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AN EXAMINATION OF EQUITY SENSITIVITY REGARDING PERCEPTIONS OF SUPERVISORS, TEAM TENDENCIES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIORS

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation

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Abstract

AN EXAMINATION OF EQUITY SENSITIVITY REGARDING PERCEPTIONS OF SUPERVISORS, TEAM TENDENCIES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIORS

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FREDERICK J. NASSAUER, JR.

Adviser: Professor Edwin P. Hollander

Over a decade ago, equity sensitivity emerged as a construct that showed promise in augmenting the predictive power of equity theory. It did this by demonstrating, in contrast to what equity theory posits, that not everyone strives to maintain a balance between what they contribute to an organization (inputs) and what they receive in return (outputs). Specifically, *benevolents* prefer to have their inputs exceed their outputs; *entitleds* prefer to have outputs exceed inputs; and *equity sensitives* desire outputs to equal inputs, as equity theory presumes. Research on equity sensitivity has demonstrated that, for example, the equity sensitivity "types" differ in their preferences for various kinds of rewards (King, Miles, & Day, 1993), and that there are cultural differences in equity sensitivity (Fok, Hartman, Villere, & Freibert, 1996).

In the present investigation, 234 individuals (graduate students, employees of a large financial services organization, acquaintances of the author, and undergraduates) responded to a survey. Participants completed measures of equity sensitivity, organizational citizenship behavior, supervisory perceptions, satisfaction with team characteristics, and satisfaction with various reward policies.

As hypothesized, respondents with higher equity sensitivity scores (benevolent-oriented individuals) were most likely to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors directed at individuals. Contrary to expectations, equity sensitivity score was unrelated to supervisor ratings along behavioral scales, or to ratings of "interactional justice"—the fairness of interactions with the leader. Equity sensitivity score was also not related to changes in managerial ratings given between accountable and anonymous rating conditions. As hypothesized, higher equity sensitivity scores were associated with lower levels of satisfaction with a team reward policy primarily based on equity individual performance. In contrast, satisfaction with reward policies based more on team performance was positively correlated with equity sensitivity score.

These findings add to our understanding of equity sensitivity and its role in organizational processes. In particular, they suggest that the impact of equity sensitivity goes beyond merely influencing individuals' preferences for levels and types of reward outcomes. Rather, equity sensitivity has wider impact, affecting preferences for teamwork and intended effort, reward distribution rules, and enacting extra-role behaviors. Implications for managers and further research opportunities are discussed.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Since its introduction more than three decades ago, Adams' (1965) Equity theory has been one of the most widely researched theories of work motivation. The basic propositions of the theory state that 1) people compare their own output-input ratio (what they get from the organization compared to what they give) to the output-input ratio of a comparison other, and that 2) they try to maintain equality between the ratios. Both laboratory and a smaller body of field studies have tended to uphold predictions of the theory.

Despite the largely supportive evidence of equity theory, later research (e.g., Miles, Hatfield, Huseman, 1989) suggested that not everyone prefers his or her own output/input ratio to be equal to a comparison other's. Equity sensitivity emerged as a construct that captured these individual preferences for giving and receiving. As defined, benevolents prefer to give rather than receive, entitleds prefer to receive rather than give, and equity sensitives prefer both equally.

Research on equity sensitivity has shown that differences exist among the "types" in how satisfied they

are under conditions of overreward and underreward, and in preferences for internal and external rewards, for example. However, the bulk of existing research has mainly focused on different kinds of rewards (e.g., pay, recognition, sense of accomplishment from work) or levels of them (underpaid or overpaid relative to some standard.) More recently, scholars have called for additional research that explores a wider array of individual difference variables and organizational processes that might be linked to equity sensitivity.

The purpose of this investigation is precisely that--to explore several yet unexamined organizational variables and processes to which equity sensitivity might exhibit some association. Specifically, these include: supervisory perceptions; the tendency to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors; satisfaction with various team qualities and expected effort working on such a team; the shifting of supervisory ratings given under different conditions; and satisfaction with equity versus equality reward distribution policies.

Identifying significant differences among the equity sensitivity groups with regard to the above variables could have important implications to the future study of the construct and its practical uses. For example, it might be

found that individuals within a certain range of equity sensitivity scores rate their supervisors in characteristically different ways than others do. A possible application of this finding might be to devise rating systems that are more accurate through partialing out the effects of equity sensitivity type.

To provide a conceptual background for equity sensitivity, Adams' (1965) equity theory will first be reviewed. Coverage of the literature on equity sensitivity then follows. Included in the discussion are characterizations of the equity sensitivity types and known links between the construct and other variables. The next several chapters will review the organizational variables and processes, described above, which are hypothesized to have associations with equity sensitivity. In each chapter, theoretical links will be drawn with equity sensitivity, and hypotheses advanced. Next, an investigation will be described that tested these hypotheses using a diverse sample of individuals with organizational experience. Finally, results will be shared, conclusions drawn, and ideas for further study will be proposed.

CHAPTER 2

Equity Theory

Overview

Equity theories suggest the perceptions people have about the fairness of how they are treated at work can explain many attitudes and behaviors on the job (Pinder, 1984). Of these theories, perhaps Adams' (1965) equity theory in particular has been most influential. With its roots in social exchange theory (e.g., Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964), Adams' theory states that individuals evaluate the fairness of their exchanges with the employing organization. People contribute to the exchange "inputs," such as effort, training, experience, and education, while they receive in return from the organization "outputs," such as pay, fringe benefits, working conditions, recognition, and attention from supervisors.

According to the theory, to determine the fairness of an exchange, people compare the ratio of the outputs (O) they receive to the inputs (I) they contribute to the output-input ratio of a comparison other. That is:

$$\frac{O_s}{I_s} \quad \text{vs.} \quad \frac{O_o}{I_o}$$

where the subscripts "S" and "O" refer to "self" and "other," respectively.[1] The comparison other can be someone within the organization, someone outside of the organization, or some standard internal to the person. If the ratios are perceived to be equal, then equity exists. However, if the individual's ratio is perceived to be less than that of the comparison other, then inequity exists and the person would be predicted to act to restore it. Similarly, the theory predicts that even in cases where the individual's ratio is more than that of the other person--so that the he or she is being overcompensated--tension still exists and the individual would be motivated to restore equity (Mowday, 1996).

According to the theory, there are several ways in which equity can be restored. One method involves the actual manipulation of the inputs or outputs of the self or referent other. For example, if a person thinks that his or her outcomes are less than those of a comparison other,

[1] Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973) suggest that the following formula is more appropriate:

$$\frac{O_S - I_S}{I_S} \quad \left| \frac{O_O - I_O}{I_O} \right.$$

because it accounts for those instances where not all participants' inputs are positive. For example, consider the case where $O_S=-10$, $I_S=10$, $O_O=10$, and $I_O=-10$. Adams' formula would indicate equity exists; however, the two individuals clearly are experiencing different equity conditions. The formula above accounts for this reality.

while their inputs are the same, there are several options available to him or her. Focusing on his or her own ratio, the individual might decide to work less hard or request a pay raise. Alternatively, he or she might attempt to have the comparison person's pay or other outcomes reduced, or somehow get the other person to work harder.

If these options are impossible, the individual might resort to psychologically adjusting his or her perceptions of the inputs and or outputs involved in the comparison. For example, the individual might come to believe that the other person really does work a little harder. This justification of inequity through "cognitive restructuring" is often observed in victims of injustices who cannot obtain restitution or otherwise retaliate against the other person or group. Some argue that the process of justifying an unfair situation through distorting perceptions serves to shield the individual against the reality of an unjust world and his or her own inability to bring about a fair resolution (Lerner & Matthews, 1967).

Although any of these attempts at restoration are theoretically possible and all would serve to restore equity, some methods might be considered more adaptive than

others might. For example, choosing to work less hard could be detrimental to the person's next performance appraisal. Thus, he or she might try a safer approach, such as requesting a pay increase. The final option available is for the individual to remove him- or herself from the situation entirely, or what Adams (1965) calls "leaving the field."

Several aspects of Adams' theory deserve emphasis. First, the individual's perceptions of his or her inputs and outputs and those of the comparison other are what matter in the overall evaluation of equity. Put another way, "...the major elements of the exchange relationship are inputs and outcomes which must be recognized and considered as relevant to the exchange" (Patrick & Jackson, 1991, p. 1091). The implication of this is that in a given situation, people might not agree as to whether equity exists. Another person, such as the individual's supervisor or coworker, might not see the same inputs and outputs identically. This feature is important to this proposal, which investigates an individual difference variable (equity sensitivity) in the perception of equity. Second, the theory suggests the ratios are important when a person evaluates equity, not the absolute values of any of the inputs or outputs (Pinder, 1984).

Research findings, related issues

Since it was first proposed, equity theory has sparked a great deal of research, perhaps because of its straightforward applicability to organizational settings (Greenberg, 1990a). In fact, in the first decade since its publication, over 100 investigations of the theory were conducted (Adams & Freedman, 1976).

Most research on equity theory has focused on how people respond to pay inequity in laboratory settings, and the theory makes several predictions about how individuals will react to such inequitable payment. The specific action taken depends upon either over- or underpayment, and whether the person is paid hourly or piece-rate. For hourly employees, underpayment is predicted to lead to less or lower quality output. Overpayment causes tension as well, and is predicted to result in the employee increasing the volume or the quality of output to reduce the tension. For piece-rate employees, underpayment is predicted to result in high output but lesser quality, while overpayment is expected to result in fewer units being produced but of higher quality (Mowday, 1996).

In general, studies have upheld the predictions of equity theory in underpayment conditions (e.g., Andrews, 1967; Lawler & O'Gara, 1967). Experiments exploring the effects of overpayment inequity however, provide mixed support for the theory (e.g., Evans & Simmons, 1969; Valenzi & Andrews, 1971). Specifically, people tend not to react as negatively when overcompensated as they do when undercompensated (Adams, 1965; Blumstein & Weinstein, 1969; Homans, 1961)--an observation made at the outset of research on the topic. This suggests that the relationship between tension experienced and equity condition (ranging from undercompensated to overcompensated) is not strictly curvilinear or "U" shaped, as the theory would predict.

To this point, in one study (Perry, 1992) which used a national sample of African-American workers, a positive linear relationship was observed between job satisfaction and degree of pay inequity that ranged from underpaid to overpaid. However, in support of the theory, both underpaid and overpaid respondents, as opposed to those equitably paid, indicated they had the skills for a better job. These groups' responses, which can be taken as indicators of experienced tension, were similar in that they were attempts to restore equity. But, while those in the underpayment condition sought to obtain higher pay,

those in the overpayment condition were believed to place a higher value on their skills to justify their overpayment. This demonstrates as well the advantage of using several measures to understand responses to equity conditions. Here, those in the study appear to have resorted to cognitive restructuring in order to restore equity; measuring job satisfaction alone would not have revealed an important process at work.

The early studies on pay inequity were criticized on various grounds by several researchers, including Prichard (1969), who pointed out that experimenters often created overcompensation conditions by making the subject believe he or she was less qualified than others who received a lesser amount for performing the same task. It was argued that this served to attack the person's self-esteem, causing the person to work extra hard to prove to the experimenters that he or she deserved the payment. This resulted in experimental outcomes that appeared to be consonant with the predictions of the theory, yet in fact might have had little to do with the subjects' needs to restore equity.

To address this, other experiments were conducted which avoided this confound (e.g., Evans & Simmons, 1969; Garland, 1973; Pritchard, Dunnette, & Jorgensen, 1972;

Valenzi & Andrews, 1971). Reviewers have arrived at dissimilar conclusions about the findings of these investigations, ranging from generally supportive (Greenberg, 1990) to less supportive (Mowday, 1996).

An integral component of equity theory states that when people make fairness judgments, they evaluate their own exchange ratio with that of one or more comparison others (Adams, 1963). Goodman (1974) elaborated upon the nature of the referent, and identified three specific types. "Others" are people in a similar exchange relationship within or outside of the organization. "Self-standards" are standards unique to the person himself or herself. For example, past exchanges at a prior organization might be used as a basis of comparison. On this note, Weick, Bougon, and Maruyama (1976) found that a group of Dutch workers was less concerned about inequities relative to comparison others than they were about their own inputs. In this case, a self-standard was employed when making fairness judgements. Finally, "system referents" include contractual expectations, either implied or explicit, between the individual and the employer.

Goodman's (1974) own research clarified the role of referents in fairness judgments and satisfaction with pay. Specifically, it was revealed that pay satisfaction was

related to perceptions of pay equity relative to any of the three classes of referents. It was also observed that often, people use multiple referents when evaluating the fairness of exchanges rather than focus on one alone. Additionally, it was noted that people with higher education were more likely to choose a referent from outside the organization, whereas those with less chose referents from within. Finally, stronger correlations were observed between perceptions of pay equity and pay satisfaction than were correlations between objective measures of pay (e.g., amount actually paid) and pay satisfaction.

This latter finding underscores the importance of the individual's perceptions of the various outputs and inputs involved, not what they are absolutely. Relevant to this point are findings of Summers and DeNisi (1990). In the organization under study, although wage and salary data indicated that managers at the company were objectively overpaid compared to managers elsewhere, 65% still indicated they felt underpaid in response to a global question on perceived pay equity.

In summary, the referent other is an important component of equity theory for it permits comparisons to be made. Of course, comparison to some standard is essential

to making judgements of fairness. Despite the fact that it often goes unmeasured in tests of equity theory (Pinder, 1984), it is probably not always necessary to capture data regarding the referents used unless it is of theoretical interest.

As already noted, most research on equity theory has been conducted in laboratory settings using pay as an output. This is understandable, as researchers are afforded better experimental control in such a setting (Neil & Leibert, 1986), and manipulating pay is procedurally simple. However, these advantages are limitations as well. As people do not appear to value pay equally (e.g., King, Miles, & Day, 1993; Summers & DeNisi, 1990), the focus on pay has taken attention away from investigating other outputs that people regard as important. Moreover, questions of external validity arise when much support for the theory comes from investigations involving college students engaged in simple experimental tasks such as proofreading and other clerical tasks that substitute for more complex job activities (Summers & DeNisi, 1990).

Although fewer than those done in laboratory settings, a growing number of field studies provides support for the predictions of equity theory. For example, Greenberg

(1988) examined not pay as an output, but office space. In this investigation, employees of an insurance company were randomly assigned to temporary offices while their own were being refurbished. The offices to which they were assigned were either comparable to their own, of a lesser grade (fitting someone lower in the organization's hierarchy), or of a higher grade to which they were entitled. Consistent with predictions of equity theory, individuals assigned office spaces of a lesser caliber than they deserved showed significant decreases in job performance. Those who received offices of a higher status raised their performance levels, while those who received an equivalent office showed nc change in performance. This study is also noteworthy because it found a relationship between inequity and actual job performance. Consistently finding such a relationship has been difficult, according to Moorman (1991), because of the potentially negative consequences of altering performance levels as a means of bringing equity to an unfair situation.

Pay continues to be an output of interest, even in naturalistic settings. For example, Greenberg (1989) evaluated equity perceptions of 114 white-collar employees of a manufacturing firm. Slow sales prompted the organization under study to implement a six-percent pay cut

to all personnel. It was found that following the pay cut, people placed more importance in nonmonetary rewards, such as floor and desk space, privacy, decor selection, windows, and office mates. The author suggested that equity was maintained by altering perceptions of outputs. In fact, overall job satisfaction levels were equal to what they were before the pay cut.

In another study, it was found that a temporary 15% reduction in pay to nonunion manufacturing employees was accompanied by an increase in employee theft (Greenberg, 1990). Such employee behavior has been attributed to employees' feelings of being exploited by the company; theft is seen as a means of correcting an inequitable situation (Hollinger & Clark, 1983). Interestingly, it was found that theft rate was reduced when employees were given an honest and sincere account of why pay cuts were required.[2] Although a non-random experimental design does not entirely rule out alternative explanations, it was also observed that during the pay cut the number of employee resignations was significantly higher than the periods

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[2] Research by Folger (1986) amplifies this point. Results showed that dissatisfaction with not obtaining promised or expected rewards was lessened when the reasons for the shortfall were justifiable.

before or after the pay cut interval. This is what Adams (1965) refers to as "leaving the field"--the final option available when actual equity cannot be restored, nor can perceptions of inputs and outputs be restructured sufficiently to restore equity.

Also on the matter of employee theft, Shapiro, Trevino, and Victor (1995) found employee perceptions of the fairness of procedures or decision-making criteria (procedural justice) were associated with reported frequency of observed theft by other employees. Together, these findings suggest that perceived unfairness can result in deviant employee behaviors, such as theft, as a means of restoring equity.

The studies above are representative of the direction research needs to take in future investigations of equity theory. Efforts should focus on testing the theory in actual organizations and including for study the many inputs and outputs in which people place value. However, criticisms surrounding equity theory are not limited to the research that has been done on the topic. The very concept of equity on which the theory is based has also been questioned.

Equity theory assumes organizations and people within them follow the "equity norm," which states that people

should receive rewards proportional to their efforts and accomplishments. And, as Goodman (1977) suggests, this is the most frequent interpretation of the concept of "equity" by organizational members. However, as Leventhal (1976) points out, there is not one but several reward allocation strategies. For example, the "equality" norm says that everyone should receive an equal share of the rewards, regardless of individual contributions. Yet another strategy is need based, so that those who lack the most, receive the most.

Leventhal (1976) suggests that there are instances when one of these distribution rules might be more appropriate than another is. For example, if, in a group setting, the goal is to maximize harmony and minimize conflict among members, an equality distribution rule is preferred over others. If, on the other hand, the goal is to maximize group productivity and there is not a great need for interdependence among people to accomplish the task, then an equity distribution rule is more appropriate. Similar points are made by Morgan and Sawyer (1967), who submit that group members who enjoy long-term, friendly relationships prefer an equality rule, whereas task interdependent strangers generally prefer an equity rule.

In sum, it appears that at least two factors emerge as important concerning reward distributions in groups: the maturity or age of the group, and the degree of interdependence required of team members to accomplish their work. Leventhal's (1976) first suggestion only makes sense if the group is established, and its members must work together closely. His second recommendation is appropriate because of the nature of the task and the relationships among the people--one would not be inclined to say that a true team exists in the first place. Therefore, distributing rewards equitably seems warranted.

Other studies suggest there are additional factors that influence when one allocation strategy will be more likely than another will. For example, early investigations found that women were more likely to distribute rewards based on equality, whereas men tended to adopt an equity distribution rule (e.g., Levinthal, 1976; Austin & McGinn, 1977). However, many of these studies have been criticized for only testing situations where the subject contributes more to some task than a coworker does. In fact, in those investigations where the participant was in a low input condition (e.g., Carles & Carver, 1979), female participants tended to distribute rewards equitably, based on contributions. Males, in contrast, distributed

rewards more equally in the low input condition, garnering more for themselves when undeserved. These findings, and those from more recent investigations (Boldizar, Perry, & Perry, 1988) have led researchers now to conclude not that men and women vary in preference for equality or equality, but in how exploitative or accommodative of others they are.

