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PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY: 1848

City University of New York

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PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY; 1848

by

George John Billy

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.**

1982

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in History in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

PALMERSTON'S FOREIGN POLICY: 1848

by

George J. Billy

Advisor: Professor William O. Shanahan

Based upon Palmerston's previously restricted private correspondence, as well as his state papers, the dissertation emphasizes the significance of the first half of 1848, and it deals with his foreign policy in terms of his personal views and his deep concern about the increasingly tumultuous temper of social and political unrest in the United Kingdom. The interplay between British domestic affairs and the unfolding revolution on the continent in 1848 is taken into account. Palmerston's view of continental events in the revolutionary year had been strongly influenced by the course of events at home. He shaped his foreign policy to meet domestic as well as foreign threats to British stability. This interconnection between domestic and continental events is analyzed in detail.

Because foreign policy was still largely the outcome of personal judgment, it is fruitful to examine Palmerston's own set of values. How this Anglo-Irish gentleman viewed society, government, the state system and Great Britain's role in it provides insight into how he evaluated his options in foreign policy during 1848-1849. His policy decisions, which on the surface seem inconsistent and contradictory, gain coherence when Palmerston's own opinions are kept in mind. Thus, the account of Palmerston's diplomacy takes his personal world view into consideration

as well as the ebb and flow of international and domestic affairs.

The dissertation attempts to offer a fresh interpretation of Palmerston's often misunderstood actions during the eventful years 1848-1849. Palmerston's shifts in alignment with the great powers during these years are emphasized. The concluding chapter of the dissertation discusses the long-range consequences of Palmerston's diplomacy for the conservative reaction on the continent following the revolutionary years, for Great Britain's imperial interests, and for Palmerston's own career. Thus, in addition to new sources, the dissertation presents a broad approach to Palmerston and Britain's role in the Revolution of 1848.

Preface

Lord Palmerston's foreign policy during 1848 has, thus far, escaped the close scrutiny of historians. Those few historians who have dealt with Palmerston's diplomacy in 1848 provide accounts which are either brief, confined, or based upon inadequate sources. This dissertation has its warranty in this significant historical omission. Centering on the crucial period of January to June 1848, it endeavors to provide a more detailed account of Palmerston's diplomatic response to the revolutionary trials of 1848. This study makes use of Palmerston's private papers, the so-called Broadlands Papers, which were previously kept at his ancestral home, Broadlands, and which are presently available at the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts and the British Library. In addition, materials held by the Public Record Office are utilized. The dissertation also has a new dimension in seeking to correlate the foreign secretary's diplomacy with his personal outlook and with the course of British domestic affairs.

As noted above, there is currently no satisfactory study of Palmerston's diplomacy for the year 1848. In particular, seven historians who have gained access to the major portion of Palmerston's previously restricted letters and dispatches, the Broadlands Papers, have barely covered the eventful year of revolution. Palmerston's papers probably were restricted in use in order to prevent embarrassment to his contemporaries and their descendants; Palmerston tended to characterize the shortcomings of contemporaries, both at home and abroad, in the bluntest, most sarcastic terms. Sir Henry Bulwer's¹ and Evelyn Ashley's² official biographies

published during the eighteen-seventies excluded much material considered injurious to Palmerston and his contemporaries. These works amount to carefully edited collections of Palmerston's correspondence.

Philip Guedalla's Palmerston (1928)³ paints a vivid picture of Palmerston the individual but says little about foreign policy. On the other hand, the solidly researched The Foreign Policy of Palmerston (1951)⁴ by Sir Charles K. Webster covers only the period 1830 to 1841. Brian Connell's Regina vs. Palmerston (1961),⁵ although informative about relations between Palmerston and Queen Victoria, is more of a collection of their correspondence than a historical study. Palmerston's most recent biographer, Jasper Ridley, in Lord Palmerston (1970)⁶ relies heavily on the Palmerston Letter-books in the British Library but devotes a scant twenty-five pages to the years 1848 and 1849. Finally, Roger Bullen's recent, penetrating work, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (1974)⁷ ends abruptly with the fall of Louis Philippe.

For the most part, Palmerston's contemporaries tended to be polemical towards the foreign secretary. For example, David Urquhart, Materials for the True History of Lord Palmerston (1866)⁸ and James E. Ritchie, The Life and Times of Lord Palmerston (1866-1867)⁹ are anti-Palmerstonian diatribes rather than historical treatments.

The works of other writers who have been denied access to the Broadlands Papers also fall short of the mark. The Marquis of Lorne, who had access to some of Palmerston's correspondence, provides valuable extracts from the statesman's papers in his biography, Viscount Palmerston, K.G.

(1892),¹⁰ yet the book lacks sufficient material on the 1848 period. H.C.F. Bell's multi-volume study, Lord Palmerston (1936),¹¹ which quotes numerous dispatches verbatim, has been outdated by subsequent research. W. Baring Pemberton's Lord Palmerston (1954)¹² and Donald Southgate's biography, "The Most English Minister..." (1966),¹³ were seriously handicapped by the unavailability of Palmerston's papers. Both works contain brief chapters on 1848 and 1849. More specialized monographs, such as Charles Sproxton's Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution (1919)¹⁴ and A.J.P. Taylor's The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy (1934),¹⁵ make valuable contributions, but they are either narrow in scope or are not centered on Palmerston.

None of the above works places very much emphasis on the connection between Palmerston's diplomacy and his own value system or the circumstances of British domestic affairs. Therefore, the present state of historiography appears to warrant a broader, more detailed study.

In order to examine Palmerston's private and public correspondence, I have utilized the holdings of several institutions while conducting research in the United Kingdom in the summer of 1978. I want to extend my sincere gratitude to the Trustees of the Broadlands Archives and the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts for permission to examine the Broadlands Papers in their possession. I also wish to express my thanks to the staff of the Department of Manuscripts of the British Library for allowing me to consult the Palmerston Letter-books, as well as the Aberdeen, Huskisson, and Peel Papers. In addition, I should like to thank

the staff of the Public Record Office for permitting me to examine the Foreign Office, Home Office and Russell Papers. Lastly, I thank Mr. Douglas Parvin, Staff Supervisor at the estate of the late Lord Mountbatton of Burma, Broadlands, for supplying details concerning Palmerston's ancestral home.

During the time that I researched and wrote this dissertation, I had the privilege of working under the direction of my advisor, Professor William O. Shanahan, of the City University of New York Graduate School. It was Professor Shanahan who first suggested the topic and in whose seminar the work began. I extend to him my sincere thanks for his invaluable guidance and steadfast encouragement. In addition, I thank Professors Keith Eubank and Donald J. Harvey of the C.U.N.Y. Graduate School for constructive suggestions on research and for reading the dissertation. Also, I am indebted to Professor David Goodway of the University of Leeds who diverted time from his own research at the Public Record Office to recommend several sources pertinent to Chartism, including the Home Office Papers. Miss Alice Eisenberg deserves many thanks for typing the dissertation and for her very helpful suggestions. Finally, to my wife Valerie, heartfelt thanks for her patience and understanding. Her daily encouragement in this endeavor will always be appreciated. Flaws and errors, if any, are, of course, entirely my own.

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Bayside, New York

PREFACE

NOTES

¹William Henry Lytton Earle Bulwer, Baron Dalling and Bulwer, and Evelyn Ashley, The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston (London: R. Bentley, 1870-1876), 5 Vols.

²Evelyn Ashley, The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1879), 2 Vols.

³Philip Guedalla, Palmerston, 1784-1865 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1927).

⁴Sir Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841: Britain, the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question. (New York: Humanities Press, 1951, 1969 reprint).

⁵Brian Connell, Regina vs. Palmerston: the Correspondence Between Queen Victoria and Her Foreign and Prime Minister, 1837-1865 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1961).

⁶Jasper Ridley, Lord Palmerston (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1970).

⁷Roger Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse of the Entente Cordiale (London: University of London, Athlone Press, 1974).

⁸David Urquhart, Materials for the True History of Lord Palmerston (London: R. Hardwicke, 1866).

⁹James Ewing Ritchie, The Life and Times of Lord Palmerston (London: The London Printing and Publishing Company, Ltd., 1866-1867).

¹⁰Marquis of Lorne (later 9th Duke of Argyll), Viscount Palmerston, K.G. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1892).

¹¹Herbert C.F. Bell, Lord Palmerston (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1936, 1966 reprint), 2 Vols.

¹²W. Baring Pemberton, Lord Palmerston (London: The Batchworth Press, 1954).

¹³Donald Southgate, "The Most English Minister..." : the Policies and Politics of Palmerston (London: Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, 1966).

¹⁴Charles Sproxton, Palmerston and the Hungarian Revolution: a Dissertation Which Was Awarded the Prince Consort Prize, 1914 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1919).

¹⁵A.J.P. Taylor, The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy, 1847-1849
(Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1934, 1970 reprint).

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NOTE ABBREVIATIONS

ADD. MSS.....	Additional Manuscripts.
B.L.....	British Library
B. MSS.....	Broadlands Manuscripts.
F.O.....	Foreign Office.
H.O.....	Home Office.
P.L.....	Palmerston Letter-books.
P.R.O.....	Public Record Office.
R.C.H.M.....	Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts.
R.P.....	Russell Papers.

CHAPTER I

BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The revolutions of 1848 threatened Europe's international stability as well as its social and political institutions. It fell to Henry John Temple, Third Viscount Palmerston to guide Great Britain's foreign relations in this turbulent period.¹ However, before examining Palmerston's diplomatic activities during the critical months from January to June 1848, some historical background is appropriate.

In 1848, Britain held a pre-eminent position in the world, comprising the largest commercial empire, the most developed industrial system, and the largest navy.² By that date British interest in acquiring new colonies had, with some exceptions, diminished. British leaders sought, in the main, to hold on to previous colonial acquisitions and to safeguard commercial expansion under the doctrine of free trade.³ Platitudes about honor and peace were equated in British minds with maintaining political and commercial advantages.⁴

A brief examination of basic industrial statistics bears out Britain's predominance. For example, in 1848 the United Kingdom had a total of 25,638 merchant ships on its registers whereas her closest European competitor, France, recorded only 14,353. Similarly, Britain led in domestic coal production. In 1845 she produced 46,600,000 metric tons in contrast to her European neighbors: Germany, 5,600,000 metric tons; Belgium, 4,919,000 metric tons; and France, 4,202,000 metric tons.

Likewise, Britain was first in the output of pig iron in 1847, amounting to 2,032,000 metric tons. France produced 592,000 metric tons; Belgium, 248,000 metric tons; and Germany, 230,000 metric tons the same year.⁵

Illustrative of Britain's boundless energy is an oil painting by the artist, Joseph M.W. Turner, entitled "Keelmen Heaving in Coals by Night," completed in 1835. On this canvas Turner depicts the British transition to an industrialized society as evidenced by two types of ships. Showing the River Tyne, on the painting's left there are staid, square-rigged merchant ships lying still in the moonlight. To the right, in contrast, there is a beehive of activity. Workmen furiously shovel coal into the holds of steam driven merchantmen, and factory smokestacks emit smoke in the background, attesting to the tireless pace of industrial Britain.⁶

Britain's trump card in international affairs was its naval might. Maintaining its lead in naval strength since the Napoleonic wars, the British navy in 1848 consisted of 252 commissioned warships.⁷ A comparison of the total units in the British Navy with those of her nearest rival, France, reveals the extensive resources at hand. In 1852 the British fleet contained a grand total of 325 warships (main units), including 7 steam ships of the line. On the other hand, the French fleet stood at 140 vessels (main units) with 2 steamships of the line.⁸ As a whole, British industrial and naval might gave that island kingdom of 15,914,000 souls⁹ an impressive image which prompted Lord Palmerston to remark to his successor, Lord Malmesbury, in 1852, "You have no idea until you know more of your office what a power of prestige England possesses abroad,

and it will be your first duty to see that it does not wane..."¹⁰

To British observers, France's expanding naval and military establishment and its growing industry, together with its past history of aggression, posed a formidable challenge to Britain's primacy.¹¹

Moreover, France's geographic position across the English Channel and on the Mediterranean made her an ever-present threat to Britain's home defense and her trade routes to the Near East,¹² French naval strategists had taken cognizance of France's geographic location and had advocated a war on British commerce (a guerre de course). The naval planners reasoned that such a projected war of attrition was the surest means of subjugating Britain because the island nation would find her commercial losses too costly and therefore she would capitulate.¹³

Traditionally, Britain counterbalanced the power of the strongest state in Europe by forming temporary alignments or coalitions with the weaker states. For example, when Napoleon I attempted to dominate Europe, Britain counteracted French expansion by acting in concert with Prussia, Russia and Austria. The theory of the continental balance of power was the basis for such action. According to this concept, no state would be able to dominate Europe because all the other states would form a league to contain her. For British statesmen, a second aim was to guarantee that no coalition was formed to isolate and endanger Britain. Even as an island, Britain could not be immune to a hostile European system.¹⁴

Another critical aspect of the theory recognized that the balance of power was always changing. Therefore, binding alliances should be avoided, since they might not permit rapid realignment with other states. Today's

ally might become tomorrow's enemy.¹⁵ Before Parliament on March 1, 1848, Lord Palmerston succinctly stated this view when he noted, "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow,"¹⁶ Palmerston recognized that it was a "perpetual" interest of Britain to ensure that neither France nor any other state would upset the European equilibrium of power by a continental war which would ultimately involve her.¹⁷

How previous British foreign secretaries dealt with the other great powers within the European state system is a key to understanding Palmerston's actions as well as British diplomacy in the first half of the nineteenth century. Emerging from the treaties of 1814 and 1815 were several considerations which Lord Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary at the time, espoused. First and foremost, he sought in the Vienna settlement the re-establishment of peace and order in Europe. Specifically, the territorial arrangements of the treaties were designed to thwart the possibility of future aggression not only by France but also by Russia. In essence, a continental balance of power was sought in order to ensure the independent existence of the great powers. To this end, even France, the defeated state, was not fundamentally weakened. She would remain a part of the European state system.¹⁸

The Vienna settlement had also endorsed concert diplomacy exercised in congresses. To preserve the hard-won peace and order from either an aggressive state or from political revolution, the great powers had agreed to meet periodically to solve, by their deliberations in concert, those problems that affected all the interested parties, including France.

Castlereagh participated in the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Troppau (1820), and Laibach (1821). Although by 1822 British political leaders, including Castlereagh's cabinet colleagues, were skeptical of the congress system, which was now perceived as a device by which Austria's conservative Prince Clemens von Metternich held liberal revolutions in check, Castlereagh still clung to the general idea of acting in concert with the other European states to solve, in a self-limiting spirit, issues of general importance.¹⁹

Castlereagh's successor, the more liberal George Canning, steadfastly opposed the policies of the eastern courts which, again following Metternich's lead, sought to preserve legitimacy in Europe against what British liberal thinkers believed to be bona fide, progressive and constitutional aspirations of political leaders in the various continental states.²⁰ Therefore, Canning refused to join Austria, Prussia and Russia in conferences convoked for the purpose of intervening in the affairs of other countries, such as in the Iberian Peninsula and in the New World.²¹

Canning's foreign policy was not isolationist but was broadly conceived so as to sustain what he believed to be British interests. For example, Britain acted in concert with Russia and France to achieve Greek autonomy from Turkish rule, finally, after Canning's untimely death, resulting in the independence of Greece in 1830. If by acting alone Russia had gained overwhelming influence in Greece in place of Turkish rule, British trade routes to the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East would have been affected. Also, in the establishment of Greece as in other considerations, Canning introduced a new element: the concern

for public opinion, The independence of Greece was both a popular issue in England as well as one of vital significance to her with respect to the Eastern Question.²²

Canning, therefore, possessed the adroitness of solving the issue of Greece in a manner which prevented Russian interference in Greek affairs, which was popular with the British public and which safeguarded British interests. He also demonstrated the flexibility of aligning Great Britain with potential rivals, France and Russia, to solve the Greek crisis amicably, a flexibility in keeping with the balance of power concept of changing great power relationships. Canning, then, was most selective in how he would act jointly with the other powers. It should be noted that Cannings's Secretary at War, Lord Palmerston, supported the prime minister's espousal of the cause of the Greeks and, in general, adopted Canning's interest in public opinion at home, liberal-constitutional developments abroad, and, above all, Britain's vital interests.²³

The interval in British foreign policy between the death of George Canning in 1827 and Palmerston's advent in 1830 has been viewed as an interlude of passivity. Specifically, in terms of a distinct lack of British assertiveness in European affairs the period stands in contrast to the boldness exhibited by Canning and to the subsequent strong-willed foreign policy of Palmerston. Canning's successors at the Foreign Office, Lord Dudley and later Lord Aberdeen under the Duke of Wellington, were unable to come to full grips with the international problems at hand as the onrush of events and the designs of the other great powers frustrated their foreign policies. Moreover, the Wellington government was pre-occupied by domestic events, such as internal government dissension over the

issue of Catholic emancipation, which also hampered Aberdeen's attempts to implement foreign policy initiatives.²⁴

For example, the boldness of Canning's espousal of Greek independence was quickly taken up by France and Russia who stole the British initiative and worked to combine the cause of Greek nationalism with their own desires for expanding their influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Lord Aberdeen, British foreign secretary from 1828 to 1830 was pro-Greek in sentiment, yet he displayed, along with Wellington, a hesitatnt attitude toward pushing for Greek self-determination. Aberdeen was concerned that a weakening of the Ottoman Empire would only encourage the Russians to broaden their influence in the power vacuum thus created and, perhaps they would be able to establish a naval station in the newly created Greek state.²⁵

However, the chance encounter and defeat of the Egypto-Turkish Navy at Navarino, October 20, 1827, by Anglo-French forces, while Lord Dudley was foreign secretary, the subsequent occupation of parts of the Ottoman Empire by both French and Russian troops, and a brief Russo-Turkish war finally forced Wellington and Aberdeen to recognize, begrudgingly, that Greek independence was a necessary though risky step. The course of events had forced their hands. The new state of Greece was proclaimed formally by a London protocol on February 3, 1830, and was guaranteed by Russia, France and Britain. Thus, rather than lead the great powers to this conclusion, the Wellington Government had been, by a failure of initiative, led to it.²⁶ Here was a lesson in assertive action which Lord Palmerston, who with fellow Canningites had abandoned the Wellington administration,

would apply in subsequent years as foreign secretary, Palmerston made certain his foreign policy was both assertive and, whenever possible, free of domestic encumbrances.²⁷

PALMERSTON AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE

With the formation of a Whig ministry under Lord Grey in November 1830, Lord Palmerston, having abandoned the Tory party, became foreign secretary for the first time, and the concepts and proclivities of both Castlereagh and Canning were accentuated. For example, whereas Canning was strongly pro-British in his dealings, Palmerston was staunchly so,²⁸ and as much as Castlereagh was keenly interested in European affairs, Palmerston was intensely concerned with the continent. Likewise, Palmerston recognized that Britain had a stake in maintaining the European balance of power, not only for the security of the British Isles, but also for her economic prosperity. Free markets for British goods were best guaranteed by peaceful commerce in an international setting where no one power dominated, as had not been the case when Napoleon I had upset the balance of power and had attempted to block British commerce from European markets through his Continental System.²⁹

Moreover, Palmerston's diplomacy would exhibit other characteristics of his predecessors at the Foreign Office. Flexibility in dealing with the other powers, for instance, would be a trademark of his statecraft. In addition, Palmerston, as with Canning concerning Greece, was also quick to seize opportunities for obtaining satisfactory settlements of international questions.³⁰

Also, as with Canning and Castlereagh, Palmerston had to take into account, at various times, domestic events and attitudes, public sentiment, and the wishes of his colleagues in the British cabinet. Finally, as with his predecessors, Palmerston found it expedient, from time to time, to back up his diplomacy with Britain's primary agent of force, her navy.³¹

In July 1830, as Palmerston was about to assume his responsibilities as foreign secretary, France underwent a revolution which installed the liberal King Louis Philippe. For Lord Palmerston, the July Monarchy marked a new, if somewhat uncertain, turn in European affairs.³² Revealing an interest in liberal reform, Palmerston optimistically observed that the July Revolution:

...is decisive of the ascendancy of Liberal Principles throughout Europe; the evil spirit has been put down and will be trodden under foot. The reign of Metternich is over,...³³

Still inherently suspicious of French foreign policy when he took office,³⁴ Palmerston, nevertheless, realized that the July Revolution provided an opportunity to settle an outstanding diplomatic question, the fate of Belgium. Already a conference of the great powers had convened in regard to a revolt by Flemish and Walloon subjects for self-determination in opposition to the King of Holland,³⁵ and Palmerston was to negotiate between two divergent views of the great powers. On the one hand, the eastern powers, Prussia, Austria and Russia, wished to see Belgium restored to the Dutch King. On the other hand, the French sought to partition Belgium in order to obtain territory on France's Belgian frontier, thus revising the settlement of 1815.³⁶

At home, British opinion on the Belgian question was also divided. The Francophiles in the British cabinet saw no harm in allowing France to acquire meager bits of territory so long as the two liberal powers, Britain and France, were in general accord on policy. Others, including Palmerston, opposed French expansion, and the British foreign secretary did not favor the weakening of the Dutch monarchy, especially one whose territory was guaranteed by Britain as a signatory of the Vienna agreements,³⁷

Notwithstanding such considerations, Palmerston also perceived an opportunity to play upon the weaknesses of the great powers to arrive at a suitable Belgian settlement. In Poland as well as France, 1830 was a year of revolution, and the eastern powers were too preoccupied with the Poles to give full weight to restoring Belgium to the Kingdom of Holland. France, herself, was divided politically and was unable to press her claims with the vigor of a unified state. Sensing the opportunities present in this international setting, Palmerston utilized the image of an expansionist France to work upon the apprehensions of the eastern courts in order to gain their acquiescence to his objectives. Similarly, Palmerston emphasized the prospect of continental isolation to coax France to accede to his ideas on Belgium. By taking the initiative in negotiating with the great powers assembled in conference in London and by playing upon their fears, Palmerston managed to induce the powers to forgo either a Dutch monarchical restoration for Belgium or its partition, in favor of steps that would eventually lead to Belgian independence and neutralization.³⁸

Palmerston, nevertheless, had to back up his diplomacy with British naval strength. In 1832 a British squadron was dispatched to patrol off the mouth of the Scheldt in order to force the Dutch to evacuate Belgium while French land forces moved in. Also, when the French again broached the topic of territorial acquisition, the British foreign secretary had to give warning of war if France refused to withdraw.³⁹

Thus, another element of Palmerstonian diplomacy was revealed: brinkmanship. To be sure, Castlereagh and Canning had judiciously used British forces as part of their foreign policies,⁴⁰ but Palmerston embarked on a more pronounced mixture of bluff, bluster and force. The French did withdraw from Belgium, albeit with compensation in the form of five fortresses on the Franco-Belgian border which were transferred to France. After more negotiations and, at times, uncertainty, the Dutch monarchy finally acknowledged in 1839 the independence of Belgium, and the great powers, her neutrality.⁴¹

Other traits of Palmerston's foreign policy were also revealed. Although the Belgian settlement brought this international question to a peaceful end, it also resulted in strong Anglo-Belgian economic and political ties which were of direct benefit to Great Britain.⁴² Also, Palmerston's support of the cause of Belgian independence helped to create, at least outwardly, the image of a liberal statesman which proved popular with the more radical elements of the Whig party in Parliament, as well as with the public.⁴³

In addition, Lord Palmerston had worked well within the European state system. Five great powers had acted in concert to arrive at the final Belgian settlement.⁴⁴ By actively engaging the interests and

cooperation of the other powers, Palmerston had also made the Concert of Europe more of a reality and less of a mere catch-phrase,

Lastly, Lord Palmerston's diplomatic relations with the French regarding Belgium reflected his future dealings with France. For Palmerston, the proximity of France would always be a source of concern and a factor in defensive planning. Also, the threat of French territorial expansion had to be considered, and French commercial interests often ran counter to British interests.⁴⁵ All these factors militated against close Anglo-French relations.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE

Yet, in the first half of the decade of the 1830's, Lord Palmerston also recognized that France was the most suitable continental partner for Britain in contrast to the more conservative governments of Austria, Prussia and Russia. In May 1836 Palmerston stated:

England alone cannot carry her points on the Continent; she must have allies as instruments to work with. We cannot have the co-operation of our old allies, the three Powers, because their views and opinions are now-a-days the reverse of ours.⁴⁶

In place of former allies of the Napoleonic wars, then, France was Palmerston's alternative choice so long as she served as an "instrument" of British foreign policy, that is, as a junior partner in any entente that was effectuated.⁴⁷

The practical result of the alignment of western powers was the Quadruple Alliance of 1834, which Palmerston had "pushed" through the

British cabinet before objections could be made, in order to safeguard British interests in the Iberian peninsula.⁴⁸ The Alliance ranged liberal Britain and France, together with Spain and Portugal, in juxtaposition to the eastern courts, who had declared their conservative union at Munchengrätz in 1833. Specifically, Palmerston had envisioned the Quadruple Alliance as a means to counteract meddling by the eastern courts in West European affairs, especially in the Iberian states.⁴⁹

Subsequent affairs in the Near East, however, caused a shift in the polarization of East and West and also in Palmerston's receptivity to an Anglo-French entente. In 1832 Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt and vassal to Sultan Mahmoud of the Ottoman Empire, revolted against his suzerain and sought to establish his own Islamic empire. Mehemet Ali's subsequent victory over the Ottoman Pasha at Koniah in 1832 whetted the Egyptian's appetite for extending his power, and the Ottoman Empire was seriously threatened with dissolution.⁵⁰

Mehemet Ali's challenge to the Porte aroused the interest of the great powers because at issue, now, was not merely the independence of Turkey, but also the outcome of the Eastern Question. Palmerston was especially interested in maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire because of Britain's developing routes of trade through the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. He did not want a hostile power interfering with those routes.⁵¹ In addition, Turkey also figured in the European balance of power, and on July 11, 1833, Palmerston declared in Parliament, "The integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire are necessary to the maintenance of the tranquility, the liberty, and the

balance of power in the rest of Europe." ⁵²

On the other hand, Russia was quite willing to share in a partition of Turkey which would benefit her, or, as an alternative she sought a position of influence over the Porte, especially concerning the right of passage through the Dardanelles. With respect to the Eastern Question, France usually supported Britain in opposition to Russia, as the French also had commercial interests in the Near East, ⁵³

When the British cabinet, for reasons of economy, balked at Palmerston's request for prompt support for the Porte, in order to ward off Mehemet Ali's threat, the Sultan turned to Russia, who obliged him for a price. ⁵⁴ That price was the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Unkiar Skelesse of July 8, 1833, by which Russia, in a secret clause, obtained exclusive, unilateral rights of passage through the Dardanelles Straits in time of war. In alarm, Britain and France belatedly moved warships to the entrance of the Straits, but the Russians had already obtained their position of advantage. ⁵⁵

Nevertheless, the peace concluded between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali did not endure and the outcome smashed Palmerston's confidence in an Anglo-French understanding. In April 1839, Ali again attempted to augment his own territory at the expense of his nominal master, the Porte. With a victory at Nesib, Ali again posed a threat to the Mediterranean status quo, and, again the interest of the great powers was awakened. However, this time the French sought a Turco-Egyptian accommodation in which France would secure added influence in the Levant. The Russians, on the other hand, perceived the possibility of driving

a wedge between Britain and France by moving closer to Britain.⁵⁶

Although Lord Palmerston recognized that Russia's fundamental interests would remain, he was just as concerned about the French maneuver and, in keeping with the concept of equilibrium of power, he forsook Britain's partner of the Quadruple Alliance and joined Russia and Austria in opposition to France. At stake was not only the balance of power but also war. Facing stiff opposition from members of the British cabinet, who saw less harm in allowing France a wider role in the Near East than in acting in accord with Imperial Russia, Palmerston steadfastly opposed France, even to the brink of armed conflict. As with Belgium, the French again faced isolation, and backing down, they agreed to a general settlement by the great powers in 1841, whereby the integrity of Turkey was once more guaranteed.⁵⁷

From Palmerston's personal point of view, the French had behaved badly, and he asserted that they could not be depended upon because they were too "knavish."⁵⁸ Thus, by 1841, the possibility of an Anglo-French entente no longer entered into Palmerston's diplomacy.

During the subsequent Conservative ministry of Sir Robert Peel, 1841 - 1846, Lord Aberdeen was again foreign secretary, and much to Palmerston's chagrin, he was willing to enter into an accommodation with King Louis Philippe and his foreign minister, François Pierre Guizot.⁵⁹

Palmerston complained:

We have always beaten the French in battle by sea and by land by the simple process of standing our ground the longest and by the same means we can always carry our points against them in diplomacy.⁶⁰

Palmerston was especially incensed at Aberdeen's permissive attitude toward growing French influence in Spain, which Palmerston viewed as

British subservience, but which Aberdeen regarded as an acceptable concession for establishing an Anglo-French entente predicated upon good will and trust.⁶¹

Palmerston resolved to set matters right when he returned to the Foreign Office in 1846, with the Whig Government of Prime Minister Lord John Russell. That period marked the onset of strained relations with the House of Orleans. In particular, the affair of the Spanish Marriages exacerbated Anglo-French relations. Louis Philippe attempted to obtain overwhelming influence over Spain's future by linking through marriage the House of Orleans with the Spanish Bourbons, a move which Lord Palmerston vigorously opposed.⁶²

The turning point in this dynastic struggle occurred when the French monarch and his foreign minister, Guizot, scored a diplomatic coup de main over Palmerston by revealing to the Spanish royal household a copy of one of Palmerston's confidential dispatches in which the British foreign secretary had made indiscreet remarks about the Spanish government. Contrary to Palmerston's wishes, on October 10, 1846, Queen Isabella of Spain married her cousin the Duke of Cadiz and her sister, the Infanta, married the Duke of Montpensier, Louis Philippe's youngest son. The maneuvers of Louis Philippe and Guizot served to confirm Palmerston's suspicions concerning France's leaders, and the British understanding with France, which Aberdeen had so ardently nurtured, fell by the wayside.⁶³

Palmerston declared:

Depend on it whatever he may say or swear to the contrary Louis Philippe hates England as a power from the very bottom of his heart as the natural obstacle to the aggrandizement of France... and if ever he could put his heel on our neck it would be shod with iron. 64

Palmerston's distrust of French political leaders was a characteristic of his diplomacy in 1848, and it was indicative of the Viscount's general penchant for developing personal antagonisms toward foreign officials. That perceptive virtuoso of diplomacy, Prince Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, recognized Palmerston's positive qualities, such as his dextrous mind and facility for expression, but also his shortcomings, which the Frenchman described:

But a trait of his character spoils all these advantages and prevents him....from being rated a statesman: he is so impassioned in public affairs that he will sacrifice the greatest interests to his resentments; almost every political question is complicated in his case by a personal question. 65

To be sure, Talleyrand's assessment was undoubtedly a partisan one. However, an element of truth was also present; there were few foreign leaders who evoked in Palmerston a lukewarm attitude.⁶⁶

Revenge did come for Palmerston in 1847 in the so-called Sonderbund crisis of Switzerland. In September, when Swiss radicals in the Federal diet attempted to dissolve a league of autonomy-minded Catholic cantons, known as the Sonderbund, and to expel Jesuit religious leaders considered reactionaries, a civil war erupted. In response, Austria's Prince Metternich intimated that Austrian troops would intervene on behalf of the Jesuits and cantonal sovereignty. Austria had no desire to have as her neighbor a liberal Swiss democratic republic. However, not desiring to move without France and believing that Guizot held similar views of Swiss events, he invited the French foreign minister to joint Franco-Austrian intervention in Switzerland.⁶⁷

Guizot had other ideas. Although he would have willingly joined France to Austria in a joint move, liberals in the French legislature would have protested such a reactionary policy, and, as matters stood, Guizot had to negotiate with Metternich very covertly. Nevertheless, Guizot perceived a means of intervening in Switzerland while simultaneously shoring up his government's popularity, which had declined because of the rift in relations with Britain over the Spanish Marriages. While warning Austria against any unilateral intervention in Switzerland, Guizot put forward several proposals for joint intervention by the great powers, including Britain. Through such schemes, Guizot sought to regain domestic popularity by demonstrating his ability to lead the great powers in a Swiss peace settlement, to induce Palmerston's participation while secretly moving closer to Metternich in political orientation, and to ensure that the ever-more conservative July Monarchy did not have to contend with a surly, democratic republic on its border.⁶⁸

Unfortunately for Guizot, Lord Palmerston displayed a marked indifference to the French plans. At first, Palmerston declined to associate his own policy with Guizot's, the individual who had caused him so much vexation in the affair of the Spanish Marriages. For although Palmerston had long held distinct reservations about the program of centralization propounded by the Swiss radicals, he also recognized their political strength and their potential for ultimately ensuring the peace and stability of Switzerland. In order to forestall intervention by the great powers, Palmerston repeatedly urged both sides in Switzerland, radical and reactionary, to exercise moderation.⁶⁹

When Palmerston finally offered Guizot a counter-proposal for joint mediation, the end result of the Swiss affair was already highly probable, though not completely certain. Palmerston's moves, or lack of them, had amounted to stalling tactics which allowed the Swiss radicals sufficient time to defeat the dissenting, minority Catholic cantons in December 1847. Contrary to the wishes of Guizot and Louis Philippe, as well as Metternich, in 1848, a liberal Swiss republic was established with a constitution similar to that of the United States.⁷⁰

Although no advocate of republican government, Lord Palmerston had subordinated his personal political ideology for other considerations. First and foremost, the expeditious victory of the Swiss radicals had ensured that no great power would interfere in Switzerland and upset European stability. Also, Palmerston had foiled his rival, Guizot, and obtained his revenge for the Spanish Marriages defeat. Moreover, cooperation with the conservative eastern powers in suppressing the Swiss radicals would have been extremely unpopular with Palmerston's own radical supporters in the British Parliament, whereas the line of action he did pursue had raised his image as a liberal. Great power intervention would have also been at variance with his own inclination for supporting moderate constitutional reforms and his predilection for upholding the guarantees of the Vienna settlement, which had established Switzerland as a neutral state.⁷¹ In addition, the fact that Palmerston did not immediately join the other powers in an international conference on Switzerland is indicative of his selective approach to such convocations,

Guizot, on the other hand, was left with the disagreeable task of extricating himself from the Swiss affair. His attempt to make France the leader of the Concert of Europe had been blocked by Palmerston's inaction until it was too late. Instead of a brilliant victory, Guizot had to explain away in the French chambers his own ambiguous relations with the other powers.⁷² Indeed, for Guizot, Louis Philippe and Metternich time was running out, as discontented political leaders throughout Europe, buoyed by the success of the radicals in Switzerland, prepared for their own attempts at revolutionary reform.⁷³

It can be seen, then, that Lord Palmerston's diplomacy contained several elements reminiscent of previous British foreign secretaries, particularly Canning and Castlereagh. Palmerston also believed that, in the Canning tradition, Britain could have no eternal allies, but would act in concert, from time to time, with various European states to achieve policy objectives. In keeping with the tradition of Castlereagh, international conferences were relied upon, although primarily when the outcome would be advantageous to Britain, as in the instance of Belgium.

Certain elements of conducting foreign policy were more pronounced in Palmerston. There was a willingness to go to the brink of war, even in the face of cabinet opposition, in order to secure a diplomatic goal, as in the case of the Mehmet Ali affair in 1840. Furthermore, Palmerston tended to inject his strong personal attitudes into his foreign policy, as evidenced by his diplomatic duels with Guizot concerning the Spanish Marriages and Sonderbund questions. First and foremost, however, Palmerston

aimed to maintain British interests and to keep Britain in first place in the eyes of the world. The foreign secretary summed up this viewpoint:

My doctrine is that we should reckon on ourselves; pursue a policy of our own; aim at objects of our own, and act upon principles of our own; use other Governments as we can..., but never place ourselves in the wake of them. Lead when and where we can; but follow never. 74

Thus, Palmerston had no doubts as to where Britain should stand among the great powers.

CHAPTER I

NOTES

¹Palmerston was British foreign secretary during the following years: 1830 to 1834, 1835 to 1841, and 1846 to 1851.

²René Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and France: Adaptations to a Changing Context of Power (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 21-22, 24-26. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), pp. 149-151.

³Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 25-26. William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 70. In fact, British governments during the first half of the Victorian era (1837-1870), maintained a policy of restricting territorial expansion because they believed colonies to be a drain on state finances. Nevertheless, Great Britain secured control over Aden, Perim and Punjab during this period. See Paul Knaplund, The British Empire, 1815-1939 (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1941), pp. 147, 187, 190.

⁴For example, in a Parliamentary debate on June 12, 1849, Palmerston said that England's commercial, colonial and maritime interests provoked a great deal of jealousy among the nations. He also stated that Britain was wholeheartedly for peace, but this did not mean that she would be unwilling to go to war if attacked. The debate concerned whether Britain should accept the principle of international arbitration, and Palmerston was against the concept. Palmerston, Address Parliament, June 12, 1849, Ashley, II, 60-61. See also Henry John Temple, Third Viscount Palmerston, Opinions and Policy of Viscount Palmerston as Minister, Diplomatist, and Statesman, Memoir by G.H. Francis (London: Colburn and Co., 1852, 1972 reprint), pp. 478-480.

⁵B.R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 360-361, 391-392, 615, 618.

⁶The original painting presently hangs in the National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. Joseph M.W. Turner, Joseph Mallard William Turner, text by John Walker (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1976), p. 112. In 1847 the United Kingdom's exports were valued at £ 59 million. Mitchell, p. 488.

⁷Christopher J. Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power, 1815-1853 (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 342, Appendix III. Kennedy cites a lower figure of 164 British warships in commission in 1848 with 35 stationed in home waters. See Kennedy, pp. 170-171.

⁸Bartlett, p. 343. Appendix IV.

⁹This was the population in 1841, and by 1851 it had reached 17,928,000. Mitchell, p. 24.

¹⁰Bell, I, 61.

¹¹Albrecht-Carrié, pp. xii, 23-24, 49. A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954, 1971 reprint), pp. xix-xx, xxiv-xxv, xxx-xxxiii. Kennedy, pp. 171-172.

¹²During Parliamentary debates on defense expenditures, Palmerston exhibited an awareness of British anxieties by his direct references to the possibility of a French invasion. For example, in a debate in 1845, Palmerston called attention to France's increased military power, especially her steam navy. He argued that Britain must be prepared to repel a French invasion. Palmerston, pp. 461-462.

¹³Palmerston duly took note of these unfriendly ideas. In June 1848, Palmerston circulated a smuggled copy of a secret strategy report that had been prepared for French naval officers and which recommended the formation of French flotillas of steam corsairs designed specifically for preying upon British merchant ships. See Palmerston, Memorandum, "Secret," June 17, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/807 and "Maritime Power of France," F.O., "Confidential," June 17, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30, 22/7C. For additional information on the French strategy of the guerre de course see Theodore Ropp, "Continental Doctrines of Sea Power," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 446-456.

¹⁴Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power: a Case History of One of the Great Concepts of European Statecraft (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1955, 1967 reprint), 33-34, 65-70.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 67-70.

¹⁶Palmerston, Address, Parliament, March 1, 1848, Ashley, II, 62.

¹⁷Palmerston expressed such sentiments in 1846. See Palmerston to Russell, F.O., July 30, 1846, Ashley, II, 12-14.

¹⁸Gulich, pp. 269-285. Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna: a Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1822 (New York: Viking Press, 1946), pp. 242-245. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, n.d.), pp. 108, 183. Sir Charles K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815 (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1966), p. 165. The foremost study of Castlereagh's foreign policy remains Sir Charles K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain and the European Alliance (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1925), two vols.

¹⁹Christopher J. Bartlett, "Britain and the European Balance, 1815-48," in Europe's Balance of Power, 1815-1848, ed. Alan Sked (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1979), pp. 148-149. Kissinger, pp. 214-231, 247-319. The Concert of Europe, ed. René Albrecht-Carrié (New York: Walker and Company, 1968), pp. 4-5. Nicolson, pp. 257-271. It should be noted that not all historians have interpreted the congress system of 1814-1822 as an example of self-limitation and united action for peace. Indeed, one historian questions the basic concept of a concert of Europe and sees self-interest as the prime motivation behind the actions of the great powers during the various international conferences of 1814-1822. See Pierre Renouvin, Histoire des relations internationales, Tome cinquième, Le XIXe siècle (Pt. 1): de 1815 à 1871. 1'Europe des nationalités et l'éveil de nouveaux mondes (Paris: Hachette, 1954), p. 57.

²⁰Canning called Metternich the "greatest rogue and liar in Europe, perhaps the civilized world." Harold Nicolson, p. 272. See also F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 211-212. Bartlett, "Britain and...", pp. 150-151. Kissinger, pp. 314-315. For a more detailed treatment of Canning's foreign policy see Sir Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of George Canning, 1822-1927 (London: George Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1925). See also Algernon Cecil, British Foreign Secretaries, 1807-1916: Studies in Personality and Policy (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1927, 1971 reprint), Ch II. P.J.V. Rolo, George Canning: Three Biographical Studies (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1965).

²¹Canning rebuffed the reactionary views of the eastern courts by calling for recognition of the various South American states that had declared their independence from Spain and Portugal. He asserted in Parliament in 1826, "I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." Nicolson, p. 273.

²²Bartlett, "Britain and ...," pp. 150-151. Cecil, pp. 81-85. Rolo, pp. 235-246. Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 38-39. R.W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789-1914: a Survey of Foreign Policy (New York: Howard Fertig, 1937, 1968 reprint), pp. 98-118.

²³Seton-Watson, p. 119. Bell, I, pp. 59-60, 66.

²⁴Between the ministries of Canning and Wellington there was the five-month government of Lord Goderich, which distinguished itself by the lack of distinction. Seton-Watson, pp. 121-132. Trevelyan points out that by passing Catholic emancipation, Wellington had alienated those elements of the polity who would have supported him most vociferously against the approaching assault of the Liberals. See George Macaulay Trevelyan, British History in the Nineteenth Century, 1782-1901 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1924), p. 221.

²⁵Seton-Watson, pp. 129-141.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 125-126, 129-140. For texts of the various Greek protocols and convention, see The Concert of Europe, pp. 102-128. See also Elie Halevy, A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century, II: The Liberal Awakening, 1815-1830 (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1961), pp. 256-258. Bell, I, 66. Cecil, pp. 105-108.

²⁷It was during his tenure as Secretary at War in the Wellington Ministry that Palmerston first developed an adversary relationship with Aberdeen regarding foreign affairs. Bell, I, 65-66.

²⁸Ibid., I, 59-60, 98. Bartlett, "Britain and ...," 151-152.

²⁹Bartlett, "Britain and ...," pp. 152-153. Geoffrey Bruun, Europe and the French Imperium, 1799-1814 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1938, 1965 reprint), p. 95.

³⁰Bartlett, "Britain and ...," p. 153.

³¹Ibid., pp. 152-153.

³²Ibid., p. 152.

³³Mabell, Countess of Airlie, Lady Palmerston and Her Times (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1922), I, 173.

³⁴Bullen, p.5.

³⁵Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, I, 74.

³⁶Ibid., I, 139. Bartlett, "Britain and ...," p. 153.

³⁷Palmerston to Granville, Private Letter, January 7, 1831, Granville MSS., P.R.O. 30/29/404 as printed in Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902 (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 216-218. Bullen, pp. 5-7. Bartlett, "Britain and ...," p. 153. Albrecht-Carrié, p. 59. On February 18, 1831, Palmerston stated in the House of Commons his reasons for interfering and in abrogating the Settlements of 1814-1815, which had linked Belgium to the Kingdom of Holland. Palmerston explained, "Events having occurred which rendered that union no longer possible, the powers, parties to the treaty by which the union was established, had a right to concern themselves with the separation of those countries." Palmerston, p. 156.

³⁸Bullen, p. 6. Bartlett, "Britain and ...," p. 153. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 112.

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Bullen, p. 7. Bartlett, "Britain and . . .," pp. 153-154. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 166-176.

⁴⁰Castlereagh's early tenure as foreign secretary encompassed the final years of the Napoleonic wars, 1812-1815, and the achievement of a coalition of military force against the French emperor. Also, Canning had sent a small British force to Portugal, along with warships, to enforce British foreign policy in 1826. Bartlett, "Britain and . . .," pp. 149-150. Cecil, p. 14.

⁴¹Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 174. Bullen, p. 7. Bartlett, "Britain and . . .," p. 154. For the texts of various international documents concerning the creation and neutralization of Belgium see The Concert of Europe, pp. 60-98.

⁴²Bartlett, "Britain and . . .," p. 154.

⁴³Ibid., Bell, I, 102-103, 151. Bullen, p. 8. Donald Southgate, The Passing of the Whigs, 1832-1886 (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1962), p. 274.

⁴⁴The treaty actually creating the new state of Belgium was signed between representatives of Belgium and Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia on November 15, 1831. The Concert of Europe, pp. 85-86. In similar fashion, Palmerston was able to secure the cooperation of France and Russia in order to expand the original Greek borders northward, making the new state more viable, in 1832. See Bell, I, 112. Seton-Watson, p. 141.

⁴⁵Bullen, p. 6-7, 201-202. Albrecht-Carrié, p. 62.

⁴⁶Palmerston to Howard de Walden, May 20, 1836, Broadlands Papers, as quoted by Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 414. See also Bartlett, "Britain and . . .," p. 154. On February 9, 1832, Palmerston had declared in Parliament, "We are fully sensible of the value of the friendship of so liberal and intelligent a power as France. We hope that we have established on a firm basis peace and amity between England and France." Palmerston, Address, Parliament, February 9, 1832, Palmerston, p. 192.

⁴⁷Bartlett, "Britain and . . .," p. 156. Bullen, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁸Speaking of the Quadruple Alliance, Palmerston wrote to his brother, "I carried it through the Cabinet by a coup de main, taking them by surprise, and not leaving them time to make objections." Palmerston to W. Temple, April 21, 1834, Broadlands MSS., GC/TE no. 219, as printed in Bourne, p. 223.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 223-224. Bartlett, "Britain and...", p. 154-155. Hinsley, p. 216. H.W. Carless Davis, The Age of Grey and Peel: Being the Ford Lectures for 1926 (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1929, 1964 reprint), p.233.

⁵⁰Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 64-65.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 66, Seton-Watson, p. 192.

⁵²Palmerston, Address, House of Commons, July 11, 1833, Palmerston, p. 246.

⁵³Harold N. Ingle, Nesselrode and the Russian Rapprochement with Britain, 1836-1844 (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 57-58. Albrecht-Carrié, p. 66.

⁵⁴Palmerston was piqued by the cabinet's resistance and, as evidenced by a letter to Lord Melbourne in 1840, he did not forget the incident. See Palmerston to Melbourne, July 5, 1840, Broadlands MSS., GC/ME no. 536, as printed in Bourne, p. 246.

⁵⁵Bartlett, "Britain and...", p. 157. Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 66-67. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 273-319.

⁵⁶Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 70-81. Bell, I, Ch. XIV. Ingle, p. 124.

⁵⁷Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 71-81. Bell, I, Ch. XIV. Ingle, pp. 124-133. Bullen, pp. 20-22.

⁵⁸Palmerston to Howard de Walden, October 31, 1840, Howard de Walden Papers, B.M., ADD. MSS. 45176, as quoted in Bullen, p. 23.

⁵⁹Bullen, pp. 29-33.

⁶⁰Palmerston to Easthope, September 9, 1842, B.P., GC/EA/31 as quoted by Bullen, p. 32.

⁶¹Bullen, pp. 28-29, 37, 48-49. Bell, I, 329-330.

⁶²Bullen, Ch. IV.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 109-119, 194. Seton-Watson, pp. 242-248. Ridley, pp. 308-320.

⁶⁴Palmerston to Normanby, March 14, 1847, B.P., GC/NO/438, as quoted by Bullen, p. 195.

⁶⁵Prince Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, Memoires du Prince de Talleyrand, ed. Duc de Broglie (Paris: Calmann Levy, 1891-1892), III, 406-407, as quoted by Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 55-56.

⁶⁶Palmerston's remarks concerning Mehemet Ali illustrate this point. He acknowledged that he hated Ali, though he was an ignorant barbarian and characterized Egyptian civilization under him as "humbug." Bell, I, 311. Seton-Watson, p. 194.

⁶⁷Bullen, pp. 293-298. Ann G. Imlah, Britain and Switzerland, 1845-60: a Study of Anglo-Swiss Relations During Some Crucial Years for Swiss Neutrality (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1966), pp. 37-38.

⁶⁸Bullen, pp. 297-299. Imlah, pp. 24-26.

⁶⁹Bullen, pp. 298-304. As early as 1832 Palmerston had been inclined toward sovereignty of the individual cantons, as desired by the great powers in the Vienna settlement. The powers had reasoned that a decentralized government would be the best guarantee that Switzerland could not formulate an active foreign policy and would remain a loose-knit, neutral state. See Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, p. 227. Imlah, pp. 7-8, 37-39. Moreover, as late as September 1847, Palmerston was still urging protection of the principle of cantonal sovereignty. See Palmerston to Minto, September 18, 1847, P.R.O., Draft, F.O. 44/1, as printed in Bourne, p. 282.

