

78-8680

GREENBERG, Donald William, 1942-  
EFFECT OF ETHNICITY ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES  
AND BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF JEWS IN  
FAIRFIELD, CONNECTICUT.

City University of New York,  
Ph.D., 1978  
Political Science, general

**University Microfilms International**, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© 1978

DONALD WILLIAM GREENBERG

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

PLEASE NOTE:

Print on some pages, light and  
indistinct. Filmed as received  
in the best possible way.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS INTERNATIONAL

EFFECT OF ETHNICITY ON POLITICAL  
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR: A STUDY  
OF JEWS IN FAIRFIELD, CONNECTICUT

by

Donald Greenberg

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate  
Faculty in Political Science in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City  
University of New York.

1977

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty  
in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

January 31, 1978  
date

Michael Kahan  
Chairman of Examining Committee

1/31 1978  
date

W. J. J. J.  
Executive Officer

Benjamin  
Marilyn  
Blanche  
Robert Abram  
Supervisory Committee

## Table of Contents

	<u>Page</u>
Chapter 1	
Survey of the Literature	1-68
Statement of the Question Examined . . .	1
Discussion of Hypotheses . . . . .	2
Survey of the Literature . . . . .	6
Definition of Ethnicity . . . . .	7
Discussion of Conceptual Propositions. .	10
Stratification . . . . .	15
Major Theories Dealing With Ethnicity. .	23
Political Science and Ethnic Politics. .	28
The Politics of Jews in America . . . .	
Theories Dealing with the Causes of Jewish Liberalism . . . . .	43
An Analysis of the Literature Concerning the Political Behavior of Jews . . . .	48
Methodology . . . . .	50
Why A Single Group Was Chosen . . . . .	52
Definition of Terms . . . . .	54
Religion and Ethnicity . . . . .	54
Social Class . . . . .	55
Political Attitudes and Political Behavior . . . . .	56
Why A Single Community Was Chosen . . .	56
Collection of the Data . . . . .	58
Construction of the Questionnaire . . .	60
How the Initial Sample Was Drawn . . . .	61
The Personal Interview How the Sample Was Drawn . . . . .	62
How the Initial Data Was Analyzed . . .	63
Construction of the Personal Interview Questionnaire . . . . .	64
Conducting the Follow-up Interviews . .	66
Analyzing the Data . . . . .	66

	<u>Page</u>
Chapter 2	
Findings of the Data	69-101
Part I	
General Discussion of the Importance of Ethnicity	
Introduction . . . . .	69
The Social Class Position of the Group .	70
Religion and Ethnicity . . . . .	74
Relationship of Ethnicity to Life .	
Opportunities and Political Behavior .	77
Summary . . . . .	83
Part II	
Discussion of Political Attitudes and Political Behavior	
Introduction . . . . .	84
Political Opinions . . . . .	84
Civil Rights . . . . .	85
Civil Liberties . . . . .	88
General Domestic Policy . . . . .	90
Internationalism . . . . .	92
Israel and Jewish-Related Issues . . . .	95
Political Behavior . . . . .	96
Chapter Summary . . . . .	100
Chapter 3	
An Examination of the Significance of the Independent Variables	102-128
Introduction . . . . .	102
Examination of the Social Class Indicators: Income, Education and Occupation . . . . .	103
An Examination of the Independent Variables and the Factors Which Measure Political Behavior . . . . .	111
Examination of Age and Generation . . . .	117
An Examination of the Ethnic Variables: Denominational Identification and the Perception of the Seriousness of Anti-Semitism . . . . .	123
Chapter Summary . . . . .	127

	<u>Page</u>
Chapter 4	
Findings From the Personal Interviews	129-157
Introduction . . . . .	129
Methodology . . . . .	130
Political Issues Unrelated to Ethnicity	130
Political Issues Which are Ethnically Related . . . . .	137
Political Behavior . . . . .	143
Sources of Political Identification .	145
What the Terms "Liberal" and "Conserva- tive Mean to the Sample Population .	146
Importance of Anti-Semitism and Denominational Identification . . .	148
The Deviant Group . . . . .	151
General Influence of Ethnicity on Political Attitudes . . . . .	155
Chapter Summary . . . . .	157
Chapter 5	
Conclusion	158-183
Introduction . . . . .	158
An Examination of the Evidence Relating to the General Thesis . . .	160
An Examination of Each Individual Hypothesis . . . . .	169
General Discussion of the Findings and Areas Indicated for Further Research . . . . .	176
Summary Statement . . . . .	182
Appendices . . . . .	184
Bibliography . . . . .	196

<u>List of Tables</u>	<u>Page</u>
2-1 Social Class Indicators . . . . .	72
2-2 Ethnic Identification . . . . .	76
2-3 Perceptions Concerning Anti- Semitism . . . . .	79
2-4 Political Behavior and Ethnicity.	81
2-5 Opinions on Civil Rights Issues .	87
2-6 Opinions on Civil Liberty Issues.	89
2-7 General Domestic Policy . . . . .	91
2-8 Opinions on International Issues.	94
2-9 Opinions on Issues of Ethnic Concern . . . . .	97
2-10 Party and Ideological Identifi- cation . . . . .	98
2-11 Involvement in Political Causes .	99
3-1 Social Class and Civil Rights . .	105
Figure 3-1 Support and Income for Government Programs . . . . .	106
3-2 Social Class and International Issues . . . . .	108
3-3 Social Class and Civil Liberties.	109
3-4 Social Class, Party Affiliation and Political Activity. . . . .	112-113
3-5 Social Class and Political Behavior . . . . .	115
3-6 Age and Generation . . . . .	118
3-7 Ethnicity and Political Issues. .	124
3-8 Denominational Identification and Perceptions . . . . .	126

## Chapter 1

### Statement of the Question Examined

The overall question examined in this study is what influence does ethnicity have on the political attitudes and behavior of a population of American Jews. This question was broken down into two specific inquiries: One, on what issues does ethnicity persist as a major variable in the formation of political opinions and political behavior and why?; and two, what differences exist within the group and what accounts for these differences with respect to the importance of ethnicity?

Data for this study was collected in two separate steps. The first was a questionnaire mailed to one member of every identified Jewish household in the town of Fairfield, Connecticut. The second was a personal interview with a random sample of individuals drawn from selected categories which were determined by an examination of the mail questionnaires. The items asked on the personal interviews were as similar to the items asked on the original questionnaire as was practically feasible.

The variables explored as potential independent variables

are reflective of the literature as well as the purpose of the study. The major independent ethnic variables are religious affiliation and denominational identification. The remaining potential independent variables examined are the social class variables of income, occupation and education, and the general variables of age and generation. The dependent variables measured are political attitudes and political behavior.

As discussed later in the chapter the methodology used in this study presents certain problems concerning the types of conclusions that can be drawn from the data. The chief limitation of the methodology is that one cannot universalize the results because a random sample of the universal population was not used. What one can say from a study using the employed methodology is what is discovered is true for the group; that is, it represents a behavior in which this group engages but one cannot say how many of the group engages in the discovered behavior. The methodology is useful and valid as long as one keeps in mind its limitations and does not attempt to make unwarranted generalizations in light of the methodological limitations.

### Discussion of Hypotheses

The general thesis of this study is American Jews regardless of socio-economic position identify the political world by ethnic criteria, and American Jews believe that their

personal self-interest is inextricably linked to the success or failure of the ethnic group. Consistent with the literature, it is recognized that ethnicity will not be an influence on all political issues; specifically, those issues which are ethnically unrelated will not be influenced by ethnic variables.

This thesis is based on stratification theory whose central assumption is an immigrant ethnic group will join together out of a belief that this offers the maximum chances for social survival in a hostile environment. The dynamics of the group association are linked to perceptions of one's place in society not to one's generation or social class (which are frequently used as measures of ethnic assimilation).

Stratification theory is relevant to the Jewish experience in America. The political behavior of Jews has been linked in the literature to the attempts of the group for survival. Cohn, for example, makes a strong case that the traditionally strong Jewish liberalism grows out of the politics of ethnic self-interest. The thesis of this study is based on the assumption that Jews attempt to use the political system to combat the impact of discrimination toward Jews which they believe to exist in society. Jews behave as they do in order to promote an ethnically defined self-interest. The critical variable which links American Jews to each other is the belief that Jews must stick together for survival. It is my contention that the issue is not the dichotomy of class versus ethnicity as much of the literature has indicated, but

it is the question of where does one as an ethnic see oneself fitting into American society.

The specific hypotheses which follow are derived from the general thesis of the study and are designed to enable one to examine the questions which are under investigation. Each hypothesis is further designed to be consistent with the literature on ethnicity.

1. Ethnicity influences the political attitudes and political behavior of Jews on issues which are perceived to be ethnically related.

The specific criteria which influence behavior are hypothesized to be denominational identification and attitudes concerning how widespread is anti-Semitism in the United States. This hypothesis is central to the dissertation. The hypothesis recognizes, however, that ethnicity while a powerful variable does not universally influence the individual. The influence of ethnicity is confined to those issues which are perceived to be ethnically related.

2. Social class variables influence political attitudes and political behavior on issues which are ethnically unrelated.

This hypothesis is an explicit recognition of the theoretical construct of eth-class developed by Milton Gordon.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

Eth-class recognizes that while ethnicity remains an influence regardless of generation or social movement other factors exist which also influence behavior. These factors are those which most affect one's life experiences and life opportunities. They are specifically those characteristics which indicate one's social class.

3. The importance of a political issue to the individual is determined by the issue's perceived ethnic relevance.

This hypothesis follows from the preceding two hypotheses. The hypothesis recognizes that while there are a multiplicity of issues and influences on the individual some issues will be considered to be of greater significance than others. The hypothesis contends that the significance of a political issue is determined by its relevance to the ethnic group. The individual will consider political events which are ethnically unrelated to be of little importance or significant to him and those which are ethnically related to be of great importance or significance. It is further contended the political behavior of the individual will reflect this ordering of political issues.

4. Individual attachment or identification with the ethnic group is determined by ethnic criteria.

The assumption upon which this hypothesis rests is, that one identifies with the ethnic group for reasons which are ethnically related rather than for reasons which have to do

with social class or generation. The hypothesis refutes both assimilationist and mobilization theories which use social class or generational criteria for explaining ethnic identification. This hypothesis is consistent with stratification theory. It assumes that ethnic attachment will be a function where one perceives himself ethnically to be in society. The specific ethnic criteria which influences ethnic identification, it is hypothesized, is the individual's perceptions concerning the nature of anti-Semitism in the United States. It is important to note that the position taken in this hypothesis that general ethnic identification is a function of ethnic rather than social class or generational criteria is central to the entire study.

#### Survey of the Literature

The primary purpose of this section is to discuss the literature which is relevant to both the general thesis of this study and to the specific hypotheses. A careful examination of the literature is especially important because the study attempts to break new ground by its exploration of the relationship, hypothesized to exist, between perceptions and ethnic identification. This is a pilot study which concentrates on establishing the general salience of ethnicity and on exploring what accounts for intra-group differences with respect to ethnic identification and resultant political behavior.

The major thrust of the literature discussion is to

examine the implications of stratification theory. This is done because stratification theory serves as the theoretical foundation for this research. Discussed also are the conceptual shortcomings of the assimilationist and mobilization theories as they relate to explaining ethnic identification. Finally the literature discussion attempts to deal with the existing literature which explains the reality and explanations of Jewish political behavior.

It is important to note that neither the discussion of the literature nor the research data conclusively proves or refutes any existing theoretical positions. The body of the study does establish, however, a direction which does seem worthy of further exploration. In addition, the research raises a number of questions which indicate the need for further study.

#### Definition of Ethnicity

Operationally, ethnicity is defined by one or more of three criteria:<sup>2</sup> race, religion or national origins. These three are frequently supplemented by a subjective intensity index of ethnicity, usually an individual's identification with an ethnic group. The most commonly used criterion of ethnicity is race, followed by nationality. For some researchers, religion is not in itself considered an ethnic criteria unless combined with nationality. All three of

<sup>2</sup>There is no universally agreed upon definition of ethnicity. These three criteria represent the consensus of the literature.

these criteria are ascriptive in nature. That is, one is born in a specific racial category which is immutable. It is something which is not dependent on life achievements. In addition to the fact that these criteria are ascriptive, there is a presumption that the similarity one shares with others carries a certain commonality of kind, and is a permanent, non-transitory condition.

The logic of the importance to the individual of ethnicity is inherent in the conceptual definition of the term. Gordon defines ethnicity as a sense of peoplehood.<sup>3</sup> "An ethnic group is a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood."<sup>4</sup> Ethnicity is a form of weltanschauung.<sup>5</sup> Ethnicity gives to the individual, not only an identification with the past, but also a framework for confronting the complexities of modern life. "The ethnic traditions not only represent the past, but they meet a current need for psychological identification and group affiliation in an increasing impersonal and bureaucratic society."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Gordon, op. cit.

<sup>4</sup>Schermerhorn, R. A., Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 12.

<sup>5</sup>For a full discussion of the term weltanschauung see Tomotsa Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification (London: Macmillan Company, 1965).

<sup>6</sup>Dennis Clark, "Toward Assimilation on Ethnic Identity," Urban and Social Change Review, Volume 4 (Fall, 1970), p. 19.

The key conceptual components of ethnicity are a sense of peoplehood, historical roots, ascribed status, a source of personal identification, and fulfillment of psychological needs.<sup>7</sup> It is critical to understand that ethnic group membership differs from other social group membership in that it rests on membership as a function of something one is rather than something one has done. It could be argued, for example, that artists have a sense of peoplehood and are a common group. While this position is a highly tenable one, it does not meet the conceptual definition of ethnicity because one is not born an artist, but becomes an artist by his life activity. An artist is something one becomes by achievement, not by ascription. When one becomes an artist, one does so by making a conscious choice to pursue certain activities that will lead to that goal. Both Gordon and Schermerhorn imply that the sense of peoplehood connected with ethnicity is not necessarily an identification based on conscious choice. One may have a great deal of his behavior guided by his national origin, and yet not be conscious of nationality as a determinant of his behavior. This is to say that ethnicity can produce in an individual a way of looking at the world which guides the individual's behavior, but which operates on an unconscious level. Race, nationality and to a lesser extent religion are the overt manifestations in our society that meet the conceptual

<sup>7</sup>Gordon, *op. cit.*, see Gordon for a full discussion of how ethnic identification serves to meet individual psychological needs.

components of ethnicity, or sense of peoplehood. Ethnicity is, then, a source of common identification based on ascriptive criteria.

### Discussion of Conceptual Propositions

The entire logic of ethnicity (or for that matter social class) as a determinant of individual behavior is based on assumptions concerning the importance of the group. The critical nature of the group's effect on the individual is a widely accepted position in sociology. In political science the two leading advocates of group importance are Arthur Bentley and David Truman.<sup>8</sup> David Ricci argues that the group is the fundamental tenet upon which the entire theory of pluralism rests. Group is widely defined as a collection of individuals that share a common bond. Group is "as a minimum an awareness by the individuals involved of some common identity and shared fate. The members of more cohesive groups will, in addition, engage in social interaction, and if this interaction is persistent and repetitive, the group is characterized by social structure."<sup>9</sup> This definition of a group implies conscious choice by the individual and demonstrable activity. Lewin disagrees with this implication: "Groups

<sup>8</sup> Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government, edited by Peter H. Odegard (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1967). David Truman, The Governmental Process; Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Knopf, 1951).

<sup>9</sup> Milton Ying, "Social Forces Involved in Group Identification or Withdrawal," Daedulus, Volume 90 No. 2 (Spring, 1961), p. 247.

are real because they are psychologically real, and thereby affect the way in which we behave."<sup>10</sup> The group may engage in no activities or make no overt demands and yet be very real to the individual because of a psychological attachment. In fact, the organization and activities of the group may be secondary in nature. It has been argued that the "primary function of this basic group identity is to provide a person with some measure of supporting self-acceptance and self-esteem."<sup>11</sup> The group, then, is a source of identification and a determinant of behavior for the individual which may operate on the individual at an unconscious yet critical level. Further, the literature indicates that identification increases as one associates with the group and decreases as one loses physical, emotional or psychological attachment to the group.

In discussing the importance and continued effect the ethnic group has on the individual, certain concepts of acculturation and assimilation have received a great deal of attention from sociologists but almost no attention from political scientists. The distinction between these two concepts is important because the basic position taken by many political scientists has been that ethnicity is important to first generation immigrants, but that as the immigrant becomes assimilated into the society in the second and third generation, ethnicity will no longer be important and will be replaced as a source

<sup>10</sup>Campbell, et al., op. cit., p. 296.

<sup>11</sup>Harold Issacs, "Group Identity and Political Change," Survey, No. 69 (October, 1968), p. 77.

of identification by some other group, most likely social class. Political scientists have always measured this alleged assimilation process by overt behavior patterns. If political scientists have mistaken an acculturation process for an assimilation process, the proposition of generational disassociation with the ethnic group is seriously undermined. The acculturation process, especially in an ethnically stratified society, may increase rather than decrease the importance of the ethnic group for the individual.

Shibutani and Gordon<sup>12</sup> have pointed out that there is no generally agreed upon definition of either assimilation or acculturation. The consensus of the literature is that assimilation is generally defined as the point where one is totally undifferentiated from others in the society. Acculturation is continued differentiation of groups in the society based on ascriptive criteria, even though the group's behavior is consistent with the norms of the society. Assimilation denotes a cultural transmutation by an individual, while acculturation deals only with the social structure. It is entirely conceivable that one can be totally acculturated while not at all assimilated. "Culture signifies the ways of action learned through socialization, based on norms and values that serve as guides or standards for that behavior. Social structure refers to the set of crystallized social relationships which its [society's] members have made with each other which places

<sup>12</sup>Shibutani and Kwan, op. cit. and Gordon, op. cit.

them in groups and which relates them to the major institutional activities of the society such as economic and occupational life, religion, marriage and the family, education, government, and recreation."<sup>13</sup>

In his discussion of assimilation, Shibutani goes further than most sociologists when he indicates that even changes in culture patterns are not sufficient to constitute assimilation. "Minority groups may alter their culture but still retain consciousness of kind."<sup>14</sup> A continuation of consciousness of kind would clearly indicate a failure of the assimilation process: "By the standard sociological definitions of assimilation, a person is not fully assimilated if he is conscious of trying to be assimilated."<sup>15</sup> It is my contention that political scientists, with their emphasis on overt signs of behavior, have assumed acculturation to be equivalent to assimilation. It has been pointed out that "assimilation involves much more than occupational, educational and geographic mobility."<sup>16</sup> It is exactly these three criteria that Dahl, for example, uses in his assertion that ethnicity is playing a diminishing role in American life. Acculturation, while producing overt

<sup>13</sup>Schermerhorn, op. cit., p. 80.

<sup>14</sup>Shibutani and Kwan, op. cit., p. 479.

<sup>15</sup>Daniel Glaser, "Dynamics of Ethnic Identification," American Sociological Review, Volume 28, No. 1 (1958), p. 35.

<sup>16</sup>Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," American Political Science Review, Volume 61 (September, 1967), p. 724.

changes in behavior (some of which over time will be quite substantive), is likely to maintain and even increase the individual's identification because the difference between groups in society based on ascriptive criteria remain salient to the immigrant regardless of generation. It has been argued that even without ethnic stratification in America it is unlikely the immigrant groups would assimilate. "American society is a complex society in which the idea of assimilation and homogenization is an absurd one."<sup>17</sup> Once the distinction between assimilation and acculturation is made, it is obvious that there can exist a dichotomy between overt behavior and strongly held attitudes, values and general perceptions of the world.

It is clear that the notion of group identification occurring at a psychological level is critical to the overall thesis of this study. Equally important is the recognition of the qualitative difference between acculturation and assimilation. It is central to the theoretical position of this study that it is the perceptual or psychological component which most fundamentally determines the importance of ethnicity to the individual. Further, the degree of ethnic identification cannot be measured by the traditional overt indicators which deal primarily with acculturation but are not at all adequate to measure assimilation.

<sup>17</sup>Andrew Greeley, "The New Ethnicity and Blue Collars," Dissent, Volume 19 (Winter, 1972), p. 272.

### Stratification

The importance of drawing a sharp distinction between acculturation and assimilation and of emphasizing the importance of psychological identification is evident when one examines stratification theory, and the critical role stratification plays in an ethnic experience. To ignore ethnic stratification and its impact on each of the stages of the assimilation process is to deny the importance of ethnicity to the individual, and it is to implicitly introduce other criteria for explaining ethnic identification. This point will be extensively discussed in the section on the major theories of ethnic assimilation. To deal with the notion of stratification one must look at the causation for ethnic group identification, and examine the difference between ascriptive and achievement status ranking.

Laumann extensively discusses the terms ascriptive status and achievement status. He defines ascriptive status as status assigned by others based on what one is, a member such as race, religion, nationality or sex. Achievement status is defined as status assigned by what one has done or earned, such as occupation or educational achievement. The distinction between these two is made by the bitter joke: What do you call a Negro physician in Georgia? You call him "Boy"! "How a person is treated does not depend so much upon what he is as upon the manner in which he is defined."<sup>18</sup> If an individual is ascriptively defined at a low status position in the society

<sup>18</sup>Shibutani and Kwan, op. cit., p. 92.

regardless of his life's achievements, it is likely to have consequences for his self-identity. Laumann has pointed out that this situation appears to be true for American Jews who have a high achievement record, but low societal status based on ascriptive criteria. Ascriptive status ranking is especially important to the continuation of ethnic identification in a society which is ascriptively stratified. In such a society there exists a hierarchy (either formal or informal) which is generally recognized and accepted by members of the society. This stratification carries with it certain rewards and sanctions based upon one's ranking within the hierarchy. It is well recognized in the sociological literature that newcomers to a society almost always suffer from status deprivation and are placed by the hosts in a low position on the status ladder. This phenomenon occurred in America for the white immigrant groups during the period of substantial immigration after the Civil War.<sup>19</sup> It is well established in the literature that, so long as discriminatory ethnic stratification persists, ethnicity will be an important variable to the individual in his life adjustments. Where the individual cannot gain recognition from others regardless of his accomplishments, he will be forced to turn for recognition to people who will automatically accept him, very likely his own ethnic group. "The need for group recognition among members of socially

<sup>19</sup>Stephen Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress; Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City (Cambridge, Harvard University Press), 1964.

insecure or deprived ethnic communities has been a constant theme in scholarly analysis."<sup>20</sup>

Stratification is a powerful model for explaining the persistence of ethnicity but it implies that, when the barriers to mobility are removed, the source of ethnic identification is likely to decrease. It also implies that this lowering of barriers is observable and measurable by objective accomplishments on the part of the individual. It has been widely discussed and accepted, however, that in an ethnically stratified society, the vehicle for mobility is to "adopt the life style of the higher status groups and to deny, at least overtly, your own ethnicity."<sup>21</sup> "Whenever underprivileged people attempt to improve their lot, the extent to which they succeed often depends upon the degree to which they no longer stand out."<sup>22</sup> What must be pointed out, however, is that the acculturative behavior necessary to achieve mobility in the society may not lessen actual informal stratification, and in addition may not lessen the perception the individual has of his actual place in society, regardless of his achievement.

The hypothesis "the greater the difference between the host and the immigrant cultures, the greater will the subordination, the greater the strength of the ethnic social systems,

<sup>20</sup>Edgar Litt, Ethnic Politics in America (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1970), p. 61.

<sup>21</sup>See Shibutani and Kwan, op. cit., for full discussion of this position.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

and the longer the period necessary for the assimilation of the ethnic group,"<sup>23</sup> implies that ethnic identity is totally a function of the observable difference between two cultures and has meaning only as long as these differences exist. It does not leave room for the residual effects of stratification (real or imagined) which may have meaning for the individual, or for the subtle manifestations of stratification that may arise after the overt discrimination has ceased to exist. In addition it does not leave room for the eventual emergence of an ethnic pride in reaction to the hostility toward the ethnic by the hosts in the society. This last point is extensively dealt with by Novak<sup>24</sup> and may account for the emergence in the late 1960's of renewed ethnic pride.

It has been pointed out that "when a system of ethnic stratification breaks down, it is not likely to be replaced by an unstratified society."<sup>25</sup> This study suggests that, when one system of ethnic stratification breaks down, it can be replaced by another system less overt in nature. An ethnically stratified society is a probable causal factor for explaining group identity along ethnic lines. The host identifies with his ethnic group out of a sense of superiority, and the immigrant

<sup>23</sup>W. Lloyd Warner, et al., Yankee City; One Volume, abridged edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 413.

<sup>24</sup>Michael Novak, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1972).

<sup>25</sup>Shibutani and Kwan, op. cit., p. 35.

out of a sense of inferiority. The superiority/inferiority dichotomy is reinforced by acculturation behavior and the fact that most manifestations of immigrant ethnicity are not allowed to surface publicly.

One of the difficulties in dealing with ethnic stratification in America today is that the term "ethnic" has become for many interchangeable with the term "social class." Novak's work is a prime example of this: the term "poor" is virtually interchangeable with the term "ethnic." The linking of these two terms, while designed to show that there continues to exist in America a great deal of discrimination against ethnic minorities, obscures a full analysis of the role that ethnicity plays in the individual's behavior. Such a link actually supports the position that it is social class, not ethnicity, which is the critical group for identification purposes in America. It implies that ethnicity has an important relation to the individual only when there is observable overt discrimination and poverty. It leaves little room for the position that, while stratification may intensify ethnic identity, this identity may exist in any event because ethnicity is the most likely and most powerful primary group in society.

It can be argued that while in the short run stratification intensifies ethnic identity, it actually weakens such identity. Stratification and the desire for mobility forces the immigrant to hide his ethnicity. "Attempts of ethnic minorities to maintain the integrity of their group thus tend

to reinforce the already existing system of stratification."<sup>26</sup> The immigrant in America was caught between Scylla and Charybdis: he could maintain his group ties and lose mobility opportunities, or deny his ethnicity and give up his psychosocial community. The difficulty and possible inconsistencies evident today in individual attitudes towards ethnicity is to an extent a function of this dilemma. In stratification theory the ethnic is part of a hierarchical arrangement and is discriminated against. As his ethnicity becomes less important to the host and he moves up the socio-economic ladder, it will also become less important to the individual because his ethnic identification is a function of discrimination, not natural identification. For those who accept a stratification model, loss of ethnic identity is inevitable over time. This time period, however, could be very extensive.

To researchers such as Gordon and Greeley, ethnic identification is not created by the discriminatory practices of the host but is a natural form of individual identification with a group. The stratification of the society affects the form of ethnic identification, but is not the source of it. This model is based upon the assumption that human beings are social creatures who need to be able to identify with a primary group in which their membership is secure. Membership in the group helps the individual satisfy certain psychological, emotional and status needs. The ethnic group

<sup>26</sup>Shibutani and Kwan, op. cit., p. 35.

is such a primary group because it has permanency, tradition, historical significance, and an unchangeable basis of commonality between group members. It is a permanent and unchanging port of call for an individual in a fast-changing, highly complex society where achievement and change are seen as inherently positive and desirable: "a person's prestige within the minority group is more or less independent of his rank in the outside world."<sup>27</sup> Using this model attachment to group can be viewed as a need to manifest (Gemeinschaft) in a society which is increasingly "Gessellschaft." The ethnic group remains important to the individual even though this attachment produces no material benefits, and even when there is no apparent rational reason to remain identified with the group. The attachment remains as long as the social-psychological attachment remains. Gordon points out that the two most important characteristics of the ethnic group are that "it serves psychologically as a source of group self-identification--the focus of the sense of intimate peoplehood --and second, it provides a patterned network of groups and institutions which allows an individual to confine his primary group relationships to his own ethnic group throughout all the stages of the life cycle." This latter point is seen as critical to many researchers. What will happen to one's ethnic identity when and if ethnic relationships break down? The

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 290.

