, *Composition of National Guard Divisions and Disposition of Former National Guard Units, 1917* (Washington, GPO, 1918), 34; Wilson, 40-64.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of Guardsmen, decided to renumber not just the divisions and their accompanying brigades, but all the regiments in the National Guard as well. State designations that had remained the same for decades – in some cases since before the Civil War – were eliminated as all the unit designations in the Army were placed in a rational sequence.

Henceforward, divisions created from the Regular Army would be numbered sequentially from 1-25; those from the Guard from 26-75 (later reduced to 50); and those from the National Army (draftees) would start with 76 and go as high as necessary. As the new square division contained two infantry brigades, the brigades would also be numbered sequentially – the 1st Division would contain the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades, the 2nd Division the 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, etc. This meant that the Guard divisions received infantry brigades numbered 51-100, and within each brigade the infantry regiments would be numbered sequentially as well. With four infantry regiments in each division, the National Guard's allotment of infantry regiments would run from 101-300, with the Regular Army's allotment below this, and the National Army's above it. For simplicity's sake, the numbering sequence of 101-300 was maintained for the other combat arms regiments as well. The practice remained in place after the end of the war, so that to this day virtually all National Guard infantry, artillery, cavalry – and later armor and aviation – regiments fall within the sequence 101-300.

During World War I, for the first (and only) time in the history of the U.S. Army, the designations of subordinate units within divisions actually made logical sense.[73] A

[73] This is true only in National Guard and National Army divisions. The Regular Army did not renumber its regiments just so they could be in sequence in a division. As a result, for example, the 1st Division contained the 16th, 18th 26th, and 28th Infantry Regiments, not the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

soldier might report, for instance, that he was from the 135th Infantry, and any individual familiar with the numbering system would know with certitude that the soldier was a member of the 68th Infantry Brigade of the 34th Infantry Division. Furthermore, since the numbering sequence was applied to other units besides the infantry in a division, he would know that the 125th, 126th, and 127th Field Artillery regiments, as well as the 125th, 126th, and 127th Machine Gun battalions were also part of the 34th Division, and would probably be located nearby providing support to the infantry. What the numbering system did NOT convey was the sense of state identity and pride that Guardsmen felt for their regiments. In fact, most Guardsmen who remained with their old regiments through the wholesale redesignations clung to the old names. Had our hypothetical soldier from the 135th Infantry been asked in a less formal setting what unit he was from, he likely would have proudly declared himself a member of the "1st Minnesota."

From the Army's point of view, this renumbering scheme was a modern efficiency that eliminated potentially fatal mistaken identities on the battlefield. To provide the simplest example, virtually every state as well as the Regular Army possessed its own "1st Infantry Regiment," and it was a simple matter to confuse one for the other even in peacetime, much less under the stress of combat. Doing away with this source of confusion could potentially save lives.

Removing the state names from units was also supposed to help foster a sense of everyone belonging to "one Army." As the war went on, draftees were used extensively as fillers in both Regular Army and National Guard formations, further blurring the distinctions between the various components. Ultimately, this would lead Secretary of War Baker and Chief of Staff Peyton C. March to order the removal of distinctive

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

component names (Regular Army, National Guard, and National Army) from units, and the elimination of all distinctive collar insignia, buttons, and other uniform items. After August 7, 1918, in outward appearance at least, a soldier's origins would be indistinguishable.[74]

Renumbering units was the least disruptive action to occur to the Guard during the mobilization of 1917. The introduction of a new Table of Organization for the "Square Division" decreased the number of infantry regiments assigned to a division from nine to four, while almost doubling the size of regiments, and created a variety of brand new units such as machine gun and trench mortar battalions that required manning. The result of all these changes was that a great many infantry regiments were removed from divisions and brigades that they had formed an association with during the Mexican border mobilization. Some of these regiments were converted from one branch to another, or consolidated with other regiments to in order to achieve the new, higher, manning levels in the infantry. In fact, of the sixty-four infantry regiments that went to war with the initial sixteen Guard divisions, only seven could trace their origins to a single pre-draft National Guard infantry regiment – all the others were created by consolidation to some degree or another after they were drafted into federal service.[75]

Coming on the heals of the 1916 reorganizations, it seemed to many Guardsmen

---

[74] War Department General Order No. 73, August 7, 1918. Both Baker and March felt that this order was among the greatest achievements of their wartime tenure. See March address to American Legion convention, Sept 30, 1929, in *March Papers*, Box 25.

[75] *Composition of National Guard Divisions and Disposition of Former National Guard Units, 1917*, 7-8. The formation of the 42nd and 93rd Divisions, which were not part of the original sixteen Guard divisions, broke this pattern. All four of the infantry regiments in the 42nd Division could trace their origins to a single pre-draft regiment, while two of three Guard regiments in the 93rd Division could do the same.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that the War Department could not make up its mind. In May 1916, prior to the border call up, the Militia Bureau urged the Utah Guard to convert its five infantry companies and two artillery batteries into a cavalry squadron. This squadron trained on the border, while the state worked on recruiting it up to regimental strength. Then, in May 1917 the Militia Bureau ordered Utah to convert its entire force to artillery.[76] In some units, an even worse fate occurred, as regiments were called to active duty then completely broken up, with the men parceled out to a variety of units, leaving no single organization that Guardsmen could point to as the lineal descendant of the parent regiment.[77] This was done without consulting the states, and with little regard for keeping the more historic units intact. For members of these proud old regiments, this was a bitter pill to swallow indeed.

The organizational changes also created huge personnel problems, especially among officers. There was a surplus of Guard field grade officers who had lost their regiments, an influx of officers from the Officer Reserve Corps whom Guardsmen often mistrusted, and a great many personnel in recently converted units who were unfamiliar with their new military specialty. By the Chief of the Militia Bureau's estimate, as many as 65 percent of the Guard's officers were transferred or experienced some other change

---

[76] Cooper, 170.

[77] The case of the Vermont National Guard, which supplied a single infantry regiment for the war, is fairly typical. The 1st Vermont Infantry Regiment provided 196 men to the 101st Machine Gun Battalion, 3 officers and 213 men to the 102nd Machine Gun Battalion, 50 men to the 102nd Infantry Regiment, 3 officers and 229 men to the 103rd Machine Gun Battalion, 13 officers and 700 men to the 101st Ammunition Train, and the unspecified "Balance" of the unit to the 57th Pioneer Infantry. *Composition of National Guard Divisions and Disposition of Former National Guard Units, 1917*, 30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in status.[78] All of this occurred after the Guard had been drafted into federal service in August 1917, so that men who had joined the Guard because they were promised an opportunity to "fight with their buddies" very often found themselves among strangers after they were drafted.

Even if the only thing that a Guard unit suffered was the loss of its traditional state designation, the change still represented yet another piece of the old volunteer militia heritage that was sacrificed because of the dictates of the federal Army. Those Guardsmen who had devoted years to their organizations only to see them peremptorily eliminated upon mobilization gained one more source of bitterness towards the Regulars that would fuel their determination to prevent a similar occurrence in the future.

Special Cases: The 42nd and 93rd Divisions

In addition to the sixteen divisions initially planned, two more divisions were fielded from the Guard in 1917. Both of these divisions were organized differently from the other sixteen, and it showed in the fact that their subordinate units did not all come from a single state or series of contiguous states. The first of these was the 42nd Division, nicknamed "Rainbow," and the brainchild of Maj. Douglas MacArthur, the military assistant to the Secretary of War. The "Rainbow" idea was devised to address two sticky problems facing the Army. The first was that raising, training and deploying the bulk of the AEF was estimated to take an entire year from the time war was declared. However, the British and French were clamoring for whatever American troops could be sent to the

[78] *CMB Annual Report, 1918*, 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

front immediately, in part because they were desperately short of manpower. The arrival of American soldiers would also provide a morale boost to British and French soldiers, and the commitment of American soldiers to combat would make it virtually impossible for the U.S. to get cold feet and back out of the war. Furthermore, an early commitment of U.S. troops would most likely be handled along lines favored by the British and French (that is to say, as reinforcements to understrength British and French units, rather than as intact divisions, corps and armies under American command).[79]

To satisfy the demands of America's allies, a few select units would be sent to France in advance of the main body to show the flag. The 1st Division, a 'Regular' formation that had been largely filled out with raw volunteers, was the first American division to arrive in France. A battalion of the 16th Infantry paraded down the Champs Elysees to cheering crowds on July 4, 1917, and then went straight into a months-long intensive training program under French tutelage.

While the 1st Division had the honor of being the first Army division to arrive "Over There," and a second, composite Army/Marine division would also ship out to France late in 1917, two divisions would not be sufficient to allay British and French demands for troops for the better part of a year. As the remainder of the small professional Army was needed to train the huge numbers of citizen soldiers now entering the service, any other early arrivals in France would have to come from the Guard. The War Department was faced with a multitude of states vying for the distinction of shipping the first Guard division abroad. MacArthur's idea solved this problem by avoiding the

[79] Wilson, 47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

necessity of having to choose one or more states over the others. He did this by proposing the creation of a multi-state division, to be composed of existing units that were surplus to the sixteen Guard divisions. The "Rainbow" moniker was also the unintentional creation of MacArthur, who in a press briefing announcing the creation of the division likened it to a rainbow stretching across the land. A reporter, seeing the perfect symbolism of the word, latched onto it, giving the newly conceived division a nickname before it had even been assigned a number.[80]

The choice of numerical designation was fairly straightforward – 42 was the next available number in the sequence for National Guard divisions (26 through 41 having been taken by the first sixteen Guard divisions formed), so the Rainbow became the 42nd Division. MacArthur was given the assignment of shepherding the division, which contained units from twenty-six states and the District of Columbia, from concept to reality. The Chief of the Militia Bureau, Maj. Gen. William Mann, became the Rainbow's first commander.[81] MacArthur would serve as the 42nd Division's Chief of Staff, as a brigade commander, and even briefly as division commander at the end of the war. His positive experiences while commanding these Guardsmen during the war shaped his relations with the Guard for the rest of his career, and help explain why he was

---

[80] Henry Reilly, *Americans All: The Rainbow at War* (Columbus: F.J. Heer Publishing Co., 1936), 25-27.

[81] Maj. Gen. William Mann replaced Maj. Gen. Albert Mills as Chief of the Militia Bureau following Mills' death in September 1916. With Mann's departure in August 1917 to command the 42nd Division, Maj. Gen. Jesse McIntyre Carter was appointed CMB. Carter himself was detached from the Militia Bureau to command the 11th Division in August 1918, leaving Brig. Gen. John Heavey as acting chief until Carter's return in February 1919. *CMB Annual Report,* 1916, 56; *CMB Annual Report,* 1918, 74; *CMB Annual Report,* 1919, 22. As a parting tribute for his contributions to the Guard, the 42nd Division's cantonment near Mineola, NY was named Camp Mills in honor of the late Chief of the Militia Bureau.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

one of the most pro-Guard Chiefs of Staff during the interwar period.

Despite the War Department's intentions, the 42nd Division was not the first Guard division to ship out to Europe. Maj. Gen. Clarence Edwards, a Regular officer in command of New England's 26th ("Yankee") Division, was so determined to get to the fighting in France that he arranged – on his own initiative – with port authorities in New York and Montreal to have his Guardsmen loaded aboard transports instead of shipped to a training camp in North Carolina. By the time the War Department noticed, they had been presented with a *fait accompli*. It was too late to unload the division without creating a stream of national and international criticism, so the 26th was allowed to proceed.[82] The 26th arrived in France in September 1917, with the 42nd Division arriving the following month. The bulk of the AEF would not arrive in France until the late spring and summer of 1918.

The eighteenth and final Guard division to be organized for World War I was the 93rd Division, which was a special case in a number of ways. The 93rd (along with the 92nd Division of the National Army) was one of two divisions of African-American soldiers to fight in the war. The 93rd, however, was not – strictly speaking – a division. It was a provisional grouping of four black (or "colored," to use the terminology of the day) infantry regiments that lacked the organic artillery, engineers, transportation, and myriad other support troops needed to form a true tactical division capable of conducting limited military operations on its own.

---

[82] Hill, 269-270. Edwards was later relieved of command by Pershing, a decision no-doubt influenced by this earlier exploit.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Before the outbreak of the war, the War Department lacked both plans and policy for the implementation of black troops. Black Guardsmen were not called up along with the rest of the Guard in August 1917, and when they were belatedly called to active duty it was only within their states. But with strong advocacy from the African-American community, a consensus was reached to give at least some blacks a chance to fight. Several states claimed black units, though only two – New York and Illinois – could boast entire regiments of black soldiers. A third regiment was created out of black National Guard battalions and companies from the District of Columbia, Ohio, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts and Tennessee.[83] The fourth infantry regiment of the 93rd Division was a National Army regiment of black draftees. A small administrative headquarters oversaw the stateside training of these regiments, and was designated Headquarters, 93rd Division (Provisional), but this headquarters was disbanded in May 1918 once all the regiments had shipped overseas.[84]

These black regiments, while part of the AEF, did not fight under American command. Rather, they were attached to the French Army, which trained, armed and equipped them, interspersing the American regiments among their own troops during combat. The regiments eventually adopted a shoulder patch to reflect this affiliation – it bore the distinctive silhouette of the French *poilus'* helmet they wore. The 369th Infantry (formerly the 15th New York Infantry) in particular gained a reputation as perhaps the

---

[83] Ibid., 276-278.

[84] Wilson, 63, 68. The designation should have been 43rd Division, in keeping with the predominantly Guard character of the unit, but the Army determined instead to put the provisional unit in sequence with the other black troops of the previously organized 92nd Division.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

finest organization in the AEF, serving in combat for 191 days – longer than any other U.S. regiment – with great distinction. The soldiers earned numerous decorations, with the regiment earning the rare and coveted Croix de Guerre with Palm Leaf from their French allies as well as the nickname "Hellfighters from Harlem." Seeing that black troops were perfectly capable of fighting, the War Department was in the process of reclaiming its black regiments from the French Army and filling out the 93rd Division to make it a standard "square" division when the war ended.[85]

Training and Service in the AEF

Stateside training continued for most Guard divisions through the winter of 1917 and into the spring of 1918. Training varied greatly from division to division, and was generally hampered by a lack of basic arms and equipment. The General Staff had done no planning for American industrial mobilization prior to the war, and as a consequence America fought the war – at least initially – with large numbers of weapons and equipment supplied by its allies.[86] Regular and Guard units also suffered losses of experienced personnel when men were selected for officer training or were assigned to provide training to the massive influx of draftees that began arriving in the fall of 1917.

---

[85] Hill, 276-278.

[86] Weigley, 360. In most cases the material provided by allies was gratefully accepted by American soldiers, but in at least one famous incident it caused a small revolt. Irish immigrants who made up the bulk of the 165th Infantry (old 69th New York) were issued replacement uniforms of British manufacture in the winter of 1917-1918, complete with buttons bearing the royal crown. Rather then wear the symbol of the hated English oppressors, some soldiers burned their uniforms. The intervention of the regimental chaplain, Father Francis Duffy, and a supply of U.S. Army buttons brought an end to the "Button Rebellion." See Albert A. Ettinger and A. Churchill Ettinger, *A Doughboy with the Fighting 69th* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 58-59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

These were not insignificant losses; Maj. Gen. John O'Ryan would later testify that his division alone furnished about 5,000 officers to the army. One of O'Ryan's regimental commanders, Col. W.C. Fisk of the 107th Infantry (which, granted, had an extremely high proportion of well-educated soldiers due to its former status as the 7th New York – a regiment composed of New York City's social elite) testified that his unit alone, with a *TOE strength of 3,755 officers and men, provided 1,500 enlisted men who were* commissioned as officers during the war![87]

American soldiers benefited from French and British instructors who passed along lessons learned in the trenches. General Pershing, however, also insisted that the doughboys be taught elements of combat that the European armies placed little emphasis on after three years in the trenches – aggressive, offensive tactics for use over open ground, and reliance on individual rifle marksmanship. Pershing insisted on a lengthy training program for all American soldiers – he wanted every American division that arrived in France to repeat the six-month program conducted by the 1st Division, even if it meant repeating training they had performed in the U.S. Based on this schedule, Pershing did not expect to take the offensive with an American army until sometime in 1919. America's allies, needless to say, were frustrated with the pace that the AEF's perfectionist commander proposed.[88]

---

[87] *Reorganization of the Army: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs,* United States Senate, 66th Congress, 1st Session, 525, 1897 (Hereafter *Senate Hearings*); TOE strength is for August, 1917, see Wilson, Chart 4, 56.

[88] Weigley, 371-372, 375-376.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The event that forced Pershing to change his mind about what constituted adequate preparation for American troops was the German *Kaiserschlacht* offensive in the spring of 1918. The Germans, reinforced by hundreds of thousands of veteran soldiers from the Eastern Front following their victory over Russia the previous fall, struck the Allies a massive blow in late March 1918, hoping to win the war before the weight of American manpower and material could decisively tip the balance. Given the dire circumstances, Pershing was forced to commit American forces before he felt they were adequately trained, and without a unified American command. When the German tide was stemmed and the crisis had passed, Pershing regained command of his soldiers and of their training. Given the superb combat performance of many recently-arrived doughboys, even the fundamentally conservative Pershing had to admit that the training regimen could be curtailed somewhat as the AEF prepared for the fall 1918 offensives that would ultimately end the war. By July 1918 Pershing considered three months of training to be sufficient – a far cry from the one to two years that Emory Upton had recommended and many Regulars believed necessary for producing an effective soldier.[89]

Not all divisions, Guard or otherwise, that got over to France ended up fighting there. Of the forty three divisions to deploy to France, twelve were detailed to become "Depot" divisions or were otherwise stripped of their personnel. As the first divisions arrived in France in the fall of 1917, Pershing's staff began to organize them into a corps. Lacking adequate support troops or any structure to provide schooling and replacements for the divisions once they were in combat, Pershing's staff recommended to the general

[89] Ibid., 387-393.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that the fourth division to arrive in France – the 42nd Division – be reorganized as a non-combat replacement and school unit. Realizing the outcry that would result across the United States if the Guard's showpiece division was kept out of the fight, Pershing demurred, and instead designated the next division to arrive – the 41st – to become a "Depot Division," receiving and processing replacements as they arrived in the theater.[90]

As divisions continued to arrive in France for the rest of the war, some would be selected to become depot organizations and would not see combat as intact units. In addition to the 41st Division, the Guard's 40th and 39th Divisions would be designated as depot units – maintaining a small cadre to run the replacement depot and associated facilities, while sending the rest of the soldiers to fight as replacements in other units. The 39th, which began arriving in France in August 1918, was later completely skeletonized – entirely broken up to replace the heavy combat losses suffered in other divisions. Skeletonization was a fate suffered by many late-arriving American divisions during the war, including the Guard's 31st, 34th, and 38th divisions. Thus, while all eighteen Guard divisions deployed to France in World War I, only twelve got to fight as intact divisions (this includes the 93rd Division, which fought as separate regiments attached to the French Army). Six of the seventeen National Army divisions to deploy to France became depot formations or were broken up, but none of the seven Regular divisions experienced this fate.[91] Lack of planning and failure to train an adequate supply

[90] Wilson, 67-68. Finding sufficient replacements was a constant problem. Despite stripping newly arrived divisions of their soldiers, the AEF ended the war with most combat divisions below 25,000 men each, and eight divisions with less then 21,000 each. See also Hill, 279.

[91] Wilson, 69-71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of individual replacements, coupled with a desire to keep experienced combat units in the line rather than rotate in green formations, led to this wasteful arrangement of training entire divisions stateside only to have them broken up upon their arrival in France.

The AEF in France represented, in its National Guard divisions, the distinct regional character of the nation in a period before mass travel and mass media had largely homogenized American culture. In keeping with this, War Department policy early in the war was to provide volunteer (later draftee) fillers to National Guard divisions who hailed from the same states from which the division was organized. The new National Army divisions were also organized on a regional basis, with draftees in each division all tending to come from the same part of the country. The Army saw this as a method of fostering divisional *esprit d'corps*, and it is evident from the shoulder patches that both National Guard and National Army divisions designed for themselves that they took pride in where they came from. Most Guard divisions incorporated some allusion to their state or region of origin into their patch, from the "YD" ("Yankee Division") monogram adopted by the New Englanders of the 26th Division, to the setting sun over blue ocean adopted by the Northwesterners of the 41st ("Sunset") Division. New York's 27th Division went a step further when they designed their patch. It superimposed the monogram "NY" over the stars of the constellation Orion – a visual pun referring to the division's much-loved commander, John O'Ryan. Regional affiliation was also commonly depicted on the patches of National Army divisions, from the Statue of Liberty patch adopted by the draftees of metropolitan New York City's 77th Division, to the "TO"

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

("Texas and Oklahoma Division") monogram of the 90th Division.[92] Once in combat, however, replacements arrived in divisions without regard to their state affiliation; to have tried to do otherwise would have resulted in a needlessly inefficient and complicated replacement system.[93]

The Home Front: Militia Bureau and State Guards

The Militia Bureau, which lost its *raison d'être* once the National Guard was drafted into federal service in August 1917, made plans to reduce both its military and civilian workforce to a bare minimum, with only a skeleton crew of senior clerks remaining in the Washington offices to eliminate a backlog of paperwork and provide the institutional memory for reconstituting the office after the war was over.[94] The job of administering to the 379,000 Guardsmen on active duty now fell to the Adjutant General of the Army. Within two weeks, however, the Secretary of War had authorized the Militia Bureau to continue in the administration of National Guardsmen while on active duty, making the bureau, in essence, an additional section within the Adjutant General's office for the remainder of the war. Even if this was not how pre-war planners had envisioned the role of the Militia Bureau subsequent to a mobilization, it made eminent organizational sense given the unique expertise residing in the bureau's personnel when it

---

[92] Wilson, 60-61, Tables 3 & 4; Richard W. Smith, *Shoulder Sleeve Insignia of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1941-1945*, 3rd ed., (Privately printed, 1981), 33, 42, 50, 58.

[93] Apparently, any gains in unit morale that resulted from organizing National Army divisions along regional lines did not impress the General Staff; though the patches alluding to regional origins remained the same, the regional origins of soldiers was not a factor in manning the draftee divisions of World War II.

[94] Memorandum, CMB to AG US, Aug. 4, 1917, Subject: Relief of officers incident to draft of the National Guard into Federal Service. RG 168/12a/029.3 – 1914-1918.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

came to the laws and regulations under which the Guard had operated.[95]

While the focus for the National Guard while in federal service was understandably on the German enemy in France, back at home the state governments were besieging Washington with requests for troops to protect key facilities from saboteurs. This was a situation not anticipated in the National Defense Act of 1916. The federal government urged the states to form State Guard units from men ineligible for the draft to take up these duties, but many states refused, arguing that the federal government should assume the responsibility while the National Guard was in federal service. Those states which did form State Guard organizations mostly detailed them to maintain the armories of the departed National Guard units, preserve civil order, respond to natural disasters (to include the "Spanish Influenza" epidemic of 1918), and so forth – not to guard against sabotage.[96] As a result, the federal government was compelled in late 1917 to create its own security forces, the United States Guard, which eventually numbered over 26,000 officers and men and protected 338 key facilities across thirty-two states. This action freed Regular and mobilized Guard forces from guard duty so they could train and deploy overseas.[97]

---

[95] Maj. Gen. Jessie Carter, "Historical Information Relating to the World War: Activities of the Militia Bureau;" 37 page typewritten ms., Jan. 12, 1920. RG 168/12a/350.05 – General.

[96] Twenty-seven states organized some type of State Guard force with an approximate strength of 79,000; see *CMB Annual Report, 1919*, 20-21. The term "Home Guard" is also sometimes used, though this designation usually applied to locally raised forces that, unlike the State Guard, did not have a statewide mission. For the most detailed treatment of the State Guards in World War I, see Barry M. Stentiford, *The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century* (College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2002), Chapter 2.

[97] *CMB Annual Report, 1919*, 19-20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Militia Bureau was charged with organizing and equipping the United States Guard from its inception in November 1917 until shortly after the end of the war.[98] While initially the federal government appropriated money to purchase arms, ammunition and equipment for the U.S. Guard, the needs of the Army overseas and competition with the states for scarce equipment made it impossible to secure all of these items. This scarcity was somewhat alleviated when weapons originally destined for the Russian government became available following the Bolshevik Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.[99]

The Guard's Contribution to the War

The National Guard's performance in France during the war fully vindicated the supporters of the militia during the legal battles of the first decade and a half of the twentieth century. The Guard provided eighteen of the forty-three divisions that served in the AEF, and twelve of the twenty-nine divisions that saw combat – in both cases, about 40 percent of the total. These divisions suffered about 43 percent of the total casualties suffered by the AEF, the somewhat higher casualty number reflecting the fact that Guard (and Regular) divisions began arriving in France in the winter 1917 – spring 1918, and

[98] War Department General Order No. 147, 1917.

[99] *CMB Annual Report, 1918*, 52-73; *CMB Annual Report, 1919*, 18-21. Initially, the General Staff had considered disbanding the Militia Bureau for the duration of the war, but instead decided to reduce its manning and put it in charge of the United States Guards. One consequence of this decision was that the Chief of the Militia Bureau, General Carter, was temporarily detached from the bureau to command a division in 1918. See Memorandum, Blanton Winship, Acting JAG of Army to AG US, Aug. 15, 1917, "Subject: Conduct of Militia Bureau during war." RG 168/12a/313.6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

thus had spent more time in combat, on average, than National Army divisions.[100] Guardsmen served with conspicuous valor; of the seventy-eight Medals of Honor awarded during or immediately after the war, fully half (thirty-nine) went to soldiers in Guard divisions. Guardsmen of the 30th Division, from the Carolinas and Tennessee, received twelve Medals of Honor, more than any other the division in the AEF; Illinois' 33rd Division and the National Army's 89th Division were the next-most recognized, with nine each.[101]

The Guard's contribution to World War I was undeniably crucial. Despite deficiencies in manning, equipment, and training prior to America's entry into the war, once America was at war the Guard gave the nation the ability to organize a larger number of combat divisions than the small Regular force could have ever hoped to raise itself, and to do this far more quickly than could have been done with just raw conscripts. Without the Guard divisions, America would have had virtually no forces to commit to help turn the tide during the critical Spring 1918 German offensive. As they would do again in World War II, the Guard gave America the breathing space it needed to mobilize and train the vast army of conscripts that would win the war. Had Secretary of War Garrison's Continental Army plan been successful in relegating the Guard to a strictly

---

[100] Hill, 285-286.

[101] Adjutant General of the Army, *Congressional Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, and the Distinguished Service Medal issued by the War Department since April 6, 1917, Up to and including General Orders, No. 126, War Department, November 11,1919* (Washington: GPO, 1920), 33-34. One Guardsman of particular note who was not included among the thirty-nine Medal of Honor recipients is 2nd Lt. Irwin Bleckley, a Kansas field artilleryman who volunteered for service in the Air Corps, and became the first Guard aviator awarded the Medal of Honor (posthumously) for his role in locating the famous "Lost Battalion" during the Argonne offensive. Bleckley was originally awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, which was later upgraded to the Medal of Honor.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

domestic role in 1916, America would have been forced to build its World War I army from the ground up. As a result, General Pershing almost certainly would not have been able to launch the final offensive against Germany until the date he originally estimated – the summer of 1919 – assuming France and Britain were still holding out at that point.[102]

The enemy's assessment of the Guard also bears mentioning. In May 1919, a reporter from the *Chicago Tribune* conducted an interview with a major of the German General Staff who had served on General Ludendorff's staff. He asked which American divisions the Germans had rated as most efficient during the war. Six of the eight divisions rated superior or excellent by the German supreme command were from the Guard – fully half of the Guard divisions that saw combat. The German officer was Gerd von Rundstedt, who would rise to the rank of field marshal during World War II.[103]

The Roots of Post-War Resentment: Personnel Policies

Many Regular officers, particularly those who, like MacArthur, had served with or commanded Guard units, were also impressed with the performance of Guardsmen during the war. Indeed, some had their view of the Guard fundamentally transformed by the experience. Colonel John "Gatling Gun" Parker was a Regular who had gained a reputation in the Army as an innovative tactician with the machine gun after employing Gatling guns in the assault up San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War. He

---

[102] Pershing himself was doubtful of this, as he related to Chief of Staff March "... our allies are becoming so war-weary that I do not believe they will hold out beyond another year." Pershing to March, June 19, 1918, *March Papers*, Box 22.

[103] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1944*, 50-51. Quote from story by Richard Henry Little of *The Chicago Tribune* Foreign News Service, May 2, 1919. Those divisions rated "among the best" were the 1st, 2nd, 28th and 42nd

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

assumed command of Connecticut's 102nd Infantry, 26th Division in January 1917 shortly before it first went into the trenches. On March 18, following the regiment's first battle, he was moved to write a letter to Brigadier General John Harbord, an old friend who was then serving as Pershing's Chief of Staff:

> This was the Militia that the Germans have such a contempt for, and which our own wiseacres said never did stand fire, never will stand fire, and never can stand fire .... Now, Harbord, the next slob who tells me the American Militia will not stand fire, or that there is anything wrong with it, when it is properly led, can expect to be called a "damned liar," even if it is in General Pershing's own office that the incident occurs. I have been fed up on Upton's military policy. ... The fact is that the American system is the best on earth; that the American Militia man, when properly led, is the finest soldier who ever wore shoe leather.[104]

This positive assessment of the Guard was not universal, and Guardsmen continued to feel slighted by the attitudes of Regulars towards them and by the actions of the War Department even after the war was over. Post-war resentment of the Regular Army by Guardsmen tended to focus on several areas in which Guardsmen felt they were treated unfairly or callously. The drafting of Guardsmen as individuals and the redesignation, conversion, or outright disbanding of Guard units once in federal service have already been discussed. In addition to these problems, Guard officers had special cause to believe they were discriminated against by the Regular establishment following their mobilization. In part, this was the natural result of the organizational change in the size and number of infantry regiments – the reduction from nine infantry regiments per

---

(all of which arrived in France relatively early). Those rated excellent were the 26th, 32nd 33rd, and 37th.

[104] Parker to Harbord, Mar. 16, 1918. Copy of letter, along with biographical information on Parker, in NGAUS archives, Box 10.1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

division to four, and from three brigades to two, meant there would be a surplus of Guard brigadier generals and colonels, many of whom would not be assigned other duties. Company grade officers, who were younger, more likely to be physically fit, and occupied positions that were less coveted by Regular officers, had a much better chance of maintaining their jobs or being offered new ones. This was particularly true for lieutenants, of whom there was an acute shortage.[105]

Of the over 12,100 Guard officers inducted into federal service, some 1,513 were released between August 5, 1917 and May 10, 1918 due to physical ailments, failure to pass an efficiency board, or resignation. This was out of proportion with the Regular Army and the ORC, which the Militia Bureau acknowledged when it expended significant space in its report for 1918 answering the criticism.[106] One-third of those released failed physicals, while the majority of the 341 efficiency board discharges were due to inadequate military education. The reasons behind the over 600 resignations were unknown, since officers were not required to tell why they wished to resign, but the bureau hypothesized that many resignations were tendered in order to avoid having to face an efficiency board, or for personal reasons relating to business or family. A small number were eliminated for disciplinary reasons – thirty by court martial, two due to desertion, and twenty-eight additional resignations or efficiency board dismissals "for the good of the service" – requested and accepted usually in order to avoid a court martial or other disciplinary action.

---

[105] Hill, 274.

[106] *CMB Annual Report, 1918*, 15-20, 126.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

As for the disproportionate discharge of Guard officers, the Militia Bureau explained that it was due to the states failing to select qualified officers to replace those who resigned after the 1916 Mexican Border mobilization, or their failure to choose qualified officers to fill all the positions that were made available when new units were organized in 1917. This problem was compounded by the fact that the Army was unable to detail sufficient numbers of officers to train and federally recognize Guard officers in their grades.[107] Guardsmen, in turn, made note of the fact that, in the cases where Regulars failed physicals or were otherwise deemed unsuitable or surplus, an effort was usually made to find some assignment within their capacity and appropriate for their grade before sending them home. Not so with Guard officers.[108] Furthermore, the learning curve that the Regular Army expected senior Guard officers to achieve in order to maintain their positions was unreasonably high, a complaint that was recalled bitterly more than a quarter-century after the war ended:

> Commanding officers who had spent all of their adult life in a particular branch and who had served and served well in the Spanish American War and on the Mexican Border were expected overnight to master the tactics and technique of a new branch and when they failed to accomplish the impossible were summarily relieved by Regular Army Commanding Officers and Inspectors who had lost all sense of proportion and decency in the sudden access of rank which the war had brought to them.[109]

---

[107] Ibid., 15, 17, 18.

[108] Hill, 296. Even the most successful Guardsman of the war, Maj. Gen. O'Ryan, noted the disparity of treatment: "When an officer of that class [i.e., a Regular] was eliminated from a division and he went to the S.O.S. [Services of Supply – the logistical forces] they agreed to the proposition that they could not use him any place else; a job was found somewhere. But in the case of a Guard or Reserve officer his head was cut off and he was out of the service." See *Senate Hearings*, 536.

[109] NGAUS President Maj. Gen. Ellard Walsh, *NGAUS Proceedings*, 1944, 47.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Regulars were placed in command of all but two of the Guard divisions after they were called up in August 1917, due to a provision in the National Defense Act of 1916 which authorized the President to appoint commanding officers from the Regular Army to all Guard units that encompassed elements from two or more states. As a result, the only two divisions that were commanded by Guardsmen were the New York and Pennsylvania divisions, both of which were fully formed and contained within one state at the time of mobilization.[110] The commander of Pennsylvania's 28th Division, Maj. Gen. Charles Clement, was sixty-two and in poor health, and was allowed to retire in December 1917. He was replaced by a Regular officer. He shared this fate with several Regular general officers in positions of command, who were likewise retired because of age or infirmity.

The other Guard division commander, Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan of New York, both started and finished the war in command of the 27th Division. O'Ryan had the distinct advantages of being, at age forty-two, the youngest division commander in the entire AEF, as well as the first Guardsman to graduate from the Army War College. Born in New York City and educated at City College and NYU law school, O'Ryan enlisted as a private in New York's 7th Regiment in 1897. His enthusiasm for soldiering, superb horsemanship, and ability as an instructor got him noticed and he was invited to accept a

[110] In the case of Ohio, a complete division – the 37th – was assembled entirely from Guardsmen of that state, but only after mobilization began and the Governor of Ohio could no longer choose the commanding officer. Ohio's adjutant general, George Wood, pled with Secretary Baker in 1918 to be allowed to accompany the division he had recruited and assembled the previous year, but his request was denied and he was not drafted. Wood to Baker, Feb. 18, 1918, in *Baker Papers*, Box 8, File Misc. W – 1918.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

second lieutenant's commission as a field artillery officer in 1900 – ability to teach horsemanship being an important qualification for any artillery officer in the days prior to motorization. He accepted the commission, and rose through the ranks steadily while practicing law as a civilian. O'Ryan developed a passion for the intricacies of artillery tactics, and became a self-taught expert in the days before there was any formal branch schooling for militia officers. His strict discipline and innovative training methods – he developed an artillery trainer for use in his armory that gained him the attention of the Chief of Field Artillery – gained him a reputation as a no-nonsense commander who was serious about preparing his men to fight. A major and battalion commander in 1912, out of the blue he was selected by the Governor of New York, John Dix, for promotion to major general and command of the New York Division (soon to be redesignated the 6th Division). At age thirty-seven, he became the youngest major general in the Army.[111]

This astonishing promotion shocked O'Ryan and was highly unusual in a National Guard that was nearly as hidebound in its adherence to the seniority system as the Regular Army. O'Ryan had done nothing to lobby for the promotion; rather the Chief of Staff of the Army, Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, had observed his fitness and recommended him to Governor Dix. O'Ryan quit his law practice and took up his military career full-time. Wood also arranged for O'Ryan to be the first Guardsman allowed to attend the year-long course at the Army War College in Washington, DC, from which he graduated in 1914 in

[111]O'Ryan, "The Reminiscences of John F. O'Ryan," 1, 6-8, 12-16. Despite his prominence, there is no published biography of O'Ryan, largely due to the lack of any personal papers from which to draw upon. Perhaps the best published biographical sketch of the general is in Robert Bullard, *Fighting Generals* (Ann Arbor: J.W. Edwards, 1944), 285-292.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the top third of his class. He then led his division to the Mexican border, where he maintained his reputation for strict discipline both on and off-duty. He forbade drinking within his division, and made a particular point of court-martialing officers if he caught them breaking the rule. One side effect of this and other strictures was that the venereal disease rate in O'Ryan's division was so low that the medical authorities conducted a surprise inspection because they believed the division's medical staff was either incompetent or falsifying their reports.[112]

O'Ryan and the 6th Division had been home from the border only a few weeks in 1917 when they were mobilized for the World War. After training in Spartanburg, South Carolina, the newly-redesignated 27th Division sailed to France in May 1918 and was attached (along with the National Guard's 30th Division) to the British Army for the duration of the war. It first saw combat near the battered Belgian town of Ypres in early July, then took part in the final offensives that pounded the German Army into submission in September and October 1918, piercing the Hindenburg line at the underground canal and tunnel complex near St. Quentin. The division demobilized in April 1919 following a massive victory parade down Fifth Avenue.[113] A conquering hero, O'Ryan's role as the only Guard division commander in France would make him the most publicly prominent Guardsman in the years immediately following the war.

But O'Ryan was a unique case. Many senior Guard officers were removed from

---

[112] O'Ryan, "Reminiscences," 16-19.

[113] American Battle Monuments Commission, *27th Division Summary of Operations in the World War* (Washington: GPO, 1944); "Gen. O'Ryan Dead; World War I Leader, 85" *NYT*, Jan. 31, 1961.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

their commands, and they questioned the impartiality of the screening process conducted by active component officers. "Eleven National Guard General Officers, 18 Colonels and 17 Lieutenant Colonels, physically fit for recent active duty on the Mexican Border, were found to be physically unfit but little more than a year later."[114] Guardsmen suspected – but could never prove, given the confidentiality of medical records – that medical boards applied a different standard to Guardsmen than they did to Regulars. Secretary of War Baker was firm in his insistence that there would be no "political generals" – high command was reserved for those who were professionally qualified for it, and invariably the Army determined those men to be Regulars, even if this meant promoting such men two or three grades in order to be eligible to fill a position. Regulars typically filled three of the four senior command positions in a Guard division – division command, artillery brigade command, and one of the two infantry brigade commands. Most of the primary staff officers were also Regulars, but their subordinate staff officers, as well as the vast majority of commanders and staff at the regimental level and below were Guardsmen, with an infusion of reserve lieutenants that had recently graduated from ROTC or the Plattsburg camps.[115]

The assumption that Regulars were more fit than Guardsmen to command large units in a modern war was certainly widely held, but a suspect one. The U.S. Army had had no experience waging war that related even remotely to the combat then underway in Europe. As it had been in the Civil War, Regulars would have to learn the same lessons

---

[114] Hill, 296.

[115] Ibid., 268-269.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

as reserve officers when it came to handling large units and engaging the enemy with modern weapons and tactics. Many would be relieved of their duties before the talented ones rose to the top – but opportunity to demonstrate that talent was something offered to Regular officers far more often than to Guardsmen. A few key statistics make this point abundantly clear; though the Guard provided twice as many commissioned officers to the war as did the Regular Army, only 25 of the 403 general officers serving on November 11, 1918 were Guardsmen. Regular Army graduates of West Point made up the vast bulk of the total (311), while most of the remainder were Regulars who were commissioned from the ranks (13) or from civil life (48). Six of the 403 general officers had received their commissions through the National Army.[116]

Complaints about the notorious efficiency boards were so widespread that Secretary of War Baker was finally compelled in January 1918 to order that each board contain a majority of Guard officers.[117] But this remedy came too late for most, and had no impact on officers deployed with the AEF. General Pershing was famous for not suffering the slightest incompetence among his officers, be they Guard, Regular, or Reserve, and his subordinate commanders followed his cue in liberally relieving officers to promote combat efficiency. Guardsmen noted, however, that despite a War Department policy that vacancies should first be filled by promotion within a division,

---

[116] War Department General Staff, Statistics Branch, chart titled "World War – Commissioned officers," June 15, 1924, (p. 271); and chart titled "General Officers – U.S. Army – World War – November 11, 1918 – Part II," July 10, 1922 (p. 275); both in RG 165/37/Box 1 – binder labeled "World War I."

[117] Daniel Beaver, *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1966), 84.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

only about a third of all replacement officers were promoted from within. Instead, it seemed that preference was automatically given to Regular officers from outside an organization, who often lacked the combat experience of veterans of Guard divisions. This led some to question whether the stated purpose of improving combat efficiency was truly the cause behind the relief of many Guard officers in France. The relief of Brig. Gen. Charles Martin of Kansas, commander of the 70th Infantry Brigade, 35th Division, just prior to the Meuse-Argonne offensive, was a case in point. According to the division historian, the division commander's "dislike of anything National Guard overshadowed his desire for efficiency," and the performance of Martin's replacement was such that "more of us would have come out of the Argonne with [Martin] in command of the 70th Brigade."[118]

The treatment of Guard officers was also noted back home with great sympathy; while the 35th Division was preparing to embark for the trip home from France, the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Missouri unanimously passed a joint resolution petitioning President Wilson "to direct that upon the embarkation of the Division, the officers who accompanied it across be returned to it and that National Guard officers of Missouri and Kansas serving with the same be assigned to the command of its regiments, battalions, companies and batteries to accompany the same to the point of demobilization."[119] Thus, even if the Regular Army would not let them serve under their

---

[118] As quoted in Mahon, 162-163. Martin also served, before and after the war, as the Adjutant General of Kansas and founder and president of AGAUS.

[119] Joint Resolution of Missouri House and Senate, Feb. 21, 1919 enclosed with letter, Wilson to Baker, Mar. 3, 1919. *Baker Papers,* Box 11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

own officers in time of war, popular sentiment would have them come home under them. Given that many senior Guard officers who lost their positions during the war were also men who, like Martin, were very influential in NGAUS and AGAUS, it becomes easier to understand why an undertone of suspicion and hostility characterized Guard relations with the Army in the immediate aftermath of the World War.

The Roots of Post-War Resentment: Demobilization

Even more serious than how individual Guard officers were treated was how the Guard as a whole was treated upon demobilization. Guard personnel were discharged from the Army at major depots in 1919, allowing them to trickle back home as individuals rather than in units. The Army defended this action by citing the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army: Guardsmen were technically inducted into service as individual draftees, so they were released from service as individuals, like any other draftee. But this action violated the spirit of the National Defense Act of 1916, in which the value of the Guard to the Army rested in its organization as *units*, not as individuals.

The Army exacerbated the problem by erroneously (in the judgment of the states) discharging all soldiers from all military obligations, both federal and state.[120] Thus Guardsmen who had time left to serve in their state enlistments were released from this duty by the federal government, denying the states the experienced individuals they

---

[120] *Opinions of the Judge Advocate General*, 220.81, Dec. 21, 1918. Reprinted in Militia Bureau Circular No. 35, 1918.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

needed to rebuild the Guard now that the war was over. In their protests over this action, the Guard had the sympathy of Congress, as was evident when Representative Daniel Anthony Jr. (R – KS) stated on the House floor:

> It was never intended by the Congress when it passed the national-defense act that any power should be lodged in the War Department which would enable it to practically destroy the National Guard at one blow, but suffice to say that the War Department has assumed that power, and by its arbitrary discharge from every obligation of State and national service of every unit of the National Guard which went into the Army during the war it has all but destroyed the National Guard of the various States.[121]

Somewhat more moderately, Senator George Chamberlain of Oregon remarked on the same issue: "I never could understand that the Congress intended any such thing, nor can I understand how it can be held that an act of Congress can nullify an obligation which an individual takes to his State."[122]

One could argue that the failure to include provisions for the return of the National Guard to state control following a federal mobilization was a simple oversight that escaped the attention of the Militia Bureau (as it evidently did that of Congress) until it was too late. Documentary evidence, however, proves otherwise. The Judge Advocate General of the Army rendered numerous opinions on the specific legal status of Guardsmen as they were called into federal service, including an opinion dating from May 1917 holding that members of the National Guard were automatically discharged

---

[121] *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 4025 (Mar. 8, 1920). Representative Charles Caldwell (D-NY), who, like Anthony, was a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs, took a different tack on the issue, blaming Congress for the poor wording of Section 111 of the National Defense Act itself. See *House Hearings*, 1937.

[122] *Senate Hearings*, 1960-1961.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from the Guard when drafted into federal service. Nor did the Army fail to make the states aware that Guardsmen were relieved from further obligations to their states after their discharge from active duty.[123] But far from suggesting any legislative means which might have averted the need to completely rebuild the Guard after the war, the Militia Bureau – quite surprisingly – remained completely non-committal regarding the adoption of such legislation. When asked in May 1917 to comment on an amendment to the National Defense Act proposed by Senator Blair Lee (D-MD), the Chief of the Militia Bureau stated the following:

> Unless this amendment is adopted the draft will permanently discharge from the militia all members of the National Guard, and at the end of the war the Guard would have to be recreated from the ground up. This, however, is not so serious a matter as it first appears. In every State there will be a great number of thoroughly trained soldiers, who, if they desire National Guard service, are free to enlist, forming organizations of an efficiency far beyond that attainable by citizen soldiers in ordinary times. If National Guard service is not desired, organizations cannot be maintained anyway, and the adoption of this amendment would merely serve to postpone for a short time the inevitable dissolution. Accordingly this Bureau sees no necessity for the amendment, although, on the other hand, it has no objection whatever to its adoption.[124]

Thus, a fundamental misjudgment and inaction on the part of the Militia Bureau contributed to the extreme difficulties that the Guard faced in reorganizing itself after World War I. A strong endorsement of Senator Lee's amendment by the Militia Bureau

---

[123] See Index Sheet, Subj: Status of Militia when in Federal Service – Draft. RG 168/12a/325.34 – Draft. Quoted opinion is in 2nd Indorsement by JAG, May 26, 1917 to Militia Bureau letter of May 18, 1917; Memorandum from AG US to AGs of the States, CGs of Depts, and all NG Divisions, Dec. 5, 1917, Subj: Individual Discharge from State service of National Guardsmen drafted into service of the United States. RG 168/12a/312.5 – General.

[124] 2nd Indorsement, Militia Bureau, May 8, 1917 to letter from Lee to Wilson. RG 168/12a/011.6 (65th Congress – Special Session).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

might well have lent sufficient weight to the proposal to ensure its passage during a special session devoted to securing necessary war legislation. A similar *laissez faire* attitude towards enlistments and commissions would certainly have been deemed unacceptable by the General Staff if it had been applied to the Regular Army. One of the chief duties of the Militia Bureau was to suggest, through the General Staff, legislation which would make the National Guard operate more efficiently, thus the adoption of a wait-and-see attitude here seems inexplicable. It is possible that the consensus of opinion at the Militia Bureau was that there would be an over-abundance of recruits for the Guard after the war released its millions of trained soldiers back into civilian life, and thus there was no need to force anybody to remain in the Guard after the war if they didn't want to. If this was the case, then it reveals a distinct ignorance for historical precedent; it took years after the Civil War before veterans shook off their distaste for military life and once again sought out the comradeship of arms in their local militia companies. Many Guardsmen no doubt took the Militia Bureau's inaction on this issue as another sign that it did not have the Guard's best interests at heart.

The Roots of Post-War Resentment: Barriers to Reorganizing the Guard

Not only did the Army fail to provide for reorganizing the Guard following demobilization; in some ways it seemed to actively discourage the return of the Guard after the war. One barrier was that many former Guard officers were enticed to accept a commission in the ORC. This occurred when word circulated that all Reserve officers would receive a promotion upon termination of their active service – but such promotion would only be granted to Guard officers who first declined their commission in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

National Guard.[125] Likewise, the Judge Advocate General of the Army ruled that Reserve officers could not be appointed in the Guard without first resigning their Reserve commissions, a sacrifice which many of them were not willing to make, especially while it was still uncertain whether the defense legislation under consideration in 1919-1920 would retain the Guard's federal reserve role.[126] Thus, with officers drawn away by promise of higher rank in the federal reserve, and enlisted men released from their state obligation by the federal government, the states were left without a cadre from which to build their post-war Guard units. Though this was a problem foreseen by Guardsmen, they were unable to change the underlying defense legislation, especially given the distractions of having to mobilize for war in 1917.[127]

In some states, units re-formed on their own initiative for homecoming parades and other events, but recruiting an entirely new National Guard from scratch was difficult – a process that the Militia Bureau did little to assist. At first the Militia Bureau refused to allow states to re-organize National Guard units, even as State Guard units were being disbanded following the end of the war, because the bureau both lacked funds and had no set policy regarding the establishment of a post-war Guard. Finally, between April 15 and June 30, 1919 (the end of the fiscal year) the bureau permitted a limited number of

---

[125] Hill, 299.

[126] The National Defense Act of 1920 would remove many obstacles to an officer holding both Guard and ORC commissions. In early 1920, some 87,000 officers were in the ORC, and some 12,000 officer vacancies existed in the Guard. Guard duty offered several attractive features over the ORC: membership in a unit; opportunity to command; and pay for drill and annual training as well as a yearly stipend to help cover other expenses. See Militia Bureau memo, Apr. 2, 1920, Subject: News Items of Interest to the National Guard. RG 168/12a/350.05 – General - #2.

[127] Efforts to make such changes prior to the war are alluded to in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1918*, 41.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

companies to be organized and maintained at the pre-war minimum strength of sixty-five men per infantry company. Beginning with the new fiscal year, however, the Militia Bureau insisted that all Guard companies applying for federal recognition present one hundred men for inspection – a difficult standard to achieve, particularly in rural communities.[128] This requirement, based on the National Defense Act of 1916, could be reduced by the Secretary of War in time of peace, but since the nation had still not formally concluded a peace treaty with all the belligerent powers some seven months after the armistice was signed, the Army ruled that no compromise could be made with the mandated strength requirement.[129]

Given this combination of handicaps – the release of all enlisted men from their state obligations, Guard officers lured away by promise of higher federal rank in the Organized Reserves, and the high bar set for organizing new units – the future of the Guard as an institution appeared uncertain in 1919. Many states refused to organize Guard units until they had some idea what kind of federal legislation – and federal funding – would be provided for Guard organizations. Guardsmen strongly suspected that powerful forces within the War Department were actively working to inhibit reorganization of the Guard, a sentiment expressed by the House Committee on Military Affairs when they conducted hearings on the slow pace of Guard reorganization in

---

[128] *CMB Annual Report, 1919*, 7-10; excerpts of Militia Bureau instructions to the states also reprinted in *Senate Hearings*, 1969-1972.

[129] Militia Bureau Circular Letter No. 49, Sept. 6, 1919. The *CMB Annual Report, 1920* (p. 6), notes that this policy regarding minimum strength was maintained despite a direct appeal by a committee of governors from the Governors' Assembly to reduce it to fifty or less.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

September 1919.[130]

The Roots of Post-War Resentment: Relations with the Militia Bureau

Many of the complaints Guardsmen had with their treatment while in federal service could have been reduced if Guardsmen had felt they had a trustworthy advocate working for them on the General Staff. Rather, in the opinion of at least one prominent Guard historian, they believed the opposite to be true:

> Far more serious to the Guardsmen was the conviction that the Militia Bureau was not their friend and brotherly advisor in arms, as originally conceived, but was their avowed enemy. With some justice, they felt its Regular Army leadership and Staff were as rank-hungry and as indifferent in planning for the welfare and future utilization of the National Guard as was the remainder of the War Department General Staff.[131]

The belief that the Regular officers running the Militia Bureau were working to eliminate the Guard's connection to the states and bring it wholly under federal control was widespread, but not necessarily accurate. While there remained a strong sentiment within the bureau for a federally run UMT program and greater adherence to federal standards for training and administration of Guard units, the officers who led the bureau during and after the war differed from most of their Regular brethren in that they remained committed to the concept of state control of the Guard under the National Defense Act of 1916.

This subtle differentiation is a fact often missed by many Guardsmen of the day,

---

[130] *National Guard Reorganization Status: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs*, House of Representative, 66th Congress, 1st Session.

[131] Hill, 297.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

who lumped all of their grievances against the bureau and the Army together and assumed they were caused by a single General Staff mindset that was intent upon destroying the Guard. An example of the middle ground trod by one long-time Regular in the Militia Bureau can be found in the appearance of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau, Brig. Gen. John Heavey, before the 1918 NGAUS convention, which took place in Richmond just days after the signing of the armistice in France.[132] Heavey, who was briefly in the Guard before attending West Point, was a Regular of some twenty-eight years service, much of which had been either as an instructor to the National Guard in the states or at the Militia Bureau. Emphasizing several times that he was speaking purely as an individual, and not as an official spokesman for the War Department, Heavey was in turn both commendatory and critical of the Guard. He complimented the Guard in general and NGAUS in particular for advocating preparedness and UMT both before the war and now again at its conclusion (the convention had approved a resolution calling for a national program of UMT). Then, however, he followed up this praise with the warning that the Guard should be careful not to claim too much credit for the victory in Europe, since its mobilized strength comprised little more than a tenth of the three million men currently under arms.[133]

Heavey devoted much of his speech to UMT and the future of the Guard. He chastised those states which failed to do what Heavey saw as their patriotic duty during the war and form State Guard units to protect against civil disorder and German sabotage.

---

[132] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1918*, 16-23.

[133] Ibid., 18, 21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

As a result, the federal government had been forced to pick up the slack with the United States Guards at those key facilities where the states refused to provide security. He argued that in the future, all states should organize State Guards in peacetime so that they will have those forces available when the National Guard is mobilized. He also argued in favor of a federally administered program of UMT, whose graduates could, if organized as federal reserve forces, still be trained in state camps at federal expense, and administered locally by the adjutants general.[134] Heavey's comments along this line were vague, as befitted the somewhat impromptu nature of his address, and at least one historian had interpreted them to mean that he was advocating the federalization of the entire National Guard, with only State Guard forces remaining under the control of the Governors. In fact, this was not so. Heavey never stated that the creation of a federal reserve fed by UMT would lead to the reduction of the National Guard to State Guard status. Heavey made it clear he was unequivocally in favor of retaining the Guard as it was organized under the National Defense Act of 1916 some two months later during testimony before the House Military Affairs Committee, and remained consistent in this view throughout the following year throughout the debate over the future of the Guard.[135]

General Heavey, however, was selective in passing along the recommendations

---

[134] Ibid., 19-21.

[135] See Stentiford, 53-55. Stentiford interprets Heavey's speech as advocating the establishment of a National Guard completely under federal control after the war, and he wonders why Guardsmen applauded General Heavey at the conclusion of his speech. The reason is that they did not interpret Heavey's remarks in this way. See "Praises National Guard: General Heavey wants it maintained as before the war;" *NYT*, Jan. 24, 1919. Heavey's thoughts are also revealed in his correspondence with Senator Wadsworth, Jan. 24 & Jan. 31, 1920, and in his analysis of Wadsworth's bill, titled "National Guard Attention! Senate Bill 3688, A Study of its National Guard features" (Jan. 1920); all located in RG 168/12a/011.6 (Proposed).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that came from the convention; in his report back to the Chief of Staff of the Army, he made note of seven resolutions by NGAUS, but only recommended action on two of them – that the State Guards be issued better equipment than the surplus Russian rifles they were getting (a seemingly unimportant point now that the war was over, but strikes were an increasing threat that preoccupied the adjutants general attending the convention); and that suitable Regular officers be made available as instructors for Guard units. Resolutions Heavey ignored included those calling for post-war companies of less than 100 men; a resolution to eliminate the distinctive markings required on State Guard officer uniforms; and – surprisingly, given his strong advocacy of it in his own speech before the convention – the resolution advocating the adoption of a program of UMT.[136]

Though the Militia Bureau bore no responsibility for the manner in which the Guard had been treated while in federal service, the antagonistic attitude which had often characterized relations between the bureau and the adjutants general during the fight for a Militia Pay bill returned as the Guard was re-created in 1919 and 1920. The return of Maj. Gen. Jesse Carter to his former position as Chief of the Militia Bureau in early 1919 did not help matters. Though Carter claimed he wanted to "strive for a more friendly feeling and a better understanding between the members of the Guard and those of the Regular Army," even the most sympathetic personality would likely have had a difficult time assuaging the anger of the more radical Guardsmen as they returned home from

[136] Memorandum from Acting CMB to CofS, Nov. 23, 1918, Subject: Report of Meeting of the National Guard Association in Richmond, Virginia, Nov. 14-15. RG 168/12a/080. - National Guard Assoc. - (1918).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

France.[137] In any event, Carter was not the type to wage a charm offensive, even at the most basic level. Unlike his predecessors, who had personally attended the NGAUS conventions or at least sent a representative, Carter announced that no official representative of the Bureau would attend the convention in 1919.[138] Any moderating influence he therefore might have had on the deliberations was thereby lost, a fact which was much regretted by the outgoing president of the association, who later expressed that he had hoped that Carter's "presence might have prevented some of the radical utterances of some of the delegates."[139] This seems unlikely, since Carter had little tolerance for what he considered a disaffected, vocal minority, and was somewhat partisan in his own right:

> The complaints of the members of the National Guard concerning unjust treatment while in our National Army can not be substantiated by a full and complete investigation. There is conclusive proof that National Guard officers were not, as a class, discriminated against by Regular officers. Individual cases of injustice have been cited by Members of Congress and by members of the National Guard to make it appear that unjust discrimination existed generally. As a general rule, the National Guard officers were treated with more consideration than were Regular officers under the same conditions.[140]

---

[137] Carter to Brig. Gen. Harvey Moss (AG, Washington and President of NGAUS), May 22, 1919. RG 168/12a/080. - National Guard Assoc. - 1919.

[138] Carbon copy, telegram transcript, CMB to Col. Daniel Devore, May 3, 1919. RG 168/12a/080. - National Guard Assoc. - 1919. Contrast this refusal to attend the NGAUS convention with the correspondence between Brig. Gen. Mann, CMB, and Brig. Gen. Foster of NGAUS prior to the 1917 NGAUS convention. Despite the bruising verbal battle between NGAUS and the War Department that preceded the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, Mann agreed to attend and was well received by the convention. See RG 168/12a/080. – National Guard Assoc. Meeting, 1917.

[139] Moss to Carter, May 15, 1919. RG 168/12a/080. National Guard Assoc. – 1919.

[140] *CMB Annual Report, 1920*, 5-6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Circular letters from the Militia Bureau – the official channel through which the War Department communicated a wide variety of information, both trivial and substantial, to the states – often took on a critical tone that showed little understanding or sympathy for problems "out in the field." For instance, when addressing the fact that only 34,300 of an authorized 126,000 Guardsmen had been recruited as of October 1919, the bureau – rather than placing some of the blame on War Department policies which had crippled recruiting efforts – offered that:

> Some of the main causes [for the shortfall in recruiting] appear to be (a) a widespread indifference on the part of eligible men toward military service; (b) a dislike for strike duty; (c) hostility of labor unions toward the National Guard; (d) delay of Congress in framing military legislation and (e) a tendency of National Guard authorities to wait until legislation is decided upon.[141] [emphasis in the original]

While all these factors were doubtless true, they skipped over those areas where the War Department bore responsibility, particularly failure to support appropriate legislation to continue the Guard after the war's end and insistence on 100 man companies in order to gain federal recognition. Furthermore, in a case of what must have seemed to Guardsmen like adding insult to injury, Carter gave one additional reason for the Guard's recruiting problems: "Furthermore it must be admitted by all fair-minded men that the present situation in the matter of enlistments has been made worse by the propaganda carried on by certain National Guard officers."[142]

Veteran Guardsmen had decidedly different views than the Militia Bureau

---

[141] Militia Bureau Circular No. 56, Oct. 14, 1919.

[142] Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

regarding the reasons behind the difficulty of recruiting new Guard companies in 1919. In a memorandum to the Governor of Georgia, Adjutant General J. Van Holt Nash offered the following:

> We are being strangled with technicalities by the War Department. They are imposing war-time organization and conditions upon us in times of peace, and demanding a degree of perfection in organization, strength, and efficiency not possible or attempted in the Regular Army. The professional soldier has no understanding or conception of the conditions confronting the citizen soldier, who can not be treated on the basis of a Regular. His service is an avocation, not a profession, and he will not make the sacrifice necessary to enlist unless the service is made attractive, interesting and beneficial.
>
> A widespread and general spirit of resentment exists among discharged officers and soldiers alike, on account of the discrimination shown them and the treatment received from the Regular Army officers during the period of their service. Breaking up and scattering the personnel and changing old organizations from one branch of the service to another during the war was a crime which cannot be forgiven, and officers and men will not join again under existing laws and risk a recurrence of similar action by those in authority, while laws which permitted such actions exist or remain in force.[143]

Even when extending a compliment to the Guard, the Regulars in charge of the Militia Bureau seemed to fail to comprehend the justified pride that Guardsmen took in their service and the strong attachment that they formed with their units. In a circular titled "Organization of the National Guard," the bureau announced in October 1919 that the post-war Guard would be organized into sixteen "Divisional Districts" divided geographically along lines similar to those used to raise the sixteen World War I divisions. Rather than being numbered 26 through 41, as the divisions had been numbered during the war, these districts were numbered 51 through 66. The circular

---

[143] Nash to Gov. Hugh Dorsey, Nov. 25, 1919, reprinted in *Senate Hearings,* 1968.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

went on to explain:

> The Secretary of War has decided that the fine services of the National Guard Divisions in the world war should receive the greatest recognition that it is possible to accord the. [*sic*] Their services and fine records are a National asset and the recognition accorded them should be of the same character. ... It has, therefore, been decided to perpetuate as many as possible of the National Guard and National Army units which took part in the war [with] Germany, by continuing their designations in the permanent military establishment .... You are therefore informed that designations other than those used in the war with Germany will be selected for all new National Guard Divisions, and the units which compose them.[144]

Thus, Guard units would once again be stripped of the designations under which they had earned glory and fame and be issued new ones with no history or honors. Those units which Guardsmen had made famous in the late war would gain, in the eyes of the Regulars running the Militia Bureau, "the greatest recognition that it is possible to accord" – that is to say, status in the Regulars! Representative Anthony, the most vocal supporter of an independent National Guard on the House Military Affairs Committee, expounded on the fears of the more militant Guardsmen when he declared: "It has been found with an officer of the Regular Army at the head of the Militia Bureau, instead of the bureau being allowed to be free to exercise what is thought best for development of the National Guard, the bureau has been dominated by the purpose of the General Staff to destroy the guard, and it has been working at cross purposes all of these years."[145]

---

[144] Militia Bureau Circular No. 35, July 16, 1919. No further mention of this redesignation scheme is made in later circulars, and the National Defense Act of 1920 included language which required that the "names, numbers and other designations, flags, and records of the divisions and subordinate units thereof that served in the World War ... shall be preserved as such as far as practicable." Section 3a, National Defense Act of 1920 (41 *Stat.* 760).

[145] *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 4026 (Mar. 8, 1920).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 3: The Debate over National Defense – 1919

> *The National Guard performed very excellent service, considering the limited opportunities which they had for training in the past. They had never received, in my opinion, the whole-hearted support of the Regular Army. There was always more or less prejudice against them, and many of our regular officers failed to perform their full duty as competent instructors, and often criticized where they should have instructed. The National Guard people naturally resented this, and very properly so. (General of the Armies John J. Pershing, Testimony before the Joint House/Senate Committees on Military Affairs, November 1, 1919)*[1]

The Guard returned from World War I with a glorious combat record and the recognition and gratitude of the American public, but an uncertain future. Virtually all veterans of the war, regardless of which component of the Army they had served in, returned convinced that America needed to overhaul the Army in order to be better prepared for future conflicts. Most agreed this would require the organization of a mass citizen army, in all likelihood fed by UMT and trained by a cadre of Regulars. Most Regulars (and not a few Guardsmen) also argued that, in the interests of unity of command and increased efficiency, the Guard had to be brought under direct federal control in peacetime. But for Guardsman who had experienced Regular Army mistreatment and discrimination during the war, there was a deep suspicion of the Regulars' motives. These Guardsmen, led by NGAUS and AGAUS, sought to maintain their independence from the Regular Army by perpetuating the organization established by the National Defense Act of 1916, with added protections for the Guard if at all

[1] *The National Defense*, 438.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

possible. The year 1919 would see battlelines drawn anew, this time on the legislative front, with the fate of the Guard hanging in the balance.

The Baker-March Bill

Some Regular officers saw the aftermath of the World War as an opportunity to rid themselves of the troublesome National Guard altogether and establish a federal reserve that they could exercise unqualified control over. The man leading this charge was none other than the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Peyton Conway March. After serving as an artillery brigade commander and Pershing's Chief of Artillery during the fall and winter of 1917-1918, March had been recalled to Washington by Secretary of War Baker to serve as Acting Chief of Staff of the Army in March 1918, the fourth officer to serve in this capacity since the war started. Promoted to Chief of Staff with the temporary rank of general in May, Peyton C. March oversaw the direction of the last eight months of the war from Washington DC.[2] Next to Pershing himself, March was the most influential officer in the Army. During the war, he centralized control over the Army's supply apparatus and oversaw the creation of the Air Service, Tank Corps, and Chemical Warfare Service. He took the General Staff, which had stumbled badly with its planning lapses during the early months of the war, and expanded it greatly in size and efficiency. It was under March's leadership that the General Staff finally gained its position of

[2] March retired in 1921 in his permanent rank of major general, but subsequent legislation passed in 1930 restored the higher wartime rank to March and any other officer who had served in a higher grade during the war.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

undisputed leadership of the Army.[3]

March had a prickly personality, and made enemies – both within his service and within Congress – fairly easily. But even his enemies had great respect for his accomplishments:

> It is essential to attempt a just estimate of General March and his services. If we take him at his own estimate, the world would hardly have know his equal. Yet with all his intense egotism, want of the human element, scant sense of justice and lack of gratitude, Peyton C. March rendered country and army a valuable service. He was able to do so because, primarily, he is a man of action, and action was the crying need of the War Department when he took charge.
>
> He is cold as an icicle, fearless of responsibility, a quick thinker, and I doubt whether there was in the army at that time any other officer his superior in driving force, marvelous energy and indomitable will power. Until he took charge, discussion, memoranda, conferences were the order. The War Department needed a dictator, and General March was a czar. He stepped on the gas and the whole army felt the pressure.[4]

However, the writer continued, once the war was over, "[t]he War Department no longer needed a czar. What it did badly need was a man of diplomacy, tact, patience. In all these qualities, General March is sadly lacking."

March was an avowed Uptonian who had little direct contact with the National Guard during his years of service. Under March's direction and with Secretary Baker's concurrence, the General Staff forwarded to Congress legislation that would create a post-war U.S. Army remarkably similar to the army America had just helped to defeat in

---

[3] Edward Coffman, *The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 144 -151.

[4] Maj. Gen. David Shanks, *NYT*, Oct. 9, 1932, 4. Shanks commanded the Port of Embarkation, Hoboken, during the war. His attacks on March were brought on by the publication of March's "inaccurate and egotistical" wartime memoir, *The Nation at War,* the previous month.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

France – a point that Guardsmen would make several times over to anyone who would listen.

The Baker-March bill, as it was commonly referred to, was introduced into the House on January 16, 1919.[5] March was clearly the guiding force behind the bill, which he claimed "embodies the experience of the war."[6] The Chief of Staff insisted on a post-war Army that was thoroughly Uptonian in its design. It called for a 510,000 man Regular Army which formed the skeleton of a field army consisting of five corps. This skeleton would be filled out by 500,000 federally-trained individual reservists, giving the United States an army of over a million men at the onset of any future emergency. The bill completely ignored the National Guard. It also codified several of the new Army branches created during the war, and greatly strengthened the General Staff. The promotion system was changed, moving away from seniority to selection by merit for promotions above the rank of captain. Finally, in a move that almost seemed calculated to draw congressional ire, the bill required that Congress vote the Army budget in one lump sum, rather than dictating (as it traditionally did) the amount to be spent on various items. The bill did not mention UMT, despite its popularity in military circles and considerable support for it among some members of Congress.

From the start, March had badly misjudged the mood in Congress. Even the congressman who introduced the bill on March's behalf, then-Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee Hubert Dent (D-AL), warned March that it would be

---

[5] HR 14560, 65th Congress, 3rd Session. See *The National Defense*, 242-251.

[6] Ibid., 303.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

impossible to pass such a bill in the six weeks remaining in the session and suggested March simply request continuing funding of the Army while Congress considered what it wanted to do.[7] This was especially true as control of the House was due to shift to the Republicans with the commencement of the 66th Congress that summer, making the incumbents in the current session hesitant to pass major legislation of this sort. Several other members of the House Military Affairs Committee were openly critical of the large size of the army requested – larger by far than any previous peacetime army in the history of the nation. Even Garrison's proposed Continental Army, to which this plan bore more than a passing resemblance, had only called for 121,000 Regulars. Secretary Baker attempted to allay these fears by telling the committee that the large army was only intended to provide a measure of preparedness in the immediate aftermath of the armistice in the event a war broke out again; over time Congress could easily reduce the size of the army either through legislation or by appropriating less money for its maintenance. Skeptical committee members argued that if the goal was only to maintain a large army for a short period of time, temporary legislation would serve the purpose far better than permanent policy. Furthermore, they saw the adoption of a large standing army so quickly after the war as a repudiation of President Wilson's stated aim that future peace would be best maintained by reducing armies and limiting armament.[8] Given the reaction of the relatively pro-army Military Affairs Committee, Baker and March could not have been very hopeful about the reception their legislation would receive from the

[7] Ibid., 300-301. See also Coffman, 177.

[8] *The National Defense*, 255-259.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

House as a whole.[9] The final session of the 65th Congress ended March 3, 1919 without considering the Army Reorganization bill proposed by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War, leaving them to introduce the legislation anew after the Republican-controlled 66th Congress convened.[10]

Within the Army, support for the Baker-March bill tended to split along component lines, with Regulars and Reserve officers in favor of the legislation and Guardsmen opposed. This was not universal, however. Some distinguished Guardsmen, including generals O'Ryan of New York and Boardman of Wisconsin would side with the General Staff in calling for a completely federal reserve. Some Regulars, including three very popular commanders of Guard divisions – generals MacArthur, Haan, and Edwards – would express reservations with the bill.[11] There was also considerable opposition from the various bureaus within the Army to measures that would strengthen the General Staff at their expense, and a significant body of opinion in the Army that believed the bill

---

[9] March acknowledged that the House favored a smaller Regular Army and a weaker General Staff than called for in the War Department bill, but he believed he had the strong support of the Senate Military Affairs Committee to help him overcome this hurdle. March to Pershing, Mar. 7, 1919 in *March Papers*, Box 22, File 1919.

[10] At least one study has maintained that an aggressive committee chairman (which Dent was not) could have taken the bull by the horns and forced through a major Army reorganization, possibly to include UMT or complete federalization of the National Guard, in the few weeks that remained in the session. Indeed, as events would prove, the best chance to achieve these goals was probably in the immediate aftermath of the war. See E. Brooke Lee, Jr., *The Politics of our Military National Defense*, a Princeton senior thesis (submitted April 1940) reprinted in its entirety as Senate Document No. 274, 76th Congress, 3rd Session, 74-75. However, Dent's opposition to the far less "militaristic" Kahn bill the following winter indicates that he almost certainly had very little sympathy for the Baker-March bill, and probably did little to aid in its passage. See *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 4070-4072 (Mar. 9, 1920) for some of Dent's public remarks on the Kahn bill.

[11] Hill, 292; MacArthur briefly commanded the 42nd Division, William Haan commanded the 32nd, Clarence Edwards the 26th. O'Ryan commanded the 27th Division; Charles Boardman the 64th Infantry Brigade, 32nd Division.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

should have attempted to enact UMT. General Pershing's staff in France was working on their own version of a future military policy which entailed a smaller Regular Army than March's plan but a lengthy period of UMT. They found the Baker-March bill "radical in its nature .... The wide latitude accorded the President is the most favorable aspect of the Bill; the most serious weakness is the absence of any provision which connects up the Regular Army with some form of a trained reserve."[12]

Many Guardsmen, however, took offense at what they believed was a War Department attempt to supplant the Guard with a vast reservoir of federally trained and controlled reservists – especially in the wake of a war in which the Guard had fought with great valor. Truth be told, the wording of the Baker-March bill did nothing to materially change the status of the National Guard – it simply left the National Defense Act of 1916 unchanged in that regard. Secretary Baker attempted to defuse questions about the Guard's status by making it clear that he was "in favor of the Government doing its part in the support and upbuilding of the National Guard, but ... not as a substitute for the Regular Army" and March likewise publicly proclaimed his support of a strong National Guard.[13] Guardsmen, however, mistrusted the War Department leadership. Following their experiences with the Regulars during the war, they were not going to be satisfied with a bill that failed to address the flaws of the 1916 legislation and at the same time created a large federal reserve that was intended to supplant the Guard as the first-line

---

[12] Comments on H.R. 14560 enclosed in Pershing to Senator Francis Warren, Mar. 24, 1919. *Pershing Papers*, Box 426. Though the analysis was prepared by Pershing's G-3, Brig. Gen. Fox Connor, Pershing's inclusion of it in this letter to his father-in-law implies his endorsement. See also Coffman 177-178.

[13] *The National Defense*, 276; see also Coffman, 182-183.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reserve of the Army. NGAUS would work hard to defeat the Baker-March bill and substitute something more favorable.

John McAuley Palmer

Meanwhile, before the 65th Congress had closed, Senator Harry New (R-IN) took the opportunity to condemn the Baker-March bill, introducing on January 31, 1919 legislation of his own calling for UMT as the basis for the military establishment.[14] The Senate's Military Affairs Committee forwarded New's bill to March's General Staff for study and comment. The task of doing this was given to three veterans of the AEF in the War Plans Division, led by Col. John McAuley Palmer.

Palmer would become a key figure in determining the outcome of the post-war National Defense debate. He came from a distinguished Illinois family, having been named after his grandfather, a lawyer and friend of Abraham Lincoln, who had served as a Congressman, Senator, Governor of Illinois, and Democratic Presidential candidate in the 1896 election. During the Civil War, the elder Palmer rose from regimental to corps command, fighting with distinction at Stone's River, Chickamauga, and in the Atlanta Campaign. The young Palmer was strongly influenced by his grandfather, who had developed a deep mistrust of Regular officers during the war. After his grandson was admitted to West Point, the elder Palmer cautioned him not to let active service make him a narrow-minded partisan of the professional Army, reminding him that Washington and all the officers of the Continental Army had been citizen soldiers. Grandfather Palmer

[14] New's bill was S. 5485.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

believed that military leadership should not be restricted to a narrow class of professional officers, but be open to capable gifted civilians as well. This was a philosophy that the young John McAuley Palmer took to heart as he began his military career.[15]

Palmer graduated from West Point in 1892 and joined the infantry. He served in a variety of posts across the country and overseas, including Cuba, China and the Philippines. From 1908 to 1910, while attending schools at Fort Leavenworth, he struck up a lifelong friendship with Lt. George C. Marshall (a relationship which would lead, more than thirty years later, to Marshall recalling Palmer from retirement to help construct the framework for the post-World War II Army). Beginning in 1911, Palmer was assigned to service with the General Staff in Washington DC, where he showed his superb gifts as a staff officer and planner as the primary author of the *Organization of the Land Forces of the United States* (better known as the Stimson Plan).[16]

When the U.S. declared war on Germany in 1917, Palmer – one of the few trained staff officers in the Army – was selected to accompany General Pershing to France as his chief of operations for the AEF. Palmer was a perfectionist who allowed himself no rest while tackling a mountain of assignments. As a result, he suffered two nervous breakdowns from the stress. Pershing, despite his stern reputation, thought so highly of Palmer that he not only insisted he return to duty in the AEF following his convalescence,

---

[15] Holley, xiv, 30-31, 70-72, 95-96. Holley's book is a mixture of autobiography and biography; he essentially took over the task of writing Palmer's memoirs as the elder man's health failed. As a result, the first 138 pages are written solely by Palmer, pages 139-283 are a collaborative effort between Palmer and Holley, and the final 438 pages are entirely Holley's work. See also John McAuley Palmer, *America in Arms*, 135-136. An excellent summary of Palmer's career can be found in Jonathan House, "John McAuley Palmer and the Reserve Components." *Parameters* XII (Sept. 1982): 11-18.