⁷⁰Bullen, pp. 304-315. William L. Langer, Political and Social Upheaval, 1833-1852 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969), p. 135. Imlah claims Palmerston did not intentionally delay the joint mediation effort out of a desire to defeat Guizot diplomatically but rather because the British foreign secretary realistically perceived the political supremacy of the Swiss radicals, and his inclination to support them was a frank acknowledgement of their advantageous position. Imlah, pp. 37-40.

⁷¹Imlah, pp. 7, 38. Southgate, pp. 271-274. Ridley, p. 331. For Palmerston's anti-republican bias see Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 27, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/463. See also Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/464/2. For the same communiqué see Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 28, 1848, Ashley, II, 73.

⁷²Bullen, pp. 314-321.

⁷³Langer, Political and..., p. 136.

⁷⁴Palmerston to Lamb, March 21, 1838, Royal Archives, Windsor, Beauvale Papers, Box 13, as quoted by Bullen, p. 53.

CHAPTER II

THE PALMERSTONIAN TURN OF MIND

Before concentrating on Palmerston's activities in 1848, it is helpful to examine other Palmerstonian attitudes and some external factors which had a bearing on his foreign policy. For example, Palmerston firmly believed that Britain's constitutional monarchy was the best form of government,¹ and that it should be recommended to all monarchs who would accept reforms. A moderate constitution was for Palmerston a means of ensuring monarchical stability and of avoiding popular unrest.² Those monarchs who adopted such measures contributed to European tranquility and merited British support. As early as 1832 Palmerston declared in Parliament:

I consider the constitutional states to be the natural allies of this country; and, whoever may be in office conducting the affairs of Great Britain, I am persuaded that no English ministry will be performing its duty if it is inattentive to their interests.³

However, at home, Palmerston was most reluctant to advocate further social and political reforms. It was only with grave reservations that he supported the compromise Reform Bill of 1832, extending representation in large urban areas. He had yielded because he believed further delay in reform might lead to widespread protests and social revolution in Britain. Faced with this alternative, moderate, timely reform was desirable.⁴

As an aristocrat, Palmerston looked upon the members of his social class as the leaders of Britain. Granting limited suffrage to the middle class in 1832 was acceptable, but as with most other Whig aristocrats in Russell's government, he felt that the aristocracy should still guide Britain. Education and experience made the aristocratic class the best-suited to safeguard British interests.⁵ In 1831 Palmerston declared in the House of Commons:

The landed interest is the great foundation upon which rest the fabric of society, and the institutions of the country. I mean no disparagement to manufactures and commerce,...But the land of the country is the country itself and the owner of the land has the deepest and most permanent interest in its well-being; tied down to the soil, he must share the fortunes of his country, whether in its greatness or its fall.⁶

An essential element in Palmerston's foreign policy in 1848 would be his abiding concern that the revolutions of that year would not endanger the safety or diminish the social dominance of the British landed gentry, of whom he was a prominent member.

Palmerston's ancestral home was Broadlands in Romsey, Hampshire. Encompassing three square miles of fertile land and over one hundred and fifty separate buildings, in addition to its stately mansion, the Broadlands estate was a world unto itself, containing livestock, all manner of crops, and the delights of the River Test, which flowed by the mansion and which was populated with trout and ducks.⁷ Although Palmerston was exceptionally busy as foreign secretary and did not have very much time for leisure, he was able to take quick trips by train to his rural retreat where he entertained guests in the grand manner.⁸ In essence, Lord Palmerston had a settled position in the upper levels of Britain's

social world where the holding of political office was more of a social duty than an occupation worked at for salary.⁹

On the other hand, when the commonality was properly instructed, education and religion, Palmerston believed, provided excellent means of inculcating a feeling of loyalty to the homeland and a sense of commitment to the social order. To use a modern expression, education and religion promoted good "social conditioning."¹⁰ In adhering to this belief, Palmerston saw to it that on his estate in Ireland the tenants received both educational and religious instruction.¹¹

Because Ireland was in a state of unrest during the period 1847 to 1848, it is worth noting that Palmerston, as an English gentleman and Irish landholder, had definite ideas on Irish nationalism. His estate in County Sligo numbered 10,000 acres, and he, therefore, had a vested interest in a pacified Ireland.¹² In fact, he did all he could to ensure Irish conformity to British authority and to diminish the tenants' power. During the years of the Famine (1845-1851) Ireland's population was reduced by approximately 2 1/2 million because of starvation, disease and emigration.¹³ Palmerston believed there was a tenant conspiracy to expel the landlords, and he advocated laws to curb civil liberties. He also paid his tenants to relinquish their homesteads and migrate to Canada.¹⁴

Moreover, at the time when the Russell government was considering relief for the starving population of Ireland, Palmerston opposed such measures for able-bodied individuals on the grounds that laissez-faire economics, especially the principle of supply and demand, should determine

the amount of food available in Ireland. At that time, the iron laws of the marketplace had determined that it was more profitable for Irish landlords to export their produce, which added to the shortage of food already caused by the potato blight.¹⁵

Palmerston's views on domestic affairs won favor with many Parliamentary conservatives who saw him as a defender of order and with it the landed gentry.¹⁶ Yet, Palmerston's major contribution to Russell's Whig regime rested not in any conservative backing he gained, but the support his foreign policy obtained among members of a liberal-oriented faction known as Radicals. Because Russell's Whig government lacked a majority in Parliament, Radical support was needed to remain in office. Palmerston's popularity, therefore, was important to the Russell government. As long as Palmerston formulated his foreign policy in a manner which appeared at least outwardly liberal in its image, as in the case of the Sonderbund war, Radical support would be forthcoming, helping the Whigs to stay in power.¹⁷

Nevertheless, Palmerston and other members of the government also recognized that they had remained in office because Sir Robert Peel, the leading Conservative, chose to remain out of office and to support the Whigs.¹⁸ Palmerston acknowledged Peel's vital aid. On July 4, 1848, he wrote:

Peel and Graham gave us the other night just votes enough to make our majority to 15 and save us from overthrow, but they took care we should not have enough to give us a swaggering majority, so as to lead us to fancy we can do altogether without them.¹⁹

"Soured" by stormy Parliamentary sessions concerning repeal of the Corn Laws and the condition of Ireland, issues which had fragmented his party, Peel decided to abstain from office during 1847, 1848 and 1849.²⁰ But his followers, the Peelites, voted with the Whigs on the issue of free trade. The Whigs and Peelites were opposed by a second group of Conservatives, the Protectionists, led by Benjamin Disraeli. Therefore, Palmerston had to manage his diplomacy in a way that not only pleased the Radicals, but which also kept the Peelites relatively satisfied and separated from the Protectionists.²¹

Within his own Whig government, Palmerston's conduct of foreign policy was subject to the review of the prime minister and the cabinet. Although the cabinet members usually were not vitally interested in foreign policy, so long as peace and prosperity continued, they were in the habit of passing collegiate judgement on major diplomatic actions, as in the Mehemet Ali affair.²² Russell, as head of the government, had an abiding interest in foreign affairs.²³ At Palmerston's direction, Foreign Office dispatches, or their abstracts, were circulated among members of the cabinet.²⁴

However, Palmerston was careful to show the contents of only those communiqués he wished, and if a controversial route of action was initiated, Palmerston would not divulge it until it was a fait accompli act.²⁵ In 1846 this prompted Sir Charles Wood to write, "The mischief is done before we hear of anything." ²⁶ Palmerston's own attitude was summed up when he stated, "None but the men who are actually engaged in the conduct of an affair can justly understand all the bearings of the circumstances and the full value of all the separate incidents which it consists." ²⁷

Palmerston was even more selective in the documents he showed to members of Parliament, which he used to justify his foreign policy. The intended dispatches were carefully edited and presented in the form of Blue Books. Nevertheless, even these publications, which amounted to a detailed account of various affairs, were more extensive than what other foreign governments were prepared to display publicly, and, at times, the Blue Books proved embarrassing to foreign diplomats.²⁸

Although Lord Palmerston was obliging with respect to the diplomatic correspondence set before Parliament, he, nevertheless, did draw a line at how much he would reveal. During one debate over requested dispatches in 1834 he asserted in Parliament:

...if, in the present case, they [Parliament] are not willing to trust us with the maintenance of the honour of the country, without calling upon us, from day to day, to come down to this House, and produce the last despatches we have received, for the purpose of enabling them to judge whether our answers to those despatches are right or wrong - if, such, I say, be the opinion of the House, let them declare it, and let his Majesty's Ministers retire,...²⁹

Palmerston had his limits of openness.

For purposes of secrecy, Palmerston augmented his official Foreign Office correspondence with private letters. The private communiques usually contained franker expressions of Palmerston's opinions and tended to round out the attitudes and viewpoints expressed in the official dispatches. In this sense, they clarified points made in the diplomatic correspondence, but did not replace the official dispatches. The private letters were used to conceal Palmerston's more confidential ideas and plans from the prying eyes of both his governmental colleagues at home and inquisitive foreign agents abroad. In general, Palmerston's correspondence, both

official and private, was most detailed and prolific.³⁰

In addition to Russell, the cabinet and Parliament, Lord Palmerston had to contend with the opinion and attitudes of his monarch, Queen Victoria. The Queen, aided by Prince Albert, took seriously her royal prerogative of reviewing foreign policy. Already in 1846 and 1847 Victoria had insisted on censoring Palmerston's dispatches which caused him much irritation. Palmerston circumvented this encumbrance by submitting only select dispatches for royal review, and the Queen was most annoyed.³¹ For example, in April 1847 she wrote to Palmerston:

The Queen has several times asked Lord Palmerston, through Lord John Russell and personally, to see that drafts of our Foreign Ministers are not despatched previous to their being submitted to the Queen. Notwithstanding, this is still done,...The Queen, therefore, once more repeats her desire that Lord Palmerston should prevent the recurrence of this practice.³²

Moreover, Victoria tended to be ultra-royalist in her outlook, and she desired to impose her views on foreign policy. By 1848 the Queen and Palmerston were at odds over both the methods and substance of his diplomacy. Victoria's dislike of Palmerston originated in part from a personal incident which had upset her sense of morals. At Windsor Castle, in 1840 Lord Palmerston was discovered in the middle of the night in the bedroom of Mrs. Brand, one of Victoria's ladies-in-waiting.³³

On the other hand, one sector of influence which Palmerston took great pains not to lose touch with was the British press. In particular, he often submitted articles to three newspapers which usually reflected the Whig viewpoint, the Courier, the Morning Chronicle, and the Globe.³⁴

In 1841 Palmerston recommended Sir John Easthope, proprietor of the Morning Chronicle, for a baronetcy in order to "nail Easthope" and secure the allegiance of the paper.³⁵ Nevertheless, Palmerston was not entirely certain of his persuasiveness, as he wrote to Lady Cowper, later Lady Palmerston:

The fact is that the only influence which my office possesses over the Courier or any other paper is positive not negative. I could get him [the Editor] to insert an article I wished today but I have no means or power of preventing him from inserting any other of quite a different kind tomorrow I can compel but I cannot control. 36

Opposition papers of the Tories, such as the Post and the Standard, on the other hand, were sure to be critical of the Whigs and Palmerston.³⁷

One group of critics which had very little representation in Parliament³⁸ and very little of Palmerston's respect was the Chartists, a workingmen's organization that advocated, among several measures, universal suffrage and voting by secret ballot. The Chartists agitated for reform during the 1830's and 1840's and were part of the general unrest and industrial violence that affected many of the counties of England, including Palmerston's Hampshire.³⁹

Encouraged by the Paris revolution of 1848, while experiencing the hardship of a commercial crisis at home, the Chartists, together with Irish nationalists, raised the spectre of revolution in the British Isles. The Russell ministry called up troops and organized special police to deal with the threat to law and order.⁴⁰ In such an atmosphere, Lord Palmerston had to take care that he did not embroil Britain in any foreign question which precluded the deployment of troops at home or which raised

the level of agitation in the United Kingdom.

Thus, although Palmerston preferred to exercise his own initiative and authority in conducting foreign policy, as shown by the diligent manner in which he approached his work and his tight control over Foreign Office functions,⁴¹ the foreign secretary did not operate in a vacuum. In addition to external factors, such as consideration of the continental balance of power, he had to conduct foreign policy in a way that did not stir up too much opposition either in the cabinet, Parliament, Buckingham Palace or the countryside. His diplomacy affected not only Britain's best interests, but also those of the Whigs and his own career. How Palmerston directed relations towards France and Europe in 1848, given all the above-cited considerations, had significance for Britain and the revolutions of 1848.

PALMERSTON'S LIFE-STYLE

Just as significant for Palmerston's conduct of diplomacy were his lifestyle and personal characteristics, for these factors helped to shape the manner and techniques of his statecraft, as well as his abiding commitment to it. Born on October 20, 1784, into an Anglo-Irish family of ancient lineage and high social connections, Henry John Temple, later Third Viscount Palmerston, had a privileged position in life, which he took care never to relinquish, but which he also took care not to abuse.⁴²

Young Temple received a typical gentleman's education, including classics and languages, at Harrow, Edinburgh, and Cambridge. At Edinburgh he studied political economy under the philosopher, Dugald Stewart, who

expounded the laissez-faire doctrines of Adam Smith, an economic viewpoint which Palmerston espoused all his life.⁴³ In addition, he acquired a facility in French, Spanish, Italian, and later Portuguese.⁴⁴ As appropriate for a gentleman, Palmerston learned to ride a horse well, a pursuit which he followed into his eighties.⁴⁵

During his early years, Henry Temple exhibited qualities and traits that he would carry with him throughout his long, busy life. He was reported to be industrious and persevering, yet also jovial, even tempered, and a lover of social activities, sporting events and fashionable clothes.⁴⁶ In later years there would be added a certain jauntiness and insouciance in his personality which belied a very serious determination to carry on with the crushing burdens of both sitting in Parliament and serving as British foreign secretary. Above all else, however, Palmerston displayed an optimistic demeanor which seldom fell into eclipse and which sustained him through all manner of trials.⁴⁷

Palmerston's early political career developed only a part of his later talents. One biographer surmizes that one reason why he was willing to serve in the relatively minor post of Secretary of War, from 1809 to 1828, was because he wanted to devote sufficient time to an active social life,⁴⁸ which revolved around dinner parties, salons and the pursuit of women, both married and unmarried. His escapades earned him the sobriquet, "Lord Cupid." In essence, the young Viscount was a dandy and more a figure of the drawing room than of Parliament.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, as Secretary of War Palmerston worked hard enough at his task to accumulate a creditable record of achievement. Much of his time

was spent in handling matters of military finance, regulations and, most importantly, the annual Army estimates, which he presented to Parliament. His long tenure at this post emanated in part from his keen interest in military affairs,⁵⁰ and the knowledge enabled him in later years as foreign secretary to gauge Britain's strengths vis-a-vis the other European powers. For example, one reason why Palmerston was so persistent in his desire to force the French to back down from their position in 1840 in the Mehemet Ali affair was because he had knowledge of the poor state of their military establishment.⁵¹

When Palmerston became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the age of forty-six, he had reached a turning point in his life. Palmerston threw himself into his work and abandoned, to a large degree, his active social life. Indeed, as noted above, the twin demands of conducting Foreign Office business and defending his conduct in Parliament required an exceptionally long work day and very little time for leisure. During his first two years in office, for example, he did not have an opportunity to spend seven consecutive nights in the country. Unlike the foreign secretaries of the other great powers, where large staffs performed many of the functions of state and where the foreign secretary was not answerable to a legislature, Lord Palmerston wrote most of the dispatches himself, as well as performing other vital functions.⁵² Palmerston explained his personal conduct of Foreign Office business to Victoria: "In England the Ministers..are liable any day and everyday to defend themselves in Parliament; in order to do this, they must be minutely acquainted with all the details of the business of their offices..."⁵³

Thus, Palmerston had a professional reason for his personal performance of Foreign Office operations.

Nevertheless, Lord Palmerston's reluctance to delegate the more perfunctory duties of the Foreign Office indicates more than a professional commitment to his work. For example, in addition to writing the drafts of all dispatches of any significance, Palmerston even took pains to personally write his own notes of invitation. Such an extreme interest in details and lack of attention to office organization bespeaks of an individual excessively concerned with daily operations which even the small clerical staff at the British Foreign Office could have handled. It appears that Palmerston was obsessed with the notion that his personal effort was required in all but the most menial matters, and he was willing to work the extra hours necessary to maintain close personal control over operations.⁵⁴

Palmerston's adamant insistence in doing most of the Foreign Office work himself took its toll. Although usually optimistic in outlook, occasionally Palmerston revealed his own impression of the demands of his position. In a letter to Lord Ponsonby, British ambassador in Vienna, Palmerston apologized for not maintaining more frequent communication and described the state of his existence:

The life I lead is like that of a man who on getting out of bed every morning, should be caught up by the end of one of the arms of a windmill and whirled round and round till he was again deposited at night to rest. 55

Yet, when Palmerston did communicate with British diplomatic representatives abroad, he often took time to include copies of dispatches from the other British embassies and, therefore, provided his representatives with a broad

picture of what was transpiring elsewhere.⁵⁶

Palmerston usually worked seven days per week and frequently past midnight.⁵⁷ On one occasion he related to a colleague that he had written through the night until his eyesight had finally given out,⁵⁸ Moreover, when Parliament was in session, his office required that he sit at the sessions and follow the debate. News of the Paris February Revolution of 1848 arrived at such a session.⁵⁹

At the Foreign Office, Palmerston was as demanding of his subordinates as he was of himself. Working at his stand-up desk, he kept his clerks busy transcribing dispatches and one of his two under-secretaries had to be on duty every day.⁶⁰ A story is related how one Sunday morning Palmerston arrived at the Foreign Office with Lady Palmerston and he noted that the head of the department was not at his post. A junior clerk explained that the senior official had gone to church, whereupon Palmerston became vexed. It took Lady Palmerston's intervention to quiet the foreign secretary's indignation.⁶¹

Indeed, Palmerston's under-secretaries were constantly over-worked, and they often took alternate leaves of absence to gain relief from their burdens. Palmerston likened them to the two statues of a weather house, one rustivating while the other laboring. Palmerston also bore down heavily upon the clerks at the Foreign Office. He continually urged them to step up their production of copied dispatches.⁶²

Similarly, Palmerston was quite demanding concerning penmanship. Because dispatches were transcribed in longhand, Palmerston had little

patience with communiqués written illegibly. For example, to one of his consuls he complained, that "A Dispatch must contain much valuable matter to reward one for deciphering such handwriting as this - which can only be comparable to Iron Railings leaning out of the perpendicular."⁶³ Concerning a second dispatch he remarked, "Reading Mr. R_____ 's handwriting is like running Penknives into one's eyes."⁶⁴ In addition, such matters as the quality of ink used, usually being too pale,⁶⁵ and protection of dispatches during transit were among the endless details Palmerston harped upon.⁶⁶

Palmerston's diplomatic corps are worth noting because they served as an extension of the British foreign secretary. That is, Palmerston usually had a direct say in picking his ambassadors, who were normally chosen from the ranks of the Whig party, and they were frequently as assertive in promoting British interests abroad as Palmerston was in furthering British interests from his London vantage point. In fact, Palmerston would defend the actions of his ambassadors to the fullest if they had faithfully carried out his orders. He claimed that complaints from foreign governments merely indicated that his representatives were performing their duty, i.e. promoting British interests.⁶⁷

At the age of fifty-five, Lord Palmerston took another step in life. He married his close companion, Emily Lamb, Lady Cowper, giving his life-style a new dimension. Along with being a steadying influence, Lady Palmerston was a social celebrity in her own right. Either in London or at Broadlands, the Palmerstons entertained lavishly, and they cemented those social and political ties which helped sustain Lord Palmerston during periods when his conduct of foreign affairs was called to question.⁶⁸

During busy times, as in 1848, the Palmerstons seldom had an opportunity to go to Broadlands, but when they did Lady Palmerston entertained the guests while the foreign secretary stayed ensconced in his study throughout the morning hours, at work on the ever-demanding diplomatic correspondence. Palmerston usually did not sit for lunch, but halfway through the meal he would appear and consume an orange. For exercise he would ride horseback daily. Thus, except for these occasional diversions from work, Palmerston left the entertaining to his socially astute wife, who made certain the Palmerston name remained prominent in high society.⁶⁹

Palmerston's wit never left him, as the following examples show. On one occasion Palmerston jokingly said that a prominent physician had recommended continuence in office as beneficial to one's health, whereupon a companion asked if being in active opposition would serve the same purpose. In reply Palmerston quipped, "No, no; that stirs up the bile and creates acidity. Ask Disraeli if it does not."⁷⁰ Another observer remarked about his joviality, "I never heard a heartier laugh than Lord Palmerston's: very deep down, and musical. He gave the impression of perfect good-humour."⁷¹

As good-humored as Palmerston may have been on occasion, he, nevertheless, disaffected many individuals, especially foreign representatives, by his blunt speech and brusque manners. He habitually kept ambassadors waiting for long periods of time outside his office, and after much delay and tardiness in an appointment, during the interview he often was sharp-tongued and abrupt. At bottom, both Palmerston's

personality and the constant press of business militated against his expending very much time on the amenities of conversation. Besides, as foreign secretary of the foremost industrial and naval power, Palmerston may have felt that he could afford to be abrasive, and, in this sense, he, perhaps, justly earned the sobriquet, "Lord Pumicestone." ⁷²

However, the general impression which Palmerston made upon others was, to some extent, inaccurate. One correspondent perceived him as follows:

He left on my recollection the impression of the possessor of a strong character, and intellect with a coarse grain in it, verging sometimes almost on brutality; and of a mind little exercised on subjects of thought beyond the immediate interests of public and private life; little cultivated, and drawing its store not from reading, but from experience,... ⁷³

Such a sketch, though partially appropriate, does not give full recognition to Palmerston's very real ability to digest and analyse the numerous details contained in the avalanche of dispatches that passed over his desk daily. If he did not read books, as had been asserted,⁷⁴ it was because he was steeped in mastering the texts of treaties and similar documents of diplomatic importance.⁷⁵ Moreover, if he was not reading such texts, he was, as in the case of Belgium, drafting many of these documents. His was an intellect of action, coupled with a passionate interest in the affairs of states.⁷⁶

Even in old age, Palmerston retained the appearance of a proud English gentleman. He has been described as follows:

...his black frock-coat buttoned across the well-knit and erect figure of middle stature, his sentences spoken towards the bar of the House; his grey short hair brushed forward, and the grey whiskers framing the head, erect on the shoulders. Some may remember, under the shaven chin, the loose bow-knot, neatly tied, at the throat, the bit of open shirt-front with short standing collars, 77

Thus, Palmerston's attention to his personal appearance was a hallmark of his image;⁷⁸ yet, in contrast, he could also appear to be plain and ordinary, while, at the same time, sound in his judgements and comments, which were attributable to his large fund of common sense.⁷⁹

In total, Lord Palmerston had many contradictory qualities. At times he was impetuous, yet he could show patience. He could be excruciatingly blunt in his speech, but he was also, at times, as gracious and good-mannered as any courtier. He was an ardent British patriot, yet, he was also concerned with the fate of other nations.⁸⁰ He worked doggedly at his statecraft, yet partook fully of sporting events and social affairs, as time permitted, without allowing old age to slow his pace.⁸¹ The two constants in his make-up were his excellent health and his sanguine outlook, which sustained him until his final end in 1865, after holding office, with few interruptions, for almost sixty years.⁸²

This, then, was the individual who directed British foreign policy in 1848. Lord Palmerston could draw upon twelve years of experience in his daily struggle to maintain British pre-eminence and stability in that year of revolution. Yet, as the great powers reeled under the tremors of political and social disorders, Palmerston would find that experience was not enough. His ingenuity and ironbound determination would also be called into play.

CHAPTER II

NOTES

¹Southgate, pp. 272-274

²Ibid., For an example of Palmerston's recommendations to European monarchs regarding the wisdom of promulgating constitutions see Palmerston to the British Representatives in Italy, Circular Dispatch, January 1848, Ashley, II, 2-3.

³Palmerston, Address, Parliament, August 2, 1832, Palmerston, p. 208.

⁴Palmerston, Address, Parliament, March 3, 1831. See also Ridley, pp. 147-150.

⁵Palmerston, Address, Parliament, March 3, 1831, Palmerston, pp. 169-171. Southgate, pp. 193-197. Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 5-6.

⁶Palmerston, Address, Parliament, March 3, 1831, Palmerston, pp. 172-173.

⁷Interview with Mr. Douglas Parvin, Staff Supervisor, Estate of the late Lord Mountbatton of Burma, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire, July 9, 1978. See also Ridley, pp. 62-63. Brian Connell, Portrait of a Whig Peer: Compiled from the Papers of the Second Viscount Palmerston, 1739 -1802 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1957), pp. 90-91.

⁸Airlie, II, 119. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 75. Ridley, p. 107. Bullen, p. 52.

⁹It should be noted that Palmerston was not free of debt. Indeed, as with other individuals of his social station, he was fashionably in debt, owing a heavy mortgage on Broadlands, £ 14,000 in 1817, which he inherited from his father, as well as costs of maintaining race horses and entertaining. On the other hand, Palmerston derived income from tenants on his estates and from investments in copper mining and a slate quarry. See Ridley, pp. 89-90.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 85. Palmerston to Minto, F.O., October 29, 1847, Ashley, II, 45. Palmerston to Leopold I, King of Belgium, Carlton Gardens, June 15, 1848, Ashley, II, 82.

¹¹Ridley, pp. 32-33, 90.

¹²Ibid., p. 32.

¹³Palmerston to Minto, F.O., December 3, 1847, Ashley, II, 49-50. Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Great Hunger: Ireland, 1845-1849 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 406-407. Lawrence J. McCaffrey, The Irish Question, 1800-1922 (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1968), p. 64. Ridley, p. 296.

¹⁴In 1847, nine ships bearing tenants from Lord Palmerston's estate in County Sligo arrived in Canada. A furor resulted from the fact that the tenants were allegedly starving, destitute and poorly clothed. Having entrusted his tenant removal program to agents, Palmerston was, most likely, unaware of the actual conditions under which his former tenants embarked to the New World. Palmerston had, in general, supported tenant ejection as a means of reducing the burden of relief created by what he considered Ireland's surplus population, which he believed represented an economic drain on the landed estates, including his own. Palmerston, Memorandum, March 31, 1848, Lord John Russell, The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840-1878, ed. G.P. Gooch (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1925). I, 223-225. Woodham-Smith, pp. 228-230. See also Bell, I, 411.

¹⁵Shipments of grain products intended for export had to be accompanied by armed guards to prevent looting by starving mobs. Ridley, pp. 321-322. McCaffrey, p. 65. George Dangerfield asserts that the grain and oats exported during the famine were not consumer products but commodities used to pay rents and were an integral part of Anglo-Irish transactions. To return these products to Ireland would have caused severe economic difficulties. However, in so stating, Dangerfield bypasses the more pressing question of feeding a starving population in Ireland, which would have consumed the grain and oats had it not been exported. See George Dangerfield, The Damnable Question: a Study in Anglo-Irish Relations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 13.

¹⁶Southgate, p. 274. Ridley, p. 333.

¹⁷Ridley, pp. 320, 323, 394, 400. J.B. Conacher, The Peelites and the Party System, 1846-1852 (Devon, England: David & Charles, 1972), pp. 10-12.

¹⁸Palmerston to Normanby, April 23, 1847, Ashley, II, 34-35.

¹⁹Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, July 4, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/480/1. Seven months earlier, Russell had written, "It is evident that a Tory Ministry can only succeed by a change of opinion, that a Peelite Ministry would be numerically weak. If this be so a Whig Ministry with Peelite elements, or a Peelite Ministry with Whig elements, afford the best chance of strength and stability. And of these the former would be the best, as the Whigs are the more numerous party of the two." Russell to Lord Lansdowne, January 4, 1848, Russell, I, 185. Sir Robert Peel also supported the Whigs because of the Conservative principle of espousing stability and order. The alternative to the Russell government at this time was, in Peel's view, political anarchy and chaos. See Norman Gash, "Peel and the Party System, 1830-1850," Royal Historical Society, Transactions (London: Royal Historical Society, 5th Ser., Vol. I (1951), pp. 55, 65-69.

²⁰In 1847, Palmerston wrote, "Peel seems to have made up his mind that for a year or two he cannot hope to form a party, and that he must give people a certain time to forget the events of last year [Repeal of the Corn Laws] ; in the meanwhile, it is evident that he does not wish that any other Government should be formed out of the people on his side of the House, because of that Government he would not be a member." Palmerston to Normanby, April 23, 1847, Ashley, II, 35.

²¹Southgate, pp. 131-132. Conacher, pp. 34-40, 48. For a thorough analysis of who composed the Peelites and their activities during each Parliamentary session from 1846 to 1849 see Wilbur D. Jones and Arvel B. Erickson, The Peelites, 1846-1857 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1972), Chs. 9-14.

²²Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, pp. 39-41.

²³As early as 1834, Russell considered himself quite able in foreign affairs, and prior to 1846 he, at times, had disagreed with Palmerston over the course of foreign policy. However, during the first years of his Ministry, 1846 to 1848, Russell and Palmerston were, for the most part, in agreement on foreign policy, and he generally backed his foreign secretary's decisions. Moreover, Russell's pre-occupation with domestic questions, such as the condition of Ireland, and his own poor health militated against his being able to keep continual watch over the diplomacy of the energetic Palmerston. Bullen, pp. 51, 60-61. Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B, MSS., GC/MI/592/2. Lord Spencer to the Duke of Bedford, March 6, 1848, Russell, I, 290. Spencer Walpole, The Life of Lord John Russell (New York: Haskell House Publishers Ltd., 1889, 1969 reprint), II, 5. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 39. Davis, p. 233.

²⁴Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 40. See also Sir Charles K. Webster, "Lord Palmerston at Work, 1830-1841," Studies in Anglo-French History: During the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, eds. Alfred Coville and Harold Temperley (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, Inc., 1935, 1967 reprint), pp. 63-68. Bullen, p. 65.

²⁵Bullen, pp. 63-65.

²⁶Wood to Russell, September 18, 1846, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/5C, as quoted by Bullen, p. 63.

²⁷Palmerston to Normanby, March 5, 1847, Mulgrave Castle, Yorkshire, Normanby Papers, Box P, Bundle 19, as quoted by Bullen, p. 64.

²⁸Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, pp. 60-63.

²⁹Palmerston, Address, Parliament, March 17, 1834, Palmerston, p. 257.

³⁰Palmerston was reputed to have written more dispatches than any foreign secretary before or after him. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 56, 63. See also Webster, "Lord Palmerston at Work...", p. 78.

³¹Connell, Regina vs. Palmerston..., pp. 18-19. Seton-Watson, p. 253. Ridley, pp. 392-394. Bullen, pp. 66-67.

³²Victoria to Palmerston, Buckingham Palace, April 17, 1847, Queen Victoria, The Letters of Queen Victoria: a Selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence Between the Years 1837-1861, eds. Arthur C. Benson and Viscount Esher (London: John Murray, 1907), II, 143.

³³Connell, pp. 18-19, 69. Bullen, pp. 66-67. Ridley, pp. 392-393.

³⁴Guy M. Townsend, "An Unusual Incident in Palmerston's Relations with the Press (May-June 1832)," in Quarterly Review of Historical Studies, XV, No. 4, (1975-76), p. 201. Connell, p. 68.

³⁵Bullen, p. 29, f.n. 17.

³⁶Palmerston to Lady Cowper, September 21, 1831, B.M., Lieven MSS., as quoted by Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 47-48.

³⁷In contrast, the Times maintained a more independent stance by reflecting the views of the party in power, yet criticizing, from time to time, the ministry. Townsend, pp. 197, 201.

³⁸The most prominent exponent of Chartism in Parliament was the nationally known Chartist leader and firebrand, Feargus O'Connor. J.T. Ward, Chartism (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973), pp. 195-197.

³⁹The fact that several prominent Chartist leaders were Irish probably intensified Palmerston's dislike of the group. Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 18, 1848, Ashley, II, 57-58. Palmerston to Minto, F.O., April 11, 1848, Ashley, II, 80. F.C. Mather, Public Order in the Age of the Chartists (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1959, 1967 reprint) pp. 1-11. F.C. Mather, "The Government and the Chartists," in Chartist Studies, ed. Asa Briggs (London: Macmillan, St. Martin's Press, 1959), pp. 373, 398-399. E.J. Hobsbawm and George Rudé, Captain Swing (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1968, 1975 reprint), pp. 196-197, 260-261.

⁴⁰Mather, Public Order..., pp. 13-28. Mather, "The Government...", pp. 394-395. D. Morier Evans, The Commercial Crisis, 1847-1848: Being Facts and Figures Illustrative of the Events of that Important Period Considered in Relation to the Three Epochs of the Railway Mania, the Food and Money Panic & the French Revolution (London: David & Charles Reprints, 1848, 1969 reprint), pp. 109-129. The exportation of British domestic products declined as the commercial panic and the continental revolutions, especially the one in France, took their toll. The value of exports dropped from £ 59 million in 1847 to £ 53 million in 1848. Mitchell, p. 488.

⁴¹Webster, "Lord Palmerston at Work...", pp. 61-81.

⁴²Ridley, pp. 1-6.

⁴³Bell, I, pp. 1-11.

⁴⁴Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 7, Lorne, p. 219.

⁴⁵Airlie, II, 119. Lorne, pp. 227-229. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 56.

⁴⁶Charles George Barrington, "Recollections of Lord Palmerston," History Today, XI (March 1961), 183. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 55-56, 58. Bell, I, 6-10.

⁴⁷Airlie, II, p. 121. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 56-57. Lorne, p. 227. Ridley, p. 93. Barrington, p. 186.

⁴⁸Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, pp. 9-10.

⁴⁹Ibid., I, 9-10, 55-56. Bell, I, 19, 45, 96-97. Ridley, pp. 41-45.

⁵⁰Bell, I, Ch. II. Ridley, 41, 48-63.

⁵¹Barrington, pp. 182, 184.

⁵²Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 56-58, 60, 65-66, 75. Sir Edward Hertslet, Recollections of the Old Foreign Office (London: John Murray, 1901), pp. 78, 85.

⁵³Palmerston to Victoria, Stanhope Street, February 25, 1838, Victoria, I, 136.

⁵⁴Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 57.

⁵⁵Ibid., I, 58.

⁵⁶Webster, "Lord Palmerston at Work...", p. 77.

⁵⁷Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 56-58, 60, 65-66,
75. Hertslet, pp. 78, 85.

⁵⁸Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 57-58.

⁵⁹Palmerston to Normanby, P.O., February 26, 1848, Ashley, II, 71.
Lorne, p. 225.

⁶⁰Barrington, p. 186. Lorne, p. 224. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 63-66. Webster, "Lord Palmerston at Work...", pp. 66-67, 72-73. Hertslet, p. 61.

⁶¹Hertslet, p. 61.

⁶²Webster, "Lord Palmerston at Work...", pp. 73-74.

⁶³Ibid., 79.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 80.

⁶⁵Guedalla, p. 200.

⁶⁶Webster, "Lord Palmerston at Work...", p. 80.

⁶⁷Bullen, p. 70.

⁶⁸Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 75. Airlie, II, 33, 119-122. Bell, I, 259-261.

⁶⁹Airlie, II, 119-122. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 75. Bell, I, 260-261.

⁷⁰Lorne, p. 222.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Bell, I, 96-99. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 58-59.

⁷³Lorne, pp. 223-224.

⁷⁴Monckton Milnes, Lord Houghton, made such an assertion. Ibid., p. 221.

⁷⁵Ibid. Walter Bagehot, Bagehot's Historical Essays, ed. Norman St. John-Stevas (New York: New York University Press, 1966), pp. 215-216. Webster The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 56, 156.

⁷⁶Palmerston's diligent work on the Belgian settlement earned him the sobriquet of "Protocol Palmerston." Guedalla, p. 163.

⁷⁷Lorne, pp. 214-215.

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 215-218.

⁷⁹Bagot, pp. 216-217.

⁸⁰Lorne, pp. 215, 230, Bell, II, 425-429.

⁸¹Lorne, pp. 228-229.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 230, 234. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 56. Lorne, p. v.

CHAPTER III

1848, THE THREAT OF REVOLUTION AND WAR

The most suspenseful period which Britain endured during the revolutionary years, 1848 and 1849, came between the February Revolution in Paris and the advent of General Eugène Cavaignac in June 1848. Although, subsequent months held the prospect of a general European war, Britain's gravest domestic peril came when Chartist and Irish nationalist agitators threatened to link up with continental revolutionaries. If such a union had been successful, it might have swept away Britain's traditional rulers. As a member of that political elite, Viscount Palmerston had reason to be fearful. The British foreign secretary had to ensure that his foreign policy maintained barriers against the possible fusion of British and continental revolutionary elements. He also had to maintain the general peace and preserve a continental balance of power that would be advantageous to Britain. Palmerston's personal interests, as well as those of his country, were at stake in maintaining the status quo. How Lord Palmerston came to grips with events both domestic and foreign was reflected in his diplomatic policy at the time.

Prior to the February Revolution, Palmerston had sought to maintain continental stability by preserving an equilibrium among the principal European states. However, as early as July 30, 1846, he recognized that Italy threatened to become a flashpoint for a disruptive European war. He informed Lord John Russell, that a European war would most likely result from France's intervention in Italy. Austria would react sharply to that action since Metternich regarded Austria's domination of Italy as a key

point of the Vienna settlement. Both Palmerston and Metternich shared a mistrust of France. In the Ballplatz mistrust was laid to France's revolutionary potential; London's mistrust included that fear along with apprehension about France's inconstancy. These fears had their basis in a sensitivity to the French liberals' speculation about profitable lines of foreign policy.¹

French liberals knew that if they probed along the Rhine they would encounter the joint opposition of Germany, Russia and probably Britain. In Italy, on the other hand, Austria could not expect effective international backing. Italy was the weak area where France could be expected to be regarded as a liberator by the Italians. There France could defeat Austria. Palmerston noted that Britain would not benefit from Austria's humiliation and the revival of French military power.²

To forestall that threat to the balance of power, and also to forestall Whig criticism for not having prevented the French intervention, Palmerston turned to the ploy of liberal reforms in Italy. He recommended that Britain induce the liberal-minded Pope Pius IX to institute governmental reforms in the Papal States, where Palmerston judged misgovernment to be the most flagrant and where the French would seek to interfere. Palmerston reasoned that such reforms would satisfy the subjects of the Pope and make them less susceptible to militant French liberalism.³

Then, in August 1847 Palmerston requested that Russell send his father-in-law, the Earl of Minto, on a diplomatic mission to Italy.

He could carry out a double task. He would go to Rome to enlist Papal aid in quelling unrest in Catholic Ireland. Minto would also go to Turin to promote Italian stability by lending moral support to Rome and Sardinia - Piedmont against the potential transgressions of their powerful neighbor, Austria.⁴ Such transgressions could lead to an Italian conflict which would involve France and bring on a European war. Moreover, the timely liberal, constitutional reforms which the "Old Whig" Minto would recommend also offered the prospect of blunting the impulse of the Italian republicans, whose ideology was repugnant to Palmerston, Russell and Queen Victoria.⁵

Lord Minto's trip evolved into that of a roving ambassador who tried to steer the Italian monarchs between two sources of unrest among their subjects, Austrian repression and radical republicanism.⁶ Minto visited the capitals of Turin, Florence, Rome and Naples where he tried to spread liberal Whig principles. He offered British moral support and tried to advance Britain's political influence, hoping all the while to secure the status quo by persuading Italian rulers to make timely reforms.⁷ To assist Minto's diplomatic effort towards these ends a British naval squadron put in an appearance in Italian waters.⁸

Early in 1848 Palmerston continued to exhort the heads of Italian states to grant constitutional reforms in order to ward off revolution and save their crowns. In January he sent a circular dispatch to the British diplomats in Italy in which he warned that foreign interference would ultimately occur if a conflict between a monarch and his subjects should develop -- interference that, he darkly suggested, would come from parties which were hostile to both the rulers and their subjects.⁹

Unfortunately for the calming efforts made by Palmerston and Minto, in January 1848 the Italian Peninsula erupted in a series of revolts. The British foreign secretary viewed this turn of Italian affairs with a sense of impending calamity. Palmerston immediately drafted a message to be relayed to Prince Metternich, which voiced his concern over a possible (as Palmerston wrote), "war of principles which, beginning in Italy, will spread over all Europe, and out of which the Austrian Empire will certainly not issue unchanged." ¹⁰ Palmerston strenuously advised the Austrian statesman not to meddle in Italian affairs and to abandon any plans for suppressing the uprisings in Italy.¹¹

Otherwise, noted Palmerston, French liberals, regardless of what the French king, Louis Philippe, and his foreign minister, François Guizot, had promised,¹¹ would come to the aid of the Italians. The ensuing conflict would engulf all Europe in a struggle certain to upset the balance of power and even to destroy the Austrian Empire. Palmerston emphasized that he viewed Austria as the central point of balance in the European equilibrium. A war fought to decide whether Austria should retain Lombardy and Venetia would probably oblige England to take the side opposite Austria.¹²

While Palmerston offered his message with some inserted phrases expressing his "regret," the message amounted to a stern warning to Austria. Its tone was calculated to raise Metternich's own concern for the balance of power which he believed to be essential to Austria's role in Europe.¹³ By February 14, 1848, the Austrian government had hastened to give assurances that it would not interfere in any progress towards

constitutional government which might be made in Italy apart from the Austrian territory there.¹⁴

Peace and an equilibrium of power on the continent, which would permit Britain to continue to prosper, were Palmerston's major diplomatic goals at this time. To these ends Palmerston outlined to Russell how he thought Britain should coordinate foreign relations with the other great powers vis-a-vis the prospect of a revolutionary turn in France's foreign policy. On February 14, 1848, Palmerston wrote that for reasons of safety against France, Britain should communicate freely and in a friendly spirit with Austria, Russia and Prussia. However, it would be advisable to avoid a concert of powers which would arouse the suspicion of France. Palmerston added, "I do not feel at all satisfied with the present state of things but from what quarter and or what manner danger may arise, it is not easy to say."¹⁵ Palmerston, seeing the storm clouds on the horizon, became more anxious than his normally jovial demeanor seemed to admit.¹⁶ Palmerston's concern about France, in particular, coincided with the views of the other European chancellories where since 1815 there had been an underlying fear of France, the possible revival of revolution and the imperial pretensions of Napoleon.¹⁷

However, in December 1847 Guizot had attempted to coordinate his diplomacy with that of the conservative Metternich in respect to tremors and movements in Switzerland and Italy. Both Austria and Russia were now somewhat more disposed toward France.¹⁸ In contrast to Palmerston's views on the alignment of the continental powers, Russia's foreign minister, Count Nesselrode, noted that it was conceivable that Britain would attempt to gain exclusive influence over Southern Italy; and if

British moves should place her in confrontation with the Italian designs of the French monarch, Britain would find herself "contre quartre," France, Russia, Prussia and Austria. Nesselrode had viewed Britain's attempts to press for liberal reforms in Italy as a "veritable plague."¹⁹ Thus, in contrast to France's turn toward the eastern powers, Britain had become more isolated vis-à-vis the other states. There was a possibility of an anti-British continental league,²⁰

Cognizant of the potential hostility of the other great powers, especially France, Palmerston and Russell diligently worked at developing plans for Britain's Channel defenses. The two British leaders exchanged ideas for expanding British militia forces as well as plans for adding more ships and fortifications.²¹ Palmerston observed to Russell that British and French naval vessels frequently encountered one another, thereby increasing the chances for a confrontation. In such an event, wrote Palmerston, "We should be obliged to go to an extreme point of humiliation or to put the whole country into confusion, either by hurried measures for defense, or by the disturbance of an actual invasion."²² Despite Palmerston's sense of urgency, the program worked out with Russell for a stouter defense against France was thwarted by an economy-minded Parliament which would not pass a new Militia Bill.²³ Therefore the brunt of defending Britain fell to the British Navy at a time when, as Russell was informed, French naval estimates were increasing.²⁴

Added to the anxiety stemming from what seemed a less than adequate military defense, there was the potentially explosive condition of civil unrest in the British Isles. The leaders of the Young Ireland

movement, which had rejected the pacifist methods of Daniel O'Connell, were agitating for Irish autonomy and were preparing for open rebellion.²⁵ Similarly, in the larger cities of England, local Chartist groups had armed themselves and appeared to be plotting insurrection.²⁶

With respect to the dangers looming in Ireland, Palmerston laid much blame at the feet of the younger Catholic priests who -- Palmerston believed -- were chagrined at not having received a portion of the Whig government's Irish relief fund.²⁷ Palmerston impressed upon Russell and later Lord Minto the need of enlisting the Pope's support for quelling the Irish insurgents as well as disciplining the priests.²⁸ The British foreign secretary reasoned that this was the least the Pontiff might do in return for all the efforts the British had made in preventing the Austrians from invading the Papal States.²⁹

It should be noted that Viscount Palmerston had a personal interest in keeping Ireland subdued. He was an Irish Peer with an estate in County Sligo.³⁰ Perhaps this private concern of Palmerston's helps to explain his vitriolic characterization of the Emerald Isle in December 1847 as being as uncivilized as the central regions of Africa and where crime was rampant.³¹ Palmerston added pointedly:

There is obviously a deliberate and extensive conspiracy among the priests and the peasantry to kill off or drive away all the proprietors of land, to prevent and deter any of their agents from collecting rent, and thus practically to transfer the land...from the landowner to the tenant. 32

Palmerston recommended hanging a dozen of the "miscreants." Indeed, if a priest were to be caught in the lot it would be like snaring a "ringed-necked pheasant in a battue."³³ Palmerston recognized the possibility of a full-scale social upheaval in Ireland,³⁴ It constituted a threat to his land and wealth as well as Britain's security.

Moreover, whatever troops might be needed to put down such a rebellion in Ireland further diminished the effectiveness of the meager land forces for repelling a foreign invasion, particularly by France. Thus, at a time when Europe was beginning to undergo the multiple shocks of revolution, Palmerston recognized that the United Kingdom was also showing signs of civil instability. It became imperative for Britain's foreign secretary to maintain a foreign policy which would not only keep Europe in equilibrium, but which would also separate continental revolutionaries from their kind at home.

As events during 1848 unfolded, Palmerston's reasoned, calculated warnings to Austria and Minto's advice, concerning constitutional reforms, to the heads of the Italian states proved to be an inadequate means of reducing tensions in Italy--tensions which could have resulted in the Franco-Austrian war that Palmerston abhorred. The possibility of French intervention in Italy required that Palmerston rethink his basic orientation toward that power, which by 1848 had become, in Palmerston's eyes, an inveterate rival.

