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THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RACISM

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RACISM

by

DAVID GOLDBERG

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in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
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1984


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
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
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
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In style and form, I have largely followed Turabian. However, footnotes are many and the bibliography is large. For this reason, and in consultation with members of my dissertation committee, I have adopted a form for reference and bibliographical citations which in its details is peculiar to this work.

I should like to thank Professor Peter Caws, my advisor, for his helpful comments, philosophical and stylistic, and for leaving me alone at all the right times; Professor Michael Brown of the Department of Sociology for some illuminating discussions; and especially Professor Bernard Baumrin for his keen, often ironic, though always thought-provoking criticism, friendly encouragement and support. This made my work so much more pleasurable. The City University of New York, and the Department of Philosophy at Hunter College in particular, enabled me financially to complete my degree in this country and I am grateful for the opportunity afforded me. Most fundamentally, though, completion of this work was made possible only by the unceasing personal support and enormous material assistance afforded me by Alena Luter.

It is especially necessary to repeat here the time-worn acknowledgement that criticisms of the arguments in this work are to be directed solely at me.

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INTRODUCTION

Individual and group praxis have so often been fueled by the discriminatory beliefs of some individuals against others. At the same time, condemnation of beliefs, intentions, actions or even articulated desires which discriminate unduly against others seems to be a fundamental feature of any normative theory in the Western philosophical tradition.¹ This apparent disjunction between moral theory and social practice is exemplified most clearly by the history of racism. Close and careful examination of the application of moral principles to the social phenomenon of racism will furnish a fuller comprehension of both the general limitations of traditional moral theory and the historical influences of racism.

Moral theory reflects how we do and ought to act in relation to others and determines how these actions are to be judged. Traditionally, the faculty of reason has furnished the core of moral theory, serving simultaneously as ideal guide for action and standard of moral judgment. Yet, theoretically, reason has been widely considered a faculty of all human beings qua human only since the insistence of the Enlightenment thinkers. Prior to the eighteenth century, exclusion from the realm of moral beings was predicated primarily upon the lack of reason. Now it was at the height of the Enlightenment that the concept of 'race' became scientifically popular. And with this rise in

'race consciousness' arose the peculiarly modern phenomenon of racism. The development of racism was coterminous not only with the expansion of contemporary forms of colonial and imperial exploitation but also with the establishment of the modern sciences of biology and anthropology.

An apparent paradox looms here: moral reason surely condemns antipathetic discriminatory beliefs and practices; and racist practices and beliefs are clearly of this sort. But racist ideas and acts, generally considered so irrational, came to pervade forms of social life simultaneously with the widespread admission that all human (moral) beings are by nature (potentially) rational. Most commentators have tried to resolve this apparent paradox by insisting that racists fail to realize their rational potential, and to that degree are immoral. The history of modern fascism, fascination with the 'mythological' appeals of racism and the contemporary focus by social scientists on the sociology and psychology of 'race relations' have served to entrench the presumption that racism is inherently irrational. A nagging fact is nevertheless commonly ignored. Those selfsame Enlightenment philosophers and moralists generously concerned to widen the cast of rationality expressed also virulently racist beliefs and arguments.

The paradox cannot be resolved simply on the basis of racism's irrationality. Disturbing features of the moral ideas and relations will be uncovered by pursuing the other horn of the dilemma. A careful analysis of our modern moral conceptions and of the history of racism will reveal that the language central to the modern expression of our moral relations is at the same time the language of expression of racial

relations, and hence of racism. This analysis is necessarily intricate and multi-faceted. Generally, focus must be shifted from the prevailing concentration of social scientists with the phenomenal appearances of race relations to the intellectual roots of racism.

Racism is perhaps unique among widespread social phenomena in that the conceptual media by virtue of which it is expressed are rooted in intellectual discourse. Without the scientific and philosophical discourses of 'race,' racist discriminations, exclusions and oppressions would be quite literally inconceivable. Thus, our analysis will include critical assessment of moral theory in general, and of the relevant scientific theory since the Enlightenment. The aims of the analysis are multifold:

- To establish the historical roots of racism. This will force us to consider whether the traditional characterization of racism is acceptable, and to reconceptualize racism if it is not.

- To determine the ways in which contemporary intellectual discourse--scientific, moral and philosophical, political and cultural --are open to racist forms of expression. Two general lines of argument will be pursued here: that persistent misconceptions of racism by social scientists have served inadvertently to prolong and continue to generate new forms of racist relations; and that, by silently inheriting this racist tradition, contemporary moral and philosophical theories have exacerbated this ongoing tendency.

- To reconsider the appropriate moral condemnation of and political responses to racism.

Structurally, the analysis divides into three parts. The general concentration of the first is moral theory; of the second is racism; while the final part aims to reformulate both racism and moral theory in light of the preceding inquiry. The first chapter reveals how virtually every kind of moral account in the Western philosophical tradition, both historical and contemporary, is at least potentially prone to racist conjecture. Here, two poles in accounts of morality are distinguishable. At one extreme, we find the set of theories which attempt to construct moral principles on the basis of rational idealizations of conditions in which moral agents ideally are supposed to act. The principles, thus rationally reconstructed, serve as the moral ideals by which agents, if they are to be moral, must set their lives. At the other extreme, moralists consider it sufficient simply to extract ethical norms from the actual practices and beliefs of individuals in given communities. The body of norms so described is taken to constitute the moral code for that community, or for a suitably similar set of social conditions.

While offering standards of action and judgment, 'constructive idealizations,' at least in their extreme form, constitute overbearing strictures on human action. Equally, rigid application of such ideals to concrete social situations as the standards of moral judgment can be undertaken only by discounting as immoral, virtually ex hypothesi, almost all human agents.² Morality surely must have a more central role in our daily lives than this abstruse moralism warrants.

At the other end of the moral spectrum, though, limiting the justifiable criteria for moral deliberation and ethical judgments to

those relative merely to the ethical communities from which they are extracted tends to vindicate practices which we generally might hesitate to affirm. Accepting such a view of the basis of moral standards leaves no independent ground upon which to base moral condemnation of communities or individuals engaging unabashedly in racist practices. This is the subject-matter of Chapter One.

The survey of views representative of these counterposed tendencies in moral theory leaves open the question whether the difficulties they face can be circumvented by a Kantianism under the likes of Donagan's traditional interpretation. It lies at the very heart of Donagan's purpose to demonstrate that the keystone of Kant's account is a defence of traditional Judeo-Christian moral beliefs and practices (or what Donagan often refers to as 'traditional common morality'). Kant's theory, with some justification, has wide appeal. It is set up specifically to furnish a criterion of morality that is foundationalist (it rests ultimately upon a single general principle) and universalist. It is a simple matter, therefore, to infer from this a fairly feasible indictment of racism; indeed, Donagan spells out the grounds for criticizing the institution of slavery, and his arguments can be adapted quite straightforwardly to the case of racism. Chapter Two will be concerned thus with the detail of 'traditional common morality'.

Now an ethical theory undertaking to defend commonly acceptable moral practices in the Judeo-Christian tradition is significant because, historically, the rise of racism can be traced precisely to that period during which Kant was seeking to defend this interpretation of 'common

morality.' The interesting question then becomes whether, theoretical condemnation notwithstanding, there are elements in the very structure of the moral account which encourage racist practices. If so, racism may turn out to be the limiting case of the traditional conception of morality. Chapter Three summarizes critically those components of the system of traditional morality that may be said to have encouraged racism.

The analysis of moral theory and racism proceeds thus far by assuming a common social understanding of the concept 'racism.' This follows fair practice. In discussing, for example, whether theories like sociobiology are racist or facilitate the expression of racism, standard usage of the concept is relied upon by most.³ Indeed, some studies devoting themselves explicitly to a general analysis of racism fail to furnish a clear definition of the object of inquiry.⁴ Philosophers, one might expect, ought to know better, especially in discussing conceptual difficulties surrounding 'racism.' But here too explicit definition is foregone sometimes in favor of informality.⁵ On the other hand, where racism is defined, the definitions are often spurious in that they assume what needs to be proved, for instance, that racism is irrational;⁶ or that 'racial prejudice' consists in contradictory judgments or beliefs;⁷ or that the definitions are confused--for example, 'racism' is synonymous with 'ethnocentrism.'⁸

In order to assess the relation of racism to our intellectual, moral and socio-economic heritage, and in particular to the history of philosophy and science, it is clear that 'racism' must be defined. Only in this way may its pervasiveness be assessed; and only thus are

important details in our own tradition to be uncovered in light of which we may judge our own milieu. A further difficulty confronts us immediately. The notion of 'racism' naturally invokes the question of its relation to the concept of 'race.' Some even define 'racism' or 'racial discrimination' simply as those discriminatory judgments or practices based on 'race,'⁹ where no further account of 'race'--either biological or social--is offered. Obviously the question whether such discriminations are justifiable or not cannot be answered until a clear-cut definition of 'race' is provided.

The various issues raised by the definition of 'race' will be considered in Chapter Four. The following chapter will demonstrate that the various attempts to define racism by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions are doomed to failure. They are replaced by an account of racism in terms of a cluster of properties. Chapters Four and Five will serve together as the basis from which to assess the widespread presumption that racism is inherently irrational. Chapter Six will argue at length that racism need not be irrational, a suggestion less surprising perhaps in light of the fact already mentioned that racism is rooted in the rise of modern science.

We have spoken of racism thus far in ways widely divergent from those in which it is commonly defined, described, analyzed and explained --in a word, discussed. It will be argued that this difference lies largely in the fact that there are racisms rather than just a simple, singular, undifferentiated racism. Accepting this determines the nature of the remaining tasks confronting us. It was Marx who removed any doubt that changing the elements of the social structure necessitates compre-

hending them first. To determine what needs to be done to facilitate the (practical) deconstruction of racism, two further strands must be added to the analysis. First, a framework must be furnished for a unifying account of all the disparate phenomena of the various racisms; for the beliefs and practices, myths and institutions; for the hypotheses and speculations, theories and expressions; for the underlying presuppositions and desires, principles and motivations; as well as their historical transformations from one to the other. Chapter Seven is given over to this undertaking.

The resultant unity ascribed to racism will serve as the foundation for the task central to the following and final chapter: outlining an appropriate moral outlook for the condemnation of all phenomena properly deemed racist. Of course, this moral outlook cannot be subject to the same internal embarrassments--the parallel disapprobation of and inducements to racism--revealed in Part One to be characteristic of the mainstream in our Western moral tradition. Because the ultimate aim and end of moral theory is practical, as Aristotle so clearly foresaw, this view of morality must encourage both anti- and non-racist ethical, legal, socio-economic, political and cultural practices. The challenge confronting the concluding chapter is to show how this is possible. It cannot be objected, then, that we are assuming racism to be some kind of 'crucial experiment' of the adequacy of moral theory without offering independent theoretical grounds to justify its condemnation as evil.

INTRODUCTION: FOOTNOTES

¹On some interpretations, Nietzschean morality might be considered an exception. Moreover, disapprobation of this sort often extends to beliefs, etc., which are considered to discriminate against others only potentially.

²This is reflected in the fact that we call an agent who is guided in action solely by such criteria 'unduly moralistic.' Do we not feel more comfortable, precisely from a moral point of view, with the German soldier who, by lying, assists a Jew to escape execution than with the soldier who--by telling the truth, holding his tongue or fulfilling his national duty--allows (not necessarily causes) the Jew's execution?

³Cf. Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977); Stephen Gould, The Panda's Thumb (New York: W. W. Norton); and Michael Ruse, Sociobiology--Sense or Nonsense? (Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 74-79.

⁴Cf. Calvin Hernton, Sex and Racism in America (New York: Grove Press, 1965); Roger Bastide, "Color, Racism and Christianity," in Color and Race, ed. John Hope Franklin (New York: Beacon Paperback, 1965), pp. 34-59.

⁵Rip Bulkeley, review of The Cultural Bases of Racism and Group Oppression, by John Hodge, Donald Struckmann and Lynn Tröst, in Radical Philosophy (Britain) 19 (Spring 1978): 30-35; and Laurence Thomas, "Sexism and Racism: Some Conceptual Differences," Ethics 90, No. 2 (January 1980): 239-41. Thomas simply hints, albeit self-consciously, at definitions of both racism and sexism:

"...there are innate differences (respectively) between whites and blacks,...men and women,...which in each case make it natural for the latter to subordinate the former."

One would expect that an article declaring itself in title as the undertaking of conceptual analysis be more circumspect in furnishing definitions of concepts central to the inquiry.

⁶Virtually every account undertaking to define racism stipulates that it is irrational. See Chapter Five below.

⁷Cf. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), pp. 189-204.

⁸Cf. Thomas Sowell, Race and Economics (New York: D. McKay, 1975), pp. vii; and Ashley Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 375-376.

⁹Again, philosophers are among those guilty of such practices. Cf. Peter Singer, "Is Racial Discrimination Arbitrary?" Philosophia (Israel), 8: 2-3 (November 1978): 186.

PART ONE

RACISM AND MORALITY

CHAPTER ONE
RACISM AND MORAL PARADIGMS

It is by now uncontroversial to assume that racism is morally reprehensible, though of course this was not always so. We might expect that a survey of the most respected theories in the history of ethics would reveal at least one on the basis of which all forms of racism would turn out in every case to be immoral. Unfortunately, no such conclusion can be drawn, for application of each theory to the phenomena of racism reveals shortcomings--both theoretical and historical--in the general account of morality offered. This chapter assesses in brief the applicability of a number of contending views; while Chapter Two undertakes a detailed analysis of Kantianism, that view from which, perhaps, we most expect an uncontroversial indictment of racist beliefs and practices.

There are minimal criteria any acceptable moral theory must meet. First, universality: the account must bring all persons into its locus of applicability. Two further conditions are immediately implied by this: impartiality (or objectivity) and definitive criteria of personhood. In other words, the theory must furnish a means whereby judgments are made and applied uniformly over a specified range of circumstances, and provide some account of what it is to be a person.

The faculty of reason is clearly fundamental to both. This reveals, then, a further condition: an account of how the moral system motivates or, more strongly, commits us to act on its precepts.

1.1 Classical Morality: Aristotle

On standard interpretations, Aristotle's classical, pre-Christian theory of virtue can be dismissed for failing to meet the criterion of universality: slaves, though clearly human, are apparently considered by Aristotle to be irrational. Hence, according to this reading of Aristotle, even if slaves are the proper objects of certain moral behavior, they are nevertheless not moral agents and so not to be treated as such.¹ The same kind of argument was reiterated in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by some European racists. Indeed, Kant followed Hume in holding a version of this view in respect of the Negroes, as we will see in detail below. While this interpretation of Aristotle fails to make sense of his more subtle claim that the slave, besides being a slave, is also a man and ought to be treated as such,² we will consider it sufficient for our purposes to bypass the theory and so avoid being drawn into Aristotle interpretation.

1.2. The Moral Critic and the Ethical Community: Nietzsche and Hegel

In spite of Nietzsche's frequent--and frequently justifiable--exhortations against system-building, some commentators have been quick to extract from the Nietzschean corpus a defence of the aristocratic ethic of the nobility. Interpreted thus, it is small wonder that Nietzsche has been held accountable so often for the horrors perpetrated in the name of the Nazi 'Superman.'³ Yet to hold the silent Nietzsche

responsible in this way strikes me as perverse as holding Adam Smith or Milton Friedman accountable for the iniquities of capitalism, or for that matter, Kant for the centuries of brutality perpetrated in the name of Christianity. The coherence of Nietzsche's views on morality can be comprehended only by interpreting them negatively as an attack upon the very possibility of a moral system. Hence Nietzsche's analysis of morality is out of place here in light of our task to establish whether any particular theory is capable of offering a general moral-theoretic indictment of racism.

On the other hand, though Hegel has been subjected to much the same maltreatment,⁴ his conception of morality can be dismissed on more reasonable grounds. For Hegel, morality consists in the practical ethical life of the community (Sittlichkeit), in turn the highest possible objectification of Spirit (Geist) in the human world. It is the closest society could approach, therefore, to the perfect social embodiment of Reason.⁵ Acceptance of this view would force us, formally, to assume Hegel's entire idealist, absolutist metaphysics. And accepting an ethical view like it but without the metaphysical baggage forces upon us as moral whatever the particular community deems as such. Accordingly, the racist practices of early twentieth century America, Nazi Germany, contemporary South Africa and some recent practices in Israel, would be justified as moral. Thus, Hegel's theory transgresses the criteria of universality and impartiality.

1.3. The Dubitability of Intuitionism: Ross and Broad

Intuitionism, on both the classical and modern versions, con-

siders morality to be a deductive system founded upon ultimate moral principles (the fundamental duties) which are not derivable from any others. These fundamental moral precepts are considered binding upon all rational creatures on grounds that they are embodied in intuitions which, because of their purely rational character, must be grasped 'clearly and distinctly' by the faculty of reason. Intuitions are characterized, then, by their Cartesian indubitability; by their assured truthfulness; and by the fact that, insofar as we are rational and our reason lights upon them, we must perceive them directly.⁶

This third condition is plainly false, despite Descartes' protestations to the contrary.⁷ Though this seems sufficient reason to reject the theory tout court, there is an equally telling moral objection. The skeptic may hold that, far from being some undeniably certain truth, intuitions are nothing more than educated guesses, subject to great variations according to cultures, value-systems, etc.⁸ The moral concomitant of such an objection is that intuitionism, at least on Ross's and Broad's accounts, seems to justify as ethical any choices made by the ordinarily respectable person. So, for example, discrimination might be found in given circumstances to be the right kind of moral conduct if otherwise ordinarily respectable people generally approve of it in these sorts of conditions. There is no moral necessity on the part of intuitionism to meet the criterion of impartiality. To block criticism of this sort, the intuitionist requires an independent guarantee of the truthfulness of the intuitions. But the sole possibility available is some form of

Cartesian God, an alternative too weighty for any contemporary moral theory to have to bear.⁹

1.4. The End of Consequentialism: Egoism and Utilitarianism

Consequentialism divides quite naturally between egoism and utilitarianism.

(a) Egoism

At least on the extreme versions, egoism obviously fails to furnish a theory adequate for the moral condemnation of racism: egoism denies that human beings ever act out of beneficence; it fails, by definition, to meet the condition of impartiality by playing on the ambiguity between self-interest objectively applied by an impartial observer to all human agents and the essential implication of the subjective application of the principle of self-interest. The latter principle necessitates that I demand that you do for me what I require to fulfill my self-interest. Clearly, discriminatory acts are justifiable on this view and would be moderated only to the extent that the agent had not the power to effectuate them. Thus, racially discriminatory acts against another ought to be undertaken insofar as it is in the agent's self-interest to do so.¹⁰

(b) Utilitarianism

As with egoism, there are well-trodden criticisms of utilitarianism--whether aggregate or average, act or rule; whether utility is defined hedonistically or eudaimonistically. It is virtually impossible, first, to foresee in every application all the consequences

of an act or a general moral rule. It therefore follows that the utility or effect on individual happiness, however interpreted, cannot be calculated for every single act, or in respect of every application of the rule to an act. This does not imply that the calculation cannot be made for some cases. But utilitarianism requires something much stronger than this if it is to furnish the basis of our moral system: namely, that we be able to calculate for every case whether an act or the general acceptance of a moral rule foreseeably would maximize human happiness. Considerations of this sort are vastly complex, and in many instances undecidable: projecting what we are to do often depends upon the future actions of others, our knowledge of which for the most part is limited; and sometimes indirect consequences of our actions unanticipated by us turn out to be relevant nevertheless to calculation of their utility.¹¹

In any case, it is clear that utilitarianism ultimately could endorse any act or any practicable set of moral rules, given the appropriate circumstances. So, for example, an act of racial discrimination or institutional racism in favor of a majority against a minority, or even in the extreme case by a minority against a majority, could be condoned easily on utilitarian grounds, given the requisite utility maximization of the individuals involved. A theory with such bizarre outcomes surely must be specious as the basis of the moral system.

The committed utilitarian has a more appealing response. Concerned with fairness to all persons, the benevolent utilitarian can

extend equal liberty to each as the means of maximizing utility, average or aggregate. From this, respect for others' liberty is implied directly, and so too the indictment of racially discriminatory acts as immoral.¹²

This assumption of equal liberty for all as a means to utilitarian ends must assume, realistically, an economy of scarce resources in which the members, possessing equal liberty, compete for the same goods. It is then open to some to claim--either as justification of their claims to the goods or of their successful domination of the competition--that they deserve the disproportionate distribution on empirical grounds. These grounds might include racially-based considerations, like needs based upon putatively racial characteristics; or the belief that though members of certain races have equal claims to liberty abstractly considered, their less 'civilized' level of development renders them incapable of the best administration of their resources from the perspective of their own happiness (utility).¹³ There is accordingly no necessity in terms of this utilitarian principle to deduce a moral indictment of racially discriminatory practices. Should the utilitarian then respond, in the only way open to him, that there is intrinsic utility in liberty, this is no longer a factual claim, and retreats from utilitarian to straightforward deontological grounds.

1.5. Hypothetical Choice Theories: Hare and Rawls

Influenced in one way or another by Kant, contemporary

rational constructions of morality assume that the morally right acts in given circumstances are just those that exemplify the principles according to which, hypothetically, the perfectly rational being would choose to act under certain specified ideal conditions. Of these 'hypothetical choice theories,' Hare's 'universal prescriptivism' and Rawls' 'rational contractarianism' are of interest to us.¹⁴

(a) Hare's Universal Prescriptivism

Hare holds that the moral principles are to be determined by the choices of an ideal observer under certain specified conditions. These choices are to be governed in turn by a pre-defined set of rules. Now Hare illustrates the theory by way of a practical application of these rules to the moral evaluation of 'racialism,'¹⁵ and it is in this regard that the difficulties with the approach are exemplified most clearly.

Racially discriminatory acts, for example, by a white person against black persons, purportedly turn out to be proscribed on Hare's view according to the following analysis. The individual who is contemplating acts of this kind must first find a generalized formulation of a universal principle a clear instance of which would be the moral judgment he or she wishes to make. So: 'White people are justified in oppressing black people.' The individual must then ask him- or herself whether he or she honestly could endorse such acts practised against him- or herself in the event that he or she were 'in the shoes of the black person.' In other words,

acts of this kind are to be deemed morally right if and only if the agent is honestly prepared to endorse them even if practiced against him- or herself. And, contends Hare, no acts of a racially discriminatory sort would pass this 'prescriptivity test.'¹⁶

The obvious objection to Hare is that his two-tier test for morality fails to proscribe such antipathetic behavior if an agent, upon faultlessly conducting the 'hypothetical shoe-change test,' then genuinely and honestly acquiesces to such treatment. Hare brands this 'honest acquiescence' a 'lack of imagination or insensitivity' (Hare, 1963: 223). But this is to deem reprehensible acts of this nature on moral grounds independent of Hare's own account. Recognizing the difficulty, Hare introduces the further general qualification: the judge (in this case oneself) cannot be 'a fanatic' (Hare, 1963: 220-1). A 'fanatic' is defined, however, as one whose "...ideal...is made to override all considerations of people's interests, even the holder's own in actual or hypothetical cases" (Hare, 1963: 176). Hare invokes thus precisely that criterion of morality--'consideration of people's interests'--that it is supposed to ground. The account is circular, and Hare has no retort to the self-consistent racist.¹⁷

(b) Rawls' Rational Contractarianism

For Rawls, alternatively, the moral rules are those universal principles which all agents would choose as fair and just because they are formulated in a hypothetical choice situation completely non-specific with respect to particular characteristics of agents. This 'original position' is characterized completely generally in that

agents are taken to be ignorant of any specific features of their own or any other's character or situation which might advantage themselves or disadvantage others in the choice of moral rules and political laws. The assumptions here are that in choosing such rules agents know only quite general, non-particular, non-discriminatory features of the world, and that the nature of this knowledge would disable them from choosing anything but the most perfectly fair and just moral rules.¹⁸

This is not the place to develop in any detail a critique of this finely crafted theory of justice as fairness. The following consideration nevertheless seems to mitigate strongly against it. Rawls' moral rules are perfectly general. So these general principles must be adjusted always to fit the particular features of an agent's situation and experience. Ideal adjustments of principles can only take place back behind the veil of ignorance. Since this veil is designed ex hypothesi never to fit the world of our experience properly--it is precisely an abstraction from this world--adjustment is necessitated constantly. We are unable thus to move from the original position, like spiders trapped in our own theoretical webs.¹⁹

More specifically, it is just those particular features of the human condition which Rawls discounts as morally irrelevant (e.g., skin color, gender, etc.) that turn out in specific circumstances to be morally apposite.²⁰ Treating a person morally in given circumstances may in fact be a function of skin-color or race, and so cannot be discounted a priori. Any affirmative action policy, for instance,

cannot be formulated as a general rule behind the veil of ignorance. Thus, two men--one white, one black--are relatively equal in capabilities, skill, training and experience, and belong to the same income bracket. They apply for the same job or award, to be granted according to the foregoing criteria. Rawlsian morality must be neutral with respect to the appointment or award. In particular, the formulation of Rawls' rule in the original position emphasizes explicitly the exclusion, in respect of such choices, of racial (or gender) considerations in which it is obvious (from the applicant's records, family histories, socio-historical conditions, etc.) that the black man has managed his achievements in the face of greater odds precisely because he is (defined as) 'black.' It seems obvious that the job or honor ought to be granted to him. In any case, discriminating between races is not morally objectionable as such, only discriminating against another race. (This will be demonstrated in detail later.) But Rawls' race-blind hypothetical choices in the original position are incapable of reflecting this difference.

Rawls can respond to concrete cases of this kind only in terms of an appeal to the general rule that those who are worse off ought to be treated better.²¹ Like utilitarianism, though, the concepts of 'being worse off' and 'being treated better' necessitate some standard criterion of quantitative measurability. But the justificatory basis of such as affirmative action policies often rests upon the prior non-fulfilment by society of just those qualitative components of eudaimonia ignored by quantitative criteria. So, once out from behind

the veil of ignorance and confronted by having to make rule adjustments to meet the specificity of such cases, we are driven back behind the veil where racial adjustments and the like cannot be made in the first place. The idiosyncrasies of Rawls' theory demand both that we make adjustments of this sort and because of their nature that we cannot. Rawls has us tied up behind the veil of ignorance, unable to undertake some of the tasks for which this haven was originally constructed.²²

We have failed thus far to find a theory of morality which includes, at least as a direct implication of its fundamental principles, an indictment even of clearly defined racist practices. Now the influences of Kant's moral thinking are apparent in the latter constructions of moral theory considered here. Indeed, though Rawls fails to furnish any justification of his system of 'justice as fairness,' Donagan is correct in suggesting that this justificatory basis must be Kantian in form.²³ It is time now to consider more directly the approach to racism of the Kantian reconstruction of 'traditional common morality.'

CHAPTER ONE: FOOTNOTES

¹Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon: Politics (New York: Random House, 1941), 1253b-1255a; cf. Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), p. 4.

²Aristotle, 1255a³-1255b15.

³Cf. Donagan (1978), pg 27; and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 325n.

⁴Cf. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols. (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1966), 1: 393-394.

⁵G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), esp. #135.

⁶Cf. Donagan (1978), p. 13.

⁷Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (London: Penguin Classics, 1968), "Fifth Meditation," p. 149.

⁸These criteria for intuitions equally sustain Sidgwick's critical specification of the theory, and the more recent accounts of Ross and Broad. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), pp. 338-343; W. D. Ross, The Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 187; C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Kegan Paul, 1930), pp. 222-223; and cf. Donagan (1978), pp. 17-21 and 22-23.

⁹Cf. Donagan (1978), p. 23. These criticisms weigh only against those theories that take the underivable basic moral principles to be knowable solely by way of our intuiting them. They leave open the acceptability of more modest intuitions, in the Aristotelian sense of grasping the particular premisses of practical reasoning. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1142a23; cf. Bernard Baumrin, "Aristotle's Ethical Intuitionism," New Scholastic (Winter), 1968; Richard Sorabji, "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue," in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. Rorty (California: University of California Press, 1981). pp. 201-220; and David Wiggins, "Deliberation and Practical Reason," in Practical Reasoning, ed. J. Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 144-152.

¹⁰Hobbes' theory is clearly more sophisticated than this. However, it is not the place here to address this view in any detail.

Suffice it to say that in respect of Hobbes' view, the issue would boil down ultimately to whether an adequate picture of human agency is provided.

¹¹Cf. Donagan (1978), pp. 194-195; 201.

¹²I am grateful to Professor Bernard Baumrin of the Graduate School, City University of New York for suggesting this utilitarian qualification.

¹³It will be demonstrated later that this comes quite close to the view expressed by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty.

¹⁴Brandt's and Firth's versions of the 'hypothetical choice theory' are similar enough to Hare's not to warrant explicit attention. Richard Brandt, Ethical Theory: The Problems of Normative and Critical Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1959); and Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (1951-52): 317-45.

¹⁵R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 203ff.

¹⁶Hare (1963), pp. 218-219. Note that Hare earlier dismisses prejudicial acts that resort for their justification to reasons of a spurious kind, e.g., heredity. The example of immigration quota policies, whether formulated in overtly or covertly racial terms, is likely to pass the test. See below, Chapter Six.

¹⁷The only conceivable alternative open to Hare is to interpret "the role of the 'ideal observer'" as akin to that of the "Christian God." Hare (1963), pp. 94-95, n.1. But this forces the ultimate justification of the system onto the quicksands of theology and reveals clearly where the basis of such idealized prescriptions really lies. Cf. Donagan (1978), pp. 215ff.

¹⁸Rawls (1971), pp. 131-137.

¹⁹I am grateful to Peter Lupu, Department of Philosophy, Columbia University, for suggesting to me the general form of this criticism. Cf. Rawls' comments on adjustments to 'reflective equilibrium.' Rawls (1971), p. 48.

²⁰"Justice itself is founded on rational differentiation, and not on blindness to relevant differences." Bernard Baumrin, "Two Concepts of Justice," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. VII, eds. P. French, P. Unger and H. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 70.

²¹Cf. Rawls (1971), pp. 152-157.

²²This criticism of Rawls is intended by extension to apply also to the use made by Edwin Dorn of the 'veil of ignorance' in his analysis of racial inequality. E. Dorn, Rules and Racial Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), esp. pp. 13ff.

²³Cf. Rawls (1971), p. 16; 251ff.; 256-257; 586; and Donagan (1978), pg. 225.

CHAPTER TWO
THE THEORY OF COMMON MORALITY

Besides its widespread philosophical influences, Kantian moral theory is central to our inquiry for significant reasons. First, Kant was concerned to elucidate and defend the traditional or common morality of the Hebrew-Christian tradition. This is Alan Donagan's insightful reading of Kant's ethical theory, and in laying out the details we will largely follow Donagan's interpretation in The Theory of Morality (referred to hereafter in intralinear textual citations only as 'Donagan, 1978'). Accordingly, Kant assumed that the ethical principles formulated by the philosophers and moralists of the tradition are 'sound and complete.' The primary concern of moral theory, then, is simply to elaborate the philosophical kernel of the tradition. This philosophical core is completely independent of any appeal to God as its foundation. The strictly moral elements--those concerning duties to and rights of oneself and others--are divorceable, and ought to be so divorced, from the purely theological elements which resort for their justification to some notion of God (e.g., sacrifices or prohibiting idol-worship) (Donagan, 1978: 27-28). This separation of religious from philosophical morality is fundamental to Kant's project in that it allows him to argue that the moral basis of the tradition is secular. So, although the majority of human beings excuse themselves of Judeo-Christian religious practices, it can be held that the

moral basis is applicable nevertheless to all human beings qua human.

The theoretical secularization of morality emphasized by Kant and his followers will focus our attention in turn upon a feature of racism fundamental to the ensuing analysis. We have mentioned already that racism has its roots in the soil of the Enlightenment, at the same time paradoxically as the theoretical extension of humanity to all human beings by virtue of their rational nature. This common rationality provides Kant with theoretical grounds for moral disapprobation of racist practices. And it provides us with the basis from which to assess the prevailing opinion that racism's rise was due to the irrational emotionalism of 'religious pietism' and 'evangelism' at the time and that its perseverance is a function solely of similar irrational forces.¹ Divorcing morality-based grounds of social practice from religious ones will enable us to look for deeper and more popular roots of racism within the historical structures of moral theory, in particular, by subjecting to analysis the concepts of 'reason' and 'rationality.' The disjunction between moral theoretic indictments and the proliferation of racist practices can be addressed then by indexing the analysis to specific historical conjunctures.

2.1. The Broad Bases of Common Morality

The Kantian theory of Hebrew-Christian morality² attempts to meet the general criteria of an acceptable moral theory laid out above by defining man as a rational animal. As such, man is subject both to the morally neutral laws of nature and to the rationally determined moral laws. The attempt is made to ground morality in a single funda-

mental principle from which all moral precepts are taken to be simple derivations. Observance of this initial principle is made a central criterion of rational action; and transgressing any one of the derivative moral principles amounts to a violation of one's own rationality (Donagan, 1978: 10).

At basis, morality is about human actions broadly construed, and the HCT adopts certain basic assumptions about human action. Broadly, actions are events of a certain type such that 'action-types' (e.g., theft, fraud, larceny) are to be distinguished from 'action-tokens.' An action-token is the individualized, non-iterative event involving the agent's undertaking or doing of something specific, given precise circumstances (e.g., removing property belonging to another person without their knowledge or permission). Action-tokens admit of various true definite descriptions, given the variety of possible descriptions of circumstances and the corresponding action-types under which the action-token is taken to fall. The various levels of specificity of circumstantial description admit of recategorizing action-types. So, an action supplemented by a description of circumstances might be redefined as one of a different type in which the circumstances are not specifically referred to (Donagan, 1978: 37, 39, 40).³ For example, a Jew's reference to a particular individual as 'Arab' might be described as a perfectly innocuous reference to the latter's 'racial' or national affiliation. Yet under a more specific description--the malicious tone of utterance during a heated debate over the rights of refugees in Israeli-occupied territory--it could

be recategorized as a 'racist slur.'

A further way in which an action-token of a certain type may be redefined as one of another type is by augmenting the original description with a description of the 'causal consequences of the action.' A 'causal consequence of an action' is defined, more or less, as an event following immediately and according to the laws of nature, from and because of the doing of the action in question, such that the action is taken to be the 'event-cause' (Donagan, 1978: 41). Thus, a white company-director receives a job application. The director's reference to the applicant as 'a black' in Donagan's terminology 'sufficiently grounds' the redefinition of the utterance-act as racially discriminatory if the 'direct consequence' of the act is the rejection on this ground of the black person's application.

The notion of 'direct or immediate consequence(s)' is crucial for the HCT. Common morality seeks to locate hereby the exact scope of the burden of responsibility by denying that the causal consequences of an act "reach" to all following events that take place only because the action obtains. The dualistic distinction between 'event causation' and 'action causation' is invoked here by interpreting human actions as "interventions by human beings in the course of nature" (Donagan, 1978: 46). This doctrine of Novus Actus Interveniens holds, in other words, that the agent is liable only for the direct consequences he or she causes by his or her intervention in the course of nature. Where the agent carries out a further intervening action between his or her original one and the final event in the causal sequence, then

this new action is held to be the one causally responsible for the event in question. The causal chain is shortened; it is deemed to extend only to the direct consequences of the action. At the same time, it 'fixes' the precise events over which the action extends (Donagan, 1978: 45-6).

Now before turning to investigate the actual content of this traditional morality, we must set out briefly what it is on this view to be a moral agent and what practical action consists in. As we will see later, it is the question of moral agency that initially raises for the HCT the spectre of legitimized racist expressions and practices.

(a) Common Moral Agency

The question of moral agency is answered by the HCT in terms of the Judeo-Christian metaphysic concerning the hierarchical scale of being. The clearest proposal of this is furnished by Aquinas: Being (ontos) is located hierarchically on an ascending scale from the lowest level of inorganic substance, upwards via vegetative life-forms, through the sensitive but irrational animals to man's rational level, the pinnacle of corporeal nature. Angels occupy the category immediately beyond rational man. Unlike man, they are considered to be completely spiritual; yet they fail at the same time to possess the absolute simplicity of God--the uncreated, infinite purity situated at the scale's zenith.⁴

Moral agency is accorded in terms of possession of reason: agents are deemed moral to the degree that they are rational beings

acting in accord with the dictates of reason. Aquinas' influence here is obvious. On the basis of the hierarchical scale of being, the criterion of moral agency is applied to any being, humans included, only on condition that they are rational.⁵ If any rational beings are discovered which somehow are not human beings, traditional morality would admit them, by virtue of their rationality, to the realm of moral beings (Donagan, 1978: 132, 231-2).

Many moral theorists have tried to circumscribe the realm of moral agency in terms of the concept 'personhood.' If 'personhood' is accepted as definitive of moral agency, Kantians like Donagan obviously would have rationality as its sole definiens. The difficulties here are apparent. First, the concept of 'rationality' must be spelled out in detail. And a well-developed robot or computer clearly would be more capable of meeting conditions confined to a narrow notion of rationality than to a wider conception of personhood involving self-consciousness, conscious experiences, feelings, etc. Donagan cannot evade this implication by arguing that whatever respect is due to a rational being qua rational is due also to a potentially rational being (Donagan, 1978: 171). The notion of 'potentiality' is left so vague as to admit almost anything on the hierarchical scale; and it depends for any precision it may possess upon an unacceptable metaphysics.⁶ Conversely, the more narrowly rationality is defined, and the more idealized its definitive features, the fewer are the human beings it will admit as members of the moral community. Rather than common morality, this approach offers the basis of a selective ethic common

only to those chosen representatives considered to meet the criteria of community membership. It is open therefore to various discriminatory techniques, including those of racism. This criticism will be developed after laying out the relevant detail of the moral account offered by the HCT.

(b) Common Morality and Practical Reason

The realm of common morality is circumscribed by the limits of rationality. To sustain this view, the Kantian must argue that reason is practical; that it not merely proposes specific action but motivates us in the strong sense to act. This rational motivation to act, it must be argued further, is not restricted simply to 'a teleology of purpose' (Kant's hypothetical imperatives), of means to ends or parts to whole. Underlying the 'teleology of purpose' there must be established a 'teleology of ultimate ends in themselves' for whose consideration all things deemed moral are undertaken (Donagan, 1978: 228).

This 'teleology of purpose,' or prudential considerations to act with the ultimate goal of attaining happiness, necessitates unconditionally those actions which will effect the overall end. At the widest level of generality, though, the end of happiness is vacant, as Aristotle pointed out. It is given content only in terms of specific desires, wants, needs, interests, etc.⁷ So, the hypothetical imperative (including the imperatives of skill) cannot involve a practical reasoning that simply effects means to fulfill that desired end. Rather, it confronts the will with a choice: act according to

the consideration of means suggested, or surrender the desired end (Donagan, 1978: 214).⁸ And from this it follows that there are injunctions of reason to act which are not limited to the hypothetical imperatives; nor are we ever wholly subject to desires even as we undertake deliberation whereby to satisfy them (Donagan, 1978: 230).

The other prong on this twin-forked argument against the picture of man living but to acquire happiness by gratifying desires and fulfilling purposes is an attack on the view that happiness is the ultimate human goal. Kant's representation of traditional morality differs in this respect from Aristotle's indictment of happiness as an empty concept. Kant admits that happiness is 'a natural end' of human endeavour, but not its ultimate end. If it were the ultimate end, reasons Kant, we would be better endowed from the perspective of survival with a natural instinct for happiness than with reason, only one of whose dual functions is prudential.⁹ It follows that fulfilling happiness is not a necessary injunction of reason. But the question still remains whether, contrary to Hume, reason alone enjoins any practical undertakings; whether reason is able, on its own, to motivate us to act.

If morality rests squarely upon rationality in this way, and contrary to Philippa Foot is not simply to be one amongst other prudential considerations,¹⁰ then reason must furnish overriding practical motivations to act in its own right. Donagan argues that by forcing us to choose at the level of the hypothetical imperative between acting on the perceived means to the desired end or giving up that end, reason

is already forcing us beyond the hypothetical imperative (Donagan, 1978: 214). We are pushed forward by our own rational natures into a realm of treating ourselves, and hence all other rational creatures like us, as ends-in-ourselves (or -themselves), and not merely as means to some further ends. Reason pulls us into the pure practical world of the categorical imperative (Donagan, 1978: 232-233).

So, at the core of the traditional view of morality stands a rational, self-legislating creature, autonomous because of its embodiment of reason, and so not physically or biologically determined to act in the way that non-rational creatures are. Rational creatures are of a higher kind than others because of the double endowment furnished by reason: the ability to deliberate rationally both about appropriate means to an end and whether the end in question ought to be endeavoured; and the ability to judge rationally, and so choose, between the alternative means and ends offered by their rational deliberations. In short, reason demands that we never transgress its dictates. From its own perspective, reason alone is the determinant of our actions as rational agents (Donagan, 1978: 31-32). Because the reason at work here is at once objective and purportedly our own, it appears that we may be defined as self-governing. The negative freedom underlying this legislative independence rests upon taking ourselves as ends-in-ourselves, not merely as means to others' ends. It is this which is supposed to yield the content of the fundamental principle of morality from which, putatively, moral action is inevitably generated. It is time now to turn to a fuller consideration of this content.

2.2 The Content of Common Morality

The content and detail of the moral system is the content of practical reason. At the basis of practical reason is a single fundamental moral principle from which is derived, by a fairly straightforward deduction, the entire corpus of common morality.¹¹ Reason presents to us this fundamental principle, precise formulation of which is obviously crucial, for it is in virtue of its form that we purportedly accept it. It follows from our critique of competing moral paradigms that the standard of universality must be met: the principle must be capable of articulating the precepts of any system adopting it as the fundamental principle. This implies the further condition of impartiality: the fundamental principle must apply impartially insofar as it is impermissible in any moral system for one to treat another in a way in which, given suitably similar circumstances, it is not permissible for the latter to treat the former. This injunction must be generally applicable by including any moral system which reason would enjoin (Donagan, 1978: 58); and, as we have seen, it must be independent of any religious premise.

Donagan derives the fundamental principle by secularizing the 'Golden Rule' of Biblical morality and then adapting it to Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative. The Golden Rule has negative and positive formulations. Together they bring to the fundamental principle the elements of universality and impartiality. But the derivation of the principle by moving from the Golden Rule to Kant's second statement of the categorical imperative rests upon a

serious flaw. Donagan takes the 'positive' and 'negative' Golden Rule to be equivalent. This equivalence is intended in the strong sense: 'forbidding one kind of action' is taken as equivalent to 'commanding one of its contradictory kind' (Donagan, 1978: 57-58). This is crucial to Donagan's derivation of the fundamental principle of morality. If the principle can be derived from one side of the equivalence such that it satisfactorily meets all the requisite conditions save universality; it can be claimed, by virtue of the logical identity, that both the positive and negative injunctions of morality are accounted for. Hence the condition of universality would be fulfilled too.

But what can be meant by this claim to equivalence? Surely not that the descriptions which properly capture the appropriate contradictory acts are identical in truth value. This is trivial and so insufficient to bear the weight which Donagan needs to rest upon it. Nor can he mean that the relevant acts commanded and prohibited by the positive and negative Golden Rules respectively are equivalent. No matter how we represent these rules logically, no act can contradict (i.e., negate) another act: after all, what specific kind of acts 'negate' ones of lying, or murder, or theft? The claim, it seems, is meaningless.

The putative equivalence of forbidden acts of a kind with moral commandments of a contradictory kind is found nevertheless at the heart of the general intuition to 'Love all other fellow human beings as oneself.' This is assumed to furnish the secularizing bridge to Kant's second categorical imperative, by interpreting 'love'

in light of Kantian 'respect' and 'human beings' as 'rational creatures.' But 'respect' is not a peculiarly moral concept. So one further feature is needed to capture peculiarly moral injunctions: im/missibility. An action is im/missible if it is contrary/not contrary to reason (Donagan, 1978: 53). And so the fundamental principle is expressed as follows:

"It is impermissible not to respect every human being, oneself or any other, as a rational creature." (Donagan, 1978: 65)

Now if we suspend criticism of the rather large blemish that discolours the core of Donagan's derivation, we must admit that the principle so formulated does capture all the requisite conditions. Although 'deduced' from Biblical prescriptions, the final formulation is independent of any theological premise. The structure of the system to be erected on this foundational principle is simple, consisting only in precepts deducible directly from the fundamental principle, or from precepts derived directly from this principle or with the aid of 'specificatory premisses.' The conditions of universality and impartiality were met in the derivation. The criterion of general applicability is captured by the generality of the formulation.

Traditional morality is thus a rational system of precepts or moral laws about human actions canonized for the most part as prohibitions. Negative injunctions of morality prohibit the moral agent unconditionally from undertaking those actions which are condemned, and they acquire their prohibitory force by virtue of the agent's

rationality. Laid out in this formal and objective manner, however, the system is incomplete. The incompleteness is manifested most clearly in the necessity of specificatory premisses to determine subjective applicability of the principle in each particular instance. By nature, specificatory premisses can be established only by informal analysis involving application of pre-established concepts and their derivatives. The more specific the circumstances of the case, the less straightforward is the application (Donagan, 1978: 71).

This manner of formulation reflects the Kantian distinction between acts objectively and subjectively considered. Objectively viewed, an act is permissible or impermissible--that is, right or wrong--in and of itself. Subjectively considered, an agent is deemed culpable or inculpable--that is, praise- or blameworthy--not merely on the basis of the objective status of the act, but more fundamentally in terms of the subjective state of mind in light of which the agent acts. This objective-subjective duality is reflected in the general structure of the moral system: Donagan distinguishes between the 'first-order moral questions' pertaining to the im/missibility of actions (considered materially as deeds) and the 'second-order moral questions' about the in/culpability of agents in acting (considered in terms of the agent's will) (Donagan, 1978: 52-57). We concern ourselves now with those details of the constitution of each which are relevant to a discussion of racist discrimination and prejudice.

(a) First-Order Considerations: Permissibility and
Impermissibility

First-order moral questions have to do with the rightness and wrongness of actions in and of themselves. In general, the rightness or wrongness of an act is prescribed by common morality in accordance with whether practical reason necessitates or prohibits doing it.¹² Considered from the point of view of morality, certain actions are right or wrong as a direct implication of the fundamental principle, and these establish a set of fundamental duties. Of these, the duties to other human beings are distinguishable as individually grounded (non-institutional), on one hand, and institutional, on the other (Donagan, 1978: 81).

(1) Non-institutional duties

Non-institutional duties to other individual rational beings fall under the impermissibility to obtrude by force or violence in the affairs or behavior of others, save under strictly specified circumstances. It is absolutely impermissible on the fundamental principle to give up one's nature as a rational creature. Enslavement of another always violates respect for him or her as rational, and hence is always wrong. Any contract which undertakes to sell a rational being into slavery therefore is invalid. Now this marks a curious contradiction within the Judeo-Christian tradition. Although any well-defined slave practice is thus morally abject, provision is made--especially in Judaic law--for the proper treatment of slaves as slaves.¹³

The HCT attitude towards slavery appears accordingly to be not unlike Aristotle's which encourages us to consider the slave both as slave and as man.

Because of its similarities to racism, the case of slavery may throw light on the nature of such discrimination. It is well known that the same people held as slaves, or at least as members of the same population group, have often also been discriminated against or prejudicially treated on the basis of their putative racial membership. Understanding the reasons for enslavement of these people may furnish elements of an explanation of racist discrimination. Now it seems that there is just the same kind of inconsistency within the HCT between moral indictments of racist practices and their proliferation as indicated here in respect of slavery. Yet we must proceed with care. It should not be generalized from this disjunction between theoretical indictments and practical endorsements to the usual conclusion that the judgments underpinning racism are contradictory and hence always or even largely irrational. Such a widespread phenomenon cannot be dismissed so casually. In any case, if the disjunction between moral theory and political practice is to amount to a contradiction in the strict logical sense, the slave must be considered simultaneously both a slave and a man; and this is a psychological impossibility. The issue of inconsistency in racist thinking will be addressed in Chapter Six. Further relevance of the phenomenon of slavery to a comprehension

of racism is addressed later in this section, and in Chapters Five and Seven.

Central to the duties to other rational beings, taken individually, is the 'Principle of Beneficence': we ought to cultivate the welfare of other rational beings by morally permissible actions without due inconvenience to ourselves. The negative implications of this principle include the impermissibility to 'insult', 'ridicule' or 'disparage' others. The sole circumstances that mitigate actions of this sort are those which would prevent the perpetration of a wrong. In addition, lying in any form--that is, willfully misinforming another--is unmitigatedly wrong.

From these prohibitions and commands falling under the 'Principle of Beneficence' may be derived moral condemnation of some kinds of practices normally falling under the category 'racist.' So, ridiculing, insulting, or disparaging another on the basis of putatively 'racial' characteristics is impermissible because sub-species of the general classes of insulting, disparaging or ridiculing. On the other hand, we are enjoined by the positive features of the 'Principle of Beneficence' to treat all other rational creatures benevolently, and this obviously excludes any act of an antipathetic or derogatory nature which rests upon an appeal to racial characteristics. Common morality allows racist insults, etc., only if undertaken to prevent a moral wrong. However, the wording of this formulation is left so vague as to

appear that prevention of any moral ill, no matter how inconsequential, would sanction such insults, etc. Hence effective power for enforcing moral indictment of this class of cases is at once withheld.

(ii) Institutional Duties

The remaining elements constituting the subject-matter of first-order moral inquiry fall under the category of 'institutional duties to others.' Common morality further distinguishes here between these institutional moral obligations that strictly speaking are pre-social and those which are inherently social.¹⁵ 'Contract' and 'property' are offered as the chief instances of the pre-social, 'family' and 'civil society' of the social institutions which create moral obligations. We will concentrate upon 'contract' in the first set, 'civil society' in the latter.

A contract is the verbal or written promise by a rational being or group of rational beings to another rational being or group to undertake a specified act or set of acts which in turn is understood and agreed to by the latter. Like promising, contract falls under the general moral category of 'truthfulness' (not lying), and is thus a first-order moral precept. Contract is not presumed to necessitate the existence of society, for it is defined simply as a promise by one party to another, and so legitimation by social institutions is deemed unnecessary. But here lies the problem. Morality is considered, objectively, to be a function of moral agents' natures as rational beings and

their situations. The irreversible implication is that agents can contract to do wrong. In other words, it cannot be held that contract is an inherently moral institution.¹⁶ This simply signals a deeper fissure in the theory of common morality. It is a primary precept, implicit in the fundamental principle, that promises ought always to be fulfilled: lying in any form is always immoral. Yet contracts (promises) to do wrong are deemed morally void.

There are prima facie reasons on this account both to fulfill contracts to do wrong and not to. To avoid reification of this inconsistency theoretically, Kantians are forced to order our duties hierarchically: so, even though we ought always to fulfill our contracts, it is a more fundamental duty, for the HCT, never to commit a wrong, even should good come of it or to avoid graver consequences (Donagan, 1978: 157ff.).¹⁷ On one interpretation, the contradiction lies right here, for if we ought never to do wrong, and breaking contracts is ever wrong, then in contracting to do wrong we always ought to do what we never ought to do. Kantians are thus forced to interpret contracts to do wrong as void, and hence not contracts at all.

Consider, however, the following example. Ruffin and Herndon are longstanding friends, living in the American South of the 1820's. Herndon owns a slave, Northrop, whom he treats humanely. Ruffin, a learned man and good Kantian to boot, tries unavailingly to convince his friend that slavery is by nature immoral, that he ought not merely to free Northrop but to assist the

latter's quest for political and economic independence. (Perhaps Herndon's own modest economic well-being rests upon his enslavement of Northrop.) So, Ruffin contracts (in Donagan's pre-social sense) with Northrop to assist the latter's escape northwards. But as Ruffin knows without doubt, fulfilment of his contract inevitably will involve lying to his friend: the only workable plan is to hide Northrop in his cellar for a few days and then ride north with him on pretext of business, pretending Northrop to be his own slave until a relatively safe environment is reached; yet Herndon, true to Ruffin's projection, will appeal to his friend for assistance as soon as he misses the slave, inquiring whether Ruffin has seen 'his boy' at all. The initial success of the escape plan must turn thus upon Ruffin's unflinching lie.

The contract between Ruffin and Northrop obviously would have been illegal, but this is not at issue: contracts have been defined above in non-legal terms. Prima facie, it is both morally right and morally wrong; there are good moral reasons both for keeping the contract and voiding it. A necessary moral implication of the unmitigatedly evil nature of slavery is that we assist its demise;¹⁸ yet, equally, Kant's astute moral argument against lying in any circumstances underscores the contract's invalidity.¹⁹ Now if lying is a fundamental feature of the contractual agreement under consideration here, the inconsistency can be sharpened: either Ruffin lies to an old friend in keeping

the contract, or he lies by failing to keep the promise to the slave institutionalized in the contract. The Kantian retort that he ought never to have contracted knowingly to lie in the first place serves merely to exacerbate the moral dilemma of the HCT--the inconsistency simply reappears at the more fundamental level as a conflict of principles in determining what to do.

There are wider implications, though. Traditional moralists need to argue both ways here but logically cannot. Either they must allow, circumstantially, some contracts to do wrong, hence moral inconsistency and so conflicts of principles, or they must face up to certain conceptual redefinitions. But it may turn out that the cost of such redefinitions is to lead us back in the same direction. By taking contract to be prior to society, it is open to Kantians to interpret social institutions contractually. Contracts on this score ought always to be fulfilled. At the same time, it is held that, objectively considered, agents can contract invalidly to do wrong; these contracts ought not to be kept. Kantians are faced, then, with the dire choice of redefining either the moral worth of acts, or contract in social terms. Reinterpreting contract thus,²⁰ however, necessitates surrendering a contractual theory of society, even though it makes lighter work of contractual enforcement.²¹ And so the overbearing moral-theoretic burdens, in the one instance, and the social theoretic ones, in the other, cause Kantians to slide indecisively between the two.

Rather than redefine the moral nature of acts, Donagan obviously chooses to define civil society pre-contractually.²² Civil society is defined thus in terms existentially independent of contract; indeed, it is the ground on which all other institutions --contract, property, family--are putatively legitimated (Donagan, 1978: 101). But then contract and property are no longer pre-social. It follows that the members of the civil society are obliged by the HCT--to themselves and to each other--to obey the laws and property dispensations of the society (Donagan, 1978: 109).

On a literal interpretation of this view, we would be bound to obey racially discriminatory laws--overt or implicit--where the civil society we inhabit sanctions them. Certainly, we are obliged to obey its property laws and it is conceivable that these laws discriminate on racist grounds. Palestinians, for example, are prohibited by Israeli law from owning property in the Jewish state, just as blacks are prohibited from owning property in 'white' South Africa. To avoid implications of this sort the general thesis is tempered: we are obliged to obey the morally defective civil laws while undertaking to rectify their shortcomings and prevent abuses. At the same time, the first-order moral precept is established that any civil law contrary to the moral law is to be disobeyed (Donagan, 1978: 109). The sense of this appears to rest on the distinction between 'active' and 'passive disobedience.' 'Active disobedience' or rebellion

against the civil society is permitted by the HCT only when the ruling group in the society perpetrates actions of extreme moral evil against a section of its members, and then only when it can be predicted with reasonable accuracy that the disobedient act(s) will remove the evil and that the good consequent of the rebellious act(s) will outweigh the moral wrongs and suffering that are part of any rebellion. In cases less extreme, 'passive disobedience'--perhaps simply ignoring the relevant law--seems called for; while in instances even less dire, we are obliged to obey the immoral law in question while attempting legislatively to change it.