[16] Holley, 97-99, 106-125, 147-179, 204, 209.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

but assigned him to brigade command for what turned out to be the final month of the war. As commander of the 58th Brigade, 29th Division, Palmer was very impressed with the performance of his National Guard troops. One subordinate in particular, the commander of Maryland's 115th Infantry, Col. Milton Reckord, struck Palmer as a superb example of the citizen-soldier who is also a competent, natural-born leader. Reckord, in the years following the war, would go on to command the 29th Division and serve as Adjutant General of Maryland and President of NGAUS.[17]

Before the war, Palmer had devoted a great deal of time to the subject of Army organization and reform, and had even published a book and several articles on the subject. Given his expertise, Pershing sent Palmer back to Washington to help the General Staff write legislation that would organize the post-war Army – a task which Pershing's staff, and Palmer in particular, had already given lengthy consideration.[18] Arriving in February 1919, Palmer found that March had already submitted the War Department's legislative proposal to Congress, so he was assigned other duties in the War Plans Division of the General Staff, eventually becoming chief of that division on August 1, 1919. Palmer's well-known interest in Army organization made him a natural choice to lead the General Staff's review of Senator New's UMT proposal.[19]

Palmer directed a group of officers who jointly authored an analysis based on

---

[17] Ibid., 364-366.

[18] See HQs, AEF "Memorandum on the Military Policy of the United States," Dec. 23, 1918. Copy in *Palmer Papers,* Box 3.

[19] Coffman, 179-180.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Senator New's bill. The proposal was circulated widely throughout the General Staff to gain its concurrence, and forwarded in memorandum format to March. Palmer's plan would establish a Regular Army somewhere between 163,000 and 228,000 men in strength, which would be increased by the addition of a reserve force formed from UMT graduates and organized into units during peacetime. This was a key departure from the Baker-March bill, which initially rejected UMT outright, and in a later incarnation endorsed a version of UMT where the graduates were employed as a pool of individuals used to expand the Army along the lines of Calhoun and Upton, offering no follow-up instruction once initial training was completed. March peremptorily rejected Palmer's proposal.[20] For the time being, Palmer resumed his other duties and remained in the background regarding Army reorganization; his moment in the limelight would come later that fall.

NGAUS Regroups

When NGAUS convened for its annual conference on May 5-6, 1919 at the Planter's Hotel in St. Louis – the same location as the very first conference forty years earlier – it was all business. Unlike previous conventions, there were relatively few long speeches by distinguished guests. Because not all Guardsmen had yet returned from France, participation was limited to ninety-four delegates representing thirty-five states.

---

[20] Memorandum, Director, WPD to CofS, Subj: "Outline of National Military Policy based on Universal Military Training," Apr. 1, 1919. Copy in *Palmer Papers*, Box 3, File "April 1st – December 31st 1919;" Palmer draft article, "At Last – An American Military System," 3-7, *Palmer Papers,* Box 4. See also Holley, 415-418. Senator New never received a report from the General Staff on his bill, see *Senate Hearings,* 1178.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The first order of business was to pick up the pieces following the complete mobilization of the Guard for the World War. There were questions regarding the legitimacy of the 1918 NGAUS convention. Only twenty-eight officers from thirteen states had attended that convention held just three days after the signing of the armistice, and most of those men had been state adjutants general or retired officers who had not been mobilized with the rest of the Guard in 1917. Did the officers elected by that "Temporary Association of the National Guard of the United States" have authority in this new association? Did the new association admit to membership those who were members of State Guard units, or just National Guard? These and other questions required careful deliberation, as the manner in which the Guard was mobilized and demobilized for the war meant many Guardsman were no longer eligible for membership in the association until their states re-established a National Guard.[21]

The future of the Guard as an institution was the convention's primary focus. As most of the delegates were concerned about the legislation that had already been proposed by the War Department in Washington, they must have hoped that the words of the keynote speaker, Senator Selden P. Spencer (R-MO) would prove prophetic: "The source of the Guard is the people, and the result of such a source means that the officers and men of the National Guard have an influence [regarding military affairs] in every community of the Nation that no other element ever can have, because they are not of the people."[22]

---

[21] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1918,* 1-14; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1919,* 5-40.

[22] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1919,* 4. Spencer, like most speakers at NGAUS conventions, was undoubtedly chosen to speak because of his affinity for the Guard. He served as a captain in the Missouri Home Guard and chairman of the draft board during the World War, before being elected to fill a vacancy during the war

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Spencer further opined that Guardsmen carried more credibility with the people (and presumably, their representatives in Congress) because unlike Regulars, who speak out of self-interest, every Guardsman "is a man that is more closely identified with the interests of the community and the State and the Nation even than they are with the military organization with which they are connected."[23]

Behind the scenes, there was a difference of opinion within the leadership of NGAUS over what course the post-war National Guard should take to achieve the goal that everyone agreed was primary – cementing the position of the National Guard as the first-line reserve of the United States Army. One faction (judging from the tenor of remarks, a minority at this convention) advocated organizing the Guard as a completely federal force. This group would be most closely associated in the coming months with the Guard's preeminent returning war-hero, Maj. Gen. John O'Ryan. The larger group (at least at the convention) sought the restoration of the Guard under the National Defense Act of 1916, leaving the underlying control of the Guard unchanged in the hands of the states. These men believed that the dual enlistment oath instituted by the National Defense Act was sufficient to satisfy constitutional concerns about maintaining a state militia while allowing full federal control in a time of national emergency. The end result of this split was that the Guard lobby, already reduced by the absence of so many soldiers still in France and the slow re-establishment of Guard units at home, was further

---

left by the death of Senator William Stone. He also sat on the Senate Military Affairs Committee. Source: U.S. Congress, *Congressional Biographical Directory* online (http://bioguide.congress.gov – accessed March 2002).

[23] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1919*, 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

weakened.[24]

Whether they favored a state or federal organization for the National Guard, there was general agreement among the delegates that the Guard had been treated poorly by the War Department and Militia Bureau during and after the war. The key reform, the convention agreed, was to get the Guard out of the hands of the Regulars. The first resolution approved by the delegates addressed this point by requesting that Congress "proceed at once to take such necessary steps as will permit the establishment ... of a National Guard Corps of the Army of the United States under the administration of National Guard officers, administered through a bureau known as the National Guard Bureau of the War Department."[25]

Subsequent resolutions dealt with a variety of issues, such as urging Congress to authorize the promotion of soldiers who had been recommended for such prior to the armistice (when a freeze was put on all promotions). The membership of NGAUS also made a point of endorsing UMT "as a necessary step toward National preparedness," but went no further in describing the specifics of a system beyond declaring that "it can best be developed in conjunction with the National Guard" – not, as most preparedness advocates would have it, as an entirely federal program. Most resolutions, however, dealt with getting the National Guard organized again in the states, to include a resolution

---

[24] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1919*; See also Derthick, "Citizen Soldier on Capitol Hill," 127-128; Hill, 304-305. Hill implies that O'Ryan and Reckord led conflicting factions at the St. Louis Convention. In point of fact, the list of attendees indicates that neither was present at the convention. More importantly, Col. Reckord actually played a minor role until after the National Defense Act of 1920 was passed – and he advocated complete federalization of the Guard, a view he would later deny. See "Views on the National Guard: An Interview with General Reckord" (hereafter *Reckord NGAUS interview*), 10.

[25] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1919*, 54.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

endorsing a lower minimum strength of sixty-five (instead of one hundred) for every infantry company. Other resolutions aimed to modify the National Defense Act regarding the commissioning of Guard officers, increase pay for officers and enlisted men, and change the length of Guard enlistments.[26]

The only contentious part of the discussion was over a section of the enlisted pay resolution which required that 50 percent of the officers and 60 percent of the enlisted men be present at any particular drill before any man could be paid. Several delegates pointed out that it was unfair to punish those who did show up at drill by denying them pay because others had chosen to stay home, and it would only make it more difficult to restore the Guard to its pre-war size if officers and men were denied pay for low attendance. The point was made that, particularly in rural areas, it was very difficult to assemble 60 percent of the men in a company on any given evening for drill. Nevertheless, the resolution carried, in part because the NGAUS leadership argued that it would be inappropriate to ask Congress to hand over the reins of the Militia Bureau to Guard officers while at the same time going on the record as favoring a relaxation in discipline.[27]

However, while the resolutions adopted by the 1919 NGAUS convention would not seem immoderate to most Guardsmen, the meeting was overshadowed by a single event – a single quote – that cast the entire convention in a radical light. During his acceptance speech following his election as President of NGAUS, Col. Bennett "Champ"

---

[26] Ibid., 54-66.

[27] Ibid., 62-66.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Clark of Missouri (parliamentarian of the United States House of Representatives from 1913-1917, commander of Missouri's 140th Infantry Regiment during the war, and son of longtime Speaker of the House Champ Clark) announced "I believe we are all absolutely united in our aim in this matter; that is, to build up the National Guard and smash the regular army."[28]

Clark, who displayed similar oratorical excess in the 1930s and 40s during his two terms as a U.S. Senator, dropped a lit match on a pool of gasoline with that remark. The exchange that followed this declaration showed that he clearly reflected a popular sentiment among many of the delegates. Brig. Gen. G. Angus Fraser, the Adjutant General of North Dakota and a later President of NGAUS himself, came to Clark's defense when others questioned the meaning of his remarks:

> It seems to me, as members of the National Guard of the United States in this Convention assembled, we had just as well come out in the open. The regular army has been fighting the National Guard for years; they have been giving the National Guard the worst of it, and I, for one member, am willing to come out and say that I am ready to put up a fight on the regular army to get a square deal for the National Guard.[29]

Clark's clarification that he believed there was a necessity for a small Regular Army to garrison Hawaii and the Philippines, but that the remainder should be eliminated, probably only added fuel to the fire. Even the most favorable historical treatment of the National Guard remarked that Clark's declaration "became the tocsin of strife that gladdened the hearts of the headline writers. ... In more calm, collected and experienced

---

[28] Ibid., 48-49.

[29] Ibid., 50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

minds present in St. Louis was the grim realization that the gauntlet had been thrown. Though originally they might have willed it otherwise, such zones of compromise as might have existed were present no longer."[30]

Fortunately for NGAUS, they would have a powerful ally during the coming fight with the Army. The American Legion, a new veteran's organization created in the aftermath of the war by National Guard and National Army officers, held its first stateside caucus in St. Louis two days after the NGAUS convention recessed.[31] Bennett Clark was a founding member of the Legion, having been elected as temporary chairman of the organization during its first caucus in Paris in March 1919. By the end of that year, the organization would boast over a million members and wield considerable political influence on defense-related issues. The testimony of the Legion's National Legislative Committee before both the House and Senate Military Affairs Committees in the winter of 1919-1920 would reinforce many of the same points that NGAUS, AGAUS and a number of adjutants general would make. Bennett Clark would continue to devote a great deal of time to Legion business in the following months, helping to shape the organization's congressional charter, and serving on several Legion committees.[32]

---

[30] Hill, 305.

[31] The 1919 NGAUS convention was initially planned to take place in Chicago, but changed to St. Louis only two weeks before the meeting was to have taken place because so many NGAUS attendees planned to attend the Legion convention as well. See Circular letters 5 and 6, State of Washington Military Department, Subject: National Guard Convention. RG 168/12a/080. – National Guard Assoc. (1919). The Legion caucus was considerably larger than the NGAUS convention, with 1100 delegates attending.

[32] Thomas Rumer, *The American Legion: An Official History, 1919-1989* (New York: M. Evans & Co., 1990), 24-25, 38-40, 66-67, 108; Richard Jones, *A History of the American Legion* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1946), 34-39, 86, 248. Milton Foreman, another founder of the American Legion and a key member of the Legion's Military Policy Committee, was later declared honorary lifetime President of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

While clearly well-connected politically and passionate in his desire to see the Guard triumph in the upcoming legislative battle, Clark's leadership of NGAUS during this period has to be judged as more of a liability than an asset. His combative language was heavily criticized in the press and was not widely supported in the Guard, even by members who shared his views. Indeed, the outgoing NGAUS president, Brig. Gen. Harvey Moss of Washington, immediately felt the necessity to exercise damage control when he wrote to assure the Chief of the Militia Bureau that "[t]he sentiment of the older and more experienced officers attending the convention was not in sympathy with the utterances of the President elect."[33] From the outset, Clark polarized the debate, leaving little room for compromise and opening up the Guard to criticism for being excessive in its demands.[34] Despite – or perhaps because of – his political connections, he failed to testify before either the House or the Senate Military Affairs Committees in the coming months, either in his capacity as NGAUS president or as a leading member of the American Legion. Indeed, he appears to drop out of the debate entirely; when the Executive, Legislative and Law committees of NGAUS convened in August 1919 in New York City to plan for the legislative battle that fall, Clark attended, but the presiding officer and spokesperson for the association was New York's adjutant general, Charles

---

NGAUS. Legion membership was near-universal among Guards veterans of the war.

[33] Moss to CMB, May 15, 1919. RG 168/12a/080. - National Guard Assoc. (1919).

[34] Guardsmen were still conducting damage-control over Col. Clark's remarks months later. See, for example, the testimony of Brig. Gen. William Moore, the Adjutant General of South Carolina, from Dec. 4, 1919, in *Senate Hearings,* 1885, or the letter of Brig. Gen. Louis Lasher, the Adjutant General of Iowa, to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs (Nov. 1919) reprinted in *Senate Hearings,* 1965.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Berry.[35] Bennett Clark even failed in the most basic duty of the NGAUS president – to arrange for a convention in each of the next two years – until the AGAUS membership (many of whom sat on the NGAUS Executive Council) pushed him to call for a meeting in New Orleans in February 1922.[36] By that point, the greatest Guard/Army legislative battle of the interwar period was well over, and relations between the National Guard and the Regular Army were on the mend.

Congress and the Guard

NGAUS' battle in 1919-1920 to preserve state control over the National Guard would turn out to be a haphazard affair, conducted on a shoestring budget, culminating in proposed legislation that was heavily criticized and went nowhere in Congress. Among the Guard voices heard by Congress there was no unanimity of opinion in favor of state control over the Guard in peacetime. But on other issues Guardsmen spoke with unity and were able to achieve their most important goals – control over the Militia Bureau and input on the decisions made by the General Staff.

Joining the Guardsmen who testified on the future status of the Guard were a significant number of Regulars whose experience during the war had raised their opinion of citizen soldiers. Congress was already well disposed to listen to the Guard. Though some of the key congressional allies from the campaign for the National Defense Act of

---

[35] "Guardsmen Oppose Universal Service," *NYT*, Aug. 6, 1919, 15; "Guard Plans Fight on Service Bill," *NYT*, Aug. 8, 1919, 23.

[36] A brief historical forward printed in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931* (pp. 3-4) relates that the 1920 convention was to be held in San Antonio, but Clark failed to arrange for it. The NGAUS Executive Council took the lead in arranging the 1922 convention. Bennett Clark's personal papers are silent

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1916 were gone (most notably Virginia's James Hay, who retired in 1916) there were still significant numbers of congressmen – particularly Republicans – who had served in the state forces and could be supposed to be sympathetic to NGAUS' point of view. In the 66th Congress four of the thirteen Republicans (but none of the eight Democrats) who made up the House Committee on Military Affairs had served in the Guard. In the Senate, the proportion was even more striking – five of ten Republicans and two of nine Democrats had state service. No Congressman on either committee had served as a Regular, except the delegate for the House from Hawaii, who had served three years in the British Army during the Boer War.[37] Personal connections between legislators and the adjutants general of their respective states in some cases extended back to a common Guard experience, as it did for Indiana's adjutant general when he made reference during his testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee to the training he had received from Corporal (now Senator) Harry New back in their old unit, the Indianapolis Light Infantry.[38]

Prior Guard membership, of course, did not always guarantee concurrence of

---

regarding his role as President of NGAUS.

[37] Military service figures compiled from survey of online biographies provided by U.S. Congress, *Congressional Biographical Directory* (http://bioguide.congress.gov – accessed March 2002). Senators Wadsworth, Warren, New, Frelinghuysen, Spencer, and Thomas, and Representatives Greene, Crago, Sanford, and James were all listed as having served in state forces. Senator Chamberlain, a Democrat, does not have Guard service listed in his biography but referred to his long service in the Guard in *Senate Hearings*, 1800. By comparison, Riker states that in the Congress that passed the National Defense Act of 1916, only nineteen individuals *in the entire Congress* claimed militia service in their official biographies – though six more refer to such service during the debates. William H. Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), 78.

[38] *Senate Hearings*, 1964.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

opinion with NGAUS. Sometimes it generated the opposite. Representative Frank Greene (R-VT) noted his long Guard service as a preamble to his opinion that the Guard should be organized under the Army clause of the Constitution – "like anybody who had any experience in it at all ... I am persuaded that the fundamental organization of the National Guard is wrong."[39] On the other hand, Representative Daniel Anthony, Jr. of Kansas, who often chaired the House Committee on Military Affairs in Representative Julius Kahn's absence, and who (even more importantly) chaired the House Subcommittee on Army Appropriations, had no Guard service. Nevertheless, he repeatedly demonstrated his preference for a strong National Guard, under state control, over a large federal Army. In this regard, he was representative of a large voting block of Southerners and Midwesterners who traditionally disliked both big government and large standing armies in peacetime.[40]

The most influential legislator in the debate possessing military experience was the chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Senator James Wolcott Wadsworth of New York. Wadsworth was born into a distinguished patrician family from Geneseo, in Livingston County in upstate New York. Public service in both the military and government was as much a part of his blood as a love of horses and farming.

---

[39] *Army Reorganization: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs,* 2 Vols. House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions. (Hereafter *House Hearings*), 1876.

[40] Robert K. Griffith, *Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: America's Experience with an All-Volunteer Army between the World Wars* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 57. Anthony, the former mayor of Leavenworth and nephew of Susan B. Anthony, attended the Michigan Military Academy as a youth and was the son of a prominent jayhawker, Col. Daniel Anthony, Sr., of the 7th Kansas Cavalry during the Civil War. Source: William Connelly, *Standard History of Kansas and Kansans* (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1918).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The son of a Civil War veteran and influential Congressman, his grandfather had been a Civil War general who died of wounds received at the Wilderness. James Wadsworth was also the great-great-grandnephew of Col. Jeremiah Wadsworth, who had introduced militia legislation modeled on the Knox plan before Congress in 1791, and then voted against it after constant amendments had weakened and transformed it into the Militia Act of 1792. Wadsworth, along with many of his Yale classmates, enlisted in the Guard in 1898 as a private (the highest military rank he ever attained) in Battery A, Pennsylvania Field Artillery, a unit largely composed of Philadelphia's social elite. Thus he witnessed first hand the manner in which the troops for the Spanish-American War were raised, trained, transported and equipped. As he noted years later, "[t]his situation gave me my first opportunity to note, in a most amateurish way, the utter lack of anything approaching a sound National military policy. It has been my deep concern ever since."[41] A veteran of the Puerto Rican expedition in 1898 (though he never fired a shot), the following year Wadsworth took advantage of his father's influence to secure a place on a troop ship sailing round the world from Brooklyn east to California. Along the way, he participated briefly in the U.S. efforts to suppress the Philippine Insurrection.

Returning to upstate New York in 1899, Wadsworth took up farming, was active in the local community and was elected to the State assembly, becoming Speaker in 1906 at the age of twenty-eight. Entering national politics when elected to the U.S. Senate in 1914 (succeeding his good friend, Elihu Root), Wadsworth was true to his Republican

---

[41] James Wadsworth, handwritten autobiographical manuscript, *Wadsworth Papers*, Box 15, 75. See also "The Reminiscences of James W. Wadsworth," 1-35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ideals of small central government and preserving states' rights even when it led him to oppose popular causes. Despite the fact that women in New York state already had the vote, he opposed passage of the 19th Amendment because it would impose federal voting laws on the states (Wadsworth claimed he would oppose it just as adamantly if the purpose of the Amendment was to *deny* suffrage to women in all the states, as the principle was the same).[42] For similar reasons, during his career as a Senator he unsuccessfully opposed Prohibition, a bonus bill for World War I veterans, and passage of a child labor act. The one area where Wadsworth favored more federal spending and greater federal control over the states was that of military policy. Long an advocate for UMT, Wadsworth's experiences with the Guard during the Spanish-American War and in his local cavalry troop did not leave him with the impression that maintaining state control over the militia produced the soundest national military policy.[43]

Two Versions of UMT: The Baker-March and Chamberlain-Kahn Bills

Prior to resuming the debate over Army reorganization in the summer of 1919, the new 66th Congress was required to fund the Army for the coming fiscal year while it considered a more permanent basis for the peacetime establishment. After spending

---

[42] Wadsworth, speech before Senate, June 4, 1919. Copy in *Wadsworth Papers,* Box 35; "Women call upon Wadsworth to Quit," *NYT,* Nov. 23, 1919. Despite the opposition of the suffragists, Wadsworth was reelected to the Senate in 1920, but his continuing opposition to Prohibition split the upstate Republican vote in New York and led to his defeat in 1926. He returned to Congress as a Representative in 1933 and served eight terms before retiring in 1951. See "Reminiscences of James W. Wadsworth," 344-356.

[43] Wadsworth campaign position paper (n.d., 1926?), *Wadsworth Papers,* Box 31, file "Addresses, Reports, Speeches, etc. 1915-1918." For a summary of Wadsworth's views on the military prior to the debate over Army reorganization, see text of Jan. 19, 1919 speech before Senate, printed under separate cover as a pamphlet titled *The American Expeditionary Force* (*Wadsworth Papers,* Box 35).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

about a week hearing testimony from Regular officers and a handful of civilians, Congress settled on a Regular Army strength of 325,000 men for one year only – a compromise between the 300,000 approved by the House and the 400,000 approved by the Senate. Proponents of peacetime UMT opposed this figure as too small, but many Guardsmen saw this relatively large peacetime Army as a sign that the new Republican Congress would look favorably on the Baker-March bill.[44] In retrospect, it would have been more accurate to view it as a sign of the still unsettled situation in Europe, and the Army's need to provide men for the occupation force on the Rhine, the Siberian and Murmansk-Archangel Expeditionary forces, as well as the various pre-war garrisons.

When the Baker-March bill failed to gain passage in early 1919 during the last session of the 65th Congress, General March had the bill reintroduced that August in the first session of the 66th Congress. It differed in only one aspect from the earlier bill, in that it included a section calling for three months of Universal Military Training at age nineteen, with no further service required in peacetime.[45] March was quick to point out that this was not the same as Universal Military *Service*, which would have included assignment to an active or reserve unit for some period of time, and was believed by

---

[44] *Army Appropriation Bill, 1920: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs*, 2 vols., House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 1st Session. Those portions of the hearings pertaining to the National Guard were uncontroversial, and related almost entirely to questions regarding the necessary appropriations to begin reorganizing the Guard along the same basis laid out in the National Defense Act of 1916. The final appropriation of $15,000,000 for the Guard for the fiscal year would allow up to 112,000 officers and men to be recruited. See testimony of General Carter, Chief of the Militia Bureau, 524-529. See also John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (New York: The Century Co., 1922), 327-330, and Hill, 302-303.

[45] S. 2715, H.R. 8287, 66th Congress, 1st Session. Reprinted in full in *Senate Hearings*, 16-27. Sections 39-52 deal with UMT. March would have preferred a longer period of UMT, but settled on three months as "the most practicable [period] which could be adopted." See March to Howard Gross, President of the Universal Military Training League, Sept. 30, 1919 in *March Papers*, Box 8, File G.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

many, even in the military, to be "Prussian in its origin and wholly un-American."[46] The distinction between the two was no doubt unclear or unimportant for many – after all, either universal training or universal service would require every young man to don the uniform and take orders from the military hierarchy.[47]

Many advocates of UMT, however, were unhappy with the type of training incorporated into the Baker-March bill. They criticized it chiefly for the short length of the training period, for not organizing the trainees into a drilling reserve force once their training was complete, and for maintaining such a large standing army as an adjunct to the citizen army. As a result, many Preparedness advocates who might otherwise have been expected to applaud the UMT aspects of the Baker-March bill were critical of it, reserving their support for the version of UMT proposed in parallel bills which had already been introduced in the Senate and House in late July by Senator George Chamberlain (D-OR) and Representative Julius Kahn (R-CA). The Chamberlain-Kahn bill, which had been drafted by the Military Training Camps Association, would legislate UMT for twice the length of time as the War Department bill – six months of UMT for every man within the two years following his eighteenth birthday – followed by a five year commitment to a reserve unit with which the soldier would attend periodic camps for refresher training. Reservists then would switch over to an unorganized manpower pool for five years, still liable for service in the event of an emergency, but no longer required

---

[46] *House Hearings*, 4.

[47] Even Senator Chamberlain, a strong supporter of UMT, acknowledged "Not one in a 100 differentiate between universal training and service." *Senate Hearings*, 1847.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to attend summer camps. The Chamberlain-Kahn bill, unlike the Baker-March bill, did not specify the organization of the Army as a whole.[48] Beginning on August 7, a new round of hearings on these and other proposed items of military legislation began in the House and Senate Military Affairs Committees. Before a new National Defense Act would be signed into law over 6,000 pages of testimony and speeches would be generated in committee hearings and on the floor of Congress, and several major proposals were considered and debated, the renewed Baker-March bill being the first.

Testimony Begins: The War Department Makes its Case

On August 3, Secretary Baker forwarded to the chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Military Affairs (Representative Julius Kahn and Senator James Wadsworth, Jr., respectively) copies of the Baker-March legislation, revised from the previous session only in the inclusion of three month's of UMT. Baker indicated that though he was forwarding the legislation, he would not give it his full endorsement until General Pershing returned from Europe and had an opportunity to review it, a point he subsequently repeated during his testimony before the Senate. Both chairmen, therefore, viewed the War Department legislation as a starting point for conducting hearings on

[48] H.R. 8068 and S. 2691, both entitled "A Bill to Provide for Universal Military, Naval and Vocational Training, and for Mobilization of the Manhood of the Nation in a National Emergency." Because UMT was included in the Kahn and Wadsworth Army Reorganization bills of January 1920, the Chamberlain-Kahn UMT bills were never reported out of committee. See Tompkins McIlvaine to Homer Cummings and Will Hays, n.d. (Feb., 1920?) in *Palmer Papers*, Box 4, file Jan-Mar 1920; McIlvaine testimony, *Senate Hearings*, 825-877 and *House Hearings*, 1387-1414; Chase C. Mooney and Martha E. Layman, "Some Phases of the Compulsory Military Training Movement, 1914-1920." *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* XXXVIII, No. 4 (Mar. 1952): 650-652; and Dickinson, 334-351.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Army reorganization.[49] Senate hearings (which were actually carried out before a subcommittee of the committee) were conducted over fifty sessions from August 7 through December 17, taking testimony from ninety-five individuals and covering a broad range of topics and several related pieces of legislation.[50] House hearings were just as extensive, lasting from September 3, 1919 through February 5, 1920, and taking testimony from 111 individuals concerning four proposed bills.[51]

General March, the first person to testify before the Senate committee, demonstrated from the outset that, despite the fact that the new legislation did nothing to legally change the status of the Guard from 1916, the inclusion of federal reserve would – in his opinion – move the Guard to a domestically oriented, back-seat role when it came to national defense:

> That is exactly the point, to have the National Guard fit into the system. If we call out an army ... the National Guard units, for instance, could be utilized as guardians for use in their States, while these other men, these Regular Army men, plus the men who have had universal military training, could be sent abroad.[52]

---

[49] *Senate Hearings*, 147; see also Bernard Boylan, "Army Reorganization 1920: The Legislative Story." *Mid-America* 49, No. 2 (April 1967): 117.

[50] *Senate Hearings*, 1-2054. The bills considered were S. 2715, the Baker-March bill; S. 2691, the six month UMT bill sponsored by Senator Chamberlain; and S. 2693, which would have created a separate Air Force and developed civil and commercial aviation. Printed separately by the Senate were testimony submitted by Secretary Baker and by the Military Policy Legislative Committee of the American Legion on January 21, and March 1 respectively, concerning S. 3792, a substitute to the Baker-March bill known as the Wadsworth bill.

[51] *House Hearings*, 1-2236. The bills considered were H.R. 8287, the Baker-March bill; H.R. 8068, the House version of Senator Chamberlain's UMT bill, sponsored by Representative Kahn; H.R. 7925, the House version of the Air Force bill; and H.R. 8870, a series of defense amendments sponsored by Representative Dent.

[52] *Senate Hearings*, 46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

While these plans for the National Guard were no cause for comment by the committee, the crux of the issue – and the reason why the Baker-March bill was ultimately doomed to failure – was also revealed in the Chief of Staff's opening remarks. The cost of a 500,000 man Regular Army was estimated as $798,660,000 at present pay; the cost of administering UMT to 650,000 young men every year was placed at $94,000,000, thus making the yearly allocation under the War Department's scheme nearly $900,000,000 annually. This compared to the annual cost of the Army for the two years preceding the war of approximately $240,000,000. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff had to be prompted by Senator Wadsworth to include in his estimate the yearly appropriation for "the support and encouragement of the National Guard," a figure which March agreed was probably "about fifteen or twenty millions more."[53]

Most of the members of the Senate committee favored the concept of UMT, though they did predict (correctly, as it turned out) that there would be significant opposition to it in the rest of Congress and the nation at large. However, they immediately questioned the size of the Regular force March was requesting, especially when he readily conceded that citizen soldiers must eventually carry the burden of any future war.[54] March received an even tougher reception from the House Committee on Military Affairs, which grilled him for most of the month of September, going through

[53] Ibid., 47-49. Though the 500,000 Army figure was widely used throughout these hearings, the actual size of the Regular Army under Baker-March (after inclusion of all officers, the Medical Corps, and unassigned recruits) was revealed to be 576,000. In addition, ROTC and the Reserve Officers Corps, like the National Guard, were not included in the $900,000,000 estimate. See 54-55.

[54] Ibid., 56.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the bill line by line. March later claimed in his memoirs that "[a]t no time in the consideration of this reorganization did the War Department imagine that Congress would appropriate the money for 500,000 men," but he resented what he said was Representative Kahn's public stance that the Army should be reduced to 100,000 men – the same figure Germany had been limited to under the Treaty of Versailles.[55]

Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, who was much respected in Congress for his honesty and open-mindedness, appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on August 18, and the House committee on September 23. Baker, a diminutive, gentle, witty lawyer and former mayor of Cleveland, was "an incongruous Secretary of War" best known before taking office in 1916 for his progressive politics and pronounced anti-militarist stance. Surprisingly, once war broke out he had proved an effective administrator, and was judged a superb Secretary and good friend by the men he worked most closely with, Generals March and Pershing (a significant accomplishment, since the two generals were coolly professional toward each other during the war, and their relationship deteriorated into bitter feud following the publication of each other's memoirs in the early 1930s).[56]

---

[55] Peyton C. March, *The Nation at War* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1932), 341. March's statement concerning Kahn was unfair; when Kahn introduced Army reorganization legislation of his own in January 1920, it called for a Regular Army of 300,000 men.

[56] Beaver, 1-8; testimonials to Baker's character and ability as Secretary of War from interviews with Senators Wadsworth and Sheppard of the Senate Military Affairs Committee are contained in Lee, 81-82. See also "Reminiscences of James W. Wadsworth," 179-191, 304. Baker has been judged more harshly in the Army's official history for excessive delay in making decisions, failing to reduce red tape, opposition to government controls over industry, and allowing the bureaus rather than the General Staff to control matters until the advent of General March; see James E. Hewes, *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 21-31. For the feud between Pershing and March, see Coffman, 236-240.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

It is clear from March's testimony that he had converted Baker over the summer of 1919 to the position of endorsing UMT.[57] For Baker, who before becoming Secretary of War had "regarded war as irrational, wasteful, and tolerable only until the reason of mankind could catch up with the rest of his civilization and devise agencies of international justice which would make it unnecessary," this represented a remarkable ideological transformation, driven in part by his belief that universal service could become a vehicle for implanting progressive ideals in the nation's youth.[58] Baker revealed something of how the experience of the war overcame his former aversion to large armies in his Annual Report for 1919, where he stated "[t]he World War has shown quite clearly that armies reflect the spirit of the people from whom they come rather than create a spirit of their own, so that the size of the army is not so important ... as the kind of an army."[59]

Baker's testimony before the House and Senate committees was similar, and with regard to the National Guard, he was complimentary:

> I should say offhand that the National Guard officer was probably a little better equipped to understand the psychology of the citizen soldier than the Regular officer, for the reason that his entire experience had been

[57] Compare the version of UMT endorsed in this bill with Baker's opposition during the war to even five weeks of training for seventeen and eighteen year old boys. See Baker to Wilson, July 28, 1918 and Wilson's reply, July 30 in *Baker Papers*, Box 8, File W. Baker believed that after the war the government should simply "encourage and enlarge military training in colleges, technical schools and high schools ..." and Wilson concurred. Baker again expresses his opposition to UMT shortly after the war ended in a letter to Senator Thomas Martin. See Baker to Martin, Nov. 24, 1918 in *Baker Papers*, Box 10, File M.

[58] Baker to Elizabeth Hauser, Sept. 18, 1919. *Baker Papers,* Box 10, File H.

[59] *Senate Hearings,* 43-44; *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1919*, 65. While Baker may have been converted, Coffman (pp. 181-182) argues convincingly that March was an Uptonian at heart, and included UMT in this second version of the bill simply to gain the backing of UMT supporters for what was still, in essence, a bill to establish an expandable army.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

> with volunteers, men from his own community, with whom he was more or less acquainted, while the Regular Army officer had the Regular Army soldier, with no particular home, but under a permanent contract of enlistment.[60]

Secretary Baker did not prove to be a strong proponent for the War Department bill in his testimony. He gave a less-than wholehearted endorsement to the 500,000 man Regular Army request ("My guess would be that a somewhat smaller number would be adequate, but I would not like to put myself against the estimate of these military men") and admitted that the projected cost of $900,000,000 per annum was "a staggering figure." Baker's real passion was for a reform that recalled his Progressive roots – attracting the large number of recruits required for a 500,000 man Army would be done by offering a broad range of academic courses to soldiers, which would have the added effect of increasing the "value of the citizenship of those men."[61] When Baker spoke of his vision of the future for the Army, he drew inspiration from the 11,000 soldiers who took courses in the American Expeditionary Forces University in France, a hastily assembled affair in which soldiers educated their fellow soldiers in a wide variety of subjects while awaiting transportation back home for demobilization, thus demonstrating "the yearning for educational opportunity which characterizes young America."[62]

---

[60] *Senate Hearings,* 159. Baker was making this judgment based primarily on the observations of others, but it is a point made several times in the hearings. Regular officers were far more likely to insist on the privileges that customarily accompanied a commission, which were seen as fundamentally unbecoming the army of a democracy by Guardsmen and draftees. One man who reported on this extensively to Baker was Raymond Fosdick, Chairman of the Commission on Training Camp Activities. See his 12 page letter to Baker, Apr. 17, 1919, in *Baker Papers*, Box 9, File F.

[61] *Senate Hearings*, 175, 214, 156.

[62] Text of Baker address to General Staff College, Sept. 2, 1919, 5, in *Baker Papers*, Box 245, File "Speeches, 1919."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Baker and March were followed by a long line of high-ranking officers asked to testify on the merits of the War Department reorganization bill. While several of these were willing to criticize the plan, especially within their area of expertise, most were unwilling to be drawn into commentary on the larger issues of army size and UMT.[63]

General O'Ryan Testifies

The first person to level a full-scale attack on the Baker-March bill was Maj. Gen. John O'Ryan in his appearance before the Senate subcommittee on September 2, 1919. O'Ryan had previously tried to bridge the gap between the Regulars and the Guard by writing to General March in June 1919 trying to convince him to change the War Department bill to be more inclusive of the Guard. While he was sympathetic to several elements of March's bill, O'Ryan told the Chief of Staff that "any plan for a national army which ignores the National Guard is fatally defective." O'Ryan suggested that March's proposed three-months of UMT be followed up with a mandatory two years and nine months in the Guard, thus making a total service commitment of three years. This would immensely enlarge the Guard, increase its efficiency, and maintain the skills of the vast reserve force once their initial training was past. In return, O'Ryan believed that he could convince the leadership of the Guard to accept complete federal control. Despite his considerable reputation, O'Ryan's attempt to broker a compromise was rejected both by March and by Guard leaders, who failed to see how accepting complete federal control

---

[63] For example, see the testimony of Maj. Gen. John Chamberlain, Inspector General of the Army, Maj. Gen. H.L. Rogers, Quartermaster General of the Army, and Maj. Gen. M.W. Ireland, Surgeon General, in *Senate Hearings*, 253-264, 543-553, 598-613.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

would correct any of the issues the Guard and Regulars had squabbled over during the World War.[64]

Having failed to mold the Baker-March bill into something more moderate and acceptable, O'Ryan began his testimony by attacking it at its core:

> I am opposed to any bill which perpetuates a large professional standing army, for I see in such an army the abandonment of real preparedness in the form of a great citizen army. ... A regular professional army is an obsolete institution, a survival of a former period when wars were largely waged by mercenary troops. ... As an organization it is essentially and unavoidably wasteful of funds, out of harmony with the scheme of things as they exist in our country and organically ineffective for the waging of modern wars of consequence.[65]

Despite what disagreements they might have with O'Ryan over federal versus state control of the Guard, the testimony of all the Guardsmen who followed would be unanimous on this theme. O'Ryan continued by noting that the money spent on maintaining a large standing army was money that would be denied a truly effective peacetime reserve, thus condemning the nation's manpower to go to war "in hastily organized units, without esprit and morale, and with little or no training, or as conscripts for the Regular Army, with limited opportunity for recognition and promotion."[66]

He followed these harsh words with a condemnation of the ORC. Supplementing the Army with lists of Reserve officers did little good if these officers had no opportunity to periodically exercise their leadership with troops. After advancing several other

---

[64] Memorandum, O'Ryan to March, June 6, 1919, no subj. RG 165/279/675. See also Holley, 424-425.

[65] *Senate Hearings,* 513-514.

[66] Ibid., 515.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

arguments on the detrimental effects of large professional armies, O'Ryan laid out the framework of the plan which he had tried to convince March and the Guard's leaders to accept back in June. Left with the mission of providing some of the trainers for UMT, a few small garrisons and perhaps a small expeditionary force, the Regular Army could be reduced to a bare minimum size of 100-125,000 men. The nation would be secure with a National Guard 1,500,000 strong in regularly drilling units, backed by an additional 1,500,000 non-drilling reservists.[67] Except for the fact that O'Ryan advocated organizing this new national force under the Army clause of the Constitution (should Congress desire), he was lock-step in agreement with Bennett Clark in terms of wanting to "smash the Regular Army" – though he was far more tactful in expressing it. In O'Ryan's opinion, the Guard had demonstrated during the just-concluded war that it was a superior fighting instrument that should be expanded upon, but that it could be further perfected by the removal of the "handicaps" it had operated under in the past, first among which was the widely disparate quality of training given by each of the states.

> Gen. O'Ryan: I think that the National Guard should be developed into a very efficient force, but I would like to see some greater degree of Federal control over it in time of peace in relation to its training. By Federal control I do not necessarily mean Regular Army control; in fact, I mean the opposite of that.
>
> Senator McKellar: Congressional control?
>
> Gen. O'Ryan: No, I mean War Department control vested in an overhead composed of National Guard officers who would have charge of the duty of training the National Guard and the development of it along the lines provided for by Congress and who ... would constitute a section of the General Staff, known perhaps as the National Guard section of the General Staff.[68]

[67] Ibid., 515-519, 523.

[68] Ibid., 523.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Several times in his presentation, O'Ryan made the point that Regular control over the Militia Bureau was a major stumbling block to the efficiency and morale of the Guard:

> I think that the National Guard, under the existing law ... is a hopeless proposition, due to the fact that the provisions of that law which relate to the National Guard and the regulations which are written under those provisions are carried out by the Regular Army, and they are carried out in such a way as to subject its development to a great handicap. I mean by that at times those who are charged with carrying it out are unfriendly to the National Guard, and at other times, while they are not unfriendly, they do not understand the conditions which affect the Guard.[69]

He followed this with numerous specific examples supporting this statement, and convincingly made the point for putting a Guardsman in charge of the Militia Bureau.[70] As for the opposition that could be expected from governors deprived of their troops, O'Ryan believed that Congress had the power to organize a citizen army in any manner it pleased. Thus, Congress could easily place restrictions on the federally organized National Guard requiring it to obey the orders of the governor in peacetime, so that the states would not have to raise additional forces to maintain civil order. Officers and men would be invited to re-create their militia units in the new federal National Guard, requiring only a new commission or a new enlistment oath to change their status. O'Ryan predicted that governors and Guardsmen alike would view the change as merely nominal, and voice no objections to it, but that it would remove the primary source of criticism leveled by the Regular establishment against the Guard.[71]

---

[69] Ibid., 527.

[70] Ibid., 536-538.

[71] Ibid., 527-529.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

O'Ryan's testimony was critical in establishing the Guard's position. His rank, recent success in the World War, and coherent plan made him the most influential of all the Guardsmen who testified before Congress. As Senator Wadsworth would later write:

> While we received from some witnesses intelligent and valuable suggestions, I think it fair to say that only two or three men came before us prepared to outline anything like a broad scheme for national defense conforming to American traditions. I remember that Major General John F. O'Ryan ... was one of the very few who contributed genuinely constructive suggestions. Nearly all the others appeared to hesitate and, to be frank, we were not getting on very well.[72]

O'Ryan's credibility, especially among his fellow Guardsmen, doubtless was bolstered by the fact that he had remained true to his previous statements on the subject of militia reform; his testimony in 1919 outlined essentially the same program of reform that he had convinced NGAUS to adopt in 1917 (the one time in its history that NGAUS had advocated that the Guard be organized completely under federal control), and was the same plan he advocated in 1915 when NGAUS was fighting the Continental Army plan.[73] While he did not advocate the line that the 1919 NGAUS convention had called for (i.e., a constitutional amendment allowing the Guard to remain under the militia clause and still serve wherever the federal authority desired in time of emergency), O'Ryan was in tune with what most Guardsmen wanted – they wanted UMT so long as it did not hurt the

---

[72] James Wadsworth, in the introduction to John M. Palmer's *Statesmanship or War* (New York: Doubleday, 1927), xii-xiii. It should be noted that O'Ryan was already well-known to Wadsworth. Wadsworth had made it a point to visit the New York division when it was stationed on the Mexican border in 1916 and again in France during the war, and had formed a highly favorable impression of O'Ryan long before he asked him to testify before his committee. See "Reminiscences of James W. Wadsworth," 234-236.

[73] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1917*, 27-32, and "Report of the Legislative Committee of the National Guard Association and Paper Delivered by Major General John F. O'Ryan, National Guard of the State of New York" (Dec. 1915), copy in RG 168/12a/080. - Meeting, 1915.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guard; they wanted the Guard organized in peacetime as the first line reserve of the Army; and they wanted some control over their own destiny by having one of their own in charge of the Militia Bureau. However, O'Ryan's presentation was weakened by his lack of preparation. His ideas were well received, but he offered no financial estimates or concrete legislation that Congress could seize upon as a substitute for the Baker-March bill.

That the War Department bill was in serious trouble became abundantly clear three days after General O'Ryan's testimony when the ranking minority member of the committee, Senator George Chamberlain of Oregon, released a blistering criticism of the Baker-March bill. Section by section, Chamberlain laid down his objections to the bill, which, in summary would:

> ... empower the chief of an all-powerful general staff corps ... to do whatever each successive chief of staff may from time to time desire to do with regard to the "duties, powers, functions, records, property, and personnel" of all military bureaus and offices of the War Department; also with regard to almost the entire organization of, and all the funds available for the support of, a Regular Army composed of more than 500,000 enlisted men and many thousands of officers. All previous legislation by Congress with respect to the "duties, powers and functions" of officers of the various staff corps and departments and of the line of the Army is to be repealed expressly or by implication. Nearly all of the control heretofore exercised by Congress over the Army is to be transferred, theoretically, to the President, but practically to the Chief of Staff. However, Congress is still to be permitted to foot the bills.[74]

Chamberlain (who as chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee in 1917-1918 had been highly critical of Baker and Wilson's conduct of the war) hinted that

---

[74] *Army Reorganization Bill: Analytical and Explanatory Statement*, Senate Committee Print, 66th Congress, 1st Session, Sept. 5, 1919, 3

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

impeachment might be in order for Baker for defying restrictions Congress had placed on the General Staff. The *New York Times*, which carried the story on its front page, quoted sources which called the report "probably the most scathing indictment of the War Department, as now administered, ever made."[75] With regards to the status of the National Guard, Chamberlain's report had nothing to say, since the Guard was not specifically addressed in the War Department bill. But Chamberlain's proposed solution to repairing the proposed War Department legislation – prepare an entirely new bill – clearly must have been encouraging to Guardsmen.

NGAUS Attacks

NGAUS had also been busy skewering the Baker-March bill. In an analysis distributed to its membership in August, the association labeled the bill "A bill to advance in grade all officers of the Regular Army" because of the huge increase in the size of the Army and the manner in which Regular officers would be given preference in all promotions. This included the Militia Bureau; after detailing the number and types of officers and men on the large bureau staff the analysis notes: "[t]he man who wrote this has a sense of humor; for their would be more men in the Militia Bureau than there would be in the Militia, if this act becomes law." The paper also ridiculed the plan to hire civilian teachers to train the men: "why they need civilian teachers with this large number of officers who will have nothing else to do in time of peace, is something which is not stated. It is apparent that this is a sop to the Secretary of War's idea that the army is to be

[75] "Senator Declares Army Bill Sets Up Staff Despotism," *NYT*, Sept. 14, 1919, 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a University. It would be much cheaper to maintain Universities than it would be to maintain such an army as this."[76]

Furthermore, NGAUS attacked the notion that the Baker-March bill would leave the Guard unaffected:

> The Secretary of War in transmitting the bill said that the bill made no reference to the National Guard. This is true. The idea of the bill is to do away with the National Guard; for it takes a young man at the time when he would be considering enlisting in the National Guard, gives him three months training, and then provides that he shall not be liable for further training or service in time of peace without his consent. ... The idea being to convey to him that, after three months, he is fully trained and need never serve again during his life, except in case of war. If it is true that he needs no further training, he would be foolish to enlist in the National Guard.[77]

This served as a precursor to similar arguments that would be made by Guardsmen later that fall and winter. If UMT failed to act as a conduit of recruits for the Guard, it would serve to cut off the supply of young men who might otherwise join their local Guard company, and kill off the state soldiery in the process.

Up through October, the only Guardsman other than General O'Ryan called to testify before either the House or the Senate committee was Brig. Gen. Roy Hoffman of Oklahoma. Hoffman had commanded the 1st Oklahoma Infantry, but lost his command when the regiment was consolidated with others in 1917. Unlike most Guard officers who faced these circumstances, Hoffman was promoted and assigned other duties, including organizing and training the 93rd Division. Hoffman's testimony was brief and

---

[76] NGAUS Organization Committee, "Analysis of the Wadsworth Kahn Bill, generally referred to as the Baker Bill" n.d., RG 168/12a/080. - States.

[77] Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

unremarkable. Echoing a theme common among officers who saw service in the AEF, regardless of whether they were Guard, Regular or Reserve, he lamented the loss of morale when units that had been raised from a single locale were broken up, and called for any future Army to be organized from units that were drawn from a single locality. He favored increasing the efficiency of the Guard by doubling training to one month a year, and (making a point that many Guardsmen would repeat) giving Guard officers access to Regular schools.[78] In general, he favored increased federal control of the Guard – "I think it should be taken over, practically absolutely, by the Federal Government." While he personally favored UMT, General Hoffman stated he did not think the country was ready for it – rather the best solution might be to make a system of military education voluntary.[79]

While UMT as presented in the Baker-March bill had been discredited by several individuals appearing before both the House and Senate committees, the concept of requiring military training for all young men still had strong advocates on both committees. These men lent their support to the version of UMT espoused in the Chamberlain-Kahn UMT bill, which had been developed by the Military Training Camps Association (MTCA). In many ways, the Chamberlain-Kahn UMT bill was more dangerous to the continued survival of the National Guard as a first-line federal reserve

---

[78] Senator Wadsworth was already familiar with the desires of Guardsmen for greater access to Army schools. This from his 1916 correspondence with the commander of M Troop, 1st New York Cavalry (from Avon, near Wadsworth's home town), at that time serving on the Mexican border: "The N.G. will always fail to be a real military organization until their officers can be supplied from a Natioanal [*sic*] School which has bred in them a spirit of seperating [*sic*] the personal from the official." Capt. N. C. Shiverick to Wadsworth, Aug. 1, 1916 in *Wadsworth Papers*, Box 18/File Military (Troop M) Aug 1-24 1916.

[79] *Senate Hearings*, 799-811.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

than the Baker-March bill. Whereas Baker-March did not propose changing Guard's legal status from what it was in 1916, Chamberlain-Kahn would amend the National Defense Act "so as to provide that the National Guard can not be called forth by Federal authority except as provided by the Constitution ...." – in other words, only for limited service within the boundaries of the United States. In addition, Chamberlain-Kahn would severely reduce the size of the Guard by limiting federal support to only 250 men per member of Congress, as compared to the basis of 800 men per member of Congress established in the National Defense Act of 1916. Tompkins McIlvaine, the Chairman of the MTCA Executive Committee, further opined that both General O'Ryan's plan to organize the National Guard as a federal force, and what he characterized as NGAUS' plan "to organize the militia under the militia powers of the Constitution as a Federal force" were unconstitutional. Either plan would interfere with the state's right to maintain a militia, and would therefore be illegal.[80]

Because of the specific formulation of the Chamberlain-Kahn UMT bill, and the clear threat it presented to the Guard's continued federal role, NGAUS found itself in the uncomfortable position of favoring UMT, but opposing the specific forms of UMT proposed in both the Baker-March and Chamberlain-Kahn bills. In the criticisms it leveled at the latter bill, it is evident how far Guardsmen had come in rejecting the confines of militia service erected by the authors of the Constitution, restrictions which were designed to protect the states from federal overreach. Chamberlain-Kahn, NGAUS argued, would turn the National Guard into a "home guard" and domestic police force,

[80] *Senate Hearings,* 834-837; *House Hearings* 1396-1397.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and such a status "puts a stigma on the National Guard and makes it a force in which no red-blooded man would care to serve." Additionally, the UMT Bill would remove 650,000 young men from the work force for six to nine months every year, and by NGAUS estimate cost an additional $1.5 – 2 billion above the already enlarged Army budget. It would create "a system of military dictatorship on the same lines as the Prussian system, and give similar powers to the General Staff," thus earning the bill the epithet "swan song of the General Staff."[81]

Palmer and Pershing Testify

Ultimately, after several months of testimony and scores of witnesses, a growing sense of frustration with the Baker-March bill became evident in both the House and Senate committees. While there is evidence in some of the testimony of a reticence to criticize the Chief of Staff's bill, more than enough individuals attacked the specifics of it to confirm the growing suspicions that the proposed legislation was no good.[82] By early October, the members of the Senate subcommittee had come to the realization that they would be better off writing a bill of their own rather than amending the War Department bill. But before proceeding, there was still at least one key individual who was yet to be

---

[81] "Guard Plans Fight on Service Bill," *NYT*, Aug. 8, 1919; NGAUS Organization Committee, "Analysis of the Chamberlain Kahn Bill" (Aug. 13,1919). RG 168/12a/080. - States.

[82] Holley, 431, cites the reticence of Generals Rogers and Ireland as examples of an unwillingness to speak against the War Department bill; Senator Wadsworth also recalls in his "Reminiscences" (p. 307) how high-ranking officers were reluctant to oppose March. However, this reticence was by no means universal. See the testimony of Maj. Gen. Edwin Glenn and Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood for just two examples of officers who criticized many aspects of the Baker-March bill, in particular the large proposed Regular Army, in *Senate Hearings,* 575-597, 619-668. Wood's testimony is particularly interesting in that the former Chief of Staff independently advocated a National Guard organized along lines very similar to those outlined by General O'Ryan.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

heard from – General Pershing, who was scheduled to appear before a special joint House-Senate session of the Committees on Military Affairs at the end of the month. It is a measure of the high esteem that Congress – indeed, the country – had for Pershing that he was the only individual that would be given this special treatment.

Prior to Pershing's testimony, however, Col. John McAuley Palmer would be among those invited to testify before the Senate Military Affairs Committee. Palmer, as the Chief of the War Plans Division of the General Staff, was a logical choice to call as a witness given the broad net which the Senate committee was casting for military wisdom. But he was not asked to speak because of his position on the General Staff. Senator Wadsworth, the chairman of the committee, had been tipped off by a number of officers that Palmer had studied the issues intently and would not be afraid to speak his mind.[83] Palmer did not disappoint; when summoned before the committee on October 9, he rather dramatically recalled the scene:

> After several weeks hearings, no witness from the War Department had spoken against the bill though I knew that many of them considered it thoroughly unsound. When I was finally summoned before the committee, I decided I would tell them exactly what I thought if they asked for my opinion. When I appeared before the Committee and Wadsworth asked me my opinion of the War Department bill, I burnt my bridges behind me and said:
>
> "In my opinion it proposes incomplete preparedness at excessive cost and under forms that are inconsistent with the genius of American institutions."
>
> The members of the committee were more or less weary after several weeks of hearings but that, coming from a member of the War Department general staff, woke them up. When they recovered their surprise, they asked me what kind of a military system I did believe in.[84]

---

[83] James Wadsworth, in the introduction to John M. Palmer, *Statesmanship or War*, xiii-xv.

[84] John M. Palmer, "Inner History of the National Defense Act of 1920," 1. *Palmer Papers*, Box 3, May-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Palmer advocated a citizen army, which, unlike the large professional armies of Europe (which admittedly were efficient, but at great cost and considerable risk of militarism) gave "full opportunity for competent citizen soldiers to rise by successive steps to any rank for which they can definitely qualify." Such armies had three main advantages over their standing army counterparts: 1) military leadership was not concentrated in a professional, militaristic officer class, but spread among the populace; 2) the war army is identical to the citizen army as it is organized in peacetime, creating less confusion at war's outset and also allowing for a smaller (and cheaper) Regular establishment, and; 3) the population as a whole will be better-versed in issues of military affairs.[85]

The core of the new and entirely-federal citizen army would be veterans of the World War. They would be augmented by UMT and organized along territorial lines into divisions, corps and armies. Upon reaching the age of nineteen, every adult male would receive six months of UMT, after which he would be assigned to a local unit of the citizen army for five years. During two of those five years every trainee would be liable to serve an additional two weeks of field training. There would be no requirement to attend armory drills, because the fundamentals of soldiering would have already been taught during the initial six months' training. Those who aspired to be officers or NCOs

---

Dec 1919 file. Palmer's published account of his role is in Chapter XVIII of *America in Arms* and does not differ materially from the "Inner History." Palmer's actual words are slightly different, and follow a lengthy discourse on the various types of armies, so they probably lacked some of the shock value he claimed they produced. See *Senate Hearings*, 1177. Holley discusses Palmer's testimony in depth, see 430-449.

[85] *Senate Hearings,* 1176.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

would be subject to longer periods of training (possibly to include armory drills), and attend all annual mobilizations, with promotion open to those who could pass both written and practical exams for the next higher rank.[86]

The Guard, in Palmer's opinion, would gladly join a citizen army under federal control, and prefer it over the old system. In fact, the National Guard soldiers of his wartime command had told him "If we are to go back to a vague reserve status like our present reserve corps or National Guard duty, we are through." Like General O'Ryan before him, Palmer praised the Guard but noted that it had accomplished all it had while operating "under an immense handicap. You cannot organize an effective army – it is impossible to organize an efficient army – for war purposes under the militia clauses of our Constitution."[87]

As for how the state's would handle the necessity of suppressing civil disorder without a National Guard, Palmer advocated what many Guardsmen had been advocating since the 1870s – that each state establish its own constabulary force instead of relying on the Guard. "Soldiers are the most expensive and most inefficient policemen." In addition, strike and riot duty were notoriously unpopular with Guardsmen and distracted them from training as a combat force. Palmer believed he had the support of Guardsmen on this issue, noting that all of the Guardsmen he had spoken to had specifically objected to General O'Ryan's scheme which would have allowed governors to call upon a

---

[86] *Senate Hearings,* 1180-1183, 1193; *House Hearings,* 1202-1203.

[87] *Senate Hearings,* 1184.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

federalized National Guard whenever they desired.[88] States would be allowed to maintain a militia if they so chose, but without the support of the federal government.

The cost of such a system would be perhaps half of the $900,000,000 per year that the Baker-March bill would require, and the focus of the Regular establishment would shift from manning skeleton formations to training and maintaining the citizen army. Aside from a large cadre of instructors for the UMT courses, three or four Regulars would be detailed to each unit in the citizen army for administrative and supply purposes (but not command, which was reserved for citizen officers) so that all the paperwork and equipment necessary for mobilization could be kept in order. Even adding in necessary overseas garrisons, a small mobile force for minor emergencies, coastal defense forces, and the War Department staff, Palmer believed the Regular force could be kept under 280,000 men and 21,000 officers – with this number diminishing over time as soldiers of the citizen army gradually became available to fill some openings formerly filled by Regulars.[89]

Palmer also was a firm believer in giving citizen soldiers a voice in the running of the army by integrating them into the General Staff – not as a separate bureau or agency, but as an essential part of the whole. Perhaps naively, he declared "I have always believed that if I could have a couple of officers like General O'Ryan, and a couple of officers of my own branch, and a couple of National Army officers to work together on the question of the proper military policy for the United States, we would get together

---

[88] Ibid., 1185, 1195.

[89] Ibid., 1186-1188.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

within a week and come to a unanimous agreement as to what it ought to be."[90]

After Palmer concluded his second and final day of testimony, Senator Wadsworth pulled him aside into his private office.

> "Colonel Palmer, a very remarkable thing has happened. Night before last this committee met at my house and decided to throw that War Department Bill into the waste paper basket and to write its own bill." Then taking up a sheet of legal cap paper with a few paragraphs written on it in pencil, he continued. "That same night we drew up this outline of what we considered the principal features of a sound American System. But none of us had the technical knowledge to work out its details and, from the hearings up to that time we could not expect much assistance from the War Department. And now to our amazement, you have been giving us all the details of our own military system for two afternoons. I have just been instructed by the unanimous vote of the committee to request the Secretary of War to detail you as our military advisor and assistant."[91]

Despite General March's opposition, Secretary Baker agreed to this request, assigning Palmer and Lt. Col. John Gulick to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs – though he made it clear (as if there could be any doubt) that these two men did not represent the official voice of the General Staff. Palmer viewed this pronouncement as freeing him from any lingering sense of obligation that he might have had to mold his advice to conform with the requests that came out of the General Staff.[92] He had shown considerable moral fortitude in expressing publicly opinions that directly contravened

---

[90] Ibid., 1197.

[91] Palmer, "Inner History of the National Defense Act of 1920," 2-3.

[92] Baker to Wadsworth, Oct. 27, 1919; Baker to Palmer and Gulick, Oct. 27, 1919 in *Palmer Papers*, Box 3, file April 1-Dec 31 1919. See also Wadsworth's account in Palmer's *Statesmanship or War*, xv-xvi, and Palmer "Inner History," 3-4. Col. Thomas Hammond and Col. Thomas Spaulding were detailed by the War Department to assist the House Committee on Military Affairs, but according to Palmer they were there as official representatives of the War Department, and thus limited in their ability to replicate in the House bill the features of the Citizen Army written into the Senate bill. See Palmer, *America in Arms*, 178.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

those of his boss, the Chief of Staff of the Army. He had anticipated that his career might suffer as a result, and references he made to being re-assigned to the on-going American expeditionary force in Siberia were only half-joking. The actions of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs saved him from potentially having to choose between such an exile and early retirement, and even though General March was angered by Palmer's testimony, the colonel's career did not suffer.[93] By being forthright in his views, Palmer was given the chance to fulfill a lifetime's goal – to shape the very defense policy of the United States into a rational system that reaffirmed America's reliance on the citizen soldier.

Palmer's subsequent appearance before the House Committee on Military Affairs on October 15, 1919 resulted in a similarly persuasive performance, but little new information. The members of the House, however, did show considerable concern for the continued success of the National Guard as it would exist under Palmer's plan, and questioned Colonel Palmer much more closely than members of the Senate had on a variety of details. Representative Thomas Crago (R-PA) – whom Chairman Kahn referred to as "Colonel Crago," in deference to his service in the Guard – wondered how Palmer's plan could engender the same kind of local pride that the National Guard had managed to achieve. Noting that "in a democracy you sometimes have to yield a great deal of efficiency at times in order to keep the thing democratized," Representative Crago went on to ask:

---

[93] Palmer "Inner History," 2; Holley, 445-449. There is no evidence that Baker or March punished any officer for expressing his views to Congress. Palmer retired in 1926 as a brigadier general, having enjoyed the support and patronage of General Pershing during the latter's years as Chief of Staff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

> I am wondering whether you have anything in your plan that would make [the federalized National Guard's] appeal to the people of the different localities as strong as the appeal which the State authorities can use to reach them. They are nearer to the people, and the people themselves are not afraid of a State force which they consider a State force, and they are somewhat afraid of a national or Federal force.[94]

Crago also feared that a federalized Guard would lose the "spirit of rivalry" between Guard units from different states and asked Palmer "are we not losing something by entirely eliminating the participation of the State in this organization?" Palmer did not believe so, citing again the eagerness of his former Guard troops to join the proposed federal reserve, and adding that he believed "It would be a proper part of the plan to delegate certain things to the local authorities, which you could do under the constitutional power to raise armies." Such decisions might include the locations of units allotted to a state, and which designations from the old National Guard or National Army a state might choose to perpetuate in these new citizen army units.[95]

Representative John McKenzie (R-IL) questioned whether the American people were ready for compulsory service in time of peace – in truth, it was the central question of the entire debate. While he thought it possible that Americans might accept universal *training* for six months, he questioned whether they would accept organizing these men into units in peacetime and subjecting them to periodic two week mobilizations, which

---

[94] *House Hearings,* 1195-1196.

[95] Ibid., 1197.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

McKenzie feared would be viewed as compulsory *service.*[96]

Representative Thomas Harrison (D-VA) questioned what impact Palmer's plan would have on the states, in severely limiting their ability to enforce their laws, and providing no federal assistance to greatly weakened state troops. Without giving Palmer a chance to answer that question, Harrison asked if it was not true that under Palmer's plan there would be at least 3,000,000 men under arms every year, clearly implying that such a figure would be extravagant. After Palmer explained that less than half that number would be under arms at any one time, Harrison followed with a rhetorical question, asking if Palmer's citizen army wasn't really a "paper organization" ... "with no meetings for drill purposes except for the two weeks that they are called out?" Palmer agreed with this characterization, but added "It is more like this, sir. It is an army that can mobilize extremely quickly, but it is actually alive for only two weeks each year."[97]

Harrison, who seemed determined to find flaws in the plan, followed with a host of other points that he wanted Palmer to address. In particular, he wanted Palmer to discuss the economic impact of removing 600,000 to 700,000 young men from the workforce every year for six months of training in military camps. Palmer, like every advocate of UMT, argued that the educational benefits of UMT (which would include literacy training and citizenship instruction for new immigrants) would far outweigh the loss of labor to the economy for six months.[98] Throughout the hearing, Palmer's tone

---

[96] Ibid., 1202.

[97] Ibid., 2106-1212.

[98] Ibid., 1212-1213.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

remained cheerful, polite and informative, and it was clear that many – though not all – committee members were impressed with his views.

General Pershing, meanwhile, had spent considerable time preparing himself for his upcoming testimony, interviewing a number of senior officers in order to assimilate their views before arriving at his own.[99] Pershing indicated through his questions that his primary desire was to perpetuate the superb Guard units which had fought so well for him in France - "It seems to me that we have a very good asset there through the tradition of the National Guard, before and after the war, state traditions and now national. We have a pride of achievement and with all that which ties them together and which forms the basis of esprit in military organizations."[100] The advice Pershing received varied as to the extent to which federal control could be expanded beyond that already present in the National Defense Act of 1916, but generally fell along the lines General O'Ryan had laid out in his testimony – organize the Guard under federal control, but empower the governors of the states to use the Guard under limited circumstances during peacetime.

By and large, Colonel Palmer's ideas for reorganizing the Army received a powerful endorsement when General Pershing appeared before the joint session of the House and Senate Military Affairs Committees on the last day of October 1919. Over the

---

[99] Pershing spent Oct. 21 – 30 interviewing senior officer in final preparation for his testimony; he had earlier spent nearly every evening for three weeks working on his presentation. See diary, *Pershing Papers*, Box 4. Transcripts of the interviews are contained in RG 200/25/ "Army Reorganization – Interviews." Of particular note regarding the disposition of the Guard are Pershing's interviews with Tompkins McIlvaine of the Military Training Camps Association, Maj. Gen. Jessie Carter of the Militia Bureau, Maj. Gen. O'Ryan, Cols. Palmer, Metts, and Riley [*sic* – this is Col. Henry Reilly], and Lt. Col. Finzer. General March, though interviewed by Pershing, did not discuss plans for the Guard.

[100] Ibid., McIlvaine interview.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

course of three days, the victorious commander of the AEF hammered the final nails in the coffin of the Baker-March bill, thereby ensuring that both committees would proceed with drawing up defense legislation of their own that would feature a strong citizen army at its core.[101] Palmer was delighted to find that Pershing also favored every major reform that Palmer had advocated, to include endorsing a federalized National Guard fed by graduates of six months of UMT, organized along territorial lines into divisions, corps and armies. Pershing gave nothing but praise for the Guardsmen who fought under him in France, and had considerable sympathy for Guard complaints over the treatment they had received at the hands of the Regulars – as the quote at the beginning of this chapter shows. The AEF commander did allow for a greater degree of flexibility in his recommendations concerning the Guard than Palmer had – he saw no problems in General O'Ryan's recommendation that governors could be allowed to call upon federally organized reserve troops to suppress insurrections in their states. He also allowed, when pressed, that even under the existing National Defense Act the National Guard "could be trained to a much higher degree of efficiency than was done before the war ... [i]f the sympathy and unreserved assistance of the Regular Army should be invoked." Nevertheless, "While all that is true, yet you will always have, under the best sort of management, and even the most earnest support of the Regular Army, 48 different units to deal with."[102]

---

[101] *The National Defense*, 363-498. See in particular 437-452.

[102] Ibid., 445.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Guard Testifies

Aside from Generals O'Ryan and Hoffman, most of the Guardsmen to testify before congressional committees did so during the last two months of 1919, at a time when both committees were busy drafting bills of their own for introduction into the session of Congress that would convene in the new year. The delay in listening to a significant number of Guardsmen was due in large part to the desire to have Guard voices weigh in on the proposed legislation of NGAUS, which was not submitted before Congress until mid-November.[103] Those individuals who represented the National Guard before Congress expressed a variety of opinions over the key issues of Guard organization and the role UMT should have in the Army. In the Senate at least, this was partly by design, as Colonel Palmer arranged to have several "progressive" Guard officers testify in an effort "to establish the fact that the official National Guard [Association] program does not represent the National Guard point of view."[104]

Col. Henry Reilly, of the Illinois National Guard, may have been asked to testify because of his extensive experience in both the Regular Army and the National Guard. He had graduated from West Point and spent ten years in the Regulars before joining the

---

[103] The NGAUS legislation came before Congress as S. 3424, introduced Nov. 13, 1919 by Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen (R-NJ), a member of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and as H.R. 10583, introduced Nov. 15, 1919 by Rep. Harry Hull (R-IA), member of the House Committee on Military Affairs; see *Congressional Record*, Vol. CVIII, Part 8, 8412, 8614. Senator William Calder (R-NY) also presented legislation (S. 3412, introduced Nov. 10, 1919) that was extremely favorable to the Guard in a number of aspects, but had the curious feature of having the President appoint all state adjutants general. Not surprisingly, both the Militia Bureau and NGAUS found aspects of Calder's legislation objectionable, and it died in committee with barely a mention. A copy of the Calder bill and related Militia Bureau commentary can be found in RG 168/12a/011.6

[104] Holley, 458.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guard in 1915. During the war he commanded a Guard field artillery regiment and an infantry brigade, but (like John McAuley Palmer) was denied promotion to brigadier general once the war ended and all promotions were frozen. In his brief appearance before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on October 28, 1919, Reilly observed that both Guardsmen and Regulars had erred in their own way. Regulars, he noted, correctly held that duty was paramount, but still seemed to act is if the only method to achieve discipline was by threat of punishment. Officers of the National Guard and National Army understood "the necessity to treat human beings as human beings ... but the idea that duty must be performed is not understood." Reilly also believed that universal military service of a year's duration should be the foundation of any future military establishment – something so far outside the realm of consideration or political possibility that the colonel's testimony was probably discounted by his listeners from the moment he made this statement. He was also the last man to testify before the Senate subcommittee prior to General Pershing, which probably further reduced the impact of any suggestions he made.[105]

Also speaking for the Guard was Brig. Gen. John Sherburne of Massachusetts, former commander of the 101st Field Artillery – a Guard organization that could trace its lineage back to the very first militia regiments formed in the English colonies in 1636. Appearing before the Senate subcommittee on November 7, Sherburne reiterated one of Palmer's points in stating that the military system must be in tune with American political

[105] *Senate Hearings,* 1555-1570. Reilly would attain a position of great influence during the interwar period as the editor of *The Army and Navy Journal*, president of the Reserve Officers Association, and author of several books.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

sensibilities. However, in sharp contrast with Palmer, for Sherburne this meant maintaining a system which preserved states' rights:

> I am not in favor of the National Guard as it was, nor of the Regular Army as it was; but I think any system you build must not be a Swiss system nor a French system, but it must be built on American institutions. The army program attempted to bring a centralized military power into being, which, to my, perhaps, conservative, New England brain, is one of the greatest potential dangers that the institutions of the country have to face, because it is upsetting the checks and balances against usurpation of power. ...
>
> [A]ny system that you install ought to have the double check of being under the State, because when you once take away the military power from the States you take away the sign and symbol of the sovereign power of the States, and in that way upset more than you can possibly foresee now, the constitutional institutions of this country.[106]

Sherburne later backed off his statement somewhat to say that he would accept a National Guard organized under either the Militia clause or the Army clause of the Constitution. However, if Congress chose the latter, it should (following General O'Ryan's lead) make the National Guard a force "raised in the States, with a State obligation also, as an aid to the police power." Regardless of how Congress chose to organize the Guard, Sherburne believed they should abolish the office of Adjutant General, thereby removing a great source of friction between the Guard and the Regular Army. Governors should deal with their tactical troop commanders directly, avoiding adjutants general who were "too often political in their appointments and their viewpoints" and "had too high rank." He also found that UMT was completely unacceptable in peacetime, leading to an excessively large military, with little military

---

[106] *Senate Hearings,* 1780.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

justification and at great expense.[107]

The NGAUS Bill

NGAUS had spent the months since its St. Louis convention rallying its forces against both the Baker-March bill and the Chamberlain-Kahn UMT bill, while simultaneously preparing its own legislation for reforming the Guard. In addition, efforts were made to rebuild NGAUS and establish branches of the association within each state in order to harness the influence (and funds) of Guardsmen returning from the war. These branches appealed for funds with a wide variety of arguments tailored to their local audience and its particular fears or prejudices. The Massachusetts association spoke of the cost-effectiveness of the Guard compared to the Regulars and linked NGAUS' efforts to those of the local chapter of the American Legion, declaring the two organizations were unified in their desire to "prevent a military system of the regular army, for the regular army and by the regular army through the medium of the General Staff which has never been able to see beyond the professional soldier." The Kansas association tapped into the reservoir of wounded pride that so many returning Guardsmen harbored, and raised fears that the pending legislation would reduce the Guard to "home guard status, and such a result following on the heels of a great war will leave the impression that the record made by National Guard organizations in France was such that troops raised and trained that way were not good enough to warrant the continuation of the plan." The Texas Guard association sought funding for NGAUS' efforts by telling its members it

[107] Ibid., 1780-1785.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was needed to defeat "the pernicious and undemocratic legislation proposed by the General Staff" which would "compel every State in the Union to place a rifle in the hands of every nineteen year old negro boy in the United States" (emphasis in the original). General Carter, whose Militia Bureau was the target of many of the attacks in these circular letters, caustically acknowledged to a correspondent that "[w]e have received a great deal of propaganda of this and more virulent types. The collection in the Militia Bureau is growing and is very interesting."[108]

NGAUS' "propaganda" had included detailed analyses of both the Baker-March bill and the Chamberlain-Kahn UMT bill that were distributed to its membership, particularly the adjutants general.[109] These described the bills in laymen's terms, and were organized by subject (e.g., "Universal Training," "Expense," "Officer Reserve Corps," etc.) in order to provide easy talking points for the reader to use in any subsequent speech he might give. NGAUS' efforts contributed to thoroughly derailing the Baker-March bill by late September, and had helped to rally opponents against the Chamberlain-Kahn bill as well, though UMT's supporters, especially in the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, remained resolute. But the time had finally come in mid-November 1919 for NGAUS to present its own version of how the Guard should be organized. The experience of shifting from the attack to defense of their own proposal

---

[108] Circular letters of Massachusetts, Kansas, and Texas National Guard Associations; Carter quote in 1st endorsement to memorandum from Col. Alvarado Fuller to CMB, Sept. 22, 1919, Subject: Propaganda relative to National Guard. All documents in RG 168/12a/080. - States.

[109] NGAUS Organization Committee, "Analysis of the Chamberlain Kahn Bill" (Aug. 13,1919) and "Analysis of the Wadsworth Kahn Bill, generally referred to as the Baker Bill" (n.d.). RG 168/12a/080. – States.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

would prove unpleasant for many of the Guardsmen involved.

The NGAUS bill, officially "A bill to establish a national reserve force and to provide for the military and physical training and for the reorganization of the National Guard, and for other purposes" would leave the status of the National Guard largely unchanged under the National Defense Act of 1916, with the major exception that the Militia Bureau (which they re-christened the National Guard Bureau) would be staffed entirely by National Guard officers and responsible directly to the Secretary of War. Organizing the Bureau this way would cut the much-mistrusted General Staff out of the administration of the National Guard.

Additionally, a National Guard Council consisting of a senior officer from each state and presided over by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, would have wide-reaching authority to make "all necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this act and for the thorough organization, discipline and government of the National Guard" as well as prepare annual estimates of appropriations for the Guard. The National Guard Council would have the authority to recommend for appointment all the officers serving in the National Guard Bureau, up to and including the Chief. Should two-thirds of the council vote to do so, the chief could also be relieved for cause. The Guard Council would even have powers that extended to Guard units in federal service, it being the only authority that could grant the Army an exception to a proposed rule that Guard units in federal service would always retain their pre-war tactical integrity.[110]

---

[110] Text of the bill (S. 3424) published in *Senate Hearings*, 1803-1817. Note particularly sections 27-28 on the National Guard Council, Sections 29-30 on the National Guard Bureau, and Section 40 on Guard service outside the territorial United States.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The NGAUS bill tackled the issue of UMT by calling for mandatory school-based training augmented with summer camps. All boys between sixteen and eighteen who attended school would receive physical and military training while in school and attend a fifteen day summer camp each year, in accordance with a program established by the National Guard Council. The federal government would provide arms, ammunition and equipment for this training, pay for the students while they attended summer encampments, and pay for the Guard and Reserve officers who would serve as instructors. The chief advantage of this system would be that training would take place close to home and be run by neighbors; thus, the population at large – which a majority of senior Guard leaders judged as opposed to UMT as it was being discussed in Congress – would be more likely to accept it.[111]

In making their testimony before the Senate, it is clear that the NGAUS representatives had learned a lesson from the highly negative press coverage they had received following Bennett Clark's impolitic comments earlier that year at the St. Louis convention. Clark did not testify, probably in order to avoid being confronted over his previous comments. Those that did testify on NGAUS' behalf were critical of the manner in which the Guard was currently administered by the Regular Army, but they avoided being inflammatory. Even the *Army and Navy Journal*, the unofficial mouthpiece of the armed services and a strong critic of the NGAUS proposals, noted "an almost complete absence of the 'smash the Regular Army' spirit" which had previously been on display.[112]

---

[111] Ibid., Sections 44-51.

