

**CONTEXT, CONTAINMENT AND CONVERSATION MODEL:
A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S
HOSTAGE AND BARRICADE RESOLUTION STRATEGIES**

by

HUGH M. MCGOWAN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
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
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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

ABSTRACT**CONTEXT, CONTAINMENT AND CONVERSATION MODEL:
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Hugh M. McGowan

Advisor: Professor Barry Spunt

The primary focus of this study is whether hostage and barricade incidents that are resolved violently differ from incidents that are resolved without violence. And if they do differ, a subordinate focus is which variables are most predictive of a violent or nonviolent resolution. This study contains statistical analysis of data from a sample of incidents from the files of the New York City Police Department's Hostage Negotiation Team. Four case studies will also be presented to illustrate some of the dynamics encountered in hostage and barricade incidents. Finally, a summary, conclusions and implications for future research will be offered.

This study departs from past research by utilizing a non-traditional contextual model for understanding hostage and barricade incidents. Previous researchers employed a motivational model with the primary focus on the offender to the exclusion of the other

players in these incidents (hostage and police). This research uses a phenomenological model which places emphasis on context rather than motive. This model allows researchers to identify and separate the interactions designated as context, containment and conversation, and the hostage-taking phenomenon can be probed and resolution outcome predicted with greater accuracy. This research will provide an appropriate framework to evaluate, interpret and understand these volatile situations.

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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

Introduction: Hostage and Barricade Situations

For over a century the police subculture has fascinated countless writers, scholars and ordinary citizens (Muir, 1977). The workaday world most people are familiar with differs significantly from the environment the police inhabit and in which they interact (Muir, 1974; Reuss-Ianni, 1983; Klockers, 1985). Being able to observe and understand this exotic "other world" can be spellbinding and exciting for the average reader (Sexton, 1998; Wambaugh, 1989). Rubinstein says that "despite the attention of countless writers, reporters, and scholars, our understanding of what ... police work is, remains murky" (1973, p.ix). Using the fictional method, many authors have offered glimpses to a very broad reading public. Among recent nonfiction writers, whose books look back on lengthy careers in police work, are such high-ranking police professionals as Daryl Gates (1993), retired Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), and William Bratton (1998) and Bernard Kerik (2001) both retired, Commissioners of the New York City Police Department (NYPD).

New procedures or innovations in policing are not always welcomed or long lasting. Some initiatives advanced by police executives are in reaction to negative press reports, and are usually too short-lived to receive a comprehensive examination or evaluation. As a rule, once the media attention is focused elsewhere, the new initiative will be neglected or abandoned altogether and the police managers go back to policing as usual (Sherman, 1983; Bratton & Knobler, 1998). However one strategy developed in the early 1970's is a notable exception to the rule. In fact, it is so widely accepted that many mistakenly believe that it has been around for much longer than the actual 30 years of its existence. Commonly called hostage negotiation, this strategy has become widely accepted in the United States and is the

focus of this study.

Focus of Study

This study will examine the hostage takers or barricaded individuals in these incidents and will show how hostages and police, in their different roles, influence the resolution of such incidents. The study will also isolate the situational variables that influence their resolution and affect the probability that a stand-off will conclude peacefully or violently.

Incidents of hostage-taking and barricade situations are unusual events that usually generate an immediate police response, a large deployment of personnel and equipment over an extended time period, and the ever-present potential of serious injury or death for hostages, residents and pedestrians, the hostage-taker or barricaded individual, and the police. To add to the drama, print and television media personnel are drawn to the scene, eager for interviews with participants and witnesses. Such interviews are often fed via a live satellite-uplink to radio and television stations' news desks, which treat such events as important news stories. When news of the incident is broadcast over the radio and television, spectators often congregate at the scene and the control of the hordes of spectators and media personnel can become a significant police problem (Gladis, 1979; Goodman, 1990). The longer the incident goes on, the more police resources are needed at the scene and the fewer police resources that are available to respond to other emergencies.

The taking of hostages is not some new phenomena. Throughout history, people have been taking one another captive (Laqueur, 1987). An early hostage taking incident is reported in the Bible at Genesis 14, when Lot, Abram's nephew, is captured by the army of four kings

(Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986). An even earlier mention can be found in Greek mythology where Persephone, the daughter of the goddess Demeter, was abducted by Hades, the king of the underworld. Demeter whose fury has destroyed all the crops on earth, turns after lengthy but fruitless negotiations, to the Olympian deities for assistance. Zeus, under great pressure to achieve a breakthrough and restore the crops, delegates Eros as his "hostage negotiator." After some time Eros succeeds in effecting a compromise which permits Persephone to return to earth each Spring as long as she travels back to Hades each Fall. Thus, Greek mythology explains why crops bloom in the Spring and die in the Fall. Incidentally, Persephone, who initially resisted Hades' advances, later fell in love and married her abductor which is, perhaps, the first example of what is now called the "Stockholm Syndrome" (Rahe et al, 1990). Historically, hostage taking usually involved holding people as a guarantee for payment or as security against war or attack (Sick, 1990; Anderson, 1993). During the build-up to the 1991 Gulf War involving Iraq, CNN made the West aware that Saddam Hussein was holding foreign nationals, including children, as hostages whom he would harm if he were to be attacked.

Unresolved Issues

Over the last 30 years many American and European police departments have developed policies and procedures to control and resolve these incidents with a large degree of success (Nassau County Police Department, 1995; Schroeder, et al, 1995; Albanese & Mohandie, 1995; McMains & Mullins, 1995; Peak, 1997; Noesner, 1999; Loudon 1999; NYPD, 2000a). However most of the data available to police commanders, who are tasked with the resolution of such incidents, has been anecdotal in nature. Past research on these

incidents has tended to be psychological in orientation with the focus on the hostage-taker or barricaded subject (Ellison & Buckhout, 1981; Mohandie & Duffy, 1999). Standard operating procedures for controlling these incidents have been formulated through a trial and error process based on the particular agency's experiences with individual cases. While these procedures have been developed and applied in many such incidents, there has been an absence of quantitative analysis to evaluate their effectiveness (Basedow, 1991).

The general policy of police agencies both in the United States, and other nations, has been to employ containment and negotiation strategies to hostage or barricade events. This decision is viewed as an automatic response by many outside the law enforcement community. However, inside the police subculture, some serious questions have been raised. Many police agency heads consider the cost and expenditure of resources involved with negotiations as unnecessary and, in fact, a poor response, except in the most extreme cases (Head, 1988; Gates, 1993; Douglas & Olshaker, 1995). As time goes by, this belief has gained adherents in the police community. David Soskis and Clinton Van Zandt (1986) remind us that in the Genesis 14 hostage situation Abram's solution, the "...use of 318 selected men to rescue Lot, may have been the first SWAT team in recorded history, and serves to remind us that the tactical force option remains the preferred one in many circles" (Moorehead, 1980; Jacobsen & Astor, 1991; Davis, 1993).

The 1974 response by the LAPD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to the Symbionese Liberation Army siege; the 1981 Philadelphia Police Department handling of the "Move" group; the handling of the 1992 Ruby Ridge incident by the federal authorities; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and FBI response at

Waco's 1993 Branch Davidian siege; these are prime examples of cases that continue to be highly controversial because of their extremely violent resolution (Morris, 1975; FBI Academy, 1981; Marimow, 1985; Reavis, 1995; Sisk, 1999; Clines, 2000). Over the years, the American public has witnessed many such dramas played out on live television. They are usually followed by a panel of "experts" who will try to provide insight into what happened, why it took place and what it means to the larger society. Inherent in most of these incidents is the question whether negotiations or tactical action would have brought about a less lethal outcome (Davis, 1993; Seper, 1999; Yardley & Milloy, 2000). Although Congressional hearings have been held and independent investigations conducted, it is highly unlikely that this issue will ever be authoritatively resolved to everyone's satisfaction (Egan, 1999; Will New Inquiry, 1999).

A second issue frequently encountered by police departments throughout the country involves incidents of domestic or family violence. Until very recently, it was the policy of most American police departments not to make an arrest whenever a domestic matter was involved (Cardarelli, 2002). Indeed, in most incidents, no police or hospital reports were officially filed (Mechanic, 1996). If the same type of injury or violence involved strangers, the police would be called to the scene, immediately arrest the party who committed the assault and present the case to the district attorney or state prosecutor without delay. However, if the parties were living together, whether married or not, or had lived together any time in the past, the criminal process was deemed to be an inappropriate way to resolve these incidents (Sontog, 2002).

Often the only available recourse for the abused or assaulted spouse, in most cases

a woman, was to personally present the matter in Family or Domestic Relations Court (Rennison,2003). Usually, the court did little other than issue an order of protection, which seldom resolved the matter and sometimes made it worse. It was only when the behavior was finally reclassified as a criminal matter that police departments were forced to arrest abusers and courts were mandated to imprison those convicted of domestic violence (Strandberg,1998). By mobilizing the American public, women have started to gain greater protection and equality in the domestic relations area and to be treated with more respect in the criminal justice system (Bayley, 1994; Rosenfield, 2002; Grover et al, 2003). Thus, it is no longer legally permissible for men to use relatively unrestrained physical force in domestic situations to "maintain discipline" in the family (Collins & Flewelling, 1991; Roberts, 1996). Abused and battered women now have court orders that must be enforced, and police officers have limited discretion about whether or not to arrest abusers. One unfortunate result of these changes is an increase in domestic violence hostage situations many police departments have seen.

Many incidents of domestic violence do not result in a serious assault or homicide. However, recent studies show that almost 2,000 deaths yearly are attributed to the victim's present or former intimate partner (Mechanic, 1996; Roberts, 1996; Intimate Partners, 2002; Domestic Homicide, 2004). According to a recent National Violence Against Women Survey, approximately 4.5 million persons in the United States were physically assaulted by their domestic partners in one recent year (Rennison & Welchans, 2000; Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000). The FBI became aware of this linkage between domestic violence and hostage incidents and alerted police departments nationwide (Fuselier, Van Zandt, & Lanceley,

1991). The FBI has cautioned police departments that a negotiated surrender is possible, but they also deem it "unlikely" that such an incident will end in a peaceful resolution. How then are the police to respond? Are there any negotiation techniques or special weapons and tactics (SWAT) that can prevent a violent outcome (Aderibigbe, 1997; Rau & Danaher, 1997; Menkel-Meadow, 2002)?

Incidents of child abuse and/or neglect are another problematic issue frequently encountered by the police (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). When such problems are reported to the authorities, the child or children are usually removed from the home and placed in some kind of shelter or foster care until the Family Court or Child Welfare Agency is convinced that the child no longer is in danger. Removal of the child usually is executed with the reluctant approval of the parent(s). However, if the social worker's request for cooperation is denied, the police are called to the scene, and this tense situation may result in a hostage or barricade situation. These incidents are often accompanied by a threat to murder the hostage and commit suicide if the police do not go away. Obviously, the police cannot just go away. They are expected to resolve these incidents within a reasonable time frame in a nonviolent manner, if possible. While such goals are commendable, they are often impossible to achieve.

In some hostage and barricade situations, another dynamic may play a role. Recently the media has publicized incidents which are often referred to as "suicide by cop" or "police-assisted suicides" (Scoville, 1998; Kennedy et al, 1998, Wilson, 2003). The incidents involve persons bent on suicide confronting police officers in a manner likely to provoke a lethal defensive reaction by the police. It has become a growing concern for police agencies yet,

many are reluctant to discuss the problem for fear that publicity might lead to copycat episodes (Scoville, p. 37-38). There are no hard statistics on the frequency of these incidents, but some experts believe that of the approximately 600 fatal police involved shootings in an average year, 10 percent are probably provoked by men and women who are determined to cause their own death (Feuer, 1998). While law enforcement agencies have been aware of suicide-by-cop incidents for years, researchers are just beginning to understand the combination of despair, self-hatred, violence and rage that seem to underlie these episodes (Officer's Research, 2004). Dr. Karl Harris, a former California police officer with a Ph.D. in psychology, is credited with being the first to identify this phenomenon. Since there has been little research in this area, with the exception of a study conducted in British Columbia, by researchers from the Harvard Medical School, there is disagreement on what motivates a person to die by this method. Cowardice, religious prohibitions against suicide, and concern over insurance policies have been suggested (DiVasto et al, 1992). In a 1998 New York Times article "Drawing A Bead On A Baffling End-Game: Suicide By Cop", Alan Feuer reported that it was a common belief that "...if you're shot by an officer, you're the victim and the officer is the perpetrator."

The police seem powerless to prevent becoming involved in this type of suicide. Dean Scoville of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department says that almost every police officer at one time or another will confront the loud and belligerent drunk who challenges the cop to shoot him. Often, these individuals bring about the confrontation to play "chicken" with a cop. Many times they are only attempting to get a rise out of the officer, and see if they can scare him. If pushed too far, the officer may feel compelled to shoot. Such incidents can

confuse the issue and add a degree of uncertainty about whether this is a true suicide by cop, or a provocation that was pushed too far (Scoville, 1998, p.40). The phenomenon of suicide by cop in hostage or barricade situations seems to be encountered more frequently. What the police is often unable to determine is whether the hostage-taker or barricaded individual is playing "chicken" with them, or whether he is trying to provoke a police-assisted suicide.

Minimizing the odds that the police will have to use deadly force against a suicidal person depends on the context of the incident (Scoville, p.42; Olmeda & Moritz, 1997). Among the concerns to be weighed is: the subject's determination; the weapons involved; the danger to hostages, police, residents and bystander; containment of the individual; and the time to negotiate. The psychological impact in the aftermath of such a tactical situation can be far-reaching (McQuillan,1997; Gallo,2004). Incident commanders, negotiators, and tactical officers can stay traumatized a long time after the incident. Dierdre Anglin, a professor with U.S.C.'s Department of Emergency Medicine, notes that historical inhibitors make it difficult to conduct research on the subject of suicide by cop or police-assisted suicide. Not only has the problem of some criteria for classifying a death as suicide by cop not been established but some law enforcement officials have taken an ostrich-like approach of denying that there is a problem. She asserts that the problem is out there and it won't go away. (Scoville, 1998, p.44). The NYPD has encountered the suicide-by-cop phenomenon and three of these types of hostage situations that ended with violent resolutions are a part of this study.

Organization of the Report

An analysis of the parties who have a significant role in these hostage and barricade

situations is long overdue. Psychology has certainly helped in understanding these incidents but it has not illuminated the processes, structures or context of barricade situations (Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Detrick, 2000). With the exception of the Branch Davidians in Waco or the MOVE incident in Philadelphia, a thorough examination of the dynamics of these situations has not been forthcoming. Limited access to official records and a lack of usable data are some of the reasons offered to explain this failure. This study has overcome some of those problems, and it is hoped that the methodology and data analysis used herein can lead to a better understanding of these situations, as well as assist in the training and policy making.

Policy makers, academics, and other researchers should realize that there are instances where the psychology terminologies have limited application and that other points of view should be examined. This requires isolating the variables and determining which ones affect the resolution of the situation. Evaluating an incident's resolution involves deciding whether the incident ended violently or nonviolently and furthermore determining the extent to which the behaviors of the hostage-taker, hostage(s), police, or a combination of these behaviors played a role in the incident's final outcome. This study will examine the context of these interactions and the tactics that influence the resolution. This will permit researchers to have a deeper understanding of how these critical incidents are resolved. If it can be determined who was injured, what degree of injury was suffered and who inflicted the injury, judgements regarding the efficacy and reasonableness of the approach taken can be made. This study will utilize a logistic regression model to analyze the effect the various factors have on the resolution of a hostage-taking or barricade incident.

A review of the literature will provide the contextual reference for the examination

of the police response to and tactics for the resolution of hostage and barricade situations. Over time, the subjects in these situations have changed. Criminal types once predominated but now more frequently the situations involve either the mentally ill or the growing number of homeless men and women. Many social scientists, researchers and criminal justice administrators question whether the police are the proper agency to be involved and to what extent the criminal justice system should be involved with this non-criminal segment of society. Mental health response and homeless outreach teams are being considered by some jurisdictions to aid with this social problem. In the meantime, the police will often be both the first responders and the agency of last resort (Gentz & Goree, 2003). This research will shed light on some of the variables that can help to predict the resolution and suggest tactics that can avoid violence.

A primary focus of this dissertation is whether hostage and barricade incidents that are resolved violently differ from incidents that are resolved without violence. And if they do differ, a subordinate focus is identification of those variables most predictive of a violent or nonviolent resolution.

A data analysis of a sample of incidents from the files of the NYPD's HNT will be conducted. Before isolating the predictive variables, it is necessary to elaborate on some of the problems that have been encountered with these incidents so that the reader can appreciate the complexities of these situations. The traditional motivational model is not adequate to explain the dynamics of these incidents and its failure to include other participants, especially the police, severely limits its ability to predict the resolution.

It is important to define certain concepts and necessary to exclude some related areas.

First, a hostage situation refers to an incident where one or more persons are held against their will as a security for the fulfillment of certain terms (McMains & Mullins, 1996). Barricade incidents are situations in which one or more persons, without hostages, isolate themselves in a protected position, and have or threaten the use of a weapon that can harm themselves or others (Pierson, 1980). Included in this category would be suicidal individuals who threaten to jump from a high place if the police try to take them into custody. Second, hostage and barricade incidents involve a location known to the responsible law enforcement agency. Excluded from this study are the crimes of kidnaping, abduction and custodial interference where the location of the victim is known only to the perpetrator.

Domestic or international terrorist-type hostage or hijacking situations, kidnaping, child stealing or parental abduction, and prison and jail riots involving hostage-taking will not be examined. So many different dynamics are involved in those situations that they are best left for a separate examination (Jenkins, 1979; U.S. Dept. of State, 1983; Fuselier, VanZandt & Lancelly, 1989; Leach, 1989; Grossman, 1995; Reavis, 1995; Wills, 1995; Strentz & Barzelallo, 1996; Brooke, 1997; Johnson & Girdner, 2001; Miller, 2002). The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are such staggering and far-reaching events that more time and research are needed before any definitive findings can be made about what these events mean for the nation and for law enforcement. New York City, which bore the brunt of these attacks, is still in a recovery phase in the months following the destruction of the World Trade Center buildings. The NYPD has been on a heightened state of alert since that day for any other terrorist activity but at the same time the police have been called upon to investigate the same types of criminal acts that occurred prior to September 11, 2001. The

NYPD's Compstat crime-fighting program created to measure and map serious crime in the city has not been abandoned in light of the terrorist attacks. In fact, it has been expanded to include hundreds of indicators that helps police commanders to calculate how effectively NYPD units are working (Rashbaum, 2002). In the days immediately following September 11, 2001, criminal activity was at an all-time low but, as time passed and the city returned to a more normal existence, criminality also resumed. While this report will not focus on terrorist hostage taking, the results of this study could have some insight on and prediction value in that important area.

In this study, a distinction is made between the terms *violence* and *force*. *Violence* is the unlawful use of physical force to injure or kill another person. The police are empowered by law to use necessary force under specific circumstances to gain compliance or in the protection of others or themselves (Hall, 1993). Therefore, a situation ending in *violence* means that unlawful force was being used or threatened. Since the police are obligated to prevent or terminate violence, when they do so the physical force is considered lawful (Hunt, 1988). For this study, when the police use physical force to overpower the offender it will be considered a nonviolent resolution. However, in those instances when the police use deadly physical force, although lawful, it will nevertheless be categorized as a violent resolution to a hostage or barricade situation. Although many different law enforcement agencies can be involved in hostage and barricade situations, the general term police will be used to describe all of them. Where it is necessary to be more precise, the actual agency involved will be identified.

The statistical analysis will consist of the following stages: the selection of the

sample, collection of the data, the construction of the code book and code sheets, the actual coding of the data, and the statistical analysis of the coded data using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. The frequencies of all of the pertinent variables will be displayed in table form. An explanation will be provided in the text on how the variables were determined and used and/or modified to test the hypotheses. Mini-histories of incidents will be provided to illustrate some of the hostage and barricade situations encountered by the police. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for future research will be offered.

CHAPTER TWO - REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

Much of the scholarly literature on hostage and barricade situations is written by mental health professionals or law enforcement personnel with a psychology background (Lancely, 1979; Strentz, 1983; Powell, 1989; Borum & Strentz, 1992; Logan, 2001). As a result, the police have traditionally viewed these encounters as problems of proper identification of typed and profiled suspects (Reiser & Sloane, 1981). However, the psychological orientation tends to remove both rational and irrational actors from their social contexts. The mental health community uses personality types as predictors of behavior based on their psychological characteristics (Fuselier, 1981; Schlossberg, 1996; Violanti, 1996). If the emphasis is on the *personality types* of the person barricaded, what *personality types* are on the police side of the barricade? What motivates the police in these tense, and often life and death, situations? Much of the relevant literature focuses on the mental state of the perpetrators and neglects the other two groups of actors - the police and the hostages.

When these writers allude to the hostages in these situations, they are usually designated as "bargaining tools." Hostages may be subject to the "Stockholm Syndrome" which refers to a highly publicized 1973 bank holdup in Stockholm, Sweden, in which two men held three women and one man hostage for six days. During captivity, the victims bonded with their captors and eventually saw the police as trying to kill them (Jenkins, 1975; Hacker, 1976; Wesselius & DeSarno, 1983; Bolz, 1991). These feelings are frequently reciprocated by their captor(s) (Strentz, 1979; Strentz, 1991; Grossman, 1995; Fuselier, 1999). On the other hand, in this same literature, the police are usually presented as rational

actors, acting logically and with due deliberation (Bohl, 1992). Seldom, except in novels or made-for-television movies, does one get any sense of the dynamics that go on behind police lines and such descriptions are rarely accurate (Schlossberg, 1979; Fusselier, 1986; DeMille, 1990; Van Zandt, 1991; Deaver, 1995).

Since the 1970's, mental health professionals and academics have actively assisted the law enforcement community in understanding and resolving hostage and barricade situations. Many of the articles written on hostage and barricade situations have a psychological orientation and favor the case study and narrative over the statistical analysis approach. During this same time period, there has been an increase in the media's reporting of hostage and barricade situations (FBI Academy, 1999).

A Climate of Animosity

The law enforcement community and the academic community have not always enjoyed a close and harmonious relationship. Through most of the 1960's and 1970's many in the law enforcement community felt that some academics and intellectuals were siding with or overly sympathetic toward the criminal and radical elements of society (Hassel, 1979, p.2). In law enforcement there a feeling that those academics and scholars were insulated in their "ivory towers" and willing to overlook any offense committed by criminal and radical elements because "society" was to blame for their behavior. On many college campuses radical groups that advocated violent means to achieve their goals were invited to receptions and speaking engagements. The police, many of whom reflected basic American working-class values and mores, felt that the behavior and tactics of student radicals and civil rights activists were destructive of all that they held sacred. College takeovers, flag burnings,

draft card burnings and Viet Nam war protests, for example, were seen by the police as a “slippery slope” that could lead to government buildings being bombed and the eventual overthrow of the American government. On the other hand, a small group of academics habitually portrayed the police as untrustworthy “pigs” and a tool of oppression who were trampling on the Constitutional free speech and the assembly rights of citizens. The violent confrontations between police and demonstrators during college takeovers, and the pitched street battles at the 1968 Democratic Party Convention in Chicago were repeatedly characterized by some behaviorists, sociologists, political scientists and others academics as police overreaction. Many studies, professional papers and Op-Ed pieces written by these academics were highly critical of such police actions and of the police community in general. Confrontations between police and demonstrators, particularly those broadcast on television, were seen by some academics as proof that the police were brutal and oppressive (Hassel, 1979, p.1). The law enforcement community was slow to recognize that the demonstrators’ main purpose was to focus the eye of the television camera upon the use of force by the police, thus spotlighting “police brutality” as a major issue and increasing disrespect for the police. Needless to say, this climate did not lend itself to much positive dialogue between the police and the intellectuals. Neither police nor academics were solely to blame for this mutual misunderstanding. Perhaps because of limited access to the police community, scholars and intellectuals, had little direct knowledge of the tremendous stresses encountered by police officers, often on a regular basis (Hassel, 1979, p.2).

A Climate of Cooperation

Responsible persons on both sides of this conflict were disheartened by the state of

affairs and struggled to bring about a reproachment. Arthur Neiderhoffer (1967), an NYPD police lieutenant and scholar, attempted to demystify some of the mystery and mystique of police culture. He invited his colleagues in the academic community to join him in this fertile field of study. He also encouraged police officers to acquire academic and professional standing with advanced degrees, and to use their education to help make law enforcement careers more reputable and professional. Executives in the police hierarchy, such as Patrick V. Murphy, not only welcomed academic research of the police community (Cohen, 1972; Cohen & Chaiken, 1972; Cohen, 1980) but he also made it possible for in-service police officers, including this author, to arrange their work schedule so that they could pursue undergraduate and graduate degrees. Commissioner Murphy was convinced that an educated police officer would be more likely to remain in the law enforcement community, and thus help to initiate positive changes, especially as they rose to positions of authority (Murphy & Plate, 1977).

New York City's Response to Terrorist Threat

The NYPD conceived its Hostage Negotiation program as an innovative and flexible response to such disasters as the Attica Prison uprising in 1971 and the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972 (Schreiber, 1973; Bolz and Hershey, 1980; Ressler & Shachtman, 1992; Strollo & Wills-Raferty, 1994). NYPD officials were concerned that New York City could be an attractive target for international terrorist activity, especially since it is where the United Nations had its headquarters. If a terrorist group were looking for a world stage and extensive media coverage, New York City would be a prime candidate (Culley, 1974). Moreover, in the early 1970s, law enforcement officials at all levels of American government

feared that the international wave of terrorist-inspired kidnaping, airplane highjackings and hostage takeovers would eventually emigrate to the American mainland (Cooper, 1981).

Before 1973, the typical police response to barricade or hostage situations was to notify personnel and have them respond to the location of the siege with all available firepower. When the police had mobilized sufficient forces at the scene, an ultimatum was delivered to the hostage taker or barricaded subject. Its message was that if the perpetrator did not immediately surrender, the police would come in shooting (Pierson, 1980; Bahn, 1989). By following this standard operating procedure, the criminal or barricaded suspect was sure to be overpowered or killed during the assault. However, there was a serious risk that the hostage, innocent bystanders or police officers might also be killed or injured in the process. Criminals caught in the act of committing a crime were the most commonplace cause of a hostage incident because they often seized hostages when they saw that all avenues of escape had been blocked. They believed that using hostages as a shield gave them a margin of safety and might prevent the police from assaulting the location to end the situation. The fact that a criminal was holding a hostage was sometimes used as justification for a police assault on a location. Indeed, holding off an assault under these circumstances would have been unthinkable.

New York City's Hostage Plan

In September 1972, New York City Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy, fearing a Munich-like hostage-taking by terrorists, ordered Simon Eisdorfer, Chief of the Special Operation Division, to form a committee with representatives from various police units to study this phenomenon and to make recommendations on how the Department should

respond (Gettinger, 1983). In a few weeks the Committee's final report was prepared and it recommended the following course of action: containment of the incident; evacuation of civilians from the area; stricter control of police personnel; establish firearms discipline; and, establishing a dialogue with the hostage-taker from the onset. The Police Commissioner approved the plan for handling hostage situations with paramount emphasis on co-ordinated action, allowing time to establish a dialogue and the preservation of human life in place of ultimatums and threats to use deadly force, the NYPD substituted a deliberate policy of allowing time to pass while conducting discussions with the hostage taker or barricaded subject (Cawley, 1974). The Operational Plan included the statement that "... this hostage plan contains a unique innovation that is a departure from the traditional police response to such [hostage] situations." Allowing time to pass while the police were attempting to communicate with the hostage-taker and trying to resolve the situation without the need for a tactical assault was an authentic innovation (Codd, 1977).

First Test of New York's Hostage Plan

In January 1973, a hostage situation developed when the police interrupted an armed robbery at John and Al's Sporting Goods Store in Brooklyn, New York. Officers from the local precinct had responded to a silent holdup alarm triggered by an employee, and had been fired upon by the robbers. When additional officers responded, including Emergency Service Unit (ESU) personnel, the surrounding area was evacuated and ESU set up an inner perimeter around the store. Unlike ordinary patrol officers, ESU officers were armed with shotguns and rifles and they wore ballistic helmets and vests. During the initial confrontation, ESU Officer Steven Gilroy had been shot and killed and two precinct officers had been

wounded. After the perimeters were established, the robbers continued to fire at the police from inside the store, however the NYPD did not return fire. The hostage plan, approved by the Police Commissioner a few months earlier, was implemented. Forty-seven hours after the incident started and the first shots were fired, all of the hostages were released unharmed; no other police officers were injured, other than those killed or wounded at the outset; and the four hostage-takers were disarmed and taken into police custody. Months later, all the defendants were tried and found guilty of a multitude of charges, including the death of Officer Gilroy.

Shortly after the occurrence, an incident critique was conducted and it was the unanimous conclusion of the evaluators that the new hostage plan was sound and workable with one important exception. The original plan emphasized the importance of establishing and maintaining a dialogue with the hostage-taker(s) but it failed to specify *who* the police communicators or negotiators would be. As a result of the critique, the NYPD decided that personnel were to be identified, trained and designated as hostage negotiators. A selection process was started and twenty members of the Detective Bureau were trained for this new assignment. By April 1973, the NYPD's first Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT) was trained and functioning (Schlossberg & Freeman, 1974; Moorehead, 1980).

Selection and Training of Hostage Negotiators

The NYPD HNT was, and has remained an all volunteer unit comprising designated members of the Detective Bureau with the rank of detective, sergeant or lieutenant. The decision to use members of the Detective Bureau exclusively was based on a list of attributes developed by the members of the departments Psychological Services Unit who were serving

on Chief Eisdorfer's Committee. For example, the individuals selected should have extensive life experience and maturity. They should have competence in gathering and analyzing conflicting and confusing data, in conducting interviews with emotional subjects, and in interrogation of criminal suspects. These attributes are not only essential for any competent police negotiator, but they are also qualities that distinguish a successful detective from the average police officer. Detective assignments are usually case driven as compared to uniformed officers who are "radio-run" incident driven. Detectives are accustomed to spending long periods of time on one assignment. Detectives work in civilian clothes which fits in well with the crisis intervention notion of a non-hostile representation of authority when dealing with hostage-taker(s). Other police departments use different criteria in their HNT selection process but those previously mentioned remains the justification for the NYPD's decision to only use personnel from the Detective Bureau.

To qualify as a negotiator, an applicant must have an *Above Standards* or higher rating on their last three annual performance evaluations, a recommendation for this additional assignment from their commanding officer, a written and oral psychological evaluation, and a personal interview with the HNT Commander. If selected, the detective will be assigned to a four week training program specially designed for the HNT. The curriculum for this course includes: psychology, physical fitness, firearms training, electronic equipment familiarization, pursuit driving, emergency first aid, and a general overview of resources available within the NYPD (Culley, 1974). When the training course is completed, trainees are returned to their respective detective squads. When an incident occurs, HNT detectives are directed to respond, based on the location of the incident, duty schedule and

any special qualifications, such as language proficiency. HNT trained investigators voluntarily assume the additional duties of hostage negotiators and receive no additional compensation, except for the normal NYPD overtime provisions that govern officers required to work past their original duty schedule.

NYPD's Policy Changes

The 1970's and 1980's saw the Criminal Justice system trying to come to grips with problems not envisioned in an earlier time. A major issue facing law enforcement agencies was how to handle mentally disturbed individuals whom governmental policy and changed social attitudes had decided were no longer to be institutionalized. This led to the indiscriminate release of most of the nation's mentally ill patients from institutions back into the community, a policy now widely regarded as one that failed completely (Lyons, 1984; Levy, 2002). After all the finger pointing was done and the blame spread among politicians, civil libertarian lawyers and psychiatrists, its legacy still poses a major dilemma for American law enforcement. In September 1984, the NYPD confronted the problem head-on after the shotgunning death of Eleanor Bumpers, an elderly grandmother with a long history of mental illness. The indictment and trial of an on-duty ESU officer Steve Sullivan, and the media's severe criticism of the NYPD for mishandling the entire incident assured attention to the incident over a protracted period of months and years (NYPD Use of Force, 1984; NYPD Reels, 1985; Condon, 1985; Smith & Pollack, 1991).

