INFORMATION TO USERS

The most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. These are also available as one exposure on a standard 35mm slide or as a 17" x 23" black and white photographic print for an additional charge.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Order Number 8914779

Gender differences in social perspective taking: A new developmental line

Paisner, Marilyn S., Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1988

U·M·I
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

GENDER DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING:

A NEW DEVELOPMENTAL LINE

by

Marilyn S. Paisner

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Educational Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

1988

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Educational Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

7/13/88
Date

Sue Rosenberg Zalk
Chair of Examining Committee

7/13/88
Date

Carol Kehr Tittle
Executive Officer

Professor Sue Rosenberg Zalk

Professor Alan Gross

Professor Carol Kehr Tittle

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

Abstract

GENDER DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING:
A NEW DEVELOPMENTAL LINE

by

Marilyn S. Paisner

Advisor: Professor Sue Rosenberg Zalk

This study investigated gender differences in social perspective taking as a function of developmental model and contextual variables. Two alternative coding schemes --Selman's unilinear model, yielding Perspective taking scores, and Lyons' two-path model, yielding Percentage of Care (vs. Justice) scores--were applied to one set of interview data in order to assess the impact of developmental model on research findings. Sex of subject, sex of protagonist and dilemma were examined to investigate how these contextual variables interact with gender. The sample consisted of 40 male and 40 female high school students who discussed three dilemmas: 1) Real life dilemma; 2) Friendship dilemma; 3) Peer group dilemma. Contrary to prediction, girls

scored significantly higher than boys on Perspective taking across dilemmas, and males had higher Peer group than Friendship scores. Furthermore, male protagonists elicited higher Peer group than Friendship scores. As hypothesized, Percentage of Care was significantly higher for girls than for boys, and higher in the Friendship than in the Peer group dilemma. Moreover, boys exhibited a narrower response range than did girls, who used both orientations (i.e. Justice and Care) more freely, and had significantly higher Percentage of Care in the Real life than in the Peer group dilemma. Theoretical and research implications are discussed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to gratefully acknowledge the support offered by my chairperson, Professor Sue Rosenberg Zalk, whose incisive comments lent clarity to this work. My appreciation is also extended to Professor Carol Kehr Tittle, who made herself available when I needed her, and provided invaluable assistance in helping me organize this project. My gratitude also goes to Professor Alan Gross who lightened the burdensome task of statistical analysis.

My special thanks to Howard Milbert for bearing with me throughout, and to Judith Pearson for helping in immeasurable ways. Ronnie Lesser, in addition, provided many fruitful ideas and suggestions. To my parents, Sally and Leon Paisner, go my appreciation for their unfailing confidence in me.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge the efforts of the school personnel who permitted me to conduct the interviews. Most of all, I thank all the students who gave of their time and themselves.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

CHAPTER I

Introduction

> The way a question is asked limits and disposes the ways in which any answer to it -- right or wrong -- may be given. (Langer, in Langdale, 1983, p. 18)

Recent interest in the development of social problem-solving has been manifest in a body of research studies utilizing the stage-sequential approach derived from parent theories of cognitive development. The core of this work appears in the literature on moral reasoning and social perspective taking considered as developmental phenomena. To the degree that these domains have accepted the assumptions of the structural models, so they have perpetuated some of the weaknesses associated with them, among which are included the conceptualization of a single developmental pathway, and minimal attention to the role of particular contexts and experiences in shaping developmental processes.

The question of gender differences in social problem solving has opened up a debate in which the weaknesses of structural models converge: Specifically, can gender differences be adequately tapped by a model providing for only one developmental line, particularly when the experiences of males and females might differ in significant respects? And as a corollary, what forms of new data about development are lost when methodologies

are designed to support the assumptions of a unilinear stage theory?

Gilligan's research tradition in the area of moral reasoning suggests the presence of two, gender-related modes of thinking; one of these modes, the Care (as opposed to Justice) orientation, had not been acknowledged with the research tools of the stage models.

A recent scoring system has been developed which allows for the representation of both modes of reasoning. In contrast, the related domain of social perspective taking has been dominated by Selman's stage model, with a system of scoring providing for only one developmental dimension.

The present study is an attempt to investigate social perspective taking as a function of two factors: developmental model and contextual variables. Given the theoretical and empirical links between moral reasoning and social perspective taking, it was proposed that the Care orientation may be operating in social perspective taking. As dual orientations have been shown to be gender related, the discovery of an alternative developmental line in perspective taking may provide important data regarding the impact of gender in this domain. Towards this end, two divergent coding schemes

(i.e. Selman's one-path model of perspective taking; Lyons' two-path model of moral reasoning) were applied to one set of interview data in order to assess the impact of developmental model on research findings. In addition, the variables of sex of subject, sex of protagonist and dilemma were examined to investigate how these contextual variables interact with gender.

Background:

Assumptions of cognitive-structural theory

Cognitive-structural theory, upon which Selman's perspective taking model rests, portrays development as a reciprocal interplay between the individual and the outside world, following an invariant sequence of progressive, hierarchically integrated stages which are advancing towards a state of equilibrium. Even as it invokes the role of experience, however, as integral to the organismic dialectic, this model subordinates the actual content of experience to the universal processes of structural transformations while giving little credence to essential, qualitative differences in how reality is both constructed and construed. It is presumed that males and females negotiate the structural shifts in an identical manner, and that particular

social contexts will not hold appreciably different meanings according to gender.

Review of the literature:

Models of gender difference

Over the last several decades, social scientists have examined consistent differences related to gender. Emanating from various theoretical traditions is the theme of a basic dichotomy in human existence. This dichotomy, conceived in terms of polar dimensions, has been variously defined: agency and communion (Bakan, 1966); instrumental and expressive (Parsons & Bales, 1955); allocentric and autocentric (Gutmann, 1965; Schachtel, 1959); animus and anima (Jung, 1959); individuation and connectedness (Cooper, Grotevant & Condon, 1983; White, Speisman & Costos, 1983); pride and caring (May, 1980). Although each modality is best understood as representative of a fundamental human dimension which is available to persons of both genders (Gilligan, 1982; White, Speisman, Costos & Smith, 1987), the modes have been identified both empirically and intuitively with patterns of psychological differences in the way males and females locate themselves within the social world (Josselson, Greenberger & McConochie, 1977a, 1977b; Hodgson & Fischer, 1979; Fischer, 1981; Douvan & Adelson, 1976.)

Thus, the literature describes a masculine orientation as characterized by an "agentic" (Bakan, 1966) or "instrumental" (Parsons & Bales, 1955) focus on mastery of the outside world, with corresponding value placed on the attributes of rationality, autonomy, independence, aggressiveness, sharp boundaries separating the self from non-self, and minimizing of both intense emotional expression and deep affective bonds. In contrast, the female pattern is organized by a central concern for "communion" (Bakan, 1966) and "expressive integration" (Parsons & Bales, 1955). This orientation is reflected in a focus on interpersonal responsiveness, emotional expressivity, acceptance of close attachment, and the development of empathy, with an inhibition of individual achievement and autonomy.

Research findings on gender-related modes

A number of research studies support the notion of gender-related dimensions. As early as 1893, Jastrow (in Garai & Scheinfeld, 1968, p. 180) attempted to analyze the content of language used by male and female college students; his request for subjects to write 100 words revealed the girls' "attention to the immediate surroundings, the finished product, the ornamental, the individual, the concrete," whereas their male cohorts

were drawn to "the more remote, the constructive, the useful and the abstract."

Several investigators have employed Bakan's (1966) agency-communion construct as a conceptual tool. Carlson (1971), for example, developed a system of scoring subjects' reports of their own affective experiences: females' responses were coded as significantly more communal, males', agentic. Block (1973) validated the Carlson study, and cited cross-cultural support for the use of the agency-communion dimension as a means of relating sex roles to ego development. White, Speisman and Costos (1983; 1986) report the use of an unpublished scoring system developed by one of the authors in which Bem's masculinity-femininity scales were adapted to code for agency-communion, as the latter constructs represent more heuristically powerful variables.

An additional study by Carlson (1971) operationalized Gutmann's (1965) allocentric-autocentric concepts; when subjects were asked to describe themselves, a significant other, space, and the future, male responses were reported as significantly more allocentric (i.e. individualistic, objective and distant) than those of females. May (1980) developed the pride and caring modalities in studies utilizing the Thematic Apperception Test. These studies revealed differential life trajectories projected according to gender: Whereas males'

stories tend to begin with grandiosity and ambition but end in catastrophe, females tend to project a long period of deprivation, but end in fulfillment.

Separation and attachment: gender differences

Several psychologists link the polar modalities described above to the complementary processes of separation and attachment, processes which remain in tension with one another throughout the lifespan. The more agentic functions are associated with the developmental thrust outward into the greater social world, and emphasize the movement towards separation and individuation; the more communal functions, in contrast, are associated with processes involving intimate ties to a primary individual. Chodorow (1978), in explicating why males tend to reflect the autonomous dimension and females the relational, points to differential social environments in infancy, as both boy and girl babies are traditionally nurtured by women. During the earliest period of self-other representation, a girl and her mother can experience each other as continuous with one another. Thus, the girl develops in the context of an ongoing relationship, and because this bond is not disruptive to her self-concept as a female, growth remains linked with intimacy and maturity is understood as the ability to create and sustain interpersonal attachments

(Gilligan, 1982; Lyons, 1983). The first intimate relationship is lived differently by a boy, whose primitive recognition of otherness is elaborated and encouraged throughout early childhood socialization.

The pair vs. the peer group: gender differences in friendships

There is a body of literature providing support for the idea that females' friendships focus on the intimate pair or dyad ("we two"), whereas males' friendships are oriented towards the larger group. Dweck and Bush (1976) report that throughout various cultures, boys have more peer relationships than girls and are more related to the group as a whole, but that girls' relationships are closer. Several researchers (Josselson, Greenberger & McConochie, 1977a, 1977b; Douvan & Adelson, 1976; Fischer, 1981; Hodgson & Fischer, 1979) relate adolescent girls' psychosocial maturity as compared with boys' to a capacity for intimacy developed in best-friendships, a capacity they eventually teach to boys through the dating process. Similarly, others report that in defining friendship, intimacy in a relationship is expressed as more valued for females than for males (Bigelow & La Gaipa, 1975; Serafica, 1982). In a related vein, Lever's (1976) studies of children's game playing behavior expands upon

Piaget's (1932/1965) observations that girls are more interested in maintaining social bonds than in upholding rules.

Undimensionality in organismic theory

What is remarkable, given the indications of two gender-related dimensions, is the degree to which a single orientation virtually defines all developmental theory. Progress is marked by progressive stages of distancing (Werner & Kaplan, 1963), autonomy (Erikson, 1968), abstraction and decentration, while those developmental processes involving attachment and caring are either undetected within the structural system, or subsumed under logical categories, interpreted as ontogenetically immature (White, Speisman & Costos, 1986).

In her analysis of the gender assymetries which have long informed our reading of human development, Langdale (1983) notes what is in effect an "aversion" among theorists towards finding gender differences, a concern that has been echoed by other researchers (Holstein, 1976; May, 1980). For example,

> Most studies in developmental psychology include both sexes routinely and test for sex differences, not because theoretically such differences are expected, but to provide justification for merging the samples of males and females, thus simplifying

> the statistical analysis and the reporting of the results. (Block, 1976, p. 228)

Moreover, embedded in the structuralist vision of development as a universal process, this aversion permeates and is perpetuated by the processes of theory-building research, and by the statistical techniques used for validation. It is significant that many of our major psychological theorists (e.g. Freud, 1926/1961; Erikson, 1968; Sullivan, 1953; Piaget, 1932/1965; Kohlberg, 1969; Selman, 1980) derive their theories from a consideration of male development. Among the cognitive theorists, for example, Piaget, Kohlberg and Selman all developed their stage theories on the basis of samples consisting exclusively of boys. In the validation of these models, which are conceived as universal, girls are frequently included in studies which obliterate gender differences by such procedures as partialling out for sex or creating samples unequal in age range and number of subjects (Langdale, 1983). Interestingly, each theorist has at one time or another voiced concerns that females are atypical (e.g. Freud, 1926/1961; Erikson, 1968; Piaget, 1932/1965; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969); as Langdale suggests, the very expectation of a gender

difference guides an exclusively male sample selection, whereas the validation studies represent a sudden leap towards the assumption of no difference.

A cyclical pattern has thereby emerged through which our most influential models lead a life of their own, with reification of a priori concepts and theory holding sway over data. In this fashion, the unique contribution of context to response has been lost in a variety of developmental realms.

These issues come to a peak in the research area of moral reasoning. Conceiving of morality in terms of a single justice structure and derived from research on males alone, the literature consistently finds females to be wanting in their level of moral development.

Moral reasoning literature

Piaget (1932/1965) studied morality within a framework of childhood games, sharing with Mead (1934) a view of games as an arena for learning to take others' roles while developing a respect for rules. Although Piaget presumed to address the development of moral reasoning in children, the study upon which he outlined his theory of moral development consisted of 20 boys from 4-13. In his attempt to validate the theory through an observation of females, Piaget noted that girls are

more relaxed and pragmatic in their attitudes towards rules, that they will bend them to satisfy everyone in the group, and that consequently, their moral sensibility is less developed than boys'.

It has been recognized that Piaget does provide, however unelaborated, the possibility of an alternative moral structure grounded in interpersonal understanding, for he acknowledges that "apart from our relations to other people, there can be no necessity" (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 196). Moreover,

> there is a spontaneous mutual affection, which from the first prompts the child to acts of generosity, and even of self-sacrifice, to very touching demonstrations which are in no way prescribed. And here no doubt is the starting point for that morality of good which we shall see developing alongside of the morality of right or duty (Piaget, 1932/1965; p. 195).

The morality of good, rooted in a child's parental relationships, "would be the result of the self-same tendency which urges individuals to respect each other and to place themselves inwardly in each other's minds" (Piaget, 1932/1965, p. 384).

Kohlberg (1969), who elaborated upon Piaget's formulization, neglected the consideration of an

alternative mode (i.e. a morality of good), and defined and expanded upon the notion of justice structures in a hierarchical scheme of moral precepts which move from the pre-conventional concern with consequences to the post-conventional capacity for conceptualizing the nature of abstract moral principles. His "universal" 6-stage model was derived from the longitudinal study of 84 boys, aged 10-16. Kohlberg's research, as well as that of others (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; Haan, Block & Smith, 1968; Haan, Langer & Kohlberg, 1976; Holstein, 1976), typically reports that women's moral reasoning tends toward Stage 3, a level indicative of a "conformist" perspective which is enmeshed in interpersonal relations and oriented towards taking responsibility for others. Men in contrast more often reason at Stages 4 and 5, levels that place the rule above the individual and approach the final stage defined as judgement according to abstract principle.

According to stage theory, the gender discrepancy would indicate that women's moral reasoning is inferior to that of men. Rather than accepting this alternative, some researchers (Gilligan, 1982, 1979; Langdale, 1983; Lyons, 1983) began to suspect that women consistently chose Stage 3 because it was the only one of the Kohlberg stages to represent their cognitive and moral perspective.

A new line of moral reasoning: the Care orientation

Recent trends in the domain of moral reasoning have worked towards developing psychological models that permit the expression of both attachment and individuation, and that effectively represent the thinking of both males and females. In the research tradition introduced by Gilligan (1979; 1982; 1986) and continued in the studies of Lyons (1983) and Langdale (1983), gender is related to differential concepts of self, and to differential forms of moral reasoning. The work of these authors suggests the operation of a developmental dimension which is separate from that line of reasoning outlined by Piaget and Kohlberg. The traditional dimension described above, based on a respect for structures of justice, is associated with a morality of equal rights that is grounded in logic and manifested in a reliance on principles of fairness to resolve moral problems (Lyons, 1983). Gilligan and her associates note that the traditional formulation is descriptive of moral reasoning in males, but that females tend to discuss moral dilemmas somewhat differently: As females reflect a sense of self that is integrally located within a network of relationships (rather than a more "separate" and "objective" sense of self), they are compelled by an urgency to foster interpersonal harmony and to avoid

hurting people. Thus, instead of relying on abstract principles, they tend to define moral issues in terms of conflicting responsibilities towards particular individuals in specific contexts (Gilligan, 1982). The new developmental dimension is referred to as the Care orientation.

Gilligan's Research

Gilligan's work is informed by a concern that the imbalances accruing from a focus on theories derived primarily from accounts of male development be redressed by attempting to derive new constructs from females' accounts of their experiences. In order to investigate whether this approach could generate an alternative reading of development, Gilligan studied moral reasoning throughout the life span, both within Kohlberg's dilemma paradigm, and in open-ended interviews with children and adults. In the latter, subjects were asked to describe experiences which they understood as moral, and to define moral problems in their lives. For example, a group of 25 Harvard undergraduates who had elected a course in moral and political choice related experiences of moral conflicts while enrolled in the course and again 5 years later (Gilligan, 1982). Following in this format, Gilligan (1982) interviewed 29 women who had been referred

to abortion clinics about issues they considered when they were deciding whether or not to terminate their pregnancies. They were interviewed again a year later. A third study (Gilligan, 1982) compared the responses of 144 males and females on questions addressing their experiences of conflict and the moral judgements they used to solve hypothetical dilemmas.

Throughout the real life interviews, two divergent premises for judgement were consistently found to be related to gender: Males attempted to systematically eliminate contextual variables in searching for a principle, whereas females included all contextually relevant elements necessary to maintain social harmony. Two representative eight-year-olds, for example, explain their bases for making a decision in a real life conflict (i.e. "when you're not sure what to do"): The boy, who wants to go out with friends at the same time that his mother is cleaning the house, appeals to hierarchical order with an assertion that "some things go before other things" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 33). The girl in contrast, deciding with whom among her many friends she should play, focuses on inclusion by choosing someone who is "all alone" (Gilligan, 1982, pp. 32-33).

Females emphasized the demands specific to the situation in their responses to hypothetical dilemmas as

well. In the classic Heinz dilemma formulated by Kohlberg, in which subjects are asked whether or not a man should steal a drug that will save his wife's life, gender differences are evident: Males respond to the abstract presentation of a dilemma with an objective logic of rights, in this instance, rights to property vs. rights to life. The prototypical female response shows a fleshing out of the stories, an attempt to translate hypothetical dilemmas into problems about real people. Women focus on actual consequences of action and wonder, for instance, about what will happen to his wife if Heinz is imprisoned; they reframe the question to ask who is going to suffer more, the druggist who loses money or the person who loses his life? (Gilligan, 1982)

Gilligan's longitudinal analyses suggest structural changes in adults' concepts of themselves in relation to others, although these changes are not yet fully explicated in stages. Gilligan does note that maturity involves a more complex balance and integration of responsibilities, suggesting that the morality of Care can be charted much like any developmental line (Gilligan, 1982). Her observation that with maturity, men develop more concern for others while at the same time women learn to include care of themselves, echoes

Bakan's (1966) perception that a well-integrated human being can be dominated by neither unmitigated communion nor unmitigated agency.

Concretism and contextual reasoning in maturity

Kohlberg's (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969) report on adult reasoning after adolescence revealed an apparent "regression" from principled levels to more relativistic forms of thinking, a finding of obviously problematic import for a stage theory, and one that has contributed to criticisms of Kohlberg's upper stages (Holstein, 1976: Simpson, 1974; Edwards, 1975; Sullivan, 1977). When Kohlberg followed-up his adolescent sample in early adulthood, he found that 20% of the subjects used less mature forms of moral judgement than they had employed as adolescents. He attempted to revise his scoring system by correcting what he assumed to be a confounding of form and content, changing his criteria for principled judgement.

Murphy and Gilligan (1980; Gilligan & Murphy, 1982), in an attempt to study the transition from adolescence to adulthood, performed a longitudinal study of students who had enrolled in Harvard's course on moral and political choice, and followed these subjects through the age of 27. The data were scored according to two methods: according to Kohlberg's revised criteria,

and according to a system of ethical and intellectual development formulated by Perry (1968).

Perry's empirical study of developmental changes among college Harvard men during the five years following college revealed a developmental sequence through nine positions, from a reliance on moral absolutes (e.g. right or wrong), through an appreciation of the contextual relativism of all knowledge, to the development of a new, more encompassing form of commitment within relativism. Perry's last three positions were understood to represent post-relativistic structures which go beyond Piaget's formal operational stage. These positions emerge only after an understanding of contextual relativism has been attained, following which the individual can go on to recognize the limits of reason alone, and the need to transcend it through an act of personal commitment and responsibility.

The Murphy and Gilligan study revealed that even with Kohlberg's revised coding scheme, some of their interview data (about 15%) still appeared "regressed" from a principled stage at one testing point to a less mature form of reasoning at a later point. Similar stage regression has been cited by others (Holstein, 1976; Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg & Haan, 1977; Sinnot, 1975) as well as by Gilligan and Kohlberg (1977), resulting in

still further revisions on Kohlberg's part. Murphy and Gilligan (1980) found, however, that their interview data scored according to Perry's criteria rather than Kohlberg's revealed an actual progression to a more advanced stage: Of the 13 subjects who could be followed over the full seven year interval, 12 progressed, one did not change and none regressed. In this study, subjects related that their earlier reliance on a single perspective had proven inadequate in the face of actual conflicts and choices experienced in daily life; consequently, they were led to abandon abstract principles in the development of a sense of responsibility to the real world.

