

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

- 1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.**
- 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.**
- 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again -- beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.**
- 4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.**
- 5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.**

Xerox University Microfilms

**300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106**

76-16,553

TUFANO, Vincent John, 1948-
POLITICS, INSTABILITY, AND THE RISE
OF MODERN MILITARISM IN PERU.

The City University of New York, Ph.D.,
1976
Political Science, general

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© COPYRIGHT BY

VINCENT JOHN TUFANO

1976

POLITICS, INSTABILITY, AND THE
RISE OF MODERN MILITARISM
IN PERU

by

VINCENT JOHN TUFANO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City
University of New York.

1976

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty
in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

February 18, 1976
date

Ronald M. Schrieber
Chairman of Examining Committee

2/18 1976
date

Leo Benham
Executive Officer

Harry A. Pomeroy
Jim Carl Alroy
Robert M. Lehan
Ernest Paul Eischen

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

To my parents and my brother, John, whose sacrifice, generosity, and understanding were far more than what I could have ever expected.

PREFACE

In 1914, the military intervened in Peru to overthrow President Guillermo Billinghurst, abruptly ending approximately nineteen years of continuous civilian government, the longest period in Peru's history as an independent country that men in uniform did not occupy the Presidential Palace. The coup was not only the country's first successful military revolt against constitutional government in the twentieth century, it was also the first time that an army organized along modern lines, with officers professionally trained by the French, intervened in politics to forcibly oust a Peruvian government. This action by the military was a significant change from the nineteenth century, since during that earlier period Peruvian armies consisted basically of primitive armed bands or "parties" headed by a caudillo, and forcible seizures of power more times than not were the end result of violent conflicts between the opposing armed groups.

A new era of Peruvian politics emerged with the coup d'etat of 1914. Henceforth, the major means of attaining power would be through forceful action involving the nation's increasingly professional military institution.

The 1914 coup provokes a number of questions: Why did Peru fall prey to successful military intervention after civilians had been heads of state for an extended period of time?

Why were civilians able to dominate governments and politics for almost two decades prior to the coup? Did the military act autonomously when it intervened or did it in some way represent and/or act in collaboration with civilians? And what can help explain the actions of the men in uniform after the coup?

These are all questions which I have tried to answer in this study of the rise of modern militarism in Peru. In attempting to deal with them, however, I have constructed and utilized a framework of analysis for the study of military coups and the problem of military disengagement from political control. The framework which is presented in Chapter 1 is based largely on a variety of propositions found in the comparative literature on civil-military relations; it includes both environmental and military institutional variables as crucial explanatory factors. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the basic historical and military institutional context for the subsequent discussion of the 1914 coup. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the ascent of Guillermo Billinghurst to the Presidency, his eventual loss of support, and the coup d'etat of 1914 which finally displaced him from power. In Chapter 6, the post-coup situation, leading ultimately to a return to civilian rule after a brief military interregnum, is described and analyzed.

The focus of this study is a particular coup, its antecedents, and the events that developed in the months following the seizure of power. Therefore, to a large degree, its

findings can constitute "neither a solid basis for a valid generalisation, nor the ground for disproving established generalizations."¹ Nonetheless, I believe that in addition to utility as a basic data gathering operation,² this study makes an important contribution to the field of comparative politics in several respects. First, this study makes use of preexistent theory to provide a deeper understanding of a particular episode; and since as Przeworski and Teune state, "the main role of theory is to provide explanations of specific events,"³ this case study is tied to the subdiscipline of comparative politics inasmuch as it utilizes comparative theories or at least casts new light on generalizations or once demonstrated propositions.

Secondly, this case study, aside from simply utilizing theory to explain the facts, adds support to or casts doubt upon preexistent theories, generalizations, propositions, and hypotheses.

Thirdly, as Almond states in Crisis, Choice and Change, "studies of individual cases in depth serve as a check on the tendency of theory to abstract, simplify, and distort historical reality."⁴ And one of the basic concerns of this work is to serve as just such a check by paying special attention to the need of relating conceptual formulations to empirical reality.

As a final remark, it should be noted that perfect knowledge concerning the events of the Peruvian case study was lacking. For example, the inability to personally interview the participants of the 1914 coup resulting from over half a century

of intervening time proved to be a considerable drawback. As a result, U.S. Department of State dispatches and newspaper articles on the relevant events, and a variety of secondary sources were relied upon more heavily than otherwise would have been the case. The lack of complete information made it necessary to apply speculative generalizations and propositions based on the exercise of judgement and intuition rather than on more strict methods of verification and proof. It is recognized that such speculation is a risky affair, and only if this caution is heeded can various statements made in this work be read in their proper perspective. As conclusions, they are meant to be tentative and subject to revision if further evidence should warrant.

NOTES

Preface

1. Arendt Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," American Political Science Review, LXV (September 1971), p. 691.
2. The data gathering function of case studies is a highly underrated one, especially since the development of the field of comparative politics is hampered by an appalling lack of information about most of the world's political systems. Obviously, if social scientists are to have adequate theories, they must also have an adequate collection of facts on which to build and test them.
3. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Inquiry (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), p. 86. Quoted in Lijphart, "Comparative Politics," p. 692.
4. Gabriel Almond, "Approaches to Developmental Causation," in Crisis, Choice, and Change, ed., Gabriel Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, Robert J. Mundt (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973), p. 23.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	iv
LIST OF TABLES	xi
Chapter	
1. THE COUP PHENOMENON: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS	1
Explanations of the Military Coup	
Studying the Problem of Military Disengage-	
ment from Political Control	
2. INSTABILITY, VIOLENCE, AND EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE	
IN NINETEENTH CENTURY PERU	70
The Development of a Praetorian Society	
and Varieties of Instability in Peru	
Evolutionary Change in Nineteenth Century	
Peru	
3. POLITICS AND THE MILITARY, 1895-1912	120
Politics and Political Conflict: An Overview	
Politics and Political Conflict, 1895-1912:	
A Narrative Summary	
The Professionalization and Reorganization	
of the Peruvian Army	
The Absence of Military Coups d'Etat:	
1895-1912	
4. THE BILLINGHURST REGIME: POLARIZATION AND THE	
WITHDRAWAL OF UNCERTAIN SUPPORT	176
Billinghurst's Ascent to Power	
Political Divisions and Conflict Within	
the Billinghurst Regime	
5. THE CIVIL-MILITARY CONSPIRACY, THE COUP, AND	
THE FALL OF GUILLERMO BILLINGHURST	223
The Making of a Coup d'Etat	
Added Factors Related to the Disposition	
of the Military to Intervene	
Factors Affecting the Capabilities of the	
Military to Intervene	
Theoretical Considerations on Civil-Military	
Relations	

6. POLITICS, MILITARY DISUNITY, AND THE MILITARY AS ARBITER	274
Political Conflict and Military Factional Arbitership After the Coup	
Political Discord and the Breakdown of Military Cohesion	
The Disengagement of Benavides from Political Control, and Continued Military Unrest	
The Military Institution's Lack of Anxiety to Perform a Rulership Role	
Role Expansion and the Rise of Military Institutional Rule	
CONCLUSION	318
.....	
APPENDIX I: Peruvian Budget Expenditures, 1892-1897; Percentage of Budget to War Department, 1892-1897	334
APPENDIX II: Peruvian Budget Expenditures, 1898-1919 ...	335
APPENDIX III: Peruvian Budget Expenditures in Percen- tages, 1898-1919	336
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	337

LIST OF TABLES

1.	Changes in Government Ministers, 1889-1919	98
2.	Subversive Attempts to Overthrow the Central Government, 1896-1912	127
3.	Superior War School Output, 1904-1915	143
4.	Graduates of Superior Division of the <u>Escuela Militar</u> , 1901-1914	144
5.	Pattern of Political Alliances, 1895-1914	211- 212

CHAPTER 1

THE COUP PHENOMENON: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Explanations of the Military Coup

The occurrence of military coups d'etat is one of the most ubiquitous and apparently permanent features of contemporary politics. This is especially true of Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia; and as relatively recent events in Greece and Portugal have shown, even contemporary Europe is not immune from the successful military coup.

Some idea of the prevalence of the military coup can be seen from the following: between 1946 and 1960, 15 countries in Latin America experienced a total of 39 military seizures of power.¹ Since that time the number has increased substantially with even the apparently more democratic countries of Chile and Uruguay having their governments overthrown by military officers. If we extend our scope, we see that between 1952 and 1969, 19 countries in Africa experienced successful military coups.² And in the Middle East between 1936 and 1967 there were 37 coup attempts, 25 of these successful.³

Looking at the above statistics, one should not be led to believe that the military coup is a relatively new phenomenon of only the last few decades. Quite the contrary is true.

The incidence of military coups can be traced back as far as the armed forces themselves in many countries. Certainly this is the case in much of Spanish America where military seizures of power have been a feature of political life since the independence era well over a century ago.

Before proceeding further, perhaps it is prudent to define what is meant by a military coup. In this study the term is used to mean a rapid change or attempted change in a state's Chief Executive through force or the threat of force predominantly by members of the regular military organization (although civilians might also be involved in the planning and execution of the coup). Such a definition by its very nature distinguishes the coup from a revolution. As Huntington notes, "a revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies."⁴ Although military coups might lead to such fundamental changes, they may also be utilized to pre-empt them. The coup phenomenon, as defined above, is a relatively limited concept and it implies nothing further than a change in a country's top personnel by the military.

It should also be added that this definition also distinguishes the military coup from other types of internal war such as popular revolts, peasant uprisings, or guerrilla warfare. In these kinds of internal warfare, when the use or threat of force causes the overthrow of a government, that

end is accomplished by forces legally separate and distinct from the state, although at times they might be organized along military lines.

A phenomenon as common as the military coup has led social scientists to seek explanations. The cumulative findings of much of the research has led scholars to view the threat and the utilization of force by the military in overthrowing governments as an intrinsic part of the political process in many countries (as opposed to viewing the coup as a form of aberrant political behavior). Such a perspective seems to be a natural one to assume, and it is one which will be more readily apparent once we delineate the various factors contributing towards the occurrence of coups d'etat.

What I intend to do here is to present these factors in the form of a practical and useful model--one sufficiently convenient to help one to decide which facts are important and which relationships among facts bear examination. This framework will be utilized, as well as refined and tested, in this study of the Peruvian coup d'etat of 1914 and its political antecedents. It must be emphasized that the model is intended to be suggestive rather than conclusive; hence, the model should be viewed as one which provides a framework for analysis rather than an all-embracing theory.

This writer believes that the military coup can best be explained as the result of an interrelationship of various factors. This is the perspective utilized by most of the current analysts, and it constitutes a reaction against the past

tendency of often interpreting coups in terms of single cause explanations which tended to yield a distorted view of the coup. One major approach of this type held that the coup situation could best be explained in terms of what can be called regime vulnerability; or, in other words, the inability of the political system to accommodate adequately the demands made upon it, thereby drawing the military into the political realm in the form of a coup to ameliorate this situation. The other major approach de-emphasized the importance of such explanations and instead held that military seizures of power could best be explained through looking at the internal structure of the military institution, its resource superiority, organizational characteristics, and the attitudes of its members.

There are limitations to either of these two approaches, as a brief discussion may bring out. It appears that it is not enough to explain a coup simply in terms of the ineffectiveness of the political system in a given situation due to either weak institutions, disorder, or poor leadership. Something more is needed. And this extra something is a study of the military institution and its members. For example, one important aspect of military seizures of power which the regime vulnerability adherents have failed to consider adequately, and which this writer believes cannot be ignored, is the motivations and grievances of the coup makers. It is true that weak institutions might provide the opportunity for the intervention, but the attitudes of the officers, which provide the disposition to intervene are equally important,

since without the disposition to intervene the officers will not attempt a coup. Equally, some knowledge of the troops, weapons, and organizational characteristics of the military is needed since these elements all contribute towards the resource superiority which is obviously necessary for the armed forces to successfully overthrow a government.

In the analytic framework for the study of the military coup presented here, the following interrelated aspects will be considered: the environmental factors which make for regime vulnerability and which also influence the military's opportunity and disposition to intervene, those military institutional and personal interest factors which affect the military officers' disposition to intervene, and those aspects of the military institution which influence the capacity of the military to intervene.

Environmental Factors

Environmental factors can appropriately be broken down into long-term and short-term variables. Under the long-term variables will be considered those preconditions which make a particular political system susceptible to successful military coups. Under short-term variables those factors which tend to exacerbate a country's political vulnerability will be considered as well as those which provide the opportunity to intervene and/or trigger mechanisms which motivate officers and possibly civilian allies into actual plotting a coup attempt.⁵

In such a conceptualization, the basic assumption is that when both factors are present, the military's potential for intervention is maximized. If the necessary preconditions are absent, even though a number of precipitants are present, then a coup will be unlikely. Of course, the converse will also be true. It should be added that it also appears logical to assume that in a given country, if the coup potential is low, then precipitants of a relatively critical nature would be needed to spark a coup. On the other hand, if the coup vulnerability of a country is high, then less serious precipitants might be enough to cause a coup.

Thus far, the discussion of long-term environmental factors and short-term precipitants has been of a relatively abstract nature, but it will now center on identifying the preconditions and precipitants. I will begin by first considering the long-term variables--the more fundamental environmental causes of the coup. Here it is convenient to emphasize political factors since, more than anything else, the coup is a phenomenon emerging from a situation where governmental legitimacy is low and where political institutions are relatively ineffective in dealing with the demands placed upon them. This is an important reason, for example, why military coups seldom occur in countries where the public is well-mobilized into strong associations and where governments are effective and enjoy widespread acceptance. A military coup under such conditions would engender widespread disapproval. Public opinion would likely be mobilized against the coup-

makers; and, as a result, widespread civilian resistance might bring to a standstill the programs and policies of the military officers.

A number of social scientists have utilized the notions of legitimacy and/or effectiveness when considering the reasons for political instability and military coups.⁶ One point which is emphasized is that military coups occur in societies where there is a basic lack of consensus concerning who should rule, by what means, and for what end. Given such fundamental disagreements, it is contended, political institutions are necessarily weak through their inability to command the respect and allegiance of significant sectors of the population; likewise, constitutional prescriptions provide relatively little guidance for people seeking to solve political problems. As might be expected, there is not uncommonly a reluctance on the part of citizens to obey the law or political authorities voluntarily. With these conditions present, governments are often relatively ineffective in the face of both immediate and long-range problems. "Governmental ineffectiveness, in turn, is likely to lead to even lower levels of governmental support and legitimacy."⁷

Of course, democratic governments under such situations lead a relatively tenuous existence. Democratic governments are almost always based on rational-legal legitimacy which is embodied in their formal constitutions. But democracies "can function only in an atmosphere of compromise, regard for fair play, and agreement on basic values."⁸ With these prerequisites

absent, the constitutional prescriptions serve as a weak guide for action, and this environment is commonly fertile ground for violent politics and military coups. Similarly, authoritarian governments are vulnerable to this kind of instability when legitimacy is withheld by important sectors of the population.

Samuel Huntington's description of praetorian societies incorporates features of the type of society presently under discussion.⁹ Most simply stated, praetorian societies are those in which the political institutions are unable to accommodate the demands of the participant political strata, leading to a breakdown in political stability. This occurs because "social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict."¹⁰ Huntington further observes that since no agreement exists on the procedures to be utilized for resolving political differences, the various political contenders utilize those resources which are readily available to them. For example, "the wealthy bribe, students riot, workers strike, mobs demonstrate, and the military coup. In the absence of accepted procedures, all these forms of direct action are found on the political scene."¹¹ Furthermore, this state of affairs is continually reinforced due to the unwillingness of the varying interests to compromise their views. The lack of a spirit of community inhibits the structural formation of the all-important political institutions. Inherent in Huntington's discussion is the notion that in a praetorian society, legi-

timacy is ephemeral, transitory, and easily lost--irrespective of whether the government is democratic or authoritarian.

Next to Huntington, Samuel Finer has perhaps presented the most detailed consideration of the relationship between legitimacy and military intervention. Finer contends that the degree of legitimacy in relation to the rules of political behavior, the means whereby political power is attained, retained, and transferred, and the legitimacy of existing political authorities are crucial factors when evaluating the underlying societal factors conducive to military coups. On the basis of these considerations as well as the scope of public participation and strength of private associations in particular societies, Finer describes four types of political culture.¹²

In states with a mature political culture, the threat of a military coup is by and large nonexistent. Here, there is a high degree of political consensus, political institutions are considered legitimate, and there is a strong belief in civilian supremacy, as well as a proportionately wide public mobilized into strong voluntary associations which could effectively oppose any attempt by the military to usurp political power.

Next are those states with what Finer calls a developed political culture. Here also, there is a high governmental legitimacy, and a strong belief in civilian supremacy, although from time to time these societies become "sharply divided on either the legitimacy of its institutions and procedures--or on the incumbents who hold office as a consequence of these."¹³

In this case, when conditions become inflamed, it is possible for the military to stage a coup, although strong sectors of opinion would oppose it to such a degree as to make such an attempt of very doubtful success, and hence relatively rare. Consequently, in a society with a developed political culture, the preferred method of intervention by the military in times of crisis takes the form of pressure, blackmail, or threats of non-cooperation.

The next two levels of political culture are ones in which a strong belief in civilian rule is lacking and with characteristics classified as praetorian by Huntington. Those states with a low political culture will first be discussed. These are the ones where there is often a relatively narrow public and much disagreement "on the legitimacy of the regime or the incumbents in office,"¹⁴ where political institutions are unable to effectively cope with political tensions, and where military intervention in times of crisis is a relatively common and accepted occurrence. In such states, there are at times varying levels of public opinion and political organizations. When the public opinion and organizations are feeble, the military does not encounter formidable difficulty in retaining control after a seizure of power. But when such public opinion and civil organizations happen to be strong, it is much more important for the military to take into consideration the opinions and views of these elements after it comes out in the open to overthrow a government. For example, although civilian forces may favor a particular

military intervention and actively support it, they may not be willing to permit the military to supplant civilian government altogether.¹⁵ In this case, since civilian forces are weaker than in a developed political culture, civilian resistance is much less likely to prove successful.

Finer's last category is called minimal political culture. In this category are placed those societies which have the least consensus on the rules of the political game, and where political institutions are extremely fragile. The states of minimal political culture, according to Finer, are those whose societies are the most conducive towards military coups since political issues are primarily resolved by force or the threat of force. Helping to create this type of situation is the fact that in societies with minimal political culture the relevant political strata are most narrowly based and no important civilian counterpressures exist to provide a barrier to the wishes of the military officers. Hence, in these societies, "the military do not require the assistance or even the blessing of civilian institutions or forces to acquire and maintain their power."¹⁶

In summary, it is suggested that societies where a firm basis of legitimacy is lacking; where there exist no strong civilian sectors of opinion to oppose military political ambitions; where there exists little consensus on who should rule, for what ends, and by what means; and where political institutions are as a result weak and ineffective, fertile ground is provided for the military coup

d'etat.

It is important not to overlook the fact that praetorian societies can exist at almost any stage in the process of increasing political participation.¹⁷ The mode and reason for military coups d'etat may vary with differences in political participation. For example, in societies with low levels of participation, where the overwhelming mass of people are politically apathetic, where there are few contenders for political power, and where no real social issues are at stake, the struggle for power would tend to take place among the small politically articulate strata. Here, when such a society is praetorian, it would not be uncommon for political conflict to take place in a spirit of extreme mutual distrust and suspicion where violence and reliance on military force are the main means of settling political differences. Ample examples of this sort of conflict can be found in nineteenth century Latin America.

On the other hand, the struggle for power in a more politically participant society could equally take place in a political atmosphere lacking in consensus and legitimacy, where suspicion and distrust are hallmarks of political life. Yet in this case, with increased participation by diversified social groups such as, say, the middle sectors and labor groups, important social and economic issues more commonly would be at stake, and instability and military intervention not infrequently are directly linked with competing class interests.¹⁸

Although it does not necessarily have to be so, the very

development of a praetorian society may be directly linked to the process of social mobilization and increased participation. In very simplified form, what can occur is that with increased industrialization, urbanization, and education, new groups of people are introduced into the political process, and these groups may seriously question the regime's legitimacy. Often this results, at least in part, as a reaction to the unwillingness by ruling groups to give the new strata access to power within the political system. With greatly increased demands placed upon them, the system's political institutions may become overloaded and decay to the point at which public authority becomes relatively incapable of restraining the various competing interests peaceably. What was formerly a civic polity becomes a praetorian one.¹⁹

The increased participation of diversified political contenders, when they cannot be assimilated into the political system, constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for a political system. As the intensity of class and/or ethnic cleavages challenges various social groups, the possibility of military coups increases--especially if some of the political forces urge the military to overthrow the government to protect their interests.

It is now felt that an adequate groundwork has been laid to provide a better understanding of the military coup when other variables are considered. Various short-term variables or precipitants of the coup phenomena will now be discussed. If it is realized that simply because a society is praetorian, it does not mean that the society is in a constant state of

political turmoil, then it can be better understood that such turmoil occurs primarily when relatively short-term episodic precipitants exacerbate preexistent tensions to a critical level. Under such conditions a favorable chance or opportunity is provided for the officers to attempt a coup d'etat.

Finer stated that a favorable opportunity involves situations which make "the civil power dependent on the military authorities," and/or "enhance the military's popularity while depressing that of the civil authorities."²⁰ While Finer's statement refers to the vulnerability of civilian governments to military coups, it must also be remembered that military governments at times have been the victims of coups carried out by discontented armed forces personnel. It therefore seems fair to suggest that a favorable opportunity for such an action will exist when the popularity of the military "out" group is enhanced while that of the military sector in power is depressed. Under such circumstances, a military faction could more easily justify a coup and could take power with less opposition than otherwise would be the case. If we can assume that military men do not act blindly on their emotions but take some kind of rational calculation before acting, then it becomes understandable why precipitants providing an opportunity to intervene are so important in our conceptual scheme.

But it is also important to note that precipitating events, although able to provide the opportunity for a military coup, might also at times be interpreted by the military as motives for such an intervention. This kind of analytic division does

not appear to be an unwise one since the opportunity and motive variables are not generally well defined and clear cut, but rather overlap one another. Hence, by looking at precipitating factors from this perspective, a more complete and realistic conceptualization of the coup situation can be attained.

When analyzing precipitants it is important to realize that they are numerous and can vary considerably from one military coup d'etat to another. This is because the emergence of a particular precipitant is influenced by the unique conditions existing in a state at a given point in time. It is also important to note that since coups d'etat are at times the result not simply of unilateral military action, but rather involve civilian conspirators as well, the precipitants listed can also be perceived by civilians as an opportunity and/or motive to engage in a coup plot.

At this point several accelerators of crises which can help precipitate a coup and which have opportunity and motive implications will be discussed. These variables include: personal liabilities of the Chief Executive, his policies, political stagnation, electoral crises, and foreign interference. They were chosen because either alone or more commonly in combination, they seem to be the major environmental accelerators of crises (excepting, of course, military corporate interests, which are better considered separately when military institutional factors are discussed). However, this factor will briefly be touched on when the category of executive policies is dealt with.

The first precipitant to be discussed is:

1. Personal Liabilities of the Executive.

At times, a country's Chief Executive might have liabilities which can threaten his popularity and eventually lead to a questioning of his legitimacy to rule. For example, personality traits of the President might be considered by some to be unsuitable for his position, and might also lead to unwise policies. The President might display an intolerable lack of tact in his dealings, making him unable to avoid giving offense, and jeopardizing good relations with others. On the other hand, incidents in the President's social life may subject him to severe criticism. He may be attacked for, say, having a drinking problem, or he may be shown to have been blatantly corrupt in his business dealings. Also, it may be proved that he lied in his public statements. Incidents such as these may lead to a large outcry of opinion against the President which might include demands for his removal. Under these conditions, military officers might believe that a good opportunity exists for staging a coup d'etat, especially if there are strong currents of public opinion in favor of it.

The military might also view the Executive's personal liabilities as lessening his claim to office. For example, personal shortcomings of the President might be seen by the officers as demeaning to the integrity and prestige of the nation which the Chief Executive represents. Or the President's personal liabilities may be seen as threatening to his bargaining position with other nations. Perceptions such as these could provide strong motives in the minds of the officers to

justify a coup attempt.

In the Ecuadorian coup of 1963, for example, the removal of President Carlos Julio Arosemena seemed to be at least partly precipitated by objections over his drinking problem which led him to make embarrassing statements to foreign dignitaries.²¹

2. Particular Policies of the Executive.

Here, the Chief Executive's personal characteristics are not the major problem. Rather, it is his policies which might be considered unwise, overly burdensome, detrimental to the national interest; or worse, treasonable. Such policies could deal with external as well as internal affairs. A wide number of different examples fall under this category. The legitimacy of the President may be seriously jeopardized if he pursues policies which threaten the economic position of important social sectors, excludes numerically significant groups from the political process, makes widespread use of terror and a secret police, and generally acts in a dictatorial manner. In other cases, strong opposition might be directed against the President's policy towards the settlement of a border dispute, the peace terms following an armed conflict, or his policies towards foreign investments in the country. With the popularity of the President low, a greater opportunity exists for the military to overthrow his government than would under circumstances where the President was receiving widespread support.

Examples of coups instigated in times of unpopular Presidential policies are numerous. The May 1960 coup in Turkey against Premier Adnan Menderes is a good example. It was carried out only after much popular resentment over his arbitrary methods, his interference with the school curriculum, his suppression of the press, and his business restrictions. When the coup did come, it was met with widespread popular approval.²²

Government policies not only can provide a fine opportunity to intervene as in the case above, they can also supply officers with powerful motives as well. This is especially true when the policy in question is perceived to be a threat to the health and welfare of the military establishment. As Lieuwen states with regard to Latin America, "perversion of the governing function includes in the eyes of the military any action inimical to the interests of the armed forces."²³ This statement, of course, has applicability in other areas of the world as well. Cuts in the military budget and reductions in personnel are examples of such policies. The 1963 coup against Guatemalan President Manuel Ydigoras Fuentes was one example of a coup motivated, at least in part, by unpopular Presidential military policies.²⁴

3. Political Stagnation

Here, politicians have come to what can be called a dead end. The work of government has come to a standstill. The decision-making process stops due to irreconcilable differences. Often, such conditions are reflective of intense executive-

legislative conflict. But in any case, they highlight a situation of low presidential popularity. Under conditions of governmental ineffectiveness such as these, powerful sectors of opinion may look towards the military to take power and carry out the work of government. The 1948 overthrow of President José Bustamante in Peru is an example of a coup largely precipitated by intense legislative-executive conflict which caused political stagnation and which left him with almost no organized support.²⁵ To the extent that political stagnation is perceived by the military as threatening to the national interest, such conditions will provide the motives as well as the opportunity for a military coup.

4. Electoral Crises

Here, the precipitant centers around elections. The crisis might be due to a questioning of the honesty of elections. It might be believed that elections will not take place; or, if they do, the electoral process will be adulterated through the use of fraud and various forms of intimidation. When criticism by civilians is strong, the opportunity for a military coup is heightened. Often the military officers intervene because they fear or object to the electoral outcomes. Such motivations for a coup are fairly frequent; they were present, to a greater or lesser extent, in Peru and Argentina in 1962, and in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras in 1963.²⁶

5. Intense Civil Strife

There are numerous ways for government opposition to

manifest its grievances. In a praetorian society general strikes, street rioting, violent demonstrations, uprisings in the countryside, assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings are not uncommonly utilized by opponents of governments to express their grievances. On the other hand, the Chief Executives of praetorian societies have often relied on violent tactics against their political opponents. In both cases, such violence may elicit significant civilian protests against the government. When the government relies heavily upon the military to maintain itself in power in the face of civilian unrest, the officers might become more inclined to overthrow the regime which they were previously defending. Dankwart Rustow suggested that continued military involvement upon the domestic scene

...adds to the army's skills in domestic coercion and ... makes the civilian government more dependent on the army and hence a more tempting and vulnerable target once the army decides on its volte-face. Where survival of a civilian government depends on armed power, a coup in which the army switches sides must, ex-hypothesi, succeed.²⁷

To the extent that the officers actually perceive the civil strife as threatening to the national interest, then such strife can provide a motive for the coup as well.

It might also be the case that more corporate concerns are involved. For example, civil strife instigated by a Chief of State may threaten to expand into civil war and directly draw the armed forces into the conflict. Officers, reacting against such a threat to their personal and institutional well-being, might be motivated to overthrow the President in order to avert such an occurrence. Also, during times of civil

strife, as already noted, the military might perform a police role and be used against dissidents. Such a role could be resented by the officers since they might feel that the army is being unjustifiably diverted from its role of protector of the nation's external security. Further, the officers might resent using force against the country's citizens, a responsibility which is not felt to be theirs.²⁸

The link between civil strife and military coups should not appear far fetched. Rustow, for example, has pointed out that in the Middle East military coups have followed periods of civil strife.²⁹ For Latin America, Egil Fossum has shown that between 1907 and 1966 sixty one out of eighty military coups occurred in times of civil strife.³⁰

6. Severe or Prolonged Economic Crises

Examples of such adversity include large scale unemployment, runaway inflation, a decline in commodity markets, a drop in export-oriented monocultural economics, the drying up of credit sources, an inability of government to pay its debts, and budget cuts. Such conditions make it difficult for the government to maintain its support and can significantly lower popular resistance to a coup attempt. Furthermore, if the military officers feel that economic crisis is a result of governmental mismanagement, and/or if it is felt that government under the control of different personnel could better deal with the prevailing economic problems, the officers would have a powerful motive to intervene.

There does exist empirical support regarding the relationship between economic decline and the military coup. Egil Fossum, for example, indicates that in Latin America coups appear to be at least twice as common in periods of economic decline as in years of economic improvement.³¹ Martin Needler adds support to this conclusion. He shows that in Latin America from 1938 to 1942, years of recuperation from the great depression, there was only one coup--a significant decrease from the previous three years of depression where there occurred six military seizures of power.³²

7. Foreign Interference

It is important that this factor be included, especially in light of the proved or alleged participation of foreign actors in coups d'etat. Certainly such participation should not be looked upon with any amazement, since many governments have vital interests to protect and defend in distant lands. If these interests are threatened by the programs and policies of a particular ruler, his overthrow might not only be sought but also actively pursued by foreign actors working at times in collaboration with internal political forces which may or may not include the military establishment. The foreign intervention could simply be economic pressure. Often a government is very dependent economically on another. And in cases where a government is working badly, economic pressure such as the closure of a particular commodity market or the drying up of loans is all that is needed to topple a government.³³

Aside from such cases as above, foreign actors might assist coup makers by simply agreeing to support their efforts

only after they are in power. In other cases, the foreign intervention might be more direct. Foreign agents, for example, could engage in clandestine activities such as bribery, defamation, and blackmail; or they might decide to provide funds in support of opposition groups which might disseminate propaganda or cause civil unrest to discredit a government. Foreign agents might even be directly involved in the actual planning and execution of a military coup. For example, in Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah stated that there was direct involvement by the embassies of the United States, Britain, and West Germany in the plan to overthrow his government.³⁴ Foreign intervention in coup situations has been either proved or alleged in other countries as well. These include Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Greece in 1967, and Chile in 1973.

The impression should not be left that the participation of foreign actors in coup situations is always subversive in nature. In fact, the contrary can be true. In addition, internal opponents of a government may be especially indisposed to plotting an overthrow if it is feared that a foreign country will mobilize its military forces or utilize other means of resistance against the coup-makers. If such threats are imminent and a coup is still carried out, its success would be in jeopardy. For example, in 1964 an apparently successful coup in Gabon turned into failure when French troops and firepower intervened to oppose the action. Similarly, British troops constituted a determining factor in squelching army

mutinies in East Africa shortly after the Gabon incident.

Thus far, this chapter has considered both long-term preconditions and short-term precipitants of the coup d'etat. With respect to the latter, it was noted that various societal, political, or economic conditions could provide the military with both the opportunity and the motive to intervene. Also noted was the fact that, at times, governmental policies may be seen as threatening to military institutional interests, and hence may precipitate what can be called a military-threat coup. This aspect of the coup d'etat will now be further discussed in specific relation to organizational factors of the armed forces which can influence the willingness of military men to plot the overthrow of a government. This will include an expanded discussion of military corporate grievances (since this topic has thus far only barely been touched on) as well as the notion of military mission and personal interest motives. Also, armed forces cohesion, proficiency, professionalization and social background will be considered in relation to the military coup d'etat.

Military Institutional and Personal Interest Factors

The discussion of institutional factors influencing a coup d'etat logically begins with military corporate interests. The military organization, like other large-scale organizations, seeks to have its corporate interests protected and preserved. Hence, when its interests are ignored or threatened, military

personnel are inclined to react. The intensity of that reaction will tend to vary according to the nature of the interests threatened. When the corporate interest which is ignored or threatened is perceived by the officers to be serious, a strong motive for a coup d'etat might be provided. The corporate grievances which might be involved can vary considerably since the military organization has multifaceted interests, in part owing to its bureaucratic complexity.

One important factor which should be considered is the military's corporate autonomy. This factor refers to the amount of freedom military men have in the handling of military affairs. Officers are often very sensitive over the autonomy which they have in military matters, and they can react quite strongly against civilian interference with their prerogatives. Conflicts can thus arise if a government attempts to expand its control over what are considered essentially military matters. For example, the re-organization or creation of military units without approval from important sectors of the officer corps, or attempts to subject military personnel to political indoctrination against their wishes, or arbitrary attempts to change the military command structure all infringe on military autonomy. Such infringements can result in severe grievances by military personnel as well as help motivate the officers to initiate a coup attempt. For example, the 1966 overthrow in Ghana of Nkrumah was one such coup where important officers were influenced by grievances concerning military autonomy matters.³⁵

There are other factors closely related to corporate autonomy which should be discussed. If a military institution is to be effective and its institutional integrity preserved, it must be disciplined and subject to a hierarchical chain of command. Hence, disruptions of the military's hierarchical stability could cause severe animosity within the military establishment. The 1964 Brazilian coup against João Goulart involved this sort of military grievance. The unwillingness of Goulart to issue a decree punishing the participants of an enlisted men's naval mutiny was viewed by many officers as a threat to the principle of military discipline, and "caused a shift in position that hurt Goulart among all three major groups within the military."³⁶ Although the military discipline issue was not the only grievance involved, it was an important one in the eyes of many of the military coup makers.

Another interest of the military institution is maintenance of its functional monopoly of violence. The development of paramilitary forces could threaten to displace the regular military institutions not only in terms of functions but also in regard to institutional existence. Hence, governmental leaders who contemplate or attempt the establishment of such organizational competitors to the military could expect a sharp reaction from military officers. In fact, not uncommonly, this is exactly what occurs. For example, in 1954, it was suspected and rumored that President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala intended to utilize a shipload of arms for the establishment of a workers' militia. This elicited widespread institutional fears within the military which refused

to help Arbenz distribute weapons among a paramilitary force which was being organized to resist rebels who had invaded Guatemala. Soon thereafter, the officers went even further and force Arbenz to resign.³⁷

Less threatening to the military than the above factor, but one which nonetheless can elicit military grievances, involves actions or policies which detract from the military's prestige and honor. Spirit, tradition, an honorable image, and organizational pride are considered integral ingredients in the process of consolidating individual loyalties to the military body. Actions which impugn the military honor or self esteem, hence, are looked down upon by the officers. Finer indicates that the officers at times compensate for their frustration and humiliation by "taking it out" on the object of their censure.³⁸ When the object of their censure is the government, a motive for instigating a coup might be provided. Such a situation commonly can take place after defeat in war,³⁹ especially when civilian politicians detract from the military's prestige by blaming the officers for the defeat, and when the military perception is that it was civilian mismanagement which was responsible. Elements such as these, for example, were involved in the 1949 coup in Syria where many army officers felt that their institution was not given the proper respect, honor, and consideration in the aftermath of their humiliating defeat in the first Arab-Israeli war.⁴⁰

Another factor which should be considered is the notion of organizational cohesion. When the organizational cohesion or unity of the military establishment is threatened, so might

be its system of discipline and its organizational effectiveness. Therefore, if it is perceived that by allowing the President to remain in office, the military's cohesiveness might be in jeopardy, officers might seek his overthrow. This is what happened in the 1966 coup in Argentina instigated against President Arturo Illia. The coup by no means was a simple matter, and a number of other important precipitants were present, such as a deteriorating monetary situation and tolerance of Peronist activity. But also contributing to military discontent were Illia's attempts to further break down the Argentine military's already weak cohesiveness in order to strengthen his political position. In fact, sources close to the President had indicated that "Illia was confident that he could control the military by dividing it internally."⁴¹ To accomplish this end, Illia tried to initiate policies designed to undermine military cohesion and exacerbate internal conflict within the armed forces. His plan failed, for Illia's attempts had the effect of alienating many officers from his regime. This factor helped to contribute to his eventual overthrow.

Other military grievances could be related to such things as salaries, promotions, retirement policies, and budgetary allocations. Salaries are basically reflective of the worth which is attributed to a specific occupation. If salaries fail to coincide with the military man's expectations of his value, not only would he tend to remain dissatisfied but also he might be less predisposed to support a government which is perceived as the cause of this state of affairs.

This might especially be the case if promises of better salaries or other material incentives are made by anti-government conspirators. One example of a coup d'etat influenced by military pay grievances occurred in the West African country of Togo in 1963.⁴²

Issues over promotions, assignments, and retirement policies might also prove to be important in regard to whether officers will be predisposed to support a given regime. Decisions concerning promotions, assignments, and retirements commonly have become politicized as governments seek ways of insuring loyalty among members of the armed forces and for removing those of questionable allegiance. For example, officers most loyal to the government may attain the quickest promotions, and officers suspected of disloyalty or undependability might be retired early. Others might be reassigned to unimportant jobs or given positions in remote areas. While such actions might at times be effective when they are discreetly carried out, the ultimate result might be different from that which was expected. In regard to the politicization of promotions, Alfred Stepan has put the argument this way:

...Excessive reliance on this political tactic can become counterproductive because it tends to upset the career expectations of all those passed over for promotion and turn them into active opponents of the government. Likewise, promotions to high office of officers who fail to satisfy the usual institutional criteria is not always effective in creating loyalty at large, because such men are often resented and therefore not influential within the military. To the extent that they are not representative of the feelings of the rank and file officers, the president runs the risk of cutting himself off from accurate information about opinions within the officer corps.⁴³

Officers whom the President intends to retire early, de-

mote, or transfer to different geographical areas might also harbor grievances severe enough against the President to lead them towards plotting his overthrow.

One example of a coup at least partly influenced by Presidential policies in regards to military promotions was the 1964 overthrow of Goulart in Brazil. Here Stepan argues that since 40 percent of the coup activists (General rank) had not received promotions by Goulart, while only 6 percent of those promoted by Goulart were involved, "it seems probable that many coup activists were officers who had either been passed over for promotions or were worried that they would be passed over."⁴⁴

Military budgets are another factor which can be of significant importance to military coups. Military officers might tend to judge the suitability of an incumbent partly in terms of his ability or willingness to provide adequate funds to the military institution. If budgets are not adequate to the perceived needs of the officers, this may be interpreted by them as a lack of concern or possibly even hostility on the part of the President towards the armed forces. Such feelings could threaten the President's chances of maintaining support within military circles, and even provide an incentive for officers to instigate a coup.

To sum up, grievances dealing with institutional concerns can involve factors such as corporate autonomy, hierarchical discipline, prestige and honor, the monopoly of violence, organizational cohesion, salaries, promotions and retirement policies, and military budgets. Either alone or more commonly

when combined with more generalized environmental factors (personal liabilities of the Chief Executive, particular policies of the Chief Executive which might reflect class or group interests, political stagnation, electoral crises, intense civil strife, economic crises, and foreign interference), they can motivate military men to attempt a coup.

Yet another factor seems important enough to be included in the constellation of variables listed above. This factor is the personal interests of the coup makers. The political actions of military men, like all others, have at times been based on personal interest motives which can include such things as the desire for prestige, status, wealth, or popularity. At other times, the interest motivating a person to act politically can be based on a personal grudge or a threatening situation. In any event, several writers have placed importance on personal motivations in their explanations for the military coup. These include Stanislaw Andreski who has stated that one of the major preoccupations of soldiers is their search for personal advantage. He goes on to state that "one of their most striking characteristics is their unideological and mercenary outlook."⁴⁵ Victor Alba, perhaps too strongly, has stated that "the militarist has no apparent objective apart from the immediate goal of power for power's sake...."⁴⁶ Merle Kling, for his part, has emphasized economic ambitions in his explanation of coups d'etat.⁴⁷

Examples of military coups where personal interest motives appeared to play a part are not too difficult to find.

The 1939 Bolivian coup attempt against General Carlos Quintanilla was based on a personal grudge. The instigator of the coup was Colonel Peña y Lillo, who had believed that unjustified rumors of cowardice in the Chaco War were instigated by Quintanilla. The revolt expressed the Colonel's deep personal antipathy towards the President.⁴⁸ An example of a coup which could have been precipitated, at least in part, by personal threat feelings is the 1965 coup in the Central African Republic which was led by Army Commander-in-Chief Jean Bedel Bokassa. One of the factors leading Bokassa to revolt very possibly was information that his political opponents were planning his assassination.⁴⁹

Although a wide number of factors such as those which have been discussed in the last few pages can provide strong grievances and motives for a change in governmental leadership, still more appears to be needed for a military coup to occur. One additional factor which is needed is the belief by the military that the coup d'etat is a legitimate means of effecting a transfer of governmental power. Obviously, when important grievances are at stake, at times those grievances alone are enough to justify a coup attempt in the minds of officers. At other times, further incentives are needed. One of these added incentives could be the widespread perception within various sectors of the officer corps that the armed forces are the very embodiment of the nationhood and that, as a result, they have the main responsibility to interpret the national interest and to guard and protect that interest over and above any responsibility to a particular government.⁵⁰

Also adding to the belief in the legitimacy of a military coup would be direct or indirect appeals for such an action by civilians (a point which has already been noted), as well as Constitutional provisions which place the responsibility of protecting the national interest in the hands of the armed forces. In fact, Constitutions, at least in Latin American countries, commonly do just that in giving the armed forces the responsibility for maintaining civil order and protecting the Constitution.⁵¹

When in a particular country military coups have traditionally been justified in terms of protecting the Constitution, and such justifications have met with approval from different sectors of the population, it probably would not be rash to suggest that the officers would be especially predisposed to view the coup d'etat as a legitimate way of carrying out their mission to protect the national interest. On the other hand, if such a tradition is lacking, officers might be less predisposed to see the coup mechanism as an appropriate one to use in times of crisis.

Even if such forcible seizures of power traditionally have been considered legitimate by officers, it may be the case that the past remembrances of officers may be particularly relevant in reinforcing or offsetting a prior belief in the legitimacy of military coups d'etat. If a relatively recent seizure of power was well received, the military might well be much more inclined to intervene than in a situation where the opposite was the case and where the officers were subjected

to severe civilian retribution.

Another factor which might help make a coup less appropriate in the eyes of military men is their increased professionalization. The professionalization issue is a controversial one, and social scientists have reached differing conclusions regarding it. Some, such as Huntington, have held that professionalization makes the officers less predisposed to initiate coups. Others, such as Finer, hold just the opposite point of view. This writer maintains the position that both views can be correct under differing circumstances.

Huntington's argument will first be considered.⁵² For him, military professionalization is made up of three factors: military expertise, social responsibility, and corporate loyalty to one's comrades. The first ingredient, military expertise, is developed on the basis of a formal education and a long training process. The expert skill which is required is proficiency in the organization and management of military affairs. The second factor is the notion that a professional officer corps is one which feels a responsibility towards the state. Such an officer corps is one which draws little or no distinction between service to the government and service to the nation, and hence stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.⁵³ The final factor, corporate loyalty, Huntington argues, develops from the separation of the military man from civilian life and his training and ex-

expertise. The recognition of their distinct life and sphere of competence creates in the minds of the military men a sense of corporate identity which seeks to protect and further the interests of their organization. Huntington further argues that since the responsibilities and the development of the skills of the modern military man demand his full-time attention, officers will become less involved in policy issues which do not directly concern them. Hence, they will be less inclined to dabble in politics.

The Huntingtonian argument, at times, might have some applicability. The development of professional expertise, for example, may encourage officers to view military intervention as a source of chaos and inefficiency which would detract from their military function. But on the other hand, professionalisation can have quite different effects. To understand how this can be, it is first necessary to criticize an important part of Huntington's definition of professionalism--that in a professional military organization the officers recognize the government's officials as a legitimate source of authority over the military. According to this definition, any military establishment which lacked this feature could not be considered professional.⁵⁴ The tautological nature of this argument is not very illuminating; but more seriously, it fails to consider that once the obedience to government authority portion of this definition is dropped, and military professionalism is viewed simply in terms of the development of specialized expertise and a sense of corporateness, these remaining portions of the definition clearly can foster powerful motives for

military intervention. The more technically expert and corporate the military institution, the more sensitive and touchy it might be to anyone or anything which threatens its institutional prerogative. Also, expanded military education might help lead military officers to believe that they are more capable than civilians to decide political matters.⁵⁵ And as Finer argues, "the military's consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to see themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government in power."⁵⁶

A final factor which can effect the disposition of the officers to overthrow governments is their social origins and outlook. It has been suggested, for example, that the political orientations of officers could be heavily influenced by the views of civilians with the same class origins and viewpoints. José Nun takes this position and states that in the more advanced countries of Latin America the military intervenes in politics to defend the declared political interests of the middle class against lower class threats. Nun further argues that such a position is a natural one for the military to assume since by and large the modern officer corps is recruited from the middle class.⁵⁷ Although such an argument might have validity at times, especially where class related issues are paramount in a particular situation, it must be remembered that in many coup situations, the conflicts are basically intra-class in nature. On such occasions knowledge of the middle class origins of the officer corps would probably be of little help in understanding the coup.

Another perspective somewhat different from Nun's is that bonds of kinship, common outlook, habits, and economic interest uniting officers to members of the ruling strata would diminish the likelihood of military intervention.⁵⁸ The validity of this proposition could be seriously undermined. For example, the officer corps and the ruling elite may have the same class backgrounds and share common habits, yet the military might be predisposed to overthrow the government because of its failure to satisfy the institutional interests of the armed forces. As should be obvious, one must proceed with caution when relating factors such as social origins to political behavior. Such caution appears especially warranted when one considers that, as Stepan notes, "it is clear from numerous historical examples that aristocrats have often led popular movements, and that lower-class leaders or caudillos have headed or been the bulwarks of traditional higher-class governments."⁵⁹ It is not being suggested here that there is never any relationship between social origins and political behavior. It is simply being argued that when studied alone, this factor seems to have little explanatory power. Other factors need to be studied, such as the historical context in which political activity takes place and the relevant issues which exist in any political controversy.

The Capabilities of the Military to Intervene

Having discussed a wide range of variables which can influence the military's disposition to intervene, factors

which affect the capabilities to intervene will now be considered. It is important to consider these factors since not all military coups are successful, and those that are can radically differ regarding "the ease or difficulty and ... the extent of acquiescence or resistance [posed] by other major political actors and the general populace."⁶⁰ On this point, Ann Ruth Willner has concisely categorized the kinds of variations which can occur during the takeover situation. They are:

1. Positive Acquiescence. The military is "invited in" and its entry is facilitated by the civilian head of the previous regime. Thus, a certain amount of legitimacy is accorded to it by virtue of the conditions of transfer. Examples are Pakistan and Burma in 1958.
2. Minimal or No Resistance. The military is either welcomed in or its entry easily acquiesced in because of disaffection with the previous regime. Examples are Burma, 1962 and Ghana, 1966. Acquiescence and limited resistance may also be the consequence of partial de facto control by the military during the previous regime.
3. Limited Resistance. There is actual resistance, although it is not necessarily violent, tacit resistance, or potential resistance by supporters of the old regime. Example of Egypt, 1952-54.
4. Considerable Resistance. There is resistance to the takeover situation by other military elements than the coup group, in addition to civilian resistance, or/and by other elements of the armed forces loyal to the old regime or competitive with and antagonistic to the coup group. In extreme cases, this situation can lead to civil or sub-civil war. Example, Indonesia, 1965-67.⁶¹

Only the first takeover situation listed above cannot properly be called a coup since, with the military being "invited in," there is no element of force involved. In the other takeover situations, however, such is not the case. In those situations, the threat or the actual use of force is a decisive element in the overthrow of the government. This

consideration helps highlight the fact that the capacity of the military to intervene successfully is directly linked to its control over the means of violence. Such a statement by no means attempts to account for differences in the political behavior or orientation of different military establishments. It is meant simply to provide an understanding of the great potential which the armed forces have for taking political power; or on a lesser level, for influencing political decisions. As Thomas Hobbes stated many years ago, "in politics, when no other card is agreed upon, clubs are trumps."⁶² In most nations today, this trump card is held by the military.

But this need not necessarily mean that at all times all elements within the military are able to effectively utilize their control over the means of violence for political ends. For example, naval units are of limited value for domestic political ends except where the capital is on the coast. By contrast, air power is much more mobile and therefore has more potential for domestic intervention. But even more than air power, ground troops are the forces overwhelmingly utilized in the coup d'etat since they are the ones most easily deployed not only in urban centers but in rural areas as well. In the former case, the attack is usually on the Presidential headquarters. In the latter case, where coups have their origins in the countryside, what often occurs is that various rural barracks pronounce against the government, march on centers of communication, sites of military supplies, the exchequer, governmental headquarters and ultimately the capital.⁶³ In either case, it is the army officers who most often command

the troops, and for this reason, it is they who are usually in the strongest position immediately after a successful coup as opposed to officers in other branches of the service who at best usually play only a secondary role.

Even within the army, though, some branches of service have more strategic capabilities than others. For example, an infantry division located near the heart of government, the capital, has more strategic capabilities than one located hundreds of miles away. Likewise, a signal corps located in the capital would be of little utility unless it had access to the weapons necessary for a forceful attack. On the other hand, a unit in charge of long-range missiles with nuclear warheads, although having an extremely high violence capability, would be of little use to coup makers whose objectives are not to destroy a state but rather simply to overthrow a government. A tank unit would better serve their needs.

Quite often, all that might be needed for a successful coup is a slight but artful use of force. It is for this reason, for example, that "in Korea, a General Park at the head of merely 3,500 men out of an army of 600,000 overturns the government and establishes himself in its place."⁶⁴ The conclusion which can be drawn from the above discussion is that it is erroneous to evaluate the capabilities of a military establishment to carry out a successful coup on the basis of its size. In fact, Stepan adds support to such a statement by showing that in regard to Latin America, there exists no significant detectable relationship between the absolute size of the armed forces and degrees of military intervention.⁶⁵

The argument thus far presented is that overwhelming force utilized by the military is not needed for a successful coup d'etat--a small amount or simply even a threat at times being all that is needed to achieve the desired results. Whether the use of a simple threat or a limited amount of force by a small portion of the armed forces will result in a successful coup often depends on the degree of military cohesion which exists. This theme will now be expanded upon.

Aside from the incontrovertible argument of force, the military has other advantages which can be used politically. A major one is the organizational structure of the armed forces which is "far superior to that of any civilian party. Its centralized command, its hierarchical structure, and its disciplined membership make it capable of acting with complete unity."⁶⁶

When such cohesion does, in fact, exist, the chances of the military carrying out a successful coup are increased.⁶⁷ This is because the strong solidarity would enable officers to mobilize support within their ranks more easily and thus inhibit the possibility for threatening schisms to develop. However, at times, such solidarity does not exist even after officers and troops have gone through a long socialization process which attempts to strip them of any individual or group identity which can detract from their corporate loyalty to the military organization. This can result from a number of factors. For example, Victor Alba suggests generational cleavages which can exist. He divides contemporary Latin American armies into barracks groups, the school officers, and

the group of young officers which he calls laboratory men.⁶⁸ The first category consists of the old-line conservative senior officers. On the other hand, the school officers are those who come out of the first military academies. The final group, the laboratory men, are the young officers who are the best trained, have the greatest intellectual curiosity, and are the least tradition bound. These categories should be viewed simply as ideal types, and irrespective of the applicability of this particular framework in specific countries, it is suggestive of conflicts which might arise based on different generational types.