[112] "National Guard in Theory and Practice," *Army and Navy Journal* (hereafter *ANJ*), Dec. 13, 1919, 456.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The first individual to testify on the merits of the NGAUS bill was Maj. Gen. Francis Macon of North Carolina. Macon had been a delegate to the St. Louis convention the previous May, and could be expected to speak in favor of the bill. However, he – like some subsequent speakers from NGAUS – did not hesitate to oppose aspects of the proposed measure that met his personal disapproval. In Macon's case, the NGAUS bill's failure to prescribe military training for all young men (not just students in schools) was an error which he suggested could be amended by requiring all young men who did not attend schools to receive training in their local Guard unit.[113]

Macon, in his brief testimony, summarized several of the major arguments that the proponents of retaining the National Guard under the Militia clause of the Constitution would make. It is significant, insofar as he was the first individual (after three and a half months of testimony spanning 1800 pages of Senate transcripts) to unequivocally advocate maintaining the National Guard under the Militia clause of the Constitution. Macon stated that he believed that the federal government's constitutional authority to prescribe the system of discipline for the National Guard was great enough to ensure that the Guard could be made a "unified coordinate force beyond any criticism which may heretofore have existed of disunity by reason of separate State organizations." On the other hand, insisting on organizing the Guard as a federal force eliminated the states' motivation to contribute to national defense:

> Unless the National Guard is organized as proposed in this bill, there will be little if any inducement to the States to continue liberal

[113] Macon's criticism gains weight given the later comments by several Senators that only 6 or 8 percent of all boys attended High School; see *Senate Hearings*, 1846, 1950.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

> appropriations which they have customarily provided in the recent years; ... one of the strongest arguments against other proposals which have been submitted is that the method or system devised for the National Guard provides a more adequate system of defense, and at the same time is much more economical.
>
> In destroying the National Guard, you wipe out the traditions of nearly a century of troops that have been organized, and you destroy all the sentiment that exists and the support that these troops have had from their communities. It would lay waste millions of dollars of valuable property which has been donated by the States in support of their militia ... and it would leave open at any time, unprotected by any constitutional provision, the power of Congress to withdraw from the States their every privilege....[114]

While the members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee may have agreed with some of these arguments, they clearly did not agree with NGAUS' proposed solution. A National Guard Bureau and National Guard Council established completely independent of General Staff oversight, responsible solely to the Secretary of War, seemed to violate all rules of good military management. Supporters of the NGAUS bill who pointed out that they simply hoped to create a degree of independence from Regular Army control similar to that enjoyed by the Marine Corps in its relations with the Navy did not impress the members of the committee.[115] Senator Wadsworth, in addressing another supporter of the NGAUS bill, spoke for his committee when he said:

> I have tremendous sympathy in your desire for a reasonable degree of what might be termed military home rule, and it has been highly obnoxious to me the way the guard in many instances has been treated, but when it comes to planning for the national defense, where both the Regulars and the guard must be called upon to defend the country, how can you ever get away from the proposition that there must be but one

---

[114] Ibid., 1797.

[115] For example, see the comments of several Senators to the testimony of General William Moore, *Senate Hearings*, 1886, and General Harry Smith, *Senate Hearings*, 1957.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

planning board?[116]

The House Committee on Military Affairs gave its first consideration of the NGAUS bill on December 16, 1919, a month after the Senate first looked at the same legislation. Maj. Ammon Critchfield, who at the time was still on federal active duty (but had previously served as Adjutant General of Ohio for nine of his thirty six years in the Guard), was the first Guardsman called upon to present the highlights of the NGAUS bill, and he had a generally receptive audience.[117]

From the outset, it was clear that the members of the House were familiar with and sympathetic towards several of the issues Guardsmen had complained about. In the opening discussion, which focused on efforts to restore the National Guard in the states, the acting chairman of the committee, Representative Daniel Anthony of Kansas, informed Critchfield that the House committee was considering amendments to the 1916 National Defense Act which would allow a one year grace-period for newly organized Guard companies, after which the minimum required strength would be sixty-five men – a number which the War Department opposed as too few to adequately expand to the required 200 man war strength after mobilization. To further make the point where his sympathies lay (and with the Chief of the Militia Bureau in the audience, awaiting his turn to testify), Representative Anthony asked Maj. Critchfield a series of questions designed more to get a point across than to elicit new information:

---

[116] Ibid., testimony of Brig. Gen. William Moore, 1889.

[117] Critchfield, despite his relatively junior federal rank, had considerable influence because of his state office, and had made several appearances before Congress in the past. See also his earlier testimony before the Senate, *Senate Hearings* 1861-1880.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Mr. Anthony: What are the requirements fixed for a company of the National Guard before it is paid under the provision in the Army appropriation bill?
Maj. Critchfield: They say 100.
Mr. Anthony: They require 100 men in a National Guard company?
Maj. Critchfield: Yes.
Mr. Anthony: Are there not a great many companies in the Regular Army to-day which have much less than that number of men?
Maj. Critchfield: I do not think there is one in the Army which has that many.
Mr. Anthony: So they are setting a higher standard for the National Guard than they are maintaining in the Regular Army?
Maj. Critchfield: Yes, sir. That law was made for the Army, section 17 of the national-defense act. They do not try to comply with it; it is impossible for them to comply with it, but they exact 100 per cent compliance from us.[118]

Anthony made it clear, however, that the House Committee on Military Affairs was not interested in the NGAUS bill in its entirety, but just in "general recommendations in reference to the National Guard" that could become amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916. He revealed (no doubt to the delight of Guardsmen in the audience) that the House subcommittee drafting the reorganization legislation had not only tentatively agreed to reduce the required strength of Guard companies, but also to install a National Guard officer as Chief of the Militia Bureau, and was planning on allowing Guard officers to take short tours on active duty as a means of promoting greater understanding and coordination between Regulars and Guardsmen. Other members of the House committee (with the notable exception of Vermont Republican Frank Greene) seemed resolved to maintain the Guard as it was under the National Defense Act of 1916, a state force with a wartime federal mission. All that was required from Critchfield were

[118] *House Hearings*, 1868-1869.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

any additional measures that could address problems that had been overlooked. As Representative Crago remarked "if there are any amendments we can make to the national defense act that will encourage the building up of the National Guard in the various States as a national force to be used as a matter of national defense, that is what we are interested in …."[119]

Critchfield contributed the suggestion that the Army should require every Guard officer to attend a basic course of six or more months in his branch before granting federal recognition to that officer, but his attempts to advance the NGAUS proposal for a National Guard Council fell instantly flat. Representative Fiorello LaGuardia of New York shredded the proposal, declaring the council would become "a sort of annual convention" and comparing the provision allowing a two-thirds majority of the council to remove the Chief of the National Guard Bureau from office to similar provisions in the "Kerensky Army" – a reference to the soldiers committees, dominated by communists, which undermined the Russian Army during the 1917 provisional government of Alexander Kerensky. The moral – that an excess of democracy was anathema to any military institution and could lead to anarchy – was instantly clear to all. Critchfield – who was clearly flustered by LaGuardia's attacks – was told by a more sympathetic congressman that the controversial Council proposal would be passed over for the time being.[120]

---

[119] Ibid., 1871-1875.

[120] Ibid., 1876, 1880-1883. During the war, LaGuardia had left his seat in the House and accepted an officer's commission in the Air Service, serving as part of an American liaison mission to Italy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Both the Senate and the House committees asked Maj. Gen. Jessie Carter, the Chief of the Militia Bureau, to testify following the initial presentation of the NGAUS bill. General Carter had held the office of Chief since the fall of 1917, prior to which he had served as an inspector of Guard units mobilized on the Mexican border. His tour was interrupted by a six and a half month period during which he held command of the newly organized 11th Division of the Regular Army, but the war ended with the division still in the U.S. and Carter returned to the Bureau.[121]

Carter defended the position of the War Department when faced with a number of common Guard complaints, such as the regulations requiring a minimum of one hundred men per company, but he showed considerable sympathy for some Guard reforms by recommending that Guardsmen be detailed for service on the General Staff, and be paid for all the drills they attended (and not denied pay, as the law stated, if an insufficient number of their fellow soldiers reported for a particular drill).[122] The support of these two reforms by a Regular officer, especially the one so closely associated with the Guard, demonstrated a broader recognition in the Army of a need for change and probably helped a great deal in ensuring these reforms would be enacted. Carter also proved, surprisingly, an advocate for maintaining the Guard under the states as it was formulated in National Defense Act of 1916, a system which he described as "the best we can have as long as we depend upon voluntary enlistment." This might seem a somewhat half-hearted endorsement, since Carter was on record as favoring UMT, but unlike most Regulars,

---

[121] *Senate Hearings*, 1803-1834; *House Hearings* 1883-1897.

[122] *Senate Hearings*, 1820-1821, 1823, 1827.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Carter thought that UMT could be used to increase the size and efficiency of the Guard. This could be done by allowing the graduates to voluntarily enlist in the Guard for three years; the incentive for doing so would be the elimination of the five year obligation (under the Chamberlain-Kahn bill then under consideration) all UMT graduates incurred to serve in the federal reserve pool.[123]

On the other hand, when invited by Senator Wadsworth to comment on the NGAUS bill, Carter was scathing in his criticism:

> The 17 divisions of the National Guard which fought overseas in the recent World War are evidence of what has been accomplished by the supervision of Regular officers over a force which for 127 years of our history had proved nothing but a disappointment. ...
>
> The records of the Militia Bureau conclusively demonstrate the pernicious influence of individual States in this perfecting of a Federal military organization. ... My experience as Chief of the Militia Bureau has convinced me that one of the greatest obstacles to efficiency in the National Guard is the failure of States to appoint or elect properly qualified military men as adjutants general of the States. ...
>
> With respect to compulsory physical training in schools, your attention is invited to the fact that public schools are entirely under State control, and the Federal Government is without power to prescribe the curriculum .... The cost of the arrangement as outlined in the bill would be stupendous as compared to the military benefit to be derived from the training received.[124]

In defending his own position and bureau from Guard criticism, Carter noted that most of the complaints made by Guardsmen concerning their service in the war were made during a time in which the Militia Bureau had no control over the Guard – that is to

---

[123] *Senate Hearings*, 1886-1887; *House Hearings*, 1822. Carter continued to push for a system of federal UMT that would feed recruits into the Guard, lobbying Col. Palmer in early 1920 to consider a scheme which would lower the reserve commitment for UMT graduates who volunteered to join the Guard. See CMB to Palmer, Apr. 3, 1920 in RG 168/12a/011.6 (Proposed).

[124] Carter to Wadsworth, Dec. 11, 1919; RG 168/12a/011.6 – (Proposed). Carter's statement is also

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

say, after they had been drafted into federal service. He questioned whether a Guard Chief would have the best interests of the federal government at heart when adjudicating disputes between the Army and the states. Furthermore, he predicted that "[t]he establishment of a National Guard Bureau [i.e., one staffed entirely by Guardsmen] will not eradicate the faults complained of, nor prove a remedy for the regrettable individual instances brought to the attention of your committee during its hearings."[125] Several Senators would later echo this last concern, pointing out that the Militia Bureau served largely as a means of transmittal for policies and decisions made by the General Staff, and that changing the leadership of the Militia Bureau would do little to change the policies that Guardsmen had so often complained about. Instead, they voiced the belief that placing Guardsmen on the General Staff would be more effective, allowing Guardsmen to influence policy making at its source.[126]

Col. Ransom Gillett of New York followed General Carter with what, in retrospect, appears to have been the impossible task of defending the NGAUS bill before both the House and Senate Military Affairs Committees. Gillett's testimony, while it may not have been convincing, at least explained how the leadership of NGAUS got from the resolutions passed by the convention in May 1919 to the much-abused legislative proposal introduced in Congress in November. Gillett, who had commanded a battalion of the 106th Infantry during the war, was a lawyer by profession, state senator, and

---

reprinted in *House Hearings*, 1887-1888.

[125] *House Hearings*, 1888, 1896-1897.

[126] See, for example, *Senate Hearings*, 1858, 1890, 1918, 1932.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

President of the National Guard Association of New York state. He had been appointed by the NGAUS leadership to a committee which was assigned to prepare legislation embodying the desires of the association. The drafted legislation went through six revisions based on input from a host of officers, including Generals O'Ryan and Sherburne, and the entire membership of the Adjutant's General Association. As a result, the final legislation was, admittedly, a "rather crude, rather rough" compromise that failed to please anyone entirely.[127]

Gillett readily acknowledged that he personally favored compulsory UMT, but the adjutants general, by a narrow margin, had voted down such a provision because they believed it would be extremely unpopular with the public at large, and that a more limited, local version of UMT would stand a better chance at congressional passage. In a similar vein, senior Guard leadership had rejected a draft clause calling for Guard representation on the General Staff. They endorsed instead a clause calling for a National Guard Bureau advised by a National Guard Council responsible only to the Secretary of War, because they felt that Guardsmen assigned to the General Staff "would not be given sufficient consideration or sufficient attention paid to their recommendations, and they base that feeling on the course of treatment they have had from the Militia Bureau and from the General Staff itself."[128]

While Gillett's testimony appeared to persuade no one, (Representative John McKenzie of Illinois went so far as to append to Gillett's testimony a telegram from the

---

[127] *Senate Hearings,* 1835-1836; *House Hearings*, 1920-1926.

[128] *Senate Hearings*, 1835-1836, 1843, 1847.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Adjutant General of Illinois which emphatically rejected the concept of a National Guard Council) he and other Guardsmen – particularly several adjutants general – continued to speak out in support of the NGAUS proposals, to include the National Guard Council and UMT under local control and in the schools.[129] The adjutants general of South Carolina, Wisconsin, Indiana, Iowa, Georgia and Kansas all endorsed the concept of a National Guard Council, as did two lesser-ranking witnesses: Lt. Col. F. M. Maddox, an Alabama Guardsman serving on active duty at the Militia Bureau; and Col. John Fraine, commander of North Dakota's 164th Infantry during the war.[130] On the other hand, a significant number of Guardsmen expressed opposition to the council idea: Col. W.C. Fisk, the commander of New York's 107th Infantry during the war, backed the federalized militia plan of his former division commander, Maj. Gen. John O'Ryan (who had requested that the colonel speak before the House committee).[131] Col. Milton Reckord of Maryland, the regimental commander whom John McAuley Palmer thought so highly of, agreed with members of the Senate subcommittee that the Guard Council idea was "too radical." Indeed, Reckord – who, ironically, would become the heart and soul of the NGAUS lobbying effort during the interwar period – opposed the entire Guard

---

[129] *House Hearings*, 1938.

[130] Testimony of TAG, SC (William Moore), *Senate Hearings,* 1880-1893; TAG, WI (Orlando Holway), *Senate Hearings,* 1940-1951; TAG, IN (Harry Smith), *Senate Hearings,* 1952-1965; TAG, IA (Louis Lasher, submitted in writing) *Senate Hearings,* 1965-1967; TAG, GA (James Nash, submitted in writing), *Senate Hearings,* 1967-1972; TAG, KS (Charles Martin), *House Hearings*, 1903-1920; Lt. Col. F. M. Maddox, *Senate Hearings*, 1856-1860; Col. John Fraine, *Senate Hearings,* 2013-2020. Col. Fraine was asked to speak before the Senate subcommittee by his adjutant general, G. Angus Fraser - the same man who had so strongly backed NGAUS president Bennett Clark after he made his intemperate acceptance speech at the 1919 NGAUS convention.

[131] *House Hearings*, 1897-1903.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

association plan. His testimony hewed so closely to the plan outlined by John McAuley Palmer that it is logical to assume that he was one of the "progressive" Guard officers Palmer suggested should testify before the Senate subcommittee. The commanding general of Pennsylvania's 28th Division, Maj. Gen. William Price, opposed the council idea, as did General O'Ryan himself – who just happened to be listening in on the testimony of the American Legion's legislative committee on December 17, 1919, when the members of the Senate subcommittee asked him on the spur of the moment to submit his opinion on several of the legislative proposals that had been introduced since his previous testimony in early September.[132] If the officers of the 6th Minnesota Infantry are any measure of Guard opinion in the states towards the NGAUS bill, the notion of a Guard Council was not particularly popular there either. "In our judgment, such a plan could only be destructive in its effects and result in constant wrangling and ill feeling."[133]

The subject of UMT also drew widely varied responses from the Guardsmen who testified. Some, like Colonel Reckord, believed the people of his state would accept UMT, though he admitted he was prejudiced on the subject because of his own strong support for four to six months of training.[134] General Price believed there was widespread support for UMT, but personally wondered if the cost of implementing the program would be so great that it would cause "a great deal of discontent" among

---

[132] *Senate Hearings*, 1925-1940, 2044-2054.

[133] Memorandum, C.O., Sixth Regiment, MN Nat. Gd. to TAG, MN, Subj: Senate Bill 3424 relating to the National Guard, Jan. 29, 1920. RG 168/12a/011.6 - (Proposed).

[134] *Senate Hearings*, 1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

taxpayers.[135] Col. Fraine supported compulsory UMT, but believed the people would oppose a long training period conducted by Regulars far from home; he advocated four to six months of training spread over two summers, to be conducted locally by citizen officers.[136] The belief that citizen-soldiers were best suited to train a citizen army was widely expressed by Guardsmen, and would later receive the powerful endorsement of the American Legion during the hearings.[137]

Even those speaking on behalf of NGAUS occasionally expressed personal opinions at odds with what was outlined in the association's bill, reflecting the debate that had preceded the bill's drafting. In general, while no Guardsman (with the exception of General Sherburne) opposed UMT outright, many showed a pragmatic realism about what was politically possible that was missing in the statements of most of the Regulars who had testified. For the Guardsmen who supported the school-based UMT of the NGAUS bill, the chief attraction of the plan was that it had the best chance of being accepted by the public at large. Wisconsin's adjutant general, Brig. Gen. Orlando Holway, pointed out that the UMT issue divided the nation along class lines, and only stood a chance of gaining acceptance if introduced gradually:

> The employer in general, the man who appears prominently in public, is [in favor of UMT], but ... the farmer and the employed men are not, and they are in the majority. These other National Guard officers will confirm this. They have been working toward universal military training for 30 years, and in their opinion conditions are not ripe for this measure.

---

[135] Ibid., 1927-1928.

[136] Ibid., 2014.

[137] *House Hearings*, 1839; *Senate Hearings*, 2022.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

> ... We believe that only a very moderate amount of compulsory training is possible at the present time.[138]

Indiana's adjutant general backed up this point by stating that he believed that only "the better class of people" in his state favored UMT.[139] The NGAUS plan, by keeping universal training local and brief, would have the best chance of making it through Congress. General Martin of Kansas summarized the situation succinctly: "A majority of the people are opposed to universal training." However, Martin believed that Kansans "would probably look with favor upon the encouragement of training through the schools" and "would have less objection to [UMT] if the boys could be trained in their own locality and under officers that they know and have confidence in."[140]

Nevertheless, NGAUS' UMT proposal – like the provisions for a National Guard Council – was doomed. By the time these Guardsmen began testifying, both the House and Senate committees were contemplating federal UMT systems of their own. In addition, as General Carter had pointed out, the NGAUS proposal was handicapped by legal barriers to direct federal control over the curriculum in schools. The federal government could only influence the conduct of training in the schools indirectly, by disbursing funds to schools that conducted the training and withholding them from those that refused; it could not dictate a nationwide program. Furthermore, the small percentage of boys who actually completed high school severely hampered the

---

[138] *Senate Hearings*, 1948-1949.

[139] Brig. Gen. Harry Smith, *Senate Hearings*, 1963.

[140] *House Hearings*, 1918-1919.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

universality of the proposed training, though several speakers backed mandatory enrollment in local Guard units as a substitute for those who didn't complete school. In addition, NGAUS suffered a credibility gap when it came to UMT that hurt the proposal. Because the association was on record as opposing both the Baker-March and Chamberlain-Kahn bills with their UMT provisions, there was a widespread impression "that the National Guard Association is against universal military training."[141] Thus, the NGAUS UMT proposal could be readily ignored by UMT advocates as an inadequate proposal created by men who didn't really support UMT in the first place.

The influence of the Guard in the final formulation of the new National Defense Act would not ultimately be based on the legislative proposals crafted by NGAUS. But while Congress rejected the NGAUS bill out of hand, it still listened intently to what Guardsmen had to say. Guardsmen possessed immense political influence as paragons of American military virtue – citizen soldiers, recently returned victorious from a war with Europe's imperial regimes. On matters that effected the Guard first and foremost, Congress would heed the advice of Guardsmen over that of Regular officers. The Guard only needed to speak with some semblance of unity in order to get what it wanted.

---

[141] *Senate Hearings*, 1966. It is worth noting that on one of the few occasions NGAUS received coverage in the *New York Times*, the headline of the story read "Guardsmen Oppose Universal Service" (Aug. 6, 1919, 15). Though the *Times* did print General Berry's denial of that statement two days later, the denial was buried in the third paragraph of the story ("Guard Plans Fight on Service Bill, Aug. 8, 1919, 23). Perhaps not coincidentally, Julius Ochs Adler, the assistant publisher and editor of the *Times*, was a prominent member of the Military Training Camps Association (which had authored the Chamberlain-Kahn bill) and his paper consistently championed the cause of UMT. See Griffith, 56. The perception that NGAUS opposed all UMT remains prevalent even in scholarly articles on the subject; for example, Mooney and Layman, 650-651, ignore the NGAUS bill and its localized UMT and instead groups the association with "various pacifist groups" that opposed the Chamberlain-Kahn bill and, by extension, all UMT.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 4: The National Defense Act of 1920

> *A very determined effort has been made in Washington to misrepresent the National Guard and to secure the passage of such legislation as will wholly destroy the National Guard. ... The main thing we can do right now is to impress upon our Congressional delegations the necessity of maintaining the National Guard under the militia clause of the Constitution of the United States and make such amendments to the National Defense Act as will make it possible for the National Guard to progress as it should. (Brig. Gen. Charles Martin, May 20, 1920)* [1]

Despite General Martin's entreaty, unity of voice was lacking on the most fundamental question concerning the National Guard in the debates of 1919 and 1920. The issue of state versus federal control of the National Guard in peacetime was the sticking point. Ultimately, it boiled down to which clause of the Constitution the Guard should be organized under: the Militia clause (which gave the states control of the Guard) or the Army clause (which would give control to the federal government). Though Guardsmen remained divided over this fundamental question, this disagreement did not preclude the Guard as a whole from influencing the legislative process on a host of other issues effecting the Guard.

Guard sensibilities steered the support of the most influential military lobbying group of the postwar period, the American Legion, and forced Senator Wadsworth to significantly modify his legislation in hopes of securing the popular backing he knew he would need if he was to convince the nation to adopt UMT. As defense legislation made its way through both houses of Congress, the adjutants general, particularly Charles

[1] Charles Martin to W. A. Hazle (AG, SD), May 20, 1920. *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Martin, lobbied behind the scenes. The Wadsworth bill, much battered by the opponents of UMT in the Senate, still presented a threat to state control of the Guard when it finally reached conference committee with the competing Kahn bill in May 1920. It was here that Martin's influence proved most critical in maintaining the National Guard under state control. The resulting National Defense Act of 1920 was a triumph for the proponents of a National Guard organized under the Militia clause, and gave the Guard much greater influence in controlling its own destiny, without imposing new conditions for federal support upon the Guard.

Division of Opinion

In general, those Regular officers who testified before either the House or the Senate in the fall and winter of 1919-1920 fell into three camps. The majority of Regulars who expressed an opinion (General Wood, General Pershing and Colonel Palmer among them) advocated greater federal control over the Guard, and argued that this could only be done by organizing the Guard under the Army clause of the Constitution. However, some Regulars (General March, his official position to the contrary, among them) took the position that the Guard should remain organized under the Militia clause, but that the clause should be strictly interpreted to limit Guard service solely "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel invasions." To replace the Guard, a new federal reserve completely divorced of the states should be organized to take on the war-fighting mission outside the borders of the United States. Finally, a small handful of Regular officers (like the Chief of the Militia Bureau, General Carter) endorsed the Guard as organized under the National Defense Act of 1916, with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

both a state and a federal mission, though most of these officers saw the need for greater federal control and standardization – in particular the elimination of the influence of the adjutants general in Guard affairs.

Guardsmen generally split into two camps: those who favored continuing under the Militia clause; and those who sought organization under the Army clause. None who testified advocated, as General March seemed to desire, a purely domestic mission for the Guard. Having served with distinction overseas in the Great War, no Guardsman was prepared to negate the huge advances in military preparedness achieved with federal dollars since the passage of the Dick Act. This in itself was a remarkable testimony to the transformative effect that landmark piece of legislation had upon the culture of the National Guard in the seventeen years since 1903.

Guardsmen who advocated organization under the Army clause of the Constitution approached the issue from two different viewpoints. A minority would cut all ties with the states, eliminate the onerous burden of strike duty, and do away with the petty politics of advancement dominated by the adjutants general. Several Guardsmen testifying before Congress remarked that their men did not enlist to be strikebreakers, and would not be satisfied serving only their states.[2] While they were proud of their local heritage, they had signed-up primarily to be of service to their nation should the occasion arise. They agreed with John McAuley Palmer that increased military efficiency could only be achieved under federal control; despite superb service in the war, the inherent

---

[2] e.g., Milton Reckord in *Senate Hearings*, 1916; Abel Davis, *Senate Hearings*, 2036.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

decentralization of the National Guard had limited its uniformity and peacetime preparedness, thus slowing its mobilization.

Most Guard advocates of federalization, however, were not willing to completely sever ties with their states, and adhered to General O'Ryan's scheme of a federalized Guard with state responsibilities. By placing the federal government in charge, they sought to eliminate local political influence from the selection of officers, ensure complete uniformity in administration and standards across the various states, and allow direct command of all Guard units by the War Department in peacetime. By allowing governors continued use of the Guard during emergencies, supporters of O'Ryan's plan hoped to deflect the opposition of the states. Realistically, advocates saw that O'Ryan's plan was the only path to federalization that would not incur the near-unanimous dissent of the governors – and such dissent would surely defeat any federalization plan in Congress. O'Ryan's plan was popular with many, and seemed a suitable compromise so long as the details could be worked out and were deemed constitutional.

The senior leadership of the Guard, particularly the adjutants general, led the opposition to plans to federalize the Guard. These men, who without exception were of long and distinguished service, owed their preeminence in their states to their appointment by the governor, and as a group had the most to lose if the Guard were to be organized under the Army clause of the Constitution and their positions (presumably) eliminated. Many argued (as the Chief of the Militia Bureau had) that the National Defense Act of 1916 was a good law that had not been given a chance to take effect

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

before units had been mobilized consecutively for the Mexican border and the World War.[3] Great improvements in the efficiency of the Guard would be achieved not by federalizing it, but by allocating more funding for schools, training, and equipment, and by allowing Guardsmen to control – or at least participate in – the administration of the Guard. They warned against tinkering with the State/Federal balance established by the founding fathers and cautioned against removing the only effective police force in existence in many states. Furthermore, the not-insignificant financial contributions of the states would be lost under a completely federal system, as would popular support for local units.

Ultimately, it is impossible to determine how the entire membership of the National Guard felt about this issue in 1919-1920 – we only have the testimony of a limited number of officers to judge by. While most of those who testified wanted the Guard to remain organized as a state force in peacetime, enough Guardsmen expressed to Congress a desire for some degree of federalization that they could not be ignored. This is particularly true because they were led by the Guard's greatest hero of the war, Major General O'Ryan, and they expressed a viewpoint which, at least on the Senate side, had considerable support.[4]

The weight of testimony before Congress favored maintaining the Guard under the Militia clause and building on the existing legislative structure. In addition to every

---

[3] e.g., Charles Martin in *House Hearings*, 1905-1906; William Price, *Senate Hearings*, 1926.

[4] In addition to General O'Ryan, Col. Fisk of New York, Col. Davis of Illinois (*Senate Hearings*, 2030), and Col. Reckord of Maryland favored federalization, as apparently did General Hoffman of Oklahoma.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

one of the adjutants general who testified, at least six other Guard officers supported organization under the Militia clause of the Constitution.[5] Thus, it is difficult to sustain the conclusion of at least one scholar that "[i]t cannot be repeated too often that the National Guard wished principally to be Federalized."[6] Such a judgment could only be justified using the loosest definition of "federalized." While there was a consensus among Guardsmen that greater participation by Guardsmen in the administration of the Guard at the federal level was needed, and that greater federal funding for schools, training, and equipment would increase the efficiency of the Guard, there was by no means a consensus on the desire to cut ties with the states.

The American Legion Endorsement

Senator Wadsworth's Military Affairs Committee, while sympathetic towards many of the complaints leveled by Guardsmen, had found the early opposition of the senior Guard leadership to the Chamberlain-Kahn bill irritating. Wadsworth opined to Colonel Palmer that key leaders of the Guard were "fifty percent political and about ninety percent selfish" in their attitude.[7] Palmer stated his belief that they were not

---

[5] The AGs testifying were Moore (SC), Dickson (IL), Holway (WI), Smith (IN), Lasher (IA), Nash (GA) and Martin (KS). Other Guardsmen supporting them were General Price (PA), General Macon (NC), Col. Gillett (NY), Colonel Fraine (ND), Lt. Col. Maddox (AL), and Maj. Critchfield (OH); General Sherburne (MA) stated he could support organization of the Guard under either clause, but preferred the Militia clause; Col. Reilly (IL) did not directly address the question but appeared to assume continued organization under the Militia clause. Note also that the Chief of the Militia Bureau, General Carter, and his executive officer, Col. Heavey, were also proponents of retaining the National Defense Act of 1916 (and thus, organization of the Guard under the Militia clause).

[6] Lee, *The Politics of our Military National Defense*, 98.

[7] Holley, 453-454.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

representative of the Guard as a whole; he continued to believe that the average Guardsman would support his plan for a reorganized Guard under the Army clause with no strike duty or adjutants general to deal with. Palmer's perception had a solid basis in fact. The AGs were seen by many within the Guard as a dominant class which, though they had the loudest voice, was not necessarily representative of the Guard as a whole. As one regimental commander would write:

> From my experience with the National Guard before, during and since the war I am sure that it must be treated as being made up of two separate and entirely distinct classes of men, to-wit: Those who entered it because they have a liking for military service and a real desire to go to war when war comes, and those who are in it primarily for political or financial reasons, or both. The latter class includes probably all of the adjutants-general and their various staffs. These are the people who were primarily represented in all National Guard conventions. Nearly everything which has been said and nearly everything which has been written came from these men.[8]

Palmer, in addition to trying to get Guardsmen with these kinds of views to testify, had great hopes that the American Legion would adopt resolutions regarding national defense that more closely reflected his views than those of NGAUS.[9] The Legion, which represented in excess of a million dues-paying veterans of the war by the time its National Legislative Committee testified before Congress in December 1919, was the single-most influential interest group to weigh-in on these issues. It represented all veterans of the war, with no restrictions regarding gender, rank, or branch of service. Few – if any – groups in America could claim the respect that these newly-returned veterans

---

[8] Col. Henry Reilly to General Pershing, Oct. 30, 1919. *Pershing Papers*, Box 146. This is the same man who testified before the Senate a few days before Pershing.

[9] Holley, 455-460.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

commanded. Palmer believed they were more representative of the citizen army he hoped to create, and that they would not show the same partisan opposition to his proposed reforms that NGAUS, and the adjutants general as a group, had shown. Gaining the support of the Legion would be invaluable in the fight to persuade Congress and the nation that military reform – particularly UMT – was necessary.

Palmer himself was not able to travel to Minneapolis on the anniversary of the armistice for the American Legion's first convention, but he enlisted a trusted friend and wartime subordinate to ensure that the resolutions crafted by the Legion's Military Policy Committee reflected his goals and those of the Military Training Camps Association, the authors of the Chamberlain-Kahn UMT bill then under consideration in Congress. According to Palmer's biographer, I.B. Holley, this effort was a resounding success. Despite attempts by NGAUS President Bennett Clark and others to influence the outcome, Holley states that the committee "rejected the Guard planks in favor of a policy statement very much along the lines advocated by Palmer and his friends in the Military Training Camps Association."[10] The Legion also voted that a seven man committee be appointed to assist both the House and the Senate in formulating appropriate legislation that reflected the resolutions of the American Legion. It was the men on these committees who would testify before the House and Senate Military Affairs Committees and work behind the scenes with them to formulate the bills which would be introduced

[10] Ibid., 457. Maj. Gen. William Haan, the Director of the War Plans Division of the General Staff and wartime commander of the 32nd Division, attended the convention on behalf of the War Department. He confirmed that some of the more radical utterances attributed to Guardsmen, including opposition to UMT, were suppressed by the convention. See memorandum for General Churchill, Nov. 28, 1919, Subj: Letter of Nov. 21st from Col. Johnston, *Haan Papers*, Box 5, File "Nov-Dec 1919."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

by Senator Wadsworth and Representative Kahn in January, 1920.

While Palmer felt a sense of jubilation when he heard about how events had proceeded in Minneapolis, a closer examination of the Legion's ten resolutions shows little that the NGAUS leadership could not stomach, and indicates that perhaps Palmer achieved less of a clear-cut victory than Holley describes. From the opening statement: "That a large standing Army is uneconomic and un-American; national safety with freedom from militarism is best assured by a national citizen army ...." the resolutions displayed, as a historian of the Legion put it, a "thread of dislike and distrust of the Regular Army."[11] The second resolution favored a policy of UMT, but only if "the administration of such policy shall be removed from the complete control of any exclusively military organization or caste" – again, an invitation for the greater involvement of citizen soldiers and a clear attack against any training system dominated by Regulars. The Legion favored a citizen army that was "officered by men from its own ranks" (again, not Regulars) and administered by a General Staff that was composed of equal parts citizen-soldiers and equal parts Regulars – a policy few Guardsmen could have any objection to. They favored organizing all members of the citizen army into peacetime units that were geographically based, preserving existing Guard organizations as much as possible. Two points in particular seemed to indicate that the NGAUS leadership may have influenced the resolutions more than Colonel Palmer might have liked: the Legion (perhaps in a nod to the NGAUS UMT proposal) recommended the

[11] Jones, 86.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

encouragement of military training in high schools and colleges; and it insisted that the "selection and training of men for the national citizen army and navy should be under the local control and administration of its own officers, subject to general national regulations."[12] NGAUS, it appears, got far more support out of the Legion than Palmer did!

As testimony from the Guard leadership in November and December 1919 would demonstrate, Guard opposition to UMT extended only to the substance of the particular bills currently before Congress, not to the concept as a whole. Neither the Baker-March version of UMT nor the Chamberlain-Kahn version held any benefit for the Guard – in fact, Chamberlain-Kahn envisioned returning the Guard to a purely state role, while Baker-March implied as much. The concept of UMT, if properly implemented so that it did not exclude the Guard, was favored by nearly all Guardsmen. The resolutions passed by the American Legion were vague enough that they could encourage both the supporters of Colonel Palmer and the Chamberlain-Kahn UMT proposal, or of NGAUS and its school-centered UMT proposal. Because the Legion did not address the sensitive issue of state versus federal control of the "national citizen army," and because it furthermore endorsed a large degree of local control and training by citizen soldiers, the resolutions could be interpreted as endorsing a reserve force organized under the Militia clause of the Constitution. Truth be told, this probably would not have been the interpretation most Legionnaires would have offered had they been asked to consider it.

---

[12] "Resolutions Adopted at the Minneapolis Convention of the American Legion on the Future Military Policy of the United States" are reprinted in full in *Senate Hearings*, 1974, and *House Hearings*, 1837-1838.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

But that question was not put before the convention. Interpretation of the Legion's resolutions would rest in the hands of the Legion committee that testified before Congress and gave its assistance in writing the Senate bill. For Palmer this was unfortunate, as the Guardsmen who served on the Legion committee were suspicious of his proposed federal reserve and – not surprisingly – "seemed determined to continue the existing Guard as the major reserve component of the nation. Instead of having massive Legion support to offset the influence of National Guard Association and the adjutants general, Palmer now found he would have to fight hard to derive any sort of advantage from the Minneapolis endorsement."[13] In point of fact, however, the Legion endorsement which Palmer clung to as the potential savior of his Citizen Army proposal was never as clear and persuasive as he thought it was.

Two Guardsmen were among the six Legionnaires who appeared before the Senate subcommittee twice during December 1919. Col. Fredric Galbraith of Cincinnati, Ohio, had commanded the First Ohio Infantry – redesignated the 147th Infantry – throughout the war in France. Col. Milton Foreman of Chicago, Illinois had commanded the First Illinois Cavalry – which had been converted in 1917 to the 122nd Field Artillery – and led it throughout the war. Galbraith, in his initial statements, came out in favor of organizing the National Guard under the Army clause of the Constitution, but it was Foreman who was assigned by the chairman of the Legion committee to speak out regarding National Guard issues.[14] Foreman interpreted the Legion's guiding resolutions

---

[13] Holley, 459.

[14] *Senate Hearings*, 1975-1976, 2022. See also Jones, 88. Galbraith would be elected the second National

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

as keeping the Guard under the Militia clause:

> When the term "Federalized National Guard" is used, it is used in the sense as it was used under the national defense act, namely, a National Guard organized under regulations passed by the Congress, trained in accordance with the training laid down for the Regular Army, and in a measure maintained by the United States. That act attempted to extend Federal control over the National Guard as fully as it could.[15]

The rest of the committee followed Foreman's lead, and endorsed what was essentially a two-component reserve: the Guard; and a federal reserve fed by UMT. Though the Legion's endorsement of which constitutional clause the National Guard would be organized under appeared settled here, there was considerable confusion among members of the Legion committee even after Foreman made this statement. Foreman eventually explained that the question was as much a legal one as a military one, and that the Army clause would be acceptable as the basis for organizing the Guard only if units remained locally organized and the governors maintained the power to use the troops, i.e., the O'Ryan formula. This was the format that was eventually adopted in the Senate bill.[16] To allow some flexibility for individuals and to ensure that the Guard was not stripped of all its recruits, the Legionnaires also suggested that enlistment in the National Guard be allowed as an alternative means for completing the Universal Training requirement. That is, a man would be allowed to choose between his eighteenth and twentieth birthdays

---

Commander of the American Legion in 1920. Foreman would be elected Honorary Lifetime President of NGAUS in November 1926.

[15] *Senate Hearings*, 2023.

[16] Ibid., 2049-2050. Foreman – like Milton Reckord – would become a stalwart supporter of state control of the Guard during the interwar period, but here in 1920 it is clear that he was comfortable with organizing the Guard as a federal force – a view that later would be perceived as heresy by NGAUS.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

whether he wished to fulfill his military obligation in a single, four month period of federal training, or join his local Guard unit for three or four years and be subject to the equivalent training spread out over that time.[17]

By this point – mid-December 1919 – a majority of the members of the Senate Military Affairs Committee were convinced that the best future military policy for the United States would include UMT.[18] However, "[i]f I were making a guess about the sentiment of Congress" declared Senator Chamberlain, a very strong supporter of UMT, "I would say that that a universal military training bill would be defeated ...." For this reason, the Senators were willing to make a compromise on the mechanics of UMT if it would gain them the support of the American Legion, because the "American Legion can do more than any other single influence in this country to-day toward creating a sentiment for universal military training .... [I]f the American Legion were to take this up and speak of the benefits of it from all the various standpoints, I think no other agency in the country to-day would have the ear of the country as the returned soldier."[19]

The Wadsworth Bill

The compromises enacted to gain Legion support led to significant changes being made to the Wadsworth bill prior to its being reported out of the Senate Military Affairs

---

[17] Ibid., 2023-2026.

[18] When it came to a vote in January 1920, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs voted nine to five in favor of including UMT in the Wadsworth bill. All the negative votes came from the rural Southern and Western states, a regional pattern that would be repeated in later votes on UMT before the full Senate and House. See Mooney and Layman, 652; Dickinson, 364-373.

[19] *Senate Hearings*, 1983-1984.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

committee in January 1920. Whereas Colonel Palmer had been willing to make a few minor concessions, such as naming the new Citizen Army the "National Guard" in order to appease Guard supporters, the Senators readily agreed to make major changes in order to secure the support of the Legion and a significant number of Guardsmen as well. The weight of Galbraith and Foreman's opinions in shaping the legislation in the private, day-to-day sessions where the actual drafting took place was even greater than it appeared from the testimony in the public record; due to other commitments, only three members of the Legion committee were regularly available to aid the Senators in writing the bill, and the Guardsmen were two of the three.[20]

As a result, the Wadsworth bill proposed organizing the Guard along the lines suggested by General O'Ryan and the Legion committee. It would be a federal force, raised under the Army clause of the Constitution, but separate and distinct from the Organized Reserve. The Guard would remain a volunteer force organized in local units, drill weekly, attend summer encampments, and be subject to the call of the governor so long as it did not interfere with a federal call to active duty. At the federal level, it would be administered by a National Guard Division of the War Department, which would be headed by a Guard officer. The General Staff would consist of 50 percent Guard and Reserve officers. Those officers seeking a commission in the National Guard would have to hold a reserve commission, and be nominated by the governor of their state. Members of the Organized Reserve – graduates all of the four-month UMT camps – would only be

[20] Palmer discusses the National Guard features of the Wadsworth bill in detail in an untitled five page copy of a letter marked "Confidential" in *Palmer Papers*, Box 4 (Mar. 1920). There is no indication of who the letter was written to. See also Holley, 459; Jones, 88.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

subject to two mobilizations of two weeks duration each during their five years in the Organized Reserve. In lieu of undergoing this mandatory four months of training, a portion of each year's class of military trainees would be allowed to enlist for five years in the Guard. This would ensure that UMT – rather than killing off the Guard – would supply a surplus of willing recruits hoping to avoid a four-month disruption in their lives. By agreeing to this request by the American Legion, the Senate committee, in effect, proposed a two-tiered reserve system: the National Guard serving as the first-line reserve to the Regular Army, a ready force that could be called upon in emergencies short of all-out war; and the Organized Reserve, which could only be mobilized upon declaration of war.[21] This was significantly different from what Palmer had originally advocated – a single Citizen Army where every member was a graduate of UMT, and state controls had been completely severed.

The Wadsworth bill was heartily endorsed by Secretary Baker, General O'Ryan, the New York National Guard Association, the Military Training Camps Association, and many Guardsmen who saw their roles secured, even enhanced, in the new, federalized National Guard.[22] General Pershing, as he traveled on a tour of inspection across the country, addressed adoring crowds regarding the benefits of military training combined

---

[21] *Reorganization of the Army; Report [To accompany S. 3792]*, Senate Report No. 400, Part 1, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 1-8; See also Holley, 460-463; Dickinson, 363-364.

[22] *Reorganization of the Army: Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs on S. 3792, To Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the United States Army, and for other Purposes – Statement of Hon. Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War.* United States Senate, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 3-28; *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 5238 (April 7, 1920); Dickinson, 364. The Wadsworth bill was initially introduced January 9, 1920 as S. 3688, then reintroduced January 28 as S. 3792.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with vocational training, both for the good of the nation and the good of the individual.[23] The *Army and Navy Journal* endorsed the Wadsworth bill, even as it denounced the influence of "non-professional soldiers" in shaping military policy and noted how this influence was "evident on almost every page of the Wadsworth bill, as it stands, by the prominence given to the National Guard."[24] The members of the American Legion also endorsed the bill after holding a special conference of all state commanders in February 1920 to consider the legislation. This conference produced a number of proposed changes, which were presented to the Senate Military Affairs Committee on March 1 by another Legion committee consisting of seven officers, four of them Guardsmen. The changes requested were minor, but not surprisingly asked for more assurances that Guard units would be kept as intact as possible after mobilization, that states could determine the location and designation of units, and that Regular officers could not command Guard units without the consent of the governor.[25]

Despite the Senate committee's attempts to be all-inclusive, not every faction was pleased with the Wadsworth bill. General Carter of the Militia Bureau remained bitter

---

[23] Pershing's speeches from his 1919-1920 tour – virtually every one of which advocates establishing UMT – are contained in a bound volume labeled "Addresses of General Pershing Delivered while on a Trip of Inspection of Military Establishments," *Pershing Papers*, Box 342.

[24] "A National Military Policy," *ANJ*, Apr. 3, 1920.

[25] *Reorganization of the Army: Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs on S. 3792, To Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the United States Army, and for other Purposes – Testimony of the Military Policy Legislative Committee of the American Legion.* United States Senate, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 3-34. One of the Guardsmen on this committee was Col. William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, Medal of Honor recipient and commander of the 165th Infantry (old 69th New York) during the occupation of Germany after the war. Donovan, a lawyer by profession, would go on to found the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, the forerunner of today's CIA. Another of the Guardsmen, H.L. Opie, had served as a battalion commander under Palmer during the war.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that his written and oral advice to the Senate committee regarding his area of expertise seemed to have been uniformly ignored. He continued in his belief, rare as it was among officers of the Regular Army, that the Guard should continue to be organized under the National Defense Act of 1916 as a state force. He also objected to other aspects of Wadsworth's bill, particularly the removal of a Regular officer from oversight of the National Guard. Carter did not formally complain to Senator Wadsworth, but instead expressed his views in a lengthy memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the Army analyzing the flaws in the bill and requesting that General March invite the attention of Wadsworth's committee to them.[26]

Wadsworth had already been made aware of General Carter's views, but through somewhat unorthodox means. Carter's executive officer, Col. John Heavey – the same man who, as the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau had attended the November 1918 NGAUS convention – had produced a detailed analysis of Wadsworth's bill on his own initiative and forwarded it to the Senator.[27] Heavey claimed to be acting in an unofficial capacity when he corresponded with Wadsworth, but he clearly did so with his superior's knowledge and approval. His personal views reflected, word-for-word, some 80-90

---

[26] Memorandum for CofS, Subject: Senate Bill 3688, Jan. 17, 1920, RG 168/12a/File 011.6 (Proposed). See also Carter's Jan. 3, 1920 memorandum to the Director, WPD, regarding proposed changes to the draft of the House bill, in the same location.

[27] Heavey to Wadsworth, Jan. 24, 1920, in RG 168/12a/File 011.6 (Proposed). Heavey's analysis is enclosed under the title "National Guard, Attention! Senate Bill 3688: A Study of its National Guard features" The title appears to indicate that Heavey forwarded his analysis to a number of Guardsmen, but there is no indication regarding the distribution. A copy of this or a similar analysis was forwarded to Representative Anthony at his request; see Heavey to Anthony, Jan. 28, 1920, in same location. Heavey's analysis is almost certainly the anonymous source used by the *Army and Navy Journal* to denounce both House and Senate plans to name a Guardsman as Chief of the Militia Bureau; see "Retrograde Step for the National Guard" in the Mar. 27, 1920 issue.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

percent of the memorandum to the Chief of Staff sent by General Carter a week earlier. Clearly, both Carter and Heavey felt strongly enough about the flaws in Wadsworth's legislation that they were willing to evade the customary strictures against serving officers communicating with Congress without first notifying the Chief of Staff. While Secretary Baker gave complete freedom to Army officers to testify before Congress without fear of reprisal, he forbade "[a]ll other efforts, direct or indirect, on the part of officers to influence legislation affecting military policy ...."[28] This was, in part, a response to the large number of officers lobbying Congress in person. It got so bad at one point during the debate in the House that a congressman commented "[i]t has been difficult to tell whether the Army headquarters is down in the Army and Navy Building or here in the corridors of the House of Representatives."[29]

Wadsworth's bill faced opposition from more predictable elements as well. Some adjutants general were displeased with the loss of autonomy the states would suffer if the Guard was removed from state control. They were also upset, no doubt, with the anticipated loss of their jobs should the bill become law.[30] They drew support from a

---

[28] Memorandum of the Secretary of War, Apr. 9, 1920 in RG 168/12a/011.0 Even after the Wadsworth bill went to committee, Carter continued to lobby (through the Chief of Staff) to have changes made; for instance, to ensure that the personnel, records and functions of the old Militia Bureau would be carried on by the proposed National Guard Division, see Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Defect in proposed legislation, May 14, 1920 in RG 168/12a/011.6 (Proposed). Heavey also remained vocal in the debate, answering critics of UMT (to include Guardsmen) in a letter to the *Army and Navy Journal* ("Universal Military Training," May 15, 1920).

[29] Representative King Swope (R-KY), *Congressional Record,* 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 4310 (Mar. 13, 1920).

[30] It is indicative of Palmer's firm belief that virtually any problem could be resolved if only the interested parties would all sit down together and have an open discussion, that he tried (without success) to hold a conference with the adjutants general in order to gain their support. See Palmer to Maj. Gen. O'Ryan, Jan. 20, 1920 in *Palmer Papers*, Box 4. Palmer also conducted a media campaign to educate the Army about

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

minority report of the Senate Military Affairs Committee submitted by Senators Kenneth McKellar (D-TN) and Morris Sheppard (D-TX) which accompanied the introduction of the Wadsworth bill to the Senate. Among the twenty one reasons given for their opposition to the Wadsworth bill was that "it destroys the National Guard of the various States, and in lieu thereof seeks to enact what the minority believe to be an unconstitutional United States National Guard." After recommending that new defense legislation be based upon the National Defense Act of 1916 and forego UMT, the minority report opined that "[t]he National Guard feature of this bill is likewise enough to cause any Senator to vote against it."[31]

The House Rejects UMT

The adjutants general could also draw support from the House. Since mid-November, the House Military Affairs Committee had made known that it favored amending the National Defense Act of 1916 rather than writing new legislation, and Representative Anthony of Kansas (who served as acting chairman for much of the winter) announced that the committee intended to exercise economy in its approach to Army reorganization – a clear sign that a large Regular Army or an expensive UMT scheme would not be favored.[32]

---

the Wadsworth bill and counteract negative press; see, for example, Palmer to editors of *The Army and Navy Journal*, Feb. 25, 1920, in same location.

[31] *Reorganization of the Army; Views of a Minority [to accompany S. 3792]*, Senate Report No. 400, Part 2, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 1, 21.

[32] Boylan, 119.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The mood of opposition to UMT, prevalent in the public at large, was more evident when the American Legion testified before the House Committee on Military Affairs on January 16, 1920. Thomas Miller of Delaware, the chairman of the Legion's National Legislative Committee, did all of the speaking. Miller, a former member of the House from 1915 to 1917, had attended a Plattsburg Camp his first summer in office. Having failed in his reelection bid in the fall of 1916, he enlisted as a private in the 1st Delaware Infantry shortly after the war broke out, was commissioned in the Reserve Corps, and ended the war as a lieutenant colonel. Miller presented essentially the same Legion platform to the House that had been delivered to the Senate the previous month, but received a much chillier reception from some members of the committee. Representatives Harry Hull (R-IA), Hubert Dent (D-AL) and Alvan Fuller (R-MA) all attacked, to varying degrees, the Legion's support of UMT, bemoaned its expense and equated it with universal service. Chairman Julius Kahn (R-CA), and Representatives Rollin Sanford (R-NY) and Charles Caldwell (D-NY) defended Miller, reflecting both the bitter fight within the House Military Affairs Committee and the House as a whole over the issue of UMT.[33]

The House Military Affairs Committee's split over UMT reflected a deeper division within both parties in Congress. Senator Wadsworth, in an attempt to build bipartisan support for UMT, had gained the support of President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker for his bill by including some of Baker's ideas regarding vocational training in his bill. Rather than helping his cause, the support of the Democratic administration gave

[33] *House Hearings,* 1837-1866.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

House Republicans from the Western states, led by majority leader Frank Mondell (R-WY), an added reason to oppose UMT, even if it meant splitting on the issue with Eastern Republicans. Outside of the wealthy, industrial, and internationalist Eastern establishment, public opinion on UMT was decidedly negative, and many Republicans sensed they could use the issue against the Democrats in the fall congressional and presidential elections.[34] House Democrats, fearing a rout at the polls if they were too closely identified with the passage of UMT, took matters into their own hands. Despite pleas from President Wilson and Secretary Baker, the House Democratic caucus on February 9 went on record as opposing UMT by a margin of 106 to 17.[35]

The majority Republican party, divided along regional lines and sensing that universal training would be impossible to pass in the current Congress, quickly looked to remove it from Kahn's bill. Even supporters of UMT were reluctantly prepared to defer the issue of the next session of Congress, rather than see it go down in defeat in a vote before the full House. Though the House Committee on Military Affairs (by an eleven to nine margin) had voted on February 20 to report Chairman Kahn's bill to the full House with a UMT provision intact, the Republican leadership insisted Kahn remove UMT from the bill before allowing the bill to come before the full House. A deeply disappointed Kahn publicly promised to reintroduce a UMT bill in the House in the fall of 1920. The

---

[34] Chambers, 246.

[35] Wilson to Baker, Feb. 7, 1920, and Baker to Clark, Feb. 9, 1920 in *Baker Papers*, Box 11, General Correspondence 1920-B. Wilson's correspondence with Baker, which had been prolific, dropped off to nothing following the President's stroke in mid-September 1919. In the following months, an occasional note with Mrs. Wilson's initials would indicate the President's wishes to Baker. Wilson's February 7 letter to Baker and the House Democratic leadership bears his shaky signature – a rarity since his stroke, and an indication of how seriously he took the opposition of his own party to his plans.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

New York Times – a strong supporter of UMT – lamented the situation with an editorial announcing "Military Training Shelved."[36] Senator Wadsworth, observing the emasculation of the UMT provisions in Representative Kahn's bill, complained bitterly about the "Bolshevistic frame of mind" of the House. "It is almost impossible," he continued, "to get them to consider the Army sensibly and quietly."[37] In a letter to Secretary Baker, Wadsworth would add: "I know some worthy citizens, who, if they had the chance, would reduce the Army to 1,216 men, provide that the officers should be elected by the enlisted men, and forbid the general to wear a certain cut of breeches because such a garment apes the British. It takes all kinds of people to make up a world."[38]

The Kahn bill, with UMT withdrawn, was reported out of committee on February 27, 1920. Although several attempts were subsequently made to introduce amendments reducing the size of the Regular Army, all were easily defeated. The bill was passed by a margin of 245 to 92 on March 18 and sent to the Senate.[39] The measures effecting the Guard were prominently mentioned by the managers of the bill in the House, and no Representative was so foolish as to publicly speak out against those measures designed to

---

[36] Mooney and Layman, 653-654; Dickinson, 366-368; *NYT*, Feb. 27, 1920. A detailed account of the fighting within the House Military Affairs Committee is in *ANJ*, Feb. 28, 1920, 792-793.

[37] As quoted in Chambers, 246-247.

[38] Wadsworth to Baker, Feb. 26, 1920. *Baker Papers,* Box 13, File W – 1919. Wadsworth may well have been referring specifically to Senator Kenneth McKellar, who sat on the Military Affairs committee and led the opposition against Wadsworth's bill on the floor of the Senate – even objecting to the proposed title "Undersecretary of War" (instead of "Assistant Secretary of War") in one portion of the bill because it copied the British fashion. See *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 5238 (Apr. 6, 1920).

[39] Passed as H.R. 12775, see *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 4560 (Mar. 18, 1920).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

increase the efficiency and redress the grievances of the National Guard. Indeed, the Guard was praised even by the more anti-militarist members of the House who opposed the size of the Regular Army in Kahn's bill and denounced the Senate's apparent willingness to endorse UMT.[40]

Kahn and Wadsworth Bills Compared

The Kahn bill was substantially different from the Wadsworth bill, taking the form of amendments to the National Defense Act of 1916 rather than an entirely new piece of legislation. It left the Guard "unchanged in essentials" from its status in 1916 with a few key exceptions: a National Guard officer was placed in charge of the Militia Bureau; rules for federal pay for drill were simplified and the amount of pay was increased; and provision was made to return drafted Guardsmen to their states to serve out their Guard enlistments at the end of any future war. Provisions were also made for reducing the length of Guard enlistments, for granting federal recognition temporarily to Guard companies which had a minimum strength of fifty men (sixty-five men after the first year), and for attaching up to 500 Guard officers to Regular units for purposes of training.[41]

Both the Wadsworth and Kahn bills called for a similar-sized Regular Army –

---

[40] See, for example, *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 4025-4026, 4028-4031, 4036-4037 (Mar. 8, 1920); 4075, 4078-4079 (Mar. 9, 1920).

[41] *To Amend the National Defense Act; Report [To accompany H.R. 12775]*, House of Representatives Report No. 680, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 1, 13. The practice of withholding drill pay from enlisted Guardsmen if the overall attendance at a drill was too low was eliminated; however, the officers of the company would forfeit their pay if a minimum standard was not met. See comments of Representative Crago, *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 4037 (Mar. 8, 1920).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

297,000 officers and men in the Senate plan, versus 316,000 officers and men in the House. The Senate bill, however, called for a reduction in Regular Army end strength to 226,200 over five years as UMT was phased in – an effort by the Senate Military Affairs Committee to make the cost of UMT more palatable to fiscal conservatives. The Wadsworth bill also required that 25 percent of the General Staff be Guard or Reserve officers, while the Kahn bill simply stated that Guardsmen serving on the General Staff had to be eligible for such service by virtue of schooling or wartime experience.

In addition to the method of integrating UMT with the Citizen Army, two aspects of the Senate legislation that bore the distinct mark of John McAuley Palmer were the tactical organization of the troops and the method detailed for resolving conflicts between citizen soldiers and Regulars. The Regular, Guard and Reserve forces were integrated into a single national force and the various units organized in peacetime into divisions and corps along geographic lines – a scheme very similar to the one Palmer had advocated in the Stimson Plan of 1912. Palmer had also devised a democratic method for resolving disputes over the initial disposition of these forces by mandating that the General Staff committee that apportioned units to the various components (and within the Guard, by state) be composed of 50 percent Guard and Reserve officers. This formula was to be repeated on all future occasions when the General Staff had to consider regulations that would effect the reserve components or universal training – a committee consisting of at least 50 percent reserve officers would prepare or approve the final

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

product.[42]

The Senate Rejects UMT

Senator Wadsworth's disappointment over the House's rejection of UMT would be matched in the Senate. This was not unexpected; Wadsworth had earlier noted that he was determined to push for UMT regardless of what the majority of the Senate thought.[43] Shortly after debate over Wadsworth's bill began in early April, it quickly became clear that few Senators from either party would support UMT. Senator McKellar, who had already co-authored the Senate Military Affairs committee's minority report skewering the Wadsworth bill, had preceded the introduction of the bill with attacks on the Senate floor:

> The question is, Shall America be ruled by a military oligarchy more powerful, more expensive, more subversive of freedom than the German military oligarchy ever was? Or shall we continue to be ruled under our Constitution by the representatives of a democratic people? The issue is unmistakable. The lines are clearly drawn. The fight is on.[44]

Senator William Kirby (D-AR) was one of the more vocal opponents of UMT. His address in many ways summarized the arguments against it:

> Never before in the Nation's history has such a policy been seriously considered. Our wars have all resulted in victory without the suggestion even of the adoption thereafter of any such policy of preparedness. Such a policy is undemocratic, un-American, vastly expensive, wholly unnecessary, and can not but result in fastening

---

[42] *Reorganization of the Army; Report [To accompany S. 3792]*, Senate Report 400, Part 1, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 3, 5. See also "Army Reorganization: Comparative Analysis of House and Senate Bills," Typewritten manuscript, n.a., 10 pages. *Palmer Papers*, Box 4.

[43] *Senate Hearings*, 1983.

[44] *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 2637 (Feb. 9, 1920).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

> militarism, which this great war was fought to destroy, upon our own beloved land.[45]

In addition to pointing out how the National Guard and some 4,000,000 recently demobilized soldiers made UMT unnecessary, Kirby decried the effect that UMT would have on race relations in the South. Military training – the same program which had been praised repeatedly for its beneficial effects during the war on white citizens and recent immigrants – would "change the disposition" of blacks and make them "idle and arrogant, a troublesome element in rural districts."[46] The issue of race would provide one more reason for Southerners to oppose UMT, though given the strength of opposition on all other grounds, it is unlikely that a proposal to exclude blacks from UMT would have changed enough votes to make a difference. In any event, such a proposal was not forthcoming.

Instead, by the third day of debate in the Senate it was abundantly clear that UMT had no chance.[47] As they had in the House, Democrats in the Senate decided to oppose UMT in hopes of using Republican support for the issue against them in the fall elections. The Republican Senators, though a majority, were too divided on the issue to carry it through alone, especially given the knowledge that UMT had already failed by an

---

[45] Ibid., 5318 (April 8, 1920).

[46] Ibid., 5319. Similar expressions were made in the House regarding the subject of UMT and blacks – see, for example, *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 4033 (Thomas Harrison, D-VA) and 4043 (Percy Quin, D-MS) (Mar. 8, 1920). Senator Kirby and Representatives Harrison and Quin were all members of their respective Military Affairs Committees.

[47] This was unanimously believed even by Senators who favored UMT. See, for instance, the comments of Senators Wadsworth, Chamberlain, Lodge, and Thomas in *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 5330 (April 8, 1920).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

overwhelming margin in the House. Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, a friend of Wadsworth's, member of the Military Affairs Committee, and the same man who had introduced the NGAUS legislation in November, sponsored a face-saving amendment which substituted four months of voluntary military training in place of mandatory universal training.[48] He did this only after a lengthy defense of the Wadsworth bill and its UMT provisions. Acknowledging the likely defeat of Wadsworth's bill, Frelinghuysen admitted he introduced the substitute measure in order to "save whatever I can of the principle of military service."[49] Substituting voluntary training would also allow the proponents of UMT to avoid an outright vote on the issue, an event which would hurt any future chances of introducing an UMT proposal after the fall elections. Republicans from the Eastern establishment could tell their wealthy supporters, who widely favored UMT, that at least they had established the framework for universal training with the voluntary training system. The voluntary training measure, which did not impose any period of service on those who opted to take it, passed the Senate by a margin of 46 to 9.[50] Further efforts, led by Senator McKellar, to eliminate even the voluntary training provisions, were rejected.[51] With universal training eliminated, the provisions in the Senate bill which would have reduced the size of the army to 210,000

---

[48] The amendment was prepared in advance through the foresight of Palmer and Gulick. See Palmer, *America in Arms*, 179-180.

[49] *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 5329 (Apr. 8, 1920).

[50] Ibid., 5402.

[51] Ibid., 5551 (Apr. 12, 1920). See also "Senate Upholds Civilian Training," *NYT*, Apr. 13, 1920, 14. Voluntary training would ultimately be eliminated from the bill a month later during the conference committee which resolved differences between the Senate and House bills.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

men over time were also eliminated.

The Adjutants General Association, presided over by General Martin of Kansas, gathered in Washington as the Senate took up debate over the Wadsworth bill. Those generals who could make the trip on short notice to Washington took advantage of the opportunity both to listen to the debates on the Senate floor from the visitor's gallery, and to privately lobby Senators and Representatives from their home states. Most of the time spent at the conference was devoted to debating and approving amendments that had already been proposed for both the House and Senate versions of the reorganization bill. In a few cases, the adjutants general also took it upon themselves to draw up amendments of their own – in particular one permitting enlistment (with parental approval) in the National Guard by sixteen and seventeen year-old boys. A majority of the amendments considered, however, were those already proposed by legislators or submitted in advance. The amendments approved by the association were forwarded to Senator McKellar (to be submitted to amend the Kahn bill, then before the Senate) and Senator Arthur Capper (R-KS) to amend the Wadsworth bill.[52] The focus of the effort, however, was on amending the House bill. The reason for this is no doubt revealed in correspondence with General Carter of the Militia Bureau from one of the adjutants general who could not attend the meeting in Washington. "We think [the Kahn bill] a workable law with some necessary

[52] "Minutes of Meeting of the Adjutants General Association of the United States – Raleigh Hotel, Washington DC, April 5-6, 1920" RG 168/12a/080. - Adjutants General Association. See also the personal account of Wisconsin AG Orlando Holway in his letter to Charles Boardman, Apr. 15, 1920 in *Boardman Papers*, Box 2, File "Correspondence 1920-1930." Due to the very short notice given for the meeting, only fifteen AGs could attend in person. Evidence of Capper's attempts to modify the Wadsworth bill on behalf of AGAUS can be found in *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 5824-5850, where Capper attempts to introduce an amendment restoring the Guard to its state status. The amendment failed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

amendments. The Wadsworth bill can never pass the House and I imagine in the wind up the House bill will pass the Senate with some modifications."[53] After three days, the majority of the AGs went their separate ways, leaving Generals Martin, Critchfield of Ohio, and Macon of North Carolina to monitor events and summon their support if the occasion required.

The Senate approved the much-modified Wadsworth bill on April 20, 1920 by a vote of 46 to 10.[54] Though UMT had been withdrawn, it still called for the National Guard to be federally organized, though with Governors able to call on the Guard in time of peace and with Guardsmen serving on the General Staff. The Senate had rejected the chance to approve the House version of Army reorganization outright, thus sending the two bills into conference.

House-Senate Conference Committee: Defeat of the Wadsworth Bill

The bill that emerged from the House-Senate conference on May 27 resembled the Kahn bill far more than it did the Wadsworth bill. In part this is due to the fact that Wadsworth's bill had been far more damaged in its passage through the Senate than Kahn's bill had been going through the House. Wadsworth's original bill had contemplated replacing the system established under the National Defense Act of 1916 with a new system predicated on UMT. Once this central pillar of Wadsworth's plan was removed by the Senate prior to the conference committee, there remained little reason to

---

[53] AG, MO (H. C. Clark) to CMB, Apr. 2, 1920 in RG 168/12a/011.6 - Proposed.

[54] *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 5898 (Apr. 20, 1920).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

do otherwise than simply amend the existing National Defense Act, which was the method employed by the House bill.

On the chief issue still separating the House and the Senate going into conference – whether the National Guard would be organized under the Army clause or the Militia clause of the Constitution – the Senators fought to the end to try to federalize the Guard.[55] One of the key arguments employed by the Senate conferees was that their plan, unlike that of the House, would include a large number of reserve officers on the General Staff, and would require that Guard and Reserve officers be consulted on an equal basis with Regulars in all decisions made by the General Staff effecting those components. Thus, rather than trying to maintain the interests of the Guard by preserving its constitutionally separate status, the Senators proposed to maintain the interests of the Guard by unifying it with the Army, while at the same time guaranteeing the citizen components adequate representation among the decision makers.

For Wadsworth, the goal of federalizing the Guard was all-important. For Charles Martin, the goal of maintaining the Guard under the militia clause was equally critical. Martin returned to Washington from April 23rd to May 6th in order to attend the conference meetings and consult with members of Congress, particularly fellow-Kansan Daniel Anthony. General O'Ryan also attended the conference committee proceedings,

---

[55] See *Army Reorganization Bill: Memorandum on the Senate Amendment to H.R. 12775, To Amend the "National Defense Act," Relating to the National Guard as a part of the Citizen Army in time of peace."* Senate Committee Print, 66th Congress, 2d Session, n.d. (May 15, 1920 handwritten at top). Copy found in RG 168/12a/011.6. Reprinted in *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 7263-7265 (May 18, 1920), with a point-by-point rebuttal following. Neither memo is attributed, but Rep. Anthony, who introduces them into the record, assured a fellow congressman that both were written by Regular officers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

providing moral support for Senator Wadsworth and roundly denouncing those adjutants general who opposed his bill and thus were "interfering with the progress of the National Guard." Martin, for his part, insisted that the House conferees remain firm in their insistence that the Guard be organized under the militia clause. Representative Anthony, at the very least, seemed to rely on Martin for his input. Following a stalemate in the negotiations, Martin returned home to Kansas. Soon after his arrival there, Anthony cabled twice with reports of further concessions on the part of the Senators, each time asking Martin "What do you think?" Martin denounced each Senate proposal in turn, insisting that they would be ruinous to the Guard and that the House version must be adopted intact. "You are doing good work" he counseled Anthony, "stay with them and you will win out."[56]

With Martin's encouragement to remain firm, Anthony and Representative Hubert Dent split with fellow House conferees Julius Kahn and John McKenzie (R-IL) on whether or not to adopt the Senate plan.[57] On May 18th the four House conferees decided to report their deadlock back to the whole House and seek further guidance. In hopes of winning over the House on this single issue of federal versus state control, Senator Wadsworth offered an extraordinary compromise for Representative Kahn to present to

---

[56] Account taken from circular memorandum, Martin to all AGs, Subject: National Guard Legislation, May 11, 1920. *Boardman Papers*, Box 2, File "Correspondence, 1920-1930." Further correspondence from Anthony to Martin is described in Martin to W. A. Hazle, May 20, 1920 in *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 1.

[57] "Reach Deadlock on National Guard," *NYT*, May 19, 1920, 8. Anthony and Dent were the only legislators to receive a unanimous vote of thanks and commendation "for their loyal efforts in behalf of the National Guard" at the June 1920 AGAUS meeting. See minutes of this meeting in *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

his chamber. If the House would agree to allow each state legislature to choose between federal or state control of its National Guard, the Senate would concede all remaining issues still before the conference committee and allow the House to complete the reorganization of the Army as it saw fit. "[F]iguratively speaking," Wadsworth reported to his colleagues, the Senate conferees had offered "to throw the Senate bill out of the window as a piece of legislation, give it up completely, and take the National Defense Act [of 1916]... as the basis for the new legislation" if only the House would allow each state legislature to decide whether or not its National Guard should be federalized.[58] While Kahn favored the Senate compromise and urged approval for it when he reported it to the House of Representatives, the House – after three hours of spirited debate that demonstrated its visceral distrust for the Regular establishment – instructed its conferees by a two-to-one margin to insist on its own version of the bill, thus keeping the Guard under the militia clause of the Constitution.[59] Back in conference with the Senate, the House conferees prevailed on this point, reporting back to their chamber that in the final bill, "[t]he sections relating to the National Guard are here presented in practically the form in which they passed the House."[60]

Wadsworth, clearly bitter at the House's intransigence, refrained from criticizing

---

[58] *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 7265 (May 18, 1920), 7331-7334 (May 20, 1920); see also "The Wreck of a Military Policy," *ANJ*, May 29, 1920, 1198.

[59] *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 7298-7318 (May 19, 1920). The vote was 212 to 104. As Martha Derthick points out, all but 9 of the 212 opposed to the Senate compromise were from the South, West and Midwest. Of the 104 in favor of the measure, 64 were from the Northeast. Derthick "Citizen Soldier on Capitol Hill," 131.

[60] *National Defense:Conference Report [to accompany H.R. 12755]*, House of Representatives Report No. 1049, 66th Congress, 2d Session, May 27, 1920, 65.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

his colleagues in the lower house directly when he reported the results back to the Senate. He did not, however, hold back from assailing opponents from outside of Congress. Wadsworth singled out the adjutants general as being "so tenacious of their prerogatives in commanding the guard in their respective states that they are not even willing to let the legislatures of their states decide whether the guard should be organized under the Army clause or remain under the militia clause." In Wadsworth's estimation they had been "for five or six years ... the principal stumbling block placed in the path of progressive, sane, national military legislation ...."[61] Senator McKellar attempted to blunt this criticism by noting that "the adjutants general of the various States are pigmies in comparison with the other interests that have been influencing this legislation."[62] But in the case of this particular issue – the issue of whether the Guard should be organized as a state or federal force – it appears that General Martin, at the very least, had a degree of influence on the committee proceedings that most K Street lobbyists would have envied.

No doubt, many Guardsmen had fervently hoped that the final bill would preserve the best aspects of both the House and Senate plans – continued organization as a state force in peacetime, as presented in the House bill, as well as the Senate provisions for a large presence on the General Staff and a role in the General Staff decision-making process. The final compromise legislation clearly gave the Guard one of these things – it remained organized under the militia clause of the Constitution. It also delivered significant progress in the other two areas, with Guardsmen allowed for the first time to

---

[61] *Congressional Record*, 66th Congress, 2d Session, 7332 (May 20, 1920).

[62] Ibid., 7333.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

serve on the General Staff if qualified to do so, and with the General Staff required by the law to prepare policies that effected the reserve components only in consultation with Guard and Reserve officers.[63] While this represented considerable progress for the Guard, it was also a significant watering down of the original Senate provision that had called for at least 25 percent of the General Staff to be Guard or ORC officers. The final law set no General Staff slots aside for the Guard or Reserve; reserve officers needed to fill out the special joint committees specified in the new legislation would be detailed as "additional members" of the General Staff. As time would show, the limited number of reserve officers so detailed would make these officers less influential than many Guardsmen had hoped they would be.

Unlike the debate over the organization of the Guard, there had been no fight in the conference committee regarding the leadership of the Militia Bureau – both House and Senate bills made provision to put a Guardsman at the helm. To be sure, the Senate version had assumed that the Guard would be federalized, but the Senators did not withdraw from this measure once federalization had been killed by the House. To ensure that the chief was a representative member of the Guard, he would be appointed by the President from a list of eligible officers nominated by the various governors. To ensure he was not a political appointee unqualified for the position, he would also be required to have served a minimum of ten years in the Guard and hold a Reserve officer's commission as a major (subsequently amended to colonel) or higher – the restrictions

[63] An Act To amend an Act entitled "An Act for making ..." approved June 3, 1916, and to establish military justice (National Defense Act of 1920), *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 41, Chap. 227 (1920) (Hereafter NDA 1920), Section 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

prohibiting Reserve officers from accepting National Guard commissions and vice versa having been eliminated in the new legislation.[64]

The National Defense Act of 1920

After five weeks in conference, the final bill was reported back to the House and Senate and quickly approved a few days before the summer recess, the focus of the politicians having turned to the upcoming party conventions which would determine presidential candidates for the fall election. President Wilson was initially inclined to veto the legislation – in fact, he requested that Secretary Baker prepare the appropriate letter giving his reasons for doing so. Baker listed five major reasons for vetoing the legislation, citing the bill's failure to enact a selective service law for use in time of war, its failure to provide even a voluntary system of military training for those willing to try it (that piece of the Senate legislation having fallen out of the final version), its failure to provide for a separate Transportation Corps, and its general inflexibility regarding personnel matters. The fifth reason for rejecting the bill was that it

> ...continues the National Guard as organized under the National Defense Act of 1916, without providing for that unity of organization and training between the National Guard and the Regular Army which will constitute them parts of a single army when assembled, and without removing the causes of misunderstanding which in the recent association of the National Guard as a part of the Army of the United States proved an impediment to perfect cooperation ....[65]

Nevertheless, despite the many reasons he had for vetoing the legislation, Baker

---

[64] *National Defense:Conference Report [to accompany H.R. 12755]*, 65.

[65] Proposed veto message in Baker to Wilson, June 4, 1920. *Baker Papers,* Box 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

persuaded Wilson that the harm done to the morale of the Army would be worse if he refused to sign the bill, and left the Army to revert to its status under the 1916 legislation as soon as the temporary authorization it was currently operating under expired on June 30.[66] Wilson relented and signed the bill on June 4.

The National Defense Act of 1920 (sometimes referred to as the Army Reorganization Act) continued the three-part composition of the Army that had been established in the National Defense Act of 1916 – Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves (to consist of the Officers Reserve Corps and the Enlisted Reserve Corps).[67] It authorized a Regular Army of 280,000 enlisted men (the Senate's figure) and 18,000 commissioned and warrant officers (the House's figure). The strength of the National Guard remained unchanged from that authorized under the National Defense Act of 1916 – 800 enlisted men per Senator and Congressman, or 435,800 men total once allotments for the territories and the District of Columbia were included.[68] These numbers, of course, were contingent on Congress voting the funds and sufficient recruits enlisting to serve in future years, two shortcomings which would keep the Regular Army and National Guard from achieving anything close to these numbers over the next two decades.

ROTC would continue to provide Reserve officers fresh out of college to the

---

[66] Baker to Wilson, June 3, 1920. *Baker Papers*, Box 13.

[67] NDA 1920, Section 1.

[68] *National Defense:Conference Report [to accompany H.R. 12755]*, 63; NDA 1920, Sections 4, 10, 15; NDA 1916, Section 62; *CMB Annual Report*, 1920, 13. The number of officers authorized in the Regular Army varied somewhat, as chaplains and medical officers were authorized based on enlisted strength.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ORC. The ORC would also act as a repository for officers who served in the Great War, where they could retain an affiliation with the Army without having to attend drills or annual encampments like the Guard. The Military Training Camps Association, the lobby for the Plattsburg Camps since 1915, was finally able to secure a more permanent place for these camps in the 1920 legislation, and the Citizen Military Training Camps (CMTC) thereby established would continue to train civilians and select enlisted men until 1940, providing those who completed the course of instruction with an appointment as an officer or NCO in the Organized Reserves.[69] This limited program designed primarily to train officers was all that remained of Senator Wadsworth's attempts to create a system of universal military training.

From the Guard's point of view, the imposition of a modern tactical and territorial organization upon the army in peacetime was almost as significant as the assignment of a Guardsman as the Chief of the Militia Bureau. For purposes of administration and training, the nation was divided on the basis of population into corps areas of roughly equal size. While the legislation established the groundwork for this in the vaguest of terms ("Each corps area shall contain at least one division of the National Guard or Organized Reserves and such other troops as the President may direct") the initial organization of these corps areas would be determined by a committee of the General Staff composed of equal parts Regular and reserve officers, to include those of the National Guard.[70] Ultimately, this committee would divide the country into nine corps

[69] NDA 1920, Sections 33, 34 (amending Sections 40 and 47 of NDA 1916).

[70] Ibid., Section 3a.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

areas, each containing a single Regular division, two Guard divisions, and the skeletons of three Organized Reserve divisions. This peacetime organization of units under the same command structure that they would use in time of war was, of course, the realization of John McAuley Palmer's work since authoring the Stimson Plan in 1912. For the Guard, it meant eighteen infantry and four cavalry divisions would be permanently organized in peacetime, and consequently a generous allotment of federally-recognized general officer slots would become available for Guardsmen to fill.

The joint committee concept was the other of Colonel Palmer's major contributions to survive the conference committee and make it into the final law, both in the form of the specific committee mandated to establish the initial locations and designations of units, and as subsequent committees to be organized whenever it was required to prepare "policies and regulations affecting the organization, distribution and training of the National Guard and the Organized Reserves, and all policies and regulations affecting the appointment, assignment, promotion, and discharge of reserve officers."[71] The former committee, which would meet and complete its work in the latter half of 1920 and early 1921, would become known as the "Section 3a committee" after its authorizing legislative clause, while the latter committees were collectively known as "Section 5" committees for the same reason.