Prior to the revolution in Paris on February 22-24, 1848, Anglo-French relations, though civil, were based upon mutual mistrust. Palmerston had succinctly expressed his opinion of the French royal

household to a colleague: "you may be quite sure that England has no bitterer enemies than all the Princes of the House of Orleans from Louis Philippe downwards..."³⁵

In general, Palmerston had preferred to treat France as a junior partner in any joint undertaking. However, in several diplomatic enterprises prior to 1848, King Louis Philippe and François Guizot had raised, in Palmerston's eyes, the prestige and influence of France at the expense of Britain. For example, in 1846 the French leaders had scored a diplomatic coup de main over Palmerston by revealing to the Spanish royal household a copy of one of Palmerston's confidential dispatches in which the British foreign minister had made indiscreet remarks about the Spanish government. Whereupon, the Spanish princess, over Palmerston's objections, chose Louis Philippe's youngest son for her husband, thus securing for France an added measure of influence in the Iberian Peninsula.³⁶ Therefore, in 1848 close cooperation with the Orleanist regime seemed remote. Yet the alternative, supporting the Austrians in Italy, was equally repugnant for Palmerston. Moreover, Palmerston recognized the commercial advantages that Britain would gain if the Italian Peninsula were to be free of both the Austrians and the nearby French influence.³⁷

THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

To Palmerston's surprise, the Paris revolution of 1848 swept away both his diplomatic adversaries: Louis Philippe and Guizot.³⁸ This unanticipated event moved Palmerston to remark, "strange that a king who owed his crown to a revolution brought about by royal blindness and obstinacy should have lost it by exactly the same means..."³⁹

The sudden turn of events opened the possibility of improved relations with France, and Palmerston on February 26, 1848, lost no time in impressing upon the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Normanby, Britain's desire for, as Palmerston emphasized, "friendship and extended commercial intercourse with France and peace between France and the rest of Europe." ⁴⁰

Palmerston added that Britain was prepared to prevent the rest of Europe from meddling in French affairs provided the new government in Paris refrained from attacking any other European country. Palmerston observed to Normanby that under these conditions relations could be more friendly than they had been under Louis Philippe and Guizot. ⁴¹ Normanby was instructed to remain in Paris and, as an unofficial representative of Britain, he was to keep in close communication with the new French Provisional Government. But he was to refrain from making any binding commitments or carry out any official functions since the new government seemed to be temporary in nature, and, from the standpoint of protocol, his credentials had been for the court of Louis Philippe. ⁴²

Moreover, there were disturbing aspects about the fall of the Orleans monarchy. The Provisional Government of Alphonse de Lamartine had alarmed all the chancellories despite its denials of any aggressive intentions and its acceptance of different forms of legitimate government. The three-day revolution had left Palmerston aghast, and he offered a gloomy scenario of what could transpire. On February 27, 1848, Palmerston wrote to Normanby that he could envision the Provisional Government sending the French Army to overrun Belgium in order to prevent

that force from participating in a domestic coup against the new republic in Paris. On the other hand, Palmerston hoped that some French general would reestablish stability and public order by just such a coup. In any event, Britain could not, in Palmerston's words, "sit quiet and see Belgium overrun and Antwerp become a French port; and even a war in other directions will sooner or later draw us into its vortex," ⁴³

In a private letter to Lord Normanby, also dated February 27, 1848, the British foreign secretary confided that he could not convince himself that France could, as he stated, "settle down" into a republic because the principle of equality would be a barrier to its permanence; because there was no one sufficiently eminent enough to receive widespread support; and lastly because, he believed, a large part of the French population preferred a permanent chief-of-state. ⁴⁴

Palmerston expressed his disdain for republics in general and a French republic in particular in a dispatch sent out the following day. He informed Normanby:

I grieve at the prospect of a republic in France, for I fear that it must lead to war in Europe and fresh agitation in England. Large republics seem to be essentially and inherently aggressive, and the aggression of the French will be resisted by the rest of Europe, and that is war....⁴⁵

Palmerston added a comment about his fears for Britain's tranquility. Universal suffrage in France, which the Provisional Government had just proclaimed, would leave Britain's own disenfranchised population "agog" and would, as Palmerston asserted, "stir up a demand for an inconvenient

extension of the suffrage, ballot, and other mischievous things. However, for the present, vive Lamartine! " 46

Thus, the sudden transformation of France from a monarchy to a republic--subject to mob rule from Palmerston's point of view--directly challenged the status quo on the continent and at home. His conservative attitude as a peer as well as his view of the proper form of government contrasted sharply with the civil egalitarianism of the new French republic. Still, Palmerston perceived one positive result stemming from the turmoil on the continent, a firmer position for the Whigs in Parliament. Palmerston concluded that "most people seem to agree that a change of government at this moment would be a public evil, as there are no set of men ready to succeed us with a chance of stability." 47

Palmerston's dispatches to the British ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna on February 29 revealed his keen sense of the reality of the situation. The February Revolution in Paris was a fait accompli that would be most difficult to reverse by outside pressure. Therefore, Palmerston sought to caution Russia, Prussia, and Austria that even though a republic might be repellent to the northern courts, as well as to himself, a reaction against Lamartine's fledgling government could cause it to collapse and bring in an even more radical, more militant regime. War could ensue.⁴⁸ Palmerston therefore concluded, "We must deal with things as they are, not as we would wish to have them." 49

Palmerston's attitude reflected his awareness of the long destructive wars of the Jacobin era when the European powers had tried to crush the First French Republic. In short, the alternative to continued diplomatic

relations with France was another general European war,⁵⁰ Palmerston expressed this view to the other great powers in the frankest terms: "If a republic is decidedly established, the other Great Powers of Europe must, of course, give credentials addressed to that Government or they will have to give billets to its troops."⁵¹

In the dispatches of February 29 to the embassies at Vienna and Berlin, Lord Palmerston urged timely constitutional reforms so that these governments could avoid the spread of social unrest to their own subjects. In particular, Palmerston remained concerned with Austria's possessions in Italy and the possibility of French intervention there.⁵² The precarious stability on the continent required, in Palmerston's way of thinking, some measures of domestic reform.

Another dispatch to St. Petersburg on March 4, 1848, revealed Palmerston's determination to slow the Russian impulse to move against France. Palmerston asked Bloomfield, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, to impress upon Count Nesselrode the fact that the peace of Europe seemed to rest upon his decisions and that any great military demonstration would incite the French Provisional Government to take action. Palmerston stressed the advisability of the alternative course of informing the French government that it need not fear interference in its internal affairs if it refrained from attacking its neighbors. It can be seen, then, that Palmerston was most earnest in wanting to prevent Russia, the most autocratic of the great powers, from unleashing the forces of reaction against the French republic and, in turn, precipitating the general European "war of principles" he so ardently wanted to avoid.⁵³

Notwithstanding Palmerston's sage comments to the principal chancellories, various European states made military preparations to meet what appeared to be a resurrected revolutionary France ready to renew the great French Revolution and even the Napoleonic era. Prussia and several other German states moved troops towards the Rhine; Belgium reinforced her defenses, and the King of Holland offered to Belgium his support. The Sardinian Army drew on its reserves to face a possible French invasion. More significantly, Nicholas I of Russia planned to move an army of 300,000 men to the Rhine, but he subsequently altered this rash decision in favor of a defensive posture within Russia. Nonetheless, Nicholas urged his fellow monarchs in Austria and the German states to shore up their defenses against an expected French onslaught.⁵⁴

In addition, the great powers turned to Great Britain for support. In Prussia, Frederick William IV wrote to Queen Victoria in highly emotional terms about what he perceived to be an attempt to spread the principles of revolution, as he put it, "by every means throughout the whole of Europe."⁵⁵ He called upon the monarchs of Europe to stand together, and he urged Palmerston to declare that the great powers were speaking as one on this grave issue.⁵⁶

Other monarchs added their entreaties to Frederick William's plea. Ralph Abercromby, the British ambassador in Turin, informed Russell that Britain was the country that Sardinia looked to for support.⁵⁷ In addition, King Leopold I of Belgium wrote to his niece, Queen Victoria, requesting the protection of Britain and the other great powers against

France.⁵⁸ Similarly, Bloomfield in St. Petersburg reported that the Tsar's government was looking with great anxiety to see what policy Britain intended to pursue toward republican France. Bloomfield wrote that the Russians did not believe that the British government might have any sympathy for the republic, and although they did not think Britain would join the other great powers in an alliance, she would be ready, they trusted, to cooperate with them in maintaining the territorial arrangements stipulated in the Treaty of Vienna.⁵⁹ Finally, Prince Metternich of Austria urged the governments of St. Petersburg, Berlin and London to present, with Austria, a united front against France and to offer both a policy of non-intervention and strong retribution if France disturbed the rest of Europe.⁶⁰

The intensity of the conservative monarchists' fears was expressed by Baron Christian von Bunsen, the Prussian ambassador in London, who told Palmerston that the Revolution of 1848 had thrown Europe back to the perils of 1793.⁶¹ For Bunsen, anarchy was the potential danger in what was transpiring, and he hoped that all governments would take a stand against the French "anarchists" on the basis of, as he expressed it, "law and civil liberty!"⁶²

On the following day, February 27, 1848, Bunsen informed the King of Prussia: "The man who has reflected most deeply on the state of Europe, in view of the catastrophe in France, is Ld. Palmerston. He is calmer and more serious than usual and even anxious,"⁶³ Indeed, Palmerston was both serious and anxious. On February 28 he wrote, "In fact the peace of Europe is now in the hands of the French govt. and with them

rests the question of peace of war." ⁶⁴ After a respite of half a century, France could again engulf Europe in a dreadful conflict.

PALMERSTON AND LAMARTINE

Lord Palmerston also received a request for closer relations from a surprising quarter--from Alphonse de Lamartine, head of the French Provisional Government and leader of a regime that could resurrect the bloodshed of the First French Republic and the Napoleonic wars. On February 27, 1848, the day after Lord Palmerston had penned his dispatch to Lord Normanby promising non-interference with republican France if she did not attack her neighbors, Normanby informed Palmerston of Lamartine's role as a focal point of stability within the Provisional Government. ⁶⁵ In the days that ensued, Normanby expanded upon this theme with a description of Lamartine's moderate behavior, his sincere desire for closer Anglo-French relations, as well as European peace, and the alternative, without Lamartine, of political chaos, the promulgation of communist doctrines, and a more radical French government. ⁶⁶

Most significant for Palmerston, Lamartine had begun to seek an alliance with Britain. On February 28, 1848, Lamartine confided, as Normanby reported, "that his first desire was the complete development of the English alliance;--that all his efforts should be directed to that object, and that in doing so, he felt assured he was promoting the only true interests of France." ⁶⁷ Lamartine added that a prompt show of support would bolster him and the other friends of order in France. ⁶⁸

Just as Palmerston had perceived that France held the key to war, Lamartine saw Britain holding the key to peace. He believed no anti-French coalition would be possible if Britain was not a party to it.

As Lamartine said, "Without England all continental war is but partial; no partial war can disquiet France," ⁶⁹ By cleaving France to liberal Britain, Lamartine could ward off the hostility of the other great powers, bring France out of isolation, and gain time for rebuilding French military strength, ⁷⁰

Palmerston found himself in the unique position of receiving supplications for support from both the potential disturber and the potential stabilizers of European order. The British foreign secretary could have thrown Britain's weight with the rest of Europe in an attempt to contain or crush republican France at the risk of a war of principles. He could have supported France and risked being an accomplice to a possible French revolutionary campaign against Europe, or Palmerston might give limited support to Lamartine and the French moderates while still maintaining friendly relations with the other great powers.

In February 1848, Palmerston chose the third alternative. He instructed Normanby to communicate with Lamartine and, to use Palmerston's phrase, the "peace party" in France, hoping thereby to avoid the excesses that might occur if Lamartine fell from power, ⁷¹ In addition, Palmerston had issued on February 29 a circular dispatch to Russia, Prussia and Austria counselling non-intervention in French internal affairs or suffer a war with her, ⁷²

Similarly, when questioned in Parliament on February 28 concerning the policy the Whig government would follow with respect to France, Russell declared that Britain would not interfere in France's internal affairs, ⁷³ Such a stand fared well with old-line Whigs who favored better

Anglo-French relations,⁷⁴ Yet, the restrained nature of Russell's response, which had been agreed upon beforehand by Russell and Palmerston, was calculated to prevent French republicans from believing they had Britain's full endorsement for whatever plans they had in mind. Conversely, the response was worded so as not to discourage relations with Britain's former allies of the Napoleonic wars--Austria, Prussia and Russia.⁷⁵

Although Palmerston sought normal diplomatic relations with France, he believed recognition of the French government would have to wait until a permanent government was established. Palmerston, at this point, still questioned a regime that was one step removed from anarchy and war with Britain's traditional allies, the signatories of the treaties of 1815.⁷⁶ On the other hand, Lord John Russell was privately more hopeful about Anglo-French relations. He told Palmerston that "it is desirable to pin down the new govt. - to terms which will bind them to our allies, as well as ourselves."⁷⁷

Lamartine subsequently confirmed Normanby's and Palmerston's judgment about his readiness to exercise a stabilizing influence in France. In an effort to allay the suspicions of the great powers, the French leader, as minister of foreign affairs, issued two documents soon after taking office. One was a circular dispatch to the diplomatic representatives in Paris and the other was a general Manifesto outlining the basic foreign policy of the Provisional Government.⁷⁸ The circular dispatch to the ambassadors in the French capital declared in part:

The republican form of the new government has changed neither France's place in Europe nor her loyal and sincere dispositions to maintain harmonious relations with the Powers which, like herself, wish the independence of nations and the peace of the world, 79

By promoting an image of peace, Lamartine hoped that this message would induce foreign diplomats to remain in Paris.⁸⁰

THE MANIFESTO

In addition, the French leader issued the above-mentioned "Manifesto to Europe," dated March 2, 1848, which was printed in the government's official newspaper on March 5. This document, which was also issued in a circular note to the great powers, disavowed any intention of provoking a European war, but it also left that intention in doubt. In deference to French nationalists the Manifesto abrogated the treaties of 1815. The Manifesto asserted: "The treaties of 1815 no longer exist as a right in the eyes of the French republic; nevertheless, the territorial limits of these treaties form a fact which she admits as a basis, and as a point of departure in her relations with other nations."⁸¹ Some repugnance could be found in Lamartine's secret apology to Normanby for having had to nullify the treaties.⁸²

The Manifesto's text had a blunt message to the conservative eastern monarchies. It revealed France's willingness to come to the aid of Switzerland and the independent states of Italy if their sovereignty were to be threatened. France would offer them armed support,⁸³ Although Lamartine did not appear to be seeking war, the great powers were put on notice that the French republic would not shrink from intervening on behalf of Italian nationalists. The Manifesto had an uncertain effect

because it mixed moderation with bellicosity.

Reactions to Lamartine's Manifesto by representatives of monarchical governments could easily be predicted. They were largely negative or openly hostile. For example, on March 3 Baron Bunsen labelled the Manifesto "melodramatic" diplomacy. It was, he claimed, an "implicit declaration of War" against Russia, Prussia, Britain (on account of Ireland and perhaps Wales) and the United States (on account of Mexico).⁸⁴

On the following day Bunsen relayed a dispatch to Palmerston from Baron Canitz, the Prussian foreign minister, reiterating Frederick William IV's previous request for Britain to take the lead in uniting the great powers against France; the Prussian ruler suggested an alliance analagous to the one made with Great Britain in 1815.⁸⁵ The Prussians clearly wanted Britain to take part in an anticipated war against France.

Russian leaders also looked upon events in France with deep suspicion. They had also hoped that Britain would play an active role in an anti-French coalition which would safeguard the territorial settlements of 1815.⁸⁶ When news of Lamartine's Manifesto had reached St. Petersburg, Nesselrode not only spoke disparagingly of it, he took diplomatic action. He told Palmerston, through Bloomfield, that the document did not inspire the Russian government with confidence, and he withdrew Count M. Kisseleff from his post as ambassador to France. However, in replying to Palmerston's request for non-intervention in French affairs, Nesselrode said that Russia would remain neutral as long as France did not attack Russia's allies. If she did, Russia would retaliate with all her military strength.⁸⁷

Two days later Bloomfield presented Count Nesselrode's reply to Palmerston's previous claim of March 4, that peace depended upon Russia's decision to refrain from promoting a military demonstration against France.⁸⁸ Nesselrode caustically replied that he thought the responsibility for peace rested rather with the British government and that Lord Normanby had held too high an opinion of the French Provisional Government.⁸⁹ Obviously, Nesselrode was not impressed by French assurances of peace and good will. Thus, although Russia, a major counter-balance to French power on the continent, had prepared for possible hostilities,⁹⁰ she had also acceded reluctantly to Palmerston's request for non-intervention in French internal affairs, and Lamartine's assessment appeared accurate: without Britain's active cooperation the great powers would not attack France.⁹¹

At home the Tories were no less alarmed by Lamartine's declarations, and the Whig government had to contend with hostile attitudes toward France. Tory members of Parliament were so agitated that Whig political leaders believed an Anglo-French war would have commenced had the Tories been in power.⁹²

On the other hand, Whigs, such as Russell and Lansdowne, acknowledged the threatening aspects of the Manifesto, but also pointed to its ambiguous nature and Lamartine's precarious position vis-à-vis his more radical brethren in the Provisional Government.⁹³ On March 6, 1848,

Lansdowne wrote to Russell that:

La Martine's manifesto had produced a different effect on different people, but the majority, and I am told particularly in the city, consider it as more offensive and threatening than they expected. Great allowance must however be made for his position which can only be maintained for the present by trimming. 94

There was a parallel political position between the Whigs in Britain and Lamartine and the French moderates; both had to deal with other political factions less disposed towards an Anglo-French understanding.

The Whigs did not have to work alone in quelling the fears of the conservative opposition. Lamartine worked earnestly at persuading British leaders of his moderate attitude. In a series of communications with the Duke of Wellington, Lamartine emphasized his desire to work in concert with Britain and to establish a permanent French government founded upon ideals and principles similar to those of the British constitutional government. The new French government, Lamartine maintained, would be dedicated to peace.⁹⁵

As a prominent Tory leader, Wellington had no reservations about opposing Lamartine's request for an Anglo-French alliance. The Iron Duke believed that such an alliance would help France to change the territorial settlements of 1814-1815, thereby damaging Britain's relations with her former allies of the Napoleonic wars--Prussia, Austria and Russia.⁹⁶ On the other hand, Russell pointed out to Wellington that the destruction of the free state of Cracow in 1846 by the agreement among Austria, Russia and Prussia had also been a violation of the Treaty of Vienna. In fact, it had been a pretext by which Guizot had previously declared that France was no longer bound by the settlement of 1815. Russell urged

Wellington to accept Lamartine's professions contained in the Manifesto in the most pacific sense, without, as Russell expressed it, "relying too much on his [Lamartine's] power of making good on his means." ⁹⁷

Yet, it was to Palmerston that Lamartine directed his most ardent assurances about the meaning inherent in the Manifesto. Consistent with his previous expressions of good will toward Britain and Europe, Lamartine, prior to issuing the Manifesto, had impressed on Normanby that the Manifesto would, regretfully, point out past violations of the Treaties of 1815 committed by the other great powers and, therefore, France would no longer be bound by them. Lamartine hastened to add that the Manifesto would also assert that France would, nevertheless, accept the reality of the treaties. She would abide by the existing territorial arrangements. Also, she would seek to modify the treaties only through negotiated agreements, as Normanby related, "with the consent of all parties." ⁹⁸ It was clear that Lamartine had taken great pains to assuage British suspicion before the Manifesto had been made public. He sought to ensure that the Manifesto would not hinder opportunities for an Anglo-French understanding and, of course, British recognition for the new regime in Paris.

Again on March 9, 1848, after the Manifesto's publication, Lamartine impressed upon Palmerston, again via Normanby, that it was: "impossible not to give an expression as to the Treaties consistent with what had been the unanimous sentiments of France." ⁹⁹ French public opinion and a national sense of humiliation about the 1815 treaties would not permit him to do otherwise.

Lamartine also assured Palmerston of France's well-disposed outlook toward Britain. On March 4 Lamartine had stated that the French government would repudiate any anti-British demonstrations.¹⁰⁰ Then, on March 7 Lamartine gave assurances to Normanby that he would take an early opportunity to stigmatize the Spanish policy of Guizot and Louis Philippe.¹⁰¹ Their actions had so vexed Palmerston in 1847 that he had considered them injurious to Anglo-French relations. Lamartine's actions pleased Palmerston, and he countered by assuring Lamartine that he would permit neither Guizot nor Louis Philippe, both in exile in England, to organize intrigues against their successors in Paris.¹⁰²

More importantly for Lamartine, the British foreign secretary chose to interpret the Manifesto in a positive manner. Contrary to conservative reactions both at home and abroad, Palmerston characterized the Manifesto in the following way: "a compromise between the Peace and the War Party among the men now in Power but in that compromise the Peace Party have shewn themselves to be in the ascendent."¹⁰³ He believed the Manifesto abounded with materials suitable for picking a quarrel with France or living in peace with her.¹⁰⁴

In addition Palmerston believed that the best general policy for the great powers would be caution about attempting to force France to acknowledge once more the terms set forth in the treaties of 1815. France had already subscribed to both the territorial aspects of the Vienna settlement and had endorsed the precedence for action through all the signatories. Despite Lamartine's assurances, Palmerston held to the long-standing diplomatic courtesy among nations that a state can not

abrogate previous treaty engagements merely by changing its internal government.¹⁰⁵ Palmerston summarized his interpretation of the Manifesto in a dispatch to Normanby on March 7, 1848, four days after Lamartine's first assurances to Normanby about it and three days after receiving Baron Canitz of Prussia's call for acting in concert against France.¹⁰⁶ It is clear that Lord Palmerston was prepared to interpret Lamartine's intentions in a pacific manner that would improve Britain's relations with France.¹⁰⁷

Contrary to the friendly inclinations of both Palmerston and Normanby, Queen Victoria had an aversion to any sort of understanding with Lamartine's republic. In February 1848, the Queen insisted that Palmerston revise a dispatch which had encouraged Normanby to cement relations with the Provisional Government.¹⁰⁸ Then, on March 10, Victoria wrote, "The Queen fears Lord Normanby is inclined to be on too friendly and confidential terms with M. Lamartine. Did Lord Palmerston caution him? We should do all that is right but not show any empressement towards what is after all a great calamity."¹⁰⁹ Thus, in contrast to Palmerston's desire to come to terms with the reality of a French republic, his monarch was adamant in her anti-republican attitudes. If Palmerston was to pursue a course of closer Anglo-French relations, it would have to be in opposition to Victoria's wishes.

Palmerston acted on his views. He gave Normanby copies of instructions to the British ambassadors at the courts of Austria, Prussia and Russia advising against military demonstrations towards France which would

likely cause, as Palmerston states, "mischief," ¹¹⁰ Lamartine had already counted upon an improvement in the international scene for on March 5, 1848, he had informed a friend that all was going well: "foreign affairs were not more assured after Austerlitz. We shall have a French system in place of isolation," ¹¹¹

It can be seen, then, that improved Anglo-French relations had special meanings for both Palmerston and Lamartine. Palmerston sought a closer understanding with Lamartine as a means of curbing French radicals, so as to maintain peace and stability in Europe, and avoid the crises previously associated with Guizot's foreign policy. ¹¹² For Lamartine, closer bonds with Palmerston would provide support from Britain and break France's isolation. Such support would protect France from her continental rivals and allow Lamartine to consolidate the new government's position at home while purchasing time for building up French military forces. ¹¹³

The British prime minister, Lord John Russell, went even further than Lord Palmerston in espousing the French viewpoint on the treaties of 1815. On the same day that Palmerston expressed to Normanby his views on the Manifesto, Russell had informed Palmerston of his assessment of Lamartine's utterances and also Baron Canitz's bid for an alliance among the great powers to stop France. Russell noted that in view of the high-handed manner in which the northern powers (Prussia and Russia) authorized Austria to absorb the free city of Cracow in 1846--in violation of the treaties of 1815--Russell was most reluctant to act in concert

with them now, even though joint action to meet a common threat (especially from France) had been agreed upon by the signatories of the treaties. Moreover, Russell called attention to Guizot's assertion that France had become free of the strictures imposed upon her by the treaty of 1815 because the other powers had violated it by ending Cracow's independence.¹¹⁴

With a note of pessimism, Russell added that in view of the revolutionary ferment in Italy and Poland, a general European war seemed likely. Yet he believed that Germany, Italy and Switzerland seemed able to effect their own independence without the foreign support of another power, such as France, and Britain would not have to witness again the terrible events that had resulted in the advent of Napoleon I.¹¹⁵

FRENCH INSTABILITY

Russell had displayed a traditional Whig desire to accept the French viewpoint along with a suspicion of the autocratic governments of the eastern powers.¹¹⁶ At bottom, neither Russell nor Palmerston nor Normanby had much faith in Lamartine's ability to restrain French political ambitions for very long. Yet, they recognized that his moderating influence, even if only temporary, was preferable to the "anarchy" and war that his successors might very well usher in.¹¹⁷ As Palmerston had remarked, "However, for the present, vive Lamartine!"¹¹⁸

Subsequent reports from France served to bear out the turbulence of French political affairs and the weakness of the Provisional Government. In early March Lord Normanby, who had become a good friend of Lamartine, spoke to him about the radicals in the government, especially Louis Blanc;

he also inquired about the civil unrest among Parisian workers, Lamartine assured Normanby that everything was under control and that the number of workers who advocated communism and common property was not formidable.¹¹⁹

Lamartine's assurances notwithstanding, subsequent reports from Normanby indicated a growing discontent among the Parisian population. For example, on March 13, 1848, in a letter marked "private" Normanby informed Palmerston that there were divisions within the government and terrorists were likely to get the upper hand.¹²⁰ A fortnight later Normanby described how the Paris mob was aware of its irresistible force, being composed of dissidents and half-starved followers, Normanby summed up conditions in the French capital as follows: "no credit, no employment, no money, no troops, no physical force any where but in the masses,"¹²¹

The provinces offered no better a picture. The British consular in Marseilles reported, as a result of the revolution, depressed economic conditions. He added, "Confidence has been in one moment destroyed, and trade consequently paralyzed, and the distrust felt through all the classes of society from the highest to the lowest is very great."¹²²

However, by March 30, Lamartine had resolved to act to head-off anarchy; he summoned a meeting of the Provisional Government.¹²³ Within three weeks Lamartine was able to get his government colleagues to agree to a decree for the recall of French troops to Paris. In a short time there would be 20,000 troops in the capital ready to maintain order. In addition, the entire military force of France was to be

augmented by 100,000 men, and a special army was to be stationed in the Rhone Valley to provide internal security as well as external defense.¹²⁴

Even with these measures, Lamartine confided to Normanby that he still was very apprehensive, for he believed there would be a fierce struggle for power before a yet-to-be elected Assembly had convened. He hastened to add, though, that the dissidents would only be sufficiently strong enough to get themselves killed, but not to overturn the government.¹²⁵ Leading the moderate candidates in the government elections, Lamartine secured the support of the owners of property and was voted into office. He subsequently became a member of the executive committee of the new permanent government.¹²⁶

Yet, Normanby told Palmerston that he frankly doubted the new majority would be coordinated to create a viable constitution. For, Normanby was unimpressed with Lamartine's plans for the new government: "I regret to say that it did not appear to me that he [Lamartine] was prepared to make a stand upon any one permanent security against the too certain democratic tendency of all republican institutions."¹²⁷ For example, Lamartine did not insist on an indirectly elected legislature which, in Normanby's opinion, would most likely be more moderate in its views.¹²⁸

It can be noted, then, that Lord Normanby was able to get much information from his almost daily conversations with Lamartine. Yet, as with Palmerston, Normanby retained the monarchist's bias against republican regimes in which, in Normanby's words, "peace and order have never yet been found long to exist,"¹²⁹

Although Palmerston was, in general, as opposed to the republican form of government as Normanby, the British foreign secretary still had hopes for improved relations with Lamartine, for no one had been, in Palmerston's eyes, more antagonistic to Britain's interests than Louis Philippe.¹³⁰ On the other hand, Palmerston's aversion to democracies revealed itself in his private correspondence. He characterized republican France as, in his words, "a nation of 33 millions...despotically governed by eight or nine men who are the subordinates of 40, or 50,000 of the scum of the faubourgs of Paris." ¹³¹

Moreover, when Palmerston wrote to Russell on April 26, 1848, he depicted France as a threat, as he had done during Louis Philippe's regime:

You must no doubt have made the same reflexion which Normanby makes, and which had already occurred to me, namely that a procession of 300,000 or even 200,000 armed men in Paris augurs ill for the future peace of Europe. I trust that we may be able to keep out of war but there can be no doubt that there exists in France a feeling of hostility to England, ¹³²

Palmerston also wrote that Britain was fortunate that defensive preparations were being undertaken and that, as he stated it, "we shall have some muskets and some cannon before any real danger comes upon us." ¹³³

The evidence suggests that although Lord Palmerston fully recognized an opportunity for closer relations with France, as well as the need to keep France from upsetting the balance of power in Europe, his private correspondence reveals a deep-seated distrust for Britain's neighbor across the Channel. Neither the fall of the House of Orleans nor Lamartine's

assurances completely expunged the sinister image of France which lurked in Palmerston's inner thoughts. Both politically and militarily, France would remain a danger to Britain. Yet, in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe, Palmerston was constrained to continue seeking ways of coming to terms with la belle France.

CHAPTER III

NOTES

¹Palmerston to Russell, F.O., July 30, 1846, Ashley, I, 12-14. Kissinger, pp. 251-252.

²Palmerston to Russell, F.O., July 30, 1846, Ashley, I, 12-14.

³Ibid. Later that year Palmerston congratulated the Pope on his introduction of administrative reforms and railroad construction. Palmerston to Petrie (?), November 23, 1846, P.R.O., F.O. 96/21, as cited in Bell, I, 41.

⁴Palmerston to Russell, August 21, 1847, Russell, I, 308. See also Palmerston to Minto, No. 7, September 18, 1847, P.R.O., F.O. 44/1, as cited in A.J.P. Taylor, The Italian Problem..., pp. 46-47. This work remains the foremost study of the Italian aspect of great power diplomacy during 1848. For more details on the Minto mission, see Palmerston to Minto, F.O., October 29, 1847, Ashley, I, 45-47.

In Russell to Palmerston, January 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/RU/172, the prime minister noted that Minto had secured the confidence of Pius IX and perhaps he should stay in Rome until Easter.

⁵Victoria to Russell, September 4, 1847, Russell, I, 309-310. Memorandum by Palmerston, July 2, 1848, quoted in Lorne, p. 104, Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, Ashley, II, 57. Palmerston also perceived the possibility of more trade with the Italian states. See Palmerston's comments on an Italian commercial league, Palmerston to Minto, F.O., October 29, 1847, Ashley, II, 45.

⁶Minto considered Austria a great "Bugbear" in Italy which threatened tranquility, but which, paradoxically, induced Italian dissidents to look to their respective governments for protection. "From what I am told I see little reason at present to apprehend any intense or serious movements for Italian unity. Austria, by her hasty menace and the hostile attitude of her army, has given the people a more rational object in the support to be afforded to their own reforming Governments; and the Liberal party is said to be sufficiently on its guard to discourage the display of revolutionary designs which would bring the Austrians into the field," Minto to Russell, Turin, September 29, 1847. Russell, I, 312-312. See also Minto to Russell, Turin, October 9, 1847, Ibid., I, 313-314; Minto to Russell, Rome, January 16, 1848, Ibid., I, 319; and Minto to Russell, Rome, January 18, 1848, Ibid., I, 320.

⁷Minto wrote, "...Princes and Patriots and Ministers all look to England for support, and it is pleasant to see how entirely we have their confidence and how gratefully they feel the disinterested service we have done them. This gives us great and useful influence with all classes in encouraging liberal measures on the one hand, and in preaching moderation on the other," Minto to Russell, Rome, November 7, 1848, Ibid., I, 314-316.

Later, in August 1848, the young leader of the Opposition Tory Protectionists, Benjamin Disraeli, depicted the Minto mission in Parliament as "a very peculiar and roving mission...to teach politics in the country in which Machiavelli was born," quoted in William F. Moneyppenny and George E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914), III, 183. A less humorous opinion of the Minto mission was held by Russia's Chancellor Count Nesselrode, who blamed Minto and other British agents for spreading the alarming doctrines of the "Chartists" in Italy and throughout the West. See Nesselrode to Chreptowitch, St. Petersburg, April 19, 1848, Karl Robert Nesselrode, Comte de, Lettres et papiers du chancelier comte de Nesselrode (Paris: A. Lahure, 1904-1912), IX, 84.

⁸Victoria to Russell, September 4, 1847, Russell, I, 309-310.

⁹Palmerston to the British Representatives in Italy, Circular Dispatch, January 1848, Ashley, II, 2-3. Palmerston to Hamilton, February 1848, Ibid., II, 65. Palmerston to Abercromby, F.O., March 28, 1848, Ibid., II, 57-58.

¹⁰Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., February 11, 1848, Ibid., II, 63-64.

¹¹Ibid. Palmerston had suspected that Louis Philippe, Guizot and Metternich had been coordinating French and Austrian diplomacy concerning Switzerland and Italy against Britain. See Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., December 31, 1847, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48549, Vol. CXXXIII.

¹²Ibid. For Palmerston's somewhat less direct, more formal communication covering the same point, see Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., No. 14, February 11, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48549, Vol. CXXXIII; Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 14, February 11, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 7/343.

¹³Kissinger, pp. 270-271, 317-319.

¹⁴Palmerston to Doyle, February 14, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/DO/99/1. Andrew Doyle was editor of the Morning Chronicle, and Palmerston wanted to have this information in print. Such news would be popular with his Radical supporters in Parliament.

¹⁵Palmerston to Russell, Carlton Gardens, February 14, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/RU/182/2. Palmerston also noted that Bloomfield, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, had maintained a "good understanding" with Russia.

¹⁶Cecil, p. 138.

¹⁷Taylor, The Struggle..., p. xix. Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 31-32.

¹⁸Nesselrode to Chreptowitch, St. Petersburg, February 19, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 63. Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., December 31, 1847, No. 211, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48549, Vol. CXXXIII. In addition, the King of Prussia, Frederick William IV, referred to Louis Philippe as "le bouclier des monarques européens," as quoted in Renouvin, p. 192. See also Bullen, pp. 315-320.

¹⁹Nesselrode, to Chreptowitch, St. Petersburg, February 19, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 63.

²⁰Seton-Watson, p. 252.

²¹Memorandum by Russell for Cabinet Circulation, September 21, 1847, Walpole, II, 16-17. Russell to Palmerston, January 4, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/RU/171, Russell, Memorandum: "National Defense," "Confidential," January 10, 1848, Walpole, II, 19-23. Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, January 11, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7A. Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, January 14, 1848, R.P., P.R.O., 30/22/7A. Palmerston to Russell, Carlton Gardens, January 30, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7A.

²²Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, January 11, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7A, also same letter printed in Russell, I, 262.

²³A new bill did not pass until 1851. Russell, I, 328. Walpole, II, 28-30.

²⁴Auckland to Russell, January 24, 1848, Russell, I, 265-266.

²⁵McCaffrey, pp. 68-70. The two foremost works on the Young Ireland movement are Dennis Gwynn, Young Ireland and 1848 (Cork: University of Cork, 1949), and Sir Charles Gavan Duffy, Young Ireland: a Fragment of Irish History, 1840-1850 (New York: G. Munro, 1880). For details of the break between the O'Connell faction and the Young Irelanders see Gwynn, Ch. 8.

Lord Clarendon, the Governor General of Ireland, was very apprehensive about the state of social order in Ireland. See Clarendon to Russell, February 5, 1848, Russell, I, 220-221.

²⁶ Although the Chartist movement posed a threat to civil order for the Russell government, it was the "troubles" in Ireland that proved the most vexing. Moreover, Chartists and Young Irelanders were in communication with each other, and they sought to coordinate their activities. See Mather, "The Government and...", P. 394. See also Gwynn, p. 170.

²⁷ Palmerston wrote, "They [the priests] are much pinched just now. As long as relief works went on they got a penny out of every shilling paid in wages. They cannot equally well get a spoonful out of every plateful given away from the soup kitchens." See Palmerston to Russell, August 19, 1847, Russell, I, 172. Lord Clarendon reported that it was primarily the younger priests who were agitating and stirring up mischief, Clarendon to Lodge, November 26, 1847, Ashley, II, 51. However, subsequent historical research has revealed that, in general, the Irish Roman Catholic clergy were suspicious of the Young Ireland program. See Gwynn, p. 167.

²⁸ Palmerston to Russell, August 19, 1847, Russell, I, 172. Palmerston to Minto, F.O., October 29, 1847, Ashley, II, 45-49.

²⁹ Palmerston to Minto, F.O., October 29, 1847, Ashley, II, 45-49.

³⁰ Bell, I, 24. Palmerston's concern was well placed, for Irish Confederates had deemed County Sligo a prime area for rebellion. See Thomas D'Arcy McGee, "Narrative," in Gwynn, Appendix V, pp. 318-321.

³¹ Palmerston to Minto, F.O., December 3, 1847, Ashley, II, 49-50.

³² Ibid., II, 50. Clarendon observed that in Ireland the landlords who had been denounced from the pulpit had received the equivalent of a death warrant and, as he wrote, "that persons giving evidence against criminals are held up as public enemies and traitors, or that people are advised to assemble in mobs and enforce their demands upon individuals," Clarendon to Lodge, November 26, 1847, Ibid., II, 51.

³³ Palmerston to Minto, F.O., December 3, 1847, Ibid., II, 50.

³⁴ In February 1848 Clarendon told Russell that the condition of Ireland was precarious and while law and order were being maintained, with difficulty, for the present, its future prospects were not good, Clarendon to Russell, February 5, 1848, Russell, I, 220-221.

³⁵ Palmerston to Bulwer, April 18, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/BU/579/1.

³⁶ Bullen, pp. 109-119, 332-333. Seton-Watson, pp. 242-248. Ridley, pp. 308-320.

³⁷Palmerston to Minto, October 29, 1847, Ashley, II, 45-49, Palmerston to Abercromby, F.O., February 12, 1848, Ashley, II, 64-65, Palmerston to Minto, F.O., February 24, 1848, Ashley, II, 55-56,

³⁸Palmerston was glad to see Guizot out of office, but he did not, as Palmerston wrote, "want his ejection to be brought about by a revolution," Palmerston to Normanby, February 11, 1848, Mulgrave Castle, Yorkshire, Normanby Papers, Box P, bundle 19, as quoted by Bullen, p. 326.

On February 24, 1848, prior to the news of Louis Philippe's abdication, Palmerston congratulated Normanby upon the change of ministers in Paris, Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., February 24, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/460.

³⁹Palmerston to Normanby, February 26, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/461.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ibid. In the original draft of this communication Palmerston wrote, "I have no time to write more," but later he removed this telling sign of the increased tempo of his work.

⁴²Palmerston also added, "Our principles of action are to acknowledge whatever rule may be established with apparent prospect of permanency, but none other," Ibid. Also quoted in Ashley, II, 71. See also Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 64, February 26, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797 for the same dispatch.

Palmerston, however, was uncertain how events finally would turn and in early March he still believed a royal resoration was possible. See Palmerston to Victoria, March 7, 1848, in Brian Connell, Regina vs. Palmerston..., p. 91.

⁴³Alphonse de Lamartine, History of the French Revolution of 1848 (New York: AMS Press, 1854, 1973 reprint), II, 14-15.

Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., February 27, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/462. For the same letter see Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., February 27, 1848, Ashley, II, 72. The day before Palmerston also cautioned Lord Minto to be careful that events should not swamp the Pope, as Palmerston warned, "for this would perhaps bring the Austrians into the Roman states and then we should have a regular European row." See Palmerston to Minto, February 26, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/MI/591/1.

⁴⁴Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 27, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/463.

⁴⁵Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/464/2. For the same letter see Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 28, 1848, Ashley, II, 73.

⁴⁶Ibid. Yet, Lamartine provided a different description of the republic's reception. He wrote, "The republic was received without repugnance at London. The statesmen were significantly impartial, sufficiently sensible, and sufficiently versed in history to comprehend that fifty years of revolution, of experience, of liberty, and of progress in public opinion, would place between the new republic and the republic of 1793 the difference that there is between reason and madness, between an explosion and an institution." Lamartine, II, 11.

⁴⁷Palmerston to Normanby, February 27, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS, GC/NO/462.

⁴⁸Palmerston to Bloomfield, F.O., No. 34, February 29, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48565, Vol. CXLIX. Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., No. 27, February 29, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD, MSS. 48549, Vol. CXXXIII. Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., February 29, 1848, Ashley, II, 75. Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., February 29, 1848, Ashley, II, 74-75. See also Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 84, March 7, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

⁴⁹Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., February 29, 1848, Ashley, II, 75.

⁵⁰As a youth, Henry Temple had discussed the fighting on the continent with his father, the Second Viscount Palmerston, e.g., see Third Viscount Palmerston to Second Viscount Palmerston, October 23, 1799, C72 (b), as quoted in Connell, Portrait of a Whig Peer..., p. 424.

⁵¹Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., February 29, 1848, Ashley, II, 75.

⁵²Ibid. Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., February 29, 1848, Ashley, II, 74-75.

⁵³Palmerston to Bloomfield, No. 37, March 4, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48565, Vol. CXLIX. See also Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 7, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797 as cited by Lawrence C. Jennings, France and Europe in 1848: a Study of French Foreign Affairs in Time of Crisis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 9.

⁵⁴Jennings, pp. 2-5. Both the King of Prussia and Lord Palmerston suggested a defensive arrangement between Austria and Sardinia to meet potential French aggression. Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., February 29, 1848, Ashley, II, 75. Jennings, p. 4.

Lord Bloomfield, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported that Nicholas I had placed at the disposal of the Minister of War the sum of seven million roubles (approximately £ 1,200,000, according to Bloomfield) for mobilizing an army of 450,000 men within three months. Bloomfield termed news of the French revolution, which reached Moscow on March 5, 1848, as causing great consternation. The Tsar intended to urge the King of Prussia to march troops to the Rhine, as he considered Austria too preoccupied with events in Lombardy to be effective on the German frontier. See Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 48, March 6, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. For Prussian arrangements see Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 41, February 29, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/285.

⁵⁵Frederick William IV to Victoria, February 27, 1848, Victoria, II, 177-178.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Abercromby to Russell, Turin, March 2, 1848, Russell, I, 331-332.

⁵⁸Leopold I wrote, "Against France we, of course, have a right to claim protection from England and the other Powers." Leopold I to Victoria, Lacken, February 26, 1848, Victoria, II, 179.

⁵⁹Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 48, March 6, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁶⁰Jennings, p. 3. Palmerston believed that Metternich would not take any action in Italy until he learned the views and the intended policy of the new French government. See Palmerston to Minto, February 26, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/MI/591/1.

⁶¹Bunsen to Palmerston, February 26, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/BU/595.

⁶²Bunsen saw in the continental revolutions the advent of a new period in modern history. Ibid.

⁶³Bunsen to Frederick William IV, February 27, 1848 (translation), Windsor MSS. J.67, as quoted by Bell, I, 426.

⁶⁴Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/464/2.

⁶⁵Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 98, February 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O., 27/803. Normanby described Lamartine as working in, as he expressed it, the "most laudable direction.," and the British ambassador stressed that since the monarchical principle was dead in France, at least for the time being, it was better to encourage the men of order who were then in power. They were striving to maintain peace, Ibid.

For Normanby's additional commentary on Lamartine and the moderates in Paris see Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, "Private," February 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/803 and Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, February 27, 1848, 11 p.m., R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/122/1-2. See also Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, February 27, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/124, and Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 101, February 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/803.

It should also be noted that Lamartine was very anxious to know British feelings concerning the republic, Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, February 27, 1848, 11 p.m., R.C.H.M., B. MSS. GC/NO/123/1-2.

⁶⁶Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, "Private and Confidential," February 28, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/803. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 29, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/125/6. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 114, March 2, 1848, P.R.O., F.O., 27/804. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 120, "Secret and Confidential," March 3, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/804.

Normanby urged British support for Lamartine and the Provisional Government because, as he expressed it, "the prompt support of England would be to them [Lamartine and his colleagues] of the greatest weight and also of the best effect upon our future influence in this country," Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 103, February 29, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/803.

⁶⁷Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, "Private and Confidential," February 28, 1848, P.R.O., F.O., 27/803.

⁶⁸Ibid. Again on March 2, 1848, Lamartine told Normanby that he, as Normanby related, "was in confident expectation to reunite his country immediately with England in bonds of the closest alliance...." See Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 115, March 2, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/804.

⁶⁹Lamartine, II, 11. Lamartine added, "The greatest danger to the republic was the fear of a coalition against her [France]....Lamartine, above all things, feared these coalition panics, which might seize upon France, and drive her to convulsions and bloodshed." See Lamartine, II, 152.

⁷⁰Ibid., II, 7-8, 17, 30.

⁷¹Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., February 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/464/2. Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 26, 1848, Ashley, II, 73.

⁷²Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., February 29, 1848, Ashley, II, 74-75. Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., February 29, 1848, Ashley, II, 75. Palmerston to Bloomfield, F.O., No. 34, February 29, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD, MSS. 48565, Vol, CXLIX.

⁷³Walpole, II, 31. See also Russell to Victoria, Chesham Place, February 29, 1848, Victoria, II, 182.

⁷⁴Bullen, pp. 61-62.

⁷⁵Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/464/2. Palmerston omitted these words from the final, private letter sent to Normanby: "John Russell was asked a question today by Hume, and gave the answer we had personally agreed upon."

⁷⁶Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 27, 1848, R.C.H.M., GC/NO/463. Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS. GC/NO/464/2. Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., No. 27, February 29, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48549, Vol, CXXXIII.

⁷⁷Russell to Palmerston, February 29, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/RU/185/1.

⁷⁸Jennings, p. 10.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid. For Lamartine's comments on the circular see Lamartine, II, 14-15.

⁸¹Jennings, pp. 10-11. Lamartine, II, pp. 22-23.

⁸²Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 118, March 3, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/804.

⁸³Lamartine, II, 23.

⁸⁴Bunsen to Palmerston, 4 Carlton Terrace, March 3, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS. GC/BU/597.

⁸⁵"C'est la Grand Bretagne dont les dispositions pourrant maintenant decider les destinées de l'Europe, c'est à Elle qu'il appartient de prononcer le mot puissant quit peut reluire à la raison les velléctes querrières du parti qui voudrait bouleverser les traités dur lesquels repose l'existence politique des Stats voisins de la France,...," stated Canitz. Bunsen to Palmerston, March 4, 1848 (Dispatch of Canitz, dated Berlin, February 29, 1848, read to Palmerston, 4 Carlton Terrace, March 4, 1848), R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/598/4.

⁸⁶Bloomfield characterized the Russian attitude as follows: "They do not, I think, count on England's at once joining an alliance with the other three Great Powers, but they appear to trust in our readiness to cooperate with them for the maintenance of the territorial arrangements stipulated at the Treaty of Vienna." Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 48, March 6, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁸⁷Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 55, "Confidential," March 15, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁸⁸Palmerston to Bloomfield, F.O., No. 37, March 17, 1848, B.L., P.L. ADD. MSS. 48565, Vol. CXLIX.

⁸⁹Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 54, March 17, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁹⁰Russia was calling up her army reservists for duty. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 56, March 17, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁹¹Lamartine, II, p. 11.

⁹²"The circular of Lamartine does not reassure one much, though I think it may be understood in any way he may be pleased to explain it. The Tories here are very violent about it, and say that the declaration is tantamount to one of war. Thank God they are not in power. I believe that had they been we should already be at war." Lord Spencer to Duke of Bedford, March 6, 1848, Russell, I, 290-291.

⁹³In correspondence with the Duke of Wellington, Russell noted, "M. Lamartine puts us all in a difficult position..." Russell to Wellington, March 12, 1848, R.P., P.R.O., 30/22/7B. See also Russell to Wellington, March 12, 1848, Russell, I, 293 for the same letter.

⁹⁴Lansdowne to Russell, March 8, 1848, Russell, I, 291.

⁹⁵J. Wellesley to Duke of Wellington, Hotel Brocket, March 3, 1848, R.P., P.R.O., 30/22/7B (plus note verbale of Lamartine to the Duke of Wellington). J. Wellesley to Duke of Wellington, Paris, March 7, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B. Wellington duly referred the communiqués to Russell, Wellington to Russell, London, March 3, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B and Wellington to Russell, London, March 11, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B. For Russell's replies see Russell to Wellington, Chesham Place, March 4, 1848, Walpole, II, 34 and Russell to Wellington, March 12, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B.

⁹⁶Wellington to Russell, London, March 3, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B. Wellington to Russell, London, March 11, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B.

⁹⁷Russell to Wellington, March 12, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B.

⁹⁸Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 118, March 3, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/804.

⁹⁹Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 147, March 9, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/804.

¹⁰⁰Normanby to Palmerston, March 4, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS. GC/NO/130/1-4.

¹⁰¹Normanby to Palmerston, March 2, 1848, Mulgrave Castle, Yorkshire, Normanby Papers, Box P, bundle 14; Memorandum by Prince Albert, March 7, 1848, Windsor Castle, Royal Archives, J/49/62, as cited by Bullen, p. 331.

¹⁰²Palmerston to Normanby, March 7, 1848, Mulgrave Castle, Yorkshire, Normanby Papers, Box P, bundle 20, as cited by Bullen, p. 331.

¹⁰³Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 89, March 7, 1848, P.R.O. 27/797.

¹⁰⁴Palmerston wrote, "If the Powers of Europe wished to make war against France there are in that circular abundant materials wherewith to pick a quarrel with her, if on the other hand the Powers of Europe are desirous of maintaining Peace, there is to be found in that circular the substance of Peace although somewhat clothed in the garb of Defiance." Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 118, March 3, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/804. Bunsen to Palmerston, March 4, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS. GC/BU/598/4.

107 Palmerston told Lord Clarendon, "The circular is evidently a piece of patchwork put together by opposite parties in the Government, the one warlike and disturbing, the other peaceful and conciliatory. I should say that if you were to put the whole of it into a crucible, and evaporate the gaseous parts, and scum off the dross, you would find the regulus to be peace and good-fellowship with other Governments." Palmerston to Clarendon, March 9, 1848, Ashley, II, 76.

108 Victoria to Palmerston, February 1848? (n.d.), Victoria, II, 183.

109 Victoria to Palmerston, March 10, 1848, Connell, p. 91.

110 Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 84, March 7, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

111 Lamartine to a close friend, March 5, 1848, Alphonse de Lamartine, Correspondence, (Paris: Hachette, 1873-1875), V, 454 as quoted by Jennings, p. 26.

112 Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., February 26, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS. GC/NO/461.

113 Lamartine, History of..., II, 7-8, 30, 152.

114 As Russell stated it, "We do not free ourselves from the obligation of Berlin - But the conduct of the three Northern Powers last year about Cracow would justify us in doing so - and Guizot I think said as much...." Russell to Palmerston, March 7, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS. GC/RU/188/1.