The structure of this formulation begins to mirror that of the original disjunction between moral indictment of such discriminatory practices and their proliferation in fact: the HCT simultaneously condemns in theory certain morally abhorrent practices and requires--again morally--that such practices be undertaken. For the class of cases under consideration, this inconsistency is resolved only in the extreme circumstances where the discrimination reduces human beings to some form of slavery, and then only when the conditions of slavery are themselves held to be inhumane. Like slavery, discrimination against human beings on the grounds of their racial characteristics is immoral, according to the HCT, because it fails to treat other rational beings with the respect due to them as such. Racist practices transgress the fundamental principle of common morality, and so are considered contrary to the dictates of reason. These practices are thus

first-order impermissible. Any laws sanctioning them accordingly ought to be actively or passively disobeyed, or obeyed while attempting to alter them within the legal constraints of the political system. The particular moral strategy to follow here is dictated by the severity of transgression of the moral code: active disobedience would be encouraged where the discrimination in question reduces the quality of life of those subjected to it to sub-human levels; passive disobedience would be sanctioned perhaps where the consequences of such acts are not necessarily inhumane but are sufficiently unjust to render human life uncomfortable; obedience accompanied by campaign to change the law would be sanctioned where disobedience caused more suffering than good, and the likelihood of legislative success seems high.²³

However, like the concept of 'negative acts,' the distinctions between 'active' and 'passive disobedience,' on one hand, and between 'disobedience' and 'reluctant obedience,' on the other, are opaque. Refusing to obey a law is apparently passive, a negative act. Nevertheless, it necessitates positive acts of various kinds. Indeed, like all acts, those of refusal are positive insofar as they are the active doing of something. On the other hand, trying to change a law while nevertheless obeying it is often interpreted as 'resistance.' Overburdened by the weight of its own conceptual poverty, the system of traditional morality refuses to acknowledge that conflicts of principles

(and duties) are basic to our common moral experience. Instead, the HCT dismisses these conflicts simply as the apparent products of unclarity, which in turn is ascribed to lack of adequate analysis.²⁴

If this system of traditional common morality captures the prevailing (first-order) moral sentiments pertaining to the rightness and wrongness of acts, and so to their permissibility or impermissibility; then the surfacing of these denied by undeniable inconsistencies and conflicts of principles and of buried but necessary qualifications begins to spotlight why the tradition appears simultaneously to condemn and condone practices like slavery and racist discrimination. But before we turn our attention to a more comprehensive analysis of these reasons, we need first to complete the presentation of the system of traditional morality by considering the second-order features pertaining to blameworthiness of agents.

(b) Second-Order Considerations: Agency and Culpability

First-order moral questions are about impermissibility of acts objectively considered. Second-order questions are about the in/culpability of the agent for acting in the way he or she did. Second-order issues thus have to do with specifying the formal conditions under which agents are blameworthy for their actions. Though morally impermissible, an agent may be inculpable under certain circumstances for performing the act in question. Similarly, though an act be permissible, the agent may be blameworthy for having done it.

But in order to assign in/culpability of an agent, thereby to assess blameworthiness, a more comprehensive theory of human action must be presented.

(1) Agency

The philosophical account of human action most widely accepted has been some version of (Goldman's) 'want-and-belief causation.' All human action is explained accordingly as effectuated, in strict causal terms, by the particular desires (wants) and beliefs held by the agent at the time of acting. For a desire actually to cause an action, on this view, it must be accompanied by the beliefs that it be executable and that its performance would not repress or otherwise prevent the fulfilment of any desire which is at least equally intense.²⁵

Traditional morality requires a picture of human action as voluntary. The philosophically popular paradigm, in contrast, rests upon the assumption that human agents undertake solely to satisfy their conscious desires. So, the 'want-and-belief' view must be undermined by traditional morality: if every act is tied causally to wants and beliefs in this way, the very possibility of moral action is threatened. Actions could no longer be conceived as voluntary, removing at once the basis of moral responsibility. By contrast, traditional morality insists that an agent conceives of numerous feasible contingencies, one (or some) of which the agent will choose voluntarily to actualize. Once such a choice has been made, the means necessary to fulfill

the end chosen will be desired, but the choice determines these desires, and not inversely. Moreover, desires are defined not as causal determinations of actions, but as "motives"--circumstances or considerations amongst others in view of which an agent may act. A human act is taken by the HCT, then, to be a voluntary act by which the agent, conscious of his or her undertakings, executes or omits to execute the purpose of the act. The purpose is that set of circumstances for the bringing about of which the act is done (Donagan, 1978: 116-118).

This presupposes that we have a definite notion of what is meant by 'voluntary.' Aristotle viewed a voluntary act as an act the "moving principle" of which is "in the agent" who at the same time is "aware of the particular circumstances of the action."²⁶ The Kantian tradition adopts this in light of Aquinas' doctrine of the will: a voluntary act is a human action--whether doing or omitting to do the thing in question--emanating originally from the agent's conscious will, and so depending entirely upon him or her. A fully human action accordingly is one which is completely voluntary. One which is not, again following Aristotle, may be non-voluntary or involuntary. In the former case, the agent does not care about what he or she does, or has done; in the latter, the agent's action is a function of ignorance or it is unwitting, and he or she is willing to apologize for it.²⁷

(ii) Culpability

We are now in a position to appreciate the grounds on which common morality assigns blameworthiness. Human agents are culpable for particular actions they do only insofar as the actions can be described as knowingly and deliberately undertaken (Donagan, 1978: 120-121). Translated for the purpose of comparison into causal terms, human beings are held to cause what they do in a much more limited sense than the prevailing picture: the causal domain, according to traditional morality, extends over the agent's doings and the natural events consequent upon his or her consciously chosen intervention. Where the agent consciously chooses not to intromit in the causal chain of nature, the agent is deemed to permit to occur whatever follows from this "abstention," but in no way to cause it. Consequences of an agent's action(s) are not restricted to their causal consequences but include anything that occurs given the agent's act (Donagan, 1978: 112-114). Further, agents deliberate in order to inform choice; choice is an activity separate from and undertaken after deliberation (Donagan, 1978: 121).²⁸

The analysis of culpability thus far leaves open the question of intentionality in traditional morality. Culpability is assigned to agents' acts on the basis of their voluntariness: that they are knowingly and deliberately done, and originate from the agents' own power. Yet we can act knowingly without intending the act, or intend an act we know we are incapable of executing. Agents

can intend to do that which they cannot cause, knowing or believing that they have not the power to bring about directly the purpose specified by the intention. An intention is defined as a prospective plan of action in respect of a specific set of circumstances with the view to achieving a specified goal (purpose) conceived to be (ultimately) attainable.

A potential loophole opens up here whereby the agent may evade moral culpability for the performance of a voluntary act. It is open to the agent to claim that he or she did not have the intention so to act. An intentional act is one which by definition must originate with an agent in accord with a specified plan. So, an act which an agent intentionally chooses to do must be voluntary once executed, and hence culpable (even though many voluntary acts are not intentional). But the HCT further extends the realm of culpability to include all the causal consequences of the intentionally chosen act, even if such consequences were never part of the agent's schema. In general, traditional morality prescribes that it is always wrong to intend an impermissible act, irrespective of whether one fails to fulfil the intention.²⁹ Conversely, we are disallowed from doing what we are not allowed to intend. Morality consists in acting rightly for good reasons, and it discounts as impermissible doing what is deemed objectively right for the wrong reasons (Donagan, 1978: 122-126).

In summary, this amounts to a description of intention falling under the category of impermissibility if it prescribes an act or

purpose that is impermissible; or if it necessitates impermissible means to attain a purpose (whether permissible or not); or if it implies any causal consequences that are impermissible (whether foreseen or not by the agent). Where the intention is impermissible in either of the two latter senses, the act is likewise.³⁰ Now the well-trodden issues pertaining to means-ends relations aside, the problem here lies in respect of the scope of causal consequences. Culpability is extended by common morality not simply to those causal consequences of intentions which the agent can be held reasonably to foresee, but to all causal consequences. However, it is humanly impossible in every case to preceive all causal consequences, whether of acts or intentions to act. Indeed, Kant iterated that 'ought' must imply 'can.' The HCT thus should assign culpability to an agent for intentions only to the extent of the blameworthiness for the causal consequences which it can be expected reasonably of him to foresee.

Consequently, genuine ignorance of the causal consequences of the intended act suffices to absolve the agent of blame, in strict relation to foreseen causal consequences. This qualification in respect of ignorance can be generalized: an agent is inculpable for an act that is executed solely because of ignorance. An act done out of ignorance in this way is nonvoluntary by virtue of the fact that it violates the fundamental condition of a voluntary act--that it be done knowingly (Donagan, 1978: 127). The question of culpability turns here on whether the ignorant

agent is antecedently responsible for the ignorance in view of which the action is done. For example, where the ignorance is a consequence of drunkenness, rage or insanity the question of culpability turns on the agent's prior responsibility for being in these states. If these states of the agent in specific circumstances are not voluntary, neither are any acts flowing from them.

On the other hand, agents in full possession of their faculties can act in ignorance--either of the particular fact that this act falls under a moral category of which they are nevertheless aware, or that such a moral universal exists. The test of culpability in such cases is whether, ignorance aside, the agent would have acted so anyway. If the agent would have acted thus, regardless of ignorance, culpability applies. In short, agents are culpable for an outcome only insofar as it arises as a result of carelessness (negligence). Where ignorance is the sole cause of the wrong act, agents are blameworthy to the degree they are culpable for the initial state of ignorance. 'Carelessness' and 'ignorance' are measures in relation to the 'care' and 'knowledge' to be expected of a 'prudential, intelligent and reasonable person' of ordinary capacities (Donagan, 1978: 128-130).³¹

These moral theoretic qualifications concerning ignorance reveal interesting implications of traditional moral theory when applied to racist situations. Consider the case of a reasonable, intelligent person who, having read various articles on IQ

heritability and race in the (liberal) press, book reviews and popular science magazines, forms the opinion (not 'unreasonably,' in light of some recent trends in the social sciences) that 'members of the black racial group are generally of more limited intelligence than those of white stock.'³² Common morality would consider this agent inculpable for an antagonistic act motivated by a racist belief insofar as the agent is acting in ignorance (of the relevant racial facts). The verdict in cases of this nature would swing to one of culpability when studies--revealing conclusively that there are no generally relevant intelligence differentiations pertaining to race--having been made available to him or her, the agent yet persists in acting in this discriminatory manner. Moral culpability for ignorance is assigned not on the basis of acting in ignorance, but only in some sense out of ignorance. The agent becomes culpable on the HCT only when the ignorance in question is the cause of the impermissible act.

Where an agent commits a racist act because of ignorance, the attribution of culpability by common morality rests upon the prior culpability of the agent's ignorance. Culpability is assigned irrespective of whether the ignorance is of (moral) universals or particulars. Consider now application of the doctrine in the following case. Buckley, seemingly, is a model of clear-headed and non-discriminatory behavior. Nevertheless, he is induced one evening, unknowingly and against his will, into intoxication by his host (perhaps by being misled about the nature

of his drink). At dinner, he is drawn into a heated debate, and in full hearing of the other guests, he utters an anti-Semitic remark (that 'Hitler was correct in taking Jews to be usurious money-grabbers.')

Buckley is unaware that the couple opposite him at the table are Jewish. It should make no difference to the analysis that the Jewish couple lost their respective parents to the Gestapo, or themselves survived a concentration camp. Buckley is ignorant equally of these details.

The second-order qualifications made by the HCT exonerate Buckley of blame. This must surely render us uneasy, just as Buckley, if he is sensitive--will feel guilty on realizing the circumstances. The act is so obviously disrespectful that the circumstantial suspension of a culpability, introduced ad hoc by the HCT, must be overridden. After all, insults are impermissible. Nevertheless, the slur is not intended specifically for the Jewish couple--Buckley is ignorant of their background. Perhaps Buckley cannot be said to have an intention here at all. Our uneasiness must surely be a function of a wider, more objective moral antipathy to such racist epithets.

Substitute now cases of rage (anger) for ones of intoxication. The same Buckley is a generous employer of many black people. One day he is justifiably enraged upon discovering that one of his employees (who happens to be black) has endangered a number of other workers and plant by his negligence on the job. While admonishing the particular worker Buckley emphasizes, in his

excitement, the irresponsible nature of blacks. Again, traditional morality would waive culpability. Yet equally, Buckley's rage notwithstanding, we are morally appalled by the nature of the behavior.

We have here cases of apparently inculpable ignorance caused by unintentional, non-voluntary drunkenness, on one hand, and rage, on the other. Ignorance in the first case is of both universal and particular: that one ought not to utter--really to think--such demeaning thoughts of other rational creatures, and that this couple at dinner are Jewish. In the second case, ignorance is of a moral universal only. What partially surprises us about Buckley's utterances in either case is that his benign facade has hidden such murky thoughts, even to his own insight. Perhaps many of us are all too akin to Buckley for our own comfort. These examples suggest that it is now basic to our moral intuitions that racism is first-order impermissible--if we will be permitted for the moment use of those very concepts of the HCT already buckling beneath their own burden. Acts of a racist kind are by their nature wrong. Moral agents thus should not be inculpably ignorant, in ways such as the above, of the universal moral principles determining this judgment.

This general principle is borne out by a case of another sort: that of an agent who has been socialized in a climate pervaded completely by racist thinking. This socialization might include familial habituation to morally deviant dispositions, educational

and social indoctrination. In this respect, at least, the agent's set of fundamental moral principles would be thoroughly aberrant. Traditional morality analyses a situation of this nature in terms of the formation by the society in question of a 'false conscience' amongst its members.³³ Common morality holds that where a society has managed to vitiate the conscience of its members by imposing perverse moral principles or concepts, or encouraging bad intellectual habits, its members who perform morally impermissible acts are not blameworthy in that respect and to that degree. The sole qualification found to militate against inculpability here is agents' refusals to acknowledge the nature of their wayward acts, even though some members of the society or of other societies direct attention to this questionable character (Donagan, 1978: 135, 139-1941). Now racist acts of some members of a society like contemporary South Africa might fall under these qualifications and hence be blameworthy. Yet a description of that social setting could be drawn up that is sufficiently strong to exonerate its agents, from the moral point of view of the HCT, of these kinds of acts. In the case of Israel, there is even deeper disagreement between protagonists and antagonists over whether the acts in question are morally abhorrent. Traditional morality both condemns and condones acts and agents of a racist kind.

We have focused thus far upon the dilemma of morality in respect of racism. Analyzing racism will serve to deepen comprehension

of this dilemma. But first, the main elements of traditional or common morality in the HCT outlined here must be brought together. Emphasis in this critical summary will be placed on those elements of the HCT relevant to the issues of racism. We will highlight thus the specific structural problems suffered by traditional morality in facing the problem of racism.

CHAPTER TWO: FOOTNOTES

¹George Mosse, Towards the Final Solution (New York: Howard Fertig, 1978), p. 6ff.; and G. Saenger, The Social Psychology of Prejudice (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. xi. See Chapters Five and Six below.

²The Hebrew-Christian or Judeo-Christian tradition of morality will be referred to hereafter as 'the HCT.' It will be used interchangeably with 'traditional morality' or 'common morality.'

³Donagan does not endorse the 'type-token' distinction explicitly, but it captures adequately his own distinction between 'individual actions' and 'actions of certain kinds.' Cf. A. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), Chapters One, Two.

⁴St. Thomas Aquinas, "On Being and Essence," Readings in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, eds. J. Katz and R. Weingartner (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), pp. 406ff.

⁵For example, angels or God. Of course, God is considered the most perfectly rational being, and hence perfectly moral.

⁶Platonic arguments for the immortality of the soul, the Hindu doctrine of 'Karma' and Cartesian 'proofs' of God's existence are examples of the kind of metaphysics necessary to ground such an argument. Note that these are all primarily theological in nature. Appeal to any of them in this context violates thus the primary condition that common morality not depend upon theological premisses.

⁷Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1.4.1095a 18029; 1.5.1095b 12-19; 1.7.1097b 22-34.

⁸Donagan mistakenly attributes to Aristotle the view that practical deliberation is restricted to assessing means to bring about desired ends. Donagan (1978), p. 213. For criticism of this reading of Aristotle, see R. Sorabji (A. Rorty, 1981); and D. Wiggins (Raz, 1978).

⁹We often find people, with overriding supporting reasons, acting contrary to their self-perceived goals of happiness. This lies, of course, at the heart of the HCT, whether of Stoic teachings, Judaic law or Christian canon. See Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. L. W. Beck, ed. R. P. Wolff (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969). pp. 13ff. Cf. Donagan (1978), p. 225.

¹⁰P. Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), pp. 157-173.

¹¹Donagan distinguishes 'a precept' from 'a principle.' 'A precept' is "any general proposition of common morality with respect to the permissibility of any kind of action considered objectively;" 'a principle' is "a more general and universally cited precept." Donagan (1978), p. 54.

¹²Alan Donagan, "Morality, Property and Slavery." (The Lindley Lecture, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1981): 6.

¹³This contradiction cannot be evaded by definitional exclusion of slaves as persons, by treating them as other, for Jewish law and commentary lays out explicit directives for the treatment of Jewish slaves.

¹⁴The class of acts to which this applies is restricted to "the free communications between rational creatures." Donagan (1978), pp. 85-89.

¹⁵'A society' is defined as an institution or set of constitutive rules, membered by rational human beings combining to achieve some mutual purpose. Donagan (1978), p. 100.

¹⁶Donagan admits as much. Donagan (1978), pp. 91-92.

¹⁷This is jarringly at odds with the earlier qualifications of the moral impermissibility of insults and ridicule.

¹⁸Property in human beings is morally illegitimate. Donagan (1978), p. 97.

¹⁹Truth-telling is at the basis of the moral system; hence lying is necessarily wrong, for if allowance is made in respect of only one lie, it would throw into doubt all other truth-claims.

²⁰There is nothing in Donagan's definitions of 'contract' or 'society' which prevents this.

²¹Donagan, for one, is silent about enforcement of contracts. But can one properly speak of contract without also speaking of its modes of enforcement?

²²Donagan intends 'civil society' in the non-Hegelian, non-Rousseauian sense, and includes all states. Donagan (1978), p. 108.

²³Cf. D.C.S. Oosthuizen, The Ethics of Illegal Action (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1973), pp. 12-26; John Rawls, "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," in Revolution and the Rule of Law ed. E. Kent (Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall), pp. 30-45.

²⁴"...I know of no specific cases of perplexity simpliciter (i.e., conflict of principles) that has plausibly been alleged to arise in any competently formulated traditional moral system." Donagan (1978), p. 149.

²⁵Goldman (1970), pp. 727-76; 130ff; cf. Donagan (1978), pp. 115-116.

²⁶Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1111a22-5.

²⁷Ibid., 1110b 17-23; G. R. Grice, "Motive and Reason," in Raz (1978), pp. 168-177; T. Nagel, "Desires, Prudential Motives and the Present," in Raz (1978), 153-167; and P. R. Foot, "Reasons for Action and Desires," Raz (1978), pp. 178-184. Cf. Donagan (1978), pp. 114-115.

²⁸In contrast, Aristotle conceives choice much more as the actual process of deliberation. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a 2-15.

²⁹Donagan's argument for this strong qualification runs as follows: That the intention miscarries is one's good or bad fortune. One cannot know a priori whether one's intentions--good or bad--will miscarry or not. So one must be answerable for one's intentions. Donagan (1978), pp. 125-126.

³⁰The act is impermissible by definition in the first case, and obviously determines the impermissibility of any intention to commit it.

³¹For the distinctions between 'ignorance of universals' and 'ignorance of particulars,' and 'acting out of' and 'acting in ignorance,' cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1142a 20-30; 1143a32ff; 1110b 24ff.

³²We will see later that such historical beacons of rationality and moral philosophy as Hume and Kant both held versions of this view. Further, like Levin, our protagonist need not hold the extremist position that all whites are superior in this respect to all blacks, merely that this is generally the case. Cf. Michael Levin, "Sexism is Meaningless," St. John's Review (Autumn 1981): 40.

³³'Conscience' is defined as an act or disposition (not a power) to apply the moral principles one possesses in the assessment of one's behavior, both past and future. Donagan (1978), p. 133.

CHAPTER THREE
THE DILEMMAS OF COMMON MORALITY

We have surveyed the leading moral theories in the Western philosophical mode. Of course, the Kantian formulation of common morality in the HCT alone has been capable of providing a general moral-theoretic indictment of racist practices. Analysis of this formulation has made it clear that the problem is not simply one of a disjunction between theory and practice, academic indictment and practical proliferation of racist acts. If this exhausted the problem, the issues would remain merely technical: How are moral judgments, strictures and commands most effectively applied to ensure ethical behavior? On such an account, once the body of moral theory had been worked out, (practical) ethics would resemble a technical science. Unfortunately, the issues are far more complex.

The dilemma confronting us now assumes a new form: If traditional morality is discarded, we are left without a moral indictment of racism; if we retain the theory, we bear the inevitable burden of deep-rooted inconsistencies which with characteristic 'bad faith' the theory insists do not exist. A theory which motivates inconsistencies in this way, thereby virtually encouraging acts we ordinarily abhor, is as good as no theory at all.

Traditional morality insists that the primary determination of the moral nature of acts and agents is 'the spirit' in which an act is undertaken. The burden of morality from the agent's point of view rests squarely upon intentionality. We have shown, further, that the main mitigating determination against agent culpability is deemed to be inculpable ignorance. In this manner, second-order qualifications purportedly override first-order precepts. Racist practices and principles are clearly first order impermissible, but second-order qualifications of agent culpability for the most part have to be so broadly construed to ensure applicability of the theory in actual situations and to account for general moral intuitions that in many cases of racism first-order determinations of impermissibility are overridden. At the same time, it turns out that the internal coherence of the first-order formulation fares no better. Here, the difficulties are characteristic of specific features of the objective structure. General shortcomings suffered by the theory at this level will be exposed by one further example.

A recent newspaper article¹ reported the following story. A white, retired transit policeman interrupted an unarmed black youth attempting to break into his home. The former policeman held the youth at gunpoint until police arrived to arrest the burglar, at which point 'the excitement, fear and anger' proved too much for the aging man who suffered a heart-attack and died. The youth was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder.

The court's decision could easily be justified on moral

grounds by the HCT despite the fact that there was no evidence to establish that the youth intended to murder the man. No recourse to second-order (subjective) determinations are necessary here, for the act-type of 'theft' can be redescribed objectively as one of 'murder' because of the causal consequences of the act (Chapter Two, #2.1). It is of no significance that the causal consequences were completely unforeseen by the youth, for the HCT makes no such subtle distinction (Chapter Two, #2.4(b)ii). Even if it did, it is open to the HCT to argue that such consequences ought reasonably to have been foreseen. This seems equally unjust, though, for the youth first threw a stone through a window of the house to determine whether the inhabitants were home. Realizing the purpose of this act, the retired policeman waited in the shadows for the impending break-in before revealing his presence or telephoning for assistance. On this account, it would seem far more just to ascribe culpability to the old man's intention 'to play policeman.' Perhaps, then, a verdict of suicide might be handed down: if murder necessitates no explicit intention, nor need suicide. In the same vein, the charge of murder could be interpreted as a 'causal consequence' of the white prosecutor's racism, as too the guilty verdict of the all-white jury, although obviously it would be impossible to prove such claims.

The most recurrent theoretical problems facing the traditional account of morality have to do with conflicts of duty. Absence of such conflicts constitutes the cornerstone of the traditional view. So proponents must deny their existence, or at least their reality given

this apparent occurrence. A slightly altered example will serve to substantiate that moral dilemmas are not the illusory ghosts of morality, but a central feature of moral experience.

Confronted by the aging, former policeman upon breaking into the house, the black youth manages to grab his daughter, threatening assault, rape and death. The alternatives seem clear to the distraught father: Acting in one kind of way, he is likely to save his daughter from physical harm, but probably would suffer grave injury himself, perhaps even death. His daughter's pleas are a constant reminder that if he does nothing she will be raped, if not killed. According to the tools of traditional analysis laid out above, the father has a duty both to preserve his own life (exacerbated by his duties to his wife and other children)² and to do something to save his daughter from suffering.

These conflicting duties cannot be dismissed simply as prima facie. However the father acts, the unfulfilled duty does not merely evaporate but remains as a duty,³ a fact to which the subsequent feelings of guilt will attest.⁴ If he acts to save his own life, he will suffer forever the harm, physical and psychological, incurred by his daughter; in acting to save her life, thereby effectively giving up his own, his daughter will bear the subsequent guilt and his family the material loss and emotional strain. Nor will the moral dilemma and concomitant suffering be alleviated by some hypothetical rationalization of a hierarchy of duties--that the aged man, for example, has lived the best part of his life and so ought to

sacrifice himself for the sake of the daughter who has her life before her.⁵

Though dramatic, such a case is properly speaking a possible world, a possible state of this world. It exemplifies that conflicts of duty--moral dilemmas--are clearly an integral part of our ordinary moral lives. Traditional morality presumes that such conflicts are merely products of a moral code constituted by a plurality of principles, and that a moral system derivative from a single general principle will fail to engender dilemmas of this nature.⁶ This presupposes that the entire moral system can be derived from this one general principle. We have seen that such an account assumes unargued the false equivalence of the positive and negative Golden Rules. The theoretical grounds upon which such a presupposition necessarily rests is unavailable. Any theory which boasts that it captures our ordinary experience and moral intuitions ought to consider moral dilemmas (conflicts of duty) a central strand precisely because such dilemmas are central to routine moral experience.

On a more theoretical plane, the central principle of any view that denies conflicts of duty has been characterized aptly as the 'Uniqueness Hypothesis:' the claim that reason is capable of determining a single distinct choice in response to every moral situation,⁷ just as it is capable supposedly of establishing the true answer to every mathematical problem.⁸ The 'Uniqueness Hypothesis' is equivalent to the view, strictly interpreted, that there are no conflicts of duty. The range of arguments cited in support of the

'Uniqueness Hypothesis' have been shown by Baumrin and Lupu to be incoherent. Of these supposed supports, one is particularly pertinent here.

To claim that a unique option exists in every moral circumstance, a means for individuating it must be furnished. The model usually proposed for this purpose presumes as its basis the 'type-token' distinction laid out above. The relevant choice is considered a particular token or instance of a general class or type of action. In most cases, the first-order moral character of the type supposedly determines the moral nature (good or bad, right or wrong) of the particular act falling under it, and so establishes the second-order culpability of the agent for acting in this way. Thus stated, the problem becomes by what means we ascertain that in a particular moral situation one specific act is the sole correct one, such that fulfilling it discharges our unique moral duty for that set of circumstances.

As Baumrin and Lupu point out, the claim that there is one such unique act reduces to the view that, for any agent in a set of circumstances, a definite description of the agent-situation matrix superior to any other for that agent in those circumstances is available in principle. This paramount description purportedly designates the unique act fulfilling the agent's true duty in those circumstances. The only way such a description could be furnished is in terms of an ordered delineation of the spatial and temporal features or of the intentions putatively definitive of the alternative acts. Any general

attack on traditional morality must demonstrate that descriptions of this nature in principle do not individuate acts in the manner required by the theory.⁹

In determining now which of (at least) two different acts at some future time is to fulfill our duty, we cannot invoke temporality as the uniquely individuating criterion of the act descriptions. The (future) time at which the act is to be undertaken is (conceivably) identical whatever acts are under consideration. Individuation must be atemporal, at least in this sense. Similarly for spatial determinations. Different acts are capable of 'occupying' the same space, so to speak. On most accounts, the same physical movements supplemented by different intentions constitute different acts. Examples abound: a prison-guard firing at a prisoner standing at the prison-fence with the intention of preventing escape would be classified differently than his firing with the intent to kill because of some personal quarrel, using the circumstances as an excuse for shooting. Similarly, a black man calling a white person 'master' with jocular intent may be described as uttering a different speech-act than using the same words with derisive or servile intention. But what, then, of intentionality, or space-time specification supplemented by intention, as the mark of act-individuation?

This is not the place to address the complex issues of intentionality. Suffice it simply to point out that intentions are notoriously difficult to specify, often by agents themselves. In any case, different acts are capable frequently of satisfying an agent's

intention. So, given a definite spatio-temporal characterization, an agent intending to keep a promise to convey information to another can satisfy this intention (or duty) by making a telephone call, mailing a letter, sending a telegram or a messenger, and so forth. It turns out, as the original formulation of the 'thief-murderer' example above reveals, that acts of specific types are imputed by the HCT to agents wholly lacking the intentions necessitated of them by such a view.

If intentionality is admitted as a well-formulated criterion of act-specification, it must be asked how the limits of the causal consequences of intentions (not simply acts) are to be determined. Where do the causal consequences of one intention potentially end and those of another begin? This raises the problem of conflicting intentionalities. If conflicts of duty are dismissed, internal conflicts of agent intentionality are undeniable. In order to deny that there are conflicts of duty, traditionalists are driven to invoke intentions together with space-time specification both as the mode of act individuation and as the standard of act hierarchy. Yet we have found that spatio-temporal specifications fail to individuate acts; and it must be admitted that agents in fact often suffer conflicts of intentions. The notion of 'intentionality' is characterized thus by the same shortcomings as the phenomena it is supposed to explain. Some other criterion of act individuation and hierarchical ordering must be employed. Now the only other characterization general enough to apply universally to all acts is specification in

terms of spatio-temporal location. But it was precisely problems with spatio-temporal specification that forced us to resort to intentionality.

This objection may be stated somewhat differently. To establish, for a given set of circumstances, that one duty in a conflict has precedence over another, the HCT must furnish a standard of value against which the competing duties can be measured. The leading candidate offered is a descriptive specification of the circumstances of the potential action (including intentional states) confronting the agent. But if the specification is purely descriptive, as it purports to be, there can be no imputation of different values to the conflicting duties without violating the profession of strict description and so transgressing the description-prescription distinction. On the other hand, any admission that the description of the act-circumstances includes a description of values, besides assuming away the conventional contrast between 'is' and 'ought,' leaves unspecified the standard of value invoked to differentiate the discrepant duty-claims. This point is crucial: theoretical confusions here underlie the standard analyses of racism that find it irrational on grounds that it conflates descriptive differences amongst races with prescriptions for the adverse treatment of members of those races because of those differences. We will consider this important issue in Part Two.

Obviously, if no criterion of hierarchical individuation of acts is available, there can be no rational means of establishing that

one of the duties in an apparent conflict of principles is the one that really ought to be done. If the imperatives embodied in the conflicting principles really are duties, they must be equally real, as much so after determining that one rather than the other is to be acted upon as before. Indeed, the latter remains a duty, though unfulfilled and perhaps unfulfillable, even when the former has been satisfied or discharged by an act.¹⁰ On the other hand, it is clear that common morality is able to deny conflicts of duty only by supplementing its account by ad hoc exception clauses and hierarchical rankings determined by some unspecified, if not unspecifiable, criterion.

These problems--barely buried within but vehemently disclaimed by the traditional account of common morality--suggest finally that their fundamental cause might lie even more deeply embedded within the structure of the theory. The distinction between the first-order and second-order moral structures needs to be supplemented by something like the 'type-token' distinction found above to be afflicted by irreparable shortcomings. Insurmountable problems arise in formulating non-contradictory general rules (act-types), as well as in determining that specific acts and intentions of particular agents in defined circumstances are act-tokens of those types. Nevertheless, in rejecting this structural distinction we should be careful not to be drawn to the other extreme. A theory like 'act utilitarianism' clearly evades such problems pertaining to the relation between general act-types and individualized acts in the determination of moral rightness

and wrongness. Here, it is simply the outcomes of the act and not any relation to a general taxonomic structure of value which establishes the act's rightness or wrongness. In addition to the narrower theoretical pitfalls of this latter view (e.g., problems of value-weighting of consequences, etc.), we have already witnessed utilitarianism's general inability to furnish an indictment of racist practices (Chapter One, #1.4(b)).

The dilemma of moral theory continues to haunt us. But it is precisely the inconsistencies and paradoxes within the prevailing theory of common morality that begin to suggest the strands of an explanatory account of racism's disparate components; of its pervasiveness in and the power of its grip on modern society. Racism, we noted earlier, arose as a powerful social force contemporaneous with the extensive rooting of the sentiments of the Hebrew-Christian moral tradition in the general social consciousness during the Enlightenment. This interrelated rise in social conditions is reflected in the works of thinkers of this period. Like other representatives of this episteme, Kant was able to construct a theory that captured and solidified the principles and tenets of this moral practice, custom and habit. Insofar as Kant's theory actually reflects the prevailing moral feelings and intuitions it purports to; and insofar as we find some intrinsic relation between the traditional Hebrew-Christian theory of common morality and the rise and spread of racist sentiment and practice; analysis of the major structural threads of each will serve as exploratory surgery with the view to comprehensive critical analysis of both.

The theory of common morality includes a descriptive and a prescriptive component. On one hand, it purports to describe the nature of what it is to be moral. On the other, however, the theory obviously assumes itself ex hypothesi to be true, thereby prescribing that in order to be moral we must abide by and act in terms of its precepts. If we admit for the moment that the theory properly captures prevailing moral sentiment in the HCT, we need to ask what it is in the theory--and whatever it is, obviously it must be central to it--that generates a moral-theoretic indictment of racism while simultaneously acquitting or encouraging as moral these same types of practices. The central theoretical feature that springs most readily to mind is reason.

Reason, we are told, furnishes us with the fundamental moral principle exhorting us to treat others with the respect due them as rational beings. From this putatively follows first-order circumscription of practices deemed immoral. But, simultaneously, it is reason that leads us to introduce qualifications to the precepts generated by the fundamental principle which encouraged these self-same immoral (particularly racist) practices. Clearly, this raises the issue of what it is to be rational. And the notion of 'discrimination,' we will find, is as basic to rationality as is that of 'consistency.'

Reason functions by discriminating between ideas, properties and objects on the basis of conceptual and perceived differences, both actual and assumed, between these ideas, properties and objects. On the traditional analysis of morality reason not only discriminates and differentiates between objects (theoretical and material), but

undertakes also to order these objects on an hierarchical scale. In analysing racism from the perspective of morality and moral theory, therefore, we need to pursue in some depth reason's tendency to discriminate and order hierarchically in this manner. It is to this that we now turn.

CHAPTER THREE: FOOTNOTES

¹"New York Post," June 19, 1982.

²This duty to preserve himself is both a duty in itself and a derivative duty to fulfill responsibilities to his dependents. Donagan (1978), pp. 76ff and 100ff.

³Cf. B. Baumrin and P. Lupu, "Conflict of Duties: Paradox or Paradigm," paper presented at the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs, New York, 22 November 1981, pp. 5-6.

⁴On the relation between conflicts of duty and guilt, see Ruth Barcan Marcus, "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency," Journal of Philosophy lxxvii, 3 (March 1980): p. 130.

⁵This example could be construed as a contemporary version of Abraham's dilemma when confronted by the decision to sacrifice Isaac or disobey God's command. Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. W. Kaufmann (Chicago: Meridian, 1956), p. 293.

⁶Cf. Marcus (1980), p. 122.

⁷Baumrin and Lupu (1981), p. 9.

⁸Cf. J. Lemmon, "Deontic Logic and the Logic of Imperatives," Logique et Analyse vii, 29 (April 1965): pp. 39-61.

⁹Baumrin and Lupu (1981), pp. 33ff.

¹⁰This clearly has serious implications for the thesis that 'ought always implies can,' but a discussion of these issues lies beyond our scope.

PART TWO

RACISM, REASON AND RATIONALIZATION

CHAPTER FOUR

RACE: BIOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

Most people fail to realize that to establish the proper place of racism in our intellectual, moral and socio-economic heritage, we must turn first to the history of science. Racism was in many ways prompted by developing theories in biology, natural history and physical anthropology. The notion of 'racism' quite naturally invokes thus the question of its relation to the concept of 'race.' Indeed, some define racism or racial discrimination simply as those discriminatory judgments or practices based on race,¹ offering no further account of 'race.' Now obviously, as with Singer, the question whether such discriminations are justifiable may be left open. But it cannot be addressed properly until a clear-cut definition of race is provided. We will concern ourselves with such a definition, therefore, prior to defining racism. By resting the definition of racism upon that of race, the former will be 'fully grounded,' to adapt a useful phrase from Baier.²

There is a view commonly held that moral indictments of racist practices and beliefs are a function of the falsity of reasoning underlying such practices and beliefs. Opening our conceptual account with 'race' will enable us to assess the degree to which this common view is credible. This will reveal at the same time the surprising extent to

which racism is rooted in the rise of modern science.

4.1. 'Race:' History of the Concept

The history of the term 'race,' spanning nearly five centuries, reveals a dual connotation: scientific and social. In terms even of its definition, the concept acquires its significance from the theory, scientific or social, in which it is embedded and which thereby determines its use. It is for this reason that use of the concept 'racism' is so fraught with difficulties: Insofar as the social connotation of 'race' is confused and conflated with the scientific, any purportedly neutral differentiation or discrimination on the basis of the concept rests upon ambiguous and so potentially false (theoretical) grounds. Yet we should not be over-eager to conclude from just these considerations, as all too many have, that every differentiation and discrimination on grounds of 'race' is false in this manner. If this is so, it must be established by way of argument.

The term is introduced into the English language circa 1500, when it is taken to signify simply 'a set or class of persons.' The English experience is substantiated by the emergent European languages. The French term race and the German Rasse also derive from the Italian razza and Spanish raza, both of which apparently are of obscure origin.³ It is most likely that the popularity of the term was precipitated by the exploratory voyages of Vasco da Gama, Christopher Columbus and other representatives of European expansionism at the close of the fifteenth century. Their respective discoveries of groups of people at

least very different from themselves clearly necessitated a general term to capture this experience. This increase in general European social consciousness of such population differentiations is further reflected in the fact that Hieronymous Bosch's The Garden of Delights (c. 1500) is the first known depiction in modern European painting of a black African figure.⁴

By the end of the sixteenth century, the term had various meanings. Many of these reflected the revitalized Aristotelian concerns of the scholastics with animal and plant classification, on one hand, and the increasing modern interest in differentiating newly discovered human groups, on the other.⁵ 'Race' is used to signify, variously, a 'breed or stock of animals' (1580), a 'genus, species or kind of animal' (1605) or 'variety of plant' (1596). At the same time, it refers to 'the great divisions of mankind' (1580), especially 'a limited group of persons descended from a common ancestor' (1581), and slightly later 'a tribe, nation or people considered of common stock' (1600). Over the following two centuries, the term became laden increasingly with theoretical permutations due to the development of classificatory biology and its extension to humankind. By the middle of the nineteenth century, ordinary usage of the term reflected the conflation of the biological and social meanings. 'Race' was commonly defined then as the 'fact of a natural or inherited disposition and qualities resulting from membership of a particular people or ethnical stock' (1849).

Before the concept is rejected tout court because of this growing confusion between natural qualities and social groupings

(ethnicity), it must be considered whether 'race' has a more solid foundation if restricted to more recent developments in biological theory. These developments are summed up in the definition of 'race' biological science now offers us.

4.2. The Biology of Race

(a) Definition

The concept of 'race' is steeped in theoretical controversy. A major factor in the generation of this controversy, social issues for the moment aside, has been the tendency by the discordant theorists to presume by the term different levels, and so different referents, in the scale of biological classification. Standardizing the terminology of classification with respect to nomenclature and reference clearly would remove a large source of disagreement and confusion. Though conceptual and referential clarification alone will not rid us of the social problems at issue here, such clarification is both a theoretical value in its own right and a means of specifying the exact nature of the social problems at issue. This kind of conceptual analysis raises in turn the foundational philosophical issue of the ontological status of the referents in question. It will be found, moreover, that the particular theory of naming and reference adopted here has crucial implications for the definition of racism.

Taxonomy is the practice of classifying groups (taxa) according to established principles. These groups consist of individual

organisms collocated on the basis of similarities they display with each other. These similarities are considered a function of descent from common ancestry. A group or taxon which incorporates substantially diverse plants or animals is called a class. The largest sub-units of a class are orders, which divide in decreasing levels of scope into families, genera and species. Because each increasingly smaller unit is a taxon, we may refer to a biological hierarchy of taxa or classificatory units.

A species is a group of individual plants or animals the individual members of which bear to each other the largest mutual resemblance. More specifically, it is a group of individuals the members of which are capable of interbreeding with each other,⁶ but not with members of other species. A species, in other words, is a group whose members are reproductively isolated. Now a sub-species or race, as the name suggests, is a sub-division of the species. It consists in a group of individuals who bear resemblance to each other in some definable characteristics while diverging in respect of those characteristics, at least, from other members of the species.⁷ Breeding between members of different sub-species of the same species--plant or animal--is in some instances feasible. Interbreeding between different sub-species occurs however less freely than intra-sub-species breeding between members within the bounds of the sub-species.⁸ Lines of demarcation between sub-species accordingly are often murky; at their periphery racial strains merge into each other (A Dictionary of

Biology, 1978: 268,276; referred to hereafter in intralinear textual citations as DB, 1978). Lack of miscegenation may be due simply to geographical isolation (hence the qualification of 'capability' in defining species above). Long-term spatial isolation may motivate classification of the isolated group as a race, or in the very long term even as a species.

These conceptual relations can be expressed genetically. Biologically related persons are those persons possessing genes, through inheritance, from a common pool. The genetic population consists in this common pool of genes from which each individual member has inherited a sample by way of the egg and sperm originating him or her. Heredity is the pattern of gene transmission from ancestry which determines the individual's locus of possible responses to the environment. Races are simply populations which diverge from each other in their relative gene frequencies, that is, in the relative degree of possessing certain inherited features. Racial differences are simply agglomerations of individual hereditary characteristics (alleles of genes) which even within a single population tend not to merge.

Races form biologically in the main by imbalances in the equilibrium of the gene pool as a result of changes in relative gene frequencies caused by mutations;⁹ or by natural selection;¹⁰ by genetic drift;¹¹ or by population mixing following migration; or through geographical or social isolation. A race is capable over a long time-period of change in hereditary features. It is,

then, not a fixed, static classificatory category. It is dynamic, changing to reflect changes in the phenomena to which it is supposed to refer. Races differ in relative ways, depending for their homogeneity and constancy upon the relative persistence of the genes in question.

Human beings possess a large proportion of common genes. It has been standard to conclude that all humans belong to the same race, the human race. In terms of the classificatory schema set out here, this is a misnomer. The different kinds of genes common to all human beings by virtue of their species membership occur in different population groupings in different idiosyncratic degrees. It is this which differentiates from each other the human groups we have called 'races.' Technically, the different races possess differing varieties or alleles of the same gene pool common to the human species.

Now the large genetic promissory note upon faith of payment of which virtually all scientific racial classification rests raises a crucial question. Genetic analysis as the basis of racial classification of humans is virtually impossible. It is not simply that knowledge has been lacking. More fundamentally, the kinds of experiments crucial for such analysis demand 'infertility between members of the different taxa' and this obviously is not the case for interbreeding between the different races of the human species (John Baker, Race; 1974; 191; referred to hereafter in intralinear textual citation as Baker, 1974). Racial classifica-

tions tend to rest thus largely upon morphological criteria. This has led some to deny both the ontological existence of races and that 'race' is a viable taxonomic concept. If this wider objection holds, the entire rational ground--scientific and moral--is removed from any racially dependent (and so racist) endeavour: There would be no basis for discriminations of a racist kind and we could bring this line of investigation safely to a close. This is the hinge upon which the whole spectrum of 'liberal' objections to racism and racial theories rests. We turn now to consider this issue.

(b) The Standard Anthropological Objection

The difficulties faced by classification of races on the basis of genotypical differences have led some anthropologists not merely to classify races phenotypically but to define the concept in these terms.¹² Coon, Garn and Birdsell, for example, define 'race' as a "population which differs phenotypically from all others with which it has been compared."¹³ Application of this criterion has often led to arbitrary classification of human population groups. Prompted by the common social and moral consequences that so often follow from discriminations on the basis of 'race,' a common objection is raised against the concept. This objection is identified generally with the 'liberal' sector of the social sciences, especially in anthropology.

This objection comprises a biological or anthropological component and a social critique. Socially, it is argued that the 'facts

of the matter' with respect to races are irrelevant. 'Race' functions always as a weapon in 'ideological warfare.' It fuels the fire of what one anthropologist calls "the ideology of race" or "racism," a normative social or political program that involves, inevitably, a "call to action."¹⁴ Now this is somewhat overstated. It is clearly not a necessary condition of the concept 'race' that it serve this function, nor is it in fact the case that it inevitably does. Where it is determined unequivocally that all members of a certain race have a particular gene, and therefore a specific physical characteristic (given for the moment that we take the concept to be theoretically well-founded), no political consequences at all need follow from this. It seems highly unlikely that there would be any political repercussions unless the race in question already finds itself in adverse political circumstances vis-a-vis others, and that this 'racial fit' is considered to be relevant in some way. The mere possibility that information of this nature is potentially open to abuse in such manner is insufficient reason to reject the notion of 'race' in toto. The force of the 'standard objection' must rest ultimately upon the purely biological arguments.

It is often held that there is too much diversity in the units biologists and anthropologists commonly consider races, that the differences between members within such units are often greater than the differences between members of those supposedly different races. It is argued also that differences between members of

different races are largely the product of social environment. The critics conclude thus that all humans are members of a single species which cannot be sub-divided, on biological grounds, into sub-species. 'Race,' it is concluded, far from being a valid taxonomic form of biological classification, is simply a warped social construct which has no basis in fact. Any discrimination on the basis of race or racial characteristics lacks all basis in fact and is therefore irrational. As such, it must be immoral too.¹⁵

Ashley Montagu, a leading anthropologist, seems to have fashioned his career around calls for the banishment of the term 'race' from all scientific and social discourse. He attacks the concept on grounds that it is artificial, at odds with the facts, "false in meaning" (whatever this is supposed to mean) and so engendering of error and confusion.¹⁶ It is, to use his own description, a thoroughly 'mythical' concept.¹⁷ Montagu admits that genetic factors much like those which have served to establish racial groupings in lower species--mutation, natural selection, isolation, drift--function also in human evolution. However, the environmental construct of culture specific only to humans, he believes, renders absolutely inapplicable the use of 'race' for the human species. Cultural effects result in increasing degrees of mobility, hybridization and social selection.¹⁸ Montagu contends that peoples grouped together in a single race on the basis of some phenomenally similar characteristic are genetically

very dissimilar in other genetic respects. More fundamentally, though, they often differ widely in cultural respects. But the argumentation to support the claim that culture determines the criteria by which human breeding groups are delimited is left by Montagu almost invariably to others.¹⁹

Jean Hiernaux rejects the definition of 'race' either as 'a grouping of similar individuals' or as 'a breeding population.' The former is rejected because it fails, *ex hypothesi*, to capture the fact that man has evolved physically, and continues to. As a grouping of similar individuals, 'race' would be applicable then only for a panmictic (isolated) community.²⁰ The latter definition is rejected because supposedly superfluous: "one word is enough for one thing, and a taxonomic class may not be equated with the unit classified."²¹ Hiernaux thus equates 'race' with 'a grouping of populations.' He insists that racial classification is feasible only if clusters of populations are discovered to exist, and if all populations of a given race are closer to their own kind than they are to those of another. The basis of classification would break down if some populations of one race were nearer to some of another than to those of their own.²²

Hiernaux contends that because of migrations due to human mobility population groupings have mixed on a scale unique in comparison with the experience of any other species. It is an unargued bias, and altogether unclear, that human migration has caused population mixing, especially in light of the fact that this is not

the case within other migratory species. But we will pass this over silently in the interests of the argument. So, further, large-scale population mixing in the human species and unprecedented human ability to modify the environment significantly have resulted in a very wide range of individual human differences. Hiernaux concludes that the human species by nature is therefore unclassifiable: the more races we create (according to some criterion of classification), the more unclassifiable the populations where differences are fewer and fewer; while the fewer the number of races established (according to some other criterion), the more it forces into the terms of the taxonomy individuals that are more unlike than similar. We are urged accordingly to give up any hope of a comprehensive classification in favor of a 'diagnostic key,' which under the circumstances is the best we can hope for.²³

If these arguments are accepted, we ought to discard the concept of 'race.' Yet we must furnish first a more appropriate mode of classifying human beings. Perhaps we ought not to be so ready to jettison the boat we currently sail in, even if leaky, where any other is a faint, possibly illusory image on the horizon. One suggestion is to link the distributions of specific morphological features with the distribution, history, and pre-history of selective and adaptive features.²⁴ There is no reason why such an approach cannot be racial, where the sense of 'race' defined above (as opposed to Hiernaux's) is complemented by a chart of gene distributions historically and geographically specified (given

that this knowledge is at least potentially available). This map would chart the geographical history of races. That such information might be unavailable in principle for certain populations militates as much against the method divorced from any account of races as it does in conjunction with it.

Other alternatives include substituting 'clinal analysis' for 'racial classification;' or 'breeding population' for 'race;' or 'ethnic' and 'ethnocentric' for 'race' and 'racism' respectively.²⁵ Clinal analysis involves charting the continuum of gradation of formal differences in a population of a species, correlated with its geographical or ecological distribution (D.B., 1978: 66). Livingstone asserts that, unlike its racial counterpart, clinal analysis is capable of explaining all gene frequency distributions. But Livingstone admits that if races are interpreted as 'breeding populations,' and if any number of racial classifications of the same populations based only on differing gene frequencies are equally valid; then the resulting analysis would yield in verbal terms much the same descriptive classification of population groups as the numerical analysis of clines.

The notion of 'breeding populations' is central both to racial and to clinal analysis. This has motivated the suggestion that 'race' is superfluous in favor of the former. Substitution of this kind, however, plays havoc with any acceptable human classification. Many of the important features in terms of which the human species is classified into manageable, identifiable groups

are common to different breeding populations. Natural selection is not restricted to the boundaries of breeding populations. So the emphasis in such classifications is not to be placed upon the relative distributions of the gene frequencies.

This conclusion might be a concession to the final suggestion that 'ethnic' be substituted for 'race.' It is thought that this captures far better the crucial importance of culture in differentiating human groupings while removing the insidious value-judgments that inevitably accompany any differentiation on the basis of 'race.' So it is believed, rather incredibly, that banishment of the concept would remove forever the odious phenomenon of racism.

First, 'ethnicity'--like 'race'--is defined in terms of descent, as extended kinship.²⁷ Second, biological differences are never alone the cause of human friction. Nor is there any guarantee that this new concept would not facilitate very similar sorts of adverse discrimination. This is attested to by the swift introduction into the language of the notion of 'ethnocentricity.' This proposed substitution clearly resolves nothing.

The deficiencies in these substitutions for 'race' suggest that the assumptions upon which rests the main thrust of the objection to the use of 'race' are also flawed. Hiernaux's definition of 'race' as a grouping of populations extends ontological status to the population--an abstract, mass object--over and above its

constituent individuals. What prompted this redefinition of 'race' was the assumption that populations change, reflecting thereby physical evolution over time. Insofar as 'similarity' is supposed to be in the definiens of 'race,' this evolution cannot be accounted for. Populations, surely, are agglomerations of individuals and the relations between them. They cannot change in any way while their individual members or their interrelations remain unchanged. So a race is, at the very least, a grouping of individuals. What 'race' refers to are not the individuals, taken separately, but a feature of the grouping. Hiernaux's objection that the definition of 'race' equates the class with the unit classified is inapplicable.²⁸

The shortcomings of the objections considered here are exaggerated by the tendency of some of the 'liberal' critics to appeal to an unspecified and unsupported moral criterion for the grounds upon which 'race' is to be rejected as a viable mode of biological taxonomy. This is a strange turn of events. An appeal is made now to a moral standard in order to undergird a scientific issue which was supposed to settle the question of morality in the first place.

Thus, the concept of 'race' should not be discarded. It plays a useful role in the classification of the human species. But it is subject to some qualifications. As a classificatory tool, we should not demand of races that they be absolutely different from each other, just that the relevant differences between races be larger than within them. There is a statistical variation in

the degree to which the hereditary features or genes characteristic of a race are present in individual members. 'Racial character' is simply the statistical spread of the characteristics in question, which are not uniformly inherent in each individual. Its stability is a function simply of the duration of the genes in question and the tendency to breed with other members of the race rather than with members of other races (whether motivated by geography or preference). Racial characters therefore need never be static, nor even constant over long durations. Individual members of a single race can and mostly do vary in size, color and proportion from each other, within some given range. This range may be extremely difficult to determine and obviously may overlap the characteristic range of other races. Where either gene durability or breeding habits change, so too does the race. This often leads to the introduction of new races. Here the effects of mutations (resulting largely from novel, artificial, humanly constructed environments) and polygenes (the cumulative effect of many genes) complicate the difficulties confronting any racial classification. But the complexities of classification should not be misinterpreted as the impossibility of classification. Neither technical nor socio-political factors should serve as absolute deterrents, only as warning signals.

It seems safe to conclude that 'race' is a valid taxonomic concept, not simply a 'mythical' notion employed only to justify oppression. It is a concept grounded in serious biological theory.

The objections lodged against it are only partly, if at all, credible. Differentiations on the basis of 'race' are not ipso facto irrational, for the concept is not by definition inconsistent. If racial differentiations are inherently immoral, it cannot be on these grounds.

As the name implies, though, biological taxonomy classifies the objects under study into an hierarchical ordering. In descending order of generality we find classes, orders, families, and genera. These are conventional categories, useful though artificial constructs of reason's concern to order nature by classifying it; the better to comprehend nature, as Kant saw clearly, by placing it under laws; to facilitate memory by way of generalizations. These taxa are simply names unencumbered by any ontological status, mere artifices facilitating an ordered understanding of nature. The crucial question is whether the more specific levels of classification--'species' and 'sub-species' ('race')--differ from the more general levels in referring to some objective reality; or whether they, too, are merely useful constructs.

4.3. The Ontology of Race

The problem of the ontological status of races is rarely addressed directly. Ontological commitments nevertheless are implicit in claims about the 'equality of races.' There is a direct relation between claiming that all human races are equal and denying not only that races exist but that 'race' is a valid classificatory tool.

Similarly, there is a relation between arguing for the inequality of races and affirming their ontological reality (Baker, 1974: 65). These relations are borne out most clearly in the ambiguities and ambivalences of Montagu's various responses to the issue.

Where Montagu asserts that human races are equal he denies that 'race' is a valid taxonomical form for the human species. By this denial he controverts the existence of human races: Existence of races presupposes that the population groups to which the term refers are different. And where there are differences the races in question cannot be equal, at least not in any biological sense.²⁹ Equality of members of the human species must be taken here to mean similitude either of the particular mental and physical features of human beings, or of their formal features, or of their potential abilities. Identity of particular features or potential abilities is clearly false. We are left with the notion of 'formal features,' i.e., that all human beings possess intelligence of some nature, have blood flowing through their veins, originate from a largely common although not absolutely identical gene-pool, and so on. But this is much too vague a basis upon which to rest the argument.