At that time, the NYPD was untrained and ill equipped for dealing with psychologically disturbed individuals. There were few guidelines to decide who was mentally ill and what risk emotionally disturbed persons posed to themselves or others (NYPD, 1978;

Panzarella & Alicea, 1997). Indeed, mental health workers and police officers often disagreed on just how dangerous such persons were (Aquilera & Messick, 1978; Bootzin & Acocella, 1988; Rosenhan, 1988; Torrey, 1994; Kirschner, 1998; Steadman et al, 1998). In 1984, after the death of Mrs. Bumpers and as a response to these problems, the NYPD made a major policy change which mandated that a high-ranking officer (captain or above) must personally respond to the scene of incidents involving such persons and personally authorize any direct action. In addition, the HNT was directed to respond, confer with the mental health workers who were present at the location and assist the commander with the safe resolution of the incident. The order was issued "to place into operation reasonable safeguards to protect both uniform members ... and emotionally disturbed persons involved ..." (NYPD, 1984). This directive applied to emotionally disturbed individuals inside a home or premises and the large number of "street people" or homeless men and women who were exhibiting psychological symptoms. The HNT was also requested to assist with suicidal individuals who were added to the emotionally disturbed person (EDP) category (Basedow, 1991; DiVasto et al, 1992; Faberow, 1997; Wexler, 1998).

This change in policy caused great difficulty for the HNT. A training course on how to recognize and manage the loosely labeled EDP category was designed and new negotiators were added to handle the tenfold increase in call-ups. The challenge then and now is for negotiators to peacefully resolve these situations (Kirschner, 1999; Vanderpool, 2003; Wilson, 2003a). Additional training and reviewing of case studies are helpful for those police officers who are interacting on a daily basis with these problems (Gentz & Goree, 2003). However, it could be even more advantageous to examine past incidents using

meaningful variables, so as to help the police understand the dynamics of these incidents and, eventually, predict their outcome (Bootzin & Acocella, 1988; Noesner & Dolan, 1992; Romano, 1998; Jamison, 1999; McGowan & Zimmerman, 2001). Over time, the NYPD has created and modified guidelines for dealing with these situations (NYPD, 2000b). The NYPD Hostage Negotiations Organization and Tactical Guide continues to stress the need for proper planning and training of police personnel and warns, in the strongest possible terms, against impulsive or uncoordinated actions that could lead to the unnecessary loss of life (NYPD,1993).

Hacker's Contribution To Cooperative Effort

The law enforcement community and the entire criminal justice system have benefitted from the efforts of academics and practitioners who struggled to overcome the mistrust of the past thirty years. Frederick J. Hacker, who in 1976 wrote Crusaders, Criminals, Crazyies, was a major influence in this struggle. Hacker believed that the larger society would suffer if the barriers of traditional mutual mistrust between academics and police remained in place. He insisted that new ways of working together must be found, and law enforcement and behavioral science would benefit from the ensuing changes. In his introduction Hacker expressed this conviction:

"I believe that nonviolent ... solutions to inevitable conflicts must and can be found and that in the overwhelming majority of cases, recourse to violence represents only self-serving moral cowardice, lack of imagination, and a failure of knowledge and spirit (p.xvi).

Hacker subtitled his text "Terror And Terrorism In Our Time"and he characterized the 1970s as "...an age of terror" for the following reasons:

"Violence, threats, blackmail, and the fear they arouse are the conditions of our daily existence. We are threatened and we threaten. We are hostages of the nuclear balance of terror. We permit terrorists to obtain machine guns and manufacture the bombs with which they blow us to pieces; we give them heroes' welcomes in our most prestigious institutions; we surrender to them the use of our powerful mass media; and we are entertained by the spectacle of our own destruction... We talk violence, watch violence, fear violence, and we guide our lives accordingly... (p. ix).

Hacker's Motivational Model - Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies

Rather than just acquiescing to the condition of society and resigning himself to it, Hacker designed an interpretive model for understanding explosive symptomatic violence based on his clinical and forensic psychiatric practice and experience. He understood that the use of psychology and psychiatry to explain, interpret, and influence social and political events was not totally welcome. He noted that some had accused psychiatry of creating a myth in order to cure it. Hacker argued that mental illness is not the end product of any conspiracy (p.xiv). He says that sometimes mental illness is either deliberately or inadvertently misdiagnosed and on occasion, it can be feigned. Utmost simplicity, according to Hacker, is a utopian scientific ideal that is often achieved by simply leaving out that part of reality which contradicts a deceptively clear conclusion. Moreover, the complexity of reality demands the search for, and toleration of, real world ambiguities and contradictions (p. xiv). While Hacker does not advocate that law enforcement officers be replaced by psychology or sociology professors, he firmly believes that the knowledge and skills of these disciplines could and should be joined together in a working partnership for the benefit of the community (Reich, 1990).

Hacker's motive model of "Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies" as a typology for


hostage-takers has been utilized by many scholars. He uses these three prototype classifications: "Crusader" to refer to the rebel, revolutionary or social protestor; the "Criminal" for those individuals who acts unlawfully for their own profit and the "Crazies" to refer to those who suffer from an emotional imbalance or brain disorder (Hacker, p.9). In describing their motivations, Hacker details the following characteristics for each prototype:

Crusaders - are unselfish and sacrificial with a task-orientated thought processes; they are functionally rational but unconventional in terms of prevailing values. They have concrete and abstract goals; they seek attention, are dramatic, publicity-conscious and indifferent to high risk but realistic often in service of unrealistic ends.

Criminals - are selfish and self-protective with a task orientated thought processes; they are realistic with concrete goals which usually are personal and involve material gain. They are usually "understandable", and not psychologically orientated. They consider themselves professional and avoid high risk.

Crazies - are self-centered and sacrificial with thought processes that are highly personal, often non-rational or irrational, sometimes delusional. They have abstract goals. They are often incomprehensible but seeking help. Their actions are usually high risk (p.12-17).

Figure 2-1 can best illustrate Hacker's hostage-taking model with his three types of hostage-takers.



Hacker was not the first to identify hostage-takers using this type of labeling system. Culley, in the October 1974 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, states that Detective Harvey Schlossberg, an NYPD police officer who earned a Ph. D. in clinical psychology, developed profiles of the typical hostage-taker and found they fell into three broad categories:

“The *professional criminal* who has his escape blocked during the commission of a crime, the *psychotic* with a depraved mind, the *terrorist* or *fanatic* with a cause.”

These or similar terms are repeatedly found in hostage-taking literature and this motive-based method of incident classification was adopted by the FBI in the 1970's and have continued to be used as the model (Lanceley, 1979; Fuselier, 1981; Strentz, 1983; Hassel, 1987; Douglas & Olshaker, 1995). Even so, the FBI in a September 1975 article warns that: “... human motivation is intrinsically a multifaceted phenomenon and in many cases unclear, even to the subject himself, [and] some social scientists may consider this method less than exact” (FBI Academy, TRAMS Unit).

Schlossberg, rather than just providing a profile of a hostage-taker, states that “[h]ostage *situations* can be broken down into three basic types.” He lists the same three types of *individuals or hostage-takers* previously listed by Culley but admits that “labels have no real meaning beyond clinical classification (1979, pp.212-214). Schlossberg does offer some techniques for involving the three types of hostage-takers but his emphasis is placed on two basic principles: first, the hostage, in and of him or herself, has no value; and second, it is just as important for the hostage-taker as the police that the hostage situation does not become violent. He says the hostage is a tool for getting attention or an audience, and that in any violent confrontation, the victory will go to the police because they have more

personnel and more guns (Police Psychologist, 1977).

Schlossberg makes suggestions for police response procedures or first responders which he labels crisis intervention theory. He does not isolate predictive variables in these situations, probably in large part because of his reliance on a motivational model. He makes a prediction on the future of negotiations that might have sounded far-fetched in 1979 but actually occurred in 1985. He states that future law enforcement work would include psychological training similar to the relationship of first-aid training to medicine (p.220). After the Eleanor Bumpers shooting death, the NYPD, the New York City Department of Mental Health and the John Jay College of Criminal Justice jointly designed a 40 hour training program for ESU officers that consisted of classroom instruction and structured role playing. This course was designed to familiarize the police officers with the different manifestations of mental illness they might encounter in their daily work assignments and suggested tactics and communication techniques they could employ to gain compliance without resorting to deadly force. Actors trained in crisis intervention were used in the role-playing to make the training realistic and timely. The scenarios were based on actual incidents encountered by the NYPD and the officers were encouraged to try different techniques to arrive at a nonviolent resolution. In 1989, this training program was reorganized to include members of the HNT working with ESU officers. At the completion of the training attendees are certified as Emergency Psychological Technicians (EPT) by the sponsoring agencies. All members of ESU and HNT are now required to complete this training and this EPT program has received endorsements from several Psychological and Metal Health Associations (Pitt, 1986). Variations of this program have been adopted by

many police agencies. A recent article in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin explains how a training program similar to the NYPD's EPT certification course can vastly improve the skills used by police officers when responding to citizens with mental illness (Gentz & Goree, 2003, pp.14-18).

Therefore, if Schlossberg identified the initial profile of the hostage-taker, then Hacker formalized it into a model or template that had universal application. Hacker spells out how his motivational model works but he also offers suggestions on how best to utilize his model (p.239). Based on his theoretical insights and practical experiences Hacker recommends:

- a.) formation of an advisory task force consisting of highly trained professionals from various fields, but not confined to law enforcement, organized and permitted to start work immediately;
- b.) in special cases they could conduct the negotiations but, in any case, it should be mandatory for the decision makers to consult them and keep them informed of all details and relevant events;
- c.) the task force should have computerized data banks available to keep track of the outcome of previous events and countermeasure taken;
- d.) various negotiations techniques and strategies should be evaluated in terms of effectiveness and morality, who should negotiate, when and how and up to what limits;
- e.) empirical research data to assist in decision-making process should be provided.

In 1974 Hacker testified before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security (p.241). He recommended that a special task force should be formed and centrally located and be able to cross state and national borders whenever a situation arises. It should, at minimum, contain a law enforcement person, a psychologist, a sociologist or criminologist, a non-government lawyer, a media person, a linguist, a cultural anthropologist and others that would assist in the resolution of the crisis. Hacker believes this group would combine doers with thinkers and thus continue to promote a climate of cooperation between academics and law enforcement practitioners.

Crelinsten and Szabo's Collaborative Efforts

Ronald D. Crelinsten and Denis Szabo also supported Hacker's goal to mobilize academics and practitioners in a collaborative effort to address this problem. In 1979 Crelinsten and Szabo, published Hostage-Taking in which they said:

“The extension of scientific inquiry may favor more rational understanding in this field and consequently a more dispassionate and less panicky appraisal of hostage situations. The scientific community is traditionally concerned with theory and methodology. The practitioners not only have access to all data, but also are traditionally concerned with pragmatic, day-to-day problem-solving. Why should we not make an imaginative effort to combine everyone's interest and abilities to engage in this endeavor?”

The theme that unites their text is the relationship between theory and practice and the interface between research and policy (p.x). They believe that the following three steps could be the contribution of science and technology to the protection of society from the phenomenon of hostage-taking:

first, collect relevant information and data on the phenomenon;

second, interpret and evaluate the data using all the theoretical resources of natural

and behavioral science to present testable hypotheses for further research;

third, the multi disciplinary and comparative approach is indispensable in the collection and interpretation of facts and theories (p.ix).


Crelinsten and Szabo state that any hostage-taking model must ask the following question: what kinds of classification are most useful in achieving the goal of preventing or at least controlling a hostage situation? Therefore, depending on what one is attempting to understand or control, certain elements are recognized and sorted out in particular ways to develop particular typologies. The key question then is how to categorize hostage-taking phenomena to make the task of understanding less difficult.

They cite the NYPD hostage training program which divides offenders into Hacker's three categories of professional criminal, psychotics and terrorists. Obviously, they say, the demands and motives would vary for the three groups which would perhaps require different response strategies. Now, say Crelinsten and Szabo, a new term, not explicitly mentioned before, has arisen: "*motive*." "Motive is not observable, and it is merely a hypothetical construct derived from behavior" (p.14). They say that the motive element is often used in the psychiatric and legal field. Since their primary concern is with the acts committed, the police are rarely interested in motive. As a result, Crelinsten and Szabo conclude their discussion of typology with the statement that "...motive and demand are intimately related but... the same demand need not have the same motive in all cases" (p.14). Therefore, the reasoning behind any typology is that it facilitates an attack on the problem (Clinard & Quinney, 1973). In terms of prevention and/or control, a typology based on context or locale is the most useful rather than a typology based on motive.


Crelinsten and Szabo's Contextual Offender - Victim Model

Crelinsten and Szabo view Hacker's motivational model as inadequate for prediction purposes. They substituted a phenomenological model which places emphasis on context rather than motive (Spiegelberg, 1976; Stewart & Mickunas, 1990). They argued that two important steps must be taken before strategies can be developed for controlling hostage-taking. The problem should be broken down into its elements and then classified without attempting a causal explanation. If the Crelinsten and Szabo model is used to identify and separate the interactions between the various players that are occurring in these encounters, they will be in a better position to apply theory to practice (p.1). This type of analysis enables one to study the hostage-taking phenomenon in a non-motivational context and predict the resolution with greater accuracy.


Crelinsten and Szabo substitute "passive victim" and "active victim" in place of the terms hostage and the police. These replacement terms help to define clearly two basic elements which characterize a hostage situation. A hostage situation involves "a person or persons held against their will as a security for the fulfillment of certain terms." Thus, the hostage, or passive victim is a means to an end. The police, or active victim, can meet the demands of the hostage-taker. The *hostage-taker*, or *offender* (1), uses the *passive victim* or *hostage* (2) to apply pressure on the *active victim* or *police* (3). This is shown schematically in Figure 2-2.



Two other elements must be added to this picture to describe the relationship between the offender and his two victims. These elements are the *threat* (4) and the *demand* (5) and they are applied to the passive victim and the active victim, respectively. The one constant in hostage-taking is its triangular aspect with the involvement of three parties. In Figure 2-3, the triangular relationship becomes apparent.




When a sixth element, the *context* (6), is added which involves the interactions between the actors involved, the picture is completed and shown in Figure 2-4.



One point that emerges from this model is that the terms *active* and *passive* do not precisely describe the two kinds of victims. The implication of these terms is that only the active victim can determine the outcome of the situation. In fact, "the passive victim often can and does influence the final resolution" (Crelinsten & Szabo, p.4). The passive victim can overpower the offender or escape or convince the offender to release them and surrender (Bolz, 1987). The fact that the passive victim/hostage can influence the outcome in these and other ways makes it clear that the hostage is much more than just a "bargaining tool." This model also shows that the police are a victim of the hostage-taker and, as such, not always able to act rationally and with due deliberation. The dynamics of these situations can be seen

to be more complex using this model as compared to Frederick Hacker's motivational model.

In the Crelinsten and Szabo model, there is a direct and continuous relationship between the offender, the police/active victim and the hostage/passive victim. This relationship in context is displayed pictorially in Figure 2-5. This shows that the actions and interactions do not exist or operate independently, but rather, there is a direct and ongoing relationship between these players.



What this comparison displays is a typology that is radically different from Hacker's Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies motive based model. The motive element is not observable and is based on a construct derived from behavior and often used in psychiatric and legal perspectives. If limited to the motive orientation, the focus will be exclusively on the offender and the other players in these incidents will be neglected. Crelinsten and Szabo's parsimonious phenomenological model offers greater opportunity for insight and understanding of hostage and barricade incidents. It also includes an examination of the "situated transactions" between the parties involved which include context and motive (Menkel-Meadow, 2001). Luckenbill describes situated transactions as those incidents in which "... the participants develop particular roles, each shaped by the others and instrumental in some way to the ... outcome" (1977).

Crelinsten and Szabo present a model that has not been used to examine any data for testing their hypotheses. At the conclusion of their text, the authors state that there is unanimous agreement among both practitioners and academics that there is a need for further research. They say this study should include the effect of policy on incident management decision-making during crisis situations, the role of the media and the hostage-captor relationship and its relevance to incident management at a minimum and "...[a] multi-dimensional problem, such as hostage-taking, requires a multi-dimensional solution" (p.93).

Context, Containment and Conversation Model

While the Crelinsten and Szabo model contains many of the important elements of these incidents that have been neglected or overlooked by others who have examined these situations, some modification of this model is necessary to improve it as an operational tool.

This study subdivides the Active Victim (Police) into three integral components:


- 1.) the on-scene commander(s);
- 2.) the tactical or ESU officer(s)-in-command;
- 3.) the negotiation or HNT commander(s).

The on-scene commander, who is in over-all command of the incident, will delegate the actual execution of these physical tactics to the ESU or tactical unit and the negotiations to the HNT or negotiation unit. ESU is initially tasked with the containment of the incident; later their task becomes the physical confrontation with the hostage-taker or barricaded individual if negotiations break down or the decision is made to end the incident by a police assault. HNT is tasked with establishing or maintaining the dialogue with the hostage-taker or barricaded individual (Cambria et al, 2002). They would be responsible for interviewing family, friends, neighbors and any significant other that could offer insight into what caused the situation and what might bring about a nonviolent resolution. Negotiators would also be required to compile a psychological profile that could assist the primary negotiator with the dialogue and the on-scene commander with information to make decisions on how best to resolve the situation. These separate units have specific duties and must work in cooperation with each other but their duties are not necessarily interchangeable.

Crelinsten and Szabo use the word demand but this writer prefers to use the term conversation. Demand connotes being in a position of power or control, whereas conversation implies an exchange of ideas or thoughts among equals. Conversation is a more neutral word and would seem to allow greater leeway in the dialogue process. This conversation is not the casual pleasantries one might exchange with a neighbor or co-worker

but rather, is a dialogue that is both directed and cautious. A relationship must be established before starting to address the hostage-taking and a climate of understanding and trust must be in place before any meaningful dialogue can be attempted. Based on this writer's experience in these situations, another point to consider is that many of the early "demands" made in the incident can be attributed to face-saving and posturing on the side of the hostage-taker or barricaded individual. Often, these demands are not repeated or insisted upon when the negotiator and the subject establish and maintain a climate of trust and understanding. The negotiators will never ignore the demands, whether reasonable or outlandish, but should expect that the initial demands or statements may be modified over time. Often initial demands become requests that will be granted conditioned on the subject releasing hostages or coming out peacefully. One of the guiding principles of hostage negotiation is to avoid emotionally charged terminology, such as "demands", "surrender", or any word or phrase that could be misconstrued or imply a superior-inferior relationship.

These modifications do not radically change the Crelinsten and Szabo Contextual Model but they do bring it more in line with the actual components that are interacting in these situations. If Hacker's Crusaders, Criminals and Crazies is considered the old "*Three C's Model*" then the modified Crelinsten and Szabo's Contextual Model should be labeled the "*New Three C's Model*". This arrangement is shown pictorially in Figure 2-6.



This arrangement places the emphasis on context, containment and conversation rather than motive. The containment of the incident is necessary to separate the hostage-taker and hostage from the police. If the containment is not in place, the hostage-taker, with or without the hostage, can bring about a confrontation. This will cause the police to end negotiations and resolve the situation by force and a violent resolution. If the physical and psychological containment is established and maintained, over time, anxieties can be

lessened and a negotiated settlement can be reached. This will head off the use of force, or at least deadly force, to bring about a resolution of the situation. The need for containment in hostage and barricade situations cannot be over-emphasized.

Mickolus and Head Study

A 1988 doctoral dissertation by William Head at the State University of New York at Albany is entitled "The Hostage Response: An Examination of U.S. Law Enforcement Practices Concerning Hostage Incidents." Head examined terrorist hostage taking in its various forms including kidnaping, hijacking, and barricade situations. Head utilized a 1977 doctoral dissertation by Edward Mickolus of Yale University as a reliable data base for information on hostage taking. Mickolus relied primarily on the Rand Corporation's chronology of international terrorism from 1968 through the beginning of 1974, encompassing approximately 540 incidents. Head found that Mickolus's data, which were called ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events), were extremely limited for studying hostage taking since less than 15 % of the cases had any relevance to his research. Although the bulk of the ITERATE data was not helpful for Head's study, it provided a serviceable framework and it helped to shape the direction of his research.

Head's data base, which he labeled the Hostage Event Analytic Data (HEAD), also included material from the NYPD's HNT. He reported at the end of his study that the data was not as conclusive as he originally hoped it would be, perhaps because the research agenda was overly ambitious. Head felt that if the NYPD database was more extensive, a more meaningful analysis would have been possible. It was previously mentioned that the NYPD's HNT program was principally formulated to cope with terrorist-type hostage

situations (Strentz, 1985). Head wanted to study the NYPD's terrorist incidents occurring in the years 1973 to 1982. However, during these years the NYPD's HNT was only called out only 20 to 25 times a year and very few of these incidents could be considered terrorist related. In addition, the record keeping during this period was perfunctory. Head was clearly disappointed that so few of these incidents were terrorist related. However, if Head's large variable framework is reworked into a more limited series of incident categories with fewer subsets, a meaningful analysis of non-terrorist incidents can be achieved. This analysis can validate Heads' proposition that "the policies and program followed by the [NYPD] with respect to hostage and barricade situations is the most rational one" (p.103). Furthermore, the Crelinsten and Szabo model, with the modified context variable, will assist in predicting the outcome of an incident.

The Research Questions and Hypotheses

Therefore, the two main research questions of this study are:

- (1.) How do incidents that are resolved violently differ from incidents resolved without violence where the proposed variables (context, containment and conversation) are included one at a time in the statistical analysis?
- (2.) Which of these proposed variables, when included jointly in the statistical analysis, is most predictive of a violent or nonviolent resolution?

The following hypotheses address Research Question No.1:

- H1.) If a favorable context exists, where there is no injury or violence prior to the arrival of the police and/or no violent confrontation when the police arrive, there is a greater likelihood that the hostage or barricade incident will be

resolved without injury or violence.

H2.) If the police contain or restrict the movement of the hostage-taker or barricaded individual, there is a greater likelihood that the incident will be resolved without injury or violence.

H3.) If the police control the conversation with the hostage-taker or barricaded individual, there is a greater likelihood the incident will be resolved without injury or violence.

The following hypothesis addresses Research Question No. 2:

H4.) If all of the three proposed variables (context, containment and conversation) of the model are included jointly in the statistical analysis then the conversation variable will be the most predictive of a nonviolent resolution.

The review of the current literature is complete and having articulated the research questions and formulated the hypotheses, the remaining chapters will set forth the methodology and analysis of this study.

CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODS

Introduction

This study explains how the interactions between the hostage-taker, the hostage, and the different police components shape the resolution of the hostage or barricade incident. To show the data and findings in a clear and concise presentation, this chapter will explain how the sample was selected and how the data was collected and coded. The analysis used in this study is divided into the three following chapters. Chapter Four provides the descriptive frequencies for all the main variables in the study. Chapter Five examines the research questions and the variables that operationalize the study's hypotheses. Finally, in Chapter Six, four case studies are presented which continue the analysis of the Context, Containment and Conversation model.

Past research on hostage situations and barricade incidents has focused on the hostage-taker or the barricaded subject. This emphasis, whether intentional or not, has resulted in some of the other variables in these encounters being neglected. Variables that provide insight into the past conduct of the barricaded subject, including previous violent behavior or history of domestic violence, can be very important. Similarly, the relationship between the hostages and the hostage-taker, and the behavior of the police and hostages during the incident, are other factors that usually go unmentioned. There were probably valid reasons for these omissions in the past, but such variables deserve consideration if only to determine whether or not they affect the resolution.

Definitions of Hostage and Barricade Situations

A hostage situation, as used in this study, is an incident where a person or persons are

held against their will by one or more individuals to force the police to act or not act in certain ways. Barricade incidents, however, are situations in which one or more persons, without hostages, isolate themselves in a protected position, and have or threaten the use of a weapon to harm themselves or others. Included in this category would be suicidal individuals who threaten to jump from a high place if the police attempt to take them into custody. Hostage and barricade incidents involve a known location so this study will exclude the crimes of kidnaping, abduction and custodial interference where the location of the victim is known only to the perpetrator(s). Domestic or international terrorist-type hostage or hijacking situations or prison riots involving hostage-taking will not be examined primarily because there are not enough incidents of this type in the NYPD files to conduct in-depth research. This is known from the unsuccessful research efforts of William Head which have been previously cited.

Permissions

A request for permission to conduct this study using official reports, and other material contained in the files of the NYPD's Hostage Negotiation Team was made to the Police Commissioner and approval was granted on February 17, 1998. An application was filed with the CUNY Graduate School and University Center, Office of the Vice President for Research and Sponsored Programs, Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects requesting permission to conduct this study. On September 4, 2002, the Chairperson of the Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects approved this application and determined that no further review is necessary.

Sample Selection

In the Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT) office at Police Headquarters there are case folders for incidents from January 1973 to the present. In the first few years of the HNT there were very few requests or "call-outs." In 1973, for example, the HNT only responded to 5 hostage situations. The information about these early incidents is not extensive and only consists of the address and a brief description of the incident. For the first ten years, from 1973 to 1982, call-outs averaged approximately 21 annually, with a grand total of 210 for the entire period. In September of 1984 the NYPD changed police procedures which resulted in a greater utilization of the HNT. Currently, the yearly average of call-outs is approximately 120 situations per year compared to the all-time high of 227 call-outs in 1985. A survey of case folders for a recent year was conducted and the results showed that the collection of data regarding an incident could still be improved. Of the 82 incidents in 1997, 56 resulted in the HNT being canceled en route or upon arrival at the scene. Therefore, only 26 of the case folders (approximately 32%) has sufficient information that could be used for this study. Using this percentage as a rough guide for past years, it is estimated that approximately one-third of the cases for each year have sufficient information available for analysis. As previously mentioned, during the first ten years of the NYPD HNT there were relatively few call-outs. If there are only 20 incidents per year for that period, then only 7 incidents per year will be amenable to analysis which means that there will be only 70 cases for analysis. For the next fourteen years (1984 to 1997), the average number of call-outs is 95 and incident information will be accessible for 30 incidents per year or 420 for this second period. When added together with the first period, a total of 490 usable cases will be available.

However, from William Head's study it is known that the information in the NYPD's files for the period 1973 to 1984 is sparse or non-existent (Head, p.139). In the later part of 1984 and continuing on through 1987 the call-outs for the HNT dramatically increased due to the change in NYPD's policy for dealing with mentally disturbed individuals, largely as a result of the shooting death of Eleanor Bumpers in 1983. In November 1984 the NYPD issued Interim Order No. 51 which mandated that every call received at the 911 Communications Center involving a *psychologically disturbed* individual required HNT to also respond to the incident (NYPD, 1984). The large number of call-outs for the years, 1985, 1986 and 1987 is not an accurate indication of the actual number of times HNT was utilized and would not provide a meaningful analysis.

Therefore, this study will use the period of 1988 to 1997 for the sample selection. During this period, the NYPD changed its automatic call-out policy and substituted a policy of only having the HNT respond based on a needs assessment by the on-scene commander (captain or higher-ranking officer). During these years this writer commanded the HNT and endeavored to maintain the case files in a more systematic fashion. A concerted effort was made to study and report on the factors observed in hostage and barricade incidents to improve the quality of training for new negotiators and to provide a data base that could be shared with other agencies. The information collected on each incident during this 1988 to 1997 time period is more extensive and provides accurate data that was missing from earlier years (Luckenbill, 1981). HNT was called to 856 incidents during this time period and using the same estimate of 30 % actual utilization determined from earlier years, approximately 257 incidents should be available for analysis.

Data Collection

When this study was first contemplated it was unknown whether sufficient information would be found in the case folders to test projected hypotheses. A survey of an entire year of cases was conducted to determine if the information needed for this study was retrievable. A chart was designed with columns for each category selected and an entry was made for each item. In order to select an incident for this study specific information would have to be available. To satisfy the research goals, the official reports would have to clearly spell out if the incident was contained, if a dialogue established, if a weapon displayed, if there a prior relationship with the hostage, the rank of the On-Scene, the ESU and the HNT commanders, if the subject or hostage was injured or killed, and the duration of the incident. In addition, the following items were also noted: HNT case number, the borough and precinct of occurrence, the time the incident started, and if any third party intervener was used during the incident was recorded.

This survey did alleviate the concern that the data was not available. Using the calendar year of 1988, 128 case folders were examined and 44 case folders had sufficient data. Of the incidents examined, 14 were in Manhattan, 13 were in the Bronx, 11 were in Queens, and 6 were in Brooklyn. Dialogue was established in 34 of the 44 situations and 24 of the cases were hostage situations and 20 were barricaded incidents. In 18 of the hostage situations, the hostage-taker had some type of prior relationship with the hostage. Some situations lasted for as long as 13 hours, while others were as short as one-half hour. For all the situations, the average time was approximately 3 hours. In 2 of the incidents the hostage-taker/barricaded subject was not contained by the police, in 6 incidents the hostage-

taker/barricaded subject was injured or killed and in 3 incidents a hostage was injured or killed.

This survey, which can be found in Appendix B, shows that the necessary information is recorded and accessible for research purposes. The same type of survey was conducted on the files for the years 1989 through 1997. This survey shows that, when combined with the previous survey, there is sufficient information for 360 incidents out of a total of 856 incidents for the ten-year period. This is 100 incidents or forty percent more than the earlier estimated total. The question whether sufficient data would be available has been answered in the affirmative.

To conduct this analysis, only those incidents that had sufficient information to test the hypotheses were selected for study. The criterion for selection was the existence of an *Unusual Occurrence Report* (UOR) in the individual incident folder. This report is prepared and signed by an executive member of the Department, usually a captain or a person of higher rank, and forwarded to the Chief of Patrol and the Chief of Department. The UOR contains the who, what, when, where and how of a particular incident, and must be prepared and forwarded within 24 hours after the incident occurred. For purposes of this study, the UOR is the most important document. All of the other reports and forms that might be prepared and placed in the typical case folder will contain some of the same data found in the UOR but not in the detail required and not to the same degree of accuracy. This UOR is the NYPD's official statement on what transpired and the superior officer who prepares and signs the UOR is mindful of the serious consequences for any omissions or falsehoods presented as facts.

Over the years, along with the increase in requests for the assistance of negotiators, an effort at better record-keeping was made, especially for incidents that involved active HNT participation. For example, if a case from any year in the period of 1988 to 1997 was selected, copies of the following reports or forms should be found:

- a.) **Request For Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT)** - prepared by a member of the staff of the Office of the Chief of Detectives with the address of the incident, precinct, cross streets, mobilization point, name of the police supervisor making the request, a brief synopsis of the situation, and a list of persons notified or responding to the situation;
- b.) **Sprint Sheet** - The Sprint (Special Police Radio Inquiry Network) software program was designed to assist the police 911 operator or dispatcher to gain quick, easy, and flexible entry into the computer system. The Sprint printout is invaluable for determining a time frame for later analysis, and it also provides a printed chronological record of who responded to an incident and, in abbreviated form, a record of radio transmissions by police units;
- c.) **Technical Assistance Response Unit (TARU) Job Sheet** - The Job Sheet is prepared by a TARU technician at the end of the assignment. This provides a recap of the incident and a description of the type and amount of technical expertise used to assist the HNT, ESU, detectives and supervisors at an incident. Examples of the type of technical assistance available include: deploying special negotiation telephones, cellular telephones, audio or video recording, and ballistic protection for personnel;

d.) **Unusual Occurrence Report (UOR)**- The UOR is prepared by the ranking Patrol Bureau member, usually a Captain or Deputy Inspector, at the completion of the incident and forwarded through channels. This report describes who, what, when, where and how of the incident in narrative form. It lists what members of the NYPD were present at the scene and which officials or units were notified. It documents all arrests and provides information on who was arrested and cites the sections of law that were allegedly violated;

e.) Additional reports might include a **Criminal Records Report**, a **Complaint** and/or **Arrest Report** and **Detective Bureau Unusual or Investigative Reports**;

f.) If available, newspaper articles\photographs are included;

g.) Any audio and video tapes of incident are also included.