Yet other factors have been implicated in allocation strategy selection. Shapiro (1975) found that participants' choice of a reward allocation strategy depended on whether or not additional future interaction with another individual was expected. Cultural preferences appear to be important in strategy selection as well. Bond, Leung, and Wan (1982) found that among Hong Kong and American college students, Hong Kong students preferred a pattern of rewards that was more equality-oriented, basing pay on the job held. In contrast, students in the American sample preferred to distribute rewards equitably, and based on performance. These results were consistent with how people from those cultures score on Hofstede's (1980) measure of individualism-collectivism.

Given these findings from group, cross-cultural, and gender research, equity theory's supposition that a norm of equity exists in all instances limits the theory's

predictive power and highlights the importance of studying the theory beyond its original, and limited, formulation. In particular, an inclusion of individual difference variables is needed so that the theory's utility might be augmented (Mowday, 1983).

Some earlier investigations of equity theory demonstrated that differences do exist with regard to how people perceive and respond to equity. For example, Tornow (1970, 1971) observed that while some people might perceive various job elements as outputs, others might perceive the same elements as inputs. Additionally, various researchers have shown that such factors as gender (Boldizar, Perry, Perry, 1988), age (Hook and Cook, 1979), IQ and religious values (e.g., Leventhal, 1976; Carrell & Dittrich, 1978) influence equity perceptions. More recently, attention has been given toward studying a construct called equity sensitivity, and how it affects people's perceptions of and responses to inequity (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1985). It constitutes an important part of this research, and will now be discussed in some detail.

CHAPTER 3

Equity Sensitivity

Huseman et al. (1985) first defined and investigated the equity sensitivity construct. These researchers suggest that Adams' (1963) assertion that "there exist normative expectations of what constitutes 'fair' correlations between inputs and outcomes" (p. 424) is incorrect. They disagree that cultural norms condition people to be equally sensitive to equity, generally desiring their ratios to be equal to that of a comparison other. Instead, they contend that people "react in consistent but individually different ways to both perceived equity *and* inequity because they have different preferences for (i.e., are differentially sensitive to) equity" (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987, p. 223).

Although equity sensitivity is a continuous variable, there are hypothesized to be three basic types of individuals. "Benevolents" prefer their output to input ratios to be less than that of a comparison other--they would rather give than receive. Alfred Adler (1935), who classified individuals according to how they reacted to others while interacting with them, is generally viewed as being the first to describe the benevolent or "socially

useful" personality type. These individuals are also similar to those Greenberg and Westcott (1983) call "creditors"-- people who find it unpleasant being on the receiving end of an exchange relationship. They experience satisfaction when contributing more than they receive in return.

Alternatively, behaviors that characterize benevolents also might result from a tendency toward "disguised self-interest" (Merton, Merton, & Barber, 1983, p.15). The desire to enhance how others perceive them might lead these individuals to prefer their inputs to exceed their outputs. To this point are findings of King and Miles (1994) which demonstrated positive associations in a student sample (n=493) between equity sensitivity score and scores on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale and the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding. Although reported correlations were modest (r=.29, .24, respectively, both at p<.0001), the findings suggest that the benevolents' tendencies toward giving rather than receiving are associated with a concern for being seen favorably by others. Similar results were found in a sample of bank employees: equity sensitivity score was positively associated with scores on the impression management scale (r=.23, p<.001). The low correlation, however, suggests

that the preferences of benevolents are not due principally to self-presentation concerns.

"Equity sensitives" prefer their ratios to be equal to that of a comparison other, and experience distress when either over- or underrewarded. Therefore, these people should most closely follow the traditional predictions of equity theory. According to Huseman et al. (1987), as conceived, equity sensitives are the only individuals who feel both distress (when underrewarded) and guilt (when overrewarded.) In contrast, benevolents are satisfied when underrewarded and feel guilty when rewarded fairly or excessively.

Finally, "entitleds" prefer their ratios to be more than that of a comparison other--they would rather receive than give. Compared to the other groups, entitleds feel satisfaction when overrewarded and distress in the other two reward conditions. Because they believe that whatever they receive is owed them, these individuals have a high threshold for feeling indebted (Coles, 1977a) and are more exploitative in their relationships with others, so that they might get more out of them (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983). As a group, entitleds feel little need to reciprocate for anything they receive (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983).

Huseman et al. (1987) describe the process by which an individual determines whether equity exists as having three stages. In the first stage, the individual examines absolute levels of inputs (in the case of benevolents) or outputs (in the case of entitleds). Input-focused benevolents, for example, would prefer inputs to be high rather than low. Then, the individual examines his or her own ratio of outputs to inputs. For example, equity sensitives prefer inputs to match outputs. Finally, in the third stage, some comparison would then be made to another individual or an internal standard. Entitleds, for example, would prefer their ratios to be higher than that of another. Theoretically, satisfaction is highest when an individual's preferences are met at each stage.

Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized relationships among equity sensitivity group, payment condition, and job satisfaction. When Huseman et al. (1985) first tested these relationships in a sample of 880 working adults, they found that only equity sensitives followed the traditional pattern predicted by equity theory (see Figure 2). These individuals reported the highest levels of job satisfaction when equitably rewarded, and reported lower levels when under- and overrewarded. In contrast, among benevolents and entitleds there was a positive relationship between

reward level and job satisfaction with the separate lines for these two groups being parallel. Furthermore, it was observed that benevolents had the highest job satisfaction of all groups.

As the authors point out, these findings are important for several reasons. First, they confirm the hypothesis that people vary in terms of how sensitive they are to equity: they do not all prefer inputs to equal outputs, as equity theory suggests. Second, it resolves an apparent conflict with expectancy theory (e.g., Porter & Lawler, 1968). Expectancy theory predicts a linear relationship between reward level and job satisfaction, whereas equity theory predicts a curvilinear one. Introducing equity sensitivity as an individual difference variable shows that while equity sensitives follow the traditional predictions of equity theory, entitleds and benevolents follow the predictions of expectancy theory. Ignoring this variable yields results that fall somewhere in between what the two theories predict, providing limited support for either.

These initial findings suggested that not all equity sensitivity groups respond to equity conditions as predicted theoretically. In particular, although benevolents tend to give rather than receive as indicated by their scores on the Equity Sensitivity Instrument (ESI),

they nonetheless demonstrate a positive linear relationship between equity perceptions and job satisfaction. Curiously, and perhaps because of these unexpected findings, no mention of the Huseman et al. (1985) study is made in a subsequent paper by Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, (1987). Instead, they elaborate upon the equity sensitivity construct and the three equity sensitivity types, and reaffirm the original predictions regarding how the three types theoretically should respond to equity conditions.

King, Miles, and Day (1993) further studied the relationships among equity sensitivity, reward condition, and satisfaction. Again, their findings suggest that the groups do not react to reward conditions as originally hypothesized by Huseman et al. (1985). In Study 1, 279 undergraduates responded to scenarios involving underreward and overreward. Consistent with Huseman et al. (1985), it was again observed that in identical overreward conditions, entitleds did not report higher satisfaction than did benevolents, again disconfirming the original proposal about how the two groups respond to overreward. Unfortunately, King et al. (1993) did not present an equitable (where inputs equal outputs) reward condition to participants, so an incomplete picture is provided.

However, consistent with Huseman et al. (1985), benevolents reported higher satisfaction than entitleds when underrewarded, and reported higher satisfaction than equity sensitives when overrewarded.

The consistent and important finding in the two studies just discussed is that benevolents do not report significantly lower satisfaction than entitleds when overrewarded, yet are more satisfied than entitleds when underrewarded. Overall, compared to the other two groups, benevolents tend to report relatively high satisfaction across conditions. This led King et al. (1993) to propose a redefinition of benevolents to one that describes them as tolerant across equity conditions rather than preferring underreward conditions.

This revised definition received additional support based on findings in Study 2 of King et al. (1993). In this study, nearly 400 Midwestern bank employees responded to surveys measuring equity sensitivity, job satisfaction, and perceptions of the extent to which pay and other outcomes were distributed fairly in the organization. A positive and significant correlation was observed among benevolents between job satisfaction and perceptions of the fairness of outcome distributions. However, fairness perceptions were measured via a seven-point Likert scale

ranging from "fair" to "unfair." This scale obviously does not include unfair outcome distributions of both the overreward and underreward types. Because it is uncertain as to which type respondents are referring when they indicate that rewards and other outcomes are distributed unfairly, the meanings of the reported correlations are somewhat ambiguous. Therefore, King et al. only presented a partial test of how the different equity sensitivity groups respond to the full range of equity conditions. Despite this, it seems that there is enough evidence to warrant the redefinition of benevolents from preferring underreward to generally tolerating all forms of equity relative to the other groups.

Research suggests that the equity sensitivity groups differ in other respects as well. For example, it appears that while equity sensitives place equal importance in pay and work, entitleds place significantly more importance in pay, and benevolents favor work over pay (King, Miles, & Day, 1993). Similar findings were reported by Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman (1994), who found that the equity sensitivity groups showed different preferences for outcomes labeled intrinsic (e.g., using one's abilities, sense of accomplishment), extrinsic intangible (e.g., feeling of belonging, friendship on the job), advancement

and status, and extrinsic tangible (e.g., pay, working conditions). Specifically, it was observed that entitleds showed the greatest preference for extrinsic tangible outcomes, and benevolents the least. And, while there were no differences among the groups in their preferences for extrinsic intangible outcomes, intrinsic outcomes were favored most by benevolents, followed by equity sensitives and entitleds. Finally, Mudrack & Mason (1995) found in a combined sample of American and Canadian business students that scores on the ESI were significantly and negatively correlated with scores on two different scales of Machiavellianism, the tendency to take control in groups when it is a viable option. That is, entitleds exhibited the strongest Machiavellian tendencies, whereas benevolents showed the least.

Although significant differences have been observed among the equity sensitivity types in various contexts, response patterns do not always support the existence of three separate groups. For example, Hartman, Villere, and Fok (1995) concluded that perhaps two groups are more appropriate than three are. They presented respondents with the equity preference scenarios as proposed by Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles (1987). The 16 scenarios describe situations that incorporate all the possible

combinations of inputs and outputs (both high and low of each) for the self and referent other. Huseman et al. (1987) identified which equity sensitivity type theoretically should exhibit the strongest preference for each scenario.

Contrary to expectations, it was observed that where significant differences in preferences existed, equity sensitives and entitleds showed similar preferences for scenarios depicting various reward conditions. Many of the scenarios were preferred equally by the three groups. Based on the findings, the authors suggested that perhaps equity sensitives and entitleds are better collapsed into a single group. Similar conclusions were advanced by Miles, Hatfield, and Husemsn (1989), who found in a study involving scenarios that equity sensitives and entitleds exhibited similar preferences for levels of inputs and overall output-input ratios.

While the results of these two studies do indicate that equity sensitives and entitleds respond similarly in certain instances, collapsing the two groups into one as standard practice seems unwarranted. In so doing, differences between equity sensitives and entitleds along other dimensions might be obscured. For example, Patrick and Jackson (1991) observed in an overreward condition that

equity sensitives indicated significantly greater intentions than entitleds to alter their inputs and outputs as a means of restoring equity. In fact, the responses of equity sensitives were similar to those of benevolents in this instance. Other examples can be cited where equity sensitives and benevolents respond similarly and differently from entitleds (e.g., King, Miles, & Day, 1993).

Based on the existing research, while two types often cluster it is not always the same pair that does. On balance, then, it would appear that the groups should remain separate for any analyses conducted so that possible differences will not be overlooked. Moreover, we would be remiss assuming two types should be collapsed simply because they responded similarly in a single study to a limited set of stimuli. There are real differences among the groups in their input/output orientations; this likely has implications in other realms yet to be identified. Until equity sensitives and entitleds have been compared and found similar in a wider variety of circumstances, it seems premature to aggregate them--or any two groups--under a common heading.

Cultural differences have also been observed with regard to equity sensitivity. This is not altogether

surprising, given findings from a relatively large body of cross-cultural research. For example, Hofstede (1980) found that people from different countries vary along such dimensions as masculinity-femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and individualism-collectivism. Of the 50 countries surveyed, Hofstede found Americans were the most individualistic. On the matter of fairness considerations, Kim, Park, and Suzuki (1990) found that whereas Americans favored an equity distribution rule, south Koreans preferred an equality distribution rule.

Several years ago, Mosak (1959) suggested that cultural values might contribute toward entitlement tendencies. In support of this, Weick, Bougon, & Maruyama (1976) found that Dutch students preferred situations where inputs were high over those where inputs were low. In contrast, American students preferred situations of high outcomes to low outcomes. Although the equity sensitivity construct was not being studied at the time, this early study suggested that culture affects general preferences for levels of inputs and outputs.

More recent investigations support the idea that culture influences sensitivity to equity. For example, Fok, Hartman, Villere, and Freibert (1996) found that among Chinese, British, French, and American respondents, the

Chinese were the most oriented toward benevolence, while the British and French were more entitlement oriented. The mean equity sensitivity score of the American respondents, by comparison, was between those of the other two groups but not significantly different from either. It was suggested that the Chinese had the highest equity sensitivity scores (i.e., were most benevolent-oriented) because of the prevailing communist ideal of contributing to the group. However, the demographic characteristics of this small (n=10) subsample were unknown, so further study is required before conclusions can be made with confidence.

In another recent investigation, Renard, Tracy, Ostrow, and Chah (1997) hypothesized that because of the collectivist nature of the South Korean culture, a sample of these individuals would score higher on benevolence than would U.S. respondents. Surprisingly, the Korean sample was higher in entitlement than the other group. It was submitted that perhaps the collectivist view of giving is limited to the family and does not extend to organizations. Additionally, it was observed that within the U.S. sample, Blacks and Whites exhibited the same preference for equity. This was contrary to expectation, as there is evidence that on the whole, Blacks adhere more to collectivist ideals and have a stronger sense of group identification and community

responsibility than Whites do (Sitaram & Cogdell, 1976; Kochman, 1981; Weber, 1985.) Taken together, these unexpected findings suggest that as a construct, equity sensitivity is unrelated to the individualism-collectivism dimension popularized by Hofstede, yet still lend some support the thesis that there are cultural differences in equity sensitivity.

Like any new theory that stands to challenge an existing and accepted one, equity sensitivity has not gone without criticism. In a review, Greenberg (1990) maintains that there is still little evidence to support the existence of equity sensitivity a stable individual difference variable. Furthermore, although differences in preferences for equity might exist, research shows that situational factors will often be so influential as to largely determine what distribution rule is followed (e.g., Deutsch, 1975).

Relevant to this point are findings by Shapiro (1975), who found that expectations of additional future interaction with another influenced how subjects distributed rewards. Among participants who had high inputs relative to their partners, those who expected future interaction distributed rewards equally between themselves and the other person. However, when future

interaction was not expected, they distributed rewards according to an equity rule, or proportionally to their inputs. In contrast, participants who contributed little compared to their partners distributed rewards equally, regardless of whether or not future interaction was expected. Shapiro argues that participants' reward allocation decisions were influenced by self-presentation concerns. When future interaction is expected, a desire to be seen favorably by the other individual overrides the person's desire to secure more rewards for him- or herself. Similarly, a need to reduce interpersonal conflict has also been implicated in the process (Leventhal, Michales, & Sanford , 1972). Such processes explain the conflicting results occasionally seen in reward allocation studies (e.g., Wiggins, 1966; Leventhal & Michaels, 1969).

While Greenberg's (1990) observation regarding the dominant influence of situational dynamics in certain instances is valid, certainly, not every social interaction is one where behaviors are overdetermined. It is precisely in those situations where choice is permitted that we would expect an individual difference variable such as equity sensitivity to exert more influence. Of course, this latter case is just as worthy of study as the former.

Regarding Greenberg's (1990) concern about data to support equity sensitivity as a stable individual difference variable, admittedly, more could be gathered. Test-retest reliability has been established--a coefficient of .80 with a three-week interval was demonstrated by Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman (1989), and the present investigation found a .77 correlation using the same time interval. Longitudinal studies spanning several years would provide more conclusive evidence. However, it would seem unlikely that, at least over a relatively short time period of a few years, an input focused benevolent would convert to an output focused entitled. Moreover, equity sensitivity need not be stable over periods of many years for it to be of theoretical interest and practical importance.

Putting aside concerns about the validity of the construct, we now turn to examining several variables and processes that might be related to equity sensitivity. The possibility that a person's equity sensitivity type is related to his or her team orientation will first be considered.

CHAPTER 4

Teams

A turbulent environment and intense competition are leading many organizations to rethink their business strategies, and implement organizational designs most appropriate for such strategies. Today, many organizations are recognizing teams as the best way to structure work processes to meet these new challenges (Mohrman, Cohen, & Mohrman, 1995). Once limited to the factory floor, now other areas, including technical, administrative, service, and managerial domains are also adopting team approaches. As teams become more prevalent, it follows that the amount of work done by them grows as a percentage of the total work done in the organization. Given this greater reliance on these new structures, it becomes increasingly important to understand those factors that contribute to team effectiveness.

Characteristics of Teams

What sets apart teams from other forms of work groups? While teams have various manifestations, differing along such dimensions as size, decision-making latitude, and flexibility of individuals' duties, some essential characteristics include having an appreciable degree of each of the following (Guzzo, 1995):

- *Task-based interdependence among members.* Group members must share resources and information, and coordinate activities in order to accomplish some shared goal.
- *Boundaries.* A team must have a stable membership. Members and non-members are clearly identifiable.
- *Decision making authority.* Decision making can be considered a collection of related activities, including: gathering, interpreting, and exchanging information; identifying and choosing among different courses of action; and executing on the final decision and evaluating its success.

According to these requirements then, commuters riding on a city transit bus would not be considered a team. Although they have a shared goal (getting to their destinations), they do not interact with each other to advance toward that goal. Membership remains stable, although only between stops. Decision-making is limited to signaling for the bus to stop, and passengers do not typically exchange information in a significant way. A football squad, on the other hand, meets all of the requirements. Each person on the field has specific responsibilities that are coordinated with others'. Special teams and offensive/defensive lines have "starters" who practice and

play together, keeping membership stable. Finally, during a game, players and coaches gather and share information about the opposing team's tactics and modify their own play selection in response.

