

INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of "sectioning" the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.

**University
Microfilms
International**
300 N. Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

8319782

Mandell, Alan David

THE MEANINGS OF SILENCE: APPROACHING MODERNITY

City University of New York

PH.D. 1983

**University
Microfilms
International** 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Copyright 1983

by

Mandell, Alan David

All Rights Reserved

PLEASE NOTE:

In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible way from the available copy.
Problems encountered with this document have been identified here with a check mark ☒.

1. Glossy photographs or pages _____
2. Colored illustrations, paper or print _____
3. Photographs with dark background _____
4. Illustrations are poor copy _____
5. Pages with black marks, not original copy _____
6. Print shows through as there is text on both sides of page _____
7. Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages _____
8. Print exceeds margin requirements _____
9. Tightly bound copy with print lost in spine _____
10. Computer printout pages with indistinct print _____
11. Page(s) _____ lacking when material received, and not available from school or author.
12. Page(s) _____ seem to be missing in numbering only as text follows.
13. Two pages numbered 135 . Text follows.
14. Curling and wrinkled pages _____
15. Other _____

**University
Microfilms
International**

THE MEANINGS OF SILENCE:
APPROACHING MODERNITY

by
ALAN MANDELL

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1983

© COPYRIGHT BY
ALAN MANDELL
1983

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Apr 27, 1983
date

Lindsey Churchill
Lindsey Churchill, Chair of
Examining Committee

April 29, 1983
date

Bogdan Denitch
Bogdan Denitch, Executive
Officer

Lindsey Churchill

David Lavin

Emil Oestereicher

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Michael Gruber for hours of talk, and for wonderful insights at crucial junctures; and, to Merrill J. Goldstein for thinking about every word with me for many cherished years. And, thank you to Victoria V. Shick for the compassion of a true and loving friend. Arthur Weiner has been a most valuable witness to this process, and I wish to thank him, too, for his talk and his silence, and for his abiding faith in my competence.

I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to David Lavin for serving on my dissertation committee, and for the significant opportunity that he provided to explore the Sociology of Education. And, thanks to Emil Oestereicher for his intelligence, and for ten years of kind prodding. Finally, my deepest appreciation to Lindsey Churchill who always offered sincere support, meaningful guidance, and who has been a fine and trusting teacher.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. INTRODUCTION. Language, Modernity and the Question of Silence	1
II. CHAPTER I. Silence as Critique	24
III. CHAPTER II. Silence as Alienation	62
IV. CHAPTER III. Silence as Understanding	114
V. CONCLUSION. Modernity and its Silences	181
BIBLIOGRAPHY	204

INTRODUCTION

Language, Modernity and the Question of Silence

And the Lord said: Behold, they are one people, and they have all one language; and this is what they begin to do; and now nothing will be with-holden from them, which they purpose to do. Come, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech.

Genesis 11:6-7

But now all is changed. All the pleasing illusions that made power gentle, and obedience liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life . . . are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off. All the super-added ideas, which the heart owns, and the understanding ratifies, as necessary to cover the defects of our weak and shivering nature, and to raise it to a dignity in our own estimation, are to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd and antiquated fashion.

Edmund Burke

Only the future is silent. Like silence, the future tells us nothing about itself, first because it is completely incapable of the Word. Not having experienced or absorbed anything, how could it express the nothingness that dwells within it? Moreover, and above all, the future is ambiguous like silence. It can offer all, and surrender itself in successive waves, each one of which, following the one before, leads a little further on the path of eternity. But it can

also rise to the surface of life like a bubble
of soap, bursting at the very instant when the
sun's rays cross it with their sparkling fires.

André Neher

Interpretation is essential to the understanding of human activities and socio-historical formations. In fact, it could be argued that the meaning of this statement has been at the center of all efforts to re-examine the project-of-sociology in terms alternative to those rooted in the epistemology of a positivistic natural science. Max Weber's expositions regarding the definition of "objectivity" in the social sciences, his demand that we, as investigators of the social world, recognize our own status as "cultural beings" who "lend" the world "significance," and his call for a science of Verstehen have served as a set of touchstones for an interpretive sociology that has consistently questioned the perceptual field and the everyday tools taken-for-granted by the mathematicized sciences.¹

While the positivist tradition has sought to "reconstruct social reality as consisting of brute data alone" -- that is, based upon behaviors and physical descriptions ostensibly "beyond interpretation" -- those social scientists who, with Weber, have struggled with the very primacy of interpretation have had to address the dilemma articulated quite directly by Alfred Schutz:²

It is up to the natural scientist and to him alone to define, in accordance with the procedural rules of his science, his observational field, and to determine the facts, data, and events within it which are relevant for his problems or scientific purpose at

hand. Neither are those facts and events pre-selected, nor is the observational field pre-interpreted. The world of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not "mean" anything to the molecules, atoms, and electrons therein. The observational field of the social scientist, however, namely the social reality, has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, acting, and thinking therein. By a series of common-sense constructs, they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives.³

No longer the neutral, distant observer of social facts, equipped with his single set of rules defined outside and prior to his investigation, the interpreting social scientist has attempted to ground a sociology in intersubjectivity itself and the sets of common meanings embedded in social realities.⁴ That "the object of science is also the subject of science, namely human society as a communication community" has engendered new logics of inquiry which strive to take account of this multi-layered process of interpretation, of this hermeneutic circle.⁵

The focus upon communication is not incidental. Its centrality to the process of constituting a human world has been recognized by interpreting-social theorists such as Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Peter Winch, Herbert Blumer, Harold Garfinkel, and Jurgen Habermas. Even in their diversity, these theorists have shared a special attunement to the "modalities of symbolic expression," to the deciphering of hidden meanings, and to the communicative den-

sity and richness of everyday life.⁵ Harold Garfinkel's claim that "we are all practical theorists," that to be in the world itself is to experience the "intertwining of worldly objects and embodied practices" refocuses the attention of sociology to the myriad activities of theorizing, interpreting, understanding, and communicating within a "moral order" that all of us -- sociologists and everyday actors -- are engaged in:⁷

From the point of view of sociological theory, the moral order consists of rule-governed activities of everyday life. A society's members encounter and know the moral order as perceivedly normal courses of action -- familiar scenes of everyday affairs, the world of daily life known in common with others and with others taken for granted.⁸

Thus, mutual understandings of intentions, of situational meanings, of words and gestures, and of the seemingly "automatic" movements that make up a "common sense world"

(Schutz) rest upon an intersubjective consensus that itself flows from a complex store of communicative practices particular to a specific society at a certain place and time.

It is in this sense that language (taken, that is, as the storehouse of such communicative practices) and our world are so deeply interwoven that it is almost impossible to separate them at all. Martin Heidegger sees language "everywhere":

. . . language belongs to the closest neighborhood of man's being. We encounter language everywhere. Hence it cannot surprise us that as soon as man looks thoughtfully about himself at what is, he quickly hits upon language too, so as to define it by a standard reference to its overt aspects.⁹

The tradition of Geisteswissenschaften (so important to Weber's methodological writings), the work of Wittgenstein and the ordinary language theorists (so important to Ethnomethodology and Habermas' writings on "communicative competence"), and the philosophical explorations of Phenomenology (so important to Schutz and Winch) all have in common this profound interest in language as the medium of meaningful action and reflection that we, of necessity, "hit(s) upon" when we think about society.¹⁰ It is, in fact, the "linguisticity" of the human experience, the notion of world as language-world, that provides the very basis for the bridge that joins historical and cultural diversity and that defines the human:

Our own language world, this world in which we live, is not a tight enclosure that hinders the knowing of things as they are: rather, it encompasses basically everything which our insight is able to broaden and lift up. Certainly one tradition sees the world differently from another. Historical worlds in the course of history have differed from each other and from today. At the same time, however, the world is always a human, and this means a linguistically created world which is presented in whatever heritage it may be.¹¹

Humans are thus, most prominently, speakers participating in and surrounded by an on-going "conversation" that defines human society itself. Participation in that conversation is what "distinguishes the human from the animal" and what continually reminds the "hermeneutic" sociologist that no description can be freed from interpretation, just as no expression of everyday desire or thought can ever be freed from language.¹²

Yet, language is not only an abstract human capability, nor is the "conversation of mankind" one that proceeds in a vacuum, dislodged from the particularities of social and historical exigencies and determinations.¹³ In fact, the "turn" to language, and the very methodological considerations of the interpreting-hermeneutic sociologists introduced above were themselves historical occurrences that grew out of a response to the details and patterns of social existence and the nature of social change that the project-of-sociology sought to explain and to judge.¹⁴

More specifically, just as Max Weber provided the contours for a methodology of an interpretive sociology, his work also defined the most basic terrain for a discussion of the social world within which sociology itself existed: the modern. The definitions of human language, its socio-cultural origins, and its evaluation by social critics, educators and medical professionals -- that is, the ques-

tion of the quality of the "conversation of mankind" -- became relevant as a methodological-impulse at that moment in social history when the meaning of modernity and its effects upon the ideational, cultural, and socio-economic identity of society became of imminent concern.¹⁵

It was the distinctiveness of the modern Occident both as a characterization of human consciousness and as a description of a set of social structures and institutions that Weber's sociological and historical work sought to locate and understand. Lord Acton's general and extolling claim that modernity announced "an awakening of new life [which] revolved in a different orbit, determined by influences unknown before" was painstakingly dissected by Weber, whose comparative-historical method directed him to examine the world of India, Ancient Judaica, China, the Roman Empire, and Medieval Europe in order to discover the "prime seedbeds of the institutional and cultural developments of the Western world."¹⁶ Weber was, in effect, searching for the sources of what he deemed a "rationalization revolution" whose ramifications reverberated throughout the "departments of life," effecting the emergence and the workings of a capitalist market, a hierarchical and bureaucratic state, a rational system of law, a technologized economy, an urbanized populace, a secularized faith structure, and even a rational chordal structure in music.¹⁷ Informed and accel-

erated by the expectations, demands, and successes of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, the Protestant Reformation and the Industrial Revolution, a powerful transformation of the world came about which disrupted and most often shattered that which was traditional: religious beliefs, forms of work and community, and socio-economic structures.¹⁸

What Weber so prominently raised to attention was the image of a landscape whose outlines were painted by the all-pervading principles of rationality. Yet, what his writings never neglected was the seemingly contradictory, but essential and meaningful vision of a modern world whose "workaday" existence also depended upon value commitments that were starkly irrational.¹⁹ It is this world-in-tension -- a tension between the rational and irrational, between the efficient and the extraneous, between the scientific and the "holy" -- that is, the deeply ambiguous and volatile quality of modern existence that Weber saw. Just as modernity presented humans with the "great promise of unlimited progress," that same world was, for Weber, decidedly one of "disenchantment" where, unlike all previous societies, "no incalculable forces . . . come into play," and where one could, in principle, "master all things by calculation."²⁰ "The fate of our time," he argued:

is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the "disen-

chantment of the world." Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations.²¹

But too, while such a "fate" -- such "rationalization" and "intellectualization" -- could never "weld together" the "great communities" of the world "like a firebrand," it is this same modern "fate" that also introduced possibilities of liberated and individuated existence, tools of scientific analysis and a realizable universalistic ethic never before attained nor, in most historical situation, even envisioned.²²

That modernity is itself a myriad set of tensions, an on-going "maelstrom" of social movements and personal upheavals that the individual cannot halt, deny, or ever leap out of is what Weber's writings have sought to teach.²³ To accept neither "eternal despair" (Baudelaire) nor undeserved optimism, but rather to "bear the fate of the times like a man" becomes for Weber the obligatory code, the "calling" of a kind of modern-heroism (symbolized by the man of science) in which the struggle with conflicting social structures, rules, and value orientations can never be relinquished.²⁴ Like the hermeneutic circle of the interpreting sociologist that necessitates constant reflection upon one's own language (method) and attention to the language of others, the modern world erects an even bolder

circle-of-obligation, one that demands on-going interpretations of the meaning of the modern, and, as importantly for Weber, by "men" who do not forget their own immersion within that historical world: by those who recognize their own modernity.

Descriptions and analyses of modern life have held a crucial place in the works of "modern" poets, painters, novelists, philosophers, theologians, as well as sociologists for nearly three centuries. Although differing in attitude and evaluation and in point-of-view and style, this corpus-of-interpretation is itself a testament to the very tension-of-modernity that Weber so carefully introduced and examined. Absorbed by the instabilities and fleeting qualities of self and social identity, focused upon the seeming inadequacy or actual lack of objective and commonly accepted social definitions of reality, and obsessed with the failures of discourse and the "authenticity" of human understanding, the most characteristic and potent "topic" of the conversation-of-modernity has been the possibility of conversation itself. Here, the medium of our talk -- our words, metaphors, and most crucially, our open-ended interpretations, and the context of our communication -- the contours and realities of modern existence -- have reinforced each other's questions and preoccupations. The conversation-of-modernity becomes a dialogue centered upon

itself and in perpetual struggle over the strength of its vision, the veracity of its ultimate truths, and over its success in sustaining recognizable and deeply felt meanings.²⁵

That modernity is "self-conscious" is thus not a conclusion wedded solely to the history of psychology or to psychological categories, but a conclusion that displays the particular ways in which the dilemmas of interpretation and the dilemmas of modernity (their concurrent "circles") are inseparable.²⁶ How language molds a world, and how a world dictates a language in its own image are problems that become paramount when the stability and quality of that world -- its ability to be understood and believed; and the adequacy of language -- its ability to make sense of and to express the vicissitudes of that world -- cannot be relied upon, nor taken-for-granted. When Jürgen Habermas argues that:

Language is . . . a medium of domination and social power. It serves to legitimate relations of organized forces. In so far as the legitimations do not articulate the relations of force that they make possible, in so far as these relations are merely expressed in the legitimations, language is also ideological;²⁷

or, when sociologists Alan Blum and Peter McHugh theorize that modernity itself seeks to "extinguish" the conversation of mankind for whom it comes "increasingly to be seen

as untimely and foolish"; when such expressions abound, neither language nor world can be unquestioningly accepted.²⁸ Each must be doubted, experimented with, interpreted for that which it might hide, and discovered anew.²⁹ And like the flaneur that Baudelaire and later Walter Benjamin imagine walking the streets of nineteenth-century Paris, the "heroic" moderns are bequeathed a never-ending (and quite Weberian) task: to collect "traces" -- tiny fragments, odds-and-ends that can serve as symbolic/linguistic clues to the meaning of the modern world whose order and complex patterns would always have to be rethought, reconstructed, renewed.³⁰

Efforts to examine language and modernity, however, have most frequently engaged the "voices" of speakers: that is, the social attitudes reflected in speech, the socialization patterns forming speech, and the details of a discourse -- its vocabulary and syntax as indicators of socio-economic status or cultural taste. Whether criticizing the ideological markings of a "distorted" communication, or keeping a "holy watch" on the "everyday hopes and injuries" expressed in informal conversation, theorists have focused upon words, for words are easily accessible to analysis and can be interpreted as concrete data which are either read or heard.³¹ Less common has been serious discussion of the open spaces, the statements without re-

sponses, the breaks in talk, the significances beyond words: the meanings of silence.³²

Most frequently, silence has been interpreted as an absence, a lack, a nothingness that connotes either inability to speak or refusal to participate in society's conversation. But also, theorists have sought to secure their own dependence upon the word by linking the question of silence to the domain of the religious -- to a pre-modern, traditionalistic theodicy that ostensibly negates the demands of modernity, especially its dependence upon interpretation and its emphasis upon the "necessary" contentions of everyday human existence. Thomas Merton, the American Trappist monk, includes in one of his diaries a description of the meaning of silence that exemplifies this ecclesiastical understanding and emphasizes the deeply religious "dialectic between silence and utterance:"

We have to keep silent for two reasons: for the sake of God and for the sake of speech. These two reasons are really one; because the ultimate reasons for speaking is to confess our faith in God and to declare His glory.³³

In keeping with Merton's sense of silence as a "declaration" of his communion with God, and like Saint-Exupéry's definition of prayer as the "exercise of silence," religious writings of many faiths have emphasized the importance of silence to their fundamental creeds and to their

devotional practices: silence's vast "eloquence," its power as a symbol of "adoration" for an omniscient deity or unfathomable universe, and its presence as epiphany -- as a sign of "revelation."³⁷

But while serious attention to religious traditions may succeed in undercutting the connotations of "passivity" that pervade most modern discussions of silence, and allow André Neher to cogently theorize about both an "inert silence of nothingness" and and "energetic silence of being," silence as a "positive performance," as an activity whose origins and significances are tied to a human world, has remained distinctly outside the parameters of most modern interpretations.³⁵ It is the main goal of this dissertation to think about silence, to interpret its multiple meanings, and to show how critical it is to the theories and practices inside modernity. More particularly, the three chapters included here will seek to explore silence as a persistent shadow that follows the words of moderns whether or not its influence has been explicitly recognized and judged.

Even more directly, the basic assumption of this work is that to search for the meanings of silence is to re-engage the problem of the meaning of the modern. Just as the dilemmas of language and modernity can truly unfold only when their deep connections with one another are real-

ized and considered, so various definitions and evaluations of modernity can be helpfully and persistently explored by explicating the voice of its shadow -- its depictions of the silent. Through descriptions and analyses of modernity as constructed by Martin Heidegger (Chapter 1), Karl Marx (Chapter 2), and Sigmund Freud (Chapter 3), the meanings of silence presupposed by such interpretations will be examined and their ramifications for social theory and everyday practices will be addressed. Silence-as-Critique and as Ecological-Opening (Chapter 1), Silence-as-Alienation (Chapter 2), and Silence-as-Understanding (Chapter 3), become another gathering of "traces" which, however different in their emphases and orientation, lead back to the double "burden" of modernity: to an on-going revisioning of the meaning of the modern and to a deepening appreciation for the complexities of silence and thus, for the meanings of language itself. That there is a question of silence, that Weber's perception of the "inexhaustible[ness]" of "possible meanings" can be seen as equally applicable to silence as it is to language and to modernity is the path that this work hopes to open:

Life with its irrational reality and its store of possible meanings is inexhaustible. The concrete form in which value relevance occurs remains perpetually in flux, even subject to change in the dimly seen future of human culture. The light which emanates from those

high evaluative ideas always falls on an ever changing finite segment of the vast chaotic stream of events, which flows away through time.³⁶

NOTES

¹Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences. See especially the section, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy."

²Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in Dallmayr and McCarthy, Understanding and Social Inquiry, p. 123. In this fine essay, Taylor explores the relationship between interpretation and the possibilities of "scientific explanation," examining not only the behavioristic and physicalistic assumptions of most social science, but the ways in which much "objective" analysis views human activities only within the institutionalized contexts of what is deemed "normal."

³Alfred Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 51, April 1954, pp. 266-7.

⁴Anthony Giddens has described this point clearly in his first "rule" of sociological method: "Sociology is not concerned with a 'pre-given' universe of objects, but with one which is constituted or produced by the active doings of subjects." Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, p. 160.

⁵Karl-Otto Apel, "The a Priori of Communication and the Formation of the Humanities," in Dallmayr and McCarthy, op. cit., p. 292. For a similar description of such a "communication community" see also Paul Ricoeur's essay, "History and Hermeneutics" in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXIII, No. 19, November 1976.

⁶The phrase "modalities of symbolic expression" comes from Paul Ricoeur's essay "Existence and Hermeneutics," in his The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics, p. 13.

⁷Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology, p. 67; and Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston, "The Work of a Discovering Science Construed with Materials from the Optically Discovered Pulsar," p. 137. This recent essay is a wonderful example of Garfinkel's (and other interpretive theorists') efforts to describe the meaningful practices that constitute everyday life. That our actions are "interactionally produced" within a speech community that comes to recognize particular objects or visions or words as mean-

ingful -- that is, as "cultural," is a key to these theorists' orientation, as well as to Garfinkel's discussion of an "ordinary night's work."

⁸Ibid., p. 35.

⁹Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 189.

¹⁰In his introduction to Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur also argues that "language" is the "common meeting-ground" of many twentieth-century philosophical approaches: Wittgenstein's investigations, the English linguistic philosophies, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Bultmanian and other New Testament exegetical schools. It is also his argument that psychoanalysis itself must be understood as language-analysis. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 3. (See Chapter 3 of this work as well.)

¹¹Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 423.

Heidegger's orientation emphasizes this "linguisticity" as well but on a more "ontological" plane. "If our essence did not include the power of language," he writes, "all beings would be closed to us, that which we ourselves are no less than the being that we are not." Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 81.

¹²The image of society as the "conversation of mankind" is taken from Michael Oakshott's "The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind." It is John O'Neill in his Making Sense Together who takes Oakshott's notion as a starting point for his own efforts to move the sociologist towards a kind of theorizing that attends to and respects the multifacetedness of this "conversible attitude." See O'Neill, Making Sense Together, p. 19.

¹³The definition of "language," and the quality of the human "conversation" are not necessarily points agreed upon by the theorists pointed to thus far. There is an important distinction between those whose analyses emphasize the ontological and those whose analyses demand attention to the historical. So, too, there is an important distinction between those who seek to "criticize" and those who see their task as one of "guardianship" (O'Neill) of the "talk" of everyday life. These differences will be examined throughout this work.

¹⁴The notion of a "linguistic turn" was first described in relation to the changes in the tradition of "critical

theory" by Albrecht Wellmer in his essay, "Communication and Emancipation: Reflections on the 'Linguistic Turn' in Critical Theory." In John O'Neill's edited On Critical Theory.

¹⁵Of contemporary American sociologists, Peter Berger has been most acutely aware of the relationship between the methods-of-sociology and the dilemmas of the modern. Many of his texts have explored this connection. Especially significant in this context is his group of essays, Facing Up to Modernity (particularly the introduction and Chapter One), and his Pyramids of Sacrifice (particularly Chapter One, "Development -- Policies, Theories, Myths"). A fuller discussion of his theoretical presuppositions can be found in Chapter 2 of this work.

¹⁶Lord Acton, Lectures on Modern History, p. 19. (Quoted in Anthony Giddens's Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, p. xi.) And, Benjamin Nelson, On the Roads to Modernity, p. 214.

¹⁷The phrase "rationalization revolution" is taken from Benjamin Nelson's essay, "Priests, Prophets, Machines, Futures: 1202, 1848, 1984, 2001," in his On the Roads, p. 252. For another significant analysis of Weber's notion of "rationalization" and its connection on to capitalist society, see Karl Loewith's "Weber's Interpretation of the Bourgeois-Capitalistic World in Terms of the Guiding Principle of 'Rationalization,'" in Dennis Wrong's edited Max Weber, p. 101-122.

¹⁸The meaning of "traditionalism" and the modern incursions upon its many domains is examined within many of Weber's writings. His essay "The Social Psychology of the World Religions" is one case in point; as is his analysis of the Indian caste system and its traditionalistic "spirit." See "India: The Brahman and the Castes" in From Max Weber, op. cit., especially pp. 411-15.

¹⁹Weber's analysis of the simultaneous existence of structures and values of rationality/irrationality can be most clearly found in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. See especially Part II, Chapter 4.

²⁰Erich Fromm discusses the "great promise" of modernity in his To Have or To Be? I seek to examine the details of such an argument in Chapter 2 of this work. And, Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in From Max Weber, ed. Gerth and Mills, p. 139.

²¹From Max Weber, p. 155.

²²Ibid.

²³It is Marshall Berman's helpful definition that is referred to here. "To be modern," he writes, "is to experience personal and social life as a maelstrom, to find one's world and oneself in perpetual disintegration and renewal, trouble and anguish, ambiguity and contradiction: to be part of a universe in which all that is solid melts into air." Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air, p. 345.

²⁴Weber, "Science as a Vocation," p. 155. Modern man's "calling" is not chosen as was the case of the Puritan who "wanted to work in a calling." For Weber, the determinative nature of modernity defines its own realm of possible response within which modern man must "struggle." See Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 181.

²⁵For a most eloquent discussion of the origins and histories of structures of meaning, and especially their ability or failure to make sense of modern life, see Ernest Becker's The Birth and Death of Meaning.

²⁶The "self-consciousness" of modernity has been a theme of analyses of the twentieth century which have focused upon the psychologization-of-society. Philip Reiff's Freud -- The Mind of the Moralists and his The Triumph of the Therapeutic have significantly charted the experience of "deconversion" from the traditional to the "anti-creedal" attitude of the modern-analytic. That literature and sociology have provided "eloquent" and "knowing" "mourners" at the wake of traditional culture is an ongoing subject of Reiff's writings. See also Eric Larrabee, The Self-Conscious Society, and Benjamin Nelson's edited Freud and the 20th Century. Norman O. Brown's Life Against Death also examines the present and future of a society-of-the-couch. The question of psychology and modernity is the topic of Chapter 3 of this work.

²⁷Jürgen Habermas quoted in Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, p. 183.

²⁸Alan Blum and Peter McHugh, "The Risk of Theorizing and the Problem of the Good of Place: A Reformulation of Canadian Nationalism." (Unpublished.) In this essay, Blum and McHugh argue that the practice of "theorizing" protects the "conversation," and pushes it on to be more and more aware of itself.

²⁹Surely, efforts to halt such "experimentation," to name the world with perfection, to create a mathematized "language" that can be isomorphic with "reality" has also been a goal of certain modes of theorizing. Such a "superior" language that shuns the conversation of modernity is antithetical to Weber's notion of interpretation, to his depiction of the modern, and to his quest for heroism. For an interesting effort to think about the language of metaphor and its efforts to name the "diseases" of modernity, see Susan Sontag's Illness as Metaphor.

³⁰Walter Benjamin's vivid descriptions of the "trace," of the modern metropolis, and of the world of the flaneur can be found in his One Way Street and Other Writings. Also see Terry Eagleton, Walter Benjamin: Or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism, Part I.

How interesting is the connection between Benjamin's image of the "trace" and Charles Taylor's discussion of the work of the social scientist who accepts the problems of a hermeneutic "reading" by interpreting the "partial expressions" of the "whole":

. . . we are trying to establish a reading for the whole text, and for this we appeal to readings of its partial expressions; and yet because we are dealing with meaning, and making sense, where expressions only make sense or not in relation to others, the readings of partial expressions depend on those of others, and ultimately of the whole.

Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," p. 103.

³¹The notion of "systematically distorted communication" is taken from the work of Jurgen Habermas. See his essay, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence" in Hans Peter Dreitzel's Recent Sociology #2, and his Theory and Practice. The sociological project of keeping a "holy watch" is introduced in John O'Neill's Making Sense Together, Chapter 5. "Distorted" communication is explored in Chapter 2 of this work.

³²As subsequent discussion will seek to show, silence has been a topic of modern theorizing, but such attention is indeed rare. B. P. Dauenhauer's Silence: The Phenomenon and its Ontological Significance is a strong exception, but interestingly sheds little light on the social meanings of silence, treating it instead as a highly abstract phe-

nomenological category. See Chapter 1 of this work for further discussion.

³³Thomas Merton, The Sign of Jonas, p. 259. Merton's many published "journals" and essays emphasize his own struggles with silence and with the meaning of contemplation. What is particularly interesting is Merton's extraordinarily powerful tie to the modern -- his interests in interpretation, his attachment to the conflicts of the world; and his simultaneous conviction, his vow to live his life as a secluded "silent," Cistercian monk.

³⁴Saint-Exupéry, Citadelle, p. 204. The other citations in this sentence are taken from André Neher's The Exile of the Word: The Silence of the Bible to the Silence of Auschwitz. Neher's text is composed of interpretations/exigences of Biblical stories and passages which flow from the Jewish Talmudic tradition. By examining the actual "structures" of silence in the Bible, the silences of both humans and of God, Neher is, in effect, rethinking the very meaning of dialogue. As he concludes: "For the inescapable condition of hearing is silence, and whoever is not silent while another speaks is not in a dialogic situation." (p. 48)

³⁵Neher, The Exile of the Word, p. 44. The notion of silence as "positive performance" is examined in Chapter 1 of this work.

³⁶Weber, Methodology, p. 111.

CHAPTER 1

SILENCE AS CRITIQUE

Passion has brought me
to this clearing of the ground,
an ancient passion singing
in my veins, beneath speech,
unheard many years, yet
leading me through cities,
streets and roads,
gathering, voices, speech
and beyond speech,
beyond the words of books,
to stand in the hillside field
in October wind, critical
and solitary, like a horse dumbly
approving of the grass,
the world as clear as light,
as dark as dark.

Wendell Berry

In the silence, you don't know,
you must go on, I can't go on, you
must go on, I can't go on, I'll
go on.

Samuel Beckett

To acknowledge that we are "moderns" is to suggest that the cosmology that we take-for granted rests upon a world-view which was introduced in the early seventeenth century (in European philosophy) and systematically articulated through the construction of theoretical axioms and development of socio-economic institutions since that time. That we recognize a continuum is not to suggest that differences did not characterize philosophically inquiry, nor that conflicts did not define the history of groups of people or social institutions. Rather, it is to understand that a set of shared assumptions regarding the place of humanity in the universe, and particularly man's relationship to nature consistently manifests itself throughout this three-hundred-year period. The primacy of Reason, the necessity and the desirability of progress, the separation between objective and subjective knowledge, between facts and values, and between intellectual and moral knowledge, the quantification of all meanings, and the supremacy of the material over the spiritual define the contours of modern thought and action. Although present in different forms and to different degrees, these principles have molded a mind-set that has served as a basic mapping of modern consciousness.

It is the centrality of science itself that has most clearly defined such a modern "enlightenment" world-view.

Descartes's Discourse on Method (1637) could be taken as a more general example of the modern project to identify and to argue for the necessity of a method, a science, by which humans can observe, measure, and thus know the universe:

For they [general notions concerning physics] cause me to see that it is possible to attain knowledge which is very useful in life, and that, instead of that speculative philosophy which is taught in Schools, we may find a practical philosophy by means of which, knowing the force and the action of fire, water, air, the stars, heavens and all other bodies that environ us, as distinctly as we know the different crafts of our artisans, we can in the same way employ them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of nature.¹

The mastery of nature (or within another context, of society itself) is the goal of this version of scientific inquiry.² Through the attainment of knowledge about its workings, modern man can ultimately control that which is outside his grasp and assert his own supremacy. To reformulate nature as a set of concepts that can be operationalized and quantified is to mold it into a mechanical system, divorced from the "confusions" of seeing it as part of a "traditional" sacred cosmos that humans cannot possess. That "dream of mechanism" functioning according to purely physical causes is clearly defined by Kepler. "My aim," he wrote:

is to show that the heavenly machine is not a kind of divine, live being, but a kind of clockwork (and he who believes that a clock has a soul, attributes the maker's glory to the work), insofar as nearly all the manifold motions are caused by a most simple, magnetic, and material force, just as all motions of the clock are caused by simple weight. And I also show how these physical causes are to be given numerical and geometrical expression.³

What this modern scientific methodology thus postulates is not only a radical separation between humanity and nature, but an on-going "war" that can only be won through the progressive development of scientific knowledge and the concomitant emergence of more sophisticated technologies. Bacon is explicit here: Recent mechanical inventions, he claimed, do not "merely exert a gentle guidance over nature's course; they have the power to conquer and subdue her, to shake her to her foundations."⁴

Thus, the modern cosmology demands a commitment to what Max Scheler refers to as Herrschaftswissen, knowledge for the sake of domination.⁵ We "mold" and "squeeze" (Bacon), simultaneously anaesthetizing and protecting ourselves from uncertainty and anarchy through the postulation of "objective knowledge" that can guarantee an anthropocentric universe with Reason as its guide. In general then, knowledge becomes power. As contemporary philosopher-scientist G. F. von Weizsacker argues: "The possession of power is then the ultimate proof of the correctness of sci-

entific thought."⁶ Within such a context, understanding and dominating are inextricably connected. That which remains opaque, which cannot be known in this limited sense, is immediately classified as "other," and the fear of this "otherness" (whether of an alien nature or of an alien people) drives moderns towards projects of fuller planning and ordering and more sophisticated modes of control.

Because such projects are based upon and continue to reinvigorate the human-centeredness of this modern worldview, there is an on-going demand that all examples of "otherness" be, in effect, "humanized" -- that they be cast into an image or a form that mirrors this modern human project. It is in this sense that the modern cosmology depends upon work and production, for nature must be transformed into something quantifiable, material, and manipulatable -- it must be worked-upon. (For Heisenberg, this re-orientation could be seen in the fact that "natural science turned into technical science."⁷) Like Descartes's "methods," scientific "techniques" serve as transformative tools, likening nature to something humanly knowable/controllable. "Nature is never so admirable nor so admired than when she is known," Bernard de Fontenelle wrote in 1702.⁸ And, to become "known," the scientist has to carry out a process of "translating" into a language consistent with the forms and the possibilities of human understanding itself. "As the

ear is made to perceive sound, and the eye to perceive color," Kepler theorized:

so the mind has been formed to understand, not all sorts of things, but quantities. It perceives any given thing more clearly in proportion as that thing is close to bare quantities as to its origins, but the further a thing recedes from quantities, the more darkness and error inhere in it.⁹

The reduction of the qualitative to the calculable, the reduction of the whole to the functioning of parts, the reduction of multiplicity to uniformity, the reduction of randomness to lawfulness, and the symbolization of the cosmos as "one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines," points to the persistence of an intimate modern relationship between images of understanding, controlling, working, and producing.