With respect to gender differences, Kohlberg's revised system revealed that although males and females had approximately equal scores at the first testing time, at a later testing point, males scored one-third of a stage higher than women. Perry's system, too, found women to be at a slightly lower position than men, but the authors interpret this as a probable scoring error.

Murphy and Gilligan's (1980) study, along with Perry's (1968), accords with the concerns of several authors (Sinnot, 1975; Chandler, 1975; Edwards, 1975; La Bouvie-Vief, 1984; Riegel, 1973, 1976; Flavell, 1973)

who, disaffected from abstract formal stages as definitive of developmental maturity, are looking at a new form of concretism which is grounded in the particular contexts of daily life. Says Flavell (1973),

> Real problems with meaningful content are obviously more important in everyday adaptation (i.e. than are abstract problems of logic) and it is possible that these are the kinds of problems our cognitive apparatus has evolved to solve (p. 117).

It has been further suggested that the reappearance of concrete, contextual thinking in adulthood represents a transformation of earlier logical reasoning into a higher plane in which the individual becomes connected to a complex social milieu (La Bouvie-Vief, 1984). Piaget (1972), when confronted with a lack of validation of his formal operational stage, appeared to be moving towards a definition of this last developmental stage as reflective of an adult's particular talents and interests rather than of a pure, abstract, universally applicable structure.

Multiple lines of development

Gilligan's work is also consonant with several other trends in developmental psychology. White and her associates (White, Speisman and Costos, 1983; White,

Speisman, Costos & Smith, 1987; White, Speisman, Jackson, Bartis and Costos, 1986) share many of the concerns discussed above: the need to revitalize structural models by recognizing and integrating the differential experiences of females, and the viability of a "two-path" model which investigates the gender-weighted but fundamentally progressive, life-span processes. Their construct of Relationship Maturity, operationalized with a six stage description of maturity within the context of two intimacy systems (parent-child, and marriage), considers such factors as the ability to take the intimate other's perspective, and the extent to which individuals and the intimate other express caring for each other. Relationship Maturity is traced in a progression from a self-focused, to a role-focused, to an individuated-connected stance with respect to the other. This model gives credence to the social contexts in which reality is constructed, and is singular in scoring developmental characteristics of a relationship rather than of an individual's reflection on social issues (Youniss, 1983).

The notion of two basic developmental paths is encompassed by the more general understanding of multiple lines of development in accord with Werner's (1948) view that development is both unilinear and multilinear.

From this vantage point, diverse thought forms are understood to follow their own developmental trajectories, and rich, varied strands of thinking, to coexist within each adult (Lesser & Paisner, 1985). The recognition that diverse spheres of activity require different constructions of thinking also permeate the models of Damon (1977) and Price-Williams (1975).

Lyons' validation study and coding scheme

Lyons' (1983) study of self-concept and moral perspectives in a sample of 36 subjects between 8-60 lends support to Gilligan's broadly-sketched constructs. With the development of a coding scheme designed to score for two distinct ways of knowing in the social world, Lyons indicates that the two alternative modes are operating in moral reasoning, and that they are related to gender. Her scheme defines the characteristically male self-concepts as the "separate/ objective self," and its corresponding morality the Justice orientation. These are contrasted with their female counterparts, a "connected self" which is associated with a morality of Care. Each orientation reveals a distinct location of the self with respect to others, and a related epistemological stance towards moral issues: That is, the separate self steps back

from a moral choice to allow for objectivity so that competing rights can be impartially evaluated, whereas the connected self, drawn towards maintaining relationships, is responsive to the particular situation, and uses a "psychological logic" (Gilligan, 1982) that need not exercise strict equality.

In Lyons' study, subjects discussed real life moral conflicts in open-ended interviews. Subjects' statements were considered in terms of their construction, resolution and evaluation of their moral dilemmas, each consideration was categorized as either Care or Justice, and the full interview scored by counting the number of considerations each individual presented within either mode. Predominance of orientation was then determined according to the higher frequency of one or the other mode. Similarly, in order to assess whether the two modes of self-definition, "connected self" or "separate/objective self," were evident, each response was coded as indicative of either the one mode or the other.

The results confirmed the following: gender was related to mode of self-definition ($p < .001$) and to moral choice ($p < .001$); 75% of all females showed a predominantly Care style; 79% of the males a Justice orientation; 63% of the females were characterized as

predominantly Connected; and 79% of the males, Separate/ objective. In addition, Lyons found more "split dominance" in females than in males, defined as an equal number of responses scored in the Care and Justice categories. There was a strong correlation between the hypothesized mode of self-definition and moral choice.

The possibility of a life span approach is implied in the age changes noted by Lyons. Both orientation were found across all age groups, but after age 27, women showed an increase in Justice considerations. This is in accord with the findings reported in Gilligan (1982, 1979), with suggestions of structural changes in adults' concepts of themselves in relation to others, and differential developmental shifts emerging for men and women: Whereas females eventually learned to include the self in making considerations, males, with maturity, tended to increase their awareness that "others may have their own contexts" (Lyons, 1983, coding manual, p. 140), a shift reflected in their increasing recognition of the need to take responsibility for others.

Langdale's use of different moral dilemmas

Langdale's (1983) study consisting of 144 subjects between 8 and 60 validates the presence of the two orientations, and indicates that they can be empirically

identified with the use of hypothetical, as well as real life dilemmas. The discovery that subjects' considerations about the resolution of a dilemma correlated .81 with the total number of considerations led her to adapt Lyons' (1983) coding scheme by coding only the resolution component of the dilemma. She applied this revised coding scheme to a consideration of four different dilemmas, one real life and three hypothetical (i.e. the Heinz dilemma, and two versions of a dilemma concerning abortion). The real life dilemma is understood to generate an individual's spontaneous moral orientation, which is used as a norm against which the other dilemmas are assessed. Thus, a "dilemma effect" is reported if the distribution of a moral orientation in a dilemma is significantly different from that moral orientation in the real life dilemma, and dilemmas can be compared according to their differential "pull" towards either Justice or Care. Langdale found that individuals' predominant mode of response was consistent within and across dilemmas; that at least 80% of the subjects had a dominant mode; that both orientations can be reliably coded; that both were significantly related to gender but not to age; and that those individuals who gave Care responses to the real life dilemma (primarily female) had significantly lower Justice scores in the hypothetical

dilemmas as compared with those individuals (primarily males) who offered no Care responses in the real life dilemma.

Langdale also notes significant differences among dilemmas in their relative pull to Justice. These dilemma effects were significant for both males and females but with different manifestations for each. That is, when a dilemma pulled strongly for Justice (e.g. Kohlberg's Heinz dilemma), males with a Care orientation in the real life dilemma tended to eliminate Care considerations when responding to the hypothetical dilemma. In contrast, females with a Care orientation in the real life dilemma used both Justice and Care considerations in responding to the hypothetical situation.

Another noteworthy finding pertains to Kohlberg's measure and suggests its inappropriateness as a definitive measure of moral reasoning in females. Langdale's analysis confirmed Gilligan's hypothesis that as befits a developmental sequence, stages 1, 2, 4 and 5* were significantly related to age. Stage 3, however, was not. Moreover, there was a strong positive relationship between the presence of a Care orientation in the real

---

* Langdale used the most recent version of Kohlberg's system which eliminates stage 6 (Colby, A., Gibbs, J., Kohlberg, L., Speicher-Dubin, B. and Candee, D. (1979).

life dilemma and the existence of Stage 3 thinking in the hypothetical dilemmas. In addition, Stage 3 was the only level at which gender differences were evident. Thus, what had been defined as a single stage within one model had been confounded with a separate orientation emanating from a divergent model.

Selman's model of social perspective taking

Selman's (1980) model of social perspective taking integrates a Meadian (1934) concern with the co-construction of self and reality with a Piagetian world view. This is evident in his notion of the progressive ability to understand and coordinate interpersonal issues as a function of decentration. Selman conceives of perspective taking as a deep infrastructure upon which an individual's understanding of social and psychological relations is organized. The construct is used analytically to clarify reasoning about interpersonal concepts in four contextual domains: knowledge of individuals, of friendship, of peer groups, and of parent-child relations. Each domain is divided into five stages (0-4) corresponding to a perspective taking level. Conceptualized in terms of structural shifts in an "understanding of relations between persons and changes in concepts of relations within persons" (Selman, 1980,

pp. 34-35), each progressive level represents a more abstract, hierarchically integrated coordination of perspectives. Growth is described within a framework of emerging out of egocentrism, from an initial period in which the self is indistinct from others (Piaget, 1929), through an early stage of differentiation in one-way relations, through a level of reciprocal perspective taking characterized by an ability to stand outside the self, moving towards a capacity to step back from the relationship itself, and culminating in a societal perspective akin to Mead's Generalized Other.

Selman utilizes a Kohlbergian dilemma paradigm to probe subjects' theories of human relations, their concepts of people, and their strategies for resolving conflicts. Individuals' spontaneous theories are elucidated through their understanding of issues which are specifically related to the particular interpersonal domain. For example, in the Friendship domain, subjects discuss the following issues: how and why friendships are formed; types of friendships; the meaning of intimacy; trust; jealousy; means of resolving conflicts; and why friendships break up.

Selman's work is particularly important in his attempt to bridge theory and behavior. He integrates clinical work with disturbed children into his framework,

strives to derive his scheme from empirical observation, and enriches an organismic approach with an appreciation for contexts. In addition, he and his co-workers (Brion-Meisels, 1984; Gurucharri, Phelps & Selman, 1984; Gurucharri & Selman, 1982), have identified subjects' behavioral strategies for resolving real-life conflicts. Further, Selman's appreciation of the social construction of social knowledge is embodied in the dyadic therapy sessions provided for the disturbed youths at the Judge Baker Guidance Center with which this research is associated (Selman & Demorest, 1984).

Selman's meaning of context represents an instance of the traditional structuralist distinction between competence and performance (Flavell, 1968), for these structuralist researchers are interested in sorting out differential levels of response as a function of varying social demands and tensions. A child's high level of reflective understanding, for instance, may not be matched by his or her erratic solution to a conflict erupting during a class meeting. In the same vein, Selman and Demorest (1984) report regressive interpersonal strategies among children whose therapy is nearing termination. According to their wide oscillations in strategies and in access to their underlying abilities relative to

contexts, such children are described by these authors as "disequilibrated" (Selman, Lavin, Brion-Meisels, 1982).

The above interest in context in terms of transient and shifting performance, however useful in refining and making real the perspective taking concept, reinforces an adherence to the notion of a stable, unitary structure which like its cousin justice structure, may obstruct entry to alternative forms of understanding. Moreover, in spite of Selman's insistence that the development of perspective taking involves a "uniquely social cognition, not just one of cognitive structures applied to social content" (Selman, 1980, p. 35), his commitment to a unitary stage model permeates his theory, his research techniques and his very measure, with the consequent distortion we have seen in related spheres of research and a parallel reluctance towards finding gender differences.

Langdale (1983) traces Selman's research from his doctoral dissertation completed in 1969, which compared moral reasoning with role taking ability, a study in which girls were included. Selman reports,

> Perhaps the most surprising result in this study was the relation of sex to the relationship between moral judgement and role taking ability. The analysis showed a

> significant relation of role taking to moral judgement for boys but not for girls. With boys and girls combined, the results showed that the relation of the 2 variables retains its significance with sex partialled out. However, the significance for boys but not for girls cannot be ignored. (Emphasis added, Langdale, 1983, p. 80).

Nevertheless, his model became elaborated on the basis of a later study consisting of 47 boys aged 7-13, who were assessed on a variety of cognitive and social dimensions. In reporting the validation studies for his model, Selman (1980) describes three studies: one consisting of 20 boys and 20 girls aged 4-10 (Selman & Byrne, 1974); another using 56 males from 10-30 (Byrne, 1973); and a third study utilizing Kohlberg's longitudinal sample of boys aged 10-16. Thus, as Langdale summarizes, "the 143 cases in the validation studies consisted of 20 females, all under the age of 10, and 123 males, ranging in age from 4 to at least 30" (Langdale, 1983, pp. 82-83).

In a later study, Selman and Cooney (1978) studied 179 males and 46 females between 4 1/2 and 32. The female sample was matched with an equivalent number of male subjects drawn from the male sample, and the data revealed no sex differences. Selman indicates that this analysis of sex differences "is only preliminary, performed more to affirm the appropriateness of the measure for both sexes than to uncover meaningful trends

in sex-related social development. Further sex-related interpersonal understanding research, as with social class analyses, must be based on more carefully selected samples . . ." (Selman, 1980, p. 188). Yet in spite of his acknowledged under-representation of female data, he continues to assert the universal validity of his model. Following in this tradition, several of his associates study only males. Gurucharri, Phelps and Selman (1984), for instance, compared longitudinally the conflict-solving strategies of normal and disturbed youths; these authors claim that only boys were selected "because it was not practically possible to examine changes in growth rates of interpersonal understanding as a function of sex" (p. 26).

Social perspective taking and moral reasoning

It has been generally accepted among cognitive structural theorists that common structural bonds underlie moral reasoning and perspective taking. Piaget (1932), like Mead (1934) emphasizes that learning to stand in someone else's place through social interaction is essential for the development of a respect for rules underlying morality. Kohlberg (1971) posits a relationship of necessity but insufficiency such that a given level of moral thinking implies a prerequisite

level of perspective taking, a claim reiterated by Selman and Damon (1980). Additionally, in attempting to explain women's "inferior" moral reasoning, Kohlberg invokes their limited opportunities for role-taking in the socio-political world to which men traditionally have access, and suggests that as females increasingly enter the work force, their moral reasoning scores are likely to rise. (The persistence of Care responses in the highly educated, professional women interviewed by Gilligan appears to belie the simplicity of his contention.) Selman (1980) elaborates upon the relationship between the two constructs by suggesting that whereas moral judgement stages describe theories about how individuals should think, act, and feel towards each other, levels of perspective taking refer more to theories about how people do think, and act and feel towards each other.

The validity of relationship between the two interpersonal spheres, although somewhat undermined by Selman's own doctoral research, had been corroborated in empirical studies which reveal that attainment of stages of perspective taking precedes attainment of corresponding levels of moral reasoning (Moir, 1974; Kohlberg, 1971). Kurdek (1978) reports, however, that some subjects receive higher scores of moral thinking than of perspective taking.

Gender differences in role taking and related constructs

An examination of gender differences in perspective taking is complicated by the raft of theoretical and methodological difficulties in the general literature on role taking and egocentrism. Many authors (Ambron & Irwin, 1975; Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Ford, 1979; Kurdek, 1978; Shantz, 1975; Urbain & Kendall, 1980) have challenged the notion of perspective taking as a unitary construct. A multiplicity of tasks varying in levels of sophistication and complexity have been used to study this construct in the divergent domains of perceptual, cognitive and affective perspective taking (Shantz, 1975). Individual tasks have varied according to the following dimensions which may account for a large portion of the variance and may explain the typically low correlations among divergent measures of perspective taking (Hudson, 1978): the type of inference which is needed (e.g. recognizing a visual configuration from someone elses's point of view; understanding another's psychological state); the format of the task (e.g. watching a filmstrip; playing a strategic guessing game); the mode of response required (e.g. pointing to a picture representing the subject's feeling; retelling a complex story from several characters' vantage points). Kurdek (1978) raises further questions about the scoring,

validity and reliability in the body of role-taking studies; in addition, he mentions the disparities among samples with regard to age range, gender, and the number of subjects utilized.

In light of the above, it is not surprising that the literature on gender differences in this area of social cognition is fraught with ambiguity and inconsistency. The points agreed upon are few: from an early age on, boys excel in the ability to recognize a perceptual configuration from another's point of view (Ambron & Irwin, 1975); girls appear better at decoding auditory cues, a precondition for making judgements about verbal communication (Garai & Scheinfeld, 1968; Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983); girls tend to perform more maturely on most measures of social problem solving until middle childhood (Turnure, 1975), at which time boys apparently catch up. Predominant findings of no gender differences have issued from studies of cognitive perspective taking. These have employed a variety of measures: Selman's interpersonal interviews (Selman, 1980; Selman & Byrne, 1974); Feffer's Role-Taking Task (Sommers, 1981; Turnure 1975); strategic guessing games (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright & Jarvis, 1968); and a "privileged information" paradigm (Chandler & Greenspan, 1972; Flavell et al., 1968; Kurdek & Rogdon, 1975).

Contrary evidence appears, however, in Kurdek and Krile's (1982) finding that girls from the third through eighth grades scored significantly higher on Selman's measure than did boys.

Several studies which do not tap the integrative element essential to Selman's understanding of perspective-taking -- comprehending "how human points of view are related and coordinated with one another and not simply what social or psychological information may appear to be like from an alternative individual's perspective" (Selman, 1980, p. 22) -- reveal that females are more skilled in role taking. One line of research derived from the area of person perception finds that in a comparison of marital partners, wives are significantly more able to predict their spouses' responses on interpersonal checklists (Murstein & Beck, 1972; Struckert, 1963; Taylor, 1967). A study by Szanton (1984) reports that 3 1/2 and 4 1/2 year old girls tend to be less egocentric than boys in predicting their mothers' choice of objects. That the boys performed better with a stranger than with their mothers on this task had implications supporting the notion of males' greater orientation outwards towards autonomy and separation.

Several authors have also found gender differences in patterns of relationships relevant to perspective

taking, suggesting that clusters of psychological variables associated with gender may be more powerful than gender as such. White, Speisman, Jackson, Bartis & Costos (1986) discovered that marriage, age and parenthood were more tightly interrelated in women, as these variables were associated with a measure of relationship maturity in females alone. In addition, it was found (White, Speisman & Costos, 1983) that women attained a significantly higher stage than men with regard to taking their parents' perspectives. White et al. (1983) suggest that women may use their entrance into adult roles to help them gain perspectives on people close to them, whereas men may use this developmental period to confirm autonomy. Kurdek (1981) also reports differential gender patterns for high school and college students: On various measures of social sensitivity and perspective taking, there were no correlations for men, but for the women, a positive correlation suggestive of a tighter clustering of these dimensions, as well as the possibility of a generalized social cognitive skill in females. Hoffman (1977), too, proposes that females may have a more highly developed affective base for prosocial behaviors than do males. His conclusions are based on a review of studies on empathy which consistently show females to be more empathic than males. Hoffman, however, defines empathy

as a vicarious affective response or readiness to be aroused empathically by others that is presumed to be unrelated to perspective taking ability. Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) enumerate the inconsistencies in empathy studies in terms of discrepant measures and definitions of the construct; their review of the literature finds that females appear to score higher in empathy when self-report is used, but are only moderately favored when assessed with measures of reflexive crying. They report that no sex differences are revealed with physiological measures or unobtrusive observation.

Dilemma effects

Langdale's (1983) study reveals that although individuals rely upon a predominant mode in solving hypothetical moral problems, they may shift orientations in response to the pull of a particular dilemma. The Heinz dilemma, for example, elicited significantly more Justice considerations among both males and females as compared with their responses to a real life or abortion dilemma. Johnston (1985) also notes that Care and Justice are represented differentially in different fables, in interaction with gender. Two of the fables, for instance, present conflicts between pairs of different animals who are attempting to live together. Boys turned towards an

abstract principle of similarity in deciding that the horse and dog appearing in one fable could coexist because they are similar animals, whereas the mole and the hedgehog of another fable, characters who had experienced tension with each other, were too dissimilar to manage. As would be predicted from the literature reviewed above, girls believed that the mole and hedgehog were capable of resolving their differences, as they had already established a relationship.

Selman's dilemmas are all designed to tap an underlying structure of perspective taking, and variability within and across domains can be understood only in terms of higher or lower levels of thinking about different issues. Scrutiny of the content of his dilemmas suggests that there might also be differences in their relative pull towards Justice and Care. A reading of the dilemmas as a body reveals the pervasive theme of a separate, "agentic" subject who is appealing to hierarchical principles in decision making. Protagonists ask such questions as the following: Who comes first, you or the group? Does it matter if someone lets me win at ping pong? Should I do what mother wants or what I want? (Or should my daughter do what she wants or what I want?)

The Friendship dilemma, in contrast, is striking in its depiction of the protagonist as a connected self who must weigh her decision against the competing claims of two friends -- an old friend with a problem and a new friend with two tickets to a play. We are presented with a conflict among three individuals, each representing a unique context and need.