Data Coding

In order to conduct a quantitative analysis one is required "... to reduce a wide variety of idiosyncratic items of information to a more limited set of attributes composing a variable" (Babbie, P.362). A code book was constructed which lists the codes assigned to the attributes that make up the variables and where the variables can be located. The code book William Head used for his dissertation was derived from a database constructed by Edward Micholus, and this provides a sample framework for the code book in this study (Head, p.21). Head's focus was on terrorist-type situations, which included kidnappings and hijackings but since these incidents are excluded from this study, only the items enumerated below will be in my

Code Book. Many of these three-hundred-sixty incidents had multiple subjects, multiple hostages and/or multiple police officials, so addendum code sheets were utilized to collect and code this additional data. A copy of the Code Book and blank code sheets used in this study can be found in Appendix B. The Code Book breaks each incident into seven separate large groupings and then further into the 52 individual variables labeled as follows:

1.) EVENT VARIABLES (10)

type of incident	date of incident	incident classification by 911
time incident started	day of week	who reported incident to 911
precinct of incident	type of location	circumstances of incident
duration of incident		

2.) HOSTAGE-TAKER(HT)/BARRICADED INDIVIDUAL(BI) VARIABLES (6)

number of individuals	race/ethnicity	arrest history
gender	age	mental health history

3.) HOSTAGE VARIABLES (6)

number of individuals	race/ethnicity	reason at location
gender	age	relationship with hostage-taker

4.) POLICE COMMANDERS VARIABLES (7)

number of commanders	age	time in police department
gender	rank	time in police rank
race/ethnicity		

5.) OTHERS PRESENT VARIABLES (8)

other NYPD police unit present	other non-NYPD police agency present
medical/mental health unit present	state/federal police agency present
third party intervener (TPI) present	news media/reporters present
elected official present	foreign government official present

6.) BEHAVIOR DURING INCIDENT VARIABLES (7)

confrontation with police	hostage-taker/barricaded subject demands
incident contained by police	demands accepted by police
dialogue started by police	third party intervener (TPI) employed
HNT role at incident	

7.) RESOLUTION VARIABLES (8)

HT/BI injured	police injured by whom	surrender method
---------------	------------------------	------------------

HT/BI injured by whom	hostage(s) injured	incident resolution
police injured	hostage injured by whom	

From 13 years of experience as a hostage negotiation practitioner, this author knows that the majority of incidents are resolved peacefully and only a small number involve injury or violence. For this study a final variable labeled Incident Resolution was designed. All the hostage and barricade incidents in this study will be examined to quantify the degree of violence, if any, and who was injured or killed and who caused the injury or death. This variable will utilize the terminology and grading system employed by the NYPD to evaluate the seriousness of assaults or injuries when determining the proper penal law section charge for complaint and/or arrest reports (NYPD,2000c). All incidents will be examined using the following scale: **Not injured** means no HT/BI, hostage, or police officer was injured; **Minor injury** means that a HT/BI, hostage and/or police officer received a minor injury; **Serious injury-NLTD** means that a HT/BI, hostage and/or police officer was seriously injured but not likely to die; **Serious injury-LTD** means that a HT/BI, hostage, and/or police officer was seriously injured and was likely to die; **Deceased-DOA** means that a HT/BI, hostage, and/or police officer was killed.

Analysis

All data analysis was accomplished using the Statistical package for the Social Sciences for Windows (SPSS) software versions 10. This software has the ability to help summarize data, perform tests of statistical significance, and develop statistical models from data sets. After the software was obtained and installed the coded data was entered into the program. A faculty mentor examined a sample of the cases to ensure correct coding. Entering the data into SPSS from code sheets and cleaning up the data set was very time consuming

and required assistance to reconcile the errant keystrokes or omissions. When this was completed, a frequency distribution was run on all variables to ensure the data could be used for hypothesis testing. The next chapter shows these frequencies.

CHAPTER FOUR - ANALYSIS - 1 (DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION)

Introduction

The initial focus of this study is to determine how hostage and barricade situations, that are resolved with violence, differ from situations that are resolved without violence. Another focus is to determine which variable(s) are most predictive of a violent or nonviolent resolution. The previous chapter explained how the three-hundred-sixty incidents (N=360) were selected. All of the variables that will be used in the analysis have been isolated from the sample and they are presented in the seven sub-sections which was mentioned in the previous chapter and used in the Code Book. A few of the variables mentioned are omitted from this chapter since they were either used for record-keeping purposes, such as case number or study number and/or they have no impact on the study variables. Each of these seven sub-sections will be examined and the data will be presented in a table format. In many of the tables the N=360 but if this is not the case it will be indicated what the actual N is and the reason for the use of a different number, e.g. there is more than one person held hostage in an incident so the number will be larger than 360.

Event Variables

Table 4-1 shows that of the of three-hundred-sixty incidents, one-hundred-seventy (47.2%) are hostage situations and one-hundred-ninety (52.7%) are barricade incidents. This represents 42% of the total number of incidents from the years 1988-1997, out of a universe of 856. Table

4-1 also shows the frequencies of each incident by the year of occurrence. The reader will see that 1995 has the most incidents with 55 and 1997 has the least with 16 incidents. This

difference in the number of incidents from one year to another is due mostly to problems with collecting reports from the seventy-seven separate police precincts rather than any overall decrease or increase in hostage or barricade incidents. In fact, 1995 was a year that had less rather than more incidents than other years. However, the number of incidents in this our study closely reflects the actual breakdown of incidents year by year. The actual breakdown of total incidents can be found in Appendix A.

YEAR	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
1988	25	14.7	20	10.5	45	12.5
1989	15	08.8	29	15.2	44	12.2
1990	24	14.1	14	7.3	38	10.5
1991	22	12.9	25	13.1	47	13.0
1992	14	8.2	17	8.9	31	8.6
1993	5	2.9	12	6.3	17	4.7
1994	7	4.1	21	11.0	28	7.7
1995	26	15.2	29	15.2	55	15.2
1996	21	12.3	18	9.4	39	10.8
1997	9	5.2	7	3.6	16	4.4
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-2 displays in blocks of time the time an incident was first reported to 911. This variable provides a verifiable exact time for all sample cases. This time will be utilized as the starting time of the incident. When the victim/hostage was asked by the police what

time an incident started most reported approximate times or said they could not give an exact time so that variable, titled Incident Start Time, could not be used. More than 66% of the cases in that variable reported the starting time as unknown. The time the police were called is documented on the Sprint system printout and this provides a satisfactory substitute.

Table 4-2 shows the incident start time where it falls in one of six blocks of time. This time-frame shows that both hostage situations and barricade incidents are most frequent during the period of 8AM to 4PM (42.6%). During the 12MM to 4AM time span there are 20 hostage situations (11.7%) compared to 11 barricade incidents (5.7%) but in the 4PM to 8PM time-frame the reverse is true with 41 barricade incidents (21.5%) as compared to the 23 hostage situations (13.5%). In most of the other time frames, there are an almost equal number for each type of incident.

TIME NOTIFIED	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
0:01AM - 3:59AM	20	11.7	11	5.7	31	8.6
4:00AM - 8:00AM	27	15.8	22	11.5	49	13.6
8:01AM -11:59AM	36	21.1	41	21.5	77	21.3
12:00PM - 3:59PM	34	20.0	43	22.6	77	21.3
4:00PM - 7:59PM	23	13.5	41	21.5	64	17.7
8:00PM - 12MN	30	17.6	32	16.8	62	17.2
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

The next variable lists which police precinct the hostage situation or barricade incident occurred. Probably only a member of the NYPD would know where in the city an incident

occurred if only the precinct number were provided. The geographical area the incident occur in will be more meaningful to the reader rather than a breakdown by precinct number. Table 4-3 shows that Brooklyn, with 98 incidents (27.2%), has the majority of all types of incidents and Staten Island with 20 incidents (5.5%) has the fewest. Manhattan, with 50, has the most barricade incidents(26.3%) and Brooklyn, with 55, has the most hostage situations (32.3%). This study includes 2 hostage situations that occurred outside of New York City and the NYPD was requested to assist those jurisdictions. Commanders from the Patrol Bureau, ESU and the HNT responded to the out-of-city locations and acted in the same capacities as they would if the incident occurred within the confines of New York City. Both jurisdictions were in New York State and the NYPD could legally exercise police powers, including the use of force, if necessary. NYPD officers have police powers throughout New York State.

NYC COUNTY	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Manhattan	36	21.1	50	26.3	86	23.8
Bronx	35	20.5	37	19.4	72	20.0
Brooklyn	55	32.3	43	22.6	98	27.2
Queens	38	22.3	44	23.1	82	22.7
Staten Island	4	2.3	16	8.4	20	5.5
Outside NYC	2	1.1	0	0	2	0.5
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-4 shows that Friday has the most total incidents with 66 (18.3%) and Saturday has the least total incidents with 41 (11.4%). However, Monday with 32 has the most

hostage situations (18.8%) but once again, Friday, with 38, has the most barricade incidents (20%). Saturday has the fewest number of hostage situations with 16 (9.4%) and Monday has the fewest number of barricade incidents with 21 (11.1%). This sample doesn't have a very wide variation from one day to another. Showing which day of the week has the most or least number of incidents is interesting but it is a very weak predictor of a hostage or barricade incident occurrence. If the sample were larger the results might show some differences but, by its self, the results might be exaggerated and unreliable for the prediction of an incident.

DAY OF WEEK	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Sunday	22	12.9	24	12.6	46	12.8
Monday	32	18.8	21	11.1	53	14.7
Tuesday	20	11.8	30	15.8	50	13.9
Wednesday	27	15.9	27	14.2	54	15.0
Thursday	25	14.7	25	13.2	50	13.9
Friday	28	16.5	38	20.0	66	18.3
Saturday	16	9.4	25	13.2	41	11.4
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

In Table 4-5 the initial classification of the incident based on the information given to the 911 operator is presented. The NYPD's 911 Communication Center receives thousands of telephone calls each day and each 911 operator has only a few seconds to decide how the call should be categorized. A reported felony crime in progress or a police officer needs

assistance will receive a higher priority and a faster response by the police than a lower priority incident, such as a noise complaint or parking condition. In Table 4-5 the most frequent classification of hostage situations is the “crime in progress” category with 42 incidents (24.1%). The most frequent initial classification for barricade incidents is the “emotionally disturbed person” category with 85 incidents (44.7%) and this same classification is the most frequent for all incidents with a total of 113 incidents (31.4%). This classification seems to be overused by the 911 operators and has become a kind of “catch-all” for any behavior that doesn’t rise to the level of criminality but nevertheless is threatening or out of the ordinary.

TYPE OF INCIDENT	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Crime In Progress	42	24.1	14	7.4	56	15.6
Injury/sick case	2	1.2	0	0	2	0.6
Shots Fired/Man w/gun	32	18.8	38	20.0	70	19.4
Domestic Dispute	22	12.9	22	11.6	44	12.2
Emot. Dist. Person	28	16.5	85	44.7	113	31.4
Invest. Condition	17	10.0	6	3.2	23	6.4
Officer is in trouble	26	15.3	23	12.1	49	13.6
Arrest/Warrant	1	0.6	2	1.1	3	0.8
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

In Table 4-6 the type of location where each incident occurs is shown. Almost two-thirds of all incidents occur in a multi-family apartment building or housing project. There

were 111 hostage situations (65.3%) and 123 barricade incidents (64.7%) for a combined total of 234 incidents (65%) in this category. The next most frequent setting was a private house or a two/three family dwelling with 41 barricade incidents (21.6%) and 32 hostage situations (18.8%) for a combined total of 73 incidents (20.3%). The least frequent locale of a hostage situation was an airplane with only 1 situation (0.6%) and the least frequent scene of a barricade incident was either a subway train or a motor vehicle, each of which had 1 barricade incident (0.5%). This sample also includes 3 hostage situations (1.8%) in a hospital but no barricade incidents.

TYPE OF LOCALE	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
P H / 2/3 Family	32	18.8	41	21.6	73	20.3
Apt. bldg.	111	65.3	123	64.7	234	65.0
Street/bridge	2	1.2	8	4.2	10	2.8
Church	2	1.2	2	1.1	4	1.1
Store/comm. bldg.	12	7.1	5	2.6	17	4.7
Govt. bldg.	3	1.8	3	1.6	6	1.7
Motor vehicle	2	1.2	1	0.5	3	0.8
Train/plane/boat	1	0.6	1	0.5	2	0.6
Hotel/motel	2	1.2	6	3.2	8	2.2
Hospital	3	1.8	0	0	3	0.8
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-7 shows who called 911 to get the police to respond. The most frequent caller

is a family member or neighbor in 83 of the hostage situations (48.8%) and 113 of the barricade incidents (59.5%) for a total of 196 incidents (54.4%). The next most frequent caller to 911 is a police officer. Oftentimes, this is an officer who was sent to the location to determine what is occurring and he or she is now making a notification that a larger police response is required. This appears to be the circumstances in 34 hostage situations (20%) and 32 barricade incidents (16.8%) for a total of 66 incidents (18.3%). It should be noted that in 3 hostage situations (1.8%) and 6 barricade incidents (3.2%) the subject who is holding the hostage or is barricaded is the person who alerts the police to the situation. Normally, one wouldn't expect these individuals to be calling 911, but each situation is unique and this might explain behavior that appears to be unusual.

TYPE OF CALLER	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Victim/hostage	21	12.4	9	4.7	30	8.3
HT/BI	3	1.8	6	3.2	9	2.5
Family / neighbor	83	48.8	113	59.5	196	54.4
Police Officer	34	20.0	32	16.8	66	18.3
Other govt. agency	8	4.7	9	4.7	17	4.7
Anon. Person	15	8.8	18	9.5	33	9.2
Other/unknown	6	3.6	3	1.6	9	1.8
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

The circumstances in each situation are unique but some broad categories do reappear in many incidents. Table 4-8 lists eight of these categories and shows their frequency in the

sample. The largest category in hostage situations involves some form of domestic or intimate violence. In 62 hostage situations (36.5%) and 39 barricade incidents (20.5 %) this is the underlying violent conduct that precipitates the resulting police involvement. In barricade incidents, the category of “emotionally disturbed person (EDP)” encompasses almost one-third or 62 incidents (32.6%). As mentioned earlier, there seems to be an overuse of this EDP category so it is almost impossible to breakout the truly mentally ill individual from the person who is in a highly aroused and emotional state. Also listed are 35 suicidal behavior incidents (18.4%) that could be placed in the EDP category but not every EDP is suicidal so the separate listing in barricade incidents and the 4 cases in hostage situations (2.4%) is a more precise description of the circumstances in these incidents.

CIRCUMSTANCES	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Crime/or attempt	33	19.4	16	8.4	49	13.6
Domestic Violence	62	36.5	39	20.5	101	28.1
Em. Dist. Pers./ EDP	37	21.8	62	32.6	99	27.5
Warrant/arrest	23	13.5	25	13.2	48	13.4
Suicidal behavior	4	2.4	35	18.4	39	10.8
Protest/Demo.	2	1.2	4	2.1	6	1.7
Mixed behavior	5	2.9	6	3.2	11	3.1
Unknown	4	2.4	3	1.6	7	1.9
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

The last grouping of the Event Variables is shown in Table 4-9 where the duration of

these incidents is shown. In 61 of the hostage situations (35.9%) and 83 of the barricade incidents (43.7%) they fall in the range of 2 to 4 hours. This is two-fifths of all cases (40%). The next closest time frame is 1 to 2 hours for 41 hostage situations (24.1%) and 57 barricade incidents (30%). If these two time periods are combined it shows that over two-thirds of the incidents in our sample are resolved in 1 to 4 hours. When the next two most frequent time frames are combined, which are the 4 to 8 hours and the less than 1 hour category it encompasses almost 95% of all situations. Though there are more barricade incidents than hostage situations, the time frame break down seems to be similar for both types of incidents.

DURATION OF INCIDENT	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Less than 1 hour	25	14.7	13	6.8	38	10.6
1 to 2 hours	41	24.1	57	30.0	98	27.2
2 to 4 hours	61	35.9	83	43.7	144	40.0
4 to 8 hours	29	17.1	33	17.4	62	17.2
8 to 16 hours	12	7.1	3	1.6	15	4.2
16 to 32 hours	2	1.2	0	0	2	0.6
32 to 64 hours	0	0	1	0.5	1	0.3
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Summary of Event Variables

This first sub-section of study variables shows that there are 170 hostage situations and 190 barricade incidents for a total of 360 situations. Most of both type of incidents (42%)

occur between 8AM and 4PM and the least number (32.4%) occur between 12 Midnight and 4AM. Manhattan has the most barricade incidents (26.3%) but Brooklyn has the most hostage situations (32.3%) and the majority of both types (27.2%) of situations. Most hostage situations (18.8%) occur on Mondays and most barricade incidents (20%) and the majority of both types (18.3%) of situations occur on Fridays.

The most frequent initial classification by 911 operators for hostage situations is a “crime in progress” category (24.1%) and for barricade incidents is the “emotionally disturbed person” category (44.7%) and this latter category is the one most frequently used when both incidents are combined (31.4%). The overwhelming number of hostage situations (65.3%), barricade incidents (64.7%) and both types of situations combined (65%) occur in a multi-family apartment building/housing project. The person who is the most frequent caller to 911 to report these incidents is a family member or neighbor in all incidents (54.4%) and in the majority of hostage situations (48.8%) and barricade incidents (59.5%).

In this sample the circumstances underlying the majority of hostage situations involves domestic violence (36.5%) and emotionally disturbed behavior (32.6%) in barricade incidents. These two same categories make up the majority (55.6%) of both types of incidents. Finally, the largest number of hostage situations (35.9%), barricade incidents (43.7%) and both situations combined (40%) take 2 to 4 hours to be resolved.

Hostage-Takers and Barricaded Individuals Variables

The focus is now on the first of the actors encountered in this sample. It was stated previously (see Chap.3, p.44) that hostage situations are incidents where a person or persons are held against their will by one or more individuals to force the police to take or resist from

taking certain action(s). Barricade incidents are situations in which one or more persons, without hostages, isolate themselves in a protected position, and have or threaten the use of a weapon to harm themselves or others. Therefore, there can be more than one hostage-taker and more than one hostage in a hostage situation and more than one individual as the subject in a barricade incident. Table 4-10 shows that in 155 hostage situations (91.2%) there is only one hostage-taker and in 181 barricade incidents (95.2%) there is only one barricaded individual for a combined total of 336 subjects (93.3%). However, in 15 hostage situations (8.8%) there is more than one hostage-taker and in 9 barricade incidents (4.8%) there was more than one person barricaded. Table 4-10 also shows that in this sample five is the maximum number of hostage-takers encountered in any hostage incident and ten is the maximum number of subjects encountered in any barricade incident.

NUMBER PER INCIDENT	HOSTAGE			BARRICADE			TOTAL		
	Incidents	HT	%	Incidents	BI	%	Incidents	HT/BI	%
01	155	155	91.2	181	181	95.2	336	336	93.3
02	6	12	3.5	3	6	1.5	9	18	2.5
03	6	18	3.5	2	6	1.0	8	24	2.2
04	2	8	1.2	1	4	0.5	3	12	0.8
05	1	5	0.6	2	10	1.0	3	15	0.8
10	0	0	0	1	10	0.5	1	10	0.3
TOTAL	170	198	100	190	217	100	360	415	100

In Table 4-11 the total number of hostage-takers and barricaded individuals is 415

(N=415). This table also shows that 185 hostage-takers (93.4%) are males and 181 barricaded subjects (95.2%) are males which totals 374 males (90.1%). The number of incidents in the sample that involve females is 41 (9.9%). Holding hostages and/or barricading oneself seems to be predominately a male endeavor. Most hostage situations where a female is the hostage-taker involves a child custody or abuse situation. The non-voluntary removal of a child from their home by a child welfare agency can be the cause of a mother holding the child hostage. Even though there are not a large number of situations involving a female hostage-taker, these incidents are just as serious and volatile as any situation with male hostage-takers.

GENDER	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	HT	%	BI	%	HT/BI	%
Male	185	93.4	189	87.0	374	90.1
Female	13	6.5	28	12.9	41	9.9
TOTAL	198	100	217	100	415	100

Table 4-12 lists the race or ethnicity of the hostage-takers and barricaded subjects. In our study sample, African American/Blacks constitute the largest ethnic/racial group among hostage-takers and barricaded individuals in 102 hostage situations (51.5%) and in 91 barricade incidents (41.9) for a total of 193 incidents (46.5%). Hispanics, as a group, have the second highest total in 53 hostage situations (26.7%) but Whites in 74 incidents (34.1%) have second place in barricade incidents. In this sample Asians were hostage-takers in only 10 situations (5%) and they were barricaded in 2 incidents (0.9%). Lastly, there is 1 hostage situation (0.5%) where the hostage-taker was of mixed ethnicity.

RACE	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	HT	%	BI	%	HT/BI	%
Afr-Amer./Black	102	51.5	91	41.9	193	46.5
Hispanic	53	26.7	50	23.0	101	24.3
White	32	16.1	74	34.1	106	25.5
Asian	10	5.0	2	0.9	12	2.8
Mixed (BI/Wh)	1	0.5	0	0	1	0.2
TOTAL	198	100	217	100	415	100

Table 4-13 shows a breakdown of the age range of the hostage-takers and barricaded individuals. The most frequent age span is found among the 21 to 30 year old's. This group has 74 hostage situations (37.3%) and 85 barricade incidents (39.1%) for a total of 159 incidents (38.3%). The next closest age span is among the 31 to 40 year old's who have 56 hostage situations (28.2%) and 61 barricade incidents (28.1%) for a combined total of 117 incidents (28.1). More than 66% of all incidents fall into one of these two age groups. There is 1 hostage situation (0.5%) in the 71 to 80 age span and 1 barricaded incident (0.4%) in the less than 16 years old age span.

AGE	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	HT	%	BI	%	HT/BI	%
Under 16 years			1	0.4	1	0.2
16 to 20 years	22	11.1	18	8.2	40	9.6
21 to 30 years	74	37.3	85	39.1	159	38.3
31 to 40 years	56	28.2	61	28.1	117	28.1
41 to 50 years	29	14.6	37	17.0	66	15.9
51 to 60 years	8	4.8	6	2.7	14	3.3
61 to 70 years	3	1.5	4	1.8	7	1.6
71 to 80 years	1	0.5	2	0.9	3	0.7
Unknown	5	2.5	3	1.3	8	1.9
TOTAL	198	100	217	100	415	100

Table 4-14 displays the arrest history of the hostage-takers and barricaded individuals. The most frequent category is found among the “unknown” which has 81 hostage situations (40.9%) and 89 barricade incidents (41%) for a total of 170 incidents (40.9%). This category does not necessarily mean that the subject has never been arrested for any offense but rather it is used when the authorities are unable to determine if an individual has every been arrested at the time the Unusual Report was prepared. An interesting category is the arrested for a violent crime (previous/violent) category where 65 of the hostage-takers (32.8%) and 45 of the barricaded individual (20.7%) for a total of 110 subjects (26.5%) are found. If that category is combined with the arrested for domestic violence offense category (previous domestic violence) there are now 100 hostage-takers (50.4%) and 63 barricaded individuals

(28.9%) for a total of 163 incidents (39.2%) where the subject has been arrested for a violent crime. A previous arrest for a violent crime is a variable that should be considered when attempting to predict whether the resolution will be violent or nonviolent. Also the no previous arrests (none) variable can influence the resolution prediction.

ARREST HISTORY	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	HT	%	BI	%	HT/BI	%
Prev./ Violent	65	32.8	45	20.7	110	26.5
Prev./ Nonviolent	2	1.0	6	2.7	8	1.9
Prev./ Dom. Violence	35	17.6	18	8.2	53	12.7
Unknown	81	40.9	89	41.0	170	40.9
None	15	7.5	59	27.1	74	17.8
TOTAL	198	100	217	100	415	100

In Table 4-15 the mental health history of the hostage-takers and barricaded individuals in our study is shown. A large number of these subjects have no previous history of mental illness or hospitalization. There are 91 hostage-takers (45.9%) and 84 barricaded individuals (38.7%) for a total of 175 subjects (42.1%) in this category. The second large category is the “unknown” used when the police are unable to determine the subjects mental health history. In many incidents the HT or BI will self-report their history if it hasn’t been revealed by a family member or neighbor to the police. The reason the police are called, especially in barricade incidents, is sometimes the result of a mental health professional in an outreach program making contact with a subject because they are not complying with the conditions they agreed to for their release from a mental health facility. Often these situations

can be resolved without police involvement but if the client or subject resists or engages in threatening behavior the police are requested. Since they are not dealing with a criminal, the use of force by the police can have unintended tragic results.

MENTAL HEALTH HISTORY	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	HT	%	BI	%	HT/BI	%
Prev. / non-hosp.	6	3.5	9	4.1	15	3.6
Prev. / hosp.	17	10.0	31	14.2	48	11.5
Prev. / depression	12	7.1	29	13.3	41	9.8
Prev./suicide attempt	3	1.8	7	3.2	10	2.4
Unknown	69	34.8	57	26.2	126	30.3
None	91	45.9	84	38.7	175	42.1
TOTAL	198	100	217	100	415	100

Summary of Hostage-Takers and Barricaded Individuals Variables

In this second sub-section the characteristics of the principal protagonist in our incidents are displayed. It was previously stated that there can be more than one hostage-taker or barricaded individual in incidents but the overwhelming majority of situations involve one and only one subject. This is true for hostage situations (91.2%), barricade incidents (95.2%) and both types combined (93.3%). In this study the total number of hostage-takers is 198 and 217 barricaded individuals which totals 415 hostage-takers/barricaded (HT/BI) subjects.

Most hostage-takers are male (93.4%) with very few females (6.5%) in this role. Males are most frequent in barricade incidents (87%) but there are more females (12.9%) in barricaded incidents. In both types of situations men are the predominate actors (90.1%) with

a much smaller number for women (9.9%). With respect to the race or ethnicity of HT/BI's in this study, African Americans/Blacks are the largest group in hostage situations (51.5%), barricade incidents (41.9%) and in all situations combined (46.5%). These percentages reflect only this study. It is doubtful that these percentages would be exactly the same for other areas of the country. The average age of our HT/BI's is found among the 21 to 30 year old group. This is true for most of the HT's (37.3%), BI's (39.1%) and in all situations combined (38.3%).

Finally, when looking at the criminal or arrest history for HT/BI's in hostage situations (40.9%), in barricade incidents (41%) and in the total of all incidents combined (40.9%), it is unknown if the subject has ever been arrested. The outcome is different when looking at the mental health problems or history. In hostage situations (45.9%), in barricade incidents (38.7%) and in both types of situations combined (42.1%) the subject has no reported previous mental health history.

Hostage Variables

There are 170 hostage situations in this sample and some of these situations have more than one hostage being held. Table 4-16 shows that the total number of hostages in this study is 403. This total number will be used for Tables 4-17 through 4-21. In 83 situations (48.8%), there was only 1 hostage held against their will but in slightly more than one-quarter of all the hostage situations, or 44 incidents (25.8%), 2 hostages were held. The maximum number of hostages held in any one situation was 15 and this occurred in only 1 incident.

Table 4-16 Number of Hostages (N=170)			
NUMBER PER INCIDENT	HOSTAGE SITUATIONS		
	Incidents	Hostages	%
01	83	83	48.8
02	44	88	25.8
03	14	42	8.2
04	11	44	6.4
05	6	30	3.5
06	3	18	1.7
07	1	7	0.5
08	1	8	0.5
09	1	9	0.5
10	1	10	0.5
11	1	11	0.5
12	2	24	1.1
13	0	0	0
14	1	14	0.5
15	1	15	0.5
TOTAL	170	403	100

Table 4-17 shows that of the 403 hostages held in the 170 hostage situations, 235 (58.3%) were female and 161 (39.9%) were male. The gender of 7 hostages (1.7%) could not be determined because they were recorded only as children in the Unusual Occurrence Report.

GENDER	HOSTAGES	
	Victims	%
Male	161	39.9
Female	235	58.3
Unknown	7	1.7
TOTAL	403	100

Table 4-18 presents the race or ethnicity of the hostages in our study. African-Americans/Blacks were held hostage in 182 situations (45.1%), Hispanics were held hostage in 116 situations (28.7%) and Whites in 83 situations (20.5%) are the third largest group.

RACE/ETHNICITY	HOSTAGES	
	Victims	%
African-Amer/Black	182	45.2
Hispanic	116	28.8
White	83	20.6
Asian	11	2.7
Unknown	7	1.7
Mixed (Black & Hispanic)	2	0.5
Mixed (White & Hispanic)	2	0.5
TOTAL	403	100

Table 4-19 shows a breakdown by the age range of our hostages. One-third (33%) are

ten years of age or younger and more than one-fifth are younger than 5 years old (22.3%). In many of the incidents involving very young children, the hostage-taker is a parent or guardian. The next largest group is found in the age range of 21 to 30 years old (19.1%). If this group is combined with the age range of 31 to 40 years, we have almost one-third (30.5%) of all the hostages in this study. The 29 hostages (7.1%) listed as “age unknown” are most likely children whose age could not be determined at the time the Unusual Occurrence Report was prepared.

AGE	HOSTAGES	
	Victims	%
1 - 5 years	90	22.3
5 - 10 years	43	10.6
11 - 15 years	26	6.4
16 - 20 years	25	6.2
21 - 30 years	77	19.1
31 - 40 years	46	11.4
41 - 50 years	26	6.4
51 - 60 years	10	2.4
61 - 70 years	14	3.4
71 - 80 years	13	3.2
81 - 90 years	4	0.9
Unknown	29	7.1
TOTAL	403	100

In Table 4-20 the reason the hostage is at a location when taken captive is presented.

In 290 of the situations (72%) the hostage situation develops in the home of the victim. In 60 situations (14.9%) the hostage is at work or in school and in 27 situations (6.7%) the hostage is in a location conducting business when the incident developed.

LOCATION OF INCIDENT	HOSTAGES	
	Victims	%
Home	290	72.0
Work/School	60	14.9
Business	27	6.7
Other	24	6.0
Unknown	2	0.4
TOTAL	403	100

Table 4-21 shows the relationship, if any exists, between the hostage-taker and the hostage. Almost three-quarters of the 170 hostage situations shows a previous relationship (72.7%). Included in this category are relationships with family, neighbors, friends, fellow students and co-workers. If category labeled “no previous contact” is combined with the “unknown” category, there are only 53 situations (31.1%) that involved a hostage-taker holding someone with whom he had no previous relationship.

RELATIONSHIP WITH HT	HOSTAGES	
	Victims	%
No Previous Contact	107	26.5
Co-worker/Student	1	0.2
Neighbor/Landlord	15	3.7
Prev. Domestic. Rel.	202	50.1
Prev. Non-domestic. Rel.	66	16.3
Unknown	12	2.9
TOTAL	403	100

Summary of Hostage Variables

In this third sub-section the recorded characteristics of the victim involved in the hostage situations are shown. Some incidents have more than one hostage being held but most situations will involve only one victim/hostage (48.8%). This study shows that in 170 hostage situations there are 403 hostage victims. Unlike the HT/BI's category, the majority of hostage victims are female (58.3%) with a minority of males (39.9%). In a few cases (1.7%), the hostage victim was only recorded as a child so the gender could not be determined.