Even if the voice of the National Guard had been split on the major issues of state versus federal control and the specific nature of the UMT system that should be adopted,

---

[71] Ibid., Section 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guardsmen had shown consistent support for other reforms, and most of these were addressed favorably by Congress. In addition to Guard control of the Militia Bureau and representation on the General Staff, the National Defense Act authorized a minimum of fifty enlisted men per company until July 1, 1921, after which time the number would revert to the sixty-five required under the 1916 law.[72] The provisions of the 119th Article of War – which held that any Regular officer, regardless of when he was promoted, outranked any reserve officer of the same grade – were universally held to be unfair, and were often quoted as one of those policies that was clearly discriminatory against citizen officers. The new law amended the procedure so that a reserve officer's date of rank relative to that of an Regular officer was based on the amount of time the reservist had spent on active duty in his current rank.[73] National Guard enlisted soldiers were no longer docked their drill pay if their fellows failed to show up for drill (though their commanding officers were still penalized in this manner – an issue NGAUS would fight in the coming years).[74] The length and terms of enlistments were simplified to three years initially, and one year for all subsequent enlistments, thus eliminating an arcane quota system for enlistments that had previously been in use.[75] The restrictions preventing

---

[72] Ibid., Section 36 (amending Section 60 of NDA 1916).

[73] Ibid., Section 51 (adding Section 127a to NDA 1916). For condemnations of Article 119, see, among others, testimony of Maj. Gen. Price and comments of Senator Wadsworth, *Senate Hearings* 1935; testimony of Mr. Allen Tukey of the American Legion, *Senate Hearings* 2041.

[74] Ibid., Sections 47 and 48 (amending Sections 109 and 110 of NDA 1916). Officers would not receive drill pay unless at least 50 percent of the commissioned strength and 60 percent of the enlisted strength of their unit attended drill.

[75] Ibid., Section 37 (amending Section 69 of NDA 1916). See testimony of General Martin for a description of some of the problems related to enlistments under the old act. *House Hearings*, 1911.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reserve officers from taking commissions in the Guard and Guard officers from taking commissions in the ORC were lifted.[76] Congress also stipulated that not less than half of the vacancies created by the expansion of the Regular Army under the new law would be filled by non-Regular officers who had served during the war. As a result, some 3,000 Guard and ORC officers would be integrated into the Regular Army during the 1920s – though none at the general officer level.[77] And, significantly, a single sentence requiring that drafted Guardsmen "shall resume their membership in the militia" after discharge from federal active duty put an end to the practice which had caused the near destruction of the National Guard following the war.[78]

Problems remained, however. Though there was language in the bill authorizing the president to assign (with their consent) up to 500 Guard officers who held ORC commissions to serve on active duty with the Regular Army, it would be contingent upon Congress appropriating the specific funds for this purpose in the future.[79] Nor was there any increase (with the exception of the chief himself) in the allotment of Guard officers detailed to serve in the Militia Bureau beyond the two assistants authorized in the 1916 Act. The clause which limited a Guard officer's pay, regardless of his rank, to no greater than that of a captain while attending Army schools had not been amended out of the

---

[76] Ibid., Section 32 (amending Section 37 of NDA 1916).

[77] Ibid., Section 24 (amending Section 24 of NDA 1916); Hill, 311n. Hill points out that the failure to integrate even a single Guardsman or Reservist as a general officer in the Regulars after World War I stands in sharp contrast to the actions of the Army after every previous war, as well as after World War II.

[78] Ibid., Section 49 (amending Section 111 of NDA 1916).

[79] Ibid., Section 44 (amending Section 81 of NDA 1916).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1916 legislation. This was despite the fact that Senator Wadsworth had termed that particular provision "indefensible" and promised at least one Guardsman "[t]hose things can be cured. It is very simple."[80]

The greatest unresolved problem, however, went back to the very mechanism used to bring the Guard into unrestricted federal service – the draft. The National Defense Act of 1920 offered no substitute for its continued use. Not only did Guardsmen still find the use of the draft unsavory, since it lumped them together with unwilling conscripts, but the mechanism of the draft still allowed the Army to break up Guard units and discard Guard officers as it saw fit once they were drafted. It was the search for an alternative to the draft – one that would guarantee a measure of permanence for Guard organizations and personnel once called into active duty – which would be the highlight of NGAUS' legislative agenda during the interwar years.

Another object of reform that was ignored in the National Defense Act despite strong support for change in the Army and Congress was the replacement system used during the war. Few officers could talk of their wartime experience without noting the camaraderie generated by regional affiliations in every National Guard and National Army division, and bemoaning the fact that units raised from the same locale and trained together were broken up, and replacements were thrown into units without any attempt to keep them together or match them to an organization from their home area. Veterans called for locally based organizations to be the model in the future, and for regional

---

[80] *Senate Hearings,* 1937.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

affiliations to be maintained by the personnel system as far as practicable during a war.[81] Without exception, this view had the sympathy of the Senators and Congressmen, many of whom had stories of their own relating how troops from their home state were misused by the replacement system.[82] The benefits to unit cohesion were undeniable:

> We knew, for example, that in a company of men largely or wholly from a particular section of a State, that in battle when there came the temptation for some of those men to quit and lie in shell holes ... and not go on, the great deterrent in relation to that kind of action was the fear, not of being shot by somebody, but of being missed on the check roll after the show was over, and having comrades write home to their families that he was missing during the scrap.[83]

Equally undeniable was the fact that America's allies and opponents during the war had organized their units along regional lines, while the U.S. Army (at least in General Martin's opinion) seemed to do the opposite:

> My observations in France were that all the other armies except our own ran strongly to that feature of localization for their organizations, while it was the declared policy of our own Army to get a fellow away from his buddies as far as you could possibly get him and not let any two men get together who happened to know each other. I know that is ruinous to proper esprit.[84]

While the geographic organization of the corps areas under the National Defense Act of 1920 meant that a degree of regional affiliation would develop in all of the components of the peacetime Army, there was no attempt by Congress to legislate a

---

[81] See comments in *Senate Hearings* of General Haan, 387-390; General O'Ryan, 512-513, 524-525; General Glenn, 593-596; General Foreman, 1982; Col. Fraine, 2016.

[82] See, for example, comments of Senators New and Sutherland, *Senate Hearings*, 389.

[83] General O'Ryan in *Senate Hearings*, 524.

[84] *House Hearings*, 1914.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

wartime replacement policy to support this. The reasoning for this lack of action is unclear – legislators may have been disinclined to interfere with a policy more suitably determined by military professionals, they might have worried that forcing the Army to maintain regional cohesion in units would prove inflexible once an actual conflict broke out, or they might have simply forgot to address the issue. The General Staff, for its part, remained opposed to developing a replacement system any more complicated than was already in place. It doubtless felt that unit cohesion was more a function of proper training than regional pride, and thus did nothing to promote this cause in the 1920s and 1930s. As a result, the Army that fought World War II would have even fewer regional ties then that which fought World War I.[85]

UMT, the Poison Pill

Though the focus of these past two chapters has been on the attempts of Guardsmen and others associated with the Army to influence Army reorganization legislation in 1919 and 1920, it must be realized that the final law was at least as much the result of outside forces as it was of careful deliberation based on testimony delivered by military professionals before congressional committees. The issue of UMT in particular was decided in most congressmen's minds without the need to consult with military experts, and in fact was settled long before debate began in Congress in the spring of 1920. Farm organizations opposed UMT because it would remove young men

[85] Following extensive criticism of the replacement system used in World War II, Secretary of War Robert Patterson promised in 1946 to create a system which trained soldiers from a community together and fed them into larger units from their same state or region. Though much applauded by the National Guard Bureau, the plan was never implemented. See *CNGB Annual Report, 1946*, 32-33.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from farms for months at a time, and required them to conduct follow-up training at intervals over several years. Labor traditionally feared a large military which could be used to put down strikes and did not want its union membership potentially forced into a strike-breaking role because of military obligations. Fiscal conservatives damned the cost. War weariness strengthened traditional American pacifist and isolationist sentiment. The fact that the wealthy Eastern establishment that profited handsomely during the war now favored UMT made most "common folk," particularly in the West and South, suspicious of their motives. Southerners, usually a very pro-military group, were put off by the image of blacks being armed and trained by the government – the real reason (Secretary Baker thought) that the House Democratic caucus expressed its opposition to UMT.[86] In addition, the threat to the Guard presented by these proposals excited the states' rights passions of Southerners further against UMT.

The current of public opinion on this subject had been clear for months in advance. General March, in talking with General Pershing prior to the latter's testimony before Congress in late 1919, noted: "I get perhaps five or six hundred letters a day from people all over the country and the great mass of them are about universal training and after the armistice and up to January 15th [1919]when we introduced this bill first I thought the turn was in favor of universal training. Recently, however, public opinion seems to have gone against us."[87] Even among those who most favored UMT, the

---

[86] "I am told that the inspiration of this activity is that such action will appeal to the Southern sentiment against the training of colored men." Baker to Wilson, Feb. 7, 1920 in *Baker Papers,* Box 13, File W.

[87] March interview, Oct. 30, 1919. RG 200/25/Army reorganization – Interviews.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Eastern Republican establishment, the timing of the issue was particularly bad, making them more susceptible to a motion to delay consideration. On November 19, 1919, the Republican dominated Senate had rejected the Treaty of Versailles and President Wilson's League of Nations for the first time. Over the months that followed several attempts were made to ratify modified versions of the treaty that reflected the reservations of the Senators, but the treaty was rejected by the Senate for a final time on March 19, 1920.[88] UMT advocates – especially those who wished to be re-elected – did not want to be seen as preparing for war by pushing for universal training at the same time they had rejected the League of Nations. As one historian of the interwar period summed it up, while there was initial optimism after the war that the American public could be persuaded to accept UMT, "[b]efore long, however, it became evident that UMT was doomed."[89]

Seen in this context, the Guard's role in shaping the debate over UMT was fairly minor, especially because its position was muddled – in favor of UMT in principle, but opposed to the forms of UMT proposed in both the Baker-March and Chamberlain-Kahn bills. Most senior Guardsmen were realistic about UMT's prospects, and their political sensibilities were displayed in the version of UMT proposed in the NGAUS bill. While this school-based, locally controlled and administered system of UMT received a barely

---

[88] Congress voted to end the war by joint resolution on May 20, 1920, a move which President Wilson vetoed. The war would not officially end for America until a second joint resolution was signed by President Harding on July 2, 1921. Treaties with all the belligerents were not ratified by the Senate until October of that year.

[89] Griffith, 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

respectful hearing before it was discarded by congressional committees already busy assembling their own federally-administered versions of military training, it should be reevaluated more favorably in light of the spectacular failure of the UMT plans of the MTCA, Chamberlain, Kahn, Wadsworth and Palmer (not to mention Baker and March). For all its flaws, the minimalist approach to UMT advocated by NGAUS would have been far more appealing to the average American than the schemes that were generated in Congress, and might have stood a chance at actually becoming law if UMT's supporters rallied behind the idea. Once in practice, such a scheme could have provided the wedge necessary to introduce a more effective method of UMT to America sometime in the future. But the NGAUS scheme was delivered too late to be of much influence in the debate, and it was weighed down, in any event, with a plan for a National Guard Council which attracted the ire of most congressman, who viewed it as a bold grab for power by the adjutants general.

Adjutant General H. C. Clark of Missouri was right when he wrote in April, 1920 "I believe that universal training is out of the question at present and we may as well recognize this in shaping legislation. Later something along this line may receive popular favor, but there is a sentiment against it just now."[90] Despite the promises of Representative Kahn and Senator Wadsworth to revisit UMT in the next session of Congress, the issue was a dead one until the growing menace in Europe and Asia revived the peacetime draft in 1940.[91] NGAUS would continue to call for UMT to be funded by

[90] AG, MO to CMB, Apr. 2, 1920 in RG 168/12a/011.6 - Proposed.

[91] Kahn died while in office in 1924. Wadsworth was not re-elected to the Senate in 1926, but returned to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the federal government but administered by the states, a position it would not change until the Korean War, when it determined that a federally-run program was desirable – so long as the trainees would be enlisted in the Guard as well as the Army Reserve once their basic training was completed.[92]

The Guard's Relations with the Militia Bureau

If there was a victim (despite his flaws) of the National Defense Act of 1920, it was Maj. Gen. Jessie Carter, the Chief of the Militia Bureau. His chief fault seemed to be he lacked sympathy for the many Guardsmen who had legitimate complaints about their treatment during the war; even if the Militia Bureau had played no role in inflicting the abuses, it should have played a stronger role in advocating fair treatment towards Guardsmen than it did. He and his bureau had also adopted too much of a laissez faire attitude toward the task of rebuilding the Guard once the war was over. He had a thin skin for the attacks made on him by his detractors, and carried on his own war of words with them in his official correspondence with the Guard, his annual reports, and in his testimony before Congress. However, for all his faults he was not – as some Guardsmen portrayed him to be – the tool of the General Staff engaged in an effort to destroy the Guard. Rather, his actions show him to be an honest broker, and furthermore, a very rare breed of Regular officer who believed that the National Defense Act of 1916 was a

---

Congress as a Representative from 1933-1951. He was instrumental in passing the Selective Service Act of 1940 (the first peacetime draft), which he believed "reflects the principles in which we of the Senate Military Affairs Committee of 1920 believed." Wadsworth to Frances Nash, Oct. 22, 1941, *Wadsworth Papers* Box 31, Universal Mil. Training, June-Oct 1941.

[92] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1951*, 60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

fundamentally sound law which, through diligence and hard work, could further perfect the Guard in its role as a federal reserve.

Carter was slow to come to the realization that he had a public relations problem, and he seemed genuinely surprised by it. He attempted to mend fences in early 1920 by mailing a letter to every federally recognized Guardsman "[i]n order to increase the usefulness of the Militia Bureau and to promote a spirit of cooperation and harmony between the officers of the National Guard and those ... in the Bureau."[93] Prior to making this unusual attempt to appeal to the mass of Guardsmen, General Carter sent an advance copy to each of the adjutants general, along with a cover letter in which he confessed "During the past few months, I have been surprised to learn that certain National Guard officers apparently believed that the Bureau has been secretly opposed to all efforts toward reorganization of the Guard."[94] Carter also tried to improve Regular/Guard relations by circulating a confidential letter to all the inspector-instructors serving with Guard units telling them that they must exemplify "the Spirit of Service," as well as "cheerfulness and tactfulness" in carrying out their duties. "It is not enough that the Inspector-instructor carry out rigidly his duties . . . , for the most complete and elaborate schedule of instruction will fail, the most urgent admonition will be ignored, unless good feeling and respect exist between the federal representative and the men of

---

[93] Memorandum from CMB, Subject: Organization of Militia Bureau – Personal correspondence with Bureau officials, Feb 1920. RG 168/12a/325.3.

[94] CMB to AGs, Feb. 7, 1920. RG 168/12a/325.3 – General. Part of Carter's problem seems to have been his inaccessibility. Commented Milton Reckord, "getting in to see him and get anything the Guard wanted before him was like getting to see the Chief of Staff." *Reckord NGAUS Interview,* 19.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the National Guard with whom he comes in contact."[95] It was good advice, which might have aided relations between the Militia Bureau and the Guard if it had been adhered to in some of the stormier periods of debate over the previous decade. But by February 1920 it was too late to change the legislation being formulated in both the House and the Senate that would replace General Carter with a Guardsman.

There remained Guardsmen who felt that the Militia Bureau had tried to serve the Guard well, but had been sabotaged by the General Staff along the way. Missouri's adjutant general, H. C. Clark, expressed this sentiment to General Carter in a letter explaining why he favored an amendment to the House bill which would make the bureau independent of the General Staff:

> I know personally that prior to sending the troops to the Mexican Border in 1916 the Militia Bureau had made workable plans for its equipment, mobilization, etc., but when the call came the Chief of Staff wiped out the whole arrangement with the stroke of the pen causing the confusion which existed in some of the states. I know that General Mills was discouraged with the action taken. The same was true in the present war. General Mann was in sympathy with the National Guard and wanted to do practical things, but his hands were tied. The National Guard felt, and has always felt, that if the Militia Bureau was given a free rein there would be no trouble at all in getting somewhere. They feel now that the General Staff is not in sympathy with the National Guard and that, to be perfectly frank, the Militia Bureau is not in a position to carry out policies which it might decide upon.[96]

Even the staunchest advocates of the NGAUS bill testifying before the Senate in the fall of 1919 had made it clear that their argument was not with the Regular personnel

---

[95] Memorandum from CMB to All Inspector-Instructors, Subj: Confidential instructions concerning communications not official in character, Feb. 3, 1920. RG 168/12a/325.3 – General.

[96] AG, MO to CMB, Apr. 2, 1920 in RG 168/12a/011.6 Proposed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

assigned to instruct the Guard and administer the Militia Bureau:

> We have had some very fine inspectors and instructors in New York State, and I have known them all, and they are splendid gentlemen, good soldiers, no better. They were victims of this system. There is no better friend of the National Guard now than Gen. Carter, yet Gen. Carter can not put his ideas into effect, because he would have to work up through the General Staff, and when it gets to the top of the General Staff it is pitched over.[97]

The same sentiment was echoed in the *New York Times* following passage of the law: "Every National Guardsman who has ever had business dealings with the bureau during General Carter's incumbency will feel, regardless of the efficiency of his successor, that the State forces have lost a tried friend and counselor."[98] Carter himself, though circumspect in his public pronouncements regarding friction with the General Staff, had privately suggested limiting the role of the staff "to furnishing information upon the subject of training and organization to the Militia Bureau," allowing the bureau the final say in which policies would be adopted for the Guard.[99] Nevertheless, despite the sympathy that some Guardsmen expressed toward Carter's predicament, the general sentiment relayed to Congress favored making one of their own the chief, and Congress was happy to oblige.

Replacing General Carter with a Guardsman was an easy and relatively painless way for Congress to placate the Guard. But there were many who felt that the Congress missed the point, because it failed to sufficiently reform a system in which the Militia

---

[97] Col. Ransom Gillett, *Senate Hearings*, 1851.

[98] Col. Fitzhugh Lee Minnigerode, "Our National Guard on Paper and in Fact," *NYT*, Nov. 21, 1920, 52.

[99] Memorandum, CMB to Director, WPD, Jan. 3, 1920. RG 168/12a/011.6 (Proposed).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Bureau was limited in its ability to make policy for the Guard. Congress did not grant the Guard the independence (akin to that of the Marine Corps from the Navy) that some of the more radical Guardsmen had clamored for, nor did it fundamentally restructure the Bureau's relationship with the General Staff – though it reduced future friction by allowing Guardsmen to serve on the General Staff and mandating the use of joint committees.

Carter's departure in 1921, coupled with the advent of a Guardsman as the Chief of the Militia Bureau, would lead to a change in the tone of discourse between the bureau and the field – even if the bureau held essentially an identical function, and had to enforce the same rules. It was easier for the adjutants general to take directions from one of their own. It was also clear that the Chief of the Militia Bureau would work more closely in the future with the adjutants general and with NGAUS, and feel fewer qualms than his Regular predecessors about summoning their influence when the needs of the Guard required it. There could be no suspicions that the chief was looking to use his post for further advancement – as General Mann and General Carter had used the post to gain division commands during the World War – since there was no other position in the Regular Army a Guard general could fill. There could be no fear that a Guardsman as chief would appease the General Staff in order to secure tenure in his position, since the law limited the chief to a single four-year term. But the tone of discourse would change for another reason as well. The Army was about to enter a long period of stagnation during which the peacetime routine, restricted as it was by severe economies imposed by Congress, would not be challenged by major reorganizations, external threats, or doctrinal reevaluations that might lead to rancorous debate.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Summary and Aftermath: The Guard's Influence

The salient difference between the debate over the 1920 Defense Act and the 1916 Defense Act was how little was ultimately at stake for the Guard in the post-war battle. Unlike in 1915-1916, nobody really had anything bad to say about the Guard's potential to wage war – far from it, it was impossible to say in 1919-1920 that a citizen army could not fight effectively. Because of the obvious evidence of this truth, March's effort in 1919 to get Congress to forego an organized citizen army and adopt an expansible army along Uptonian lines – either with or without UMT – was hopelessly doomed.[100] Even if March's plan had somehow been enacted in 1920, it would have posed less of a threat to the Guard than Secretary of War Garrison's Continental Army scheme in 1916 – and Garrison's plan had stood a much better chance of passage than March's ever did. The war had changed the debate in the American public's mind so that it now focused on how a citizen army could be made even more efficient – not whether one should exist at all. In this regard, there was a general agreement, especially among Guardsmen, that things had to change.

Pershing, Palmer, and O'Ryan had presented the most compelling plan for change, one that would perpetuate all Guard organizations from the war and use those former state soldiers who were willing to come over to form a federal Guard. This organization would still be locally based and available to respond to civil emergencies and natural disasters. The argument that the states still needed a military force of their own to fend

[100] For concurring opinions regarding the fate of the Baker-March proposal, see Beaver, 243, Holley, 434.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

off the hostile intentions of a despotic central government had largely lost its weight by 1920, judging by the relatively few states' rights advocates who dragged it out during debates. Their proposal that the governors be given the ability to direct the citizen army within their states in peacetime created the impression that the Guard would not change significantly. And while their plan, as ultimately expressed in the Wadsworth bill, advocated a revolutionary departure from the militia as it was established in the Constitution by eliminating local control over appointment of officers and conduct of training, this change would probably have had little effect on Guardsmen outside of the adjutants general if it had been passed. This was as it was intended, since average Guardsmen would have to be persuaded to join this new federal force willingly, whereas the adjutants general were the most popular target of Regular (and Guard) criticism of the Guard.

A further lesson of the debate over the defense act was that Guard opinion was not monolithic, nor were Guardsmen's opinions unchanging. The appeal of the Wadsworth bill was such that even future NGAUS stalwarts like generals Reckord and Foreman supported the bill in 1920 because it gave the Guard a role on the General Staff, would guarantee future recruits to fill the ranks, and made it more likely that Guard units would be deployed intact for the next war. Just before World War I broke out, NGAUS had voted for the Guard to be organized completely under federal control. After the war ended, a significant portion of Guard opinion continued to feel this way. But the behavior of Regular officers towards the Guard during the war had led many more Guardsmen who otherwise might have favored federalization to distrust the idea of Regular control of the Guard. Too many Guardsmen had been removed from positions of command for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

questionable reasons, denied promotion, or experienced the condescension of Regulars. Despite the promises made, and the sound military rationale that federal, centralized control of the reserve forces presented, many Guardsmen could not bring themselves to surrender their independence to this same group which had mistreated them so recently. Had the Guard's experience in World War I been different, had it been allowed to go to war under senior commanders drawn from its own ranks, and been treated as valued partners of the Regular Army, there is no reason to believe that more than a handful of Guardsmen would have opposed federalization after war's end. Federalization – if presented to Congress with the full backing of the Guard, and stripped of the poison pill of a UMT proposal that was roundly decried by large segments of the country – could have been achieved in 1920.

Martha Derthick, in her study of NGAUS' political influence, devotes a single paragraph to her discussion of the Guard association's role in 1920, concluding that NGAUS "was less active than in 1916, and its lobbying does not appear to have been crucial to the outcome of the debate."[101] This is true only if our evaluation of NGAUS' impact is limited to noting the failure of its own legislative proposal. That was, however, only part of what NGAUS sought, and despite the obligatory defense that NGAUS officials gave it, there is little indication that they felt their bill had a realistic chance of gaining passage. It must also be understood that NGAUS was not the sum-total of the Guard's lobbying effort. NGAUS, AGAUS, individual adjutants general, General

[101] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 45. Derthick's doctoral thesis deals with the subject more extensively, but with the same conclusion. See Derthick "Citizen Soldier on Capitol Hill," 126-132.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

O'Ryan, and Guard members of the American Legion all played a role in shaping both the public debate and the final legislation – as the transcripts of the House and Senate hearings and speeches from the floor in Congress demonstrate. The membership of NGAUS made up the largest segment of the Guard voices that were heard, but by no means all of them.

Behind the scenes, there are the words of Colonel Palmer and others regarding the influence of Guardsmen (as members of the American Legion) in shaping the Wadsworth bill. The outcome of this participation, moreover, is seen in many of the "lesser" measures that were incorporated in the final bill which had the unanimous support of the Guard – the reduced manning levels required of companies, the elimination of barriers to obtaining an ORC commission, the amendment to Article 119 regarding relative ranks of Guardsmen and Regulars, and so forth. There is also clear evidence of the powerful influence of the adjutants general, whose opinions regarding the proper organization of the Guard carried weight – particularly in the House – and whose influence was denounced by Senator Wadsworth and others. While Derthick's study limits itself to NGAUS, it would be a mistake to conclude that, by extension, Guard influence as a whole was minimal in 1920. Although the Guard was split over the key issue of federal versus state organization, Guardsmen were united in their support of a whole platform of lesser reforms. Guard's influence was crucial in shaping the 1920 legislation; what's more, the Guard was immensely satisfied with the outcome. Unlike the complaints made by General Martin and others regarding Representative Hay's stubborn refusal in 1916 to adopt NGAUS amendments into the first National Defense Act, there would be no hand-wringing from Guardsmen during the 1920s and 1930s regarding missed opportunities for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

legislative reform in 1920.[102]

Summary and Aftermath: Reactions to the National Defense Act of 1920

General March, unsurprisingly, was disappointed with the legislation Congress passed. Retiring from the Army in July 1921 on the day his rival General Pershing took his place as Chief of Staff, March would remain an informal consultant to the senior leadership of the Army for years to come and an Uptonian to the core. A decade later, when it was safe to do so, he would point to the German Army of the Great War as the model for the U.S. Army to follow. "Of course, no American wants to Prussianize this country. But to discard a Regular Army of substantial strength for the militia of Gen. Palmer's dreams is unthinkable. And the next time the United States goes to war, we will yearn for the army of the Baker-March bill, expanded at once to its full strength by the product of the universal training of the youth of the country therein provided ...."[103]

Most professional officers, however, found a great deal of good in the new law. "In general," opined the *Infantry Journal*, "while the Act in its final form contains some objectionable features and omits others for which hopes had been entertained, it is as a whole not only excellent but is a decided innovation in the way of military legislation." Given the current state of Congress, the editors of the *Journal* believed "that the Army has been more fortunate than it had any right to expect" in the legislation which finally

---

[102] *House Hearings*, p.1905.

[103] "Further Reminiscences of a War Time Chief of Staff of the Army;" lecture delivered at the Army War College (hereafter AWC lecture), Feb. 3, 1931, 9. *Baker Papers*, Box 154, General Peyton March, 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

resulted.[104] Senator Wadsworth, General Pershing, and Colonel (later Brigadier General) Palmer likewise determined that the National Defense Act of 1920 was a qualified victory which had been well worth the fight. Their greatest regret was the failure to enact UMT; as Wadsworth later stated, "we created the framework of a sound military structure but we failed to fill it with men!"[105] However, as each of them acknowledged, just creating a sound peacetime framework for the Army was a major victory, when viewed in the context of prior attempts to accomplish this. Pershing, who as Chief of Staff after the war was often called upon to address the subject, declared the legislation to be a momentous step:

> The deliberations of these committees resulted in the adoption of a sound military policy for the first time in our history, which we find embodied in the Act of June 4, 1920. ... The idea behind this plan, which was and is now strongly advocated and approved by all officers of experience, both in the permanent and temporary forces, was to keep alive the history, the traditions and the associations of the war and so far as practicable to utilize the war organizations of citizen soldiery so that they might form the basis of any army we should need for the future.[106]

Palmer, like March, would continue to display a certain amount of political naïveté regarding UMT and the Guard long after the events of 1919-1920 had passed. Fourteen years after the fact, Palmer remained convinced that had March accepted his plan for a small Regular Army supplemented by UMT and a full size Citizen Army,

---

[104] "Army Reorganization," *Infantry Journal,* July 1920, 71-76.

[105] "The Reminiscences of James W. Wadsworth," 313.

[106] "Remarks of General Pershing before the National Press Club, Washington DC, March 29th, 1922" *Pershing Papers*, Box 343, binder labeled "Speeches, 1922-1923." These comments are representative of the dozens of speeches in which Pershing addressed the NDA of 1920 while Chief of Staff.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Congress would have passed the measure.[107] Congress in 1920 may have agreed with Palmer that a large Regular Army was not necessary for the security of the nation, but it fundamentally disagreed with the proposed solution of instituting UMT to create a large reserve force. Despite Palmer's honest efforts to involve what he saw as the "better element" of the Guard in developing his reforms, the Guard's most politically experienced and influential elements, as represented by AGAUS and NGAUS, were never on board. Even Guardsmen who were in league with him forced him to change his ideal system to one that better suited their desires. In the end, the Wadsworth bill reflected O'Ryan and the American Legion committees at least as much as it did Palmer.

Palmer never really acknowledged how much he and Wadsworth were forced to accommodate those interests when writing the Senate bill, or how his ideas were further reduced or eliminated in the final law following reconciliation with the Kahn bill. Though Palmer revisited the formulation of the 1920 legislation many times in his personal and professional writings, he tended to gloss over these defeats, as in his September 1921 lecture to the Army War College where the bitter disputes of early 1920 were reduced to a single sentence: "Practically all of the constructive features of the original Wadsworth Bill, except the provisions for Universal Military Training, were finally included in amendments to the National Defense Act."[108]

---

[107] Palmer, Memorandum for Record, dated 1933, attached to the Apr. 1, 1919 memo to CofS from Director, WPD, Subj. Outline of a National Military Policy Based on UMT. *Palmer Papers*, Box 3, April 1-Dec 31 1919.

[108] Palmer, "The Military Policy of the United States as Settled by Recent Law and Executive Orders," AWC lecture, Sept. 3, 1921, 1. MHI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Summary and Aftermath: Victory without Sacrifice

As it had in 1915-1916, the National Guard in 1919-1920 had demonstrated that it could be effective in defeating that which threatened it. But unlike the act of 1916 (or 1903 or 1908 for that matter), the National Defense Act of 1920 represented a gain for the Guard without any of the attendant forfeiture of autonomy that the previous acts had called for. The reason for this was simple – the sacrifices incurred in World War I proved the Guard's value to national defense, and permitted the Guard to come to the table afterwards and demand more of a say in how it should be run.

John O'Ryan's role in shaping the Guard ended in 1920. He retired from the Guard in 1923 following twenty-six years of service, took up a career in business, and later dabbled in New York City politics. He briefly considered a run for mayor in 1933, but threw his support behind Fiorello LaGuardia and was rewarded with the job of police commissioner after LaGuardia was elected. Their two fiery personalities clashed, and O'Ryan resigned after less than a year on the job. Except for a brief stint as Civilian Defense Director for New York state during World War II, he returned to his law practice until his death in 1961.[109] Ironically, despite his failure in 1920, his consistent vision for an efficient National Guard operating under strict federal supervision – a Guard which had eliminated the discrepancies created by forty-eight separate systems in peacetime – was largely obtained during the balance of the twentieth century by continued application of federal legislation and regulation, a process of evolution rather than revolution.

---

[109] "Gen. O'Ryan Dead; War leader, 85," *NYT*, Jan. 31, 1961.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 5: 1920-1933 – Post-War Organization of the National Guard, Development of the Militia Bureau, and Early Amendments to the National Defense Act

> *Critics of the National Guard should remember it has won its position against strong and persistent opposition. For many years it has been forced into politics to maintain the tradition of a national citizen army organized and trained in time of peace. This conflict has had a necessary influence on the quality and character of some of its leaders. During the many years while this struggle lasted, the citizen army required leaders who could employ political means of overcoming the persistent resistance of the War Department. Now that this fight has been won, the Guard is prepared to accept military efficiency as the sole basis for leadership. (John McAuley Palmer,* Statesmanship or War, *1927)* [1]

With passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, the focus of the National Guard's efforts shifted from lobbying for survival to rebuilding the force. The nation rapidly lost interest in the military once the immediate debate over post-war legislation had concluded, and before the ink was dry on President Wilson's signature of the National Defense Act, the Army had become a target for measures of fiscal economy. With the election of a succession of Republican presidents and the continuation of congressional control by business-oriented Republicans for the remainder of the decade, the political culture of America took a turn which was decidedly anti-military. Samuel Huntington, in his seminal work on civil-military relations *The Soldier and the State*, characterized the predominant civil philosophies of the period – reform liberalism and business pacifism – as unified in their disdain for the military. The businessman saw military spending as a drag on the economy and large military forces as a threat to

[1] Palmer, *Statesmanship or War*, 158.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

peaceful prosperity, while "the reformer viewed military professionalism as economically wasteful, socially useless, and ethically backward."[2] Turning away from Europe and their failed crusade "to end all wars," most Americans in the 1920s focused their attention on making money and having a good time. As Robert Griffith, a historian of the Army in the interwar period, notes, "[a]s far as the American people were concerned, the volunteer army was out of sight and out of mind."[3] The National Guard, despite what was widely perceived to be its greater influence in Congress, suffered cuts to its force structure equal to those inflicted upon the Regular Army by a fiscally conservative and ideologically isolationist Congress. The Guard lobby, however, rather than competing with the Regular army for scarce dollars chose to use what influence it had to lend aid in the struggle against some of the more drastic measures proposed against the Regulars.

Because of the Guard's generally friendly relations with the Army (as compared to the tumultuous first two decades of the century and the decade that followed the second World War) historian Martha Derthick has characterized the interwar years as "Years of Stability" during which "the Guard's political life was remarkably tranquil."[4] This was not a stagnant period, however. Aside from the annual battles with Congress to ensure adequate funding, close examination of Militia Bureau, NGAUS, AGAUS and congressional records show a constant desire to improve the position of the Guard in the

---

[2] Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap, 1957), 289-294.

[3] Griffith, 53. Within days of the passage of National Defense Act of 1920, Congress passed the Army appropriation bill for fiscal year 1921 – and approved funding for only 175,000 enlisted men rather than the 280,000 it had just authorized in the National Defense Act.

[4] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 45-46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Army. As a result, a steady flow of amendments to the National Defense Act emerged from the public/private partnership of the Militia Bureau and the Guard lobbies, seeking to correct problems and add entitlements for Guardsmen that had been overlooked in 1920. While the War Department and Congress rejected some of these proposed changes, a significant number of them were enacted into law – especially those which had a negligible fiscal impact. Thus, rather then characterizing the interwar years as "Years of Stability" for the Guard, it would be more accurate (if less pithy) to call them "Years of Slow but Steady Progress."

Rebuilding the Guard after the War

The first three years following passage of the National Defense Act were primarily focused on rebuilding the Guard. Recruiting was slow at first. Testimony in the fall and winter of 1919 revealed that many Guardsmen were pessimistic that the Guard would ever be able to rebuild. Maryland's Milton Reckord, when asked in December 1919 how he felt about reorganizing his old regiment, honestly admitted that he thought it would be one of the hardest jobs he would ever undertake. Echoing sentiments similar to those expressed by the men who faced the task of reorganizing the state militias after the Civil War, Reckord believed that Guardsmen had had enough of the Army and did not want to return. "Those of us who have been over there and have been through it for the time being, at least, Senator, see nothing in it."[5] New York's Ransom Gillett made similar remarks in his testimony to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs: "Well, Mr.

[5] *Senate Hearings,* 1919.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chairman, they are fed up. They are through. I am not going to tell you that any different or other legislation that could be put on the statute books would bring them back, because I do not think it would. I do not blame them."[6]

Other old Guard hands were a bit more sanguine in their outlook. General Roy Hoffman could think of only one veteran of the war who had joined either of the two new infantry regiments Oklahoma was raising in September 1919, but he was certain that things would eventually change. "These boys have not had time yet to really settle and get their legs steady. In time a good many will drift back."[7] While Adjutant General Harry Smith of Indiana readily admitted "you cannot get them now" in December 1919, he remained hopeful that 70 percent of those who saw service during the war would eventually join the Guard. "When they came back from the Mexican border they said 'Never again,' and in three months they had a stronger organization than they ever had before. ... If you once get the bug you always have it."[8]

The growth of the Guard prior to the passage of the National Defense Act in June, 1920 was indeed extremely slow, seeming to confirm the worst fears of the pessimists. A few units, totaling little more than 37,000 officers and enlisted men in twenty-four states, had been organized in the first half of 1919 out of the limited funds left over for that fiscal year.[9] With no legislation to provide guidance regarding apportionment of units

---

[6] Ibid., 1854.

[7] Ibid., 804-805.

[8] Ibid., 1962.

[9] *CMB Annual Report, 1920,* 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

among the states, the units had been organized where it was most feared they would be needed in the event of labor unrest. Furthermore, most of the men in these new National Guard units had not served in the National Guard during the war; in many cases they had been members of the State Guard and were resented by National Guardsmen who had been mobilized for the war, came back from overseas, and found their old armories occupied and their old units reorganized in their absence.[10]

The flood of AEF soldiers returning to America reached its peak from April to July, 1919, and with it Guardsmen were released back into civilian life with no further military obligation to serve.[11] As most of these men were beginning their readjustment to home life in the summer of 1919, the Army appropriation bill for fiscal year 1920 was signed into law, authorizing the Militia Bureau to continue the rebuilding of the Guard and making a limited allocation of units to the states. While the bureau authorized the states to recruit up to 109,000 men (based on a quota of 200 men per member of Congress in that first year), by June 30, 1920 only half that number had become federally recognized members of the National Guard. Fourteen states - including pre-war Guard stalwarts Massachusetts and Illinois – lacked a single federally recognized National Guard unit.[12]

The impediments to recruiting in the immediate post-war period have already

---

[10] Ibid., 8.

[11] "Embarkation of Troops For Europe and Arrivals in U.S. from Europe" Statistics Branch, WDGS, June 19, 1920. Binder labeled "World War I," RG 165/37/Box 1 (Chart 178).

[12] Appendix 1 lists the growth of the National Guard from 1920 to 1933. See also *CMB Annual Report,1920,* 7-9, 13-14, 61.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

been discussed in previous chapters. What becomes clear, however, is that passage of the National Defense Act in June 1920 removed a great deal of uncertainty from the equation and provided an immediate boost to recruiting. The smaller authorized company strengths enacted in the legislation – as well as the newfound certainty that the Guard would continue to exist in essentially its old form – were at least partly responsible for the addition of 5,711 enlisted men to the rolls the very month the act was passed.[13] The *Army and Navy Journal* reported in late June that "[i]ncoming reports [to the Militia Bureau] from the Guard organizations indicate that a spirit of enthusiasm is evidently growing among the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Guard."[14] Though the rate of increase would decline during the winter months, by June 30, 1921 Guard strength had more than doubled from the previous year to 114,455, with only four states still lacking any federally recognized units.[15] Former Guardsmen were coming back to the Guard. The new commander of the 1st Maryland Infantry, the regiment Milton Reckord believed would be very hard to recruit for in December 1919, was able to report in August 1921 that "forty-six of the fifty-four officers Federally recognized in my Regiment have had

---

[13] *CMB Annual Report, 1920*, 9.

[14] "National Guard Reorganization," *ANJ*, June 26, 1920, 1326.

[15] *CMB Annual Report, 1921*, 6. Despite this rapid increase in size, the Guard was still well short of the 212,000 goal set for FY 1921. Professional officers expressed considerable concern over this, since it did not bode well for the Guard reaching the congressionally mandated goal of a minimum Guard strength of 424,800 by July 1, 1924. See Col. John Heavey, "Development of the National Guard," *Infantry Journal*, February 1921, 134-138; Maj. H.A. Finch, "The National Guard Problem," *Infantry Journal*, May 1921, 477-483. This concern that the Guard would not be able to expand quickly enough was replaced, by the winter of 1921-22, with the realization that Guard growth would be retarded by lack of funding. The *CMB Annual Report, 1922* reported 159,658 federally recognized Guardsmen in June 1922, a 40 percent increase over the previous year, but noted "[t]he total would have been larger if money to meet the increased cost had been available." (p. 5)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

combat service, and the majority of them served in the 29th Division...."[16]

Future allocations of Guard units to the states would have to await the decision of the congressionally mandated committee outlined in Section 3a of the National Defense Act. Returning to the structure of the prewar Guard was out of the question – the Defense Act had specified the general outline of a territorial structure for a peacetime army that completely integrated the Guard into its forces at the outset of a future war. The peacetime Guard would be organized for war, meaning that in peacetime the Guard would consist of far more support units necessary to create complete combat divisions – and far fewer infantry regiments – than had been the case in 1916. Most Guardsmen understood and embraced this fact, and made it clear both in testimony before Congress and before the Section 3a committee of the General Staff that it was their World War units, lineage, and honors that they would like to see perpetuated – not their pre-war units. One clear indication of this sentiment is that, while the National Defense Act of 1920 allowed states to designate units as they wished, only a handful chose to return to pre-war state designations, most preferring to retain the designations they fought with during the war.[17]

---

[16] Col. D. John Markey, "The National Guard from the Inside," *Infantry Journal*, Aug. 1921, 145. The wartime 29th Division was composed primarily of Guardsmen from four states (including Maryland) and the District of Columbia, so officers who were veterans of the 29th were likely to have been former National Guardsmen.

[17] Technically, Guard units which were federally recognized prior to the distribution of the final allotments by the War Department were required to organize under state designations; almost all changed these once the federal designations used during World War I became available in early 1921. See Militia Bureau Circulars No. 75, Nov. 24, 1920, and No. 19, Mar. 17, 1921. Only seven infantry regiments in four states kept their state designations after 1921 – 1st and 5th Maryland, 1st Virginia, 8th Illinois, 10th, 14th, and 71st New York. Source: *National Guard Register, 1939*. All but the 71st NY were required to change their regimental designation upon being ordered into federal service in 1940 and 1941 in order to prevent

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A small committee of Regulars within the War Plans Division of the General Staff performed the initial work of laying the parameters for the post-National Defense Act Army. The ranking officer on the committee was Lt. Col. John Gulick, who previously (along with Col. John McAuley Palmer) had been assigned in the fall of 1919 to assist in crafting the Wadsworth Bill.[18] This committee defined the missions of the various components, delineated corps area boundaries and functions, and detailed the manner in which units would be allotted at the local level, among many other things.[19]

In August 1920, the general outline of the postwar army as developed by Gulick's War Plans Division committee was formally announced.[20] The six territorial departments of the old Army organization were abolished, and in their place the continental United States was divided into nine corps areas, each with one Regular, two National Guard, and three Organized Reserve divisions, plus the relevant support troops sufficient to form two tactical Army corps in wartime. The corps areas had administrative, training, and tactical control over the units within their boundaries in both peace and wartime. The nine corps

---

confusion with Regular Army regiments bearing the same number. See *CNGB Annual Report, 1941*, 15.

[18] Following this assignment, Gulick served on the Section 3a committee which determined the specific allotments of Guard units to particular states. He so impressed Milton Reckord at that time that Reckord specifically requested Gulick be assigned as executive officer of the Militia Bureau in 1926. Reckord compared Gulick to General George Marshall, whom he knew well, as "a thoroughly efficient high executive in the business world rather than a stiff neck regular Army officer of the General Staff." Gulick was appointed Chief of Coast Artillery with the rank of major general immediately following his tour at the Militia Bureau. See *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section IV, 8-9; *CMB Annual Report, 1930*, 5.

[19] Memorandum for Director, WPD, Subj: Report, Committee No. 2 – on Army Reorganization, July 10, 1920. RG 168/344a/325.4 – Gen. (Box 315). This is an extensive document, consisting of a five page cover memo outlining the problem and findings of the committee, and four attached studies each bearing on a specific aspect of Army organization.

[20] War Department General Order No. 50, August 20, 1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

areas were further grouped into three Army areas for purposes of inspection, maneuver, and war planning. If adequately manned, equipped, and funded, the plans called for a peacetime organization that would allow 2,000,000 men to be mobilized within sixty days. These men would form six field armies of three corps each, for a total of fifty-four infantry divisions, at least seven cavalry divisions, and numerous corps and army level units in support.[21]

In the summer of 1920, the War Plans Division of the General Staff organized six committees to develop further the structure of the postwar army, one of which was the Section 3a committee tasked with determining the specific organization of the Guard.[22] Fourteen Guard officers who held ORC commissions were assigned to serve as additional members of the General Staff, and were split among several committees.[23] Ten of these Guard officers (selected in part to represent each corps area), along with three Regular officers assigned to the General Staff, formed the Section 3a committee on National Guard organization which began its work in early August. All these Guardsmen had served with distinction during the World War, and many would remain prominent in the Militia Bureau or on the War Department General Staff after the war. Among them were

---

[21] Memorandum from AG US to CG, each Corps Area, Subject: Organization and Administration of Corps Areas, Sep. 20, 1920. RG 168/344a/325.4 – General.

[22] Wilson, 87. Other committees developed the TOE for the new infantry and cavalry divisions, determined the number of Regular Army personnel needed to train and administer the reserves, determined manning needs for foreign garrisons, determined the number of Regulars needed for an expeditionary force, and determined the locations of Regular units throughout the United States to meet strategic and training considerations.

[23] War Department General Order No. 52, Aug. 24, 1920. See also "Guardsmen on War Board," *NYT* Sept. 8, 1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Frank Rumbold of Missouri, who in 1917 had been the first Guardsman to serve in the Militia Bureau; Guy Wilson of Michigan, a future president of NGAUS; George Rickards of Pennsylvania and Creed Hammond of Oregon, who would become the first two Guardsmen to serve as Chiefs of the Militia Bureau; and Milton Reckord, recalled to active duty only a few months into his tenure as Adjutant General of Maryland.

While some of the choices made by this Section 3a committee were not easy, the principle of decentralized decision-making prevented any complaints of General Staff heavy-handedness from occurring. Under this system, the committee in Washington generated a tentative set of unit allotments for the states, and the nine corps area commanders in conjunction with the states' adjutants general made the final determination of which states would provide specific units and where they would be organized within the state. With the assistance of the Militia Bureau, each adjutant general was asked to submit information to the committee concerning the number of units already organized in their state, as well as the number of additional units and their probable location within each state that could be organized in the future, based on the established proportion of 800 men per member of Congress mandated in Section 62 of the National Defense Act of 1916.[24] Since the general outline of the Army had already been dictated, it fell to the Section 3a committee only to tentatively group the states within each corps area to form two divisions, and to determine what types of divisional, corps and army troops each state would organize. In general, the committee was guided by the

[24] Militia Bureau Circular No. 48, Aug. 9, 1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

principal that states which had already started to organize particular units should not be forced to abandon them, and that state requests to be allotted specific World War units be honored wherever possible. By October 1920, "after considering the desires of the States insofar as they could be ascertained" and numerous other mitigating factors, the Section 3a committee had determined the initial, tentative allotments of units. In most cases, the total strength of the units allotted to a state was set at or slightly below the minimum strength of 800 men per member of Congress, a strength which each state was required to reach by June 30, 1924.[25]

Allotments were forwarded to the corps area commanders, along with specific instructions from the Adjutant General of the Army requiring that conferences be held in each corps area with representatives from each state. A National Guard officer who had sat on the Section 3a committee in Washington attended each conference in order to lay out the plan and answer any questions. In these conferences, which were held in November and December 1920, each state was given the option to accept or reject the proposed units. The corps area commander and the adjutants general of his area were given great flexibility in changing the apportionment of units among the states from that suggested by the Section 3a committee in Washington. As a general rule, however, the tentative plan forwarded by the Section 3a committee was accepted *in toto*, with only a few states requesting minor adjustments. The Secretary of War, taking into account these adjustments, approved the final allotments in early 1921 and transmitted them to the

[25] Memorandum from AG US to CGs, all Corps Areas, Subject: Allotment of National Guard troops, Oct. 19, 1920. RG 168/344a/325.4 – 1919-1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Militia Bureau, the states, and to each corps area.[26] Following receipt of the allotments, local boards of officers in each state again met to determine the exact locations and designations of the units allotted to them, and (in the case of multi-state divisions) to recommend to the corps area commanders the numerical designation of the infantry divisions which should include these units.[27]

In retrospect, the work of the Section 3a committee in negotiating the desires of the National Guards of forty-eight states, three territories, and the District of Columbia – without touching off a political firestorm – was nothing short of amazing, and serves as a tribute to John McAuley Palmer and his strong advocacy of joint committees. General Carter, still acting as Chief of the Militia Bureau for the first half of 1921, seemed relieved that the responsibility of juggling the requests of competing adjutants general was not his:

> These final allotments ... had been agreed upon by State authorities and a member of the General Staff, and had received the approval of the Secretary of War. The Militia Bureau was in charge of carrying out the administrative details only. ... Under the present law, the Militia Bureau has no power whatever to alter in any way the final allotment made to the States.[28]

Meanwhile, other committees on the General Staff developed the TOE for the new infantry and cavalry divisions, a process not completed until April 1921. Despite

---

[26] Ibid. State by state breakdown can be found in RG 168/344a/325.4 - Gen-32 - folder "Final Allotments National Guard Units by Board of Officers under Sec. 3a N.D. Act." (Box 315). See also Memorandum from ACofS to CofS, Subj: Basic Plan for the organization of the National Guard, Mar. 14, 1922. RG 168/12a/325.4 – Section 3a Committee Report.

[27] Militia Bureau Circular No. 19, Mar. 17, 1921.

[28] *CMB Annual Report, 1921*, 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

General Pershing's insistence on a smaller, more agile formation for open warfare, the post-war infantry division retained its two brigade, four regiment "square" structure (though it did shed over 7,000 billets in order to slim down to just under 20,000 men per division). The cavalry division, retained despite its lack of utility on the Western Front, was reduced considerably to a war strength of just under 7,500. Since it was already clear by the time these TOE were completed that Congress was not going to fund the Army to the full extent authorized under the National Defense Act, peacetime tables were drawn up for the Regular Army which further reduced the manning levels to 11,000 officers and men per infantry division and 6,000 per cavalry division.[29] Guard units mirrored the TOE of Regular units, except in cases where the number of men exceeded the legislated minimum of sixty-five men per Guard unit.[30] In these cases, the Guard unit was not required to recruit up to the higher peacetime strength number, but could be federally recognized at the lower "maintenance strength" minimum of sixty-five officers and men.[31] For the most common type of unit in the Guard – the infantry company – this maintenance strength of sixty-five was twenty-eight fewer men than required of a Regular Army infantry company organized under the peacetime TOE. On a larger scale, it meant that Guard infantry and cavalry divisions could be fully manned at a maintenance strength of 8,066 and 4,383 officers and men, respectively, rather then at the 11,000 and 6,000

---

[29] Wilson, 86-96.

[30] The term "unit" usually refers to a single company, battery, or troop, though any separate organization, no matter how small, that contained both officers and enlisted men qualified as a "unit" under the definition used by the Militia Bureau. Officer-only organizations were referred to as "Headquarters."

[31] Maintenance strength for Guard units was reduced from sixty-five to sixty men in 1924. See Section 110, *National Guard Regulations, 1922, Changes No. 19* (Oct. 1, 1924).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

peacetime strength level mandated for the Regular Army. Both Guard and Regular units, however, would be required to expand to full strength before deploying for combat.[32] The Militia Bureau worked with a will to quickly promulgate draft TOE out to the various states in advance of the final tables, and also advised local commanders on how they could legally circumvent some barriers to enlistment in order to speed the organization of new units.[33]

The organization and federal recognition of newly authorized units continued at a rapid pace. The allotments established in 1920 would not remain stable, however. In late 1922, a second joint committee (to be discussed later in this chapter) was summoned to reduce allotments in order to adjust organizational levels to conform to the new realities of lower levels of funding than had been anticipated in 1920. The 1922 adjustments, as well as adjustments required to conform to new TOE as they were published by the War Department, would have some states making changes to conform to federal requirements for many months after the "final" allotments had been issued.[34]

In accordance with the direction given in the National Defense Act, most of the Guard units that served in the World War were retained afterwards. Sixteen of the eighteen National Guard divisions in World War I had been organized along regional lines. The other two divisions, the 42nd and 93rd, had been assembled from Guard units

---

[32] Memorandum from ACofS to CofS, Subject: Basic Plan for the organization of the National Guard, Mar. 14, 1922, 8, in RG 168/12a/325.4 - Section 3a Committee Report.

[33] See Militia Bureau Circular No. 35, June 16 1920 (superseded by circular No. 1, Jan. 8, 1921), and Circular No. 62, Oct. 18, 1920.

[34] e.g., see *Report of the Adjutant General, Maryland*, 1920-1924, 5. Maryland reported that is was making fairly major reorganizations to conform with changing federal requirements as late as October 1923.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from all over the country. Given these circumstances and the requirement that all post-war infantry divisions would be confined to a single corps area, the decision was made not to include the 42[d] and 93[rd] Divisions in the post-war Guard. In addition, the 31[st] Division was not initially organized after the war because the southern states that had contributed troops to this division during the war had insufficient manpower to organize three divisions, and chose to perpetuate the 30[th] and 39[th] Divisions instead.[35] To bring the total number of Guard infantry divisions back up to eighteen, three new divisional designations were created in 1920 – the 43[rd], 44[th], and 45[th]. Two of these new divisions were assigned to corps areas in the more densely populated Northeast; the 43[rd] sharing the 1[st] Corps Area in New England with the old 26[th] Division (which was now entirely contained in Massachusetts) and the 44[th] in the 2[nd] Corps Area split between New York and New Jersey. The 45[th] Division in the 8[th] Corps Area was shared by Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Colorado – states which during the war had contributed troops to the 36[th] and 40[th] Divisions.

Four cavalry divisions (the 21[st] through 24[th]) were also allotted to the Guard, though these organizations were spread out over too large a geographic area to permit effective training as divisions. As a result, in 1929 the divisional headquarters were eliminated and the cavalry reapportioned with one separate brigade per corps area.[36] In

---

[35] Due to the shuffling of troop allotments among the states from 1921 to 1923, the geographic makeup of the post-war 39[th] Division ended up conforming closer to that of the World War 31[st] Division than it did to the World War 39[th] Division. As a result, at the request of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida and with the approval of the Fourth Corps Area, the 39[th] Divisions was redesignated the 31[st] Division on July 1, 1923. *CMB Annual Report, 1923*, 11n.

[36] Wilson, 116. In 1936, following an increase in the size of the Guard, cavalry division headquarters were once again organized.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

addition to the infantry and cavalry divisions, the Guard was allotted some 130 companies of coast artillery, a variety of Corps, Army and General Headquarters Reserve combat units, and a dozen separate (non-divisional) infantry regiments. These last were a special concession to the Guard. Some of these infantry regiments were units which by reason of geography or policy could not be included in an existing division; e.g. regiments allotted to Hawaii and Puerto Rico or segregated units for black Guardsmen. Others were regiments which had already been either completely or partially organized, could not be integrated into a division in their corps area, and which the states refused to convert to another branch either because of tradition or sentiment or an insistence on maintaining additional infantry structure beyond that already allotted.[37] In summary, though minor changes occurred constantly, with the exception of the reorganizations of the cavalry divisions the entire interwar period was one of remarkably little change in the location and organization of Guard units. Indeed, it represents what is most certainly the most stable period of Guard/militia organization from the passage of the Militia Act of 1792 up to the present day.

Selecting the Chief

The campaign in late 1920 to determine which Guardsman would become the first Chief of the Militia Bureau seemed to justify the fears of Regular officers that the position would fall victim to partisan political manipulation. Initially, it appeared that President Wilson wanted to select the man who many felt was the obvious and most-

[37] See Maj. Gen. George Rickards, "The National Guard," AWC lecture, Nov. 14, 1924, 9. MHI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

qualified choice, John O'Ryan. Wilson's nomination of O'Ryan in December to the rank of major general in the Officers Reserve Corps seemed to confirm the New Yorker's status as the front-runner for the post.[38] O'Ryan's reputation, and his close friendship with Senator James Wadsworth, a fellow New Yorker, assured that his nomination would sail through the full Senate. O'Ryan, however, perhaps disillusioned by the manner in which his schemes for National Defense had been derailed by Congress only months earlier, quickly decided he wasn't interested in the job. He instead asked New York's governor to recommend his former subordinate for the job, the wartime commander of the 106th Infantry, Col. Franklin Ward.[39]

Two other men nominated for the position received serious consideration, at least in the press.[40] The first was Col. George C. Rickards of Pennsylvania, a veteran of forty-three years service and the wartime commander of the 112th Infantry (formerly the 16th Pennsylvania Infantry, which he commanded in the Spanish-American war and on the Mexican border before leading it in France) and the 56th Brigade, 28th Division. Since July 1920, Rickards had been assigned as an additional member of the War Plans Division of the General Staff and was serving on the Section 3a committee which helped

---

[38] "Wilson Names O'Ryan for Major General," *NYT*, Dec. 21, 1920, 22.

[39] "Recommended for Militia Bureau Chief," *ANJ*, Dec. 18, 1920, 452. Ward at that time was assigned to the General Staff.

[40] Other than speculating about O'Ryan, the *Army and Navy Journal* confirmed the nomination of only three other officers – Ward, Rickards, and Martin. See *ANJ*, Dec. 18, 1920, 452 and Dec. 25, 1920, 487. Milton Reckord's papers include a copy of a letter of nominating him for the post as well. See Gov. Richey to Sec. of War Baker, Nov. 22, 1920 in *Reckord Papers*, Box 6, Folder "World War I – Correspondence." Martin's correspondence indicates that, according to a source on the General Staff, at least three other officers were being considered for the position – Generals Presson of Maine, Hulen of Texas, and Steiner of Alabama. See Martin to Col. John Rose, Oct. 1, 1920. *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

determine the future organization of the National Guard.[41] The other nominee was Brig. Gen. Charles Martin of Kansas, the AGAUS president.

Even before the final passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, Martin had planned to call a meeting of AGAUS for the purpose of reviewing the legislation and securing uniformity of action in reorganizing the Guard under the new legislation.[42] The forthcoming meeting gained a sense of urgency when, within days of the June 4th signing of the act, at least one governor nominated an officer of his state for the position of Militia Bureau chief. "[U]nless something is done and done quickly," a concerned AG wrote Martin, "the situation will reolve [*sic*] itself into what I discussed with you and General Lasher in Washington. There will be a scramble for political endorsements to procure this appointment which will damn the National Guard, and put it in the position of becoming a mere political machine, I believe."[43]

On June 21st and 22nd, AGAUS met in Chicago, an event which turned out to be the coronation of Martin as the adjutants' general choice for the first Guardsman to be Chief of the Militia Bureau. Twenty-two states were represented, and after brief discussions of the new defense legislation, the talk turned to the nomination process. While Martin excused himself, the assembled AGs discussed several candidates before overwhelmingly (with three abstentions) selecting Martin as their choice. Furthermore,

---

[41] "Major General George C. Rickards," *Infantry Journal,* Apr. 1925, 460-461.

[42] Martin to W. A. Hazle (AG, SD), May 20, 1920. *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 1.

[43] Col. John Bersey (AG, MI) to Martin, June 8, 1920. *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 1. Brig. Gen. Louis Lasher was the AG of Iowa.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

seven additional proxy votes from states not present were tallied for Martin.[44]

With the solid support of AGAUS behind him, Martin was ultimately able to garner the nominations of thirty-five governors in his quest to become the first National Guardsman to serve as Chief of the Militia Bureau. But President Wilson was not obligated under the National Defense Act of 1920 to select the officer with the plurality of nominations. Rather, the president was only obligated to make his selection from the list of officers nominated. Martin was an outsider to the Army staff; if anything, as the leader of the fiercely independent adjutants general of the various states, he was viewed as an enemy of the Regular Army and the General Staff in particular.[45] Furthermore, his accumulation of endorsements smacked of precisely the kind of political maneuvering that Regulars despised in the Guard. Rickards, on the other hand, had "won the approval and admiration of his associates" during his tour on the General Staff. Since a special committee of the General Staff was responsible for reviewing all the candidates and recommending the most fit, it seems clear that Rickards' service – and the perception by Regular Army members of the General Staff that he would be somebody they could work with – was the most important factor in determining the final outcome. President Wilson appointed Rickards, subject to Senate confirmation, to the post of Chief, Militia Bureau on December 30, 1920 – one day before the deadline in the National Defense Act

---

[44] "Minutes of Meeting of the AGAUS held at Chicago, Illinois, June 21st and 22nd, 1920." *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 1.

[45] Martin himself was under the impression that opposition within the War Department to his nomination came from the Assistant Chief of Staff, General Wright. See Martin to Col. John Rose, Oct. 1, 1920. *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

required him to name a Guardsman for the post.[46]

Martin's supporters were outraged. Governor Henry Allen of Kansas declared that ignoring the recommendations of two-thirds of the governors was a clear indication "that the intent of the law has been violated."[47] Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas railed against the choice, and managed to delay the Senate's confirmation of Rickards until after a new Congress – and new Republican president – was in place. The Harding administration, however, nominated Rickards a second time (to have done otherwise might have established the precedent that the president was restricted to selecting the officer nominated by the most governors) and his nomination was quickly confirmed by the Senate.[48] The result of all this was that General Carter remained the Chief of the Militia Bureau until Colonel Rickards' confirmation by the Senate on June 28, 1921 – something which no doubt surprised Carter, given that he had already bid goodbye to the National Guard a year earlier in his 1920 Annual Report, announcing that he would use (what he assumed to be) his final report as Chief as an opportunity to "invite attention to the improvements made in the force through the earnest, conscientious and patriotic efforts of Regular officers on duty in the Militia Bureau."[49]

The selection of Rickards' successor, Col. Creed C. Hammond of Oregon, was not

---

[46] "The New Militia Bureau Chief," *NYT*, Jan. 1, 1921, 7; "Crippled Militia's Needs," *NYT*, Feb. 6, 1921, X5.

[47] "Col. Rickards goes to War Department," *NYT*, Dec. 31, 1920, 4.

[48] "Stands Pat for Rickards," *NYT*, June 26, 1921, 3; "Rickards Nomination Confirmed," *NYT*, June 29, 1921, 13; "Colonel Rickards for Militia Bureau." *ANJ*, June 11, 1921, 1109; "Confirmation of Colonel Rickards Held Up." *ANJ*, June 18, 1921, 1133.

[49] *CMB Annual Report, 1920*, 9. Emphasis added.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

nearly as controversial. Of the five candidates for the position in the spring of 1925, Hammond not only secured the most gubernatorial nominations – thirty-four – but he also possessed the most General Staff and Militia Bureau experience of those nominated.[50] Hammond had impeccable credentials for the posting as Chief, Militia Bureau. A veteran of thirty-two years (nine of which were on active duty, to include service in the Regular and Volunteer forces) he saw action in the Spanish-American War, Philippine Insurrection, and World War. From August 1920 through October 1922, Hammond had served on active duty as an additional member of the General Staff in the G-3 and War Plans Divisions, and thereafter in the Militia Bureau where he rose to become chief of the Finance and Property section. In addition to this breadth of staff experience, Hammond was a westerner, and sources who were informed about the Secretary of War's thinking noted that Hammond's selection was in part intended to recognize the contributions of the western states to national defense.[51]

Hammond proved so popular a choice during his tenure that replacing him in 1929 required an unequivocal statement on the part of the Secretary of War regarding presidential prerogative in the selection process. In order to secure himself a second term as chief, General Hammond attained every gubernatorial nomination except one. Only the Governor of Maryland demurred, at the request of his adjutant general, Milton

---

[50] The other nominees were the AG of Florida, Brig. Gen. J. Clifford Foster, the former AG of Missouri, Brig. Gen. William Raupp, the commander of the 53d Infantry Brigade, Brig. Gen. Franklin Ward of New York, and Lt. Col. Clark C. Wrenn of Texas. Ward (who had also been nominated to be the Chief in 1920) had previously served on the General Staff, while Wrenn was serving on it at the time of his nomination. Rickards, at sixty-four, was too old to succeed himself. Source: "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, Mar. 1925, 331.

[51] "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, Apr. 1925, 461.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reckord. Reckord feared that a dangerous precedent would be set if chiefs could, in effect, get themselves elected by the unanimous consent of the governors rather than selected by the President, and urged the selection of a different man.[52] The War Department heeded this advice, and informed Hammond that a "rotation policy" was being put into effect, and requested that the governors of the various states submit new nominees for the appointment.[53] Several months later, the War Department recommended, and the president selected, Brig. Gen. William Everson of Indiana to be the next chief.

General Hammond's non-selection aroused significant resentment in several states, and requests that NGAUS take action were widespread. Fortunately, the president of the association in 1929, Brig. Gen. Ellard Walsh of Minnesota, had the good sense to steer clear of a political fight that could do little to profit NGAUS. The Guard association would remain strictly neutral in the matter. NGAUS' purpose, Walsh pronounced, was the initiation of policies and legislation with the intention of improving the National Guard; "we were not concerned in the appointment of any individual by the executive branch of the Government, but were concerned with the administration of that individual

---

[52] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 56. Derthick believes that Reckord's maneuvering to unseat Hammond was politically motivated, to ensure that the Militia Bureau chief's personal influence could not challenge that of NGAUS when it came to speaking out on Guard affairs. It may be that personal animus had more of a role to play than Derthick realized. General Reckord considered Hammond to be a political appointee who was not held in high regard by his fellow Guardsmen, a statement which is difficult to reconcile with the large number of nominations Hammond received in both 1925 and 1929. Reckord's opinion of Hammond was so low that he claimed to have influenced the Secretary of War to appoint Col. John Gulick as Executive Officer of the Militia Bureau in 1926 in order to maintain the bureau's efficiency while Hammond was chief. See *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section IV, 8-9.

[53] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1929*, 41.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

after appointment."[54] Walsh (who during and after World War II would become the fiercest defender of the Guard and its place in the military establishment) went so far as to warn the NGAUS delegates in 1929 that it might be preferable to return to the pre-1920 practice of having a Regular Army officer serve as Chief, Militia Bureau, since the manner of selecting the chief under the present law "tends toward division and dissension and gives no assurance that the voice of the States will be recognized."[55]

Such a suggestion must be seen purely as a warning to the assembled delegates – perhaps one specifically aimed at his good friend Milton Reckord – to stop interfering in the selection process. It is doubtful that anyone in NGAUS, to include President Walsh, wanted to give up Guard control of the Militia Bureau. Walsh himself engaged in more than a little lobbying when, after only two years as chief, Maj. Gen. Everson resigned to become pastor of a large Baptist church in Denver. Everson's successor was Brig. Gen. George Leach, a partisan Republican, former two-term mayor of Minneapolis, and a lifelong friend of Walsh. Leach's unpublished autobiography notes that Walsh "had spent several years lining up the Adjutant Generals [*sic*] of more than half the states in the Union to ask the President to appoint me ...."[56] Walsh, quite appropriately, had the honor of swearing Leach into office at a special ceremony preceding the 1931 NGAUS convention.[57]

---

[54] Ibid., 42.

[55] Ibid.

[56] George Leach, "The personal history of Major General George E. Leach," 81. Typewritten ms., Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN.

[57] "National Guard Convention," *Army and Navy Register*, Dec. 12, 1931, 553.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Thus, after a somewhat rocky first decade, the method of selecting the chief was firmly established.[58] Due in part to the executive branch's refusal to be limited in choice to the officer with the plurality of gubernatorial nominations, and in part to an announced policy of neutrality on the part of the Guard lobbies, the process did not devolve into an all-out political popularity contest damaging to the reputation of the Guard. While there is little doubt that considerations other than the purely military have weighed, from time to time, on the selection of the Guard's seniormost officer, it is also fair to say that they weigh no more heavily in this selection than they do for any of the other senior general officer positions, all of which are made by the president and confirmed by the Senate. By obtaining the position of Chief, Militia Bureau for the Guard as it did in 1920, Guardsmen and the Guard lobbies elevated one of their number to greater prominence and influence then had ever been the case in the past, and finally gained for the Guard some permanent measure of access into the deliberative and policy making heart of the Army.

The Regular Army and the Civilian Components

A key facet of the interwar relationship between the National Guard and the Regular Army, one that developed very quickly after the passage of the National Defense Act, was the gulf between rhetoric and reality when it came to the organization and mission of the Regulars. Simply put, the budgets passed by Congress in the 1920s and

[58] NGAUS eventually pushed through a law which eliminated the "rotation policy" that had removed Hammond from consideration for a second term; see Section 5, Act of June 19, 1935 (49 *Stat.*. 392). During and after World War II several Chiefs would serve beyond their initial four-year terms.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1930s did not permit the Regular Army to both man its divisions completely and allocate all the personnel required to adequately train the civilian components. Congress slashed Army funding with bipartisan abandon. Daniel Anthony, who (in addition to his seat on the Military Affairs Committee) chaired the House Subcommittee on Army Appropriations, was probably the most important single individual in Congress when it came to determining the Army's budget. His dislike – particularly for the General Staff – has already been well established. But Anthony was not alone on his subcommittee in zeal for cost-cutting; he was amply supported by ranking minority member Thomas Sisson (D-MS) and the majority of the House of Representatives in his constant search to trim the budget further. Anthony was so hated in military circles for slashing the budget that the *Army and Navy Journal* actively – and unsuccessfully – campaigned against his re-election in 1922. Anthony remained in charge of the Army Appropriations subcommittee until March, 1929 (he did not stand for re-election in 1928, and died in 1931).[59]

Though Representative Anthony had voted for the National Defense Act in 1920 and its 280,000 man Regular Army, he still believed that nine full-strength Regular Army divisions was a far larger force than was necessary for the immediate defense of the nation. Thus, days after passage of the act, Congress authorized only 175,000 men for the

[59] Griffith, 57, 65. A good general source on the subject of military appropriations (which unfortunately picks up precisely where this thesis ends) is Elias Huzar's *The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by Congress through Military Appropriations, 1933-1950* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1950). The dominance of the House subcommittee on military appropriations vis the Senate is well covered in Chapter II; a key factor here is the constitutional proscription that bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House. The Senate subcommittee tended to view itself "as a 'court of appeals' whose chief job is to correct errors made by the House ...." (p. 73).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Regular Army for fiscal year 1921 (extending from July 1920 to June 1921). This would turn out to be the high point of strength for the Army until 1940. Debate the following spring over the fiscal year 1922 budget found Senator Wadsworth (who chaired the Senate subcommittee on military appropriations) trying to hold the line at 175,000 men, while Representative Anthony, with the support of President Harding, pushed for and eventually got 150,000 men. Funding for educational and vocational training championed by former Secretary of War Baker, for the development of the Air Service, for equipment and supplies for the National Guard, and for a host of other items, were all slashed as well. The reductions from 1920 to 1923 proved so swift that Regular Army enlistments were suspended entirely for a period and some officers and NCOs had to accept reductions in grade in order to stay in the service.[60] By fiscal year 1923, after another bitter fight between the House and Senate over strength, Congress finally settled upon a post-war Regular Army strength. It agreed to fund a Regular Army of 125,000, though it consistently fell short in actual appropriations for even this low figure. Actual average strength of the Regular Army for the rest of the decade fluctuated between 111,000 and 121,000 men.[61]

Given the fact that Congress would not fund the Army at even half the strength contemplated in the National Defense Act, the Army was forced to make a choice. Guidance was not lacking from the highest authority regarding what the Army should do

---

[60] Griffith, 61-62.

[61] Griffith, 57-69. Chapter 3 of Griffith's book provides an excellent account of the political struggle over the Army budget and its impact on the Army in the 1920s.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in this case. In July 1921, President Harding issued a memorandum to the newly-installed chief of staff of the Army, General Pershing, which laid out his interpretation of the National Defense Act. Published later that year as War Department General Order No. 31, the memorandum was released amidst great fanfare by Secretary of War John Weeks, who resorted to hyperbole when he stated to the press "[f]or the first time in the history of the country the President has promulgated a military policy for the United States." Briefly summarized, the mission of the Regular Army would first be to support the citizen components:

> As the regular army contains more regiments and other units than can be maintained at effective strength with the authorized enlisted personnel, you are directed to retain a suitable number of units at an enlisted strength effective for immediate military service and to place the units thus rendered surplus 'out of commission' until such time as Congress shall authorize an increase in the enlisted strength of the regular army.
>
> ... As the law provides for a military expansion by reinforcement of the regular army from the organized citizen forces, the President directs that these forces shall be developed to the fullest extent and that the maximum practical number of carefully selected officers of the regular army be employed for that purpose. The retention in the regular army of skeletonized military units ineffective for immediate military service is not deemed advisable.[62]

Despite this rather clear direction, the General Staff chose in the course of the 1920s to skeletonize rather than eliminate units of the Regular Army. Belief in the Uptonian expansible army was not dead among active-duty officers. The General Staff reverted to form and cut the enlisted strength of units, developing warplans which would flesh units

---

[62] Weeks quote and text of Harding memo reproduced in entirety in "New Army Policy Fixed by Harding," *NYT*, July 25, 1921, 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

out with volunteers and draftees at the outset of the next conflict.[63]

Such a course had severe consequences for the training of the Guard and the Organized Reserve. In order to save slots for officers in Regular units, the War Department choose to eliminate each of the nine corps training centers for the Guard and Organized Reserve, and reduced the number of officers assigned as instructors to the Guard, ROTC, and CMTC. In retrospect, the decision was probably easy for the General Staff to make – not only was it in keeping with the still-predominant Uptonian mindset of most Regular Army officers, but it was also understandable from a career-advancement point of view. The Army has always valued service with troops – particularly command – above all other assignments. Maintaining a large number of skeleton organizations created more opportunities for Regular officers to command troops, and also made it easier to justify larger numbers of high ranking officers. Assignments to corps training centers and Guard, ROTC and CMTC instructor positions rarely offered the opportunity to command and isolated officers from their Regular Army peers, thus offering little opportunity for recognition and promotion. As Colonel Palmer relayed to his patron General Pershing, this insistence on maintaining skeleton organizations was understandable but fundamentally flawed:

> It is very natural for Regular Army officers to be reluctant to accept a solution of the organization problem that tends to reduce the number of Regular Army units. But where sound principles of military organization, as well as economic and political considerations, demand it, the national interest must be regarded as paramount. This apparently is one of those

[63] The Army attempted to maintain three divisions at peacetime strength in three of the corps areas, and a reinforced brigade in each of the remaining six corps areas which was to expand to division strength upon declaration of war.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

> cases where personal interest tends unconsciously to interfere with intellectual honesty. ... No large body of Regular officers, many of them ignorant of important features of the problem, can be expected of their own volition to arrive at a solution that would apparently relinquish all hope of future expansion of the Regular Army.[64]

Palmer was ultimately unsuccessful in changing the policy of the War Department. Though the skeletal organization of Regular Army units contravened its own published policy as well as the directives of the President, it was maintained throughout the interwar period.

Believers in the citizen Army, like Palmer and his good friend George Marshall, were dismayed by this short-sightedness on the part of the General Staff.[65] General Palmer, in his popular writing, would later make the point that the decision to alter the Regular Army's force structure in this way was one which had a significant impact on the National Guard and Organized Reserves, and thus should have been made by a joint committee as dictated by the National Defense Act.[66] Not surprisingly, however, the Guard and Reserve were not consulted.

Ironically, the General Staff would continue to rely heavily on the appeal of the citizen army components when making its case before Congress for adequate funding of Regular Army officer personnel. This was particularly true when faced with the House's efforts in 1932 to cut 2,000 Regular officers from the rolls of the Army. As Chief of Staff

---

[64] Palmer to Pershing, Subj. Peace Organization of the Regular Army, July 21, 1922. RG 200/Pershing Papers Box 25/ "Army reorganization interviews," 3, 4.

[65] See Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 220-221, esp. footnote 33.

[66] Palmer, *America in Arms*, 189-190. For more on Palmer and his views on the post-war structure of the Army, see Holley, 500-504.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Douglas MacArthur would repeatedly emphasize in his (ultimately successful) bid to defeat the proposed cuts, the first consequence of Regular officer reductions would be the abandonment of training of the reserve components.[67] Elimination of skeletonized units in the Regular establishment was never considered an option, even during the most fiscally trying times.

Early Amendments to the National Defense Act

The legislative efforts of the Guard lobby did not end in June 1920. By no means content to sit back and enjoy the fruits of their victory following passage of the National Defense Act, within weeks the members of AGAUS were formally discussing changes that they would like to see in the law. The first major effort in this regard came when representatives from twenty-two states held a meeting in Washington from March 15-17, 1921.[68] The dozen changes the assembled adjutants general proposed to the War Department and forwarded to key members of Congress in some cases constituted minor adjustments in the wording of the law. In most instances, however, the AGs sought to significantly modify the act either by rectifying existing problems, easing the burden of recruiting and administration, or by creating opportunities for the advancement of

---

[67] John W. Killigrew, "The Impact of the Great Depression on the Army, 1929-1936" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana Univ., 1960), 120-123. Similar arguments were a staple of the *Army and Navy Journal's* campaign against the officer cuts; e.g., "Reduction of Army Officers," Apr. 23, 1932, 795; Editorial, May 21, 1932, 896.