Montagu recognizes the pitfalls of his shifting argument. Following others, he converts to a moral conception of equality, the 'equality of rights of all human beings,' or their 'equality before the law.' He would still deny the ontological existence of races, on the basis of the confused claim that "there is a biological equality in

difference."³⁰ This assertion is either meaningless or abstrusely metaphorical. It furnishes no ground upon which to sustain a biological contention of this nature. It invokes once more a moral notion to decide the scientific issue which the scientific facts were supposed to determine in the first place. Thus, in recognizing biological differences or inequalities (unqualified by any moral judgment) Montagu is led in the end to affirm, along with other biologists and anthropologists, that races exist.³¹ Assuming that races exist implies, ex hypothesi, that the members of each race differ from those of the others. In this sense they are unequal.

The clearest example of this relation between biological evidence of group dissimilarities ('inequalities') and claims to the ontological existence of races is provided in Baker's work. Baker presents a number of arguments to support his contention that races exist. First, he tenders a large body of evidence illustrating that various groupings of human beings differ in numerous and significant ways. He argues both that these population groupings meet the criteria definitive of a race and that the differences in question are not a function of environmental factors. The evidence is offered to support the claim that there are relations of biological superiority and inferiority between the groups. These genetic and morphological differences--in gene-strings, size, color, proportion of body-parts, habits, language, temperament, intellectual and physical abilities--are taken then as grounds for the conclusion that races exist (Baker, 1974: 99-117; 419-530; 531-532). The fact that there are 'inter-

mediates,' far from negating the existence of races, is turned by Baker into an argument in its favor. Admitting the existence of intermediates implies acceptance of those poles between which they are intermediates (Baker, 1974: 100). The claim that the existence of intermediates is a counterexample to the view that races exist, rests upon the assumption that races are by nature discrete, absolute and static. The arguments supporting this assumption have been dismissed already

Clearly, none of the arguments prove beyond doubt that races exist. The arguments--if that is what they amount to--are sketchy at best, flawed at worst. An analogy furnished by Baker in support of his "theory of intermediates" serves to highlight some deeper philosophical issues buried beneath the theoretical relation of 'race' and racism.

Baker claims that just as a large gradation of colors between green and blue does not militate against our use of the terms 'green' and 'blue,' so the existence of intermediates in no way negates the existence of races (Baker, 1974: 100). Baker conflates here use of the color-terms with existence of races. This serves simply to hide the more fundamental philosophical presupposition that abstract or general terms refer to some objective (essential) existence over and above that of its components. In support of this hidden premise, Baker warns that if races have no existential objectivity, then not only human but plant and animal classification in their entirety are thereby rendered altogether arbitrary. On the contrary, argues Baker, the fact that some arrangements are clearly nonsensical, that others

could not be otherwise and that yet other classifications are open to reasonable deliberation militates against the view that human taxonomy is arbitrary. He concludes that the taxonomy therefore cannot be artificial either (Baker, 1974: 68).³²

Baker's imputation of objective existence to races rests upon an essentialist ontology. 'Species' and 'sub-species' are taken to have objective referents in nature because they supposedly specify the nature of their individual members. This objective instantiation of races presupposes a form of (Platonic) essentialism that takes as the real existents not individuals but abstract forms, the races themselves, in light of which individuals putatively are what they are. It is races that are assumed real; individuals are simply true to their proper natures insofar as they assume their respective racial characters. In turn, races differ from each other by nature; they embody abilities which are superior or inferior relative to those of other races. It is for these reasons that works reflecting this line of reasoning assume such a potentially racist hue.

Cartesian rationalism fares only marginally better on this point. Unlike the Platonists, Descartes held that it is quite feasible to examine the meaning or content of an idea³³ without any direct ontological commitment to the existence of the referent of that idea in the world. We can examine the properties of a triangle without assuming the actual existence of triangles; and so we can analyse the meaning of 'race' without committing ourselves to the existence of races. This reveals only a single perspective of a complex picture.

It is fundamental to the Cartesian position that something is true, or truly exists, insofar as one has a 'clear and distinct idea' of it in one's mind. To the extent that one can be said to have in one's mind clear and distinct ideas of the different races, they must (be said to) exist.³⁴ These a priori ideas of races must reveal also the exact nature of the races in question, including their internal and external relations. It is possible that these ideas reveal the moral equality of the different races. Yet it remains open to the rationalist to argue that, on the basis of the true a priori ideas of racial superiority/inferiority innate (though perhaps hidden) in every mind, a particular race is naturally superior or inferior to another; and that these natural differences produce necessary moral consequences.

We are confronted by two equally untenable positions: There are no races and all racial classifications therefore are invalid. And races exist ontologically, stamping upon individuals their true nature. Both are a priori views. The former is unable to offer us any other viable taxonomic framework for human populations. The second reifies obvious differences between groups composed of similar individuals into absolute differences with far-reaching moral implications. The former view ignores the facts, the latter bends them to suit its own purposes.

The only alternative that seems to avoid these extremes, as Linnaeus and Blumenbach already foresaw so clearly in the eighteenth century, is to deny that 'race' has any objective existential reference. This circumvents reification of the differences into an absolute principle of dominance and subjection. The concept can be retained at

the same time as a convention, a useful classificatory tool for ordering our knowledge of actual differences between population groups. Although artificial constructs, it does not follow that these classifications are arbitrary. The categories of classificatory systems are designed to correspond to the perceived continuities and discontinuities between the populations under study. They reflect relationships between things which are not merely a function of the adopted system. Ultimately, the classification depends upon the purpose for which it is to be utilized. In this sense only is it a function of expediency and application. Similarly, far from denying or affirming the existence of races, the notion of 'intermediates' is simply a classificatory term designed to capture the dynamic, changing, non-discrete character of human population groupings.

This view is obviously more compatible with a Lockean or Quinean form of empiricism which insists upon a conventionalist and constructivist doctrine of species or kinds. Central to the determination of kinds for both Locke and Quine are the standards of convenience and utility.³⁵ We should not jump to the conclusion, though, that empiricism's record on this matter is unblemished. Empiricism generally holds that all our ideas or concepts derive either directly from experience, or indirectly by way of other ideas which are derivable directly from experience. Simply stated, our ideas of races, if they are true, must ultimately have been effected by the real existents, the objects of our experience. Empiricism is thus faced with problems similar to those we found afflicting rationalism: If we have a true

experience of a race superior in some way to another, that experience is a product of an objective reality. We are bound then to impute such superiority in fact to the population in question. This is not to say that racism follows inevitably from empiricist foundations. Yet it is not an unexpected implication of the conventionalist and utilitarian character of racial classification when coupled with ontological and epistemological presuppositions of this sort. Locke's admission that any contingent property of a kind (including color or intelligence) can be adopted conventionally as a nominal essence underlines this point.³⁶ This will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

Infused with potentially racist implications, the concept of 'race' is compatible with any of the generally acceptable, standard philosophical foundations. This concept of 'race' is not inherently antithetical to reason, whether we take its referent to be some idealized essence, a Cartesian idea in the mind, or a conventional stipulation of individuals constituting a group according to some specified criterion. This conclusion is the first step in a string of arguments intended to illustrate ultimately that racism is not necessarily irrational. The latter will serve in turn as the basis for demonstrating why a moral theory grounded solely upon reason, while capable of furnishing a clear-cut condemnation of racist beliefs and practices, is nevertheless capable simultaneously of encouraging and legitimizing some of those selfsame beliefs and practices. To proceed any further in this direction, we must turn our attention now to defining racism.

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER FOUR

¹Peter Singer (1978), p. 186.

²'Grounded racism' is discriminatory behavior which is based on the notion of race.' Kurt Baier, "Merit and Race," Philosophia (Israel), 8: 2-3 (November 1978): 127.


³Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959); Encyclopaedia Britannica, 18th ed., s.v. "Race."

⁴H. W. Janson, History of Art, 2nd ed., (New York: Prentice-Hall and Abrams, 1980), Figure 471, p. 363. For a detail of the center panel of this triptych, see Colorplate #50. The detail of the right-hand side of the center panel reveals a black figure with head turned away from the group of surrounding white figures. The figure's eyeline is directed at no particular object depicted within the work. The gazes of virtually all the numerous white figures in the panel are directed explicitly, even quizzically at the black figure, symbolizing curiosity about an 'object' so similar and yet so very different. Closer inspection of all three panels of the work reveals at least fourteen black figures, all similarly depicted. These figures are intended obviously to symbolize the devilish character; they are depicted mostly in a variety of acts of enticement and enchantment reminiscent of Eden.

⁵Aristotle classifies organisms according to increasing degrees of perfection. It will be suggested later that this mode of classification is extended by Aquinas and others into the hierarchical chain of being. Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione Animalum, 733b 1-10.

⁶Baker defines a species as a group whose members do interbreed only with their own kind. This definition is partly motivated by considerations of geographical separation. The major difference between this definition and the one above is that it serves to decrease the number of different species in favor of increasing the number of sub-species (races). John Baker, Race (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 4.

⁷Diagrammatically:



⁷(Continued) Cf. Baker (1974), p. 66.

⁸For example, Triturus cristatus karelini (crested newt inhabiting Greece, Turkey, Iran); and Triturus cristatus danubialis (crested newt inhabiting the Danube valley). Baker (1978) pp. 101ff. Rejecting differentiations of human beings into races merely on the basis of morphology, Kant had already insisted in 1775 upon reproduction as the primary criterion of racial distinction. Concentrating solely upon morphology, Kant argued, gives rise only to an 'academic system of naming' (Nominalgattung). This is good simply as a means of assisting 'ordinary memory.' The concept of Realgattung (a 'genuine interbreeding stock' or species) serves as 'a natural system for the understanding' by bringing 'creatures under laws.' A realgattung is divisible into Racen, the recognizably different forms. Immanuel Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II: "Von den Verschiedenen Racen der Menschen" (Berlin: Reimer), pp. 427-443.

⁹I.e., changes in the hereditary elements of an organism occurring because of a small chemical change in one of its genes. Cf. M. Banton and J. Harwood, The Race Concept (New York: Praeger Publications, 1975), p. 66; A. Abercrombie, C. J. Hickman and M. L. Johnson eds., A Dictionary of Biology (London: Penguin, 1978), p. 185.

¹⁰I.e., that individual members possessing certain characteristics within a population, including a range of individuals not having them, provide a greater number of offspring to the next generation than those lacking them. Where the characteristics are inherited, the population-composition is thus altered. Abercrombie, Hickman and Johnson (1978), p. 190.

¹¹I.e., an alteration in the population occurring not by natural selection but as a result of chance. Abercrombie, Hickman and Johnson (1978), p. 122. Except where otherwise indicated, I have drawn the biological detail from L. Dunn, "Race and Biology," Race, Science and Society, ed. Leo Kuper (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 31-67.

¹²Genotypical differences are those differences in the underlying genetic constitution of the individuals constituting the different population groups in respect of a particular trait or traits. Phenotypes are the organism's phenomenal or measurable appearance or behavior in respect of a trait or traits. Banton and Harwood (1975), p. 47.

¹³C. Coon, S. Garn, and J. Birdsell, Races (Springfield, 1957).

¹⁴Manning Nash, "Race and the Ideology of Race," in Race and Social Difference, eds. P. Baxter and B. Sansom (London: Penguin, 1972), pp. 112-113.

¹⁵Cf. Robin Fox, "Chinese have Bigger Brains than Whites--Are They Superior?" in Prejudice and Race Relations, ed. R. Jack (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970); and Pierre van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon (Holland: Elsevier, 1981), p. 2.

¹⁶Ashley Montagu, "Human Species in the Light of Genetics," in The Concept of Race, ed. A. Montagu (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 9.

¹⁷Ashley Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 24.

¹⁸Montagu (1964), p. 31.

¹⁹Montagu cites approvingly the fact that there is no entry for 'race' in the Dictionary of Biology, though he admits that there is one for 'sub-species.' In any case, Montagu seems to forget that he had agreed earlier to 'animal races.' Ashley Montagu, "Introduction," in Montagu (1964), p. 18.

²⁰Jean Hiernaux, "The Concept of Race and the Taxonomy of Mankind," in Montagu (1964), p. 31.

²¹Hiernaux (Montagu 1964), p. 33.

²²Technically, 'inter-cluster distances' cannot be greater than 'intra-cluster distances.' Hiernaux (Montagu 1964), p. 35.

²³Hiernaux (Montagu 1964), pp. 35-432. For arguments largely similar, see Frank Livingstone, "On the Non-Existence of Human Races," in Montagu (1964), pp. 46-60.

²⁴C. Loring Brace, "A Non-Racial Approach Towards the Understanding of Human Diversity," in Montagu (1964), p. 104.

²⁵Cf. Hiernaux (Montagu 1964), pp. 31, 33; Livingstone (Montagu 1964), p. 48. And in the latter respect, cf. Montagu (1964), p. 13; Montagu (1974), pp. 376ff; Banton and Harwood (1975), pp. 31-32; and Van den Berghe (1981), pp. 27-28.

²⁶Livingstone (Montagu 1964), pp. 54, 48-49.

²⁷Van den Berghe (1981), p. 27.

²⁸In any case, Hiernaux has a misguided conception of definition. Most forcefully stated, definition just is 'equating a class with the unit classified.' Cf. Jean Hiernaux, "The Concept of Race and the Taxonomy of Mankind," in Montagu (1964), pp. 35-42.

²⁹"If it be argued that the human species is one (then) it consists of a group of populations which, more or less, replace each other geographically or ecologically...and not in...entities (i.e., races) which have no meaning." Montagu (1964), p. 9. My emphasis.

"...there is not a single biological or sociological datum which would in any way have negative bearing upon the recognition of the universal truth of human equality..."

Ashley Montagu, Statement on Race (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 127. Similarly, Hodge, Struckmann and Trost speak of "equality of all peoples." John Hodge, Donald Struckmann and Lynn Dorland Trost, The Cultural Bases of Racism and Group Oppression (California: Two Riders Press, 1975), p. 74.

³⁰Montagu (1972), p. 127.

³¹"The differences between the races are superficial...The differences...remain interesting...so long as we are not led to exaggerate their importance. Montagu (1972), p. 50.

³²Similar views can be imputed, in general, to S. Garn, Races (Springfield: Charles Thomas, 1968), pp. 126-127; and Carleton Coon, The Living Races of Man (New York: A. Knopf, 1965). p. 10.

³³Descartes refers to the 'objective reality' of an idea by which he means its content, sense or meaning.

³⁴In the Third Meditation Descartes qualifies this by stating that if the object to which one's idea refers does not exist, one cannot have (had) a clear and distinct idea of it. As a qualification of his theory of truth, this is clearly circular. Descartes must resort thus to arguments for God's existence and necessarily undeceiving nature. God is the guarantor of the existence of the material world, and so of truth. Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy tr. F. E. Sutcliffe (London: Penguin Classics, 1968), p. 113.

³⁵John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. D. Woozley (New York: Meridian, 1964), Bk. III, Ch. 6, #29; W. V. O. Quine, "Natural Kinds," in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 114-138.

³⁶Locke (1964), Bk. III, Ch. Three, #14-16; Kay Squadrito, "Racism and Empiricism," Behaviorism (January 1976): 112-113; Harry Bracken, "Philosophy and Racism," Philosophia (November 1978): 241-260; Noam Chomsky, Reflections on Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), pp. 130-311.

CHAPTER FIVE
RECONCEPTUALIZING RACISM

5.1. Socializing Biology: 'Social Race'

We have restricted ourselves thus far to the biological conception of 'race.' The foregoing analysis suggests that there is a general social understanding of 'race' which is to be differentiated from the strictly scientific. In this sense, 'race' is intended as a group of people self-defined or defined by other groups of people as different from these other groups on the basis of observable natural--that is, hereditary and innate--physical characteristics. These physical features are considered to be related inherently to intellectual, ethical and other attributes not strictly physical. So 'race' designates--in the words of Pierre van den Berghe--"a group that is socially defined but on the basis of physical criteria."¹

There are a number of 'racial tokens' by virtue of which races, socially defined, may be identified. First, physical traits--phenotypical characteristics transmitted genetically from one generation to the next (e.g., skin color). Complementing the strictly biological markers are two kinds of social or cultural badge: a uniform of sorts that has come to characterize the group in question (e.g., clothing of a distinct nature, or circumcision); or behavioral features such as habits, styles of conduct, bearing, etc. The larger the society, the

more biological (genealogical) the criteria invoked as the test of authentic racial membership; in small intimate societies membership is more or less implicit--one is known to belong or not (Pierre van den Berghe, The Ethnic Phenomenon, pp. 28ff; referred to hereafter in intralinear textual citations as Berghe, 1981). At the foundation of this social account of race is not so much the fact that there are different races, but the general belief that there are. Racial identity is a psycho-social phenomenon not necessarily predicated upon any ontological claim that races actually exist in nature.

We should not be overhasty in condemning a priori as irrational those members of a society who hold such beliefs. Beliefs of this kind might turn out to dovetail quite neatly with the strictly biological facts. Even where groupings on these perceptual criteria differ in some manner from the narrow biological classifications, the groupings might yet consistently reflect the apparent differences between bunches of individuals, more closely perhaps than the strictly biological taxonomy does. In terms of the biological criteria of race, for example, neither Jews nor blacks (qua 'black,' or 'Negro,' or 'non-European') qualify. Yet anti-Semitism and antipathy towards blacks are commonly regarded as the most widespread forms of racist belief and practice. It is all very well to infer from this that racism is by nature irrational: it presumes as races what in fact are not. This fails to acknowledge that one who restricts definition of 'race' to the biological may be racist. And it assumes a priori and hence unanalyzed the invalidity of the social conception. The problems of racism cannot be defined away so off-handedly.

This has led some social theorists to differentiate between 'race' and 'racial,' on one hand, 'ethny' and 'ethnic' on the other, in order to capture this distinction between the biological and the social. So there are different forms of discrimination: 'racist' and 'ethnocentric' (Berghe, 1981: 29).² However, the latter designations extend to references well beyond the scope to which we must restrict ourselves here.³ They are not the commonly used social terms and so augur confusion over some of the fundamental issues at hand. As noted, to be able simply to state the problem of racism, it suffices that people believe that there are races and racial differences. This shifts assessment of the justification of the beliefs, of their rationality, their morality and of the practices based on them, onto the grounds for those beliefs. We will remain therefore with the designations 'race' and 'racism.' This will serve to accentuate nuances in racism and racist thought. We turn now to define racism.

5.2. Racism Defined

5.2.1. Theoretical Presuppositions

'Race' is theoretically laden. It has been shown that we must choose the theoretical framework in terms of which the concept is to be defined and so acquires meaning. This choice of paradigm, to bend Kuhn's term slightly, is overdetermined by the purpose we project for the concept; by its function in relation to the web of other concepts from which the theory is woven; by ontological, epistemological and other philosophical considerations. The definition of race is informed by biological and social contexts. We can expect that the definition

of racism, by resting upon both these definitional contexts of race, displays the same sort of theory-ladenness.

Three criteria must be met in any definition of racism. First, the definition must meet the requirements of theoretical consistency and non-contradiction. Second, it must make sense of common social usage of the concept, subject to the strictures of the first criterion. Third, controversies surrounding racism cannot be prejudged by assuming in the definition of racism the controversial properties in question. We must be far more circumspect in our definition than almost all others have been in assuming a priori that racism is necessarily (a) irrational; (b) a set of prejudices; (c) only about groups; and (d) grounded in phenomenal properties as the basis of ascriptions of inferiority or superiority, with the view to domination/subjugation. Though this list is not exhaustive, it covers all the cases most commonly and plausibly considered definitive of racism.

In assessing whether each of these is a necessary condition of racism we must take care, as others have not, to neutralize any bias in favor of one kind of ontological and epistemological theory or another. This will enable us to consider objectively the relative tendencies of each in giving rise to racist beliefs and practices. Similar caution must be exercised in divorcing the definition of racism from any presuppositions specific to particular biological, social, political or economic theories. For instance, the tendency of some sociobiologists to define racism as a function of "our deeply rooted biological nepotism" (Berghe, 1981: xi) is clearly contrary to the

facts. It implies that all people are inevitably racist, and that everybody always was and always will be racist (Berghe, 1981: 29). Similarly, an account that holds racism to consist merely in rationalizations for any economic oppression of another group implies that "racism has been common in all ages and in virtually all parts of the world."⁴ Though a survey of Greek literature reveals an occasional vague reference to differences in blood or color, no developed theoretical accounts of racial differences will be found. As noted, the concept of 'race' only enters general social consciousness around the turn of the fifteenth century.⁵ Greeks tended not to differentiate human groups on the basis of biological differences. Rather, they labelled as 'barbarian' all persons or groups considered to differ in manners or cultural ways from themselves.

It cannot be assumed either that racism is an archaic ideological remnant of pre-industrial societies which will disappear, along with all ideology, as the result of industrialization. Nor can it be assumed that racism is simply the rationalized product of the capitalist mode of production, the effect of a 'false capitalistic consciousness' which will wither away with the state and capitalism's denouement. The former assumption is contrary to the rise of racism historically and to its continued presence in some socialist theory and practice.⁶ Like the biological account mentioned above, both presume that racism is irrational.

This proposed neutrality of definition thereby to avoid pre-determination of racism's essential character requires keeping a

further distinction firmly in view. Any definition of racism prescribes the limits of the explanatory account by circumscribing the phenomena deemed racist. Adequacy of explanation presupposes adequacy of definition; but the converse obviously is not necessarily true. We will consider here the common definitions of racism in terms of the four kinds of necessary properties cited above. It will be argued that conceptual inconsistencies are fundamental to all such definitions. Some of the confusions characterizing these attempted definitions will force us to address here the explanatory accounts underlying and supporting them.

5.2.2. Disavowing Common Conceptions

(a) The Presumption of Irrationality

The generally accepted definitions of racism in virtually every discipline addressing itself to this problem commonly presume that racism is irrational. In Chapter Two it was shown that the Hebrew Christian Tradition (HCT) of morality presupposes the logical equivalence of immorality and irrationality. Racist acts and beliefs, by transgressing the categorical imperative of treating other rational beings with the respect due to them as such, must be irrational and hence immoral. Conversely, in transgressing the categorical imperative racist acts are immoral and hence contrary to reason. But agents were found inculpable in significant ways for racist acts performed and beliefs held; and many racist acts and beliefs turned out to be permissible as such on this account of morality. This suggests that racism is not essentially irra-

tional; indeed, that racist acts and beliefs turn out in many instances to be rational. Irrationality cannot be assumed so easily as a necessary condition of racist acts and beliefs.

Irrationality is not a sufficient condition either. There are obviously many irrational beliefs and practices that have nothing to do with racism. For example: my belief that only clear substances count as water, and at the same time that this specimen of purified water is blue; or acts that follow directly from inconsistent deliberations--knowing that the peanuts I am eating are fatally harmful to my sole surviving kidney, yet persisting in eating them because of my belief that they are a great source of phosphate and protein. Any acceptable definition of racism must be neutral with respect to rationality. Only then can we assess if racism is ever rational on the basis of the theoretical structure of the arguments and beliefs, and of the truth or falsity of the empirical facts appealed to in justification of the beliefs and acts adjudged to be racist. In this way, we can establish the conditions, if any, of racism's rationality.

(1) Biological Racism

Racism is discrimination against members of a race perceived to be other than the agent's own. The further characterization coming to mind in establishing racism as irrational is biological in nature. Racism could be defined as irrational if it was found to be the product of biologically programmed preference by humans, like other animals, for their own kind or sub-species. If this is the case, accordingly,

racism would be irrational in the biological sense of pre-rationally motivated behavior. This is just one interpretation of irrationality among others. Under another interpretation, the same form of racism turns out to be justifiably rational: Increased fitness for survival is considered the ultimate biological purpose. Cross-mating by members of the different human races, like those of other species, supposedly reduces fitness of offspring for survival. If racism has as its fundamental goal the prevention of such cross-mating, then insofar as it is effective in attaining this goal, it fulfills its biological function. Racism could be praised thus as 'biologically rational.'

The argument clearly rests upon questionable premisses.⁷ This does not concern us. What is pertinent is that the sense of irrationality as 'biological preference' is either unspecified or abstrusely metaphorical. In the former instance, the underlying neutrality with respect to the question of racism's rationality remains hidden; in the latter instance, the sense is unclear. The biological tack does not help at all in clarifying the nature of racism.

This prompts two further attempts to characterize racism as irrational. First, the biological reductionism inherent in the attempt to characterize racism as irrational in the biological sense has inspired the sociobiological analysis of racism. Second, concern with 'capacity to interbreed'

has been displaced by the attempt to locate the source of racism purely within the limits of human sexual drives and their defence mechanisms.

(ii) The Sociobiology of Racism

The sociobiological paradigm holds that members of the various human races, like other animals, have reached the point--via selection--of kin preference: reproductive partiality to kin maximizes the inclusive fitness of the intra-breeding kin. Human organisms are simply frameworks for the natural selection of reproductively successful genes; and genes favoring intra-kin relations, biological history has proved, have selective advantage. Racism emphasizes genetically heritable phenotypes in selection of sexual partners--and all other fraternal relationships are seen to be to this reproductive end. These phenotypes are considered the most reliable markers, given current knowledge, of kinship or genetic relatedness. Racism must be irrational by nature, so the argument concludes, for this underlying genetic determinism of human behavior functions irrespective of whether or not human agents are conscious of it (and for the most part they are not).⁸

The biological data accepted by sociobiology as true are highly questionable, often metaphorically formulated, and sometimes incomprehensible. More to the point, the inevitable implications of sociobiology are contrary to well-established

fact. Van den Berghe's denials to the contrary notwithstanding, the sociobiological paradigm implies that racism has existed and will continue to exist universally as long as its beliefs and practices facilitate the health and existence of reproductively successful genes. Van den Berghe considers this an empirical question. He responds--unsupported by any evidence or reason--with a resounding denial (Berghe, 1981: 29). Fundamental confusion lies at the heart of Van den Berghe's reply: Racism has not always existed; nor do members of every race discriminate racially against those of all--or often any--others. Such considerations are empirical. There is hope, for these and other reasons, that racism will not persist infinitely. But the sociobiological paradigm has as a theoretical implication that racism is universal, in both the temporal and spatial senses. A denial of universality must be established theoretically, that is, by qualification of the thesis. Given the paradigm, any such successful qualification could only be at the expense of biological determinism, and so too of the notion of irrationality at issue in this theory. The irrationality here characterizes racism not so much as it does sociobiologists of Van den Berghe's ilk.⁹

(iii) Sexual Racism

The biological approach, whatever its various guises, adopts the criterion of 'reproductivity' or 'the capacity to interbreed' as a mark of the racial. We must consider, in contrast,

Charles Herbert Stember's interpretation of racism in terms of sexuality (Stember's book Sexual Racism, will be referred to hereafter in intralinear textual citations as Stember, 1978).

Stember does not interpret racism as a function of the biological deterrent to interbreed with members of the same race. Racism is held instead to be the rationalization by the male members of the race of the unconscious fear of losing (potential) female sexual partners to male members of other races. Though the rationalization may be explicitly in terms of 'racial purity,' it is argued that the actual motivation is the concern with 'sexual deprivation' or fear of unfulfilled sexual drives, impotence, and so on (Stember, 1978: 12-13).¹⁰ The fundamental motivation of such rationalizations and practices is irrational: Those overcome by this kind of fear and anger are unaware of its source hidden deep within. It is buried quickly beneath the self-explanatory banner of 'concern for racial purity' (Stember, 1978: 13, 21-2; 25).

Counterexamples spring readily to hand: What of the racial discrimination of a white homosexual against black men or women? Or of white women against black men or women, and of the latter's response? If we relax for the moment our standards of intellectual rigour, some extension of the theory probably could be found to account for such obvious variations.

There are further blatant counterinstances nevertheless that even theoretical laxity cannot dispel. White heterosexual men (or, generally, men of a particular race) often consort openly, freely and non-discriminatorily with black heterosexual men (or men of another race) without suffering sexual anxiety of any kind in relation to the latter (or anybody else). These same men may be racist--even viciously so--towards members of other racial groups, interpreted biologically (e.g., Mongoloids) or socially (e.g., Jews). No reasonable extension of any theory can be drawn so as to account for the occurrence of phenomena the possibility of whose occurrence the theory explicitly excludes in the first place (Stember, 1978: 144-165).

Stember illustrates his analysis by references to popular racist literature. Interpretation of this literature corroborates Stember's thesis only if the term 'intermarriage' as it occurs here is read always as 'sexual equality,' a move Stember is ever quick to make (Stember, 1978: 27-28). This only tilts the scales a priori in favor of the view that racism is irrational. Any rejection of racial intermarriage is considered accordingly rejection of sexual equality between the races. And sexual motivation by nature is not rational. Even if 'fear of intermarriage' is fear of sexual equality, this fear is never considered simply as an absolute evil. What are feared are not so much sexual status and lack of satisfaction, but the further consequences in which intermarriage

is taken to result. These include breakdown in the moral fabric and culture of the society in general, and perhaps that very eventuality which Stember dismisses as mere rationalization--'racial impurity' (Stember, 1978: 20, 24).

Like the biological accounts, this theory undertakes to reduce all racist beliefs and practices ultimately to the single factor of sexual drives and its concomitant fears. But for a reductionistic theory of this kind to succeed in interpreting phenomena apparently so diffuse, it must be universally applicable, capable of analyzing every occurrence of a racist nature in its light, and admitting of no exceptions. Now logical problems with the general form of reduction aside,¹¹ past experience of reductionistic theories especially in application to the complexities of social phenomena reveals that rigid application turns out ultimately to be dogmatic. Its success depends usually on perversion of the evidential data to fit the theory.¹² We will call this 'the dogma of universal reduction.' It is difficult to imagine that a white realtor's fear of falling property values because blacks are moving into the neighborhood is sexual at basis. The thesis of 'sexual racism' can be held only by ignoring such facts.

Stember's particular form of reduction rests upon one interpretation of psychoanalytic theory. We turn now directly to psychoanalytic accounts of racism to assess their ability in settling this problem of definition.

(iv) The Psychoanalytics of Racism

Assuming the sexual dimension to be the mainspring of racist attitudes, these attitudes are then interpreted variously by psychoanalytic theories as follows: In terms of 'super-ego concerns' and 'id-concerns,' on the one hand. Here, sexual enmity is viewed merely as the projection of the racist's own undesirable, hidden alter-egoistic impulses onto a 'minority out-group.'¹³ On the other hand, racist attitudes are considered more popularly as rationalizations of incestuous desires and the Oedipus complex. The details of analysis differ sharply from one account to another.¹⁴ In general, the fear, anger and resentment purportedly characteristic of racism are taken to be sexually motivated. In this, the psychoanalytic paradigm simply reiterates the shortcomings of Stember's account.

It was argued above that the basis of all racist beliefs and practices is not merely sexual. Certainly, introduction of racist hiring policies to maintain a surplus labor force is not sexually motivated. Psychoanalytic theories commonly attempt to explain vastly differentiated phenomena by a single reductive cause. They commit what we characterized above as 'the dogma of universal reduction.' If this assumption of the universal sexual basis is false, the issue subsequently demanding attention is whether the emotional components central to racist beliefs and practices--fear, anger, resentment, etc.--are somehow rational. While our emotions may be irrational in

origin, this does not mean that they necessarily exclude the rule of reason. Where fear arises as a result of a rational belief about the given circumstances, it may be said that the emotion is rationally grounded. Aristotle's analysis of the virtues as mean states between two extremes proves instructive.¹⁵ Too much fear amounts to paranoia, too little to bravado. The acts prompted in part by such emotional states (motivated by the appropriate desire) may be characterized similarly. The question of the rationality of emotions (here, the suitable amount of fear) turns on the circumstantial evidence (Aristotle's right place, time, manner, object, people) and the rationality of the beliefs underpinning them. If the racist's fear or anger is not always sexually motivated but is in some instances a function of well-formed beliefs, racism cannot be inherently irrational. That this is conceivable militates against the necessarily irrationalist perspective of psychoanalytic theory. We will return to a more detailed analysis of the rationality of racist beliefs in the following chapter.

Joel Kovel's White Racism--A Psychohistory (referred to hereafter as Kovel, 1970)¹⁶ attempts to free a psychoanalytic account from restriction to the sexual basis of racism. Although Kovel eventually resorts to analyzing racism in Oedipal terms (Kovel, 1970: 72), he begins by defining it as a set of 'mysterious psycho-social symbols and fantasies' holding "an irrational power over us" (Kovel, 1970: 5, 13, 14).

These symbols and fantasies serve to hide, through rationalization, "the random oppression of another person." Through history, this oppression has slipped away from being directly and consciously dominative of others to one that is perpetuated unconsciously via "inner connections with the symbolic matrix" that is constitutive of culture (Kovel, 1970: 178, 211, 94). Accordingly, the history of race relations, and therefore implicitly the existence of races, have generated the symbols and fantasies definitive of racism (Kovel, 1970: 5). Kovel realizes later that if he is to sustain the 'unconscious, symbolic, mysterious fantasy' thesis, he will have to argue also that the concept of 'race' is a symbolic fantasy, historically produced perhaps, but with no other objective basis. Without denying his previous claims, Kovel asserts that racism, via its constitutive symbols and fantasies, creates races as symbolic fantasies through history and culture with the view to random human oppression (Kovel, 1970: 178, 94). The existence of races precedes and gives rise to a racism whose symbols and fantasies create those races to begin with. The particular ends this process putatively sets out to institute are merely random and not specific at all. The irrationality, it seems, is more characteristic of those who assume it of racism than it is of the racism they are undertaking to analyze.¹⁷

(v) Economic Racism

This tendency to reductionism, both in definition and

analysis, is reiterated by economic accounts of racism. For example, in 1958 a leading South African labor analyst argued that racism was an illogical political ideology designed to serve only the short-term political interests of the ruling Afrikaner population. It was destined in the long run to drag the country into a destructive civil war between its various racial groups. By restricting the free operation of the laws of the capitalist market, racism must be economically irrational. Ridding the economy of all politically imposed racist institutions and barriers (for example, the job color-bar restricting certain categories of work to whites) would allow these laws to operate freely. Consequently, black labor would be able to compete unrestrained against their white counterparts for jobs on the open market. On the basis of W. W. Rostow's five stages of economic growth, liberalization of the society at large--political, legal, cultural--would follow inevitably.¹⁸

Rationality here is simply consistency with the free unhindered effect of the economic laws of the market, most fundamentally those of supply and demand. Racism supposedly obstructs and redirects the pure effects of these laws to its own perverted self-defined ends. It is therefore contrary to reason. At work is an extended mode of reduction: The values by which we ought to abide are strictly determined by economic laws in their natural form. Any values imposed upon the economic are nothing more than irrational distortions. This

fundamental assumption is misleading. Economic rationality on the capitalist model is defined usually in terms of maximization of profit. Where racism facilitates this end it is economically rational. Neo-Marxists were quick to point this out in the South African context. They have shown that there are strict relations between the introduction of specific racist legislation, the impoverishment of labor and subsequent increased returns on capital.¹⁹

Considerations of the latter sort have led the economic reductionism to be defined in terms even more direct. Racism is considered, by Marxists and liberals alike, as an ideology born to serve the interests of colonialism²⁰ and to justify economic exploitation and subjugation of the indigenous or imported labor force by and for the interests of capital.²¹ If racism amounts to nothing more than rationalized justification of economic disparity and exploitation, appropriate changes in the economic system must suffice to rid us of the rationalizations by abolishing the exploitative acts in question. Two counterfactuals contradict this thesis. First, it is possible to legislate against racist practices with no economic effect. Second, racism characterizes members of both exploited and exploiting classes, and of vastly differentiated economic systems.

Racism is not reducible without remainder to economic determinations.²² The question remains whether each instance of the general set (each belief, practice, institution, etc.)

is reducible, albeit to different material causes in each case, yet reducible nonetheless. If this could be demonstrated, racism would still be no more than rationalizations for ends other than its own. These ends would be dictated by the 'material' realm in question.

Now there are many phenomena which must be considered racist yet which evidently are not so motivated. The most reasonable examples are suggested by taking some of the expressed concerns of contemporary racists at their face value instead of attempting to reduce them, by some contorted machinations, to an underlying level. Many racist concerns today have no reference at all to economic considerations. They are restricted to the sole concern of maintaining a unique, traditional cultural heritage, felt to be threatened by the influx of new immigrant cultural values.²³ There need be no hidden economic motivation to the resentment of those white English folk who find their neighbourhood transforming culturally from one of 'privacy, chamber music and bacon'n eggs' to that of 'public steel drum music, West Indian food and natty dreadlocks,' or of white Germans from that of 'Wagner and schnitzel' to 'belly-dancing, sheesh kebap and Turkish delight.' It cannot be concluded that there is anything inherently irrational in this resentment. Of course, this leaves open whether the acts to which this resentment may lead are irrational or not.

Any strict reduction of ideologies, social theories and rationalizations to 'material' factors like the economic is acknowledgment of the irrationality of the rationalization. Rationality must be answerable ultimately only to the dictates of its self-imposed criteria (the 'laws of reason'). Conversely, where the decisive power of determination lies outside the scope of reason, the phenomenon is to that extent irrational. 'Racism' covers extremely wide scope in its signification: beliefs, practices, principles, institutions. No single factor on its own is capable of providing a causal account of all the phenomena falling properly within its range--whether biological, sexual, psychoanalytic or economic. Racism is not exclusively the causal product of determinations external to the conscious deliberative agent, prior to reason and to that extent irrational.²⁴ This critique establishes only that racism is not essentially irrational. It cannot be defined as such. To establish positively that at least some racist beliefs and acts are rational, it must be demonstrated that they are capable of meeting the self-defined criteria, strictures and ends of reason. This will be addressed in the following chapter.

(b) Racial Prejudice

If racism is to be defined by the social sciences it must adopt an approach different in kind from the preceding ones. Standard accounts in mainstream psychology and sociology have

recognized this. They broach the subject by analyzing the cognitive structure of belief systems. These accounts are singular in defining racism as a species of prejudice, and on that account irrational. It may be responded that any definition of racism assuming it simply to be irrational is inadequate because question-begging. But we need to assess this general approach more carefully to determine whether it suffers any deficiencies peculiar to its own formulation.

In the sense at issue here, a prejudice may be defined as an antipathetic, hostile attitude, expressed or felt, towards a person as a group member. The object of the prejudice is presumed, by faulty and inflexible generalization, to bear those characteristics, usually reprehensible, which putatively define the group. For any judgment of a person to qualify as prejudiced, it must meet the following criteria: Judgment must be executed without full knowledge of the facts. The question, then is whether it is reasonable to expect the judge to have been in possession of these facts. If not, then the prejudicial judgment must be a function of a logical error. This logical error may arise in one of two ways: the judge improperly categorized the individual judged as a member of the group in question; or the judge wrongly inferred that the individual is characterized by the relevant properties because a group member. Prejudice operates mainly by the process of stereotyping and is marked fundamentally by the subject's intolerance towards the object.²⁵

Prejudice has both an attitudinal (belief) and a behavioral²⁶ component. An agent's prejudicial act is one (at least partly) motivated by the relevant prejudicial beliefs, where these beliefs are constituted in the manner defined above. The formulation of prejudice in these terms is prompted by the positivistic concern of the behavioral sciences to measure attitudes and quantify beliefs. Traditionally, behaviorists have been over-ready to assume quantifiability as the beacon of science. For the behavioral sciences, prejudices are only worth their value on the 'scale of prejudice.'²⁷ In spite of the proliferation of scientific neologisms and mathematical formulae, this measurement of prejudice is capable of furnishing only very approximate descriptions of people's beliefs and behavior towards each other. If agents are self-conscious about their prejudicial attitudes (and they often are), they will be reluctant usually to admit them openly. After all, this is partly the nature of prejudice. In spite of checks and balances, we can never be sure that the attitude/belief reports are sincere. So the data base is evasive. This approach provides no ground for a proper comprehension of racism. In any case, descriptions fall far short of explanation. Descriptions of the relevant phenomena furnish the data to be analyzed. Explanation of prejudicial beliefs and behavior require conceptual analysis and phenomenal interpretation.²⁸

Conceptual and quantificational difficulties with the notion of 'prejudice' notwithstanding, we must still establish whether

racism in all cases is prejudicial, as is all too often assumed. It is easy to cite instances of racism that meet the criteria of prejudice offered here. But if it is to be defined as prejudice, racism must be so always. The definitive features of prejudice can be summarized as follows: a prejudgment; it rests on factual mistakes or the logical error of overgeneralization (i.e., characterizing an individual a priori in terms of universals); it differs from a simple prejudgment in that it is fundamentally aversive, i.e., it is characterized not only by a negative attitude towards its object but discourages modification in the face of further available information.²⁹ The dogmatic feature of prejudice (which seems so much to have dazzled social scientists) consists in the agent's persistent refusal to acknowledge the relevant information even when readily available; and when the agent fails to possess this information, in his or her denial that further relevant information potentially exists. Yet the following case must be considered a prejudice too: though the possibility of countervailing evidence is acknowledged, the agent persists in the overgeneralization on the information currently available.

Are these the criteria according to which we judge anything 'racist'? Establishing what amounts to potentially relevant information is often less straightforward than it seems. This is especially so in respect of races. The facts here are by nature theoretically constituted. It is conceivable that one criterion

by which we assess the reasonableness of judgments about another group (race) is the judge's past experiences of group members and the care taken in applying the judgment so formed to any further member of the group encountered. An agent may construct an 'ideal type' (set of characteristics) for a racial group on the basis of past experience to use as a guide for responses in daily experience. In each case, care is taken to establish that a particular individual is a member of the race and has acquired the relevant racial characteristics (within acceptable degrees). Where the individual is found to bear the traits in question, he or she is treated aversively in relevant ways. Otherwise, the agent remains neutral. The agent patently avoids any prejudice on the definitional criteria cited above. Though care is taken to meet traditional standards of rationality, we still would brand 'racist' the person who so acts. Cases like this may not be the norm; they are possible nevertheless. There are instances of racism that involve neither factual errors nor logical fallacies, and the value claims of which are grounded undeniably in past experience. Racism cannot be defined simply as prejudice.

In surveying the standard definitions of racism as irrational and prejudicial it is apparent that social scientists, biologists and sociobiologists have confused what can be characterized--with due deference to the philosophers of science--'the context of definition' with 'the context of explanation.'³⁰ Social scientists largely proceed by providing first explanations of

racism and only then--often in an introduction formulated after the body of the text--turn to define the concept.³¹ The definitions serve really as summaries or telescoped surveys of the major explanatory features. It comes as no surprise that the explanation appears to be derived deductively from the definition. So constituted, the definition reflects not the phenomenon as it occurs in the world, but some idealized theoretical construction. Philosophy since Socrates has taught us that talk about something improperly defined is bound to be talk about nothing.

(c) Racism as Group Categorization

The attempt to define racism as prejudice reveals another misnomer common to conceptions of racism in the social sciences. Though some psychologists reduce racism to individual feelings, many social scientists construe it strictly in group terms. Any reference to 'individual feelings' is in terms of some underlying collective determination--be it an archetypal innate disposition, an authoritarian personality type, or a group experience. This has serious methodological implications. Usually the groups are considered not as collections of individuals but as universals transcending the total sum of qualities of their particular constituents. These universals are assigned an ontological status and character of their own and assumed to occasion individual behavior in fundamental respects.

The clearest statement that racism is essentially a group phenomenon is furnished by Harold Blumer: "...a race prejudice

exists in a sense of group position rather than in a set of feelings which members of one racial group have towards members of another racial group...(This) focuses interest on the collective process by which a racial group comes to define and re-define another racial group."³² Blumer's account of racism fails to include those instances of prejudice against individuals qua individuals and not simply as group members. Individuals different from ourselves, and this includes racial differences, may be prejudged by us precisely because of these differences and independent of their group (or racial) membership.³³ A Jew properly judges a particular individual to be an Arab on the basis of the relevant phenotypical markers. It is possible that the Jew is prejudiced against this individual on the basis of his general dislike of these characteristics, irrespective of any further endearing features the Arab (as Arab) might possess. Considerations such as these have encouraged some consciously to avoid any emphasis at all upon a group basis in their definitions of prejudice.³⁴

The methodological problems afflicting the 'group thesis' are equally severe. Basic to Blumer's view is the underlying premise that groups have a separate ontological status from, perhaps prior to, that of the individuals comprising them: "It is important to recognize that this sense of group position transcends the feelings of the individual members of the dominant group, giving such members a common orientation that is

not otherwise to be found in separate feelings and views."³⁵

It is crucial to recognize that some philosophers--especially moral philosophers--have reproduced this methodological approach. A central tenet of the Hebrew Christian tradition of common morality is the relegation of individuals to mere exemplars of the moral law. An individual, insists Kant, is worthy of respect and hence moral only to the extent that he or she exemplifies the moral law.³⁶ Contemporary moral theories in the Hebrew-Christian tradition reiterate this formalism: Rawls, for example, abstracts ex hypothesi from any and all characteristics (most significantly racial ones) that identify persons as individuals. For Baier, more explicitly, the only interesting form of racism from a moral point of view is 'grounded racism.' As noted, this consists only of those acts--individual or institutional--done for the sake of the racist principles and policies motivating them and irrespective of whether they appear to have racist effects or not. The anti-individualist strain is quite apparent: Racist acts, individuals and institutions are merely instances of the implementation of abstract principles. The acknowledged implication of this borders on the bizarre. An institutional officer simply using existing racist institutional rules to advantage herself or her constituents without believing in the truth of the principles--without acting for the sake of the principles--is not racist.³⁷ Consider the following example. In the 1940's, a white professional baseball player of average ability, without

wishing to perpetuate the league's policy to exclude blacks from playing for its own sake, used the policy in various ways to ensure his own extended employment.³⁸ On Baier's view the player was not racist (though he may have been immoral on some other ground). The traditional approach prides itself for capturing our common moral beliefs. Yet some of its primary precepts fly in the face of our most basic moral intuitions as regards racial discrimination.

The primary reason racism has been defined so often in group terms--whether directly or as a function of principles abstracting from individual features--is the widespread concern to dismiss it on grounds of illogicality: On the basis of the characterization of some group members racists assert that all group members are so constituted. It is crucial to notice by contrast that the essential methodological ploys of racism are by no means exhausted by this overgeneralization of particulars. "The concrete is concrete," Marx reminds us, "because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse." And a few lines earlier, "...to begin with population would be a chaotic conception of the whole."³⁹ 'Population' is just a name for the collection of individual units. Populations display a wide range of variation across their individual members; species and sub-species are established properly by finding features common across individuals within suitable ranges.⁴⁰ An individual may lack a particular racial characteristic and yet be a member

of the race in question. Clearly, we must consider racist those who establish first whether particular individuals possess the racial trait(s) in question and proceed then to treat adversely only those characterized by such traits as it is thought any bearer ought to be.

A white Australian, for example, believes that any individual bearing a particular odor belongs only to the Aboriginal race indigenous to Australia. He admits openly that not all Australian Aborigines smell in this way. As an administrator, he decrees that only those Aboriginal individuals actually characterized by this trait are to be washed, and failing elimination of the odor, are not to be employed in public jobs. The Australian administrator clearly discriminates on racial grounds against Australian Aboriginal bearers of the trait considered aversive. He does not discriminate against the Aboriginal group as a whole (at least not in this respect).

Races are nothing more than collections of their individual members and the relations between them. They are not entities with separate ontological status, a group character or group mind of their own. Under this interpretation, individual members of a race still may be subjected to racial discrimination--not as group members but as individuals bearing racial characteristics. Racism thus cannot be defined essentially as a group phenomenon.

(d) Racism, Phenotypes and Hierarchies

One final set of considerations commonly assumed in definitions

of racism must be assessed. Racism is widely defined as the belief in or practice of differentiating population groups on the basis of their typical phenomenal characteristics, and then ordering the groups (races) so distinguished as superior (dominant) or inferior (subordinate) on the basis of such traits and their putative links, a priori or observed, to the intelligence and culture of the peoples in question. Some accounts assume as a necessary component of racism an emphasis of phenomenal or phenotypical traits that are directly perceivable (especially skin color, but also odor, head and body size and shape, hair texture, etc.). Others emphasize phenotypical characteristics in a sense only indirectly perceivable (especially blood).

Now the total number of polygenes determining the various individual characteristics of human beings is large, indeed, too large to be analyzed genetically given the current state of knowledge (Baker, 1974: 110). For this reason, many have considered it proper to resort to morphological characteristics in identification and classification of races. Phenotypical traits are used "as probabilistic markers of common descent" or race (Berghe, 1981: 31). When carefully executed, there is nothing intrinsically objectionable to this procedure. Those identifying emphasis upon phenotypical characteristics as an essential feature of the definition of racism object really to the racist's concern to establish as inferior or superior the individual(s) in question solely on the basis of their display of the trait supposed

to be racially relevant. In this regard, identification and ordering in terms of skin-color is considered most commonly to be the cause of vice.

(1) Directly Perceivable Phenotypes: Skin Color and Odor

Some define racism explicitly in terms of skin color.⁴¹

Many others, careful to define racism quite generally, retreat in their explanations to presuming that racism is largely or even completely exhausted by the prejudices of whites against blacks on grounds of the difference in color.⁴² This emphasis upon color as the basis of analysis of racism is usually explained in terms of 'group cohesion' or 'color symbolism.' Many sociological studies suggest that group members, naturally attracted to each other by mutual resemblance (in this case, similarity in skin color), display much greater affinity ('positive attitudes') to each other than they do to non-members. Conversely, they are more threatened by the latter than they are by their own kind. Racist beliefs and behavior supposedly are motivated by these projected threats.⁴³

There is a long tradition in popular Eastern metaphysics that has assigned value--moral and aesthetic--to colors. This has prompted Roger Bastide to suggest that, "In human thought every gulf or separation tends to take the form of a conflict of color...Christianity has brought no exception to this very general rule."⁴⁴ It is widely assumed that the roots of segregation and discrimination are to be discovered here. To

English speakers in the sixteenth century, 'black' signified 'deeply stained with dirt; foul; malignant; related to death; sinister; wicked; disgraceful; and liable to punishment.' 'White' signified 'purity; virginity; goodness; justice; and truth.'⁴⁵ White and black peoples accordingly come to perceive and think not only of the other in these terms but of themselves too. The European's contact with the Asian or 'yellow' peoples is explained in similar fashion: 'yellow' traditionally has signified treason for Christianity.

These considerations obviously colored the attitudes of white European Christians. These terms often carried veiled references to class, power, wealth, culture and education. It is not unreasonable that color has been adopted as a mark of differentiation of population groupings. It is undeniably present and visible, and sight is dominant amongst the sensory faculties, as Sartre emphasizes. Nevertheless, a pre-conscious color-attitude does not pervade and define all interactions between members of the different races. Many considerations cast doubt upon the presumption that 'color racism' exhausts all racist phenomena.

First, black intellectuals like Aime Cesaire responded to color-based attacks by undertaking to arouse the self-image of black men. To this end universal black characteristics were suggested connoting joy and beauty. These were thought to be located in blackness as such. It may be asked how we

are to understand and act in terms of concepts which connote contradictory meanings. If 'black' signifies to some values that are negative, to others positive ones, we cannot formulate on an objectively neutral account of the meaning of the term alone a consistent conception of racism. Further, the designation 'black' for the population group in question became popular only in the 1960s (though it was used occasionally centuries ago). Prior to this, the same people were referred to as 'colored.' This also has enjoyed popularity only quite recently. Over the past two centuries racist or racial designations for the most part either have not been color-bound at all, or only secondarily so. The prevailing concern generally has been with otherness: with 'Caucasians,' 'Asiatics' or 'Orientals,' and 'Negroes;' with 'natives,' 'non-whites,' 'non-Europeans,' with 'nigger' and 'kaffir,' and so on.⁴⁶ Color has been only one marker of difference--of power, class, wealth, status, education, intelligence--amongst a number; albeit the most visible.

Further reflection serves to deepen this skepticism. People who are genetically blind or color-blind are capable of distinguishing between members of different races on the basis of odor, skin-texture, etc. They may discriminate against others on this basis too.⁴⁷ If there are no good reasons to deny that such discriminations are racist, and it seems there are not, color cannot be essential to the

definition of racism. This is corroborated by experiences in various parts of the world. Although racism is not foreign to East Asia, those of European descent for the most part are not referred to there as 'the white man.'⁴⁸ Similarly, Latin Americans consider color to be only one simple element in the complex of an agent's entire social position. Discrimination solely on the basis of this one trait lies largely outside the scope of the Latin's experience.⁴⁹ The most evident variety of non-color racism is anti-Semitism, widely accepted as one of racism's most prevalent forms. Clearly, racism cannot be restricted to discriminations on the basis of color.

Emphasis of any other particular visible phenomenal trait similarly must be deemed inessential to the definition of racism. Odor is the only other phenomenal characteristic sufficiently distinguishable and universal as a functional marker of differentiation. The various human races exude odors that are produced endogenously, originating from the a-glands of the axillary organ, the genito-anal region and in semen. Differing from personal smells exogenous in origin (those produced by food, tobacco, drugs, etc.), these endogenous 'racial' odors are thought to have a function related to sexual allurements. They are supposedly attractive in their unadulterated form to other racial members of their own kind while repellent to members of other races (Baker, 1974: 171ff).

This is no basis for discriminations of a racist kind. Personal odor--whether uniquely racial or not--can be and is masked with great ease. It fails to furnish a consistent basis for racial differentiation and adverse discrimination. The following example highlights the issue: A white model is refused work modelling perfume aimed at black custom in North American society on the basis of incongruous natural body odor. It cannot be alleged that the model is a victim of racism on this account alone. If refusal is maintained when the perfume clearly hides the natural body odor, we may be led to reverse judgment. Racism evidently must lie in more than just the raw fact of differences in odor.

This argument can be generalized to cover any other directly perceivable phenotype. All things racist are not exhausted by discriminations against people on the basis of directly perceivable phenomenal characteristics. Racial discriminations need not be carried out on this basis at all. So racism cannot be defined essentially in these terms.