115 Ibid.

116 Bullen, pp. 61-62.

117 Russell to Wellington, March 12, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B. Palmerston to Normanby, R.C.H.M., B. MSS. GC/NO/462. Palmerston to Bloomfield, F.O., No. 34, February 29, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48565, Vol. Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/464/2. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 103, February 29, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/803.

Normanby noted that Lamartine's problems were compounded by the fact that he was not good at being a man of "business," Normanby to Palmerston, March 12, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/135/2. Also, Palmerston frankly doubted Lamartine's ability to completely prevent civil disorders in France, Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 88, March 7, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

¹¹⁸Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, February 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/464/2.

¹¹⁹Normanby wrote, "I told him [Lamartine] that I observed some uneasiness was already felt in England, not so much at the political character of the Revolution, which had been accepted frankly as no concern of our's; but at its social tendencies,..." Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 120, "Secret and Confidential," March 3, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/804.

¹²⁰Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, "Private," March 13, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/137/2.

¹²¹Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 174, March 18, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹²²Turnbull to Normanby, Marseilles, "Private," March 10, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹²³Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 214, March 30, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹²⁴The official announcement of the decree was not to be posted until after the upcoming general election. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 268, April 22, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806. See also Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 222, April 1, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806. Normanby to Palmerston, April 6, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806, as cited by Jennings, p. 64.

¹²⁵Normanby to Russell, April 26, 1848, Russell, I, 294.

¹²⁶Lamartine, History of..., II, 193, 223-229. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 280, April 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806. Normanby summed up the results of the French general election as follows: "The elections have gone in favor of men inclined to check the revolutionary movement, although almost everyone ret'd is for the present professedly a Republican." Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 282, April 29, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

¹²⁷Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 283, April 29, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

¹²⁸Ibid.

¹²⁹Ibid.

¹³⁰Palmerston to Bulwer, April 18, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/BU/579.

¹³¹Palmerston to Clarendon, April 22, 1848, Pitt House, Clarendon MSS., as quoted by Bell, I, 424. Earlier, Palmerston indicated that he believed sooner or later there would be a reaction in France and a return of the monarchy, Palmerston to Bulwer, March 4, 1848, R.C.H.M., B, MSS., GC/BU/572, as cited by Bullen, p. 290.

¹³²Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, April 26, 1848, R.P., P.R.O., 30/22/7B.

¹³³Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

CHARTISM AND IRISH NATIONALISM

While Lord Palmerston was grappling with the various twists and turns of international affairs in March 1848, domestic events created a striking, new challenge to any plans that Palmerston had for stabilizing relations with France. British Chartist and Irish nationalist leaders, inspired by the quick turn of events in Paris, looked to the Provisional Government for support,¹ and the French were receptive. On March 5, 1848, the day after Baron Bunsen had written to Palmerston that Lamartine's Manifesto constituted a declaration of war against Britain on account of Ireland,² Louis-Antoine Garnier-Pagès, a member of the Government, addressed a deputation of Chartists and suggested that the British government did not possess the total support of its citizens.³

In reaction, Lord Palmerston instructed Normanby to tell Lamartine that he feared Garnier-Pagès remarks were the initial step in a series of incidents that would exacerbate Anglo-French relations. He reminded Lamartine that the British government had already publicly declared non-interference in French internal matters, and Britain had a right to reciprocal treatment from France. The Garnier-Pagès address had departed from this principle of non-interference.⁴ Palmerston, therefore, displayed an early sensitivity to any ties that might develop between the revolutionary government in France and dissidents in the United Kingdom,

Palmerston's problems did not end with Garnier-Pagès speech, for on March 7, 1848, Lamartine publicly eulogized Daniel O'Connell and, in a symbolic act of solidarity with Irish nationalism, he accepted an Irish flag from a delegation of Irishmen.⁵ Palmerston quickly responded with an admonition intended to shock Lamartine into caution. The British foreign secretary urged Normanby to inform Lamartine, as Palmerston suggested, "in terms as civil as you can use," that these remarks had offended many persons who desired better relations with France.

Palmerston added:

...if this practice of interfering in our affairs, and of giving in this manner direct encouragement to political agitation within the United Kingdom shall continue to be persevered in by the French Government, a cry will soon arise in the country for the withdrawal of our embassy from Paris. 6

On the following day Palmerston sent another dispatch warning Lamartine again that his dealing with questions concerning the internal affairs of Britain was contrary to international usage. While the British government had taken care to abstain from interference in French internal activities, Her Majesty's government expected France to do the same.⁷

During the ensuing days revolutions rocked many continental governments. The Vienna uprising forced Metternich to flee the capital on March 14, and together with an uprising in Berlin, gave testimony to the unstable conditions present in the heart of Europe. Moreover, a Milanese insurrection, the so-called "Three Days of Milan," had forced an Austrian army to evacuate the city on March 23, 1848, preparing the way for a general revolt in northern Italy.⁸

In such a setting, Palmerston and Normanby strove ever harder to ward off an insurrection in the British Isles by the link-up of Anglo-Irish agitators with counterparts on the continent. In particular, Palmerston was troubled by a visit to Paris by two Irish Confederate leaders--Smith O'Brien and Thomas Meagher. These advocates of repeal had hoped to enlist Lamartine's support in the struggle for autonomy. On March 21, 1848, the day Palmerston had informed Normanby of his deep displeasure with Lamartine's address in Paris to Irish dissidents on March 17, the Russell government had been unsuccessful in its bid to stop O'Brien and Meagher. The two Irishmen were summoned to appear in court to answer charges of sedition, but they chose instead to sail to France.⁹

Palmerston and Russell considered them to be criminals guilty of treason. They wanted the Irishmen to receive no encouragement from the French government.¹⁰ Normanby, prompted by the pending visit of O'Brien and Meagher, pressed Lamartine to cease giving access to Irish delegations, for he asserted that Lamartine had meddled in Britain's internal affairs. Lamartine thereupon expressed great regret and inquired as to what was offensive. Normanby pointed to the fact that, in his words, "he [Lamartine] had spoken of the Irish having by agitation won their religious liberties, adding, so they might by the same means obtain their constitutional liberties,..."¹¹ Normanby said this was a question to be decided by British authorities and not the French Provisional Government.

Although Lamartine expressed his regrets at this interpretation of his words, he added, much to Normanby's objection that he could not be held responsible for what other members of the government said to foreign delegations.¹²

Normanby pointed out to Lamartine that his government was likely to receive an address by, "the most violent section of Irish Repealers," and Lamartine should use great caution in answering them. Lamartine agreed to keep on alert for this group, and he would also advise his colleagues. However, it was possible, according to Lamartine, that it would be the more radical Minister of Interior, Alexandre-Auguste Ledru-Rollin, rather than Lamartine who would receive the Irish delegates.¹³ Lamartine, though well-intentioned himself and chastened by Palmerston's successive warnings, could not guarantee that O'Brien and Meagher would receive neither support nor encouragement. He was a leader in the French government, but not in total control of it.

When Lord Palmerston received the foregoing dispatch, describing Lamartine's position on foreign delegations, on March 24, the British statesman considered Lamartine's attitude wholly unsatisfactory. On the contrary, according to Palmerston, the French government was responsible collectively for the remarks of its members when they spoke to foreign deputations in reference to another country's internal affairs. In a sternly worded note Palmerston expressed this viewpoint and again warned Lamartine:

I have therefore to instruct Your Excellency [Normanby] strongly to impress upon M. Lamartine the serious effects which must be produced upon relations between the two governments if any member to the Provisional Government should, in replying to Deputations from any part of the United Kingdom, indulge in remarks and animadversions upon the internal affairs of the United Kingdom. 14

In succeeding communiqués Palmerston repeated to Lamartine, via Normanby, grave warnings about the consequences of French indiscretions.¹⁵

Lord John Russell agreed with his foreign secretary's disapproval of the French speeches to foreign deputations. Russell wrote, "The best way would be if Lamartine and his colleagues would give up these public receptions of deputations from foreign governments. It was only permissible in the first days of the new Republic."¹⁶ Palmerston provided his own assessment of French actions: "The French will infallibly get themselves into quarrels with Foreign Powers in this way; perhaps it is the object of some members of the government."¹⁷ Thus, at a time when Normanby was pointing out the weaknesses within the Provisional Government,¹⁸ both Palmerston and Russell keenly sensed the volatility inherent in the French government's practice of addressing foreign deputations, especially if they were from the British Isles.

In a letter to Normanby on March 25, 1848 Palmerston addressed himself directly to the presence of Smith O'Brien and the other Irish leaders in France. Palmerston asked Normanby to remind Lamartine that the Irish Confederates were to be tried next month on charges of sedition, and their primary purpose for going to France was for gaining French

support for, as he termed it, "Irish sedition," ¹⁹

Palmerston urged Lamartine not to see the Irish dissidents at all or he would face a break in diplomatic relations. He then added but later scratched out a revealing comment: "Clarendon is very anxious that you should have Smith O'Brien and his associates narrowly watched at Paris, so as to know who they meet and...communicate with and what they do." ²⁰ Palmerston clearly perceived the visit of Irishmen as a revolutionary plot, and he meant to squelch it, even if it required testing Lamartine's desire for amicable Anglo-French relations.

Two days later Palmerston alerted Normanby to the fact that two additional Irishmen, Richard O'Gorman and an accomplice solely identified as Mr. Redmond had followed Smith O'Brien to Paris, and he instructed Normanby to watch them. The British foreign secretary had received information concerning their plans for insurrection:

It is supposed that these Irish gentlemen are to take back with them to Dublin some persons either French or Irish experienced in the art of erecting barricades, and able to command in street warfare, and we wish that if possible you should gain important information as to who and what the persons may be, if any, who accompany them on their return. ²¹

Palmerston did not want the scenario of Parisian street barricades repeated in Dublin. ²² His foreign policy, then, was, at least at the moment, as much concerned with maintaining stability at home as it was with maintaining a stable equilibrium of power on the continent.

Fortunately for Palmerston, he did not have to choose between stability at home and good relations with France. Lamartine decided to abandon his would-be revolutionary colleagues from Ireland rather than

forsake the opportunity for an Anglo-French understanding, Supporting the Irish "repealers" might have raised Lamartine's image as a revolutionary hero but keeping on good terms with Britain at the time, was more important to the new republic's security. As Lamartine had written, no European coalition of powers could have crushed republican France without British support.²³ The republic would live so long as Britain was benign.

In accordance with Palmerston's directions, Normanby saw Lamartine on the morning of March 26 and informed him of the British foreign secretary's stern warnings of March 24 and 25, that Lamartine and the other members of the government should refrain from remarks that would reflect on Britain's internal affairs and serve to encourage agitators. However, because Normanby sensed that Lamartine could not openly accede to such a demand by a foreign country, the British ambassador refrained from attempting to force Lamartine into such a subservient position. As Normanby explained to Palmerston, if Lamartine were to refuse, "one must have been prepared for the consequence."²⁴ Therefore, Normanby sought to temper Palmerston's sharp admonition and avoid a possible break in diplomatic relations.

Nevertheless, when Palmerston's succeeding dispatch of March 27 arrived, again instructing Normanby to warn Lamartine of the perils which awaited France if she dealt with the Irish delegation, Normanby had no choice but to confront Lamartine with the full brunt of Palmerston's directive. After his interview, on March 28, Normanby was able to report that Lamartine had firmly agreed, as Normanby wrote, "to show their

[the Irish] deputation that there were questions upon which the French Government would take no part and could pronounce no opinion," ²⁵

Then, three days later, in an effort to assure Normanby and Palmerston, Lamartine informed the British ambassador that he had seen Smith O'Brien and had told him not to expect encouragement or support of any kind from France. In addition, Lamartine revealed to Normanby the substance of the public address he intended to deliver to the visiting Irish delegation. In effect he would say that Britain and France were on terms of perfect amity and because she wished this condition to continue, France would not meddle in British internal affairs.²⁶ When on April 1, 1848, Normanby showed Lamartine the wording of the previous day's dispatch described directly above, Lamartine said, "I should be quite ready to sign that." ²⁷

True to his word, and at the risk of becoming very unpopular with members of the political clubs of Paris, Lamartine gave little substantive support to the Irish delegation when he addressed them on April 3. The Frenchman declared, in part, "When our blood does not run in the veins of a people, we are not permitted to employ our intervention or our hands in its affairs." ²⁸ Lamartine also repeated in the same manner what he had privately related to Normanby, that France desired to remain in sound relations with Britain.²⁹

Lamartine's actions were fatal to the continental aspirations of O'Brien and Meagher. Prior to the speech, O'Brien had boasted that France was prepared to send 50,000 of her, as he termed them, "brave citizens" to fight on Ireland's behalf if the Irish requested it.³⁰

Instead, the Irishmen returned to the United Kingdom empty-handed,³¹
 Other Chartist leaders in England were also exasperated by the moderate
 posture of Lamartine and his colleagues. They, too, had hoped for
 continental aid,³²

In contrast with Lamartine's earlier actions concerning Irish
 representatives, Lord Palmerston was delighted with Lamartine's most
 recent actions, and he told him so on April 4 and 7, 1848.³³ On April 4
 Palmerston asked Normanby, "Pray tell Lamartine how very much obliged
 we feel for his handsome and friendly conduct about the Irish deputation.
 His answer was most honourable and gentlemanlike, and just what might
 have been expected from a high-minded man like him."³⁴ Palmerston
 could be well-satisfied with the results of his efforts to curb Lamartine.
 An Anglo-French crisis was averted, and the Irish rebels had failed to
 link up with the continental revolutions.

SOCIAL UPHEAVAL IN BRITAIN

Trouble did erupt in Britain and Lord Palmerston's foreign policy
 was affected by the potential threat of British civil strife. During the
 spring of 1848 the prospect of a commercial depression in Britain,
 worsened by the disruptions of economic intercourse caused by revolutions
 on the continent, plus the spectre of social changes in Europe, raised
 both the expectation and the agitation for political reforms in urban
 laboring districts in Britain.³⁵

For example, on March 7, 1848, Sir George Grey, British home secretary,
 informed Lord John Russell of demonstrations planned for that evening in

London, Edinburgh and Glasgow. In London 2000 police were called out to disperse a demonstration at Kennington Common. A contingent of Life Guards also saddled up. At Clerkenwell Green demonstrators wearing tricolored cockades were reportedly talking of going to gunsmiths for arms.³⁶ However, the following day Grey was able to inform Russell that very few incidents had occurred in London, Liverpool or Edinburgh, but rioting did occur in Glasgow and Grey termed it "serious."³⁷

News of the strife in Britain reached the European capitals and prompted Palmerston to issue a circular dispatch to the foreign missions on March 14,³⁸ the same day he had complained to Lamartine of Garnier-Pagès' address to a Chartist deputation in Paris.³⁹ Attempting to minimize the impression of social unrest in Britain, Palmerston asserted that the rioting nowhere assumed dangerous proportions. With the exception of Glasgow, the activity amounted to the breaking of street lamps and windows by mischievous boys.

Palmerston admitted that in Glasgow the rioting was in earnest and that gunsmith shops had been ransacked, but the malcontents were quickly suppressed. Order had been maintained with the support of the middle and lower classes, many members of whom had volunteered to serve as constables. Palmerston added that there were numerous offers in Edinburgh and Glasgow for the formation of volunteer corps to preserve peace. In addition, Palmerston reported to Normanby that the House of Commons voted overwhelmingly to extend the income tax in a show of support for, as Palmerston wrote, "upholding the honor and dignity of the country."⁴⁰

Yet, the condition of British domestic affairs did circumscribe Palmerston's options for diplomatic action. Earl Grey reported to Russell on March 20, 1848, that in view of the unsteady state of affairs both in Ireland and in France it was not prudent to send troops away from Britain. Also, troops from the Cape of Good Hope were on their way home and if war had broken out, two other regiments of Sepoys from Madras could have been utilized.⁴¹

Therefore, unrest in the British Isles, as well as the possibility of a French invasion, however remote, required the home posting of British troops which could not, then, be used to back up any diplomatic moves on the continent, if Palmerston contemplated such action. British warships, to be sure, were at his disposal but troops for a continental campaign were pinned down to home duties. This situation made it all the more imperative for Palmerston to tailor his foreign policy so as to avoid embroiling Britain in a general European conflict which would demand British troops. On the other hand, he also had to avoid giving the impression that Britain was too preoccupied with its own internal affairs to act assertively, if need be, in Europe or elsewhere.

In addition, on March 4, 1848, a Chartist leader, Ernest Jones, had informed officials of the French government that the British working class would refuse to participate in any war against France.⁴² Palmerston had to make certain that Lamartine did not try to test the validity of Jones's promise. The British foreign secretary's frequent warnings to Lamartine in March 1848 had succeeded in this regard.

Palmerston's interest in the recent events in France went beyond his diplomatic moves or his dealings regarding foreign deputations. Palmerston's correspondence with Normanby reveals that as a member of an incumbent government and as a member of the establishment in Britain, Lord Palmerston was keenly interested in understanding how Louis Philippe's misuse of political power and military forces enabled the Paris mob to topple the Orleans monarchy.⁴³

Normanby, first on his own initiative and subsequently in reply to Palmerston's inquiries, provided clues to Louis Philippe's downfall. The ambassador noted that the French king's restrictive policies and foreign minister Guizot's diplomatic adventurism had disaffected many of the king's supporters. "Packing" the French Chamber with his own adherents also contributed to the king's alienation. Perhaps most importantly though, Louis Philippe had lost the loyalty of the French middle class, many of whom were enrolled in the National Guard. Normanby felt that the loss of this broad base of support, in particular, severely damaged Louis Philippe's position.⁴⁴

During the revolution of February 23-24, 1848, mismanagement of the military forces available in Paris had sealed the king's fate. Normanby reported that at first the troops on hand were steady and largely immune to the taunts of the populace. However, as a result of vacillation on the part of the monarchy and inconsistent orders from their commanders, the soldiers became badly demoralized. Finally, in acts of disgust, the military went over to the side of the revolutionaries and gave their arms to the Paris crowd.⁴⁵

In a detailed memorandum Palmerston set down the essential facts which Normanby had provided, and the foreign secretary asked Normanby for additional information concerning the disposition of the French king's troops.⁴⁶ In reply the British ambassador recounted that demoralization among the soldiers occurred when, after standing fast before the excited populace, the troops were ordered to retreat in order to avoid a collision with Parisian citizens. It was at this point that the troops, in deep disgust, gave their arms to the mob.⁴⁷ A report from the British ambassador to Berlin later indicated that the Prussian troops in that capital had also become very demoralized under similar circumstances. After facing demonstrators in Berlin, they, too, were withdrawn as if in retreat, a move which was very unpopular among the soldiers.⁴⁸

THE CHARTIST THREAT TO AUTHORITY

Chartists, in league with members of the Young Ireland movement, had been buoyed up by the results of the Paris revolution. They resolved in the spring of 1848 to agitate in earnest for reform measures, both by petition to Parliament and by armed acts if necessary.⁴⁹ Their decision levelled a much more direct challenge to the Whig government than that of any foreign adversary. The Whigs were presented with a domestic challenge by Chartist and Irish repeal leaders which, if successful in exhibiting internal weaknesses in Britain, could very well entice one or more of the continental powers, such as France or Russia, to possibly challenge British authority and security either in the home Isles or more likely in Britain's colonial empire. Just as

significantly, the twin threats of Chartist dissent and Irish rebellion posed a challenge to social order and the hierarchy of authority in which Palmerston and other members of the aristocracy, both Whig and Tory, maintained their positions of influence and power.⁵¹

On April 4, 1848, Chartists, along with a representative from the Irish Democratic Confederation, met in convention and decided, under the leadership of Feargus O'Connor, to stage a mammoth demonstration before Parliament on April 10 in hope of overawing the legislators with their demands for reform, such as universal suffrage. A monster petition containing 5,400,000 alleged signatures was to be presented in the Commons.⁵²

The Whig government's response to the announced demonstration in London, as well as other demonstrations by Chartist and Irish groups throughout the British Isles, reflected their grave concern about the possibility of social upheaval. In London a formidable force was gathered to push back the demonstrators: 8,000 soldiers, 4,012 members of the Metropolitan Police, 1,500 Chelsea (military) Pensioners, armed civil servants, units of marines and sailors, 12 artillery pieces, and 150,000 special constables, including Prince Louis Napoleon.⁵³ The aged Duke of Wellington was appointed commander of the military forces and the Police Commissioners of Metropolitan London, the civilian forces.⁵⁴

The basic strategy agreed upon was for all military forces to be positioned in the vicinity of vital areas, such as Westminster Bridge,

The troops would be concealed to avoid fraternization with the demonstrators as had occurred during the French Revolution and as Lord Palmerston sought to avoid in London. Wellington, wanted the troops concealed also, but mainly to avoid provocation by an undue show of military force.⁵⁵ The soldiers would be called out only as a last resort. By April 6 all the troops were at their assigned posts.⁵⁶

Civilian forces, then, would contend with the demonstrators for as long as possible. Special constables, primarily enlisted from the middle and upper classes, stood guard at most corners and intersections. Finally, the municipal police were charged with heading off the demonstrators and preventing a march towards Parliament. The overall plan was to prevent a crossing of Westminster Bridge and to confine the Chartists to the south bank of the Thames. Only those Chartist delegates bearing the lengthy petition would be allowed to enter Parliament.⁵⁷

In contrast to the February Revolution in Paris, the Whig government had forewarning of the demonstration, as the Chartists intentions were generally known. The Whigs were able to lay down careful plans to suppress the agitators. The risk of fraternization between troops and the populace of London was to be minimized, and as many personnel as possible from the middle and laboring classes were recruited to maintain order.⁵⁸ The central organs of government, Parliament and the administrative buildings, were to be barricaded. In preparation for the London demonstration, Lord Palmerston had anxiously requested Sir George Grey to supply armed police to guard the Foreign Office during the night of April 10:

I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to request that you will move Secretary Sir George Grey, in consideration of the exposed position of this building which is open to attack on four sides, to direct that a sufficient body of armed police headed by a competent officer be sent into this office at night fall in order to take upon themselves the defense of the building in case of danger. ⁵⁹

Under Palmerston's supervision four armed clerks, servants and messengers of the Foreign Office were also enlisted to barricade and defend the building with muskets and cutlasses. ⁶⁰

Expecting a rash of demonstrations, and perhaps riots, in other crowded industrial and commercial cities, such as Liverpool and Manchester, Sir George Grey coordinated the armed reception that would greet any disturbers of the peace. ⁶¹ However, it was in Ireland that the Whig government displayed the gravest concern. ⁶² Amid frantic reports from Lord Clarendon, Governor-General of Ireland, that rebellion was a distinct possibility, ⁶³ Palmerston urged the manufacture of more muskets for the volunteer corps which might be raised in Ireland. ⁶⁴

Eventually, troops originally assigned to keep order in England were transferred to Ireland. ⁶⁵ In Manchester on April 10, for example, while preparing for possible conflict, the commanding general was ordered to send an entire regiment to the Emerald Isle to supplement the troops already on assignment there. ⁶⁶ In addition, the Russell government proposed on April 7, 1848, a new anti-sedition law, the Crown and Government Security Bill, which to the prime minister's relief and Palmerston's hearty approval was passed by Parliament almost unanimously, ⁶⁷ immediately after the demonstration of April 10 in London.

By April 9 Sir George Grey had received word that the Chartist leaders themselves were frightened by the impending demonstration and that the people could no longer be controlled.⁶⁸ On April 10, between 12,000 and 150,000 demonstrators, including Irish contingents carrying green banners, convened on Kennington Common, London, where they marched and heard rousing speeches.⁶⁹ However, their grand leader, Feargus O'Connor, who had now lost his original zeal for the march on Parliament, urged the crowd to disperse and most demonstrators followed his request. When an afternoon rain further dampened the prospects of trouble, Russell was able to report to Queen Victoria that the remaining 5,000 demonstrators were rapidly leaving.⁷⁰

Because the Chartist demonstration of April 10 ended in what appeared to be an unsuccessful attempt at revolution and because Parliament subsequently rejected the Chartist's demands for reform,⁷¹ historians have tended to minimize and overlook the very real fear which the April 10 demonstration had brought to Britain's upper-class and establishment.⁷² As shown in the correspondence of contemporaries, prior to April 10, there was wide-spread fear of the lower-class revolutionary potential. For example, on April 10 Lady Palmerston had expected to see a militant rabble armed with guns, pikes, pistols, and knives.⁷³ Conservatives, such as Lord Aberdeen, viewed events with pessimism and saw in them the seeds of anarchy and a time of extreme trial.⁷⁴ In addition, Sir Robert Peel indicated he wanted something done to prevent trouble, and his followers in Parliament called for stricter laws,⁷⁵

Members of the middle class, especially London shopkeepers, who formed a significant portion of the Whigs voting constituency also clamored for a strong defense of the capital.⁷⁶ In addition, the government had received reports from Ireland which indicated that Irish revolutionary leaders were awaiting the outcome of the London demonstration as a signal for a general rising.⁷⁷

On the other hand, Lord John Russell did not appear to be very worried about how his government would suppress a Chartist insurrection. On April 9, 1848, he confidently asserted to Prince Albert that he had no doubt that the London police with the attendant troops would triumph easily over a London mob. Yet, Russell was quite concerned about the resentment which any loss of life might incur.⁷⁸ This was also the Prince Consort's concern, not merely because of domestic reasons, but because it would indicate to Europe that Britain was not as stable in her political and social condition as she had appeared. On April 10, he wrote to Russell:

I don't feel doubtful for a moment who will be found the stronger, but should be exceedingly mortified if anything like a commotion was to take place, as it would shake that confidence which the whole of Europe reposes in our stability at this moment, and upon which will depend the prosperity of the country.⁷⁹

Therefore, the effects of a successful Chartist demonstration, or even an unsuccessful but bloody one, were uppermost in Albert's thoughts because of their impact on Britain's stature among the great powers.

Other eminent persons shared this concern about the demonstration's effects upon Britain's continental prestige. Lord Normanby wrote to

Lord Palmerston on the morning of April 10 that Paris was full of excitement over what was transpiring in London. Normanby noted, "When the triumph of order shall be made known tomorrow I can not conceal from myself that very general disappointment will be felt in almost all classes." ⁸⁰

Normanby observed that in France violent republicans would see the overthrow of royal authority as a triumph of their principles, more moderate republicans would be gratified by Britain being forced to follow their example, and even the most ardent reactionaries would be secretly pleased to see Britain forced, as Normanby wrote, "to partake their misfortune." ⁸¹

Taking up Normanby's remarks on April 18, Palmerston told the British ambassador in Madrid, Sir Henry Bulwer;

You will have seen that Monday the 10th passed off quietly in London, notwithstanding the wishes to the contrary of the Republicans in Paris and the moderados of Madrid. We shall have no insurrection in England and I hope that internal peace will still be maintained in Ireland. ⁸²

In addition, Palmerston told Russell that, "...they the [Spaniards] will feel more respect for us after they know the result of the 10th." ⁸³

Similarly, in a letter to Queen Victoria, Russell related the Chartist demonstration to foreign affairs as he wrote, "A quiet termination of the present ferment will greatly raise us in Foreign countries." ⁸⁴

Clearly, then, the impact of domestic events upon Britain's influence in foreign affairs was recognized by Lord Palmerston and his contemporaries. The British foreign secretary had made a concerted effort to deter Lamartine from dealing with the Chartist and Irish leaders who had gone to Paris.

Moreover, influential opinion at home and abroad looked to Britain and the effects that the April 10 demonstration might have on her stability. The interplay between what was transpiring in Britain and what was occurring on the continent was, indeed, a prominent factor in how Palmerston proceeded with his diplomacy. If Britain had faltered, Palmerston's ability to bring the weight of British prestige to bear upon continental issues would have been necessarily weakened.

Representatives in Turin and St. Petersburg were quick to describe the salutary effect of the Whig government's triumph. On April 19, 1848, Lady Mary Abercromby wrote to Russell that the effect was great on the continent for, as she expressed it, "All eyes were turned to London, and people seem to breathe more freely since they have seen that the good sense and good feeling of the country still keeps it safe,"⁸⁵ Similarly, the Chartist defeat had an impact on Russia's attitude toward Britain. Count Nesselrode had anxiously awaited the results of the Chartists' work in London, as well as that of the Irish dissidents.⁸⁶ News of the events of April 10 caused the Russian government to express great satisfaction with the way the Chartists were repressed and by the example set by Britain.⁸⁷

The British government's triumph over the Chartists enhanced Britain's stature on the continent. By April 10 Europe had experienced repeated shock waves of revolution,⁸⁸ but Britain had remained steadfast. She was so much stronger in her diplomacy because the government had faced the Chartist challenge of April 10 and had won.

The resulting success of the Whig government's triumph over the threat of civil disturbance contained another element not overlooked by Lord and Lady Palmerston; the loyalty shown to the government. According to Lady Palmerston, there was the distinct expectation of a fight and the rallying to the government by members of all social classes, especially the middle class in London, was most encouraging.⁸⁹ Commenting on the failure of the Chartist demonstration in London on the following day, Lord Palmerston characterized April 10 for Normanby as a glorious day for peace and order. Palmerston noted that defending constables had been recruited from all classes of society and that, as he put it, "the constables, regular and special, had sworn to make an example of any whiskered and bearded rioters whom they might meet with, and I am convinced would have mashed them to jelly."⁹⁰ In Palmerston's view, then, all responsible society had come forward to preserve order against the anarchist challenge of the mob.

The government showed its mettle in dealing with a serious threat to provoke turmoil, and all elements in the population that preferred order to disorder sided with the government.⁹¹ The Chartists had failed miserably in their attempt to gain a broad base of support for their reform measures.⁹² Congratulations on the Russell government's triumph poured in from all quarters⁹³ and all political parties in Britain.⁹⁴

Later in April 1848 in a dispatch to Normanby in which Palmerston had commented on how well Lamartine was keeping France stable and safe, the Viscount added that at home the Security of the Crown Bill plus the scarcity of food in Ireland would prevent any widespread outbreak,

at least until the harvest was gathered.⁹⁵ Reflecting her husband's views, Lady Palmerston also referred to the condition of Ireland and wrote, "Let us hope however that the failure here [of the Chartists] will have some effect as well as Lamartine's answer and the ridicule with which Feargus O'Connor has been covered by the discovery of the absurd exaggeration of his numbers...."⁹⁶ Thus, although the danger of civil disturbances persisted in Ireland, the Palmerstons were more sanguine.

It was only the Chartists and Irish Confederates who did not share in the Whig triumph and, for the time being, they did not believe the April 10 demonstration had been a defeat at all.⁹⁷ Chartist leaders continued to plan more demonstrations and the Young Ireland movement drew closer to open rebellion.⁹⁸ Queen Victoria was led to declare that the condition of Ireland was alarming and, as she informed Russell, "altogether, there is so much inflammable matter all around us that it makes one tremble,"⁹⁹ Thus, not everyone agreed with the Palmerstons' cautiously optimistic viewpoints noted above. The quick passage of the Security of the Crown Bill at the end of April, with little Radical opposition, further illustrates the genuine fear of unrest felt by Britain's upper class even after the April 10 Chartist debacle.¹⁰⁰

During the period of May to August 1848, the threat of armed¹⁰¹ insurrection was manifest in England and Ireland. The Chartists had planned a second great demonstration at Bishop Bonner's Fields, Bethel Green, for Whit Monday, June 12, 1848. In response over 5,000 British officers and men were called out to maintain order, and defensive measures, similar to those taken on April 10, were implemented. Again,

the British population, for the most part, supported the government, rather than the Chartists, just as the Parisian bourgeoisie at this time was behind moderate elements in the French government,¹⁰² The political diarist, Charles Greville, reported in his diary the mood of the Russell government: "The Government are now getting seriously uneasy about the Chartist manifestations in various parts of the country, especially in London, and at the repeated assemblings and marchings of great bodies of men,"¹⁰³ The Whig government moved against the demonstrators by making arrests, and a general Chartist insurrection set for August 6, 1848, ended in utter failure. Stripped of its leaders through incarceration, Chartism entered its final decline.¹⁰⁴

IRELAND IN REVOLT

The Young Ireland movement ground on after the April 10 demonstration in London. By April 17 when it had become widely known that a general rising would probably be attempted by July 1848,¹⁰⁵ the Whigs moved to head off the rebellion. In May the great Irish Confederate leader, John Mitchell, was arrested and on July 22, 1848, the Act of Habeas Corpus was suspended for Ireland.¹⁰⁶

At the same time, in an effort to relieve Ireland's economic woes, Lord Russell anxiously attempted to draft a plan of reforms, but objections raised by his own cabinet members discouraged implementation.¹⁰⁷ In particular, Palmerston was opposed to any softening change in the tenement ejectment laws, which Russell had proposed, because it would impair the right of private property. Palmerston firmly believed that fundamental improvement in the social condition of Ireland could only be accomplished

by, as he expressed it, "systematic ejectment of small holders and of squatting cottiers,"¹⁰⁸ No reform plan was adopted and the risk of an Irish rebellion persisted,¹⁰⁹

At stake also was the support of the Peelites, upon whom the Russell government depended in the Commons,¹¹⁰ Peelites, such as Sir James Graham, had supported the Whig government to maintain social and political stability as much as because of their opposition to Protectionism. Graham summed up the Peelite position in these terms:

A rebellion in Ireland, a bad harvest, a Protectionist Government, any one of them would place an institution in great danger; and if ministers go on spending money with profusion, and fail in their duty to levy taxes equal to their expenditures, public credit will be shaken, and a smash will be inevitable, ¹¹¹

Therefore, although the Peelites did not want a Protectionist-oriented Tory government led possibly by Benjamin Disraeli,¹¹² Graham and his colleagues also would not tolerate expensive social legislation which Irish relief might very well demand. Russell had to make do or raise taxes, a move which was not likely to be popular.

When open rebellion in Ireland finally did occur in July 1848 the government was well prepared for it. The Irish Confederates had hoped for an insurrection throughout Ireland, but their aspirations met with little popular support.¹¹³ The Irish uprising came to a disastrous end on July 29, 1848, when 100 poorly armed rebels were met by police forces in the village of Ballingarry, where some were captured and others dispersed. Their leader, Smith O'Brien, escaped but was later apprehended, tried, and deported.¹¹⁴ With the abysmal defeat at Ballingarry, the

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Young Ireland movement fell into decline. Ireland would remain a running sore that was destined to afflict succeeding British governments.

The failure of the Chartist and Young Ireland movements have been ascribed to various causes. Most importantly these movements never did attain the support of the majority of Britain's citizens. Also, there frequently was dissention among the leaders of both movements, and overall coordination in demonstrations was never totally realized. In addition, through painstaking planning the Russell government was able to muster sufficient police and military forces to suppress insurrections by either the Chartists or the Irish Confederates.

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However, the very failure of these movements has tended to obscure the continued danger of social revolution which they posed, or, at the very least, had the appearance of posing to Britain's ruling class.

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Sir James Graham's words were not penned lightheartedly:

I cannot shut my eyes to the certainty that the establishment of a Republic in France will give immense activity to the democratic movement in this country; and a rebellion in Ireland may be the signal for a servile insurrection which would spread far and wide. 118

Thus, the interaction between events on the continent and activities at home was borne in mind by Britain's political leaders.

For Palmerston, concern about the domestic scene had shaped his foreign policy. His desire to establish better relations with France and his desire to restrain her from embroiling Europe in a "war of principles," 119 was temporarily superseded by the overwhelming need to prevent any collision between Chartist and Irish revolutionaries, on

the one hand, and French revolutionaries on the other. Considerations about the balance of power became secondary for the time being to the potential danger to the Whig government, as well as to Palmerston's personal concern as an Irish landlord.

By the same token Palmerston and his colleagues were keenly aware of the impact which a successful Chartist or Irish nationalist demonstration of power at home would have had for Britain not only at home, but also abroad. The British image of order and strength would be replaced by one of chaos and weakness. Such an image was not one which a great power with farflung, somewhat exposed, colonial possessions could afford to display. Indeed, Britain's prestige and influence as a great power were at stake.

As it turned out, Palmerston was spared the undesirable task of withdrawing Normanby from Paris as he had warned Lamartine he might do. Lamartine, desirous of breaking out of diplomatic isolation, heeded Palmerston's warnings with respect to the Chartist and Irish deputations. The opportunity for closer Anglo-French relations remained bright.

¹Gwynn, pp. 164-167.

²Bunsen to Palmerston, 4 Carlton Terrace, March 3, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/BU/597.

³Jennings, p. 49.

⁴Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 105, March 14, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

⁵Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 117, March 22, 1848, F.O. 27/797. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 187, March 23, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805. Nicholas Mansergh, The Irish Question, 1840-1921 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1965), p. 62. Elie Halévy, A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century, IV: Victorian Years, 1841-1895. (London: Ernest Benn, 1962), p. 292.

Normanby reported that Irish dissidents had forcibly pressed into participation in the procession leading up to the meeting other Irishmen in Paris who had not actively supported their cause but were, nevertheless, amalgamated into the band of demonstrators. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 183, P.R.O., March 21, 1848, F.O. 27/805.

⁶Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 21, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS. GC/NO/467. Also printed in Ashley, II, 76-77.

⁷Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 117, March 22, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

⁸Langer, Political and..., pp. 351-356, 372-373, 391-396.

⁹Gwynn, pp. 164-165.

¹⁰Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 124, March 25, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

¹¹Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 187, March 23, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 121, March 24, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797. See also Memorandum and Instructions of Palmerston for Normanby re Normanby's Dispatch No. 187 (March 23, 1848), F.O., March 24, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

¹⁵Palmerston noted that Smith O'Brien and colleagues were, "persons under legal accusation and held to bail to be tried next month on a charge of sedition...and of course these gentlemen go over to Paris solely and entirely for the purpose of getting directly or indirectly French support for Irish sedition," Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 25, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS. GC/NO/469. See also Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 124, March 25, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 125, March 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 126, March 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

¹⁶Memorandum of Russell re Dispatch No. 125 (Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 27, 1848), R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/468.

¹⁷Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 24, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/468 (includes foregoing memorandum by Russell).

¹⁸E.g., Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 174, March 18, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹⁹Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 25, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/469.

²⁰Ibid. On the same day, Normanby had written that he was endeavoring to watch the "Irish traitors," Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, March 25, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/146/21.

²¹Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 27, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/470.

²²Most accounts of the visit of the Irish deputation to France are brief, and they omit information provided in Palmerston's private correspondence with Normanby concerning the foreign secretary's attempt to stymie the Irish nationalists.

Palmerston's low opinion of the Irish Confederates is revealed, in part, by his comments concerning John Mitchel, who remained in Ireland. Palmerston wrote that Mitchel was boasting of his intention to commit high treason, but that he was too ambitious, according to Palmerston, to do such a thing, but he could, as Palmerston wrote, "stir on more foolish and excitable men to crimes which he may be afraid of committing himself." Ibid.

²³Lamartine, History of..., II, 11, 147. See also Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 231, April 5, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

²⁴Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 202, March 26, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

²⁵Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 209, March 28, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

²⁶Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 215, March 31, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

²⁷Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 223, April 1, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

²⁸Lamartine, History of..., II, 148. See also Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 231, April 5, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 228, April 3, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

³¹Gwynn, p. 168. Also, the Irish delegates were somewhat at odds with each other. Normanby reported that the Irish delegation had disagreed among themselves and had stayed at different hotels. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, March 31, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/149/2.

³²Albert R. Schoyen, The Chartist Challenge: a Portrait of George Julian Harney. (London: Heinemann, 1958), p. 177.

³³Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., April 4, 1848, Ashley, II, 77. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 145, April 7, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/798.

³⁴Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., April 4, 1848, Ashley, II, 77. In this letter Palmerston also commented on the hurried pace at which he had been living.

³⁵Schoyen, pp. 158-160.

³⁶Grey to Russell, March 7, 1848, Russell, I, 186. Grey to Russell, March 7, 1848, I, 186-187.

³⁷Grey to Russell, March 8, 1848, Russell, I, 187.

³⁸Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 106, March 14, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

³⁹Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 105, March 14, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

⁴⁰Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 106, March 14, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797. Palmerston also noted that the recent passage of the 10 hours work bill had proved so favorable with workers in Manchester that they gratefully offered to support the government in keeping order. As with the Reform Bill of 1832, a timely concession toward reform had helped to maintain stability.

In addition, the Duke of Buckingham had offered the Russell government his personal yeomen for defense of the realm. Palmerston to the Duke of Buckingham, F.O., March 16, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/BU/11.

⁴¹Earl Grey informed Russell, "I do not think in the state of affairs in Ireland and in France we can send a force from home," Earl Grey to Russell, Belgrave Square, March 30, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B.

⁴²Schoyen, p. 158.

⁴³Memorandum of Palmerston re Normanby's Dispatch No. 104 (Normanby to Palmerston, February 29, 1848), March 3, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/803.

⁴⁴Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, "Private and Confidential," March 13, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/136/8. Normanby to Palmerston, March 13, 1848, Ashley, II, 66-67.

Commenting on Louis Philippe's downfall, Normanby wrote, "And it was one of the greatest political mistakes made by the showy orators and clever intriguers who formed the last Cabinet of Louis-Philippe, that they neglected and disgusted the armed aristocracy of the Bourgeoisie, who had indeed become the third estate in the Realm, the Chamber of Peers having fallen in hopeless disrepute, since it had been swamped by the creatures of the king." Normanby to Palmerston, March 19, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/140/11. See also Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, "Private and Confidential," March 21, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805,

⁴⁵Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 104, February 29, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/803.

⁴⁶Memorandum of Palmerston re Normanby's Dispatch No. 104 (Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, February 29, 1848), March 3, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/803.

⁴⁷Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 123, March 4, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/804. See also Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, "Private and Confidential," March 13, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/136/8.

⁴⁸Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 75, "Confidential," March 23, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/285. Palmerston received a similar report concerning the Vienna uprising of March 13, 14 and 15, 1848. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, Vienna, No. 98, April 10, 1848, F.O. 7/348, as printed in Günter Dürriegel, "Bericht des Botschafters Grossbritanniens über die Wiener Märztage des Jahres 1848," Wiener Geschichtsblaetter, Band XXVII (1971), No. 1, pp. 144-155.

⁴⁹Schoyen, pp. 161-163. Gwynn, pp. 167-168. J.T. Ward, Chartism (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973), pp. 196-197. Mather, "The Government and...", p. 394.

⁵⁰War with France had been considered a possibility. See Earl Grey to Russell, Belgrave Square, March 30, 1848, R.P., P.R.O., 30, 22/7B. Also, Russia had been regarded as a potential threat to India, Palmerston to Russell, Carlton Gardens, June 9, 1848, Ashley, II, 36-37.

⁵¹At bottom, Whigs and Tories were, notwithstanding fine political distinctions, members of the establishment and, as such, members of a privileged social group. See Southgate, The Passing of..., pp. xv, 78.

⁵²Schoyen, pp. 162-164. Ward, pp. 204-206. Mark Hovell, The Chartist Movement (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1966, 1967 reprint), pp. 288-289. Many of the signatures on the petition were bogus, e.g., Queen Victoria's and the Duke of Wellington's. Also, by Parliamentary count there were only 1,975,496 signatures on the petition. See Ward, p. 208.

⁵³David Large, "London in the Year of Revolutions, 1848," London in the Age of Reform, ed. John Stevenson (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1977), p. 189. Ward, p. 206. Schoyen, p. 165. For Government reports of the events of April 10, 1848, in London and throughout the British Isles, see the Home Office reports in P.R.O., H.O. 45/2410, passim. Also, see Charles C.F. Greville, The Greville Memoirs (Part II). A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1852, ed. Henry Reeve (New York: D. Appleton, 1885), II, 297-299.

For many details concerning the deployment and make-up of the civilian forces enlisted by the government see Lady Palmerston to Mrs. Huskisson, Carlton Gardens, April 14, 1848, B.L., Huskisson Papers, ADD. MSS. 39, 949, Supplement, Vol. II, "Letters to Mrs. Huskisson, etc.," ff. 233-240.

⁵⁴Lady Palmerston to Mrs. Huskisson, Carlton Gardens, April 14, 1848, B.L., Huskisson Papers, ADD. MSS. 39, 949, Supplement, Vol. II, "Letters to Mrs. Huskisson, etc.," ff. 233-240. See also Mather, p. 396. Elizabeth Longford, Wellington, Pillar of State (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 378-379.

⁵⁵ Lady Palmerston to Mrs. Huskisson, Carlton Gardens, April 14, 1848, B. L. Huskisson Papers, ADD. MSS. 39, 949, Supplement, Vol. II, "Letters to Mrs. Huskisson, etc.," ff. 233-240. Longford, p. 379.

⁵⁶ Wellington to Russell, April 6, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30, 22/7B. Russell to Albert, Chesham Place, April 9, 1848, Victoria, II, 198.

⁵⁷ Ibid. Sir George Grey to Russell, Home Office, April 9, 1848, Walpole, II, 69. Lady Palmerston to Mrs. Huskisson, Carlton Gardens, April 14, 1848, B.L., Huskisson Papers, ADD. MSS. 39, 949, Supplement, Vol. II, "Letters to Mrs. Huskisson, etc.," ff. 233-240. Schoyen, pp. 164-165.

⁵⁸ Lady Palmerston to Mrs. Huskisson, Carlton Gardens, April 14, 1848, B.L., Huskisson Papers, ADD. MSS. 39, 949, Supplement, Vol. II, "Letters to Mrs. Huskisson, etc.," ff. 233-240.

⁵⁹ Addington to Phillipps (Commissioner of Police), "Immediate," April 10, 1848, P.R.O., H.O. 45/2410. See also Addington to Marchant, F.O., April 10, 1848, P.R.O., H.O. 45/2410.

I am indebted to Professor David Goodway of the University of Leeds for pointing out the Home Office Papers in the P.R.O. (H.O. 45/2410) pertaining to preparations for the Chartist demonstrations throughout the British Isles. Professor Goodway's own research has revealed how very extensive were the preparations of the Russell government concerning the Chartist challenge. See David Goodway, London Chartism, 1838-1848 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982). See also David Goodway, "Chartism in London," Society for the Study of Labour History Bulletin (Spring 1970), pp. 13-16.

⁶⁰ Addington to Marchant, F.O., April 10, 1848, P.R.O., H.O. 45/2410. See also Bell, I, 409.

⁶¹ See various correspondence between Sir George Grey and other government and police officials, H.O. 45/2410, passim.

⁶² Mather, p. 394.

⁶³ For example, Clarendon wrote, "I can not say that our position here improves, there may be no immediate outbreak; but the determination to rebel is manifesting itself more and more throughout the country, and my expectation that an outbreak will be averted is diminishing. In ordinary times we might safely reckon upon our ordinary means for preserving tranquility, but in the present state of Europe, and when such strange and unexpected events have happened everywhere, it is difficult to say upon whom we can rely and impossible to foresee the issue of the struggle," Clarendon to Russell, March 30, 1848, Russell, I, 221-222. See also Memorandum of Lord Lansdowne, March 30, 1848, R.P., P.R.O., 30, 22/7B, for further references to Clarendon's correspondence at this time.

⁶⁴Palmerston to Russell, April 7, 1848, Russell, I, 187. Russell was, in principle, opposed to raising volunteer corps of yeomanry in Ireland: "But this would be to rely entirely on the Protestants, and would probably unite the whole Roman Catholic population against us," Russell, "State of Ireland" Memorandum, R.P., P.R.O. 30, 22/7B.

⁶⁵Total forces of regular infantry and cavalry serving to keep order in the British Isles was slightly less than 30,000 men. Frederick C. Mather, Public Order..., pp. 153, 160. Mather's book, which is based heavily upon Home Office documents at the P.R.O., provides an excellent description of how the British government utilized police and military forces during the years of Chartist agitation.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Conservatives wanted the bill to be permanent and more stringent, but in deference to the Radical faction in Parliament, the Whigs demurred. See Greville, II, 300. See also Walpole, II, 66-67.

Palmerston had doubted that a bill which curbed civil liberties, such as Habeas Corpus, would pass in Parliament unless a sufficient issue of danger was before the public's view. See Palmerston, Memorandum, March 31, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30, 22/7B. The planned Chartist demonstration, with the potential threat of Irish rebellion, provided the catalyst for passage of the legislation.

Lady Palmerston, in noting the opposition to the bill prior to its passage, wrote, "If we pass our bill we shall have some holidays, if not the Government are determined to persevere and to have no holidays. The opposition will be bullied by this determination. They are in very small numbers but very inveterate," Lady Palmerston to Mrs. Huskisson, Carlton Gardens, April 14, 1848, B.L. Huskisson Papers, ADD. MSS., 39, 949, Supplement, Vol. II, "Letters to Mrs. Huskisson, etc.," ff. 233-240.

⁶⁸Sir George Grey to Russell, Home Office, April 9, 1848, Walpole, II, 69.