<sup>28</sup>Gordon, op. cit., p. 38.

degree to which ethnic relations have broken down is still an open question (see Lieberman and Laumann for a discussion of this).<sup>29</sup> It has also been pointed out that, "even when most of the life styles assume an American middle-class stamp, these in-group social patterns reinforce ethnic identifications and seem to give them an enduring nature."<sup>30</sup> It is also possible that, because of the American immigrant experience (which fostered a denial of overt ethnicity in order to achieve social mobility), the forms of ethnic association may have altered to conform to the peculiarities of American society, so that ethnic manifestations are not now always clearly recognized. "For ethnic sub-systems may persist or evolve new structures independent of the host society and despite dramatic cultural transitions in the direction of the mainstream cultures."<sup>31</sup> The ties to ethnicity may have remained important over generations in America, but the forms of these ties may have been altered. It is, misleading, therefore, to contrast first-generation immigrants with third- or fourth-generation people and to use the various differences as evidence of the diminishing importance of ethnicity.

The upward movement of a group in a society that is ethnically stratified takes place in three stages. In the

<sup>29</sup>This pattern of ethnic persistence is discussed by Laumann, op. cit. and Stanley Lieberman, Ethnic Patterns in American Cities (Glencoe, Illinois Free Press, 1963).

<sup>30</sup>Parenti, op. cit., p. 721.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 718.

first stage, the group huddles together in the face of discrimination. In the second stage, the individual group members move away from the ethnic group and achieve socio-economic success in society. In the third stage, the group consolidates its success and either reidentifies with the group or completes the assimilation process. The measurement of these stages has always been determined by generational longevity combined with social class status. Measurement by these criteria substitutes a class model of stratification for an ethnic stratification model which rests on perception of status in the society, not actual social class achievement. It is important, therefore, for the researcher to keep this distinction in mind, recognizing that a group could be in an early stage of development perceptually while in an advanced stage socio-economically and generationally.

#### Major Theories Dealing With Ethnicity

There are four major theories dealing with the individual and his ultimate adjustment to his ethnicity: the assimilationist theory, the cultural pluralist theory, the mobilization theory, and the psychological-descriptive theory.

The problem in dealing with these theories is that researchers have not used similar definitions for critical terms, nor have the theoretical assumptions upon which the theories are based been always made explicate. Virtually no researchers have indicated whether they accept a model of

ethnicity based on stratification and discrimination, or on ethnicity as a natural expression of community. It is my contention that all the ethnic theories are based on one or a combination of these two models.

The assimilationist model has as its leading advocates Lloyd Warner and Louis Wirth in sociology, and Robert Dahl in political science. It accepts the stratification model for the analysis of ethnic behavior. This school recognizes ethnicity as a factor in the early immigrant experience, but sees this ethnicity created by the newness of being in a foreign culture and by the initial lack of acceptance of the immigrant by the host peoples. As the newness wears off and the immigrant begins to achieve some measure of social mobility, the need and desire for ethnic identification ceases and the individual begins to associate himself and identify with his social class, not his ethnic group. In this model ethnic behavior is seen by second generation immigrants as the old way, the "non-American way." The individual wishes to cast off the old way in order to be part of America. This position is summed up by Wirth's analysis of why the ethnic moves out of the immigrant neighborhood. According to Wirth "Whenever a family moves to a better location, it does so in the hope of improving its social status, of getting rid of the handicaps of foreignness and Jewishness at one clip. Leaving the Jewish neighborhood is motivated by the desire to flee, to alienate oneself from one's fellow Jews, to live in a neighborhood

that has lost all traces of ethnicity. Assimilation and integration are the terminal phases of these processes."<sup>32</sup>

Closely allied with the assimilationist model is the cultural pluralist, or melting pot theory. The cultural pluralist model essentially asserts that individuals, not groups, have succeeded in America. Society recognizes and respects ethnic sub-cultures and there has been a merging of the many diverse sub-cultures in America into a distinct American culture which incorporates aspects of many immigrant cultures. The melting pot theory is popular because it is consistent with the notion of pluralism and the position that the political system is responsive to group needs and desires in the society. It is a theory which denies elitism and, while loosely based on a stratification model, does not deal with the discriminatory aspect of this model. With respect to the popularity of the model Metzger asserts, "Sociologists, by and large, have accepted the image of Horatio Alger in the melting pot as the ideal definition of American society. They have taken the view that incorporation of America's ethnic and racial groups into the mainstream culture is virtually inevitable. Successful assimilation, moreover, has been viewed as synonymous with equality of opportunity and upward mobility."<sup>33</sup> The heart of the cultural pluralist model lies in the assumption

<sup>32</sup>Louis Wirth, The Ghetto (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 275-276.

<sup>33</sup>Greeley, op. cit., p. 271.

that the lines of distinction between ethnic groups in the society are of little importance or impact, that these distinctions are not sufficient to produce meaningful loss of opportunity. Nor do the immigrant groups have a need to hold on to their ethnicity except for peripheral attachment to a past heritage. This theory assumes that assimilation, not acculturation, will take place and that achievement criteria, not ascriptive criteria, will be the sole determinants of status. The model also assumes that a dominant ethnic culture does not and probably never did exist in America. This theory attaches little importance to ethnic cleavages in society seeing them as only a temporary condition which totally disappear in time.

The ethnic resurgence theory labeled by Gabriel as mobilization theory rests not on stratification theory but on the assumption that human beings need community. In this model ethnicity is seen as the natural form of identification for the individual, which has a high influence in determining the way in which the individual leads his life. "Identification with an ethnic group is a source of values, instincts, ideas and perceptions that throw original light on the meaning of America."<sup>34</sup> Milton Gordon, the leading proponent of this theory, argues that ethnic membership is the most likely and natural form of community in America. He has attempted to reconcile the upward mobility of many ethnic Americans with

<sup>34</sup>Novak, op. cit., p. 290.

continued attachment to ethnicity by developing the concept of eth--class: "Subsociety created by the intersection of the vertical stratifications of ethnicity with the horizontal stratifications of social class is the eth--class."<sup>35</sup> This concept asserts that the psychological attachment and importance of ethnicity remains, while certain changes in life style occur as a function of upward mobility. Most proponents of this model of ethnic community assert that it has a hiatus period in the case of second-generation immigrants. The discrimination that immigrants suffered at the hands of the host caused them to deny their ethnicity in order to gain social mobility. This denial of ethnicity occurred primarily with second-generation individuals. With movement up the socio-economic ladder, the third generation ethnic can reassert his ethnicity and allow it to take its proper place. A key to this model is that the transmission of ethnic identity must occur between generations, even when the identity is being overtly denied. This transmission must take place at a psychological, perhaps an unconscious level. The institutions within which ethnic attachment manifests itself may change, but the feeling for the ethnic group remains stable. It is critical to point out, that if the ethnic community model is valid, it holds regardless of one's social class position.

Attachment to the ethnic group and the amount of individual behavior determined by ethnicity should not be affected

<sup>35</sup>Gordon, op. cit., p. 51.

substantially by class. If ethnicity is a primary attachment to community which can be re-kindled after initial success in the society, it should not be seriously altered by the transient or secondary group identifications attendant to this mobility. One could posit (in fact) that the more secure the individual is in his socio-economic position, the more important his ethnicity is likely to become for him and his offspring. One of the problems with research on this model is that most of the researchers have equated ethnicity and social class. What should be stressed is not the individual's sense of his economic position but the amount of security he feels within society (i.e., whether the individual feels that a reassertion of his ethnicity will threaten his position in society). This implies that stratification and discrimination continue to exist in American society, and that this perception of potential discrimination keeps ethnicity from fully asserting itself in third- and fourth-generation immigrants. It is of little importance whether the discrimination actually does exist; it is only important if people believe it does.

#### Political Science and Ethnic Politics

In discussing ethnic politics a distinction must be made between institutional ethnic politics (e.g., whether the Democratic Party presents an ethnically balanced ticket) and individual ethnic politics (e.g., how an individual's ethnicity manifests itself politically in both behavior and attitudes).

This dissertation is concerned with individual ethnic politics. There is virtually no dispute that a form of institutionalized ethnic politics existed in American urban areas from approximately 1870 to 1920. In this period the immigrant traded political allegiance for the services of a formal institution, the local political party, which would promote his access to the material opportunities of the society. The success and continued existence of the political machine depended upon the delivery of service and the symbolic achievements of having people from an ethnic group succeed in the political and social system. To many the period of machine politics is considered a low point in American politics. Attachment to a party based on ethnic considerations is seen in a negative light. It has been hypothesized that, as people moved up the socio-economic ladder and became more Americanized and more sophisticated, issue-oriented, rational politics would replace ethnic politics. This position is based on an elitist assumption.

"Elite groups assume that issue politics are the issues of social class; for after all, social class is the only rational difference in the society."<sup>36</sup> The machine is seen by many as a mechanism for transition for the immigrant from his native culture to American culture. Machine politics was based on personalism and community, with a strong bond of commonality between leaders and followers based on ethnic and class identification.<sup>37</sup> It was politics which ran counter to the reform

<sup>36</sup>Greeley, op. cit., p. 272.

<sup>37</sup>This argument is made by Litt, op. cit.

movement in this country, which placed a positive emphasis on participation in the electoral process. Novak states: "In participatory democracy, ethnic styles is not participation in making rules; it is participation in a network of people who exchange service."<sup>38</sup> Litt sees formalized ethnic politics as a kind of business: "In many ways traditional ethnic politics was a solemn deliberation of small and shrewd political businessmen"<sup>39</sup> The machine era was in the Weberian sense charismatic politics which, Weber points out, runs counter to rational bureaucratic politics, which is the hallmark of the modern state. The critics of formalized ethnic politics (machine politics) have not considered that ethnic political parties were a rational and wholly appropriate response to America by the immigrant. It encompassed the desire to have social mobility and it also recognized the discriminatory nature of American society.

There are two major schools of thought concerning the evolution of ethnic politics. The two schools are the assimilationist school (which has as its leading advocate Robert Dahl) and the mobilization school (which is advocated by Wolfinger and Parenti). According to Dahl the immigrant undergoes three stages of political development. In the first stage he is attached to the political world by his ethnic ties and behaves politically in a non-rational way. As he moves up

<sup>38</sup>Novak, op. cit., p. 31.

<sup>39</sup>Litt, op. cit., p. 159.

the socio-economic ladder he begins to move further away from the ethnic group politically, and class issues become salient. In the final stage he is totally assimilated in the population and his political behavior is rational (i.e., based on social class and ideological criteria). He is totally undifferentiated in the population from others of similar social class regardless of ethnicity. "The end of the process is reached when group members are as occupationally differentiated as the whole population. At this point they are politically indistinguishable from the general population, as from a control group with similar non-ethnic characteristics, and ethnicity is no longer a factor in their voting behavior."<sup>40</sup> The assimilationist theory rests on the acceptance of a pluralist model for American politics.<sup>41</sup> It also denies the possible inherent identification component of ethnicity for the individual, as well as ignoring the issue of whether America is stratified on ethnic lines. The assimilationist model sees the machine era and ethnic politics at variance with pluralism, and an aberration in American political life created by the influx of large numbers of immigrants into the country. The assimilationist school concentrates on the form of early ethnic politics in America, the urban machine, as proof that ethnic

<sup>40</sup>Raymond Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," American Political Science Review (December, 1965), p. 896.

<sup>41</sup>For a full discussion of pluralist theory see David Ricci, Community Power and Democratic Theory; the Logic of Political Analysis (New York: Random House, 1971).

politics does not exist except under extreme conditions; it denies that ethnic politics has a rational as well as a psychological base for its continued existence.

The mobilization theory of ethnic voting states: "The strength of ethnic identification and the level of ethnic relevance is in the election. The most powerful and visible sign of ethnic political relevance is a fellow-ethnic's name at the head of the ticket. Middle-class status is a virtual prerequisite for candidacy for major office; an ethnic group's development of sufficient political skill and influence to secure such a nomination also requires the development of a middle class. Therefore, ethnic voting will be greatest when the ethnic group has produced a middle class, i.e., in the second or third generation, not the first. Furthermore, the shifts in party identification resulting from this first major candidacy will persist beyond the election in which they occurred."<sup>42</sup> An offshoot of the mobilization theory is that the second generation ethnic will not engage in ethnic politics while they are consolidating achieved mobility gains. Once these gains are assured, the individual will reassert ethnic identity through voting behavior by supporting candidates of similar ethnic background. The mobilization theory recognizes the notion of ethnic identity as a factor in an individual's adjustment, but fails to consider that in latter generations ethnicity is a source of political attitudes and behavior for tangible, not just symbolic goals.

<sup>42</sup>Wolfinger, op. cit., p. 905.

The mobilization theory and the assimilationist theory are defective in explaining ethnic identification because both have an inherent class component within them. In the assimilationist model, class mobility is the criteria for movement through the five stages of political development; the generation of the individual is not as crucial as is his socio-economic status at any given point in time. Using Dahl's model one would conclude that the impoverished ethnic group remains in stage one or two for many generations.<sup>43</sup> In the mobilization theory, the resurgence of ethnic political behavior is also dependent on a movement up the class ladder. One engages in ethnic politics in the first generation in order to have mobility opportunities; ethnic politics decreases as one moves up the ladder. One reengages in ethnic politics as a source of pride in one's ethnic group when one's class position is consolidated. Again, generation is not the critical variable, but rather perception of class position and security felt within that position. It is perhaps more important to determine a person's perception of his place in society than it is to determine his generation.

A related issue is the notion that ethnic politics is always primarily used by individuals for advancement in society; in other words, ethnic politics is self-interest politics. That is, it is always rational, even if based on non-rational

<sup>43</sup>Robert Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). See Dahl's table of stages of development. Negroes, for example, were in stage one over many generations.

assumptions. The individual uses ethnic politics to carve out a place in the society, retreats while he consolidates that gain, then reengages in ethnic politics to advance further against other ethnic groups. Weed argues that, under certain conditions, rigidity and ethnic stratification in ethnic balancing can take place. In other words, one must continue to engage in ethnic politics because the nature of American society is stratified along ethnic lines. It is possible that between the first and third generation the rewards of ethnic politics are changed from direct benefits achieved through the political system to indirect benefits, i.e., from tangible rewards to ideological rewards. In Dahl there is a critical point in the movement from ethnic to class politics when divisible benefits replace indivisible benefits. Dahl does not consider that the ethnic group may have a philosophy or world-view which they wish to advance through political action. In order to determine this, one must consider not simply the generation of the individual, but the individual's perception of where he stands in American society.

Richard Gabriel has attempted to verify the assimilationist and the mobilization theories on a population in Rhode Island. He found no support for the assimilationist theory and only marginal support for the mobilization model. He advanced a hypothesis, based on his research, that low-status individuals engage in ethnic politics to advance their status position, while high-status individuals engage in ethnic behavior because

of pride in their ethnic group. He also found, however, that there is no guarantee that the high status individual will engage in ethnically motivated political activity, and that a trigger device unexplained by Gabriel must occur in order for the ethnic political behavior to take place. Litt supports this general position when he states, "a high degree of ethnic involvement may sensitize one to political phenomena but it does not predispose him to react to most of these phenomena in any specific manner."<sup>44</sup> It is conceivable that Gabriel evolved this notion of a trigger device because he studied simply generation, and did not deal with the perception of place in society held by individuals of third generation who were also middle class.

If ethnicity is a source of identity and community for the individual, the question becomes, not whether class replaces ethnicity as a determinant of behavior, but what kind of changes individual and institutional ethnic political behavior undergo as a result of class movement.

Most of the research in the area of ethnic studies has concentrated on whether ethnicity remains important; such research has involved studies where the criteria for ethnicity was whether the surname of the candidate was significant, e.g., do Italians vote for candidates with Italian surnames. Ethnicity has been placed primarily in two areas: affinity for a particular political party, and whether there is a crossing

<sup>44</sup>Litt, op. cit., p. 118.

of pride in their ethnic group. He also found, however, that there is no guarantee that the high status individual will engage in ethnically motivated political activity, and that a trigger device unexplained by Gabriel must occur in order for the ethnic political behavior to take place. Litt supports this general position when he states, "a high degree of ethnic involvement may sensitize one to political phenomena but it does not predispose him to react to most of these phenomena in any specific manner."<sup>44</sup> It is conceivable that Gabriel evolved this notion of a trigger device because he studied simply generation, and did not deal with the perception of place in society held by individuals of third generation who were also middle class.

If ethnicity is a source of identity and community for the individual, the question becomes, not whether class replaces ethnicity as a determinant of behavior, but what kind of changes individual and institutional ethnic political behavior undergo as a result of class movement.

Most of the research in the area of ethnic studies has concentrated on whether ethnicity remains important; such research has involved studies where the criteria for ethnicity was whether the surname of the candidate was significant, e.g., do Italians vote for candidates with Italian surnames. Ethnicity has been placed primarily in two areas: affinity for a particular political party, and whether there is a crossing

<sup>44</sup>Litt, op. cit., p. 118.

of party lines because of a candidate's ethnicity. As Litt points out, "Most of the studies about ethnicity and politics are based on investigations of voting and party behavior. These choices are usually grosser and intrinsically more decisive than administrative and radical decisions, in which ethnicity is often less overt and the outcomes supposedly integrative and non-political."<sup>45</sup> Even this kind of research, Litt argues, is not being done as well as it could be. "Ethnic politics dying analyses too short a time period because you need middle class status for high office. The ethnic must wait for a while before reentering politics."<sup>46</sup> A major problem in such research is where to study the ethnic. Gabriel articulates a common theme when he states: "If, however, this study is to locate the effects of ethnicity on a political system it would seem that these effects would be most visible in that area where the constituent dimensions of ethnicity are strongest, namely within the city itself."<sup>47</sup> The problem with this approach is that it is not consistent with the demographic reality of America. When one studies the city, one increasingly studies the elderly and the poor. To look toward the city to determine ethnic significance is to equate white ethnic and white poor in fact, if not intention. This prevents a

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 19

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>47</sup>Richard Gabriel, "Ethnic Attitudes and Political Behavior in City and Suburb: the Irish and Italians of Rhode Island" (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1969), p. 186.

testing of any of the generational or class theories concerning either dying or reassertive ethnicity. Such a method assumes that old reality concerning institutional ethnic politics is still valid. One also deals with environments which are increasingly becoming racially polarized, creating a peculiar set of dynamics. Concerning the city, Weed states, "The decline of the cities ends. . . ethnic succession and produces rigidity and stratification in ethnic balancing."<sup>48</sup> It is my contention that to study the current status of ethnicity, communities which are reflective of today's realities (both demographically and politically) must be studied. Campbell points out that, "in most groups formed along occupational, ethnic, or religious lines membership is more likely to determine attitudes than are attitudes to determine membership."<sup>49</sup> It is very possible that the state of the American city is creating attitudes which are determining group membership, and as such will distort the model of ethnicity which argues that membership determines attitudes.

It is my contention that the study of ethnic behavior must be directed, not so much to overt behavior such as voting or party affiliation, but toward the social-psychological position of the individual in relation to his perception of his achievement and his ascriptive roles in society. This is, of course, the argument of Milton Gordon and is supported by Litt, who

<sup>48</sup>Perry L. Weed, The White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 118.

<sup>49</sup>Campbell, et al., op. cit., p. 323.

states, "The closeness of an individual to his ethnic group does not, per se, appear to be a potent factor in accounting for ethnic political behavior in general or Jewish liberalism in particular. Indeed ethnically determined political responses are most directly based upon the individual's perception of the social climate on which his ethnic culture is located. A climate that is not seen as hopelessly discriminatory aids the development of altruistic group values that can help overcome the external situation."<sup>50</sup> Increasingly, research must move away from generation and class as the significant variables and move toward the socio-psychological state of the individual.

Virtually all of the research, especially that done by voting studies and by secondary research methods, is designed to determine manifestations of ethnic politics. Comparatively little research has been done on what purposes ethnic politics serve for the individual or the ethnic group. What does the individual get out of being ethnically motivated in his political behavior? It has been argued widely that the first purpose of ethnic politics was to give the immigrant a mechanism for access to American society and to provide a means for mobility opportunities. This is a position accepted in both the assimilationist and mobilization models. Demographic changes and wide distribution of ethnics in the social class structure makes it appear that ethnic politics is no longer needed to serve this purpose. (One current day exception to this is the Black civil rights movement in America.) The basic

<sup>50</sup>Litt, op. cit., p. 119.

purpose served by the old style of ethnic politics was to provide benefits and recognition: "Divisible political benefits in regards to the Jews; combined with the recognition of the ethnic group needs; and the awarding of political preferments and secondary gains in which enduring social, economic and political patterns of distributing benefits are based on prior attainments of ethnic groups in elected politics."<sup>51</sup> Inherent in "old" ethnic politics were both tangible and psychological or symbolic rewards. "The fundamental assumption of 'recognition politics' is the acceptance of a psychological relationship between individuals and their ethnic group, and between group needs and the political system."<sup>52</sup> It is my contention that this basic purpose has not been altered, although its form has undergone significant change. There were limits inherent in the structure of recognition and accommodation politics, localism and the issues which concerned them. "Accommodation politics was never designed to cope with expansive changes in public politics and institutions of the party."<sup>53</sup> The desire to be a success as Weed points out breeds a desire for more and more recognition of the ethnic group, and the local political party can only go so far in this pattern of continual recognition through appointment.

As the environment changes, the indicators of ethnic

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 60-61.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 157.

politics become less and less clear. Litt argues that the political purpose of ethnicity is now "a marginal device for imposing rationality, congruity and consistency on political choices made by ordinary citizens who have relatively low investment in normal political activity."<sup>54</sup> Ethnicity is a bridge between the individual and the political system. The foundations for the bridge are primary identification with the ethnic group and the continuing ethnic stratification of American society. There remains, however, a crucial purpose for ethnic politics which is likely to insure its continuation in American society: "Ethnic politics also functions to secure and protect material and psychic values especially with regard to the group's comfort and recognition in the society."<sup>55</sup> Weed states: "Ethnic politics is a reaction to and protection of a certain value system."<sup>56</sup> This is consistent with the view taken earlier in this paper that the ethnic group has an outlook on life whose validity it will try to establish in the political system. In the past the thrust of ethnic politics was for socio-economic survival. As that goal ceases to be as meaningful the secondary aspect of ethnic politics can come to the fore. This ethnic worldview operates parallel to the use of political activity to achieve and validate status in society. This duality is why the psycho-social state of

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>55</sup>Weed, op. cit., p. 217.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 217.

the individual is critical in determining the place ethnicity has in his life.

### The Politics of Jews In America

There has been a good deal of speculation and some empirical evidence which indicate that American Jews do behave in a distinct manner in the political system. Litt states: "The synthesis of a decade's research supports the proposition that the core of Jewish political values is the ameliorative use of federal and other governmental power to enhance the educational, social and psychological well being of the individual."<sup>57</sup> What Litt and others<sup>58</sup> have agreed is the politics of Jews in America has been the politics of liberalism. The two questions important to examine are: one, the source of Jewish political liberalism and two, what does liberalism mean to Jews.

The literature supports the position that as a group Jews are liberals. Fuchs states, "The results of all of these studies show American Jews to be economic liberals--twentieth-century style--almost without regard to differences in class lines within the group, and despite the fact that Jews as a group now are perched near, if not on the top of the economic

<sup>57</sup>Litt, op. cit., p. 119.

<sup>58</sup>The belief that Jews are politically liberal is widely accepted. It is the position taken by Fuchs, Cohn and Sklare. In addition, there is evidence of Jewish liberalism in The Changing American Voter and in William Flanigan, Nancy Zingale, Political Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1975).

class ladder."<sup>59</sup> The liberalism of the group is affirmed by a recent major study which concluded, "Upper status northern Protestants, Jews and Blacks have become more liberal since the fifties and every other group has become more conservative."<sup>60</sup> There is no precise definition of exactly what liberalism means, but in the major work done on liberalism and Jews by Lawrence Fuchs he does indicate that liberalism has two components: internationalism and domestic social welfare. Internationalism includes providing non-military aid in order to help countries achieve both national self-determination and better life opportunities for their citizens. The ultimate goal of internationalism is world peace. The domestic social welfare component of liberalism is the use of the government to insure that all Americans have a minimum acceptable standard of living and full opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the society.<sup>61</sup> In sum it can be said that liberalism is the belief that the government should be an active participant in attempting to reach social welfare goals. Jews have consistently taken such a position in this country since at least the 1880's.

The literature in this area suffers from a lack of empirical evidence to support the proposition that Jews are

<sup>59</sup>Lawrence H. Fuchs, The Political Behavior of American Jews (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956).

<sup>60</sup>Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1976).

<sup>61</sup>Litt, op. cit., p. 110.

liberal. Much of the evidence that does exist was gathered prior to 1965. Many questions related to liberalism and American Jews need to be answered, or at least updated. It is fair to conclude tentatively that Jews are politically liberal, but it is clear both from this section and the next that further research is definitely needed in this area. It is important to note that the data from the study indicate that Jews continue to be liberal, but that liberalism does not form the foundation of their political beliefs or behavior.

#### Theories Dealing with the Causes of Jewish Liberalism

The question raised in the previous section concerning the political liberalism of Jews will now be examined. There are two major theories which deal with this question. Neither of the theories can be empirically evaluated because there is virtually no evidence which either confirms or refutes them. What will be undertaken here is a description of each of the theories. The first theory is that Jews are liberal because the seeds of modern liberalism are inherent in traditional values and traditions. The second theory is that Jews are liberal because they have found that it is in the self-interest of Jews to be liberal and to support liberal parties and candidates.

Lawrence Fuchs is a proponent of the value theory. He contends that there are three values very important in Jewish life which support liberalism. The first and most important

is charity, or Zedakah. The second is learning, and the third is non-asceticism. Zedakah is considered to be a better word to describe the value than charity because Fuchs contends charity in America "is not generally accorded as a matter of right. The recipient of charity ought to 'deserve' it, not merely need it."<sup>62</sup> In Jewish tradition charity is given solely as a function of need without regard to desert. In addition, Zedakah implies a notion of justice. Fuchs states that "most students of Jewish community culture would agree that its real meaning is not charity but justice, 'social justice' would be more accurate."<sup>63</sup> There is no distinction between the state and the individual; in Jewish tradition there is just the community. The community gives to all its members who are in need because that is the "just" thing to do. For the community to thrive (and it must thrive), all within the community must be taken care of. This very broad view of charity is clearly consistent with liberalism, especially the notion of the community being responsible for the welfare of all of its members.

Non-asceticism is the belief in living a good and full life. It is the notion that everyone should get as much enjoyment out of life as possible. It is related to liberalism in that non-asceticism supports all efforts of the community to make the best possible life for the members of the

<sup>62</sup>Fuchs, op. cit., p. 186.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 180.

community. Fuchs shows the relationship between non-asceticism and liberalism when he states "[Because of Judaism's] emphasis on this worldliness and the enjoyment of life here and now, Jews have been made more receptive to plans for a better life, for reconstructing society, for remaking man's environment, for socialism, for millennialism."<sup>64</sup> For Fuchs Jews may not even be consciously aware of the operation of these influences. He contends that their strong support of liberalism cannot be adequately explained by any other factors: "The enthusiastic Jewish response to the New and Fair Deals cannot be put down to Jewish insecurity alone, economic, psychological or otherwise. Zedakah (charity), a word which is probably unknown to the majority of American Jews, played its role in shaping Jewish political behavior in recent decades because of the structuring of political issues."<sup>65</sup> In this theory there is a relationship between liberalism and certain values which predispose and guide the individual toward a liberal ideological stance. The individual may not even be aware of these influences on him, but that does not affect their operation. While Fuchs and others make a powerful intellectual argument for this theory, the empirical evidence needed to evaluate it has not as yet been produced.