Cohesion might also be weakened through intra-service rivalries. Animosity might exist among the air force, navy, and the army--or within branches such as conflicts between engineers and infantry, or between cavalry and infantry.⁶⁹ On the other hand, factions might be based on tribal, regional, religious, or political cleavages. In any case, they would tend to make coup attempts more risky than under more favorable conditions. Where coups do succeed under conditions of low cohesion, it does not appear unwise to suggest, as Janowitz does, that there is a greater "likelihood of counter-coups after the seizure of power."⁷⁰ One example of a coup which failed due to low cohesion was the second Turkish officers' coup of 1962 which had the backing of only a small minority of the officers and which lacked the support from the military high command.⁷¹

It is for reasons such as the above that, before a coup attempt, conspiring officers often sound out the views of

other officers in key positions to widen the base of military support and hence decrease their chances of failure. In regard to Brazil, Stepan notes that "because of the virtual operational autonomy of many regiments, divisional army commanders run the very real risk of having their orders disobeyed unless they have first sounded out opinions among middle level officers."⁷² The desire to sound out opinions before initiating a coup has also been noted in Peru, where there exists "caution born out of fear lest internal disagreements imperil the solidarity and hence stability of the military institution."⁷³ Victor Villanueva noted one interesting way in which opinions were sounded out before the 1962 coup in Peru. Here, a questionnaire of more than a hundred questions was distributed to the officers about their opinions regarding what position the army should adopt in determined situations.⁷⁴

Aware of the diversity of views which often exists in military institutions, Martin Needler has suggested a model which can be illustrative of the process taking place if the success of a coup is to be insured.⁷⁵ The model essentially is one of coalition building within the officer corps. The coalition begins with those most opposed to the government. To these hard-liners, other officers opposed to the incumbent will gradually be added. Finally, the highest threshold is reached, and an individual officer (or group of officers) joins the conspiracy who by his prestige, influence, and/or strategic position provides "the critical margin of support needed not just in size, but especially in 'weight'"⁷⁶ to make a successful coup.

Although this model can have applicability to some coups such as the 1964 Brazilian case where Marshal Castello Branco occupied the swing man position in the coalition-building process, in other circumstances the coup might emerge from what can be described as a rapid outburst of military opposition such as in the 1961 Ecuadorian coup.

Another factor that can help make officers more capable of carrying out a successful coup is the tenor of civilian support. While significant civilian support and urging for a movement against a particular government might constitute the incentive needed for officers to initiate a coup, a favorable civilian reaction following a coup might also be of considerable importance. This is because such support might help convince officers of regiments which remained loyal to the government to refrain from resisting the new authorities. It does not appear rash to suggest that there would be a natural abhorrence for blood-letting since, by and large, soldiers do not like to fire on their countrymen. Further, if the major sectors of opinion react favorably to a coup, officers who remained loyal to a particular government might feel that active resistance would serve no useful purpose and that their time would be better spent working in support of the new rulers.

Where there exists military, police, or civilian sectors which remain loyal to the incumbent, the success of a coup can be threatened if such forces not only are inclined to oppose the rebellious military sectors, but have the resources

to effectively do so. Resistance against a coup can take place in a variety of ways. The masses can be deployed against the new government, opponents might manipulate the technical facilities at their disposal in order to resist the consolidation of power, or military sectors loyal to the old regime might attempt to foil the plans of the conspirators immediately before, during, or after a coup attempt. Hence, the neutralization of such political forces by identifying and isolating their leadership, and by disrupting their organizations can be of crucial importance if the success of a coup is to be assured.

A brief summary at this time might be helpful. The argument which has been presented is that the military coup d'etat is a multifaceted process which is best studied in terms of both environmental factors and military institutional ones. Under environmental factors are included both long-range and short-range variables. Long-range variables deal with the general preconditions necessary for a successful coup. Short-range variables are those which can provide both the motives and the disposition to intervene. Other factors which could affect the disposition to intervene are military corporate grievances, their sense of military mission, the degree of professionalization of the military and the social background and orientations of its members. It was further suggested that a coup conspiracy needs the perception by the officers that the coup is a legitimate means of ameliorating grievances. Also noted were factors which could affect the capability of the military to carry out a successful coup.

Some of these factors were the material resources available to the military, its organizational structure, the degree of cohesion present at a particular time and favorable civilian reaction to a coup. It was finally proposed that absence or neutralization of outside competitors to military power such as police, paramilitary organizations, or civilian sectors could enhance the chances of success for the military coup makers.

Studying the Problem of
Military Disengagement
From Political Control

So far, this chapter has dealt with factors relating to a successful seizure of military political control by the military. This section deals mainly with factors which can influence the officers' decision whether to maintain political control or give up such control once they have seized power.

It is important to note that when disengagement from political control is discussed in this section, what is meant is not disengagement from politics. Military control here refers simply to control of the formal decision-making structures of the state either directly or indirectly by a member or members of the armed forces. Hence, while military men may give up this kind of control, they nonetheless might, for example, remain ready to play the role of ultimate arbiter of the political process, guarantor of the integrity of the Constitution, and preserver of national unity.⁷⁷

As noted above, military control can be either direct

or indirect. When it is direct, officers can be found in formal positions of power. When it is indirect, political control would still be in the hands of the officers, but civilian front men with little will of their own would occupy the formal positions of power. More difficult to deal with is the case where ruling officers doff their uniforms and resign their commissions in order to civilianize themselves. The question becomes whether such men really become civilians or whether they should still be considered military men. Agreeing with Edward Felt, the position taken here is the following:

If a man was a career officer immediately before taking power, if his associations subsequently were still military, if his style remains military, and if all indications were that his heart was still with the army, his government is still a military government even when his commission is laid aside. He is and remains a soldier in all but name.⁷⁸

In such cases his government should be considered a military one.

One of the perspectives which this study takes is that the performance of the officers after they seize control can be related to the reasons for their intervention. Once the intent and motivations of the coup makers is known, it is suggested that one is then in a better position to understand the propensity of the officers either to stay in power or to disengage themselves from direct political control. Such a perspective realizes of course that the conditions of take-over or changing circumstances can make the officers pursue policies largely unrelated to their original intentions or motivations. We are assuming for the moment, however, that

such circumstances do not develop and hence there is little incentive for the officers to change their political orientations. Later in this section, the nature of changing circumstances which might affect the military's actions once they are in power will be discussed.

A reasonable place to begin inquiry along these lines is to see whether the motives and intentions of the officers in the coup situation were basically short-range and of limited scope, or whether grievances were involved which were perceived to have solutions only through protracted military rule. It seems logically plausible to propose that where the constellation of coup makers' grievances are basically subject to quick solution or where civilian government is viewed as being capable of handling grievances of a more fundamental and long-term nature, the tendency of the military would be to relinquish power soon after the coup. Probably, this would be especially true if the military only very reluctantly intervened after the insistence by civilian groups which sought to replace the incumbent with different civilian leadership. On the other hand, if the reason for the coup is related to problems which are perceived by the officers to demand continued military rule, then logically, if not tautologically, it can be hypothesized that the military would be predisposed to maintain itself in power and not readily disengage itself from political control.

For example, if the major reason for a coup is simply to prevent the assumption to power of an individual personally unacceptable to the military, or if the action is motivated

by a desire to change a government which is perceived as oppressive to the populace or which is institutionally threatening to the military, then, once the coup has effectively dealt with these short-term problem situations, there is no reason for the military to perpetuate itself in power. Under such a situation, the military, not having political power as an aim, would relinquish power when it is convenient to do so. One such example is the Peruvian coup d'etat of 1962.⁷⁹ Here, a military junta overthrew the President during disputed elections largely because it was feared that groups opposed to the military would attain power. Once in power, although carrying vigorous reformist measures, the military, as it had promised, restored power to civilians once new elections were held the following year. The 1954 Brazilian coup against Getúlio Vargas is another example of a coup with short-term objectives. Here, the coup was designed largely to overthrow a government which was graft-ridden, badly managed, and unable to initiate effective policies. To solve the problem, the military forced Vargas from the Presidency. Not having any aspirations to serve as ruler, and lacking the view that civilian regimes are illegitimate, the army saw the Vice President installed in office at once and withdrew even from indirect rule through elections held in 1955.⁸⁰

As opposed to situations such as the above, the major reason for a coup might involve more fundamental issues subject to long-term solutions. Of course, in this type of coup situation, there are almost always short-term issues involved which can better provide the immediate excuse for the inter-

vention. Issues of a long-term nature can be quite varied. For example, it may be believed that extensive socio-economic restructuring of the society is necessary. Or it may be perceived that the development of a new political order based on new structural foundations must be established. On the other hand, radical or reformist goals might be absent. For example, it may simply be believed that certain groups must be excluded from political power for a prolonged period of time. In any case, it is important to note that long-range issues such as these are not a sufficient cause for the emergence of protracted military rule. The necessary element is the perception by the military coup makers that the long-range issues, whatever they may be, can be resolved only by the military men--that civilians cannot effectively deal with the problems which exist and therefore no longer have a legitimate claim to rule.

A good example to contrast with the previous ones occurred in Peru in 1968. A number of short-range issues were involved. Some of these were high inflation, failure of the government to implement its programs, and charges of government corruption. But a more important preexistent factor conditioning the actions of the officers after the coup was their belief that radical socio-economic changes were needed and that the military was the only force capable of successfully carrying them out. Military rule continues to the present day in Peru, and there is little to suggest that the officers are contemplating returning power to the civilians.

One should not obtain the impression from the above that ruler-type military regimes are always motivated by nationalistic ends which necessitate military control. Personal ambitions can be a powerful motivating factor for continued military rule. This, quite naturally, is because control of the Presidency and the machinery of government can provide new and greatly expanded opportunities for added prestige, status, and material enrichment. And if the original intent of the officers in seizing power was not personal ambition, such ambitions quite often are easily fed by the ceremonial trappings and the perquisites of office.⁸¹ Of course, at times, it is very difficult to attribute military rule to personal ambitions since the actions of the officers are always covered by a veil of patriotic motives. Still, an analysis of the military educational system, the socialization experiences of the officers, and the past as well as present actions of the officers could provide powerful clues when evaluating their real motives. A number of these factors will be further discussed later in this section.

But at this time, it should also be noted that there are other conditions aside from personal interests which can make military officers who seized power with intentions of returning to the barracks unwilling to relinquish control. A general statement on the matter provided by Amos Perlmutter is that such a state of affairs will occur "if the conditions for the return of a civilian regime are not fulfilled."⁸² Although Perlmutter does not expand on the statement to indicate exactly what the conditions are, several can be

suggested. One factor might be active petitioning for the military to remain in power by civilians who find themselves incapable of handling political problems. A different factor refers to the conditions of the military takeover. Officers who were wary of perpetuating themselves in power and who overthrew a government only for short-range immediate goals might be surprised by the minimal resistance or lack of resistance that the coup engendered. As a result, the officers' confidence in their ability to rule unhampered by civilians can become bolstered. The military men, as a result, might be prompted to try to perpetuate their control. Another factor hinges on the notion that all armies at all times are not cohesive bodies with unified viewpoints among their members. Officers involved in a successful coup who had intentions of returning power to civilians might be displaced or subjected to heavy influence by more radical or politically ambitious officers who lack such attitudes. On the other hand, while in power, external or internal threats to national security might become exacerbated, and help expand the role expectations of the officers. They may come to believe that the state's security is best protected by continued rule under military direction. Also, officers might become more realistically aware of the extant political problems once they are in power. And as a result, officers might be prompted to reevaluate and change their original objectives only after they have seized power.

The last factor applies quite well to the 1952 Egyptian coup situation if the initial statements made by the new

military rulers were sincerely espoused. Those statements expressed the hope that the evils of the previous regime could be quickly remedied, and that once this was accomplished, power could be returned to civilian control. As Rustow indicated:

Nagib and Nasir replaced Faruq with a regency council for his infant son and invited the Egyptian parties to purge themselves of corrupt elements. After some months, they concluded that corruption had been more than skin deep and that no trained, clean cadre stood ready to take over. With Nasir's victory over Nagib, the initial promise of early elections was dropped altogether.⁸³

African cases offer good examples of military men who, after having stated their intentions to return power to civilians, changed their perspective and assumed a rulership role. General Soglo of Dohomey, Colonel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, Colonel Lamenzana of Upper Volta, General Mobutu of Congo-Kenshasa, and Colonel Eyadema of Togo all upon seizing power denied that they intended to perpetuate military control.⁸⁴ Yet, in all these cases the military kept power, either as a result of personal ambitions, a reevaluation of objectives, or both.

As opposed to situations as the above, the reverse can occur; that is, military men who had intended to stay in power indefinitely relinquish control leading to a return of civilian rule. Several factors can be suggested which might account for such a situation. For example, the inability to formulate and/or execute effective policies might lead ruling officers to the conclusion that they have overestimated their capabilities and that they do not possess the skills needed to rule. The source of the problem might be policy disagreements which have emerged either between different elements of the ruling military

leadership, or between the ruling military clique and non-ruling officers who seek to bring civilians back to power or subvert and/or undermine extant governmental programs.⁸⁵

The emergence of strong anti-government opinion in the form of strikes, work slowdowns, riots and demonstrations might provide the incentive needed for the military to return to the barracks. This sort of pressure might result from an inability by the officers to implement policies which satisfy the interests of divergent civilian groups whose allegiance is necessary for the officers to rule. Also, opposition could result from the unwillingness of the population to grant the military the legitimacy to rule (as opposed to the legitimacy for instigating a coup to protect civilian interests). Strong opposition could even emerge at the time of the takeover. The military coup makers might have expected either no or only minimal resistance; but instead, considerable opposition to the coup was forthcoming. Such resistance possibly can lead officers to favor a return to the barracks as soon as possible instead of perpetuating their rule as was originally intended. As opposed to this sort of situation, the military might give up power as a result of foreign threats of intervention. Another possibility is that after a long period of rule, the military might voluntarily step down, believing that it had accomplished its long-range objectives.

An example of the sort of transition described in the above discussion and one which illustrates the factors which can contribute towards it occurred during the dictatorship

of Thailand's Premier Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. while somewhat more tolerant than previous Thai military regimes, Thanom's made no serious attempt to heed the urgings of civilians and introduce genuine parliamentary government. After years of dispute over the matter, the controversy finally came to a head in October 1973 when the government arrested thirteen students and university lecturers accused of distributing leaflets calling for a permanent Thai constitution to replace a temporary charter which was then in effect. A mass wave of protest quickly followed in which thousands of Thai students burned buildings, seized weapons, and violently clashed with government troops. Realizing the gravity of the situation, and unwilling to risk a full-scale civil war, Thanom quickly submitted his resignation. Other officers in high-level government positions quickly followed suit as Sanya Dharmasakti, dean of Thammaset University (which had been the center of student protests) took command of the government.⁸⁶

Two somewhat different examples from the above occurred in Dahomey and Sierra Leone--each of which "restored civilian rule in 1968 after an interlude of military rule. In both instances, withdrawal occurred after young officers, and men in the ranks overthrew their superiors who earlier had seized control from civilians."⁸⁷

It should be noted that the disengagement by a ruler type army from political control can involve a gradual transformation of a military-dominated government into a civilian-dominated one. This process would involve the establishment

of close ties between officers and civilian leaders, and the gradual replacement of the officer policy makers by civilians. It is possible that the ruling officers would "divest themselves of their soldierly regalia and demeanor to become full-fledged civilians."⁸⁸ They may attempt to follow the Kemalist example: officers who "decide to immerse themselves fully in the civilian realm, renouncing direct involvement in the armed forces."⁸⁹

What still needs to be considered are characteristics of military establishments and their personnel which exist before a coup has taken place and which might tend to influence whether officers will perform simply an arbiter function or assume a rulership role. One factor which seems important to consider is the perceptions of officers towards national security problems; this relates to the concept of military professionalism which was discussed earlier in this chapter. In simplified form, two basic orientations are possible. One view is to see such problems as being confined primarily to conventional military operations. That is to say, the security of the state is seen to be dependent upon the maintenance of a well-equipped, trained and disciplined fighting force strong enough to successfully counter internal or external military threats whenever they might arise. To the extent that military training is centered around such an orientation, it may be reasonable to assume that the officers will be more likely to believe that military efficiency will be compromised to the extent that they participate in matters not subordinated to their principle military function. If this is true, then

it seems plausible to suggest that their general tendency would not be one directed towards protracted political control of a nation since it would be felt that such a role would threaten the military capabilities of the armed forces.

On the other hand, military training might lead officers to a different perspective. That is to say, officers may be led to an orientation which does not see national security as being protected exclusively in terms of conventional military operations. Rather, the orientation might be one which also emphasizes the need for a military role in carrying out programs of social and economic welfare designed to provide wide scale assistance to the civilian population. In fact, the systematic use of such an approach has been favored by U.S. military training programs,⁹⁰ and has been embraced to a greater or lesser extent by many countries throughout the world.⁹¹ But even before U.S. military training programs, perceptions of an expanded role for the military existed.⁹²

In recent years, the expanded education and utilization of the military in non-military roles in countries under U.S. military influence has been linked to a counter-insurgency task. It is contended that the deployment of the military in a wide number of civic action programs is not only "an indispensable means of strengthening the economic base and establishing a link between the Armed Forces and the populace,"⁹³ but also provides a necessary means of attaining and maintaining the loyalty of the population. Hence, military civic action programs have been viewed as "a prophylaxis where insurgency is probable and therapy where it exists."⁹⁴

Where military establishments have extensive training programs in non-military subjects and where they stress the need for the performance of non-military roles in their countries, it is proposed that officers would attain an enlarged view of their capabilities and more easily come to the conclusion that they are in a better position to rule than civilians. This seems to be exactly what happened in Brazil and Peru in recent years.

Where the non-military training is linked to counter-insurgency techniques, the existence of an insurgency threat is an added factor which can lead officers to the view that political power should be under their direction. Under these circumstances, there would be a decreased fear of civilian retribution since the perception would be that long-term military rule not only would be capable of handling any immediate internal subversion, but would provide the necessary long-range solution to it.

It should also be noted, as Janowitz argued, that where military weaponry and equipment is particularly technical and complex, there may be a significant "transferability of the professional officer's skill to domestic political activity."⁹⁵ The modern technology of war making may demand military men with considerable engineering, planning, and management skills--skills which can increase the capacity and hence perhaps also the proclivity of officers towards seeing themselves as potential long-term rulers of their nation.

This might especially be the case if military training provides the armed forces personnel with an abundance of skills

which are lacking in the wider society, especially if it is a very traditional one. In such a case, officers might be particularly sensitive to the need for their society to be modernized. These same officers may feel that since the military is the most modern force in the country, it is in the best position to provide the direction and the leadership for a modernizing task.⁹⁶

Since military men, like all others, are conditioned in part by their past experiences, the historical remembrances of officers may influence not only their disposition to intervene (as noted earlier in this chapter) but also their disposition to assume a role of political rulership. For example, if in the past a military establishment seeking to prolong its rule had experienced serious defeats or reversals as a result of civilian retribution, and these incidents are particularly vivid in the minds of the officers, it seems reasonable to propose that they would be disinclined, or at least quite cautious, to reach a decision in favor of direct military control for any protracted period of time, especially if powerful civilian groups would oppose it. If, on the other hand, past experience has shown that civilian sectors are by and large apathetic, unconcerned or in any event impotent to effectively resist military might, officers might have little difficulty in convincing themselves that they have the capabilities needed to rule.

There are other factors that can provide clues to the possible behavior of the officer when assuming power; these relate to the politicization of the officer corps. Naturally,

if in the past bright and ambitious officers have been actively sought out and cultivated by political leaders, it should not be surprising if these same officers became interested in politics.⁹⁷ Also, the existence of political awareness in officers would be self evident if they are known to have organized and/or participated in political cliques within or outside the armed forces. However, what would be more helpful is knowledge of the political positions that the officers have held, since it would provide a better perspective from which to evaluate any tendency which they are likely to take in regard to either an arbiter or political rulership role. For example, if it is known that particular officers in the past have taken the view that the existing political system is unworkable and radical, new measures must be taken which only the military are capable of successfully carrying out; then, if these officers carry out a successful coup, one should not be surprised if they try to perpetuate their rule. On the other hand, if the officers are known allies of long established political parties, one could expect that the actions of these officers after a coup would be related to the political position taken by these parties.

It should also be stated that the past actions of the military officers can provide one way to gauge the sincerity of their statements. If, for example, officers with a past history of personal corruption and disinterest in social issues take over a government and express their intentions of staying in power to carry out revolutionary social transformations, one might be led to seriously question the sincerity of their

statements.

Thus far, a number of propositions have been suggested in regard to the problem of military disengagement from military control. A summary of what has been stated is in order. It was proposed that one way of approaching the problem was to relate the officers' reasons for the intervention to their subsequent behavior. Following this approach, it was suggested that the officers would not tend to perpetuate their rule if they intervened only to attain short-range limited ends or believed that civilians could adequately deal with grievances of a more fundamental and long-term nature. But if the officers intervened with the belief that continued military rule was necessary, they would be inclined to hold onto power. Further, it was added that personal interest motives could provide powerful incentives for continued military rule.

Owing to the complexity of political life, it was also noted that the original motives and attitudes leading to a coup could change; and that such changes could significantly alter the disposition of the military leaders either to relinquish power or to prolong the expected period of military rule. A variety of factors which might result in such changes were noted. It was suggested that factors which might change the attitudes of officers into those in favor of protracted military rule could include personal interests, increased influence of officers with ruler type orientations, petitions by civilian groups for continued military rule, increased security threats, or a more realistic situational appraisal by the officers once power had been attained.

Factors which might lead officers to retreat from their protracted rulership orientation and relinquish control include: an inability to effectively formulate and carry out government policies, organized and intense anti-government public opinion, foreign pressure, and opposition within influential sectors of the officer corps.

It was also proposed that the officers' perception of national security problems, the nature of military training and education, the transferability of military skills to the civilian sector, and the historical remembrances of the officers could all influence their predisposition to relinquish or hold on to power after a coup. Finally, it was suggested that the past actions of different officers could provide clues as to their motives in a coup situation.

The coup phenomenon has so far been presented in essentially abstract terms; it will be given concrete content in the following chapters by application to the Peruvian case study.

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. Irving Louis Horowitz, "The Military Elites in Latin America," in Elites in Latin America, ed., Martin Lipsit and Aldo Solari (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 151.
2. Ruth First, Power in Africa (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), pp. xii-xiv.
3. Eleizer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 246-250.
4. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 264.
5. The utility in making distinctions between long-term predisposing variables and short-term precipitants is well recognized by many social scientists. See, for example, Gabriel Almond et al., Crisis, Choice, and Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), p. 49; Mauricio Solaún and Michael A. Quinn, Sinners and Heretics: The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), p. 207.
6. See Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974), p. 27; Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 177; Lyle N. McAlister et al., The Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution: Four Case Studies (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970), p. 5; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order, p. 196; Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962), *passim*.
7. Solaún and Quinn, Sinners and Heretics, p. 62.
8. Stanislaw Andreski, Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 262.
9. See Huntington, Political Order, pp. 192-198
10. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
11. *Ibid.*

12. Finer's terminology is used only with reluctance since the author is aware of its ethnocentric overtones.

13. Samuel E. Finer, Comparative Politics (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 538.

14. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 110.

15. See *ibid.*, p. 118.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

17. See Huntington, Political Order, p. 197.

18. See Solaun and Quinn, Sinners and Heretics, pp. 8-18, Huntington, Political Order, pp. 197-237.

19. See for example Huntington, Political Order, pp. 78-92.

20. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 72.

21. See Martin C. Needler, "Ecuador 1963," in The Politics of the Coup D'Etat, ed., William G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969), pp. 5-6. See also Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, The Politics of Neo-Militarism in Latin America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 45.

22. See Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 117.

23. Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, p. 98.

24. See *ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

25. See Robert Marrett, Peru (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp. 173-174.

26. See Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, p. 107.

27. Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics," in The Contemporary Middle East: Tradition and Innovation, eds., Benjamin Rivlin and Joseph S. Szyliowics (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965), p. 467.

28. See for example Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule, p. 10; Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 27.

29. Rustow, "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics," p. 467.

30. Egil Fossum, "Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups D'Etat in Latin America," Journal of Peace Research, III (Fall, 1967), p. 234.

31. Ibid., p. 237.
32. Martin Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change, (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 61.
33. First, Power in Africa, p. 17.
34. Ibid., p. 414.
35. Ibid., pp. 196-198.
36. Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 206.
37. Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala: 1944-1954 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1959), pp. 309-313.
38. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 62.
39. See Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule, p. 22; Rustow, "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics," pp. 466-467.
40. See Be'eri, Army Officers, pp. 55-56.
41. Kenneth F. Johnson, Argentina's Mosaic of Discord: 1966-1968 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1969), p. 10.
42. First, Power in Africa, p. 208.
43. Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 208.
44. Ibid., pp. 166-167.
45. Andreski, Parasitism and Subversion, p. 72.
46. Quoted by Needler in Political Development, p. 63.
47. See Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," in Latin America, Reform or Revolution, ed., James Petros and Maurice Zeitlin (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1968), p. 91.
48. See Kurt C. Arnade, "The Technique of the Coup d'Etat in Latin America," in The Evolution of Latin American Government, ed., Asher N. Christensen (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1961), pp. 310-311.
49. Keessing's Contemporary Archives, XV (Keynsham, Bristol: Keessing's Publications Limited of London, 1966), p. 21192.

50. This argument is presented in similar terms in Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule, p. 12.

51. For a discussion of the political intent for including such provisions in the Brazilian Constitution, see Stepan, The Military in Politics, pp. 74-79.

52. The argument appears in Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957).

53. Ibid., p. 84.

54. Lieuwen, for example, has followed Huntington's line of reasoning. As a result, he judges the professional status of military institutions on the basis of whether or not they are participants in the political arena. See Lieuwen's Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), p. 151.

55. See the concluding remarks in Luigi R. Einaudi and Alfred C. Stepan III, Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil. (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, R-586-DOS, 1971), p. 124.

56. Finer, The Man on Horseback, p. 25.

57. See José Nun's article "A Latin American Phenomenon. The Middle Class Military Coup," in Latin America, Reform or Revolution, pp. 145-185.

58. See for example Stanislaw Andreski's discussion in his Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 196-199.

59. Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 52.

60. Ann Ruth Wilner, "Perspectives on Military Elites as Rulers and Wielders of Power." Paper prepared for delivery at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, September 7-12, 1970, p. 3.

61. Ibid, pp. 3-4.

62. The statement by Hobbes appears in Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 177.

63. See William Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," in Latin American Politics, ed., Robert D. Tomasek (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966), p. 231. The amount of political administrative centralization in a country can help determine the degree to which coordinated action

against a variety of pressure points will be needed to successfully carry out a coup. When the capital is the political center or even the cultural-economic hub of a particular country, the logistics of the coup would be potentially less complicated than in countries where power is more decentralized. See Mark N. Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York: Dodd Mead and Co., 1974), p. 5; Edward Luttwak, Coup D'Etat (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1969), pp. 44-45.

64. Introduction by Samuel E. Finer in Luttwak, Coup D'Etat, p. xii. In the more artful executions of the military coup, only an extremely limited use of direct force is needed. Instances exist, for example, where the Palace guards are won over to the conspiracy, open the Palace doors, and allow a few military officers to enter who accompanied by a handful of police and/or army personnel summarily arrest the President. The Peruvian coup d'etat of 1919 is one such case.

65. Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 24.

66. Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, p. 97.

67. See Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule, p. 14; Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 68.

68. Victor Alba, "The Stages of Militarism in Latin America," in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed., John J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 174.

69. Lieuwen notes rivalries such as these in Latin American armies: "the Air Force versus the Army in Ecuador in 1961 and in Guatemala in 1962, the Air Force and Army versus the Navy in Venezuela in 1962, and the Air Force versus the Navy in Argentina in 1963 ... the engineers versus the infantry in Ecuador in 1961 and the cavalry versus the infantry in Argentina in 1962." See Generals vs. Presidents, p. 96.

70. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development, p. 68.

71. See Nur Yalman, "Intervention and Extrication: The Officer Corps in the Turkish Crisis," in The Military Intervenes, ed., Henry Bienen (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. 141-142.

72. Stepan, The Military in Politics, p. 28.

73. Luigi Einaudi, The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, RM-6048-RC, 1969), p. 12.

74. Victor Villanueva, El militarismo en el Perú (Lima: Empresa Grafica T. Scheuch, 1962), p. 210.

75. Needler, Political Development in Latin America, pp. 67-70.
76. Ibid., p. 68.
77. See Rustow, A World of Nations, p. 195.
78. Edward Feit, The Armed Bureaucrats (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), p. 6.
79. See Payne, The Peruvian Coup D'Etat of 1962, passim.
80. See Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 136-149.
81. Ruth First, Power in Africa, pp. 438-441.
82. Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities," in Political Development and Social Change ed., Jason L. Finkle et al, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971) p. 314.
83. Rustow, "The Military in Middle East Society and Politics," p. 469.
84. See First, Power in Africa, p. 439
85. Examples of splits within the officer corps which exist after military intervention can be found in the articles written by Springer, Yalman, and Sohn which appear in Bienen's The military intervenes.
86. Informative background on the Thai military can be found in David A. Wilson, "The Military in Thai Politics," in Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, pp. 253-276. Details of the political demise of Thanom Kittikachorn can be found in The New York Times, October 15, 1973 through October 21, 1973.
87. Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 51.
88. Ibid., p. 57.
89. Ibid.
90. See Edward Bernard Glick, Peaceful Conflict, The Non-Military Unuses of the Military (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1967), pp. 67-99.
91. See ibid., pp. 101-174.

92. See *ibid.*, pp. 33-44.
93. Statement contained in December 1961, National Security Action Memorandum No. 119; appears in *ibid.*, p. 71.
94. Quoted from U. S. Civil Affairs School's Common Subject Lesson Plan; appears in *ibid.*, p. 75.
95. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development, p. 40.
96. See Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in Johnson, The Role of the Military, pp. 76-77.
97. Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development, p. 41.

CHAPTER 2

INSTABILITY, VIOLENCE AND EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY PERU

In Chapter 1 it was argued that military coups d'etat cannot adequately be analyzed in isolation from the political environment in which they take place. One important aspect of that environment is the long-term factors which can exist over an extended period of time and which might make a country particularly vulnerable to seizures of power. Societies especially conducive towards such military interventions were categorized as praetorian, and it was noted that the general features of praetorian societies are political institutions which are weak and under-developed and generally incapable of mediating political differences in an effective manner. It was stated that a major reason why this occurs is that there is a lack of agreement concerning who should rule, by what means, and for what ends. In these societies where the legitimacy assigned to the political institutions is low, the various competing forces confront one another nakedly and utilize whatever means are at their disposal to attain their political objectives.

The environment existing in Peru at the time of the military coup d'etat of 1914 manifested many of the traits of a praetorian society. But a praetorian society was nothing

new in Peru. In fact, Peruvian praetorianism had existed throughout the nineteenth century, becoming manifest even before the last remnants of the Spanish colonial forces were defeated in 1826. To adequately understand and assess the significance of the 1914 coup, one must understand the dynamics of the Peruvian variant of praetorianism. To this end, it becomes necessary to analyze and explain the political dynamics of nineteenth century Peru, many aspects of which, as will be shown in Chapter 3, emerged in the sort of party politics taking place in the early years of the twentieth century. Such a course of action appears to be an appropriate one to pursue in light of the fact that the conditions of a country at any particular point of time are the result of a long chain of events which cannot be overlooked if an intelligible view of the subject is desired.

When discussing nineteenth century Peruvian praetorianism, particular emphasis will be given towards describing and explaining the politics of the military caudillos, since this was among the most characteristic features of Peruvian political life. Further, knowledge of nineteenth century Peruvian caudillos and their armies becomes necessary in order to understand the institutional transformation and professionalism which took place after 1895.

The Development of a Praetorian Society
and Varieties of Instability
in Peru

The Withdrawal of Spanish
Colonial Rule

The immediate impact of the withdrawal of Spanish colonial rule in Peru was political chaos which continued to a greater or lesser extent throughout much of the nineteenth century. At times there simultaneously existed two claimants to the Presidential office; and during one particularly anarchic period, the number rose to seven.¹ In a situation in which political institutions were weak and ineffective, the issue was ultimately resolved by the sword. Caudillismo--the union of personalism and violence for the conquest of power²--predominated. In Peru, throughout the nineteenth century, those caudillos of national prominence almost invariably can be considered military men since they wore the uniform and identified themselves with military life.³ Conspiracy and insurrection became the norm rather than the exception. In fact, at times, a main preoccupation of Peruvian Presidents was to devise means to counter the numerous conspiracies being hatched by their political opponents. President Agustín Gamarra, for example, from 1829 to 1833, had to cope with seventeen conspiracies, headed by no fewer than ten aspirants to power.⁴ This trend continued well into the nineteenth century. Between 1872 and 1876, for example, there were known to be at least thirty seven conspiracies,

subversive movements, and assassination attempts,⁵ most of marginal importance directed primarily at President Manuel Pardo. Force and fraud were the main ways in which power was attained. Electoral procedures analogous to those, say, in the United States or Great Britain, remained a dead letter and very rarely were considered the way to attain power, even among many of the more educated and cultured segments of a society dominated by poverty and ignorance.

Before considering in greater detail the diverse manifestations of praetorianism in nineteenth century Peru, it is important to explain the reasons for it. This is especially so since many of the factors contributing towards the emergence of praetorianism in Peru's early republican history continued all the way up to the period of the 1914 coup and, for that matter, even to the present time.

One must begin with a consideration of colonial Peru, since the impact of its cultural and institutional legacy was profound. Spanish domination over Peru extended for a period of over three centuries, establishing a social and political order which was authoritarian to the core. The legitimacy of the entire system was based on the absolute authority of the Spanish monarchy, which governed through its highest ranking representative, the Viceroy. The Viceroys, who governed in the King's name, "were responsible for revenues, justice, Indian welfare, subordinate appointments, labor regulations--indeed, every department of Spanish rule...came within the Viceregal province."⁶ Also, the enormous distances which separated Peru from Spain tended to augment considerably

the Viceroy's discretionary power and "allowed him to proceed in most cases without reference to...the limits which the King of Spain was in the habit of putting upon his administrative faculties."⁷ Assisting the Viceroy were various judicial and advisory bodies⁸ which at times became so powerful as to share and even usurp Viceregal prerogatives.

The highest posts and hence the greatest opportunities in the colonial administration went to peninsular Spanish aristocrats.⁹ Only lower offices were given to the white criollos.¹⁰ The rapid turnover in the highest posts of the imperial government was reflective of the exploitative character of the system. Such positions not only satisfied demands for royal patronage but also provided an opportunity for the rapid personal gain and self-enrichment which these offices were correctly assumed to afford. Obviously, office holders felt little responsibility to the people in a system where public posts were viewed as concessions for personal gain.

In the economic realm, the exploitative nature of colonial rule was pronounced. A principle reason for Spain's control in Peru was the rapid utilization of the area's resources for the exclusive benefit of the Spanish crown. Toward this end an exclusive trade monopoly in favor of Spain was established which kept the Peruvian colony in a relative state of commercial and industrial reclusion and underdevelopment. As might be expected, it was not the intention of Spain to develop a self-sufficient Peruvian economy. Labor was viewed by the upper class white population, peninsulares as well as criollos, as disdainful and reserved for the conquered Indian masses.

Both the economic restrictions and the vast opportunities to exploit the relatively defenseless Indians, when combined with the geographical isolation not only of Peru from the Spanish metropolis but also of Lima from the rural areas, helped foster a natural tendency among colonials to fall prey to the opportunities of graft, lawbreaking, and excessive arrogation of power. But in the colonial society, if success was to be attained, it would depend to a significant extent on one's family and social ties rather than on individual achievement. This is because, irrespective of one's skills or abilities, participation in enterprises of any sort--whether they be domestic, commercial, political or otherwise--depended almost entirely on the loyalties and obligations that blood and social connections were able to elicit.

To sum up, crucial characteristics of Peru's colonial heritage included authoritarian life styles, a prevalence of graft, lawbreaking, and venality in political and economic life, a heavy dependence on ascriptive and particularistic modes of behavior, and a lack of experience in self government. While the above features were transmitted to an independent Peru, one crucial element was lacking which was needed for the maintenance of political stability: the underlying loyalty to the King. "Whether loyalty to the Spanish King was actual or merely a perfunctory invocation of his name, the fact remains that for all the power of any official and for all the differential between theory and practice, the actions of government were carried out in the King's name, not that of the of-

officials."¹¹ His authority made possible for centuries the continued transference of political authority from one colonial administration to another in relative peace and quiet.

With independence in Peru came a drastic reversal of this state of affairs.¹² Peru's unpreparedness for independence is reflected in the fact that generally the Peruvian criollos not only did not actively seek political separation from Spain, they provided relatively few of the material resources needed to attain it. Independence was imposed rather than sought. That is to say, Peruvian independence was achieved largely through the intervention of outside forces. In this center of Spain's military and political power in America, many of the wealthy criollos had royalist sympathies. As a result, Peru was able to avoid the violence of the independence struggle until José de San Martín landed in Peru in 1820 with forces largely from Chile and Argentina. It is important to note that those Peruvians who finally did join the independence movement to fight against the Spaniards in guerilla bands "were not Indian irregulars or popular forces. They were criollos and mestizos of middle rank and modest fortune whose property and families suffered at the hands of royalists and then sought vengeance."¹³ They were joined by adventurers who fought for plunder and not uncommonly practiced forced recruitment. Also, as the struggle progressed, a number of royalist officers changed sides to fight in favor of the liberation forces.

By and large, the criollos were not avid supporters of either the royalists or those who fought for independence.

They sought first and foremost "to preserve their own position ... [and simply] awaited the victory of the strongest."¹⁴ Lacking in civic spirit and any genuine attachment to the independence movement, the criollos constituted poor material from which an authoritative and stable state could be formed. Likewise, the establishment of strong and effective government was hampered by the multiplicity of armed groups fighting for the cause of independence. In fact, by 1823, the independence forces--Peruvian, Argentinian, Chilean and Colombian--were engaged in intense squabbling as discipline wavered with no single authority being capable of holding the disparate elements together. Simón Bolívar would later recall that in this period "discord, misery, discontent, and egoism reigned everywhere."¹⁵ Not only did this internal discord exist during the independence struggle, it continued after independence had been achieved and the foreign forces withdrawn from the country.

A major problem centered around the fact that with the legitimacy of the King gone, the political-spiritual commonality that had existed abruptly came to an end; and nowhere was to be found any individual or institution able to command the respect, influence, or semi-sacred character of the King. Of course, attempts were made to find new sources of legitimacy, but they invariably failed. As in most of Spanish America, the Peruvians looked abroad for their inspiration. The dominant political ideas during this period were those of the European Enlightenment and those coming from contemporary United States thinkers. The democratic principles

espoused during the independence era offered the only internationally respected alternatives to the idea that legitimate authority derives from royalty sanctified by God's grace. Hence, the Constitutions which were drafted were almost invariably based on republican and democratic principles,¹⁶ and often displayed similarities to the United States Constitution. The problem was that democracy was totally foreign to the traditions of colonial rule and it was unable to be respected in a social order built on the foundations of hierarchy and authoritarianism; and which in general "lacked the support in informal attitudes and behavior which alone could make possible the regular and peaceful transfer let alone the routine acceptance of democratic authority."¹⁷ Democratic Constitutional formulas continued and, although the validity of their principles were seldom denied, the rule of force became the norm. As Jorge Basadre stated, "The reality rebelled against such [democratic] canons."¹⁸

The lack of congruence between an authoritarian socio-cultural configuration and democratic norms prevented the latter's genuine acceptance and institutionalization. The lack of foundations upon which an enduring democratic rational-legal legitimacy could be based, combined with the loss of the traditional legitimacy of the King, resulted in a continuing legitimacy vacuum. In such a situation, political loyalties all but inevitably became based on the unstable foundations of personalities as "the collapse of the supreme authority activated the latent forces of local oligarchies, municipalities, and extended family systems in a struggle for power,"¹⁹

which occurred not only in Peru but in most of independent Spanish America as well.

In part, the violent manner in which these struggles took place was an exaggerated expression of the proclivity for the avoidance of law which was long nurtured in colonial Peru. But other factors also contributed to a political climate where force and violence would become routinized and political stability the exception rather than the rule. One of these factors was that Peru, lacking in a tradition of self-government, possessed no corps of experienced political functionaries which had the skills, interest or necessary involvement to effectively arbitrate the claims of the varied political contenders. This political unpreparedness continued throughout the nineteenth century. From this perspective, it becomes more easy to see that beneath the surface of endemic political disorder there existed an important element of continuity with the colonial past. Although political unpreparedness was a fact of life after independence was achieved, "the matter could be understood not as an absolute contrast between colonial and national epochs, but as a preexistent condition becoming manifest, or as a continuous disability at first latent and then exposed."²⁰

Adding to the above, one could cite another factor which helped precipitate endemic political instability and turmoil in Peru. This was the inability of the state to defend itself.²¹ Even though there was significant discensus in Peru after the wars of independence, this does not necessarily mean that a breakdown of peace and order was inevitable. It could have

been prevented if the state had effectively monopolized supreme power within the national territory. This is essentially the doctrine of Hobbes, who proposed that first and foremost, peace and order can be preserved if the state has the power to over-awe the whole.²² But such a state did not exist in Peru. Neither nascent governments which were established nor any of the competing groups could muster together the forces capable of constituting such overwhelming power. Armed forces remained scattered and dispersed under diverse and competing leaders who operated over terrain which was rugged, covered large distances, and which was often accessible from without only with great difficulty and expense.²³ Such circumstances were particularly pronounced in the first years of the Peruvian republic where state power often extended only up to the gates of the capital, leaving much of the rest of the country under the control of local bosses and nomadic armed bands which flourished in the interior.²⁴

Militarism and Politics in a
Praetorian Society :
Nineteenth Century Peru

It is not particularly difficult to see why the military caudillos predominated politically after independence and throughout most of the nineteenth century. The destruction of colonial power caused a political vacuum in the civilian sector since there was an absence of any social class or civil elite able or willing to take control.²⁵ The Peruvian civilians by and large did little to fight for their independence, and

since they were without political organization²⁶ and broken into rival factions, many civilians were predisposed to recognize military men as their political leaders. Those who did not came out second best in the struggle for power. The army officers not only had the will to power, but the arms and prestige needed to seize it. The military was the chief political instrument of the times; it was what has been called the super-party.²⁷

All the elements of a praetorian society were present. "No political institution, [and] no corps of professional political leaders ... [were] recognized as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exist[ed] among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative method of resolving conflicts."²⁸ The result: the powers of the rival military caudillos confronted each other nakedly and violently. This occurred quite naturally. As Carlos Dellepiane has stated: "The excesses of the elements of war, the abundance of men in arms, the habit of fight which created unsuspected energies and the necessity of employing such warlike activity, unchained equally the tempest of the continued conflicts that were produced in America in that epoch."²⁹

Helping to keep the military men in the limelight in Peru throughout the nineteenth century was the multiplicity of international conflicts which the country faced. These included the conflicts with Bolivia from 1827 to 1828, the war with Colombia from 1828 to 1829, the wars of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation which took place between 1835 and 1839, the war

with Bolivia in 1859, the invasion into Ecuador during 1859 and 1860, war with Spain in 1866,³⁰ and finally the major war with Chile from 1879 to 1883 which has gone down in history as the War of the Pacific.

Peru, especially in the early days of her independence, could not be considered an established polity with clearly defined and widely accepted boundaries. This fact, combined with the lust for power often displayed by influential military men and civilian politicians, undermined Peru's ability to maintain peace with her neighbors. Further, Spain continued to have designs on Peruvian territory. The resulting conflicts helped serve as a justification for the continued existence of the military chieftains who more easily were able to represent themselves as saviors, defenders, and protectors of the nation. Many of these conflicts, especially the War of the Pacific, helped keep the country's civilian forces weak and dependent on the power of the military leaders.

Those military leaders most prominent during the first decades of the republic often held high ranks in the colonial army, before abandoning their posts to fight for the cause of independence.³¹ Many came from distinguished families,³² although later prominent military leaders were increasingly drawn from the intermediary sectors of the society,³³ as well as from more modest origins.

In any case, the military men, in keeping with the past political tradition of colonial Peru, had relatively little desire to disturb the traditional social and economic structure.

They did not alter the economic position of the rural landholding aristocracy, nor were they predisposed to decisively challenge the position of the church officials or raise the social position of the exploited Indians or other lower class sector.³⁴ Their primary concern was power and the psychological gratification and/or material benefits which it could bring. The military career offered one way for men outside of the upper class to overcome the arbitrary restrictions of the social order and attain a level of power, prestige, and wealth which otherwise would not have been available to them.³⁵

As Emilio Romero has stated:

Militarism was the only honorable path through which any cholo or indio of Peru could aspire to the highest posts of public life. The military uniform covered the man of the people and with it he could open his way through the frightened doctors and the delicate counts and marquesses of the aristocracy to the highest posts of the Republic. Gamarra, Salaverry, Castilla, San Roman, never would have attained power as civilians. The Lima elite would have crushed them with their contempt and ridicule. But the cholo Castilla, and the Indian San Roman, were Marshals of the Republic. They were men on horseback who smelled of pisco and dust.³⁶

In such an environment, the Presidency became one of the most sought after positions in Peru, and for the military caudillos this office commonly was considered the culmination of one's career in arms.³⁷ The Presidency meant control of the government and access to the national treasury. Since there were always a large number of ambitious army men who desired to attain the advantages of office, there was continued competition for the Presidential post. But the military caudillos often solicited the aid and the economic support of various civilian groups which often rep-

resented liberal or authoritarian, federalist or centralist tendencies. Not uncommonly, these groups found such alliances convenient since being attached to a caudillo not only meant that an attempt might be made to implement their ideological views, but perhaps more importantly, often meant preferential policies, posts in the administrative structure, and other benefits should the favored caudillo attain power. This was especially important in the early days of the republic since there were only very limited opportunities outside of the state and large landholding in a society of primitive economic development.

As might be expected, the patronage power of the President was great. Furthermore, what P. Dávalos y Lissón has stated in regard to Presidents in early twentieth century Peru is equally applicable to the nineteenth century:

No matter what questions arise or how significant an administrative matter might be, it falls ultimately in the hands of the President, and it is he who must decide favorably or adversely. From the Minister to the lowest employee of the state, who must be seen in the dispatch of some business which concerns the government, comes the same answer to the seeker desirous of results: "See the President, don't waste your time discussing the matter with me."³⁸

Herein lies an important key to understanding the pattern of political conflict which persisted with variations well into the present century: that is, the supreme focus of attention in the government is the President. Often local and regional governments, Congress, and the courts were subordinate to him on important matters. Moreover, the President commonly was able to issue decrees on a wide range of matters.

If he was the one to support when favors were granted, he also was the one to be blamed rather than another state official if the favors were not forthcoming. Needless to say, in a country with limited resources such as Peru, all groups did not get their demands satisfied, and those affected often constituted a potential threat to the President's political existence.

Not uncommonly, the President was empowered to appoint all high state functionaries, which included ministers of state, diplomatic agents, and officers to the notoriously overstaffed armed forces. He also determined who would be included in the civil and military lists, named prefects, sub-prefects, and other local authorities, and decided who would be given retirements and pension benefits.³⁹

Patronage positions which the President dispensed were prized possessions in a society where manual labor was looked down upon,⁴⁰ and where the vast majority lacked the capital and determination to engage in commercial enterprise. Those who were successful in business found patronage positions advantageous since they could be used as a means to further enrich themselves. membership in the state bureaucracy was probably especially sought after in light of the fact that "since colonial times, the bureaucracy was the final aim of aspirations and of the educational system."⁴¹ Recruitment into the bureaucracy was, and to a large degree remains, a favor granted by the President or by officials dependent upon him. If individuals were not able to be included in active

state employment, they could be pensioned and hence receive otherwise unobtainable funds. The practice was widespread both on the civil and military lists. So widespread were pensioning practices that U.S. consular representative Mr. Hovey wrote in 1868 that "nearly every white family, in some way or another, was pensioned."⁴²

But naturally, it was the full-time government positions which were most sought after. Probably, one of the reasons why this was so was because of the special opportunities for material advancement that such positions often afforded, especially in the upper echelons of government. The heritage of the colonial system remained and office holders still felt little responsibility to the public. Governmental office was primarily a position which was expected to be exploited for personal advantage. Not only could these positions be utilized for self-serving policy making, but they also provided special opportunities for graft.

Mr. Christiancy, U.S. consular officer in Peru in 1881, made the following informative comment:

Every man naturally looks only to what he deems his own immediate interest or elevation to power; and when placed in power he seeks only to enrich himself by the opportunities which his office gives him to appropriate public funds for his own use. This has become so settled a conviction in the public mind that whenever any man obtains an office it is at once assumed by the people that such is his object. This opinion is, doubtless, sometimes unjust, but on looking back through the various governments and forms of governments, I am satisfied this conviction is generally well-founded. If, for instance (except in times of war when no administration would dare entertain any claim), any man has a claim against the government, well or ill founded, he could get it allowed by giving a fair share of it to the President and cabinet officers and however good the claim might be, it was seldom allowed without this reward.

Mr. Christiancy went on to state that:

there seems to be no fixed principle of honesty, no idea even of that self sacrificing patriotism which is essential to a proper and honest administration of government.⁴³

If these statements accurately reflect the reality which existed, then such behavior properly cannot be considered a form of corruption since no recognition was present of the differences between public role and private interests.⁴⁴ Rather, when kept within limits, the actions were simply manifestations of traditionally accepted behavior.

The civilians who supported the various military caudillos throughout the nineteenth century were numerous.⁴⁵ Often, newspapers, periodicals, and propaganda sheets edited by eminent civilians became the "news" organs of the various military caudillos. Those who came to power had their propaganda organs; but on the other side, the competing faction or "outgroup" also had its own publications to criticize the extant regime in diatribes often filled with extremism, suspicion, and vituperation. Not surprisingly, such organs at times were published at the risk of government persecution.⁴⁶ The existence of exclusive, partisan communication patterns for competing political contenders even has continued throughout the present century.

Owing to what has been stated, Bourricaud's argument that "the endless struggles and the inexplicable hatreds which place the clans of the Peruvian oligarchy against each other can basically be explained by the competition for favors"⁴⁷ is a convincing one. Furthermore, since government competition in

Peru has been based so often on the material advantages which government office and politics could afford, it also could explain why, as A. J. Duffield stated, "groups or families of despots ... frequently quarrel among themselves, cut each other's throats, and alternately embrace and kiss one another."⁴⁸ When "outgroups" found that they could strike a bargain for patronage and benefits with those in power, their former grievances disappeared or were thrown into the background.

Be this as it may, it would be unfair not to mention that if personal interest motives were commonly involved in political conflict, they were not the only ones. Among other motives which predominated were firstly those of a nationalist coloration, invoking the defense of the country before a traitorous negotiation with the enemy or as a reaction to the humiliating power of foreigners in the national life (1827, 1829, 1835-1838, 1865); secondly, those of a legalistic coloration wherein defense of the Constitution was invoked before a ruler who was considered despotic (1834, 1844); and finally, those of a moralistic coloration evoked during a situation of speculation and waste (1854).⁴⁹ In fact, on the surface, important insurrections rarely seemed to be primarily personal since they tended to be sparked by events or situations which could understandably elicit grievances of a patriotic nature against the President.⁵⁰

It is important to emphasize that, as already noted, in the absence of any legitimate procedures for the resolution of political conflicts, force and violence became the accepted procedures for effecting transfers of governmental power. One

of the keys to the violence capabilities of the military caudillos and their henchmen were their armies. And during much of the nineteenth century, owing "to the fragmented nature of authority and power in the system, coupled with the primitive technology and the ready availability of an exploitable Indian mass..., anyone with significant resources...[could] arm a following and use it to acquire control of the apparatus of the state in Lima, or to keep the central government from interfering in the area under his control."⁵¹ The leaders of these personal armies almost invariably were men of high military rank with long experience in uniform. Civilian caudillos, at least those of national prominence, were a rarity in nineteenth century Peru.

One could find aristocrats and commoners, whites, Indians, and mestizos, rich and poor, the highly educated and illiterates among the caudillos. Commonly, it was only by virtue of extraordinary character traits such as incredible energy, daring, and self-confidence that they were able to successfully reach a position of command and effectively wield power over their armed following. At other times, the power of particular military caudillos was due primarily to the strong support given by various political groupings, often local in character, desirous of maintaining or expanding their power.

The rank and file of the armed parties was generally composed of forcibly recruited Indians, although at times in the larger coastal cities and their outskirts anyone who was not in hiding or under the protection of foreign embassies was likely prey for caudillos seeking to build or strengthen their armies. In such instances, lower class mestizos, mulattos, and negroes were often the most vulnerable to impressment. Convicted criminals were also

among those forced into service when circumstances necessitated it. But commonly, this element, along with adventurers and vagabonds, willingly participated in the armed struggles⁵²--induced by opportunities to rob and pillage with impunity.