The observation of a qualitative difference among dilemmas, suggesting that they may differentially encourage Justice or Care responses, was investigated in a pilot study by the author in which 14 college women were interviewed on Selman's (1979) Friendship dilemma and Peer group dilemma (Jacquett, 1976). With the use of Lyons' (1983) scoring criteria, results indicated that the Friendship dilemma elicited significantly more Care responses than did the Peer group dilemma ($X^2 = 6.69$, $p < .05$). Subjects responded to the Peer group situation with a tendency towards forming injunctions and imperatives. There were a predominance of considerations involving fairness, duty, rights, as well as considerations of the self. For example: "He comes first, not the group;" "If you want to be part of a group you should put your all into it -- all of its members put in an

equal amount of time;" "Marty has an obligation -- he had a commitment to the band and he should keep it." Responses elicited by the Friendship dilemma suggested an alternative epistemological source. The concern with specific individuals and minimizing their hurt was expressed by one woman's stated, "It's like, do you really need this play more than she needs you?" The overriding emphasis on maintaining an interpersonal bond was revealed in several types of statements: attempts at active inclusion ("Get another ticket and let everybody go, then there won't be problems"); juggling the character's time to satisfy everyone ("First she can get up early and talk to Joanne about her problem . . ."); lying to one of the friends; or avoidance ("Make up a story, say her grandmother's sick"). In short, these findings lend support to the notion that the domain of social perspective taking, like that of moral thinking, encompasses two separate lines of reasoning.

Response variability as a function of gender represented in the stimulus

Selman's experimental paradigm, in focusing on the perspective taking structure below the surface content, is not concerned with the gender of the characters represented in the various dilemmas; some are about boys

and others about girls. The literature suggests, however, that experimental variation of the gender of a target character may correspond to differential judgements by subjects. One body of studies reports differences in the perception and treatment of boys and girls by the social environment (Livesly & Bromley, 1973). There are findings that adults in a laboratory setting respond more quickly to the sound of a crying infant who is said to be a girl (Condry & Condry, 1983), and that adults select different toys for playing with a three-month-old depending on the gender label attributed (Seavey, Katz & Zalk, 1975). In a study presenting young adults with vignettes of parent-child disciplinary encounters varying the gender of parent and child, discipline directed at daughters was more often perceived as harsh than discipline directed at sons, girls were judged more likely to be harmed by the discipline, and punishment by fathers was more often perceived as abusive than the same punishment administered by mothers (Herzberger & Tenner, 1985). Barnett & King (1984; 1985) report that both children and college students react differently to stories about victims and aggressors according to the gender of the individuals involved: Male victims were perceived as

more angry, females, sad. In addition, females were perceived as warranting more assistance than males.

Studies in a related research area reveal an implicit devaluing of female roles, traits and achievement as compared with that of males, a finding associated with "differential status characteristics" of males and females (Eagly, 1983; Lockheed & Hall, 1976). For example, there is evidence that when the authorship of a scholarly article is either ambiguous regarding gender or when the gender is experimentally manipulated, the work is judged as more competent when attributed to a man (Goldberg, 1968; Paludi & Strager, 1985). Similar judgements have been noted with regard to artistic merit (Pheterson et al., 1971), mental health criteria, and the selection of characters for job promotions or pay increments (O'Leary & Hansen, 1985). Attribution theory and research of over a decade have generated comparable findings regarding causal attributions for achievement. These consistently report that equal achievement is explained differently according to the gender of the achiever: Success in males is more often attributed to ability, in females, to luck or to ease of the goal. On the other hand, females are assigned more personal responsibility for failure (Deaux & Emswiller, 1974; Feather & Simon, 1975; O'Leary & Hansen, 1985; Spence, 1974). Many of these studies

utilize a story completion format derived from Horner's (1972) work on achievement motivation and conflict in women. Post (1981), for example, presents subjects with stories about a medical student that vary according to gender and to outcomes of success or failure. Reviews of such literature emphasizes that the results are a reflection of sex-role attitude and expectations, which serve as a mediating function in the attribution process (Post, 1981; Wittig, 1985); subjects' judgements, in other words, operate within their belief systems about gender differences.

Gender differences in the stimuli are also pertinent to a consideration of the perceived similarity between subject and target character. Shaver's (1970) defensive attribution hypothesis states that judgements of responsibility for an accident depend on personal as well as situational similarity: i.e. greater perceived similarity is associated with less attribution of personal responsibility. Support for this hypothesis includes Whitehead and Hall's (1984) report that judgements of legal actions involve an interaction between the subject's gender and the target character's occupation: Females judged someone in a feminine occupation (seamstress) to have acted more reliably than one in a masculine profession (shoemaker), while male judgements took the opposite

position. Another study (Britain & Coker, 1982) underscores the importance of perceived similarity on the basis of a common gender shared by a subject and a stimulus character in noting that children listening to songs attended selectively to same-sex characters and recalled more when the same-sex character was dominant.

Developmental considerations

Converging areas of social-cognitive inquiry yield findings that adolescence is a particularly fertile period for the emergence of new perspective taking capacities and for more complex and intimate relationships. Piaget (1965/1932), who finds formal operational structures to be stable by age 15 or 16, grounds the teenager's "morality of cooperation" in the mutuality of peer relations. From a related vantage point, Youniss (1981) describes adolescents' ability to construct and comprehend the moral sphere in terms of communicative relations embodying mutual understanding. Brion-Meisels and Selman (1984) posits a restructuring of social knowledge which occurs by age 15, a shift from reciprocity towards the mutuality in perspective taking which is the basis of intimacy. These structural shifts are associated with a more mature understanding of friendship, peer and authority relations, and of one's own identity and feelings. In addition,

there are concomitant new behavioral strategies for solving interpersonal conflicts, and new interaction patterns develop.

Some structural theorists, in examining the social-cognitive spurts in adolescence, describe affective and existential difficulties which appear as a flip side of the ability to differentiate and coordinate perspectives. Elkind (1967) describes a form of egocentrism peculiar to early adolescence, reflected in the young teenager's playing to an imaginary audience, as stemming from a new "thinking about thinking" (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958); this self-centering is resolved by about age 15. Chandler (1975) proposes that increased decentering skills present the adolescent with an abstract, relativistic world, of unlimited alternatives out of which a self must be forged. He suggests that the resulting "epistemological loneliness" can be conquered by a process of recentering the self in a concrete relationship with the social environment. In addition, there is evidence that adolescents' reflective abilities in perspective taking, although generally highly developed, are still actively evolving (Gilligan, 1979; Mullis, 1983; Yussen, 1976), and vary according to contexts (Brion-Meisels & Selman, 1984) or to particular relationships, such as parent child relations (Cooper et

al., 1983; White, Speisman & Costos, 1983). Researchers in the area of psycho-social development explore adolescents' growth of interpersonal understanding in a context of issues pertaining to intimacy and identity formation (Douvan & Adelson, 1966; Erikson, 1968; Fischer, 1981; Gilligan, 1979; Hodgson & Fischer, 1979; Josselson, 1977). Gilligan (1986), who notes adolescents' heightened sensitivity to the moral dimensions of both Care and Justice, discusses adolescence as a period of renegotiating attachment relationships as conflicts of responsibility become increasingly complex.

Summary

The construction of knowledge in the realm of social perspective taking implies a particular location of the self within the social world. As informed by structural models, this construct has been considered as a largely cognitive ability which gradually becomes more abstract and objective, a developmental orientation definitive of and derived primarily from a study of males. an alternative orientation has been identified and empirically validated in the research area of moral reasoning. Grounded in a concern for "Care" rather than "Justice" and directing its focus to the particular and the concrete in a context of an interpersonal network,

this mode is associated with the responses of females. The theoretical and empirical links between moral reasoning and social perspective taking suggest that a method of analysis used to reveal a unique, gender-related developmental line in the one domain (i.e. moral reasoning) will reveal expose a similar, previously undetected line in the other (i.e. perspective taking). Further, research has suggested that specific contexts such as friendship relations or peer group relations as well as gender represented in the stimulus, might affect the way an individual responds in a perspective taking situation.

Chapter II

Statement of the Problem

This study has the following aims:

1. To investigate gender differences in social perspectives taking as a function two factors: (a) developmental model and (b) contextual variables by:

a. utilizing two divergent coding schemes evolved from alternative developmental models (i.e. Selman's one-path model of perspective taking; Lyons' two-path model of moral reasoning) in order to assess the impact of developmental model on research findings;

b. studying the interactions of the following contextual variables: sex of subject, sex of protagonist, and dilemma;

2. To investigate whether the Care orientation, which has been identified in the related domain of moral reasoning is present in social perspective taking.

Hypotheses

With regard to the objectives of the present study, the following hypotheses were formulated:

A. There will be gender differences in social perspective taking as a function of developmental model:

Hypothesis 1

There will be no gender differences in perspective taking scores irrespective of dilemma or sex of protagonist;

Hypothesis 2

The Percentage of Care responses will be higher for females than for males across all dilemmas;

Hypothesis 3

The Percentage of Care responses will be higher for females than for males irrespective of sex of protagonist;

B. There will be variation in Percentage of Care responses as a function of dilemma:

Hypothesis 4

The Friendship dilemma will yield a higher Percentage of Care responses than will the Peer group dilemma irrespective of sex of subject or sex of protagonist:

C. There will be variation in Percentage of Care responses as a function of sex of protagonist:

Hypothesis 5

Female protagonists will elicit a higher Percentage of Care responses than will male protagonists irrespective of dilemma or sex of subject;

D. The Percentage of Care responses will vary as a function of the relationship between sex of subject and dilemma;

Hypothesis 6

The difference between Percentage of Care responses

in the Real life dilemma and in the Friendship dilemma will be significant for males but not for females;

Hypothesis 7

The difference between Percentage of Care responses in the Real life dilemma and in the Peer group dilemma will be significant for females but not for males.

Chapter III

Method

Overview

The Friendship dilemma and Peer group dilemma, as developed by Selman (1979) and Jaquette (1976), were used to assess levels of thinking about issues relevant to social perspective taking. In these dilemmas, Selman did not systematically vary the sex of protagonists: The main character in the Friendship dilemma is a girl whereas the protagonist in the Peer group dilemma is a boy. As the present study hypothesized that gender represented in the stimulus would be associated with variation in subjects' responses, a cross-gender variant of each dilemma was created. This yielded four experimental subsamples of 20 subjects each: 1) male subject/male protagonist; 2) male subject/female protagonist; 3) female subject/male protagonist; 4) female subject/female protagonist.

In addition, each subject was interviewed on a Real life dilemma following the procedure outlined by Lyons (1983). Thus, each subject responded to 3 dilemmas: Real life, Friendship and Peer group.

The Friendship and Peer group dilemmas were scored separately using Selman's social perspective taking measure, generating two perspective taking scores for

each subject: Friendship Average Issue Score (FAIS) and Peer Group Average Issue Score (PGAIS). All three dilemmas, Real life, Friendship and Peer group, were scored for Lyons' Percentage of Care measure. This yielded three scores for each subject: Real life Percentage of Care, Friendship Percentage of Care, Peer group Percentage of Care.

In summary, the independent measures were: 1) Sex of Subject; 2) Sex of Protagonist; 3) Dilemma. The dependent measures were: 1) FAIS; 2) PGAIS; 3) Real life Percentage of Care; 4) Friendship Percentage of Care; 5) Peer group Percentage of Care.

Subjects

The sample consisted of 80 predominantly middle class high school students in the New York City area, 40 males and 40 females. There were 54 sophomores, seven juniors and 19 seniors. The students were contacted by their schools and interviewed in school during a free class period. Almost two thirds of the participants attended either private schools in New York City or a public high school for gifted students. Ten males and ten females were drawn from same-sex Catholic high schools and the remaining students attended suburban or city high schools. The mean chronological age of the students

was 16 years 2 months (the average age of the girls was 15 years 6 months, of the boys, 16 years 4 months). Eighty-five percent on the respondents were Caucasian and 15% were non-Caucasian. The data were collected during the 1986-1987 school year.

Instruments

(1) Perspective taking measure

Selman's (1979) social perspective taking measure was utilized. This consists of a hypothetical dilemma format followed by standardized interviews designed to assess individuals' reasoning about interpersonal issues. As Selman notes, inter-domain correlations are high, particularly by age 14 or 15. Two of Selman's four contextual domains were employed: Friendship relations and Peer group relations. The Friendship dilemma is presented in Appendix A and the Peer group dilemma in Appendix B.

(a) Friendship dilemma: (Selman, 1979)

This describes the conflict of a teenager who must choose between friends, an old friend with a problem and a new friend with tickets to a play.

(b) Peer group dilemma: (Jaquette, 1976)

This presents the conflict faced by the star member of a rock band who is torn between outside interests and the demands of the group.

After reading each dilemma, the participants were interviewed with Selman's mandatory questions taken from his manual, Assessing interpersonal understanding: An interview and scoring manual in five parts, constructed by the Harvard-Judge Baker Social Reasoning Project. The Friendship Interview is given in Appendix C and the Peer Group Interview in Appendix D.

(2) Care orientation measure

Lyons' (1983) Manual for coding real life moral dilemmas was employed to obtain a subject's Percentage of Care considerations offered in the resolution of dilemmas. The coding system was developed by Lyons in order to code moral statements as based on either Justice or Care considerations. This scheme was applied to three dilemmas:

(a) Real life conflict dilemma:

This asks participants to give an example of a conflict experienced in their own lives. Real life dilemmas yielded a Percentage of Care score which was

used as a norm with which responses to Selman's Friendship and Peer group dilemmas could be compared. The Real life interview format appears in Appendix E.

(b) Friendship dilemma (Selman, 1979)

(c) Peer group dilemma (Jaquette and Selman, 1976)

Procedure

Subjects were told that they were participating in a study designed to investigate how people solve conflicts in social relationships. It was explained that they would be asked to describe a personal conflict (i.e. Real life dilemma), after which they would read and discuss two stories about conflicts other people had experienced. They were further informed that general questions about friendship and peer group relations would follow. The directions are given in Appendix F.

After the introduction, the Real life interview was administered. Next, subjects read and discussed the Friendship dilemma, followed by the Friendship interview, and the Peer group dilemma, followed by the Peer group interview.

Each interview was tape-recorded and transcribed for scoring. The interviews were scored double-blind by two trained psychologists who did not know the age and sex of the subjects, nor the purpose of the study.

Scoring

(1) Perspective taking measure

Subjects' levels of reasoning are assessed according to their understanding of Issues which are specifically related to the domains under consideration. For the Friendship domain, six Issues are examined: friendship formation, intimacy, trust, jealousy, conflict resolution and friendship termination.

There are seven Issues relevant to the Peer group situation: group formation, cohesion, conformity, group rules, decision making, leadership and group termination. Some of the questions, for example, which tap an individual's concepts of intimacy are as follows: What is a really close friendship? Is there a difference between best friends and regular friends? What kinds of things do good friends know about each other?

Questions probing a subject's concepts of group leadership include: Why might a leader be important to a group? Can there be more than one type of leader? Are there any problems in having a leader?

As scored according to the criteria explicated in Selman's manual (pp. 338-351), all codable responses were assigned to one of the pertinent Issues (e.g. intimacy in the Friendship domain; leadership in the

Peer group situation), and each Issue was assigned a developmental level of perspective taking. Issue Scores were then weighted together to derive a subject's Friendship Average Issue Score (FAIS) and Peer group Average Issue Score (PGAIS). Average Issue Scores were used in this study because they are more refined than global stage scores and are expressed in the form of continuous data. As such, higher scores indicate a more advanced developmental level on this measure. Guidelines for scoring both Friendship and Peer group concepts (i.e. Issues) are provided in Appendix G. In addition, because this study involved only adolescents, who would be expected to reason at the highest levels of Selman's five-stage scheme (i.e. stages 3 and 4), a closely examined differentiation between stage 3 and stage 4 responses is included.

(2) Care orientation measure

Justice vs. Care

The Justice and Care orientations are conceived as representing two distinct forms of understanding of the self-in-relationships. Justice and Care are unimodal constructs which exist along a single continuum. Guidelines for scoring considerations as either Justice or Care are given in Appendix H.

Methodological considerations in employing the Care orientation measure

Two modifications of Lyons' scoring were adopted:

(a) Reducing the number of dilemma components scored:

Lyons subdivided her analyses of dilemmas into three components and scored each of them: a subject's (1) construction of the problem; (2) resolution of the problem; (3) evaluation of the problem. In accord with the procedure employed by Langdale (1983), only the resolution component was scored in this study. This decision was based on the high degree of consistency (.81) of orientation across the three dilemma phases.

(b) Derivation of Percentage of Care scores

Lyons' interviews were coded by scoring each consideration offered by a subject as either Justice or Care; a "consideration" is any idea about a moral dilemma. Moral orientation scores were derived by counting the number of Justice considerations and the number of Care considerations within each interview. In this manner, an orientation score was derived for each subject according to which category, Justice or Care, received the highest frequency. Chi square analyses were performed as appropriate for nominal data.

In the present study, the procedure of counting Justice and Care considerations was retained. However,

as it is believed that the predominance categories of Justice and Care do not yield sufficiently sensitive measures, Percentage of Care was used to permit the dependent measure to be treated as a continuous variable. All Percentage of Care scores were converted to Arcsin values in order to meet the assumptions of a normal distribution and to provide for a common variance.

Chapter IV

Results

The results are presented in the following sections: (I) Results of the inter-rater reliability on the Perspective taking measure; (II) Results of the inter-rater reliability on the Percentage of Care measure, (III) Findings pertinent to the analysis of Perspective taking; (IV) Findings relevant to Percentage of Care; (V) Pearson correlations between Perspective taking and Percentage of Care; (VI) Justice and Care orientations as a function of gender and dilemma; (VII) Frequency count of subjects who reveal a predominance of Care considerations.

I. Inter-rater Reliability on the Perspective taking Measure

Twenty-eight of the 80 interviews were randomly selected from among each experimental group. These were scored by using Selman's coding criteria. Pearson correlation coefficients between the two judges were as follows: FAIS, $r = .95$, $p = <.001$; PGAIS, $r = .97$, $p = <.001$.

II. Inter-rater Reliability on Percentage of Care Measure

Using Lyons' coding criteria, both readers coded the relevant portions (i.e. the resolution of the dilemmas) of all 80 interviews. The Pearson correlation

coefficients were as follows: Real life Percentage of Care, r = .96, p<.001; Friendship Percentage of Care, r = .90. p<.001; Peer group Percentage of Care, r = .92, p<.001.

III. Univariate Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance on Average Issue Scores (Selman's Perspective taking Scores)

A 2 X 2 X 2 (Sex of Subject X Dilemma X Sex of Protagonist) univariate repeated measure analysis of variance was conducted using Average Issue Scores as the dependent variables. The Between-Subjects Variables were: 1) Sex of Subject and 2) Sex of Protagonist. The Within-Subjects Variable was Dilemma (Friendship and Peer group). That is, the dependent measures were the Average Issue Scores on Dilemma: Friendship Average Issue Score (FAIS), and Peer Group Average Issue Score (PGAIS).

The means and standard deviations for the dependent variables are presented in Table 1. Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations for Average Issue Scores as a function of Sex of Subject, and Table 3, as a function of Sex of Protagonist. Table 4 presents the findings of the repeated measure analysis of variance for the Between-Subjects Variables, and Table 5 presents the findings for the Within-Subjects Variable.

Table 1

Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Average Issue Care Function of Sex of Subject, Sex of Protagonist and Dilemma

Sex of Subject	Sex of Protagonist	Average Issue Score			
		Friendship		Peer Group	
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Male	Male (n = 20	3.01	0.17	3.12	0.16
	Female (n = 20)	3.07	0.16	3.16	0.15
Female	Male (n = 20)	3.17	0.14	3.25	0.17
	Female (n = 20)	3.26	0.22	3.18	0.20

Table 2

Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Average Issue Scores as a Function of Sex of Subject

Sex of Subject	Average Issue Score			
	Friendship		Peer Group	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Male (n=40)	3.04	0.17	3.14	0.16
Female (n=40)	3.21	0.19	3.22	0.19

Table 3

Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Average Issue Scores as a Function of Sex of Protagonist

Sex of Protagonist	Average Issue Score			
	Friendship		Peer Group	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Male (n=40)	3.09	0.17	3.19	0.18
Female (n=40)	3.17	0.21	3.17	0.17

Table 4

Repeated Measure Analysis of Variance for Average Issue Scores (Selman's Perspective taking Measure)

Between - Subjects Variables

Source	Dependent Measure	SS	df	MS	F	p
Sex of Subject	Average Issue Score	0.61	1	0.61	13.32	<.001
Sex of Protagonist	Average Issue Score	0.38	1	0.38	0.81	0.37
Sex of Subject X Sex of Protagonist	Average Issue Score	0.02	1	0.02	0.44	0.51
Error		3.50	76	0.05		

Table 5

Repeated Measure Analysis of Variance for Average Issue Scores

Within - Subject Variable

Source	Dependent Measure	SS	df	MS	F	p
Dilemma	Average Issue Score	0.11	1	0.11	7.71	<.01
Dilemma X Sex of Subject	Average Issue Score	0.10	1	0.10	6.86	<.01
Dilemma X Sex of Protagonist	Average Issue Score	0.08	1	0.08	5.85	0.02
Dilemma X Sex of Subject X Sex of Protagonist	Average Issue Score	0.05	1	0.05	3.23	0.08
Error		1.08	76	0.14		

1. Between-Subjects Variables (Sex of Subject, Sex of Protagonist)

a. Sex of Subject: As can be seen in Table 4, a significant main effect was found for Sex of Subject ($F = 13.32$, $p < .001$). Girls scored significantly higher than boys across dilemmas and irrespective of sex of protagonist. Hypothesis 1 predicted that there would be no sex differences in Average Issue Scores, and Hypothesis 1 is rejected.

b. Sex of Protagonist: The main effect of Sex of Protagonist was not significant. Average Issue Scores did not vary between subjects as a function of sex of the protagonist in the story.

c. Sex of Subject X Sex of Protagonist: The Sex of Subject by Sex of Protagonist interaction was not significant.