Werner Cohn<sup>66</sup> is a proponent of the other major theory

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 190-91.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>66</sup>Werner Cohn, "Sources of American Jewish Liberalism" (unpublished PhD dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1956).

which attempts to explain Jewish liberalism. Cohn's basic premise is that Jews are liberal because they have found it in their self-interest to be liberal. Cohn's position does not rest on philosophical or value premises as much as on what he contends is the historical reality of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe and the political events which affected Jews. He states, "Beginning with the era of the French Revolution, the European political spectrum became divided into a 'Left' and a 'Right' along an axis that involved the issue of secularism. The Right (Conservative, Monarchist, Clerical) maintained that there must be a place for the Church in the public order; the Left (Democratic, Liberal, Radical) held that there can be no (public) church at all, and that churches should be recognized only as private and voluntary organizations. Both sides took the Christian dichotomy of 'religious' and 'secular' as a starting point, with the left championing the supremacy of the 'secular' in public life. The axis supporting left from right also formed a natural boundary for the pale of Jewish political participation. It was the left, with its new secular concept of citizenship, that had accomplished the Emancipation, and it was only the left that could see a place for the Jews in public life."<sup>64</sup> To support the conservative was to support the individuals and ideologies which had oppressed Jews for many decades. It was to support the forces which opposed change which was

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 10-11.

desired by Jews. Cohn contends that Jews were constantly looking to make changes, to make a new world. From the time of the French Revolution, the reality of European politics moved Jews toward liberalism. "As Jews gradually won their political rights in western countries, they found that the liberals and radicals who sought to change society were their allies, whereas the conservatives and reactionaries, who wanted to keep the system of caste and privilege, were their enemies."<sup>65</sup>

There were three factors, then, which according to Cohn pushed the Jews into liberalism. The first was the nature of the ideological split between left and right. The second was the reality of European politics, and the third was the belief of Jews that they needed the public sector to protect them from the rising plebian anti-Semitism which was occurring in Europe.

Cohn argues that, before the left-right dichotomy, Jews were not involved in politics. It was the left which provided them with an entry into the political world. It is not surprising, therefore, that European Jews anchored politically with the left and rejected all association with the political right. Cohn states that in nineteenth-century and twentieth-century Europe, "Moderate democratic parties claimed the majority of Jews and formed the right wing of the Jewish pale of political participation."<sup>66</sup> The group ranged from

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 290.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

moderate to radical in ideology. In analyzing why Jews in America have remained identified with liberalism, Cohn claims that old habits are not easily broken and, more importantly, that American liberal politics supports the goals of American Jews. "The American Jewish ideology has two fundamental sources: 1. American Jews identify their fate with that of world Jewry; 2. There is a cluster of political ideas and aspirations which arose from the development of the social position of European and American Jews. In this cluster, the notion of a Left as the defender and champion of human rights (and by implication, of Jewish rights) holds a central position."<sup>67</sup> Cohn's position is basically that Jews are drawn to liberalism because of historical reality and by a belief in the greater viability of the left for supporting the political issues important to Jews. Regardless of which of these theories one agrees with as an explanation of Jewish liberalism, the literature is virtually universal in its acceptance that the liberalism of American Jews is a fact.

An Analysis of the Literature Concerning  
the Political Behavior of Jews

Two things are most striking about the literature concerning the political attitudes and political behavior of Jews. The first is how little empirical data there is on the subject; the second is that researchers have made no

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 128.

attempt to relate the behavior of Jews to the general theoretical literature on ethnicity, especially stratification theory. The literature almost without exception indicates that Jews are liberal and Democrats, and that they are more liberal than they are Democrats. It does not, however, shed any light on a number of questions which naturally arise from these findings: How important or deeply held are the liberal values of Jews? What will happen if liberal politics is in conflict with other variables which are important to the group? What general factors might be mitigating the liberal views of Jews? What will happen to Jewish liberalism if it seems no longer to serve the interests of the group? For example, Elazar states, "Israel has become the keystone to the entire Jewish belief system, the basic common demonination that virtually all Jews who do not wish to exclude themselves from the Jewish camp are willing to accept."<sup>68</sup> Is support of Israel and all that follows from it consistent with liberalism? And if not, will Jews abandon liberalism? These are the type of questions which have not as yet been investigated.

In the area of general ethnic theory, how much of Jewish political behavior is affected by the ethnic stratification of American society? Do Jews perceive ethnic politics to be a response to the reality of ethnic discrimination in American society? Do they use the political system to secure and maintain their place in the general society, and will their

<sup>68</sup>Daniel Elazar, Community and Polity (Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1976).

political behavior change as they move up the socio-economic ladder? What is the relationship between the social status position of Jews in the society and their perception of their place in society? The importance of this last question (considering the status inconsistency theory which Laumann indicated might hold true for Jews) is pointed out by a researcher attempting to explain the Jewish Defense League: "The organization [JDL] made explicit what others hesitated to verbalize, that American Jewry was far less secure than its prosperity, prominence, and seeming influence suggested."<sup>69</sup>

To have established that Jews in America have been and continue to be liberal does not in any sense preclude further attempts to understand the political behavior and political attitudes of the group. I have raised just a few of the questions which arise out of the literature. While my research cannot provide definitive answers, my integration of the general ethnic literature data on the political behavior of American Jews will contribute to an understanding of the influence of ethnicity on the political behavior of America's Jewish population.

#### Methodology

The methodology employed in this study is designed to be consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis.

<sup>69</sup> Marshall Sklare, The Jewish Community in America (New York: Behrman House, 1974), p. 314.

It allows for an examination of the relationship between perception of one's place in the society and ethnic identification and for an examination of individual motivations. The study rests on stratification theory which sees the movement toward ethnic assimilation as heavily dependent upon individual perceptions of the groups' status in society. In order to examine this type of phenomena without ignoring other potentially important variables it is necessary to generate both quantitative and qualitative data. To accomplish this two separate instruments are employed to gather data. The collection of quantitative data is accomplished by a mail questionnaire sent to every identified Jewish household in Fairfield. The qualitative data is gathered by in-depth interviews with a small selected sample. The methodology while containing certain weaknesses (discussed below) does allow for the collection of data relevant to both the general thesis of the study and the specific hypotheses. It is felt that the methodology used is justified considering the exploratory nature of the study, and the fact the study is attempting to break new research ground in attempting to explain the source of ethnic identification.

There are three methodological weaknesses with this study. First, a random sample of Jews is not used; second, the interviews are open ended which made the quantification of the interview data virtually impossible. The interview data is presented therefore as the subjective interpretations of the

author and by anecdotes which represent positions taken by the subjects; third, all subjects come from a single upper income suburban community which results in very little variance of the sample population with respect to social class variables. The sample population does not represent a normal range of population with respect to income, education and occupational status. This means, of course, that the limited variance must be taken into account when analyzing the influence of social class variables on the sample population. These methodological weaknesses do not invalidate the validity of the study as long as one is aware of them and does not overstep in analysis and generalization the limits of the methodology.

#### Why A Single Group Was Chosen

The nature of this research and the methodology employed indicated that a single ethnic group be studied rather than a sample population consisting of multiple ethnic groups. This study has attempted to explore through the use of open ended in-depth interviews the relationship between ethnicity and political attitudes and behavior. In order to accomplish this it is necessary to establish the linkages between ethnicity and political behavior for each ethnic group examined. This is so for several reasons: one, is that the literature establishes ethnic groups can be at different stages of the assimilationist process; and second, ethnicity is defined as a sense of peoplehood and its manifestations will be distinct

for each group. The methodological problems of attempting to study the impact of more than one ethnic group at a time would be insurmountable.

It would, in addition, serve no meaningful purpose to study more than one group at a time. As Greeley, among others, has demonstrated ethnicity has remained a significant variable in American life and studies are not needed to determine its significance in a general sense.<sup>70</sup> What is needed now, according to a number of scholars<sup>71</sup> in the field, are studies of specific groups in order to determine internal differences. What is needed are studies which will explore the specialness of each group and determine how the group's unique ethnicity manifests itself in areas of behavior.

There are several reasons why the group chosen to be studied in this project are Jews: one, the literature indicates that Jews have maintained a strong ethnic identification while simultaneously achieving a considerable amount of social mobility in the society; second, there has been a good deal of literature attempting to establish the parameters of Jewish peoplehood (this gives the researcher a strong starting point in conducting empirical research); third, there is little empirical evidence on the current reality of the political behavior of the group and little evidence of the actual linkages between ethnicity and political behavior. The final

<sup>70</sup>See, for example, Andrew Greeley, Why Can't They Be Like Us (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1971).

<sup>71</sup>An example of this is Harold Abramson, Ethnic Diversity in Catholic America (New York: John Wiley, 1973).

reasons for choosing this group are practical ones. The group is manageable from a size point of view and more importantly it is identifiable. The Jewish population of Fairfield consists of about 1,300 households. It was possible to send a questionnaire to every household. It was considered desirable to do this rather than take a random sample because the initial contact was a mail questionnaire and the return rate on such devices are usually low. By sampling the universe it was believed that some of the problems created by a low response rate would be minimized. The fact that the Jewish population was identifiable was a major practical reason in choosing this group. There exists in an attempt to identify Jews the not only normal institutional means of church membership, the additional major source in Fairfield of the United Jewish Council, an organization which attempts to identify every Jew in the community regardless of affiliations. The practical reasons in conjunction with the literature made Jews an ideal group for a study of this type.

#### Definition of Terms

Certain key terms used in this study are subject to a variety of definitions and interpretations. In order to avoid any confusion with regard to meaning an explanation of the operational definitions of these terms will be undertaken.

#### Religion and Ethnicity

Religion is defined for purposes of this study in its

narrowest context. It is defined as those activities and events individuals engage in directly related to the formal worship of a deity. The definition of ethnicity comes from Gordon. It is defined as a sense of peoplehood. In this study the term Judaism is used to refer to both the religion and the ethnic group of the respondents. Therefore, when Judaism refers to religion, it is used in the sense of formal worship, when it refers to ethnicity it is used in the sense of the group's peoplehood. There is precedent for viewing Judaism in this dual context. For example, Daniel Elazar<sup>72</sup> talks of Jews as a community which clearly transcends the formal worship of the group and Mordecai M. Kaplan defines Judaism "as the evolving religious civilization of the Jewish people."<sup>73</sup> Kaplan means by civilization much more than worship, he means the evolving spirit of Jewish culture. The two components of Judaism reflected in Kaplan's definition are present in the definition used in this study.

#### Social Class

There is no one agreed upon definition of social class among scholars but there has developed over time widespread agreement as to what constitutes its components.<sup>74</sup> The three

<sup>72</sup>Daniel Elazar, Community and Polity (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1976).

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>74</sup>Milton Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1958).

components of social class are income, occupation and education. In this study no single definition of social class is used but the three components are each treated as a separate and distinct independent variable, and are considered to be the social class indicators.

#### Political Attitudes and Political Behavior

Political attitudes in this study are defined as any opinion, feeling or belief the individual has on any issue which is identified as political by either the respondent or the interviewer. Political behavior is defined consistent with Milbrath's<sup>75</sup> identification of the activities which comprise political behavior. Specifically they are: voting, political contributions, working for candidates, attending political rallies, activity in political parties or clubs, discussing politics, following politics in the media, writing letters to public officials or the media, wearing campaign buttons or using bumper stickers and running for public office. It also includes activities an individual engages in pursuant to a political cause such as but not exclusively picketing, demonstrating or support of specific organizations.

#### Why A Single Community Was Chosen

The two related issues to be discussed in this section are why the study took place within a single community and why

<sup>75</sup>Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965).

the specific community chosen for the study was Fairfield, Connecticut. The major reason a single community was chosen was to minimize the uncontrolled variables which might affect the study. The use of multiple communities, especially if some were suburbs, some urban and others rural would add a dimension to the study which is not intended. The study is intended to examine the impact of ethnicity and the use of a single community was believed would better serve that purpose than a study which sampled from a number of communities. A second reason is, it is a well-accepted technique to study a group within a community.<sup>76</sup> The procedure has been used by a number of researchers and the benefits are considered to outweigh the limitations. The third reason was to be able to sample an entire universe with the initial mail questionnaire. There was no practical method possible which would allow the sample of an entire universe other than studying a single community.

Fairfield was chosen for several reasons: one, a suburban community was desired. The reason for this was that the population trends in America show that the suburbs are where Americans are moving and therefore it was considered desirable to study a suburb; two, as Sklare points out one must go where the population is located, and Fairfield has a significant Jewish population; three, Fairfield represents a reasonable

<sup>76</sup>An example of a study employing this technique is Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenbaum, Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier (New York: Basic Books, 1967).

community. It is not contended that Fairfield is a typical suburb because that would be an absurd contention. Every community is unique and as such there is no typical American suburb. There is, however, nothing so unique about Fairfield which would indicate it should not be used. It is similar to most American northeastern suburbs in that its major growth has taken place since 1950. It is primarily single family residences and most of the people who live in the community do not work in the community. As far as the Jewish population of Fairfield, it is about 5% of the town's total population which is higher than the county as a whole but similar to the Jewish populations of many New York metropolitan area suburbs. The final reason Fairfield was chosen was for practical considerations. The researcher was very familiar with the community and had access to lists of Jewish population which were not available to him any place else.

#### Collection of the Data

The data for this study was collected in two separate steps. The initial step was to send a questionnaire to one adult member (at least 18 years old) of every identified Jewish household in the town of Fairfield. Step two was (after analysis of the mail questionnaire) to construct categories of people to interview and to draw a random sample from each category. The persons selected were contacted and interviewed. The instrument used in the personal interviews was an open-ended

questionnaire. The data gathered in the second step was examined and used in the study but no attempt was made to formally quantify the data collected in the personal interviews.

The data was collected by the two step procedure described above for both methodological and conceptual reasons. The primary objective was to collect data which related to the respondent's motivation for his political behavior and to determine the intensity of his attitudes concerning political issues. The best way to accomplish this is with in-depth open-ended interviews which necessitates a small sample. The problem presented, however, was what to ask and who to study. The additional major consideration was, would the results of a very small sample have any validity. The use of a mail questionnaire sent to the entire universe was intended to overcome these problems. Specifically the mail questionnaire generated a great deal of information about the Jewish population of Fairfield and it also established the parameters within which the personal interviews could be focused.

The methodology used to collect the data presents certain limitations with respect to the type of generalizations one is justified in making. The primary limitation is (because a random sample of all Jews was not the sample population) one cannot say that the results are true for all Jews. One is justified in saying, however, that a sample of Jews reflect the behavior patterns uncovered in the research. This by no means invalidates the study, as long as one does not go outside

the limits of the methodology in drawing conclusions from the data.

### Construction of the Questionnaire

The original mail questionnaire was designed to establish the relationships between the respondent's political behavior and political attitudes and his ethnicity, social class, generation and age. It also was designed to establish the degree to which one's religion played a role in his life. The questionnaire attempted to keep all questions and responses easy to understand and subject to a minimum of confusion.

The questionnaire was divided into eight parts: one, dealt with social class, age and generation; two, with the importance of religion to the respondent; three, with ethnicity and what that meant to the individual; four, with the cultural or non-religious aspects of Judaism including anti-Semitism; five, with political opinion on a range of political issues broken down into questions concerning civil rights, foreign policy, general domestic, civil liberties and Israel and issues directly related to Jews. In this section people were asked to indicate either agreement, neutrality, or disagreement with questions which were designed to indicate a position; six, with the frequency of general political activity in which the respondent engaged; seven, with the relationship between ethnicity and one's political motivations; and eight, with the respondent's involvement in political causes. The questionnaire

consisted of sixty-one separate items. In all but ten items the respondent answered by circling a letter on the questionnaire itself which corresponded to their choice of answer. On eight items concerning age and generation the respondents were asked to fill in a one word answer and on two items, one, concerning temple membership and the second concerning contributions to the United Jewish Appeal they were asked to write their reasons in one or two sentences. The questionnaire was pre-tested twice with a Jewish population in an adjoining community and revised after each pre-test. Since home residence was the criteria for determining the sample population it was not possible for a pre-test subject to be mixed in with the sample population.

#### How the Initial Sample Was Drawn

For the reasons already discussed an attempt was made to contact every Jewish household in the town of Fairfield, Connecticut, and to survey one member of that home who was at least eighteen years old. Which member to be sampled was determined by random selection after identification of all household members had been accomplished. It is quite likely that children living with parents were underidentified by my methods because they are not usually listed separately on institutional membership lists.

In order to identify the Jewish population of Fairfield, membership lists were obtained from all area temples and

synagogues that serve Fairfield, as well as the solicitation lists from the United Jewish Council. The Council attempts to identify all Jews, not only those who contribute or who are members of organizations. These sources generated a list of approximately one thousand households in Fairfield. This was supplemented by compiling a list of common Jewish surnames. An examination of the telephone directory for still unidentified Jewish households generated another two hundred and fifty possibilities. One thousand, two hundred and fifty questionnaires were sent out. The first mailing generated three hundred and twenty responses from individuals who filled out the questionnaires and another fifty responses from people who indicated they are not Jewish. In addition, another fifty questionnaires were returned as undeliverable. A second mailing resulted in another one hundred and fifteen responses. The total response to the mailing was four hundred and thirty-five out of one thousand, one hundred and fifty questionnaires for a return rate of 37%.

#### The Personal Interview

#### How the Sample Was Drawn

It was originally hypothesized that the differences in the sample population with respect to the importance of ethnicity would be a function of religious identification combined with institutional affiliation. An analysis of the data did not, however, bear out this hypothesis. Analysis indicated

that identification was of significance but affiliation was not. The cells that were drawn for the interview came from the identifier categories. A sample of twenty-four total respondents were drawn. There were six each of secular, Orthodox, Reform and Conservative identifiers. No attention was paid to institutional affiliation or any other variables in drawing the sample. All of the individuals who returned the questionnaire could be identified by the code number which appeared on each questionnaire, were divided into the four appropriate categories; using a random number table, six respondents were chosen from each category and contacted in order to set up interviews. There were two refusals, both Orthodox identifiers, and they were replaced by a random selection. The interviews were conducted between January 10, 1977 and January 21, 1977.

#### How the Initial Data Was Analyzed

There were three goals to be reached with the initial data: one, to determine the political attitudes and behavior of the sample population; two, to examine the independent variables in order to determine their impact on the group; and three, to establish the parameters of inquiry and to segment the population for the follow-up interview. To a great extent the analysis appropriate for goal two also accomplished goal three.

After the results of the questionnaires were all coded

and fed into the computer, a simple percentage analysis on each question was performed. The results of this initial analysis are reported in Chapter Two. The second stage of the analysis, in order to accomplish step two, was to cross tabulate each of the independent variables (specifically, age, sex, generation, religious affiliation, religious identification, education, income and occupation) with the dependent variables; the expressions of political opinions and actual political behavior. The final step in the analysis was to perform a chi-square test of each independent variable with each and every item which constituted the independent variables. The results of this analysis are reported in Chapter Three. In addition an analysis was undertaken in which age and generation and also religious identification and religious affiliation were held constant against each other to insure that significance attributed to one of these variables was not in fact actually caused by another. The results of the quantitative analysis appear in Chapters Two and Three and encompass goals one and two. Goal three was accomplished by examining the results obtained and constructing the cell categories from which the interview population was drawn.

#### Construction of the Personal Interview Questionnaire

The purposes of the personal interview were to explore in depth the motivation for one's political behavior and attitudes and how intensely one holds his views and opinions. The

interviews were also intended to examine liberalism in the sample population. The personal interview questionnaire had no forced responses. The respondent did not have to choose one answer from a number of possible choices, all questions are open-ended.

The questionnaire was divided into six parts: part one, the impact of community and religious affiliation on political behavior is explored; two, the motivation for an intensity of political attitudes was explored in the area of civil rights, general domestic issues, civil liberties, international relations and Israel and matters directly related to Jews; three, was an exploration of liberalism, conservatism and general political philosophy; four and five, explored motivation and activity level for general political activity and political causes, and six, explores the specific importance of religion and ethnicity on political opinions, behavior and philosophy. Included were perceptions of anti-Semitism in America and respondents personal feelings regarding their Jewishness. The questions and issues explored in the personal interview were, when it was possible, identical to those of the mail questionnaire. This, it was felt, would allow for a valid comparison and analysis of the two instruments. The only new area in personal interview was part one. The personal interview questionnaire was constructed to allow the respondent maximum freedom in answering the questions. The personal interviews were pre-tested once on a population that was not part of the actual sample but had been part of the original pre-test population.

### Conducting the Follow-up Interviews

The interviews were conducted at the respondents convenience between January 10, 1977 and January 21, 1977. Most of the interviews were conducted in the homes of the respondents but three were conducted in the researcher's office and one in the researcher's home. The interviews took about one hour to complete. The shortest interview took forty-five minutes and the longest slightly less than two hours. The researcher took extensive notes during the interviews in an attempt to get the respondents full answers. The form of the interview was for the interviewer to maintain possession of the questionnaire and ask the respondents the questions, one at a time. This was done to insure all items were covered and that the respondent would stay with one issue and not move ahead to another before the one was completed. The conducting of the interview posed no problems except the interviewer felt that some respondents were, at the beginning of the interviews, trying to please the interviewer with certain types of responses. This dissipated within five or ten minutes although the interviewer did consider it prudent not to explore specifically ethnic or religious motivation until part six of the questionnaire. All interviews were conducted by a single interviewer.

### Analyzing the Data

One of the purposes of the mail questionnaire was to provide quantitative data in order to allow the intensive interviews to be open-ended. No attempt was made to formally codify

or quantify the data collected in the personal interviews. The notes taken by the researcher were examined and patterns were discerned. Where possible indications were made of the number in the sample who followed the patterns. A great deal of the analysis was an attempt to discover direct quotes from individual respondents which were representative of a view expressed by at least several members of the sample. A number of patterns emerged quite clearly and the results of the interviews are discussed in Chapter Four. The analysis was made easier by the fact that there was such near unanimity of the sample population on most issues. The views expressed especially on certain crucial issues polarized into two camps which sharply disagreed. Within each of the groups, however, there was very little internal disagreement.

The actual procedure followed for analyzing the questionnaire was to read each question through identifying positions taken as I went along. Respondents were then placed into the categories that emerged. The respondents were then reanalyzed with respect to the independent variables. For example, was there a pattern to the response by age or income or affiliation and a note was made if such a pattern existed. This was done for every item. Lastly, all patterns were then reanalyzed for other general or specific similarities that were mixed. The final step in the analysis was as the results were being written into chapter form potential relationships or patterns of interests which emerged were all carefully examined. For

example, did individuals who listed philosophical reasons for what is special about being Jewish also list philosophical reasons for what influenced their political philosophies. The results of all findings from the personal interviews appear in Chapter Four. In the analysis of the personal interview all standard procedures were followed with respect to coding responses and quantifying the data within the limitations created by the use of an open-ended interview.

## Chapter 2

### Part I

#### General Discussion of the Importance of Ethnicity

##### Introduction

The major findings in the data are relevant to the central thesis that ethnicity is a major variable in the political attitudes and political behavior of American Jews: 1-a, for the sample population of suburban Jews, ethnicity is a factor in the general political attitudes of the group; 1-b, the major impact of ethnicity is on issues which are directly related to ethnic group concerns; two, on issues not related to the ethnic group, intra-group differences are caused by social class variables (specifically, education, income and occupation); and three, attachment to and identification with the ethnic group are related to the belief that anti-Semitism is a major problem in the United States.

This chapter is a discussion of these data collected by the mail questionnaire. Consistent with the literature discussed in Chapter One (which suggests how ethnicity will influence the individual and in what manner that influence will manifest itself), the following topics are discussed: one, the social class of the respondents; two, the relationship

between ethnicity and religion; and three, the relationship of ethnicity to life opportunities and behavior. Part II of the chapter discusses the political opinions and behavior of the group, comparing them to national samples where possible. The chapter firmly establishes ethnicity as a factor in the general political attitudes and behavior of the sample population, and the chapter indicates the major impact of ethnicity on issues related to ethnic group concerns.

#### The Social Class Position of the Group

The literature, including the work of Lloyd Warner, Milton Gordon, and Robert Dahl, indicates that social class is related to the role ethnicity is likely to play as a source of identification and influence for the individual. Groups which are lower class are likely to be strongly motivated by ethnicity while ethnicity will probably have little meaning to groups who have been upwardly mobile. The data, however, indicate that the sample has generally achieved a high social class position as measured by each of the three social class indicators, and yet most of the respondents are motivated by ethnicity in their political behavior. The data further indicate that there is no relationship between ethnic group identification and social class indicators. As indicated by the data, the sample population does not have a sense of security consistent with its achievement level. The sample sees the ethnic group as vulnerable in the society, subject

to continued social discrimination. Social class variables, while important for explaining many intra-group differences, have little direct relevance to ethnic identification and attachment.

The extraordinary social class achievements of the sample can be appreciated when they are compared to the nation in general and specifically to Fairfield, the community from which the sample was drawn. The sample population makes more money, has more schooling, and enjoys greater occupational prestige than either the population in general or the residents of Fairfield. Table 2-1 compares the nation, Fairfield and the sample population on income, occupation and education. The \$28,000 median income for the sample population is twice as high as for all American suburbs,<sup>1</sup> and \$10,000 higher than for the town of Fairfield.<sup>2</sup> The sample population had 66% college graduates, which is more than twice the number of college graduates for the nation, and is considerably greater than the 40% college graduates for the town of Fairfield. Occupationally, 42% of the American work force is engaged in

<sup>1</sup>New York Times, January, 1977, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Median income for the Town of Fairfield was not directly available and was calculated from known data. Median family income and per capita income were known for Fairfield from the 1970 census. The United States Census Demographic Profile Report for the Town of Fairfield indicated per capita income for 1975. Median income was calculated by figuring the percentage rise in per capita income from 1970 to 1975 and applying the same percentage rise to the median income figure from 1970.

Table 2-1 Social Class Indicators

	<u>Sample</u>	<u>Fairfield</u> (a)	<u>Nation</u> (b)
Median Income	\$28,000	\$18,000	\$14,000
Years of School Completed	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
0-8	.5	21.0	21
9-11	3.7	14.0	-
High School	28.3	30.5	54
College	35.2	34.5	25
Graduate	30.8	-	-
Occupation			
Professional	40.0	34.9	21
Sales	13.6	8.9	11(c)
Clerical	4.8	18.7	-
Craft	3.7	12.8	42
Unskilled	2.0	12.9	-
Self-Employed	13.4	-	-

(a) Figures on town of Fairfield come from 1970 census data.

(b) Figures for nation come from Gallup Poll No. 114, 1975.

(c) This 11% is a combination of sales and clerical.

manual or blue collar jobs, compared to 13% for the town of Fairfield and 2% for the sample population. On the other end of the occupational scale, 21% of the American work force are employed in professional or managerial jobs, compared to 34% for the town of Fairfield and 40% for the sample population.

The data strongly indicate that the sample population are fully acculturated into American society as measured by social class achievement indicators. The identification with the ethnic group cannot be explained by the actual social class position of the group. Therefore, the data clearly does not support the assimilationist theory which contends that social class achievement reduces ethnic identification. The degree of ethnic identification does indicate that the group is not assimilated, regardless of its social class achievements. The relationship of Jewish ethnicity to behavior is obviously a more complex phenomenon than a simple linear relationship between social class achievement and ethnic identification.

The "eth-class concept"<sup>3</sup> introduced by Milton Gordon appears to be an approximate description of the interaction of social class and ethnicity for the sample population. The eth-class concept rests upon the individual's perception that a primary group with which he identifies provides him with a sense of peoplehood while the individual is simultaneously

<sup>3</sup>See chapter one for a full discussion of "eth-class" in Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

affected by social class. The data indicate that this is the situation for the sample. The group has a fundamental attachment to ethnicity, but is simultaneously influenced on a number of political issues by one or more of the social class variables.