When material support did not come voluntarily, robbery and extortion became an important means by which the armies attained the necessary funds and supplies. In one of Peru's more chaotic periods, Samuel Larned, U.S. Charge d'Affairs at Lima, wrote:

No one is secure from the molestation and insult by the numerous armed parties, either in his house, or in the streets; and the latter are deserted by all save the aged, women and children. It is almost impossible to keep a servant, such is the violence and rigor of the impressment. In short, nothing can exceed the state of terror and dismay which pervades all classes; for, besides all the rest, military executions are almost daily in numbers--for desertions, concealment, etc. It is supposed that ... full a thousand persons have been dragged from their homes, and forced to become soldiers within the last few days; and that from seventy five to one hundred thousand have been taken in forced loans and contributions.⁵³

When armies are recruited from the interior, it was the small Indian villages which commonly fell prey to the military caudillos. Clements Markham, commenting on force impressment in the latter decades of the nineteenth century stated that "the villages are surrounded, and all the men that can be caught are driven away to serve in the ranks."⁵⁴ He also noted that

When they are dragged from their homes to defend the quarrels of the Spanish criollos in which they take no interest, they will seldom fight and they often seek the first opportunity of returning home. But when they once believe in a commander,...they become undaunted soldiers.⁵⁵

Similar comments were made by Mr. Christiancy of the U.S. legation in Peru in 1879. He stated:

...these Indians are mild, gentle, and very industrious people..... They are small, wirey men, capable of much greater endurance than any white race I have ever seen,

and only need to be well commanded to make the most formidable armies.⁵⁶

Desertions posed a potential problem for many military caudillos. "In Peru, officers prohibited the playing of Indian flutes for fear that nostalgia invoked by them would be irresistible to the soldiers in the highlands."⁵⁷ Still, desertions occurred and there are known cases where whole units deserted during battle to go over to the opposite side.⁵⁸ In fairness, it must be noted that when a caudillo was popular and fighting for a cause in which the people believed--such as, say, during wartime--the ranks of the army swelled with volunteers.⁵⁹

As should by now be obvious, when we are speaking of nineteenth century Peruvian armies, we are referring to something completely different from the modern armies of today. By and large, their ranks were filled with a motley assortment of individuals lacking in arms, professional training, and regulation uniforms. One interesting aspect of the primitive nature of the early Peruvian armies was the rabana, or the female companion of almost every footsoldier who might have been, but was not generally, his wife. The rajanas lived in the barracks, followed on the long marches, helped carry equipment, cooked meals, and even followed into battle. Further, these women at times served as intermediaries through which sensitive information was passed by officers.⁶⁰

If the rank and file of the armies lacked professional training, so did the commanders who attained their skills and rank almost always not as a result of performance in military academies but on the basis of experience attained in the battlefield. Often promotions represented simply a prize to the supporters of a given caudillo.⁶¹

The national army, or in other words the army of the military caudillo in power, often was basically the same in structure and composition as those of his competitors. The infantry invariably was the largest and most important branch of the service. The cavalry served limited and often only decorative purposes. The artillery acquired importance only when cities were under siege, especially in the second half of the century.

When the army of a particular military President was defeated, its members at times were dropped from service, denied their pension rights, and the officers prosecuted for their complicity with the former President. Quite often, however, their pension rights were restored and they were incorporated, albeit only after long delay, into the national army; that is, the army of the victorious military caudillo.

Although civil war between competing armies, each of which usually numbered several thousand, was a common way of effecting a forcible transfer of power, it must be remembered that any army was basically a loosely held together aggregate of men often lacking in discipline, or a sense of loyalty to their leaders. Hence, conspiracies also emanated from within the ranks of an army attached to a particular ruling caudillo. One of the techniques utilized in such cases, though not a usual one, was a rapid uprising by troops stationed in a garrison, compelling the President to resign.⁶² Sometimes, these plots involved armed bands springing up within the country which seconded the movement by declaring in favor of the rebellious action.

Other Manifestations of Instability in Nineteenth Century Peru

If violence and force used by military caudillos and their armies were basic means by which transfers of political power took place and constituted the most prominent manifestation of praetorianism in nineteenth century Peru, there were also other important indicators of Peru's lack of political institutions able to mediate, refine, and moderate group conflict.

One of these was the general acceptance and use of violence for political ends by various civilian sectors. The least relevant examples of such violence in terms of impact on national life were the varied rural Indian rebellions which occurred throughout the nineteenth century which were usually local, autonomous, without fixed plan and which also failed to bring any long-term relief from their exploited condition. More important in terms of their political ramifications were the numerous popular uprisings emanating from urban centers which, especially when occurring in Lima, could pose a direct threat to the incumbent's hold on power.

Throughout nineteenth century Peru, large sectors of the urban population were either unemployed or underemployed, beggars or vagabonds who constituted a mass of people who not only were poor but who also had no definite or recognized place in society at all. In such an exposed and defenseless position, they constituted a volatile element in the society,

especially in light of the fact that for them, as for practically all other sectors of the society, there existed no intermediary institutions through which grievances and claims could be pressed. The existence of such a population even predated Peru's independence when "the propertied classes of Lima were terrified by the licentiousness of the populace and the coloured people of this city and its environs, who exceeded whites by a third and who were arrogant, insubordinate, and lawless."⁶³ Such a population existed throughout the Republic and was liable to react very sharply to any disruption in the normal, familiar, pattern of life; when given direction, this reaction was able to pose a threat to the President and the government which could serve as a focus of discontent.⁶⁴ Likewise, even more secure sectors of the civilian population such as shopkeepers, artisans, and journeymen joined in the commotions when political issues were particularly intense or when there was a threatening economic condition. Perhaps the most notable of these revolts occurred in 1872 when Colonel Tomás Gutiérrez and his three brothers overthrew Colonel José Balta.⁶⁵ The unpopularity of this action helped set off a wide undercurrent of discontent which had been simmering in the civilian sector due to increased and widespread economic distress.⁶⁶ The end result was a wide-scale rising against the action of the Gutiérrez brothers, three of whom died at the hands of the furious mobs.

Armed conflict was found not only outside the institutional channels for resolving conflict, but within those channels as well. In democratic countries such as the United

States, elections are the basic means through which peaceable transfers of political power are effected. In nineteenth century Peru, if one was to read its Constitutional prescriptions, he would obtain the impression that elections served the same function.⁶⁷ In fact, the electoral situation which existed was a praetorianized distortion since elections were decided more by force than by suffrage. They reflected the weak institutional arrangements in a country where the foundations necessary for the proper functioning of democratic procedures were absent.

Elections, either for the Congress or the Presidency, were numerous in nineteenth century Peru. They took place, for example, in 1840, 1842, 1845, 1855, 1862, 1867, 1868, 1872, 1875, 1876, 1886, 1890, 1895 and 1899. "In 1840, 1845, 1855, 1868, 1886, 1890, [and] 1895, they were simple formalities to consolidate a warlike triumph,"⁶⁸ or in other words, the assumption to power of a caudillo through an armed struggle. "In 1842, they were not completed because the candidates advanced themselves by means of a golpe de cuartel."⁶⁹ Only in 1872 did the opposition candidate win through the votes of the people. The other elections were fraudulently conducted and often served to legitimize the continued power of the government in office.

The electoral procedures, by United States standards, could be called scandalous. The people voted for election boards, or comisiones receptoras, as they were called. The competition generally took the form of a warlike struggle to

win control of the polling booths which were placed in open spaces, or squares. It was understood that those who controlled the booths were in a position to win the election. The struggle took place between armed bands from the lower class who were commonly paid by the different political contenders. At times, even before election day had arrived, the opposing groups engaged in numerous and frequent conflicts, causing bloodshed and death. During the elections, the "authorities were a decisive factor. Disguised or undisguised soldiers often intervened,"⁷⁰ fighting on the side of the government-backed candidate when necessary, and this helps to explain why such candidates almost invariably won.⁷¹

In a communique from Mr. Gibbs of the U.S. legation in Peru in 1875, a good description is given of what one of these elections was like. He stated:

As the day of the taking of the booths approached, fears were entertained of a bloody strife, and great alarm existed among all classes.

...All stores were closed, and the streets nearly deserted, the various clubs were formed, armed, and placed in buildings near the polling tables, to begin the strife during the night, so as to have them by daylight. About midnight, firing could be heard until about 6 in the morning, except in the Parish of Santa Ana, where the contest was held until about 10 a.m.; the adherents of Prado had taken all the tables, and by this act he was declared the successful candidate In Lima, the number of deaths officially given is 25, and wounded some sixty or more. The military and police arrangements of the government to preserve order were admirably carried out; if they had not, I think the loss of life would have been immense, and the strife would have existed many days. All establishments, banks, hotels, and stores were closed; great parts of the inhabitants were in their houses, with closed doors; and the city had the appearance of a place afflicted and abandoned during two days.⁷²

The electoral process for Congressmen often did not end on election day. What ensued further exemplified the frailty

of Peruvian democratic procedures. The defeated group at the electoral booths did not resign, they simply feigned the elections of another booth, and hence brought the final decision to the legislative chambers which passed upon the credentials of their members. But such action was of little significance since in nineteenth century Peru, the legislature was commonly controlled or dominated by government partisans.

When executive-legislative conflict occurred or threatened to occur, the President attempted, usually successfully, in one way or another, to make the Congress subservient to him. In fact, one of the main tendencies of the Chief Executive in keeping with Peru's authoritarian heritage which occurred not only in the last century but in the present one as well, has been to usurp or attempt to usurp the powers of the legislative branch. For the most part, Congresses free and independent of the President have not existed in Peru. Presidents have made or have attempted to make the Congress subservient in a number of ways. For example, at times, the President has demanded that Congress accept government policy or acquiesce in the seating of his favorites. At other times, the Chief Executive has prevented the seating of duly elected officials, has imprisoned and prosecuted opposition members of Congress despite their Constitutional immunity, or has hired agents to intimidate the Congressmen in a variety of different ways in order to convince them to toe the government line.⁷³ The net result of such actions by the President has been under most circumstances to keep the Congress a weak and ineffective check on his prerogatives.

As a reaction to the legislatures' subservience to the President, the Deputies, not being able to effectively fight with the President, commonly attacked him through his Ministers of State who constituted the formal heads of the administrative departments. Their job was to advise the President, provide him with counselors, oversee the respective branches, and also to limit the personal power of the Chief Executive since, by virtue of the Constitution of 1860, all of his acts, in order to be valid, needed the accord of each Minister in the respective branches.⁷⁴ The President alone had the power to name Ministers of State with the powers to remove them being a dual one lodged with both the President and the Congress. Since the President could always pick ministers whom he could dominate and who were favorable to his policies,⁷⁵ the legislature's response was with relative frequency to overthrow ministers by using their vote of censure,⁷⁶ with no power to replace them.

Table 1

Changes in Government ⁷⁷ Ministers, 1886-1919 (33 years, 1 month)	
Minister of Foreign Relations	46
Government	70
War	64
Justice	57
Finance	65
	303 Total

A good example of the extent of Ministerial instability during the end of the nineteenth century, which overflowed into the twentieth, can be seen in Table 1. During a 33 year, 1 month period, there were 303 Ministerial changes in five major government departments. The changes were due mainly to legislative votes of censure although Presidential action and that of groups working outside of the Congress also played a part.⁷⁸

It is important to recognize that such instability took place even when the Congressional majority was of the same party as the President. This is reflective of the fact that nineteenth and early twentieth century political parties not always constituted tightly knit, well disciplined organizations. Quite the contrary was often the case. Like the armies of the military caudillos, the political parties were basically loosely formed cliques or coalitions of individuals most commonly gravitating around a single leader. The parties had almost no basis for maintaining discipline outside of patronage benefits and the personal appeal and capabilities of their leaders. In Peru, this has proved to be not too solid a foundation upon which to base party discipline inside or outside of the legislative chambers. More will be said about the nature of the political parties later in this work. Suffice it to say here that the unstable foundations of the political parties along with their lack of cohesiveness, institutionalized mass support, or effective internal institutional

characteristics is another manifestation of political debility in a praetorian society which has made more difficult the smooth functioning of government.

Summary

Thus far, the thrust of this chapter has been to describe and explain varied aspects of politics in the praetorian society of nineteenth century Peru. It was argued that the roots of Peruvian praetorianism go back at least to colonial times where a rigidly authoritarian socio-political order was established and where lawbreaking, venality, and graft became common in interpersonal dealings. Also, the system was one which depended heavily upon ascriptive and particularistic modes of behavior.

With independence came a breakdown of the traditional legitimacy of the King, with new sources of legitimacy failing to provide a viable substitute. The adoption of unrealistic constitutions, the lack of politically experienced personnel, and the institutional weakness of the state all helped to make conditions propitious for endemic instability.

Political conflicts primarily centered around control of the Presidential office, which afforded greatly expanded opportunities for quick advancement nonexistent in the wider society. The struggles commonly were decided by the use of

naked force in the battlefield. Owing to the prestige and power capabilities of the military caudillos, they were the ones who almost always were in the political limelight and in control of the government. Contributing to this state of affairs throughout much of the nineteenth century was a lack of politically organized civilian sectors which could act as an effective counterpoise to the power of the military men. Nonetheless, civilian sectors were quite prepared to condone and employ violence when it could serve their interests.

The praetorian nature of elections, Presidential usurpation of the legislature, and Ministerial instability are further examples of the unruliness which pervaded the political atmosphere of nineteenth century Peru.

Evolutionary Change in Nineteenth Century Peru

If lack of consensus, weak political institutions, endemic instability, and the political predominance of military caudillos were distinguishing features of political life in the nineteenth century, Peru at the end of that century was in important ways different from Peru at the dawn of independence, and these differences helped change the contours of political conflict as that country entered the present century, in

simplest terms, although force and violence would continue to be a political fact of life, political power shifted from the military caudillos into the hands of the big aristocratic families of Lima. This section will briefly describe the jagged manner in which that process gradually took place.

Peru had its first Constitution in 1823, but it was only in 1872 that Manuel Pardo became Peru's first civilian President. Before that time, political parties were virtually nonexistent.⁷⁹ Power was controlled by a variety of military chiefs, and the politically fragmented civilian elites preferred to ally themselves to the various military power competitors. This period of Peru's history best approximates what Finer calls a minimal political culture since there existed no effective civilian counter-elites to block or significantly interfere with the power pretensions of the military men. Those popular outbursts which posed a threat to an existing military regime all fell under the direction of military caudillos. Civilian elites did not have the popularity, capability, or disposition to use simmering discontent among the masses as a means to attain the Presidency. Manuel Pardo and his Civil Party was the exception.

To understand Pardo's assumption of political power, one needs to understand changes which occurred in Peru's economy since the two are related. The economic changes were due to the commercialization of the guano industry, which first rose to prominence in the 1840s. Guano sales became a remarkable and important source of new wealth and prosperity for many years afterwards. In fact, much of the government revenues

came from these sales. "Between 1851 and 1868...there sprang up in Lima a new class of Peruvian entrepreneurs who used the growing supply of capital and the natural preference granted under the law of 1848 to make large profits."⁸⁰ The law of 1848 stipulated that Peruvian citizens would be given preference in the awarding of all future consignment contracts for the sale of the government owned guano.⁸¹ The new class of guano entrepreneurs quickly rose to attain leadership positions in Lima society, and joined through marriage and social ties the old colonial nobility,⁸² impoverished by the independence struggle though conserving its social power.⁸³ A strong community of commercial and financial interests began to emerge in Peru among this group. As long as their economic interests were not threatened by the military caudillos, they were not overly concerned with displacing the military men from positions of political power.

But when the condition of the Peruvian commercial and financial interests began to worsen, members of the economic elite found increasing appeal in the idea of having as President a civilian able to overcome the economic mishandling of the men in uniform and their advisors. This state of affairs occurred during the administration of Colonel José Balta, who ruled from 1868 to 1872. Initially, Balta's rise to power was supported by the consignment contractors of guano who integrated the upper class. But this support gradually eroded when in an attempt to cope with serious budget deficits, Balta backed his Finance Minister, Nicolás de Piérola, when he cancelled the system of awarding consignment contracts to Peruvians.

That system was replaced with a contract to the Dreyfus House of Paris, which was given the right to handle all guano sales. Any long-range ameliorative effects which the Dreyfus contract would have had on the Peruvian economy came to nought when Balta's reckless railroad building campaign brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy. Peru's first political party emerged as a plutocratic-aristocratic reaction to the Dreyfus contract,⁸⁴ as the economic situation worsened in 1871. Not suprisingly, it was composed in the great majority of the old contractors of guano whose source of wealth had been cut off by the Dreyfus contract. The Civilista Party, as it was called, not only put forth a program in opposition to Balta's economic policies, it pursued an anti-clerical and anti-militarist program as well.⁸⁵ The Civilists sought to take education out of the Church's hands, and once in power they even went so far as to pass a law forbidding the Jesuit Order from residing within Peru's borders. Of equal, if not greater, importance, the Civilists sought to decrease the influence of the military in politics,⁸⁶ which was regarded as a source of incompetence and waste. Such a policy not only elicited Church hostility, it also resulted in serious antagonisms within the military.

In 1872, the Civil Party put up Manuel Pardo--one of the most vociferous critics of the Dreyfus contract--to run in the elections for President. This act elicited further discontent within many sectors of the military which bitterly opposed and feared the idea of a civilian as Chief of State. Such antipathy made military sectors determined to prevent Pardo's assumption

of power. As a result, several officers, with the aid of army troops, overthrew President Balta, who at the last moment was unwilling to prevent Pardo from assuming power though he had intended to do so. But Pardo would not be denied his victory.

Economic stress was widespread by the end of Balta's administration. The price of food had risen alarmingly, and many factories were closed due to their inability to keep up with foreign competition. The coup against Balta, which was aimed at preventing Pardo from assuming power, served as a focus for the discontent of the masses, who were egged on and supported by military sectors that had declared in favor of Pardo, by members of the Congress, and by Civilista clubs in Lima. The result was a large popular and successful insurrection against the coup makers resulting in Pardo's ascension to the Presidency.

It was the first time that countervailing power against military pretensions to power had proved successful; and, as a result, as Finer would state, there was a sudden jump in the level of political culture existing at that time.⁸⁷ No longer could the society be considered one of simply minimal political culture, since now there were known to exist counterpressures against the military that could prove effective.

One of the major policies of Pardo upon attaining power was to strengthen the country's counterpressures against the military. He did this not by trying to build a strong grass-roots political organization. Rather, Pardo focused his attention on building a strong national guard. This was an

armed body, parallel to the army but independent from it, whose members were mostly stationed in Lima, but who also operated in Callao and other areas as well. Its numerical strength in Lima exceeded that of the capital's army garrison; and, in total, the national guard may have contained more troops than the regular army.⁸⁸ Members of the Civil Party rather than army officers were named chiefs of the national guard.⁸⁹ This fact probably is an important reason why the national guard remained completely loyal to Pardo during his administration. Nonetheless, during Pardo's Presidency numerous uprisings occurred, but they were all unsuccessful--in many cases owing to the armed action of the national guard.

But since many uprisings did occur, it is obvious that there existed significant sectors of discontent. Pardo had realized that one of the reasons for Peru's continued budgetary problems was the maintenance of a very large active duty list of army officers. To offset this condition, Pardo reduced the army and retired a great many military men.⁹⁰

Hence, there emerged a large number of officers whose careers and economic positions were adversely affected by Pardo's policies. These men, combined with some low-ranking active duty soldiers, constituted an important though unsuccessful subversive element.

Also, there existed important civilian political opponents to Pardo. There were, first, the numerous public officials of the previous regime who found themselves without positions; and second, the conservative forces of the country such as that part of the old aristocracy which was not commingled with

the new plutocracy and who objected to Pardo's liberal policies. The power of these conservative forces was concentrated in urban centers of the interior such as Puno, Cuzco and Arequipa and these places constituted an important base of support for a number of anti-Civilist conspiracies.

It was during this period that Nicolás de Piérola, the Finance Minister of Balta, began his conspiratorial and subversive activity. He represented many of the discontented sectors and had a large base among the traditional aristocracy and the clerical element.⁹¹ He was the major civilian caudillo of the nineteenth century, and spent many years of his life engaging in subversive movements to overthrow various governments. His appearance represented a significant change from the past when the political struggles for power were dominated almost completely by military men. He was a new type of power contender--the civilian, with good background, often highly educated and representing various social sectors or business interests, who takes up arms and with his followers rebels against constituted authority. The civilian caudillo would be an increasingly important power contender in the opening years of the twentieth century and would signify the dwindling importance of the old style militarist.

But for much of the nineteenth century, the traditional military caudillos would re-emerge to the position of political prominence which was temporarily eclipsed by their civilian opponents. If Pardo was successful in coping with violent insurrections directed against him in the wake of widespread opposition from diverse political sectors, he and

cohorts still found themselves unable to ameliorate the economic situation which worsened under Civilista rule as the budget deficit remained, exports contracted, money was devalued, and the pauperization of the poor intensified. Under such conditions, the Civilistas found themselves unable to maintain their popularity or cohesion and completely incapable of finding a suitable civilian successor to replace Pardo. Conditions were ripe for the return of the military man. With some Civilista support, General Ignacio Prado in 1876 assumed the Presidency after successfully defeating his opponent Rear Admiral Lizardo Montero in typically bloody elections.

In light of widespread opposition, deteriorating economic conditions, the inability of the Civilista Party to maintain its internal cohesion, and the willingness of many of its important members to support a military candidate for the Presidency, civilian rule had proved to be based on extremely weak foundations. But perhaps the main reason for the prolonged re-emergence of the military caudillos in the late nineteenth century was Peru's devastating defeat in the War of the Pacific, which, as previously noted, lasted from 1879 to 1883. During the war the fragility of the political system was apparent as the various competing civilian and military factions were unable to strongly align themselves. Moreover, "in the face of the enemy, the army tended to fragment into personalist factions which had characterized it during most of the nineteenth century."⁹²

Lack of enthusiasm for the war in the face of numerous Peruvian military defeats, combined with strong political

opposition undoubtedly prompted President Prado to leave the country, although the official reason given was to personally supervise the purchase of war equipment abroad. Under such demoralizing circumstances, numerous army units mutined against General Luis La Puerta, who had been placed in charge during Prado's absence. As the situation grew increasingly worse, La Puerta finally yielded the Presidency to Nicolas de Piérola (who was a major participant in the revolt and the army's declared favorite). But this return to civilian rule was short lived. By the end of the war, whatever chance there previously may have been for continued civilian rule had quickly vanished.

Peru was devastated, the economy was at a standstill, and numerous families of fortune were ruined,⁹³ largely owing to the occupation and sacking of Lima by Chilean forces. By and large, civilians interested more in rebuilding their economic position than on regaining political power acquiesced before the power pretensions and the armed conflicts of the various military caudillos who for more than a decade would be entrenched in power. The military was in power by default in a period of national demoralization; members of the Civilista Party would formally ally themselves with the militarists during this era in the hopes of attaining influence in the government. The various attempts by Nicolas de Piérola to unseat them through force of arms were completely unsuccessful.

While various power struggles were going on, Peru's economic reconstruction took place. It involved a situation in which the guano industry would play a much less important role in the country's economy than in the past. Instead, the economy relied on the exploitation and commercialization of a diversified set of raw or partially treated export products. As in the past, there emerged an import industry based on a narrow internal market. In the export sector, a coastal sugar and cotton industry was vigorously organized and developed. Along with this, copper and petroleum and other extractive industries grew in importance, as well as banking and insurance agencies needed to handle the nation's finances. Although much of the country's economy was in the hands of foreign interests, a new indigenous financial and commercial elite developed, working in collaboration with foreign interests. This new elite filled the ranks of the Civilista Party, which consisted mainly of "large urban property holders, the important sugar and cotton producers, the owners of prosperous businesses, and the most successful lawyers, doctors, and professors." ⁹⁴

Though poorer than the oligarchy of the past,⁹⁵ their interest in controlling the state intensified in the early 1890's, when the military rulers showed no interest in relinquishing political control or in providing civilian sectors with increased political decision-making power. The Civilistas were not alone in seeking to wrest political power from the military men. Nicolás de Piérola, maintaining his base of support with the more traditional sectors of the oligarchy

from the interior and still popular with clericalist sectors, not only continued to have aspirations for power but now was willing to ally himself with the Civilistas who in the past has been among his main political opponents as a lingering result of the Dreyfus contract. Their target was General Andrés Cáceres, head of the Constitutional Party or the Militarist Party, as it was referred to since it was composed largely of military officers. The union of the Democratic Party of Piérola and the Civilista Party proved effective. With the financial backing of the wealthy Civilista elite, Piérola--long-time conspirator and leader of armed parties--was able to successfully organize, equip, and command an army composed of guerilla bands which operated in varied sections of the country. The civil war which lasted months was finally decided in Lima. There, the force of montoneros,⁹⁶ assisted by armed civilians in the city, battled government troops for two days until a truce was called and General Cáceres stepped down from power. Elections were called, and Nicolás de Piérola, the charismatic and audacious leader of his quickly improvised army, became President of Peru. The military forces of Cáceres were in disarray.

Once again, civilian elites constituted an effective counterbalance to the power pretensions of the military caudillos, though still in a society lacking strong political institutions. What would follow has been called the Golden Age of the Oligarchy. For almost two decades, the military would remain in the barracks as the Presidency passed to a succession of civilians who largely represented the interests of the rich-

est and most prestigious families of Lima.

It was during this period that important changes took place within the military. For the first time in Peru's history an intensive effort was made to reorganize and professionalize the military institution. The next chapter will describe that process, assess its significance, and suggest possible factors which could account for the political passivity of the military prior to 1912, when Guillermo Billinghurst became President. With such information, one can better understand the military institutional context in which the military coup d'etat against Billinghurst in 1914 took place--not only the first military coup against Constitutional authority in the twentieth century, but the first to take place during a strong and sustained effort to professionalize the military. Furthermore, the next chapter will consider the changes in and the nature of the environment in which politics took place during this period.

NOTES

Chapter 2

1. Jorge Basadre, Historia de la República del Perú, 10 vols. (Lima: Talleres Gráficos P.L. Villanueva, S.A., 1961-1964), Vol. I, p. 409.
2. Robert L. Gilmore, Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela 1810-1910 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1964), p. 47.
3. As will later be noted, in nineteenth century Peru, the major civilian caudillo was Nicolás de Piérola.
4. Basadre, Historia, I, p. 320.
5. Ibid., IV, pp. 1966-1968.
6. Charles Gibson, Spain in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 93-94.
7. Alexander Garland, Lima in 1906 (Lima: La Industria, 1908), p. 33. On the certain irrelevance of law in Spanish America, see Gibson, Spain in America, pp. 109-111.
8. Gibson, Spain in America, p. 94.
9. The peninsular was the individual born in Spain who came to America.
10. The criollo was the individual of Spanish descent who was born in America.
11. William H. Beezley, "Caudillism: An Interpretive Note," Journal of Inter-American Studies, XI (1969), pp. 346-347.
12. A very readable discussion on the effects of the cessation of the legitimacy of the Spanish King and continued instability is in Frank Tannenbaum's Ten Keys to Latin America (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), pp. 145-153. Similar discussions can be found in Needler, Political Development, pp. 24-26; and Gibson, Spain in America, pp. 205-212.
13. John Lynch, The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1973), p. 181.
14. Ibid., p. 266.
15. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 268.

16. Jorge Basadre, La multitud, la ciudad, y el campo en la historia del Perú (Lima: Editorial Huascarán, S.A. 1947), p. 156.
17. Needler, Political Development, p. 25.
18. Jorge Basadre, Perú: problema y posibilidad (Lima: Librería Francesa Científica y Casa Editorial E. Rosay, 1931), p. 25. The distinction between el país legal and el país real or profundo is one which has commonly been made by Peruvian intellectuals. The "legal" country is that appearing in abstract Constitutional constructions and the "profound" country being the reality which the Constitution does not represent. See José Pareja Paz-Soldan, ed., Las constituciones del Perú (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica, 1954), p. 45. Note also the interesting comment made in Graham H. Stuart, The Governmental System of Peru (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1925), p. 19. "Rebellious individualism is the bête noir of Peruvian politics and Peruvian government. Perhaps nowhere can be found a greater respect for the theories of constitutional government or keener appreciation of its value than in Peru; yet, at the same time, there is a careless disregard of or a smiling indifference to the practice of its principles."
19. Richard M. Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in The Founding of New Societies, ed., Louis Hartz (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, Inc., 1964), p. 162.
20. Gibson, Spain in America, p. 210.
21. Basadre, Perú, p. 25.
22. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan in Hobbes, Selections, ed., Frederick J.E. Woodbridge (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1930), pp. 252, 335-336, 339-340.
23. On the difficulty and expense involved in transporting goods to Peru's interior, see W.M. Matthew, "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru 1820-70," Economic History Review, XXI (December 1968), p. 568. See also Basadre, La multitud, p. 155.
24. See for example the letters of Samuel Larned, U.S. Chargé d'Affairs at Lima, to John Forsyth, Secretary of the United States, March 26, 1835; November 16, 1835 in Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs 1831-1860, ed., William R. Manning, Vol. X (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938), pp. 331, 373. An insightful observation on the coastal outlaws in the early years of the Republic was provided in J.J. Von Tschudi's Travels in Peru (London: David Bogue, 1847), pp. 194-195. He stated: "All the inhabited parts of the coast of Peru, especially the districts adjacent to Lima and Truxillo, are infested largely by robbers, and travelling is thereby rendered extremely unsafe. These bandetti are chiefly runaway slaves,

free negroes, zamboes and mulattos. Most of the highway robbers who infest the coast of Peru belong to extensive and systematically organized bands, headed by formidable leaders, who maintain spies in the towns and villages, from whom they receive regular reports. They sometimes prowl about in parties of thirty or forty, in the vicinity of the capital, and plunder every traveller they encounter."

25. See Victor Villanueva, 100 años del ejército Peruano: frustraciones y cambios (Lima: Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1971), p. 13.

26. Victor Villanueva, El militarismo, p. 18.

27. Carlos Miro Quesada Laos, Radiografía de la política Peruana (Lima: Páginas Peruanas, 1959), p. 9.

28. Huntington, Political Order, p. 196.

29. Carlos Delleplane, Historia militar del Perú (Buenos Aires: n. p., 1941), p. 283.

30. Ibid., p. 285.

31. See Manuel de Mendiburu, Biografía de generales repúblicanos (Lima: Editorial Lumen, 1963), *passim*.

32. See *ibid*.

33. See Victor Villanueva, Ejército Peruano: del caudillaje anárquico al militarismo reformista (Lima: Librería-Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1973), p. 28.

34. Ibid., pp. 44-45.

35. Villanueva, El militarismo, p. 22.

36. Emilio Romero, Historia económica del Perú (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1949), p. 454. quoted in Luigi Einaudi, The Peruvian Military (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, D-14465-RC, 1969), p. 11.

37. Villanueva, El militarismo, p. 22.

38. Pedro Dávalos y Lisson, La primera centuria, 2 vols. (Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, 1919), Vol. I, p. 61.

39. Many of these powers could be found written into the various Constitutions promulgated during the nineteenth century. See Paz-Soldan, Las constituciones, *passim*.

40. See the interesting comments made in a letter by Mr. Christianity to Mr. Blaine, May 4, 1881 in U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, transmitted to Congress, with the Annual Message of the President, 1881 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1881), p. 902. The letter states: "Labor is looked down upon

as a disgrace and degradation, and as only fit for a servile race. Any man of standing in Lima, today, who purchases an article at a store, however small the package, would at once lose caste if he dared to take it home in his hand. He must have a servant carry it for him." See also A.J. Duffield, Peru in the Guano Age (London: Richard Bentley and Sons, 1877), p. 11. Duffield writes: "Idleness among the upper classes, i.e., the whole white population ... is the order of the day and is punished by no one." Also commenting on the disdain for work in Peru was Von Tschudi in Travels in Peru, p. 92. He stated that: "... [The white creollos] are disinclined to any kind of active exertion. If they ride the distance of ten miles, they think they have performed a feat of heroism worthy to be recorded in the state archives They shrink from anything that demands intellectual exertion. In short, they are sworn enemies of business of every kind, and those who are obliged to work for their own support, make choice of some occupation which, like that of a shopman, affords them ample time to smoke cigars and gossip with their neighbors."

41. Romero, Historia económica, p. 446, quoted in Margoli Sarfatti Larson, and Arlene Eisen Bergman, Social Stratification in Peru (Berkeley: Institute of International Affairs, 1969), p. 116.

42. U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1868, vol. II, p. 506.

43. Ibid., 1881, p. 903.

44. See Huntington, Political Order, p. 60.

45. A list of some of the prominent Peruvian civilians and the military caudillos that they were attached to can be found in Miro Quesada, Radiografía, p. 11.

46. See Carlos Miró Quesada Laos, Historia del periodismo Peruano (Lima: Talleres Gráficos P.L. Villanueva, S.A., 1957), *passim*.

47. François Bourricaud, "Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy," Studies in Comparative International Development, II (1966), p. 25.

48. Duffield, Peru in the Guano Age, p. 140.

49. Basadre, Perú, p. 27.

50. Ibid.

51. Liisa North, Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1966), pp. 8-9.

52. See Von Tschudi, Travels in Peru, p. 201. As might be expected, the integration of criminal elements into the army caused much fear among the population. Von Tschudi, on the page cited above, vividly describes the general reaction when a corps composed of the criminal elements (categorized as montoneros) arrived at Lima: "... a universal panic pervades the city On every side are heard cries of 'cierra puertas!' (close the doors) 'Los montoneros!' Every person passing along the streets runs into the first house he comes to, and closes the doors after him. In a few moments the streets are cleared, and no sound is heard but the galloping of the montoneros' horses."
53. Samuel Larned, U.S. Chargé d'Affairs at Lima, to John Forsyth, Secretary of the United States, in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, p. 357.
54. Clements R. Markham, The Wars Between Peru and Chile, 1879-1883 (New York: R. Worthington, n.d.), p. 99.
55. Ibid.
56. United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1879, p. 819.
57. John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 49.
58. See for example, the letter of Mr. Hovey to Mr. Seward, January 14, 1868 in U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1868, p. 841.
59. The most pronounced cases in the nineteenth century probably occurred during the War of the Pacific.
60. See Leonidas Castro Bastos, ¡Golpismo! (Lima: Editorial Librería y Imprenta "D. Miranda," 1962), p. 40; Markham, The Wars Between Peru and Chile, p. 100; E. George Squier, Peru Illustrated (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1877), p. 46.
61. "La ley de ascensos en el Perú," Boletín del Ministerio de Guerra y Marina (No. 1, 1905), p. 36.
62. Perhaps the best known of these coups in the nineteenth century was the forcible ouster of President Balta in 1872.
63. López Aldana to Castellí, March 10, 1811, quoted in Pablo Macera, Tres etapas en el desarrollo de la conciencia nacional (Lima, 1955), pp. 88-89; requoted in Lynch, The Spanish-American Revolutions, p. 158.
64. Popular revolts emanated both from within and outside the capital. In some instances, news of a localized uprising quickly led to similar outbreaks in divergent parts of the country.

65. A brief account of the incident can be found in Felipe de la Barra, Objetivo: Palacio de Gobierno (Lima: Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1967), pp. 88-100.
66. See Vallanueva, Ejército Peruano, pp. 91-92.
67. See Paz-Soldan, Las constituciones, passim.
68. Basadre, La multitud, p. 232.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Books containing information on nineteenth century Peruvian elections include Basadre, La multitud, pp. 232-233; Castro Bastos, ¡Golpismo!, p. 34; Dávalos y Lissón, La primera centuria, pp. 129-130; Stuart, The Governmental System of Peru, p. 119.
72. Mr. Gibbs to Mr. Fish, October 20, 1875, in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1876, p. 415. See also Miro Quesada Laos, Autopsia de los partidos políticos (Lima: Tall. Gráf. de la Lib. e Impr. "Minerva," 1961), p. 75.
73. See J.M. Manzanilla, El poder legislativo del Perú (Lima: Imprenta La Industria, 1903), p. 15.
74. Previous Constitutions had similar requirements.
75. At times, the Presidents named compromise Ministers to try to satisfy the wishes of various groups within the legislature.
76. See Dávalos y Lissón, La primera centuria, p. 63; Paz-Soldan, Las constituciones, p. 916.
77. The information in the chart comes from Paz-Soldan, Las constituciones, p. 919. During the period covered in the chart, power was held by military men for a period covering 9 years, 11 months, and 2 days.
78. Ibid., p. 922.
79. Stuart, The Governmental System, p. 113.
80. Jonathan V. Levin, The Export Economies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 83-84.
81. Ibid., p. 77.
82. Basadre, Perú, p. 109.

83. Ibid., p. 108.
84. José Raúl Cáceres, El pasmo de una insurgencia (Lima: Ed. Perú, 1942), pp. 46, 50.
85. See Miro Quesada Laos, Autopsia, p. 30.
86. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
87. See Finer, The Man on Horseback, pp. 136-137.
88. Villanueva, Ejército Peruano, p. 102.
89. Ibid.
90. See Miro Quesada Laos, Autopsia, p. 53.
91. See Mr. Gibbs to Mr. Fish, January 13, 1876 in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1876, p. 416; Cáceres, El pasmo, pp. 46, 54.
92. North, Civil-Military Relations, p. 23
93. Ernesto Yepes del Castillo, Perú 1820-1920, un siglo de desarrollo capitalista (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1972), p. 130.
94. Howard Lawrence Karno, "Augusto B. Leguía: The Oligarchy and the Modernization of Peru," (The University of California, Los Angeles: Unpublished Ph. d. Dissertation, 1970), p. 65.
95. See José Clavero, El Tesoro del Perú (Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1896), p. 51.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY, 1895 - 1912

Politics and Political Conflict: An Overview

The civil war of 1894-1895 marked both the end of a period in which the military caudillos would predominate politically and the beginning of an era during which the increasingly modernized and reorganized army would not be predisposed to overthrow governments. What the civil war did not do, however, was to significantly alter the nature of political conflict. Although for the first time in Peru's independent history, civilians would dominate the political limelight and civilian governments would rule for nineteen years, the most prolonged period in Peruvian history, political institutions nonetheless remained weak and unable to effectively mediate, refine, and moderate group political action. Despite the fact that civilian political actors often proclaimed their attachment to democratic methods, they remained autocratic in orientation and at times willing to use force and fraud as a means of attaining and maintaining political control.

In most ways, the pattern of politics which emerged during this period and for much of the rest of the twentieth

century as well had distinct similarities to the politics of nineteenth century Peru. This section describes its nature since it portrays the political milieu at the time of Guillerme Billinghurst's rise to power in 1912.

That the pattern of politics which was dominated by civilians after 1895 had similarities with the past was perhaps all that could have been expected. Those who won political power at that time, and those who participated in politics and held political office afterwards were neither political neophytes nor men who had idealistic visions of vast societal or political reconstruction. They were men of long political experience who often collaborated with military caudillos, though at times grudgingly, and who were thoroughly immersed in the politics of violence in nineteenth century Peru. Their political behavior helps add credence to the notion that political practices grow out of the past and adapt themselves in the present with little break in continuity. Many, though not all, came from the upper class, and their interest in politics appeared to be based largely on personal preferment and material gain; almost none considered it desirable for government to be responsive to the needs of the masses.¹

The lower class sectors at the turn of the century remained for all intents and purposes disorganized. Although some labor elements became increasingly organized and vocal, especially in Lima and Callao, during the first decade and a half of the present century, politics remained basically elitist, dominated largely by competing elements of the Peruvian aristocracy

122
who allied themselves with different political parties and who were chiefly landowners, owners and directors of important commercial and manufacturing enterprises, or prestigious lawyers and doctors.

As in the nineteenth century, lower class participation in politics remained largely ephemeral, transitory, and commonly manipulated from above. The small civilian middle sector of administrators, middle-level government employees, proprietors of smaller businesses, middle sized or small real estate owners, teachers, and rural professionals never constituted an independent force during the first two decades of the present century--either politically, socially, or economically. The vast majority identified with the institutional status quo, and by and large acted simply as an appendage of the upper class, which was their major source of cultural values and economic opportunities.² The pattern of governmental power and political conflict was quite similar to that of the past, and basically conforms to James L. Payne's framework describing twentieth century Peruvian political dynamics³: government remained highly centralized with the President at the apex of power and the major focus of attention in the decision-making process. He continued to dispense large amounts of patronage, remained the main initiator of major governmental policies, and tried to exclude opposition forces from governmental positions. Groups unable to influence the Chief Executive's decisions or excluded from his favor, lacking in other equally effective sources from which to secure the assistance and goodwill of government, at times remained predisposed to attempt

the President's overthrow. Partisan communication channels remained, although some parties did not have them at all times, and they tended to reinforce opposing political alignments and thereby contributed to intense conflict--conflict which, as in the past century, is best described in terms of the "ins" versus the "outs."

The most important difference was that whereas those in the past who had wielded political power and who had sought to overthrow governments were almost always military caudillos backed up by their henchmen and primitive makeshift armies, political power from 1895 up to 1914 was always in the hands of civilians, and increasingly, political battles, though often retaining an important element of violence, were dominated by civilian competitors as opposed to men in uniform.

The major competitors for power up to at least 1914 almost invariably were members of one of four political parties,⁴ three of which could trace their origins back prior to 1895. They were the Civil, Democratic, Constitutional, and Liberal parties. The first of these, the Civil Party, was composed of the richest and most learned elements of Peruvian society. Although it was never dominated by one man, the Civil Party usually had two or three recognizable factions based on the personal ambitions or r  valries of individual leaders.

The Democratic Party was first organized in 1884 and was always under the formal leadership of its founder, Nicol  s de Pi  rola, until his death in 1913. After that date, the party gradually diminished in popularity and prestige. Its major bases of support were the clericalist element, the

landowners of the interior, and the lower classes of Lima who found appealing the charismatic qualities of its audacious leader.

The third major competitor for political power, and the newest, was the Liberal Party, organized in 1900 by a rich hacendado, Augusto Durand, and composed largely of breakaway elements from the Democratic Party.

The final major political party was the Constitutional Party of General Andres A. Cáceres. It was composed largely of men with military backgrounds, though civilians of prominence could be found in its ranks. After the defeat of Cáceres in the civil war of 1894-1895, with important members of its leadership exiled, the party was without formal allies up until 1903, when it alligned itself with the Civil Party. From that time on, even after the Constitutional Party split into two distinct factions, its members never intensely sought to control the Presidency, though some harbored Presidential aspirations. The party primarily served as a support for the dominant Civil Party in return for benefits and favors which it could provide to its members.

These political parties were composed basically of nothing more than small coteries of men, many privileged notables, who were allied to individual leaders whose personal prestige was a major element of party unity. Party labels and principles represented almost nothing more than window dressing to cover the varying interests of its members. Just as in the nineteenth century, lack of adherence to clearly defined principles accounted for the relative ease

with which alliances between political groups were made and broken, and the ability of former enemies to shake hands, forget past differences, and join sides in political contests as coalitions formed and dissolved in response to the shifting ambitions of their various members.⁵ The political parties as they existed from 1895 through the first decades of the present century could not be considered as simply organizations designed to attain political power through electoral means. Instead, they were hybrids whose leaders, while acclaiming the validity of democratic procedures, were nonetheless at times predisposed to resort to force or support its use as a means of attaining political objectives.

As a general rule, the political parties lacked any institutionalized links with the public. Rather, their ability to mobilize grass roots support was largely based on different forms of patron-client relationships. At the service of the party leaders were a variety of individuals who were able to wield social or economic power over the lower class element. Such individuals included government officials, overseers, merchants, or landowners who were usually bound to the party leaders by ties of kinship, friendship, or personal interests. Their importance to the party leadership rested on their ability to mobilize lower and middle class sectors for various political purposes such as voting in favor of specified candidates; or, more commonly, engaging in mass political rallies or demonstrations.

Political instability up to 1912 took various forms. The common practice of overthrowing government Ministers

126
remained, but this form of instability had relatively little influence on effecting changes in Presidential leadership. The most serious sorts of instability were the various forms of political violence which, as in the nineteenth century, were used both by the Chief of State and his advisors against his political adversaries as well as by "out groups" seeking to topple governments or influence electoral outcomes.

The former sort of political violence was at times used by the President in trying to neutralize Congressional opposition, as well as against political opponents outside of the Congress. The latter kind commonly took the form of violent demonstrations around election time and armed movements in the countryside, which after 1900 were led exclusively by civilians. Only once did an attempt to forcibly oust the President take the form of an attack on the Presidential Palace, but this also was led by civilians. In almost all cases after 1900, such subversive outbursts involved men who were either members of or who had connections with the Democratic and Liberal Parties. The civilian leaders of these parties, having prior conspiratorial experience, were at times predisposed to use it in an era where the political game appeared to remain basically unchanged except for the dwindling relevance of the old style military caudillo. Although the subversive turmoil was considerably less than that occurring during much of the pre-1895 era, it nonetheless remained, and most governments during the period faced some threat of its violent overthrow (see Table 2).

Table 2

Subversive Attempts to Overthrow the Central Government, 1896-1912

Date	Government in Power	Nature of Incident	Participants	Results	Motivation
1898	Nicolás de Piérola	<u>Montonero movements</u>	Adherents of General Cáceres, and others non-aligned or minimally aligned to him	Government forces defeat insurgents	Local feuds and a desire to return General Cáceres to power
1899-1900	Nicolás de Piérola	<u>Montonero movements</u>	Augusto Durand, Guillermo Billinghurst in contact with General Cáceres, Colonel Vizcarra and others	Insurgents defeated by government forces	Opposition to Romo's nomination and election to the Presidency
1908	José Pardo	<u>Montonero movements</u>	Augusto and Juan Durand, Enrique Llosa, other Liberal and Democratic Party members	Government forces defeat insurgents	Opposition to the selection of Leguía as the Civil Party's nominee for the Presidency
1909	Augusto B. Leguía	Civilian attack on the Presidential Palace	Carlos, Isaiás, and Amadeo de Piérola and adherents of Democratic and Liberal Parties	Government forces overpower conspirators and rescue the President	Opposition to their exclusion from power
1910-1911	Augusto B. Leguía	<u>Montonero movements</u>	Amadeo de Piérola, Mateo Vera, Orestes Ferro, Samanez Ocampo, Aurelio Matute, Manuel Chumán and others	Defeated by government forces	Opposition to their exclusion from power

Many of the outbreaks or near outbreaks of conspiratorial strife related to the fraudulent nature of the electoral practices in what can best be described as a façade democracy and which tended to exclude major political participants from positions of political power.

Since there is a lack of reliable narrative accounts of politics from 1895 to 1912 in English language works on Peru, the following section provides the historical context in which the events leading to Guillermo Billinghurst's assumption of power in 1912 took place. This account will focus on political conflict and the continuing lack of strong political institutions able to adequately deal with their peacable amelioration.

Politics and Political Conflict,
1895-1912: A Narrative Summary

In March of 1895, the nation's armed forces under General Cáceres lay discredited after their defeat by the quickly improvised army of Nicolás de Piérola. The alliance between the Civil and Democratic Parties proved effective. Nonetheless, the period from 1896 to 1899 was not one of political peace. Aside from the federalist revolt in Loreto, which in no way was designed to topple the central government, there were others that had such an aim. Among such revolts were those of General Cáceres, exiled as a result of his defeat, who nonetheless continued to conspire. With former officers and other supporters, Cáceres plotted

29

and helped influence the outbreak of various armed uprisings in the countryside. Lacking both popular and financial support, those uprisings proved incapable of very seriously threatening the government of the new civilian rulers, who effectively utilized their military forces against the rebels.

By 1900, the first of a series of armed revolts by important civilian political contenders had broken out as their political aspirations were frustrated by those in power. Elections continued to be viewed with skepticism by opposition candidates as a means whereby they could hope to attain power. This was because the new election law passed in 1896 made it practically impossible for any other than a partisan of the government to be elected. It established a national electoral council which was empowered to appoint the local committees that directed and supervised the elections. Since the government appointed all the members of this council, and since they were always partisans of the government, it was a foregone conclusion that the government-supported candidates would win.⁶ Elections became a formality to sanction the appointment to power of candidates favored by the Chief-Executive. In cases where factious party differences might have emerged before or after the appointment of the members of the electoral council, the President's power to dissolve the council and use alternative methods to validate the election returns of the candidates further insured the election of those whom he favored.

It was in this sort of political environment that major party cleavages emerged in 1899.⁷ Not accepting the im-

posed election of López de Romaña or the alliance between the Civil and the Democratic Parties, Guillermo Billinghurst, who had expected the Democratic Party nomination for President, in contact with General Cáceres, joined forces with Augusto Durand, and helped to instigate an unsuccessful armed movement in the countryside. Later in 1900, Durand would form his own party to oppose the government and again planned a subversive movement though arrests prevented its outbreak.

The alliance between the Civil and Democratic Parties eventually broke down as Romaña steered an independent course to the surprise and dismay of Democratic Party leader Nicolás de Piérola. Romaña increasingly allied himself with and filled government posts with Civil Party members. The immediate cause for the rupture of the Civil-Democratic Party alliance was the unwillingness of the Civil Party to support the Democratic Party candidates in the municipal elections of 1901. In control of the electoral apparatus, only Civil Party candidates were elected. The Congressional elections of the following year resulted in a similar occurrence, and shortly thereafter the break between the Civil and Democratic Parties was formalized.

In 1903, the Civil Party controlled electoral apparatus again predetermined the outcome and Piérola did not even bother to oppose the Civilista nominee Manuel Condomo. Tumultuous street scenes instigated by Democrats as a reaction to the Civil Party tactics occurred during this period, and violent uprisings threatened to break out as the Democratic and

Civil Parties armed thousands of their followers. A bloody conflict was avoided only after conferences between the two protagonists convinced them of its undesirability.⁸ By this time, to strengthen its political position, the Civil Party formed an alliance with the Constitutional Party of Cáceres.⁹

Shortly thereafter, in 1904, also in the hopes of strengthening their political positions, the Liberal and Democratic Parties made a pact, but it proved completely ineffective in overcoming the might of the Civil dominated electoral machine. Once again, in 1904, fraudulent elections swept the Civilista Party Congressional candidates into power. The volatile street scenes of the previous year continued, but again, no armed uprising against the government occurred.

Presidential elections also took place in 1904, and although, as expected, they resulted in a victory for the Civil Party, internal factional strife within the party became increasingly pronounced as a generational conflict arose over the party's Presidential nomination. The eventual nominee was José Pardo, who ruled from 1904 to 1908.¹⁰ During this period, relative peace and economic prosperity prevailed in the country, with Piérولا and Durand favoring a role of political non-participation.

In 1908, the choice of the Civil-Constitutional coalition for the Presidential nomination was Pardo's Finance Minister, Augusto B. Leguía, a shrewd businessman and able administrator. As had occurred in the past, the opposition sectors, believing that they had no chance of electoral success

132

in a situation where electoral fraud would again be utilized, did not put forth an actual candidate and contented themselves simply with political agitation.¹¹ Twenty three days before the election, they reverted to the tactics followed several years previously: Liberal and Democratic Party members led by Augusto Durand instigated an armed uprising with less than a hundred and fifty men outside of Lima. The uprising proved unsuccessful.¹² Moreover, the government imprisoned almost all the leaders of the Liberal and Democratic Parties as well as the manager of the opposition newspaper La Prensa.¹³ With the opposition temporarily neutralized, Leguía triumphed handily at the polls.

The Leguía administration would not be one without political difficulties. The common practice of granting amnesty to opponents convicted of political crimes resulted in the release of Liberal and Democratic Party members who were jailed as a result of the 1908 revolt. But no political benefit was gained from this move since the released prisoners continued their stance of hostility toward the Civil-Constitutional alliance. The opposition continued to hurl incendiary remarks against the government, threatened revolution, and organized partisan street demonstrations which at times led to violent confrontations with government authorities, who were able to disperse the crowds only after considerable difficulty.

Suspicious and distrustful of conciliatory gestures made by Leguía,¹⁴ important sectors of the Liberal and Democratic Parties remained discontented and continued to believe that force was the only means of attaining power. A revolt

finally came in May 1909, at a time when some sort of armed outburst had been rumored for over a month.¹⁵ This time, however, the tactics of the rebellious elements had changed. Instead of resorting to an armed uprising outside of the capital as in past years, opponents of the regime directly attacked the Presidential Palace. Involved in the attack were thirty-six men, almost all civilians, who were led by Carlos de Piérola, the brother of Nicolás, and two of the latter's sons. There has never been any evidence that Nicolás de Piérola or Augusto Durand were involved in the conspiracy.