2. Within-Subjects Variable (Dilemma)

a. Dilemma: As indicated in Table 5, there was a significant main effect for Dilemma ($F = 7.71$, $p < .01$). Peer group scores were significantly higher than friendship scores.

b. Dilemma X Sex of Subject: There was a significant interaction effect between Dilemma and Sex of Subject ($F = 5.58$, $p = < .05$). As seen in Table 2, girls performed relatively evenly on the two measures

but boys scored significantly higher on Peer group concepts than on Friendship concepts. Scheffé post hocs revealed this effect to be significant (t = -3.14, p = <.01).

c. Dilemma X Sex of Protagonist: There was a significant interaction effect between Sex of Protagonist and Dilemma (F = 5.85, p<.05). Scheffé post hocs revealed that when the protagonist was a male, PGAIS was significantly higher than FAIS (t = -2.10, p<.05).

d. Dilemma X Sex of Subject X Sex of Protagonist: The interaction effect between Dilemma by Sex of Subject by Sex of Protagonist approached significance, indicating a trend towards a differential effect of dilemma type across sex of subject and sex of protagonist. (F = 3.23, p<.08).

IV. Univariate Repeated Measure Analysis of Variance for Lyons' Percentage of Care Measure

In order to examine the Percentage of Care in three dilemmas, Real life, Friendship and Peer group, two analyses were necessary. First, a 2 X 2 X 2 (Sex of Subject by Dilemma by Sex of Protagonist) univariate repeated measure analysis of variance was conducted for two of the dilemmas, using as the dependent variable Percentage of Care. The two dilemmas were the

Friendship dilemma and the Peer group dilemma. As with the Perspective taking measure described above, the Between-Subjects Variables were Sex of Subject and Sex of Protagonist, and the Within-Subjects Variable, Dilemma (Friendship and Peer group). Table 6 presents the means and standard deviations for the Percentage of Care scores by Sex of Subject and Sex of Protagonist. Secondly, a 2 X 3 (Sex of Subject by Dilemma) repeated measure analysis of variance was performed in order to examine the Real life dilemma, as this dilemma is independent of the possible effects of Sex of Protagonist. Thus, the dependent measure was Percentage of Care score on three dilemmas: Real life Percentage of Care, Friendship Percentage of Care, and Peer group Percentage of Care. Means and standard deviations for the Real life Percentage of Care Scores are included in Table 7.

Table 8 presents the findings of the 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measure analysis of variance for the Between-Subjects Variables, and Table 9, for the Within-Subjects Variable. Table 10 presents the findings of the 2 X 3 repeated measure analysis for the Between-Subjects Variable and the Within-Subjects Variable.

Table 6

Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Percentage of CareScores[1] by Sex of Subject, Sex of Protagonist and Dilemma

Sex of Subject	Sex of Protagonist	Percentage of Care			
		Friendship		Peer Group	
		Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Male	Male (n = 20)	0.39	0.63	0.21	0.39
	Female (n = 20)	0.64	0.66	0.12	0.37
Female	Male (n = 20)	1.01	0.66	0.39	0.56
	Female (n = 20)	0.99	0.61	0.36	0.48

[1]Expressed in Arcsin values

Table 7

Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Percent of Care Scores[1] in the Real Life Dilemma

Sex of Subject	Sex of Protagonist	Real Life Percentage of Care	
		Mean	Standard Deviation
Male	Male (n=20)	0.42	0.69
	Female (n = 20)	0.21	0.49
Female	Male (n = 20)	0.60	0.75
	Female (n = 20)	1.00	0.68

[1]Expressed in Arcsin values

Table 8

2 X 2 X 2 Repeated Measure Analysis of Variance for Percentage of Care Measure

Between - Subjects Variables

Source	Dependent Measure	SS	df	MS	F	p
Sex of Subject	Percentage of Care	4.80	1	4.80	14.00	<.001
Sex of Protagonist	Percentage of Care	0.03	1	0.03	0.09	0.76
Sex of Subject X by Sex of Protagonist	Percentage of Care	0.12	1	0.12	0.35	0.56
Error		26.04	76	0.34		

Table 9

2 X 2 X 2 Repeated Measure Analysis of Variance for Percentage of Care Measure

Within - Subjects Variable

Source	Dependent Measure	SS	df	MS	F	p
Dilemma	Percentage of Care	9.62	1	9.62	34.99	<.001
Dilemma X Sex of Subject	Percentage of Care	0.76	1	0.76	2.75	0.10
Dilemma X Sex of Protagonist	Percentage of Care	0.32	1	0.32	1.16	0.29
Dilemma X Sex of Subject X Sex of Protagonist	Percentage of Care	0.26	1	0.26	0.94	0.34
Error		20.90	76	0.28		

A. 2 X 2 X 2 Analysis of Variance

1. Between-Subjects Variables (Sex of Subject, Sex of Protagonist)

a. Sex of Subject: A significant main effect was found for Sex of Subject (F = 14.00, p<.001). Percentage of Care was significantly higher for girls than for boys across dilemmas and sex of protagonist. This finding confirms Hypotheses 2 and 3.

b. Sex of Protagonist: There was no significant main effect for sex of protagonist. Percentage of Care did not vary according to whether the stories were about a male or female. This finding fails to confirm Hypothesis 5, which predicted that female protagonists would elicit a higher Percentage of Care responses than would male protagonists.

c. Sex of Subject X Sex of Protagonist: There was no significant interaction effect between Sex of Subject and Sex of Protagonist.

2. Within-Subjects Variable (Dilemma)

a. Dilemma: There was a significant main effect for Dilemma. The Friendship dilemma elicited a significantly higher Percentage of Care than did the Peer group dilemma, irrespective of Sex of Subject or Sex of Protagonist (F = 34.99, p<.001). This finding confirms Hypothesis 4.

b. Dilemma X Sex of Subject: There was no significant interaction effect between Dilemma and Sex of Subject.

B. 2 X 3 Analysis of Variance

1. Between-Subjects Variable (Sex of Subject)

a. Sex of Subject: A significant main effect was found for Sex of Subject (F = 20.32, p<.001). As Table 10 predicted in Hypothesis 2, Percentage of Care was significantly higher for girls than for boys across the three dilemmas.

2. Within-Subjects Variable: Dilemma (Real life, Friendship, Peer group)

a. Dilemma: The main effect for dilemma was significant. Scheffé post hocs revealed that as predicted in Hypothesis 4, Percentage of Care in the Friendship dilemma was significantly higher than in the Peer group dilemma (t = -12.61, p<.001), as well as in the Real life dilemma (t = -5.24, p<.001). Furthermore, Real life Percentage of Care was significantly higher than Peer Group Percentage of Care (t = 7.37, p<.001).

b. Dilemma X Sex of Subject: There was no significant interaction effect between dilemma and sex of subject. However, in order to test the specific sex of subject by dilemma interactions predicted in Hypotheses 6 and 7, subsequent analyses were performed to compare separately by sex the Percentage of Care in

Table 10

2 X 3 Analysis of Variance for Percentage of Care Measure

Between - Subjects Variable

Source	Dependent Measure	SS	df	MS	F	p
Sex of Subject	Percentage of Care	9.24	1	9.24	20.32	<.001
Error		35.45	78	0.45		

Within - Subjects Variable

Dilemma	Percentage of Care	9.71	2	4.86	16.05	<.001
Dilemma X Sex of Subject	Percentage of Care	1.01	2	0.51	1.67	.19
Error		47.22	156	0.30		

the Real life dilemma with Percentage of Care in both the Friendship and Peer group dilemmas. A significant dilemma effect was found: (Boys: $F = 4.07$, $p<.05$; Girls: $F = 13.85$, $p<.001$). Although the overall comparison was significant, however, Scheffé post hocs did not reveal a significant interaction effect for males. This finding disconfirms Hypothesis 6. On the other hand, there was a significant dilemma effect for females ($t = 3.49$, $p<.001$). Girls expressed significantly higher Percentage of Care responses in the Real life dilemma than in the Peer group dilemma, as predicted in Hypothesis 7.

V. Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Average Issue Scores (Selman's Perspective Taking Scores) and Percentage of Care (Lyons)

Table 11 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for Average Issue scores and Percentage of Care scores. As can be noted, there were modest positive relationships between Real life Percentage of Care and FAIS ($r = .29$, $p<.05$); Real life Percentage of Care and PGAIS ($r = .29$, $p<.01$); and Friendship Percentage of Care and FAIS ($r = .26$, $p<.05$).

Table 11

Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Perspective Taking Scores and Percentage of Care Scores

		Friendship Average Issue Score	Peer Group Average Issue Score
Friendship Percentage of Care	Male	.23	.09
	Female	.02	.10
	Total	.26	.16
Peer Group Percentage of Care	Male	.20	.36*
	Female	.07	-.01
	Total	.21	.18
Real Life Percentage of Care	Male	.15	.29*
	Female	.32*	.19
	Total	.29*	.29**

* <.05
** <.01
*** <.001

Table 12

Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Percentage of Justice and Percentage of Care by Sex of Subject and Dilemma Expressed in Arcsin Values

Real Life Dilemma

	Male		Female	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Percentage J	1.22	0.63	0.68	0.72
Percentage C	0.31	0.60	0.80	0.73

Friendship Dilemma

	Male		Female	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Percentage J	0.92	0.69	0.38	0.52
Percentage C	0.52	0.65	1.00	0.63

Peer Group Dilemma

	Male		Female	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Percentage J	1.31	0.50	1.01	0.62
Percentage C	0.17	0.38	0.37	0.52

Table 13

Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Percentage of Justice and Percentage of Care by Sex of Subject and Dilemma Expressed in Percentages

Real Life Dilemma

	Male		Female	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Percentage J	0.79	0.39	0.46	0.46
Percentage C	0.21	0.39	0.54	0.46

Friendship Dilemma

	Male		Female	
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Mean	Standard Deviation
Percentage J	0.63	0.42	0.30	0.36
Percentage C	0.37	0.42	0.70	0.36

Peer Group Dilemma

	Male		Female	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Percentage J	0.87	0.27	0.70	0.35
Percentage C	0.13	0.27	0.30	0.35

Table 14

Frequency Count of Subjects Revealing Predominance of Care Considerations

n = 80

	Real Life	Friendship	Peer Group
Male (n=40)	7	10	2
Female (n=40)	17	20	6

VI. Justice and Care Orientations as a Function of Sex of Subject and Dilemma

Tables 12 and 13 are provided in order to allow an examination of the distribution of the Justice and Care orientations as a function of Sex of Subject and Dilemma. Table 12 depicts separately by dilemma the gender differences in orientation expressed in Arcsin values. In Table 13, this information is presented in the form of percentages. It can be seen that girls utilized both orientations almost equally in the Real life dilemma (Percentage of Care = 54%), but revealed shifts towards a greater Percentage of Care (70%) in the Friendship dilemma. In the Peer group dilemma, they shifted towards the Justice orientation (Percentage of Care = 30%).

Boys in contrast, although sharing the same pattern of shift as girls, showed a strong predominance of the Justice mode in all dilemmas. Their Percentage of Care scores were as follows: Real life, 21%; Friendship, 37%; Peer group, 13%.

VII. Frequency Count of Subjects Revealing a Predominance of Care Considerations

As the present study did not utilize as a dependent measure the Predominance of Care category

employed by earlier investigators, a frequency count was performed in order to note the actual number of subjects who were Care dominant (i.e. greater than 50% Care responses). Table 14 indicates the frequency count for each dilemma. The number of Care dominant male subjects (n = 40) for each dilemma is as follows: Real life, 7; Friendship, 10; Peer group, 2. Female subjects tended more towards "split dominance:" Real life, 17; Friendship, 20, Peer group, 6.

Summary of Results

The repeated measure analysis of variance performed on the Perspective taking measure revealed a significant main effect for Sex of Subject. Girls scored significantly higher than boys across dilemmas and irrespective of Sex of Protagonist; thus, Hypothesis 1 was rejected. No significant effects were found for Sex of Protagonist, nor for a Sex of Subject by Sex of Protagonist interaction. There was a significant main effect for Dilemma, with higher scores in the Peer group category than in the Friendship category. However, an examination of an interaction effect between Dilemma and Sex of Subject indicated that only males showed significantly higher Peer group scores than Friendship scores, whereas females performed relatively evenly in both domains. There was a significant interaction

effect between Sex of Protagonist and Dilemma: When the protagonist was a boy, Peer group concepts were significantly higher than Friendship concepts. No interaction effect was found for Dilemma by Sex of Protagonist.

On the 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measure analysis of variance performed on the Percentage of Care measure, a significant main effect was found for Sex of Subject: Percentage of Care was significantly higher for girls than for boys across dilemmas and irrespective of Sex of Protagonist. This finding confirms Hypotheses 2 and 3. There was no main effect for Sex of Protagonist; Percentage of Care did not vary according to whether the stories were about a male or a female. This fails to confirm Hypothesis 5. There was no significant interaction effect between Sex of Subject and Sex of Protagonist. A significant main effect was found for Dilemma, with the Friendship dilemma eliciting a higher Percentage of Care than the Peer group dilemma, irrespective of Sex of Subject or Sex of Protagonist. This finding confirms Hypothesis 4. Similarly, the 2 X 3 repeated measure analysis of variance performed on the Percentage of Care measure revealed main effects for Sex of Subject and Dilemma. A comparison of the Real life dilemma with the Friendship and Peer group dilemmas, performed separately by sex, did not reveal a

significant interaction effect for males. This fails to confirm Hypothesis 6. On the other hand, there was a significant interaction effect for females: Girls expressed a significantly higher Percentage of Care in the Real life dilemma than in the Peer group dilemma, thus confirming Hypothesis 7.

An examination of sex differences in the Justice and Care orientations viewed separately by dilemma revealed that males and females displayed a common pattern of shift in moving from the Real life dilemma to the Friendship and Peer group dilemmas: the Percentage of Care was highest in the Friendship dilemma, lowest in the Peer group dilemma, and in an intermediate position for the Real life dilemma. The magnitude of shift, however, differed according to sex, with boys exhibiting a narrow range of shift and relying heavily on the Justice mode in all dilemmas. Girls in contrast tended to use both modes in the Real life dilemma, and shifted more radically in the other dilemmas: towards a predominance of Care in the Friendship dilemma, and towards a statistically significant predominance of Justice in the Peer group dilemma. A frequency count of subjects revealing a predominance of Care considerations in each dilemma showed that few males were Care

dominant. but that females tended towards "split dominance."

A modest positive correlation was found between Percentage of Care and Perspective taking scores.

Chapter V

Discussion

The overall findings of this study offer a picture of gender differences in social perspective taking with a particular relevance to structural-developmental theory. In light of the reluctance with which stage models have allowed the examination of divergences between males and females, the unpredicted differences reported here are as evocative as those predicted--stretching the limits of Selman's model as well as supporting the notion of dual developmental lines, and extending for the first time Gilligan's concept of a Care orientation to a theoretical domain outside of moral reasoning. The findings also have a bearing on our understanding of contextual factors and how these factors interact with gender.

Perspective taking interviews

The finding that girls scored significantly higher than boys on the perspective taking interviews (i.e. on Selman's Average Issue Scores) does not support Hypothesis 1, which predicts no gender differences. This hypothesis was derived from Selman's own claims and reported research studies. These results do accord, however, with Kurdek and Krile's (1982) report that in

their sample of third through eighth graders, girls scored significantly higher than boys on Selman's measure. Moreover, outside of the immediate sphere of stage theory, a vast literature, some of which will be summarized below, notes girls' precocious social maturation and consistently reports that differential socialization practices reinforce girls' deeper sensitivity to the interpersonal world. Interestingly, a recent study by Selman and others (Selman, Beareslee, Schultz, Krupa & Podorefsky, 1986) makes this very claim. Citing literature on sex role socialization while bypassing the fruits of Selman's own research, these authors predicted--and found--that girls will show a higher level of negotiation strategies than boys on a task of interpersonal problem-solving.

A related finding was the significance of dilemma type on Average Issue Scores for boys but not for girls. The finding that boys scored significantly higher on Peer group than on Friendship concepts, although not predicted, is consistent with the reports of males' greater orientation towards and socialization by the peer group as compared with the intimate dyadic relationship (Dweck & Bush, 1976; Lever, 1976; Hodgson & Fischer, 1979). The results also validate writings which suggest that girls and boys are differentially

socialized for characteristics associated with the processes of separation and attachment (Bakan, 1966; Carlson, 1971; Parson & Bales, 1955; Gutmann, 1965; White, Speisman & Costos, 1983; Gilligan, 1982).

Similarly, psychologists studying ego functioning and identity formation in adolescence differentiate between male and female identity pathways or relationship styles. Several of these authors describe males shying away from close relationships in the service of their seeking autonomy, in contrast to females'avoidance of separation (Fischer, 1981; Hodgson & Fischer, 1979). Douvan and Adelson's (1966) interviews with adolescents suggest that girls attempt to forge an identity through intimate relations with same-sex friends as contrasted with boys' pursuit of mastery. Josselson, Greenberg and McConochie (1979a, 1979b), examining psychosocial maturity in 11th and 12th grade adolescents, performed separate analyses by gender to account for the finding that the highest scorers were over-represented by girls whereas the converse was true for boys. According to these authors, the high-maturity girls, who sought their identity in relation to others, were "some of the most complex, multifaceted, and in some ways, most fully human young people in the sample" (Josselson. Greenberg & McConochie, 1979, p. 158).

Hodgson and Fischer (1979) also noted that more women than men scored in the highest categories of intimacy status, suggestive of a "readiness for intimacy" which coexists with or precedes females' struggles with identity.

The link between the male and his peer group is affirmed in the thinking of male and female subjects alike in a significant Dilemma by Sex of Protagonist interaction effect, such that dilemmas portraying male protagonists elicited higher level Peer group than Friendship scores. In this regard, a study by Pearson (1985) confirmed that male and female authors were able to correctly ascribe gender-linked modes of moral reasoning and peer interaction to their characters.

Girls, in contradistinction to boys, discussed with uniform sophistication issues of both friendship and peer group relations (see Table 2). This finding raises the possibility that variation in contextual factors may be more pertinent to the level of perspective taking in boys than in girls. In addition, girls' homogeneity across perspective taking domains augments the literature suggestive of a tighter interweaving of social skills in females than in males (White, Speisman & Costos, 1983; Kurdek, 1981; Hoffman, 1977).

The Care Orientation

The significant gender differences in Percentage of Care obtained with Lyons' measure accord with the literature outlined above, offering strong support for the proposal that social perspective taking encompasses two gender-related lines of reasoning which are not discernible with the research tools of a unitary model. The results of this investigation are in keeping with the studies emanating from Gilligan's tradition in the realm of moral reasoning and introduce its application to a related theoretical domain.

The present study demonstrates that as Lyons (1983) showed with real life dilemmas and Langdale (1983) with hypothetical moral dilemmas, perspective taking dilemmas can be reliably coded for both the Justice and Care dimensions, with differential findings according to gender. In line with these investigations and as proposed in Hypotheses 2 and 3, this study found that girls used significantly more Care considerations than boys, that boys conformed heavily to the Justice mode, and that girls were more "split" in manifesting a conflicting allegiance to the respective modes. Gilligan (1982) has suggested that in a culture dominated by the qualities of thinking associated with the Justice orientation, girls will be torn between the

Care orientation to which they are socialized and the dominant Justice mode. Hodgson and Fischer (1979), along with other observers of female development in adolescence, also suggest that girls' identity pathways are more ambiguous, conflictual and complex than boys'.

With regard to the category of "split dominance," it is interesting that in contrast to the high Percentage of Care scores shown by the female subjects in this study, girls actually tended more towards "split dominance" than towards Care dominance. That is, 17 girls (or 43%) gave a majority of Care considerations in the Real life dilemma, and 20 girls (50%) in the Friendship dilemma. This finding is somewhat lower than the reports of Lyons (1983) and Langdale (1983), who found that 75% of the females were Care dominant. Perhaps the time constraints in the present study, which necessitated the completion of three interviews within a single 45-50 minute class period, did not allow sufficient time for more extensive probing, and it is possible that with greater elaboration of their responses, girls may have offered more Care considerations. In addition, derived as they are from a sample consisting exclusively of teenagers, these findings may be a reflection of singularly adolescent issues; the idealism and capacity for formulating principles, the intensified awareness of one's "own

individual self," may result in a temporary skewing towards the Justice orientation which might be expected to mellow with further development.