### Religion and Ethnicity

Regarding religion and ethnicity, two major assumptions were made by the investigator which are reflected in the questionnaire. One, that Judaism is more than just a formal religion to suburban Jews, and two, that Judaism is the ethnic group for suburban Jews, i.e., Judaism is the source of primary group identification for Jews. The data confirm both of these assumptions.

The sample population has a strong attachment to Judaism independent of its status as a religion. (Religion is defined here as the formal practice of worship.) Seventy-seven percent of the sample population are temple or synagogue members, but only 11% of the members regularly attend services. The high percentage of respondents who are formally affiliated but do not attend services is a strong indication of the cultural importance of Judaism, especially when one considers the high cost of affiliation.<sup>4</sup> Membership represents

<sup>4</sup>Membership in a temple or synagogue in Fairfield costs between \$300 and \$600 for annual membership. This is exclusive of other costs connected with membership such as building funds or tickets for High Holiday services.

a way of belonging in a formal sense to the Jewish community.<sup>5</sup> There are a number of other indications that the sample population has a strong attachment to Judaism, independent of an attachment to the formal religious components of Judaism. The respondents are married to Jews; they indicate that most of their close friends are Jewish; they consider themselves to be Jewish; they feel closer to Jews than any other community, social or professional group; they encourage their children to develop a Jewish identity; and they claim to contribute heavily to Jewish charities and causes. The attachment of the population to Judaism and their identification with Judaism clearly transcends their attachment to Judaism as a formal religion, and this attachment indicates that Judaism is for the sample population the source of primary identification.

The second principal assumption in the study questionnaire was that Judaism is the ethnic group for the sample population, and this is confirmed by the data. As Table 2-2 indicates, the group considers its ethnic group to be Jewish or Jewish-American. Fewer than 1% of the sample indicated that they considered their ethnicity to be related to nationality or country of origin. Only 4% indicated that they had no

<sup>5</sup>This is the position taken by Marshall Sklare who indicates that membership in a temple or synagogue for many American Jews is a way of recognizing that they are Jewish and attaching themselves to the Jewish community. One does not necessarily join the temple for religious reasons. See for a full discussion Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier (New York: Basic Books, 1967).

Table 2-2 Ethnic Identification

	<u>Ethnic Group With Which the Sample Identifies</u>
	<u>%</u>
American	16.0
Jewish	8.0
Jewish- American	70.3
Nation of Origin	.5
Other	1.9

ethnic group. The data indicate clearly that the sample population considers Judaism to be its ethnic group. The literature on ethnicity, specifically the work of Milton Gordon, states that ethnicity is not simply one's nationality but the ascriptive group with which one feels a sense of peoplehood. The sample population clearly feels a primary sense of identification with Jews, and so identifies Judaism as its ethnic group.

Relationship of Ethnicity to Life Opportunities  
and Political Behavior

There were several items on the questionnaire designed to elicit data concerning the individual's perception of how much influence ethnicity has on his life opportunities, and to what extent the respondent believes the ethnic group is subject to discrimination in the society. These areas were tapped because they are of central concern in the literature of assimilation and stratification.<sup>6</sup> The sample population has achieved a high socio-economic position in the society, and the evidence indicates that they have not lost life opportunities due to ethnically motivated discrimination. These facts do not mean, however, that the group members do not

<sup>6</sup>Chapter One has a discussion of the meaning of one's ethnicity on life opportunities to assimilation and stratification. See also for stratification Tomotsa Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification (London: Macmillan and Co., 1965). For full discussion of its meaning to assimilation see Gordon, op. cit.

still consider that their ethnicity has potentially negative consequences. There exists a body of literature which indicates ethnic identification can be a result of perceptual factors.<sup>7</sup> An individual can believe a situation exists and behave according to that belief regardless of the reality of the situation.<sup>8</sup> The data indicate that this is the situation for the sample population who state that being Jewish has been a factor in their life opportunities, and who at the same time see anti-Semitism as a major problem in America.

Twenty-eight percent of the sample population stated that their religion was an important factor in their life opportunities. This figure is quite high compared to a national sample in which only 2%<sup>9</sup> indicated religion was a factor in life opportunities. Another indicator of what the sample population believes to be the status of Jews in America is the number who indicate that anti-Semitism is a major problem in America. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents believe this, but only 12% indicated they have experienced a great deal of personal anti-Semitism. Table 2-3 reports these results for the sample population. The group believes

<sup>7</sup>This concept is fully discussed in Gordon, op. cit.

<sup>8</sup>This is a widely held position in psychology. For a full discussion of its manifestations in political behavior see Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1970).

<sup>9</sup>Data comes from Survey Research Center study in 1972. Jews were not analyzed separately so it is not possible to know what percentage of Jews in the 1972 study indicated that religion was a factor in their lives. Code Books (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Survey Research Center, 1972).

Table 2-3 Perceptions Concerning Anti-Semitism

Have You Experienced Much Personal Anti-Semitism	
<u>% in Sample</u>	
Quite a Bit	11.7
Little	71.5
None	16.1

Do You Believe Anti-Semitism to be a Serious Problem in the United States	
<u>% in Sample</u>	
Yes	67.8
No	28.3

that anti-Semitism is a major social problem, although their own life experiences and their personal achievements do not support that position. The sample population is clearly not assimilated, since assimilation<sup>10</sup> by definition is the elimination of the meaning attached to an ascriptive characteristic which distinguishes groups in the society. This position on anti-Semitism further indicates that the sample population has still not completely passed the initial stage of the ethnic assimilation process: the stage in which the group bands together because of the hostility and discrimination to which its members are subjected. The sample population believes that discrimination against Jews continues to exist. This view is held regardless of occupation, income, education, age, or generation. This strongly suggests that ethnic identification rests on the individual's perception of reality concerning the position of the ethnic group in the society, and that quantifiable measures such as generation, income, education and occupation are not suitable indicators of an individual's ethnic identification.

Table 2-4 reports the relationship between personal motivation for political behavior and belief concerning whether Jews as a group must engage in political behavior. The discrepancy between the two items is on the surface somewhat

<sup>10</sup>While there is no one completely agreed upon definition of assimilation, Gordon and others consider it to be a total integration into the society. See Chapter One for a full discussion of the definition of assimilation.

Table 2-4 Political Behavior and Ethnicity

How Much of Your Political Behavior is Motivated  
by Your Religion

% in Sample

None	48.5
25-50%	33.1
75%+	5.7

Do You Believe Jews Must Engage in Political  
Activity to Further Jewish Causes

% in Sample

Yes	88.6
No	9.4

confusing. Eighty-seven percent of the sample answered that Jews as a group must engage in political activity in order to get favorable treatment for Jews. This is a strong indication that the sample population considers Jews to constitute a distinct political interest group in society. Only 38%, however, indicated that any of their own political behavior was motivated by their ethnicity. This would seem to indicate that personal ethnic identification has no political significance, which runs counter to the data. The explanation lies in the fact that, when pursuing issues which concern the ethnic group, the respondents do so through intermediary organizations such as B'nai Brith or the United Jewish Council.<sup>11</sup> These groups have direct impact on the political system. The individual does not see his behavior as political because he is not directly involved in the political system. The conclusion that can be drawn is that the sample population identifies Jews as a distinct group in society and correspondingly perceives the need of the group to pursue political goals. The attachment of the sample population to the political goals of the Jewish community are clearly established in Part II of the chapter, which examines political attitudes and behavior.

<sup>11</sup>This information was uncovered in the personal interviews. See Chapter Six. See also Daniel Elazar, Community and Polity, Philadelphia's Jewish Publication Society, 1976. Elazar has a lengthy discussion of the relationship between Jewish organizations and political activity.

Summary

In order to discuss the specific political manifestations of ethnicity, it was necessary in Part I of the chapter to establish the linkage between Judaism as a religion and Judaism as an ethnic group, and to indicate the general significance of ethnicity to the sample population. In addition, it was necessary to establish the social class of the group, considering the weight social class is given in the literature. These tasks have been accomplished in Part I and, in addition, it has been established that the sample population sees anti-Semitism as a major problem in the United States, and that they consider their religion to have affected their life opportunities. These are strong indications which are consistent with the literature on stratification and assimilation which suggests the sample population, while acculturated, is far from assimilated. The suburban Jew is to some extent perceptually fixated in the initial stage of the ethnic assimilation process. Finally, the social class of the sample, combined with the strong identification with the ethnic group, lends credence to the notion of "eth-class" described by Milton Gordon. Part II of the chapter attempts to establish the overall significance of ethnicity with respect to political attitudes and behavior.

Part II  
Discussion of Political Attitudes  
and Political Behavior

Introduction

Political attitudes were measured by a series of items on which the respondents were asked to indicate whether they support, were neutral, or were opposed to possible government actions. Behavior was measured by the political activity and the political causes the individual engages in, and by party and ideological identification. The purpose of this section is to establish the general importance of ethnicity in political behavior and attitudes.

Political Opinions

The political opinion questions are arranged in five categories with from two to six questions in each category. The categories are: civil rights, civil liberties, internationalism, Israel and related questions, and a general domestic category. A factor analysis was conducted and factor clusters were generated which had Eigen values greater than 1. All the categories except for general domestic clustered into separate factor categories. No attempt has been made to make one single index out of the items. Each question is examined separately, but questions are grouped together into the above stated categories.

The responses have been divided for purposes of discussion

into "support," "neutral," or "opposed." This simply means whether the respondent supports the proposed government action, was neutral toward it, or was opposed to the action. The terms "support" and "opposed" are meant to have no ideological connotation. They are strictly descriptive.

The responses to the political opinion questions are analyzed with respect to the degree of liberalism expressed by the respondents for the particular item. This is done because, as Chapter Two indicates, liberalism is crucial to the political attitudes and behavior of American Jews. The definition of "liberal" is drawn primarily from Fuchs' work.<sup>12</sup> To be liberal is to advocate government action to achieve desired social goals. On domestic issues, that usually entails specific government programs to upgrade minority groups and attempts to relieve the citizenry from undue economic burdens. On international issues, liberal policy is associated with international cooperation and the use of non-military American aid to achieve social goals for foreign nations.

#### Civil Rights

There were four questionnaire items concerned with civil rights: government programs to eliminate discriminatory practices against blacks, government programs to desegregate schools except for busing, busing as a means to desegregate schools, and government programs to help blacks obtain housing

<sup>12</sup>See Lawrence Fuchs, The Political Behavior of American Jews (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956).

in the suburbs. The first two items are concerned with the principle of aid to minorities, and the latter two are concerned with specific programs. On all items connected with civil rights, the support response is defined as the liberal position. There is considerably less support for specific actions than for activism in civil rights in principle. Table 2-5 reports on the support for civil rights in the sample population and in the population at large. Eighty percent of the sample supported unspecified government programs to eliminate discrimination, and 64% supported the desegregation of schools. This is a strong indication of the generally liberal attitude of the sample population on civil rights issues. On items which called for specific action, however, support among the sample population decreased sharply. Eleven percent supported busing as a method to desegregate schools, and 37% supported government programs to help blacks obtain housing in the suburbs.

The sample population is considerably more liberal than the nation at large on civil rights matters but the gap significantly narrows when specific action is called for. The sample population is more liberal in principle on civil rights than are those in a national sample who identified themselves as liberal but are less liberal than this group on specific civil rights programs. Eighty percent of the sample population support the general position of government programs to eliminate discrimination, compared to 30% for the

Table 2-5 Opinions on Civil Rights IssuesGovernment Programs to Eliminate  
Discrimination Against Blacks

<u>Sample</u>		<u>Nation, 1972<sup>(a)</sup></u>	<u>Nation<sup>(c)</sup></u>		
<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Conservative</u>
79.7	4.3	30	67	38	13

Busing as a Means to Desegregate  
Schools

<u>Sample</u>		<u>Nation<sup>(c)</sup></u>		
<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Conservative</u>
11.4	72.6	37	8	2

Government Programs to Help Blacks  
Obtain Housing in the Suburbs

<u>Sample</u>		<u>Nation, 1975<sup>(b)</sup></u>
<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Support</u>
37.2	31.5	18

## Desegregation of Schools (No Busing)

<u>Sample</u>		<u>Nation, 1972<sup>(a)</sup></u>
<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Support</u>
36.7	18.4	36

(a) Survey Research Center, 1972.

(b) Gallup Poll No. 127; February, 1976.

(c) From William Flanigan and Nancy Zingale, Political Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1975). This is a sample of individuals who self-identified themselves as Liberal, Moderate or Conservative.

population at large, and 67% of the liberal group. Busing is supported by 11% of the sample, compared to 4% for the population at large, and 37% for the liberal group. The sample population is attitudinally more liberal than the nation at large on civil rights, but is programmatically close to the population at large. This indicates both the general ethnic influence and the fact that the group, while somewhat distinct from the general population, is within the mainstream of American thinking on how far the government should go in civil rights programs.

#### Civil Liberties

There were two questionnaire items which were concerned with civil liberties issues: government surveillance of American citizens for national security purposes, and a relaxation of certain civil liberties in an effort to reduce crime. The "opposed" response was defined as the liberal position. The sample population is liberal on civil liberties issues. Sixty-two percent of the sample opposes a relaxation of civil liberties, and 49% are opposed to government surveillance. There is no national data to compare to the sample population on government surveillance but, as Table 2-6 reports, 30% of a national sample opposed relaxation of civil liberties in an effort to reduce crime. The sample population is considerably more liberal than the population at large on this civil liberties issue and is also much more willing to take a stand on

Table 2-6 Opinions on Civil Liberty Issues

	<u>Sample</u>			<u>Nation, 1972(a)</u>		
	<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
Police Searches Without Warrants	27.1	62.7	10.2	39	30	31

	<u>Sample</u>		
	<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>
Government Surveillance For National Security	41.0	49.0	10.0

(a) Survey Research Center, 1972

the matter. Thirty-one percent of the national sample had no opinion on the issue of relaxation of civil liberties, compared to 11% of the sample population. This is an indication of the importance and commitment to civil liberties of the sample population. The questionnaire items concerned with civil liberties each asked the respondents to make a difficult choice between two highly desirable alternatives. The difficulty of making such choices is indicated by the national sample, in which 31% of the respondents had no opinion. The sample population did make a choice, with only 11% indicating no opinion. They placed civil liberties ahead of national security and ahead of efforts to reduce crime. As with civil rights, when the responses of the sample are compared with national data, the indication is that ethnicity is a factor in the political attitudes of suburban Jews.

#### General Domestic Policy

There were four questionnaire items which were concerned with general domestic policy: tax reform, the establishment of a national health plan, strict government enforcement of pollution controls, and federal aid to American cities. For each of these items the "support" response was defined as the liberal position. As in the other areas of domestic policy, the sample population indicates that they are liberal. As Table 2-7 reports, the sample population is considerably more supportive of these programs than the nation at large, and

Table 2-7 General Domestic Policy

	<u>Sample</u>	
	<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
Aid to Cities	74.5	8.9
Strict Enforcement of Pollution Controls	83.0	5.5

	<u>Sample</u>		<u>National Sample of (a)</u>		
	<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Conservative</u>
Tax Reform	82.5	6.6	65	44	38

	<u>Sample</u>		<u>National Sample of (a)</u>			
	<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Nation 1972 (b)</u>
National Health	75.8	16.1	75	43	28	41

(a) Flanigan, *op. cit.* This is a sample of subjects who self-identified themselves as Liberal, Moderate or Conservative.

(b) Survey Research Center, 1972.

is as supportive of them as those in a national sample who were self-identified liberals. Seventy-six percent of the sample population support a national health plan, compared to 41% for a national sample, and 83% of the sample supports tax reform, compared to 44% of a national sample of individuals who identified themselves as moderates.

The sample population on domestic matters expresses quite strongly a basic philosophical commitment to liberalism. The one major divergence is on certain specific programs to overcome the effects of discrimination against minorities. The relationship of ethnicity to the liberalism of the group is established by comparison of the responses of the sample population with national samples. On almost all issues, the sample population is more liberal than the population at large and at least as liberal as those in the population at large who identify themselves as liberals. Ethnicity has a liberalizing effect on the sample population. The liberalism of the sample population does not, however, substantially separate the group from the nation at large as indicated by the fact that, on specific civil rights programs, the gap is not wide. The sample population is not as liberal as the national self-identified liberal group on specific civil rights programs. It can be concluded that suburban Jews are domestically liberal, but that they are within the mainstream of American thinking.

#### Internationalism

There were four questionnaire items concerned with

opinions on international matters. Three were direct measures and one was an indirect measure of internationalism. The three direct measures were: American concessions to Communist countries in order to better relations, American aid to underdeveloped countries, and American involvement in the internal affairs of foreign nations in order to keep Communists out of power. The indirect measure was whether or not to increase the defense budget. The liberal response was defined as "support" on the items which called for concessions to Communist countries and aid to underdeveloped countries, and "opposed" on the items which called for interference in the internal affairs of other countries and increases in the defense budget.

As Table 2-8 indicates, the sample population cannot be characterized as liberal or non-liberal on international matters. The sample population is rather cautious on international affairs. The sample population is opposed to concessions to Communist countries and aid to underdeveloped nations, which are the non-liberal positions. They take a liberal position, however, on increasing the defense budget or interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. The findings are sharply at deviance with Fuchs' findings in the late 1950's. Fuchs found that internationalism was a bulwark of Jewish liberalism.

While there is no direct evidence to support the position, the movement away from a liberal view on international affairs

Table 2-8 Opinions on International Issues

	<u>Sample</u>		<u>Nation, 1975(a)</u>		
	<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Too Much</u>	<u>Too Little</u>	<u>Right Amount</u>
Aid to Underdeveloped Countries	19	52			
Concessions to Communist Countries	11	67.3			
Interference in the Internal Affairs of Other Countries	26.9	54.9			
Increase in Defense Spending	30.6	43.7	36	22	32

(a) Gallup Poll No. 129; April, 1976.

may well be a reflection of concern for Israel. The data clearly indicates that Israel is the single most important issue to the group. There is a statistical relationship between international issues and items concerned with Israel,<sup>13</sup> but no direct evidence from which to draw a firm conclusion. There is little available national data with which to compare the sample population on international issues. On defense spending, 36% of a national sample felt too much was spent on defense, and 32% felt too little was spent. Thirty-one percent of the sample population felt too little was spent, and 42% felt too much was spent. The sample population is not significantly separated from the nation at large on international matters, but is considerably less liberal than American Jews were twenty years ago.

#### Israel and Jewish-Related Issues

There were six questionnaire items concerned with Israel and other Jewish-related issues. The items were: suspension of economic aid to countries which voted in the United Nations to equate Zionism with racism; cessation of trade with Russia over the emigration of Soviet Jews; American military supplies to Israel; the use of American troops to assist Israel; American policy pressuring Israel to recognize the Palestinians;

<sup>13</sup>This was determined by statistical tests of significance performed on the data. Correlation of coefficient shows a score of greater than .3 on the international items and the items on Israel.

and American friendship with the Arab nations. These items cannot be classified as liberal or non-liberal. What is strongly indicated by the data is that the sample population is solidly in support of Israel and considers Israel to be a most important political issue. Comparison with national samples indicates that deep cleavages exist between the sample population and the nation at large on the Middle East.

Table 2-9 reports the findings for the sample population and for national samples on opinions concerning the Middle East. The questionnaire items on the Middle East were highly controversial, and the percentage of support responses by the sample population indicates very strong support for Israel. The least controversial item was military aid to Israel; the basic support of the group for Israel is indicated by the fact that 93% of the sample population favored American military aid to Israel, compared with 37% of the nation favoring such aid. In fact, only 44% of a national sample indicated general support for Israel. Forty percent of the sample population supported sending American troops to Israel if needed, compared to 2% of a national sample. Israel is important to American Jews,<sup>14</sup> and Israel is the issue which most separates the sample population from the general population.

#### Political Behavior

Political behavior was measured by three separate

<sup>14</sup>The importance of Israel to American Jews is discussed in the literature most specifically by Elazar, op. cit.

Table 2-9 Opinions on Issues of Ethnic Concern

	<u>Sample</u>		<u>Gallup<sup>(a)</sup></u>
	<u>Support</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	<u>Support</u>
Stopping Trade with Russia Over Issue of Emigration of Soviet Jews	64.1	16.8	
Suspension of Aid to Countries Who Equate Zionism and Racism	72.7	13.8	
American Friendship with Arab States	16.1	48.0	
American Pressure on Israel	12.7	68.0	
Sending Military Supplies to Israel	92.9	1.6	
Use of American Troops to Assist Israel	39.5	39.8	
If Middle East War Breaks Out What Should the United States Do:			
Stay Out			55
Support Israel (Military Aid)			9
Support Israel (General)			7
Military Intervention if Necessary			5
Send Troops to Israel			2
Should United States Supply Arms to Middle East			
			<u>Yes</u> <u>No</u> <u>Opinion</u>
Israel			37 49 14
Arabs			2 85 13
Where Do Your Sympathies Lie in Middle East			
Israel			44
Arabs			8

(a) Gallup Poll No. 116; February, 1975

indicators: party and ideological identification, level of general political activity, and degree of involvement in specific political causes.

Ideological identification indicates the liberal nature of the sample population compared to the nation at large. The data indicate that the sample population is far more Democratic and less Republican than the nation in general. Table 2-10 reports on party and ideological identification for the sample and for the nation. Forty-six percent of a national sample were Democratic Party identifiers and 22% were Republican, compared to 69% and 11% respectively for the sample population. In a national sample, 18% identified themselves as left of center and 30% as right of center, compared to 43% and 9% for the sample population. These data indicate the basic liberalism of the American suburban Jew.

Examination of the political causes which the sample population are involved in indicates that the issues which most affect the sample population concern Israel and other ethnic-related issues. While the sample population indicates a great deal of political involvement, the level of involvement on issues of ethnic concern are substantially higher. Table 4-11 reports on levels of activity in specific political causes. Fifty-five percent of the sample population are involved in local school issues, which is the greatest amount of involvement on non-ethnic issues. Fifty-seven percent of the sample are involved in combating anti-Semitism, and 78%

Table 2-10 Party and Ideological Identification

	<u>Sample</u>	<u>Gallup</u> <sup>(a)</sup>
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
Liberal	42.9	18
Moderate	44.6	42
Conservative	8.5	30
Democrat	68.8	46
Republican	10.5	22
Independent	17.7	36

(a) Gallup Poll, Position on Political Spectrum No. 131; June, 1976. Political Affiliation No. 131; June, 1976.

Table 2-11 Involvement in Political Causes

	Sample	
	<u>Involved</u>	<u>Not Involved</u>
Civil Rights	34.2	64.4
Local School	55.4	43.2
Local Zoning	41.4	57.0
Conservation	40.2	57.7
Opposition to a Freedom of Speech Issue	24.8	73.3
Anti-Semitism	56.5	71.0
Busing to Achieve Racial Balance	10.5	38.4
Aid to Soviet Jewry	60.0	87.6
American Policy Toward Israel	61.5	37.2
Direct Aid to Israel	77.9	20.5

are involved in direct aid to Israel. Such a level of activity strongly indicates the relative importance of issues of ethnic concern to the sample population. Ethnic issues are the only ones which show a clear relationship between opinions expressed and actual behavior in support of those opinions. The involvement pattern of the sample population indicates two significant phenomena: one, that on ethnic issues Jews do comprise a distinct political group in the society; and secondly, while the sample is more liberal than the general population on other issues, there is relatively little meaningful difference between the sample and the general population on political behavior.

#### Chapter Summary

In relation to my major thesis, the chapter has established that ethnicity is important to the suburban Jew in his political opinions, and that the issues which are most important to the suburban Jew are those which concern the ethnic group, especially issues concerning Israel. The chapter demonstrated that the high social class position of the group is not a factor in ethnic identification and attachment. It has been further shown that Judaism is what the group considers to be its source of ethnic identity, and that the group feels there is a relationship between their ethnicity and their life opportunities.

What can be concluded from the examination of political

opinions is that the sample population is more liberal than the population at large on domestic matters. When specific programs are mentioned, the gap between the two groups narrows. On international issues, the sample population cannot be considered to be either liberal or non-liberal. The data indicate that the sample is cautious in their views on international issues. There is a dramatic difference between the nation and the sample population on Israel. The degree of support for Israel indicates that, on ethnically related issues, suburban Jews comprise a distinct political group.

Chapter Four examined the data generally establishing the parameters of ethnicity for the sample. Chapter Five will provide an examination and analysis of the internal differences in the group, and an examination of the importance of the hypothesized independent variables. Chapter Six is an examination and analysis of the personal interviews with respect to the relevance they have for the findings discussed in Chapters Four and Five.

## Chapter 3

### An Examination of the Significance of the Independent Variables

#### Introduction

The data indicate three significant qualifications of what has been said about the independent power of ethnicity to affect political behavior and attitudes. The first is that the social class indicators (education, income and occupation) are highly significant on political issues which are unrelated to the ethnic group. Second, specific denominational identification appears to significantly affect respondents' attitudes on issues which are related to ethnic group concerns. Third, opinions on the prevalence of anti-Semitism in the United States are also an independent variable on issues which are of ethnic concern. It is further indicated that age and generation are not important independent variables with respect to explaining the political behavior and attitudes of the sample population. The data indicate that, on general political issues, intragroup differences are explained by social class, while on ethnically related issues, differences are explained by ethnic factors.

The data run counter to a good deal of the literature,<sup>1</sup> which indicate that either ethnicity or social class (but not both) will influence the individual. The data is consistent, however, with the concept of eth-class<sup>2</sup> discussed by Milton Gordon. Eth-class is the vertical integration of social class with a horizontal integration of ethnicity. This means, of course, that on some issues social class will be significant to the individual, while on other issues ethnic factors will be important. This is what the data discussed in Chapter Five indicate is the situation for the sample population.

Examination of the Social Class Indicators:

Income, Education and Occupation

The data indicate that on issues not related to ethnic group concerns, the social class indicators are significant. Education is the most significant of the social class variables, followed by income, and then occupation. The relationships

<sup>1</sup>See discussion of the assimilationist and mobilization theories in Chapter One. The literature which supports either of these theories indicates one is influenced by either ethnicity or social class but not both. For specific example see: Robert Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), especially Chapter One or Raymond Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," American Political Science Review, December, 1965.

<sup>2</sup>See discussion of eth-class in Chapter One. The concept is extensively discussed in Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life, The Role of Race, Religion and National Origin, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). The major thrust of Gordon's argument is that the primary group identification of ethnicity remains even while the individual is acculturating and being influenced on many issues by social class factors.

between education and political attitudes are linear: the greater the amount of education, the more liberal the respondent is. Where education is concerned, the major division in the population occurs between those respondents who have a high school education or less, and those who have at least completed college. The relationships between income and political attitudes are bi-modal. The highest income respondents are the most liberal, followed by the lowest income respondents and then the middle-income group. The relationship of income to political opinions is demonstrated in Figure 3-1. Occupation is not as important as either income or education, and the relationships between political attitudes and occupation are not clear. Generally, those of higher status occupations are more liberal than those of lower status occupations, but the data are not definitive because the occupations of the sample population cluster among those of higher status. This makes comparisons between occupational groups difficult.