The race or ethnicity of the hostages in this study shows that most victims are African American/Blacks (45.2%). An examination of the age range of the hostages reveals that one-third of the victims are in the 1 to 10 year old (33.9%) group and the majority of the victims (72%) are taken hostage while in their homes. Over two-thirds and almost three-quarters of the hostage victims had a previous personal relationship (72.7%) with the HT.

Police Commanders Variables

Table 4-22 shows the number of police commanders present at hostage situations and barricade incidents. In 118 incidents (32.8%) there is one On-Scene Commander (OSC) from the Patrol Bureau. The Emergency Service Unit (ESU) had only one commander at 198 incidents (55%) and the Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT) had one commander for 352 incidents (97.7%). In 242 incidents (67.2%) there are two or more On-Scene commanders but in 162 incidents (45%) there are two or more ESU commanders assigned. The HNT had two or more commanders in only 8 incidents (2.2%). The maximum number of On-Scene commanders at any incident is 9 and this occurred in only 3 incidents (0.8%). If the number of commanders is multiplied by the number of incident the total number of commanders in this sample is 1792 (N=1792). This total number will be used for all of the following Police Commanders Variables.

NO. PER INCIDENT	Incidents	OSC	%	Incidents	ESU	%	Incidents	HNT	%
1	118	118	32.8	198	198	55.0	352	352	97.7
2	124	248	34.4	112	224	31.1	7	14	1.9
3	65	195	18.1	39	117	10.8	1	3	0.3
4	24	96	6.7	7	28	1.9			
5	14	70	3.9	2	10	0.6			
6	6	36	1.7	1	6	0.3			
7	6	42	1.7						
8				1	8	0.3			
9	3	27	0.8						
TOTAL	360	832	100	360	591	100	360	369	100

Table 4-23 lists the civil service rank of all the police commanders. In 376 incidents (45.1%) the OSC is a captain, and in 153 incidents (18.3%) the OSC is a deputy inspector (63.4%). In 205 incidents (34.6%) the ESU commanders is a sergeant and in 154 incidents (26.5%) the ESU commander is a lieutenant (60.2%). In the majority or 304 incidents (82.3%) the commander of the Hostage Negotiation Team is a lieutenant.

RANK	OSC	%	ESU	%	HNT	%	TOTAL	%
							L	
Sergeant	10	1.2	205	34.6	55	14.8	270	14.9
Lieutenant	1	0.1	154	26.5	304	82.3	459	27.9
Captain	376	45.1	115	19.4	10	2.7	501	27.9
Deputy Inspector	153	18.3	31	5.2			184	10.2
Inspector	105	12.6	51	8.6			156	8.7
Deputy Chief	78	9.3	32	5.4			110	6.1
Assistant Chief	74	8.8	3	0.5			77	4.2
Bureau Chief	15	1.8					15	0.8
Chief of Dept.	20	2.4					20	1.1
TOTAL	832	100	591	100	369	100	1792	100

Table 4-24 shows that of the 1,792 police commanders in this study, 1,768 are males. Only 15 of the OSC's are females (1.8%), and 3 of the ESU commander's were female (0.5%). There are no female HNT commanders in this study.

GENDER	OSC	%	ESU	%	HNT	%	TOTAL	%
Male	817	98.1	588	99.4	369	99.9	1768	98.9
Female	15	1.8	3	0.5			18	1.0
TOTAL	832	100	591	100	369	100	1792	100

Table 4-25 examines the race or ethnicity of the police unit commanders. In this study, the majority of police commanders are White (93.9%). This includes 769 On-Scene Commanders's (92.4%), 553 ESU commanders (93.2%), and 367 of the HNT commanders (98.6%) for total of 1,684 commanders.

RACE/ETHNICITY	OSC	%	ESU	%	HNT	%	TOTAL	%
White	769	92.4	553	93.2	367	98.6	1684	93.9
Afr. Amer./Black	38	4.5	20	3.3	1	0.2	59	3.2
Hispanic	24	2.8	14	2.1	1	0.2	38	2.1
Asian	1	0.1	4	0.6			5	0.2
TOTAL	832	100	591	100	369	100	1792	100

Table 4-26 gives the breakdown by the age range of the police commanders. Most of the commanders fall within the age range of 41 to 60 years (85.7%). This is true for 693 of the OSC's commanders (83.2%) and 360 HNT commanders (97.4%). The ESU commanders are younger and they have 466 members in the age range of 31 to 50 years (78.7%).

AGE	OSC	%	ESU	%	HNT	%	TOTAL	%
21 - 30 years	2	0.2	20	3.3			22	1.2
31 - 40 years	100	12.0	114	19.2	5	1.3	219	12.2
41 - 50 years	352	42.3	352	59.5	187	50.6	891	49.8
51 - 60 years	341	40.9	98	16.5	176	47.68	615	34.4
61 - 70 years	33	3.9	6	1.0			39	2.1
Unknown	4	0.4	1	0.1	1	0.2	6	0.3
TOTAL	832	100	591	100	369	100	1792	100

Table 4-27 shows a comparison of the police commanders by the number of years of service in the NYPD. Of the 832 On-Scene commanders, 595 (71.3%) have between 21 and 35 years of police service. The Emergency Service Unit has a majority of their commanders in the range of 21 to 30 years of police service (56%) and the Hostage Negotiation Team has the same range with 272 of its commanders in the 21 to 30 year range of police service (73.6%). When all the unit commanders are combined, the largest grouping, or 994 commanders is in the 21 to 30 year range of police service (55.4%).

Table 4-27 Police Commanders Years of Police Service (N =1792)								
YEARS OF SERVICE	OSC	%	ESU	%	HNT	%	TOTAL	%
1- 5 years								
6 - 10 years	3	0.3	60	10.1	1	0.2	64	3.5
11 - 15 years	87	10.4	86	14.5	6	1.6	179	9.9
16 - 20 years	98	11.7	73	12.3	62	16.8	233	13.0
21 - 25 years	188	22.5	218	36.8	164	44.4	570	31.8
26 - 30 years	202	24.2	114	19.2	108	29.2	424	23.6
31 - 35 years	205	24.6	36	6.0	20	5.4	261	14.5
36 - 40 years	40	4.8			7	1.8	47	2.6
41 - 45 years	2	0.2	2	0.3			4	0.2
Unknown	7	0.8	2	0.3	1	0.2	10	0.5
TOTAL	832	100	591	100	369	100	1792	100

Table 4-28 shows a comparison of the police commanders by the number of years in their civil service rank. The majority, or 749 of the On-Scene commanders, have between 1 to 5 years in their rank (90%) and this is the same for 448 Emergency Service Unit commanders (75.8%). The Hostage Negotiation Team has a majority, or 281 of its commanders, with 6 to 15 years in their rank (76.1%). When all the unit commanders are combined, the largest grouping, or 1255 commanders are in their civil service rank in the 1 to 5 year range (70%).

YEARS IN RANK	OSC	%	ESU	%	HNT	%	TOTAL	%
1 - 5 years	749	90.0	448	75.8	58	15.7	1255	70.0
6 - 10 years	65	7.8	116	19.6	164	44.4	345	19.2
11 - 15 years	4	0.4	8	1.3	117	31.7	129	7.1
16 - 20 years	6	0.7	13	2.1	10	2.7	29	1.6
21 - 25 years	1	0.1	2	0.3	16	4.3	19	1.0
26 - 30 years					3	0.8	3	0.1
31 - 35 years			2	0.3			2	
Unknown	7	0.8	2	0.3	1	0.2	10	0.5
TOTAL	832	100	591	100	369	100	1792	100

Summary of Police Commanders Variables

This fourth sub-section shows that the 360 incidents in this study have a total of 1,792 unit police commanders during their duration. This breaks down to 832 on-scene commanders, 591 ESU commanders and 369 HNT commanders. The HNT has far fewer commanders overall so they are much more likely to remain at an incident until it is resolved without handing over command to another supervisor. This reflects the different manner in which the Detective Bureau and the Patrol Bureau handle an assignment or investigation. Usually, an investigation in the Detective Bureau is handled by the same members from the on-set of the assignment to its conclusion where as the Patrol Bureau passes on an assignment to members coming on-duty at the change of shifts. Since ESU is part of the Patrol Bureau, they usually are relieved at incidents unless there is insufficient number of officers to continue with the assignment and still be available for other assignments. In that

instance, the ESU personnel would remain at the incident on overtime and the next shift would handle any new assignments that arise. Since the incidents in this study have roughly the same breakdown for both types of incidents the rest of the variables will be summarize using the combined totals.

Many of the OCS are captains (45.1%), sergeants are in command of ESU (34.6%) and the overwhelming majority of HNT commanders are lieutenants (82.3%). Almost all of the commanders are male (98.9%) with the OCS (98.1%), ESU (99.4%) and the HNT (100%). In the age range, the OSC has most of their personnel in the 41 to 60 year range (83.2%), ESU in the 31 to 50 year range (78.7%) and the HNT similar to the OCS with a majority in the 41 to 60 year range (98.2%). Almost all of the police commanders in this study are White, with the OCS (92.4%), ESU (93.2%) and HNT (98.6%).

The majority of OCS commanders have 21 to 35 years of service in the NYPD (71.3%), and most ESU and HNT commanders have the same 21 to 30 years of service (56% and 73.6%) respectively. Finally, time in civil service rank for the unit commanders shows most of the OSC fall in the 1 to 5 years range (90%), ESU in the 1 to 10 years range (95.4%) and HNT in the 1 to 15 years range (91.8%).

Others Present Variables

Table 4-29 lists the other units from the NYPD that could be present at hostage situations and barricade incidents. In 90 hostage situations (52.9%) and 105 barricade incidents (55.3%) for a total of 195 incidents (54.2%) there are no additional units present. In those incidents where additional units are present, a multiple unit response is involved such as a K-9 unit and the Borough Task Force to assist with crowd control. This type of

response is shown in 24 hostage situations (14.1%) and 36 barricade incidents (18.9%) for a total of 75 incidents (20.8%).

OTHER NYPD UNITS	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
K-9 Unit	6	3.5	17	8.9	23	6.4
Community Affairs	4	2.4	1	0.5	5	1.4
Warrant Squad	2	1.2	1	0.5	3	0.8
Bomb Squad	3	1.8	3	1.6	6	1.7
Borough Task Force	24	14.1	26	13.7	50	13.9
Multiple Units Response	39	22.9	36	18.9	75	20.8
None	90	52.9	105	55.3	195	54.2
Unknown	2	1.2	1	0.5	3	0.8
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-30 shows the New York City investigative units, not part of the NYPD, that might be involved at hostage situation or barricade incident. These agencies are not usually requested to assist the NYPD with a hostage situation or a barricaded incident. Rather, what sometimes occurs is that representatives from these agencies go to a location to conduct an investigation or execute a civil procedure in the normal course of their duties. While at the location they encounter an individual(s) that violently resists their efforts or makes threats and the agent requests assistance from the NYPD. This occurs in 35 hostage situations (20.6%) and 29 barricade incidents (15.3%) for a total of 64 incidents (17.8%).

NON-NYPD UNITS	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
City Marshall	2	1.2			2	0.6
NYC Investigator	2	1.2	1	0.5	3	0.8
Child Welfare Case Investigator	4	2.4	1	0.5	5	1.4
Fire Marshall	4	2.4	7	3.7	11	3.1
Parole/Probation Officer	9	5.3	6	3.2	15	4.2
Correction Officer	2	1.2			2	0.6
Multiple Unit Response	2	1.2			2	0.6
Other	10	5.9	14	7.4	24	6.7
None	135	79.4	161	84.7	296	82.2
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-31 shows the New York State and Federal law enforcement agencies that can be encountered at hostage and barricade incidents. In this study there are 20 instances where a Federal or state agency is present; 10 hostage situations (5.9%) and 10 barricade incidents (5.3%). These encounters are infrequent but they require cooperation and intelligence sharing to avoid jurisdictional problems and inter-agency rivalries. The FBI is the agency most frequently involved with the NYPD. Both agencies have a written protocol for joint investigations that is often used to handle hostage and barricade incidents.

STATE/FEDERAL AGENCY	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
NY State Police	1	0.6			1	0.3
FBI / DEA	6	3.5	3	1.6	9	2.5
ATF / USSS / Customs			1	0.5	1	0.3
Military Police/USCG	1	0.6			1	0.3
Other Agency	2	1.2	6	3.2	8	2.2
None	160	94.1	180	94.7	340	94.4
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-32 shows the medical and/or mental health professionals that can be encountered at hostage and barricade incidents. In this study there are 147 instances (86.5%) during a hostage situation and 168 instances (88.4%) during a barricade incident for a total of 315 incidents (87.5%) where the only medical/mental health unit at the scene is New York City's Emergency Medical Service(EMS). If an EMS unit is available, they are routinely dispatched to every hostage and most barricade incidents for a standby precautionary assignment. This can tie-up a unit for a long time but in the event the situation turns violent it is important to have trained medical personnel present and available to render assistance rather than waiting for a unit to be assigned and arrive on the scene.

MEDICAL/MENTAL HEALTH UNIT	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
NYC EMS	147	86.5	168	88.4	315	87.5
Pvt. Ambulance	2	1.2	5	2.6	7	1.9
Psych. Outreach Team	1	0.6			1	0.3
Multiple Unit Response	1	0.6	3	1.5	4	1.1
None	9	5.3	8	4.2	17	4.7
Unknown	10	5.9	6	3.1	16	4.4
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-33 is a breakdown of third party interveners that can be encountered at hostage and barricade incidents. There are 100 instances (58.9%) during a hostage situation and 115 instances (60.4%) during a barricade incident where a family member, significant other, neighbor or co-worker was present and offered to intervene to help resolve the crisis.

TPI PRESENT	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Family/Significant Other	72	42.4	93	48.9	165	45.8
Clergy/Teacher	4	2.4	2	1.0	6	1.7
Neighbor/Co-Worker	28	16.5	22	11.5	50	13.9
Other/Multiple Parties	16	9.4	19	9.9	35	9.7
None	43	25.3	52	27.3	95	26.4
Unknown	7	4.1	2	1.0	9	2.5
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-34 shows the news media personnel that can be encountered at hostage and barricade incidents. We have 105 instances (61.8%) during a hostage situation and 140 instances (73.6%) during a barricade incident where there is no news media representatives present or it is unknown if they are present. In approximately one-quarter of all incidents, when the media is present, we usually have a multiple unit response.

NEWS UNIT PRESENT	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Local/Community Press	2	1.2	7	3.6	9	2.5
City Newspaper Reporters	10	5.9	11	5.7	21	5.8
City TV/Radio Reporters	1	0.6	3	1.5	4	1.1
Multiple Media Response	52	30.6	29	15.2	81	22.5
None	97	57.1	119	62.6	216	60.0
Unknown	8	4.7	21	11.0	29	8.1
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-35 lists the elected or appointed government officials that can be encountered at hostage and barricade incidents. This study shows that there were no government representatives present during 144 hostage situations (84.7%) and 175 barricade incidents (92.1%) for a total of 319 incidents (88.6%). In some incidents, the official most likely to respond will be the county district attorney or their assistant. This occurred at 15 hostage situations (8.8%) and 9 barricade incidents (4.7%) for a total of 24 incidents (6.7%).

GOVT. OFFICIAL PRESENT	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Mayor/Governor	4	2.4			4	1.1
City Council/Legislator	1	0.6	3	1.5	4	1.1
District Atty./ Prosecutor	15	8.8	9	4.7	24	6.7
None	144	84.7	175	92.1	319	88.6
Unknown	6	3.5	3	1.5	9	2.5
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-36 lists the foreign government officials that might be encountered at hostage and barricade incidents. In 168 instances (98.8%) during a hostage situation and 188 instances during a barricade incident (98.9%) for a total of 356 incidents (98.9%) there was no foreign government representatives present.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PRESENT	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Ambassador/Deputy	1	0.6			1	0.3
Consul/Deputy	1	0.6	1	0.5	2	0.6
Other Govt. Official			1	0.5	1	0.3
None	168	98.8	188	98.9	356	98.9
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Summary of Others Present Variables

In this fifth sub-section other units and individuals present at the incidents in our

study were outlined. In most of the instances (54.2%) there are no additional units from the NYPD or from non-NYPD investigative units (82.2%). This is also true for the majority of state or Federal law enforcement units (94.4%). The medical or mental health professional present variable shows that the NYC Emergency Medical Service personnel are present at most hostage situations (86.5%), barricade incidents (88.4%) and a majority of all situation (87.5%). They are usually assigned to these situation as a precautionary measure and remain on-scene until the situation is resolved.

Third party interveners (TPI) can be family members, neighbors, clergy, teachers or a combination of any of these groups. In hostage situations (42.4%), barricade incidents (48.9%) and in both types of incidents (45.8%) most TPI's are family members or significant others. Representatives of news agencies are sometimes present at these incidents but at most of the hostage situations (57.1%), barricade incidents (62.6%) and in combined incidents (60%) no news media/reporters were present. This is the same for elected or appointed government officials with none present at hostage situations (84.7%), barricade incidents (92.1%) and for both types of incidents (88.6%). Also, in the foreign government officials present variable none were present in the sample of hostage situations (98.8%), barricade incidents (98.9%) and all incidents combined (98.9%).

Significant Behavior During Incident Variables

Table 4-37 shows the different types of confrontations that the police might encounter at a hostage or barricade incidents. In this study there are no confrontations at 54 hostage situations (31.8%) and 59 barricade incidents (31.1%) for a total of 113 incidents (31.4%). Therefore, in almost one-third of all situations, the police encounter in a best case instance,

a verbal confrontation, and in more than one third of all situations, in a worst case scenario, they are threatened with a firearm and/or are fired upon by the hostage-taker or barricaded individual.

CONFRONTATION	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
No Confrontation	54	31.8	59	31.1	113	31.4
Shots Fired / No Injury	13	7.6	9	4.7	22	6.1
Shots Fired / Injury	10	5.9	5	2.6	15	4.2
Threaten With Firearm	30	17.6	37	19.5	67	18.6
Threaten With Non-Firearm	28	16.5	28	14.7	56	15.6
Threaten Verbally	35	20.6	52	27.4	87	24.2
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-38 shows the number of times the police contained a hostage situations or barricade incidents. In this study there is containment in 154 hostage situations (90.6%) and in 150 barricade incidents (78.9%) for a total of 304 incidents (84.4%).

CONTAINED	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Contained	154	90.6	150	78.9	304	84.4
Not Contained	16	9.4	40	21.0	56	15.6
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-39 shows if the first responding police officers were able to start a dialogue in a hostage situations or barricade incidents. Dialogue is established in 41 hostage situations (24.1%) and in 58 barricade incidents (30.5%) for a total of 99 incidents (27.54%). However, in 72 hostage situations (42.4%) the police were unable to establish a dialogue and in 53 situations (31.2%) the dialogue was started but it is discontinued by the hostage-taker. In 125 hostage situations (73.6%) there is no meaningful dialogue with the first officers at the incident. During 130 barricade incidents (68.3%) this also was the circumstances.

DIALOGUE STARTED	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Unable To Establish	72	42.4	79	41.5	151	41.9
Established Dialogue	41	24.1	58	30.5	99	27.5
Started But Broken Off	53	31.2	51	26.8	104	28.9
Other	4	2.4	2	1.0	6	1.7
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-40 shows the role played by the Hostage Negotiation Team in hostage situations and barricade incidents. HNT started or took over the dialogue previously started by the patrol officers or ESU in 61 hostage situations (35.9%) and in 55 barricade incidents (28.9%) for a total of 116 incidents (32.3%). However, in 47 hostage situations (27.7%) and 50 barricade incidents (26.2%) the HNT was either canceled en-route or held in a stand-by status. In these instances the HNT was not in a position to influence the resolution of the incident. However, the police on the scene (patrol or ESU) could be in conversation with the

HT/BI and working to bring about a nonviolent resolution.

HNT ROLE	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Started Dialogue	23	13.5	19	10.0	42	11.7
Took Over Dialogue	38	22.4	36	18.9	74	20.6
Coached ESU/Pct. Officer	30	17.6	39	20.5	69	19.2
Unable To Start Dialogue	14	8.2	29	15.2	43	11.9
Canceled En-route	36	21.2	32	16.8	68	18.9
Stand-By Status	11	6.5	18	9.4	29	8.1
Coached a Third Party	1	0.6	4	2.1	5	1.4
Multiple Roles	17	10.0	13	6.8	30	8.3
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-41 shows the utilization of any third party intervener (TPI) in hostage situations and barricade incidents. A TPI is employed in 34 hostage situations (20%) and 53 barricade incidents (27.8%) for a total of 87 incidents (24.1%). The reader is reminded that in Table 4-33 a TPI was present during 120 hostage situations (70.5%) and 136 barricade incidents (71.5%) for a total of 256 incidents (71.1%). Therefore, a TPI is only employed in less than one-third of the hostage situations (28.3%) but in almost two-fifths of the barricade incidents (38.9%).

TPI USED	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Family / Significant Other	20	11.8	32	16.8	52	14.4
Clergy / Teacher	1	0.6	2	1.0	3	0.8
Mental Health Professional	1	0.6	5	1.0	6	1.7
Other	10	5.9	11	5.7	21	5.8
Multiple Parties	2	1.2	3	1.5	5	1.4
None Employed	136	80.0	137	72.1	273	75.8
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-42 lists the HT or BI demands, if any, made to the police. In 46 hostage situations (27.1%) and 57 barricade incidents (30%) for a total of 103 incidents (28.6%) the HT/BI did not make any demands to the police. In 36 additional hostage situations (21.2%) and another 48 barricade incidents (25.2%) for a total of 84 incidents (23.3%) the HT/BI demands were never clearly stated or understood by the police. These two variables combined make up more than one-half of all the incidents in our study.

DEMANDS TO POLICE	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
No Demands Made	46	27.1	57	30.0	103	28.6
Not Be Arrested	23	13.5	29	15.2	52	14.4
Not Be Hospitalized	5	2.9	12	6.3	17	4.7
Custody/Visit Children	9	5.3	12	6.3	10	2.7
Airplane / Leave USA	2	1.2			2	0.5
Currency / Other Valuables			1	0.5	1	0.2
Not Go To Prison	6	3.5	5	2.6	11	3.0
Get Wife/Other To Scene	13	7.6	10	5.2	23	6.3
Not To Be Hurt	15	8.8	8	4.2	23	6.3
Not Sure Of Demands	36	21.2	48	25.2	84	23.3
Other	15	8.8	19	10.0	34	9.4
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-43 shows HT/BI demands that are accepted by the police during a situation. In 134 hostage situations (78.8%) and 146 barricade incidents (76.8%) for a total of 280 incidents (77.7%) the HT/BI demands to the police were not accepted. In 17 additional hostage situations (10%) and another 12 barricade incidents (6.3%) for a total of 29 incidents (8%) the HT/BI demands that the police not hurt them if they surrender were accepted on the condition that the subject would not resist being taken into custody. These two variables combined make up more than 80% of all the incidents in our study.

DEMANDS ACCEPTED BY POLICE	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
No Demands Accepted	134	78.8	146	76.8	280	77.7
Not Be Arrested	2	1.2	13	6.8	15	4.2
Not Be Hospitalized	1	0.6	1	0.5	2	0.5
Custody / Visit Children	1	0.6			1	0.2
Money / Other Valuables			1	0.5	1	0.2
Get Wife/Other To Scene	10	5.9	8	4.2	18	5.0
Police Not Hurt Subject	17	10.0	12	6.3	29	8.0
Other	5	2.9	9	4.7	14	3.8
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Summary of Significant Behavior During Incident Variables

In this sixth sub-section of variable groups, the important actions or significant conduct that occurs during the hostage situations and barricade incidents in this study are summarized. One of the important behaviors is whether there is a confrontation when the police arrive at the incident. In approximately one-third of the hostage situations (31.8%) and barricade incidents (31.1%) and for all situations (31.4%) there is no confrontation with the police. Thus, one can assume that in a majority of all hostage situations and barricade incidents the police encountered some type of confrontation.

The next significant action to determine is whether the police are able to contain the incident. In the majority of hostage situations (90.6%) and in three-quarters of the barricade

incidents (78.9%) and in most of the total of both types of incidents (84.4%) the incident is contained. Then the sample is examined to determine if the first police officers at the incident are able to establish a dialogue or engage the subject in a rational conversation. This occurs in less than one quarter of the hostage situations (24.1%), less than one-third of the barricade incidents (30.5%) and less both types of incidents (27.5%).

Now the frequency of one of the significant parties in our study, the HNT, is examined to see the role they play in the resolution of the incident. When the HNT are canceled en-route or if on the scene but placed in stand-by status they will be considered inactive. This occurs in less than one-third of the hostage situations (27.7%), barricade incidents (26.2%) and for both types combined (27%). Therefore, the HNT plays an active role in over two-thirds of the incidents.

Next is shown how frequently a third party intervener (TPI) is used during incidents. In over two-thirds of hostage situations (80%) and a lesser percentage of barricade incidents (72.1%) and in both types combined (75.8%) no TPI is utilized during the incident either without coaching or under the control of the HNT.

When the frequency of demands made by the HT/BI in the study are examined it shows that the police consider demands in more than two-thirds of the hostage situations (72.9%) and approximately the same frequency for barricade incidents (70%) and for all incidents combined (71.4%). The police refuse to act on most demands and only acknowledge demands in one-fifth of the hostage situations (21.2%), a similar percentage in barricade incidents (23.2%) and basically the same percentage for all situations (22.3%).

Resolution Variables

Table 4-44 lists the seriousness of the injuries to the HT/BI during an incident. In 126 hostage situations (74.1%) and 146 barricade incidents (76.8%) for a total of 272 incidents (75.6%) the HT/BI is not injured. There are 9 hostage situations (5.3%) and 7 barricade incidents (3.6%) where the HT/BI is seriously injured but not likely to die (NLTD) and 1 barricade incident (0.5%) where the BI is seriously injured and is likely to die (LTD). In 19 hostage situations (11.2%) the HT dies or is dead-on-arrival (DOA) and in 14 barricade incidents (7.3%) the BI dies or is DOA for a total of 33 incidents (9.2%).

HT/BI INJURY	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Not Injured	126	74.1	145	76.8	272	75.6
Minor Injury	16	9.4	22	11.5	38	10.6
Serious Injury-NLTD	9	5.3	7	3.6	16	4.4
Serious Injury-LTD			1	0.5	1	0.3
Deceased-DOA	19	11.2	14	7.3	33	9.2
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-45 shows who caused the injuries to the HT/BI during an incident. In 126 hostage situations (74.1%) and 146 barricade incidents (76.8%) for a total of 272 incidents (75.6%) the HT/BI is not injured. In 18 hostage situations (10.6%) and 24 barricade incidents (12.6%) the HT/BI's injuries are self-inflicted for a total of 42 incidents (11.7%). In 25 hostage situations (14.7%) the HT is injured and in 19 barricade incidents (10%) the BI is injured because of police action for a total of 44 incidents (12.2%).

HT/BI INJURED BY	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Not Injured	126	74.1	146	76.8	272	75.6
Self-Inflicted	18	10.6	24	12.6	42	11.7
Police Action	25	14.7	19	10.0	44	12.2
Non-Participant	1	0.6	1	0.5	2	0.5
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-46 lists the seriousness of the injuries to a hostage victim during a situation. Since only hostage situations have hostages, Tables 4-46 and 4-47 will use the N=170. In 133 situations (78.2%) a hostage is not injured, in 20 hostage situations (11.7%) a hostage receives a minor injury, in 6 situations (3.5%) a hostage is seriously injured but not likely to die (NLTD) and finally, in 11 situations (3.1%) a hostage is killed or is dead-on-arrival (DOA).

HOSTAGE INJURY	HOSTAGES	
	Incidents	%
Not Injured	133	78.2
Minor Injury	20	11.7
Serious Injury-NLTD	6	3.5
Deceased-DOA	11	3.1
TOTAL	170	100

Table 4-47 shows that in 133 situations no hostage is harmed (78.2%). In 20 incidents a hostage suffered a minor injury (11.73%), in 6 incidents a serious injury (3.5%), and in 11 incidents a hostage is fatally injured (6.4%). In 32 incidents a hostage is injured by the HT (18.8%), in 5 incidents the police injured a hostage (2.9%), and in one incident an injury was self-inflicted (0.5%).

HOSTAGE INJURED BY	HOSTAGES	
	Incidents	%
Not Injured	133	78.2
Hostage-Taker	31	18.2
Police Action	5	2.9
Self-Inflicted	1	0.5
TOTAL	170	100

Table 4-48 lists the seriousness of injuries to the police during a hostage situation or barricade incident. In 157 hostage situations (92.4%) and 176 barricade incidents (92.6%) for a total of 333 incidents (92.5%) the police are not injured. There were 5 hostage situations (2.9%) and 9 barricade incidents (4.7%) where the police received a minor injury and in 5 hostage situations (2.9%) and 4 barricade incidents(2.1%) a police officer is seriously injured but not likely to die (NLTD). In 1 hostage situation (0.6%) a police officer is seriously injured and is likely to die (LTD)and in 2 hostage situations (1.2%)and 1 barricade incident (0.5%) a police officer is killed or is DOA.

Table 4-48 Police Injured (N=360)						
POLICE INJURY	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Not Injured	157	92.4	176	92.6	333	92.5
Minor Injury	5	2.9	9	4.7	14	3.9
Serious Injury-NLTD	5	2.9	4	2.1	9	2.5
Serious Injury-LTD	1	0.6			1	0.3
Deceased-DOA	2	1.2	1	0.5	3	0.8
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-49 shows who caused the injuries to the police during a hostage situation or barricade incident. In 157 hostage situations (92.4%) and 176 barricade incidents (92.6%) for a total of 333 incidents (92.5%) the police are not injured. There were 12 hostage situations (7.1%) and 13 barricade incidents (6.8%) where the HT/BI's caused the injuries. During one barricade incident (0.2%) a police officer accidentally injured himself while attempting to contain a subject. The injury is minor and the officer refused medical attention.

Table 4-49 Police Injured By (N=360)						
POLICE INJURED BY	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Not Injured	157	92.4	176	92.6	333	92.5
HT/BI	12	7.1	13	6.8	25	6.9
Police Action	1	0.6			1	0.2
Self-Inflicted			1	0.5	1	0.2
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

In Table 4-50 the HT/BI method of surrender at the conclusion of a situation is listed. In 91 hostage situations (53.5%) and 102 barricade incidents (53.7%) for a total of 193 incidents (53.6%) the HT/BI voluntarily surrendered. In another 31 hostage situations (18.2%) and 27 barricade incidents (14.2%) when the police forced entry into the incident location the HT/BI surrendered without further resistance. However, in 11 hostage situation (6.5%) and 16 barricade incidents (8.4%) the HT/BI committed suicide and in 7 hostage situations (4.1%) and 1 barricade incident (0.5%) the police shot the HT/BI.