For modernity, the methods and techniques of science become the central voice and paradigm of the richest, most genuine human language; for through the use of this language, man can create and control a world in his own image. Such a language, in all of its calculative potency, is thus conceived of as the means by which modern man is truly saved from "wandering" in the "dark labyrinth" of nature.¹¹ Modern man can only be protected from the ultimate evils of death, disorder and confusion and from the dreaded anxiety they engender by utilizing these tools that he himself has created.¹² They form a bulwark against an omnipresent

"Otherness" whose potential for disruption is perceived as boundless. Most significantly, just as the human is postulated as separate from the natural and in perpetual war against it, human language-as-science is defined as outside the spontaneous, uncertain, and ultimately unknowable nature:

Nature is withdrawn from speech and reformulated as that matter or material upon which speech operates -- that external and oppressive material which only acquires relevance in its making, i.e., in its being used.¹³

Human speech -- language -- is primarily formulated as a tool of production. John Sallis, in his analysis of the relationship between language, science, and modernity clearly points to this "technologizing" of language:

In order to become an instrument, it [language] must itself, however, first have been subjected to man's mastery; man is able to master beings by means of language only because he has, first of all, mastered language itself. Language, in other words, comes to be regarded as an instrument which ideally should be instituted by subjectivity in such radical independence of things as to permit it to be retained completely under human control.¹⁴

This instrumentalized role of language is further legitimated through a set of modern postulates that defines the alien qualities of nature itself -- its darkness, secretive-ness, and fearful irrationalities -- and reaffirms a notion

critical to this history of industrialization: that man's progress is attested to through the systematic "domestication" of nature, through its "mastery" and "appropriation."¹⁵ Language is thus a tool that creates uses out of nothingness -- a human method that creates resources out of nature.

It is then the learning of a specific man-made language that makes a man human within this modern cosmos. Language itself presents him with the necessary tools to climb out of the haphazardness and the true danger inherent in nature and become man. In this sense, man produces himself through his own activity (one literally builds an ego, a self), and only needs to rely upon resources (nature) as a means for his own growth. As Alan Blum explains in relation to Locke's own modern outlook: "Man is originally speechless (brutish) and becomes social through his capacity to manufacture speech."¹⁶ The "progress" from nothingness to activity (manufacturing "uses") parallels the "progress" from silence to speech. Silence is uncivilized to the extent to which it produces nothing. It represents a pre-human condition where the overpowering claims of nature dominate man and no selfhood can exist. To build a world is not only to appropriate nature to human ends -- to mold a chaos into a human world; it is also to build a language out of the void of nature's speechlessness -- its

profound silence.

Thus, out of the basic presuppositions of this analysis of modernity, we can extrapolate the modern meaning of silence: silence is both dangerous and evil. Silence announces man's vulnerability and failure in the face of a chaotic (disordered) cosmos, and points to a kind of radical passivity that negates man's ultimate human nature as actor, as speaker and as worker. Because there is truly no-thing before the human, modern man must fight against silence as he fights against nature. Speechlessness is in fact, death for modern man -- death in the face of a notion of nature that stands opposed to the necessary human projects of making, doing, and speaking. "Men are then motivated by the void," Blum argues. "This is to say that the actions of men are grounded in what-is-not because the possibility of the void incites them to speak, to move."¹⁷

But, there have been "betrayals" of this mapping of modern consciousness -- silences that have not constituted impassés of technique/production nor failures of language to speak an anthropocentric universe. The ontological groundings of the modern cosmos, that is, the very fears of worklessness and speechlessness that "incite" its activities, have been addressed and transfigured into a critique of modernity. This critical orientation sees in modernity's fears -- its "otherness" -- the opportunities to envi-

sion a qualitatively different world where "man" and "nature" are defined and illuminated based upon criteria consciously in opposition to the modern world-view.

Martin Heidegger's "Memorial Address" (1955) points the way towards such a critique by examining the relationship between "thinking" and modernity. For Heidegger, modernity's insistence upon productivity, labor, language-as-science and the working-upon-nature-as-progress leads to the domination of "calculative thinking."¹⁸ Quite in keeping with the powerful modern images of Descartes and Kepler's dream of nature-as-well-oiled-mechanism, all of modern thinking for Heidegger is pre-occupied with planning, calculation, organization, and automation.¹⁹ Heidegger's own depiction of the modern world of calculation is most telling:

The world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry.²⁰

Thus, by producing answers and by evaluating success through collections of well-ordered things, modern calculative thinking, according to Heidegger, has been instrumental in creating tools necessary to an atomic age fixed by the ineluctable demands of technology.

But what is most primary for Heidegger is that in cre-

ating a specific and narrow notion of language as human tool (as a repository of nouns, frozen in their thingness), and in creating a never-ending stream of products, calculative thinking is unable to reflect upon either the meanings or the repercussions of its own activities. "Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. [It] races from one prospect to the next."²¹ Unable to respond to the question: "What really is happening in our age?" except through the unceasing reiteration of its own assumptions, calculative thinking can only lead to the reality that "man will be encircled even more tightly by the forces of technology."²² The fear of stopping to reflect on the very premises upon which the modern cosmos rests (the "truth" of scientific "rationality" and "reality") is thus, in itself, a key element in the perpetuation of a modern "comprehension of things." As Heidegger asks:

Whence do the sciences -- which are always in the dark about the origin of their own nature -- derive the authority to pronounce such verdicts? Whence do the sciences derive the right to decide what man's place is, and to offer themselves as the standard that justifies such decisions?²³

It is because of its failure to seriously confront such central questions that Heidegger depicts modern calculative thinking as a radical "flight from thinking."²⁴

From this perspective, a "reflective insight into our

age" thus demands a form of thinking that looks beneath the taken-for-grantedness of calculative thinking; and, to this extent, beyond the terms of modernity itself.²⁵ Heidegger refers to this form of thinking as "meditative thinking." What is central for Heidegger is not that meditative thinking should (or ever could) usurp the role of calculative thinking, but rather, that the unreflective upon reign of calculative thinking has so steadfastly defined modernity that it has torn apart a delicate balance which should characterize human experience in any world -- a quality of experience that necessarily demands both work/speech and reflection/silence. As Heidegger insists, it is the real possibility that calculative thinking "could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking," that is of greatest concern.²⁶ In fact, for Heidegger, as distinct from other modern theorists (explored in Chapters 2 and 3 of this work) who see in the triumph of calculative thinking the ultimate triumph of man, our historical situation raises the gravest of issues. In his view, it is not in production and science, but through this meditational mode that man becomes human and without the latter, man loses touch with "his own special nature."

Meditative thinking presents a model for human experi-

encing of the social world and of nature that immediately draws into focus and questions the paradigmatic mind-set of modernity. Heidegger is seeking to elaborate a quality of "being" that does not have as its core the demands to control, to reduce to mere matter, nor to transform -- all qualities inherent in calculative thought. Meditative thinking instead rests upon a "releasement toward things."²⁷ This "releasement" does not depend upon achievement nor creation of use-values, but upon a reception -- a listening. Such a position of receiving alters human situatedness in the world. Rather than a preoccupation with building and producing, meditative thinking offers a new level of attention to what is at hand. In this way, "trust" rather than the omnipresent skepticism and fear so dominant in calculative thinking is characteristic of meditative thought. To listen and to become a "co-respondent" offers a striking alternative to the modern quest to fill up a fearful and untrustworthy silence/void through the talk of everyday gossip or the mere noise of technology.

Moreover, Heidegger's meditative thinking greets the operationalization and materialization of modernity with a re-spiritualization, an "openness to the mystery."²⁸ As distinct from his understanding of the modern confluence of knowing and dominating, Heidegger poses the possibility of an attuning to qualities and presences that moderns are

blinded to when the Cartesian goals of "clear and distinct concepts" are the only guides to thought. Thus, it is the way in which modern "discoveries" and "progress" closes rather than opens humans to a "world" that is most significant to a contemporary Heideggerian, F. Joseph Smith, who writes:

The older system may well become the closed system and we may perish for the utter light and clarity. Such well-ordered worlds leave little room for world as such. Such order is often artificial and covers over the dread of the abyss by clutching at straws, whether divine or human.²⁹

As Heidegger himself stresses in his quest to define the true nondeterminancy in the "work" of the thinker: "The greater the work of a thinker . . . the richer is the unthought in the work, i.e., that which through that work and through it alone, comes up as never-yet-thought."³⁰

Important for Heidegger is not a criticism of all striving towards "light," "clarity," and indeed truth itself, nor should Heidegger be read to imply a simplistic anti-technological stance. Techne (which is at the origin of technology) is, for Heidegger, one mode of "bringing-forth," of opening, of revealing, of knowing.³¹ But, in Heidegger's depiction of the history of metaphysics, as the scientist (and the philosopher) sought to discover permanences in reality, he began to distance himself from nature

and from world -- from "being." Scientific thinking came to depend upon a process of forgetting-of-being (Seinsvergessenheit), and modern technology itself grew out of an increasing need to "control" such "presencings," rather than "receive" them with openness. According to Heidegger, Plato and Aristotle reduced the fullness of authentic pre-Socratic knowing (and therewith of techne itself) to the ends of doing and making; and with Descartes's ego cogito ergo sum, the temper of modernity had become firmly established. Receptiveness became identical to man's ability to re-present "reality" to himself -- to set it apart from himself as an object: and through such methodical distancing to assure himself of his own existence and of the existence of a "reality" outside himself. So, too, it is with this increasing scientific certainty (human-certainty) that, according to Heidegger, the determination of man-as-center of the cosmos becomes more fixed, and man's "will to power" comes to find a precarious security in the ultimate reign of technology and its goal of total domination.³²

Heidegger's "meditative thinking" calls into question this unswerving faith in the Faustian hubris that lies at the core of the modern anthropocentric world-view, a mode of being which moves Heidegger to claim: "It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself."³³ It poses an alternative through the image of a de-centered

universe where things can appear in themselves, and humans can "respond to the appeal of [their] presencing."³⁴ Such experiences as "responding," "listening," and "opening" which are seen as basic qualities of being, offer a world where man is not first and where uses do not have to be built out of a chaotic nothingness. While modern calculative thinking depends upon human-as-calculator-laborer, meditative thinking depends upon human-as-receiver-relater. For Heidegger, such a characterization becomes possible as we come to see that there is something before us. Described in yet another way, in this analysis, to think meditatively is, in effect, to offer thanks: to attend to and care for a "source" that precedes human creations and human language. Meditative thinking is thus an involvement in a process of being-inspired, for through such thinking/thanking the human pays heed to its inspiration -- to what it is not.³⁵

It is silence -- not human products nor language-as-science that prepares the grounding, the opportunity, for such inspiration according to Heidegger. As moderns can loosen the life-death grip that ties them to their tools of control, to their ego-centered talk, to their ultimate faith in history/culture, they can "listen to what remains unspoken," to experience "grace."³⁶ They can, as Heidegger describes it, "foster the saving power."³⁷ That is, it

is not the project of "humanizing" the cosmos that inspires human being-in-the-world for Heidegger (such is the project of calculative thinking that always must transform that which is not human into that which is human). Rather, it is the listening to a silence that re-establishes a continuity/reciprocity of self-world-nature. Even more striking is that within this Heideggerian context, silence takes on a new meaning. It does not mean absence or without life/activity. Such a definition flows logically only from the modern presuppositions that rest so firmly upon the dichotomies of activity/passivity and language/silence. As has been discussed above, such a model bequeaths to moderns their terror in the face of silence. Silence, for Heidegger, offers an opportunity for a re-awakening of voices drowned-out by the "reassuring chatter of the world of things."³⁸

Significantly, too, nature itself is not speechless matter as moderns would have it. If one can listen-through-silence, one can hear and know. Smith's "listening" to the earth-as-rich-loam is helpful here:

The raw sounds of earth, such as the rush of winds through the pines, the roar of the alluvial ocean, the crash of thunder, or even the gentle muttering and murmuring of the pebbled brook, are not "matter" for musical forms. Instead they are the element which comes forth most elementally when it is forced back or sets itself back into its elemental earthiness.³⁹

To be silent is thus to dislodge oneself from the contemporary discourses of investigation and calculation in order to open up new possibilities for re-experiencing/re-understanding nature (and other humans). Such possibilities would emerge not through the techniques of control nor even through the seemingly benign "translation" of its ways into artistic forms, but by a "moving through" and a receptivity to sound, feeling, and vision. It is not "human" language which is at the center of this experience -- not human work/production. It is rather the keeping of a "watchful silence," and the silent elucidation of spaces freed from human willing and open to "come forth" from "concealment."⁴⁰ For this perspective, "clearing" and not "producing" would serve as an appropriate metaphor for such an on-going process.⁴¹

The meaning of silence that this general Heideggerian orientation introduces could be taken as a core-concept from which one contemporary notion of social-critique might be understood to stem. When, for example, cultural historian-critic William Irwin Thompson envisages the "transition from civilization to planetization, from a materialistic industrial society based upon production and consumption to a contemplative culture based upon consciousness and ecological symbiosis," he is looking to silence both as a source of a criticism of modernity, and as an "initiation

experience for the entire human race."⁴² Silence becomes the central metaphor that exposes the differences between "clearing" and "producing," and that simultaneously points towards human practices that allow a renewed experience of nature (ecology-reciprocity) and a qualitatively different experience of self (egoless-openness to Other). It is both criticism and possibility.

Many critics of modernity, particularly those grappling with the social conflicts and movements for change in America in the 1960's and 1970's, share Thompson's understanding that silence is an active and potent force that can make one aware of the profound alienation that is endemic to modern civilization. "The movement into silence," Rosenberg and Bergen argue, "is visible only as an alternative . . .

It may represent the only option the self can envision if it would resist joining an eternal struggle that absorbs all possibility and leaves one in an agony of emptiness that welcomes death itself.⁴³

The practice of silence thus defines opportunities to search for and locate "voices" within that have "seduced" moderns into participating in a distorted and inauthentic "communal dialogue," and into obeying sets of rituals that are destructive of self, both through the ultimate despair that they breed and through the bad-faith that they nour-

ish.⁴⁴ Thus, for critics Rosenberg and Bergen, "Silence is . . . a turning away from this mutual destructiveness."⁴⁵ It is (using the Sartrean example) "a refusal to do the dance of the waiter and to exist as a waiter-thing."⁴⁶

As in one component of Heidegger's "meditational thinking," silence here is a stopping -- a stopping from asking culture for definitions of self and social meaning, a "remov[al] from the on-going drama that culture enacts."⁴⁷ Silence is thus a means to see what we take-for-granted, a tool whose basic nature is antithetical to the methods-of-certainty upon which modern knowledge depends. Silence is, from this perspective, a "method" of radical halting, and thus is also an invitation to question and to wonder. Yet, importantly, no ready answers are provided within its terms. As Rosenberg and Bergen conclude: "Stepping outside of history does not magically ensure one's 'fate.' It does bespeak the knowledge that culture cannot provide that certain cure."⁴⁸

Rosenberg and Bergen understand silence as a means. From their perspective, it is a critical (though non-modern) method that can alter the "necessary" course of modern thinking and acting. Its strength lies in its indisputable negation of the tenets of modernity. Its essence emerges as modernity's "other." But this particular notion of silence-as-means-of-criticism -- of silence as "world-

stopping," is only one part of the meaning that the Heideggerian orientation to silence-as-social-critique might carry with it. Rosenberg and Bergen's depiction of silence dwells upon silence as an occasion of "turning away" from that which portends alienation and destruction. Interestingly, however, their often insightful and probing exploration of silence (which focuses upon psycho-cultural analyses of Bellow, Ellison, and Heller's novels) recapitulates the modern preoccupation with and definition of criticism-as-negation. Silence is powerful because it seems to capture that most radical questioning of modern discourse. Although they emphasize the significance of silence in "presencing" for humans the true meaning of non-determinateness (an experience that would surely be very crucial for Heidegger), Rosenberg and Bergen emphasize stopping at the expense of a fuller speculation upon silence as a positive performance that not only negates that which is, but outlines the horizons of qualitatively different self-humanity-nature-relations.⁴⁹ In the end, silence for Rosenberg and Bergen is primarily cast within the terms of an existential act of genuine courage by a single self facing the "absurd" of contemporary culture.⁵⁰

Kurt H. Wolff's wonderfully rich and speculative efforts to play with the meanings of "surrender" have much in common with Rosenberg and Bergen's theorizings about si-

lence.⁵¹ For Wolff, modern men, alienated from culture and history,

have come upon, have invented the notion of surrender in the very surrender of the conviction that they can no longer move on tradition: if they could, they would continue being able to be true to it, however critical they might be; their experience would build on it, develop it, continue it. But, as is, there is no continuity of tradition; we, who are such men, are thrown back on ourselves.⁵²

"Surrender" as a "response to our crisis," to our "disordered time" becomes the moment of experience, and that particular "structure" of experience in which the modern self no longer relies upon the presuppositions of modern knowing, feeling, and capturing that which he confronts. To surrender means,

not to select, not to believe that one can know quickly what one's experience means, hence what is to be understood and acted on: thus it means not to suppose that one can do justice to the experience with one's received notions, with one's received feeling and thinking, even with the received structure of that feeling and thinking; it means to meet it, whatever it be, as much as possible in its originality, its itself-ness.⁵³

Like Rosenberg and Bergen's notion of silence as "world-stopping," Wolff's descriptions of "surrender" move towards a recognition of that decisive juncture where the self seeks to leap outside of history and of tradition, to suspend its "received notions," and to "meet as immediately as

possible whatever the occasion may be."⁵⁴ Yet, while Wolff shares with Rosenberg and Bergen the key sense in which "surrender" (or silence) cannot anticipate a precise conclusion or "cure" even though it does prestage a "new beginning-in-the-world," Wolff more fully addresses the nature of that "positive performance."⁵⁵

"Surrender" is "cognitive love."⁵⁶ Its originality flows from the fullness of experience that it introduces -- its sense of a "total involvement" where everything becomes experience in its infinity.⁵⁷ Moreover, "surrender" positively responds to what the Heideggerian view sees as the limiting and egotistical tenets of modernity by bringing to life a form of communication -- a form of contemplation, that has been denied by "calculative" thought. Wolff's use of one of James Agee's descriptions is most poignant:

The light in this room is of a lamp. Its flame in the glass is of the dry, silent and famished delicateness of the latest lateness of the night, and of such ultimate, such holiness of silence and peace that all on earth and within extremest remembrance seems suspended upon it in perfection as upon reflexive water: and I feel that if I can by utter quietness succeed in not disturbing this silence, in not so much as touching this plain of water, I can tell you anything within the realm of God, whatsoever it may be, that I wish to tell you, and that whatsoever it may be, you will be able to help but understand it.⁵⁸

Agee has "surrendered" to a silence that reveals a delicate

web connecting him to others and to a world. His is a very private experience, but one that simultaneously points to a powerful sense of sharing and relating: to an awakening of communication not through talk but through the "holiness of silence." When man, according to Wolff, is "thrown back on what he really is," when he "hears" the silence, "that which he is thrown back on is at the same time that which he shares with his fellow man."⁵⁹ It is this experience of sharing which opens towards a new set of human understandings and possibilities, and which provides the individual with both an immediacy and genuineness of self-experience, and with a lived experience of a common humanity.

W. I. Thompson's vision of a "contemplative culture" seeks to hold onto the general contours of Heidegger's critique of modernity, to the meaning of silence outlined by Rosenberg and Bergen, and to the notion of "surrender" introduced by Wolff. Silence is defiance of the talk and production of modernity. But Thompson's vision, like Wolff's, also encompasses the anticipation of a particular content -- of an end, not just a means. Here rests the "possibility" of silence, not solely as a "turning away" (as Rosenberg and Bergen would have it), but as a turning towards that which offers authenticity and fullness; and especially for Wolff, the transcendence of one's individual alienation -- as what was described above as "releasement

toward things." The existential act of silence becomes transformed in Thompson and Wolff's notions of silence-as-social-critique into a positive view of another world filled with the "life" of silence.⁶⁰ Silence in this context is not only the means to locate and to exorcise that "seductive" modern dialogue. It is also the coming to life of new voices: the utopian anticipation of a qualitatively different social world. Through silence, "a new voice enters," poet Gary Snyder explains; "a voice speaks through you clearer and stronger than what you know of yourself; with a sureness and melody of its own, singing out the inner song of the self and of the planet."⁶¹ Silence is thus experienced (for it is the experience and not solely the rational and analytic understanding of this phenomenon which becomes important from this perspective) not merely as negation, but as a voice of "its own," a voice that precedes and "speaks through" the human. By "allowing" such a "song," "expression," the human -- no longer frozen in and guarded by what Philip Slater refers to as the all-pervading Ego Mafia (that most dominant modern-self) becomes attentive to another quality of being-in-the-world where building an ego and protecting its instrumentalized language no longer defines the thrust of human practice.⁶²

Heidegger's analyses and speculations upon the necessary role of "meditative thinking" can thus introduce a notion of Silence-as-Stopping (Rosenberg and Bergen) and Silence-as-Surrender (Wolff), while also providing the contours for an even fuller notion of Silence-as-Ecological-Opening.⁶³ The powerful relationship between silence and ecology flows from what Gary Snyder describes as a process by which the "breath" of silence brings the outer world into one's body and allows humans to hear what Theodore Roszak refers to as a "long forgotten language" that announces the intimate connections between humans and nature.⁶⁴ For these theorists, silence is itself a language that brings to life an "overall sensibility," that recognizes the interrelationships of "self" and "planet" -- of their "mutualistic interdependence."⁶⁵ No longer deafened by their "arrogant designs," humans within such an ecological framework that has been brought to awareness through a revived, not quiescent silence, can re-situate themselves in a world and slowly come to appreciate and act in relation to the interdependencies that characterize the cosmos and that particularly define the "vital reciprocity" between nature and humans.⁶⁶ Instead of the "artificial synthesis" of "technological" (modern) man in which "he has no longer any knowledge of anything except himself, his machines, and his knowledge that he knows what he knows," this practice of

silence opens towards a "bringing together" of humans and nature in a "living and sacred synthesis," and calls attention to the need for a qualitatively different set of political-ethical postulates to guide human social and individual action.⁶⁷

Silence-as-Ecological-Opening thus addresses itself not to negation, but to this new "synthesis" that could, in keeping with Heidegger's notion of "respiritualization," be termed, re-sacralization.⁶⁹ "Out of that immense silence there is that which is sacred."⁷⁰

In this first chapter, silence has been examined as critique: as a method that serves as a radical halting in the face of that which is modern, as a "surrender" in the face of human alienation, and as a practice that envisages possibilities of a quality of human and natural life that makes apparent the narrowness and destructiveness of a uni-verse where self is Ego and nature is moldable resource; where, in Jacques Maritain's words: "The universe becomes dumb."⁷¹ Most clearly, writers within this "tradition" have sensitively explored the ontological groundings of human life, and thus have not only come to question the contents of modernity (its values, priorities, and socio-economic institutions), but its definition of knowledge and its very mode of understanding itself. Because "modern" social science cherishes its own sphere of influence and

its definition of society-as-human construction, as worked-upon-thing, it too has relegated matters of ontology (of being) to an order of philosophical discourse to which it has to pay scant attention. Through its methods, presuppositions, and theories, social science recapitulates a profoundly "secular" view of the world that by definition precludes serious attention to questions regarding the "sacredness" of humans-place-in-the-cosmos. Awareness of silence-as-critique re-awakens such questions, and demands a re-thinking of the language (tools) of social science itself which most basically and concertedly promulgate talk of nam-ing, ordering, and defining the functions of what is at hand.

But silence-as-critique also points to an important ambiguity. This general Heideggerian perspective offers the insight that silence is that privileged moment of human experience that can make apparent the non-human origins of both language and existence, and "the possibilities that lie outside of history."⁷² It can also provide the opportunity for humans to see the "wholeness of life" and attune themselves to a language that reverberates with the connections between humans and nature. This mode of being-in-the-world (so consistent with the model of "meditative thinking" that Heidegger outlines), defines the need and offers the

possibility of describing the ontological groundings of life itself, and can anticipate forms of social and cultural existence consistent with these groundings.

Yet, the process by which such groundings and anticipations come to inform everyday life and the social-economic and cultural institutions that define its boundaries has to be of a different quality and of a different order. While silence-as-stopping can offer a powerful method of criticism of the modern and serve to expose taken-for-granted alienated forms, and silence-as-ecological-opening can provide a positive vision through which that criticism can become "possibility," the articulation of specific criteria that could serve to translate criticism and vision into daily reality would have to take place not only outside of the purely calculative domain (the domain of the modern), but outside of meditative thinking -- outside of silence itself.

In his analysis of modernity, Heidegger (as has been discussed above) is quick to acknowledge the necessity of both "calculative thinking" and "meditative thinking" to human existence. It is the radical imbalance between these two modes of being, and not the possible transcendence of either "order" that is significant to him. But, through what order of thinking/being are criteria elucidated and determined that could link the calculative/technical with

the meditative/visionary? Perhaps the process of articulating rules and laws, establishing traditions and rituals, or determining socio-cultural priorities consistent with the vision of the silent, would have to be guided by a third order of thinking/being that is simultaneously aware of both realms. Such a third "moment" of being introduces another sense of translating: not solely into that which mirrors the human (as this analysis claims that modernity demands), but into that which attends to the need for humans to both speak and work and to be silent and "open to the mystery."⁷³

NOTES

- ¹René Descartes, Philosophical Works, Vol. I, p. 119.
- ²A. Wheelis, The End of the Modern Age, p. 31.
- ³Condillac, Condorcet, d'Alembert and other "enlightenment" thinkers surely understood that a single method would hold valid for all sciences. Their notions of a "social mathematics" or a "geometry of politics" attest to their efforts to understand social relations within the same model as they sought to understand nature.
- ⁴W. Leiss, The Domination of Nature, p. 58.
- ⁵Ibid., p. 95.
- ⁶Ibid., p. 87.
- ⁷Ibid.
- ⁸Ibid., p. 78.
- ⁹Wheelis, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
- ¹⁰This image of the "machine" is taken from Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion; see Ibid., p. 34.
- ¹¹The image of man lost without the "language of mathematics" is taken from Galileo; see Ibid., p. 32.
- ¹²The issue of the origins of language is crucial here. For modern man, language does not have its beginnings with the "gods" or with nature. That is, language does not "speak through man." Language, rather, is a product of man's own work. This topic is further explored below.
- ¹³A. Blum, Socrates: The Original and its Images, p. 21.
- ¹⁴John Sallis, "Towards the Movement of Reversal: Science, Technology, and the Language of Homecoming," in Sallis, ed., Heidegger and the Path of Thinking, pp. 157-58.
- ¹⁵However critical in its intent, such a notion is ultimately taken-for-granted in the attitudes of Marx as well. See Capital, Vol. I, p. 177. For further elucidation

tion, also see Chapter 2 of this work.

¹⁶Blum, op. cit., p. 28.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁸Martin Heidegger, "Memorial Address," in Discourse on Thinking, p. 46.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 49.

²⁰Ibid., p. 50.

²¹Ibid., p. 46. Erich Fromm, in his To Have or To Be? makes a similar point about the ways in which a "decreasing use of verbs in Western languages in the past few centuries" reflects a basic reorientation of humans towards their world and towards nature. For Fromm, even activities come to be expressed as nouns of having. See especially Chapters V, VIII, and IX.

²²Heidegger, "Memorial Address," pp. 49 and 51.

²³Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, p. 43. Heidegger further addresses this issue in the essay "Science and Reflection," in The Question Concerning Technology, p. 157.

²⁴Heidegger, "Memorial Address," p. 45.

²⁵Ibid., p. 50.

²⁶Ibid., p. 56.

²⁷Ibid., p. 54.

²⁸Ibid., p. 55.

²⁹F. Joseph Smith, "In-the-World and On-the-Earth: A Heideggerian Interpretation," in Frings, ed., Heidegger and the Quest for Truth, p. 188.

³⁰Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, quoted in Hubert Dreyfus, "Holism and Hermeneutics," in Review of Metaphysics, 34, September 1980, p. 13.

³¹Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 13. Important to note is that Heidegger's elucidation of history is as a history-of-being. The history of human remembering to think-on-being and the forgetting-of-being provides the context for his analysis.

³²According to Heidegger's "history of metaphysics," it is with Nietzsche's "will to power" that human "forgetting" reached its zenith. See *ibid.* for further analysis.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 27. It is interesting that the British economist-ecologist E. F. Schumacher's conception of "buddhist economics" rests upon a similar analysis. (See below for further discussion.)

³⁴Heidegger, "A Letter to a Young Student," in Poetry, Language, and Thought, p. 183.

³⁵For this insight about "thanking," my appreciation to Michael Gruber. Heidegger's interest in the German poet Holderlin is evident throughout his work, and becomes very significant in his later writings where his interest in language and poetry is even more pronounced. Heidegger, in his essay "Remembrance of the Poet" quotes Holderlin's line: "Often we must keep silence; holy names are lacking." Thus, the connection between silence and a respect for that which cannot be named in human terms is important. Meditational thinking thus demands a kind of waiting for that inspiration that could allow that which is not-spoken -- that which is holy -- to come to man. See Heidegger, "Remembrance of the Poet," in his Existence and Being, p. 237.

³⁶Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, p. 55.

³⁷Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 33.

³⁸Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 194. W. I. Thompson's understanding is consistent with this point of view as well: "Modern man knows how to talk back to nature, but he doesn't know how to listen. Archaic man knew how to listen to wind and water, flower, and tree, angel and elf." See W. I. Thompson, Evil and World Order, p. 48.

⁴⁰The notion of "watchful silence" is taken from James L. Perotti in his Heidegger and the Divine, p. 111.

⁴¹For a description of "clearing" see Walter Biemel, "Poetry and Language in Heidegger," in J. Kockelmans, On Heidegger and Language. For another interesting use of the term, see the writing of contemporary American farmer-poet Wendell Berry, especially The Clearing.

⁴²W. I. Thompson, Darkness and Scattered Light, p. 34.

⁴³Rosenberg and Bergen, The Cold Fire, p. 195.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 191.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 178.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 191.

⁴⁹The argument for silence as a "positive performance" that is not simply the negation of discourse is very clearly developed in B. P. Dauenhauer, Silence: The Phenomenon and Its Ontological Significance, especially Chapter 6. See also Max Picard's The World of Silence, Chapter 1, "The Nature of Silence."

⁵⁰Rosenberg and Bergen's analysis has to be read as part of a culture of criticism significant to America in the late 1960's and 1970's. Their analyses of Bellow, Ellison, and Heller are indeed helpful to an understanding of American culture and to the search for a "source" of criticism. It is significant that they turn to silence as explanatory of the absurd of modern culture; but also significant that their use of silence does not foresee other uses of it to present a "positive" notion of "possibility."

⁵¹Kurt H. Wolff, over the years, has written many essays on his notions of "surrender" and "catch"; pieces that have dealt with aesthetic experience, the meaning of bodily experience, and the experience of self and community, among other topics. His amazing attention to the process of teaching and learning as depicted and described in many of these essays is also very helpful in understanding the terms that he has sought to unfold in his writing and thinking. See especially his volume Surrender and Catch, 1976.

⁵²Wolff, "Surrender as a Response to Our Crisis," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. II, #2, Fall 1962, p. 21.

⁵³Wolff, "Surrender and the Body," in Cultural Hermeneutics, 2, 1974, p. 19.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵The notion of "a new beginning in-the-world," a kind of ontological version of a "new conceiving" was also developed by Wolff in Sections 42-43 of Wolff and Moore's edited The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse, p. 96.

⁵⁶Wolff, "Surrender as a Response to Our Crisis," p. 22.

⁵⁶Wolff, "Surrender and the Body," p. 20.

⁵⁷James Agee, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, p. 51, partially quoted in Wolff, "Surrender as a Response to Our Crisis," p. 20. It is interesting that Agee's work has also been extensively used by another sociologist, John O'Neill, in his Making Sense Together: An Introduction to Wild Sociology. For O'Neill, Agee's "meditations" on the lives of three tenant farmer families present a "path" for "wild sociology" -- one that, like Agee's, "turns at times to the eye of the camera but also for the same reasons to the compassionate icon of crucified humanity." The powerful streak of romanticism found throughout O'Neill's very provocative volume is much less evident in Wolff's discussion, which, importantly, always points towards a profound faith in the "utmost exercise of one's reason." This focus upon "reason" in Wolff's works also differentiates his thought from other critics-of-modernity. See John O'Neill, Making Sense Together: An Introduction to Wild Sociology, "The Holy Watch," p. 59.

⁵⁹Wolff, "Surrender as a Response to Our Crisis," p. 21.

⁶⁰Such a "positive" view of silence and its "possibility" has been most fully explored in diaries, notes, and "journeys" by those who have directly sought another mode of experience outside the contours of the modern. Perhaps the question: "Is there a Self other than the modern Ego-Self?" is a question that is most present in these writings. This kind of writing has been traditionally defined as "religious" or "spiritual." But, what is significant to a study of contemporary American society is the extent to which such "explorations" have become part of a more general cultural trend and mode of critique. Two recent pieces of writing within this "genre" (whose experimental style is also quite purposeful) are: Paul Zweig's Three Journeys: An Automythology, and Eric Lerner's Journey of Insight Meditation. A more conventional example of such writings which is nevertheless aware of a broader notion of religious is Thomas Merton's Asian Journal.

⁶¹Gary Snyder, "Poetry and the Primitive: Notes on Poetry as an Ecological Survival Technique," in Earth Household, p. 123.