Table 3-1 reports the relationships between the social class indicators and the questionnaire items which tap opinions on civil rights. Social class indicators are significant on all civil rights items. The bi-modal pattern depicting the relationships between income and political attitudes is observable on civil rights. For example, 30% of the lowest income group supports government programs to help blacks obtain housing in the suburbs. The support for this drops to 19%


Table 3-1 Relationship Between Social Class Indicators and Opinions on Civil Rights Issues

<u>Help Blacks Obtain Suburban Housing</u>				
<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	
Skilled	31.3	31.3	24.9	
Office Worker	28.6	28.6	33.3	
Manager	25.0	12.5	56.3	
Professional	41.0	22.5	27.8	
Self-employed	40.2	26.7	26.7	
Sales	33.2	20.3	40.8	

<u>Income</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	
\$0-12	10.0	15.0	75	<u>Busing to Desegregate Schools</u>
12-26	5.2	14.3	80.5	
26-44	12.3	13.5	74.2	
44+	20.8	12.3	66.9	
\$0-12	22.7	41.6	29.7	<u>Help Blacks Obtain Suburban Housing</u>
12-26	18.7	41.3	40.8	
26-44	44.0	22.3	33.7	
44+	49.1	22.7	28.2	
\$0-12	61.5	15.3	23.1	<u>Desegregate Schools (No Busing)</u>
12-26	55.9	17.8	26.8	
26-44	76.7	11.2	12.1	
44+	74.8	11.2	14.0	

Figure 3-1 Relationship Between Support and Income for Government Programs to Help Blacks Obtain Suburban Housing and Income



for the middle-income group and then rises to 44% and 49% respectively for the two highest income groups. The linear relationships between education and political attitudes are clear on civil rights. For example, 50% of those who did not graduate from high school and 52% of those for whom a high school diploma was a terminal degree support desegregation of schools without busing, compared to 68% support by college graduates and 70% support by those who have graduate degrees. The data on civil rights establishes the importance of social class indicators on issues not of ethnic concern. It also demonstrates the pattern of the relationships which exist between political attitudes, income and education.

Table 3-2 reports the findings on social class variables as they correlate with international issues. The linear pattern holds for education and liberalism, as does the bimodal pattern for income and liberalism. For example, 21% of the lowest income group support aid to third world countries, compared to 14% of the middle-income group and 21% and 31% respectively for the two highest income groups. Thirty-one percent of those who did not graduate from high school are opposed to interfering in the affairs of other countries in order to help out Communists, compared to 44% of those who graduated from high school, 66% of college graduates, and 55% of those with graduate degrees. The "opposed" response was defined as the liberal position on that item.

Table 3-3 reports on the relationship social class

Table 3-2 Relationship between Social Class Indicators and Opinions on International Issues

<u>Aid to Underdeveloped Nations</u>			
<u>Income</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
\$0-12	20.4	34.1	45.0
12-26	14.2	20.0	65.5
26-44	21.5	23.8	54.7
44+	31.5	26.8	42.2

<u>Improve Relations by Concessions to Communists</u>			
<u>Education</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
0-11	6.2	12.5	81.3
High School	6.5	11.4	74.8
College	8.6	19.0	68.0
Graduate	17.9	20.9	59.0

<u>American Interference in the Internal Affairs of Nations</u>			
<u>Education</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
0-11	37.5	31.2	31.2
High School	32.5	11.4	43.9
College	19.8	9.8	66.6
Graduate	27.5	15.7	55.3

Table 3-3 Relationship Between Social Class Indicators and Opinions on General Domestic Issues and Civil Liberties Issues

<u>Tax Reform</u>			
<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
Skilled	81.3	6.3	12.5
Office Work	85.7	9.5	0.0
Managerial	78.1	9.4	12.6
Professional	82.0	2.8	9.8
Self-employed	86.7	6.7	6.7
Sales	88.2	5.1	3.1
 <u>Education</u>			
0-11	100.0	0	0
High School	80.8	7.7	5.8
College	74.1	6.1	17.1
Graduate	72.4	6.9	18.9

<u>Police Searches Without Warrants</u>			
<u>Education</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
0-11	40.0	13.3	46.7
High School	35.8	7.3	52.0
College	24.2	4.6	69.3
Graduate	28.4	9.0	64.9

variables have on civil liberties, opinions and general domestic issues. While the patterns established for education and income generally continue to exist, a significant variation occurs concerning the relationship between education and support for a national health plan. The less educated respondents are more supportive of a national health plan than those who have a greater amount of education. One hundred percent of those who did not complete high school support a national health plan, compared to 81% of the high school graduates, 74% of the college graduates and 72% of those with graduate degrees. This indicates that, on issues which could have a direct impact on the individual, liberalism ceases to be important in opinion formation and other, more practical factors become salient for the individual. Although not statistically significant, the lowest and middle-income groups are more supportive of a national health plan than the two highest income groups. On the issue of a national health plan, income and education are at variance with the general trends established by the data. It would seem reasonable to conclude that, while there exists a definite relationship between the liberalism and social class on political opinions, liberalism loses a great deal of its influence on issues which are perceived to have a potential for directly affecting the respondent's life.

An examination of the political opinion item on the questionnaire confirms the importance of social class indicators

as motivating factors on political opinions of the sample population on issues not related to ethnic group concerns. There is a definite pattern with respect to liberalism, income and education. Generally speaking, the higher the income and the greater the amount of education, the more liberal the individual is. The social class position of the individual appears to determine the degree of liberalism on most political issues unrelated to ethnic concerns. Neither party identification nor ideological identification are independent variables with respect to political opinions. Chi-square scores were computed for both of these variables, and each was found to have no statistical significance with any of the measures of political behavior and attitudes. It can be concluded that liberalism appears to be the effect of other factors, rather than the cause of one's political attitudes and opinions.

An Examination of the Independent Variables and  
the Factors which Measure Political Behavior

The factors which measure political behavior are: one, ideological and party identification; two, the general level of political activity; and three, involvement in political causes. It was considered possible that ideological or party identification might be independent variables, but as indicated in the preceding discussion this is not the case.

Table 3-4 reports on the relationships of ideological

Table 3-4 Relationship Between Social Class Indicators and General Political Behavior

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Discuss Politics with Friends</u>			<u>Follow Politics in Media</u>		
	<u>Never</u>	<u>Occasion-ally</u>	<u>Regu-larly</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Occasion-ally</u>	<u>Regu-larly</u>
Skilled	20	50	25	25	25	50
Office Work	14.3	47.6	33.1	14.3	33.3	52.4
Managerial	0	50	50	0	28.1	68.8
Professional	2.8	40.3	56.4	1.4	20.1	77.8
Self-employed	13.3	66.7	20	13.3	40	46.7
Sales	3.4	55.9	40.7	8.5	13.6	76.3

<u>Income</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Occasionally</u>	<u>Regularly</u>	
\$0-12	57.5	40.0	2.5	<u>Campaign Contributions</u>
12-26	46.4	44.2	9.4	
26-44	36.9	50.3	12.8	
44+	25.0	42.5	32.5	
\$0-12	73.1	24.3	2.6	<u>Attend Political Rallies</u>
12-26	74.6	21.7	3.4	
26-44	65.8	32.7	1.5	
44+	59.2	34.7	6.1	
\$0-12	60.8	29.2	5.0	<u>Work for Candidate</u>
12-26	74.7	21.7	3.6	
26-44	66.4	32.0	1.6	
44+	53.1	34.6	12.3	
\$0-12	13.4	25	61.6	<u>Follow Politics in Media</u>
12-26	4.3	23	72	
24-44	2.3	24.7	73	
44+	6.1	18.5	75.4	
\$0-12	83	14	4	<u>Wear Campaign Buttons</u>
12-26	70	22	6	
26-44	66	32	1.6	
44+	67	23	10	
	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Ideological Identification</u>
\$0-12	26.1	61.9	12.0	
12-26	41.9	50.8	7.3	
26-44	51.8	36.7	11.5	
44+	51.8	44.4	3.8	

Table 3-4 (continued)

Relationship Between Social Class Indicators  
and General Political Behavior

<u>Education</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Occasionally</u>	<u>Regularly</u>	
0-11	18.7	62.6	18.7	<u>Discuss Politics With Friends</u>
High School	8.4	62.6	28.5	
College	3.3	47.1	49.1	
Graduate	3.0	41.8	54.5	
0-11	25	12.5	60.2	<u>Follow Politics in Media</u>
High School	8.1	34.1	53.7	
College	3.9	24.8	68.6	
Graduate	2.2	17.2	80.6	
0-11	87.5	2.5	0.0	<u>Attend Political Rallies</u>
High School	76.4	17.1	3.3	
College	65.4	30.7	2.6	
Graduate	61.9	32.8	5.2	
0-11	93.5	6.5	0.0	<u>Wear Campaign Buttons</u>
High School	78.8	17.3	1.9	
College	70.7	22.2	4.9	
Graduate	65.5	28.4	6.0	

and party identification, and the level of political activity, with the social class indicators. The importance of the social class variables are indicated by the data on general political activity. The amount of general political activity the individual performs is directly related to the social class indicators. Respondents of lower income and less education are consistently less active than those of higher income and more education. For example, 27% of the lowest income group report attending political rallies, while 25% of the middle-income group, and 34% and 41% of the two highest income groups have attended. The bi-modal pattern for income operates on political activity as it did on political opinions. The lowest income group is more active than the middle-income group, but not as active as the two highest income groups. The relationship between political activity and education is linear, which is similar to the relationship between education and political opinions. Zero percent of those who did not graduate from high school report having ever worked for a candidate, compared to 25% of those who are high school graduates, and 38% of those with college or graduate school degrees.

The importance of social class variables in the political behavior of the sample population is further indicated by Table 3-5, which reports the findings on the relationship between involvement in political causes and the social class indicators. Significant relationships exist between almost all the political causes which are not directly related to

Table 3-5 Relationship Between Social Class Indicators and Involvement in Political Causes

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Civil Rights Involved</u>	<u>Military Ventures Involved</u>
Skilled	12.6	18.8
Office Work	23.8	23.8
Managerial	31.2	18.8
Professional	4.2	25.7
Self-employed	13.4	13.4
Sales	32.2	22.1

<u>Income</u>	<u>Civil Rights Involved</u>	<u>Local Zoning Involved</u>	<u>Freedom of Speech Involved</u>	<u>Busing Involved</u>
\$0-12	19.5	38.0	28.5	26.1
12-26	26.2	43.0	27.9	8.0
26-44	37.0	36.3	22.3	11.8
44+	56.2	56.2	41.2	10.1

<u>Education</u>	<u>Civil Rights Involved</u>	<u>Local Schools Involved</u>	<u>Local Zoning Involved</u>	<u>Ecology Involved</u>	<u>Military Ventures Involved</u>	<u>Freedom of Speech Involved</u>
0-11	13.4	37.5	38.5	24.2	9.4	18.2
High School	19.5	48.2	71.5	30.1	17.0	22.5
College	34.6	63.4	46.4	45.1	27.0	30.1
Graduate	53.6	59.0	55.2	50.0	37.0	32.8

ethnic group concerns and the variables of income and education. Respondents with little education are consistently less involved than those with a greater amount of education. For example, 19% of those with high school degrees have been involved with civil rights activities, compared with 35% and 54% for those with college and graduate degrees. The "U" shaped pattern for income tends to disappear on involvement in political causes, and is replaced by a linear pattern. The greater one's income, the more likely it is one will be involved in political causes. For example, 38% of the lowest income group report being involved in activities concerned with local zoning decisions, compared to 43% for the middle-income group, and 36% and 56% for the two most affluent groups.<sup>3</sup>

The data indicate the importance of social class factors on political opinions and behavior. Social class indicators are related to liberalism and to political activity in much the same way. The higher one's income and the greater the amount of one's education, the more liberal one is likely to be, and the more one is likely to be politically involved. For the population, to be liberal appears to be an effect of social class factors. The data does not indicate that ideological identification is a causal factor. A major finding

<sup>3</sup>The fact that low income groups are less active in political causes than higher income groups is consistent with Milbrath's discussion of levels of political participation and those factors which influence these levels. For complete discussion see Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965).

which is unexplainable by the data is the curvilinear relationship of income to political opinions. It is not possible to determine from the data why this pattern exists, but it is a finding which clearly indicates the need for further research.

#### Examination of Age and Generation

Age and generation were held constant against each other to insure mutually independent significance. Neither age nor generation as indicated by the data is an important independent variable for explaining the political attitudes and behavior of the sample population. Generation is statistically significant on only three items. On issues where age is significant, the findings are similar to what the literature indicates would be expected for age-related factors in the general population.<sup>4</sup>

Table 3-6 reports the findings on those relationships which are significant for age and generation. The impact of generation is related to whether one believes himself to be motivated by religion in his political behavior. Forty-two percent and 51% of first- and second-generation respondents indicate that none of their political activity is motivated by their religion, compared to 0% of third-generation

<sup>4</sup>The significance of age on political participation is well established in the literature. Younger and older individuals are less politically active than those in the middle age group. For discussion of this phenomenon see: William Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingale, Political Behavior of the American Electorate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1975) or Norman Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).

Table 3-6 Relationship Between Age and Generation and Opinions on Political Issues and on Political Behavior

<u>Generation</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	
First	40.3	17.3	23.0	<u>Increase in Defense Spending</u>
Second	32.8	18.6	43.3	
Third	23.3	20.7	52.5	
	<u>None</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>All</u>	
First	42.3	40.4	5.8	<u>Ethnicity As a Moti- vation for Political Activity</u>
Second	50.6	30.5	4.2	
Third	0	69.8	12.1	
	<u>Never</u>	<u>Occasionally</u>	<u>Regularly</u>	
First	78.7	40.4	5.8	<u>Wearing Campaign Buttons</u>
Second	64.8	28.6	6.6	
Third	77.9	17.9	4.2	
<u>Age</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>	
0-34	14.6	7.1	73.2	<u>Police Searches Without Warrants</u>
35-54	21	7.6	71.4	
55+	41.3	6.8	51.9	
0-34	31.9	5.5	73.2	<u>Government Surveillance of Citizens</u>
35-54	36.4	7.6	56.0	
55+	51.4	8.0	40.6	
	<u>Involved</u>			
0-34	36.8			<u>Local School Issues</u>
35-54	62.4			
55+	53.6			

respondents who so indicate. The data indicate that third-generation persons are more willing to admit or are more conscious of the fact that at least part of their political behavior is motivated by religion.

Age is related to political attitudes and behavior in a similar fashion, as would be expected for the population at large. For example, on support for police searches without warrants in an effort to reduce crime, there is no difference in support for the 18 to 34 and 35 to 54 age groups, but a sharp rise in support for those over 55. The support was 19% and 21% in the two younger groups, and 41% by those 55 and older. This result is expected, considering the general concern for safety the elderly have in our society. On political activities, those items which are age-related are again what would be expected for the population at large. For example, 78% of those 0-34 and 55 and over never wear campaign buttons, compared to 65% of those 35-54 who never wear them. On involvement in local schools, 37% and 53% of the 0-34 and 55 and over groups have been involved, compared with 63% of the 35-54 age group who report involvement. The findings on all are consistent with the literature. Younger and older people are less politically involved than are middle-aged people. This strongly indicates that age is not a factor for the sample any more than it would be for a totally random sample of Americans. Neither age nor generation are, according to the data, significant in explaining the intragroup

differences which occur in the sample population.

The fact that generation appears to be such an inimportant factor is surprising, considering how heavily the assimilationist and mobilization theories stress the importance of generational differences. There are, I believe, three widely held beliefs which are in error when they lead people to conclude that generation will be an important variable in white ethnic behavior: one, the assumption made that second generation individuals suffer a sharp drop in their ethnic identification; two, the belief that generational differences in the latter part of the twentieth century are similar socio-economically or ethnically to equivalent generations prior to World War II; and three, belief that generational labels are equivalent, without taking into account variables which affect individuals, such as years lived in the United States, life experience, and life opportunities.

Alma and Karl Taeuber have dealt extensively with generational differences, and they have shown that the pre-quota immigrants upon which most of the studies are based and whose behavior most of the theories are attempting to explain are dying out, and that post-quota immigrants who are frequently very dissimilar are making up the bulk of the foreign-born or first-generation population. The reality of this is evident when one looks at the social class characteristics of the first generation of the sample population. They do not differ from the sample population as a whole. What the Taeubers conclude

is that "studies of ethnic assimilation which rely on comparisons of the characteristics of the foreign born with their children, the second generation, are based on increasingly inaccurate description of reality."<sup>5</sup>

The assumption that a loss of ethnic identification occurred by the second generation was based on a set of social conditions which were presumed to exist, and which supposedly encouraged the denial of ethnic identification, to allow the individual to consolidate socioeconomic gains in a society where social discrimination against the white ethnic existed. That belief, while possibly accurate even as late as 1940, bears no resemblance to the post-World War II reality of American society. The white ethnic American is not a poor and struggling immigrant who is trying to carve out some socioeconomic gains in the face of massive discrimination, but rather he is operating in much more affluent circumstances and with much greater opportunities.<sup>6</sup> The social reality of 1976 simply renders generational assumptions made in 1930 inoperative. There is also the question of whether many second-generation individuals should be realistically considered

<sup>5</sup>Alma Taeuber and Karl Taeuber, "Recent Immigration and Studies of Ethnic Assimilation," Demography, Volume 4, No. 2, 1967, pp. 807-808.

<sup>6</sup>For a discussion of the change in opportunity potential for white immigrants see Richard Krickus, Pursuing the American Dream, White Ethnics and the New Populism (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1976) or Stanley Feldstein and Lawrence Costello (eds.), The Ordeal of Assimilation (Garden City, Anchor Press, 1974).

"second generation." Many immigrants came to the United States in the pre-quota migration period as very small children and, while they were technically first generation, were afforded second generation opportunities and consequently lived a second generation life style. Their offspring, while technically second generation, are realistically third generation. It was their parents who consolidated socioeconomic gains: they had the life opportunities of a third-generation individual. For these reasons, generation will probably be shown to be less and less significant in studies of white ethnic groups. It is not that generation is unimportant, but rather that changing social realities have rendered it less significant. What has to be examined, then, is whether, starting with the second generation, there is a movement away from ethnic group association and attachment, possibly to a social class group. The data indicates strongly that no such movement exists. There is no support here for the assimilationist theory. The mobilization theory cannot really be tested, since the assumptions concerning generation made by the theory are probably not correct in a post-World War II environment. The conclusion that can be drawn from the examination of the variables is that generation is not an important factor for ethnic attachment or identification of suburban Jews.

An Examination of the Ethnic Variables:  
Denominational Identification and the Perception  
of the Seriousness of Anti-Semitism

Table 3-7 indicates that ethnicity is not significant on issues unrelated to ethnic group concerns, but is highly significant on virtually all issues which are so related. The data support the importance of ethnicity on issues related to the ethnic group, and clarify the dichotomous influences on the sample population with respect to political attitudes and behavior. Social class variables influence the sample population on issues unrelated to ethnic group concerns, while ethnicity is the principal influence on issues which are related to those concerns. On issues related to ethnic group concerns, liberalism is not a factor. What separates the population is the degree to which they support the Jewish population<sup>7</sup> on any given issue or in any given activity. This support is determined by two factors: one, denominational identification; and two, one's perception of the prevalence of anti-Semitism in America.

On political opinion items, Orthodox identifiers are the most supportive of the position perceived to be favorable to Jews, followed by Conservative, Reform and secular identifiers. On all issues, those who considered anti-Semitism to

<sup>7</sup>What constitutes the Jewish position on an issue was based on a pamphlet put out by the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council which talks about political issues and makes specific recommendations. Joint Program Plan For Jewish Community Relations, 1974-75, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council; New York, 1975.

Table 3-7 Relationship Between Denominational Identification and Perceptions Regarding Anti-Semitism and Political Opinions

<u>Denominational Identification</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>			
Orthodox	82	2.5	7.5	<u>United Nations Resolution on Zionism-Racism</u>		
Conservative	80	8.4	8.4			
Reform	64.7	10.8	21.5			
Secular	58.6	15.9	20.8			
Orthodox	75	15	2.5	<u>Stopping Trade With Russia Over Emigration of Soviet Jews</u>		
Conservative	76.8	8.4	12.8			
Reform	50.4	22.5	23.5			
Secular	46.3	24.4	26.8			
Orthodox	90	0	0	<u>American Military Supplies to Israel</u>		
Conservative	97	1.5	0			
Reform	92.2	3.4	2.0			
Secular	85.4	6.1	6.1			
Orthodox	35	35	25	<u>Use of Troops to Assist Israel</u>		
Conservative	42.8	15.3	33.5			
Reform	40.2	12.7	43.6			
Secular	35	15.9	46.4			
Orthodox	2.5	17.5	65	<u>American Pressure on Israel</u>		
Conservative	22.2	24.1	51.7			
Reform	16.4	12.7	66.6			
Secular	21.9	14.6	53.7			
Orthodox	10	37.5	40	<u>American Friendship to Arab States</u>		
Conservative	13.3	25.6	55.6			
Reform	19.6	35.3	42.1			
Secular	20.7	35.4	37.8			
	<u>None</u>	<u>Some</u>	<u>All</u>			
Orthodox	37.5	40	10	<u>Ethnicity As A Motivation for Political Activity</u>		
Conservative	45.3	31.5	7.4			
Reform	52.9	32.4	5.9			
Secular	54.9	36.6	6.1			
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>				
Orthodox	92.5	2.5		<u>Must Jews Engage in Politics</u>		
Conservative	94	4.5				
Reform	81.4	18.7				
Secular	82.9	14.6				
		<u>Anti-Semitism a Problem</u>				
		Yes	72.3	13.7	13.7	
		No	58.4	12.0	29.6	
			<u>Stopping Trade With Russia Over Emigration of Soviet Jews</u>	<u>Support</u>	<u>Neutral</u>	<u>Oppose</u>

be a serious problem were more supportive of the position considered to favor Jews than those who did not believe anti-Semitism to be a serious problem. For example, 72% of those who believe anti-Semitism to be a problem favor stopping trade with Russia if they do not allow emigration of Soviet Jews, compared to 58% of those who do not see anti-Semitism as a problem. On the political opinion items, the Orthodox and Conservative identifiers tend to cluster together, and so do the Reform and secular identifiers. For example, 82% and 80% of the Orthodox and Conservative identifiers support suspension of American aid to any country which supported the United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism, compared to 65% and 59% of the Reform and secular identifiers. This would seem to indicate that the "Jewish" position is more supported by the Orthodox and Conservative identifiers, while Reform and secular identifiers are similarly less supportive. This is, however, a false conclusion, a fact that becomes apparent when one looks at political behavior. The division here is between the secular identifier and all others, since the secular identifier is considered less active in ethnic causes than are the others. For example, 72% of Orthodox identifiers are involved in combating anti-Semitism in the United States, compared to 67% of Conservative, 64% of Reform and only 43% of secular identifiers. Those who perceive anti-Semitism to be a major problem are considerably more involved in political causes which are of concern to the

Table 3-8 Relationship Between Denominational Identification and Perceptions Regarding Anti-Semitism and Political Behavior

<u>Denominational Identification</u>	<u>Involved</u>			
Orthodox	72.5	<u>Combatting Anti-Semitism in United States</u>		
Conservative	66.9			
Reform	63.7			
Secular	42.7			
Orthodox	82.5	<u>Aid to Soviet Jewry</u>		
Conservative	71.9			
Reform	56.9			
Secular	36.6			
Orthodox	80	<u>American Policy Toward Israel</u>		
Conservative	67.5			
Reform	62.7			
Secular	46.3			
Orthodox	92.5	<u>Direct Aid to Israel</u>		
Conservative	82.8			
Reform	82.4			
Secular	63.4			
Orthodox	17.5	<u>Ideological Identification Liberal</u>		
Conservative	41.9			
Reform	45.1			
Secular	57.1			
Orthodox	67.5	<u>Ideological Identification Moderate</u>		
Conservative	45.3			
Reform	44.1			
Secular	36.6			
Orthodox	5.0	<u>Ideological Identification Conservative</u>		
Conservative	8.4			
Reform	10.8			
Secular	7.3			
		<u>Direct Aid to Israel</u>	<u>Aid to Soviet Jewry</u>	
		<u>Involved</u>	<u>Involved</u>	
	<u>Anti-Semitism A Problem</u>			
	Yes	80.9	65	
	No	52.9	54.6	

ethnic group than those who do not consider anti-Semitism to be a problem. For example, 81% of the former are involved in direct aid to Israel, compared with 53% of the latter group.

The data indicate that ethnicity is important on political attitudes and behavior related to ethnic group concerns. The two specific ethnic variables which are significant are denominational identification and perception of the nature of anti-Semitism in the United States. Those individuals who are identified with the religiously affiliated groups are much more supportive of the Jewish position than those who are identified with the cultural group.<sup>8</sup> The secular identifiers and those who do not see anti-Semitism as a serious problem are less identified with Judaism, less politically active in Jewish causes, and less supportive of the position generally believed to favor Jewish interests.

#### Chapter Summary

In Chapter Five, the data was examined to determine what accounts for intra-group differences, and to show which of the potential independent variables are significant in influencing political attitudes and behavior. The data indicate that age and generation are of minimal significance, and that the social class indicators of income and education are highly

<sup>8</sup>This use of the term "cultural" comes from the mail questionnaire. Question 15 of the questionnaire asked the respondent to indicate denominational affiliation and secular was defined as Judaism meaning something cultural not religious to the individual.

significant on matters not related to ethnic group concerns. On issues which concern the ethnic group, the ethnic variables of denominational identification and perception of the seriousness of anti-Semitism are significant. Chapter Four established the overall importance of ethnicity, and Chapter Five explored the factors which accounted for intra-group differences. Chapter Six, which follows, examines the information gathered in the personal interviews in an attempt to add depth, intensity and clarification to the findings discussed in Chapters Four and Five.

## Chapter 4

### Introduction

Chapter Four examines the data gathered in personal interviews. The interviews were primarily concerned with two areas of inquiry: one, to determine what factors influence the political opinions and behavior of suburban Jews; and two, to explore the importance of a variety of political issues to the sample population. The primary value of the interview was their in-depth exploration of political positions, attitudes and beliefs. The interview data support the basic findings discussed in Chapters Four and Five. The data further indicate that the respondents attach little importance to political issues which are not of concern to the ethnic group, and a great deal of importance to ethnic-related issues, the most important of which is Israel. The sample population indicate that on most issues neither their ethnicity nor their social class is a conscious influence on their political decision-making. A further major finding of the interviews is that one's position on issues of ethnic concern is related to one's perceptions concerning the seriousness of anti-Semitism in the United States. The interviews support the position that suburban Jews comprise a distinct political

group in America on issues which are of concern to the ethnic group.

### Methodology

There were twenty-four individuals interviewed between January 10, 1977 and January 21, 1977. The interview population was randomly chosen from four significant groups of respondents who had returned the original questionnaire. The interviews were open-ended and took between forty-five minutes and two hours to complete. The interview questionnaire paralleled the mail questionnaire to the extent possible. On all questions the respondents were encouraged to give the full range of their views and to explore those factors which influenced their position.<sup>1</sup>

### Political Issues Unrelated to Ethnicity

The two major findings from the personal interviews concerning opinions on political issues unrelated to ethnic group concerns are: one, these issues are unimportant to the sample population; and two, the respondents are generally unclear about what factors have influenced their opinions on the issues discussed. The unimportance of these issues to the group is underscored by the facts that most of the interviewees had little or no knowledge about the issues, and that most spoke about them briefly, usually in sweeping generalities.

<sup>1</sup>For a full discussion of the methodology see Appendix C.

No particular philosophy was indicated by the respondents as an influence on their political opinions. This is true regardless of social class or ethnic factors. Most political issues are not important to suburban Jews, and the respondents stated repeatedly that they spent very little time thinking about politics or political issues (with the exception of Israel).

The data from the mail questionnaire indicate that the sample is supportive of civil rights in concept, but not supportive of specific civil rights programs. This finding was confirmed by the interviews, and it was further found that civil rights for racial minorities is unimportant to the group. The objections to the specific civil rights programs, it appears, were based on two underlying causes: one, the anti-black feelings among some of the respondents; and two, the perceived potential threat that specific programs pose to many of the respondents. Only eight of the twenty-four respondents favored any specific programs to assist minority groups, although all twenty-four favored equal treatment for all people under the law. Most of the respondents who objected to specific programs to assist minorities did so because they felt such programs constituted reverse discrimination and were therefore unfair. Four of the respondents openly expressed anti-black feelings. One, who indicated he worked with blacks, said, "Blacks are lazy, they don't want to work." Another respondent said she favored education programs for blacks

because education, "is the only way to stop them from being the animals they are now."