At any rate, the power of one's own gender in determining perspective taking processes is highlighted by the failure of this study to find the Sex of Protagonist effect posited in Hypothesis 5: i.e. girl protagonists did not elicit higher Percentage of Care considerations than boy protagonists. It can be seen that the inclusion of both a Sex of Subject and Sex of Protagonist variable has in effect pitted the impact of one's gender against the impact of gender represented in the stimulus; with regard to the Justice and Care orientations, these findings point to the preeminence of one's own gender: If, say, a boy reads a story about a girl, his being a male is a more compelling determinant of his general cognitive stance than is the protagonist's being a female.

In addition, the findings of this study confirm that, as Langdale discovered with moral dilemmas, perspective taking dilemmas differ in their relative pull towards Justice or Care. Moreover, in accord with Johnston's study (1985), subjects of both genders can shift from one orientation to the other. Here, the context of intimate Friendship relations elicited as proposed in Hypothesis 4 significantly more Care

considerations than the context of Peer group relations, which heavily tapped the Justice orientation.

The dilemmas

Peer group dilemma

The structure of the Peer group dilemma appeared to place subjects at some distance from the actual situation, allowing for a degree of reflection not easily experienced within the Friendship context. One young man, in considering this dilemma, proposed that the protagonist "has to find a medium, a neutral spot between her outside interests and the group's." Perhaps the fact that in this dilemma, the protagonist alone is defined or even named helped to create in subjects a stance in which values were more easily viewed as abstract, and that a sense of remoteness from any individual characters within the group brought to the fore two primary forms of considerations among both female and male subjects: self-interest, and a strong tendency towards thinking in terms of principles and moral imperatives--of fairness, responsibility, equality, of duty, commitment, and contractual bonds, of right and wrong.

Peer group dilemma responses

The following excerpts from the Peer group interviews are typical:

> I think she should just sit down and think about it without people yelling at her and breathing down her back and everything, and say, am I committed? Is this what I really want to do, if I want to be a musician? If this is what I want to make of myself, if its my career, I guess I have to work harder even if it means I lose a few things. And if she doesn't, that's her choice too because it's her life and she comes first. But she shouldn't be telling these people "I'll be there, I'll be there," because that's totally wrong on her part.
>
> I think he owes them something if it's an agreement. I think he should stay because--what is that--the needs of the one and the needs of the many?
>
> It's wrong to make a commitment she can't keep.
>
> I believe a band is a commitment on all of the members of the group to help each other and to succeed as a unit.
>
> Melissa's being selfish to think that she shouldn't put in an equal time as everybody else, she's one of those people who thinks when I'm not there things aren't kind of happening, like the world stops--so if she's not putting in equal time, they should either get rid of her or she should say i'm going to put in equal time. That's not being fair to them.
>
> I assume that in the beginning when the band formed she agreed to come to the sessions on time and then do her part; that's pretty irresponsible of her to just cut out.
>
> I guess once you start something you should at least try to finish it. If you make a commitment you should stick to it.

> If she doesn't make a commitment on this she may learn to get into the habit of not making a commitment on something else, you know, she should make a decision and learn how to make decisions.
>
> I've always felt that commitments are important. If you say you're going to do something you should do it. I guess that's why parents say "maybe" isn't a promise.
>
> Marty has certain obligations to the band, Her goes into this agreement which he has to be there, have jam sessions, and he has to have equal time with the jam sessions.

Friendship dilemma

The Friendship dilemma, in contrast with the Peer group dilemma, is constructed in such a way that subjects are less drawn towards seeking a "neutral spot." Standing on different epistemological ground, they tended to become more personally involved in the characters and the immediacy of their predicament. Subjects identified more readily with one character or another; in placing themselves in another's shoes, they leaned towards empathy rather than judgement. They focused on characters' feelings, on the restoration of a disturbed relationship, and on the fostering of general harmony.

Friendship dilemma responses

She knows Joanne feels obviously a little insecure about her relationship with Charlene because she wouldn't have acted this way if she hadn't been a little insecure about it, and jealous, too. She should stay with her and try to help her a little.

John is feeling like left out, he doesn't like the other guy, they need to be together and act the way they were acting before Tim came along, and then straighten things out between them. Like, even though I'm friends with Tim, you're still my friend and everything like that, and you shouldn't be upset.

I'd probably go with Tina because she's new. I just came recently myself and I know how hard it is to sort of fit in, and so she'd have at least one person to talk to, to cheer her up.

I would have arranged it so I could find out her problem but then also be able to go to Washington. Because I can't stand to be in the middle! I just can't, I like to, I don't know, please everybody, I don't like to have any one person mad at me.

She should think about Joanne's feelings because I know how it is to feel like that, that you think you're going to lose a friend even though it isn't true, but you're still jealous.

He'll probably lie because it's easier than hurting John if he really wants to go.

If she was to go with Tina, she'd be breaking Joanne's heart.

It seems that Joanne has a problem and maybe putting it off to the next day, then she'll just keep it inside her.

The thing is, Joanne has a problem and I think Charlene should go and talk to Joanne about it. Also, it's more complicated because Joanne is like jealous, you know, and would probably have read

things into it if Charlene had gone off with Tina and sort of rejected her.

I think they can all learn to be friends and then no one's pulling on someone away from somebody else and then nobody's left out.

To make everything right, I think that Charlene should go with Joanne, to make her not jealous.

It would really hurt the friendship if he went with Tim.

Gender differences in response shift

Although males and females demonstrated the same pattern of shift in moving from the Real life to the Friendship and Peer group dilemmas (i.e. Percentage of Care increased progressively from the Peer group to Real life to the Friendship dilemma), the magnitude of shift differed markedly according to gender: Girls' Percentage of Care scores varied as a function of dilemma considerably more than did boys' scores. This finding confirms and expands upon Langdale's report that when a hypothetical moral dilemma pulled strongly for the Justice perspective, males who had shown a Care orientation in the Real life dilemma tended to eliminate Care considerations, whereas females who were Care dominant in the Real life dilemma used both Justice and Care considerations in the hypothetical situation. The narrowed response range in boys appears in addition to

play a part in the current study's failure to detect statistically significant shifts in orientation among males (in contradistinction to the females), as Hypothesis 6 specifies an overly circumscribed degree of shift.

It appears, then, that the two orientations are indeed available to individuals of both genders as cognitive frames or perspectives to be drawn on in reflecting about social problems. The differences, however, are intriguing. The contrast between girls' fluidity in utilizing either one mode or the other according to context and the restricted range of perspectives shown by boys raises the question of whether males have less access to the Care orientation or are rejecting it. In like vein, Pearson's (1985) study of Justice and Care reasoning in children's literature demonstrated that whereas both male and female authors were able to shift moral codes in accord with the gender of their protagonists, there was a significantly greater shift for female than for male authors (i.e. male authors were more likely to ascribe Justice reasoning to both male and female characters whereas female authors were more likely to ascribe Justice reasoning to males and Care reasoning to female subjects).

Real Life Dilemmas

In discussing their personal conflicts, the young men and women interviewed in this study articulated a number of themes involving struggles with changes in themselves, altered relationships with family and friends, conflicts between their principles and their responsibility towards others. As a group, their sensibilities were acute, reflecting dilemmas transcendent of any particular developmental period, as well as quintessential adolescent concerns. There were several instances of pressure to take drugs or alcohol, a few expressions of self-interest (for example, plagiarizing a lab report), one or two concerns with saving face (as in one young man's readiness to fight a gang attempting to steal his leather jacket). Conflicts of loyalty were prominent, such as mediating between friends, choosing which divorced parent to live with. Attempts at self-definition were revealed in many dilemmas: choosing friends, identifying with or withdrawing from parents, deciding whether or not to change one's religion. There was a focus on honesty in communication, and a concern with being true to oneself without losing friends. A few subjects, for instance, spoke out against racial slurs in the face of group disapproval or emphasized the need to act with clarity of purpose. One young girl, left alone at home for the

weekend, was presented with the dilemma of allowing a good friend to visit, accompanied by a group of rather frightening strangers who had been taking drugs; she decided that to simply leave the house with a note left on the door "would be the wimp way out--I had to make the proper judgement and consider the consequences of my actions."

Justice considerations

There were concerns about fairness and reciprocity: e.g. not eating sweets because a little brother had just been diagnosed as diabetic; telling one's parents about drinking at parties despite possible punishment because, in the words of one subject, "your parents have entrusted you with so much, given you so much, that it's only right to give them back what they deserve so that you are not cheating your parents or yourself."

A number of subjects appealed to societal standards, principles or family traditions in order to

resolve choices, such as refusing to steal because "it's wrong," declining to cut classes with friends "because while you're at school you're supposed to be in class," not repeating a secret because of the sanctity of trust. Said a 16 year old girl in discussing her relationship with her fiance,

> We're both Catholics and we're both brought up in the same kind of situation. Our families are strict and they're both off the boat, both from Italy and stuff, and so we were brought up in the sense that making love before marriage is wrong, so it was like we couldn't do it because here we are, we're brought up in that perspective and we couldn't go against it...And I'm a really good Catholic and going to church and facing God would really upset me.

Care considerations

Some focused on the welfare of others. One young man lost friends in his attempt to help a disturbed, drug-addicted friend; a girl decided to forgo a trip abroad with her mother and sister because her father, unable to take time off from work, would have had to come home to an empty house. Another saw a friend cheat on an exam: Although "in one sense it was hurting me, it would have hurt her if I told. She would have been suspended or thrown out, and I preferred to get a lower

grade myself-- It wouldn't hurt me as much as it would hurt her."

Other subjects indicated their tenacity in trying to maintain attachments, as seen in one girl's resolution to achieve a new balance with her mother:

> The conflict was with my mother, and it's a conflict about our relationship which isn't very good, which I view as not being very good, but my mother-- views it in a different light. My parents are divorced. They've been divorced ever since I can remember, ever since age 3 or so, and I never remember their being married, and I've lived all my life with my mother, but she went to law school when I was young and I think that I missed out on alot of important growing years with my mother, relationship-wise, and I'd like to have a better relationship with my mother, more open. And she grew up in a household where they really didn't communicate and you were shot down for expressing your views and opinions, so it's very hard for her to communicate with people, and she's just learning through her adult life how to do that. And I like communicating with people, I like having open conversations about how we feel. So I brought this up to her and it's very hard, it has been a
>
> struggle for me, inside, with myself, because I don't like living with her anymore, and in fact I moved away from home, I moved to my father's house, I couldn't deal with being with her and not enjoying it. So I brought it up with her and she told me that she didn't view it as badly as I did, as badly as my opinion was, and she said that she would do anything to try to help me with this conflict, and that doing things with me and talking about things with me so to try to help me- and it has gotten better in the past couple of weeks since I've brought this to her attention because she never really realized it before. (...hard to do..) Oh, yeah, it was very difficult for me to realize what I was feeling, what I was going through because-- I don't like high school, in fact I hate high school, and I think one of the reasons why I hate it so much is because I wasn't very happy at home. So, I would trans- whatever I can't think of

> the word, I always forget it, but my feelings from home life- to school. And I realized that I do have a bad relationship with her and I would like it be better, especially since I'm going away to college very soon, and I felt that if I didn't come to a resolution with her and tell her how I felt, and find out how she felt that it would be too late once I went to college because I know that I'm probably not going to live at home again, and that California is a long way away, and I wouldn't be coming home every weekend, that sort of thing, and that I'd like to come to a resolution before I went away, that was important for me to do.

Developmental transitions

There was the poignancy of altered relationships along with growth, the difficulty in recognizing that, e.g., "she's changed alot since we were little kids, we don't have any of the same values or morals anymore, we're very different people." A few subjects exemplified developmental transitions outlined by Gilligan. One young man was confronted with a "dilemma of the fact" as his abstract principles were tested by a real problem:

> My friend Dave went out with his girlfriend for about a year and a half and he got her pregnant, and he's my best friend so he came to me first, he didn't tell anybody, and the first thing he wanted to do was get an abortion, and his girlfriend wanted an abortion. But to me-- I don't really believe in abortion, but like when you read about it, like you say abortion's bad, but my friend was 17, the girl was 16, and this thing could have ruined their lives, so like when something like that happens to someone who's close to you, personally, it's much different than on a statistical basis, so you know I agreed with him, I even lent him the money to have the abortion.

Another subject revealed what Gilligan has described as a shift to a higher level of the Care mode, in which loyalty to the self is included, a shift which is prominent in her account of female development. As Gilligan posits, "girls ask themselves if they can be responsive to themselves without losing connection with others, and whether they can respond to others without abandoning themselves" (Gilligan, 1986, p. 293). The subject in the present study, describing a conflict with a close friend who had become unhappy and destructive, struggled to maintain an attachment while avoiding harm to herself:

> Well I have this friend who was really my best friend last year, but she began to change this year. She's I would say obnoxious, she tries to say things that will hurt me, but I'm not sure whether it's conscious on her part or not. At any rate, it happens, and I have found myself more and more, because I don't want to have to deal with her and because I don't want to get hurt, I will lie, saying I'm busy, saying my family is going out. Really, I'm doing my very best to avoid her.. (It sounds like you really have a conflict.) Yeah, it's because I don't want to lose her, because she was such a good friend, and I think she could probably pull out of the slump that she's in. But I don't want to have to have pain of the things she says to me, the pain of being with her, and she will cut me down, and it's also I don't know whether she means to do it or not, and I've talked to her about it, I've said please, you're saying these things which are upsetting me, please don't do it, and she just continues, she's good for a while and then she sort of falls back into it. (You don't want to end this relationship.) I don't want, I think, no I don't want to end the relationship, I still want to be her friend, but I'm trying to back off and just not be as close and stay away until she pulls out of whatever happens

> to her...Because well I know she's been doing terribly in school, really, really badly, she goes to a different school, and I just feel that as soon as she's resolved whatever's going on in her life, she'll be able to stop making remarks about mine. But in the meantime I have to figure out whether or not to, you know, how I'm going to deal with her, and mostly that means I try to keep talks short, and I haven't seen her for a while.

Deciding whether or not to "have sex" was particularly troubling when this was perceived as an act of irrevocable separation from a parent:

> It was really, really a horrible decision to make, it was very hard because my mother would be, she wouldn't be angry but she just wouldn't think that was the right thing, and it was very difficult to go against what my mother believed...The horrible thing was that it would never be that again, and I began to think about age, and I began to think about life, and I had never really thought about it like I did at that time, that you only live once and that you're going to die, and that I'm taking this step that I'm never going to go back to again, and it was very hard.

In sum, the real life conflicts among both males and females present a rich display of the two orientations, with spontaneous considerations of rights as well as responsibilities, objectivity as well as contextual specificity, and in general, a tension between separation and attachment.

The function of context in perspective taking: two coding schemes and implications for future research

A review of the influence of context (i.e. dilemma) on social perspective taking as a function of coding scheme reveals an interesting paradox: Boys were more sensitive to context according to Selman's measure, girls, according to Lyons' measure. That is to say, the separate perspective taking domains were associated more strongly with differential stages of thinking in males and with differential qualities of thinking in females. Furthermore, in light of the fact that Selman's coding scheme was not expected to reveal differences at all, these findings are important not only in their contribution to an increasingly complex representation of gender differences as such, but in suggesting research considerations of an application of divergent models, with each shedding light on a different order of psychological phenomena. As in the present study, a unidimensional framework yielding conventional, incomplete but hardly dispensable information pertaining to "levels" (e.g. girls had higher perspective taking scores than boys; boys' Peer group scores were higher than their Friendship scores) might be tempered or fortified as the case may be drawing on a system providing for qualitatively different dimensions (e.g.

boys, who were more consistent in utilizing a single orientation, tended to rely on Justice reasoning; girls used more Care considerations than boys but freely shifted perspectives according to context).

The findings also underscore the need to consider contextual variables in the design and interpretation of empirical research. To begin with, in the present study a female interviewer alone met with both male and female subjects. Consequently, the possibility that sex of examiner was operating as an independent variable needs to be addressed. That such might be the case is suggested by reports of response bias in sex-role measurement (Grimes & Hansen, 1984). Further, a study of gender differences in self-disclosure (Alloy, Schuldt & Bonge, 1985) found that sex of examiner and intimacy level of questions jointly determined the duration (i.e. length of time) of subjects' verbal disclosures. A consideration of the influence of an examiner's gender within an interview setting also concords with research models that focus on gender-related behaviors as a function of the context of a particular social interaction (Deaux & Major, 1987), as well as with those emphasizing subjects' perceptions of examiners' expectations (Darley & Fazio, 1980). In addition, future research might address the fact that in the current study, the data were not counterbalanced, as all

subjects participated in the Friendship interview prior to the Peer group interview, and this format may have affected the experimental results.

Future investigations might also explore other contexts as relevant to gender differences in perspective taking. For example, the area of parent-child relations is of major interest in a sample of adolescents, among whom identity strivings might well result in the masking of otherwise well developed perspective taking skills. Cooper, Grotevant and Condon (1983), in their study of adolescent role taking and identity formation within the context of the family, emphasize that neither of these social cognitive domains has a clear end point, and that both will be in flux as a function of changes in contextual factors. These authors also note that adolescents who exhibit greater identity exploration and role taking skills participated in relationships expressive of both individuation and connectedness, which suggests a different approach to examining the association between a Care orientation and more "agentic" functions. An additional area of research might examine the intersection of the Justice-Care dimension with levels of social perspective taking across different age groups, focusing on periods of developmental transition (i.e. middle childhood to adolescence, adolescence to early adulthood, and

throughout the adult years). Furthermore in light of the primarily middle class sample utilized in the present study, future investigators will need to examine these variables across a wider range of socio-economic groups.

Educational implications

Western education has been guided by the traditional emphasis on thinking as a hierarchical progression of increasing abstraction. It has been noted (Johnston, 1985) that problem-solving conceptualized as a hierarchy involves a systematic exclusion of variables until the most important principle remains. In contrast, thinking conceptualized as a "web" involves finding solutions through an inclusion and interaction of all considerations. The gender differences found in this study with regard to social knowledge are not about social reasoning alone, but about reasoning. Consequently, the neglect of one orientation has implications for cognition itself as well as for the growth of interpersonal understanding specifically addressed here. As Bales (1979) has posited, the effective functioning of any task-oriented group, such as in a school or classroom, requires qualities of thinking associated differentially with either gender (i.e. both "expressive" and

"instrumental"). For this reason, the concept of a Care orientation has a particular relevance to education at the level of teacher training: Once teachers become aware of the two alternative orientations operating in themselves, their students and in approaches to study, these can be utilized to complement each other in the service of more flexible teaching styles and more varied opportunities for student participation.

In an account of interview data with women (Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, 1986), Gilligan's meaning of two epistemological stances is broadened to include a different perspective towards intellectual inquiry. That a relationship with an object of knowing can be a relationship with an inanimate object or an idea is a concept obviously central to the Piagetian paradigm. What has been largely absent however is the sense of personally involved, even passionate interaction with objects of knowing in their full particularity rather than as means towards approaching an increasingly general pattern or rule. A common theme among the women interviewed was an expressed sense of alienation from formal education. This was voiced by the less educated as well as the most educated, privileged and ostensibly successful of the participants. Several of these interviewees suggested that a feeling of community or some form of meaningful

commitment was instrumental in reconnecting them to formal education.

As the authors note, it is instructive to compare this pattern with Perry's portrait of Harvard undergraduates. Reminiscent of Erikson (1968), these men ultimately entered the community of thinkers only after having grappled with autonomous issues of doubting and separation. If "separate knowing" entails a position from which the thinker steps back in doubt to seek the critical error, then "connected knowing" arises in relationship and moves towards understanding or caring about an object on its own terms. What becomes essential is to find a means of placing oneself at the heart of the learning process, and by so doing, participate in an act of empathy which far from primitive projection, involves an active receptivity towards what is being studied (Belenky et al., 1986; Noddings, 1984; Noddings & Shore, 1984).

An illustration of connected knowing is presented in Keller's (1985) account of the geneticist Barbara McClintock, whose perspective towards nature embodied an attentiveness to particulars in their unique milieux, an orientation that distinguished her research from that of most of her peers and that she believed facilitated a breakthrough in her analysis of chromosomes in corn plants. Keller proposes that divergence in one's

perceived relation to science yields new frameworks within which science can operate.