[68] At the request of the Adjutant General of the Army, General Carter of the Militia Bureau proposed several revisions of the National Defense Act in September 1920. Every one of his suggestions – including several which would be successfully advanced by AGAUS and NGAUS in the next two years – was rejected outright at the time. See Memorandum from AG US to All Chief of Bureaus, Branches and Services, Subject: Proposed Legislation, Aug. 16, 1920; response containing proposed legislation from CMB to AG US, Sep. 1, 1920, and nine memos, various subjects, from AG US to CMB, Dec. 9 thru Dec.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guardsmen and the Guard as a whole.

While oftentimes these changes were seemingly trivial or technical, they were typical of the types of changes that senior Guard leadership would seek during the interwar period, and thus bear closer examination. Several of these amendments had been proposed during the debates over the National Defense Act, and having failed at that time, were re-introduced with the hope that Congress would pass them as separate measures. One change would enhance recruiting by allowing enlistment of boys sixteen to eighteen years old in the Guard with their parents' consent; another would allow all newly organized companies in the Guard to be federally recognized with a minimum strength of fifty men and be given one full year after federal recognition to achieve their maintenance strength of sixty-five; a third change would allow Guard officers to serve as Chiefs of Staff of Guard divisions, a position reserved for Regular officers; a fourth would change the name of the Militia Bureau to the National Guard Bureau and would lift the restrictions on the number of Guard officers assigned there; a fifth would pay Guard officers for travel expenses incurred in attending Army schools and eliminate the restriction of pay for all Guard officers attending schools to that of a captain; a sixth would make the U.S. Property and Disbursing Officer in each state (a Guard officer on the staff of the Adjutant General), rather than the Quartermaster General of the Army, responsible for disbursing Guard pay.[69]

The *Army and Navy Journal* (which copied liberally from a highly critical analysis

---

13, 1920, rejecting each specific proposal in turn. All memos contained in RG 168/12a/011.6 – (Proposed).

[69] "Adjutants General for Law Changes," *ANJ*, Mar. 26, 1921, 819.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the AGAUS proposals prepared by the Militia Bureau) quickly attacked the proposed changes, particularly on the grounds of the added expense they would incur. Only a single change proposed by the AGs received entirely favorable consideration; commanders of organizations, whether lieutenants or captains, should be allowed to collect $240 a year of additional administrative pay. The law as written at that time specified that only captains could receive this allowance. It was also conceded that adding a third Guardsman to the staff of the Militia Bureau would be a good measure in order to equalize the geographic representation of Guardsmen at the bureau, but warned that replacing Regulars with Guardsmen throughout the bureau, as the adjutants general had suggested, would only serve "to lessen the efficiency of the bureau if not to lower the standards required of the National Guard."[70]

The War Department was not entirely opposed to change, though it was hesitant to request major revisions of the National Defense Act from Congress with the new law in place for less than a year. The AGAUS proposals were reviewed by the Secretary of War, the Militia Bureau, and a Section 5 committee of the General Staff. Afterwards, a conference committee between members of the General Staff and representatives of AGAUS found that several issues could be resolved by non-legislative means. For instance, it was agreed that the Secretary of War possessed sufficient authority in peacetime to extend the period during which companies could be federally recognized at

---

[70] "Proposed Changes, National Guard Laws," *ANJ*, Apr. 9, 1921, 882-883. The anonymous article in *Army and Navy Journal* does not credit the Militia Bureau for its analysis of the resolutions. However, it is clearly based on the work of General Carter's staff. Compare to analysis attached to letter of CMB to Rep. Julius Kahn, Apr. 21, 1921, in RG 168/12a/011.6 - (Proposed)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the reduced strength of fifty men for an additional year, to July 1, 1922.[71] It was also agreed that several other proposed changes should be presented to Congress, to include compensating travel expenses and eliminating discrimination in pay for Guard officers attending Army schools, as well as allowing lieutenants commanding organizations to collect the $240 administrative pay allowance. Two other provisions where change was agreed upon would permit future officers commissioned in the Guard to receive ORC commissions (the law, as written, limited ORC commissions to current or former Guard officers) and would allow disbursement of pay through the U.S. Property and Disbursing Officer in each state.[72] The War Department agreed to request amendment of the relevant sections of the defense act from Congress, and on July 26, 1921, the chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Military Affairs submitted identical bills to accomplish these changes and more.[73]

The Senate version of the bill was passed within two weeks; in the House,

---

[71] Authority to do this was based on Section 60 of NDA 1920. See "Minimum Strength of National Guard Units," *ANJ,* July 23, 1921, 1252. In 1922, following further pleading from the Militia Bureau and NGAUS, the Secretary of War authorized a policy change allowing all newly organized Guard companies to be federally recognized at the reduced strength of fifty for a full six months before they would be required to reach their maintenance strength of sixty-five. Units which had been organized for longer than six months were required to maintain sixty-five men at a minimum or risk withdrawal of federal recognition. See Section 110, *National Guard Regulations, 1922, Changes No. 3* (Mar. 22, 1923). In 1924 maintenance strength was reduced from sixty-five to sixty. Ibid., *Changes No. 19* (Oct. 1, 1924).

[72] "Amendment of National Guard Law," *ANJ,* Apr. 23, 1921, 933.

[73] "Amending National Guard and Reserve Laws," *ANJ,* July 30, 1921, 1272 and "National Guard and National Defense," Aug. 20, 1921, 1345. See also *CMB Annual Report, 1921,* 35. Besides making the four changes mentioned above, the law amended Section 81 of the National Defense Act to allow a third National Guard officer (in addition to the chief) to be assigned to the Militia Bureau, amended Section 5 to allow Guard officers who demonstrated their ability to be declared eligible for General Staff service (previously, only Guard officers with wartime General Staff service were eligible), amended Section 37 to allow Guard officers, when promoted, to be promoted in the ORC as well, and made other minor changes.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

however, the bill stalled in the House Military Affairs Committee. The committee, though sympathetic toward the bill, was afraid to report it to the full House for fear that it would be defeated at a time when a particularly anti-militarist sentiment was responsible for voting down every piece of defense legislation that came to the floor. When AGAUS again assembled in Washington on December 12-13, 1921, Chief of Staff Pershing hosted representatives from thirty-two states at a luncheon at the Army and Navy Club, and President Harding received them at the White House. But their main purpose was to appear before the House Military Affairs Committee to urge it to report the bill favorably. As Milton Reckord, the Secretary of the Legislative Committee, told the assembled AGs, they were there to tell the Military Affairs Committee "We want that bill brought out and we will pass it when it comes out."[74]

The AGs then brought their influence to bear on their congressmen. Though it would take ten more months and the resubmission of the bill before a new session of Congress, the fruits of their labors were realized with a revision of the National Defense Act on September 22, 1922. With the exception of failing to transfer the handling of Guard pay to the Property and Disbursing Officer in each state, the new law addressed all of the issues agreed upon by the War Department and AGAUS in the Spring of 1921 – it expanded Guard eligibility for service on the General Staff, facilitated attainment of an ORC commission and promotion in the ORC for Guardsmen, increased from two to three the number of Guard officers who could be assigned to the Militia Bureau, eliminated pay

[74] "Minutes of the Meeting of the AGAUS, Raleigh Hotel, Washington DC, Dec. 12-13, 1921." RG 168/12a/080. - Adjutants General Assoc. See also "Adjutants General, N.G., Meet in Washington," *ANJ*, Dec. 17, 1921.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

discrimination for Guardsmen attending Army schools, and mandated quarterly pay for enlisted personnel, among other issues.[75] While significant, this legislation did not mark the first change to the National Defense Act to benefit the Guard. An earlier, minor amendment to Section 90 of the National Defense Act, passed by Congress in the first quarter of 1922, had allowed the Militia Bureau to hire caretakers for air service and motor drawn units.[76]

The AGAUS meeting in Washington in December 1921 was also an opportunity to push for several other changes in the law, particularly in the area of pay reform. This was prompted by the ongoing debate in the House and Senate over revising the pay scales of all the military services, a debate which would culminate in the passage of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1922.[77] Three of the six resolutions the AGs passed in December 1921 had to do with the proposed pay act: a statement of general support for several pay bills then before Congress; a request that former Guard officers serving in the Regular Army be allowed to compute longevity pay based on their Guard and militia service (not

---

[75] Act of September 22, 1922, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 42, Pt. 1, Chap. 423. (Public Law No. 358). Note that the issue of the $240 administrative pay for officers commanding units was resolved in the Pay Readjustment Act, discussed below. The request to make payments for drill attendance quarterly had been specifically advocated by NGAUS in its February 1922 convention. Previously, drill pay was disbursed semi-annually. See *NGAUS Proceedings, 1922*, 53-54. A full explanation and justification of the provisions in this law is provided by Secretary of War Weeks in letters to the Senate Military Affairs Committee reproduced in Senate Report No. 238, *Amendments to the National Defense Act*, 67th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 1921 and Senate Report No. 856, *Amendments to National Guard Provisions of the National Defense Act*, 67th Congress, 2d Session, Aug. 3, 1922.

[76] Act of March 1, 1922, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 42, Pt. 1, Chap. 90. (Public Law No. 161). Previously, only employment of animal caretakers was permitted. This bill was one of several backed by NGAUS, see *NGAUS Proceedings, 1922*, 55. Section 90 of the National Defense Act, which dealt with "Care of Material, Animals, etc., National Guard" was the most amended section of the National Defense Act relating to the Guard; between 1920 and 1940 eight laws were passed modifying it.

[77] Act of June 10, 1922, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 42, Pt. 1, Chap. 212. (Public Law No. 235).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

just on their active federal service); and a request that Guard officers assigned to active duty with the General Staff receive the same pay and allowances that Regular officers received.[78] Maj. Gen. William Price of Pennsylvania briefly presented the Guard's opinion on how the proposed legislation could be improved in testimony the following March before the House subcommittee studying service pay.[79]

In June 1922, the Pay Readjustment Act delivered virtually all of what the adjutants general had asked for, and then some. Any Guard officer, company or field grade, commanding an organization smaller than a brigade became eligible for an additional $240 per annum of administrative pay allowance.[80] For lieutenants commanding company-sized organizations this was a particular boon, as it marked a significant increase to their maximum pay of approximately $420 a year. Former Guard officers commissioned in the Regular Army before July 1, 1922 were allowed to compute their service in the Organized Militia or National Guard at 75 percent for purposes of longevity pay (the small number of Guard officers who took Regular Army commissions after that date received no credit for militia service). Traditional Guard officers on federal active duty received full credit (for purposes of longevity pay) for the time they previously spent on active duty and half credit for their time in state service. Since

---

[78] "Minutes of the Meeting of the AGAUS, Raleigh Hotel, Washington DC, Dec. 12-13, 1921." RG 168/12a/080. - Adjutants General Assoc. Subsistence, housing and longevity pay made up a significant portion of a Regular officer's pay.

[79] *Readjustment of Service Pay: Hearings before a Special Committee of the House of Representatives.* 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 117-8 (March 20, 1922).

[80] Guard officers alone were eligible for this payment, as Regular units had full-time clerks who removed much of the administrative burden from their commanders.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

previously no credit at all had been given for time in the militia or National Guard, and only partial credit for time spent in federal service, this was a significant improvement. In addition, Guard officers would be entitled to receive the same pay and allowances as Regulars while serving on federal active duty, whether it be for annual training, for attendance at Army schools, for service with the General Staff, or service during a national emergency.[81]

Lastly, in what was a clear demonstration of the Guard's political clout, the lowest ranking enlisted soldiers in the Guard were spared the 30 percent pay cut which the Pay Readjustment Act inflicted upon the same ranks in the Regular forces. Privates first class and privates in the Regular Army had their pay reduced from $35 to $30 and $30 to $21 a month, respectively, as a result of the new law. Since drill pay in the Guard was computed at 1/30th of a month's base pay for the equivalent rank in the Regular Army, this cut would have reduced drill pay for new privates in the Guard to 70 cents per drill (or day of annual training), and made recruiting for the Guard even more difficult – as it would become in the Regular Army. Instead, Congress made an exception for the

---

[81] These additions to base pay were subsequently negated when the Comptroller General of the United States ruled that longevity pay, rental and dependent allowances could only be paid when Guardsmen were on federal active duty other than for training – i.e., only during a national emergency, not while attending annual training or service schools. This would not be the last time that the comptroller would reduce or negate legislative victories for the Guard. See Militia Bureau Circular No. 3, Jan. 4, 1923 and memorandum from CMB to Chief, Legislative Branch, Subject: Legislation affecting the Pay Readjustment Act of June 10, 1922, Feb. 7, 1923. RG 168/12a/011.6 – Proposed. The NGAUS leadership denounced the comptroller ruling as perverting the will of Congress and the General Staff and gave strong support to legislative remedies proposed by the Militia Bureau; see *NGAUS Proceedings, Feb. 1923*, 63-77. Congress quickly came to the Guard's defense, and passed legislation which corrected the problem; allowances were restored to Guardsmen with the Act of March 4, 1923, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 42, Pt. 1, Chap. 281 (Public Law No. 532); see also Militia Bureau Circular No. 29, Mar. 29, 1923. Longevity pay was restored (and made retroactive to July 1922) by the Act of May 31, 1924, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 43, Pt. 1, Chap. 224 (Public Law No. 171).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

National Guard, maintaining drill and annual training pay scales at the old rate of $1 and $1.15 per drill/day for privates and privates first class.[82]

Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the new National Defense Act, the senior leadership of the Guard aggressively sought further advantage for the Guard by repairing defects in the law, increasing pay and benefits for Guardsmen, and empowering the Guard by seeking to increase the role of Guardsmen in the Militia Bureau, as chiefs of staff of divisions, and on the General Staff.[83] Though many of the proposals they advanced were not transformed into law – for the time being – the adjutants general demonstrated that they would not adopt a passive attitude during the post-war period. It should be noted, however, that the first recourse of the Guard lobby was to work through the War Department, even if it meant eliminating from consideration those proposals the General Staff found most objectionable. A spirit of cooperation was adhered to, in part because of an honest desire by most men to heal the damage rendered to Army/Guard relations during the World War, but also for the practical reason that military legislation introduced in Congress without the War Department's approval stood little chance of passage. But even measures that failed to be accepted by the War Department the first few times they

---

[82] Sections 1, 3, 14, Act of June 10, 1922. NGAUS lobbied directly for this provision; see *NGAUS Proceedings, 1922*, 58. It should be noted that the two pay scales even out somewhat when one takes into account that Pvts and Pfcs in the Regular Army had means for making up their lost pay that were not available to Guardsmen, such as reenlistment bonuses, and (for those in combat units) marksmanship bonuses. Specialist pay, which was initially denied to Guard enlisted men by the Comptroller General, was reinstated by Congress in Section 6 of the Act of June 3, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 365).

[83] It should be noted that the Guard was not alone in seeking changes to the National Defense Act of 1920. A study conducted by a member of the House Committee on Military Affairs concluded that in the first ten years after the passage of the act some sixty-five laws amending it were passed, each law effecting from one to fifteen sections of the National Defense Act. See Rep. Hubert Fisher, "Congressman Urges Study of Defense Act," *ANJ*, Feb. 8, 1930, 529.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

were introduced still succeeded in helping the Guard lobby shape the debate over the proper role and prerogatives of the National Guard in the defense establishment. In some cases it would be decades before goals were achieved, but they were not forgotten.

The Alliance of the Guard Lobbies and the Militia Bureau

Legislative proposals advanced by the Guard later in the decade continued the trend established in 1920-1921, with some changes. The first change was the return of NGAUS from a period of relative dormancy. While the organization did not entirely die away, no conventions were held in 1920 and 1921, and only belatedly did the association get involved in lobbying for legislative changes in 1922. As we have already seen, this period of dormancy did not prevent reform from happening – the AGs under the auspices of AGAUS had been quite effective in advancing the Guard agenda. It is clear though that the AGs felt they would benefit from having their sister organization return to an active status.[84] While influential, the AGs were a small, elite group vulnerable to criticism, as the debates on defense legislation in 1919-1920 had demonstrated. NGAUS, though still driven largely by the will of the adjutants general, was more broad-based and – at least on the surface – more representative of the Guard. While the membership and public perception of the two groups may have differed, the political agendas of NGAUS

---

[84] An indication of how much influence AGAUS had over NGAUS can be found in the minutes from the December 1921 AGAUS meeting. "It was moved and seconded that Col. Bennett Clark, President of the National Guard Association of the United States, be requested to call an early meeting of this Association sometime in February 1922. Carried Unanimously." The assembled AGs then agreed among themselves on the form of representation that would take place at the NGAUS convention, and selected New Orleans "during the Mardi Gras" as the location for the convention. See "Minutes of the Meeting of the AGAUS, Raleigh Hotel, Washington DC, Dec. 12-13, 1921." RG 168/12a/080. – Adjutants General Assoc.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and AGAUS remained virtually indistinguishable during the interwar period.

As the typewritten minutes of the February 1922 NGAUS convention in New Orleans attest to, there was considerable confusion regarding what procedures to operate under, and disputes regarding the validity of the actions taken by NGAUS in 1918 and 1919; clearly delegates in 1922 disagreed with some of the things that the early post-war association said and did. The newly elected president, Col. Guy Wilson of Michigan, consciously drew distinction between the new, post-Defense Act NGAUS, and Bennett Clark's "smash the Regular Army" NGAUS of 1919 when he enjoined:

> Congress has given to us as the Army of the United States, the Regular Army, the National Guard and the Organized Reserves and if any one of these components attempts to build up its own organization by tearing down the other and destroying the other forces, by that very act they destroy themselves. Let us take a lesson from the history of the past and be a regular force right now, "Each for one and one for all" and the more quickly we of the National Guard can convince those of the regular establishment and those of the Organized Reserves that we are willing and anxious to co-operate with them, the more quickly we can compel those of the Regular Service and those of the Organized Reserves to co-operate with us.[85]

Maj. Gen. Price of Pennsylvania echoed these comments when he later reflected upon the spirit of the convention. "The general feeling was expressed that no longer could the petty attacks of those nursing personal grievances against the Regular Army be supported or even countenanced by the National Guard, and that the only standard of measurement of future worth to either force would be the attitude of those concerned toward the work to be accomplished in the reorganization of the force."[86] One indication of this spirit was

---

[85] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1922*, 45-46.

[86] "Review of the National Guard Convention," *ANJ*, Mar. 18, 1922, 675.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that in this very first post-Defense Act NGAUS convention two resolutions were passed urging Congress to maintain adequate appropriations and an adequate officers corps for the Regular Army.[87] This theme of cooperation would, almost without exception, characterize the interwar period.

The second significant change in Guard legislative initiatives compared to the period prior to July 1921 is the development of the Militia Bureau as a cooperative partner with AGAUS and NGAUS. Martha Derthick considers this to be the most important legacy of the National Defense Act of 1920, and it is difficult to argue with her conclusion.[88] It was through the Militia Bureau, far more than through representation on the General Staff, that the interests of the Guard would be presented to the War Department. The bureau became a full and equal partner with the two Guard lobbies, serving as a valuable conduit for intelligence on measures being considered by the General Staff or Congress, and a source for detailed staff studies and official data that could be used to support NGAUS and AGAUS proposals. When speaking to Congress, the bureau provided an official, professional opinion which was augmented by the civilian-soldier viewpoint of NGAUS and AGAUS. If, on balance, the viewpoints of Militia Bureau officers were necessarily somewhat muted by virtue of their status as representatives of the War Department, the leaders of NGAUS and AGAUS were under no such restrictions and could freely state their opinions concerning laws, appropriations, or War Department policies as they wished.

---

[87] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1922*, 60-61.

[88] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 56.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Together, the three organizations presented a solid "Guard" front to the War Department and Congress; in virtually all cases, disagreements over policy were settled in private to ensure a unified voice in public. Many times, this amounted to giving the Militia Bureau a veto over some of the more unrealistic resolutions approved by the NGAUS membership during their annual convention, shooting them down before they were ever presented to the General Staff. Milton Reckord, on accepting the presidency of NGAUS in October 1923, was the first to elaborate on this policy:

> I know from past experience that we can rely upon the Chief of the Militia Bureau and the officers in that Bureau, be they Regular Army or National Guard, to listen to what we have to say, and that we will get their assistants [*sic*] and their help, and everything that I do as President of this Association throughout the coming year, I shall first attempt to have approved by the Chief of the Militia Bureau. (Applause) I say this, not because I always agree with General Rickards, because in the past he and I have have [*sic*] had honest differences, but I say it because I believe that if we wish to get the best, we have got to hold the Militia Bureau up on a pedestal – in other words, we have got to make it more than a mere adjunct of the War Department – and therefore I think all questions affecting this Association should be laid before the Chief.[89]

Reckord's policy of ensuring Militia Bureau concurrence before advancing the NGAUS platform has generally been adhered to for the last eighty years, a stark contrast to NGAUS relationship with the Militia Bureau during its first dozen years when a Regular officer was in charge.

The Militia Bureau embraced this alliance with the Guard lobbies with equal fervor. The contrast between General Rickards and his immediate predecessor, General Carter, could not have been stronger in this regard. General Carter eschewed the NGAUS

---

[89] *NGAUS Proceedings, Oct. 1923*, 147.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

conventions (his response to an inquiry about attending the 1919 convention "No representative this bureau contemplated") and the Militia Bureau under his leadership dismissed virtually every amendment proposed by AGAUS following their March 1921 meeting. General Rickards (and his successors) attended the NGAUS conventions religiously with their staffs because he felt it was the "duty of the Militia Bureau to be present ...."[90] For the October 1923 NGAUS convention, not only did Rickards and five other officers from the Bureau travel to Denver, but the chief – believing so strongly that these conventions were critical for exchanging ideas and the forging of common bonds – mailed letters to AGs who had not committed to attend which went "to the limit of propriety in urging attendance at the National Guard Association Convention."[91] Rickards also fought to gain passage of many of the AGAUS amendments rejected by his predecessor in 1921, and proved material in achieving the legislative successes described earlier in this chapter. For his efforts, in 1927 he became the first-ever Chief of the Militia Bureau (or its predecessor, the Division of Militia Affairs) to be elected an honorary life member of NGAUS.[92]

The close working relationship between the Militia Bureau and the Guard lobbies began early and was key to their joint success. Within a week of the 1922 New Orleans convention at which NGAUS was reorganized, the Chief of the Militia Bureau called the

---

[90] Ibid., 53.

[91] Rickards to Brig. Gen. Edward Logan (President, NGAUS), Oct. 15, 1923; see also Rickards' strong endorsement to the CG, DC to attend the combined NGAUS/AGAUS meeting of February, 1922. 1st endorsement to memo, CG DC to CMB, Subj: The National Guard Association of the United States, Jan. 21, 1922. All correspondence in RG 168/12a/080. – National Guard Association.

[92] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1927*, 163.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

leadership of NGAUS and AGAUS to Washington to testify before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on proposed amendments to the Pay Readjustment Act, the first of many such summons to action. A week after that testimony took place, General Rickards forwarded a copy of the revised Pay Readjustment bill to all of the AGs with a note informing them that the provisions specifically recommended by NGAUS had been added to the proposed legislation.[93]

In an attempt to generate greater communication with the AGs, General Rickards received permission from the Secretary of War to bring them all to Washington for a week-long training session, to be held – not coincidentally – at the same time AGAUS normally held its annual spring meeting. This first "School of Instruction for the State Adjutants General," held May 5-10, 1924, included presentations to the assembled AGs by the Militia Bureau staff and a host of luminaries, as well as social events culminating in a reception with President Coolidge. It was judged a huge success. Rickards was able to provide his most important customers with a great deal of information, while AGAUS was able to conduct business with what was almost certainly a record-high turnout for the time – only three states lacked representation.[94] A second "school" was held in March of the following year, with similar superb results, before a ruling of the Comptroller General brought the program to a crashing halt; the conferences were not considered to be within

---

[93] See copies of telegrams, CMB to Col. Guy Wilson and Gen. Charles Martin, Mar. 7, 1922. RG 168/12a/011.6 - Proposed; Memo, CMB to AGs of all States, Subj: Pay, Mar. 23, 1922. RG 168/12a/011.4

[94] Memorandum to all AGs, Subj: School of Instruction for State Adjutants General, Mar. 11, 1924. RG 168/344a/080. - Adjts Gen. See also untitled, undated, eight-page synopsis of 1924 school in RG 168/344a/350.05 (Box 365); *CMB Annual Report, 1924*, 2; "Conference of State Adjutants General," *ANJ*, May 17, 1924, 906.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the scope of training, and reimbursement of attendees was denied. Congress had to pass a law a year later in order to validate the expenses for the two "schools" which had already been held and allow for reimbursement. The adjutants general would continue to hold their spring meetings in Washington after 1925, and conduct business in a similar fashion, but they would have to pay for it out of their own pockets.[95]

The Struggle for an Autonomous Militia Bureau

The Guard developed a sense of pride in and ownership of the Militia Bureau after 1920, and this is reflected from the outset in how NGAUS and AGAUS worked willingly with General Rickards and his successor, General Hammond, to ensure the Bureau achieved autonomy from the General Staff. Though its existence was specified in law, the role of the Militia Bureau was largely defined by the War Department. Within months of the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, War Department General Order No. 64 delineated the duties and functions of Chief, Militia Bureau and of department and corps area commanders relative to the National Guard.[96] This order charged the bureau with "the administration and development of the National Guard in accordance with the approved policies of the War Department." However, these policies which affected the Guard were prepared by the General Staff – and not necessarily in

---

[95] "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, Apr. 1925, 462-470; *CMB Annual Report, 1925*, 3; *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 119; Section 5, Act of May 28, 1926 (44 *Stat.* 675). Termination of the "School of the Adjutants General" meant a much smaller turnout for the annual spring AGAUS meeting. In May 1927, only twenty states were represented. See Minutes of Spring, 1927 AGAUS meeting, 6, 7. RG 168/344a/080. - Adj. Gen. Assoc. (Box 189).

[96] Para. V, War Dept. General Order No. 64, Oct. 23, 1920. During the war and its immediate aftermath, these duties were specified in paragraphs V, VI, and VII, War Dept. General Order No. 119, Sept. 11, 1917.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

consultation with the Militia Bureau. Regulations based on these policies which the Militia Bureau developed for the Guard all had to be cleared by the General Staff before being promulgated.

Though the assignment of Guardsmen to the General Staff was supposed to increase the Guard's input into the development of policies and regulations, this did not always happen to the satisfaction of NGAUS, AGAUS or the Militia Bureau. Joint Regular/Guard ("Section 5") committees were not always formed when they should have been. Dissatisfaction with the Guardsmen serving on the General Staff was initially widespread. Senior Guard leaders, to include General Martin and General Rickards, expressed great frustration at the fact that Guardsman detailed to the General Staff in 1920-1921 did not at that time hold active commissions in the Guard. It was felt that some of these men had more allegiance to their position on the General Staff than to the needs of the National Guard.[97] Rickards assumed his post as Chief of the Militia Bureau in July 1921 with the realization that the National Defense Act had not nearly eliminated the restrictions on the Militia Bureau that his Regular Army predecessors had been forced to deal with.

Within a few weeks of his taking office, Rickards was asked to submit comments to a special board of officers appointed to evaluate the organization of the General Staff.[98]

---

[97] See Martin to Col. John Rose, Oct. 1, 1920, *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 1; Resolution No. 3, *NGAUS Proceedings, 1922*, 53; *NGAUS Proceedings, Oct. 1923*, 86-87; "Minutes of the Meeting of the AGAUS, Raleigh Hotel, Washington DC, Dec. 12-13, 1921," 12. RG 168/12a/080. - Adjutants General Assoc.; Draft memo, CMB to Board of Officers ..., Subject: Comments concerning relations between the War Department and the Militia Bureau, July 19, 1921. RG 168/12a/325.3 - General.

[98] Rickards took office as Chief, Militia Bureau on July 1, 1921, the same day General Pershing became the new Chief of Staff. Among Pershing's first acts was to reorganize the General Staff along the lines of his

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The new chief requested that in the future, policy announcements from the General Staff concerning the National Guard first gain the Militia Bureau's concurrence – or at the very least its views – before they were made. He also asked that he be allowed to recommend those Guard officers who were to be assigned to General Staff duty, and that an officer of the Militia Bureau be included in General Staff studies affecting the government of the Guard.[99]

Rickards was also forced early in his tenure to face down a challenge from the new corps area commanders which would have had the effect of emasculating the Militia Bureau. He addressed this issue in his speech at the December 1921 AGAUS meeting:

> The appointment of a National Guard officer as head of the Militia Bureau has not met with universal approval as you have no doubt discovered in the public address of one of the Corps Area Commanders six or eight weeks ago, in which he classes the law providing for the appointment of a National Guard officer to Chief of the Bureau as "Class Legislation," and expressed the hope that the law would soon be changed so as to permit the detail of an Army officer to that post. He also voiced as his opinion that the office of State Adjutant General should be abolished, and that States should work direct with the Corps Area Headquarters instead of the Bureau at Washington, and in order to do this, the Corps Area Headquarters take over all the administrative functions of the Bureau with the exception of the allotment of funds. In other words, set up in each Corps Area a Militia Bureau.[100]

At the time Rickards made these remarks, General Pershing had already ordered the matter studied by a joint committee consisting of two Regular and two Guard officers

---

wartime staff in France. See War Dept. General Order No. 41, Aug. 16, 1921.

[99] Memorandum, CMB to Board of Officers ..., Subj: Comments concerning relations between the War Department and the Militia Bureau, July 20, 1921. RG 168/12a/325.3 - General. This memorandum is considerably more mild than the draft version, dated July 19, which is found in the same location.

[100] Address of Maj. Gen. Rickards to the AGAUS, Raleigh Hotel, Washington DC, Dec. 12, 1921. RG 168/12a/080. - Adjutants General Assoc., 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

on the General Staff, and two officers of the Militia Bureau. This committee had issued its preliminary findings on October 20, largely confirming the existing relationships between the Bureau, the General Staff, and the corps area commanders.[101] However, at the time of the AGAUS convention, the findings were still under consideration and the necessary revision of General Orders and National Guard regulations had not yet been completed. The assembled adjutants general made their feelings known, passing a resolution opposing decentralization of the Militia Bureau. In fact, now that the Bureau was in Guard hands, the members of AGAUS were in favor of expanding its authority at the expense of the General Staff:

> Resolved: ...[T]hat no action be taken having for its purpose the decentralization or removal from the Militia Bureau of any of the powers or prerogatives now exercised by said Militia Bureau, and that a policy be adopted to confer additional control and jurisdiction over the National Guard in said Militia Bureau, and that all policies, regulations and proposed legislation affecting the National Guard be submitted to the Militia Bureau for its approval before adoption.[102]

With the publication of War Department General Order No. 6 on January 31, 1922, the corps area commander's role relative to the National Guard was further defined, but the status quo already in place was essentially maintained. The challenge posed by the corps areas to the administrative authority of the Militia Bureau was put down. While the order, in a nod to the complaints of AGAUS and the Militia Bureau, instructed the

---

[101] "Proceedings of a Board of Officers Convened in the War Department Pursuant to the Following Orders: Special Orders 235-0" - Oct. 20, 1921. Eight page staff study contained in RG 168/347a/29.3 (Box 6). The committee did further defined the specific responsibilities of the Corps Area Commanders with regard to the National Guard and gave them a greater role in the supply of Guard units in their area – though control of federal funds for supply of the Guard remained in the hands of the bureau.

[102] "Minutes of the Meeting of the AGAUS, Raleigh Hotel, Washington DC, Dec. 12-13, 1921." RG 168/12a/080. - Adjutants General Assoc.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Section 5 committees of the General Staff to obtain the views of the Chief of the Militia Bureau whenever formulating policies and regulations that effected the Guard, the new wording did not liberate the Militia Bureau from having to carry out the dictates of the General Staff. In fact, the changes brought about by this new General Order were so slight that they were only given two brief sentences under the heading "Decentralization of Supply" in the 1922 Annual Report of the Chief, Militia Bureau.[103]

Real change in the Militia Bureau's status as a semi-autonomous agency of the War Department would have to wait. General Rickards continued to be frustrated throughout his four-year tenure as chief, which ended in June 1925. In an unusual break with the normal custom of praising the spirit of cooperation and camaraderie that characterized Guard and Regular relations, Rickards used the concluding remarks of his final annual report to attack General Staff interference in the workings of the Guard. "I am convinced that sound business principles and the best interests of national defense will be served when the Chief, Militia Bureau, shall have his duties fully defined by regulations, if not by law, and be permitted to exercise them."[104] Rickards further urged that the Guard budget should henceforward be made a separate appropriation, in part "to eliminate the feeling ... in the Regular Army to the effect that moneys used for the maintenance of the National Guard are being taken from funds necessary for the support of the Regular Army." Had he been able to handle the appropriation in his own way rather than be bound by the dictates of the G-4 section of the General Staff, Rickards

[103] *CMB Annual Report, 1922*, 17.

[104] *CMB Annual Report, 1925*, 51.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

argued, he would have been able to add 13,000 more men to the Guard and still remain within the amount appropriated for the Guard by Congress.[105] Rickards also brought this protest before NGAUS during its December 1924 convention in Philadelphia. NGAUS responded by resolving to seek legislation that would clarify the duties of the Militia Bureau and protect it from the encroachment of the General Staff.[106]

The president of NGAUS at this time was Brigadier General Milton Reckord of Maryland, who without a doubt was the single most influential individual in the association during the interwar period. Born in 1879 in Reckordville, Maryland – a small town named after his grandfather – Milton Reckord received only a high school education before taking up his father's milling business after his untimely death. Inspired by the return of his local Guard unit, Company D, 1st Maryland Infantry, from service abroad during the Spanish-American War, Reckord enlisted on February 15, 1901 at the age of twenty-one. He was actively recruited by the unit commander because the officer wanted a good baseball team for his company, and Reckord was captain of the hometown team (most of which enlisted along with him when he decided to join). He would not take off the uniform until he was eighty-six – just a few weeks shy of sixty-five years of military service. Young Private Reckord showed leadership ability and his company was under strength, so it was not surprising that within five months of his enlistment he was appointed first sergeant and within three years he was elected captain (he never served as a lieutenant). A major when America went to war in 1917, he was rapidly promoted to

---

[105] Ibid.

[106] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1924*, 100-103, 182-183.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

lieutenant colonel and then colonel and given command of Maryland's 115th Infantry shortly before it shipped out to France in June 1918.[107] He distinguished himself in combat commanding the 115th, and made a singular impression upon his brigade commander during the last month of the war, Col. John McAuley Palmer, as an exemplary citizen-soldier. Palmer became a lifelong friend.

Upon returning home in 1919 Reckord strongly considered retiring from the Guard; as he recalled, "I had done my bit now – let the younger men do it."[108] More out of a sense of duty than anything else, Reckord reluctantly agreed upon his return home to re-form the 1st Maryland Infantry. In January 1920 Reckord received a call from the newly-inaugurated governor of Maryland, Albert Ritchie. He was offered the job of adjutant general, which he agreed to accept on two conditions: that the governor not require him to spend all of his time on the job, and that the governor not play politics with officer appointments.[109] Though he would become known as a masterful advocate for the National Guard in the halls of Congress, Reckord studiously avoided state politics while performing his functions as adjutant general. As a result he was asked to stay on in his post through both Republican and Democrat administrations for forty-five years (interrupted only by active federal service during World War II) – longer tenure than any adjutant general in any state has ever held, or likely will ever hold.

---

[107] Allan Crist, "Milton Atchison Reckord," *The National Guardsman*, Feb. 1966, 22-25; "General Reckord dies at 95," *Baltimore Sun*, Sept. 9, 1965, C1. Reckord was typical of Guard officers of his day in that he had served time in the ranks before becoming an officer, another cultural divide that distinguished the Guard from the Regular Army.

[108] *Reckord NGAUS Interview*, 4.

[109] *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section I, 31.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The administration of Maryland's military forces was not considered a full-time job in 1920, and did not pay full-time wages. Reckord had ample opportunity to continue to oversee the family business, enjoy his favorite pastime of horse racing (Reckord would serve several terms as president of the organizations that owned the Pimlico and Havre de Grace racetracks), as well as champion the two associations he was a lifelong member of – the National Guard Association and the National Rifle Association.

Geography, as much as disposition, had a great deal to do with Reckord assuming the burden, sometimes single-handedly, of the NGAUS legislative effort. His offices in Baltimore and Annapolis were the closest to Washington DC of any of the adjutants general, and this close proximity made it easy for Reckord to meet with members of the War Department or Congress whenever the business of the Guard required it. Given NGAUS' lack of permanent staff and limited budget with which to compensate members for travel on the organization's behalf, Reckord provided an inexpensive means by which the association could stay in touch. He was also well-connected, persuasive, and willing.

By Reckord's own recollection some forty-six years later, following his testimony to the Senate Military Affairs subcommittee in December 1919 he assisted Senator Wadsworth and Colonel Palmer in writing the Wadsworth bill. While he thought the proposed legislation was "an excellent bill," Reckord later claimed he opposed those provisions which would have created a strong Organized Reserve because he "thought the Guard ought to be continued in its original status" – a statement somewhat at odds with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

his testimony in December 1919.[110] Following the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, Reckord was summoned to active duty with the General Staff, and served on the first joint committees established under the new law, to include the Section 3a committee which apportioned National Guard units among the states. By 1921 he was secretary of the AGAUS legislative committee, and he would frequently serve a similar role in NGAUS when that association was revived in early 1922. In October 1923 he was elected president of NGAUS, a post which he held for two years. He would continue to remain active in NGAUS and AGAUS legislative efforts for the rest of his long professional life.

The few years Reckord had spent as Adjutant General of Maryland were sufficient to alter some of the views he held just shortly after the World War had ended. The strong support he had shown for federal control of the National Guard in his 1919 testimony (albeit control through a General Staff that had significant citizen-soldier representation) had diminished in the years that followed as he witnessed the gradual encroachment of federal authority on every aspect of the Guard. Reckord brought this issue before the assembled Guard officers in early 1926 during his second year as president of NGAUS:

> ...practically every day there are new regulations, new opinions, and new decisions which restrict our activity, which limit the authority of the State, which impose conditions on organizations and individuals not heretofore required - in fact, Federal control down to the minutest details. It will be only a question of time, and that not far off, when there will be nothing left for the States authorities to decide and all matters will be controlled by Federal regulations.[111]

---

[110] *Reckord NGAUS Interview*, 10; *Senate Hearings*, 1915-1916.

[111] *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 62.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The January 1926 NGAUS convention at which Reckord made this statement took place thirteen months after NGAUS had resolved, in response to General Rickards' request, to demand the revision of General Order No. 6 of 1922.[112] Their goal was to eliminate what Guardsmen saw as War Department interference with the prerogatives of the Militia Bureau, the institution which now Guardsmen looked upon to restrain encroaching federal controls. During 1925, the leadership of NGAUS had met with Secretary of War Weeks to discuss a host of legislative proposals the Guard association wished to have adopted by the War Department. Secretary Weeks asked the NGAUS leadership to defer its request for legislation to supplant General Order No. 6 in order to see if a Section 5 committee of the General Staff couldn't devise a suitable revision of that would be agreeable to all parties. Seeking to avoid a public confrontation, General Reckord and other NGAUS leaders acquiesced. By January 1926, however, revision of the order had been stalled by disagreements between the General Staff and the Militia Bureau.

Some insight into the stormy struggle over this revision was given by Lt. Col. Clark C. Wrenn of Texas, who served two and a half years as a Guardsman on the General Staff and was a member of a Section 5 committee tasked to revise the order in 1925. Opposition within the War Department to giving the Militia Bureau any more autonomy had been strong; the Adjutant General of the Army went so far as to state to the committee that the bureau was a mistake and should be abolished. On two occasions, a

---

[112] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1924*, 182-183.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

compromise general order was drafted by a joint committee, only to be rejected by higher authority within the War Department. A third revision was then drafted without consulting either the Militia Bureau or Guardsmen on the General Staff. This order would strip the Militia Bureau of many of its present functions and remove it from the supervision of the Secretary of War, returning it to the direct control of the Chief of Staff, where it had resided before the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916. Promulgation of this new order had been temporarily halted late in 1925 at the request of the Militia Bureau when word of it leaked out.[113]

It was under the cloud of this attempt to emasculate the Militia Bureau that the January 1926 NGAUS convention took up the issue of revising General Order No. 6. Maj. Gen. Creed Hammond of Oregon, the new Chief of the Militia Bureau, urged patience and expressed hope that the new Secretary of War, Dwight Davis (a former Guardsman in Missouri's 138th Infantry during the war), would be more amenable to the Guards' requests. General Reckord, however, indicated that the patience of the Guard was wearing thin:

> General Orders No. 6 can define the duties of the Militia Bureau to our satisfaction and the matter can be handled by regulations rather than by law, but I think we have reached the point where we should state that if this matter is not definitely and promptly settled to our satisfaction, in this way, we shall present this to Congress and define the duties of the Militia Bureau by law.[114]

The discussion over the revision of General Order No. 6 became the central issue

---

[113] *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 84-85.

[114] *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 23, 64, 89-90. Weeks was forced to resign as Secretary of War in October 1925 due to ill health.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the 1926 NGAUS convention. The assembled delegates adopted a draft revision of the order (developed a few days earlier at a meeting of AGAUS) which went into great detail regarding what powers they believed should be assigned to the Militia Bureau. The membership of NGAUS once again resolved to either get the order amended to their liking or submit legislation before Congress to achieve the same goal.[115] This time, they would not be dissuaded by the Secretary of War from seeking legislative redress of their grievances, though many members still held out hope that the matter would ultimately be settled internally and administratively, through a revision of General Order No. 6.

The threat of dictating the role of the Militia Bureau to the Army by legislative fiat helped to hastily bring about concession on the part of the War Department. Under the direction of Assistant Secretary of War Hanford MacNider, the NGAUS leadership held several meetings with representatives of the General Staff, Judge Advocate General's office, Adjutant General's office, and Militia Bureau in early 1926. MacNider, a former Iowa National Guardsman who rose from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel during World War I, and afterwards served as National Commander of the American Legion, was responsible for Army procurement and industrial mobilization planning. However, he also informally served as the immediate civilian supervisor of the Militia Bureau (a function delegated to him by the Secretary of War). He had not been involved in the earlier fights over revising General Order No. 6, and he was sympathetic to the Guard's point of view.

At the same time as negotiations between the Guard and the General Staff were

[115] *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 78-104.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

proceeding, Representative John C. Speaks (R-OH) of the House Military Affairs Committee introduced legislation which would enact everything NGAUS and AGAUS wanted without giving the General Staff any input in the process.[116] Speaks was a forty-year veteran of the Ohio National Guard, rising from private to brigadier general, who had served in Puerto Rico during the Spanish American War and as a brigade commander on the Mexican border and during the World War. Faced with the threat of this pending legislation – a tactic rarely employed by the Guard lobbies during the interwar period – an entirely new general order was quickly developed and published. This order granted broad authority to the Militia Bureau and placed resolution of any conflicts firmly in the hands of the Secretary of War, though in practice the Assistant Secretary of War remained the authority who would negotiate disputes between the Militia Bureau and the General Staff.[117]

The 1926 version of General Order No. 6 avoided the listing of specific duties and responsibilities of the Militia Bureau, the format employed in 1922 and in the revisions suggested by AGAUS and NGAUS.[118] The role of the bureau was defined much more broadly and in fewer words. The War Department gave the Militia Bureau "general administrative control of all War Department activities incident to the

---

[116] H.R. 9571, 69th Congress, 1st Session. See also *NGAUS Proceedings, Nov. 1926*, 24-25. During Speaks' ten years in the House of Representatives (1921-1931) Milton Reckord said of him "All I had to do was hand the bill to General Speaks and he said, "If I need you I'll call you. If I don't, why I'll let you know when the committee approves it." *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section II, 46.

[117] War Dept. General Order No. 6, Mar. 10, 1926. The fact that this order shares the same number as that of Jan. 31, 1922 is entirely coincidental.

[118] *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 78-82.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

relationship established by law and custom between such National Guard and the Federal Government ...."[119] Though still subject to the policies of the War Department, the order made the Chief of the Militia Bureau responsible for initiating proposed changes to Guard policies, regulations, or even laws as appeared desirable to him. Guard regulations, in particular, were subject to change only with the recommendation of the chief, a critical victory for NGAUS and the Guard's ability to control its own direction. The roles of the various War Department staff offices were not mentioned a single time in the two-page order; rather, the higher authority consistently mentioned was the Secretary of War. This exclusion, however, did not keep the General Staff and the Adjutant General of the Army from continuing to play a significant, though diminished, role in the determination of policies effecting the National Guard.

General Hammond's report for 1926 displayed obvious pleasure with the new General Order No. 6; "relations with the General Staff, The Adjutant General's Office, ... are being carried on in a spirit of hearty cooperation."[120] The increased administrative independence won by the Militia Bureau was soon complimented by increased fiscal independence, a product once again of the concerted efforts of NGAUS and AGAUS.[121] Beginning with the passage of the military appropriation bill for fiscal year 1928, the Chief of the Militia Bureau gained the flexibility (subject to the Secretary of War's

---

[119] War Dept. General Order No. 6, Mar. 10, 1926.

[120] *CMB Annual Report, 1926*, 63.

[121] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1924*, 156; *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 123.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

approval) to shift funds among the various categories appropriated for arming, equipping and training the National Guard, so long as he did not increase any one category of funding by more than 10 percent over the amount originally appropriated by Congress.[122] Thus, a small shortfall in funding for animal forage could be made up for with a transfer from funds allotted for armory drills. An excess in the appropriation for summer camps brought about by lower-than-expected attendance could be put to good use increasing Regular Army instructors' travel funds, allowing them to visit more Guard units. Previously, any shortfall in one area would have to be met with either a transfer from the funds of the Army or a request for a deficiency appropriation from Congress, with all the attendant delay and uncertainty which this entailed, while surplus moneys in other areas were returned to the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year. The achievement of a degree of fiscal flexibility was an important gain for the Militia Bureau in the 1920s.

Organization of the Guard in the 1920s: Adjusting Goals Downward

The Section 3a committee which met in the summer and fall of 1920 marked the first time in the history of the Army that officers of the citizen components had input into the specific nature of the units they would provide in their role as a federal reserve force. While this committee performed superbly in its mission of apportioning forces among the states and territories, the fundamental assumptions guiding them – assumptions based upon the force structure outlined in the National Defense Act of 1920 – were flawed. While the act directed the Army to organize the National Guard with a minimum strength

[122] Army Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1928. *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 44, Pt. 2, Chap. 167 (1927). (Public Law No. 630), 1132.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of 435,800 into tactical units along the lines used during the World War, it rapidly became clear that Congress would not provide the Army the means to reach this strength. In fact, even before the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, there was a train of thought in Congress that the National Guard would be best served by returning to an infantry-heavy structure, foregoing more expensive and difficult to train units like field artillery.[123] While infantry units were cheapest to maintain and had the most utility to the states, reverting to an overwhelmingly infantry structure would have limited the usefulness of the Guard as a federal reserve, returning it essentially to the status it had held in early 1917, when units were forced to undergo difficult and time-consuming reorganizations before the Army would employ them in the war. Though Representative Anthony of the House Subcommittee on Army Appropriations was more sympathetic to the National Guard than the Regular Army during his tenure in Congress, his overarching desire to cut military funding to the bare minimum led to his strong support for this regressive proposal. During the February 1921 appropriation hearings for fiscal year 1922, Anthony faulted the Militia Bureau for the slow development of the Guard and pressed for the National Guard to be organized "along the most economic and useful lines, which are Infantry organizations." The Director of the War Plans Division of the General Staff was required at that time to point out to Anthony that – per Congress' directions – the Guard's organization was agreed to by joint committee with Guard input, not dictated by the Militia Bureau, and was required if Guardsmen wanted to preserve the

---

[123] See, for instance, the comments of Rep. John McKenzie in *Army Appropriation Bill, 1921: Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Military Affairs,* House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 2nd Session, 235-6. (March 26, 1920)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

wartime divisions they had fought in.[124]

Anthony persisted the following year, taking the Secretary of War and the Chief of the Militia Bureau to task during the fiscal year 1923 appropriation hearings while searching for ways to make the Guard less expensive. Later that month, General Rickards warned the assembled NGAUS delegates in New Orleans that it might well be necessary to substitute cheaper units for some of the more expensive ones, and that the bureau was already studying this eventuality.[125] Col. John McAuley Palmer, speaking as Pershing's representative before this same convention, was even more blunt, stating that it was his opinion that the congressional climate would probably dictate transferring certain Guard units not yet organized to the Organized Reserve. To make these determinations, Palmer reminded his audience, it would be necessary to once again summon a joint Section 3a committee similar to that organized in the summer and fall of 1920.[126] Certainly, this was an instance of preaching to the choir, as the Guard had already come to value the new role it had in determining its own future. NGAUS added its voice to that of Rickards and the General Staff, going on record as opposing any readjustment of troop allotment unless recommended by a joint committee under Section 3a of the National Defense Act.[127] Secretary of War Weeks endorsed this approach in a letter to Representative Anthony and, after some delay, directed the Chief of the Militia Bureau in September 1922 to form

---

[124] "General Haan on Guard Organization," *ANJ*, Feb. 26, 1921, 716.

[125] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1922*, 17.

[126] Ibid., 26-27.

[127] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1922*, 58-59. See also Rickards' correspondence with Anthony on this subject following the convention. Letter of Mar. 6, 1922 in RG 168/12a/011.6 - Proposed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a new committee to determine which units should be maintained in the Guard should Congress choose to fund it on a reduced basis of 450-500 men per member of Congress, or about 250,000 Guardsmen total.[128] The committee, which consisted of six National Guard and five General Staff officers, first met November 10, 1922, and returned a final report to the Secretary of War on January 15, 1923.

Given that much of the pressure to reduce expenditure on the Guard was coming from Representative Anthony of Kansas, it is not surprising that one of the key officers invited to form this second Section 3a committee was the Adjutant General of Kansas, Charles Martin. Martin, who approached his first assignment at the War Department with some trepidation, afterwards seemed genuinely impressed with the hard work performed by the General Staff. It was he who read and endorsed the final report of the committee before his colleagues at the February 1923 NGAUS convention.[129]

As they had done in 1920, the General Staff and the Militia Bureau went to great lengths to ensure the input of all the concerned parties when dealing with the potentially explosive topic of reducing allotments to the states. The G-3 section of the General Staff mailed questionnaires to each of the adjutants general and corps area commanders and

---

[128] Weeks to Anthony, Mar. 21, 1922. RG 168/12a/325.4 - Section 3a Committee Report. See also "Weeks Orders Study of Militia," *NYT*, Sep. 8, 1922, 9.

[129] *NGAUS Proceedings, Feb. 1923*, 37-44. Martin was not originally selected for this duty, but was added to the list after the initial announcement. See "War Department – Release No. 1 – September 21, 1922" in RG 168/12a/350.05 (Box 371). Martin was not invited to serve on the committee until October; the War Department was forced to delay the start of the board because it could not find a representative number of Guardsmen of sufficient rank willing to serve up to three months for this purpose. See letter, AG US to Martin, Oct. 11, 1922 in *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 3, and "National Guard Board Meeting Date Not Set," *ANJ*, Oct. 21, 1922, 182. Also serving on the 1922 committee were several veterans of the 1920 Section 3a committee, to include Milton Reckord of Maryland, Franklin Ward of New York, Frank Rumbold of Missouri, and John Gulick of the Regular Army.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

tabulated their responses for the use of the committee. Once the committee had assembled, representatives of twenty states and the District of Columbia presented their views and recommendations in person.[130] In addition, officers of the Militia Bureau, the various divisions of the General Staff, and branches of the War Department, were all allowed to weigh in on the subject.

After considerable study, the final recommendation of the committee closely reflected the plan presented by the Chief of the Militia Bureau, General Rickards, at the beginning of their deliberations – a plan which reflected the growing consensus of the AGs over the course of the past year.[131] No radical departure from the core allotments of 1920 would be sought. The minimum peacetime strength goal for the Guard was reduced from 435,800 to 249,930 (a figure still well above the 160,000 Guardsmen in the force as of June 1922). The units to be included in this 250,000-man program included virtually all the combat structure that had been agreed upon in 1920: eighteen infantry divisions, four cavalry divisions, twelve non-divisional infantry regiments, 130 companies of coast artillery, and a small number of corps, army, and GHQ Reserve units, most of which were

---

[130] See memorandum, ACofS G-3 to Committee to Study the Question of the Strength and Organization of the National Guard, Subj: Instructions, Nov. 10, 1922; Memorandum, CMB to Committee to Study ..., Nov. 10, 1922; Proceedings of the committee, various dates in Nov.-Dec. 1922. The NGAUS Executive Committee also convened in Washington in December 1922 to discus the reorganization and submitted a list of principles to the Secretary of War regarding the same; see their memo of Dec. 12, 1922, Subj: Allocation of units of the National Guard and authorization to form the same. All correspondence contained in RG 168/12a/325.4 - Basic Organization.

[131] Rickards' plan is detailed in his memorandum to the committee of Nov. 10, 1922. A summary of his testimony is provided in "Guard Chief Fights Basic Plan Change," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 14, 1922. Final report of the committee, dated Jan. 15, 1923, contained in RG 168/344a/325.4 - General (Box 315). A good summary of the committee findings is contained in "Board Recommends 250,000 as National Guard Peace Strength," *ANJ*, Feb. 3, 1923, 558.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

already completed or were in the process of being organized.[132]

The balance of the units, including almost all of the corps, army, and GHQ Reserve organizations allotted in 1920, were placed on a deferred list until the initial 250,000-man program was completed. Most of these units, as General Rickards later acknowledged, were "of types which States are unable to utilize for State purposes; are expensive to maintain; are difficult to house; or are very difficult of recruitment during peace."[133] In addition, none of these deferred units were slated for the first stage of mobilization in the War Department General Mobilization Plan, because it was not anticipated they would be needed during the earliest stages of the next war.

The committee urged that expansion to 250,000 take place as quickly as possible, but certainly no later than June 30, 1926. Secretary of War Weeks approved the plan on January 23, 1923, after which it became known as the "Modified Program for the Development of the National Guard." Judging from the comments given to the board, the final plan was probably greeted with enthusiasm by most AGs, who were relieved of the responsibility for having to organize a great many units which were of little or no use in a state emergency, and therefore were difficult to convince state legislatures to provide with armories and assorted funds.

---

[132] These latter primarily consisted of eighteen regiments of 155mm field artillery and seven antiaircraft artillery regiments. When completed, the 250,000 "modified program" contemplated manning all but the corps, army and GHQ Reserve organizations at peacetime strength. Corps, army and GHQ Reserve units would be restricted to maintenance strength levels. New TOE devised for brigade and battalion headquarters would save personnel spaces by allowing these units to be federally recognized at significantly lower strengths than had been established in 1920-1921.

[133] Maj. Gen. George Rickards, "The National Guard," AWC lecture, Nov. 1, 1924, 6. MHI. Deferred units were chiefly in the medical, engineer, field artillery (155 mm) and air corps branches.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

As much study and passion as the General Staff and the Militia Bureau poured into making their case for 250,000 men being the absolute minimum number necessary to preserve the viability of the National Guard as a first line defense force, one wonders how much the officers who drew up this figure believed Congress would abide by their professional judgment. As it turned out, Congress did not. Federal appropriations grew slightly for fiscal year 1924 to just under $30 million, and remained steady at that rate for the rest of the 1920s. Guard strength, which exceeded 177,000 on June 30, 1924, quickly outstripped available funds in the following fiscal year as recruiting picked up steam.[134] In an effort to slow the pace of growth, the War Department suspended the federal recognition of any new Guard units beginning on July 25, 1924. Despite this, Guard strength still grew, peaking at just under 190,000 men at the end of September as men enlisted in already existing units. Further restrictions on enlistments and armory drills were imposed, and even though strength began to slide back towards the 177,000 figure of the previous June, it was clear that funds for armory drills would be exhausted well before the fiscal year was over.[135]

The Militia Bureau, understandably, hoped for additional funds from Congress to allow Guardsmen to continue drilling regularly for the remainder of fiscal year 1925. Despite the support of the Secretary of War and heavy lobbying on the part of the NGAUS and AGAUS Executive Councils, the President's Bureau of the Budget refused

---

[134] See Appendix 1.

[135] *CMB Annual Report, 1925*, 13-14.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to request a deficiency appropriation to cover this unforeseen expense.[136] As a result, the War Department ordered the Militia Bureau to suspend armory drills entirely once the money appropriated for them was expended. The Militia Bureau reluctantly issued instructions to the states: once a state's allotment for drill pay ran out, units would simply not be allowed to drill – or more accurately, would not be paid if they did drill – for the remainder of the fiscal year.

To stave off what it believed would be an imminent disaster, the Guard lobby went over the Budget Bureau's head, straight to Congress. With the support of both House and Senate leaders, NGAUS and AGAUS secured a $1,332,000 deficiency appropriation in March 1925 to cover the remaining drills in the fiscal year – technically, by authorizing the expenditure of funds appropriated in fiscal year 1923 which had not been used at that time. By procuring the money without enacting new legislation, congressional leaders ensured that President Coolidge could not veto the action (the fiscal year 1923 appropriation had already been signed into law, and no portion of the funding it authorized could be retroactively vetoed). Coolidge was angered by this circumvention of the budgetary process and the damage it did to his program of debt reduction, and initially ordered the War Department not to disperse the funds – a tactic of questionable validity which could have led to a legal showdown between the Executive and Legislative branches. A flood of protests from governors decrying the damage that would be

---

[136] Minutes, Special Meeting of Executive Council of NGAUS and Executive and Legislative Committees of AGAUS, Washington, DC, Oct. 17-18, 1924. Copy, letter from NGAUS and AGAUS to President Coolidge, Oct. 18, 1924. NGAUS archives, Executive Council Meetings binder. See also General Reckord's account in *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 59-60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

rendered to the National Guard if drill pay was cut off, as well as the persuasive arguments of NGAUS President Milton Reckord during a personal audience with the president, caused Coolidge to back down from his threat and promise that Guardsmen would be paid to drill for the remainder of fiscal year 1925.[137]

Damage had already been done to Guard morale, however, by the continuing freeze on new organizations. Though the Militia Bureau chief, General Hammond, acknowledged that the squeeze on personnel had a bright side in that it led to "the elimination of dead timber" and more careful selection of personnel in most units, the negative impact far outweighed the positive.[138] The rapid progress of the Guard toward a complete and balanced force was brought to a crashing halt. The eighteen infantry and four cavalry divisions which formed the core of the National Guard were all incomplete to varying degrees; of the 142 units needed to complete an infantry division, the 27th Division was the most complete with 137 units federally recognized, while the 40th Division had only 75 – barely 50 percent of its required complement of units. The 24th Cavalry Division was in the worst shape of all, with only 39 of its required 86 units

[137] Memorandum, Reckord to all AGs and members of Exec Council, Apr. 16, 1925. NGAUS archives, Box TF-1, NGA Memos 1925-44. Reckord describes his March 1925 meeting with President Coolidge in *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section III, 31. See also "Coolidge Stops Pay of National Guard," *NYT*, Mar. 24, 1925, 29 and "Coolidge Gets Plea to Pay Guardsmen," *NYT*, Mar. 25, 1925, 3. The best account of Guard organizational changes from 1920 through May, 1925 is contained in a lengthy General Staff study titled "Major Army Project No. 6 – National Guard 250,000." This study includes eleven appendices which consolidate key documents from a number of sources – lists of allotted and deferred units, synopses of laws, regulations, and policies relating to federal recognition of units, copies of correspondence from the Militia Bureau, General Staff, and President relating to the FY 1925 deficiency appropriation, and more. Copy contained in RG 168/344a/325.4 - Gen. - 10 (Box 314).

[138] Maj. Gen. Creed Hammond, "The National Guard," AWC lecture, Nov. 5, 1925, 4. MHI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

federally recognized.[139] States felt that the federal government had reneged on a contract by refusing to allow the organization of units which were allotted to them and had been accepted by them. In many cases, state and local funds expended on armories were wasted when anticipated new units were not authorized to occupy the buildings.[140]

By June 30, 1925 – the end of fiscal year 1925 – the restrictions on recruiting which had been in place for almost a year had brought Guard strength down to 177,000 again. Strength would fluctuate between 174,000 and 182,000 for the rest of the decade.[141] The War Department did not lift the ban on granting federal recognition to new units until January 1926, and then only for a select number of organizations which increased the authorized strength of the Guard by only 2,211 men. This expansion was to be made without an attendant increase in budget; each state was given strict instructions prior to organizing new units not to recruit more men than could be supported on an appropriation equal to that of the previous year, since no additional funds (except for drill pay) would be forthcoming.[142] It was abundantly clear that neither Congress nor the administration was contemplating any significant increase to the Guard anytime soon, and certainly not the increase of 75,000 men needed in order to meet the 250,000 strength envisioned in the "Modified Program for the Development of the National Guard."

---

[139] *CMB Annual Report, 1925*, 14-15.

[140] Maj. Gen. Creed Hammond, "The National Guard," AWC lecture, Nov. 5, 1925, 4. MHI.

[141] See Appendix 1.

[142] Memorandum, CMB to AG US, Subj: Limit of Federal Aid, Strength and Restriction on Armory Drills for Fiscal Year 1926, Sept. 3, 1925; 1st Indorsement, AG US to CMB, Sept. 25, 1925, and 3rd Indorsement, AG US to CMB, Jan. 8, 1926. RG 168/344a/325.4 – Gen. – 13. See also *CMB Annual Report, 1926*, 17-18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Future increases would come in very small increments. In light of this, the Militia Bureau took steps to ensure that those troops which Congress *would* fund were fairly distributed among the states. In November 1926, the bureau adjusted strengths among the states so that no state would be authorized less than 110 percent of the combined maintenance strength of its units – anything less would make it extremely difficult, given normal fluctuations in strength, for units to continue to qualify for federal recognition and for officers, in particular, to qualify for drill pay. By forcing some states to slim down the number of men assigned to their units, the bureau was able to gain authority to form new organizations without increasing total manpower over the 185,000 aggregate strength Congress was willing to fund. These new units were used to complete battalions or regiments which had already been partially organized.[143]

In August 1927, the Chief of the Militia Bureau acknowledged the impossibility of achieving the planned strength of 250,000 in a memorandum to the Adjutant General of the Army which proposed that a well defined program for the organization of the Guard be initiated. In order to realize a complete and well-balanced force, several steps were proposed. First, General Hammond urged that all deferred units (those above the 250,000 number approved by the Secretary of War in January 1923) be withdrawn entirely from allotment to the National Guard, and that the remaining units needed to complete the infantry and cavalry divisions and a limited number of other units be definitely organized. However, in order to organize the remaining units contemplated in the 250,000 man modified plan with significantly fewer than 250,000 men, it would be

[143] *CMB Annual Report, 1927*, 14-15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

necessary to further skeletonize the Guard. Hammond proposed that the rest of the force could be organized, and some 31,000 personnel slots eliminated, if all existing and future units were limited to 110 percent of their maintenance strength. In other words, the Guard would strive to maintain all of its units within a very narrow band of strength, the gain or loss of six soldiers in an infantry company being the difference between minimum strength (and loss of federal recognition) and maximum strength (and denial of pay for additional personnel). No longer would Guard units which were capable of doing so be allowed to recruit up to the peacetime strength prescribed for the Regular Army. Even taking this step, however, would only reduce the aggregate strength of the Guard to a little over 219,000. In order to get down to what was considered an absolute basement figure of 210,000 men, a small number of divisional support troops (mostly medical and trains units) would remain inactive and unorganized until wartime.[144] This proposal was briefly studied by a Section 5 committee of the General Staff which recommended approval, and on September 26, 1927 the proposed 210,000 man organizational scheme was formally approved by the Secretary of War.[145]

Based on the newly adopted plan, War Department requests for appropriations for fiscal years 1929 and estimates for 1930 took into account the small incremental increases

---

[144] Memorandum, CMB to AG US, Subj: Program for the Development of the National Guard, August 26, 1927. RG 168/344a/325.4 - Gen. - 21. For a brief but valuable summary of Guard organization in the 1920s, see Col. William Waldron, "Organization and Strength of National Guard," *Infantry Journal*, May-June 1931, 267-270. Waldron was executive officer of the Militia Bureau from 1929-1933.

[145] Memorandum for CofS from [eight officers comprising the Section 5 committee], Subj: Program for the Development of the National Guard, Sept. 9, 1927. RG 168/344a/325.4 - Gen. - 21. See also description of recent organizational issues in Maj. Gen. Creed Hammond, "The National Guard as a Federal Force," AWC lecture, Oct. 13, 1928, 1-2. MHI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

needed for the Guard to reach 210,000. Yet even this further shrinking of the "minimum" requirements for the Guard failed to spur Congress to increase appropriations sufficiently to complete the Guard's organization, and regular prodding by NGAUS in the years that followed had little effect. A bill that would have required Congress to fund the increase to 210,500 failed to make it past the House in 1930 and 1931, and the ever-worsening reality of the Depression caused the NGAUS Executive Council to realize that continued calls for strength increases were not only unrealistic, but kept them from focusing on more attainable reforms.[146] Though appropriations and allotted strength crept slowly upward in the 1930s, Congress would not authorize the Guard to exceed even 200,000 men until 1939.

Summary

Upon reviewing the Guards' unsuccessful struggles to convince Congress and the White House to increase funding for its force structure, an unlikely conclusion arises. Contrary to the opinions held by Guard and Regular contemporaries, as well as historians of the period, the Guard was no more successful than the Regular Army in fending off cuts to its personnel. In this category of spending, the Guard and the Regular Army received practically identical treatment. Congress reduced the Regular Army during the 1920s from a planned (National Defense Act) strength of 280,000 to an authorized

[146] See resolutions in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1928*, 107-108; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1929*, 137; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1930*, 100; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 97. The bill was H.R. 8366, informally known as the Strength bill, introduced by Rep. Speaks of Ohio on Jan. 9, 1930. See the President's Report in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 20, for one instance where the NGAUS leadership urged the convention to stop making unrealistic requests for increased strength.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

strength of approximately 125,000, or 44.6 percent of planned strength. The Guard likewise in 1920 had been planned to reach a strength of 436,000; by the end of the decade it was authorized approximately 190,000 men, or 43.5 percent of planned strength.[147] While there is evidence that the Guard lobbies had some small success in gaining yearly add-ons to appropriations in other areas, Congress proved consistently unwilling to incur the long-term costs coincident to a large increase in troop strength.

Outside of force structure cuts, the first half of the 1920s had proved a resounding success for the Guard. The first implementation of joint Guard/Regular committees as mandated under the National Defense Act of 1920 had allowed for a remarkably trouble-free reorganization of the Guard following its near-dissolution at the end of the World War. The legislative agenda formulated by AGAUS in 1921 received help from a re-invigorated NGAUS and a potent new ally, the Guard-controlled Militia Bureau. The Militia Bureau's authority and influence was further increased by the successful struggle, led by the Guard lobbies, to gain greater autonomy for the bureau from the General Staff.

The latter half of the 1920s would see continued amendments to the National Defense Act and Pay Readjustment Act aimed at achieving greater equity in the treatment of Guardsmen, and more flexibility in the rules and regulations governing their service. In addition, the 1920s became a decade of rapprochement in Guard/Regular relations, a period in which the Guard's increasing professionalism and limited service on the War Department General Staff enhanced its value as a federal reserve component. This growing professionalism, coupled with a wider exposure to the Guard than ever before in

[147] Actual strength, for several reasons, was about 5 percent below authorized strength in both components.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the peacetime history of the Army, slowly began to transform the opinions of some Regulars concerning the ultimate value of the Guard to the national defense.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 6: Legislative reform; Relations with other components; Growing professionalism; and Service on the General Staff

> *To-day the National Guard recognizes the Regular Army as the parent organization, looks to it for guidance, and believes in it as never before. The Regular Army officers on duty with the National Guard are throwing their whole soul and energy into assisting the National Guard to attain the maximum of stability and efficiency. The National Guard Association no longer goes direct to Congress, but submits those matters of legislation which they believe necessary to further promote their organization to the Chief of the Militia Bureau, who, in turn, submits them to the General Staff; and may I add that we have yet to hear of discontent from the National Guard on any matter of this character that the Militia Bureau has deemed it prudent to disapprove. (Maj. Gen. George Rickards, Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, January 10, 1925)*[1]

Most histories of the National Guard that discuss interwar legislation limit themselves to a brief discussion of the National Defense Act of 1920 and the National Guard Status Act of 1933, but pay no attention to other legislative measures. In many cases, this is justified, as the amendments to the National Defense Act which NGAUS, AGAUS and the Militia Bureau lobbied for during this period were of little import, amounting to minor adjustments to the law. But beginning in 1922, the Guard benefited almost annually from legislation that improved its position in the defense establishment and provided increased benefits for its soldiers. There were a variety of gains, particularly in the areas of health care coverage for Guardsmen injured while training and increased flexibility in the rules governing drill attendance and pay. The

[1] *War Department Appropriation Bill, 1926: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 11248.* U.S. Senate, 68th Congress, 2nd Session, 52.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

expansion of the caretaker force to include both officers and civilians is another – albeit more problematic – legacy of the Guard's legislative program in the 1920s. In other areas, most notably the Guard's ability to secure adequate appropriations, the best efforts of the Militia Bureau and the Guard lobbies were barely enough to ensure the minimum amount necessary for drills and annual training – and precious little more.

Several themes which bear on the Guard's role in the Army and its ability to influence defense policy and legislation also require examination. Relations with the other components were tranquil, and with few exceptions the barriers of animosity and mistrust which characterized intercourse between Guardsmen and Regulars from 1908-1920 melted away. Though hampered by a lack of resources and to some extent by a lack of desire, the Regulars placed more emphasis then ever before on training the civilian components in peacetime. As a result, through increasing daily interactions, Guardsmen and Regulars came to understand each other better. In a similar vein, Guard and Reserve officers cooperated rather then competed during the interwar period, to the mutual benefit of both components.

One foundation of the Guard's influence was the increasing professionalism it displayed. This professionalism was rooted in a number of factors – organization along Regular Army TOE, better training, adherence to stricter policies and standards, and the reduction in personnel turnover. But the most important factor contributing to the growth in professionalism in the Guard during the interwar period was the increasing access to Army schools. Thousands of Guardsmen attended resident Army service schools prior to World War II, and tens of thousands enrolled in correspondence courses. These courses provided not only tactical and technical skills, but also promoted greater uniformity

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

throughout the Guard. Finally, service at the pinnacle of Army power – the General Staff – became an important, if little noted, method for increasing the Guard's influence on Army policies and regulations. Officers assigned this duty not only eased the passage of numerous Guard-sponsored reforms, they were a daily reminder to the current and future leaders of the Army of the civilian components that made up the bulk of the force. Functioning both as members of joint committees and as additional members of the staff, these officers helped shape the Army of the interwar period, both in presenting the Guard viewpoint to the General Staff and in integrating the Guard more closely with the Regular Army.

Legislative Reform, 1923-1924

The Militia Bureau remained keenly focused on making changes to the National Defense Act and other related laws. In January 1923, the bureau recommended to Congress amendments to eleven sections of the National Defense Act and three sections of the Pay Readjustment Act.[2] Most of the changes requested were of a fairly minor nature – validating payments previously made, clarifying the definition of the National Guard to include the National Guard Reserve and to consist only of those officers and

[2] Militia Bureau, "Pending Legislation Recommended by the Militia Bureau since February, 1922," Jan. 24, 1923. RG 168/12a/080. – National Guard Assoc. This document was evidently prepared for the edification of members of NGAUS as well as for later publication in the *Infantry Journal* (See "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, Mar. 1923, 344-345). The *Infantry Journal*, in a bid to increase subscriptions, created a separate department devoted exclusively to the National Guard beginning with the June, 1922 issue. The Militia Bureau actively used the *Infantry Journal* to publicize significant news and accomplishments of the National Guard, and encouraged submissions from the various states to the same. Most of the material for this department was written by the Militia Bureau, the balance coming from the states. See Militia Bureau Circular No. 35, Apr. 24, 1922; see also "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, June 1922, 694.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

enlisted men who were federally recognized, and making it specifically clear that members of the National Guard were not included among those exempt from militia duty when called into federal service. Two of the amendments sought, however, were more significant because they were indicative of the flexibility that Guardsmen were seeking – and would ultimately achieve – in their ability to qualify for drill pay when performing drill under less than traditional circumstances. The first amendment would allow "split" drills; that is, it would permit units to subdivide into groups and perform armory drill on separate nights, and still receive credit for a single unit drill. This allowed a commander to divide his unit by level of training or area of specialty, so that he could, for example, emphasize tactical drill one evening with his infantry squads, while his communications section could assemble on a different night to practice maintenance and repair of field telephones.[3] The second significant amendment sought by the Militia Bureau would allow individuals, under special circumstances, to drill with units other than their own in the same state and receive pay. This was considered especially important for men who lived in one part of a state, yet attended school in another part during much of the year.[4]

The February 1923 NGAUS convention had many important issues to deal with, including the findings of the recent Section 3a committee revision of the Guard force structure, a revision of the NGAUS constitution, and the push to pass legislation which

---

[3] The Secretary of War tried to get the approval of the Comptroller to permit split drills in October 1923, but the Comptroller ruled against it and insisted on new legislation. See "Decision on Split Armory Drill Pay for National Guard," *ANJ*, Oct 20, 1923, 174.

[4] "Pending Legislation Recommended by the Militia Bureau since February, 1922," Jan. 24, 1923. RG 168/12a/080. - National Guard Assoc.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

would restore to the Guard the pay and allowances denied by the Comptroller General after passage of the Pay Readjustment Act in June of the previous year. Nevertheless, there was meaningful discussion of further amendments to the National Defense Act that piggybacked on the Militia Bureau's legislative program. NGAUS' primary goal was the elimination of the requirement that enlisted men attend a minimum of 60 percent of the drills given in any month in order to receive any drill pay at all. While this provision had initially been included in the National Defense Act in order to encourage higher drill attendance, it was the experience of Guard officers that good men who might have had valid excuses for missing two or three drills in a single month quit in droves when they were not paid for the drills they had attended.[5]

Even as the Militia Bureau and NGAUS focused in early 1923 on armory drill reforms, Congress was in the process of approving a bill which would add another significant benefit to Guard service – the assurance that the federal government would care for Guardsmen who were injured while conducting federal training. Previously, the government provided medical care only while a Guardsman was under orders for federal active duty; when those orders expired, he was on his own. On March 4, 1923, President Harding signed into law a measure which entitled any Guardsman injured while attending encampments, maneuvers, or service schools to receive medical and hospital treatment at government expense until he was fit to be transported home. In addition, the government provided rations (during the period which a soldier was not under orders) and the cost of

[5] *NGAUS Proceedings, Feb. 1923*, 102-104.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

transportation home.[6] While this new benefit was welcomed by Guardsmen, it was considered only a partial victory. NGAUS, AGAUS and the Militia Bureau would request, and quickly receive, an expansion of this benefit. They argued that medical care alone was insufficient if, at the same time, a Guardsman was driven to financial ruin through loss of both his military and civilian salaries while he was recuperating. As a result, in 1924 legislation was passed which permitted Guardsmen to continue to draw their pay and allowances for up to six months while hospitalized for an injury incurred during training.[7]

The process of creating the War Department's legislative program for each new Congress was centralized in the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch of the General Staff. In the spring of every odd-numbered year, a memorandum to the various divisions of the General Staff requested legislative proposals for submission to the new Congress convening the following December.[8] Militia Bureau submissions, like those of the other arms and services of the Army, were first vetted by the appropriate division of the

---

[6] Section 6, Act of March 4, 1923 (42 *Stat.* 1508). Congress also used this law to restore allowances denied to Guardsmen due to the Comptroller General's overly-restrictive interpretation of the Pay Readjustment Act, and to validate a number of different payments made in the past which were later questioned or denied by the Comptroller General.

[7] Section 4, Act of June 3, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 364). If a Guardsman was still hospitalized after six months, he no longer received pay but he continued to receive subsistence. The law also provided for up to $100 in burial expenses if a Guardsman was killed while on federal active duty. The Act of April 26, 1928 (45 *Stat.* 461) further amended the law by covering treatment for diseases incurred while on active duty, and added coverage for follow-on medical treatment as necessary after a Guardsman had been returned home.