⁶²Slater's examination of modernity's inherent ego-mania has been a theme in all of his works since The Pursuit of Loneliness (1972). His most recent book continues to focus on the narcissistic underpinnings of moderns, especially in regard to money. See Slater, Wealth Addiction.

⁶³The most explicit effort to connect Heidegger's thought with those of "ecology" has been made by George Seidel in his essay "Heidegger: Philosopher for Ecologists?", in Man and World, Vol. 4, #1, 1971.

I would argue that Wolff's exploration of "surrender" does not explicitly deal with the relationship between humans and nature (with, as Snyder has called it, the connection between humans and "the planet"), as much as it does deal with the relationships among humans. It is the movement towards a new understanding of humanity that is decisive for Wolff. The "ecological" possibilities within Wolff's thought are, however, quite strong, and consistent with his work.

⁶⁴Snyder, op. cit., p. 199; and Roszak, Person/Planet, p. 48. Susan Griffin, in her Woman and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her, has collected texts and linked them through her own poetic commentaries in order to show the mind-set of modern Enlightenment thinking, especially in regard to ways in which women and nature have been defined and exploited as one. Her short section on "Naming" provides another example where a writer critical of modern technique and language looks to a "moment" in silence, a moment before language, when nature and humanity "knew" a unity.

Behind naming, beneath words, is something else. An existence named unnamed and unnameable. We give the grass a name, and earth a name. We say grass and earth are separate. We know this because we can pull the grass free of the earth and see its separate roots -- but when the grass is free, it dies. . . . But in a moment that which is behind naming makes itself known. . . . And all this knowledge is in the souls of everything, behind naming, before speaking, beneath words. (pp. 190-91)

⁶⁵These phrases are taken from Murray Bookchin's essay "Toward an Ecological Society," (from a book of the same title), pp. 60-61.

⁶⁶This sense of modernity's "arrogant designs" and the "vital reciprocity" between nature and humans "forgotten" by modern man is defined and amplified in Roszak's Person/Planet, p. 53.

The argument introduced here is not intended to imply that only through silence can such an ecological "whole" come to be recognized, nor that the experience of silence automatically makes such a relationship real. It is that for many contemporary thinkers (often "silently" indebted to Heidegger's world-view), silence has been considered a meaningful language whose qualities provide an experience of the recognition of human-nature reciprocities.

⁶⁷Thomas Merton, "Symbolism: Communication or Communion?", in New Directions, #20, p. 5. Merton's use of "God" in his synthesis is surely primary to his orientation as a Catholic monk. However, the perspective of silence-as-ecological-opening is not dependent upon "god" as a term. What is significant is an acknowledgment of an "other" that precedes and informs human existence.

There have recently been a number of authors who have attempted to derive the foundations of an "ecological ethics." Among the most significant have been E. F. Schumacher's A Guide for the Perplexed, and Robert Cahn's Footprints on the Planet: A Search for an Environmental Ethic. Henry Skolimowski's Eco-Philosophy: Designing New Tactics for Living is also an impressive effort to articulate the particulars of what he calls an "ecological humanism." See also Garrett Hardin's Exploring New Ethics for Survival.

⁶⁸Contemporary efforts to re-define political practice in a manner that takes seriously issues that depend upon a recognition of human-nature relations (nuclear energy, pollution, etc.) have importantly also sought to bridge what has conventionally been taken to be the "gap" between the realm of religion/spirituality and politics/economics. Writers like W. I. Thompson, Theodore Roszak, Philip Slater, and E. F. Schumacher (among many others) have begun a dialogue that treats silence, for example, not merely as the practice of an isolated individual within a specific religious tradition, but as a mode of thinking about and acting in concert with a set of "ecological" criteria that positively define the qualities of human-nature relationships. It is the "social" meaning of silence that is thus

significant here; and the significance of silence as a kind of teaching that points towards what W. I. Thompson calls an "epochal transformation of culture."

⁶⁹In a very interesting essay, "The World is Your Body," Alan Watts utilizes the difference between an emphasis upon man in the world and man of the world to demonstrate how moderns deny their "mutuality" with nature. (Watts's essay is contained in Disch, ed., The Ecological Conscience: Values for Survival, p. 181.) In his essay cited above, Murray Bookchin uses the term "the respiration of the natural world" to connote a similar process. See Bookchin, op. cit., p. 70.

⁷⁰Krishnamurti, The Wholeness of Life, p. 145.

⁷¹Jacques Maritain, The Dream of Descartes. Quoted in E. F. Schumacher, A Guide for the Perplexed, p. 9.

⁷²Rosenberg and Bergen, op. cit., p. 196.

⁷³There have surely been important efforts in the last several years, for example, to criticize the technocratic (and in the terms of this chapter, modernistic) biases of public policy decision-making. Importantly, such writings have moved from the recognition of the limitations and distortions of positivistic methodologies to the articulation of possible alternative processes. The notion of "translation" introduced here, however, demands attention to the specific criteria used to judge a rule or policy; and the way in which "silence" as symbolic of a renewed human-nature constellation could inform such criteria. A very helpful overview of questions and problems associated with the methodologies of public policies can be found in Frank Fischer's Politics, Values, and Public Policy: The Problem of Methodology. Whether or not rule-policy making can not only respond to its technocratic bias but also to its rationalistic bias is a critical question that flows from this Heideggerian analysis.

CHAPTER 2

SILENCE AS ALIENATION

The underground language of people who have no power to define and determine themselves in the world develops its own destiny and precision. It enables them to sniff the wind, sense the atmosphere, defend themselves in a hostile terrain. But it restricts them by affirming their own dependence upon the words of the powerful. It reflects their inability to break out of the imposed reality through to a reality that they can define and control for themselves. It keeps them locked against themselves.

Sheila Rowbotham

The deep elemental stirrings that lead to social change, begin with the hearts of men whose thoughts have hitherto not been articulate or have never gained a hearing, and whose needs are therefore ignored, suppressed, and treated as if they did not exist. There is no revolution without a voice.

Thomas Merton

-- An' his language, said the other woman.
 -- Aw yis.
 Here the other woman sighed in her turn and drew her shawl about her:
 -- On'y, said she, God bless the gintleman, he uses the words that you nor me can't in-tarpit.

James Joyce, Stephen Hero

In Chapter 1, "silence" was examined as a critique of modernity -- as that privileged moment when the rigors of modern reason "modelled on mathematics" and a world reduced to the "projection of an arithmological domain of beings" was questioned and halted, and a qualitatively distinct set of human relations could be both envisioned and explored.¹ The experience of silence understood in those terms (so influenced by Heidegger's reflections) tested the very boundaries of our expectations and assumptions as moderns, and expressed many of what Daniel Bell has called "the root perplexities of a time" -- most centrally, modernity's dependence upon techniques and modes of thought which seek to mold and control nature and other humans, yet which have simultaneously created ecological disaster and human misery.² It is the recognition of such "perplexities" that Heidegger's analysis of "calculative thinking" and his introduction of the notion of "meditative thinking" invited. And thus, silence-as-critique offered an engagement with a notion of silence grappling with and seeking to free itself from the very nature of modernity's presuppositions: from its very language.

Silence-as-critique claims the explicit need to open spheres of thought, feeling, and experience beyond modernity. In this sense, the particular repercussions of modernity's reign were not conceived as isolated aberrations,

particular ills that could be remedied within the universe that modernity itself had erected. Silence-as-critique elucidated what it understands to be the central crisis and the absolute limitations of modernity as a world vision and as a social praxis, and would thereby negate the very possibility of utilizing the modern mind-set to "reform" itself. But there is another orientation to the modern whose meaningfulness silence-as-critique would deeply question. This orientation acknowledges the absolute power and brilliance of modern accomplishments, while also criticizing the historically specific social, political, and economic relations that modernity has given birth to thus far. From this perspective, modernity is not the Frankenstein that has exploded with its inherently demonic powers; it is an ideal -- a utopia not yet realized.

It is the analysis of Karl Marx that most powerfully typifies this second depiction of the modern. For Marx, modern bourgeois society is truly revolutionary. Its infinite expansion of human capability through production and exchange, its transformation of society from one based upon superstition and magic to one based upon the tenets of reason and the tradition of Enlightenment thought, and its hypostatization of freedom as an ultimate social good together constitute a human ideal that Marx clearly shares. Marshall

Berman's careful and imaginative analysis of The Communist Manifesto shows just how "modern" Marx's vision was:

"Marx's imagery projects . . . a sense of wonder over the modern world: its vital powers are dazzling, overwhelming, beyond anything the bourgeoisie could have imagined, let alone calculated or planned."³ For Marx, the bourgeoisie has created a potentiality whose vastness and radical character even they cannot foresee, nor fully comprehend.

Yet, what is crucial for Marx is not solely the ecstasy, the "wonder," the possibility of modernity's project. It is its lack of realization, its abstraction, and most importantly, its ultimate "demonic" nature. Again, Berman's description is most applicable:

But Marx's images also express what must accompany any genuine sense of wonder: a sense of dread. For this miraculous and magical world is also demonic and terrifying, swinging wildly out of control, menacing and destroying blindly as it moves. The members of the bourgeoisie repress both wonder and dread at what they have made: these possessors don't want to know how deeply they are possessed. They learn only at moments of personal and general ruin -- only, that is, when it is too late.⁴

For Marx, the revolutionary modern society that he sees literally exploding around him is unquestionably double-edged. Within it lies the possible realization of the just, free, and fully productive social world that the world-vision of modernity postulates. But the core of

Marx's analysis of modernity -- its true thrust -- is the second edge: the endemic social chaos, human suffering, and destruction that the present historical form of modernity -- capitalism -- necessarily breeds.

What is significant here is that Marx has transformed the very nature of the discussion of modernity. No longer is modernity itself called into question (as it was in Chapter 1). Marx has clearly accepted its ideals: the liberatory nature of reason and science; the ultimate technologization of production, the subjugation ("humanization") of nature based upon human "needs"; and the vast expansion of material resources. What is in question for Marx is capitalism, and the social, economic, and cultural system that capitalism defines.⁵

Alienation, for Marx, is the central characteristic of capitalist society, and its omnipresence is necessary to the basic workings of that economic system.⁶ Marx's critique of political economy is, in effect, an analysis of the origins of alienation, of the historical transformation of human self-productive capacities into alienated labor. While "it is evident that political economy establishes an alienated form of social intercourse, as the essential, original, and definitive human forms," Marx argues, it is necessary to rather show that such reified categories only hide present social relations, neglect historical changes,

and distort the true differences between what is "natural" to humans and what is the result of distinct socio-economic forms.⁷ In his Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, Marx is quite explicit:

What requires explanation is not the unity of living and active human beings with the natural inorganic conditions of their metabolism, with nature, and therefore their appropriation of nature; nor is this the result of a historical process. What we must explain is the separation of these inorganic conditions of human existence from this active existence, a separation which is only fully completed in the relation between wage-labor and capital.⁸

Marx's examination of alienation rests upon his analysis of this process and experience of "separation." His descriptions of the birth of the commodity form, of the commodification of labor power, of the origins of surplus value and of the shaping of class society, all stress the multifaceted nature of this separation -- a separation integrally tied to a system which rests upon a celebration of the cash nexus, the quantification of all relationships, the immiseration of whole populations, and "the institutionalization of economic growth."⁹ Thus, alienation for Marx heralds "the devaluation of the human world."¹⁰

Marx pinpointed the separation/alienation of people at work, continually citing ways in which human beings had become, within the capitalist work process itself, mere "abstractions," dirempted from a social "wholeness,"

"robbed of a specifically human dimension."¹¹ Whether in relation to their productive activities, in relation to the products of their labors, in relation to themselves and to others, or in relation to their "species-being," work in capitalist society had "become an operation beyond and above man."¹² Marx's conclusions reassert his insistence that the "active power" of humans -- the very basis upon which the modern ideal rests -- has been strangled by capitalism:

His [the worker's] life appears as the sacrifice of his life, the realization of his nature as the diminution of his life, his production as the production of his destruction, his power over the object as the power of the object over him; the master of his creation appears as its slave.¹³

Alienation, this "incredible world picture" (as Ernest Becker aptly describes it) captured for Marx the constricting structures and the deadening qualities of human existence under capitalist social relations.¹⁴ More than the "thought of alienation" as Hegel had described it, or the state of unnaturalness due to human pride, avarice and amour propre as Rousseau had postulated, alienation for Marx describes with historical accuracy and social concreteness the "absolute negation" of self-development (self-consciousness), and social-development (community).¹⁵ Moreover, this taken-for-granted capitalist world-of-alienation twists the opportunities for a "free manifesta-

tion of life" by shaping our very language -- creating a truly "alienated" language only applicable to the sophisticated manipulation of objects, and to the reduction and perpetuation of human actors to mere "matter" (neither animal nor human). Marx is explicit in describing the integral connection between this language-of-matter, this language-of-objects, and alienation itself:

Our objects in their relation to one another constitute the only intelligible language we use with one another. We would not understand a human language, and it would remain without effect. On the other hand, it would be felt and spoken as a plea, as begging, and as humiliation and hence uttered with shame and with a feeling of supplication; on the other hand, it would be heard and rejected as effrontery or madness. We are so much mutually alienated from human nature that the direct language of this nature is an injury to human dignity for us, while the alienated language of objective values appears as justified, self-confident, and self-accepted human dignity.¹⁶

Language, dictated by the terms of capitalism's hegemony, thus defines the actual vocabulary and grammar of social relations for Marx. Accentuated is the calculus of "objective values" whose vast power either stifles/distorts the voices of a "human language," or acknowledges such "effrontery" as only a sign of "madness." Alienation has, for all intents and purposes, frozen human speech, allowing only those voices to be heard that have internalized the contours of a dehumanized and objectified social system.

Thus, for Marx, alienation has resulted in a world-of-silence -- a world where the fullness, value, and actuality of human freedom, creativity, and sociation cannot be expressed; where the very tools of speaking a non-alienated world have been stolen, have been separated from the majority of potential speakers. Silence is alienation for Marx: it both symbolizes and displays the profound emptiness endemic to the historical world of capitalism. And thus, within these terms, revolution, the overturning and transcendence of alienation -- the actualization of the modern -- becomes a returning-to-speech, a voicing of true "human dignity."¹⁷ Yet, most certainly from this perspective, prior to such a radical reconstitution of society, the exploited, the oppressed, the alienated are truly "prisoners of silence."¹⁸

Importantly, Marx was not only interested in the presence of domination and the static realities of class rule under capitalism. He simultaneously sought to examine the very process of alienation's "secretion within every aspect of society."¹⁹ Silence, in effect, had to be continually re-achieved. That is, alienation and the silent acceptance of the status quo that it fights to engender would have to be created and legitimated by ideological forms powerfully generated through and contained in that society's institutions and ideas. Thus, it is the dominant class -- the

holders-of-speech who, for Marx, controlled not only "material" production, but "intellectual" production as well:

The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of intellectual [Geistig] production, so that hereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of intellectual production are subject to it.²⁰

Put it yet another way, for Marx, the forms and the contents of all social-learning (of the formation of human consciousness itself) would necessarily be framed within the terms of the "ideological hegemony" of the ruling-class, of the dominant cultural code.²¹

It is therefore quite consistent with this general orientation that Marx (and later theorists influenced by this tradition) have been interested in the "socialization strategies" of capitalist societies, and even more particularly in the growth of schooling as a key element in the on-going reproduction of society and perpetuation of alienation.²² If, as Joel Spring, a contemporary historian of American schools asserts, schools have become "the major institutions of social, economic, and political control . . . which consciously plans to turn people into something," an analysis of their origins and a phenomenology of their everyday workings would be crucial to an understand-

ing of the "processing [of] knowledge and people" in capitalist society.²³

Most analyses of schools have in fact emphasized the school as an "agency of socialization," that teaches "values" and "roles."²⁴ For Talcott Parsons, the school is a particularly important institution, for it is "the first socializing agency in the child's experience which institutionalizes a differentiation of status on nonbiological bases."²⁵ The school for Parsons (and for Robert Dreeben) forms necessary "linkages" between the life of the child in the family (the biological base) and the "public life of adults." As Dreeben explains, the school "must provide experiences conducive to learning the principles of conduct and patterns of behavior appropriate to adulthood."²⁶ Thus, school-socialization has both a "cognitive" and a "moral" component. The child learns on the "axis of achievement" based upon his/her cognitive-growth, his/her success in broadening a repertoire of knowledge; and the child learns on the "axis" of meaning and behavior, the molding of a notion of what is good and bad, and what is allowed and punished. Christopher Hurn describes this "moral socialization" clearly:

Schools . . . teach or encourage such qualities as punctuality and orderly work habits, they develop the ability to defer gratification, they teach the values and ideals of the adult society to the next generation.²⁷

More succinctly, schools promote, and, if successful, achieve a most radical result: the "re-organization of the pupil's personality system."²⁸

Parsons and Dreeben most obviously acknowledge the importance of the school in forming and promoting socially acceptable values and behaviors, in defining a basic "style of thought" and structure of consciousness -- as a primary component of the "socialization strategy" of contemporary society.²⁹ But their functional orientation and their generally ahistorical presentation leads them to uncritically accept the basic "fair" and "just" nature of the schooling system itself in "channeling" and "selecting" within "an increasingly differentiated and progressively more ungraded society." That is, their assumption of a functioning meritocratic society deters them from asking questions that Marx's orientation would demand regarding the nature and the qualities of social relationships, not merely their abstract functioning within a taken-for-granted and non-alienated social whole.³⁰ It is more exactly this unfulfilled task, "the task to determine the contribution made by the educational system to the reproduction of the structures of power relationships and symbolic relationships between social classes" that has been the focus of those critical analysts of education who have been significantly influenced by Marx's questions and assumptions, and who have sought to re-

wise our basic understanding of the history and experience of schools.³¹

Michael Katz, one such "revisionist" historian of the American educational system, describes the dominant metaphor through which education has been typically understood. Education, according to Katz, is "portrayed as a flower of democracy planted in a rich and liberated loam which its seeds continually replenished."³² Like Parsons's and Dreeben's analyses, such understandings of education (for the revisionists) conceal the very ideological assumptions that inform schooling and that might allow one to truly comprehend its origins and its extraordinary growth.³³ That is, such descriptions of education seek to pass-over the ineluctable bond between schools as the primary modern institution of social-learning and the lived realities and necessary reproduction of alienation upon which capitalist society depends. Instead, Cohen and Lazerson's summary discloses the major themes of the revisionist's orientation:

The school's role has been to socialize economically desirable values and behavior, teach vocational skills, and provide education consistent with students' expected occupational attainment. As a result, the school's culture became closely identified with the ethos of the corporate workplace. Schooling came to be seen as work or the preparation for work; schools were pictured as factories, educators as industrial managers, and students as the raw materials to be inducted into the production process.³⁴

Schools, as re-formulated here, can no longer be meaningfully viewed as bastions of modernity -- of liberation, replenishing and increasing the possibilities of opportunity and democracy; nor as institutions merely "socializing" citizens to neutral adult-roles. It is only within the context of an unequal society whose "power relationships" demand expanding and more formal opportunities for the inculcation of class-specific values that, for these critics, schools can be adequately understood.³⁵ More specifically, a basic theme can be said to define much of this writing: that it is only within the context of the particular structures and cognitive/behavioral demands of the capitalist economy and especially its system of work that the world of schooling can be accurately accounted for.³⁶

It has perhaps been the writing of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, especially their text, Schooling in Capitalist America, that has most persuasively set the macroscopic terms of this revisionist argument.³⁷ For them, the "structural correspondence," the "fit" between the educational system and the "requirements of alienated work" is the pivotal relationship to explore:

The perpetuation of the class structure requires that the hierarchical division of labor be reproduced in the consciousness of its participants. The educational system is one of the several reproduction mechanisms through which dominant elites seek to achieve this objective. By providing skills, legitimating

inequalities in economic positions, and facilitating certain types of social intercourse among individuals, U.S. education patterns personal development around the requirements of alienated work.³⁸

Consistent with Marx's analysis described above, education for Bowles and Gintis does not "produce" inequality, repression, domination, nor alienation. What it does do is "reproduce" and "legitimate a pre-existing pattern" -- a pattern defined by the parameters of the capitalist economic system.³⁹

A central concern of Schooling in Capitalist America is thus an analysis of the economic bases for the rise of mass public education in the United States. According to Bowles and Gintis's historical rendering, the pressure for free and obligatory public education in nineteenth-century America "reflected an increasing concern with production and with the conditions of labor."⁴⁰ Support for such a system of learning among employers became "virtually unanimous only as the problem of creating, controlling, and extracting ever-increasing amounts of work from a permanent labor force became more pressing."⁴¹ So too, over one hundred years later, the unprecedented expansion of college education through the rapid growth of the community college system not only reflected the demand for greater access to higher education by minorities and workers themselves, nor the exigencies of a transformed economic system that de-

manded a new population of workers equipped with particular skills (although both factors were important); but such growth reflected the need to inculcate a set of attitudes commensurate with the social relationships of a hierarchical and impersonal office or production line within corporate capitalism.⁴² The community college movement was, in fact, a "successful adaptation" to the tasks which it was created and expected to perform:

process large numbers of students to attain that particular combination of technical competence and social acquiescence required in the skilled but powerless upper-middle positions in the occupational hierarchy of the corporate capitalist economy.⁴³

Parsons's conclusion that the school provides the "re-organization of the pupil's personality system" not just the amplification of cognitive abilities is thus corroborated by Bowles and Gintis (and by the revisionists in general), but again within the particular context of historically changing demands of work and an alienating social system. School "attempts to gear the development of personal needs to . . . a set of social relationships similar to those of the workplace," they argue.⁴⁴ The discipline of work, the "appropriate" mode of self-presentation, the "correct" demeanor and self-image, the "acceptable" "valuation of authority," and the identification of self with one's social-class -- all "moral" not "cognitive" influences

-- are "crucial ingredients of job adequacy," and key "learnings" articulated in and managed by the schooling process itself.⁴⁵ And what is important to recognize here is the insistence that with the inclusion of such "moral" teachings, the interests of the school have entered what Pierre Bourdieu has called the realm of the "symbolic." Schools authorize and ultimately control the direction of "symbolic violence," inculcating a "matrix" of social attitudes, predispositions, and cultural orientations -- a "habitus" that reinforces the unequal power relations of capitalist society and simultaneously conceals its basis.⁴⁶

Efforts by the revisionists to pinpoint the actual workings of this "symbolic violence" have often been described in terms of a microscopic examination of the school's "hidden curriculum"; and writers like Jules Henry, Ray Rist, C. A. Bowers, and Ivan Illich have all sought to show how school and teacher expectations have been translated into behavioral formulas that predefine student success and failure, and articulate the tiers of the hierarchy that students are ultimately placed within.⁴⁷ For Rist particularly, the most seemingly benign aspects of the classroom (the seating arrangements, the reading group designations, for example); and the qualities of everyday interactions between teacher and students and among students, quickly become solidified into permanent structures whose

"objectivity" comes to confer upon them the status of a "caste phenomenon" out of which there is barely any movement.⁴⁸ For the revisionists, such "castes" become the now solidified bases for the class divisions that schools help to reproduce, based as they are upon the alienation that students learn to live-by in the classroom, and later in the workplace itself:

Alienated labor is reflected in the student's lack of control over his or her education, the alienation of the student from the curriculum content, and the motivation of school work through a system of grades and other external rewards rather than the student's integration with either the process (learning) or the outcome (knowledge) of the educational "productive process."⁴⁹

In the most ultimate of reversals then, it is the "most effectively indoctrinated students" -- that is, the most alienated, the most silent -- "who are the most successfully integrated . . . within the hierarchical educational process," and, in turn, "the most valuable to the economic enterprise or state bureaucracy."⁵⁰ Thus, Colin Greer's response to those who have argued that American public education has "failed" is quite consistent with the conclusions that Bowles and Gintis and the revisionists have arrived at regarding the alienation that schools have effectively taught:

The fact of the matter is that American public schools in general, and urban public schools in particular, are a highly successful enterprise. Basic to that success is the high degree of academic failure among students. Attitudes and behavior patterns such as tolerance of boredom, learning as memorization, competition, and hostility are learned and reinforced in the classroom. The schools do the jobs today that they have always done. They select out individuals for opportunities according to a hierarchical schema which runs parallel to existing social class structures.⁵¹ (my emphasis)

It is thus the major thesis of this revisionist perspective -- so in keeping with Marx's theorizings on modernity and alienation -- that schools, their classroom structures, their curriculae, and the ideological nature of their daily "pedagogic work" (Bourdieu) successfully reproduce alienation and engender a stultifying quietude, a silence, in the face of social class divisions and the unequal distribution of power. And, for many of the revisionists who have sought to analyze the social and cultural reproduction of capitalist society, it has been the society's and the school's power to mold, evaluate, and legitimate the very language that people use to describe themselves, their communities, and the quality of their social existence that has been another most critical determinant in the "socialization strategy" of modern societies.⁵²

British socio-linguist Basil Bernstein's analyses of codes and grammars, societally nurtured and class-specific

language games, have been most significant texts utilized by the revisionists to investigate the nexus of symbolic orders, languages, and social structures.⁵³ More specifically, Bernstein's explorations of language and socialization have sought to analyze how class in capitalist society can be linguistically interpreted and shown to reproduce ("transmit") alienation by institutionalizing unequal access to societal understanding and creating a diminution of general communicative capacities among particular speech-code users.⁵⁴ By examining the differences between "restricted" and "elaborated" codes, Bernstein has traced the origins and ramifications of alienation to what Alfred Schutz might call the nature of the "consensual properties" of language, demonstrating that the "open horizon of words and concepts" that Schutz postulates (like the idealized "rich and liberated loam" that Katz described earlier) is rather, in fact, not only socially constructed, but socially constricted based upon one's class position.⁵⁵

The restricted code characterizes the speech of the "lower class" and tends "to operate at a low causal level of generality in which descriptive, concrete . . . symbols are employed aimed at maximizing the emotive rather than the logical impact."⁵⁶ And while the use of such a code does provide for the expression of ideas, according to Bernstein, they are on a "relatively low order of concep-

tualization."⁵⁷ Bernstein provides a succinct set of "characteristics" of this "restricted code." It is made up of:

short, grammatically simple, often unfinished sentences with a poor syntactical construction; simple and repetitive use of conjunction . . . frequent use of short commands and questions; rigid and limited use of adjectives and adverbs; infrequent use of the impersonal pronoun (it, one) as subject of a conditional sentence; statements formulated as questions which set up a sympathetic circularity. . . . Individual selection from a group of traditional phrases; symbolism . . . of a low order of generality. . . . Feelings communicated will be diffuse and crudely differentiated.⁵⁸

Thus, the restricted code "encourages an immediacy of interaction," accentuates the "descriptive" over the "analytic," and most significantly, "discourages the speaker from verbalizing his discrete relationships with the environment."⁵⁹ The necessary "acquiescence" to authority and to rigid roles demanded by the economic system and learned within the schools (as Bowles and Gintis have explained it) is, according to Bernstein, contained within the very lexical and syntactical properties of the restricted code itself.⁶⁰ Claus Mueller's conclusions are appropriate here:

If the available lexical and syntactic resources are underdeveloped and if arrested communication persists, an individual or group will not be able to select freely among existing perceptual and cognitive alternatives. Their ability to generalize and to use an abstract mode of understanding will be limited.⁶¹

While restricted codes rest principally upon "particu-

laristic" "orders of meaning," "elaborated codes" provide for "universalistic meanings." And significantly for Bernstein, it is through sensitization to and practice with such "universalistic" criteria that individuals may have "access to the grounds of their experience and can change the grounds."⁶² That is, the "elaborated code" of the middle and upper classes provides the opportunity to depersonalize one's speech, to distance oneself from the immediacy of particular societal demands and forms of authority, and to envision "alternative realities."⁶³ The elaborated code becomes for Bernstein the prerequisite to reflexion itself, to the process of self-conscious realization of domination and alienation which is necessary for any social change. Without it, speakers "are not . . . aware of the existence, functions, or limitations of the code"; they cannot "enter into a reflexive relationship to the social order."⁶⁴ They are indeed "arrested" in their communicative potentials (Mueller) and, more frighteningly, not able to speak their own alienation, let alone provide the impetus for a revolutionary transformation of society.

Class society is thus reproduced and strengthened by the "limitation [of] access to the elaborated codes" for Bernstein, and like Marx and the revisionist analysts of education, the dominant class becomes the "holders of speech," having not only separated the lower class from the

fair fruits of their labors, but having socialized them to accept alienated work, and stolen from them the language-codes that they might use to analyze the workings of capitalist society and, with "reasoned principles" (Bernstein), conceptualize non-alienated social relations.⁶⁵

But most poignantly, by explicitly trying to describe the myriad vicissitudes of alienation, and the extensive powers of a capitalist class system to reproduce itself through social institutions and within the consciousness and the language of its victims, theorists of modernity-as-capitalism have recapitulated in their own analyses the actual social conditions of the world whose damage they have taken such pains to critique: they have "made" the alienated silent.

Paulo Freire, the contemporary Brazilian teacher and educational/social critic, has developed an influential theory and practice of learning that synthesizes the key terms of silence-as-alienation which have been introduced in this chapter. Deeply tied to a set of traditions that have emphasized the dehumanizing thrust of modern society: Mounier's personalism, Sartre's existential phenomenology, Marxism, and contemporary Catholic liberation theology -- Freire has analyzed the socialization strategies that perpetuate domination and has successfully experimented with a

radical "pedagogy of the oppressed" whose goal is a true humanization/"hominisation" of modern society.⁶⁶

Freire's understanding of alienation (as distinct from the social and historical context of the revisionists) has primarily been built around his experience of the power of capitalism's foreign domination, especially of colonialism in South America (and later in his life, in Africa). That is, while fully cognizant of the alienation of work and the alienation due to social class inequities in the "first world," Freire's life's work has been devoted to a fuller examination of the nature of the "closed societies" of the "third world."⁶⁷ The hierarchical social structures, the external economic controls, the exporting of raw materials and importing of manufactured goods, the recurrence of disease and malnutrition, the low life-expectancy and the extraordinarily high percentage of illiteracy, are all conditions that Freire describes and criticizes as part of the colonial legacy. But Freire's primary contribution has been to a fuller examination of a quality of consciousness, an archaeology of dependency: to a heightened appreciation of and attack upon the "colonisation of man's mental territory."⁶⁸ Freire has, in effect, sought to dissect the actual workings of a culture of oppression -- of a culture of total alienation that has produced "mutism" instead of human dialogue.⁶⁹

The alienated world of "object"-societies, according to Freire, has reduced human possibility to its basic animal level. And like the analyses of the young Marx and in keeping with the most radical outcome of a world shaped solely by a "restricted-code," Freire describes the oppressed as so thoroughly "immersed in their universe" that like animals, they cannot "emerge from the world" and "objectify it."⁷⁰ "Dominated consciousness," as Freire calls it, "exist[s] only to live," and "is not capable of reflecting upon itself and knowing itself living in the world."⁷¹ That is, the very processes of thinking and speaking have been stripped of that which is most authentically human: the activity of naming a world for oneself, of reflecting upon the human work that has formed and nourished that world. The "vanquished" have thus been "dispossessed of their words, their expressiveness, their culture," resulting in what Freire has depicted as the "culture of silence":⁷²

The dependent society is by definition a silent society. Its voice is not an authentic voice, but merely an echo of the voice of the metropolis in every way: the metropolis speaks, the dependent society listens.⁷³

It has only been the elites of power who have had the right to act and to choose -- to say "the word"; and whose practices have allowed them to become subjects, not objects;

"considerers," not merely "spectators" who have properly "adapted" to the dictates of a cultural and linguistic invasion:

. . . oppressors attempt to destroy in men their quality as "considerers" of the world. . . . In order to present for the consideration of the oppressed and subjugated a world of deceit designed to increase their alienation and passivity, the oppressors develop a series of methods precluding any presentation of the world as a problem and showing it rather as a fixed entity, as something given -- something to which men, as mere spectators, must adapt.⁷⁴

"Reality" is thus a product of an ideological mythologization that distorts and deceives in order to perpetuate the view of alienated society as static and "natural." For Freire, as for Marx, such "fixity" serves the basic interests of the oppressors and also forms the psychological matrix within which fatalistic "naïve consciousness" views and understands its own life-situation.⁷⁵ By oversimplifying problems, providing fanciful interpretations, and resorting to "magical" explanations, dominated consciousness "cannot perceive clearly" the "order" of society itself, "nearly impervious" as it is to "the problems and challenges beyond the biological sphere."⁷⁶ For Freire, members of the "culture of silence" are socialized to misperceive the "truth" of their society and to " . . . not comprehend the causal relationships that have shaped their

socio-cultural situation."⁷⁷

But like the revisionists described above, Freire does not merely present a macro-portrait of fragmented and distorted consciousness that has become "introjected" as a deeply ingrained social collective unconscious.⁷⁸ He is also interested in the act-of-immersion into the "culture of silence," and in the nature of the "pedagogy" that creates such powerful cultural, linguistic, and "epistemological obstacles" to the modern realization of freedom, humanity, and non-alienation.⁷⁹ While Freire's phenomenology of social-learning is often more socially inclusive than the revisionist's critique of the socialization strategies of the school (based as it is upon societies where illiteracy is the predominant condition of the majority), his descriptions of alienated learning, his conclusions regarding the political nature of all education, and his on-going efforts to point to the ways in which learning reproduces the severely limiting forms of alienated society are quite consistent with their analyses.