Three of the respondents who favored civil rights programs indicated they were influenced by their religion. They felt that Jews must help the disadvantaged minorities. One said, "Very fine thing, very proud of the rabbis and Jews who took part [in civil rights]." Most of the respondents indicated that their opinions on civil rights were influenced by the printed media and by personal experiences. As indicated earlier, the interviewees felt civil rights was unimportant to them, and they had very little knowledge of the issues.

On international matters the subjects, as they had with civil rights, indicated they did not care and knew very little about the specific issues. The answers they gave were usually vague and most spoke in cliches or catch-phrases. The reasons they did give for support or opposition to a program were almost always concrete or practical, rather than philosophical. They said they were not influenced by any ideology or philosophy in their opinion formation, but by the printed media and personal life experiences such as foreign travel and business contacts. Most stated they virtually never thought about international issues, and they did not consider them to be directly relevant to their lives. Only one person made any connection between general American foreign policy and Israel.

The majority of the subjects are not in favor of concessions to Communist countries because they feel the Communists

cannot be trusted. One subject said, "The Communists do not honor their word." Those who do favor concessions do so because they feel we have to co-exist and therefore have no choice but to cooperate with the Communist world. One advocate of concessions summed up this feeling when he said, "We [America] should take risks for peace."

Seventeen interviewees, almost the entire group, support aid to underdeveloped countries.<sup>2</sup> The most often cited reason was "need." "The countries who have should give to the countries who need" was a recurrent theme expressed on this issue. This was the one issue where reasons given for support could be seen to be based on a moral or philosophical foundation. Individuals who objected to aid did not do so on ideological grounds, but for practical reasons. They felt that the money is not appreciated or that it never gets to the people who need it. Not one of the respondents mentioned even a single detail concerning American aid to underdeveloped countries.

When asked what they felt should be done about the defense budget, the respondents indicated that they knew very little about it and did not feel qualified to make any judgment. Several indicated, "Only an expert could judge what to do." The few who favored cutting the defense budget wanted only "to cut the fat but not the substance," and those who favored increases were equally vague, indicating only that

<sup>2</sup>This finding is at variance with the data on the mail questionnaire where only 19% favored aid to underdeveloped countries.

we must maintain our strength.

The interviewees have little to say about international issues. They indicate that issues are unimportant to them. They show no knowledge of international issues. Almost no one made a connection between general international issues and Israel, which is an issue of importance to the group. The interviews made it very clear that internationalism was an area which occupied a very low priority in the politics of suburban Jews.

There were two specific issues of general domestic concern which were discussed in the interviews: direct federal aid to American cities, and a national health plan. These issues were considered by the investigator to be especially good indicators of liberalism, because both involve intervention by the federal government to achieve social goals. In the mail questionnaire, both of these proposals received overwhelming support from the sample. Seventy-five percent of the sample support both proposals. The data from the interviews indicate that the support for these programs are motivated by practical considerations, not ideological ones. The position taken by the group places them in the liberal camp, but they do not take this position because they are liberal. National health and aid to the cities are issues which are of little direct importance to the group, and ones of which the interviewees have very little knowledge. Some kind of national health plan is a program the interviewees

wish would happen rather than something in which they are actively engaged. Seventeen of the interviewees favored a national health plan; the major reason given in every instance was economic. The interviewees indicated that the cost of medical care was excessive, and posed for them a potentially devastating financial burden.

Aid to the cities is supported by a majority of the respondents, primarily for practical reasons. The two reasons most frequently cited were "cities need aid" and "America cannot survive without its cities." One subject stated, "without aid to the cities the country will die. The heart of the country is in Bridgeport." On both of these issues the subjects indicated that they have very little knowledge and little direct interest in them. No one, for example, mentioned that the government already directly aids cities through revenue sharing, nor did anyone make reference to any specifically proposed national health plan; this follows the pattern established on other issues unrelated to ethnic group concerns. These issues have little direct relevance to the group. The interviewees attach little importance to them, are uninvolved in them, and are relatively uninformed concerning them.

The one set of issues not directly related to ethnic group concerns which are of importance to the group are civil liberties issues. Many of the subjects indicated that civil liberties were very important to them. One person stated,

"Civil liberties are even more important than freedom of religion." The majority of the subjects were opposed to any relaxation of civil liberties, by a margin of fourteen to eight. All of the eight who favored relaxation of civil liberties in an effort to reduce crime indicated extensive personal experience with crime, especially in the central city. The major reason cited for opposition to any relaxation of civil liberties was the threat to freedom which is inherent in any relaxation of civil liberties. One respondent said, "I am afraid civil liberties have been eroded too much. If you erode civil liberties, you could wind up with a police state." Another individual indicated that a destruction of civil liberties was the first thing Hitler did. The general tone of the remarks concerning this issue was that if one group's civil liberties were taken away, any group's civil liberties could be taken away. Many of the interviewees spoke at length on this matter, and were articulate and knowledgeable in their views. The data indicate that civil liberties is an issue which is important to the group.

The question which arises out of the discussion on civil liberties is why these issues are important political issues to the group, when other issues unrelated to ethnic concerns are not. While there is no direct evidence to support the position, I believe that civil liberties is an important transition between non-ethnic and ethnic concerns. My position is based on the fact that most of the respondents associated

the threat to civil liberties with the group rather than the individual. The data indicate that the group most important to the sample is the ethnic group, and that a strong civil liberties stance is another way of attempting to protect the position of Jews in America.

The data from the personal interview indicate that neither ideology in general nor specifically liberal ideology influence the political opinions of suburban Jews. The group has little interest or knowledge on most political issues. They are not consciously motivated or influenced politically by either ethnic or social class factors. Factors which they say influence their opinions are practical considerations, and they base their views on scanty information which is received from a variety of sources. There is no evidence that on general political issues there is any one strong influence on the group. They are primarily apolitical on issues unrelated to ethnic group concerns. The liberalism indicated by the mail questionnaire seems more a by-product, or an effect of their political opinions, rather than a cause of their opinions. The views of the group are moderate and reflect no ideological extremes. They basically indicate a group which is uninterested and uninformed on most political issues.

#### Political Issues Which Are Ethnically Related

The interviews further indicate the difference between

those issues which are ethnically related and those which are unrelated to ethnic concerns. The data strongly indicate that issues of ethnic concern, especially Israel, are very important to the group. When discussing Israel and the Middle East, the respondents stated that Israel was the most important issue to them. They were knowledgeable on this issue, interested and involved. The reasons they give for why they support Israel and the intensity of their support indicate the importance of this issue to the suburban Jew.

The issues related to Israel and the Middle East were discussed with the subjects generally, rather than through specific questions. The respondents all fit into one of three categories: those who gave unqualified support to Israel, those who supported Israel with reservations, and those who did not consider the matter to be important. There was no one interviewed who indicated that he was opposed to policy that might benefit Israel. Most of the group indicated their unqualified support for Israel. This support included all the items asked on the original questionnaire, including total willingness to use American troops if it were necessary. This group thought that Israel was totally correct in its territorial expansion, that Israel truly wanted peace but the Arabs did not, that Israel had already made too many concessions, and that Israel was very willing to compromise while the Arabs were inflexible. This group indicated little concern for the Palestinian situation. They took the position that

the Palestinian problem was not Israel's responsibility, but the responsibility of the Arab nations. Concerning American policy, the interviewees wanted the United States to support Israel with aid and to give no aid or sell any military goods to the Arab nations. They wished the United States to support Israel, but not to pressure Israel or to try in any way to dictate policy in the Middle East.

The second category of respondents were those who supported Israel, but with reservations. There were only two or three individuals in this category, and their reservations were either concerned with Israel's responsibility for helping to settle the Palestinian problem, or concerned with the use of American troops. Essentially this group was as fully supportive of Israel as the first group.

The most often mentioned reason given for support of Israel was the need for a Jewish homeland, and how (the opinion that) the survival of all Jews was dependent on the success of the State of Israel. One respondent said, "I support Israel with all my heart and soul. All Jews are one, the State of Israel is more than just a nation. If it dies, all Jews die." A connection was made by many between the survival of the State of Israel and the survival of Jews.

The second most often mentioned reason for support of Israel was that Israel was a source of Jewish pride: Israel seems to enable many of the respondents to enjoy a vicarious experience of success and to derive personal and group

satisfaction and accomplishment because of Israel's successes. One respondent said, "As long as Israel exists, Jews will not be the minority that people can step on. Because of Israel, Jewish people all over the world raise their head, they do not have to be afraid." Another respondent said because of Israel "the Gentile has more respect for the American Jew." This same person talked at length of how, when in 1948 Israel had military success, his fellow workers looked at him differently, with more respect, and how he had felt proud and superior.

The third reason given for support of Israel was that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, and deserved American support for that reason. This reason was given most frequently by people with reservations about Israel. Those individuals also tended to shy away from considering Israel a homeland, or linked to Jewish survival. Reasons one and two were both cited by many, but the latter reason usually was given alone. One respondent caught the difference between this and the other reasons when he said, "The reason the United States should support Israel is because it is a democracy, but the reason I support Israel is because I am a Jew." Most of the subjects clearly supported Israel because they were Jews, but several seemed to need to find a reason to support Israel for secular reasons.

There were four people in the sample who did not support Israel. One found the arguments which called Israel a Jewish homeland and linked Israel to Jewish survival to be beyond

his own experience. He could not relate to either of those positions. He indicated his concern for Israel was the same as his concern for Zambia, England, or any other country. Another said it was possible we might need a Jewish homeland, but he certainly wasn't sure of it, and felt much more strongly about the general economy, balance of trade and cost of energy. There were two others who were lukewarm in their support of Israel. They also had difficulty accepting the arguments of Jewish survival and Israel as a Jewish homeland.

Israel is the most important issue that was discussed by the group. All of the individuals who supported Israel indicated that it was the single most important political issue to them. They were in full support of Israel. They followed events closely, cared deeply, and for many it was the only political issue that had any real meaning. Many spoke at great length about the Middle East. They displayed a good deal of knowledge concerning the history of the area and its current state. Several subscribed regularly to publications such as the Jerusalem Post so as to be better informed. Many had traveled to Israel, with several indicating multiple visits. One respondent said she had visited Israel more than thirty times, another fifteen, and a third twelve times. Three people indicated that in the last ten years they had been officers in national organizations whose primary purpose was to support Israel. Most of the respondents spoke easily, articulately, knowledgeably, and emotionally on this issue. One individual

who had a high school education and worked as a skilled laborer answered the items concerning political issues in monosyllables, and indicated on each one that he had no interest or opinion on it. He spoke on the issue of Israel, however, for five minutes, displaying clearly thought out positions. Every measure available strongly indicates that this is the most important political issue to suburban Jews.

The strength and intensity with which the sample expressed their views toward Israel indicate the importance of ethnic concerns to them. The reasons which were given for support of Israel demonstrates that ethnic self-interest is a factor which influences the political opinions of the sample population. The respondents state that Jews, like other groups, deserve a homeland, and that such a homeland is critical to the survival of the Jewish people. The interviewees do not indicate that they care about the problems other groups in the area have, such as the Palestinians. They further do not seem to consider the Middle East to be a complex situation. The issue is clear-cut and simple for them. The sample believe that Jews need Israel to survive, and therefore that Israel must survive.

The data gathered from the interviews which is concerned with the population's opinions on a range of political issues parallels the findings from the mail questionnaire. The data from the mail questionnaire indicate that the sample is influenced by social class factors on certain political issues, and

by ethnic factors on other issues. The data from the interviews indicate that those issues which are influenced by social class factors are unimportant to the group, while those influenced by ethnic factors are important. The conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that ethnicity is an important factor in the salience of a given political issue for suburban Jews.

#### Political Behavior

The responses to questions concerning political behavior further indicate that the sample is basically apolitical except on issues which are of ethnic group concern. The interviews indicate that the level of political activity which was reported on the mail questionnaire was grossly inflated. In the mail questionnaire, 33% indicated that they worked at least occasionally for candidates, but in the interviews only 7% indicated having ever worked for candidates. Most respondents indicated that they had never taken part in any form of political activity. The reasons given by the subjects for what would motivate them to work for a candidate concerned the personality and character of the candidate himself. Factors such as issues, ideology, or party were not mentioned as motivating criteria. Most indicated they would work for a candidate only if the individual was "special," if the candidate had personal qualities which were outstanding. One subject summed up the general position of the group when she said,

"I would work for someone if the candidate had a quality that was bigger than the words." The level of general political activity is minimal for the sample population, which further indicates the unimportance of politics to them.

The interviewees indicated that there were only two political causes in which they were involved: local schools and Israel. The reasons given for involvement were self-interest and the desire to aid Israel and the Jewish community. Involvement in Israel is seen by the sample population as that which one does simply because one is a Jew. Most of the respondents seemed surprised when asked why they were involved in Israel. They gave the interviewer the impression that they believed such involvement was the natural thing to do. It was not something one decided to do, but rather something one automatically did. The minimal amount of political activity indicated by the interviewees further confirms the basic apolitical nature of the group, as well as the importance placed on issues of ethnic concern as opposed to political issues which are ethnically unrelated.<sup>3</sup>

An apparent contradiction between the political activity engaged in by the interview population and their support of Israel was explained during the course of the interviews. One would expect that, given the importance of Israel to the group, they would indicate that they engage in political

<sup>3</sup>Most of the interviewees did not consider their involvement in schools as political but saw it as a parental duty. The involvement was mostly with the PTA.

activity such as supporting candidates whose views on Israel are sympathetic. Israel, however, was not mentioned once as a motivation for political activity. The interviews indicated that ethnically related political activity is not pursued directly through the political system, but through intermediate ethnic organizations, which in turn interact with the political system. The individual can therefore distinguish between political activity and ethnic group activity. Hence the basic lack of interest the respondents have in politics is maintained with respect to their political activity, even though they indicate a high level of activity on Israel (which is, of course, a political issue).

#### Sources of Political Identification

The interviews firmly established that issues which are politically important to the sample are those issues which concern the ethnic group. This finding was further supported by the question asked the interviewees, "With what group's interests in society did they politically identify?" Twenty of the respondents indicated they identified primarily or exclusively (sixteen indicated exclusive identification) with the political interests of Jews. Four indicated they did not identify with the political interests of Jews. These four were consistently at variance with the majority of the sample on ethnically related matters. The data clearly indicate that the primary political group to the suburban Jew is the ethnic

group. The sample indicates no other group whose political interests they identify with or consider important. The indication is that the suburban Jew sees his own interests bound with the interests of the ethnic group. One subject said, "What I want to know, is it good for the Jews?" Most indicated they would support a position if it was good for the ethnic group, without considering any other aspect of the position. The identification with the ethnic group is the most powerful political attachment in the world of suburban Jews.

What the Terms "Liberal" and "Conservative" Mean  
to the Sample Population

The literature<sup>4</sup> indicates that American Jews are liberal in their political attitudes and behavior, and the data from the mail questionnaire indicate that this is so for the sample population. Yet liberalism was not mentioned once as a factor which influenced anyone's political opinions or behavior. Further, ideological identification by the respondents was not statistically significant on any item in the mail questionnaire. In order to explore the meaning of liberalism for the sample population, each interviewee was asked what the terms "liberal" and "conservative" meant to him politically, and what his own political philosophy was.

The respondents used personal terms to describe liberal and conservative. The overwhelming majority, seventeen, used

<sup>4</sup>See Lawrence Fuchs, The Political Behavior of American Jews, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956).

positive terms to describe liberal and negative ones to describe conservative. Only two of the respondents spoke about the terms liberal or conservative in terms which could be even remotely considered ideological, philosophical, or directly political. "Liberal" was said to mean "open-mindedly fair, willing to change and caring about people." "Conservative" was said to mean "closed-minded, status quo oriented, anti-progressive and pro big business." Those who considered themselves to be conservative put the negative connotation on liberal, and the positive one on conservative. What can be concluded is that the majority see "liberal" as something positive but do not connect it with a political philosophy or ideology. This is further evidenced when one examines the responses to the question concerning political philosophy. Not one of the respondents indicated that he had a clear political philosophy. They spoke in vague generalities or used personal terms to describe their political philosophy. Most made it clear that political philosophy was not a matter which they had ever thought about. To be liberal, for Jews, would seem to be an effect of a host of factors which this study has not been able to determine, although ethnic and class factors appear to be important. What is most important, however, is that the liberalism of suburban Jews is an effect of their politics, not a cause of their political opinions and behavior.

Importance of Anti-Semitism and  
Denominational Identification

The data indicate that the group identifies politically very strongly with issues of ethnic concern. The evidence is clear that, whether or not ethnicity has a general influence on political attitudes, on those issues which are of ethnic concern suburban Jews are a distinct political group. In the mail questionnaire, two variables were found significant with respect to the individual's position on issues of ethnic concern: denominational identification, and one's perception of how serious a problem anti-Semitism is in the United States. The personal interviews strongly indicate that denominational identification is not seen by the respondents to have any significance, but that one's perception how serious a problem anti-Semitism is in the United States is very significant to the group; it is also significant with respect to the position one takes on matters of ethnic concern.

The respondents were asked the question "How, if it exists, does anti-Semitism manifest itself in America?" Twenty out of twenty-four subjects considered anti-Semitism a problem, seventeen out of the twenty indicated that they had had no personal experience with anti-Semitism for many years, and three indicated recent experience with anti-Semitism. The opinions and feelings of the respondents on this matter were very strong, and it is a matter of the utmost importance and concern to the group.

This was an area where the respondents spoke easily, without lengthy consideration. They were quite sure anti-Semitism still existed in America and that it is widespread, but thought it had become covert rather than overt. Most respondents had a similar belief that anti-Semitism exists in educational opportunities, in restricted housing, in restricted country clubs, in job discrimination (especially at high level corporate and banking positions) and in the attitudes of the American people. One subject emphatically stated, when the question was asked, "First of all, it does exist." All the respondents who believed it was a problem indicated it was covert, subtle and serious. One respondent said, "It is always there--under the surface." Another said, "There is a lot of it, but it is hiding." For the respondents there was no doubt that, while it is covert, anti-Semitism has remained a very serious problem in America, and it has not lessened very much in the lifetime of the respondents. One subject indicated that he had no more fist fights and no one called him a "dirty Jew" as they did when he was a child, but the same anti-Semitic feelings and the same beliefs in anti-Semitic generalities are still present in society. "It is there," one respondent said; there exists in American society "deep-rooted attitudes against Jews."

The four respondents who did not consider anti-Semitism a problem do not differ from the others in any radical way. They have had little or no personal anti-Semitic experiences,

but neither have most of the others. Denominationally, two are secular identifiers, one is a Reform Jew and one a Conservative identifier. They believe that Jews are sensitive to anti-Semitism and distort what little there might be out of all proportion. One indicated that, "Jews are super-sensitive to anti-Semitism, and see it where it frequently isn't." Another indicated Jews were victims who saw everything as anti-Semitic in order to "commiserate on their common martyrdom." Two of the respondents indicated that a little anti-Semitism may possibly exist, but that certainly it wasn't a very "big deal." One subject expressed it by saying, "I have no strong feeling of anti-Semitism. I don't know; it may be a latent thing. Far less than for minority groups, even Catholics. What little I see just rolls off. I have no time to get involved in something of so little importance."

Those who identify anti-Semitism as a serious problem in the United States are more concerned with issues related to the ethnic group than those who do not see it as a problem. There is a statistical relationship between belief in anti-Semitism and secular identification. The indication is that those who see anti-Semitism as a problem need to identify with the ethnic group out of a belief that the group operates in a hostile environment and must band together out of a need for survival. This position is consistent with the stratification literature<sup>5</sup> discussed in Chapter One. The relationship

<sup>5</sup>See Chapter One for discussion of ethnic stratification, also Tomotsa Shibutani, and Kian M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification (London: Macmillan and Co., 1965).

of anti-Semitism to concern with ethnic-related issues indicates that American Jews are to some extent fixated in the initial stage of ethnic assimilation. Primary identification with the group is based on the practical grounds of a need for group survival.

#### The Deviant Group

The importance of the issue of anti-Semitism is further indicated by an examination of the deviant group. The deviant group are those four respondents who do not consider anti-Semitism to be a serious problem in America. They differ with the majority on virtually every measure of political attitudes and behavior related to issues of ethnic concern.

There are four individuals who comprise this group. They are dissimilar to the general group and are similar to each other on several crucial issues. The four are denominationally mixed, with two secular, one Reform and one Conservative. Three are men and one is a woman. Occupationally one is unemployed, two are professionals, and one owns a business. Educationally they are all college graduates and their yearly family incomes range from \$14,000 to \$80,000. The group cannot be explained in terms of denominational identification or by any social class indicators. Politically the group does not vary from the others on any of the general opinion questions (save one on general political activity), on degree of liberalism or on involvement in politics. Finally the

deviant group does not vary from the others on early experiences related to Judaism or association with formal or informal religious stimuli.

The group's deviance is on matters related to support for Israel and Judaism, and on personal feelings about the meaning of Judaism in their lives. The group is considerably less supportive of Israel and Soviet Jewry. The group does not see as much that is unique about the Jewish approach to life as the entire sample does. They speak in neutral or negative terms about what is personally special about being Jewish, and they do not see Judaism as having influenced them as political beings. The deviant group all fit the above description. While others in the sample join this group for one or another item, no one but these four follow the complete pattern. The group deviates in its lack of support of Israel, the general low level of influence Judaism has had on the individuals, and their very limited identification with the political interests of the ethnic group. These four all indicated that they did not identify with the political interests of Jews, and three of them indicated other groups with whom they did identify.

What is the causative factor which makes this group deviant? A very careful examination of all the interviewees' responses does not provide a clear answer to the question, but there is one item on which these four stand alone. It is, further, an item which the subjects identify as very important. The item of critical importance is anti-Semitism

in America. These four either saw no anti-Semitism, or considered it a minor problem not worth talking about. Two of the four said that while there may be some anti-Semitism, it was constantly slackening. This was the one item in which the most distinct dichotomy existed between these four and the rest of the group. Why this group does not see anti-Semitism where others do was not explored, but the difference between those who do see it and those who do not is dramatic. On support for Israel, as an example, the subjects were very strong in their views and very firm. Most gave forceful reasons for their support of Israel, such as its importance to the survival of all Jews, the need for a Jewish homeland, or Israel as a source of prestige. The issue is without any doubt the most important political concern to the population except for the deviant group, who indicated that Israel and its survival was not of great importance to them. One respondent said he thought no more about Israel than he did about Zambia and another, who gave the strongest pro-Israel position of the deviant group, indicated that he supported Israel, but that Israel was not as important an issue to him as inflation or government spending.

The deviant group also was either negative or neutral about what was "special" about being Jewish. They said "nothing is special, I don't feel special" or, as one indicated, that what was special about being Jewish was putting up with a lot of silly and unnecessary rituals. The deviant group

recognized the idea of a Jewish approach to life and identified the same characteristics as were generally identified. The critical factors which separate the deviant group from the rest of the respondents are, first and most important, that the deviants do not see anti-Semitism as a problem, and secondly, that the deviants do not see anything special or positive about being Jewish. The differences between the groups are on practical, not ideological grounds. The differences directly involve what is perceived to be the ethnic group's self-interest. Most of the respondents indicate that they must protect themselves as Jews because of a hostile world. The deviant group does not take this position. They are no more or less humanistic or ideological than the others. They are not more or less political, and they do not differ on what basic Jewish values are. They do differ on how serious a problem anti-Semitism is.

This division on the seriousness of anti-Semitism leads to several other positions, specifically, less support for Israel and a lack of identification with the political interests of Jews. This strongly indicates that the motivating factor for a good deal of political behavior of most respondents is a desire to protect the ethnic group, and hence themselves, in a world they perceive to be hostile. The deviants do not see the world as hostile to the ethnic group and, therefore, do not see the need to be protected by the group. They can afford to abandon the group and either strike out

as individuals, or seek new groups with which they are politically compatible. What the deviant group tells us about the others is that most of the respondents cannot leave the group because they fear they will be vulnerable for being what they are, and so must stay with their own out of a need for self-preservation.

General Influence of Ethnicity on  
Political Attitudes

The data indicate that ethnicity is a crucial variable on issues of ethnic concern. The question remains unanswered, however, whether ethnicity has a general influence on the political attitudes and behavior of the group. This has been a major concern of the literature regarding the causes of Jewish political behavior.<sup>6</sup> Fuchs argues that Jewish political behavior is a function of Jewish tradition and laws, while Cohn argues Jewish political behavior is caused by the political and historical reality of what serves the self-interest of Jews. The data from Chapter Four does indicate that there is a general influence of ethnicity on political matters when Jews are compared to the population in general. This matter was explored in the personal interviews, and the conclusion can be drawn that the respondents believe that ethnicity has influenced their political attitudes, but that they are very unclear as to its specific manifestations, implications and

<sup>6</sup>See Chapter Two also Fuchs, op. cit., and Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).

consequences.

When asked why they thought American Jews have been traditionally liberal,<sup>7</sup> the interviewees fell into one of two camps (which are similar to the positions held respectively by Fuchs and Cohn). One group indicated that Jews are liberal because it is in the traditions and values of Judaism to be liberal. One subject said, "Contained within our body of laws is an approach to everything that comes up between people, and there is always a humane answer." The other group believes Jews are liberal because it is in their self-interest to be liberal. This view was expressed by one respondent who said, "If you help the oppressed, Jews might do better." The indication is that both Jewish values and ethnic self-interest influence the overall political attitudes of the group.

The last question each respondent was asked was whether he believed that being Jewish has influenced the sum total of his political thoughts and actions. The majority (sixteen) felt it had, but they could not be specific about how it had. One respondent indicated, "I think the central core of who I am is that I am a Jew. Judaism permeates all areas of my life." The general tone of the responses was that Judaism affects every aspect of life, so it must also affect one's politics. The fact that so many in the sample are liberal, combined with the fact that the subjects are unclear of what influences their political thinking, does indicate that their

<sup>7</sup>This item was designed to elicit respondents own personal political philosophy with respect to his Judaism by indirect questioning.

ethnicity is a factor in their political attitudes. It is a factor, however, which operates in a subtle and indirect manner which seems to predispose the individual toward liberal opinions and programs. The effect of ethnicity, however, is clearly not a major influence on the attitudes and behavior of suburban Jews except on matters of ethnic concern.

#### Chapter Summary

The interviews support the findings from the mail questionnaire. Ethnicity is critical to the politics of the group on matters of ethnic concern, and it is a subtle indirect influence on general political issues. On non-ethnic-related issues, other variables play a major role. The interviews confirm that the group is basically apolitical on most issues. The issues which are politically important to the respondents are those which concern ethnic matters, especially Israel. The politics of the group is primarily determined by ethnicity, and the primary political interests the group identifies with are the interests of Jews. The group is held together politically by the belief that anti-Semitism is a major problem in the United States. The belief in anti-Semitism appears to be the single most important variable in their positions on issues which are of ethnic concern. Finally, the interviews indicate that the group is liberal, but that this liberalism appears to be the effect of social class and ethnic factors. The predisposition to be liberal does not appear to be a causal factor of influence in the behavior of the group.

---

## Chapter 5

### Introduction

The major purpose of this chapter is to examine the data in an attempt to establish if the hypotheses are confirmed. The secondary purpose is to analyze and interpret the major findings of the research with respect to their meaning for ethnic studies and what further research they indicate is warranted.