[8] A supplement to the War Department legislative program was usually prepared beginning in the spring of every even-numbered year for submission to the second session of Congress the following December. This meant that legislative proposals were usually introduced by the War Department every year, rather than just once per Congress (every two years).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

General Staff before being included in the War Department's legislative program.[9]

Once in the hands of the General Staff, the officers assigned to study the bureau's proposals could reject or modify them as they saw fit. It was precisely to ensure that matters of this sort received proper consideration from individuals familiar with the workings of the National Guard that the Section 5 provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920 had been enacted; however, in 1923 there were insufficient Guardsmen assigned to the General Staff to allow for joint committees to review Guard-related legislative proposals. Those proposals that survived review had their language fine-tuned by the Judge Advocate General's Office and were forwarded to the Legislative Planning Branch where they were consolidated with other requests into one or more bills. The Chief of Staff and Secretary of War gave final approval to the legislative program before presenting the bills to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Military Affairs, who in turn brought the bills to the floor of their respective chambers for consideration.[10]

Within the Militia Bureau, the development of legislative proposals was a major undertaking effecting every branch. An indication of how seriously General Rickards took his duty of developing legislation is that one of the few expansions made to the chronically over-worked staff of the Militia Bureau was the addition of a Judge Advocate

---

[9] See memorandum, Chief, Organization Branch, G-3 to CMB, n.s., Mar. 23, 1923; Memorandum, Executive Officer to [various sections, Militia Bureau], Subj: Legislation to be proposed to the 68th Congress, 1st Session, Mar. 30, 1923. RG 168/12a/011.6 - (Proposed).

[10] Information on War Department procedures with respect to legislation also contained in Letter of Instruction, AG US to Chiefs of All War Dept. Arms, Services, and Bureaus, Subj: Legislation, Feb. 20, 1931. RG 168/344a/011.6 - Gen. - 48.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

General officer (a military lawyer) in early 1923. His duties included interpreting federal statutes and regulations as they applied to the Guard, as well as helping to craft new laws.[11] In addition to the Militia Bureau's legislative program, extensive consideration was also given to initiatives proposed by NGAUS, AGAUS, and individual adjutants general. Given the sometimes scanty records now preserved, it can be difficult to determine whether a proposed reform originated in the bureau or from outside. This is particularly true after 1920, when the Militia Bureau under the leadership of Guard officers relinquished its formerly passive role and became proactive in developing legislation for the Guard. Regardless of who initiated particular reforms, once reforms were integrated into the Militia Bureau's legislative program the bureau actively sought to keep the leadership of the Guard in the states informed and involved – a wise policy given the political influence these men could bring to bear.

In 1923, the Militia Bureau kept the leadership of the Guard informed of its activities by forwarding a copy of its legislative submissions to every adjutant general, along with an invitation for comment. This lengthy memorandum contained the exact language, as well as a detailed explanation of each change, for proposed amendments to twenty-three sections of existing law.[12] A consolidated listing of the changes – condensed down to a single page – was later published in the *Infantry Journal* for the

---

[11] *CMB Annual Report, 1923*, 4. *CMB Annual Report, 1925*, 49. Major William Turnbull was the first JAG officer assigned to the Militia Bureau.

[12] Memorandum for Adjutants General of all States, etc. Subj: Proposed Legislation Affecting the National Guard, Aug. 31, 1923. RG 168/12a/011.6 - (Proposed).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

benefit of the remainder of the Guard.[13] Many AGs availed themselves of the opportunity to comment on the legislative program and request additional changes. The Militia Bureau promised careful consideration of each of these comments prior to the submission of a final draft of any proposed legislation to Congress.[14] NGAUS gave its stamp of approval to the Militia Bureau's legislative program during its October 1923 convention, hoping, no doubt, that the added weight of its endorsement would encourage Congress to consider the bureau's requests most seriously.[15]

The Chief of the Militia Bureau made a special effort to ensure that NGAUS remained fully advised of the legislative program and how it related to the resolutions passed at both the February and October 1923 NGAUS conventions. The commonality of purpose between the two legislative programs is strikingly evident in this communication. NGAUS recommended nine proposed amendments to the Pay Act in February 1923. Of these, the bureau was able to report ten months later that six had been enacted into law and the remaining three, though they had failed of enactment in the previous session of Congress, were included in the War Department legislative program for the next Congress. Only on one minor issue was there even a slight divergence of opinion

---

[13] "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal,* Oct. 1923, 458.

[14] See, for example, letters from AGs of Iowa, Connecticut, North Carolina, Utah, New York, and Alabama, all dated Sept. 1923, in response to the Aug. 31, 1923 all-States memorandum. RG 168/12a/011.6 - (Proposed).

[15] Due to time constraints, only a few legislative reforms were addressed in separate resolutions at the convention. The remainder were endorsed in a catch-all resolution which referred study of the Militia Bureau's legislative program to the NGAUS Executive Council. Given that this was the same convention in which newly-elected NGAUS President Milton Reckord promised full cooperation and stated "we have got to hold the Militia Bureau up on a pedestal," NGAUS support for the Militia Bureau's program was never in doubt. See *NGAUS Proceedings, Oct. 1923*, 147, 162-163.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

between what NGAUS wanted and what the Militia Bureau was willing to support.[16]

A similar harmony of interest was demonstrated on amendments proposed by NGAUS to the National Defense Act. Of thirteen specific changes to this law recommended by NGAUS in February, 1923, the Militia Bureau was able to report that ten were recommended for inclusion in the current legislative program of the War Department. The remaining three were considered unnecessary because the desired condition already existed in another section of the law. The Militia Bureau showed an equal desire to comply, insofar as was in its power, with a wide variety of other concerns that NGAUS had expressed. It was happy to report that it had amended the National Guard Regulations as NGAUS had requested, and was making efforts to ensure that funds would be available for division and brigade commanders to inspect all their units in cases where their division or brigade was divided between two or more states. The only requested reforms that the bureau flatly refused to consider were those with significant financial impact – such as increasing the numbers of officer personnel in field artillery organizations, or authorizing full-time caretakers for a number of small units – not because these were unworthy requests, but because they were simply unattainable in the existing fiscal environment.[17]

---

[16] Memo for President, NGAUS, n.s., Nov. 6, 1923 (written for the CMB by Col. R.H. Van Deman, Chief of Planning Section). RG 168/344a/080. – Nat. Guard Assn. The difference of opinion was over marksmanship bonus pay. NGAUS favored an amendment which would make Guard enlisted men eligible for the bonus (just as Regular enlisted men were), while the Militia Bureau did not. The bureau feared that if Guardsmen were made eligible too much rifle practice would be crowded into field training periods which should chiefly be devoted to other exercises. When legislation further amending the Pay Readjustment Act was enacted the following June, the Militia Bureau view prevailed and marksmanship pay was left out. See Section 6, Act of June 3, 1924 (43 Stat. 365).

[17] Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

While the NGAUS and the Militia Bureau wish lists of legislative reforms were nearly identical, the War Department did not always concur with them. In December 1923 the bureau received formal notification regarding those requested reforms which would become part of the War Department's legislative program, and those which had not made the cut. The most prominent items dropped from consideration by the General Staff were the request for split drills, a request to double the number of caretakers for Guard air squadrons, and to allow some caretakers to be civilians (at that time, all caretakers were required to be enlisted in the unit they served). Despite initial rejection by the General Staff, all of these items were later restored to the War Department legislative program and would become law in 1924. However, six other reforms requested by the Militia Bureau were considered unnecessary or not sufficiently urgent to warrant inclusion in the legislative program.[18] Inclusion of a proposed reform into the legislative program was indicated to the Militia Bureau via memorandum from the Legislation Branch of the General Staff, which also served as notification that a particular officer or officers of the Militia Bureau would be expected to testify on the reform's behalf before the appropriate congressional committees.[19]

The fruits of the Militia Bureau program, strengthened by the vigorous lobbying of NGAUS President Milton Reckord and his Legislative Committee, made 1924 a banner year for National Guard legislation. The Militia Bureau proposed, and the War

---

[18] Memorandum, AG US to CMB, Subj: Amendments to the National Defense Act, and Pay Readjustment Act, proposed by Chief, Militia Bureau, Dec. 14, 1923. RG 168/12a/011.6 - (Proposed).

[19] See, for example, four memoranda from Lt. Col. J. H. Bryson, Chief, Legislation Branch to Col. C.C. Hammond, Militia Bureau, various subjects, all dated Dec. 11, 1923. RG 168/344a/011.6 - (Proposed).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Department General Staff approved, a sufficiently large number of amendments to various laws that they were bundled together into a single piece of "Guard" legislation. After months of consideration by various staffs within the War Department, events moved quickly once all the necessary concurrences had been given. A final draft of the legislation was forwarded by General Rickards to the Adjutant General of the Army on April 23; the Secretary of War in turn endorsed and forwarded it to the chairmen of House and Senate Military Affairs Committees on April 29. The Secretary of War's cover letter to the chairmen (which the Militia Bureau drafted) smoothed the path of the legislation by emphasizing NGAUS's endorsement of the bill, as well as the fact that the proposed changes had been approved by the Budget Bureau. Neither congressional committee spent much time debating the measure before recommending to their respective chambers that the legislation be passed without amendment – the House Military Affairs Committee favorably reported out the bill on April 30, the day after it was received; the Senate committee reported out the bill on May 5.[20] Congress approved the bill without amendment and in less than a month it was signed into law.[21]

Guard reforms also predominated in a second piece of War Department legislation

---

[20] Memorandum, CMB to AG US, Subj: Proposed Legislation, Apr. 23, 1924. Includes legislation and draft letters of endorsement for Secretary Weeks to send to Senator Wadsworth and Representative McKenzie. RG 168/344a/011.6 - (Proposed) - Gen. - 9. Copy of letter, Weeks to Wadsworth (Apr. 29, 1924) appears in *National Guard Amendments to the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as Amended*, Senate Report No. 514, 68th Congress, 1st Session, May 5, 1924, 1. See also *To Amend the National Defense Act*, House of Representatives Report No. 612, 68th Congress, 1st Session, Apr. 30, 1924.

[21] The respective bills were S. 3248 and H. R. 8886; signed into law as Act of June 3, 1924, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 43, Pt. 1, Chap. 224. (Public Law No. 186).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

amending the National Defense Act.[22] Another proposed law contained three sections that addressed major problems the Guard had with 1922 Pay Readjustment Act.[23] All of these bills were signed into law during a one-week span in late May/early June 1924, an achievement that allowed first-term NGAUS President Milton Reckord to proudly report during the December 1924 NGAUS convention the acquisition of twenty-seven amendments favoring the Guard.[24]

The single most important item NGAUS desired in 1924 was an amendment to the National Defense Act which would provide that all federally recognized National Guard officers could, with a bare minimum of additional paperwork, be appointed in the ORC and commissioned in the Army of the United States. Furthermore, NGAUS wanted the appointment in the ORC to occur without additional examination (beyond that already required for a Guard officer to gain federal recognition) and for it to run concurrently with an officers' federal recognition in the National Guard (rather than require re-appointment in the ORC every five years, as it did under the old rules).[25]

When this amendment was enacted into law later that year it marked the culmination of nearly three years of resolutions and lobbying by NGAUS to institute a

---

[22] Act of June 6, 1924, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 43, Pt. 1, Chap. 275. (Public Law No. 207).

[23] Sections 1, 2 & 4 of Act of May 31, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 250, 251).

[24] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1924*, 22-23.

[25] See testimony of Col. D. John Markey, chairman, NGAUS Legislative Committee, in *To Amend the National Defense Act of June 3 1916, as Amended: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 6354 and S. 2169,* House of Representatives, 68th Congress, 1st Session, 45-51 (Feb. 21, 1924). Enacted as Section 3, Act of June 6, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 470), adding Section 38 to the NDA 1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

single type of commission for all reserve officers.[26] The legislation also demonstrated the success of joint committees on the General Staff, as it was the product of a committee of Regular and ORC General Staff officers and NGAUS representatives. Three National Guard general officers were placed on orders by the Secretary of War to serve on this committee, in part because of the high profile of the issue, and in part because there were insufficient Guardsmen assigned to the General Staff.[27] While the legislation was an improvement over the old way of doing business, it still did not entirely satisfy most Guardsmen, who objected to having to receive an ORC appointment in order to be employed as a federal reserve force. The desire for an even more seamless transition from state to federal roles, a status that would guarantee the Guard would be employed as intact units under its own officers during the next war, would ultimately drive NGAUS to seek the creation of a separate federal reserve component for the Guard.

The goal of liberalizing the rules surrounding armory drills was also significantly advanced in 1924. Not only was the concept of "split drills" passed into law (and payments previously made for these types of drills validated), but the National Defense Act was amended to eliminate the requirement that enlisted men attend a minimum of 60 percent of the drills in a given month in order to be paid. Payment would now be made

---

[26] See *NGAUS Proceedings, 1922*, 54-55; *Feb. 1923*, 107; *Oct. 1923*, 67-69, 164-166. See NGAUS President Edward Logan's letter to the Secretary of War, Feb. 10, 1923. RG 168/12a/ 080. - Natl. Gd. Assn. (1923).

[27] Testimony of Milton Reckord in *To Amend the National Defense Act of June 3 1916, as Amended: Hearings ... on H.R. 6354 and S. 2169*, 68-73. See also Reckord's account of the long process of gaining War Department approval in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1924*, 24-28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

for every drill attended.[28] The provision requiring 50 percent of all officers and 60 percent of all enlisted men to attend drill in order for officers to receive drill pay was also eliminated from the law; subsequently, requirements for officers to receive drill pay would be determined by Militia Bureau regulation.[29] Furthermore, the National Defense Act was amended to give officers and warrant officers greater flexibility in attending drills by increasing from five to eight the maximum number of drills they could attend in a single month (enlisted men were already authorized up to eight per month).[30] Enlisted men were authorized to attend drill away from their home unit and receive pay, so long as the unit they drilled with was within their state. Furthermore, a catch-all provision allowed the Secretary of War to provide that periods of actual military duty could be accepted as service in lieu of traditional drill, allowing the War Department (and ultimately the Militia Bureau) even more flexibility to make accommodations for some of the atypical situations occasionally presented when military units are organized in a

---

[28] Section 2, Act of June 3, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 363), amending Section 92, NDA 1920; Section 7, Act of June 6, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 471), amending Section 110 of the NDA.

[29] Section 3, Act of June 3, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 364), amending Section 109, NDA 1920. It would take another two and a half years, two NGAUS resolutions, an AGAUS resolution, and a poll of all the AGs by the Militia Bureau before this issue was ironed out to everyone's satisfaction. Militia Bureau Circular No. 39, Dec. 28, 1926 announced that Guard officers would finally get paid for drills they attended where less than 60 percent of the enlisted men were present, so long as the average enlisted attendance at drills *for the quarter* exceeded 60 percent of maintenance strength. This was considered a fair compromise – it still punished officers who couldn't consistently get their men to attend drill, but did not deny them pay if a few drills had abnormally low turnout. See *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan 1926*, 118; *Nov. 1926*, 76-79, 100; "Items on the National Guard," *Infantry Journal*, Oct. 1926, 450-451.

[30] Ibid. This change did not have financial impact, as the maximum number of drills for which a Guardsman could be paid in a year remained at sixty (and typically only the minimum number of drills, forty-eight, was budgeted for). The change simply created uniformity between officer and enlisted personnel and gave units the freedom to drill more frequently during certain times of year (typically the summer) and less frequently at other times.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

civilian component.[31]

Several of the 1924 amendments reduced the administrative burden placed on Guard commanders and staff officers. One amendment authorized the expenditure of federal funds for the feed and care of privately-owned animals which many states and Guard organizations purchased in order to make up for a lack of federally-supplied animals.[32] New laws simplified the paperwork involved in condemning property which had become unserviceable through fair wear and tear, and allowed the Property and Disbursing Officer in each state to appoint an agent to assist in disbursing funds.[33] Additionally, a change in the law gave Guard soldiers the option of re-enlisting for either one or three years. Previously, the law required re-enlisting every year – a significantly greater administrative hassle for commanders than three-year enlistments. Unfortunately, the law did not provide any incentive for soldiers to chose the longer enlistment – it was up to each commander to encourage this paperwork-saving measure in his own way.[34]

---

[31] Section 7, Act of June 6, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 471), amending Section 110, NDA 1920.

[32] Section 5, Act of June 6, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 471), amending Section 90, NDA 1920. Guard units were chronically short of horses and mules throughout the interwar period, and many of those animals which the federal government did furnish were old or infirm castoffs from the Regular Army. On June 30, 1925 there were 10,259 horses and 23 mules in the Guard, of which 896 (8.7 percent) were state or privately owned. Source: *CMB Annual Report, 1925*, 43. The average age of the animals, as reported in November 1927, was 19; units had, on average, 84 percent of the horses authorized for peacetime training. Source: Memorandum, XO, MB to ACofS, G-4, Subj: Answers to Questionnaire for Chief of Staff, Nov. 22, 1927, 6-7. RG 168/344a/325.4 - Gen. - 27.

[33] Section 1, Act of June 3, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 363), amending Section 87, NDA 1920; Section 5, Act of June 3, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 365). The latter reform was particularly necessary in large states which held concurrent summer camps at multiple locations. Under the original law, only the USPDO was permitted to disburse federal funds, and yet it was impossible for that one individual to be in multiple locations at the same time in order to purchase supplies or pay soldiers.

[34] Section 4, Act of June 6, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 470), amending Section 69, NDA 1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Though Congress throughout the interwar period was generally unwilling to authorize new military expenditures, it broke this trend in 1924 with regard to flying units. It authorize five extra caretakers (for a total of ten) for each Guard air service squadron. Congress also authorized, in an amendment to the Pay Readjustment Act, an additional 50 percent increase in pay for Guardsmen engaged in flying, thus putting Guard aviators on a par with their Regular Army peers.[35]

In a precedent-setting move, Congress in 1924 also approved an amendment which would allow one caretaker in each Guard organization to be a civilian in cases where it was not practical to have all enlisted caretakers.[36] At first, this was intended to be only a minor accommodation which would be made in a few instances where an organization was unable to find either a willing or competent enlisted man to serve as caretaker for animals and equipment (particularly motor vehicles and aircraft) assigned to a unit. At the Guards' request, Congress further expanded the Guard's ability to employ civilian caretakers in 1928. These laws, though beneficial in a great many instances, would have unintended consequences in decades to come. Over the years, the civilian caretaker force would grow, presenting problems for Guard and Reserve units that lost highly experienced caretakers and clerks upon mobilization because these individuals did not have a military obligation to serve with the unit. Efforts to reduce or eliminate the

---

[35] Section 5, Act of June 6, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 471), amending Section 90, NDA 1920; Section 4, Act of May 31, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 251), amending Section 20 of the Pay Readjustment Act.

[36] Section 5, Act of June 6, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 471), amending Section 90, NDA 1920. The creation of a civilian force of caretakers was first formally presented to the War Department by the Militia Bureau in late 1922, at the urging of the NGAUS Executive Council. See memorandum, CMB to Secretary of War, Subj: Caretakers for National Guard material and horses, Dec. 27, 1922. RG 168/12a/011.6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

civilian caretaker force and replace it with caretakers who were also members of units, however, have been strongly resisted to the present day.[37] While civilian caretakers play a vital role in ensuring Guard readiness during peacetime, the consequence of their loss during wartime makes this particular amendment to the law something of a two-edged sword for the National Guard. Nevertheless, like hospitalization benefits and liberalized rules regarding drill, the civilian caretaker force is another legacy of the Guard's legislative reform agenda in the 1920s.

The number and scope of the amendments enacted in 1924 makes that year the highlight of the decade for Guard-related legislative reform; while the years 1925-1932 would bring further changes, the sum total of these were not as far-reaching or abundant as those of 1924.[38] Though the National Guard Status Act of 1933 would justifiably gain

---

[37] Caretakers remained state employees, governed by state law but paid with federal funds, until 1968. At that point, they were converted to federal civil service workers and re-named "Military Technicians." Technicians are further subdivided into those who have no military service obligation ("non-dual-status") and those who are required to be drilling members of the Guard or Reserve in order to hold their job ("dual-status"). Non-dual-status technicians are civilians at all times and cannot serve if their unit is summoned to active duty (unless they have volunteered to be members of the Guard or Reserve of their own accord); dual-status technicians are civilians in their day-to-day work, but become subject to military law while performing drill or otherwise serving under orders, and are mobilized along with their unit in an emergency. Most technician positions in the Guard (historically 90-95 percent) require the technician to serve in a dual status in order to ensure that the expertise possessed by these full-time employees is not lost upon mobilization. In order to increase the readiness of the reserve components, Congress has included provisions in defense appropriations bills in every year since 1983 to reduce the numbers of non-dual-status technicians, particularly in the Army Reserve, where their numbers are much higher than in the Guard. See Lawrence Kapp, "Military Technicians: The Issue of Mandatory Retirement for Non-Dual-Status Technicians," CRS Report for Congress (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Mar. 28, 2000).

[38] Other reforms that were enacted in May-June 1924 which were already discussed in this and the preceding chapter include: provisions to validate payments to warrant officers; provisions to amend the Pay Readjustment Act to allow payment of longevity pay and rental allowances to officers and specialist pay to enlisted soldiers; and provisions to allow for the continuation of pay for up to six months to soldiers injured in the line of duty and being treated in Army facilities, and grant $100 in burial expenses to families of Guardsmen killed while on duty. In addition, the provisions regarding the $240 administrative pay for officers commanding organizations less than a brigade were overhauled to allow the Secretary of War to determine which officers were eligible and to make the compensation variable depending on the size of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

preeminence as the most significant piece of Guard legislation between 1920 and 1947, the reforms achieved in 1924 contained numerous benefits for the Guard that endure to the present day.

It is clear that the character and energy of the NGAUS president had a great deal to do with how ambitious – and ultimately successful – the legislative program of the organization would be. Col. Guy Wilson, president from February 1922 to February 1923, and his successor, Brig. Gen. Edward Logan, who presided until October 1923, were not particularly active men, and pursued existing campaigns for reform with only moderate vigor. The disgruntled secretary of the Ohio National Guard Association went so far as to comment to the Chief of the Militia Bureau that "[n]either of these men functioned during the last year according to my knowledge."[39] On the other hand, Logan's successor, Milton Reckord, actively worked with Congress and the Militia Bureau to ensure the passage during his first year of the three bills sought by the National Guard.[40] Even if some of these measures had been initiated prior to Reckord taking office, it is clear that his dedicated leadership was an important ingredient in making NGAUS an effective organization. Fortunately for the continued advancement of the

---

organization. A summary of all the legislative changes enacted in May/June 1924 effecting the Guard can be found in "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal,* July 1924, 96-97. The new procedures regarding administrative pay are explained in detail on pp. 100-101.

[39] Col. C.C. Chambers to Maj. Gen. Rickards, Jan. 5, 1923. RG 168/12a/080. - Ohio Natl. Gd. Assn. At the time this letter was written, Logan was serving as chairman of a NGAUS committee established to consider the issue of dual commissions.

[40] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1924*, 21-24. Reckord also demonstrated his political "pull" by securing the attendance of many important officials at the 1924 convention, to include Senator Wadsworth, Secretary of War John W. Weeks, Chief of Staff of the Army John L. Hines, Reserve Officers' Association President John Delafield, and National Commander of the American Legion (and future Adjutant General of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guard, new legislative proposals were no longer solely reliant on the election of activist leaders to NGAUS and AGAUS. After 1920 the Militia Bureau became as much an engine for reform as the associations had been before the war.

Legislative Reform, 1925-1929

Reform in the latter half of the 1920s focused on incremental changes to the National Defense Act. Based on the resolutions of the December 1924 NGAUS convention, President Milton Reckord (re-elected to the post even though he did not seek it) drew up a new National Guard bill for Congress' consideration early in 1925. While six of the seven measures desired by NGAUS were passed into law that year, none of them was a major reform.[41] For the time being, the Guard lobbies had achieved what they wanted – or at least as much as was reasonable to expect in such fiscally restrained times. Future legislative agendas sought only small adjustments to the law, and to defend past

---

Washington) James A. Drain.

[41] Act of February 28, 1925, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 43, Pt. 1, Chap. 371. (Public Law No. 509). Section 5 amended Section 127a of the National Defense Act so that all federal service rendered by Guardsmen (except for drill) would be credited for purposes of relative rank. This put Guardsmen on a level playing field with Reserve officers, who automatically received credit whenever they served on active duty. However, it placed a huge administrative burden on the Militia Bureau, which was tasked with tracking the federal service of every Guard officer – over 66,000 cards were typed up in the first year in order to account for every officer. See *CMB Annual Report, 1926,* 8-9. The other amendments required that the CMB be selected from among active officers of the National Guard (thus excluding former Guard officers); allowed re-enlistment of Guardsmen between 45-64 years old (effecting some 2,000 senior NCOs in the Guard); allowed transfer of enlisted men between the National Guard and National Guard Reserve; and allowed money appropriated for the Militia Bureau (for the purchase of property only) to remain available for most of an additional fiscal year, rather than revert to the Treasury. See testimony of D. John Markey in *Miscellaneous Public Bills, Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs on Various Bills and Resolutions*, House of Representatives, 68th Congress, 2nd Session, 73-76 (Jan. 29, 1925); and *To Amend the National Defense Act [to accompany S. 3760]*, House of Representatives Report Nos. 1316 and 1316, Pt. II, 68th Congress, 2d Session, Jan. 29, 1925, for full details.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

gains.[42]

The small number of relatively minor legal reforms passed from 1926 to 1932 prove this thesis. In 1926, a single bill which slightly modified the language in three sections of the National Defense Act and validated certain payments to Guardsmen was all that NGAUS, AGAUS and the Militia Bureau sought from Congress. Two of the requested amendments to the Defense Act were made solely because the Comptroller General had made overly narrow interpretations of existing law, denying payments Guardsmen felt were properly due to them. The only measure of even moderate novelty in the 1926 bill was the allowance that a single caretaker in Guard air squadrons could be a lieutenant – previously, all caretakers were restricted to the enlisted ranks or were civilians.[43] The following year, in part because Congress held a relatively short session, and in part because of reluctance on the part of the War Department, only two legislative

---

[42] For example, President Reckord was equally proud of NGAUS and the Militia Bureau's defeat of an attempt to remove the payment of rental allowances to Guard and Reserve officers for all duty of less than 30 days. See *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 59. In a similar vein, at the invitation of the Militia Bureau and based upon a resolution adopted by AGAUS that spring, a committee of Guard officers from each corps area convened in Washington in May 1925 to consider the National Defense Act. After two days, it concluded that "any attempt at a general revision or radical change ... would be inadvisable as they considered that law, notwithstanding its minor inconsistencies, basically sound." "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, July 1925, 85.

[43] Act of May 28, 1926, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 44, Pt. 2, Chap. 417 (Public Law No. 310). Explanation for each of the changes is contained in *To Amend the National Defense Act [to accompany H.R. 11511]*, House of Representatives Report No. 1031, 69th Congress, 1st Session, Apr. 28, 1926; a somewhat more abbreviated explanation appears in *CMB Annual Report, 1926*, 61. The desire to have an officer as caretaker in air squadrons was a reform pushed by NGAUS; see *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 119-122; Memorandum, J. Clifford Foster (Pres., NGAUS) to Exec. Council and all State AGs, Subj: Report of action so far obtained under Resolutions adopted by NGAUS at St. Augustine Convention, Feb. 7, 1926. NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1, "NGA Memos, 1925-44." A section of the Air Corps act of 1926 also addressed a Guard issue by expanding the conditions under which Guard aviators were eligible to receive flight pay; as before, this amendment was needed in response to an overly restrictive interpretation by the Comptroller General of the 1924 law establishing flight pay for Guardsmen. See Section 6, Act of July 2, 1926 (44 *Stat.* 782).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

actions of any consequence relating to the Guard was passed.[44]

In 1928, six minor amendments to existing law were ushered through Congress at the Guard's behest.[45] Probably the most significant change was a further expansion of the civilian caretaker force, something the Guard had been pushing for since the first civilian caretakers were permitted in 1924. The problem with finding enlisted caretakers, General Hammond informed the Adjutant General of the Army, was that "[y]oung men who possess the mental and physical attributes desired in members of the National Guard can, as a rule, obtain more lucrative employment than that of caretakers for material or animals."[46] The amended law, passed in April 1928, required only a single caretaker per unit be an enlisted member of the National Guard.[47] In addition, due to an adverse ruling – yet again – by the Comptroller General, the Militia Bureau in 1928 had to request modification of the language in section 67 of the National Defense Act in order to specifically permit officers of the General Staff and the Militia Bureau to attend the

---

[44] This was provision in the 1928 Army appropriation bill, mentioned in the previous chapter, which gave the Militia Bureau a 10 percent interchangability of funds among the various items appropriated for it. In addition, a Joint Resolution was passed, calling for the War Department to return to the states private unit funds entrusted to it by Guard units mobilized for the World War which were not reconstituted after the war. Public Resolution No. 64, 69th Congress, 2nd Session (44 Stat. 1404).

[45] *CMB Annual Report, 1928*, 50. In addition, a seventh law instructed the Comptroller General to adjust and settle a few remaining claims for drill pay from 1917, 1918, and 1919. See Act of May 22, 1928, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 45, Pt. 2, Chap. 680 (Public Law No. 468).

[46] Memorandum, CMB to AG US, Subj: Amendment of Section 90, National Defense Act, June 17, 1926. RG 168/344a/011.6 - Proposed - 31. Hammond's request to increase the number of civilian caretakers authorized for Guard units had been proposed as a separate measure in 1927 and passed by the Senate, but failed to be acted on by the House prior to the end of the legislative session. NGAUS passed a resolution in favor of additional civilian caretakers as early as December 1924. See *NGAUS Proceedings, 1924*, 180.

[47] Act of April 21, 1928, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 45, Pt. 2, Chap. 397 (Public Law No. 293) amending Section 90 of the NDA 1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

annual NGAUS and AGAUS conventions.[48] The remaining amendments extended federally-funded medical care to Guardsmen who contracted diseases while on active duty; allowed U.S. Property and Disbursing officers more flexibility in administering Guard payrolls; eliminated additional qualifications for state staff officers in excess of those required of other officers in the Guard; and regularized funding for the National Matches.[49] The latter was (and remains) a rifle and pistol competition open to both military and civilians. The matches were extremely popular among Guardsmen, and drew near-universal participation from each state as well as significant attention in the annual reports of the Militia Bureau.[50] The following year, 1929, no legislation of any significance to the Guard (other than the annual appropriation bill) was passed by Congress.

Such a relative paucity of legislation after 1924, when compared to the number of bills passed in the first half of the decade, was not the result of lack of ambition on the part of the Militia Bureau. In late 1926 the War Department initiated a study of the National Defense Act with the goal of proposing a comprehensive overhaul of the law.

---

[48] Act of April 6, 1928, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 45, Pt. 2, Chap. 321 (Public Law No. 239). Earlier discussion of the adverse ruling is found in synopsis of memorandum, CMB to AG US, Subj: Reimbursement of traveling expenses of Militia Bureau officers, July 18, 1927. RG 168/344a/080. – National Guard Association.

[49] Act of April 26, 1928, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 45, Pt. 2, Chap. 436 (Public Law No. 318); Act of April 6, 1928, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 45, Pt. 2, Chap. 322 (Public Law No. 240); Act of May 12, 1928, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 45, Pt. 2, Chap. 529 (Public Law No. 370); Act of May 28, 1928, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 45, Pt. 2, Chap. 816 (Public Law No. 557).

[50] See, for example, *CMB Annual Report, 1928*, 29-31. The National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, the governmental agency which officially hosted the National Matches, was affiliated with the Militia Bureau. The National Rifle Association, which maintained a close association with the matches, by law provided the trophies and medals for the winners.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Given a clean slate on which to propose changes, the Militia Bureau recommendations relative to this study were extensive. The bureau sought amendments to twenty-one sections of the act in order to clarify its wording, repeal obsolete passages, and incorporate changes which had taken place over the previous six years, as well as introduce minor amendments based on the experiences gained during that time.[51] The War Department did little with this study in 1927 and 1928, and requested in early 1929 that all subordinate branches and bureaus once again submit a comprehensive list of amendments they wished to see made to the National Defense Act. Given two more years to contemplate the subject, General Hammond in 1929 requested that his earlier recommendations be discarded and replaced with an even bigger wish list, consisting of forty amendments to thirty-eight sections of the National Defense Act.[52] But, as in the past, Congress was unwilling to consider a major overhaul of the legal underpinnings of the military without some larger crisis – like a war – to spur it on.

Thus, despite a general consensus that the National Defense Act served the Guard well, there remained many improvements that the Militia Bureau felt could be made. None of these amendments, it was acknowledged, were so critical as to require immediate action, which is fortunate given Congress' reluctance to consider military legislation. The 1927 and 1929 studies, however, illustrate a key point when compared to the annual

---

[51] Memorandum, CMB to AG US, Subj: Hearings before the House Military Affairs Committee, Jan. 5, 1927 (w/21 enclosures). RG 168/344a/011.6 – Proposed – 34.

[52] Memorandum, Acting AG US to Chiefs of all War Dept. Branches and Bureaus, Subj: Revision of the National Defense Act, Jan. 21, 1929; CMB reply, Feb. 20, 1929 (w/40 enclosures). Both in RG 168/344a/011.6 - Proposed - 45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

legislative resolutions passed by NGAUS. The Militia Bureau had the time and staff to develop a thorough and coherent plan for revising the National Defense Act should the opportunity arise. NGAUS took up the topic of reform each year in a somewhat haphazard manner, tackling whatever crises or concerns were presented by members, and – in the course of a two or three day convention – forming, debating, and ratifying resolutions that reflected the biases of the Resolutions Committee, if not always the considered opinion of the entire National Guard.

Though these resolutions reflected the spirit of the conventions and the desires of the Guard (as expressed by the senior officers who attended these conventions), they did not always demonstrate a complete grasp of the laws and regulations governing the National Guard, or propose the best solution to a problem. The Militia Bureau usually moved quickly to accommodate the desires of the NGAUS convention if a resolution fell within its purview. Five of nineteen NGAUS resolutions addressed to the Chief of the Militia Bureau at the 1926 convention were requests to modify regulations in some manner, and each of these changes was either made or awaiting final General Staff approval at the time the next NGAUS convention met in 1927.[53] Many times, however, the resolutions passed by NGAUS conventions complicated matters for both the Militia Bureau and the association's leadership by insisting upon legislative remedies for problems which were better solved by regulation, or asking for regulatory changes that contravened existing law. An even more frequent fault was that a convention often

[53] Memorandum, CMB to Asst. Sec. of War, Subj: Letter ...relative to certain resolutions passed by NGAUS Nov. 17-19, 1926. Dec. 9, 1926. RG 168/344a/080 - N.G. Assn. - 6; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1927*, 34-36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

insisted upon promoting a resolution which flew in the face of the harsh fiscal realities that the NGAUS and Militia Bureau leadership were forced to deal every day.

The NGAUS Executive Council sometimes acted to suppress resolutions that seemed unlikely to succeed. In August 1927, for example, the Executive Council determined not to expend any political capital in pursuit of three different resolutions passed by the 1926 convention, deciding instead to recommend to the membership of NGAUS that the issues be deferred or dropped because they would cost too much to enact.[54] Despite an appeal by the NGAUS president that the money was better spent elsewhere, the October 1927 convention insisted on re-affirming two of the three resolutions that the Executive Council had rejected, and passed several more resolutions that would be even more expensive to enact. NGAUS leaders felt palpable frustration. "You are simply hamstringing the members of your Executive Council by enacting resolutions which call for increases ... which we know cannot be given at this time" complained NGAUS Secretary Ellard Walsh.[55] The Chief of the Militia Bureau likewise called for a degree of consideration by the convention:

> I remember out in Denver [the Oct., 1923 NGAUS convention] one resolution which was for a caretaker for every infantry unit in the National Guard and it would cost about $3,000,000 to pay those caretakers. It was a good resolution, but I will leave it to you to see where we could get the money.[56]

---

[54] "Minutes of Meeting of Executive Council, NGAUS," Chicago, Aug. 26, 1927. NGAUS Archives, Minutes binder.

[55] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1927*, 37-40, 167.

[56] Ibid., 66-67.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The convention turned a deaf ear. The following month, the Militia Bureau reported to the Chief of Staff that if seven of the NGAUS resolutions recently passed were enacted (all of them worthy measures to be sure), it would cost an additional $3,500,000 per year.[57] The War Department understandably did not choose to push for the adoption of any of these resolutions.

At the 1928 convention, frustration over resolutions once again surfaced. After the 1927 convention had insisted on requesting that full wartime staffs be authorized for every Guard unit (this at a time when hundreds of Guard units were still not organized for lack of funds), President G. Angus Fraser of North Dakota chided the assembled delegates; "The utter futility of securing such an increase in appropriation is fully apparent to those who each year appear before the Budget Director or Congress, or both, to defend the items contained in the National Guard Budget."[58] In this case, as in numerous other instances – and usually after consultation with the Militia Bureau – the Executive Council determined to ignore or modify the resolutions of the convention as it saw fit. This trend grew as the Depression worsened, and the annual appropriations fight grew more challenging. It culminated in 1931, when the NGAUS convention voted to empower the Executive Council to take action in all matters during the year without reference to the convention.[59] The Depression also caused NGAUS delegates to demonstrate a greater

---

[57] Memorandum, XO, MB to ACofS, G-4, Subj: Answers to Questionnaire for Chief of Staff, Nov. 22, 1927, 13-14. RG 168/344a/325.4 - Gen. - 27.

[58] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1928*, 28.

[59] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 110.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

degree of restraint. The tabling of expensive resolutions, a rarity during the 1920s, became more commonplace, while other resolutions – particularly those referring to changes in TOE – were automatically referred to either the Executive Council or another special committee to ensure adequate consideration by those most familiar with the appropriations process.[60]

The Struggle for Adequate Funding, 1930-1933

Congress enacted nothing of significance to the Guard in 1930; the only law of even passing relevance was an act which settled claims brought against the War Department by some states after World War I.[61] Congress did not enact any Guard legislation in 1931either, though this was partially a function of NGAUS's determination to focus all its energies that year on the National Guard status bill.[62] The other major legislative initiative of 1930-1931– an attempt to fund an incremental increase in Guard strength to 210,500 – took a back seat to the status bill, especially since this strength bill (as it came to be known) would have required a significant increase in Guard appropriations during a budgetary crisis. In fact, the NGAUS and AGAUS conventions in December 1931 both formally resolved to forego lobbying Congress for any strength

---

[60] See, for example, *NGAUS Proceedings, 1929*, 138; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1930*, 57-61; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 69-70; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1933*, 72-73, 86.

[61] Act of June 28, 1930, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 46, Pt. 1, Chap. 711 (Public Law No. 468). The law reimbursed states for state-owned property which Guard units brought into federal service during the war. See *Reimbursement to States for Military Property and Equipment Brought in to Federal Service in 1917 [to accompany H.R. 704]*, House of Representatives Report No. 1041, 71st Congress, 2nd Session, June 18, 1930. The bill was prepared by the Militia Bureau and introduced into the Senate at the request of the AG of New Jersey. See Lt. Col. R.M. Cheseldine to TAG, PA, Feb. 7, 1929. RG 168/144a/011.6 - (Proposed).

[62] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 19, 20.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

increase for at least a year, since there was no real hope of getting the funding anyway.[63]

The primary legislative goal for NGAUS, AGAUS and the Militia Bureau from 1930-1933 was passing the fiscally-neutral Guard status bill, but the distraction of the ever-worsening Depression made it a lesser priority when faced with budget cuts that threatened the very core of Guard training and readiness. Congress, in an attempt to save money, continued in the early 1930s to make appropriations for Guard pay based on pre-Depression drill and annual training attendance figures, ignoring the fact that the Depression had spurred Guardsmen to attend training in unprecedented numbers. In 1930 the Chief of the Militia Bureau reported that 95 percent of all Guardsmen attended annual training, significantly more than the 86 percent for whom they budgeted. The money to cover this added expense came out of funds for camp construction.[64] In November 1931 the Militia Bureau was placed in the position of having to order the states to curtail drills when the Secretary of War and the Budget Bureau refused to allow a request for a deficiency appropriation to cover the increased cost of drill pay. Only the intervention of Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur, who offered to make up the deficit with funds appropriated for the Regular Army, allowed the Militia Bureau to rescind its earlier order so that the Guard could complete fiscal year 1932 with the minimum forty-eight drills required by the National Defense Act.[65] The situation caused the newly installed Chief of

---

[63] "Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the AGAUS," Hotel Roosevelt, New Orleans, LA, Dec. 1, 1931, 12. NGAUS Archives, AGAUS file folder; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 97.

[64] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1930*, 35, 98.

[65] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 20-22, 42, 50-52; Killigrew, 94-101.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the Militia Bureau, Maj. Gen. George Leach, to become publicly critical of congressional stinginess only a few months into his tenure. "I am here to state that the United States Government has misappropriated our funds when they loan to foreign governments at the expense of our own national defense." Speaking of the National Defense Act, Leach continued "Congress has violated its own act ... It has rendered our country insecure, disregarding the very standard of security it has itself set up."[66] Despite such extraordinary criticism from a general officer on active duty, and the pleas and protests of NGAUS and AGAUS, the Guard was similarly under-funded in fiscal year 1933. As a result, General Leach was forced to forego aircraft and ammunition purchases and curtail a number of other expenses in order to find the money to pay for forty-eight drills and fifteen days of annual training that year.[67]

This scramble to fund even the bare minimum of training days, along with the 1932 fight to keep Congress from eliminating 2,000 officers from the Regular Army (cuts which NGAUS played a significant role in derailing) stalled not only the Guard status bill but also minor legislative initiatives on caretakers and hospitalization of personnel. As the NGAUS legislative chairman, Brig. Gen. Herbert Johnson of Vermont, informed the association's membership in October 1932, "Several attempts were made to get final action on these two bills as there was no special opposition to them, but they simply met the

[66] "Calls Defense Cut National Betrayal," *NYT*, Feb. 21, 1932, N4.

[67] See Maj. Gen. Leach's discussion in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 23-24 and "National Guard Notes," *Infantry Journal*, Sep-Oct 1932, 392-393.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

fate of all bills in our last Congress that were not appropriation or emergency relief."[68] Though the status bill finally was enacted into law in 1933, the caretaker and hospitalization legislation were left pending.[69]

The fiscal nadir for the Guard during the interwar period came during the debate over the 1934 budget. In March 1933, the incoming Roosevelt administration insisted on across-the-board cuts in order to balance the 1934 budget, the War Department's share of these cuts being $52,000,000 (a 19 percent cut from what had originally been appropriated for 1934). As meetings were held between the War Department, Militia Bureau, and Budget Bureau regarding the cuts, rumors circulated that the Guard would be forced to absorb a disproportionate share of the financial blow. While General Reckord headed the Guard's lobbying effort in Washington, the NGAUS and AGAUS leadership assembled in Minnesota in June for an emergency meeting with the bureau chief, Maj. Gen. George Leach. General Leach announced the grim news; he had determined that the Guard could absorb at most a one-third cut to its appropriations for the year, operating on $22,000,000 instead of $33,000,000. This could be done by eliminating all equipment and ammunition purchases and attendance at service schools, putting off maintenance on facilities and equipment, and other short-term measures. Drills would be reduced from

---

[68] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 80. These bills would have allowed re-hospitalization for a Guardsman who suffered a relapse within six months of being released from Army medical care, and allowed the employment of caretakers in cases where animals or equipment were pooled from multiple units, particularly at a remote location such as the state's training camp (the forerunners of today's UTES (Unit Training Equipment Site)).

[69] The caretaker pooling legislation was finally enacted in Section 6, Act of June 19, 1935 (49 *Stat.* 392) amending Section 90 of NDA 1920. The rehospitalization legislation was enacted in the Act of June 15, 1936, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 49, Chap. 547 (Public Law No. 677).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

forty-eight to twenty-two, but two weeks of annual training would remain and overall strength would not have to be trimmed. Provided these cuts were only for a year, and that Congress granted his bureau full interchangability among the various categories of appropriated funds, General Leach projected that no permanent damage would be done to the Guard.[70]

However, the War Department at the time was only offering $18,000,000 for the maintenance of the Guard (of which some $3,500,000 was already committed to fund unpaid obligations) – meaning disastrous consequences for the Guard if the amount could not be increased. Brig. Gen. Ralph Immell of Wisconsin, the president of AGAUS, was furious. By his estimate the overall cut to the War Department was only 7.5 percent, yet the Guard was being told it would be cut by even more than the 33 percent it could absorb. Old grudges and mistrust quickly rose to the surface:

> Every time in my experience whenever we have had a problem of this sort, we were either sold short or got in at the last. I don't see why the National Guard should continue year after year to show evidence of its great sincerity and honesty and bind itself to the support of all the components of the Army, when I find from bitter experience that apparently we are the only ones that do this. I think we have reached a point now where we have got to show our teeth, if we are going to the end of the row; let's not prolong the agony.[71]

Even General MacArthur, widely respected for his service with the Guard in World War I and for finding the necessary funds for drill pay in 1931 (NGAUS had

---

[70] "Proceedings of conference of National Guard officers called at Camp Ripley, Minnesota, June 15th and 16th [1933]," 18-20. NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1, State Staff Studies, 1933 folder; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1933*, 81-83.

[71] "Proceedings of conference of National Guard officers called at Camp Ripley," 22.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

honored him with a special resolution of thanks at the time), came under attack. "It is a question of a fight with the Chief of Staff and the Regular Army by the National Guard" declared Mississippi's adjutant general, Thomas Grayson, while Minnesota's adjutant general, the influential Ellard Walsh, believed the AGs should send MacArthur a telegram "declaring war."[72]

Fortunately, rather than openly declaring war, NGAUS and AGAUS summoned representatives from each state to Washington in early July. Though prepared for the worst, frank discussions with a sympathetic Director of the Budget forestalled the need for a more open breach with General MacArthur. President Roosevelt agreed to release additional funds from the Treasury in order to raise the Guard's appropriation to $24,510,030, enough to allow for thirty-six drills during the fiscal year which had already begun.[73] While NGAUS and AGAUS still complained that the Guard had been cut disproportionately compared to the Regular Army, senior Guards leaders knew that it could have been far worse.[74] In fact, as soon as the final budget was announced the AGs agreed among themselves to continue to maintain a full drill schedule even though a dozen drills would be "free" to the federal government. At a time when everyone was

---

[72] Ibid., 30, 32. *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 97.

[73] Minutes, AGAUS meeting, July 5 - 6 1934, Washington DC. NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1, State Staff Studies 1933 file; *CNGB Annual Report, 1934*, 18, 21. Milton Reckord's account of his role in this is contained in *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section III, 47-50. The actual amount appropriated was $33,284,864, but nearly $9,000,000 was required to be held in a general reserve and could not be expended by the Guard.

[74] "Resolution Adopted by the Joint Convention of NGAUS and AGAUS, July 6, 1933." NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1, State Staff Studies 1933 file. The resolution is critical of MacArthur, holding him responsible for apportioning the Army budget so that the Regular Army lost only 11 percent compared to previous appropriations, while the Guard lost 45 percent. The resolution credits President Roosevelt and the Budget Director for procuring additional funds for the Guard in order to limit its cut to 28 percent.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

being asked to tighten their belts, "[t]hese drills represent a contribution by the National Guard to the welfare of the Country."[75] Given that the Depression had created a situation where Guard units had ample volunteers looking for an opportunity to make a little extra income, any soldiers who objected to the additional drills could easily be replaced with more eager recruits. Fortunately for Guardsmen, 1934 proved to be the only year that Congress funded less than forty-eight drills, so the requirement to attend free drills did not become a regular burden for the remainder of the Depression.

The Guard and Appropriations

Given how the National Guard struggled along with the rest of the Army to make ends meet during the depths of the Depression, it is logical to question the common perception that the Guard had a distinct advantage in gaining extra appropriations from Congress. As has already been demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Guard's force structure suffered no more and no less a cut than that of the Regular Army during the 1920s. Yet it was widely perceived at the time that the Guard had an advantage before Congress. Certainly, the leadership of NGAUS believed this:

> This Association has proved its greatest worth, however, in the matter of securing appropriations from The Congress, and especially in those cases where the Director of the Budget has placed a limiting figure on National Guard items which, in the opinion of the Association, would be insufficient to properly maintain the existing force. The Militia Bureau, being a federal agency, in such case is barred from taking any action in opposition to the Budget, while the National Guard Association is free and untrammeled and may properly, – and frequently has taken the matter to

[75] Ibid., and memorandum, AGAUS to AG, ME, Subj: Special Meeting AGAUS and Executive Council NGAUS in Washington, July 6, 1933. NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1, State Staff Studies 1933 file. See also Ralph Immell to Lewis Douglas, Director, Bureau of the Budget, July 6, 1933 in same location.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Congress.[76]

Regular Army officers believed this as well. General Pershing's representative to the February 1923 NGAUS convention, General Charles H. Martin (not to be confused with AGAUS President Charles I. Martin) noted "You have been more successful with Congress – and I am glad of it – in getting appropriations from Congress, than we have been, in the Regular Army."[77]

Relative to the Regular Army, the Guard was well funded in the interwar period. From 1904-1916 only once were congressional appropriations for the Guard in excess of 4 percent of what was appropriated for the Regular Army. After 1920, the heavy reliance placed on the Guard as a result of the National Defense Act changed this proportion dramatically. As the size of the Guard grew, so did its funding. The Guard's budget grew to 8.94 percent of the Regular Army appropriation in 1925; though this shrunk steadily to 6.67 percent in 1933, it still represents a level of funding relative to the Regular Army that would not be equaled in the post-World War II era until 1988.[78] However, while Guard funding relative to the Regulars may have been high, the figures are a reflection of the small size and poor condition of the Regular Army during the

---

[76] NGAUS President Ellard Walsh, *NGAUS Proceedings, 1929*, 26.

[77] *NGAUS Proceedings, Feb. 1923*, 9.

[78] Source: "Army Funding, 1903-1997 (Current $)" NGB Historical Services files. Figures are extracted from the *Digest of Appropriations for the Support of the Government of the United States*, published annually by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The Guard accounted for a paltry 1.54 percent of the Regular Army budget in 1920 as it was being reorganized, and progressively more each year until 1925 as it grew in size and the Regular Army shrunk. From 1934-1936 the Guard budget relative to that of the Regular Army grew, demonstrating that the Guard was better able to defend its budget during the height of the Depression, but by 1940 it had shrunk to 5.07 percent of what the Regulars were getting.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

interwar period. The National Guard was still constantly short of funds, and the Guard lobbies were unable to significantly ease the burden.

Members of Congress clearly identified with National Guardsmen from their home states, and generally held them in warm regard. Indeed, the affection expressed by some politicians, particularly when speaking at NGAUS conventions, makes it puzzling that the Guard was not more adequately cared for in annual appropriations than was in fact the case. Annual federal appropriations for the Guard throughout most of the interwar period amounted to some $30-35,000,000, to which the states added some $15,000,000 more primarily for administration and armory costs.[79] Martha Derthick makes the claim that NGAUS from 1923-1939 was directly responsible for a total of $18,595,371 in federal congressional add-ons to the amount budgeted for the National Guard by the executive branch.[80] If Derthick's figure is accurate, this represents less than a 4 percent increase per year, on average, over the president's budget – not a great deal. And the accuracy of this figure is questionable. Derthick does not say how she arrived at it, nor is it possible to be sure that NGAUS (and not AGAUS, or a single AG, or – even more likely – the Militia Bureau) was responsible for convincing Congress to add on a particular amount to an appropriation.

Anecdotal accounts of NGAUS influence on the funding process are scarce. President Reckord reported in January 1926 that NGAUS, through various efforts, had

---

[79] See memorandum from C.C. Hammond to AG, VA, Subj: Information, July 2, 1923 (RG 168/12a/056. - (Army); "States Part in Defense Plan Stressed by General Martin," *ANJ*, Sept 12, 1931, 25; "National Guard Notes," *Infantry Journal*, Jan-Feb 1933, 69.

[80] Derthick "Citizen Soldier on Capitol Hill," 146.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

added $3,250,000 to the Guard budget.[81] At the November 1926 convention, President Foster claimed responsibility for congressional add-ons of $92,000 for attendance at Army service schools and $600,000 for the purchase of additional horses.[82] President Price in 1927 stated that the joint efforts of NGAUS and the Militia Bureau gained roughly $750,000 more for the National Guard than was originally budgeted, while President Walsh claimed to have gained $300,000 for the Guard during the difficult struggle over the 1930 budget – though this was still $326,000 less than the bare minimum additional funds NGAUS had considered necessary.[83]

While gaining even small budget increases during the frugal 1920s could be challenging, the Guard lobbies scored significant victories several times – particularly during the Depression – simply by persuading Congress not to cut something out of the Guard budget. In 1932 NGAUS and the Militia Bureau were delighted that they were able to gain agreement from Representative Ross Collins (D-MS), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations, not to restrict the Guard to forty-two drills and limit Annual Training attendance to 75 percent (as was recommended by the Budget Bureau for fiscal year 1933). Instead, the Guard was able to persuade Collins to allow the Militia Bureau 100 percent interchangability of budget items, thus letting the Guard (and

---

[81] *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 59. About half of this large sum primarily consists of the deficiency appropriation secured in early 1925 to allow the Guard to complete forty-eight drills in FY 1925.

[82] *NGAUS Proceedings, Nov. 1926*, 28-29.

[83] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1927*, 34; Memorandum, Walsh to all AGs and Members of Executive Council, Subj. National Guard Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1930, Mar. 2, 1929. NGAUS archives, Box TF-1, NGA Memos 1925-44. A substantially similar account is related by Walsh in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1929*, 27-34.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

not Congress) pick and choose what it wanted to fund. Though they did not add back a single dollar to the amount budgeted for the Guard, NGAUS and the Militia Bureau still successfully negotiated a means by which Guard training for the year would not be limited. NGAUS's Legislative Committee was also proud to report that year that the Guard appropriation recommended by Collins' subcommittee was not reduced on the House floor, something which had typically been the case in the past.[84] Furthermore, the granting of 100 percent interchangability in the Guard budget was a significant benefit that was continued in later years, with substantial savings resulting from the increased flexibility.[85] Out of short-term hardship, the Guard was able to come away with long-term benefit.

Given that NGAUS's very existence was largely justified by its ability to gain concessions from Congress, it is not inconceivable that the association's leadership exaggerated its claims of effectiveness. While it is clear that NGAUS played an active role every year in lobbying for increased funding for the Guard, it proved far more effective in defending the current level of expenditures and softening the blow of proposed cuts than in generating congressional add-ons. Though NGAUS never got as much as it wanted, at least the presence of citizen-soldiers in the halls of Congress and at nearly every committee hearing ensured that members of Congress did not forget that there were Guardsmen back home in their districts who would take note of their actions.

---

[84] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 77-79.

[85] Specific examples of how 100 percent interchangability gave the Guard the ability to take advantage of unanticipated savings during fiscal years 1933-35 are provided by General Leach in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1934*, 41-42.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Relations with the Regular Army

A significant result of the National Defense Act of 1920 was the transformation in the relationship between the National Guard and the Regular Army. The often bitter verbal attacks between Guard and Regular partisans that characterized the preceding decade disappeared, it seemed, overnight and were replaced by a common desire to cooperate and jointly develop the Army of the United States under the new system laid down by Congress. Secretary of War Patrick Hurley epitomized this attitude in his March 1932 speech before AGAUS:

> Today, in other words, the National Guard of the United States has reached maturity. ... The National Guard and the Regular Army both are in that first line of defense. They are a team. Since the World War, they both have consistently pulled together.
>
> We can have no efficient Regular Army at the expense of a crippled National Guard. Nor can the safety of this country be entrusted to the National Guard no matter how efficient it may be, if our regular forces are deficient on [*sic*] inefficient.[86]

There remained, it is true, hints of wariness on the part of Guardsmen, but publicly they were supportive of their Regular Army brethren. As it became clear after 1920 that Congress was not interested in fully funding the Army outlined in the National Defense Act, Guardsmen did not adopt the view that congressional funding was a zero-sum game, whereby less funding for the Regular Army would equal more funding for the National Guard. Instead, they were of the opinion that cuts to the Regular Army were an unacceptable risk to the defense of the nation, and were ultimately harmful to the adequate training of the Guard as well. The Regular Army, for its part, gladly endorsed

[86] "1933 Funds Assured Adjutants General," *ANJ*, Mar. 12, 1932, 649, 672.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

this viewpoint and adopted the mantle of trainers of the Citizen Army as defense against further budget cuts.[87]

The rhetoric of the period from members of both components enjoined the National Guard and the Regular Army to stick together in the common battle against pacifist forces seeking to strip the nation of its defenses. Truth be told, the greater threat to military readiness during the period came from conservative "small army" advocates in Congress whose philosophical reasons for wanting to reduce the size of the military had little to do with pacifism, but understandably little effort was expended by Army officers in attacking senior members of Congress. Regular Army officers shed much of their Uptonian mindset and came to accept the Guard as a permanent part of the federal military establishment, even if privately they continued to view peacetime command of the Guard by the states as needlessly inefficient. The General Staff demonstrated its willingness to go along with a wide variety of reforms proposed by the Guard during the course of the 1920s, so long as the contemplated measures were fiscally prudent. When funds grew tight, the Guard typically found allies in the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff willing to support deficiency appropriations to cover shortages in drill pay; even willing, if necessary, to supply the money out of the Army's own budget, as General MacArthur did in 1931. For the Guard, concern for the welfare of the Regular Army was evident from the early 1920s, and remained throughout the interwar period. It manifested itself in numerous resolutions passed by NGAUS in the 1920s, in Guard support for Army appropriations throughout the period, and was affirmed most clearly in 1932 when

[87] Killigrew, 44-46.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

direct approaches by members of the House with promises of increased funding for the Guard failed to gain NGAUS's support for deep cuts in the Regular Army's officer strength.[88] As Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur gratefully acknowledged, NGAUS's "influence has contributed powerfully in combating the rising tide of pacifism which threatens to engulf us."[89]

Regular Army Instructors and the Guard

The basis of the increased understanding and cooperation between the Guard and the Regular Army in the 1920s came not just from the shared battles against pacifism and for congressional funding – topics covered in great detail by other authors – but also from increased contact between members of the two components.[90] Aside from the few Guardsmen assigned to the Militia Bureau or the General Staff, the most intimate contact was between Guardsmen and Regular Army officers and NCOs who spent 3-4 year tours as instructors with the National Guard. But beyond this, virtually every soldier in the Army was exposed to Guardsmen at some time during the interwar period. Whether it during their annual summer training, at Army service schools, or on joint Army/Guard field exercises, the peacetime training of the civilian components became a much more important task for the Regular Army after 1920 then it had even been before.

---

[88] See "National Guard Resents Injustice to Regulars," *ANJ*, Sept. 2, 1922 12 for a survey of Guard opinion early in the decade; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 14-15 presents an account of efforts by House leaders to get NGAUS to support cuts in Regular Army officer strength in 1932.

[89] MacArthur to Brig. Gen. Herbert Johnson, July 20, 1932. NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1, File "NGA Memos, 1925-44." This letter was read aloud at the 1932 NGAUS convention; see *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 13-14.

[90] In particular, Griffith and Killigrew provide excellent coverage of the Army between the wars.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

John McAuley Palmer, writing from his retirement, saw that the success of the citizen components rested on the willingness of Regulars to instruct:

> In training a citizen army the attitude of the instructor is quite as important as the aptitude of the pupil. If we intrust it to men like Washington and Steuben and Stonewall Jackson who know it can be done and want to do it progress will be more rapid than if we intrust it to men like Scott and Sherman and Upton who think it cannot be done because they want to do something else.[91]

From 1920 on there was a distinct shift in the role played by Regular officers serving with Guard units. This was highlighted by the official change in title from "Inspector-Instructor" to simply "Instructor" beginning in early 1921, and was reflected in the 1922 edition of the National Guard Regulations, which explicitly stated "[Instructors] are not detailed to duty with the National Guard to personally enforce the provisions of law or regulations."[92] The reason for this change was simple: Guardsmen were less likely to admit their lack of knowledge or ask for assistance from the same individual who was tasked to inspect and report upon their shortcomings. The Militia Bureau urged instructors to embrace this new role, stating "The chances for successful service of an instructor are improved in the ratio in which he is able to divest himself of the idea that he is an inspector."[93] As befitted the emphasis on training, the instructor's own efficiency

---

[91] Palmer, *America in Arms*, 205-206.

[92] Militia Bureau Circular No. 27, Apr. 4, 1921; Section 368, *National Guard Regulations, 1922*. The 1919 National Guard regulations specifically tasked these officers with inspecting units to ensure compliance with the National Defense Act and War Department regulations. While the 1922 regulations still required instructors to report non-compliance through channels to the Corps Area Commanders, the job of conducting inspections and enforcing laws and regulations fell upon the Corps Area Commander's staff.

[93] "Items on the National Guard," *Infantry Journal*, Aug. 1926, 220.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

report was based in part on the preparedness of the unit to which he was assigned.[94] This must have proved frustrating to many instructors, since their role was strictly advisory and they had no legal authority to compel obedience from their charges. By law, the National Guard officers who commanded the units were entirely responsible for training, a right which no less an authority than the Constitution had reserved to the states.

The assignment as instructor would test the tact and diplomacy of many Regular Army officers as no other work in their professional career; as Samuel Huntington observed, "instruction of the civilian components in particular required a new type of officer with a new outlook."[95] This new type of officer was required to be more sympathetic with his charges than the old breed of Army officer, an expert in "salesmanship" as well as tactics, and a civic paragon – not an aloof warrior. In many ways this duty would serve as the perfect primer for positions of responsibility within the vast citizen army that would be created during World War II.

Officially, at least, the senior leadership of the Army embraced the mission of training the reserve components as one of its highest priorities, and was committed to providing the finest possible officers for this duty. Within a few days of his taking office as Chief of Staff of the Army, General Pershing instructed corps area commanders that "officers detailed for service in the organization and training of the National Guard and

---

[94] Section 372, *National Guard Regulations, 1922.* Instructors, under the direction of the Militia Bureau, were assigned to the Corps Area Commands and detailed for duty to the states; their evaluations were written by the Corps Area Commander, and only the Corps Area Commander could order an instructor's relief – however, he was required to consult with the Adjutant General of the state to which the officer was detailed. Needless to say, this created a somewhat confusing command relationship.

[95] Huntington, 284-285.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reserves should be selected from the most efficient officers in our army."[96] Maj. Gen. Hanson Ely, the Commandant of the War College, reiterated the importance of this duty: "... if he [a Regular Army officer] cannot do satisfactory duty with the National Guard he has no business in the Regular Service, because one-half of the duty of the officers of the Regular Service is with the National Guard, or the Reserves, or some other component of the National Defense."[97] This dictum applied to officers assigned to the General Staff as well: "[A]ny officer of the General Staff who has not knowledge of the National Guard or Reserves, has not had his education completed."[98]

The rhetoric of senior Army leaders, however, was not matched by the numbers of officers assigned to this important duty. The 1922 allotment of Regular Army officers assigned to the Guard was 699.[99] The Army cut this allotment in January 1923 to 485, reflecting the cuts in Regular officer personnel made by Congress.[100] The Militia Bureau strenuously objected to this reduction, in part because it represented a 28 percent cut for the Guard, as compared to 19 and 9 percent cuts, respectively, in Regular Army officers

---

[96] Pershing to Corps Area Commanders, July 9, 1921, as quoted in Brig. Gen. Anton Stephan, "Teamwork: A Vital Factor," *Recruiting News* (U.S. Army Recruiting Publicity Bureau) Vol. 3, No. 30, Oct. 1, 1921, 3.

[97] *NGAUS Proceedings, Oct. 1923*, 15.

[98] Maj. Gen. Hanson Ely, in "Conference on the National Guard," p.3. [Document is transcript of the Q&A following Maj. Gen. Creed Hammond's Nov. 5, 1925 AWC speech]. MHI.

[99] *CMB Annual Report, 1923*, 26-27.

[100] *CMB Annual Report, 1924*, 20. Of these 485, 441 would serve as instructors, the remainder being assigned to the Corps Area staffs and the Militia Bureau. Regular Army officer strength after 1923 remained fairly constant at around 12,000. By 1932, some 1,650 of these 12,000 officers reportedly were engaged in training the Guard, ORC, and ROTC. Source: "Reduction of Army Officers," *ANJ*, Apr. 23, 1932, 795.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

assigned to instruct the ORC and ROTC.[101] NGAUS added its protest to that of the Militia Bureau during its February 1923 convention, passing a resolution that called for Guard instructor reductions to be no greater than those experienced by other components.[102] The Militia Bureau, to no avail, pressed for the assignment of sufficient officers so that it could detail one instructor per National Guard battalion, thus making each instructor responsible for six units – this at a time when it was common for instructors, and not Guard officers, to conduct much of the unit training. With only 440 instructors available on average, however, instructors were limited to one or two per regiment. Though the allotment of 485 officers was established at a time when the Guard numbered less than 140,000 personnel, it was not increased over the next decade as Guard strength grew to nearly 190,000. In fact, despite the persistent complaints of NGAUS and the Militia Bureau, in 1926 the allotment decreased slightly to 476.[103]

Instructors were detailed to the states based on how far they would have to travel to maintain contact with all the elements of a regiment; thus more instructors were assigned *per capita* to less-densely populated states.[104] Unfortunately, an additional challenge instructors faced was that not enough money was appropriated for the purpose of travel – only an average of 4.5 visits per unit per year – so that the instructors,

---

[101] Memorandum, CMB to AG US, Subj: Allotment of Officers to the National Guard, Jan. 10, 1923. RG 168/12a/210.651.

[102] *NGAUS Proceedings, Feb. 1923*, 85.

[103] See Appendix 1. There is extensive correspondence regarding Militia Bureau requests for the assignment of more Regular Army officers to duty with the National Guard in RG 168/344a/210.651.

[104] "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, Nov. 1923, 597.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

particularly for regiments spread across great distances, were sometimes under-utilized for lack of funds.[105] Furthermore, instructors were frequently assigned other work not related to instruction. While lobbying for additional funds to allow instructors to get out to the units, NGAUS also attacked corps area commanders responsible for diverting instructors from their proper tasks:

> These officers are used for every conceivable duty. At times these additional duties conflict with the National Guard work. I believe in co-operation; I am a staunch supporter of the one Army plan, but I do not believe officers who are charged against the National Guard should be used for C.M.T.C., Reserve Corps Recruiting duty, Court Martial Boards, etc., and this Association should oppose any such proposition. I also submit the fact these officers are sent to us as Instructors. Yet they are required to certify our armory drill payrolls and do other clerical work which not only taxes them from their primary duty - THAT OF INSTRUCTION - but makes auditors and inspectors of them.[106]

Despite the fact that more resources could have been expended on instruction and corps area commanders occasionally misused instructors, there is no doubt that the Army's level of commitment to training the Guard was vastly greater than it had been before the World War, and this new level of commitment was of great benefit to the Guard. By way of comparison, immediately prior to the war the Army had detailed 148 officer inspector-instructors and 122 sergeant instructors to the Guard, about a third of the

---

[105] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1927*, 161.

[106] Milton Reckord, *NGAUS Proceedings, 1924*, 36. The Militia Bureau seconded these concerns to the Adjutant General. See CMB to AG US, Subj: Use of National Guard Instructor Personnel on duties other than those pertaining to the National Guard, Feb. 29, 1924; response in AG US to All Corps Area Commanders and CMB, SAB, Apr. 16, 1924; See also CMB to AG US (Liaison), Subj: Assignment of Regular Army officers on duty with the National Guard for duty with the Organized Reserves, and vice versa, Nov. 26, 1927. All correspondence in RG 168/344a/210-651 - Gen. - 26.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

officers and a fifth of the NCOs that would be assigned to this duty after the war.[107] The proportion of instructors to troops after the war – despite falling short of the amount desired by the Militia Bureau – was high enough that about half of the states responding to a survey in 1925 believed they had enough instructors for proper training.[108] The professional commitment and quality of the officers assigned to this duty was also high. The *Infantry Journal* frequently published articles by instructors and Guardsmen describing the rigors and rewards of this type of duty, articles which reflected a new and improved attitude towards the Guard, its capabilities, and limitations.[109] Guardsmen almost universally praised Regular officers assigned to train them. They were somewhat less effusive in their praise of Regular NCOs detailed as Sergeant Instructors; though the Guard successfully lobbied in 1924 for an increase in grade for Sergeant Instructors, NGAUS and the Militia Bureau requested that some 200 be cut from the force during the Depression in order to better spend the money elsewhere.[110]

---

[107] Figure given is for March 31, 1917, and almost certainly represents the largest number assigned since the passage of the 1903 Dick Act. See Memorandum [for file], n.s., Oct. 15, 1928. RG 168/344a/210.651 - Gen. - 28. A considerably lower figure of 114 Regular officers is given as the maximum ever assigned prior to World War I in "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, June, 1922, 695.

[108] Memorandum, CMB to All States, Subj: Allotment of Regular Army Instructors and Sergeant Instructors to the National Guard, Oct. 2, 1925; and Memo [for file], n.s., Oct. 31, 1925. RG 168/344a/210.651 - Gen. - 16.

[109] See, for example, Capt. Miles Savelle, "National Guard Instructor," Jan. 1923, 7-10; Maj. Thomas Hammond, "Sergeant Instructors with the Guard," May 1926, 524-527; Capt. Jefferson Stewart, "A National Guard Instructor at Work," Oct. 1929, 391-394; Lt. Wilbur Rose, "What the Guard Expects," July 1930, 76-77. These articles are in addition to numerous short pieces in the monthly "National Guard Department" section relating to instructors.

[110] See testimony of Maj. D. N. Swan, Militia Bureau, in *To Amend the National Defense Act of June 3 1916, as Amended: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 6354 and S. 2169*, House of Representatives, 68th Congress, 1st Session, 51-54 (Feb. 26, 1924); *To Amend in Certain Particulars the National Defense Act [to accompany S. 2169]*, House of Representatives Report No. 397, 68th Congress, 1st Session, Mar. 28, 1924, 2-3; Section 1, Act of June 6, 1924 (43 *Stat.* 470). CMB Leach at the 1932

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Instructor duty was not considered a plum assignment by most Regular officers – quite to the contrary, because it was a posting away from the mainstream of the Army, neither a command nor a prominent staff assignment, many officers considered it positively detrimental to their careers. Future wartime Chief of Staff George Marshall was a prime example. Despite his hearty agreement with the military principles of his good friend John McAuley Palmer, and a lifelong belief (in the words of his most famous biographer) that "the pre-eminent mission of the military professional" was to make the citizen Army effective, Marshall felt his career had been seriously side-tracked when he was pulled from regimental command in 1933 for duty as the senior instructor for the Illinois National Guard. Marshall attempted to avoid instructor duty through a personal appeal to Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur, but he was rebuffed in part because the politically influential commander of the 33rd Division, Maj. Gen. Roy D. Keehn, had requested the best colonel in the Army to serve as instructor for his division.[111]

The Militia Bureau, for its part, did its best to make Guard instructor assignments more desirable. It pressed the War Department in 1922 to reclassify instructor duty – if

---

NGAUS convention reported that the Militia Bureau was looking to reduce the number of NCO instructors in order to save money; cutting by half the number of sergeant instructors would save the Guard $240,000 a year, a sum better applied sending Guardsmen to schools so they could learn to conduct the training themselves. NGAUS took up the theme and passed a resolution endorsing Leach's plan, which was implemented a few months later. See *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 26-27, 70.; "National Guard Notes," Infantry Journal, May-June 1933, 234, July-Aug 1933, 310; *CMB Annual Report, 1933*, 15.

[111] Pogue, 221, 260, 281-285. Marshall also served as Chief of Staff of the 33rd Division while instructing it, a position reserved for a Regular officer by Section 65 of NDA 1920. A handful of Regular officers went even further, taking commissions in the National Guard and serving in command or staff positions in addition to their normal duties as instructors. See Militia Bureau Circular No. 50, July 26, 1921. In 1927, this amounted to twenty-seven Regular officers; the senior-most was Col. E.J. Williams, a former executive officer of the Militia Bureau, who served as a major general commanding the 30th Division. "Items on the National Guard," *Infantry Journal*, Feb. 1927, 208.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

performed with combatant troops – as the equivalent of "duty with troops," and sought successfully in the 1930s to ease legislative restrictions that kept instructors from serving on the General Staff following their tours with the Guard. This was a change that not only made instructor duty more attractive for Regular officers, but was bound to increase the tiny fraction of General Staff officers who had experience training Guard troops (only four out of a hundred in 1934).[112] In addition to these official efforts, on at least two separate occasions Milton Reckord used his influence to advance the careers of Regular Army colonels who had served the Guard faithfully as executive officers of the Militia Bureau, both out of friendship, and because he hoped other Regular officers would see that service in the Militia Bureau would not leave them "out in the cold when promotions are being considered."[113]

Guard relations with the Regular Army were cordial and cooperative during the interwar period; for senior officers fighting annual budget battles with Congress it was common sense to make common cause. Although there were occasional moments of friction – the threat to have Congress define the role of the Militia Bureau in 1926, or the near-war in 1933 over the Roosevelt administration's cuts to the fiscal year 1934 budget – the leaders of the two components got along well. What is less often considered is the manner in which understanding between the components deepened – one personal relationship at a time – as Regulars in ever increasing numbers were exposed to the

---

[112] "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, June 1922, 695; "National Guard Notes," *Infantry Journal*, Nov.-Dec. 1934, 487; *CNGB Annual Report, 1938*, 3; Act of June 3, 1938, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 52, Chap. 319 (Public Law No. 578) amending Section 5 of the NDA 1916.

[113] *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section IV, 9; *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 68, 122.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guard, and limited numbers of Guardsmen gained the opportunity to serve on active duty in Washington alongside Regulars. Thus, while Guardsmen, John McAuley Palmer, and others criticized the Regular Army for not abandoning its skeletonized divisions and fully embracing the role of preparing the citizen army for war, it is also true that the Army devoted far more resources to training the civilian components than in the past. This effort brought about the beginning of a cultural change within the Army which began to bear fruit during World War II.

The Guard, for its part, took seriously the injunction of Secretary of War Weeks in 1924 to lobby Congress and the nation on behalf of the Regulars:

> If the executive branch of the Government is to convince the country and Congress of the wisdom of proposals affecting the Regular Army, the civilian components of the Army, forgetting if need be their own immediate necessities, must undertake to educate public opinion in favor of such proposals. ... [T]he National Guard has a direct, and I might almost say, overwhelming, interest in preserving the size, the efficiency, and the morale of the Regular Army.[114]

Less than a decade later, NGAUS accepted the congratulations of Assistant Secretary of War Frederick Payne for its efforts on behalf of the Regular Army:

> In this work of arousing public opinion, members of the National Guard did splendid work. They saw clearly the sinister nature of these attacks on our defenses. They did not view the situation purely in terms of their own components of the Army. They perceived that while the immediate effect of the proposed legislation would have been merely to limit severely the number of Regular officers on National Guard duty, its implicit dangers were far greater. ... They felt rather that the whole Army, not its several elements, was in danger, and they rallied gallantly to its defense.[115]

---

[114] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1924*, 54.

[115] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The days when the leadership of NGAUS vowed to "smash the Regular Army" were buried in the shared struggles of the twenties and thirties. But they were not gone forever. Much of the old bitterness would be resurrected during the mobilization of 1940-1941, and again following that war during the debates over the post-war structure of the reserve forces. But the close relations fostered during the interwar period were not forgotten either, and ultimately aided in securing the Guard's position in the Cold War defense establishment.

Relations with the Organized Reserves

The Guard's dealings with the Organized Reserves were also generally cordial. While the Guard and the Organized Reserves were both civilian components, there were two great gulfs separating them – both of which the Guard was happy to maintain. The first was that the Organized Reserves were a federal component, and lacked some of the freedom of action that state control granted the National Guard. The second was that the Organized Reserves consisted only of cadres of officers and enlisted specialists who were not formed into complete units and rarely had the opportunity to train. The Guard prided itself on being the "first line" defense of the nation, and as such, occasionally a dismissive note crept into communications concerning the second-line ORC and the civilian training programs, ROTC and CMTC.

The officer portion of the Organized Reserves, the ORC, remained strong after World War I, with 103,829 Reserve officers enrolled in 1926. Some 6,629 of these were Guard members (both officers and enlisted men), who until 1933 had to have an ORC commission if they wished to perform their federal mission without delay or examination

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

upon mobilization.[116] The numbers of Guardsmen with ORC commissions increased steadily, so that by 1933 some 12,381 of 13,364 Guard officers held commissions in both the Guard and the ORC.[117] The ORC grew during the interwar period as well, fed by the graduates of ROTC and CMTC even as World War I veterans retired from its lists. The ERC, however, remained insignificant, never exceeding the 5,775 enlisted men enrolled in 1926, and shrinking to 2,149 men by 1941.[118]

The Guard, though perhaps unwilling to admit it, remained suspicious of the Organized Reserves and resented what it saw as Regular Army favoritism directed towards it and the federal civilian training programs. When cuts in Regular Army instructor personnel were made in 1923, the Militia Bureau quickly noted how disproportionate they were for the Guard as compared to the ORC, ROTC, and CMTC. In 1933 when the War Department was instructed to trim $52,000,000 from the Army's budget, the Guard quickly compared how much more it was asked to cut proportionate to other parts of the Army. The threat of competition from the Organized Reserves most worried the Guard, and this did not go unnoticed by the Army's leadership. As the Adjutant General of the Army noted as early as 1922:

> It is feared that in certain quarters enthusiastic efforts to bring about successful organizations has created an atmosphere of undesirable

---

[116] Crossland and Currie, 295; *CMB Annual Report, 1926*, 14. Guard enlisted men could hold ORC commissions which would become effective upon federal mobilization and allow them to serve as officers in any available vacancy. While Guard officers (after 1922) held ORC commissions in the same grade in which they served in the Guard, almost all enlisted Guardsmen who held commissions in the ORC were 2nd Lieutenants.