SURRENDER METHOD	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
Voluntary Surrendered	91	53.5	102	53.7	193	53.6
Forced Entry/Surrendered	31	18.2	27	14.2	58	16.1
Forced Entry/Resisted	16	9.4	26	13.7	42	11.7
Forced Entry/Hid Inside	7	4.1	11	5.8	18	5.0
Committed Suicide	11	6.5	16	8.4	27	7.5
Jumped/Captured	5	2.9	3	1.6	8	2.2
Subject Escaped	2	1.2	4	2.1	6	1.7
Shot By Police	7	4.1	1	0.5	8	2.2
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 4-51 shows the level of violence in the resolution of the hostage situations and barricaded incidents. In 109 hostage situations (64.1%) and 138 barricade incidents (72.6%) for a total of 247 incidents (68.6%) the resolution is without violence or injuries. In 29 other

hostage situations (17.1%) and 27 barricade incidents (14.2%) the incidents are resolved with minor violence for a total of 56 incidents (15.6%). In 8 hostage situations (4.7%) and 8 barricade incidents (4.2%) resolution is achieved with moderate violence because there is a serious injury to a participant but they were not likely to die. Major violence occurred in the resolution of 3 barricaded incidents because a participant is seriously injured and is likely to die. Finally, 24 hostage situations (14.1%) and 14 barricade incidents (7.3%) for a total of 38 incidents (10.6%) end in extreme violence because a participant is killed or commits suicide.

VIOLENCE LEVEL	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	Incidents	%	Incidents	%	Incidents	%
No Violence	109	64.1	138	72.6	247	68.6
Minor Violence	29	17.1	27	14.2	56	15.6
Moderate Violence	8	4.7	8	4.2	16	4.4
Major Violence			3	1.5	3	0.8
Extreme Violence	24	14.1	14	7.3	38	10.6
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Summary of Resolution Variables

In this seventh and final sub-section of the study the variables that make up the resolution phase of the hostage situations and barricade incidents are summarized. In order to know if an incident has a violent or nonviolent resolution it must be determined if the HT/BI was injured. A HT/BI is injured in less than one-quarter of the hostage situations (25.9%), less often in barricade incidents (23.2%) and about the same for both types of

incidents combined (24.4%). When the HT/BI is injured in hostage situations, the HT is most often injured by police action (14.7%), in barricade incidents, the BI's injuries are self-inflicted and these two outcomes are the same for both types of incidents (23.9%) combined.

Hostage injuries occur in only a little more than one-fifth of hostage situations (21.8%). In these cases, most of the assaults are caused by the HT (18.2%). The police are less frequently injured at hostage situations (7.6%), barricade incidents (7.4%) and overall (7.5%). When the police are injured, they are usually hurt by the HT (7.1%), the BI (6.8%) and combined injuries by the HT/BI are about the same (6.9%).

Finally, the most frequent surrender method used by the HT/BI is to voluntarily surrender in hostage situations (53.5%), the same in barricade incidents (53.7%) and likewise for both types of incidents (53.6%). There is some form of violent resolution in more than one-third of hostage situations (35.9%), less so in barricade incidents (27.4%) and almost one-third of all situations combined (32.4%).

The next chapter will demonstrate how the variables selected will assist in predicting the resolution of hostage situations and/or barricade incidents with greater accuracy.

CHAPTER FIVE - ANALYSIS - 2 (TESTING OF HYPOTHESES)

Study Hypotheses

All of the hypotheses that make up the context, containment and conversation model will be tested using the sample of incidents (N=360). The first three hypotheses advanced earlier (see Chap.3, p.40) will answer the first research question which asked:

(1.)How do incidents that are resolved violently differ from incidents resolved without violence where the proposed variables (context, containment and conversation) are included one at a time in the statistical analysis?

These hypotheses will define and operationalize the parameters of the terms context, containment and conversation as they are used in this study. The hypotheses are: First; If a favorable context exists, where there is no injury or violence prior to the arrival of the police and/or no violent confrontation when the police arrive, there is a greater likelihood the hostage or barricade incident will be resolved without injury. Second; If the police contain or restrict the movement of the hostage-taker or barricaded individual, there is a greater likelihood the incident will be resolved without injury. Third; If the police control the conversation with the hostage-taker or barricaded individual, there is a greater likelihood the incident will be resolved without injury.

Most Predictive Variable

The fourth hypothesis will answer the second research question (see Chap.3, p.41):

(2.)Which of these proposed variables, when included jointly in the statistical analysis, is most predictive of a violent or nonviolent resolution?

Hypothesis number four is: If the three components of the proposed Context, Containment and Conversation model are jointly combined in a logistic regression model the Conversation variable will be the most predictive of a nonviolent resolution. This variable has the greatest potential for lowering the emotional level of the conflict and would seem to have the greatest potential for prediction value of incident resolution. Conversation combined with the passage of time can allow the most recalcitrant subject to rethink their situation and seek a face-saving way to end the siege. If a subject wants the crisis to be over, negotiating a way out is easier when one has an advisor (HNT) who has helped others in similar circumstances. Having personally witnessed this process on numerous occasions, this writer believes that the likelihood of attaining a nonviolent resolution is much greater with the active intervention of trained and experienced hostage negotiators.

Independent Variables

Context is the first variable in the study's analysis but before examining this variables the term context should be clarified. Crelinsten and Szabo use the term context to describe a physical or situational setting, such as a bank or inside an airplane in flight (p.4). However, police response is influenced by factors that are more complex than mere location. Therefore, a context that accounts for the hostage-takers (HT) or barricaded individuals (BI) behavior rather than the locale of the incident is substituted. The HT/BI's conduct is a more important factor than the physical location of the incident because the behavior of the HT/BI's raises the anxiety and emotional level of the responding police officers. Factors, such as location, may or may not have an influence on the conduct and behavior of the police. For example, if a hostage or barricade situation develops in a hospital some of the

patients, because of the seriousness of their illnesses, can not be easily evacuated. Also, any interruption of their care or treatment could lead to a worsening of their illness and possibly their death. In this instances, location is an important component of context. On the other hand, a hostage or barricade incident could take place in a part of a hospital that is away from the area where patients are treated, such as administrative offices or a basement storage room. This area could be isolated and the police presence would have minimum impact on the hospital operations or patient care. In this second scenario, location would not be considered an important component of context.

For this study, any violence or injury to a participant prior to the arrival of the police at the incident and/or a violent confrontation when the police arrive on the scene will be considered an unfavorable context. Included in the definition of violence would be tumultuous behavior such as smashing furniture or windows, property damage, displaying a weapon or firearm, and any other conduct that is threatening or menacing. Table 5-2 displays the major violence in the "Type of Confrontation With Police" category. For example, if a hostage is menaced by the hostage-taker with a firearm this type of behavior would also pose a threat to the police. While this may not completely account for all of the behavior of the hostage-taker or the barricaded individual, it does take into consideration the most serious or threatening conduct.

In many incidents, the prior injury or violence is the reason the police are called. Nevertheless, prior violence or injury does not always mean that an incident will have a violent outcome. Likewise, if there is no prior violence or injury and there is no violent confrontation when the police arrive at the location, this would be considered a favorable

context. This again does not mean the incident will be resolved without violence or injury. If context is correctly defined and quantified it will prove to be an important variable but it must be evaluated with consideration of the other factors that influence the incident resolution. The variables that are included in the definition of context will provide a predictor of outcome that is superior to the location or setting context advanced by Crelinsten and Szabo.

Hypothesis number one stated that:

“If a favorable context exists, where there is no injury or violence prior to the arrival of the police and/or no violent confrontation when the police arrive, there is a greater likelihood the hostage or barricade incident will be resolved without injury or violence.”

Context is a dichotomous independent variable coded 0 if the context is not favorable and 1 if the context is favorable. Context is determined based on the conduct of the HT/BI in each case and not on the location of the incident. An unfavorable context is defined as any violence or injury to a participant prior to the arrival of the police at the incident and/or a violent confrontation when the police arrive on the scene. On the other hand, a favorable context would be if there is no prior violence or injury and there is no violent confrontation with the police.

Containment is also a dichotomous independent variable coded 0 if not contained and 1 if contained. A situation would be deemed contained if the police were able to limit or restrict the ability of the HT/BI to force a physical confrontation or escape. If the HT/BI erects a barrier to block police entrance into the location, they are also closing off any

avenue of escape for themselves and I consider this a contained situation. If the situations requires more containment the police can cover windows with ballistic material to prevent the HT/BI from firing out of the location. Also, when the HNT are on the scene, further isolation of the HT/BI can be achieved, such as controlling telephone calls into and out of the incident location. Unfortunately, since this tactic was not reported on any report consistent basis it could not be evaluated for effectiveness or factored into this study's analysis.

Conversation is the final independent dichotomus variable and this is coded 0 if no conversation is developed and continued and 1 if a conversation is developed and continued. The analysis shows that HNT controlled the conversation in 220 incidents but this does not preclude the possibly other police officers or TPI's, unassisted by HNT, engaged the HT/BI in conversation and brought about the resolution.

Dependent Variable

Resolution is the only dependent dichotomus variable in this study. Resolution is whether there was violence or injury in the incident outcome and coded 0 if there was no violence/injury in the resolution and 1 if the incident was resolved with violence/injury regardless of who caused it

In Table 5-1 the frequency of injury prior to the arrival of the police or in some instances, the reason the police were initially called to a location is listed. In 146 out of 170 hostage situations there is no injury prior to the arrival of the police. In 185 out of 190 barricade incidents there is no injury prior to the arrival of the police. Overall, in 331 out of 360 total situations, or more than 90%, there is no injury prior to the arrival of the police.

INJURY/ VIOLENCE	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
No Prior Injury	146	85.9	185	97.4	331	91.9
Prior Injury	24	14.1	05	02.6	29	08.1
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

In Table 5-2 the characteristics of the confrontation stage, or when the HT or BI first encounter the police are shown. In over one-half of all incidents there is either no confrontation or the confrontation is a verbal encounter. For the purposes of the Context Hypothesis, and to be conservative, verbal threats are considered to be nonviolent regardless of what words make up the threat. What behavior is violent and what behavior is nonviolent is determined using the “nursery rhyme method.” Therefore, “sticks and stones may break my bones” equals violent behavior but “names will never harm me” equals nonviolent behavior.

In more than 30% of hostage situations and over 25% of barricade incidents, a firearm has been fired or threatened to be used by the subject. When the incidents with firearms are combined with the incidents involving other dangerous instruments (knives, swords, hammers, etc.) used to threaten the police, firearms or other dangerous instruments are present in more than 40% of hostage and barricade incidents. These would be the “sticks and stones” or violent confrontations that constitute the second part of the unfavorable context variable.

CONFRONTATION	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
No confrontation	54	31.8	59	31.1	113	31.4
Threaten verbally	35	20.6	52	27.4	87	24.2
Threaten with firearm	30	17.6	37	19.5	67	18.6
Threaten with other	28	16.5	28	14.7	56	15.6
Shots fired	23	13.5	14	07.3	37	10.3
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 5-3 displays the results of when the seven separate categories of possible confrontations are re-coded into a dichotomous chart to show the frequency of violent and nonviolent confrontations when the police first arrive at the incident.

CONFRONTATION	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	#	%	#	%	%	%
No Confrontation	90	52.9	111	58.4	201	55.8
Yes Confrontation	80	47.1	79	41.6	159	44.2
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 5-3 shows that there is almost a fifty-fifty chance of having a confrontation in hostage situations (47.1% vs. 52%) as compared to a slightly lower chance that a confrontation will occur in a barricade situation (58% vs. 41.6%). If only the prior injury variable is used the confrontation variable would lose the opportunity to test this model on many of the significant incidents.

Context is operationalized as the combination of two variables; confrontation and injury prior to police arrival. When these two variables are combine, allowing for an injury prior to the arrival of the police and a confrontation with the police occurring in the same incident, the results are as shown in Table 5-4.

CONTEXT	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Favorable Context	79	46.5	108	56.8	187	51.9
Unfavorable Context	91	53.5	82	43.2	173	48.0
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

A favorable context is one in which there is no violence or injury prior to the arrival of the police and there is no violent confrontation with the police when they arrive at the incident. Table 5-4 shows that an unfavorable context occurs in slightly over half of the hostage only situations (53.5%) but the opposite is true in barricade only situations where more than half begin with a favorable context (56.8%). In all situations, an almost 50-50 split between favorable and unfavorable contexts.

Hypothesis number two addresses the containment component of the Context, Containment and Conversation model:

“If the police contain or restrict the movement of the hostage-taker or barricaded individual, there is a greater likelihood the incident will be resolved without injury or violence.”

In Table 5-5, the data shows that in a large majority of incidents (84.4%), the police

are able to contain the HT or BI to a confined area. This can be an important factor in how the incident will be resolved. In some incidents, containment is easily obtained by the police because the subject, not wanting to be apprehended, will place furniture or other obstacles in front of the entrance into their residence. By this action, the subject prevents the police from forcing entry but he or she also block their only means of escape. This keeps the police out of the location and the subject inside, which, in most instances, is what is desired by the first officers on the scene. This act of barring the door usually means the police will not be forced into a physical confrontation before they are prepared to do so, if necessary. It also allows for additional police personnel to arrive on the scene to assist with the situation, such as ESU and the HNT. In some cases, the police will prevent this confrontation by blocking the apartment entrance door from the outside with a large ballistic shield that achieves the same result.

In addition to the physical containment of the subject in a hostage or barricade situation, another tactic that has been shown to be very effective is to limit the contact the subject has with people outside the barricaded location by controlling their telephone communications. The police, with the cooperation of the local telephone company, can prevent incoming calls and the only outgoing calls permitted would be to trained police negotiators. This is another part of the containment that the police would strive for at the onset of an incident. If it is not possible to obtain this communication containment, the task for the police of trying to bring about a peaceful resolution becomes extremely difficult if outsiders, such as family members, the press and others are allowed unlimited access to the hostage-taker or barricaded individual.

It would almost seem by definition that barricade situations would have to be contained but the reader is reminded that this study encompasses within barricade situations suicidal episodes, such as a person threatening to jump off a bridge or high building. Usually there is no physical barrier preventing the police from walking up to the subject except, if they try to come too close, the subject threatens to leap to their death. Therefore, in these instances, there is no containment but the police are restrained from taking the person into custody by the threat to jump. This study also has hostage situations where an adult holds a child in their arms and threatens to jump from a high place. Again, there is no physical barrier blocking the police but the threats serve the same purpose in restraining the police.

CONTAINMENT	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Contained	154	90.6	150	78.9	304	84.4
Not contained	16	9.4	40	21.0	56	15.6
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Hypothesis number three addresses the third and final component of the Context, Containment and Conversation model:

“If the police control the conversation with the hostage-taker or barricaded individual, there is a greater likelihood the incident will be resolved without injury or violence.”

In this study a variable titled “dialogue started by police” (see Table 4-39) is listed. When this variable was formulated, the police in this instance were the first officers at the

scene of the incident. In many situations no attempt is made to establish a dialogue, pending the arrival of the supervisor and additional personnel. This variable shows that a dialogue is established in only 28.2% of hostage situations, 26.8% of barricade situations, and 27.5% of the total of all situations examined.

In Table 5-6 the Hostage Negotiation Team's (HNT) specific behavior at an incident is listed and shows that negotiators attempt, actually start, or takeover a dialogue from precinct officers, coached ESU, precinct, or some other third party with the dialogue in 263 cases (73%). This variable is a reliable source for the data being sought. Hypotheses number three stated that there is a greater likelihood an incident will be resolved without injury or violence if the police control the conversation in hostage or barricade situations. Therefore, it follows that the use of family members, clergy, news reporters, or even law enforcement personnel who are not trained negotiators should be avoided. They can be well-intentioned but they could actually make the situation worse rather than better and their intervention could end in disaster (Strentz, 1996). The subjects who take hostages or barricade themselves usually have a negative self-image and are emotionally unstable. They often have poor coping skills and low frustration levels. In hostage and barricade situations they can be easily frightened or provoked. HNT members are carefully selected and trained to be objective, non-judgemental, emphatic, able to work in crisis situations, with high frustration levels, disciplined, mature and mentally stable. Special recognition must also be given to the NYPD's ESU members who peacefully resolve many potential barricade situations. Because of their rescue orientation they frequently employ talk tactics in their daily interactions with disturbed or mentally ill individuals before resorting to physical force. They train and interact

often with HNT and therefore are much more than a SWAT unit. Over the last thirty years numerous incidents in New York City have been resolved without violence thanks to the training and professional demeanor of the ESU officers and supervisors.

HNT ROLE	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Started dialogue	23	13.5	19	10.0	42	11.7
Took over dialogue	38	22.4	36	18.9	74	20.6
Coached ESU/ Pct. Officer	30	17.6	39	20.5	69	19.2
Canceled en-route	36	21.2	32	16.8	68	18.9
Unable to start dialogue	14	8.2	29	15.2	43	11.9
Multiple roles	17	10.0	13	6.8	30	8.3
Stand-by status	11	6.5	18	9.4	29	8.1
Coached a T.P.I.	1	.6	4	2.1	5	1.4
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Table 5-7 shows those cases where the HNT controlled the conversation. The “not controlled” number was arrived at by combining the “canceled en-route” incidents with the “stand-by status” incidents and the “unable to start a dialogue” incidents and all these incidents were mutually exclusive of each other. In this study the reader will find that the HNT controlled the conversation in over one-half of the hostage situations and over three-quarters of the barricade incidents.

CONVERSATION	HOSTAGE		BARRICADE		TOTAL	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Not Controlled	61	35.9	79	20.7	140	38.9
Controlled	109	64.1	111	79.2	220	61.1
TOTAL	170	100	190	100	360	100

Bivariate Analysis

Starting with the Context hypothesis, Table 5-8 shows the comparison of the 163 hostage and barricade incidents where there is favorable context with the 107 hostage and barricade incidents where there is an unfavorable context and it shows that those that had a favorable context were more frequently resolved without injury or violence. A violent resolution occurred in 24 hostage and barricade incident where there is a favorable context and in 66 hostage and barricade incidents where there is an unfavorable context. The test of this hypothesis shows that, as the model predicted, if a favorable context exists there is a greater likelihood the hostage or barricade incident will be resolved without injury/ violence.

Table 5-8 Favorable/Unfavorable Context Versus Resolution In All Cases (N=360)

Resolution	CONTEXT		Total
	Favorable (1)	Unfavorable (0)	
<u>No Violence/Injury</u> (0)	163 (87.2%)	107(61.8%)	270 (75%)
<u>Violence/Injury</u> (1)	24 (12.8%)	66 (38.1%)	90 (25%)
TOTAL	187 (100%)	173 (100%)	360 (100%)

$\chi^2 = 30.72, p = .00$

*percentages in parentheses

Table 5-9 shows the comparison of the 70 hostage incidents where there is favorable context with the 57 hostage incidents where there is an unfavorable context and it shows that those that had a favorable context were more frequently resolved without injury or violence. A violent resolution occurred in 9 hostage incidents where there is a favorable context and in 34 hostage incidents where there is an unfavorable context. The test of this hypothesis shows that, as the model predicted, if a favorable context exists there is a greater likelihood the hostage incident will be resolved without injury or violence.

Table 5-9 Favorable/Unfavorable Context Versus Resolution In Hostage Cases (N=170)

Resolution	CONTEXT		Total
	Favorable (1)	Unfavorable (0)	
<u>No Violence/Injury</u> (0)	70 (88.6%)	57 (62.6%)	127 (74.7%)
<u>Violence/Injury</u> (1)	9 (11.3%)	34 (37.3%)	43 (25.3%)
TOTAL	79 (100%)	91 (100%)	170 (100%)

$\chi^2 = 15.09, p = .00$

*percentages in parentheses

Table 5-10 shows the comparison of the 93 barricade incidents where there is favorable context with the 50 barricade incidents where there is an unfavorable context and it shows that those that had a favorable context were more frequently resolved without injury or violence. A violent resolution occurred in 15 barricade incidents with a favorable context and in 32 barricade incidents with an unfavorable context. The test of this hypothesis shows that, as the model predicted, if a favorable context exists there is a greater likelihood the barricade incident will be resolved without injury or violence.

Table 5-10 Favorable/Unfavorable Context Versus Resolution In Barricade Cases (N=190)

Resolution	CONTEXT		Total
	Favorable (1)	Unfavorable (0)	
<u>No Violence/Injury</u> (0)	93 (86.1%)	50 (60.9%)	143 (75.3%)
<u>Violence/Injury</u> (1)	15 (13.8%)	32 (39.0%)	47 (24.7%)
TOTAL	108 (100%)	82 (100%)	190 (100%)

$\chi^2 = 15.82, p = .00$

*percentages in parentheses

The bivariate analysis of context suggests that a favorable context is indeed an important component in predicting that an incident will be resolved without violence/injury. The analysis shows, first in all situations, then in hostage only situations, and finally in barricade only situations the model correctly predicts that if a favorable context exists there is a greater likelihood the situation will be resolved without injury or violence. In all situations the likelihood of no violence/injury with a favorable context is 87.2%, in hostage only situations it is 88.6%, and in barricade only situations it is 86.1%.

Next is the Containment hypothesis. Table 5-11 shows the comparison of the 233 hostage and barricade incidents where there is containment (favorable) with the 37 hostage and barricade incidents where there is no containment (unfavorable). It shows that those that had a favorable containment were more frequently resolved without injury or violence. A violent resolution occurred in 71 hostage and barricade incident where there is favorable containment and in 19 hostage and barricade incidents where there is unfavorable containment. The test of this hypothesis shows a tendency toward the model prediction, that

while not significant, does show a close relationship between containment and whether the hostage or barricade incident will be resolved without injury or violence.

Table 5-11 Favorable/Unfavorable Containment Versus Resolution In All Cases(N=360)

Resolution	CONTAINMENT		Total
	Favorable (1)	Unfavorable (0)	
<u>No Violence/Injury</u> (0)	233 (76.6%)	37 (66.1%)	270 (75%)
<u>Violence</u> (1)	71 (23.4%)	19 (33.9%)	90 (25%)
TOTAL	304 (100%)	56 (100%)	360 (100%)

$\chi^2 = 2.82, p = .093$

*percentages in parentheses

Table 5-12 shows the comparison of the 120 hostage incidents where there is containment with the 7 hostage incidents where there is no containment. It shows that those that had a containment were more frequently resolved without injury or violence. A violent resolution occurred in 34 hostage incidents where there is containment and in 9 hostage incidents where there is no containment. The test of this part of the hypothesis shows that, as the model predicted, if there is containment, there is a greater likelihood the hostage incident will be resolved without injury or violence.

Table 5-12 Favorable/Unfavorable Containment Versus Resolution In Hostage Cases (N=170)

Resolution	CONTAINMENT		Total
	Favorable (1)	Unfavorable (0)	
<u>No Violence/Injury</u> (0)	120 (77.9%)	7 (43.8%)	127 (74.7%)
<u>Violence</u> (1)	34 (22.1%)	9 (56.3%)	43 (25.3%)
TOTAL	154 (100%)	16 (100%)	170 (100%)

$$\chi^2 = 8.96, p = .003$$

*percentages in parentheses

Table 5-13 shows the comparison of the 113 barricade incidents where there is favorable containment with the 30 barricade incidents where there is unfavorable containment. A violent resolution occurred in 37 barricade incidents where there is favorable containment and in 10 barricade incidents where there is unfavorable containment. The test of this part of the hypothesis shows that the relationship was not significant. It appears that barricade situations seem to be less dependent on containment than hostage only situations.

Table 5-13 Favorable/Unfavorable Containment Versus Resolution In Barricade Cases (N=190)

Resolution	CONTAINMENT		Total
	Favorable (1)	Unfavorable (0)	
<u>No Violence/Injury</u> (0)	113 (75.3%)	30 (75.0%)	143 (75.3%)
<u>Violence</u> (1)	37 (24.7%)	10 (25.0%)	47 (24.7%)
TOTAL	150 (100%)	40 (100%)	190 (100%)

$$\chi^2 = .002, p = .965$$

*percentages in parentheses

The last part of the bivariate analysis is the comparison of all hostage and barricade incidents when the police control the conversation. Table 5-14 shows in the 98 controlled

conversation (favorable) hostage and barricade incidents compared to 172 conversation not controlled (unfavorable) hostage and barricade incidents, the relationship between conversation and the likelihood the incident would be resolved without injury or violence was not significant. A violent resolution occurred in 42 hostage and barricade incidents where the conversation is favorable and in 48 hostage and barricade incidents where the conversation was not favorable.

Table 5-14 Favorable/Unfavorable Conversation Versus Resolution In All Cases (N=360)

Resolution	CONVERSATION		Total
	Favorable (1)	Unfavorable (0)	
<u>No Violence/Injury</u> (0)	98 (70.0%)	172 (78.2%)	270 (75.0%)
<u>Violence/Injury</u> (1)	42 (30.0%)	48 (21.8%)	90 (25.0%)
TOTAL	140 (100%)	220 (100%)	360 (100%)

$\chi^2 = 3.06, p = .081$

*percentages in parentheses

Table 5-15 shows the comparison of the 83 hostage incidents where the conversation is favorable with the 44 hostage incidents where the conversation is not favorable. A violent resolution occurred in 26 hostage incidents where the conversation is favorable and in 17 hostage incidents where the conversation is not favorable. The test of this part of the hypothesis shows that, as the model predicted, if the police control the conversation, there is a greater likelihood the hostage incident will be resolved without injury or violence.

Table 5-15 Favorable/ Unfavorable Conversation Versus Resolution In Hostage Cases (N=170)

Resolution	CONVERSATION		Total
	Favorable (1)	Unfavorable (0)	
<u>No Violence/Injury</u> (0)	83 (76.1%)	44 (72.1%)	127 (74.7%)
<u>Violence/Injury</u> (1)	26 (23.9%)	17(27.9%)	43 (25.3%)
TOTAL	109 (100%)	61 (100%)	170 (100%)

$\chi^2 = .334, p = .563$

*percentages in parentheses

Table 5-16 shows the comparison of the 89 barricade incidents where the conversation is favorable with the 54 barricade incidents where the conversation is not favorable. A violent resolution occurred in 22 barricade incidents where the conversation is favorable and in 25 barricade incidents where the conversation is not favorable. The test of this part of the hypothesis shows that the relationship was not significant.

Table 5-16 Favorable/Unfavorable Conversation Versus Resolution In Barricade Cases (N=190)

Resolution	CONVERSATION		Total
	Favorable (1)	Unfavorable (0)	
<u>No Violence/Injury</u> (0)	89 (80.2%)	54 (68.4%)	143(75.3%)
<u>Violence/Injury</u> (1)	22 (19.8%)	25 (31.6%)	47 (24.7%)
TOTAL	111 (100%)	79 (100%)	190 (100%)

$\chi^2 = 3.47, p = .063$

*percentages in parentheses

Multivariate Analysis Using Logistic Regression

The sample for the logistic regression includes all 360 cases. There is valid data on incident resolution and the three independent variables (context, containment and conversation).

Table 5-17 Summary Statistics For Study Variables (N=360)

Variables	Metric	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dependent Variable					
Resolution	0= No violence/injury 1=Violence/injury	.25	.43	0	1
Independent Variable					
Context	0=Unfavorable 1=Favorable	.52	.50	0	1
Containment	0=Not Contained 1=Contained	.84	.36	0	1
Conversation	0=No Conversation 1=Conversation	.61	.49	0	1

Table 5-18 Correlation Matrix (Independent And Dependent Variables)

	Context	Containment	Conversation	Violence/Injury
Context	1.000	-.075	-.072	-.292*
Containment	-.075	1.000	-.003	-.088
Conversation	-.072	.003	1.000	-.092
Violence/Injury	-.292	-.088	-.092	1.000

*p< .01

The independent variables (context, containment and conversation) are not significantly related to one another so there is no question of multi-collinearity. Bachman and Paternoster (1997, p.493) state that multi-collinearity is only a problem if the independent variables are correlated at .70 or higher. Here the correlations between the independent variables are all

close to 0 suggesting almost no relationship between context, containment and conversation.

Table 5-19 Logistic Regression Violence/Injury In Resolution (All Cases N=360)

Variable	B	S.E.	Exp (B)
Context	-1.564**	.279	.209
Containment	- .755*	.341	.470
Conversation	- .591*	.264	.554
Constant	.545	.376	1.725

*p<.05, **p<.001

Of the three independent variables, Context is the best predictor of violence/injury in the incident resolution. When the context is favorable, the odds of violence/injury in the resolution are 79.1% lower than when there is an unfavorable context. Containment is the next best predictor. When the hostage-taker or barricaded individual is contained, the odds of violence/injury in the resolution are 53% lower than when not contained. Conversation is the weakest predictor of violence/injury in the resolution. When the HNT develops and/or continues a dialogue(i.e. when there is Conversation), the odds of violence/injury in the resolution are 44.6% lower than when no dialogue is developed.

Table 5-20 Logistic Regression Model Fit Statistics

Initial log likelihood function (constant only in model)

-2 log likelihood = 404.881

With Context, Containment and Conversation in model

-2 log likelihood = 363.523

Chi Square = 41.359 with 3df Significant at the 0.001 level

Pseudo R² = .1021 or 10.21%

Table 5-20 displays the model fit statistics. With Context, Containment and Conversation in the model, a 10.21% improvement in the variance is explained. The fitness

of the logistic regression model has been evaluated using a classification table with a threshold value of 0.5. That is, those cases having a predicted probability at 0.5 or greater are predicted to have a violent or injurious resolution and predicted to be otherwise if the probability is below 0.5.

Table 5-21 Logistic Regression Classification Table (All Cases N=360)

Observed	Predicted Resolution		Total	% Correct
	No violence/Injury	Violence/Injury		
No violence/Injury	268	2	270	99.3
Violence/Injury	83	7	90	7.8
Total	351	9	360	100
Cases Predicted Correctly				76.4%

Logistic regression allows us to predict the probability of violence/injury in the resolution for any given situation. The three variable logistic regression equation for violence/injury in incident resolution is:

$$\ln\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{1-\hat{p}}\right) = b_0 + b_1 x_1 + b_2 x_2 + b_3 x_3$$

$$\ln\left(\frac{\hat{p}}{1-\hat{p}}\right) = .545 + (-1.564)(\text{context}) + (-.755)(\text{contain}) + (-.591)(\text{conversation})$$

Interpretation of Logistic Regression - All Cases (N=360)

Logged Odds

The logged odds of a violent resolution are 1.564 lower for cases with a favorable context than without, .755 lower for cases with containment than without, and .591 lower for cases with conversation than without.

Odds Ratio

With the emphases of this study on a nonviolent non-injurious resolution then the estimated odds for context in all cases becomes $\frac{1}{0.209} = 4.78$. Using the odds ratio format in which the odds of a nonviolent non-injurious resolution are compared for a favorable and unfavorable context, it is possible to make the following statements:

The estimated odds of a nonviolent non-injurious resolution are nearly 5 times greater for a favorable context than for an unfavorable one. That is, about 48 cases with a favorable context will end in a nonviolent non-injurious resolution per 10 cases with an unfavorable context.

Logistic Regression - Hostage Only Cases

Table 5-22 Logistic Regression Violence/Injury In Resolution (Hostage Only N=170)

Variable	B	S.E.	Exp (B)
Context	-1.635**	.436	.195
Containment	-1 .629**	.596	.196
Conversation	- .226	.403	.798
Constant	1.098*	.617	2.999

*p<.05, **p<.01

Table 5-22 shows that when Hostage Only cases are separated, Context and Containment are the only variables significant at the .01 level. If the Context is favorable, the odds of violence/injury in the resolution are 80.5% lower than if the Context is unfavorable. If the incident is Contained, the odds of violence/injury in resolution are 80.4% lower than if not Contained. Conversation is **NOT** significant.

Table 5-23 Logistic Regression Model Fit Statistics (Hostage Only)

Initial log likelihood function (constant only in model)

-2 log likelihood = 192.285

With Context, Containment and Conversation in model

-2 log likelihood = 167.728

Chi Square = 24.557 with 3df Significant at the 0.001 level

Pseudo R² = .1277 or 12.77%**Table 5-24 Logistic Regression Classification Table (Hostage Only)**

Observed	Predicted Resolution		Total	% Correct
	No violence/Injury	Violence/Injury		
No violence/Injury	126	1	127	99.2
Violence/Injury	35	8	43	18.6
Total	151	9	170	
Cases Predicted Correctly				78.8%

Interpretation of Logistic Regression - Hostage Only Cases (N=170)**Logged Odds**

The logged odds of a violent resolution are 1.635 lower for cases with a favorable context than without, 1.629 lower for cases with containment than without, and .226 lower for cases with conversation than without.