In this regard, the upsurge in the use of systems perspectives across various fields gives credence to more holistic forms of analysis in which any element is understood only in terms of its relationship to and participation in its total context. With specific import for pedagogy, Coles (1987) postulates a theory of interactivity to account for why students fail to learn. Rejecting the traditional model of learning disabilities, with an emphasis on de-contextualized assessment and remediation, Coles' model views the learner as an active agent within a complex network of interconnected social relationships and conditions. These relationships are "mutable" such that a positive change in one condition allows for a positive charge in another, and students modify their circumstances as they are modified by them. From a similar, if more encompassing perspective, proponents of global education (Kniep, 1986a, 1986b) propose the development of curricula designed to encourage students' recognition of their linkages to others, and their appreciation for both the interconnectedness and divergence of world systems.

Similarly, much as anthropology has been strengthened by an interplay between "etic" and "emic"

approaches, or studying a cultural phenomenon both from the vantage point of an existing theory and from the internal experience of the phenomenon itself, the concept of two orientations might be applied to any area of study in the humanities or social sciences. An historic period, a sonata, a novel, a case study, an art movement, all might be examined from dual perspectives, alternating an abstract analysis from the outside with a more intimate contemplation of the object on its own terms (see Belenky at al., 1986). The very shift in perspective might in fact become a focus of study, especially among high school or even junior high school students who are developing a capacity to coordinate multiple perspectives.

In addition, several authors have discussed a mode of education in which interdependence motivates the learning process. Belenky et al. note the function of teacher as a partner who can encourage public dialogue through which thinking aloud and sharing of perspectives leads to an expansion of an individual's intellectual schemes, not with the aim of creating "cognitive conflict" or a Piagetian "clash of ideas," but in order to permit the evolving of thought processes invigorated by collaboration and social connectedness. This vision echoes a Vygotskian conception of learning as arising out of intimate relationships through the transmission

of shared cultural meanings, and can be directed to a consideration of Gilligan's neglected developmental line:

> As the contemporary reality of global interdependence compels the search for new maps of development, the exploration of attachment may provide the psychological grounding for new visions of progress and growth.
> (Gilligan, 1986, p. 298)

Appendix A

Friendship Dilemma: female

Charlene and Joanne have been good friends since they were five. Now they were in high school and Joanne was trying out for the school play. As usual she was nervous about how she had done, but Charlene was there to tell her she was very good and give her moral support. Still Joanne as worried that a newcomer in school would get the part. The new girl, Tina, came over to congratulate Joanne on her performance and then asked if she could join the girls for a snack. Right away Charlene and Tina seemed to hit it off very well. They talked about where Tina was from and the kinds of things she could do in her new school. Joanne on the other hand, didn't seem to like Tina very well. She thought Tina was a little pushy, and maybe she was a bit jealous over all the attention Charlene was giving Tina.

When Tina left the other two alone, Joanne and Charlene arranged to get together on Saturday, because Joanne had a problem that she would like to talk over with Charlene. But later that day, Tina called Charlene and asked her to go to Washington to see a play on Saturday.

Charlene had a dilemma. She would have jumped at

the chance to go with Tina, but she had already promised to see Joanne. Joanne might have understood and been happy that Charlene had the chance to go, or she might feel like she was losing her best friend when she really needed her.

Friendship Dilemma: male

Charlie and John have been good friends since they were five. Now they were in high school and John was trying out for the school play. As usual he was nervous about how he had done, but Charlie was there to tell him he was very good and give him moral support. Still John was worried that a newcomer in school would get the part. The new boy, Tim, came over to congratulate John on his performance and then asked if he could join the boys for a snack. Right away Charlie and Tim seemed to hit if off very well. They talked about where Tim was from and the kinds of things he could do in his new school. John on the other hand, didn't seem to like Tim very well. He thought Tim was a little pushy, and maybe he was a bit jealous over all the attention Charlie was giving Tim.

When Tim left the other two alone, John and Charlie arranged to get together on Saturday, because John had a problem that he would like to talk over with Charlie. But later that day, Tim called Charlie and asked him to go to Washington to see a play on Saturday.

Charlie had a dilemma. He would have jumped at the chance to go with Tim, but he had already promised to see John. John might have understood and been happy

that Charlie had the chance to go, or he might feel like he was losing his best friend when he really needed him.

Appendix B

Peer-group dilemma: female

WHO COMES FIRST--YOU OR THE GROUP?

Six members of a rock band are trying to work on a new piece of music. But as usual, Melissa, their star musician, is not there. Most of the band agrees that Melissa is important to them; some say because she is a good musician, others because she holds the band together by her joking around. But as the group gets to talking, some of the members start getting angry over Melissa's not putting in equal time. One member says, "I've had it with her and this band, too. If she isn't staying for jam sessions, neither am I." Others agree and things start to look pretty shaky with some arguing that the group should get rid of Melissa and others insisting that they need her because she keeps them together. Finally one of the group agrees to talk to her.

Melissa appears at the next practice session, but only to tell the group that she's off to make a date for the weekend. The band explodes with bitter feelings towards Melissa and starts to question whether the group can stay together at all. Finally they decide to give Melissa an ultimatum: either she

commits herself to the group totally or there won't be any group at all.

Melissa is faced with a real problem: should she give up some of her outside interests and devote more time to the group or leave the group in shambles?

Peer Group Dilemma: male

WHO COMES FIRST--YOU OR THE GROUP?

Six members of a rock band are trying to work on a new piece of music. But as usual, Marty, their star musician, is not there. Most of the band agrees that Marty is important to them; some say because he is a good musician, others because he holds the band together by his joking around. But as the group gets to talking, some of the members start getting angry over Marty's not putting in equal time. One member says, "I've had it with him and this band, too. If he isn't staying for jam sessions, neither am I." Others agree and things start to look pretty shaky with some arguing that the group should get rid of Marty and others insisting that they need him because he keeps them together. Finally one of the group agrees to talk to him.

Marty appears at the next practice session, but only to tell the group that he's off to make a date for the weekend. The band explodes with bitter feelings towards Marty and starts to question whether the group can stay together at all. Finally they decide to give Marty an ultimatum: either he commits himself to the group totally or there won't be any group at all.

Marty is faced with a real problem: should he

give up some of his outside interests and devote more time to the group or leave the group in shambles?

Appendix C

Friendship Interview

Introductory questions

1. What do you think is the problem in this story? Why?
2. What do you think Charlene/Charlie should do? Why?

I. Formation

1. Why are friends important? Why does a person need a good friend? Why?
3. What kind of person makes a good friend?

II. Closeness/intimacy

4. What is a really good, close friendship? Does it take something special? What kinds of things do good friends know about each other?
5. What kinds of things can good friends talk about that other friends sometimes can't? Are there different kinds of friendship? What's the difference between a regular and a best friend?
6. Which is better to have, one close friend or a group of regular friends? Why?

III. Trust and Reciprocity

7. What kinds of things do good friends do for each other? Is it important to do things for each other for a good friendship? Why?
8. Do you think trust is important for a good friendship? Why? What is trust? Is it something

more than just keeping secrets and paying back? Is there something more? something deeper to trust?

IV. Jealousy

9. How do you think Joanne/John feels about the new friendship? Do you think she/he might get jealous? Of What? What does it mean to be jealous in a friendship? How can it hurt a friendship?

V. Conflict resolution

10. Can people be friends even if they are having arguments? How is that possible?

11. How should arguments be settled between good friends?

12. What kinds of things do good friends sometimes fight or argue about?

VI. Termination

13. What makes friendships break up?

14. What does a person lose when they lose a good friend?

15. Why is it that good friends sometimes grow apart?

16. What does it mean to grow apart from a good friend?

Appendix D

Peer Group Interview

Introductory questions

1. What do you think is the problem in this story? Why?
2. What do you think Marty/Melissa should do? Why?

I. Formation

1. Why do people like to be in groups or clubs?
2. What kinds of qualities should you look for in a person who will make a good member of a group? Why?

II. Cohesion

3. What keeps a group of friends together? What keeps it from falling apart?
4. What is group spirit or team spirit? Why is it often important to have group spirit in a group?
5. Is a member's loyalty usually pretty important to a group? Why? What is loyalty anyway? (If necessary, explain, "a feeling that each person will stick with the group no matter what.") Why does loyalty help a group stay together?

III. Conformity

6. Sometimes a person will go along with the group, even though he doesn't really want to, just because the rest of the group is doing it. Why does that happen?
7. Is it better when people in a group are pretty

much the same or when they're different? In what ways?

IV. Rule Orientation

8. Does it sometimes help a group, like the band, to have some kind of rules? What kind might help?

9. Should all members of the group obey the rules? Why?

V. Decision making and organization

10. Should the leader decide or should everybody help decide what rules a club might have?

11. What things make a team or band work well together? Would teamwork help? What is teamwork in a group?

VI. Leadership

12. Is it better when a group like a club or band has a leader or when everyone is the same? Why? In what ways?

13. Why might a leader be important? Can there be more than one type of leader?

14. Are there any problems in having a leader for a group?

VII. Termination

15. For what reasons might someone be thrown out of a group? Sometimes a group will scapegoat or throw all the blame on one person. Why is that?

16. What things make a group break up?

Appendix E

Real Life Conflict Interview

Conflicts often arise in social relationships. Have you ever had an important conflict? Were you ever in a situation where you weren't sure what was the right thing to do? Could you describe the situation? What exactly made it a conflict for you? What did you do? Why do you think you resolved it that way? Were you satisfied with what you did?

Appendix F

Introductory Instructions to Subjects

I am going to ask you some questions about social relationships and particular conflicts that sometimes arise. First I'd like you to tell me about a conflict you have had, and then you will read about some other people and conflicts they had, and answer some questions about them. Keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers, and that you are free to discontinue this interview at any point.

Appendix G

Friendship Domain

B. Overview of Aspects

Issue I - Close Friendship Formation

Stage 0 - Momentary physical interaction

A. Motives for friendship
   1. responses to specific cases rather than general question
   2. friends not differentiated from the activity in which self and others are involved

B. How one goes about making friends (mechanisms)
   1. close friends live close by (friendship-making a function of proximity and propinquity)
   2. friendship by fiat--arbitrary decree
   3. knowing the surface facts of social life
   4. giving presents--it's not the thought but the present that counts

C. Ideal friend-qualities of persons that make them good friends
   1. superficial similarity
   2. non-aggressive behavior toward the self
   3. geographic location

Stage 1 - One-way assistance

A. Importance of friendships (motives)
   1. a friend is someone who serves the self's needs
   2. assistance in times of trouble

B. Mechanisms
   1. tune into other's attitude
   2. present as a means of putting other in a good frame of mind
   3. getting to know other's likes and dislikes

C. Ideal friend

1. someone with good intentions
2. someone who matches activities with the self

Stage 2 - Fairweather cooperation

A. Motives for friendship
   1. friendship is important for inner peace of mind
   2. self needs people like the self

B. Mechanisms for making friends
   1. reveal one's own likes and dislikes
   2. presents as windows on the self's motives
   3. match-up of liked activities
   4. knowing what other thinks of you

C. Ideal friend
   1. concern with fronting and with not putting on a false appearance
   2. someone who acts like an equal--not "bossy" or "show-off"

Stage 3 - Intimate sharing

A. Motives for friendship
   1. for companionship and intimacy
   2. mutual support--support for others is reflected back onto the self

B. Mechanisms
   1. reveal personality characteristics, know those of other
   2. first impressions as lasting impressions

C. Ideal friend
   1. rub-off theory
   2. complimentary personalities--generally similar interest

Stage 4 - Autonomous Interdependence

A. Motives for friendship
   1. gaining a sense of personal identity
   2. gaining a sense of peer identity
   3. both support and freedom

B. Mechanisms

1. building up of commonality
2. ability to reflect on the process of friendship formation

C. Ideal friend
1. relativity and complexity of personality
2. friend as sensitive, empathic, to the self's needs

Issue II - Closeness and Intimacy

Stage 0 - momentary physical interaction

1. dichotomization or polarization of friends
2. close friends equal to physical propinquity
3. superficial similarity

Stage 1 - one-way assistance

1. rank ordering of persons as friends
2. longer time known means better knowledge of likes and dislikes
3. one-way wants

Stage 2 - Fairweather cooperation

1. good friends "get along with each other"--ranks friendship, not the friend
2. getting to know other's "true, real, or inner" attitudes

Stage 3 - Intimate sharing

1. close relations based upon sharing and intimacy
2. length of time of friendship important because close relations are built upon mutual experience
3. close friends need not be the same but need to have things in common
4. caring about both self and other

Stage 4 - Autonomous Interdependence

1. reflective awareness of the many possible qualitatively different types of

relations
2. close friendship involves moral commitment as well as support of a deep psychological value: a respect for the person as an individual

Issue III - Trust and Reciprocity

Stage 0 - Momentary physical interaction

1. reciprocal acts of physical affection or reciprocal restraint from harm
2. trust equivalent to confidence in physical prowess and ability

Stage 1 - One-way assistance

1. reciprocity as one-way street--actions which please another
2. trust as knowing (predicting) what other will do as well as can do
3. trust as doing other's bidding

Stage 2 - Fairweather cooperation

1. two-way reciprocity
2. equal satisfaction
3. trust equals keeping secrets
4. trust as pay-back--reciprocating tangible products and services

Stage 3 - Intimate sharing

1. mutual support and admiration
2. shared intimacy
3. consistency and dependability of persons

Stage 4 - Autonomous interdependence

1. reciprocity of emotional and psychological support
2. trust as the ability to let go

Issue IV - Jealousy

Stage 0 - Physical interaction

1. physical lock-out

2. jealousy of objects and activities

Stage 1 - One-way assistance

1. hurt feelings for being excluded
2. mine is better than yours

Stage 2 - Fairweather cooperation

1. hurt feelings as a result of being left out of interpersonal interaction

Stage 3 - Intimate sharing

1. jealousy as possessiveness in a relation
2. jealousy as a trait as well as a state

Stage 4 - Autonomous Interdependence

1. jealousy - admiration of meaningful relations
2. awareness of conflict between jealousy and growth

Issue V - Conflict Resolution

Stage 0 - Momentary physical interaction

1. conflict resolution through non-interaction
2. physical intervention

Stage 1 - One-way assistance

1. negating the action
2. appeal to the other's outlook

Stage 2 - Fairweather cooperation

1. resolutions which appeal to both parties' sensibilities
2. taking back true intent
3. trust equals keeping secrets
4. friends on the inside but not on the outside

Stage 3 - Intimate sharing

1. conflicts arising within the relation need mutual resolution

2. conflicts of personality
3. working through conflicts strengthens the friendship--continuity of friendship through thick and thin

Stage 4 - Autonomous interdependence

1. relation of complex personalities and complex conflicts
2. level of communication between friends

Issue VI - Termination

Stage 0 - Momentary physical interaction

1. physical harm
2. physical separation

Stage 1 - One-way assistance

1. unilateral decisions
2. squealing, name-calling, insults: bad manners

Stage 2 - Fairweather cooperation

1. disagreements and differences of opinion rather than unilateral opinion
2. fair and foul weather friendships

Stage 3 - Intimate sharing

1. conflicts of trust
2. fair and foul weather friendships: greater stability but also less irreversibility
3. incompatibility -- lacking -- common bond

Stage 4 - Autonomous interdependence

1. disagreements as lack of communication
2. personality issues
3. growing apart

Peer Group Domain

B. Overview of Aspects

The stage-related aspects described in this manual are briefly stated below. The scorer should use this overview to locate the general level of a subject's response and then read the more detailed description and examples provided in the text.

Issue I. Group Formation

Stage 0 - Physicalistic Connections

A. Motives
   1. to gain rewarding objects or activities

B. Mechanism
   1. Mechanistic formation
   2. Initiations as fun

C. Ideal Member
   1. Simple physical traits or capabilities

Stage 1 - Unilateral Relations

A. Motives
   1. Values placed on group activity
   2. Collaboration on action

B. Mechanisms
   1. Materialistic basis for decision
   2. Upfront judgment
   3. Having to learn skills or specific knowledge
   4. Initiations as test or specific skill

C. Ideal Member
   1. Someone with good manners and well behaved
   2. Someone with good physical abilities which improve collaborative actions

Stage 2 - Bilateral Partnerships

A. Motives
   1. To make more friendships
   2. To avoid feeling lonely
   3. Coordinating interests among members
   4. Initiations
      (a) as to match up personal skills with

group
(b) to embarrass the new member

B. Ideal Member
1. Someone who treats others as equals
2. Someone who can keep a secret

Stage 3 - Homogeneous Community
A. Motives
1. To seek prestige
2. To be part of a larger whole
3. To share feelings and personal problems

B. Mechanisms
1. Breaking through the shell
2. Conforming to group norms
3. Initiations as a rite of passage

C. Ideal Member
1. Someone faithful to the group as a whole
2. Someone like everyone else in the group

Stage 4 - Pluralistic Organization
A. Motives
1. To fulfill basic human needs of attachment and identification
2. To realize a collective sense of purpose

B. Mechanisms
1. Internalizing obligatory standard
2. Establishing an organization "superstructure"
3. Subjugating self-interests for (the sake of) collective interests
4. Initiations as functional symbol for identifying with group.

C. Ideal Member
1. One who fills functionally defined role-responsibilities

II. Group Cohesion
Stage 0 - Physicalistic Connections
1. Cohesion as physical proximity
2. Better is better, worse is worse

Stage 1 - Unilateral Relations
1. Sticking together because we like group activities

2. Group spirit as
   (a) through friendships
   (b) good manners
3. Loyalty as blind obedience
4. The ideal group based on materialistic prowess
5. Good relations through good manners

Stage 2 - Bilateral Partnerships
1. Sticking together
   (a) good friendships
   (b) maintained by bilateral exchanges
2. Group spirit as
   (a) good friendships
   (b) coordinated teamwork
   (c) confidence in group's ability
3. Loyalty as
   (a) fair exchange and good relationships
   (b) keeping secrets and telling truth
4. Each to his own thing--naive self-interest
5. Good group relations based on reciprocated affection

Stage 3 - Homogeneous Community
1. Sticking together through
   (a) Common bonds and shared experiences general

Stage 4 - Pluralistic Organization
The sociological approach--groups as total social organisms
2. Sticking together to achieve collective ends
3. Loyalty as personal commitment
4. Group spirit as a process with a function
5. Interpersonal relations independent of collective spirit

III. Conformity

Stage 0 - Physicalistic Connections
1. Unexplained imitation of overt acts--confusing conforming act with its cause

Stage 1 - Unilateral Relations
1. Conformity of actions not thoughts
2. Compelled by estimations of material

benefits
3. Directed by conscious intentions to "show" or "copy" actions
4. Conformity as a method for learning about group - modeling

Stage 2 - Bilateral Partnerships
1. Conformity of mental attitudes based on pragmatic coordination
2. Motivated to make or keep group friendships
3. Motivated to make a good impression on others
4. Getting used to it -- conformity as habit

Stage 3 - Homogeneous Community
1. Conformity to communal attitudes -- custom and convention
2. Conformity in order to be the right kind of person
3. Conformity to maintain one's part in the community
4. Conformity as a natural mental contagion

Stage 4 - Pluralistic Organization
1. Relativity of cultural values and the pluralistic community
2. Conformity through obligation to agreed upon standards

IV. Group Rules and Norms

Stage 0 - Physicalistic Connections
1. Rules as arbitrary punishment--Confusion of rule with personal wishes

Stage 1 - Unilateral Relations
1. Rules provide concrete and specific information on contact
2. Rules judged by their physical consequences
(a) to avoid being hurt
(b) to avoid being punished
(c) to stop fights

Stage 2 - Bilateral Partnerships
1. Rules for coordinating different

interests

Stage 3 - Homogeneous Community
1. Rules for insuring a generalized uniformity of values

Stage 4 - Pluralistic Organization
1. Rules for organizing a pluralistic social system

V. Group decision-making and organization

Stage 0 - Physicalistic Connections
1. Decision-making as phenomenalistic actions

Stage 1 - Unilateral Relations
1. Learning simple collaborative skills
2. A unilateral decision-making process and stalemate
3. Group organization as knowing specific facts

Stage 2 - Bilateral Partnerships
1. Decisions based on convergent agreement of interests
2. Resolving conflicting interests through voting-quantifying
3. Organization based on bilateral partnerships-teamwork

Stage 3 - Homogeneous Community
1. Working together as a unit
2. Decision-making based on consensus
3. Distinguished plurality from majority--majority represents group consensus

Stage 4 - Pluralistic Organization
1. Decision-making principles of a pluralistic democracy

VI. Leadership

Stage 0 - Physicalistic Connections
1. Leadership as physical power over others

Stage 1 - Unilateral Relations
1. Leaders must be the best and know the most

2. Leadership as a series of unilateral tyrannies

Stage 2 - Bilateral Partnerships
1. Leadership based on pragmatic equality with followers
2. Leader as arbitrator, organizing interests within group
3. Leader as group psychologist--using encouragement and friendliness

Stage 3 - Homogeneous Community
1. The leaders as marshalling group solidarity--"as a whole"
2. Confusing leadership role with personality--High status negates commonality

Stage 4 - Pluralistic Organization
1. Leadership as social role function--abstracted form individuals
2. Multiple functions or kinds of leadership

VII. Termination

Stage 0 - Physicalistic Connections
1. Breaking physical connections

Stage 1 - Unilateral Relations
1. Breaking up because of anti-social behaviors ("fights") 2. Excluding member because of material consequences of his actions

Stage 2 - Bilateral Partnerships
1. Breakdown of bilateral exchanges and agreements 2. Loss of group's friendships and good feelings for each other 3. Excluding member for failure to uphold partnership

Stage 3 - Homogeneous Community
1. Losing the group's foundation of trust and loyalty 2. The domino theory--a homogeneous system approach
2. The breakdown of group commonality
3. Getting a bad reputation

Stage 4 - Pluralistic Organization
1. Culmination of collective goals
2. Disunity through factionalism and individualism

3. Exclusion through violation of formal rules

Guidelines for Scoring Stage 3 & Stage 4 in the Friendship and Peer Group Interviews

In the friendship domain stage 3 reasoning includes a perception of friendship as a mutual dyadic system formed for cooperative functions rather than as reciprocal relations between independent parties. The individual can now stand outside the friendship relation and view it as a stable system. There is a sense that fiends are part of each other, and differentiation exists between levels of conflict, some of which are recognized to strengthen the bond. At this stage, the individual is not yet aware of the dynamic and open-ended nature of friendship as a system which is available to change and growth. With the attainment of stage, 4, concepts of autonomous interdependence emerge. There is a new awareness of the need for both dependence and autonomy, as well as an understanding of the friendship relation as an active process with stages of its own.