[117] *CMB Annual Report, 1933*, 4, 7. In addition, 1,314 enlisted men also held ORC commissions.

[118] Crossland and Currie, 295-296.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

> competition rather than the spirit of cordial cooperation ... The development of the Organized Reserves as a Federal militia, with training and instruction similar in all respects to the National Guard, is not contemplated.[119]

General Pershing himself publicly noted that part of the reason he was touring Guard encampments in the summer of 1923 was "to iron out the lingering hostility in National Guard circles to the Organized Reserve" – a statement which caused the Chief of the Militia Bureau to fire off a quick letter noting his surprise and disappointment that Pershing would believe any significant amounts of hostility still existed.[120]

Despite these protestations, the Guard jealously protected its status as the only reserve component with fully organized units. When in 1928 the War Department authorized the formation of a single enlisted Organized Reserve unit – apparently by accident – the NGAUS Executive Council quickly took up the issue with the Assistant Secretary of War and had the unit eliminated.[121] When legislation was introduced into the House and Senate that same year to establish a separate "Reserve Division" in the War Department to administer the ORC, ROTC and CMTC, it was also opposed by NGAUS. Harkening back to the fight against Secretary of War Garrison's Continental Army Plan in 1915-1916, the NGAUS Executive Council issued a statement in May 1928 that denounced plans to create this new agency – not only because it was touted by some in testimony on Capitol Hill as a precursor to full-strength Organized Reserve units, but

---

[119] Memo, AG US to Commanding Officers of all Corps Areas and Departments, Subj: The Association of the United States Army, Apr. 25, 1922. RG 168/12a/080. - Assoc. of the Army of the U.S.

[120] Rickards to Pershing, July 23, 1923. *Pershing Papers*, Box 146.

[121] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1928*, 37.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

also because ROTC and CMTC would be subsumed by the new division and the Guard might subsequently be deprived of graduates of these programs.[122] Despite characterizations to the contrary, NGAUS was not opposed to establishing a Reserve Division so long as it was restricted to administration of the Organized Reserves, and not ROTC and CMTC. Though NGAUS cooperated with ROA to work out compromise legislation, the objections of a few congressmen ultimately killed the bill.[123]

The Reserve Division bill controversy aside, the 1920s were marked by greatly increased cooperation between the Guard and the ORC, with the Guard providing training opportunities and resources to Reservists who would otherwise lack them. On average, a Reserve officer in the 1920s was lucky if he received fifteen days of annual training once every four or five years.[124] One method advanced for increasing the amount of training available to the ORC was by loaning Organized Reserve cadre units use of Guard armories, equipment and horses, or by having Reserve officers train with the Guard – all practices which were encouraged by the Militia Bureau, though evidence suggests in many cases this type of cooperation originated at the local level.[125] In 1927 alone, 552

---

[122] "Statement ... as to the attitude of the National Guard toward Senate Bill No. 3458 and House Bill No. 11683, now pending before Congress," May 17, 1928. NGAUS Archives, Minutes binder. Reprinted in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1928*, 21-23.

[123] Telegram, Walsh to Brig. Gen. Milton McLean (AG, KS), May 12, 1928. NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1. See also *NGAUS Proceedings, 1928*, 21-24, 126-132.

[124] Crossland and Currie, 40.

[125] See, for example, Militia Bureau Circular No. 16, Apr. 3, 1925 and No. 27, June 11, 1925. Early reference to this kind of cooperation shows it originating in the states. See resolution "H" of the Conference of State Adjutants General, 9th Corps Area in memo to CMB from Edgar Sirmyer, Officer in Charge of National Guard Affairs, 9th Corps Area, Dec. 29, 1922. CMB reply to CG, 9th Corps Area, Mar. 17, 1923, indicates that local arrangements of this type are commonplace. Documents in RG 168/12a/080. - Adj. Gen. Assoc. Lt. Col. George Marshall makes note of growing Guard/ORC cooperation in "The

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reserve officers were attached to Guard units for field training.[126]

The Guard and Reserve lobbies naturally reflected the friendly relations between their components. NGAUS and the Reserve Officers Association (ROA – founded in October 1922) often made common cause in lobbying Congress for adequate military funding. The president of ROA was often an honored guest at NGAUS conventions, with reciprocal invitations usually extended to the NGAUS president by ROA. Communications from one organization to the other were always full of expressions of mutual fraternal trust and admiration. ROA even went so far as to allow Guard officers who held ORC commissions to become full voting and office-holding members in 1927, despite objections from within the organization that the presence of Guardsmen could serve as an "embarrassment" to the association and potentially weaken it.[127] ROA also endorsed several major Guard legislative projects, including the Guard strength bill and the Guard status bill. Working together with several other civil-military associations, all of which shared the same problem of lacking a full-time Washington staff, NGAUS and ROA funded a congressional monitoring service which alerted them if anything of interest to their components came up on Capitol Hill.[128]

Guard criticism of the ORC, though rare, tended to focus on the ease with which rank was obtained. This was, ironically, a brush which had been used to tar the Guard

---

Development of the National Army," AWC lecture, Sep. 10, 1923, 11. MHI.

[126] Memorandum, XO, MB to ACofS, G-4, Subj: Answers to Questionnaire for Chief of Staff, Nov. 22, 1927, 13. RG 168/344a/325.4 - Gen. - 27.

[127] "The National Guard," *Infantry Journal,* Jan. 1928, 99-100.

[128] "National Guard Notes," *Infantry Journal*, July-Aug. 1931, 388; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 106.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and militia many times in its own past, but since the enactment of the National Defense Act of 1916 and ever more stringent examinations of physical and professional fitness, some Guardsmen had come to look down upon ORC officers who could gain rank without spending time training or with troops. Members of the ORC were certainly aware of this – one Reserve major made the comparison to rebel armies during the revolutions in Mexico circa 1910, admitting "we have had, at one time or another, plenty of lieutenant colonels who would have been better cast in the humbler roles. And the similarity of the Reserve Corps to the rebel armies in having all officers and hardly any privates has been striking for a long time."[129] Perception of this criticism was at least part of the impetus behind experiments conducted in 1929 that placed ORC officers in charge of CMTC camps in order to give them more experience handling troops. The widespread use of ORC officers in CCC camps during the Depression also provided valuable training opportunities for Reservists. Inevitably, the obvious increased utility of having federal Reservists function in trained units would overcome National Guard resistance, and after World War II the Army Reserve (which succeeded the Organized Reserves) would be organized in complete units like the Guard.

Growth of Professionalism

The most striking change in the National Guard of the 1920s and 1930s was its increasing professionalism. By any measure, the Guard became more efficient than ever before in its peacetime history. While senior Guard leaders complained about many

[129] Maj. Edward Schauffler, "The Reserve Corps Gets Some Troops," *Infantry Journal*, Nov. 1930, 568.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

issues – particularly lack of funds – they were relentlessly upbeat regarding the overall condition of the Guard. To quote from a typical pronouncement of this type, "despite the discouraging conditions under which the commanders of the National Guard labored during the past few years, practically all the organizations are up to a higher state of efficiency than they have been at any time in the history of the country."[130] This was a consistent theme, and not just one espoused by Guardsmen. Regular Army observers made similar reports. Lt. Col. George Marshall, who in his capacity as aide de camp to General Pershing had spent nearly three years touring the country and reviewing troops, reported to the War College in 1923 that:

> The great change in the National Guard from the pre-war organization is in equipment and the quality of the officer personnel .... In certain sections of the country which heretofore have had a very weak organization, we found not a marked, but a remarkable, improvement, the troops comparing favorably with the best of State troops prior to 1917.[131]

In fact, Marshall forecast with some alarm that Guard officers might someday exceed Regulars in command experience:

> A Colonel of Infantry [in the Regular Army] today cannot expect to have a regiment for more than about two years in ten or twelve of service. Without careful management, it is conceivable that we might reach a point where the most experienced regimental officers will be in the National Guard and not in the Regular Army. The consequent loss of prestige would be fatal to the leadership of the latter force.[132]

The press made note of the Guard's increased efficiency as well. The *New York*

---

[130] CMB Creed Hammond in "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, Oct. 1925, 458.

[131] Lt. Col. George Marshall, "The Development of the National Army," AWC lecture, Sept. 10, 1923. MHI.

[132] Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Times, a strong advocate for defense spending during the 1920s, noted that the money spent on the Guard had produced a quality product. "The Guard of the post-war period is not far behind the regular army in training. In physical material it is superior. Without fear of contradiction it can be said that the infantry of the Guard is just about as fit as the regulars to go into the first line of defense."[133]

The factors contributing to this increasing professionalism were many. The emphasis on standards in postwar Guard regulations was far greater than in the past; extensive space was devoted to annual physical exams, annual efficiency reports, boards for retention and promotion, and other measures designed to ensure the physical and professional qualifications of Guardsmen. The result was a National Guard that was not only more uniform, but superior in quality to its pre-war predecessor.[134] Professional conferences, such as the ones held in 1924-1925 for the AGs, or those held (with more success) for U.S. Property and Disbursing Officers beginning in 1923, helped disseminate information and spread uniform standards and practices across the states. Even the problem of turnover – one of the biggest detractors to Guard readiness in the past – diminished during the 1920s. In 1924, virtually every enlisted man was new after two years, every officer after three.[135] Turnover diminished considerably within the next

---

[133]"The National Guard Convention," *NYT*, Jan. 14, 1926, 24.

[134] Article VI, *National Guard Regulations, 1922*, 60-87.

[135] Maj. Gen. George Rickards, "The National Guard," AWC lecture, Nov. 14, 1924, 14. MHI; see also *CMB Annual Report, 1924*, 4. Rickards gives figures of about 35 percent annual turnover for officers (90 percent of it in the company grades) and 45 percent for enlisted. Rickards was viewing the problem at its height. By 1926, the *CMB Annual Report* (p. 13) put officer turnover at a considerably lower 21 percent, and separations trended downward for the rest of the decade.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

decade, particularly after the start of the Depression. At the same time, drill attendance increased, from just under 65 percent in 1924, to just over 75 percent in 1928, to over 90 percent beginning in 1933.[136] Less turnover and better attendance at drill and summer camp naturally led to a more efficient and professional force.

The composition and training of the Guard during the interwar period also contributed to a higher degree of professionalism. The post-war Guard, unlike the force that existed prior to World War I, was organized from the entire spectrum of arms available to the Regular Army, to include airplanes and tanks. Training – which previously had remained focused at the unit level – occurred at higher echelons. Beginning in the summer of 1928, much to the benefit of brigade and division staffs, five Guard divisions assembled for training during their summer encampments.[137] Command post exercises were introduced on a large scale in 1929; these headquarters-only activities eventually grew to full-scale integration of Guard divisions into Army level field maneuvers every year from 1935-1939.[138]

Increasing professionalism also meant shedding some of the more negative trappings of militia culture. One benefit of increased commissioning and promotion standards was the rapid elimination of a practice that had consistently given the Guard a bad name in the past: the election of officers. Nearly universal prior to 1916, by 1920 only a dozen states still elected officers; by 1926, the *Infantry Journal* admitted of

---

[136] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1928*, 54. *CNGB Annual Report, 1933*, 12.

[137] *CMB Annual Report, 1929*, 1-2.

[138] *CNGB Annual Report, 1941*, 11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

knowing only one state which still engaged in the practice.[139] Bloated state staffs were also reduced to numbers more consistent with the mission they were performing. The Militia Bureau pushed this reform primarily as a means to demonstrate economy to Congress; state staff expenses constituted some 2 percent of the Guard budget in 1922, or about $250,000. Large state staffs had been necessary prior to the World War to do the work of brigade and division staffs which did not exist in the Guard at that time; however, after 1920 these higher echelon staffs were amply provided for, making large state staffs superfluous. After extensive polling of the adjutants general (who proved surprisingly receptive to the idea), the 1922 *National Guard Regulations* instituted a significant reduction in state staffs, with the consequent shifting of most of the excess officers and men to deployable units.[140] The Militia Bureau felt there was room for even more trimming, publishing revised regulations on July 1, 1926 that reduced the numbers further. This time, the protests from NGAUS and AGAUS were considerably louder.[141]

---

[139] "News Items of Interest to the National Guard," Apr. 2, 1920. RG 168/12a/350.05 - General #2 (Box 370); "Items on the National Guard," *Infantry Journal*, Nov. 1926, 568. The state which still elected officers was not identified.

[140] Section 152, *National Guard Regulations, 1922*. See also "Reduction in Personnel of National Guard Staffs," *ANJ*, Oct. 14, 1922, 158; "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, Nov. 1922, 593. Some thirty of thirty-four adjutant's general who responded to the Militia Bureau were in favor of some reduction of state staffs. Gen. Rickards eased the transition by promising each state that did not already have a portion of a division or brigade headquarters allocated to it received such an allotment, in order that excess state staff members have appropriate units to transfer to. As always, Rickards communicated extensively with NGAUS and AGAUS to ensure they understood his intention was to increase the number of soldiers in deployable units, not eliminate them from the Guard. See CMB memorandum for Exec. Committee, NGA, Dec. 7, 1922, 6-7. (RG 168/12a/080. - National Guard Association) and correspondence with AGAUS President Charles Martin, Aug. 19, Aug. 30 and Oct. 5, 1922 in *Charles Martin Papers*, Box 4, Folder 3.

[141] *NGAUS Proceeding, Nov. 1926*, 95-96. This is identical to the resolution passed at the fall, 1926 meeting of AGAUS. Fuller discussion of the issue takes place in the Spring 1927 Meeting of the AGAUS, May 9, 1927, 125-133. RG 168/344a/080. - Adj. Gen. Assoc.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

While the Militia Bureau responded in 1927 by granting some flexibility in how the regulations could be implemented, the issue was revisited yet again in 1932 and 1933 in an effort to close serious gaps in the Guard's budget, as well as reduce a force which was frequently cited by the Guard's critics as an illustration of Guard inefficiency.[142]

Professional Education

The single most important factor in increasing the professionalism of the Guard in the interwar period was widespread access for the first time to Regular Army schools. Informing Guardsmen about these new opportunities and encouraging them to take advantage of them were among the most frequent causes for communication between the Militia Bureau and the states.[143] While resident schools – typically three month courses tailored specifically for Guardsmen – offered the best training, a much larger number of Guardsmen were able to take advantage of newly created correspondence courses offered by the Army. Though only a handful of correspondence courses were available beginning in 1920, the numbers of enrollees expanded dramatically during the interwar period as the Army developed more courses and their popularity grew.[144] By 1930, correspondence

---

[142] See *CMB Annual Report, 1927*, 9; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 26, 69-70; "Proceedings of conference of National Guard officers called at Camp Ripley, Minnesota, June 15th and 16th [1933];" Memorandum for the Executive from Maj. H. C. Fellows, Militia Bureau, Subj: Proposals for the following: Reduction of the Strength of the State Staff and State Detachments, etc., Aug 10, 1933. Copy of last two items in NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1, State Staff Study, 1933 folder; "National Guard Notes," *Infantry Journal*, July-Aug. 1933, 311-312;

[143] See, for example, Militia Bureau circulars No. 36, 37, 52, 58, 61, 66, 67, 77, 78, 80, and 82 in 1920 alone. Course offerings, dates and other errata make up a significant proportion of subsequent year's circulars as well.

[144] See Appendix 1 for resident service school attendance figures for 1920-1933. By comparison, correspondence course enrollment in 1920 consisted of 52 Guard officers and no enlisted; in 1930: 1,071 officers and 126 enlisted; 1933: 9,680 officers and 15,794 enlisted. In 1940, the interwar year with the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

courses were a prerequisite in most states for attendance at service schools, and the successful completion of courses gave credit on the professional exams given for promotion. Guard enlisted men could qualify to fill an officer vacancy during the wartime expansion of the Guard by completing correspondence courses and receiving a certificate attesting to their mastery of the basic material.[145]

Unfortunately, attending resident courses was impossible for those Guardsmen who could not afford the time; George Marshall advocated shorter courses for the simple reason that "it is always difficult to get the type of man we want when he has to give up his business for three months."[146] Nevertheless, demand for resident courses always exceeded supply, and the primary impediment to attendance throughout the interwar period remained lack of funding. In 1922, for example, the Militia Bureau warned the states that the 1923 appropriation only provided for 156 Guard officers to attend schools; in the previous year 220 officers had applied to attend the Infantry School alone.[147]

Requests for additional appropriations for schools were commonplace; for NGAUS and the Militia Bureau, these funds were even more critical than those requested

---

highest enrollment in both types of courses, 675 officers and 144 enlisted men attended resident schools as compared to 13,542 officers and 20,249 enlisted enrolled in correspondence courses. Source: *CNGB Annual Report, 1941*, 8. Correspondence courses were immensely popular despite the fact that, unlike members of the ORC, Guardsmen had to pay for their course materials out of pocket. NGAUS was able to get this policy reversed in 1928. See *NGAUS Proceedings, 1927*, 169; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1928*, 29.

[145] See "National Guard," *Infantry Journal*, Oct. 1930, 434-435.

[146] Larry Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, Vol. 1, *The Soldierly Spirit, Dec. 1880-June 1939* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1981), 595.

[147] Militia Bureau Circular No. 20, Mar. 14, 1922. As Appendix 1 shows, the Militia Bureau found additional funds in 1923 to send 330 officers to school – the largest number funded between 1920 and 1933.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

for Regular Army instructors because the primary goal of sending Guardsmen to school was to qualify them to train their own units without assistance from the Regulars. This goal also drove the manner in which personnel were selected for schools. The policy was to select officers from each state so that the knowledge they gained would be dispersed as widely as possible. As a result, Guard officers from smaller states had a better chance of obtaining coveted school slots than those from larger ones.[148]

Nearly 6,000 Guard officers gained the opportunity to attend resident Army service schools from 1920 to 1940. On the eve of World War II some 3,746 of these officers were still in the Guard and on active duty – about 20 percent of the officer personnel of the National Guard at that time.[149] Virtually every Guard officer – and a great many of the enlisted men – who hadn't attended a resident service school had completed one or more of the by-then ubiquitous correspondence courses. Compared to the Guard in 1917, with virtually no exposure to the Army's professional education system, this was a huge improvement which would be reflected in the coming war.

---

[148] "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal,* Jan. 1923, 214-217; *NGAUS Proceedings, Oct 1923,* 112; "The National Guard," *Infantry Journal,* Jan. 1929, 94-96.

[149] *CNGB Annual Report, 1941,* 8-10. Data is as of July 1, 1941. The vast majority – 3,468 – attended only the basic course in their branch (the largest group, 1,406 in all, graduated from the Infantry course). Approximately 1 in 13 graduates of the basic course (278 in all) went on to attend the Command and General Staff Course at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Less than 1 in 6 of these (43 total) were graduates of the pinnacle of the Army's educational system, the War College in Washington, DC. Not surprisingly, Lt. Gen. Raymond McLain of Oklahoma, who as commander of the XIX Corps in Northwest Europe rose higher than any other Guardsman during World War II, was first in his Command and General Staff Course of 1938. This despite the fact that his formal education ended in the 9th grade. See Betty McLain Belvin, *Ray McLain and the National Guard* (Manhattan: Sunflower Univ. Press, 1994), 15, 62.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Motorization

The Guard also kept pace with the Regular Army in technological advancement, at least in the field of motorization. Primarily for economic reasons, motorization was embraced whole-heartedly in 1933, so that by 1940 all but a single regiment of Guard field artillery was truck-drawn. The rapid adoption of motorization by the Guard stemmed from several factors: the lack of sufficient horses, the high cost of feeding and caring for the horses that were on hand, and the support of a key ally in Congress.[150]

Although the financial benefits to be gained from abandoning the horse were well recognized in the 1920s, there was considerable opposition to converting to trucks because of their poor mechanical reliability and lack of cross-country mobility. As the Executive officer of the Militia Bureau pronounced in 1929, "it is the view of the Militia Bureau that motorization should not be required unless it can be conclusively shown that the tactical employment and efficiency of such artillery will not be impaired."[151] This hesitance was overcome with the appointment in late 1931 of Maj. Gen. George Leach, a field artillery officer, as Chief of the Militia Bureau. Leach very quickly found his own interest in motorization had influential backing in Congress:

> Within a week after taking office I had to defend my annual budget for the next fiscal year before the sub committee on War Department appropriations in the House of Representatives of which the Hon. Ross Collins of Mississippi was chairman.
>
> The Regular Army and former Chiefs of the Bureau had had

[150] A good summary of motorization during the interwar period is contained in *CNGB Annual Report, 1941*, 11-13. Though the Guard's motor pool expanded from 5,931 vehicles in 1931 to 15,845 in 1940, this still only represented 27 percent of the vehicles required for wartime mobilization.

[151] Col. John Gulick, *NGAUS Proceedings, 1929*, 129.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

> continued trouble with Collins and I had been properly warned. However, I found out the first day of the hearing what was making all the trouble.
>
> Collins was for mechanization of the army and it was something that had interested me since our experience in the First World War and it was therefore easy for me to get into the good graces of Mr. Collins. From that day we were friends to the end.[152]

Leach became a strong advocate of motorization at NGAUS conventions in subsequent years, selling it primarily as a cost-saving measure estimated to save over $1,300,000 annually once all horses in the field artillery were replaced.[153] Representative Collins preached the gospel of motorization to the National Guard somewhat more forcefully, blasting those in the military establishment whom he felt impeded progress:

> Military conservatism has too long been allowed to retain masses of slow-moving, slow-shooting, expensively massed troops. These antiques must yield to motorized and mechanized forces. ...
>
> The military authorities determine how the sum available to them can best be spent to insure National safety. Yet when we realize that the large percentage of the money appropriated is for personnel to almost the total neglect of mechanized equipment, and when we see money used on the transient training of high school boys and drill ground maneuvers and single-shot rifles, we are somewhat shaken in the belief in the good judgment of our General Staff.[154]

At the time he spoke these words, Collins had already backed them up with actions. In May 1933 the Guard took delivery of the largest order of vehicles received by the War Department since the World War. Twenty field artillery regiments were equipped that year alone, and by 1935 all but three Guard artillery regiments had been

---

[152] George Leach, "The personal history of Major General George E. Leach," 82.

[153] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 28-29; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1933*, 29-32. *NGAUS Proceedings, 1934*, 22-25.

[154] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1933*, 62.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

motorized.[155] The influx of new vehicles allowed the Guard to discard its remaining World War issue trucks and tractors, whose continued maintenance had been a significant financial burden. Thus equipped during the 1930s, the Guard's field artillery was better prepared to meet the challenges of modern, mobile warfare during World War II.

National Guard Service on the General Staff

The two signature reforms of the National Defense Act of 1920, so far as the National Guard was concerned, were the designation of a Guard officer as Chief of the Militia Bureau and the detailing of Guard officers as additional members of the War Department General Staff. While the former provision created immediate and lasting benefits for the Guard, the latter provision garnered results that were somewhat less dramatic, but nevertheless positive for the long term professional growth of the Guard and its acceptance within the highest echelons of the Army staff.

The lengthiest treatment previously given in published sources to the first two decades of Guard service on the General Staff consumes less than a page. It concludes that joint committees met on "two or three occasions" and that Guardsmen on the General Staff "lacked the rank, legal authority, experience, or prestige necessary to exercise influence." In summary, "the service of Guard officers on the General Staff was

---

[155] "To Deliver 509 Chevrolets," *ANJ*, May 13, 1933, 747; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1941*, 12. Despite agreement on motorization, Collins remained a "small Army" advocate and very stingy with regards to funding for personnel and training. During debate over the 1935 appropriation, Collins gladly supported funds that would complete the motorization of the Guard, but opposed spending a similar amount of money to restore the Guard to forty-eight drills after it had been reduced to thirty-six the previous year. See "National Guard Notes," *Infantry Journal*, May-June 1934, 232-233.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

insignificant."[156]

This conclusion is overly negative. Because a great many of the relevant documents were purged from the interwar files of the General Staff (excluding the War Plans Division) shortly after the start of World War II, it is difficult to ascertain the influence of Guardsmen on the General Staff in day-to-day decision making, or to determine exactly how many times joint committees were summoned. Even with incomplete records, however, it is fairly easy to dismiss the statement that these committees met only two or three times; in the 1920s alone joint committees were called three times just to determine the force structure of the Guard, resulting in the initial allotments of 1921, the 250,000 man plan of 1923, and the 210,000 man plan of 1927. Numerous other joint committees, called for a wide variety of purposes, are referred to in various sources, including NGAUS convention proceedings, professional journals, Militia Bureau records, and files that were not purged by the General Staff.[157]

---

[156] Derthick, 57. The term "joint" in this context is not used in its modern sense of inter-service (e.g., Army and Navy), but rather inter-component within the Army. Joint committees convened under Section 5 of the National Defense Act of 1920 to consider regulations and policies pertaining to the Guard or the Organized Reserves (Section 3a of NDA 1920 also authorized joint committees to determine the force structure and allotment of Guard and Reserve units). Joint committees were required to have equal parts Guard or Reserve officers and Regulars on them, though in practice the numbers were often unequal due to shortages of Guardsmen and Reservists serving on the General Staff.

[157] For example, appointment of a Section 5 committee to study revision of NGRs in 1924 (RG 165/12/13468-2); discussion of membership and roles of joint committee for studying polices and regulations relating to dual commissions in 1925 ("National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, Sep. 1925, 331); .findings of joint committee to study 1929 proposed revisions to the NDA (RG 165/281/2808-2); recommendations of joint committee to determine control methods to insure that Militia Bureau would not exceed funds appropriated for it (Appendix H, Major Army Project No. 6 – National Guard 250,000 in RG 168/344a/325.4 - Gen. - 10); multiple joint committees in 1925 which attempted to revise General Order No. 6 governing the Militia Bureau (*NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 84-85, 99); committee to determine number of Guard officers needed upon mobilization (Memorandum for Asst. CofS, G-1, from [Section 5 committee chaired by Brig. Gen. Charles Martin], Subj: Procurement of officers for expansion to war strength of the National Guard, June 29, 1923 in RG 168/344a/File 325.4 - Gen.); Section 5 committee appointed in 1930 to evaluate the Guard status bill (*NGAUS Proceedings, 1930*, 72, 75-76); Section 5

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

While Guard veterans of World War I may have questioned the Regulars' sincerity, the War Department publicly embraced Guardsmen and Reservists when they were first detailed to the General Staff in the summer of 1920. "They have been received at the War Department with every consideration ordinarily extended to those of equal rank in the regular army; rooms have been made available for their exclusive use and every courtesy accorded them."[158] Furthermore, the War Department demonstrated that it intended to comply with the National Defense Act not only by regularly forming joint committees of Regular and reserve soldiers, but also by instituting a standing committee of all the Guard and Reserve officers that was charged with "passing upon questions with regard to which the War Department may desire their combined views and with initiating recommendations of their own."[159] It was hoped the officers in this forum would share problems and reach solutions, developing a consensus of opinion among themselves as to how best to tackle various questions being studied by the General Staff. By forming this committee, the War Department demonstrated a willingness to go beyond the letter of the law in order to profit as much as possible from the unique experiences of Guard and Reserve officers serving with them.

---

committee appointed in April 1932 to report on later versions of the status bill (RG 165/281/3463-1 [OCS file 16810-22]).

[158] "Guardsmen on War Board," *NYT*, Sept. 8, 1920.

[159] Standing "National Guard and Reserve Committee" announced in General Staff office memorandum, n.s. Sept. 13, 1922. RG 165/216/1920-26. See also "National Guard and Reserve Committee created in W.D.," *ANJ*, Sep. 16, 1922, 73. The purpose and scope of this standing committee is further defined in an updated version of this memorandum, Subj: Organization and performance of duty by the Reserve, including National Guard officers, on duty with the War Department General Staff under the provisions of Section 5(b) of the National Defense Act, Apr. 13, 1923, same location.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

That Guard officers lacked experience for General Staff service is a matter of perspective. The primary reason for having Guard officers detailed to the General Staff was to bring their experiences as Guardsmen with them in order to better judge policies developed for the Guard; as far as the law was concerned, their ability to assist the General Staff in carrying out its other work was only secondary. As General Staff positions were high profile and limited in number, only the highest quality Guard officers were accepted for this duty. But even a superb officer was of limited use on the General Staff until he had learned the ropes, and this took time.

Regular officers assigned to the General Staff typically served a four year tour, the maximum permitted by law. A Guardsman detailed as an additional member of the General Staff served for six months, but if the officer proved efficient and desired to remain on active duty, his tour was routinely extended for another year. After eighteen months, the officer was required to return to his home state or transfer to one of the slots designated for Guard officers at the Militia Bureau. As the 1920s wore on, the War Department and the Guard developed differing opinions on what type of service was most useful – having a few officers serve relatively lengthy tours with the General Staff, or having as many officers as possible serve a minimal tour. The War Department favored the latter approach, hoping to develop a large pool of semi-experienced staff officers in order to facilitate the wartime expansion of the General Staff. As a result, in 1929 the War Department changed its policy to limit Guard and Reserve tours to six months, with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

only exceptional officers being extended for an additional six months.[160] NGAUS and the Militia Bureau took the opposite tack, arguing that six months was barely enough time to become familiar with the workings of the General Staff. Inexperienced Guardsmen would have difficulty performing their primary duty – asserting the needs and priorities of the Guard in their daily work and on joint committees. In addition, the constant rotation of officers every six months created needless travel and relocation expenses.[161] Though Secretary of War James Good and his Chief of Staff, General Charles Summerall, politely ignored these protests in 1929, the Guard eventually won the argument. Good and Summerall's successors (under pressure from NGAUS) reversed the policy some two and a half years later and restored the tour to its previous length of eighteen months.[162] In 1935 NGAUS gained a further concession from the War Department in securing tours equal in length to those of Regular Army officers, thus allowing Guardsmen in the late 1930s to serve up to four years on the General Staff.[163]

The argument that Guard officers detailed to the General Staff lacked sufficient numbers, rank and prestige to exercise influence has some merit, at least on the surface. Given their relatively small numbers (no more than five Guard officers on a General Staff that typically exceeded a hundred) and middling rank, it could be expected that many

---

[160] "Extends Army Staff Duty," *NYT*, Feb. 10, 1929, 24.

[161] *CMB Annual Report, 1929*, 52-53; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1929*, 34-40.

[162] Militia Bureau Record of Communication Received, Memorandum, CofS to G-1, Subj: Detail of Reserve and National Guard officers upon the War Dept. Gen. Staff, Dec. 10, 1931. RG 168/344a/210.651 - Gen. Staff - 22.

[163] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1934*, 101; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1935*, 59.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guardsmen adopted the prevailing culture of the General Staff, to the detriment of their roles as advocates for their component. This no doubt happened in some cases. In any hierarchy, but particularly in the military, the opinions and attitudes of the leadership greatly influence subordinates. We need look no further than the Militia Bureau for an example of this phenomenon, where the replacement of a single Regular officer – the chief – with a Guardsman brought about a remarkable transformation in 1921.

However, this argument fails to take into account several factors. First, the record of steady reform throughout the interwar period bespeaks consistent cooperation and concession to Guard sensibilities by the General Staff – an achievement that cannot be solely attributed to changes in the leadership of the Militia Bureau. After all, the most frequent target of Guard complaints prior to 1920 was not the Militia Bureau, but the General Staff and its thwarting of both Guard and Militia Bureau initiatives. Guardsmen working from the inside after 1920 certainly must have had something to do with creating a more favorable and understanding environment on the General Staff.

Secondly, the War Department – at least when considering the most high-profile issues – took action to ensure that problems of rank, prestige, and insufficient numbers were eliminated. For major policy, legislative, or force structure questions, the Secretary of War would order senior Guard officers onto active duty for short periods specifically to serve on joint committees.[164] In some cases, such as the negotiations over the revision of

[164] The three best examples of this were the October 1922 committee called to develop the 250,000 strength plan, the December 1923 committee called to consider creating a single type of commission for all reserve officers, and the October 1927 committee to consider a NGAUS resolution to establish the National Guard as a component of the federal Army at all times (discussed in the next chapter). On at least one other occasion, in July 1926, a special board that included two Guard generals was appointed by the Secretary of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

General Order No. 6 in early 1926, the presence and influence of NGAUS or AGAUS representatives in negotiations with the General Staff made for a de facto Section 5 committee even though the Guardsmen were not on orders. Developing policies in such a way served the War Department by ensuring harmony with the Guard's lobbies; in at least two cases the Guardsmen who were ordered to active duty to serve on joint committees were nominated by NGAUS. Though somewhat unorthodox, joint committees of this type certainly honored the spirit of the National Defense Act by giving the Guard an influential voice in matters that affected it.

Guardsmen detailed to the General Staff certainly would have disagreed with the characterization that they did not exercise influence. "[S]o far as my two years' experience indicates," noted Brig. Gen. Franklin Ward, an original member of the Section 3a committee called to active duty in 1920, "[Guard officers] always had a great deal to say about the policies that were enacted with respect to the National Guard."[165] Milton Reckord served nine months on the General Staff in 1920-1921, and was frequently recalled thereafter by the Secretary of War for special boards. "We did not meet just to stamp with our approval what [the] Gen. Staff laid on our desk; we'd study problems, discuss with [the Chief of Staff], then be relieved and go home."[166]

War to revise policies for the federal recognition of National Guard general officers. No doubt this particular board was called because the policy under consideration affected officers senior in rank to any of those on the General Staff who might have been assigned to a Section 5 committee. See "Items on the National Guard," *Infantry Journal*, July 1926, 103.

[165] *NGAUS Proceedings, Jan. 1926*, 102.

[166] Milton Reckord, reconstructed interview notes compiled by Col. Allan Crist, June 19, 1974. NGAUS Archives, Box 2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

When referring to joint committees at conferences or in speeches, Guardsmen invariably stated their approval of the process and the results they obtained. But it is also clear that having Guardsmen serve on the General Staff assisted the Guard in the more mundane types of requests that did not warrant formal Section 5 committee meetings. A rare interoffice note attached to a memorandum concerning proposed personnel policies for Regular Army instructors illustrates this point well:

> I have talked over this matter with Gen. Rickards and he feels it would be better if we delayed taking it up for a period of three or four weeks until we can get another National Guard officer on the General Staff as it is understood to be their intention to detail this next officer with the G-1 Section of the General Staff. With a National Guard officer in that section it is possible that we might get favorable action on this request. Without that we will undoubtedly get unfavorable action and it might estop [*sic*] us for some time.[167]

That is not to say that there were no problems, especially at the outset. Particularly in the early 1920s, Guardsmen were not detailed to the General Staff in sufficient numbers and the officers who were detailed were not considered representative of the Guard, so far as some senior leaders were concerned. Officers were selected for this duty without consulting, or even informing, the Militia Bureau, and at one point only a single Guard officer was serving on the General Staff.[168] These problems were largely alleviated by 1924, but Guardsmen continued to differ with the General Staff throughout

---

[167] Typewritten note "Memorandum for Col. Baltzell [Chief of Militia Bureau Training Section], from EJW [Col. Ezekiel J. Williams, Executive Officer, Militia Bureau], Jan. 27, 1925, attached to memorandum from AG US to CMB, Subj: Relief of officers on duty with the National Guard, Jan. 21, 1925. RG 168/344a/210.651 - Gen. - 8.

[168] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1924*, 36-37. The NDA 1920 specified only that officers selected for General Staff duty had to be eligible for such duty (either by completing the requisite military education or having demonstrated qualification for such service during the war) and have been nominated by a governor. Section 5, NDA 1920, 41 *Stat.* 762-764.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the interwar period over what issues joint committees should study.

The Guard lobbies and the Militia Bureau believed the purview of these committees should have been much more broad than the General Staff was ever willing to allow, and complained that there were many subjects that affected the Guard which the General Staff would not delegate to joint committees. Even within the General Staff, there was disagreement over what topics required consideration by a Section 5 committee and what topics did not.[169] Milton Reckord advised NGAUS to keep a close track of whether the commitment to joint committees was being honored by the War Department:

> I do feel that the National Defense Act provides fully for such representation by defining the composition of the General Staff Committees that are charged with the preparation of policies and regulations affecting the National Guard, but I am not so confident that this excellent provision of the National Defense Act is always adhered to. In fact, I am quite convinced that in many cases the opinion of the National Guard is not obtained until action has been taken.[170]

In the end, this was an issue that the Guard could not win without changing the law. As much as they would have liked to be consulted on any manner which even tangentially impacted on the Guard, the decision on whether or not to appoint a Section 5 committee rested in the hands of the Chief of Staff. Inevitably, these committees were not called during the interwar period as often as Guardsmen thought they should be. Not surprisingly, given the great weight of work that fell to the General Staff after the United

---

[169] See, for example, the non-concurrence of WPD to the recommendation by G-3 that a joint committee be appointed to study plans for National Defense, force structure and organization. Memorandum, Acting ACofS, WPD to ACofS, G-3, Subj: Comments on memorandum (G-3/12982), re. "Practical Application of the National Defense Act." June 16, 1925. RG 165/281/2197.

[170] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1926*, 64.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

states entered World War II, joint committees were suspended in 1942 for the duration of the war.[171]

It is a military axiom that a staff officer's life is full of drudgery, lacking either recognition or glory. But it would be a mistake to conclude that Guardsmen detailed to the General Staff came and went without making any mark. As a group, their work during the 1920s and 1930s helped increase understanding between the two components and eased the passage of many legal and regulatory reforms. For the handful of officers who were chosen for this work, service on the General Staff paid dividends in their careers. Milton Reckord, a major general and commander of the 29th Infantry Division in 1941, was too old to remain in an active combat command once the war started. General Marshall, however, remembering his service both on the General Staff and in numerous other arenas, retained his services as a corps area commander in the United States, and later as the provost marshal of the entire European theater. Unlike most of his fellow Guard general officers who were deemed to be too old for active service in 1941, Reckord was not put out to pasture. His keen mind was put to work contributing in a meaningful way to the war effort.

General Marshall also appointed a Georgia National Guardsman, Col. Miller G. White, to be his G-1 in September 1942, and promoted him to brigadier general (in 1943 he gained a second star). White, who first came on tour with the General Staff in 1937 as a major, had been placed in charge of planning for the implementation of a proposed

---

[171] Memorandum, AG US to CNGB, Subj: General Staff Committees, May 2, 1942. Copy of memo reproduced in "Survey of Laws and Orders Regarding the National Guard Bureau," (n.d., n.p.) 70, NGAUS Archives, Box 21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Selective Service system. When Congress initiated the first-ever peacetime draft in 1940, much of White's work came to fruition.[172] As G-1, White was an immensely influential figure who administered the manpower of the largest army in the history of the United States.

A third Guard veteran of General Staff service in the 1930s was Lt. Col. Robert Beightler of Ohio. Beightler, one of an exclusive handful of Guard officers to attend the Army War College, served in the War Plans Division from 1932 to 1936, his experience in civil engineering and highway construction making him an invaluable resource for reviewing the strategic utility of numerous Depression-era road-building projects. During his tenure, Beightler established relationships with a number of senior officers, in particular two whom he would serve under in the Pacific during World War II: Douglas MacArthur and Walter Krueger. Beightler, like John O'Ryan in World War I, would be the only Guardsman to command a division from mobilization until war's end – in his case, Ohio's 37th "Buckeye" Infantry Division.[173]

Service on the General Staff, far from being insignificant, proved to be an important element in helping to push forward numerous reforms during the interwar period. Even though the General Staff remained overwhelmingly the province of the Regular Army, Regular officers slowly became more aware of and sympathetic to the peculiar needs of the civilian components through prolonged exposure to Guardsmen and

---

[172] Bruce Jacobs, "Taps: Miller G. White," *National Guard,* Mar., 1988, 46.

[173] John Kennedy Ohl, *Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 50-54.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reservists working alongside of them. This is not to say that mutual understanding became universal, or that old animosities were completely washed away; in 1939, despite the salutary effects of nearly two decades of Guard service on the General Staff, honorary lifetime president of NGAUS Milton Foreman was still quick to pronounce "[w]hen the General Staff get together making a study, God help the militia."[174] Guard leadership naturally wanted even greater integration with the staff, nevertheless, they acknowledged that the level of participation after 1920 was a big improvement over what had gone before. Joint committees gave the Guard, for the first time in its history, a sense of ownership in the greater Army. It is difficult to imagine any of the major decisions of the 1920s – allotment and force structure issues, defining of the role of the Militia Bureau, or organizing the Guard as a federal component – being implemented with as little protest and as much cooperation from the states but for the fact that joint committees were responsible for hammering them out. Easing these inevitable frictions – only part of what was achieved by Guard service on the General Staff – was significant in and of itself.

Summary

The period 1920-1933 saw a steady stream of changes to the National Defense Act and related military legislation. Although the underlying law was considered fundamentally sound, the Guard adopted anything but a passive approach as it sought greater parity in pay and allowances, more flexibility in the performance of armory drills, hospitalization for injuries incurred while on active duty, expansion of the caretaker

[174] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1939*, 65.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

force, and a host of fixes to small inequities. Though appropriations remained tight, the Militia Bureau was able to develop the force and maintain a sufficient number of training days in part because it requested – and was granted by Congress – the flexibility to shift funds within its budget as needed. These achievements were accomplished almost entirely in cooperation with the War Department, in large part due to the steady work of the Militia Bureau and a small group of Guard officers working within the General Staff. The Guard lobbies reserved the right to appeal directly to Congress, but in this new era of goodwill the threat rarely had to be backed up with action. Indeed, relations with the other components were superb, in large part because the Guard did not have to fear either being dominated by the Regulars or supplanted by the Organized Reserves. Public support for the Guard was unprecedented: "Since the World War the National Guard forces of the United States have received far more favorable mention in the newspapers than during any like period before the war."[175] Indeed, the greatest American hero of the 1920s, Charles Lindbergh, was a captain in the Missouri National Guard at the time he made his famous solo transatlantic flight.[176]

Although there was room for improvement, compared to the Regular Army and the Organized Reserves, the National Guard was in very good shape. It was the largest component of the Army, had a definite plan for its growth and development, and was clearly more efficient, more professional, better equipped, better paid, and better integrated with the rest of the Army than it had been at any earlier point in its peacetime

---

[175] Lt. Wilbur Rose, "National Guard Publicity," *Infantry Journal*, July-Aug., 1934, 310.

[176] Charles Gross, *American Military Aviation: The Indispensable Arm* (College Station: Texas A&M Univ.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

history. Given that its performance in World War I had been widely acclaimed, there was reason for optimism that the Guard would play an even more central role in national defense in future conflicts, provided the means could be found to integrate the Guard seamlessly into the Army at the outbreak of the next war.

Press, 2002), 52.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 7: The National Guard Status Act

> *"...it is certainly unjust for the National Defense Act to provide for three separate branches of the Army of the United States; that is, the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Officers Reserve Corps, the much talked-of 3-in-1, whereas in fact a National Guard officer does not figure until he has a Reserve commission, even though federally recognized. This makes it a 2-in-1 instead of a 3-in-1. (Brig. Gen. William H. Kershner, Adjutant General of Indiana, letter to the Spring 1927 AGAUS meeting)*[1]

The Act of June 15, 1933, informally known as the National Guard Status Act, was the culmination of Guard legislative reform during the interwar period. Guardsmen had strongly felt the need for such a law after the experience of being drafted into federal service in 1917. The law eliminated this distasteful practice, so at odds with the volunteer nature of the Guard, by formalizing the dual State/Federal status which had existed in theory since 1903. Henceforward, all Guardsmen became sworn members of two organizations: the organized militia, formally known as the "National Guard of the several States, Territories and the District of Columbia;" and a federal reserve component, known as the "National Guard of the United States." Transition from one organization to the other – from peacetime to wartime status – would be accomplished in time of emergency by the order of the President, without further examination or delay. By pushing for and ultimately gaining the passage of this law, the Guard took a major step in ensuring its own future as a force with both local and national relevance.

---

[1] Minutes of Spring 1927 AGAUS Meeting, Washington DC, May 9, 1927, 198. RG 168/344a/080. - Adj. Gen. Assoc.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The fact that it took thirteen years from the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920 to the passage of the Status Act might give the impression that this was a controversial law. In fact, it was not. Guardsmen universally favored eliminating the draft as the vehicle for entering federal service. The War Department, while opposed to a few of the ancillary measures that NGAUS tried to include in the bill, supported the central theme of affirming the National Guard's role as a federal reserve component. Aside from one speech, there was no opposition to the measure in Congress. Rather, the long delay which preceded passage of the bill was due to years of deliberations among Guardsmen over exactly how to achieve a deceptively simple goal: making the National Guard a legal component of the United States Army, while at the same time preserving its independence from federal control during peacetime. Once the Guard agreed on the form that the legislation should take, passage was virtually assured, though congressional delays held up the measure for another three years.

Early Means to Federal Service: Dual Commissioning

Though the terminology is potentially confusing, the fact that a Guard unit or officer had received "federal recognition" only certified that they could receive equipment and training funds from the federal government, and could be paid for performing drill or annual training in peacetime. Gaining federal recognition did nothing to guarantee that either units or officers would be accepted into federal service in the event of a war. Prior to 1933, Guardsmen could only enter federal service by volunteering or being drafted, actions which in either case legally severed their ties with the Guard (and any commission they might have held while in the Guard). For Guard officers, only a commission granted

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

by the federal government could give them authority commensurate with their rank following a mobilization.[2] During World War I, there had been significant delay and confusion regarding the mobilization of the Guard. After the declaration of war on April 6, 1917, most Guardsmen remained in state service for months before being called (as militia) in July, subsequently to be drafted into federal service on August 5. The draft was accompanied by a presidential directive instructing all officers and enlisted men to continue to function in their former capacities.[3] This had the effect of instantly appointing every Guard officer with a federal commission in the ORC, though general officers still required the consent of the Senate before they could assume their federal rank. This scheme imperfectly served its purpose for the mass mobilization of 1917, but there was no guarantee that the president would automatically grant ORC appointments at the outbreak of some future war, or do so without requiring officers to undergo a battery of exams.

The National Defense Act of 1920 offered a solution for Guard officers hoping to ensure they did not suffer delays or uncertainty regarding their status during future mobilizations. It allowed Guardsmen to apply for commissions in the Officers' Reserve Corps in peacetime, thus certifying their qualifications in advance of any mobilization. An ORC commission was also a prerequisite for any officer who wished to voluntarily

---

[2] Guard units could be *called* into federal service for duty under the Militia clause of the Constitution, as they had been in 1916 for service on the Mexican Border. In this case officers required only their National Guard commissions (with or without federal recognition) to serve in their rank. However, the Guard when summoned in this manner was limited to its constitutional role of enforcing the law, suppressing insurrection, and repelling invasion, and could not fight outside the borders of the United States (except when actively repelling an invasion).

[3] Proclamation of July 3, 1917. Reprinted in *CMB Annual Report, 1918*, 6-7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

serve on active duty in peacetime, either at the Militia Bureau or on the General Staff. For Guard officers who chose to join the ORC, this meant being commissioned twice – once by the state, and once by the federal government. While other approaches to mobilizing Guard officers for federal active duty were explored by the Army, in the end the requirement that an officer hold an appointment in the ORC was the only method which held up under legal scrutiny.[4] The Militia Bureau expended significant effort in the 1920s to educate Guard officers about the policies surrounding and the advantages of obtaining a federal commission; while the government could not require Guard officers to join the ORC, it made a long and sustained pitch for it.[5] Officers believed that having an ORC commission was the best method to ensure that they would be allowed to remain with their units at the start of the next war.

However, despite the obvious appeal to the War Department to have as many Guard officers as possible hold a federal commission, obtaining an ORC appointment was not a simple procedure. At first, there was no connection between the process of acquiring federal recognition in a particular rank and the process of acquiring an ORC

---

[4] In April 1921, the General Staff announced a policy that appeared to contemplate future mobilizations where Guard officers would be allowed to serve without receiving ORC appointments; however, a ruling of the Judge Advocate General of the Army in July 1921 reaffirmed that Guard officers could only serve during time of war if given appointment in the ORC. See "Guard Officers in the Federal Service," *ANJ*, June 11, 1921, 1108; and "Guard Officers in Reserve Corps," *ANJ*, July 30, 1921, 1269.

[5] Militia Bureau Circular No. 56, Aug. 18, 1921 discusses how officers would be treated differently when drafted into federal service depending on whether or not they had an ORC commission. Policy for obtaining ORC commissions, as handed down by the Adjutant General of the Army, was further defined in Circular No. 57, Aug. 19, 1921, and Circular No. 60, Aug. 23, 1921 (the latter refers specifically to general officers). An excellent summation of these early policies and argument for all Guard officers to obtain an ORC commission was written by Maj. John Goodman, Jr. "Dual Status of Officers: National Guard – Officer's Reserve Corps," *Infantry Journal*, Jan. 1922, 24-28; a later example which updates Guardsmen on the latest policies is Col. D. John Markey, "Why a Dual Commission for National Guard Officers?," *Infantry Journal*, Mar. 1927, 260-264.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

commission in the same rank, even though both procedures required virtually the same examinations to ensure physical, moral and professional qualifications. NGAUS and the Militia Bureau sponsored laws in 1922 and 1924 which eliminated some barriers and reduced discrepancies between the two types of commissions.[6] Even with these changes, getting an ORC commission was time-consuming and paperwork-intensive. But as a result of this legislation and the ongoing educational campaign by the Militia Bureau, the percentage of Guard officers who held a second commission in the ORC grew steadily over the course of the next decade.[7]

Despite the fact that Guard officers obtained ORC commissions in ever-increasing numbers, the perception remained that the process was fundamentally unfair. Like the use of the draft as a mechanism for mobilizing the Guard, the requirement that Guard officers join the ORC in order to perform federal service seemed to call into doubt the validity of their membership in the National Guard. "Having deliberately elected membership in the National Guard in preference to that in the Organized Reserves, and having a certain pride in their National Guard organizations, they do not like to have to resort to what seems to them an obvious subterfuge in order to enter the active federal

---

[6] Act of September 22, 1922, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 42, Pt. 1, Chap. 423. (Public Law No. 358), and Act of June 6, 1924, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 43, Pt. 1, Chap. 275. (Public Law No. 207) (Discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation respectively). These laws made all Guard officers eligible for ORC commissions, eliminated redundant exams and made ORC commissions co-terminus with a Guard officer's federal recognition.

[7] In 1923, 38 percent of Guard officers held ORC commissions. This figure grew by about 7 percent annually to 75 percent in 1928. The rate of increase slowed some thereafter, but by 1933, over 92 percent of Guard officers were dual-commissioned. Percentages determined by figures provided in *CMB Annual Report, 1923*, 1, 5; *1928*, 7, 13; *1933*, 4, 7. In addition to the more than 12,381 officers with ORC commissions in 1933, some 1,314 Guard enlisted men also held ORC commissions that would be activated in the event of a mobilization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

service for which they are devoting their time and efforts to prepare."[8] Guard officers wanted a single commission that would be valid both for peacetime militia service and wartime federal service. If this could not be accomplished, they preferred a separate federal commission that would be automatically tendered upon receipt of federal recognition – preferably one that made no mention of the ORC.[9]

Dissatisfaction with dual commissioning was openly expressed at the very top in Guard circles. Chief of the Militia Bureau George Rickards told the adjutants general attending the March 1925 "School of Instruction for State Adjutants General" that "[t]he problem of the federal status of National Guard officers is, in my opinion, no nearer solution than it was five years ago, and with the conflicting views of those in authority, perhaps never will be."[10] Upon submitting his final report as Chief of the Militia Bureau, he reiterated:

> I still urge as strongly as ever the amendment of the law so as to provide that there shall be issued to federally recognized National Guard officers commissions in the Federal service, to become effective upon call or draft into the service of the United States without reference to appointment or commission in the Officer's Reserve Corps.[11]

Rickards' successor, Maj. Gen. Creed Hammond, took up the cause later that same year

---

[8] "Report of the Committee Appointed by Par. 1, S.O. 156, W. D., July 5, 1927, To consider Resolution No. 14 ... and to report with recommendations to the Secretary of War." (McPherren committee report), 4. RG 168/344a/319.1 - "Bill to Amend N.G." (Box 302).

[9] The 1924 legislation made gave Guardsmen part of what they asked for by making what was essentially a semantic change; henceforward reserve officers would be *appointed* in the ORC, but *commissioned* in the Army of the United States. See "N.G. and R.O. Commissions in Army of United States," *ANJ*, Feb. 10, 1923, 583; Act of June 6, 1924, 43 Stat. 470, adding Section 38 to NDA 1920.

[10] "National Guard Department," *Infantry Journal*, Apr. 1925, 467.

[11] *CMB Annual Report, 1925*, 52.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in the annual lecture customarily given by the Militia Bureau chief to the class at the War College. "I do not believe it should be necessary to appoint [a Guard officer] in the Reserve in order to prepare him for a commission under which he can serve the United States."[12] These words aside, the Militia Bureau took little action on the issue after legislation removing some of the obstacles to obtaining an ORC commission was passed in 1924.

Left unsaid amidst all the complaints over dual commissioning was the fact that, while National Guard officers had at least an imperfect opportunity to seek some type of federal status, warrant officers and enlisted members of the Guard were still without a place in the federal establishment short of a much-resented draft. Increasingly, Guardsmen came to view the issue of officer commissions in the larger context of the Guard's lack of federal status. Beginning in 1926, NGAUS led the way by focusing not on the issue of separate commissions for Guard officers, but on gaining a permanent place in the federal establishment for all members of the Guard.

The McPherren Committee

The first meaningful efforts towards changing the legal basis of the National Guard took place at the November 1926 NGAUS convention in Louisville, Kentucky. The consensus of the convention was presented in Resolution No. 14, which called for the National Defense Act to be amended so as to make the federally recognized National Guard "at all times, whether in peace or war, ... a component of the Army of the United

[12] Creed C. Hammond, "The National Guard," AWC lecture, Nov. 5, 1925, 11. MHI

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

States," while at the same time preserving peacetime government of the Guard for the states.[13] The resolution called for the president of NGAUS to appoint a special committee to study what legislation might be required, and for the Executive Council to promote the passage of such legislation.

A month later, NGAUS President William Price met with Assistant Secretary of War Hanford MacNider in Washington to discuss this and other resolutions passed by the convention. Because of the importance and complexity of the issue, the two men agreed that an official War Department study by a joint committee would be the best way to tackle the problem, and that NGAUS would be allowed to determine the Guard members of the committee. In the spring of 1927 Price met with representatives of the Militia Bureau and delivered a list of three Guard officers he thought were best suited to serve on such a committee. Despite the fact that the Militia Bureau did not agree with the views expressed in the resolution or the remedial amendments proposed by NGAUS, it recommended to MacNider that the "wide publicity" given the issue necessitated a thorough and authoritative study "which will command the confidence not only of the National Guard but of all others concerned in the operation of the National Defense Act."[14] After further review and concurrence by the G-1 division of the General Staff,

---

[13] *NGAUS Proceedings, Nov. 1926*, 100. See also discussion, 80-89.

[14] Memorandum, Col. Gulick to the Asst. Sec of War, Subj: Letter from Major General Wm. G. Price, ... relative to the status of the National Guard under the National Defense Act, May 6, 1927. RG 168/344a/011.6 (Proposed) - Gen. - 35. The "wide publicity" Gulick referred to is, in part, a reference to a letter from Senator Carl Hayden (D-AZ) to MacNider pressing for action on the committee, and presenting for MacNider's consideration a number of proposed amendments to the National Defense Act authored by Arizona AG Charles Harris. This no doubt influenced Price's decision to put Harris on the committee. (Copies of MacNider/Hayden correspondence dated Mar. 23 and Apr. 4, 1927 in same location).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

MacNider appointed a special committee consisting of the three Guard officers designated by Price, along with two Regular officers, to consider how the desires expressed in Resolution No. 14 could be carried into law.[15]

The committee, which met for a week in mid-October 1927, was universally referred to as the "McPherren committee" after its chairman, Brig. Gen. Charles E. McPherren, commander of an Oklahoma field artillery brigade and a lawyer in civil life. McPherren and the other senior Guardsman on the committee, Arizona adjutant general Col. Charles Harris, had been particularly vocal at the 1926 NGAUS convention in advocating revision of the National Defense Act. The third Guardsman, Lt. Col. Clark C. Wrenn of Texas, was a staff judge advocate officer already on duty with the General Staff. Given the complex legal questions under discussion, one of the two Regulars assigned to the committee, Maj. Fred Llewellyn, was detailed from the Judge Advocate General's office, while the other, Col. Lytle Brown, was detailed from his assignment as the assistant commandant of the Army War College because he was known to have made a study of the National Defense Act.[16] Neither the General Staff nor the Militia Bureau was represented on the committee, which in any event was not authorized to take any action other than to study the issues.

The McPherren committee, in a thoughtful analysis, concluded that Congress did not have the power to make the Guard a component of the Army at all times, as this

---

[15] Memorandum, ACofS G-1 to CofS, Subj: Status of the National Guard under the National Defense Act, May 20, 1927. RG 168/344a/011.6 (Proposed) - Gen. - 35.

[16] Ibid., and Para. 1, War Department Special Order No. 156, July 5, 1927.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

would violate the Constitution by removing control of the militia from the states. On the other hand, it concluded that Congress could produce practically the same effect by creating an Army reserve component just for Guardsmen, but specifying that appointment or enlistment in this new component would not affect their militia status. It offered as a means for accomplishing this a proposed bill which would alter twenty sections of the National Defense Act, and recommended that the bill be presented in two weeks' time to the NGAUS convention in St. Paul, Minnesota, for its consideration. Should NGAUS concur with the report of the committee, then it was recommended that the Secretary of War secure the enactment of the proposed legislation in Congress.[17]

The McPherren committee report was greeted with great interest by the delegates attending the 1927 NGAUS convention, and it proved to be the highlight of the event. General McPherren addressed the convention at length, quickly dispelling any lingering doubts that members might have had regarding their status:

> It is true that what the lawyers call loose language is used throughout the National Defense Act to the effect that the Federally Recognized National Guard is a part of the Army of the United States; however, as we have seen, it has been judicially held and the law officers of the Government are of the unanimous opinion that under existing law the Federally Recognized National Guard is the organized Militia of the States and of the Nation, and no more .... It is true that most of our guests in addressing our Conventions and others in writing of the National Guard, refer to it as a first line component of the Army of the United States, and no doubt in most instances such speakers and writers believe it to be such, as in fact it should be constituted in law.[18]

---

[17] "Report of the Committee Appointed by Par. 1, S.O. 156, W. D., July 5, 1927, To consider Resolution No. 14 ... and to report with recommendations to the Secretary of War." (McPherren committee report) RG 168/344a/319.1 - "Bill to Amend N.G." (Box 302). Report is reprinted in its entirety in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1927*, 185-220.

[18] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1927*, 91.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

McPherren went on to make a rambling, legalistic presentation demonstrating in excruciating detail that Congress had the authority to organize a reserve component made up of Guardsmen, and that this could be done without disturbing their status as militia.[19]

But the true evaluation of the report's merit was made behind closed doors, by a special sub-committee of the NGAUS Resolutions committee consisting of a representative from each of the nine corps areas. After two days, they determined that they simply did not have the time to study the lengthy and complex McPherren proposal and make a definitive recommendation. They asked that the convention authorize the NGAUS president to appoint a new committee as soon as practicable. This special committee would study the McPherren committee report over the course of the next year, survey each of the states for its input, and make a recommendation to the Executive Council on whether to accept or reject the legislation it proposed. As a final precaution, the entire issue would be brought before the convention the following year for approval.[20]

Caution was warranted for legislation of such a fundamentally important and transformative nature, particularly because the McPherren committee had charted an approach to the problem which the Guard had not tried before. Though in hindsight it reminded some of Colonel Palmer and Senator Wadsworth's 1920 plan for a federal National Guard, Guardsmen since then had not seriously considered the potential of using

---

[19] Ibid., 91-108. The key legal decision clarifying the issue was a 1918 Supreme Court ruling, *Arver vs. United States*, (Selective Draft Law Cases) Vol. 245, U.S. Reports, 366 (1918), which held that the militia provisions of the Constitution did not limit the powers of Congress to raise armies from the whole body of the manpower of the nation if it so chose, to include those men serving in the Organized Militia.

[20] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1927,* 175-184.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Congress' constitutional power to raise armies in order to overcome the limitations of the militia. As the Resolutions committee chairman admitted:

> It happens, however, that in connection with all previously proposed Federal legislation concerning the National Guard the assumption has been that it was necessary to proceed under what we know as the Militia provisions of the Constitution. This has been so long argued and contended, and acquiesced in by the Guard itself, as to have almost developed to the point of conviction. The proposal now under consideration is approached from an entirely different angle and its immediate acceptance and complete endorsement cannot be reasonably expected.[21]

The most vocal advocate of caution was Milton Reckord, who feared that organizing the National Guard as a federal reserve would give the Regular Army too much control over Guardsmen. "If we are going to place ourselves in a position where we may accept a federal commission of any kind which is going to help close our mouths, I think we should go very slowly.... If we are going to place ourselves in a position where we can't fight our battles, the Lord help us, because nobody else will fight them for us."[22] To demonstrate his point, Reckord told the convention about a verbal altercation from his recent past as NGAUS president, but in doing so perhaps unintentionally illustrated some of the flaws in his own argument. As Reckord related the incident, he had been addressing a congressional committee when the director of the Budget Bureau asked him "By what authority do you appear before Congress?" When Reckord replied

---

[21] Brig. Gen. J.J. Garrity, Chairman, NGAUS Resolutions committee. *NGAUS Proceedings, 1927*, 177.

[22] Ibid., 179-180. Another potential problem Reckord pointed out was that acceptance of a commission in a federal reserve component would prevent officers in several states from holding civil office due to provisions in state constitutions forbidding the holding of multiple offices – a point that the McPherren committee had acknowledged might require a few states to change their laws.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that he presented himself as a U.S. citizen and the president of NGAUS, the Budget director countered "What about your Reserve Commission?" Reckord's response: "When I am on active duty as a Reserve officer I am amenable to discipline, but at no other time" ended that line of questioning, but the implicit threat in the budget director's words was understood by every officer present. Any officer holding a federal reserve commission could suffer professionally if he was too vocal in his opinions.[23]

While Reckord's vignette demonstrated the potential threat behind accepting federal status for the National Guard, neither he nor any other officer present could cite a single example of a Reserve officer brought onto active duty in order to be silenced, or otherwise punished for being too vocal.[24] Moreover, Reckord's own outspoken career as an advocate for the Guard (during which he was simultaneously a commissioned officer in the ORC) illustrated how little real danger to free speech the holding of a federal commission presented. Furthermore, the ROA did not lack for voices even though the vast majority of its membership had no state appointment to shield them during their military careers. Indeed, a growing majority of Guard officers were voluntarily accepting ORC commissions with the active encouragement of the War Department, the Militia Bureau, and NGAUS itself. Nevertheless, the concerns expressed by Reckord, and the respect the convention held for him, meant that the membership endorsed his

---

[23] Ibid.

[24] The law made it difficult to silence Reserve officers for any length of time because, except in time of emergency, they could only be involuntarily ordered to active duty for a maximum of fifteen days a year. See Section 32, NDA 1920 (41 *Stat.*. 776), which added section 37a to the NDA of 1916.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

recommendation to "go very slowly."[25]

Ironically, the method advocated by the McPherren committee of creating a separate federal reserve component for the National Guard would be the approach taken in the National Guard Status Act of 1933, a law which Milton Reckord lauded years later as "the greatest step that the National Guard ever took."[26] Even more ironically, Reckord claimed credit for both writing ("There is not a single word in that bill that I didn't write ....") and shepherding the law through the War Department and Congress.[27] McPherren's contribution was downplayed. Certainly Reckord gives him no credit; he dismissed McPherren as a political appointee who had served as AG of Oklahoma while the rest of the Guard fought in the World War and who "didn't know anything about the National Guard."[28] Granted, the 1933 act contained many important changes from the bill proposed by McPherren's committee in 1927, and Reckord was responsible for most of those changes. But credit for rejuvenating the debate and offering a novel approach to the problem belongs to McPherren and his committee – not with Milton Reckord, who initially was wary of the whole idea.

Studies and Revisions

The NGAUS president for 1927-1928, Col. G. Angus Fraser of North Dakota,

---

[25] Reckord's somewhat fuzzy recollections of the debate over the McPherren committee report are contained in *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section II, 14-15, and *Reckord NGAUS Interview*,12-13.

[26] *Reckord NGAUS Interview*, 13.

[27] *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section II, 19-20.

[28] Ibid., 15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

followed through in November 1927 on the resolution to appoint a new special committee to study the McPherren report. The composition of the committee made it clear that General Reckord was determined to exert his influence over the outcome. While Reckord, his good friend Ellard Walsh, and several other NGAUS stalwarts each represented their respective corps area, neither McPherren nor Harris, the strongest advocates of the proposal, were included. Instead, Lt. Col. Clark Wrenn of Texas was designated as the 8th Corps Area representative. While Wrenn had served on the McPherren committee and signed the final report, he did not believe that making the Guard a component of the federal Army at all times was a good thing. He preferred to keep the Guard essentially as it was, the Organized Militia of the States, with federal service limited to a presidential call or a draft. However, the mandate of the 1926 NGAUS convention under which the McPherren committee was organized called for legislation which would make the Guard a part of the Army at all times, and Wrenn believed it was his duty to sign the final report because the committee had accomplished just that.[29]

The members of the NGAUS special committee, however, did not feel bound to respect the mandate of the last two NGAUS conventions. They spent the better part of the next year studying the McPherren committee legislation and soliciting input from the

[29] Memorandum, Fraser to AGs of the Several States ...and Members of the Exec. Council, Subj: Change in Status of the National Guard as Proposed in Resolution No. 25, St. Paul Convention, being the so-called "McPherren Resolution, May 25, 1928. NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1, NGA memos 1925-44. Arizona, Oklahoma, and Texas were all in the 8th Corps Area, so only one of the three Guard officers who served on the McPherren committee could have been appointed to the NGAUS special committee. See Wrenn's defense of his role on the McPherren committee in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1928*, 45-46, 91-93.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

states before convening in Chicago in September 1928. There they unanimously and summarily rejected the McPherren plan because they believed it would "so constitute the National Guard of the United States that it would become a federal force and would effect the surrender by the various states of many of the rights of control and supervision of the military forces of the states now enjoyed by them ...." However, the NGAUS committee reiterated the conclusion reached by the 1927 convention – namely, that the "new approach" of founding the legislation upon the Army clause of the Constitution "is worthy of careful consideration and development" and recommended entirely new legislation be drawn up that accomplished this while avoiding the pitfalls of the McPherren proposal.[30]

At the same time, the serious consideration NGAUS was focusing on the issue brought forward a host of other studies on dual commissioning and the Guard's status. After rejecting the McPherren plan, the NGAUS special committee considered two of these studies, each prepared by a Regular Army infantry officer recently assigned to the Militia Bureau, and each accompanied by its own proposed legislative amendments. The first, a War College paper prepared by Maj. Alvin Colburn, was dismissed out of hand because it advocated continuing the draft as a means for mobilizing the National Guard.[31] The second was presented to the NGAUS committee in person by Col. Frederick Shaw.[32]

---

[30] "Proceedings of a Special Committee of NGAUS for the Study of the So Called McPherren Plan," Chicago, IL, Sept. 18, 1928, 40-41. NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1, File "McPherren Plan."

[31] Ibid., 25-29. See also Memorandum for the Commandant, The Army War College, Subj: Reserve commissions for National Guard officers (Colburn study), Mar. 7, 1928. Copy in RG 168/344a/319.1 - "Bill to Amend N.G." (Box 302).

[32] Ibid., 10-24. See also "Suggested Amendment of Certain National Guard Provisions of the National

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Shaw's study was acknowledged to have some good points, but it was too recent to have been analyzed thoroughly and it was feared by some of the officers present that, like the McPherren plan, it would place the Guard too firmly under federal control.

However, upon further study during the weeks leading up to the 1928 convention, it became evident that Shaw had been more cautious than the McPherren committee in his approach to the problem. The McPherren committee had advocated creating a separate federal component which Guardsmen would be members of during both peace and war, and claimed that Congress could legislate that their peacetime militia status would be unaffected while members of this new component. Shaw rejected this legal logic and proposed a different solution:

> A dual status (State and Federal) of officers or enlisted men of the National Guard is utterly inconsistent with the militia provisions of the Constitution. Militiamen may be exempted from duty as such to perform Federal functions but no individual can be exempted from duty as a militiaman and at the same time retain that ... status.
>
> It therefore inevitably follows that if the militia, or any part of it (as the National Guard) is to be made available for Federal service ... it must be done by providing in Federal law for a Federal organization which can come into existence upon the order of the President and that will consist of the organizations and personnel of the National Guard of the several States.[33]

Herein was defined, in its clearest form yet to date, the basic solution to the Guard status problem. In essence, Colonel Shaw allowed that the National Guard could have "Dual Status," but (barring an amendment to the Constitution) it could not *simultaneously* be

---

Defense Act to Legalize and Simplify the Transition of the National Guard from Militia to Federal Force Status and back again" (Shaw study), July 14, 1928. Copy in RG 168/344a/319.1 - "Bill to Amend N.G." (Box 302).

[33] Shaw study, 9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

both a state and a federal force, no matter how the law was written. The solution would be to write the law so that the federal component of the National Guard would only be populated when the Guard was ordered into federal service; at all other times the federal component would have only an inactive "shadow" existence, its personnel residing in identical units of the Organized Militia under state control.

The Militia Bureau also studied the Guard status issue. Its chief contribution was produced by a two-man committee consisting of Lt. Col. Raymond Cheseldine, a Quartermaster officer from the Ohio National Guard serving on active duty at the Bureau, and Capt. Frank Taylor, a Regular newly assigned to the Militia Bureau to fill the JAG position on the staff. Their plan, submitted for the consideration of the special NGAUS committee less than a week before the November 1928 convention, was admittedly a hybrid of the McPherren, Colburn and Shaw plans "worked out in conformity with what the Committee believes to be the desires of the majority of the members of the National Guard."[34] The influential executive officer of the Militia Bureau, Col. John Gulick, conducted his own study of the McPherren, Shaw and Colburn plans and concluded that, while "the McPherren plan more nearly meets the desires of the National Guard as expressed in Resolution No. 14, 1926 ... the relinquishing of even a part of the present State control and support is a matter which deserves the most careful consideration of all concerned."[35] Gulick offered his own proposed solution to the problem which he

---

[34] "Plan for Revision of the National Defense Act in Conformity with Resolution No. 14, National Guard Association, 1926." (Cheseldine/Taylor study) Nov. 9, 1928. RG 168/344a/319.1 - "Bill to Amend N.G." (Box 302).

[35] "A Study of Various Plans Relative to the Status of the National Guard in the Army of the United States."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

believed, with only fairly minor changes in the current law, would accomplish everything that NGAUS wanted except make the Guard legally a part of the Army of the United States at all times.

Armed with this multitude of outside studies as well as their own evaluations, the special committee rendered its report to the NGAUS convention assembled in Hot Springs, Arkansas from November 13-15, 1928. At the outset, the Executive Council recommended that the NGAUS convention abandon its mandate, expressed in each of the last two years, that the Guard be "at all times" a component of the federal army. Though it was acknowledged that the McPherren legislation would indeed accomplish this goal, the NGAUS leadership recommended discarding it because "after exhaustive study, we have concluded that this cannot be done without surrendering the rights of the States."[36] Rather, they recommended further study and development of new legislation along the lines laid out in the Shaw study, which the leadership believed contained in it "the germ of the solution of this involved question ...."[37]

The oratory which followed this report was the most confrontational of the 1920s. General McPherren staunchly defended his committee's work, challenging those present to cite a single instance where state control over the Guard would be reduced by the legislation it proposed. He then attacked the Executive Council for subverting the

---

(Gulick study), Nov. 3, 1928 (amended Nov. 6, 1928). RG 168/344a/319.1 - "Bill to Amend N.G." (Box 302).

[36] *NGAUS Proceedings*, 1928, 19.

[37] Ibid., 33.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

mandate of past NGAUS conventions which had insisted that the Guard be made a component of the Army at all times.[38] Members of the Executive Council and the special committee defended, with somewhat less vitriol, their decision to reject the McPherren plan. Motions to table both the McPherren committee report and the report of the NGAUS special committee were vigorously debated and ruled out of order. Ultimately, all the heated discussion led to a decision to postpone consideration for a third year and to study the issue further.[39] Many of the delegates doubtless found the whole debate rather esoteric, agreeing with past-president William Price that "we can better spend our time and our talents in evolving schemes to get more money and more men to make this National Guard effective under the present law than to chase a will of the wisp all over the country to find some way whereby we can get in [the Army of the United States], when as a matter of fact we are already in ...." The Chief of the Militia Bureau, Creed Hammond, reflected a similar attitude (which no doubt demonstrated why the Militia Bureau had not taken the lead in studying this earlier) when he stated that "While I believe that these discussions have been of great value from an educational viewpoint . . . it seems to me that there are other matters of great importance that should also receive the attention of the National Guard Association."[40]

---

[38] Ibid., 60-72.

[39] Ibid., 101, 111.

[40] Ibid., 58, 73.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reckord Writes the Guard Status Bill

Accordingly, the convention moved on to new business and the new president, Ellard Walsh, appointed a committee in December 1928 to continue the study of the issue. Composed, like its predecessor, of a single representative from each corps area, the committee this time included General McPherren as well as General Reckord. The presiding officer was Maj. Gen. Benson Hough of Ohio, commander of the Ohio National Guard's 37th Division and a highly respected federal judge in civil life.[41]

It was in 1929 that Milton Reckord put his stamp on the legislation which would ultimately become the National Guard status bill. Hough assigned Reckord to draft legislation for consideration by the committee as a whole which would build on the principle espoused in the Shaw plan. In an effort to build consensus, Hough instructed Reckord to send each new section off to McPherren for his comments and approval before forwarding it to Hough and the remainder of the committee. Reckord did this, though McPherren (according to Reckord) "never made a single suggestion, never offered a change" to anything he sent him.[42]

In interviews conducted some four decades later, General Reckord claimed the writing of the bill was a simple affair: "I sat down with my secretary and wrote fourteen or sixteen changes to sections, complete section changes to the National Defense Act,

---

[41] "Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Council of the National Guard Association ..." Dec. 7, 1928, Washington, DC. Minutes volume, NGAUS Archives; *Reckord NGAUS Interview*, 13.

[42] *Reckord NGAUS Interview*, 15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with nobody by [*sic*] my secretary in the room."[43] While Reckord functioned essentially alone in early 1929, close examination and comparison to the McPherren, Shaw and Militia Bureau studies shows he used these as models for much of his work.

Several of the most prominent features of the final law attributed to Reckord were not his invention. He copied the formulation for the Army of the United States found in Section 1 of the bill from Colonel Shaw's study, though the final product that became law in 1933 was worded almost exactly as the McPherren committee had proposed in 1927. The redesignation of the Militia Bureau to National Guard Bureau in Section 81 of the National Defense Act was McPherren's idea; Reckord had suggested "National Guard Division" in the draft he submitted to NGAUS, but was later overruled (apparently at the Militia Bureau's insistence). The wording in Section 111, which detailed the method whereby the National Guard would henceforward be mobilized for war, strongly resembled the proposed version put forward by Colonel Gulick of the Militia Bureau, while Section 37 regarding the Officer's Reserve Corps was drawn directly from the Cheseldine/Taylor study. Reckord also claimed credit for re-writing Section 5 of the National Defense Act to require that joint General Staff committees which considered matters affecting both the ORC and the Guard be made up of equal parts officers from each of the three components; in point of fact, the McPherren committee had written this provision two years earlier.[44]

---

[43] *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section II, 16.