Odds Ratio

Continuing the emphases on a nonviolent non-injurious resolution, then the odds for context in hostage only cases becomes $\frac{1}{0.195} = 5.12$. Using the odds ratio format in which the odds of a nonviolent non-injurious resolution are compared for a favorable and unfavorable context, it is possible to make the following statements.

In hostage only cases the estimated odds of a nonviolent non-injurious resolution are more than 5 times greater for a favorable context than for an unfavorable one. That is, more

than 50 cases with a favorable context will end in a nonviolent non-injurious resolution per 10 cases with an unfavorable context.

Logistic Regression - Barricade Only Cases

Table 5-25 Logistic Regression Violence/Injury In Resolution (Barricade Only N=190)

Variable	B	S.E.	Exp (B)
Context	-1.487***	.372	.226
Containment	-.331	.444	.718
Conversation	-.791*	.363	.454
Constant	.299	.503	1.348

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Table 5-26 Logistic Regression Model Fit Statistics (Barricade Only)

Initial log likelihood function (constant only in model)

-2 log likelihood = 212.582

With Context, Containment and Conversation in model

-2 log likelihood = 191.632

Chi Square = 20.949 with 3df Significant at the 0.001 level

Pseudo R² = .0985 or 9.85%

Table 5-27 Logistic Regression Classification Table (Barricade Only)

Observed	Predicted Resolution		Total	% Correct
	No violence/Injury	Violence/Injury		
No violence/Injury	141	02	143	98.6
Violence/Injury	<u>45</u>	<u>02</u>	<u>47</u>	04.3
Total	186	04	190	
Cases Predicted Correctly				75.3%

Interpretation of Logistic Regression - Barricade Only Cases (N=190)

Logged Odds

The logged odds of violent resolution are 1.488 lower for cases with a favorable context than without, .331 lower for cases with containment than without and, .791 lower for cases with conversation than without.

Odds Ratio

Again with the emphases on a nonviolent non-injurious resolution, then the estimated odds for context in barricade only cases becomes $\frac{1}{0.226} = 4.42$. Using the odds ratio format in which the odds of a nonviolent non-injurious resolution are compared for a favorable and unfavorable context, it is possible to make the following statements:

The estimated odds of a nonviolent non-injurious resolution in barricade only cases are more than 4 times greater for a favorable context than for an unfavorable one. That is, more than 40 cases with a favorable context will end in a nonviolent non-injurious resolution per 10 cases with an unfavorable context.

Summary

In this chapter the two research questions and the four hypotheses are restated to explain how each was operationalized. Each of the variables were carefully selected, and in some cases re-coded to elicit the required data and narrow the parameters of the research.

Tables 5-1 through 5-4 explain how Context is defined. Hypothesis number one states that: If a favorable context exists, where there is no injury or violence prior to the arrival of the police and/or no violent confrontation when the police arrive, there is a greater likelihood the hostage or barricade incident will be resolved without injury or violence. The frequencies of favorable versus unfavorable context in hostage, barricade and the combination of both

incidents is almost equally split.

In Table 5-5 the number of hostage, barricade and total of both types of incidents that are favorably and unfavorably contained was determined. In the majority of all incidents the police are able to contain the subject to a limited area. Hypothesis number two states: If the police contain or restrict the movement of the hostage-taker or barricaded individual, there is a greater likelihood the incident will be resolved without injury or violence.

In Tables 5-6 and 5-7 the conversation phase of the model is shown. The Conversation is controlled (favorable) in most hostage, barricade and all incidents combined. These tables assist in the analysis of Hypothesis number three: If the conversation with the hostage-taker or barricaded individual with the police is favorable there is a greater likelihood the incident will be resolved without injury or violence.

Next is the bivariate analysis and Tables 5-8 through 5-10 show the comparison of hostage, barricade and all incidents combined with a favorable context versus an unfavorable context. They actually show that the context variable and the resolution variable are associated at the 5% level.

Tables 5-11 through 5-13 examine the frequency of violence or injury in incident resolution based on favorable or unfavorable containment in hostage, barricade and all incidents combined. They show that containment is a significant factor in hostage situations. In barricade incidents and in all situations combined the relationship is **NOT** significant. It does show that there is no association between the containment variable and resolution detected at the 5% level.

Tables 5-14 through 5-16 display the results of the comparison with the conversation

controlled or not controlled and the resolution of the incident. In this instance, the relationship between control of the conversation and a non violent resolution was **NOT** significant in hostage, barricade and all incidents combined when all 360 incidents are examined.

In the last section of this chapter a multi-variate analysis employing logistic regression was utilized. Table 5-17 is the Summary Statistics for Study Variables, and 5-18 is the Correlation Matrix For Independent and Dependent Variables. Tables 5-19 through 5-21 show the results of the analysis for all incidents combined. Tables 5-22 through 5-24 show the results of the analysis for hostage situations and Tables 5-25 through 5-27 show the results for barricade incidents.

In the next chapter four case studies will be examined in greater detail. This overview should provide the reader with a better understanding of the dynamics of these situations and the efforts made to bring about a nonviolent resolution.

CHAPTER SIX - ANALYSIS - 3 (CASE STUDIES)

Introduction

Robert Lin, in his text Case Study Research: Design and Methods, says that many research investigators have disdain for the case study strategy and view them as a less desirable form of inquiry due to investigators use of equivocal evidence or biased view to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions. Lin states that bias can also enter into other research strategies and case studies in many textbooks are often confused with ethnographic or participant-observation methods. To understand the critical features of the case study strategy Lin offers the following more “technical” definition:

“A case study is an empirical inquiries that:
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context;
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident;
and...multiple sources of evidence are used.”(p.23)

Robert Stake (1994) says that sometimes we may be more interested in a phenomenon or a population of cases than in the individual case but we cannot understand any case unless we know about other cases. A case study is examined to provide insight into an issue or refinement of a theory. Therefore, the case plays a support role, facilitating our knowledge of something else. The case may or may not be typical of other cases but the case is chosen because it is expected to advance our understanding. There is no typical case since each has its own unique history and each is a complex entity operating within a number of contexts...”(pp.237-39). Stake also says that cases can be chosen because “...understanding them will lead to... better theorizing, about a still larger collection of cases” (p.237). This is precisely why this study has a sample of incidents so that the reader can better understand

the dynamics of these situations and evaluate the refinement of the prediction model construct.

Stake provides an example that coincides exactly with the present study. He tells us that understanding phenomena depends on well chosen cases. Suppose, he says, we want to “understand the behavior of people who take hostages and decide to probe the phenomenon using a case study”(p.243). We would want to be able to generalize about hostage-taking behavior yet we know that each of our selected cases weekly represents the larger group of interest. They will represent some population of cases and the phenomenon observable in the case represents the phenomenon generally. So at the start the phenomena are given; the cases are opportunities to study the phenomena.

“The phenomenon ... is hostage taking and to improve our understanding of hostage taking, to fit it into what we know about conflict resolution, human relations - that is, various *abstract dimensions*. On representational grounds, the epistemological opportunity seems small, but we are optimistic that we can learn some important things from most any case...or a small number of exemplars”(p.248).

Stake summarizes by telling us that “[t]he researcher examines various interest in the phenomenon, selecting a case of some typicality, but leaning toward those cases that seem to offer *opportunity to learn*.” He concludes his hostage-taking illustration by saying that “...it is better to learn a lot from an atypical case than a little from a magnificently typical case”(p.243). That is the goal of this chapter. In these case studies the names have been changed to protect the confidentiality of the parties involved; precise dates and locations have been omitted for the same reason.

CASE NUMBER ONE – GRANDMOTHER AND THE BURGLAR

Introduction

This first case study was selected because, at first glance, it appears to be the type of hostage situation that one would expect to hear reported on the evening news - a criminal caught in the act holds police at bay while threatening to harm a hostage. Essentially, these are the circumstances of this situation, but its similarity with other hostage situations of this type ends quickly. The elderly victim or hostage held against her will in this case led a normal, uneventful life. She had never experienced anything like this life threatening episode, and yet she quickly took control of her emotions and, after her release, she seemed to be no worse for her experience. This is not always the case for younger women or men who find themselves in these situations. Although initially very frightened when she first encountered a strange young man in her apartment, she acted quickly to calm the intruder. She even offered to make her uninvited guest some breakfast, which he politely declined. But not meaning to “meddle”, in her words, she also gave some “grand-motherly” advise to the hostage-taker about finding some kind of employment with a future, rather than burglarizing homes, which he said he would consider. After the situation was resolved, the media labeled her the “Jewish Grandmother” hostage and pestered her to sell her story. She declined all offers. But a few months later, a made-for-television movie, based loosely on this incident, aired on a major television station. Contrary to the way the story was told on television, she really didn’t single-handedly negotiate her release from a poor misguided youth while holding off a police SWAT team that was determined to break down her door and blast the hostage-taker to pieces. Obviously, creative licence gives screen writers enough

leeway to tell a story any way they choose, and so what if it really doesn't reflect actual events.

Rather than being a poor fellow forced into a life of crime to feed his family, the hostage-taker was a vicious career predator who had stalked and seriously assaulted elderly citizens in more than 70 "push-in" type robberies over a period of months. Why he didn't assault and rob this elderly victim must be attributed to the alarm raised by other residents and the fast response and tactics of the police. This burglar-robber/hostage-taker realized that all avenues of escape were closed off so he worked at getting for himself the best possible deal. He didn't hesitate to assault dozens of his prior victims even when they offered no resistance. However, when faced with police officers ready to confront him when he surrendered, he had to be repeatedly reassured that he wouldn't be hurt after he was taken into custody.

The other part of this case study that is very informative and assists in the understanding of hostage taking is the performance of the initial on-scene commander who took over the conversation from one of the precinct police officers and tried to negotiate the release of the hostage. He was not trained as a hostage negotiator and, in his well-meaning efforts to secure the elderly and frail women's release, he actually agreed to demands that he could not accomplish and the subject knew he was lying. By not being truthful with the hostage-taker and insisting on being the police negotiator rather than the incident supervisor, he exercised poor judgement and questionable tactics. Fortunately, trained and seasoned hostage negotiators arrived before long and the following case history fleshes out the details of the resolution.

Context and Containment Phase

Early on a weekend morning an elderly couple were awakened by a loud sound outside their bedroom window. When they went to the window they saw a young man standing on the terrace outside their fourth floor apartment. They immediately called 911; but before the police arrived, the male had climbed up the terrace's metal framework and was seen entering a fifth floor apartment occupied by "Tilly," an elderly female. Shortly after the police arrived on the scene, they interviewed the original 911 caller, proceeded to the fifth floor apartment, knocked on the door and demanded entry. They heard a muffled scream from inside the apartment and tried to force open the front door. From inside the residence, they heard a male voice saying, "...stop or I'll...kill her."

The police promptly began to evacuate adjacent apartments. One officer went to the window of an apartment that shared a fire escape with the apartment occupied by the hostage-taker. He saw a young man climbing through the window onto the fire escape. The male had what appeared to be a gun in his hand which he pointed at the officer and stated, "I have a gun [so] get away from the window." The officer withdrew but kept the fire escape in view. The young man retreated back into his apartment. Officers blocked the entrance to the fifth floor apartment and while other officers were watching the fire escape and terrace so all avenues of escape were closed off. The police officers on the scene, after containing the incident, then set up a temporary headquarters in one of the adjacent apartments that had been evacuated. They also requested the Duty Captain, Emergency Service Unit (ESU) and Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT) to respond to the scene. Precinct officers maintained their containment of the situation until they were replaced by ESU officers.

By this time, the Context and Containment phase of the model had been completed. A preliminary determination could be made based on these factors. It was previously mentioned that violence or injury before the police arrive on the scene, and/or a violent confrontation when the police arrive, are important elements of Context. In this situation there was no violence or injury before police arrival and the only confrontation with the police consisted of verbal threats. If the officer who saw the hostage-taker/burglar actually had a gun pointed at him it did not rise to the level of violence or injury merely because a possible gun was pointed in the direction of an officer. Certainly the officer was alarmed and possibly traumatized by the brief encounter with the subject but the same could be said for many of the victims/hostages in this study. At the onset it was stated that only actual injuries or violence would be classified as such otherwise every person involved in these situations would have to be considered as injured because they had been frightened or alarmed during the incident. This would serve no purpose and defeat any attempt at serious research. Therefore, since there was no injury or violence prior to the arrival of the police, and since the only confrontation with the police when they arrived was verbal, the Context for this incident is favorable.

Containment was established shortly after the police arrived on the scene and after the initial attempt by the first officers to gain entry was rebuffed no further attempt was made by the police. The subject also didn't attempt to leave the apartment after he encountered the police office watching the fire escape from an adjacent apartment. Hence, this incident can be considered contained from the onset and it remained that way until the final resolution.

Conversation Phase

Shortly after they arrived on the scene, precinct officers called the telephone number listed for Tilly, the 84-year-old woman, who lived alone in the apartment. The hostage-taker, a 29-year-old male named Louis, answered the phone and refused to come out, or to let Tilly leave the apartment. The first officer to speak to Louis was replaced by the patrol supervisor who was the initial on-scene commander. This officer wanted this incident to be resolved safely, but his actions actually did more to keep the hostage-taker on edge. When he took over the conversation he told Louis that he was the officer in charge. He later told the HNT members that he felt he had to agree to the demands of the hostage-taker to prevent Tilly's being harmed. When Louis demanded a million dollars and an airplane to leave the country the supervisor agreed to provide them without any hesitation. Louis later told investigators that he really didn't want his "demands" but rather, he was testing the supervisor to see if he was being truthful with him. When his "demands" were agreed to without any discussion, he felt the police supervisor was just trying to get him to come out so they could shoot him. The supervisor remained on the phone for the next 30 minutes until approximately 7AM when the HNT took over the conversation with the subject. When a trained police negotiator replaced the patrol supervisor on the telephone, the subject Louis, was reluctant to engage in any meaningful discussion or answer any questions because he felt the police were trying to develop a psychological profile on him. The Negotiator replied that he wasn't doing that -- furthermore, he couldn't even spell those big words. Louis laughed at that, and it soon became apparent to the other HNT members who were monitoring the conversation that the entire tone and subject matter of the dialogue had changed for the better. The plain-spoken and calming manner of the Negotiator appeared to have put the

hostage-taker at ease. As the conversation continued, the Negotiator told the subject that right from the start he was going to be truthful with him. "Do you want me to lie to you?" asked the Negotiator. "Of course not" answered Louis. So, if he didn't want to be lied to, he would have to understand that some of the things the Negotiator was going to tell him he might not like to hear. If he didn't like what he was being told, he would have to promise not to get angry and hurt Tilly. Since he said he could handle the truth, Louis agreed not to get angry or to hurt Tilly. At this point Louis told the Negotiator that the previous officer he was talking to had promised to deliver a million dollars and an airplane to fly out of the country. When the Negotiator, who had been briefed on this previous conversation, had a chance to respond he simply said, "Louis, that's not going to happen." There was silence for a moment then Louis said, "I didn't think so, but I just thought I would ask." The request for the money and airplane was not brought up again once it became apparent that a climate of trust was established.

When the Negotiator asked Louis if Tilly was okay, he said she seemed fine. He asked the Negotiator to hold on and he would have her answer for herself. Tilly came on the phone and said that she had been nervous when Louis first appeared in her apartment but she was calm now. Tilly also said that Louis was very worried that the police would break down the door to try to get him. The Negotiator assured Tilly that the police would not do anything hasty as long as she was not in danger. She went on to say that Louis seemed to be a nice, polite young man who had said he was sorry if he had frightened her. When asked whether she had to take any medication, she said she did and that Louis had brought her a glass of water to take with her pills. After being reassured that everything was being done to end the

situation peacefully, the Negotiator asked to speak again with Louis. When he came back on the telephone, the Negotiator thanked him for letting him speak with Tilly. It was good that he was treating Tilly well, he said, but he should be aware that because of her advanced age and previous health problems her captivity should not go on too long. He pointed out that if anything happened to her while she was being held against her will, Louis would be responsible. In reply, Louis said he was aware of this, but he was afraid that once Tilly left the apartment the police would rush in and shoot him. As time passed, it became clear that Louis wanted to release Tilly, but he had to be confident that the police would live up to their promises.

For the next two and a half hours, Louis and the police negotiator carried on an almost continuous dialogue. Finally, at about 10 A.M., Louis said he would release Tilly if the police would give him two cigarettes. At approximately 10:30 A.M., after five hours of negotiations, Louis moved the furniture away from the front door and allowed the frail, elderly grandmother to leave her apartment. Tilly was examined by the EMS personnel at the scene, but after she refused further medical attention, she was reunited with her family who had rushed to the scene. When she talked with members of the HNT, she told them Louis had treated her with respect. At one point, she had even offered to make him some breakfast, and although he declined the offer, he did accept some orange juice. She went on to say that after she got over her initial fright, she felt that the young man in her apartment was probably more afraid than she was and that it would serve no purpose for both of them to act emotionally. She wanted to help the young man out of the predicament he had gotten himself into, and she did so by giving him “grand-motherly” advice. She tried not to belittle

him, but she felt that with her age and life experience she could offer him some encouragement about turning his life around.

After Tilly left the apartment, Louis was still fearful of how he would be treated when the police took him into custody. At one point he even threatened to turn on the gas in the apartment to prevent the police from assaulting it. But after being reassured that the police would not storm the apartment, the dialogue became a matter of working out the details of his surrender. The negotiator promised Louis that if he come out peacefully, he would be allowed to speak privately with his sister at the police station. Louis had called her while he was barricaded in the apartment. Eventually, Louis opened the apartment door at 12:30 P.M., raised his hands, was taken into custody and brought to the precinct. His sister was driven to the station house in a separate car and she was permitted to speak privately with Louis before he was taken to court. During this prolonged siege neither the hostage nor the hostage-taker had been injured. The handgun carried by Louis proved to be a starters pistol, which was not capable of firing a bullet.

Conclusion

This incident had a favorable context, a contained situation and a conversation controlled by the HNT. Tilly, was able to overcome her fear and anxiety, and to actively assist the police negotiators in calming Louis and getting him to think and act more rationally. Tilly took an active part in the Conversation phase and should be credited with helping to bring about a nonviolent resolution.

A follow-up investigation revealed that Louis was wanted for a series of “push-in” robberies that involved serious assaults on many elderly people in the area. The Grand Jury

handed down more than seventy criminal indictments against Louis and after a plea bargain agreement, he was sentenced to a long prison term.

CASE NUMBER TWO – PROTEST TO STOP THE WAR MACHINE

Introduction

This second case study involves a prestigious location, an unusual individual, sustained attention by the media and use of family members as third party interveners, a tactic used very infrequently.

Here the barricaded individual was a middle-aged women protestor, and the location she chose for her protest was the United Nations (UN). Even before September 11, 2001, a high level of security protected this historic site. Normally, American police agencies were not permitted to enter this location without the permission of the Secretary General or his designee, and then only for the most serious reasons. Since there was no delay in requesting assistance, it can be assumed that the UN Security personnel felt this situation was best handled by the NYPD. During the almost 50 years of its existence, the UN has put up with numerous protests and demonstrations, but in this case a single woman's actions effectively shut down UN world headquarters. The possibility of a car bomb on the UN grounds was a phenomenon rarely encountered. This situation, therefore, was treated as a serious event and United States government officials, as well as other foreign diplomats had to be kept informed of developments. Under most circumstances, NYPD hostage negotiators would not operate under such world wide scrutiny but their years of experience with suicidal or emotionally disturbed individuals helped them defuse a potentially grave international incident. The following case study explains in detail how this was possible.

Context and Containment Phase

This incident started on a Saturday morning shortly before noon when a UN security

officer opened an exit gate to permit the departure of a motorcade. Before he realized what was happening, a white van operated by a woman proceeded the wrong way through the open gate. When the security officer attempted to stop the vehicle, the driver ignored him and drove past the check point. He promptly radioed a report of the intrusion to the security office. When the van came to a stop in front of the UN General Assembly Building, additional security officers surrounded the van and ordered the woman out of the vehicle. She refused to obey. The windows of the van were shut tight and all the doors were locked. The driver shouted out to the officers that the van was loaded with gasoline and explosives which she would ignite if they attempted to force her out of the van. After the officers backed away from the van, they requested emergency assistance from the NYPD.

Because the UN property is a high security location, NYPD immediately notified several local, state and federal authorities. The patrol supervisor, a sergeant, was the first NYPD official on the scene and he requested ESU and HNT to respond. Neither the patrol supervisor nor any of the first responding officers attempted to engage the women in the van in conversation. They could see that the women had placed printed signs in the windshield that blocked most of their view into the van. Therefore, they concentrated their first efforts on removing people from the inner perimeter danger area. Within a few minutes ESU officers had arrived on the scene. They attempted to engage the woman in conversation but she appeared to be highly agitated. She wore a necklace made of wooden kitchen matches and she held a disposable lighter in each hand and had signs taped to the van's windows warning that the vehicle was rigged with explosives. There was also a strong smell of gasoline coming from her van.

ESU officers assisted with the evacuation of people from the inner perimeter danger area which encompassed just about all of the open area in front of the UN Building. ESU officers also placed blocks in front of and behind the rear wheels of the van so it could not be moved from its location.

Representatives from all segments of the media were on the scene almost immediately. Barring their access to the incident was problematic, but the UN Security staff was finally able to resolve the problem by moving the media to a location that gave them a view of the unfolding events but did not permit them to interfere with police operations. NYPD press liaison officers responded to and remained on the scene and provided updates and briefings during the incident.

The Context phase of the “Three C Model” is favorable since there was no violence/injury before the arrival of the police. When officers arrived on the scene the only threat made by the woman in the van was to ignite the gasoline and explosives if they tried to forcibly remove her from her vehicle. This is how the woman was going to isolate herself without fearing police intervention. At this point the authorities are faced with a serious problem but still only a verbal threat which means the Context is favorable. Containment was started almost immediately by the UN Security staff and continued by the NYPD officers upon their arrival. Thus within a short time, the area was cleared and isolated except for emergency personnel, the situation was contained and remained that way for the duration of the incident.

Conversation Phase

When the HNT arrived on the scene, shortly after 12 noon, the female occupant of

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the van had been identified through a check of the vehicle's license plates. With the information that the driver was a 41-year-old woman named Nora, HNT officers, standing a few feet away from the driver's left side door, tried to engage her in conversation. In response she supplied them with her father's telephone number and she told them that if she was allowed to stay at the UN and protest America's use of tax money for military purposes, she would not harm anyone, and would not cause the "van to explode."

HNT detectives promptly contacted her father who said he did not support what his daughter was doing. He went on to say that his daughter had a long history of psychological problems, was the mother of two teenagers, had been divorced and her ex-husband had custody of the children. He also said that Nora had a sister who was a psychologist, and if the HNT called her she would be able to provide some insight into what had motivated her sister's behavior. He also promised to keep himself available if the police needed any further assistance from him. He also informed them of Nora's brother who was a graduate student at an upstate New York university. HNT personnel placed calls to the two siblings but they were not immediately available.

As negotiations continued, Nora said that she might consider surrendering if she was allowed to make a statement on television. At approximately 4PM, after conferral with the On-Scene Commander, it was decided that it would be too dangerous to allow the press to approach the van. If the media surrounded the vehicle and the emotionally disturbed woman accidentally or purposely ignited the gasoline or explosives, the reporters could be seriously injured or killed. However, if police officers posing as television reporters were able to lure the subject away from the vehicle they might be able to overpower her before she could harm

herself. When a video camera and boom microphone were located, two police officers were selected to pose as the news crew.

The officers who were standing near the driver's door told Nora that a "press pool" crew from the media would be coming through the front gate and they would approach the front of the van so she could be interviewed. The officers moved away from the van when the "news crew" entered through the front gate and stood in the roadway. This subterfuge was carefully choreographed and the tactical plan had a good chance of success but Nora refused to leave the van. However, after the failure of repeated attempts to get Nora to come out of the vehicle and speak to the "reporters", it was decided to resume negotiations. Nora was asked to accept a telephone so that communications would be more private and personal but she refused to accept any "police" device inside her vehicle. All communications would have to be conducted with her inside the vehicle and negotiators standing outside. Since the ruse to lure her out of the van had failed, preparations for a long standoff were made. The On-Scene Commander ordered that no overt action would be taken and negotiations would continue for as long as it took to bring about a nonviolent resolution.

At approximately 9PM, Nora's brother was finally located and arrangements were made to drive him down to the city. Since the trip would take a few hours, negotiators would continue to engage the subject in dialogue while awaiting the brother's arrival. When Nora was told that her brother was en route to New York City, she said she would be willing to speak with him if he was on the scene, but she refused to speak to anyone by telephone. Nora said that she was prepared to stay in the van for as long as it took to change "American foreign policy." She stated that she had carefully planned every facet of this protest and since

she was wearing adult diapers, she had no need to leave the vehicle even to go to the bathroom. Faced with this degree of determination, the police decided that the best course of action was to attempt to wear her down verbally. When she was exhausted, it was believed, her resistance to the negotiators and family members would lessen and it might get her to reconsider her "fasting to death" protest plan.

At about 11:30PM telephone contact was made with her sister. She told the HNT that her sister was a deeply troubled woman who had psychological problems for many years. The sister believed that this latest ongoing incident should be viewed more as a cry for help than a protest against America's foreign policy. Nora's sister offered to try to reason with her and she felt that she could keep a dialogue going long enough until her brother arrived on the scene. Nora refused to accept a telephone but she did agree to speak with her sister, so a speaker phone was placed near the driver's side window. This telephone call, which lasted about three hours, did not convince Nora to surrender but it did give the police the time they needed to get her brother to the scene.

The brother arrived at the UN at approximately 3AM and was briefed by HNT detectives. The brother and the various police negotiators took turns speaking with Nora trying to persuade her to leave the van. When a female negotiator was introduced to Nora she seemed to become more relaxed and even expressed some concern about changing her clothes. The female hostage negotiator assured her that she would be allowed to change her clothes and wash up in private.

Finally, around 10AM on Sunday, Nora said she was tired, cold and sore from her gasoline soaked clothing and agreed to come out of the vehicle. She tossed out two cigarette

lighters and with her brother standing nearby, opened the driver's door and stepped out of the van with her hands raised. Because her legs were shaking and cramping from the cold and from sitting so long, HNT officers physically supported her as she walked into the UN Building. Assisted to a bathroom by the female detective, she exchanged her gasoline-soaked clothing in for a hospital smock and was transported to a nearby hospital for medical and psychological evaluation.

Conclusion

This barricade situation had a favorable context, a contained situation and a conversation that lasted almost 24 hours but was controlled by the HNT. The use of third party interveners, carefully controlled by the HNT members, definitely helped to resolve this situation. All the HNT members believed that a wearing-down process was the best way to get the woman to leave the van. Her mental state was considered so fragile that any attempt to order or intimidate her could have had dire consequences. The Bomb Squad removed one can of gasoline from the van but found no explosives. After being released from the hospital Nora was arrested; she eventually pleaded guilty to reduced charges and was sentenced to five years probation on the condition that she continue to receive psychological counseling.

CASE NUMBER THREE – THE WALKING TIME BOMB

Introduction

This third case study involves one of the most violent emotionally-disturbed people the NYPD Hostage Negotiation Team ever encountered. The violent behavior was ongoing during this episode and this elevated state of danger applied to the police on the scene and residents of the community since the field of fire available to the hostage-taker was quite large. Some of the residents of this community were quite elderly and in poor health and were unable to be evacuated so the only thing the police could do for their safety was to move them to areas of their homes where they would not be in a direct line of fire. The subject was armed with a rifle and he repeatedly opened fire from an upstairs window so the police and residents always had to be mindful of cover and concealment during the course of this siege. The dialogue or conversation between the negotiators and the subject was problematic at best. Two separate jurisdictions were involved, requiring ad hoc arrangements that were modified as the situation developed; nevertheless, the two agencies functioned in a cooperative manner. In the after-action critique at the conclusion of the incident, it was decided that although the tactical teams were not easily integrated or controlled, the joint hostage negotiation team had worked well.

Many people, especially in the media, questioned why this individual had never been hospitalized or psychologically evaluated during his lifetime since he was obviously emotionally disturbed or mentally ill. In spite of displaying threatening or actual violent behavior on many occasions, he was allowed to freely roam about his neighborhood. Why did he murder his parents and few best friends? What set him off at this time and why would

he break into the home of complete strangers and yet not physically harm them? These are a few of the unanswered questions that were raised by the media, neighbors and the family of the victims (McFadden, 1991; Faison, 1991). While these questions cannot be answered definitively, the reader should be aware that often the police are brought into situations that mental health professionals, family, teachers, clergy, etc. have failed to resolve. Although the law enforcement community is neither trained nor equipped to treat mental illness, reviewing this case study might provide a degree of understanding and insight into what was possible under these extreme circumstances, and thus helpful for evaluating police performance.

Context and Containment Phase

In the very early hours on a Sunday morning a group of young people was leaving a wedding reception when they heard a young man calling for help because he had been shot. They immediately notified 911 and shortly thereafter NYPD officers arrived on the scene. They found a 25-year-old male lying on the pavement, conscious but suffering from gunshot wounds to the back and leg. The victim told the officers that he had been shot at a nearby residence and had crawled out to get help. He further stated that other people had also been shot there by the same person, a 47-year-old male he identified as Charlie. The officers immediately notified their supervisor and, after the wounded male was removed to the hospital, they responded to the scene of the shooting.

When the police supervisor, accompanied by ESU officers, arrived at the site, a single family, two story house, they heard calls for help and the sound of breaking glass coming from within. ESU entered the location and discovered a 22-year-old male suffering from gunshot wounds. He was immediately transported by ambulance to a local hospital. Also

found in the house were two other males in their twenties who were pronounced dead at the scene by EMS. ESU continued to search the scene and in a storage shed in the rear yard the bodies of two other males, ages 30 and 75, were discovered. The 75-year-old deceased male was identified as the father of the suspected shooter. The 73-year-old mother was not immediately found but later, after a more thorough search, her corpse was found in a hole in the basement covered over by a metal plate. Because the police were not able to locate Charlie, they started an intense search of the surrounding neighborhoods.

At approximately 10AM officers at the crime scene were notified of a hostage situation a few blocks away from their location which might be related to their homicide investigation. Officers proceeded to the second location where it was determined that the hostage-taker in the ongoing incident was Charlie, the subject wanted for the homicides and assaults. The police officers at the hostage incident said they had been called to a private home at 9AM by a gardener who made weekly visits to take care of the grounds of a retired psychiatrist and his wife. When the gardener arrived at their house and knocked at the rear door, a shot was fired at him from an upstairs bedroom windows and a man at the window yelled, "get away or I'll kill you." The gardener, who was unhurt, ran to a nearby house and called the police. When the first officers arrived, they questioned the gardener and then promptly began to evacuate the surrounding homes. Because most of the residents were still sleeping, it took some time to complete the evacuation. Many residents had to be moved to safety through side and back entrances that were out of the line of fire. Eventually the entire neighborhood was cordoned off and officers were stationed at the perimeters to keep spectators and the media at a safe distance. When the NYPD ESU officers arrived on the

scene, they took over the containment of the residence where the elderly couple was being held.

At this point in the incident the Context phase would be considered extremely unfavorable. There was violence and serious injury immediately preceding the arrival of the police both at the subject's residence and at the site of the hostage situation. The police were shot at after they arrived on the scene so a violent confrontation can also be added to the Context phase. Containment was obtained after some had time elapsed but the subject was still free to roam throughout the house. Containment would be considered unsatisfactory but while the hostages were still in the house the police were unable to improve the situation.