The prevalent "pedagogy of the oppressed" is, for Freire, an "exercise of domination" which "stimulates the credulity of students with the ideological intent . . . of indoctrinating them to adapt to the world of oppression."⁸⁰ Most learning arrives at its domesticating end by following

the pattern of what Freire refers to as a "banking theory" where "deposits" of information/vocabulary are received, memorized, and "properly" stored, and readied for recall when externally demanded.⁸¹ Students in such a situation can only be defined as passive "containers" to be filled up by a teacher. In fact, for Freire, education suffers from a kind of "narrative sickness," where the teacher's sole task is:

to fill the students with the contents of his narration -- contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them significance. Words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity.⁸²

The anti-dialogic core of such "hollow" speech engenders a "form of talk that does not communicate, but offers communiqués."⁸³ And in producing communiqués, is imposing prescriptive signals and domesticating slogans; that is, in offering only "alienating verbosity," the process of learning has, for Freire, reached its most twisted conclusion. Successful internalization of the forms and the meanings of those "lifeless objects" that parade as knowledge reproduce that very (and desired) lifelessness in those who are the objects, the "receptacles" of that knowledge. Freire (so consistent with the conclusions of Greer and Bowles and Gintis described earlier) explains the "true" meaning of

"success" within such a system:

The more completely he [the teacher] fills the receptacles, the better a teacher he is. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better the students are.⁸⁴

It is thus the "successful" "transfer" of inert ideas and the ultimate passification of its receivers that is the aim of an authoritarian and mono-logical pedagogy designed to reproduce the ideological and psychological moorings of alienated society. In the "culture of silence," the human body "carries out orders from above"; and, too, in such a universe, the human mind carries but another set of orders, less visible at first, but no less significant in reproducing inhuman social and cultural conditions. The colonized mind for Freire is denied its "transformative" capabilities, trained as it is to accept only what is prescribed and "filed" by an elite. The ability to use the language to create authentic knowledge and to reflect upon that knowledge (and the knowledge of others) has been buried. The oppressed "cannot know that they know," Freire explains, for the simultaneous process of learning-in-alienation (the social forms) and learning-of-alienation (the pedagogical contents) makes "thinking difficult." And most importantly for Freire, such a pedagogy and the alienated world that it buttresses makes "speaking the word, forbidden."⁸⁵ As Clift Barnard has so sharply and appropriately claimed in

his description of Freire's analysis of the consciousness of the peasantry:

To the peasant submerged in the daily business of survival, often not consciously aware of oppression and exploitation since they are synonymous with living, freedom has no meaning because the unknown cannot be thought about.⁸⁶

The "word" has been separated/alienated from those who "should" speak it. But more dramatically, the "word" is so hidden by the successful pedagogy of domination that it cannot even "be thought about" in its unmasked presence.

For Freire, as for the other theorists introduced in this second chapter, to be "silent" "does not signify an absence of response, but rather a response which lacks a 'critical' quality."⁸⁷ That is, the "silent" response is a response, but one which can only echo the cultural imperialism which is its "true" origin.⁸⁸ From this perspective, the silent response becomes a symbol, a living claim to the "false consciousness" of the oppressed and to their intermittent "oscillat[ions] between ingenuous optimism and hopelessness," neither of which (for Freire) can critically -- that is, accurately, account for the structures or qualities of social and cultural existence.⁸⁹ As Freire succinctly concludes: "People live by myths, and people are involved in myths and not in the truth, but having the illusion that they are thinking correctly."⁹⁰ Silence has thus been the-

orized as false speech, the result of mythical thinking -- a quality of talk that cannot speak the truth. Encased in a forcibly closed and ultimately ignorant set of words and worlds, such talk, according to this analysis, cannot speak the meaning of freedom, cannot speak beyond the barriers that alienation has so systematically erected through the learnings of school and society. To have been silenced (for the silencing of the majority is the necessary result of colonialism for Freire and of class domination and alienated work for the revisionists) is to have been struck dumb, to have been "ideologised" into a concrete reality, a status quo, that only breeds the further manipulation and reproduction of humans-as-things: that is, humans without "authentic" or "true" voices.

Silence-as-Alienation has thus sought to bring to awareness a most detailed and critical portrait of those who have been "vanquished" by the "necrophilic" demands of capitalism/imperialism, and whose humanity has been restricted and literally invaded by that which is outside, which is alien.⁹¹ As distinct from the orientation of Silence-as-Critique (Chapter 1) whose domain encompassed the ontological groundings of life itself, Silence-as-Alienation has brought forth a powerful analysis of the variables that define a specific historical world. And while

Silence-as-Critique has, in Rosenberg and Bergen's terms, attempted to locate "possibilities that lie outside of history," the theorists of Silence-as-Alienation have looked within the historical, seeking to locate those concrete and alienating determinants that have curbed the full realization of that which history (and especially modern history) could bring about.⁹²

Silence-as-Critique announced access to a utopian vision, one which claimed an enriched and renewed relationship between humans and cosmos. But, as was argued at the conclusion of Chapter 1, the "translation" from vision to social transformation was often left abstract; and the processes by which such new ontological groundings could come to inform everyday life and its social and cultural framework were rarely addressed. But, Silence-as-Alienation presents another problem of "translation." In this case, it is not from an "ideal" (an exhilarating vision gained through the fruits of silence) to a "real" (a world freed from modernity's basic anthropocentrism and calculative stance) as Silence-as-Critique would have it; but a "translation" from a "real" (the omnipresence of silence as a result of alienation) to an "ideal" (the possibility of true speech, freedom and non-alienation). That is, while Silence-as-Critique cannot readily speak a reality filled by its vision, Silence-as-Alienation cannot readily speak

its ideal without re-creating other forms of alienation.

Most clearly, the "ideal" of Silence-as-Alienation (based as it is upon man's most basic analysis of modernity) is the emergence of human voices, the speaking of the "word" which announces human praxis and the coming to life of human transformative powers. In fact, Freire's description of the goals of his adult literacy -- conscientization programs, points to the actual "birth" of the non-alienated and the critical. As adults "problematize" and openly discuss the alienated and "static" social realities around them within the very process of learning to read,

they penetrate to the very core of reality being scrutinized and become capable of perceiving their former perception. In this fashion they reflect critically on their own action and discover the reasons why they were acting as they were. That is, they are exposing the "culture of silence" and its inhibiting and alienating power for what it is, while at the same time they are recognizing its inadequacy [and] its underlying contradictions.⁹³

Through such an explicitly educational-political method, the ahistorical, reflexive, conditioned and trained consciousness undergoes a most radical conversion to its opposite: the historically attuned, the reflective, the committed and the educated. A "knowing human subject" can now unveil that which was hidden, can "become capable" of examining that which was misunderstood, can "intervene in

reality": can locate the "true" sources of his/her alienation.⁹⁴

Yet, also (and as important for Freire as these aims) is that the actual process of learning must be strictly guided by the results of that quality of socio-cultural existence most absent from alienated-life: dialogue. As distinct from the mono-logical nature of the rules and the socialization strategies that define domination, for Freire dialogue is freedom. And the "cultural circles" themselves, those contexts within which Freire's method are implemented, must truly be centers of "creative dialogue in which everyone knows some things and does not know others, in which all seek, together, to know more."⁹⁵ It is surely with this "dialogical" ideal in mind that Freire defines the meaning of teaching, not as the authoritarian work of an omniscient knower, but as the art of posing problems, asking questions, guiding ideas: as authentic help:

Authentic help means that all who are involved help each other mutually, growing together in the common effort to understand the reality which they seek to transform. Only through such praxis -- in which those who help and those who are being helped help each other simultaneously -- can the act of helping become free from the distortion in which the helper dominates the helped.⁹⁶

And, in keeping with Freire's radical pedagogy, one should add that it is only as a result of such dialogical-praxis

that "authentic speech" could be distinguished from the alienated-silence of a distorted and debased echo.

What is significant here are not Freire's ideals, nor his honest dedication to the dialogic process, but rather the powerful tensions, if not contradictions, between the two.⁹⁷ That is, it is exactly because Freire (and the revisionists) has so vehemently and systematically argued that alienated speech is ignorant and misguided speech -- silent in the face of its own domination, that dialogue itself could never successfully recover the voice of non-alienation. It is only from one who already can "recognize" the "inadequacy" of the "culture of silence" and who knows and can speak the truth of alienation, that the "word" can be given. And it is only through alienating forms that such a pre-determined "truth" can be told: can be "transferred." Peter Berger is explicit in defining what he has powerfully called this "cognitive arrogance" in Freire's orientation:

It is hard to imagine a more "elitist" program (and, for that matter, a more "paternalistic" one) than one based on the assumption that a certain group of people is dehumanized to the point of animality, is unable either to perceive this condition or rescue itself from it, and requires the (presumably selfless) assistance of others for both the perception and the rescue operation.⁹⁸

For Berger, such "cognitive imperialism" only recapitulates

the imposition of value judgments perpetrated by other "modernizing-elites" who also lack the "cognitive respect" that would befit a response to any culture, to any world.⁹⁹

But Berger's critique wholly neglects Freire's sense of process: his myriad discussions of the importance of dialogue as a mode of non-alienated being, and as a key quality of helping and learning. And in doing so, Berger too easily relegates Freire's work to the scrap-heap of elitist "consciousness raising" fads. More important is the tension between Silence-as-Alienation and dialogue itself, for without an explicit analysis of the criteria by which the truth of any dialogue can be determined -- that is, without a set of principles and guides for ascertaining what is true when speakers communicate with one another, truth can only be spoken by those who claim a privileged status prior to the dialogic-encounter. Only such knowers/outsiders could then "make sense" of the speech of the participants, "translating" distorted and constricted talk into "meaningful" criticism of an "alienated" social world. In such a situation, Silence-as-Alienation could only be reproduced, dialogue itself negated, and the difference between "human language" and "madness" impossible to judge.¹⁰⁰

NOTES

¹Stanley Rosen, Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay, p. xv.

²Daniel Bell discusses such "perplexities" in his The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. Bell's treatment is particularly relevant because of his attention to cultural "discourses" and his discussion of the "poverty of emotive language in our [modern] time." See Chapter 2, pp. 86-87.

³Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air, p. 101. Berman's efforts to depict the "experience of modernity," and particularly his analysis of Marx are extremely helpful in placing Marx within this "modern" context. Although Berman's descriptions and conclusions often romanticize the modern project and its possibilities, his readings of primary texts are often informative and exciting.

Another author who has examined Marx's confrontation with the meanings of modernity is J. M. Cuddihy. Cuddihy's The Ordeal of Civility particularly examines the "struggle" of Jews such as Marx, Freud, and Levi-Strauss with the demands of modern "civility" and the traditional world of Shtetl Europe. See especially Part II. Also see Chapter 3 of this study for a closer examination of religion and modernity.

⁴Berman, op. cit.

⁵In claiming that Marx has accepted the "ideals" of modernity, I do not mean to imply that the capitalist system, fully realized, served as his ideal social form. What is argued is that the terms of modernity addressed in Chapter 1 -- and criticized therein -- were accepted by Marx, and that it was capitalism's inability to achieve such ideals that was at the heart of Marx's analysis. (Also see Note #15, Chapter 1)

⁶A number of secondary sources are particularly strong in aiding the reader of Marx to understand his use of the term "alienation." Schroyer's The Critique of Domination explores how alienation is central to the basic category of "critique." Schlomo Avineri's The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, and Istvan Meszaros's Marx's Theory of Alienation are also important descriptions, as is the detailed textual reading of the 1844 Manuscripts in Bertell Ollman's Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society.

Melvin Seeman's 1959 essay, "On the Meaning of Alienation," provides a compendium of uses of the term, focusing upon five definitions: meaninglessness, powerlessness, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement. Seeman's descriptions, however, move far from the particular notion of alienation that Marx sought to explore: that is, alienation as defining a concrete socio-economic relationship demanded by capitalism.

⁷Karl Marx, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, p. 272.

Such emphasis upon "natural" relations is more obvious in Marx's "early" writings, but importantly, his efforts to provide historical interpretations, to show how both social categories and social realities unfolded due to particular socio-economic exigencies are contained throughout his writings.

⁸Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, pp. 86-87.

⁹Trent Schroyer, Critique of Domination, p. 88.

¹⁰Marx, Writings of the Young Marx, p. 121.

¹¹Roger Garaudy in his Marxism in the 20th Century uses notions of the "splitting" and "mutilation" that "stands in the way of worldwide participation in human culture" and the "robbing" of a "human dimension" (cited here) to helpfully describe Marx's understanding of alienation. See p. 99.

¹²Marx, Writings of the Young Marx, p. 266. For a further elaboration of Marx's notion of "species beings," see p. 294 and following.

¹³*Ibid*, p. 272. Chapter X of Capital, Volume I, presents one of Marx's most effective efforts to connect an historical analysis of "the working day" with specific examples of work-life in mid-nineteenth-century Europe. The following is one example in which Marx describes the "passion," perhaps the "demonic" "passion" (as described above) of capital and its effects upon the worker:

But in its blind unrestrainable passion, its werewolf hunger for surplus-labour, capital oversteps not only the moral, but even the merely physical maximum bounds of the working day. It usurps the time for growth, development, and healthy mainte-

nance of the body. It steals the time required for the consumption of fresh air and sunlight. It higgles over a meal-time, incorporating it where possible with the process of production itself, so that food is given to the labourer as to a mere means of production, as coal is supplied to the boiler, grease and oil to the machinery. (Capital, Vol. I, pp. 264-65)

¹⁴See Ernest Becker, Beyond Alienation: A Philosophy of Education for the Crisis of Democracy, p. 227. Becker's description of alienation is surely in keeping with Marx's. Becker describes a kind of life in which man "only has himself, his dazzling and diverting little consumer objects; his few closely huddled loved ones; his life-span; his life-insurance; his place in a merely biological and financial chain of things."

¹⁵Bernard Murchland's The Age of Alienation presents a detailed overview of the use of the term "alienation" and is helpful in seeing how Marx's use of the term borrowed from his theoretical predecessors, and yet set its own course. Marx's discussion of "Phenomenology" in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts analyzes his understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of Hegel's use of the term and its "abstract negation." (See Writings of the Young Marx, pp. 318-37) Ernest Bloch's conclusion that Marx had "moved from mind to man" is pertinent here. See Bloch, On Karl Marx, p. 106.

¹⁶Marx, Writings of the Young Marx, p. 280.

¹⁷Ollman's essay, "Marx's Vision of Communism" (contained within his group of essays Social and Sexual Revolution) is a useful guide to a recapitulation of Marx's critique of capitalist society, and more concretely, to an articulation of his "vision" of a truly revolutionary, changed society. Ollman seeks to pull from Marx those "clues" as to what a non-alienated society would look like. But more important from the perspective of this essay is Alan Blum's essay "Reading Marx." Blum's efforts to locate the presuppositions of those who seek to "read" Marx "empirically" are very significant, especially because they attest to Marx's own commitment to the reason of modernity and to the "tuning" of his own "talk" to the world of capitalism.

¹⁸The phrase "prisoners of silence" is taken from the title of Jonathan Kozol's book about illiteracy in the

United States. His analysis and those of other "critical"-educational-theorists who will be discussed in this chapter, utilize the assumptions of silence-as-alienation as integral to their interpretations.

¹⁹See Palermo, "Praxis and the Reified Character of Educational Physicalism," p. 373. Palermo's provocative analysis of Competency-Based Teacher Education examines how the deeply behaviorist biases of such programs "legitimate the alienated irrational world as one which appears as the only possible world."

²⁰Marx, The German Ideology, p. 61.

²¹Antonio Gramsci developed the notion of "ideological hegemony" in his Prison Notebooks. Gramsci's term has been central to most critiques of capitalist educational systems that have sought to utilize the basic framework of Marx's analysis of capitalist society.

²²Claus Mueller discusses "ocialization strategies" in his book The Politics of Communication. See especially the section "Class-Specific Socialization and Values," pp. 58-72.

²³Joel Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State, p. 149. It is Michael Apple who, in his essay "Ideology, Reproduction and Educational Reform," examines the interconnections between the "processing" of "knowledge" and "people," p. 376.

²⁴Talcott Parsons, "The School Class as a Social System: Some of its Functions in American Society," p. 130. Many of the "functional" analyses of schools have flowed from suggestions in Parsons's essay. Robert Dreeben's On What is Learned in School, for example, develops an argument in general agreement with Parsons, describing in greater detail some of Parsons's key insights.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 133.

²⁶Dreeben, On What is Learned in School, p. 4. Like Parsons, Dreeben is particularly interested in the nature of the social relationships formed within the school and their difference from family relationships. Important for him is the way in which the very structure of the school "constitutes a setting more conducive than the family to a formation of looser, more fluid social bonds inconsistent with . . . strong ties of dependency" (p. 21). It is the learning to act within a world of such "fluid social bonds"

that, unlike the family, would "provide conditions appropriate for acquiring those capacities that enable people to participate competently in the public realm" (p. 65). Dreeben's point is also consistent with Parsons's interest in the school as the vehicle that moves the self from "particularistic" treatment to the "universalism" of the broader public realm. In addition, Dreeben argues that instilling norms of "independence" and "achievement" are crucial school functions.

²⁷Christopher Hurn, The Limits and Possibilities of Schooling, p. 188.

²⁸Parsons, op. cit., p. 143.

²⁹Sherry Gorelick uses the phrase "style of thought" in her efforts to describe the effects of schooling upon the cultural/social assumptions of students. See her essay "Undermining Hierarchy: Problems in Schooling in Capitalist America."

³⁰Parsons, op. cit., p. 153. Dreeben is cognizant of the possible "ideological" nature of his functional description, and thus adds the "ideological caveat" that "it is important that the argument of this book not be taken as a defense of national values." Dreeben, op. cit., p. 85. Such a "formulation" that Dreeben describes as "hypothetical in nature" only reconfirms the sense in which his analysis seeks to skirt questions of quality, and focuses instead upon questions of effective and ostensibly abstract functioning.

³¹This quote from French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is taken from David Swartz's discussion of Bourdieu's basic view of education and social inequality, "Pierre Bourdieu: The Cultural Transmission of Social Inequality," p. 13.

³²Michael Katz, "The Origins of Public Education: A Reassessment," p. 381. Two histories by Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform and Class, Bureaucracy and Schools, are important revisionist texts, as is Joel Spring's history cited in Note #23. Another example of such a perspective can be found in Colin Greer's The Great School Legend, and in David Nasaw's Schooled to Order. It is essential to all of the above to either implicitly or explicitly argue that the very writing of educational history has reproduced the ideological givens of the school system, and has thus fostered the understandings of society "taught" within the schools themselves.

³³The importance of this "concealment," especially the "concealment" of the actual inculcation of social values within the school system -- within "pedagogic work" itself, is crucial to Pierre Bourdieu's analysis. See his Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (with Passeron), p. 39. The difference between Bourdieu/Passeron's discussion and Dreeben's is most striking.

³⁴Cohen and Lazerson, "Education and the Social Order," p. 319. There are assuredly important differences among what this essay has called the "revisionists." The goal here is to present a general but valid introduction to a common set of themes and understandings that most typically look to the potential liberating qualities of modern society.

³⁵The notion that schools provide the opportunity for the "expansion" of democracy is surely not irrelevant to these analyses. Rather, as Nasaw argues, it is the "primary tensions between the rhetoric of democracy and the reality of a class-divided society" that educational history "should" address. Nasaw's efforts to discuss the differences between "massification" and "democratization" are important here. So are Bowles and Gintis's efforts to discuss the conflicts between "aspirations" and "labor requirements." (See below)

³⁶Cohen and Lazerson refer to a comment made by a local schoolboard president in the Lynds' "Middleton" of the 1920's that is relevant here: "For a long time all boys were trained to be President," he said. "Then for a while we trained them all to be professional men. Now we are training boys to get jobs." Cohen and Lazerson, op. cit., p. 323.

³⁷Bowles and Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life. Gintis's criticism of Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society, "Toward a Political Economy of Education" (in Illich, et al., After Deschooling What?) introduces many of the arguments in Schooling and is very useful as a beginning point in understanding their perspective.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 151 and 147.

³⁹Ibid., p. 265.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 16.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 164. From studying Bowles and Gintis, one

might arrive at the conclusion that compulsory mass education was "imposed" upon the population by economic elites who saw such schooling to be in their economic interests. It is, however, important to note Katz's argument that education "became compulsory only after attendance had become nearly universal" (Katz, "The Origins," p. 400). Such a difference in interpretation does not undercut Bowles and Gintis and Katz's shared understanding of what Katz refers to as "the temporal connection between the economy, the social order, and the schools (ibid., p. 384). It does, nevertheless, point to the largely economistic analysis utilized by Bowles and Gintis, often at the expense of of a fuller analysis of the workings of the larger social structure. David Hogan's "Capitalism, Liberalism, and Schooling" addresses itself to this criticism of Bowles and Gintis, especially in terms of their overemphasis upon explanations of "production" and "reproduction."

⁴²Ibid., p. 212. Bowles and Gintis's critique of a purely "technical" explanation for the expansion of schooling is significant, and is shared by other revisionists as well. Even David Riesman and Christopher Jencks, whose general orientation in their text The Academic Revolution is not consistent with the revisionist analysis, argue that the community college was not established as an "alternative path to the top for individuals," but rather as a "safety valve releasing pressures that might otherwise disrupt the dominant system" (pp. 491-92). For another evaluation of community colleges which treats the importance of "vocationalism," see Fred Pincus, "Tracking in the Community Colleges."

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 131. Bowles and Gintis depend heavily upon Melvin Kohn's Class and Conformity: A Study in Values to provide evidence for the relationship between sense-of-self, social-class, and work that is at the core of their argument. Kohn's description of work-life for the "lower social class" is indicative of his perspective and of that held by Bowles and Gintis:

The conditions of occupational life at lower social class levels limit men's view of the job primarily to the extrinsic benefits it provides, foster a narrowly circumscribed conception of self and society, and promote the positive valuation of conformity to authority. (Ibid., p. 145)

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Bourdieu and Passeron, op. cit., pp. 9-11. For further elaboration of the notion of "habitus," also see Bourdieu's essay "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction," in Karabel and Halsey, Power and Ideology in Education, pp. 488-95. Along with David Swartz's discussion (see Note #31), Paul DeMaggio's "Review Essay: On Pierre Bourdieu," provides a good introduction to Bourdieu's complex and abstract analyses.

⁴⁷Illich used the notion of "hidden curriculum" in his Deschooling Society, whose publication provided debate among revisionists as well as within the broader educational community. Jules Henry's Culture Against Man is an early text defining the "hidden curriculum" through a careful description of both student and family interactions. Rist's work follows closely upon Henry's model, and provides the clearest examination of classroom practice, especially the use of "labeling" by teachers, that ultimately create "objective" structures of discrimination. C. A. Bowers's essay "Education and the Social Construction of Reality" (in his Cultural Literacy for Freedom) is also pertinent here, prominently for its efforts to "illuminate" the dimension of "the student's experience [which is] generally ignored" (p. 17).

⁴⁸Many authors have acknowledged the workings of a "hidden curriculum" and the effects of teacher expectations upon student performance (see Rosenthal and Jacobson's now classic study, Pygmalion in the Classroom). What differentiates the revisionist studies, like Rist's -- from other studies is their question concerning the "criteria" upon which such differential expectations are formed." (Rist, "Student Social Class and Teacher Expectations: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Ghetto Education," in Karabel and Halsey, op. cit., p. 413). For the revisionists, class and racial determinations are central to this "hidden" process. Also see Rist's interesting study of an urban, middle-class white school in Portland, Oregon during its first year of integration, The Invisible Children: School Integration in American Society, and Entwistle and Hayduk's "Academic Expectations and the School Attainment of Young Children."

⁴⁹Bowles and Gintis, op. cit., p. 131. Bowles and Gintis emphasize the values and preparations for "work" and the mirroring of school-work relations to an extent not found in most other analyses that also point to the connection between social domination and schooling (see Note #41).

⁵⁰Gintis, "Toward a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society," p. 60.

⁵¹Colin Greer, The Great School Legend, p. 152. Christopher Hurn has developed a criticism of both the "functional" models of education (represented here by Parsons and Dreeben) and what he has called the "radical" model (described here as the revisionist model represented by Bowles and Gintis and Greer). Hurn might claim, in response to Greer's summation and Rist's descriptions that, "we simply do not know whether children effectively learn what schools intend to teach" (Hurn, op. cit., p. 189).

⁵²Michael Apple's Ideology and Curriculum, and his essay "Ideology, Reproduction, and Educational Reform" have been instrumental in defining the "cultural reproduction" thesis regarding the function of knowledge -- its definition and selection -- in perpetuating the cultural and economic components of class relations. Pierre Bourdieu's work on "cultural transmission" is also important in defining this theme. C. A. Bowers's essay "Curriculum as Cultural Reproduction: An Examination of Metaphor as a Carrier of Ideology" is a very important effort to reflect upon the ideological presuppositions of these critics of educational ideology. Bowers's examination of the confusion of metaphor with "literal" explanation is an appropriate complement to Alan Blum's essay on Marx (see Note #17).

⁵³Bernstein's three-Volume Class, Codes and Control explores his interpretation of language and social class. An American edition of Volume I (Schocken Books, 1975) provides a useful background, as does Claus Mueller's The Politics of Communication (see especially Chapter 2). Bernstein's work is central to Bourdieu's analysis, and although not explicit in Bowles and Gintis, is directly meaningful to their conclusions.

⁵⁴Bernstein has clearly stated that "class" is "the most formative influence upon the procedures of socialisation"; and it is thus the ways in which language is molded by and itself molds such class divisions that is significant to his analysis. Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, p. 175.

⁵⁵Anthony Wootton, in his Dilemmas of Discourse, discusses Schutz's analysis and his own interpretation of "coding rules." See pp. 77 and 97.

⁵⁶Bernstein, op. cit., p. 46. In his early writings, Bernstein used the phrases "public codes" and "formal codes," and later substituted the phrases "restricted codes" and "elaborated codes."

⁵⁷Bernstein, "Elaborated and Restricted Codes: Their Social Origins and Some Consequences," p. 65.

⁵⁸Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control, p. 38.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 47.

⁶⁰It is important to point out that not all sociolinguists have agreed with Bernstein's characterizations. A pointed criticism of Bernstein's depiction of the "restricted code" has come from analysts of Black English, especially linguist William Labov, and from anthropologists such as Eleanor Leacock. British sociologist Frank Musgrove encouragingly quotes L. A. Jackson's conclusion that Bernstein's theory is nothing more than "bastard poetry masquerading as science." (See Labov, Language in the Inner City; and Musgrove, School and the Social Order.) The point here is to show how relevant Bernstein's conclusions are to Marxist/revisionist interpretations of alienation, socialization, and modernity.

⁶¹Mueller, op. cit., p. 58. Bernstein does seek to explain that the "hierarchy" of codes is not his own, but is rather based upon the specific valuation of contemporary class society. He states:

Let it be said immediately that a restricted code gives access to a vast potential of meanings, of delicacy, subtlety and diversity of cultural forms, to a unique aesthetic whose basic in condensed symbols may influence the form of the imagining. Yet, in complex industrial societies, its differently focused experience may be disvalued, and humiliated within schools or seen, at best, to be irrelevant to the educational endeavor. (Bernstein, op. cit., p. 186)

It is, however, the argument of this chapter that such a value-judgment is being made by those who accept the taken-for-granted social rules and by those who seek to criticize those same rules.

⁶²Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 175-76.

⁶³Ibid., p. 186. Bernstein is sensitive to the fact that such "distancing" carries with it a different "potential for alienation," but for him and for the other revisionists, this "potential" alienation of self from feeling is secondary and far less important than the class-alienation that the social structure perpetuates.

⁶⁴Mueller, op. cit., p. 58; and Bernstein, *ibid.*, p. 176.

⁶⁵Bernstein, *ibid.* It is exactly the absence of such "reasoned" principles that, for Bernstein, defines the "restricted code."

⁶⁶The term "hominisation" was coined by Teilhard de Chardin and is important to Freire's utopian vision. By "hominisation" de Chardin was referring to the fullest "spiritualization" of human civilization, the telos of human evolution where humans are able to reflect and act upon the earth "in its totality." See de Chardin's The Phenomenon of Man, Book Three.

⁶⁷The influence of Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies is explicit in Freire's theorizing.

⁶⁸This phrase is taken from Robert Mackie's essay "Contributions to the Thought of Paulo Freire," in Mackie's edited Literacy and Revolution, p. 109. There are many essays devoted to tracing the influences upon Freire's thought. Denis Collins's short introduction, Paulo Freire: His Life, works, and thought, is a particularly good guide to Christian influences; while Joel Spring's "The Growth of Consciousness: Marx to Freire" in his A Primer of Libertarian Education provides a general overview of the Marxist and anarchist influences.

⁶⁹Thus, Freire's critique, while dependent upon economic and political analyses, is an exploration of the culture-of-alienation, and even more specifically, a critique of linguist-alienation-as-domination. See Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom, p. 44. (Referred to in the following as Cultural Action)

⁷⁰Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, p. 119. (Referred to in the following as Pedagogy)

⁷¹Freire, Cultural Action, pp. 22 and 29.

⁷²Freire, Pedagogy, p. 134.

⁷³Freire, Cultural Action, p. 34. Freire makes a similar point in his Education for Critical Consciousness where he argues that "with no experience of dialogue, with no experience of participation . . . they [the oppressed] have consistently been denied their right to have their say, having historically had the duty to have their say, having historically had the duty to only listen and obey" (p. 120).

⁷⁴Freire, Pedagogy, p. 135. Also see Chapter 4 for Freire's descriptions of "cultural invasion" and other "modalities" of oppression. It is interesting to note how "parallel" Freire's notion of the "voices" of the "metropolis" is to Bernstein's notion of that "percentage of the population" that has "been given access to the principles of intellectual change." Such "access" is what is denied the speakers of the "restricted code" and what is denied to the oppressed who have become only "objects," "beings for others," not "authentic" voices.

⁷⁵In analyzing the psychology of domination, Friere is influenced by Zevedei Barbu's Democracy and Dictatorship: Their Psychology and Patterns of Life. Insights from Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth, Albert Memmi's The Colonizer and the Colonized, and Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom are also important to his analyses. Clearly, for Freire, to "falsify reality" is to "falsify consciousness." It is the "correspondence" (Bowles and Gintis) between these two falsifications that Freire has sought to trace.

⁷⁶Freire, Pedagogy, p. 48. The last phrase is taken from J. J. Dewitt's An Exposition and Analysis of Paulo Freire's Radical Psycho-Social Andragogy of Development, p. 93.

⁷⁷Dewitt, op. cit.

⁷⁸Freire uses the notion of "collective unconscious" in his "Agrarian Reform Training and Research Institute" Annual Report (1968) that is translated by J. J. Dewitt, and contained within *ibid.*, p. 227.

⁷⁹See Matthews's "Knowledge, Action and Power," in Mackie, op. cit., p. 89.

⁸⁰Freire, Pedagogy, p. 65.

⁸¹In another context, Freire uses Sartre's image of the relationship between "knowing" and "eating" ("to know is to eat") in order to define what he therefore calls the

"nutritionist view of knowledge." Like the "banking theory," the "nutritionist view" accentuates the passivity of the learner, the static quality of the content of the learning, and the notion of regurgitation-as-knowing. "To know," Freire asserts, "is not to swallow knowledge." Freire, Pedagogy in Process, p. 80. Dewitt also makes a helpful Freirian distinction between "alimentary pedagogy" and "elementary andragogy." Dewitt, op. cit., pp. 126 and 173.

⁸²Freire, Pedagogy, p. 57.

⁸³Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 46.

⁸⁴Freire, Pedagogy, p. 58.

⁸⁵Freire, "Education for Awareness: A Talk with Paulo Freire" (with Rex Davis), in Mackie, op. cit., p. 61; and Cultural Action, p. 22.

⁸⁶Clift Barnard, "Imperialism, Underdevelopment and Education," in Mackie, op. cit., p. 12.

⁸⁷Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, p. 24.

⁸⁸The description of education as "cultural imperialism" is taken from Martin Carnoy's book of the same title. Carnoy is one revisionist who has analyzed the modes of pedagogical domination in colonial societies, and who has examined the effects of the imposition of western models of schooling upon indigenous cultures; and the limitations of schooling in bringing about social change. His analysis of the "internal" colonization of Blacks in America is also relevant. For another expression of the meaning of "cultural imperialism," see Marcus G. Raskin's chapter, "The Channeling Society," in his Being and Doing.

⁸⁹Freire, Education for Critical Consciousness, pp. 12-13. Here, the different sources of Freire's thought are most interestingly combined. Gabriel Marcel's discussion of "irrational consciousness" in his Man Against Society is surely significant to Freire's depiction of "naïve" and "magical" consciousness. But also significant here is Lucien Goldmann's analysis of the differences between "false," "real," and "potential consciousness" in his The Human Sciences and Philosophy.

⁹⁰Freire, "Education for Awareness: A Talk with Paulo Freire" (with Rex Davis), in Mackie, op. cit., p. 67.

⁹¹The description of the "necrophilic person" is used by Freire and taken from Fromm's Escape from Freedom. With this phrase, Fromm has tried to grasp the characteristics of the person who can only see the world as a set of controllable objects. "He loves control," Fromm writes, "and in the act of controlling he kills life." (Escape from Freedom, p. 41) Freire uses this personality-typology as an appropriate image of social-colonial-domination. See Freire, Pedagogy, pp. 150-66.