⁶⁹Estimates of the crowd of demonstrators in London on April 10, 1848, vary according to the source. Russell reported 12,000 to 15,000 people, and Feargus O'Connor claimed 500,000 demonstrators. The government, perhaps, wished to reduce the size, and hence the importance, of the demonstration, and O'Connor, perhaps, to magnify it. See Russell to Victoria, Downing Street (2 a.m.), April 10, 1848, Victoria, II, 199-200, Mather, "The Government and...", p. 394. Ward, p. 206. Goodway judges that 150,000 is a credible figure. See Goodway, "Chartism in London," Society for..., p. 14.

⁷⁰Russell to Victoria, Downing Street (2 p.m.), April 10, 1848, Victoria, II, 199-200. See also, Greville, The Greville Memoirs (Part II). A Journal of..., II, 298-299. Charles C.F. Greville, The Greville Diary, Including Passages Hitherto Withheld from Publication (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page, 1927), II, 288-290. Schoyen, p. 166.

⁷¹Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., April 11, 1848, Ashley, II, 80. Hovell, pp. 291-292.

⁷²Langer, p. 71. David Thompson, England in the Nineteenth Century, 1815-1914 (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1950), pp. 86, 96. Malcolm I. Thomis and Peter Holt, Threats of Revolution in Britain, 1789-1848 (London: Macmillan Press, 1977), pp. 113-114.

In contrast, David Goodway has asserted that the Chartist threat of 1848 in London had possessed more substance than historians have previously granted the movement and that the link between Chartists and Irish nationalists was significant. According to Goodway, Chartism in London in 1848 was on the ascent. See Goodway, "Chartism in London," Society for..., pp. 13-16.

⁷³Lady Palmerston to Mrs. Huskisson, Carlton Gardens, April 14, 1848, B.L., Huskisson Papers, ADD. MSS. 39, 949, Supplement, Vol. II, "Letters to Mrs. Huskisson, etc.," ff. 233-240.

⁷⁴"We shall have our own time of trial on Monday; for those who thought that the Chartists would submit to the Proclamation of the government [banning the demonstration] appear to be mistaken." Aberdeen to Guizot, Argyll House, April 8, 1848, B.L., Aberdeen Papers, ADD. MSS. 43334, Vol. CCXCVI, f. 16.

After fleeing France, Guizot took up residence in England, and although Lord Palmerston had disagreed with Guizot's foreign policy, the Palmerstons, nevertheless, saw Guizot socially. See Palmerston to Normanby, April 4, 1848, Ashley, II, 77-78.

⁷⁵Greville, The Greville Memoirs (Part II), A Journal of..., II, 294, 296. The Peelite, Lord Jocelyn, declared in Parliament, "I believe there is not a single man in the House who has not seen with indignation and disgust the language of certain mischievous and traitorous men; avowedly with the object of overturning the institutions of this country - avowedly with the object of levying war upon her Majesty's Crown, by exciting to overt acts of rebellion her Majesty's subjects in that country [Ireland]." Address by Lord Jocelyn in Parliament, April 3, 1848, Walpole, II, 66. Russell duly acknowledged the potentially dangerous nature of the state of unrest in Ireland and promised to take measures to strifle rebellion. Address by Lord John Russell in Parliament, April 3, 1848, Walpole, II, 66-67.

⁷⁶Trevelyan to Russell, April 4, 1848, R.P., P.R.O., 30/22/7B. Southgate, p. 24.

⁷⁷Col. Harry D. Jones to C.E. Trevelyan, Dublin, April 10, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B.

⁷⁸"But any loss of life will cause a deep and rankling resentment. I trust, for this and every reason, that all may pass off quietly." Russell to Albert, Chesham Place, April 9, 1848, Victoria, II, 198.

At first Russell was slow in reacting to the forthcoming threat of the Chartists on April 10, but after being strongly urged by fellow Whigs, the Peelites, and members of London's middle class, the prime minister pressed forward on the preparations noted above. See Greville, The Greville Memoirs (Part II), A Journal of..., II, 294-298. Mather, "The Government and...", p. 396.

⁷⁹Albert to Russell, Osborne, April 10, 1848, Victoria, II, 198-199.

⁸⁰Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 248, April 10, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Palmerston to Bulwer, April 18, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/BU/579/1. Indeed, foreigners were in awe at the Russell government's success. Princess Lieven informed Lady Palmerston that the French, as she expressed it, "devaient mourir de honte de voir la différence entre des deux pays, les esprit, l'ordre, et le courage de coeur qui le soutianment." Bunsen, too, was impressed. He likened London on April 10, 1848, to a large ship, manned and ready for action. For both Lieven's and Bunsen's comments see Lady Palmerston to Mrs. Huskisson, Carlton Gardens, April 14, 1848, B.L., Huskisson Papers, ADD, MSS. 39, 949, Supplement, Vol, II, "Letters to Mrs. Huskisson, etc.," ff. 233-240.

⁸³Palmerston to Russell, Carlton Gardens, April 21, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B.

⁸⁴Russell to Victoria, Downing Street (2 p.m.), April 10, 1848, Victoria, II, 199-200. In the same vein, the Duke of Bedford wrote, "I wish you joy most heartily on the events of yesterday, which cannot fail to produce the best effects everywhere, and show the country and the world that we do not mean to be scattered and trodden down like other Governments, and that there is resolution and power here to assert the supremacy of law and order." Bedford to Russell, April 11, 1848, Walpole, II, 69-70.

⁸⁵Lady Mary Abercromby to Russell, Turin, April 19, 1848, Russell, I, 188.

⁸⁶Nesselrode compared England's relationship to Ireland with that of Russia and Poland. Nesselrode to Chreptowitch, St. Petersburg, April 19, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 84.

⁸⁷Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, April 20, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁸⁸Langer, Chs. 10, 11, 12.

⁸⁹"There certainly was great alarm in all quarters, the uncertainty of what numbers of disaffected might come in town, the manufacturing districts and the very great number of foreigners in this country, French, Poles and Germans and the daily arrival of many more known to be revolutionists from Paris of the very worst character. This with all that has occurred lately in Europe made one of course anxious to avoid no precautions....," Lady Palmerston to Mrs. Huskisson, Carlton Gardens, April 14, 1848, B.L., Huskisson Papers, ADD. MSS. 39, 949, Supplement, Vol. II, "Letters to Mrs. Huskisson, etc.," ff. 233-240. See also Lady Palmerston to Lord Palmerston, April 10, 1848, Airlie, II, 116-117.

⁹⁰Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., April 11, 1848, Ashley, II, 80.

⁹¹Langer, 56-57. South, p. 24. Bell, I, 104-107.

⁹²Schoyen, pp. 181-184.

⁹³Albert to Russell, Osborne, April 10, 1848, Victoria, II, 198-199. Lady John Russell, Diary, April 10, 1848, Walpole, II, 69. Duchess of Bedford, to Russell, April 11, 1848, Russell, I, 187.

⁹⁴Duke of Bedford to Russell, April 11, 1848, Walpole, II, 69-70.

⁹⁵Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., April 18, 1848, Ashley, II, 81. See also Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., April 20, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/476.

⁹⁶Lady Palmerston to Mrs. Huskisson, Carlton Gardens, April 14, 1848, B.L., Huskisson Papers, ADD. MSS. 39, 949, Supplement, Vol. II, "Letters to Mrs. Huskisson, etc.," ff. 233-240.

⁹⁷Schoyen, p. 166-167. Goodway, "Chartism in London," Society for..., p. 14.

⁹⁸Ibid. Mather, "The Government and....," pp. 397. Ward, pp. 211-216.

⁹⁹The Queen added that the Chartist defeat should have a calming effect, Victoria to Russell, April 16, 1848, Victoria, II, 201.

¹⁰⁰Walpole, II, 67.

¹⁰¹Robert Kee, The Green Flag: the Turbulent History of the Irish National Movement (New York: Delacorte Press, 1972), pp. 270-289. Mather, Public Order..., pp. 23, 25-28. Ward, p. 211.

¹⁰²Greville, The Greville Diary..., II, 290-292. Goodway, "Chartism in London," Society for..., p. 15. Langer, Political and..., p. 347-348. Whether the parallel rioting by members of the laboring class in Paris served as an inducement for the British middle class to zealously support the British government is an open issue. Schoyen believes this is the case but Goodway doubts there was much of a connection. See Schoyen, p. 172. Goodway, "Chartism in London," Society for..., p. 16.

¹⁰³Greville, The Greville Diary..., II, 290.

¹⁰⁴Goodway, "Chartism in London," Society for..., p. 15. Schoyen, pp. 174-176. Mather, "The Government and...", p. 397.

¹⁰⁵B.P. Smith to Robert Peel, Dublin, April 17, 1848, B.L., Peel Papers, General Correspondence, ADD. MSS. 40, 600, Vol. CCCCXX, ff. 136-137.

¹⁰⁶Smith O'Brien and Thomas Meagher were also arrested but were released after juries could not agree on their guilt. Mitchel faced a packed jury which duly convicted him of treason. He was sentenced to transportation for 14 years. McCaffrey, p. 71. Schoyen, p. 174.

¹⁰⁷Russell, Memorandum: "State of Ireland," March 30, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30, 22/7B. Walpole, II, 65.

¹⁰⁸Palmerston, Memorandum, March 31, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30, 22/7B.

¹⁰⁹Southgate, p. 176.

¹¹⁰Palmerston to Normanby, April 23, 1847, Ashley, II, 34-35. See also Southgate, p. 132.

¹¹¹Graham to Peel, "Private," April 30, 1848, B.L., Peel Papers, ADD. MSS. 40, 452, Vol. CCLXXII, ff. 268-273.

¹¹²Southgate, p. 132.

¹¹³McCaffrey, p. 71.

¹¹⁴Gwynn, pp. 258-268, 272. Langer, pp. 244-245.

¹¹⁵McCaffrey, p. 71.

¹¹⁶Gwynn, pp. 152-153, Schoyen, pp. 164, 174-178. Southgate, p. 24. Ward, pp. 213-216. Mather, Public Order..., pp. 153-164. Goodway also points to the widespread infiltration of local Chartist groups by government-paid spies. See Goodway, "Chartism in London," Society for..., p. 16. For additional details see Mather, Public Order..., Ch. VI.

¹¹⁷In particular, two present-day historians, in examining British unrest during the first half of the nineteenth century, have de-emphasized the potential dangers that lurked within the various plans and schemes of the Chartists and Irish nationalists. See Thomis and Holt, p. 126. On the other hand, as mentioned above, Goodway believes there was a true challenge to the established order within the Chartist and Irish Confederate movements in 1848. Goodway, "Chartism in London," Society for..., pp. 14-16.

¹¹⁸Graham to Lewis, Netherby, April 22, 1848, Charles Stuart Parker, The Life and Letters of Sir James Graham, Second Baronet of Netherby, P.C., G.C.B. (London: Murray, 1907), II, 69-70.

¹¹⁹Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., February 11, 1848, Ashley, II, 63-64.

CHAPTER V

THE ITALIAN QUESTION

The foremost diplomatic question confronting Palmerston in 1848 arose from the prospect of a general European war developing from a Franco-Austrian conflict in Italy. Therefore, as pressing as domestic concerns were at the time, it was the Italian question that required his utmost attention. The potential threat to the continental balance of power and peace in Europe could not be ignored. Palmerston acted with his customary dispatch.¹ With these concerns in mind, Palmerston had sent Lord Minto to Italy in 1847 to support the monarchs of the Italian states² and to snuff out the sparks which threatened to ignite the Italian tinderbox. By March 1848 Palmerston had concluded that Minto had succeeded admirably in his mission, and he complimented Russell's father-in-law for having pressed upon the Italian monarchs timely reforms which had prevented Italy from becoming, as Palmerston wrote, "nothing but Republics from the Alps to Sicily."³

Because Prince Metternich had steadfastly opposed timely political reforms in Italy, which Palmerston regarded as necessary for stability, one of the most important events for the future of Italy, in Palmerston's eyes, was the Austrian statesman's resignation and flight from Vienna.⁴ Palmerston subsequently described Metternich as an "old twaddle,"⁵ and Palmerston declared, "...happy would it have been for the Continent of Europe if this had happened some years ago - but better now than later."⁶ For Palmerston had considered Metternich's repressive policies to be inimical to the monarchical principle in Italy because it was the Austrian

presence there, Palmerston believed, which had stirred up unrest.⁷ Now, with the Austrian prince gone, the hour for Italy to throw off the bonds of Austrian authority seemed at hand.

Responding to the cries for national liberation issued by his fellow Italian countrymen and in hopes of gaining popularity among his subjects, Charles Albert, King of Sardinia - Piedmont, declared war on Austria on March 28, 1848.⁸ Thus, the Italian conflict which Palmerston dreaded so much broke out at a time when the British foreign secretary was simultaneously contending with volatile revolutionary governments abroad and the potential threat of an Irish - Chartist rebellion at home.

In defense of Charles Albert's seemingly aggressive conduct, the Marquis de Brignole, Sardinian ambassador to Paris, informed Lord Normanby that the Sardinian king had been petitioned by the notable citizens of Milan to intervene on their behalf. The "great families," as Normanby termed them, of Milan had feared that a republic and anarchy might prevail in Lombardy if Charles Albert did not come to their assistance. Upon this basis, then, Charles Albert entered Lombardy in pursuit of the already retreating Austrians.⁹ In another letter to Palmerston, Normanby remarked that had not Charles Albert gone to the aid of the Milanese, the French would have done so.¹⁰

To Palmerston's relief, events turned for the better. Charles Albert chose to combat the Austrians without French assistance. Moreover, the Austrian army, faced with a series of revolts throughout northern Italy, was obliged to stay within the perimeter of a naturally defensive position, the Quadrilateral, near the river Mincio. By May, when Austria was willing

to consider abandoning Lombardy, Palmerston began to negotiate with the Austrian representative in London to get Austria out of Italy before France intervened.¹¹

During the period March to June 1848, Lord Palmerston penned a number of letters which revealed his vision of Italy's future. Essentially, the foreign secretary believed that Italy was far more costly for Austria to hold by arms than it was worth as a possession, and he fully expected that Austria's days in Italy were numbered.¹² On March 28, 1848, he wrote:

If 80,000 or 100,000 Austrian troops could not keep the Milanese against the unorganized population of the country, how can any Austrian effort be sufficient to reconquer that province against the whole population now about to be organized and supported by 80,000 Sardinian troops? I consider the destiny of Lombardy and Venice as decided. ¹³

Lord John Russell concurred fully with Palmerston's assessment of Austria's limited future in Italy.¹⁴ Both statesmen firmly believed that Austria would be driven out of Italy.¹⁵ Palmerston's foremost concern remained the European war which both Russell and he viewed as a very real possibility. The British foreign secretary wanted the Austrians to leave Italy quietly before France entered the crisis.¹⁶

Palmerston envisioned the unification of northern Italy into a single state under Charles Albert, whose actions against the Austrians, from Palmerston's point of view, were understandable if not condonable. As a single unit, northern Italy would serve as a neutral buffer between France and Austria. The new state would, thereby, help to preserve European peace. In addition, such a state would possess political and commercial leverage.¹⁷

The British foreign secretary acknowledged that a new Italian state constituted a revision of the Vienna settlement of 1815. However, Palmerston believed, as did Russell, that Europe was in the process of a major, inexorable transformation, and with respect to the creation of a monarchy for northern Italy, Palmerston was quite willing to stand aside and permit its establishment.¹⁸ All Italy, in Palmerston's opinion, should be united into a confederation similar to that of Germany, but under no circumstances was it desirable for republics to be established.¹⁹ Palmerston, then, did not envision the Italian states uniting into a single nation - state, especially a republic.

On the other hand, Queen Victoria had other ideas concerning Italy. Rather than favor a new north Italian state under Charles Albert, the Queen did not believe the Sardinian king should be permitted to carve out a larger Italian kingdom from lands which she regarded as legitimately belonging to Austria. Indeed, she told Palmerston, "Why Charles Albert ought to get any additional territory the Queen cannot in the least see."²⁰ When Palmerston continued to favor the Italians, Victoria lost her patience and sharply criticized the foreign secretary:

She [Victoria] cannot conceal from him [Palmerston] that she is ashamed of the policy which we are pursuing in this Italian controversey in abetting wrong, and this for the object of gaining influence in Italy. The Queen does not consider the influence so gained as an advantage, and though this influence is to be acquired in order to do good, she is afraid that the fear of losing it again will always stand in the way of this. 21

Moreover, Victoria treated the principle of self-determination as an aberrant concept which was a manifestation of popular fickleness and,

in this sense, an idea that should be discouraged.²² It can be seen, then, that Lord Palmerston's view of Italy was another element of disagreement in his relations with the Queen.

With respect to the Austrian role in Italy, Palmerston believed that Austria would be a stronger state without possessions south of the Alps. Referring to the Austrians on March 30, 1848, Palmerston wrote:

But the loss will not impair their pecuniary resources nor their power and military position. If their Italian subjects had been loyal and attached Italy would have been a source of strength; as things have been it has been and must have continued to be a source of weakness. It was a vulnerable point, and not a shield.²³

For Palmerston the expulsion of the Austrians was a foregone conclusion. However, he decided not to press this point immediately on the Austrians, hoping that an Italian victory would settle the matter decisively.²⁴ Concerning the course of European events in general, Palmerston summed up his views: "We have nothing to do though we may perhaps have something to say on these matters." ²⁵ Only with respect to Belgium, because of her special relationship with Great Britain, was there, in Palmerston's opinion, a need for possible assertive action.²⁶

Ironically, subsequent to his flight from Vienna, Metternich confided to Lord Minto that Austria's emperor, Francis I, had objected at the time of the Vienna settlement to the annexation of Lombardy, fearing that it would, indeed, be a source of Austrian weakness, and Metternich had agreed with this viewpoint. However, the Allies had insisted that Austria acquire Lombardy. Whereupon Metternich had proposed the creation of a Lombardo - Venetian administrative department with a liberal constitution.

However, as Lombardy became a matter of domestic policy with its annexation, it was outside of the prince's direct control as the chief advisor for foreign affairs. His proposals were not implemented.²⁷ Thus Metternich claimed absolution from the manner in which Austria's Italian provinces had been governed and the turmoil that had resulted.

In addition to subsequently advising the Austrians to come to terms with Charles Albert, Palmerston had additional advice which he relayed through Lord Ponsonby, the British ambassador in Vienna. Palmerston urged Austria's emperor, Ferdinand I, to abdicate in favor of a stronger ruler. The British foreign secretary characterized the Austrian emperor as a "nullity" and "idiot." Austria would decline further if a more competent, more inspiring ruler was not chosen quickly.²⁸

Palmerston added that it was in the best interests of all Europe for Austria to remain a strong and effective great power.²⁹ For he believed Austria would lose not only her Italian possessions, but perhaps Galicia as well. Yet, he wrote, "I hope her [Austria's] losses will go no farther, but enough will even then remain to make her if well governed a most powerful state."³⁰ Therefore, it can be seen that Palmerston expected a significant transformation in the geographic composition of Austria.

Although Palmerston may very well have shown his concern for Austria's welfare, in part, to persuade Austrian officials that Italy was a lost cause, his remarks about the Austrian emperor coincide with his general assessment of the revolutions of 1848, which he also included in a dispatch to Ponsonby: "There is a general fight going on all over the Continent between governors and the governed, between law and disorder, between

those who have and those who want to have, between honest men and rogues..."³¹
 He emphasized that in order to protect the other classes from the "turbulent, the poor and the rogues," as he called them, an energetic leader was required.³²

Therefore, Palmerston's firm espousal of the institution of monarchy was related to some extent to his deep-rooted dislike and fear of the "turbulent" lower classes who stood to gain by social revolution. It is noteworthy that Palmerston expressed these views in early May when the Whigs had successfully overcome the Chartist demonstration of April 10 and as Palmerston was conducting his foreign relations with the revolutionary regime in Paris. Moreover, his inherent aversion for any government which either disavowed or diminished the principle of monarchy was undoubtedly a factor in his foreign relations with the moderate republican Lamartine and the reform-minded Charles Albert. The worst kind of monarch in Palmerston's view was one who was personally weak and vacillating and, at the same time, the sovereign of a state whose government was repressive. The Austrian emperor fitted this description.³³ Such a regime, to Palmerston's mind, invited revolution and, in the case of Italy, war with the republican regime of France.

During March 1848 Viscount Palmerston revealed in his dispatches not only his views of how Italy should be reconstituted and the European states governed, but also the heavy burden which he carried as foreign secretary of a great power and the world's pre-eminent maritime state.

Normanby had complained about not receiving frequent communiqués from his superior, and Palmerston replied:

As to your not always getting letters from me by every messenger who passes through Paris, never wonder at that nor think it extraordinary. Wonder rather when I am able to find time to write at all; I am sure you would if you saw the avalanche of dispatches from every part of the world which come down upon me daily, and which must be read; and if you witnessed the number of interviews which I cannot avoid giving every day of the week. Every post sends me a lamenting Minister throwing himself and his country upon England for help, which I am obliged to tell him we cannot afford him. 34

Written before the uncertainties of the pending Chartist demonstration of April 10 were resolved and while the European powers were reckoning with the new revolutionary republic of France, as well as civil unrest within their own states, Henry John Temple had bared to Normanby the tolls and responsibilities which were his lot as British foreign secretary in 1848.

If Lord Palmerston was to have any respite at all, it would most assuredly be achieved by preventing the Franco-Austrian war over Italy which he had anxiously foreseen as a possibility since 1846.³⁵ In spring 1848, it was, then, with the objective of restraining France from intervening in Italy and elsewhere that Palmerston proceeded with Anglo-French relations.

Notwithstanding Lamartine's assurances of non-aggression in March 1848, Sardinia's monarch, Charles Albert, was openly suspicious of French designs on Italy and, as noted, he had appealed to Lord Palmerston, through

Sir Ralph Abercromby, for support,³⁶ Palmerston had capitalized on these suspicions by warning the House of Savoy of the dear price it would have to pay for any French help it might elicit in their struggle with the Austrians, in particular, the loss of territory.³⁷

Such warnings by Palmerston were by no means void of substance, for on March 31, 1848, Lamartine informed Lord Normanby that he hoped the Sardinian province of Savoy would someday be reunited with France by peaceful means. Normanby further reported that approximately 700 to 800 Savoyard émigrés residing in France, and well-disposed toward her, were poised for an incursion into Savoy. Although Lamartine professed his staunch opposition to an armed expedition,³⁸ Palmerston could not be encouraged by Normanby's reports.

Moreover, on April 3 Normanby informed Palmerston that three corps for a planned French Army of the Alps were being formed at Lyons, Dijon and Grenoble with the express purpose of marching to the Sardinian frontier where they would await orders to intervene in Italy if Sardinia requested military assistance. The Marquis de Brignole in Paris told Normanby that such an army on the frontier was a threatening symbol to his country and, as Normanby related, "if they were only to advance if called upon by his [Brignole's] government there could be no use in their presence there,"³⁹ It can be seen, then, that from its very inception the French revolutionary government had designs on northern Italy. Lamartine's great Manifesto of March 1848 had mentioned Italian independence⁴⁰ but his private diplomatic initiatives indicated France's interest in Italy was not entirely altruistic.

Subsequent reports from Normanby in Paris provided a more promising picture of conditions in Savoy itself. An armed band of insurgents, despite Lamartine's professed efforts at prevention, had crossed the French frontier and attempted to establish a republic in Savoy with the expectation of eventually being annexed by France. However, the local population in Savoy, led by their village priests, resisted the revolutionary effort and returned the local civil authorities to power.⁴¹

Nevertheless, the Army of the Alps remained a French objective, and Lamartine informed Normanby on April 7, 1848, in very frank terms, that the Army's main purpose was for possible intervention in Italy under certain conditions. If as a consequence of a defeat Charles Albert would experience grave difficulties in his contest against the Austrians, and if, then, Italy was exposed to a prolonged conflict, France could not look on with indifference. The Army of the Alps would serve as an instrument in an armed diplomacy. That is, it would be used only after French consultation with the British government and in the hopes of a general European settlement of the Italian question.⁴²

In addition, Normanby grimly reported that Lamartine was uncertain whether he could prevent French troops from joining the Savoyard insurgents. Also, if the Frenchmen joined the Savoyards in attempting to make Savoy a republic, Lamartine might have to send the French army into Italy to restore order. Normanby vociferously advised against such an action which he informed Lamartine would have the worst possible effect in Britain and would be misconstrued throughout Europe.⁴³

Thus, at a time when the British Chartists were about to challenge the Russell government in London, French warhawks were looking toward Italy and the potential "war of principles" Palmerston so ardently abhorred and which Lamartine appeared almost powerless to prevent.

After the attempt of the Savoyards was repulsed by their own countrymen, no further incursions into Savoy took place. Palmerston, as well as Normanby, believed that Lamartine had done all he could to prevent the more radical members of the Provisional Government from pushing the Army of the Alps into Savoy and a European conflict.⁴⁴ On April 24, 1848, Normanby warned Palmerston that should Charles Albert be defeated, there would be, according to Lamartine, a great cry for the French to intervene. Lamartine assured the British ambassador confidentially that he would do all he could to restrain the impulse to do so and that if forced by events to interfere, France would do so only in accord with Britain.⁴⁵

Lamartine also suggested to Normanby the convocation of a European congress to settle the Italian question. Normanby noted that such a suggestion was new but that at first observation it could be said that any plan should come from the Italians themselves or at least be met by them half-way. To Palmerston, Normanby concluded that Lamartine was apparently seeking ways to channel the energy of his unemployed countrymen into pursuits other than war, and he was, as Normanby expressed it, "naturally anxious to diminish his difficulties by appearing to obtain the legitimate objects of popular sympathy by other means than by arms."⁴⁶

Again, on May 1, 1848, Lamartine made even clearer his foreign policy aims. The Frenchman asserted that he believed Sardinians were in negotiation with the Austrians in an attempt to acquire Lombardy and to prevent the establishment of a republic anywhere in Italy, and that Britain and the Pope were also in league with the two powers. Whereupon Lamartine spoke up for France's interests by stating that such an Austro-Sardinian arrangement might be the best obtainable under the circumstances, but, as Lamartine claimed, "...then France might well expect some small compensation in the way of security, if so powerful a neighbor as Sardinia would then become, was established upon her Eastern Frontier within forty miles of Lyons." ⁴⁷ As in his remarks of March 31, 1848, Lamartine was still seeking territory in Italy, albeit peacefully. ⁴⁸

Essentially, Lamartine had to achieve two objectives. He had at least to appear to be pressing forward on French interests in Italy, and he had to take care as not to upset the nascent Anglo-French entente, which required him to dampen the French impulse for aggressive action. Just as significantly, if an accord concerning Italy was reached, Lamartine wanted to make certain that France received a share of the spoils. His suggestions for a peace conference, his allusions to compensation and his references to the Army of the Alps all bespeak of an underlying desire to expand the French frontier on the side of Savoy.

Occupied with revolutions much closer to Vienna, the Austrians had recognized their precarious position in Italy, and they were willing to negotiate a settlement. ⁴⁹ In April Count Dietrichstein, the Austrian

ambassador at London, asked Palmerston to prevail upon Abercromby to recommend to Charles Albert the suspension of arms while Austria's Count Hartig negotiated with the Milanese. Palmerston favored a quick settlement which preferably removed Austria completely from Italy or, at the very least, finalized matters before the French had decided to intervene.⁵⁰ Palmerston duly recommended to Charles Albert a cease-fire so that an Austrian delegation could make its peace proposals.⁵¹ In essence, Palmerston's concern about Italy mirrored his larger concern for stabilizing the balance of power in what was a very unstable Europe. Restraining France was the key objective.⁵²

However, in May 1848, the fate of the city-state of Venice became a serious stumbling block to an Italian settlement. By revolution the Venetians had wrested their independence from Austria in March, and when the Austrians made preparations for retaking the city,⁵³ the French were aroused. Lamartine viewed Austria's moves as an attempt to regain her lost position in northern Italy, and he was adamant in his desire to prevent Austria's return to the maritime city. Indeed, Lamartine asserted to Normanby on May 1, 1848, that he had had requests from Italian governments to intervene in Italy, and the French would if Venice fell, even if the intervention required a violation of Sardinia's frontier and was contrary to Charles Albert's wishes.⁵⁴

Upon receiving Normanby's report of possible French intervention on behalf of Venice, Lord Palmerston urged the British ambassador to warn Lamartine that French intervention would result in a European war which

both Lamartine and the British Government would, as Palmerston put it, "deprecate." Palmerston strongly suggested that Lamartine channel France's national feelings on the Italian question into diplomatic rather than military steps.⁵⁵ As circumstance dictated, there was no confrontation. The Austrians were unable to lay a close siege on Venice until the following spring, because they had become too pre-occupied with revolts in Vienna and Hungary.⁵⁶

In a private letter to Normanby on the same day, May 2, the British foreign secretary wrote down his overall assessment of Lamartine and republican France. Palmerston rejoiced in the recent victory in the French election in which moderates had, for the most part, defeated, to use Palmerston's term, "raggamuffins." He added that for the time being Britain had to put up with a republic across the channel; there was no alternative.⁵⁷

Passing on to Lamartine, Palmerston observed that he was the only person of character and qualities befitting a leader at present. He was pledged to a republic, but Palmerston surmised that possibly in the future a president or first consul might transform himself into something more permanent.⁵⁸ Palmerston then concluded, "All one endeavours for the present must be to persuade Lamartine to keep the peace and not break loose into Italy, or Germany, or Belgium,..."⁵⁹

Palmerston's correspondence indicates, then, that although the British statesman still preferred a monarchy in France, which in his view would have been more stable than a republic, there was, he believed, no

suitable alternative to the republican Lamartine. By persuasion, prodding and, as with the incident involving the Irish delegation's visit to Paris in March 1848, periodic threats if necessary, Palmerston was striving to put a brake on revolutionary France, a France which he termed "wretched" in condition,⁶⁰ but which he nevertheless, was obliged to deal with for the present. Palmerston's ability to come to grips with the terms of reality as it had existed in 1848, rather than as he would have wished it, was strikingly exhibited by his handling of France. He made the best of the circumstances.

Nevertheless, Palmerston did not sit in idleness as events evolved. He worked diligently to defuse the potentially explosive Italian question by more than merely counselling Lamartine towards moderation. Palmerston continued to try to reduce the chief source of agitation in Italy, Austria's remaining presence there. On May 8, in a confidential dispatch to Ponsonby in Vienna, Palmerston urged the Austrians to relinquish Lombardy entirely rather than run the risk of war with France.⁶¹ Similarly, Palmerston warned Sardinia of the need to come to an expeditious settlement with Austria.⁶²

Yet, Palmerston's efforts were hampered by the British prime minister who was inclined to favor France. In a lengthy memorandum dated May 1, 1848, the day Lamartine informed Normanby of possible French armed intervention on behalf of Venice, Lord John Russell acknowledged that it was in Britain's best interest to, as he claimed, "settle the pending questions, and to fix the boundaries of states. Otherwise, if war once becomes general, it will spread over Germany, reach Belgium, and finally sweep England into its vortex."⁶³

Yet, along with recognizing the possibility of European war, especially at the hands of French interference in adjoining states, Russell also observed that the treaties of 1815 had been eroded by events and the actions of powers other than France. Russell, therefore, asserted, "the right of France to interfere when nations have driven out their Governments by their own means being such as it is not easy to dispute, it becomes us to consider what is to be our part in the forms of European policy." ⁶⁴

Although he did not want Britain openly to disavow the treaties of 1815, Russell, nevertheless, did not want Britain to, as he stated, "go on clinging to a wreck if a sage spar is within our reach." ⁶⁵ With respect to Italy, Russell fully expected France to intervene if Austria remained there by force of arms, and he favored, as did Palmerston, close communication with France, though not acting in open concert with her. However, in contrast to Palmerston's desires, Russell frankly expected France to demand compensation in Savoy if Charles Albert became king of Lombardy. ⁶⁶

Moreover, while Russell wanted to settle the Italian question quickly to forestall French intervention, unlike Palmerston, he exhibited a propensity for accepting the French disposition for interfering in the affairs of other states because other powers had previously set a precedent for doing so. He was willing to grant a measure of credence to French claims of interests in the other European states. Palmerston's correspondence displays, on the other hand, a marked disinclination for permitting the French to interfere in the affairs of the other European states -- lest a war result. ⁶⁷

The British cabinet also proved a vexing factor in the Italian question because it, including the prime minister, was unwilling to compromise on the cause of Italian nationalism in order to avert French intervention. Specifically, the cabinet balked at endorsing a compromise settlement put forward by a special Austrian envoy, Count Hummelauer, in his memorandum of May 23, 1848, and subsequently revised at Palmerston's request. Because Austria had fallen into poor straits militarily in Italy, she had sent Count Hummelauer to London to propose that an autonomous Lombardo - Venetian kingdom be established with a sole connection to Austria through a viceroy and with a ministerial representative of the kingdom at the imperial court at Vienna. With these terms Hummelaurer sought Britain's mediation in the Italian conflict. Whereupon, Palmerston, sensing that he might be able to induce Austria to settle affairs in Italy, proposed the complete abandonment of Lombardy and the retention of the Venetian state under a viceroy. Hummelaurer agreed and went even further by also granting Venetia the same autonomous position he originally proposed for the Lombardo - Venetian kingdom.⁶⁸

Believing that he had achieved significant progress, Lord Palmerston presented Hummelauer's revised proposal and request for British mediation to the British cabinet. Carried away by its open sentiments for Italian nationalism and seemingly unconcerned by the possibility of French intervention in Italy, the cabinet demanded complete independence for Venice. On May 25, 1848, Palmerston regretfully informed Hummelaurer of his failure with the cabinet.⁶⁹ After further fruitless attempts to secure British mediation, the Austrian envoy left London.⁷⁰

Thus, although Lord Palmerston favored the creation of a north Italian state under Charles Albert, he was much more concerned about the possible European war that could result if the French decided to invade Italy as Lamartine had intimated. A quick concession by Austria with British mediation might have achieved Palmerston's overriding objective of peace. On the other hand, the British prime minister and cabinet appeared less apprehensive about France's potential role in Italy and, in this instance, they short-circuited Palmerston's efforts.

Meanwhile, on May 19, 1848, in a move unknown to Palmerston, Alphonse de Lamartine finally decided to wait no longer. Speaking before France's Executive Commission, he urged that the Army of the Alps be ordered to advance and save Italy, as well as divert the hostile internal, fratricidal passions then residing in France. In this secret council meeting Lamartine hoped by a single act to aid Italy, acquire Nice and Savoy, and to relieve tensions within France, tensions which threatened his own political position as well as the general welfare of the republic.⁷¹

However, Lamartine, like Palmerston, suffered a setback. Questioning the validity of invading Italy against the wishes of its heads of state, such as Charles Albert, in order to save her from Austria, various members of the Executive Commission resisted Lamartine's call to arms and voted against it.⁷² In failure, Lamartine told the French Assembly on May 23 that the republic would only intervene in Italy if called upon by the Italians.⁷³ Therefore, contrary to the image of sober restraint which Lamartine had presented to Palmerston and Normanby, the Frenchman had decided to risk the Anglo-French entente for the immediate gains of Italian

territory and possible domestic tranquility. Normanby and Palmerston make no mention of this incident and the diplomatic correspondence suggests that they were not aware of it.⁷⁴

Nevertheless, the threat of French interference in Italy remained alive. In conversations with Jules Bastide, France's new foreign minister, Lord Normanby learned of new demands for compensation. Bastide stated that in view of the distinct possibility of Piedmont becoming a much greater power in northern Italy as a result of annexing former Austrian possessions, France could no longer look upon such a state, situated within forty miles of Lyons, with indifference to her own security.⁷⁵ Moreover, although France most definitely had no intention of acquiring Italian lands by force of arms, she did feel that in light of the fact that other signatories [Sardinia-Piedmont] of the treaties of Vienna were "helping themselves" to neighboring territories, without consultation, she did not think it unreasonable for France to augment her frontier on the side of Savoy or Nice by peaceful means. In reply Lord Normanby could recognize the jealousy that would be evoked by any territorial annexation Austria might obtain, as she was a traditional rival of France, but not of any envy resulting from the acquisitions of Sardinia.⁷⁶

Palmerston lost no time in replying. The following day, June 20, he refuted Bastide's reasons for wanting to extend the Franco-Italian frontier eastward. Palmerston pointed out that contrary to posing a new threat to French security, the establishment of a new north Italian state would create a buffer between France and Austria. Too small to be a substantive menace to France in her own right, an enhanced Piedmont would throw

Austria's boundary back to the Tyrol and relieve France of the need to guard her southern flank. Palmerston concluded, "Thus it would appear that the contemplated arrangements for the north of Italy would in their result if they should be carried into effect afford additional securities to France instead of in any degree weakening her defensive frontier." ⁷⁷

It should be noted that in desiring to push Austria's border back to the Tyrol, as well as in forcing her to abandon Italy in general, Lord Palmerston was not intent upon diminishing Austria's great power status. Palmerston truly believed Austria would be better suited without an Italian cancer sapping her of energy. Moreover, as an integral component of the balance of power in Europe, the maintenance of Austria was vital to continental stability. Both privately and publicly Palmerston pointed this out.⁷⁸ For example, approximately a year later Palmerston declared in the House of Commons:

Austria stands in the centre of Europe, a barrier against encroachments on the one side, and against invasion on the other. The political independence and liberties of Europe are bound up, in my opinion, with the maintenance and integrity of Austria as a great European power;...⁷⁹

Palmerston, then, could not treat Italian affairs as merely a peninsula issue or even as a Franco-Austrian dilemma. If the balance of power was to remain viable, he had to ensure that neither the French nor the Austrians nor the Italians themselves embroiled their respective neighbors in that "vortex" of events which Russell had so artfully described in his foreign policy memorandum of May 1, 1848.⁸⁰

However, the French threat of intervention in Italy evaporated, for the time being, in June 1848 as the French government became pre-occupied with

an unemployed workers' revolt which developed in the insurrection and official reaction known as the "June Days." Fearing the threat of civil war, the moderate elements in the French government installed General Eugène Cavaignac as head of state with emergency powers.⁸¹ At last, it appeared that France acquired the strong, energetic leader that Palmerston had hoped for since the onset of the February Revolution of 1848.⁸² On June 26, 1848, in an interview with Cavaignac, Normanby congratulated the general for his triumph over the recent revolt and attempt at anarchy.⁸³ Palmerston heartily approved of Normanby's good wishes for the general and especially for the triumph over the Paris insurrection.⁸⁴ For the present, France would be more concerned with putting her own house in order rather than that of Italy.

SOUTHERN ITALY

Although Palmerston had expended a great deal of effort to create a viable balance of power within the revolutionary conditions prevailing in northern Italy, the south of Italy, especially Sicily, was also a deep British concern. It was in the south that British statesmen wished to maintain a balance of interests decidedly in their favor. Jutting into the Mediterranean towards Africa, southern Italy cut across British sea lanes to the Middle East and India. The Italian peninsula was of strategic value to Britain. In addition, several British merchant families carried on prosperous enterprises in the manufacture and trade of sulphur and wines in Sicily where they had gained local influence.⁸⁵ Sicily and southern Italy were more than pieces in the mosaic of continental

power, they were distinct areas of British commercial interest.

From its initial establishment the French Provisional Government roused British suspicions concerning southern Italy. On March 1, 1848, in one of his earliest interviews with Lord Normanby, Lamartine mentioned that the King of Naples, Ferdinand II, had previously asked Guizot if he would send a French naval force to counter-balance a British squadron patrolling off his coast. Lamartine declined the Neapolitan monarch's request and used this opportunity to express to Normanby his desire for an Anglo-French alliance. However, Lamartine also asked Normanby if Britain had any designs on Sicily. Normanby steadfastly denied that Britain had any desire to dominate Sicily and emphasized that his country wished that no internal disputes would impair, as he stated, the "political amelioration" of Italy.⁸⁶

Within this interview of March 1 there were two elements characteristic of Anglo-French relations concerning southern Italy in the ensuing months: French acknowledgement of British interests and British wariness regarding French intentions. Generally Lamartine chose to follow Britain's lead concerning the south.⁸⁷ In April, Lamartine again stressed France's non-interference with the influence, in Sicily, which Britain, according to Lamartine, "had always maintained in consequence of her long connection with that Island towards the close of the [Napoleonic] war."⁸⁸

Yet, British suspicion of French intentions remained. In particular, Lord Minto was apprehensive about French republican propaganda in Italy.⁸⁹ These suspicions were partially confirmed when a French diplomatic agent

at Naples had engaged in pro-republican activities, but was later recalled by the Paris government.⁹⁰ Normanby added his own view by telling Palmerston that certain Frenchmen would heartily rejoice if a republic was proclaimed in Sicily, as it would symbolize the triumph of their principles and the demise of British influence.⁹¹

Ultimately, it was the disposition of the British fleet under Admiral Sir William Parker which tipped the scales in favor of Britain's influence in southern Italy.⁹² In several dispatches to his son-in-law, Lord John Russell, Minto lamented the fact that there were not more British ships to counter-balance French ships in Italian waters. Minto noted that the proximity of French harbors and, therefore, more French ships gave Britain a distinct disadvantage if an engagement occurred.⁹³

Just as significantly, the British had deployed their naval forces off the Italian coast at key points to back up their diplomatic initiatives, such as in Sicily where the fleet was utilized to enforce a British demand on Sicilian revolutionaries to refrain, at this time, from breaking completely away from the King of Naples.⁹⁴ Minto complained that the equality of the French naval forces was forcing Admiral Parker to, as Minto declared, "keep his squadron together and may very probably lead to great disorders in Italy and to the sprouting up of Republics, which might have been prevented by the presence of a British line-of-battle ship or two in different parts of the coast."⁹⁵ The French presence was perceived as a threat to Britain's influence in the area. Minto frankly stated that he had no confidence in the honesty of French agents or officers in maintaining stability and cooperation. Nevertheless, during the period

of February to June 1848, Lamartine did follow Britain's lead, for the most part, concerning south Italian affairs.⁹⁶

It can be seen, then, that Great Britain exercised much influence in southern Italy partially because of Lamartine's reluctance openly to challenge a recognized British area of influence, for he did not wish to upset the developing Anglo-French entente, and because a British squadron diligently patrolled the Italian coast with the expectation of trouble. Unlike affairs in Italy's northern interior, in the Mediterranean Palmerston had the added leverage of British naval forces and the French knew it. The British presence continued.⁹⁷

THE ISSUE OF THE ÉMIGRÉS

In examining the various events surrounding the potential threat of incursions into Italy, it should be noted that as with the Savoyard expedition in southern France, other alien groups in Paris during March and April 1848 had plans for armed expeditions to other parts of Europe. Lord Palmerston had to counter the threat that these plans had posed for peace and the equilibrium of the continent.

Belgium's special relationship with Britain came into play very early in the Provisional Government's existence. On February 27, 1848, Lord Normanby received word that the new French government had resolved to respect the present territorial divisions and even if Belgium had offered to unite itself with France, the French would refuse.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, on March 31, Palmerston emphasized to Normanby that France should not interfere with Belgium: "But Belgium is a case by itself, and both France

and England are bound by treaty engagements in regard to that country, which it is most desirable for the repose of France and England that no events should call into active operation."⁹⁹ Palmerston was fully prepared to back up his words with action.¹⁰⁰

Yet Belgian security was threatened. During the last week in March 1848, Belgian dissidents left Paris by train for the Belgian frontier with the objective of overthrowing King Leopold I, Queen Victoria's uncle, and of establishing a republic. Instead of stopping the émigrés at the Franco-Belgian border, French officials directed the train to pass without stopping into Belgian territory and into the hands of forewarned Belgian army units who captured the dissidents.¹⁰¹ Even though Lamartine vehemently disavowed his government's complicity in the abortive expedition, both British and Belgian officials were suspicious of the French government, for they believed that no real attempt had been made to stop the émigrés. For example, free passage had been paid for the Belgians by an employee of the French Minister of the Interior.¹⁰² A second penetration of Belgian territory by would-be revolutionaries, although abortive, further eroded the credibility of Lamartine's protestations of non-complicity in these acts.¹⁰³

Palmerston reacted predictably. Although he acknowledged Lamartine's assertion that the Provisional Government had taken preventive measures, he also noted that Frenchmen had accompanied the Belgian émigrés. Palmerston instructed Normanby to warn Lamartine confidentially that, in the British foreign secretary's words, "all practicable means should be employed to

prevent aggression of this kind from France upon the Belgian territory." ¹⁰⁴
 Palmerston would tolerate no infringement on Belgium's independence

German émigrés in Paris were no less active in their plans. On March 18 Normanby reported that the Democratic Association of Germans, which customarily drilled daily in Paris, was preparing to move against the Grand Duchy of Baden, a state which possessed no defensive forces of its own.¹⁰⁵ Concerned about the possibility of a general European war that might develop from German revolutionaries spilling forth from France into other states, Palmerston instructed Normanby to tell Lamartine that the German expedition was of prime importance because an eruption from France into any of the German states could be the first act of a European war.¹⁰⁶

As with the Belgian expedition, Lamartine professed that he had done all he could to halt the Germans. He indicated that when several German delegations had demanded the means to enable them to return to their homeland en masse, he had refused,¹⁰⁷ and when the German corps franc finally decided to invade Baden in April, Lamartine ordered that they be prevented from crossing the frontier. However, the government ultimately made no substantial effort to hinder the German exodus,¹⁰⁸ and the émigrés entered Baden on the evening of April 24. At first the German dissidents met little resistance, but later German troops arrived and the émigrés were either captured or routed. As with the expeditions to Savoy and Belgium, the final result was failure.¹⁰⁹

However, for Lamartine the most perplexing émigré problem involved the Polish population in Paris. Ever since the advent of the July Revolution

of 1830 the French assembly at its opening session would officially declare its wish for the restoration of the Polish state, and because the successive governments of the regime of Louis Philippe had given recognition to the Polish cause, it was impossible for the new republic to abrogate the idea of a revived Poland.¹¹⁰ Yet, when Polish émigrés in Paris in March 1848, with the support of members from the national workshops, demanded that the Provisional Government declare war on Prussia, Austria and Russia in order to free Poland, Lamartine declined. Risking his own life as well as a political censure, on March 26 at a gathering of Poles, in a manner similar to his reply to the Irish delegation on April 3, Lamartine declared that France would not attack the other powers unless she was at war with them, and at present she was at peace.¹¹¹

Lamartine temporized. He assured the Poles that France would one day come to their aid but it was up to France to choose the hour and form, as he asserted, "...to restore to you, without aggression and without spilling blood, the places which is due to you in the sunlight and on the catalogue of nations,"¹¹² Lamartine's speech achieved the pacification he had desired, at least for the time being.¹¹³ Outbursts of sympathy among Parisian radicals continued but no substantive aid for Poland ensued.¹¹⁴

In view of Palmerston's several warnings concerning foreign dissident groups in Paris and their planned expeditions, it is clear that the British lion was aroused by their presence and potential threat to continental peace. Therefore, the reasons why Lamartine permitted such acts to jeopardize the nascent Anglo-French entente he was striving so earnestly to develop is worthy of brief explanation. In point of fact, Lamartine,

as was recognized by Normanby, had very little control over military or police forces with which to curb the expeditionary schemes of the dissident aliens then residing in Paris.¹¹⁵ Taken as a whole, these largely unemployed alien groups constituted a very unstable element in Parisian society and one that French radicals might employ to overturn the moderate government of Lamartine. In this sense, by permitting the émigrés to return to their homelands, Lamartine was relieving internal tensions, albeit at the cost of criticism from the other European states.¹¹⁶

In addition, regardless of how moderate Lamartine was personally, he was the leader of a revolutionary republican regime which was composed of individuals with a wide spectrum of political beliefs. Certain members of the government, such as Ledru-Rollin and Charles Delescluze, were in favor of exporting the republican revolutionary ideology; for Lamartine to steadfastly oppose their efforts would be to rend in two the French government.¹¹⁷

Nevertheless, Lamartine succeeded, at last, in April 1848 in obtaining from his fellow members of the Provisional Government a decree forbidding the assembly of émigré groups on the frontiers for the purpose of invading neighboring states. They would be declared outlaws. To pacify Palmerston, Lamartine urged Normanby to pass this news on to the British foreign secretary even prior to its publication in France.¹¹⁸

With respect to the issue of the émigrés, it can be seen that it was not entirely within Lamartine's control to alter the course of the expeditions. Extenuating factors were at work and it has been noted

that both Lords Palmerston and Normanby were conscious of Lamartine's weak base of power.¹¹⁹ Even though Lord Palmerston preferred a stronger leader in France, he accepted the reality of Lamartine's situation and republican France.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, on what Palmerston deemed to be vital issues, such as the Belgian insurrectionists and the security of Belgium, there would be less flexibility and he made his views just as apparent in his correspondence on this issue as he had done concerning the British Chartist and Irish repeal groups which had also come to Paris for aid in March 1848.¹²¹

One can conclude that Anglo-French relations during the first half of 1848, as far as Palmerston was concerned, were based upon a very acute awareness of the potential threat to European peace which would be engendered in an aggressive, revolutionary French foreign policy. Keeping this potential threat ever in mind, Lord Palmerston, in dealing with the issues of Italian nationalism and the émigré expeditions emanating from France, continuously urged Normanby to impress upon Lamartine the danger present in overstepping the French frontier. At stake was the fragile Anglo-French entente, the continental balance of power, and general peace.