My fundamental thesis is American suburban Jews define the political world by ethnic criteria. That is, they judge political events in terms of what they believe they mean to the ethnic group. They do this because they see their own personal self-interest inextricably linked to the success or failure of the ethnic group. The importance of ethnicity is not based on philosophical or ideological criteria but on the practical rationale that the group needs to stick together because of the potential threat of discrimination against group members because of their religion. The group is held together with respect to political behavior by the reasons discussed in the ethnic stratification literature (see Chapter One). An immigrant group will remain together when they first come to a new country because of non-acceptance by the host society

and they will be subject to social, economic and political discrimination. As long as it is believed that the discrimination continues to exist, the individual will either remain tied to the ethnic group for protection or attempt to deny his ethnicity in order to be accepted by the host society and be judged by achievement criteria. The first stage will always be, however, group solidarity. In this stage the group will attempt to secure for itself within the society social and economic opportunities. Both the assimilationist and mobilization theories accept this as the initial stage for the white immigrant in America. In most of the literature the assumption made is this stage ends when the group begins to move up the socio-economic ladder and moves to second generation in the United States. The critical dimension is, however, perception of discrimination. If the group continues to believe itself to be subject to discrimination, an outside group, then the rationale which creates the initial group solidarity is very likely to remain in effect. The group cannot separate from its ethnicity nor can it assert it as a means of re-identification with roots, but remains together fixated in the first stage of the assimilation process. The degree of socio-economic success does not itself alter the group's outlook. It is not possible to study the reassertion or diminution of ethnicity for a group if the group remains held together out of stratification rationales. Neither the mobilization nor the

assimilationist theories can explain the degree of ethnic behavior for suburban Jews because both assume the individual by second generation has left stage one. They assume one can further prove a group has left stage one by examining the social class movement of the group. It is the contention of this author that what determines the stage of assimilation is the individual's perception of discrimination, and that the suburban Jew perceives a great deal of anti-Semitism to exist. Jews are, therefore, in stage one of the assimilation process. This explains the importance of ethnicity to the group. It is not possible to deal with the question of whether ethnicity will cease to be important to the individual until such time as he no longer perceives himself to be part of a discriminated against minority. It is the author's contention that the data while not definitive supports confirmation of both the basic thesis and the position that the group basically considers itself to be subject to discrimination in the society because of a religious and ethnic membership.

#### An Examination of the Evidence

#### Relating to the General Thesis

Two initial questions arise which are related to the general thesis position. One is, does the group consider itself to be an ethnic group, and two, do the members of the group feel close to each other? The data clearly supports an affirmative response to both of these questions. On the

original questionnaire the sample was asked of what ethnic group do you consider yourself to be a member. Seventy-eight percent indicated Jewish or Jewish American. Less than 1% indicated a country of origin as the source of ethnicity. What this clearly shows is that the group makes no distinction between ethnic group and religious group. The two are the same. The religion and ethnic group are both Jewish. The group was asked to indicate how close they felt to a number of groups in society. The groups that the sample felt closest to were the religious and the ethnic group. Eighty percent felt close to the religious group compared to 48%, for example, feeling close to people with similar occupations. The data establishes clearly that the sample population sees the ethnic group as the same as the religious group and that they feel close to both of these groups.

The position that Judaism is more than just a religion to the group is supported by the data from the mail questionnaire. Seventy-five percent of the sample indicated that they felt themselves to be Jewish. Twenty-eight percent indicated that they felt Judaism was a factor in their life opportunities. Both of these strongly indicate that Judaism is a force important to the respondents. The group also indicates that Judaism is more than just a religion. The item on friendship patterns, 87% indicated that most or all of their closest friends were Jewish. Finally, in the interviews a number of respondents at some point made the distinction between Judaism

as just a religion and Judaism as a cultural entity. This further indicates that in the minds of the sample population Judaism is more than just a religion; it is a cultural phenomenon that has relevance to the individual. The conclusion that can be drawn is Judaism is the identified ethnic group for the sample population, and Judaism is not just a way of worship but a force which is socially, politically and economically relevant to the group and must be viewed in a broader context than just a religion.

Having established that Judaism is the ethnic group for the sample population, attention can now be turned to the general thesis that the political world for the suburban Jew is determined by its relevance to ethnic group concerns. The data supports this thesis. It indicates that the only political issues that are important to the group are those which they believe to be relevant to the ethnic group.

The original questionnaire indicates support for the position. Eighty-nine percent of the sample indicated that they believed Jews should engage in political activities that are relevant to Jews. While only 40% indicated their personal motivation for political activity was their religion, this difference might well be accounted for by the fact that the interviews established that a good deal of individual activity related to ethnic group concerns is done not through direct political action within the formal political system but through organizations which are not exclusively political in nature.

What then the 89% figure represents is a clear indication that the group recognizes and affirms ethnicity as a legitimate criteria for political behavior. Further evidence from the original questionnaire to support the thesis is the data on the political causes people are or have engaged in. With the one exception of involvement in local schools, matters related to the ethnic group were supported by a much greater percentage than other types of causes. Except for schools no issue of general national or local concern was supported by more than 41% of the sample while issues related to the ethnic group were supported by at least 56% of the group with a high of 78% support on direct aid to Israel. The data from the mail questionnaire while by no means conclusive establishes that the group considers conceptually, at the least, ethnicity a legitimate reason for political behavior and secondly the group behaviorally is considerably more involved in political causes related to the ethnic group than to anything and everything else.

The interviews provide further support for the general thesis. The respondents were asked to indicate how important to them were the political issues asked on the original questionnaire and what influenced their opinion on each of the issues. The results were dramatic. The most important issue was the success of Israel and the second most important issue was civil liberties. In fact, no other issue was important to the group, civil liberties was somewhat important and Israel

was very important. Many of the respondents indicated that Israel was the only political issue important to them. It was for many the only one they knew anything about and could express clear positions on. The importance of Israel supports the general thesis especially when one considers how very unimportant almost all other political issues were to the respondents. The major support, however, comes from the reasons they support Israel. The survival of all Jews and the great source of pride in Israel were the reasons most frequently cited for why they support Israel. These highly emotional reasons equating Israel with the literal survival of Jews indicates the intensity and importance of ethnic concerns for the group. Even civil liberties which is the only other political issue important to the group appears to be at least indirectly related to the ethnic group. This was indicated by the fact that the respondents wanted civil liberties protected because if you take it from one group you can take it from any group. The key is they looked at it as a group concern rather than an individual concern.

There were two other strong indicators from the interviews supporting the general thesis: One, the general lack of political activity; and two, the degree of identification with the political interests of groups in the society. The original questionnaire indicated the sample population to be rather actively involved in political activities such as working for candidates or contributing money to political campaigns. The

interviews showed that this original assessment was overstated. The group are actually not engaged in political activity and most indicated at some point in the interview that politics was not important to them, they thought very little about it and were not involved in it. This was further buttressed by their low level of involvement in political causes. The group has little concern for matters not related to the ethnic group and little interest in political activity. The only causes that they were involved in were support of Israel and local school issues. The last major piece of evidence which supports the general thesis is the groups with whose political interests the subject identified. With the exception of the deviant group all of them strongly identified with the political interests of Jews. Several also identified with the interests of other groups but for most the Jews were their only group identification.

The data strongly supports the general thesis that the political world is viewed in terms of what is important to the ethnic group. The only issues important are those of perceived concern to the ethnic group, the only causes they are actually involved in are those concerning the ethnic group except for involvement in schools, the interest and activity level in the political system generally is very low and the only group with whose interests they identify are the Jews. Finally they pursue their group interests through formal non-political organizations which are exclusively ethnic and can thus

reinforce both the group position and the importance of ethnic group concerns.

The data establishes the importance of ethnicity to the political behavior of the group. This leaves to be explored the contention that Jews view their position in the United States as that of a discriminated against minority because of their religion, and that this view persists independent of life accomplishments or social class gains made by individuals. The mail questionnaire showed that a substantial majority of the sample considered anti-Semitism to be a problem in the United States and that about 30% considered Judaism to be a factor in their life opportunities. This is compared to about 2% of the white population at large which considers their religion to be a factor. Considering religion to be a factor in your life opportunities is a clear indication of non-assimilation. Further, the belief that anti-Semitism is a problem when the individual has not been personally subject to it, as most of the sample indicated they had not, indicates that the group still sees the society as ethnically stratified and that they believe themselves to be near the bottom of the ladder.

The personal interviews provided similar stronger support for the position that the suburban Jew believes he is a discriminated against minority. With the exception of the deviant group which showed no social class, age or generational pattern, all others believed anti-Semitism was a major but covert

problem in the United States. They indicated it existed in almost all areas of life: housing, social clubs, education, business, and that it had not diminished in their lifetimes but had just become more subtle and more covert. There was no social class pattern to this view, a \$15,000 a year skilled worker expressed the same view as a physician with an income in excess of \$75,000. The group is quite convinced that anti-Semitism exists and exists strongly in America. This view exists even though seventeen of the twenty who expressed it have not themselves been subject to any personal anti-Semitism in years and no one felt that because of anti-Semitism they had ever lost a major life opportunity. A second indication of the stage one mentality of the group is the "life-death" of Judaism notion expressed in their support of Israel, and the view frequently stated that as long as Israel exists Jews can hold their heads a little bit higher, people will look upon Jews with more respect. There are many reasons to support the state of Israel but the ones given by the group clearly demonstrate a persecuted group mentality. The support is further linked to an attempt to move up in the estimation of perceived higher status societal group. These views further contain an implicit warning to Jews that given all this hostility if Jews don't stick together they won't survive. Another factor which supports the author's contention is that the group while indicating the strong influence of Judaism on their political beliefs show little direct influence of Jewish values

and traditions on their political attitudes and behavior. As discussed earlier there is evidence which appears to support the position that the individual is influenced by the values of the group, specifically the Jewish views on charity and social justice, but in the interviews these influences do not directly manifest themselves. This is consistent with the literature on stratification which argues an individual cannot identify with the values of the ethnic group directly while the group is in the initial stage of the assimilation process. The pride in the group is evident from the responses to question 17 on the interview, and this further indicates that the individuals are not assimilating and losing their ethnic group identity, but rather that they believe the group is in danger and Jews must stick together out of a need for survival. Identification with the group based on ethnic pride which can be freely exercised in an environment where the individual feels himself to be ascriptively secure is a stage that it appears Jews in America have not as yet reached.

The final evidence which supports the hypothesis is a comparison between the deviant group and the others in the sample. The deviants do not believe anti-Semitism is a problem, they do not support Israel, they are not involved in political causes which affect the ethnic group and they do not identify with the political interests of Jews. They do have a wider range of political interests than the others, they do have more well defined political philosophies, and they do consider

a greater number of political issues important to them compared with the others. They are not tied to the notion that they must stay with the group and it is reflected in the wider variety of their political activities. They seek their political alliances consistent with their desired goals and their ideologies. They break the relationship between the stage one perception reflected in the group's position on anti-Semitism and its political behavior. This demonstrates the degree to which most of the group is motivated in political behavior by ethnic concerns, and how most individuals are tied to the group because of the belief that the society is hostile to Jews.

#### An Examination of Each Individual Hypothesis

In this section we will look at the evidence that is relevant to each of the four specific hypotheses. The discussion of the hypotheses attempts to demonstrate the direction the evidence indicates for each hypothesis.

It is important to note that this study, as with most exploratory studies, raises more questions than it answers. The direction of the evidence is clear but neither the quantitative nor the qualitative data is definitive. The discussions of the general thesis and of the specific hypotheses are as valuable for what further research areas they indicate as for what they conclude. The implications for further research will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.

1. Ethnicity influences the political attitudes and political behavior of Jews on issues which are perceived to be ethnically related.

The data indicate strong support for this hypothesis. On the six questionnaire items used to measure opinions on ethnically related issues ethnic variables were statistically significant on all six.<sup>1</sup> One significant variable is denominational identification. The data indicate that Orthodox and Conservative identifiers are much stronger in their support for the position favorable to the ethnic group than are Secular or Reform identifiers. Perception concerning anti-Semitism was also significant on ethnically related items. Individuals who believe anti-Semitism to be a major problem are far stronger in their support for the position favorable to the ethnic group than are those who do not consider it a problem. The importance of ethnic variables on ethnically related issues is also clearly evidenced on those questionnaire items which explored the respondents' behavior. On all items the ethnic variables of denominational identification and/or perceptions concerning anti-Semitism are statistically significant. With respect to denominational identification a sharp break existed between the secular identifiers and all others. There is little direct evidence in the interviews which either supports or refutes this hypothesis. The one piece of datum which indirectly supports the hypothesis is, that the deviant group (who are

<sup>1</sup>Statistical significance was measured by a chi-square test. PL.05, DF.6.

separated from the others by an ethnically related variable) is much less interested than the others in political issues related to the ethnic group. The deviant group is also far less supportive of the position favorable to the ethnic group than are the others on the specific issues.

The data very clearly indicate that ethnic variables strongly influence attitudes and behavior on ethnically related issues. In addition the data indicate that other variables do not influence attitudes or behavior on ethnically related issues. Of the six questionnaire items which explored opinions on ethnic issues neither the social class variables nor generation were found to be significant. In the interviews there were no indications by any of the respondents that their opinions or behavior on ethnically related issues were influenced by factors other than ethnic ones. The conclusion based on the data is support for the hypothesis that ethnicity influences the political attitudes and political behavior of Jews on issues which are perceived to be ethnically related.

2. Social class variables influence political attitudes and political behavior on issues which are ethnically unrelated.

The data support this hypothesis. On the questionnaire there were fourteen items which explored political opinions on issues which are ethnically unrelated. Ethnic factors are not significant on any of these items. Social class factors, generation and age are significant. On virtually all of the

items which are ethnically unrelated the social class indicators have the greatest amount of influence on opinions and behavior.

The data indicate that political behavior and political attitudes are influenced by social class variables in a variety of ways. The greater one's income, the more education one has and the higher status one's occupation, the more liberal one is likely to be. The one major exception to this is that lower income persons are more liberal than middle income persons, but not as liberal as upper income ones. As was pointed out in Chapter One there exists a methodological weakness with respect to any analysis of social class due to the fact that there is very little variance of the social class indicators. This makes generalizations concerning the intra-class differences somewhat suspect but it does not alter the findings which indicate the general importance of social class on the sample population. On this point the data are clear and support strongly the hypothesis that social class variables influence political attitudes and political behavior on issues which are ethnically unrelated. This study does not determine the exact nature of this influence and further research in this area is clearly indicated.

3. The importance of a political issue to the individual is determined by the issue's perceived ethnic relevance.

The data strongly support this hypothesis. A major reason for conducting the personal interviews was to establish the

political intensity of the subject population with respect to ethnically and non-ethnically related political issues. The questionnaire data also, however, indicates support for the hypothesis. There are eleven separate issues, areas of political behavior, on which data was collected. Five of these issues are ethnically related. The political behavior of the sample population establishes clearly that ethnically related issues are more important to them than other types of political issues. The minimum political involvement of the sample population on ethnically related issues is 56.5% on combating anti-Semitism. The greatest involvement is on direct aid to Israel; 77% of the sample indicate involvement in this area. The involvement on general political issues is much lower on all issues save one. The percentage of the sample population involved in ethnically unrelated political issues ranges from 10.5% of the sample involved in busing to achieve racial balance to 41.4% of the sample involved in local zoning. The one exception is involvement in local schools; 55.4% of the sample are involved in this issue. These data clearly establish that the sample population considers ethnic political issues to be more important than non-ethnic political issues.

The interviews indicate further support for the hypothesis. The interviewees were asked how important to you are the political interests of Jews, and what other groups in society have political interests you consider important. Twenty out of the twenty-four people interviewed indicated that Jewish

political interests are most important to them, and most indicate that these are the only interests important to them. The few who indicated other groups are important to them all considered these groups to be of secondary importance compared to the political interests of Jews. In addition, most of the interviewees indicate most political issues are unimportant to them and they have little interest or knowledge about political issues which do not concern Jews.

The exceptions are ethnically related issues. On these issues the subjects indicate strong interest and in many cases a good deal of knowledge. The subjects further indicate a good deal of involvement in ethnically related issues. The conclusion drawn from an examination of the data is the hypothesis that the importance of a political issue to the individual is determined by the issue's perceived ethnic relevance is supported.

The data concerning **hypothesis four** is presented in Chapter Five and it strongly supports the hypothesis. Social class and generation have little impact on the importance of ethnicity. Ethnicity is just as important to the individual of a higher social class as to one of a lower social class. The personal interviews confirmed that social class is not a factor at all in one's commitment to ethnicity. The deviant group who do not find ethnicity important come from no set social class or generation. No item on the mail questionnaire

which was related to ethnic intensity or ethnic commitment had any significant relationship to social class. The conclusion to be drawn is that the individual does not lose nor does he gain ethnic commitment as a function of social class. The attachment to ethnicity as indicated by the personal interview comes from one's perception concerning the seriousness of anti-Semitism, one's feelings of pride in the ethnic group and one's degree of positive identification with the group.

The data indicates that generation also has no influence on the importance to the individual of ethnicity. Generation, as discussed in Chapter Five, has little influence in general and it does not influence the importance of ethnicity. The data from the mail questionnaire indicate the only generational item related to ethnicity, showed third generation individuals more influenced by ethnicity than other generations in the motivation for their political behavior. This indicates a possible increase in ethnic commitment or ethnic importance for advanced generations but since there was no other evidence which supported this position, it would be precipitous to conclude that advanced generation increased ethnic commitment. In the personal interviews generation did not come up as a factor on any items. An examination of the deviant group indicates it is not a factor for them. Two are second and two third generation individuals. As discussed in Chapter Five the logic of generation being significant is questionable.

The research evidence does not indicate any significant generational influence. Hypothesis number four is, therefore, confirmed by the research. Neither social class nor generation is an influence on the importance ethnicity holds for the individual.

General Discussion of the Findings and Areas  
Indicated for Further Research

The most basic and fundamental conclusion to come out of this research is that the only matters of political importance to suburban Jews are those which are seen to affect the ethnic group. Threat to the ethnic group is what activates the group to political action. They are not ideologically motivated in their political behavior, ethnic values are not a direct influence on their behavior and they do not behave politically out of a desire to express an ethnic pride. They are motivated by self-interest which now is to them synonymous with the ethnic group. The group believes that it continues to operate in a hostile environment and it believes political action can be used effectively to insure that the potential impact of discrimination can be minimized. It would appear while suburban Jews would take direction within the political system as they would deem appropriate to achieve their goals, they do not as a rule operate within the formal political system in order to pursue their major political goals. This is so because there are a number of organizations which pursue the political goals

for the group and the individual simply supports these organizations who in turn operate directly in the political system. The data strongly indicates that ethnicity is the prime motivation for political behavior for suburban Jews regardless of social class, generation or age. These variables appear to have little or no relevance to the individual's attachment to ethnicity with respect to his political behavior. The variable which is crucial is perception of anti-Semitism. Where the individual believes anti-Semitism to be a serious problem he has a strong general identification with the group and he is interested and involved in political issues which concern the group.

Those individuals who do not consider anti-Semitism to be a serious problem, have a weak general identification with the ethnic group and are not concerned with ethnic political issues. This group does not differ in any way from the others except on the issue of perceptions concerning anti-Semitism. This is a strong indication of support both for general stratification theory and for the contention that a key variable in ethnic identification and ethnically motivated political behavior is the individual's belief concerning the status of one's ethnic group in the society. This is an exploratory study and while this hypothesis has not been conclusively proven there is sufficient support to indicate this question deserves further serious study. The data which supports the hypothesis is primarily drawn from the interviews, and as such

is not data which is quantifiable.

The data further indicate that the direction of research should be consistent with stratification theory rather than with either the assimilationist theory or mobilization theory. The overt indicators of generation or social class which many researchers use to measure ethnic identification do not appear to be significant as perceptions concerning the status of the ethnic group. Research in the area should therefore be concerned with the exploration of the ethnic group's perceived status as it reflects on ethnic identification.

A second area of further research indicated by this study is the degree to which the ethnically motivated behavior of Jews is done out of a perceived self-interest and the degree to which it is done out of an ideological or moral position which is derived from Jewish thought and philosophy. This issue has been raised by a number of scholars who have attempted to analyze the liberal politics of American Jews. The two major schools of thought are discussed in Chapter One. One, described by Cohn, indicates Jewish politics is primarily out of self-interest. The other, described by Fuchs, indicates Jewish politics is based on a core of Jewish values. The data indicate some support for the Cohn thesis; however, clearly more research is needed.

On issues which are directly related to ethnic group concerns the data clearly indicate that ethnic self-interest and not ideology is a major influence on the political behavior

of Jews. The behavior of the group is designed to advance or protect the interests of Jews. It is self-interest politics because the data indicate Jews believe themselves to be operating in a hostile environment and they believe in a general sense that their own interest is limited to the success or failure of the ethnic group. The data is not clear concerning the exact nature of the link between individual and group interest, and it is an area also indicated for further study.

On issues which are ethnically unrelated the data is unclear on whether or not Jews are influenced by ethnicity in any way. The data indicate that social class factors influence suburban Jews on general political issues and not ethnic factors. There are however several factors which indicate that this area needs further research. One, is the general liberal attitude of Jews<sup>2</sup> expressed in the responses to the questionnaire. The sample expressed views which are considerably more liberal than the population at large. Two, is the interview data which indicate that Jewish values are considered by the group to be of a general influence on their lives but in most cases the individual is unsure of the exact nature of this influence. The data indicate the political issues which are pursued are those which concern the ethnic group, and that this is motivated by ethnic self-interest. What is unclear, however (and certainly demands further research) is the question do Jewish values or philosophy influence the political attitudes

<sup>2</sup>See Chapter One. The position taken by most researchers is that Jews as a group are politically liberal.

and opinions of American Jews. In this area the data raise more questions than they answer but do indicate further research.

A final area where further research is called for, based on an examination of the data, is why does an individual not identify with the ethnic group? The deviant group or non-ethnic group identifiers differ from the others on only the one major criteria: the serious of anti-Semitism in America. The question is why these people do not consider anti-Semitism to be a problem, and so conclude that their own self-interest is not related to the fortunes of the ethnic group. As shown in the discussion of the deviant group (Chapter Four) they do not differ from the others on any indicators except perceptions of anti-Semitism in America, and on their ethnic identification with respect to political behavior. The data do not offer any explanation for the group's deviation but does indicate the impact of the deviation. Further research in this area is clearly indicated.

It is important to note that the context within which the matter of ethnic influence must be analyzed is one which recognizes that suburban Jews believe themselves to be a minority group which is discriminated against and hence are perceptually in the initial stage of the ethnic assimilation process. This keeps the group fixated at a level where politics is engaged in for survival and does not allow the development of political action influenced by ethnic values. It is not possible to fully explore ideological ethnic influence for a

group which does not consider its status to be secure. The pride the individual feels for the specialness of the group and the very strong general identification with the group is not able to reach full fruition in such an environment.

The individuals who are not strongly identified with the group and who feel they have separated from the group did not indicate that this separation represents a negation of their Jewishness. They did reject, however, the perceived status position of the group. It is not that the deviant has become assimilated but rather that he has begun the process of moving away from the ethnic group. He will reach a point where he can choose to re-identify with the group or not make his separation permanent. If he does re-identify, it will not be because he feels he has to out of a need for survival but he will do so because he wants to. When this stage is reached for most of the group then a full exploration of ethnic influence will be possible.

Two further areas of study indicated by this research are why does the group consider its status threatened given the achievement record of Jews in America and the question of liberalism and the Jewish community. The group is clearly more liberal than the country at large but further research is needed to determine how much of an impact and how important this liberalism is to the political behavior of the group.

### Summary Statement

The two major findings of the research are only the degree to which ethnic group issues determines the political behavior of suburban Jews and secondly, the degree to which, despite the success of the group, suburban Jews consider themselves to operate in a hostile environment. This belief, it has been concluded, is critical to the political behavior of the group. The original questionnaire with a sample of 435 indicated a high degree of ethnic solidarity and a generally liberal posture for suburban Jews. It further indicated the general importance of ethnicity to the group, and that the religious group and the ethnic group are the same for suburban Jews. The data from the questionnaire indicated social class variables are an important influence on ethnically unrelated issues but that generation and age are not particularly significant for the group with respect to political behavior and attitudes. Lastly, the questionnaire data indicated that the issues of greatest solidarity and the political activities most important to suburban Jews were those which concerned the ethnic group.

The personal interview confirmed the importance of ethnicity in determining the group's political behavior. The only political matters of importance to the group were those which affected the ethnic group. The respondents indicated a low level of sophistication and a generally unexplicated political philosophy of the respondent. The group was for

the most part completely devoid of political content in their discussion of liberalism, conservatism and political philosophy. The interviews showed the community, denominational identification and social class were not important influences on the behavior of the group but that belief in the problem of anti-Semitism and pride and identification with the ethnic group were. The interviews further indicated that when one lost identification with the group, he also lost his desire to engage in ethnic political behavior. Finally, the study indicated that a group could be fixated in a stage of ethnic assimilation regardless of the number of generations in the country or the success the group has had. The research neither negates nor affirms any of the major theories concerning assimilation but it does seriously question the measures or criteria used to determine the developmental stages posited in these theories, and it strongly indicates a perceptual or psychological measure is more appropriate for measuring one's stage in the assimilation process. The study clearly indicates that ethnicity is important to the offspring of white immigrant groups but that a full understanding of the meaning of this importance is a complex issue and one which demands further study.

List of Appendices

- A. Mail Questionnaire.
- B. Letter sent to all subjects.
- C. Explanation of how interview population was chosen.
- D. Interview Questionnaire.

Appendix A

Please try to answer all questions. There are, of course, no right or wrong answers in these questions. Remember your anonymity is guaranteed. Only statistical results will be published.

For questions 1-12 please fill in your response on the line to the right of the question.

1. What is your sex? M \_\_\_ F \_\_\_
2. How old are you? \_\_\_\_\_
3. In what country were you born? \_\_\_\_\_
4. In what country was your mother born? \_\_\_\_\_
5. In what country was your father born? \_\_\_\_\_
6. In what country or continent was your mother's mother born? \_\_\_\_\_
7. In what country or continent was your mother's father born? \_\_\_\_\_
8. In what country or continent was your father's mother born? \_\_\_\_\_
9. In what country or continent was your father's father born? \_\_\_\_\_
10. How many grades of school did you finish?  
a) 1-6 b) 7-9 c) 10-11 d) high school e) college f) graduate g) other
11. What is your occupation? \_\_\_\_\_
12. If you are currently married, what is your spouse's occupation? \_\_\_\_\_  
(If you are not married or you are not currently living with spouse, please write "N.A." in space 12.)  
Starting with question 13 just circle the letter of the response you wish to make.
13. What was your approximate family income last year?  
a) 0-6,000 b) 6,001-12,000 c) 12,001-20,000 d) 20,001-26,000 e) 26,001-34,000 f) 34,001-44,000  
g) 44,001-54,000 h) 54,001 or over i) I don't know
14. If you had to choose one, what social class do you most consider yourself to be a member of?  
a) upper class b) upper middle class c) middle class d) lower middle class e) lower class  
f) working class g) no opinion h) other \_\_\_\_\_
15. Which of the following do you most consider yourself to be?  
a) non-Jewish b) orthodox Jewish c) conservative Jewish d) reform Jewish e) secular Jewish  
f) don't know g) other \_\_\_\_\_ (Secular means Judaism is cultural not religious for you)
16. In which of the following were you raised?  
a) non-Jewish b) orthodox Jewish c) conservative Jewish d) reform Jewish e) secular Jewish  
f) don't know g) other \_\_\_\_\_
17. If married is your spouse Jewish?  
a) not applicable b) yes c) no d) don't know e) other \_\_\_\_\_
18. In which one of the following are or were your children raised?  
a) no children or children too young b) non-Jewish c) orthodox Jewish d) conservative Jewish  
e) reform Jewish f) secular Jewish g) don't know h) other \_\_\_\_\_
19. Are you a member of a Synagogue or Temple?  
a) yes b) no
20. Please indicate in your own words the reasons for your Temple or Synagogue affiliation. (If you are a member, why? and if you are not a member, why not?)
21. How often do you attend religious services?  
a) never b) only on High Holy Days c) occasionally (10 times a year or less) d) moderately (about every 3 weeks) e) regularly (weekly) f) daily g) other \_\_\_\_\_
22. Do or did you encourage your children to attend religious services and take part in Jewish activities?  
a) non-applicable b) encourage strongly c) encourage d) neither encourage or discourage e) discourage  
f) discourage strongly
23. About how much do you contribute to the United Jewish Campaign (U.J.A.)?  
a) nothing b) under \$100 c) \$101 to \$400 d) \$401-\$800 e) \$801-\$1200 f) over \$1201 g) I do contribute but do not wish to reveal the amount. h) other \_\_\_\_\_

24. Please indicate in your own words the reasons you contribute if you do or the reasons you do not contribute if you don't.