⁹²Rosenberg and Bergen, The Cold Fire, p. 196. (See Note #72 in Chapter 1)

⁹³Freire, "Agrarian Reform Training and Research Institute," p. 234. The most careful and accurate description of Freire's method of political/literacy training can be found in Dewitt, op. cit., Chapter 5. An interesting effort to apply such methods of conscientization within an American middle-class context is described by Linda Finlay and Valerie Faith in their essay "Illiteracy and Alienation in American Colleges: Is Paul Freire's Pedagogy Relevant?" Jonathan Kozol's Children of the Revolution analyzes education in Cuba today where many of Freire's insights have been utilized. And, Freire's own Pedagogy in Process provides an extremely relevant set of materials describing Freire's thoughts, practices, and preparations for his work in Guinea-Bissau, the former Portuguese colony in Africa.

⁹⁴Freire analyzes the distinctions between "emergence," "intervention," and "conscientization" in Pedagogy, pp. 100-101. While Freire distinguishes between "reflexivity" and "reflectivity," Bernstein uses "reflexivity" to refer to similar "reflective" properties. (See Note #64)

⁹⁵Freire, "To the Coordinator of a 'cultural circle.'" p. 61. This insistence upon "dialogue" is central to Mounier's thought -- an important source for Freire. See Mounier, Personalism, Part One, Chapter II, "Communication."

⁹⁶Freire, Pedagogy in Process, p. 8.

⁹⁷Freire is meticulous in his attention to the presence of dialogue in teaching-methods and in student-learning -- much more so, for example, than Bowles and Gintis who emphasize the content of "revolutionary education" more than the process by which it is learned. "The dissident teacher can become an effective subversive," they claim, "through teaching the truth about society." (My emphasis) (Bowles and Gintis, op. cit., p. 274) It is the tension between the content and the method that is in question here.

⁹⁸Peter Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice, p. 126.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 128 and p. 60. The key to Berger's analysis is his distinction between the results of a scientifically valid analysis, and the results of an analysis based upon empirically unverifiable "value judgments." For Berger, Freire's hierarchization of consciousness is an example of the latter that claims the status of scientific truth.

¹⁰⁰See Marx's statement (cited in Note #16).

In a very provocative analysis, Dennis P. McCann criticizes the process of conscientization for, in effect, having no limits, having no ultimate truths to hold onto. Writing from the perspective of a Christian, McCann asks if such a perspective might ultimately conflict with a belief in religion itself. "Is the theology of liberation," he asks, "really free of the 'mythmaking irrationality' that conscientization seeks to overcome?" It is the argument here that the dialogue of conscientization does have limits, limits that are defined by the prior analysis of alienation and its origins. See McCann, Christian Realism and Liberation Theology, p. 182.

CHAPTER 3

SILENCE AS UNDERSTANDING

The great contribution of Freud to the philosophy of mind has been the realization that human behavior is not only a food getting strategy, but is also a language; that every move is at the same time a gesture. Symbolization is both an end and an instrument.

Suzanne Langer

Our language is our window on life. It determines for its speakers the dimensions, perspective, and horizon of a part of the total landscape of the world. Of a part. No speech, however ample its vocabulary, however refined and adventurous its grammar, can organize the entire potential of experience. None, be it ever so sparse and rudimentary, fails to give some usable grid.

George Steiner

He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore. And thus the task of making conscious the most hidden recesses of the mind is one which it is quite possible to accomplish.

Sigmund Freud

That humans must "make sense" of their world, and that they forever strive to be saved from that which seems "senseless" is, according to Weber, a "socio-psychological" given that pervades all socio-historical situations. Whether criticizing the systems of sense-making that characterize a specific epoch (as the ontological critique of modernity has done -- see Chapter 1), or locating the manipulations and distortions inherent in those same systems (as the historical critique of modernity has done -- see Chapter 2), each orientation has presupposed a set of communicable meanings that define "how it is that men belong to one another."¹ Within these theoretical orientations as well as among everyday social actors, a most powerful "demand" has been made: "that the world order in its totality is, could, and should somehow be a meaningful 'cosmos.'"²

It is this taken-for-granted quality of such meaningfulness that many analysts claim has been undercut by the emergence and diffusions of modern structures of institutional organization and consciousness.³ With modernity, traditional forms of community, kinship, and orders of shared belief which had once guided members and clarified their personal and social actions have been eroded, and a pervasive "fear of the social void" has animated both adherents of the traditional beliefs and those who have sought to find and live according to new patterns of asso-

ciation and morality.⁴ Dislocations of communities and changes in common practices -- that is, transformations in meanings had occurred in many historical eras, but de Tocqueville claimed to have seen another, more momentous and socially significant metamorphosis. "Something was taking place in France," he wrote while reflecting upon the recent Revolution, "that the world had not seen before:

In earlier ages established religions had been violently attacked, but this had always been due to the rise of a new type of religion and the fanaticism of its adherents. . . . In France, however, though Christianity was attacked with almost frenzied violence, there was no question of replacing it with another religion. Passionate and persistent efforts were made to wean men away from the faith of their fathers, but once they had lost it, nothing was supplied to fill the void with.⁵

Surely, the coming of the modern had signaled the technologization of work and the economy, and the democraticization of participation. With it also came the relativization and pluralization of world-views and the transposition of "Destiny" into questions of choice.⁶

De Tocqueville saw that not only one faith, Christianity, but religion itself was losing its potency -- its ability to provide terms of plausibility and legitimacy for the broader social terrain, and a path that could lead a person through the turning points of his/her individual existence. Modernity did multiply choices, and make heresy

not only the "occupation of marginal and eccentric types," but, as Peter Berger argues, a general quality of social life.⁷ Yet, de Tocqueville draws attention to the fact that the plight that modernity bequeaths is more than the "universalization of heresy" (the obligation to choose), for modernity itself could not immediately and successfully "fill the void" that even heretics in their "freedom" "demand." The repository of sacred and ultimate meanings that for Durkheim could make a "believer" "stronger," and could provide him/her with the feeling of greater "force either to endure the trials of existence, or to conquer them" had to be "filled" and continually replenished from another source.⁸ Modern men and women were, in effect, "condemned to seek the meaning of [their] lives" outside of the traditional religious community.⁹

It was from this sense of the modern context -- one in which a shared "background-picture of the world" could no longer be assumed, and where the "aleatory" and necessarily "frustrating" elements of "uncertainty" and "impossibility" which characterize all human-projects were exacerbated and eluded meaningful explanations, that modern depth-psychology was born.¹⁰ Psychoanalysis was, in fact, more than a technique which claimed access to and understanding of the most primary origins of human motivation and behavior. So, too, Sigmund Freud's "discovery" of the unconscious and his

elucidations of symptoms and cures for myriad personality "disorders" pushed well beyond the boldly theoretical. Freud's analytic brilliance, his place as "master among the modernists" was rather in what Nelson Goodman might have called his "world-making" genius.¹¹ His collected works could be viewed as a project for the creation of a new set of scientifically based meanings that could be shared by members of a distinctively modern community. While psychoanalysis emerged through the systematic breakdown of traditional religiously grounded "social heroisms," it had to strive to create its own notions of self, human significance, and adequate interpretation -- its own sense of meaning. For Freud, this new world-view was to be grounded in analysis, in the scientific Weltanschauung.¹²

Among sociologists, Philip Reiff has been most sensitive to the differences between the qualities of meaning and the forms of "belonging" within a religious community, a "positive community"; and those within the therapeutic, the analytic, the scientific -- the modern "negative community."¹³ For Reiff, positive communities are "characterized by their guarantee of some kind of salvation of self; and by salvation is meant an experience which transforms all personal relations by subordinating them to agreed communal purposes."¹⁴ Thus, the "positive community" integrates its members through the acceptance of symbolic sys-

tems and the performance and participation in rituals that stem from exclamations, visions, and understandings of prophecy and sacred teachings. "Salvation" -- the full conversions of the self, and its profound transformation into communal membership serves as the goal of such communities. Not "virtuosi of the self," but mythmakers and followers who abide by commitments to creeds of group-faith make up these "positive communities."¹⁵

"Negative communities," on the other hand, "do not offer a type of collective salvation," for their power to bind flows not from commitment but from scientific analysis. They cannot transform, but only inform.¹⁶ The prophet of the positive-religious community has become in its modern psychoanalytic cloak, a critic, bound to the elucidation and verification of scientific information which disclaims any status as revelation. Not the ultimately unknowable world of the symbol, but the universe of argumentation through reason has become his domain. "No longer protected by a fantasy of having arrived at some resting place where security, reassurance, and trust reside like gods in their heavens," the communally "detached" individual can only rely upon rational insights, not religious cures to help him/her in modernity's pervasive unbelief.¹⁷ Thus, the negative-analytic community becomes the institutionalization of "suspicion systematized" whose true "mod-

ern"-believer is more an isolated archaeologist of psychological introspection than a theologian or disciple of a sacred creed.¹⁸ As Freud himself described:

I arrived at a procedure which I later elevated to a method and deliberately employed: the procedure of clearing away, layer by layer, the pathogenic psychical material which we liked to compare with the technique of excavating a buried city.¹⁹

For Rieff, it is the realization and acceptance of the indeterminateness of such "excavating" that typifies the negative-analytic stance: that gives it its power as a source of meaning, and that simultaneously makes it susceptible to the incursions of non-scientific "meta-religions," and the disdain of those who call for a renewal of "faith in faith."²⁰

But, while Rieff's theoretical construction provides an excellent vehicle by which to examine historically changing meaning-systems as they relate to cultural and social forms, and his depiction of communities allows important insights into the effects of the psychoanalytic worldview upon the qualities and possibilities of group-membership within modern society (as distinct from those that pervaded traditional society), Rieff too easily depicts the "negative community" as lacking belief. That is, the "analytic" and the "negative" seem to stand neutrally outside of any faith-structure, and the possible leap-of-faith (the

"experience of conviction") necessary to accept its tenets is only minimally explored.²¹ And significantly too, the scientific-analytic claim to "truthfulness," to "realism," and to the sober acceptance of and tolerance for ambiguity is taken-for-granted by Reiff on terms so fully consistent with the "negative" community's own self-understanding that it is most difficult to ascertain whether Rieff has sought to construct an ideal typical "negative community," or whether he claims that such a "community of scientists" has indeed been historically realized.²²

Even more crucial is Rieff's scant attention to an ongoing dialogue between the "negative" and the "positive" communities -- between the modern and the traditional, between the psychoanalytic and the religious, between science and faith. If Freud was to be a "world-maker," if his modern therapeutic project was to be a "triumph," he had to engage in a conversation with those non-modern voices that had played such a seminal role in his own education, in his own family and community, and in the larger social world around him. Not only the "creedal"-commitment therapies of Adler, Reich, and (especially) Jung, but the rational-analytic therapies of Freud himself were constantly meeting the traditional world through the images, stories, myths, and idols of dreams and past cultures, seeking to respond to it and to understand it using a specific linguistic-

interpretive matrix called "analysis."

But it is the nature of those "meetings" and the forms of their analytic language that is critical. Their quality -- that is, their "syntax of relatedness" -- provides clues to their own status as distinctively modern forms of knowledge and new sources of meaning.²³ Whether this "scientific" explanatory model itself could be understood as just another symbol system with its own presuppositions, strategies, and dictionary of possible interpretations -- another world-view, this time built not upon traditional, but upon newly realized modern-scientific discursive grounds;²⁴ or whether the psychoanalyst who "casts himself in the role of a social scientist" has truly transcended the realm of the positive-symbolic to successfully embrace a position of pure, "non-moral," non-interdictory, and illusionless scientific analysis is a central issue that this third excursion into the meaning of modernity seeks to address.²⁵

Sigmund Freud's work is in fact filled with pieces of his "conversation" with the traditional -- most vividly, with religion itself. It is almost as if his life among secularized and liberal Jews in nineteenth-century Austria could not fully eradicate the traditional world of Chasidism and of Orthodoxy that his parents had physically left in the Jewish Pale of East Galacia -- just as the dissemi-

nation of a scientific world-view had not fully undercut the powerful ties of his fellow Austrians to the Christian faith.²⁶ The assimilationist and cosmopolitan culture of Vienna in which German was the language of both private and public life, and in which few religious holidays were ever strictly observed, surely molded Freud's views of Jewish ritual and of religion itself.²⁷ It is quite in keeping with his sense of himself as a "godless" "man of medicine" that he wrote to his friend Silberstein in 1874 about his feelings when he saw the "unpleasant" plum preserves that had always marked the Yom Kippur "festival" in the Freud household:

Our festivals have outlived our dogma, like the funeral meal has outlived the dead. . . . [When] we children of the world [eat], we no longer think, like the pious, that we have done a good deed; rather we are simply conscious of having a good dish.²⁸

The lofty "metaphysics" of religion had, in Freud's eighteen-year-old eyes, taken its more rightful place not among the "workings of divine power," but within the sensual materialism of the stomach.²⁹

But neither assimilation nor secularization in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Austria were ever complete or secure, and it was by no mistake that, aside from notable exceptions such as Brucke, Jung, and the Swiss pastor Oskar Pfister, "Freud spent his whole life in a vir-

tual ghetto."³⁰ It is also significant in this regard, that during the early, most difficult years of the development of psychoanalytic theory, Freud used the Vienna chapter of the B'nai Brith as the central intellectual forum for the introduction of his psychological speculations and theoretical forays. Many of his papers (on dream theory, on childhood sexuality, on screen memories) were first "tested" before members of this Jewish lodge, and between the years 1897 and 1902, Freud brought his on-going scientific investigations to this group no fewer than eight times.³¹ On the occasion of his seventieth birthday, Freud delivered a lecture to the Vienna B'nai Brith in which he spoke of his early isolation from the intellectual community of Europe, his feelings that "I was like a man outlawed, shunned by everyone." It was the B'nai Brith that became for him "a circle of chosen, high-minded men who, regardless of the audacity of what I had done, would receive me with friendliness."³² And, most significantly, Freud concludes: "That you were Jews only suited me the more, for I myself was a Jew, and it always seemed to me not only shameful but downright senseless to deny it."³³

Freud not only did not "deny it" on a personal level, but focused many of his most important intellectual ventures on the very nature of religion: religion and the formation of character structure and identity, religion and

wish fulfillment, and the psychical origins of monotheism, guilt, and of belief in general. Leonardo da Vinci (1910), Totem and Taboo (1913), The Future of an Illusion (1927), Civilization and its Discontents (1929), and Moses and Monotheism (1938) all attest to Freud's virtual preoccupation and his on-going struggles with the development of a modern scientific -- that is, a psychoanalytic account of religion. Psychoanalysis, for Freud, had to address and explain religion, the bastion of the traditional, for only by proving that modern analytic prowess had "thanked God" for His "provisional services" and "conducted [Him] to its frontier," could it take its "rightful" place as a science -- as the modern source of meaning and explanation.³⁴

Religion, for Freud, was to be approached in a manner similar to that of neurosis. One must begin with an analysis of the immediate motivations in humans for sustaining religious beliefs and ritual practices, and then step-by-step pass to an explanation of the particulars of prehis-tory gained through an understanding of human infantile experiences.³⁵ Clearly, the most potent reason for religious belief, according to Freud, is the very nature of life itself. "Life, as we find it," he explains, "is too hard for us; it brings too many pains, disappointments, and impossible tasks. In order to bear it, we cannot dispense with

palliative measures."³⁶ An anonymous nature confronts the unprotected human with unimaginable "terrors" and with the "cruelty of fate, particularly as it is shown in death," while civilization itself has imposed "sufferings and privations" that are experienced as "intolerable."³⁷ Although such realities confront humans in all stages of their lives and in all historical circumstances, religion emerged from the most basic universal experiences of the unprotected infant who longs for safety, security, and the surety-of-being only attained in fantasy through the presence of a provider-father.³⁸ It is this utter helplessness, this deepest physiological and emotional dependency in confronting the "machinery of the universe" that Freud sees as both the basis of modern neurotic symptomatology and the heart of primitive ritual.³⁹

Thus, for Freud, religion evinces humanity's "oldest, strongest, and most urgent wishes."⁴⁰ It is an attempt at exorcism, a mode of reconciliation and compensation and necessarily, a form of "illusion." By illusion, Freud does not mean a conscious prevarication, an immoral lie, nor an error. Rather, "what is characteristic of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes," and a belief takes on the status of an illusion "when a wish-fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation:

We shall tell ourselves that it would be very nice if there were a moral order in the uni-

verse and an after-life; but it is a very striking fact that all this is exactly as we are bound to wish it to be. And it would be more remarkable still if our wretched, ignorant and downtrodden ancestors had succeeded in solving all these difficult riddles of the universe.⁴¹

Impotent humans thus create gods for themselves, illusionary efforts made in confusion and fear, in order to become united to the wielders of power, to the forces of nature. Humanity's "unclear," conflict-ridden "inner perceptions" of its own "psychical apparatus" stimulates, according to Freud, "thought illusions which are naturally projected outwards and characteristically into the future and into a hereafter. Immortality, retribution, the whole hereafter, are such representations of our psychical interior . . . psychomythology."⁴² Erich Fromm, borrowing from Feuerbach and Marx, and in terms quite consistent with Freud's analysis, emphasizes this creation of illusions through this "psychomythological" process of "projection." "In worshipping God," Fromm contends, man

tries to get in touch with that part of himself which he has lost through projection. After having given God all he has, he begs God to return to him some of what originally was his own. But having lost his own he is completely at God's mercy.⁴³

Freud's "analysis" of religion could be understood as a careful dissection-reduction of faith into its psycholog-

ical constituents, or a brilliant discussion of the similar psychic underpinnings of obsessional acts and religious rituals, or a bold explanation of the ontogenetic rehearsal of a phylogenetic story, or perhaps most notably, as a scathing condemnation of religion as unimpeded indulgence in and worship of dependency.⁴⁴ But more relevant to this discussion of Freud's conversation with the world of faith was his use of religion as an opportunity to argue for and bolster the necessity of his own techniques, his own most modern perspective -- analysis. Religion is, in Fromm's words, "another symptom of the failure of nerve."⁴⁵ Yet, as important as the possible "limitations" of a self who has "adjusted" to his/her disillusion through the crutch of illusion (a depiction most in keeping with Fromm's and Freud's descriptions), is the unlimited truth, the sanctity, that "unalterable core of knowledge" which for Freud was without illusion: science itself.⁴⁶ "No, our science is no illusion," Freud claims. "But an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere."⁴⁷

The doctrines of religion "bear the imprint of the times in which they arose, the ignorant times of the childhood of humanity."⁴⁸ To push itself out of this infantile cocoon, so replete with the warmth and comfort of a "beneficent providence" is the modern project, a task signaling

evolutionary progress: the maturity of humanity. And it is only on the "slow" and methodical "road of scientific work" that, according to Freud, we adequately confront the "riddles of the universe" and can attain any true "knowledge of reality outside ourselves."⁴⁹ It is "merely an illusion to expect anything from intuition and introspection," Freud argues:

They can give us nothing but particulars about our own mental life, which are hard to interpret; never any information about the questions which religious doctrine finds it so easy to answer. It would be insolent to let one's own arbitrary will step into the breach and, according to one's personal estimate, declare this or that part of the religious system to be less or more acceptable. Such questions are too momentous for that; they might be called too sacred.⁵⁰

The "arbitrary" and even pretentious quality of "personal estimates" could neither rescue humanity from the "nursery of history" nor heal it of the experience of loss and deprivation that Freud (through his own experience, through his studies of antiquity, and through his work with patients) knew religion had touched in the human psyche. The issues of religion were indeed "too sacred," and demanded the most valued response, not born of individual whim or the sophistry of opinion, but of "our God logos."⁵¹

Thus, important for Freud was his understanding that it was "religion's technique" not only to "depress the value of life" and "distort the picture of the real world,"

but to "draw people into a mass-delusion" by "presupposing" an intimidation of the intelligence, by "impeding the power of Reason."⁵² Religion "fixed" humans in an infantile psychological state (perhaps at its best "sparing people an individual neurosis"). But even more powerfully for Freud, religion undercut "another and better path" to human understanding: "that of becoming a member of the human community, and with the help of a technique guided by science, going over to the attack against nature and subjecting her to the human will."⁵³ To become a "member," to belong to this modern scientific community was, for Freud, to accept a more realistic and successful deity, logos, who could empower humans, not "prophetic gods," by providing effective means/techniques, and by positing illusionless goals. It was wrong, Freud argued, that people were more content, that is, "happier at a time when religious doctrines held unrestricted sway" (as many modern critics have assumed) for "the greater the number of men to whom the treasure of knowledge become accessible, the more widespread is the falling-away from religious belief."⁵⁴ For Freud, such "treasures," such new sources of "social heroism" had begun to claim their own powerful "sway," and could (in some ideal-modern future) provide a system of meanings for a "human community" no longer distorted by the passions and partisans of faith, nor the regressions of irrational human

desires. It was the "voice of the intellect," the voice of the rational-analytic that modernity had allowed to be heard, even though this "voice" was yet weak:

The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing. Finally, after a countless succession of rebuffs, it succeeds. This is one of the few points on which one may be optimistic about the future of mankind, but it is in itself a point of no small importance. And from it one can derive yet other hopes. The primacy of the intellect lies, it is true, in a distant, distant future, but probably not in an infinitely distant one.⁵⁵

Freud's psychoanalytic theory was his monumental contribution to the modern project. Its "hope" was to provide the rational, illusionless groundings that would free the intellect in order that it could "gain a hearing," and search for the reason of its own unreason.⁵⁶ And, too, Freud's psychoanalytic method was invented as a rational tool, a "technique guided by science" that could empirically "clear away, layer by layer," the unconscious strivings, the personalities of modern individuals dislodged as they were from the moorings of traditional belief, and in need as they were of a new set of functional meanings. Analysis had to converse with religion, but significantly, only as the superior voice. Although often "rebuffed," it professed to know the inadequacies and limits of faith and (like Marx) to lay bare the core of "false

consciousness" that stood at the base of all faith systems.⁵⁷ In the end, it was the ultimate rational grounds of possible truthful discourse that psychoanalysis presupposed its method had incorporated, and that its theory had announced.

Freud's search for psychoanalysis led him through a virtual lexicon of potential explanatory languages. His medical professors had taught a physicalist vocabulary of anatomy, nervous system excitations, "neurones," and channelings of masses -- a language of quantifiable life-force based upon the model of a machine.⁵⁸ Between the years 1877 and 1897, in fact, Freud the neurologist (and materialist) published close to twenty scientific papers seeking to harmonize the vocabularies of neurology and "pure" academic psychology. Even as he was introduced to Charcot in 1885 (after his work with Dr. Josef Breuer, and his familiarity with Breuer's account of Anna O's hysteria), how striking it is that Freud presented himself at the Salpêtrière with his slides of nervous-tissues prepared with the techniques of silver staining that he had so carefully developed in his Vienna laboratories.⁵⁹ It was Charcot's pioneering work in creating and suppressing symptoms with hypnosis and suggestion that affected Freud profoundly, and had begun to allow him to imagine the possibility of

thought "separate from consciousness," a conception essential to his later understandings of dreams, of infantile sexuality, and of the sexual etiology of hysteria. But as Freud opened his office in Vienna, it was still as a neurologist whose "therapeutic arsenal contained only two weapons, electrotherapy and hypnotism," for as he relates in his Autobiographical Study, "a visit to a hydropathic establishment after a single consultation was an inadequate source of income."⁶⁰

While Freud's first significant effort to explain mental illness, the "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895), drew closely upon this Newtonian-Darwinian-Helmholtzian theoretical background, postulating a construction of mental processes within a "medical lexicon" of motor-images and machine-models that emerges almost personless, his second attempt in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) rests decisively upon accounts of wishes, ambivalences, loves and feelings of loathing that rescue the complexities of human experience from the possibility of a single explanation of cause and effect.⁶¹ What Freud had found in dreams was not only the presence of unconscious desire, the transference of libidinal wishes into images and pictures and fantasies, and the workings of what he described in his text as "displacements" and "condensations." He had found a new model, one whose central tenet was the necessity of

interpretation itself. A hermeneutics of meaning had come to challenge the language of pure physicality -- of force and mechanical interpretations. "The aim of which I have set before myself," Freud writes, "is to show that dreams are capable of being interpreted."⁶² And Freud's systematic catalogue of previous professional and lay efforts to explain dreams (that he included in the first chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams) only reaffirms his thesis: that such theories "leave no room for any problem of interpretation."⁶³ Thus, while never relinquishing his quest to speak and to know as a modern "man of science," what Freud sought was a "scientific treatment" of the interpretation of frequently "unintelligible" and "confused" symbolic communication in the "hidden meaning of dreams."⁶⁴

The new model of science that Freud had discovered -- his model of interpretation based upon the paradigm of the dream -- was never intended to serve solely as an abstract theory. The "royal road" demanded not only a "plunge" that Freud asked his readers to take with him "into the minutest details of [his] life," (although such self-analysis and the kind of mutual-analysis that the writing provokes fills the pages of Freud's works).⁶⁵ Nor, did it only inform Freud's highly reflective reformulations and restructurings of an adequate "metapsychology" that, even at his death, he did not feel had been fully articulated. This model was

also, and most impressively, the center of a clinical activity, a mode of therapeutic-intervention, a form of professional-interpretation that Freud practiced for more than forty years, and that has been institutionalized as a key component of the "classical" psychoanalytic establishment since Freud.⁶⁶

Freud was deeply concerned about the practice of psychotherapy, and many of his papers and talks in the early years of the psychoanalytic movement were directed to physicians whose support Freud knew that he needed, and whose skepticism Freud also knew he had unleashed. "To many physicians," Freud wrote in 1904,

psychotherapy seems to be the offspring of modern mysticism and, compared with our physico-chemical specifics which are applied on the basis of physiological knowledge, appears quite unscientific and unworthy of the attention of a serious investigator.⁶⁷

To be labeled "unscientific" and objectified as a proselytizer for yet another mystical sect (whose ranks had so obviously swelled in turn-of-the-century Europe) was something that Freud continually encountered, and just as emphatically sought to deny. How significant, for example, is the image that Freud must have so consciously chosen when writing to his medical peers regarding the psychoanalytic method of treatment:

I cannot recommend my colleagues emphatically enough to take as a model in psycho-analytic treatment the surgeon who puts aside all his own feelings, including that of human sympathy, and concentrates his mind on one single purpose, that of performing the operation as skillfully as possible.⁶⁸

The success of psychoanalysis could not be based upon "human sympathy," nor upon a "direct intuition" as he had previously and painstakingly argued in The Interpretation of Dreams.⁶⁹ Here was an "operation" that only seemed to lack the precision that defined "physiological knowledge," and the clarity of "physico-chemical specifics." Psychoanalytic treatment was to be based upon scientific interpretation. It was to be the method of symbolic-surgery.

But, as Freud and the physicians who gathered around him did recognize that there was a difference between the nature of their "operation" and that of their medical colleagues. The physical props of their "consulting rooms," according to Theodor Reik, "look like those of any physician." "There are desks, tables, a couch and chairs, books, pictures, and ash trays.

Yet, the furniture and objects in the room of the analyst acquire a significance quite different from that of the furnishings in the office of a specialist in kidney diseases or a corporation lawyer.⁷⁰

While Reik sensitively describes this "significance," this "atmosphere of psychoanalysis" that transforms a "common-

place" and "sober" situation into a "magical one," one can see how the "furniture" and the "objects" within the room are arranged with explicit theoretical regard -- with the primary intention of facilitating a particular "syntax of relatedness" between patient and analyst.⁷¹ The patient will:

. . . lie on a couch with the analyst seated behind them; so that he is able to observe them without being under scrutiny himself. Therefore, they cannot watch his expression or respond to his apparent approval or disapproval; and when they try to laugh or joke with him about their troubles in an attempt to smooth them over, they find him bafflingly silent and unresponsive. They may talk for long periods with scarcely an interruption; while at other times they will be checked by insistent comments, comments which sometimes will make them more comfortable, but which, quite as often, prove to be disturbing.⁷²

This psychoanalytic positioning of patient and analyst purposefully separates their worlds, even as they remain so physically close to one another; and draws apart their spheres of consciousness and meaning in a most concrete way.⁷³ The "seated" analyst, freed from the "scrutiny" of the patient, can maintain his distant and "evenly hovering attention" to the words and gestures of his client.⁷⁴ And, the patient's prone position, spatially subordinate to that of the analyst, also acknowledges the critical psychological correspondence between lying on a couch and sleep itself. The world of the dream, the principal terrain where-

in, according to Freud, the complex interactions between thought and feeling, between consciousness and that which is systematically repressed, comes to life -- such a world (usually met only in sleep) is re-awakened and vividly displayed within the psychoanalytic situation itself. Now, opened to the ear of the scientist-of-dreams, those "buried" unconscious images, clues to the psyche's only seemingly mysterious workings can be heard as a text accessible to deciphering, available for correct analysis.⁷⁵

Thus, for Freud, there was only one "fundamental rule of psychoanalysis," and it is contained in the injunction to the patient: "Say whatever goes through your mind."⁷⁶ As Lawrence Kubie aptly describes this directive:

The psychoanalyst asks the patient to make use of the simplest and most primitive of all ways of thinking: i.e., to allow his thoughts to flow without guidance or direction, bumping along from one idea to the next as a blindfolded man would bump from tree to tree in a forest. . . . Thus, he is asked to think aloud in the presence of the psychoanalyst with that simple and naive form of undirected musing which everyone uses in the solitude of his own chambers, and which is at the same time the most spontaneous and creative of all forms of thought.⁷⁷

Such "free association" would enable the analyst to glimpse the "primitive" (traditional) voices that spoke in such "simple and naive form" the paradoxical connections, unsuspecting juxtapositions, painful visions, and mere "bump-

ings" of the patient. "Sitting at the window of a railway train and describing to someone behind you the changing views you see outside" is how Freud described this psychological "roam[ing] through mental highways and byways, unhampered by conscious restrictions."⁷⁸ It is this most private "musing" -- these privileged data that the analyst, "without use of any special aids," can not only become attentive to (to hear), but can come to know based upon his trained-translation of the patient's symbolic symptomatology (the patient's deepest "riddle") into a meaningful scientific (psychoanalytic) code.⁷⁹

The psychoanalytic situation thus provides a structured ritual empowering words themselves.⁸⁰

By the use of words the patient makes himself known to the other, the analyst, and thereby learns to know himself too; he learns to express his desires and his fears; he assesses what he thinks he possesses and what he lacks -- what he is and what he would like to be. But talking in analysis is even more than this, as we know -- it is a continuous search, a veiled demand to be listened to, reassured, understood.⁸¹

But, in using (and cherishing) words to such an important extent, and in acknowledging their uninhibited flow as the main access to meaning and interpretation, as "the vehicle to all the affects underlying the analytic relationship," psychoanalysis also calls forth the significance of the absence of words -- of silence.⁸² And while silence in the

psychoanalytic situation is noteworthy as both part of the "positioning" of the analyst (as a part of analytic technique), as well as part of the repertoire of the patient's communicative practices, it is extremely relevant that it has been the silence of the patient -- the interpretation of this stark negation of the "fundamental rule of psychoanalysis" that has been most widely analyzed by the psychoanalytic community itself.⁸³

The silence of the patient has stood as a central concern of psychoanalytic interpretation because it signals such an apparent and truly profound resistance to analytic practice itself. In fact, it is within the category of "crass resistances" that includes breaking-off treatment, lateness, missing appointments, automatic rejection or misinterpretation of everything the analyst says and falling asleep, that Glover, in his basic text on analytic technique, discusses patient silence.⁸⁴ The silent patient is "blocking" the words so primary in treatment, and refusing to participate in the necessary analytic transference either as a form of revenge against the analyst, as a defense against what is perceived as the "aggressiveness" of the analyst (contained in and marked by the analyst's specific interpretations), as repression of unconscious feelings and desires, or as a sign of regression to some prior psychic

stage of development.⁸⁵

Such a negative evaluation of patient silence abounds in the analytic literature.⁸⁶ What is clear is that silence is theorized as a "protection" and as a "provocation," and thus must be treated as would any other psychoneurotic symptom. For Weisman (as for most others), an adequate interpretation of silence demands an "investigation of its uses as a defense, the underlying conflict, the emotions concealed, and the effect on the patient's relationship with others as indicated in the transference."⁸⁷ Thus, for example, while working with a twenty-five-year-old female graduate student who had "sought psychoanalysis because of periodic mild depressions," Weisman became concerned about the "intractable silence" that "distinguished" their sessions. For Weisman, the patient's silence was intimately connected to a more generalized "deliberate vagueness" wherein she "endeavored to avoid the interest of the therapist." Conceptually fixed within the bounds of psychoanalytic presuppositions that emphasize such defensiveness, "denial," "avoidance," and lack of willingness to participate by the "rules" of the analytic process itself, Weisman's conclusions are thus meaningful:

By this breaking off communication (through her silence), the patient protected herself from closer contact. . . . She shunned the intimacy implied in mutual psychoanalytic investigation with denial, avoidance, and

suppression of her positive attitude
toward the doctor.⁸⁸

But even Weisman's instructive descriptions of what could be taken as transference-failures, negations of the necessary "intimacy" of analyst-patient "investigation," fail to capture the tenor of many analytic conclusions regarding silence as a specific sign of "intersystemic processes of the psychic apparatus" of the patient.⁸⁹ Kata Levy's examination of the "causations" of silence as a "blockage" to valid analytic-work quite clearly exemplifies how silence is interpreted from the viewpoint of psychic functioning itself, allowing the analyst to see in its presence the clues to personality formation and, most evidently, disorder:

Apart from the cases of severe obsessionals where silence is the symptom par excellence of the neurosis itself, chronically silent persons (within the analytic situation) have a strong anxiety preparedness, are fixed at anal retention, are inhibited in their sexual lives, are often homosexually inclined, and are without exception of an infantile character.⁹⁰

While Levy's vivid objectifying might be construed as an exaggeration of the analytic pose, the thrust and general nature of her particular interpretations are consistent with the broader psychoanalytic project.