(ii) Indirectly Perceivable Phenotypes: Blood

It appears that the only remaining alternative is for racism to be conceptualized strictly in terms of blood: Racism is the view that bearers of certain kinds of blood are superior to others. The history of racist thought has been interpreted in this way by those who find the concept of 'blood' permeating some aspects of racist literature and

legislation. Philosophical spokesmen for the nobility in the eighteenth century, such as Comte Henri de Boullainvilliers, adopted blood as a symbolic object. They extolled it as the bearer of such virtues as courage, energy, fortitude, in a word, noblesse.⁵⁰ Here blood signifies lineage. With the entrenchment of the bourgeoisie and the rise of biological science in the following century, "the concern with genealogy became a preoccupation with heredity" in which "the symbolics of blood" were displaced by the "analytics of sexuality."⁵¹ Blood was presumed the apparatus whereby group characteristics were transferred from one generation to the next. 'Race' was defined simply as 'blood-relationship.' This furnished the basis for legal categorizations. The Texas statute book, for example, defined a Negro as "any person having in his veins any Negro blood whatever."⁵²

As biology gave rise to genetics increasing attention was focused upon blood as a strictly scientific object. The question of the relation of blood constitution to race then naturally had to be addressed. It had to be admitted that there is virtually no correlation between race and blood-type distribution: Distributions were found to be very nearly random for any acceptable racial typology.⁵³ One reason for this is that blood is a single characteristic, perceivable only indirectly. 'Race,' by contrast, has been defined increasingly in terms of an aggregated convergence of numerous

phenotypical traits. Blood begins to fade consequently as a determinant of race consciousness and accordingly as the basis in terms of which to define racism.

With this increased geneticizing of race and the complementary rejection of blood as scientifically relevant, racism can be tied still to a concern with blood only by focusing on Nazi ideology. Nazi ideologues attempted to reconstitute blood as a mythical, symbolic object: "Today a new belief is arising: the Mythus of blood; the belief that the godly essence of man itself is to be defended through the blood."⁵⁴ Hardly new, this represents merely the return to Boullainvilliers' aristocratic myth transformed into the larger twentieth century concerns with the Volk. Those trying to restrict the notion of racism to this sanguinary Nazi rhetoric fail to comprehend the wider modern dimensions of the problem that have insinuated themselves from the outset into modern biological science and into our traditional conception of rationality.

Racism is not exhausted by the putative appeal to phenomenal terms, directly or indirectly perceivable. The definition of racism cannot assume such an appeal as a necessary condition.

(iii) The Racial Domination Thesis

All the elemtns variously deemed essential thus far to the notion of 'racism' have turned out on closer inspection

to be contingent. Many have thought it undeniable, nevertheless, that racism is a set of beliefs or actions always predicating superiority of the agent's own race and inferiority of that of the victim (object), with the aim of domination and subjection. Two claims must be distinguished. First, the mere assertion of superiority of one (or some) race(s) and the corresponding inferiority of another (or others). This amounts to little more than a simple belief, or set of beliefs, that the inferiority is remediable--what Bracken calls 'soft racism.'⁵⁵ It suggests actions which at worst are paternalistic or complacent.⁵⁶ Second, it is often insisted that this belief in and expression of superiority and inferiority have as their sole end the domination and subjugation (political, economic or perhaps only cultural) of those races assumed inferior. The racist beliefs in question here, in Bracken's terms, are usually 'hard,' that is, rationalizations of the racially hierarchical differences as the irreversible and irremediable product of nature. They are understood both as motivating and as furnishing self-justifications for actions designed exclusively to maintain domination over those deemed members of the inferior racial group(s).⁵⁷

This domination and subjugation is assumed sometimes in definitions of racism to be a precondition in the presence of which racism is most likely to emerge.⁵⁸ Racism is explained

accordingly as consisting simply in ideological constructions whose sole aim is to rationalize the prevenient relations of subjugation.⁵⁹ On this view, racism is an effect of domination. The actual acts of domination and submission are causally explainable only in terms of motivational factors like desire for economic profit or the pleasure of domination. This fails to account for the typical racial constituency here of dominator and dominated. It seems more fruitful to define racism as the attempt to institutionalize the general belief that members of the superior races should rule over or dominate in some general sense those of inferior races.⁶⁰ We call this the 'racism as racial domination thesis' (RDT).

Now it is not the case that a belief that one is justified in dominating another rationally entails a belief in the inferiority of that person. The exigencies of realpolitik furnish ample evidence to the contrary. Neither need a belief in the innate inferiority of another entail a belief that one is justified in subjugating this other; nor need it give rise to domination, actualized or attempted. So the RDT can consist only in a conjunction of the claim to racial superiority or inferiority and the claim of self-justified domination of those considered members of inferior races.

Unlike the definitions dismissed thus far as inadequate this conjunction illuminates certain features of racism invariably overlooked, notably the kinds of sadistic qualities

often encouraged by racist relationships.⁶¹ Of course, racism does not in every case consist in a relationship; for example, a person may believe simply that a certain racial group is inferior or superior but in no way acts on the belief(s).⁶² Where racism consists in a relationship, it need not be one of domination (or the belief in domination). While believing in the inferiority of members of some races, inherent or induced, the racist may consider it a duty 'to civilize' (in a benign manner) those adjudged inferior. Neither component of the RDT conjunction holds universally. Racism cannot be defined in terms of the strong thesis that it implies, entails or aims always at domination.

(iv) Hierarchy and Superiority

The question remains whether at the very least racism consists in the belief in the superiority of some races (and their members) over others. So widely accepted is this view that the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy acknowledges it as "essential to racism and distinctive of it."⁶³ Here, too, the validity of common scientific and philosophical opinion must be queried. In certain circumstances, beliefs and acts predicated not only upon the more extreme claim of hierarchical distinctions but more simply upon assertions of racial differences must be deemed racist. Some racist claims are strictly cultural, making no appeal (direct or indirect) to 'material' (economic or sexual) factors. The same kinds of

appeal, currently the vogue in British politics, attest to the fact that some forms--new and few, perhaps, but racist nonetheless--are grounded solely upon claims of difference.

As Barker remarks:

The redefinition of racialism...leaves the new racists free from any imputation of claiming to be superior to other races. You do not need to think of yourself as superior--you do not even have to dislike or blame those who are so different from you--in order to say that the presence of these aliens constitutes a threat to our way of life.⁶⁴

It cannot be just the bald assertion of racial differences which renders a claim racist, though some would have us think so. It is, rather, a belief in such differences as justification for some manner of exclusion of those considered racially different from the agent. Once more, a feature generally thought essential to the notion of racism turns out under certain well-defined circumstances to be inapplicable.⁶⁵

Racism cannot be defined strictly in terms of beliefs of racial superiority, or the attempt to dominate, whether or not on the basis of this belief. It seems virtually impossible to determine any necessary features of racism. It is not necessarily irrational, inherently prejudicial, predicated

only about groups or judgments made on the basis of phenotypical traits with the aim of domination.

5.3. Racism Reconceptualized

We conclude that racism is not reducible to any single essential feature, or set of definite unchanging features, the existence of any one or all of which would be necessary for racism's presence. This conclusion is less surprising in light of the recognition that 'racism' does not refer straightforwardly to a single phenomenon. It signifies a cluster of various distinguishable phenomena, any one or small number of which must subsist, given the appropriate circumstances, for the designation properly to apply. It is unfitting to speak of necessary conditions, in the philosophically strict sense, for the existence of racism.

We have nowhere denied that, given specific psycho-social circumstances, racism may be a function of assumptions that are biological (5.2.2.a.i), psychological (5.2.2.a.iv; 5.2.2.b) or economic (5.2.2.a.v) in nature; or motivated by fears of sexual degeneracy (5.2.2.a.iii). To define racism thus, however, is to confuse explanation under one interpretation with definition. Nor have we denied that racism is often a species of prejudice (5.2.2.b), simply irrational (5.2.2.a) or a function of assumptions of questionable group membership (5.2.2.c) based upon putative possession of some phenotypical characteristics. The preceding analysis emphasizes only that racism cannot be characterized necessarily in terms of any of these features, taken singly or conjointly.

Racism is not a single reality, as it is so often taken to be.⁶⁶ It assumes widely variant forms: Generally, racism is often irrational. Yet racism must be considered rational in many more instances than is recognized commonly. More specifically, racism may be a function under varying conditions of strictly biological assumptions, of sexual motivations, or a product of our psychological constitution. It is often determined by economic and socio-historical factors. Racism assumes forms so basic and common to our culture, and is reflected often in the language we learn as children, that we take it invariably for granted. In this it is no different from any of a number of other socio-psychological features that render us specifically human. Racism may manifest itself in a set of beliefs, which may be held either as mere hypotheses to be given up if disconfirmed upon testing or as undeniable truths. Alternatively, it may manifest itself in an act or acts generated by such beliefs. The wider distinction is reflected in the beliefs themselves: as a belief in superiority or inferiority of the respective races, or just in their differences, on one hand; with a view to domination, on the other.

The conventional manner of definition by specifying necessary or sufficient conditions is inappropriate to the case of racism. Full comprehension of the various forms constituting racism, and of their occurrence in specific social, economic and historical circumstances, presupposes modes of analysis specific to the form in question. In some instances, various modes of interrelated analysis are required.⁶⁷ This will be illustrated in detail in Chapter Seven.

Racism is capable of wide diversity in form, function and specificity. It must be established nevertheless what it is that renders peculiarly racist any particular belief, act or outcome. Racism is a species of discrimination. It is constituted at the very least by a belief in racial difference or distinction--whether 'race' is interpreted strictly biologically or socially. But this cannot be the significant definitive characteristic of racism: We may believe rightly that we belong to a particular race distinct from others by virtue of possessing a racial phenotype different from theirs without thereby being in any way racist. As Peter Singer notes, discrimination between races as such cannot be the distinctive mark of racism save where the designation 'racism' is used in a 'morally neutral, descriptive and non-evaluative' sense.⁶⁸

This reveals a fundamental feature of racism considered in the evaluative or moral sense. Over and above the mere fact of difference, it is central to the concept of racism that the relevant beliefs and acts consist in the discrimination not merely between races but against members of a race the agent takes to be distinct from his or her own. In short, the discrimination must express preference, on biological or social grounds, for one race over and against another or others.⁶⁹ This mode of discrimination functions in terms of categories of inclusion and exclusion, and by extension, of endowment and disavowal, whether of characteristic properties of races, of entitlements or of rights, and of their respective values on some scale. So we would redescribe as racist the British

Parliamentarian who sees fit to differentiate, on the basis of great cultural distinctions, between indigenous Englishmen and colonial immigrants. He undertakes by such differentiation to exclude those he disavows of his own unique cultural heritage, thereby discriminating against them on the basis of their social race. Racism does not rest necessarily upon the presupposition that the agent believe the individuals in question are characterized deterministically by innate racial (genetic) differences, unchangeable and given for all time. The agent need not believe even that these characteristics, though inherited, are subject to evolutionary changes over long durations. It is enough, as anchor for discriminations of the racist sort, that the agent hold that the characteristics simply be acquired (biologically, culturally, ideologically, and so forth) from the racial group of which he takes the individual to be a member.

A subjective aspect and an objective aspect of racism can be distinguished. The subjective aspect consists in the agent's beliefs of a racist sort and in the intention to act in accord with these beliefs. This aspect of racism can be specified independent of whether any act is undertaken. This facilitates 'tagging' as racist anyone who merely holds beliefs of a racist kind without publicizing or acting on them, because the potential so to act is present; as well as anyone who has the discriminatory intentions of the relevant kind which nevertheless fail in every case to actualize. The agent could hold the relevant beliefs or have the intention in respect of no specific person(s), merely of some abstract group entity.

But this sort of 'softish racism' must be considered irrational, given that 'race' was defined earlier strictly in terms of its component members.

Though sometimes consisting merely in a set of beliefs or unfulfilled intentions, perhaps with no person(s) as its proper object, racism is to be predicated primarily of agents on the basis of their acts fueled by the relevant (conscious or unconscious) beliefs and intentions. These beliefs, intentions and acts have as their objects specified groups and their individual members. Sartre recognizes clearly that racism must "become a practice," that "it is not contemplation" but "a praxis illuminated by a 'theory' ('biological,' 'social,' 'empirical,'...it does not matter which)..." Perceptively, Sartre identifies within this drive of racist beliefs to actualize themselves in praxis not simply "self-justifying violence" but "the reciprocal interiorization of a single oppression."⁷⁰ Violence in the racist act is a function of the antagonism, the exclusion and the disavowal, the negation of the other's claim to entitlements, inclusion and endowments. Once initiated, this violence--which is at once a violation--induces a counter-violence that serves to typify the original 'object,' the violated, in terms of the racist's classification. In time, the racist identity takes on a rationale of its own. It assumes ultimately the mantle of self-identity, serving to corroborate the self-validating accusations, claims and theories of the racist. It does not follow that the racist escapes unscathed. As the master comes very soon to reflect slavish qualities, and the

sadist his object's, the racist reflects those of his victim. This theme will be developed more fully in Part Three.

Bearing all these qualifications in mind, racism can be defined summarily as follows: Racism rests upon those beliefs in respect of 'racial' differentiations by which agents take themselves as belonging to a race and others as belonging to other races. These supposed memberships are ascribed on the basis of the putative possession of purportedly differing racial characteristics (biological or social). Such ascriptions express racial preference and also reveal desired, intended or actual exclusions or inclusions, disavowals and entitlements, violations and violence. Racist acts based on such beliefs fall under the general category of 'discriminatory behavior against others in virtue of being deemed members of different racial groups.'

This definition is not designed to furnish essential properties presumed to constitute racism irrevocably and eternally. Neither are they sufficient conditions that are offered here. The cluster of properties suggested operate at levels of generality too great to serve as necessary or sufficient conditions. They are offered as general guidelines which, given specific circumstances, will help to determine whether a belief, intention, act, consequence, principle or institution is racist. Following Wittgenstein, we can say that all things racist bear to each other a family resemblance. There is "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail."⁷¹ The similarities and differences are detailed in Chapter Seven.

The significance and reference of 'racism' (or 'racialism,' 'racial prejudice,' etc.), like those of 'race,' have shifted and multiplied over time. It is not inconceivable that this trend will

continue, though the direction at this time is unpredictable. We need to ensure an openness both to phenomena possibly overlooked and to the contingency of new developments. Though bearing properties that fall outside those suggested here, these may be seen fit yet to be considered racist. The stringency of conceptualization in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions belies both possibilities.

This definition has been styled so as to be neutral with respect to any ontological or epistemological foundations. It rests nevertheless upon a form of the cluster theory of naming grounded in a use theory of meaning. Other leading candidates are hopelessly inadequate to the task at hand: Kripke's alternative of a causal chain of reference linked ultimately to an original baptismal ceremony seems self-evidently ludicrous in trying to make sense of ordinary references in daily usage of 'racism.' The contorted extremes of tabulation to which a formalized Fregean sense theory of the Katzian variety is driven in the effort to furnish an account of reference falls prey to Ockham's razor. The cluster theory has the virtue, ideological commitments to metaphysical foundations aside, of furnishing us with a general account of how 'racism' refers: As a cluster of descriptions one or more of which need be present for the designation 'racist' to be applicable, given the appropriate circumstances. It betters other philosophical theories of naming and reference in suggesting appropriate mechanisms by which the term refers.⁷² And it betters virtually all analyses of the concept which attempt and fail to reduce racism to a single causal explanans. Suffice it to

point out that the cluster theory has not been endorsed here for any name, referent or concept other than 'racism.'

Now the foregoing analysis suggests why racism has been elusive of the moral point of view, in general, and the traditional theory of morality, in particular. A moral theory may be capable of furnishing a moral indictment of racism under one specific interpretation. But there are other interpretations under which racism may fall which lie outside the scope of these theories. Equally, it may be that the original success of the moral theory blinds us to further interpretations of racism. Prior to addressing these issues in moral theory, we must consider in detail whether racism may be rational in some instances.

CHAPTER FIVE: FOOTNOTES

¹Pierre van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 9. Cf. Van den Berghe (1981), p. 29; E. U. Essien-Udom, "Tribalism and Racism," in Kuper (1975), p. 235; and Brace (Montagu 1964), p. 105.

²Cf. Montagu (1974), pp. 376ff; and Michael Banton, "The Concept of Racism," in Race and Racialism, ed. Sami Zubaida (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), pp. 31-2.

³'Ethnocentrism' was defined originally in 1906 by W. G. Sumner as the presumption of "one's own group ('in group' or 'we group') (as) the center of everything, and all others ('outgroup' or 'other group') are scaled and rated with reference to it." W. G. Sumner, Folkways (New York: Ginn Publishing Co., 1906), pp. 12-13; cf. R. A. Levine and D. T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism (New York: John Wiley, 1972), p. 9.

⁴Thomas Sowell, Race and Economics (New York: David McKay, 1975), p. 20.

⁵Despite the fact that at 1252a27 of Aristotle's Politics the term 'race' is used in translation, what Aristotle clearly intended here is 'the human race' or, properly speaking, 'the species.' This is simply the first step in the mischief that leads many to accuse Aristotle in particular and Greeks in general of racism. Cf. John Block Friedman, The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). For a view that attempts to argue that Imperial Rome certainly suffered its (occasional) excesses of racial prejudice and strife, but which really ends up corroborating the thesis here, see A. N. Sherwin-White, Racial Prejudice in Imperial Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

⁶Examples are cited in Z. A. Medvedev, The Rise and Fall of Lysenko, tr. I. M. Lerner (New York: Anchor Books, 1971) and Dominique Lecourt, Proletarian Science? The Case of Lysenko, tr. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1977).

⁷This has not prevented some biologists arguing that there is a tendency among members of different human races not to interbreed, and that this has its basis in our biology. Baker (1974), p. 96.

⁸Van den Berghe furnishes the most well-developed sociobiological account of racism. Van den Berghe (1981), pp. 35, 29-30, xii. Van den Berghe vacillates between emphasizing that racism is

irrational and admitting that it seems impervious to rationality, and racist sentiments "often seem irrational."

⁹Van den Berghe is not alone as a sociobiologist in holding these views. He boasts of approval of his views by the sociobiological pioneers, Wilson and Dawkins. Wilson views sociobiology as the scientific basis of a new ethic. If these are to be some of its tenets, one trembles at the prospects. E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1975), pp. 562ff.

¹⁰Stember especially has in mind the white man's fear, and accompanying anger, of the black male's potential fornication with the white female. He attempts to generalize the thesis by citing limited examples of other population groups, like Jews. The fear and anger are grounded in desire for and frustration of sexual excitement. Charles Herbert Stember, Sexual Racism (New York: Harper Colophon, 1978), p. 22; 34-6; 163-4.

¹¹Philosophically, this can be formulated as the impossibility of analyzing phenomena that fall under one logical category as causal effects of phenomena that fall under another category logically unconnected to the first, and where the former category cannot be reduced logically to the latter without residue. Cf. W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in From a Logical Point of View (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), pp. 37-42; W. V. O. Quine, "Russell's Ontology," in Essays on Bertrand Russell, ed. E. D. Klemke (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), p. 13; and A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge (London: Penguin Paperbacks, 1969), pp. 78-80; 82-83; 118-129; 210-214.

¹²Cf. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: Verso Books, 1978), pp. 55ff; and Popper (1966), II, pp. 215-216. Popper's criticism here is directed at Hegel, whom he badly misinterprets, and at the general basis of psychoanalysis, which he distorts by simplification.

¹³The prejudiced American, for example, supposedly projects his own repressed, super-egoistical desires of 'ambition, deceit, and greed' onto the Jew, and his id-desires of the 'flesh' onto the Negro. Thomas Pettigrew, "Complexity and Change," in The Negro American, eds. T. Parsons and K. Clarke (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 348.

¹⁴Larson suggests, simplistically, that white men in America desire black women because they "often" had black wet-nurses in the South. Others argue that racism, as the universal sexual attraction to sexual partners of another racial group, is just the hidden effort to avoid the incestuous desire for one's own group members. In

contrast to both, Bastide represents the innocent white woman as the tabooed symbol of freedom for the black man which aggravates the white male, provoking his resentment. Cf. C. M. Larson, Marriage Across the Color Line (New York: Johnson, 1965); R. Seidenberg, "The Sexual Basis of Social Prejudice," Psychoanalytic Review 38 (1952), p. 94; Roger Bastide, "Color, Racism, and Christianity," in Color and Race, ed. John Hope Franklin (Boston: Beacon Press), pp. 34-49; Stember (1978) 49-54.

¹⁵ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 6. Aristotle has in mind here the virtues as such. We are suggesting an outline of morally acceptable emotional expressions.

¹⁶ Joel Kovel, White Racism--A Psychohistory (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970).

¹⁷ For a similar criticism of psychoanalytic reductionism in respect of prejudice, cf. B. Bettelheim and M. Janowitz, Social Change and Prejudice (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 51ff.

¹⁸ M. C. O'Dowd was a member of the Board of Directors of De Beers Corp.. De Beers is the largest private mining interest in South Africa, and largest employer of black labor in the private sector. This view was very influential with 'liberal' businessmen in South Africa until the mid-seventies. The view is not very different from Sowell (1975).

¹⁹ Cf. Charles van Onselen, Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, 2 vols. (Britain: Longmans); R. Davies, et al., "Class Struggles and the Periodisation of the State in South Africa," Review of African Political Economy 7 (1976): 4-30; F. Johnstone, Class, Race and Gold (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); and Harold Wolpe, "Capitalism and Cheap Labour in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid," Economy and Society 1, 4 (1972).

²⁰ In the liberal tradition, see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), pp. 158-221. In the Marxist tradition, cf. Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism and Dictatorship, tr. Judith White (London: Verso Books, 1979), pp. 255, 267; Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology (London: Verso Books, 1977), pp. 81ff. For Poulantzas, racist ideology is simply one element of fascism. Fascism is analysed as a complex of 'overdeterminations' all reducible in the final analysis to a single element: the economic. Laclau has noted a similar reductionism in respect of the general analysis of fascism by conservative, liberal and Marxist commentators alike.

²¹In the liberal tradition, see William Julius Wilson, The Declining Significance of Race (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978), pp. 2-9. In the Marxist tradition, see Oliver Cromwell Cox, Class, Caste and Race (New York: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 322-323; Andre Gorz, "Immigrant Labour," New Left Review 61 (1970); M. Legassick and H. Wolpe, "The Bantustans and Capital Accumulation in South Africa," Review of African Political Economy 7 (1976): 87-107.

²²John Gabriel and Gideon Ben-Tovim, "Marxism and the Concept of Racism," Economy and Society 7, 2 (1977): 118-141.

²³"The area which I represent does not wish to be like Southall, which is synonymous with the Asian community. We wish to maintain our individuality." Robert Taylor, M.P., Hansard, House of Commons Official Report (England), Vol. 914, no. 137, Monday, July 5, 1976, p. 994. "I have seen my task as that of trying to keep all that is best in England and to be able to hand on to my children, as my father handed on to me, a country to be proud of, a homogenous nation sharing the same faith, history and background." John Stokes, M.P., Hansard (1976), p. 1065. Cf. Martin Barker, The New Racism (London: Junction Books, 1981), pp. 16, 19. The apartheid policy was established in South Africa by appealing to biological and economic factors. Hence Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, chief architect of the policy, in 1954: "There is no place for (the African) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labor." Senate Debates (South Africa), 16th June, 1954. By the 1980's, the official representation of the 'separate development' or 'Homelands' policy had shifted dramatically: "The White and Black segments of the South African population are bearers of very different cultures. Western cultures...remain differentiated...Although economic, political, religious and educational institutions can never be entirely isolated from one another, they are in Western cultures much more easily related to specialized forms of activity...All this is foreign to traditional African culture which is highly integrated." The South African Yearbook (Pretoria: South African Government Press, 1981), pp. 75ff. My emphasis.

²⁴See the insightful paper by Henri Tajfel, "The Roots of Prejudice: Cognitive Aspects," Psychology and Race, ed. Peter Watson (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1973), pp. 76-95.

²⁵This definition is reconstructed from the following sources with the view to furnishing the most coherent account of the concept in question: Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 6-9; J. M. Jones, Prejudice and Racism (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1972), pp. 2ff, 60ff; Jay Newman, "Prejudice as Prejudgment," Ethics 90 (October 1979): 47-57. Cf. Otto Klineberg, Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and

Winston, 1954); Saenger (1953), pp. 3, 153; Simpson and Yinger (1953), pp. 13-16; Zubaida (1970), pp. 18-19.

²⁶Allport (1954), pp. 13-15; J. Jones (1972), pp. 62ff.

²⁷"...quantification has become a kind of academic necessity; non-quantifiable phenomena are somehow regarded as less precise and to be taken less seriously. The development of measurement techniques within the social and behavioral sciences has, in many ways, corresponded to the development of the disciplines themselves." Roger Jowell, "The Measurement of Prejudice," in Watson (1973), p. 44.

²⁸Cf. Jowell (Watson, 1973), pp. 47-47, 55.

²⁹This is the only sense we can impute to Allport's claim that "prejudgments become prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge." Allport (1954), p. 9. The entire claim is italicized.

³⁰The distinction in the philosophy of science imitated here is obviously that between 'the context of discovery' and 'the context of justification.' Cf. Feyerabend (1978), pp. 165-167.

³¹Cf. Howard Ehrlich, The Social Psychology of Prejudice (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 8; Klineberg (1954), p. 374.

³²Harold Blumer, "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position," Pacific Sociological Review 1, 1 (Spring 1958): 3. My emphasis. Blumer appears to restrict his remarks to race prejudice. It is clear that he intends his analysis to exhaust all forms of racism. Racism for Blumer just is race prejudice. Comer reiterates this stress on groups: "Racism is a low-level defense and/or adjustment mechanism utilized by groups to deal with psychological and social insecurities similar to the manner in which individuals utilize psychic defenses and adjustment mechanism to deal with anxiety." J. Comer, "White Racism: Its Root, Form and Function," in Black Psychology, ed. R. L. Jones (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 311. Others talk of racism as a rationalization for domination by one group over another: Cox (1948), pp. 341fn., 425; Nash (Baxter and Sansom, 1972), p. 119; Bracken (1978), p. 241.

³³Cf. Newman (1978), p. 48.

³⁴N. Ackerman and M. Jahoda, Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder (New York: Harper, 1950) pp. 3-4.

³⁵Blumer (1958), p. 4. This is obviously central for Blumer. On the following page he reiterates the point using almost identical wording and stressing it as "a crucially important recognition."

³⁶Kant (1969), p. 21, fn. 2.

³⁷Baier (1978), pp. 127-130.

³⁸Similarly, the well-documented Rand Rebellion in South Africa (1922) on this view was not racist either. Here, white workers first struck, then openly rebelled against the attempted introduction by the Chamber of Mines of black labor onto the mines. Whites realized they would have to compete on the open market, at lower wages, for mine employment. The banner of the strike: 'Workers of the world unite--for a White South Africa!' If this doesn't count as racism, then by extension neither do many of South Africa's apartheid laws. This implication is contrary not only to generally respectable judgment; it contradicts Baier's own opinion.

³⁹Karl Marx, Grundrisse, tr. Martin Nicolaus (London: Pelican Books, 1973), pp. 101, 100.

⁴⁰D. Johansen and M. Edey, Lucy--The Beginnings of Mankind (New York: Warner Books, 1981), p. 37.

⁴¹"Racism is the fussing over the objectively meaningless datum of the color of a man's skin." Kovel (1970), p. 178.

⁴²Cf. Edward Shils, "Color and the Afro-Asian Intellectual," in Franklin (1968), pp. 1-18; H. Isaacs, "Group Identity and Political Change," in Franklin (1968), p. 89; Bracken (1978), p. 253. Bracken admits initially that there are various kinds of racism, including 'color racism.' But later he equates (modern) racism exclusively with "counting color as an essential quality of men."

⁴³K. Gergen, "The Significance of Skin Color in Human Relations," in Franklin (1968), p. 115.

⁴⁴Bastide (Franklin 1968), p. 36. My emphasis.

⁴⁵Oxford English Dictionary, 16th Century ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Cf. Jones (1972), p. 115; and Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 7-11. European languages other than English reveal similar connotations at the time for corresponding terms.

⁴⁶The derogatory name 'kaffir' used so liberally in South Africa was introduced by the British who acquired the term from their Orientalist experience. 'Kefir' in Arabic originally referred simply to the other.

⁴⁷ Cf. A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology and Race (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), p. 69; and Bastide (Franklin, 1968), p. 34.

⁴⁸ Talcott Parsons, "The Problem of Polarization in the Axis of Color," in Franklin (1968), p. 366.

⁴⁹ Julian Pitt-Rivers, "Race, Color and Class in Central America and the Andes," in Franklin (1968), p. 272.

⁵⁰ Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 222-223.

⁵¹ Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, tr. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), pp. 124.

⁵² Texas Penal Code (1911), Article 484, Act of 1887. 'Non-European,' 'Native,' Bantu, etc., have been defined similarly by the South African lawbooks.

⁵³ Of the vast literature on this issue, see Kroeber (1963), pp. 112ff; and Dunn (Kuper 1975), pp. 54ff.

⁵⁴ Alfred Rosenberg, Race and Race History, ed. Robert Pois (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 82.

⁵⁵ Bracken (1978), p. 252.

⁵⁶ John Stuart Mill attacks explanations in terms of 'inherent natural differences' as vulgar. John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (New York, 1929), p. 324. However, Mill's defense in On Liberty of benign despotism by civilized rulers of those "races (which) may be considered as yet in their nonage," may be interpreted as a form of 'soft racism,' given the realities of colonialism to which he was directly party. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Mary Warnock (New York: Fontana, 1974), pp. 135-136.

⁵⁷ Marcus Singer's formulation reiterates the distinction between these two claims. Singer insists that only acts and practices are to be deplored. M. Singer (1978), pp. 156-157.

⁵⁸ Cf. Nash (Baxter and Sansom 1972), p. 119; Richard Popkin, "Hume's Racism," Philosophia (Israel) 8, 2-3 (Spring, 1978): 212.

⁵⁹ Cf. Easien-Udom (Kuper 1975), p. 237.

⁶⁰ Cf. Hodge, Struckmann and Trost (1974), pp. 10ff; and

Stokeley Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Black Liberation in America (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 3.

⁶¹Deleuze has shown that each subject in the particular perversion of sadism "needs only the 'element' of the same perversion," and not a masochist as his object. Gilles Deleuze, Masochism (New York: George Braziller, 1974), p. 37. This will be developed in application to racism in Chapter Seven.

⁶²On the traditional account of morality, this person may be moral: though having such beliefs in the inferiority of race(s), the agent may consider them still to be overridden in every case by a moral principle to avoid discrimination against other persons.

⁶³Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, reprint edition 1972, s.v. "Racism," by P. Cummings. Most simply assume this as the central claim of racist thought. It is presented in the literature with varying degrees of emphasis: (a) Some refer to this feature simply as 'usual' to racist beliefs. Michael Banton, "The Concept of Racism," in Zubaida (1970), p. 18. (b) While emphasizing this condition, others consider it merely a rationalization. Cox (1948), pp. 431, 452ff. (c) The overwhelming majority consider it unequivocally to be the necessary and universal component of racism. Nash (Baxter and Sansom 1972), pp. 114ff; Easien-Udom (Kuper 1975), pp. 236-237; Bracken (1978), p. 241; and Ashley Montagu, Race, Science, and Humanity. New York: Modern Age Books, 1940), pp. iii-iv.

⁶⁴Barker (1981), p. 18. In an earlier article, Barker traces the development in definition from that strictly in terms of superiority claims to that which merely emphasizes difference. Martin Barker, "Racism--The New Inheritors," Radical Philosophy (Britain) 21 (1979): 2-17. The following reflects this new expression: "It is from a recognition of racial differences that a desire develops in most groups to be among their own kind...the whole question of race is not a matter of being inferior or superior, dirty or clean, but of being different." R. Page, "To nature, race is not a dirty word," Daily Telegraph (London), 3 January 1977, quoted in Barker (1979), p. r.

⁶⁵Van den Berghe tries to play upon this ambiguity between racism predicated upon difference and that predicated upon superiority in the attempt to evade the implication that sociobiological theory (as he describes it) is undeniably racist. While he defines racism simply as "the emphasis upon biological traits to differentiate groups within (a society)," he denies that sociobiology is racist on the grounds that it makes no claim "about any invidious ranking" between races. Realizing his predicament (at least intuitively), he denies also that sociobiology differentiates racially between human groups.

This is disingenuous: on the next page, Van den Berghe admits that "sociobiology stresses a common biological propensity...of all humans...to favor kin over non-kin." Van den Berghe (1981), pp. 29-30.

⁶⁶For example, I. D. MacCrone, Race Attitudes in South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 254.

⁶⁷This is clearly recognized by Jeremy Cronin in "Afrikaner National Ideology and Group Oppression," (Unpublished draft, University of Cape Town, 1976), p. 9.

⁶⁸Peter Singer (1978), p. 186.

⁶⁹That racism must be discrimination against rather than between races is illustrated by the following observation: "Physical differences can never be obliterated, but whether they, rather than cultural or social differences, are regarded as significant, is a matter each social system decides for itself. It is for this reason that the value accorded to physical appearance varies so greatly from place to place and class to class in Latin America." Pitt-Rivers (Franklin 1968), p. 277.

⁷⁰Jean-Paul Sartre, The Critique of Dialectical Reason, tr. Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: New Left Books, 1978), pp. 720-721, 733.

⁷¹Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), #66. Cf. Renford Bambrough, "Universals and Family Resemblances," in Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations, ed. George Pitcher (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), pp. 186-204; and Haig Khatchadourian, "Common Names and 'Family Resemblances,'" in Pitcher (1966), pp. 205-230.

⁷²The criticism of the cluster theory, especially the Strawson-Searle versions, are too well known to be ignored: Peter Strawson, "On Referring," in Readings in the Philosophy of Language, ed. J. Rozenberg and C. Travis (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1971), pp. 175-195; John Searle, "Proper Names," in Rozenberg and Travis (1971), 212-218; Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 71ff.; J. J. Katz, "A Proper Theory of Names," Philosophical Studies (January 1977).

CHAPTER SIX
RACISM AND RATIONALITY

As a prescription for social behavior, (social)
Darwinism is but reasoned savagery.

T. H. Huxley

To capture the common intuition that racism is always morally aversive, it has been widely assumed that it is irrational. We have defined racism in a manner independent of its putatively irrational nature. It is possible now to assess directly those arguments in support of the claim that racism is inherently irrational. We will find first that these arguments are inconclusive and confused, failing to apply exhaustively to all racist phenomena as defined above. The latter part of this chapter will fill out the account by assessing the rational status of clear expressions of racism in light of some standard philosophical accounts of rationality. As we have seen, the traditional conception of morality insists upon the strict logical equivalence of morality and rationality. A fundamental implication of the analysis in this chapter is that although everything moral may be rational, not everything rational is by that token moral. This has far-reaching consequences for moral theory. These will be addressed in the concluding chapter.

We must keep in mind here the two senses between which the use of 'reasons' is so often ambiguous. These senses can be summed up under the general realms of 'reasons as rationalizations' and 'reasons as deliberations.' Often the two are distinguished only in temporal terms: deliberation is undertaken to decide future acts; rationalization is supposedly about past acts, especially in light of their consequences.¹ This is misleading. Rationalizations hide the real motives of imminent acts from ourselves or others thereby to justify to ourselves or others what we are about to do. These are clear instances of what Sartre calls "bad faith." This suggests that the two may be distinguished in terms of motives. Deliberation is capable of motivating us to act in certain ways, whereas rationalizations serve only to hide the real motives of acts and so strictly speaking are not motives at all. But Aristotle and Hume warn us that reason alone causes no action at all, that motivation is properly a matter of desire.² So deliberations are to be distinguished from rationalizations as follows: The former offer the agent objective considerations in view of which, given the proper motivating desire, we can or do act. Rationalizations offer justifications to ourselves or others for our acts, potential or completed, usually because of impending or negative consequences to others.

This suggests a further distinction in respect of rationalizations. Rationalizations function by offering causal explanations that undertake to justify the act or state of affairs. These justifications are usually pseudo explanations that gain credibility largely

because they approximate the formal logical criteria of explanation while reiterating generally accepted social beliefs (Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, p. 69; referred to hereafter in intralinear textual citations as Allport, 1954). In distinguishing 'rationalized justifications' from proper causal explanations care must be taken to isolate the true and proper cause(s) of the phenomena under consideration. In determining whether racism is irrational, it must be established whether there are good objective reasons for the beliefs and acts under consideration, or whether the reasons offered by the agent for these beliefs or acts are rationalized justifications, pseudo-explanations motivated by and to be explained in terms of deeper underlying factors. This is complicated by the concomitant distinction in respect of reasons: While there may be good objective reasons for an agent's belief or act, these may not be his or her reasons for so believing or acting. Indeed, the agent may not properly have a subjective reason in this respect at all.³

6.1. Rationalizing Irrationality: A Critical Analysis

Generally, two classes of arguments--logical and moral--are offered in support of the contention that racism is irrational. Each class consists of two sub-classes. The logical arguments can be construed broadly as 'stereotyping.' They divide between those stressing the centrality to racist thinking of category mistakes, empirical errors and overgeneralizations, on one hand; inconsistencies and contradictions, on the other. The arguments from morality concern issues in means-end reasoning, in the first instance; consistency or coherence

amongst ends, in the second.⁴ Each argument-type will be examined in turn.

6.1.1. The Illogical Nature of Racism: Categorizing and Stereotyping

It is an undeniable fact of human psychology and epistemology that categorizing is a central function of cognition. Whatever cognitive and epistemological theories are ascribed to, placing sensory data under categories is central to the way in which human beings experience the environment.⁵ Application of categories facilitates human cognition by cohering data, thereby furnishing order to a world which in their absence would be chaotic for us. The data thus organized is so large that it would be impossible to assimilate them if considered monadically. Categorizing simplifies the complexity of our surrounding world, condensing potentially overwhelming data to manageable proportions. It enables identification and serves ultimately as a guide to action. Scientific classifications are thus simply natural extensions of our ordinary cognitive facility.

Given this broad picture of cognition, it is unsurprising to find it extended to social cognition. Basically, the same cognitive functions pertain, for the same general purposes (categorizing and identification) and reasons (simplicity), and to the same general ends (a guide to social action) (Allport 1954: 20-3; 17-173).⁵ In perceiving and thinking about the people we are in contact with in society, the economy of thought demanded to navigate the complexity of social experience (Allport's 'principle of least effort') is promoted and reinforced by characterizing individuals in terms of groups--

classes, races, religions, etc. (Allport, 1954: 173-175). The less familiar we are with the individuating characteristics of the person in question, the more likely we are to treat them in terms of their ascribed group membership.

Categorizing is "a natural and inevitable tendency of the human mind" (Allport 1954: 171). Some criterion of differentiation of acceptable forms of categorizing from the unacceptable, of the rational from the irrational, is necessary. Allport accordingly defines the rationality of a category in terms of "the essential attributes of all objects that can be correctly included within the category." This transgresses the stricture of non-circularity: the correctness ('rationality') of application is defined directly in terms of the correctness of application ('inclusion'). In any case, Allport informs us but a breath later that the "consequence of least effort in group categorizing is that a belief in essence develops" (Allport 1954: 171; 173-174). While we are encouraged to develop our categories solely on the basis of identification of essences, the same essentialist thinking is disparaged because of its tendency to oversimplification. Clearly, we have no basis here for distinguishing rational from irrational categories.

A general proposal is to conceive of stereotypes as transgressions of the rational limits of category utilization, as irrational categories. This is just another version of the usual presumption that stereotyping is inherently irrational. It still requires that criteria of rational categorizing be furnished. Now examining accounts

of the processes by which stereotyping takes place makes it increasingly evident that stereotyping must be considered by social scientists as merely a species of social categorizing. It involves fundamentally the same kinds of purposes, reasons and ends as we identified above for categories in general.⁶

It has often been claimed that stereotyping involves an "economy and efficiency of thought only at the expense of accuracy."⁷ Nevertheless, stereotypical categories differ from those of ordinary functional thought in respect only of their tendency to rigidify, to harden our attitudes towards others, though not in any necessity that they do. 'Rigidity' consists in the agent's refusal to admit of alteration in light of countervailing evidence, or in the denial that any such evidence in fact exists.⁸ While many cling resolutely, even zealously, to their stereotypes, thereby establishing their apparent stability over time, this rigidity cannot be assumed as an essential feature of stereotypes. The little research undertaken fails to exclude the distinct possibility that the rigidity is more properly characteristic of the individual agents than of the stereotypes as such.⁹

Consequently, rational and irrational stereotypes can be differentiated on the basis of whether they commit errors--conceptual, factual or logical--when ascribed in respect of the data base at hand. Racist stereotyping and thinking is considered commonly to commit such errors invariably, and hence must be irrational. A representative text simply asserts that "Anti-semitism...consists of faulty habits

of thought...characterized by simplism, overgeneralization and errors of logic."¹⁰ We will restrict analysis here to an examination of each of these errors in respect of racist stereotyping and thinking.

(a) Basic Errors Underlying Racist Stereotyping

(1) Conceptual Errors and Category Mistakes

By denying that 'race' is a viable taxonomic unit of the human species, this class of objections makes it a necessary feature of racism that it is contrary to good reason: any form of racism appeals ex hypothesi to the concept of 'race' as the basis for the discrimination. This objection has no credible foundation when stated thus. We have argued above that it is not improper to classify the human species from biological, anthropological or sociological points of view on racial grounds. Nobody seriously objects to discriminating between members of different races, only against them.

This objection is expressible more narrowly. Social psychologists have identified a common error in our attributions concerning the causes of behavior by others. We tend to explain such behavior by attributing it to 'racially transmitted dispositional traits' of the agents in question rather than to the effect of environmental conditions in which agents find themselves at the time. This 'fundamental attribution error' or category mistake¹¹ functions by displacing the proper set of conceptual factors in the causal explanation of the behavior in favor of a set that is only apparently more appropriate (Allport 1954: 109). This so-called error is merely

a 'tendency' of such reasonings. Though cited as a 'logical fallacy,' no objective criteria of causal reasoning are offered against which may be judged those causal explanations appealing to 'race.' Criteria are foregone, displaced simply by examples of the error.¹² Such logical mistakes that do occur in racist reasoning may be handled more appropriately under the domains of 'factual errors' and 'overgeneralizations.'

(ii) The Fact of the Matter

On the view that racist thinking functions always by way of stereotyping, individuals are squeezed into hard and fast categories by the rigid application to them of racist stereotypes with no regard for whether these individuals properly possess the identifying racial characteristics. These stereotypical characteristics are supposed to be no more than broad generalizations. It is assumed that the factual errors arise unavoidably in ascribing the putative racial traits to individuals, especially where these traits are aversive. Racists fail to notice the extent of individual differences in respect of a given property (e.g., 'ability,' 'intelligence' or 'culture') within the group under observation; or the degree of overlap in respect of such traits between members of the observed group and those of the racist's own.¹³ This purportedly leads racists to be too rapidly convinced of the accuracy of their racial attributions.¹⁴ Where available evidence conflicts with their stereotypes, racists may be led

to distort the evidence--via selection, accentuation and interpretation--thereby to corroborate the applicability of the given stereotype (Allport 1954: 176, 166).¹⁵

Assume for the moment that the premisses of this description of racist thinking are true: that racist beliefs are solely a function of stereotyping, and that racial stereotyping is always aversive. Given even such strong assumptions, the conclusions in no way follow necessarily. First, racists may not recognize individual intra-group differences or inter-group similarities. But the premisses nowhere deny necessarily that they may, or often do, recognize these differences and similarities. Nor is it established that stereotypes inevitably involve factual errors. Indeed, they may capture the relevant facts quite accurately. Second, it is not necessary to racist thinking that racial stereotypes be substituted for observation. The racist may simply use the stereotype to assist in observations of others' characteristics to facilitate imposing order upon a set of data otherwise potentially overwhelming (5.2.2.b. above). Where the relevant information is unavailable and decisions are immediately pressing, the racist may appeal to the stereotype at hand. It is not clear, either, that racist stereotypes necessitate in those holding them a dogmatic conviction of accuracy and validity in their racial attributions, or that they inexorably distort counter-evidence. As suggested above, the dogmatic convictions and tendencies to

to distort may prove in many cases to be a function of agents' personalities.¹⁶

Racial stereotypes may lead to factual errors and in those cases ought to be dismissed (for the most part) as irrational. It is not essential to their nature that they involve such errors. Jones has argued that the factual errors often committed in stereotyping are not indicative of deficient categorizing or processing functions. They follow largely from shortcuts that usually operate so ably in our ordinary information processing and which render our categorizing easier. The operations of stereotyping are at basis no different from those of categorizing.¹⁷ The fundamental issue in establishing agent irrationality on the basis of factual errors in racial stereotyping is the determination, in cases of lack or falsity of information about races, of the agent's culpability: Ought the agent properly to have known more about the racial group or individual in question? Like other questions of culpability, the verdict here can only be established contextually. In this respect, racist thinking is no different from other forms of social thought.

(iii) Overgeneralizations

Overgeneralization is a complementary feature of this standard picture of racial stereotyping which is widely criticized. Racial stereotyping purportedly overgeneralizes from a narrow data base of racial characteristics empirically perceived

to their assumed status as the core traits of the alien racial stock. The characteristics in question supposedly harden into a stereotype of the other race, its ideal features, which any individual identified as a member is thereby considered a priori to possess. Racial stereotypes are defined accordingly as overgeneralizations of the agent's experience of members of another race, "developing from a sharpening and overgeneralization of facts" and "...usually thought to mark off the entire group" (Allport 1954: 190, 104). Individual members of a race are ascribed racial characteristics a priori which they may not possess (Allport 1954: 103). Since treatment of all racial members are enjoined on the basis of possession of these racial characteristics, those members failing to possess the relevant traits will be treated--perhaps adversely--on grounds not at all applicable to them. If such is the nature of racism, it must be irrational.

Clearly, not every form of racial stereotyping suffers the fallacy of universalizing from particular characteristics or from individual members. Frederick Samuels suggests a useful characterization of stereotypes in terms of their 'degree of coverage' of the data base to which they refer: A 'universal assertion' claims that all group members possess the relevant trait; a 'widespread assertion' that most do; and a 'partial assertion' that only some do.¹⁸ To charge that racism overgeneralizes by its very nature is to believe that racist claims

are embodied always in universal assertions, capable of aspiring at best to widespread coverage, and usually attain only partial inclusion. The insistence that to meet the criteria of rationality racist claims must--and cannot--achieve universal coverage is far too strong. In less controversial cases of rational application of categories absolute fit is not demanded. The history of biology is replete with examples in which it has been unclear whether a specimen is a member of one sub-species or another, or forms a sub-species of its own.¹⁹ Particular races were characterized above in terms of probabilistic or statistical generalizations of trait possession by members (4.2.b.). It is open to the racist to discriminate against a race and its members on the same basis.

A foundation for this is furnished by Keith's formulation of a classificatory schema for the degree of visibility of races based on the proportion of members easily identifiable. A 'pandiacritic' race is one of which every member is easily identifiable; a 'macrodiacritic' race consists in an identification rate of over 80 percent; 'mesodiacritic' between 30 percent and 80 percent; and a 'microdiacritic' race is that of which members are less than 30 percent recognizable.²⁰ Pygmies or Bushmen are probably 'pandiacritic;' blacks close to though not absolutely so; and Jews are 'mesodiacritic.'²¹

More precisely, stereotypes are probability estimates of differential group-trait characteristics. They are constructed

as abbreviated measures of the believed degree of trait-incidence amongst members of given groups compared with the agents' comparable beliefs about the population at large.²² For example, agents may believe that 'Jews are stingy' or that 'blacks are lazy' to varying degrees; that all or 60 percent or merely 30 percent of the racial group are so characterized. This degree of belief or estimate is furnished by plugging the agents' many relevant judgments into a Bayesian statistical formula. Given the availability of objective statistical data (e.g., contributions by Jews to secular charities, productivity levels for blacks and whites at the same level of employment, etc.), the degree of accuracy of agents' stereotypes and predictions are hereby computable. There is potentially available, thus, an objective measure against which to assess the validity of agents' social judgments.²³

This formulation solves problems confronting any analysis of racial stereotypes. Agents are not committed to extending the stereotyped beliefs about a group to all its members; they can allow exceptions to the generalization. In this way, one may hold a stereotyped belief about a group; treat the relevant proportion of group members accordingly; yet insist consistently that though some best friends are group members, they lack the characteristics in question. An agent may believe, for example, that her Jewish friends are generous

while adhering to the stereotype 'stingy Jews' (to the degree, say, of 0.6). This suggests that stereotypes have partial extension, altering and corroding the more generally familiar agents become with group members. Clearly, the model laid out here represents much more closely the way we largely respond to others--as individuals and as group members--within the complexity of our social relations.

Most significantly, this offers us a means by which to distinguish rational from irrational stereotypes. The degree of (ir)rationality is potentially computable. The measure of agents' stereotypes are constructed in light of the relevant group information objectively available and taken into consideration by the agents. Rationality for the most part is not an all-or-nothing affair; to restrict rationality to true propositions totally distorts the history of science. A firm foundation for rational racism is suggested by this recognition. Familiar with members of a race he is capable of identifying macrodiacritically (e.g., blacks), a racist may construct an aversive stereotype on the basis of his fairly extensive, direct experience of them in relation to his experience of the population at large (e.g., 40 percent of blacks encountered in a given city have criminal records, as opposed to 20 percent of whites). On this basis, the racist may construct a predictive estimation of his future experiences and probable behavior responses. He may even be open to

careful modification of his behavior as a result of failed predictions and new experiences. He meets accordingly all the strictest demands of rational agency.

The following objection may be raised: Although this analysis accounts for stereotypes in general, "which are not necessarily irrational or even incorrect,"²⁴ racist stereotyping is never like this. It will suffice to offer some counterfactuals in response to this objection. Bertrand Russell collected substantial data which revealed a higher statistical probability of genius amongst Jews than amongst members of other population groups. Dismissing in turn each of the most feasible explanations for this statistical trend, Russell eventually just shrugged and admitted the statistical generalization as a bizarre but interesting fact.²⁵ Now this furnishes rational fuel for the racist. Consider the case of two applicants for scientific research grants alike in every respect save that one is a Jew and the other is not. There is a second-level inductive (causal) ground for offering the grant to the Jew. Where there is a goal to maximize the scientific or cultural well-being and advancement of the society at large, it might be argued that there is a moral obligation to award the Jew. By extension, the racist could insist that probabilities must be constructed, and social policies instituted on their basis, for all racial groups in the society. Recall the Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring

Harbor, New York (see Appendix to Chapter Seven, A.7.5., below).

Many rational racists have argued thus, albeit in less explicit (and perhaps less extreme) form. Hume's beliefs in Negro inferiority were not just personal acceptance of the social prejudices of the time.²⁶ They were formed as conclusions of generalizations from experience by a careful philosophical observer. This is borne out by analysis of the construction of his argument (see 6.2.2.a., below). Similarly, Carleton Putnam's letter to President Eisenhower (October 13, 1958) pleading for a reversal of the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court desegregation decision appeals to the same sort of induction from empirical generalizations as Hume.²⁷ Immigration quotas or job quota guidelines--racist or racial--employ just this mode of reasoning to furnish the data base undergirding the policy at hand.

Racist stereotyping is not simply a matter of overgeneralization grounded in conceptual and factual errors, the impaired psychological functioning of an authoritarian or prejudiced personality as opposed to a tolerant one.²⁸ Racist thinking is capable in many cases of avoiding both primary features of stereotyping: the tendency to rigidify our conceptions of individuals by ignoring their differences in the face of some idealized group conception. This somewhat counter-intuitive conclusion that racism need not function

by stereotyping (in the narrow sense at issue here) will be corroborated by a more careful examination of the common view that the logic of racist stereotyping inevitably involves inconsistencies and contradictions.

(b) The Logic of Racism: Inconsistency and Contradiction?

The prevailing presumption that the logic of racism is commonly characterized by inconsistency and contradiction assumes two forms: first, that there are undeniable inconsistencies between the relevant attitudes of agents and their behavior; and second, that racist stereotyping and thought consists in contradictory beliefs about members of the race in question. There are glaring shortcomings with either formulation of this 'racist logic.'

(i) Attitude-behavior Inconsistency

Early studies by social psychologists of the relation between agents' attitudes and behavior claimed to reveal a very low correlation between them. These studies suggest that attitude is not a reliable predictor of behavior. However, various conceptual difficulties mark this supposed inconsistency.²⁹

It is a widely held truth of logic that only propositions (or bearers of propositions like sentences or statements) may be inconsistent. To speak literally of 'attitude-behavior inconsistency' is to speak loosely. Nevertheless, social psychologists treasure these claims of inconsistency as a scientific thesis which generates research programs. Subsequent research

has failed to furnish any clearly defined or substantial findings in this respect.³⁰

A common assumption underlying these studies is that attitudes are capable of causing behavior directly and uniquely. This raises an additional conundrum. If an attitude consists at least in a belief (or set of beliefs), then without the relevant desire to impel action in accord with the belief or to aim at the consequences projected by the belief, the attitude alone can have no direct determinative (causal) effect upon the agent's behavior. Attitudes can only affect actions indirectly--by fashioning desire in a relevant respect.³¹

If the conjunction of these logical and conceptual truths is assumed, we conclude that agents can harbor only inconsistent beliefs. The beliefs in question can be only in respect either of particular premisses (for example, descriptive claims about the member of a race, or the race as such, against which the agent bears a grudge), or of moral or prudential universals (believing, for instance, that members of a race ought both to be treated with respect and used merely to the agent's own ends). The universal claims can only be inapplicable, strictly speaking, to particular premisses; the agent's desires can but conflict with each other (where the agent desires two mutually exclusive objectives only one of which can be realized). The supposed inconsistency between

attitude and act is not 'an anomaly,' nor is it an 'insignificant datum.'³² It is simply no inconsistency at all. An agent honestly reveals that she has a non-discriminatory attitude towards a race or member at time t_1 . If at time t_2 she is seen to act towards that race or member in a manner that conflicts with this attitude, it can be consequent only upon altered (or the greater influence of competing) attitudes (whether of universal or particular beliefs); or upon the introduction of desire (or changed desire).

This conclusion is readily reflected in the psychological research. Summarizing the history of 'the consistency controversy,' Liska emphasizes that recent research reveals a "significant relationship between attitudes and behavior." He admits, though, that it is completely unclear whether the relationship is one of an effect of attitude on behavior or an effect of behavior on attitude.³³ The problem turns in part upon the difficulty of establishing a data base for attitude descriptions. The traditional method of social psychology has been to present test questionnaires to subjects. Their responses are prompted and circumscribed, therefore, by the imagination of the test designer. Giving up this artificial approach, on the other hand, abandons to chance any possibility of general objectivity (i.e., coherence) as a basis for data base analysis. So much for the research. In any case, Aristotle's account of practical reasoning is obviously not

recommended reading for social psychologists.

(ii) Contradictions in Beliefs

Racist logic is more commonly depicted as consisting in straightforwardly contradictory and hence irrational beliefs entertained by the agent. This 'contradictory belief thesis' is not merely an hypothesis about the psychological state which individual racists reproduce. It undertakes to represent the logic in terms of which racist beliefs function by their very nature. Though individual racists may hold contradictory beliefs about a race or members as racial representative, the thesis ultimately must be examined independent of references to and generalizations from studies based on individual psychology. Subscription to this thesis is widespread.³⁴ Allport offers the most complete formulation, summarizing much of the background work to the thesis and exerting considerable influence since. The following analysis will concentrate thus upon Allport's presentation of this view.