The plan of the insurgents was to seize the President, and force his resignation, expecting to be supported by the masses,¹⁶ who in a period of serious economic depression were suffering greatly¹⁷ and especially predisposed towards the use of violence. It was the hope of the rebels that in the face of popular approval and in light of Leguía's unpopularity even among important sectors of the Civil Party, the military would honor Leguía's resignation and acquiesce at their assumption of power.¹⁸

The plan failed. Leguía refused to resign even after being forced onto the streets and insulted, physically abused, and threatened with death by his kidnappers. The masses, not heeding the urgings of the insurgents, failed to second the movement, and the military, after some delay, fired upon the small body of Presidential kidnappers and rescued Leguía. As in the 1908 revolt, many Liberal and Democratic Party members were jailed, but a general amnesty would again secure their freedom.

Although the coup temporarily appeared to increase the cohesiveness of Leguía's Civil Party,¹⁹ long-brewing animosities between factions of the party became increasingly manifest in the months following the coup. This trend continued into 1910 and 1911, as Leguía increasingly alienated himself from the Civilista wing of ex-President José Pardo as well as from the sector of the Constitutional Party which remained joined to Pardo. Animosity against Leguía could be found as early as his nomination to the Presidency. It increased when he introduced his pre-May 1909 conciliation policy which had involved giving guarantees to provide opposition candidates with seats in the Congress. Civil-Constitutional Party discontent was further intensified over financial and foreign policy matters. Leguía was criticized for excessive governmental expenditures, and he elicited further criticism for his willingness to agree to a mediated solution to Peru's border dispute with Ecuador.

By the end of 1910 clear pro- and anti-Leguía factions had developed within the Civil and Constitutional Parties. The anti-Leguíst wing eventually labeled itself the Independent Civil Party, with José Pardo among its major political personalities. Allied with a few Liberal Party Congressmen, the anti-Leguía Civil and Constitutional Party members categorized themselves as Bloquistas (the Bloc). Their program basically was simply one of thwarting Leguía's governmental policies.

The Bloquistas were in an advantageous position to

achieve their ends in light of the fact that they controlled a majority of Congressional seats.²⁰ One of the aims of Leguía was to fill the Congress with members sympathetic to his own views in the upcoming Congressional elections. This was done first by dissolving the electoral council--most of whose members were allied to the Bloc;²¹ and which, if left intact, would have assured a Congress even more obstructionist than that already in existence. When partisans of both Pardo and Leguía claimed victory at the polls, the Bloquista dominated Congress became determined to prevent the installation of the Leguíst sympathizers by a Congressional vote. Leguía countered by using the police and army to prevent the gathering of anti-Leguístas in the Congressional chambers. Pro-Leguía Congressmen then held a meeting the next day with only their own partisans in attendance; and on July 14, 1911, despite a lack of a majority or the required quorum, voted in favor of the candidates supported by the President.²² In so doing, a Leguía controlled Congress was established, and the shallow institutional roots of Peruvian Constitutional behavior were once again clearly illustrated.

If the Bloquistas were not a source of armed subversion in the two years following the 1909 coup, the same could not be said for other opponents of Leguía, many consisting of Democratic Party members, some of whom were involved in the 1909 attack against the President. Shortly after the discovery of a conspiracy in Cuzco in late October of 1910,²³ armed uprisings broke out in various sectors of the country and continued into April of the following year before the

136
rebels were completely dispersed by government troops. This movement constituted the final armed uprising against the Leguía administration, for in September 1912, Leguía handed power over to Guillermo Billinghurst.

Although political instability continued as a fact of life during the 1895-1912 period, the army remained non-interventionist in orientation as it underwent a number of important changes which will now be discussed.

The Professionalization and
Reorganization of the
Peruvian Army

Upon attaining power in 1895, one of Nicolás de Piérola's major objectives was to completely reorganize and professionalize the army along modern European lines. As has already been noted, up to 1895 Peruvian armies were relatively primitive organizations with the rank and file forcibly recruited and the officers having little or no systematic training in the art of war.

The need for a professional army was clear to Pierola and the Civilistas.²⁴ Certainly, the need for a professionally trained army was perceived by many national figures prior to 1895. A systematically educated and technically prepared officer corps was an aspiration, though never attained, of numerous Peruvian Chiefs of State throughout the nineteenth century, dating back to the earliest days of the republic. In fact, as early as 1823 the establishment of a center of military instruction had been decreed,²⁵ although the first

military academy actually opened in 1826 and lasted a little over a month. All other military academies in the nineteenth century also had a transitory existence. Rudimentary military academies were in operation from approximately 1830-1834, 1850-1854, 1859-1867, 1872-1880, and 1889-1894. Their effects were very limited due to Peru's numerous armed conflicts which destroyed armies, caused various military academies to close and resulted in the reshuffling of army personnel. Furthermore, when the military academies did exist, they were poorly supported, inadequately staffed, and their graduates bore little resemblance to true professionals.

Undoubtedly, international exigencies helped to foster a desire for a modern, powerful fighting machine. Numerous armed conflicts with Peru's neighbors had occurred during the nineteenth century, and Peru still had severe grievances and border disputes with many of them.²⁶ The threat of another armed conflict was never a distant one, and in light of the country's shabby military performance and defeat in the War of the Pacific, the need for an effective military establishment was even further heightened lest a similar military disaster occur in the future.

Peru's military professionalization program centered around the hiring of a French military mission which, in September of 1896, was given the task of completely reorganizing the army and instructing its personnel.²⁷ In this way, Peru became the first South American country to establish close collaboration in military matters with France.²⁸ Up to that time other South American states had relied exclusively on German

personnel to train and reorganize their armies. Perhaps Piérولا was distrustful of having Germans integrated in his country's army since they were at that time in the process of training Peru's long-time enemy, Chile. But whatever the roots of Piérولا's antipathies against the Germans, they were strong enough for him to cancel the contract which his predecessor, General Cáceres, had made with the German Colonel Pauli for the training of the Peruvian army. Pauli's contract was canceled even after he turned sides and helped Piérولا organize his army of montoneros against Cáceres.

Up to 1914, the size of the French Mission varied from six to eleven.²⁹ Almost all were officers with long military experience, many of whom had distinguished themselves in colonial service in such places as Tunisia, Algeria, Madagascar, and the Sudan. They were of high military rank which ranged from Major up to General. The head of the first military mission was Colonel--later General--Paul Clément, who not only reorganized the Peruvian army's general staff, but who also became its head from 1901 until 1910, when the new chief of the French military mission, J. B. Calmel, took over that function. The other members of the French mission also had important functions in the Peruvian army. For example, up to 1914 members of the mission were almost invariably in charge of the Superior War School.³⁰ Similarly, the French officers were in charge of the instruction in the less advanced military schools and collaborated heavily in the planning and implementation of the varied military reform programs which were undertaken.

The accomplishments of the French mission were many. They can be broken down into three general categories: first, aspects related to the formation of professional personnel; second, the initiation of military reorganization policies; and third, the writing and codification of military laws designed to give regularity to varied aspects of military life and hence circumvent the often arbitrary and capricious manner in which military matters were handled in the past.

For the French mission, the formation of professional personnel was related to the establishment and proper functioning of military academies able to provide modern training in the art of war and perfect the officers' knowledge of weapons, develop their capacity to manage complex organizations, and advance their level of competence in the command and discipline of troops. It has already been noted that the need for military academies had long been recognized in Peru, and that they had been established from time to time. But it was only the French organized military schools which were designed to function in the context of an intensive effort to transform the nature of Peruvian military life, and which have endured up to the present. The first of these, the Escuela Militar de Aplicación, was organized in 1898,³¹ changed its name to the Escuela Militar de Chorillos in 1900, and evolved into the present center of military instruction in Peru. From 1902 until 1945 the school was divided into a División Superior and a División de Tropa.³² Their object was to prepare officers and men in the army in all phases of military life and

to provide them with the proper military attitudes of morality, discipline, and devotion to country. In the División Superior were incorporated military men from the infantry, artillery, and cavalry who pursued an intensive four-year course of study and who, upon completing their training, received their commission as Lieutenants. To be admitted, one had to be between sixteen and eighteen years of age, be of good health, be at least 1 m. 54 cm. in height, and have appropriate letters of recommendation. Furthermore, it was necessary to take competitive entrance examinations in Spanish, arithmetic, geography and history of Peru, and writing. Although no hard data is available on the matter, it is probably safe to say that the educational requirements alone eliminated most Peruvians, especially Indians and mestizos, from entering the academy in light of the mass illiteracy which affected this sector of the population. Once admitted, the students' four-year course of study included algebra, trigonometry, composition, history, geography, physics, French, lineal drawing, chemistry, military art, military legislation and administration, ballistics, tactics, gymnastics, fencing and horseback riding, marksmanship, topography, fortifications, military law, and hygiene.³³ To graduate, a student needed to pass a battery of exams on the courses studied.

According to the accounts provided in the annual reports of the Minister of War to the Congress, there was general satisfaction with the results. The 1910 report, for example, noted that the intensive instruction provided in the military academy produced brilliant results and permitted the formation of a respectable nucleus of officers. At the same time,

though, the War Minister complained that the scientific level of the superior division left much to be desired and suggested that steps should be taken to provide more technical training.³⁴

The División de Tropa or Troop Division was designed to give sufficient elementary instruction to non-commissioned officers which would enable them to effectively instruct the rank and file body of troops in the varied aspects of military life. The two-year course of study was attended by students who, as in the superior division, needed to pass a battery of examinations before being able to graduate. By 1908, 1,452 students had received instruction in this section of the military academy.

The preoccupation of Colonel Clement, chief of the first military mission, with creating trained personnel resulted in the establishment of what was called the Academy of War, which existed from 1901 to 1902. Its job was to provide professional instruction to the bulk of Peruvian officers who at the time had no formal military training. It was hoped that such training would not only better orient them towards an understanding of the technical and scientific nature of war but would also prevent them from being considered inferior by those graduates from the Escuela Militar.³⁵ All those from the rank of Second Lieutenant up to Captain in Lima were required to attend, while attendance for those of higher rank was optional. Classes lasted two hours on the days assigned; and after two years in operation, the academy was closed,

having "satisfied ... the aims of the government in decreeing its organization."³⁶

One of the most important educational institutions which was established by the French Mission was the Escuela Superior de Guerra, or Superior War School, which began its operation in 1904, and which continues to operate down to the present day. The school was specifically designed to train officers of the rank of Captain and Major for positions in the Peruvian General Staff--the apex of the Peruvian military hierarchy. The school was directed and staffed largely by French officers who organized and provided advanced military instruction in the same subjects covered in the Superior Division of the Escuela Militar, although by 1912 new courses were added, which included political economy, coastal defense, submarines, and the telegraph.³⁷

A significant aspect of the army professionalization effort was the sending of the most promising commissioned and non-commissioned officers to France, other European countries, and even to Japan, to further their military education.³⁸ Sometimes those who were sent abroad served actual tours of duty in the French army and upon returning to Peru they were able "to use their training and the prestige it gave them to build highly effective careers in an institution where the quality of the officer corps had not been refined by intense competition."³⁹

One other feature of military instruction in Peru was the publication of the Boletín del Ministerio de Guerra, whose first edition came out in June 1904 and which originally

was published every fifteen days thereafter.⁴⁰ It eventually evolved into the contemporary Revista Militar del Perú. The journal provided numerous articles on varied military matters, and it became one of the foremost instruments for the dissemination of information on new developments in military science. As the table below indicates, up to 1915 the number of graduates from the Superior War School were few; and at the time of the 1914 coup, they made up a very small part of the 255 officers in the ranks of Major and above who were included in the active duty list.⁴¹ It is apparent that higher military education under the aegis of the French in the upper ranks of the military hierarchy was a slow and gradual process, and by the 1914 coup, most of the senior officers still lacked advanced formal training.

Table 3
Superior War School
Output⁴²
1904 - 1915

Years	Number of Students Enrolled	Number of Graduates
I 1904, 1905, 1906	11	11
II 1907, 1908	14	13
III 1911, 1912	9	9
IV 1913, 1914, 1915	9	9
	<u>43 Total</u>	<u>42 Total</u>

When the number of officers graduating from the newly organized Escuela Militar is compared with the number of active duty officers in the Peruvian army in 1914, a similar conclusion is reached.

Table 4
Graduates of Superior Division
of the Escuela Militar,⁴³
1901 - 1914

Year of Promotion	Number of Officers Graduated	Total Number of Graduates	Percent of Officers Graduated from Superior Division	Number of Active Duty Officers
1901	6	6	1	435
1902 (Feb.)	15	21	-	-
1902 (July)	4	25	-	-
1903	25	50	5	958
1905	26	76	8	991
1906	25	101	10	1011
1907	32	133	14	958
1908	26	159	-	-
1909	22	181	19	967
1910	40	221	-	-
1911	46	227	29	931
1912	40	307	-	-
1913	24	331	32	1032
1914	27	358	41	863

On the basis of Table 4, even if one assumes that all of the officers who graduated from the Superior Division from 1901 to 1914 were still in active service in 1914, we find that only 358 or approximately 41 percent of a total of 863 officers had attained their commissions as the result

of formal academy training. Although the trend was for an increasingly higher percentage of the officer corps to have gone through an intensive academy learning experience, the transformation into a professionally trained officer corps was a slow one, and by 1914 was still far from being complete.

It has already been noted that during 1901 and 1902 a military academy was functioning to instruct officers who did not have advanced training. But it probably is safe to say that it was not an overly intensive attempt since only officers stationed in Lima were involved and classes were held only two hours on the days assigned. Furthermore, during the two semesters of its operation, a total of only 164 officers were registered.⁴⁴

By and large, then, on the basis of the information provided, from the perspective of military training up to 1914, the bulk of the Peruvian officers could be considered relatively unprofessional, still a mediocre, if improving, group, as they were not the product of the solid training given at the advanced French organized military centers of instruction.

As already noted, the French military mission performed other important functions aside from increasing the numbers of Peruvian soldiers with a sound military education. Among the most important of these were policies related to the reorganization of the General Staff, which throughout the nineteenth century hardly ever existed in any tightly organized manner. One of the beliefs of Colonel Clement was that a modern military establishment needed an efficient General Staff

devoted to explicitly military concerns which could systematically formulate, organize, and administer military programs giving the army a degree of autonomy over its internal affairs which previously had not existed.

The French reform of the General Staff was an attempt to make Colonel Clement's aspiration a reality. As a result of the reform of 1901, an enlarged General Staff having places for fifty-one officers and soldiers was established, directly responsible to the Minister of War and constituting the main bureau of communication between the Ministry of War and the army. The reorganized General Staff was originally composed of four sections: organization, instruction, technical studies, and administrative services. The first of these dealt with the organization of troops in peacetime and their organization and mobilization in times of war; the second with such things as the instruction of the troops, the increase or reduction of military personnel, military discipline, inspections, promotions, and troop movements; the third section dealt with the technical studies related to the material of war, construction, and means of communication; the last section was concerned with the administration of all clerical matters pertaining to military personnel.⁴⁵

In an attempt to gain tighter control over the expanding military bureaucracy, the following services, some newly organized,⁴⁶ were put under the direction of the General Staff: quartermaster corps, artillery, sanitation, transportation, and veterinary services. "The technical direction of these

141
services ... [was] in charge of Chief Inspectors (of Artillery, of Administrative Services, of Sanitation) who, jointly with the Inspectors of Infantry, Cavalry, and Engineers, form[ed] the bureau of Technical Inspection of the Army."⁴⁷

Under the French inspired reorganizations, the General Staff and the Bureau of Technical Inspectors was joined with a third bureau, that of the General Direction of War, which dealt with purely administrative affairs; or to be more specific, supervised all the payments and accounts in regard to military expenditures which previously had been the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. These bureaus together constituted the Ministry of War. As in the past, the chief of this department, the Minister, supervised the organization, discipline, and armament of the army. He also issued military regulations and recommended to Congress the passage of laws and regulations which he deemed necessary. The Minister of War was directly responsible to the President, who was empowered with supreme authority in matters of national defense and who constitutionally was given ultimate control of the organization and distribution of the Peruvian armed forces.

The increased organizational complexity and bureaucratization of the army was one manifestation of the desire to seek routinized institutional structures to replace the heroic leadership and personalism commonly found in the nineteenth century as a basis for an effective and permanent fighting force.

An important reform which tried to foster the insti-

tutionalization of military procedures and organization was the Law of Obligatory Military Service which was passed in 1898.⁴⁸ It was an attempt to establish new and more modern norms for the recruitment of military personnel which could replace the past common practice of forceful and completely arbitrary impressment of men into military service. With the initiation of the law, the old system of forced recruitment slowly began to change. The 1898 law worked as follows:⁴⁹ obligatory military service was established for all male Peruvians from the ages of 19 to 50. All male citizens were registered for military service, which was in charge of the Subprefects in each department into which Peru was divided. In each provincial capital each year a lottery would be held and vacancies for active service would be filled on the basis of ballots randomly picked which contained the names of the able bodied and single males who were 19 years old. Those from 20 to 23 years of age were also liable to have their names put into the lottery if vacancies were not completely filled by the 19 year olds. The number of ballots chosen in all provinces was determined by the Ministry of War; and this number depended upon the needs of the military which varied from year to year.

Under the law, the army was composed of the regular army, the reserves, and a national guard. Into the reserves went those individuals who had not served in the active army. Also, the first line of reserves was formed by the ex-soldiers until they became 30 years old, married men, and students of universities and technical schools from 19 to 30 years of age.

147
The second line of the reserves consisted basically of all men 30 to 35 years of age.⁵⁰ Finally, the national guard was formed of citizens between 35 and 50 years of age. It was intended that under this system, in times of national emergency, a large pool of men could quickly be mobilized with a minimum of delay.

Although the functioning of the military service law insured a military establishment drawn from different sections of the country, those who served, as in the past, were primarily those of the poorest classes; the Indian sector made up the bulk. This occurred for a number of reasons. First, the law enabled those who could pay a fee to avoid entering into the lottery drawing and the reserves. Secondly, the law exempted from service individuals in specialized occupations and students at technical schools and universities, which were beyond the reach of the masses. The 1898 law also stipulated that those to be called first were those who did not comply with the registration procedures, in most cases the Indians. This is of little wonder, since they had learned through long and bitter experience not to trust authority, public or private. Hence, even with the passage of the law, force was the means employed to recruit many of the noncomplying Indians, though in a less arbitrary manner than in the past. The law, nonetheless, marked an important beginning of the time when forced recruitment would essentially be a thing of the past.

It should also be noted that since the burden of military

service fell on young single men, with a definite time limit, the army slowly changed from being a familial institution of the soldier with his female companion travelling and living with him to one lacking this aspect.

Other laws and codes were enacted with the aid of the French which helped to modernize and give regularity to varied aspects of military life. The more important of these were the Law of Promotions and the Code of Military Justice. The first was passed in 1901; and it marked a change from a past in which no set procedures existed for military promotions. In the nineteenth century, the most common source of commission was from the ranks without passage through any kind of formal training.⁵¹ The Promotion Law of 1901⁵² began to change this situation, since it allowed only one third of all commissions to be given in any year through this method. Further, those promoted by this method needed at least four years of military service, one in the rank of First Sergeant, and to have passed an examination. To be promoted to Captain, an officer had to have at least two years of service, and would be appointed on the basis of the number of vacancies available, half by seniority and the order of grades attained on an exam, half on the basis of seniority and merit ranking. To be promoted from Captain to Major, one needed at least four years' service as a Captain, as well as passing an examination. To become a Lieutenant Colonel, three years ~~were~~ needed as a Major but no examination, only merit rating. The promotion to Colonel was based on at least four years as Lieutenant Colonel, merit ranking established by the General Staff, and

approval by a review board of one Brigadier General and four Colonels. Only after completion of this multi-step process was nomination by the Chief Executive to the Congress for promotion to Colonel possible. No specific requirements were set for the promotion to General.

Although the promotion law was an attempt to routinize promotion procedures and an improvement over the arbitrary methods of the past, the law nonetheless allowed promotions to be made on the basis of personal or political favoritism. For example, for a promotion to the grade of General, no objective criteria such as academy training was specified, and aside from minimum time in grade requirements, the same was true for the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel. Furthermore, promotions normally needing authorization by the Congress could be bypassed by use of the President's decree powers. Likewise, the Congress could circumvent the normal promotion procedures and make promotions on its own initiative for eminent service which deserved the gratitude of the nation.⁵³ Where criteria such as merit ranking constituted a determining factor for promotions, evaluations based on subjective criteria could easily come into play. And even where examinations were needed for promotions or for entrance into the military academy, answers could be given in advance or biased grading practices could have been ways of assuring that ascriptive criteria would remain more important than actual achievement. Under such conditions, military promotions were often made for personal and political reasons,⁵⁴ a phenomenon which has continued throughout the twentieth

century.

A final reform inspired by the French was the drafting and adoption of the Code of Military Justice in 1898. Up to that time, military law, when practiced, was based on the old Spanish ordinances dating back to 1768. In fact, these laws were used in Peru "even after they had been declared obsolete by the mother country herself."⁵⁵ This state of affairs changed with the introduction of the new code whose 743 articles covered judicial procedures, organization and attributes of military tribunals, fields of violation of the military regulations and corresponding punishments. The code had the effect of more clearly delineating civil and military spheres of authority, and further had the effect of modernizing the substantive and procedural aspects of Peruvian military law.

The Absence of Military Coups d'Etat: 1895-1912

A variety of changes which took place in the military shortly after 1895 made the army of early twentieth century Peru different from the more primitive armies of the previous century in a number of important ways. With the introduction of the French military mission, the Peruvian army was reorganized along modern lines, rational recruitment policies were introduced, and the army was provided with modernized codes and regulations to govern varied aspects of military life. The military institution became more compartmentalized or bureaucratized, and took on the form of a modern military

organization.

In the opinion of Lieutenant Cordier, the U.S. military attaché in Peru in 1910, the French mission had rendered inestimable service to the Peruvian army.⁵⁶ In this same period, the Germans also noted that the French produced excellent achievements as far as the training of the Peruvian officer corps was concerned.⁵⁷ Added to these views, the British writer Percy Martin commented favorably on the accomplishments of the French mission. He noted that "to all those who have seen the Peruvian soldier on the march and in the field of maneuvers it must be apparent that the instruction carried out by the French military mission has been of the utmost value to the country The thorough training undertaken by the French officers raised Peru to the position of one of the most powerful fighting forces in South America."⁵⁸ Peruvian scholars also noted recognizable changes in the Peruvian military. Alexander Garland, the Peruvian educator and statesman, noted that "the cooperation of the French officers in the task undertaken by the Government of reorganizing the ... army, has been highly beneficial and has produced excellent results."⁵⁹

All of the military reforms marked the beginning of the end of the caudillo led makeshift armies of the past, which after 1895 would never again defeat the regular army representing the government in power, and which by the second decade of the twentieth century would practically be a thing of the past. Thereafter, when men in uniform forcibly intervened in politics, they would do so almost always as members of the

formal professional military organization.

But if the utilization of force by the increasingly modernized and professionalized military men would become a common occurrence throughout much of the twentieth century, it was relatively rare between 1895 and the administration of Guillermo Billinghurst which began in 1912.

During the few times that active and inactive military men did intervene during this period to forcibly overthrow a government, they always acted in an individual capacity and never had institutional support within the armed forces. Aside from the anti-government conspiracies involving the then exiled General Cáceres and those with known links to him prior to 1900, the author has uncovered only four other plots between 1895 and 1912 in which military men participated. The first was in 1900 when Colonel Vizcarra acted in favor of Billinghurst and Durand. The fighting, which never posed a very serious threat to the government, involved montoneros in the interior. The other three subversive movements involving military men occurred in 1908, 1909, and 1910-1911,⁶⁰ and in each of these cases, only a mere handful of army officers took part.

The combination of environmental and military institutional factors existing between 1895 and 1912 that helped to consolidate and perpetuate civilian control, hindered the emergence of military grievances strong enough to result in military subversive attempts, and at times worked to perpetuate the maintenance of a politicized military, will now be analyzed.

One of the factors which probably helps to account for

the loyalty of the great majority of officers in service, at least in the years directly following Piérola's assumption to power, was this political leader's use of the purge tactic. Piérola had defeated the army of General Cáceres and, instead of keeping the bulk of the officers who had remained loyal to Cáceres, the new President opted to discharge them.⁶¹ In the 1893 army register, the latest one available before the Civil War of 1894-1895, 2110 officers were listed in active service. By 1901, the earliest subsequent date for which an active duty list is available, only 427 active service officers filled the ranks of the infantry, cavalry, and artillery.⁶² Of this total, only 118 were listed as having served prior to 1895, evidence of the extent of Pierola's house cleaning.

Almost none of those officers who survived the purge or those who subsequently entered the officer ranks was involved in subversive activity. But among those purged, now without position or means of livelihood, there was discontent, and some of these involuntarily retired officers constituted a subversive element. In both 1896 and 1898, the government found it necessary to arrest former officers who served under Cáceres for conspiratorial activity in various parts of the country.⁶³

In the opening years of the twentieth century, a new policy of reincorporating many of those dropped from service into the active army officer corps⁶⁴ seems to have had the effect of coopting these discontented elements. The result was a significant rise in the number of officers who had served

prior to 1895. By 1906, out of an active duty officer corps of about 1000 individuals, approximately 250 of these had pre-1895 service⁶⁵ compared to the 1901 figure of 118.

At least in part, the willingness of the Civil Party rulers to allow these officers to return to active duty seems to have been a reflection of the increased cordiality which began at the turn of the century between the Civil Party and General Cáceres. As mentioned previously, as the alliance between the Civil and Democratic Parties dissolved, the Civil Party, in order to strengthen its political position, allied itself with General Cáceres and the Constitutional Party which still had a popular following. Among those who found their way back into active service and who attained important military positions were high ranking officers who had been or still were allies of Cáceres.⁶⁶ Civilista strategy had the dual effect of strengthening their own political position vis-à-vis the Democratic Party and at the same time helped to remove as a possible threat Cáceres and disgruntled army officers who harbored past grievances against the civilians in power. Now newly reintegrated into the active army, these officers were predisposed to support civilian government.

Cáceres publicly had disavowed any further political aspirations in 1899, and statements to this effect continued to be issued.⁶⁷ Undoubtedly, the Civilistas helped to insulate themselves from any political threat that Cáceres might have posed by assigning him to diplomatic posts in Italy and Germany from 1901 to 1914,⁶⁸ when the General returned to Peru to help solve the political crisis following the coup d'etat

157
against Guillermo Billinghurst.

Inside the country, those who were reintegrated into service almost never constituted a subversive element; indeed, a number of such high ranking officers--including Colonel Justinio Borgoño and General Pedro Muñoz--were among the supporters of the various civilian regimes.

Thus, through the Civil-Constitutional alliance, military men were increasingly brought back into partisan politics. The obvious result was to undermine whatever effects professionalization may have had on making the military a non-political institution. If a non-political military institution was an objective of the professionalization effort, and members of the French mission apparently believed that it was since they discouraged officers from meddling in politics, the loopholes written into the promotion law might have been one indication of some desire to keep the military institution politicized. While after 1903 it was clear that if the military was becoming more professional in terms of such formal indicators as hierarchical structure, internal differentiation, and the codification of rational-legal norms, this should not be construed to mean that its personnel were non-political. In 1910, the prestigious French military advisor Paul Clement became so annoyed by the politicization of the officers that he issued a general order prohibiting military men from attending political meetings.⁶⁹

Much of the responsibility for politicization of the officers must go to those civilians who were willing to seek political allies among the military. A crucial difference

with the past, however, was an important reversal: if in the past the military caudillo governed with the support of various elements of the oligarchy, sectors of the oligarchy would now govern with the support of the military. In any case, the absence of military coups up to 1914 must not be interpreted as evidence of an unwillingness by military men to engage in partisan politics.

Other policies pursued by Piérola and his predecessors, when analyzed in terms of the political environment existing in Peru, generally do not appear to have facilitated the emergence of military grievances sufficient to cause subversion by the military institution.

Beyond the exclusion from service of a large number of officers who had been allied to General Cáceres, and a general reduction in the size of the officer corps, Piérola's military policy could not be considered retributive. For example, army force levels were maintained. From 1889 to 1894, the government's authorized active duty army personnel numbered approximately 3000 men,⁷⁰ a figure which remained basically unchanged from 1895 to 1903.⁷¹ The actual number of troops varied somewhat from this figure owing to retirements, sickness, desertions, etc. The largest variances noted occurred in 1900 when under Piérola's successor, Eduardo López de la Romaña, only 2291 men were listed on active service, but this drop was stated to be the result of losses related in one way or another to military action against internal rebellion.⁷² By 1904, the army's size had expanded to 4000 men, and from 1909 to 1912, as a result of heightened border frictions with

its neighbors, Peru's army increased to a permanent force of 7000 men.

On the financial side, if one considers only amounts expended from the general budget, the military fared quite well during this period in comparison to the state of affairs existing under the military men who were in power in the early 1890s.⁷³ As indicated in Appendix I, in the three years prior to Piérola's rise to power in 1895, military budgetary expenditures decreased each year from S/ 3,381,487 in 1892 to S/ 1,951,602 in 1894, a reduction from 47.6 percent of the budgetary expenditures down to 26.6 percent.

This pattern of decreased expenditures changed into a general upturn from 1896, when S/ 2,911,809 were allocated to the military, through 1912 when this rose to a figure of S/ 8,646,642 (see Appendix II). These amounts reflected a general increase in governmental expenditures which occurred during that period in real terms.⁷⁴ Undoubtedly, the general economic prosperity which characterized this era helps to explain the willingness of the government to greatly expand the budget.

Although the military fared quite well in absolute amounts, in percentage terms, budgetary expenditures devoted to the military showed a noticeable decrease from 1896 to 1912. In percentage terms military expenditures during this period were at all times lower than the 1892 and 1893 figures which were 47.6 and 41.6 percent. The 26.6 percent of government expenditures for the military in 1894 was never matched after 1903, although it had been exceeded in three out of four

years during the Piérola administration (1896 to 1899).

The expansion of the army in size and budget reflected the fact that Piérola and his successors were very far from being enemies of the armed forces or collaborators in their destruction. Important military acquisitions such as modern cartridge making machines, new uniforms, new rifles and artillery pieces, and even two naval cruisers were involved in the military expansion. Outlays were also made for the construction and maintenance of new barracks, the French military mission, new educational institutions, and journeys by army personnel to Europe and Japan. Pay raises in 1902 and 1911 also increased military expenditures.⁷⁵ Nonetheless, the military's share of the government expenditures decreased considerably.

In Chapter 1, it was noted that such a decrease could be a possible source of military grievances. The question which must be considered, then, is why possible military disgruntlement over such matters did not result in a coup in Peru between 1895 and 1912--especially after the turn of the century when the downward trend became most pronounced.

One answer to the question might be that, considered alone, grievances over military budgets were not viewed as sufficiently serious by officers to warrant the outbreak of a military institutional subversive movement, especially in light of the fact that for most years under discussion the military institution was receiving increased funds in absolute, if not relative, terms.

Moreover, it has been suggested that, if recent military

experience in attempting to attain or maintain political control were negative and involved severe civilian retribution, the military's propensity to engage in conspiratorial activity would be decreased. This factor quite possibly was at work in the post-1895 situation. It should be remembered that this period in Peru's history was one which followed close upon the heels of one of the most costly defeats the Peruvian military ever suffered. The military defeat in the civil war of 1894-1895 clearly demonstrated that army officers held no monopoly over violence and the capacity for coercive political control since civilian forces had clearly shown themselves capable of mustering the material resources needed to thwart military political pretensions should the regular army intervene without support by major civilian elites. And these resources were significant since the unified forces acting under Piérولا were able to carry on a fierce struggle which is estimated to have cost over 10,000 lives.⁷⁶

While the civilian victory seems to have bolstered the confidence of some civilian political contenders such as Augusto Durand (who was a chief in the rebel army of Piérولا and who showed a proclivity for instigating and participating directly in rebellion), it appears to have undermined that of all but the more ambitious and zealous officers and some who found themselves ousted from the service and often without a livelihood. The bulk of the active duty officers who entered and remained in the military in the years after 1895 were particularly docile. Following the line of reasoning presented in the framework for analysis, along with the

effectiveness of Piérولا's purge techniques and the cooptation tactics of his Civilista successors, the lingering recollections of the military's defeat apparently helped curb the appetite of many officers for violence and predisposed them to acquiesce in civilian rule.

Under these circumstances, the threshold which had to be reached in order to catapult officers into a subversive attempt was heightened, making increasingly unlikely the possibility that minor precipitants alone would be enough to lead officers to forcibly attempt a seizure of power. It appears reasonable to suggest that many officers, fearing retribution, probably remained unwilling to initiate an armed movement against the government unless they were urged to do so by important sectors of the civilian political elite or perceived military institutional interests as being severely threatened. But in point of fact, at no time were military institutional interests severely threatened, and the available evidence indicates that appeals for military intervention were absent during the period under discussion. Opposition political sectors seeking to overthrow governments were generally narrowly partisan and made little effort to elicit the support of the armed forces. Perhaps the military appeared too loyal to the Chief Executive.⁷⁷ Then too, in reaction to the military predominance of the recent past, many civilian sectors were adverse to supporting a military seizure of power. Certainly this was the case for Nicolás de Piérولا who, while remaining an important opponent of Civilista govern-

ments, refused to conspire with the army.⁷⁸ Those opposition sectors which sought to use armed force against the President in all but one instance relied on the traditional tactic of organizing an independent armed following in the countryside sufficiently strong to overpower the regular army of the incumbent government.

By 1909 at least some of the opposition political forces were increasingly aware of the futility of resorting to that tactic as a means of bringing down governments in Peru, since their armed movements always failed to muster a sufficiently large following to pose a serious threat to the increasingly professional and modernizing military organization. These individuals began to perceive a quick assault upon the Presidential Palace as a more practical and potentially more successful tactic--one which in the twentieth century would become the major means of toppling governments in Peru.

A small faction of the Democratic and Liberal Parties were determined to use this coup tactic against President Leguía in 1909. But although the Democratic Party's unofficial news organ La Prensa noted less than a week before the coup that there were some who wanted "revolución de los cuarteles,"⁷⁹ or a barracks revolt, the coup plan did not count on active participation by the nation's armed forces. In fact, the conspirators had no military elements at their disposal aside from a few officers working outside of the boundaries of the military institution.⁸⁰ This lack of military support was an important reason for the coup's failure.

Judging by his action, Augusto Leguía, the coup target

in the 1909 attempt, became convinced of the need to cater to the institutional needs of the armed forces as a means of insuring their loyalty. The coup was undoubtedly a shock to Leguía, especially in light of the fact that some military men displayed considerable hesitancy and an attitude of unconcerned passivity before trying to rescue the President, who had been seized by the insurgents. The Presidential abductors were left unmolested for a full two hours,⁸¹ and when the military did decisively intervene to save the President, they did so by indiscriminately firing into the crowd which was holding Leguía captive. It was only with great luck that the President was not killed.

One of the reasons for the military's unsympathetic attitude may well have been varied military institutional grievances which, while not severe enough to foster a military coup, were sufficiently serious to help engender military passivity in the face of a threat against the President. These grievances involved Leguía's signing of a decree to cut the army by six hundred men and complaints over a lack of footwear, overcoats, and undergarments.⁸²

Moreover, it has also been suggested by one Peruvian Senator in 1910 that the poor military showing in this episode was a result of generational differences between the old school "barracks" officers and the new academy graduates.⁸³ The argument is plausible, since the old school officers, whose experience had been acquired in the war of the Pacific and in the armed subversive movements of the nineteenth century, were hostile to the French military mission, whose work they hampered and

impeded.⁸⁴ Promotions of the better trained academy graduates were also slowed down by the older generation of officers.⁸⁵ The resulting animosities and weakening of a sense of discipline might have been one of the reasons for the dilatory behavior displayed by some of the officers in carrying out their duty and orders to rescue the President.

Leguía in private was visibly indignant at the officers and harshly criticized them for their negligence.⁸⁶ But in public, he tried to paper over the incident by making glowing statements on the military's performance. More importantly, Leguía benefited from the lessons of this incident as the political situation in Peru subsequently became more serious than at any time since 1895. For by 1910, the Civil and Constitutional Parties both formally split into opposing factions, important parts of which became vociferous critics of their former ally, President Augusto Leguía.

In spite of the deteriorating political situation, a military revolt was made unlikely by the apparent unwillingness of opposition political elites to call for such action as well as by the policies to the military institution pursued by Leguía. In the years 1910 and 1911, Leguía engineered important additions to the published budgetary figures for the military. Thus, in spite of a published budget showing an absolute and relative drop in military expenditures during this period, by resorting to decree powers and through collaborating with Congressmen to pass special enactments when foreign conflicts threatened, Leguía "gave preferential attention to the Peruvian army and navy, and placed them on a

better footing for defensive purposes than they had ever been up to that time."⁸⁷ Leguía almost doubled the size of the army, provided it with new weapons, and tried substantially to increase Peru's naval power. Moreover, under his government the Peruvian air force had its beginning.⁸⁸ One of the results of this favorable treatment of the armed forces was undoubtedly solidification of political support from the military institution.

Intermittently, from 1910 to 1912, Peru faced serious disputes with Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Chile--some of which Leguía was alleged to be aggravating for domestic political purposes. The most serious of these disputes were those with Ecuador and Chile, both of which appeared to be heading for war. The disputes with Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia never appeared as threatening, although armed clashes did occur with Bolivia and Colombia.⁸⁹

Using these disputes as a justification for increased military expenditures, Leguía pursued a vigorous policy of military expansion and rearmament.⁹⁰ To fund the program, a number of large loans were made which did not enter into the published budget: first, on June 7, 1910, the German Transatlantic Bank loaned Peru Lp 100,000. Several months later, a similar loan was made by the Peru and London Bank. The following year, this bank made another loan to the government for Lp 60,000.⁹¹ Furthermore, Leguía not only negotiated for a \$30,000,000 loan with an American-English syndicate in August of 1911, but also introduced into the Congress a proposal to empower the Chief Executive, at his discretion, to negotiate

a loan of \$24,350,000 for the purchase of munitions and vessels of war in view of future possible emergencies.⁹²

One of Leguía's most important military efforts, beginning in early March 1910 and continuing up to his departure from office, was his negotiations with the Electric Boat Company of the United States for the purchase of submarines for use against Chile should war break out.⁹³ Leguía by 1912 had contracted with this firm for purchase of 8 submarines and 32 torpedos at a cost of \$4,228,000; but this contract was cancelled by his successor, Guillermo Billinghurst, and this action gave rise to severe criticism of his administration.

All of Leguía's military expansion and rearmament efforts helped him attain more solid political support from members of the armed forces, who were less predisposed to ally themselves with his Congressional opponents, who at times failed to support his military policies. One of Leguía's most important actions was probably the executive decree increasing the pay of the army and navy.⁹⁴ This pay increase accounted for an additional annual government outlay of Lp 65,000; the manner in which it was done--that is, through bypassing the Congress--allowed Leguía to take full credit for it. Further, Leguía scored with the army by vetoing a Congressional bill designed to restrict the military's jurisdiction as assigned by the Code of Military Justice.⁹⁵

As will be seen in the next chapter, if varied environmental and military institutional factors helped to inhibit military intervention in the period prior to Billinghurst's assumption to power in 1912, this state of affairs would soon change.

NOTES

Chapter 3

1. See Enrique Chirinos Soto, "La política Peruana en el siglo XX," in Visión del Perú en el siglo XX, ed., José Pareja Paz-Soldan (Lima: Librería Stadium, 1962) p. 5.
2. See José Pareja Paz-Soldan, "Evolución constitucional del Perú en el siglo XX," in ibid., p. 12; see also Bourricaud, "Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy," pp. 26-27.
3. See James L. Payne, Labour and Politics in Peru (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 3-10, 268-270. It should be mentioned that while Payne's framework has utility in describing important features of political conflict in twentieth century Peru, a major deficiency is his perception of the political role of the armed forces. For Payne, the major interest of the military in domestic politics is the preservation of internal peace; and he contends that the major factor leading to military coups is discontent over excessive internal unrest. I believe that such an approach is unrealistically one sided. While Payne does consider an important precipitating variable, he completely ignores a consideration of other factors of crucial importance.
4. For information on the various political parties see Cáceres, El pasmo de un insurgencia, passim; Miró Quesada, Autopsia, passim; see also Miro Quesada's Radiografía de la política Peruana, passim.
5. See the critical account of Peruvian political parties in Manuel Gonzalez Prada, Horas de Lucha (Lima: Edición Peisa, 1969 edition of the 1924 volume), pp. 3-6, 268-270.
6. See Stuart, The Governmental System of Peru, p. 119; Miro Quesada, Autopsia, pp. 249-250; see confidential dispatch by Taylor to Assistant Secretary of State, September 12, 1908, U. S. Department of State, Dispatches from U.S. Ministers to Peru to the Department, 1826-1906 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives Microcopy T-52).
7. A summary discussion of events leading to these party cleavages can be found in Miro Quesada, Autopsia, pp. 282-288.
8. See Carlos Camprubi Alcazar, "Un Cubano al servicio del Peru," Revista Historica, XXIX (1966), p. 53.
9. See Miró Quesada, Autopsia, pp. 343-345.

10. See Basadre, Historia, VII. pp. 3349-3361; Miró Quesada, Autopsia, pp. 307-357.
11. See Taylor to Assistant Secretary of State, September 18, 1908, U.S. Department of State, Internal Affairs of Peru 1906-1910 (Washington, D.C.: National Archives), Case No. 3742.
12. See Richard Neill to Elihu Root, May 31, 1908, Internal Affairs of Peru 1906-1910, Case No. 3742.
13. Alberto Ulloa, Don Nicolás de Piérola (Lima: Imprenta Santa María, 1949), p. 369.
14. See El Diario, May 5, 1909, p. 1; La Prensa, May 1, 1909, p. 1; May 16, 1909, p. 1; May 17, 1909, p. 1.
15. See Combs to Secretary of State, April 20, 1909, International Affairs of Peru 1906-1910, Case No. 3742.
16. See La Prensa, August 11, 1911, p. 1; Cresson to Secretary of State, March 12, 1910, U.S. Department of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Peru 1910-1929, microcopy no. 746, 30 reels (Washington, D.C.: Archives of the United States Department of State). Hereafter cited as U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy 746, with relevant reel numbers.
17. See Combs to Secretary of State, May 14, 1909, Internal Affairs of Peru 1906-1910, Case No. 3742; La Prensa, April 21, 1909, p. 1.
18. The best account of the coup is in J. P. Paz-Soldán's Revoluciones del Perú, golpe de estado de 29 de Mayo de 1909 (Lima: Imp. del Estado, 1914). A good account in English of the events can be found in Peru To-Day, I (June 1909), pp. 23-26.
19. See El Diario, June 1, 1909, p. 1; June 5, 1909, p. 1; June 9, 1909, p. 1; El Comercio, March 7, 1910, p. 1.
20. Miró Quesada, Autopsia, p. 398.
21. Basadre, Historia, VIII, pp. 3594-3595.
22. Ibid., pp. 3597-3599.
23. El Comercio, November 2, 1910.
24. See part of the speech by Piérola appearing Basadre, Historia, VII, pp. 3147-3148.
25. See Historia de la Escuela Militar del Perú (Lima: Talleres "Reprográfica," 1962) p. 18.

26. On Peru's border disputes, a handy English language source is Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America (New Haven: Harvard University Press, 1938), *passim*.
27. A copy of the contract leading to the establishment of the French mission is in Revista Militar del Perú, XLIII (November 1946), pp. v-viii.
28. Fritz Epstein, European Military Influences in Latin America (Manuscript on file in the Library of Congress, 1946), p. 159.
29. See "Relación nominal de los miembros de las diversas misiones militares enviados por Francia al Perú con especificación de las respectivas fechas," Revista Militar del Perú, XLIII (November 1946), pp. xviii-xix.
30. From 1904, when the school opened, up to 1914 a Peruvian was in charge only for part of 1905. See Cinquantenario de la Escuela Superior de Guerra (n.p.: n.d.; publication is located in Lima: Biblioteca del Centro de Estudios Historico-Militares), p. 7.
31. "La Escuela Militar de Chorillos" in Revista Militar del Perú, XLIII (November 1946), p. xvi.
32. Carlos Rios Pagaza, "La Escuela Militar de Chorillos, 1898-24 de Abril 1953," Revista de La Escuela Militar, XXVIII (June and July, 1953), p. 379.
33. Historia de la Escuela Militar, p. 49.
34. Peru, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Memoria del Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, 1910 (Chorillos: Oficina Tip. Lit. de la Escuela Militar, 1910), pp. 10-11.
35. Peru, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Memoria que el el Ministro de Guerra y Marina presenta al Congreso Ordinario de 1901 (Lima: Imp. Liberal, 1901), p. VI.
36. "Cronica-Militar, La Academia de Guerra, 1901-1902," in Revista Militar del Perú, L (June 1954), p. 55.
37. Cinquantenario de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, pp. 33-34.
38. Up to 1914, at least once the number sent abroad rose to over twenty. See Peru, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Memoria del Ministro de Guerra y Marina, 1911 (Chorillos: Oficina Tip. Lit. de la Escuela Militar, 1911), p. 20.
39. Einaudi and Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development, p. 58.

40. Information on the history of Peru's military press can be found in Alejandro Arenas, "La Prensa Militar," in Memorial del ejército, primer centenario de la independencia nacional, ed., Alejandro Arenas (Lima: Imprenta del Estado Mayor General del Ejército, 1921), pp. 181-182.

41. See Peru, Ministerio de Marina y Guerra, Escalafón general del ejército, 1914 (Lima: Imp. y Lit. del Servicio Geográfico del Ejército, 1914), passim.

42. The information in the table comes from Cincuentenario de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, p. 12.

43. Number of officers graduated from the División Superior comes from "Promociones egresadas de la Escuela Militar de Chorrillos de 1901 hasta 1952," in Revista de la Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, XXVIII (April-July, 1951). Number of officers in active service comes from the Escalafón general del ejército for all the years listed except for 1905. The information for that year comes from Percy Martin, Peru in the Twentieth Century (London: Edward Arnold, 1911), p. 49.

44. Peru, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Memoria que el Ministro de Guerra y Marina Sr. Colonel Heracleo Fernandez presenta al Congreso Ordinario de 1902 (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1902), p. 23.

45. See "The Peruvian Army and its Organization," in Peru Today, VI (February-March 1914), p. 1167-1168. For information on the army's bureaucratic structure, including minor changes made after the 1901 reorganization of the General Staff, refer to this same article.

46. Among the new branches created were the veterinary service; the topography, engineering and repairs sections; and the section of military inspectors. See José Carlos Martín, José Pardo y Barreda, el estadista (Lima: Compañía de Impresiones y Publicidad, 1948), p. 72.

47. "The Peruvian Army and its Organization," pp. 1167-1168.

48. For similarities with the Argentine obligatory service law, see Marvin Goldwert, "The Argentine Revolution of 1930: The Rise of Modern Militarism and Ultra-Nationalism in Argentina" (Ph. D. Dissertation, History Department, University of Texas, 1962), pp. 44-47.

49. The following highly abbreviated account comes from "Reglamento de la Ley de Servicio Militar," and "Ley de Servicio Militar," in Peru, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Legislación Militar del Perú, II (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1904), pp. 141-166.

50. The exceptions in the law were for teachers and school graduates who were in a "liberal" profession. They served from 19-35 years of age.

51. Luigi Einaudi, "The Peruvian Military" (Santa Monica: Unpublished Rand Corporation Manuscript, D-14465-AC, 1969), pp. 84-85.

52. The following information on the promotion process comes from "Ley de ascensos en el ejercito," Legislación militar del Perú, II, pp. 6-9.

53. See Article 59, Section 23 of the Constitution of 1860 in Paz-Soldan, Las constituciones del Perú, p. 694. Although the Constitution of 1860 was suspended for several months in 1867 and from December 1879 to January 1881, it was at other times in operation until the Constitution of 1920 was promulgated in its place.

54. See Stephen Rozman, "The Evolution of the Political Role of the Peruvian Military," Journal of Inter-American Affairs, XII (October 1970), p. 548. Rozman's data comes from Luis Humberto Delgado's El militarismo en el Perú (Lima: American Express, Ltd., 1930), p. 16. Promotions made for political and personal reasons have continued throughout the twentieth century. See, for example, Carlos A. Astiz and José Z. Garcia, "The Peruvian Military: Achievement Orientation, Training, and Political Awareness," The western Political Quarterly, XXV (December 1972), pp. 669-672.

55. Stuart, The Governmental System of Peru, p. 97.

56. Cresson to Secretary of State, February 11, 1910, Internal Affairs of Peru 1906-1910, case no. 23720.

57. See Epstein, European Military Influences, p. 159.

58. Martin, Peru in the Twentieth Century, pp. 51-52.

59. Garland, Peru in 1906, p. 139.

60. The movements were the revolt led by Augusto Durand in 1908, the civilian coup of 1909, and the uprising of 1910 involving Amadeo de Piérola, Mateo Vera, Urestes rerro, and others.

61. Ulloa, Nicolás de Piérola, p. 293; Miro Quesada, Autopsia, p. 239.

62. See Peru, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Memoria que el ministro de Guerra y Marina presenta al Congreso Ordinario de 1893 (Lima: Imprenta del Centro Militar, 1893), passim; Escalafón general del ejército, 1901 (Lima: Imprenta de "El Nacional," 1901).

63. See letter of Dudley to Secretary of State, September 12, 1898, Dispatches from U.S. Ministers to Peru, 1926-1906, Microcopy, T-52.

64. The process was given legal sanction in the 1905 law No. 160 appearing in Peru, Anuario de la legislación Peruano, I (Lima: Imprenta de "La Revista," 1907), p. 160.
65. See Peru, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Escalafón general del ejército, 1906 (Lima: Tip. de "El Lucero," 1907), *passim*.
66. The tactic of allowing former enemies to attain high posts as a means of coopting them has been one long used in Peru. One commentator, noting this tactic at about mid-nineteenth century, said of its practitioner, General Ramón Castilla, the following: "... his political successes and management of parties almost amount to genius, while his victories have never been stained by cruelty, and his antagonists have seldom been proscribed for any length of time, generally pardoned at once, and often raised by him to posts of importance in the service of the Republic." Clements R. Markham, Travels in Peru and India (London, 1882), quoted in Robert Marett, Peru (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 92.
67. Miro Quesada, Autopsia, p. 291; see also letter of Dudley to Secretary of State, June 12, 1902; Dispatches from U.S. Ministers to Peru, 1826-1906, microcopy T-52.
68. See Introduction by Jose R. García Díaz in Andrés A. Cáceres, La Guerra entre el Perú y Chile 1879-1883 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Internacional, 1924), p. 6.
69. See "Orden General--Prohibiendo que los militares asistan a reuniones politicos," in Peru, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Legislación militar del Perú, VI (Lima: Tipografia "Union," 1914), p. 231.
70. See D. Ismael Heredia, "Para los anales militares, organizaciones del Ejército Peruano en tiempo de paz de 1825 a 1910," in Revista Militar XLII (April 1945), p. 443.
71. See the Memorias of the Ministry of War and Navy for the pertinent years for data on troop numbers.
72. See Peru, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Memoria que el Ministro de Guerra y Marina presenta a la Legislatura Ordinaria de 1900 (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1900), pp. 4-5.
73. This statement refers to the administrations of Colonel Remigo Morales Bermudez, Colonel Justiniano Borgoño, and General Andrés A. Cáceres.
74. See "Message Presented by Señor Don Guillermo E. Billinghurst" in New York Times, November 24, 1913, pp. 12-14.
75. Information on military expenditures and acquisitions comes from a variety of sources. See, for example: Basadre, Historia, VII, p. 3400; Martín, José Pardo, pp. 72-73; Peru,

Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Memoria que el Ministro de Guerra y Marina Sr. Colonel Heraclio Fernandez presenta al Congreso Ordinario de 1902 (Lima: Imp. del Estado, 1902), p. XIV; José Pardo, Mensaje presentado al Congreso Ordinario de 1905 por el Presidente de la República (Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1905) p. xxiv; Augusto B. Leguía, Mensaje que S.E. el Presidente de la República presenta al Congreso Ordinario (Lima: Oficina Nacional de "La Opinión Nacional," 1910), p. 28.

76. Fighting in Lima in the last days of the civil war resulted in approximately 2000 deaths.

77. This undoubtedly was the case in the 1908 and 1909 movements. See Ulloa, Nicolás de Piérola, pp. 367, 375.

78. See Basadre, Perú, p. 154.

79. La Prensa, May 24, 1909, p. 1.

80. Ulloa, Nicolás de Piérola, p. 375; Paz-Soldan, Revoluciones del Perú, passim.

81. Paz-Soldan, Revoluciones del Perú, p. 20.

82. Ibid., p. 31.

83. Peru, Congreso, Cámara de Senadores, Diario de los debates de la H. Cámara de Senadores, 1910 (Lima: Imprenta de "El Diario," 1910), p. 305.