[44] Ibid., 17. The General Staff had previously interpreted the National Defense Act as requiring 50 percent Regular officers on all joint committees, even those affecting both civilian components.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Several other sections penned by Reckord closely resembled the work of others. In some sections, however, the National Guard Status Act of 1933 contains material that cannot be found in either the various studies or Reckord's work of 1929 – an indication of changes to the legislation made by the General Staff, Militia Bureau, and Congress over the next four years.[45] In addition, Reckord was a model of economy, slimming down the number of sections needing amendment to a bare minimum – in fact, several additional sections had to be added later to account for changes Reckord hadn't considered necessary.[46]

Though Milton Reckord may have claimed more credit for originating ideas than was his due, the legislation he developed in 1929 was still a remarkable achievement. He synthesized several very detailed studies, none of which would have achieved the desired result in their own right. Reckord kept what was good, and crafted new language where the remainder did not suit his vision. Although it was closely scrutinized and subjected to numerous minor changes, Reckord's synthesis remained essentially intact once it was submitted to Congress. The NGAUS special committee, convening in Chicago in June 1929, approved this work and prepared a final report for submission to the convention

---

[45] An excellent example of this is Section 5 of the Status Act, amending Section 58 of the NDA 1920 (48 *Stat.*. 155). This key section establishes and defines "The National Guard of the United States" as a component of the Army. Elements from McPherren, Shaw and Reckord are all evident, but the final product most closely resembles the language suggested by Capt. Taylor in his spring 1930 analysis of the NGAUS legislation (language which is significantly different from that which he and Lt. Col. Cheseldine jointly authored in their 1928 study). See memorandum, Taylor to CMB, Subj: HR 10478 – Amending the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as amended. n.d. RG 168/344a/319.1 - "Bill to Amend N.G."

[46] Reckord proposed amending or adding a total of 16 sections of the NDA of 1920; the McPherren committee 20, and Shaw 24, and Cheseldine/Taylor 35 (Gulick only addressed 3 sections of the NDA in his study). As it turned out, the act when finally passed amended 20 sections in all.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that fall.[47]

Reckord's legislation was presented to the October 1929 NGAUS convention along with the recommendation of the special committee that it be formally adopted as part of the NGAUS legislative program. Unlike the 1928 convention, there were no fireworks. Even General McPherren (who did not attend the convention) appended his signature to the unanimous recommendation.[48] When it came time for the convention to discuss the report, there was no comment or dissent from the floor. The report was adopted without further discussion or debate, as was a resolution that the Executive Council immediately seek the enactment of the recommended amendments into law.[49] Less than three months later, at the annual meeting of the Executive Council in Washington DC, the status bill was put forward as NGAUS' highest priority for the new year.[50] Thus, after three years of hard work, the matter was finally prepared for presentation to Congress and the War Department.

The Status Bill goes to Congress

On January 10, 1930 Representative John C. Speaks of Ohio, a former Guard general and NGAUS' closest ally on the House Military Affairs committee, introduced

---

[47] Milton Reckord, "Guard as a Component of U.S. Army Studied," *ANJ*, July 6, 1929, 905-906.

[48] "Report of Special Committee ...to the NGAUS, in convention assembled at Los Angeles, Cal., October 17, 18, 19, 1929." RG 168/344a/011.6 - "Proposed Amendments to NDA" (Box 178). Report reprinted in its entirety and discussed in detail in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1929*, 64-91.

[49] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1929*, 113.

[50] "Minutes of meeting of the Executive Council of NGAUS," Jan. 5, 1930, Washington DC. NGAUS Archive, Minutes volume.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the status bill into the House.[51] Following its introduction, the Military Affairs committee forwarded the bill to the General Staff for comment. Meanwhile, the NGAUS legislative committee (with Milton Reckord taking a lead role) met with their ROA counterparts to iron out any differences of opinion on the proposed legislation. By mid-February, after several conferences, a new draft bill incorporating a few minor changes had been secured along with the support of ROA. "We must not have opposition from the other civilian components of the Army, nor must we have opposition from the War Department" wrote NGAUS President Alfred Foote as he forwarded a copy of the modified legislation to his allies in the Militia Bureau.[52]

The G-1 division of the General Staff took the lead for the War Department in reviewing the status bill and recommending changes, after which concurring opinions were sought from the remainder of the General Staff, the Judge Advocate General's Office, the Adjutant General's Office, and the Militia Bureau. Most changes advocated by the G-1 division were technical in nature; there was general agreement regarding the positive value of the legislation as a whole. There were, however, objections to some of the ancillary language that Milton Reckord had included in the legislation – in particular, provisions that would mandate a minimum of nine Guard officers on the General Staff,

---

[51] H.R. 8420, 71st Congress, 2nd Session. The bill was thereafter referred to as the National Guard bill, National Guard status bill, or Speaks bill, even after Speaks failed to be reelected in the fall of 1930.

[52] Foote to Gulick, Feb. 19, 1930. RG 168/344a/319.1 - "Bill to Amend N.G." See also Memorandum, Foote to All AGs, CGs, COs. Subj: Report of Special Committee on Proposed Changes, National Defense Act, Feb. 25, 1930. RG 168/344a/011.6 - Proposed - Gen. - 51. Aside from the changes relative to the ORC, the name "National Guard Bureau" was substituted for Reckord's original term "National Guard Division." The revisions to the bill were sufficient to cause Rep. Speaks to re-submit the legislation on March 4, thereby giving it a new number, H.R. 10478.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

each serving a minimum tour of two years, and provisions that would specify the duties of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.[53] Reckord had inserted the first provision as a response to the small number of Guard officers detailed to the General Staff and the recently announced War Department policy that their tours would be limited to six months. He inserted the second because of the lingering mistrust over General Order No. 6 of 1926. The gains the Militia Bureau made from that order could be lost at any point should the General Staff decide to change its policies; NGAUS felt that legislation specifying the duties of the Militia Bureau would act as insurance against this.

The Militia Bureau, however, gave NGAUS little support in its pursuit of these provisions. The bureau concurred with the G-1 that the assignment of officers and length of tours on the General Staff should be determined by War Department policy, not by legislation – despite the fact that the bureau was on record as opposing the six-month tours recently instated by the War Department. Likewise, the bureau gave only the most tepid endorsement to the section which would specify the duties of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in law. After first distancing themselves from the proposed measure (these provisions "reflect the views of the National Guard Association") the Militia Bureau opined that the objections posed by the G-1 were not considered "serious enough" to warrant their removal from the bill.[54] In other words, the bureau would not

---

[53] Memorandum from ACofS, G-1 to CofS, Subj: Amendments to the National Defense Act, proposed by the National Guard Association, Jan. 31, 1930 (plus Exhibit D, proposed changes to NDA). RG 168/344a/011.6 - Proposed - Gen. -51. Original document is G-1 file 8963-4 & 5.

[54] Memorandum, CMB to ACofS G-1, Subj: Amendments to the National Defense Act, proposed by the National Guard Association, Mar. 6, 1930, 1, 10. RG 168/344a/011.6 - Proposed - Gen. - 51.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

stand in the way if they were removed; NGAUS would have to fight for them on its own.

Within the Militia Bureau, the legislation was studied most extensively by Capt. Frank Taylor, the co-author of the 1928 Cheseldine/Taylor study. Taylor suggested significant additions and changes to several sections of the proposed law which ultimately made it into the final version.[55] Unfortunately, the War Department's extended study of the bill was one factor that contributed to the failure of the status bill to become law in the 71st Congress. When the House Military Affairs Committee called for hearings in mid-April, the Acting Secretary of War requested additional time to evaluate the bill. As a result, representatives of NGAUS, AGAUS and the ROA all unanimously endorsed the status bill in April 1930, while representatives of the JAG office and Chief of Staff Charles Summerall testified a month later.[56]

General Summerall's testimony reflected the General Staff's earlier evaluation of the bill; he supported the overall goal of the bill, but displayed misgivings over portions of the legislation which were not essential to the creation of a federal status for the Guard. These provisions included those previously objected to by the G-1, as well as language that would allow Guard and ORC officers to transfer from one component to the other, and a clause that would make Section 5 committees equally representative of all three

---

[55] See copy of memorandum, Taylor to CMB, Subj: H.R. 10478 – Amending the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as amended. n.d. RG 168/344a/319.1 - "Bill to Amend N.G." This document is a carbon copy of the original and bears no date. However, in all likelihood Taylor was told to perform his analysis as soon as the revised version of the status bill, designated H.R. 10478, was introduced in early March. Milton Reckord acknowledged changes proposed by the Militia Bureau to sections 58, 73, 76, 77, 78, and 81. *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 89-90.

[56] *Officers' Reserve Corps – National Guard (Proposed Amendments to National Defense Act): Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 10478.* House of Representatives, 71st Congress, 2nd Session.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

components when dealing with issues that affected all three components.[57] Summerall presented an alternate "stripped down" version of the status bill to the committee which removed these offending passages, but the House Military Affairs Committee paid little attention to it. The status bill underwent some technical amendments in committee, but at the Guard's insistence Representative Speaks reintroduced the bill on June 12 with most of the offending material intact.[58] It was favorably reported out of committee on July 2, and the following day Congress adjourned for five months.[59]

The fall of 1930 saw NGAUS rallying support among Guardsmen, calling for letters, telegrams and personal appeals to press for passage of the status bill in the final session of the 71st Congress. Failure to enact the legislation in both houses would force the reintroduction of the bill in the next Congress, and with it another round of hearings.[60] In the meantime, the War Department made its own study of the revised status bill with a Section 5 committee in preparation for hearings before the Senate Military Affairs committee in the new session.[61] Once Congress re-convened on December 1, 1930,

---

[57] Ibid., 65, 67.

[58] H.R. 12918, 71st Congress, 2nd Session. One minor concession to the War Department was that the revised bill reduced the number of Guard officers to be detailed to the General Staff from nine to five, but still insisted on mandating a two year tour.

[59] *To Amend the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, relative to the National Guard [to accompany H.R. 12918]*, House of Representatives Report No. 2058, 71st Congress, 2nd Session, July 2, 1930.

[60] See *NGAUS Proceedings, 1930*, 54-55, 72, 80. See also memorandum, Brig. Gen. George Leach (VP, NGAUS, 7th Corps Area) to AGs, GOs, and COs of the National Guard, 7th Corps Area; Subj: National Guard Legislation Pending Before the Congress of the United States, Dec. 27, 1930. NGAUS Archives, Box TF-1, File "NGA Memos, 1925-44" and *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 26.

[61] See discussion of War Department objections to status bill presented by Col. Wells, a National Guard member of the Section 5 committee appointed to study the bill. *NGAUS Proceedings, 1930*, 72-80.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

delays continued to plague the bill. The House was immediately consumed with other pressing business through the holiday recess and into January.

At the same time, NGAUS was haunted by its earlier refusal to amend the bill in order to take War Department concerns into account. As the date for consideration of the bill approached in the House, Secretary of War Patrick Hurley wrote to Representative W. Frank James (R-MI), the Chairman of the House Military Affairs committee. Though Hurley reiterated the War Department's support for the general principles espoused in the bill, he insisted on five amendments in order to secure full War Department backing. These amendments would, among other things, eliminate those provisions the G-1 had objected to nearly a year ago – the stipulation that Guard tours on the General Staff would last two years, and the specification of the duties of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau.[62] Representative James, who had suffered a lengthy illness in 1930 and therefore had not had any role in the earlier consideration of the status bill, was insistent that the bill be entirely acceptable to the War Department before he would recommend passage to the House.[63] Faced with this ultimatum, NGAUS agreed to the War Department's amendments and gained the unanimous approval of the House Military Affairs committee.[64] But the delay meant that the status bill – as further amended – lost its place

---

[62] Hurley to James, Feb. 5, 1931. RG 165/281/3463-1. General Reckord became more willing to delete the clause specifying a two-year tour for Guardsmen on the General Staff when he received a promise from the new Chief of Staff of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, that the War Department would restore the previous eighteen-month tour. See *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 94-95.

[63] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 19, 88, 93.

[64] *To Amend the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, relative to the National Guard [to accompany H.R. 12918]*, House of Representatives Report No. 2058, Supplemental Report. 71st Congress, 3rd Session, Feb. 14, 1931.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

on the House calendar and could only be squeezed in days later.

Representative James was finally able to bring the bill before the House of Representatives on Saturday morning, February 28, 1931 – some eight months after the Military Affairs Committee first approved it, and only four days before the end of the congressional session. James, through a prior agreement with the Speaker of the House, was able to request a suspension of the normal rules of business, and debate was limited to forty minutes. Those in favor of the measure, beginning with Representative Speaks, pointed out the obvious benefits of the legislation: it increased the availability of the National Guard for federal use without impinging on state control in peacetime. In addition, the bill enjoyed the support of the National Guard lobbies, the ROA, and the War Department, and would not incur any additional federal expense.[65]

The opposition to the bill consisted almost entirely of Representative Ross Collins, the chairman of the House subcommittee on Military Appropriations. Collins' speech, while impassioned, was full of inaccuracies and misunderstandings regarding the law. He argued that it would make the Regular Army, National Guard and ORC virtually one and the same, and that it opened the door for vast increases in pensions, pay, and other expenses. Many of his interpretations were so wide of the mark (particularly for a representative with his background in military legislation) that they appear to have been deliberate distortions designed to frighten his fellow Congressmen into voting down the bill. Though it was evident Collins truly believed that the bill would create undue –

---

[65] *Congressional Record*, 71st Congress, 3rd Session, 6496-6497 (Feb. 28, 1931).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

possibly unconstitutional – federal control over the Guard, he had little success in convincing others of his viewpoint, particularly after the speakers who followed him refuted several of his arguments. The House passed the bill by a margin of 304 to 49.[66]

The bill was quickly forwarded to the Senate Military Affairs Committee, which held only the most cursory hearings before reporting favorably on the bill on March 3 – the day before the 71st Congress was scheduled to close.[67] The Senators did not like being rushed, however, and the committee vote was 8-6, with the "against" votes due primarily to complaints about insufficient time to study the measure. The bill arrived in the Senate the day before the end of the session, where a filibuster prevented the status bill and several other bills from being considered by the body as a whole.[68]

The status bill had been unlucky in its first trip before Congress. In particular, Representative James' extended illness and his insistence that important business not be conducted in his absence had kept the bill from being considered earlier in 1930. As it was, the bill was introduced in January of that year and hearings not scheduled until mid-April. In all likelihood, had James been present the bill would have been approved by his committee and passed by the House before the end of the session in July 1930 – rather than late February 1931, as was the case. At the very least, James' presence in 1930 would have made the leadership of NGAUS aware of the absolute necessity of achieving

---

[66] Ibid., 6497-6502. A lengthy and passionate rebuttal of Collins' speech (undated and unattributed) can be found in the Militia Bureau's records. See "An Analysis of the Speech of Hon. Ross A. Collins ... Feb. 28, 1931" in RG 168/344a/011.6 - Proposed Amendments to NDA.

[67] *To Amend the National Defense Act,* Senate Report No. 1872, 71st Congress, 3rd Session, Mar. 3, 1931.

[68] See "National Guard Bill Lost," *ANJ,* Mar. 7, 1931, 633, 635; *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931,* 93.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

unreserved War Department support for the bill before going any further. NGAUS' refusal to accept significant modification of the bill in 1930 ultimately ended up costing the Guard lobby a chance to get the bill passed in early 1931. The cost of this mistake would prove to be a two and a half year delay before the bill became law.

NGAUS also failed to properly prepare the Senate for the arrival of the bill. Members of the Senate Military Affairs committee were inexplicably left in the dark about the benefits of this legislation, with the result being a divided report that made it more difficult to override a filibuster in order to gain consideration of the bill in the last days of the 71st Congress. Had NGAUS introduced parallel legislation in the Senate, or even simply briefed the Senators in greater detail in advance, it is quite possible that the Senate Military Affairs committee, like their counterpart in the House, would have unanimously approved the bill. A unanimous recommendation, delivered to the Senate just a little bit earlier, probably would have done the trick. Certainly, the leadership of NGAUS believed this. "Had it reached the Senate forty-eight hours earlier, in my opinion, it would have passed ...."[69]

The Status Bill Becomes Law

The 72nd Congress did not convene for its first session until December 7, 1931. NGAUS did not waste much time, getting allies on both the House and Senate Military Affairs committees to separately introduced the status bill in January 1932.[70] Though the

---

[69] Brig. Gen. Robert Travis, chairman, NGAUS Legislative Committee. *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 94.

[70] S. 2938, introduced by Senator David Reed (R-PA), Jan. 7, 1932 & H.R. 7435, introduced by Rep. James on Jan. 11, 1932.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

bills were identical to the legislation passed (with War Department support) by the House and Senate Military Affairs committees in the previous Congress, custom dictated that the bills once again be referred to the War Department for comment. A Section 5 committee was appointed for the purpose, which took an inordinate amount of time preparing a report for a proposal that had already been examined in detail over the last two years.[71] When the report arrived, NGAUS was surprised to find it was lengthy and that it recommended a number of additional changes. The result was a further delay as minor revisions were made. Though the House Military Affairs committee approved a modified version of the bill in June, the proposed legislation got no further during the last month of the congressional session.[72]

The true cause behind the delays suffered by the status bill in 1932 were the pressing demands of other issues. General MacArthur admitted to NGAUS President Robert Travis that he delayed the General Staff's report on the status bill because he did not want other matters considered until after the Army appropriation bill had been dealt with; in 1932 the Regular Army barely escaped from a coordinated attempt to eliminate

---

[71] Copies of some records relating to the appointment and proceedings of the Section 5 committee to study S. 2938 and H.R. 7435 can be found in the records of the Militia Bureau, RG 168/344a/011.6 (Proposed) Gen.- 68. The index to the Office of the Chief of Staff's records (RG 165/10/Subj: National Guard) indicates extensive documentation relating to War Department studies of the status bill under OCS file 16810. However, examination of the OCS records (RG 165/12/16810) shows all records under this file heading prior to 1940 were purged. The index file does indicate, however, that the Secretary of War did not forward his report to Congress on the two bills until April 16, 1932. RG 165/10/Subj: National Guard - Re: OCS file 16810-23. See also "Approves Guard Bill," *ANJ*, April 23, 1932, 814.

[72] *National Guard Bill [to accompany H.R. 12499]*, House of Representatives Report No. 1566, 72nd Congress, 1st Session, June 9, 1932. The most coherent account of events is given by NGAUS president Robert Travis in *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 16-18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2,000 of its 12,000 officers.[73] NGAUS itself was consumed with preserving the Guard's budget, which was also threatened by Congress with severe cuts, and the importance of the status bill paled in significance when confronted with the immediate crisis. Furthermore, Congress was awash in a sea of other measures as it tried to cope with the worsening Depression. As the NGAUS Legislative committee chairman explained to the assembled delegates at the 1932 NGAUS convention "...anyone who followed the work of the 72nd Congress must have realized the absolute impossibility of getting a bill of this nature through. ... No one could have accomplished more."[74]

The second session of the 72nd Congress was short, lasting less than three months. NGAUS chose not to push the status bill during this brief time, instead waiting to conduct a full press when the 73rd Congress convened in March 1933. This time, success came relatively swiftly. The Guard's persistence over the previous three years meant committee members in both the House and the Senate were intimately familiar with the proposed legislation. With little delay, the House Military Affairs committee reported favorably on the status bill in mid-May.[75]

There remained one final hurdle. Even after three years of study the Army's leadership remained suspicious of the Guard's motives in wanting this legislation passed. Milton Reckord's recollection of these events remained vivid decades later as he recalled

---

[73] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 17.

[74] Brig. Gen. Herbert Johnson, *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 77.

[75] *National Guard Bill [to accompany H.R. 5645]*, House of Representatives Report No. 141, 73rd Congress, 1st Session, May 16, 1933. The bill's sponsor was the chairman of the House Military Affairs committee, Rep. John McSwain (D-SC), a Reserve captain who served in the Guard's 154th Infantry, 39th Division during World War I.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chief of Staff MacArthur's summons to his office:

> "Milt, get in your car and come over here. We have your bill before me and I have all my officers assembled ... and they think there's a nigger in the woodpile in this bill, but dammit, we can't find it." I said "General, you can't find him because he isn't in there. You people know how to read the English language. Read it and that's what the bill says, and that's what it means."
>
> "Well," he said, "my people tell me there's a nigger in this bill somewhere. Get in your car and come over here and show us where he is." I said, "I can't do it. I'm going to Pimlico to the Preakness races." He said, "No, you're not. To hell with the Preakness." ...
>
> So finally he persuaded me to leave my friends and get in my car and come over here. ...
>
> He said when I walked in the door, "Milt, sit down here." And he repeated what he'd said. I said, "General, as I told you, there's no ... no ... no black boy in the woodpile at all." Well," he said, "I'm going to test you." ... "I have written here on a little sheet of paper about two lines. If you accept this amendment, we'll support the bill. If we ... if you won't accept the amendment, I'm afraid we can't support it." ... I read it. I said "I'll be delighted to accept this language and I'll show you right where it ought to go in this bill."
>
> And I turned a couple of leaves back and showed him where it ought to go and that's where it is in the law. They had made him believe that we were trying to run around him and go directly to the Secretary [of War]. And his amendment was something to this effect: that when the Secretary had determined and approved the policies affecting the National Guard, they should be administered under the Chief of Staff.[76]

With War Department backing once again secured, the status bill passed in the House on

---

[76] *Reckord NGAUS Interview*, 16-18. A substantially similar account is contained in *Reckord MHI Interview*, Part II, 18-19. Though Reckord never recalled the year or date of this encounter, it can be deduced given that the Preakness race is always held on the third Saturday in May. In May 1930, Summerall and not MacArthur was Chief of Staff. In May 1931 Congress was not in session; in May 1932 the War Department had already given its approval for the bill; furthermore, similar language giving the Chief of Staff authority over the National Guard had been defeated that year in the House Military Affairs committee (see *NGAUS Proceedings, 1932*, 17). In 1933 the Preakness was held on May 20, prior to the Senate Military Affairs Committee's consideration of the bill. When the Senate committee issued its report on June 6, one of the four amendments made to the House version of the bill contained language very similar to what MacArthur told Reckord he wanted. See *To Amend the National Defense Act,* Senate Report No. 135, 73rd Congress, 1st Session, June 6, 1933. MacArthur's proviso was inserted at the very end of Section 2 of the Status Act, amending Section 5 of the NDA 1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

June 5 by a margin of 169 to 1. Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas, the chairman of the Senate Military Affairs committee and one of the leading opponents to Senator Wadsworth's federalized National Guard in 1920, took the lead in creating a federal status for the Guard in 1933. He ushering the Guard status bill through cursory hearings before his committee and then straight to the Senate floor. The bill was passed by the Senate on June 10; President Roosevelt signed it into law five days later.[77]

Aftermath

The members attending the September 1933 NGAUS convention gave Milton Reckord a standing ovation for his services in securing the passage of the Status Act.[78] Technically, the battle was not completely over even at that point. The G-1 and the Adjutant General of the Army spent months after the passage of the law debating exactly how to implement its requirements. According to a representative of the National Guard Bureau attending the convention, four General Orders had been drafted and discarded without reaching a consensus.[79] The main sticking point was the unwillingness of the Adjutant General of the Army to grant a federal commission to the AGs of the various states and their staffs, arguing that these men were not members of tactical units that could be mobilized. General Reckord was confident that the law would force the Army

---

[77] See "Pass National Guard Bill," *ANJ*, June 10, 1933, 821. Milton Reckord's article "National Guard Bill Passed" *ANJ*, June 17, 1933, 831 contains a good summary of the final provisions. Act of June 15, 1933 – "An Act to Amend the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as amended" (Status Act) *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 48, Pt. 1, Chap. 87 (Public Law No. 64).

[78] *NGAUS Proceedings, 1933*, 88.

[79] Ibid., 90.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to commission every federally-recognized officer, regardless of where he was assigned, and urged the convention to be patient in awaiting the new order:

> I think after they get through mulling around, writing a number of orders and tearing those up, they will finally reach a conclusion that they have to do what the law says shall be done and we will eventually get a satisfactory order. ... Candidly, I think it is silly that grown men can sit up there and try to find out some way to circumvent the absolute intent of Congress.[80]

Reckord proved correct. The National Guard Bureau refused to concur with a number of proposed orders put forward by the War Department, ultimately causing the Secretary of War to request that the Attorney General make a ruling on how to interpret the new law. The Attorney General sided with the Guard, and on April 4, 1934 every federally recognized member of the National Guard of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia was appointed or enlisted in the National Guard of the United States.[81] The National Guard had finally achieved true "dual status."

While the National Guard Status Act accomplished this primary purpose, virtually all of the other provisions NGAUS had added on to the law had been stripped away during the course of several War Department reviews. NGAUS had initially wanted a minimum of nine Guard officers to be detailed to the General Staff for two year tours; the final law specified five officers and left the length of tour up to the War Department.[82]

---

[80] Ibid., 98.

[81] Correspondence from 1933-1934 relating to the drafting of a general order can be found in RG 168/344a/011.6 - Gen. - 68. See in particular Attorney Gen. to Sec War, Feb. 2, 1934; War Department General Order No. 3, April 4, 1934.

[82] Section 2, Status Act, amending Section 5, NDA 1920. While the NDA 1920 had not specified the numbers of officers to be detailed to the General Staff, since 1926 a minimum of ten Guard and Reserve officers had been on tour, so the law simply codified what was already a matter of policy (See Appendix 2).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

NGAUS had wanted language defining the duties of the Chief, National Guard Bureau inserted into the law, and wanted the number of National Guard "Assistants to the Chief" increased from three to nine. The final law did not define the Chief's duties and only raised the number of assistants to four.[83] NGAUS and the ROA had both wanted transfers between the Guard and the ORC to occur with a minimum of paperwork, but General Summerall's objections in 1930 had struck this language from the legislation. Only one minor provision that was not central to creating the federal component status of the Guard survived in the final legislation: the requirement that Section 5 committees contain equal numbers of officers from each of the three components when considering matters that affected both the Guard and the ORC.[84] Other changes made by the law were essentially neutral. The Militia Bureau was redesignated the National Guard Bureau, and the chief was required to be at least a colonel (the National Defense Act of 1920 permitted a major to be Chief, but the four Guardsmen appointed since that time had all been colonels or brigadier generals). The National Guard Reserve was redesignated the Inactive National Guard, but its function remained unchanged.[85]

Though the two year tour provisions were not included in the law, Reckord did gain the reversal of the policy limiting tours to six months and restoring them to eighteen months.

[83] Section 16, Status Act, amending Section 81, NDA 1920. The justification for raising the number to four in all likelihood had to do with the policy for apportioning assistants. In 1922, when legislation increased the number of assistants from two to three, the rationale had been to have a representative from each of the three army areas serve in the bureau. In 1932, the Army developed new mobilization plans that created four army headquarters, thus justifying an additional assistant in order to maintain equal representation.

[84] Section 2, Status Act, amending Section 5, NDA 1920.

[85] Section 16, Status Act, amending Section 81, NDA 1920; and Section 15, Status Act, amending Section 78, NDA 1920. The National Guard Reserve/Inactive National Guard served as a pool of non-drilling, federally recognized officers and enlisted men who would help increase Guard units to full strength upon mobilization.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Many Guardsmen had believed the Status Act would deliver one very concrete benefit: the guarantee that their units would not be broken up at the start of the next war as they had been in 1917. Congressmen had sold the bill to their fellows in this way, and the press had likewise advertised that the bill would maintain the integrity of Guard units following mobilization.[86] But this was a false promise. Though the law stated that Guard units should be "maintained intact insofar as practicable," this did not amount to a firm prohibition against changes following mobilization.[87]

In the end, undeniable military necessity required that the Army have the flexibility to reassign individuals and reorganize units as it saw fit. This was demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt after war broke out in 1941. Guard infantry divisions were "triangularized" in 1942, stripped of one of their four infantry regiments as well as their tank companies and air squadrons. Cavalry and coast artillery organizations were reorganized wholesale. Guard generals in particular were removed from their commands by a wide variety of administrative means. If the extent of the unit reorganizations and personnel turnover did not approach that of World War I, it was due to the Guard's greater conformity to federal TOE and standards before the war broke out, and to the far higher levels of professional education that existed in the Guard in 1941, not to any legal restrictions that the 1933 act or any other law placed upon the Army. In

---

[86] For example, see comments of Rep. Speaks, McSwain, and Wainwright in *Congressional Record*, 71st Congress, 3rd Session, 6497, 6500, 6501 (Feb. 28, 1931) and subtitle of *New York Times* article, "National Guard Bill Passed by House: Measure would stop distribution of units throughout the Army during war" (*NYT*, June 6, 1933, 47). Riker (pp. 85-86) argues that this is the primary reason Guardsmen backed the bill.

[87] Section 18, Status Act, amending Section 111, NDA 1920.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

short, there was no more legal guarantee in 1941 than there had been in 1917 that Guardsmen would get to fight alongside the buddies they had served with in peacetime.

Summary

The drive to create a federal status for the National Guard originated almost entirely within the membership of NGAUS, not in the Militia Bureau. Unlike a host of other reforms achieved in the 1920s and 1930s, the bureau played a secondary role, occasionally at odds with NGAUS, in developing this legislation. The War Department also displayed a sometimes uncooperative attitude; though the benefits of having the federal role of the Guard formalized were manifestly evident, the War Department dragged its feet conducting studies of the proposed legislation, demanded changes time and again, and remained suspicious of the Guard's motives until the very end. One object lesson of the campaign to pass the status bill was the absolute necessity of achieving complete concurrence from all parties involved before Congress was willing to consider any changes. Just as the Guard was able to derail Regular Army attempts in 1916 and 1920 to impose unacceptable conditions on the Guard, the Regular Army was able to strip away every feature of the status bill that it considered objectionable before granting its stamp of approval to the measure.

Milton Reckord emerged in 1933 with his greatest victory in a long and productive life as an advocate for the National Guard. But it was not his victory alone; he owed perhaps more then he was willing to concede to a few unheralded men – McPherren and Shaw in particular – for providing him with a blueprint for the status bill. Many other officers in the War Department left their fingerprints on the proposal as they

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

reviewed it time and again. Reckord's most important contribution was his absolute insistence that the prerogatives of the states not be interfered with in peacetime. Had he failed to take a stand in 1927, NGAUS would likely have approved the McPherren plan and National Guard history would have been fundamentally different. Had the McPherren legislation withstood a constitutional test, the Guard would have ceased to be the Organized Militia of the States, and the rights of governors to control the Guard in peacetime would have been determined by Congress, and not by the Constitution.

Aside from issues of Federal/State control, what concrete benefit did the status bill confer to the individual Guardsman? Beyond eliminating the odious practice of drafting the Guard into federal service, the answer is clear: very little. Other than minor changes to the composition of some joint committees, Guard influence on the General Staff did not change. The law did not greatly expand the number of Guard officers eligible for service on the General Staff or in the Militia Bureau, since over 90 percent of Guard officers already held ORC commissions at the time the law was passed. Guardsmen did not receive a guarantee that they would fight the next war with their buddies; nor can it be argued that by virtue of this law alone the availability of the Guard for federal purposes truly changed. The law still required an extraordinary act of Congress – the declaration of war or of national emergency – before the president could order Guardsmen into active federal service. Many Guardsmen, like former NGAUS President William Price, were doubtless correct in their presumption that if their nation truly needed the Guard, it would find a way to mobilize it regardless of its legal status. All the law did was make the mobilization process a bit quicker and smoother.

So why is the law important? Because it was inevitable that at some point the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guard would be forced to take on a more formal federal status if it wanted to avoid being relegated to an inferior position compared to the Organized Reserves/Army Reserve. By pursuing federal status in the 1920s the Guard assured that it would be obtained on its own terms – not forced upon it by the federal government at some future time of crisis. As a result, the law reinforced the Guard's position as the Army's preeminent reserve without sacrificing its peacetime ties to the states, the cornerstone of the Guard's influence, popularity, and power.

The history of the National Guard in the twentieth century, particularly in the post-Vietnam War era, has been one of greater and greater federal employment during peacetime, to include overseas deployments for training and peacekeeping. These peacetime missions abroad would be impossible for the Guard to perform under the organized militia legal construct of 1920. Indeed, these types of deployments would still be illegal under the legal construct established by the Status Act, but it was a step in the right direction. Without the 1933 legislation to act as a basis for dividing control between the federal government and the states, the Guard would have faced a difficult challenge at some point in the second half of the twentieth century: resign itself to an increasingly irrelevant status as solely the organized militia of the states; surrender militia status and become solely a reserve component of the Army; or forge a middle ground similar to that laid down in 1933. Given that it took NGAUS four years in the 1920s to develop legislation that created an acceptable middle ground, and another three years for the War Department and Congress to approve it, it is doubtful that such an elegant solution could have been quickly developed during a later time of crisis. The Guard was fortunate that it pursued resolution of the status issue when it had the time to give it the deliberation it

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was due.

Although the Status Act made the Guard a federal reserve component and simplified the mobilization process, it took subsequent legislation to enable the Army to deploy the Guard on a regular basis for extended periods in peacetime. Robert Sligh, author of a detailed study of the Guard's mobilization for World War II, argues that the 1933 act was the beginning of a long, slippery slope which ended in the 1980s with the Guard surrendering its state status in all but name, with no real power residing in the hands of governors, even in peacetime.[88]

Sligh's argument has some merit. It is clear that the overarching theme in Guard/Army relations in the twentieth century has been the gradual encroachment of federal authority over what had once been a predominantly state institution. The 1933 Status Act is a legal watershed in this evolution of control. But in many ways the adoption of a formal federal status in 1933 was more a symbolic gesture than a practical measure. The threshold for mobilizing the Guard was left so high that it was reasonable for Guardsmen at the time to assume – and rightly so – that the Guard would have a voice in determining whether it would be called up in the future. It was Congress, traditionally the Guard's closest ally in the federal government – not the president or the General Staff – that held the authority to declare war or national emergency and thus trigger a

---

[88] Robert Sligh, *The National Guard in National Defense: The Mobilization of the Guard in World War II* (New York: Praeger, 1992), 1-3, 158, 160-161, 167-169. For Sligh, the last vestige of state control was removed from the governors when they lost their ability to veto peacetime training for their Guard units. In 1986 several governors opposed to Reagan administration policies in Central America refused to allow their units to participate in exercises there. That fall, Congress passed an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act which would prevent governors from doing this in the future. Governor Rudy Perpich of Minnesota took the lead in challenging the new law, but the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed its constitutionality. (U.S. Supreme Court, *Perpich v. Department of Defense*, June 11, 1990).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

mobilization of the Guard. Indeed, this is how the Guard was mobilized in 1940. Only when national opinion was sufficiently aroused by events in Europe did Congress pass a joint resolution authorizing the mobilization of the Guard for a year of training, and as Sligh points out, NGAUS was a key player in acquiescing to the resolution.[89]

Given this viewpoint, the true tipping point – the point at which federal controls over the Guard in peacetime began to outweigh state controls – came after World War II. The passage of the Armed Forces Reserve Act in 1952, an otherwise innocuous measure which consolidated several existing laws covering the reserves under a single statute, placed the Guard on a par with the federal reserve components.[90] This included removing the limitation that the Guard could only be mobilized following an act of Congress. Thereafter, like any of the other reserve components, the president could order any individual or unit of the Guard onto involuntary active duty for up to two years.[91] The Guard, in seeking continued relevance, had surrendered a critical piece of its autonomy. Neither NGAUS nor the governors demonstrated any particular objection to this provision at the time, an oversight which doubtless would not have occurred had any of them foreseen President Eisenhower's mobilization of the Arkansas National Guard in 1957, an event precipitated by his desire to remove it from the control of Governor

---

[89] Sligh, 93-99. While many individual Guardsmen saw the mobilization as a hardship (and nearly 100,000 sought discharges in 1940 rather than leave jobs and families for a year) General Reckord led NGAUS in support of the joint resolution in part to help secure the Guard's place in the defense establishment as it expanded for imminent war.

[90] The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, *U.S. Statutes at Large*, Vol. 66, Chap. 608 (Public Law No. 476).

[91] Ibid., Section 233(b)(1) (66 *Stat.* 489).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Orville Faubus during the desegregation of Little Rock's Central High School. Presidential authority had finally trumped gubernatorial authority in peacetime. Following this action Faubus referred to his own National Guard as "occupation troops."[92] With those words, the scales that measured the balance of power tipped for good in favor of the federal primacy over the Guard, both in war and in peace. While the Guard remains to this day legally under state command the vast majority of the time, the president can remove it from a governor's control, without his consent or the consent of Congress, at any time he deems it is in the national interest.

[92] Doubler, 246. In contrast, the governors of at least five states in the 1930s used their National Guard to block federal agencies from carrying out New Deal programs in their states; in each case the conflict was resolved in the federal government's favor in the courts. See Mahon, 177.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

> *Whether the circumstance is a hurricane in the Carolinas or Gulf states, fires in Florida or California, floods across the Midwest, or tank displays for school fairs and community parades, it is the Army National Guard which is tangibly serving the people's needs, led by local leaders, commanded by state governors. Herein lies the Guardsmen's most potent power, stretching back three centuries before towns became colonies and ultimately a nation: their indestructible "connectedness" to the people; where all power in America is derived and translated by the power of the vote. To the average American at the community level across the country, it is the Guardsman who represents for them "the good soldier"*[1]

The Guard's "connectedness" to the people has allowed it to maintain a degree of autonomy since the founding of the United States. Though the Guard in the twentieth century – like a host of other local institutions – surrendered greater and greater control to the federal government, it has persisted in maintaining a functional degree of state control in peacetime. This despite the fact that military power is by its very nature most effectively wielded by a unified, centralized command structure. The leadership of the National Guard supports continued ties to the states not out of a sense of tradition or nostalgia, but because they have practical value. Service at the local level translates directly into political support at the national level. As long as the Guard remains useful to the states, governors will fight to ensure the Guard receives funding and a degree of autonomy from federal control. While Congress has typically supported greater federal oversight of the Guard in order to ensure its wartime readiness, the legislative branch has sided with governors and the Guard in resisting complete federalization despite several

[1] David Fautua, "How the Guard and Reserve will fight in 2025," *Parameters* (Spring 1999): 133.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

attempts by the Army to accomplish this during the twentieth century.

The period 1915-1933 was critical in the development of the Guard, spanning the enactment of three major laws that redefined the balance between state and federal control. In 1915-1916, the Guard was on the defensive, fighting a Secretary of War and a War Department that wanted to rid itself of the twelve-year experiment in federal funding of the militia instituted under the Dick Act. The Guard's survival in this struggle was partly due to its unified opposition to the Continental Army plan, but was more dependent on the fact that (unlike the proposed federal reserve force) it was already a force in being, and that many legislators were opposed to expanding the Regular Army. Nevertheless, while Congress increased the Guard's role in the national defense scheme, it required a significant price: more inspections, more conformity to federal standards, more drills, more field training, and more accountability. Furthermore, the new law established a future competitor to the Guard in the form of a nascent federal reserve. The National Defense Act of 1916 was a victory for the Guard, one which rewarded it with greatly increased financial support and military relevance, but at considerable cost for those who valued the Guard's autonomy.

The mobilizations for both the Mexican border and World War I came too quickly on the heels of the National Defense Act to truly test the law's efficacy. Regulars remained critical of the Guard's ability to serve, but the public latched onto its hometown heroes and followed their progress in France with pride. The Guard's participation in the war, both in terms of its numbers relative to the whole force, and in terms of its exploits, marks that conflict as its "finest hour" and validated it as a federal reserve force. But a significant number of Guardsmen returned home seething with indignation over the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

treatment they had received from the Regulars. The Regular Army, bred in the insular world of West Point and small frontier forts, had not been well equipped institutionally or psychologically to handle the army of a democracy. For the Guard's leaders the experience of the World War, coming in the wake of the still-fresh memories of the fight over the Continental Army, only served to reinforce the worst fears and suspicions they had of the Regulars. The next two decades would teach the Regular Army a great deal about handling citizen-soldiers, but in 1919 the relationship between the Guard and the Regular Army was poisoned, particularly after the War Department revealed its plans to overturn the balance established by the National Defense Act of 1916.

General March's plan for organizing the post-war Army seemed – even after it was augmented with UMT – to be a return to the Upton-inspired Continental Army scheme. It constituted (as Col. John McAuley Palmer phrased it) "incomplete preparedness at excessive cost and under forms that are not in harmony with the genius of American institutions."[2] While Palmer's own vision of a "Citizen Army" was doubtless more in harmony with the nation's history than March's was, even he failed to appreciate the American people's disgust with the aftermath of the war in Europe and their overwhelming desire to avoid having anything to do with the military. Given this prevailing mood, the Guard's opposition to General March's plan (as well as other schemes of military organization based on UMT that ignored the Guard) was probably not critical to defeating it. In 1920, UMT was universal chiefly in its unpopularity

[2] *Senate Hearings*, 1177.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

outside of military circles. Though Guardsmen supported UMT, they were less optimistic about its chances of being implemented. NGAUS developed a school-based, locally administered UMT plan designed to be more palatable to both Guardsmen and the public at large than the federally-administered proposals. But given the tenor of public discourse, any scheme of UMT, no matter the sponsor or how it was devised, was likely destined to fail.

In like manner, NGAUS' legislative bid to carve out an autonomous existence for the Guard akin to that of the Marine Corps was an example of overreach, but it did not ultimately harm the Guard's ability to gain significant concessions from Congress. In large part this success was due to other Guard voices, distinct from NGAUS and its discredited "smash the Regular Army" leadership, who worked directly with key legislators. General O'Ryan and the members of the American Legion committee worked hand-in-hand with Senator Wadsworth and Colonel Palmer to craft legislation that would federalize the Guard, but preserve its local character and give it a central place in the new Citizen Army. Although Congress derailed Wadsworth's scheme, the final legislation retained many elements favorable to the Guard. On the most important question of all, adroit lobbying by AGAUS President Charles Martin played an important role in retaining the Guard under the militia clause of the Constitution.

As a result, the National Defense Act of 1920 delivered two key reforms to the National Guard: a Guardsman to head the Militia Bureau, and Guardsmen serving on the General Staff. The Guard achieved these gains without being required, as in 1916, to sacrifice additional autonomy. Furthermore, the law addressed other issues to the satisfaction of Guardsmen such as relative rank, the size of Guard companies, the return

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the Guard to the states following demobilization, and the docking of pay for enlisted men when drill attendance fell below a minimum standard. Congress retained the draft as a means for bringing the Guard into active federal service, but believed that by giving Guard officers the opportunity to obtain ORC commissions it alleviated some of the uncertainty and delay that had characterized the mobilization of 1917. The Guard, ultimately unsatisfied with this compromise, saw the continuance of the draft provisions in the 1920 law as the primary piece of unfinished business to be addressed in the coming decade.

The National Defense Act of 1920 did not significantly alter the balance of State/Federal control; legally, the Guard remained the organized militia. If anything, by giving Guardsmen control of the Militia Bureau and access to the General Staff, the law tilted the balance of control back toward the states. However, despite this, federal controls and direction of the Guard would grow ever stronger during the interwar period. Notwithstanding the amendments of 1920, the underlying basis of the Guard's relations with the Army remained the National Defense Act of 1916, and this law provided the War Department with extensive means for imposing uniformity upon the Guard regarding TOE, personnel standards, and training. The Army had not had the time to exercise this control before war was declared in 1917; after 1920, however, the War Department imposed numerous new requirements and exacted greater compliance from the Guard. Fortunately for both the Army and the Guard, the presence of Guardsmen in the Militia Bureau and on the General Staff tempered the application of ever-increasing administrative and regulatory controls during the next two decades. Without the service of these Guardsmen, the spirit which characterized the interwar period – one of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

cooperation with the Regular Army and mutual pursuit of a more uniform, efficient, and professional National Guard – almost certainly would have been lacking.

The final major legislative reform, the National Guard Status Act of 1933, differs from the other two acts – and indeed from most major laws in the twentieth century that effected the Guard – in that it was initiated, written, and ushered through Congress entirely by NGAUS. The product of multiple studies and lengthy debate, the law was symbolic of the Guard's firm commitment to its role as a federal reserve, yet demonstrated a continued underlying suspicion of the Regular Army in its insistence on maintaining militia status in peacetime. The Status Act only resolved one of the chief concerns Guardsmen had carried since World War I – it eliminated the draft. It did not attempt to legislate an ironclad guarantee that Guard units would not be broken up upon mobilization. But because Guard organization in the interwar period more closely mirrored what the Army needed upon mobilization for war, the organizational turmoil of 1917 was not repeated on as large a scale in 1941.

The issue of whether the 1933 act presents another step toward dominant federal control of the Guard is a matter of perspective. There is no question that Guardsmen willingly sought a federal status for themselves, even if it was a "shadow" status that remained dormant unless Congress and the president jointly invoked it. This is as the author of the bill intended. Milton Reckord, in the ten years since he advocated federalization of the Guard before Senator Wadsworth's Military Affairs Committee in 1919, had reversed course and become a staunch advocate of state control. But like all Guardsmen, Reckord was not opposed to federal control in wartime, and the legislation he crafted made that transition quicker and at the same time more dignified for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guardsmen. Since a vote of Congress was still required to bring about a federal mobilization, Reckord and his compatriots believed they still were assured of at least being consulted before the Guard was again mobilized. If the law had an unintended consequence for the Guard, it was that it diminished the considerable legal and psychological barriers separating state and federal control. The Guard, by so willingly adopting a federal status in 1933, lowered the bar to surrendering even more of its autonomy after World War II, when Congress showed little hesitation in treating it precisely like the other reserve components of the armed forces.

The characterization of the interwar period as "years of stability" for the Guard is not inaccurate, because the Guard's size, position in the defense establishment, and relations with the other components of the Army remained steady during that time.[3] However, it ignores the regular progress that NGAUS, AGAUS and the Militia Bureau made in advancing the Guard's agenda with the War Department and Congress. The Militia Bureau's primary role in developing regulations and policies for the Guard was affirmed after a drawn-out struggle with the General Staff. The right to medical care and pay while recovering from injuries sustained on active duty was secured, and then expanded upon in the 1920s. Likewise, the right to receive pay and allowances equal to that of Regulars while serving on active duty was a source of constant contention between the Guard and the Comptroller during the 1920s, but was finally settled in the Guard's favor after the passage of several laws. Guardmembers who today fulfill their drill

[3] Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

obligations away from their home unit or who drill on alternate days owe this flexibility to Guardsmen who gained these reforms in 1924. The military technician force – an essential element of reserve component readiness – expanded in size, scope of duties, and type of personnel during the interwar period. Administrative pay for commanders, flight pay for aviators, and increasing authority and flexibility for Guard Property and Disbursing officers were also secured or expanded through the efforts of the Militia Bureau and the Guard lobbies during the interwar period.

Reforms of this nature have been consistently ignored in the literature on the National Guard, but they are an important legacy of this time. One significant amendment from the interwar period falls outside the scope of this study: a provision enacted in April 1939 which granted retirement pay for Guardsmen injured while on extended active duty. Though Guardsmen and their families were already authorized pensions for injury or death suffered on active duty, this was the first time the Guard had made inroads into securing retirement pay for its members. As this research has shown, while the 1939 reform was important, it wasn't "the first legislation of significant material benefit to the Guard since 1916."[4] Numerous reforms – some with much wider application or conferring greater assistance – preceded it.

What made this type of steady progress possible was the relationship that developed between the Guard lobbies and the Militia Bureau. The differing agendas that

[4] Section 5, Act of April 3, 1939 (53 *Stat.* 557); Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, 49. Other legislative reforms from 1934-1939 generally followed lines discussed earlier. For example, caretaker duties were expanded to allow pooling (49 *Stat.* 392) and include clerical work (52 *Stat.* 1153); rehospitalization for injuries incurred on active duty was added (49 *Stat.* 1507); Property and Disbursing officers were authorized clerks (53 *Stat.* 592).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

characterized the pre-1920 relationship became common goals with the advent of a Guard officer as the chief of the bureau in 1921. This relationship served very well to secure changes to law or policy governing the Guard. It also proved adequate in the annual battle for appropriations, though the evidence here is somewhat more mixed. Despite indications that it could have achieved significantly greater strength had it been properly funded, the Guard experienced identical cuts to those suffered by the Regular Army in the 1920s. NGAUS' success in gaining congressional add-ons to Guard appropriations was limited; its biggest victories were not in gaining more federal dollars, but in preserving the basic level of appropriations from further cuts and convincing Congress to grant the Militia Bureau flexibility in re-apportioning funds. The Guard lobbies, despite their reputation for congressional influence, could do little beyond that.

The spirit of amity between the National Guard and the Regular Army was a hallmark of the interwar period. In sharp contrast to World War I and its immediate aftermath, the two components maintained a solid front against a common enemy which they termed "pacifism." This mutual support proved particularly useful during the first years of the Depression when Congress and the president trimmed funding for both components, but neither suffered irreversible harm in part because of the support of the other. While neither side completely trusted the other, and some individuals doubtless viewed the relationship as an alliance of convenience, relations between Guardsmen and Regulars made gains in the interwar period that outlasted the heavy strains of World War II. Most importantly, key leaders of the Regular Army became committed to training the citizen components. Though many Regular instructors adopted this task begrudgingly (an attitude that persists even to this day) their exposure to citizen-soldiers ultimately proved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

beneficial in forging the common bonds necessary to creating the army of a democracy.

While the Regular Army focused more effort on training the Guard, the Guard also made the statement that it was serious about increasing its utility as the Army's first line reserve by adopting a federal status in 1933. Furthermore, Guardsmen backed up this commitment by developing a far more uniform and professional force during the interwar period. While many elements contributed to the growth in professionalism, access to the Army's educational system – either through resident or correspondence courses – was the most important. It marked the start of a trend, with the admittance gained in the interwar period serving as a taste of things to come. Attendance at resident Army service schools after World War II would gradually become commonplace for all members of the Guard, officer and enlisted, with the result that the critical role once played by Regular Army instructors in the direct training of Guard units would gradually diminish. After 1955, even basic training of Guard enlistees would be conducted by the Regular Army, thereby imparting a uniform federal standard to Guardsmen beginning with the most junior soldiers.

Another important element influencing the relationship between the Guard and the Regular Army was Guard service on the General Staff. The prevailing historical view of this service has tended to underestimate its importance. Guardsmen did, in fact, exercise influence on the General Staff. Officers from the civilian components were assigned to the General Staff primarily to serve on joint committees, and these committees were regularly summoned to consider problems that impacted the Guard and Reserves. The War Department also encouraged Guard and Reserve officers to form their own standing committee to generate recommendations or consider issues being studied by the various

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

divisions of the General Staff. In addition to committee work, Guardsman serving on the General Staff were typically designated "action officers" for any Guard-related issue forwarded to the staff for consideration. Though Guard and Army leaders differed regarding the types of issues that required consideration by joint committees, this did not lessen the Guard's enthusiasm for having Guardsmen serving as their eyes and ears in headquarters, as well as ambassadors of the Guard's point-of-view. As was the case with the Guard's access to Army schools, the progress which was made during the interwar period was built upon after World War II. Not only were greater numbers of Guardsmen detailed to the Army (and after 1947, Air) staff, but the program was expanded to include National Guard representatives attached to the major commands of the Army and Air Force.[5]

The role of the National Guard lobbies – NGAUS and AGAUS – was vital in obtaining results for the Guard during this period. Though dominated by a small group of senior officers, these organizations (NGAUS in particular) were viewed as representative of Guard opinion by Congress, the War Department, and the Militia Bureau. Though the Guard lobbies fought to present their point of view in opposition to the War Department during the debates over the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920, the interwar period presented a different face of their lobbying efforts. NGAUS and AGAUS as a rule sought cooperative solutions with the War Department. This was absolutely necessary during the interwar period; despite the much-vaunted lobbying ability of NGAUS and AGAUS,

[5] See Donald Coble, "Our Man in Headquarters," *The National Guardsman*, Feb. 1968, 2-7 for an assessment of how the program had grown by the 1960s.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Congress did not pass any of the legislative reforms urged by the Guard without gaining the concurrence of the War Department first. With the stakes no longer life-and-death as they were in 1916 and 1920, confrontation between the War Department and the Guard no longer produced results.

Milton Reckord, the most influential and long-term advocate for Guard legislation during this time, clearly illustrated the contrast between the old style and the new. In 1923, as the newly-elected president of NGAUS, Reckord challenged the old way of doing business at an AGAUS meeting:

> We listened to the other three talk and finally the president said, "Well, General – gentlemen – we'll have lunch and then we will go up on the Hill," and that was too much for me. I broke my silence and I said, "Well, General, what are we going up on the Hill to do?" And he said, "To see our Congressmen and see if they can't help us to get some of these regulations changed." I said, "Well, I have a suggestion to make. Why don't we call the people we know over in the War Department and go over and see them first? Maybe we can get all of them to make the changes we want without going up on the Hill." And these older fellows [said], "Oh, we can't do that. They won't pay any attention to us." So I said, "I don't believe that. I served on the General Staff Committee a couple years ago and I know several of them up there now, and one of my old friends from the World War is the G-3, the training man. All these regulations affect training. Why don't you let me see if I can make an engagement for all of us ... to go up there and talk to him about these things?" ... And, we went up that afternoon, sat with him and he agreed to every single thing they wanted.[6]

Although a new, cooperative spirit predominated in the interwar period, the Guard lobbies knew that their ultimate recourse, should they need it, lay in the legislative branch. Here they had some good friends: as the Chief of the Militia Bureau

---

[6] *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section IV, 14-15.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

acknowledged, "...it is not giving away any secrets to say that Congress, barring some individuals, seems to be very kindly disposed toward the National Guard."[7] Some of this influence derived from direct Guard connections, which were far more common in Congress than personal ties to the Regular Army. There was no better friend of the Guard in the 1920s in the House than General Speaks (R-OH), and Senator Millard Tydings (D-MD) – who Milton Reckord recruited into the Maryland National Guard in 1916 the night before it was called-up for duty on the Mexican border – was as close an ally as the Guard could desire on the Senate Military Affairs committee.[8]

The Guard's state roots and semi-autonomous status gave it credibility even with those legislators who were often considered hostile to the military – "small Army" men, fiscally conservative and suspicious of the power vested in the General Staff – men like Representatives James Hay in 1915-1916, Daniel Anthony in 1920, and Ross Collins in the early 1930s. Alliances with these men could be problematic. While Hay was critical in saving the Guard from Secretary of War Garrison's Continental Army plan, he also showed little interest in addressing some key NGAUS concerns. Daniel Anthony played a central role in 1920 in keeping the Guard organized under the Militia clause of the Constitution, but he opposed UMT (which most Guardsmen favored) and he favored returning the Guard to an all-infantry force after 1920. Ross Collins gladly provided the funds to motorize the Guard, but opposed the status bill as well as funding for training or

[7] CMB to Commanding Officer, 9th Corps Area, Subj: Conference of State Adjutants General, Mar. 17, 1923. RG 168/12a/080. - Assn. of Adjts. Gen.

[8] *Reckord MHI Interview*, Section II, 44-45.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

personnel. Nevertheless, each of these legislators was important in his own right in maintaining the Guard's autonomy, as well as its continued military relevance.

The achievements of the Guard lobbies were all the product of part-time work by men who were already busily engaged (in most cases) as adjutants general of their own states, as well as in civil pursuits. These men saw themselves as patriotic and concerned citizens, not as lobbyists. In fact, they objected to the term "lobbyist" because they believed it implied they were being paid to express the views that they held; as one proud committee chairman stated, "no member of this [NGAUS Legislative] Committee accepted any pay from the Association for his time or services in Washington, and therefore we were not embarrassed in any of the hearings by the charge of lobbying."[9] Rather than face such potential humiliation, NGAUS and AGAUS chose to rely on their own volunteer efforts to influence Congress and monitor events in the War Department, despite the fact that more might have been accomplished had they hired people to maintain a consistent presence in Washington. There was widespread concurrence with General Reckord's belief that "the strength of the National Guard lies in the fact we have no paid representative in Washington. When we go to a member of the House or Senate, we are speaking because of our interest, rather than because of the salary we get."[10] This too would change after World War II, when NGAUS adopted permanent offices and a full-time staff in Washington in order to monitor and influence Congress and the Defense Department.

The interwar period was in many ways a golden age for the National Guard. After

---

[9] Brig. Gen. Robert Travis, *NGAUS Proceedings, 1931*, 94.

[10] "Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the AGAUS," Hotel Roosevelt, New Orleans, Dec. 1, 1931,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

struggling to survive and remain relevant in 1915-1916, the Guard had earned its laurels on the battlefields of France, and returned home to receive (after considerable struggle) its just reward – a secure place in the hierarchy of national defense. Though it suffered from insufficient funding along with the rest of the Army during the 1920s and 1930s, the Guard was confident in its popularity both with Congress and the nation as a whole. The interwar period saw the Guard grow more professional and become more integrated into the workings of the General Staff. Through a series of incremental reforms, the Militia Bureau and the Guard lobbies provided new benefits for Guardsmen, increased the efficiency of the organization, and struck down many of the inequalities that had troubled citizen soldiers. These achievements were crowned by the adoption of a formal federal status in 1933, a move which was careful to preserve the Guard's unique "dual status" as a state force in peacetime. Step by step, Charles Dick's vision of a "true National Guard" – state forces which had obtained the equipment, training, and legal status to provide useful service to their nation in time of war – had finally come to be realized.

---

15. NGAUS Archives, AGAUS file folder.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix 1 – National Guard, 1920-1933

Fiscal Year	Actual Strength	Appropriations	RA Instructors: Officers	RA Instructors: Enlisted	Service Schools: Guard Officers	Service Schools: Guard Enlisted
1920	56,106	$13,177,750	75	165	31	150
1921	113,630	$28,000,000	141	294	140	137
1922	159,658	$25,554,100	323	443	138	72
1923	160,598	$25,815,000	401	458	330	112
1924	176,322*	$29,814,140	441	536	327	76
1925	177,204	$31,104,642	447	583	276	65
1926	174,969	$31,779,085	447	589	288	117
1927	181,142	$31,976,525	441	579	294	126
1928	181,221	$32,474,888	433	584	314	130
1929	176,988	$32,426,471	441	584	311	129
1930	182,715	$32,619,798	441	585	268	130
1931	187,386	$35,836,450	440	585	295	131
1932	187,413	$35,379,352	444	590	264	121
1933	185,925	$33,613,369	425	560	239	121

Source: *Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, 1941*, pp. 8, 12. Fiscal year commenced six months prior to the calendar year; e.g., FY 1920 began July 1, 1919 and ended June 30, 1920.

RA (Regular Army) Instructors: Officers includes those assigned as instructors to Guard divisions, regiments and battalions. Does not include 25-30 Regular Army officers assigned to the Militia Bureau and 14 assigned to corps area and department headquarters. Regular enlisted personnel were not assigned to the corps area or department staff or the Militia Bureau.

Service Schools: Number of Guard officer/enlisted personnel to attend resident schools (not correspondence courses) that year.

* Figure is for June 20, 1924. (See *CMB Annual Report*, 1924, 1) By June 30, 1924 the number was "in excess of 177,000." Source: *CMB Annual Report, 1925*, 13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix 2 – National Guardsmen on the General Staff, 1921-1941

Date	G-1	G-2	G-3	G-4	WPD	Total	Total All GS
6 July 1921						9*†	109
1 June 1922						7*†	101
31 Dec. 1923	5	4	1	1	0	11*	109
1 July 1924	2	1	4	0	0	7*	62
1 July 1925	1	1	5	1	0	8*	97
1 July 1926	2	2	6	1	0	11*	93
1 July 1927	2	2	3	2	1	10*	94
1 July 1928	2	2	2	2	2	10*	90
1 July 1929	2	1	3	2	2	10*	102
1 July 1930	2	2	2	2	2	10*	102
1 July 1931	2	2	2	2	2	10*	107
1 Oct. 1932	2	2	2	2	2	10*	108
1 Oct. 1933	1	0	1	1	1	4 (of 10*)	107
1 Oct. 1934	1	1	1	1	1	5 (of 11*)	103
1 Oct. 1935	1	1	1	1	1	5 (of 10*)	102
1 Oct. 1936	1	1	1	1	1	5 (of 10*)	102
1 Oct. 1937	1	1	1	1	1	5 (of 10*)	101
1938-1939	no data available for these years						
5 Aug. 1940	1	1	1	1	1	5 (of 10*)	183
1 Apr. 1941	3	0	1	0	0	4 (of 9*)	195

Source: Data compiled from War Department Statistics Branch slides (various dates) in binder labeled "Officers: Ages, Gen. Staff Corps, GS Corps Eligible List, Schools – Students & Graduates." RG 165/37/Box 3.

* = Guard and Reserve officer figure total. Note: War Department Statistics Branch did not differentiate from 1921-1932 between officers who held National Guard commissions in addition to ORC commissions, and those who just held ORC commissions.

† = assignments of Reserve officers to divisions within the General Staff were not provided in 1921 and 1922.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Manuscript and Archival Collections

National Archives – Archives II, College Park, MD

Notation system used in footnotes for National Archives Records: Title, author, recipient and date of the document is given first, followed by: RG (a) / (b) / (c)

(a) = Record Group number (either 165, 168, or 200)

(b) = MLR (Master Location Register – subgroup – identified below)

(c) = file entry within the subgroup. Note that some files occupy multiple archival boxes. In cases where it is particularly useful, box numbers are provided; however, box numbers may change if additional processing of the records is done in the future.

Record Group 165 – Records of the War Dept. General and Special Staffs

MLR 10 – Index to Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff, 1921-1942

MLR 12 – Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff, 1921-1942

MLR 37 – Records of the Statistics Branch, War Dept., 1921-1942

MLR 216 – Reports, Lists and Charts relating to Organization and Function of G-3 Division, 1920-30

MLR 279 – War College and War Plans Division, General Correspondence, July 1919-Oct 1920.

MLR 281 – War Plans Division, General Correspondence, 1920 - 1942

Record Group 168 – Records of the National Guard Bureau

MLR 12a – Central Correspondence File, 1916-1923

MLR 344a – Army-NGB Decimal File 1922-1954

MLR 347a - Army-NGB Administrative Decimal File, 1920-1950

Record Group 200 – National Archives Gifts Collection

MLR 25 - Papers of General John J. Pershing, 1916-1924, 1931-1939

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

US Army Military History Institute (MHI) – Carlisle Barracks, PA

Interview Transcript - General Reckord interviewed by Lieut. Col. Bernie Callahan. Senior Officer Debriefing Program, 1974. (Cited as *Reckord MHI Interview*)

Copies of lectures delivered to the Army War College. (Cited as AWC Lectures)

National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) – Washington, DC

Archives: The library of the National Guard Association possesses archives relating to the National Guard and the National Guard Association both on a federal level and in the individual states. A small amount of material relating to the Adjutants General Association is also intermixed in the archives. Archives include two unpublished historical monographs on NGAUS (Walsh and Crist). Association records prior to World War II are spotty due to the lack of a permanent facility prior to 1944.

NGAUS convention proceedings, 1903 – Present.

Minutes, NGAUS Executive Council – 1916-1944 (incomplete)

Militia Bureau/National Guard Bureau Circulars

Private Papers

Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division – Washington, DC

Baker, Newton D. (Secretary of War, 1916-1921)

Palmer, John M. (Military policymaker, Author)

March, Peyton C. (Chief of Staff, 1918-1921)

Pershing, John J. (Commander, AEF; Chief of Staff, 1921-1926)

Wadsworth, James W. (Senate Military Affairs Committee)

Papers in collections other than the Library of Congress

Boardman, Charles (Adjutant General, Wisconsin 1897-1913 and commander, 64th Infantry Brigade, 32nd Division, 1917-1918) – papers at the Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, WI.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Clark, Bennett Champ (President, National Guard Association, 1919-1922) – papers in the Western Historical Manuscript Collection, Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO.

Haan, William (Commander, 32d Division, 1917-1919; Director, WPD, 1919-1922) – papers at the Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, WI.

Kahn, Julius (House Military Affairs Committee) - papers at Western Jewish History Center, Judah Magnes Memorial Museum, Berkeley, CA.

Leach, George (Chief of Militia Bureau/National Guard Bureau, 1931-1935) – unpublished autobiographical manuscript titled "The Personal History of Major General George E. Leach" at Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN.

Martin, Charles – (Adjutant General, Kansas, 1909-1917, 1919-1923 and President AGAUS) – papers at the Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, KS.

Reckord, Milton (President, NGAUS, 1923-25, chair of the NGAUS legislative committee) – papers at the University of Maryland Library, College Park, MD.

Oral Histories

O'Ryan, John. "The Reminiscences of John F. O'Ryan." Interview by Owen Bombard, 1949-50; Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1957.

Reckord, Milton. "Views on the National Guard: An Interview with General Reckord." Interview by Harry Moskowitz and Jack Roberts, August 26, 1966. National Guard Association Library, NGAUS Archives, Box 2. (Cited as *Reckord NGAUS interview*) See also oral history under MHI listing.

Wadsworth, James W. "The Reminiscences of James W. Wadsworth." Interviews by Owen Bombard, Wendell H. Link, and Dean Albertson, 1950-52; Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1975.

War Department Reports and Publications

Annual Reports:

Reports of the Secretary of War

Reports of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs (1909-1916)

Reports of the Chief , Militia Bureau (1916-1932) (cited as *CMB Annual Report*)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reports of the Chief, National Guard Bureau (1933-Present) (cited as *CNGB Annual Report*)

National Guard Register (Troop and Station lists, 1922-1998)

Regulations:

Militia Bureau. *National Guard Regulations, 1922.* Washington: GPO, 1922.

Special Reports:

Sanger, William C. *Report on the Reserve and Auxiliary Forces of England and the Militia of Switzerland.* Washington: GPO, 1903.

General Staff, Army War College. *A Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States.* Washington: GPO, 1915.

Militia Bureau. *Report on Mobilization of the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States, 1916.* Washington: GPO, 1916.

Adjutant General's Office. *Composition of National Guard Divisions and Disposition of Former National Guard Units, 1917.* Washington: GPO, 1918.

Adjutant General of the Army. *Congressional Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, and the Distinguished Service Medal issued by the War Department since April 6, 1917, Up to and including General Orders, No. 126, War Department, November 11,1919.* Washington: GPO, 1920.

American Battle Monuments Commission. *27th Division Summary of Operations in the World War.* Washington: GPO, 1944.

United States Congress

Congressional Record, 1873-Present.

Congressional Publications: Senate

Scott, James Brown. *Extracts from the Journals and Debates of the Federal Convention, the State Constitutional Conventions, the Congress, the Federalist, together with other papers relating to the Militia of the United States.* 64th Congress, 2nd Session (1917). Senate Document No. 695.

Committee on Military Affairs. *Reorganization of the Army: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs,* 66th Congress, 1st Session (1919). (Cited as *Senate Hearings*)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Committee on Military Affairs. *Army Reorganization Bill: Analytical and Explanatory Statement*, 66th Congress, 1st Session, Sept. 5, 1919. Senate Committee Print.

Reorganization of the Army; Report [To accompany S. 3792], 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Jan. 28, 1920. Senate Report No. 400, Part 1.

Reorganization of the Army; Views of a Minority [to accompany S. 3792], 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Jan. 31, 1920. Senate Report No. 400, Part 2.

Committee on Military Affairs. *Reorganization of the Army: Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs, on S. 3792, To Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the United States Army, and for other Purposes – Statement of Hon. Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War*. 66th Congress, 2nd Session (1920).

Committee on Military Affairs. *Reorganization of the Army: Hearing before the Committee on Military Affairs on S. 3792, To Reorganize and Increase the Efficiency of the United States Army, and for other Purposes – Testimony of the Military Policy Legislative Committee of the American Legion*. 66th Congress, 2nd Session (1920).

Committee on Military Affairs. *Army Reorganization Bill: Memorandum on the Senate Amendment to H.R. 12775,To Amend the "National Defense Act," Relating to the National Guard as a part of the Citizen Army in time of peace*. 66th Congress, 2nd Session (1920). Senate Committee Print.

Amendments to the National Defense Act, 67th Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 1921. Senate Report No. 238.

Amendments to National Guard Provisions of the National Defense Act, 67th Congress, 2d Session, Aug. 3, 1922. Senate Report No. 856.

National Guard Amendments to the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, as Amended,, 68th Congress, 1st Session, May 5, 1924. Senate Report No. 514.

Committee on Appropriations. *War Department Appropriation Bill, 1926: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 11248*. 68th Congress, 2nd Session (1925).

To Amend the National Defense Act, 71st Congress, 3rd Session, Mar. 3, 1931. Senate Report No. 1872.

To Amend the National Defense Act, 73rd Congress, 1st Session, June 6, 1933. Senate Report No. 135.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Lee, E. Brooke Jr., *The Politics of our Military National Defense*, 76th Congress, 3rd Session (1940). Senate Document No. 274.

Congressional Publications: House of Representatives

Committee on Military Affairs. *To Increase the Efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs,* 2 Vols., 64th Congress, 1st Session (1916).

Committee on Military Affairs. *National Guard Reorganization Status: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs,* 66th Congress, 1st Session (1919).

Committee on Military Affairs. *Army Appropriation Bill, 1920: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs*, 2 vols., 66th Congress, 1st Session (1919).

Committee on Military Affairs. *Army Reorganization: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs,* 2 Vols., 66th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions (1919-1920). (Cited as *House Hearings*)

To Amend the National Defense Act; Report [To accompany H.R. 12775], 66th Congress, 2nd Session, Feb. 26, 1920. House Report No. 680.

National Defense: Conference Report [to accompany H.R. 12755], 66th Congress, 2nd Session, May 27, 1920. House Report No. 1049.

Committee on Military Affairs. *Army Appropriation Bill, 1921: Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on Military Affairs,* 66th Congress, 2nd Session (1920).

Special Committee of the House of Representatives. *Readjustment of Service Pay: Hearings before a Special Committee of the House of Representatives.* 67th Congress, 2nd Session (1922).

Committee on Military Affairs. *To Amend the National Defense Act of June 3 1916, as Amended: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 6354 and S. 2169,* 68th Congress, 1st Session (1924).

To Amend in Certain Particulars the National Defense Act [to accompany S. 2169], 68th Congress, 1st Session, Mar. 28, 1924. House Report No. 397

To Amend the National Defense Act , 68th Congress, 1st Session, Apr. 30, 1924. House Report No. 612.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Committee on Military Affairs. *Miscellaneous Public Bills, Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs on Various Bills and Resolutions*, 68th Congress, 2nd Session (1925).

To Amend the National Defense Act [to accompany S. 3760], 68th Congress, 2nd Session, Jan. 29, 1925. House Report Nos. 1316 and 1316, Pt. II.

To Amend the National Defense Act [to accompany H.R. 11511], 69th Congress, 1st Session, Apr. 28, 1926. House Report No. 1031.

Committee on Military Affairs. *The National Defense: Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs - Historical Documents Relating to the Reorganization Plans of the War Department and to the Present National Defense Act,* March 3, 1927. Part 1. 69th Congress, 2nd Session (1927). (Cited as *The National Defense*)

Committee on Military Affairs. *Officers' Reserve Corps – National Guard (Proposed Amendments to National Defense Act): Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 10478.* 71st Congress, 2nd Session (1930).

Reimbursement to States for Military Property and Equipment Brought in to Federal Service in 1917 [to accompany H.R. 704], 71st Congress, 2nd Session, June 18, 1930. House Report No. 1041.

To Amend the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, relative to the National Guard [to accompany H.R. 12918], 71st Congress, 2nd Session, July 2, 1930. House Report No. 2058.

To Amend the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, relative to the National Guard [to accompany H.R. 12918], 71st Congress, 3rd Session, Feb. 14, 1931. House Report No. 2058, Supplemental Report.

National Guard Bill [to accompany H.R. 12499], 72nd Congress, 1st Session, June 9, 1932. House Report No. 1566.

National Guard Bill [to accompany H.R. 5645], 73rd Congress, 1st Session, May 16, 1933. House Report No. 141.

Secondary Sources

Books

Ambrose, Stephen E. *Upton and the Army.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Beaver, Daniel R. *Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort.* Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1966.

Belvin, Betty McLain. *Ray McLain and the National Guard.* Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1994.

Bland, Larry, ed. *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall.* Vol. 1. *The Soldierly Spirit, Dec. 1880 - June 1939.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.

Bullard, Robert Lee. *Fighting Generals.* Ann Arbor: J.W. Edwards, 1944.

Chambers, John Whiteclay II. *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America.* New York: Free Press, 1987.

Clendenen, Clarence. *Blood on the Border: The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars.* London: Macmillan, 1969.

Coakley, Robert. *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789-1878.* Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1989.

Coffman, Edward. *The Hilt of the Sword: The Career of Peyton C. March.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966.

Cooper, Jerry. *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865-1920.* Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997.

Crossland, Richard and James Currie. *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983.* Washington: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984.

Derthick, Martha. *The National Guard in Politics.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Dickinson, John. *The Building of an Army.* New York: Century Co., 1922.

Doubler, Michael. *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000.* (Dept. of the Army Pamphlet No. 130-1) Washington: GPO, 2001.

Ettinger, Albert M. and A. Churchill Ettinger, *A Doughboy with the Fighting 69th.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

Galvin, John R. *The Minute Men: The First Fight: Myths & Realities of the American Revolution.* Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989.

Griffith, Robert K. *Men Wanted for the U.S. Army: America's Experience with an All-Volunteer Army between the World Wars.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Gross, Charles. *American Military Aviation: The Indispensable Arm.* College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.

Hewes, James E. *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963.* Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975.

Hill, Jim Dan. *The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard.* Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1964.

Holley, I.B. Jr. *General John M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy.* Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1957.

Huzar, Elias. *The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by Congress through Military Appropriations, 1933-1950.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1950.

Hylton, Renee and Robert Wright Jr. *A Brief History of the Militia and National Guard.* Washington: National Guard Bureau, August 1993.

Jones, Richard. *A History of the American Legion.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1946.

Kington, Donald M. *Forgotten Summers: The Story of the Citizen's Military Training Camps, 1921-1940.* San Francisco: Two Decades Publishing, 1995.

Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Merton G. Henry. *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775 - 1945.* Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955.

Mahon, John K. *History of the Militia and the National Guard.* New York: Macmillan, 1983.

March, Peyton C. *The Nation at War.* Garden City: Doubleday, 1932.

Millett, Allen, and Peter Maslowski. *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, Revised and Expanded Edition.* New York: Free Press, 1994.

Newland, Samuel. *The Militia's Role in National Defense: A Historical Perspective.* Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 1987.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ohl, John Kennedy. *Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler.* Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.

Palmer, John McAuley. *Statesmanship or War.* New York: Doubleday, 1927.

_____. *Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen.* New York: Doubleday, 1930.

_____. *America in Arms: The Experience of the United States with Military Organization.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

Pershing, John J. *My Experiences in the World War.* 2 vols. New York: Frederick Stokes, 1931.

Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939.* New York: Viking Press, 1963.

Reilly, Henry J. *American's All: The Rainbow at War.* Columbus, Ohio: F.J. Heer Publishing Co., 1936.

Riker, William H. *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy.* Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957.

Rothstein, Julius. *The Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau.* Washington: National Guard Bureau, Historical Services Division, n.d.

Rumer, Thomas. *The American Legion: An Official History, 1919-1989.* New York: M. Evans & Co., 1990.

Sligh, Robert B. *The National Guard in National Defense: The Mobilization of the Guard in World War II.* New York: Praeger, 1992.

Smith, Richard W. *Shoulder Sleeve Insignia of the U.S. Armed Forces, 1941-1945,* 3rd ed. Privately printed, 1981.

Stentiford, Barry M. *The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century.* College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.

Weigley, Russell F. *History of the United States Army.* New York: Macmillan, 1967.

Wilson, John. *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades.* Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Articles

Boylan, Bernard. "Army Reorganization 1920: The Legislative Story." *Mid-America: An Historical Review* 49, No. 2 (April 1967), 115-128.

Fautua, David. "How the Guard and Reserve will fight in 2025," *Parameters*, Spring 1999, 127-149.

Herring, George C., Jr. "James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy, 1915-1916." *The Journal of Southern History* XXX (November 1964), 383-404.

House, Jonathan. "John McAuley Palmer and the Reserve Components." *Parameters*, Vol. XII (September 1982), 11-18.

Karsten, Peter. "Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes for the American Century," in *Building the Organizational Society*, ed. Jerry Israel (New York, Free Press, 1972), 197-232.

Mooney, Chase C. and Martha E. Layman. "Some Phases of the Compulsory Military Training Movement, 1914-1920." *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* XXXVIII, No. 4 (March 1952), 633-656.

Weiner, Frederick. "The Militia Clause of the Constitution," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. LIV, (December 1940), 181-220.

Unpublished Secondary Sources

Cantor, Louis "The Creation of the Modern National Guard: The Dick Militia Act of 1903." Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1963.

Derthick, Martha "Citizen Soldier on Capitol Hill: The Political Life of the National Guard." Ph.D. dissertation, Radcliffe College, 1961.

Killigrew, John W. "The Impact of the Great Depression on the Army, 1929-1936." Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1960.

McCreedy, Kenneth O. "Palladium of Liberty: The American Militia System, 1815-1861." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1991.

Periodicals

Army & Navy Journal (cited as *ANJ*)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Army & Navy Register

The Baltimore Sun

Infantry Journal

The National Guardsman (1947 - Present; retitled *National Guard* in Nov. 1978)

The New York Times (cited as *NYT*)

The Washington Post

Websites

United States Congress:

Congressional Biographical Directory (http://bioguide.congress.gov). Accessed April – November 2002.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.