Also at stake was the political profile of Europe. Palmerston, Minto and Normanby wanted to see the European states remain as monarchies, and they labored toward maintaining the status quo. True, they expected to see Austria pushed across the Alps, but Palmerston, in particular, believed that this alteration of the Treaty of Vienna was fortuitous for Austria because her Italian possessions were a drain on her strength. Moreover, an enlarged northern Italian monarchy would serve as a buffer

between France and Austria. In southern Italy British commercial interests were also at stake. Here the British backed their diplomatic initiatives with Admiral Parker's ships and this area of British influence served as a counter-balance to French interests in the north.

Palmerston, for his part, had lamented the erection of a French republic, and he chose to support the moderate Lamartine mainly because there had been no alternative. When the more solid image of General Cavaignac appeared on the Parisian scene, Palmerston rejoiced. The French radicals had been put down.

At bottom, the British foreign secretary adjusted to realities he could not alter, and it was this flexibility, not found in Metternich, which permitted him to conduct great power diplomacy within the changing context of revolutionary Europe. His two basic concerns, the interests of Britain and, in turn, the balance of power, were fixed rubrics of his diplomacy. Unlike Russell, he was, for example, quite willing to compromise Italian nationalism if a quick settlement of the Italian question, which posed a threat to Europe's equilibrium, could be achieved.

Lamartine, on the other hand, was beset by several concerns. He fully realized that France required the tacit, if not outright, support of Britain if she was to rebuild herself into a viable, republican state. Yet, Lamartine also had to display the proper revolutionary zeal in order not to be labelled the "Guizot" of the French republic. Shrinking entirely from any sort of action which encouraged republican revolutions in neighboring states would have drawn the disapproval of radical activists

in the political clubs of Paris, just as having refused to aid the visiting Irish delegation on April 3, 1848, had done. In addition, if an Italian settlement was reached without France's participation or benefit, the Provisional Government would have had to defend itself from the impassioned indigantion of French public opinion.¹²²

Also, France's internal condition required special consideration. The Provisional Government was, at first, too weak to control internal discord, and even the newly created instrument for foreign intervention, the Army of the Alps, had the dual purpose of subduing Lyons and its environs.¹²³ The émigré problem in Paris also represented a factor of dissension and distrust within France. With patience and forbearance, as well as warnings from time to time, Palmerston tolerated Lamartine's solution to the émigré problem--simply letting them leave.

However, Lamartine's attempts to acquire territory in northern Italy, either peacefully or by force, met the stern opposition of Palmerston and Normanby, as well as the French Executive Commission, which had refused Lamartine's secret request of May 19 for military intervention in Italy.

In conducting his French relations, then, Palmerston tailored his correspondence to the issues at hand. He neither attempted to "bludgeon" France into submission nor turn a deaf ear to Lamartine's problems. Rather, as noted, Palmerston diligently worked to persuade Lamartine, the one individual whom both Normanby and he had come to regard as capable of keeping France within her borders, that it was in France's best interests to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of her neighbors.

As noted, Lamartine did not follow a consistent policy of non-interference. For example, he either would not or could not, because of a lack of adequate authority, bar the émigrés from crossing the French frontier and his request for military intervention on May 19 was certainly a bellicose act. Nevertheless, Palmerston fully recognized that, for the time being, Lamartine was the most moderate leader within the Provisional Government. To Palmerston's and Normanby's credit, they were successful, for the most part, in inducing Lamartine to remain pacific in his foreign policy, and to this extent the British diplomats were successful in their overall objective of keeping Europe from a general war.

Chapter V

NOTES

¹Palmerston to Russell, F.O., July 30, 1846, Ashley, I, 3. See also Taylor, The Italian Problem..., p. 91.

²Palmerston to Russell, August 21, 1847, Russell, I, 308. Memorandum by Palmerston, July 2, 1848, quoted in Lorne, pp. 102-104.

³Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/MI/592/2.

⁴Ibid. For the same dispatch see Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, Ashley, II, 57-58.

⁵Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., April 18, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/475. Palmerston wrote, "Metternich is not coming here at present. I suppose he finds the Hague a quieter place than London would be. People say that we should be surprised to see what an old twaddle he is become." Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., April 18, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/475. This passage was crossed out and does not appear in the version printed in Ashley. See Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., April 18, 1848, Ashley, II, 81.

⁶Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/MI/592/2.

⁷"The fire of intense dislike to Austrian domination which had so long been kept smothered by overpowering force now burst out into a flame from one end of Italy to the other, and a general crusade was proclaimed to drive the Austrians over the Alps." Memorandum by Palmerston, July 2, 1848, quoted in Lorne, p. 105.

⁸Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 210, March 28, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805. A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 8. Although Palmerston did not favor Charles Albert's entry into a war with Austria, the British foreign secretary made it clear that he did not wish to interfere or stop the Sardinian monarch. See Palmerston to Normanby, March 31, 1848, Ashley, II, 78.

⁹Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 210, March 28, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹⁰Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/147.

¹¹Taylor, The Italian Problem..., pp. 103-104. Ashley, II, 83.
Taylor, The Struggle..., pp. 17-18.

¹²Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/MI/592/2. For the printed version see Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, Ashley, II, 57-58.

¹³Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., GC/MI/592/2. This passage was subsequently deleted and does not appear in the printed version of the dispatch which appears in Ashley, II, 57-58.

¹⁴Russell wrote, "It is expected that the Italians will drive the Austrians from Lombardy, though perhaps not from Venice..." Russell to Palmerston, March 25, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/RU/191/1.

¹⁵Ibid. Palmerston stated, "As to Northern Italy the Austrians will never get it again, and I should think they will be too wise and too weak to attempt it. They will have enough on their hands in other quarters." Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, March 30, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/471.

¹⁶Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., April 21, 1848, Ashley, II, 85-86.

¹⁷Palmerston expressed his views on northern Italy concisely, "Europe is now undergoing great changes, I cannot myself regret that the establishment of a good state in Northern Italy should be one of them." Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 31, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/472. See also Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/MI/592/2. Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., April 21, 1848, Ashley, II, 85-86. Palmerston to Leopold, Carlton Gardens, June 15, 1848, Ashley, II, 82-83.

¹⁸Palmerston wrote, "No doubt that this is another corner off the Treaty of Vienna but Europe is about to assume a new organization and it will be well if all northern Italy can be united into one independent state." Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, March 30, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/471. For similar views shared by the prime minister see Russell to Palmerston, March 25, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/RU/191/1.

¹⁹Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/MI/592/2.

²⁰Victoria to Palmerston, May 1848 (n.d.), Victoria, II, 207.

²¹Victoria to Palmerston, Buckingham Palace, July 1, 1848, Victoria, II, 215-216.

²²Victoria to Palmerston, Osborne, August 21, 1848, Victoria, II, 227-228.

²³Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, March 30, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/471.

²⁴Ibid. Taylor, The Italian Problem..., p. 93.

²⁵Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, March 30, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/471.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Minto to Russell, May 21, 1848, Russell, I, 335-336.

²⁸Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., April 21, 1848, Ashley, II, 85-86. See also Palmerston to Ponsonby, May 1848, Ashley, II, 87.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/MI/592/2.

³¹Palmerston to Ponsonby, May 1848, Ashley, II, 87.

³²Ibid.

³³Palmerston to Leopold I, Carlton Gardens, June 15, 1848, Ashley, II, 82-83. It should be noted that in the past Charles Albert had not been viewed as a resolute liberal leader. At Turin Abercromby, in September 1847, noted that Charles Albert was influenced, in part, by a retrograde, conservative faction at the Piedmontese court, and he was not entirely for progressive reform. See Abercromby to Russell, Turin, September 25, 1847, Russell, I, 311-312. Similarly, Lamartine distrusted Charles Albert's intentions for, as Lamartine perceived the matter, the Sardinian monarch had wavered too long between a role as protector of Italy under Austrian auspices and liberator of Italy with French support. See Lamartine, History of the..., II, 26. As noted above, Charles Albert had ultimately sought the aid of neither Austria nor France.

³⁴Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 31, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/472. Also printed in Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 31, 1848, Ashley, II, 78.

³⁵Palmerston to Russell, F.O., July 30, 1846, Ashley, I, 12-14.

³⁶Abercromby to Russell, Turin, March 2, 1848, Russell, I, 331-332.

³⁷Palmerston to Abercromby, March 27, 1848, Le relazioni diplomatiche fra la Gran Bretagne e il Regno di Sardegna e la Gran Bretagna, ed. Federico Curato, (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'Eta Moderna e Contemporanea, 1961) 3 rd Ser., I, 133-134 as quoted by Jennings, pp. 41-42.

³⁸Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 216, "Secret," March 31, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

³⁹Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 227, April 3, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

⁴⁰The French leader declared, "If the right of uniting among themselves to consolidate an Italian country were contested by an armed hand - the French republic would conceive itself entitled to arm itself to protect these legitimate movements of augmentation, and of nationality among the nations." Lamartine, History of the..., II, 23.

⁴¹Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 233, April 5, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 235, April 6, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 239, April 7, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 242, April 8, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 24/806.

⁴²In characterizing Lamartine's so-called "armed diplomacy," Normanby wrote, "that the first object, if the case arose, would be to consult with us, and endeavor to come to an understanding with the British Government, and if possible with Europe, as to a settlement of the Italian question." Lamartine had also informed Normanby that the Army of the Alps was being created to maintain order in Lyon with its large manufacturing population, as well as for possible military action in Italy. See Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, April 7, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

⁴³Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 242, April 8, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

⁴⁴Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 246, April 10, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806. Palmerston wrote, "Lamartine is really a wonderful fellow, and is endowed with great qualities. It is much to be desired that he should swim through the breakers and carry his country safe into port." See Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., April 18, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/475.

⁴⁵Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 274, "Confidential," April 24, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 288, May 1, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/807.

⁴⁸Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 216, "Secret," March 31, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

⁴⁹Ashley, II, 84. In spring 1848, revolutions in Prague and Budapest had compounded the problems of the Austrian monarchy. A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, 1971 reprint), pp. 57-60.

⁵⁰Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., April 21, 1848, Ashley, II, 85-86.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²These were the same concerns Palmerston had expressed in 1846. Palmerston to Russell, F.O., July 30, 1846, Ashley, II, 12-14.

⁵³George Macaulay Trevelyan, Manin and the Venetian Revolution of 1848 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1923, 1974 reprint), Chs. VI-VII. Jennings, p. 90.

⁵⁴Lamartine assured Normanby he was an advocate of the status quo and a lover of peace but, as Lamartine declared, "he could not earn the character of the Guizot of the Republic,..." Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 288, May 1, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/807.

⁵⁵"But your Excellency [Normanby] should avail yourself of any opportunity which may present itself of again pressing upon M. Lamartine, that such a move of a French army into Italy would bring on in all probability that general war in Europe which he himself [Lamartine] as much as Her Majesty's Government would deprecate, and you should earnestly suggest that whatever expression of the national feeling of France M. Lamartine may think it necessary to make, might better assume a diplomatic than a military character." Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 195, May 2, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/798.

⁵⁶Trevelyan, Manin and..., p. 210.

⁵⁷Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., May 2, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/477.

⁵⁸Palmerston wrote, "...there is no Frenchman except Lamartine who by his public position and present qualities and character could be followed as a great leader in political regeneration of the country. The nation having now only one leader and that leader being by circumstances pledged for the present to a Republic, a Republic the nation must have." Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., No. 85, "Confidential," May 8, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48548, Vol. CXXXIII.

⁶²Jennings, p. 90.

⁶³Russell, Memorandum on Foreign Policy, May 1, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30, 22/7c.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid. For the same memorandum, see Walpole, II, 40-42.

⁶⁷Ibid. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 195, May 2, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/798.

⁶⁸Taylor, The Italian Problem..., pp. 101-107.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 107-110. For information on Antonio Panizzi, Director of the British Museum, concerning his efforts to convince prominent British statesmen of the righteousness of Italian self-determination see Margaret C.W. Wicks, The Italian Exiles in London, 1816-1848 (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries, 1937, 1968 reprint). pp. 159-162.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 112.

⁷¹Louis-Antoine Garnier-Pagès, Histoire de la révolution de 1848 (Paris: Pagnerre, 1861-1872), X, 6, as quoted by Jennings, p. 99.

⁷²Jennings, pp. 99-100, 103-104.

⁷³Jennings, p. 104.

⁷⁴In his significant, pioneering work on this subject, Jennings emphasizes that, heretofore, French historians have tended to caste Lamartine in a more pacific light, as unwilling to go to war for Italian territory, such as Nice and Savoy. See Jennings, pp. 90, f.n. 67, 100.

⁷⁵Referring to Charles Albert's military moves, Normanby reported on Bastide's assertion: "if other Powers, parties to the Treaty of Vienna were helping themselves at pleasure to the Territories of their neighbors, there ought to be some previous consultation with those, who had not begun by desiring anything for themselves. He [Bastide] did not think it would have been unreasonable if France had asked for some augmentation to her frontier on the side of Savoy or Nice;..." See Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 400, "Confidential," June 19, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/809.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 263, June 20, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/798.

⁷⁸"As to Austria, every person who attaches value to the maintainance of the balance of power in Europe must lament her present helpless condition...." Palmerston to Leopold I, Carlton Gardens, June 15, 1848, Ashley, II, 82-83. Palmerston also wrote, "...the maintenance of the Austrian empire is an object of general interest of all Europe and to no country more than England." See Palmerston to Ponsonby, May 1848 (?), Ashley, II, 87.

⁷⁹Palmerston, Address, Parliament, July 21, 1848, Palmerston, p. 482.

⁸⁰Russell, Memorandum on Foreign Policy, May 1, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30, 22/7c.

⁸¹Lamartine, History of..., II, 263-270. Frederick A de Luna, The French Republic Under Cavaignac, 1848 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), chs. VI, VII. Langer, Political and Social..., pp. 346-350.

⁸²In February Palmerston had written, "One ...felt that it might be in the power of any popular general to march fifty or sixty thousand men into Paris, and decide matters according to his will, in spite of the armed mob or of the National Guard..." Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., February 27, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/462.

⁸³Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 418, June 26, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/808.

⁸⁴Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 269, June 28, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/798.

⁸⁵Jennings, p. 139. Harold Acton, The Last Bourbons of Naples, 1825-1861 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), pp. 112-117. In particular, Benjamin Ingraham and later Joseph Whitaker amassed fortunes in commercial trade centered around Sicily. See Raleigh Trevelyan, Princes Under the Volcano (William Morrow & Co., 1973), pp. 3-5. 81.

⁸⁶Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 115, March 2, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/804.

⁸⁷Lamartine claimed that he had refused a request of the King of Naples (originally sent to Guizot) to dispatch a French naval squadron to counter-balance a British one that was patrolling the Sicilian coast. Lamartine had informed Normanby of his refusal to demonstrate his desire to act in accord with Britain. Ibid.

⁸⁸Normanby again denied the indirect assertion of Lamartine that Britain had a special interest in Sicily. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 267, April 22, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

⁸⁹Minto wrote to his son-in-law, "I feel very far from easy as to the turn that affairs may now take in Italy, where I fear that hopes and designs only relinquished in many quarters because apparently desperate may be revived by the expectation of republican propagandism and support from France, in Lombardy and elsewhere." Minto to Russell, H.M.S. Hibernia, March 10, 1848, Russell, I, 322-323.

⁹⁰Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 424, June 29, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/809.

⁹¹Normanby wrote, "...there is a party here who would rejoice in a Republic being proclaimed in Sicily beyond any other event as the most unexpected triumph of their principles, and the greatest blow to the influence of that country whom they will always consider as their natural rival." Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, "Separate," April 26, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

⁹²Victoria to Russell, September 4, 1847, Russell, I, 309-310. Minto to Russell, Palermo, March 26, 1848, Russell, I, 324-325. See also Minto to Russell, Naples, April 6, 1848, Russell, I, 325-326.

⁹³Minto wrote, "I heartily wish we had two or three more big ships in the Mediterranean. I do not think it right at any time we should not be superior there but in such times as the present it is surely madness to run the risk of starting at a disadvantage." Minto to Russell, H.M.S. Hibernia, March 10, 1848, Russell, I, 322-323, Minto to Russell, Naples, April 6, Russell, I, 325-326.

⁹⁴Minto to Russell, Palermo, March 26, 1848, Russell, I, 324-325.

⁹⁵Minto to Russell, Naples, April 6, 1848, Russell, I, 325-326.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Bastide had given orders to the French fleet to follow in the lead of the British fleet with respect to affairs in Sicily. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 424, June 29, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/809.

⁹⁸Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, "Private," February 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/803.

⁹⁹Palmerston to Normanby, March 31, 1848, Ashley, II, 78. In a second dispatch Palmerston wrote, "...it must be needless to point out [to Lamartine] how highly important it is that all practicable means should be employed to prevent aggressions of this kind from France upon the Belgian territory." See Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 139, March 31, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

¹⁰⁰On March 30, 1848, Palmerston wrote, "As to Belgium our engagements may oblige us to do as well as to say." Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, March 30, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/471.

¹⁰¹Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 203, March 26, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 139, March 31, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 221, April 1, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 249, "Confidential," April 10, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806,

¹⁰²Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 221, April 1, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806. Jennings, pp. 56-57.

¹⁰³Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 249, "Confidential," April 10, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806. Jennings, pp. 55-57.

¹⁰⁴Palmerston to Normanby, F.O. No. 139, March 31, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

¹⁰⁵Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 172, March 18, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹⁰⁶Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 118, March 22, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797.

¹⁰⁷Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 197, March 25, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹⁰⁸Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 232, April 5, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

¹⁰⁹Jennings, p. 69.

¹¹⁰Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 207, March 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹¹¹Ibid. Lamartine, History of..., II, 142-146.

¹¹²Lamartine, History of..., II, 143.

¹¹³Ibid., II, 146. However, Lamartine confided to Normanby that as a result of his reneging on aid to the Poles, as Normanby related, "much management was required to suffer down a refusal which was not without considerable danger to the government." Normanby to Palmerston, No. 207, March 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹¹⁴Jennings, p. 97.

¹¹⁵Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 197, March 25, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805.

¹¹⁶There were between 15,000 and 20,000 foreigners in Paris. Jennings, pp. 58-59, 60, 70.

¹¹⁷Jennings, pp. 54-55, 76-78.

¹¹⁸Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 268, April 22, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

¹¹⁹Palmerston to Normanby, F.O. No. 88, March 7, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/797. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O. April 18, 1848, Ashley, II, 81. Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, "Private," March 13, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/137/2.

¹²⁰Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., May 2, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/477.

¹²¹Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., March 25, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/469.

¹²²Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 231, April 5, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

¹²³Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 239, April 7, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

CHAPTER VI

AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA

From January to June 1848, Lord Palmerston had to witness not only the resurrection of a French republic, but, in addition, the steady weakening of other western and central European powers. Consequently, his effort to maintain the continental balance of power within the context of an on-going revolution was not easy. How Palmerston achieved an effective counterpoise to the possible war that French revolutionary excesses might spread throughout the continent underlies the conduct of the British foreign secretary's diplomacy in 1848.

It has been noted that Palmerston believed Austria's future as a component in the balance of power was, at the very least, uncertain.¹ While Metternich was still at the Viennese court, Palmerston worked to discourage Austria from interfering with the Italian constitutional movement and, most importantly, to prevent Austria from blundering into a confrontation with France.²

After Vienna experienced revolution in mid-March 1848,³ Palmerston concluded that Austria would no longer be able to hold on to her Italian provinces and, as recounted above, he had urged the Austrians to abandon Italy before the French entered the peninsula. Just as significantly, Palmerston believed Austria would be a stronger, more potent state if the Italian lands were relinquished.⁴

In Palmerston's view it was essential for Austria to continue to be a stabilizing factor in the European state system. She had the size and strategic geographic position to sustain that function. At the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh and Metternich had worked well together,

and, notwithstanding the more strained relationship that had existed between Palmerston and Metternich, the British foreign secretary's high estimate of the importance of Austria remained. Palmerston had characterized Austria's European mission in a conversation with F.A. Pulszky, a Hungarian patriot, and Pulszky described Palmerston's viewpoint in the following terms:

...if it [Austria] did not already exist, it would have to be invented; that it was an European necessity, and the natural ally of England in the East; ...in the frame of the European State-system it would be impossible to replace Austria by small states.⁵

Yet, the Austrian emperor, Ferdinand, did not, as has been indicated, inspire Palmerston with his leadership. The British statesman could not perceive how Austria would carry on effectively unless a new monarch was chosen. Palmerston centered on the eighteen-year-old nephew of Ferdinand, Francis-Joseph, and cited those qualities which made him well-suited for ruling Austria:

And though he is young he could mount his horse, and show himself to his troops and his people, could excite some enthusiasm for his person as well as for his official station, and, by the aid of good Ministers and able generals, might re-establish the Austrian empire in its proper position at home and abroad....⁶

Palmerston, then, sought to suggest a leader who would revitalize Austria and bring her back to full strength in order to help counter-balance both the potential danger of France and the Russian Empire to the east.⁷ In Palmerston's eyes, constitutional reforms, were insufficient. A great power required a monarch who epitomized the strength and authority of the state and who was capable of amalgamating the nation or nations, as in the case of Austria, into a well-ordered, cohesive whole.

Written in May 1848, shortly after the defeat of the Chartists at Kennington Common on April 10, Palmerston displayed his desire to see the European balance of power survive the 1848 revolutions. Nevertheless, Francis Joseph would not become emperor until Ferdinand had abdicated on December 2, 1848,⁸ and in the interim the Austrian Empire appeared to be so weakened as to seriously alter the equilibrium of great powers on the continent.⁹ Palmerston had to look elsewhere for an anchor of stability in the sea of revolution that had broken through the dikes of European monarchical authority and had engulfed the continent.

PRUSSIA AND GERMAN UNIFICATION

Prussia and the other states of Germany, outside of the Austrian Empire, offered an alternative opportunity to counter-balance the might of both France and Russia. Although Palmerston had referred to the German states, particularly Prussia, on numerous occasions,¹⁰ his comprehensive and lengthy memorandum on Anglo-German relations written for Prince Albert and dated September 16, 1847, is of prime importance.¹¹ Treating the German states as a single political entity and excluding Austria (which he viewed as a separate power), Palmerston revealed in this document a keen knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages of relations with the Germans. In order to be consistent in terminology, future references to "German," the "Germans," and the "German states" will conform to Palmerston's concept and will refer to the members of the German Confederation of 1815 exclusive of Austria and Holstein.

With respect to acquiring territory in Europe, Palmerston believed that Britain and the German states were essentially non-aggressive and

conservative in nature. Whereas, they faced the potential threat of two aggressive, expansionist powers, France and Russia. An Anglo-German alliance, therefore, was most logical and advantageous: Germany could form a bulwark to the European territorial designs of both France and Russia. On the other hand, the Germans would have a powerful ally--Britain.¹² Moreover, the danger to Britain and Germany would become all the more acute if, however improbable at the time, one day France and Russia would possess more compatible political regimes and would join in alliance.¹³ Therefore, Palmerston pointed out to the Prince Consort, for reasons of self-preservation and mutual safety, that an Anglo-German political connection was most desirable, as well as in keeping with the moderate national temperaments of these states.¹⁴

Yet, the prospects for an alliance between Britain and the German states were not entirely unclouded. Since the founding of the Zollverein in 1834, Prussia had encouraged the German states to join her internal customs union,¹⁵ which Englishmen regarded as antithetical to free trade principles in general and cheaply produced British goods in particular.¹⁶ Palmerston acknowledged that the Zollverein's clearance of internal customs restrictions within all the German states would be beneficial to the free flow of trade inside German borders.¹⁷

However, the very benefits German manufacturers derived from the protective tariffs of the Zollverein had been, Palmerston asserted, offset by the ill-will and political damage to Anglo-German relations which the prohibitory provisions of the customs union had created in Britain. As long as the provisions of the Zollverein continued to shut out British articles, it would be viewed as, in Palmerston's

words, "a league founded in hostility to England..."¹⁸

Therefore, in light of the Zollverein's injurious impact on British manufactures, Palmerston emphasized that it was incumbent upon Her Majesty's Government actively to persuade the north German states who had not joined the customs union to refrain from doing so. Any British ministry which did not pursue such a policy would be seen as derelict in its duty and would have been thought to have sacrificed the commercial interests of Britain.¹⁹

Palmerston's memorandum reveals the knotty problem which was present in 1847 with respect to Germany. The Prince Consort, a German from Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld,²⁰ would readily see from this memorandum that Palmerston recognized positive advantages to better Anglo-German relations²¹ but that the foreign secretary was also cognizant of the injurious effects of the provisions of the Zollverein with respect to the importation of British wares and the need for inducing Prussia to reduce its prohibitory provisions or of persuading other north German states to shun the customs union.

Apart from general considerations for Britain's commercial development, which was an established, integral part of British foreign policy, Lord Palmerston's diplomacy usually did not hinge upon economic issues.²² Yet, he felt it sufficiently important to dwell on the economic effects of the Zollverein in this memorandum because the customs union was, indeed, a stumbling block to the political arrangement that he envisioned as possible. An Anglo-German understanding would have enhanced both British security and the continental balance of power. As the events of 1848 unfolded, the

balance of power and the Zollverein would figure prominently in Palmerston's attitude and approach to foreign relations with the German states.

As previously noted, in spring 1848 Frederick William IV and Baron Canitz of Prussia had looked to Britain for support against what they believed would be a French military onslaught similar to that of the First French Republic and of the Napoleonic era.²³ For the most part, however, Prussian foreign policy had tended in the past to follow that of Austria and Russia, and Prussian political orientation was basically conservative.²⁴ Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, preferred to avoid any sort of anti-French alliance, especially with conservative powers, for fear of enflaming French passions for a missionary war of republican principles. He, therefore, declined an alliance in favor of simply keeping in close communication with the northern courts.²⁵

However, when Berlin, itself, erupted in revolution on March 15, 1848, and other German states experienced similar outbursts, a new set of liberal statesmen assumed prominence in Germany. Notably, Max von Gagern became the primary leader of the German nationalists and subsequently President of the Frankfurt national assembly. In addition, Baron Canitz was replaced by a new, energetic Prussian foreign minister, Baron Heinrich von Arnim-Suckow.²⁶

Riding the crest of this liberal tide, on March 21, 1848, Frederick William IV declared that he was willing to lead the effort for a united German and went on to state: "I have, today, received the old German colors, and my people have been placed under the venerable banner of the German Empire. Prussia goes forth out

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into Germany," However, not willing to depose German princes, the monarch envisioned his role of leader as only temporary in nature and he left the actual details of German unification to such leaders as Gagern and Arnim.²⁸

The foreign policy plans which Arnim and Gagern set down in order to effectuate the unification of Germany, however, caused Lord Palmerston to reassess his earlier views on Germany and the prospects of an Anglo-German alliance. Specifically, Arnim and Gagern conceived of a complex plan to unite the disparate German states by declaring war on Russia in order to liberate Poland. The two German leaders hoped by such drastic action to stir the German states to united action, welding together the German nation with a common cause.²⁹

In March 1848 Arnim and Gagern pressed for initiation of the Polish plan. On March 17, 1848, Arnim announced that he would attempt to restore Old Poland as a bulwark (eine "Vormauer") against Imperial Russia and to also achieve stronger German ties with Britain and France.³⁰ Similarly, on March 22, 1848, von Gagern informed his brother of his idea of uniting the diverse states of Germany through a Polish crusade: "...I see only one means of salvation: we must force the King of Prussia, now German King, to liberate, to restore Poland, perhaps be her elected King. Therefore war with Russia."³¹ Arnim and Gagern were in earnest in their bid for German unification through a Russian war. Gagern saw Frederick William IV on March 23 and urged the monarch to act. The king steadfastly refused, but Arnim and Gagern, nevertheless, proceeded with plans for Poland's restoration.³²

Arnim and Gagern's hope of drawing France also into the conflict was not without reason. As noted above, for many years during the July Monarchy the French Chamber of Deputies had passed annual resolutions of sympathy for the subjugated Poles, and, now, with a republic in France, the German liberals expected French liberals to rally with them in freeing Poland from the repressive control of the Tsar. Reality soon began to destroy the Gagern - Arnim plan of unification, however, as Lamartine proved most reluctant to commit France to such an undertaking, if he could abstain without stirring up French radical opinion at home against his regime.³³

Therefore, when Adolphe de Circourt, a special French representative to Prussia, notified Lamartine on March 31, 1848, of Arnim's request for both an alliance for the restoration of Poland and the dispatching of a French squadron to the Baltic, an aide to Lamartine cautioned Circourt to pledge support to Prussia only if Russia attacked her.³⁴ Also, as noted earlier, in Paris Lamartine addressed Polish émigrés in public and gave notice that France regrettably would not enter into conflict with other powers for the sake of Poland.³⁵

Yet, another shattering blow came in April when Palmerston learned of Arnim's intentions.³⁶ Rather than give moral support to this liberal cause as Arnim had hoped, Palmerston strongly warned him on April 6 not to commit hostile acts against Russia. He wrote to Lord Westmoreland in Berlin;

...I have to instruct you earnestly to recommend the Prussian Government to abstain from any proceeding which could justly be considered by Russia as aggressive, and to avoid so far as they [the Prussians] possibly can any measures which might in their consequences lead to aggression on the Russian territory.³⁷

It can be seen, then, that the British foreign secretary was decidedly against disturbing the status quo at least as far as German plans for wresting Russia's control of Poland were concerned.

On the other hand, Russia's foreign secretary, Count Nesselrode, adroitly prevented the occurrence of any incident which would touch off a Russo-German conflict over Poland.³⁸ However, he did advise Frederick William IV not to take on the role similar to the "perfidious" one played by Charles Albert in Italy.³⁹ Moreover, a Russian army of 240,000 men was sent to safeguard Russian Poland.⁴⁰ Thus, the Russians took a wary, defensive attitude and avoided any move that might be interpreted as aggressive.⁴¹ Palmerston duly took notice of Russia's pacific posture and was pleased.⁴²

It was the Prussians themselves, who finally defused the Polish powder keg. In raising the expectations of the Poles and in granting them concessions aimed at eventual autonomy, the Prussian government raised the ire of many of its own citizens,⁴³ including Otto von Bismarck.⁴⁴ Concern for the fate of the German minority in Prussia's Posen province fired up anti-Polish sentiment.⁴⁵ During the latter part of April, skirmishes between Prussian and Polish forces occurred, and by May 9 the Polish forces had been defeated and had capitulated.⁴⁶ It should be noted that Russia was looking for just such discord. In fact, Count Nesselrode had encouraged Baron Meyendorff, the Russian ambassador to Berlin, to endeavor to widen the breach between Germans and Poles⁴⁷ because the Russians did not want armed Polish nationalists on the frontier of Russian Poland.⁴⁸

The death knell to Prussian support for a resurrected Poland was sounded in spring 1848. On May 18 Frederick William IV summoned his courage and repudiated the Polish policy of his liberal ministers. He declared that he would never become allied with France against Russia. Such a step in his eyes was "lunacy" and wrong.⁴⁹

Faced with the adamant opposition of the Prussian monarch, as well as that of Russia and Britain, and failing to obtain the active support of France, Arnim and Gagern were forced to give up their plan for German unification through a liberal - nationalist crusade against Russia. The civil unrest in Posen between Germans and Poles further added to the impulse to shelve the Polish project. On June 12, 1848, the Earl of Westmoreland reported that Baron Arnim and his colleagues were, as Westmoreland related, "anxious to maintain the most cordial relations with Russia..."⁵⁰ Moreover, they frankly acknowledged the difficulties which Posen had presented for both Prussia and Russia.⁵¹

It can be seen, then, that contrary to the initial judgement set down in his memorandum on German relations in 1847,⁵² Lord Palmerston, when faced with the prospects of a European war, was quite willing to forego an alliance with German liberals and to support their autocratic neighbor, Tsar Nicholas I. In this particular instance, Russia had acted responsibly by her defensive stance, and it was the German liberals who had called for an aggressive war, which Palmerston did not want. Palmerston had observed in his warning to Arnim concerning Poland on April 6, "...there are so many causes every where which may at any time and in almost every part of Europe occasion the calamities of war."⁵³ He clearly did not want Poland to be a center of conflict.

THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION

In yet another German crisis more significant for German unification and the maintenance of the balance of power, Palmerston again disappointed the German liberals by acting in a manner calculated to forestall change in Central Europe. On March 24, 1848, the Estates of the Elbe Duchies, Schleswig and Holstein, in a spirit of nationalist revolution, seceded from Denmark and appealed to the German Confederation for support. German liberals responded and even Prussia's Frederick William IV supported the cause of the Elbe Duchies as a diversion from the more dangerous Arnim anti-Russian plan for Poland. Subsequently, on April 10, 1848, the day of the great Chartist demonstration in London, Prussian troops entered the Duchies, and Danish forces were expelled by the end of the month. To German liberals the events in the Duchies had much significance; they demonstrated it was possible to unite Germans by what they regarded as a liberal, constitutional program of national unification.⁵⁴

As with the Polish question, Lord Palmerston took a keen interest in the question of the Elbe Duchies. Two days after the provisional government of the Duchies had declared its independence, Lord Westmoreland forwarded Arnim's assurances that Prussian troops, which had been dispatched to the frontier of Holstein, were sent expressly for the purpose of preserving peace within Germany. Moreover, Arnim was apprehensive over how the other European states would react to the crisis of the Duchies.⁵⁵

At first, Palmerston took an impartial, almost neutral view of the dispute, and his position irked the Russians,⁵⁶ who did not wish to see

the Duchies separated from Denmark. However, as German forces became more aggressive in April, both Palmerston and Nesselrode took active roles in the quarrel. As early as April 4, 1848, Nesselrode contended to Palmerston that the German Confederation, for the most part Prussia, had no right to meddle in the affairs of Schleswig-Holstein, treating the dispute as wholly a Danish affair.⁵⁷ Then, on April 11, a day after German troops marched into the Duchies, Palmerston offered to mediate the dispute if both Prussia and Denmark agreed.⁵⁸ Palmerston's aim in so doing was to ensure the status quo and to prevent a general European war.⁵⁹ Russia was quick to suggest a joint mediation, but later accepted Palmerston's preference at being sole mediator.⁶⁰ In late April the Prussians also accepted Palmerston's offer of mediation,⁶¹ perhaps, in part, because of the perilous condition of their state finances,⁶² the rioting that had been occurring in the Polish districts of Posen, and the growing opposition of the great powers.

In particular, Palmerston's mediation offer was fortified with a stern admonition to Prussia. A fortnight after warning Arnim not to make any moves that would precipitate a war with Russia over Poland, the British foreign secretary instructed Westmoreland:

...you will strongly urge the Prussian Government to suspend hostilities in order to enable negotiations to be carried on; and in order to afford full security against any chance of collision. ⁶³

It was upon receiving this warning that Arnim had agreed to the British mediation.⁶⁴

Similarly, on April 26, Nesselrode informed Arnim, by way of Meyendorff, that the invasion of Jutland had posed a grave threat to the interests of the Baltic Powers and to the equilibrium established by the treaties of 1814-1815. Prussia's conduct would inevitably lead to a rupture in Prusso-Russian relations.⁶⁵ To make matters worse for Arnim, on April 26 Lamartine had decided to side with Denmark, although he was, at this time, determined to not take an active part in the Elbe Duchies dispute.⁶⁶

Although the Prussians had accepted Palmerston's offer of mediation, albeit after receiving his frank warning, they, nevertheless, exhibited a disposition which Palmerston would have to ponder seriously. In a confidential dispatch to Palmerston on April 27, Westmoreland noted that Arnim had asserted that the dispute of the Duchies could have been settled earlier had Britain not dissuaded the state of Hanover from sending in its troops, consequently causing a delay in the entire campaign. Britain was cast as the spoiler of the German states' success, i.e. primarily Prussia's effort.⁶⁷

Just as revealing, Westmoreland related that a friend of Arnim claimed that Denmark had lost a great opportunity by not agreeing to the incorporation of Schleswig, as well as Jutland, into the German Confederation. A further incorporation, by treaty, of the Danish kingdom and her merchant navy into the German Zollverein would have raised the Danes' status and influence and, as Westmoreland related, "(however displeasing it might have been to England) it would have secured [Denmark]... the lasting gratitude and friendship of Germany."⁶⁸

Although Westmoreland could not ascribe these opinions directly to Arnim, Palmerston could, upon receipt of this communiqué, surmise how far

the Germans were prepared to go in their drive for national unity and economic protection.⁶⁹ Contrary to his assessment of 1847, in the memorandum on relations with Germany written for Prince Albert, Palmerston could perceive that Prussia, leader of the German states, was, indeed, intent upon aggrandizement and further development of the Zollverein within all northern Germany and on into Denmark. Such plans for political and economic expansion stood in direct contrast to the rather pacific characterization of the German states which Palmerston's memorandum had depicted.

Russia, on the other hand, was serving as a restraining influence in Central Europe, in contrast to the aggressive image portrayed in Palmerston's memorandum. Moreover, the Russians were willing to follow Britain's line of diplomacy as far as the Schleswig-Holstein mediation was concerned. The roles of Prussia and Russia had been unexpectedly reversed.

However, it was in May 1848, as Prussian troops crossed into Denmark, that the great powers brought full diplomatic pressure to bear on Prussia. At first, neither Britain nor Russia wanted to provide aid to Denmark in the form of armed military intervention.⁷⁰ Yet, as Prussia advanced into Jutland, the Russians became more alarmed over the altered scales of power on the Baltic. Coming out fully for Denmark, on May 8 Nesselrode instructed Meyendorff in Berlin to let the Prussians know in no uncertain terms ("clair et precis") that Russia would protect Denmark. Nesselrode also observed to Meyendorff that the Prussians had become more apprehensive

of what France might do, and this would, perhaps, help quicken a settlement of the Elbe Duchies dispute.⁷¹ Furthermore, the Swedish government had decided to place part of its fleet at the disposal of Denmark.⁷²

Finally, on May 10, 1848, Nesselrode had all but lost patience with the Prussians. Stating that Prussia was not a power to trifle with, he remarked that the Russian fleet was preparing itself to help defend Denmark against Prussia. The Russian army, however, could not be utilized because it was being readied for possible action against a Hungarian national uprising closer to the Russian frontier.⁷³ Coordinating their foreign policy with Britain, the Russians duly informed the British that a break in relations with Prussia was a distinct possibility if Prussia persisted in the occupation and conquest of Jutland.⁷⁴

Meanwhile, Palmerston described himself as "labouring hard" to mediate a settlement of the Duchies issue. Nevertheless, he also hoped that the Russian and Swedish declarations of support for Denmark would succeed as the Prussians had acted, in Palmerston's view, "with unjustifiable violence."⁷⁵ Yet both Palmerston and Nesselrode were willing to propose a settlement along national lines, a settlement which would be advantageous to German nationalists.⁷⁶ The Germans held out for compensation for damages incurred by a Danish blockade of the Prussian coast, and the possibility of a larger war remained until June.⁷⁷ Then, faced with a coalition of powers against her and rebuffed by France, Prussia finally faced reality and announced the evacuation of Jutland on June 3, 1848.⁷⁸

In the ensuing months the liberal impulse for a German amalgamation of the Elbe Duchies was further thwarted. Arnim, whose conduct Palmerston

labelled "violent, overbearing, oppressive, disingenuous, shuffling and tricky," ⁷⁹ resigned in June 1848 over an internal dispute with the Prussian Minister of Finance. ⁸⁰ Moreover, the Prussians had become alienated from German nationalists at Frankfurt who had criticized their conduct in the Schleswig-Holstein campaign even though Prussia had made the greatest sacrifices. ⁸¹

Also, Frederick William had become disenchanted with the liberals and an armistice was, after much deliberation, signed on August 26, 1848, at Malmö. Although German liberal - nationalists at the Frankfurt national assembly protested the armistice in September, the armistice was enforced by Prussian arms. ⁸² Thoroughly exasperated by the Schleswig-Holstein question in January 1849, Palmerston employed his sharp wit to characterize the Duchies issue as, in his words, "stale as a Christmas Pantomime in July." ⁸³

Nevertheless, the sad tale of Schleswig-Holstein did not end with the armistice. In March 1849 war broke out again between Denmark and the German states, again led by Prussia. Once again Lord Palmerston, with the aid of the Russians, pressured Frederick William into another armistice on July 10, 1849, and in July 1850, the three great non-German powers--Britain, France, and Russia--composed a protocol confirming Danish rule of inheritance in Schleswig and Holstein, discrediting Prussia. ⁸⁴ For by 1850 Palmerston had little sympathy for Prussia, and he offered this verdict: "In regard to the Schleswig-Holstein question, she [Prussia] has throughout acted with the greatest

duplicity and bad faith...." ⁸⁵

Because Queen Victoria, along with her husband, Prince Albert, was inclined to favor German unification efforts,⁸⁶ the queen was very critical of Palmerston's treatment of the Schleswig-Holstein question. Victoria learned in April 1848 that Palmerston had agreed to mediate the question of the Elbe Duchies, and she was irked that Palmerston had not discussed the mediation proposal with her.⁸⁷ Later, she asserted to Palmerston that it was illogical for him to claim that the German states did not possess just claims to the Elbe Duchies and, at the same time, declare that Charles Albert had legitimate claims to Austrian territory.⁸⁸ In fact, Victoria viewed Denmark as the perpetrator in the Schleswig-Holstein dispute: "The cause of the war having been the unlawful attempt to incorporate Schleswig into Denmark, the peace cannot be lasting unless it contains sufficient guarantees against the resumption of that scheme." ⁸⁹

Nevertheless, Palmerston stood his ground. The foreign secretary claimed that he never could comprehend the grounds upon which the Frankfurt Assembly had attempted to justify its attack on the Duchies.⁹⁰ Furthermore, in reply to Victoria's assertion that the protocol of the great powers in 1850, concerning the Elbe Duchies, was an attack on the German states,⁹¹ Palmerston retorted to Russell, "Is not the Queen requiring that I should be Minister, not indeed for Austria, Russia or France, but for the Germanic Confederation?" ⁹² Whereupon, Victoria responded, "The Queen does not wish her Minister to be Minister for Germany, but merely to treat that country with the same consideration which is due to every country on whose interests we mean to decide." ⁹³

As with his relations with France and the Italian states, Lord Palmerston's policies towards the German states had run counter to the attitudes of his sovereign.

However, on the Elbe Duchies question, Lord Palmerston's position coincided with the views of the majority of the British press and population, which favored the Danes.⁹⁴ On this issue, Palmerston was on firm ground. Two days after his retort to Queen Victoria's criticism, he successfully defended his overall foreign policy in Parliament, and he gave his general assessment of Britain's condition. In part, he declared:

It is a noble thing to be allowed to guide the policy, and to influence the destinies of such a country [Britain] ,...For while we have seen,.. the political earthquake rocking Europe from side to side--while we have seen thrones shattered, shaken, levelled, institutions overthrown and destroyed...,this country has presented a spectacle honourable to the people of England, and worthy of the admiration of mankind. 95

The members of Parliament cheered him at the close of his address, and a majority of its members supported Palmerston's conduct of foreign affairs.⁹⁶

With respect to the question of the Elbe Duchies, Palmerston displayed the characteristic wit which concealed his keen knowledge of the diplomatic questions that were his daily concern. In later years, he was alleged to have quipped that only three individuals had understood the intricacies of the Schleswig-Holstein question, the Prince Consort, who had by that time died, a Danish professor now in an insane asylum, and himself, who had forgotten the details.⁹⁷ Yet, even the most casual perusal of Palmerston's correspondence and speeches concerning the Elbe Duchies points to quite the opposite conclusion: Palmerston had an abiding

knowledge and interest in the dispute.⁹⁸ Palmerston's public image as a jovial bon vivant and blustering patriot, so popular with the British electorate and public, masked the dead seriousness with which he had disciplined himself to master the various facets of the Schleswig-Holstein question, just as he had mastered the details of the Belgian question years before.⁹⁹

Concerning Palmerston's attitude toward the Elbe Duchies, Lawrence Steefel, author of the classic work on the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, offers the most concise reason why Lord Palmerston, as well as statesmen from the other European powers, opposed a German annexation of the Elbe Duchies. The Duchies had become an international issue affecting the continental balance of power. No mere dynastic quarrel, at stake was the political configuration of Central Europe.¹⁰⁰

In addition to the Zollverein, so unpopular in Britain because of its restrictions of British exports, it was not in Britain's best interests to witness the emergence of a great power on the North Sea so close to Britain.¹⁰¹ Moreover, neither Russia nor France, in the final analysis, favored such an aggressive German state.¹⁰² Palmerston also disliked the fact that the German states would be united by force of arms and that international boundaries would be violated if the Schleswig-Holstein campaign was successful.¹⁰³

Consequently in 1848, when German liberals accepted Palmerston as a mediator in their dispute with the Danes, they actually prepared their political undoing. Palmerston viewed his task as primarily one of

preventing war between the German states and the two adjacent powers, France and Russia.¹⁰⁴ By May 1848 the foreign policies of Palmerston and Nesselrode were in full accord in their determination in not permitting the Baltic political equilibrium to be disrupted by successful German expansion.¹⁰⁵ In effect, Palmerston's intervention through mediation served Britain's interests and, at the same time, benefitted France and Russia. German liberals were the only losers.

The general question of German unification merited no better consideration in Palmerston's eyes. As noted, initially he had been optimistic about a unified German state which would be a "natural" ally of Britain and a bulwark against potential French and Russian aggression,¹⁰⁶ similar to the north Italian state which he had favored as a buffer between France and Austria. Indeed, as early as 1844 Palmerston recognized that Prussia's fortunes were ascending while Austria's were declining. In Palmerston's view, Prussia had taken encouraging steps toward constitutional government.¹⁰⁷ For monarchical solidarity, initially the Russians had also supported Prussia. In March 1848, they believed that whether Germany would escape the rampant, unsettling republican doctrines unleashed by the February Revolution would depend upon the Prussian monarchy's actions.¹⁰⁸ Prussia's hour of counter-revolutionary leadership seemed close at hand.¹⁰⁹

However, the course of events for Germany, both internal and external, altered the prospects of Germany unity and also Palmerston's opinion of the prospects of unification. Within Germany, Prussia's prestige and power were almost immediately reduced by the Berlin revolution of

March 1848, which had revealed Frederick William's inability either to avert or suppress the crisis.¹¹⁰ Westmoreland reported recurrent outbreaks of anarchy in Berlin in March, June and autumn 1848. These dispatches conveyed to Palmerston the image of an unstable, unordered state.¹¹¹

The Prussian ruler, himself, had no lasting desire to reign over all Germany. Shortly after his declaration of March 21, expressing his wish to lead the effort toward unification, Frederick William IV stated, "The colors black, red and gold shall not supplant my cockade, the honored colors of black and white."¹¹² Then, on April 3, 1848, when the Frankfurt Assembly offered him the crown as emperor of Germany, he rejected it as having come from the "gutter."¹¹³

Moreover, the Frankfurt Assembly exhibited traits of instability which had alienated yet another individual, Lord Palmerston. Lord Cowley, the British observer at Frankfurt, repeatedly described the wranglings of the delegates as unrealistic, pedantic and irrational. For example, Cowley complained, "The affairs themselves seem to be getting into greater confusion every day - and as to the Ministers a more useless inefficient body of men were never brought together....,"¹¹⁴

In July, when he was asked to give recognition to the German parliament at Frankfurt, Palmerston declined, claiming it was not, as yet, a permanent government. He was quick to recommend, though, that the Germans should adopt a more enlightened commercial policy with lower import duties.¹¹⁵ Thus, Palmerston had not lost sight of the Zollverein with its impediments

to admitting British goods.

Within Germany the forces of disunity were almost as varied as the number of German states; particularism was predominant. Prussia, outside of Austria the largest state and vital to any unification plan, was ultimately unwilling to subordinate its interests and to decentralize its government. On the other hand, the other states resisted a subordinate role under Prussia.¹¹⁶ In addition, the alternate path to unification through a national effort, such as war, had been thwarted in Poland and Schleswig-Holstein.

Indeed, the German bid for Schleswig-Holstein has been characterized as the pivotal event which turned the great powers, notably Britain and Russia, away from the ideal of German unification.¹¹⁷ As noted, initially both Britain and Russia saw value in a united Germany. Britain perceived an enlarged German state as a barrier to French and Russian aggression. Similarly, Russia felt that a strong German monarchy would prevent the spread of French-style republics in Central Europe.¹¹⁸

The harsh reality of the relentless German march on Schleswig-Holstein, regardless of the justification which German nationalists perceived, forced Palmerston and Nesselrode to reassess the value of a "new" German state on the Baltic. The warnings to Prussia by Palmerston and Nesselrode demonstrated that they ultimately preferred regional stability and the status quo, rather than an aggressive power which seemingly ignored rational considerations, such as international boundaries.¹¹⁹

In August 1848, Palmerston was convinced that the current efforts toward German unification would come to nothing,¹²⁰ and in the following

year he told Baron Bunsen what he thought of German unity. Palmerston granted that the national impulse towards unity in the German states was commendable, but it turned out to be a mere "plaything." However, the idea of establishing a large German state (Grossdeutsche) in Central Europe was more serious and unwelcome. As Palmerston remarked:

But the plan to erect such a monster of an empire is another thing. That would be a public nuisance. And what a policy for Germany to guarantee to Austria the possession of Italy! It would produce a hostile position of England and France against it, - it would be a renewal of the Holy Alliance, only in a more practical and formidable form. That is impossible. ¹²¹

This was certainly not the German state that Palmerston had envisioned in his memorandum to the Prince Consort in 1847.