Most poignantly, within this analytic framework, pa-

tient silence is met by the analyst with profound distrust. Such silence is not, however, without meaning. It is not no-thing that the patient "speaks," nor even the "false speech" of mythical thinking described in Chapter 2. It is rather an active communication of symbology-symptomatology, a some-thing whose definition can be learned and ultimately known by the analyst.⁹¹ Most importantly, this silent-expressivity always demands an interpretation: the emptiness cannot rest alone, nor carry within its own validity and reason-for-being. Its true communication is in its translation/transformation into another language -- a language of analysis and scientific-interpretation. Like the experience of religion that necessitated an explanatory template based upon Freud's theoretical model of neurotic/irrational wish-fulfillment, the silence of the patient has to be re-spoken in analytic verse, interpreted as that which defies reason by its "intractable" stubbornness to speak, and spoken anew in the analyst's voice in order to fill-up a space that lacks the talk of explanation.

The silence of the patient has, in effect, been easier for the analytic community to discuss and examine than has the silence of the analyst himself. While patient silence has produced a wealth of explorations, all proceeding from the metapsychological presuppositions of psycho-dynamic/

analytic discourse (that is, the vocabulary of taken-for-granted conscious and unconscious structures and processes), the nature of the analyst's position as silent-partner in the analytic "investigation" has been either neglected entirely or discussed in technical, not substantial terms.⁹³ As technique, silence has been a cornerstone of analytic practice since Freud. As "one of the most potent tools of the analyst's therapeutic encounter with the patient," silence serves as another means by which the atmosphere of the dream can come to life -- by which the "controlled regression" (which can be taken as the definition of psychoanalysis) can take place.⁹⁴ The silence of the analyst acts as a kind of invitation to the speech of the patient, communicating that all words are permissible, acceptable, and necessary; and that the daily "bright" talk of the world has been shut-off and put into the background:

The quiet acts like a lampshade modifying a too bright light. The pressing nearness of material reality becomes remote. It is as if the silence of the analyst already marks the beginning of a quieter, less immediate way of looking at others and at oneself.⁹⁵

Conventional roles taken by those who exchange words and glances are thus purposefully suspended -- a deliberate artificiality signaled by the analyst's silence (and by his hidden presence). Thus, a conscious use of the "active power of silence" can "pull the patient forward," and al-

most as a result of the stark and unbearable strain of experiencing his/her own silence as well as that of the analyst, "drive him [the patient] into deeper levels than he intended."⁹⁶ By thus accenting the polarity of speech and silence, the analyst can instigate the patient's flow of associations and meanings, and provide himself with priceless data to be worked-upon.

The silence of the analyst, however, is not only a careful manipulation provided to create a quiet space, freed for the musings of a repressed unconscious. A successful therapeutic process, according to analytic doctrine, can come about only if the analyst can "comport" himself as a "relatively unresponsive blank screen"; a silent screen that can be used by the patient to "displace" and "project" the "unresolved warded-off imagos of his past."⁹⁷ It is as such an "unresponsive" "recording machine" that the analyst could be most highly effective in gathering analytic information. Fromm-Reichman clearly describes this classical image of the analyst:

The more colorless and the more inanimate the countenance of the psychiatrist appeared, the more nearly he approached the ideal of serving the patient as a recording machine on which he could record whatever was on his mind. This inanimate attitude also served as a safeguard against the psychiatrist's becoming personally involved with his patients and with the emotional experiences which they were reciting.⁹⁸

The analyst has to "attach" the patient to the treatment, and thus to the analyst himself; and such a therapeutic "alliance" was believed to come about only if the patient experienced the analyst as a "receptive organ," as a silent, non-judgmental and "inanimate" listener.⁹⁹ Only through such non-intervening silence (especially in the earliest stages of the analysis) could the patient's transference feelings "reach their optimal intensity," and could the "physician" "discover" and ultimately "reconstruct" the patient's unconscious."¹⁰⁰

The analyst thus displays his silence as a provocative technique that allows him to take on myriad masks, to participate in various roles, to become the object of a world of fantasies and projections; to serve as a "silent actor in a play the patient is creating."¹⁰¹ He becomes something and someone, a chameleon of personages, not based upon his own choices, but based upon the unconscious workings of the patient who uses the opportunity-of-silence to return to an infantile past, to re-experience loves and doubts and angers, and to speak-into-consciousness the emotional cathexes that have wedded him to images and feelings constricting emotional growth, and causing pain and suffering. To employ silence is thus to be able to find

the road to the secret message, the hidden language the analyst is attempting to decode. In order to arrive at this language of the

unconscious the analyst just listen without intervention.¹⁰²

But such a depiction of analytic-silence hides its own work, and thus remains falsely tied to a definition of silence that is closer to neutral-listening than it is to the systematic and particularistic-hearing that it truly represents. While the "colorless" and "inanimate" character of the analyst seems to attune itself -- by its very silence and non-intervention to a melody of sounds that emerge from the patient, it is the choosing and naming of the hidden themes, and the interpretation of the dissonances and counterparts that strike the analyst's ear that together mold a specific hearing (and a specific understanding) that the analyst's silence occasions.¹⁰³

While the psychoanalyst has been quick to interpret the silence of the patient as resistance and neurotic symptom, his own silence has been treated as more profound -- that is, more neutral, and without need of interpretation. Yet, it is in subscribing to a dictionary of meanings and significances and to a specific psycho-sexual landscape, that the analyst meets the patient and selectively hears his/her story. The "cryptic interplay of forces" that Wilhelm Stekel, for example, claims to hear as he silently at-

tends to his patient's dreams, is more than the mere elucidation of a "course of connections" that emerge with scientific facticity directly from the words of the patient.¹⁰⁴ It is rather Stekel's own work of putting into play a theory of relevances that name significance and conduct such a "hearing." The analyst's absence-of-words, is, in fact, a form of "intervention," but one whose activity remains hidden until that critical moment in time when the analyst makes his interpretation present to the patient. The question of when an interpretation should be given (that is, when it should be overtly stated in words) is thus systematically confused with whether the analyst's time-of-silence is itself a period-of-interpreting.¹⁰⁵ The analyst's silence is thus masked-speech, a limited silence of contemplation-made-of-interpretation, fixed in its depth and its quality by the contours of analytic definitions and by the vicissitudes of psychoanalytic theory (of the psychoanalytic logos) as it is given at any particular time.

Not the indeterminateness of "excavating" (as Rieff has depicted the analytic process), but the methodical interpretation of clues and "symptoms" and "pathological manifestations" seen against the background of faith in a modern psychological symbol-system brilliantly constructed by Freud; this is how psychoanalysis might be more appropriately depicted. By his silence, the analyst temporarily

steps away from the immediacy of his words (though not his interpretations), and comes to hear and thus to understand the "very elaborately organized nature" of the patient's mental processes always utilizing the sieve of psychoanalytic theory as his guide. Thus, using silence as a vehicle for understanding, the analyst can (in Freud's words):

trace the symptoms back to the instinctual impulses which motivate them . . . just as the chemist segregates the fundamental substance, the chemical element out of the sale in which it has been combined with other elements and was thus unrecognizable.¹⁰⁶

To "recognize" the particularly significant "elements" of the patient's psyche, and to pinpoint their functions and the structural constellations in which they work is the goal of the psychoanalyst-"chemist," who, through his silent and spoken interpreting seeks to show how scientific analysis can crystallize unconscious motivations and name the ignorance and illusion that inform the very foundation of the patient's injured emotional life.¹⁰⁷

Freud's confrontation with modernity emerged most vividly through his hermeneutic-experiments with a new science that he called psychoanalysis. This "science of the emotions" not only sought to rescue the conflict-ridden self from the universe of neurosis (a world of illusion-filled "private" religious belief); it also defined the tools and

the universe of a modern exegetical enterprise in which new meanings were created and hidden meanings were uncovered.¹⁰⁸ Yet, Freud's explorations and his most practical assurance that a silent-analyst using his psychoanalytic canon of interpretations could understand the dynamics of a hidden-self also drew attention to a new terrain and level of investigation. Freud's true commitment was not to an examination of the ontological (and thus "archetypal") groundings of psychic and symbolic life as Jung's later work was to demand.¹⁰⁹ Nor, was he committed to an examination of the historical details of an alienated society as many twentieth-century neo-Marxist social critics used his rich theoretical work to demonstrate.¹¹⁰ Such an onto-theological enterprise (such as Jung's) located its promise outside of the socio-historical domain (as has been discussed in Chapter 1). And too, the socio-critical enterprise (such as Marcuse's) located its critique within the contemporary historical world but always with a view to an undominated realization of modern societal potential (as has been discussed in Chapter 2).

For the onto-theologian (like Heidegger), silence could actuate a meeting with a new world vision that simultaneously tamed and undercut the commands of the modern; while for the social analyst of alienation (like Marx), silence could eloquently attest to modern society's monumen-

tal power to deprive most of its citizens of a voice that could speak freedom. For Freud, however, the silence of the analyst could lead to understanding. Silence was the central component of a method that could lead towards the unraveling/reappropriation of meaningful images that might govern the life of the modern self.¹¹¹ Such an understanding (based as it is upon the presuppositions of a psychoanalytic faith-discourse) does not imagine a new world-vision outside of the modern, nor does it claim privileged access to a critical consciousness whose aim is to change economic concitions and the very social-logic of gratifications that rule the individual's deepest desires.¹¹² It is rather an understanding that takes-for-granted the firmness with which the world of modernity reigns (and thus that proclaims the basic psychological naïveté of either desiring the return to a past paradise, or imagining a future without the alienation, the "insufficiency" that is civilization), and that heralds the use of modern scientific tools of analysis to make sense of a clash-of-symbols -- to make comprehensible an individual biography, a "text" whose narrative renders confusions, illogic, and for the patient, immediate pain.¹¹³

Thus, for Freud, silence is not critique, nor alienation, but method-of-understanding. Yet, to claim the possibility of understand, and to name the scientific theories

and analytic practices -- the psychoanalytic repertoire of modern meanings -- that equip the analyst to attain such an end, does not provide a clear indication of how and when such an understanding does, in fact, take place. The "rightness," the "usefulness," the fit of interpretation and the correct discursive organization of a flow of associations that becomes an adequate life-history is not immediately given. While Silence-as-Critique posed one problem of "translation" -- from its "ideal" to the "real"; and Silence-as-Alienation posed a second -- from the "real" to its "ideal"; Silence-as-Understanding poses another, more basic dilemma of modernity: How can the truth of understanding be determined?¹¹⁴

It has been the work of Jurgen Habermas that has been most helpful in raising and approaching this issue; that is, in re-examining and re-formulating Freud's psychoanalytically-based notion of understanding. By linguistically re-interpreting Freud's concepts of instinct, repression, and unconscious, Habermas has stressed the communicative dimensions of the analytic situation: the analyst's theoretical presuppositions (his ability to "understand the patient"), and importantly too, the patient's self-understanding (his/her ability to corroborate the analyst's interpretation).¹¹⁵ Freud's psychoanalytic situation, in effect,

provides Habermas with a microcosm that can be used to explore and to analyze social relations among individuals and their common possibilities of understanding -- of communicating shared meanings and interpretations with one another.¹¹⁶ And, in this way, Habermas poses an extremely provocative response to the meaning of psychoanalytic truth itself.

Habermas's interpretation of Freud insists that not only does analytic treatment cherish the word (as has been described above), but that it is through language itself that humans are able to transform the technology of "instincts" and instinct-governed behaviors into meaningful communicative actions at all. "Only in the medium of language is the heritage of man's natural history articulated in the form of interpreted needs," Habermas argues. "On the human level, instinctual demands are represented by interpretations."¹¹⁷ Interpretations, and especially the interpretations of needs and wishes which cannot be defined by any natural/biological a priori are, in fact, isomorphic with being human because "the concept of instinct, when transferred back from animals to men, is still rooted in meaning-structure of the life-world."¹¹⁸

For Freud, "repression" pointed towards a process of self-censorship, one that manifested itself in resistances, failures of memory, frequently obscure dream images -- and,

in silence itself. Through his articulation of the differences between the "manifest" and the "latent" content of dreams (by means of his analytic "procedures"), Freud claimed to have located the etiology of such repression in a locus of conflict: a conflict between infantile sexual urges and social-parental demands.¹¹⁹ Such conflicts were perpetuated intra-psychically, and, through the process of repressions, made unconscious. But in Habermas's linguistic rendering, repression becomes the actual "banishment of need-interpretations" themselves -- an act carried out in and through language:

The psychically most effective way to render undesired need dispositions harmless is to exclude from public communication the interpretations to which they are attached. Freud calls the excluded symbols and motives that are excluded through them unconscious wishes. Through the mechanism of repression, conscious motivations present in the public use of language are transformed into unconscious, as it were delinguisticized, motives.¹²⁰

While "normal" communications rest upon a foundation of recognized and established meanings (allowing individuals to understand themselves as well as to reciprocally acknowledge one another's presence), through the process of repression, these "interpreted needs" are denied access to the public realm.

Thus, according to Habermas, a public language which carries with it the possibility of recognition of both self

and other is transformed/deformed into a truly private language. In this sense, neurotic symptoms (which express a repressed wish and the defensive process itself; just as, according to Freud, religion does) can be conceived of as disturbances of linguistic-biographical texts. Such symptoms do not obey ordinary grammatical rules, nor do they exhibit taken-for-granted patterns of interaction. Moreover, the meanings constellated within such symptoms are concealed from the patient.¹²¹ Because the very symbols which can interpret repressed needs are excluded from public communication, repression itself interrupts and ultimately distorts the patient's communication with him/herself. Significant "biographical connection[s] crucial to the formation of ego-identity" have, according to Habermas, "become inaccessible to the subject."¹²²

It is within the context of this linguistically mediated meta-psychology that in Habermas's terms, the psychoanalytic situation can be reformulated as a hermeneutic arena wherein a damaged/distorted communication can be restored/reappropriated, and the repressed "biographical connections" can be brought to consciousness. The fact that repression itself has been carried out through the medium of language -- through the privatization of a meaningful public communication, makes it possible to reverse the process.¹²³ The silent-analyst thus becomes an interpreter,

a hermeneutician, who teaches the client to listen to his/her own talk and to hear certain hidden themes, dissonances and counterparts based upon the psychoanalytic "ear"; that is, to recognize his/her own meanings in a manner previously "blocked"/excluded from his/her possible understanding. Thus, it is as a translator from one symbol system to another that the analyst serves:

The analyst instructs the patient in reading his own texts, which he himself has mutilated and distorted, and in translating symbols from a mode of expression deformed as a private language into the mode of expression of public communication. The translation reveals the genetically important phases of life history to a memory that is blocked, and brings into consciousness a person's own self-formative process.¹²⁴

The translator-analyst serves as one who kindles, who "instructs" the patient in the use of a particular kind of therapeutic-knowledge that strengthens his/her basic reflective capacities (an ability to "read"/hear the text); allowing that patient to attain "consciousness" of a previously unrecognizable "self-formative process."

Self-reflection for Habermas, is thus the vehicle that makes transparent a life-history, that provides the patient with the ability to acknowledge those features of his/her acts that have operated independently of daily public awareness.¹²⁵ And, it is exactly for this reason that psychoanalytic understanding (the "truth" of the analyst's use

of his symbolic system) cannot be the sole property of a "knowing" scientist. Although the psychoanalytic process could be conceived of as a process of re-learning -- as what Habermas calls a "compensatory learning process," the accuracy of the analyst's teachings can only be determined by the particularities of the patient's own participation in that learning, by his/her recognition of his/herself within the descriptions/scientific "de-codings" provided by the analyst.¹²⁶ The analyst's interpretation, his effort at reconstructing a life-history, of making sense of a clash-of-symbols, only aids in the project of insight and the alleviation of pain when the patient "sees himself through the eyes of another and learns to reflect upon the symptoms as offshoots of his own action."¹²⁷

Specific psychoanalytic hypotheses construed by the analyst as he hears the world of his patient thus gain meaning within the very dimension of self-reflection it-self. Accuracy, completeness, and truth can only be measured by one "standard of verification": "the patient's act of recollection and agreement."¹²⁸ "The experience of reflection" then is, from Habermas's point of view, "the only criterion for the corroboration or failure of hypotheses."¹²⁹ But what is most crucial to Habermas's analysis is that self-reflection itself is tied to an inter-subjective sphere, not to the subjective responses of an isolated

ego/patient, nor to the adept use of a lexicon of psycho-analytic terminology from which specific interpretations spring. It is within the "intersubjectivity of linguistic communication with another" whose presence can only be ascertained on the basis of "mutual recognition" that understanding can be said to take place.¹³⁰ Thus, as Ricoeur appropriately states, it is "when the truth in the analyst has become the truth of the sick consciousness" that perhaps one can determine that the analysis has come to an end. Only at such a point has the necessary reciprocity of knowing, the fit of interpretation been mutually recognized, and the "equality of the two consciousnessness" acknowledged in understanding.¹³¹

Habermas's impressive reconceptualization of psycho-analytic truth and his examination of the mutuality of selves that successful "termination" demands, allows him to appropriate from Freud's model significant clues to the meaning of understanding, to a form of self-reflective knowledge that holds within it an "emancipatory" design.¹³² Yet, although Habermas's own hermeneutic magic allows him to use Freud to reconstitute inquiry -- to define a notion of modern scientific inquiry based upon an interest neither captured nor bound by positivistic-empirical fact-finding or uncritical hermeneutic description, his theorizing has

necessarily lost the deeper tensions-of-interpretation within the analytic situation itself.¹³³ Such a diminution/transformation is comprehensible since Habermas's project was oriented to elucidate the nature and process of attaining critical-rational-knowledge, not to enter the practical world of therapeutic-mending (a world Freud never left); and, his "data" was the theoretical articulation of the most reflective analyst, Freud himself, not the daily curvatures, dream "distortions" and "negations" of an emotional life.

What is absent in Habermas's description is not an explication and account of a "probable" course of exchanges and intersubjective communications between analyst and patient, nor a theoretical reconstruction of the "possible" usefulness of general interpretive protocols in responding to the language-world of an individual patient. Habermas's rendering of the psychoanalytic situation is inadequate because it too easily transforms therapy (that is, the practice-of-interpretation) into a rational-analytic enterprise. Ironically, the image of psychoanalysis that emerges from Habermas's writing is not the hermeneutic, interpretive interplay of starts and stops, of miscues and waverings, of inadequate explanations and confusions -- of speech and silence that he claims so significant; but, a world of words whose truth and ultimate objectivity can be

known.¹³⁴ It is in such truth-carrying words, in such a rational grammar of perfected public (analytic) discourse that Habermas's trust-faith rests. And thus, while boldly contrasted to the positivistic ideal of a disinterested scientist-of-the-mind whose explanations can be raised to veracity without the participation of the "object" of such investigation (the patient him/herself), Habermas's view presents the same idealized version of scientific psychoanalytic practice that (as has been described above) the analytic literature itself portrays. Both are committed to the assumptions of the analytic lexicon and its theoretical postulates. And, significantly, both neglect and thus negate the silence: Habermas because he is intent on seeing in psychoanalytic interpretation a set of rational theorems that can be gathered in words, presented as reasons, and mutually (universally) agreed upon; and the analytic community, because for them, silence is only a calculated and temporary respite from their word-interpretations that will inevitably be spoken.¹³⁵

To respect the silences of the psychoanalytic situation would demand a renewal of and respect for Freud's dialogue with religion, and a new encounter with the sacred polarities of "illusion" and "science," "commitment" and "analysis," "consolation" and "resignation" that so struc-

tured Freud's own thought and preoccupied his search for a discursive model -- for a set of images and meanings that could guide humans in the faith-less modern world.¹³⁶ Silence had to be fixed in significance -- symptomatized, masked, or merely negated, because like religion (modernity's "other"), its possibility stood outside of and antagonistic to the "fateful inexorability of a process of growth" that, for Freud, defined scientific progress.¹³⁷ As words formed interpretations, and interpretations became understandings, and understandings grounded grand theories defining not only the emotional "distortions" of an individual, the psychic life of all humans, but also providing a general vocabulary of social-symbols for moderns, silence had to be relegated to technique or insubstantiality.

But perhaps it was Freud himself (more than the theorists and practitioners who have tried to live his example), who knew the tensions within faith, between a faith-ful scientist and his un-ending work and, between speech and silence. To his minister-friend and follower Oskar Pfister, Freud wrote of the ideal traits of the most modern of scientists, the qualities of the "social heroism" of the psychoanalyst:

Your analysis suffers from the hereditary weakness of virtue. It is the work of an over-decent man who feels himself obliged to be discreet. . . . Discretion is thus incompatible with a good presentation of

of psychoanalysis. One has to become a bad fellow, transcend the rules, sacrifice oneself, betray, and behave like the artist who buys paints with his wife's household money, or burns the furniture to warm the room for his model. Without some such criminality there is no real achievement.¹³⁸

To acknowledge and experience such perfect indiscretion, such a necessary "transcend[ing of] the rules," and such true "criminality" that would move the psychoanalyst to emerge from and thus come to recognize the depth of his own faith-system (and his commitment to definitions of understanding based upon such faith); that is, to participate with other "positive communities" in the ritual "sacrifice" of objects, words, and symbols that have been held so sacred, is a project to which the science of psychoanalysis and its modern "negative" community must now return.¹³⁹

NOTES

¹John O'Neill emphasizes the importance of this notion of belongingness in his Making Sense Together: An Introduction to Wild Sociology. To "belong to one another despite all differences" is, for O'Neill, both a "predicament" for "ordinary man" and a quality of social existence that cannot be ignored by sociologists, although it often is. See p. 10.

²Max Weber, "The Social Psychology of the World Religions," in From Max Weber, p. 281.

³The use of the term "modernization" has been addressed in the "Introduction" to this work. Further clarity can be gained from the introductory chapter in Berger, Berger, and Kellner's The Homeless Mind (see especially pp. 8-9). For an interesting effort to defend the use of the term "modernization" and to apply it to the "transformation of American life" between the years 1600 and 1865, see Richard D. Brown, Modernization. That "modernization" "can furnish a realistic explanation of the history of Western society within a worldwide context" is a consistent theme in Brown's history, although his own analysis shows that a simplified and linear use of the term often distorts the historical record (p. 20).

⁴In his text, The Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in Western Thought, Robert Nisbet argues that such a "fear" loomed significant for the social philosophers of the West from Plato to Kropotkin (p. 446).

⁵Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, p. 149.

⁶For a theoretical outline of such changes, see Peter Berger's The Heretical Imperative, Chapter 1. Chapters One and Two of Daniel Lerner's The Passing of Traditional Society present an extremely helpful overview of such a "general reorganization of the ways of living throughout the entire world" (A. Siegfried, in Lerner, p. 43).

⁷This statement represents the basic argument of Berger's text (ibid.). For Berger, as the "socially available" authority of religion declines, individuals are forced into a depth of questioning about social and personal meaningfulness that was less necessary (if not unheard of) when traditions-of-faith were taken-for-granted, and their

tenets were more fully incorporated into the everyday activities of social members.

⁸Emil Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, p. 416.

⁹Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death, pp. 194-95. It is Becker's claim throughout his work that "man lives his contradictions for better or worse in some kind of cultural project in a given historical period" (p. 198). Clearly, the emergence of modernity as structure-of-society and as form-of-consciousness defined that "cultural project" in explicitly non-religious terms. For Becker (and for the argument that follows) psychological introspection becomes the new "repository" of meanings for moderns.

¹⁰The importance of such a "background-picture" is described by Owen Barfield in his text Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry (see especially Chapter 11, and his descriptions of meaningful "collective representations" in Chapters 1 and 2). It is Sociologist of Religion, Thomas F. O'Dea, who develops the notions of "uncertainty-context" and "impossibility-context" to point to elements isomorphic with mortality itself that have to be addressed through particular religious strategies in order that humans successfully deal with "problems of meaning." T. F. O'Dea, Sociology and the Study of Religion, especially the essay of the same title, pp. 201-220.

¹¹The phrase "master among the modernists" is taken from Peter Gay's useful intellectual history: Freud, Jews and Other Germans: Masters and Victims in Modernist Culture, p. 71. Also see Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking.

¹²Following some key suggestions of psychoanalyst Otto Rank, Ernest Becker has analyzed the significance of heroism to the maintenance of a culture. It is such "social heroisms" that provide guides to feelings of value, specialness, and "unshakable meaning." For Becker, societies must elucidate means by which such "heroism" can be defined and expressed. Perhaps the crisis of modernity could be understood as a crisis of hero systems. See especially Becker's The Denial of Death, pp. 1-8, and Becker's The Birth and Death of Meaning. For a discussion of Freud's view of how psychoanalysis is part of science and its world-view, see his The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Standard Edition, Vol. 22, p. 181.

¹³Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic, p. 32 and P. 53. Also see Chapter 3: "Community and Therapy."

¹⁴Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 32. In effect, Rieff's book is a "defense of the analytic attitude," of the "negative community" against those moderns like Reich, Lawrence, and Jung who have sought to "contrive" a "second faith" in the face of modernity's demands.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 51.

¹⁸Gay, op. cit., p. 46.

¹⁹Freud, Standard Edition, Volume II, p. 139.

²⁰Rieff discusses Jung's project as an example of a "meta-religion" posing as analytic-science. (Rieff, op. cit., p. 113 and p. 98) It is also interesting to note how similar the "spirit" of Rieff's argument is to the thrust of Weber's view, especially in "Science as a Vocation" (discussed in the Introduction to this work). For both, the scientific ideal (for Rieff, the "analytic"-ideal) calls for a kind of modern "heroism" that frees itself from the lures of faith and of "positive community," and accepts the indefiniteness of continuous investigation. As will be argued below, however, too often Rieff, in his effort to distinguish between the two forms of community, neglects the "positive" "commitment" to the analytic stance.

²¹Ibid., p. 114. Here, Rieff draws the distinction between reason-analysis and "conviction."

²²Ibid., pp. 33-34 and pp. 51-57. Rieff clearly states that from the vantage point of the "negative community," the "positive ones appear either fraudulent or stupid" (p. 33). What is obvious, however, is that Rieff accepts this judgment himself, and seems less inclined to confront Becker's thought that the true hostility to psychoanalysis will always be hostility against "admitting that man lives by lying about himself and about his world, and that character . . . is a vital lie" (Becker, op. cit., p. 51). Rieff seems to have halted his reflections when he saw the "truth," not the possible "lie" of the negative community itself.

²³Leonard E. Strahl, Conceptual Models in Psychoanalysis and the Consequences of their Applications. Strahl's work, heavily indebted to sociological and philosophical

analysis of language and language games, serves as a useful compendium of theoretical and case-study material that deal with the effects of psychoanalytic discourses upon modes of interpretation. That psychoanalysis itself is only one approach to exegesis is an implicit assumption of Strahl's fine study.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Rieff, op. cit., p. 234. Rieff argues throughout his text that as culture becomes tantamount to "a vast museum" of analyzable artifacts (p. 133), and analyst-as-social-scientist can only claim to "analyze interdictory symbolisms, not to assert them" (p. 234). To "assert" such symbolisms is to show a "commitment to a positive" world-view, not to disinterestedly analyze it. See also Rieff's interesting assessment of the limitations of Freud's notion of science as "resignation" and religion as "consolation" in his Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, Chapter 8, especially pp. 325-38.

²⁶Dennis B. Klein, in his Jewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement (particularly Chapter 2, "Freud and the Psychology of Movement"), presents one of the clearest summaries of Freud's life in relation to his Judaism. David Bakan's Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition seeks to show that Freud's analytic theory could be understood as a secularization of Jewish mystical traditions. In so doing, Bakan, too, presents useful information concerning Freud's knowledge of Jewish tradition and his own struggles with Judaism. Perhaps the most provocative of the many texts on Freud and Judaism is John M. Cuddihy's The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity. By arguing that Freud's theory has to be understood as part of the dilemma of Jewish emancipation itself -- from the shtetl to bourgeois society, Cuddihy perhaps exaggerates the id-yid connection, yet presents a sensitive study of the way in which a burgeoning world-view confronts its shadows -- its past.

²⁷In an interesting recent essay, "Jews and Germans," Gershom Scholem argues that many Jews during that period sincerely believed that their "full" assimilation had made them more scrupulous and faithful adherents of German culture than the Germans themselves. In Scholem, On Jews and Judaism in Crisis: Selected Essays, pp. 73-80.

²⁸Heinz Stanescu, "Young Freud's Letters to his Rumanian Friend, Silberstein"; quoted in Klein, op. cit., p. 45.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Bakan, op. cit., p. 55. Freud's relationships with these non-Jews was extremely important to him, and, from his perspective to the ultimate acceptance of psychoanalysis itself. His contestations with Jung were particularly powerful. See Ernest Jones's description of such "dissensions" in Volume 2 of his The Life and Works of Sigmund Freud, pp. 137-41.

³¹Klein includes an interesting chapter on Freud and the B'nai Brith in his text. (See Klein, op. cit., especially pp. 87-88)

³²Sigmund Freud, "On Being of the B'nai Brith," Commentary, March 1946, pp. 23-24.

³³Ibid., p. 23. Freud was always cognizant of his "Jewishness," of his own Yiddishkeit background, and of a growing anti-Semitic wave in Europe. Most interesting was his original intention (before fleeing to England) to withhold the final section of his Moses and Monotheism from print, a section that he was sure would cause even more anger and resentment. His statement in the final edition of that text (1938) attests to his awareness:

We are living here in a Catholic country under the protection of that Church, uncertain how long the protection will last. So long as it does last I naturally hesitate to do anything that is bound to awaken the hostility of that Church. It is not cowardice, but caution . . .

Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine Jones, pp. 67-69.

³⁴This quote is by nineteenth-century rationalist. E. Caro, and is quoted in Bakan, op. cit., p. 26. Freud actually suggests in his An Autobiographical Study that he had begun his quest to explain religion, and thus substantiate analysis in his 1907 essay, "Obsessive acts and religious experience" (An Autobiographical Study, p. 121).

³⁵As supplements to Freud's own writings on the topic, there are many authors who have sought to describe (and criticize) Freud's analysis of religion. Y. Masih's Freudianism and Religion presents a detailed description of the Freudian literature (particularly VII). Also interesting are Erich Fromm and Hans Kung's Terry Lectures given at

Yale University almost thirty years apart from each other. The differences between Fromm's Psychoanalysis and Religion (a generally sympathetic rendition of the Freudian position) and Kung's Freud and the Problem of God (a critical examination of both Freud's position on religion and on science itself) are most stark, but quite helpful in seeing the ramifications of Freud's point-of-view.

³⁶Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (in Standard Edition, Volume XXI), p. 75. Freud's focus in Civilization and its Discontents much more directly examines "efforts to set limits to man's aggressive instincts" (p. 112) than to the "illusions" of religion per se that he discusses elsewhere.

³⁷Freud, The Future of an Illusion (in Standard Edition, Volume XXI), p. 18.

³⁸Ibid. Thus religion, as Kung argues, "is based entirely on the Oedipus complex of mankind as a whole." Kung, op. cit., p. 39. See Freud's summary description of this process in An Autobiographical Study, Standard Edition, Volume XX, p. 68.

³⁹Freud explores this connection between neurosis and religious ritual in Totem and Taboo (in Standard Edition, Volume XIII, pp. 1-161). In this analysis, Freud was very much influenced not only by Darwinian theories of evolution, but by J. G. Frazer's The Golden Bough, originally published in 1890.

⁴⁰Kung, op. cit., p. 46.

⁴¹Freud, The Future of an Illusion, pp. 30; 31, 33.

⁴²Freud, quoted in Kung, op. cit., p. 44.

⁴³Fromm, op. cit., p. 50. Fromm's general argument is intriguing for what it sets out to do. Instead of following the path clearly marked out by Freud regarding the illusions of religion, Fromm attempts to make a distinction between two kinds of religion -- those that he calls "authoritarian" and those that he calls "humanistic." This "neo-Freudian" revision takes much of the power out of Freud's original formulations.

⁴⁴Fromm describes it this way: "Indeed, man is dependent. . . . But it is one thing to recognize one's dependence and limitations, and it is something entirely different to indulge in this dependence, to worship the forces on which one depends." Ibid., p. 53.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 4.

⁴⁶Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 55.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 56.

⁴⁸Freud, The New Introductory Lectures (in Standard Edition, Volume XXII, p. 168).

⁴⁹Freud discusses the "consolation" of religion in such terms throughout The Future of an Illusion. Confronting the "hostility" of a world where humans are "no longer the object of tender care," no longer "the centre of creation" is the task of a more "mature" humanity that has "evolved" to a new and higher level of consciousness (see pp. 49-52).