Similar developmental shifts are suggested in consideration of Peer Group concepts. Stage 3 embodies an awareness of the peer group as a total community or a "we" held together by shared interests or beliefs and by a consensus of expectations. What is absent at this point is an ability to differentiate the various

processes which help to explain changes in the whole. There is confusion, for instance, regarding the abstract role of leadership; active leadership is frowned on as violating a stage 3 idea of homogeneous community. In the same vein, obligation is conceptualized as conformity to the group's values. At stage 4, new elements of thinking include a sociological perspective by which group processes are treated as interdependent systems, the idea of a pluralistic community in which diversity is united behind common goals, and the value of contractual agreements for organizing a plurality of interests.

Scoring Average Issue Scores

1. Pure Issue Scores: When 75% or more of the considerations are at a particular stage for a given Issue, the Issue receives a pure score. A pure score has a value of 1.

2. Major/minor Scores: A major stage is given to the level with the greatest frequency, but less than 75%. The minor stage is given to the level with fewer scores than the major stage, but greater than or equal to 25%. For example, an Issue with 2, 2, 2, 1, 1 would be 60% Stage 2, 40% Stage 2, and would be scored a major Stage 2 and a minor Stage 1. The major/minor Issue stage is shown in the following manner: 2(1).
A major score has a value of 2/3.
A minor score has a value of 1/3.

3. To compute this without fractions, multiply pure stages by 3, major stages by 2 and minor stages by 1, add them together, then divide this total by the number of Issues times 3.

4. Equal frequency scoring: When equal numbers of considerations are scored at two stages within a given

Issue, the reader returns to the data gives a quality rating to the level which most clearly represents the subject's best thinking. The quality rating becomes the major score (marked with an* in the sample scoring sheet) and the other level becomes the minor stage.

Appendix H

Guidelines for Scoring a Consideration as Justice or Care

Within the Care orientation, relationships are experienced as a responsiveness to others on their own terms, and mediated through activities which maintain connection in relationships. It is grounded in a sense of interconnectedness among people. Some Care considerations are as follows.

i. Concern with the general effects to others

ii. Maintenance or restoration of relationships: or response to another considering interdependence

iii. The welfare, well-being of another or the avoidance of conflict; or, the alleviation of another's burden/hurt/suffering (physical or psychological)

iv. Concern with the "situation vs./over the principle."

v. Concerns care of self; care of self vs. care of others

Within the Justice orientations, relationships are experienced in terms of reciprocity between separate individuals, i.e., as a concern for others expressed through considering them with objectivity and fairness. These relationships are mediated through rules which

come from duties of obligations and commitment. Some justice considerations are as follows:

i. Concern with general effects to the self

ii. Standards, rules or principles for self or society; or, considers fairness; i.e., how one would like to be treated if in another's place.

iii. Obligations, duty or commitments

iv. Considers the "principle vs./Over the situation."

v. Considers that others have their own contexts

It is to be understood that an actual choice made by a subject was not in itself indicative of a particular orientation, as the same decision can arise from alternative perspectives. For example, two people decide that the protagonist in the Friendship story should forego theater tickets to stay with their old friend. "she made a promise and she should stick to it" typifies a Justice rationale underlying one subject's decision; when statements such as this are made, it is as if the actual situation is understood in terms of a more abstract principle. In contrast is a Care consideration underlying another subject's decision: "Tina really needs her now and she would be badly hurt if Charlene left now for someone else."

Lyons' Coding Schemes for Coding

Moral and Self Orientations

Morality as Care and Morality as Justice: A Scheme for Coding Considerations of Response and Considerations of Rights

I. The Construction of the Problem
   A. Considerations of Response (Care)
      1. General Effects to others (unelaborated)
      2. Maintenance or restoration of relationships; or response to another considering interdependence.
      3. Welfare, well-being of another or restoration of relationships; or response to another considering interdependence.
      4. Considers the "situation vs/over the principle."
      5. Considers care of self; care of self vs. care of others.
   B. Considerations of Rights (Justice)
      1. General effects to the self (unelaborated including "trouble" "how decide")
      2. Standards, rules or principles for self or society; or, considers fairness; that is, how one would like to be treated if in other's place
      3. Considers the "principle vs./over the situation"
      4. Considers that other have their own contexts.

II. The Resolution of the Problem/Conflict (same as Part I).

III. The Evaluation of the Resolution
   A. Considerations of Response (Care)
      1. What happened/how worked out
      2. Whether relationships maintained/restored
   B. Considerations of Rights (Justice)
      1. How decided/thought about/justified
      2. Whether values/standards/principles maintained.

A Scheme for Coding Responses to the Describe Yourself Questions.

I. General and Factual
   - A. General Abilities
   - B. Physical characteristics
   - C. Identifying activities
   - D. Identifying possessions.
   - E. Social Status

II. Abilities and Agency
   - A. General ability
   - B. Agency
   - C. Physical abilities
   - D. Intellectual abilities

III. Psychological
   - A. Interests (likes/dislikes)
   - B. Traits/dispositions

IV. Relational Components
   - A. Connected in Relation to Others
     1. Have relationships; make, sustain, to care, to do things for others
     2. Abilities in relationships; make, sustain, to care, to do things for others
     3. Traits/dispositions in relationships (help others)
     4. Concern; for the good of another in <u>their</u> terms.
     4. Preoccupations with doing good for another; with <u>how</u> to do good
   - B. Separate/objective in relation to others
     1. Have relationships; (relationships part of obligations/commitments
     2. Abilities in relationships (act in reciprocity; live up to obligations; commitment; fairness)
     3. Traits/dispositions in relationships (act in reciprocity; live up to obligations; commitment; fairness)
     4. Concern; for others in light of principles, values, beliefs, or general good of society
     5. Preoccupations with doing good for society; with <u>whether</u> to do good for others.

Appendix I

Sample Interview Scored for Percentage of Care

Subject 21

Real Life Dilemma

It happened this morning: It was in gym and it was this Chinese girl in gym, and its like very obvious, her facial structure and everything and she's a little different and everything but she's really nice. We were playing basketball and she took a little fall -- like you know, we always fall -- she took a little fall and somebody here whispered to me oh it's because she can't see because her eyes are slanted, and I said oh, come on, and then everybody started joking like it was all friendly, you could tell it was all friendly but it bothered me. Like there was a few things that I could have said. But like I felt bad and I don't want to be prejudiced, I don't feel that way, I like her and the girl happens to be a good friend of mine and I happen to to like being with her. So I had to decide like not to say anything, to just keep my cool and stand up and say, I don't think you should be talking like that.

(Not say anything? You mean not go along with it?)

Yeah, not go along with what they were saying.

(Why did this feel like a conflict for you?)

Because I was going back and forth! I could have said something to fit in. Because when I said it they kind of looked at me and they said, oh why, what's the matter with you? You know it was kind of like a conflict because I thought I could go with everybody and be like everybody else or be my individual self, go with my own opinions and beliefs.

(Why do you think you did what you did?)

Because I think it was right. I think it was the way I was brought up, like you know, to be myself and if somebody doesn't like my opinion, well that's too bad.

Number of Care Considerations = 0
Number of Justice Considerations = 1
Real Life Percentage of Care = 0.0

Friendship Dilemma

I think the girl who has to decide, she's afraid of hurting two different people's feelings.

I think she should do just what she wants. Like if

she really wants to go ... But then again, like on the other hand, she did make a commitment, if that were me, I guess I should go with whoever I made the commitment to first. Not just the fact that I've known her longer or that she's a little bit closer a friend. I think that because I made the commitment to her and told that I'd be there.

Number of Care Considerations = 0
Number of Justice Considerations = 1
Friendship Percentage of Care = 0.0

Peer Group Dilemma

I think its hard for people to decide whether they should stick up for themselves and do what they want or go with their friends and go with what the group is doing. I think she should just sit down and think about it without people yelling at her and breathing down her back and everything, and say, am I committed, is this what I really want to do, if I want to be a musician, if this is what I want to make of myself, if it's my career, I guessed I have to work harder even if it means I lose a few things. I think she should stay with the band if she wants to and if she doesn't that's her choice too, because it is her life and she comes

first. But she shouldn't be telling these people I'll be there, I'll be there, I'll be there, because that's totally wrong on her part.

(If she was doing if just for fun?)

If she's doing it as fun she's still making a commitment to these people and it's wrong to make a commitment she can't keep. I mean you can't always keep an appointment but then you should tell your friends I can't make it on that day, let's get together another time. But she's just letting it go, she's going to ruin friendship, she's going to ruin the band.

Number of Care Considerations = 1
Number of Justice Considerations = 2
Peer Group Percentage of Care = 33%

Sample Interview Scored for Perspective Taking

Subject 21

Friendship Domain

Friendship Dilemma

I think the girl who has to decide, she's afraid of hurting two different people's feelings.

I think she should do just what she wants. Like if she really wants to go ..., but then again, like on the other hand, she did make a commitment. If that were me I guess I should go with whoever I made the commitment to first. Not just the fact that I've known her longer of that she's a little bit closer a friend. I think that because I made the commitment to her and told her that I'd be there.

Friendship Interview

(Why are friends important?)

Because I think everybody needs somebody they can turn to other than parents or family because there are a lot of subjects that are hard to discuss, to talk with your mother, it's a little easier with your friends, they are always around you. Like teenagers are always

I 3

out, your realize that you eat dinner and you're right back out again, so I think it's good to have friends because they're around you a lot and they know how you're feeling, they're more or less going through the same things that you are, so they know how you feel.

(What kind of a person? ...)

Somebody who has the ability to listen, who's honest, I3
who like if I ask somebody if I look good in this, if they're a really good friend, they should say it's not the outfit for you.

(What's a really close friendship ... ?)

I think it's something that has to be built up over a period of time. I mean you can have a good friend that you just met but I think a relationship gets better as it II3
develops.

(Difference between best friends and regular friends?)

Well there is a little bit because -- that's kind of like pressure -- not pressure, but like if you're with somebody a couple of times, like I went to grammar school with a girl named Tracy, and I know her for a very long time so now we came here to this school and everybody says, oh they're best friends because we're together. But

I don't know. I think there's a bit of a difference. You're with somebody that you enjoy more than others, not that you hate the others but you just don't enjoy them as much.

(What good friends tell each other?)

Everything. I think you should be able more or less be able, to tell them everything if you trust them.

(Trust?)

To, you know, that they won't go around telling everybody else, and you know that they, this person III3
really listens to you. It's not that she just wants to hear gossip but maybe she can help you with the problem or something.

(What do good friends know about each other?)

Know about each other? I think like how the person really is. Not just when the person is out and III3
puts up a front, sometimes everybody really does that, not all the time but once in a while you do that, and I think a friend, really knows the other person's real self because they're so close.

(Are there things that close friends do for each other?)

Well there is ... it all depends on how close the friendship is and like if I ask a friend to do something they were able to, then the friend would do it. If they weren't able to, they would tell me and I wouldn't be mad, I couldn't force them to if they weren't able.

(Is it better to have one best friend or ...)

I think if there's one person you really enjoy being with and you like a lot then that person would be considered your best friend. If there are five people that you really like a lot, you could consider them your best friends. It just goes however you feel, there's no set law that says you can have only one best friend.

(Joanne feels?)

I think she's a little bit jealous because she was competing with her and since she's a newcomer maybe she's even more jealous.

(Jealousy means? ...)

It doesn't always have to mean that the relationship IV4
isn't strong. It could be. Like it could be a sign but it doesn't have to mean like, oh, I'm jealous, the relationship is over. It's just like a normal feeling. If she acts upon it and gets really snotty with these

girls and everything then I could say alright, I guess the friendship wasn't that close. But if she just feels jealous but if she learns to like suppress it and then just deal with her feelings by herself and learn to overcome it, then I don't think it affects the relationship that much.

(Can friends stay close if they have arguments?) V3

With each other? I think they could because an argument is, just like a small argument is just having a difference of opinion, it's nothing big, it's not like they were fist-fighting and knocking each other out and everybody has different opinions, so if the relationship is close enough they can be able to deal with it.

(How should arguments be settled?)

I think instead of yelling and screaming the better way is just to let one person talk at a time, not you say a sentence and then I say a sentence, let one person just let out all their feelings calmly and rationally and then have the other person think about what that person is saying and then that person, you know, talks about how she feels. V4*

(What do good friends fight or argue about?)

Everything, believe me, everything! They could fight about other people, where to go, guys, that's one of the biggest ones, guys, and just different opinions on little things.

(What makes a friendship break up?)

When two people can't trust each other and they're not willing to give and take, they just want to take, they want to do everything they want to do and it's not fair. VI3

(What does someone lose ... ?)

If it's really really a good friend I think they lose a piece of themselves because if you can put your trust in this person and have your deep feelings with this person and now that person is gone it's like a loss of yourself because you put so much into this person, you work so hard at this friendship and maybe it just didn't work out. VI3

(Why do friends sometimes drift apart?)

I think because if you're good friends with somebody at a young age and you mature, your opinions change, as you mature. VI4

Sample Interview Scored for Perspective Taking

Subject 21

Peer Group Domain

Peer Group Dilemma

I think it's hard for people to decide whether they should stick up for themselves and do what they want or go with their friends and go with what the group is doing. III4

I think she should just sit down and think about it without people yelling at her and breathing down her back and everything, and say, am I committed. Is this what I really want to do, if I want to be a musician, if this is what I want to make of myself, if it's my career, I guessed I have to work harder even if it means I lose a few things. I think she should stay with the band if she wants to and if she doesn't that's her choice too, because it is her life and she comes first. But she shouldn't be telling these people I'll be there, I'll be there, I'll be there because that's totally wrong on her part.

(If she was doing it just for fun?)

If she's doing it as fun she's still making a commitment to these people and it's wrong to make a commitment she can't keep. I mean you can't always keep an appointment but then you should tell your friends I

can't make it on that day, let's get together another time. But she's just letting it go, she's going to ruin friendship, she's going to ruin the band.

Peer Group Interview

(Why do people like to be in groups?)

Because it gives you a good feeling when you're with a group because you feel like people want to be with you, they like your company, they accept you, not that they want you to be one of them like a clone, but you're just part of a group. I4

(What qualities should you look for ... ?)

They should be like a good friend, they should be a person who's not a troublemaker and you know who doesn't have a lot of problems, not a wild person, an average friend. I3*

(What makes a group of friends stick together?)

It's like hard to pinpoint it because a group is more than fun really to be with because there's so many different opinions floating around, there's always a choice to do something. Like when you're with one friend it's always, when it's one to one it's like what do you want to do, I don't know, but with a group it's like, II3

let's do this, let's do that, it's just a lot more fun.

(What's group spirit?)

It's like how a group presents itself, what a group II4
represents ... like a cheerleading group, it like how much they can put into it so the more you put into it you can see they're more popular because they're putting a lot into it. Yes, I think it can help a group stick together.

(Is a member's loyalty important to a group?)

Yes, because if the members weren't loyal it wouldn't be a group, it would be just people once in a while hanging out together. A group is mostly like always II3
together and I think the members should be very loyal.

(Sometimes a person will go along with a group ...)

I think maybe because this person wants to be recognized, they say, oh look, she's part of this group, I think that's mainly what it is. Maybe she likes the III3
people but she doesn't like what they're doing and everything, that's why she's hesitant to join this group, even though she likes them as friends.

(Not like what they're doing? They why go along?)

Most of it is pressure, even when the person's not

pressuring you there's pressure in your head, if I don't do it maybe they'll be mad at me but if I do do it, I'll be going against myself. III4

(Sort of like what you were faced with in gym.)

Yeah.

(Better if people in a group are pretty much the same, or ...)

My personal opinion is when everyone is different because there's more variety.

III4

(Similarities good too?)

It's good for them to be similar because if they're too far apart, they'll fight a lot, and that doesn't make a good group.

(Can rules help?)

I think rules would have helped, it wouldn't have totally solved the problem but possibly it would have helped because Melissa, if they'd sat down and said if anyone misses x amount of practices, you know, will be given a warning or whatever, I think it would have helped. I think she would have realized more and she would have IV3

told them I can make this one and that one.

(All the members obey?)

If it pertains to them, I think all members should. V3

(Who should decide?)

If it's a group like a group of friends, I don't think there should be like one leader, somebody that everybody has to listen to, I think maybe a person should VI3 be a spokesperson and say, listen guys. Let's calm down and figure out what we're doing. Like not a leader to be worshipped or anything but an organizer, just to get everybody together.

(Problems with a leader?)

There's a lot of problems with having a leader because VI3 they sometimes can get pushy and think they're on top of the world because they're a leader and that you cause a lot of fights, and hard feelings, and it can make the other people feel like they're just little followers adn they're not involved as much.

(More than one leader?)

Yeah, they can, it doesn't matter, it depends on how the people feel, if they're comfortable listening to these

people's opinions then it's fine to have more than one leader.

(What makes a group really work well together?)

I think it depends on how much they enjoy being together on the things that they do and how much they put into it. Like the more fun you want it to have the more you try. You work at it and you get a lot out of it. V3

(Scapegoat?)

I think it's because there's such a temptation because there's so many people, so if something goes wrong, you know, you don't want to take the blame so there's someone right there, so you lay it on them.

(Throw someone out of a group?)

Possibly because they're maybe changed, they're not the person the group once thought they were. They could also be interested in another group and they can't decide and the group would be annoyed at the indecision. VII3

(What makes a group break up?)

When not everybody puts their everything into it, when say, oh we just don't care about this and when people can't communicate, like. VII3

Perspective Taking Scoring Test

Subject 21

Friendship domain

Issue Scores	Issues	Individual Considerations
3	I. Friendship formation	3,3
3	II. Closeness and intimacy	3
3	III. Trust and reciprocity	3,3
4	IV. Jealousy and exclusion	4
4(3)	V. Resolving conflicts	3,4*
3(4)	VI. Friendship termination	3,3,4

FAIS = (3X3) + (3X3) + (3X3) + (3X4) + (2X4) + (2X3) + (1X3) + (1X4) / 6X3

= 3.33

Peer group domain

Issue Scores	Issues	Individual Considerations
3(4)	I. Group formation	4,3*
3(4)	II. Group cohesion	3,4,3
4	III. Conformity	4,3,4,4
3	IV. Rule-orientation	3
3	V. Decision-making	3,3
3	VI. Leadership	3,3
3	VII. Termination	3,3

PGAIS = (3X4) + (3X3) + (3X3) + (3X3) + (3X3) + (2X3) + (2X3) + (1X4) + (1X4) / 7X3

= 3.24

Dear Parent,

Your child is being invited to participate in a research study on adolescents' social perspective taking. I am writing my dissertation at the Graduate Center of the City of New York, investigating how adolescents form ideas about problems in friendships, peer groups, and right and wrong. This project has been approved by the Board of Education's Office of Educational Assessment.

Each child will read two paragraphs about individuals who are facing a dilemma involving friends and peers. Your child will be asked how the dilemma could be solved and to discus some issues about friendship and group relations. In addition, the students will be interviewed about how they go about solving their own dilemmas.

The interview will last no more than 45 minutes and a concerted effort will be made to ensure that it will not interfere with essential class time. Your child is free not to participate or to discontinue the interview at any time without any negative consequences. All results will be confidential and no names will be included in the data collection.

This is a non-stressful interview, and most participants have found it to be thought-provoking and fun. Moreover, it can be exciting to be part of current research in the social sciences.

A summary of this study will be available to you when it is completed if you are interested. If you have any questions, please write to me at the Graduate Center.

If your child would like to participate and you are willing, please sign the attached permission slip and return it to your child's teacher.