25. Do you believe that an important part of being Jewish is supporting the state of Israel?

- a) definitely yes b) yes c) probably yes d) probably no e) no f) definitely no g) no opinion

26. Which one of the following most closely fits the ethnic group you feel yourself to be a member of?

- a) American b) Jewish c) Jewish-American d) Your nation of origin (example, German, Russian, Polish)  
 e) your nation of origin plus American (example, German-American, Russian-American) f) no opinion  
 g) other \_\_\_\_\_

27. I am going to list some categories of people. Please indicate how close you feel to each of them.

	Very Close	Close	Neutral	Distant	Very Distant	No Opinion
a. people of similar religion to you	a.					
b. people of similar occupations or professions to you	b.					
c. people of similar social class to your own	c.					
d. people of similar educational achievement as you	d.					
e. people who live in the same community as you	e.					
f. People of ethnic background similar to your own	f.					

28. Please indicate your feelings on your degree of "Jewishness". Personally regarding being Jewish I feel

- a) very Jewish b) Jewish c) moderately Jewish d) not Jewish at all e) no opinion

29. Of your three closest friends how many are Jewish?

- a) 3 b) 2 c) 1 d) 0 e) don't know

30. Do you feel that being Jewish has had an effect on your life opportunities?

- a) has had no effect b) it has held me back c) it is a handicap I have overcome d) it has helped me get ahead e) no opinion f) I don't know

31. Do you feel anti-semitism is a major problem in America?

- a) yes b) probably yes c) probably no d) no e) no opinion

32. Have you personally experienced much anti-semitism in your life?

- a) quite a bit b) some c) very little d) virtually none e) no opinion f) other \_\_\_\_\_

The following is a list of possible type actions the government could take. Please indicate your degree of support for each one of the actions.

33. Government programs to eliminate discriminatory practices against blacks in education, housing and jobs.

- a) strongly support b) support c) neutral d) moderately opposed e) strongly opposed f) no opinion

34. Government programs to desegregate schools except for busing.

- a) strongly support b) support c) neutral d) moderately opposed e) strongly opposed f) no opinion

35. Busing as a means to desegregate schools.

- a) strongly support b) support c) neutral d) moderately opposed e) strongly opposed f) no opinion

36. Government programs to help blacks obtain housing in suburbs.

- a) strongly support b) support c) neutral d) moderately opposed e) strongly opposed f) no opinion

37. Government programs which give financial aid to American cities.

- a) strongly support b) support c) neutral d) moderately opposed e) strongly opposed f) no opinion

38. The American government making concessions to Communist countries such as giving them favored trade status in order to better American relations with them.

- a) strongly support b) support c) neutral d) moderately opposed e) strongly opposed f) no opinion

39. Increased economic aid to African, South American and Asian countries.

- a) strongly support b) support c) neutral d) moderately opposed e) strongly opposed f) no opinion

40. American involvement in the political activities of other countries to try to keep the Communists out of power (such as our involvement in Italian politics).

- a) strongly support b) support c) neutral d) moderately opposed e) strongly opposed f) no opinion

41. Changes in the tax laws which would eliminate many current special deductions in the hope of making the income

tax fairer.

- a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 42. A government national health plan that would cover most medical and hospital expenses for every American.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 43. Strict government enforcement of air and water pollution standards.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 44. Procedures such as police searches without warrants and stop and frisk in an effort to reduce crime.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 45. Government surveillance such as wire taps of American citizens on matters concerning national security.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 46. Increase in defense spending for new weapons programs such as the B-1 bomber.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 47. The suspension of economic aid to any country that supported the United Nations resolution equating Zionism and racism.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 48. Stopping trade with Russia if the Russians do not allow emigration of Soviet Jews.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 49. American military supplies to Israel.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 50. The use of American troops, if necessary, to assist Israel.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 51. American policy of pressuring Israel to recognize the Palestinians in order to get a peace settlement.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 52. American friendship and aid to the Arab states.
  - a) strongly support   b) support   c) neutral   d) moderately opposed   e) strongly opposed   f) no opinion
- 53. Which of the political parties do you vote for in national and state elections?
  - a) Democrats 75 to 100% of the time   b) Democrats - majority of the time   c) Republicans 75 to 100% of the time   d) Republicans - majority of the time   e) about 50 - 50   f) don't vote   g) other \_\_\_\_\_
- 54. Which of the following do you most consider yourself to be?
  - a) very liberal   b) liberal   c) moderate (middle of the road)   d) conservative   e) very conservative
- 55. Below are a list of political activities. Please indicate by checking the box to the right your degree of involvement with these activities.

- a) voting
- b) campaign contributions
- c) work for candidates
- d) attending political rallies
- e) active in political party or club
- f) discuss politics with friends
- g) follow politics in newspapers and magazines
- h) write letters to newspapers or public officials
- i) wear campaign buttons or use bumper stickers

	Never	Occasionally	Regularly
a.			
b.			
c.			
d.			
e.			
f.			
g.			
h.			
i.			

- 56. Have you ever run for public office?   a) Yes \_\_\_   b) No \_\_\_\_\_
- 57. Is any of the political activity you engage in motivated by the fact that you are Jewish?
  - a) none of it   b) less than 25% of it   c) about 50% of it   d) about 75% or more of it   e) other \_\_\_\_\_
- 58. Do you believe that Jews must engage in political activity to get favorable government treatment for the state of Israel and on domestic matters important to Jews?
  - a) definitely yes   b) yes   c) probably yes   d) definitely no   e) no   f) probably no   g) no opinion
- 59. How many professional (those associated with your occupation) organizations are you a member of?
  - a) none   b) 1   c) 2   d) 3 or more

60. Below is a list of political issues some Americans might be involved in. Please indicate whether you are presently involved or have been involved in these activities. Involvement includes activities such as writing letters, demonstrating and working for candidates. Also please indicate if you have contributed money to any of these causes.

	never involved	have been or are presently involved	never contributed money	have contributed money
a) Civil Rights	a.			
b) Local School Issues	b.			
c) Local Zoning Issues	c.			
d) Conservation or Ecology	d.			
e) Opposition to a Military Venture	e.			
f) Freedom of Speech Issue	f.			
g) Combating Anti-Semitism in America	g.			
h) Busing to Achieve Racial Balance	h.			
i) Aid to Soviet Jewry	i.			
j) American Policy to Israel	j.			
k) Direct Aid to Israel	k.			
l) Others _____	l.			

61. Please indicate below if you are a member of any of the following Jewish organizations.

	not a member	active member	non-active member
a) B'nai B'rith Abraham Lodge	a.		
b) B'nai B'rith Harmony Chapter	b.		
c) Jewish War Veterans	c.		
d) Probus Club	d.		
e) Jewish Community Center	e.		
f) Brandeis Club	f.		
g) National Council for Jewish Women	g.		
h) Hadassah	h.		
i) Mizrahi	i.		
j) O.R.T.	j.		
k) Women's Auxiliary Jewish Home for the Elderly	k.		
l) Others _____	l.		

Use this space for any comments you have.

# FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY

NORTH BENSON ROAD, FAIRFIELD, CONNECTICUT 06430 ■ (203) 255-5411

Dear Fairfield resident,

Professor Donald Greenberg of Fairfield University in conjunction with the Greater Bridgeport United Jewish Council, is conducting a major research project as regards the Jewish population of Fairfield, Connecticut. The results will hopefully advance our knowledge as well as enable the local Jewish organizations to better serve the needs of the Jewish community.

The enclosed questionnaire will take you about fifteen minutes to complete. Please take the time from your busy schedule to complete the questionnaire and return it in the envelope provided. In order for the study to be valid and for the project to produce meaningful results, we need your response.

You have my full assurance that all responses will be anonymous, and will be utilized only to compile statistical results. Once the data has been collected, all records of those who have received questionnaires will be destroyed, and it will be impossible to identify any of the participants in the study.

If you have any questions please feel free to call me, Professor Greenberg, at any time. I can be reached at Fairfield University (255-5411, ext. 574), or at home (374-1907). Thank you for your cooperation, your time and effort are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,



Donald W. Greenberg  
Assistant Professor of Politics  
Fairfield University

P.S. It is possible that by an error a person who is not Jewish has received a questionnaire. If this has happened to you, please write "not Jewish" along with your name, on the top of the questionnaire and return it in the envelope provided.

Appendix C

There were twenty-four subjects interviewed. The interviews were conducted between January 10, 1977 and January 21, 1977. Most of the interviews were conducted in the homes of the respondents but three were held in the interviewer's office. The interview population was randomly chosen from those subjects who returned the original questionnaires. The respondents were divided into four categories based on denominational identification and six subjects were chosen from each category. The subjects were contacted and interview times were arranged. There were two refusals to be interviewed, both Orthodox identifiers and these were replaced by random selection.

An examination of the general characteristics of the interview population indicates that the subjects were representative of the entire sample population. There were thirteen women and eleven men. The ages ranged from a low of 30 years old to a high of 78. Income ranged from \$11,000 to over \$80,000. Occupationally there were a number of unemployed, several skilled workers, three businessmen or salesmen and several professionals. Educationally all but one had at least a high school degree and a substantial number had college or graduate degrees.

The questions asked each respondent were the same and closely paralleled the original questionnaire. The two major purposes of these interviews was to examine influences on the formation of political opinions and motivations for political

behavior. There were no structured choices and no attempt has been made to formally code the responses. Respondents were allowed to talk as long as they wished in answer to each question. No attempt was made to guide the answers. Notes were taken by the interviewer and these notes are the source for this chapter. It took approximately one hour to complete an interview although several lasted over two hours and the shortest one was completed in forty-five minutes.

Appendix D

1. How long have you lived in Fairfield?
2. What type of communities have you lived in during your adult life?
3. What type of community were you raised in?
4. How has living in a town such as Fairfield affected you as a Jew?
  - a) How have any other communities you have lived in affected you as a Jew?
5. Have you ever changed your denominational affiliation?
  - a) What was your reason for this?
6. What are your reasons for support or opposition to each of the following government programs:
  - a) Government programs to eliminate discriminatory practices against Blacks in education, housing, jobs.
  - b) Government programs to desegregate schools except for busing.
  - c) Busing as a means to desegregate schools.
  - d) Government programs to help Blacks obtain housing in suburbs.
  - e) Generally speaking, what do you feel the government should be doing in the area of civil rights.
  - f) What do you think have been the major factors in the formation of your opinions on civil rights.
  - g) How strongly do you feel about civil rights.
7. What are your reasons for support or opposition to each of the following government programs:
  - a) The American government making concessions to communist countries such as giving them favored trade status in order to better American relations to them.

- b) Increased economic aid to African, South American and Asian countries.
  - c) American involvement in the political activities of other countries to try to keep the Communists out of power.
  - d) Increases in the defense budget.
  - e) Generally speaking, what do you feel the government should be doing in the area of civil rights.
  - f) What do you think have been the major factors in the formation of your opinions on foreign affairs.
  - g) How strongly do you feel about foreign affairs.
8. What are your reasons for support or opposition to each of the following government programs:
- a) Procedures such as police searches without warrants and stop and frisk in an effort to reduce crime.
  - b) Government surveillance such as wire taps of American citizens on matters concerning national security.
  - c) Generally speaking, what do you feel the government should be doing in the area of civil liberties and also crime prevention.
  - d) What do you think have been the major factors in the formation of your opinions on civil liberties.
9. What are your reasons for support or opposition to each of the following government programs:
- a) Changes in the tax law which would eliminate many current special deductions in the hope of making the income tax fairer.
  - b) A government national health plan that would cover most medical and hospital expenses for every American.
  - c) Government aid to the cities.
  - d) Generally speaking, what do you feel the government should be doing in the area of domestic programs.
  - e) What do you think have been the major factors in the formation of your opinions on domestic programs.
  - f) How strongly do you feel about domestic programs.

10. What are your reasons for support or opposition to each of the following government programs:
  - a) The suspension of economic aid to any country that supported the U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism.
  - b) Stopping trade with Russia if the Russians do not allow emigration of Soviet Jews.
  - c) American military supplies to Israel.
  - d) The use of American troops if necessary to assist Israel.
  - e) American policy of pressuring Israel to recognize the Palestinians in order to get a peace settlement.
  - f) Generally speaking, what do you feel the government should be doing in the area of Middle East policy.
  - g) What do you think have been the major factors in the formation of your opinions on the Middle East.
  - h) How strongly do you feel about Israel and Middle East politics.
11. What do the terms liberal and conservative mean to you?
12. Would you please describe some of your own important political beliefs, or if you wish, to your own overall political philosophy.
13. What do you think have been the major influences on you in the formation of your political beliefs.
14. In the original questionnaire there was a list of political activities such as campaign contributions, working for candidates, attending political rallies and being active in political parties or clubs.
  - a) When you have been involved in any of these activities, what motivated you to get involved.
15. In the original questionnaire, there was a list of political causes people might be involved with such as civil rights, local schools or zoning, conservation, freedom of speech, combating anti-Semitism in America and abroad and Israel.
  - a) When you have been involved in any of these activities, what motivated you to get involved.

16. How important are the political interests of American Jews to you.
  - a) What other groups have political interests are important to you.
  - b) Are there any groups in society you feel close to or feel yourself to be a member of.
17. How do you feel anti-Semitism shows itself in America.
18. What do you feel is unique about the Jewish approach to life.
19. What values or beliefs you feel this approach to life is based upon.
20. Why do you think traditionally American Jews have been politically liberal.
21. What do you feel is special about being Jewish.
22. That concludes the questionnaire except if you would just think for a moment about the political opinions you have and the political activities and causes you are involved in. What role is your being Jewish had in these areas.

Bibliography

- Abramson, Harold J. Ethnic Diversity in Catholic America. New York: John Wiley, 1973.
- Banfield, Edward and Wilson, James A. City Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Berger, Bennett. Working Class Suburb. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1960.
- Berkson, Issac B. Theories of Americanization. New York: Arno Press and The New York Times, 1969.
- Bonjean, Charles M.; Hill, Richard J.; McLeMore, Dole S. Sociological Measurement. San Francisco: Chandler, 1967.
- Campbell, Angus; Converse, Philip; Miller, Warren; Stokes, Donald. The American Voter. John Wiley, 1960.
- Cohn, Werner. "Sources of American Jewish Liberalism." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1956.
- Dahl, Robert. Who Governs. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
- Dashefsky, Arnold, and Shapiro, Howard. Ethnic Identification Among American Jews; Socialization and Social Structure. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974.
- Davis, James. Elementary Survey Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1971.
- Dobriner, William. Class in Suburbia. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963.
- Elazar, Daniel. Community and Polity. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1976.
- Feldstein, Stanley and Costello, Lawrence, eds. The Ordeal of Assimilation. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1974.
- Flanigan, William and Zingale, Nancy. Political Behavior of the American Electorate. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1975.
- Fuchs, Lawrence H. The Political Behavior of American Jews. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956.

- Gabriel, Richard. "Ethnic Attitudes and Political Behavior in City and Suburb: The Irish and Italians of Rhode Island." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1969.
- Gans, Herbert. The Levittowners. New York: Pantheon Books, 1967.
- Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel P. Ethnicity Theory and Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.
- Glazer, Nathan and Moynihan, Daniel P. Beyond the Melting Pot. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. and Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Gordon, Milton M. Assimilation in American Life, The Role of Race, Religion and National Origin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Gordon, Milton. Social Class in American Sociology. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1958.
- Greeley, Andrew M. Ethnicity In The United States: A Preliminary Reconnaissance. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974.
- Greeley, Andrew. Why Can't They Be Like Us. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1971.
- Hamilton, Richard. Class and Politics in the United States. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972.
- Hollingshead, August and Redlich, Frederick G. Social Class and Mental Illness. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958.
- Howe, Irving. World of Our Fathers. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.
- Hyman, Herbert H.; Cobb, William; Feldman, Jacob; Hart, Clyde; Stembar, Charles. Interviewing in Social Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954.
- Isaacs, Stephen. Jews and American Politics. Garden City: Doubleday, 1974.
- "Jewish Voting in Recent Election." The American Jewish Committee Information and Research Services, New York: 1970.
- Joint Program Plan for Jewish Community Relations 1974-75. National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, 1974.
- Jones, Terrence. Conducting Political Research. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

- Kamin, Leon. "Ethnic and Party Affiliations of Candidates as Determinants of Voting," in Ulmer, Sidney, ed. Introductory Readings in Political Science.
- Kramer, John. North American Suburbs, Politics, Diversity, Change. Berkeley, California: The Glendessary Press, University of California, 1972.
- Kramer, Judith R. and Leventman, Seymour. Children of the Gilded Ghetto. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
- Krickus, Richard. Pursuing The American Dream White Ethnics and the New Populism. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1976.
- Laumann, Edward O. The Form and Substance of Urban Pluralism: Urban Networks and Values. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972.
- Lenski, Gerhard. The Religious Factor. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1963.
- Levy, Mark R. and Kramer, Michael S. The Ethnic Factor How America's Minorities Decide Elections. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972.
- Lieberson, Stanley. Ethnic Patterns in American Cities. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963.
- Liebman, Charles. The Ambivalent American Jew; Politics, Religion and Family in American Jewish Life. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1973.
- Litt, Edgar. Ethnic Politics in America. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1970.
- Maslow, Will. The Structure and Functioning of the American Jewish Community. New York: American Jewish Congress and American Section of the World Jewish Congress, 1974.
- Milbrath, Lester W. Political Participation. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965.
- Miller, Delbert. Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement. New York: McKay, 1964.
- Nie, Norman H.; Verba, Sidney; Petrocik, John R. The Changing American Voter. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.
- Novak, Michael. The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics. New York: Macmillan Co., 1972.

Parenti, Michael. "Ethnic and Political Attitudes; Three Generations of Italian Americans." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1962.

Polsby, Nelson W.; Dentler, Robert A.; and Smith, Paul A. Politics and Social Life. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963.

Rinder, I. D. "Jewish Identification and Race Relations Cycle." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1957.

Rose, Peter, ed. The Ghetto and Beyond. New York: Random House, 1969.

Schermerhorn, R. A. Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research. New York: Random House, 1970.

Shibutani, Tomotsa and Kwan, Kion M. Ethnic Stratification. London: Macmillan Co., 1965.

Sklare, Marshall. America's Jews. New York: Random House, 1971.

Sklare, Marshall, and Greenblum, Joseph. Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier. New York: Basic Books, 1967.

Sklare, Marshall. The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958.

Sklare, Marshall. The Jewish Community in America. New York: The Behrman House, 1974.

Verba, Sidney; Nie, Norman H.; and Kim, Tae-On. The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971.

Warner, Lloyd; Law, I. O.; Srole, Paul; and Srole, Lou. Yankee City. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.

Weed, Perry L. The White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics. New York: Praeger, 1973.

Weyl, Nathaniel. The Jew in American Politics. New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1961.

Wildavsky, Aaron. "The Intelligent Citizen's Guide to the Abuses of Statistics: The Kennedy Document and the Catholic Vote," in Politics and Social Life, edited by Wilson Polslig, Robert Dentle, and Paul Smith. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963.

Wirth, Louis. The Ghetto. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928.

Wolfinger, Raymond. The Politics of Progress. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1974.

Wood, Robert. Suburbia--Its People and Their Politics. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958.

### Periodicals

Antonovsky, Aaron. "Toward a Refinement of the Marginal Man Concept." Social Forces, XXXV (October, 1956), 57-62.

Apple, R. W. "The Jewish Voter." New York Times. April 6, 1976.

Bonfield, Edward and Wilson, James P. "Public Regardiness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior." American Political Science Review, December, 1964.

Bell, Wendell. "Economic, Family and Ethnic Status; An Empirical Test." American Sociological Review, 20 (February, 1955), 45-52.

Benedict, Burton. "Stratification in Plural Societies." American Anthropologist, 64(1956), 1235-46.

Blalock, H. M. J. "Status Consciousness: A Dimensional Analysis." Social Forces, XXXVIII, (March, 1959), 243-248.

Bogardus, Emery. "Measuring Changes in Ethnic Relations." American Sociological Review 16 (February 1951), 48-51.

Boylan, Edward S. "Are Jews Converting to Republicans." National Review, October 27, 1972, pp. 1174-5.

Brenner, Saul. "Patterns of Jewish-Catholic Democratic Voting and the 1960 Presidential Vote." Jewish Social Studies, 26 (July, 1964), 169-178.

Brownlee, H. A. "A Note on the Effects of Non Response on Surveys." Journal of the American Statistical Association, LII (1957), 277-283.

Centers, Richard. "Social Class, Occupation and Imputed Belief." American Journal of Sociology, 58(May, 1953), 543-55.

Clark, Dennis. "Toward Assimilation or Ethnic Identity." Urban and Social Change Review, 4(Fall, 1970), 18-21.

Donald, Marjorie. "Implications of Non Response for the Interpretation of Mail Questionnaire Data." Public Opinion Quarterly 24 (September, 1960), 99-114.

Duncan, Otis Dudley and Lieberman, Stanley. "Ethnic Segregation and Assimilation." American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (January, 1959), 364-74.

"Ethnic Groups in American Life." Special Edition. Daedalus 90 (Spring, 1961).

Eulau, Heinz and Schneider, Peter. "Dimensions of Political Involvement." Public Opinion Quarterly XX (Spring, 1965), 128-42.

Featherman, David. "The Socio Economic Achievement of White Religio-Ethnic Subgroup." American Sociological Review, April, 1971, pp. 207-22.

Gans, Herbert. "American Jewry: Present and Future." Commentary, May 1956, pp. 422-31.

Gaysenor, Maurice G. "Jewish Vote in Chicago." Jewish Social Studies, XX (October, 1958), 195-215.

Glaser, Daniel. "Dynamics of Ethnic Identification." American Sociological Review, XXIII (February, 1958), 31-40.

Glazer, Nathan. "Black and White Ethnics: The Difference, and the Political Difference it Makes." Social Problems, 18 (Spring, 1971), 444-62.

Golonensky, David I. "The Marginal Man Concept." Social Forces, XXX (March, 1952), 333-339.

Gorenstein, Arthur. "A Portrait of Ethnic Politics." American Jewish Historical Quarterly, 50 (March, 1961), 202-40.

Greeley, Andrew. "The New Ethnicity and Blue Collars." Dissent, 19 (Winter, 1972), 270-78.

Greeley, Andrew. "Political Attitudes Among American White Ethnics." Public Opinion Quarterly, 36 (Summer, 1972), 213-220.

Greeley, Andrew. "A Model for Ethnic Political Socialization." American Journal of Political Science, XIX, (May, 1975), 187-205.

Greenstein, Fred and Wolfinger, Raymond. "The Suburbs and Shifting Party Loyalties." Public Opinion Quarterly, XXII (Winter, 1958), 473-482.

Greer, Scott. "The Social Structure and Political Process of Suburbia: An Empirical Test." American Sociological Review, 25 (August, 1960), 514-26.

Hansen, Marcus Lee. "The Third Generation in America." Commentary, XIV (November, 1952), 492-500.

Hodge, Robert W. "Occupational Prestige in the United States." American Journal of Sociology, 70 (November, 1964), 286-302.

Horowitz, Louis Irving. "The Jewish Vote." Commonweal, 97 (October 13, 1972), 30-33.

Ianni, Francis A. J. "Residential and Occupational Mobility as Indices of the Acculturation of an Ethnic Group." Social Forces, XXXVI (October, 1957), 65-72.

Isaacs, Harold. "Group Identity and Political Change." Survey, October, 1968, pp. 76-99.

"Is There a Jewish Vote." Near East Report, July 19, 1972.

Kellstodt, Lyman. "Ethnicity and Political Behavior: Inter Group and Inter Generational Differences." Paper presented at the American Political Science Convention, 1973.

Kenkel, William. "The Relationship Between Status Consistency and Politico-Economic Attitudes." American Sociological Review, XXI (June, 1956), 365-368.

Klebanoff, Arthur. "Is There a Jewish Vote." Commentary, January, 1970, pp. 43-47.

Kolodny, Ralph. "Ethnic Cleavages in the United States." Social Work, 14 (January, 1969), 13-25.

Kristol, Irving. "Are Jews Turning Conservative." The Jewish Digest, November, 1972.

Landecker, Werner S. "Class Crystallization and Class Consciousness." American Sociological Review, XXVIII (April, 1963), 219-229.

Landecker, Werner S. "Class Boundaries." American Sociological Review, 25 (December, 1960), 868-87.

Lazewitz, B. and Rowtzn, S. "The Three Generation Hypothesis." American Journal of Sociology, 69 (March, 1964), 529-38.

Lieberson, Stanley. "Suburbs and Ethnic Residential Patterns." American Journal of Sociology, LXVII (May, 1962), 673-681.

Litt, Edgar. "Status, Ethnicity and Patterns of Jewish Voting Behavior in Baltimore." Jewish Social Studies, July, 1960, pp. 159-164.

Litt, Edgar. "Jewish Ethno-Religious Involvement and Political Liberalism." Social Forces (May, 1961), 328-332.

Nam, Charles B. "Nationality Groups and Social Stratification in America." Social Forces, May, 1959, pp. 328-33.

Parenti, Michael. "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification." American Political Science Review, 61 (September, 1967), 717-27.

Porter, Jack. "Jewish Conservative Backlash." Commonweal, (October 13, 1972), 33-37.

Reeves, Richard. "Splitting the Jewish Vote." New York, June 18, 1973, pp. 57-63.

Riga, Peter. "The Plight of the Ethnics." Catholic World, March, 1971, pp. 289-92.

Rosenthal, Erich. "Acculturation Without Assimilation? The Jewish Community of Chicago, Illinois." American Journal of Sociology, 66 (November, 1960), 275-88.

Schonefeld, Eugene. "Jewish Identity and Voting Patterns Among Small-Town Jews." Sociological Quarterly, 9 (Spring, 68), 170-5.

Schneider, William; Berman, Michael; Schultz, Mark. "Bloc Voting Reconsidered: Is There a Jewish Vote." Ethnicity, December, 1974.

Secombe, James. "The Mythical Jewish Vote." Congressional Record, July 29, 1940.

Simpson, Richard. "Correlates and Estimation of Occupational Prestige." American Journal of Sociology, 66 (September, 1969), 135-40.

Taeuber, Alma and Taeuber, Karl. "Recent Immigration and Studies of Ethnic Assimilation." Demography, 4 (1967), 798-809.

"Voting-Jews." Ethnicity, 1 (December 1974), pp. 317-421.

Wolfinger, Raymond. "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting." American Political Science Review (December, 1965), 896-909.

Wilson, James. "Generational and Ethnic Differences Among Career Police Officers." American Journal of Sociology, LXIX (March 1964), 522-528.

Wrong, Dennis H. "How Important is Social Class." Dissent, 19 (Winter, 1972), 276-286.