Allport submits that racist stereotyping is inherently characterized by contradiction: "Two opposing images are held, and it is unlikely that both could be true equally... prejudiced people readily subscribe to self-contradictory stereotypes...The need for sequential and uniform logic does not trouble us." (Allport, 1954: 194-196.) Relying upon results of studies reported in The Authoritarian Personality, Allport cites as an instance of these contradictory beliefs the

following set: 'Jews tend to keep apart excluding gentiles from Jewish social life, remaining a foreign element in American society;' and 'Jews pry too much into Christian activities, seeking too much recognition and prestige from Christians, and going too far in hiding their Jewishness.' Items of the former kind constitute a 'subscale of seclusiveness,' of the latter a 'subscale of intrusiveness.' Since Adorno et al had found in their surveys that the two subscales converged to the degree of $+0.74$, it is concluded that the same racist agents who held that Jews are seclusive tended also to believe that Jews are intrusive (Allport 1954: 194ff.).³⁵

Logically, contradictions are subject to far more stringent prerequisites than Allport acknowledges here. First, contradictions are strictly of the form 'a & -a.' Second, the agent must hold both constituent beliefs of the contradictory set in respect of the same people or well-defined group, not of some vaguely constituted and shifting population. And third, the beliefs must be held within the same delimited time-span. Allport's conception of contradiction clearly transgresses each of these strict criteria. At best, the 'subscale of seclusiveness' could contradict only indirectly the 'subscale of intrusiveness;' that is, where the properties within one subscale, given the appropriate context, controverted those in the other. Now the measure of $+0.74$ suggests that

the same agents tend to believe the apparently contradictory characteristics of a racial group. But the study which elicited this correlation in no way establishes whether the racists tested hold these beliefs in respect of all the members of the race in question; or if only of some, whether the contradictory beliefs are predicated of the same group members. Nor does the study confirm that the beliefs were held simultaneously, or at least within a narrowly defined time-span. Each agent surveyed marked off the properties considered characteristic of Jews or Negroes in the abstract, without reference to specific individuals. We have seen that there need be nothing irrational in believing Jews in general to be stingy while admitting that one's close Jewish friends are generous.³⁶

The properties offered by Allport as examples are not of the proper logical form: Jews, it is believed, only tend to keep apart, remaining foreign to American society, while seeking too much recognition from Christians. Tential judgments in terms of differing predicates cannot contradict each other.³⁷ Blinded by the all-consuming appeal of racist contradictions, Allport and other bearers of this irrationalist torch fail to recognize the disturbingly seductive elements of 'savage rationality' in racist thought.

The logic of racist thought is less characterized by internal inconsistencies and contradictions than commonly

assumed. This is corroborated by the fact that group (racial) stereotypes do not arise randomly. They are determined by the relative probabilities of trait possession by members of a given (racial) group, the nature of historical contacts between agents and members of that (racial) group, the dynamics of group identification and membership identity; as well as by socio-political, economic and cultural conditions. Deeply influenced by the intricate web of these specific determinants which serve to define any social actor, the (potential) racist constructs what amounts to an implicit, coherent theory of character for members of the group in question. It is in light of this picture that group members' behavioral expectations, and so the agent's responses, are projected. The point to be underlined here is that "...the implicit theory generally is internally consistent and is unlikely to contain sharply contradictory traits."³⁸

Racism is not logically irrational by nature. It involves no inconsistency between attitudes and acts (such inconsistency is ill-conceived). Nor must a racist hold contradictory beliefs (a racist need not). This highlights earlier conclusions (6.1.1.b.1.): A racist act may conflict with an affirmative attitude expressed at an earlier time by the racist, but the act itself must have been effected then by a changed attitude in relation to a specific desire; or the racist act may conflict with a currently held belief. In this latter case, an

aversive desire on the agent's part is most likely at odds with the belief in question. The agent would be considered irrational here, but not in the former instance. On the other hand, where a racist holds contradictory beliefs about a race or member, he is in this respect clearly irrational. But where both these beliefs are conscious, it is highly unlikely that they will be held together. Finally, racism need not function by way of stereotyping in the narrow sense (employing the techniques of dismissal, rigidity and plain ignorance). The logic commonly ascribed to such stereotyping is not simply inapplicable to the general operations of racism; it is inadequately formulated in and of itself.

Failing to establish that racism is necessarily irrational on strict logical grounds, we must turn to inquire whether the claim can be established on the wider basis of prudential or moral grounds.

6.1.2. The Irrational Nature of Racism: Means and Ends

An agent is rational, on the standard formal account, where the ends, aims and purposes proposed and pursued are mutually coherent, and the means utilized to attain them are consistent with the projected fulfillment of these pursuits.³⁹ These two conditions of agent rationality--the prudential consideration of means-end consistency and the moral coherence of ends--are interdependent. Ultimately, these conditions must be considered conjointly. Nevertheless, in determining how well some of the various forms of racism meet them,

care must be taken, for the sake of clarity, to keep the conditions distinct as far as possible.

(a) The Imprudence of Racism

The prudential condition obviously rests upon the way in which ends are circumscribed.⁴⁰ The clearest attack upon the rationality of racism on grounds of imprudence has been economic in nature. We will restrict ends for the moment to economic ones. As for utilitarian moral theory, the coordinating principle of coherent ends suggested by economic rationality is the maximization of utility or, in economic terms, of profit.

Now assume economic profit as our end. Determination of the appropriate means will include defining investment possibilities and predicting probable outcomes for each; as well as specifying the optimum conditions (for example, labor hiring and wage policies, working conditions, etc.) under which each of these possibilities may be instituted. What has to be decided are the institutional forms and behavior conducive to the highest possible returns on investment given prevailing market conditions.⁴¹ The objection that racism is economically irrational translates into the claims that all racist practices ultimately prove unprofitable; that the neutral calculus of economic profit never discriminates on racial grounds; and that where discrimination occurs, it is always extra-economic (political, psychological, etc.).⁴² It has been mentioned already that racist laws have been introduced on occasion for good economic effect (in South Africa, for instance).

A closer look at the claims from 'economic reason' will reveal the terms under which racism may be prudentially rational in the sense at issue here.

In a review of two recent books by Thomas Sowell, Christopher Jencks distinguishes between four kinds of economic discrimination: 'myopic,' 'malicious,' 'statistical' and 'consumer-directed.' 'Myopia' is the refusal to employ any properly qualified member of a specified racial group because of a misjudgment about the job-performance of some group members. It is economically irrational, causing the discriminating employer to hire less qualified workers without decreasing the wage bill. 'Malicious discrimination,' against the group as a whole but not directly against any particular member, is considered economically irrational on the same grounds. The example cited in support of this condemnation is problematic: refusing to hire a black more qualified for the job out of fear that extending some economic power to blacks will undermine white social supremacy in general. Where white social and political supremacy is both a cherished socio-political end and a tested means of maintaining the profit-ratio above the level otherwise attainable, employers practicing 'malicious discrimination' will be economically rational. Third, it has been demonstrated already that what Jencks calls 'statistical discrimination' meets our ordinary standards of rationality (6.1.1.a.iii. above). It will come as no surprise, then, to be told that the employer who refuses to hire members of a

particular racial group in light of good statistical evidence that its members are generally less productive or more likely to fall foul of the law is acting rationally in the economic sense.⁴³

'Consumer-directed discrimination,' fourthly, is discrimination motivated not by antipathies of the discriminating employer or supplier, but by consumers of the product or by those wishing to maintain the value of the good. A real estate agent in an upper-middle-class neighbourhood, for example, acts in the best economic interests of her clientele by refusing to sell property to members of a particular race where it is clear that this would result inevitably in lower property values for the neighborhood in general. Similarly, an Israeli employer, though not antagonistic towards Arabs himself, nevertheless refuses to hire Arab personnel because his clientele has warned all businesses in the community that they would be boycotted if they employ Arabs. He is hardly proceeding contrary to good economic reason by so acting.⁴⁴

It is open to objection that in such cases consumers' demands are simply irrational products of 'habits, imitation and suggestion' rather than of rational choice.⁴⁵ While 'snob' and 'bandwagon effects' complemented by modern advertising techniques render this partially true even in respect of racist stereotyping, these do not exhaust the modes whereby agents acquire their racist views. After all, agents may choose to avoid or accept values of

others or to acquire the object advertized. Where conscious deliberation determines these choices, the projected effects will be incorporated into the rational calculation of economic utility. If economic rationality is defined in terms of maximizing utility, these kinds of qualification must be neutral with respect to the conclusion reached above.

Some forms of racist discrimination clearly facilitate the general end of profit or utility maximization and so must be considered economically rational. The same conclusion will be reached by analyzing the rationality of white workers in defending maintenance of job color-bar practices to guarantee their own jobs and preserve higher wage-levels by eliminating competition. It is possible to generalize this conclusion along Kantian lines: where ends, aims and purposes are predetermined and rationality is defined simply in functional terms, those forms of racism engendering the ends in question (provided the ends themselves meet prudential requirements) must be rational. The claim that racism is absolutely irrational can rest only upon the question of ends.

(b) The Immorality of Racist Ends

Considered in isolation, individual ends are arbitrary and subjective. As such, there is no way of judging their rationality. The singular means by which to determine whether an agent's end is rational is in relation to whether it is capable of cohering with a given system of ends. To be considered rational, an

economic system must be both efficient and just. In the former respect, it must be capable of utilizing and organizing the productive forces available to sustain and reproduce itself. Accepting for the moment the profit motive as the standard of economic rationality, the productive and reproductive relations entailed by this end encourage political, social, cultural, and psychological institutions for the most part consistent with each other.⁴⁶ It was Marx's virtue to have shown us that the concept of production assumes concrete significance only in terms of its coherence with a much wider set of values and needs hierarchically ordered in relation to each other. Where coherence breaks down, the entire institutional system begins to transform, whether radically or accommodatingly.

The institutions of production suggest a coherent set of values--political, legal, moral, etc. The question here is whether racist discriminations--considered as ends-in-themselves, as beliefs held and practices undertaken for their own sakes--are capable of cohering consistently with our other ends. To hold racist beliefs or undertake racist practices as ends-in-themselves is literally to adhere to and act for the sake of racist principles. It is to believe or act thus not because of any advantages the beliefs or acts may afford us, and in the face of any conceivable or actual disadvantages. Where social ends are racist, social institutions are fashioned in their light, thereby facilitating realization of these ends. The contemporary South

African conjuncture attests to this fact. There is no inherent inability of racist principles to cohere with other ends like social affluence, retention of state power, domination and the like. Those claiming that racism is necessarily irrational are left hanging their argument upon the inconsistency of racist ends or principles with moral ones.

It is possible to inquire a priori into the nature of moral, legal or political ends and then to assess actual economic institutions and values in their light. It may be demanded that actual economic practices and ends alter to cohere with the ends of fair distribution thus rationally reconstructed. The moral question confronting racism is whether any of its forms is capable of cohering consistently with the system of ideal ends determined in this way. To hold that racism must be irrational because it is incapable of cohering with specifically moral ends implies a view something like Kant's 'kingdom of moral ends.' This consists in a body of universal principles--honesty, truth, justice, liberty and so forth--determined by perfectly rational legislating beings subject solely to common, objective (rational) laws. No other principles than these--or those consistent with them--are moral, for no other principles are (socially) rational.⁴⁷ Racist principles, the argument concludes, would not be chosen. They are inconsistent with principles of liberty and justice. Hence racism must be irrational.

This argument establishes its conclusions only by sleight of

hand. An end, we are told, is a proper member of the kingdom of ends by virtue of being chosen as rational by an ideally legislating being. To determine whether a racist principle is moral, it must be established first whether it is rational. We cannot, on pain of circularity, simply claim its immorality a priori and infer its irrationality from this. And we cannot presume so readily that racist principles are inconsistent with those of liberty or justice. It is rationally possible that a policy of separate development, where the social, political and cultural institutions are kept apart on racial grounds, meets rational standards of freedom and equality--for example, by guaranteeing distributively equal levels of resources to the respective separate institutions. It cannot be objected that, though this is a possibility, experience has proved otherwise. The neo-Kantian argument is an a priori one; all that has to be established in response is rational possibility.

This argument against racism assumes also the overriding status of moral considerations compared to prudential ones. There are serious difficulties here too. As Philippa Foot has argued, the claim that moral considerations are overriding from the moral point of view is tautologous and uninteresting. Further, common cases can be cited where the agent acting on prudential considerations in the face of competing moral ones can be considered reasonable.⁴⁸ Nor can we accuse of inconsistency on this score alone one who finds no compelling reason to obey moral rules

(though he might be condemned as vicious). He has not thereby necessarily undermined his purposes, frustrated his ends or disadvantaged himself.⁴⁹

Given this line of reasoning, it may be concluded that there are no good moral arguments (in the sense of 'moral' used here) to establish the strong claim that racism is by nature irrational. We have shown that some forms of racist belief and practice are clearly consistent with widely held standards of traditional moral reason. This conclusion closes also the more general line of reasoning: On one hand, racism has been roundly condemned on logical grounds, whether on the basis of committing category mistakes and factual errors as a consequence of the failure to individuate acts properly; for overgeneralizing from a narrow data base thereby identifying agents only on the basis of some unempirical, metaphysical group identity; or for employing contradictions and inconsistencies. On the other hand, it has been presumed all too often that racism transgresses the strictures of prudential or moral reasoning. Now racism is irrational in those cases where racist discriminations are a function of these factual or logical, prudential or moral errors. Yet none of these shortcomings have been found under scrutiny to exhaust the entire range of racist propositions, beliefs and acts. No convincing argument of any kind has been found to establish that racism is by nature irrational.

6.2. Rational Racism

The fact that some forms of racism are clearly rational, given the criteria discussed thus far, suggests the possibility of a general argument to establish that there are forms of racism potentially capable of meeting any grounded, generally accepted criteria of social rationality. Accounts of rationality differ widely, not merely between societies as represented by anthropologists but between philosophers in the Western tradition. It is possible, nevertheless, to formulate in a general way the fundamental criteria of rationality offered variously by the major philosophical traditions. If it can be illustrated that some manifestations of racism are consistent with the criteria thus established, the burden of proof would shift rather heavily to those persisting in the view that racism is inherently irrational and so immoral.

Criteria of rationality are theory-bound. They are determined by the theoretical structure in terms of which the concept of rationality is defined and by the function of the theory at large. In general, rationality has been defined either in purely formal terms (dominating the domains of logic and philosophy, mathematics and science), or relative to socio-economic parameters (the prevailing approach in anthropology and social psychology). In the former case, strict conditions on rationality at best only approximated by the actual state of things are employed to explanatory and predictive ends. The looser nature of the latter kinds of definition, on the other hand, tend to admit as rational any socially acceptable beliefs and

behavior (within the temporal and spatial limits under consideration). In discussing how well racism fares in meeting the criteria suggested by each, the less stringent claims of relativism will be addressed first.

6.2.1. Racism and Relativism

Relativism assumes a variety of forms in different disciplines --from social anthropology to linguistics and the history of science.⁵⁰ Where a relativist mode of rationality is explicitly endorsed, two characteristic kinds of arguments are cited in support. The more favored view is that, because of the nature of human beings, both human perception and conception of the world must be thoroughly theory-bound. The concepts of 'nature,' 'reality,' 'perception,' 'conception,' etc., supposedly are circumscribed by the theory in terms of which they are explicated. If this is so, 'truth' and 'rationality,' 'implication' and 'logical validity' equally must be theory-relative. Differently structured societies purportedly employ different logics. Though violating the strictures of 'scientific rationality,' these logics nevertheless are consistent with their own logical and conceptual structures. The second argument holds that, because social factors are relevant to the determination of the truth and validity of beliefs, the standards of truth and validity must be relative to such social determinants.⁵¹

It is not the place here to assess the strength of these theses. Nor need we dwell upon the commonplace that the extreme form of relativism generates its own paradox--in Putnam's words, "if all

is relative, then the relative is relative too" (Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History, p. 104; referred to hereafter in intralinear textual citations as Putnam, 1981). Our sole concern is whether racism in any of its manifestations is consistent with either of the two positions articulated above.

At the extremities of cultural or social relativism, rationality amounts to nothing more than the rationalizations each culture or society makes of its experiences, organization, institutions, and so forth.⁵² Racist differentiations and exclusiveness may be built into the rationality of the society--into what it takes to be its 'reality' or 'world,' its 'truth,' or into the ways members are socialized into thinking about, indeed 'seeing,' themselves and others. In such cases, 'racist logic' must be 'valid.' Racism, in short, is rationally justifiable. Examples are ready at hand: colonial Egypt, Nazi Germany, contemporary South Africa, latter-day Israel. Such rationalizations serve to justify the status quo of the societies or historical forms giving rise to racism. The racism that arose with and has flourished in the aftermath of the Enlightenment may be justified accordingly as the inevitable permutation of these societies and historical forms (though in one sense 'permutation' is a misnomer here).

A relativist might respond that racism is the product of a society or culture which assumes its own standards as the objective measure against which all others are to be assessed, and that this constitutes a failure to recognize the fundamental insight upon which

relativism is built. To combat racism, the relativist must encourage a society to admit to the relativity of its own cultural and social norms. It must show that these standards, like the conception of rationality, are incommensurable with those of other societies or cultures. (Such might be the view of Winch, or of the social application of a Kuhnian 'paradigm.') Even this modified relativism is consistent with racism. Societies like Britain or Germany that consider themselves different from African or Arabic societies, while admitting cultural incommensurability, may choose still to exclude members of the other societies on racial grounds precisely because of these differences. Relativism appears to furnish racism with its most natural mise-en-scene.

6.2.2. Racism and Rational Foundations

In contradistinction to relativism, a formal account of rationality seeks to establish ideal criteria determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for the rationality of a belief or act in any circumstances. A survey of contemporary philosophical literature suggests that the demand for ideal criteria is little more than idle fancy. There is almost no prospect of establishing generalizations sufficiently strong to cover all beliefs and acts regarded commonly as rationally acceptable (Putnam 1981: 104). Two major attempts at ideal constructions of this sort will be considered here. 'Justificationism' and 'falsificationism' are assumed respectively as representative of standards of rationality in the contemporary empiricist and rationalist traditions of epistemology and the philosophy of

science. These two accounts have been widely affirmed recently, in one form or another, by philosophers and social scientists alike. Our concern here will be to represent each in a manner as widely acceptable to its range of proponents as its limits allow, rather than with a critique of internal inconsistencies and shortcomings inherently characteristic of its formulation. This focus will facilitate judgment of racism's capacity to meet the standards of rationality thus reconstructed.

(a) Justificationism, Rationality and Racism

For the justificationist, an agent may be 'epistemically rational' if he accepts a belief for one of the following reasons: First, if the agent believes the proposition *p* because, upon analysing its constituent terms, he rightly considers it necessarily true (e.g., 'Jews are Jewish by descent or conversion'). Or second, a belief in *p* is a consequence either of adequate sensory experience or is validly inferred from antecedent beliefs. In the latter case, belief in *p* is rational only if the agent believes *p* as the conclusion of the inference from a set of propositions (logically) constituting sufficient evidence for *p* and the agent comprehends that her evidence supports *p* in this way. The original set of evidential propositions must be grounded ultimately in adequate sensory experience. The agent comes to formulate reasons for a belief in *p* by examining various alternatives to the proposition at hand, concluding with the affirmation that it reflects the highest degree of certainty of those

propositions she generally ought to have considered. It is possible to establish degrees of rationality of belief based upon the range of possibilities considered in relation to the amount of information readily available, agent culpability in ignoring information, and so forth.

It is possible to construct a justificationist account of 'practical rationality' on this epistemic foundation. An agent's act will be rational if the agent's desire to achieve some goal is coupled with rational beliefs (reasons) about the goal and the relevant means for its attainment; and if the agent acts in accord with these beliefs. These reasons--whether functional, utilitarian, environmental or deontological--pick out the particular act as the one to be done. The desire so to act motivates or impels the agent in the necessary manner. An irrational act is one an agent undertakes without a reason, for a bad reason, or in the presence of a good reason to do otherwise.⁵³

Consider Hume's racist belief that no Negro in eighteenth century Europe "ever discovered any symptom of ingenuity."⁵⁴ This racist proposition would be rational on the criteria offered here if based on Hume's personal experience of all Negroes in Europe at the time--which is unlikely, to say the least; or upon an inference from a more general kind of experience--never coming across a report of one counter-example, or hearing of another's experience to the contrary, and so on. This is quite feasible, and accords perfectly with the demand that the belief be validly

inferred from a prior set of beliefs founded ultimately upon sense-experience. The most likely justification of Hume's belief, however, is that it is constructed inductively from a finite set of experiences (both direct and indirect). In this case, Hume's racist proposition must be rational given that, upon examining evidence available to him as well as some countervailing propositions, he continued to find no persuasive evidence to the contrary.⁵⁵ In light of this belief, and a desire to maintain the highest scientific and cultural standards for his society, Hume may have concluded rationally that he had a practical reason to deny certain categories of work to Negroes both in the motherland and in the colonies. Racist forms of thinking and racist deeds suggested by these beliefs are not necessarily irrational on the stricter version of verificationism, given merely the truth of the facts appealed to and valid inferences from them, in the narrower case, or induction in the wider.

If the justificationist standards are relaxed mildly, a wider number of racist cases turn out rational. In view of Gettier examples,⁵⁶ a justificationist will be rational in believing *p* if he has good reason to believe *p* even though *p* is in fact false; or where *p* is true even though his beliefs are bad ones. Hume's racist belief would have been rational, even if false, given that on the evidence available to him at the time, it genuinely appeared to be true; or if in fact it was true, though he believed it only on the basis of unsubstantiated

hearsay. Similarly, the justificationist requirement that the agent's reasons adequately support his belief has been criticized as too stringent. It has been suggested that an agent's belief in God would be rational even if the argument from which he concluded his belief is invalid, provided he had considered fairly arguments to the contrary and the logical mistakes were not simple-minded ones.⁵⁷ If the justificationist is led thus to relax the standard of rationality to meet these demands, the cost in a society at root both religious and racist might very well be rational endorsement of a large body of racist beliefs.

Such considerations have motivated Bracken's accusation, following Chomsky's lead, that empiricism "facilitates the articulation of racism" (Harry Bracken, "Philosophy and Racism," p. 244; referred to hereafter as Bracken 1978).⁵⁸ Bracken isolates the major elements of Locke's empiricism: the radical attack on essentialism; its replacement by the 'tally model' of establishing 'nominal essences' on the basis of 'choice preference,' and the tabula rasa. These features purportedly enabled the philosophic expression of Locke's racism. Empiricism is supposed to afford no barrier to assuming color as a nominally essential property of human beings. This is coupled with the assumption that each individual, starting on an equal footing as a blank tablet, establishes his own position on the social hierarchy. Bracken insists that from this conjunction of nominal essence and blank slate the correlation of 'color' and 'intelligence' is most likely

to ensue. Locke's doctrine and practice are offered as illustration of this compatibility of racism and empiricism (Bracken 1978: 244-253).

By a 'nominally essential property,' Locke means the conventional designation as essential of a particular contingent property, in this case color (John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III, vi, #6, referred to hereafter as Locke 1964). Bracken emphasizes that Locke endorses any property like color as potentially essential. This emphasis is misplaced. Actually, Locke is attacking here the very notion of essential properties. Bracken's self-serving misreading of Locke's example in Book Four of the Essay only exacerbates this misplaced emphasis (Locke 1964: IV, vii, #16). Locke suggests here an account of how a boy in seventeenth century England, in formulating a concept of 'man' for himself, fails to include Negroes, and on completely rational grounds. Nowhere in the passage does Locke insist that the boy ought to formulate his concept of man in this manner, nor that he is morally right in excluding Negroes. Locke projects here not racist discrimination on the basis of color but an explanation of how people might come to be racist on these grounds. Bracken self-indulgently conflates these two ontological and epistemological analyses with Locke's public colonial convictions expressed elsewhere,⁵⁹ salts this with well-known evidence of racism on the part of other empiricists like Hume, and concludes that empiricism facilitates the development and

expression of racist ideology.

Bracken's ulterior motive in all of this is to disavow Lockean empiricism in favor of Cartesian rationalism, which he and Chomsky both take to furnish "a modest conceptual barrier to racism" (Bracken 1978: 250). By contrast, we have established here that racism may be rational on empiricist grounds. As noted earlier though, classical empiricism is neither more nor less prone to racist conclusions and inferences than any other foundationalist philosophical system (4.3). To add flesh to this counter-suggestion, we turn now to an assessment of racism in terms of the rationalist tradition.

(b) Rationalism, Rationality and Racism

Falsificationism is not strictly in the Cartesian mold. Nevertheless, it is assumed here as representative of the contemporary rationalist tradition because of its emphasis upon rational criticism as the core of scientific methodology (reason) and its deemphasis on claims to the truth.⁶⁰ Many social scientists assuming racism to be irrational have been enamored also of falsificationism as the method proper to their scientific practice. The differences from the justificationist foundation of adequate sensory experiences suggest that there may be embedded here a conception of rationality exclusive of racist principles.

Popper remarks that science is really the only human activity systematically and successfully undertaking to correct its errors.⁶¹ Commitment to the correction of error is taken as the mark of the

rational attitude. To say what it is to be scientific is to reveal what it is to be rational. On this view, scientific theories can only approximate the truth to varying degrees; no theory can be absolutely true. The core of the rational outlook, accordingly, is to be severely critical of any theory, belief or idea, subjecting them to vigorous criticism with the view ultimately to falsifying them. The more vulnerable the theory is to criticism, the more rational. A theory, belief or idea must be subjected to vigorous rational discussion and may be held only tentatively if capable of withstanding such criticism or when no other viable alternative is at hand. The rational attitude, in sum, is one of conjecture and hypothesizing (theorizing); testing; tentative acceptance (belief); and ultimately refutation and rejection in favor of a better alternative.⁶²

It might be thought that racist theory, beliefs and ideas must be irrational insofar as they defy vigorous criticism. Like the Popperian view of Marxism or psychoanalysis, they appear not to be formulated in a falsifiable manner. Had they been so formulated, the criticism might continue, racist theory would have died a natural death in the nineteenth century.

In the recent past, however, it has been possible for agents--even scientists--to suggest 'bold' hypotheses of a racist kind to account for a wide body of relevant data. Upon being subjected to 'vigorous criticism' and comparison with other conceivable hypothe-

ses, these conjectures may be accepted or rejected tentatively on the basis of their comparative showing. So, an Eysenck, Jensen or Herrnstein hypothesis--that blacks, for example, are inherently less intelligent than whites-- would be 'falsificationistically' rational under the following conditions: if it accounts for the data (that blacks in fact performed less well on the relevant IQ tests) and if the proponent showed a willingness to give up the hypothesis in the face either of a more compelling hypothesis (e.g., 'blacks' scores reflect economic status') or relevant data and criticism to the contrary (e.g., further testing revealed otherwise, or analysis of the tests indicate bias). There is nothing in the nature of some racist hypotheses, beliefs, even stereotypes--and of the agents advancing them--that disables them from meeting the falsificationistic criteria of rationality offered here.

What prevents this from being noticed is the widespread assumption that there is but a single racist theory, a single doctrine that falls under the designation 'racism.' This is patently false. Like theories of biological determinism in general, theories of racism have been suggested in varying forms since the Enlightenment. To suggest or believe one racist hypothesis or proposition is not thereby necessarily to suggest or believe any one of those discarded to the ash heap of history. As long as those proposing racist theories are willing to abandon them in the face of counter-evidence and overpowering criticism, the

theories themselves may be capable of meeting standard criteria of scientific rationality thus described. It is more fruitful, perhaps, to think of some racist beliefs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as comparable purely from an epistemological standpoint (if this is yet possible), to the 'flat earth' or, better still, 'phlogiston' theories of earlier epistemes.

More traditional rationalists like Chomsky and Bracken have claimed that, if human essence is conceived in typical Cartesian fashion as consisting a priori in (the possession of a) mind, rationalism thereby offers a "modest conceptual barrier to racism." After all, sceptics aside, it is easy enough to discern that the most diverse peoples populating our world possess minds. Besides the fact that Chomsky's innate psychological algorithms supposedly constitutive of rationality are unlikely to be discovered (Putnam 1981: 126), this stricter form of rationalism is as readily prone to racism as the empiricism it denounces for facilitating racism's rise. Having posited a priori that human essence consists in the possession of a human mind innately structured in a particular way, it is simple to deny (as racists have so often done) that certain groups ('primitive minds,' perhaps) are so characterized. Similarly, as Searle points out in criticism of Chomsky, the rationalist can hold easily that different races are characterized by different mental structures.⁶³ It does not help Bracken to defend Chomskian rationalism by chiding Searle for failing to understand that color on the rationalist account is

merely a contingent property, that "color (including racial) prejudices do not apply to minds." Bracken admits earlier that 'color racism' is not nearly the only form racism assumes, nor even "the most fundamental" (Bracken 1978: 254,242).

Bracken clearly implies by his analysis that empiricists alone have been guilty of 'philosophical racism.' Here Kant, in standard rationalist fashion (at least on this issue), turned Hume's empiricist endorsement of racism into a virulent a priori principle. Citing Hume's racist remarks appreciatively, Kant adds:

So fundamental is the difference between these two races of man (the Negro and the White), and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color...The blacks are very vain in the Negro way, and so talkative that they must be driven apart from each other with thrashings... the fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid.⁶⁴

Social scientists at the end of the last century argued that the 'primitive' or 'savage mind' failed to possess the properties of rationality universally ascribable to the civilized (Western), scientific and logical mind. Equally, the recent, admirable anthropological studies illustrating similarities and differences between 'scientific' and 'primitive' ('traditional') models of thought may be adopted inadvertently by the racist to signify evidence of differences (rather than inferiority) and consequently

assumed to constitute a rational basis for exclusion.⁶⁵

It must be clear by now that in spite--or perhaps because--of the wide variety of conceptions as well as the difficulty of specifying an adequate account of rationality, the analysis thus far suffices to support the suggestion that some variant of racist beliefs or theories will be capable of meeting virtually any philosophically acceptable criteria of rationality.⁶⁶ Prior to concluding that racism, in some forms, is rational, one final common objection must be considered.

6.3. Moral Reason and Racism

There is a common intuition that however rationality is conceived, racism must be excluded. Two possibilities suggest themselves. First, racism is to be rationally excluded on the basis of some ad hoc rule(s) contextually applicable. This tends to be arbitrary, failing to fall strictly within the boundaries of rationality itself. Short of specifying a priori--and hence unargued--that a rule of this kind is applicable only in respect of racist acts and beliefs, it could end up excluding other acts and beliefs generally considered rational.

It seems more likely that racism is to be rationally excluded only on the basis of some widely accepted view of moral reasoning. Central to the standard creed of the rationality of moral deliberation is the conviction that, in a given context, there is always only a single correct (objective) act to undertake. As Cavell points out, this unique act is supposedly determined by reasoning from a premise to which all reasonable people would assent, via intermediate steps

(description of context, particulars, etc.) which anyone would be capable of comprehending to a conclusion with which all would acquiesce and hence are compelled to accept. To fail to accept the conclusion specifies either incompetence or irrationality. This constitutes a more stringent account of rationality than the strictest of the sciences depend upon.⁶⁷ Besides, it has been demonstrated that the nature of morality belies such rigor. As Socrates reminded Euthyphro, even the gods disagree about moral issues. This translates in terms more contemporary into the fact that moral discord at heart is often not resolvable at all. This is not tantamount to admission that morality is irrational. On the contrary, it is affirmation of the fact that one of the marks of the moral is that moral disputes be open to rational disagreement.⁶⁸

Now it might be thought accordingly that racist contentions are not something there can be rational disagreement about: Racist beliefs and acts are by nature so extreme, and those who hold or espouse such beliefs or act in this way are supposedly not open to being persuaded otherwise. So it is thought that racist beliefs and agents must be irrational (unreasonable). This objection is not simply the logical one that racism conflates natural with social kinds, that appeals to 'race' as biological grounds for differential social treatment always involve unjustified and often only implicit social values as the motive for such treatment. Nor is it merely the point of empirical sociologists that racists are found never to alter their views. The objection translates rather into the moral claim that 'race' never commands

'categorically;' it is incapable of grounding a moral imperative at all. 'Race,' ex hypothesi, is a 'morally irrelevant category.'⁶⁹

It has been demonstrated already that this view of racism's irrationality rests upon the mistaken assumption that racism is incapable of cohering, under some interpretations, with other rationally determined moral ends. But this particular formulation of racism's putative irrationality reveals a deeper misconception that goes to the heart of the popular liberal view of racism. Two examples will reveal the distortion at work here.

Maintenance and promotion of cultural tradition are widely considered morally virtuous ends. It could be generalized that the institution of a general policy fostering these ends preserves respect for members of the different cultures in question. Some societies have established that a necessary means for realizing these ends is the enforcement of immigration restrictions on the influx of members of 'alien' cultures. Quotas of this kind need not be overtly racist in formulation.⁷⁰ It is possible to universalize the immigration policy without contradiction: Tory parliamentarians are quite willing to admit that 'alien' cultures may want to protect their heritage, that they ought to do so, and that this would necessitate similar immigration restrictions on their behalf. The general policy is capable, thus, of passing morality's universalizability test. Though not overtly racist in formulation or intention, policies like this are covertly so in principle or effect.⁷¹ They discriminate against--by excluding --members of a particular (social) race. The criterion of 'race' is

capable of covert institution in ways that pass all the ordinary tests of traditional moral theory. Such policies cannot be condemned as immoral on the basis of the 'moral irrelevance of race.' Besides not appealing (overtly) to 'race' at all, these policies are to be considered immoral not for making 'race' relevant but because 'race' becomes the effective basis for exclusion.⁷²

The issue of preferential treatment highlights this point. Where we have an ideal of a just--a non-racist--society, preferential treatment may be considered an effective means to approximate this ideal. But then it cannot be maintained, on pain of circularity, that 'race' is a morally irrelevant category. In certain contexts it may assume primary relevance. Suffice it to endorse here Wasserstrom's astute insight: In a society so deeply stained as our own by racial discrimination, it is not some putatively irrational appeal to 'race' as the criterion of differential treatment that is unjust. Rather, it is the fact that racial membership is used to pick out individuals or groups with the view to excluding them or subjecting them to such invidious treatment as slavery, oppression, abuse, etc. It is not so much the criterion employed to determine the subjects of such treatment that is immoral, but the actual subjection to the form of treatment itself.⁷³ That 'race' may be used neutrally to discriminate between individuals or groups, perhaps with favorable ends in view, indicates that its use must acquire its abhorrent character from the particular moral quality of the principle in respect of or end(s) for which it is (to be) used, not from the bare use. Appealing to the 'morally irrele-

vant category of race' fails to ground the claim that racism is irrational.⁷⁴

Our analysis thus far supports Putnam's insight that if something is considered part of the definition of rationality (or racism, for that matter), it is rendered conveniently unnecessary to argue for it (Putnam 1981: 184). The wider point at issue here is similarly confirmed: The moral status of the use of 'race' is at least partially independent of its rational status. Where the use is culpably irrational, it is also immoral; though we have established that racism in general is immoral notwithstanding its rationality. The irrational forms of racism are summed up neatly in Sartre's dictum that "...the contradiction of racism" consists in the fact that "in order to treat a man like a dog, one must recognize him first as a man." The metaphor from which Sartre's epigram gains its significance--that racists treat others like, not as, dogs suggests also the capacity of other forms of racism to accord with the general standards of rationality (whatever they are taken to be).⁷⁵ Though extreme, the 'savagery of racism'--to employ another metaphor--is capable in the final analysis of being rational (i.e., reasoned). This is less surprising in light of the fact that other forms of extreme (un)social action--like war--may be conceived similarly.

To accept this conclusion, it is necessary to recognize that a full account of rationality must consist in a complete specification not merely of human psychology, but also of the evolution and raison d'etre of the structures of social life. Thus racism, in some of its

manifestations and to varying degrees, must be rational. This holds whether rationality is characterized in the formal, 'objective' mode of philosophers and scientists; or in the 'subjective' mode of social psychology. Here beliefs are rational in respect of their ability to comfort and protect against anxiety; to organize vague feelings; to provide a sense of identity; to be a prerequisite for participation in a cause, etc.⁷⁶ The following chapter will reveal that the concepts of racism: identity and difference, inclusion and exclusion; the necessity of classifying; the hierarchy central to 'the great chain of being'--all this is so much part of the structures of our cultural heritage, our very way of thinking. Contrary to prevailing opinion, then, we could not but expect that racism be rational in part. Having swallowed this bitter pill, the question then becomes on what basis racism is to be condemned in general as immoral and how, ultimately, we are to rid our social life of its suffocating grip.

CHAPTER SIX: FOOTNOTES

¹For accounts in which temporality serves implicitly as the distinguishing feature, see Allport (1954), pp. 334-337; and Frederick Samuels, Group Images (New Haven: College and University Press, 1973), pp. 30-32. Cf. R. Keat and J. Urry, Social Theory as Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 145-159.

²Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a10ff.; David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. E. Mossner (London: Pelican Classics, 1969), pp. 460-465; Grice (Raz 1978), pp. 168-169; Roy Edgeley, "Practical Reason," in Raz (1978), pp. 23ff; G. H. von Wright, "On So-called Practical Inference," in Raz (1978), pp. 46ff.

³Grice (Raz 1978), p. 169.

⁴The wider classification into logical and moral errors of racist thinking can be found also in Richard Wasserstrom, "Rights, Human Rights and Racial Discrimination," in Moral Problems, ed. James Rachels (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1975), p. 120. Wasserstrom's moral sub-classification rests on his human rights perspective and differs from the above. He thinks that the moral errors rest on the logical ones.

⁵Cf. Tajfel (Watson, 1973), pp. 79-80; R. A. Jones, "Perceiving Other People," in In the Eye of the Beholder, ed. A. G. Miller (New York: Praeger Publications, 1982), pp. 49-53.

⁶"In terms of strictly psychological processes, there is nothing evil, immoral or inferior about stereotyping. Its central operating characteristics--categorization, inference, anticipatory thinking, planning--are obviously adaptive and functional." Miller (1982), p. 31. Historically, see W. Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1922), p. 16; T. Newcomb and W. Charters, Social Psychology (New York: Dryden Press, 1950), p. 31; Allport (1954), pp. 172-126--though later he insists that a stereotype is not a category but often exists as "a fixed mark upon the category," p. 190; R. A. Jones (Miller 1982), pp. 78, 80, 90-91. In contrast, cf. J. Fishman, "Examination of the Process and Function of Social Stereotyping," Journal of Social Psychology 43 (1956): 27-64; D. Campbell, "Stereotypes and the Perception of Group Differences," American Psychology 22 (1967) 817-829.

⁷Newcomb and Charters (1950), p. 214.

⁸Tajfel (Watson 1973), p. 84.

⁹Fishman (1956), pp. 35ff.

¹⁰R. Wuthnow, "Anti-Semitism and Stereotyping," in Miller (1982), pp. 181-182.

¹¹Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969), pp. 16ff.

¹²R. A. Jones (Miller 1982), p. 61.

¹³Tajfel (Watson 1973), pp. 80-85; R. A. Jones (Miller 1982), p. 42.

¹⁴Campbell (1967), pp. 823-835.

¹⁵W. Stephan and D. Rosenfield, "Racial and Ethnic Stereotypes," in Miller (1982), p. 119.

¹⁶Some have condemned stereotypes as false on the basis that agents using them in their observations of groups had had no contact with the stereotyped groups. Allport describes an agent who, merely hearing from others that Negroes have a peculiar odor and connecting this verbal information with his general aversion to the pungent odor of sweat, forms the false stereotype 'smelly Negroes.' Allport (1954), pp. 136-137. Cf. D. Katz and K. Braly, "Racial Stereotypes in One Hundred College Students," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 28 (1933): 289. But as Campbell notes, lack of contact by agents with the object group is not a sufficient ground for assuming falsity. Campbell (1967), p. 824. See also 'Aborigine example,' (5.2.2.c.) above.

¹⁷R. A. Jones (Miller 1982), p. 41. Fishman underscores this by insisting that, however erroneous stereotypes appear to be, they must rest upon a 'kernel of truth.' Only this allows for the marked agreement in people's stereotypes and for the fact of the direct relationship between changes in stereotypes and changes in the social, political and economic conditions in which they appear.

¹⁸Samuels (1973), pp. 22-24.

¹⁹For example, the sub-species of Larus argentatus, the herring gull. Cf. Baker (1974), pp. 76-79.

²⁰Sir Arthur Keith, "The Evolution of the Human Species," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 58 (1928); 305-321. Cf. Allport (1954), pp. 132-133.

²¹ Social experiments in the 1950s employing photographs established that Jews then had a 50 percent identification rate. Allport (1954), pp. 132-133. Today, European and American Jews are probably only microdiacritic.

²² Cf. C. McCauley, C. Stitt, and M. Segal, "An Individual and Quantitative Measure of Stereotypes," Psychological Bulletin 87 (1980): 197.

²³ Cf. Miller (1982), pp. 497ff.

²⁴ Stephan and Rosenfield (Miller 1982), p. 108.

²⁵ I am grateful to Professor Jerrold Katz of the Graduate School, CUNY, for drawing my attention to this example. Unfortunately, I have not been able to trace it to any one of Russell's popular essays.

²⁶ Contra Popkin's influential interpretation of Hume's text. Richard Popkin, "Hume's Racism," The Philosophical Forum IX, 2-3 (Winter-Spring 1978): 223-224. Cf. David Hume, "Of National Characters," in Philosophical Works, eds. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, vol. 3: Moral and Political Essays (Germany: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964), pp. 252ff.

²⁷ Carleton Putnam, Race and Reason (Washington, D.C. Public Affairs Press, 1961), pp. 6-7. Signatories to the introduction endorsing Putnam's book include geneticist R. Ruggles Gates (Columbia University) and Henry Garrett (formerly Professor Emeritus of Psychology, Columbia University, New York).

²⁸ Contra Allport (1954), p. 176; and Theodore Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), pp. 1-11, 145-152.

²⁹ For the earliest study revealing low correlation, see R. T. La Piere, "Attitude vs. Actions" (1934), in The Consistency Controversy, ed. A. Liska (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), pp. 44-52. For the inference that attitude is an unreliable predictor, see Leon Festinger, "Behavioral Support for Opinion Change" (1964), in Liska (1975), pp. 56, 67. For a methodological critique of these studies, see M. Fishbein, "The Relationship between Beliefs, Attitudes and Behavior," in Cognitive Consistency, ed. S. Feldman (New York: Academic Press, 1966), p. 214.

³⁰ Liska (1975), p. 19. The strength of agreement among philosophers that only propositions or their bearers can be inconsistent is revealed by the fact that it is assumed by those differing in virtually

every way but this: Michael Dummett, "Truth" in Philosophical Logic, ed. Peter Strawson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); Karl Popper, "What is Dialectic?" in Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 315-335; and Michel Foucault, This is Not a Pipe, tr. J. Harkness (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 19.

³¹Some social scientists have recognized this, holding that belief states (e.g., moral beliefs) only have indirect impact on behavior. See S. Schwarz, "Words, Deeds and the Perception of Consequences and Responsibility in Action Situations," in Liska (1975), pp. 146-162. Others have sought either to redefine 'attitude' to include conation or as only one of many (perhaps interactive) causes. In the former respect, see Howard Ehrlich, "Attitudes, Behavior and the Intervening Variables," in Liska (1975), pp. 135-137; in the latter, see M. de Fleur and F. Westie, "Attitudes as a Scientific Concept," in Liska (1975), pp. 27-28.

³²H. Leventhal et al., "Effects of Fear and Instructions on How to Cope with Danger," in Liska (1975), pp. 245-259.

³³Liska (1975), p. 15.

³⁴It has been espoused by social psychologists, anthropologists and philosophers, amongst others. Cf. R. T. La Piere, "Type-rationalizations of Group Antipathy," Social Forces 15 (1936): 232-237; D. Levinson and R. W. Sanford, "A Scale for the Measurement of Anti-Semitism," Journal of Psychology 17 (1944): 339-370; Adorno et al (1950), pp. 605-653, esp. p. 631. Ruth Benedict, to whom is owed the first technical use of 'racism,' writes: "...between the two world wars racists...repeated (Houston) Chamberlain's self-contradiction (denying that race is relevant to the racist position)." Ruth Benedict, Race, Science and Politics, revised ed. (New York: Modern Age Books, 1947), p. 133. Kurt Baier implicitly rests upon this postulate his assertion that 'individual racism' is irrational because the agent's beliefs are "hypothetical or deluded." Baier (1978), p. 126. Marcus Singer reiterates the claim that "the theory of racism...is self-contradictory as well as confused..." Singer (1978), p. 176.

³⁵Allport admits that "there is somewhat less self-contradiction (in respect of Negro stereotypes)...but contradiction is by no means absent..." Examples of this supposed 'self-contradiction': 'Negroes are lazy and inert, but also aggressive and pushing'; or 'The Negro knows his place, but force is needed to keep the Negro in his place.' Allport (1954), p. 198.

³⁶Fishbein points out astutely that because of intragroup heterogeneity, in assessing beliefs about and behavior towards a particular object, the beliefs about and behavior toward that very object

must be considered, and not towards the class of which the object may be a member. Subsequent testing bore this out. Fishbein (Feldman 1966), p. 214.

³⁷This criticism may be generalized to cover other examples Allport cites: 'Laziness' and 'inertia' are not contradictory as such to 'aggression' and 'pushiness;' nor does 'knowing one's place' obviously contradict 'needing force to keep one in one's place.'

³⁸Stephan and Rosenfield (Miller 1982), p. 96. My emphasis.

³⁹Maurice Godelier, Rationality and Irrationality in Economics, tr. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), p. 12. The means believed by the agent to be appropriate to achieving the projected goals conceptually cannot exclude the possibility of actualizing the ends pursued.

⁴⁰In Kantian terms, "whoever wills the end, so far as reason has decisive influence on his action, wills also the indispensably necessary means to it that lie in his power." Kant (1969), #417, p. 39.

⁴¹Cf. Godelier (1972), pp. 30-35.

⁴²"In short, empirical evidence confirms what economic analysis would predict: that regulated industries have more discrimination than unregulated industries when this depends only on economic considerations..." Sowell (1975), p. 167.

⁴³Christopher Jencks, "Thomas Sowell vs. Special Treatment for Blacks," New York Review of Books XXX, 4 (March 3, 1983a): 37-38.

⁴⁴Jencks(1983a), pp. 37-38. Peter Singer differentiates the kind of examples offered here from another: the refusal by a film director to hire a White actor for a part in a film scripted explicitly for a black character. This is obviously a case of discrimination between, not against, races; and so, on our definition above, it is not racist. Peter Singer (1978), pp. 188-191.

⁴⁵Otto Lange, Political Economy (New York: Pergamon, 1963), p. 263. Cf. Godelier (1972), p. 41.

⁴⁶Godelier (1972), p. 40. Where workers cooperate fully to maximize profit, we can speak of a 'worker rationality' that is "complementary, derivative and dependent" upon capitalist rationality. Godelier (1972), pp. 302, 305, 308.

⁴⁷Kant (1969), #433-434, pp. 58-59.

⁴⁸For example, we do not really deem morally abhorrent the millionaire who, approached for a reasonable donation of money to a morally good cause he has no aversion to, declines on grounds of desiring to spend the money in his own interest, such as purchasing a new car or boat. Philippa Foot, "Are Moral Considerations Overriding?" in Virtues and Vices (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 181-188.

⁴⁹Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," in Foot (1978), pp. 161ff. Foot's criticisms of Kantianism are compelling and consistent with those laid out above. This should not sway us to accept Professor Foot's conclusion that morality is just another kind of hypothetical imperative. Moral ends are empirically determined for Foot, they are the kinds of ends "that arouse devotion...(that)...people are willing to die for." Yet no analysis is offered as to why it is just these ends that we hold so dear. If the content of morality is to be determined only empirically, racist principles will be moral where and when they are socially valued and fought for. This is as unacceptable as the Kantianism under attack.

⁵⁰Cf. S. I. Benn and G. Mortimer, "Rationality and Belief," in Rationality and the Social Sciences, ed. S. I. Benn and G. Mortimer (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 1-2. For example, the relativism of 'functional rationality' can be distinguished from that of 'instrumentalist rationality.' In the former respect. Cf. P. Partridge et al, "The Rationality of Societies," in Benn and Mortimer (1976), pp. 369ff.; and Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction (London: 1940), p. 54. In the latter respect, cf. Max Weber, Economy and Society (New York: 1968), pp. 22-26; and Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 168-169; 178.

⁵¹The formulation of the first argument captures the relativistic thrust of Levy-Bruhl (anthropology), Whorf (linguistics), Winch (philosophy) and Kuhn (history of science). Cf. L. Levy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality (New York: Beacon Press, 1966), pp. 50, 520; B. Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1956), pp. 211ff, 239ff; Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1958), pp. 15, 100, 126; and Peter Winch, "Understanding Primitive Society," in Rationality, ed. Bryan Wilson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), pp. 89-101; and Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962), pp. 110ff. The second argument is exemplified in Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge, 1940), pp. 255ff. Both arguments are outlined and analyzed more fully in Steven Lukes, "On the Social Determination of Truth," in Modes of Thought, eds. R. Horton and R. Finnegan (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), pp. 239-248.

⁵²Cf. Marshall Sahlins, Culture and Practical Reason (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976), pp. 72-73.

⁵³This reconstruction in no way depends upon Hume's distinction between a 'rational' belief and the weaker condition of a reasonable one. Cf. Hume (1969), pp. 147ff, 167ff; Putnam (1981), p. 107; D. Hamlyn, The Theory of Knowledge (New York: Macmillan Press, 1973), pp. 78ff. In general, see G. Mortimer and J. Maund, "Rationality in Belief," in Benn and Mortimer (1976), pp. 11-20. This outline of justificationism is wide enough to cover logical positivist criteria by circumscribing 'good reasons' above in strictly verificationist terms. Cf. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Penguin, 1974), pp. 45ff.

⁵⁴Hume (1964), pp. 252ff.

⁵⁵Cf. Popkin (1977), p. 213. Popkin's reconsideration of Hume's racism has come to my notice. Popkin shows that there was available to Hume considerable counter-evidence that he simply ignored or brushed aside. Now once Hume had entrenched his inductive generalization as a theory that would bridge no counterfactuals, he could employ it as justification of his denial that there could be countervailing evidence. This is in keeping with a good deal of scientific and philosophical practice. It seems to belie Hume's own epistemological views only in the sense of affirming that facts are theory-laden; that a theory can blind one to crucial facts. Richard Popkin, "Hume's Racism Reconsidered," The Journal 1, 1 (Winter 1984): 1 61-71.

⁵⁶Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23 (1963): 121-123.

⁵⁷Mortimer and Maund (Benn and Mortimer 1976), p. 14; and Anthony Kenny, "Belief, Rationality and God," Bantham Lectures, Columbia University, New York, March 1982.

⁵⁸Later, Bracken emphasizes that the main elements of Locke's empiricism "facilitated the rise of racism." Bracken (1978), p. 250. My emphasis. Cf. Noam Chomsky, Language and Responsibility (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), pp. 92-93.

⁵⁹John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: Mentor, 1965), Second Treatise, #23, 24, 25. Bracken further cites Locke's advice to the Governor of Carolina. Bracken (1978), p. 253.

⁶⁰Popper denies that it is possible to know the truth of any proposition, even of the lowest-level observation statement. Popper (1969), pp. 53-54. Cf. W. H. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 44-45; and in general, 44-76.

⁶¹Popper (1969), p. 216.

⁶²Popper (1969), pp. 52ff; Newton-Smith (1981), pp. 44-76; Mortimer and Maund (Benn and Mortimer 1976), pp. 20ff; and Feyerabend (1978), pp. 172ff.

⁶³John Searle, "The Rules of the Language Game," Times Literary Supplement, 10 September 1976, p. 1120. For historical examples of those holding implicit versions of 'rationalist racism,' see Appendix below, A.7.5.

⁶⁴Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime, tr. John T. Goldthwaite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 111, 113. My emphasis.

⁶⁵Those espousing the earlier view include: E. B. Tylor, The Origins of Culture (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1958); Lewis Morgan, Ancient Society (New York: Meridian, 1963), Part One: "Growth of Intelligence Through Inventions and Discoveries," pp. 3ff; A. Marshall, Principles of Political Economy (London: 1946), pp. 723-724; and I. Jarvie and J. Agassi, "The Problem of the Rationality of Magic," in Wilson (1970), pp. 172-193. For the more generous view of 'traditional thought': Levy-Bruhl (1966); L. Levy-Bruhl, How Natives Think (London: Allen and Unwin); Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), Chaps. One and Two; Horton (Wilson 1970), pp. 131-171; S. Lukes, "Some Problems About Rationality" in Wilson (1970), 194-213; and M. Hollis, "The Limits of Irrationality," in Wilson (1970), pp. 214-220.

⁶⁶Although Habermas's account of the third level of 'critical (reflective) reason' might appear to exclude the racism that is clearly capable of arising at the first two levels of 'purposive (instrumental)' and 'communicative (hermeneutic) reasons,' closer examination--beyond our scope here--will reveal otherwise. Cf. Jurgen Habermas, Towards a Rational Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970a), pp. 81-92; Habermas, "On Systematically Distorted Communication," Inquiry 13 (1970b); 205-218. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971); and Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 253-282. For a development of these themes in Habermas's later work, see Thomas McCarthy, "Rationality and Relativism," in Habermas: Critical Debates, eds. J. B. Thompson and D. Held (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1982), pp. 57-78.

⁶⁷In mathematics, different--even contradictory--answers sometimes are acceptable, e.g., $\sqrt{4}$ is 2 or -2.

⁶⁸Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 254ff., esp. p. 260. This feature has led some philosophers over-enamored with the success of science to deny that moral deliberation can be rational. Cf. C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), pp. 2, 158.

⁶⁹Cf. Carl Cohen, "Why Racial Preference is Illegal and Immoral," Commentary (June 1979). Wasserstrom summarizes this thesis as it appears in legal case history. R. Wasserstrom, "On Racism and Sexism," in Today's Moral Problems (New York: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 84ff. This criticism was presented to me most forcefully in conversation by Howard McGary, editor-in-chief of The Journal of the Society for the Study of Black Philosophy. For a thesis implicitly conflating the claim that 'race' is morally irrelevant with the more insidious one that racism is morally irrelevant, ending up (it would seem not so inadvertently), with racist conclusions, see Michael Levin, "Is Racial Discrimination Special?" Journal of Value Inquiry 15, 3 (1981): 225-234.

⁷⁰Quotas may be based on the criterion of origins or family ties, and set in accord with some 'significant' historical context or 'contribution to society.' For example, 'Only persons with family members domiciled in or originating from Britain in 1850 may be granted British citizenship,' or 'Only persons whose family originated in Europe...' and so on. Similarly, those holding that distinct cultures can be maintained only by some form of 'homeland policy' need not appeal to overtly racist criteria for its formulation or institution.

⁷¹The actual principle and effects of contemporary British immigration policies facilitate a fairly free influx of whites from Australia, South Africa and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) while restricting entry to a much greater degree of West Indians, Africans, Asians and Aborigines.

⁷²Similarly, appeal to the 'utilitarian principle' will not necessarily prove to be morally effective here: Though the average or aggregate pleasure of the indigenous population as a consequence of the policy may outweigh that of immigrant applicants (if such calculation is possible), we wish to maintain that the policy is immoral nevertheless.