Research on team performance in general has faced several challenges. For one, historically, team performance has been difficult to define precisely. As Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman (1995) point out, teams are assembled for many purposes and are typically evaluated with regard to those purposes. In industry, raising sagging production levels often is such a purpose. However, teams have consequences for their customers, their members, and for the other people and groups with whom they interact. Focusing exclusively on results as performance ignores the process or means by which the team achieved those results.[3] Taking a broad perspective, Hackman (1990) defined group effectiveness as having three components. They include the degrees to which a team

- meets its goals for quality, quantity, and timeliness of the finished product,

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[3] However, Steiner (1972) did take into consideration the means by which results are achieved in his formula for productivity:

Actual productivity = potential productivity - process losses

- enhances its members' abilities to work interdependently on future projects, and
- meets the development and satisfaction needs of its members.

From another perspective, Mohrman et al. (1995) focus on the first of the above components, but add to this the extent to which the team contributes to the success of the larger organization.

Another challenge with respect to research on teams is what is referred to as the "unit of analysis" problem (McIntyre & Salas, 1995). As opposed to individual-level analysis, which focuses on characteristics of individuals, team research is primarily concerned with the characteristics and functioning of groups of people. This latter case involving group-level analysis poses limitations, especially for field-based research. First, there is a smaller population of teams for study than individuals from which an investigator can choose. Consequently, statistical methods typically used to test research hypotheses often lack power. Investigators can elect instead to conduct their experiments in laboratory settings using alternate populations, but questions of external validity arise. Constructing high-fidelity

simulations of workplace processes can also be quite expensive.

An important goal of team research is to uncover those factors that contribute to team effectiveness. As a guiding tool for research, Hackman (1987) presents a model of group effectiveness that includes three sets of variables. Input variables include team organization (authority and division of labor among members), norms (informal rules of conduct), composition (the collection of KSAs and other characteristics of members such as values and needs), leadership, and team size. Process variables include strategies used by the team members, effort, and skill utilization. The mere application of effort and skill is not always sufficient for success; rather, coordination among members is required. Positive interpersonal relations are important as well. Output variables include traditional performance indicators such as quality and quantity, but also include turnover, satisfaction, and emotional tone. A fourth component of the model, environmental demands and resources, affects all of the variables just reviewed.

An exhaustive review of the research on all of these factors is beyond the scope of this paper. What is of interest are those factors in the model that might interact

with equity sensitivity type to have individual and group consequences. Consideration of these potential links will serve to answer the questions: Are some equity sensitivity types more team oriented than others are? Can equity sensitivity be used, together with other criteria, as a basis to select people for teams?

At present, more needs to be known about how the staffing process affects team effectiveness (Klimoski & Jones, 1995). Traditionally, staffing for individual positions begins with an analysis of the job in question. The important KSAs are determined by observation of incumbents at work, speaking with supervisors, and collecting any existing descriptions of the job. Measures of these important KSAs are then developed or identified to discriminate among applicants along these dimensions.

With regard to teams, Klimoski and Jones (1995) suggest several factors that contribute to an individual's effectiveness in such a setting. These factors include: both specific aptitudes and general abilities such as verbal intelligence; training and experience; motivation, resulting from the extent to which the individual's needs, interests, and values are satisfied by team membership; and the clarity of role expectations in the group. However, effective team staffing involves considering those factors

that will contribute to both individual and team performance. Focusing exclusively on the elements of the individual-effectiveness model will not necessarily lead to effective team functioning. Ideally, a team effectiveness model such Hackman's (1990) should also be considered when making staffing decisions.

Are some people are more team-oriented than others are? Remarks occasionally heard such as "She's a real team player", or "He has no team spirit" give at least qualitative evidence that distinctions can be made among people in terms of their team orientations. The supposition that there are certain people who are more comfortable working on teams than others are is a specific application of tenets of person-organization fit (P-O fit) theory. P-O fit has been defined in various ways, including the congruence between "...the norms and values of organizations and the values of persons" (Chatman, 1989, p. 339), individual needs and organizational structures and reinforcement systems (Moos, 1987), and individual personality and perceived organization personality (Bowen, Ledford, & Nathan, 1991). The premise is that aside from having the required technical skills, the closer the fit of the individual to the rest of the people in the organization the more successful he or she will be.

Several investigations have explored the links between P-O fit and organizational outcomes. For example, Bretz and Judge (1994) had working professionals rate how important various policies or philosophies were to themselves and the organization, such as helping others, paying on the basis of individual performance, and showing fairness in organizational activities. They found that the closer the match between individual importance and perceived importance to the organization (i.e., better fit), the higher tenure with the organization and reported job satisfaction. Other investigations have demonstrated relationships between P-O fit and organizational commitment (Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989) and job performance (Caldwell & O'Reilly, 1990).

Some theorists see selection activities as a process where not only applicants' knowledge, skills and abilities can be assessed relative to job requirements, but also to evaluate applicants' fit with the current organizational membership (Chatman, 1989). To this point, one study found that applicants referred by organizational members tended to be of higher quality than those who arrived from other sources (Conrad & Ashworth, 1986). The belief is that organizational members, because they understand the culture of the organization, can better identify applicants who

will fit within that culture. Another investigation showed that interviewers who identified specific criteria to be used for evaluating the candidate's fit with the organization tended to hire employees who were more successful than those who did not (Caldwell & O'Reilly, 1990).

It is possible that equity sensitivity orientation is an important dimension that contributes to the general fit between an individual and the larger organization, or in this instance, the team of which the individual is a part. In fact, the measure employed by Bretz and Judge (1994) to assess fit included many items that concerned fairness issues interpretable in terms of inputs and outputs. Therefore, evaluating fit according to equity sensitivity seems quite consistent with how fit has been evaluated before.

The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI; Briggs, Myers, & McCaulley, 1985) is a widely used instrument that, in effect, has been used to assess the fit of individuals with teams. Based on the work of Carl Jung, The MBTI is a personality inventory that classifies people into one of 16 "types" based on how they acquire and process information. An individual receives a score along each of four different dimensions: introversion/extroversion, sensing/intuiting,

thinking/feeling, and judging/perceiving. A typical use of the MBTI is to have members of an existing team fill out the instrument to identify their types. Then, it is shown how the range of different types working together can be both an impediment and asset to performance (Zemke, 1992).

The MBTI is generally not used as a selection instrument for hiring purposes, and is considered by some to be best suited for organizational development activities such as improving communication and team development (Smither, 1994). In fact, a number of studies have found insufficient evidence for its validity and reliability (Zemke, 1992).

Although selecting people for teams according to the broad personality types measured by the MBTI has had limited success, researchers are hoping that other individual characteristics will prove more promising. Some variables requiring additional investigations are team members' preferences, personalities, and interaction styles (Klimoski and Jones, 1995). In the Hackman (1987) model of team effectiveness, research in this area would fall under the input variable composition. In a chapter on team competencies, Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, and Volpe (1995) reviewed the research on the role of affective and attitudinal factors in team performance. Based on their

review, they suggested that people who work in teams probably require certain general team-related attitudes. For example, attitudes toward teamwork and the team concept have been shown to be related to airline crew performance (Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1980; Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, & Russini, 1986).

A more recent investigation (Driskell & Salas, 1992) also examined how team members' tendencies toward collective behavior impacted group success. Collective behavior (defined rather differently from how Davis (1969) defined it) was described as the "tendency to coordinate, evaluate, and utilize task inputs from other group members in an interdependent manner in performing a task" (p. 279). In this study, individuals on two person teams first made separate judgements regarding a problem presented to them. Then, they collectively discussed the problem and arrived at a group decision. Results showed that the group solutions made by two person teams with a collective orientation were significantly better than the individual solutions made by the team members. In contrast, group decisions made by teams composed of "egocentric" members were no better than decisions made by the individuals who comprised them. Apparently, those in the latter group neither took advantage of the information and ideas of

their teammates nor allowed themselves to be influenced by their partners.

Considering how entitleds, benevolents, and equity sensitives have been defined, it is possible that the groups have different attitudes toward teams and teamwork. For example, benevolents have been described as "socially useful" (Adler, 1935), and "creditors" (Greenberg and Westcott, 1983). As it is more important for them to give to the organization than receive from it, it is likely that they would more readily adopt a team philosophy than the other types would. On the other hand, output-focused entitleds might not take on such a perspective as readily. Findings of Driskell & Salas (1992) showed that compared to collectivists, group decisions made by teams composed of "egocentric" members were no better than decisions made by the individuals who comprised them: they did not make use of the process gains available to them. Entitleds might also be considered egocentric, as they prefer to receive rather than give, and focus on maximizing their personal returns. Given this, it is likely that a team philosophy would be quite inconsistent with entitleds' preferences for receiving.

There are other aspects of teams that the equity sensitivity groups might regard with differing levels of

satisfaction. One such factor, which might be considered an environmental demand (Hackman, 1987), is how rewards are distributed to the team. The fair distribution of rewards to team members is particularly important. This is evidenced by the observation that many teams that fail seem to do so because the organizational structures that support it--including HR and compensation systems--do not encourage true teamwork (e.g., Lawler, 1996). Providing some insight into the issue are Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman (1995), who found that the more team members were rewarded for individual contributions (equity distributions), the more team performance suffered. When members were rewarded based on the performance of the team (equality distributions) team performance was the highest. However, it was also observed that the more people were paid for their individual contributions, the more satisfied they were with pay and work.

Apparently, this would pose a dilemma for effectively managing and rewarding teams, for high individual satisfaction and team performance appear not to be attainable simultaneously. What is needed, they argue, is for people to be given a chance to acclimate themselves to working within a team structure. With time, many employees seem to redefine their traditional conceptions of fair

rewards from one based on individual efforts and equity, to one that is founded on teamwork and equality. Eventually, they suggest, people come to see traditional merit-pay systems as divisive and working at cross-purposes to effective team performance. Clearly, if true teamwork is desired of group members, then a compensation system that encourages and rewards team performance and not individual performance is required. Therefore, rewards should be distributed equally to members, based on team performance, rather than distributed equitably, and based on individual performance.

Considering the natures of the equity sensitivity types, it might be hypothesized that they have different preferences for team versus individual reward structures. Specifically, we might expect entitleds to prefer least rewards distributed based on team performance. Under such a reward structure, it would be difficult for entitleds to obtain a higher O/I ratio relative to the others within the group, as is their preference.

Because rewards are distributed according to team performance, which is some combination (additive or multiplicative) of individual contributions, an individual sees less connection between his or her own performance and rewards. Working harder will not necessarily result in an

appreciable increase in rewards received, and would not increase the entitled's O/I ratio as inputs probably grow faster than any outputs gained. Because rewards are consistent across members, entitleds would have little option other than reducing their inputs to maintain a high O/I ratio relative to others. However, if we assume that members must act interdependently for task accomplishment, and the norms of the group emphasize teamwork and member contribution, reduction in effort would be discouraged. In effect, there is a lower bound to individual contributions set by the norms of the team. This would leave little recourse for the entitled type to reduce any dissonance experienced, apart from cognitive restructuring or leaving the team altogether.

In contrast, benevolents should be more satisfied with pay distributed equally, in part, because they have more acceptable means of adjusting their I/O ratios. Although outputs received are largely immutable, benevolents are free to increase their inputs to high levels relative to others' (unless dysfunctional norms have developed whereby members may not work above a certain level of effort.) Through hard work, benevolents can give more than they receive absolutely and relative to a comparison other, increasing their satisfaction, and without jeopardizing

their standing within the group. Alternatively, and in keeping with their revised definition, benevolents would simply be more tolerant than the other types to share in rewards equally when they in fact contribute more than others do.

Of all the means of restoring equity, perhaps the one most readily under control of the individual is increasing or decreasing effort expended at the task. In a team environment where rewards are distributed equally, altering effort is the only way of making significant changes to equity conditions, apart from leaving the team altogether and changing perceptions of inputs and outputs. Reviewing the research on "social loafing" (Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979) will provide greater understanding of when reduction in effort occurs and if we might expect to see differences in loafing among the equity sensitivity types.

CHAPTER 5

Social Loafing in Groups

Some 50 years ago, Ringelmann, a German psychologist, reported in an unpublished paper that when German workers were asked to pull a rope with other people, they pulled less hard than they did when asked to pull the rope individually. In fact, while collective pulling force did increase with group size, dyads pulled at 93% of the sum of individual efforts, trios pulled at 85%, and groups of eight pulled at just 49% the sum of individual efforts (Moede, 1927).

Latané, Williams, and Harkins (1979) first used the phrase "social loafing" to describe this reduction in effort observed when people work in groups compared to when working individually. They conducted several experiments that ruled out alternative explanations for the findings of the early Ringelmann investigation. One possible confound was that the equipment used was so inefficient and cumbersome that it prevented people in groups from pulling with as much force as they could when pulling individually. In their first study, Latané et al. controlled for this by asking subjects to clap their hands and shout out loud. Findings were the same as those observed by Ringlemann: the average output (sound pressure, in this case) produced by

each person decreased as group size increased. These findings are consistent with social impact theory (Latané, 1973), which says that as the number of people grows who are targeted by social forces (here, instructions to clap your hands and shout out loud), the pressure directed at any one individual diminishes. As pressure decreases, so should effort in response to that pressure.

In a second investigation, Latané et al. (1973) were able to control for "coordination losses" among members which might have accounted for the results found in experiment 1. These potential losses were sound cancellation (destructive interference) of individual voices, people not directing their voices at the microphone, and not everyone making noise at the same time. To control for these threats, participants were made part of "pseudogroups" whereby they were led to believe they were making noise with others, yet they were actually working alone. While they shouted, isolated from others, they wore headphones that played a 90-db recording of five people shouting simultaneously. Results indicated that even when controlling for coordination losses, individuals exerted less effort as perceived group size increased.

Latané et al. (1979) made several interpretations to their findings. From an equity perspective, participants

might have brought to the experiment a preconceived belief that people in groups tend to withhold effort and "free ride" off others. Not to be taken advantage of, participants may then reduce their own efforts to maintain equity. This has been called the "sucker effect" (Orbell & Dawes, 1981). Another explanation involves the lessened contingency between inputs and outcomes that occurs in some forms of group work, whereby the individual is able to "hide in the crowd." As group size grows, the less direct is the relationship between the individual's effort and the outcomes he or she receives. Because outcomes are delivered to the group, working extra hard will not yield an appreciable increase in reward. Similarly, working less hard will not result in significantly less reward either. This reduced contingency might have contributed to feelings of lethargy, which then resulted in subjects exerting less effort at the task.

Factors that reduce or eliminate social loafing

The observation of a tendency for loafing to occur in group situations naturally led to efforts at uncovering the roots of its causes and means of prevention. Research has identified several ways in which loafing can be reduced or prevented. One method is through making individual contributions identifiable. Williams, Harkins, and Latané

(1981) had each member of a group wear a microphone which, participants were led to believe, would be used to monitor individual sound levels produced while the group as a whole shouted. It was found that the sound level an individual produced in this condition was not different from when performing alone. Similar findings were reported by George (1992), who observed that the degree to which salespeople perceived their efforts could be observed by their supervisors was inversely related to social loafing.

Social loafing also appears to be lessened through increasing the difficulty and uniqueness of the task. Harkins and Petty (1982) observed that prior research on social loafing used simple experimental tasks (e.g., clapping or pulling a rope) that all participants performed. The authors reasoned that subjects involved in such a task might believe that although their contributions would be added to everyone else's, they were not really needed since the task was so simple--anyone could do it. On the other hand, because most subjects believe they are above average on a variety of dimensions, the authors reasoned, subjects might believe their contributions could be less easily duplicated on a difficult task, so they should loaf less. Similarly, if participants were each given unique pieces of a larger task to perform, they

should feel that their individual contributions are important to the success of the group and not reduce effort, even if their individual contributions are unidentifiable.

Experimental findings of Harkins and Petty (1982) supported these views. Subjects who faced difficult or unique tasks performed better than those who had easy or redundant tasks. Furthermore, participants who performed difficult or unique tasks performed equally well whether their individual contributions were identifiable or not. These results demonstrate that identifiability of contributions is not the only means available to reduce social loafing--providing a challenging, unique task can eliminate it as well and does so through a more constructive process involving intrinsic rather than extrinsic factors.

Task meaningfulness also appears to be involved in social loafing. One investigation (George, 1992) found that participants loafed more when the meaningfulness of the task was perceived to be low. They also observed that intrinsic involvement, a composite variable consisting of task meaningfulness, contribution, and task significance, was not a significant predictor of social loafing when task visibility was entered first in hierarchical regression.

It was suggested that this finding supports an economic exchange view of social loafing: if people believe they are not being observed, they will be motivated to loaf so as to receive the same rewards even while working less.

There are yet other factors that have been implicated in social loafing. Of particular relevance are findings from Jackson and Harkins (1985) that demonstrate participants' expectations of partner effort contribute to social loafing. In line with the explanation based on equity advanced by Latané, Williams, and Harkins (1979), the authors hypothesized when a group participant has knowledge of the effort exerted by the other group members, the participant will tend to match the effort exerted by the other group members. If all people receive one *n*th of a fixed reward (where *n* is the number of participants in the group), then the only way for an individual to maintain equity when paired with an underperforming co-actor would be to reduce his or her inputs as well.

Similarly, individuals should also match the effort of a high-performing co-actor to maintain equal O/I ratios. Furthermore, such a process should occur whether or not people work individually or in groups. In the absence of information concerning the effort levels of co-actors, the typical subject probably believes that people work hard

alone but loaf in groups, so the usual findings would be observed.

Experimental findings reported by Jackson and Harkins (1985) supported their hypotheses. Participants were paired in two-person pseudogroups with a confederate said to be of equal ability, and were instructed to shout as loudly as they could. When subjects were not led to expect the confederate would exert any particular level of effort, the typical loafing effects were observed. That is, individuals shouting alone produced a louder sound volume than when they shouted with the confederate. In contrast, when participants expected the confederate to put in little effort on the shouting task, participants generated little noise in both the individual and group trials.

Similarly, when participants expected the confederate to work hard at the task, they also worked hard, producing loud sound volumes in both the individual and group conditions. The sound levels produced by participants when they had no knowledge of the confederate's intended effort at shouting was in between the levels produced in the low and high effort expected conditions. In effect, participants matched the effort exerted by the confederate.

More recently, Williams and Karau (1991) also examined the influence of participants' expectations of coworker

performance on social loafing, and made several refinements to understanding of the loafing process. Drawing on expectancy-value theory (Vroom, 1964), the authors identified under what conditions social compensation should occur. Social compensation is exhibited when subjects make up for their partners' low productivity by working harder in a group task than when working individually.

From an expectancy-value theory perspective, people are predicted to put forth effort at a task to the extent they believe exerting effort will result in desired performance (expectancy), performance will result in obtaining rewards (instrumentality), and that these rewards are meaningful (valence). Williams and Karau (1991) argue that expectancy, value, and instrumentality factors each contribute to whether social loafing or compensation occurs. Therefore, in contrast to a matching paradigm, even when coworker effort is expected to be low, compensation should occur when instrumentality, expectancy, and valence are high.