Conversation Phase

After the evacuation was accomplished, one of the initial officers at the scene made a telephone call to the home of the hostages, 71 year-old Robert and 61 year old Goldie. Goldie answered the telephone and said that a man with a rifle was in the house and would not allow them to leave. Goldie only spoke to the officers for less than a minute before the call was ended. After Goldie was freed she told the police that Charlie broke into the house, apparently chosen at random, around 5AM. He told them that he was wanted by the police but he wasn't going to surrender to them because he had done a bad thing.

The police made a second call and this time the hostage-taker Charlie answered the telephone. He said that he would not allow the occupants to leave but he did not intend to harm them. However, at approximately 10:30AM Charlie agreed to release Robert so he could receive medical attention. Robert was a retired psychiatrist with a history of heart disease, and had started to suffer chest pains. Goldie pleaded with Charlie to let her husband

get medical attention and she would stay with him. Robert, still in his robe and pajamas and clutching his chest, came out the front door of the house and he was rushed by ambulance to a nearby hospital.

Any hopes that the hostage-taker would follow up with the release of Goldie were short-lived. Conversations between the HNT, who had taken over from the patrol officers, and Charlie continued but they were of short duration and not successful. Some time during the afternoon, tensions mounted when Charlie became erroneously convinced that the police had entered the house. He became frantic, running from room to room, holding Goldie in front of him as a human shield and firing out the window at the police who surrounded the house. The situation remained deadlocked throughout the afternoon. Eventually Charlie realized that the police were not in the house so he calmed down and agreed to speak once again with negotiators. Hopeful that fatigue would overtake the hostage-taker, HNT members tried to keep the dialogue going by telephone as long as possible so as to deny Charlie the opportunity to rest.

Goldie, now the sole hostage, was also watching for the same signs of weariness in Charlie. At about 6PM, she noticed that Charlie's head was nodding while he was talking on the telephone with the negotiators. On more than one occasion, he actually dropped the phone and dozed off for a minute or two. She had planned her escape when she noticed this behavior and started backing toward the bedroom door while still facing her captor. When he dropped the telephone handset once again and started to doze while sitting on the bed, she opened the door as quietly as possible and walked down the staircase and went directly to the front door. She paused in the open doorway until she was spotted by one of the police

officers assigned to the front perimeter of the house. She made a dash toward him and was brought into a nearby home that was being used as a Command Post. When Charlie awoke from his short nap, he picked up the fallen telephone and told the police negotiator that he knew that Goldie had gotten away but he didn't seem upset by her escape. The dialogue with the negotiators continued on and off for the rest of the afternoon into the evening. Charlie continued to state that he wouldn't come out, despite repeated assurances that nobody would hurt him. The Conversation phase all during this incident would have to be considered as unsatisfactory since the dialogue was never ongoing or meaningful.

At approximately 11PM, a police robot, operated by remote control from the Command Post, was sent into the residence. This robot is capable of climbing steps and is equipped with video cameras, spotlights and a speaker system with an audio capability. The robot entered the residence through the side entrance and a video search was conducted by use of the cameras. It was determined that Charlie was not on the ground floor of the house so the robot was then moved to the staircase leading to the second floor of the residence. The robot ascended the stairs and when it arrived on the upper landing, Charlie could be seen on the video monitor pointing his rifle at the robot. The robot operator, using the speaker system, ordered Charlie to drop his weapon. Instead, he began to fire repeatedly at the robot. He shot the spotlights out but the camera and speaker system continued to work. Eventually, one of the shots severed the power cable and the robot ceased to function. When this happened, Charlie went back into the upstairs bedroom and called the negotiators on the phone to say that "...the score was now Charlie 1 and the Robot 0."

The robot, even though it was put out of service, was actually blocking the narrow

upper hallway, so it served as a barrier to confine Charlie to the front upstairs bedroom. This enabled ESU officers to take up positions in the downstairs part of the house where they would be in position to prevent his escape. From approximately 3AM to about 9AM the standoff continued. When the negotiators tried to call Charlie during this time to ask if he wanted anything or wished to talk to anybody, he refused to answer the telephone.

At about 9AM, officers on the ground floor level reported hearing a shot fired in the bedroom. Negotiators continued to try to get Charlie to answer the telephone. Shortly after noon ESU officers entered the upstairs bedroom and found Charlie's dead body on the floor with a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head.

Conclusion

Charlie's suicide did not come as a complete surprise to the HNT members who were involved with this situation. The failure to establish any meaningful dialogue, especially after the second hostage escaped, made this outcome a strong possibility. Experts on the phenomenon known "as suicide by cop" tell us that "...this is not a capricious act of mania or rage but rather a calculated attempt to force the police to act as executioners"(Feuer, 1998). Charlie seemed to be acting out a suicide ritual that involved killing off his parents and friends and engaging in behavior that would force the police to kill him. Charlie became convinced that he didn't have long to live and he told the police negotiators more than once that he was going to die. There is no medical evidence to support his belief and there also is no record of his ever having received psychiatric care. One acquaintance said that Charlie was a "walking time bomb" and he didn't want to be around when he went off (Faison, 1991). Since Charlie did not leave a suicide note, it will never be known what drove him to such an

extreme and violent end to his life.

CASE NUMBER FOUR – THE REPEAT OFFENDER

Introduction

This fourth and final case study was selected not because it was unique but rather because it has many of the elements of incidents that hostage negotiators, not only in New York City but around the world encounter on a regular basis. It is a hostage situation that involves on-going violence to a spouse or other intimate. The FBI has reported that these types of incidents are on the rise and the police has urged social welfare agencies to improve their training and cooperation in order to stem the tide of this serious problem.

The hostage-taker in this situation is unique in that he was a repeat domestic violence offender and a repeat hostage situation offender in the same year. When the police became aware of the subject's previous involvement with hostages-- family members held against their will and threatened with harm -- the on-scene commanders wondered whether it would be possible to successfully negotiate for the second or third time with the same individual, or would it be necessary to order an immediate assault on the location by the tactical (ESU) officers to resolve the incident.

The HNT Commander requested that the On-Scene Commander postpone plans for a tactical assault until they could determine whether it might be possible to resolve the stand-off without violence. The FBI has cautioned local police agencies that based on their research domestic violence motivated hostage situations are often no-win incidents. However, careful and thorough evaluation by trained and disciplined HNT and tactical officers can often succeed where others might fail. The following case study is a good example of one such situation.

Context and Containment Phase

Early one Sunday afternoon the police were called to a family dispute in a multiple story building. At the location, looking through the window of a ground floor apartment, the officers saw a male holding a woman and young girl at knife point. The officers did not try to enter the apartment but they tried to calm the male by talking to him from the street. Their supervisor soon arrived at the scene and immediately requested that ESU and HNT respond. In less than 5 minutes ESU officers were on the scene and replaced precinct officers at the window. They also established an inner perimeter which contained the incident and limited the number of persons having access to the subject. Meanwhile, precinct officers evacuated the occupants of adjacent apartments and moved them away from the building.

The large crowd of neighbors and spectators which had assembled seemed to make the subject more excited and the situation more volatile. When additional officers arrived at the location, they moved the assembled spectators further away. That seemed to calm the male to some degree, although he continued to threaten to harm the two hostages. The man at the window yelled to the police that his name was Joseph and the women were his wife, Veronica, and his daughter, Lucy. At that point, Joseph had not harmed either hostage, but he continued yelling to the officers that if they tried to stop him he would kill them both. A check of the Domestic Violence Files at the local Precinct turned up no prior record for the location. Because the police did not have the full names for the individuals involved, they were unable to check further. At this point in the situation, the Context was marginally favorable and the Containment was satisfactory.

Conversation Phase

Within a half an hour of the initial call, the HNT was on the scene. Telephone communication with Joseph was quickly established. The initial contact with Joseph had been made by yelling back and forth an obviously unsatisfactory way of establishing a meaningful dialogue. When Joseph was at the window, he continued to hold his hostages with his arm around their necks and he moved the knife from the neck of one to the other, a method of communication that kept both the police and the hostage-taker at an emotionally high level. When the HNT arrived at the scene, ESU officers were persuaded to stop their communicating with Joseph and permit all dialogue to be carried out by telephone with the police negotiators. This resulted in moving Joseph away from the window while he talked on the telephone, a tactic that dampened emotions for both the hostage-taker and the police.

During the initial dialogue, Joseph, who was 43 years old, kept threatening to harm 35-year-old Veronica and 12-year-old Lucy if the police attempted to storm the apartment. The police negotiator reassured him that they would neither storm the apartment, nor shoot at him. In exchange, Joseph had to promise that he would not provoke the police by menacing his wife and his daughter with the knife. Joseph told the negotiator that he was upset because his wife was not taking care of his children. In effect, he was holding his family hostage, as he had done before, because he wanted Veronica to be a better mother.

When the HNT learned of the previous hostage incident involving Joseph, a more focused search was made of the Domestic Violence files which disclosed that nine months previous to this incident, Joseph had held his wife and three daughters hostage for more than six hours. He had allowed his daughters to leave the apartment but he refused to release his wife. When he fell asleep the police were able to get his wife safely out of the apartment and

then they overpowered him and took him into custody. He was arrested on a variety of charges, pleaded guilty to a reduced charge and was sentenced to six months in a New York City jail. One week before this incident, he had been released from jail and it only took him a day to locate his family, since they had only moved a block away from their former home.

The negotiators initially attempted to convince Joseph to release Lucy. They told him that, if he loved his daughter, as he claimed, there was no reason for him to hurt her or continue holding her at knife point. After about two hours of intense and focused conversation, Joseph allowed his daughter to leave the apartment. But he insisted that he was going to kill his wife and then take his own life. Yet over the next seven hours, Joseph continued talking with the negotiators who stressed the importance of young children being with their mother as they were growing up. As more time passed, Joseph became less combative and angry and he admitted that "perhaps" he should have been in better control of his emotions and not acted so violently toward Veronica.

Seven hours after the incident began, he agreed to release Veronica. This happened after the HNT permitted Joseph to speak with his sister, who was present at the scene. After Veronica left the apartment, Joseph became deeply depressed. He told the Negotiator that he was a failure as a husband and father and the only thing left now was for him to commit suicide. The Negotiator, who had been on the phone during most of the negotiations, now worked on trying to impress upon Joseph the importance of maintaining the family structure. Even if he had to go to jail for his past conduct, the Negotiator said, there would come a time when he would be released. If he committed suicide, however he would never see his

children grow up, get married, and have his grandchildren. They might forgive him for his past conduct, the Negotiator said, but his wife and children would never forgive him if he committed suicide. This theme seemed to strike a chord in him and in less than an hour after he released his wife, he put down his weapon and surrendered to the police.

Conclusion

When Veronica and Lucy were interviewed after their release, they both said they believed that Joseph was going to kill them. His fury and rage were constant, and nothing they could say would deflect him from what he threatened to do to them. They became even more frightened when the police arrived on the scene because they thought the police would try to shoot and, if they missed, they would be killed. Knowing that the police had to overpower him when they were called before, they believed that Joseph would sooner die than surrender and be sent back to jail.

Veronica said that Joseph wasn't always a violent man but when he lost one job after another because of his drinking, he "took it into his head" that she was running around with other men. Lucy was always taking her mother's side against him and he was always calling her bad names if she expressed any interest in young men her age. Drinking made him act "crazy" and they lived in constant fear. Things started to get better when Joseph was "away" but when Veronica told him by telephone, while he was in jail, that he couldn't return to living with them, he said she would regret telling him that.

The police Negotiator felt that Joseph had a volatile temper and a great deal of anger but as long as he wasn't challenged or threatened he could be reasonable. The Negotiator continually referred back to Joseph's statements that he was a "good father and husband" and

he was only wanting what was best for his family. If he was speaking the truth, the Negotiator asked, then how could a good father and husband hurt his family? It took a very long time and a great deal of patience to hear this subject out; but by not interrupting, the Negotiator was able to establish a relationship of trust which brought about a successful resolution.

When the precinct and ESU officers started a dialogue with Joseph they ignored his taunts and insults and were able to buy the time needed to get HNT members on the scene. The HNT was able to develop and steer the dialogue started by the initial police officers at the incident. Over time, they moved the emotional level lower and steered the conversation into areas that resonated with Joseph and eventually led him to the final resolution. The successful resolution of this incident was due to the team work, discipline and training on the part of the numerous police officers who had responded to a perilous hostage situation. After his arrest and later arraignment, Joseph pleaded guilty to all charges, including parole violation for the first incident, and he is now serving a long sentence at a state prison.

CHAPTER SEVEN - SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Summary

Chapter One noted that when new procedures in policing are introduced, they often have a very transient impact. Frequently, the new initiative is abandoned and the police go back to business as usual. However, the hostage negotiation strategy, which is the subject of this study, is an exception. Despite its relative newness, it has been adopted by almost every local, state and federal agency in the United States, and by many police departments worldwide (Albanese & Mohandie, 1995). Employing containment and negotiation strategies to resolve hostage or barricade situations has rapidly become the general policy of most police agencies. Yet some police executives have recently asserted that the monetary cost and number of personnel necessary for these strategies is an excessive and wasteful way to resolve such incidents. They advocate a tactical or SWAT deployment-- meeting force with force-- as the quickest and most economical way to resolve such incidents. While they admit that mistakes were made in the past - - e.g. the siege at Ruby Ridge, Idaho and Waco, Texas -- they regard these incidents as aberrations, which should not constrain police commanders. This ongoing argument of action tactics versus talk tactics, is not likely to be settled soon especially in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This chapter also explained the organization of this study, which is limited to domestic-type hostage and barricade situations, and expressly excludes terrorist-type hostage-taking, hijacking, kidnappings and prison uprisings, subjects which should be examined separately to be properly understood.

Chapter Two is a review of the literature relating to the subject matter of hostage

negotiation. The references cited herein were carefully selected and represent the most insightful authors and the most current developments in the field. This chapter cites scholars and practitioners who have made contributions to our understanding of this subject. One such scholar is Frederick Hacker, author of the 1973 study Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism In Our Time. That study advanced Hacker's design of an interpretive model that helps to explain the explosive symptomatic violence of the late 1960's and early 1970's. It also presented convincing arguments for the law enforcement community to accept and adopt the expertise of the mental health community. Hacker advocates joining the knowledge and skills of the psychology and sociology disciplines with those of the criminal justice disciplines in a working partnership for the benefit of the community. Hacker explains his model in great detail and suggests that his template has universal application. While Hacker's motivational model has often been utilized as a typology for hostage taking, and for understanding the psychological makeup of the subjects, it lacks a resolution prediction capability. Obviously, the ability to predict an incident's resolution is very important to police commanders.

Ronald Crelinsten and Denis Szabo are the co-authors of the 1979 study, Hostage Taking, which examines the relationship between theory and practice and the interface between research and policy. One focus of their examination involves the key question of how hostage-taking events should be categorized to facilitate understanding and outcome prediction. They advance the idea that a typology based on context is more useful than a typology based on motive. Their model also posits a direct and continuous relationship between the offender, the victim and the police.

Because this contextual model has not been used to examine any data set for hypotheses testing, its usefulness is problematic. On the other hand, it does contain many important elements that have been neglected by others. After some modification however, it can serve as an operational tool. While such modifications do not radically change the Crelinsten and Szabo model, they do bring it more in line with the actual components that are interacting in these incidents. In the modification the emphasis is on context, containment and conversation rather than motive. This is the model that will be used in the analysis of the sample of cases selected from the files of the NYPD Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT).

At the end of this chapter the two main research questions of this study are presented:

- 1.) how do incidents that are resolved violently differ from incidents resolved without violence where the proposed variables (context, containment and conversation) are included one at a time in the statistical analysis and;
- 2.) which of these proposed variables, when included jointly in the statistical analysis, is most predictive of a violent or non-violent resolution.

Chapter Three discusses the research methods used in this study. Definitions of hostage and barricade situations are presented and the manner in which the sample was selected is discussed. Before this study was undertaken there were concerns that the case folders would not have sufficient information to test any hypotheses. After conducting a basic survey of the case files, it was determined that there was sufficient data available. Next is an explanation of how the code book was constructed and the data was coded. The construction of the code book was made easier by another researcher who had examined the

NYPD files for a different study. His code book provided a sample framework for this study. The code book in this study has seven major sections and six to ten sub-sections for each unit. A copy of the code book and a sample of all code sheets is included as an appendix to this study.

Chapter Four is the first of the three analysis chapters and it describes in detail the frequencies of the study variables. There are seven major sections. The first is the Event Variables. For the 10 year period encompassed by this study there are 170 hostage situations and 190 barricade incidents, thus providing 360 total incidents for analysis. Each incident is then broken down as follows: time of notification; county of incident; day of the week; initial classification; type of locale; classification of caller; circumstances; duration. The second major section is the Hostage-Taker (HT) / Barricaded Individual (BI) Variables. A brief overview of the subjects in this study would show the characteristics with the greatest frequency are a single, male, African-American /Black, 21 to 30 years old. In many incidents it could not be determined if the HT/BI had an arrest history or a mental health history. In Hostages Variables, the third major section, only 170 hostage situations are examined since by definition these are the only incidents with a person being held. The characteristics of a hostage with the greatest frequency are a single, female, African-American/Black, 1 to 5 years old. Many of the hostages were held in their home by a parent or close relative. In Police Variables, the fourth section, most incidents are shown to have at least two on-scene commanders (OSC), one Emergency Service Unit (ESU) commander and one Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT) commander. Most OSCs are captains, most ESU commanders are sergeants, and most HNT commanders are lieutenants. Almost all of the police commanders

are males, White, and 41 to 50 years old. Most of the OSCs have 21 to 35 years of police service. ESU and HNT commanders have 21 to 30 years of police service. Most of the OSCs and the ESU commanders have served in their civil service rank for 1 to 5 years and the HNT commanders have 6 to 10 years in their civil service rank. In Others Present Variables, the fifth section the frequency of other NYPD units present at these incidents is shown. The frequency of non-NYPD investigative agencies, state or Federal police agencies, medical/mental health units, third party interveners (TPI), new media, elected/appointed government officials, and foreign government official presence at incidents is also detailed. In Significant Behavior During Incident Variables, the sixth section, the study details confrontations with the police, incident contained or not contained, dialogue started or not started, TPI use or not used, subject demands, and demands accepted by the police. The seventh and final section, Resolution Variables, displays a breakdown of any injuries to the hostage-taker or barricaded individual and who caused the injury, and injuries to a hostage or police officer and who caused the injury. Lastly, the method of surrender and the incident resolution frequency is displayed.

Chapter Five is the second analysis section, namely the testing of the hypotheses. All of the hypotheses that make up the contextual model (context, containment and conversation) are tested using the sample of incidents. These hypotheses define and operationalize the parameters of these terms as they are used in this study. How the variables are selected and how they were re-coded to be tested is explained. For example, a favorable context consists of two mutually inclusive areas: 1.) no injury or violence occurred prior to the arrival of the police and/or 2.) no violent confrontation occurred when the police arrived at the incident.

Then these separate variables are combined into one new re-coded variable to determine if the context is favorable or unfavorable. Containment is more easily noted but conversation has to be determined based on criteria that must be clearly explained. Then a breakdown for hostage only situations, barricade only incidents and the total for all incidents is shown. In this study there are three independent variables and one dependent variable and all of these variables are dichotomous. A bivariate analysis is conducted and shown in table form with supporting text. The relative frequency of violence or injury in incident resolution is tested based on favorable/unfavorable context in hostage only situations, barricade only incidents and the total for all incidents. The same analysis for containment and conversation is performed. The results of the bivariate analysis are then summarized. A multi-variate analysis is performed on the sample data using logistic regression and the findings reported in the form of odds-ratio tables with text. There are 27 tables in this chapter.

Chapter Six is the last part of this study's analysis. Four case studies of actual incidents from the NYPD Hostage Negotiation Team files are presented. Three of the cases are hostage situations and one is a barricade incident. One of the incidents is resolved violently and the other three non-violently. These case studies illustrate the complexity of crisis situation resolutions. While there are no "typical" hostage or barricade incidents, the selected cases serve as excellent illustrations of the dynamics encountered in these tense scenarios. The written word often seems inadequate to capture the emotion and tension inherent in these sieges but it is hoped that readers may gain insight into these incidents from these presentations.

Conclusion

The objective of this study was to compare and analyze various strategies used by the police to resolve hostage and barricade situations, and to develop a framework to facilitate an accurate prediction of the resolution of the incident, and whether that resolution will be violent or non-violent. In its wider ramifications, this study provides an appropriate framework to evaluate, interpret, and better understand these volatile incidents. This study will also assist police policy makers, academics and citizens to better understand the dynamics of these situations. It will provide public officials and criminal justice practitioners with reliable and concrete information upon which to base germane policy recommendations concerning police procedures and training (Goldstein, 1990; Fyfe, 1999, Buerger, 2004). Because of the lack of a suitable framework, administrators and policy makers are often unable to distinguish between proper practice with an undesirable resolution, and mere violence that is deemed excessive (President's Commission on Law Enforcement, 1968; Fyfe, 1979; Friedrich, 1980; Fyfe, 1981, 1981a & 1982; Mayo, 1985; Fyfe, 1998; Blair, 1999). This research also fills a void in the literature by supplementing research findings from psychology and presenting police tactical action and its consequences in a context that can be examined and evaluated.

One conspicuous feature in the evolution of police rules and regulations is that the rules "...tend to reflect organizational responses to a single case". The public, according to many in the police culture, view shooting someone as an "essential part of the stock-in-trade of police work" (Manning, p.143). When an officer is involved in a violent incident, such as a shooting, an affirmation of a "basic identity" takes place but Manning asserts "there is very

little possibility for accolades for the avoidance of violence. If there were, the sense of a competent self could be expanded to include and reinforce the nonviolent self" (Ibid, pp.141-144). This dissertation will contribute to the field of knowledge by developing an analytic model which facilitates further research and inquiry into these complex situations (Stone, 1999). It is possible to lessen what James Fyfe calls the *Split-Second Syndrome* that affects police decision making in crisis situations by developing greater police diagnostic expertise. Fyfe (1968) defines the *Split-Second Syndrome* as the mistaken belief that, because police work is unique and time constraints and stress are usually present, no set of principles can be applied to the diagnosis of specific situations. This research, however, demonstrates that general principles may be applied to the diagnosis of specific situations (Harrison, 1999).

In many cities, police departments have been strapped for funds for years; and if citizens are going to make a bigger investment in the police, they are also going to insist that police departments become more accountable - a principle downplayed in the current enthusiasm for aggressive policing (Currie, p.183). There is no evidence that police must endanger lives and violate basic civil liberties in order to control crime (Ibid, p.183). Since the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001, many inside and outside the law enforcement community are advancing ideas on how the police should respond to any future terrorist events. However, the fear of a terrorist attack should never be the justification for a "shoot first and ask questions later" type of policy. Indeed, the police should never be permitted to adopt tactics that violate basic civil rights or are premised on emotional rather than rational principles. Procedures that have been tested over time, such as hostage negotiation, should be continued and expanded upon because they have been shown to be more rational, and

safer for the citizen and the police. This study will assist police executives and policy makers in preventing unnecessary violence and make a valuable contribution to law enforcement and the community as a whole. "In a civilized society what matters is not just whether we reduce crime, but how. And how seriously and honestly we confront that question in the coming years will be a test of our character as a nation" (Currie, p.193).

Implications

In Chapter One three unresolved issues were presented (see pages 3-9) and this study has significance for these issues. The three issues that were discussed can be summarized as follows:

- 1.) hostage negotiation versus tactical action;
- 2.) domestic violence hostage situations;
- 3.) police assisted suicides or "Suicide by cop" incidents.

In the on-going debate over hostage negotiation versus tactical action some of the concerns of police commanders involves the effectiveness of tactics, cost and expenditures of scarce resources, in particular, personnel. Since police agencies must operate within a predetermined budget the idea of incurring cost overruns or deficit spending is unacceptable to an agency head. Hostage negotiations can be a time consuming procedure and this should be factored into an agency's budget calculations. One solution that the NYPD has adopted is to estimate, based on an average of previous years, what amount of money would be necessary to pay for overtime, equipment, etc. in the event of such situations. Other public agencies, such as highway/street repair or sanitation departments, do this for snow removal or flood control. These funds are usually placed in a special budget line and if some or all of

the money is not used in a fiscal year the money is rolled-over to the next year. This bookkeeping procedure works well to keep an agency from suffering a huge budget cost overrun in any particular year. It also should be mentioned that a jury award or out of court settlement resulting from a civil action can often cost a municipality far more than any overtime expense especially when tactical action results in serious injury or death. A police agency is not immune from litigation if it utilizes hostage negotiation procedures but the actions and procedures employed can put the department in a more defensible position in any civil action. If a non-violent resolution is the desired outcome of a hostage or barricade situation a police agency head would have a difficult time explaining why budget constraints took priority over preventing an injury or death resulting from such an incident.

Hostage and barricade situations are by their very nature inherently dangerous to the hostages, hostage-takers and the police. The use of hostage negotiations procedures has been shown to lessen the danger to all parties. This is an important factor that is often overlooked in the debate between negotiations versus tactical action and it can not be emphasized often enough especially if we consider not only the physical danger involved but the psychological trauma that can result from a violent outcome. Police administrators are accountable for permitting tactical action that have unfavorable resolutions and law enforcement agencies can suffer immeasurable harm if they are perceived to be brutal or insensitive to citizens, even those accused of crimes. The damage done to the reputation of the FBI and ATF, as a result of the Ruby Ridge and Waco incidents, will take many years, if ever, to mend. The police need the cooperation and support of the citizenry they serve and this is only possible when they are perceived to be fair and reasonable in their treatment of all people. The

implication for this issue is that an agency should not choose between negotiations versus tactical action but rather incorporate both into a cooperative and disciplined approach that can respond to and resolve incidents. Joint training should be mandated and an appreciation for the important role each unit plays in the resolution of critical incidents should be fostered. The public and the police will both benefit from this enlightened approach to these most difficult situations.

The second issue raised in Chapter One involves domestic violence hostage incidents. Many of these instances are resolved without violence but all of these situations have the potential to be resolved violently. An important factor in the resolution is the tactics employed by the police on the scene. In the beginning of this study it was stated that a model based on motive was not adequate for prediction of incident resolution. However, understanding the motive of the hostage-taker or barricaded subject is important to the HNT if they hope to establish a meaningful dialogue in the conversation phase of the incident. The mental health community has made great advances in explaining the dynamics of domestic violence and intervention in these situations requires knowledge of the issues that will be encountered.

Some of the issues that are part of domestic violence hostage situations involve substance abuse, loss of employment, custody of children and visitation rights, child support and/or alimony payments, anger management, stalking and orders of protection. These are some of the factors that can cause a hostage-taking situation. A peaceful resolution will usually only be possible if the HNT is knowledgeable of the myriad of problems that can be encountered and devise workable solution strategies. The subject in these incidents will often

times be frustrated with the bureaucratic process and convinced that the “system” is against him and he can never successfully overcome the feeling that he is a loser. This sense of failure permeates everything he attempts and results in a feeling of helplessness and hopelessness. These feelings are similar to the ones that psychologists say are encountered in suicidal individuals. Oftentimes domestic violence offenders speak of a lack of viable options and the only course open to them is homicide/suicide in hostage situations and suicide in barricade incidents.

Therefore, in this study the motivational model is not applicable to predicting resolution but rather to strategies for conversation. The HNT has to be skillful in directing the dialogue away from suicide and toward realistic and obtainable options. Future study and a closer examination of dialogue used in incidents will enable researchers and practitioners to make recommendations as to the advantages of one verbal strategy over another. As negotiators gain experience and when sufficient time is available they may become more adept at turning domestic violence hostage-takers away from suicide. The contextual model and the motivational model can co-exist and complement each other when used properly to explain and resolve these dynamic situations.

The third unresolved issue presented in the first chapter was the phenomena known as police assisted suicide also labeled “suicide by cop” (SBC). The methodology used in this study can be applied to the investigation of SBC situations. The Context, Containment and Conversation model can be helpful in isolating these incidents and the variables identified can be used as a guide for researchers. SBC situations are problematic, especially when the actions of the subject are open to interpretation and not clearly indicative of a suicide

modality. Family members and significant others will often reject the suicide determination and insist that the police overreacted and other means were available to restrain the individual. In instances where the subject displayed a toy gun or an unloaded weapon the question can be raised was the subject truly suicidal or was it a bluff. Often a public outcry against a police action can result in a reluctance of police officials or prosecutors to endorse a SBC determination. It appears that only in those instances where there can be no doubt of the intentions of the deceased, e.g. a suicide note was left behind, can public officials be sure that the confrontation was a true SBC incident. Unfortunately, this is a rare occurrence.

The methodology used in this study can be modified to examine those questionable situations and might be able to assist policy makers and police officials with criteria for evaluation of behavior of the parties involved. This could also assist law enforcement agencies with recommendations for police training to avoid or lessen the number of encounters that have this fatal potential and also place the agency in a more favorable position in the event of a criminal or civil court proceeding arising from the event. If the phenomena of SBC can be better understood perhaps the frequency of these incidents can be diminished.

At the beginning of this study it was proposed that a phenomenological model based on context, containment and conversation would be superior to a motivational model for predicting incident resolution. The results of the statical analysis support this proposal. Obviously, this model is more of a work-in-progress than a finished product, and further analysis and refinement should help to improve the prediction ability of this model. Therefore, the report encourages researchers and/or practitioners to utilize this model to

examine hostage and barricade incidents from their jurisdictions, and to evaluate its prediction ability. When additional data becomes available, this model can serve as a basic framework that can be amplified and augmented.

Some areas of research could not be developed in this study because specific data was not recorded or not retrievable from the official records. In some instances, additional data might have been obtained from audio or video recordings; but the lack of predetermined parameters and the sparsity of researchers trained to extract this material precluded any such effort (Houts & Ellias, 1999). However, sources outside of the police community would seem to offer valuable latent resources, such as audio or video tapes of interviews conducted by news reporters who were present at the incident. Obviously, access to this material would require written guidelines and legal consultations to avoid any First Amendment issues and smaller police departments would often lack the personnel, or technical equipment necessary to utilize these additional data sources. Even in larger departments, there are finite numbers of personnel, limited amounts of available technical equipment, and issues of cost effectiveness, namely whether the results obtained would justify the expenditure.

If this outside source material were combined with debriefings from initial responding police officers, tactical officers and hostage negotiators, as well as with all interviews conducted by investigators with family members, neighbors and other witnesses, it would facilitate the establishing of an accurate time sequence of developments during an incident, and provide a treasure-trove of reliable data to help make accurate predictions of resolution outcome. A recent article in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin recommends the use of negotiation position papers (NPP) to provide the on-scene commander with periodic

written briefings that give the status of the incident, an assessment or analysis of the incident and recommendations as to strategy that should be pursued (Dalfonzo & Romano, 2003). This study will assist practitioners in formatting an NPP and in their identification and evaluation of the context, containment and conversation phases (Trompetter & Hornig, 1999). This model and tools such as the NPP and could prove invaluable both during an incident, and afterwards of post-incident critiques and in the course of litigation proceedings.