⁷³Wasserstrom (Wasserstrom 1979), pp. 76; 84, 86.

⁷⁴At the other extreme, a cautionary note must be sounded concerning the development of a 'Black counter-logic' to the 'dominant, phallogocentric, White rationality' that has facilitated the rise of racism (Cornel West, "Race, Class and Marxism," a talk at the

'What's Left?' Conference, New York, March 1983)). Growing out of the concern to furnish a positive account of 'Negritude,' this 'counter-logic' has been projected as the basis for 'a universal, inclusive, conjunctive mode of rationality.' Racism is essentially 'dualistic, disjunctive, exclusionary and hierarchical.' So it must be irrational. (Hodge, Struckmann and Trost: 1975; and John Hodge, "Dualistic Ideology and Group Oppression," a lecture at City University of New York, March 1981). The spirit of this proposal perhaps warrants encouragement. Yet it is doubtful whether an alternative of this kind is capable of grounding the massive body of mathematical and scientific knowledge now available to us. It should be presented not as a 'counter-logic' but as a counter-rationality. It would constitute thus a model in terms of which we are to think of ourselves and others, and could include as a part the logic and findings of the hard sciences. Once formulated in this way, the model could be judged against other forms of (social) rationality, and could not be dismissed simply as irrational by the 'dominant mode' because inconsistent with 'good' (standard) logic. Further, to describe the model as a 'Black' logic is contrary to its own projected ideals: Although not exclusionary of others in principle, the designation suggests the very categories of 'disjunction' and 'exclusion' it rejects. In offering the 'logical framework' in terms of which 'race' is to be regarded as morally irrelevant, it is enthroning--if only implicitly--that category as morally basic which it is undertaking to eradicate. If such be the new paradigm of rational virtue, it is unlikely to win over many converts.

⁷⁵ Sartre (1976), p. 111. Sartre's analysis of the anti-Semite and morality mirror the ambiguity here. The anti-Semite is condemned as one who, because anti-Semitism is a 'passion,' is never capable of reasonable acts in his other spheres of life: he is prone to excess in every respect. This transgresses Sartre's more careful Aristotelian qualification elsewhere: an agent is "the sum of his actions." He is to be characterized morally (as reasonable or unreasonable, courageous, etc.) in strict relation to the moral character of the individual acts performed by him. Agents are not to be condemned a priori as unreasonable for all their acts on the basis of a single or limited undertaking. Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite and Jew (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), pp. 21-22; and "Existentialism is a Humanism," in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Meridian, 1956), p. 300.

⁷⁶ Cf. Godelier (1972), p. 317; and R. P. Abelson, "Social Psychology's Rational Man," in Benn and Mortimer (1976), pp. 58-92.

PART THREE

RACIST DISCOURSE, RIGHTS AND REACTIONS

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SOCIO-DISCURSIVE FORMATION OF RACISM

7.1. Racism as a Field of Discourse

Racism is characterized by a complex history. Resting upon the rise in use of the concept 'race' in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, racism took firm root, as we have seen, at the same time as Enlightenment scientists and philosophers extended the property of reason to all human beings. Over the ensuing two centuries, racism came to be redefined in terms of a group of central constitutive elements. This furnishes the key to a unified account of racism. The history of racism is to be read as reinterpretations, mixtures, recyclings, and ultimately transformations of and additions to this pool of elements in light of new problematics, changed circumstances and trenchant criticisms. Like any history, the 'story' of racism is strewn as much with temporal ruptures and conceptual discontinuities as it is with a semblance of unity and continuity. Further complicating this history is the proliferation since the 1940s of explanatory accounts of racism's rise, its functions and machinations, logic and practice. It needs to be shown here how this 'meta-level of scientific explanation' may be incorporated within a general account of racism, especially in light of the fact that these misrepresentations have contributed not insignificantly to racism's extended life.

Now, to develop a theoretical framework sufficiently wide in scope to incorporate these disparate elements, racism must be considered in general as a field of discourse, characterized by family resemblances. As a theoretical construct, the discursive field of racism is broad enough to include all the various entities constitutive of racism. Taken independently, these constitutive entities fall under the category of 'expressions.' Racist expressions include beliefs and verbal outbursts (e.g., epithets, slurs, etc.), their underlying 'pre-conceptual' structure and, more overtly, acts and their consequences, as well as the principles on which racist institutions are based. The 'field of discourse' is capable of including also all those discussions of racism, the burgeoning set of texts that undertake to analyse and explain racism's occurrence and logic, its origin and history.

On this view, beliefs and descriptions must be assumed as theoretically basic. Whether actually racist or putatively explanatory, beliefs and descriptions are directly accessible to analysis and interrogation. Acts and their consequences, or institutions and their principles, must be described first, translated into texts, to furnish a form appropriate for analysis. Beliefs and descriptions may be expressed actively (spoken, enacted) or in writing; but the former is likewise transcribable into the latter and thus open to analysis on the same basis.

The domain of racist discourse is populated, at the most general level of description, by two sets of texts: the expressive and the analytic. We have found racism analysed variously as rationalizations

for psycho-sexual fear, economic or social disparities; for cultural inclusion/exclusion or for political entitlements/disavowals. As often as not, racism may be rational, that is, logically and factually valid responses to given circumstances and available evidence. But racist texts are constituted by beliefs in a narrower sense: as expressions of racist principles, supposed justifications of differences, advantages, claims to superiority (whether 'natural' or 'developed'), and of racist practices and institutions. These expressions have assumed widely divergent forms: scientific, linguistic, economic, political, philosophical, cultural, religious, and so forth.

This concept, 'field of discourse,' can be utilized thus as an instrument for organizing the family resemblances that constitute the data of racism. But this concept is also an analytic tool, an explanatory device. It must be asked therefore what analytical virtues can be brought by its use to an understanding of racism which have been overlooked or ignored by all other analytical approaches. 'Field of discourse' is used, then, both as a theoretical tool and a metaphor for organizing the divergent phenomena of this analysis. The appendix immediately following this work illustrates application of this concept by way of the different forms racist discourse has assumed. These illustrations are largely socio-cultural and historical.

7.2. The Field of Racist Discourse

The view that racism consists in a field of discourse is suggested explicitly by Cornel West and less directly by Edward Said's

analysis of Orientalism. West's account simply summarizes briefly the bare threads of Foucault's original specification of the concept 'discursive field,' applies it tendentiously to a limited 'genealogy of racism' and suggests how it might be incorporated into a more sophisticated Marxist historiography. Contrastingly, Said's more detailed investigation streamlines the concept's applicability to the specific confines of Orientalism, at once narrower and more institutionalized than our object of concern.¹ We will consider afresh therefore Foucault's original insights in respect of this concept.

A well-defined field of discourse arises out of a 'discursive formation' consisting of a totality of ordered relations and correlations--of subjects to each other and to objects; of economic production and reproduction, cultural symbolism and connotation; of laws and moral rules; of social, political, economic and legal inclusion and exclusion. The socio-discursive formation consists of a large set of statements or expressions: 'is's' and 'oughts', 'do's' and 'don't's', 'can's and 'cannots,' 'thou shalt's' and 'thou shalt not's.' At a given historical conjuncture, the conditions of existence and co-existence, production and reproduction, preservation, transformation and dissolution; all this promotes rules constitutive of a discursive field by defining an object which can be spoken of and the mode in terms of which it can be analysed, its elements named and classified, its functions explained.² The object--racism--exists as the effect of, that which is given rise to by, established and determined relations between subjects and institutions, economic and social practices, by patterns

and principles of conduct and ethics, classificatory systems and technologies of power. Racism is not simply present in these relations, nor is it reducible to them or to any one of their constitutive elements. Hence the failure of any attempted explanation of racism solely in terms of economic determinism, sociological or biological reductionism.

Specifying both racism's 'genealogy' and 'ontology' in this way establishes concretely what we could assert only before: the ethnocentrisms of socio-epistemic conjunctures prior to the seventeenth century, though forerunners of racism, were not themselves forms of racism. 'Slavery' or 'barbarianism' are discursive objects differently constituted and structured than racism. They make no appeal as such to any concept having its originary place in a particular scientific discourse in the way in which 'race' does. There is a radical schism between these earlier forms of subjection, exclusion or subjugation and racism, a rupture reflected in the discourses constituting these respective phenomena.

A field of discourse is populated, in ascending degree of specificity, by texts, works and expressions. A work is a highly organized set of expressions, occupying book-space, capable of physical transportation, parented and owned as property by its author. A text, by contrast, is not specific in the way in which a work is. As Barthes points out, it consists in a 'methodological field' which facilitates the "activity of associations, contiguities, and cross-references."³ Texts offer the threads of the structure that enables

the development and deployment of the concepts of the discursive field. At the risk of banalizing Barthes' analysis, it can be said that works are instantiations of texts; and texts lay out the framework of the field of discourse. The interplay of concepts is to texts what expressions and statements are to works.

There are numerous elements specific to texts which provide the methodological ground of discursive fields: socio-historical conjuncture; formal components and relations; the subjective expression.⁴ Each will be discussed in turn.

7.2.1. Sowing the Field: Socio-Historical Conjuncture

The socio-historical conjuncture underlying a field of discourse is the confluence of 'material' (socio-political, economic, etc.) conditions and values pertaining at a given period in time which together facilitate the definition of a discursive object and the articulation of the field of discourse. Once the discursive field is established, variations and transformations in these conditions and values may stimulate discursive modification, development, even dissolution.

The socio-historical grounds of racism have been closely examined: The voyages of discovery from the sixteenth century onwards, reporting vast areas of 'unconquered' land with inestimable mineral wealth and natural resources, yet peopled by strange, often hostile beings;⁵ a nascent capitalism fueled increasingly by an ever-expanding appetite for profit, leading very quickly to demands for cheap labor and raw materials, race-bound slavery and the denuding of

natural resources; early nineteenth century population increase in Europe leading to colonial spread;⁶ and the drive for market expansion stirred by the unquenchable desire for profit.⁷ The nineteenth century 'economic miracle' brought with it the political solidification of the State, the forces of which were no longer directed just at the native barriers to colonial extension, but employed also for internal division and exclusion, domination and violence. The terror conducted against Jews in Spain or Russia was extended in the first half of the twentieth century into a well-oiled machine of annihilation in Germany; and the exclusion of Jews from British citizenship until the eighteenth century, and then again completely in 1890, has developed into State-sanctioned techniques of racial exclusion not only of Blacks and Asians in Britain and some of its former colonies, but ironically of Palestinians in Israel.

Although these material factors can be taken in a general fashion to have encouraged racist practices and articulations, racism--to repeat--is not reducible to and cannot be explained purely in terms of them. In defining the field of discourse, historical analysis must extend beneath the surfaces of socio-economic relations to uncover those elements undergirding the discursive and material interrelations, namely, the system of values and appropriation. In the case of racism, this historical perspective reveals a remarkable confluence of the mode of economic and aesthetic valorization (the general criteria according to which things are imbued with value) and appropriation (how these objects are made our own).

George Mosse has pointed out insightfully that the rise of racist discourse rested upon the eighteenth century resurrection of classical values of beauty.⁸ Equally interesting is the degree of similitude these values shared with the criteria of value in the classical economic tradition. Equilibrium and utility have analogous functions in classical economic theory to proportion, symmetry and refinement for classical aesthetics. Both sets of criteria determine an order of balance and harmony established on the basis of the geometric model. Beauty is for classical aesthetics a property possessed by subjects just as the possession of economic goods creates the utility of classical economics. Possession of property signifies wealth, that which the agent has been capable of appropriating in the face of competition.⁹ To lack classical beauty is to be poor, which--as for laissez faire economics--is considered one's own fault. Where beauty is interpreted in terms of racial properties: fair skin, straight hair, head shape, well-composed bodily proportions and so on; not to have them are faults of inheritance, in the same way that heirs are designated to maintain wealth within the confines of the family 'blood-line.' Just as economic poverty (lack of property or ownership of the means of production) leads agents inevitably to work for pittance in factories and mines, so 'racial poverty' was seen to justify property in humans. Locke's 'justifications' of property appropriation and ownership, on one hand, and human property in black slaves, on the other, best exemplifies the confluence of values at work here.¹⁰

Another historical dimension molding racist discourse is embedded here. The criteria of value for classical aesthetics, as for classical economics, are thoroughly intellectualist. Beauty is regarded, first, as a property present as an ideal essence to the intellect, characterized by its clarity and knowability (cf. Plato, Philebus, 59b-65d; and Plato, Symposium, 210a-212a). Second, though 'utility' in the classical economic tradition appears to be defined in terms of 'satisfaction of desire,' the market mechanisms by which the classical model 'tends to equilibrium' is equally intellectualist, a fact to which Adam Smith's 'invisible hand of reason' bears witnesses.¹¹ This intellectualism is supported by a very strong naturalism: Objects are deemed beautiful insofar as they correspond to or mirror the order of things, just as they supposedly tend to their true value (natural price) as demand and supply 'mirror' each other.¹² The same naturalism and intellectualism pervade the foundations of modern philosophical discourse. The rationalist and empiricist traditions rest ultimately upon common philosophical presumptions: truth as the correspondence of idea to reality, knowledge as mind mirroring nature. This further supports our earlier line of argument that rationalism and empiricism are in their own ways both open to racist conjecture.¹³

Translated into abstract racial terms, this pervasive naturalism and intellectualism led to the view that persons are beautiful on the basis of their 'natural' qualities,' established on grounds of racial membership. Aesthetic value solidified thus into natural law

which became for the classicist revival of the eighteenth century as compelling as the laws of nature, economics and morality precisely because they were all deemed to derive from the same basis. For this reason, many natural historians, biologists and anthropologists at the time classified mankind not simply on grounds of strictly physical criteria like "measurement, climate and environemnt" but according to the aesthetic values of "beauty or ugliness."¹⁴ The aesthetic values of bodily beauty referred to above were establishehd as the mode of determining the individual's place in the racial (and therefore social) hierarchy; and perceived intellectual abilities (or lack) were thought to reveal inherent racial differences in mental capacity.

Most commentators have assumed that racists inevitably combine these two strains into a spurious causal principle, i.e., racial membership determines both one's degree of beauty and intellectual capacity, such that where observers have access to one, they may deduce the other. The racist tradition in its entirety cannot be dismissed so hastily on grounds that racist discourse rests historically upon collapsing 'aesthetic values' and 'natural qualities.' Based on their inheritance of Cartesian dualism, some early racist thinkers of empiricst persuasion had already begun to think of mind and nature as merely correlated in various ways.¹⁵

This looser relation~correlation rather than causality-- enabled the extension of each strain into a separate genealogical line of racist discourse: 'Aesthetic racism' wedded to the physicality of bodily shape and color, quality of bodily accoutrements like hair, and

so forth;¹⁶ 'intellectual racism' expanding into the technology of brain capacity measurements and IQ testing.¹⁷

This interplay of factors--legal, political, economic, aesthetic and philosophical--forms thus the socio-historical backdrop against which the field of racist discourse could take root. This grounding of the field of racist discourse in socio-historical factors is analogous to the embedding of socio-cultural values and practices in scientific theory by Paul Feyerabend in Against Method. To see how racism has so successfully pervaded cultures and periods, and how these factors solidified into the various finite racist forms, we must lay forth the two remaining elements fundamental to the discursive field: namely, the formal features constitutive of racist discourse; and the subjective aspect--the internalization and expression of racist discourse by subjects.

7.2.2. Ploughing the Field: Structural Components

The structural boundaries of a discursive field enclose a set of expressions revealing a unity at a given socio-historical conjuncture. This delicate unity is overdetermined not merely by the various socio-historical elements analysed above, but equally by the dynamics endogenous to the structure of the discursive field. In general, what is circulated and exchanged within a field of discourse like racism is not simply truth but representations. These representations draw their efficacy from traditions and conventions, institutions and tacit modes of mutual comprehension.¹⁸ Analysis of the representations must reveal not only the objects to which they refer, nor simply the

styles of reference found in the figures of speech, metaphors, categories and expressions of the discursive field. In the relations between the expressions lies a grammar, just as a formative 'pre-conceptual' plane is to be found extending across the categories and between the expressions and the objects represented. Analysis of the structures of racist discourse is concerned with all these components.

(a) The 'Grammar' of Racist Discourse

A recent work has shown that the unity of an individual work is determined partially by lexical distribution and the connectivity of vocabulary in it.¹⁹ The discursive unity of racism--what marks it off as a discourse separate from others--is not so strictly determinable. The field of racist discourse cuts across different languages, works, acts and institutions. Though the assumptions, principles and purposes of this discourse might in a loose way circumscribe its content, the discursive content is not so well-defined as it is for a given work. It fails to furnish a foundation sufficiently firm for textual determination by lexical distribution and vocabulary periodicity. Clearly, the unity of racist discourse cannot be established on narrow grammatical grounds.

Cornel West suggests that the unity of racist discourse is a product of "the structure of modern discourse...the controlling metaphors, notions, categories and norms that shape the predominant conceptions of truth and knowledge in the modern West." This

"complex configuration of metaphors, notions, categories and norms produces" a "normative gaze" which in turn "produces and promotes such an object (i.e., 'white supremacy') of modern discourse." The unity of racist discourse accordingly is "a product of" and is "promoted by "these controlling metaphors, notions, categories and norms which "...produce and prohibit, develop and delimit forms of rationality, scientificity and objectivity which set parameters and draw boundaries for the intelligibility, availability and legitimacy of certain ideas" (Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance: pp. 50, 49, 53; referred to hereafter as West 1982).²⁰

Discursive unity is surely not a product of figures of speech (including metaphors). Discourse is only expressed by such means--and partially so at best. The metaphors of racist discourse are not reducible to a single form: "nigger dogs" or 'Blacks (or Red Indians) are savages',²¹ differ in form, substance, even in the specificity of their purposes, not only from 'the Jewish conspiracy' or Chamberlain's 'Aryan race-soul,' but also from "Sambo, the typical plantation slave (as) docile but irresponsible, loyal but lazy, humble but...lying and stealing..."²² It is not that color racism and anti-Semitism differ by virtue of the fact that blacks are referred to as animals and Jews only in the context of some abstruse mythology. Jews are often described in terms of animal imagery;²³ and a color racism relying upon character-trait stereotyping need have no recourse to animal metaphors at all.

Now it might be thought that discursive unity is a function either of a prevailing corpus of norms or of a prevailing style. These norms are established by way of a series of descriptive statements about others which delimit the way we 'perceive' them. Style, in turn, is supposedly the dominant mode of discursive expression. In the former case, the discourse of racism consists not only of this descriptive knowledge of others. It includes a set of hypothetical premises about others (e.g., 'the great chain of being', classificatory hierarchy, etc.), and about the differences between them (physical or mental); a class of ethical choices and decisions (e.g., domination and subjugation; entitlement and disavowal, disrespect and abuse); a set of institutional regulations, directives and pedagogic models (e.g., apartheid, 'separate development,' educational institutions, choice of language of education and bureaucracy, etc.)(in general, cf. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 33; referred to hereafter as Foucault 1972). Though norms or prescriptions for behavior are circumscribed by specific hypotheses, ethical choices, regulations and models in particular circumstances, no uni-directional norms are basic to racist discourse: A decision that one race is intellectually inferior to another may be taken as the basis of a norm of exclusion from educational institutions or of the concentration of special educational resources. Similarly, the model of racist expression, its style, may be interpreted variously as aversive, academic (or scientific), legalistic,

bureaucratic, economic, cultural, linguistic, religious, mythical, ideological, and so on. Racist descriptions, hypotheses, choices, models and rules of discourse have altered over time. This precludes even the possibility of establishing a singular, trans-historical, normative or stylistic pattern.

A complementary criticism can be launched against attempts to establish discursive unity on the basis of common objects referred to or common themes developed and spoken about in the discourse of racism: Anti-Semitic statements pick out objects different than those racist statements that objectify blacks. Similarly, the theme of an anti-Semitic slur (e.g., 'communist conspirators!' as grounds for excluding Jews from trade unions or political office)²⁴ differs largely from that of anti-black ones ('Dumb nigger!' as the ground for restricting blacks to manual labor or slavery). Various objects are named, described, analysed and judged--in a word, emerge--in the discourse, just as themes are chosen, delineated and developed in speaking. Determined by the discursive field, these objects and themes cannot be all that differentiates the discourse of racism from other discourses (cf. Foucault, 1972: 32-36).

Themes and objects emerge only in discourse, delineated by the set of norms and principles, hypotheses and choices, articulated in figures of speech and styles. All of this assumes coherence and uniqueness only when compared from the point of view of the discourse as a whole with another discursive field. If discursive

unity is to be achieved, it can be a product solely of those underlying factors which directly generate the discursive field. Foucault calls this set of factors the 'preconceptual' level (Foucault 1972: 60). Changes in descriptions and hypotheses, rules and models, norms and styles, are reflected in transformations in the preconceptual soil of racist discourse. The structural unity of the discourse of racism must be sought in a transformational schema of its preconceptual set and "in the interplay between their location, arrangement and displacement" (Foucault 1972: 33-34).

(b) The Preconceptual Soil of Racist Discourse

The preconceptual set consists of those factors of power (including value) which directly enable the expression and signification of racist discourse. The members of this set are not to be mistaken for the empirically concrete concepts of racist discourse. Nor do they constitute any abstract, trans-historical a priori essences, an ideal foundation of the racist discursive formation. These factors of power vested in and between historically located agents are generative of the concepts and categories in terms of which racism is expressed and comprehended. These properties and conditions definitive of racist expression and practice are historically produced, effects of a determinate social history, standing only in time (5.3.). Preconceptual factors effect rules that determine the transformations, inferences and references for this discursive field, thereby defining in a general way the expression

of those agents--and only those--who speak this discourse (cf. Foucault 1972: 62-63).

A semblance of coherence and stability is imparted to the field of racist discourse in the face of conceptual breaks and reformulations, or fractures and alterations in its elements. Unity is not furnished by some abstract ahistorical durability of racism. The discourse of racism transforms--arises, alters, perhaps will eventually disintegrate--with these changes. Unity is a function, rather, of a cluster of principles--the 'pre-concepts'--which at a higher level of generality have been central to racism. The specific character of these pre-concepts has already been suggested in the definition of racism offered above (5.3): classification and order, value and hierarchy; differentiation and identity, discrimination and identification; exclusion and domination, subjection and subjugation; entitlement and disavowal, violence and violation.

Classification is basically the scientific extension of the epistemological necessity, noted earlier, of placing phenomena under categories. The impulse to classify data goes back, of course, at least to Aristotle. Yet it is only the response to the burgeoning body of empirical data by the "esprits simplistes" of the seventeenth century and the Enlightenment that establishes classification as a fundament of scientific methodology (Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, pp. 7ff; referred to hereafter as Lovejoy 1960).²⁵ With its catalogues, indices and inventories

classification establishes an ordering of data, thereby furnishing systematicity to observation.²⁶ Because it purportedly reflects the natural order of things, this ordering of representations "ought to be as it is" and so cannot in truth be otherwise. But, as Peter Caws points out, if the ordering of the representations is itself of such crucial import, it always presupposes value.²⁷

The data that in the eighteenth century lent themselves most readily to 'systematic seeing,' to representations by rules, were obviously those of biology and natural history. Extended to human affairs, this pervasive spirit of simplicity sought to re-establish for social relations the kind of simple order thought to inhere in nature (Lovejoy 1960: 8). Hence the application of the categories of speciation (racial differentiation, etc.) to human groupings on the basis of natural characteristics. Perhaps the major assumption underlying anthropological classification at this time was that identification of races in terms of their differentia is adequate to establish the laws of behavior of their members.

If classification is central to scientific methodology, and scientific method furnishes the ideal model of rationality; and if the capacity for rationality is to be the mark of humanity: then it seems that the anthropological ordering into a system of races in terms of rational capacity would establish a hierarchy of humankind, with that race represented by the classifiers at its

pinnacle. Racial ordering implies a racial hierarchy, and a behavioral expectation. The racial hierarchy was thought to be revealed through its physical correlates--color, head-shape, body size, smell, hair texture, etc. This engendered a 'meta-physical pathos,' an aesthetic empathy or aversion that, because supposedly natural, was thereby considered reasonable.²⁸

Racial classification, the ordering of human groups on the basis of putatively natural (inherited or environmental) differences, directly implied thus a hierarchy of races. The derivation of hierarchy from classification rested upon the longstanding view not only that the universe is perfectly intelligible to reason, but on the 'principle of gradation' inherent in this. Formulated explicitly as Aristotle's 'hierarchy of being' and adopted later as a fundament of Christian thought, this principle maintained a perfectly continuous evolvment of being "from a less to a greater degree of fulness and excellence" (Lovejoy 1960: 317). The 'neutrality' and 'disinterested' stance of the rational scientist created the theoretical space for a view to develop of subjectless bodies, bodies that could be analysed, categorized, classified and ordered with the cold gaze of scientific distance. Once the principle of gradation was employed to ground racial classification, providing thus an objective ordering, the subjectivity of aesthetic taste and judgment, of empathy and aversion, could be applied to this objectification of human subjects. The full weight of eighteenth century science and rationality, philosophy,

aesthetics and religion merged thus to circumscribe European representations of others.²⁹ This objective reduction of human subjects to abstract bodies had the 'scientific' effect of facilitating their subjection to the cold hard 'gaze' of the European.

The principle of gradation obviously has a moral implication too: Higher existences are of greater worth than lower ones (Lovejoy 1960: 330).³⁰ The chain of elements--classification, order, value, hierarchy--is taken to delineate the realm of possibilities at each level of existence. If 'ought implies can,' the range of moral imperatives is thereby delimited and a ladder of command accordingly authorized. This ladder of command consists in a hierarchy of orders and injunctions that simultaneously reflects and cements the putative racial order. Though a product of a complex of relations of power and its representations, this hierarchy of commands serves also to perpetuate them.³¹ Various interpretations of the principle of gradation, for example, considered it justifiable to treat 'lower racial orders' as animals, subjecting their members to forms of labor and living conditions otherwise reserved for animals. Polygenicists like Edward Long reasoned that because Negroes and Whites are incapable of forming properly fertile hybrids ('mulattoes'), they must constitute different species. Long held that Negroes are not properly human and ought not to be treated as such. A century later, Social Darwinism--in Europe as in the United States--encouraged inferences in the same vein.³² The principle of gradation, it could be said, was at once a principle of degradation.

Classification, order and value are fundamental to the forms of rationality we have inherited. Socially, it is evident that we labor still under the constraints of this rationalized authority, ordering our relations with others in their light. The principle of racial hierarchy is now widely considered obsolete. This has motivated varied responses to racist thinking and discourse. The most widespread is that because the concepts of 'inferiority' and 'superiority' implicit in 'racial hierarchy' are part of a buried scientific paradigm, the ladder of command they authorize has no scientific, no rational legitimacy (5.2.2.2.d.iv). At best, the theory of racism is considered not unlike the phlogiston theory of gases in the eighteenth century which, despite empirical discoveries and new paradigms, persisted yet to the turn of that century.³³ At worst, racism is dismissed simply as a crude rationalization for the domination and subjugation of others. A more sophisticated response has been the denial that racism exists any longer in principle: if the principle of natural hierarchy has been abandoned to the shifting sands of time, there can be no concept of racial superiority commanding acts or authorizing differential distributions.³⁴

In abandoning appeals to superiority connoted by hierarchical classification, racists are committed neither to irrationality and rationalization nor to extinction. History for the moment aside, though hierarchy may not be implicit in the concept of 'racial classification,' difference surely is, as the synonym 'racial

differentiation' bears out. 'Difference' and its antithesis, 'identity,' inhere in the concept of 'race,' furnishing the grounds for racial classification.³⁵ Denomination of a particular race is established in respect of a series of differences from other individuals or groups, and by virtue of a series of identities between like beings. The choice of what is to count as a relevant difference or identity is based not only upon the prevailing socio-historical elements disclosed above, but also on various assumptions effective in social or scientific discourse at the time.³⁶

Racial differentiation--the discrimination between races and their members--is not in and of itself racist (4.2.b.). Yet racial identity, even when externally ascribed, implies unity. When this identity becomes internalized, it solidifies into identification, the sense of belonging together. Only then does racial differentiation begin to define otherness; and discrimination against the other becomes at once exclusion of the different.³⁷ Elaboration of racial differences and identities has sufficed as one of the foremost contemporary modes of determining exclusions and inclusions. While it allows racists to applaud the debunking of racial hierarchies, it serves in the same breath to establish unity for modern racist discourse.

At a deeper level, exclusion on the basis of difference furnishes a common ground for the transformational schema generated by classification. 'Differential exclusion' constitutes the

primary generative pre-concept of the deep structure of racist discourse. It is racial exclusion which at basis motivates the entire superstructure of racist beliefs, hypotheses and theories; of expressions and acts; of laws and institutions. And it is racial exclusion which in general furnishes a criterion of entitlement and restriction, endowment and appropriation.

If it is to be successful, exclusion necessitates a suitable authority to distinguish the beneficiaries of the entitlement, those who will enjoy the fruits of the endowment from those to be restricted in their enjoyment or deprived of rights, goods or services. The sense of belonging together is too loose on its own to furnish a mode of objective differentiation and exclusion. The psychoanalytics of group identification underlying this sense of belonging serves to pick out an authority in the body or person(s) of whom the members of the group recognize themselves. By internalizing this authority, by subjecting itself to his law, the group not only incorporates itself and so establishes cohesion, but acquires thereby also a privileged moral position.³⁸

This identification of, with and by means of a personal authority thrusts the question of the mode of exclusion to a prior level. Though it may be evident that the sense of identity with others is cemented by mutual recognition in an authority, it is not at all clear what initially motivated this sense of mutual belonging. Once this is established, the question remains whether the authority in fact appeals to this factor as the underlying mode

of differentiation and exclusion, and as a foundation of moral privilege. These questions suggest that this form of authority is not simply contractually based but, in a peculiar way, is vested in a theoretical corpus.

If each episteme has its 'regime of rationality,' it must be grounded in a "general politics of truth;" not in the collection of objective truths to be discovered and endorsed, but in a body of rules by means of which 'truth' is to be differentiated from 'falsity' and thereby accorded discriminatory force.³⁹ The will to power, the desire to exercise power--whether in the pure pleasure of the act or as a means to further ends--clothes itself in the fashions of the discourse of rationality, in the language of truth, assertion, natural representation, value, in a word, 'knowledge.' Now if "...nothing is more material, physical, corporeal than the exercise of power," than the power of authority; authority then cannot be something ideal. It is established only by being invested with the power of discrimination, exclusion and enforcement. If the canons of value and taste in which authority resides have the power of enforcing material effects, these canons must embody material force.⁴⁰

This prerequisite of material force circumscribes the realm of possibility for grounding racist discourse. If the discourse of racism was to furnish the material power for the definition of otherness and the forceful exclusion of the different, it had to be grounded in the relation of bodies to each other, in ways of

seeing bodies, in a discourse of the body. Though voyages of discovery and imperialist drives may have suggested general differences between conquering populations and conquered, the rise of racist discourse was rendered theoretically feasible only by the change in paradigm from the seventeenth century onwards of viewing human subjects. The new philosophical presumption that bodies are but machines naturally divorceable from minds liberated massive developments in technologies of physical power and bodily discipline. These technologies of discipline and power were superimposed upon human subjects to encourage docility by reducing subjectivity to physical dimensions and correlates.⁴¹

The grounding and unifying of racist discourse in bodily relations, in "the investment of the body, its valorization, and the distributive management of its forces" signifies the dimension of material force--the relations of power--at racism's heart.⁴² The 'distributive management of bodies' entailed by color racism extended the space in which capital accumulation, the growth of productive forces and the massive liberation and redeployment of surplus value could take place. It has been used also by a white working-class to maintain for itself a privileged position in the industrial complex. Similarly, anti-Semitic discourse has been deployed often to exclude 'Jewish bodies' from neighborhoods or European economies, as anti-Arab invective has been invoked to clear West Bank territory of Palestinians.

If the authority of racist exclusion is located in the discourse of the body, if this 'body-talk' (so to speak) is to unify the discourse of racism, something more must be said by way of establishing the body as an object of discourse. From the point of view of human subjects, there is nothing more 'natural' to think and speak about than the body: it is directly experienced, its deficiencies immediately felt; it is the receptacle of pleasures and pains, desires and needs; and bodies of others are unproblematically observable, confronted, engaged. The body, in other words, is central to our ordinary experience. It offers a unique paradigm, a symbol of a 'bounded system' whose parts and functions are related in a complex structure, and whose substance is confined by boundaries and limits so threatened, fragile and vulnerable. The body thus comes to stand for the body politic, to symbolize society.⁴³

As a mode of exclusion, the discourse of racism assumes authority and is vested with power, literally and symbolically, in bodily terms. It is human bodies that are classified, ordered, valorized and devalued. It is human bodies that, because of their differences, are forced to work, disavowed of their labor product, disenfranchised or restricted in their right of social entry and mobility. The corporeal properties furnish also the metaphorical medium for distinguishing the pure from the impure, the diseased from the clean and acceptable, the included from the excluded. Classification of differences determines order. Hierarchy is

established on the basis of a value of purity--whether interpreted biologically (in terms of 'blood' or 'genes'); hygienically (in terms, for instance, of body odor); culturally (for example, language as signifying the evolution of thought patterns and rational ability); or even environmentally (character, like nose, as a function of climate). Impurity, dirt, disease and pollution are expressed as functions of the transgression of classificatory categories, as too are danger and the breakdown of order. Actively undertaking to transgress or pollute the given order necessitates re-inventing order by way of confinement and artificially imposed separation.⁴⁴ To this end, techniques of racial prohibition inherited the repressive apparatuses imposed against leprosy and witchcraft, redefined them in light of newly evolved technologies of insanity and, aided by the theoretical tools of modern science, tailored them to contemporary socio-political conditions.⁴⁵ This heritage of repressive exclusion is best exemplified in the case of Robben Island, off the shores of the Cape of Good Hope, where lepers first, then the mentally insane, and now black political rebels have been incarcerated. The Island thus has come to signify, in the symbolism of South African politics, the wider artificial imprisonment of the bodies of others, their general exclusion, that it is the function of South Africa's black Homelands policy to police.⁴⁶

Instruments of exclusion (legal or cultural, political or economic) are forged by subjects as they mold criteria for estab-

lishing racial otherness. Racism is promoted--perhaps entailed --by this discourse of the body, with its classificatory systems, its order and values, its ways of 'seeing' particular bodies, and most fundamentally, its modes of exclusion. Paradoxically, racist discourse has been capable of drawing social subjects together, unifying them as subjects of authority. Subjects have been able to recognize identity in this discourse, just as they can be identified by it. The discourse of racism furnishes a cohesive foundation for the body politic, a continuity in time, across authorities. It is a discourse authors of the law might invoke as justification of entitlements and restrictions, endowments and disavowals, incorporation and disenfranchisement.

Racist discourse thus enters the domains of morality and legality as a foundational claim. Its asserted title to establish differences is taken as an objective basis of inclusion and exclusion, whether natural or historical. This is offered, in turn, as a primary ground of entitlements, of rights of accessibility (to enfranchisement, opportunity or treatment) and of endowments (goods and the means thereto); and conversely, of denial (disenfranchisement or restriction, of prohibition (to entry, participation or services), and of alienation (of goods or the means to them). In general, the discourse of racism justifies the exclusion of others by ignoring or denying their respective claims and encourages active interference in establishing what the excluded, the disenfranchised and the restricted are entitled to and properly can expect.

The question of exclusion and entitlement is exemplified most vividly by immigration policy. Eugenacists addressed the political, legal, economic and moral issues of immigration from the standpoint of their scientific findings. Earlier this century, prominent eugenacists in the United States and Britain argued that members of alien racial stocks should be excluded or severely restricted from entering the respective countries in order to prevent weakening or to improve the biological quality of the local stock. In Britain, East European Jews were especially singled out.⁴⁷ In America, the national quota on population entrance from any country in Europe was reduced to 2 percent of residents of that origin already in the U.S. in 1890; Orientals eventually were excluded altogether (culminating with the complete ban on Japanese in 1924). The European bill had the effect of favoring immigrant stocks--the desirable English, Irish, Germans, Scandinavians--over the 'inferior' stocks of newer immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe.⁴⁸ More recently, exclusion, disenfranchisement, restriction of entry and mobility, and denial of the means to fulfil needs and wants have been justified in South Africa, Britain and Israel (to name but the most overt) on the basis of appeals to racial difference alone.⁴⁹

To summarize: The formal apparatus of racist discourse has emerged out of a conflation of multiple determinations. These include the economy of power and its relations pertaining at a given historical conjuncture; a new way of looking at bodies, a new

mode of speaking about others--the technologies of classification and the analysis of differences and identities; novel forms of institutionalized prohibition--for instance, on bodily contact implied by the concept of heredity, or on land tenure implied by the appeal to historically grounded land rights. As a discourse of exclusion, racism appeals either to inherent superiority or to differences. These putative differences and gradations may be strictly physical or intellectual, linguistic or cultural. The exclusions each purportedly warrants in turn serve both as the basis for justifying differential distributions or treatment and as significations of those very relations of power that prompted them.

The discursive unity of racism is induced by the transformational schema of pre-concepts laid out above. At specific socio-historical conjunctures, this schema generates the concepts peculiar to the enunciation of racism at that time and place, and thereby the categories and stereotypes, the expressions and metaphors, the styles and themes expressed in the field of racist discourse. To establish racism specifically as a discourse, however, the pre-conceptual schema must give rise in addition to racist hypotheses and presumptions, indeed, to racist argumentation, reasoning and rationalization(Foucault 1972: 59-60).

If the widespread employment and influence of racist discourse is to be comprehended fully, it is the persuasiveness of racist modes of argumentation that yet must be accounted for. This

suggests a facet of the racist discursive formation that remains to be analyzed: To show how agents have so readily expressed racist discourse--how they dig, sow, hoe and reap the field and then distribute its produce---it must be illustrated how agents subject themselves to modes of expression, making these modes of expression their own; whom subjects direct these utterances and reasoning at, and why; and what subjects aim to gain from this method of expressing themselves.

7.2.3. Of Fields and Farmers: The Racist Subject

The widespread adoption of racist discourse--across classes, nations, social groups, races; in different places, at different times--cannot be explained solely in socio-economic, political or historical terms. Such explanations are singular in ignoring a central feature: the persuasiveness of racist discourse, its compelling character for agents. Similarly, the prevailing presumption of racism's ideological irrationality, of the 'false consciousness' of racists, suggests the psychosis of the racist personality rather than his or her persuasion, conscious belief and conviction, or rational willingness. To comprehend this diffuse domestication of racist discourse, something must be said about human agency and the formation of subjectivity.

Social groups are constituted for the most part by the self-recognition of its members in the image of an authority. By what media does this group-member recognition take place, and how is this recognition effected? Emile Benveniste's insight that individuals are 'interpellated' as subjects in and by means of language⁵⁰ raises a

distinctively novel possibility in conceiving the formation of the subject: as the point of convergence, the bodily intersection, of multiple discourses. Whatever properties and (Kantian) categories are thought to constitute humans qua human, individuals are defined as subjects by way of social discourses. Discourses are the intermediary between self and society, mediating the self as a social subject.⁵¹

Discourses like racism are products of the economy of power, the interrelations of bodies, produced and refined in practice. These discourses do not just reflect the economy of power, its relations of domination, subjugation and exclusion. Once initiated, racist discourse is placed in the arsenal of the 'practico-inert,'⁵² ready to be passed along, inherited, reproduced and transformed to suit prevailing conditions. By converging with other discourses and interiorized by the individual, the discourse of racism comes to define not only subjectivity but otherness too. It molds the subject's relations with others. Subjects' actions are rendered meaningful to themselves and others in light of the values which the discourse makes available or represents to the parties involved.⁵³ In this way, racist discourse --reproduced, redefined perhaps, and acted on--reconstitutes also the relations of power that produced them.

Just as language furnishes the key for becoming conscious of oneself as distinct from the world, social discourse provides the means for social self-definition. Naming one's race, on the plane of racial identity, functions similarly as naming oneself at the level of self-consciousness and self-identity. The possibility of the former

necessitates self-recognition by the individual in the image of the social fathers (e.g., White leaders, founding-fathers, a Jewish Jehovah, the Aryan Superman, etc.), just as self-consciousness presupposes self-recognition by the youth in his own father (or father-figure). Each level of subjection--to the authoritative discourse of the father or to social authority (in this case racial)--is established by means of socio-linguistic symbols. These symbols incorporate general rules and taboos that represent 'The Law:' the 'Law of the Father' and the 'Racial Law.'⁵⁴ Once internalized, these discursive bodies of law, and others like them, define the subject.

This analogy is obviously not symmetrical. The 'Patriarchal Law' is central to the constitution of human subjectivity in a way in which the 'Racial Law' and racist discourse happily are not. The 'Law of the Father' acts as a model, an ideal, which facilitates the definition of individual subjectivity by social discourses. This is reflected in the fact that it is far easier to abandon the likes of the 'Racial Law,' to give up racist discourse, than it is to transgress the 'Law of the Father.' This renunciation or shift to other discourses, like modifications internal to the discourse, might reflect more or less subtle changes in the economy of power, in production and reproduction of the relations of power. But it is possible that they are in some circumstances determined rather by features specific to the psychological and bodily functioning of agents themselves. This possibility must be addressed now.

The human subject consists in the intersection of social discourses in the body. The dimensions brought by the body to this equation are the (bounded) capacities to desire and to think. Yet it is precisely discourses which offer the medium for thought. Kant's famous dictum may be emulated to express the state of subjectivity: Discourses without desires are empty; desires without discourse blind.⁵⁵ Because the human subject fails to act save on the impulsion of desires, discourses on their own would be unmotivated, hence empty in the sense of having no effect. Conversely, a desire not yet defined by a discourse could only be blind (indiscriminate). The intentions, motives, expressions and acts of the racist are obviously discourse-specific, whether consciously defined in such explicit terms or inadvertently so (as with unconscious slips and misstatements that reveal repression or wish-fulfillment).⁵⁶

On the conscious level, discourses define intentions, reasons and goals by articulating them. If the statement of intention includes that of desire, the general intention of the racist may be described as 'exclusion.' This is perfectly compatible both with specific racist goals and reasons offered in support or as justification. The racist may intend to exclude the racial other with the goal in mind of domination or subjugation; or that of maximizing profit by maintaining a cheap labor force, a 'reserve army of labor;' or of reserving jobs for members of his own race; or of maintaining indigenous culture; and so on. As reasons or the general principles they take to inform their acts, racists may offer the goals themselves or, as often as not,

various other categories of reasons, like scapegoating (e.g., a conspiracy theory), rationalizations (like 'inferiority'), rational stereotyping (e.g., a normative judgment appealing to factual evidence), and so forth. These motivations a racist may have to act in a racist way may be complemented by other factors: fear, for example, whether brought on by the threat of physical force or psychologically induced; or conformism, the behavioral disposition--imposed or merely encouraged--to conform to the needs of the community. Of course, such factors may be a function of a racist discourse in the process of reinforcing itself.⁵⁷

The field of racist discourse is a product of praxis in determinate historical circumstances. At the same time, the power of racist discourse conjoins with the power of other discourses to determine the subjectivity of individual agents in history. What begins to emerge from this racial subjectivization is a subjection to violence. This violence of racism afflicts not only the object of racist acts but the racist subject too. Violence is inherent in racist discourse. If subjects are defined by the discourse of difference, then subjects recognize themselves only in relation to others. To render this identity-in-otherness, this recognition of the self in the other, into a self-identity (or self-consciousness); the other (literally the other's otherness) must be negated, cancelled. Where this identity-in-the-other is racially predicated, defined by racial discourse, the drive to self-consciousness becomes a negation of the racial other, the other's exclusion. Tabulating racial differences as

an order of what Sartre calls 'alterity,' defining the other thereby to exclude him or her, is at once to constitute the other as enemy, to engage him or her in a relation of violence.⁵⁸

This relation of violence has a dual manifestation: Identification of the other as other is promoted by the initial drive to establish self-identity by identifying with the other. Negating the other, denigrating him, is at once self-negation and self-denigration.⁵⁹ The pleasure of violating another becomes in a sense also the masochistic pleasure of self-violation. Contrastingly, the other vacillates, in responding to this violence, between the hardships of active resistance and the relative comforts of passive resignation. This hesitation signifies prior internalization of the preconditions of the victim's own subjection and violation. The subjection at work here all too often presupposes interiorization by the victim of the pre-concepts of the discourse that motivated his or her exclusion: persecution approaching self-persecution (the 'persecution complex') and then exteriorized as the vicious persecution of others. Anti-Semitism is the perfectly self-referential example: the modes of Jewish subjugation are reproduced in the Jewish violence against Arabs.

Now it cannot be objected, as it has been of Foucault, that this account is a "discursive idealism" which "...attempts to derive real effects of oppression from the conceptual structure of...discourse."⁶⁰ The field of racist discourse is the concrete effect of the material relations and conditions laid out above, causing subjects

to act towards other subjects with the material effect of real oppression. Foucault responds to the charge of idealism by emphasizing the materiality of the exercise of power. He refers frequently, nevertheless, to an abstract 'Will to Power,' pure and unadulterated. At times, Foucault seems to think that this 'Will to Power' motivates all drives to dominate, whether by physical force or by the imposition of 'knowledges,' and so furnishes also the productive force of all fields of discourse. In Foucault's defence, it may be suggested that this abstraction from material powers and reification in a singular universal is simply a literary device, a manner of speaking. Foucault is clear that power is exercised not in the abstract, not in some idealized conceptual space, but by subjects upon others to various material ends. These ends include the material advantages possession of power inevitably entails and the pleasure of power, the thrilling enjoyment of its very exercise. Actually, we would be better served to take Foucault's Nietzschean 'Will to Power' as more properly akin to the Hobbesian 'desire for powers',⁶¹ articulated by and in discourses, both positive (as those of revolution, transcendence, overcoming) and negative (of racism, domination, authority, etc.).

The issue of racist discourse can be addressed at the level of socio-historical economies of power and value; of the formal structures of racist discourse; or of subjective expression. Whatever level we choose to address it at, there can be no doubt that it consists in a set of practices; of relations of power; of struggles and repressions; of violations and violent acts. In the appendix to this

work it is demonstrated briefly how the transformational schemas for racist pre-concepts and concepts laid out above are actualized by subjects historically in the various forms which racist discourse has assumed.

The line of analysis adopted here suggests that the factors which would facilitate the dissolution of the racist field of discourse and the deconstruction of racist practices are three in kind: First, the radical alteration of its socio-economic determinants, not just the internal modification of some of its elements. Second, transformation and extinction of its formal components, its grammar and language. This is most likely to occur only once these features become or are rendered irrelevant to the material determinants at the first level. This suggests the third possible approach: To end the particular forms of subjective expression by altering subjective practice. This amounts to abandoning racist discourse on a conscious psychological level because of the realization that the discourse no longer serves the agent's purposes; or in order to fulfil some general desires defined in terms of another, competing discourse; or--what may amount to the same motive--because one is convinced that one's reasoning is poor. It is this set of questions which will be addressed, within the context of the moral problematic posed by racism, in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN: FOOTNOTES

¹ Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982), pp. 47-68; Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 1-4. West intimates that he is currently developing a much larger project involving more detailed analysis and application of the notion, 'field of discourse.' West (1982), p. 160, fn. 1.

² Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, tr. Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: Tavistock Publications, 1972), pp. 38, 45, 179.

³ Roland Barthes, "From Work to Text," in Textual Strategies, ed. Josue Harari (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 74-6.

⁴ Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald Bouchard (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977a), p. 137.

⁵ See, for example, the debate in Spain (1550-1) between Las Casas, representative of the Church, and Sepulveda, spokesman for imperialism. Lewis Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians (Chicago: Regnery Press, 1959), pp. 28-73. See Appendix to this work, fn. 4, below.

⁶ Consider Hegel's argument for colonialism as a response to overcrowding and poverty in European cities. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, tr. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), #241-247.

⁷ Cf. Andre Gorz, "Colonialism at Home and Abroad," in Socialism and Revolution (New York: Anchor Books, 1970), p. 217. Stanley Aronowitz, The Crisis in Historical Materialism (New York: Praeger Publications, 1981), pp. 89-100.

⁸ George Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of Euoprean Racism (New York: Howard Fertig, 1978), pp. 10-11; 21-22. On this point, West merely mimics Mosse. West (1982), pp. 53-54; 58-59.

⁹ Locke (1965), "Second Treatise," pp. 327-344.

¹⁰ Locke (1965), #23, 24, 25. In a footnote to #23, editor Peter Laslett quotes Leslie Stephen:

"The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (Locke was secretary to the proprietors of Carolina) provide that every freeman 'shall have absolute power and authority over his negro slaves'...the Instructions to Governor Nicholson of Virginia which Locke did much to draft in 1698 regard negro slaves as justifiably enslaved because...captives taken in a just war, who had forfeited their lives 'by some Act that deserves Death'...Locke seems satisfied that the forays of the Royal Africa Company were just wars of this sort, and that the negroes captured had committed such acts."

Cf. Bracken (1978), p. 253. One is reminded also of the theme of attraction and repulsion in Cocteau's film, "Beauty and the Beast."

¹¹Smith, of course, does not employ the concept 'equilibrium' --a later fiction--but rather that of 'natural price.' Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (London: Pelican Classics, 1978), p. 158.

¹²Arnold Hauser, The Social History of Art (New York: Vintage Books, 1951), I, p. 82; Marshall (1946), pp. 323-350.

¹³Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), pp. 129-306. Cf. West (1982), p. 53; Mosse (1978), p. 11. See appendix below, A.7.5.

¹⁴Mosse (1978), pp. 21-22. This tendency by early racist thinkers like Buffon, Camper and Lavater, influenced by art historian J. J. Winckelmann, has been well-documented by Mosse and others. Mosse (1978), Chs. One and Two; cf. West (1982), pp. 53-59. Thomas Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea in America (New York: Schocken Books, 1965) pp. 32-39, 69-72; Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), p. 3-98.

¹⁵Witness Hume: "In Jamaica...they talk of one negro as a man of parts and learning; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks few words plainly." Hume (1964), p. 252, fn. 1. My emphasis. Of course, this fits the Humean notion of causality as constant conjunction.

¹⁶For example, the depiction of the "Jewish nose" from Carl Gustav Carus in nineteenth century Germany through Thomas Rowlandson in Dickensian England to Nazi propaganda. See Mosse (1978), p. 29 and Plate 4. A more sanitized version of this is Wilson's claim that body adornments--hairstyles and so forth--like racial characteristics, are gene-determined. E. O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 22. See A. 7.3. below.

¹⁷For example, the development in racist thinking from the likes of Gall and Spurzheim to Broca and Morton, the Eugenics Societies, culminating with the contemporary views of Jensen, Eysenck and Herrnstein. See A.7.5. below. Kant had moved already to merge these trends in his own racist deductions: After more or less abandoning strict Cartesian dualism, Kant could turn Hume's correlation between race and intelligence back into a causal relation by moving at the same time from 'beauty' as the basis of aesthetic classification to the concept of 'sublimity' (perfection). In typical Kantian synthesis, racial sublimity incorporated aesthetic and intellectual qualities such that Kant, as we have seen, could derive a Negro's 'stupidity' causally from his blackness. Kant (1960), p. 113.

¹⁸Said (1978), pp. 21-22.

¹⁹"...once the system of content has been settled in outline not only the main items of the vocabulary needed for expression, but also their relative frequencies are, by and large, determined, the system of content determining how often a particular word will appear in combination with other words." Gustav Herdan, Type-Token Mathematics, quoted in Peter Caws, "On the Determination of the Text," in About French Poetry from Dada to "Tel Quel," ed. Mary Ann Caws (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1974), pp. 278-279.

²⁰Two general features must be noted about West's analysis: First, West substitutes the concepts of 'production' and 'promotion' for 'determination' to avoid shortcomings internal to Marxist discourse. But it is difficult to establish from his analysis that there really is any difference in the way these concepts are used. Second, while West here considers modern racism (which he equates with 'white supremacy') to be a product of modern discourse, one of its objects, he has taken the view--at least in conversation--that racism itself is a discourse.

²¹The former is taken from Joseph G. Baldwin, The Flush Times of Alabama and Mississippi (New York: D. Appleton, 1853), p. 300; for the latter representation in 'antebellum Southern literature,' see Alan Rose, Demonic Vision (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1976), pp. 46ff.

²²In the former case, see Houston Stewart Chamberlain, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, ed. George Mosse (New York: Howard Fertig Publishers, 1968), pp. 542ff. Alfred Rosenberg, Hitler's philosopher-king, made much use of this notion. Alfred Rosenberg, Race and Race History, ed. R. Pois (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 35ff. For the depiction of Sambo in historical sources, see Stanley Elkins, Slavery (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959), p. 82.

²³"(Jewish elders) have the tenacity of a snake, the cunning of a fox, the look of a falcon, the memory of a dog, the diligence of

an ant and the sociability of a beaver," Hermann Goedsche (under the pen name Sir John Radcliffe), in his novel Biarritz (1868); in Mosse (1978), p.117,

²⁴ An entry in Himmler's diary associate Jews with reds. Quoted in Mosse (1978), p. 178.

²⁵ If introduction of words into the language is any guide, the term 'classification' appears only in the eighteenth century. Lucien Febvre, "The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century," in Historians at Work, eds. P. Gay and G. Cavanaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1975). p.111.

²⁶ "Every note should be a product of number, of form, of proportion, of situation." Linnaeus, Philosophie Botanique, #299; quoted in Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 134. Foucault calls this ordered observation "seeing systematically."

²⁷ Peter Caws, "Order and Value in the Sciences," in The Concept of Order, ed. Paul Kuntz (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), p. 106. My emphasis.

²⁸ The assumptions and reasoning are uniform, whether we consider the hard-headed naturalism of Kant (and, less extremely, of Linnaeus) or the benign environmentalism of Buffon or Lamarck. Though author of the principle that "all men are created equal," Jefferson believed that nature condemned the negro to inferiority on the scale of being: "Blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstance, are inferior to the whites in the endowment both of body and mind." Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 1954), p.143.; in general, cf. pp. 139-143. These premisses run clear to Social Darwinism, eugenicism and the IQ movement. See A.7.5.

²⁹ The Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Kentucky in 1885: "Instinct and reason, history and philosophy, science and revelation alike cry out against the degradation of the race by the free commingling of the tribe which is the highest (Whites) with that which is the lowest (Blacks) in the scale of development." Quoted in Stember (1976), p. 38.

³⁰ "The patriot stood appalled," continued the Bishop of Kentucky, "before the abysmal ignorance and moral incapacity of the black race."

³¹ Cf. Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchus (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970), pp. 66-7.

³² "The planters do not want to be told, that their Negroes are human creatures...they...(are)...no better than dogs or horses..." Edward Long, History of Jamaica, 3 vols (New York: Arno Press, 1972), II, pp. 270-271. Long appeals to his contemporary, Hume, in justification of his own racist views: "Mr Hume presumes, from his observations of native Africans, to conclude, that these are inferior to the rest of

the species, and utterly incapable of all the higher attainments of the human mind." Long (1972), II, p. 376. On polygenicism, Social Darwinism and racism, see A.7.5. below.