84. See letter of Cresson to Secretary of State, Feb. 11, 1910, Internal Affairs of Peru 1906-1910, Case No. 23720.

85. Ibid.

86. Paz-Soldan, Revoluciones del Perú, p. 37.

87. The West Coast Leader--The Peruvian Yearbook (Lima: n.p., 1921), p. A.

88. Juan Godoy Mendoza, Historia del Perú (South America: Ojeda, 1967), p. 164.

89. Basadre, Historia, VIII, pp. 3582-3583, 3587, 3602-3606.

90. Even before these disputes intensified, Leguía by October 1909 had begun his rearmament program which, at that time, included the acquisition of 16,000 Mauser rifles, 4000 Mauser carbines, 20 Maxim rapid fireguns, 4 -- 24 centimeter rapid fire Schneider-Canet guns, and 28 -- .75 millimeter Schneider-Canet mountain guns. See letter addressed to the Secretary of State, October 12, 1909, Internal Affairs of Peru 1906-1910, Case No. 23720.

91. Basadre, Historia, p. 3624.

92. Ibid., p. 3633; Robertson to Bliss, August 24, 1911; Howard to Secretary of State, August 29, 1911; Robertson to Secretary of State, October 9, 1911; Consul General at Callas to Secretary of State, November 20, 1911. The dispatches appear in U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 17.

93. See dispatches from March 26, 1910 to September 24, 1912, U.S. Department of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations Between the United States and Peru, 1910-1929, microcopy no. 747 (Washington, D.C.: Archives of the U.S. Department of State). It should be noted that aside from entering into negotiations for the purchase of a flotilla of submarines, Leguía also unsuccessfully negotiated for the purchase of two or three battleships. See letter addressed to the Secretary of State, October 30, 1911, in microcopy no. 747.

94. See Combs to Secretary of State, January 16, 1911; U.S. Chargé d'Affairs (ad interim) to Secretary of State, April 8, 1911, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 17.

95. Basadre, Historia, VIII, p. 3632.

CHAPTER 4

THE BILLINGHURST REGIME: POLARIZATION AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNCERTAIN SUPPORT

The society which emerged after 1895, although ushering in a period of protracted civilian rule, nonetheless, in keeping with past political traditions, was one in which the institutional arrangements for maintaining order, resolving disputes, and selecting authoritative leaders remained ineffective. In this situation private ambitions, interests, and preferences commonly were unrestrained by a sense of public authority, and the role of force and fraud in the political process continued to be important tools of the politicians.

While important elements of a praetorian society remained, there now existed counterpressures which could provide a barrier to the military. In terms of Finer's levels of political culture, Peruvian society was able to display characteristics of both a low and a developed political culture. Insofar as the political institutions were relatively weak and the polity, while increasingly mobilized, was still not widely participant, the society approximated a low political culture. Insofar as public opinion failed to

legitimate military coups, and civil forces were willing and able to effectively resist such intervention by the eve of World War I, Peruvian society is able to fit into the category of a developed political culture. The existence of strong civilian counterpressures was undoubtedly apparent to officers who remembered the military's defeat by civilian forces in the 1894-1895 civil war, a defeat which possibly left all but the most ambitious or desperate officers disinclined to initiate a coup movement unless major civilian elite sectors sanctioned such an action or military institutional interests were severely threatened.

Against the background of these long-range environmental factors, we can now understand the variety of short-range precipitants which developed during the administration of Augusto Leguía's successor, Guillermo Billinghurst. These factors not only resulted in a gradual eroding of Billinghurst's bases of political support within both military and major civilian elite sectors, but also eventually led to calls by prominent civilians for a military coup. Under such circumstances, the military's disposition to intervene was strengthened, and by 1914 the opportunity for the military to carry out a coup was probably more favorable than at any other time during the preceding twenty years.

Billinghurst's Ascent to Power

If on the eve of the coup d'etat of 1914, Billinghurst found himself without the support of the major civilian elites

in the country, such was not the case at the time of his assumption of power.

As 1912 approached, Augusto Leguía made no serious attempt to perpetuate his Presidency unconstitutionally, since the result of such an act undoubtedly would have been to precipitate an unwanted political crisis. Rather, by the beginning of 1912, Leguía opted to support the candidacy of Antero Aspíllaga as his successor.¹ Aspíllaga, a wealthy cotton and sugar empresario and a well known member of the Peruvian elite, had provided important support to Leguía in his battles with the belligerent Congressional opposition in 1910 and 1911.² While Aspíllaga counted on the support of the Leguista dominated legislature and the governmental machinery to assure his election, he was not an overly popular candidate; and the Democratic, Liberal, and Independent Civil Parties were unwilling to support his candidacy. But neither were the leaders of these parties initially able to find an acceptable candidate within their own ranks.³

It was under these conditions that in May 1912, Guillermo Billinghurst, then sixty-seven years old, announced his candidacy. Billinghurst, the rich inheritor of a fortune in nitrates in Tarapacá, had intermittently participated in politics for nearly forty years, was Chief of the northern army during the War of the Pacific, had accompanied Piérola in varied rebellions, and by 1895 had become one of the most important members of the Democratic Party. His influence in the Democratic Party waned after 1899 when he had vehemently opposed Piérola's stance on the question of Presidential suc-

cession, conspired against the government, and then largely withdrew from politics until 1909. In that year, Billinghamurst was elected Mayor of Lima. During the succeeding twenty months, he carried out many valued improvements, and as a result managed once again to gain popularity within the Democratic Party. Billinghamurst also managed to avoid major confrontations in the struggle between the followers of Leguía and the Bloc, and succeeded in maintaining a relatively cordial relationship with both of these groups.⁴

Since he was on generally good terms with the opposition to Leguía, Billinghamurst managed to attain their support as a suitable compromise candidate. It was an alliance of convenience; but one which would prove to be, for the time being at least, an advantageous one. Billinghamurst, with the active support of the Liberals, the dissident Constitutionalists, the Independent Civilists, and many of the Democratic Party members, was able to mount a vigorous campaign. He also attained the backing of the country's leading newspapers, La Prensa and El Comercio.

His campaign almost immediately began to elicit widespread support among the lower class masses as well as with middle sectors. Billinghamurst's promises of improved housing and better working conditions, combined with his assurances of a larger loaf of bread at a cheaper price, met with vast approval from the lower classes. Indeed, on one occasion over twenty thousand people are estimated to have participated in manifestations in his favor, while those demonstrating in support of Aspíllaga never approached that number. Yet, in light

of past political traditions, Billinghurst did not believe that elections, in fact, would be held honestly. Claiming that the electoral process would be carried out in an illegal fashion,⁵ Billinghurst supporters at the time of the election staged a general strike in Lima, the first time that such an event took place in the capital. During the strike, numerous bands of armed Billinghurst supporters succeeded in committing many acts of violence, setting fire to the polling booths within the city, and putting into flight the personnel in charge of them. The purpose of these tactics was to prevent the polling of a sufficient percentage of the popular vote as was required to validate the election under Peruvian law, thereby having the matter decided in the Congress⁶ where Billinghurst could be in a position to negotiate his way into the Presidency. The tactic worked. "The Congress declared that the necessary percentage of the votes had not been forthcoming, and therefore no [valid] election had been held, and they proceeded to elect a President and a Vice-President."⁷

On August 19, 1912 the Leguista dominated Congress, acting on Leguía's instructions, overwhelmingly elected Billinghurst to the Presidency by a vote of 132 to 30.⁸ As a bonus for allowing the Presidency to go to Billinghurst, the incumbent Chief of State's brother, Roberto, was elected First Vice-President.⁹ Also reflective of the bargaining involved was the choice of another brother, Carlos, for the position of Second Presiding Officer of the Senate and the election of Miguel Echeneque, a known Leguía partisan, as Second Vice-President. Further, "It was generally reported that Mr. Billing-

hurst had agreed to support certain pending measures of the Leguía administration."¹⁰

Hence, while Billinghamurst found himself elected as President, his position was a peculiar one. He was supported by the combined forces of Liberal, Constitutional, Democratic, and Independent Civil Party sectors, which sought to put an end to the political influence of Leguía. But to attain the Presidency, Billinghamurst had to make compromises with Leguía, whose forces still controlled the Congress. The result was that Billinghamurst's Presidency seemed to contradict its reason for being. Whether or not Billinghamurst had originally intended to tolerate a perpetuation of Leguía's influence as his political maneuverings implied is unknown. But if one judges the matter on the bases of Billinghamurst's actions and policies, the answer appears to be that he did not. The Leguístas and Billinghamurst quickly had a falling out as the new President promptly allied himself to the Independent Civil Party and anti-Leguía factions of the Constitutional Party.

The following section will discuss in greater detail the nature of the conflict with the Leguístas and the reasons for it. Further, other short-range factors will be considered which ultimately had the effect of depressing the popularity of Billinghamurst.

Political Divisions and Conflict Within the Billinghamurst Regime

One of the expressed fears that some of the Independent Civilists had in supporting Billinghamurst was that his character

would lead to violent measures and a personalist regime.¹¹ And one of the reasons why Nicolas de Piérola refused to support Billinghurst was the belief that his personality was too passionate to be suitable for the Presidency.¹² In fact, these opinions were validated as Billinghurst increasingly came to act dictatorially not only with his own cabinet officers, whom he at times treated "with no more consideration than if they were clerks, trying to do everything himself, and swearing at them at will,"¹³ but also with those outside of his cabinet. The personality variable is an important one because it can influence the sorts of decisions and policies which will be made and the strategy and tactics which are used in dealing with political conflict. In Billinghurst's case, his psychological orientation apparently made it natural for him to centralize power in his hands, to exclude opposition forces from positions of influence, and to use or condone violence against opponents if they appeared to be a threat to him or his policies.

The first acts of violence against the political opposition erupted in late December 1912, approximately three months after the new President was inaugurated. This violence made particularly clear the weakness of the political accommodation that Billinghurst made with Leguía and his supporters. At that time, about a hundred Billinghurst partisans attacked and seriously damaged the printing office of the Lima newspaper El Mosquito, which had been vehemently criticizing the Billinghurst regime and defending Leguía. Later, some of these malcontents marched towards the house of Augusto Leguía but were

routed by police.¹⁴

The act precipitated a Ministerial crisis when the government showed reluctance in answering inquiries about the incident. The Leguístas responded by censuring the Minister of Government and Police and forced the cabinet to resign.¹⁵ The crisis spiralled as Billinghurst retaliated by withdrawing all the administration measures which were before the Congress, some of which had been pending during the Leguía administration and which Billinghurst had agreed to support. Congress ultimately adjourned when the Bloquistas, the political sectors allied against Leguía, refused to attend Congressional meetings.

The struggle with the Leguístas then subsided until the Congress again opened in mid-1913. By this time, the Liberals had allied themselves with the Leguístas. Also, a new electoral law endorsed by Billinghurst had gone into effect. Under the law, electoral autonomy passed to the provinces and the power to resolve electoral disputes was given to the Supreme Court. Despite these modifications, as in previous years, the Congressional election outcomes of 1913 were widely disputed, constituting the immediate precipitants for a renewed intensification of conflict between the President and his allies and the Leguístas.

The Supreme Court, which had the power to decide on the electoral disputes, engaged in what has been called a "wholesale guillotine operation,"¹⁶ and nullified an estimated three fourths of the electoral results. The act obviously was a move against the President's opposition since had it not taken place the Leguístas Congressional majority would have in-

creased.

When the Leguista Congressmen, in defiance of the Supreme Court, repudiated its decision and formally incorporated two of their partisans into the Senate, the reaction of Billinghurst was to resort to violent tactics similar to those employed earlier against El Mosquito. In late July 1913, a government inspired mob of hundreds encountered little difficulty in preventing the Senate from convening, since the Senatorial guards conveniently had been withdrawn. Also, mobs proceeded to prevent Rafael Villanueva, the President of the Senate and a partisan of Leguía, from leaving his home and some even attempted to dynamite it. Violence continued when on the night of July 24, a pro-government mob attacked Augusto Leguía's residence and touched off a gun battle which lasted well over an hour.¹⁷ The outcome was ex-President Leguía's being taken prisoner by gendarmes who had fired on the residence in support of the mob. Roberto Leguía, who was elsewhere at the time of the incident, fearful of his safety, took refuge in the Italian legation.¹⁸

Augusto Leguía was charged with assault with armed force and conspiracy to overthrow Billinghurst's government. Rather than face these charges, Leguía chose to leave the country¹⁹--an option which the President had permitted him to make.²⁰ Roberto Leguía, in light of the volatile situation, also decided to leave Peru. Augusto Durand, who also faced governmentally inspired intimidation, remained in the country and continued to serve as Senator from Huancayo.

It was rumored that Billinghurst hoped that his tactics

would sufficiently intimidate the opposition Congressmen into acquiescing, at least temporarily, to his wishes and thereby make unnecessary "the execution of the alleged determination of the President to declare himself dictator with a Congress of his own choosing."²¹ While the departure of Augusto Leguía and his brother succeeded in making the political condition of the country unusually quiet, this was simply the calm that precedes the storm. The Congress, while not seeking to censure the President for his actions, still toed the Leguista line and remained reticent to pass important measures that the President favored. This obstructionist stance found confirmation in the daily routine of unimportant business in which the Congress engaged. Moreover, at times sufficient members of Congressmen failed to meet; and lacking a quorum, the transaction of government business in this legislature came to a standstill.²²

The intense civil strife and the differences between the Leguistas and Billinghurst to some extent reflected a continuation of disagreements between the pro- and anti-Leguía wings of the Civil Party which had emerged during the previous administration. Billinghurst, shortly after he took office, at the instigation of political friends of José Pardo,²³ opted to work in favor of the anti-Leguía Civilists, and in doing so sought to carry out policies opposed to those preferred by Leguía and his supporters. It was these policies which were a root cause of the struggle between Billinghurst and the Leguistas.²⁴

Those policies break down into two interrelated cate-

gories: first, those concerning Peru's relations with Chile; and secondly, those attempting to foster economy in government. In regard to the first category, some historical background is needed to put the policy differences between Leguía and Billinghurst in proper perspective. Ever since Peru's defeat by Chile in the War of the Pacific, relations between the two countries were quite poor, owing largely to Chile's protracted delays in carrying out terms contained in the peace treaty (The Treaty of Ancon) of 1884. According to this treaty, the Peruvian provinces of Tacna and Arica would remain in possession of Chile and should be subject to her laws and official authorizations for a period of ten years, at which time a plebiscite was to be held to decide by popular vote whether Tacna and Arica were to remain definitively under the dominion and sovereignty of Chile or were to revert back to Peru.²⁵

The problem revolved around the fact that while Peru had continually demanded the fulfillment of this treaty, Chile remained unwilling to conclude the special protocol in terms agreeable to Peru. Apparently, Chile did not wish to go to the polls until it was sure of a favorable result, and to secure this, time was required. It was alleged that the desire by Chile to keep the territory was largely for economic reasons since there were reported to be vast mineral resources in it.²⁶

But it was not simply the delays which disturbed many Peruvians--it was also what occurred in Tacna and Arica during

the delays. In order to assure a safe vote, a policy of Chileanization was carried out. This policy consisted of the application of rigorous measures against Peruvian residents in order to intimidate and force them to leave the territory. For example, the Peruvian press was subjected to controls and at times shut down, Peruvians were discriminated against and forced out of work, Peruvian clubs and schools were closed, and many Peruvians were killed. At the same time, Chile had begun to colonize the territory with its own nationals, build railroads, and subsidize factories.²⁷

In Peru, there was often hostile reaction against such policies. When Augusto Leguía was President, his approach to the problem of Tacna and Arica was a tough minded one, willing to base any cordiality between Peru and Chile only on the faithful compliance to the Treaty of Ancon. His stand aggravated the relations between the two countries. Chileanization intensified, and Leguía countered with large arms purchases and incendiary speeches against Chile which brought the two countries to the verge of war. While a strong stance against Chile could serve as a source of political capital, there were those who believed that war with Chile would be disastrous to Peru and who therefore believed that Leguía's hard nosed approach to the problem was a reckless one. Such opinions were commonly voiced by Leguía's Civilist opponents, who criticized him for embittering Chile to such a degree that she deliberately intrigued with her neighbors against Peru.

Shortly after Billinghamurst's assumption of power, acting in favor of such anti-Leguía Civilista sentiments, the new

President quickly sought to defuse the tense situation existing between Chile and Peru. In November 1912, Billinghurst initiated an exchange of telegrams between his government and the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, leading to an agreement called the Hunneus-Valera Accord which offered a formula for resolving the Tacna and Arica dispute. Major points of the agreement were: postponement of the plebiscite until 1933, and the stipulation that it would be overseen by an electoral board composed of three Chileans and two Peruvians whose majority decision would be binding on all. Further, the accord stipulated that a commercial treaty of reciprocity was to be negotiated and the payment of 50,000 pounds was to be made to Peru on the signature of the treaty.²⁸

The reaction to the accord at best was mixed.²⁹ La Prensa and El Comercio, the news organs of the Democratic and Independent Civil Parties, both agreed that some kind of accord was necessary and favored careful consideration of the protocol arrangements. Neither paper expressed unfavorable opinions towards the accord while the matter was before the Congress for ratification. The same could not be said for the Leguistas and their supporters,³⁰ who vehemently opposed the accord and who considered it to be an unpatriotic act which assuredly would result in delivering definitively the provinces of Tacna and Arica into the hands of Chile without any sort of adequate compensation or advantage.³¹

It was objected that by 1933 the Chileanization process would guarantee a majority of votes in favor of the Chilean position, and that the Chilean majority on the electoral board

89 would assure a confirmation of a vote against Peru. Further, some opponents of the accord suspected Billinghurst and his associates of intending to deposit in European banks for their personal use the cash award tied to the commercial treaty.³² The issue elicited such discontent that it has been categorized by some writers as one of the main causes of Billinghurst's overthrow.³³ Since the Leguistas had the dominant position in the Peruvian Congress, ratification of the accord was effectively defeated.

But the strife between the Leguista supporters and Billinghurst was not solely the result of disagreements regarding the Hunneus-Valera Accord. It was also due to Billinghurst's drive to economize in government spending. During the previous administration, as was noted in the last chapter, Augusto Leguía pursued a policy which called for significant expenditures for armaments and war vessels. Notable in this regard were his negotiations with the Electric Boat Company for the purchase of a flotilla of submarines, which it was believed would safeguard the Peruvian coast and pose a formidable threat to the Chilean navy should war break out between Peru and her long-time southern adversary. Furthermore, Leguía planned to carry out varied railroad and irrigation projects which also would have necessitated significant outlays of capital.

Billinghurst, like many of his Civilista adherents and Democratic Party supporters, thought a number of Leguía's projects foolhardy, and found debts that had accrued difficult to pay.³⁴ Discontent by Billinghurst became manifest in an early speech before the Congress when he criticized Leguía for

leaving behind a very large debt. As might be imagined, such criticism was not favorably received in the Leguista dominated Congress. Irrespective of this fact, Billinghurst sought to cancel projects which Leguía had negotiated and even considered cutting the number of public functionaries and deleting numerous items from the military budget.

While Congressional pressure in the Leguista dominated Congress succeeded in maintaining without significant alteration the last two items mentioned above,³⁵ Billinghurst nonetheless, to economize, failed to carry out contracts favored not only by Leguía³⁶ but by the Liberal Party chief, Augusto Durand, as well. Among the most important of these contracts were those for eight submarines from the Electric Boat Company, which Billinghurst upon taking office had originally promised to carry out.³⁷ In justifying his action, Billinghurst stated that the fulfillment of the contract would have imposed significant financial burdens on the government and that insufficient technical studies on the matter had been made to warrant the purchase of the submarines.³⁸ This action met with severe criticism by Leguía and his supporters,³⁹ who desired to have the submarines delivered and who accused Billinghurst of leaving the country defenseless through his naval policy. Furthermore, Rafael Grau, a prominent pro-Leguía Senator, made the accusation that, owing to the cancellation of the contract, two of the submarines destined for Peru were purchased by Chile. Billinghurst felt this accusation was serious enough to warrant rebuttal after his eventual overthrow. Accusations of attempts by Billinghurst to sell one of Peru's cruisers also elicited

criticism by supporters of Leguía.⁴⁰

While Billinghamurst's suspension of the submarine contract drew significant criticism, his failure to carry out Leguía's policies in regard to big irrigation projects and the construction of the Ucayali Railroad also helped to foster discontent among the Leguístas.⁴¹ Moreover, Billinghamurst's policy in regard to the Ucayali Railroad, the construction of which he considered would result in a waste of thirty million dollars, was stated to be the major factor accounting for the falling out between the President and the Liberal Party chief. Augusto Durand was a wealthy hacendado from Huancayo who practically controlled the coca supply in Peru. Immediately upon assuming power, although Durand had supported Billinghamurst for the Presidency, there was "considerable speculation as to how he and Durand would get along, as it was realized that Senator Durand exercised considerable power."⁴² Severe animosities finally developed when Billinghamurst failed to carry through on plans for the projected railway line, which was designed to pass through Durand's home province of Huancayo in the Peruvian Sierra.⁴³ Durand had been having financial problems, and since he had heavy landholdings in the area to be crossed by the railway, he counted on the rise of land values which the construction of the line surely would have brought about.⁴⁴

It was this variety of short-term factors that provided the setting for the violence of July 1913 which resulted in Augusto and Roberto Leguía's departure from the country. At this time, Billinghamurst still counted on the support of the

Independent Civil and the anti-Leguía Constitutionalists as well as Democratic Party elements. The contentment of Democratic Party members at the political reaction against Leguía found expression in their unofficial news organ La Prensa which, in commenting on the July 1913 incidents, showed no sympathy for Leguía and characterized him as evil, personalist, and immoral.⁴⁵

By July 1913, at a time when Billinghurst sought to neutralize his Leguista and Liberal Party opponents, the President showed a tendency to break past political traditions. During the previous civilian administrations since 1895, military men in the cabinet held only the post of Minister of War. But Billinghurst began to give other cabinet posts to military men as well. In July, Colonel Pedro Portello became the Minister of Development. Later in August, Colonel don González Tirado became the Minister of Government and Police, which made half the cabinet composed of military personnel. It is possible that part of the reason why Billinghurst increasingly filled his cabinet posts with such men was as a symbolic gesture to show military support for his administration. But whatever political advantage Billinghurst may have gained by this maneuver eventually vanished as the political situation grew more serious and as Billinghurst's policies caused increased disenchantment among civilians and military men alike.

One of the factors making for this disenchantment relates to Billinghurst's attempts at organizing a base of support among urban labor which he was assiduously courting. After the civilians gained control of the state in 1895, Peru's

economic development increased significantly. For example, from 1897, when imports were valued at approximately \$5,000,000, they increased to a figure of approximately \$25,000,000 in 1912. Likewise, increased economic activity was reflected in a rise of exports, which grew from approximately \$7,000,000 in 1895 to some \$47,000,000 in 1912.⁴⁶ These export increases were due to significant developments which had taken place in the copper, petroleum, cotton, and sugar industries which all showed almost yearly production increases. According to the information available, cotton production increased from 5,876 metric tons in 1899 to 19,230 metric tons in 1912;⁴⁷ petroleum production increased from 37,079 tons in 1903 to 233,600 tons in 1912;⁴⁸ coal production increased from 36,920 tons in 1903 to 278,927 tons in 1912;⁴⁹ and copper production increased from one ton in 1904 to 19,500 tons in 1912.⁵⁰

Economic change and modernization were accompanied by the rise of a rural and urban proletariat which increasingly became organized to press for various labor benefits. Among those who composed the first labor organizations and who demonstrated for better working conditions, fewer hours, and increased wages were textile, electrical, and sugar plantation workers, longshoremen, printers, miners, motormen, and bakers. Whereas prior to 1900 labor unrest was minimal, after the turn of the century labor discord significantly increased as the tension between labor and management assumed greater importance in Peruvian life. The largest portion of this unrest took place in Lima and in the nearby port city of Callao,⁵¹ where large groups of people could more easily make concerted

194
attacks on employers.

Many of the early labor groups in Peru embraced anarchism, in keeping with Peru's tradition of suspicion, distrust, and watchfulness in politics.⁵² The trend for workers was to demonstrate for the amelioration of immediate grievances through direct action against their employers rather than through active participation in politics (in which most showed either little or no interest). The strike became the major method utilized when demonstrating for change, but when this tactic alone proved insufficient, mass demonstrations took place as did assaults on factories and on strikebreakers. At times, mass thefts of food to replenish dwindling food supplies also occurred. It was not uncommon for the government to intervene with the police and the armed forces, and bitter clashes often resulted.

As should be obvious, the increased social mobilization which resulted from economic change simply added a new destabilizing element to the already preexisting unstable society where intra-class conflict restricted to the country's upper class predominated. But henceforth, inter-class conflict would increasingly influence political outcomes as the extant political elites more than ever before would be pressured into taking into account the interests of labor.

In such an environment, Billinghurst became the first Peruvian President to utilize sectors of labor as a counterbalance to the political opposition. Throughout his administration, in an attempt to gain labor support, Billinghurst's attitude towards the workers was a relatively friendly one.

195

In fact, the President made sympathetic speeches on their behalf and provided workers with a number of benefits. In trying to fulfill pledges made at his inauguration, Billinghurst built low-cost housing for workers and endeavored to establish public work schemes to counter unemployment. Further, in an effort to gain increased popular backing, Billinghurst supported free cinemas, visited worker neighborhoods, attended their social functions, sent worker delegations to Chile to try to establish more cordial relations, and even met personally with commissions of striking workers to discuss their grievances.⁵³ Billinghurst's most notable accomplishments were a series of labor decrees benefiting workers. They included the legitimation of the right to strike, protection for any strike involving three quarters of the employees and compulsory arbitration, compensation for accidents occurring on the job, and the establishment of a special governmental agency which was organized to supervise the enforcement of these laws.⁵⁴

While anarchist elements remained unwilling to support Billinghurst, other labor sectors found it desirable to do so. The President drew this support, as well as other lower class elements, into a loosely formed organization called the Committee of Public Health. This organization was led by don Lauro Angel Curletti, who acted in close collaboration with the labor leader Justo Casaretto. The purpose of the organization seemed to be little more than a vehicle to violently thrust against the President's opponents, and it never evolved into anything beyond simply an appendage of the Billinghurst administration to be used for purely political purposes.⁵⁵

It was elements from this organization that were utilized against the Senate and Leguía in July 1913, and which would later be mobilized to intimidate the opposition in the days immediately preceding Billinghurst's overthrow. The Committee was no sharp break from the past since in Peru lower class elements had commonly been mobilized and directed to use violence against the political opposition. The difference during the Billinghurst administration was simply that sectors of organized labor for the first time were systematically utilized for this purpose.

The reaction to Billinghurst's policies towards labor and his utilization of lower class elements for political purposes was mixed. Criticism against his mobilization of the lower classes became significant only during the days prior to his overthrow as the intensity of the violence increased. On the other hand, while the various political parties made no formal objections to Billinghurst's labor policies,⁵⁶ it is known that important sectors of the Peruvian business and political elite objected to them. Objections were evidenced by the fact that the Congress failed to act on Billinghurst's labor requests,⁵⁷ and in response to Congressional reticence Billinghurst resorted to decree measures.

At a meeting in the Presidential Palace with representatives of a large number of business establishments, held shortly after Billinghurst's enactment of an eight-hour day for the Callao dockworkers, the President was told by the employers that such a short work day would be ruinous for the country.⁵⁸ This outlook was confirmed in a Department of State

memorandum of 1914 which stated that " ... a cause for his [Billinghurst's] downfall was his espousal of the causes of the masses in their demands for shorter working days and more pay. Foreign capital complained that it was not possible, from an economic standpoint, for a Peruvian to work eight hours and compete with the rest of the world, as a European would do as much in eight hours as a Peruvian laborer would do in twelve."⁵⁹ Lack of sympathy by British financial interests was noted in a letter to John Barrett, Director of the Bureau of American Republics, sent by W. Bruce Douglass, a friend of President Billinghurst and privy to the opinion of British business interests in Peru. He stated that "all British opinion in Lima that represents capital in mills, mines, sugar estates, etc., is naturally unfavorable to a President who ... [would] dare to ameliorate the condition of the working classes in any shape or form: among such ... Billinghurst is looked upon as an entirely mischievous person"⁶⁰

Despite the fact that Billinghurst tried to assuage employer fears that the eight-hour day would be extended throughout the country by stating that the government would remain impartial on the matter, the President continued to maintain cordial relations with labor sectors. As a result, employer fears and complaints failed to subside.

Relating to the President's favorable policies towards labor were anxieties created regarding the constant disruptions due to the wide-scale strikes which took place during the Billinghurst administration. Such anxieties seemed to be warranted, owing to the fact that of the 31 major strikes occurring

in Peru from 1901 up to the date of Billinghurst's downfall, 12 occurred during the approximately 16 months that Billinghurst was in power. Or in other words, almost 39 percent of the total number of major strikes occurring in approximately 13 years took place in less than 1 1/2 years during the Billinghurst administration.⁶¹ From the above figures, the disproportionate number of major strikes taking place during the Billinghurst government can be easily seen. Since the President's encouragement of labor was considered responsible for "the boldness and absurdity of the laboring class's demands,"⁶² he was held to be the blame for the intensification of labor unrest. This unrest combined with his labor decrees and policies constituted an added incentive among the Congressmen to look with disfavor upon the Billinghurst regime. Such dissatisfaction in high levels of government was clearly shown by some of the President's Ministers who resigned, not being able to accept what were perceived to be artificially created conflicts between capital and labor.⁶³

The President's policy in regard to Indian welfare was another short-term factor which was known to have caused discontent within the Congress. In the first decades of the present century, the value of land in different part of the Sierra increased significantly, partly as a response to urban demands for foodstuffs. The reaction among entrepreneurs was to force the Indians from their lands and use the property for their own material gain. The Indians, not always resigning themselves passively to this situation, at times rose in revolt, causing bloodshed and property damage.

In an attempt to deal with the problem, Billinghamurst appointed Teodore Gutierrez Cuevas as personal emissary to study the social situation in the Sierra.⁶⁴ Gutierrez previously had demonstrated his sympathy for the Indians as Sub-prefect of Chucuita in 1903. Furthermore, Gutierrez was Vice-President of the Committee of Public Health.⁶⁵ Resistance to Gutierrez was quickly forthcoming. Opponents from the Sierra, via telegraph, accused him of inciting Indians to rebel. And echoing this accusation, Congressmen who represented the latifundistas of the area succeeded in pressuring the President to refrain from introducing legislation to benefit the Indians and to cut short the investigation of Gutierrez.⁶⁶ Billinghamurst expressed his disapproval of the obstructionist action by accusing selfish landowners of fabricating lies to discredit his attempts at reforms. While not succeeding in providing the Indians with any relief of their grievances, Billinghamurst's interest in Indian welfare helped widen the gap between himself and the Congress.

The differences between the President and the legislature intensified towards the end of 1913. At that time, the major matter of business was Billinghamurst's determination to carry out economies in the 1914 budget that he had not believed prudent to put into effect in 1913.

Early in his administration, Billinghamurst had complained of "official parasitism so intimately allied with the bureaucratic element that it constituted a dangerous decay of the nation's economy."⁶⁷ This fundamental complaint of the President clearly reemerged in his revealing November 1913 message

providing an exposition of the country's financial condition.⁶⁸ It contained an analysis of the great increase in public expenditures occurring from 1894. The conclusion reached was that the substantial increase could not be attributed to causes of an economic or administrative character, and the increase was stated not to have been due to inflation or a devaluation of Peruvian currency. Rather, Billinghurst indicated that the cause of the increase, which he termed an economic evil, was due almost exclusively to the political order, and therefore susceptible to correction. The political causes in part referred to patronage positions in the bureaucracy and financial policies that were designed to serve personal rather than state interests. As might be expected, the President abolished many useless offices. In fact, the proposed budget called for an expenditure of S/ 3,109,836,⁶⁹ as opposed to the budgets of 1912 and 1913, each of which called for expenditures of S/ 3,331,396.⁷⁰ In other words, a 6 percent decrease from the budget in effect for 1913 was urged with the burden falling on all the branches of government except the legislature and the Ministry of War and Navy.

The 1913 budget had been an extension of the one for 1912, and it was accepted by the Leguista Congressional majority early in the Billinghurst administration as a political compromise at a time when executive-legislative relations were not overly strained. As Billinghurst's relations with the legislature deteriorated, the opposition Congressional majority which emerged looked with increasing disfavor upon Billinghurst's economy measures, pressuring the President to refrain from

making changes and eliminations in the budget that he considered wise.

The proposed budget for 1914 being reduced from that in effect for 1913 caused increased concern. This was especially so because the 1913 budget itself was significantly less than the one Augusto Leguía had proposed and considered adequate for 1913, but which Billinghurst was able to avoid passing. In terms of the Leguía budget, Billinghurst's called for an overall reduction of 14.8 percent. The military cut amounted to 9.8 percent, while the Departments of Government, Foreign Relations, Justice, Finance, and Development were reduced 10, 4, 13, 18 and 36 percent respectively. The budgetary allotment for the Congress remained unchanged.⁷¹

Although, as indicated previously, Billinghurst's policy of economic retrenchment was in part politically motivated, as well as a reaction to what he considered excessive government spending and financial irresponsibility, it is also possible that Billinghurst was reacting to an unfavorable economic situation. The years 1912 and 1913 can be described as years of industrial and financial depression in Peru, and low prices of copper and sugar, major Peruvian exports at that time, had placed the leading industries of the country in a precarious position.⁷² Furthermore, somewhat indicative of an unfavorable economic situation, the nation's exports, which had shown a continued rise in value from 1909 to 1912, dropped by 3.2 percent in 1913.⁷³ In light of the not at all favorable economic condition, budget cuts probably seemed a way of alleviating the financial burdens of the state.

Irrespective of the possible sagacity of Billinghamurst's proposed budget from a financial viewpoint, from a political perspective it aggravated the President's problems. The Congress, while in session, refused to act on the proposed budget and adjourned without its passage.⁷⁴ The probable reason for the Congressional intransigence was the hope that, as in the past, the President would use his authority to hold an extraordinary session of Congress wherein a new budget meeting with the Congress's approval would be submitted. For Billinghamurst, there were two major alternatives--either to call an extraordinary session of the Congress, increasing the budget to one acceptable to the Congressmen; or simply to promulgate the unaltered proposed budget by executive decree. Billinghamurst opted for the latter course of action on December 29, 1913, refusing even to accept suggestions as to modifications from his cabinet.

This action caused a wave of disapproval. Naturally, disappointed office holders objected, and both Liberals and Leguístas denounced such an act as illegal. Moreover, discontent clearly emerged from within the ranks of the Democratic Party. Reflecting this discontent, La Prensa, the mouthpiece of the Democratic Party, stated that Billinghamurst's action was without merit and condemnable.⁷⁵ El Comercio, which was the news organ of the Independent Civil Party allies of Billinghamurst, stated simply that it did not believe that the President had the right to decree the budget.⁷⁶

Discontent over Billinghamurst's policy of financial retrenchment existed not only among civilians but within military

circles as well. Military opinion felt that Billinghurst's military expenditures were insufficient to maintain and better equip an army that had almost doubled in size during the previous administration. It was complained that Billinghurst withdrew from Congressional consideration legislative projects designed to finance the purchase of war material. Moreover, discontent developed when despite making a number of additions, Billinghurst eliminated and reduced the allocation for numerous items in the military budget totalling Lp 80,987⁷⁷ or a 10.9 per cent decrease from the military allocation for 1913.⁷⁸

General Pedro Múñiz, head of the anti-Leguista wing of the Constitutional Party, and a past Minister of War, along with Lieutenant Colonel José Urdanivia Ginés of the General Staff were among those who criticised Billinghurst's military policies. Muniz considered many of Billinghurst's reductions as unwarranted,⁷⁹ and Urdanivia, in a manifesto to the army, condemned Billinghurst for his lack of interest in meeting the needs of the army, failing to provide its men with suitable living conditions, adequate equipment, and increased salaries. He went so far as to state that Billinghurst's military policies ran the danger of reducing the armed forces to a state of impotence.⁸⁰ While perhaps an overstatement, such rhetoric nonetheless probably helped to create or reinforce military feelings against the President. Also, previous policies of Billinghurst, such as the cancellation of the submarine contract, might have remained a source of discontent within the military. It is, perhaps, for this reason that Augusto Leguía in September of 1913 attempted to use this issue along with others such as Billing-

hurst's lack of proper maintenance of naval vessels and his decrease in the number of garrisons in a manifesto that, while not making direct appeals for the military to intervene, nonetheless was described by El Comercio as an attempt to incite the army against the government.⁸¹

One policy of Billinghurst which is known to have caused a number of animosities within the military was the Hunneus-Valera Accord discussed earlier in this chapter. As noted, there were important politicians who felt that the accord would give to Chile definitively the territories of Tacna and Arica without Peru being provided with any sort of adequate compensation in return. The Tacna and Arica issue was one which had often elicited fervent emotions among military men, some of whom considered any attempt to give these lands to Chile as tantamount to treason. Such attitudes remained well into the twentieth century. Not surprisingly, the officers who conspired were those who considered Billinghurst's Tacna and Arica policy an unpatriotic and condemnable one. Even non-commissioned officers criticized Billinghurst for his Tacna and Arica policy.⁸²

While Billinghurst's policies helped lead military men to assume a pro-interventional stance, the President's main focus of attention at the end of 1913 remained on his civilian political opponents. In this regard, his attitude towards the Congress, in light of a strong opposition, was an increasingly unfavorable one. As was mentioned earlier, the President's intimidation tactics in July 1913 were an attempt to force Congressional acquiescence and thereby make it unneces-

sary for Billinghurst to replace the present Congress with one of his own choosing. But as it became ever more apparent that the extant Congressional majority had no intention of acquiescing, Billinghurst finally decided to attempt to gain the political upper hand by electing a new Congress, while concomitantly holding a plebiscite on Constitutional reforms.⁸³

Many of the Constitutional revisions that Billinghurst contemplated unquestionably would have made his political position more secure, and some were designed specifically to increase the formal power of the executive over the legislative branch. The proposals included one which stipulated that the offices of Vice-President be abolished. Its passage would have formally displaced from power Roberto Leguía and Miguel Echeneque, who were both Billinghurst opponents and who held the posts of First and Second Vice-Presidents of the Republic. Also proposed was a total renovation of the Congress to replace the procedure which was then in effect of electing only one third of the Congress at a time. This latter procedure repeatedly resulted in significant executive-legislative disharmony, and it helped account for the discord during the Billinghurst administration. By enacting his proposal for the total renovation of the Congress, Billinghurst could much more easily assure a favorable Congressional majority. Other proposals were designed to strengthen the President's power of the purse, and make unnecessary his use of controversial decree measures. One of the more important of these was a proposal limiting the ability of the Congress to approve, disapprove, or modify the executive's budget.

Also included was a proposal calling for the exclusive right of the executive power to increase or decrease public salaries, and the automatic extension of the budget in effect if the Congress did not approve the President's budget programs.

While rumors of such proposals aroused Congressional opposition, equally important was the alleged decision of the President to hold elections for a total renewal of the Congress simultaneously with the plebiscite vote, a decision which effectively would have dissolved the extant Congress. While defending his decision to hold Congressional elections, after his overthrow Billinghurst emphasized the point that members of the incumbent Congress would have been permitted to run in the elections which he contemplated.⁸⁴ But Peru's past history of fraud and irregularities during election times, combined with Billinghurst's known willingness to use force to influence political outcomes, gave the Congressional opposition sufficient justification for viewing the President's plan as a direct and grave threat to their political power.

As should be obvious, with the passage of his proposed reforms and the election of a new Congress favorable to Billinghurst, the President's political position would be one which would more easily enable him to carry out the Hunneus-Valera Accord which remained as a controversial political issue. Also, Billinghurst could also push through his proposed Indian reforms, more freely impose economic cutbacks, and be able to carry out added labor reforms with little Congressional opposition.

Rumors to the effect that Billinghurst was planning to

act against the Congress and hold special elections had emerged in late 1913, and it was precisely these rumors which catapulted a number of Congressmen into organizing a conspiracy against him.⁸⁵ Opinion that Billinghurst was determined not to deal any longer with the present Congress was strengthened when the President failed to show any inclination to hold an extraordinary session of Congress and as he decreed his budget proposal for 1914. By the end of January, rumors about the Congressional dissolution were widespread and the major political topic of the day.

It was at this time that Billinghurst partisans began to wage a campaign to gain popular backing. Meetings in support of Billinghurst's proposed actions were held throughout the country and telegrams in support of the still officially unannounced project were prominently printed in the Billinghurst news organ La Nación.⁸⁶

The first reports of meetings in support of Billinghurst appeared in the January 24 issue of La Nación where it was stated that the local chiefs of the Democratic, Liberal, Constitutional and Civic Union Parties of Cuzco all decided to support the plan to convoke Congressional elections as well as whatever measures the government might decide to take to implement Constitutional Congressional reforms.⁸⁷ Letters, telegrams, and reports of pro-Billinghurst speeches from other parts of the country made essentially the same points, adding at times statements to the effect that the lack of initiative of the present Congress, its negligence and ineptitude, and its determination to put obstacles in the way of the

government's programs makes necessary as the only solution to the problem the dissolution of the Congress.

On January 29, the West Coast Leader published an interview with Billinghamurst in which, although the President stated that whether he called for new elections was a question which depended wholly on the Peruvian people, he went on to hint strongly that the elections would be carried out, since he spoke commendably of the mass meetings in support of such an action. Further, Billinghamurst spoke positively of the fact that the consciousness of the people had finally been aroused against what he called "taxation without representation, and ... the manner of selecting Senators and Deputies which has been absolutely arbitrary and in the majority of cases contrary to the wishes of the provinces."⁸⁸

By this time, Billinghamurst's support within the Independent Civil Party and the anti-Leguía faction of the Constitutional Party was on the verge of collapse. One of the factors which had deterred some of the leaders of these parties from withholding their support for Billinghamurst was doubt as to whether he was planning a total dissolution of the Congress or a partial one.⁸⁹ A partial one might not have been viewed as a direct threat to them, since being among Billinghamurst's major bases of support, they could still hope to exert some influence on the President. But the willingness of these party sectors to continue their support for Billinghamurst quickly dissolved as it became increasingly obvious as February approached that the President had no such plans for a partial dissolution and as their ability to maintain political influence appeared

increasingly threatened. Billinghurst's loss of the support of the Independent Civil Party became evident in a manifesto signed by its leadership, published on January 30, 1914. The manifesto declared the party's unequivocal opposition to Billinghurst's plans to dissolve the Congress, an act which "would ruin the parliamentary institutions of Peru and rise above its ruins the omnipotence of rulers."⁹⁰ Moreover, the leadership mentioned the illegal character of the President's plans by noting the 1878 law which condemned plebiscitary movements against the Congress and the 1860 prohibition against Congressional dissolutions by the Chief Executive.

Similar remonstrances were made by other parties. On January 27, a Liberal Party manifesto signed by Augusto Durand had condemned the contemplated actions by the President and voiced its opinion against what was described as an unconstitutional act.⁹¹ On February 1, the Leguista wing of the Civil Party presented its manifesto of opposition to Billinghurst; and on February 2, the Democratic Party leadership, after days of editorializing in La Prensa against the plebiscite and the planned dissolution of the Congress, issued their first formal statement on the matter. It was more inflammatory than the others, and the only one to hint of rebellion. The manifesto did so by stating that a "just revolution is the reestablishment of public order legitimately and directly by the nation, a revolution operated by one constituted power against the regime of which it forms a part."⁹² Divergent factions of the Constitutional Party also endorsed

the criticisms against the Billinghurst regime, although they were unable to make a formal statement on the matter, since they were prevented from doing so by Billinghurst officials.⁹³

By early February, important sectors of all the leading political parties had expressed their opposition to Billinghurst's plans. Further protests came from university students who stated that the dissolution of the Congress would be a crime.⁹⁴ The President of the Chamber of Deputies, Ricardo Benton, while stating that the President was perhaps inspired by patriotic motives, also indicated that he was pursuing a course of action which was condemned by the Constitution and by special laws.⁹⁵ The First Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, H. Fuentes, expressed the same opinion as to the illegality of the proposed move and suggested that the Supreme Court order the termination of the manifestations against the Congress.⁹⁶

Of the Lima dailies, only Billinghurst's own news organ, La Nación, and the worker periodical, La Acción Popular, supported the President. The others either took a position of no comment on the political issues or expressed their opposition to Billinghurst.⁹⁷

It was in this environment that the military forces in Lima, in the early morning hours of February 4, 1914, attacked the Presidential Palace and succeeded in overthrowing Guillermo Billinghurst. The military action came not as the result of a sudden impulse, but rather as the climax of a political

struggle which had long been in progress. It took place at a time when very possibly the opportunity for a successful military intervention was better than at any other time since civilians took over direct control of the government in 1895. This fact becomes evident from the pattern of political alliances which existed from 1895 up to 1912 and at the time of the 1914 coup.

Table 5
Pattern of Political Alliances
1895 - 1914

Major Groups in Support of the President		Major Groups in Opposition to the President
1895-1899	Civil and Democratic Parties	Constitutional Party
1899	Civil Party and major faction of the Democratic Party	Constitutional Party, Democratic Party splinters
1900-1903	Civil and Democratic Parties	Constitutional and Liberal Parties
1903-1909	Civil and Constitutional Parties	Democratic and Liberal Parties
1909	Sectors of Civil and Constitutional Parties, some Democratic and Liberal Party support for Leguía's project of conciliation	Some Civil and Constitutional Party factions as well as elements of Liberal and Democratic Parties
1910-1912	Civil Party sectors and Cáceres wing of Constitutional Party (military support counted upon due to favorable military institutional policies)	Civil Party sector, Muñez faction of Constitutional Party, Liberal and Democratic parties

Major Groups in Support of the President		Major Groups in Opposition to the President
1914	Some labor and lower class elements, some local party support	Pro-Leguía Civil Party, Independent Civil Party, Democratic Party, both pro- and anti-Leguista wings of Constitutional Party (elements within military look unfavorably upon the President due to policy disagreements)

At all times from 1895 to 1909, the Civil Party remained, by and large, unified and in power, and could count on the allegiance of first the Democratic Party and then the Constitutional Party. During 1909, the alliance pattern became more complicated as party fragmentation intensified. Still, the man in power at the time, Augusto Leguía, could count on the support of elements of the powerful Civil Party and a strong faction of the Constitutional Party. Also, during 1910 and 1911, owing to favorable military institutional policies, he was better able to rely upon the support of the armed forces.

During the Billinghurst administration, the political situation became quite different. By the time of his downfall, the leading elements of all the major political parties which included the richest, most prestigious, and economically powerful sectors of the country, had deserted him. Also, the President's support within the armed forces was undermined by policies that were looked upon with disfavor by important military

men. The only counterbalance that Billinghamurst could depend upon in the civilian political sector to resist a military coup were some local party supporters and sectors of the lower class which, as will later be seen, proved to be a weak reed.

To summarize, Billinghamurst's loss of support resulted from a variety of interrelated factors. Most of the short-term environmental precipitants listed in Chapter 1 were to some extent involved. These included personal liabilities of the Chief Executive, civil unrest, government policies, political stagnation, electoral crises, and the economic situation. While there is no direct evidence of external interference, it might have been the case that foreign businessmen hostile to Billinghamurst's labor policies, acting alone or in collaboration with their government's diplomatic agents, gave material or moral support to the conspirators.

With regard to the personal liabilities of the Chief Executive, it can be stated that although his lack of restraint and his inability to brook opposition were factors which caused criticism, by themselves, they were not sufficient to account for his wide-scale loss of support. Rather, it was the policies which Billinghamurst's character traits helped lead him to pursue that more than anything else caused his loss of support. These policies included a program of economic retrenchment (which in part was possibly a response to a situation of depression and inadequate funds). Combined with Billinghamurst's drive for more fiscal responsibility, his policy towards Tacna and Arica, his courting of labor interests, his attempts to aid the Indians, and the belief that Billinghamurst

could be blamed for the intensification of labor discord and strife caused disenchantment within the relevant political strata. All these factors resulted in and/or were a manifestation of intense executive-legislative conflict and political stagnation as the Congressional opposition pursued an obstructionist course of action. In reaction to the deadlock, Billinghurst sought to hold a plebiscite on Constitutional reform, dissolve the extant Congress, and hold elections which posed a threat to various power contenders. This maneuver resulted in a further intensification of opposition and the President's eventual loss of support among the major civilian political elites in the country.

Continuing the summary, While Billinghurst's actions and policies depressed the popularity of his regime with civilian sectors and made civilians disposed to seek his overthrow, the President did little to solidify his position with the military. Unfavorable military institutional policies such as cuts in military allocations, and complaints of inadequate equipment, living conditions, and salaries caused discontent as did the President's stance on Tacna and Arica. These factors all helped to make military men more predisposed to revolt against Billinghurst than if he acted more favorably towards their interests and preferences.

While a large number of factors have already been introduced to explain the coup d'etat of 1914, a more complete view of the seizure of power necessitates consideration of the civil-military conspiracy and the operational dynamics of this coup. Additional factors influencing the military men to revolt, including the willingness of civilian elites to sanction such a course of action, Constitutional provisions which could

215
be used to justify a coup, and the willingness of civilian elites to conspire actively with the officers are discussed in the following chapter. Moreover, it will be shown that the decision of officers to intervene was also influenced by the prospect of threats to the institutional existence of the military.

NOTES

Chapter 4

1. This support was half-hearted at best. It has been stated that Leguía in actuality desired to extend his term of office, although political conditions were unpropitious for a serious attempt to implement that aspiration. See, for example, Miro Quesada, Autopsia, pp. 403, 405-406.
2. Jorge Basadre, "Un fragmento de la historia Peruana en el siglo XX," in Visión del Perú en el siglo XX, ed., José Pareja Paz-Soldan (Lima: Librería Stadium, 1962), p. 379.
3. Ibid., p. 383.
4. The information on Billinghamurst comes from a variety of sources. See *ibid.*, pp. 383-386; Alberto Tauro, ed., Diccionario enciclopedico del Perú, I (Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos Americanos, 1966), pp. 190-191; a biographical sketch of Billinghamurst appears as an attachment to Dispatch No. 130, August 31, 1912 in U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
5. Howard to Secretary of State, May 28, 1912, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
6. See *ibid.*; Basadre, Un fragmento, p. 389, El Diario, p. 1.
7. Howard to Secretary of State, August 3, 1912, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
8. The election results appear in The West Coast Leader, August 22, 1912.
9. Miro Quesada, Autopsia, p. 408.
10. Howard to Secretary of State, August 3, 1912, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
11. Víctor Andrés Belaunde, Memorias, II (Lima: Imprenta Lumen, 1961), p. 241.
12. Miro Quesada, Autopsia, p. 406.
13. Bryan to Secretary of State, February 5, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

14. See The West Coast Leader, December 26, 1912, p. 4.
15. Basadre, Un fragmento, p. 411.
16. The West Coast Leader, July 24, 1913, p. 1
17. The best account of the incident appears in *ibid.*, July 3, 1913, p. 1.
18. Howard to Secretary of State, August 19, 1913, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
19. *Ibid.*
20. The West Coast Leader, August 14, 1913, p. 1.
21. Howard to Secretary of State, August 3, 1913, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
22. Howard to Secretary of State, August 19, 1913, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
23. See Memorandum in Reference to the Establishment of a Provisional Government, no date, frame nos. 37-47, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 3.
24. For strong criticism of Billinghamhurst's association with the Civil and Constitutional sectors of the Bloc, see El Mosquito, October 31, 1912, p. 1; November 9, 1912, p. 2.
25. See relevant parts of the text of the Treaty of Ancon in W.J. Dennis, Tacna and Arica (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), p. 297.
26. See dispatch from American Legation, Port au Prince, Haiti to Secretary of State, July 19, 1910, U.S. Department of State, Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations Between Peru and Other States, 1910-1929 (Washington: Archives of U.S. Department of State), microcopy no. 748.
27. See Dennis, Tacna and Arica, p. 200; Pedro Dávalos y Liassón, Diez años de historia contemporanea del Perú, 1899-1908 (Lima: Imprenta Gil, 1930), pp. 44-45; The London Times, April 1, 1910, p. 5.
28. See conditions proposed by telegraph in the Hunneus-Valera negotiations in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, pp. 1227-1228; see also Alberto Wagner de Reyna, Historia diplomática del Perú, I (Lima: Ediciones Peruanas, 1964), p. 139.
29. Howard to Secretary of State, December 21, 1912, U.S. Department of State, Records Relating to Political Relations Between Peru and Other States, microcopy no. 748.