In their experiments, subjects worked either coactively or collectively with a confederate at idea generation. Subjects' expectations about their partners' effort were either measured via Rotter's Interpersonal

Trust Scale (1967) or manipulated directly[4]. It was observed that when working collectively, whether participants expected their partners to be unable, unreliable, or unwilling, and thus believing their partners would probably expend less effort, social compensation occurred. However, compensation was only observed when participants regarded the task or the evaluation of results by the experimenter as meaningful.

These findings also refine understanding of the results of Jackson and Harkins (1985) where subjects matched the effort of confederates. Williams and Karau (1991) argued that Jackson and Harkins unintentionally manipulated the value of the task for participants. For example, in the low effort coworker condition, the confederate indicated he or she was not going to work hard and thought the task was not so interesting. This latter remark of the confederate might have reduced the valence of the task for the subject. Given this, it is not surprising that subjects loafed; had the confederate said the task was

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[4] The rationale for using Rotter's (1967) measure was that those who score low on the scale should expect others to loaf in the group task and thus work harder. Similarly, those who score high should expext others to work hard and reduce their own efforts.

interesting, increasing the valence of the task, subjects might have been more motivated to perform.

Finally, a recent investigation (and rare, in that it was a field study) by George (1995) examined leader contingent and noncontingent reward/punishment behaviors and their association with social loafing. The investigator collected survey data from 448 salespeople from workgroups of a retail organization. All participants were members of "primary" workgroups, defined as groups where members work together, view themselves as being part of a group, work together toward group goals, and share group responsibilities. Groups varied in size from four to 10 members. Supervisors provided ratings on respondents' social loafing behaviors. The author drew upon cognitive evaluation theory (e.g., Deci, 1971) and principles of operant conditioning as a framework.

Consistent with predictions, leader contingent reward was negatively associated with social loafing, while non-contingent punishment was positively associated with social loafing. In addition, as predicted, contingent punishment and non-contingent reward was unrelated to social loafing. An important lesson for managers is that, as has been pointed out by others (e.g., Daniels, 1989) the effects of reward and punishment are not necessarily symmetrical.

While contingent reinforcement of desirable behaviors serves to increase the behavior it follows, contingent punishment does not necessarily exclusively decrease the behavior it follows. Punishment can cause the punished individual to engage in a number of aggressive or self-defeating acts, such as escape and avoidance behaviors and lashing out at the punisher. Non-contingent punishment is particularly damaging: as negative consequences are not necessarily delivered following undesirable behaviors, it has no feedback value whatsoever.

The studies reviewed indicate that there are many factors that determine level of effort expended at group tasks, such as expectations of coworker effort, identifiability of individual contributions, and the nature of the task. Future studies could directly test whether equity sensitivity impacts the above processes. However, given our knowledge of the equity sensitivity types and the nature of teams, it is hypothesized that entitleds--all other things being equal--would be more inclined to loaf in a team setting than the other types. Given that entitleds focus on maximizing their outputs, within a group setting they could conceivably get by with working less, thus increasing their own O/I ratio.

In the present investigation respondents are to be presented with a series of items that describe characteristics of a team. It has already been hypothesized that the different types will find these characteristics appealing to different degrees. For example, one of the characteristics of the hypothetical team states that individuals often give up individual popularity and recognition in return for taking on a team identity (see Appendix G, item 4). This would likely be acceptable to benevolents. As they should be more concerned with contributing to the team than receiving recognition as individuals, this characteristic would probably not result in them expending less effort as part of the team.

In contrast, input-oriented entitleds should find this characteristic less appealing, as their contributions would be obscured by others' and not bring them individualized rewards. This might prove demoralizing to them and result in them expending less effort. Reducing their efforts would also serve to increase their O/I ratio relative to others. Similar claims could be made about how the types would respond to item 3 (see Appendix G), which states that team members help, and perform the tasks of other people. Because this item implies taking on additional tasks

without a concomitant increase in reward, it is likely that benevolents might find this more acceptable than the other types.

CHAPTER 6

Organizational Justice, Equity Perceptions, and Supervisor Ratings

Stemming from concepts in equity theory, organizational justice is a term used to describe fairness as it relates to the workplace. It is concerned with how employees determine if they have received fair treatment on the job and how these perceptions of fairness are related to other work-related variables of interest (Moorman, 1991). Traditionally, organizational justice has been broken down into two separate components: distributive justice and procedural justice.

Distributive justice refers to perceptions of how equitably people are compensated based on their contributions--the focus is exclusively on results or outcomes. Such a conceptualization of fairness is consistent with equity theory, in that perceptions of fairness are based on the ratio of one's inputs to outputs, as compared to the ratio of some referent such as a coworker. Perceptions of distributive justice have been implicated as a contributor to employee job satisfaction. In testing a revised job satisfaction component of the Price-Mueller turnover model, Agho, Mueller, and Price

(1986) found that distributive justice (defined as the degree to which rewards and punishments are related to performance inputs) was only one of two job characteristics that was related to job satisfaction.

Procedural justice includes two components, formal procedures and interactional justice. Formal procedures focuses on fairness of the procedures used to allocate rewards. Here, the focus is on how the rewards are distributed, and not what is rewarded (Cropanzano & Folger, 1996).

Support for the importance of procedural justice comes from Shouksmith (1994), who found that in a sample of 1121 health care professionals, organizational commitment was positively related to perceptions of the fairness of their organizations' promotion systems. In a laboratory experiment, Greenberg (1987) examined subjects' perceptions of both the fairness of procedures used to make payment allocations and the fairness of the payments themselves. Subjects were given either high, medium, or low rewards for the work they did (locating items in a catalog and copying down their prices on index cards). They were also informed that the pay they received was based either on the room they were assigned (unfair procedure) or how well they performed the task (fair procedure).

In evaluating the fairness of the procedures used to make payment allocations, participants judged the unfair procedure to be unfair, and the fair procedure to be fair regardless of the level of pay they received. Examining the fairness ratings of the outcomes received however, revealed a different picture. High, medium, and low payments were considered fair as long as the procedure used to distribute them was fair. In contrast, given an unfair distribution procedure, only when the subject received a low payment was the outcome considered unfair. These findings point to work in other fields that suggest that people will not often protest against an unfair system or procedure as long as they are not personally affected by it (e.g., Cohen, 1986).

Finally, interactional justice (e.g., Bies, 1987) concerns the perceived fairness of interactions with the leader. Specific leader behaviors include how procedures are carried out, decisions are explained, and how he or she relates interpersonally with followers on such dimensions as kindness, truthfulness, and consideration. Leader fairness is considered essential to the success of the leadership process by models of leadership based on social exchange, such as the transactional approach (e.g., Hollander, 1978). The importance of leader fairness

receives empirical support from Farh, Podsakoff, and Organ (1990), who found that leader fairness was associated with follower organizational citizenship behaviors (see Chapter 7.)

Differences among the equity sensitivity types suggest they may not rate their supervisors equally in terms of interactional justice. For example, Konovsky & Organ (1996) observed that benevolents scored higher than entitleds on the Big Five dimension of agreeableness (McCrae & Costa, 1987), which is the degree to which someone is (in part) tolerant, trusting, flexible, forgiving, and soft-hearted. Given this, benevolents might be more willing than entitleds and equity sensitives to overlook a manager's less than fair dealings with them. Therefore, we might expect a linear relationship to be observed between equity sensitivity score and ratings of interactional justice.

Similarly, there is some rationale to hypothesize the equity sensitivity groups will rate their managers differently on more general behavioral dimensions, not limited to those concerning fairness. Managers, of course, are usually responsible for evaluating their subordinates' performance. In this function, they are the agents largely responsible for the formal rewards or outcomes--such as

salary increases or promotions--that their followers receive from the organization. Supervisors also provide more informal rewards, such as thanks and praise for doing quality work. In sum, the manager is in large part responsible for a variety of outputs the employee receives. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to suggest that employees who are unhappy with their outputs relative to their inputs would voice this dissatisfaction through ratings of their managers. Likewise, individuals who are satisfied with their outputs and inputs might incorporate their satisfaction into their managers' ratings.

Although we might expect differences in how the equity sensitivity groups would rate their supervisors across the various reward conditions, the relationship between the variables might not be a linear one as is predicted between equity sensitivity and interactional justice. This is so because, as shown by Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles (1985--see Figure 2), the equity sensitivity groups do not all respond the same way to different equity conditions. Their findings indicated that while benevolents and entitleds exhibited a linear relationship between pay equity and satisfaction, equity sensitives demonstrated a curvilinear or U-shaped relationship between the variables. Therefore, testing for a linear relationship between equity

sensitivity score and supervisor ratings may be inappropriate; a better approach would be to separate individuals into groups and test for differences among them across different equity conditions as done by Huseman et al.

An important consideration regarding supervisor ratings is whether supervisors can identify who gave what ratings. In fact, the two conditions of anonymity versus accountability have been shown to impact both the ratings given and how raters and ratees view the process itself. Bernardin and Villanova (1986) suggest some reasons why managers might resist the upward appraisal process, particularly under anonymous rater conditions. For example, some employees might focus on irrelevant, personal issues, and as a result give low ratings that are undeserved. Furthermore, allowing subordinates to rate their leaders is considered by some to be an undermining of authority and an "inappropriate" sharing of power.

For these reasons, if ratings are to be given, managers may assume that rater accountability will provide for more accurate ratings. On the other hand, Bernadin and Villanova (1986) point out that under conditions of accountability, the power differences between subordinates and managers make it questionable that low ratings will be

given to managers even when deserved. Rater leniency has been observed in many studies of both upward and downward feedback (e.g., Ilgen & Knowlton, 1980; Klimoski & Inks, 1990) in which the raters are identifiable, and it has been suggested that this may be due in part to the rater's heightened sensitivity to the ratee's feelings (Mitchell & Klimoski, 1984). However, in an upward feedback paradigm with subordinates held accountable for their ratings, the inherent power imbalance would suggest that inflated ratings would most likely be due to fear of reprisal rather than concern for feelings, in line with Bernardin and Villanova's observations. Recent experimental field studies support these points (e.g., Antonioni, 1994).

The difference between anonymous and accountable rating conditions also appears to be what has been referred to as "strong" versus "weak" situations (e.g., Greenberg, 1990a). That is, in the strong or accountability condition, situational dynamics such as the potential for retaliation might largely override how individuals actually want to rate their managers. Therefore, although differences would be expected in how the equity sensitivity groups would rate their supervisors, their ratings might be quite similar in this case.

In contrast, in the weak or anonymity condition, people would be more free to give ratings they believe are appropriate. In the absence of situational constraints, we would expect to see maximum differentiation among the equity sensitivity groups in the ratings they give. Specifically, we would expect entitleds to lower their ratings the most of the three equity sensitivity groups.

CHAPTER 7

Organizational Citizenship Behaviors

One construct that is thought to be associated with fairness perceptions and might be linked to equity sensitivity is organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Organ (1988) defined such voluntary employee behaviors as being outside of formal job requirements, not recognized by reward systems, and contributing meaningfully to the effective functioning of the organization.

Generally, OCBs are classified according to whether they benefit specific individuals (OCBIs), such as helping someone who has a particularly heavy workload, or the organization in general (OCBOs), such as refraining from doing personal business on company time. Prior investigations suggest that these two components have different antecedents as evidenced through factor analysis (e.g., Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Farh, Podsakoff, & Organ, 1990; Skarlicki & Latham, 1996), so the distinction is meaningful.

Organizational theorists have given attention to these "extra-role" behaviors for over half a century. For example, Barnard (1938) recognized organizations as systems of cooperative efforts, describing these efforts as "something different from effectiveness, ability or value

of personal contributions" (pp. 84-85). Katz and Kahn (1966) noted several decades later that such spontaneous behaviors (e.g., cooperative gestures and actions that enhance the image of the organization) are as necessary for the success of the system as those behaviors required by a person's role. The 80s saw several independent efforts to better develop these ideas that Barnard (1938) and Katz and Kahn (1966) described. Research began on the similar constructs of OCB (Batemen, & Organ, 1983), organizational commitment (Steers, Mowday, & Porter, 1982), and prosocial organizational behavior (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986).

Also during this time, interest in alternative measures of job performance was growing, perhaps in response to disappointing findings in job satisfaction-performance research; at least one meta-analysis (Iaffaldano & Muchinsky, 1985) provided empirical evidence that despite the intuitive belief in one, there is no significant relationship between job satisfaction and performance.

Staw (1984) criticized the existing research for defining the two constructs so narrowly, and called for substituting measures of prosocial behaviors mood state for traditional measures of performance and satisfaction, respectively. This widening of the performance criterion

has proven beneficial, for if performance is defined in terms of OCBs, significant relationships are often found. For example, in a university setting using non-faculty employees, Bateman and Organ (1983) observed a .41 correlation between OCB (as rated by employees' supervisors) and both overall and facet job satisfaction using the Job Descriptive Index (JDI: Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969). Smith, Organ, and Near (1993) found a significant and positive relationship between OCB and job satisfaction among a sample of over 200 employees from two large banks.

These findings and those from other studies (e.g., Puffer, 1987) suggest that the long-assumed job satisfaction-performance link does in fact exist, provided job performance is defined appropriately. Indeed, in their meta-analysis, Iaffaldano & Muchinsky (1985) found that if more subjective measures of job performance were used, the relationship with job satisfaction was higher. It is likely that the more subjective measures included OCB-like elements, resulting in the higher correlations.

In a recent review article on personnel selection, Borman, Hanson, and Hedge (1997) again stressed the importance of more fully developing the criterion space of job performance to include elements other than task

performance, and cited advances in this area. Borman et al. reviewed recent research investigating specific predictor-criterion links that shows, for example, while ability best predicts technical proficiency, personality variables best predict contextual performance (e.g., Van Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996; Campbell, 1990). Regarding supervisor ratings, one study found that supervisors place about equal weight in both "technical" and "contextual" factors in determining overall performance ratings (Motowidlo & Van Scotter, 1994).

Various researchers (e.g., Moorman, 1991; Organ, 1988, 1996) believe that there is a significant connection between fairness perceptions and employee OCB. From an equity perspective, instead of altering job performance in response to perceptions of inequity, employees can instead more safely withhold OCBs such as volunteering and assisting others. As these are discretionary behaviors, found outside the job description, negative consequences are less likely.

However, while perceived unfairness might trigger an employee to reduce his or her OCBs, Organ (1996) doubts that the employee consequently will feel that equity has been restored. And, it is clear that in such a case the relationship between the employer and employee is

fundamentally altered for the worse. As Organ (1996) suggests, the likely consequence is a redefining of the relationship between the individual and organization from one of give and take--where some latitude is allowed--to one more contractual, rigid, and formal in nature. The employee limits contributions to those that are required of him or her, and expects for each of them comparable rewards. However, as long as a general sense of fairness prevails, there is some ambiguity about the value of inputs made to the organization and the appropriate output deserved by the individual. The individual does not demand that each contribution, no matter how small, be matched by a comparable reward.

Indirect evidence of such a relationship comes from the satisfaction-performance studies just reviewed. Specifically, Organ (1996) argues that many measures of job satisfaction also capture fairness cognitions that in turn lead to feelings of satisfaction. This sequence is consonant with the belief-attitude-behavioral intentions-behavior sequence suggested by Ajzen & Fishbein (1977). Perceptions (beliefs) of fairness (e.g., "I'm not getting paid what I'm worth!") lead to feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction (an attitude--a positive or negative feeling toward some object). These feelings then lead to

behavioral intentions that in turn result in actual behaviors--in this case, withholding or performing OCBs.

Studies that more directly measure fairness perceptions have shown links between these perceptions and OCB. For example, Konovsky and Folger (1991) found that perceptions of procedural justice predicted OCB, whereas Farh, Podsakoff, and Organ (1990) found a composite measure of leader fairness representing distributive and procedural justice predicted OCB. Other research suggests that perceptions of interactional justice are better predictors of employee OCB than are distributive justice and formal procedures (Moorman, 1991). Similar findings were reported by Deluga (1994), who found that fairness, as a component of supervisor trust building, was most associated with subordinate OCB. The important implication of these latter two studies is that if managers want to support OCB among their followers, they need to increase the fairness of their interactions with them. More generally, the evidence supports the link between fairness perceptions and engaging in OCB.

There has been some debate as to whether fairness cognitions or the resultant feelings of satisfaction are better predictors of OCB. To this point, Millar & Tesser (1986) found that both the cognitive and affective

components of an attitude can drive behavior in response to the attitude object, although others suggest cognitions and affective states are not as highly correlated as might be assumed (Zajonc, 1980). In fact, some research suggests that certain forms of affect might be dispositional. For example, although job satisfaction has been found to be positively related to several variables including opportunity to use one's skills and abilities (e.g., Hackman & Lawler, 1971) other research has explored job satisfaction as an individual difference variable. Staw & Ross (1985) found job satisfaction to be stable both over a five-year period under the same employer, and across different employers and/or occupations. More recent research further supports the belief that aspects of job satisfaction are related to general factors of emotionality, and not exclusively a function of the work environment (Watson & Slack, 1993).

Whether cognition or affect is primarily responsible for engaging in OCB has practical importance. If cognition is found to drive OCB, then organizations can take steps to increase the probability that people will regard their interactions with the organization as fair. On the other hand, if the tendency to perform OCB is driven largely by affect and results from dispositional tendencies, then

organizations might have less at their disposal to encourage OCB, aside from initial selection.

Recent research provides some answers to this question. In a sample of staff members of two large hospitals, Organ and Konovsky (1989) collected data regarding employees' self-perceived typical positive and negative affect, job cognitions concerning pay and the job itself, and OCB (as seen by their supervisors). Hierarchical regression indicated that cognitions were superior to affect in accounting for OCB directed at both the organization and individuals. Farh, Podsakoff, and Organ (1990), who focused specifically on leader fairness, reported similar results. In their study, which used a sample of Taiwanese Ministry of communication workers, it was found that perceptions of fairness accounted for unique variance in OCB over and above that accounted for by satisfaction with the leader. However, satisfaction with the leader did not account for any additional variance when perceptions of leader fairness were entered first in the regression.

These findings suggest that OCB is a deliberate, calculated response to perceived fairness, and that organizations can take an active role in encouraging OCB. Conducting and acting on periodic "fairness audits" that

assess critical fairness-related issues might be a viable means of maintaining or enhancing perceptions of equity. Some success has also been noted in increasing OCBs through training leaders to be fairer with their followers. Skarlicki and Latham (1996) provided union leaders with instruction on implementing principles of organizational justice. Following training, the followers of leaders who went through training perceived union fairness to be higher than followers whose leaders did not go through training.