³³Cf. Douglas Lee Eckberg, Intelligence and Race (New York: Praeger, 1979), "Forward," by John Garcia, pp. vii-viii.

³⁴This reasoning informed William Buckley Jr.'s view in the late 1960s that America had rid itself of racism. It is implicit also in Levin's claim that use of 'racist' is scientifically and morally illegitimate. Michael Levin, "Sexism is Meaningless," St. John's Review (Autumn 1981b): 40, fn. 12. See A.7.5. and 8.2. below.

³⁵"The close relation of identity and difference (is)... that which gives us thought...Everywhere, wherever and however we are related to beings of every kind, we find identity making its claim on us." Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, tr. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1969), pp. 21, 26.

³⁶Foucault (1970), pp. 138ff.; cf. Terry Eagleton, "Wittgenstein's Friends," New Left Review 135 (1982), pp. 66-67.

³⁷The terms 'identity,' 'difference' and 'belonging together' are Heidegger's. Heidegger (1969), pp. 25, 26. Identification may be motivated variously by economic, political, cultural, linguistic, historical, psychological or psychoanalytic factors, and may be rational or irrational. For the positive and negative psychoanalytic dimensions of 'identity' and 'identification,' see respectively: E. Erikson, "The Concept of Identity in Race Relations," in Parsons and Clark (1965), pp. 227-253; and Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, tr. V. Carfagno (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 46, fn.

³⁸Reich (1970), pp. 46-47. Cf. Cronin (1976); Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus," in Lenin and Philosophy, tr. B. Brester (London: New Left Books, 1971), pp. 170-177.

³⁹Michel Foucault, "Truth/Power," in Power/Knowledge (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 131.

⁴⁰M. Foucault, "Body/Power," in Foucault (1980), pp. 57-58; cf. Edward Said, "The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions," in Aesthetics Today, eds. M. Philipson and P. Gudel (New York: Meridian Books, 1980), p. 120; and Said (1978), pp. 19-20.

⁴¹Foucault calls this change in paradigm a "sudden discovery." M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, tr. A. Sheridan-Smith (New York:

Pantheon Books, 1977b), p. 138; in general, see pp. 135-169. The coherent strength drawn by racism from the general discourse of the body may be gleaned from the fact that racist metaphors often turn around corporeal references; whether directly (like Hume's likening of Negroes to parrots and former U. S. Secretary of Interior James Watt's equations, in a speech on 27 September 1983, of Jews and blacks with cripples), or indirectly (as the common attribution of the symbolism of dirt to blacks and Arabs).

⁴²Foucault (1977b), p. 138.

⁴³Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 115.

⁴⁴For example: "Women are the gates of entry into the caste. Female purity is carefully guarded and a woman known to have sexual intercourse with a member of the lower caste is brutally punished." Douglas (1966), p. 125; in general, pp. 2-4, 103-4, 162. Cf. Dumont (1970), pp. 47-48, 60. Some eugenicists bemoaned the biological vices of racial miscegenation and hybridization between 'inharmonious' stocks. Cf. R. Ruggles Gates, "Heredity and Eugenics," Eugenics Review 12 (1920): 1-13; Jan Mjoen, "Harmonic and Unharmonic Crossings," Eugenics Review 14 (1922): 35-40; in general, Nancy Stepan, The Idea of Race in Science (New York: Archon Books, 1982), p. 130.

⁴⁵For the relevance of rationalizations for witchhunting to racist discourse, see Brian Easlea, Witchhunting, Magic and the New Philosophy (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), p. 33.

⁴⁶"The Homelands...are as much island-prisons as the isolated enclave of The Island, cut off by white territory as The Island is by sea from White civilization. It is symbolic of the self-encapsulated provincialism, the island-in-isolation of the entire society." "The Island," a film about political imprisonment in South Africa, by David Goldberg and Michael Oblowitz.

⁴⁷For the eugenicist outlook on immigration in Britain, see C. P. Mudge, "The Menace to the English Race and its Tradition of Present-Day Immigration and Emigration," Eugenics Review 11 (1920): 202-212. Karl Pearson, a leading figure in the British movement, suggested that only those immigrants be admitted who displayed physical and mental capabilities 25 percent higher than the native British mean. K. Pearson, "The Problem of Alien Immigration into Britain Illustrated by an Examination of Russian and Polish Jewish Children," Annals of Eugenics I (1925-6): 1-127. See Stepan (1982), p. 130.

⁴⁸Advocating this bill was no less than Albert Johnson, Republican Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration. In 1923,

Johnson was elected president of the prestigious Eugenics Research Association. Eugenic presuppositions obviously had wide influence. In 1922, U.S. Vice President Calvin Coolidge claimed in a popular essay that biological laws reveal the deterioration of Nordics when mixed with other races. Gossett (1965), p. 466. On the racist presuppositions of eugenicism, see A.7.5. below.

⁴⁹ Compare the remarks of Margaret Thatcher and Roy Jenkins in Britain: "...the British character has done so much for democracy for law...throughout the world, that if there is a fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in." Margaret Thatcher, Daily Mail, 31 January 1978. And, "First, we have a community...of an indigenous majority and a... substantial minority of different...origins with family ties in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean...These are the basic facts. They necessitate both a strict limit on the amount and the rate of inward immigration for settlement..." Roy Jenkins, Hansard, p. 983. Both quoted in Barker (1981), pp. 15, 19.

⁵⁰ 'Interpellation': an Althusserian concept, signifying the 'calling,' the 'hailing,' of the individual by others. This hailing, at once a recognition, is considered by Althusser to represent the means by which the individual becomes a subject. Althusser (1971), pp. 179ff. Cf. Emile Benveniste, Problems of General Linguistics (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1971).

⁵¹ This need not imply that the individual, theoretically or historically prior to this discursive intersection, is just a blank tablet, an empty receptacle. As Lacan emphasizes, though one may have an immediate intuition of one's individuality, this individuality can be expressed and actualized only in and by means of language. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, tr. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), pp. 529ff; Anika Lemaire, Jacques Lacan, tr. D. Macey (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 53. Nor does this commit us to relativism: some physical states and psychological dispositions (e.g., emotions) may be innate; but they cannot be expressed or acted upon in a discursive vacuum. Acts and expressions are mediated largely by the discourses definitive of an agent's subjectivity.

⁵² The 'practico-inert,' following Sartre, is 'the material product of past praxis.' Sartre (1976), pp. 318-320.

⁵³ Jacques Lacan, Ecrits, tr. A. Sheridan-Smith (New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 1-7; Althusser (1971), p. 181; Paul Hirst, On Law and Ideology, (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), pp. 64ff. Cf. Michael Shapiro, Language and Political Understanding (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), p. 130.

⁵⁴Lemaire (1977), pp. 56-57.

⁵⁵Kant's deep insight: "Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N. Kemp-Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 93.

⁵⁶For the distinction between conscious and unconscious factors in the determination of the text, see Peter Caws (M. Caws 1974), pp. 274ff.

⁵⁷For remarks on fear, see Goran Therborn, The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (London: Verso Books, 1980), pp. 94ff. For an account of 'conformism' in Heidegger, see John Haugland, "Heidegger on Being a Person," Nous (1982): 15-25. The above should not be interpreted as an attempt to reduce 'the power within the structure of the discourse to that of individual subjects. Following Foucault, West argues that this discursive power is 'relatively autonomous' and "...hence not fully accountable in terms of...the psychological needs...intentions, aims, needs, interests, objectives..." of individual subjects. West (1982), pp. 49-50. The power of the racist discursive formation assumes a logic of its own, an internal historical life autonomous from--though produced by--the lives and psychologies of individual subjects.

⁵⁸Sartre (1976), p. 720.

⁵⁹Hegel (1967), pp. 229-240.

⁶⁰West (1982), p. 160, fn. 1; Peter Dews, "The Nouvelle Philosophie and Foucault," Economy and Society 8, 2 (1979): 127-171.

⁶¹"So that in the first place, I put forth a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death." Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (London: Pelican Classics, 1968), p. 161.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION: AGAINST THE DISCOURSE OF RACISM

8.1. Recapitulations: Against the Discourses on Racism

We are left now to face practical concerns: To eradicate the various forms of racism; to neutralize the field of racist discourse. The theoretical grounds on the basis of which to address these questions are before us. But first, the threads in the preceding analysis must be interwoven.

Characterizations in the social sciences, philosophy and popular thinking have rested upon a uniform set of presumptions: Racism is an irrational group prejudice ascribing inferiority of members of other racial groups, on the basis of certain physical characteristics, and with a view to subjugating these racial others or rationalizing their existing domination. This definition has been shown to be reductive of racism's nature, to conflate definition with partial explanation and to be, therefore, sorely inadequate (Chapter 5).

By contrast, it has been demonstrated how racism assumes many and diffuse forms at different socio-historical conjunctures (Chapter 7 and Appendix). An adequate definition of the concept has to be capable of incorporating the entire range of phenomena. We have portrayed racism accordingly as an open-ended core cluster of pre-concepts: beliefs and acts of agents as members of a race; discrimination against

subjects as members of other races; identity and identification; racial preference; ascriptions of racial hierarchy and difference; inclusions and exclusions; endowments and restrictions; dominations and subjugations; violence and violation. These pre-concepts are generative of the particular expressions--beliefs, principles, statements, acts or institutions at given times and locations--which make up the general field of racist discourse. They have pervaded the socialization of modern subjectivity over the past few centuries by insinuating themselves, in the various fashions suggested, at the center of social discourse.

This saturation of social discourse is exemplified most clearly by the fact that racism, though not a necessary feature of any major metaphysical approach in the Western tradition, is easily compatible with them. We have shown how racist discourse has been molded and adapted to comply with these various philosophical frameworks by leading exponents of each. Hence the imperialistic racism of Anglo-empiricist possessive individualism; the a priori exclusions of enlightened European rationalism; and the chauvinistic judgments of dialectical synthesis offered from the distance of an ahistorical, hypothetical end-state. Compare the racisms of Locke and Hume, in the first instance; Leibniz, Voltaire and especially Kant, in the second;¹ and, in the third, that of the dialectical tradition from Fichte and Hegel, through Marx and Engels, to later Hegelians and Marxists.²

The capacity of racism to assume standard scientific, philosophical and cultural forms underlines the earlier conclusion: Some

modes of racism are capable of meeting any readily acceptable standards of rationality--whether the standards are specified in logical or scientific, political or moral terms (Chapter 6). This conclusion rests, in turn, upon that conception of 'race' as a conventionally useful classificatory category with no ontological commitment to the existence of inherent, biologically transmissible racial groups (Chapter 4). Scientists and philosophers have supported contrasting views here: On one hand, that because 'all races are equal,' no races exist in nature, and so all racial classifications are invalid. On the other, races exist ontologically, stamping upon individuals their real nature. The former view we have shown to be incoherent. And though essentialism, rationalism, Lockean empiricism and Quinean conventionalism are all compatible with the latter, it reifies historically determined differences between groups into absolute distinctions (4.3.). Denying that 'race' commits us ontologically to biologically determined human groups has two implications: It avoids any reification of such differences into an absolute principle of exclusion or domination. At the same time, we can continue to use the concept as a classificatory convention for categorizing actual differences between population groups. Racism is to be defined accordingly not simply on narrow biological grounds, but in terms of an extended notion of 'social race' (5.1.; 5.2.). Only in this way is it possible to capture the sociopolitical commonplace of 'racial comprehension,' which rests in turn upon the processes of 'racial formation.'³ Thus are explained both the peculiarly social flavor of the standard usages of 'race' and the common rationality of such use.

Now the explication of racism's immorality commonly rests upon the widespread conviction that racism is inherently irrational. This conviction is supposed to follow from those two aspects exhaustive of racism's general epistemological nature: the cognitive and the emotive.⁴ In the former instance, however, endorsing 'social race' as a rationally acceptable concept, at least in some usages, removes the objection that any appeal to 'race' necessarily conflates social and biological kinds. Yet then there are no universal conceptual grounds for condemning racism as irrational. Further, if racists are not inevitably self-contradictory in their expressions (6.1.1.b.; 7.2.2.b., 7.2.3), the logical basis for such accusations of racism's irrationality is dislodged also. The cognitive component of racism's purported irrationality thus can be only contingently true. In cognitive terms, racism then is but contingently irrational. In any case, a subject may believe at different times that all races are morally equal and that members of a particular racial group are inferior or racially different. Confronted with the fact that, taken together, he or she has held inconsistent beliefs, the racist may give up the (objectively) more defensible one. This alone fails to render him or her irrational, especially in light of Gettier examples (6.2.2.a.).

The emotive component is equally troublesome. It has been assumed widely, by social scientists in particular, that because all racists suffer some pathological or emotive disorder, their relevant beliefs and actions must be irrational (5.2.2.2.a.; 6.1.). This entails the bizarre conclusion that the racist is not strictly responsible

for the deeds following from this racist character. And so, according to the qualifications of 'second-order common morality' laid out above (2.2.b.ii.), the racist must be morally excusable for such deeds.

These failures of the cognitive and emotive components of the argument for racism's inherent irrationality together signal disturbing and deep-rooted shortcomings in our most common conceptions of moral theory. The only way moral theory is able generally to meet the preconditions of impartiality and universality so fundamental to the moral point of view is by resting morality upon rationality (Chapters 1, 2). The strong assumption here is that morality and rationality are (logically) equivalent: a principle, belief, act or institution is moral if and only if rational.

Where racism is endorsed by an ethical community (such as Hegel's Sittlichkeit), or by any human subject acting purely to satisfy rational self-interest or utility (as required by egoism and utilitarianism), it turns out to be rational on the criteria offered by each account, and so moral. In each case, the criterion of impartiality clearly would be transgressed (1.2., 1.4.). On the other hand, though an Aristotelian virtues-based theory or the universal prescription of Hare may apply impartially to all members of the moral community, both are open to the a priori circumscription of the class of acceptable moral agents. So Sepulveda could dismiss Mexican Indians, just as he had taken Aristotle to dismiss slaves, from the realm of rational beings. Where an account of moral virtues is tied to a strongly historicist foundation, as with MacIntyre,⁵ it becomes even

more difficult to universalize the virtues. To require that an agent, at any time and place, can be moral only if he displays these virtues seems inconsistent with the assumptions of historicism. Implications for a view which characterizes virtues racially are obvious. Hare's 'hypothetical shoe-change test' faces similar problems. It is easy enough to imagine ourselves 'standing in another's shoes,' given that they more or less fit. Universalizability is much harder, though, if we have to imagine ourselves (to change metaphors) 'standing in another's skin.' This is especially so where the racial signs are taken by the subject to represent experiences or characteristics very different from his own. It is conceivably rational to believe in these differences and their racist implications (6.1.1.a.). It must be moral, therefore, on this view too (1.5.a.).

Only the 'common morality' of Kantianism, in its revisionist or traditionalist strain, showed any real promise of a general theoretical censure of racist acts. Common moral agency is portrayed in terms of rational, self-legislating and self-governing (autonomous) beings as ends-in-themselves. Rational beings are assumed as such to occupy a higher level on the scale of being than those non-rational creatures subject solely to the laws of nature. Universality is achieved by abstracting away all characteristics and projects individuating agents (the Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance'), or by considering all rational acts the potential projects of all agents, abstractly conceived (Kantian universalizability). Because racist principles are entailed only by features individuating agents, they would not

be chosen by the abstract, universal rational being. They contravene, in other words, the fundamental principle of universal respect for rational beings.

This formalism entails perfectly universal moral sanctions because they are chosen by rational beings from whom have been removed all motivations to act that are peculiarly their own. The 'guiding principle' of a self-legislating rational individual "...is always to act so that he need never blame himself no matter how his plans finally work out."⁶ This capacity to avoid blame rests ultimately upon a blindness to all desire and self-interest. The ambiguity here is twofold: Choosing the moral law from behind the veil of ignorance begins to sound suspiciously like choosing it out of ignorance. And because this ignorance is taken as the foundation of moral principle, it implies that the rational agent is never culpable for this choice of moral law.⁷ At the same time, abstracting away all desire and self-interest gives up any motivation to act at all, and so implies inertia.⁸ Rawls tries to avoid these difficulties by distinguishing between the veiled theory of ideal principles of justice and the non-ideal theory of actual justice. The morality of the latter is measured in terms of its degree of reflection of the ideal principles. This simply brings to the fore again the insurmountable problems of release from the veiled space of ignorance and adjustments to its principles in the actual unveiled world (1.5.b.).

The viability of 'traditional' or 'common morality' is left resting upon the assumption that its content is specifiable directly

by the content of rationality. To act morally is to act according to the dictates of reason; immoral acts are simply irrational.⁹ Analysis of this content in its application to racism revealed critical weaknesses, both in content and structure of the moral account (2.2.). Subjective second-order qualifications of agent culpability (e.g., anger, intoxication) were found to undermine the objective first-order condemnation of racism as contravening respect for all rational beings. A deeper structural problem lay here though. An essential tenet of any ethic of duty is that it is possible in every case to individuate acts uniquely. Yet acts cannot be so individuated always in terms of intentions, or their spatio-temporal location. Reason seems not to guarantee in all cases a decision procedure for determining the objectivity of moral descriptions of act-situation complexes. A racist principle, belief, act or institution under one description may not be regarded so under another (Chapter 3).¹⁰

These difficulties are not simply a product of the subjective determinations of agent culpability and their incongruities with the already formulated principles of act rightness. The most severe problems characterize the objective structure of 'common morality': The major tension between the assumption of free, self-legislating and therefore morally responsible agents and the purported derivation from this of a single, necessary act as the fulfilment of duty for each set of moral circumstances; the supposed equivalence of positive and negative Golden Rules; the indictment of slavery (and racism) as inhumane and its encouraged practice; the disjunction between insults, ridicule

and disparagement as not always wrong and the Pauline principle never to do evil that good come of it; the contradiction inherent in 'contracting to do wrong;' the knot of problems involved in the distinction between 'active' and 'passive disobedience;' and the denial that moral agents are ever faced by conflicts of values, principles or duties. This final denial is entailed by the assumption that reason alone furnishes sufficient motivation to act by dictating one and only one imperative for each set of moral circumstances (2.1; 2.2.).

Conflicts of values, principles and duties seem to be so much a part of our common moral experience. They are denied by the theory of traditional morality on the basis that they are either metaphysically or logically impossible. In the former instance, it is held that agents as a matter of necessity could never find themselves in such a morally conflicted situation. As Williams points out, though, only a God of an extremely interventionist kind could ordain such moral consistency.¹¹ This removes the very foundation of the secular ethic it is supposed to ground.

The logical impossibility of conflicts is entailed by the contention that one of the values, principles or duties in the conflict turns out always to be inconsistent with the predetermined hierarchy of objective moral principles. Either the content of reason is socially determinate or rationality is purely formal. If purely formal, rational deliberation consists at least in the consistency of the agent's beliefs, the rational assessment of probable outcomes, and the optimal ranking of actions in time.¹² Besides the fact that the

latter consideration is value-laden, a good deal of racist thinking may be consistent with these formal standards of rationality (6.2.). If the content of reason is socially determinate, it must be recalled that some of the very same concepts needed for specification of the moral content are those central to the formulation of the racist principles and values (7.2.2.).

In any case, affirming one of the values, principles or duties in the conflict does not thereby automatically abnegate the conflicting ones. They remain precisely as values, etc.¹³ There is only a better reason, given the circumstances, to act in accord with the first. The conclusion seems inescapable that many values and principles of a racist kind may be included in the system of common morality as laid out here.

Over the past three centuries intellectual, aesthetic and social values have not only made possible the rise of racist discourse; in many ways, these values have also actively encouraged racist expressions. Where racist expressions conflict with other values and principles, the social necessity to overcome them can be dictated neither by a purely logical formalism nor by the dictates of pure practical reason. If the conclusion is accepted that racism may be rational in part, we cannot hope to condemn racism on the basis of a theory that equates morality and rationality. The demand to eliminate racism is fundamentally a social one, determined by socio-historical circumstances in all their complexity.¹⁴ If moral and political theory are to facilitate emancipation from racist discourse, they must reflect

this fact; and in some sense they must reflect each other too. It is to these final questions that we turn now.

8.2. Innovations: Against Racist Discourse

8.2.i. Eroding the Field of Racist Discourse

The field of racist discourse is composed of stereotypes and categories, hypotheses and presumptions; of styles, themes and metaphors; of argumentations, reasonings and rationalizations; of desires and acts, beliefs and institutions. The principles and general expressions are found not merely in isolated statements and claims, nor just in beliefs and opinions held in everyday life. Over the preceding two centuries they have controlled some scientific disciplines and pervaded philosophical systems (A.7.5.). Their contemporary influences have persisted, shifting to economic determinations, political decisions, legal orders and general cultural representations.¹⁵ These surface manifestations at given socio-temporal coordinates are generated by underlying 'factors of power' engaged in historically determinate 'relations of power.'

Human bodies are constituted as subjects by social discourses. Racist discourse carries out a double function here: Out of bodies it constitutes racial subjects, agents with the relevant desires, thoughts, emotions and projects; with identifiable social identities; who act in ways largely predictable; and so forth. By the same token, these bodies are objectivized: they are categorized, classified, defined and constituted thereby as objects in the social hierarchy.

Racist discourse accordingly subjects its victims to degrading administration of resources and law. In this way, social status vis-a-vis the body politic is established (inclusion/exclusion; entitlement/restriction, etc.). The process of constitution as a subject of racist discourse authorizes control over/by others. In their formation, these subjects come to occupy functional places in those relations of power that initially gave rise to them.¹⁶

The racial differences and gradations thus asserted--physical or intellectual, linguistic or cultural-- purportedly furnish justifications for differential treatment or distributions. They signify at the same time the relations of power that prompt them. Now relations of power order the range of possible actions available to agents subject to these relations. By its general operations, racist discourse supervises dominant relations of power and reproduces subjects racially. In this way, racist discourse manages the range of available actions by restricting, maintaining or extending it as circumstances demand. Where racist discourse achieves this without excessive expenditure of energy and resources, the system's 'degree of rationality' may be considered 'economical.' The 'economy of racist discourse' is a function of the relation of these expenditures and gains which the discourse generates.

The general economy of the field of racist discourse can be summarized as follows: Relations of power promote the system of differences that constitute the core of racist discourse. This system of differentiations in turn grounds the reproduction of these or the

formation of new relations of power. This entails both the overriding projects of racist discourse and the means and institutions by which the discourse is to be exercised and the projects fulfilled. Racist discourse is aimed thus at reproduction of relations of power, authorization and preservation of entitlements and restrictions, inclusions and exclusions, goods and pleasures. Implementation of its goals are sought not merely by way of beliefs and expressions, nor simply by covert manipulation or the explicit force of laws. Racist discourse pervades all forms of social discourse, informal and technical, thereby to govern the definition of institutions, private and public. The tensions caused by its invasion of modern moral discourse have been illustrated in detail. The widest sphere of influence racist discourse can exercise, though, extends over the state apparatus.¹⁷ The 'Racial State' embodies the greatest possible concentration of social power for racist discourse, and so potentially its most rational economic expression. Wedded to the powerful institutions the state has at its disposal, the capability of racist discourse to entrench and extend relations of power is potentially overwhelming.

As with any economic function, there are points of diminishing return. Where racist discourse proves uneconomical, it will be displaced by more efficient means of governing and rationalizing relations of power. Paradoxically, this drive for optimal efficiency in maintaining power relations suggests guarded optimism for devising conceivable counters to racist discourse and the kind of power relations it represents. If it is possible that a social discourse like racism

may be supplanted in the interests of greater subjection, domination and control, it is conceivable also that it is replaceable at the behest of more progressive concerns.

Freedom is relative to the circumstantial possibilities of acting in various ways. More fundamentally, freedom is "the condition for the exercise of power." The struggle between the drive to subjugate, dominate and subject, on one hand, and the refusal to capitulate, on the other, is the struggle in short between power and freedom, and the relative measure of each.¹⁸ Now racist discourse may give way quite naturally in one direction before more severe or subtle discourses, as circumstances dictate. If it is to be attacked actively, from the opposing perspective, it can be done only in the name of freedom, or those discourses properly promoting freedom or the exercise of power: inclusive, non-dominative, effective shared control of the means and product of production; just distribution of resources, just application of the law; non-derogatory representations, and so on. From this latter point of view, the refusal to capitulate may assume more or less extreme and active forms: Refusal to accept the designations of the discourse; gradual erosion of the preconditions and conceptual field of the discourse; persistent and even-paced transformation; rapid, violent overthrow. Dissolution of the field of racist discourse under the banner of freedom hinges ultimately on a concerted and integrated attack on all three elements structurally constitutive of the discursive field: The socio-historical preconditions; the formal components of the discourse; the forms and functions of subjective expression.

Preconditions for racist discourse include all the material social factors and their complementary economic, aesthetic and intellectual values that together cleared the historical space for the development and expression of racism. If these factors and values are changed in appropriate and effective ways, inducements to racist discursive practices will tend to dissipate. To be more specific than this necessitates careful and detailed analysis of particular institutions and practices in given socio-historical circumstances. This is fundamental to any prescription of precise and productive actions aimed at well-defined ends for each set of concrete conditions. Nevertheless, it lies beyond the scope, and perhaps ability, of philosophical analysis. All we can do is sketch a framework from the perspective of which any such analysis and projection is to be undertaken.

Critical examination of the formal grammar of racist discourse is to be approached by tracing the racist concepts of individual surface expressions back through their transformations to the underlying preconceptual set. Critique of this deep theoretical structure necessitates, first, that each member of the preconceptual set be delimited; and then, that each be located in the wider philosophical tradition of which it is a part and judged accordingly.

Consider the principle of 'hierarchy.' It derives its significance and force from 'the great chain of being' (7.2.2.b.). The traditional metaphysical ethos accepts an essential, unbroken continuity within, though not between, kinds of being. The place of each real existent in the universe is to be specified by a complete logical

map. Like Descartes' arguments for the existence of God, this view slides from logical map to ontological assertion, from an hypothesis about nature to the nature of reality itself. Failure of arguments to prove God's existence merely shifted theological belief back on to the grounds of faith. In the case of racist belief, though, it is especially crucial that the grounds of faith be swept away too. The general underlying assumption of essential, pre-fixed, lawlike (racial) similarities must be rejected. It is these identities and their complementary differentiations that putatively furnish the foundation of personal and group identity, sympathetic association and identification. Yet all critically acceptable scientific evidence militates against this essentialist assumption (whether of the nominal or ideal variety) (4.3.; A.7.5.). It follows that any implication of racial superiority and domination suggested by this essentialist conviction must be spurious also (5.2.2.d.iii. and iv).

The racist grounds for exclusion and domination have shifted increasingly, in response to these criticisms of essentialist assumptions, to direct concern with racial difference and racial identity. This shift undertakes to incorporate at the heart of racist discourse features central to any general notion of rationality. These forms of racist exclusion and domination cannot be rejected so easily, then, from the standpoints of available scientific evidence or traditional moral theory. A line of attack can be launched only on the basis of a progressive counter-perspective: There are multiple individual differences between all human subjects, as there are in nature.

Similarity and identity may be established only in the most radically contingent manner (Lovejoy 1960: 332-333). Thus is removed a main-spring of group over-identification, inclusion and exclusion. Discrimination between individuals is to be encouraged at the expense of identification with the same and discrimination against members of other races. And pleasures of the diverse are to be enjoyed in the face of comforts of the similar.¹⁹

More detailed analysis of the pre-concepts necessitates once again particular case studies beyond our scope here. But this does raise the issue of the racial subject. Agents may alter their subjective practice by abandoning racist discourse on a conscious psychological level. The question may be posed thus: How can the subject be 'de-racialized?'

The subject was portrayed earlier as the intersection of social discourses (7.2.3.). The racist subject is to be transformed accordingly by the displacement of racist discourse. And racist discourse is to be displaced by changing the material conditions in which it arises; or by thoroughly debunking the assumptions, expressions and aims of racist discourse; or by a competing social discourse. Clearly, no single line of attack on or argument against racism will suffice to rid contemporary social experience of it. Racist discourse is too disparate in structure and content to succumb to a single, uniform counter-strategy. The various assumptions, hypotheses, theories and principles, arguments and aims, expressions and acts must be criticized relative to the circumstances in which they function and have force.

Concerned philosophers and social scientists should undertake thus to undermine the assumptions, reasonings and aims of racist discourse wherever and whenever expressed.

Purging social life of this form of exclusivist discourse cannot be left simply to such armchair concerns. It is a fundamental implication of the analysis that in order to eschew racism, it is insufficient merely to change the material conditions of social life. As bearers and transmitters of social values, social discourses develop at a given place and time in respect of changing relations of power between social subjects already constituted by prior discourses. A social discourse need not simply reflect the given relations of power at a socio-historical conjuncture. Difficult though it may be, the adoption of new social discourses by social agents can serve to reconstitute subjectivity, thereby to redefine relations of power between subjects. If racist analyses are to be discouraged and racist discourse undermined, it is necessary to alter the discursive values, practices and institutions of modern society: aesthetic, economic, philosophical, cultural, legal, political and moral. More than a discourse of anti-racism, perhaps what we need are anti-discourses of racism, vigorous denials of the instruments by which racist discourse may be expressed. There is nevertheless a comprehensive landscape from which integrated attacks on racist discourse may be launched and by means of which its instruments may be misplaced. It is furnished by a view of the grounds for a political and social morality exclusive of the entire field of racist discourse. I will do no more in conclusion

than suggest and illustrate the general structure such a competing discourse would have to assume.

8.2.2. Moral Discourse and Racism

The moral system, of its own accord, cannot empower acts at all. We must want to be moral in order to fall under the motivating power of the moral law; we have to adopt the moral point of view to be impelled by its legislation.²⁰ In wanting to be moral, we undertake to do what the system of morality determines to be moral just as we accept the findings of the relevant science if we aim to be scientific in any domain. The debate over moral systems accordingly is to establish which best captures the domain of morality and moral relations. To stretch the analogy a little farther: Reason is compatible with diverse philosophical and scientific standpoints, at times even for the same domain of facts. Similarly, reason may suggest diverse, sometimes incompatible alternatives for practical (even moral) action. This does not entail necessarily that in undertaking not to act in accord with the dictates of moral reason we are by that token irrational. In given circumstances, other considerations of practical reason may override the moral ones.

The problem concerning practical considerations for action comes down to this: By molding desires, interests and goals, as well as by suggesting major (universal) premisses for an agent's practical reasoning, racist discourse provides 'internal reasons' for an agent to act on. Any counter-discourse to racism, if it is to be successful, must be capable thus of fulfilling a number of projects: It must

demonstrate that racism in any form is wrong; it must fashion desires, interests and aims in non-racist, or anti-racist ways; and it must furnish non-racist and anti-racist universal premisses for practical deliberation. In short, the 'internal reasons' for non- and anti-racist practices must override those for racist acts. The basic system of anti- and non-racist motivation must be at once moral, political, even legal.

There are some very basic philosophical arguments against racism. Recognizing these fundamental moral claims and their implications is insufficient alone to motivate counter-action to racism. Recognition of moral claims must be tied to socio-political action and assertion. I want to suggest that a rights-based theory, under a specific interpretation, will succeed in integrating the moral, political and legal counter-attack on racist discourse.²¹ The following brief account will offer first a schematic derivation of the structural basis of the theory and illustrate its commitment to the condemnation of racism. Some key implications will be revealed then in applying the theory to a number of central issues, theoretical and practical, concerning racism and racist discourse.

(a) Deriving the Structure of Moral Discourse: An Outline

Virtually every attempted derivation or justification of human (or natural) rights rests upon the initial assumption that all human beings are equal in some relevant respect(s).²² Notwithstanding that some further premise is necessary to carry through the entailment that all human beings possess human rights,²³ this

widespread assumption of universal equality is problematic. As Hobbes pointed out, humans are strictly equal neither in fact nor a priori before the law. The factual supposition is false; and the derivation of rights from a principle of ('formal') equality is proposed, indeed, as a foundation for the law.²⁴

This reveals, to state it very starkly, that any attempt to discover rights as objective truths in the world, elements of an essential, universal human nature, is doomed to problems similar to those afflicting any ethics of duty.²⁵ Our emphasis earlier upon diversity as basic, similarity and identity as contingent (8.2.1.) removes for us the possibility that there are essential rights so entailed or discoverable. This uncovers a deeper point. The primary focus of any moral point of view built upon an essentialist metaphysic is likely to be not how people treat others, how they act, but how they are (in their being), what their characters fundamentally consist of. A shift in background emphasis from Kant to Aristotle and Sartre prompts an alternative perspective in light of which rights may be established.

Nobody would deny that we have rights in respect of the positions we occupy and the conditions we find ourselves acting in. Let these be called 'conditional rights.' They tend to be established in respect of their logical consistency with the theoretical corpus that specifies rights in general, the kinds of claims agents in the society largely make, empirical description of the agent's circumstances, the general norms relevant to those circum-

stances, etc. The precise derivation of these rights is for the moment unimportant. If it is the case that social subjects have some general right, qua social subject, in any set of conditions in which they find themselves, this can be called the fundamental or basic right.

It turns out there is such a right. It is the right, as a social subject in any society, to be treated with respect by all other social subjects, in every society. There is a loose, non-technical, perhaps intuitive consideration that supports assertion of this right as fundamental. It is potentially derivable from otherwise quite different philosophical systems. The Hobbesian would accept it out of consideration of the terribly undesirable social outcomes should the principle fail to hold; the utilitarian could be convinced, perhaps, that it maximizes interactive potential utility; Kantians must accept that their own right to respect is conditional not so much upon their respect of all others as upon the latter's right to be treated with respect (i.e., universalizability). It could be shown, too, that some Aristotelian virtues (e.g., justice, friendship, liberality) rest upon the underlying acceptance of this right. Yet it is the notion, laid out above (7.2.3.), that the subject is constituted by way and in terms of relations with other social subjects (in short, 'inter-subjectively') which offers a more technical derivation of the basic right to respect.

The individual becomes at once self-conscious and a subject by being conscious of what is the same as himself in others (7.2.3.). This recognition of sameness leads to identification with the (racially) similar. Every other, however, is both similar and different. Recognition of the other as both similar to and different than him, albeit in varying degrees, must imply therefore the subject's self-recognition as different. As different, though, he still wants respect from the other. And so he must recognize that the other claims respect, from his or her own point of view, too. There is thus a general claim by each social subject to be treated with respect, and hence also a general right (as claim) to such respect. This right (as claim) is central, then, to the rise of self-consciousness and the constitution of the social subject. Subjects warrant respect only insofar as they accord it; they are entitled to respect only by granting it. And so we have the right to respect as entitlement. But if agents are entitled to respect (on condition of granting it), they are entitled thus to immunity from arbitrary transgression or organized violation of that respectful treatment, and also to a liberty of sorts. The immunity and freedom at this point are merely theoretical. If they really are to be immune from transgression and thus enjoy in fact the freedom to which they are entitled, agents must be empowered to assert the claim, singly or conjointly, to be treated with respect. Hence the right to be respected both as immunity and as power.

Rights consist, then, in clusters of the four elements: claim, entitlement, immunity (or liberty), and power.²⁶ The strength of each right is relative to the absence or presence of each element in the cluster. The fundamental right of each to be treated with respect obviously includes all four elements. Whoever has a legitimate claim is entitled to the appropriate means, given the circumstances and the claims of others, to assert the correlative right. The right to respect holds for every set of conditions. So the agent is entitled to the appropriate means to establish this right, conditional upon the circumstances and the claims of others. By implication, the agent is entitled to immunity from disrespectful treatment and to the power enabling establishment of respect. Where any element of this right fails to hold in given conditions, there is the derivative right--appropriate to the conditions--to assert or struggle to establish it.

All forms of racist discourse are united by their purpose to exclude racial others. Exclusions intended or (indirectly) empowered by racist discourse are inherently disrespectful of others: They aim to deny participation in the social community, to dominate, subjugate, violate (5.3.; 7.2.2.2.b.). Racist discourse contravenes, therefore, the basic right to respect.

The Kantian agent's duty to respect others as ends in themselves is replaced, at the heart of the moral system, by the social subject's right to be treated with respect. On the Kantian view,

the burden of meeting this requirement of respect rests with the agent only in appearance; the weight is actually borne by a problematic notion of rationality. On the view offered here, this burden rests actually with the acting subject. The subject must meet, to an acceptable degree, the expectations or demands, following from the right to respect and appropriate to the circumstances, of those likely to be effected by the practice(s) in question. Being treated with respect means, loosely, being treated as a social subject who, like all others, has desires, aims, purposes and projects; thus being assured the preconditions, psychological and material, for the potential realization of the widest feasible range of these desires, etc., given the realities and possibilities of prevailing social conditions. This includes being justly and fairly included in the overall distribution of the available (and potential) social resources. It includes also being afforded the greatest possible realm of freedom, all other social subjects and conditions considered.²⁷ Far from being formal, the burden of morality lies in the public realm of relations between social subjects.

The basic right is derived from varying sets of conditions none of which are essential to its existence. This reveals that though it is perfectly general--it holds more or less for all sets of conditions--there is no structural necessity about its existence, and no essential quality about its specific characteristics. Two features follow from this: Rights may conflict with one another;

indeed, we should expect that they will.²⁸ And rights, even the fundamental right, have to be asserted.

A right of one subject relative to a given complex of conditions may conflict with another's right relative to those same conditions. This conflict can be resolved only if greater weight is assigned appropriately to one of the conflicting rights relative to the other. The weighting depends upon various factors: relative presence of the component parts of each right; its approximation to the basic right; projected consequences of the assertion of each right in relation to the basic right; and so forth. A right may be overridden only by another right. But the party's overridden right does not thereby cease to exist. It simply carries less weight--morally, politically, legally--than the triumphant right.³⁰

(b) Moral Implications

(i) Theoretical Practice

Preferential treatment. The issue of preferential treatment clearly hinges on the conflict of rights of the parties concerned. Rational arguments in support of black's rights to preferential treatment appeal usually to the burdens of past discrimination and its effect on present generations. Arguments against any form of reverse discrimination generally point out that the right to equality of those (whites) to be excluded by the treatment is transgressed unjustly; and that acceptable standards of competence are reduced adversely.³¹ It is beyond

our scope to survey the expanding literature on this conflict. Suffice it to remark that the approach adopted here highlights little noticed features of the antagonistic arguments.

First, rights in general are relative to individuals in determinate socio-historical conditions. So the right to respect is socio-historically determinate, too. Rights to or against preferential treatment are to be weighed in respect of the particular socio-historical conditions in which they arise and are asserted. Conflicts will be between rights of individual parties in given situations, and only derivatively between those of groups. A group right to or against preferential treatment holds only in case each member of the group has the right for a given set of conditions.³² Second, emphasis on the conditional character of rights suggests that the battleground for compensation is not the relevance of past discrimination against ancestors of present agents. The right to preferential treatment depends upon present discrimination and institutional disadvantages, though these may have resulted from acts of past agents. Attention is focused thus not upon removal of past causes, in any case an outmoded concern, but on the injustices of present discrimination and the current disadvantages of past acts.³³

This focus escapes the counter that there is a right to preferential compensation consequent upon discrimination against past generations. Levin's especially insidious version

of the counter-argument is twin-pronged. He argues, on one hand, that blacks no more deserve compensation for past discrimination than a grandchild for the murder of his grandfather or the theft of his ancestor's watch before the child's birth.³⁴ This objection obviously does not apply to the right to preferential treatment based on current discrimination and unjust disadvantage. On the other hand, Levin contends that racially discriminatory acts can be recategorized in every case under a moral class making no use of racial terms. The peculiarly racial characterization of these discriminatory acts is removed by such moral redescription. It is easier, then, for Levin--and others with similar intent--to deny that racial discriminations are "special" or that anyone is "under any obligation to rectify them." For, currently, there just is no institutional discrimination.³⁵

Though lacking the insidious intent, those who argue that race is 'a morally irrelevant criterion' often end up inadvertently endorsing similar outcomes. If 'race' is morally irrelevant, it is more difficult to justify preferential treatment in favor of those discriminated against racially. For no distinction can be sustained, then, between racially predicated acts that are aversive and those that are benevolent. 'Race' is replaced usually as a criterion of merit or award by 'education,' 'occupation' or 'ability.'³⁶ 'Ability' is interpreted almost exclusively, however, as 'natural,' that

is, heritable. As such, it is open to racial connotation. Similarly, education is often racially determined, if only indirectly by way of racial neighborhoods, socio-economic status, or private schooling. And because education and rank are so much linked to education, they too may be determined indirectly along racial lines. Avoiding 'race' as an explicit determinant of merit fails thus to address the problem of 'covert racism.'

Covert racism is the practice of racism without explicit reference to or use of racist principles and expressions (A.7.5.). It includes, at the level of theory, redescription in non-racial terms of acts and events patently racist. Levin's arguments to maintain the status quo while denying that America currently suffers 'institutional racism' is a good example. The definition of racism cannot be restricted thus to overt expression of institutional principles. It must cover also racist effects.³⁷ A viable moral system is to include in its motivational and critical schema, accordingly, both principles and consequences of acts and institutions. It is not simply the use of 'race' which is morally wrong, but the use of racial characteristics to pick out people in order to subject them to invidious treatment (6.3.). The point is that racial characteristics themselves may be--though it is not necessary that they are--used invidiously. In keeping with these various considerations, the rights theory offered

here encourages us to approach the issue of preferential treatment as a conflict of rights: the right of an individual in particular circumstances to preferential treatment weighed against the right of another individual in circumstances comparable not to be subjected to reverse discrimination.

Immigration. Another major issue in the history of racism has been racial immigration quotas or restrictions (7.2.2.b.; A.7.5.). Peter Singer points out that there can be no justification of blanket prohibitions on immigration by members of any race. He insists, nevertheless, that his basic principle of 'equal consideration of interests' would allow for a quota system leading to a gradual adjustment in a society's racial composition.³⁸ But this, surely, is racism enough. It furnishes the framework for racist immigration policies current in Britain, Israel and South Africa. In the latter case, 'equal consideration of interests' is appealed to precisely in justifying the policy that only white immigrants be admitted so as to create numerical equity with blacks. There is only one version of this kind of policy that could meet the requirement of respect: Racial restriction based on a policy of separate but equal development, with territory and resources distributed in proportion to population size. Integration can be shown, however, to be fundamental to fostering respect. It facilitates experience and tolerance of difference, new cultural insights and exchanges. Denying integration limits development

of benefits for both parties. It amounts to forceful exclusion. It is thus one kind of racism and so antithetical to respect.

Censorship. It has been contended recently by Chomsky, Glass and others that racist science and research should be censored. Hollinger argues, by contrast, that no scientific theory may be criticized or rejected, condemned or suppressed solely on ethical or political grounds.³⁹ It is not my concern here to rehearse the arguments. Suffice it to point out that this issue too can be resolved on a case-by-case basis by weighing the conflicting rights against each other: the right to free research and expression, bolstered by the values of increasing scientific knowledge; against the right to be treated with respect and not to be subjected to derogatory characterization and treatment. Those, like Glass, too ready to wield the censor's pen should note that it is very difficult, for the most part, to differentiate in advance racist from merely racial research programs. This is especially true in the case of covert racism. In any case, it is a painfully learned fact that it is better in the long run to confront vicious studies publicly than it is to harbor them secretly. Clearly, racist science is irrelevant or contrary to serious human concern and should not enjoy public support.⁴⁰ But whether a research program that contravenes the right to respect of a group is to be banned, depends upon the severity of contravention in the given circumstances.

Truth and reference. A deeper philosophical issue lies here.

It has been argued that if we admit the truth of sentences like 'Niggers will benefit from preferential treatment,' we commit ourselves ontologically thereby to the existence of niggers, and this is morally abhorrent. Patrick Grim thinks that this warrants including an ethical criterion amongst our more traditional standards for choosing a theory of truth. Grim 'opts' accordingly for a 'quasi-Strawsonian theory' by virtue of which racist utterances are neither true nor false because they fail always to refer. A. J. Stenner tries to avoid these kinds of commitment by way of Russellian redescrptions; while Kriste Taylor holds that terms like 'nigger' simply fail to secure reference.⁴¹

Derogatory terms like 'kaffir' and 'nigger' obviously do not exhaust racist discourse. Nor are all racist utterances necessarily false, as Stenner in particular seems to think. The solutions offered by Grim and Stenner are artificial, and Taylor's response but partially correct. Terms like 'nigger' do refer in modern discourse--to blacks; and reference is secured, in the same fashion as any common name. Over and above their mere reference, however, these terms carry invidious moral judgments. They are objectionable because their social uses are very nearly always accompanied by such reprehensible judgments. These judgments may be arbitrary, or false, or overgeneralized; though they need not be. In any

case, they are contrary to the right to be treated with respect.

So Taylor is right that ethical and pragmatic considerations may determine whether we use 'nigger' to refer. Once acknowledged, the right to respect may change the way we refer to and speak about others, thus altering the rules for referring (e.g., the change from Non-European, Negro and non-white to black). Changes in the modes of speaking about, referring to, representing, and so acting towards others are likely to follow from altering the relations of power between social subjects. Social relations characterized by approbation of the basic right will exclude racist modes of discourse. Success in purging ways we speak of racist expressions rests in large part, therefore, on our ability to assert the basic right to be treated with respect; to displace racist by moral discourse.

The system of rights here espoused is obviously incomplete. A complete and fully determinate elaboration of all particular rights is impossible. Our world is much larger than any one of us; we cannot know all the conditions that even currently pertain; our own goals often lack precise definition; and any language capable of specifying rights must be diachronic in nature.⁴² It might be objected, with MacIntyre, that rights are mere fictions, hence incapable of possessing the objectivity of moral norms.⁴³ Indeed, rights are to be viewed partly in this way. Rights are claims, entitlements and immunities.

Short of being asserted, though, rights really are just fictive. To be effective, they must be codified, legalized, institutionalized. In short, rights must legitimize acts and empower rules. The characterization of rights will be fulfilled only by elaborating the connection between rights and powers.

(ii) Assertive Morality: Rights as Powers

In a moral society, as in a law-abiding one, subjects have powers afforded them only in terms of the existing system of rights. For every right, there is--in the vocabulary proposed by G. A. Cohen--a 'matching power.' Conversely, the structure of powers available to subjects ensures a matching structure of rights. These relations are summed up by the following two equivalences: 'A power is an effective right,' and 'A right is a legitimate power.'⁴⁴ The fundamental right of all to be treated with respect, if it is (to be) effective, entails the legitimate power to establish the preconditions for that respect. The right can be ensured only if the preconditions obtain. Power lacking legitimacy is force, mere might; legitimacy without power is ineffective, impotent.

Conditions abound under which subjects are denied their effective right to respect, or the preconditions to respect. Those subjected to intense racist discrimination, and therefore incapable of enacting their basic right, have an ineffective right for they lack power. If the right can be

instituted, though only with much difficulty or at great cost, the right will be (proportionately) more effective and the corresponding power (proportionately) stronger in legitimacy.⁴⁵ The subject, for this range of cases, may consort with others in conjoint projects to effect his or their rights in order to legitimize their power. Thus are born group rights, group powers and collective action. (Witness, for instance, the Civil Rights movement in the U.S.A. and pass-burning in South Africa.)⁴⁶

A structure of rights corresponds thus to a structure of powers, reflecting in part the relations of power at a given socio-historical conjuncture. It is possible, nevertheless, to judge these established rights, powers and relations against the system of rights, moral or legal, entailed by the basic right to be treated with respect. And it turns out that racist discourse and practice always transgresses the basic right. The models of moral, legal and political discourse thus constructed offer social subjects reasons to act. Plugged into the subject's system of practical reasoning, they furnish internal--or subjective--reasons to act in a non-racist or anti-racist way, as the case may be, that are potentially stronger than competing racist ones. The strength of these reasons rests upon acceptance by the subject of such grounds as appeal to truth or to a wider range of empirical evidence than racist claims; greater ability to withstand rigorous

conceptual criticism; greater intercourse with, consideration and respect for others; recognizing, appreciating and enjoying the value(s)--intrinsic and extrinsic--of diversity; subjecting egoistic desires to moral and political ones, etc.

Moral discourse undertakes to displace racist discourse by effecting moral formation of social subjects, and moral comprehension of the social world and relations of power in the face of racial formation and racial comprehension. Where their rights conflict, social subjects will find themselves in moral disagreement. Racist discourse ascribes such conflicts to irresolvable social or biological differences. Even in the face of enjoying tremendous utilitarian advantages from exclusions predicated upon assertion of such differences, the discourse of moral rights encourages that we struggle to dissipate these exclusions and disadvantages. Caught in and between racist relations of power and committed, in the fight for our own rights, to the overthrow of racism and silencing racist discourse, we must face the instrumental question of practical deliberation: Which is the means most appropriate for us to overthrow these forms of racism in the given circumstances? Counter-attack may be economic or political, legal or cultural; in each case, it may be direct or indirect, overt or implicit. It may be violent, antagonistic, manipulative or mediatory. It may be restricted to personal relations or extended against the state and those public institutions

sustaining the offensive code of behavior. Analysis of the alternatives, once more, must be context specific. For example, it may be found that preferential treatment programs are, all things considered, the best means available for American society over a given period. It may be determined later, though, that the negative consequences they spawn necessitate their abolition in favor of a much more extensive redistribution of educational resources. (The time for such decisions, it seems, fast approaches.)

The discourse of moral rights thus encourages--often sanctions--that ultimately we fight for rights which, though legitimately ours, are not yet effectively so. A dictum of Sartre's reminds us, though, that in fighting to assert our own rights, we fight also for the rights of others. In fighting for our rights, we are fighting to extend our realm of freedom in relation to and with others. The rights and freedoms so defined and struggled for are inclusive and not merely individual and isolated. The struggle by each of us to assert our right to be treated with respect is at the same time the current fight against racism.

CHAPTER EIGHT: FOOTNOTES

¹It can be demonstrated, similarly, that social scientists in the rationalist tradition, like Lewis Morgan and Karl Wittfogel, are in their own ways as prone to racist conjecture and expression as those in the empiricist mold, like Jensen, John Baker and perhaps sociobiologists like Pierre van den Berghe.

²On the question of racism, the dialectical tradition is by no means clean-handed either. For the classical Hegelian, otherness is to be excluded by the 'sublation'--the ambiguous overcoming--of difference. In socio-economic terms, this translates into Hegel's thesis of 'oriental despotism,' but also, in a peculiar way, into Marx's 'Asiatic mode of production.' Marxism finds itself in a position here similar to that of rationalism and empiricism. Though racism is certainly not an inherent feature of Marxist theory, it is not straightforwardly antithetical to it either. Besides the embarrassing distortions motivating a distinctive 'Asiatic mode of production,' witness also Marx's and Engels' commentaries on anthropological literature, especially that of Morgan and Tremaux; and their many aversive remarks about 'the degenerate Negro,' the 'Jewish niggers,' 'Slavic extermination' and 'ethnic trash.' Marx seems to have held inconsistent views on 'racial inferiority' at different places. Yet he is neither virulent anti-Semite nor consistent defender of subjugated races. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction, tr. H. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 186ff. and 200ff; Karl Marx, "The British Rule in India," in Karl Marx, Surveys from Exile, vol. 2, ed. D. Fernbach (London: Pelican Books, 1973), pp. 306-307; Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Karl Marx, Early Writings, intro. Lucio Colletti (London: Pelican Books, 1975). In general, cf. Diane Paul, "In the Interests of Civilization: Marxist Views on Race and Culture in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of the History of Ideas (Jan.-Mar. 1981): 115-138.

³'Racial comprehension' is the understanding of social phenomena in terms of racial categories. 'Racial formation' consists in 'creating' races out of social groups with a view to providing a set of categories for 'racial comprehension.'

⁴I am grateful to Professor Bernard Baumrin of the Graduate School, CUNY, for this way of summarizing the argument.

⁵MacIntyre attempts to find a central identical core structure to the five different accounts of the virtues he analyses: Homer,

Aristotle, Christianity, Jane Austen, Benjamin Franklin. There are serious weaknesses at the basis of this attempted derivation. MacIntyre 'Christianizes' Aristotle's account of the virtues, reading them as 'internal means to the end of a good human life' (the human telos). Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 172. Aristotle speaks primarily of the 'virtuous life,' and only secondarily of the 'good life.' The exercise of the virtues just is the practice of the virtuous life. Further, MacIntyre admits that exclusion is central to--indeed, a basis of--every one of the five accounts: "Every one of these accounts claims not only theoretical, but also an institutional hegemony..." MacIntyre (1981), pp. 173-174. Now if the concept of 'the moral tradition' is one of the three levels essential to the derivation of the core structure of the virtues (p. 174), and 'exclusion' is central to 'the moral tradition' at every one of its stages, there is no barrier--theoretical or institutional--to racist exclusion. MacIntyre's 'special definition' of 'a practice' as 'a coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity' which is fundamental to 'achieving standards of excellence' (p. 175) does nothing to dispel this conclusion: If racism as a form of exclusion is established as (a set of) practices necessary at a stage of history to achieve excellence, it must be virtuous, on this account, at that stage.

⁶Rawls (1971), p. 422.

⁷I am reminded of a recent joke: An aide calls President Reagan to warn him that blacks are upset over his policy to grant tax-exemptions to schools with racially discriminatory entrance policies. In response, Reagan scratches his head, muttering, "Blacks?...blacks?...Who on earth are they?" And then, smiling in recognition, "Oh-h...oh blacks!...That's what happens when you're color-blind!" Is not this a feasible outcome of motivation to act 'from behind the veil of ignorance?'

⁸"...Kantianism abstracts in moral thought from the identity of persons...my present projects are the condition of my existence, in the sense that unless I am propelled forward by the conatus of desire, project and interest, it is unclear why I should go on at all; the world, certainly as a kingdom of moral agents, has no particular claim on my presence, or indeed, interest in it." Bernard Williams, "Persons, character and morality," in *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 3, 12.

⁹Cf. P. Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives," in Foot (1978), pp. 172-175.

¹⁰Ketchum is wrong in thinking that redescriptions of acts as non-racist are just instances of self-deception: consider my

remarks about 'covert racism' (A.7.5.). In any case, it is difficult to establish criteria of self-deception for a wide range of cases. Sara Ann Ketchum, "Moral Redescription and Political Self-Deception," in Sexist Language, ed. Mary Vetterling-Bruggin (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp. 279-289.

¹¹Bernard Williams, "Conflicts of Values," in Williams (1981), p. 75.

¹²Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck," in Williams (1981), p. 31.

¹³Cf. Baumrin and Lupu (1981), pp. 5-6.

¹⁴Bernard Williams, "Conflicts of Values," in Williams (1981), pp. 72, 81.

¹⁵Cf. Foucault (1972), p. 179.

¹⁶Cf. Michel Foucault, "Afterword: The Subject and Power," in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983), pp. 211-212.

¹⁷In general, cf. Foucault (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983), pp. 219-224.

¹⁸Cf. Foucault (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983), pp. 221-222.