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 31. Throughout Freud's writing on religion and in many of his writings on the "pathology" of "cultured communities," he continues to insist that humans never-endingly strive to protect themselves from the "hostile realities" around them. In many places, his analysis of religion becomes a critique of educational modes that deprive children of an adequate understanding of life-without-protection. "In sending the young out into life with such a false psychological orientation," Freud argues in Civilization and its Discontents, "education is behaving as though one were to equip people starting on a polar expedition with summer clothing and maps of the Italian lakes." (Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, footnote, p. 134)

⁵¹Only "our God logos," Freud states, "can replace a faith in God." Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 54.

⁵²Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 84. The final phrase is used by Fromm, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵³Ibid., and ibid., p. 77. It is interesting to note how similar Freud's language is to Marx's. Progress through the domination of nature was a key tenet in both of these modern orientations to the universe. Without techniques of understanding and controlling, humans were left unprotected and vulnerable, and could only count on reasonless gods (Freud), and on a civilization unable to attain its material capabilities (Marx).

⁵⁴Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 38. Here, Freud's comment is directed specifically at Jung. Intriguing to note is that Freud claimed that the "obsolete and

objectionable trappings of religion" would be rejected first; and later, the "fundamental postulates" (ibid.). But, it is the "trappings" that remained after the "fundamental postulates" had been rejected or forgotten that became the legacy of the traditional, and that Freud and psychoanalysis had to come to terms with in their patients as well as in their theories.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 53.

⁵⁶In a brilliant analysis of Freud's notion of "time" (and thus of possibility and hope), Rieff argues that Freud's basic "antitheodical" posture leads him to the following stance (as stated by Rieff): "There is no hope, no promise. Nor is there justification. This is the best of all possible worlds, as it is the only possible world. The future is an illusion." Although Freud's pessimism is very apparent, especially in his analyses of the "illusions" of religion, Rieff again places Freud's posture as a stoic outside of any faith. It is the faith-structure of the intellect, of reason, and thus, of modernity that this Chapter claims Freud was a part of. Rieff, "The Meaning of History and Religion in Freud's Thought," in Bruce Mazlish, ed., Psychoanalysis and History, p. 31.

⁵⁷The "suspicion" (Peter Gay) of all faith as "false consciousness" is discussed by Ricoeur in his Freud and Philosophy. The "great masters" of suspicion, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, explore a "demystifying hermeneutics" where the truth of immediate consciousness is not in itself, but somewhere else. "If we go back to the intention they had in common," Ricoeur argues, "we find in it the decision to look upon the whole of consciousness primarily as false consciousness." Freud and Philosophy, p. 33.

⁵⁸See P. Amacher, "Freud's neurological education and its influence on psychoanalytic theory."

⁵⁹For an excellent history of Freud's work that successfully connects biography with an extremely helpful rendering of the development of Freud's thought, see O. Mannoni, Freud. (In the context of this discussion, see especially Chapter 2.)

⁶⁰Freud, An Autobiographical Study (in Standard Edition, Volume XX, p. 16).

⁶¹Strahl, op. cit., pp. 101-102. Significant shifts in Freud's understanding can be seen in the differences between his language-of-fact in "Project" and the language

that he uses (especially in the seventh chapter) in The Interpretation of Dreams.

⁶²Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 128.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 129 and 138. What is most stark in Freud's writing is the complex set of vocabularies that his explanatory universe rests upon. Sometimes vitalism, other times mechanism and physicalism, and at other points symbolism and hermeneutics -- each has its part in what Mujeeb-ur-Rahman calls the "Freudian paradigm." What is significant, however, is Freud's unswerving dedication to what he understood to be "science" itself. (See Mujeeb-ur-Rahman, M. ed., The Freudian Paradigm: Psychoanalysis and Scientific Thought.)

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 138.

⁶⁶As will be discussed below, there are many texts by psychoanalysts and by observers of such a therapeutic form that describe and critique the psychoanalytic "attitude" and form of "cure." Sherry Turkle's Psychoanalytic Politics, however, which describes the deep connections between psychoanalysis and French culture in the 1960's and 1970's, is one very significant effort to see the politically charged nature of such therapeutic forms. Turkle moves psychoanalysis out of an isolated consulting room and into the world of intellectual and social debate; and in this way, presents important sociological (and not merely anecdotal) work on the meaning of psychoanalysis. See also Joel Kovel's The Age of Desire, which explores the reflections of a "radical psychoanalyst" as he sees and seeks to understand his clients within a critical social and historical context.

⁶⁷Freud, "On Psychotherapy," (1904), Collected Papers, Volume I, p. 250.

⁶⁸Freud, "Recommendations for Physicians on the Psychoanalytic Method of Treatment," Collected Papers, Volume II, p. 327. Freud's "dialogue" with the men of science of his day quite interestingly exists side-by-side with his "dialogue" with the men of faith. What was dramatic about Freud's quest was his acknowledgment and his understanding of both groups; and his on-going desire to see himself (and thus, psychoanalysis) as charting a path that was distinct from both worlds, although always tied to his ideal sense of the scientific.

⁶⁹Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 129. It is important to note that Freud's writings on the psychoanalytic method are characterized by a flexibility and an openness to possibilities that were frequently absent among his early followers. When addressing his colleagues, he also said: "There are many ways and means of practising psychotherapy. All that leads to recovery are good." (Freud, "On Psychotherapy, p. 252.)

⁷⁰Theodor Reik, Listening with the Third Ear, p. 109.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 110. Reik's use of the adjective "magical" is interesting, and reflects his more romantic autobiographical descriptions of psychoanalytic life, usually shunned by Freud himself.

⁷²L. S. Kubie, Practical and Theoretical Aspects of Psychoanalysis, p. 37. Kubie's "text," originally published in 1950, has served as a most basic guide for the practicing analyst. It includes a simple elucidation of key theoretical tenets of Freudian psychology, as well as very practical notes on "proper" practice.

⁷³For a critical view of such a positioning of analyst and patient, see Erwin Strauss, Phenomenological Psychology, pp. 137-65. Also see Medard Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis, p. 64. Michael Gruber's essay "Sleeping Dreams, Waking Dreams" introduces this perspective in a most helpful manner.

⁷⁴Freud writes of such an "evenly hovering" posture in his essay, "Recommendations," p. 324.

⁷⁵It was this "systematic presentation" of the dream work within the analytic situation (as Ernest Jones defined it) that made Freud (and especially Jones himself) so taken by the model of chess, where "opening moves" and strategic plans defined a set of carefully reflected upon maneuvers. See Jones, op. cit., p. 235.

⁷⁶Freud, "Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psychoanalysis," in Collected Papers, Volume II, p. 355.

⁷⁷Kubie, op. cit., p. 45.

⁷⁸Freud, "Further Recommendations," pp. 355-56; and Kubie, *ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

⁷⁹Freud constantly made reference to the "tools" of his scientific trade that marked the psychoanalyst distinct from other medical professionals. That there was to be no

particular instrumentation, no gadgets nor medicines; and that it was in the education of what Reik later called the tuning of a "third ear" within the analyst himself where the "true" tools rested, was something that it seems Freud was quite proud of. However, such a tool-less trade also made Freud more vulnerable to cries of mysticism and charlatanism from the medical establishment. See, for example, Freud, "Recommendations," p. 324.

⁸⁰See Reik, op. cit., p. 124 regarding "the power of words" and "the power of silence." The notion of free association (and thus psychoanalysis itself) as constituting a system of symbols, in effect, a language with specific "ramifications" (that is, meanings) that are interpreted by the analyst, is most fully developed in the writings of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. One of Lacan's on-going theoretical desires is to "bring[ing] the psychoanalytic experience back to the Word and to Language." See particularly his essay "Symbol and Language," in The Language of the Self, pp. 29-51. The effects of Lacan's re-interpretation of psychoanalysis upon classical theoretical and technical analytic understanding is the main topic of Terkle, op. cit.

⁸¹S. Nacht, "The Non-Verbal Relationship in Psychoanalytic Treatment," p. 328. As distinct from other more traditional Freudian renderings, Nacht places more emphasis upon the patient's coming-to-know: the patient's ability to assess. The "work" of the analyst in molding what could be interpreted and come to be accepted as valid is thus de-emphasized.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³For the most comprehensive review of psychoanalytic literature on the silence of the patient, see Meyer A. Zeligs, "The Psychology of Silence." See also J. A. Arlow, "Silence and the Theory of Technique," and Nacht, *ibid*.

⁸⁴See Glover, The Technique of Psychoanalysis, pp. 98-99, and pp. 295-6. Glover's perspective is helpfully described in Sandler, Dare and Holder's text, The Patient and the Analyst: The Basis of the Psychoanalytic Process, p. 78. In this latter text, Glover's point of view is not seriously challenged, although the authors show how "forms of resistance" have become more widely described and analyzed.

⁸⁵M. A. Zeligs, op. cit., p. 31.

⁸⁶For other "negative" analyses of silence see R. Greenson, "On the Silence and Sounds of the Analytic Hour," and Lowenstein's contribution to the "symposium" on "the silent patient" in The Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Volume 9 (where Zelig and Arlow also appear).

⁸⁷Avery D. Weisman, "Silence and Psychotherapy," p. 258. Weisman's essay is instructive because although he nicely and importantly discusses other "traditions" of silence (such as is found among Zen Buddhists, Trappist monks, and Quakers), his own analysis of "psychoanalytic" silence seems to deny the relevance of such traditions altogether, and relies most clearly upon Freud's basic sense of silence-as-resistance to the transference. It was actually Anna Freud who, in her 1936 work, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, described patient silence as basically a "defense mechanism."

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 251.

⁸⁹Zelig, op. cit., p. 41.

⁹⁰Kata Levy, "Silence in the Analytic Session," p. 56.

⁹¹M. Masud R. Khan, in a paper, "Silence as Communication," does show that the analytic interpretation of silence is as a communication, and one that cannot entirely be understood as negation/regression/flight/anxiety (as others would have it). What Khan points to is the "active" and "articulate" side of silence -- its expressivity (in one case that he presents, as the "expression" of a hidden side of a patient, a part of the patient's personality that he is too frightened to explicitly announce in speech). But although Khan does not display the negative reductionism of Levy (for instance), he still examines patient-silence as an absence of language that the analyst must fill-in based upon his own interpretive-knowing schema.

⁹²To the extent that the silence of the patient (he/she who is ignorant, who does not know the reasons) must be critically interpreted by the analyst (he who knows, and who can give reasons), the psychoanalytic interpretation of the presence of silence is not unlike the Marxist interpretation of the false-conscious "silence" (the "false speech") of those who are oppressed/dominated, that has been described in Chapter 2. It is in defining the bounds of such a critical stance, and in determining the meaning of critical itself that these two versions of silence differ.

⁹³Zelig's piece, for instance, does discuss the analyst's silence, but most frequently in terms of the response of the patient. Reed Brockbank's 1970 essay, "On the Analyst's Silence in Psychoanalysis: A Synthesis of Intrapsychic Content and Interpersonal Manifestations," examines the "prudent" use of silence by the analyst, thus emphasizing the notion of silence-as-technique. Once again, see Glover's discussion The Technique of Psychoanalysis. Interestingly, Reik also mentions (in a footnote to his text), that in his search for materials dealing with the meaning of silence of the psychoanalyst, he found almost nothing. "I did not succeed in my search for a discussion of this theme in psychoanalytic literature," he writes. He only notes one exception to this "general avoidance" or "neglect." (Reik, op. cit., p. 124)

⁹⁴Brockbank, op. cit., p. 459.

⁹⁵Reik, op. cit., p. 125.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 126. It is thus relevant to notice that psychoanalysts continually warn each other -- through their writings on silence -- of a kind of combat that might take place when silence is met with silence. Analytic talk might have to be utilized when the "obstinate" patient looks to the analyst's silence as a confirming example of his sense of the process as a battle. Glover writes in this context:

To meet silence invariably with silence is to court a sort of silent combat which confirms the obstinate or aggressive patient in his view that analysis is a kind of psychological pugilistic encounter to be settled by the gaining of points.

Quoted in Brockbank, op. cit., p. 457.

⁹⁷Ralph R. Gleenson, "That 'Impossible' Profession," p. 21. Gleenson's essay (published in the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association) is significant for its discussion of the problems of the young analyst-in-training who uses silence as a technique because of its association with the analytic process. Gleenson describes how such a "virtue" "may turn out to be something quite different" if the use of silence does not announce patience, but rather the "hidden, sadistic, aggressive impulses" of the analyst himself (p. 17).

⁹⁸Frieda Fromm-Reichman, Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy, p. 11. Fromm-Reichman contrasts her own technique of "intensive psychotherapy" with this classical Freudian understanding.

⁹⁹Freud, "Recommendations for Physicians," p. 360 and p. 328.

¹⁰⁰Gleenson, op. cit., p. 19; and Freud, "Recommendations," p. 328. Once again, Freud's use of the term "physician" is significant and consciously chosen.

¹⁰¹Gleenson, op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁰²Morris Brody, "Interpretation in Psychoanalysis," p. 205.

¹⁰³Gleenson uses the image of the melody in his essay; and shows how it is the task of the analyst to find the "hidden themes" within the melodic structure. But Gleenson's attachment to the detachment of the silent analyst does not allow him to sense the selectivity of the analyst's hearing -- the particular choices that the analyst makes as he hears even in his silence.

¹⁰⁴Wilhelm Stekel, "The Final Results of Psychoanalytic Treatment," (included in van Teslaar), p. 319. See also John Forrester's linguistic interpretation of Freudian practice in his extremely useful history and analysis, Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis, pp. 75-88.

¹⁰⁵It is that point when silence should become speech that is frequently discussed in the analytic literature. Glover claims that such a "speaking" should only come about when "the defensive systems" of the patient "have been really weakened." And Freud writes of the danger of "hurl[ing] solutions" at patients when they are not ready. See Glover, op. cit., p. 9; and Freud, "Further Recommendations," p. 361.

¹⁰⁶Freud, "Turnings in the Way of Psychoanalytic Therapy," in Collected Papers, Volume II, p. 393.

¹⁰⁷Freud writes of such "ignorance" in "Turnings." It is in this sense that the process of psychoanalysis could be perceived as a kind of teaching in which mutual recognition of a specific symptomatology (named originally by the teacher-analyst) is acknowledged by both analyst and patient. (See discussion of Habermas that follows.)

¹⁰⁸The phrase "science of the emotions" is taken from Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, in his excellent discussion of Freud's definition of the art of "interpretation," pp. 113-162.

¹⁰⁹Jung's works on modernity and modern man's "loss of soul" are extensive, and his on-going relationship with Freud surely served as one means by which Freud continued his dialogue with religion (discussed earlier in this chapter). Silence was significant for Jung as well, but as distinct from Freud's use of the term, for Jung silence allowed humans to come in contact with an archetypal symbology that could never be reduced to psychological terms. Like the ontological understanding of silence (discussed in Chapter 1), Jung understood that silence could lead humans to a "soul," to a truth beneath (and beyond) the truncated meanings that modernity had erected. It was this spiritualization of silence that Freud deeply distrusted and interpreted as the garnering of even further illusions to bolster human dependencies. See Carl Jung, Collected Works, especially Volume 4. For another "Jungian" view that would see silence as moving to realms not even defined by the "limitations" of the archetype, see James Hillman, The Myth of Analysis.

¹¹⁰Surely, Freud's theoretical works (more than his writings on analytic practice) have served as a very significant source for the social criticism especially of twentieth-century neo-Marxists associated with the Frankfurt School. The argument here is not that Freud's works cannot serve as another means by which to examine civilizational "discontent" and cultural "repression," but merely that such an analysis was not the central focus for Freud himself. Herbert Marcuse's Eros and Civilization has been a most significant neo-Hegelian reading of Freud, and Russell Jacoby's Social Amnesia provides a powerful argument whose basis is that psychoanalysis is truly a theory of "an unfree society." The writings of Philip Rieff (discussed earlier in this chapter) stand as a more traditional Freudian "corrective" to these critical theories.

¹¹¹Ricoeur writes of psychoanalytic "reflection" as part of a "reappropriation of our effort to exist," in his Freud and Philosophy, pp. 45-46.

¹¹²It is Marcuse who has most carefully explored the transformation of the logic of an isolated self to the logic of a social being whose gratifications and repressions are societally molded, not naturally given. See especially Eros and Civilization, Chapter 4. See also Kovel, op. cit., Chapter 6, "Desire and the Transhistorical."

¹¹³For an interesting effort to think about such a notion of understanding (or in his terms, "comprehension"), see L. Mink's "History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension," p. 544. Such comprehension is also what Reik means when he discusses "listening with the third ear" or the "surprise" of the analyst. See Reik, op. cit., Chapter 23.

¹¹⁴Nelson Goodman perhaps most clearly points to the modern dilemma which lacks the "evolving tradition" that claiming "rightness" demands:

We have seen that rightness of categorization which centers into most other varieties of rightness, is rather a matter of fit with practice; that without the organization, the selection of relevant kinds, effected by revolving tradition, there is no rightness or wrongness of categorization, no validity or invalidity of inductive inference, no fair or unfair sampling, and no uniformity or disparity among samples.

Goodman, op. cit., pp. 136-9.

¹¹⁵This discussion is not intended to do justice to the corpus of Habermas's work. Rather, the focus will be upon the one portion of his theorizing that could provide some clues to the question of psychoanalytic "truth" and "understanding." Most relevant to this discussion are Chapters 10 and 11 of Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests. Also see McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas, pp. 193-213.

¹¹⁶Implicit in Habermas's reconstruction of psychoanalysis is his critique of a mechanistic "energy-distribution" model, and his own efforts to explore the possibilities of psychoanalytic self-reflection as a critique of meaning, and thus, as a form of science. This point is fully developed in Schroyer's The Critique of Domination, and in Kovel's interesting piece, "Things and Words: Meta-Psychology and the Historical Point of View," especially pp. 40-44. See also Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, pp. 185-225.

¹¹⁷Habermas, op. cit., p. 239.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 256.

¹¹⁹Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 311-12.

¹²⁰Habermas, op. cit., p. 223.

¹²¹In effect, Habermas has transformed a theory of repression into a theory of alienation. Symptoms of the neurosis do express "latent desires," but are "inaccessible" to the patient -- "alienated from him and yet belong[ing] to him nevertheless." Ibid., p. 218.

¹²²Ibid., p. 217. Communications, self-reflection, and emancipation are integrally interwoven in Habermas's rendering of Freud. In fact, it is exactly because Freud's model relies upon the liberating potential of self-reflection (and thus the access of a self to a meaningful autobiography) that Habermas sees it as a model for a critical science. See also Tony Smith, "The Scope of the Social Sciences in Weber and Habermas," pp. 77-81.

¹²³For a very useful discussion of this "reversal," see Jack Mendelson, "Freud and Critical Social Theory," p. 23.

¹²⁴Habermas, op. cit., p. 264. It is surely important to note here that Habermas's re-interpretation of Freud is interested in social and institutional critique, and not only the distortion of individual neurosis. The examination of the Freudian model of the self serves as an example for a broader cultural critique that should define (for Habermas) the role of the critical social sciences themselves. Schroyer describes this "role" most clearly:

All critical science attempts to restore missing parts of the self-formative process to men, and in this way to force a process of self-reflection that will enable them to reinterpret the legitimacy of existing social control systems.

It is exactly such social "legitimacy" that this Chapter claims Freud's own theorizing fails to elucidate. Trent Schroyer, "Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced Industrial Society," in Dreitzel, p. 225.

¹²⁵Habermas is quite specific in defining this key property of a "psychoanalytic hermeneutics." It "aims not at the understanding of symbolic structures in general," he writes. "Rather, the act of understanding to which it leads is self-reflection." Habermas, op. cit., p. 262.

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 233.

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 232.

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 270. Such a point is made regarding the nature of critical theory itself by Albrecht Wellmer in his excellent digest of the "critical turn" in social theorizings. For Wellmer, a critical theory can "only be substantiated to the degree to which the emancipated individuals can still recognize their own past in the objectifying analyses provided by social scientific theories." Wellmer, "Communication and Emancipation: Reflections on the 'Linguistic Turn' in Critical Theory," p. 95.

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 266. Clearly, Habermas's use of "reflection" here is deeply indebted to Hegel's; and, even more so, his sense of reflection as a critical category follows closely upon Marx's own historical reading of The Phenomenology of Mind. Others, like Christopher Nichols, in his "Science or Reflection: Habermas on Freud," have argued that such a notion of reflection moves in directions quite distinct from Freud's own intentions.

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 244. Habermas's argument here is even more poignant when seen within the context of his broader project -- to define a form of "emancipatory" knowledge that is neither confined to the terms of empirical-analytic inquiry, nor seen as identical to the notion of Gadamerian hermeneutic-understanding. It is within this project of seeking to combine such a hermeneutic-understanding with causal explanation that Habermas's re-formulation of psychoanalysis takes place. McCarthy's exegesis is helpful here. See McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 203-6.

¹³¹Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 474. From Ricoeur's point of view, psychoanalysis itself could be conceptualized as a struggle for self-recognition which demands the overcoming of specific "self-alienations" (in Habermas's terms, "blockages" to a recognizable life-history). It is psychoanalysis as an intersubjective "drama" of moving from "satisfaction" to "recognition" that Ricoeur elaborates upon in his text.

¹³²Many theorists (like Nichols, mentioned above) have questioned Habermas's use of Freud's model as an example of critical and emancipatory reflection. Habermas's on-going dialogue with Hans-George Gadamer has also, in part, dealt with such problems in developing a critically-reflective hermeneutics. Habermas has addressed some of the questions regarding his theory in a new introduction, "Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis," in his text Theory and Practice.

¹³³Surely, Habermas is making no claim to an adequate analysis of Freud's entire psychoanalytic-project. The point here is that in transforming the psychoanalytic situ-

ation into a heuristic device for the demonstration of his own theory of "interests," Habermas has "moved" Freud, molding Freud's notions of "correct" analytic practice into an ideal-typic form of knowledge.

¹³⁴James Ogilvy, in his text Many-Dimensional Man, provides an important glimpse into the objectivistic prejudices that he claims betray Habermas's own self-understanding. See especially pp. 347-9.

¹³⁵See Paul Watzlawick's The Language of Change for an interesting distinction between the language of analytical dissection, logic, explanation, and reason, and another language whose workings depend upon imagery, metaphor, and analogy. By unduly casting his description in the former (in a "language of definition"), Watzlawick might contend that Habermas truncates the work of the symbolic process in therapeutic encounters -- and, in effect, cannot account for change itself. See pp. 13-18.

¹³⁶It is quite significant to note that while Freud's commitment to "science" was without bounds, in The Future of an Illusion he contrasts the "illusions" of religious belief with the "resignation" of the man of science. (Also, see Note #25.)

¹³⁷Freud, The Future of an Illusion, pp. 68-9 and p. 76.

¹³⁸Freud to Pfister, in "The Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society," p. xxxi, 1906-1908. Quoted in Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic, p. 107.

¹³⁹There have surely been steps in this direction -- efforts to confront the science of psychoanalysis, to name its faith, and to rethink its language. Roy Schafer's work has been particularly significant in this regard. See especially his 1976 text, A New Language for Psychoanalysis, and two important articles: "Narration in Psychoanalytic Dialogue," and "The Interpretations of Transference and the Conditions for Loving." Strahl's work (see Note #23) has been extremely helpful in synthesizing this material and in bringing to light its clinical ramifications.

MODERNITY AND ITS SILENCES

The discursive symbolism of science
 Is an insufficient language
 For the Speech of Care.
 Neither Hope nor Love are verifiable,
 But have existence and efficacy,
 And present themselves in Silence.

H. G. Brack

These are not natural silences . . .
 that necessary time for renewal, lying
 fallow, gestation, in the natural cycle
 of creation. The silences I speak of
 here are unnatural: the unnatural thwart-
 ing of what struggles to come into being,
 but cannot. In the old, the obvious paral-
 lel: when the seed strikes stone; the soil
 will not sustain; the spring is false; the
 time is drought or blight or infestation;
 the frost comes premature.

Tillie Olsen

Without speech, we lose soul, and human
 being assumes the fantasy being of animals.
 But man is half-angel because he can speak.
 The more we distrust speech in therapy,
 the closer we are to an absorption into the
 fantasy of the archetypal subhuman, and the
 sooner the archetypal barbarian strides
 into the communications ruins of a culture
 that refused eloquence as a mirror of its
 soul.

James Hillman

Sociology has never neglected the centrality of language to the formation and perpetuation of societies. From the social construction of self-identity, to the conversability of everyday talk, to the structural and syntactical varieties of speech within a community, to the very concepts and vocabularies of a science of society itself, sociologists have explored, named, and dissected a world of speeches and languages.¹ What Henri Lefebvre has called a "delirium of words," a "festival of language" has, in fact, stood as the very core of that which has been deemed social.² That "miraculous outrage of human speech" has then, for most philosophers and sociologists, literally pulled humans from the "natural rhythms and anonymities" of a mute universe of plants and animals, and has provided that singular and necessary opportunity for the creation of a meaningful universe.³ The "wonder of the word" -- that is, the on-going creation and role of linguistic symbols, has made men, in Ernest Becker's formulation, "quintessentially human."⁴

But, as this dissertation has sought to explore, sociology's attention to and emphasis upon forms and qualities of linguistic phenomena has frequently disavowed the significance of that which denied speech and thus, posed a threat to the human project itself: silence. The systems

of shared meanings, the acceptance of common actions, structures, and understandings -- the very roots of social life have been taken to depend upon a kind of socially meaningful narrative that members both build and borrow from. Silence seemed to halt voices, to push them outside of the contours of such an everyday stream of significances, or even to claim transcendence from the complexities of social discourse altogether.⁵ That is, for most, silence announced not another path to the unraveling and articulation of societal patterns, relevance structures, or bodies of knowledge, but a most potent destruction of inquiry itself.

What the preceding three chapters have tried to describe, however, is that a world of human words was never able to completely eradicate the persistent shadow of silence. Even more specifically, the analyses of Heidegger, Marx, and Freud have sought to demonstrate that silence became particularly relevant as a crucial quality of the texture of human life, as a problematic and characteristic response to a specific historical period, and as a tool for understanding systems of public and private myth systems at exactly that period when Western man was to have attained his fullest, most modern glory. Just as optimism over material progress, faith in logic and Reason, and a commitment to scientific discovery and knowledge were heralded as

a true sign of the "enlarg[ing] of human powers" where nature and social existence "will be more at our command," the discourses of silence were also opened to myriad interpretations and detailed investigations.⁶

Thus, the "unprecedented" triumphs of the human project, and manifest successes of that most cherished tool -- human language itself -- also affirmed the presence of silence as an integral aspect of the modern world.⁷ It is as if the very tensions of modernity that Max Weber so brilliantly examined -- tensions quite endemic to the seminal poles of Reason/Unreason, Freedom/Alienation, Science/Faith, and Self/Community -- are, in part, expressed through an on-going and deeper strain between an active world of words and a "mute" world of silence.⁸ Surely, new forms of inquiry, not the end of inquiry have been the result of the persistent "question of silence."

As has been developed in Chapter 1 of this text, Martin Heidegger's theorizing draws from silence a source of critical meaning, experience, and thought absent from what he sees as the technical, "calculative," and exploitative thrust of modern life. In fact, it is the vivid "uselessness" of silence that, according to the Heideggerian theorizing of Max Picard, contributes to its significance. "It [silence] interferes with the regular flow of the purpose-

ful. . . . It lessens the damage inflicted by exploitation

It makes things whole again, by taking them back from the world of dissipation into the world of wholeness. It gives things something of its own holy uselessness, for that is what silence itself is: holy uselessness.⁹

Struggling to stand outside of the world of "profit and utility," the true value of silence thus lies in its opposition to a mathematized uni-verse of deafening noise, predictable outcomes, and superficial "outward signs."¹⁰ Its sacred ("holy") role, for Picard and for Heidegger, is to remind humans of a "wholeness" and heal them of the "dissipation" upon which modern life so usefully depends.

But this general Heideggerian approach to modernity is concerned not only with a criticism of a world out of balance, and condemned to a bitter helplessness in the face of an overwhelming technology. It is also engaged in a re-situating of humans within a world -- a re-thinking of the anthropocentrism that has informed modern faith structures and that has dominated modern social and political institutions. An attention/attunement to silence makes explicit the modern tension between man's determinateness and indeterminacy. Within the values and daily absorptions of the contemporary quotidien, according to Heidegger, moderns accentuate their ability to objectify, design, and control.

For Bernard Dauenhauer, however, it is the "nondeterminate which is preeminent in man." Silence, he argues,

steps back from the stream of determinations which man introduces and makes it clear that man is not preeminently the determiner, but rather is the one who wonders, the one in whom nondeterminateness is preeminent even while he performs determining mediations.¹¹

Silence is motivated not by reliance upon an infinite human purposefulness, a dependence upon exhibitions of worldly material wares, nor upon secret delight in an uncontrolled hubris in the face of nature and other humans. "Silence is motivated by finitude and awe." As Dauenhauer concludes: "Man can make a difference in the world, but he cannot control what difference he does make."¹²

Silence is thus an occasion for a human openness, an openness of "wonder" and "awe" that mediates the decisive and limiting closures of thought, feeling, and experience most characteristic of modern man. "Meditational" thinking (not "calculative thought") thus brings to life that which is mediate, not which is objectively given immediately. It is the necessary balance, an awakening to the oscillations between these two modes of "being" that Heidegger argues, human must address and hearken to."¹³ Silence thus provides another voice (not a profound absence, or lack), another source of experience/being for humans that stands critical to the modern world. According to this first ex-

ploration of silence and modernity, it is not the quiescent negation of human activity, but the re-situated experience of humans in a variegated world attuned to myriad voices that silence provides acknowledgment and experience of.¹⁴

Karl Marx's analysis of modernity, examined in Chapter 2, focused upon the complex workings of the world of capitalism -- a system whose components and demands, according to Marx, permeated the economic, social, and cultural forms of modern societies. Marx painstakingly described the extension of world markets, the expanded scale of technology and international communications, the systematic concentration of capital, production, and administration, and the rapid urbanization of a world whose very essence was coming to fuel and reflect the burgeoning needs of capitalism.

But significantly, Marx's vision of modernity displayed what Marshall Berman has aptly described as a "strange dialectical dance."¹⁵ The dramatic triumph of bourgeois-modern society was absolutely evident to Marx:

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjugation of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground -- what earlier century

had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?¹⁶

Yet, also for Marx, such a truly revolutionary transformation, such a "colossal" display of human possibility, also brought with it profound immiseration, the omnipresence of unsurety in the face of the "vicissitudes" and "fluctuations" of the market, the reduction of human relations to the quantifiable measuring of things, the division of society into unbending hierarchies, and the base "repulsiveness" of work itself. All that was considered "holy" became "profaned."¹⁷

Thus, in Marx's rendering, the modern world always evidenced this two-sidedness. The dimension of human and social potential, of freedom beyond scarcity, of classlessness and of human equality was awakened from its "slumber." But such a modern "ideal" was simultaneously bound by the "vicissitudes" of a capitalist system that reproduced human desperation, unfreedom, and the brutal struggle for existence. It was alienation -- characterized by powerlessness, meaningless, isolation, fragmentation, and self-estrangement -- that defined present modern society for Marx."¹⁸

The modern promise was only an embryo, stalled in its growth and distorted by the realities of social institutions and values: realities that always drew from and

boldly mirrored the pervasive alienation of capitalist society.