However, an issue now requiring clarification is whether these perceptions of fairness have links to the different classes of OCBs--those directed at individuals (OCBI) or the organization as a whole (OCBO). From a social exchange perspective (Blau, 1964), people who benefit from acts of kindness should in turn reciprocate toward the source. Therefore, if people perceive the "organization" treats them fairly, then they would be likely to engage in OCBO in return.

On this matter, Skarlicki and Latham (1996) found that perceptions of leader fairness were related to OCBO but not to OCBI. In their investigation, leader fairness was a composite variable of procedural and interactional justice measures. To the extent that the leader represents the organization, increases in perceptions of interactional

justice should be accompanied by increases in OCBO (and possibly, also by increases in helpful behaviors toward the leader himself or herself.) To this point, McNeely and Meglino (1994) found that fairness perceptions and recognition for desirable behavior were related to prosocial *organizational* behaviors. In contrast, there was a modest (r=.18) yet significant correlation between prosocial *individual* behaviors and empathy. Moreover, there was a negative relationship between empathy and performing role-prescribed behaviors. These findings suggest that while OCBO is determined by perceptions of fairness, OCBI is influenced more by dispositional variables.

However, Farh, Podsakoff, & Organ (1990) found that perceptions of leader fairness were associated with "altruism," or helping other people (equivalent to OCBI) and not "compliance," (equivalent to OCBO). Interpretation of these findings is made difficult because in this investigation (compared to Skarlicki and Latham, 1996) leader fairness was measured by three scales: contingent reward, supportive leader behavior, and participative leader behavior.

While the first of these three scales was reported to measure distributive justice, and the latter two to measure

procedural justice, it is evident based on example items from each scale that the three measures overlap with interactional justice concepts. This makes comparison of "leader fairness" across the studies problematic. Measures of OCB were different as well. Skarlicki and Latham (1996) created site-specific measures of OCB, and respondents' OCB ratings were provided by peers. Farh, Podsakoff, & Organ (1990) used the 16-item scale developed by Smith, Organ, and Near (1983), which was used by supervisors to provide ratings on participants. Again, comparison across studies is made difficult if different measures and methods are employed.

Another avenue to explore is that the equity sensitivity groups may be differentially disposed to engaging in OCBs. Organ (1990) as well proposed that engaging in OCB might be partly dispositional in nature, and related to an individual's sensitivity to equity. Addressing this point are findings that job satisfaction is fairly stable over the life-span (Staw, Bell, & Clausen, 1986), suggesting that satisfaction is partly dispositional in nature.

To the extent that equity sensitivity type is a fairly stable attribute of an individual, it may have an influence on enactment of OCB. We would hypothesize that as

benevolents are more concerned, by definition, with giving to the organization, they would engage in more extra-role behaviors overall. In contrast, entitleds are more concerned with receiving, and therefore would be predicted to do little beyond their formal job duties. They have a low threshold for experiencing unfairness, and therefore would refrain from enacting OCBs, whereas benevolents have a much higher threshold, and would engage in extra-role behaviors. Given this, we might expect a positive relationship between frequency of OCBs and equity sensitivity score.

It should be noted that a prior study (Konovsky and Organ, 1996) did not find such a relationship. However, in this investigation, participants' supervisors provided ratings of OCBs about the participants. It could be argued that collecting information about OCBs from supervisors is not the best practice, as individuals are probably on their "best behavior" around their supervisors. The present study obtained OCB data via self-report. This is subject to criticism as well, as positive self-presentation tendencies might contaminate results. However, to establish firmly that a relationship exists (or does not exist) between variables is best done through multiple investigations, using several methodologies.

CHAPTER 8

Statement of Problem and Hypotheses

As an individual difference variable, equity sensitivity shows promise in helping understand why some individuals respond differently to various workplace stimuli, particularly issues involving fairness. Although some pertinent research exists, investigators (e.g., King, Miles, & Day, 1993) have called for additional studies that examine how equity sensitivity relates to both organizational variables such as absenteeism and turnover, and personality variables such as self-esteem and moral maturity. The present investigation accomplishes this, by exploring several important variables and processes to which the construct might be linked. The major hypotheses will now be reviewed.

As has been shown, teams present a work environment for their members that is quite different from other arrangements. Perhaps most salient about teams is the collective nature of the work and the collective attitude required of the members for success (Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, and Volpe, 1995; Davis, 1969). Given how the equity sensitivity types have been characterized and their observed preferences, we might expect differences

in their stated satisfaction levels for various facets of a team. Put formally, they are as follows:

> H1a: There will be a positive relationship between equity sensitivity score and satisfaction with the various characteristics of a team. That is, benevolents will be most satisfied, and entitleds least satisfied, with the team characteristics.

Finding such a relationship could have practical applications. For example, people could be selected for teams based on their equity sensitivity orientation, among other characteristics. Or, in a team-building exercise, if team members could be made aware of their equity sensitivity orientations, implications for team dynamics and development could be drawn, as is done with the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator.

Although measures of satisfaction are typically employed as dependent variables, others can be chosen. When participants are presented with several characteristics of a team, their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with these aspects might influence how much effort they would intend to put forth were they to be placed on the team. We might also expect there to be differences

among the equity sensitivity groups in intended levels of effort. For example, the literature on social loafing would suggest, all other equal, that entitleds would be more prone to loaf in a team environment. In particular, because their inputs can become lost in the crowd, they can safely withhold effort and still receive the same rewards. This suggests the following hypothesis:

> H1b: There will be a positive relationship between equity sensitivity score and intended work effort on a team.

One issue particularly relevant to teams is how rewards are distributed. As conceived, the ideal team allocates rewards equally, not based on individual accomplishments. Given that entitleds focus on receiving, this arrangement might not provide them with adequate levels of outputs. Benevolents, on the other hand, focus on their own inputs, and should therefore be more comfortable with rewards distributed equally. Therefore,

> H2a: In a team context, there will be a negative relationship between equity sensitivity score and

preference for pay distributed according to an equity distribution rule.

H2b: In a team context, there will be a positive relationship between equity sensitivity score and preference for pay distributed according to an equality distribution rule.

As already stated, organizational citizenship behaviors are another dimension on which equity sensitivity groups might differ. As benevolents are inclined to focus on how they can contribute to the organization, they should be more likely to engage in such extra-role behaviors than would entitleds, who focus on the outputs they receive from the organization. Because the equity sensitivity groups also differ with respect to their thresholds for experiencing unfairness, we might expect differences in how often they engage in OCBs for this reason as well (Organ, 1990). Therefore,

H3: There will be a positive relationship between frequency of OCBs and equity sensitivity score.

The general characterizations of the equity sensitivity types lead to several other hypotheses.

Hatfield and Sprecher (1983) described entitleds as being exploitative in their relationships with others. Other research indicates that equity sensitivity score is positively related to agreeableness (Konovsky & Organ, 1996), such that benevolents tend to be more tolerant, flexible, good-natured, and forgiving, than entitleds are. These qualities of the different equity sensitivity types may affect how individuals perceive their supervisors. Because entitleds--as opposed to benevolents--might be less willing to forgive an unfair leader, the following hypothesis is advanced:

> H4a: There will be a positive relationship between equity sensitivity score and perceptions of interactional justice.

It was also argued that a supervisor is largely responsible for administering rewards to subordinates. For their part, subordinates might voice their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their outputs relative to their inputs by adjusting their supervisors' ratings accordingly. It was also pointed out that the different groups show different levels of satisfaction across equity conditions. Therefore,

H4b: There will be differences among the equity sensitivity types in ratings they give their supervisors under different reward conditions.

Furthermore, it was suggested that in the absence of situational constraints, there would be an even more pronounced difference in the ratings given to supervisors by the different equity sensitivity groups. That is, as opposed to the accountability or "strong" condition, in the anonymous or "weak" condition, entitleds would lower their ratings given to their supervisors even more than would benevolents. Specifically,

H5: The differences in participants' ratings of their supervisor between the anonymous and accountable conditions will be inversely related to their equity sensitivity scores.

Finally, consideration of the different preferences of the equity sensitivity types suggests two additional hypotheses. It is likely that over the course of one's career (and at any given job in particular) the potential for inputs to exceed outputs is greater than the reverse. Given this, and that benevolents prefer their inputs to

exceed their outputs, they would be more satisfied with their various jobs and consider how they have been treated as more fair than individuals from the other equity sensitivity groups. Stated formally

H6a: Equity sensitivity scores will be positively related to respondents' perceptions of being treated fairly at their current jobs.

H6b: Equity sensitivity scores will be positively related to respondents' perceptions of being treated fairly over the course of their entire careers.

In keeping with a social exchange perspective, "fairly" will be defined as receiving what is deserved based on the inputs contributed by the individual.

CHAPTER 9

Method

Participants

Two hundred thirty-four people comprised the main sample in this investigation. Of these individuals, the largest subsample (n=121) were masters students at Baruch college, taking courses in psychology, management, and finance. Another subsample was obtained from the author's place of employment, a development department in a large financial services organization (n=40). Participants from this site were college-educated management personnel and professionals within the department. The third subsample consisted of 32 people enrolled in undergraduate classes in I/O psychology and organizational behavior at Baruch College.

Finally, a number of acquaintences (n=41) of the author also participated, and in several instances they themselves found volunteeres to fill out the survey. People from this subgroup were quite diverse in their occupations, and no single profession dominated. Specific professions included management consultant, lawyer, engineer, sales representative, and HR specialist. Table 1

below presents demographics and other characteristics of these separate groups.

Table 1

Characteristics of the subsamples used in the present study.

Group	n (% of sample)	Mean Age	Gender (%Female)	Mean equity sensitivity score (sd)
Acquaintances	41 (18%)	30.1 [a]	53%	25.7[ab] (4.8)
Financial servcs. organization	40 (17%)	34.9 [b]	72%	27.1 [b](6.0)
Masters	121 (52%)	29.6 [a]	50%	23.7 [a](5.9)
Undergraduates	32 (14%)	27.6 [a]	63%	24.0 [a](8.0)

Note. Means with unlike superscripts are significantly different at $p<.05$ by Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests.

As can be seen, there exist some differences among the subsamples. Not unexpectedly, the individuals from the financial services organization were the oldest on average. While the mean age of those in the undergraduate sample was the lowest, it is not so low as to raise concerns over their suitability to participate.

There were also significant differences among the subsamples in their mean equity sensitivity scores. Specifically, the mean equity sensitivity score of the

financial services sample was most benevolent oriented, while the Masters sample was the most entitlement oriented. Furthermore, the mean of the financial services sample was significantly higher than that of both the masters and undergraduate samples. It should be pointed out, however, that a score of 25 represents a true "equity sensitive" orientation, which is the orientation people should have according to traditional equity theory. While the mean scores of all the different subsamples are fairly close to this classification, there exists variance in scores within the groups, indicating that people differ in terms of their sensitivity to equity regardless of subsample.

To ensure participants had a minimum amount of work experience, the minimum age required for participation was set at 21. The mean age was 30.2 years (sd=6.8) and ranged from 21 to 55. In the entire sample, one hundred twenty eight participants (54.7%) were female, one hundred (42.7%) were male, and 6 (2.6%) were unidentified. Regarding work experience, 26.1% indicated they had 3-5 years of work experience, while 25.6% reported having between 6-9 years. Of the remainder, 12.4% had 2 years or less experience, while 33.4% had 10 or more years total work experience. Forty-seven percent indicated they had supervisory or managerial responsibilities.

An additional 12 masters students at Baruch also participated in the test-retest portion of the study. These 12 people only filled out the Equity Sensitivity Instrument (ESI) two times separated three weeks apart. The 10 other people who participated in the test-retest study came from the masters students subsample described above. In total, the participants in this investigation were college educated, came from a variety of occupations, and overall, had a significant amount of work experience.

Measures

Equity sensitivity. Equity sensitivity was measured by the Equity Sensitivity Instrument (ESI) developed by Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles (1985). This five-item scale (see appendix B) measures the degree to which individuals are input or output oriented in their exchanges with the organization. For each item, respondents allocate ten points between two response choices, where one of the choices represents an "entitlement" or outcome preference, and the other represents a "benevolent" or input preference. The instrument is scored by summing all of the points allocated to the benevolent responses.

Although equity sensitivity is scored as a continuous variable, samples are often divided into three categories of entitleds, equity sensitives, and benevolents. As

suggested by Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles (1985) the breakpoints are sample-specific, and found at +1/2 and -1/2 standard deviations about the mean. The equity sensitives group is defined by those scores between the breakpoints. Coefficient alpha of the instrument is acceptable, with reported values in the .80s (e.g., Huseman et al., 1985; Konovsky and Organ, 1996). In the present investigation, coefficient alpha was .81 using the 234 respondents from the main sample. One study (Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman, 1989) collected test-retest reliability data. The reported value was .79, with a three-week interval.

Interactional Justice. The scale to assess interactional justice was that used and developed by Moorman (1991). This six-item measure captures respondents' perceptions of the manner in which their supervisors carry out formal procedures. For example, item 1 asks if the supervisor considers the respondent's viewpoint, and the second item asks whether the supervisor is able to suppress his or her personal biases. Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that all six items loaded significantly on a single latent variable, with individual standardized loadings ranging from .73 to .87. Chronbach's alpha for the present study was .91. The complete scale appears as Appendix C.

Supervisor Ratings. The rating scales used to evaluate participant's supervisors were adapted from those used in a program of leadership research conducted by Hollander and his colleagues (e.g., Schwager, Russeva, Nassauer, Kelly, and Hollander, 1995). They appear in Appendix D. Both "relational" and "task-oriented" qualities are included, and represent a variety of leader behaviors which typically might be found on upward feedback forms. Schwager et al. (1995) found, for example, that respondents tended to differentiate among the task and relationship-oriented qualities, especially in cases involving bad leadership.

The two versions of this measure appear in Appendices D and E. The items on which participants rate their supervisors are cast within the context of a scenario. The scenario describes an upward feedback system that has just been implemented at the participant's organization. Because ratings tend to be inflated when raters know they will be used to make administrative decisions (Klimoski & Inks, 1990), the feedback system is described as being for developmental purposes only.

To strengthen the realism of the scenario and to prepare the respondent for rating his or her supervisor on the various items, two "orienting" 9-point Likert items are

given first. The first asks the participant to rate the quality of his or her relationship with the supervisor. The second asks the participant to consider how the supervisor might react to receiving the participant's honest ratings.

Because one intent of the investigation was to determine if there are differences in how the equity sensitivity types would rate their supervisor under anonymous and accountable conditions (hypothesis 5), each participant completed two versions of the supervisory rating form. The anonymous version states twice (once in the scenario, and once just before the actual rating scales) that ratings are anonymous. In the accountability version, it is emphasized twice (again, in the introductory scenario section and just before the actual rating scales) that the manager will be able to identify who gave what ratings. To add to the realism of the scenario, respondents were asked to simulate signing their names by drawing an "X" on the line provided.

Based on pilot data, several items were removed from this scale because of low response variance and a desire to decrease the time required to complete the survey. The final scale consisted of six rating items (not including the two orienting items.) The first two items (concerning

the manager's overall effectiveness and fairness) are nine-point Likert items, where 1 is "way below average" and 9 is "way above average." The next four items assess the manager in terms of listening, directiveness, rewarding, and perceptiveness. Definitions for each are provided. These too, are on nine point scales, but 1 is labeled "far too little" and 9 reads "far too much." The scale value 5 is the best rating that can be given, and reads "just right."

This change in scale values for the final four items makes conceptual sense, especially in light of the investigation's focus on equity theory and equity sensitivity in particular. On the typical Likert scale, points are labeled "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree" or some variant. Whatever the specifics, one end of the scale is the "best" while the other end is the "worst." While this approach is acceptable in many instances, for others it is not.

To illustrate, imagine we desire respondents to indicate how directive their supervisors are (as we do here.) We could present a definition of directiveness (e.g., when a person tells others how to perform a task) and then have respondents indicate, on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale, the degree to which

they agree their managers display this quality. The scale, as constructed, cannot accommodate the various manifestations of directiveness.

The respondent of a manager who never gives directions about anything (even when required) would probably select a value of 1. However, what values should be selected for managers who are 1) overly directive, 2) directive but only when appropriate, and 3) sometimes, but not always directive when the situation calls for it? It is likely that some participants with managers from case 2 and those with case 3 managers would both select the middle of the scale to describe their managers. In both instances, the manager tells his or her followers what to do to an intermediate degree, yet in case 2 the manager's behavior is clearly more adaptive than it is in case 3. Other participants with case 2 managers, drawing on their knowledge of how "typical" 5-point scales are conducted, might select 5. Because one end of the scale is the "best" and the other end is the "worst," they might choose 5 to describe their managers who are directive in the "best" way possible--that is, directive when appropriate. However, these particular responses at the high end of the scale are likely indistinguishable from ratings given to case 1 managers, who are overly directive.

From the example, it is clear that trying to capture some behaviors or constructs using traditional scales is inappropriate. King, Miles, and Day (1993) committed this same error when measuring people's perceptions of the fairness of outcomes. Because their scale values ranged from "unfair" to "fair," they failed to capture unfairness of both underreward and overreward types. To avoid this measurement problem, the leader behaviors of listening, directiveness, rewarding, and perceptiveness were assessed using nine point scales where the anchors were labeled "far too little" and "far too much," while the middle point was labeled "just right."

Unfortunately, the benefit of added measurement precision afforded by this scale format was negated by the observation that pilot participants frequently failed to notice the meanings of the numbers along the scale. It was clear that many people still responded to the items as if one end was the "worst" and the other end was the "best." The final version of the scale included a warning to participants, immediately preceding the scales, that the format of the following items had changed and that 5 was the best score that could be given. To draw further attention to the new scale values, the anchors and middle

point were shaded, and "Best Rating" was placed above the middle point.

While these modifications seemed to reduce misinterpretation of the scale values, a number of people still did not appear to take notice of the changes to the last four scales. For example, some respondents rated their managers high (assigning values of 8 or 9) on overall effectiveness and fairness, and then proceeded to assign similar values of 8 or 9 on the dimensions of listening, directiveness, rewarding, and perceptiveness, although they represent "bad" ratings. When response patterns such as this were encountered, the questionable items were flagged and not included in the analysis.

Organizational Citizenship Behaviors. Items to measure this construct were those developed by Williams and Anderson (1991) and were adapted to be suitable for a self-report format. Items 1-7 measure OCBs directed at individuals within the organization (OCBI subscale), while 8-13 address OCBs which target the organization as the beneficiary (OCBO subscale). Williams and Anderson (1991) demonstrated the integrity of the factor structure of the scale, with the two subscales being moderately correlated (r=.56, p<.05). There were no significant cross-loadings of individual items. Alpha reliabilities for the OCBI and

OCBO subscales were .88 and .75, respectively. The instrument appears in Appendix F.