¹⁹Even legitimate groups are assembled on a contingent basis. The same analytical approach applies here. Emphasis must be placed upon acceptance of diversity, not upon the privileging--ontologically or methodologically--of the individual. In any case, individual subjects are also socially and historically constituted.

²⁰I take this to be the point of Philippa Foot's remarks about morality being a system of hypothetical imperatives.

²¹Although I will not argue the wider issue explicitly here, I believe that the system I present, when fully developed, furnishes an account of morality appropriate to addressing moral concerns in general.

²²Cf. Gregory Vlastos, "Justice and Equality," in Social Justice, ed. R. Brandt (Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), pp. 31-72. Dworkin distinguishes between the 'right to equal treatment' and the 'right to treatment as an equal.' Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 227. Cf. Montagu (1972), pp. 123-125.

²³ Cf. Richard Wasserstrom, "Rights, Human Rights and Racial Discrimination," in Rachels (1975), pp. 115ff.

²⁴ Hobbes (1975), pp. 183 and 189ff. Hobbes argues that men are by nature not so different that we cannot assume a 'formal' equality by nature.

²⁵ These problems arise whether one is committed with Dworkin to the discovery of rights as objective truths; or with Virginia Held to a range of rights that putatively exist in the world, some amongst which we purportedly agree to. For a view of human rights resting upon an essentialist Platonic conception, cf. D. Henrich and D. Pacini, "The Contexts of Autonomy: Some Presuppositions of the Comprehensibility of Rights," in Daedalus: Human Rights, ed. Stephen R. Graubard. 124, 4. (Fall (1983): 225. Compare Marx's critique of 'human rights' as basically 'egotistical.' Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Marx (1975), pp. 228-234.

²⁶ On rights as claims, cf. E. F. Carritt, Morals and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), pp. 183-191. In general, cf. Rex Martin and James Nickel, "Recent Work on the Concept of Rights," American Philosophical Quarterly 17, 3 (July 1980); 170. For present purposes, I need not engage any further in the debate over certain aspects of the specific nature of rights: e.g., whether a right always entails a specific second- or third-party duty (though I think it is clear that it does not); the scope or range of a right; to what extent --and in some cases whether at all--rights may differ in degree; and so on. Martin and Nickel (1980), pp. 172ff. Cf. G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 62-63.

²⁷ R. S. Downie and E. Telfer, Respect for Persons (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 38-64.

²⁸ As Williams points out: "If all rights have to be absolute rights, then it is plausible to conclude that there are no rights at all." Bernard Williams, "Politics and moral character," in Williams (1981), p. 61, fn. 1.

²⁹ The conflicting rights might appear to hold relative to different condition complexes--perhaps because there are conditions relative to one that seem not to obtain for the other. But if the rights really do conflict, the set of conditions for the former must be widened to include all factors relevant to the latter.

³⁰ "...it is part of the point of rights that they cannot just be overridden by consequences." Williams (1981), p. 61. For a general

argument against conflicts of duties, see Baumrin and Lupu (1981), p. 8 ff. and (2.2.a.) above. Baumrin and Lupu's argument can be adapted to show that a right cannot be overridden by another conflicting right in any simple way. Theories of disapprobation and punishment are derivable from the conception of rights above: A subject's right to be treated with respect may be constricted appropriately if he or she has transgressed another's right illegitimately.

³¹Cf. Barry Gross, Discrimination in Reverse (New York: New York University Press, 1978), and Levin (1981a). On the other hand, cf. M. Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlon, eds., Equality and Preferential Treatment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Irving Thalberg, "Reverse Discrimination and the Future," The Philosophical Forum IV, 1-2 (1973); Thalberg, "Justifications of Institutional Racism," The Philosophical Forum III, 4 (1972); Alan Goldman, "Reverse Discrimination and the Future: A Reply to Irving Thalberg," The Philosophical Forum 4, 4 (1973), and Alan Goldman, Justice and Reverse Discrimination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 120ff.

³²Cf. Goldman (1979), pp. 76ff. and 188ff; Thalberg (1973); O. Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause," in Cohen, Nagel and Scanlon (1977), pp. 84-154; and James Nickel, "Should Reparations be made to Individuals or to Groups?" Analysis 34.5 (1974): 154-160.

³³Cf. Goldman (1973), pp. 331-332. Notice the negative implication of this focus for the more extreme claims of financial reparations for all blacks because of past discrimination. Contra Howard McGary, "Justice and Reparations," The Philosophical Forum IX, 2-3 (1977): 250-263. For a more modest and appealing argument, see H. McGary, "Reparations, Self-Respect and Public Policy," The Journal 1.1 (Winter 1984): 15-26.

³⁴Levin (1981a), pp. 226ff.

³⁵Like William Buckley Jr., Levin implies that America no longer suffers institutional racism by claiming that "...the only possible defense of reverse discrimination represents it as an attempt to rectify the consequences of past discrimination." Levin (1981a), pp. 225-226. An interesting feature of discrimination against others is highlighted by this problem of redescription. There are circumstances in which a subject's right (for example, not to be murdered) overrides his right not to be subjected to racist discrimination, exclusion and domination. The former right cannot override the latter if this is to be offered as justification for the discrimination, etc. To accept it as justification would amount merely to rationalization of the subject's subjugation (e.g., slavery). But in very well-defined circumstances, and only in such circumstances, the subject may accept as legitimate an act of a racist sort levelled at

him (e.g., an epithet) realizing that this saves him from harm at the hands of a third party. In effect, the subject resolves this conflict of rights by redefining the latter act as one not properly racist. It cannot be said of this redescription, as it can of some others, that it is self-deceptive. Cf. Ketchum (Vetterling-Braggin 1981), pp. 279-289. Remarkably, Levin thinks the threat of murder justifies any form of racist discrimination--including, presumably, racial slavery. Levin (1981a), p. 226.

³⁶On the general issue of 'race as merit,' cf. Baier (1978), pp. 130ff.; and Michael Davis, "Race as Merit," Mind XVII (1983): 347-367. For examples of the view that 'race is morally irrelevant,' see William Nunn, "Reverse Discrimination," Analysis 34.5 (1974): 151-154; and Justice Douglas' dissent in *De Funis v. Odegaard*, 416 U.S. 312, 313 (1974).

³⁷Contra Baier (1978), p. 127.

³⁸Peter Singer (1978), p. 202.

³⁹Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 361-2; M. Glass, "Anti-Racism and Unlimited Freedom of Speech: An Untenable Dualism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy VIII 3 (Sept 1978): 559-576; R. Puccetti, "Glass on Racism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy XI, 1 (March 1981): 69-71; M. Glass, "Jensen's Pseudo Anti-Racism: A Reply to Puccetti," Canadian Journal of Philosophy XI, 1 (March 1978): 73-76; R. Hollinger, "Can a Scientific Theory be Legitimately Criticized, Rejected, Condemned or Suppressed on Ethical or Political Grounds?" Journal of Value Inquiry (Winter 1975): 303-306.

⁴⁰Against censorship, cf. Block and Dworkin (1974b), pp. 98-9. It is possible to make a much stronger case for the right to censor public lectures, speeches and articles in the media that are clearly racist. On the notion of 'irrelevant science' and its immorality, see Bernard Baumrin, "The Immorality of Irrelevance: The Social Role of Science," in Sourcebook for Community Psychology, ed. P. Babarik (Massachusetts: Ginn Publishing Co.), pp. 201-210.

⁴¹Patrick Grim, "A Note on the Ethics of Theories of Truth," pp. 290-298; A. J. Stenner, "A Note on Logical Truth and Non-Sexist Semantics," pp. 299-306; Kriste Taylor, "Reference and Truth: The Case of Sexist and Racist Utterances," pp. 307-318, all in Vetterling-Braggin (1981).

⁴²H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 124; Martin and Nickel (1979), p. 21.

⁴³MacIntyre opposes the modern fiction of rights (and utility) to the long tradition of virtues. But other than an appeal to history, one finds no compelling reason in MacIntyre why virtues as moral norms

--rather than as descriptions of acts or dispositions--cannot be viewed similarly as long-standing fictions. MacIntyre (1981), p. 67.

⁴⁴G. K. Cohen (1978), pp. 216ff. If r = rights, p = powers, d = duties; and cor. = 'corresponds to;' the correspondences for duties may be represented thus: $(r \& p) \text{ cor. } d$; so, $(r \& -p) -\text{cor. } d$; and $(-r \& p) -\text{cor. } d$. I am grateful to Professor Baumrin for suggesting this. Cohen has a very different program in mind: to show how Marx is capable of defining the concepts fundamental to the base in non-superstructural (primarily non-legal) terms. I am grateful to Cornel West for suggesting to me the relevance of Cohen's analysis of rights and powers.

⁴⁵For the distinction between 'difficulty' and 'cost' in this context, see Cohen (1978), pp. 238-241.

⁴⁶In contrast, cf. Milton Fisk, Ethics and Society (New York: New York University Press, 1980), pp. 201-250. Fisk attempts to construct a 'relativistic theory of rights' along Marxist lines.

APPENDIX

REAPING THE FIELD OF RACIST DISCOURSE

(This appendix is included to illustrate the application of the critical tools laid out in Chapter Seven. The five sections of the appendix are numbered accordingly to reflect this fact.)

REAPING THE FIELD OF RACIST DISCOURSE

All is race, there is no other truth.

Benjamin Disraeli,
Tancred (1847)

The earliest conception of racial otherness arose at the outset of the sixteenth century, provoked by spreading contact with the unknown and the feared--Africa and Islam, the Far East and the New World, encouraged and informed by the compatible partnership of economic drives and Christian principles. This fear, promoted originally by ignorance and misrepresentation, is reflected in Hieronymus Bosch's pictorial allusions to black devils (in The Garden of Earthly Delights) and in Catholic Europe's hysterical portrayal of Mohammed as the prophet of a false revelation, the image of "lechery, debauchery, sodomy and a whole battery of assorted treacheries." (1) Expansion of colonial contacts, extension of science, solidification of capitalist market economies and property ownership, and growth of European scholarship and literacy induced a general body of 'knowledge' in terms of which racial others could be approached, defining both what they are and their potentiality. A discourse of the other was constructed in which others could not--they were ambiguously not able to--speak for themselves; they were and are spoken for. (2)

The field of racist discourse, and the changing relations to racial others as the shifting object of the field, is overdetermined by the socio-historical complex at the time in question; by the interplay of discourses emerging from biological discoveries and anthropological constructions, from psychological, linguistic and geographic hypotheses, from philosophical premisses and aesthetic values. The discourse of racism is a hybrid of other discourses and material practices at specific historical conjunctures--scientific, economic, political, legal, pedagogic and so on. In some circumstances, racist discourse may be considered a mutation of these pre-existing discursive fields. Yet it has been nothing else often than the direct mode of expression by these discursive fields.

The particular socio-historical character of the racist discursive formation is established on the basis of the dominant discursive factor in the generative complex. The pre-concepts of the recent discursive field are a function of pre-existing discourses (7.2.2.b.). They generate the conceptual and practical apparatus of racism--the principles, norms, categories, laws, etc. This conceptual and practical apparatus effects racial exclusions, dominations or subjugations. Racist discourse is capable of expression itself only by the media of other discourses: religious, cultural, political, legal, economic, anthropological, mythological, linguistic, scientific or philosophical, as the case may be. To illustrate how racist discourse is manifested in practice--how the pre-concepts effect concepts expressive of racism in actual contexts--we will comment briefly on some modes that racist discourse adopts as its own medium of expression. (3)

A.7.1. Religious Racism

As racist discourse took root, appeals to theological doctrine were made to support the view that members of different races equally ought to be treated with Godly respect. (4) At the same time, the concept of 'hierarchy' so central to Christian doctrine opened up the theoretical space for the definition of racial difference and exclusion, whether of Black, Asian or Jew. (5) Orthodox Christian theology picks out Christians as God's chosen people who alone qualify for salvation. As a strictly religious doctrine, this facilitated invidious treatment through the ages of all religious others. Combined over the past four centuries with racial presuppositions, this religious orthodoxy naturally became the medium of expression for 'religious racism.' The Caucasian 'sons of Japheth' have been considered the only ones fit to rule the City of God, to police God's law against the Semitic onslaught of the 'infidels of Shem' and to administer and convert the 'uncivilized dark sons of Ham.' (6) Though pre-Adamism and polygenicism constituted an attack by early biological science upon orthodox Christianity, the multiplicity of racial origins had taken root already as an idea in Christian theology. (7)

The discourse of religious racism has not evaporated entirely in the face of increased secularization of contemporary political life. Besides the obvious church segregation between whites and blacks in South Africa and the American South, less overt forms have recently surfaced: Witness attempts by the Reagan administration to undermine the U.S. Supreme Court decision denying tax exemption to religious schools because they violate federal non-discriminatory policy regarding entrance qualifications. Appealing to 'freedom of religious belief' (the First Amendment) as a justification for racially discriminatory entrance policies, Bob Jones (founder of Jones University, Washington, D.C.) iterates that "our convictions are religiously based."

He likens the Supreme Court ruling that Reagan's tax-exemption policy is unconstitutional to a "Communist put-down of religion."

A.7.2. Economic, Political and Legal Racism

The assumption by racism of the concepts of other discourses and its expression in terms of them are exemplified most vividly by the interplay of economic, political and legal racism. As the most common of racist forms, these have been dealt with at length above and by many others elsewhere. Suffice it then merely to suggest and illustrate some general propositions.

It is a truism that economic exclusion on racial grounds has enjoyed widespread popularity, fueled by the massive colonial expansion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the slave trade and its more modern form, migrant labor. It is equally true that political racism in both of its primary manifestations--relative or absolute exclusion of races from political power, and the use of the political architecture to subjugate races or to exclude them from exercising rights or claiming benefits--complements economic racism. And legal racism--the institution of racial exclusion, subjugation and domination in and by means of the legal code--is employed by both economic and political racism to their own ends. This is not meant to suggest a reductive determinism by economic or political interests. Though the 'racial spirit' of economic or political interests may determine in large the spirit and letter of the law, they need not. As with the U.S. Immigration Restriction Law of 1924, legal racism may be instituted on the basis of appeal to a body of putative scientific knowledge (in this case, eugenics), and it may have no direct political or economic effect.(8) Similarly, political racism is not reducible to economic racism. Access to the political process by members of a race in no way guarantees the absence of economic racism against them. And their enjoyment of the economic fruits may fail to guarantee political access and institution of their rights.

Recent examples abound. (9) Nevertheless, the model in terms of which economic, political and legal racism converge and mutually fuel each other is laid out by the great colonial administrators. Their words speak for themselves. Thus Lord Cromer:

...in dealing with Indians or Egyptians, Shilluks, or Zulus...it is essential that each special issue should be decided mainly with reference to what, by the light of Western knowledge and experience tempered by local considerations, we conscientiously think is best for the subject race...Even the Central African savage may eventually learn to chant a hymn in honor of Astrea Redux as represented

by the British official who denies him gin but gives him justice. More than this, commerce will gain. (10)

And Balfour:

(Egyptians) have got under (us) far better government than in the whole history of the world they ever had before, and which not only is a benefit to them, but is undoubtedly a benefit to the whole of the civilized West....We are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the Egyptians, though we are there for their sake; we are there also for the sake of Europe at large. (11)

The principles of this model of economic, political and legal racism: race--civilized and subject; territory, advantage, commerce; administrative government, justice, legality. The forms of racism fundamental to this model are reflected in general by 'racial comprehension,' the interpretation of social phenomena in terms of the discursive field of racism. In given historical circumstances, the discourse of racism facilitates what Omi and Winant call 'racial formation'--the formation of particular classes, groups, tribes or nationalities into specific 'social races.' (12) The discursive pre-concepts of this 'racial formation' and 'racial comprehension' remain identical: identity; identification and difference; exclusion by the power of physical force; and material domination.

A.7.3. Representational Racism: Culture

This process of racial formation and racist exclusion is facilitated by images and representations of identity and difference, identification and alienation. We have shown how classical aesthetic and economic values converged in the eighteenth century to promote pictures of exploitable alien races (7.2.1.). This representation of racial otherness has played a fundamental role over the past four hundred years in exciting identification and estrangement. It cannot be reduced merely to reflections of some more 'material, infra-structural base.' We will rest content here simply to point out some primary examples of 'cultural racism.'

Representations of black slaves in the seventeenth century (13) were transformed by way of economic theory and aesthetic values central to scientific debate in the eighteenth century into idealized images of inherent inferiority in nineteenth century literature: Flaubert's influential description of the Egyptian concubine as the ideal of Oriental women; Rudyard Kipling's superior, patriotic White Englishman;

or D. H. Lawrence's mystical appeals to 'blood and flesh,' as "wiser than intellect." (14) Literary and cinematic representations of Negroes by writers of the American South late last and early this century fortified a social image of 'Sambo' as the "...supine, grateful, humble, dependent, slow-witted, humorous, child-loving, child-like, watermelon-stealing, spiritual-singing, blamelessly fornicating, hedonistic, faithful black servitor..." (15) At the same time, Sambo was reduced to little more than savagery, as in D. W. Griffith's notorious epic, "Birth of a Nation." Comparable portraits of blacks and Jews are prevalent in proto-Nazi writing and Nazi propaganda--from Richard Wagner's cryptic notes and Otto Weininger's Jewish self-contempt (by nature 'the lowest of characters'), through illustrations for the Protocols of the Elders of Zion to newspapers, posters and films. (16) In this way, the aesthetics underlying the rise of racism were turned with great effect into a racist aesthetics, at once informing and cementing identities and exclusions, identifications and alienation.

Wherever such representations surface, there is a counter-tradition. This ranges from the sincere, positive portrayals of the downtrodden and subjugated, as in Jonathan Swift's later work and in the television series "Archie Bunker" and "The Jeffersons;" their sanctification in mid-twentieth century literature; to the problematizing of standard images in the work of Faulkner (17), South African detective novelist James McClure, John Ford's classic "The Searchers," or more recently in "Trading Places;" and of Black-White relationships in John Coetzee's brilliant writings, Robert Altman's powerful "Streamers" or Sam Fuller's controversial film, "White Dog." Of concern though, all this notwithstanding, is the persistent marginalization, at least in America, of Black literature, art, filmmaking, even acting. Only musicians and dancers have made much headway: witness jazz, soul, funk, rap, salsa, slam-dancing, and so forth. It can be argued that this is so because it fits precisely the traditional modes of representation.

A.7.4. Representational Racism: Linguistics

This concern with representation, with creating an identity for the racial other, which in time was assimilated by the latter as self-identity, assumed also a purely linguistic form. In the words of Friedrich Max Muller (nineteenth century Oxford philologist), it is "language that makes man." (18) European linguists at this time looked not to physical markers by which to determine racial classification, but to affinities and differences in the system of linguistic representations of the various language groups. In 1808, Friedrich Schlegel argued that German, Greek and Latin (and so English and French derivatively) were commonly rooted in Sanskrit. The ancient superiority of Aryan sagacity was to be inherited not biologically but linguistically, via the classical grammar of the Greeks and Romans. The

virtues represented by these classical grammars (independence, self-reliance, etc.) were supposed by Muller and others to be relayed thus to the bearers of modern civilization. 'Inferior' civilizations, derivative from Chinese or Semitic rather than from Aryan origins, were marked purportedly by linguistic incapacity and inability to assimilate. It was thought, for instance, that the wandering Jew was naturally incapable of speaking German properly.

This linguistic racism has had a varied and longlasting currency. Gobineau considered linguistic science to determine racial heritage--language was supposed to be the perceivable manifestation of racial blood. (19) Ernest Renan (writing in 1855) retained the strictly linguistic model by insisting that close philological study revealed the inherent inferiority of Semitic languages (Arabic, Aramaic, Hebrew). Jews could be excluded thus within Europe just as Arabs could be excluded from Europe, on common linguistic ground, thereby avoiding any embarrassing reference to nineteenth century geographical differences between Jew and Arab. As Said remarks, Renan speaks not so much about philology and as he speaks philologically, expressing racism in linguistic terms (20). In a more modern vein, White schoolchildren in South Africa could choose either English or Afrikaans as their medium of school instruction. Black children fortunate enough to attend school were taught until 1976 almost exclusively in Afrikaans, their second or even third tongue and language of their oppressors. A nineteenth century criterion for passively defining racial exclusion was transformed thus by socio-historical conditions into an active instrument of racist oppression.

A.7.5. Philosophical and Scientific Racism

Racial science and philosophy have played a formative role in racist theory and practice by furnishing the tools for both 'racial formation' and 'racial comprehension.' Racial science and philosophy provided the central pre-concepts of racist discourse (race, difference, otherness, hierarchy, superiority) and many of the concepts by the media of which racist discourse has been and continues to be expressed. The history of racist science runs deep and wide--it is the history of eighteenth and nineteenth century natural history, anthropology and in part biology. This history has been documented in detail recently. It will suffice simply to sketch an order to this genealogy of scientific racism, highlighting the philosophical presuppositions which enabled the formulation of these scientific hypotheses and elaboration of scientific theories of racism.

It has been argued above that empiricism and rationalism are in their own ways equally prone to and encouraging of the formulation and expression of racist discourse (4.3; 6.2). Empiricism encouraged the tabulation of perceivable differences between peoples and concluded to their natural differences. Rationalism proposed initial innate

distinctions (especially mental ones) to explain the perceived (behavioral disparities). The contrast between Lockean empiricism and Leibnizean rationalism is a prototype of that between Hume and Kant analyzed earlier. We have seen how the various facets of Locke's doctrine enabled him to articulate his racist beliefs (6.2.2.a.). The innatism of Leibniz's rationalism, on the other hand, is reflected clearly in his remark that "...the greater and better part of humanity gives testimony to these instincts (of conscience)...one would have to be as brutish as the American savages to approve their customs which are more cruel than those of wild animals." (21) Racist pre-suppositions did not prompt this particular formulation of personhood by rationalists or empiricists (as Bracken, for one, would have us believe about Locke). There is nothing in the formulation of either that necessarily entails racist principles. Racism, rather, is capable of being expressed by means of the conceptual fields of these major philosophical discourses. These discourses respectively have framed the foremost trends in scientific racism over the past two centuries. (22)

The prevailing explanation of human origins and diversity well into the eighteenth century was premised upon the Biblical doctrine of monogenicism. The earliest natural historians and anthropologists --Linnaeus, Buffon, Blumenbach and supported by Montesquieu--upheld the scriptural doctrine of a single human origin. The 'obvious' superiority of whites over blacks and Indians was considered, by scientists of empiricist and rationalist persuasions alike, to be caused by environmental factors: climate, diet, culture. This approach was carried into the following century by James Cowles Prichard and Alexander von Humboldt, the main influences at the time on British and German anthropology and racial science. (23)

It was evident already to Enlightenment thinkers that some basic racial characteristics--particularly those of blacks--did not really vary with the environment. This prompted increasing attempts to argue that Africans--and then also Jews--did not derive from the same origins as Europeans. In 1734, Voltaire--Europe's voice of equality--declared that "bearded whites, fuzzy negroes, the long-maned yellow races and beardless men are not descended from the same man...(Whites) are superior to these Negroes, as the Negroes are to apes and the apes to oysters." And later, he added that "...only a blind man is permitted to doubt that Whites, Negroes and Albinoes...are totally different races." Voltaire's view was scientifically quite widespread. (24) But the theory of monogenicism at that time then must have been a degenerate scientific paradigm, and an alternative with an incipient research program already must have been potentially available.

Over the preceding century the theory of polygenicism had emerged, submerged and re-surfaced. Formulated in detail by Hobbes' contemporary, 'mad genius' Isaac de la Peyrere, the doctrine of

pre-Adamism claimed that the Bible represented only Jewish history and so established only the origins of the Jewish species. Following Jews' fall from God's favor and the incarnation of Christ, Christians were elevated over the Jewish species as the Chosen People. Prior to the creation of Adam, a stock of men had lived an unspecifiable time in a Hobbesian state of nature. (25) La Peyrere was forced by the religious and political establishment to renounce his views publicly, though he never recanted them theoretically. The doctrine disappeared tentatively to await its proper time. By 1789, the attack by reason against religion had cleared away the possibility of a doctrinal reaction. The data against monogenicism by this time was overwhelming. Francois Burtin, a Dutch scientist, concluded from available fossil evidence that rational beings predated Adam, though he refused to deem them men; and in 1800 Edward King (a member of the Royal Society) argued that Biblical interpretation and scientific evidence revealed that Adam was the genealogical father of that species of humans possessing the highest capabilities--language and science. (26) Pre-Adamism thus constituted the hypothetical bridge between religious presumption and scientific theory, the break between the sixteenth century Scriptural suggestion of monogenist origins and nineteenth century polygenicism, the modern hypothesis of natural history and anthropological science.

At the opening of the nineteenth century, polygenicism was a potentially powerful hypothesis in light of its obvious capability to cohere and explain a burgeoning body of data from a wide variety of disciplines. It seems not only theoretically more plausible than its aging competitor. It had claimed already initial corroboration by the cranial comparisons and facial measurements of Dutch anatomist Pieter Camper (1792-3), the physiognomy (or "science of reading the human face") of Johann Lavater (1781), and the plottings of skull shape, brain (mental) organs and therefore human character by Gall and Spurzheim, the founders of phrenology. Now the importation of aesthetic and pseudo-scientific values and criteria of judgment at the very bases of these 'disciplines' (7.2.1. above; and Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man, p. 92--referred to hereafter as Gould 1981) motivated polygenicism's downfall internally--complementing the external attack by Darwin. Polygenicism's inability to differentiate the quality of data that seemingly corroborated it, revealed that it was a metaphysical hypothesis rather than a scientific one. This judgment can be made only from hindsight however. What proved important about cranial comparisons, physiognomy and phrenology at the time was that they promoted the methodology of measurement shortly to become so central to racist science.

Experience in Britain, France and America, where polygenicism constituted scientific doctrine for nearly three-quarters of the century, bears this out. In Britain, the prevailing monogenicism

of Prichard was overthrown by the arguments of Robert Knox, the charismatic anatomist linked to the notorious grave-robbing case in Edinburgh (1829), and his loyal disciple James Hunt, founder of the renegade Anthropological Society of London (1863). In its place was substituted a polygenicism that classified the Negro as an originally distinct human species; suggested the same of the Jew; predicted that the Saxon race--with its fair hair, blue-eyed strength and legal genius--was about to dominate the world; and denied that Saxons could cross successfully with other species. (27) In France, master craniometrist and self-professed empiricist Paul Broca concluded, on the basis of extensive empirical studies but not altogether value-free brain measurements, that "...In general, the brain is larger in...superior races than in inferior races." He qualified this later by adding that "...a more or less white skin, straight hair and prognathous face are the ordinary equipment of the highest group in the human series...A group with black skin, woolly hair and a prognathous face has never been able to raise itself spontaneously to civilization." The great distance between different races (for example, Saxons and Aborigines) would suffice, according to Broca, to prevent any crossing between their members, for offspring would fail to be fertile. (28)

It was in America, though, that polygenicism was accepted most readily. American naturalists and anthropologists, after all, had direct, daily contact with the object of study. The question of civilization for them was a burning one. Against the environmentalist thesis of Princeton president and philosopher, Stanley Stanhope Smith, Samuel Morton (scientist and Philadelphia physician) set out in 1839 to test empirically the polygenecist hypothesis that races could be ranked objectively by measuring brain (skull) size. The results, published in the acclaimed Crania Americana, purportedly established Caucasian skulls as the largest, followed by Mongolians, Malays, American Indians and blacks (Ethiopians). Assuming at least a correlation between brain size and intelligence, Morton--and almost all anthropologists throughout the world--concluded that Caucasians are inherently the most and blacks the least intelligent race. Later, on the basis of the skulls sent to him by George Gliddon, vice-consul at Cairo, Morton extended his measurements to include Egyptians. In 1848, the great Swiss naturalist Louis Agassiz immigrated to the U.S. Originally a monogenicist, Agassiz was quickly persuaded to the polygenicist position upon his first encounter with negroes while dining with Morton at a Philadelphia restaurant and confronted with Morton's results. Agassiz soon became scientific spokesman for polygenicism in America, assisted by the social and political energies of Gliddon and Josiah Nott (a leading physician). The scientific and socio-political thrusts of the theory were brought together explicitly in a memorial volume dedicated to Morton (edited by Nott and Gliddon).

This included the cranial findings, archaeological and geological researches and the Biblical criticism supporting the polygenist hypothesis. The volume sets out to justify the polygenetic origins and growth of humankind, and calls for comprehensive discrimination --educational, political, legal, social--against the Negroes on racial grounds. (29)

The protagonists of polygenesis adopted the empirical method of measurement as their own and demonstrated that vast amounts of data from various fields could be synthesized. A retrospective historical critique such as Gould's reveals numerous crucial distortions in the data collection by both Morton and Broca, the best of these scientists. Broca seems to have held the hypothesis under evaluation as an established truth, leading him unconsciously to distort or ignore counter-evidence. Analysis of Morton's measurements reveals 'miscalculations and convenient omissions,' 'subjectivity based on prior prejudice,' 'inconsistencies favoring the findings' and 'shifting criteria of data relevance' (Gould 1981: 85ff.; 68-69). These are criticisms rendered possible only by a century of philosophical sophistication and scientific self-consciousness. Polygenism was not pseudoscience. As Gould admits, it was the most developed hypothesis of the leading scientists of a society the social constitution of which prompted such unfortunate presuppositions. The criticisms of polygenism at the time bear witness to this interpretation. Before Darwinism, the attack on polygenism was, as a memoir to Morton put it, "...from a theological and not from a scientific statement." (30) A properly scientific critique could be and was undertaken only with Darwin's theory of evolution which offers a much wider, more complete account of diversity among species.

Darwin was opposed completely to polygenism. Yet he was ambivalent about the question of racial hierarchy in respect of the human species. In The Descent of Man, Darwin hypothesized that human races have evolved in a continuous manner--anatomically, mentally and morally--from some ape-like ancestor. Because Europeans saw themselves as vastly different from apes, evolutionary continuity encouraged the gradation of human races, a hierarchy receding through lower and primitive races. Darwin understood the differences as ones of degree, not kind, and always viewed Negroes with sincere compassion and kindness. His argument for evolution nevertheless rests clearly upon the time-worn hierarchy of races and the continuity between animal and human species. It was but a small step from Darwin's well-intentioned science to the social application of 'survival of the fittest' and 'natural selection' by Social Darwinism. Rather than end racism, Darwinism inadvertently stoked the coals of its fire. (31)

Eugenics is the clearest and most fully articulated expression of scientific racism motivated by Social Darwinism. Formulated

originally by Galton and Pearson in England, Broca in France, and Haeckel in Germany, eugenics may be characterized as the merging of the polygeneticist's concern with measurement and the evolutionary theory of Social Darwinism. Eugenic worth (or 'hereditary hygiene') of a race determined its quality. The greater the possession by racial members of superior qualities (physical prowess, intelligence, industriousness and character), the greater their worth. These qualities, the objects of statistical measurement, were considered improvable by restricting marriage inter-racially and encouraging natural selection. (32) Though it petrified by the 1930s into a cornerstone of Nazi ideology, the eugenics movement enjoyed great popularity before World War I and was supported widely by leading scientists and conservatives in Europe and in the United States. (33) Thus racism continued to be defined and expressed in terms of scientific concepts, fashioned now as 'racial biology.'

By the outbreak of World War II, the eugenics movement had retreated in the face of scientific criticism and all but buckled beneath the weight of political pressure. The scientific--and racist--concern with measurement persisted. Only now the 'object' to be measured was not quite so concrete. Increasingly inflated by the 'marginal sciences' as the method of science, measurement was turned inward. If the feasibility of head measurements was to be called in question by rejecting correlations between skull size and intelligence, what better way to save the hypothesis of differential racial intelligence than to measure directly the intelligences of racial members. Now intelligence testing was not developed in response to this issue. Binet may have started out under the influence of Broca's craniometry, but he soon abandoned the whole approach "as ridiculous." In constructing the tests to inform the 'Binet scale' (in effect, the first IQ tests) Binet warned that the measurement so derived was merely 'a rough empirical guide,' not reflective of intelligence which is impossible to measure (quoted in Gould 1981: 148). Despite this warning, American psychologists not only adapted the method to measure 'innate intelligence' but were quick to apply it in support of the hypothesis that intelligence in large part is determined causally by racial inheritance.

Motivated by his concern to weed society of 'morons,' H. H. Goddard introduced the Binet scale into America. Lewis Terman developed this scale into the renowned Stanford-Binet test (since become the standard model of all intelligence testing). While Terman publicly espoused racist views, (34) it was left to R. M. Yerkes' notorious Army Mental Tests (1917)--worked out with the help of Goddard, Terman and others--to establish a racial hierarchy of intelligence: Nordic stock placed top, followed by the darker Mediterranean peoples, East European slaves, and Negroes (lighter blacks were found to score higher than darker blacks) (Gould 1981: 167-167). Once publicized, the results of the tests were assumed

as definitive proof of hereditarian hierarchy and appealed to in justification of racist, segregationist and exclusionist social policies.

This hereditarian banner of racial intelligence differentials has been regenerated more recently via the discredited work on twins by the late London psychologist, Cyril Burt; the large research program conducted on Negro intelligence by Audrey Shuey (1966); the arguments and data of Jensen (1969) and Eysenck (1973); and Herrnstein's resurrection of Terman's meritocracy (1973). (35) Jensen, Eysenck and Herrnstein agree that the fifteen point average differential between the mean scores of whites and blacks, which Shuey's testing claims to have established, can be explained only by Burt's assumption of the genetic determination of intelligence. It is an implication of this line of reasoning that social position for the most part is genetically determined too. Exclusion, subordination and subject!on are not socially but biologically inherited. (36)

This entire psychological apparatus--its assumptions and concepts, its biases, methods and results--has been criticized roundly. The target of these critical attacks is the ongoing attempt to establish racial differentials in confirmation of the hereditarian thesis. Hence Herrnstein's cautiousness. Because the most convincing of these criticisms are common currency now in contemporary social science and philosophy, we will rest content simply to mention the prevailing critical trends: Burt's conscious manipulation of research data in order to confirm his hypothesis; Shuey's inadvertent cultural (if not racial) bias in test construction; (37) the conceptual confusion of Jensen's arguments and his reliance, for data confirmation, upon Burt's manipulated twin-studies and Shuey's biased readings; Herrnstein's questionable secondhand evidence and disingenuous profession of unconcern with the race issue. For all this, though, the twentieth century hypothesis of racial heritability of intelligence is no less scientific than was its nineteenth century predecessor.

The fascination with measurement has been due to the concern to furnish an objective basis for what seemed obvious but somehow had managed always to elude proof. In the case of intelligence tests, the putative objectivity of measurement was supposed to counterbalance the 'ghostly' nature of what was being measured, and also the subjectivity of the media of measurement (the standards, the questions asked on the test, etc.). The ephemeral quality of 'intelligence' could be contained only by reifying it: thus Jensen defined 'intelligence' as "what intelligence tests measure." (38) But numbers, the seemingly ideal empirical content, may be manipulated easily and in themselves prove nothing. As Gould reminds us, "numbers suggest, constrain and refute; they do not...specify the content of scientific theories" (Gould 1981: 74). While some psychologists claimed that

their tests corroborated the racial hereditarian hypothesis, bias in test construction and manipulation of the data (by ignoring or altering numbers, whether consciously or not) point to an a priori, a predisposing conviction on the part of the scientist that the hypothesis must be true. This intrusion of a priori conviction (most would call it prejudice or dogma) at the foundations of empirical inquiry is contrary to the ideals of objective science. It has been a very wide practice, nevertheless, throughout the history of institutional knowledge. That scientists with the most cherished reputations--Ptolemy, Galileo, Newton, Dalton, Mendel--at times may have manipulated data in more or less analogous methodological fashion suggests that science itself indulges, in practice, in some of the worst excesses of rationalism. (39) Far from being pseudoscience, the scientific racism of the past two centuries has been uncomfortably close to the very center of some scientific fields. This conclusion is supported also by the arguments above establishing that racism may be rational in part.

Eighteenth century science gave definition to the concepts of 'race,' 'classification' and 'hierarchy.' The 'objective' measurements of the following century furnished content to the concepts of 'superiority' and 'inferiority;' and by way of 'heredity' a rationale for domination and subjugation. It may be said of twentieth century science that it found a way of measuring what philosophers from Plato to Descartes no doubt would have considered immeasurable. So it is that racial science sowed some of the pre-concepts central to the discursive field of racism. Once these pre-concepts had taken root, they promoted the formulation of new concepts and gave rise thereby to new forms of racist expression. Scientific and philosophical racism have been formative thus both in the production and reproduction of racist discourse.

We find here also the poverty of so much modern social science devoted to the study of racism and committed to its downfall. Pre-supposition and practice too often militate against ideals. The prejudices that racism is pseudoscientific and irrational have encouraged surveys to evoke irrational responses from racists by circumscribing the beliefs to which subjects may respond in the study. (40) In the name of a scientific objectivity that assumes meaning only in terms of meaningless statistical data, social science has devoted its energies largely to uncritical statistical descriptions of 'race relations.' At the same time, critical and historical analysis is directed mainly to the irrationalist and mythological theories of a Gobineau or Chamberlain, a Rosenberg or Stoddard. This wealth of misplaced material leaves the core of racist discourse intact, inadvertently undermining its own purposes. The challenge to this paradigm of sociological study has come only recently, and perhaps not yet quite explicitly. It is prompted not by sociological or psychological theory but by some fine historical, philosophical and

and textual analyses. Occasionally, science must mirror philosophy.

Those subjects who continue to speak racist discourse and act out its projections, perhaps only vaguely aware of this shift in critical paradigm, have mapped out a response already. We suggested above that this is reflected in racist discourse itself. In the face of general socio-political and theoretical criticism, racist discourse has moved from the traditional expressions in terms of superiority and domination to those in terms of difference and exclusion. More fundamentally, the discourse has gone underground; it is no longer largely overt but tacit. It has moved from the explicit representations and assertions of Ardrey's popular literature on 'predatory apes' and our 'inherited war instinct' to the more obscure philosophical and scientific realms of sociobiological instincts or to implicit moral arguments. (41) This new form of racism--'covert racism'--can be described as 'the practice of racism by other means.' Exclusion of the racial other is implied by his or her different genetic heritage; or it is implicit, as Ketchum and Pierce demonstrate, in certain 'conservative,' 'pseudo-liberal' and 'libertarian' arguments cited in support of maintaining existing sexist practices. (42) But the clearest subterfuge behind which covert racism lurks is the criticism that use of the concept 'racist' (not merely 'race') is illegitimate: Insofar as it refers to (i.e., describes) scientific analyses of genetic differences, it is redundant. And employed as a 'derogatory, vituperative epithet' with no basis in scientific fact, it is invidious of whom it is predicated. (43) As illustrated in the conclusion above, this purported redundancy of the use of 'racism' implies ex hypothesi not only that the given genetic data is true but that it justifies also the given social and economic--in a word 'racial'--relations. On the other hand, the 'moral illegitimacy' of the concept's use--moral, no less--implies that the person referred to by the epithet is justified morally in the views expressed or acts undertaken.

APPENDIX: FOOTNOTES

¹R.W. Southern, Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 91-92, 108-109. Cf. Denys Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957), p. 87.

²Cf. Said (1978), pp. 60ff. This partiality is problematized still further, as we have seen, when interiorized by others as a feature of their own identity.

³Though not exhaustive, the forms of racist discourse suggested here have wider scope than the abstract, artificial architecture of others. Kovel's historical differentiation between 'dominative,' 'aversive' and 'meta-racisms' rests upon an over-psychologized description of some general manifestations of racism. Kovel (1970), pp. 177-230. Barker's broad distinction between the earlier 'classificatory' and the new 'motivational' racism distorts the fact that the latter rests upon the former. In any case, these two forms are hardly exhaustive; and we have shown above that all forms of racist discourse are capable potentially of molding agents' motivations. Barker (1981), pp. 76, 114. Bracken, on the other hand, acknowledges that there are different forms of racism--color, language, religious, nationalistic, etc. But then, encouraged by nothing more than a fleeting suggestion that "color racism...may...be the most fundamental form," Bracken proceeds on the assumption--and with questionable ends in mind--that it is. Bracken (1978), pp. 242ff. See (6.2.2.a.) above.

⁴Father Las Casas' arguments against Sepulveda for the peaceful Christianization of Mexican Indians rest upon the prevailing monogenicist presumption that all races derive originally from a single, common, divine origin, implying equality of all before God. Sepulveda, a leading Aristotelian whose translation of the Politics into Latin remained influential for centuries and a prominent voice of the Inquisition, was commissioned by the President of the Spanish Council of the Indies to respond. Sepulveda's counter-arguments naturally rested upon the popular Aristotelian doctrine of natural slavery. Hanke (1959), Chs. IV, V and VII.

⁵Thus Hay could write, "...the 'black man' or 'yellow man' was regarded by all Europeans as characteristically different from the 'white man,' just as a thousand years earlier the Christian had known he was different from the pagan." The history of the view that

blacks are the 'sons of Ham,' as whites are 'sons of Japheth' the Aryan and Semites are the 'sons of Shem,' is a long one. The first interpretation of the Biblical passage appears to be that of Josephus, a Jewish scholar of the first century A.D. This religious reading was continued by St. Augustine and later served simply to distinguish the inhabitants of Europa genealogically from those of Asia and Africa. The reference begins to assume racist connotation only with the rise of anthropology at the close of the seventeenth century. For an example of this latter style, cf. James Cowles Prichard, *The Natural History of Man* (London: 1837), I, p. 134. Cf. Hay (1957), pp. xv-xvi; 14; and Leon Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth*, tr. Edmund Howard (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 7, 90, 135, 174, 211.

⁶ These terms were often invoked in the 1950s to justify apartheid in South Africa. They symbolize also the ambiguity of Jews' racial status: As competitors for God's grace, Jews are regarded as Semites, Christ's executioner, by nature economic exploiters, usurers and conspirators; yet many Jews are undeniably European, of Caucasian stock, and so share with Christians a common culture, if not heritage. For an extreme use of these terms, see Rosenberg (1970), pp. 100-125.

⁷ Contra Popkin's thesis that pre-Adamism and polygenicism were the "...real spectre haunting Western thought...the most fundamental challenge to the Judeo-Christian tradition to arise from the 'new science'..." Richard Popkin, "Pre-Adamism in Nineteenth Century American Thought," *Philosophia*, 2-3 (Winter 1978): 208. Based on a sociological survey of American religious commitments, Glock and Stark try to show that, in a more modern vein, Christian beliefs have been an important determinant of secular anti-Semitism in America. C. Glock and R. Stark, *Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

⁸ For example, the policy of 'petty apartheid' in South Africa, defunct since 1976, legislated separate park benches, post office lines, buses and other services for blacks and whites.

⁹ An instance of economic racism with no direct political effect: MTV's decision to broadcast virtually only rock'n'roll (commonly regarded as 'white music') to the exclusion of 'rhythm'n'blues,' 'funk,' 'rap,' 'soul,' etc. ('black music'), and the initial exclusion from the channel of black broadcasters and performers. This decision was motivated by a concern for the profit projected from the larger white audience. The wider effects of this exclusion are revealed neither politically nor legally but in terms of the media's socialization influence on viewers. An instance of racism that seems

to me genuinely politically motivated but with no direct economic effect: Reagan's firing of the three members of the six-person Civil Rights Commission who outspokenly opposed his anti-civil rights policies and replacing them with supporters of his policies (December 1983). The Civil Rights Commission was established as an independent body to judge the civil rights record of each administration.

¹⁰Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, quoted in Said (1978), p. 37. My emphasis.

¹¹Balfour to the House of Commons (1910), quoted in Said (1978), p. 33. In 1899, Senator Albert Beveridge addressed the U.S. Senate thus: "God has not been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples for a thousand years for nothing but vain and idle self-affirmation. No! He has made us the master organizers of the world to establish a system where chaos reigns...He has made us adept in government that we may administer government among savages and senile people." Quoted in Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought (New York: Braziller, 1959), p. 180.

¹²For example, the standard nineteenth century designation of Egyptians as 'Orientals' is now more circumscribed as 'Arabs.' Japanese are referred to by Americans sometimes as 'a nation,' other times as 'a race,' given the state of economic, political and legal relations between the peoples at a socio-historical conjuncture. In South Africa, Japanese--especially businessmen--enjoy the status of 'honorary whites.' Cf. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, "By the Rivers of Babylon: Race in the United States," Part I, Socialist Review 71 (October 1983): 31.

¹³For example, the gigantic black marble statues of four moor slaves in the remarkable monument to the Doge Giovanni Pesaro of Venice. The statues by the sculptor M. Barthel of Dresden are part of the monument guarding the side door of the Church of Santa Maria dei Frati in Venice. Designed by Longhena, the monument was completed in 1669. The obvious literary representation is Daniel Defoe's 'Boy Friday.'

¹⁴"...All I want is to answer my blood direct without fribbling intervention of mind, or moral or what not." D. H. Lawrence, Letter to Ernest Collinge, 17 January 1913, quoted in Greta Jones, Social Darwinism and English Thought (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), p. 129.

¹⁵Robert Penn Warren, Who Speaks for the Negro? (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 52. For a survey of Southern literature on this issue, see Rose (1976); and for a brief analysis, see Joseph Boskin, "The Complicity of Humor: The Life and Death of Sambo," The Philosophical Forum IX, 2-3 (Winter 1978): 371-382.

¹⁶The cover of *Degenerate Music* (1938) shows a 'Black Coon' saxophonist in 'whiteface,' coattails and top hat, sporting a Star of David armband. See Mosse (1978), pp. 34-35. For the primary examples of the 'nazification' of culture in art, music and film, see Rosenberg (1970), pp. 126-174, and Leni Riefenstahl's "Triumph of the Will." Hitler is known to have commissioned propaganda films in support of South African 'Brown Shirts' depicting blacks as primitive savages.

¹⁷Floyd Watkins describes *The Reivers* by Faulkner as "admirable for its racism," and there is a heated debate as to whether Faulkner or his writings are racist. It seems undeniable to me that Faulkner is concerned to represent the racism which, as a 'son of the South,' he found all around him; by their honesty, these representations are supposed to promote moderation and toleration. In this, Faulkner is not unlike his contemporaries, American image-makers Ford and Hawks, both for whom he worked as a scriptwriter. Floyd Watkins, *The Death of Art: Black and White in the Recent Southern Novel* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1970); C. Peavy, *Go Slow Now: Faulkner and the Race Question* (Eugene: University of Oregon, 1971); and Lee Jenkins, *Faulkner and Black-White Relations: A Psychoanalytic Approach* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

¹⁸Friedrich Max Muller, *Three Lectures on the Science of Language* (Chicago: 1895), p. 45.

¹⁹"It is just because the connexion between race and language is so close, that it lasts much longer than the political unity of different peoples, and may be recognized even when the peoples are grouped under new names. The language changes with their blood, but does not die out until the last fragment of national life has disappeared." Comte Arthur de Gobineau, *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races*, tr. A. Collins (New York: Howard Fertig, 1967), p. 193. Cf. Poliakov (1974), pp. 235ff.; Mosse (1978), pp. 40ff.

²⁰Said (1978), p. 134. Cf. E. Said, "The Text, the World, the Critic," in Harari (1979), p. 178.

²¹Gottfried Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, tr. P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), I, ii, #17; see also I, i, #76, 84.

²²Contra Kay Squadrito's argument in her criticism of Bracken that empiricism neither historically facilitated nor logically entails racism. Squadrito (1979), pp. 105-115.

²³ Benjamin Rush, writing in 1773, offers a clear example of this. See Jordan (1969), p. 287; Popkin (1977), p. 212; Stepan (1982), p. 44.

²⁴ F. Voltaire, Traite de Metaphysique (1734) and Essai sur les Moeurs L'Esprit des Nations (1754), both quoted in Poliakov (1974), p. 176. Hume held that differences in national character are determined not by physical but by moral factors; the sole exception to this rule--black-white differences are a function of different origins. Both Edward Long (in his study of Jamaica) and Charles White (an Englishman writing on natural history) claimed that the mental, cultural and moral inferiority of blacks is innate in the species and not caused by environmentally determined species degeneration. The Negro was considered thus a separate, lower species, naturally and irreversibly inferior. Cf. Popkin (1978), pp. 212-213.

²⁵ Popkin (1978), p. 208; Poliakov (1974), p. 132. Popkin demonstrates that some versions of pre-Adamism had already been suggested in the sixteenth century: in 1520 Paracelsus surmised that a former Adam had generated nymphs, salamanders and American Indians--all soulless. Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake later that century for holding, amongst other heresies, that the world was over 20,000 years old and prior to Adam had been inhabited by Indians, Africans, Pygmies and Giants.

²⁶ Popkin (1978), pp. 214-215. This same pre-Adamite thesis was turned around to express the otherness of Jews in Europe. The great Goethe, for example, claimed that only Jews, "superior (over ordinary Europeans) especially where money is concerned," are descended from Adam. Herder, too, held that European origins (Persian, Indian) differed from that of Jews. Thus was suggested the Indo-European roots of civilization that both German romanticism and German racial mythologists made so much of. Cf. Poliakov (1974), pp. 134, 241ff.

²⁷ Stepan (1982), pp. 41-42; Christine Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), p. 18.

²⁸ Both quotations in Gould (1981), pp. 83-84. Broca was a professor of clinical surgery at the University of Paris and founder, in 1859, of the prestigious Anthropological Society of Paris. In a brilliant analysis of Broca's measurements, Gould reveals the implicit though unconscious values and presuppositions that led to distortions. In general, see Gould (1981), pp. 82ff. On the putative infertility of cross-breeds, cf. Stepan (1982), p. 95.

²⁹ Popkin (1978), pp. 219-221; 225-226; Gould (1981), pp. 42ff., 51; Gossett (1965), pp. 58-60, 73-74.

³⁰Quoted in Popkin (1978), p. 225. The criticisms of Hume's racism at the time by the likes of Beattie, Ramsay and Gregoire are properly philosophical, but they attack Hume's particular claims and method of argument, rather than his general polygenicist assumption. Cf. Popkin (1977), pp. 20ff; Popkin (1984), pp. 63-5.

³¹Cf. Stepan (1982), Chapter Three; Mosse (1978), pp. 7-73.

³²For example, Haeckel, the leading German biologist in the nineteenth century and founder of the German Monist League: "(The) difference between the reason of a Goethe, a Kant, a Lamarck, or a Darwin and that of the lowest savage...is much greater than the graduated difference between the reason of the latter and that of the most 'rational' mammals, the antropoid apes...(Since) the lower races (such as the Australian negroes) are psychologically nearer to the mammals (apes and dogs) than to civilized Europeans, we must therefore assign a totally different value to their lives," quoted in Daniel Gasman, The Scientific Origins of National Socialism (New York: Elsevier, 1971), p. 40. Galton's classic, Hereditary Genius, proved to be the seminal work of eugenics. Galton defined eugenics as 'the science of the improvement of the human race by better breeding.' See Stepan (1982), pp. 114ff.; Mosse (1978), pp. 73ff.; and Gould (1981), pp. 73-75.

³³Prominent members or supporters of the eugenics movement in America included scientists Charles Davenport (president of the society), Irving Fisher, Alexander Bell, R. Ruggles Gates, T. H. Morgan--though he later resigned in mild protest, Luther Burbank, John Rockefeller, Dale Carnegie, etc.

³⁴"We have only to compare the negro with the Eskimo or Indian, and the Australian native with the Anglo-Saxon, to be struck by an apparent kinship between general intellectual and inventive ability." Lewis Terman, Genius and Stupidity (1906), quoted in Gould (1981), p. 175.

³⁵On Burt, see W. Broad and N. Wade, Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1982), pp. 203-211; Gould (1981), Chapter Six; Stepan (1982), pp. 184-148. In general, see Audrey Shuey, The Testing of Negro Intelligence (New York: Social Science Press); Arthur Jensen, "How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement?" Harvard Educational Review 39 (Winter 1969): 1-123; H. J. Eysenck, The Inequality of Man (London: 1973); Richard Herrnstein, IQ in the Meritocracy (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1973).

³⁶Herrnstein's constant and cautious denials notwithstanding, this is the view he clearly endorses:

"Given the well-established, roughly fifteen point black-white difference in IQ (as documented exhaustively by Audrey Shuey...)...assume...0.8 is the heritability for whites and blacks...All we could say is that the differences between people, on average are 80 percent inherited...To the extent that variations in the American social environment can promote or retard IQ, blacks have probably been held back. But a neutral commentator (a rarity these days) would have to say that the case is simply not settled..."

Herrnstein (1973), pp. 185-186. For an excellent and thoroughly demolishing conceptual critique of this line of reasoning, and of IQ heritability and testing in general, cf. N. J. Block and Gerald Dworkin, "IQ: Heritability and Inequality," Parts 1 and 2, Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs 3, 4; 4,1 (Summer 1974a; Fall 1974b) esp. 1974b: 43. Cf. Gould (1981), Chapters 5, 6. Amongst the vast critical literature on race and IQ, see: Ashley Montagu, ed. Race and IQ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); A. Gartner, C. Greer and F. Riessman, eds., The New Assault on Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Eckberg (1979), and James Lawler, IQ, Heritability and Racism (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1978).

³⁷"In almost all studies the so-called racial background of individual respondents and respondent populations has been derived in ways that show no resemblance to means used by genetic specialists. In those few cases where any information is given about criteria of assortment...skin color has been the sole or dominant criterion, and that is measured by the eye...The classic study by Shuey on the testing of Negro intelligence illustrates the racist implications of investigations conceived in this mode." E. Gordon and D. Green, "An Affluent Society's Excuses for Inequality," in Montagu (1975), pp. 85-86. Block and Dworkin offer a perfect example of recent convergence of aesthetic racism and scientific racism:

"...the Stanford-Binet (test) shows four-year-olds three pairs of pictures asking, Which one is prettier? In all cases, the "correct" picture has the classic Anglo-Saxon features while the "incorrect" one has features common to other ethnic groups, e.g., a wide flat nose and thick lips in two cases, and a hooked nose in the last case."

Block and Dworkin (1974a), p. 393.

³⁸Arthur Jensen, Genetics and Education (New York: 1972), pp. 75-6.

³⁹Broad and Wade (1982), pp. 22-37.

⁴⁰Studies will ask, for example, 'Whether Jews are less likely than Christians to oppose Communism' or 'Whether Jews are inclined to be more loyal to Israel than to America.' Cf. Glock and Stark (1966), p. 119.

⁴¹Robert Ardrey, African Genesis (New York: Delta Paperback, 1963) and The Territorial Imperative (New York: Dell, 1966). On the racism implicit in concepts and arguments of sociobiology, see Barker (1981), pp. 100-164.

⁴²Sara Ann Ketchum and Christine Pierce, "Implicit Racism," *Analysis* (January 1977): pp. 91-95.

⁴³Levin (1981), p. 40, fn. 12.

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(Because of the large number of footnotes and bibliographical entries, we have adopted a more convenient bibliographical style. In effect, it is a combination of the standard Turabian manual style and anthropological format. Books and journal articles are listed together alphabetically by author. This style has been approved by my dissertation examining committee.)

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