30. Undoubtedly, negative reaction against the accord emerged in southern Peru since at the time of Billinghurst's overthrow, large sectors of the masses in that portion of the country (the one nearest Chile) were reported to be decidedly against the President and could be counted against him, while in the northern portion of the country, little of this attitude was noted. See Consul-General at Large to Secretary of State, January 18, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
31. The Leguista sentiments can be found in El Mosquito, November 9, 1912, p. 1; November 23, 1912, p. 1; November 30, 1912, p. 1.
32. See the letter of Antonio Marmal to William Jennings Bryan, February 11, 1914 in U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
33. See Wagner de Reyna, Historia diplomática del Perú, p. 139; Arbitration Between Peru and Chile--The Case of Peru in the Matter of the Controversy Arising out of the Question of the Pacific Before the President of the United States, Arbitor (Washington, D.C.: National Capital Press, Inc., 1923), p. 63; Ireland, Border Disputes, p. 167.
34. See El Comercio, September 24, 1913, p. 1; La Prensa, September 23, 1913, p. 1. The relevant articles of both papers were reprinted in the Billinghurst organ La Nación, September 25, 1913, p. 2.
35. Basadre, Un fragmento, p. 418.
36. Howard to Secretary of State, August 3, 1913, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
37. Chester to Howard, February 4, 1913, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 11.
38. Guillermo Billinghurst, El Presidente a la Nación (Santiago: La Imprenta Dierner, 1915), p. 20.
39. See El Mosquito, November 30, 1912, p. 1; see also the manifesto of Augusto Leguía in La Nación, September 22, 1913, p. 1.
40. See El Mosquito, September 30, 1912, p. 1.
41. Bryan to Bingham, February 5, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.

44. See McMillin to Secretary of State, April 1, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
45. Article appearing in La Prensa, September 23, 1913; reprinted in La Nación, September 25, 1913, p. 2.
46. C. Noel Wilde, The Republic of Peru. Its Development and Commercial Opportunities (Ottawa: Department of Trade and Commerce, Commercial Intelligence Service, 1923), p. 19.
47. Dávalos y Lissón, La primera centuria, p. 311.
48. Ibid., p. 343.
49. Ibid., p. 339.
50. Ibid., p. 358.
51. See Wilfredo Kapsoli, Las luchas por las ocho horas en Perú (Lima: Publicación del Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas de FEPUC, 1971), pp. 10A-10B.
52. See Ernesto Yepes de Castillo, Perú, 1820-1920, un siglo de desarrollo capitalista (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1972), pp. 219-232.
53. See La Nación, September 8, 1913, p. 1; September 19, 1913, p. 1; September 24, 1913, p. 2; October 6, 1913, p. 1; December 5, 1913, p. 1; December 20, 1913, p. 1.
54. Basadre, Un fragmento, pp. 398-401.
55. See the volatile, incendiary, and purely political nature of circulars from the Committee of Public Health distributed during the incidents against Leguía and the Senate in July 1913; enclosures with dispatches nos. 228 and 231 in U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
56. La Prensa applauded the eight hour day in its issue of January 5, 1913, p. 1; El Comercio, January 11, 1913, p. 1 stated that the government acted wisely in decreeing an eight hour day for the Callao dockworkers. On January 25, 1913, p. 1 El Comercio also reacted favorably to Billingham's decree which was designed to regulate strikes.
57. See Basadre, Un fragmento, p. 398 for remarks of Billingham lamenting the absence of labor legislation and the Congress's failure to adopt measures designed to deal with the problem.
58. Zitor (pseudonym), Historia de las principales huelgas y paros obreros habidos en el Perú (Lima: Manuscript no. E 1221 in Sala de Investigaciones Bibliográficas, Biblioteca Nacional, 1946), p. 45.

59. Bryan to Bingham, February 5, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, Microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
60. W. Bruce Douglass to Hon. John Barrett, July 25, 1914 in U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
61. The figures are based on data provided in Kapsoli, Las luchas, pp. 10A-10B.
62. Bryan to Bingham, February 5, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
63. Manuel A. Capuñay, Leguía: vida y obra del constructor del gran Perú (Lima: Cia Impresiones y Publicidad, 1951), p. 106.
64. Basadre, Un Fragmento, p. 401
65. Ibid.
66. See statement by Mauro A. Paredas, "El levantamiento campesino de Rumi Maqui," Revista Campesino (December 1970), in Villanueva, Ejército Peruano, p. 158.
67. See Basadre, Un fragmento, p. 43.
68. An English language version on the financial message appears in Peru To-Day, V (September 1913), pp. 944-968.
69. Billinghamurst, El Presidente, p. 43.
70. It should be noted that actual expenditures during these years, as in previous ones, exceeded the expenditures proposed in the budget.
71. The percentages were derived from data contained in Billinghamurst, EL Presidente, p. 43.
72. L.S. Rowe, Early Effects of the War Upon Finance, Commerce and Industry in Peru (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1920), p. 14.
73. The percentage is based on data provided in Davalos y Lissón, La primera centuria, p. 14.
74. Billinghamurst, El Presidente, p. 63; The West Coast Leader, October 30, 1913, p. 287.
75. La Prensa, January 2, 1914, p. 1.
76. El Comercio, December 30, 1930, p. 1.
77. See the President's financial message in Peru To-Day, V (September 1913), pp. 949-951.

78. The military allocation for the 1912 budget appears in Dávalos y Lissón, La primera centuria, p. 264. This allocation was extended for the following year.

79. See Peru, Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, Memoria que el Ministro de Guerra y Marina General Pedro E. Muñiz presenta a la Legislatura Ordinaria de 1914 (Lima: Empresa Tipografica "Unión," 1914), pp. 26-30.

80. See José Urdanivia Ginés, Una revolución modelo-ejército Peruano (Lima: Edit. Castrillón Silva, 1954), pp. 17-20.

81. The relevant article appeared in El Comercio, September 24, 1913; it was reprinted in La Nación, September 25, 1913, p. 2.

82. See, for example, the letter appearing in Felipe de la Barra, Objetivo: Palacio de Gobierno (Lima: Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1967), pp. 134-135.

83. For a listing of the proposed Constitutional reforms, see Basadre, Un fragmento, pp. 134-135.

84. Billinghamurst, El Presidente, p. 9.

85. The conspiracy began in the early part of November 1913. By mid-November, the rumors proved valid as the President was known to have spoken of dissolving the Congress and proceeding with new elections in order to strengthen his support in the Legislature. See Dispatch to Secretary of State, November 17, 1913, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 8.

86. La Nación, January 24, 1914, p. 1; January 26, 1914, p. 1; January 28, 1914, p. 1; January 29, 1914, p. 1; February 2, 1914, p. 1.

87. La Nación, January 24, 1914, p. 9.

88. The West Coast Leader, January 28, 1914, p. 9.

89. See La Prensa, January 16, 1914, p. 1.

90. See El Comercio, January 30, 1914, p. 1.

91. See La Prensa, January 27, 1914, p. 1.

92. La Prensa, February 2, 1914.

93. Peru To-Day, V (January 1914), p. 1128.

94. La Prensa, February 3, 1914, p. 1.

95. La Unión, February 1, 1914, p. 1.

96. Ibid.

97. The West Coast Leader's policy of no editorial comment remained unchanged throughout the crisis.

CHAPTER 5

THE CIVIL-MILITARY CONSPIRACY,
THE COUP, AND THE FALL OF
GUILLERMO BILLINGHURSTThe Making of a Coup d'Etat

Although the military intervened on February 4, 1914, a conspiracy against the President had been in progress from early November 1913. In that month, at a time when rumors about a dissolution of the Congress were believed by many, a group of Congressmen met to study the stance that the Congress should take.¹ In the meeting, several points were agreed to: first, that a Congressional manifesto to the nation and army would be written denouncing what was described as an unconstitutional plan of the government to act against the Congress, protesting it, explaining its antecedents, and calling for the help of the army and navy to prevent the President's usurpation of the Congress; second, that a member of the group would discuss the matter with the Presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in order to obtain their cooperation and their signature on the manifesto; third, the spirit and will of the Bloquista representatives would be ascertained; and finally, that in view of information that many officers were showing themselves hostile to government policies, one of the Congressmen would be commissioned to also carry out a

3
probing operation--and at the same time for other representatives to secure the participation of Augusto Durand, the Liberal Party chief, in the conspiracy.

Of the eleven men who were listed as being at the meeting, four were Leguistas, three were members of the Constitutional Party (at least two of which were allied to Leguía), two were Liberal Party members, one was a member of the Democratic Party, and one was categorized as an independent.² Many of these men held prestigious positions or were well known and respected representatives. For example, Rafael Grau was one of the most prominent men of the Constitutional Party, was considered to be a spokesman for the military, and an expert on military affairs.³ Also among those at the meeting was José Balta, an erudite engineer when not engaged in politics, who had been a prominent member of an executive committee on national policy composed of Leguista and Liberal opponents of Billinghurst.⁴ Alberto Ulloa, aside from being a Deputy from Yauyes, also was one of the most prominent Congressmen of the Democratic Party; and further, was the editor of La Prensa, one of Lima's most important newspapers. Alberto Solomon, while an independent, was a noted intellectual and for many years had taught constitutional law at the University of San Marcos.⁵ Also in the group of conspirators were Luis Julio Menéndez, who was a member of the executive board of the Civil Party; and David García Irigoyen, a well known Constitutional Party member who in 1913 was Second Vice President of the Chamber of Deputies.⁶

Two weeks after the Congressional manifesto had been written, a second meeting of Congressmen was held. At this time it was resolved to delegate to Augusto Durand the leadership of the group determined to prevent Billinghurst's dissolution plan. The reason why Durand was given this position remains unknown. Possibly, it was the role Durand demanded if he was to join the movement and through it further his Presidential ambitions. In any event, Durand had a great deal of past revolutionary experience, was a vehement opponent of Billinghurst, and was the chief of the Liberal Party, credentials which the original Congressional conspirators undoubtedly found appealing and substantial enough for Durand to be considered an appropriate leader of the movement against the President.

While various Congressmen then proceeded to obtain signatures for the Congressional manifesto, Durand, along with several other individuals, through personal contacts, went about gaining support for a movement among officers and troops of the army. By mid-December, as Congressional support for a coup against Billinghurst increased, a significant portion of the Lima garrison was said to be at the disposal of the Congressmen.⁷

In Lima there had never been any great isolation between civilians and officers. Officers commonly lived off base in residential neighborhoods, and the military garrisons were easily accessible to civilian authorities. Hence, although no formal institutionalized channels of communications appeared to have been utilized by the civilians to contact mili-

tary officers, informal personal contacts proved adequate and not at all difficult to carry out.

During two meetings with compromised officers representing five different army units in attendance, the plans against the government were finalized, and after listening to the Congressional manifesto, the officers reaffirmed their willingness to support the movement. Also, it had been resolved to attempt an attack on the Presidential Palace on December 14 with the aid of members of the Palace guard, which contained compromised officers. These plans might well have been carried out if it were not for the occurrence of unexpected incidents. First, the partially compromised Seventh Battalion was ordered to march from its Lima base to Arequipa. While this news alone did not deter the conspirators from carrying out a coup, simultaneously with the departure order arrived its replacement. This was the Ninth Infantry Battalion led by General Varela, the Minister of War, and a loyal follower of Billinhurst. It appeared that the presence of Varela made unlikely the participation of the Ninth Infantry Battalion in a coup, even though some of its members were joined to the conspiracy. Hence, whether by coincidence or by design, it was believed that an immediate coup attempt would lack important military strength which was counted upon. In light of this fact, various members of the plot considered it overly dangerous to attempt a coup, and the movement against Billinghamurst was postponed.

The delay was utilized by the conspirators to augment their support. One of the ways in which this was done was by organizing popular auxiliary forces in Lima designed to second

the military operation if such assistance proved necessary. An effort was also made by the plotters to increase their military support. With this end in mind, numerous conferences were held with commissioned and non-commissioned officers. It was realized, however, that not only the quantity of the military support but also its quality was important. Therefore, attempts were made to attain the backing of prestigious military men. One of the officers who was sought out by the civilian conspirators was Lieutenant Colonel Urdanivia Ginés, chief of the personnel section of the General staff, whose competence and prestige in the army were considerable. When approached, "the Commander Urdanivia did not vacillate in associating himself with the defense of the Congress, and from this moment, he was a most active collaborator of the movement."⁸

It should be noted that among those officers already committed to the conspiracy, Urdanivia had been sounding out opinions as to the sagacity of a conspiratorial movement of his own.⁹ While apparently unaware of the civilian subversive plans, he was known by fellow officers to be predisposed to join a movement against Billinghurst; and it is reasonable to suggest that this information might have been passed on to the civilian conspirators by one of the already committed officers who was in contact with Urdanivia. This high ranking officer, a native of Tacna, was prompted to engage in conspiratorial activity primarily over his bitterness over the Hunneus-Valera Protocol, to which he was vehemently opposed, and he found that many officers sympathized with his discontent over the agreement with Chile.

As the reaction against Billinghurst gained strength among civilians and within the military, it was felt by Augusto Durand as well as by other representatives that it would be prudent, in order to help assure a winning coup coalition, to attain the support of the Chief of the General Staff, in this case Colonel Oscar Benavides. In 1910, Colonel Benavides was the Commander of the Ninth Infantry Battalion, which then constituted a force of 360 men. When it was learned that over 200 Colombian troops under Generals José Isaías Gamboa and Gabriel Valencia, with the help of local aborigines, had occupied La Padrera in the Peruvian Selva, Benavides marched his infantry battalion across the Andes and disembarked for La Padrera. He arrived after "ninety five days without losing a man or committing an abuse."¹⁰ After several days of military operations, the Colombian forces were routed, and their equipment seized. The Peruvian forces suffered only very light losses. In recognition of his victory, Benavides was promoted to Colonel.¹¹ The exploits of Benavides created a wave of enthusiastic public opinion and were "the origin of the vast prestige that the Commander Oscar R. Benavides received."¹² By the time he returned to Peru after convalescing in Europe for illness, he had attained a well established reputation for valor and personal toughness and was received as a national hero.¹³ It is possible that his popularity was greater than that of any other military man in Peru.

In light of Benavides' prestige and his popularity with the rank and file of the army,¹⁴ Durand and other Congressmen were probably correct in believing that he would be a con-

siderable asset to the conspiratorial cause. Using persons associated with the Colonel, such as his brother don Miguel, the cooperation of Benavides was asked. Benavides agreed that when the dissolution of the Congress occurred, he would resign his post, and fulfill his obligation to act in favor of the conspirators.

By mid-January, the conspiratorial movement included a large number of troops stationed in Lima and nearby Callao, and elements of the General Staff including its chief, the head of the personnel section, the Chief of the Office of the Ministry of War along with forty topographers.¹⁵ Furthermore, increasing Congressional support accrued to the movement as ninety Congressmen signed the Congressional manifesto to the nation. The figure constituted over half of the total 172 Senators and Deputies, and owing to the fact that both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies were adjourned and therefore many Congressmen were not in the environs of Lima, the number of Congressional signatures of the manifesto was a very significant one.

The manifesto is an interesting and important document.¹⁶ First of all, it provided a condemnation of Billinghurst's administration and accused the President of criminal activity. The nature of the accusations and the condemnatory nature of the manifesto can be seen by some of its remarks. It stated:

The decree of the executive power to cancel dictatorially the powers of the Congress and convoke general elections of Senators and Deputies in order to substitute a legal Parliament with one not able to be such, constitutes a grave crime against the national sovereignty, whose most substantive manifestation is the legislative power, exercised by the Congress.

The manifesto went on to state that Billinghamurst

has broken the harmony between the public powers and has destroyed constitutional rule He has upset the public order, in order to convert it into rebelliousness, which the law punishes ... and which the Congress condemns with the total indignation of its patriotism and with the majesty of its right.

The manifesto further criticized Billinghamurst's designs to dissolve the Congress, his usurpation of Congressional functions, and his violation of personal guarantees. Also included were criticisms of Billinghamurst's international policy alluding to the Hunneus-Valera Accord; and moreover, it was stated that one of the reasons for Billinghamurst's actions against the Congress was its unwillingness to agree to his unwise and unpatriotic external litigations.

The final portion of the manifesto left no doubt as to the issue of executive legitimacy. It stated not only that Billinghamurst was outside the Constitution and the laws, but also declared the Presidency vacant, since Billinghamurst "was absolutely incapable of the exercise of the command that the Congress conferred in 1912."

The manifesto was not quiet on the stance that the armed forces should take in the matter. The manifesto urged military nonobedience to Billinghamurst, and such a stance was justified on Constitutional grounds. The document was explicit in referring to crucial Constitutional provisions which could add support to their argument and which could be used to separate the military from any responsibility it might have towards a particular government. The provision referred to was one which stated that "the object of the public force

is to assure the rights of the nation in the exterior and the execution of the laws and order in the interior."¹⁷ The provision goes on to state that "military obedience will be subordinated to the Constitution and laws."¹⁸

Keeping these points in mind, the manifesto concluded:

The army and navy, glory and pride of Peru, has well defined and precise duties; and they have to comply with them with the quickness and abnegation that the gravity of the moment demands and the military honor requires.

They should not obey the government that has disregarded the political charter because the army and the navy only live within the Constitution that consecrates the legitimacy of its existence.

They should not continue at the service of a government that has suppressed individual guarantees, that has disturbed the public ... because to assure the execution of the laws and the order of the nation's interior is the Constitutional object of the army and navy (article 119 of the Constitution).¹⁹

While the manifesto was made public only after the coup and was partly designed to convince military men not to come to the defense of the deposed President, its contents were previously known to various military men. Furthermore, Congressmen who were familiar with the document had been actively engaged in the process of gathering military support, and similar Constitutional arguments were used not only to urge military nonobedience but also to justify military assistance in a coup attempt against Billinghurst. It is possible that the Constitutional argument, when convincingly presented, was one which could help to legitimize a coup in the eyes of military men, and hence foster military assistance for such an endeavor. Moreover, the unabashed willingness of important civilian political elites to seek out, petition, and actively collaborate with officers in a conspi-

ratorial movement undoubtedly helped to break down whatever reticence various officials might have had about participating in a coup attempt.

On January 16, with significant support having accrued for a coup against Billinghurst, a meeting of the major Congressional conspirators was held. While Augusto Durand expressed confidence that the entire Lima garrison would act in favor of the Congress and that a movement against the President would be able to overthrow the government without firing a shot, other Congressmen expressed reservations.²⁰ Both military and political reasons were given to justify the delay. According to the Congressional manifesto, the decision attributed to the President to dissolve the Congress was the main justification for his removal from office. Hence, Rafael Grau, one of the main conspirators, argued that it would be best to wait until Billinghurst explicitly announced his intention of carrying out the Congressional dissolution, and by doing so clearly legitimize his ouster.²¹ Added to this political argument against an immediate coup d'etat was a military one. Although much of the Lima garrison was willing to support the movement as were a portion of the troops at Callao, it was felt that, contrary to Durand's opinion, the possibility of the coup's failure still existed. It was therefore argued that before proceeding it would be wise to continue gaining support not only within the military but among police forces in Lima as well.²² Furthermore, wary of the possibility that Billinghurst might attempt to arm his followers with weapons from the military arsenal, it was considered important to se-

cure the support of the troops stationed at the Santa Catalina fortress where the arsenal was located. As a result of such factors, it was decided to continue to delay the military coup d'etat.

The additional time was used by Durand and his co-conspirators in mobilizing increased support for the movement, now extending their work not only to military men and police sectors that were not yet involved in the conspiracy in Lima, but also to civilians in distant provinces as well. Preparing for the possibility of a more protracted conflict, armed groups of civilians were readied in Arequipa, Junin, Ica, and in a number of other provinces which would join the conflict if necessary.

As pro- and anti-government intensified in the last week of January and the first days in February, tensions were considerably heightened. At that time, rumors were circulating that a subversive plot against the President was afoot, and that Colonel Benavides was among the conspirators. While initially Billinghamurst did not believe that the Chief of the General Staff was involved, the President did suspect that a civil-military plot was in progress and he apparently tried to counter such a conspiracy by instigating violent acts against his civilian political opponents and by threatening to mobilize elements of the Committee of Public Health in his defense.

In such an environment, the active plotters, both civilian and military, had become increasingly convinced of the need to carry out the coup as soon as possible and to wait no longer for the President to formally announce the dissolution

of Congress. Continued delay might have given Billinghurst the time needed to successfully expose and thwart the conspiracy.

Numerous statements made by eminent civilians shortly after the President's overthrow illustrate the sense of gravity and apprehensiveness which existed at that time. Intermingled in their remarks are expressions of discontent and anxiety over Billinghurst's policy of courting the power of the masses as an offset to the upper class--a tactic which "thoroughly antagonized the older element politically, found among the educated and well-to-do."²³ Augusto Durand stated:

Mr. Billinghurst was playing with fire and undermining the base of our social organization by mixing a purely political question with one social, by appealing to the baser interests of the masses and trying to turn them against the directive classes.²⁴

Luis Pardo, a well known member of the Peruvian aristocracy, made the following comment:

The painful situation that Peru was going through filled with worry all spirits because of the proximity of the grave occurrences which were increasing day by day. The unjustifiable resolution of the government to carry out the work of demolishing our institutions with a retinue of threats and violent acts, resulted in rapidly crystallizing a general indignation The eve of the social and political downfall of Peru was approaching.²⁵

Pedro de Oliviera also conveyed a feeling of crisis in a speech given shortly after the coup. He stated:

The moral sense of the salaried mobs had been misplaced in such a manner that the audacious insolent disrespect and destructiveness of the lower classes had eclipsed the other classes, [and] that before such misfortune the national conscience asked itself: where are the virtues of our majors, of our managing classes?²⁶

An important accelerator of crisis which hastened the conspirators to move against the President was the belief that

34
Billinghamurst, in order to carry out the planned dissolution of Congress and counter the opposition, would try to neutralize the operational effectiveness of the army, leaving the city at the mercy of lower-class elements.²⁷ This belief seems to have had some justification, since in the beginning of February, an order was received by one of the committed army units to disarm and decrease its troop strength.²⁸ Moreover, on February 2, the President signed a decree that removed the command of the military arsenal at the Santa Catalina fortress from Colonel Benavides and put it under the direct control of the Minister of War, General Varela, who favored arming the people. The decree constituted the initial step towards arming the President's supporters with the weapons necessary to construct a paramilitary force with which to more seriously threaten not only his civilian opponents but the established military institution as well.

As noted in Chapter 1, efforts on the part of the Chief Executive to organize or arm such a force are often viewed very unfavorably by important military men. In the Peruvian case, the decree acted as a catalyst and elicited significant opposition by Colonel Benavides,²⁹ who now became willing to support an immediate coup attempt. It is obvious that the inherent danger for Billinghamurst was that his mobilization of lower class supporters if it was to be effective in squelching the opposition, could go beyond the threshold of internal disorder which some officers were willing to tolerate.

One of the fundamental reasons why Benavides had joined the conspiracy was the belief that his participation would help

avoid the emergence of a schism within the armed forces between pro- and anti-government factions.³⁰ With inter-military factionalism decreased, Benavides believed that unnecessary bloodshed would be avoided. While the postponement of the coup allowed time to build up increased consensus within the military against Billinghurst, and thereby help limit the possibility of a bloody confrontation between opposing military factions, Billinghurst's decree of February 2, which ultimately might have led to the arming of the people with thousands of rifles, made increasingly possible a conflict of considerable proportions with grave consequences to the nation. If in previous years the possibility that a military coup would result in widespread violence acted as a deterrent to intervening among officers, in 1914 the reverse seems to have occurred. Widespread armed conflict threatened to break out only if a coup was not immediately forthcoming.

General Desvoyes, the head of the French military mission, possibly acting on the urgings of Benavides, convinced Billinghurst to rescind the controversial order.³¹ Benavides, by that time, seems to have been committed to participate in an immediate coup, especially since the lower-class masses still threatened to upset public order. Moreover, the rumor remained that Billinghurst would try to carry out measures to effectively prevent the army from intervening in the wake of such strife.

On February 2, Billinghurst, suspicious that Benavides was involved in a plot against the government, issued a decree making Colonel Luis B. Regal Chief of the General Staff.³² On the following day, the President confronted Benavides and

asked him if his office was a true center of conspiracy. According to Billinghamurst, Colonel Benavides replied that such accusations were completely false.³³ But irrespective of such utterances, Billinghamurst was unwilling to revoke Benavides' dismissal. Urdanivia Ginés, in his account of the confrontation between Benavides and the President, added that in an attempt to assuage Benavides, Billinghamurst offered the Colonel's post in one of Peru's military missions in Europe.³⁴

A different version from that of Billinghamurst regarding events on February 3 was given by the U.S. Minister to Peru, Bryan McMillin, who stated that in the meeting between Billinghamurst and Benavides, when the President asked whether the Chief of Staff of the army would stand by him, Benavides "replied that he would not, as he regarded the action contemplated by the President as unconstitutional."³⁵ Whatever the case, Benavides' status, prestige, and command capabilities within the army apparently remained intact as was his determination to overthrow Billinghamurst. Reviewing his estimation of the volatile political situation existing immediately before Billinghamurst's overthrow, Colonel Benavides concisely summed up his opinion on the need for military action against the President, stating:

Matters had gone so far that there was a manifest decision to suppress the national representation and preparations were being made for the perpetration of the frightful outrage by the immediate disarmament of the public forces and their consequent dispersal, in order to furnish means of attack to a low class of people who unquestionably did not represent part of the real citizenship of Peru, who are patriotic and who never consent to serve as the means for the consummation of acts which bear the stamp of barbarity and would destroy the entire social, political, and national organization.

Under such circumstances, what was the duty of the army? Nobody ... can say it ought to have cooperated or at least impassively looked on during the execution of the work of national destruction. Its attitude was clearly indicated by the teachings of its own existence. It was in accordance with this opinion that the army acted on February 4.³⁶

Billinghurst's actions against the civilian opposition in the days prior to his overthrow were more forceful than those against Benavides who, in displaying a great lack of caution, he allowed to move about freely and unsupervised by agents loyal to the government. Congressmen suspected of conspiracy were arrested, and others forced into hiding. On the eve of the revolt, the offices of La Prensa and La Crónica were closed by police, and in an effort at further intimidating the opposition, several hundred workmen, organized and armed with government revolvers, drove through the streets of Lima in eighty hired carriages, firing shots into the air and cheering their support of Billinghurst.³⁷

Such actions, however, proved completely incapable of thwarting the military coup which was to take place in the early morning hours of February 4. Although Billinghurst was advised by his Minister of War to try to arm the people with guns from the Santa Catalina arsenal, the President remained unwilling to do so, just as he had been unwilling to follow through on the order transferring the command of the arsenal the previous day. After his overthrow, Billinghurst stated that his decision was based on his "fear of the unforeseen consequences that were able to spring forth"³⁸ from such a move.

On the very eve of the coup, a final meeting was held

by the military and civilian plotters, this time at the home of Colonel Urdanivia Ginés. Augusto Durand, who was to lead the movement, found himself unable to attend, since he was in hiding from government agents who were seeking his arrest. As a result, he remained ignorant of the final coup plans and arrived at the Presidential Palace hours after Billinghurst's downfall.³⁹ The leadership position was taken up by Colonel Benavides, who had the greatest prestige and status of the military conspirators. At the meeting, the final details of the movement against Billinghurst were worked out, with Benavides soliciting the assistance and advice of Jorge and Manuel Prado, personal friends of the Colonel and members of the aristocracy.

Billinghurst's fears that a military conspiracy existed against him were confirmed before daybreak on February 4. Committed elements within the military forces in the environs of Lima rose, and assembled quietly in the Plaza de Exposición. This square was the rallying point from which the troops would later march to the Plaza de Armas, located directly across the street from the Presidential Palace, which would then be attacked. During the initial phase of the coup, bloodshed occurred only at the Santa Catalina fortress, where General Varela was assassinated,⁴⁰ and at the Bourbones barracks, where sharp fighting took place between loyal and subverted units.

The military forces actively involved in the attack were the Ninth Infantry Regiment, the Third Cavalry Regiment, a battalion of sappers, and the escort regiment of the President's chasseurs. Also involved were other minor units such as a

company of light mountain artillery coming from the Lima suburb of Chorillos.⁴¹ In all, from 1000 to 2000 troops out of a 7000 man army were estimated to have been employed in the coup,⁴² and this figure does not include troops in outlying provinces standing ready to second the movement if such an action proved necessary.

Billinghurst found out about the troop movements shortly before the attack began. The news had been transmitted to the President by his wife, who phoned the Palace after having received the information by a group of workers.⁴³ With a sizeable portion of the army troops of Lima against him, Billinghurst was able to employ against the subversives only the First and Second Police Battalions of Lima, which were able to arrive at the Palace before the attack and set up a hastily improvised defense mounting two machine guns on the roof of the building.

When the attack on the Palace did come, a heavy exchange of fire commenced and continued for over an hour.⁴⁴ By 6 a.m. the forces of Benavides, vastly superior in number to that of the Presidential defenders, were in complete control of the building. About fifty men altogether lost their lives in the battle. Billinghurst, who had planned to avoid capture and seek asylum in a foreign legation, was seized before he could make good his escape, and complying with the instructions of his captors, resigned the Presidency. After spending several days in the penitentiary, Billinghurst was exiled, but only after he declared that he would never again participate in Peruvian politics and agreed to return to Lima should political

proceedings be initiated against him by the Congress. Judicial proceedings never materialized and Billinghurst died in Iquique, Chile, a little over a year after his downfall.⁴⁵

Aside from the initial resistance by the two police battalions, and the fighting at the Bourbones barracks, almost no further resistance to the coup movement occurred. Part of the reason for this lack of resistance was due to the prompt and decisive measures which were taken after seizing the palace. Since elements of the police had constituted a major source of opposition, Colonel Benavides, in order to neutralize their capabilities, ordered all the policemen to their barracks where they were disarmed by army personnel.⁴⁶

Another potential source of resistance was labor sectors and lower class elements that Billinghurst had depended upon for support. While thousands of Lima's inhabitants dashed out into the streets alarmed by the firing taking place at the Presidential Palace, they were prevented from forming crowds and mobilizing their numbers against the coup makers by soldiers who were ordered to fire volleys into the air.⁴⁷ The fragility of Billinghurst's support among this group was evident in the days after the coup when no evidence of organized opposition to the disposed President materialized in Lima.⁴⁸

Part of the reason for the lack of such opposition may be attributable to the fact that the pro-Billinghurst papers La Nación and La Acción Popular were shut down after the overthrow, eliminating the only news organs which had defended Billinghurst on the eve of his downfall. Moreover, major personages of the Committee of Public Health, who were respon-

sible for the mobilization of Billinghurst's popular support, were either put into flight or were seized by government authorities.⁴⁹ With the backbone of Billinghurst's relatively uninstitutionalized political organization broken, the attitude of the masses was one basically of docile acceptance.

The only real resistance after the President's deposition came from the distant province of Cuzco, where Prefect Orestes Ferro, a past outlaw and Billinghurst partisan, refused to recognize the new regime and posted armed supporters around the prefecture. Aware of Ferro's resistance and fearful of increased opposition, the armed forces of Cuzco were ordered by Benavides to seize the prefecture and capture Ferro--orders which were quickly carried out with no major problems. After the incident in Cuzco, no further resistance to the coup was forthcoming.

The large degree of support from military and civilian sectors of the country became quickly apparent. With the exception of Cuzco, all the Prefects throughout the country made known their allegiance to the new regime within a day after the coup.⁵⁰ Within the armed forces, there were widespread expressions of approval for the action. Generals Muñiz and Cáceres, the leaders of the major factions of the Constitutional Party, both gave their approval to the movement. At a banquet held for Benavides shortly after the coup, officers from numerous sectors of the armed forces were in attendance, and expressed their well wishes. These sectors included the Ministry of War; the General Staff; the Superior War School; the Military Academy; the Council of General Officers; infantry,

cavalry, artillery, and engineering units; members of the French military mission; and also a group of navy men.⁵¹

Aside from Congressional commendations for the coup, hundreds of eminent Peruvians expressed their satisfaction with Billinghurst's overthrow at various receptions held in honor of Benavides and civilian participants in the coup.

Within the news media, there was widespread approval of the military action. Variedades, the major news magazine, expressing its felicitations to the army, called the coup "a work of salvation as beautiful as urgent which attained the overthrow of a dictatorship that had begun with most odious and hateful characteristics."⁵² La Prensa, one of the strongest critics of Billinghurst prior to his deposition, stated the following:

Thanks to the army, whose honor once again has mixed with that of the country, thanks to the courageous care that strongly nourished the love of its flag and of its name, [and for] having just suffocated, in an action of arms ... the most immoral, audacious, and inconceivable dictatorship ... that Peru has suffered. Long live the army! Long live progress! Long live the Constitution!⁵³

La Crónica, which had opposed Billinghurst, stated:

Lima, thanks to the movement operated by the national army, has recovered its tranquility harmfully disturbed during a large space of time It is just ... that the country has recovered its prestige before the foreigners, that it has recovered its tranquility, [and] that all express gratitude to the army that has brilliantly demonstrated itself to be the true military institution which is able to be confided in.⁵⁴

El Comercio, the mouthpiece of the Independent Civil Party, in a most restrained tone said the following:

The happenings which occurred ... that have put a violent end to the government of Mr. Billinghurst is not able to have caused surprise to anyone since inconceivable aberrations of the supreme mandatory had brought him to reveal

himself against the Constitution, trying in spite of the sane councils that arrived to him and the sane manifestations of public opinion against his aim to dissolve the Congress and electing another outside the law.⁵⁵

Although the seizure of power met with widespread acceptance from the major political sectors of Peru, this unity would soon dissolve as a new struggle for power dominated the political scene in the months following the coup. Before considering that struggle, it becomes necessary for a fuller understanding of the coup to extend the discussion by amplifying on points already mentioned and by introducing new ones related to the disposition and the capabilities of the military to intervene.

Added Factors Related to the
Disposition of the Military
to Intervene

As the preceeding discussion has shown, while a multiplicity of variables may lead individuals to conspire against a particular Chief of State, those precipitants alone in the eyes of some of the conspirators may not seem sufficient to warrant an actual coup attempt. This information suggests the following proposition: that at times, though not necessarily so, the emergence of a "threshold precipitant(s)" might be of significant importance if a coup attempt is to materialize. While this sort of precipitant may not be necessary for the initiation of a conspiracy, it might be the added factor which is needed not only to gain extra support for a coup but also to provide the critical pull within a group of plotters, transforming their coup plans into an actual coup attempt.

Points already discussed will now be reintroduced in terms of this perspective. In the 1914 coup, while numerous factors such as particular policies of the executive, intense executive-legislative conflict, and varied military institutional grievances were among those leading different individuals to seek the President's overthrow, some of the plotters believed it advantageous to wait until the dissolution of Congress took place. Although this "threshold" precipitant never materialized, it was replaced by others which increased the urgency of the President's downfall and which constituted the most immediate factors leading to the attack on the Presidential Palace. As was indicated, those added accelerators of crisis were intensified civil strife connected with Billinghurst's mobilization of his supporters against the political opposition and threats to the institutional existence of the military.

As was noted in Chapter 1, a factor which can help propel officers into conspiracy is grievances over promotions. One reasonable hypothesis is that those most inclined to engage in coup activity would be those officers who have most found themselves passed over for promotion. Unable to advance themselves through normal channels, they would be predisposed to engage in conspiratorial activity as a means of dealing with their frustrations. If the hypothesis is valid in the Peruvian case, it could be expected that military coup activists at the time they engaged in conspiracy, would have found themselves in their present rank for a period considerably longer than that of most officers in the same grade. This hypothesis was tested for major military conspirators in the coup against

Billinghamurst.⁵⁶

Of nineteen active duty officers named as being actively involved in the planning stage of the coup, information on the promotion patterns of sixteen was obtained.⁵⁷ On the average, these officers had received their promotions more recently than 63 percent of those army officers holding corresponding ranks, a percentage much higher than what would be expected if the hypothesis was to be validated.

I also divided the sixteen officers into first, second, third, and fourth quarters according to their seniority in their respective ranks. The first category corresponded to those who had been in grade the longest, and the fourth was for those who were most recently promoted. By this procedure, the information obtained was even more revealing. In the first quarter, or those in grade the longest, were only two officers. In the second quarter were three officers. In the third quarter were five individuals; and in the last quarter, six.

The question which arises is why were most of these coup activists those who had been in grade for relatively short periods of time. A possible answer can be surmised if one looks at the promotion dates of the twelve officers in the third and fourth quarters. Although only one of the twelve was promoted while Billinghamurst was in office, eleven received their promotions when August Leguía was in power. The Leguistas and those closely allied to them constituted a significant part of the civilian conspirators. Since individuals among this group and their acquaintances personally petitioned

officers to conspire, and since such officers became important conspirators, it seems reasonable to suggest that the bulk of those petitioned were assumed to be loyal or favorably disposed to Leguía. Due to the fact that military positions and promotions traditionally have been used as a means of showing political favoritism or rewarding political loyalty, it may be the case that many of the officers who received promotions during the Leguía administration were among those most predisposed to act favorably towards requests to join a movement backed by Leguía and his followers.

While personal loyalty may have been an important factor motivating officers to engage in conspiracy, it should not be overlooked, as suggested in the framework for analysis, that military men can be influenced by less than noble motives. As a result, purely personal interests may have been involved in helping to elicit military support against Billinghurst.

The deposed President, for example, made the statement that gold was distributed among the sergeants and officers of the Lima garrison as an inducement to revolt.⁵⁸ Colonel Urdanivia Ginés made known the fact that in early February, Augusto Durand sent him a check for S/ 60,000 to carry out the coup without further delay. The Colonel added, however, that he did not accept the check.⁵⁹ Unfortunately, Urdanivia did not mention whether other military men were offered and accepted money as an inducement to participate in a coup, and no other information on the matter was obtainable. But since personal gain has always been a powerful motivating force behind political activity in Peru, it is possible that Billinghurst's

assertion that such material incentives played an important part in the coup was an accurate one.

Undoubtedly, the vast majority of military officers are personally interested in promotions. In Peru, military promotions have long been utilized as a reward for meritorious action. In fact, this procedure had been given legal sanction by virtue of Article 58, Section 24 of the Peruvian Constitution of 1860 which gave Congress the right "to give rewards to towns, corporations, or people for eminent service that they have lent to the Nation."⁶⁰ A law promulgated in 1878 was somewhat more specific in stating that rewards could be forthcoming to those who safeguarded the existence of the public powers when they are threatened.⁶¹

Since a coup against Billinghurst would be viewed as an act in defense of Congress, and since Congress was authorized to give promotions to military men as a reward for such an action, it is plausible to suggest that the desire for quick promotions may have helped provide an incentive among officers to act against Billinghurst. The desire for rapid promotions can also help account for the fact why Generals, those at the top of the military hierarchy, were conspicuously absent in the planning and execution of the coup.

After the coup, promotions were quickly forthcoming. In late 1914, the Congress passed Law no. 1993, which gave promotions to the rank directly above to all the officers of Lima and its vicinity who had taken a direct and active part in the coup. Also, promotions were given to those officers who seconded the movement in Cuzco. The promulgation of Law

no. 1993 perfectly illustrates the point that if technical expertise and academy training were more highly valued than in the past, political considerations were still of extreme importance in promotion considerations, and they could constitute even possibly the determining factor in deciding whether or not promotions would be forthcoming or withheld.

If, in fact, a desire for quick promotions was a motivating factor among officers, it would suggest a proposition which had not been included in the analytic framework: that commissioned officers at field grade positions or lower in the military hierarchy might be more willing to engage in conspiratorial activity than their higher ranking comrades. It is also possible that such action by lower level officers could at times be a reflection not of a desire for quick promotions, but of an aggressive response to an inability to participate as fully as the more senior officers in the military and/or political decision making process.

Now, the issue of professionalism will be considered in relation to the 1914 coup. In Chapter 1, it was suggested that the more professional the military, the more touchy it might be on policies which are considered detrimental to military institutional interests. To extend the proposition, it can be stated that within the military, it would be the most technically expert and proficient officers who would be most concerned with the institutional welfare of the military, and who therefore would be those most inclined to intervene in reaction to unfavorable military institutional policies. This

49 might have been the case immediately preceding the 1914 coup. This is because Billinghamurst's military policies were criticized by officers; and owing to the fact that eleven, or 58 percent, of the nineteen officers named as being involved in the conspiracy had completed their training at either the Superior War School or the Superior Division of the Escuela Militar at a time when at best a little over 40 percent of the officer corps had such advanced training.⁶²

On the other hand, it is possible that there was no actual relationship between degrees of professionalization and propensity for intervention. It might have been the case, for example, that there existed a significant number of lesser trained officers who were inclined to become actively involved during the planning stage of the coup but did not have the opportunity to do so. Or it may have been that the most rigorously trained officers appeared to make up a larger part of the coup activists simply because they were the ones most urged to do so by civilian plotters, owing to factors such as personal ties, accessibility to strategic command positions, and proximity to the coup target. It must also be born in mind that throughout the nineteenth century, officers who were often completely lacking in professional training commonly attempted to topple governments, and that such intervention by more professional officers in 1914 might have been principally a reversal to traditionally accepted modes of behavior when the right opportunity prevailed.

Caution must also be applied when imputing relationships between social origins or ties of officers and their propensity

for military intervention. In Chapter 1, it was mentioned that a common proposition which has been expounded is that officers united by bonds of kinship, common outlook, habits, and interests to members of the civilian ruling strata would diminish the likelihood of military intervention.

While at times valid, this proposition is not applicable for nineteenth century Peru. This is because the proposition is meant to explain how civilians in positions of political power are able to maintain their control and exclude military men from exercising power. But in Peru, prior to 1895, political power practically always was in the hands of the men in uniform. Many of these men did not come from the Peruvian oligarchy of wealth, but rather from middle and lower class sectors. Notwithstanding this fact, it is important for one not to reach the conclusion that "the military exercised power against oligarchic interests. Actually, everything operated as if there had been an implicit agreement between the big families and the 'civilian' military [men]. These surrounded themselves with members of the oligarchy, whom they made their counselors, ministers, and ambassadors."⁶³ As a result of this community of interest, the military men never worried about rearranging the economic structure of the society, and acted to defend the economic status quo. As Carlos Astiz states, "clearly, the military officers wanted to join the upper class and share in its privileges, not to destroy it."⁶⁴

Several reasons can be suggested for this community of interests. From a practical point of view, the military men

sought to come to a working understanding with members of the oligarchy since they were the ones who could provide the wealth needed to operate the government and finance the army. They also were the ones who best had the education and skills needed to carry on economic activity, the administration of government and foreign affairs. From another perspective, the conservative upper class sectors were probably seen as the embodiment of culture, refinement, and the carriers of proper social values. Even the civilian middle class tended to model itself on the upper class way of life.

But if the military caudillos who wielded political power were tacitly allied with the aristocracy of wealth which controlled economic power, the bond between the two groups proved completely incapable of preventing political instability and military interventions. This occurred basically because the military men and the oligarchy did not constitute a cohesive sector but rather quarreled among themselves; and in the absence of any accepted code of behavior on political matters, violence and intervention by the men in uniform became inevitable.

Once the military was forced into a secondary position after the civil war of 1895, the oligarchy of wealth openly governed. As the apparently endless struggles within the clans of the Peruvian oligarchy continued, the military, while subordinate politically, continued to defend oligarchic interests against threats to the extant economic structure. As was noted earlier, these threats came primarily from urban worker groups that increasingly became organized and demonstrated

for change. The army became more clearly than ever before a praetorian guard or protecting stratum for the property interests of various oligarchic sectors and commonly was called in to break up labor unrest and guard factories against sabotage. It was such activity which helps account for the fact that the masses often looked on the military with disdain, and why one writer has stated that during this time, the common prejudice of the military was the oppression of the people.⁶⁵ The attitude of anarchist labor sectors which flourished in early twentieth century Peru was neatly summed up in the anarchist periodical La Protesta which stated that "the cuartel perverts men, transforming them, [and] obliging them to be obedient as machines A soldier is not able to be a man, he is conditioned to be a beast."⁶⁶

The Peruvian case seems to contradict the views of Huntington and Nun, who both see the military in Latin America as playing a role of conservative guardian of the existing order at a relatively advanced stage of economic development where the middle class has already assumed a dominant political position.⁶⁷ On the contrary, the military in Peru began to assume that role before middle class participation became pronounced and the economy fairly developed.

What must be considered here, however, is the point of view expounded by Victor Villanueva, the most prolific writer on the Peruvian military, that the coup against Billinghurst was first and foremost a response to negative reactions within the oligarchy over the President's rapprochement with labor and his passage of the eight hour day for the dockworkers at

Callao.⁶⁸ Earlier, the proposition was mentioned which stated that military men would not be predisposed to intervene against the social sector with which they identify. A derivative of that proposition would be that if those in political power are pursuing policies opposed to the social sector with which the military identifies, the officers would be inclined to intervene against the government. It is this proposition which Villanueva's argument posits as the most important explanatory one for the 1914 coup.

The major shred of evidence which Villanueva presents to support his viewpoint is an excerpt from a speech presented earlier in this work; that is, Mr. Oliviera's statement about the disrespect and destructive actions displayed by the lower classes against the higher sectors of the society.⁶⁹ Villanueva misinterprets the statement by indicating that these actions referred to the pretension of the lower classes to work only eight hours daily,⁷⁰ when in actuality there is nothing to suggest this point of view. As was previously argued, Oliviera's statement seems primarily to be an expression of the anxiety which existed over the increasing violence utilized by the lower class sectors against Billinghurst's opponents, especially since it was made shortly after a time when the outbreak of violence was perceived to seriously threaten Peru.

Neither Oliviera's statement nor any of the others made after the coup explicitly referred to Billinghurst's labor policy and the eight hour day as the major reason for the coup. This, of course, is not to say that such issues were not of importance. Clearly they were since sectors of the Peruvian

upper class and foreign businessmen strongly objected to Billinghamurst's tendency to identify with labor. Still, one must not ignore the fact that to a significant extent, the coup was a reflection of intra-class conflict and disunity which continued to be the major source of political instability as it had been in the past. The reasons for this assertion need not be detailed here since they were discussed in depth earlier in this work. What is being argued is that while the military's tendency to identify with upper class threats and incursions can be considered an important factor, by itself it should not be considered the major determinant of the political behavior of the officers, and provides only a partial and basically inadequate explanation of the 1914 coup.

The analysis of factors predisposing officers to intervene which has been given in this section to supplement and expand on points considered earlier clearly illustrates the complexities involved in studying a particular coup. Factors which have not yet been discussed from a theoretical point of view and which must be included in the analysis are those which influence the capabilities of the military to intervene. They will be discussed at this time.

Factors Affecting the
Capabilities of the
Military to Intervene

That a coup took place in Peru on February 4, 1914, as the military became increasingly professional and as civilians managed to rule for a period longer than ever before, is a fact of importance; that the coup succeeded is of equal importance. In Chapter 1, a variety of factors were discussed which can influence the capabilities of the military to overthrow successfully a government. At that time, it was stated that the strategic capabilities of the forces utilized, the degree of military cohesion, the tenor of civilian opinion, and the neutralization of police, military, or civilian forces not allied to the conspirators are important factors which could help decide whether a coup would succeed or fail. What is intended here is to meld the abstract theoretical considerations of Chapter 1 with relevant facts contained in the historical narrative account which was presented in the third section of this chapter. Moreover, new facts which could shed light on the capabilities of the military to intervene successfully in 1914 will be introduced.

Factors regarding the strategic capabilities of the military will first be presented. It was noted in Chapter 1 that it was usually the army which plays the primary role in a coup situation since it is the branch which commands the bulk of the ground forces. This generalization has been born out throughout almost the entire history of military inter-

vention in Peru. It is the army which almost always has been the branch of service in the political limelight. Aside from the fact that the navy has never commanded significant numbers of troops, the fact that Lima is not a coastal city and therefore not susceptible to naval bombardment also helps to explain the limited role of the naval forces in conspiratorial activity. The coup d'etat of 1914 was no exception. It was the army troops which dominated the situation. The Peruvian air force at that time was only in its embryonic stages of development; its strategic capabilities in a coup situation were negligible, and quite understandably played no part whatsoever in the coup.

It was suggested in Chapter 1 that not just any sort of army units have strategic capabilities; those located close to the heart of government, the capital, are those of great utility when carrying out a coup. Further, it was argued that units with access to weapons that can be advantageously utilized in a forceful attack are of greater significance than units lacking in such access. Undoubtedly recognizing the validity of these propositions, the conspirators concentrated their attention on gaining the support of troops not only stationed in Lima and its outskirts, but with a high power potential as well. In doing so, the plotters helped to insure the success of their endeavor.

The Lima garrison was the most powerful. In fact, so many troops were stationed there in 1909 that it was described as a city full of soldiers,⁷¹ the heart of which was within whispering call of three thousand troops.⁷² The situation was

basically the same in 1914. Significant bodies of troops were stationed in the nearby port city of Callao, various units were stationed in the suburbs of Lima, and in central Lima a sizeable body of troops was attached to the General Staff, the Presidential Guard, and the Santa Catalina fortress. It was in drawing on these localized centers of military strength that a force of at least a thousand men was mustered to attack the Palace. As should be obvious, while Billinghurst succeeded in substantially neutralizing the capabilities of one of the committed units before the coup by transferring it to Arequipa which is located in southern Peru far from Lima, the power potential of the rest of the Lima garrison remained basically unchanged. It should be added, though, that if the coup had been delayed much longer, even those power capabilities might have been atomized if Billinghurst had succeeded in disarming the troops and reducing their number.

Among the units which the plotters found it advantageous to win over were those with excellent power capabilities for an attack against the Presidential Palace. They consisted primarily of a combination of infantry, cavalry, and light artillery units. It goes without saying that had the conspirators depended on, say, simply the forty cartographers from the General Staff or more realistically on a small force of a hundred men to carry out the coup, it most probably would have been doomed to failure in the face of the resistance which was forthcoming from forces loyal to Billinghurst located around the Presidential Palace.

This observation leads to a consideration of the degree of military cohesiveness which existed to help insure the coup's success. In Chapter 1, it was suggested that the greater the degree of military cohesion, the greater the chance that a coup would succeed, and that the likelihood of counter-coups after the seizure of power would be decreased. The coup d'etat of 1914 seems to support these points. On the basis of information presented earlier in this study, it appears that an important degree of officer consensus existed at the time of the coup. The process by which such consensus was attained appears to conform, to a large degree, to the model suggested by Martin Needler which was mentioned in Chapter 1: that is, a process whereby a coalition of officers of a size and character adequate to execute a successful coup is slowly constructed among officers with varying degrees of hostility towards the incumbent. In the 1914 coup, although the coalition was composed largely of officers in important command positions in Lima, it also spread to embrace officers in outlying regions so as to help avoid open fighting between army units and to attain an added degree of security should unanticipated resistance have been forthcoming. The fact that numerous sectors within the officer corps were won over to the conspiratorial side before the coup helps to explain why almost no resistance after the coup was forthcoming from members of the military institution.

Moreover, Needler's swing man notion may have been applicable in the 1914 coup. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the

swing man is the individual officer who, due to his prestige, influence and/or strategic position, provides the critical margin of support needed not just in size but especially in weight to make a coup successful. In the coup of 1914, Colonel Benavides appears to be the officer who filled the swing man position. This is because Benavides not only held the influential position of Chief of the General Staff but also because he wielded great prestige and respect due to his military exploits. While at first reticent to join the conspiracy, as the situation degenerated he eventually was persuaded that a coup was a desirable course of action. The winning over of Benavides to the conspiracy undoubtedly helped to insure its success, and even the civilian and military plotters realized that he was a considerable asset. Whether or not a coup would have succeeded without the participation of Benavides is unknown, but it does seem reasonable to suggest that in light of this officer's great prestige, non-committed officers probably were less willing to offer resistance after Billinghamhurst's overthrow had taken place.

While the careful sounding out of opinions within the officer corps and the winning over of Benavides helped to insure the success of the coup against Billinghamhurst, another factor noted in Chapter 1 should be mentioned that may have helped prevent discontent within the officer corps and increased officer consensus immediately after the seizure of power, thereby helping to stifle the possible emergence of a counter-coup. This factor is the tenor of civilian opinion to a movement that has toppled a particular government. Earlier, it

was shown that after Billinghamurst's deposition, significant support for the coup was forthcoming in Peru from leading political and professional men, and from important sectors of the news media. As a result of such support, a counter-coup in the days following Billinghamurst's overthrow might have appeared as unwise and serving no useful purpose since major elements of the society would have been against the action.