In the present investigation, pilot testing necessitated several changes made to the instrument. Three items from the OCBO subscale and one from the OCBI subscale did not exhibit adequate loadings on the proper factors. Rewording the items to a self-report format might have contributed to these findings. Because initial pilot testing took a considerable amount of class time, it was decided that several items needed to be removed to decrease the time required to fill out the survey. For these reasons, the four items with the lowest factor loadings were removed.

Principal components analysis with varimax rotation of the OCB scale produced a two-factor solution that accounted for 52% of the variance. All of the items loaded on their anticipated factors with the exception of item 10 ("I don't mind staying late when there's a job that needs to get done.") Rather than loading on the OCBO subscale, it loaded on the OCBI section. For this reason, any analyses involving the OCBO subscale only included the two remaining items, 8 and 9.

Satisfaction with Teams Qualities. The five item scale appears in Appendix G and was developed for this

research. Each item describes a facet of a hypothetical team. Respondents are asked to consider each facet and indicate how appealing it is to them. Content for the items is based on characteristics of what might be considered "true" teams and ideal member qualities as described by Guzzo (1995) and Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, and Volpe (1995).

Reward Distribution Preference. Reward preference (i.e., for equity or equality) is assessed by four items developed for this research. A scenario that describes a hypothetical team that the participant has just been made a part of precedes the items. One of the tasks of the team is to decide how the yearly bonus will be distributed among team members. The items that follow present different possible reward distribution policies that vary in terms of the proportions of the bonus to be distributed according to either individual (based on equity) and team performance (based on equality). For example, the first policy says rewards for each team member will be based on 20% team performance and 80% individual performance. As such, it represents a distribution policy based primarily on an equity rule. The fourth policy considers only team performance, and therefore is based on an equality

distribution rule. The second and third policies present intermediate combinations.

Power analysis

Unless otherwise indicated, conventional parameters were used for the following analyses, where power=.8, and significance level = .05. Effect sizes were estimated on a case-by-case basis to determine sample size required. Terms for effect size such as "small, "medium," and "large" are taken from Cohen (1988), as are table references.

The sample size that is required for planned Pearson correlations needs to be determined. As an example, H1a concerns equity sensitivity score and preference for working in a team-based environment. To detect a "medium" effect size of r=.30 (a=.05, 2-tailed) would require an n of 85 (table 3.4.1). To detect a "small" effect size (r=.10) would require a prohibitively large number of people (783), and the percentage of variance accounted for (1%) is of little practical significance given the variables under study. To detect an intermediate effect size of r=.20 would require an n of 194. The anticipated correlation, without any actual supporting data for its specification, is probably between .20 and .30. Therefore, approximately 150 respondents would be required for this analysis.

Some analyses require partialing or "holding constant" a particular variable (e.g., gender). In these analyses, there is one variable to be partialed (set "A", or w=1), and one IV (set "B", or u=1). To determine sample size required, effect size must be again be specified. This involves identifying the most likely value of $R^2_{YB.A}$, the percentage of variance accounted for in the criterion by the IV while holding the covariate constant. If it can be hypothesized that $R^2_{YB.A}$ is from about 4% to 6.25% (i.e., $R_{YA.B}$=.20 and .25, respectively) then the necessary sample sizes (obtained using values from table 9.4.2) are 212 and 133, respectively. A conservative estimate would be closer to the lower R^2 value; therefore, about 180 subjects would be necessary for adequate statistical power for this analysis.

Given that data from 234 people were collected, it is believed that adequate power has been achieved for the necessary statistics.

Procedure

Data were collected by several means. For the masters sample, surveys were distributed to students during class time. Instructors were asked not to be present while the surveys were being completed. Prior to distribution, the

investigator introduced himself (or was introduced by the instructor) and asked for volunteers to participate in the study. The nature of the investigation was described in very general terms, by saying: "This questionnaire looks at several workplace issues such as fairness, how you perceive your supervisor, and what you think about teams." Participants were guaranteed their anonymity and that their responses would be held in confidence. They were also assured that they had the right to refuse their participation without consequence. Participants were instructed to read all the directions carefully. In particular, they were told to pay attention to scale values before circling them. With the exception of one class where the students brought back the completed forms the following week, the students filled out the surveys while the investigator remained to answer questions. After the surveys were collected, students were debriefed on the nature of the investigation. Participants were also given instructions on how to contact the investigator at a later time if they wished to inquire about the results.

Other data were collected in slightly different ways. For the financial services organization sample, the department manager sent an email message encouraging staff members to participate; the investigator then went to each

person individually and asked him or her to volunteer. The same introductory remarks (including the voluntary and anonymous nature of the study) were given as those used for the student sample. Participants who did complete the survey (40 out of 48 for an 83% return rate) returned it to the author and placed it in a folder among the others returned. For the subgroup of the investigator's acquaintances, to whom the introductory remarks could not be communicated orally, the cover page of the questionnaire included these remarks. These participants either mailed them back or gave them directly to the investigator.

CHAPTER 10

Results

Using a sample of 22 masters students, test-retest reliability was computed for the ESI. The reliability coefficient with a three-week interval was .77 ($p<.001$). This is similar to the .80 correlation found by Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman (1989) using a sample of 150 undergraduate business students, which also employed a three-week separation between administrations. Given this reliability data, it might be concluded that equity sensitivity remains fairly stable, at least over short periods of time.

However, using the main sample, a small but significant correlation ($r=.20$, $p<.001$, n=220) was observed between score on the ESI and participant age. Other researchers have observed such a relationship as well, but not consistently across different samples (e.g., Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman, 1989). These findings suggest that while equity sensitivity remains reasonably stable over short spans of time, people might adopt slightly more benevolent tendencies over longer time frames. Of course, because the present investigation was cross sectional and not longitudinal, it is not possible to rule out that

generational differences might have accounted for the ESI-age correlation and not intraindividual changes over time. Regardless, the modest correlations indicate that there is relatively little overlap in the two variables anyway.

For the main sample (n=234), the mean equity sensitivity score was 24.67, just beneath a "pure" equity sensitive score of 25, and the standard deviation was 6.19. For supplementary analyses, breakpoints were established for the three equity sensitivity types in the manner recommended by Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles (1985). The entitled and benevolent groups are defined at +/- one-half standard deviation from the mean. In so doing, equity sensitivity scores of 21.58 and lower defined entitleds (*n*=57), scores of 27.78 and higher defined benevolents (*n*=69), and scores that fell in between defined the equity sensitives (*n*=108).

Because of sample-specific differences in equity sensitivity (perhaps due to gender composition or culture), defining groups by a single set of breakpoints across all investigations might not yield adequate representation in each of the groups. Therefore, creating sample-specific breakpoints is required. However, it must then be remembered that people from different studies who received similar equity sensitivity type classifications might have

scored quite differently on the ESI. Treating equity sensitivity as a continuous variable avoids the problem altogether. In fact, more recent investigations of equity sensitivity have refrained from using the breakpoint approach (e.g., King & Miles, 1994; Renard, Tracy, Ostrow, & Chah, 1997). The present study also treats equity sensitivity as a continuous variable, and uses correlational approaches for most of the analyses performed.

To investigate Hypothesis 1a, that equity sensitivity is positively related to satisfaction with team characteristics, a series of correlations were computed between equity sensitivity score and responses to each of the four team characteristic items. Table 1 presents these results.

Significant and positive correlations were observed for items 1 (team members are interdependent), 2 (team members are self-managed, not directed by a supervisor), and 4 (team members often trade individual recognition for taking on a team identity). Although the observed correlations are modest, there was a tendency for entitleds to find these three qualities of teams least appealing, and benevolents to find them most appealing. There was no relationship between appeal for item 3 (team members help

and perform the tasks of other people) and equity sensitivity type. Therefore, hypothesis 1a was largely supported.

Table 1

Correlations between Equity Sensitivity Score and Appeal of Team Characteristics

Item	n	*r*	*p*
1. Team members are interdependent	234	.26*	<.01
2. Team members are self-managed	234	.16*	<.05
3. Team members perform varied tasks	234	.12	NS
4. Team members trade individual popularity for team identity	234	.30*	<.01

*Statistically significant

Note. Complete item wordings can be found in Appendix G.

Hypothesis 1b stated that there would be differences among the equity sensitivity groups in intended effort working as part of a team with the characteristics shown above. In support of hypothesis 1b, a significant and positive correlation was observed between equity sensitivity type and intended effort (N=234, r=.29, p<.01).

Further analyses revealed that there were differences among the equity sensitivity types in what aspects of teams

were most responsible for intended effort levels. After dividing the sample into the three equity sensitivity groups according to the breakpoint method, separate stepwise multiple regression analyses were conducted for each type, where the team qualities were regressed on intended effort level. For both benevolents and equity sensitives, only the interdependent nature of team members entered into the equation (for benevolents: $R=.367$, $R^2=.135$, $p<.01$; for equity sensitives: $R=.323$, $R^2=.105$, $p<.01$). In contrast, for entitleds, the only team characteristic that entered was trading individual popularity and recognition for taking on a team identity and forming relationships with team members ($R=.467$, $R^2=.218$, $p<.001$). This shows the equity sensitivity types regarded different factors as more important when making decisions concerning their intended expenditure of effort were they to be placed on the team.

Hypothesis 2a inquires whether benevolents least prefer, and entitleds most prefer, to distribute pay according to an equity distribution rule. However, investigating this hypothesis must take into account that in cases of high input relative to a coworker, women are more likely to distribute rewards based on equality than are men (e.g., Leventhal, 1976). Moreover, in the main sample, women scored marginally higher on the ESI than men

did (women: 25.33; men: 23.73, $t(226)=3.73$, $p=.06$). Therefore, any observed differences (for both hypotheses 2a and 2b) might be due to a gender effect and not equity sensitivity type. To account for this, gender was partialed out in the analyses.

As a means of investigating hypotheses 2a and 2b, partial correlations were performed between equity sensitivity score and satisfaction with the four policies, using gender as the covariate. Results are presented below in Table 2.

Table 2

Partial Correlations between Equity Sensitivity Score and Degree of Satisfaction with Reward Policies while Holding Gender Constant

Policy	n	*r*	*p*
1. 20% team, 80% individual performance	223	-.16	<.05
2. 50% team, 50% individual performance	223	.17	<.05
3. 70% team, 30% individual performance	223	.17	<.05
4. 100% team, 0% individual performance	223	.15	<.05

Hypothesis 2a is tested by examining responses to the first pay policy, which distributes bonuses according to

20% team performance and 80% individual performance. In support of hypothesis 2a, a rather small yet significant negative correlation was observed between equity sensitivity score and satisfaction with the first pay policy while controlling for gender. This indicates that in the context of the scenario, entitleds tended to prefer rewards distributed equitably more so than the other groups did.

Hypothesis 2b is most directly tested by examining responses to the fourth policy, where rewards are distributed entirely on team performance. In support of the hypothesis, a small yet significant positive correlation was found between equity sensitivity score and satisfaction with the policy, while holding gender constant.

Similar relationships were observed when policies 2 (50% team performance, 50% individual performance) and 3 (70% team performance, 30% individual performance) were examined. Small yet significant and positive correlations were found for both policies while controlling for gender. These two significant correlations also support the hypothesis that benevolents tend to prefer an equality-based distribution over entitleds and equity sensitives. Whether the percentage of bonus tied to individual

performance was 50%, 30%, or 0%, entitleds showed the least satisfaction with each of these arrangements compared to the other equity sensitivity types. Only under policy 1, where rewards were 80% based on individual performance (predominately an equity distribution rule), was a negative correlation observed between equity sensitivity type and satisfaction with the policy. Given these findings, hypothesis 2b was supported. Figure 3 graphically presents these findings.

Hypothesis 3 posits that frequency of OCB is associated with equity sensitivity score. Because actual workplace behaviors were being assessed, people included in these analyses had to either have a supervisor currently (hence, they are working), or have had one within the last six months. It was reasoned that beyond six months, people would not be able to accurately answer questions regarding their work behaviors at that time. This constituted the "current" sample (N=223).

To investigate hypothesis 3, partial correlation coefficients were computed between equity sensitivity score and OCBI/OCBO while holding gender constant. Gender was partialed out because of a small but significant correlation between gender and OCBI (r=.15, p<.05). Holding gender constant, a significant correlation was observed

between equity sensitivity score and OCBI (N=200, r=.32, p<.001) but not between equity sensitivity score and OCBO (N=200, r=.04, p=.57). Therefore, hypothesis 3 was partially supported.

Hypothesis 4a states that equity sensitivity score will be positively associated with perceptions of interactional justice. To confirm the unidimensionality of the interactional justice scale, principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted. A single factor emerged that accounted for 71% of the variance. All items loaded at .76 or better on the common factor. Using the "current" sample, a low and marginally significant correlation (N=209, r=.13, p=.07) was observed between equity sensitivity score and perceptions of interactional justice. Therefore, hypothesis 4b received only weak support.

Hypothesis 4b states that there will be differences among the equity sensitivity types in ratings they give their supervisors under different reward conditions. That is, we would expect differences among the groups in the ratings given to their supervisors in conditions of underreward, fair reward, and overreward. Because, in effect, we are substituting the dependent measure of satisfaction used by Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles (1985) with supervisor ratings,

we would predict a similar pattern of results to what they found (refer to Figure 2).

For the analysis, item 7 on the Participant Information form was used as the measure of reward condition. This item reads "Considering your present job, overall, how fairly do you think you've been treated?" Fairness is defined in terms of inputs and outputs, so if the assumption made in Chapter 6 is correct (supervisors are largely responsible for delivering rewards or outcomes), the item should be capturing the perceived fairness of the outputs delivered by the supervisor compared to inputs contributed.

Using this item, one group was formed by those respondents (n=67, or 33%) who answered with a value of 3 or lower, indicating they were underrewarded. Another group was formed by the 109 people (54%) who circled 4, which was labeled "fairly rewarded." The last group consisted of those people (n=27, or 13%) who circled a 5 or greater, indicating they felt they were overrewarded.

To investigate hypothesis 4b, using the "current sample" two 3 (equity sensitivity type) by 3 (reward condition) ANOVAs were computed. For the dependent variables, the first ANOVA used the average of items 3 and 4 from the anonymous version of the supervisor rating form and the second used the average of items 5-8 from the same form. Before averaging,

items 5-8 were "folded" around the middle score to transform the scores into deviations from the ideal rating of 5 (e.g., 6 was recoded as 4, 7 became a 3, and so on.)

The first ANOVA did not support the hypothesis. A main effect for reward condition was found ($F(2,198)=26.47$, $p<.001$), but both the main effect for equity sensitivity group ($F(2,198)=.42$, $p=.67$) and the interaction ($F(4,196)=.22$, $p=.93$) were not significant. The equity sensitivity groups did not differ in the ratings they gave to their supervisors in general, nor were there differences within reward conditions. Figure 4 graphically presents the findings.

The second ANOVA did not support hypothesis 4b either. Again, although a main effect for reward condition was observed ($F(2,195)=23.42$, $p<.001$), there was neither a main effect for equity sensitivity group ($F(2,195)=.359$, $p=.70$) nor a significant interaction ($F(4,193)=.112$, $p=.95$) present. The equity sensitivity groups did not differ in the ratings they gave their supervisors either across reward conditions or within them. Analyses were repeated for the accountability condition; these results were nonsignificant as well.

Although not hypothesized, it was observed in the anonymous condition there was a .19 ($p<.01$) correlation

between equity sensitivity score and item 2: How would you predict your manager would react if given honest ratings? In other words, the more benevolent-oriented the individual, the more he or she thought that his or her manager would react positively to receiving feedback. This finding is interesting, given that there were no differences in mean ratings given by the equity sensitivity groups, as found in the above ANOVAs. However, equity sensitivity score and response to item 2 was only marginally significant in the accountability condition (r=.13, p<.10), which demands caution when interpreting this observed relationship.

Hypothesis 5 posits that differences in participants' ratings of their supervisors between the anonymous and accountable conditions will be inversely related to their equity sensitivity scores. That is, benevolents will change their ratings the least, and entitleds will change them the most (presumably, giving better ratings) from the anonymous to accountability conditions. This was checked using two composite measures. The first measure was the mean of items 3 and 4, and the second was the mean of the folded ratings of items 5-8.

Mean ratings were calculated for both the anonymous and accountability conditions. The average rating given in

the anonymous condition was then subtracted from the average rating given in the accountability condition to arrive at a change score. Positive change scores indicate that higher ratings were given in the accountability condition, and negative change scores indicate that lower ratings were given in the accountability condition. Plotting the distributions of change scores, the modal response change for each composite measure was 0.00, indicating the most common rating change from the anonymous to the accountability condition was to make no change in ratings at all.

It was also observed that for both composite measures more change scores were positive than negative, meaning more people gave higher ratings when their identities would be known than lower ratings under the same condition. Paired-samples t-tests indicated that the composite ratings were significantly higher in the accountability condition than in the anonymous condition (composite of items 3 and 4: N=206, $t(205)=-5.67$, $p<.001$; composite of items 5-8: N=202, $t(201)=-6.47$, $p<.001$). These findings suggest that the anonymous versus accountability manipulation was successful.

To evaluate hypothesis 5, equity sensitivity scores were correlated with the change scores for both composite

ratings. Neither set of change scores was significantly related to equity sensitivity score (composite of items 3 and 4: N=206, r=-.04, p=.58; composite of items 5-8: N=202, r=-.11, p=.12), so the hypothesis was not supported.

Finally, it was hypothesized that equity sensitivity score would be related to perceptions of being treated fairly both at the respondent's current job (hypothesis 6a) and over the course of his or her entire career (hypothesis 6b). Using the "current" sample, equity sensitivity was weakly but significantly related to perceptions of being treated fairly at the present job (N=203, r=.14, p<.05) and over the course of the entire career (N=203, r=.15, p<.05). Therefore, although the relationships were weak, hypotheses 6a and 6b were supported.

CHAPTER 11

Discussion

The purpose of this investigation was to extend our knowledge of the equity sensitivity construct by examining several organizational variables with which it might exhibit some associations. The variables selected, including supervisor ratings, organizational citizenship behaviors, team tendencies, and reward distribution preferences, fulfill the call of various researchers (e.g., King, Miles, & Day, 1993) to go beyond the range of measures (such as pay level) typically chosen to study equity sensitivity.

Hypothesis 1 was largely supported, suggesting there are differences in preferences for various team qualities among the equity sensitivity types. Of the four team items, only item 3 (team members perform varied tasks and help other people) was not significantly related to equity sensitivity score at alpha=.05 or better. This might have occurred because the item does not necessarily imply that additional work is required of each person while holding rewards constant. Therefore, from this item it can be concluded that the equity sensitivity types do not show different comfort levels with the team requirement of taking on various tasks not necessarily within their

formally assigned duties. The finding that degree of appeal of interdependence of team members (item 1) was modestly yet significantly related to equity sensitivity score might be explained through social loafing explanations. It could be that entitleds, who found this item least appealing, most believe that people in groups tend to loaf and would therefore be least willing to compensate for underperforming teammates.