This writer proposes a reformulation of the recommendations that Frederick Hacker made in 1974 before the Congressional Committee on Internal Security (see Chap. 2, p.30). He called for the formation of a specialized Federal task force to manage and negotiate all terrorist hostage situations in place of local law enforcement agencies. These recommendations were not acted upon and the FBI continues to be the agency responsible for terrorist related incidents, including hostage-taking. I also recommend the formation of a special task force but solely to act as a research team and not to manage or negotiate hostage or barricade situations. This research team would closely resemble the response of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) to a reported airplane crash or train wreck. When a transportation accident (train, boat or airplane) is confirmed, investigators from different disciplines and work experience are activated and respond as a "Go Team" to the crash site. Their accident investigation is divided into different phases, such as mechanical, human factors, engineering, weather, etc. and team members try to assemble as much data as possible in their area of expertise. The proposed "Go Team" would respond to an ongoing incident not a past event, but the methodology would be similar. Team members would be selected for their expertise in such different disciplines as police administration, psychology,


media, tactics, crisis negotiations, etc.; they would be responsible for identifying and documenting many of the variables that impact on the situation and the resolution. Initially, the participants should resemble the task force Hacker recommended, and any additions should be kept to the minimum needed to accomplish the research agenda. Obviously, their ability to function in this emotionally charged atmosphere would improve as they gain experience. Their special expertise, their prior vetting by the FBI and/or the NYPD, and their being sanctioned by the police agency involved would make them a welcome addition at the incident site. Since their mission is not to replace or supersede any Federal or local law enforcement negotiator, but rather to supplement and enhance resolution efforts, much of the native reluctance of the participants to cooperate with “outsiders” should gradually diminish. While this type of in-depth investigation should not be attempted for short term, non-violent incidents, it should be utilized for the more protracted incidents that involve widespread violence, the realistic threat of injury to hostages, or that involve a large number of hostages and/or subjects. Hopefully, this research team could capture and operationalize some of the variables not presently realized because of time or personnel constraints, thus leading to better understanding of hostage and barricade dynamics. It is hoped that Dr. Hacker and others in the scientific community would endorse these recommendations and modifications since their overall goal is to increase the aggregate of objective scientific data (Webb,1966; Buerger, 2004).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A



NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT - HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS UNIT
HOSTAGE/BARRICADE SITUATIONS
1973-1997



APPENDIX B (1 of 3)

SURVEY OF 1988 DATA

Case No.	Borough	Precinct	Time	Contained Yes/No	Dialogue Yes/No	Weapon Yes/No	Rel w/Host Yes/No	Rank of OSC			Rank of ESU			Rank of HNT			Hostage Inj/Shot/DOA Yes/No	Hostage Taker Inj/Shot/DOA Yes/No	3rd Party Intervenor Yes/No	Duration
								Cpt	DI	In Ch	S/L	Cpt	DI	In Ch	S	L				
H002	MAN.	024	0833	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			X		X			X	No	Yes	Yes	13:00	
B008	QNS.	113	2130	Yes	Yes	Yes	---	X		X				X		---	No	No	02:00	
H009	QNS.	112	0915	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	X				X		X		No	No	Yes	07:00	
H012	MAN.	032	2015	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			X	X			X		No	No	No	03:00	
B015	QNS.	109	2000	Yes	Yes	Yes	---	X			X			X		---	No	No	01:15	
H017	BKN.	084	1430	Yes	Yes	Yes	No			X			X	X		No	No	Yes	03:00	
H020	MAN.	025	0505	Yes	Yes	Yes	No			X	X			X		No	No	Yes	02:30	
H022	MAN.	026	1900	Yes	Yes	Yes	No			X			X	X		No	No	Yes	08:30	
H030	QNS.	114	1305	Yes	Yes	No	Yes			X	X			X		No	No	No	01:00	
H031	QNS.	101	2345	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			X			X		X	No	Yes	No	04:00	
B040	BRX.	042	0915	Yes	Yes	Yes	---	X			X			X		---	No	No	09:00	
H041	MAN.	030	0140	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			X			X	X		No	Yes	No	03:00	
H043	BRX.	047	1220	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	X			X			X		Yes	Yes	No	00:45	
H044	MAN.	005	0930	Yes	Yes	Yes	No			X		X		X		No	No	No	03:00	
H046	QNS.	115	0830	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	X				X		X		Yes	Yes	No	03:00	

APPENDIX B (2 of 3)

SURVEY OF 1988 DATA

Case No.	Borough	Precinct	Time	Contained Yes/No	Dialogue Yes/No	Weapon Yes/No	Rel w/Host Yes/No	Rank of OSC			Rank of ESU			Rank of HNT		Hostage Inj/Shot/DOA Yes/No	Hostage Taker Inj/Shot/DOA Yes/No	3rd Party Intervenor Yes/No	Duration	
								Cpt	D/In	Ch	S/L	Cpt	D/In	Ch	S					L
B047	MAN.	025	1040	Yes	Yes	Yes	---	X				X			X		---	No	No	04:30
B049	BKN.	060	2335	Yes	Yes	Yes	---			X				X	X		---	No	No	02:00
B052	QNS.	106	0940	Yes	No	No	---		X			X			X		---	No	No	02:00
B053	BRX.	044	0840	Yes	No	No	---		X		X				X		---	No	No	01:00
B054	QNS.	115	1905	No	Yes	Yes	---	X					X		X		---	No	No	02:00
H059	BRX.	041	2355	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			X	X				X		No	No	Yes	04:30
H062	BRX.	044	0530	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			X	X				X		No	No	No	02:00
B066	BKN.	070	2315	Yes	Yes	Yes	---		X		X				X		---	No	NO	00:30
H069	QNS.	113	1645	Yes	No	Yes	Yes		X			X			X		No	No	No	03:00
H070	QNS.	101	0215	Yes	No	No	Yes	X			X				X		No	No	No	01:00
B071	MAN.	007	1150	No	Yes	Yes	---	X			X				X		---	No	No	02:30
B073	BKN.	069	1435	Yes	Yes	No	---	X			X				X		---	No	No	01:15
H074	BRX.	044	1350	Yes	No	No	Yes			X	X				X		No	No	NO	02:00
B075	BRX.	048	0740	Yes	Yes	Yes	---			X	X				X		---	No	No	07:00
B076	MAN.	005	0625	Yes	Yes	No	---		X		X				X		---	No	No	01:00

APPENDIX B (3 of 3)

SURVEY OF 1988 DATA

Case No.	Borough	Precinct	Time	Contained Yes/No	Dialogue Yes/No	Weapon Yes/No	Rel w Host Yes/No	Rank of OSC			Rank of Esu			Rank of HNT			Hostage Inj/Shot/DOA Yes/No	Hostage Taker Inj/Shot/DOA Yes/No	3rd Party Intervenor Yes/No	Duration	
								Cpt	DI/In	Ch	S/L	Cpt	DI/In	Ch	S	L					Cpt
H087	MAN.	007	0600	Yes	No	Yes	Yes			X				X		X		Yes	Yes	Yes	08:30
B088	BRX.	048	2220	Yes	Yes	No	---		X		X					X		---	No	No	04:00
B091	MAN.	009	2230	Yes	No	No	---		X		X				X			---	No	Yes	04:00
B092	BRX.	049	2315	Yes	Yes	Yes	---		X		X					X		---	No	No	00:30
H093	QNS.	114	2125	Yes	Yes	No	Yes			X	X						X	No	No	No	02:15
H094	BKN.	088	1250	Yes	Yes	No	Yes			X	X					X		No	No	No	02:00
H095	BRX.	046	1540	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			X		X			X			No	No	No	06:15
B098	MAN.	030	1630	Yes	No	Yes	---		X			X				X		---	No	No	01:15
B100	MAN.	025	1755	Yes	No	No	---		X			X			X			---	No	No	00:30
H101	MAN.	009	2200	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	X			X				X			No	No	No	00:30
H102	BRX.	052	0450	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	X			X				X			No	No	No	01:00
B104	BRX.	048	0210	Yes	Yes	Yes	---	X			X				X			---	No	No	00:30
B107	BRX.	050	0655	Yes	Yes	Yes	---	X			X				X			---	No	No	02:00

APPENDIX C

McGOWAN'S CODE BOOK

<u>Description</u>	<u>Variable Code</u>
Event Variables:	
1.) Type of incident	01 Hostage 02 Barricade
2.) Date of incident	code exact = _ _ / _ _ / _ _
3.) Time incident started (mil.)	code exact = _ _ _ _ _ 9999 = unknown
4.) Day of week of incident	01 Sunday 05 Thursday 02 Monday 06 Friday 03 Tuesday 07 Saturday 04 Wednesday
5.) Precinct of incident (Pct. #)	code exact = _ _ _ _ outside NYC = 666
6.) Type of location of incident	01 private house / 2/3 family 02 apartment building 03 street/bridge/tunnel 04 church/temple/mosque 05 store / commercial bldg. 06 school/college building 07 government building 08 motor vehicle 09 train, plane, or boat 10 hotel, motel, rooming house 11 hospital/nursing home 99 unknown
7.) Time police notified (mil.)	code exact = _ _ _ _ _ unknown = 9999

- 8.) Initial classification by 911
- 01 crime in progress / in past
 - 02 injury / sick case
 - 03 shots fired / person with gun
 - 04 hold-up / burglary alarm
 - 05 investigate problem / condition
 - 06 investigate domestic dispute
 - 07 emotionally disturbed person
 - 08 warrant / arrest situation
 - 09 officer needs assistance
 - 10 other
 - 88 n/a
 - 99 unknown
- 9.) Reported to 911 by
- 01 victim / hostage
 - 02 hostage taker / barricade
 - 03 family / neighbor / resident
 - 04 police officer
 - 05 other government agency
 - 06 passerby / motorist
 - 07 anonymous person
 - 08 other
 - 99 unknown
- 10.) Preamble to incident
- 01 actual / attempted crime
 - 02 domestic viol.-prev. history
 - 03 domestic viol.- no prev. history
 - 04 emotionally disturbed person
 - 05 warrant / arrest execution
 - 06 child welfare removal
 - 07 suicidal behavior
 - 08 protest / demonstration
 - 09 mixed behavior
 - 99 unknown
- 11.) Duration of incident (hours)
- code exact = _ _ _ _ _
 - unknown = 9999

- 18.) Mental health history
- 01 none
 - 02 previous / not hospitalized
 - 03 previous / hospitalized
 - 04 previous / depression
 - 05 previous / suicide attempts
 - 07 other
 - 99 unknown
- 19.) Relationship with hostages
- 01 no previous contact
 - 02 employee / student / neighbor
 - 03 previous domestic relationship
 - 04 previous non-domestic contact
 - 05 no hostages
 - 99 unknown

Hostage Variables (IF NONE GO TO QUESTION NO. 27)

- 20.) Number of hostages(s)
- code exact =
 - non-applicable = 88
 - unknown = 99
- 21.) Gender of hostage
- 01 male
 - 02 female
 - 88 non-applicable
 - 99 unknown
- 22.) Race of hostage
- 01 White (non-Hispanic)
 - 02 Afro-American/Black
 - 03 Caribbean American/Black
 - 04 Hispanic - Puerto Rican
 - 05 Hispanic - Mexican
 - 06 Hispanic - Dominican
 - 07 Hispanic - Peruvian
 - 08 Mixed (Black and Hispanic)
 - 09 Mixed (White and Hispanic)
 - 10 Asian (specify)
 - 11 Other
 - 12 Other biracial
 - 88 Non-applicable
 - 99 Unknown

23.) Age of hostage	code exact = <u> </u>
	non-applicable = 88
	unknown = 99
24.) Language(s) spoken/understood	01 English
	02 Spanish
	03 French
	04 Slavic
	05 Chinese
	06 Amer. Sign Lang.
	07 Japanese
	08 multi-lingual
	88 non-applicable
	99 unknown
25.) Reason for being at location	01 home
	02 work/school
	03 in transit
	04 conducting business
	05 visit family / friends
	06 kidnaped
	88 non-applicable
	99 unknown
26.) Relationship with H.T.(s)	01 no previous contact
	02 co-worker / student
	03 neighbor / landlord
	04 previous domestic relationship
	05 previous non-domestic
	06 other
	88 non-applicable
	99 unknown

Police Commanders Variables:

27.) Number of On-Scene Commanders (OSC)	code exact = ____ unknown = 99
28.) Rank of OSC	01 Sergeant 02 Lieutenant 03 Captain 04 Deputy Inspector 05 Inspector 06 Deputy Chief 07 Assistant Chief 08 Bureau Chief 09 Chief of Department 99 unknown
29.) Gender of OSC	01 male 02 female 99 unknown
30.) Race of OSC	01 White (non-Hispanic) 02 Afro-American/Black 03 Caribbean American/Black 04 Hispanic - Puerto Rican 05 Hispanic - Mexican 06 Hispanic - Dominican 07 Hispanic - Cuban 08 Mixed (Black and Hispanic) 09 Mixed (Black and White) 10 Asian (specify) 11 Other 12 Other biracial 99 Unknown
31.) Age of OSC	code exact = __ unknown = 99
32.) OSC years /months with the P.D.	code exact = __. __ n/a = 88 . 00 unknown = 99 . 00

33.) OCS Years /months in rank	code exact = <u> </u> . <u> </u> n/a = 88.00 unknown = 99.00
34.) Number of Emergency Service Commanders (ESU)	code exact = <u> </u> n/a = 88 unknown = 99
35.) Rank of ESU	01 Sergeant 02 Lieutenant 03 Captain 04 Deputy Inspector 05 Inspector 06 Deputy Chief 07 Assistant Chief 88 n/a 99 unknown
36.) Gender of ESU	1 male 2 female 88 n/a 99 unknown
37.) Race of ESU	01 White (non-Hispanic) 02 Afro-American/Black 03 Caribbean American/Black 04 Hispanic - Puerto Rican 05 Hispanic - Mexican 06 Hispanic -Dominican 07 Hispanic - Cuban 08 Mixed (Black and Hispanic) 09 Mixed (Black and White) 10 Asian (specify) 11 Other 12 Other biracial 99 unknown
38) Age of ESU	code exact = <u> </u> n/a = 88 unknown = 99

- 51.) State/federal law enforcement present
- 01 NY State Police
 - 02 other state police agency
 - 03 FBI/DOJ (DEA)
 - 04 ATF/Treasury Dept/USSS
 - 05 Armed Forces Military Police
 - 06 other agency
 - 07 none
 - 99 unknown
- 52.) Third party intervener present
- 01 family/significant other
 - 02 clergy/teacher
 - 03 neighbor/fellow employee
 - 04 other
 - 05 none
 - 06 multiple parties
 - 99 unknown
- 53.) News media/reporters present
- 01 local/community press
 - 02 city news reporters
 - 03 national news reporters
 - 04 city TV/radio reporters
 - 05 national TV/radio reporters
 - 06 multiple response
 - 07 none
 - 99 unknown
- 54.) Elected official present
- 01 governor/mayor
 - 02 legislator/city council person
 - 03 district attorney/prosecutor
 - 04 other
 - 05 none
 - 99 unknown
- 55.) Foreign government official present
- 01 ambassador/deputy
 - 02 consul/deputy
 - 03 envoy/emissary
 - 04 other
 - 05 none
 - 99 unknown

Significant Behavior During Incident Variables:

56.) Time police arrived at incident	code exact = __: __ unknown = 00 : 00
57.) Confrontation of subject with police	01 no confrontation 02 shots fired / no injury 03 shots fired / injury 04 threaten with firearm 05 threaten with non-firearm 06 threaten verbally 07 other 99 unknown
58.) Incident contained by precinct officers	01 contained 02 not contained 03 other 99 unknown
59.) Dialogue started by precinct officers	01 unable to establish 02 established dialogue 03 started but broken off 04 other 99 unknown
60.) Time supervisor/duty captain arrived	code exact = __: __ unknown = 00 : 00
61.) Time ESU arrived on scene	code exact = __: __ unknown = 00 : 00
62.) Time HNT requested	code exact = __: __ unknown = 00 : 00

- 63.) HNT role at scene
- 01 establish dialogue
 - 02 takeover dialogue
 - 03 coached patrol / ESU
 - 04 coached other T.P.I.
 - 05 unable to have a dialogue
 - 06 stand-by status
 - 07 multiple roles
 - 08 other
 - 09 cancel en route /on scene
 - 99 unknown
- 64.) Number of negotiators present
- code exact = __
 - n/a = 88
 - unknown = 99
- 65.) Third party intervener employed
- 01 none used
 - 02 family/significant other
 - 03 clergy/teacher
 - 04 mental health professional
 - 05 other
 - 06 multiple parties
 - 99 unknown
- Resolution Variables:**
- 66.) Demands made by H.T. / B.I.
- 01 no demands
 - 02 not be arrested
 - 03 not be hospitalized
 - 04 custody / visit with children
 - 05 leave the country / airplane
 - 06 currency/gold/jewels/etc.
 - 07 not go / go back to prison
 - 08 bring wife/family /other here
 - 09 will not be harmed by police
 - 10 release prison inmate
 - 11 not sure of demands
 - 12 other
 - 99 unknown

- 67.) Demands complied with by police
- 01 none
 - 02 not be arrested
 - 03 not be hospitalized
 - 04 custody / visit with children
 - 05 leave the country / airplane
 - 06 currency/gold/jewels/etc.
 - 07 not go / go back to prison
 - 08 bring wife/family/other here
 - 09 will not be harmed by police
 - 10 release prison inmate
 - 11 other
 - 99 unknown
- 68.) Method of surrender
- 01 voluntarily existed location
 - 02 forced entry /no resistance
 - 03 forced entry /resisted arrest
 - 04 forced entry/hid inside location
 - 05 jumped from window /captured
 - 06 subject committed suicide
 - 07 subject escaped
 - 08 other
 - 99 unknown
- 69.) HT / BI Injured
- 01 not injured
 - 02 minor injury / R.M.A.
 - 03 serious injury /N.L.T.D.
 - 04 serious injury /L.T.D.
 - 05 deceased / DOA
 - 88 n/a
 - 99 unknown
- 70.) H.T. / B.I. Injured By
- 01 self-inflicted
 - 02 police
 - 03 non-participant
 - 04 hostage
 - 05 other (specify:_____)
 - 88 n/a
 - 99 unknown

- 71.) Hostage Injured
- 01 not injured
 - 02 minor injury / R.M.A.
 - 03 serious injury /N.L.T.D.
 - 04 serious injury / L.T.D.
 - 05 deceased / DOA
 - 88 n/a
 - 99 unknown
- 72.) Hostage Injured By
- 01 self-inflicted
 - 02 police
 - 03 cohort
 - 04 hostage-taker
 - 05 other (specify: _____)
 - 88 n/a
 - 99 unknown
- 73.) Police Officer Injured
- 01 not injured
 - 02 minor injury / R.M.A.
 - 03 serious injury /N.L.T.D.
 - 04 serious injury /L.T.D.
 - 05 deceased / D.O.A.
 - 88 n/a
 - 99 unknown
- 74.) Police Officer Injured By
- 01 self-inflicted
 - 02 police
 - 04 hostage-taker
 - 05 other (specify: _____)
 - 88 n/a
 - 99 unknown
- 75.) Incident Resolution
- 01 no violence
 - 02 minor violence
 - 03 moderate violence
 - 04 major violence
 - 05 extreme violence

**Additional Hostage-Taker (H.T.)/Barricaded Individual (B.I.) Variables
(Label 13a, 13b, etc.)**

HOSTAGE-TAKER # ___

BARRICADED SUBJECT # ___

13 __.) Gender of H.T. / B.I.

01 male
02 female
99 unknown

14 __.) Race of H.T. / B.I.

01 White (non-Hispanic)
02 Afro-American/Black
03 Caribbean American/Black
04 Hispanic - Puerto Rican
05 Hispanic - Mexican
06 Hispanic - Dominican
07 Other Hispanic
08 Mixed (Black and Hispanic)
09 Mixed (Black and White)
10 Asian (specify)
11 Other
12 Other biracial
99 Unknown

15 __.) Age of H.T. / B.I.

code exact = ___
unknown = 99

16 __.) Language spoken / understood

01 English
02 Spanish
03 French
04 Slavic
05 Chinese
06 Amer. Sign Lang.
07 other
08 mixed
99 unknown

17 __.) Criminal history

01 none
02 previous / non-violent
03 previous / violent
04 previous / domestic violence
99 unknown

18 __.) Mental health history

- 01 none
- 02 previous / not hospitalized
- 03 previous / hospitalized
- 04 previous / depression
- 05 previous / suicide attempts
- 07 other
- 99 unknown

19 __.) Relationship with hostages

- 01 no previous contact
- 02 employee / student / neighbor
- 03 previous domestic relationship
- 04 previous non-domestic contact
- 05 no hostages
- 99 unknown

Additional Hostage Variables
(Label 21a, 21b, etc.)

	HOSTAGE # __ __
21 __.) Gender of hostage	01 male 02 female 99 unknown
22 __.) Race of hostage	01 White (non-Hispanic) 02 Afro-American/Black 03 Caribbean American/Black 04 Hispanic - Puerto Rican 05 Hispanic - Mexican 06 Hispanic - Dominican 07 Other Hispanic 08 Mixed (Black and Hispanic) 09 Mixed (Black and White) 10 Asian (specify) 11 Other 12 Other biracial 99 unknown
23 __.) Age of hostage	code exact = __ __ unknown = 99
24 __.) Language(s) spoken/understood	01 English 02 Spanish 03 French 04 Slavic 05 Chinese 06 Sign 07 other 08 multi-lingual 99 unknown
25 __.) Reason for being at location	01 home 02 work/school 03 in transit 04 conducting business 99 unknown

26__.) Relationship with H.T.(s)

- 01 no previous contact
- 02 fellow employee / student
- 03 neighbor / landlord
- 04 previous domestic relationship
- 05 previous non-domestic
- 06 other
- 99 unknown

Additional On-Scene Commander Variables (OSC)**(Label 28a, 28b, etc.)****ON-SCENE COMMANDER #** __

28__.) Rank of OSC

01 Sergeant
 02 Lieutenant
 03 Captain
 04 Deputy Inspector
 05 Inspector
 06 Deputy Chief
 07 Assistant Chief
 08 Bureau Chief
 09 Chief of Department
 99 unknown

29__.) Gender of OSC

01 male
 02 female
 99 unknown

30__.) Race of OSC

01 White (non-Hispanic)
 02 Afro-American/Black
 03 Caribbean American/Black
 04 Hispanic - Puerto Rican
 05 Hispanic - Mexican
 06 Hispanic - Dominican
 07 Other Hispanic
 08 Mixed (Black and Hispanic)
 09 Mixed (Black and White)
 10 Asian (specify)
 11 Other
 12 Other biracial
 99 unknown

31__.) Age of OSC

code exact = ___
 unknown = 99

32__.) OSC years/ months with the P.D.

code exact = ___ . ___
 unknown = 00 . 00

33__.) OCS Years/months in rank

code exact = ___ . ___
 unknown = 00 . 00

Additional Emergency Service Commanders (ESU)**(Label 35a, 35b, etc.)****ESU COMMANDER # ___**

35__.) Rank of ESU

01 Sergeant
 02 Lieutenant
 03 Captain
 04 Deputy Inspector
 05 Inspector
 06 Deputy Chief
 07 Assistant Chief
 88 n/a
 99 Unknown

36__.) Gender of ESU

01 male
 02 female
 88 n/a
 99 Unknown

37__.) Race of ESU

01 White (non-Hispanic)
 02 Afro-American/Black
 03 Caribbean American/Black
 04 Hispanic - Puerto Rican
 05 Hispanic - Mexican
 06 Hispanic - Dominican
 07 Other Hispanic
 08 Mixed (Black and Hispanic)
 09 Mixed (Black and White)
 10 Asian (specify)
 11 Other
 12 Other biracial
 88 n/a
 99 unknown

38__.) Age of ESU

code exact = __-__
 n/a = 88
 unknown = 99

32__.) ESU years/months with the P.D.

code exact = __-__ . __-__
 n/a = 88. 00
 unknown = 99. 00

33__.) ESU Years/months in rank

code exact = __-__ . __-__
 n/a = 88. 00
 unknown = 99. 00

**Additional HNT Commanders (HNT)
Label 42a, 42b, etc.)**

HNT COMMANDER # ___

42__.) Rank of HNT Commander (HNT)	01 Sergeant 02 Lieutenant 03 Captain 04 Deputy Inspector 05 Inspector 06 Other (Specify_____) 88 n/a 99 unknown
43__.) Gender of HNT	01 male 02 female 88 n/a 99 unknown
44__.) Race of HNT	01 White (non-Hispanic) 02 Afro-American/Black 03 Caribbean American/Black 04 Hispanic - Puerto Rican 05 Hispanic - Mexican 06 Hispanic - Dominican 07 Other Hispanic 08 Mixed (Black and Hispanic) 09 Mixed (Black and White) 10 Asian (specify) 11 Other 12 Other biracial 88 n/a 99 unknown
45__.) Age of HNT	code exact = ___ n/a = 88 unknown = 99
46__.) HNT years/months with the P.D.	code exact = ___ . ___ n/a = 88.00 unknown = 99.00
47__.) HNT Years/months in rank	code exact = ___ . ___ n/a = 88.00 unknown = 99.00

APPENDIX D **McGOWAN'S CODE SHEET**

QUESTION NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE CODE
	Study Number	HBID	---
	NYPD HNT #	HNT #	--- / ---
01.)	Type of incident	TYPEINC	--
02.)	Date of incident	INCIDMDY	-- / -- / --
03.)	Time incident started	BEGINTME	--
04.)	Day of week	INCDYWK	--
05.)	Precinct (Pct.#)	PCTNO	---
06.)	Type of location	TYPELOC	--
07.)	Time P.D. notified (mil.)	TIMEPDNT	-- : --
08.)	Job classification by 911	PDCLASS	--
09.)	Reported to 911 by	TOPDBY	--
10.)	Preamble to incident	PREINC	--
11.)	Duration of (hrs./min.)	DURHRMN	-- : --
12.)	Number of H.T. / B.I.(s)	NOHTBI	--
13.)	Gender of H.T. / B.I.	GENHTBI	--
14.)	Race of H.T. / B.I.	RACETHBTBI	--
15.)	Age of H.T. / B.I.	AGEHTBI	--
16.)	Language spoken	LANGHTBI	--
17.)	Criminal history	CRIMHIST	--

18.)	Mental health history	MENTHIST	--
19.)	Relationship with hostage	RELWHOS	--
20.)	Number of hostage(s)	NOHOS	---
21.)	Gender of hostage	GENHOS	--
22.)	Race of hostage	RACETHOS	--
23.)	Age of hostage	AGEHOS	--
24.)	Language of hostage	LANGHOS	--
25.)	Reason at location	REASLOC	--
26.)	Relationship with H.T.(s)	RELWHT	--
27.)	Number of OSC.'s	NOOSCS	--
28.)	Rank of OSC	RANKOSC	--
29.)	Gender of OSC	GENOSC	--
30.)	Race of OSC	RACETHOSC	--
31.)	Age of OSC	AGEOSC	--
32.)	OSC yr/mo in P.D.	OSCYMPD	-- / --
33.)	OSC yr/mo in rank	OSCYMRK	-- / --
34.)	Number of ESU Cmdr'.s	NOESU	--
35.)	Rank of ESU.	RANKESU	--
36.)	Gender of ESU	GENESU	--
37.)	Race of ESU	RACEESU	--
38.)	Age of ESU	AGEESU	--
39.)	ESU yr/mo in P.D.	ESUYMPD	-- / --

40.)	ESU yr/mo in rank	ESUYMRNK	__ / __
41.)	Number of HNT Cdrs.'s	NOHNTS	--
42.)	Rank of HNT	RANKHNT	--
43.)	Gender of HNT	GENHNT	--
44.)	Race of HNT	RACEHNT	--
45.)	Age of HNT	AGEHNT	--
46.)	HNT yr/mo in P.D.	HNTYMPD	__ / __
47.)	HNT yr/mo in rank	HNTYMRNK	__ / __
48.)	Other police unit present	PDUNITPR	--
49.)	Non-NYPD agency	NONPDPR	--
50.)	Medical/mental health	MENHLTPR	--
51.)	State/federal agents	STFEDPR	--
52.)	Third party Intervenor	TPIPRES	--
53.)	News media present	NEWSPRES	--
54.)	Elected official present	ELOFFPR	--
55.)	Foreign government agent	FORGOVPR	--
56.)	Time police arrived	TIMEPDOS	__ : __
57.)	Confrontation with police	CONFPD	--
58.)	Contained by police	CONTBYPD	--
59.)	Police start dialogue	DIALWPD	--
60.)	Time supervisor arrived	TIMSUPAR	__ : __

61.)	ESU arrived on scene	TIMESUAR	__ : __
62.)	Time HNT requested	TIMHNTRQ	__ : __
63.)	HNT role at scene	HNTROLE	__
64.)	Number of HNT present	NOHNTPR	__
65.)	Third party employed	TPIUSED	__
66.)	Demands of HT/BI	HTBIDEM	__
67.)	Demands police met	PDOKDEM	__
68.)	Method of surrender	SURRMETH	__
69.)	HT/BI injured	HTBIINJ	__
70.)	HT/BI injured by	HTBIINBY	__
71.)	Hostage injured	HOSTINJ	__
72.)	Hostage injured by	HOSTINBY	__
73.)	Police Officer injured	POINJ	__
74.)	Police Officer injured by	POINJBY	__
75.)	Incident resolution	INCRES	__

ADDENDUM # I CODE SHEET

Additional Hostage-Taker (HT) / Barricaded Individual (BI) Variables :

QUESTION NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE CODE
	HT # ____	BI # ____	
	Study Number	HBID__	---
	NYPD HNT #	HNT #	--- / ---
13__.)	Gender of HT/BI	ADDQ13__	--
14__.)	Race of HT/BI	ADDQ14__	--
15 .)	Age of HT/BI	ADDQ15__	--
16__.)	Language spoken	ADDQ16__	--
17__.)	Criminal history	ADDQ17__	--
18__.)	Mental health history	ADDQ18__	--
19__.)	Relationship with hostage	ADDQ19__	--

ADDENDUM #II CODE SHEET

Additional Hostage Variables(s):			HOSTAGE #__
QUESTION NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE CODE
	Study Number	HBID__	----
	NYPD HNT #	HNT #	----/---
21__.)	Gender of hostage	ADDQ21__	--
22__.)	Race of hostage	ADDQ22__	--
23 .)	Age of hostage	ADDQ23__	--
24__.)	Language of hostage	ADDQ24__	--
25 .)	Reason at location	ADDQ25__	--
26__.)	Relationship with HT	ADDQ26__	--

ADDENDUM # III CODE SHEET

Additional On-Scene Commander Variables (OSC): OSC # ___

QUESTION NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE CODE
	Study Number	HBID__	---
	NYPD HNT #	HNT #	---/---
28__.)	Rank of OSC	ADDQ27__	--
29__.)	Gender of OSC	ADDQ28__	--
30__.)	Race of OSC	ADDQ29__	--
31 .)	Age of OSC	ADDQ30__	--
32__.)	OSC yr/mo in P.D.	ADDQ31__	--/---
33__.)	OSC yr/mo in rank	ADDQ32__	--/---

ADDENDUM # IV CODE SHEET**Additional Emergency Service Unit Commanders (ESU):**

ESU # __

QUESTION NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE CODE
	Study Number	HBID__	----
	NYPD HNT #	HNT #	----/---
35__.)	Rank of ESU	ADDQ33__	--
36__.)	Gender of ESU	ADDQ34__	--
37__.)	Race of ESU	ADDQ35__	--
38__.)	Age of ESU	ADDQ36__	--
39__.)	ESU yr/mo in P.D.	ADDQ37__	--/---
40__.)	ESU yr/mo in rank	ADDQ38__	--/---

ADDENDUM # V CODE SHEET**Additional Hostage Negotiation Team Commanders (HNT):**

HNT # __

QUESTION NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE CODE
	Study Number	HBID__	---
	NYPD HNT #	HNT #	---/---
42__.)	Rank of HNT	ADDQ39__	---
43__.)	Gender of HNT	ADDQ40__	--
44__.)	Race of HNT	ADDQ41__	--
45__.)	Age of HNT	ADDQ42__	--
46__.)	HNT yr/mo in P.D.	ADDQ43__	--/---
47__.)	HNT yr/mo in rank	ADDQ44	---

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