It should also be added that the simple perception that resistance to a coup would prove unsuccessful can provide a powerful enough motive for potential sources of resistance to acquiesce after a coup has been carried out. In the Peruvian case, one possible source of resistance from the military was snipped off at the bud. This potential source of resistance was from troops stationed on the naval ships at the Callao port. Upon hearing of the coup, the Prefect of Callao was ready to send these troops in defense of the deposed President. But the threat of resistance vanished after the commanding officer of the Navy, Admiral Meliton Carvajal, who was a past Minister of War, gave the order by telephone from Lima for the troops to remain on their ships. The reason for the action was that Carvajal, believing that the success of the movement was assured, saw no reason to condone an action which would simply produce added bloodshed.⁷³

It was suggested in the framework of analysis that the neutralization of civilian, police, or military sectors which remain partially or totally loyal to the incumbent can help insure the success of a coup. The facts in the 1914 Peruvian case appear to be consistent with this proposition

since the coup leaders found it necessary to take decisive steps in order to neutralize the police and to prevent Billinghurst's lower class supporters from mobilizing their forces against the new rulers. Of particular importance were steps taken to counteract the threat of military commanders loyal to Billinghurst as troops were being mobilized for the attack on the Presidential Palace.

The rank and file troops theoretically simply obey the orders of their commanders; and often, the criteria that is used in deciding who to obey is made on the basis of rank. For example, troops would obey a Colonel if he was visible to them as opposed to being situated in an anonymous command office if he countermanded the orders of a Lieutenant. Therefore, if officers in relatively high grades are in a position to countermand the orders of lower ranking officers who are attempting to mobilize their troops against the government, the success of the coup attempt could be seriously threatened.

In the 1914 coup, the disruption of the troop mobilization was a possibility since various uncommitted officers were of equal or higher rank than military plotters in charge of different army units, and could have tried to countermand their orders.⁷⁴ These officers loyal to the President were quickly arrested, and one was assassinated. Among the officers who were arrested on the day of the coup were the new Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the President's military escort, the aid to the Minister of War, and the Superintendent of War.⁷⁵ The threat of General Varela, the Minister of War, was dealt with through assassination. The importance of the neutraliza-

tion of opposition officers was exemplified by the fact that in the Bourbones cuartel, at the eastern end of the city, where there remained loyal military men who were not effectively dealt with prior to the troop mobilization, sharp fighting broke out, although the troops loyal to the President were quickly overpowered.⁷⁶

Theoretical Considerations on Civil-Military Relations

A number of models have been presented in the social science literature as realistic interpretations of the kind of civil-military relations taking place in various countries. On the basis of the analysis of the pattern of coup dynamics taking place in Peru in 1914, some clearly appear to be inapplicable, and this leads one to seek more suitable alternatives. For example, various models have been presented which deal with the question of why military leaders are kept under control and continue to obey civilian rulers. Three major models of civil-military relations, as pointed out by Morris Janowitz, are the aristocratic, democratic, and totalitarian models.⁷⁷ In the aristocratic model, an organized tightly knit aristocracy is posited to exist which rules the society, and most of the military officers not only are drawn from this social sector, but also have values, interests, and goals that are congruent with it. In this situation, "political control is civilian control, because there is an identity of interest between aristocratic and military groups,"⁷⁸ and the belief exists among officers that political control

should be lodged in the hands of the dominant civilian elite sector.

Unlike the aristocratic model, in the democratic model there is a more pronounced differentiation between civilian and military elites. Moreover, here, the civilian politicians maintain control through a set of rational-legal rules which closely specify the military roles and circumstances under which the military can utilize its power. In particular, these rules exclude the military from involvement in domestic partisan politics.⁷⁹ Here, military professionalism is maximized and a crucial element of the professional ethic is the voluntary acceptance of commands from the political rulers irrespective of whether they agree with the policies of the government.

In contrast to the aristocratic and democratic models is the totalitarian one. Here, the military is controlled by a centralized and authoritarian one party system. The subservience of the military officers is maintained not only by intensive political indoctrination but moreover by various control mechanisms such as a secret police, political infiltration by party members into the military organization, and by the party's arming of its own military units.⁸⁰

Clearly, none of these models were applicable during the 1914 coup for the simple reason that the political involvement by the Peruvian military was far wider than any of the above mentioned models allows. Moreover, Peru at the time of the coup in no way could be considered totalitarian, nor did there exist any homogeneous ruling elite or an officer

corps drawn from it. And while ostensibly the Peruvian military was becoming more professional in its institutional structure and in its technical training, the norm that military men should divorce themselves from internal partisan politics never became clearly established either in the civilian or in the military sector. With the continued absence of strong political institutions, the state remained in ways vulnerable to seizures of power.

The model which best fits the situation existing at the time of the 1914 coup is one constructed by Alfred Stepan, which he calls the moderator model of civil-military relations.⁸¹ Stepan posited that the sort of Latin American society wherein such a model is able to flourish is one where political institutions are weak and incapable of effectively dealing with the demands placed on them--precisely the sort of society which existed in Peru at the time of the 1914 coup. In regards to the military, Stepan argues that while formal indicators of professionalization are increasing in terms of hierarchical structure, internal differentiation, and specialized education, the military remains politicized. Again, this seems to have been the case in Peru in the early years of the twentieth century. Stepan further asserts that in the Latin American praetorian society, where civilian political sectors are willing to involve the military in politics, a crucial ambivalence exists; namely, that while military men are accepted as political participants, they are denied the right to rule for protracted periods of time. It is contended by Stepan that this perspective has been due to Latin America's

link with Western European culture which has conditioned its political elite into accepting the democratic system of government as an inherent part of a civilized and developed polity.⁸²

But democratic government in Latin America often has proved not to be a suitable mechanism for resolving disputes, selecting authoritative leaders, and checking the executive. Because of this fact, political elites find it advantageous under varying circumstances to call the military into politics "to be the moderator of political activity," but to deny it "the right systematically to attempt to direct changes within the system."⁸³ It is argued that military intervention is facilitated by widespread approval for such an act by the relevant political strata as opposed to only limited approval.

Stepan contends that in the moderator pattern of civil-military relations, the military role is limited basically to removing the Chief Executive and transferring political control to alternative civilian groups. Whether or not the military plays this role depends largely on the military's belief that democratic forms of government are both legitimate and practical, and upon the military's view that when compared with civilians, they have a relatively low capacity to rule.⁸⁴ As Stepan states: "The moderator model does not rest on a set of controls imposed by civilians, but on a set of norms both within and without the military. The norms encourage a highly political military whose political acts are nonetheless limited to certain boundaries. In this sense, the model assumes a military that is both controlled and yet highly politicized."⁸⁵

One of the advantages of viewing military interventions

in the context of the moderator model is that it views such events not as aberrations from generalized patterns but as an extension of normal political activity. Moreover, the model more easily allows one to view coups not as secret, one-sided actions of military men against civilians; but rather focuses one's attention on the "evolved, open and dual responses of civilian and military elites to particular cases, in which both civilians and the military look to the military for the resolution of the crisis."⁸⁶

When one tries to apply the moderator model to the Peruvian coup of 1914, it becomes obvious that it is quite suitable. To be more specific, prior to the coup major civilian political actors clearly urged the military to intervene in order to check and overthrow the Chief Executive. Moreover, wide-scale acceptance of such a role probably facilitated assuring the construction of a winning coup coalition. Also, while civilians were willing to legitimize the Peruvian military's right to overthrow the extant civilian government, it was clear that the political crisis was one where the legitimacy of the Chief Executive was in question. And this view was held both by the President's civilian and military opponents. Neither had as a reason for the coup the replacement of the democratic political institutions with new political structures. In fact, quite the opposite was the case: defense of the Constitution and the integrity of the political institutions delineated in that charter was a major motive behind the coup. As a result, both the military and the civilian participants had no aspirations for prolonged military rule at the

time of the President's overthrow. While the political unity of the coup participants broke down shortly after the seizure of power, at no time did the heart of the disagreement involve whether or not military rule should be perpetuated--quite the contrary was true. The struggle for power which emerged basically involved differences over which civilians would replace the deposed Chief of State.

This struggle for power along with issues concerning the problem of military disengagement from politics will be the main focus of attention in the next chapter. Also to be considered are factors which deterred the military from actively seeking to foster military institutional political control in the months following the coup. As a contrast, factors fostering a change in military perceptions in recent years will be noted as well as their influence on the emergence of military institutional rule in 1968.

NOTES

Chapter 5

1. The most complete account of the civil-military conspiracy, based on data provided by the main participants, was published in La Prensa from February 8 to February 12, 1914. This account was reproduced in Alberto Ulloa Cisneros, Escritos historicos (Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe, 1946). Much of the information on the civil-military conspiracy in this volume comes from that account.
2. The names appearing in Ulloa's Escritos historicos were checked for party affiliation in Neptali Benvenuto, Parliamentarios del Perú contemporáneo (Lima: Imprenta Malatesta, 1921); also used was William Belmont Parker's Peruvians To-Day (Lima, Southwell Press, 1919)
3. Benvenuto, Parliamentarios, p. 136
4. Ibid., p. 146.
5. Ibid., p. 155.
6. Ibid., p. 115.
7. Ulloa, Escritos historicos, p. 326.
8. Ibid., p. 330.
9. Urdanivia Ginés, Una revolución modelo, p. 9.
10. Basadre, Historia, VIII, p. 3602.
11. Parker, Peruvians To-Day, p. 51.
12. Basadre, Historia, VIII, p. 3605.
13. Ibid.
14. Bryan to Bingham, February 5, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
15. See Urdanivia Ginés, Una revolución modelo, p. 16.
16. A copy of the manifesto appears in La Unión, February 5, 1914, p. 2.
17. Article 119 of the Constitution of 1860 states that the public force is composed of the national guard, the army, and the navy.

18. This article is one well rooted in Peruvian Constitutional law; similar provisions can be found in Peruvian Constitutions as early as 1828.

19. The relevant article can be found in Paz-Soldan, Constituciones, p. 694.

20. See Ulloa, Escritos historicos, p. 331.

21. Ibid., p. 332.

22. One of the fears was that without additional support, a simple coup attempt might mushroom into an extended and costly civil war.

23. McMillin to Secretary of State, April 1, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

24. The West Coast Leader, February 5, 1914, p. 1.

25. The speech was made at a banquet in honor of the participation of the Prado brothers in the coup of 1914. The excerpt from the speech comes from Urdanivia Ginés, Una revolución modelo, p. 63.

26. See *ibid.*, p. 64. Anxiety over the lower class's destructive capabilities was expressed by Albert W. Bryan, a U.S. Department of State official residing in Peru. In urging U.S. recognition of the new government which immediately followed Billinghurst's, he stated: "The present revolution seems to have been supported by all the better elements of the Republic, and the masses had little to do with it. When you consider that in a country of over four million people, there are only about fifty thousand white people, or people who can even read or write, the masses are much to be feared. They are mostly indian or choloes (a mixture of negro, indian, chinese, etc.), and are most dangerous when aroused The lower clases of Peru are in an ugly mood, and to give them any opportunity would be to produce a condition that would endanger the civilization of the Republic." See Bryan to Bingham, February 5, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2. U.S. recognition came on February 13.

27. Ulloa, Escritos historicos, p. 338, see Basadre, Un fragmento, p. 431.

28. Ulloa, Escritos historicos, p. 345.

29. de la Barra, Objectivo, p. 131.

30. Basadre, Un fragmento, p. 429.

31. See *ibid.*, p. 427; see also Urdanivia Ginés, Un revolución modelo, p. 20.

32. Urdanivia Ginés, Un revolución modelo, p. 20.
33. Billinghamurst, El Presidente, p. 83.
34. Urdanivia Ginés, Un revolución modelo, p. 21.
35. McMillin to Secretary of State, February 9, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
36. The statement was made by Benavides during an interview appearing in The West Coast Leader, February 5, 1914, p. 1. Variedades, the major news magazine which was published in Peru at the time of the coup, offered essentially the same estimation of the coup environment as that made by Benavides. It stated that "in the army, the military men ... were not able to leave themselves disarmed in order to leave the city to popular elements capable of executing sinister happenings. In such a situation, a group of chiefs and officers resolved to prevent these intentions from becoming a reality." Quoted in Urdanivia Ginés, Una revolución modelo, p. 68.
37. McMillin to Secretary of State, April 1, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy 746, reel no. 2; The West Coast Leader, February 5, 1914, p. 1; Peru To-Day, V (January 1914), p. 1124.
38. Billinghamurst, El Presidente, p. 84.
39. Germán Arenas, Algo de una vida (Lima: Sanmartí y Cía., 1941), p. 89.
40. Peru To-Day, V (January 1914), p. 1125; La Crónica, February 4, 1914, p. 1; El Comercio, February 4, 1914, p. 1.
41. See The West Coast Leader, February 12, 1914, p. 1; Peru To-Day, V (January, 1914), p. 1125.
42. Billinghamurst in El Presidente, p. 74 makes a high estimation of two thousand troops. In a personal memorandum given to the U.S. Department of State Minister to Panama, Billinghamurst asserted fifteen hundred troops were involved. See Price to Secretary of State, May 25, 1914 in U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2; The New York Times, February 5, 1914, p. 4 gave a figure of a thousand troops.
43. Billinghamurst, El Presidente, p. 85.
44. Details on the capture of the Palace can be found in Ulloa, Escritos historicos, pp. 353-357.
45. Basadre, Un fragmento, p. 435.
46. La Prensa, February 4, 1914, p. 1; The West Coast Leader, February 5, 1914, p. 8.

47. Letter of W. Bruce Douglass to John Barrett, February 16, 1914 in U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2; The New York Times, February 5, 1914, p. 4.
48. McMillin to Secretary of State, February 8, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
49. See La Unión, February 6, 1914, p. 1; February 7, 1914, p. 1.
50. The West Coast Leader, February 5, 1914, p. 9.
51. Basadre, Un fragmento, p. 442; El Comercio, February 21, 1914, p. 1.
52. The statement by Variedades appears in Urdanivia Ginés, Una revolución modelo, p. 121.
53. La Prensa, February 4, 1914, p. 1.
54. La Crónica, February 6, 1914, p. 1.
55. El Comercio, February 4, 1914, p. 1.
56. The names were taken from accounts appearing in Urdanivia Ginés, Una revolución modelo and Ulloa, Escritos históricos.
57. The information was contained in the Escalafón General del Ejército, 1913 (Lima: Imp. y Lit. del Servicio Geográfico, 1913).
58. Billinghamst, El Presidente, p. 80.
59. Urdanivia Ginés, Una revolución modelo, p. 42.
60. See Paz-Soldan, Las constituciones, p. 694.
61. See the statement contained in Law. No. 1993, in Peru, Anuario de legislación Peruano, IX (Lima: Imprenta Americana, 1915), p. 22.
62. The names were checked against the graduation lists of the Superior War School and the Superior Division of the Escuela Militar. The lists can be found in "Promociones egresadas de la Escuela Militar de Chorrillos de 1901 hasta 1952" in Revista de la Escuela Militar de Chorrillos, XXVIII (April and May, 1953), pp. 149-156. See also Cincuentenario de la Escuela Superior de Guerra del Perú, p. 17.
63. Bourricaud, "Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy," p. 25.
64. Carlos A. Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 134.

65. Zitor, Historia de las principales huelgas, p. 54.
66. La Protesta, IV (March 1914), p. 1.
67. See Huntington, Political Order, pp. 221-222; Nun, "The Middle Class Military Coup."
68. Villanueva, Ejercito Peruano, pp. 147-153.
69. Ibid., p. 152.
70. Ibid.
71. See Combs to Secretary of State, June 8, 1909, Internal Affairs of Peru, 1906-1910, case no. 3742.
72. See American Consulate-General to Assistant Secretary of State, June 6, 1909, Internal Affairs of Peru, 1906-1910, case no. 3742.
73. Basadre, Historia, VIII, p. 3743.
74. Ulloa, Escritos historicos, p. 339.
75. See La Crónica, February 4, 1914, p. 3.
76. The West Coast Leader, February 5, 1914, p. 9.
77. See Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, pp. 2-3.
78. Ibid., p. 3.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., p. 4.
81. See Stepan, The Military in Politics, pp. 62-66.
82. Ibid., p. 63.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

POLITICS, MILITARY DISUNITY,
AND THE MILITARY
AS ARBITER

In the coup d'etat of 1914, the army acted largely as an instrument of threatened political groups, not as a directive force. In Chapter 1, it was suggested that the performance of the officers can be related to the reasons for their intervention, and that if the coup-maker grievances are subject to quick solution, the tendency of the military would be to relinquish power relatively soon after the coup has taken place. This proposition is borne out by the Peruvian case. The 1914 coup was essentially negative or preventive in nature; once Billinghurst was overthrown and a brake was put on a number of the President's policies,¹ the major objectives of the coup were attained. As a result, Benavides acted in an executive capacity only up to 1915, when a convention of political parties was able to agree on the new civilian President. He made no effort to militarize his administration, and showed little interest in being anything but a simple warden or arbiter who acts only in a limited sphere.

Factors listed in Chapter 1 that can cause military officers to become unwilling to relinquish control were inapplicable or of little significance in this instance. For example, Benavides displayed no ambitions for personal aggrandize-

ment during his administration; civilian sectors, while often disagreeing on who should succeed Benavides, were all in agreement that if he was to act as a President, this position was to be only a brief transitional one; no civilian sectors petitioned Benavides or other military men to perform a prolonged rulership role; no important sectors of the military were known to exist that could pressure or force Benavides to perpetuate his military dominance against the wishes of the civilian political elites; and no external threats developed that might have led officers to perpetuate their control for a protracted period of time for security reasons.

However, it is important to note that Colonel (later General) Benavides was in power for approximately sixteen months before the Presidency was transferred to a civilian. The relatively brief prolongation of his rule could not be considered reflective of unified civilian opinion after the coup regarding the need for a military man in a position of power while an appropriate and more permanent replacement for Billinghurst could be found. Quite the contrary was the case. It was indicative, to varying degrees, of Benavides' willingness at times to decisively side with civilian political contenders and, at their behest, maintain himself in power and thwart the power pretensions of opposing civilian forces.

These occurrences, which will be described in detail later in this chapter, suggest the following proposition which has not previously been mentioned: that the duration of a temporary military arbitral government can vary considerably,

and that the time period involved for such a government can hinge largely on the ability of the military man or men in power to find a suitable civilian replacement for the Presidency, or on the ability of civilians themselves to agree on a replacement whom the men in uniform do not find objectionable. In this regard, it must be kept in mind that the military does not at all times act as a monolith; and that, as noted in the framework for analysis, the military can be politically heterogeneous in its viewpoints. As a result, the military man or clique in power after a coup may be allied politically to civilian sectors that are looked upon with disfavor by another military faction. This chapter will show that, on occasion, the military "out-group" will act or try to act to prevent the implementation of decisions which are detrimental to the civilian political sector which it supports, adding further instability to that which already exists.

Political Conflict and Military Factional Arbitership After The Coup

While varied civilian political sectors became unified in regard to their determination to dispose Billinghamurst from the Presidency, there was little other than this common goal to keep the political forces allied to one another after the President's ouster had been attained. As a result, the temporary party unity displayed at the time of the coup quickly broke down as the varied party factions renewed their past animosities and quarrels.

The major issue at hand was the question of Presidential

16
succession. This issue quickly became the main focus of attention since there was very little resistance to the coup, and therefore little time had to be spent on the consolidation of power. The issue ultimately would be decided after many months of heated debate, violent demonstrations, and a series of uprisings had taken place.

The original version of the Congressional manifesto to the nation had stated that an unnamed individual was to preside over a junta of representatives that was to be empowered with political authority until a more permanent government could assume control.² However, in a revision of the manifesto made shortly before the coup took place, it was specified that Augusto Durand would head the junta. Only Alberto Ulloa and Durand were aware of this revision, and it was revealed only after the manifesto was circulated to the public on the day of the coup.³ It was a position that some of the original conspirators felt rightly belonged to Durand since the leadership of the movement had been given to him shortly after the conspiracy began.

From the point of view of various observers, it was a position that Durand intended to use to advance his own material interests and Presidential aspirations.⁴ In this regard, it was stated by the U.S. Minister in Peru that "He [Durand] planned a clean sweep of the Billinghurst administration, and, by voting popular elections with the majority he and his supporters could count on in Congress, which elections he would ... direct through his assumed control of the army, he intended to have himself elected President."⁵ The

Congressional majority which was referred to were the Leguía partisans who had been united with Durand's Liberal Party members against Billinghurst early in his administration, and who had been the most vociferous of Billinghurst's critics.

The political leverage that Durand might have obtained by presiding over a Congressional junta, as stipulated in the Congressional manifesto, never materialized since Benavides decisively thwarted Durand's attempts to fill that position. In the preceding chapter, it was noted that Durand was in hiding from government agents before a coup had been carried out; at least partly due to this unforeseen circumstance, the leadership position shifted to Colonel Benavides who, in collaboration with other conspirators, finalized the coup plans, and headed the committed military forces around Lima in a successful attack on the Presidential Palace.

One of Benavides' first political moves was to prevent Durand from assuming power. The intention of Durand to assume the position of political leadership was clearly evidenced when the Liberal Party chief, after finally hearing about the coup, arrived at the Palace hours after its completion. At that time, he tried to control Benavides politically. It is reported that Durand began giving orders to the military men and other functionaries who were present.⁶ Benavides, reacting to Durand's power pretensions, clearly let it be known that he was the one who would dominate the situation.⁷ Those present agreed with Benavides on the matter since his were the orders that were obeyed. From that time on, Benavides continually thwarted Durand's attempts to gain the political

upper hand.

If Benavides had relinquished power to Durand, military control of the government after Billinghamurst's overthrow would have lasted only a matter of hours. By not doing so, Benavides took the first step at prolonging his pre-eminent political position until a more suitable civilian could be found.

Benavides, riding a high wave of popularity, had little difficulty in attaining from the Congress its approval to act as President of a provisional junta made up of representatives from each of the five major parties represented in the legislative chambers⁸ which would rule the country until they had the opportunity of providing for a permanent government. Benavides, with his control over the army, was to be the dominant political actor.

The Colonel not only took a decided stand against Durand's attempt to gain political control on the day of the coup, he would in the months following also display partisan political preferences that would significantly influence the outcome regarding Presidential succession.

Benavides, as opposed to most of the officers of the Peruvian army, came from one of the most eminent families of Peru.⁹ He was closely connected with other families which formed part of the country's aristocratic upper class and which in the struggle for power after the coup would give their support to the Independent Civil Party opponents of the Leguístas and Durand.¹⁰ Among his close friends were the brothers Jorge and Manuel Prado, who in 1914 were predisposed

to work in collaboration with the Independent Civil Party,¹¹ the Presidency of which was then in the hands of a third brother, Javier. It was Jorge and Manuel Prado upon whom Benavides depended for advice immediately preceding the coup and who accompanied him into the Presidential Palace after the coup had succeeded.¹² The political stance that the Prados would assume in the months following became clear at the time of Billinghamurst's resignation. At that time, Billinghamurst had stated to one of the Prado brothers that he was prepared to deliver the Presidency to Roberto Leguía, who was First Vice-President and who could be considered Constitutionally next in line to become Chief of State. The answer that Prado gave, if Billinghamurst's statement on the matter is an accurate one, was that "we are not making the revolution for Leguía."¹³

Since the Prado brothers were directly in favor of the Presidency going to a member of the Independent Civil Party, and since Javier Prado had himself expressly stated his desire to become Chief of State, the statement made by Billinghamurst leads one to assume that if the Prado brothers were not engaging in conspiratorial activity in favor of Leguía, they were doing so to further their own personal interests and those of the Independent Civil Party. Colonel Benavides, owing to his close ties with the Prado family,¹⁴ would ultimately act decisively in favor of a party which was one of the most predisposed to prolong its support for Billinghamurst.

As a digression, it is advantageous to refer to part of

a model of coup dynamics posited by Martin Needler. He stated that the swing man in a particular coup--that is, the military man whose critical latecoming support assured a winning coup coalition--

because of his higher rank, greater prestige, and crucial importance for the coup ... is placed at the head of the provisional government that emerges after the revolt is successful--as provisional President, as chairman of the ruling military junta, or as minister of the armed forces behind the facade of a civilian provisional government.

Needler went on to state that

an interesting paradoxical situation is thus created. The swing man becomes the leading figure of the new government, yet he is the person least committed to the objectives of the coup, and who was, as a last minute addition to the conspiracy, perhaps out of sympathy with, or not even aware of, the more fundamental aims of the group that hatched the original plan. Indeed, a situation can actually be created in which the head of the new government never actually sympathized with the aims of the conspiracy, but joined it at the last minute only to avoid pitting brother officers against each other and possibly precipitating a civil war.¹⁵

The picture of coup dynamics presented above is best viewed as an ideal model drawn for the instruction of the reader; it should be realized that things are seldom as perfect and typical as this in real life.

The Peruvian occurrences are a fairly good replication of the model posited by Needler, and add credence to its applicability at certain times. It has already been noted that the support of Benavides was considered by a number of conspirators as very important to insure the success of the coup, and that he seems best to fit into Needler's swing man category since his participation might have been the crucial added margin of support needed to construct a winning coup coalition.

While not the last adherent to the coup, neither was Benavides ever a vehement critic of Billinghamurst, and it was only with reluctance that he joined the movement relatively late after it began. Moreover, Benavides never displayed any great sympathy with the early Liberal or Leguista conspirators, and there is nothing to suggest that he intervened specifically to defend their interests. On the other hand, the Colonel's close links with Independent Civil Party members led him to pursue a course of action that would frustrate the ambitions and power pretensions of the early coup conspirators.

It had been predicted less than a week after the coup that a fierce struggle would take place for political supremacy,¹⁶ and this was to prove to be correct. Benavides, in an interview with The West Coast Leader on the day following the seizure of power, stated that he had no political ambitions and that he would relinquish political control as soon as possible.¹⁷ Shortly thereafter, in taking the first step necessary in order to step down from power, he issued a decree calling for a special Congressional session on March 1 to deal with the succession problem.¹⁸

Before the meeting took place, the major political parties stated their preferences on how the Presidency should be decided. The Democratic Party made the first statement, favoring the idea of Presidential elections.¹⁹ This position was supported by the Independent Civil Party, which undoubtedly felt that through its influence and wealth it could assure a favorable outcome at the polls. Opposed to the idea of general elections were the pro-Leguía Civil Party members who,

not wishing to risk an electoral contest, urged the Congressional transference of the Presidency to First Vice-President Roberto Leguía. He had been called back to Peru by his supporters,²⁰ who felt that he would be in an advantageous position to attain the Presidency. This is because the Leguístas held the Congressional majority, and since they argued that the coup did not destroy the whole executive structure but simply deposed the President leaving Roberto Leguía, by virtue of Constitutional provisions, next in line for the office of Chief of State.²¹ All that they felt was necessary was a Congressional confirmation of Leguía's succession to the Presidency. Supporting this position was the Liberal Party and its chief, Augusto Durand. Thwarted by Benavides in his early attempt to gain political predominance, undoubtedly Durand did not believe he stood a chance of success in elections held under the aegis of Benavides, whom he found unable to control and with whom his relations were strained. It was only under such circumstances that Durand became willing to throw his support behind Leguía. However, according to the U.S. Minister to Peru Bryan McMillin, "Durand wished to use Leguía for personal ends during the remainder of his term, expecting to secure the reversion of the Presidency by the support he would be able to furnish Leguía during his incumbency."²² The position of the Constitutional Party members was divided along the pro- and anti-Leguía divisions as had occurred in the past. For example, General Cáceres maintained his allegiance to the Leguísta position while Arturo Osóres, the Constitutional Party's delegate on the provisional junta,

succumbed to the pressures of the Independent Civil Party and took a position in favor of popular elections.²³

The factious differences which emerged and the events which followed had no significant ideological base and each party seemed to be "animated primarily by its desire of controlling government revenues and power."²⁴ There was practically no difference in the various party programs and the actions of the political contenders appeared to be entirely opportunistic.

The determination of the anti-Leguista forces to prevent the Congressional majority from declaring Roberto Leguía President became quickly apparent. Three days before Congress was to hold its session of March 1, the Independent Civil Party, the Democrats, and a group of Constitutionals formed a pact against Leguía, Javier Prado being their main spokesman. As in the past, the anti-Leguista coalition called itself the Bloc. Their main concern, at that time, was simply to hinder Roberto Leguía from being elected President by the Congress. The Bloc secured its objective on March 1, the day of the Congressional session's planned convening, by refusing to attend the meeting and thereby preventing the Congress from convening for want of the necessary two thirds quorum.²⁵

Another Congressional session was scheduled on March 11, but again, the obstructionist tactic of the Bloc succeeded and the Congress was unable to secure the required quorum.²⁶ The same tactic was used still another time, on March 23; but on this occasion, it was claimed by the Leguista opposition that,

although it could muster a sufficient number of Congressional adherents to obtain a quorum despite Bloquista absentees, it was prevented from doing so because a significant number of Leguista Congressmen were frightened away or forcibly prevented from going to the Congress as a result of Bloquista inspired violence and intimidation.²⁷ By this time, Roberto Leguía had returned from Europe, and tensions had mounted as the Bloc and Leguistas spent money to swell their ranks among the popular classes and as demonstrations in favor of the competing parties touched off disorder, riots, and shooting.²⁸

Benavides, whose control over the army would ultimately be of crucial importance in helping to settle the controversy, up to this point favored his Independent Civil Party allies mainly by insisting that quorum be attained if Congressional business was to take place. If Benavides had not demanded the strict enforcement of the quorum rule, then the Leguista Congressmen could easily have voted the Presidency to Leguía since they held a majority of the votes. That there was a precedent for nonenforcement of the quorum rule was clearly exemplified by the fact that Congress had elected the provisional junta without the necessary quorum--something which Benavides accepted without any reservations whatsoever.

But now that his Independent Civil Party friends could benefit by strict enforcement, Benavides changed his approach to the law. It was also claimed that aside from insisting on strict enforcement, Benavides supported the intimidation tactics used against the Leguista Congressmen.²⁹ Nonetheless,

Benavides still had not taken decisive actions to solve the controversy.

But the patience of Benavides was wearing thin as no orderly solution to the dispute seemed possible, and as the threat of armed revolt became increasingly pronounced. He appeared considerably more determined than in the past to bring the succession controversy to an end when, on March 24, at a meeting of the provisional junta and the several party leaders he stated that the existing situation was intolerable and strongly urged the different political contenders to find some solution.³⁰ As an indication of the Colonel's mood, no one was permitted to leave the room until a solution was reached; when some attempted to do so, they were refused exit.³¹ But still, as the hours passed, and as matters remained as far from solution as ever, the meeting came to its unsuccessful end, as would others in the days following.³²

Shortly thereafter, Benavides apparently had made up his mind to intervene decisively to break the deadlock and issued a decree urging the members of Congress to attend a meeting scheduled for May 15.³³ Perhaps indicative of the fact that Independent Civil Party members were aware that Benavides would act in their favor was the statement made by Javier Prado indicating that those formerly not in attendance at past Congressional sessions would be present at this one.³⁴

On May 15, force became the deciding factor. Government forces prevented public demonstrations and cleared the area around the Congress building.³⁵ Then, Benavides used the police, backed up by army troops, to prevent the pro-Leguía

28¹⁵

Congressmen from entering the legislative chambers while the Bloquistas were allowed to do so.³⁶ While the Bloquista Congressmen declared that a quorum was attained, no figures were provided, and the validity of their contention could be seriously questioned since the Leguístas in previous meetings had shown that they commanded the Congressional majority--a claim that they continued to press. The Bloc, composed mainly of Independent Civil Party members, at the meeting proceeded to elect Benavides as Provisional President, thereby sanctioning a prolongation of Benavides' military rule.

On the same day, the pro-Leguía Congressmen, in a desperate attempt to counter their opponents, met in the home of Roberto Leguía and declared him President. They claimed that Benavides was fraudulently elected and asked the citizenry and the armed forces to withdraw their support for Benavides and recognize Leguía as the legitimate President.³⁷ The situation which thus developed was the curious one of two individuals claiming the position of Chief of State.

Again, force would be used to decide the matter. Pro-Leguía Congressmen were detained and arrested,³⁸ and orders were dispatched for the arrest of Leguía and Durand, who quickly went into hiding. Benavides, attempting to consolidate his power, made General Pedro Muñoz--head of the anti-Leguía wing of the Constitutional Party--Minister of War. Further, the Benavides government was undoubtedly made more secure when it gained the support of the prestigious General Cáceras who previously had been head of the pro-Leguía wing of the Constitutional Party.³⁹

The election of Colonel Benavides as Provisional President was somewhat of a change from his position of President of the six man junta that he had held up to May 15. In the junta, Benavides was inconvenienced by the need to outwardly act in collaboration with junta members who were in favor of the Leguista position. As Provisional President, he was able to choose his own cabinet and could act in a more independent manner to find a suitable civilian successor.

Colonel Benavides at all times simply acted as an extension of civilian politics, and there is no evidence to suggest that the actions which he took resulting in the prolongation of his rule were inspired either by his own personal ambitions or by a desire to establish in the long run a military government to rule over the nation's civilian forces.

Political Discord and
the Breakdown of
Military Cohesion

Military force was one of the crucial supports on which Benavides would base his continued rule. Nonetheless, it soon became apparent that while he was able to maintain the loyalty of the major portion of the military, by no means were army sectors unanimous in their acceptance of the President or of his party affiliations.

If there was a significant degree of cohesiveness among military sectors when Billinghurst was overthrown, more than anything else, this seems to have been reflective of the fact that major political parties were agreed on the need to take

such a course of action. As a result, when the unity of the civilian political elites broke down, the various military factions could also be expected to split according to their party preferences. This was exactly what happened. The situation which developed gives added support to the contention stated in Chapter 1: that while organizational features such as centralized command and hierarchical structure can help enable the military to act with complete unity, the ability of the military to act in such a fashion can be seriously disrupted by political cleavages that may develop among the men in uniform. On the other hand, military factionalism such as that displayed by the Peruvian military helps to further weaken the position of those who are predisposed to view the military as an institution which is isolated from the surrounding environment instead of one that can, at times, be a reflection of the society encompassing many of its interests and political conflicts.

That disunity existed within the Peruvian military due to varied political allegiances among the troops was something that had been rumored in the weeks prior to the events of May 15.⁴⁰ Moreover, unrest and disunity within the military was said to be partly due to the increasingly depressed economic state that Peru found itself in. The political unrest incident to Billinghurst's overthrow "served to aggravate the commercial depression from which the country had already been suffering."⁴¹ The unfavorable economic situation was further exacerbated by the outbreak of the First World War, the immediate

effect of which "was to bring a violent decline in customs receipts as well as a marked, although less serious decline in the revenues from other sources."⁴² Reflective of this fact was that after April, beginning with the month of May, the total receipts for the rest of the months of 1914 were always lower than the same months of the previous year,⁴³ and the overall drop in customs receipts from 1913 to 1914 was 15.3 percent.⁴⁴ Moreover, the credit of the country, which was already quite poor, practically disappeared and the most important government assets had to be mortgaged.⁴⁵ As a result, government spending was cut in all ministries except that of the interior. The overall drop in expenditures was 11.6 percent and the War Ministry's expenditures dropped 21.7 percent from that of the previous year,⁴⁶ cuts which were much more drastic than those proposed by Billinghamurst in 1913 and which at that time were vigorously assailed by his critics. One significant aspect of the economic crisis was the inability of the authorities to pay the salaries of many government employees including those of the military, which, as a result, fell in arrears for a considerable period.⁴⁷ Even when the salaries were paid, they were in smaller amounts since, in response to the economic crisis, a law had been passed reducing the pay of all public functionaries.⁴⁸

These two factors, the economic and the political, account to varying degrees for the breakdown of military cohesion and for the military insurrections and plans for revolt that took place during the period in which Benavides remained in office.

The first of the revolts came on March 2, 1914, when at Iquitos, located in the distant Selva, a rebellion of the army's Seventh Infantry Regiment took place. There, non-commissioned officers and the troops arrested most of their officers, and shortly thereafter marched to the local bank in an attempt to obtain their unpaid salaries. However, since some sort of disturbance had been anticipated, the government authorities of Iquitos were not caught completely by surprise. The Prefect of the Department was quickly able to muster together a group of loyal army troops, police, and civilian volunteers which proved strong enough to force the insurgents back to their barracks and convince them to surrender.⁴⁹ The revolt was stated to have been caused largely by lack of salary payments for troops; it was in no way designed to be a prelude to an attempt to overthrow Benavides or the provisional junta.

Unlike the Iquitos revolt, most of the other subversive activity which occurred was known to be primarily politically motivated though discontent over nonpayment of salaries might also have been a factor.⁵⁰ The first of these politically motivated rebellions occurred on May 21, shortly after Benavides was elected Provisional President. It has already been noted that it had been rumored that the army was divided politically. Perhaps helping to create such disunity were attempts made to strengthen Roberto Leguía's position by spreading propaganda within the army emphasizing that it owed much to Augusto Leguía's favorable military policies during his past Presidency.⁵¹ As a result, when

290
Leguista partisans urged the military to withhold its support of Benavides after the May 15 events, the action came only after some attempt had already been made to win military support and such urgings continued as Juan Durand, the brother of the Liberal Party chief, distributed circulars in outlying provinces calling for an armed movement against Benavides.⁵²

Reacting in favor of the Leguista position on May 21, two officers of the Seventh Infantry Battalion in Puno, in Southern Peru, acting in collaboration with two police officers, rose with an unknown number of troops and attacked the police barracks in an attempt to secure arms. The attack proved unsuccessful since the bulk of the troops and officers remained loyal to the government, were able to resist the attack, and completely restored order within a matter of hours.⁵³

Still determined to seek the overthrow of Benavides, partisans of Leguía and military officers continued to conspire and set June 13 as the date for an uprising against Benavides which, if successful, would install Roberto Leguía in the Presidency. The plan called for the participation of troops around Lima, especially those attached to the Military School of Chorillos, who would meet at four different spots in the outskirts of the city, then gather at a central point from which an attempt would be made to subvert the Lima garrison and then launch an attack on the Presidential Palace.⁵⁴ The attack never took place. Unknowingly, many

of the officers whom the Leguístas tried to subvert were predisposed to remain loyal to the government, and they informed the authorities of the details of the conspiracy.⁵⁵ Responding to this information, government officials apprehended, on the night of the planned attack, an army Major and five civilian conspirators as they assembled near the Chorillos Military School and confiscated weapons, ammunition, and horses which were intended to be used in the attack.⁵⁶ One of the military conspirators, Lieutenant Rodríguez Ramírez, arrived at one of the designated spots with his squadron; but when other committed troops failed to arrive, he returned to his barracks.⁵⁷

That night, to insure order, army troops loyal to the government patrolled the capital. On the following day, President Benavides, to assure himself that the plot had been effectively dealt with, placed himself at the head of a regiment of troops and proceeded to the outskirts of Lima where he found everything quiet.⁵⁸ Furthermore, a number of officers were arrested from the military school and from various army regiments.

These steps, however, did not succeed in preventing further conspiratorial activity. In late July another civil-military subversive plot was discovered and effectively broken up. At that time, a number of sergeants and other military men who had been dismissed from the army along with a number of pro-Leguía Congressmen were surprised by the authorities and arrested as they conspired.⁵⁹ Also, Augusto Durand, who had been in hiding since May 15 was located by the police and

forced to leave the country. As the Leguista cause appeared increasingly hopeless and as past supporters became more disposed to accept Benavides, the conspiratorial activity against the Chief of State came to an end.

The Disengagement of Benavides
from Political Control, and
Continued Military Unrest

Throughout the Benavides administration, despite the various civil-military challenges that had to be dealt with, a major focus of attention for the President was the question of his successor. He held power only reluctantly, and remained determined to step down from power as soon as an acceptable substitute could be found. This preoccupation of Benavides led to a series of negotiations with numerous party leaders including past partisans of Leguía and Durand.

The arrangement which was finally worked out was an interparty convention that would nominate unity candidates for President and Vice-President. The idea of a convention of parties was that of Benavides, who, with the aid of Generals Muñiz and Cáceres, proposed it to the various political parties.⁶⁰ A unity candidate could make it possible to avoid the bloody confrontations and inflamed struggles that often accompanied Presidential elections. Perhaps this factor, combined with a general weariness of prolonging the succession struggle, accounts for the fact that most of Peru's political parties agreed to participate in a convention in which each of the parties represented was given a hundred votes. Still,

Civil Party members who remained allied to Leguía did not participate, neither did the Democratic Party, which at that time was preoccupied with rearranging its internal organization, something which the death of its founder, Nicolás de Piérola, had necessitated. Augusto Durand, who after a brief exile was allowed to return to Peru, was by this time reconciled to the fact that it was futile to continue to support Leguía, and he decided to favor his Liberal Party's participation in the convention, as did the Independent Civil and Constitutional Parties. Also allowed to participate in the convention were all ex-members of the Congress and past and present members of the Cabinet. This sector of the convention constituted 118 delegates. In all, 418 delegates were in attendance at the convention. Of this group, only 16 had military titles, all delegates of the Constitutional Party.⁶¹

The predominant position of the Independent Civil Party became quickly apparent as only two candidates emerged to seek the Presidential nomination. The first was ex-President José Pardo; who had remained allied to the Independent Civil Party, who was supported by that party's leader, Javier Prado; and who was favorably looked on by Benavides as well. The other candidate was General Pedro Muñíz, who never constituted any real threat as a Presidential candidate due to his poor health and lack of popularity with the civilian political elites. The political strength of Pardo was quickly apparent when he was able to secure almost twice the number of votes as Muñíz on the first ballot; but since he lacked the necessary first ballot 85 percent of the votes, it was only on the second ballot

that Pardo succeeded in winning a sufficient percentage to secure his nomination.⁶²

The only opposition which Pardo received at the Presidential elections was that of Carlos de Piérola, who was handily defeated.⁶³ The elections were unusually tranquil by Peruvian standards. By this time, the Leguista Congressmen who remained unwilling to change their allegiance were resigned to the fact that it would be futile to oppose the succession of Pardo to the Presidency, and offered no resistance to his inauguration. But one indication of continued discontent was the fact that at the inauguration ceremonies, which were held in the Chamber of Deputies, when retiring President Benavides entered the hall and delivered his farewell address, he was received with hisses, hooting, whistling, and hostile remarks.⁶⁴

In any event, the assumption to the Presidency by Pardo in August 1915 marked the end of a military interregnum which had begun almost a year and a half before. Benavides had completed fulfilling his role as political arbiter in a country torn by political discord and strife.

Interestingly, while many civilian sectors actively supported Pardo's assumption to power and those that did not were completely unwilling to offer any resistance, the same could not be said for the military. In opposition to Pardo, the Prefect of Ancash, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Rivera Hurtado, led a military revolt in the department capital of Huaraz several weeks prior to the President-elect's scheduled inauguration date. Favoring the perpetuation in power of

Benavides,⁶⁵ the commander complained that it was an error to deliver the Presidency to Pardo, whom he considered to be an enemy of the country and of the military since it was claimed Pardo intended to lower military salaries and raise taxes.⁶⁶ Despite such claims, the movement failed to gain adherents in the departments as had been hoped, and within a few days was squelched.

Benavides was in no way involved in this attempt to prolong his stay in power, and was quick to repudiate the movement, condemning its leader for his actions. As a protest, Benavides requested that the law be changed so that Pardo's Presidential term would begin on a date earlier than was stipulated⁶⁷--a request that was acted upon immediately, Pardo being sworn in only four days after the revolt had begun.

Either as an attempt to start anew the Huarez revolt or as a political protest against Pardo's failure to include the insurrectionists in an amnesty enacted shortly after Pardo's assumption to power, two Lieutenants in September 1915 succeeded in releasing the imprisoned participants of Rivero y Hurtado's revolt and tried to subvert a military regiment which was recently stationed in Huarez. But their subversive attempt lacked any significant support and was quickly crushed.

To recapitulate, in all, from March 1914 to September 1915, four military insurrections took place and two others were prevented from being carried out. Of this total, at least four were politically motivated,⁶⁸ three of which were known to have directly reflected extant tensions among civilian

political forces in the country.⁶⁹

As opposed to the February 1914 coup, a major feature of the unsuccessful insurrections was that they were all narrowly based movements, their leaders having failed to adequately sound out the opinion and assure the support or acquiescence from relevant military actors. As a result, in all cases military elements loyal to the government played an important part in effectively countering the insurgents.

Their failure gives added support to an important proposition which has already been mentioned at various stages of this work: namely, that where the attitude of the military is sufficiently fragmented to insure significant military opinion in favor of the regime in power, the possibility of success for a military insurrection can be considerably decreased.

Undoubtedly, helping to prevent the emergence of a winning conspiratorial coalition of military men was a lack of adequate civilian support that could have proved sufficient to propel important sectors of the military into a willingness to discontinue their loyalty and support for the extant regime. Almost all of the revolts that took place appeared to be completely lacking in important civilian backing. The one exception was the Puno revolt, which counted on Liberal Party and Leguista support. But even in this case, significant sectors of the civilian political elite remained allied to the government. The continued unwillingness of these sectors to deny the political regime legitimacy possibly was enough to deter crucial military activists wishing to avoid

bloodshed and the risk of dangerous military splits from giving their approval and assistance to the revolt. Had the opposition to the government been more widespread, a more favorable condition would have existed for the emergence of a successful military revolt.

It is also important to note that while the economic situation degenerated in the months following Billinghamurst's ouster, no successful military revolt occurred. This state of affairs undermines the position of those who, in explaining the successful coup, would tend to stress the economic factor while not paying sufficient attention to others that may be involved.

There are other points that one should not overlook which are related to the flurry of insurrectionist activity after the February 1914 coup and the willingness of some civilian sectors to continue to urge military armed uprisings. In this regard, it can be stated that some of the military rebelliousness occurring in the months following Billinghamurst's overthrow could have been due to an increased proclivity on the part of some officers to intervene in politics through force of arms. It has been argued previously that the trauma of military defeat in 1895 probably tended to make many officers wary of engaging in military rebellions and thus helped push the army into the political background from 1895 up to the February 1914 coup. The success of this coup and its widespread civilian acceptance and support quite conceivably had an opposite effect. The military was brought back into the

political limelight, its prestige was heightened, and some officers reacting to this situation might have become somewhat more inclined to intervene than otherwise would have been the case, while conceivably still remaining wary of acting completely independently of civilian wishes.

Moreover, it must be noted that after the 1895 civil war, in an era of civilian reaction against armed military interventions, the civilian out-groups for almost two decades apparently never sought the institutional participation of military forces in an attempt to depose the government. Subsequent attempts by civilians to urge such participation seemed to have been a response to the increased realization that such participation was of crucial importance if an armed uprising which civilian sectors supported was to be successful. The favorable outcome of the February 1914 coup would have reinforced that view, and thus helps account for the fact that civilians continued to urge military insurrection in the months following the coup. Such urgings undoubtedly helped to heighten the proclivity of some officers to engage in such activity.

The above mentioned occurrences were important indicators of future developments that would take place in Peru. The willingness of military men to use their troops in armed intervention, and civilian urgings and collaboration in military conspiratorial activity were something that would continue for many of the years throughout the present century. The military, finding itself again playing a crucial political role

in 1914, never again would experience a shock such as their defeat in 1895, able to help thrust them so decisively into the political background. The almost two decades during which civilian political forces would try to work out their political differences without resorting to the country's military forces for assistance came to an end. The military would be assiduously courted by civilian out-groups; and civilian sectors, when not actively calling upon the military to intervene, nonetheless would commonly express their approval at such actions,⁷⁰ especially at times when significant criticisms were publicly being aired against a particular government.

The Military Institution's Lack
of Anxiety to Perform
a Rulership Role

Not only did the coup d'etat of 1914 herald the beginning of an era when the increasingly professional military would intervene to oust Chiefs of State, it also displayed the sort of political stance that the armed forces would take for much of the present century: that is, one where the military as an institution shows no great anxiety to govern on more than a brief caretaker basis or to perform an expanded policy-making function. While individual officers at times would display an interest in governing for protracted periods of time, such as during the Presidency of Oscar Benavides from 1933 to 1939, it is important to realize that in such in-

stances the government administration remained basically civilian with the officers confining themselves primarily to military affairs.

There are several factors which can help account for the military institutional non-proclivity to perform a rulership role after the 1914 coup, and which can also have applicability to other coup situations that occurred later in the century. As suggested in Chapter 1, knowledge of the military's perception towards national security problems can help explain the tendency of officers to assume a rulership role. At that time, it was proposed that if national security problems are perceived by the officers as being confined primarily to conventional military operations, they would not tend to participate in matters extrinsic to their principal military function. The Peruvian case lends support to this proposition.

In 1914, the military lacked the belief that national defense involves not merely the organization and means of defense of the country against armed aggression, but everything necessary to insure national well-being.⁷¹ Accordingly, the military in 1914 did not view itself as an organization that should participate to any significant extent in matters extrinsic to their principal military function. The conception did not exist, for example, that programs of social and economic welfare designed for the civilian population and leading to national development, were functions that the military had a responsibility to perform.

The primacy of the traditional view of national defense during the period of the 1914 coup can be shown by referring

to military periodicals where one can expect particular military role orientations to be revealed.⁷² An analysis of the major military journal published prior to the 1914 coup, the Boletín del Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, indicates and illustrates the fact that the military mission was a restricted and narrowly based one. The articles which appeared dealt almost exclusively with conventional military concerns such as armaments acquisition and distribution, battle strategy and tactics, the maintenance of discipline, and the role of the cavalry, artillery, and infantry during war. On the other hand, there was practically no articles which appeared that discussed national political, social, and economic problems, problems of national development in general, or which emphasized the need for the military to perform non-military roles.⁷³

When one refers to the training received by the officers in Peru in the period of the 1914 coup, one sees that aside from a few courses such as history, French, and political economy, the great majority were either more strongly or directly related to conventional military concerns. It can be concluded, therefore, that within the Peruvian military, there did not exist the sort of non-military training able to produce a cadre of specialists desirous of attaining political control in order to formulate and implement policies leading to national development.

Also, the technology of war making in Peru did not appear to demand especially sophisticated skills relative to those needed to foster economic development or manage the administration of government. In light of this fact, the officers probably did not believe that their military skills

were better suited to non-military functions than those of highly educated civilians who, in collaboration with foreign experts after 1895, had increasing success in bringing about economic change and development in the country. In such an environment, while some military men harbored political aspirations to become President, such aspirations, as commonly displayed in the nineteenth century were coupled by the belief that the administration and formulation of policy should remain largely in the hands of civilians. No conviction existed that the military was the only viable alternative to the political order, and the choice of opting for a government heavily administered and directed by the military does not appear to have been an option that officers viewed as a desirable one.

This attitude among the officers was reflected in the fact that from 1895 to 1914, there was a total absence of any clique or organization of military men seeking to attain military institutional rule. On the other hand, when the officers did engage in politics, they did so almost always in collaboration and in basic agreement with civilian-political elites who accepted the existing political order and who never sought to impose radical new institutional forms of government. Hence, not only the training and skills of the officers, but also their past political behavior offered little to suggest that in a coup situation, there would be any significant sector within the military inclined to foster military institutional rule.

That Benavides played a simple arbitor role is quite understandable in light of the fact that he had no past political experience, nor had he displayed any past desire to engage in politics. This lack of interest and experience in

politics, his aristocratic background, and his close links with the Prado family all helped to preclude the possibility that Benavides would pursue a course of action in favor of protracted military rule which was against the interest of his civilian allies, and there is not the slightest hint that Benavides ever sought to foster such a policy.

In trying to explain the lack of interest within the military to pursue a rulership role, one should also not overlook the proposition of Chapter 1 which states that if in the recent past the military experienced important reversals and defeats by civilians, the historical remembrances of the officers would make them disinclined to reach a decision in favor of a prolonged rulership role if powerful civilian forces were against it. As mentioned earlier, following their defeat in the 1894-1895 civil war, officers appeared to be quite chary of pursuing a purely independent political position; and, as a result, seems to have precluded the possibility that Benavides or most other officers would attempt to change from an arbiter to a rulership role, especially since it might have been believed that such an attempt would have met with serious objections among the powerful established civilian political elites who were compact and probably homogeneous enough to come together to protect their collective interests against an outside military threat. These sectors, while legitimizing the right of the military to perform a limited arbitor role in no way were predisposed to give the military institution the right to rule indefinitely in place of the civilians. Most military men, undoubtedly, understood that to try to foster military institutional rule would have had the effect of isolating themselves from all of the major political

parties that when united quite possibly had sufficient resources to organize and equip a montonero force powerful enough to overwhelm the military pretenders to power. The military men, knowing of this possibility, may well have felt that a policy in favor of military institutional rule would have been an extremely dangerous one to pursue.