Finally, there was a rather small but significant tendency for benevolents to report higher satisfaction with the self-managed nature of teams than the other groups. That is, benevolents appear to be slightly more comfortable with having decision-making power and a lack of specific direction from supervisors.

The strongest correlation observed with equity sensitivity score was for item 4. That is, benevolent-oriented respondents reported the highest satisfaction with the team characteristic stating that team members trade individual popularity and recognition for a team identity. This makes sense, as this item is most directly related to outputs received by team members. Successful team members need to be able to adopt a team philosophy, which includes substituting group goals and rewards for individual goals and compensation. Given the different input-output

orientations of the equity sensitivity groups, entitled should have the most difficulty with making this adjustment and benevolents the least. This, in fact, was found.

Overall, significant differences were found among the equity sensitivity groups in their preferences for various team characteristics. This has practical importance for managers selecting team members. Given two equally qualified individuals in terms of their technical abilities, these findings suggest that more benevolent-oriented individuals would function better as team members. However, as pointed out by Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman (1995), people need to be given ample time to adjust their views regarding teams and teamwork. With time, individualistic tendencies might give way somewhat to team-oriented perspectives. Be that as it may, these results indicate that the equity sensitivity types begin with different team orientations, so using equity sensitivity type as a selection criteria can only serve to speed up the process of team development.

An additional argument for including equity sensitivity as a measure for selecting people for teams comes from hypothesis 1b, which was supported. A significant correlation was observed between equity sensitivity score and the intended effort working on a team

having the characteristics above. In other words, if placed on the team, as described, entitleds intended to work the least hard, and benevolents intended to work the hardest. Borrowing from the social loafing literature, it was suggested that in an environment where individual rewards are given up for group rewards, and individual contributions are obscured by others', entitleds might work less hard to increase their output-input ratios to a desirable level. Results are consistent with this reasoning.

Results of multiple regression of the team characteristics on intended effort was also revealing. Separate regressions were conducted for the different equity sensitivity groups. It was observed that for equity sensitives and benevolents intended effort was best predicted by the interdependent nature of team members (item 1). In contrast, for entitleds, intended effort was best predicted by responses to item four, which regarded trading in individual recognition and rewards for a team identity. This confirms the focus on outputs of the entitled type, and further suggests that within a team environment they might have greater difficulty than the other groups in satisfying their preferences.

Although the observed correlation was weak, hypothesis 2a was supported--there was a negative association between equity sensitivity score and preference for an equity distribution rule even when controlling for gender. Although all endorsements for the policy were positive, entitleds showed the strongest preference and benevolents the least preference for rewards distributed primarily according to individual performance. The preferences of equity sensitives fell in between. These findings make sense, as only under a reward policy based on individual performance are outputs largely under control of the team member. However, distributing rewards based on individual performance may be detrimental to team performance (Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman, 1995) so selecting people who are comfortable with a reward distribution policy having a equality-based component should prove beneficial.

Hypothesis 2b was also supported, although the observed correlation was weak. There was a significant and positive correlation between preference for an equality-based distribution rule and equity sensitivity score. That is, benevolents were most comfortable with receiving rewards based on team performance, and entitleds were least comfortable with that arrangement. It should be pointed out however, that most people regardless of equity

sensitivity score expressed dissatisfaction with an equality-based reward policy.

Overall, the people in this investigation preferred that even in a team setting, their individual contributions be recognized when distributing rewards. This observation might suggest that the potential for building true teams is limited because providing individual rewards only serves to encourage individual goals and efforts; to encourage teamwork, people should be paid as a team.

Perhaps a compromise between equality and equity distribution rules can satisfy both the individual needs of members and management's desire to foster true teamwork. Examining preferences for the two remaining policies suggest this would be possible. Focusing on the second policy, which bases rewards half on individual performance and half on team performance reveals that satisfaction levels for this policy are in the middle range across all the groups. Again, satisfaction is related positively to equity sensitivity score, showing that rewards based on equality distribution rules are least preferred by entitleds and most preferred by benevolents. This reward policy might be a good compromise for both encouraging team performance and satisfying the needs of individuals for personalized outcomes.

Hypothesis 3 received partial support. Even when controlling for gender, equity sensitivity scores were positively associated with organizational citizenship behaviors directed at others within the organization (OCBI) but not directed at the organization as a whole (OCBO). In this investigation, benevolent oriented individuals were more likely than others to report engaging in such behaviors as helping others who have been absent, listening to coworkers' problems and concerns, and taking a personal interest in other employees. This finding is significant in that it gives empirical support to a theoretically assumed relationship that has not been found elsewhere (e.g., Konovsky and Organ, 1996).

It might be argued that since equity sensitivity has been found to be modestly associated with scores on measures of impression management such as the Marlowe-Crowne (King and Miles, 1994), what is being observed is simply a desire for respondents to appear in a favorable light, called social desirability. While possible, this argument is weakened by examining the first item on the OCB scale. This item, not included as an item in the actual OCB scale, asks if the participant ever took *anything* that did not belong to him or her, even when he or she was young. Using the breakpoints established to divide the

sample into three groups, a chi-squared test indicated that there were no significant differences among the equity sensitivity groups in their frequencies of responding yes and no to this item. Given this, it is not likely that benevolents, as has been observed occasionally, responded to the OCB items in a way reflecting self-presentation concerns more so than the other groups.

The finding that equity sensitivity score was not related to OCBO could be due to several factors. One possibility is that the scale was not faithfully adapted to a self-report format from the original.[5] This hypothesis is supported by factor analysis, which revealed that in the present sample item 10, which was found by Williams and Anderson (1991) to load on the OCBO subscale, instead loaded on the OCBI subscale. Because item 10 was subsequently dropped, the remaining two items may have not adequately represented the criterion space of OCBO.

Another matter concerns whether the behaviors included on the subscale are considered "good" or "bad" across all organizations. For example, making personal phone calls from work (item 9) was intended to be reverse

[5] The original version of the measure is filled out by the subordinate's supervisor.

coded--people who rate themselves low on this item are better citizens. However, an upper-level manager from the financial-services organization indicated that within the department surveyed, it is quite acceptable to make brief, personal telephone calls when necessary. Behaviors selected for revised versions of the scale should be carefully selected to insure they are equally valid indicators of OCB across organizations. The measurement problems associated with the OCBO subscale in the present study suggest additional research should be conducted before ruling out the possibility that OCBO is unrelated to equity sensitivity.

Although not hypothesized, a small but significant correlation was observed between perceptions of interactional justice and OCBI (r=.18, p<.05). Farh, Podsakoff, and Organ (1990) also observed that leader fairness was associated with follower organizational citizenship behaviors. It is interesting to note that although the single item measure of leader fairness included in the Supervisor Rating Scale (see Appendix D or E) was strongly correlated with the measure of interactional justice (r=.63, p<.001) the single item measure was not correlated with OCBI. One explanation of

this is that the single item inadequately captures the fairness construct.

No support was found for hypothesis 4a. In both the anonymous and accountability conditions, equity sensitivity was unrelated to the two composite measures of supervisor ratings. This suggests that subordinates' input-output orientations do not influence perceptions of general leader behaviors such as giving direction and listening.

Hypothesis 4b received only weak support. Equity sensitivity was only marginally related to perceptions of interactional justice (r=.13, p=.07) and the correlation was quite low. Perceptions of interactional justice were not meaningfully related to equity sensitivity orientation. This finding, together with those from hypothesis 4a, suggests that perceptions of leader behaviors--including those dealing with fairness and rewarding behaviors--are not related to equity sensitivity. Of particular interest was the finding that there was no relationship between equity sensitivity score and perceived rewarding behavior of supervisors (item 7 from the Supervisor Rating Scales, r=.07, p=.30). Given the entitleds' preferences for outputs to exceed inputs, across all supervisors, we might expect entitleds to report they are not receiving enough given their preferences. In contrast, benevolents should

report their supervisors performing more rewarding behaviors. However, this was not found. The above results suggest that equity sensitivity is not involved in supervisor perceptions, even those concerning fairness and reward issues.

Hypothesis 5, regarding differences in how the equity sensitivity types rate their managers under anonymous and accountability conditions, was not supported. Although participants did increase the ratings they gave to their managers from the accountability condition to the anonymous condition, there was no interaction with equity sensitivity score. That is, entitlement oriented individuals did not raise their scores more than the other equity sensitivity types from the anonymous to accountability conditions. In this instance, situational dynamics present in the strong and weak conditions had equal effects on the different equity sensitivity types.

Finally, although correlations were modest, equity sensitivity was significantly and positively related to perceptions of fair treatment at the participant's present job and over the course of his or her entire career. Similarly to findings that job satisfaction might be partially dispositional in nature (e.g., Arvey, Bouchard, Segal, & Abraham, 1989), this latter finding suggests that

equity sensitivity orientation might be responsible for characteristic feelings of being over, fairly, or underrewarded in a given job and across the life span. The implication is that despite management's attempt to enhance perceptions of fairness, such perceptions might be partially dispositional in nature and thus not easily altered. If equity sensitivity is indeed a dispositional quality of an individual, it should show stability over time. Future investigations could examine the stability of equity sensitivity over shorter periods (one or two years) as well as over longer timeframes (several decades) to provide more direct clarification of this issue.

Despite some significant findings in the present investigation, there are several limitations to the generalizability of the results. First, although used widely, research involving scenarios only approximates the events which people might experience in a naturalistic setting. It is possible that respondents would behave differently were they faced with these situations firsthand. One major benefit of this methodology is, however, the ability to investigate issues that may be extremely difficult or even impossible by other means.

Another limitation of the present study is the method of measurement. Because all data were collected via self-

report questionnaire, there is a possibility of method bias inflating observed relationships. Again, the impact of a single study is limited; other investigations should be conducted to test these relationships using different methods.

Finally, one last concern is the nature of the sample used. When observations made on a sample of respondents are used to make generalizations about the population from which it was drawn, it is important that the sample is representative of the population (Neale & Liebert, 1986). In this case, the population might be considered educated, working adults. Admittedly, the sample used here is one of convenience--no attempt was made to select at random from the population. Moreover, participation was voluntary. For these reasons, it is possible that a representative sample was not achieved.

Additionally, it might be argued that such a mixed sample, including masters and undergraduate students, acquaintances of the author, and employees from a large financial services organization, makes interpreting and generalizing results difficult. Aggregating the groups might obscure relationships found only within a particular subgroup. Similarly, relationships found in the combined sample might not apply to individual subgroups, making

generalizations to other populations difficult. The significant differences in mean equity sensitivity scores among the groups shows they are not entirely similar and suggests these problems associated with aggregation might be a possibility.

Finding differences in mean equity sensitivity scores, at least, does not appear to be an appropriate rationale for conducting separate analyses. There are no a priori reasons why the relationships between equity sensitivity and the criterion variables under study should differ fundamentally among the subgroups. Moreover, from a statistical perspective, combining groups differing on mean equity sensitivity level should serve to increase the variance in equity sensitivity scores. Because variance is required to establish a relationship between a predictor and a criterion, combining groups should improve the likelihood of finding relationships.

This same argument can be used for the criterion measures being examined. The unifying influence of corporate culture puts limits on the expression of certain workplace behaviors (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). Similarly, attraction-selection-attrition processes operate to promote a workforce of relatively homogeneous personality characteristics (Schneider, 1987). Both of these factors

serve to reduce the variance in behaviors and perspectives of people within a single organization. From this perspective, therefore, a sample of individuals drawn from several organizations would be preferable to one composed of people from a single organization because a greater range of behaviors would be likely.

The results of this study and the literature reviewed suggest several other avenues for future research. Some evidence indicates that equity sensitivity might be related to "counterproductive behaviors" such as malingering, theft, and insubordination (Hogan & Hogan, 1989). For example, Ones (1993) observed that one of the major personality factors measured by integrity tests is the Big Five factor of agreeableness. Also relevant is a study by Goldberg (1991), which reported a measure of dishonesty loaded the most heavily on the agreeableness factor. Because equity sensitivity is moderately related to agreeableness as well (Konovsky & Organ (1996), we might expect that benevolents would be less inclined to engage in counterproductive behaviors than entitleds would.

Theoretical support for this relationship also comes from an element of counterproductive behaviors, employee theft, which has been advanced as a means by which an individual can bring equity to an unfair situation

(Hollinger & Clark, 1983). In the present investigation, it was found that entitleds reported being treated slightly less fairly than others did at both their present jobs and across their entire careers. Therefore, theft behaviors should be more prevalent among entitleds as a means to correct the greater inequity they experience.

However, in the present study there was no relationship between equity sensitivity score and the global item measure of theft. Entitleds were not more likely than others to report having taken something that did not belong to them, even when they were young. Despite this, the relationship between equity sensitivity and counterproductive behaviors should be examined using a complete measure of the latter construct before concluding that such a relationship does not exist.

Additional research should also be directed at the link between equity sensitivity and job performance. One study that examined this (Hartman, Villere, & Fok, 1995) found that equity sensitives were rated marginally lower by their supervisors than benevolents and entitleds on an eight-item measure of contribution and worth to the company. Benevolents and entitleds were rated equally high.

It is puzzling why equity sensitives would be rated lower than entitleds. Perhaps, in their desire for a quid pro quo relationship with their employers, equity sensitives tend to select means of restoring fairness across reward conditions that are less adaptive than those selected by the other types. In fact, differences have been noted in the methods used by the types to bring equity to situations of overreward and underreward (Patrick and Jackson, 1991).

Evidence from the present investigation does not support effort as an explanation for differing performance ratings--a positive relationship was observed between equity sensitivity score and intended effort working on a team. In the case of teamwork, at least, it is unlikely that equity sensitives tend to exert less effort than the other types. Clearly, more research is required to understand the link between equity sensitivity and job performance, using well-developed measures that capture both task and contextual performance.

Another potential area of investigation concerns the apparent conflict between the predictions of equity theory and expectancy-value theory in the case of social loafing and compensation. When an individual expects that coworkers are reducing their efforts at a group task,

equity theory would predict the individual would lower inputs to maintain a comparable O/I ratio with the other members. This should occur even if the task is meaningful. On the other hand, expectancy-value theory would predict that to obtain a valued reward an individual would increase his or her effort to make up for the reduced efforts of others. While results found by Williams and Karau (1991) tend to support this latter explanation, perhaps both theories are applicable in certain cases.

It is possible that equity sensitivity provides understanding on the contradictory predictions of the two theories. As was shown by Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles (1985), when subjects were presented with reward conditions ranging from undercompensated through overcompensated, while entitleds and benevolents followed predictions of expectancy theory, equity sensitives followed predictions of equity theory.

Regarding social loafing and compensation, consider the case where an individual is paired with a non-performing coworker at a task where the reward for successful completion is shared equally between them. It is possible, that even when valence, expectancy, and instrumentality are high for the individual, entitleds might exert less effort to compensate for the lack of the

partner's effort than benevolents and equity sensitives would. Since entitleds are more output-focused than the other types, they would experience the most discomfort over having to expend more effort to insure the completion of the task. Moreover, in making up for the partner's loafing, they would lower their own O/I to below their partner's.

This scenario would be considered highly unpleasant to entitleds, and might result in them exerting less effort than equity sensitives or benevolents in a similar situation. Therefore, as opposed to the other types, with entitleds we might observe a pattern of results that resembles a blend of both expectancy-value and equity theories. While entitleds might still increase their efforts to receive desired rewards--supporting expectancy theory--they might hold back their efforts to some extent compared to the other types. In so doing, they would be able to keep their ratios as close as possible to the loafing coworker, as equity theory would predict.

The findings from this investigation also point to several practical uses for equity sensitivity. For example, when selecting people for a team, an individual's equity sensitivity type could be considered along with other characteristics such as skills and abilities. On a

related matter, knowledge of team members' equity sensitivity types could help managers decide whether a reward distribution policy based on equity, equality, or some combination would be most appropriate.

A larger matter concerns whether some equity sensitivity types are "better" employees overall, and if so, should equity sensitivity be used for general selection purposes. The present study found that equity sensitivity was positively associated with both OCB and intended effort working on a team. However, this must be balanced with findings from one study in which equity sensitives received the lowest job performance ratings by their supervisors among the three types (Hartman, Villere, & Fok, 1995). Although more data should be collected, taken together, these findings suggest that benevolents might make better employees, all other things being equal. The data is equivocal regarding whether entitleds or equity sensitives should be selected next.

For many purposes however, hiring based on a disposition such as equity sensitivity might be impractical. Moreover, courts tend to frown upon selection systems that focus on traits rather than those critical behaviors for job success identified through a thorough job analysis (DeVries, Morrison, Shullman, & Gerlach, 1986).

Given this, how might managers embrace people of different equity sensitivity orientations to maximize their satisfactions and contributions to the organization?

Managers should understand that the different equity sensitivity types prefer different kinds of outcomes. With this knowledge, they can develop a greater repertoire of rewards or outputs to offer their followers, and make efforts to match them with the types of individuals whom will appreciate them most. For example, rather than just giving a cash award to the individual who generates the most sales in a particular quarter, give the option of accepting the cash or participating in a learning event or other developmental opportunity.

Another practical use of equity sensitivity is in team development. Similarly to how the MBTI has been used, team members can identify their equity sensitivity orientations and be led through a discussion of the different characteristics and preferences of the types. Implications for team development, management, and teamwork can be discussed.

One concern regarding existing equity sensitivity research is that a single measure has been used to capture the equity sensitivity construct. As pointed out by Cook and Campbell (1979), employing multiple operationalizations

of a construct is preferred to relying on a single one, as single representations of the construct often underrepresent it and contain irrelevancies. Future investigations of equity sensitivity should employ several measures of the construct and compare how the method of measurement affects results.

One potential modification to the ESI could be to transform it into a standard Likert format. Although the large majority of respondents correctly filled out the ESI, a small percentage simply checked one response or the other for each pair, rather than allotting 10 points between the two choices. Perhaps transforming the scale into a standard Likert format would eliminate these misinterpretations. For example, the two alternatives for each item could represent the poles on a single 9-point scale, where the middle point would read "prefer both equally."

In a second approach, for each pair of items, 5-point scales could be substituted for the benevolent and entitled alternatives. Respondents could then indicate from 1 (unimportant) to 5 (very important) their preferences for each. Subtracting the sum of the ratings given to the entitled alternatives from the sum of the ratings given to the benevolent alternatives would yield a deviation score

indicative of the person's equity sensitivity orientation. Scores close to zero would indicate an equity sensitive orientation, scores greater than zero would identify a benevolent orientation and scores less than zero would indicate an entitlement orientation. Although this procedure should conceivably yield similar classifications, an important difference between this scoring methodology and the others might have implications for studying the construct.