Although Palmerston was, no doubt, primarily interested in keeping Europe at peace, and although he did not want to see an expansion of the Zollverein, there was also a personal element of dislike in his attitude toward the Prussian state. Palmerston believed the Prussians were hungry for power and not truly interested in developing constitutional rights within Germany.¹²² In this sense, Palmerston's personal views may have contributed to his blindness to the fact that the Germans did have a legitimate aspiration in seeking national unity.¹²³ For the German liberal nationalists, unification was more than a "plaything."

The question of the Elbe Duchies and German unification were, of course, finally settled not by the liberals but by the Junker, Otto von Bismarck.¹²⁴ Unrealized at the time, Palmerston's decision to oppose the liberals' thrust towards German unification contributed, indirectly, to the eventual German unification under more conservative, militant leadership.

IMPERIAL RUSSIA

Discounting the stability of Austria because of her internal weaknesses and Prussia because of her reckless foreign policy, as evidenced by Poland and the Elbe Duchies affairs, Lord Palmerston was obliged to seek another continental power to offset the potential aggression of France. During the first half of 1848 the search for European stability involved an understanding with Imperial Russia that was prior to that year unforeseen.

In the past, Britain and Russia had, from time to time, acted in concert. For example, when France attempted to gain a position of greater influence in the Near East in 1840 and 1841, Palmerston and Nesselrode acted jointly to curb the efforts of Adolphe Thiers, the French foreign minister, who mistakenly believed that Anglo-Russian accord was unlikely. Nesselrode seized upon the opportunity to drive a wedge between Britain and France. Palmerston, for his part, joined with Nesselrode to put a stop to French maneuvering and to isolate them.¹²⁵

The Anglo-Russian rapprochement was all the more advantageous to Britain because Nesselrode, in an attempt to cement Russia's relationship with Great Britain, was willing to forego the Russian navy's privilege of entering the Dardanelles at will, as guaranteed by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi of 1833, and to do so in the future only while in concert with the other great powers. Such an agreement would give Britain less concern about the possibility of Russian interference with British trade routes through the eastern Mediterranean to the Levant and India.¹²⁶

Nevertheless, Palmerston was under no illusion concerning Russian cooperation, believing that Russia's previous policies and interests would continue.¹²⁷ When the Convention of the Straits was formally signed in 1841,¹²⁸ France was a fully participating signatory and was once more a member of the Concert of the great powers. Palmerston had no desire to keep France in permanent diplomatic isolation.¹²⁹

In actual fact, except for periods of emergency, such as the threat posed by Napoleon I, the factors for Anglo-Russian discord outweighed those for agreement. In particular, the Eastern Question, concerning control of the Dardanelles, was a traditional "bone of contention." Time and again, Britain was obliged to "prop up" the Ottoman Empire against her aggressive Russian neighbor in order to prevent a Russian thrust into the Near East.¹³⁰

In Persia, Afghanistan and northern India, British commercial interests fell into conflict with Russian attempts to acquire influence and control.¹³¹ For example, when in 1847 the Russians requested the permission of the Shah of Persia to build a hospital in a Persian district, Palmerston vociferously warned that this would mark the first footstep in a series that would end in Russian domination of the area. Palmerston asserted, "once they [Russians] have thus gained a footing in the Shah's territory, they will not fail to push on their encroachment further and further."¹³² During 1848 British observers noted Russian advances in the Caucasus and predicted that the mountain regions would fall under Russian control within four years.¹³³ Therefore, Russia's drive southward presented a challenge not only to Turkey, but to British centers of influence in the Near East.

Anglo-Russian naval competition in the 1830's also left a residue of mistrust between the two powers. Although Russian naval construction did not present a serious challenge to the British navy, the prospect of some future contest for naval supremacy was magnified.¹³⁴ During 1848 Palmerston referred reports on Russian naval construction and movements to the British Admiralty.¹³⁵ The real challenge would take place if Russia combined her naval forces with some other power, such as France. It will be recalled that in his 1847 memorandum on relations with Germany, Palmerston mentioned the possibility of Europe's two aggressive powers, France and Russia, entering into an anti-British alliance.¹³⁶ Any direct attack on the British Isles would have to come, of course, by sea.

In addition to questions of power and influence, there were also ideological differences. British Whigs perceived themselves as liberal in political orientation and, therefore, antithetical to the autocratic and reactionary policies of the Russian Tsar.¹³⁷ For example, both Russell and Palmerston were sorely vexed by the manner in which Russia, along with Austria and Prussia, wantonly violated the Treaty of Vienna and blotted out Cracow's independence in 1846 by brute force.¹³⁸

In February and March 1848 Lord Palmerston was most reluctant to act in concert with Russia. He would keep in communication with her, but not act in unison to suppress republican France, however repellent the republic was to him personally. Practically speaking, Palmerston had cautioned Nesselrode that an overt reaction by the great powers would only serve to rouse French radicals and diminish the influence of Lamartine and the French

moderates. Palmerston believed a general European war would result.¹³⁹

On the other hand, in Russia anti-British sentiment was present. Russian nationalists had opposed Nesselrode's attempts at courting Britain by curtailing Russian prerogatives at the Straits in 1841. The nationalists equated accommodation to Britain with sacrificing Russian interests.¹⁴⁰

Nesselrode, himself, had no abiding respect for Palmerston, although he had a keen respect for British armed might. Nesselrode wrote:

Certainly I hate Palmerston as much as Prince Schwarzenberg [of Austria] can hate him, and my feeling goes back of his; but Palmerston is not eternal, and a war with England would be the worst of all wars. It is out of our power to inflict damage on her, and it is we who should have to pay the costs. God preserve us from that! 141

Given a normal course of affairs, it can be seen that neither Britain nor Russia were particularly disposed toward any kind of entente. Their natural interests stood in sharp juxtaposition.

However, the turn of events in the first half of 1848 were far from normal. The unpredictable, unstable affairs had upset the equilibrium of power on the continent and prompted Palmerston and both Nesselrode and Nicholas I to seek stability wherever it could be found.

To counter-act the threat of war and revolution which he believed to be inherent in the doctrines of the newly-established French republic, the Russian Tsar, at first, relied primarily upon the King of Prussia to repulse the French threat to Europe, although Russia's own forces also stood ready within her borders to repel a French attack if it came. Nicholas considered Austria too weakened by the revolution in Lombardy to be much assistance elsewhere.¹⁴² Nesselrode did not expect Britain to

form a defensive alliance with the eastern courts, but he had hoped, as previously noted, that she would join with the other powers in maintaining the territorial settlements of 1815.¹⁴³

However, the March 1848 revolutions in Vienna and Berlin swept away the reactionary influence of Metternich in Austria, and in Prussia placed in power nationalists, such as Arnim, who were downright antagonistic to Russia. For the moment, Russia's traditional conservative allies, Prussia and Austria, were lost to the revolution. St. Petersburg was in a state of utter consternation, for Russia stood alone in eastern Europe.¹⁴⁴

Facing isolation, the leaders of Russia cast their eyes westward to Britain. On March 20, 1848, Lord Bloomfield reported that Count Nesselrode was very depressed, and he had lamented that Russia had no allied power in Europe to assist her in averting the revolutionary storm that she believed would soon threaten her. Bloomfield added that Nesselrode had expressed the greatest anxiety over maintaining a cordial understanding with Britain.¹⁴⁵ Similarly, in a letter to Queen Victoria on March 22, 1848, Nicholas I called the British monarch's attention to the social disorder on the continent and noted that Britain and Russia alone remained upright. He asked if a "union intime" of the two powers was not needed to save the world.¹⁴⁶

Finally, on March 29, 1848, Nesselrode again attempted to convince Palmerston that Britain and Russia had shared common interests. Because of the revolutionary course of events, Russia would now regard Austria and Prussia with the same attitude as she had regarded France. On the other

hand, Ireland and Poland were vulnerable points for Britain and Russia. In essence, the two great powers had reverted back to their isolated positions of 1812, when they had faced the empire of Napoleon.¹⁴⁷

By April 10, 1848, all the above-cited correspondence had arrived in London, and Palmerston was prepared to respond to Russia's call for solidarity. Because Russia had taken a very responsible, restrained, and defensive posture in reaction to the French February Revolution,¹⁴⁸ because Russia displayed a willingness to coordinate her foreign relations concerning France with those of Great Britain,¹⁴⁹ and because Russia was, in total, an agent for maintaining the status quo and the balance of power in Europe, which was by no means secure, Lord Palmerston was already disposed toward Russia. Palmerston had previously congratulated the Tsar for having not given offense to France,¹⁵⁰ and he had warned Arnim not to precipitate a war with Russia over Poland.¹⁵¹

Palmerston's diplomatic moves in April 1848 took a markedly more sympathetic line, and in the ensuing months Britain and Russia coordinated their foreign policies in an attempt to maintain order in Europe. On April 11, 1848, the day after Chartists had challenged civil authorities in London and the Prussian Army had invaded the Elbe Duchies, Lord Palmerston wrote to Bloomfield:

Assure Count Nesselrode that our feelings and sentiments towards Russia are exactly similar to those which he expressed to you towards England. We are at present the only two Powers in Europe (excepting always Belgium) that remain standing upright and we ought to look with confidence to each other. 152

Palmerston added that he hoped the Russian emperor would of his own accord settle the Polish question satisfactorily. Britain would not interfere.¹⁵³

On the same day, Palmerston informed Berlin that he was willing to mediate the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, a mediation which ultimately blocked German liberal-nationalists and forestalled the creation of a great German state on Russia's Baltic frontier.¹⁵⁴ Then, on April 14, 1848, Palmerston declared that the identical foreign policies of Britain and Russia must have a beneficial effect on the maintenance of Europe and to Nesselrode he pledged:

With regard to any plots which might be carried on in the United Kingdom with a view to disturb the internal tranquility of any part of the Emperor's Dominion, His Imperial Majesty may be assured that Her Majesty's Government will at all times endeavour to prevent the hospitable shelter which this country affords to foreigners from being perverted so as to serve as a means for disturbing the tranquility of other countries. 155

Palmerston, therefore, was not only indirectly protecting Russia's interests by checking liberal-nationalists within Germany, but also intent upon discouraging émigrés, such as Poles, who had plans for liberating subject peoples within Russia.

It has been noted earlier that Palmerston and Nesselrode worked jointly in April and May 1848 to apply pressure on Prussia, in order to restrain her from attacking Russia with respect to Poland and check her leadership in the campaign for Schleswig-Holstein. Anglo-Russian cooperation continued throughout the spring and the status quo was, indeed, maintained in Central Europe. Russia continued to play her passive but vigilant role and was largely content to follow Britain's lead in her foreign policy concerning

France and Prussia,¹⁵⁶

Palmerston, on the other side of the continent, duly praised the Tsar for his patience and forbearance, even though Russia possessed awesome military power.¹⁵⁷ On June 21, 1848, Palmerston wrote:

...His Imperial Majesty may well have the proud satisfaction of reflecting that while by the development of his force he has secured the tranquility of his dominions he has also by the steadiness of his policy and by his resolute moderation contributed most essentially to the maintenance of the peace of Europe. 158

In terms of keeping the peace, Russia had served Palmerston's need for a restraining influence on the continent, and he was quite willing to be lavish in his praise.

Nevertheless, Lord Palmerston had to make certain that Anglo-Russian relations did not even hint of British subservience. For in February 1848, Palmerston's dealings with the Russians had become the basis of a charge of treason.¹⁵⁹ Two members of Parliament, David Urquhart, a Radical whom Palmerston had previously dismissed from the British embassy at Constantinople,¹⁶⁰ and Thomas Anstey, who put forward most of the argument for impeachment,¹⁶¹ accused Palmerston of being a paid Russian agent and of tailoring his foreign policy to further Russian interests.¹⁶²

When the charge of treason was repeated on March 1, 1848,¹⁶³ Lord Palmerston characterized his foreign policy in a manner which transcended the question at hand and which indicated the underlying motive behind his diplomacy. Palmerston declared:

I hold, with respect to alliances, that England is a Power sufficiently strong to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of any other Government....And if I might be allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I think ought to guide an English Minister, I would adopt the expression of Canning, and say that with every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy. 164

The members of Parliament did not take Urquhart and Anstey's accusations seriously,¹⁶⁵ and Palmerston had adroitly used the occasion to reassert his long-held belief, in the Canning tradition, in Britain's ultimate need for independence of action and in the foremost principle of protecting her interests.

The fundamental conflict in interests between England and Russia did not remain submerged for long. In mid-1848 Russia abandoned her passive role of continental observer and once more entered Europe's affairs--in a manner which resurrected the Eastern Question. After helping Austria suppress a Hungarian uprising led by Louis Kossuth, Nicholas I endeavored to force the Porte in Constantinople to return Hungarian and Polish rebels who had fled to Turkey in order to escape Austrian reprisals.¹⁶⁶ At this point, the issue was not merely the fate of a band of nationalists but the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. As in the past, Britain, along with France, moved warships to the mouth of the Dardanelles to ward off Russia. In October 1849 the Tsar showed signs of yielding to the combined resistance of Britain, France and Turkey. By the close of the year the danger of war had subsided.¹⁶⁷

Palmerston took full advantage of the popularity with which the Hungarian cause was held in Britain. His defense of the Hungarian refugees

raised his popularity with the Radicals in Parliament, as well as in the country at large.¹⁶⁸ However, it should also be noted that Palmerston took care to come out openly for the Hungarians only after it had become certain that their cause was futile.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, even though he had publicly espoused their cause,¹⁷⁰ he had privately urged the Russians to settle the Hungarian problem as expeditiously as possible.¹⁷¹

Palmerston's sentiments may have been with the Hungarians, but his overriding priority, which he acknowledged in Parliament, was preservation of the European equilibrium of power, and Austria was central to this concept. The main value in preserving Hungary's viability, in Palmerston's eyes, was because it was an inherent part of Austria's strength. Austria's weakening of Hungary was, in this sense, self-destructive.¹⁷² Nevertheless, Palmerston did not allow such priorities to inhibit him from also grasping the opportunity to enhance his popular, liberal image by means of his public stand on Hungary.¹⁷³

Yet, Queen Victoria was clearly not satisfied with Palmerston's wish to support the Sultan of Turkey on the Hungarian refugee question. Except for offering moral support to the Sultan, the Queen believed Britain had no business interfering with the fate of the Hungarian and Polish refugees who had fled to the Ottoman Empire, and she expressed her views to Lord John Russell.¹⁷⁴ Once again, Palmerston's foreign policy had gone counter to the Queen's opinions. Undeterred, however, Palmerston replied to Russell that the Hungarians were "revolutionists," but revolutionists in the same sense as the English rebels who, in the seventeenth century, had installed the current royal family on the British throne.¹⁷⁵

In conclusion, it should be noted that Palmerston's selection of Russia as an ally in April 1848 was consistent with his ideas on British position in the world. Palmerston had declared in Parliament that Britain had neither eternal enemies nor eternal allies.¹⁷⁶ Palmerston's sentiments fell well within the ever shifting framework of relationships that constituted the European state system. A staunch ally of yesteryear could very well become at some future time a determined adversary, and as in the instance of Russia in 1848, the opposite circumstance was possible. Great power relationships were not fixed.¹⁷⁷

Palmerston's move towards Russia was also consistent with the balance of power concept in another way. In a Europe badly out of balance due to revolution, Russia represented a locus point of continental stability as well as a counter-balance to possible aggression by France or the German states, especially Prussia.

Envisioned as a single entity, the German states, led by Prussia, were Palmerston's original candidate for countering the excesses of both France and Russia. In 1847 Palmerston believed that the German states might very well form an alliance with Britain to check the aggressive impulses of her neighbors east and west. In addition, Russia looked to Prussia, in particular, for a buffer against revolutionary France. However, by April 1848 it had become apparent to both Palmerston and Nesselrode that only Britain and Russia remained "upright" and untouched by social disorder. The two statesmen recognized elements of stability in each other's political state, which mirrored their own political positions, interests, and vantage points of power. If they were to preserve the European world that they knew

and which they were used to governing, they had no choice but to stand together.

In observing the revolutionary events of March and April 1848, Lord Palmerston could not have been entirely sanguine. At home Irish and Chartist rebels had threatened to rend in two the social fabric of Britain. Abroad, Lamartine was hard-pressed to temper the radical elements in the Provisional Government, and armed expeditions of émigrés were carrying republican ideas to their homelands. Moreover, the German states, especially Prussia, proved to be unpredictably trouble-some. Palmerston willingly foresook the national causes of Poland and Germany for the more reassuring strength of autocratic Russia.

On the other hand, Count Nesselrode found it expedient to seek an understanding with Russia's adversary, Britain. Prussia and Austria, were overtaken by the revolution, which, so Nesselrode believed, would next threaten Russia. Regardless of the personal antipathy he held for Palmerston, Nesselrode chose to throw in his lot with Britain. Only Britain, and her energetic foreign secretary, offered the prospect of a great power alliance that would save Russia and the Tsar.

Thus, a minor diplomatic revolution had taken place during the first half of 1848. Lord Palmerston had a unique opportunity to effectuate rapprochements with two rivals, France and Russia. In league against Britain, these powers could have been most formidable. Palmerston, however, had successfully gained the confidence of both France and Russia, yet, kept them in mutual distrust of each other. Britain was maintaining a vital position in the European balance of power.

At first glance, it would seem the height of inconsistency for Palmerston to cultivate relations with such ideologically opposing powers--a republic and an absolute monarchy. Along with any sympathy Palmerston may have had for liberal nationalists abroad, ideological considerations were ultimately subordinated to the higher priority of maintaining the European equilibrium, an equilibrium in which Britain played a central role and in which her best interests were perserved. Lamartine and Nesselrode had turned to Palmerston for support and the British foreign secretary, with keen perception, took advantage of circumstances to devise the means of keeping both France and Russia beholden to Britain.

CHAPTER VI

NOTES

¹Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/MI/592/2.

²Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., No. 14, February 11, 1848, B.L., P.L. ADD. MSS. 48549, Vol. CXXXIII.

³Ponsonby described how the forces in Vienna were mismanaged and the revolution occurred. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, Vienna, No. 98, April 10, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 7/348, as quoted in Dürriegel, pp. 144-155. Dürriegel points out that Ponsonby held a disapproving view of the Viennese revolution (p. 145). See also Heinrich von Sybel, Die Begründung des Deutschen Reiches durch Wilhelm I (München und Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1913), pp. 99-100.

⁴Palmerston to Leopold I, Carlton Gardens, June 15, 1848, Ashley, II, 82-83.

⁵Ferencz A. Pulszky, Meine Zeit, meine Leben (Pressburg und Leipzig: C. Stampfel, 1880-1883), II, 332, as quoted by Sproxton, p. 20. See also Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., No. 14, February 11, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48549, Vol. CXXXIII.

⁶Palmerston to Ponsonby, May 1848, Ashley, II, 87.

⁷Palmerston, Address, Parliament, July 21, 1849, as printed in Bourne, p. 296.

⁸Taylor, The Habsburg....., p. 76.

⁹Palmerston had confided to Minto his hope that the Austrian Empire would not decline from status as a great power as a result of revolutions within her disparate parts, Palmerston to Minto, F.O., March 28, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/MI/592/2.

¹⁰For example, in 1844 Palmerston spoke of Prussia as follows: "Prussia is taking the lead in German civilization, and as Austria has gone to sleep, and will be long before she wakes, Prussia has a fine career open to her for many years to come," Bell, II, 5.

¹¹Palmerston, Memorandum on Relations with Germany, September 16, 1847, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, I, 1/43, as printed in Bourne, pp. 277-280.

¹²Ibid.

¹³With Nicholas I of Russia and Louis Philippe on the respective thrones of Russia and France in 1847, Palmerston did not believe a Franco-Russian alliance was possible, as personal feelings and differing political viewpoints prevented such a tie, but Palmerston believed that at some time in the future such an alliance might evolve. Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵J.H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 96-103.

¹⁶Palmerston, Memorandum on Relations with Germany, September 16, 1847, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, I, 1/43 as printed in Bourne, pp. 277-280.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 280.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Theodore Martin, The Life of His Royal Highness, The Prince Consort (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1875), I, 1.

²¹Palmerston believed that Germany, situated in Central Europe, was more vulnerable to the aggressive behavior of France and Russia and, therefore, an Anglo-German alliance was of more value to Germany than to the insular-protected Britain. Palmerston, Memorandum on Relations with Germany, September 16, 1847, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, I, 1/43 as printed in Bourne, p. 277.

²²Bell points out that Palmerston usually did not place as high a degree of emphasis on economic factors as on national security and prestige, and the documents examined in my research tend to confirm this judgment. The Zollverein alone was insufficient to disaffect Palmerston from Germany. See Bell, II, 3.

²³Frederick William IV to Victoria, February 27, 1848, Victoria, II, 177-178. Bunsen to Palmerston, 4 Carlton Terrace, March 4, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/BU/598/4.

²⁴The destruction of Cracow was a recent example of collaboration among the northern courts. Russell to Wellington, March 12, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B.

²⁵Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., No. 44, March 10, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/282.

²⁶Westmoreland reported details of the Berlin revolution, Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 67. P.R.O., F.O. 64/285. Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 75, "Confidential," March 23, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/285. Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 124, April 10, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/286. See also Lewis Namier, 1848: the Revolution of the Intellectuals (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1946, 1948 reprint), pp. 65-66. For additional details on the March revolution in Berlin, including Frederick William's vacillation in utilizing his military forces, see Sybel, pp. 101-103.

²⁷"Ich habe heute die altern deutschen Farben angenommen, und mein Volk unter das ehrwürdige Banner des deutschen Reiches gestellt. Preussen geht fortan in Deutschland auf!" See Sybel, p. 105.

²⁸Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 75, "Confidential," March 23, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/285. Werner E. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-1871: with Special Reference to England and Russia (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 15.

²⁹Namier, p. 66. Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 8.

³⁰At the behest of his liberal ministers, one week later Frederick William authorized a reorganization of the Prussian Grand-Duchy of Posen and the formation of Polish committees, both national and local, to implement plans of reorganization. Mosse p. 13.

³¹Max von Gagern to Heinrich von Gagern, March 22, 1848, Ludwig von Pastor, Leben des Freiherrn Max von Gagern, 1810-1889 (Kempton und München: J. Kösel, 1912), p. 234 as quoted by Namier, p. 66.

³²Namier, pp. 66-68.

³³Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 207, March 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/805. Lamartine, History of..., II, 142-146.

³⁴Namier, pp. 74-75.

³⁵Lamartine, History of..., II, 142-146.

³⁶Stratford Canning, who Palmerston had diverted to Central Europe to observe events while enroute to Constantinople, reported that the Prussian king had implored him to exercise his influence to brake the bellicose, anti-Russian impulses of Arnim. Arnim also had sounded out Canning in order to ascertain what Britain would do if a Prusso-Russian war over Poland erupted. See Canning to Palmerston, No. 7, March 30, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 30/117 as quoted by Namier, pp. 76-77.

³⁷Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., No. 84, April 6, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/282.

³⁸Bloomfield reported, "In reply to an inquiry Count Nesselrode said explicitly that Russian troops would not take the initiative in the event of hostile demonstrations by the Poles in Galicia and Posen, but would wait for a violation of Russian territory." In the British ambassador's opinion, a war begun by the Tsar would have been unpopular in Russia but the nation's honor would have been aroused if Russia underwent an unprovoked attack. See Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 88, April 8, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

³⁹"Tout ce que nous demandons au Roi de Prusse, c'est qu'il ne se laisse pas entraîner à jouer le rôle perfide du Roi, de Sardaigne, c'est d'empêcher que Posen ne devienne le foyer des comités polonais d'où partiront toutes les incursions dans le royaume, et je crains de trop lui demander quoique a soit dans son intérêt peut-être autant que dans le nôtre." Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, April 11, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 81.

⁴⁰Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 79, March 29, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁴¹In March 1848 the Russians pursued a foreign policy of non-interference because they feared, in part, a German-led European anti-Russian crusade which would require general mobilization of the armed forces to ward off, and also because, as noted, an aggressive foreign policy was unpopular at home. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 88, April 8, 1848, B.L., P.L. ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. See also Namier, p. 116. Mosse, p. 14.

⁴²Palmerston to Bloomfield, F.O., No. 94, April 14, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 65/344.

⁴³Westmoreland reported on the events in the Grand Duchy of Posen. Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 120, April 9, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/286. Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 130, April 13, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/286. Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 132, April 13, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/286.

⁴⁴Bismarck had also exhibited concern over the Schleswig-Holstein question. Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 109, April 5, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/286.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Namier, pp. 92-95.

⁴⁷"Notre grande affaire, en ce moment-ci, est d'élargir autant que possible la brèche qui commence à se manifester dans les sympathies allemandes en faveur des Polonais." Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, April 21, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 85.

⁴⁸Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 233, June 12, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/288.

⁴⁹Namier, pp. 78-79.

⁵⁰Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 233, June 12, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/288.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Palmerston, Memorandum on Relations with Germany, September 16, 1848, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, I, 1/43, as printed in Bourne, pp. 277-280.

⁵³Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., No. 84, April 6, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/282.

⁵⁴Mosse, pp. 18-19. Keith A.O. Sandiford, Great Britain and the Schleswig-Holstein Question, 1848-1864: a Study in Diplomacy, Politics and Public Opinion (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 23-26. Sybel, pp. 159-163. Taylor, The Struggle..., pp. 13-14. The classic work on the Elbe Duchies dispute remains Lawrence D. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1932). For a brief discussion of the Duchies' history to 1848 see Steefel, pp. 3-9.

⁵⁵Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 83, March 26, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/285. Westmoreland also reported a Danish appeal for Britain to protest to Arnim Prussia's troop movements toward the Elbe Duchies. See Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 87, "Confidential," March 29, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/285.

⁵⁶"Palmerston la mène pitoyablement à mon avis. Au lieu d'en imposer à ce brouillon de Brunswick, il prend une attitude d'impartialité timide et scrupuleuse qui ne conduira à rien." Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, March 26, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 72.

⁵⁷Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 82, April 4, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁵⁸Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., No. 90, April 11, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/282.

⁵⁹At this point Palmerston was inclined to preserve Danish sovereignty over the Duchies as part of his more general objective of maintaining peace and the status quo. He explained his aims in offering his mediation to Queen Victoria on April 13, 1848. Bell, II, 8.

⁶⁰Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 89, "Confidential," April 8, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, April 11, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 81. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 101, April 12, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 182, April 26, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/798. Initially, Russia had declined Denmark's request for being either a mediator or for giving direct assistance because she desired to avoid rousing German sentiment against her and perhaps reviving the Polish question. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, April 27, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, p. 88.

⁶¹Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 159, "Confidential," April 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/286.

⁶²As of April 10, 1848, there was a balance in the Prussian state treasury of only 8,500,000 dollars (Prussian). Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 128, P.R.O., F.O. 64/286.

⁶³Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., No. 100, April 20, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/282.

⁶⁴Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 159, "Confidential," April 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/286.

⁶⁵Nesselrode to Meyendorff, April 26 (O.S.) 1848, printed in F. de Martens, Recueil des Traités (St. Petersburg: 1888), VIII, 375, as quoted in Mosse, p. 19.

⁶⁶Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 279, April 26, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/806.

⁶⁷Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 159, "Confidential," April 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/286.

⁶⁸Ibid. This was at least the second occasion that Westmoreland had indicated Prussia's desire of extending the territories covered by the Zollverein. See Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 59, March 13, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/285.

⁶⁹As circumstances stood, Westmoreland observed to Palmerston, there was in Germany a national feeling for unity and a willingness to make sacrifices in order to safeguard the rights of Germans in the Elbe Duchies. Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 159, "Confidential," April 27, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/286.

⁷⁰As previously noted, the Russians were apprehensive about causing an anti-Russian reaction in Germany that might have affected the Polish question. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, April 27, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 86-87. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 190, May 2, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/798. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 136, May 5, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁷¹Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, May 8, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 92-93. A.J.P. Taylor asserts that the Russians never truly threatened to intervene against Prussia, yet the evidence indicates that the Russians impressed upon Berlin the dire consequences that would ensue if the Prussians did not relent in their drive against Denmark. See Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 15.

⁷²Nesselrode termed the opinions of the Swedish and Russian governments on the Schleswig-Holstein affair as identical. See Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 140, May 9, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁷³Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, May 10, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 95-97. As early as April 8, 1848, Bloomfield had been advised that the Russian fleet was being fitted out and Nesselrode stated, "Be assured if the Russian fleet acts, it will act with yours." Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 91, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. Bloomfield later reported that the fitting out of the fleet was a routine procedure normally implemented in the spring. Eighteen sail of the line and twenty-four frigates, brigs and schooners would be ready in May. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 111, April 19, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

⁷⁴Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 192, May 15, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/287.

⁷⁵Palmerston to Bloomfield, May 19, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 356:29 as quoted by Bell, II, 8.

⁷⁶Ibid. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, May 8, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 93. Nesselrode was the first to propose dividing the Duchies along national lines. See Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 14.

⁷⁷Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 192, May 15, 1848, F.O. 64/287. Although the Russians may have, at first, welcomed the Schleswig-Holstein dispute as an alternative to the Polish question, as A.J.P. Taylor has claimed, by May 20 Nesselrode was acknowledging the possibility of a war with Prussia over the Duchies issue. See Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 13. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, May 20, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 97-100.

⁷⁸Nesselrode noted that the cause of war no longer existed. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, June 3, 1843, Nesselrode, IX, 106-109.

⁷⁹Palmerston to Bloomfield, May 28, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 356:29 as quoted by Bell, II, 10.

⁸⁰Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 236, June 15, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/288.

⁸¹Prussia's alienation was noted by Baron Christian F. Stockmar, Prince Albert's long-time advisor. Stockmar, Letter, Frankfurt, June 20, 1848, as printed in E. von Stockmar, Memoirs of Baron Stockmar, ed. F. Max Muller (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1873), II, 277.

⁸²Mosse, p. 20. Taylor, The Struggle..., pp. 14-16. Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 67-68.

⁸³Palmerston to Bunsen, Broadlands, January 6, 1849, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/BU/609.

⁸⁴Taylor, The Struggle..., pp. 36-39. In 1849 when the Danes denounced the armistice, Bunsen accused them of throwing down the gauntlet, which Germany was obliged to pick up. Thus, Bunsen attempted to impress upon Palmerston, without success, the German point of view concerning the Elbe Duchies, Bunsen to Palmerston, 4 Carlton Terrace, March 2, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/BU/602/4. For Palmerston's and Westmoreland's correspondence concerning the Elbe Duchies in 1849 see P.R.O. ser. F.O. 64/294, 295, and 300. For example, Westmoreland referred to the signing of the second armistice on July 10, 1849. See Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 272, July 10, 1849, P.R.O., F.O. 64/300.

⁸⁵Palmerston added, in regard to German affairs, "her [Prussia's] only object from beginning to end seems to have been her own aggrandizement, which, at moments when much was within her grasp, she had not courage or steadiness successfully to pursue." Palmerston to Cowley, F.O., November 22, 1850, Ashley, II, 171-172.

⁸⁶Victoria to Leopold I, King of Belgium, Buckingham Palace, May 8, 1848, Victoria II, 260-261. Prince Albert, Memorandum on German affairs, Ardverikie, September 11, 1847, Martin, I, 439-446.

⁸⁷Victoria wrote, "The acceptance of the mediation between Denmark and Holstein is too important an event not to have been first submitted to the Queen." Victoria to Palmerston, Osborne, April 17, 1848, Victoria, II, 202. Palmerston duly apologized for not keeping the Queen informed, and claimed that the pressing demands of work prevented him from doing so. Palmerston to Victoria, Carlton Gardens, April 18, 1848, Victoria II, 203,

⁸⁸Victoria to Palmerston, Buckingham Palace, July 1, 1848, Victoria, II, 215-216.

⁸⁹Victoria to Palmerston, Buckingham Palace, June 21, 1848, Victoria, II, 265.

⁹⁰Bell, II, 9.

⁹¹Victoria to Palmerston, Buckingham Palace, June 22, 1850, Victoria, II, 295-296.

⁹²Palmerston to Russell, Carlton Gardens, June 23, 1850, Victoria, II, 296.

⁹³Victoria to Russell, Buckingham Palace, June 25, 1850, Victoria, II, 298.

⁹⁴Bell, II, 10. Sandiford, p. 25.

⁹⁵This was Palmerston's famous address subsequently known as Civis Romanus sum. Palmerston, Address, Parliament, June 25, 1850, Ashley, II, 159. Russell to Victoria, Chesham Palace, June 26, 1850, Victoria, II, 299-300.

⁹⁶Russell to Victoria, Chesham Palace, June 26, 1850, Victoria, II, 299-300. Ashley, II, 160-161.

⁹⁷Pemberton, p. 331.

⁹⁸E.g., Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., No. 64, March 6, 1849, P.R.O., F.O. 64/294. Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., No. 100, June 22, 1849, P.R.O., F.O. 64/295. Palmerston, Address, Parliament, July 23, 1863, as printed in Bourne, pp. 368-370.

⁹⁹Bell, I, 96-97, 256, 258. Lorne, pp. 222, 227, 232.

¹⁰⁰Steeffel, p. 8.

¹⁰¹Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 13. Palmerston also wanted Denmark to remain as guardian of the entrance to the Baltic Sea, Bell, II, 8.

¹⁰²Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 162, June 2, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 16.

¹⁰³Bell, II, pp. 8-9. Rudolph Stadelmann, Social and Political History of the German 1848 Revolution (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1975), p. 114. Mosse, pp. 361-362. Taylor, The Struggle..., pp. 12-13.

¹⁰⁴Bell, II, p. 8.

¹⁰⁵Palmerston spoke of Russia's assistance in his efforts to settle the Duchies dispute. Palmerston to Bloomfield, P.R.O., F.O. 356;29 as quoted in Bell, II, 3.

¹⁰⁶Palmerston, Memorandum on Relations with Germany, September 16, 1847, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, I, 1/43 as printed in Bourne, pp. 277-280.

¹⁰⁷Bell, II, 5.

¹⁰⁸Meyendorff to Nesselrode, March 7/19, 1848, Peter von Meyendorff. Peter von Meyendorff, Ein russischer Diplomat an den Hofen von Berlin und Wien. Politischer und privater Briefwechsel, 1826-1863, ed. O. Hoetzsch (Leipzig: W. de Gruyter & Co., 1923), II, 49, as quoted by Mosse, pp. 16-17.

¹⁰⁹Ibid. See also Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 67, March 16, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/285.

¹¹⁰Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 75, "Confidential," March 23, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/285.

¹¹¹Ibid. Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 67, March 16, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/285. Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, No. 229, June 9, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/288. Westmoreland to Palmerston, Berlin, November 9, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/290.

¹¹²Friedrich Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State (Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 255.

¹¹³Holborn, pp. 85-86.

¹¹⁴Cowley to Palmerston, August 21, 1848, Broadlands MSS. as quoted by Mosse, p. 24.

¹¹⁵Mosse, p. 23. The Russians had nothing but contempt for the Frankfurt Assembly. Nesselrode wrote, "Il est impossible pour un cabinet qui se respecte d'avoir affaire aux hommes de Francfort." Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, August 18, 1848, Nesselrode, IX, 152.

¹¹⁶Meinecke, p. 255. Palmerston noted, for example, a report from the British representative at Stuttgart in describing the, as Palmerston wrote, "hostile feeling with which Wurtemberg regards the pretension of the King of Prussia to place himself as the head of the Germanick Confederation." Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., No. 143, April 4, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/798.

¹¹⁷Stadelman, p. 114. Mosse, p. 21. A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History: a Survey of the Development of Germany Since 1815 (New York: Capricorn Books, 1946), p. 82.

¹¹⁸Meyendorff to Nesselrode, March 19, 1848, Meyendorff, II, 49 as quoted by Mosse, pp. 16-17.

¹¹⁹In June 1848 Bloomfield reported that even though a united Germany would have formed a bulwark against French aggression, Russia did not wish for such a powerful neighbor. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 162, June 2, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD, MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

¹²⁰Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., August 7, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/486/2. Earlier in July Palmerston characterized Germany as being in a state of anarchy. Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, July 4, 1848, R.C.H.M., B. MSS., GC/NO/480/1.

¹²¹Palmerston to Bunsen, July 20, 1848, Baron Christian Karl J. von Bunsen, Memoirs of Baron Bunsen (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1869), II, 149. The French were already apprehensive about the positioning of German troops on the Rhine, as they believed the real danger to the German states was from Russia to the east. See Normanby to Palmerston, Paris, No. 425, "Confidential," June 29, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 27/809.

¹²²Palmerston to Cowley, F.O., November 22, 1850, Ashley, II, 171.

¹²³Sir Charles Webster considered Palmerston's inability to view Germany in objective terms a major flaw in his diplomacy. See Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston..., I, 368. The Duke of Argyll said of Palmerston, "He hated Prussian statesmen. They were playing a game for the hegemony of Germany, and not at all for the establishment of constitutional liberty amongst the German people..." Eighth Duke of Argyll, Autobiography and Memoirs (London: J. Murray, 1906), I, 332-333, as quoted by Bell, II, 1.

¹²⁴Taylor, The Struggle..., chs. VIII, X. Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: the Period of Unification, 1815-1871 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), Vol. I, chs. 11, 19-21.

¹²⁵Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 70-81. Bell, Vol. I, ch, XIV.

¹²⁶Ingle, pp. 124-133. Bell, Vol. I, ch XIV. Seton-Watson, p. 192.

¹²⁷Albrecht-Carrié, pp. 71-72.

¹²⁸For the text of the Convention of the Straits see The Concert of Europe, pp. 149-151. A subsequent secret, verbal agreement, known as the Nesselrode Memorandum of 1844, was yet another pledge that Russia would act in concert with Britain concerning the future fate of Turkey and the Straits. See Vernon John Puryear, England, Russia, and the Straits Question, 1844-1856 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965), pp. 55-57 and Appendix E. See also Ingle, pp. 170-171.

¹²⁹The Concert of Europe, p. 148. Albrecht-Carrié, Britain and..., p. 80.

¹³⁰For example, although in 1830 Palmerston was not entirely enamored with Turkish policies, he, nevertheless, stated in Parliament, "I do not wish to see Turkey garrisoned by Russians nor the Russian frontier extended in that line," Palmerston, Debate on the Address in Parliament, February 5, 1830, Palmerston, p. 131. The British policy of protecting Turkey against Russian encroachment has been traced back to the ministry of William Pitt in 1791. See Trevelyan, British History..., pp. 43-44. See also Seton-Watson, p. 192. Ingle, pp. 101-102.

¹³¹Ingle, pp. 72-95.

¹³²Palmerston to Lt. Col. Sheil, F.O., December 6, 1847, No. 62, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48577, Vol. CLXI. Palmerston also wrote, "...while Russia was...marching on India, we should not be idle in Europe; but still Russia is strong in her European defenses, whether in the Baltic or in the Black Sea, and it is well that we should be able to defend India in Asia, as well as in Europe." See Palmerston to Russell, Carlton Gardens, June 9, 1847, Ashley, II, 36-37.

¹³³Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 67, March 24, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

¹³⁴Ingle, pp. 96-98. Christopher J. Bartlett, "Statecraft, Power and Influence," Britain Pre-eminent: Studies of British World Influence in the Nineteenth Century, ed. C.J. Bartlett (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1969), p. 183.

¹³⁵Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 111, April 19, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII (referred to the Admiralty on May 2, 1848). Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 153, May 23, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII (referred to the Admiralty on June 2, 1848).

¹³⁶Palmerston, Memorandum on Relations with Germany, September 16, 1847, Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, I, 1/43, as printed in Bourne, pp. 277-280.

¹³⁷Bullen, p. 3.

¹³⁸Russell to Wellington, March 12, 1848, R.P., P.R.O. 30/22/7B. Palmerston wrote of Cracow's destruction, "The measure is an abominable shame, and executed by the most hollow pretences and the most groundless assertions." Palmerston to Normanby, November 19, 1846, as printed in Bourne, p. 274.

¹³⁹Palmerston to Bloomfield, F.O., No. 37, March 4, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48565, Vol. CXLIX.

¹⁴⁰Ingle, pp. 144-145.

¹⁴¹Although written three years later, implied in Nesselrode's passage was a long-standing antipathy towards Palmerston. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, St. Petersburg, December 12, 1851, Nesselrode, X, 72, as quoted by Bell, II, 19.

¹⁴²Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 48, March 6, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. To support Austria, Russia was prepared to loan her six million silver roubles (approximately £960,000). Later, as Austria, herself, underwent revolutions, the loan was suspended. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 47, March 6, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 71, March 27, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

¹⁴³Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 48, March 6, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 52, March 11, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

¹⁴⁴Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 64, March 20, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Nicholas I to Victoria, St. Petersburg, March 22, 1848, Victoria, II, 196.

¹⁴⁷Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 79, March 29, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. As a British foreign secretary who had been engaged in strenuously attempting to discourage Lamartine from giving aid to Irish revolutionaries who had gone to Paris for aid, Palmerston could readily understand Nesselrode's point of view on Ireland and Poland.

¹⁴⁸Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 60, March 18, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 85, April 8, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

¹⁴⁹Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 87, April 8, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

¹⁵⁰Bloomfield to Palmerston, F.O., March 18, 1848, No. 57, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48565, Vol. CXLIX.

¹⁵¹Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., No. 84, April 6, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/282.

¹⁵²Palmerston to Bloomfield, F.O., April 11, 1848, Ashley, II, 79.

¹⁵³Ibid.

¹⁵⁴Palmerston to Westmoreland, F.O., No. 90, April 11, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 64/282.

¹⁵⁵Palmerston had the Polish émigrés particularly in mind because he added that he hoped that the Tsar might come to some arrangement that would avert strife in the Russian controlled portion of Poland. Palmerston to Bloomfield, F.O., No. 94, April 14, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 65/344.

¹⁵⁶Palmerston wrote of Russia's defensive stance, "...Her Majesty's Government have the more reason to applaud this course on the part of the Russian Government, because it is the course which the British Government also has resolved to follow." Palmerston to Bloomfield, F.O., No. 94, April 14, 1848, P.R.O., F.O. 65/344.

¹⁵⁷Palmerston had received information on Russia's extensive military forces. Bloomfield had reported the Russian army as having a total of 400,000 men with 90,000 cavalry and irregular cavalry amounting to 100,000 men. Bloomfield to Palmerston, St. Petersburg, No. 96, April 11, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48568, Vol. CLII.

¹⁵⁸Palmerston to Bloomfield, F.O., No. 162, June 21, 1848, B.L., P.L., ADD. MSS. 48565, Vol. CXLIX.

¹⁵⁹Seton-Watson, p. 255.

¹⁶⁰For a description of the evolution of the adversary relationship which developed between Palmerston and Urquhart see Sir Charles K. Webster, "Urquhart, Ponsonby and Palmerston," English Historical Review LXII, (July 1947), 327-351.

¹⁶¹Seton-Watson, p. 255.

¹⁶²Ibid. Ashley, II, 61.

¹⁶³Seton-Watson, p. 255.

¹⁶⁴Palmerston, Address, Parliament, March 1, 1848, Ashley, II, 62. See also Palmerston, Address, Parliament, March 1, 1848, Palmerston, pp. 471-472.

¹⁶⁵Ashley, II, 61. Seton-Watson, p. 255. Historians have concluded that both Urquhart and Anstey were unbalanced. See Webster, "Urquhart....," p. 328. Ridley, p. 334.

¹⁶⁶For additional details concerning Palmerston's diplomacy regarding the Hungarian uprising of 1848-1849 and its aftermath, see Sproxton, especially pp. 65-145. Russia's intervention and suppression of the Hungarian revolution further enlarged the great fear of the Russian army that was prevalent in Europe. See Michael Karpovich, Imperial Russia, 1801-1917 (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1932), p. 33.

¹⁶⁷Sproxton, pp. 113-145. On October 23, 1849, Palmerston was able to report that neither Austria nor Russia was insisting any longer on the forced expulsion of the Hungarian refugees from Turkey. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., October 23, 1849, Ashley, II, 115.

¹⁶⁸Sproxton, pp. 96-98.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 82-83, 94-100, 110-113.

¹⁷⁰Palmerston, Address, Parliament, July 21, 1849, Palmerston, p. 483.

¹⁷¹Seton-Watson, p. 290. Sproxton, pp. 82-83.

¹⁷²Palmerston, Address, Parliament, July 21, 1849, Palmerston, pp. 483-485.

¹⁷³Sproxton, pp. 96-98. Bell, II, 28.

¹⁷⁴Bell, II, 19-20.

¹⁷⁵Ibid., II, 20.

¹⁷⁶Palmerston, Address in Parliament, May 16, 1848, Palmerston, p. 472.

¹⁷⁷Gulick, pp. 67-70.

CHAPTER VII

TOWARD CLOSER RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

During the second half of 1848 Lord Palmerston continued his effort to thwart potential French aggression. Although France's General Cavaignac had stabilized conditions in Paris through re-¹pressive measures, a Franco-Austrian war was still possible; and in Italy the outcome of military operations had upset Palmerston's plans for a pacific Austrian retreat. On July 24, 1848, an Austrian army led by Marshal Joseph Radetzky decisively defeated the Italians at Custozza. In autumn the new Austrian spokesman, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, stiffened Austria's resolve not to relinquish² Lombardy or any other part of Italy.

The possibility of French intervention loomed before Palmerston. In order to restrain the French, Palmerston offered Cavaignac the possibility of Anglo-French mediation to settle the Italian crisis. Although Cavaignac was prepared to send an army of 60,000 to force the Austrians out of northern Italy, he, too, favored mediation. The French general perceived the Anglo-French mediation as the first step in an alliance with Britain, which would end French isolation. Also, if Vienna refused to give up Lombardy, Cavaignac conceived of joint military intervention by Britain and France. Therefore, on August 5, 1848, the two powers agreed to joint mediation for different reasons. Palmerston wished to prevent the French from entering Italy, and Cavaignac saw mediation as a prelude to possible³ joint military intervention.

Palmerston's attempt at a mediated settlement did not go unnoticed in Britain. Queen Victoria remained vigorously opposed to the Cavaignac regime, and she termed the Anglo-French mediation, "most dangerous for the future of Europe...."⁴ Although Palmerston defended his actions by pointing out that mediation was a means of restraining the French, Victoria remained adamantly against Palmerston's line of action. Moreover, the Queen was vexed because her foreign secretary had exhibited a preference for Charles Albert's claims rather than defend what she⁵ believed were the legitimate rights of the Austrians in Italy.

In addition, Queen Victoria was receiving appeals from the Austrians. Palmerston attempted to discourage the Austrian pleas by telling officials in Vienna, via ambassador Ponsonby, that attempts to influence the British court would not alter his foreign policy. In particular, Palmerston referred to the "intrigues" of Metternich, now in exile in England, and a letter from Austria's General Alfred von Windischgrätz⁶ to the Queen. The pressure on Palmerston was mounting.

Well aware of the extant hazards, Palmerston, in a dispatch to Ponsonby on August 31, warned Baron Wessenberg, Austria's foreign minister at the time, that Lombardy had to be surrendered. Moreover, if the mediation should falter because of Austrian stubbornness, the French, already impatient, would attack with British approval and drive the Austrians "clean over the Alps."⁷ Palmerston's mediation in the dispute over the Elbe Duchies had just come to fruition with Prussian acquiescence in the Malmö armistice, and he now was pressing the Austrians to come to terms with Italy.

In the same dispatch Palmerston went on to say that Providence had divided mankind into different nations and countries distinctly separated from one another by natural barriers and cultural dissimilarities. The Alps were the natural border between the German and Italian peoples, two culturally different races. For the Italians, Austrian rule had always been hateful. Italy should, therefore, be⁸ relinquished.

The British foreign secretary was quick to caution Ponsonby that the Austrians would reply that by the same reasoning Britain should, then, give up Ireland. But to Palmerston's mind the cases were quite different. In Ireland the races had inter-mingled and were almost a single people. He added, "The language is the same;...and the land, and wealth, and⁹ intelligence of the country is for the connection."

Thus, Palmerston, himself an Irish peer with an extensive Sligo estate, not only minimized the extent of Irish religious and literary culture, but, at a time when Irish nationalists were clamoring for autonomy, he blithely implied that only the landed gentry in Ireland counted, and they were for the Union with England. Such, then, was part of the frame of mind with which Palmerston carried forth his relations with Austria. The rhetoric Palmerston employed to justify his warning of French interference with British consent did not allow for any embarrassing imperfections in the home Isles.