Marx's analysis discovered such alienation not only in social forms, but in consciousness itself. Societal reproduction demanded opportunities for and methods of social learning -- of attitudes, roles, and ideologies; that is, of a specific language that melded with and strengthened the hold of a deactivated and atomized populace.¹⁹ The capitalist world-of-words for Marx, had to flow from a controlled and limited repertoire of meanings, constructions, and vocabularies that legitimized the details and the qualities of an alienated and mystified social life.²⁰ According to Marx, it was thus the goal of capitalist society to teach a constricted speech -- words lacking the power to see through and beyond the taken-for-granted present, and denying the speaker the ability to speak the "truth" of alienated society and to know the potential of modernity. In this analysis then, silence becomes the ultimate reification and fullest negation of human creativity and capability.²¹ Silence is no-thing (a falsehood, an unfreedom), and marks the empty place where some-thing (a truth, a freedom) has been wrenched away.²²

Sigmund Freud's "conversation" with modernity, his

renderings of the deepest tensions of modern existence, always revolved around the social and the most private struggles between the rational and the irrational, the contemporary and the traditional -- between the world of science and the world of religion. His was an unrelenting search for the very meaning of a modern-faith. Most significantly, Freud denied an uncritical "enlightenment" vision, one that might seek to collapse the realities of personal and societal pain, obsession, and conflict into the unscathed purities of health, wholeness, and permanent surety. By analyzing those "somatic structures and processes operating behind individual behavior," by seeking to "reveal the individual's blindness and dishonest self-control," and by constantly pointing to the dis-content that was civilization, Freud's writings drew a portrait of a most ancient and highly complex organism that had evolved into modernity still replete with the repression that, according to him, was the essence of society and at the core of the self.²³

Yet, while Freud as philosopher of human nature and as practitioner of "analysis" upon neurotic wounds came to question the veracity and applicability of the mechanistic and narrowly physiological theories of science that looked to linear relationships and single causes of private disorders (a "chase" for what Rieff so wonderfully characterizes as the "chimera of a sole motive force"), he never re-

linquished the ideal of a modern science of psychology.²⁴ His demand to know through the power of his "god," logos (a "god" whose strength and ultimate wisdom Freud vehemently defended against those "romantics" who gave the decisive voice to intuition and to the irrational) was most central to his articulation of psychoanalysis, the "science of human irrationality."²⁵ Mental conflicts, sexual fantasies, unconscious strivings, repetition compulsions, characterological defects -- that is, the structures and weavings of instinctual life itself and the universality of neurosis could never be made perfectly static nor ultimately controlled. For Freud, however, psychoanalysis could provide a theory and a technique that could comprehend the etiology of the dissonances of a real and symbolic life-history, could provide strength for the patient's ego "against the enemies, the instinctual demands of the id and the moral demands of the super-ego," and could contribute to a repository of interpretations that held meaning for (religionless) moderns.²⁶

The actual practice of the analyst, the "dirty work" that (according to Jung's formulation) the modern physician/scientist of the psyche "must not shudder at," demanded the recounting of a life, the offering of a stream of words, a kind of modern confession of verbal images that,

when "properly" dissected and analyzed could lead the scientist to an elucidation of symptoms, tendencies, correspondences, and thus, explanations.²⁷ The "cultivation" of "word consciousness" was surely at the heart of Freud's psychoanalysis, providing the necessary data for the physician's interpretations.²⁸ The absence of the patient's words thus created the most formidable barrier to the analytic process; and it is not surprising that such patient silence was treated as yet another neurotic symptom, another potent resistance. In orthodox analytic practice, the silence of the patient was encountered as a form of speech, but one whose significance could only be filled-in by the analyst himself. Quite importantly then, the silent patient was not extricated from the analytic dialogue. His discourse, however, was formed and completed by a vocabulary-of-analysis, an analytic "currency" that stood outside of him, and through which his "resistance" was made sense of: his silence "objectified."²⁹

As has been described in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, it is the technique of no-speech; that is, the purposive and controlled silence of the analyst himself whose significance has infrequently and superficially been examined by the psychoanalytic community. Because Freud recognized that only through a successful "transference" could

the deepest unconscious desires of the patient be activated, the "regressive movement of the patient" be given freedom, and the most "valuable parts of the fantasies" be brought to consciousness, the "calm detachment," the wordlessness of the analyst was accepted as not only appropriate, but as absolutely necessary to therapeutic cure.³⁰ The analyst's silence became his most valued tool -- one that informed a mode of comportment, an attitude of listening, and most importantly, a period of waiting before the overt speaking of interpretations that would be demanded at a future time. Thus, as distinct from patient silence, the silence of the "scientist of the mental unconscious" was to stand beyond analysis itself, dedicated as it was to the scientific reflection upon and elucidation of a symptomatology that could ultimately be unraveled and understood based upon a new, modern faith in psychoanalytic meanings.³¹

Freud, however, was keenly aware of the limitations of his science, and its inability to ever fully rescue either individuals or civilization from the pain and perplexities of modern existence.³² To understand was to be able to offer a meaningful resolution of neurotic disturbance: to strengthen an individual ego, or to alert a world to the omnipresence of guilt, entangled projections, death wishes, and human aggression. Silence-as-method-of-understanding

served more as a keystone for a hermeneutics of reconciliation than as a component of a critical theory of unblemished hope in human potential. Thus, while post-Freudians (like Jung and later James Hillman) saw in psychoanalytic practice the opportunity to "save" the human "soul" from the incursions and reductions of modernity, to see beneath scientific analysis a world of symbols and gods that represented a "wisdom" "far greater" than man's own, that could "lift him out of his distress," Freud always remained committed to his belief in modernity's call for unremitting analysis and a life of irreconcilable tensions.³³ Modern life (for Freud, "our advance of civilization") had surely brought with it a "loss of happiness," but more significantly for him, it also announced the progress, though never absolute success, of that most human of gods -- scientific inquiry itself.³⁴

The theories of Heidegger, Marx, and Freud represent three distinctive approaches to modernity. Silence-as-Critique, Silence-as-Alienation, and Silence-as-Understanding disclose different visions of our modern world, and offer three opportunities to bring into focus the particularities of contemporary life, and the very means by which social philosophers examine the world and interpret its scientific significances. Quite clearly, Heidegger, Marx, and Freud pose orientations that have been most often contrasted

with each other.³⁵ This examination of the meanings of silence either implicitly or explicitly utilized by these analysts of the modern has sought to further explicate the differences among these points of view, and to offer a set of problems and questions that flow from each analysis.

Yet, while this search-for-difference is most fruitful, the possible complementarity of visions should not be lost. Each theorist has, in effect, successfully portrayed and accentuated one moment of an interpretation -- one aspect of a broader whole that is modernity. Heidegger's search beyond modernity, Marx's vision of a non-alienated world stirred by the potentials of modernity, and Freud's practical and theoretical excursions within everyday modern life are three realities that all present themselves to moderns. Even more particularly, they represent three experiences of time and place that are simultaneously expressed, and are only differentiated in recollection and analysis.³⁶ In this composite view then, the distinctive quality of the modern lies in concomitant presentation of three possibilities, each of which push modern self and society away from an unreflexive acceptance of a stable and taken-for-granted "traditional" world.

Heidegger's ontological theorizing presents a scath-

ing condemnation of the modern calculative pose, and in so doing, seeks to anticipate a future defined outside of the contours of modernity. Heidegger's attention is thus directed to a new quality of "being" that both undercuts the demands of the present, and opens towards the image of a "human of utopian vision." Like Heidegger, Marx offers a criticism of modernity, but one that encapsulates the specific historical modalities through which modernity has presented itself in a socio-economic, a capitalist universe. Marx's attention is thus directed to the limitations of present-day alienated existence and to the recognition that humans cannot stop/transcend history -- nor should they try, for modernity brings with it the potentialities for a truly "radical man" who can build an un-alienated social world quite consistent with the promise of the modern.³⁷ And like Marx, Freud also focuses upon the present. His psychoanalysis of everyday life sees in the modern world the contagiousness of cultural pathology and the paralysis of individual emotions -- the "alienation" of repression. Unlike both Marx and Heidegger, however, Freud's attention never leaves that constellation of neurosis, but seeks to understand it through the trained interpretation of the scientist of the mind. Freud's "ideal" is not a "human of utopian vision," nor a "radical man," but an "analytic realist" who sees in modernity that most powerful and liv-

ing reflection of the very ambiguity that distinguishes all humans from other animals.

Thus, silence as opportunity for experience of a renewed humanity (Heidegger), silence as the vivid sign of that which moderns lack (Marx), and silence as the designed and limited reflection upon that which is at hand (Freud), acknowledge the three-fold quality of modernity. That each cannot be extricated from the influence of the others, and that each voice-of-silence contributes to a recognition of the limitations, the possibilities, and the complexities of the contemporary world only reaffirms the power and the scope of modernity itself.

NOTES

¹In his summary of Merleau Ponty's understanding of language, John O'Neill articulates this sense of the importance of language quite clearly:

Through language I discover myself and others in talking, listening, reading, and writing. It is language which makes possible that aesthetic distance between myself and the world through which I can speak about the world and the world in turn can speak through me.

O'Neill, Perception, Expression, and History, p. 64. See also Alan Blum's insightful discussion in Theorizing, pp. 214-17.

²Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, p. 4.

³George Steiner, Language and Silence, pp. 36-37. The first section of this book, "Humane Literacy," offers incomparable exigeses of literary texts as they approach both the world of words and the full expression of silence itself.

⁴Ibid., p. 54; and Ernest Becker, The Birth and Death of Meaning, p. 14.

⁵Bernard Dauenhauer's basic argument in his important Silence: The Phenomenon and its Ontological Significance is that there exists a "complexity of silence" that parallels (and is quite significant to) the "complexity of [spoken] discourse." See his "first approximations," pp. 3-25.

⁶This vision of human progress and power was written by Priestley in 1771. "Whatever the beginning of the world," he concluded, "the end will be glorious and paradisiacal, beyond what imaginations can now conceive." Quoted in Carl Becker's The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers, p. 145.

⁷As has been the case with his previous theoretical excursions, Peter Beger's The Heretical Imperative offers a most helpful analysis of the repercussions of the "modern

situation." It is Berger who writes of "the juxtaposition of this new world over the old worlds of traditional man -- a cataclysmic and unprecedented event in human history" (p. 2).

⁸For a most current effort to define the tensions that define the fabric of various aspects of modern life (especially, in this context, the tensions between community and self, between belief and science), see George Urban's interview with Daniel Bell, "Religion and Ideology," especially pp. 16-18.

⁹Max Picard, The World of Silence, p. 19.

¹⁰See *ibid.*, p. 40. Picard beautifully describes the reliance of speech upon silence, but always within the context of an abiding faith in a "divine" whose presence is "preserved" by a lasting connection with the world of silence" (p. 20). See also Picard's chapter, "The Noise of Words," pp. 172-97.

¹¹Dauenhauer, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 174.

¹³The necessary existence of both poles/modes of "being" is described throughout Heidegger's writing, from his examination of technology to his descriptions of Holderlin's poems. His essay, "Building, Dwelling Thinking" (in Poetry, Language, Thought) provides a most useful example of this aspect of Heidegger's point of view, especially in terms of his understanding of "human dwelling."

¹⁴In the end, it is important to note that Heidegger's analyses of silence seek to "save" words, not to deny them. For Heidegger, it is exactly because modern societies have robbed words of their meaning, transforming them into isolated objects divested of significance, that sources have to be re-experienced, and re-understood. It is the power of words (frequently for him, the strength of the poetic) that becomes manifest through the power of silence. Although in a very different context, Michael Shapiro makes a similar point in his Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices, pp. 57-8.

¹⁵Marshall Berman, All that is Solid Melts into Air, p. 90.

¹⁶Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, p. 48.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 51; 52; and 46.

¹⁸Along with the other references to Marx's exposition of the meaning of alienation noted in Chapter 2 of this work, Robert Blauner's Alienation and Freedom is particularly clear in its analysis. See especially Chapter 2, pp. 32-4.

¹⁹Georg Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness is deeply interested in the analysis of the production and reproduction of such "reified" consciousness. Andrew Arato's thorough description of Lukacs's theory and its relationship to Marx's categories is important here. See Arato, "Lukacs' Theory of Alienation."

²⁰From this perspective then, the schools were not democratic forums wherein children could learn a vocabulary of modernity's possibility, but rather managed vehicles for the "banking" of class-specific knowledge. Most clearly, this is the main argument of the revisionists and of Paulo Freire.

²¹Several significant feminist theoreticians have developed analyses of modern society very much in-keeping with the Marxist orientation of silence-as-alienation outlined here. Adrienne Rich, Susan Griffin, and Tillie Olsen have all seen in silence a negation of self-determination, an "unnaturalness" that forces women into roles and experiences of distortion and limitation. See especially Rich's essay, "Women and Honor: Some Notes on Lying" (in her On Lies, Secrets, and Silence), and Olsen's Silences (especially pp. 5-46).

²²Such a formulation is consistent with Susan Griffin's provocative analyses in Pornography and Silence: Culture's Revenge Against Nature. To be silenced is to be a victim of domination and alienation, according to Griffin. While a woman's "real self" is "consigned to silence," a "false self" is carefully and damagingly "Mold[ed]." As Griffin writes: "Wordlessly, even as a small girl, she begins to try to mold herself to fit society's image of what a woman ought to be" (p. 202). As is the case of other "Marxist" analyses presented here, silence (the negation of speech) or "lying" (the distortion of speech, the speaking of "untruth") become the only options for women in modern, alienated society.

²³The first phrase is taken from Thomas Hanna's insightful Bodies in Revolt where he examines Freud as a "somatic thinker" (p. 72). The second phrase comes from

Becker, op. cit., p. 205. It is Norman O. Brown who emphasizes Freud's "radical revision of traditional theories of human nature and human society." According to Brown, such a "revision" rests upon the insistence in all of Freud's work that "repression is . . . a fact." Brown, Life Against Death, p. 3.

²⁴Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic, p. 95. For Rieff, such a "chase" was not only a problem of pre-Freudian theorists, but of post-Freudians (like Adler) as well.

²⁵Erich Fromm describes this "synthesis of rationalism and romanticism" in Freud's work in his essay, "Freud's Model of Man and its Social Determinants," in his The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, p. 36.

²⁶Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 36. Freud also refers to this battle as "like a civil war." In a description consistent with that of Freud's view, Jung writes of the desire by the patient to "govern himself." In struggling against "the enemies" (Freud) he "wants to take the helm in his own hands; the steering has too long been done by others." And, Jung concludes: "He wants to understand; in other words, he wants to be an adult." Jung, "The Theory of Psychoanalysis," in Jung's Collected Works, Volume 4, p. 193.

²⁷Jung, "The Theory of Psychoanalysis," p. 187.

²⁸Brown, op. cit., pp. 149-51. Brown argues that psychoanalysis ultimately confused "word-consciousness" with "true-consciousness," thereby undercutting Freud's most significant recognition that infantile fantasies were not based upon a "real" sexual life, and thus could never be truly "remembered."

²⁹Freud was particularly attentive to the form of "currency," to the linguistic grid applicable to the terrain that he was seeking to examine. When describing the "strangest characteristic of unconscious (repressed) processes," he warned those who might expect a rational logic in the world of the dream: "One is bound to employ the currency that is in use in the country one is exploring." Freud, "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," Standard Edition, Volume XII, p. 225.

³⁰It is Jung (following Freud's example) who clearly described the necessity of the analyst to gain access to and "follow" the "false tracks of fantasy." Jung, op.

cit., pp. 185 and 187. The significance of the analyst's "calm detachment" is at the center of Rieff's distinction between the "analytic" and the "commitment" therapies. Rieff, op. cit., pp. 74-6.

³¹Freud used this phrase to describe his science in "The Question of Lay Analysis." Surely, Freud acknowledged, psychoanalysis was "one-sided," focusing upon the "mental unconscious." But, for Freud, such a specific focus placed analysis among the sciences, each with its specific and appropriate terrain. "After all," he claimed, "physics does not diminish the value of chemistry; it cannot take its place but on the other hand cannot be replaced by it." Freud, "The Question of Lay Analysis," Standard Edition, Volume XX, p. 230.

³²Perhaps Freud's ultimate pessimism was expressed most vividly in one of his final essays, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," where he describes the irreconcilable conflicts between life and death instincts in all organisms which produce both the "spontaneous tendency to conflict" and the powerful resistance to cure itself. Freud, Collected Papers, Volume V., pp. 345-47.

³³Jung's clearest statement of this position can be found in his Modern Man in Search of a Soul, pp. 264-48. See also James Hillman, Re-Visioning Psychology, pp. 226 and 228. It is surely in keeping with Jung's criticism of Freud's claim that humans can never fully transcend neurosis/pathology, that he sees Freud's world-view as a "symptom of" a larger "morbidity." Jung, "Freud and Jung: Contrasts," in Jung's Collected Works, Volume IV, p. 335.

³⁴Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 81.

³⁵Martin Kalin's The Utopian Flight from Unhappiness is one effort to develop such contrasts. Characteristically, Kalin's examination of Marx and Freud seeks to argue that each approaches and understands social realities in a most distinctive way. Frequently, too, Marxists have criticized those who theorize from a Heideggerian position for relying upon ahistorical social abstractions, neglecting the particularities of social and economic realities. See, for example, the distinction that Max Horkheimer makes between "traditional" and "critical" theory in his Critical Theory. Also see T. W. Adorno's The Jargon of Authenticity.

³⁶John Forester's extremely fine essay, "Listening: The Social Policy of Everyday Life," comes closest to rec-

ognizing and expressing this sense, although Forester is much more interested in depicting, through a wonderful description of the listening-process, the complementarity of the hermeneutic and the critical orientations. That "understanding" and "criticizing" are both significant components of a true "praxis of listening" is the central argument of Forester's piece.

³⁷Such a notion of "radical man" is a central metaphor and "ideal type" in Freire's thought.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agee, James. Let Us Now Praise Famous Men. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980.
- Alschuler, Alfred S. School Discipline. New York: McGraw Hill, 1980.
- Amacher, P. "Freud's Neurological Education and its Influence on Psychoanalytic Theory." Psychological Issues, Vol. IV, No. 4, Memo 16. New York: International Universities Press, 1965.
- Apple, Michael W. "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict." Interchange, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1971): 27-40.
- ; "Ideology, Reproduction, and Educational Reform." Comparative Education Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1978): 370-84.
- Arato, Andrew. "Lukacs' Theory of Reification." Telos, No. 11 (1972): 25-66.
- Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition: A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man. New York: Doubleday, 1959.
- Arlow, J. A. "Silence and the Theory of Technique." Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. 9 (1961): 45-55.
- Alviner, Schlomo. The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
- Bakan, David. Sigmund Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition. New York: Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958.
- Barfield, Owen. Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1965.
- Becker, Carl. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932.
- Becker, Ernest. The Birth and Death of Meaning. New York: The Free Press, 1962.
- ; Beyond Alienation: A Philosophy of Education for the Crisis of Democracy. New York: George Braziller, 1967.

- . The Denial of Death. New York: The Free Press, 1973.
- Bell, Daniel. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. New York: Basic Books, 1976.
- . The Winding Passage. Cambridge, Mass.: A.B.T. Books, 1980.
- . "Religion and Ideology." Encounter, Vol. LX, No. 2 (1983): 10-24.
- Berger, Peter L. Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change. New York: Doubleday, 1976.
- . Facing Up to Modernity: Excursions on Society, Politics, and Religion. New York: Basic Books, 1977.
- . The Heretical Imperative. New York: Doubleday, 1980.
- Berman, Marshall. All That is Solid Melts into Air. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.
- Bernstein, Basil. "A Public Language: Some Sociological Implications of a Linguistic Form." British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 10 (1959): 311-26.
- . "Elaborated and Restricted Codes: Their Social Origins and Some Consequences." American Anthropologist, Vol. 66, No. 6, Part 2 (1964): 55-69.
- . Class, Codes and Control. New York: Schocken Books, 1975.
- Bernstein, Richard. The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1976.
- Blauner, Robert. Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and His Industry. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964.
- Bloch, Ernest. On Karl Marx. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.
- Blum, Alan. "Reading Marx." Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 43, No. 1 (1973): 23-34.
- . Theorizing. London: Heinemann, 1974.

- . Socrates: The Original and its Images. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.
- Bookchin, Murray. Toward an Ecological Society. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1980.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, and Passeron, Jean-Claude. Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture. New York: Russell Sage Publications, 1977.
- Bowers, C. A. Cultural Literacy for Freedom. Eugene, Ore.: Elan Publishers, 1974.
- . "Emergent Ideological Characteristics of Educational Policy." Teacher's College Record, Vol. 79, No. 1 (1977): 33-54.
- . "Curriculum as Cultural Reproduction: An Examination of Metaphor as a Carrier of Ideology." Teacher's College Record, Vol. 82, No. 2 (1980): 267-89.
- Bowles, Samuel, and Gintis, Herbert. Schooling in Capitalist America. New York: Basic Books, 1976.
- Brack, H. G. Phenomenology of Tools. West Jonesport, Maine: Pennywheel Press, 1982.
- Brockbank, Reed. "On the Analyst's Silence in Psychoanalysis: A Synthesis of Intrapsychic Content and Interpersonal Manifestation." International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 51 (1970): 457-64.
- Brown, Norman O. Life Against Death. Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1959.
- Brown, Richard D. Modernization: The Transformation of American Life. New York: Hill and Wang, 1976.
- Cahn, Robert. Footprints on the Planet: The Search for an Environmental Ethic. New York: Universe Books, 1978.
- Cantin, Eileen. Mounier: A Personalist View of History. New York: The Paulist Press, 1973.
- Carnoy, Martin. Education as Cultural Imperialism. New York, David McKay, 1975.
- Cohen, David, and Lazerson, Marvin. "Education and the Corporate Order." Socialist Revolution, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1972): 47-72.

- Colby, Kenneth M. A Primer for Psychotherapists. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1951.
- Cuddihy, John M. The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity. New York: Basic Books, 1974.
- Dallmayr, Fred, and McCarthy, Thomas, eds. Understanding and Social Inquiry. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977.
- de Chardin, Teilhard. The Phenomenon of Man. New York: Harper & Row, 1961.
- de Tocqueville, Alexis. The Old Regime and the French Revolution. New York: Doubleday, 1955.
- deWitt, John J. An Exposition and Analysis of Paulo Freire's Radical Psycho-Social Andragogy of Development. Unpublished dissertation, Boston University School of Education, 1971.
- DiMaggio, Paul. "On Pierre Bourdieu." American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 84, No. 6 (1979): 1460-74.
- Dauenhauer, Bernard P. Silence: The Phenomenon and its Ontological Significance. Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1980.
- Dreeben, Robert. On What is Learned in School. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1968.
- Dreitzel, Hans-Peter, ed. Recent Sociology #2. New York: Macmillan, 1970.
- Elias, J. L. Conscientisation and Deschooling. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977.
- Entwisle, Doris, and Hayduk, Leslie. "Academic Expectations and the School Attainment of Young Children." Sociology of Education, Vol. 54, No. 1 (1981): 34-50.
- Finlay, Linda, and Faith, Valerie. "Illiteracy and Alienation in American Colleges: Is Paulo Freire's Pedagogy Relevant?" Radical Teacher, No. 16 (1979): 28-37.
- Fischer, Frank. Politics, Values, and Public Policy: The Problems of Methodology. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980.

- Forester, John. "Listening: The Social Policy of Everyday Life." Social Praxis, Vol. 7, No. 3/4 (1980): 219-32.
- Forrester, John. Language and the Origins of Psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press, 1980.
- Freire, Paulo. Cultural Action for Freedom. Harvard Educational Review Monograph #1, 1970.
- . "To the coordinator of a 'cultural circle.'" Convergence, Vol. IV, No. 1 (1971): 61-62.
- . Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Herder and Herder, 1972.
- . Education for Critical Consciousness. New York: Continuum Books, 1973.
- . Pedagogy in Process: The Letters to Guinea-Bissau. New York: Continuum Books, 1978.
- Freud, Sigmund. An Outline of Psychoanalysis. London: Hogarth Press, 1949.
- . Collected Papers, Vols. I and II. New York: Basic Books, 1959.
- . Civilization and its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton, 1962.
- . Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, Vols. VII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVIII, and XXI. London: Hogarth Press, 1963.
- . The Interpretation of Dreams. New York: Avon Books, 1965.
- Frings, Manfred S., ed. Heidegger and the Quest for Truth. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968.
- Fromm, Erich. Psychoanalysis and Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
- . The Forgotten Language. New York: Grove Press, 1951.
- . The Crisis of Psychoanalysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.
- . To Have or To Be? New York: Harper & Row, 1976.

- Fromm-Reichman, Frieda. Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.
- Garaudy, Roger. Marxism in the 20th Century. New York: Scribners, 1970.
- Garfinkel, Harold. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
- ; Harold, Michael; and Livingson, Eric. "The Work of a Discovering Science Construed with Materials from the Optically Discovered Pulsar." Philosophy of Social Science, Vol. 11 (1981): 131-58.
- Gay, Peter. Freud, Jews and Other Germans. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Gerth, Hans, and Mills, C. Wright. From Max Weber. New York: Oxford University Press, 1972.
- Giddens, Anthony. New Rules of Sociological Method. New York: Basic Books, 1976.
- Gintis, Herbert. "Communication and Politics: Marxism and the 'Problem' of Liberal Democracy." Socialist Review, Nos. 50 and 51: 189-232.
- Glover, Edward. The Technique of Psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press, 1955.
- Goodman, Nelson. Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishers, 1978.
- Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Greenson, Ralph R. "On the Silence and Sounds of the Analytic Hour." Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1961): 79-84.
- ". "That 'Impossible' Profession." Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1966): 9-27.
- Greer, Colin. The Great School Legend. New York: Basic Books, 1972.
- Griffin, Susan. Pornography and Silence: Culture's Revenge Against Nature. New York: Harper & Row, 1981.

- Gutierrez, G. A. A Theology of Liberation. New York: Orbis Books, 1973.
- Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledge and Human Interests. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971.
- . Theory and Practice. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
- Hanna, Thomas. Bodies in Revolt. New York: Delta Books, 1972.
- Hardin, Garrett. Exploring New Ethics for Survival. New York: Viking Press, 1972.
- Heidegger, Martin. Existence and Being. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949.
- . Discourse on Thinking. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
- . What is Called Thinking? New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
- . Poetry, Language and Thought. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
- . The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- Henry, Jules. Culture Against Man. New York: Random House, 1963.
- Hillman, James. Re-Visioning Psychology. New York: Harper & Row, 1975.
- Hogan, David. "Capitalism, Liberalism and Schooling." Theory and Society, Vol. 8 (1979): 387-413.
- Horkheimer, Max. Critical Theory. New York: Seabury Press, 1972.
- Hurn, Christopher. The Limits and Possibilities of Schooling. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1978.
- Illich, Ivan. De-Schooling Society. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
- . After De-Schooling What? New York: Harper & Row, 1973.

- Jacoby, Russell. Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing. Boston: Beacon Press, 1975.
- Jencks, Christopher, and Riesman, David. The Academic Revolution. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969.
- Jung, Carl G. Modern Man in Search of a Soul. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1934.
- . The Collected Works, Vol. IV. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Kalin, Martin G. The Flight from Unhappiness: Freud Against Marx on Social Progress. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1974.
- Karable, Jerome, and Halsey, A. H., eds. Power and Ideology in Education. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Katz, Michael B. The Irony of Early School Reform. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.
- . Class, Bureaucracy and Schools. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.
- . "The Origins of Public Education: A Reassessment." History of Education Quarterly, Winter, 1976:
- Khan, M. Masud. "Silence as Communication." Bulletin of Menninger Clinic, No. 27 (1963): 300-313.
- Klein, Dennis B. Jewish Origins of the Psychoanalytic Movement. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981.
- Kovel, Joel. "Things and Words: Metapsychology and the Historical Point of View." Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1978): 21-88.
- . The Age of Desire: Case Histories of a Radical Psychoanalysis. New York: Pantheon Books, 1981.
- Kozol, Jonathan. Prisoners of Silence: Breaking the Bonds of Adult Illiteracy in the United States. New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1980.
- Krishnamurti. The Wholeness of Life. New York: Harper & Row, 1979.

- Kubie, Lawrence. Practical and Theoretical Aspects of Psychoanalysis. New York: International Universities Press, 1950.
- Kung, Hans. Freud and the Problem of God. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.
- Labov, William. Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972.
- . Sociolinguistic Patterns. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1973.
- Lacan, Jacques. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978.
- Lefebvre, Henri. Everyday Life in the Modern World. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
- Leiss, William. The Domination of Nature. Boston: Beacon Press, 1974.
- Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. New York: The Free Press, 1958.
- Lerner, Eric. Journey of Insight Meditation. New York: Schocken Books, 1977.
- Levy, Kata. "Silence in the Analytic Session." International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 39 (1958): 50-58.
- Mackie, Robert, ed. Literacy and Revolution. New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1981.
- Mannoni, O. Freud. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.
- Marx, Karl. Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. New York: International Publishers, 1965.
- . Capital, Vol. 1. Translated by Moore and Aveling. New York: International Publishers, 1967.
- . Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society. Garden City: Anchor-Doubleday, 1967.

- , and Engels, Frederick. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969.
- Masih, Y. Freudianism and Religion. Calcutta: Thacker Spink and Company, 1964.
- Mazlish, Bruce, ed. Psychoanalysis and History. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
- McCann, Dennis P. Christian Realism and Liberation Theology: Practical Theologies in Creative Conflict. New York: Orbis Books, 1981.
- McCarthy, Thomas. The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Signs. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964.
- Merton, Thomas. Seeds of Destruction. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1964.
- , Asian Journal. New York: New Directions, 1973.
- , Love and Living. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1979.
- Meszaros, Istvan. Marx's Theory of Alienation. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
- Mink, L. "History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension." New Literary History, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1970): 544.
- Mounier, Emmanuel. Personalism. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952.
- Mueller, Claus. The Politics of Communication. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Mujeeb-ur-Rahman, M., ed. The Freudian Paradigm: Psychoanalysis and Scientific Thought. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1977.
- Murchland, Bernard. The Age of Alienation. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Musgrove, Frank. School and the Social Order. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1979.

- Nacht, S. "The Non-Verbal Relationship in Psychoanalytic Treatment." International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 44 (1963): 328-33.
- Nasaw, David. Schooled to Order: A Social History of Public Schooling in the U.S. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Neher, André. The Exile of the Word: From the Silence of the Bible to the Silence of Auschwitz. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1981.
- Nelson, Benjamin. On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science and Civilizations. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981.
- Nichols, Christopher. "Science or Reflection: Habermas on Freud." Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 2 (1972): 261-70.
- Nisbet, Robert. The Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in Western Thought. New York: Crowell, 1973.
- O'Dea, Thomas F. Sociology and the Study of Religion. New York: Basic Books, 1970.
- Ogilvy, James. Many Dimensional Man: Decentralizing Self, Society, and the Sacred. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
- Ollman, Bertell. Alienation: Marx's Conceptions of Man in Capitalist Society. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- , Social and Sexual Revolution. Boston: South End Press, 1979.
- Olsen, Tillie. Silences. New York: Delacorte Press, 1978.
- O'Neill, John. Perception, Expression and History. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
- , Making Sense Together: An Introduction to Wild Sociology. New York: Harper & Row, 1974.
- , ed. On Critical Theory. New York: Seabury Press, 1976.
- Palermo, James. "Praxis and the Reified Character of Educational Physicalism." Philosophy and Social Criticism,

Vol. 5, No. 3/4 (1978): 367-85.

Parsons, Talcott. Social Structure and Personality. New York: The Free Press, 1964.

Perotti, James L. Heidegger and the Divine. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1974.

Picard, Max. The World of Silence. South Bend, Ind.: Henry Regnery, 1952.

Raskin, Marcus. Being and Doing. New York: Random House, 1971.

Rich, Adrienne. On Lies, Secrets, and Silence. New York: W. W. Norton, 1979.

Reik, Theodor. Listening with the Third Ear. New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1948.

Reiner, Everett. School is Dead. Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1971.

Ricoeur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970.

-----, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974.

Rieff, Philip. Freud: The Mind of the Moralist. New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1961.

-----, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

Rist, Ray. The Invisible Children: School Integration in American Society. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978.

Rosen, Stanley. Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.

Rosenberg, Stanley, and Bergen, Bernard. The Cold Fire: Alienation and the Myth of Culture. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1976.

Rosenthal, Robert, and Jacobson, Lenore. Pygmalion in the Classroom. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.

- Sallis, John, ed. Heidegger and the Path of Thinking. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1970.
- Sandler, Joseph; Dare, Christopher; and Holder, Alex. The Patient and the Analyst: The Basis of the Psychoanalytic Process. New York: International Universities Press, 1973.
- Schafer, Roy. A New Language for Psychoanalysis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- "The Interpretations of Transference and the Conditions for Loving." Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1977): 335.
- Schroyer, Trent. The Critique of Domination. New York: George Braziller, 1973.
- Schumacher, E. F. A Guide for the Perplexed. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- Schutz, Alfred. Collected Papers. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1967.
- Seeman, Melvin. "On the Meaning of Alienation." American Sociological Review, Vol. XXXIV (1959): 783-91.
- Seidel, George J. "Heidegger: Philosopher for Ecologists?" Man and World, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1971): 93-99.
- Shapiro, Michael J. Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.
- Sirianni, Carmen. "Production and Power in a Classless Society: A Critical Analysis of the Utopian Dimensions of Marxist Theory." Socialist Review, No. 59: 33-82.
- Skolimowski, Henryk. Eco-Philosophy: Designing New Tactics for Living. Salem, N.H.: Marion Boyers, 1981.
- Slater, Philip. Wealth Addiction. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1980.
- Smith, Tony. "The Scope of the Social Sciences in Weber and Habermas." Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1981): 67-83.
- Snyder, Gary. Earth House Hold. New York: New Directions, 1969.

- Sontag, Susan. Styles of Radical Will. New York: Dell Publishing, 1969.
- Spring, Joel. A Primer of Libertarian Education. New York: Free Life Editions, 1975.
- Steiner, George. Language and Silence. New York: Atheneum, 1974.
- Swartz, David. "Pierre Bourdieu: The Cultural Transmission of Social Inequality." Harvard Education Review, Vol. 47, No. 4 (1977): 545-55.
- Thompson, William I. Passages about Earth. New York: Harper & Row, 1974.
- . Darkness and Scattered Light. New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1978.
- Turkle, Sherry. Psychoanalytic Politics: Freud's French Revolution. New York: Basic Books, 1978.
- van Teslaar, T. S. An Outline of Psychoanalysis. New York: Random House, 1925.
- Watzlawick, Paul. The Language of Change: Elements of Therapeutic Communication. New York: Basic Books, 1978.
- Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Scribners, 1930.
- . The Rational and Social Foundations of Music. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1958.
- Weisman, Avery D. "Silence and Psychotherapy." Psychiatry, Vol. 18 (1955): 241-60.
- Wheelis, Allen. The End of the Modern Age. New York: Basic Books, 1971.
- Woolf, Kurt H. "Surrender as a Response to Our Crisis." Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. II, No. 2 (1962): 16-30.
- . "Surrender and the Body." Cultural Hermeneutics, Vol. 2 (1974): 19-60.
- . Surrender and Catch. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1976.

- Wootton, Anthony. Dilemmas of Discourse. London: Allen and Unwin, 1975.
- Wrong, Dennis, ed. Max Weber. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
- Zeligs, Meyer A. "The Psychology of Silence." Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. 9 (1961): 7-43.
- Zweig, Paul. Three Journeys: An Automythology. New York: Basic Books, 1976.