Very truly yours,

Marilyn Paisner

Marilyn Paisner

SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE TAKING INTERVIEW:

I have read the attached letter and understand that Ms. Paisner will be glad to answer any of my questions regarding her study.

I give my permission for _____ to be interviewed.

_____
Parent's Signature

_____
Date

I would like to participate in the interview.

_____
Student's Signature

_____
Date

References

Alloy, D.A., Schuldt, W.J. & Bonge, D. (1985). Sex differences in self-disclosure. Representative Research in Social Psychology, 15 (1-2), 10-15.

Ambron, S.R. & Irwin, D.M. (1975). Role taking and moral judgement in 5 and 7 year olds. Developmental Psychology, 11, 102.

Bakan, D. (1966). The duality of human existence. Boston: Beacon Press.

Bales, R.F. & Cohen, S.P. (1979). SYMLOG: A system for the multiple level of observation of groups. New York: Free Press.

Barnett, M.A. & King, L.J. (1985). Undergraduates punish-help judgements; the effect of transgressors and victims sex. Sex Roles, 12 (5/6), 529-568.

Barnett, M.A., King, L.M., Esper, J.A. & Feighug, K.M. (1984). The effect of transgressors and victims sex on children's punish-help judgements. Sex Roles, 10, 757-764.

Belenky, M.F., Clinchy, B.M., Goldberger, N.R., Tarule, J.M. (1986). Women's ways of knowing: The development of self, voice and mind. New York: Basic Books.

Bem, S. (1974). The measurement of psychological androgeny. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42 (2), 155-162.

Bigelow, B. & La Gaipa,J. (1975). Children's written descriptions of friendship: A multidimensional analysis. Developmental Psychology, 11, 857-858.

Block, J.H. (1976). Conceptions of sex role: Some cross-cultural and longitudinal perspectives. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 22, 283-308.

Block, J. (1976). Issues, problems and pitfalls in assessing sex differences: A critical review of The Psychology of Sex Differences, Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 2 (4), 283-308.

Brion-Meisels, S. & Selman, R.L. (1984). Early adolescent development of new interpersonal strategies: Understanding and intervention. School Psychology Review, 13 (3), 278-291.

Britain, S.D. & Coker, M. (1982). Recall of sex-role appropriate and inappropriate models in children's songs. Sex Roles, 8, 931-934.

Byrne, D.F. (1973). The development of role taking in adolescence. Dissertation Abstract, 34 (11), 5647B.

Carlson, R. (1971). Sex differences in ego functioning: exploratory studies of agency and communion. Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology, 37, 267-277.

Chandler, M. (1975). Relativism and the problem of epistemological loneliness. Human Development, 18, 171-180.

Chandler, M.J. & Greenspan, S. (1972). Ersatz egocentrism: A reply to Borke. Developmental Psychology, 7 (2), 107-109.

Chodorow, N. (1979). The reproduction of mothering. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Colby, A., Gibbs, J., Kohlberg, L., Speicher-Dubin, B. & Candee, D. (1979). Standard form scoring manual. Center for Moral Education, Harvard University.

Coles, G. (1987). The Learning Mystique: A Critical Look at "Learning Disabilities. New York: Pantheon Books, Random House.

Condry, S.M., Condry, Jr., J.C. & Pogatshnik, L.W. (1983). Sex differences: a study of the ear of the beholder. Sex Roles, 9 (6), 697-704.

Cooper, C.R., Grotevant, H.D., Condon, S.M. (1983). Individuality and connectedness in the family as a context for adolescent identity formation and role taking skill. In H.D. Grotevant & C.R. Cooper (Eds.), Adolescent development in the family, New Directions for Child Development, 22, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 43-58.

Damon, W. (1981). Exploring children's social cognition on two fronts. In J.H. Flavell & D. Ross (Eds.),

Social cognitive development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 154-176.

Darley, J.M. & Fazio, B.H. (1980). Expectancy confirmation processes arising in the social interaction sequence. American Psychologist, 35, 867-881.

Dasen, P.R. (1971). Cross-cultural Piagetian research: A summary. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 3, 23-39.

Deaux, R. & Emswilly, T. (1974). Explanations for successful performances for sex linked tasks: What is skill for the male is luck for the female. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 20, 80-85.

Deaux, K. & Major, B. (1987). Putting gender into context: An interactive model of gender-related behavior. Psychological Review, 94 (3), 369-389.

Douvan, E. & Adelson, J. (1976). The Adolescent Experience. New York: Wiley.

Dweck, C.S. & Bush, E.S. (1976). Sex differences in learned helplessness: Differential debilitation with peer and adult evaluators. Developmental Psychology, 12 (2), 147-156.

Eagly, A.H. (1983). Gender and social influence: A social psychological analysis. American Psychologist, 38, 971-981.

Edwards, C.P. (1975). Societal complexity and moral development: A Kenyan study. Ethos, 3, 505-527.

Eisenberg, N. & Lennon, R. (1983). Sex differences in empathy and related capacities. Psychological Bulletin, 91 (1), 100-131.

Elkind, D. (1967). Egocentrism in adolescence. Child Development, 38, 1025-1033.

Erikson, E. (1968). Identity: youth and crisis. New York: Norton & Company.

Feather, N.T. & Simon, J.G. (1975). Reactions to male and female occupational success and failure in sex-linked occupations: Impressions of personality causal attributions and perceived likelihood of

different consequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 20-31.

Feffer, M.J. & Gourevitch, V. (1960). Cognitive aspects of role taking in children. Journal of Personality, 28, 383-396.

Fischer, J.L. (1981). Transitions in relationship style from adolescence to young adulthood. Journal of Youth & Adolescence, 10 (1), 11-23.

Flavell, J.H. (1963). The developmental psychology of Jean Piaget. Princeton: Van Nostrand.

Flavell, J. (1981). Monitoring social cognitive enterprises: Something else may develop in the area of social cognition. In J.H. Flavell & L. Ross (Eds.), Social cognitive development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 222-287.

Flavell, J.H., Botkin, P.T., Fry, C.L., Wright, J.W. & Jarvis, P.E. (1968). The development of role taking skills in children. New York: Wiley.

Ford, M.E. (1979). The construct validity of egocentrism. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 1169-1188.

Freud, S. (1925/1961). Some psychical consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud, 19. London: Hogarth Press.

Garai, J.E. & Scheinfeld, A. (1968). Sex differences in mental and behavioral development. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 77, 169-299.

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Gilligan, C. (1986). Exit-voice dilemmas in adolescent development. In A. Foxley, M. McPherson, & G. O'Donnell (Eds.), Development, democracy, and the art of trespassing: essays in honor of Albert O. Hirschman. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 283-301.

Gilligan, C. (1979). Woman's place in man's life cycle. Harvard Educational Review, 49 (4), 432-446.

Gilligan, C. & Kohlberg, L. (1977). From adolescence to

adulthood: The rediscovery of reality in a post-conventional world. In Appel & Preseissen (Eds.), Topics in cognitive development. New York: Plenum Press.

Gilligan, C., Kohlberg, L., Lerner & Belenky, M. (1971). The adolescent as philosopher: The discovery of self in a postconventional world. Daedalus, 100 (4), 1051-1080.

Gilligan, C. & Murphy, J.M. (1981). Development from adolescence to adulthood: The philosopher and the dilemma of the fact. In D. Kuhn (Ed.). New directions for child development: Intellectual development beyond childhood, 5, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Goldberg, P.A. (1968). Are women prejudiced against women? Transaction, 5, 28-30.

Grimes, M.D. & Hansen, G.L. (1984). Response bias in sex-role attitude measurement. Sex Roles, 10, 67-72.

Gurucarri, C., Phelps, E. & Selman, R.L. (1984). Development of interpersonal understanding: Longitudinal and comparative study of normal and disturbed youths. Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology, 52 (1), 26-36.

Gurucharri, C. & Selman, R.L. (1981). Preadolescence and adolescence: a longitudinal follow-up study. Child Development, 53, 924-927.

Gutmann, D.L. (1965). Women & the conception of ego strength. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 11, 229-240.

Hains, A. (1984). Variables in social cognitive development: Moral judgement, role taking, cognitive processes and self concept in delinquents and non-delinquents. Journal of Early Adolescence, 4 (1), 65-74.

Haan, N., Block, J. & Smith, M.B. (1968). Moral reasoning of young adults: Political-social behavior, family background and personality correlates. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10, 184-201.

Haan, N., Langer, J. & Kohlberg, L. (1976). Family moral patterns. Child Development, 47, 1204-1206.

Herzberger, S.D., Tennen, H. (1985). "Snips and snails and puppy dog tails": Gender of agent, recipient, and observer as determinants of perceptions of discipline. Sex Roles, 12 (7/8), 853-865.

Hodgson, J.W. & Fischer, J.L. (1979). Identity and intimacy development in college youth. Journal of Youth & Adolescence, 8 (1), 37-50.

Hoffman, M. (1977). Sex differences in empathy and related behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 84 (4), 712-722.

Holstein, C.B. (1976). Irreversible, stepwise sequence in the development of moral judgement: A longitudinal study of males and females. Child Development, 47, 51-61.

Horner, M.S. (1972). Towards an understanding of achievement-related conflicts. Journal of Social Issues, 28, 157-177.

Hudson, L.M. (1978). On the coherence of role taking abilities: An alternative to correlational analysis. Child Development, 49, 223-227.

Inhelder, B. & Piaget, J. (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to adolescence. New York: Basic Books.

Jaquette, D. (1976). Conceptions of peer-group relations. In R.L. Selman (Ed.), Assessing interpersonal understanding: an interview and scoring manual in five parts. Constructed by the Harvard-Judge Baker Social Reasoning Project. Manuscript, Harvard University, 179-274.

Johnston, K. (1985). Two moral orientations -- two problem-solving strategies: Adolescents' solutions to dilemmas in fables. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Graduate School of Education.

Josselson, R., Greenberger, E. & McConochie, D. (1977). Phenomenological aspects of psychosocial maturity in adolescence. Part I: Boys. Journal of Youth & Adolescence, 6 (1), 25-55.

Josselson, R., Greenberger, E. & McConochie, D. (1977). Phenomenological aspects of psychosocial maturity in adolescence. Part II: Girls. Journal of Youth

& Adolescence, 6 (2), 145-147.

Jung, C.G. (1959). The archetypes and the collective unconscious. In H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler & W. McGuire (Eds.), Hull, R.C. (Trans.), The collected works of C.G. Jung (Vol. 9, Part I). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keller, E.F. (1985). Reflections on gender and science. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kniep, W.M. (1986a). Defining a global education by its content. Social Education, 50, 437-445.

Kniep, W.M. (1986b). Social studies within a global education. Social Education, 50, 536-542.

Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive development and epistemology. New York: Academic Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior: theory, research and social issues. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Kohlberg, L. & Kramer, R. (1969). Continuities and discontinuities in childhood and adult moral development. Human Development, 12, 92-120.

Kuhn, D., Langer, J., Kohlberg, L. & Haan, N. (1977). The development of formal operations in logical and moral judgement. Genetic Psychology Monographs, 95, 97-188.

Kurdek, L.A. (1978). Perspective taking as the cognitive basis of children's moral development: A review of the literature. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 24 (1), 3-28.

Kurdek, L.A. (1981). Young adults' moral reasoning about prohibitive and prosocial dilemmas. Journal of Youth & Adolescence, 10 (4), 263-273.

Kurdek, L.A. & Krile, D. (1982). A developmental analysis of the relation between peer acceptancy and both interpersonal understanding and perceived social self-competence. Child Development, 53, 1485-1491.

Kurdek, L.A. & Rogdon, R.M. (1975). Perceptual, cognitive and affective perspective taking in kindergarten through 6th grade children. Developmental Psychology, 11 (50), 643-650.

La Bouvie-Vief, G. (1984). Culture, language and mature rationality. In K.A. McCluskey & H.W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span developmental psychology: historical and generational effects. New York: Academic Press, 109-128.

Langdale, C. (1983). Moral orientations and moral development: the analysis of care and justice reasoning across different dilemmas in females and males. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Graduate School of Education.

Lesser, R. & Paisner, M. (1985). Magical thinking in formal operational adults. Human Development, 28, 57-70.

Lever, J. (1976). Sex differences in games children play. Social Problems, 23, 478-487.

Livesly, W.J. & Bromley, D.B. (1973). Person perception in childhood and adolescence. New York: Wiley.

Lockheed, M.E. & Hall, K.P. (1976). Conceptualizing sex as a status characteristic: Applications to leadership training strategies. The Journal of Social Issues, 32, 111-124.

Lyons, N. (1983). Manual for coding real-life moral dilemmas. Unpublished document. Harvard Graduate School of Education.

Lyons, N. (1983). Two perspectives: On self, relationships and morality. Harvard Educational Review, 53 (2), 125-145.

Mac Coby, E.E. & Jacklin, C.N. (1974). The psychology

of sex differences. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

May, R. (1980). Sex and fantasy: Patterns of male and female development. New York: Norton.

Mead, G.H. (1934). Mind, self and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mischel, W. (1970). Sex typing and socialization. In P.H. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael's manual of child psychology (2). New York: Wiley & Sons, 3-73.

Moir, D.J. (1974). Egocentrism and the emergence of conventional morality in preadolescent girls. Child Development, 45, 299-304.

Moser, R. (1984). The measurement of role taking in young adults. Journal of Assessment, 48 (4), 380-387.

Mullis, R.L. (1983). Perspective taking among offender and non-offender youth. Adolescence, 18 (72), 831-836.

Murphy, J.M. & Gilligan, C. (1980). Moral development in late adolescence and adulthood: A critique and reconstruction of Kohlberg's theory. Human Development, 23, 77-104.

Murstein, B.I. & Beck, G.D. (1972). Person perception, marriage adjustment, and social desirability. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 39, 396-403.

Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education. Berkeley & Los Angeles, Cal.: University of California Press.

Noddings, N. & Shore, P.J. (1984). Awakening the inner eye: intuition in education. New York: Teachers' College Press, Columbia University.

O'Leary, V.E. & Hansen, R.D. (1985). Sex as an attributional fact. In T.B. Sonderegger (Ed.), Psychology and gender. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1984. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 133-177.

Paludi, M.A. & Strager, L.A. (1985). What's in an author's name? Differential evaluations of performance as a function of author's name. Sex Roles, 12, 353-361.

Parsons, T. & Bales, R. (1955). Family, socialization and interaction process. New York: Free Press.

Pearson, J. (1985). Differences in self concept and modes of moral choice in male vs. female protagonists in literature for latency-age children. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Fordham University.

Perry, W.B. (1968). Forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college years. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Pheterson, G.I., Kiesler, S.B. & Goldberg, P. (1971). Evaluation of the performance of women as a function of their sex achievement and personal history. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 19, 114-118.

Piaget, J. (1929/1976). The child's conception of the world. Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co.

Piaget, J. (1972). Intellectual evolution from adolescence to adulthood. Human Development, 15, 1-12.

Piaget, J. (1932/1965). The moral judgement of the child. New York: Free Press.

Post, R.D. (1981). Causal explanations of male and female academic performance as a function of sex-role biases. Sex Roles, 7, 691-698.

Price-Williams, D.R. (1975). Explorations in cross-cultural psychology. San Francisco: Chandler & Sharp.

Riegel, K.F. (1972). Dialectical operations: the final period of cognitive development. Human Development, 16, 346-370.

Riegel, K.F. (1976). The dialectics of human development. American Psychologist, 31, 689-700.

Rubin, K.H. (1973). Egocentrism in childhood: A unitary

construct? Child Development, 44, 102-110.

Schachtel, E.G. (1959). Metamorphosis: On the development of affect, perception, attention and memory. New York: Basic Books.

Seavey, C.A., Katz, P.A. & Zalk, S.A. (1975). Baby X: The effect of gender labels on adult responses to infants. Sex Roles, 1, 102-109.

Selman, R.L. (1979). Assessing interpersonal understanding: An interview and scoring manual in five parts. Constructed by the Harvard-Judge Baker Social Reasoning Project. Manuscript, Harvard University.

Selman, R.L. (1980). The growth of interpersonal understanding: Developmental and clinical analyses. New York: Academic Press.

Selman, R.L. (1977). A structural-developmental model of social cognition: Implications for intervention research. Counseling Psychologist, 6 (4), 3-6.

Selman, R.L. (1976). Toward a structural developmental analysis of interpersonal relationship concept: Research with normal and disturbed pre-adolescent boys. In A. Pick (Ed.), X Annual Minn. Symp. In Child Psychology, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.

Selman, R.L., Beardslee, W., Schultz, L.H., Krupa, M. & Podorefsky, D. (1986). Assessing adolescents' interpersonal negotiation strategies: Towards the integration of structural and functional models. Developmental Psychology, 22 (4), 450-459.

Selman, R.L. & Byrne, D.F.A. (1974). A structural-developmental analysis of levels of role taking in middle childhood. Child Developmental, 45 (2), 803-806.

Selman, R.L. & Cooney, E.W. (1978). Children's use of social conceptions: Toward a dynamic model of social cognition. In W. Damon (Ed.), New Directions for Child Development, 1, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Selman, R.L. & Damon, W. (1975). The necessity (but insufficiency) of social perspective taking for conceptions of justice at 3 early levels. In

D.J. De Palma & J.M. Foley (Eds.), Moral development: current theory and research.

Selman, R.L. & Demorest, A.P (1984). Observing troubled children's interpersonal negotiation strategies: Implications of and for a developmental model. Child Development, 55 (1), 288-304.

Selman, R.L., Lavin, D.R. & Brion-Meisels, S. (1982). Troubled children's use of self-reflection. In F.C. Serafica (Ed.), Social cognitive development in context. New York: Guilford Press, 62-69.

Serafica, F.C. (1982). Conceptions of friendship and interaction between friends: an organismic-developmental perspective. In F.C. Serafica (Ed.), Social cognitive development in context. New York: Guilford Press, 100-132.

Shantz, C.U. (1975). The development of social cognition. In E.M. Hetherington (Ed.), Review of child development research (vol. 5). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shaver, K.G. (1970). Defensive attribution: Effects of severity and relevance on the responsibility assigned for an accident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 14, 101-113.

Simpson, E.L. (1974). Moral development research: A case study of scientific cultural bias. Human Development, 17, 81-106.

Sinnot, J.D. (1975). Everyday thinking and Piagetian operativity in adults. Human Development, 18, 430-443.

Sommers, S. (1981). Emotionality reconsidered: the role of cognition in emotional responsiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41 (3), 553-561.

Spence, J.T. (1974). The thematic apperception test and attitudes toward achievement in women: A new look at the motive to avoid success and a new method of measurement. Journal of Consulting & Clinical Psychology, 42, 427-437.

Struckert, R.P. (1963). Role perception and marital satisfaction -- a configurational approach. Marriage and Family Living, 25, 415-419.

Sullivan, H.S. (1953). The interpersonal theory of psychiatry. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Szanton, E. (1984). The child's awareness of another's point of view: Variations based on age, sex and the relationship with the "Other." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland.

Taylor, A.B. (1967). Role perception, empathy and marriage adjustment. Sociology and Social Research, 52, 22-34.

Turnure, C. (1975). Cognitive development and role taking ability in boys and girls from 7-12. Developmental Psychology, 11 (2), 202-209.

Urbain, E.S. & Kendall, P.C. (1980). Review of social-cognitive problem-solving interventions with children. Psychological Bulletin, 88 (1), 109-143.

Walker, L.J. (1980). Cognitive and perspective taking prerequisites for moral development. Child Development, 51, 131-139.

Werner, H. (1948). The comparative psychology of mental development. New York: Science Editions.

Werner, H. & Kaplan, B. (1963). Symbol formation: an organismic-developmental approach to language and the expression of thought. New York: Wiley.

White, K., Speisman, J.C. & Costos, D. (1983). Young adults and their parents: individuation to mutuality. In H.D. Grotevant & C.R. Cooper (Eds.), Adolescent development in the family, New Directions for Child Development, 22, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

White, K., Speisman, J.C., Costos, D. & Smith, A. (1987). Relationship maturity: A conceptual and empirical approach. In J.A. Meacham (Ed.), Contributions to Human Development, 18, 81-101.

White, K., Speisman, J.C., Jackson, D., Bartis, S. & Costos, D. (1986). Intimacy maturity and its correlates in young married couples. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 152-162.

Whitehead, G.I.; III, & Hall, A.E. (1984). Sex differences in the assignment of responsibility for an accident. Sex Roles, 11 (9/10), 787-798.

Wittig, M.A. (1985). Sex-role norms and gender-related attainment values: their role in attributions of success and failure. Sex Roles, 12 (1/2), 1-13.

Youniss, J. (1981). Moral development through a theory of social construction: an analysis. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 27 (4), 385-403.

Youniss, J. (1983). Social construction of adolescence by adolescents and parents. In H.D. Grotevant & C.R. Cooper (Eds.), Adolescent development in the family. New Directions for Child Development, 22, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Yussen, S.R. (1976). Moral reasoning from the perspective of others. Child Development, 47, 551-555.