As summer passed into autumn and the Austrians continued to avoid a negotiated settlement with Charles Albert, Palmerston continued to

criticize Austria. On November 12, he declared in a dispatch to Ponsonby, that Austria could not remain quietly in Italy. He added that the hypocrisy of the "Metternich school," which made falsehoods seem to be truths, would ultimately end in anarchy and dissolution of
10
the Austrian Empire.

In December, Schwarzenberg commented on Palmerston's verbal attacks, and his words are worth quoting for their picture of the Austrian view of Palmerston. Schwarzenberg wrote:

Lord Palmerston regards himself too much as the arbiter of Europe. For our part we are not disposed to accord him the role of Providence. We never impose our advice on him in relation to Ireland; let him spare himself the trouble of advising us on the subject of Lombardy. 11

Schwarzenberg added that he was tired of Palmerston's "eternal insinua-
12
tions," and that the Austrians would no longer tolerate them.

The conservative-minded Queen Victoria was also tired of Palmerston's foreign policy. As a result of their disagreements over diplomacy and his continued circumvention of her censorship, on September 19, 1848, Queen Victoria asked the prime minister to remove Palmerston. Russell
13
agreed, in principle, to do so. However, he was reluctant to dismiss the foreign secretary at that time because Palmerston was important for retaining support in Parliament. Liberals and Radicals in Parliament favored Palmerston's actions, which, regardless of his inner thoughts and motives, appeared outwardly liberal in orientation. His diplomacy seemed to preserve British interests as well as European peace. Also, the general assertiveness of Palmerston's foreign policy sat well with the public at large. In short, Palmerston was too valuable a political
14
asset for Russell to give up. Palmerston remained in office.

The fact that Palmerston wanted all Europe to know he was opposed to the Austrian policy in Italy was indicated in a dispatch dated December 28, 1848. Commenting on a Milanese newspaper article which attacked him and which he felt was inspired by Vienna, Palmerston told the ambassador to Turin, Ralph Abercromby, that he wished the attacking article was circulated and read throughout Europe.¹⁵ It can be seen, then, that Palmerston was well-informed in the use of the opinion-making media.

A DIPLOMATIC TURNING POINT

After repeated warnings to Lamartine not to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, after persuading Cavaignac to participate in joint mediation of the Italian question, and after witnessing the frustrating Italian defeat at Custozza with the resultant continuation of Austrian suppression, Lord Palmerston came to a turning point in his foreign policy. In the same December 28 dispatch noted directly above, he observed that the Italian states were too weak to throw off their Austrian yoke alone. This being the case, it would be better for the French to intervene and drive out Austria than to leave the task undone. Although he doubted that the French were prepared to act in the near future, he took comfort in the fact that if and when they did intervene, the British would also be there and, as he put it, "prevent any permanently bad consequences from resulting from it."¹⁶ Thus, after undergoing a year of anxiety and frustration over the possibility of a Franco-Austrian clash in Italy, Palmerston now looked forward to resolution of the Italian crisis, even if it

did mean war.

War actually did come from an unexpected source. In an act of foolishness, Charles Albert of Sardinia reopened hostilities with Austria in the spring of 1849 and, at Novara, Marshal Radetzky once again decisively defeated the Piedmontese army on March 23, 1849.¹⁷

Facing the cold facts of the reality of Italian defeat, Palmerston went one step further in his turn of position, a step which was taken in full consideration of the balance of power. On April 9, 1849, Palmerston told Russell that the best means of dealing with the grave danger of European war that existed was for Britain and France to remain resolute to offset the power of Austria and her chief supporter, Russia. Prussia, Palmerston noted, was pursuing an independent policy and could no longer be considered, as he expressed it, "the kettle tied to the tail of her two great military neighbors."¹⁸

Palmerston added that of the two alternatives, either supporting France or courting Austria, the first was preferable. Britain could still restrain France. On the other hand, if Britain chose the second course and was forced to make any sacrifice of "truth, principle, or justice," as he put it, then she would alienate France without gaining Austria. Moreover, thinking of the political consequences in Britain, Palmerston observed that the government would lose its support at home without reconciling "a single Tory."¹⁹

It should be noted that Palmerston's attitude toward Russia had also altered. Palmerston previously looked to Russia as a steadying influence on the continent during the heat of the revolutions in 1848,

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but her continued support of Austria made her a potential adversary. On the other hand, the French Republic, which he characterized in February 1848 in the most disparaging terms, had now turned into a most worthy ally. In this sense, Palmerston was adhering to a fundamental rubric of the balance of power which dictated that Britain would never have permanent allies, for a friendly state today could be a possible
21
adversary in the future.

The French finally did intervene in Italy, but not for the cause of north Italian nationalism. France's new president, Louis Napoleon, was elected on December 19, 1848, as "the guardian of order," and his ascent to power represented a set-back for republicans and radicals. Louis Napoleon decided to intervene in central Italy to forestall Austrian intervention there and, also in response to the requests of his Catholic supporters, to assist the Pope in his return to Rome. The people of Rome had expelled the Pope in November 1848, and in February 1849, the revolutionary Triumvirs, subsequently headed by Giuseppe
22
Mazzini, declared Rome a republic.

The French believed that the Roman republicans would prefer their intervention to that of the Austrians. This hope proved false. Several days after French troops debarked (April 24, 1848) at Civitavecchia near Rome, they had to fight with republican forces led by Giuseppe Garibaldi. After a period of negotiation, the French reinforced their army and mounted a major assault which eventually resulted in the downfall of the Roman republic at the end of June. Thereafter, Papal
23
government was restored in Rome. Paradoxically, the largest republic

in Europe, rather than the Habsburgs, had thwarted republican aspirations in Italy.

Palmerston looked upon the French intervention as only a temporary solution to conditions in Rome. He believed that if the Pope refused to make governmental reforms, Rome's citizens would rise up again in revolt and re-establish the republic. In general, he disapproved of this restoration of the Pope's temporal power since he preferred to see the Catholic Church in each country localized and nationalized.²⁴

By May 1849, most of the diplomats of the great powers, including Palmerston, were anxious to be rid of the Italian question. The Austrians were pre-occupied with putting down a troublesome revolution in Hungary, and the Russians had intervened to assist the Austrians. Although Palmerston still wished for an independent state in northern Italy, which would serve as a buffer between France and Austria, his enthusiasm for supporting France diminished. True, the French were attempting to obtain Parma and Modena for Sardinia, but in return they still expected to annex Savoy.²⁵ Also, Palmerston was generally tired of the drawn-out affair of Italy. Unknown to his liberal supporters in Parliament, Palmerston had Normanby tell an Austrian representative that "the Queen's Government wants Italy pacified as soon as possible...²⁶ Lord Palmerston desires it as much as you."

At home, Russell and the Cabinet were adamant in their opposition to supporting French intervention in northern Italy. As a consequence, on July 26, 1849, Palmerston informed Alexis de Tocqueville, the French

foreign minister, that Britain could only give Sardinia moral and diplomatic support. The French government decided not to intervene. They merely requested that Austria moderate the demands of indemnity
27
she had been making on Sardinia.

Finally, on August 6, 1849, the long desired Austro-Sardinian peace settlement was signed at Milan. This peace agreement restored the frontiers of 1815, and Sardinia was forced to pay an indemnity to Austria of 65 million francs. Also, Radetzky assumed absolute authority over Lombardy and Venice under the titles of Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. The cause of north Italian liberation was, for the time being, put to rest. In December 1849, routine diplomatic relations between
28
Austria and Sardinia were restored.

THE EASTERN QUESTION

During 1848 and 1849 the revolt in Hungary, mentioned above, paralleled the Italian revolutions. In 1848 Hungarian liberals rose in protest against Habsburg rule, and in April 1849 Hungary declared independence under a government headed by Louis Kossuth. Kossuth made an earnest appeal for support throughout liberal Europe, but he was ignored. Louis Napoleon was absorbed in his intervention in Rome,
29
and Britain was the only other great power capable of helping Hungary.

Palmerston, however, strongly opposed allowing a great power to suffer grievous territorial losses. As much as he disliked Austria's internal policies, Palmerston regarded her as vital to the continental balance of power. Consequently, Britain offered the Hungarians no substantial support. In fact, Palmerston had secretly urged the Russians to help the Austrians suppress the Hungarian revolt as

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expeditiously as possible.

At home, Palmerston's stormy relations with Austria drew criticism from conservatives in Parliament. On July 31, 1849, Palmerston successfully fended off the verbal attacks of Conservative Lord Brougham. During the debate on affairs in Hungary, Palmerston skillfully stood by his criticism of Austria's Hungarian policies, yet maintained that he recognized the value of preserving Austria's place in the balance of power. He wished that Austria would allow the Hungarians constitutional reforms, but he did not support Austria's dissolution. Palmerston was sustained in Parliament, and a motion by Brougham, disapproving of Palmerston's policies, was rejected by a majority of twelve.³¹

Until May 1849, Nicholas I was reluctant to intervene in Hungary because he did not want to provoke the French into a move elsewhere. However, the Tsar now saw that Louis Napoleon was occupied with the Roman intervention. Nicholas, thereupon, announced on May 8 that he would support Austria against the Hungarians. On that same day, the Tsar recognized the French republic. Nicholas was especially anxious to suppress the Hungarians because he did not want unrest to spread to nearby areas under Russian control. By August 1849, Austrian and Russian troops had defeated the Hungarians. Kossuth and his followers fled into Turkey. Hungarian nationalism was subdued without a single substantive move in its behalf by Britain or France.³²

As noted above, in September 1849, when the Tsar and the Austrians demanded that the Sultan of Turkey expatriate the Hungarian nationalists, the larger diplomatic question of the Straits was resurrected. Palmerston correctly perceived the Austro-Russian demands as a Russian

attempt to dominate Turkish internal affairs, especially the Dardanelles. Great Britain traditionally opposed Russian hegemony of the Straits because of the United Kingdom's own commercial interest in maintaining trade routes to the Near East and India. Therefore, when Palmerston requested cabinet approval to support Turkey's refusal to return the Hungarian nationalists, the foreign secretary was moving primarily out of concern for British interests. Moreover, Stratford Canning, the British ambassador in Constantinople, and General Aupick, the French
33
ambassador there, had already assured the Porte of their support.

Although Palmerston was fairly certain that Austria and Russia were too pre-occupied with suppressing revolts in their territories to go to war, he was not certain that the "Broadbrims of the Cabinet," as he called them, would approve of any Anglo-French intervention
34
which would lead to confrontation with the two powers. Earlier that summer the cabinet had disallowed any joint Anglo-French intervention
35
in Italy.

It was with relief, then, that Palmerston was able to inform Canning on October 2 that the cabinet had approved two modes of action. Britain and France would put forward "friendly" representations to the Austrian and Russian courts, telling them to desist in their demands on the Sultan. Secondly, Britain and France would send squadrons of ships to
36
the mouth of the Bosphorus to support Turkey.

However, Palmerston warned Canning that the Sultan should not call for the squadrons unless absolutely necessary. The Whig government as Palmerston expressed it, had to, "show to Parliament that we have used all civility and forbearance, and that if hostilities ensue, they have

not been brought on by any fault or mistake of ours,"³⁷ Thus, Palmerston was still very much concerned about reaction at home.

As the days passed, it became apparent to the Tsar that he could not achieve his objective without clashing with other powers. Russia decided to drop her demands on the Sultan, and the Austrians had little choice but to follow suit. On October 23, 1849, Palmerston was able to report to Normanby that Russia and Austria were backing down.³⁸ Britain had once again blocked Russian designs on the Straits.

This last joint Anglo-French action of 1849 is an especially appropriate conclusion to Palmerston's relations with France and the other European countries during 1848 and 1849 because it illustrates the return to the more traditional concerns for power and influence pursued by the great powers before the revolutions rocked them at their foundations.³⁹ The joint moves at the Bosphorus also marked the beginning of the Anglo-French alliance of the Crimean War and, in this sense, it forecast subsequent events.⁴⁰

Lord Palmerston remained foreign secretary until December 17, 1851,⁴¹ when Lord John Russell asked him to resign. This momentous event was precipitated by yet another episode in France. On December 2, 1851, Louis Napoleon, by a coup d'etat, subverted the French constitution and augmented his presidential authority. Palmerston heartily approved of Louis Napoleon and, in an inadvisable act, endorsed the French president's move in a conversation with the French ambassador at London,⁴² Count Walewski, on December 3.

Following sharp disagreements over his previous foreign policy

concerning France, Italy, Germany, and Austria, Palmerston's action was one more difference between Victoria and himself. The queen disapproved of his taking a stand on French affairs without consulting either the cabinet or the monarch. This incident, added to the previous disagreements separating the two figures, led Victoria once again to request Palmerston's removal.⁴³ This time Russell, who knew his government was near its end, acquiesced and dismissed his foreign secretary, mainly because the prime minister viewed Palmerston as a barrier to a future coalition with Peelites.⁴⁴

During the ensuing debate in Parliament on February 3, 1852, Russell defended his decision to drop Palmerston. He related Palmerston's conversation with Count Walewski in which Palmerston gave his endorsement of the coup. Russell also dwelled at length on Palmerston's differences with Victoria concerning the royal prerogative of review of foreign policy. At last, Lord Palmerston was in a snare that he could not escape. He was depicted as a government servant at odds with his sovereign.⁴⁵

Moreover, his endorsement of Louis Napoleon's military coup had blackened his image before his liberal supporters, the Radicals. And this time Parliament did not sustain Palmerston and he left office. Several days later Palmerston delivered his own riposte: he refused to support a government bill before Parliament, and the Whigs, losing the vote of confidence, fell from power.⁴⁶

CHAPTER VII

NOTES

¹De Luna, p. 3. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., February 27, 1848, Ashley, II, 72.

²Taylor, The Struggle..., pp. 20,22.

³De Luna, pp. 352-354. Taylor, The Italian Problem..., pp. 139-140.

⁴Victoria to Palmerston, September 7, 1848, Connell, Regina vs..., p. 119. See also Connell, Ibid., pp. 116-117.

⁵Victoria to Palmerston, September 7, 1848, Connell, Ibid., p. 119. Palmerston to Victoria, September 1848, Connell, Ibid., pp. 119-120. See also Victoria to Palmerston, May 25, 1848, Connell, Ibid., p. 98.

⁶Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., August 31, 1848, Ashley, II, 88-90. Palmerston to Ponsonby, Brochet, November 12, 1848, Ashley, II, 90-91. See also Palmerston to Ponsonby, Panshanger, September 9, 1849, Ashley, II, 105-106.

⁷Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., August 31, 1848, Ashley, II, 89.

⁸Ibid., pp. 89-90.

⁹Ibid., p. 90.

¹⁰Palmerston to Ponsonby, November 12, 1848, Ashley, II, 90-91.

¹¹Schwarzenberg to Werner, Olmütz, December 4, 1848; Circular Dispatch, December 7, 1848, Hans-Hof-und Staatsarchivs, Vienna, as quoted in Taylor, The Italian Problem..., pp. 190-191.

¹²Ibid. Ponsonby forwarded a copy of Schwarzenberg's remarks to Palmerston. In reaction, Palmerston said Schwarzenberg's words were similar to "the outpourings of an enraged woman of the town when arrested by a Policeman in the act of picking a Pocket." Quoted in Ridley, p. 350.

¹³Victoria, Private Journal, September 19, 1848, Connell, Regina vs..., pp. 121-123.

¹⁴Southgate, The Passing..., pp. 270-272. Ridley, pp. 393-394. See also Southgate, "The Most English Minister...", pp. 223, 241-242, 245.

¹⁵Palmerston to Abercromby, Broadlands, December 28, 1848, Ashley, II, 91-92.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 28.

¹⁸Palmerston to Russell, Broadlands, April 9, 1849, Ashley, II, 93-94.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Gulick, pp. 33-34, 65-70.

²²Taylor, The Struggle..., pp. 24, 28-29. Langer, Political and..., pp. 441-442.

²³Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 29. Langer, Political and..., pp. 443-447.

²⁴Palmerston to W. Temple, Carlton Gardens, July 7, 1848, Ashley, II, 95-96.

²⁵Taylor, The Italian Problem..., pp. 230-235.

²⁶Hübner to Schwarzenberg, N. 17A, May 3, 1849, Hans-Hof-und Staatsarchivs, Vienna, as quoted in Taylor, The Italian Problem..., p. 230.

²⁷Taylor, The Italian Problem..., pp. 234-235.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 236.

²⁹Taylor, The Struggle..., pp. 30-33.

³⁰Seton-Watson, p. 290.

³¹Palmerston, Address, Parliament, July 21, 1849, Palmerston, pp. 480-491. Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., July 16, 1849, Ashley, II, 96-98. Palmerston to W. Temple, F.O., July 24, 1849, Ashley, II, 98.

³²Taylor, The Struggle..., pp. 31-33.

³³Canning to Palmerston, Constantinople, September 17, 1849, Ashley, II, 112, f.n. 1. Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, September 29, 1849, Ashley, II, 107-108. Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 33. Albrecht-Carrié, p. 37.

³⁴Palmerston, Memorandum of Conversation with Brunnow, Carlton Gardens, October 2, 1849, Ashley, II, 108-110. Palmerston to Normanby, Carlton Gardens, September 29, 1849, Ashley, II, 107-108.

³⁵Taylor, The Italian Problem..., pp. 234-235.

³⁶Palmerston to Canning, F.O., October 2, 1849, Ashley, II, 112-113. See also Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., October 2, 1849, Ashley, II, 110-111. Palmerston to Ponsonby, F.O., October 6, 1849, Ashley, II, 113-114.

³⁷Palmerston to Canning, F.O., October 2, 1849, Ashley, II, 112-113.

³⁸Palmerston to Normanby, F.O., October 23, 1849, Ashley, II, 115. See also Taylor, The Struggle..., pp. 33-34.

³⁹By September 1849, Palmerston himself recognized that the wave of reaction was sweeping over Europe and suppressing the liberals. See Palmerston to W. Temple, Brocket, September 23, 1849, Ashley, II, 100-101.

⁴⁰Taylor, The Struggle..., p. 34.

⁴¹Russell to Palmerston, Woburn Abbey, December 17, 1851, Walpole, II, 139-140.

⁴²For Palmerston's account of the incident see Palmerston to Lansdowne, Broadlands, January 22, 1852, Ashley, II, 215-218. See also Southgate, "The Most English Minister..." pp. 286-290.

⁴³Palmerston to Lansdowne, Broadlands, January 22, 1852, Ashley, II, 215-218. Southgate, "The Most English Minister..." pp. 288-290.

⁴⁴Russell looked forward to forming a Whig-Peelite coalition headed by himself. The P.M. knew Palmerston was noxious to the Peelites and, therefore, a political liability. Russell wanted Palmerston out. See Southgate, "The Most English Minister..." p. 291.

⁴⁵Russell, Address, Parliament, February 3, 1852, Ashley, II, 218-220. For Palmerston's reply see Palmerston, Address, Parliament, February 3, 1852, Ashley, II, 220-223. See also Southgate, "The Most English Minister..." pp. 293-296.

⁴⁶Ashley, II, 227, 229. Palmerston to W. Temple, Carlton Gardens, February 24, 1852, Ashley, II, 229-230. Southgate, "The Most English Minister..." p. 291.

Chapter VIII

Conclusion

This dissertation has attempted to redress a significant historiographical omission. There has been no comprehensive study of Viscount Palmerston's foreign policy in 1848, which utilizes his private papers. Until recently, the bulk of Palmerston's private correspondence was maintained at his ancestral home, Broadlands, and was restricted in its use. Palmerston's tendency to portray the shortcomings of his contemporaries in blunt, derogatory terms probably had prompted the caretakers of his papers to limit their use for research until such a time as when his correspondence would no longer be an embarrassment to his contemporaries or their immediate descendants. As noted in the Preface, the handful of historians who had gained access to the documents did not describe Palmerston's foreign policy in 1848 with any degree of thoroughness. In particular, the effect of British domestic affairs upon Palmerston's diplomacy and the interplay between domestic and foreign events has received very little attention.

The present work represents an effort to fill in this gap in scholarship. By drawing heavily upon the above-mentioned private correspondence of Palmerston, including many hitherto unused documents formerly housed at Broadlands but now available to researchers at the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts and the British Library, and by using Palmerston's Foreign Office correspondence maintained by the Public Record Office, the dissertation provides a fresh interpretation and more complete account of Palmerston's foreign policy in 1848.

The central subject of discussion in this study has been Lord Palmerston's foreign policy during the period of January to June 1848. Various influential factors, both domestic and foreign, have been described in order to characterize the broad range of concerns which affected his diplomatic moves. In order to place the first half of 1848 in historical perspective, this work has also described events leading up to and following this period.

An examination of the many facets of Palmerston's activities and the factors influencing his moves point to several conclusions. The evidence shows that the first six months of 1848 were one of the most uncertain and trying periods, if not the most taxing, in Palmerston's entire career as foreign secretary. The host of imponderable factors to be considered had challenged even the adroit Viscount Palmerston. The spectre of a general continental "war of principles" generated by the leaders of the February Revolution instilled fear in the chancellories of Europe, and even the normally sanguine Palmerston experienced anxiety.

Other external factors, such as Charles Albert's decision to go to war, Austria's refusal to relinquish her Italian possessions, the aspirations of the émigrés in France, the initial uncertainty as to how Russia would react to the February Revolution, and the unexpected aggressiveness of the German nationalists militated to make the first half of 1848 a most suspenseful period.

To be sure, there were threats of European war during other periods, but what made the months of January to June 1848 unique was that in

addition to the above-mentioned factors there was the threat of political and social upheaval in the British Isles. Chartists and Irish nationalists, buoyed up by the February Revolution, attempted to overturn established authority at home. Their threat was a substantial one, and the evidence indicates that Palmerston and his governmental colleagues did not take lightly the Chartist-Irish challenge, regardless of the impression given by the eventual defeat of the insurrectionists. The elaborate deployment of troops and police, especially for the Chartist demonstration of April 10, 1848, in London, exemplified the serious nature of the affair. Britain was not immune to the trials which Europe was undergoing.

Palmerston's consciousness of the impact that domestic affairs might have on his foreign policy is evident. His dispatches concerning Britain's stability after April 10 demonstrate his awareness that Britain's image abroad depended on how well she weathered the strains of the Chartist and Irish insurrections. Palmerston and his contemporaries knew that any signs of weakness would leave Britain vulnerable to possible aggression by the other great powers. France or Russia could possibly have been encouraged to act on such a premise. Also, Britain's prestige as an ordered state would have been diminished by a Chartist success, or even, as Prince Albert noted, a bloody defeat.

Just as serious was the possible link-up of Chartist and Irish radicals with the revolutionary regime in France. Lord Palmerston's warnings to Lamartine regarding overtures to Irish nationalists illustrate Palmerston's sensitivity about the effects of foreign agitation on the

"turbulent" class at home. Lamartine's cooperation on this matter was a sine qua non to better Anglo-French relations.

At stake was not only Britain's tranquility and social unity, but Palmerston's own place as a member of the British establishment. In addition, the safety of Broadlands and his estate in County Sligo depended upon the maintenance of social and political order. Palmerston's political and financial future were tied to the established order. Deterring Lamartine from giving support to the Chartist and Irish delegates was not only prudent for Britain's benefit but also for Palmerston's personal political future and financial well-being. The significance of the interplay between domestic events in Britain and affairs on the continent was unmistakable.

Indeed, by April 10, 1848, Lord Palmerston had reached a turning point in his assessment of conditions at home and abroad. By that date it had become clear to Palmerston that in Britain and on the continent the established order was being fundamentally threatened. The Chartists had made an open bid to force the hand of the government. Likewise, Irish nationalists were waiting for an opportune moment to strike for autonomy. On the continent the moderate Lamartine had displayed a political weakness which reassured neither Palmerston nor Russell. The French republic seemed poised for intervention in northern Italy, a move that would eventually lead to a general European war. Moreover, German troops were invading Schleswig-Holstein and the Poles were precipitating unrest in Posen and in Russia.

Lord Palmerston had come to realize that concessions toward constitutional reform promulgated by the heads of state would not halt the revolutionary trend spreading throughout Europe. The revolutions were resulting in unwelcome democratic practices, such as universal suffrage, which would, to use Palmerston's term, set British citizens "agog." A stronger antidote would be required. Forsaking any empathy he might have had for the national aspirations of the Poles, Germans or Hungarians, by spring 1848 Lord Palmerston was prepared to throw in his lot with that other great power still remaining "upright"-Imperial Russia. Both Palmerston and Nesselrode saw value in this relationship, most importantly, self-preservation. At home, Palmerston supported stronger measures of social control, such as the Security of the Crown Bill. The abnormal times required extreme measures.

Even Britain's traditional strengths, her industrial advantage and her naval power were limited by unforeseen circumstances in 1848. The revolutions had exacerbated the commercial crisis which Britain was enduring. Also, the preponderant power of the British Navy had limitations. It could not be employed simultaneously throughout European waters. As Lord Minto had pointed out, there were areas, such as off the Italian coast, where the French fleet had the advantage of proximity to home ports. Britain required the aid of a land based power to help carry out her continental policies, and until April 1848, when Palmerston finally settled on Russia, there was a serious question as to how Britain would assert her presence in Europe.

However, if it was the worst of times in terms of political and social conditions, it was also the best of times for Britain to play a key role in continental affairs. With characteristic vigor, Palmerston seized the chance to do so. The February Revolution had sent a "chill" through the European capitals and the other great powers besieged Palmerston with requests for support to meet the resurrected French "menace." On the other hand, Lamartine had also sought an alliance with Britain in order to break France's diplomatic isolation and to gain time for rebuilding her military strength.

Palmerston's decision to continue relations with both camps, France and the eastern powers, gave evidence of a keen perception of the balance of power and of Britain's central position in it in 1848. Although the Second French Republic was personally repellent to Palmerston, he had faced the reality of the revolutionary fait accompli and worked as closely as possible with the moderates in the Provisional Government. He wanted to put a brake on the revolutionary mission of the republic which threatened to intervene in Italy, and which had émigrés eager to surge forth into Belgium, Italy and Germany. In addition, the flight of Louis Philippe and Guizot had removed adversaries who had given Palmerston much vexation and, correspondingly, opened the door for better Anglo-French relations.

On the other hand, Palmerston was quick to realize the need to keep abreast of affairs in Prussia, Austria and Russia. First and foremost, Palmerston wanted to make certain that the eastern powers, Russia in particular, did not over-react to the French republic and

blunder into a repetition of the revolutionary wars of the 1790's. Also, in the general arrangement of powers prior to 1848, Palmerston regarded Prussia as the most likely candidate for serving as Britain's "instrument" for counter-balancing the aggressive behavior of both France and Russia. Palmerston had regarded Austria as also significant for the balance of power on the continent. Communication with the eastern powers, then, was essential for maintaining European stability.

Thus, in return for Britain's support and aid, Palmerston had obliged the other great powers to act with restraint. In essence, the February Revolution had focused attention on the importance of Britain, a state which had not had favorable relations with the other great powers during the recent Spanish Marriages, Cracow and Sonderbund affairs. In this sense, the February Revolution was diplomatically advantageous to Britain.

Armed with the advantage of being needed by the other powers at the outset of 1848, Lord Palmerston successfully protected his country's interests, which were best guaranteed by maintenance of peace and the status quo as codified by the settlements of 1814-1815. Even while the basic relationships of the great powers shifted during January to June 1848, Palmerston was successful in ensuring that the continent would not witness a general war, which would imperil British commerce and political stability, as had been the case with the French Revolution and advent of Napoleon I. Palmerston looked first to Prussia and Austria and then to Russia to counter-balance the power of France. In summation, the advantage Britain possessed in the first half of 1848, that of being

a potential source of support for both the eastern powers and France, was put to use by Palmerston to preserve the European equilibrium. It was at the heart of British interests and a cardinal principle of Palmerston's foreign policy.

In Italy, there was a balance of interests to consider also. Palmerston had wanted to help to establish a north Italian state where political and commercial ties could be developed similar to the connections established in southern Italy. In general, the British influence in southern Italy tended to counter-balance French and Austrian influence in northern Italy, and the evidence indicates Palmerston was looking for an even more favorable situation in the north.

Moreover, Palmerston was willing to permit an alteration of the settlements of 1814-1815 in Italy because he believed Austria would be a stronger state without her Italian possessions. They constituted a drain on her resources and were a vulnerable point in Austria's defenses. Palmerston wanted Charles Albert's new kingdom to be a stabilizing buffer between France and Austria. In this sense, Palmerston was seeking to strengthen the balance of power, not upset it. The foreign secretary was not in favor of uniting the Italian peninsula, at this time, into a single Italian state, which would have significantly altered the status quo.

One can conclude from Palmerston's actions that other concerns, such as his interest in constitutional and national developments in Poland, Germany, Hungary, and Italy, were for the British foreign secretary

of secondary importance and subordinate to his desire to maintain a stable balance of power in Europe. Palmerston worked with Nesselrode to discourage the Gagern-Arnim plan for resurrecting Poland, and through his mediation of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, Palmerston blunted the national aspirations of German liberals. He supported the Hungarians only after it was evident that their cause was futile. Finally, he was willing to compromise on Italian self-determination in order to arrive at a quick, compromise settlement inherent in the Hummelauer proposal. By April 1848, concern for the general balance of power had overridden any sentiments Palmerston may have had for liberal, nationalist developments on the continent. One may also conclude that regardless of any liberal inclinations Palmerston may have displayed prior to 1848, he was unmistakably more conservative in his orientation in 1848. Reform from below was definitely not to his liking.

Yet, Palmerston had to be mindful that his foreign policy remained acceptable to Radicals in Parliament, whom the Whigs depended upon to stay in power. By recognizing the French republic, by opposing the Austrians in Italy, and by mediating the Elbe Duchies question, albeit for private reasons inimical to democratic liberalism, Palmerston projected an image favorable to the Radicals. Moreover, he knew how to use the press to shape this favorable image. One can conclude that Palmerston had Parliament very much in mind as he made foreign policy decisions, and he kept confidential those communications which he knew would not sit well with the members of House of Commons.

Palmerston's actions were, as noted, not popular with everyone in Britain. Queen Victoria interpreted his diplomacy not as an attempt at saving the European monarchies, but, indeed, as an anti-monarchical liberal assault. On the other hand, Russell and Palmerston's other governmental colleagues, who were pro-Italian in sentiment, were unwilling to compromise on Italian self-determination as implied in the Hummelauer proposal. The attack by Urquhart and Anstey further illustrated the various reactions which Palmerston's policies produced. In all these cases, for different reasons, Palmerston was unable to convince his critics of the correctness of his approach to foreign affairs. Nevertheless, by secrecy, determination and the dexterity of his defense in Parliament, Lord Palmerston was able to turn aside damaging criticism in 1848.

It can be concluded that Palmerston's struggle to do what he believed best for Britain involved not only foreign adversaries and Britain's own alienated groups, primarily the Chartists and Irish Nationalists, but also the members of his own class and political milieu. Only when all these factors are kept in mind is it possible to comprehend the difficulty of Palmerston's task and the measure of diplomatic success he achieved.

THE BROADER CONTEXT OF PALMERSTON'S DIPLOMACY

Even though the time span from the February Revolution to the advent of General Cavaignac has been treated as a specific period in Palmerston's foreign policy, conclusions about its relationship to Palmerston's diplomacy before February and after June 1848 can also be made. Lord

Palmerston's foreign policy was well within the tradition of two of his predecessors at the Foreign Office: Lord Castlereagh and George Canning. As with Castlereagh, Palmerston was acutely aware of the significance of the continental balance of power for Great Britain. Also, along with Canning, Palmerston placed British interests above all others, and he did not feel obliged to tie British foreign policy to any one combination or alignment of powers. Although Palmerston had also displayed, as did Canning, an interest in the constitutional and national development of foreign states and peoples, nevertheless, he was unwilling to allow such interests to deter him from safeguarding British concerns. Indeed, Palmerston believed the national developments of Greece and Belgium, for example, were in Britain's best interests, and he worked for their success. In 1848, on the other hand, the national developments of Germany and Poland were, from Palmerston's point of view, not in Britain's best interest. Moreover, in contrast to Lord Aberdeen, Palmerston was unwilling to sacrifice specific points of diplomacy, as in the case of Anglo-French rivalry in the Iberian Peninsula, in order to achieve a better general understanding with a great power.

In addition, there is a certain pattern to Palmerston's actions in spring 1848 which is similar to the approach to foreign relations that he used previously. Specifically, Lord Palmerston "played on" the fears and anxieties of the great powers in a manner similar to his diplomacy concerning the Belgian question in the 1830's. Although the particular details of the two historical periods were different, in both instances the eastern courts were fearful of France, and Palmerston seized upon

their fears to attain certain goals: Belgian self-determination in the 1830's and peace through a stable equilibrium of power in 1848.

Similarly, in 1848 the newly installed Lamartine wished to break the ring of diplomatic isolation that surrounded France just as the newly enthroned King Louis Philippe wished to do so in 1830, and both feared a reaction by the other great powers. Moreover, both Frenchmen cooperated with Palmerston to avoid a rupture with Great Britain. In both cases, Belgium in 1831 and Europe in 1848, Lord Palmerston was able to take advantage of the disposition of the great powers to obtain international conditions satisfactory to Britain.

A major difference in 1848 was the quickly shifting political orientations of the great powers because of the unpredictable course of the revolutions on the continent. For example, in 1847 Prussia appeared to be a stable, well-ordered state. In 1848, she appeared, in Palmerston's judgment, otherwise. The successive revolutions in Paris, Vienna and Berlin had created an unstable international polity, and in such an uncongenial continental setting Palmerston declined to convene an international conference to settle outstanding questions, as was done for Greece and Belgium. The initial alignment of the eastern states against France dissolved into a more indefinite arrangement, and Palmerston, by April 1848, looked further east to Russia for a steady continental state.

Even in the move towards Russia, Palmerston was not entirely original. It will be recalled that in 1840, during the Mehemet Ali crisis, Palmerston had aligned Britain with Russia to counteract the

diplomatic maneuvers of France. To be sure, the specific facts of the diplomatic question at issue were different in 1848. However, as in 1840 it was Count Nesselrode in 1848 who perceived that the coordination of British and Russian foreign policy would be advantageous to Russia. In both instances Russia had an opportunity to exercise more influence in the affairs of the great powers, and in 1848 self-preservation was an added impetus. It can be concluded, then, that even during the extraordinary events of 1848, Lord Palmerston chose as best as possible to solve the dilemma of European stability within the traditional framework of the European state system, and Nesselrode held a similar viewpoint. Neither statesman sought to involve Europe in a reactionary war against the new French regime and neither individual believed it was possible for his state to withdraw from Europe and simply ride out the revolutions.

At first examination, Palmerston's relations with two ideologically opposite powers, the Second French Republic and Tsarist Russia, seem inconsistent and illogical. However, as in the Belgian question of the 1830's, the British foreign secretary was adhering to the principle of the balance of power. During the first half of 1848, Britain was at the center of the balance, just as she had acted as central arbiter in the Belgian question. While keeping France and Russia beholden to Britain for support, Palmerston also insured that they would remain distrustful of each other. No Franco-Russian league antithetical to Britain would form while he was foreign secretary.

Nevertheless, the relationships of the great powers continued to evolve, and Palmerston's concern for maintaining the continental equilibrium subsequently motivated him to move closer to France in the last half of 1848 and in 1849. In spring 1848, Palmerston looked upon the French Republic with distrust and revulsion. However, Palmerston's main concern was to restrain France from causing a European war which would ultimately involve Britain. The British foreign secretary realized that the alternative to closer relations, armed reaction to the French Republic, would only agitate the French to carry the revolution to the rest of Europe, as they had done in the 1790's.

By August 1848 Palmerston and Cavaignac took one more step in closer Anglo-French relations. Their plan for joint Anglo-French mediation in Italy, although motivated by different reasons, constituted the delicate beginning of an entente cordiale. Britain had begun to shift to the side of France in the balance of power.

Then, in April 1849, Palmerston revealed to Russell yet another step in his change of position. By that time Palmerston was fully prepared to acknowledge his aim of counter-balancing the power of Austria and Russia by standing together with France even if war resulted. It was no longer simply a matter of restraining France with respect to Italy, but of checking the preponderance of Austria backed by Russia.

This change in position is all the more remarkable when one considers that Palmerston during the previous year had openly expressed to the Russians Britain's distinct desire to cooperate in maintaining the balance

of power against the shock of revolution. Yet, by autumn 1849 Britain and France were opposing Russia and Austria at the Straits. The danger of revolution in Europe was, for the most part, over, and other considerations, such as the Eastern Question, once more came to the foreground. During 1848 and 1849 Palmerston adhered to the strictures of the balance of power theory, which dictated that a power must remain free of binding alliances in order to shift with changes in the continental equilibrium. Nevertheless, as events unfolded, the Anglo-French cooperation of 1849 contained the seeds of the alliance against Russia in the Crimean War.

Palmerston's view of Austria is especially worth noting because it illustrates a number of his foreign policy views. The foreign secretary badly misjudged Austrian strength in Italy. As noted, Palmerston fully expected Austria to be driven out of Italy and the Austrian Empire to be on the verge of disintegration. The harsh reality of Custozza and Novara shattered Palmerston's illusions of Austrian weakness and drove him closer to the French. Palmerston's personal bitterness towards the Austrians is evidenced by his many dispatches criticizing their policies both in Italy and Hungary. At one point in September 1849 Palmerston, in a moment of anger, declared, "The Austrians are really the greatest brutes that ever called themselves by the undeserved name of civilized men."¹ It can be argued that it was not only considerations for the balance of power, but also Palmerston's increasing personal dislike for Schwarzenberg and the "Metternich school," which motivated him to oppose the Austrians so ardently in Italy. This is why in December 1848, perhaps in a state of frustration over negotiations, Palmerston was even

willing to reverse his previous stand on French intervention and to allow the French to use force against Austria in Italy.

Perhaps the most tragi-comic aspect of Palmerston's relations with Vienna was his attempt to avoid a comparison between Austrian control of Italy and British control of Ireland. Palmerston's effort to deny the existence of distinctly Irish culture and nationalism, while claiming that Austria was repressing Italian national and cultural aspirations, implied a double standard of judgment. Schwarzenberg, as was noted, rejected Palmerston's viewpoint.

The tragedy of Palmerston's attitude seems to rest squarely in his refusal to recognize the legitimate national aspirations of the people of Ireland. His own personal economic interest, his County Sligo estate, no doubt, firmed up his opposition to autonomy. One can conclude that Palmerston's argument for persuading Austria to relinquish Italy was badly undercut by the British example in Ireland.

Palmerston's foreign policy concerning the Germans also proved momentous. His handling of Gagern and Arnim's plan for unification and his mediation of the question of the Elbe Duchies shows his steadfast opposition to altering the balance of power in Central Europe. Palmerston opposed any change in the status quo and, in so doing, he stifled the unification efforts of German liberals. Peace in Palmerston's mind meant ensuring that no major power, one that could be potentially harmful to Britain, bordered the North Sea. Moreover, British commercial interests would be hampered by extension of the Zollverein. Peace, therefore, also meant holding the German liberals in check. The ultimate significance

of Palmerston's German policy could not be realized immediately. To some extent, by thwarting the nationalistic impulse of the liberals, Palmerston was contributing to the situation in which Germany was eventually unified under the conservative leadership of Bismarck.

Similarly, Palmerston opposed Hungarian independence because it would mean the diminution of Austria as a great power. Italy was, in Palmerston's view, not vital to the continued existence and strength of Austria; Hungary was essential to Austria's great power status. Palmerston's interest in keeping Europe stable prevailed over any preference he had for permitting the Hungarians to develop more autonomy along liberal lines.

One may conclude that in all Palmerston's relations with the great powers the concept of the balance of power was central to his diplomacy. Concern for the arrangement of powers prevailed over most of Palmerston's ideological views. As noted above, he could side with republican France as well as with autocratic Russia. Keeping Britain supreme through maintenance of the status quo was of utmost importance. His very real ability of adjusting to the unpredictable turn of events while still maintaining the balance of power to Britain's advantage is undeniably evident. Britain was served by a master diplomat.

Nevertheless, Palmerston's personal outlook did play a part in his diplomacy. Palmerston ardently believed that Britain's form of constitutional monarchy was worthy of "export."² Hence, he recommended constitutional reforms in Italy and Hungary. Part of his vexation with

the Austrians originated, it appears, in their refusal to take his advice. As noted, he was openly disdainful of Austria's weak monarch, Ferdinand. He preferred strong monarchs who knew when to grant reforms in order to avoid social unrest. Palmerston's recommendations of reform, therefore, were not intended to dilute royal authority; they were proposed to strengthen it. The Austrians thought otherwise.

Similarly, Palmerston disdained the French republic because it was not a monarchy. He preferred the dictatorships of Cavaignac and Louis Napoleon to the liberalism of Lamartine.

It is ironic, then, that Palmerston fell from power because of differences with his own sovereign, Victoria. Ultimately, Palmerston could not oppose the ruler and the royal office that he so deeply respected. Thus, he stepped down in 1851.

Palmerston's personal attitudes towards his counterparts in the other capitals were, at times, a hindrance. In particular, his negative opinions of Mehemet Ali, Guizot, Louis Philippe, and, later, Schwarzenburg undoubtedly "peppered" his diplomatic relations in a way that did not facilitate understanding. Moreover, in London, Palmerston conducted his personal interviews with foreign diplomats in a rather rude manner. He was habitually late in admitting foreign representatives into his office and was often shockingly brusque and sharp-tongued in his conversations. As foreign secretary for the world's foremost naval and industrial power, with so very much pressing business to attend to everyday, he may have believed that civility was unnecessary. Nevertheless,

Palmerston's demeanor did not promote smooth diplomatic relations. For many foreign observers, his sobriquet, "Lord Pumicestone," aptly symbolized his style of diplomacy.

On the other hand, because Lamartine offered a moderate alternative in France and because the Frenchman had been willing to tie his country's fortunes to that of Great Britain, Palmerston was willing to give Lamartine the benefit of the doubt on the Manifesto and on the question of the émigrés. As Tallyrand had pointed out, Palmerston's foreign policy had a personal side to it that was not entirely free of defects.

In addition, Palmerston's statecraft exhibited a more marked propensity for "brinkmanship" than any of his predecessors at the Foreign Office, especially Aberdeen. That is, as evidenced by his utterances concerning the Mehemet Ali affair, the Spanish Marriages dispute, and the issues which demanded resolution in 1848 and 1849 (such as the Schleswig-Holstein Question and when Chartists appealed to Lamartine for aid), Lord Palmerston was quite ready to speak out boldly with bluntness whenever he believed British interests were affected. He did not hesitate to give clear warning to the other powers when he deemed it necessary, and, as in the Eastern Question in 1849, he was quite willing, when permitted, to back up his demands with British naval might. In essence, Palmerston's foreign policy was stamped with the imprint of his strong determination.

However, for too long Palmerston's intellect has been dismissed as superficial or too concerned with only immediate interests.³ Rather,

the evidence suggests that in forming his foreign policy Henry John Temple had a very real long-range objective ever before him: Britain's well-being. In 1848 the British Foreign Secretary allowed no other consideration to interfere with his mission of safeguarding Britain's fundamental interests. The theoretical basis for Palmerston's diplomacy was the concept of the continental balance of power. Palmerston perceived in it the means by which Britain's political and economic interests would remain viable.

For Lord Palmerston diplomacy was no mere game, but the means by which Britain raised her voice in the world. Palmerston directed his intellect toward mastering the myriad details and facts relative to international issues, which continuously fell before him as he opened his daily bundle of dispatches. However, the flippancy Palmerston often displayed, as in his alleged quip about not remembering the details of the Elbe Duchies dispute, tended to obscure the fact that he usually had an abiding grasp of issues which included all facets--political, geographic, military, economic, legal, and social. Engaged in a very personal style of diplomacy, Palmerston endeavored to keep the details of his diplomatic acts concealed from the prying eyes of his contemporaries, such as Queen Victoria, and this practice further obscured Palmerston's talents and long hours of toil on Britain's behalf. Thus, his popular image as a light-hearted, witty socialite was only partially accurate.

Moreover, his common sense enabled him, for the most part, to cut through issues and to succeed in the business he was about. His intellect was attuned to action and finding practical solutions to international problems.

True, Palmerston's methods were pragmatic and that of a realpolitiker, but the fundamental basis of his diplomacy, the balance of power, and the underlying goal of his efforts, Britain's interests, remained constant. Moreover, in terms of economic theory, in 1848 Palmerston espoused the laissez-faire doctrines he had learned as a youth under Dugald Stewart. His displeasure with Prussia's Zollverein stemmed from his own economic orientation as an advocate of free trade as well as from the very real barrier it presented to British exports. Palmerston embraced the common element present in both the balance of power concept and laissez-faire economics: freedom of action--a salient trait of his diplomacy.

The evidence also shows that Lord Palmerston's aristocratic turn of mind bore significantly on his general approach to diplomacy in 1848-1849. Because Palmerston detested revolutions because they challenged upper-class interests, the general trend of his diplomacy can be seen as an effort to ensure the continuation of rule from above. Even in Italy where on the surface it seemed as if he was advocating the cause of Italian liberalism, his major aim was to create a strong monarchy, not a republic, capable of maintaining social stability and able to serve as a buffer between France and Austria. Stability on the international and national levels worked to the benefit of the ruling class, and in his judgment the existing rulers alone would preserve stability. Moreover, he probably genuinely believed that Austria would be strengthened by giving up the Italian drain on her resources. Similarly, he supported Lamartine only to avoid a more radical leader in France. Unfortunately

for Palmerston, Victoria did not share such a pragmatic approach to foreign relations.

In summation, it can be concluded that Lord Palmerston's foreign relations with the great powers were of vital importance not only to Britain's position in the world, but also to the outcome of the Revolutions of 1848 and 1849. Palmerston preserved Britain's paramount position; he moved closer to France to put a brake on French revolutionary excesses and to stabilize the balance of power. He warned Lamartine not to support revolutionary elements either from the British Isles or among the émigrés in Paris.

Also, Palmerston adroitly blunted revolutionary impulses elsewhere. In Italy, as noted, he supported an expanded north Italian state headed by a monarch, Charles Albert, rather than a republic, and he opposed the liberal desire for unification of the entire Italian peninsula. Furthermore, Palmerston steadfastly opposed German unification attempts by means of the Gagern-Arnim plan, which also included the liberation of Poland. In addition, the British foreign secretary's mediation of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute ultimately amounted to a denial of German national-liberal aspirations for incorporating the Elbe Duchies into a larger, unified German state.

Palmerston's treatment of the Hungarian revolution is yet another example of his desire to thwart the unstabilizing character of continental revolution. Palmerston gave moral support to the Hungarians only after their cause was lost, and he had secretly urged the Russians to help the Austrians to end the Hungarian uprising as quickly as possible. Palmerston

clearly wanted to maintain the territorial integrity of the Austrian Empire, except south of the Alps in Italy where he believed Austria's presence was a source of weakness rather than strength.

Palmerston was especially astute in perceiving that, unlike the revolutions of 1830, the upheavals of 1848 could not be contained within the normal channels of diplomatic activity. For example, employment of the international conference, so successful in solving the Belgian question, would have been of little value in the unstable environment of 1848 where the stability of so many European states was questionable. By April 1848 Palmerston had realized that it was in Britain's best interests to link up with that other remaining stable great power, Russia. As Palmerston states, Britain and Russia were the two remaining "upright" powers and were, therefore, responsible for insuring the stability and peace of Europe. Although temporary in nature, the accommodation between Britain and Russia represented a formidable barrier to the aspirations of continental liberals and nationalists, especially in Central Europe. Both Palmerston and Nesselrode were determined to retain the shape of the Vienna settlement.

The evidence indicates that the general orientation of Lord Palmerston's foreign policy in 1848, though seemingly liberal at first examination, was, upon closer analysis, conservative in nature. As has been noted, Palmerston was intent upon preserving British interests through maintenance of the continental balance of power, and, although he was willing to support moderate reforms from above, he would not support revolutionary

changes which threatened the general disposition of the great powers. In this sense, Lord Palmerston's foreign policy in 1848 should be counted among the factors which contributed to the failure of the Revolutions of 1848 and 1849.

As Palmerston saw it, the best interests of Britain, of his own class, and, not least, his still uncertain career were simultaneously served by the various moves he made in 1848 and 1849. Palmerston ensured that England did not fall into the dilemma which George Bernard Shaw later described when he wrote, "The nation which lets its duty get on the opposite side of its interests is lost." ⁴ At the close of 1849 Great Britain was still the pre-eminent power in the world and Palmerston still occupied the Foreign Office.

CHAPTER VIIINOTES

¹Palmerston to Ponsonby, Panshanger, September 9, 1849, Ashley, II, 105-107.

²Southgate, The Passing..., pp. 272-273.

³Lorne, p. 221. Bagehot, pp. 216-217.

⁴George Bernard Shaw, The Man of Destiny, Complete Plays with Prefaces (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1963), I, 743. The play was first performed in Croydon, England in 1897. See Shaw, I, 695.

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