The military coup d'etat of 1914, then, constituted an important watershed in Peruvian history. Not only did it mark the beginning of an era where the increasingly professional military organization, as opposed to the caudillo-led make-shift armies of the past, would participate in successful seizures of power, often on behalf of important civilian sectors; it also displayed what was to be for many years the unwillingness of officers to attempt to foster prolonged military rule.

It should also be noted that the 1914 coup was the first time that, when the Peruvian military intervened to overthrow a government, it acted to some extent as a guardian of upper class groups against the threats of lower class sectors. The precedent established in the 1914 coup for such a guardianship role also helps to explain the significance of the coup, since the military in Peru would intervene repeatedly in later years to topple governments as modernization progressed, in response to intra-class strife similar to that occurring during the Billinghurst regime.

Role Expansion and the
Rise of Military
Institutional Rule

Interestingly, if intra-class strife continues to be a relevant factor in Peruvian political life, the same can not be said for the military's lack of anxiety to govern on more than a brief caretaker basis. With the emergence of military institutional rule in 1968 came an important change in Peruvian patterns of civil-military relations. Although a digression from the main focus of this study, a consideration of factors leading to the role expansion of the Peruvian military is deemed important enough to be included in the next few pages as a contrast to the 1914-1915 situation.

In 1914, as previously noted, the military institution was limited in scope and embraced traditional notions on national security and military operations. Such orientations continued throughout much of the present century, but by the early 1960's there were indications of important changes in military attitudes. The changes could be seen, for example, in Revista Militar, the official journal of the army. As Liisa Noth points out, for the years 1962, 1963, and 1964, a significant number of articles discussed "national political, social and economic problems, or problems of national development in general."⁷⁴ Such articles continue into the present.

Many of the articles referred to the responsibility of the armed forces in contributing to the nation's social and economic development. Many articles also urged widespread participation in civic action programs. Included among the journal's recurring themes was the necessity of treating all the nation's citizens with respect, of aiding in the satisfaction of basic human needs, of modernizing the nation's communication and transportation system, and of promoting higher education and better living conditions.

Many of the articles appearing in Revista Militar urged military intervention in such fields as administration and health service, recreation, agriculture, transportation, communication, and in many other areas. In short, they urged military intervention into practically every aspect of governmental activity.

One of the main reasons why the officers began to feel that they had many of the skills necessary to successfully promote the nation's social and economic development was due to the specialized training the officers and troops have received. As opposed to the relatively rudimentary instruction in the early years of the present century, the Peruvian military training programs became increasingly sophisticated and have turned out many military men with advanced technical and managerial skills comparable and at times even superior to those of their civilian counterparts. For example, "the graduates of the Peruvian Naval Academy are considered to have the best engineering education in the nation, and Peruvian seamen to be among the best technically trained."⁷⁵

The military's enlisted personnel also receive advanced training that previously was nonexistent, which makes them better able to contribute to the nation's socio-economic development. For example, "The Peruvian army [now] has industrial training centers that teach mechanical drawing, electric motor rewinding, heavy equipment operation, steel work, tailoring, shoemaking, sanitation, welding, locksmithing, pipe-fitting, electricity, bricklaying, and carpentry. Peruvian industry eagerly seeks the graduates of these centers."⁷⁶

Perhaps the one institution that has been most responsible for changed military perceptions regarding its political role is the Centro de Estudios Altos Militares (CAEM),⁷⁷ designed to provide advanced instruction to Peru's senior officers. First opened in 1950, the CAEM offered a wide ranging curriculum dealing with social, economic and political problems. Particularly stressed was the idea that national defense and national development were interrelated concepts. The new national security doctrine emphasized that modern warfare involves a total national effort and therefore, national security policy must by necessity involve all areas of national concern. Planning for programs that could effectively deal with social cleavages, obstacles to economic change, and political disunity became an increasingly important concern of the military officers.

Contributing to such attitudinal changes was exposure to U.S. counterinsurgency and civic action doctrines both in the United States and in Peru. One of the major concepts which was taught was that to effectively cope with insurgency, it

was necessary to gain the support of the people for the government and for the military forces. Such support, it was contended, could be attained by providing the people with social and economic services in a wide range of areas.⁷⁸

But apparently changes in the military's educational system and the increased non-military skills that the officers obtained were not enough to propel them into action leading to military institutional rule. It "took the ~~guerrilla~~ campaigns of 1965-1966 to force social theory out of the schools and into the barracks, thereby making political immobilism and economic decline of the late 1960s a matter of urgent military concern."⁷⁹ In 1965, ~~guerrilla~~ groups operating in the Andes began to ambush police units. This, in turn, led to an armed forces offensive which eventually succeeded, after months of intense military operations, in liquidating the insurgents. The military experience helped to confirm the officers in their commitment to reform. The Peruvian high command noted, for example, that in those areas where civic action and pilot agrarian reform programs had been carried out, the insurgents failed to obtain significant support.

But perhaps a greater motivating factor inducing the military towards a more progressive policy was the fear of its own self-destruction. The officers were very aware of the possibility of mass defections once the soldiers of peasant origin confronted their kinfolk; and as Einaudi points out, "if a mere handful of radicalized urban intellectuals (who acted as guerilla fighters) could occupy thousands of troops for months, what would happen if popular forces and the peasantry

were enlisted for future disorder?"⁸⁰ Many military officers answering this question believed that the best way to avoid renewed insurgency was by fighting economic backwardness and conditions of injustice in the countryside. It was also realized that significant change could only occur with the initiation of widespread land reform and changes in the country's socio-economic relations.⁸¹

When the civilian regime of the period, that of Fernando Belaúnde Terry, proved incapable of enacting a meaningful land reform law, military dissatisfaction in the latter part of the 1960's was obviously heightened. Adding to this dissatisfaction was the continued inability of civilian politicians to come together to work in a unified effort for change and development. Like past civilian governments, Belaúnde's lacked Congressional support. On a number of occasions, the legislators voted no confidence in government ministers, and several were forced to resign. Belaúnde's own Popular Action Party split into conflicting factions, and a serious balance of payment deficit, inflation, charges of government corruption, and problems with foreign investors,⁸² added to the increased lack of confidence in the government.

In such an atmosphere, it became almost impossible to govern effectively, and the military leaders felt that their intervention was needed to save the country from the irresponsibility and demagogy of the civilian politicians. A decisive change had occurred within the military due largely to the advanced and expanded training of its personnel and their historical experiences. The officers not only felt significant

change was needed in the country's social, economic and political structures, they now believed that they were in the best position to carry out such changes and to govern the country. No longer, as in the past, did the officers believe that, when compared to civilians, they did not have the legitimacy or the capacity to rule.

The ultimate result of such a perspective was a coup against Belaúnde on October 3, 1968 and the emergence of protracted military institutional rule, an important change from their past political style. The stated intention of the new military rulers was to promote superior levels of life to the less favored sectors of the population by transforming the economic, social and cultural structures of the state; by imprinting upon the government a nationalist spirit; by moralizing all sectors of the country; and by changing the country's political structures.⁸³ The significant changes that the new military directors and managers have carried out clearly indicates that many of the above stated goals have been taken seriously by the officers. While the military rulers have had their internal rifts as evidenced by the August 1975 replacement of President Velasco by his Prime Minister, the military leaders still express no intention of returning to the barracks. Whether the military will return to a limited role of guardian and moderator such as during the 1914 coup remains to be seen. At present, there is little to suggest such an outcome.

NOTES

Chapter 6

1. While this chapter does not consider the administrative and legislative details of the period following the 1914 coup, it should be mentioned that Billinghurst's drive towards socio-economic and political reforms were halted. To this extent, the Benavides government can be considered a conservative brake on a liberal impulse.
2. Ulloa, Escritos historicos, p. 370.
3. Ibid., p. 377.
4. See McMillin to Secretary of State, April 1, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
5. Ibid.
6. Arenas, Algo de una vida, p. 89.
7. Ibid.
8. Miro Quesada, Autopsia, p. 416.
9. Bryan to Secretary of State, February 5, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
10. See McMillin to Secretary of State, April 1, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
11. In 1912, Jorge and Manuel Prado had favored Aspillaga for President and in doing so opposed a significant part of the Independent Civil Party.
12. See Peru To-Day, V (January 1914), p. 1125.
13. Billinghurst, EL Presidente, p. 88.
14. See Bryan to Bingham, March 26, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2; See also Luis Alberto Sánchez, Testimonio personal (Lima: Ed. Villasán, 1969), p. 122.
15. Needler, Political Development, pp. 68-69.

16. See McMillin to Secretary of State, February 9, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
17. The West Coast Leader, February 5, 1914, pp. 1, 9.
18. El Comercio, February 7, 1914, p. 1.
19. La Crónica, February 10, 1914, pp. 2-3.
20. The New York Times, February 15, 1914, Section 3, p. 3.
21. Relevant parts of the Constitution used to back up the Leguíst argument were Articles 90 and 91.
22. McMillin to Secretary of State, April 1, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
23. See *ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. McMillin to Secretary of State, March 2, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
26. McMillin to Secretary of State, March 11, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
27. The West Coast Leader, March 19, 1914, p. 9.
28. See *ibid.*; McMillin to Secretary of State, March 24, 1914; Consul-General to Secretary of State, March 3, 1914, in U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
29. See translated letter of Augusto Leguía to his son Pepe, attached to Leguía to Prevost, April 23, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
30. The West Coast Leader, March 26, 1914, p. 9.
31. *Ibid.*
32. McMillin to Secretary of State, March 27, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
33. McMillin to Secretary of State, April 27, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
34. Handley to Secretary of State, May 4, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.
35. The West Coast Leader, May 19, 1914, p. 9.
36. La Prensa, May 19, 1914, p. 1; Basadre, Historia, p. 3757; Handley to Secretary of State, June 9, 1914, U.S. Department of

State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

37. El Comercio, May 15, 1914, p. 1; The New York Times, May 19, 1914, p. 6.

38. Handley to Secretary of State, June 9, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

39. El Comercio, June 5, 1914, p. 1.

40. McMillin to Secretary of State, April 10, 1914; Handley to Secretary of State, April 13, 1914 and April 20, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

41. Rowe, The Effects of the War, p. 14.

42. Ibid., p. 15.

43. Ibid., p. 16.

44. Percentage was calculated from figures appearing in *ibid.*, p. 15.

45. Ibid., p. 18.

46. Percentages calculated from figures appearing in Appendix II.

47. Rowe, The Effects of the War, p. 18; Handley to Secretary of State, April 20, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

48. See Law No. 2014 in Peru, Legislación Militar, VIII (Lima: Imp. y Lit. del Estado Mayor del Ejército, 1916), pp. 114-116.

49. El Comercio, April 14, 1914, p. 1; McMillin to Secretary of State, April 20, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

50. Discontent due to nonpayment of salaries apparently was widespread in the army since news of the Iquitos outbreak was suppressed for a short period of time due to fears that the example might have a bad effect on troops in Lima. See McMillin to Secretary of State, April 20, 1914; Handley to Secretary of State, April 20, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

51. McMillin to Secretary of State, April 20, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2. The possibility of a breakdown in military cohesion was first suggested to Benavides by Durand on March 23, the day of the third attempt to convoke the Congress. At that time, Durand stated to Benavides that his claims in favor of Leguía were

just and that he counted on at least half of the chiefs of the army. See The West Coast Leader, March 26, 1914, p. 9.

52. El Comercio, May 21, 1914, p. 1.

53. El Comercio, May 22, 1914, p. 1

54. El Comercio, June 15, 1914, p. 1.

55. Ibid.

56. Handley to Secretary of State, June 22, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

57. See Andres Gallarde E., "El frustrado complot de La Cruz de Yerbates," in Oiga, VII (March 6, 1970), p. 45.

58. Handley to Secretary of State, June 22, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

59. El Comercio, July 23, 1914, p. 1.

60. Ricardo Ríos, La convención de partidos (Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1918), p. VIII.

61. Ibid., pp. 261-262.

62. Ibid., pp. 275-278.

63. Basadre in Historia, VIII, pp. 3806-3807 indicates that the election results were 131,289 votes for Pardo and 13,151 votes for Piérola.

64. Handley to Secretary of State, August 18, 1915, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

65. See McMillin to Secretary of State, August 17, 1914; August 18, 1914, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

66. See El Comercio, August 24, 1915, p. 1.

67. McMillin to Secretary of State, August 17, 1915; Handley to Secretary of State, August 18, 1915, U.S. Department of State, Records, microcopy no. 746, reel no. 2.

68. These were the Puno uprising of May 21, 1914; the frustrated plots of May and July 1914; and the Huarez rebellion of August 1915.

69. The Huarez rebellion did not appear to be a response to civilian urgings.

70. In the successful 1919 coup, Augusto Leguía collaborated

not only with police factions but also with military sectors that favored his ascent to power; in 1930, various civilian elites actively participated in the planning of Sánchez Cerro's successful revolt against Leguía; in 1948, General Odría, with the backing of influential members of the oligarchy, overthrew José Luis Bustamante y Rivero; in 1962 when President Manuel Prado refused to annul the results of Presidential elections, Fernando Belaúnde Terry and supporters from his Popular Action Party openly declared their support for a military coup; in 1968, Belaúnde was overthrown at a time when many not only expected a coup, but desired one.

71. Einaudi and Stepan, Military Institutional Development, p. 68.

72. See *ibid.*, p. 99.

73. An exception was concern shown for the need to teach basic reading and writing skills to the illiterate conscripts. See for example the article entitled "Instrucción civil de soldado," in Boletín del Ministerio de Guerra y Marina, I, No. 7, pp. 843-844.

74. North, Civil-Military Relations, p. 52.

75. Glick, Peaceful Conflict, p. 28.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

77. The best study on the CAEM is Victor Villanueva's El CAEM y la revolución de la Fuerza Armada (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1972).

78. Among the most important areas that civic action programs were involved in were highway construction and maintenance, vocational training, colonization programs, communications services, and health and hygiene assistance.

79. Luigi R. Einaudi, "Revolution From Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968," Paper prepared for delivery at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, September 7-11, p. 8.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

81. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-14.

82. The government handling of what has been called the Brea y Pariñas controversy involving the International Petroleum Company was the subject of particularly severe criticism by civilians and military men alike.

83. See the manifesto of the Revolutionary Junta reproduced in Mario Monteforte Toledo, La solución militar a la Peruana, 1968-1970 (Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, 1973), pp. 23-29.

CONCLUSION

The major concern of this study was to describe, explain and analyze factors relevant to an understanding of the Peruvian coup d'etat of 1914 and the actions of the military in the months following that event. With that task in mind, a framework for analyzing the events surrounding the coup d'etat was presented--one general enough to take into account the varying constellation of causal components that each different coup d'etat would, to some degree, display and yet specific enough to guide research and suggest numerous factors that can influence the occurrence of coups and the actions of the military afterwards. While this summary by no means incorporates all the data and findings of this study, it does provide a relatively thorough overview of major points.

Based on the comparative literature on civil-military relations, two major contributing elements were isolated as being primarily responsible for a successful military coup--environmental and military institutional factors. Environmental factors were broken down into long-range and short-term variables, a distinction that some analysts, unfortunately, have not clearly delineated in their writings on military coups d'etat. Under long-term variables were considered those preconditions which make particular systems susceptible to successful coups. Here, closely following Huntington's line of

reasoning, it was contended that praetorian societies were those most susceptible to military coups; that is, societies in which government enjoys limited legitimacy and where political institutions were lacking that could effectively moderate, mediate, and refine group conflict.

This general proposition was eminently applicable in the Peruvian case. It was shown, for example, that political institutions throughout the nineteenth century were always quite fragile. Factors contributing to this condition included the withdrawal of the traditional legitimacy of the Spanish King, and the failure to find an equally effective substitute; a lack of experience in self-government; the habits of graft, lawbreaking, and violence nurtured during the colonial era and independence struggle; provincial isolation; and continued international conflict which helped to keep the military caudillos in the political limelight. Since the political institutions proved incapable of commanding the allegiance of significant sectors of the population, the country suffered from considerable instability and violence as military caudillos at the head of primitive armies struggled for power.

Borrowing from Finer, distinctions were made among mature, developed, low, and minimal political cultures, the latter three being most relevant to this study. The distinctions were based on differences in the scope of public opinion, the ability and willingness of civil forces to effectively counter military pretensions to power, and the degree of legitimacy assigned to governmental institutions and pro-

cedures.

The division of states into these categories of political culture proved advantageous when applied to the Peruvian situation; it provided a useful perspective from which to evaluate regime vulnerability lacking in such studies of coups as Solaún and Quinn's Sinners and Heretics. While most of the nineteenth century seemed to best approximate one of minimal political culture (where political institutions most lacked in authority, and where the military caudillos could often intervene irrespective of civilian opinion), Peruvian society in the early twentieth century was in important ways different. Most importantly, by that time, when the civilian political sectors sought to resist the military's political pretensions to power they were in a better position to do so successfully. It was argued that commercial and industrial growth was closely related to the emergence of a strong civilian bloc against the military caudillos. Economic development not only increased the material resources of civilians, it also helped to bolster their determination to gain control of the state from military leaders who often engendered little civilian respect owing to their propensity for using their positions as steppingstones to political power. The effectiveness of civilian power became evident in the mid-1890s when the major civilian political elites united their forces and proved capable of forming an army powerful enough to defeat the military in battle, relegating it to the political background. From that point, if the military was to intervene successfully to overthrow governments, it would be much more

important for it to acquire the acquiescence or even the assistance of important civilian political sectors. Officers undoubtedly realizing this fact for a period lasting almost two decades were considerably less willing than in the past to participate in subversive movements.

The Peruvian case seems to lend support to the proposition that military defeats or reversals suffered at the hands of civilians could help offset a disposition by officers to overthrow governments. Since major civilian elites did not seek military seizures of power until during the Billinghurst administration, many officers, probably fearing civilian retribution, remained unwilling to participate in such potentially dangerous activity--even though they could have based such an action on their duty to defend the Constitution. (There certainly were many cases from 1895 up to Billinghurst's rise to power where the Constitutionality of a President's action was open to serious question.)

Other factors were noted that probably helped to predispose the military to support civilian government during this period. For example, directly following the civilian victory in the civil war of 1894-1895, the army was purged of unreliable elements. But when some of the purged military men engaged in subversive activity, they were reintegrated into the army, a tactic which helped to remove as a threat disgruntled army officers harboring past grievances against the civilians in power.

It was also mentioned that the government catered to military institutional interests. Thus, during the 1895-1912

period, it was shown how the military grew in size and how increased funds were expended on the armed forces. While a decreased percentage share of budgetary outlays during the 1895-1912 period and unfavorable policies during the early part of the Leguía administration might have been a source of military grievances, they proved insufficient to lead officers to attempt seizures of power, possibly because civilians failed to urge such action.

It was shown that although after 1895 Peru's army was reorganized, professionalized, and took on the appearance of a modern military establishment, this process could not be equated with depoliticization. Both civilians and army officers remained favorably disposed toward entering into political alliances. Ultimately civilian political collaboration with military men would expand into a readiness to urge military seizures of power, the first example of which was the 1914 coup against Billinghurst.

Information was provided to show that the sort of political milieu which existed at that time could not be considered a decisive break from the past. It was noted, in this respect, that although civilian elites succeeded in wresting political power from the military men in 1895, they, no more than their political predecessors, were able to construct effective political institutions capable of moderating group conflict or reducing tensions. As a result, civilian-instigated violence and insurrections against the central government constituted an integral part of the political process.

Most of the attempts to seize power from 1895-1912 were

armed uprisings in the countryside, all crushed by the government's military forces. By 1909 at least some of the aspirants to power, aware of the futility of that tactic, decided that a quick attack on the Presidential Palace by civilian forces would have a better chance of success. The result was an unsuccessful coup attempt against Augusto B. Leguía. Its failure quite possibly had the effect of convincing various civilian political actors as to the necessity of military institutional support and participation in future coup attempts.

The above information provided the essential background for considering the successful coup against Billinghurst in 1914. To explain that coup, a detailed consideration of short-range environmental and military institutional factors was undertaken. The short-term variables occupied a crucial position in the framework for analysis because, while the notion of praetorianism could help explain the vulnerability of societies to political instability, it could not adequately account for the fact that the degree and intensity of such instability in particular societies could vary considerably at different times and under varying circumstances. It was therefore contended that one must also consider short-term variables that could exacerbate a country's vulnerability to political instability, create a favorable opportunity for the military to intervene, and also constitute the trigger mechanisms able to motivate officers and possibly even civilians into an actual coup attempt.

A multiplicity of short-term variables were considered, based largely on factors deemed relevant by those scholars who

had previously dealt with the problem of military coups.² Environmental short-term variables included personal liabilities of the Chief Executive, unfavorable Executive policies, political stagnation, electoral crisis, intense civil strife or the threat of such strife, economic crisis, and foreign interference. Military institutional short-term variables included threats to the military's corporate autonomy or its functional monopoly on violence, actions against the military's honor or prestige, attempts to break down military cohesion, and grievances over salaries, promotions, retirement policies, and budgetary allocations. Personal interests were also considered as a possibly important short-term factor when studying the coup phenomenon.

Many of the variables relevant to the 1914 coup have been summarized at the end of Chapter 4 and there is no need to repeat them here. It should be noted, however, that while a multiplicity of variables led individuals to conspire against Billinghamurst, there was a need for "threshold" precipitants to help transform coup plans into an actual coup attempt. These "threshold" precipitants were increased civil strife and threats to the military's institutional existence.

As suggested in the framework of analysis, a consideration of the various short-term variables proved indispensable for explaining why the Billinghamurst regime lost its legitimacy to rule in the eyes of most civilian political elite sectors and important military men as well. In fact, Billinghamurst's loss of support was so pronounced that the opportunity for a successful coup appeared to be better than at any other time

since the civil war of 1894-1895. Since all coups d'etat differ in some way from each other, the particular constellation of variables which were important in the 1914 Peruvian coup is not likely to be replicated in another seizure of power. Hence, the short-term variables mentioned earlier should be considered primarily as a guide to research; the lack of applicability of some of them in this particular case should not be considered evidence of their irrelevance to other coup situations.

This reservation applies to other factors as well. One of these is the influence that professionalization might have on the disposition of officers to intervene. In the 1914 coup, while increased professionalism may have helped account for military interventionist activity, the available evidence was relatively inconclusive. Still, it is possible that increased professionalism, as various authors have suggested, in other instances can clearly be shown to be an important factor contributing to military intervention. This certainly has been the case in Peru in recent years.

Another factor which should be approached with caution is the social origins and identifications of the officers. In the era of the 1914 coup, the military tended to identify with upper class as opposed to lower class interests, and this factor appears relevant when explaining military discontent with Billinghurst. Considered alone, however, the military's tendency to protect upper class interests against lower class threats can provide no more than a partial and basically inadequate explanation of this coup, since it was largely the result of more traditional, intraclass conflict.

Other factors affecting the capabilities of the military to topple a government were also discussed--variables that have not been sufficiently emphasized by most writers on the subject.² This study suggests that the military, while often giving the appearance of a unified monolithic force, frequently lacks such cohesiveness. Tribal, regional, religious, political, and generational cleavages and inter- and intra-service rivalries could, at times, significantly fragment military establishments and thereby detract from their ability to successfully intervene. On the other hand, when cleavages within the military are minimal and when there is significant consensus within the officer corps, the possibility for the success of a military coup would be increased. This proposition was supported in the 1914 coup where there appeared to be significant agreement among officers as to the desirability of Billinghamurst's overthrow owing to a gradual coalition-building effort which had been carried out prior to the coup. The failure of several military insurrections in the months following Billinghamurst's ouster, in which the vast majority of the officer corps apparently remained uninvolved in conspiratorial activity and loyal to the government, also add support to this contention.

Along with military cohesion, it has been argued that the success of a coup would be heightened if the officers involved had important troop command positions, had access to weapons suitable for a coup attempt, and if troops to be used for an insurrection were located near the capital. All three factors were present in the 1914 coup, and undoubtedly

helped to insure the movement's success.

Other factors affecting the capabilities of the military to intervene successfully which were applicable in the 1914 coup included: public opinion favorable to the military seizure of power; the belief that resistance to the coup would be futile; and the effective neutralization of civilian, police and military sectors loyal to the President.

Aside from explaining the causes of the coup and its operational dynamics, it was important to account for the actions of the military after the seizure of power had succeeded.³ In the framework for analysis, it was suggested that the performance of the officers after they seize power could be related to the reasons for their intervention, and that once the intentions and motivations of the coup makers are known, one is in a better position to understand the propensity of officers either to stay in power or disengage themselves from direct political control. Following this line of reasoning, it was proposed that if officers intervened to ameliorate grievances subject to relatively quick solution, the tendency of the officers would be to relinquish control shortly after the coup had succeeded. This proved to be the case in Peru after the 1914 coup when the Presidency was returned to a civilian. At that time, the major interest of Colonel Benavides, who succeeded Billinghurst as Chief of State, was to find a suitable civilian to replace him.

Since Benavides remained in power against the wishes of some civilian sectors and prolonged his rule for a period

of approximately sixteen months, it was considered advantageous to formulate a proposition that had not been included in the original framework of analysis: namely, that the duration of a temporary military-led arbitral government can vary considerably, and may hinge on the ability of the military men in power to find a suitable civilian replacement for the President, or on the ability of civilians themselves to agree on a replacement whom the men in uniform do not find objectionable. In the Peruvian case, once a replacement was found who was acceptable to most civilian political sectors as well as to Benavides, the temporary military arbitral government came to an end.

While the framework for analysis posited a multiplicity of factors which could lead military men who intervened to pursue an arbitral role to change their minds and seek instead to perform a rulership role, no such change of role occurred in this Peruvian case. Hence, no opportunity was presented to test the adequacy of the list of subordinate variables. Also, the case study afforded no opportunity to test the group of variables included to explain a change from a rulership role to disengagement from political control. In both cases, future research is very much needed to ascertain the suitability and completeness of the explanatory factors posited.

Although knowledge of the motivations of officers engaging in a coup was stated to be important in accounting for the actions of the military once in power, certain characteristics of the military establishment and its personnel which existed before a coup has taken place can also be helpful in

critical of the existing system and who feel that they are in a better position to rule than civilians are known to be involved in a military coup, it should not be expected that they will seek to disengage themselves from political control. In the years prior to the 1914 coup, there do not appear to have been officers who were critical of the extant political system and who sought to establish military institutional rule. On the other hand, officers remained willing to collaborate with and remained subject to the preferences of civilian political elites who in no way rejected the extant political system or who favored government under the direction of the men in uniform. Hence, the past political behavior of the officers provided little to suggest that they would try to foster military institutional rule. As was to be expected, when engaged in politics after the coup, the officers, acting in agreement with their civilian allies, in no way sought to impose a government ruled by the military institution.

A final factor which was mentioned to help explain the political actions of the officers was their past historical remembrances. Here, it was suggested that if in the recent past, officers suffered an important defeat or reversal at the hands of civilians, the officers would be wary of taking independent political positions that would antagonize the civilian political elite. In applying this proposition to the Peruvian case, it was stated that due to the military defeat in the civil war of 1894-1895, the officers probably were especially unwilling to take a position in favor of protracted military rule. This is because such a viewpoint would have

this respect. The hypothesis that officers whose training was restricted to conventional military functions would not tend to engage in matters extrinsic to their principal military function finds support in the 1914 coup. At that time, no significant emphasis was given in military training to subjects dealing with social, economic, or political problems that could help lead officers to the view that they were in a better position to rule than civilians.

It was suggested that if military training and technology were particularly advanced and gave the military men an abundance of transferable skills which were lacking in the wider society, officers could become especially predisposed to view themselves as in a better position to lead the country than the civilians. In this Peruvian case, there was nothing to suggest that the military possessed skills suitable for national leadership that were superior to those of civilians. This may be one reason why officers did not seek to perform a rulership role.

Also discussed in the framework for analysis were factors related to the politicization of the officer corps that could provide clues to their behavior after a coup had taken place. In this regard, it was proposed that knowledge of the viewpoints of the officers could provide a hint as to actions they would tend to pursue. Here, the argument was advanced that if officers were closely allied to long-established political parties, the officers would take political positions in conformity with their viewpoints. Also, if officers who were

alienated the officers from the relevant civilian political strata and would once again have made the military extremely vulnerable to significant civilian retribution.

In contrast to the 1914-1915 situation, changes in the military scope and level of instruction have since helped modify the role orientation of Peru's officers, bolstered their confidence in engaging in activities extrinsic to their main military function, and helped lead them to seek substantial changes in the social, political and economic structure. Threat perceptions engendered as a result of the 1964-1965 guerrilla struggle helped lead to the determination by officers to directly control and manage the state. When the civilian President Belaúnde Terry found himself unable to rule effectively, and as discontent with his government became increasingly pronounced, the military took this opportunity and seized power in 1968. Military institutional rule resulted which continues to this day.

This study has clearly shown that the coup d'etat can be highly complex in nature, and that efforts to explain it in simplistic terms are doomed to failure. Neither societal nor military institutional factors alone can adequately provide a balanced understanding of a coup. Rather, it appears most fruitful to combine both factors in the sort of framework constructed at the outset of this work.

This Peruvian case study constitutes an initial attempt at applying the framework for analysis which is contained in this dissertation. As a result, this study in no way pretends to have adequately tested its suitability. Admittedly, many

of the variables are imprecisely defined and in need of refinement. This study is illustrative and suggestive rather than a definitive statement on the subject of military coups and their aftermath.

As should be obvious, the framework for analysis could not have been constructed had it not been for a host of scholars who previously had examined, from a variety of perspectives, the military and military coups. It is hoped that future study will lead to a more developed and refined analytic framework than the one presented in this volume.

NOTES

Conclusion

1. Among recent attempts to delineate military institutional and/or societal short-term variables are: Solaún and Quinn's Sinners and Heretics; Welch and Smith's Military Role and Rule; and two works by William R. Thompson: The Grievances of Military Coup Makers (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), and "Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup," Comparative Politics, VII (July 1975). Solaún and Quinn provide a more adequate discussion on societal variables than on military institutional ones. Welch and Smith provide a generally good discussion on both sets of factors, although a variety of variables presented in this case study were not discussed by them. Thompson provides an excellent analysis of a wide range of military institutional grievances; his discussion on regime vulnerability and societal short-term variables is not as well done.
2. This tendency is best exemplified by studies that discuss simply the causes of coups d'etat without considering the fact that a significant number of coups end in failure. Solaún and Quinn's Sinners and Heretics is one of the most noteworthy examples in the current literature.
3. Welch and Smith's Military Role and Rule provide a good discussion of various kinds of military governments that can emerge following a coup d'etat as well as military institutional and societal factors which can influence their emergence. While at times similar variables were discussed, the focus of this study's analytic framework was different, being primarily concerned with factors affecting the decision of the officers either to maintain political control or return to the barracks. The choice of emphasizing such factors was based primarily on the need to refer to a framework capable of accounting for the decision of the officers to relinquish political control relatively shortly after the Peruvian coup of 1914. This author readily acknowledges the equal value of the approach taken by Welch and Smith.

Appendix I

Peruvian Budget Expenditures (in soles) 1892 - 1897

Year	Congress	Interior	Foreign Affairs	Justice	Hacienda	War	Public Works	Total Ordinary	Total Extra-Ordinary	Total
1892	306047	998988	211921	736769	1469211	3381487	-----	7104427	709	7105136
1893	353893	953918	222927	917821	2241869	3337421	-----	-----	-----	802789
1894	355093	830682	216123	672964	2754189	1951602	-----	6780653	566194	7346854
1896	371267	2004068	320843	1052841	2122152	2911809	68166	8851146	442286	9293427
1897	324271	2573273	477532	1154211	3252170	3052788	217654	11051899	216244	11268143

Note: One Peruvian Pound (Lp) = 10 soles

Percentage of Budget Expenditures to War Department, 1892-1897

Year	Percent
1892	47.6
1893	41.6
1894	26.6
1896	31.3
1897	27.0

Note: All data obtained from The Statesman's Yearbook for the relevant years

Appendix II
Fiscal Budget Expenditures
for the Period 1898-1919

Year	Congress	Public Instruction and Culture	Foreign Affairs	Justice, Worship Instruction and Sanitation	Treasury and Commerce	War and Marine	Public Works and Industry	Total
1898	1898	1898	1898	1898	1898	1898	1898	1898
1899	1899	1899	1899	1899	1899	1899	1899	1899
1900	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900	1900
1901	1901	1901	1901	1901	1901	1901	1901	1901
1902	1902	1902	1902	1902	1902	1902	1902	1902
1903	1903	1903	1903	1903	1903	1903	1903	1903
1904	1904	1904	1904	1904	1904	1904	1904	1904
1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905	1905
1906	1906	1906	1906	1906	1906	1906	1906	1906
1907	1907	1907	1907	1907	1907	1907	1907	1907
1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908	1908
1909	1909	1909	1909	1909	1909	1909	1909	1909
1910	1910	1910	1910	1910	1910	1910	1910	1910
1911	1911	1911	1911	1911	1911	1911	1911	1911
1912	1912	1912	1912	1912	1912	1912	1912	1912
1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913	1913
1914	1914	1914	1914	1914	1914	1914	1914	1914
1915	1915	1915	1915	1915	1915	1915	1915	1915
1916	1916	1916	1916	1916	1916	1916	1916	1916
1917	1917	1917	1917	1917	1917	1917	1917	1917
1918	1918	1918	1918	1918	1918	1918	1918	1918
1919	1919	1919	1919	1919	1919	1919	1919	1919

Source: Peru, Ministerio de Fomento, Statistical Abstract of Peru, 1919 (Lima: Imp. Americana, 1920), p. 92.

Appendix III
Fiscal Budget Expenditures in
Percentages, for the Period 1898-1919

Source: Peru, Ministerio de Fomento, Statistical Abstract of Peru, 1919 (Lima: Imp. Americana, 1920), p. 93.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Relevant Works on Civil-Military Relations and Military Intervention in Politics

A. Books

Andrews, William G., and Ra'anani, Uri, eds. The Politics of the Coup d'Etat: Five Case Studies. New York: Von Nostrand Reinhold, 1969.

Andreski, Stanislaw. Military Organization and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Be'eri, Eleizir. Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society. New York: Praeger, 1971.

Beltrán, Virgilio Rafael, ed. El papel político y social de las Fuerzas Armadas en America Latina. Caracas: Editorial Arte, 1970.

Bienen, Henry, ed. The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968.

_____, ed. The Military and Modernization. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1971.

Chorley, Katherine. Armies and the Art of Revolution. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.

Felt, Edward. The Armed Bureaucrats. Military Administrative Regimes and Political Development. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973.

Finer, Samuel E. Comparative Politics. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971.

_____. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. New York: Praeger, 1962.

First, Ruth. Power in Africa. New York: Pantheon Books, 1970.

Gilmore, Robert. Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela, 1810-1910. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1964.

- Glick, Edward Bernard. Peaceful Conflict, the Non-Military Uses of the Military. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1967.
- Goodspeed, D. J. The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'Etat. New York: The Viking Press, 1962.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Gutteridge, William. Armed Forces in New States. London: Pall Mall Press, 1964.
- Hagopian, Mark N. The Phenomenon of Revolution. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1974.
- Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- _____. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations. New York: Vintage Books, 1957.
- Imaz, José Luis de. Los Que Mandan [Those Who Rule]. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970.
- Janowitz, Morris. The Military in the Political Development of New Nations; An Essay in Comparative Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
- Johnson, John J. The Military and Society in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964.
- _____, ed. The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.
- Lieuwen, Edwin. Arms and Politics in Latin America. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961.
- _____. Generals vs. Presidents, Neo-Militarism in Latin America. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966.
- Lindenberg, Klaus, ed. Fuerzas armadas y política en América Latina. Bibliografía selecta. Santiago: Instituto Latinoamericano de Investigaciones Sociales, 1972.
- Luckham, Robin. The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-67. Cambridge, Eng: The University Press, 1971.
- Luttwak, Edward. Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook. Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1966.

- McAlister, Lyle M. et al. The Military in Latin American Sociopolitical Evolution: Four Case Studies. Washington D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970.
- Mosca, Gaetano. The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939.
- Needler, Martin C. Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change. New York: Random House, 1968.
- Potash, Robert A. The Army and Politics in Argentina 1928-1945. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969.
- Rustow, Dankwart. A World of Nations. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967.
- Solaún, Mauricio, and Quinn, Michael A. Sinners and Heretics; The Politics of Military Intervention in Latin America. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973.
- Stepan, Alfred. The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Thompson, William R. The Grievances of Military Coup Makers. Series No. 01-047. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973.
- Van Doorn, Jacques, ed. Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays. The Hague: Mouton, 1968.
- Welch, Claude E., and Smith, Arthur K. Military Role and Rule. North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1974.
- Welch, Claude E. Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

B. Articles and Manuscripts

- Bobrow, Davis D. "The Civic Role of the Military: Some Hypotheses." Western Political Quarterly, 19 (March 1965), 101-111.
- Fossum, Egil. "Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups d'Etat in Latin America." Journal of Peace Research, III (Fall 1967), 228-251.

- Germani, Gino, and Silvert, Kalman. "Politics, Social Structure, and Military Intervention in Latin America." European Journal of Sociology, II (1961), 62-68.
- Goldwert, Marvin. "The Argentine Revolution of 1930: The Rise of Modern Militarism and Ultra-Nationalism in Argentina." Ph.D. dissertation. History Department, The University of Texas, 1962.
- Hopkins, Keith. "Civil-Military Relations in Developing Countries." British Journal of Sociology. XVII (1966), 165-182.
- Lissak, Moshe. "Modernization and Role-Expansion of the Military in Developing Countries. A Comparative Analysis." Comparative Studies in Society and History, IX (April 1961), 341-350.
- McAlister, Lyle N. "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America." Journal of International Studies, III (July 1961), 341-350.
- _____. "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of Military in Latin America." Latin American Research Review, II (Fall 1966), 5-36.
- Nun, José. "The Middle Class Military Coup," in Véliz, Claudio, ed. The Politics of Conformity in Latin America. London: Oxford University Press, 1967, 66-118.
- Plank, John Nathan. "Peru: A Study in the Problems of Nation-Forming." Ph.D. dissertation. Political Science Department, Harvard University, 1958.
- Rapaport, David C. "Coup d'Etat: The View of Men Firing Pistols," in Friedrich, Carl, ed. Revolution. New York: Atherton Press, 1966, 53-74.
- Rustow, Dankwart A. "The Military in Middle Eastern Society and Politics," in Rivlin, Benjamin, and Szyliowicz, Joseph, eds. The Contemporary Middle East: Tradition and Innovation. New York: Random House, 1965, 461-474.
- Thompson, William R. "Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup." Comparative Politics, VII (July 1975)
- Wilner, Ann Ruth. "Perspectives on Military Elites as Rulers and Wielders of Power." Paper prepared for delivery at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, September 7-12, 1970.

2. Works Relevant to the Peruvian Case Study

A. Books and Monographs

Arenas, Alejandro, ed. Memorial del ejército, primer centenario de la independencia nacional. Lima: Imprenta del Estado Mayor General de Ejército, 1921.

Arenas, Germán. Algo de una vida. Lima: Sanmartí y Cía, 1941.

Astiz, Carlos. Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969.

Ayarza, Victor E. Reseña histórica del Senado del Perú, 1821-1921. Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1921.

Barra, Felipe de la. Objetivo: Palacio de Gobierno. Lima: Juan Mejía Baca, 1967.

Basadre, Jorge. Historia de la República del Perú. 10 vols. Lima: Talleres Gráficos P.L. Villanueva, S.A., Vols. I-IV, 1961; Vols. V-VI, 1962; Vol. VIII, 1963; Vols. VIII-X, 1964.

_____. La multitud, la ciudad, y el campo en la historia del Perú. Lima: Editorial Huascarán, S.A., 1947.

_____. Perú, problema y posibilidad. Ensayo de una síntesis de la evolución histórica de Perú. Lima: Librería Francesa Científica y Casa Editorial E. Rosey, 1931.

_____. La promesa de la vida peruana y otros ensayos. Lima: Librería Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1958.

Belaúnde, Víctor Andrés. La crisis presente, 1914-1939. Lima: Ediciones "Mercurio Peruano," 1940.

_____. La realidad nacional. Lima: Ediciones "Mercurio Peruano," 1945.

_____. Meditaciones Peruanas. Lima: Talleres Gráficos P.L. Villanueva, S.A., 1963.

_____. Memorias, II, Mi generación en la universidad. Lima: Imprenta Lumen, 1961.

Benvenuto, Neptalí. Parlamentarios del Perú contemporáneo, 1904-1921. Lima: Imprenta Malatesta, 1921.

Billinghurst, Guillermo. El Presidente a la Nación. Santiago: La Imprenta Dierner, 1915.

- Borchard, Edwin M. Opinion on the Controversy Between Peru and Chile Known as the Question of the Pacific. Washington: n.p., n.d.
- Bourricaud, Francois. Power and Society in Contemporary Peru. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Cáceres, José Raúl. El pasmo de una insurgencia. Lima: Editorial Peru, 1942.
- Capuñay, Manuel A. Leguía: vida y obra del constructor del gran Perú. Lima: Compañía del Impresiones y Publicidad, 1952.
- Carey, James C. Peru and the United States. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964.
- Clavero, José G. El tesoro del Perú. Lima: Imp. Torres Aguirre, 1896.
- Cotler, Julio. Crisis política y populismo militar en el Perú. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1969.
- Dávalos y Lissón. Diez años de historia contemporánea del Perú, 1899-1908. Gobiernos de Piérola, Romaña, Candamo, Calderón y Pardo. Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, S.A., 1930.
- _____. La primera centuria. 2 vols. Lima: Librería e Imprenta Gil, S.A., 1919.
- Delleplane, Carlos. Historia militar del Perú. Buenos Aires: n.p., 1941.
- Dennis, W.J. Tacna y Arica. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931.
- Duffield, A.J. Peru in the Guano Age. London: Richard Bentley and Sons, 1877.
- _____. Prospects for Peru. London: Newman and Co., 1881.
- Einaudi, Luigi R., and Stepan III, Alfred C. Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, R-586-DOS, 1971.
- Gonzalez Prada, Manuel. Bajo el aprobrío. Paris: Tipografía de Luis Bellenand et Fils, 1933.
- _____. Horas de lucha. Lima: Ediciones Preisa, 1969.
- Hopkins, Jack W. The Government Executive of Modern Peru. Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1967.

- Ireland, Gordon. Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America. New Haven: Harvard University Press, 1938.
- Kapsoli, Wilfredo. Las luchas por las ocho horas en el Perú. Lima: Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas de FEPUC, 1971.
- Lambert, Jacques. Latin America: Social Structures and Political Institutions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.
- Levano, Cesar. La verdadera historia de la jornada de ocho horas en el Perú. N.p., n.d.
- Levin, Jonathan. The Export Economies: Their Pattern of Development in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Manning, William R., ed. Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831-1860, Vol. X, Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru. Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1938.
- Manzanilla, J.M. El poder legislativo del Perú. Lima: Imprenta "La Industria," 1903.
- Maríategui, José Carlos. Siete ensayos de interpretación de la realidad Peruana. Lima: Empresa Editora Amauta, 1959.
- Markham, Clements R. The War Between Peru and Chile, 1879-1882. New York: R. Worthington, n.d.
- Martin, José Carlos. El gobierno de Guillermo E. Billinghurst, 1912-1914. Lima: C.I.P., 1963.
- _____. José Pardo y Barreda, el estadística. Lima: Compañía de Impresiones y Publicidad, 1948.
- Martin, Percy F. Peru in the Twentieth Century. London: Edward Arnold, 1911.
- Maúrtua, Victor M. The Question of the Pacific. New York: Harper and Bros., n.d.
- Miró Quesada Laos, Carlos. Autopsia de los partidos políticos. Lima: Tall. Gráfs. de la Lib. e Impr. "Minerva," 1961.
- _____. Historia del periodismo Peruano. Lima: Talleres Gráficos P.L. Villanueva, S.A., 1957.
- _____. Radiografía de la política Peruana. Lima: Páginas Peruanas, 1959.

- Monteforte Toledo, Mario. La solución militar a la Peruana, 1968-1970. Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, 1973.
- North, Liisa. Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru. Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1966.
- Pareja Paz-Soldán, José, ed. Las constituciones del Perú. Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica, 1954.
- _____, ed. Visión del Perú en el siglo XX. 2 vols. Lima: Librería Stadium, 1962.
- Parker, William Belmont, ed. Peruvians To-Day. Lima: Southwell Press, 1919.
- Payne, Arnold. The Peruvian Coup d'Etat of 1962: The Overthrow of Manuel Pardo. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1968.
- Payne, James L. Labour and Politics in Peru. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.
- Paz-Soldán, Juan Pedro. El golpe de estado del 29 de Mayo de 1909. Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1914.
- Pinillos, Jorge Dulante. Nicolás de Piérola. Lima: Compañía de Impresiones y Publicidad, 1947.
- Ríos, Ricardo. La convención de los partidos de 1915. Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1918.
- Rowe, L.S. Early Effects of the War Upon the Finance, Commerce, and Industry of Peru. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1920.
- Sánchez, Luis Alberto. Testimonio personal: memorias de un Peruano del siglo XX. Lima: Ed. Villasán, 1969.
- Squier, E. George. Peru Illustrated. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1877.
- Stuart, Graham H. The Governmental System of Peru. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of America, 1925.
- Tauro, Alberto, ed. Diccionario enciclopédico del Perú. 3 vols. Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos Americanos, 1966.
- Ulloa Cisneros, Alberto. Escritos historicos. Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe, 1946.
- Ulloa y Sotomayer, Alberto. Don Nicolás de Piérola. Lima: Imprenta Santa María, 1949.

- Monteforte Toledo, Mario. La solución militar a la Peruana, 1968-1970. Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, 1973.
- North, Liisa. Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru. Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1966.
- Pareja Paz-Soldán, José, ed. Las constituciones del Perú. Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica, 1954.
- _____, ed. Visión del Perú en el siglo XX. 2 vols. Lima: Librería Stadium, 1962.
- Parker, William Belmont, ed. Peruvians To-Day. Lima: Southwell Press, 1919.
- Payne, Arnold. The Peruvian Coup d'Etat of 1962: The Overthrow of Manuel Pardo. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1968.
- Payne, James L. Labour and Politics in Peru. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.
- Paz-Soldán, Juan Pedro. El golpe de estado del 29 de Mayo de 1909. Lima: Imprenta del Estado, 1914.
- Pinillos, Jorge Dulante. Nicolás de Piérola. Lima: Compañía de Impresiones y Publicidad, 1947.
- Ríos, Ricardo. La convención de los partidos de 1915. Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1918.
- Rowe, L.S. Early Effects of the War Upon the Finance, Commerce, and Industry of Peru. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1920.
- Sánchez, Luis Alberto. Testimonio personal: memorias de un Peruano del siglo XX. Lima: Ed. Villasán, 1969.
- Squier, E. George. Peru Illustrated. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1877.
- Stuart, Graham H. The Governmental System of Peru. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of America, 1925.
- Tauro, Alberto, ed. Diccionario enciclopédico del Perú. 3 vols. Buenos Aires: Talleres Gráficos Américaallee, 1966.
- Ulloa Cisneros, Alberto. Escritos historicos. Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe, 1946.
- Ulloa y Sotomayer, Alberto. Don Nicolás de Piérola. Lima: Imprenta Santa Maria, 1949.

Unsigned. Arbitration Between Peru and Chile--The Case of Peru in the Matter of the Controversy Arising Out of the Question of the Pacific Before the President of the United States, Arbitor. Washington, D.C.: National Capitol Press, Inc., 1923.

_____. Historia de la escuela militar del Perú. Lima: Talleres "Reprográfica," 1962.

Urdanivia Ginés, José. Una revolución modelo-ejército Peruano. Lima: Editorial Castrillón Silva, 1954.

Varela, Hector F. Revolución de Lima: reseña de los acontecimientos de Julio (1872). Paris: Imprenta Hispano-Americano de Rouge, Dunon y Fresne, 1872.

Villaneuva, Victor. 100 años del ejército Peruano: frustraciones y cambios. Lima: Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1971.

_____. Ejército Peruano: del caudillaje anarquico al militarismo reformista. Lima: Librería-Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1973.

_____. El CAEM y la revolución de la Fuerza Armada. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1972.

_____. El militarismo en el Perú. Lima: Empresa Gráfica T. Scheuch, 1962.

Von Tschudi, J.J. Travels in Peru. London: David Bogue, 1847.

Wagner de Reyna, Alberto. Historia diplomática del Perú, Vol. I. Lima: Ediciones Peruanas, 1964.

Well, Thomas E., et al. Area Handbook for Peru. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

Wilde, C. Noel. The Republic of Peru, Its Development and Commercial Opportunities. Ottawa: Department of Trade and Commerce, Commercial Intelligence Service, 1923.

Zitor (pseudonym). Historia de las principales huelgas i paros obreros habidos en el Perú. Lima: Manuscript no. El221, located in the Sala de Investigaciones de la Biblioteca Nacional, 1946.

B. Articles, Manuscripts, and Archival Sources.

Camprubi, Alcázar. "Un Cubano al servicio del Peru." Revista Historica, XXIX (1966), 5-78.

- Chapman, Charles A. "The Age of the Caudillos: A Chapter in Hispanic American History." Hispanic American Historical Review, XII (August 1932), 281-300
- Einaudi, Luigi R. "Revolution From Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968." Paper prepared for delivery at the 1971 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Conrad Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, September 7-11.
- _____. "The Peruvian Military." Santa Monica, Calif.: Unpublished Rand Corporation Manuscript, D-14465-RC, 1969.
- Epstein, Fritz T. "European Military Influences in Latin America." Manuscript on file in the Library of Congress, 1941.
- Gallardo E., Andrés. "El Golpe del febrero de 1914." Oiga, VIII (February 27, 1970), 39-42.
- _____. "El frustrado complot de la cruz dy yerbateros." Oiga, VIII (March 6, 1970), 45-59
- Karno, Howard Lawrence. "Augusto B. Leguía: The Oligarchy and the Modernization of Peru." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970.
- Matthew, W.M. "The Imperialism of Free Trade: Peru; 1820-70." Economic History Review, XXI (December 1968), 562-579.
- Pando, Egusquiva, César A. "Las misiones Francesas y el ejército del Peru." Revista Militar del Peru. XLIII (November 1946), 95-102.
- Plank, John Nathan. "Peru: A Study in the Problem of Nation-Forming." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 1958.
- Rios Pagaza, Carlos. "La Escuela Militar de Chorillos." Revista de la Escuela Militar, XXVIII (June and July 1953), 379-386
- United States Department of State. Serial Files on Peru. Washington, D.C.: Archives of the United States Department of State.
- Unsigned. "Misiones militares Francesas: orientación informativa." Revista Militar del Peru, XLIII (November 1946), 1-xvi.
- _____. "Relación nominal de los miembros de las diversas misiones militares enviadas por Francia al Peru, con especificacion de los respectivos fechos." Revista Militar del Peru, XLIII (November 1946), xvii-xiv.

3. Public Documents

- Perú. Cámara de Diputados. Diario de los debates de la H. Cámara de Diputados, II. Lima: Librería y Imprenta Gil, 1914.
- Perú. Cámara de Senadores. 2º Congreso Extraordinario de 1909, diario de los debates de la H. Cámara de Senadores. Lima: Imprenta de "El Diario," 1910.
- Perú. Mensaje del Presidente de la República en la instalación del Congreso Ordinario, 1897-1914. Lima: various publishers, 1897-1914. Titles vary slightly from year to year.
- Perú. Ministerio de Fomento. Statistical Abstract of Peru, 1919. Lima: Imp. Americana, 1920.
- Perú. Ministerio de Guerra y Marina. Escalafón general del ejército y la armada, 1899, 1901, 1906, 1907, 1909, 1911, 1913-1915. Lima: various publishers, 1899-1915. Titles vary slightly from one volume to another.
- Perú. Ministerio de Guerra y Marina. Legislación militar del Perú. Lima: various publishers, 1904-1916.
- Perú. Ministerio de Guerra y Marina. Memoria del Ministro de Guerra y Marina. 1878-1915. Lima: various publishers, 1878-1915. Titles vary slightly.

4. Periodicals

Actualidad Militar

Boletín de Ministerio de Guerra y Marina

Oiga

Revista de la Escuela Militar del Perú

Revista Historica

Revista Militar del Ejército del Perú

Variedades

5. Newspapers

Economista Peruano (Lima)

El Comercio (Lima)

El Diario (Lima)

El Mosquito (Lima)

El Peruano (Lima)

La Crónica (Lima)

La Nación (Lima)

La Prensa (Lima)

The London Times (London)

The New York Times (New York)

The West Coast Leader (Lima)