Compared to the original format and the prior suggested revised format, this approach is not a zero sum game. That is, giving a higher rating to one alternative does not necessitate giving a lower rating to the other. Consider the case where an individual gives scores of 5 to all five benevolent alternatives and all five entitled alternatives. The person's deviation score would be zero, and he or she would be classified in absolute terms an equity sensitive. Now, imagine a second individual who gives scores of 3 to all benevolent and entitled alternatives. While this individual would receive the same classification as the first, they differ in the magnitudes of their endorsements for benevolent and entitled orientations. This adds a new dimension to the equity sensitivity construct--strength of preference.

Capturing this information perhaps comes closest to truly measuring "equity sensitivity."[6] The individual who rates all alternatives with 5s is very concerned with inputs as well as outputs, whereas the individual who provides ratings of 3 for all alternatives is less concerned with them. Although both are labeled equity sensitives, they appear to differ in their regard for, or their sensitivity to, inputs and outputs. Future investigations should empirically evaluate this line of reasoning, and ascertain if there exist meaningful differences among people in terms of this "strength" dimension.

Still other concerns suggest that future efforts should investigate the construct validity of the ESI. As conceived, the ESI measures a person's input/output orientation: the equity sensitivity groups, by definition, exhibit different preferences for *levels* of inputs and outputs. However, findings of Miles, Hatfield, and Huseman (1994) suggest that this may not be accurate. In their investigation, they observed that while the equity sensitivity types exhibited different preferences for

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[6] Indeed, it could be argued that the ESI would be more appropriately labeled a benevolence or entitlement scale.

different kinds of rewards (e.g., extrinsic or intrinsic), their average preference scores across the different types of rewards were the same. This indicates that they all have the same levels of desires for outcomes, but that the groups differ in the specific outcomes they desire. If true, then what does the ESI measure? Perhaps, it is suggested, the ESI is capturing people's preferences for different types of outputs only.

For example, consider item 1 on the ESI. Choice A (Get from the organization) is an output and those who allot more points to it are entitlement oriented. The choice is probably interpreted by the respondent as receiving a tangible reward such as pay. In contrast, choice B (Give to the organization) is considered an input and therefore the Benevolent response.

However, might choice B also be considered an intangible output? Miles et al. (1994) defined intangible outputs as including the following: a sense of accomplishment; using one's abilities; a feeling of achievement; doing challenging work; a sense of competence; a feeling of personal worth; a feeling of confidence; doing meaningful work. It is suggested that "give to the organization" may *imply* that any one or more of these

intangible outputs will follow. The same argument could be made for the other choices keyed as benevolent responses.

If true, the benevolent choices are actually serving as surrogates for intangible outputs. Given this, the scale appears not to measure preferences for inputs *and* outputs, but for tangible and intangible *outputs*. Moreover, if the findings of Miles et al. (1994) are valid (the equity sensitivity types do not vary in terms of preference for levels of outputs, but in the types of outputs they prefer), why do people vary in their ESI scores? The reinterpretation of what the ESI measures clarifies this question. Future research should address the construct validity of the ESI to determine if this reinterpretation is warranted.

Despite the position that equity sensitivity is an enduring attribute of an individual, several observations suggest more needs to be done to verify its actual stability. For instance, research by Mohrman, Cohen, and Mohrman (1995) indicates that many people who initially are uncomfortable working in a team environment tend to adapt to it over time. The present investigation found that entitleds rated various team characteristics as less appealing than did benevolents, and indicated they would exert the least effort of the three types if placed on the

team. Is it possible that over time, entitleds' perceptions of teamwork would approach those of the other groups? If true, are equity sensitivity orientations changing as well? Or, consider the case where an individual undergoes a life-altering experience. For example, would a new parent, now faced with providing for his or her child, become more entitlement-oriented to secure enough resources?

By definition, in addition to being stable over time, a disposition is said to influence behavior across different situations (Carver & Scheier, 1992). The results of the present investigation further support the position the equity sensitivity has a dispositional quality, by showing the construct relates to several different outcome variables. However, perhaps equity sensitivity can be altered within certain limits by various events, but still shows some relative consistency within the individual across time and situations. Future research should examine this issue as well.

Although not hypothesized, significant differences in mean equity sensitivity scores were found among the different subsamples, with the financial services organization subsample having the highest score. Although differences in equity sensitivity orientation among

organizations have not yet been sought, it is reasonable to hypothesize that they might. One explanation is that the nature of the business or work itself complements a particular equity sensitivity type. For example, in certain types of organizations (e.g., venture capitalist group) or occupations (e.g., sales) in which individuals may tend to focus on financial rewards and maximizing individual outcomes, entitleds may predominate. In contrast, in organizations that depend on contributions from their members (e.g., a charity) and rewards are more internal, we might expect the average employee to have a benevolent orientation.

For various reasons, therefore (perhaps based on the nature of the work), a particular equity sensitivity orientation might be a better fit in some types of organizations than others. Over time, this particular type becomes the most dominant and can be maintained by selection and socialization process. Through selection, employers evaluate applicants in terms of their fit with the values and norms espoused by the organization; socialization experiences convey the important values and norms of the organization to further increase homogeneity (Chatman, 1989). Similarly, applicants seek out and prefer organizations that endorse norms and values similar to

their own (Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984). In this way, organizations as well as individuals might implicitly be selecting each other based on equity sensitivity orientation, among other factors.

In the present investigation, conversations with various members surveyed from the financial services organization confirmed that teamwork is very prevalent in the department. Perhaps through initial selection (from both the organization's and individual's perspective) individuals with more benevolent orientations were hired, resulting in the high equity sensitivity score among the subsample. Alternatively, or in addition to selection, socialization experiences may have induced upward shifts in equity sensitivity scores. Future research should assess the initial fit between new hires' equity sensitivity scores and the predominant equity sensitivity orientation of the team and or department, and whether individuals' equity sensitivity scores align themselves with the latter over time.

Additional research should also be directed at clarifying the nature of the construct through expanding its nomological network; identifying other variables that have links to equity sensitivity will increase our understanding of its essential nature. Also unanswered is

under what conditions should equity sensitivity be treated as a categorical variable (by using the breakpoint method to establish groups) as opposed to a continuous variable. Despite how equity sensitivity is scored as a continuous variable, perhaps the equity sensitivity types do not differ in terms of degree, but in kind, along various dimensions.

Continuing research on equity sensitivity has further established it as a viable extension of equity theory, even with doubts expressed by some (e.g., Greenberg, 1991). This study has identified still other variables to which equity sensitivity is related, such as organizational citizenship behaviors and satisfaction with various team characteristics. These findings are significant insofar as they demonstrate equity sensitivity has implications beyond mere preference for levels of, and types of, inputs and outputs. Rather, an individual's equity sensitivity type may influence behavior in a variety of contexts, particularly those where fairness is involved. The present investigation also has highlighted several areas for additional study, including the identification of other variables within the nomological network of equity sensitivity, the nature of the construct, and its measurement. Such prospects demand future research.

Baruch College

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To: Frederick Nassauer

From: Tim Kirby, Grants Officer

Re: Approval of the project entitled
"An Investigation of Equity Sensitivity Regarding Upward Feedback Ratings, Reward Distribution, and Organizational Citizenship Behaviors"

Date: April 8, 1999

The protocol for the referenced project was approved by the Baruch College Human Subjects Committee on April 6, 1999. The approval is in force for one year. If you wish to continue the project beyond one year, a protocol must be submitted two months in advance.

Please note that, if applicable, the consent forms approved with the protocol are the only ones that can be used. No changes can be made without the approval of the Committee.

Thank you and good luck with the research.

Appendix A. Instructions to Participants

Thank you for volunteering to participate in this research effort. Before beginning, there are several important points to remember:

- **Do not write your name or employing organization anywhere on the survey.**
- **Participation is voluntary.**
- **Read all instructions carefully, and observe scale values. *Make sure you know what a number means before you circle it.***
- **Answer honestly. There are no right or wrong answers.**

In order for you to respond properly to many of the following questions, you should currently have a supervisor to whom you report. You should also feel that you know this person reasonably well. However, if you do not, you may consider a past supervisor when answering the questions. Which describes your situation?

Please circle yes or no at each step.



Appendix B. Equity Sensitivity Instrument

The questions below ask what you would like for your relationship to be with *any* organization for which you might work. For each question, *divide* 10 points between the two choices (choice A and choice B) by giving the *most* points to the choice that is *most* like you and the *fewest* points to the choice that is *least* like you. You can, if you would like, give the same number of points to both choices (that is, 5 points to choice A and 5 points to choice B). In addition, you can use zeros. Just *be sure* to allocate *all 10* points per question between each pair of possible responses.

In any organization I might work for:

1. It would be more important for me to:
   _____A. Get from the organization
   _____B. Give to the organization

2. It would be more important for me to:
   _____A. Help others
   _____B. Watch out for my own good

3. I would be more concerned about:
   _____A. What I received from the organization
   _____B. What I contributed to the organization

4. The hard work I would do should:
   _____A. Benefit the organization
   _____B. Benefit me

5. My personal philosophy in dealing with the organization would be:
   _____A. If I don't look out for myself, nobody else will
   _____B. It's better for me to give than receive

Appendix C. Interactional Justice Scale

Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements concerning your manager.

My manager:

1. Considers my viewpoint.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Strongly disagree				Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree

2. Is able to suppress personal biases.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Strongly disagree				Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree

3. Provides me with timely feedback about decisions and their implications.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Strongly disagree				Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree

4. Treats me with kindness and consideration.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Strongly disagree				Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree

5. Shows concern for my rights as an employee.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Strongly disagree				Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree

6. Deals with me in a truthful manner.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Strongly disagree				Neither agree nor disagree				Strongly agree

Appendix D. Supervisor Rating Scales--Anonymous Version

Appendix D. Supervisor Rating Scales--Anonymous Version

Instructions and scenario: ***Imagine*** **that the company for which you now work recently implemented a managerial feedback program. This system allows employees to give their managers anonymous ratings on their performance. These ratings are to be used for development only. In other words, they will not be used to determine your manager's future pay increases, promotions, or assignments.**

Before you fill out the rating scales below, *think about how your manager might respond to receiving your honest ratings.*

Please consider and answer the following (these two items are NOT part of the actual feedback form):

1. How would you characterize **your relationship with your manager?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Very Bad				Neither Good nor Bad				Very Good

2. If you were to give ***completely honest*** ratings, how would you expect **your manager to react to those ratings?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Very negatively				Neither negatively nor positively				Very positively

MANAGERIAL FEEDBACK FORM BEGINS HERE

Please evaluate your manager on how much he or she displays the following qualities by circling the appropriate number. Remember, your manager **WILL NOT KNOW IT WAS YOU** who gave him or her these ratings.

3. **Overall effectiveness:**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Way Below Average				Average				Way Above Average

4. **Fairness** is the degree to which an individual is unbiased in such matters as making decisions and distributing rewards and punishments.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Way Below Average				Average				Way Above Average

NOTE: SCALE VALUES HAVE CHANGED FOR THE REST OF THE ITEMS!

NOW, "5" IS THE BEST SCORE THAT CAN BE GIVEN!

5. **Listening** is the degree to which an individual attends to and is interested in what another person says. **Best Rating**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Far Too Little				Just Right				Far Too Much

6. **Directiveness** is the degree to which a person tells others how to perform a task.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Far Too Little				Just Right				Far Too Much

7. **Rewarding** is the degree to which a person gives some form of recognition such as a "pat on the back" for a job well done.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Far Too Little				Just Right				Far Too Much

8. **Perceptiveness** is the degree to which an individual shows awareness of and consideration for other people's interests, needs, and attitudes.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Far Too Little				Just Right				Far Too Much

Appendix E. Supervisor Rating Scales--Accountability Version

Instructions and scenario: Again, ***imagine*** that the company for which you now work recently implemented a managerial feedback program. As before, you will be providing your manager with ratings on his or her performance. This time, however, **you will be held accountable for your ratings.** That is,

your manager WILL KNOW what ratings YOU GAVE to him or her.

Once again, the ratings will be used **for development only**. They will **not** be used to determine your manager's future pay increases, promotions, or assignments.

Before you fill out the rating scales below, *think about how your manager might respond to receiving your honest ratings.*

Please consider and answer the following: (these two items are NOT part of the actual feedback form):

1. How would you characterize **your relationship with your manager?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Very Bad				Neither Good nor Bad				Very Good

2. As before, if you were to give **completely honest** ratings, how would you expect **your manager to react to those ratings?**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Very negatively				Neither negatively nor positively				Very positively

MANAGERIAL FEEDBACK FORM BEGINS HERE

Now, ***draw an "X"*** on the line below to ***simulate*** you signing your name on the actual feedback form to be given to your manager.

Draw an "X" here:_____

Please evaluate your manager on how much he or she displays the following qualities. Remember,

YOUR MANAGER *WILL KNOW* IT WAS YOU WHO GAVE HIM OR HER THESE RATINGS.

3. **Overall effectiveness:**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Way Below Average				Average				Way Above Average

4. **Fairness** is the degree to which an individual is unbiased in such matters as making decisions and distributing rewards and punishments.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Way Below Average				Average				Way Above Average

NOTE: SCALE VALUES HAVE CHANGED FOR THE REST OF THE ITEMS!

NOW, "5" IS THE BEST SCORE THAT CAN BE GIVEN!

5. **Listening** is the degree to which an individual attends to and is interested in what another person says. **Best Rating**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Far Too Little				Just Right				Far Too Much

6. **Directiveness** is the degree to which a person tells others how to perform a task.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Far Too Little				Just Right				Far Too Much

7. **Rewarding** is the degree to which a person gives some form of recognition such as a "pat on the back" for a job well done.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Far Too Little				Just Right				Far Too Much

8. **Perceptiveness** is the degree to which an individual shows awareness of and consideration for other people's interests, needs, and attitudes.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Far Too Little				Just Right				Far Too Much

Appendix F. Organizational Citizenship Behaviors Measure

Please read carefully the following items. For each, indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statement.

Please be honest.

Remember, your answers will be kept strictly confidential.

1. I have never taken *anything* that did not belong to me, even when I was young.
Agree **Disagree** (circle one)

At my job:

2. I help others who have been absent.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree

3. I help others who have heavy workloads.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree

4. I take time to listen to my coworkers' problems and concerns.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree

5. I go out of my way to help new employees.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree

6. I take a personal interest in other employees.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree

7. I pass along information to coworkers.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree

8. Work is never *so* important that I can't take a break any time I want to.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree

9. I believe it's OK to make personal phone calls from work.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree

10. I don't mind staying at work late when there's a job that needs to get done.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree			Neither Agree nor Disagree			Strongly Agree

Appendix G. Team Qualities Scales

Teams have special characteristics that set them apart from other forms of work groups. Read each of the following characteristics of teams, and indicate by circling the appropriate number how much the characteristic appeals to you.

1. Team members are interdependent. That is, they often must interact with others to accomplish the mission of the team.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Unappealing			Neither Appealing nor Unappealing			Very Appealing

2. Team members often decide among themselves how work will be divided and the task will be accomplished, rather than be told how to do it by a supervisor.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Unappealing			Neither Appealing nor Unappealing			Very Appealing

3. Team members often help, and perform the tasks of other people. That is, there are often no firm boundaries between what each person is expected to do.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Unappealing			Neither Appealing nor Unappealing			Very Appealing

4. While individual members often give up individual popularity and recognition, in return, they gain the benefits of forming relationships with others and taking on a team identity.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Unappealing			Neither Appealing nor Unappealing			Very Appealing

5. Imagine that at your company, you are going to be placed on a team having the qualities described above. As part of this team, all other things being equal, *how much effort* would you expect to put into your work?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Little effort			A moderate amount			A lot of effort

Appendix H. Reward Policies Scales

Instructions and scenario: ***Imagine*** that at your company you have just been made part of a new work team. You and your teammates will now need to pool together your talents to work on projects which the group as a whole has been given responsibility for completing. **Although you know and respect the abilities of some people on your team, there are others with whom you have not yet worked.**

Because this is a new team, several decisions about how it will be managed now have to be made. In particular, it must be decided how year-end bonuses will be awarded. To encourage true teamwork among people, **upper management has decided that a minimum of 20% of the bonus will be based on team performance.** However, four potential arrangements have been suggested. For each of the following bonus policies, indicate by circling the appropriate number **how satisfied** you would be with it.

Possible year-end bonus policies

Policy 1: 20% Team Performance 80% Individual Performance

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Dissatisfied			Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied			Very Satisfied

Policy 2: 50% Team Performance 50% Individual Performance

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Dissatisfied			Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied			Very Satisfied

Policy 3: 70% Team Performance 30% Individual Performance

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Dissatisfied			Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied			Very Satisfied

Policy 4: 100% Team Performance 0% Individual Performance

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Dissatisfied			Neither Satisfied Nor Dissatisfied			Very Satisfied

Appendix I. Participant Information Scales

Participant information

1. My age is: _____ (please write in)

2. My gender is: (1) male (2) female

3. The gender of the manager I have been describing is: (1) male (2) female

4. Please indicate your **total years** of work experience:
   (1) less than 1 (4) 6-9 years (7) 21 years or more
   (2) 1-2 years (5) 10-15 years
   (3) 3-5 years (6) 16-20 years

5. Please indicate how long you have worked for your manager:
   (1) 3 months or less (5) 3-4 years
   (2) 4-7 months (6) 5 or more years
   (3) 8-11 months
   (4) 1-2 years

6. My job is officially considered to have:
   (1) no supervisory responsibility (3) managerial responsibility
   (2) supervisory responsibility (4) executive responsibility

7. Considering your present job, overall, how fairly do you think you've been treated?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I've received less than I deserved			Fairly—I've generally received what I deserved			I've received more than I deserved

8. Over the course of your entire career (all the jobs you've had), how fairly do you believe you've been treated?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I've received much less than I deserved			Fairly—I've generally received what I deserved			I've received much more than I deserved

Thank you for your participation!

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

Figure 1. Predicted job satisfaction levels for equity sensitivity orientations under various reward conditions. Adapted from Husman, Hatfield, & Miles (1985)



Figure 2. Actual job satisfaction levels for equity sensitivity orientations under various reward conditions. Adapted from Husman, Hatfield, & Miles (1985)



Figure 3. Reward policies varying in terms of the proportion of the reward based on team/individual performance and satisfaction with these policies as reported by the different equity sensitivity types.



Figure 4. Mean supervisor ratings by equity sensitivity groups under various reward conditions.

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IMAGE EVALUATION
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











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